Themes in the Philosophy of Music

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OXFORD

To
David Novitz

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Introduction

I studied philosophy in order to write about music. It was as simple as that.

I had always intended to study music at university, and so I did. In my first degrees I specialized in musicology and ethnomusicology—history, theory, and analysis. But in my first year I found myself needing a subject in the humanities to complete my enrollment. The philosophy courses sounded interesting, so I took them. What a pleasant revelation they were. Here were people who shared my interest in analyzing and debating arguments and my fascination with questions about personal identity, determinism, God's existence, and the like. Moreover, from the second year, courses in aesthetics were offered. Though I needed to satisfy the general requirements for a major, and later honors, in philosophy, it was the comparatively marginal area of philosophy of art that most attracted me.

When I asked my music professors how music could express emotion, they were content to accept this as a mystery or, alternatively, to list some standard theories—expression, arousal, symbolism, associationism—as if one should simply adopt the theory one liked best. In any event, they were not interested in critically evaluating the reasons given for approaching the issues in this or that fashion. It was the philosophers who had skills relevant for that, though they were often self-conscious about their lack of a technical background in music. I persisted with philosophy precisely in order to become equipped to address the questions about music that most intrigued me. Such questions included: How does music express emotion? How does it differ from a semantic system? How do great works unify and reconcile the striking contrasts and differences presented at their surface?

I was fortunate that at this time—the final years of the 1960s—more books on aesthetics were appearing. As well as Collingwood, I studied Wittgenstein's lectures, collections edited by William Elton and Cyril Barrett, Richard Wollheim's *Art and its Object*, and Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art*, all

of which were then recently published. Outside class I read Monroe Beardsley's *Aesthetics* and, on music, Eduard Hanslick, Leonard Meyer, and Susanne Langer. When I moved on to an MA, in the early 1970s, it was examined by philosophers though it was on theories of musical analysis. For the Ph.D. I enrolled in philosophy at Birkbeck College in order to study with Ruby Meager, who was always a delight and inspiration. Because I had been pondering the topic for years, it was inevitable that my thesis was on the expression of emotion in music and on the kind of response this elicits from the listener.

I first worked out my account of musical expressiveness as an undergraduate in Australia. Television featured an advertisement for a brand of shoes called 'Hush Puppies'. The logo for this brand was a basset-hound. The advertisement focused on the shoes and, walking alongside, a basset-hound. One day the penny dropped for me. Basset-hounds are sad-looking, but no one thinks they feel as they look. In fact, when they express a sadness they feel, dogs do not do it with their faces anyway. The basset-hound's sadness is presented in its face's appearance and its general demeanor, having nothing to do with experienced emotions. Music could be similar. It has a dynamic character; it moves. And we describe the way it moves in terms appropriate for human behaviors; it is sprightly, dragging, energetic, lethargic, and so on. Accordingly, music can present the appearance of emotions that have a distinctive dynamic or physiognomic profile. It possesses its expressiveness no less objectively than its dynamic properties in general; if notes can be high or low, rushing forward or hanging back, tense and foreboding or relaxed and weightless, then music can be happy and sad independently of how its composer or the audience feels. No doubt composers sometimes express their feelings in what they write, but they do so not by conveying what they feel to, or betraying it in, the music but, instead, by creating music with an expressive character that independently matches what they are inclined to feel.

The Hush Puppy insight was one thing, elaborating the detail quite another. In particular, I had to try to explain why people are moved to feel what the music expresses. On a cognitive account of the emotions, a person could be saddened by music only if she believes it to be deserving of sadness; for instance, only if she believes there is something unfortunate and regrettable about it. Now, sad people can be the objects of my sadness because I believe that it is unfortunate and regrettable that they are subject to the negative experience they are undergoing. In the case of the basset-hound, however, I do not have a basis for feeling sad, since I do not believe it feels as it looks and thereby do not believe it is undergoing an unfortunate or regrettable

experience. If music is sad as basset-hounds are—merely by presenting an appearance with the characteristics of sadness—it should not move me to sadness. Yet many people who claim to be responding to the music's expressiveness and who do not believe there is anything unfortunate or regrettable about that, testify that they are moved to echo the emotions it expresses. Happy music—other things being equal and if it inclines to make them feel anything—tends to make them feel happy; sad music tends to make them feel sad. To allow for this, I argued that the response to music is not of the usual, object-directed kind, but is not thereby unique. In general, expressive appearances can be contagious. If they elicit an affective response not founded on the appropriate beliefs, that response is liable to mirror the expressive character of the appearance to which it is a reaction.

This, dogs and all, found its way into the thesis for which I received my Ph.D. in 1976. Not surprisingly, my first philosophical publication (Ch. 9 in this volume), in 1980, came from that thesis, as did another comparing music to language (Ch. 8). The topics of music's expressiveness and of our reaction to it have continued to hold my interest over the years. One reason for this is the large number of publications devoted to the topic in the latter decades of the twentieth century. New nuances and approaches are constantly put forward. One theory that came to prominence in the mid-1990s holds that there is someone who feels the emotions expressed in music, but it is not the composer, the performer, or the listener. Rather, it is a persona imagined by the listener, who then hears the music's progress as representing the actions, mental life, and affective experiences of this persona. The narrative the listener weaves about this persona must be controlled by and responsive to changes in the music, which is why the narrative reveals something objectively interpersonal about the music's expressiveness and not something solely idiosyncratic to the listener who entertains it. In Chapter 10 I outline why I continue to prefer my earlier account to this new alternative: It is far from clear that such imaginings are entertained by all listeners who appreciate the expressiveness of music and it is doubtful that the progress of instrumental works could constrain the corresponding contents of the imagined narrative to the required extent. 'The state of the art'—an overview and summary of the options and desiderata, as well as the dominant models, for philosophical theories about music's expressiveness at the dawn of this century—is described in Chapter 11.

In the mid-1980s I began to focus on a raft of questions about the representation and nature of musical works. At first I considered the transcription of musical works through their adaptation for an instrumental ensemble other

than that for which they were originally composed. An example is Liszt's piano transcription of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. At the same time, I thought about the conditions for the authentic performance of works specified by scores. What interested me was the balance and relation between, on the one hand, the constraints imposed by the work on what could be done by the transcriber or performer and, on the other, the freedom essential to the interpretative function played by transcribers and performers. I believe the resulting papers (Chs. 3 and 5) were the first on their subjects by a philosopher, but the authentic-performance movement soon became a hot topic.

As I see it, an authentic performance is one that faithfully, accurately represents the work it is of. (Since accuracy admits of degree, so does authenticity.) To understand what is required for authenticity, it follows that one first needs to understand the makeup and nature of musical works; that is, their ontological status. This topic is no less contentious than is the debate surrounding authentic performance, however. Some characterize musical works as abstract sound structures that can be faithfully instanced by any instruments, so long as they sound the right notes in the right order. Others regard the work's instrumentation as integral to its identity, so that only a performance using the appropriate instruments can qualify as authentic. For some works, such as Mahler's symphonies, I judge the second of these views to be correct. Nevertheless, for works of earlier periods, such as Machaut's *Messe de Nostre Dame*, the first view seems nearer the mark. So, I have been led to the overall conclusion that musical works display a variety of ontologies, with some works being 'thick' and others being 'thin' with constitutive properties, these being properties that must be realized in a maximally faithful performance. In addition, this ontological variety has a historical dimension: at any given time, the conventions and practices of the day limit how 'thick' the work can be, and, in general, this limit was extended, allowing works to become thicker, over the past millennium. Finally, not all musical works are for performance. For example, some are purely electronic and are for playback, which crucially lacks the interpretative freedom that is central to performance. Philosophers who debate the nature of musical ontology typically fail to acknowledge the flexibility inherent in our concept of the musical work.

I outlined the views just indicated in 1991 (Ch. 4) and have continued to develop them subsequently (Ch. 2). To acknowledge the nature of many popular songs, I allow for a second variety of works for performance; namely, those designed for studio performance. Such pieces are not intended for live rendition. They rely on the resources of the studio to generate a distinctive

soundscape. Yet different studio recordings can be of the same, single piece and count as performances of it, even if these are not of a kind that can be given live. As this last observation makes clear, the developments in recording technology have affected not only the possibilities of musical works but also those for performance. Works created for live performance are also disseminated via recordings made in studios under conditions unlike those for live performance. What is on the disk does count as a performance of the work, but, as such, it may be expected to meet different standards and satisfy different interpretative goals than the live performance it simulates. This is not to say, however, that the person who records a work created for live performance is accorded the same freedom in the studio as the person who makes a recording of a work for studio performance. Meanwhile, on the coin's other side, works created for studio performance might be presented live. Indeed, this is one way of viewing what happens in karaoke. I argue in Chapter 6 that we can better understand the nature and variety both of works and performances by considering phenomena such as karaoke and music-minus-one disks.

My interest in the nature of musical works led me to reflect on the status of John Cage's *4′ 33″* (Ch. 1), a piece notorious for the fact that it instructs the musician not to play throughout its duration. On my view, if the contents of performances of Cage's piece are the sounds that otherwise would be ambient to those performances, which is the way Cage most often characterizes it, *4′ 33″* is not a musical work. Unlike many who aim at this conclusion, it is not part of my agenda to deny that Cage's piece is art. My concern, rather, is to discover where the limits of our concept of musical works lie. To this end, I argue that, whatever else they involve, musical works must establish or follow parameters such that sounds made outside those count as ambient. Cage's does not. It takes all sounds at its performances as their contents, leaving none to qualify as ambient. As art, *4′ 33″* is an important and interesting theatrical piece about music, not a musical work as such.

So far, I have recorded my interest in musical works, their performance, and their expressive properties, but what is involved in their reception and appreciation was never far from my mind. Just as analysis of the nature of works has implications for what will count as an authentic performance, it has consequences also for a description of the basis for the listener's comprehension of what she hears. To understand and appreciate a musical work one must first be able to identify it as the individual it is; to distinguish it, on the one hand, from the particular interpretation embodied in the given performance (supposing the work to be for performance) and, on the other,

from ambient sounds that might be occurring simultaneously. Then one must sort within the work significant from minor features.

Inevitably, then, the listener's appreciation must be cognitively informed, as well as unthinkingly reactive, and must take into account factors lying outside the work's borders. This is not to say that the listener requires knowledge of music theory and technicalities. As regards higher-order aesthetic features, such as the work's unity, it is sufficient that she hears what the composer has achieved, even if she does not register the microprocesses that are causally responsible for the work's overall integration (Ch. 14). Nor is it to hold that the listener requires knowledge of music's history and practices beyond what could be obtained from listening carefully to music of the relevant kind; bookish, academic study may be helpful, but is not required. Nevertheless, the 'contextualism' present in my account of music's ontologies commits me to the view that the listener's fullest comprehension of a piece requires her acquaintance with the works and musical practices that shaped its natal setting. In particular, I suggest in Chapter 13 that the fullest understanding of a musical composition involves familiarity with the norms, conventions, and artistic goals of its genre, since these constrain and may be in tension with possibilities inherent in the work's musical material. Also relevant is knowledge of the work's precedents and the composer's overall *oeuvre*. In general, it is more important to understand what problems were identified as such by the composer, so that what was written can be heard rightly as attempting their solution, than to attain a grasp of the piece's generic structural type.

As regards the value of music, in Chapter 12 I distinguish the beneficial consequences of an interest in music in general from the value we seek in any individual work that is appreciated for its particularity. Art is often said to be valuable because it produces socially desirable consequences; for instance, it makes us more empathetic to other people. I agree; if we are exposed to enough artworks, we can hope to enjoy rewards of this sort. But we do not typically concern ourselves with particular works solely for the contribution they make to this general benefit. Indeed, that consideration rarely figures for us. Instead, we are interested in their worth as individuals approached for their own sake. But here, again, the work's individuality needs to be appropriately contextualized if it is to be recognized and valued for what it is. It is not an individual *tout court* but, rather, an individual, late eighteenth-century, Viennese string quartet, for example. Also, the judgment needs to be relativized to the kind of interest that motivates us. What we will find valuable depends on our background knowledge and on what we happen to be looking for at the moment, as well as on the nature of the work.

As well as recapitulating the account of what goes into the performer's interpretation of the work, and adding a discussion of what is involved in extracting the composer's work-determinative instructions from the notation he uses, Chapter 15 turns to the listener's—or, in this case, the critic's—interpretation of the work and the performance. This interpretation takes the form of a description the function of which is to find a manner of characterizing the work or performance as a coherent whole. It registers the way the work's elements (including expressive and not merely formal features) contribute or not to the fashion in which the music unfolds, develops, and ends. Or, it examines the light the performance interpretation sheds on the work and considers respects in which the performance is revealing, original, and creative. In effect, it recommends an appropriate way of listening to the work or the performance.

A more personal note is injected in Chapter 7 where I puzzle over why a work involving the mistreatment of musical instruments should leave me feeling queasy. In some cases, this response might be explained by the fact that the instruments in question are expensive, handcrafted, and ennobled by the repertoires created for them and the traditions in which they feature, but the discomfort remains even where such things are not true of the instruments misused. Musical instruments extend the personal boundaries of the person who uses them. As a consequence, we accord them the status of honorary persons, or so I speculate. Witnessing instrument abuse is rather like seeing an anaesthetized person subject to the surgeon's knife.

The essays included here span the period 1980 to 2002. I have selected papers that stand on their own—short pieces and ones addressed primarily to the writings of others were excluded. Though I have preserved the arguments intact, I have edited the articles for uniformity in style and in referencing. Two of the articles (Chs. 2 and 7) are published here for the first time. A bibliography of the works cited is provided at the book's end.

Stephen Davies
Auckland
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Part One
Ontology

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John Cage's *4′ 33″:*   1
Is It Music?[1]

Imagine a fugue written for a synthesizer. It is typical of the genre with this exception: its lowest note is at 30,000 hertz, above the range of human hearing. Also, consider a piece of about 300 measures in common time. In most respects the work is ordinary but the tempo is indicated as 'crotchet = five years'. The opening sixteen-bar theme lasts for more than three centuries; the performance is completed after 6 millennia. In a third case, a work specified for solo piccolo contains a single note, the C at 128 hertz. This tone lies more than two octaves below the instrument's range. Are these pieces musical works?

Rather than priming our intuitions, philosophers' science-fiction examples can shred them. For that reason we might be reluctant to pursue such cases. But we cannot dismiss so casually actual works that are no less challenging. One notorious example is John Cage's *4′ 33″*.

I

Cage's score for *4′ 33″* reads as follows: 'Tacet. For any instrument or instruments'. The piece is in three movements: 30″, 2′ 23″, and 1′ 40″.[2] The first performer of the work, the pianist David Tudor, closed the keyboard lid at the work's beginning and reopened it at the performance's end; he marked the work's three movements with arm gestures (Tomkins 1968: 115; Kostelanetz 1970: 195). The première was given at Maverick Concert Hall, Woodstock, New York, in August 1952.

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[1] First published in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 75 (1997), 448–62.

[2] Or 33″, 2′ 40″, 1′ 20″ in the manuscript presented to Irwin Kremen (Revill 1992: 166).

There are at least two very different ways to view *4' 33"*—as consisting of a passage of absolute silence or as comprised of whatever sounds occur during the period. When musical works are played, extraneous noises are likely to intrude. Sirens howl in the distance, planes rumble overhead, people cough, programs rustle. All of these sounds might be heard during a performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, but none belongs to it. Now, according to the view that Cage's work consists of silence, the same applies. We may never experience absolute silence, yet the work might consist of just that. In that case, noises that occur are irrelevant to, and distractions from, the work. According to the second account, the work's content is given by the sounds audible to its (actual or possible) audience. This content will vary from performance to performance. All noises at a performance are to be regarded as belonging to that performance provided they fall within its temporal boundaries. None is to be disregarded.

There is no doubt that Cage intended *4' 33"* in the second of the ways indicated. 'My piece, *4' 33"*, becomes in performance the sounds of the environment' (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 188):

[The original audience] missed the point. There's no such thing as silence. What they thought was silence, because they didn't know how to listen, was full of accidental sounds. You could hear the wind stirring outside during the first movement. During the second, raindrops began pattering the roof, and during the third the people themselves made all kinds of interesting sounds as they talked or walked out. (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 65)

Cage's goal is to get the audience to attend to whatever can be heard as the work is performed—the shuffling of feet, the murmur of traffic from outside the auditorium, and so on. The content of the performance consists in whatever sounds occupy the designated period, not solely of silence as such. Cage supplies a frame so that the audience can focus on the noises it encompasses. 'If true silence did not exist in nature, then the silences in a piece of music, Cage decided, could be defined simply as "sounds not intended," and Cage made up his mind to write a piece composed entirely of just such sounds' (Tomkins 1968: 114–15).[3]

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[3] Note, though, that Cage's attitude to the work changed over time. 'This notion [of Cage's in the 1960s] that simply living could be art created a new interpretation of *4' 33"*. Where before the piece had represented a demonstration of empty time structure or a showcase for unintentional sounds, Cage now considered it as a musical work that went on constantly, an intimation of the ultimate unity of music and life ... Cage felt that his work could show all listeners how to find that "daily beauty" that was not obtained through the offices of any composer, but "which fits us each moment (no matter where we live) to do our music ourselves. (I am speaking of nothing special, just an open

Cage (1966: 51) argues as follows in rejecting the possibility of the first of the characterizations of *4′ 33″* provided above: 'There is no such thing as silence. Get thee to an anechoic chamber and hear there thy nervous system in operation and hear there thy blood in circulation.' But the ubiquity of sounds does not count against the possibility of a silent work. For that piece, all the noises heard will be ambient and not part of the performance as such. Cage attempts to counter this point when he claims:

If the music can accept ambient sounds and not be interrupted thereby, it's a modern piece of music. If, as with a composition by Beethoven, a baby crying, or someone in the audience coughing, interrupts the music, then we know that it isn't modern. I think that the present way of deciding whether something is useful as art is to ask whether it is interrupted by the actions of others, or whether it is fluent with the actions of others. (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 210)

But I doubt that modern music can be distinguished from ancestral forms in this manner. What could be more modern than a work of silence that, because sound is everywhere, is 'conceptual' in being unavailable to the senses in its 'pure' form? If Cage's is not the silent piece, that is for reasons other than the ones he gives.

In what follows I consider *4′ 33″* as Cage intended it. Viewed this way, the content of an instance of the work is the sounds apparent to the audience within the boundaries of performance. Many of the arguments I will consider would not apply, or not in the same way, to the silent piece.

Why does Cage want us to listen to ordinary sounds? In the first place, he opposes the valorization of traditional musical works and doubts their continuing interest. The following is typical: 'I agree with the African prince who went to a concert in London and afterward was asked what he thought. He had heard a program of music that began before Bach and went on up to modern times, and he said, "Why did they play the same piece over and over again?"' (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 60). Underpinning this attitude is an opposition to the manner in which we impose concepts of structure or expressiveness on what we hear, thereby preventing ourselves from hearing the music that is all around us. For instance, in his Julliard Lecture, Cage laments an approach to sounds concerned with pitch names and the musicologists' terminology of 'sharps', 'flats', and the like (Cage 1967: 95–111; see pt I). As well, he hopes to banish the personality and intentions of the composer from his work:

ear and an open mind and the enjoyment of daily noises.)" ' (Pritchett 1993: 145; see also Kostelanetz 1970: 12, 20, 195–6.) Moreover, Cage's conception of silence was subject to revision (De Visscher 1993).

I think perhaps my own best piece, at least the one I like the most, is the silent piece . . . I wanted my work to be free of my own likes and dislikes, because I think music should be free of the feelings and ideas of the composer. I have felt and hoped to have led other people to feel that the sounds of their environment constitute a music which is more interesting than the music which they would hear if they went into a concert hall. (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 188)

'Observing the effects of the ego on my earlier works, I tried to remove it, by the use of chance techniques, in my latest works. We discipline the ego because it alone stands between us and experience. I wanted to let the environment—or experience—into my music' (quoted in the *National Observer*, 26 June 1967: 20).

Allowing that we are to interest ourselves in the sounds that occur during a rendition of *4′ 33″*, three possibilities are evident:

(1)   We might hear them as if they are musical or in relation to the musical (as traditionally conceived). This approach involves regarding the sounds that happen *as if* they are products of intentions of the kind composers usually have. It is to hear them as tonal (or atonal), as developing or answering earlier sounds, as (if appropriate) melodies, chords, and the like. Moreover, this mode of listening is to be historically grounded, as all musical listening is. We are to hear these sounds in relation to (as evocations, extensions, developments, repudiations, of, rebellions against,) the practices and conventions of musical composition and performance followed in prior musical eras.

It is plain, though, that Cage would reject this approach. He does not want us to hear the sounds that occur as aspiring to the condition of music (traditionally conceived), but, rather, to appreciate them for their qualities as sounds *tout court*.[4]

or:

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[4] Note, however, the last sentence of the following quotation, in which Cage acknowledges the relevance of an interest not in naked sonic properties but in art-historically informed ones: 'I have spent many pleasant hours in the woods conducting performances of my silent piece, transcriptions, that is, for an audience of myself, since they were much longer than the popular length which I have had published. At one performance, I passed the first movement by attempting the identification of a mushroom which remained successfully unidentified. The second movement was extremely dramatic, beginning with the sounds of a buck and doe leaping up within ten feet of my rocky podium . . . The third movement was a return to the theme of the first, but with all those profound, so-well-known alterations of world feeling associated by German tradition with the A-B-A' (Cage 1966: 276). De Visscher (1993: 127) cites this passage in suggesting that *4′ 33″* is not a closed work but is an experience that can occur at any place and time. This interpretation ignores Cage's claim that the woodland version is a transcription, which implies it is not the original as such.

(2)   We might consider the sounds heard in a performance of *4′ 33″* for their (aesthetic) interest solely as audible events, without regard to music and its performance. We might attend, that is, to the 'naked' aesthetic properties they present simply as sounds.

This is an approach Cage might countenance. He would reject an interest in classifying noises in terms of such history-laden concepts as 'beautiful' and 'ugly', but he does emphasize the aesthetic interest of sounds taken for what they are. For instance, we might enjoy for its unique qualities the sound of countless smoothed stones grinding against each other as a wave retreats from a shingle beach. So long as we refrain from the attempt to reduce what we hear to comfortably confined concepts, Cage would endorse that project.

Finally:

(3)   We might hear in the sounds occurring during a performance of *4′ 33″* a new kind of music, one transcending and deconstructing the categorical distinction drawn traditionally between the musical and nonmusical. In that case, there is conceptual room, so to speak, for regarding the noise of the everyday as music only because the standard notion of music is undermined and rejected. There is an invitation to conceptual revision.

It is this last proposal that is most clearly advocated by Cage. If Cage doubts, as he seems to, that the world of sound conforms to our projection of it, then the radical revision of our concepts can be properly invited by the suggestion that music is incarnate in all sounds. Michael Nyman (1974: 22) captures Cage's project in these terms:

It is a well-known fact that the silences of *4′ 33″* were not, after all, silences, since silence is a state which it is physically impossible to achieve...*4′ 33″* is a demonstration of the non-existence of silence, of the permanent presence of sounds around us, of the fact that they are worthy of attention, and that for Cage 'environmental sounds and noises are more useful aesthetically than the sounds produced by the world's musical cultures.' *4′ 33″* is not a negation of music but an affirmation of its omnipresence.

Given that he shares a commitment with Cage to (3), Nyman is not patently mistaken in concluding that music is omnipresent, though his premises suggest only that sound is everywhere and unavoidable.

Daniel Herwitz claims that Cage, in his more radical moments, commits himself to (3). Herwitz (1988, 1993) holds that the deconstruction of the concept of music advocated in this approach is incoherent. He argues, and I agree, that perception is inherently structure-imputing, so that Cage's

recommendation that we should perceive impersonally, aconceptually, rejecting appearances of organization, form, and structure, loses its grip on the notion of perception. Herwitz offers a Wittgensteinian response to Cage's radically skeptical challenge to the standard notion of perception. Such listening has meaning only where we can imagine a form of life in which it is lived out. None is conceivable for humans who perceive in the manner recommended by Cage. For them, there could be no awareness of others or self, for instance. The mode of perception advocated by Cage would deconstruct, as well as the traditional concept of music, all else besides. In its extreme form, the position advocated under (3) is incomprehensible, for it recommends something that must remain inaccessible and unintelligible to human beings.

Herwitz detects a less radical stance implicit in Cage's commitment to Zen Buddhism. The advocacy of unstructured perception might be viewed, in that context, as inviting a form of intellectual discipline (like considering the noise made by one hand clapping). Even if we cannot coherently entertain the thought of Cage's account of perception put into general practice, we can imagine an ascetic form of life in which pervasive but partial detachment is achieved from what is presented to the senses. Suppose, then, that Cage is interpreted as endorsing the desirability of this kind of listening. In that case, his view is best represented by (2), by the idea that we should cultivate an interest in the naked aesthetic properties of sound, not by the more radical thesis of (3).

Now, we might dispute with Cage the claim that most sounds, including those of music (traditionally conceived), are aesthetically interesting when approached solely for the sake of their naked qualities. And, even if we allow that some might be interesting when considered in this manner, nevertheless we might question whether they are more aesthetically worthwhile than are musical works heard as such. Rather than challenge the approach recommended in (2) on these grounds, I present a different argument, the conclusion of which is as follows: although we might choose to listen aconceptually on some occasions and in some contexts, it could not be that we listen that way to 4′ 33″ while viewing it as Cage's work of art.

Noël Carroll (1994) argues that Cage elevates the sounds he frames to the status of art and, in doing so, invests them with a significance they would not otherwise possess. The sounds become referential, partly by exemplification and partly by contextual implicature. That is to say, they have been given a use by which they refer to themselves and to ordinary sounds in general. Moreover, they gain significance from being used to repudiate the concert

tradition that is the background for their presentation. They enter, as ordinary sounds do not, into an art-historical conversation with the music composed by Bach and Beethoven and with the performance tradition governing how such pieces are presented. As a result, they acquire artistically significant properties in addition to whatever naked aesthetic properties they possess. This distinguishes them from the ordinary sounds they might be taken to resemble by someone unaware of the artistic context.[5]

The presence of Cage's friend, Marcel Duchamp, lurks in the background.[6] Duchamp took ordinary objects and turned them into ready-made artworks. The creation of *Fountain* via the translocation to the realm of art of the urinal that was its material substrate gave that urinal a new setting and significance. It then was to be compared with marble statues, not with look-alikes found in the art gallery's men's room. As a result, its whiteness took on an import that it did not possess previously. *Fountain* flaunts its vulgar origin and intended function, cocking a snook at the art establishment, as no mere urinal can do. In short, it is an object requiring interpretation. As Arthur Danto (1981) would have it, *Fountain* makes a 'statement' as look-alike urinals from the same production line do not. *Fountain* has artistically significant properties as a result of which it cannot be understood and appreciated merely as a urinal; indeed, as a result of which it no longer looks just like another urinal to those who are suitably backgrounded.

On this account, with which I concur, Cage failed with *4′ 33″* if his prime intention was to draw our attention to the naked aesthetic potential of ordinary sounds. He failed because he intended to create an artwork and succeeded in doing so, thereby transforming the qualities of the sounds to which that work directs our attention. In terms of the earlier discussion, in creating an artwork that recalls the performance of musical works Cage inevitably invited the approach of (1) rather than (2). The sounds to which he draws our attention derive their artistic significance from being brought into relation to music (traditionally conceived) through his invocation of the practice of musical performance via the manner *4′ 33″* is presented. The

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[5] William Duckworth (1989: 22) says this: 'But it seems to me that when you focus on that piece it becomes art silence rather than real silence. And that the understanding of real silence is what the piece is about.' Cage does not disagree.

[6] Cage's relationship with and affection for Duchamp is well known. He wrote *Music for Marcel Duchamp* (1947) for prepared piano, authored a concrete poem (with Calvin Sumsion), *Not Wanting to Say Anything about Marcel* (1969), and an essay '26 Statements re Duchamp' (Cage 1967: 70–2). *Reunion* (1968) was a concert built around a game of chess played between Cage and Duchamp (see Nyman 1974: 83–4 and Pritchett 1993: 153). For a discussion of Duchamp's influence on Cage see Perloff 1994.

listener who appreciates Cage's piece as an artwork cannot rest with the contemplation of the naked qualities of the sounds constituting the work's performance. Indeed, the receptive listener finds those qualities 'transfigured', to use Danto's term, so that they are no longer available. The audible events that occur should not sound to the person who is aware that an artwork is being performed as they would to someone who mistakes what is happening for a break in the concert.

II

I have said that Cage created an artwork in *4′ 33″*. Some people would regard that assertion as false. (For just one example, see Sparshott 1980.) To pursue the debate with them, it could be pointed out that Cage's piece seems to have the relevant formal credentials—it is discussed in books on the history of twentieth-century music, for instance—and that he was acknowledged as a composer in 1952, having produced works (such as those for prepared piano) whose status as art and music is not in doubt. In reply, they might suggest that this shows only that Cage tried to produce an artwork, not that he succeeded. And so the debate could be continued by considering whether or not *4′ 33″* does satisfy any of the acknowledged functions of art, or whether it is suffi-cient for art-hood that something be recognized as such within the informal institutions of the artworld, and so on. I will not pursue this argument. Instead, I accept that *4′ 33″* is an artwork and consider some marks of this, especially ones indicative of what kind of artwork it is.

   One sign that Cage's creation is a work of art is that it has a title. Temporal chunks may be described, but are not usually titled. *4′ 33″* might look to be no more than a description of the work's duration, but is not.[7] Other titles of artworks—Suite in B minor, Third Symphony—are similar in having the appearance of mere descriptions, but all of these are designations that func-tion as titles. As such they are part of the work, affecting its artistically significant properties (see Levinson 1985; Wilsmore 1987). In this they are unlike labels, such as those on jam jars, which do not affect that to which they are attached. In characteristically indirect and humorous fashion, Cage indi-cates his awareness that '4′ 33″' functions as a title by suggesting that it could be read as 'four feet thirty-three inches'.

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[7] Observe that it is the work, not any accurate performance, that has a duration of 4′ 33″. As Revill (1992: 165) points out: 'With gaps between the movements, *4′ 33″* from start to finish will always last longer than its title'.

Cage's title, interpreted in the standard way, draws attention to the piece's duration, to its temporal boundaries. This is apt when we recall that Cage's artistic act draws the limits of the work, leaving the content and form to take care of themselves. Unlike the other designatory titles mentioned above, Cage's does not limit the musico-historical context that is the work's reference class. Again, this is appropriate, given the piece's radical character. It stands against any and all traditional types of music.

4′ 33″ is a temporal artwork; it has a fixed duration.[8] Chance procedures were used to determine the lengths of the movements. There is a hint, though, that the overall duration of the piece is significant. In 'A Composer's Confessions' (written in 1948), Cage prefigures the creation of *4′ 33″* (Cage 1992; see also Kostelanetz 1988: 66): 'I have . . . several new desires . . . first, to compose a piece of uninterrupted silence and sell it to the Muzak Co. It will be $4\frac{1}{2}$ minutes long—these being the standard lengths of "canned" music, and its title will be "Silent Prayer".'[9]

4′ 33″ is a work for performance, as is evident from Cage's creation of a score, scores being sets of instructions addressed to performers. As such, it is a work that can be multiply instanced; convention allows that the instructions encoded in scores can be executed on more than one occasion. Performances will differ in their contents, obviously, but this is also true, if to a lesser extent, of many multiply instanced artworks, including musical ones. What is necessary for a performance of *4′ 33″* is an appropriate causal chain linking what the performer does to the instructions penned by Cage. If I dust the keys of a piano for four and a half minutes, I do not perform Cage's work. On the other hand, I could perform Cage's work on my home piano if I followed his score.

As just noted, performance does not require the presence of an audience in an auditorium but, like other pieces for performance, *4′ 33″* takes much of its point from its being intended for that setting. The presence of an audience in a concert hall may be needed if a performance of *4′ 33″* is to achieve the fullest impact, since the piece invokes that context and all it implies about our

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[8] Cage might have indicated that the length of performances be chosen by the performers, of course. Even then, instances of the work would have a clockable duration fixed by (the execution of) Cage's instructions. Salzman (1993: 6) writes: 'One man's silence is, after Cage, much like another's. (In fact, all silence, no matter how noisy, is now by Cage.)' He is right to imply that another composer's attempt to copy *4′ 33″* would be boring and derivative, but the parenthetical remark is exaggerated. Performances of Cage's work have temporal limits.

[9] Note, again, that Cage indicates the relevance of music, not the properties of naked sound, as inspiring the work's genesis.

privileging certain pieces, about the milieu relevant to music appreciation, and about the social values and status of those who play the 'classical-music game'.[10]

As a work for performance, *4′ 33″* is written for musical instruments, as the score makes clear. I cannot perform Cage's work in my home if no musical instruments are found there. The piece is not performed on the instruments for which it is written, however. But this does not mean that patently defective instruments can be substituted for ones that are in working order. A piano used to perform *4′ 33″* should possess the appropriate 'insides'—strings, hammers, and the like. Though sounds are not generated from it, the performance is ineffective unless the instrument can be assumed to be capable of producing musical notes. (It does not seem to have been Cage's intention in this piece to provoke questions about where to draw the line between musical instruments and other things.)

This is not the only convention of musical presentation that should be respected in performing *4′ 33″*. Were it to be played by a violinist, it would be proper for her to tune up on stage before its commencement and to be ready to play as it lasts, violin posed on the knee. It would be no more appropriate in this piece for the instrumentalist to read the newspaper during the performance than it would be for the triangle player to do the same while she was not required to play during the performance of a symphony.

Works for performance (music, drama, ballet, opera) usually call for a significant creative input from the performers, who possess the special skills necessary to achieve this. Cage's piece requires no performance skill, apparently. As a non-pianist, I might refrain from playing the piano with as much dexterity as David Tudor displays in doing the same. But in the concert setting it may be important that it is customary for performers to be masters of their crafts. In that context, my reading of *4′ 33″* may be less interesting than Tudor's when my lack of pianistic ability is known to the audience. If the work is the more powerful (and ironic) in performance for the fact that a talented and highly trained musician obeys Cage's instructions by declining to exhibit the skills he possesses, my rendition will be lacking by comparison.

If Cage's work is for performance, who are its performers? When a member of the audience yells 'This is rubbish!' once the performance is under way, she adds to its contents but is she thereby a performer? Several commentators

think so. Paul Thom (1993: 207) writes of *4′ 33″* that it 'calls into question the distinction between performers and audience: during a performance of it, the audience find that the silences afford each one of them the opportunity to become a performer, and unintentional coughs tend to become intentional'. Jill Johnson (1970: 148) comments: 'In this piece, Cage makes everybody present (audience) the creator and the performer.' These observations are astute, yet I disagree that audience members are performers of *4′ 33″* in contributing to the contents of the renditions they attend. The sounds of street buskers playing an arrangement of Beethoven might filter into the hall during a performance of *4′ 33″*, thereby contributing to its contents. It is counter-intuitive to suggest that these musicians are playing Cage's work (as well as a transcription of Beethoven's). The same applies to the noises made by those inside the auditorium who cannot prevent themselves from yawning. But it might be thought that the case is different where the sound is made with the intention that it become part of the performance. I deny this, though. I do so because the intentions of these noisy audience members do not stand in the appropriate relation to the instructions issued in Cage's score, which, after all, prescribes that the performers be silent. The performers are the musicians on stage, for it is they who are the target of Cage's instructions and who execute them. Cage's work does, indeed, undermine the distinction between performer and audience in that the latter contributes more to the content of the performance than the former. But it does not make the audience into performers. Although its offerings might be intentional, the audience is not addressed by Cage's instructions and its interventions are not directed or invited by his score.[11]

III

I claimed that Cage created an artwork, and have been considering what kind of artwork that is. I have suggested, unsurprisingly perhaps, that the piece is titled, temporal, multiple, and for performance (by musical instruments, if not on them). In most of these respects *4′ 33″* is like Western paradigms of musical works, but is it one? Is *4′ 33″* music? The answer to that question

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[11] In 1987 Cage identified as one of his interests 'music that is performed by everyone'. In the work of a year earlier in which he pursued this goal, he issued instructions to the audience via the score, thereby making performers of those who were willing to comply: 'And then, through I Ching chance operations we subjected a map [of the campus of the University of Wisconsin] to those operations and made an itinerary for the entire audience which would take about forty-five minutes to an hour. And then all of us, as quietly as possible, and listening as attentively as possible, moved through the university community. It was a social experience' (Cage, quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 111).

depends on how music is properly defined. Rather than offering a definition, I make the assumption (controversial enough in its own right) that it is a necessary condition for something's being music that it be organized sound.[12] If Cage's is not a work that organizes sound, it is not music.

Jerrold Levinson, who argues for the necessity of the condition I have accepted, believes it is satisfied by *4' 33"*:

Since I will ultimately retain 'organized sound' as a necessary condition of music, a few clarifications are in order regarding my understanding of the phrase. First, I certainly understand it to comprise the organization of sound and silence, or sounds and silences taken together; there are very few imaginable musics, and no actual musics, for which silence—the space between sounds—would not be a structural principle. Thus, to spare a word for Cage's notorious *4' 33"*, we can include it in music if we like, as a limiting case of the organization of sound-and-silence; and this is made easier, of course, if we recognize that Cage has in effect organized for listening, at a very abstract level, the anticipated but unpredictable sounds that will occur at any performance of his piece. Second—and a piece such as Cage's, where organization takes the form of framing, illustrates this as well—the notion of 'organizing' should be understood widely as covering what might be more idiomatically put in some cases as 'designing' or 'arranging'. (1990*b*: 270 n. 3)

Let me make explicit at the outset something I take to be covered by Levinson's account: In the case of *works* intended for performance and specified by scores, the necessary condition can be satisfied only by the performers as a result of their following the composer's prescriptions, which they can do only by knowing the performance practices and the notational conventions assumed by the composer. At a performance of *4' 33"* the audience might stand as one person and sing their nation's anthem, thereby organizing sounds that become the content of the given performance. If I had allowed earlier that the audience's members are performers, it would have followed that this instance of *4' 33"* satisfies the necessary condition of something's being music, even if others do not. But I argued that the audience's members are not the work's performers, even where their contributions are intentional. Many renditions of the work will contain organized sounds among their contents, but neither the composer nor the performer, the one to whom the score's instructions are addressed, is directly responsible for bring-

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[12] Blacking (1973: 10–19), an ethnomusicologist, insists that musical sounds must be *humanly* organized. I pass by such niceties. By the way, Cage seems to endorse this account of music: 'If this word, music, is sacred and reserved for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century instruments, we can substitute a more meaningful term: organization of sound' (quoted in Kostelanetz 1970: 55).

ing this about. If *4′ 33″* satisfies Levinson's necessary condition, it must do so as a result of the actions of the performer(s).

One can imagine a conservative person who offers the stipulated condition in order to show that many contemporary pieces fail to qualify as music. That is not the reading intended by Levinson, however. He claims that sounds can be organized by being 'framed' and that Cage's score, in delimiting the work's boundaries, supplies just such a frame.[13] Though I will challenge Levinson's view that Cage's piece meets the specified condition, I share with him the rejection of a conservative interpretation of that condition. Twentieth-century composers have brought into the realm of music sounds that at earlier times would not have been thought of as organized. In order to include the efforts of these composers, I accept that 'organized sound' requires a historically flexible interpretation. A recursive approach to its characterization is called for, not an absolutist, ahistorical, acultural one. Only in that way could it (as it should) encompass as music contemporary works composed through the use of chance procedures, or ones allowing a significant element of improvisation.[14] In such cases, the composer selects the procedures that generate the work's sound structure or (indirectly, perhaps) instructs the performers to make the relevant selection, and in either instance we can talk of the organization achieved, even where it varies from performance to performance. I allow that Cage's *Imaginary Landscape No. 4* (1951)—a piece in which pairs of performers at each of twelve radios manipulate the tuning and volume knobs—is organized sound, because the performers, in following the composer's directions, are causally responsible for the appropriations that occur, if not for their contents.

Even if we are liberal in applying the criterion that music be 'organized sound', so as to accommodate the efforts of recent composers, is Levinson correct to hold that *4′ 33″* satisfies it?

Here is one argument to that conclusion: In music, and in speech for that matter, silence is used between the sounded parts in the articulation of

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[13] Levinson is not alone in characterizing Cage's creative act as one of framing—see also Salzman 1967: 165; Nyman 1974: 29; Carroll 1994. Cage himself argues that framing generates art. He does so, however, not because he sees the frame as a method for organizing the work's contents but, instead, as part of his attempt to deconstruct the established notion: 'I was with de Kooning once in a restaurant and he said, "If I put a frame around these bread crumbs, that isn't art." And what I'm saying is that it is. He was saying that it isn't because he connects art with his activity—he connects with himself as an artist whereas I would want art to slip out of us into the world in which we live' (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 211–12).

[14] For a relevant discussion see Wolterstorff 1975. Wolterstorff suggests that *4′ 33″* might be a musical work, despite its lack of a definite sound structure, because it is performable. For obvious reasons, performability could not he a sufficient condition for something's being music, as Wolterstorff plainly realizes.

structure. Given this, is it not the case that the performer in *4′ 33″* structures the soundscape by refraining from making sounds? I find this first argument unsatisfactory. If a speaker says nothing then it is not the case that her silence articulates the form of an utterance. And if the musician obeys Cage's instructions by making no sound she gives effect to Cage's intention to allow what happens to occur without imposing a structure on it. It does not follow from the fact that silence serves a structuring function in all sounded music that a piece in which no sounds are made by the performer thereby achieves an organized structure.

A different argument, seemingly the one Levinson has in mind, reminds us that the content of performances of *4′ 33″* is supplied by sounds that otherwise would be ambient. Whoever chooses where *4′ 33″* is played can anticipate what will be heard. For instance, a performance of Cage's piece during a battle will have contents that differ predictably from those it will have in a concert hall. It is through the choice of venue that the sounds making up the performance become organized.

Suggestive though this consideration may be, I believe it to be trumped by a more general one. It seems to me that if sounds are organized some sonic possibilities must be excluded. This means that however free and chaotic is the method of a musical work's organization, it must rule out the possibility of some kinds of sonic events so that, should they occur during a performance, they are to be classed as ambient. Where sound is organized, however loosely, there must also be the possibility of ambient sound, of sound excluded by the manner of organization. Conversely, where no noises could count as ambient, the soundscape cannot be truly described as organized. Now, as we have seen, Cage's *4′ 33″* encompasses all sounds, anticipated or not, within the ambit of its performances, so none counts as ambient.[15] Since it excludes no sonic events from the content of its performances, the sounds within them are not organized.[16]

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[15] I accept that a person who listens to a broadcast or recording of *4′ 33″* is likely to hear sounds, ones issuing from the listening environment, that are not part of the sonic contents of the given performance, but I do not see this concession as undermining the argument given. For works intended for live performance, ambient noises are those that occur in the performance situation without counting as part of the sonic content of the performance as such. (It is not always easy to determine the spatio-temporal boundaries of musical performances, of course, but this does not seem to be what *4′ 33″* is designed to show.)

[16] Had Cage written the truly silent work described at the beginning of this chapter, the previous argument would not apply. Whether the silent work organizes sound and, if it does, whether this is sufficient (and not merely necessary) for its being music are not issues I pursue.

It is true that the instructions in Cage's score restrict what the performer is to do and thereby create the possibility for mistakes in performance. These might be of at least two kinds: a note might be sounded accidentally, or the performance could be mismanaged so that it lasts for a longer or shorter time than the specified period. This does not undermine the previous argument, though. Mistakes count as part of the performance (unless they are so pervasive as to destroy the performance altogether), not as ambient noise. Cage's instructions create the possibility of mistakes in performance, but they do not thereby provide for a distinction between the sounds of the performance and ambient noise.

Cage was influenced in writing *4′ 33″* by the uniformly white paintings made by his friend Robert Rauschenberg. Rauschenberg organized the painted space, but did so in a way that is likely to lead its viewer to become more aware than would otherwise be the case of visual elements in its neighborhood, of components that are not part of the artwork's content as such. For instance, shadows cast on the painting's surface are likely to be considered for their aesthetic character. The musical equivalents to Rauschenberg's paintings would be works consisting, say, of quietly constant, 'white' noise, or of an unvarying, pure sine tone, or in which the pitch is constant. Works of this kind would lead us to focus on ambient sounds, because of both their uniformity and their lack of intrinsic aural interest. But *4′ 33″* takes what otherwise would be ambient noise into its performances as their content. It enfranchises those sounds as art rather than excluding them, while inviting us to contemplate them.

Cage's *4′ 33″* is better compared to an empty picture-frame that is presented by an artist who specifies that her artwork is whatever can be seen through it. The frame can be viewed from any angle and can be placed anywhere. (To remove the influence of 'ego', perhaps it is specified that the frame's porter be blindfolded.) It seems to me that there is no virtue in holding that by creating the frame and the idea of how it is to be used the artist organizes the visual displays seen within its boundaries, neither do I see a reason to class this work as a painting. *4′ 33″* is the picture-frame's sonic equivalent. Neither Cage nor the performer he directs is responsible for organizing (selecting, appropriating) the sounds that constitute the contents of any of the work's performances. As a result, there is no distinction between the contents of performances of his work and ambient sounds falling within their temporal parameters.

Given the necessary condition for something's being music outlined earlier, it must be concluded that *4′ 33″* is not a musical work.[17]

I previously emphasized that *4′ 33″* is to be approached against the background of a knowledge of the tradition of musical works and performance practices. This claim is consistent with the judgment that Cage's is not a work of music. The piece does not have to be music to have as its point a reference to music. In the same way, the empty picture-frame should be understood and appreciated within a context established by the presentation of paintings, but it invokes this tradition without itself qualifying as a painting. And, to return to an earlier example, as an artwork Duchamp's *Fountain* is not clearly either a sculpture or a fountain. A distinct category has been described to accommodate classification of this kind of art, ready-mades. Nevertheless, it is the artistic tradition of sculpting in marble that provides the setting against which *Fountain* is to be viewed if its artistic qualities are to be recognized and appreciated.

Many contemporary works have challenged the accepted boundaries of art and have done so not only by inviting us to question the distinction between art and non-art but also by evading easy categorization within particular art forms, genres, or schools. *4′ 33″* belongs to—indeed, contributed to the initiation of—this trend. It is an artistic happening, a conceptual piece that reflects on the world of music without itself being a musical work. I suspect that much of the impetus for arguing that *4′ 33″* is music comes from the desire to acknowledge the legitimacy of its art status. That impulse should be checked or lessened when it is accepted that one can reject the piece as music without calling into doubt its credentials as art.

IV

I characterized *4′ 33″* above as a 'happening'.[18] This provides the clue to its proper classification: as an artwork it is a piece of theater. It is not a work of musical theater, such as opera, but a performance piece about music.

Cage has always been aware of the theatrical side of musical performance. In response to 'Is a concert a theatrical activity?' he says: 'Yes, even a conventional piece played by a conventional symphony orchestra: the horn

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[17] Campbell (1992) arrives at the same conclusion—that, as an artwork, the piece is not music—by a different route.

[18] Herwitz (1988: 792) describes *4′ 33″* as 'a founding example of a *happening*'. Clark (1970) regards traditional, total-control, and chance music (with *4′ 33″* mentioned as an example of the latter) as instanced variously by performance, production, and happening.

player, for example, from time to time empties the spit out of his horn. And this—when I was as a child, taken to an orchestra concert—frequently engaged my attention more than the melodies, harmonies, etc.' (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 101). From the late 1960s Cage arranged what he called 'musicircus' (see Cage 1990: 433). In fact, he has a long-standing connection to the performance-art movement. Some authors cite the event he organized at Black Mountain College in 1952—a joint performance with Merce Cunningham, Robert Rauschenberg, David Tudor, M. C. Richards, and Charles Olson—as the first example of a 'happening' (see Kostelanetz 1988: 103–5, 210–11, 248–50; Pritchett 1993: 139):

The theatrical focus of the silent piece may have been unintentional, but nevertheless Cage knew that 'theatre is all around us,' even in the concert hall. In the same year, 1952, Cage arranged an event which deliberately moved out beyond 'pure' music into what was unmistakably theatre. This was the so-called happening at Black Mountain College, the first post-war mixed-media event. (Nyman 1974: 60)

'As he moved towards no-control, Cage also moved towards theatre . . . Cage's theatrical inclinations really took wing that summer when he was invited down to Black Mountain College' (Tomkins 1968: 113).

4′ 33″ should be compared with *0′ 0″* (1962), which was also called *4′ 33″ No. 2*. *0′ 0″* specifies that in a situation provided with maximum amplification (no feedback) one has to perform a disciplined action, without any interruptions and fulfilling in whole or part an obligation to others.[19] Some of Cage's performances of *0′ 0″* consisted in his preparing and slicing vegetables, putting them in an electric blender, and then drinking the juice, with the sounds of these various actions amplified throughout the auditorium (Hamm 1980). Other performances involved Cage in writing and in drinking water (Revill 1992: 203–4). Cage describes the piece as one 'where anything we do is made apparent as music, when through happenings anything we do is made apparent as theater' (quoted in Kostelanetz 1988: 193). Pritchett (1993: 139) sums up the work, more accurately in my view, this way:

Part of the problem of approaching *0′ 0″* is that it does not appear to be 'music' in any sense that we might use the term—even in the somewhat expanded sense of Cage's music of the 1950s. Its character instead would seem to place it under the category of theatre, or more properly what has come to be known as 'performance art'.

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[19] For comment on the piece see Nyman 1974: 77; Pritchett 1993: 138–40, 146–9; Kostelanetz 1988: 69–70.

As an artwork $0'\ 0''$ is a piece of theater, an example of performance art, not of music. I claim the same for $4'\ 33''$, though it more obviously draws a parallel with the performance of 'classical' musical works.

One philosopher who grasps that Cage's work is theatrical rather than musical is Kendall L. Walton. He writes (1987: 76–7) of the artworks of Cage (and Duchamp):

They are easily understood as symbolic or expressive of certain attitudes about life, or society, or the art establishment in very much the way that actions of characters in literature very often are. They are, in fact, strikingly similar to actions of characters in the theater of the absurd. The activities of many avant-garde artists can be, and have been, regarded as a kind of theater.

Walton (1987: 77) goes on to consider how our continuing interest in such pieces is explained:

If the act of producing the object is symbolic or expressive in one way, the act of buying or displaying it or just observing it may be symbolic or expressive in another. Attending a concert of Cage's indeterminate music may be a way of expressing one's agreement with the point one takes Cage to have been expressing in producing the music; the listener may be symbolically thumbing his nose at the art establishment, or debunking the 'masters', or affirming a kind of Cagian zest for life.

If the works provide little by way of aesthetic experience as this is standardly described, it is necessary to explain their attraction to an audience. As Walton sees it, an audience aware of what it is likely to encounter in choosing to attend a performance of Cage's $4'\ 33''$ shares in and affirms an art-political stance, one that aims to deflate the pomposity of the art establishment and to express solidarity with the radical nature of avant-garde art-making. This account is perceptive. I previously mentioned the possibility of one's performing Cage's work alone in one's home. I guess that few people with pianos do so, though the piece is easy to play. If Walton is right, this reluctance is not hard to explain. Political affirmations are at their most significant in public settings. On similar grounds, we might predict that recordings of $4'\ 33''$ (of which several are available) are not sold in large numbers. Neither buying a record nor listening to it at home succeeds as a public expression of one's attitude as does attendance at a concert including Cage's music. More than most works, $4'\ 33''$ relies on a public context of presentation for its effect.

V

4′ 33″ challenges the boundary between noise and music in that it is likely to include more of the former than paradigmatic musical works. It leads us to think about the distinction between art and ordinary life by incorporating aspects of the latter in its performances. It raises questions about the nature of performance, since the musicians addressed by its score are not called on to display their musicality and instrumental skills, whereas members of the audience contribute more to the content of performances than do the musicians who execute the work. It is *for* musical instruments but is not played *on* them. Like many conceptual works, its value consists in its leading us to consider such matters. Its merit lies primarily in its cognitive, artistically conceived properties, not in the aesthetic appeal of its sensuous qualities. Moreover, to the extent that the paradigms it sets out to debunk are ones endorsed by politically powerful, wealthy minorities who take their taste and standards to be superior to all others, its message is also political, not narrowly academic.

We should acknowledge the originality and importance of Cage's contribution to our understanding of music and of the philosophy of the arts. But we need not always accept that his works answer the questions they provoke in the way that he claims. Accordingly, I have argued that *4′ 33″* does not show that 'music is all around us', or that audience members are among its performers, or that there is no line to be drawn between music and performance art.

Ontologies　　　　　　　　　　　　2
of Musical Works

In this chapter I discuss the ontological variety and social constructedness of musical works.

Some philosophers would not allow the possibility of an ontological analysis of musical works. They think ontology is the study of the most basic material stuff; is confined to subatomic particles and their properties, or perhaps to the set of elements. Other philosophers are more broad-minded. They regard ontology as dealing more widely with natural kinds and thereby as extending beyond the elements to encompass stable compounds. A yet richer ontology will be available if biological species (or other such categories) are included among the natural kinds. None of these accounts covers musical works, however. They are not natural kinds, however broadly that notion is construed.

Musical works are humanly created and their existence and propagation presupposes a great deal by way of cultural stage-setting. They are socially constructed, we might say. (In this, they are like most things we encounter—inflation, books, universities, weeds, the market.) It remains to work out just what is entailed by the social constructedness of musical works, of course, but I will reserve my comments on that topic for the close. Here the opening point is the simple one: an ontology that admits musical works within its purview will be a profligate one that could ask also about the nature, matter, and mode of existence of parking tickets, general elections, the Open Championship, Chardonnay, and fluffy dice.

Three sections follow this introduction. The first is an exposition of the standard philosophical approach to musical ontology. The tempo is allegro; more conclusions than arguments are presented. The second develops an alternative account of the natures of musical works. The third recapitulates the idea that musical works are socially constructed.

I

The philosophical debate on the ontology of musical works has followed a pattern familiar from the discussion of natural kinds. It takes over the terminology and categories of that discussion.

Some philosophers are nominalists about musical works. They regard designations such as 'Beethoven's Fifth' as non-referring; there are no musical works as such. Instead, we use phrases like 'Beethoven's Fifth' as shorthand for classes or sets of performances. Everything said about musical works is reducible without loss to statements about musical performances.

This is unconvincing, though. Many of the things we say about musical works are not reducible to claims about performances or about sets of performances. For example, consider the following: 'With his Fifth, Beethoven fully entered his mature period', or: 'Beethoven's First was influenced by the symphonies of Mozart and Haydn'. Moreover, we group performances into sets in terms of the works they are of and no other principle allows us to group them as we do, so the individuation of performances presupposes the existence of works, not vice versa. Let us be realists, then, not nominalists, about musical works.

Though they may be real, musical works are abstract. They are not encountered directly, without the mediation of performances or scores. Musical works supervene on these more concrete objects or events. What kind of abstracta are they?

One possibility is that they are abstract particulars. Yet, even if we put aside the controversial standing of abstract particulars within metaphysics, this suggestion is unappealing for the obvious fact that musical works can be multiply instanced. If different performances all can instance the same musical work, it is not a particular.

A much more common view holds that musical works are Platonic universals. They are patterns or structures existing in the realm of the Forms. Their instances qualify as such by virtue of partaking in, echoing, or representing the appropriate patterns or forms.

This view faces an obvious problem: Platonic universals exist timelessly, whereas we think of musical works as created and as potentially destructible. Some Platonists respond by biting the bullet. Musical works are discovered, not created. To make the bullet more palatable, they argue that discovery is not so different from creation; some discoveries become possible only when an individual with particular talents finds herself within a particular cultural or musico-historical setting. Other Platonists argue that the work is created,

because it comes into existence when the eternal pattern or form is selected, indicated, or prescribed by the composer. As well as picking out the given pattern or structure, the composer says something like 'Make it so', and the work is not created as such until the pattern is brought into conjunction with, and therefore given salience by, this injunction.

Others are unconvinced by musical Platonism. They regard the work's cultural context as more deeply implicated in its nature and identity than the Platonist is able to allow. Were the same sonic pattern or structure independently discovered and indicated in different socio-musical settings or periods, two works, not one only, would have been composed. Also, whereas Platonists usually regard the practicalities of sounding the work on instruments made of wood, gut, metal, skin, hair, and bone as irrelevant to the piece's identity, their critics maintain that such considerations are often among the elements constitutive of the work's identity. It is not a matter of indifference, as Platonists have suggested, that Bach's E major Violin Concerto is written for the violin and not the tuba. An otherwise correct rendering of it on the latter instrument violates a requirement crucial for an accurate realization of the work. Besides, if one takes musical works to be immanent in their performances, not to belong to some other realm that the performances merely represent, musical Platonism will be unacceptable.

Is another option for characterizing universals available? One is an Aristotelian view, according to which universals are created along with their first instances and may be destroyed where no instances remain and more cannot be made. Aristotelian universals are firmly tethered to this world and its concrete items and events. So, without further ado or argument, let us accept that musical works, *qua* abstracta, are Aristotelian universals.

Musical works are universal whats? In relation to their performances, musical works have been described as classes, types, and kinds to which their performances stand as members, tokens, or instances. In some accounts, the differences between these relations might not go beyond the divergence in their labels, but in other versions the dissimilarities are substantive. When they are, I prefer the third to the other two positions.

Someone holding that a musical work is a class of performances must have in mind a potential or idealized extension of performances, not the actual ones. Otherwise, all unperformed works would be the same piece, and predicates other than those we would normally expect or permit, such as 'growing larger', would apply to pieces such as Beethoven's Fifth. Nevertheless, and however we formulate it, this view always faces the sort of objection

raised earlier to nominalism; namely, not everything we say about musical works can be expressed as thoughts about either individual performances or the set of idealized or possible performances.

Those who maintain that musical works are types that are betokened by their performances tend to characterize the relation as one in which properties are shared between the two. In other words, the type possesses many if not all of the properties common to its various tokens. But how are we to make sense of the idea that, as an abstract thing, the work shares properties, including physical ones, possessed by its tokens? If the performance must be noisy, so is the work it tokens. But if abstract universals cannot be identical with or cause air vibrations, exactly what can it mean to say that the work possesses the same property of noisiness as its performances?

Advocates of the view that works are kinds, with performances their instances, avoid the problem just raised by claiming that the kind shares with its instances predicates, not properties as such. There is a relation of counterfactual dependence between what can be said truly of the kind and the properties possessed by its instances. The work is noisy when and only when something cannot be a properly formed instance of it without being noisy.

The phrase 'properly formed instance' deserves closer consideration. Nelson Goodman (1968) maintains that only perfectly formed performances, ones that are note-for-note accurate, instance the work they purport to be of. He does so because he fears that any lesser standard will commit us to holding, via the transitivity of identity, that all works are identical. If the identity of the work can survive one note change, it must survive a possible infinity of note changes, in which case Beethoven's Fifth is sonically indistinguishable and no different from *Stand by your Man*.

I will not try to answer Goodman's worry here, but I support a view closer to common sense: like natural kinds, musical works can have malformed instances. These are genuine instances, but they are less than perfect. The school orchestra really does play the march from Carmen, though they are not quite together, many of them play out of tune, and the performance is splattered with wrong notes. To acknowledge this, let us say that, *qua* universal, the musical work is a *norm* kind, with its performances as its instances.

Kind of what? Idealists have argued that the artwork is a mental entity whose nature can be inferred from traces left in the world by the artist. Idealist ontologies are not generally popular now. A different theory, advocated by

Gregory Currie (1988), holds that artworks are action types; specifically, the artist's action of discovering via a particular heuristic path the structure that is the work's outward face. His view shares with idealism the consequence that the art objects we typically encounter are not artworks. They present only the artwork's public, structural aspect. This theory has a number of (other) unintuitive corollaries; for instance, that all artworks can have multiple instances and that none is created. I see no compensating advantages to make these acceptable.

In discussing the musical work, Goodman maintains that it is a semantic content specified within a notational system dealing with sounds. That, I take it, is his own way of expressing the most widely held view, which is that a musical work is a sound-structural kind. Theorists argue over whether anything more than its sound structure is essential to the nature and identity of the musical work. Some say no, and thereby accept that two composers, working independently and in different musico-historical contexts, compose only a single work if they indicate identical sound structures. Against this, the things beyond its sound structure that are usually mentioned as necessary to the identity of a musical work are its performance means, the musico-historical setting in which it is composed, and the identity of its composer. If the performance means is part of the work, then it is properly instanced only if its sound structure is elicited in the appropriate fashion from the instruments indicated by its composer. A sonically indistinguishable rendition produced on a synthesizer would not instance the work. And if its natal context is relevant to the work's identity, two sonically indistinguishable performances might be of quite different works that share a sound structure in common but differ in other crucial respects as a result of the fact that they were composed in very different socio-cultural environments. One is an eighteenth-century baroque toccata, for instance, and is riddled with challenging discords and expressive extremism, whereas its twentieth-century postmodern *doppelgänger* self-consciously evokes an accessible style and is generally understated. And if its composer's identity is crucial to the work's identity, two possibilities need to be considered. According to the first, only Beethoven could have composed his Fifth, and, according to the other, at most one person (or collaborating team) could have composed the Fifth.

Where do I stand on this latest set of issues? I support ontological contextualism, which acknowledges the socio-historical embeddedness of some of the features making up the work. I do not accept, however, that a given piece can have only one composer. Different people, working independently in the

same socio-historical setting, might create the same, single piece. Some of the work's constitutive properties depend on features internal to its sound structure, but others rely on the sound structure's external relation to musical practices, conventions, styles, and genres that are presumed by its composer. Naturally enough, the relevant practices, conventions, styles, and genres are those of the time and place of the work's composition.

In sum, I think musical works are prescribed, sound-event kinds, rather than kinds of patterns or actions. They are created and may be destroyed. Some of their identifying features depend on relations between their internal structure and social factors external to their immediate boundaries. They admit of less than perfect instances. As universals, they are more Aristotelian than Platonic.

Earlier I asked without answering the question: Is its instrumentation among the work's essential properties? I ducked and weaved because I think its performance means is implicated in the work's identity in some cases and in others not. Sometimes, the use of particular instruments is explicitly pre-scribed as work-constitutive; at others, their use is implicitly dictated by conventions of the musical practices; but also, on yet further occasions, their use is not prescribed at all and has no place among the work's identifying conditions.

There is a basis here for criticizing the philosophical positions I have been outlining. They assume an ontology in which all musical works are composed for live performance and are also historically uniform. I do not. Some musical works are not for performance and others that are for performance are not for live performance. Also, not all musical works include their performance means among their identifying conditions. In this and other respects, the ontological possibilities for musical works are malleable and have evolved through time. Moreover, the terminologies and boundaries traditionally employed by ontologists—universals, types, norm kinds, and so on—do not map easily on to the kinds of identifications and distinctions that are important to composers, performers, and listeners.

Let me expand on the importance of this last point. I do not advocate the kind of ordinary-language philosophy that proceeds on the assumption that the theories implicit in the discourses and actions of the folk can never be wrong. But, on the other hand, I do not think it is tenable to suppose that we might be totally or fundamentally mistaken in our ordinary view of what musical works are. As I suggested earlier, the relevant notions are socially constructed. Among other things, this means that the ontological agenda is set by the ways the relevant people identify and individuate works and

performances and the ways they conceive of their roles and responsibilities with respect to these. That agenda no doubt is revisable and refinable, and philosophers might be those best suited to contribute usefully to such a process, but it must provide our point of reference and cannot be dismissed as irredeemably in error or as simply irrelevant. The folk views cannot be rejected altogether, if one's goal is to analyze the familiar concept, as opposed merely to changing the subject.

II

As just explained, I think the philosophically standard consideration of musical ontology is mistaken in some of its leading assumptions and is not always perspicuous or helpful anyway. I now try to develop a more fruitful approach. It recognizes historical relativities in the concept of a musical work and acknowledges ontological variety within musical works. In this and other respects, it meshes with the way the musically inclined discuss works and performances. It explains how and why they evaluate the respective contributions of the composer and the performer as they do and how and why they assess the performance both for faithfulness to the work it is of and for originality and interest as an interpretation of that work.

My first distinction is between musical works that are for performance and those that are not. An example of the former would be Beethoven's Fifth and of the latter Herbert Eimert's *Four Pieces* (1952–3), which was one of the first pieces generated electronically in its entirety, stored on magnetic tape, and sounded when a suitable copy of the master is played back. Works that are not for performance are stored as encodings. They are instanced when a clone of the master is decoded on an appropriate device, as when a tape of Eimert's work is played on an industry standard tape player. Such works are for playback, not performance.

Not all works predating the electronic age are for performance. Music written specifically for music boxes, barrel organs, pianolas, calliopes, and the like is also not for performance. Pieces that are not for performance have a long historical pedigree.

A work that is not for performance may include encodings of musicians playing orthodox instruments in real time. If it does, those musician are not performing the work but, rather, supplying raw materials that later are incorporated into its contents.

By contrast, the delivery of works for performance requires the intervention of musicians. Such works are transmitted either via written or spoken

instructions, such as musical scores,[1] or via a performance or recording with the status of an exemplar.

Among works for performance, I distinguish those for live performance from those for studio performance. Most commercial rock songs belong in the latter category. These are for special kinds of performances that involve the electronic manipulation and sculpting of sound to achieve effects that, typically, cannot be achieved live. Multi-tracking, collaging, filtering, mixing, and other interventions are central to the presentation of such works. The result, which is issued on disk, is what I call a virtual performance. It is virtual in two respects. No continuous performance event of the kind that seems to be represented on the disk need take place and the 'performance' occupies an aural space unlike any present normally in the real world.

A work for studio performance is like a work that is not for performance in being issued on disks that are themselves for playback, not performance. The difference between the two is not apparent either in the disk or in the reliance in both cases on the resources of the studio. It is apparent in the attitude to re-recordings or 'covers', should they occur. When William Shatner recorded 'Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds', he produced a new performance of the Beatles' song, not a distinct but related work that is not for performance. By contrast, if I put together something on my computer that sounds like *Four Pieces*, I have produced a new but derivative piece, not a performance of Eimert's.

Works for studio performance can be done at live gigs. The normativity conditions for these performances are not like those for live performances, though. The use of synthesizers and lip-synching is accepted and the result is judged against what is on the CD, not vice versa.

By contrast with pieces for studio performance, works for live performance are to be played in real time. They must include some part for a live performer. In the paradigm case, all the parts are sung or played on orthodox musical instruments. This is not required, however. Much of the piece might

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[1] An aside on the written instructions issued by composers: Those that are work-determinative must be followed and satisfied if an authentic performance of the work is to result. In practice, not everything notated is of work-determinative force. Scores often contain recommendations and non-determinative indications of the kind of interpretation the composer might prefer. Also, many required aspects of the performance are likely to be inherent in the performance practice shared by the composer with the musicians he addresses. There may be no explicit indication of these in the work's score, though they are mandated nevertheless. Finally, the notation is by no means always to be interpreted 'literally'. Accordingly, in discerning what is work-determinative, the musician needs to interpret the instructions publicly issued by the composer in the light of conventions of the music practice and of the notational system that apply to them.

be on tapes or disks that are issued along with the instructions addressed to the performer and that are played back as the performer does her thing. Also, the instruments need not be of the ordinary kinds. For instance, *KNOBS* (1971) by John Cage and Lejaren Hiller comes as an LP with a set of instructions specifying how the record player's dials are to be manipulated as the disk plays.[2] The instructions accompanying each individual disk are unique to it. A performance of the work results when the disk jockey follows the instructions. This does not mean that the person who fiddles with the graphic equalizers of her hi-fi as she listens to a recording of Beethoven's Fifth, or of a rock song, or of Eimert's *Four Pieces* thereby is a performer. Either the performance is over when the disk is issued or the work on the disk is not for performance. *KNOBS* is different. What is on the disk is neither a finished performance nor an encoding of a work that is not for performance; the disk contains a pre-performance input and the work is instanced only when this input is modified in accordance with the accompanying instructions.

Works for live performance, such as Beethoven's Fifth, can also be issued on studio recordings the making of which does not involve continuous real-time playings. I call what is on such a recording a simulated performance. They mimic the sound of a live performance, though no seamless performance, such as seems to be represented on the disk, took place. The normativity conditions for such recordings differ from those of works for studio performance. Large chunks of what is on the disk should have been played continuously in the recording studio—though the order of sections need not be respected and multiple takes will be standard—and the performers should be capable of giving the recorded work in performances that are live.

Here is one last complication: works that start life in one category can be approached as if they belong to a different one. There is a long tradition of transcribing musical works created for one instrumental medium to another; for instance, Liszt transcribed Beethoven's symphonies for the piano. Something similar happens when Walter Carlos switches on Bach's music by synthesizing it or when Jimi Hendrix treats Bob Dylan's 'All Along the Watchtower' as if it is for studio performance. In these cases, I regard the outcome as a new but derivative work.

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[2] *KNOBS* was released by Nonesuch records (H-71224) in 1971. In Davies 2001 I wrongly identified the piece as *HPSCHD* of 1967–9. *HPSCHD* is for harpsichords and computer-generated sound tapes. A performance of *HPSCHD* is the source of the recorded material found in *KNOBS*, but, as Fred Suppé made me aware, *KNOBS* is a distinct piece.

That is one dimension along which I describe musical works. The second dimension to which I appeal distinguishes between works in terms of their relative 'thickness' or 'thinness'. The thicker the work, the more the properties of its sounded instances are essential to its character. A piece that is specified solely as a melody and chord sequence, leaving instrumentation, elaboration, and overall structure up to its performers, is thinner in constitutive properties than one in which those features are also work-determinative. Generally, the more a work's instances can differ while remaining equally and fully faithful to it, the thinner that work is.

Electronic works that are not for performance are almost as thick as their instances. Tape hiss on the master that is not part of the work, the lower sonic quality of legitimate clones, tolerated differences in decoders and their settings, all suggest that, even here, the work is marginally thinner in properties than are the soundings that provide legitimate instances. Works for performance, though, are always thinner than the performances that faithfully instance them. The instructions to the performer always underdetermine some aspects of the sound of the performance, even when they are taken in conjunction with the performance practices they take for granted. What is added by the performer constitutes her interpretation of the work. That interpretation closes the gap between what is instructed and the repleteness of sounded music. In being written for performance, pieces are written for interpretation and, within broad limits set by the appropriate performance practices, the player is free to style her interpretation as she chooses. Even the thickest of works for performance—late Mahler symphonies, say—leave huge scope for interpretation. Thin works—for instance, ones that specify note types rather than tokens, as in a figured bass, or that allow for improvisation or embellishment, or that leave details of the instrumentation and ensemble open—leave even more to the discretion of the performer. The thinner the work, the more the performer takes the limelight and the composer a backseat in the audience's proper assessment of what is achieved and who is responsible.

Generalizing wildly, the historical trend has been toward the thickening of musical works. In the past, note types rather than particular tokens might be indicated by the composer (an example being the figured bass), a great deal in the way of embellishment and fleshing out was left to the performer's discretion, instrumentation was not rigidly fixed (being adaptable to what was available), and even aspects of large-scale structure were free (so that, for instance, a mass could be put together from movements each of which was written by a different composer). Even when one rightly recognizes the extent to which the performance practice constrained the performers' choices as

regards matters on which the composer was silent, still it is true that works of 1700 determined fewer of the details of a performance than was true in 1800, and similarly for 1800 and 1900. By way of compensation, the composer was more likely to direct the presentation of his work in 1700 than 1900 and thereby had more influence over the performance's interpretative elements.

One way to understand the thickening of musical works is as the result of a successful attempt by composers to control performance details despite their progressive alienation from performances of their music. As scores were more widely disseminated, composers became less involved in the rendition of their works. At the same time, though, instrumental ensembles became more standardized, there was more uniformity in the technical level of musicianship, and printed notations evolved in ways that facilitated the expression of more detailed, subtle, and complex compositional ideas, with the consequence that composers could specify work constituents in greater detail. These changes had to be accepted as dealing with work-determinative elements before they resulted in the thickening of musical works, of course. That acknowledgment was seen as appropriate, given what composers could achieve when given a richer palette on which to exercise their talents. And so, by a kind of bootstrapping, works have become thicker over the past millennium.

This is not to say that the composer's aim was always to eliminate the performer and her interpretation (though this option was taken when acoustic technology made it available). In fact, the richer the substance of the work, the more varied and interesting are the interpretative opportunities it presents to the performer. In consequence, the thickening of works was not straightforwardly at the expense of the performer's freedom. It worked as often to empower the performer as to diminish her contribution.

III

I have allowed that musical works are socially constructed. They are subject to variability and change in their form and substance, depending on behaviors and organizations that people contingently choose to adopt or revise. What can and cannot be specified as part of a musical work depends on when and where that specification is made, and changes in the relevant constraints are affected as much by technology and society as by what might be dubbed 'purely musical' parameters. The invention of means for storing sounds as electromagnetic patterns and for decoding them subsequently had an enormous effect on music, but these developments were not strictly musical

and neither were they pursued for the sake of their musical significance. Similarly, Western music was hugely influenced by the structures, roles, and practices of the church and court, but these depended on relevant institutional functions and wider social organizations rather than on musically important considerations. Even where musical change was seemingly directed by purely musical developments, as in the centuries-long erosion of the system of church modes, behind this lay the operation of tastes and preferences that were not exclusively shaped by narrowly musical considerations.

I have just described part of what it means to say that musical works are socially constructed. The question is: What other entailments go with the thesis? I mention four that have been canvassed and I argue against them all.

(1) It might be suggested that the historicity and social constructedness of musical works together entail that there is some datable moment before which there were none. As a general hypothesis, I guess this must be correct. There were no musical works before the evolution of the human species. Or, to be less speciesist, there were no musical works until the evolution of beings who made music under that conception of what they were doing and who, as music makers, went on to create musical works. Some advocates of the hypothesis take a more radical stand than this one, though. For instance, Lydia Goehr (1992) has argued there were no musical works prior to 1800. Only with Beethoven did the concept become regulative and concrete, with all the note tokens specified and every mark in the score indicating an essential feature of the work.

In my view, Goehr mistakes features local to a particular musico-historical setting for ones essential to the work concept. As a result, she wrongly concludes that the musical creations of other times and places qualify as works only through the anachronistic imposition of a concept that is alien to them. Instead, I think we should adopt a view of musical works broad enough to encompass the full range of musical activities in which pieces are identified as repeatable individuals, whether the piece be 'Greensleeves', 'Happy Birthday', or Beethoven's Fifth. Rather than identifying this or that moment as the one when works first put in an appearance, a better way of acknowledging the historical evolution of the work concept is to describe, as I have done previously, how works tended to become thicker with constitutive properties as time went on. We can accommodate the similarities and the differences between Bach's and Beethoven's works by showing how both composers issued work-determinative instructions, though these

instructions—and hence the works that are instanced in following them—differ in the levels of their specificity.

(2) The historicity both of musical works and of present-day listeners has sometimes been interpreted as showing that works of the past are inaccessible. The thesis comes in two versions.

According to the first, performers and audiences are not epistemically positioned to deliver and to hear the works of the past. We know too little of the notational conventions and performance practices of the past to be able confidently to identify the composer's work-determinative instructions, or the notational records of works are so corrupted that none is trustworthy, or we lack the requisite knowledge of the instruments and of the performance techniques needed to play the music in question. Meanwhile, the listener is ignorant of the musical syntax and inflections of the time and, thereby, is not able to listen in the appropriate fashion.

While there is some truth in these observations, especially as they apply to very distant periods, as generalizations they are false. It is not the case that we lack the required information and skills for all music, or even for most music, of the past millennium.

The second, stronger version of the thesis responds this way: Even supposing the knowledge and skills are available, so that we now play the music as the best of the composer's contemporaries would have done, and even if listeners know all the musical rules and grammar of the composer's day, still we cannot hear the music as it was intended to be heard. The point is one about the perceptual experience of music rather than our knowledge of it. Because we are products of our musical environment and background, which include much that was not around when the work was written, we bring attitudes and expectations to our listening that are alien to the music in question. These exclude us from experiencing that music fully or appropriately, according to the view in question.

I think this approach characterizes the listener's habits as more rigid than they often are. Listeners are very adept at moving between different styles and periods of music by adjusting their musical expectations and bracketing out what is irrelevant or inappropriate. Some individuals like rhythm and blues, reggae, and Andrew Lloyd Webber musicals, though the grammars, genres, forms, and styles of these various kinds of music differ. Similarly, others listen with understanding and appreciation to jazz and to classical music, or to Western and to non-Western varieties of music. When such a person listens to one kind of music, she puts 'off-line' the expectations and information relevant to the other kinds of music she understands and likes. The same

applies when it is the music of the past that is heard. The listener brackets out what she knows of later music in order to hear the music of the past in terms of expectations that are appropriate to it.

This is not to say that the present-day listener experiences the music written in the past just as the composer's contemporaries did. She listens from a different musico-historical location and is aware of doing so. But these differences between the composer's contemporaries and today's listener do not bar the latter from accessing the work or prevent her from understanding and appreciating what she hears in an appropriate fashion.

(3) The idea that musical works are socially constructed is equated sometimes with the idea that the identity of each individual musical work evolves through time, instead of being fixed with its creation. We can access the present-day incarnation of the work, if not its primal version, because the work's identity is constructed and reconstructed in the ever-changing present. Just as I can be one and the same person as that crying baby, that reluctant schoolboy, and that slim athlete with a full head of hair, so Beethoven's Fifth—the work that is so well known and widely recognized, that influenced succeeding generations of composers, that became associated with the propaganda of global warfare, and, unfortunately, that accompanies several television commercials—is the same as a piece that at an earlier time had no such identifying properties. Sometimes this view is coupled with that discussed in (2), according to which we cannot go back because the work as originally conceived no longer exists. But that connection is not required. A proponent of the current position might maintain there is no point in going back, even if we can, because doing so involves losing touch with all the work means for our own age.

This theory may rest on the conflation of a thing's identity with its significance. That the latter changes does not mean that the former does. The film *2001: A Space Odyssey* altered the way many people hear both the 'Blue Danube' and the opening of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, but not everything that is true and significant of these pieces is also essential to their identities. Had the film's makers chosen to use the 'Emperor Waltz' instead, the 'Blue Danube' would not now be a different waltz.

Or, perhaps the conflation is between interpretations and their objects. That different interpretations of an item are given through time does not mean that the identity of what is interpreted thereby alters. As I have already observed, that Beethoven's Fifth can be interpreted in performance in contrasting ways does not mean that the various performances cannot be of the same, single work. And the many literary accounts of the Fifth's political or

psychological message, though they can serve to direct our attention to musical features we might otherwise miss, are additional and apart from the work, so that alterations to them cannot affect its identifying properties.

(4) Even if we can access the works of the past, despite the differences between our socio-musical age and their composers', and even if such works take their identities from the context of their creation, with subsequent accretions of meaning altering their significance rather than their identity, a further conclusion might be gleaned from music's social constructedness; namely, there is no privileged socio-historical position from which to appreciate and understand any musical work. As it is intended here, the claim is that the work can be contextualized in any way the listener chooses, with no point of view on the work better or worse than any other. We can, if we want, listen to Mozart's music without regard to the context of its creation and the musical conventions, practices, genres, and styles of his time. When we do so, we follow the music's syntax, but with no sense of the piece's or the style's historical location within the unfolding of Western music, and without respect for the music's functions and organic integrity. If I were to respond that this listener is not directing her attention to Mozart's work as such, she might deflect the point by agreeing to it. In this postmodern age, the listener is free to concern herself with the piece's present significance rather than with its historically rooted identity, with what she can find when it is approached on her own terms rather than with what the dead composer's contemporaries would have made of it. To return to the vocabulary introduced earlier, her interest is in a thinner piece than Mozart's. She abstracts from his piece to a pure sound structure, which then becomes a tool for her own listening purposes.

This last position is at odds with the ontological contextualism I favor. It denies that our primary interest is in musical works as of their composers, even if I have correctly indicated what is crucial to the identity of works classified in that way. And this challenge is a serious one. Earlier I suggested that the theory of musical works should not depart too far or for too long from folk practice and judgment if it is to be plausible. My opponent can claim with some justice that the folk wisdom of the present supports her view, rather than my own. Music composed originally to be contemplated, or to invigorate religious ritual, is used nowadays as ambient background for other activities or is appropriated for functions other than the intended ones, as when it is used in TV commercials. Movements are taken from the works in which they belong (as in compilations of adagios, say), or themes and fragments are excerpted (as with the opening of Strauss's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*), or the

original is 'improved' by being given a techno backbeat or an electronic incarnation (as with switched-on classics). On radio and TV, segments of musical pieces from all cultures and periods are juxtaposed in a haphazard collage, without acknowledgment of the sources. Different pieces are more likely to be combined in terms of their shared expressive character or mood than in terms of their common musical cultures, periods, styles, and genres. In other words, the folk practice is one of decontextualizing the music. It shows that, if I am not mistaken about the ontology of musical works, I am wrong, at least, in thinking that it is musical works as such that are the listener's focus.

My response has several aspects. I suggest that, even if the practice has come to this, it could not always have been so. An interest in works as of their composers was formerly essential, given the kind of music that was created. Moreover, if the folk practice really remains committed to decontextualizing the music that is its target, it will not be music as we know it that survives.

Music would not be what it is—would not have the same value, prestige, potency in connecting to human emotions and ideas, capacity to engage the listener so deeply that she comes to characterize its nature as central to her conception of herself as a person—music would not be those things had it not led listeners to focus on musical works considered as the creations of their composers. The fact is, worthwhile music is hard to come by and difficult to perform well. (I am not thinking only of classical or 'serious' music. Only a fool would think good pop songs are easy to write or that Lennon and McCartney do not deserve to be ranked with Schubert and Wolff.) As a result, talented composers and performers have always merited a special respect and affection. (Indeed, the most talented have been lionized and mythologized to an astonishing degree.) To interest ourselves in a musical piece not in its full-bodied form as the work of its composer but merely as the silhouette cast by his piece is to deny him a respect due to the care, skill, and attention that he put into its making. That has implications for what composers are likely to serve up in the future, of course, but there is already a huge cost in the present. To be concerned solely with the pleasant noise made by music is to spurn the much greater rewards and pleasures that go with taking an interest in the musical works that are there. Listeners taking this route sell themselves short without good reason.

Music may be socially constructed, but this does not mean that the practice can retain its vigor and value under all social regimes. It may be true that we often act now as if composers are really dead and not living through the works they wrote. If so, there should be mourning, because music is degraded where

there are no listeners interested in works as the creations of their composers. Musical works might go the way of illuminated bibles, scrimshaw, tapestries, miniature portraiture, masques, and miracle plays, which are art forms that have had their day. If musical works go, what remains is muzak. Muzak is the husk of pleasant noise that remains after musical works have been gutted through decontextualization.

Transcription, Authenticity, and Performance[1]   3

My aim here is to provide an account of musical transcription and of the authenticity of transcriptions. Performing and transcribing are compared and contrasted in the final sections.

I

What is transcription? In this first section I attempt to elucidate what is meant by the notion. Though I realize that a transcription might take the form of an impromptu performance, I shall talk in the following of transcriptions as specifications for musical performance (and these specifications will usually be musical scores).

It is a necessary condition of a musical score's being a transcription that it be intended as such. So, if a musical score is a transcription of a musical work, X, it must be the intention of the producer of the score to write a work faithful to the musical content of X while writing for and in a way appropriate to a medium other than that for which X is written. However, the mere presence of the appropriate intention is not a sufficient condition for the score's being a transcription. It is also a necessary condition for transcription that the musical content of the transcriber's score should adequately resemble and preserve the musical content of the original work. The joint realization of these two conditions is a sufficient condition for the success of an attempt at transcription. Just what the realization of these conditions amounts to is the subject of the discussion in the remainder of this section.

Transcription presupposes the prior existence of an independently identifiable work. The transcriber's intention is to transcribe that work and the successful realization of that intention is possible only where there exists such a work to be transcribed. This trivial point is worth making in order to distinguish cases of transcription from those, such as the following, that in other respects are very similar. The orchestration of *The Wedding* gave Stravinsky a great deal of trouble. He wrote the accompaniment to the vocal soloists and choir first for a very large orchestra, then for player pianos, and finally for four pianos and percussion (in the version we know). Although the final version no doubt was similar to and derived from the earlier versions, it is not a transcription. What Stravinsky was doing was struggling with the work's composition, and the work was not *finished* until the completion of the third version. (This would remain true even if Stravinsky had made available the earlier versions.) The final version could not be a transcription because there was at the time it was written no independently existing work to which it could stand as a transcription.

Since musical works are not individuatable solely by reference to their composer, there is no difficulty, in general, in allowing that a composer can transcribe his own works. Stravinsky transcribed *Pulcinella* three times—in 1925 for violin and piano, in 1932 as *Italian Suite* for cello and piano, and in 1933, also as *Italian Suite*, for violin and piano. Mozart transcribed parts of his operas for the type of woodwind ensemble that commonly played in the streets. And a great many composers have made piano reductions of their orchestral works.

A transcription must depart far enough from the original to count as a distinct piece and not merely as a *copy* of the original. Some aspect of the original must be altered in the transcription. Usually, there is a significant alteration in the medium for which the work is written. And, usually, a change in medium involves a change in instrumentation (and note changes consequent on this). It is possible to produce a new piece through a change in instrumentation, because most musical works are medium-specific. That is to say, one of the complex of identity criteria in terms of which Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is the work that it is, is the fact of its being written for a standard symphony orchestra (including trombones and piccolo). (Works that are not obviously medium-specific, such as J. S. Bach's *The Art of the Fugue*, are rare.) For the most part, the possibility of musical transcription relies on the fact that one can write a new piece, while preserving the musical content of the original piece on which the new piece is based, by altering the medium through which those contents are presented. So, an

orchestral work may be transcribed for piano, or wind band, or cello duet, or vice versa.

A change from one musical medium to another cannot be achieved mechanically or even automatically by the specification of a change in instrumentation. One does not transcribe a harpsichord concerto merely by crossing out the word 'harpsichord' on the score and replacing it with the word 'piano'. Although a change in instrumentation has been specified, the instruments are played in a similar way and share membership in the family of keyboard instruments. Stravinsky's re-orchestration of *Petrushka*, which involved reductions in the number of wind parts and suchlike alterations, provides a similar example. What Stravinsky produced (and intended to produce) was another version of the same work and not a transcription of it, because the new version does not involve a change in medium and (hence) does not differ enough from the original to qualify as a transcription.

There is at least one further way the specification of a change of instrumentation does not amount to a change of medium—namely, that in which the attempt at change fails because the specification is not easily realizable. For example, one cannot transcribe an orchestral work for piano merely by transferring the notes played by the orchestra on to treble and bass staves and specifying that the resultant score should be played on the piano, because the resultant score probably would be unplayable on the piano, or painfully unpianistic if playable. One cannot be properly said to be writing for a particular medium unless one takes account of what is involved for musicians in working with and within that medium. As I shall discuss in greater detail later, transcription is creative precisely in that it seeks to reconcile the musical content of the original work with the limitations and advantages of a medium for which that content was not designed.

There is no rule to say how far a transcriber may depart from the contents of the original in accommodating those contents to the medium for which she is writing. But there is such a thing as going too far, so that an attempt at transcription fails as a result of modifying too extensively the musical contents of the original. It is not sufficient that the composer of transcriptions take a work as her model and that this model be acknowledged in the resulting composition. The composer of 'arrangements on', 'variations on', and 'homages to' does this much without producing transcriptions. A successful attempt at transcription aims at and achieves greater faithfulness to the musical contents of the original than does, for example, a successful attempt to write a set of variations on another's theme. An attempt at transcription that fails through its lack of faithfulness to the musical contents of the original

might have been a successful homage had the composer's intentions been different. Where the attempt at transcription is successful and the transcription alters the notes found in the original, then those alterations do not destroy the configurations giving the original its musical character; instead, they re-create within the medium for which the transcription is written equivalent configurations. (I mention some of the techniques employed by transcribers, in discussing the creativity involved in transcription, in the third section.)

Some examples illustrate the way transcriptions must be heard as respecting the musical contents of their models. Debussy's piano piece (of about 1910) 'Homage to Haydn', Stravinsky's ballet *The Fairy's Kiss*, based on Tchaikovsky's music, and Beethoven's *Diabelli Variations*, based on Diabelli's theme, all would have been failures had they been intended as transcriptions, because they depart too far from their sources to count as transcriptions of those sources. Each of these works acknowledges the source of its musical inspiration but goes on to recompose and decompose the musical content of its source (in a way perfectly appropriate to its being a homage, an arrangement on, or a set of variations, but in a way that would not have been appropriate to the realization of an intention to produce a transcription). By contrast, the orchestrations of piano pieces by Chopin brought together as the ballet *Les Sylphides* are properly counted as transcriptions because they aim at and succeed in preserving the musical contents of their model. Because they are so faithful to the originals it is not inappropriate that the work is attributed to Chopin. (Indeed, the names of the transcribers who collaborated on the work are not now widely known.) Two further examples of transcription come closer to the risk of failure in being more adventurous. Tchaikovsky's Suite No. 4, Op. 61, known as 'Mozartiana', transcribes for orchestra music by (or attributed to) Mozart. In this case the orchestration is as much Tchaikovskian as Mozartian. Yet more interesting is Stravinsky's *Pulcinella*. Stravinsky does more than re-orchestrate Pergolesi's music, he adds to it. But he does so with a light touch, aiming to add an 'edge' to the sound rather than to recompose Pergolesi's piece. So, though *Pulcinella* has a Stravinsky-like sound one would not associate with Pergolesi, the work is more like a transcription than anything else. It is a work by Pergolesi/Stravinsky, not by Stravinsky alone.

One matter has not yet been made fully explicit, perhaps because it seems so obvious, but it deserves mention for all that. Transcriptions are transcriptions of musical works, and the contents of the original preserved in the different medium of the transcription are its *musical* contents. A musical work might be inspired by Shakespeare's *Hamlet* or Leonardo's 'Last Supper',

but no musical work could be a transcription of these works of art, because nothing could count as the successful realization of an intention to produce a musical transcription of their respective propositional and representational contents. Of course, one can transcribe a musical work that sets a text. But the fact that one can transcribe a musical work presenting a propositional content does not entail that a transcription of that propositional content alone is possible. If the text is preserved in a musical transcription, it is preserved by being repeated. So far as the preservation of the propositional content of the text is concerned, there is no change of medium from the original to the transcription, for that propositional content is sung or spoken in both cases. So, where a transcription preserves the text of the original work, it is not a transcription by virtue of doing so—faithfulness to *this* aspect of the original work does not involve a change of medium and it is at least by virtue of its change of medium from the original that the transcription qualifies as a transcription.

II

In this section I discuss the point served by transcription; I discuss the function from which it derives its value and attraction for us. In fact, there seem to be four ways the practice of transcription or its products are likely to be of interest to us. Of these, it is perhaps the second of those discussed that explains the former prevalence of the practice and the fourth that explains the continuing appeal transcriptions hold for us.

In the first instance, transcription may have a pedagogical use. It is used in the teaching and mastery of orchestration, of counterpoint, of harmony, and so on. Exercises in transcription give the student direct and practical experience that cannot be easily obtained in other ways in the handling of musical materials. By transcribing for orchestra a piano piece that is already a transcription of an orchestral work, the student is able to compare his efforts with the composer's. The primary motivation for J. S. Bach's and Mozart's transcriptions of works by Vivaldi would seem to have been pedagogical.

The 'market' for pedagogical uses of transcription has always been too limited, however, to account for the number of transcriptions produced. A more important function of transcription once was to make musical works more readily available than they would have been in their original form. Works were transcribed for the instruments commonly found in the home, which explains the popularity of *Intabulierung* (for lute) in the fifteenth century and of piano transcriptions in the nineteenth century. (Similarly, the

expense and inconvenience of assembling orchestras for training and re-hearsal sessions for opera singers, choirs, ballet groups, and concerto soloists accounts for the commonness of piano transcriptions of the orchestral parts of operas, choral works, ballets, and concertos.) Transcriptions were undoubt-edly valued for providing greater accessibility to composers' works to a wide audience interested in music. Indeed, it is unlikely the practice of transcrip-tion would have achieved the importance it has done if it had not been the case that it served this socially useful function.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that we cannot account for the continuing interest in transcriptions solely in this pragmatic fashion. Stokowski's orches-tral transcription of Bach's Toccata and Fugue in D minor for Organ, BWV 565, probably is *less* accessible than the original, but it is no less interesting or valuable as a transcription for that fact. A yet more impressive consideration is the following: Nowadays technology has made performances of music more readily available than ever before. Radios, record players, tape players, etc. make performances of a vast variety of music accessible to a wide public. It is easier *now* to hear music by learning how to turn a knob than by learning how to play the piano. So, if transcriptions attracted us merely as a means of access to the original and not in their own right, we would no longer be concerned to hear or play transcriptions. If transcriptions were like translations—to be rejected in favor of the original where possible—these technological changes would have scotched our interest in and valuing of transcriptions. But this has not happened. This suggests that musical transcriptions are taken to have intrinsic worth and are not merely 'poor substitutes for the real thing'.

One reason for valuing a transcription in its own right might be for the compositional skill shown by the transcriber. But such an interest in a transcription would not explain how it is valued as a transcription; the fact of the work's being a transcription is incidental to *that* interest. The fact of the work's being a transcription would be relevant, however, where the focus fell on the transcriber's compositional skill as a transcriber in adapting the mu-sical contents of the original to the medium for which the transcription is written. But, though such an interest might lend to a transcription a worth in its own right, it does not explain in general why the activity of transcription should continue to be of relevance and value. Admiring the skill shown by a master of some activity does not at all require one's admiring that activity. One's admiration of the marksmanship of an assassin need not imply any admiration for the activity in which the assassin is engaged.

The fourth and final reason for valuing and taking an interest in transcrip-tions *qua* transcriptions explains, I think, the source of their continuing

significance to us. As I have mentioned already, transcription is a creative activity (in a way that recording and copying are not). It is inevitable that the transcriber presents the musical contents of the original from a personal perspective, although presenting them in a way that is faithful given that those contents are filtered through a different medium. Because a transcription is more than a mere copy of its model, it reflects on its model through the way it re-presents its model. A transcription cannot help but comment on the original in re-presenting the musical contents of the original, so a transcription invites reconsideration of and comparison with the original. Rather than being valued merely for making the musical contents of their models more accessible, transcriptions are also valued for enriching our understanding and appreciation of the merits (and demerits) of their models.

In the remainder of this section, I sketch an analogy that, it is hoped, will help to clarify and crystallize the points made above. In this analogy the painterly art of portraiture is contrasted with photographic 'snapping' as a parallel to the contrast between transcription and the reproduction (for example on record) of (performances of) music.

The foolproof camera (which, let us suppose, is proof also against the skills of the professional photographer and film developer) now performs the function once fulfilled by the practice of realistic portraiture. If the camera had always been with us it is unlikely that the *genre* of realistic portraiture would have developed to the extent that it did. But these facts are consistent with one's now painting a realistic portrait, although it would be strange (admittedly) if one's sole purpose in painting the picture were to record a likeness of the sitter. More importantly, these facts are consistent with a continuing fascination with the realistic portraits of persons with whom one is familiar in 'snaps' or in person. Such an interest, as well as concerning itself perhaps with the painterly skills displayed by the artist, would involve attention to the look of the sitter *as that look was perceived by the artist*. The interest in the portrait might differ from the pragmatic interest in the 'snap' as showing how the person actually looked. This is evident from the fact that the 'snap' (showing how the person now looks) would cease to be of importance in the presence of the actual person, whereas the portrait (showing how the person now looks) would usually continue to be of as much significance, and might be of much more, in the presence of the actual person. Even where portraiture takes as its aim the faithful depiction of the sitter's appearance, it is in the very nature of the activity that this is achieved creatively. Such a portrait inevitably comments on, as well as recording, the appearance of the sitter. And, hence, the portrait continues to be of interest in the presence of

the sitter or in the presence of mechanical reproductions of the sitter's appearance.

III

In this third section I develop a comparison between transcription and performance, especially with respect to the notion of authenticity. In particular, I emphasize how both practices are essentially creative in pursuing the goal of faithfully interpreting the composer's text.

On the account offered so far, transcription involves the interpretation of the composer's work by a transcriber who stands between the composer and his or her audience. Also, the transcriber's aim is to re-create faithfully the composer's work. In these respects the transcriber's role is not unlike that of a performer of the composer's work. Moreover, performance, like transcription, necessarily involves both an appropriate intention and the recognizable preservation of the musical contents of the work. Both performance and transcription take faithfulness to the composer's recorded musical ideas as one of their primary goals and in both cases the realization of this goal requires the exercise of creative initiative. Because transcriptions may be more or less faithful, like performances they may be assessed for their degree of authenticity. Authenticity in transcription is a relative notion that operates within the gap between transcriptions that are barely recognizable as such and transcriptions that preserve the musical content of the original work as fully as is consistent with respecting the characteristics of the medium for which the transcription is written.

Although both the transcriber and the performer take faithfulness to the composer's specification as among their primary aims, the transcriber is less constrained than the performer in the pursuit of this goal. The basis for this discrepancy is not difficult to discern. The composer is able to express in a musical notation many of her intentions as to the way the work is to be performed in virtue of her knowledge of notational conventions, this knowledge being held in common with musicians who perform the composer's score. According to these conventions, some of the composer's expressed intentions are determinative of what must be played in faithfully realizing the work in performance. And, according to these conventions, other of the composer's expressed intentions are recommendatory only (and not determinative). An ideally authentic performance is a performance that is faithful to what is determined in the musical notation according to the conventions appropriate to the interpretation of that notation. By contrast,

the transcriber works in a medium other than that used by the composer and it is not always possible in the medium of the transcription to duplicate what is determinative in the score of the work being transcribed. What is easily and characteristically presented in one medium may not be so readily expressible in another. Whereas the performer can best attempt to realize the composer's musical ideas by rendering the score faithfully, the transcriber has more license to depart from the composer's score in the attempt to present the composer's ideas in a way that takes account of the medium into which they are transcribed. The transcriber has more freedom than does the performer not because the point of each enterprise is different but (rather) because their point is the same. In both cases, the aim of the activity is to mediate between the composer and his or her audience in a way allowing for the faithful presentation of what the composer intended and successfully represented in the notation. The greater freedom of the transcriber acknowledges that the way the goal of faithfulness is achieved differs between performance and transcription as a consequence of the fact that the transcriber works in a musical medium other than that for which the composer wrote. But in both cases a concern with authenticity takes its point ultimately from the authority of authorship, from a concern to present accurately (to an audience) what the composer had to 'say'.

Performance is similar to transcription in another respect: Because the composer's determinative intentions underdetermine the sound of an ideally authentic performance of his or her work, there is a set of ideal performances (and not any single ideal performance) in terms of which the relative authenticity of actual performances is judged. In other words, because any musical notation underdetermines the sound of a faithful performance, different-sounding performances may be equally and ideally authentic. In a similar way, though there must be some common factor (or tolerance across a range of factors) in virtue of which any transcription is recognizable as a transcription of a given work (and hence is a transcription at all), the score of a work underdetermines the score of an authentic transcription; so different transcriptions may be equally and ideally authentic.

In accordance with the above it is not surprising that, for a given work, a transcription into one medium will differ from a transcription into another medium though both transcriptions may be equally authentic. Most popular movements of famous symphonies have been transcribed for brass band and for piano. The 'Ritual Fire Dance' from de Falla's *Love the Magician* has been transcribed for guitar as well as for piano. Though such transcriptions differ in many ways that reflect the character of their different media, many

different transcriptions would be appropriately judged to be highly and equally authentic.

One can also predict that transcriptions into the same medium might differ significantly in many respects without their differing also in their degree of authenticity. Such a case is illustrated by Brahms's and Busoni's transcriptions of J. S. Bach's 'Chaconne' from the Partita No. 2 for Solo Violin, BWV 1004. Both are transcriptions for the piano, they differ markedly, and each might be reasonably judged to be highly authentic. Bach's 'Chaconne' is extremely demanding technically for the violin, because what is essentially a melodic instrument must constantly play or hint at the chord sequence on which the piece is grounded. If the work were transcribed note for note for the piano its character would be drastically altered. It would sound far too 'thin' in texture for its content. Moreover, because the work would present no difficulties for a competent player, the tension apparent in a performance on the violin would be dissipated in a performance on the piano. Both Brahms and Busoni acknowledged these problems in the way they wrote their transcriptions, but they found quite different solutions for them. Brahms, by the simple expedient of transcribing the work for that special genre 'works for piano left hand', is able to remain very close to Bach's score while creating a transcription that is pianistic (given its *genre*) and technically demanding to a degree that provides for a tension in performance such as one gets with the original. Busoni, who transcribed the work for piano 'two hands', enriches the texture by the use of octave doublings, etc., so that the transcription is as rich in sound as the original, typically pianistic, and technically difficult. So, both these transcriptions are faithful to the content of the original and both are characteristically pianistic in ways leading both transcriptions to be praised as authentic, but they are very different pieces.

There is yet a further respect in which performance and transcription may be compared and contrasted usefully—each is an intrinsically creative activity. It is because the score of a work underdetermines the sound of a performance of that work that performance is essentially (and not merely incidentally) creative. The creative element in performance is not something added on to the performance after accuracy has been achieved; rather, the artist's creativity is integral to the faithful realization of the work in performance. The act of transforming the notes-as-written into the notes-as-sound involves the performer's bringing more to the work than is (or could be) recorded in the score; so the faithful presentation of the score in performance involves the *creative* participation of the performer. In a similar way, the role of the transcriber is essentially (and not merely incidentally) creative, because it is the tran-

scriber's job to adapt the composer's score, not to reproduce it, and to adapt it so that it is suitable for the medium into which it is transcribed in order that the composer's musical ideas are preserved rather than distorted by the new medium. This double task of transcription—the faithful presentation of the composer's musical ideas in a way consistent with the medium into which the work is transcribed—provides scope for the creative imagination of the transcriber. Both goals, if either is to be met, must be jointly realized in a single act. To present the composer's ideas faithfully is to reproduce them clearly, and to reproduce them clearly is to present them so that the characteristics of the medium of transcription work effectively toward their clear articulation, which is to write in a manner appropriate to the medium into which the work is transcribed. So, transcription is inherently creative in a way that is analogous to performance.

The creativity of transcription has been illustrated already in the discussion above of Brahms's and Busoni's transcriptions of Bach's 'Chaconne', but further comment is appropriate. Unlike a performance of the work, a transcription is not the less authentic for its systematic unfaithfulness to those aspects of its model that it transforms. Brahms's and Busoni's transcriptions are not the less authentic in being written for the piano. But, in general, an attempt at transcription must preserve the musical contents of the original work if that attempt is to succeed. Where deviations from the original are necessary as a concession to the medium of transcription and/or where they re-create more effectively the aural experience generated by the original, such deviations might make the transcription *more*, rather than *less*, authentic. For example, in transcribing an orchestral work for the piano there need be no loss of authenticity where the effect of the original can be recreated only by specifying that different aggregations of notes be played. This may arise where it is not technically possible to play all the notes of the original on the piano, in which case the transcriber may select only the more important notes (and perhaps those that hint at the missing notes) for the piano. In other cases, the transcriber may be able to achieve the same aural effect only by adding notes. For example, a powerful orchestral unison might best be rendered in octaves on the piano. Sometimes, the transcriber may be able to achieve the appropriate effect only by choosing notes *other* than those employed in the original. For example, an accompaniment figure used in an orchestral work may be unplayable on the piano and the transcriber may substitute new material fulfilling the same function and generating the same (sort of) sound as the material replaced. And, to go yet further, even where it is possible for the transcriber to use exactly the same notes, it is conceivable that the aural

impression of a performance of the original is better created with new material. In transcribing a work for piano, if all that matters at some point is that there be a headlong rush of wildly impetuous sound, then a technically simpler substitute may do the job just as well as an accurate but pianistically awkward copy of the original. Liszt's transcriptions, for example those of Beethoven's symphonies, abound with such imaginative and creative uses of pianistic resources.

A further similarity between transcription and performance follows directly from the fact that each is an inherently creative activity. Just as authenticity in performance is value-conferring in a way acknowledging the creative contribution of the performer in the faithful realization of the composer's specification, so too authenticity in transcription is value-conferring in a way acknowledging the creative contribution of the transcriber in producing a specification of the work for a different medium. It is the performer's and transcriber's creative contributions to the faithful presentation of the composer's musical ideas that are praised. In both cases, this praise takes its point ultimately from an interest in the composer's attempt to create an aesthetically rewarding work.

IV

In this final section I emphasize some of the more important disanalogies between transcription and performance. Performance is ineliminable, and is envisaged as such by the composer, in a way that transcription is not.

Performance is integral to the realization and presentation of musical works to an audience. The composer provides the event specification from which the work takes its identity, but it is the performer who executes this specification and thereby generates tokens of the work. (These points are consistent with cases where the composer is the performer, the performer is his or her own audience, the 'performer' reads the score and creates the 'sound' of a performance in his or her head without touching a musical instrument, and so on.) By contrast, the role of the transcriber is eliminable. A musical work need not be transcribed as a condition of its being realized and presented to an audience.

The point here is not that technology has done away with a need for transcription while leaving unaffected the need for performance. Technology, facilitating the copying and reproduction of performances, may have reduced the frequency with which new performances are needed or are made. So, the need for performance may be as subject to the influence of technology as is the

need for transcription. But the point in distinguishing performance from transcription is this: Composers write *for* performance but *not* for transcription; performance is integral to the work as conceived by its creator in a way that transcription is not. So, the activities of the transcriber are, as it were, uninvited and, hence, in need of justification in a way performance is not. That the transcriber brings to the original work a creative dimension is not so obviously grounds for praise as is the creativity shown by the performer because whereas the performer's contribution is anticipated and expected by the composer, the transcriber's contribution is not. How is it, then, that transcription saves itself from the charge of plagiarism or sycophantism, despite its creative aspect? That is, why do we sometimes regard as praiseworthy the transcriber's presentation of the composer's ideas when that presentation is gratuitous? The answer, as outlined in the preceding discussion, is this: transcription is valued not merely as a report of, but also as a commentary on, the composer's original work and, as such, it continues to be of interest even where the original is accessible.

The Ontology of   4
Musical Works and the
Authenticity of their
Performances[1]

The authentic-performance movement is a phenomenon of the last fifty years. Once one could rarely find a recording of baroque music played on the original instruments and such performances were often lame and faltering because of the players' unfamiliarity with the instruments and with the appropriate performance practices. Now, it is difficult to find a recording of such music not played in the 'authentic manner' and different orchestras vie with each other in the vibrancy of their interpretations.

Not surprisingly, the authentic-performance movement has raised a hue and cry among performers and musicologists, since it challenges entrenched traditions of performance. Very recently some philosophers have also turned their attention to the subject of authentic performance. The ontology of musical works has also attracted the interest of philosophers in recent decades.

There is an important connection between any theory of the ontology of musical works and a specification of the characteristics that must be exhibited in an authentic performance of a musical work, though this connection has not received much comment in the literature (but see Levinson 1987). If an authentic performance is (at least) an accurate performance of a work, then theories of musical ontology should tell us the type and range of properties

that must be produced in an authentic performance of a work. In the main part of this paper I hope to characterize the debate about the ontology of musical works in a way that draws out this connection.

I

Opponents or critics of the authentic-performance movement have made points such as the following against the use of musical instruments and performance practices from the work's historical period: (a) The attempt to produce authentic musical sounds and styles has often resulted in dull, lifeless performances. Many features, other than literal-minded, mechanical accuracy, make for good performances. The use of unfamiliar instruments and styles can inhibit fluency and spontaneity, which are hallmarks of vital musical performances (Kivy 1988c; Taruskin 1988). (b) Even if we could reproduce the sounds of the work as these might have been heard at the time of its composition, authenticity, as the recreation of the *experience* of the work shared by the composer and his or her contemporary audience, is unattainable, because we cannot reproduce the physical, social, cultural, and historical context of the composer's time (Dipert 1980b; Young 1988). The way we hear music has been affected by the changing history of music; we cannot bridge the gap separating us from the past. Our understanding of the work may be better than that of the composer and of her contemporaries, because we, unlike them, can place the work within the historical tradition binding it to its future, as well as to its past. To sum up: The type of authenticity so many performers take as their goal is impractical (indeed, impossible) to achieve and undesirable.

What is it that explains the appeal and success of the authenticity movement? Some authors deconstruct the notion and thereby discover (lo!) that the movement is a modern one, offering the attraction of novelty (Taruskin 1988; Tomlinson 1988). (The appeal to deconstruction is often used unselfconsciously, with neither a suggestion that deconstruction is itself a new and fashionable theory, nor a hint, whether of glee or embarrassment, that one might deconstruct the theory's own foundations.) These writers see 'authentic' performance as a modern style of performance (no less reconstitutive of its object than have been other styles of performance) that claims for itself an illegitimate superiority through its invocation of the imprimatur of the composer.

It is sometimes said that performers should strive for a different type of authenticity—for the compelling vibrancy that brings life to a work (Kivy

1988c). (Such a performance might follow from a mastery of old instruments and a sympathetic commitment to works from a certain period, but in that case the 'authentic' approach is justified as the means to an end, and neither as an end in itself nor as a means superior to a variety of alternative approaches.) There is no single, ideal performance of any work—performing must be creative if it is to be convincing. Performers might allow themselves to be advised by composers' intentions, where these are known, but they should not sacrifice their creative autonomy to the fixed will of the composer, for without the exercise of that autonomy performance reduces to the bare transmission of characterless notes.

Against the view outlined above one might argue as follows: Our aesthetic interest in music in general and our favoring music above sounds that occur naturally as well as above sounds specified and produced by us for other reasons presuppose that composers, more often that not, succeed in writing artistically interesting works, and that they do so not by chance but by design. The musical work is known to us through its performances. The composer needs the services of the performer if her ideas are to be publicly presented, and the composer relies on the performer to respect what has been specified of the work in question if the work as specified is to reach an audience of non-performers. For this reason, the so-called 'intentional fallacy' is no fallacy at all in so far as it applies to the performer. The performer can be intending to perform the work in question only when intending to perform what is constituted as the work by its composer. The hearer might dismiss the composer's intentions as worthless and refuse to allow his response to the work to be ruled by those intentions, but the performer, in order to perform the work in question (and not to improvise or fantasize on that work instead), must be dedicated to preserving those of the composer's intentions that are determinatively expressed and that identify the work as the individual it is.[2]

From this it does not follow (as is so often implied) that the performer's creativity is compromised by her pursuit of authenticity in performance (Davies 1987, 1988a). This would follow only if the composer's specification exhaustively determined every aspect of the work, so that a performer would have to do no more than copy the work from a recipe supplied by the composer. Plainly this is not the case where performers work from notations.[3]

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[2] Not everything recorded in the score need be determinative. Conventions of performance practice and score reading, as well as composers' intentions, set the standards for determinativeness. For a fuller account of this issue see Davies 1987.

[3] Some contemporary composers and transcribers have attempted to make notations as specific and detailed as possible—see Bartók's transcriptions of Hungarian folk music, where many supple-

What is specified by the composer underdetermines the sound of any accurate performance of the work. If 'authentic' means 'accurate', then many different-sounding performances could be equally and thoroughly authentic. More-over, because the performer's contribution to the work's realization is by no means fully determined, authenticity and creativity in performance will be complementary rather than exclusive. If one cannot perform the work *at all* except by exercising one's creative skills as an interpreter and realizer of the material provided by the composer, then one cannot perform the work *authentically* except by being creative.[4]

The fact that performance is creative explains the reluctance nowadays to talk of the performer as owing a moral duty to the composer (see Dipert 1980*b* and cf. Kivy 1988*b*) or (though this is rarely considered) to the audience that relies on performers for access to the composer's work. Talk of performers' duties as correlative with composers' or audiences' rights, whether the duties be 'moral' or not, seems inappropriately restrictive, given the creative free-dom that is essential to the performers' fulfilling their role. But whatever difficulties there may be in the terminology, still there is an important notion such talk aims to capture. Where musical works exist and where audiences attend performances in order to hear those works, the first aim of the activity of performance is to deliver the work in question to the audience (and a crucial further aim is to do so well). To meet these aims the performer must exercise her creative talents within bounds prescribed both by the composer and by the wider conventions of the composers' day that governed the per-formance of works of the type in question. Performers and audiences come together on the basis of an understanding of the point of the activity in which they are jointly involved. Players who are not prepared to direct their talents to the delivery of the work are unilaterally rejecting the enterprise in terms of which they have come together with the audience. If the musicians are professional and the conventional or contractual circumstances make the purpose of their employment clear, then a failure to focus their efforts in the appropriate way might well involve the dereliction of a moral duty. If the musicians are amateurs, then, still, the activity would be misrepresented as a performance of a given work unless it were a part of the performers' intentions

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mentary notational symbols are used. Simply, I doubt that any written notation can fully specify every aspect of the sound of an accurate performance of it. The standard musical notation certainly does not.

[4] Admittedly the notion of creativity appealed to here is minimal and is consistent with thought-less, even mechanical, playing. The creative element in most performances may often go beyond this minimal level, though this is not always the case.

to do what is necessary, given their capabilities, to deliver the work. Within the tradition of 'classical' music, to aim at music making is usually to aim at performing particular musical works, and to aim at this is willingly to accept constraints on the exercise of one's freedom.

Is the above equation of authenticity in performance with accuracy in the presentation of the individual musical work justified? Authenticity is a relative notion, so we might always ask: authentic with respect to what? Performances of musical works might be authentic (or not) with respect to many possible factors—the dress of the musicians, the physical environment within which the performance takes place, the size of the audience, the price of admission, the work being played. Clearly the pursuit of authenticity in performance is selective, and it is so with a very particular purpose in mind. Where music making takes place more or less in the absence of particular musical works, authenticity is concerned with styles of playing. Where an interest in authenticity follows from a concern to present an authentic performance of a musical work, authenticity is aimed at delivering what constitutes the work as the individual it is. An authentic performance of a work might aim to be authentic in further respects; for example, it might (also) aim to re-create the physical environment of the work's first performance (e.g. where a film is being made of the composer's life). But this further kind of authenticity, the authenticity that goes beyond delivering the work itself, is not required in the standard concert setting. What we require from an authentic performance of the work is a performance that is accurate in the sense that it truly represents that in virtue of which the work is the individual it is. It is for this reason that I have equated authenticity with accuracy. An interest in the work being performed is primary in that it gives point to the activity of performing musical works (as opposed to music making in the absence of musical works, or for the sake of historical reconstruction, etc.). So it is that the notion of authenticity in the performance of particular works is centrally and importantly an interest in accuracy in performance.

Now, though, having allowed that the goal from which performance takes its first aim is that of faithfulness to the composer's determinatively expressed musical ideas, it is only fair to concede that performance serves a variety of goals. When a work is familiar and often performed, the attempt to approach the work in a fresh and unusual manner might become desirable. After all, the composer presumably intends that performances of her works be interesting, as well as faithful, and what an audience will find interesting in a performance depends on what they already know of the work. That is to say, where the first goal of performance already has been realized in other performances (and the

audience is familiar with the work in question), other purposes of perform-
ance rightly come into greater prominence (see Levinson 1987).

What of the point, often raised, about the inaccessibility of the significance
of past events, given the number of beliefs and experiences that are no longer
common to us and our musical predecessors? The issues raised by this ques-
tion are subtle and complex, but I shall comment only briefly. Such an
objection to the project of authenticity will work only if there are insurmount-
able differences between us and our predecessors and only if those differences
are such as to affect totally the experience of the musical work *qua* the work
that it is. No doubt there are many respects in which our experiences of music
are bound to differ from those of its contemporary listeners, and no doubt
many of those differences are ineradicable, but to allow this is to be far from
having to accept that authenticity in performance is undesirable and unattain-
able, for it is not obvious that interpersonal judgments of authenticity are
rendered impossible by just any disparities in the experiences of different
listeners (Davies 1988*b*).

II

Different theories of the ontological character of the musical work describe it
as variously thin or rich in properties. At its most spare, the musical work is
said to be a sound structure of (timbre-less) rhythmically articulated notes, or
a relationship between notes, or some combination of these two (Goodman
1968; Webster 1974; Cox 1986). (To use Webster's example, on the view that
the work is a set of pure pitch relationships one would be performing the Bach
E major Violin Concerto just so long as one preserved the appropriate note
relationships, which one might do by playing the piece in B major with piano
and sousaphone.) At the other end of the spectrum is the view that it is
essential to the musical work's being the piece it is that it possess a sound
structure with tempo, timbre, etc. that must be produced by the playing of
certain types of instruments and that must have been composed by a particu-
lar individual at a particular time and place (Levinson 1980; see also Walton
1988*b*). (For example, on this view one would be performing the Bach E
major Violin Concerto accurately only if a violin and orchestra such as is
specified in Bach's score were used to produce the sound of the work and only
if a causal thread might be traced between what one was doing and Bach's
having composed that work at a particular time and place.) Between these
poles, alternative views are possible—for example, that the work is a sound
structure with a certain tempo and timbre but that the means by which such a

sound structure is produced are not part of the identifying features of the work as such (see Kivy 1988a). Whether or not the work is taken to include expressive properties depends on what one takes to be the musical substrate of such properties. If pure note relationships can be expressive, expressiveness might be a property of the work according to the thin characterization; if they are not, it will be performances or interpretations, rather than the work itself, that are expressive (see Pearce 1988). Alternatively, if expressiveness derives as much from the manner by which sounds are produced as from the sounds themselves, only the thick characterization of the work could include expressiveness among the work's properties (Levinson 1990a).

The dispute between theorists with different views on the ontology of the musical work takes a number of forms—whether an analysis of the concept should be ruled by ordinary language, as opposed to an analytical perspicuity being necessary to penetrate the confusions of such ordinary language (Goodman 1968); whether two composers who independently produce specifications that would be interpreted as generating identical sound structures (produced by identical performance means) have composed one or two works (Levinson 1980; Anderson 1982); whether any work might have been composed by a different composer, or at a different place and time; whether a musical event that aims to preserve no more than the thinly characterized sound structure of a work is really a performance of the work; and so forth. (For the most part discussion has centered on musical works of the type written from c.1650–1940. Surprisingly little has been said about works such as Cage's 4' 33" or pieces in which chance plays an important function; but see Ziff 1973, with responses in Sircello 1973 and Walton 1973; see also Tormey 1974 and Cavell 1976.)

One part of the current debate concerns whether musical works are discovered or created. If a work exists (between the times of its performances) as the possibility of its production, then it also exists prior to its composition just so long as it is logically possible that it might be instanced prior to the time of its composition. And if it exists prior to the time of its composition, then the composer must discover, rather than create, the work. Thus, if the musical work is characterized as a thin sound structure (and anything that reproduces that sound structure is an instance of the work, if not a performance of it), then the work might be instanced prior to its composition and must exist for all time, since it might be instanced at any time (Wolterstorff 1975; Cox 1985). Partly in reaction to such a view, the thicker characterization of the work, as necessarily including a performance means and as necessarily being indexed to a person, time, and place, rejects the claim that the work exists

eternally (Levinson 1980). This view ties the work into the world of time and space, so allowing that the work is created and not discovered—and, hence, it rejects the idealism of the alternative view. That is, the argument specifies that an instance of the work must be a performance of it and that performances of the work become possible only from a particular time. The reply to this argument might take different forms: Simply, one could reject the inclusion of performance means within the account of the work's ontology and thereby allow for the possibility of instances of the work that are not performances of it (Kivy 1988*a*); or one could prize the work free of the world by arguing that it might have always been composed by another person, at another place, or at another time, and so might have always been performed at some time before its actual but contingent time of composition; or one might argue that the work still exists eternally as a possibility prior to its composition, even if (as a contingent fact) that possibility could be realized in this world only with the birth of (for example) Beethoven, with the realization of the possibility of the instrument we call a piano, with the realization of a particular cultural and musical context, and so on (Kivy 1987; Walhout 1986). And, to complicate what is already a complex issue, one might argue about the difference, if any, between creation and discovery and about what is supposed to hang on that difference (see esp. Kivy 1987).

III

The connection between a work and its instances has been characterized on the model of a class to its members (Goodman 1968), a kind to its instances (Wolterstorff 1975), and a type to its tokens (Wollheim 1980). The difference between these analogies is not always as clear as it might be, but might come to this: A class is the collection of its instances and does not usually share many properties with its members; a kind stands as a concept the propositional content of which (subjunctive conditional) specifies the nature of its instances without its being a collection of those instances; a type is an abstract individual that possesses and shares the definitive properties of its tokens.

If one thinks there may be such a thing as an imperfect performance of a musical work—something that misrepresents some characteristic of the work though remaining recognizable as an instance of the work—then one might introduce the suggestion that the relationship between the work and its instances is normative rather than descriptive (Wolterstorff 1975; Anderson 1985). This view tends to be associated with the account of musical works as kinds, but I can see no reason why the alternative views might not avail

themselves of some such notion. Thus, the class that constitutes the work might be the subset of those of its performances that are correct in all relevant respects; the norm kind might specify the properties that a correct perform-ance should have; the type may be betokened by more or less well-formed tokens.

On any view, the work determines or exemplifies the properties its in-stances must display in order that they be instances of it; ontologically speaking, it is the nature of the work that determines those properties of its instances by virtue of which they are its instances. The epistemic process goes in reverse, however. We come to know the work through its performances. We abstract the work from its instances, stripping away from its performances those of their properties that are artistically irrelevant, and then stripping away those artistically relevant properties that are properties of the perform-ance but not properties of the work, thereby exposing the work and its properties.

Even if one does not know what properties Beethoven's Fifth Symphony has except by recovering them from performances of the work, one could not recover the work without the aid of some theory about the ontological status of musical works (or of musical works of this type). One can distinguish the irrelevant from the relevant properties only in terms of a theory establishing criteria for relevance. Theories of musical ontology are a priori in this sense: our acquaintance with musical works is indirect, mediated, and we can separate the message from the medium only in view of a conception of what it is that distinguishes the two. Unfortunately, the range of theories presented in the literature suggests there is little agreement at the level of the intuitions grounding the relevant a priori judgments.

I offer just one example by way of illustration: R. A. Sharpe (1979) has denied that performances stand to musical works as tokens stand to types; if they are tokens of anything, he concludes, they are tokens of interpretations. Sharpe arrives at this conclusion by suggesting that it is a feature of the tokens of any given type that their equivalent parts may be interchanged without their status as tokens being impaired—a part of a linen flag might be replaced by an equivalent part of a plastic flag and one would still have a flag, he suggests. But, so continues the argument, parts of different interpretations of a musical work are not similarly interchangeable. What are interchangeable, instead, are parts of performances that are interpretationally consistent the one with the other.

One might challenge this argument on a number of grounds. (a) One could begin by pointing out that there is no bar to a single item's being at the one

time a token of more than one type, so one cannot show that performances are not tokens of musical works by showing that they are tokens of interpretations of musical works. (b) Or, pointing out that internal interpretative consistency is not a necessary condition for something's being a performance of a given work, one might suggest that Sharpe is wrong in denying the possibility of substitution between different interpretations (Kivy 1983). After all, an internally inconsistent performance is often played without any substitution having taken place! (c) Or, one might question the claim that intersubstitutability of parts is a definitive test of a common betokening function. This final criticism ties the objection to the point made above—what one takes to be a token (or class member, or kind instance) depends on one's view as to the nature of the type in question (Dipert 1980*a*). Whether **the**, *the* and the, all are tokens of the same type depends on what one takes the type to be—they all are tokens of the definite article but they are not all tokens of a single typeface. Sharpe's objection to the type/token account of the work/performance relation reveals an implicit commitment to a theory about the nature of the musical work (as well as of the type/token relation).

IV

Already I have emphasized that one could abstract the work from its authentic performances only in the light of a theory about the nature of musical works. Granting that, how does one do it? A crude but tempting answer, perhaps, is this: Find the lowest denominator common to all authentic (accurate) performances of the work, discard those common factors that, according to one's theory, are not relevant to its identity—that all performances took place in the evening, for example—and what one has left is the work. Reflection suggests that this approach is mistaken, however. If every element of the work were determinatively fixed, presumably some such procedure might succeed, but if the work contains elements that are variable, with only the limits of possible variation fixed, then the lowest common denominators underspecify the work. For example, where the work contains a figured bass, the only elements common to accurate performances of the work might be the melody, the bass-line, and a harmonic structure between the two. But that does not mean that the realization of the figured bass is not part of what gives the work its identity. Even if different realizations of the figured bass are possible, so that different (but equally accurate) performances of a given work contain different realizations of its figured bass, an essential part of the work might be the fact that its middle parts be realized

in accordance with quite definite sets of conventions. This suggests that in determining the identifying features of any particular work we need to look beyond the level of common factors and include variable elements where there is a pattern to their variation from performance to performance.

Those who would concentrate their attention exclusively on the musical parameters (pitch, rhythm, texture, instrumentation, timbre, etc.) common to a work's accurate performance are likely to favor a thin characterization of the ontology of the work, because, at that level, the common factors may not go far beyond the notes and the relationships between them. And such theorists are likely to regard conventions allowing for variations in perform-ance as matters of musical style, where style is a characteristic of schools and movements rather than part of what gives any particular work its identity. On the other hand, those who favor the thicker characterization of the musical work are likely to regard the style of the work's proper playing as essential to its being the work that it is. Accordingly, they will tend to include in their account of the work's ontology, as well as the lowest common denominators, the patterns and limits of allowable variation. Where such patterns are common to a number of works (as they are likely to be, given that the conventions are not usually codified), they constitute a style.

The emphasis I have placed both on conventions of performance and on conventions for the transmission of the composer's work-determinative in-tentions to the musician who will execute the composer's work will strike some people as too insecure a basis for an account of musical ontology. Artistic conventions are not more than rules of thumb, and the history of art just is the history of the overthrow and alteration of such conventions. How could the conventions secure the work unless we have a check on what they are and how they are being used? And how, without something such as a score, could we draw the crucial distinction between the composer's making a mistake in accidentally breaking some convention and the composer's deliberately altering some convention? The reply to such questions is two-pronged: (1) It is not the case that wherever music puts aside or minimizes the role of notation we get styles of music making without thereby getting (performances of) musical works. In the absence of highly developed systems of notation, there is a tendency for musical works to become simpler and for improvisational and performance skills to become more important for their own sake, but this tendency is neither necessary nor universal. Javanese notation is far less detailed and complex than is orthodox Western notation (and the general run of Javanese musicians never have occasion to refer to this notation), but there are long and intricate individually named works for the

gamelan orchestra. Many of these works have been in the repertory for hundreds of years. The survival of long and complex musical works largely in the absence of a notation is made possible by the fact that the conventions of performance are complex, stable, widely understood, and generative in nature (in that the widely differing parts for various instruments each can be derived, in terms of the convention appropriate for that instrument, from the work's melodic foundation). The first point then is this: There can be a tradition of performing and preserving individual musical works, some of which may be complex and prolonged, in the absence of a complex musical notation. (2) Where a complex musical notation exists, the manner in which it should be read is governed by conventions that may be invisible only because they are so familiar to those at home with the notation. As well as conventions for reading the score, there are conventions for going beyond what is given in the score—decoration, double-dotting, a preference for stopped rather than open strings unless the contrary is directly indicated, fingerings, the method for realizing a figured bass, etc. etc. Whether something is recorded in the score depends on how well known and widespread various of the conventions are—the composer does not always spell out the limits to the performer's freedom, since those limits are established already within the musical culture, period, and style. Because it is contingent whether or not some particular part of the work (or of the manner of its performance) is recorded in the notation, I believe there is no reason for insisting on a sharp division between the score and the conventions controlling performance practice with respect to such scores, no reason for confining the work to what is notated and dismissing the rest as a matter of style that could play no essential part in shaping the identity of the individual work.[5]

How are mistakes in composition to be distinguished from innovations? The existence of a score guarantees nothing. What is printed in the score might be a mistake (type-setting error, copying error); or, even if the score correctly records what the composer wrote, what the composer wrote might contain an error (for example, a slip of the pen, such as a failure to cancel an accidental with a natural within the same bar). So, again, how can we separate composers' innovations from errors, given that the standards of correctness are set

[5] Goodman (1968) does make such a division because he argues that if the score specifies the work univocally and recoverably, it can do so only if it meets various syntactic requirements (that would not be met by conventions of the type I mention). He is happy to depart from ordinary usage in denying that performances differing by a single note cannot both instance the same work; to do otherwise, he thinks, is to undermine the notion of the transitivity of identity. On similar grounds he denies that the verbal language of tempo (allegro molto, etc.) is notational. For a discussion see Boretz 1970; Goodman 1970; Kulenkampff 1981.

only by mutable conventions? The answer: By seeing whether composers repeat themselves, correct themselves when their attention is drawn to the matter, teach their students the same procedures, describe the matter in their theoretical treatises, and so on and so forth.[6] Obviously, careful attention must be paid to the background of musical practice against which the composer and performers work and, in particular, to those conventions that stand fast for the work (or type of work, or musical period) in question. (An interesting case is that of the Javanese gamelan orchestra, where 'wrong notes' are standardly played so that the gods will not be offended by the pride displayed by humans who act as if they believe that they might attain perfection. Being a musically fastidious people, there are conventions within the performance tradition that govern what wrong notes will be played and the instrument that will play them. In this case an authentic performance would have to contain 'wrong notes'.)

Could the account offered above explain radical rejections of or alterations in musical conventions, such as were involved in the overthrow of the modal system, or in the move to twelve-tone technique? Yes, and for two reasons. (1) Despite what is often said, it is not the case that whole systems of conventions are overthrown at a single bound. Systems of conventions are eroded (and restructured) rather than being dumped holus-bolus. The discontinuities are very marked to those who stand near. With the passage of time and the wider perspective that is thereby created, we often become increasingly aware of the continuities that had always tied the new movement to the heritage against which it reacted. (2) The accumulation of small changes can, in time, produce wholesale alterations. Moreover, even small changes might make possible spectacular aspect-shifts, so that the tiniest innovations could turn one's musical world on its ear.

It is common to suppose that acquaintance with artworks comes from first-hand experience and that, in the musical case, the experience (for the audience, if not the composer) will be an experience of performances of the work. But if a person can become acquainted with a musical work solely by reading its score, the second part of the conjunction is false. And if a few people can experience a musical work solely from reading its score, perhaps they can experience it in the following case also: Several people call out the pitch

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[6] When Jane Torville and Christopher Dean competed in the Olympic Games in Calgary in 1984 they appeared to make a mistake and the shocked crowd gasped. The dance, which followed a prescribed pattern, was twice repeated. On the first repeat, when the questionable pattern of movement recurred, some people gasped again. On the second repetition no one gasped, because everyone recognized that they were seeing an innovative and risky step, not a mistake.

names of notes and their relative durations, the whole being preceded by an announcement that the work is to be played on the piano (Carrier 1983). Under such circumstances what one has, I think, is a 'performance' of the score rather than a performance of the work. Nevertheless, it may be possible for some people to recover the musical work specified by the score from such a 'performance'.

V

An inauthentic performance is a performance that misrepresents the work of which it is a performance while remaining recognizable as a performance of the given work, despite its inaccuracies. The possibility of inauthentic performance presupposes the possibility that mistakes in performance can be recognized as such. I explained above how this might happen: (a) An audience familiar with a work might recognize the way one performance of it differs from others, Or (b), an audience familiar with performance conventions appropriate to the work in question might recognize that those conventions have been violated and might also come to know that this was not intended by the composer and, hence, that the violation was an accident of the work's performance. Sometimes, of course, one might suspect that an error has occurred but not know if it is an error made by the performer, the printer of the score, the composer, or if in fact it is an error at all.

How does one recover the work from its inauthentic performances? To do so, it must be possible not only to detect errors as such but also to determine what would have been correct. Very often this is possible. Most people, I am sure, can tell in some contexts not only that a note has been sung wrongly but also what note should have been sung instead. One might make the general point as follows: Musical works are very complex. One kind of atomic unit of musical content—the unit an alteration in which might make a difference to the musical sense of any given passage—is the pitched tone.[7] (I allow that

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[7] It is my intention here to indicate a musical unit equivalent in status to that of the phoneme in language. The danger of such an approach, of course, is the temptation to draw too close a parallel between music and language—to describe music as a semantic system generating 'sentence-like' units of meaning from the combination of 'word-like' units according to rules of musical syntax. Like so many others, I reject the view that music is a semantic system, which is one reason why I call the atomic units 'phoneme-like' rather than 'word-like'. As I use the analogy, units of musical meaning are combined to form patterns with musical significance; the patterns are significant in that someone who understands music must recognize and appreciate such patterns. The crucial disanalogy lies in the fact that those musical patterns no more have semantic content than do the marks left by a snake as it travels across the sand.

duration, timbre, and dynamics each might also have their atomic units of musical content.) The level at which musical significance arises is that of themes, motives, ostinatos, chords, etc. Many atomic units contribute to the creation of any unit of musical significance. It is always possible that some atomic units be mischaracterized without this resulting in the destruction of the molecular level of organization at which musical significance begins to operate. (Indeed, were this not the case, one could never have the same theme in both a minor-key and a major-key version, or in an embellished version, etc.). Because there are conventions for the generation of units with musical significance from the atomic units, it is possible not only to tell when an atomic unit has been mischaracterized, but also to tell, within the wider context of musical significance, what that unit should have been. But, having said all this, it is obvious that the business of recovering a work from its inauthentic performances is likely to be less secure than that of recovering it from its authentic performances.

Could one recover Bach's E major Violin Concerto from a performance played by piano and sousaphone, given that all the notes were played to tempo and given that one was told that the work was written for the baroque violin? Some people might do so. But notice that it is not a requirement of something's being an inauthentic performance that the work be *entirely* recoverable from the performance. What is required is that sufficient is recoverable to disambiguate the performed work from others. That is, a performance may be recognizable as a performance of a particular work even if it is not possible to recover all of the work from the performance. So, even if one could not easily appreciate how Bach's work would sound for the violin if one heard it played on a sousaphone, it does not follow from that fact that it is not a performance of the work that one is hearing.

VI

At least one of the connections between musical ontology and musical authenticity should be obvious by now: If an authentic performance is an accurate performance, what is to count as an authentic performance depends on presuppositions about the ontology of musical works, since the ontology determines what it is that constitutes the work as the individual it is and an accurate performance is a performance that reproduces all that is constitutive of the work's individuality. That is to say, not only is the notion of a musical work an artifact of theory, so too are the notions of a performance and of an authentic performance.

Notwithstanding what I have just written, to the extent that the theorists of musical ontology aim to characterize our intuitive notion of the musical work, it should be possible to test their theories against our intuitions and against the terms in which we identify and discuss musical works and their performances. Some philosophers might regard ordinary language as hopelessly sloppy and treat philosophical analysis as prescriptive rather than descriptive. In such cases there is always a difficulty in our accepting that we should abandon our intuitions and ways of talking for the sake of a philosophical theory. Most philosophers, though, *do* take themselves to be analyzing our present concepts and if it turns out that our concepts are sloppy and obscure, then it will be part of the philosopher's job to map the limits of those obscurities and point to the source of our conceptual sloppiness. The majority of the philosophers who discuss musical ontology take themselves to be performing some such descriptive role and it is possible (therefore) to test their views against our shared intuitions—in theory.

Nevertheless, in practice that test seems not to get us anywhere fast—as I indicated at the outset, there are no widely shared intuitions about the nature of musical works entrenched firmly enough that the philosophical debate about musical ontology can be easily resolved. However, in view of the connection between ontology and authentic performance for which I have argued, it is possible perhaps to reconsider the debate about musical ontology in terms of our intuitions about musical authenticity, so long as those intuitions are firmly based. The issue is not one about whether authenticity in performance is desirable; neither is it one about whether we can experience authentically performed music as it was experienced by its composer's contemporaries. Rather, the issue is whether we are agreed on what is involved in aiming at authenticity. If we are, it might be possible to draw inferences from the agreed facts that reflect on the debate about musical ontology.

Are we so agreed? It seems to me that there is a considerable measure of agreement about what is involved in aiming at authentic performance for some kinds of music, at least. Performers have consistently tried to achieve authenticity by the use of the instruments for which the composer wrote, by the adoption of styles of playing and by the adoption of the performance practices for reading and interpreting notations that held at the time of composition, and so on. If we consider the kind of ontology presupposed by such a view of authenticity, it appears we must favor a thicker rather than a thinner characterization of the nature of the musical work. If the use of the appropriate performance means is important not simply because other means of producing the appropriate sounds are not available, but in the fuller sense

that the use of those means is integrally and inescapably a part of the process by which authentic performance is achieved, then musical works are not viewed as pure sound structures.

The point I have made above is an important one, I believe, in its implications for the correctness or otherwise of different accounts of musical ontology. But, by focusing on a narrow area of performance and musical history, its significance might be easily overestimated. If we take a wider perspective and consider the way an interest in music might range from a concern with music making in the absence of musical works, through an interest in music making with musical works minimally important and the stress on the improvisational skills of the performer, and finally to music making with a complex, more or less determinate musical work as the primary object of interest and the music making the means by which that work is presented, what emerges, I think, is the realization that the notion of authentic performance has no single, fixed essence. The more it is that the musical work drops out of account—for example, because it exists as no more than a cipher the performers must expand and develop in the creation of a performance—the more it will be the case that authenticity in performance is concerned with faithfulness to styles of playing rather than to the work itself. The more it is that the musical work is sufficiently complex and stable to become the focus of attention—for example, because it is recorded by means of a sophisticated notation or because conventions for performances are sufficiently complex and detailed to allow for the preservation of the individuality of long pieces— the more it will be the case that authenticity in performance is concerned with faithfulness to a determinative text. Moreover, because musical conventions are mutable, as are complex systems of notation, what it is that can be determined by the composer and the conventions as the text of a musical work will be relative to the time of the work's composition. Accordingly, what it is that can be required in the name of faithfulness from a performance of a given work will depend very much on the work's period.

Given this wider perspective, what emerges, I suggest, is the idea that the criteria for authenticity in musical performances are variable. In some cases it is essential, if authenticity is to be achieved, that particular types of instruments are used, because the use of those instruments is specified by the composer and the performance practice of the day treats such specifications as determinative. In other cases, a variety of instrumental ensembles might be employed in different, equally authentic performances, because the conventions of the day allowed the composer to determine nothing more definite than a range of possibilities. By the mid-nineteenth century, notated phrasing

and dynamics are determinative and must be observed in an authentic performance; in the mid-eighteenth century these musical parameters are variable within wide limits and notations of them had the status only of recommendations. In some extreme cases, the limits of choice permitted to the performer are perhaps so wide that the work appears to be no more than a pure, timbreless sound structure that might be realized authentically on a synthesizer, since not even an historical limitation on the work's instrumentation would be recognized by its creator and the musical culture within which that composer worked.

If what I have said on the basis of this wider perspective is correct, it might appear to be appropriate to draw the paradoxical conclusion that all the theories of musical ontology I have mentioned are correct and that none of them is. More carefully, the moral to draw perhaps is this: The totality of musical works from culture to culture and from time to time do not have any single ontological character. Some musical works are thick with properties, others are thinner—some works include the performance means as part of their essential nature, and much more besides, whereas others are more or less pure sound structures.

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Part Two
Performance

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Authenticity in Musical Performance[1]

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In this chapter I discuss musical performances and their authenticity with respect to the independently identifiable musical pieces of which they are performances.[2]

The adjective 'authentic' has a number of meanings that no doubt are related. But I am not here interested in the unity of the concept, nor in the relative primacy of these different meanings. Nor shall I discuss one familiar notion of musical authenticity—that in which a performance is authentic with respect to a style or *genre*. My limited interest is in the authenticity of musical performances as performances of particular compositions (which are independently identified with event specifications that, in the case of the Western cultural tradition on which I shall concentrate, take the form of musical scores). That is, if I talk of the authenticity of a performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, I am interested in its authenticity as a member of the class of performances recognizable as performances of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and not with it as a member of other classes of performances to which it may also belong, such as that of the nineteenth-century symphony.

The view for which I argue characterizes authenticity in musical performance as follows: A performance that aims to realize the composer's score faithfully in sound may be judged for authenticity. A performance of X is

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[1] First published in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 27 (1987), 39–50. Reprinted in Alex Neil and Aaron Ridley (eds.), *Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994, 62–73, and in Patrick Maynard and Susan Feagin (eds.), *Aesthetics: Oxford Reader Series*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 228–34.

[2] Though it might be argued, for example, that rehearsals are not performances, this is a subtlety I ignore.

more authentic the more faithful it is to the intentions publicly expressed in the score by the composer (where those intentions are determinative and not merely recommendatory of performance practice). Because the composer's score underdetermines the sound of a faithful performance, the authenticity of any particular performance is judged against (the appropriate members of) a set of ideally faithful performances. As a commendatory term, 'authentic' is used to acknowledge the creative role of the performer in faithfully realizing the composer's specifications.

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first four concentrate on the aim of faithfulness in securing authenticity; as well as an attempt to define authenticity, these sections contain a characterization of what is involved in faithfully realizing a composer's intentions. In the penultimate section I discuss why authenticity in musical performance is value-conferring. In the final section I emphasize the creative nature of the performer's role.

I

In this first section I argue that the pursuit of authenticity involves the attempt to produce musical *sounds* as opposed to the social *milieu* within which those sounds were originally created.

Over the past fifty years there has been a growing interest in authenticity in musical performance. The same period has also seen a developing interest in the performance of premodern music. These parallel developments are probably related. Where modern music is written for modern instruments and notated in the standard fashion, a high degree of authenticity will be achieved in performance by a competent musician. But the more foreign the styles of performance and the more unfamiliar the instruments employed, the harder will it be for musicians to produce authentic performances without the benefit of scholarly advice and instruction.

A moment's reflection shows that the pursuit of authenticity in musical performance has been highly selective. The price of admission, the dress of the audience, the method by which the program is printed—each of these and much else in the context of music's performance is decidedly modern. The search for musical authenticity takes a very particular direction. A highly authentic performance is likely to be one using instruments contemporary to the period of composition (or replicas of such instruments) in its performance, involving an interpretation of the score in the light of stylistic practices and performance conventions of the time when the work was composed,

employing ensembles of the same size and disposition as accord with the composer's specification, and so forth.

The selectivity displayed in the search for authenticity in musical performance has been systematic in a way suggesting that the quest may be characterized as aiming at the production of a particular *sound* rather than at the production of, for example, the social ambience within which the music would or could be presented by the composer's contemporaries. This point is effectively illustrated as follows: Orchestral music composed in the latter half of the eighteenth century might have been standardly performed in wood-paneled rooms. Nowadays such works would be performed in concert halls. Modern concert halls are designed with modifiable acoustics, the adjustments being made by the use of baffles, etc. In performing music of the period in question, the acoustics of the concert hall would be set with a reverberation period such as one might find in a wood-paneled room containing a small audience. Though the music now is performed in a large hall in front of a large audience, the acoustic properties of the modern building are so arranged that they duplicate the acoustic properties of the sort of room where the music would have been performed in the composer's day. Though one might prefer the intimacy of music performed in salons, I take it that it will be accepted that the use of concert halls that reproduce the acoustic properties of wood-paneled rooms would be considered not *merely* as an adequate compromise between the demands of authenticity and, say, economic considerations but, instead, would be accepted as a full-blooded attempt at authentic performance.[3] That modern acoustic technology might serve the aim of authenticity in this way suggests strongly that musical authenticity aims at the creation of a particular sound and not at the production of a particular visual, social, or other effect.

Some performances are less authentic for being given in buildings other than that for which the work was written, but this is true only of performances of works written with an ear to the unique acoustic properties of a particular building. That is, it is true of performances of Stravinsky's *Canticum Sacrum* and of many works by Andrea and Giovanni Gabrieli, which were written for San Marco in Venice, and it is not true of Verdi's *Aïda*, which was written for the opera house in Cairo, because, whereas the acoustics of the opera house in Cairo are not distinctively different from those of other opera houses,

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[3] As implied here, the desirability of musical authenticity may sometimes be outweighed by other factors—musical, pragmatic, or even moral. (I assume that arguments against the use of trained castrati in *opera seria* are of the latter kind.) Of course, where the choice is between no performance at all and a less than ideally authentic performance, the latter may be preferable.

the acoustics of San Marco are unlike those of other buildings. These examples do not count against the point that a concern with the authenticity of a performance is a concern with its sound.

II

In this second section I suggest that one might best hope to make a performance authentic by recreating the musical sound of a performance that might have been heard by the composer's contemporaries. (Why this is a formula for success is a matter considered in the next section.) I argue also that the sound to which an authentic performance aspires is that of a possible, rather than any actual, performance; that is, authenticity in musical performance is judged against an ideal.

So far, I have said a performance is more or less authentic in a way that depends on its sound. One might ask—the sound of what? A musical work is comprised of notes and relationships between them, so an authentic performance of a given work must be a performance that concerns itself with producing the notes that constitute the work. The sound of an authentic performance will be the sound of those notes.

But it is not easy to specify the set of notes that constitute a given work (see Ziff 1973, Sircello 1973, and Walton 1973). The notes recorded in the score are often not the notes the performer should play; there are conventions frequently known both to composers and performers governing ways the written notes are to be modified (for example by accidentals or embellishment). So, an interest in discrepancies between what is written and what is conventionally played is of practical and not merely scholarly significance. Debates about the problems of *musica ficta* in music written pre-1600 strongly reflect a desire to achieve authentic performances of the music in question.

Even where the conventions by which the score should be read are known, it is not always a straightforward matter to say which notes should be played. Consider music written at about the end of the seventeenth century, when pitches were as much as a minor third lower than now. The modern performer might play the work at the modern pitch level, but vocal and wind parts would then sound strained even if sung or played brilliantly and correctly.[4] Or, the performer might tune down modern instruments, as a result of which their tone will suffer, or transpose orchestral parts, in which case the sound is

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[4] Competent musicians do not usually stumble over fast passages, lose the tempo, or produce gross tonal contrasts but, despite this, hard music sounds hard to play (Mark 1980).

affected by alterations in fingerings and embouchure, by changes in register, by shifts to harmonics, etc. In view of such difficulties it is understandable that performers have turned to the use of instruments from the period of composition, or to replicas of such instruments, so that vocal and instrumental parts 'lie' comfortably to the voice and hands. The use of such instruments is ultimately justified by the resulting sound of the performance.

However, despite the use of instruments and the appeal to musical conventions from the time of composition, clearly it is inadequate to characterize authenticity in musical performance in terms of the sound heard by the composer's contemporaries. His contemporaries could perform the work in question in ways that were relatively inauthentic.[5] Typically, this would occur where the performance contained wrong notes or where the composer's specifications were misrepresented in some other way. The musicians who sight-read the overture to *Don Giovanni* from orchestral parts on which the ink was still wet probably gave a performance that was not as authentic as it could have been. Since the performances heard by the composer's contemporaries often were less authentic than was possible, authenticity in musical performance cannot be defined in terms of the sounds actually heard by the composer's contemporaries. This suggests that, in striving for authenticity, the performer aims at an *ideal* sound rather than at the sound of some actual, former performance.

III

In this third section I consider the relevance of the composer's intentions in an assessment of the authenticity of a performance of the composer's work. I suggest that only those intentions that are accepted by convention as determinative are relevant to judgments of authenticity; other of the composer's intentions or wishes might be ignored in an ideally authentic performance. Because the composer's determinative intentions underdetermine the sound of an ideally authentic performance of her work, there is a set of ideal

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[5] It might be objected to what I have said that judgments of authenticity apply only to performances that are historically removed from the period of composition, or culturally removed from the place or style of composition, or in some other way distanced from the composition. On my view, judgments of authenticity tend to reduce to judgments of accuracy. But this does not mean that a performance by the composer's contemporaries (for whom the score is 'transparent' to the conventions by which it should be read) is not distanced from the work in a way that leaves room for judgments of authenticity. Performance involves a creative element that is integral and not merely appended to the faithfulness of the performance. This creative element distances *any* particular performance from the work of which it is a performance.

performances (and not any single ideal performance) in terms of which the relative authenticity of actual performances is judged.

There are conventions in terms of which musical scores are to be read. The composer is able to express her intentions in a musical notation only because the conventions for realizing in sound that notation are known both to the composer and to the performer of the day. Those conventions provide not only a vehicle for but also a limitation on the intentions that may be expressed in the score. Not all of the intentions that the conventions allow to be expressed are determinative of what can be required in the name of authenticity. Non-determinative intentions (as expressed in the score or in other ways) have the status of recommendations. I take it that exact metronome indications are non-determinative, in that tempo may be varied to suit the performance conditions. Both the composer and the performing musician who is her contemporary are usually familiar with the conventions and know which of the expressed intentions are determinative and which are not determinative of that at which an authentic performance must aim.

The conventions by which musical scores are to be read change over time in ways affecting what the composer may determine with respect to the performer's attempt to produce an authentic performance. Phrasing was not notationally determined in the early seventeenth century but was notationally determined by the nineteenth century. At some time, before the convention was established, composers notated phrasings that would have been rightly understood as recommendations for, rather than as determinative of, what should be played. At that time, the composer's indications of phrasing might be disregarded without any diminution in the authenticity of the performance (though the performance may have been less good as a result on other grounds). (These changes in convention sometimes arise from composers' rebelling against the existing conventions, but such rebellions reject only a few conventions at any one time and do so against a wider background of accepted conventions.) Because conventions of determinativeness change through time, the conventions appropriate to the authentic performance of a score are those with which the composer would have taken musicians *of the day* to be familiar. It is this fact that explains what I have emphasized in the previous section—that an attempt at an authentic performance is likely to be successful by aiming to re-create the sound of an accurate performance by the composer's contemporaries.[6]

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[6] The claim that the conventions of score reading and/or performance practice establish which of the composer's publicly expressed intentions are determinative may be defeated where there are

Sometimes it is possible to infer from what is written in the score that the composer would have preferred to write something else had the instruments or the performers been capable of accommodating her intentions. For example, a sequential pattern might be interrupted by an octave transposition where a continuation of the pattern would have exceeded the singer's or the instrument's range. In these cases, it is appropriate to talk of the composer's wishes (rather than intentions). Sometimes nowadays, with the wider range of some instruments and the greater proficiency of many musicians, these wishes could be realized and there would be a musical point to doing so. However, such wishes have no more a bearing on the authenticity of a performance than do the composer's non-determinative intentions. Both the work and the performance may be better for the modification, but not because the alteration makes the performance more authentic. If it were accepted that mere wishes could set the standards of authenticity, it would be accepted also that many works could not have been performed authentically by the composer's contemporaries and some could not be performed authentically at all.

Clearly, in taking the line I have, I must deny that authenticity in musical performance is judged against the *sound* of some particular performance that was envisaged by the composer. I have said that not all of the composer's expressed intentions are determinative of what must be accurately rendered in an ideally authentic performance, in which case I must also hold that the sound of an ideally authentic performance is underdetermined by the intentions in terms of which its authenticity is judged. The way we talk of authenticity favors my view, I claim, rather than the view that authenticity is measured against the *sound* of a performance that the composer had in mind. First, in reaching judgments about the authenticity of performances, we do not seem to face the epistemological difficulties that would inevitably arise if the standard for authenticity was a sound that may never have been realized. Second, rather than taking composers' performances as definitive models that performers are obliged to copy slavishly, we take them to be

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grounds for believing that the composer was not familiar with the conventions or that the composer believed that the musicians who would perform the piece were not familiar with all the relevant conventions. These double-take and triple-take situations are unusual. An example: If the composer had only ever heard violins with a thin and reedy tone and by the indication 'violin' on the score meant to designate instruments of that type, then the fact that Guaneri's violins were extant at the time would not license their use in performances of the composer's works in the name of authenticity, not even if the composer had *wished* that the instruments she knew as violins had a richer, fruitier tone. (To avoid such problem cases I should relativize all claims about the role of the relevant conventions to the composer's knowledge of those conventions and beliefs about the performers' knowledge of those conventions.)

revealing of what we expect to be an interesting interpretation. In a performance, the composer may make her intentions as regards the *sound* of a performance more explicit than could be done in the score, but what is made explicit is not thereby made definitive. Other performers are left with the job of interpreting the score for themselves.[7] Third, we would not (as we do) accept that *different-sounding* performances of a single work might be equally and ideally authentic if authenticity were judged against the sound of a *particular* performance imagined by the composer. It is (a member of) a *set* of ideal performances against which the authenticity of an actual performance is judged.

This last point deserves emphasis. Because an ideally authentic performance faithfully preserves the composer's determinative intentions and because those intentions underdetermine the sound of a faithful performance, different-sounding performances may be equally and ideally authentic. For example, many combinations of vocal and instrumental resources are compatible with what is determinative in the score of Guillaume de Machaut's *Messe de Nostre Dame*. Even if the composer wrote for a particular combination of singers and instruments (such as were assembled for the coronation of Charles V in 1364, perhaps) the conventions of the day allow that performances by quite different combinations would be no less authentic. As long as two performances are faithful to the score and are consistent with the performance practices in terms of which it is to be rendered, they may be equally authentic while sounding different. Compare, for example, performances of Beethoven's symphonies as conducted by Klemperer and Toscanini, both of whom have been praised as interpreters of the works. Klemperer tends to take the pieces at the slowest tempo consistent with Beethoven's instructions and he emphasizes the structural qualities of the music so that, for example, climaxes at relatively weak structural points receive less weight than do those in structurally important places, even where the dynamics indicated in the score are the same in both places. Toscanini takes the works at a brisk tempo and concentrates on the drama or beauty of each individual passage, investing every note and phrase with its full potential of power. Without Klemperer's staid approach, the grandeur and architectonic qualities of Beethoven's music could not be presented. Without Toscanini's volatile approach, the dynamism and verve of Beethoven's music could not be appreciated. So, the ideally authentic

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[7] A pertinent discussion of musical authenticity and the relevance of composers' intentions may be found in Taruskin 1982. The status of the composer's intentions is interestingly discussed in Dipert 1980*b*. The philosophical literature on the subject of artist's intentions is immense. Two of my own papers bear on the topic—see Davies 1982 and 1983*a*.

performance has no *particular* sound because it is no *particular* performance. Rather, the standard against which the authenticity of performances of a work is judged is comprised of a set of performances each of which is faithful to the composer's determinative intentions.

In view of the above I offer the following account: A performance will be more authentic if it successfully (re-)creates the sound of a contemporary performance of the work in question such as could be given by good musicians playing good instruments under good conditions (of rehearsal time, etc.), where 'good' is relativized to the best of what was known by the composer to be available at the time, whether or not those resources were available for the composer's use.

IV

In this fourth section I analyze musical performance as involving both certain intentions on the part of the performer and a relationship of invariance between the composer's sound specification and the performer's realization of that score. Performing is briefly contrasted with improvising and fantasizing. The point of authenticity is said to be the faithful realization of the composer's score in sound.

The notion of performance must be analyzed in terms of the performer's intentions. If the production of some set of sounds is a performance of X, then it must be the intention of the producer of the sounds to generate a sound faithful to an X-specification. However, the intention to perform X is defeasible; where the sound produced is not recognizable as a realization of the X-specification the attempt at performance has failed. The notion of authenticity operates *within* the range set on the one hand by performances that are barely recognizable as such and on the other hand by performances that are ideally accurate. The closer a performance, recognizable as such, comes to the sound of an ideal performance of the work in question, the more authentic is that performance.[8]

I have suggested that there must be, as well as the appropriate intentions, an invariant relationship between the composer's specification and a performance of that specification as a necessary condition of the success of

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[8] It is controversial, I realize, to regard a barely recognizable performance as authentic. Of course, the level of authenticity expected in a *competent* performance is far higher than the minimum at which a performance is barely recognizable as such. A minimally recognizable performance is inauthentic when authenticity is relativized to a standard of acceptability at the level of a competent performance.

the attempt at performance. There must be some common factor (or tolerance across a range of features) necessary for a performance's being a performance of X rather than of Y, and necessary for different-sounding performances all to be performances of the same X. Now, clearly the standard by which an attempted performance is minimally recognizable as such falls far short of a standard that identifies the work with the totality of notes constituting it. By this standard only a perfectly accurate performance could count as a performance of the work in question, yet we all know that the school orchestra may play wrong notes, play out of tune, and fail to play together while performing what is unmistakably Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. It is because musical works are comprised of large numbers of notes, not all of which contribute equally to the overall effect, that the identity of the work survives the performance of wrong notes. So, what is invariant between performances of the same work is *patterns* of notes (or aspects, gestalts, emergent properties, functions, of notes) plus a tolerance for deviation from these patterns. Musical works are so complex that there are patterns of notes within patterns of notes and these various patterns may remain recognizable despite changes in or omissions of individual notes. The standard of adequacy that must be met in a successful attempt to perform the composer's score need not be one that requires a high degree of accuracy.[9] It is within the gap between a set of ideally faithful interpretations of a work and of barely recognizable performances of that work that the notion of authenticity operates. A performance is the more authentic the further beyond the minimum standard of adequacy it falls. The more faithful is a musical performance to the work's specification the more authentic is that performance.

The difference between a *performance* of X, an *improvisation* on X, and an X-inspired fantasia lies in the musician's intentions, the aim being to realize a higher level of invariance with respect to the work's specification in performance than in improvisation and in improvisation than in fantasizing. Whereas authenticity is appropriately predicated of performances of particular works, it is not appropriately predicated of improvisations or fantasias inspired by particular works; that is, authenticity applies only where there is intended to be more rather than less invariance between the specification of the work and

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[9] The same kind of point may be made with respect to other musical parameters. A performance on the piano of J. S. Bach's Concerto in D minor for Harpsichord, BWV 1052, *is* a performance of it, despite the change of instrument, and not the performance of a *transcription* of Bach's work. Conventions in Bach's time allowed quite free interchange between keyboard instruments and, in view of this, merely changing the solo instrument does not transform the work enough for the performance to count as that of a transcription. (One does not transcribe a musical work merely by altering a word in its *title*, which, in effect, is what happens here.)

its rendition in sound. This suggests that the notion of authenticity applies where a 'text' (usually a written score in literate music cultures and a model rendition in oral music cultures) is interpreted by a mediator who stands between the composer and his audience, and where the point of the interpretation is to render faithfully to the audience what is determined of the sound of the performance in the work's specification. A concern with the authenticity of performances of particular works ultimately takes its interest from a more fundamental concern with the authority of authorship.

A shift of focus to music that is primarily improvisational (i.e. most jazz, a substantial amount of non-Western music, and some recent 'classical' music) helps to bring out the point. In such music, where the composer creates a cipher lending itself to improvisational manipulation, we are more likely to be concerned with the authenticity of the *style* of the performance of any given work than with its authenticity as a performance of that particular work. The less the sound of the performance is determined in a faithful realization of the composer's specification, the less we are concerned with the type of authenticity in performance I have been discussing (and the more the musicians are rated above composers). The less the composer has a hand in the final outcome, the less is a concern with musical authenticity a concern with the authority of authorship.

V

In this fifth section I consider the way authenticity in musical performance is valued. I suggest that though such authenticity would not be valued were it not a means to an independently valued end—the end of presenting the composer's interesting musical ideas—nevertheless, authenticity in musical performance is not valued as a means to this end.

Beyond the level of an acceptably competent performance, authenticity is value-conferring. A musical performance is better for its being more authentic (other things being equal). Because we have an aesthetic concern with the musical interest of the composer's ideas, and because those musical ideas must be mediated by performance, we value authenticity in performance for the degree of faithfulness with which the performance realizes the composer's musical conception as recorded in the score. I am not maintaining that authenticity in performance takes its value from the worth of the musical content contributed by the composer. Rather, my point is this: Were it not for the fact that composers set out to write aesthetically rewarding works, and were it not for the fact that they are usually successful in this, we would not

value authenticity in musical performances as we do. But, in any particular instance, authenticity in performance is valued independently and irrespective of the aesthetic value of the work itself. A performance is better for a higher degree of authenticity (other things being equal) *whatever* the merits of the composition itself. A performance praiseworthy for its authenticity may make evident that the composer wrote a work with little musical interest or merit. It is the creative skill required of the performer in faithfully interpreting the composer's score that is valued in praising the authenticity of performances of that score.[10]

Of course, authenticity is not the only quality for which a performance might be valued. Where a relatively inauthentic performance is highly valued, it is valued *in spite of* its inauthenticity. Thus, Schnabel's recorded performances of the Beethoven sonatas are well regarded despite the wrong notes they contain.

VI

In this final section I emphasize how creative is the role of the performer in faithfully realizing the composer's specification. In developing the point, a contrast is drawn between performing and copying.

The performer transforms the notes-as-written into the notes-as-sounds. In talking casually of the notes of a piece, and thereby obscuring this distinction, one might easily lose sight of the creativity of the role enacted by the performer in faithfully converting the one into the other. The sounded notes created by the performer go far beyond the bare peg that the composer provides and on which the musicians hang their art. An authentic performance concerns itself with the production of the notes that constitute the piece and that the composer specified, but the notes-as-sounds produced by the performer involve subtleties of attack, decay, dynamics, tone, and so on that cannot be captured in any notation composers are likely to use. The written notes and the way they are played come together inseparably in the notes-as-sounds, and it is in no way to undervalue the role of the composer as the specifier of the notes-as-written to acknowledge that the musician

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[10] Indulging in some armchair sociobiology: It is perhaps not surprising in a social species such as ours—which is concerned with successful communication and for which there can be no guarantee that any particular attempt at communication will not fail—that what facilitates communication becomes valued for its own sake and apart from the worth of the contents it helps to communicate. (Not that I think that music can be usefully compared to a language with respect to its meaning—see Davies 1983*b*.)

brings something original to the notes-as-written in rendering them into sound (Harrison 1978). The creative role of the performer, rather than involving a departure from the concern to realize faithfully the composer's intentions, is integral to the execution of that concern.

What is more, rather than consisting of mere aggregations of notes, music is comprised of themes, chords, subjects, answers, sequences, recapitulations, developments, motifs, accompaniments, and so forth. These are gestalts (or aspects, etc.) and not mere successions of notes. Because their articulation in sound owes as much or more to the performer as to the composer, it can be seen how extensive and important is the creative role of the performer.

One way of bringing out the creative role of the performer as a necessary intermediary between the composer and the audience is by contrasting performing and copying. Copying need not be intentional; copying may be a mechanical process performed by a machine. And where copying is intentional, the aim of faithfulness is to be contrasted with that of creativity. By contrast, performance is always intentional, because the performer must bring more than is supplied by the composer to a performance that is faithful to the composer's ideas. Performing must go beyond what is given by the composer in order to present that accurately. But nothing not present in the original need be brought to copying. A machine might copy a performance (for example, by recording it on tape), but performing is done only by agents.[11] And copies are authentic only in the sense contrasted with forgery or fakery, whereas performances are authentic in the sense that has here been under discussion. Authenticity is an attribute acknowledging the way the interpretation of a musical score is both necessary in the presentation of the music-as-sounds and is also inherently creative. Authenticity, as a praiseworthy attribute, acknowledges the ineliminability of the performer's contribution to the sound of the performance.

[11] I do not deny that copying by hand an illuminated manuscript might require patience, skill, etc. in a way that suggests that copying is anything but mechanical in this instance. Nor do I wish to deny that there are imaginable cases in which computers are programmed to produce sounds where we would be tempted to say a machine performs. (Just as there are cases in which the musician performs *on* a violin without our saying the violin performs, so there are cases in which musicians perform *on* computers—but the example to be imagined is not of this type.) But if there were such computers, talk of them as machines would begin to look inapposite; at such a point one begins thinking in terms of intelligent or agent-like 'machines'.

So, You Want to Sing with the Beatles? Too Late![1]   6

I have always wanted to play Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic. I am thwarted in this ambition by my inability to play the violin. Even if I were competent, though, I might have difficulty arranging a gig with the Vienna Philharmonic. Given my lack of charisma and sex appeal, it is likely they would prefer to employ Vanessa-Mae. But all is not lost. Thanks to the wonders of recording technology, I have the chance to play the soloist's part in a performance that is accompanied by an orchestra of skilled professionals. I can buy a music-minus-one recording.[2] I have already mastered the use of the record player. Once I have acquired the skill to control horsehair, catgut, and wood, seemingly nothing can keep me from the fulfillment of my goal.

My desire may not be a common one but I suspect that millions have imagined themselves thrilling audiences with their vocal renditions of 'I Love Rock 'n' Roll', 'My Way', 'Like a Virgin', 'Bad', 'The Wind Beneath My Wings', 'Little Red Rooster', 'The Girl from Ipanema', 'Born in the USA', 'The Rose', or 'Yesterday'. If everyone can sing, then the means for satisfying such desires is readily at hand. It is karaoke.[3]

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[2] 'Music-minus-one' recordings are of works from the classical repertoire with a prominent solo part which is absent from the record. The idea is that the home musician takes on the role of the missing soloist. For instance, she plays a flute or recorder for Bach's Brandenburg Concerto No. 4, the solo violin for Brahms's Violin Concerto, the piano in Grieg's Piano Concerto.

[3] In karaoke, a popular song is played from a multimedia (vision and sound) CD-ROM disk. The main vocal part of the song, which is missing from the sound track, is supplied by a member of the

My topic is the interactive music disk, such as music-minus-one recordings and karaoke. These are interactive in that they 'invite' (are designed and marketed to allow for) a contribution from the user. Unlike ordinary music disks or videos, which provide a finished commodity for the listener's consumption, these encourage her participation. Indeed, such disks are uninteresting failures unless they elicit the appropriate involvement. But do they hold out the promise suggested above; that is, can one really play with the Vienna Philharmonic or sing with the Beatles? And when one does play or sing, how is that activity properly described: as a performance? of the work? with the group or orchestra?

I

As a prelude to addressing the above questions, I begin with a more general one: What is it that makes one a performer (one of the performers) on the occasion of a (classical) work's performance? Consider this case: At a concert by the Vienna Philharmonic featuring Brahms's Violin Concerto, a person in the audience, call him Colin Legno, pulls out his fiddle and plays the solo part, along with the virtuoso, Maestro Battere, on stage. Is Colin thereby a performer? Can he claim to have played Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic? First intuitions suggest otherwise, but the reasons take some sorting out.

The person beside Colin who quietly whistles his way through the first-violin music is not a performer, since Brahms wrote no part for a whistler in his Violin Concerto. Colin plays on the violin what Brahms wrote for the instrument. He is not debarred from being a performer on this count (or on this score!), as is the whistler, or as he would be if it were the solo part of Mendelssohn's Violin Concerto he was playing. There is a departure from Brahms's implicit instructions, since what Colin plays was intended for a single violinist, not a duo. But this point alone does not settle the issue, for it does not indicate whether it is Colin's contribution or Maestro Battere's that is uncalled for. In any case, Colin might switch to playing the second-violin part, which is written for an indefinite number of players. Another point, that Colin is situated in the auditorium, not on the stage, is inconclusive. There are many works calling for a contribution from offstage. It would

live audience, who is provided with a microphone for the purpose. The words are shown on the screen and a 'bouncing ball' indicates the rhythm to be followed. Karaoke has not attracted much attention from philosophers of music. Ethnomusicologists, too, have ignored the phenomenon, an exception being Keil 1994.

not be surprising if the musician who plays the trumpet call in a performance of Beethoven's *Leonore No. 3* does so from the gallery. There is no general rule restricting performers to the stage, but even if some such convention applies to Brahms's Violin Concerto, which issues no instructions for offstage playing, Colin might elbow his way on to the concert platform before he begins. A further suggestion, that Colin is not a member of the Vienna Philharmonic, is also indecisive. In reply, it might be noted that, in the general run of things, neither is Maestro Battere. Besides, orchestras are often put together on an *ad hoc* basis, or use supplementary musicians for the purposes of a given performance. And, anyway, we can suppose that Colin is in fact a member of the Vienna Philharmonic—one who happens to spend his day off by attending this concert. Finally, it might be suggested that Colin has not been advertised as the work's soloist, but against this we can note that substitutions do sometimes occur. If Maestro Battere became indisposed, leading the conductor to ask if there were a violinist in the house, Colin might, after all, get to play Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic. To summarize: If Colin is not a performer on this occasion, that is neither because he is excluded by the relation between what he does and what Brahms wrote, nor because there is an irreparable departure from the conventions pertaining to concert presentations.

What, then, does exclude Colin's efforts from the given performance? It is the fact that he is not recognized by the performing group as of their number on this occasion. It is the musicians' intentions as regards their activity that make them performers of the work at hand. The relevant intentions are mutual and reciprocal. It is because the musicians aim both to perform Brahms's work (that is, to follow the instructions encoded in the score he wrote) and to do this together that they are performers on a particular occasion of the work's rendition. Two orchestras at different ends of a concert hall might both play Brahms's Violin Concerto, but this would result in two, simultaneous, performances, not a single one, provided each saw the other as constituting a distinct orchestra. (Some pieces are written for physically separated groups, each with their own conductor. Karlheinz Stockhausen's *Gruppen* is one such. But in performing this work the musicians recognize each other as engaged in common in that enterprise.)

In the case of live performances, the temporal and regional proximity of the musicians is also required. Suppose that Colin were to play the solo part in a given performance of Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic but did not arrive at the venue, being caught in a traffic jam. Knowing that the concert is to be broadcast live on the radio and that professional

musicians of this caliber will play on regardless, senza soloist, Colin plays his violin in the car with its radio tuned to the concert. I think we would deny that he has played the concerto with the orchestra, even though they include him among their group, because he was not present at the performance. We would do the same if, arriving two hours late, he rushed to the stage and played through his part. Again, he would have failed to play the work with the orchestra.[4]

For recordings of performances, these conditions are relaxed. Signora Usignolo might record her part in a love duet at one time in Milan, while Signor Ondeggiando tapes his at another in Naples.[5] Recorded performances can differ in many respects from live ones. For instance, instead of playing the work continuously from beginning to end, as in a concert rendition, the recording might involve many takes that are later edited together. To mark the difference, I will reserve the term 'studio performance' for what finds its way on to a recording. As just indicated, the boundaries marking a studio performance are not set by the temporal and regional conditions that apply to live concerts, but are defined by the technological process. A studio performance is completed when the master version is 'in the can', ready for printing and issuing.

The distinctive character of studio performances seems to allow for a possibility that should give new hope to Colin. The orchestra records the concerto independently of the soloist, intending that part to be added later and elsewhere. Moreover, rather than including some particular soloist within their group, they intend the performance to encompass any suitably skilled violinist. They record and issue a music-minus-one recording of Brahms's Violin Concerto. Now, at last, it seems that Colin can satisfy his aspiration to play Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic. He is thought of as a member of the performing group, even if that thought is referentially opaque. And, since he is dealing with the product of recording technology, he is not debarred by spatial and temporal separation from combining his efforts at home with the orchestra's in the studio. Suppose he does so. Is it the case now that he plays with the Vienna Philharmonic? Does

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[4] Yehudi Menuhin tells the story of a performance of Mendelssohn's Violin Concerto with a conductor who had only one tempo. In the Finale Menuhin went his own way. Half the orchestra followed him, the rest staying with the conductor, and half the audience clapped when Menuhin finished, whereas the remainder applauded when the conductor ended the performance. This suggests that simultaneity is not strictly required, given that Menuhin did play the work with the orchestra.

[5] One or more of the performers might be dead at the time the others lay down their parts. So it is that Natalie Cole can duet with her father, or the surviving Beatles can record a song with John Lennon.

he bring to fulfillment and completion the performance of Brahms's Violin Concerto that was begun in the recording studio? The terms in which music-minus-one recordings are advertised might suggest that he does just this. But that description turns out to be questionable.

Suppose Colin plays along with the same recording on Monday, then on Tuesday, then on Wednesday. Two descriptions allow that he plays the work with the orchestra but both are counterintuitive. According to the first, there is a single performance that is completed differently on each occasion of Colin's playing. This runs against the view that distinct renditions of the solo part result in different performances (if they result in any). By the second, a new performance occurs each time Colin plays. But that cannot be correct, because the orchestra's contribution to the performance is no less essential than is Colin's, and the orchestra's contribution is unchanging. (The disk might become scratched in the meantime and the settings of the dials on the playback device might be altered between playings, but changes of these sorts are not normally taken to affect the identity of the recorded performance.)

In both cases, what counts against the description is the fact that the recorded performance is over before Colin begins. The way we individuate studio performances is such that only one studio performance can find its way on to any recording; subsequent playings of the given disk do not result in new performances. The orchestra's performance was fixed in the studio when the master tape achieved its final version. At that time the studio performance is done, finis. And, since it is completed prior to Colin's record playings and violin scrapings, he cannot include his efforts in that performance. He cannot bring the orchestra's performance to a close and he cannot generate new performances. In fact, he cannot perform with the Vienna Philharmonic at all, though he can certainly play along with or alongside a recording of its (studio) performance. Brahms's work is one for performance but Colin cannot join in with a performance that is finished.

It is for the same reason that the idea of a music-minus-conductor disk makes no sense. There are recordings of orchestras that dispense with the conductor, as some Russian orchestras did in the name of socialist equality, but one cannot become a conductor by waving one's arms over the score while playing such a recording. The conductor directs and controls the orchestra in its performance, and when the performance is over, as is the case when it is on disk, one cannot direct it.

Is there no way that, by playing his violin along with a recording, Colin could become a co-performer of a musical work? There is one, but the piece would be ontologically very different from Brahms's. Such an opus would be

written for playback device, disk, and violin, with the instructions for the live performer's part issued along with the disk. If Colin executes the given instructions in conjunction with his playing of the disk, he performs the work. Each time he does this, a distinct performance results. (Given that he follows the instructions faithfully on each occasion, how different these various performances will be depends on the freedom the instructions allow him and on how consistent he is in the choices he makes when he is free.)

To dramatize the distinction between this work and Brahms's, imagine a sound-alike case. A contemporary composer, who specializes in sound ap-propriation, creates a work that is note-for-note identical to Brahms's Violin Concerto, except that hers is for disk, record player, and violin. A notation for the violin part, just like Brahms's, accompanies the disk that is issued. The disk that is part of her work sounds, when played, indistinguishable from the music-minus-one recording. Nevertheless, her work, unlike Brahms's, is for performance by the home soloist, whereas Brahms's work is for performance by the ensemble. The two works are by no means the same; for instance, the contemporary work is derivative and referential in a way that Brahms's is not. But even if we put these historical/contextual differences aside, yet others remain. One, as I see it, lies in the fact that the home violinist generates performances of the contemporary piece in a way he cannot do for Brahms's when he plays along with the recorded orchestra. Brahms's Violin Concerto is for performance in all its parts. When the studio musicians play Brahms's music, they are producing a (studio) performance. This may be incomplete as regards the number of players but is not unfinished as a performance. By contrast, only the soloist's part is for performance in the contemporary piece. It is for mixed media—disk, playback device, and violin—as Brahms's is not. It contains a role for the disk, which is played as the soloist performs; that is, the work is for disk and violinist, unlike Brahms's, which is for orchestra and violinist. The studio musicians who make the recording that becomes part of the contemporary piece are not performing the work but, rather, laying down that part of it that is not for performance. The disk they make is not a 'record' of a performance of the piece; they are creating, not performing, an element of the work.

It is clear that those who produce a music-minus-one recording of Brahms's Violin Concerto should not be viewed as composers specializing in appropri-ation. Similarly, it is plain that the studio musicians aim to play Brahms's music, not a sound-alike but different piece. So, there is no warrant for reclas-sifying the music-minus-one recording as (part of) an avant-garde com-position. And, in any case, it is Brahms's concerto, not an avant-garde one,

that Colin wishes to play. Colin could perform the contemporary, multimedia work by playing (what is written for the violin) along with the appropriate disk. But, according to the arguments offered so far, he cannot in the same way perform Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic by playing along with the music-minus-one disk.

One idea, brought to mind by thoughts of the multimedia avant-garde work, remains to be examined. Classical works are often transcribed. In my view, transcription involves a change in medium and results in a new work, but one that derives its identity from the original and maintains a familial relationship with it (Davies 1988*a*). We should consider, then, whether the music-minus-one recording might be viewed as a transcription of the original work, one that is for disk, playback device, and performer. If that view is correct, Colin can play Brahms's Violin Concerto, though he would do so in the same extended sense that is involved in saying that a pianist performs Beethoven's Fifth Symphony by playing Liszt's transcription.

Keen as I am to see Colin achieve his desire, I am reluctant to endorse this suggestion. Typically, transcription involves a change in the medium of instrumentation (and alterations to the music required by this). Yet, in respect of its instrumentation, Brahms's Violin Concerto is unaffected in being presented via a music-minus-one disk, though the recording leaves the solo part for the home performer. There is a change in medium from the intended live performance of all parts to the recorded format, but this alteration concerns the medium of transmission rather than of execution. To accept that this results in a transcription would commit one also to regarding orthodox recordings of works intended for live performance as transcriptions. There are, certainly, important differences between live and studio performances. But we would not normally maintain that in purchasing a recording of the Vienna Philharmonic playing Beethoven's Fifth Symphony one has come to possess (merely) a transcription of Beethoven's work. The recorded version is classed alongside the orchestra's live performance, not with acknowledged transcriptions, such as Liszt's. Instead, we regard work identity and perform-ance-type identity as surviving the recording process. So, this final suggestion comes to naught.

How should we describe the relation between Colin's rendition of the solo part and Brahms's Violin Concerto when Colin plays along with the appropriate music-minus-one recording? He plays (part of) Brahms's work; the studio performance is of the other parts; his playing coincides with the playback of theirs. Moreover, his playing is responsive to theirs. Just as the orchestral musicians accommodate and react appropriately to local fea-

tures of each other's playing, so Colin adjusts his to fit with nuances of the recorded performance. In seeking a satisfying overall result, Colin tries to match his interpretation to the recorded one. But even if his performance parallels the orchestra's, the two cannot meet as one. He does not play with the Vienna Philharmonic; he plays *along* with, in tandem with, it. Earlier I described music-minus-one disks as interactive in that they call for an input from the home musician. More correctly, if less grammatically, what is provided by the home musician is an 'alongsideput'.

In actuality, Colin cannot cross the rift that separates his musical efforts from those of the members of the Vienna Philharmonic but, and herein lies the magic of recorded music, he can do so in imagination. In conjunction with the privacy of his situation, the disk provides a perfect prop in his specialized game of make-believe. It creates a compelling illusion. If he closes his eyes, it becomes easy to entertain the thought that the orchestra is in his living room.[6] What he cannot do in reality he can accomplish with ease in imagination, given the recording's help. It is *as if* he plays Brahms's Violin Concerto with the Vienna Philharmonic. And the phenomenology of that experience might be so vivid that his ambition is satisfied well enough. The person who produces the music-minus-one recording is a dream merchant. He cannot make one's fantasy of playing with the Vienna Philharmonic come true, but he can improve the dream; he can give it more substance than otherwise would be possible. As the technology improves, so will the level of verisimilitude. The music-minus-one disk of the future will come as a computer program generating a three-dimensional sound-and-hologram re-presentation of the orchestra.

I noted earlier that the idea of a music-minus-conductor recording is a nonsense; one cannot conduct a performance that is over. Yet, as everyone knows, the world's living rooms are full of listeners who act as if they are conducting. As the melody passes to the wind section, these listeners flick their eyes toward where the wind section would be located. They imperiously cue the cymbal crash. They crouch before the arrival of a sudden pianissimo. I do not think such behavior is as odd as one might at first think. It is no more strange than that of the person who gives way to the desire to dance as the music plays. Her lack of inhibition in either case might depend on the privacy

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[6] Or, with a Practice Play-Along, one can put oneself in the 'electronic space' occupied by the orchestra. This is a device, Stan Godlovitch tells me, that allows the player of any instrument to feed the instrument's output into an amplifier where it is blended with any other input signal, such as one from a record. The instrumentalist can hear himself from the same speaker that carries the recording of the Vienna Philharmonic. There is a recipe for building a Practice Play-Along in Anderton 1972.

of her situation, but the kinetic impulsion she experiences depends not solely on her awareness of the music but also on her imaginative involvement with the music-making process. By fueling the imagination, recordings invite not merely engagement but participation.

II

On the face of it, karaoke is like the music-minus-one recording. There are differences, of course. A lower level of executive skill is required of the singer in karaoke than of the instrumentalist who tackles the solo part of a classical concerto. Karaoke includes a visual medium.[7] And karaoke is for public performance, usually under boozy, uproarious circumstances; it is a form of entertainment designed as much for the audience as for the participants. In this last connection, karaoke should be thought of as involving a series of songs and extending over several hours. But, despite these differences, the two are similar in the respects I have been discussing. Karaoke does not make it the case that one sings with the Supremes or the Rolling Stones, say, but it allows one to sing along with them and gives that experience a robust vitality that fosters the illusion, if one indulges it, of being a pop star.

Popular music displays more ontic variety than classical works of the type that are recorded on music-minus-one disks, and it is worth considering how this might affect the arguments offered.

Popular music[8] might involve improvised playing that is not the perform-ance of any preexisting piece. There is performance, but not the performance of a given work. Such music making operates within stylistic and other constraints (such as formal ones, as in the twelve-bar structure of blues), but beyond the similarities these produce between episodes of performance, there is insufficient in common to indicate that different renditions are of a given piece. Moreover, the performers have no prior piece in mind that they instance. Early blues and jazz performances are often of this kind.

A second type is that of the song that is for live performance. The song is identifiable independently of any given performance; it can be presented more

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[7] Music-minus-one recordings are likely to involve the use of a score of the soloist's part. For karaoke, where it is assumed that the tune is known, it is the words of which one might need reminding. The visual display of the words serves as a prompt. To my mind, the visual aspect of karaoke, if it shows those who contribute to the sound track, is likely to inhibit, not to amplify, the illusion that one is joining them as co-performer. In practice, however, the visual display can be ignored by the singer who knows the words of the song.

[8] I use this term very broadly, intending it to cover most 'nonclassical' varieties of Western music, including jazz, blues, rock, rhythm and blues, country and western, soul, reggae, rap, and so on.

than once; it is instantiated or exemplified in those performances that are accurate. Such a song might be indefinite in many respects, allowing scope for improvisation from realization to realization. Jazz standards are of this kind, the work consisting of a skeletal melody and chord sequence that is fleshed out very differently in its various renditions. Or, the song might be quite definite in its detail, so that its various performances must resemble each other closely. The early songs of Simon and Garfunkel might belong to this type. Because popular music depends mainly on an oral tradition, such works are perpetuated through the performance practice rather than being preserved in a written notation. This means that later performances are modeled on those elements of earlier ones that are essential to the piece in question. First recordings of songs attain a special status within this tradition in allowing for the wide dissemination of the relevant works. They encode a (studio) performance of the piece, but one that has the standing of an exemplar.

The third category is that of pieces requiring studio performance. In these songs, the recording technology makes an essential contribution to the work's definitive properties. Multi-tracking (allowing a single vocalist to lay down several harmonizing parts, for instance), electronically generated effects of timbre and reverberation, or complex mixing techniques generate some of the piece's characteristics. Such works allow for multiple performances, but each instance must be made in the recording studio. They are not for live performance, or if they are played on stage they involve the contribution of the electronic paraphernalia usually found in the recording studio and of technicians or sound engineers. Again, the first recording captures a model performance. Pieces of this type began to emerge with the rise of electronic instruments and the move to composition in the studio context.

The final classification is of works that are constituted through the recording process at the level of detail permitted by that process. Such songs are electronic works. (In ontological type, they are like electronic compositions made by classical composers, such as Stockhausen's *Gesang der Jünglinge*.) Though performing goes into their making (usually along with a considerable amount of studio input), that performing generates the work, which is defined by and is as detailed as the information recorded on the finished tape. The song literally becomes the master tape or the record stamped from the master die. The song can be transmitted subsequently only by duplicates of the definitive tape. Such pieces might be compared to movies, where the work is the master print and its clones. Just as movies are for screening, not acting, these musical pieces are for playing, not performing. The Beatles' 'A Day in the Life' is a song of this type. And, if Ted Gracyk

(1996) is correct, rhythm and blues, as well as much other contemporary pop music, belongs in this category.[9]

A key point in the earlier discussion was that one cannot join in a performance that is completed, even if that finished performance does not include all the designated parts and even if one can play along with a recording of it. That claim applies to the first three varieties of pop music described above. All involve performance. Where they are recorded for karaoke, the performances are over when the master version of the disk is made. Singing along with karaoke does not make one a co-performer with those who made the disk. But if the disk is of a piece of the last type, one that in the original form is an electronic work that is not for performance, then the status of the karaoke version and of one's activity in using it is less certain. Karaoke invites a performance from the user. But how can that be if the piece on which it is based is an electronic work?

Earlier I canvassed and rejected the idea that music-minus-one recordings are transcriptions. The suggestion does seem plausible, however, when applied to karaoke disks based on pieces the originals of which are electronic. A piece that is not for performance (though singing and the like goes into its creation) is transformed into one calling for the performance of at least one of its parts; namely, what is left for the karaoke singer. An electronic work is changed into a piece for disk, playback device, and singer. The alteration is not in the medium of music making (singing for work creation versus singing for performance), but in the ontic basis of the work. As a result, a new piece is created, though it is one that depends for its identity on the original.

When it deals with pieces that are purely electronic, karaoke inverts the kind of work metamorphosis that is generated in rendering Bach's music on a preprogrammed synthesizer. Via the synthesizer, a work for instrumental performance achieves an electronic realization that does not involve perform-

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[9] I allow that the types I have described fall along a continuum and that the boundaries between them are not clearly marked. Also, the distinctions can be blurred further if a song receives new incarnations. (A freely improvised blues might be recorded live. This recording might be subsequently emulated by other performers, with the result that we come to hear the original as establishing a work though this was not the performer's intention. Or, to take another case, what began life as a work for performance might later be recorded as a purely electronic piece. Strictly speaking, we should regard the later version as a transcription of the original, I think. But the distinction between originals and transcriptions is less significant in popular than in classical music, because, in popular music, instrumentation and the means of presentation are less central to work identity.) Despite these concessions, the ontological categories I have distinguished are useful, I believe, because they map on to differences implicit in the modes of descriptions and assessments applied to popular musics.

ance. That change might be regarded as a special variety of work transcription. It differs from the usual case in that, rather than a change from one performing instrument to another, there is a shift from sound generation through performance to sound generation without performance. Now, if computer synthesized renditions of Bach are to be regarded as transcriptions, albeit ones of a nonstandard kind, then karaoke disks of the Beatles' 'A Day in the Life' could be viewed similarly, for they involve the same alteration in work medium but in the reverse direction.

III

I began by characterizing music-minus-one and karaoke recordings as interactive, but I have concluded that, though they are so in part, in inviting a musical response from the user, they are not fully interactive. What would such a disk be like? On the model of arcade computer games, it would be one that allows the user to modify the output of the disk itself, not merely to add something that runs in tandem with that output. The latest CD-ROM technology provides for just this possibility, though its potential in this regard is only beginning to be explored.

Peter Gabriel has produced a Macintosh CD-ROM, *Xplora I* (1993), that allows the user to remix his songs—also to play instruments, and earn tickets for a 'backstage pass'.[10] I have not seen Gabriel's disk, but imagine this case: a CD-ROM has digitalized versions of the many individual tracks recorded in the studio and includes many takes of each individual part. It is possible to create and add tracks—for example, from a library of drumming patterns. The user can edit the tracks provided—controlling tempo, cutting or adding notes, filtering frequencies, modulating pitches, and otherwise modifying their sound qualities. All the technical capabilities for mixing tracks are available, affecting their relative volume, stereo location, and reverberation. Finally, it is possible to playback the result.

The user of this CD-ROM, call her Cynthia, occupies the role played in the recording studio by the record producer or sound engineer. In the case of pop songs, most of which are either for studio performance or are electronic works, that role is crucial and creative. The names of some record producers—Sam Phillips, Phil Specter, Berry Gordy, George Martin—are as well known to

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[10] Todd Rundgren and David Bowie have also offered CD-ROM music playthings, and others are due from Bob Dylan, the Rolling Stones, and the Cranberries. Laurie Anderson is creating multimedia performances for CD-ROM, the first being 'Puppet Motel'.

aficionados as are those of the musicians they worked with (Elvis Presley, the Beatles) and the distinctive sound environments they created (the Detroit sound of Tamla-Motown). Nowadays, many pop musicians produce their own recordings, so important to the final result is the contribution made by the manner in which studio techniques are managed. Record producers deserve the listing they receive on record labels, for their creative role is no less crucial than that of the musicians to the final result.

If the user mixes the tracks on her CD-ROM, how should we describe her activity? The CD-ROM does not provide studio performances or electronic works but the raw, sonic material from which such things were made. In manipulating this, she creates either a new studio performance of a given work or a new electronic piece. She works with the musicians involved in the recording no less literally than does the sound engineer. Cynthia shapes their studio performance or combines with them in the composition of an electronic work. She is a co-performer or co-composer—or, if this is too strong, an indispensable midwife and facilitator—of the studio performances or electronic works that she generates. But there is one crucial respect in which her efforts are distinguished from those of the sound engineer. Earlier I said that a studio performance or an electronic work is completed when the final cut of the master tape is 'in the can'. Cynthia's labors are not linked to a chain of production from which issues a pressing, though she might save as files those editions that she likes. (I assume that the copyright of material on the CD-ROM will be such as to deny her the legal authority to 'publish' her results.) She cannot finalize her work in the appropriate fashion and, to that extent, her activity is largely confined to the process of production, which becomes an end in itself rather than a means to achieve completed performances or works. If she is a co-performer or co-composer, she is so in a limited, derivative fashion, for she cannot fulfill the typical purpose of exercising the role. She cannot bring the performances or works she engineers to definitive completion.

Imagine now an equivalent CD-ROM with individual tracks of many takes of all the instrumental parts of a work, such as Brahms's Violin Concerto, composed for live performance. The role of the record producer may be no less important or skilled in this case than in those considered above. Choosing which (parts of) takes to splice together in order to achieve a satisfying whole is no simple task and many decisions concerning stereo spacings and balance between parts can be crucial. But the talents of the sound engineer are directed normally to achieving a 'lifelike' sound; that is, a sound reproducing in the playback environment an acoustic experience such as might be achieved by a

listener appropriately situated at an ideal, live performance.[11] Cynthia, how-
ever, is unlikely to restrict her activities to this aspiration, given the techno-
logical resources at her disposal. She might not go to the trouble of editing the
raw material provided for a studio performance of Brahms's Violin Concerto
into a studio performance of Tchaikovsky's, but she is likely to experiment
with unlikely effects made possible by the software. She will 're-place' the
orchestra in stereo space. She will select balances that could not be obtained
in live performance (for instance, by having the clarinet overpower the horns).
She will bring out relationships between the material for solo violin and for
other instruments that would be swamped by the orchestral texture in live
performance created by the usual instruments in their normal disposition. She
is likely to turn Brahms's piece into (a different but related) one that could
only be for studio performance.

Nor is there reason to expect Cynthia to stop here. She might add material
(for instance, a snare-drum beat) or modify the tracks (for example, transpos-
ing the violin part down an octave, below the instrument's range, in parts of
the slow movement), or introduce electronic effects (such as timbral changes
generated through the use of filters). Her alterations and combinations might
be so radical that contact with the original is lost. Whether the raw material is
for a studio performance of a pop song or for a recording of music first written
for live performance, the user of the CD-ROM is liable to use the technology
in a manner that tends toward the composition of electronic works based on,
but distinguishable from, their models.

We are familiar already with what might result—commercialized 'classics'
put on electronic steroids and given a 'beat'. If the new technology tempts the
user to bastardize Bach, massacre Mozart, and vilify Verdi, there will be those
who condemn it. But it should be recalled that CD-ROMs are used by
consenting adults in private. And there may be no more reason to think that
the majority of users will confuse musical reality with the electronic confec-
tions they create than there is to believe they mistake the output of other
computer games for life.

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[11] I do not deny that a more active style of intervention is sometimes practiced. Gunther Schuller
recalls a Stokowski recording of Khatchaturian's Second Symphony. Stokowski 'sat down at the
board with all those knobs and dials, and started doing the most incredible things in terms of
balances. He was practically recomposing Khatchaturian's piece. Mind you, the orchestra had
played it as written with all the correct dynamics . . . But when we got into the mixing studio—my
Lord—flutes became twice as loud as brass sections; he was bringing out the viola's inner parts over
the melody in the violins and other strange distortions . . . He made the music bigger than life-size'
(quoted in Eisenberg 1988: 125–6).

What is the Sound of One Piano Plummeting?   7

Consider this fictional opus, *Green Trio*, which is for strings. The score reads as follows:

Half fill the cello with crème de menthe. By pouring, get as much as possible of the crème de menthe from inside the cello to inside the viola. And, again, from the viola to the violin. If any crème de menthe remains in the cello, repeat the series until the viola and cello are empty or until the violin is full.

I predict that many music lovers would feel uneasy on witnessing a rendition of this work. That is how I felt when I attended a performance of Adrian Sherriff's *A Little Water Music for Gamelan* (1998).[1] Various brass pots were removed from Javanese musical instruments, turned upside down, and filled with water. The water was stirred, using the beaters with which the pots are normally struck, and poured from pot to pot according to a palindromic structure. As I watched, I cringed. I was glad that comparatively few Javanese were present. They treat their musical instruments with great respect. For instance, it is not appropriate to allow dogs to walk around within the orchestra and neither is it acceptable for anyone to step over the instruments, most of which are low to the ground. When ritual meals are made, an extra portion is set aside for the large gong, and the entire gamelan, as well as the players, are blessed. But it was not only the thought that the piece could be culturally insensitive that made me queasy. I would feel similarly on viewing a performance of *Green Trio*.

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[1] The piece was played by Dome, a group from Melbourne, on Wednesday 24 March 1999 in the Ilott Concert Chamber, Wellington, New Zealand.

I

In this chapter I discuss what might be called 'instrument abuse', where it occurs as part of the performance of a musical work, or is associated with such performances.[2] My aim is to reflect on the basis for our attitudes and feelings toward musical instruments and their use. In general, we treat them with care and respect, even reverence, more so than we accord to many of the other artifacts that are part of our lives. It is because musical instruments are viewed as worthy of a special regard that we are likely to be disquieted when they are mistreated.

This is not to deny there are works involving damage to musical instruments:

The *12 Piano compositions for Nam June Paik* (1962) by George Maciunas begin with piano movers bringing the piano on to the stage, and end with their carrying it off; between these events the pianist has (among other things) to place a dog or cat (or both) inside the piano, play Chopin, stretch the three highest strings with a tuning key till they burst, place one piano on top of another. Maciunas' *Solo for Violin* (also 1962) proposes that an old classic be played on a violin and that where pauses are notated the violin is to be maltreated—by scratching the floor with it, dropping pebbles through the f-holes, pulling the pegs out, and so on ... In the 'Fluxus variation for no performer' [part of *Piano Piece No. 5* by Toshi Ichiyanagi] an upright piano is positioned on stage with its profile facing the audience, and its sustaining pedal held down. A performer hidden from the audience in the wings throws darts at the back of the piano according to the instructions in the score. (Nyman 1999: 86, 111)

Indeed, some pieces go further, in taking as their goal the destruction of the instrument. As one work in the series *Piano Transplants* (1969–72) by the New Zealand composer Annea Lockwood, an old piano was burned. As a prelude, the piano's strings were tightened to breaking point and fireworks were inserted into it. The series contained, as well as 'Piano Burning', 'Piano Drowning', in which a piano was immersed in a pond, and 'Piano Garden', in which a piano was partially buried in a garden. The composer Gillian Whitehead told me she had difficulty watching a recent performance of

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[2] I do not discuss the use or misuse of musical instruments in nonmusical art, as in kinetic sculptures such as Rebecca Horn's *Concert for Anarchy* (1990), in which the key mechanisms of an inverted and suspended grand piano are repeatedly spewed from the keyboard. Nor do I consider cases of the destruction of one work during the creation of another. Examples from the visual arts would include Robert Rauschenberg's *Erased De Kooning* (1953) and Francis Picabia's *The Fig-leaf* (1922), which was painted over one of his most controversial works.

'Piano Burning'. 'Someone must have loved that piano once', she said. Many people would feel the same, I think.

Another case also emerged in the 1960s. Some rock musicians wrecked their instruments at the close of the performance. Jimi Hendrix sometimes set fire to his guitar and the Who's Pete Townshend would smash his guitar while Keith Moon destroyed his drum set.[3] These musicians intended to shock their audience. And that response, if it occurs, follows not merely from what might be seen as their conspicuous consumption, but also from the fact that the instruments on which they were playing so recently are destroyed.

These examples do not undermine the earlier claim that we have a special regard for musical instruments. The reverse. We could not be made uneasy or shocked by such behavior unless we were disposed to think there is something wrong about damaging or destroying musical instruments. The artists concerned deliberately set out to exploit that attitude of concern, either to horrify the audience members for the sake of appearing outrageous or to jolt them into noticing an art-political point. What art-political point could be made via Lockwood's acts of piano demolition? One about the harmful domination of the repertoire by the piano, perhaps, or about how our attitudes to music and its performance are overly sentimental or romantic.

Such thinking is explicit in the notes to *Firescape for Burning Piano* (1997) by Michael Hannan:

The idea of burning a piano is a controversial one exploited in the 1960s by the experimental composer Annea Lockwood with her piece Piano Burning. The piano is symbolic of the glories of European romantic music, so the burning of a piano is sacreligious [*sic*] to many devotees of this tradition. Many pianos have, however, deteriorated beyond repair, but their owners (often music schools) are often prepared to sell them to some unsuspecting buyer. My view is that these useless instruments should be destroyed in order to put a stop to this unethical practice. Fire is the most dramatic way to achieve this. Using multi-tracking and loop editing techniques *Firescape* has been assembled from a tape of a burning piano recorded in Holland in 1975. The quality of the tape is compromised by the fact that the microphone is actually in the blaze causing it to disintegrate slowly. The aim of this project is to emphasise some of the highlights of the source tape and at the same time to create an ambient composition with an appealing design. (http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/carts/contmusic/mh/terrains.html)

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[3] Richie Unterberger (see Erlewine *et al.* 1997: 1014) writes: '[The Who] became regulars at the Marquee club in London, which is where Townshend first smashed one of his guitars out of frustration with the sound system; the destruction would become one of his performing signatures.'

As is so often the case, the vein exploited by people who would startle or provoke is mined by others for the sake of humor:

What's the difference between a violin and a viola?
The viola burns longer.
What's the difference between a viola and a trampoline?
You take your shoes off to jump on a trampoline.
What's the difference between a viola and an onion?
No one cries when you cut up a viola.
What's the definition of 'perfect pitch'?
Throwing a viola into a garbage can without hitting the rim.

In a hilarious review written for the *Bangkok Post* many years ago, Kenneth Langbell records how a recitalist became progressively unnerved by an unruly piano stool, sticking keys, and the buckling of one of the piano's legs. In the deadpan style with which the review began, he records how the pianist eventually attacked the piano with a fire ax while swearing loudly.

Several works of art misuse musical instruments for humorous effects. In Robert Watt's *Duet for Tuba* coffee is dispensed from one of the tuba's spit valves and cream from the other, and in Ay-O's *Rainbow No. 1* soap bubbles are blown out of various wind instruments (Nyman 1999: 85). Again, I claim such pieces are amusing only because they set out to deflate the attitudes of reverence we typically hold for musical instruments.

II

Many of the examples I have mentioned involve permanent damage to musical instruments, or their destruction. It is not difficult to think of reasons why we might disapprove of this. Many musical instruments are crafted by hand. Many are individual, even within generic types such as violin and harpsichord. And many have a high monetary value. Accordingly, we are likely to be less horrified when a mechanically mass-produced plastic recorder or a ready-made conch shell is smashed than when a Stradivarius violin is ravaged.

Considerations of the kind just mentioned are not adequate to account entirely for the reaction to instrument abuse, however. They do not explain why we might squirm at the wanton destruction of plastic recorders and of pianos that have plainly reached the end of their working lives. Nor do they explain our queasiness at seeing an instrument misused but not permanently damaged. The performers of *A Little Water Music for Gamelan* explained that their actions did not permanently damage the instruments used, but I found

what was done disturbing nonetheless. We are unsettled by the misuse of musical instruments even where this does not injure them.

A number of pieces in the Western tradition are relevantly similar to *A Little Water Music for Gamelan*. For instance, John Cage's works of the 1940s for prepared piano were offered as 'serious' music and were not intended to result in the long-term deterioration of the instruments used. They did not have the purpose of disquieting the audience for the sake of achieving some political, humorous, or meta-artistic effect.[4] Nevertheless, the audience may have difficulty in appreciating the music because of their sensitivity to the instruments' treatment. Their unease might be like that sometimes caused by little girls' beauty pageants. The viewer can be distracted by the thought that a kind of mistreatment of or disrespect for the children is involved, even if they are not permanently harmed by what happens.

What underpins the respect we accord to musical instruments? Here is a new idea. Skilled carpentry joiners are liable to wince if they see someone remove a paint-pot lid with a screwdriver, and to be positively anguished if a wood chisel is used for the same end. They might be worried about the tool but would no doubt bridle at what was done even if no long-term damage would result to the chisel. As I interpret this, it shows we apply a notion of proper function in assessing how a tool should be handled.

The current suggestion, like the last, explains part but not all of our reaction to the misuse of musical instruments. It does not cover how we might feel about the violent wrecking of a piano that is no longer in best working order and it does not do justice to the strength of our feelings in other cases. The string instruments employed in a performance of *Green Trio* are not being used for the purpose to which they are best suited, but my awareness of that fact, though relevant, does not account fully for my unhappy reaction.

Here is another, related, idea. Most musical instruments belong to families with a long and distinguished pedigree. The violin, to take an outstanding case, is heir not only to centuries of craftsmanship in its making and of skill in its use but also to an extensive repertoire of works written to suit its specific characteristics. This repertoire includes dozens of virtuosic pieces designed to showcase the instrument and to challenge the performer. As a result, even a broken-down violin merits respect, because of the aura of tradition that

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[4] It would be naïve, given his temperament, to think that Cage was entirely serious about what he was doing, or that he was blithely insensitive to its ironic implications, but I assume that these strands were subsidiary to his main purpose of exploring new sonorities and timbres. His first piece for prepared piano was written to provide percussion music for a dance group in a space that was not large enough for a percussion orchestra (see Nyman 1999: 44).

ennobles it. Moreover, pretentious, juvenile pieces that call for the mistreat-ment of the instrument are bound to be distasteful since they betray and belittle all the composers and performers who have strived to develop and perfect the musical heritage that is the platform on which all present composers stand.

As before, I think this latest complaint identifies what is unsettling about many cases of instrument abuse, but it does not account fully for the reaction even in those cases where it applies, and it leaves others untouched. Not all musical instruments have a lineage like the violin's. Not all pieces involving the mistreatment of musical instruments are jokey or trivial in their intent or sophomoric in their results. And the wince that goes with watching a violin receive a violent *coup de grâce* has rather more to do with the particular event than with a sympathetic rage felt broadly on behalf of generations of instru-ment makers, composers, and performers.

Time to take stock. I have said we object to the maltreatment of musical instruments because this can compromise their financial value, because doing so involves a departure from their proper function, and because this is an affront to valued musical traditions and achievements. These considerations account for much, perhaps all, in some cases, of our negative response to the maltreatment of musical instruments within musical pieces. But there is often a residue left unexplained by such factors. To mop this up, what is needed, I suggest, is an explication of why we value musical instruments not merely instrumentally, so to speak, but also for their own sakes. If it matters to us how musical instruments are used, even when they are not permanently damaged by their treatment, and if it matters to us how they should be disposed of when they are no longer at their best, our attitude acknowledges that we find in them some aspect of intrinsic worth.

Earlier I observed that Indonesians strongly disapprove of anyone's step-ping over the instruments of the gamelan. That behavior does not affect any instrument's purpose or use, so why is it disliked? To understand this, recall how offensive it is in Indonesia to step over a prone person. In effect, musical instruments are accorded the status of honorary persons. Just as it is wrong to mistreat someone or to fail to show them the appropriate respect, even if they are not otherwise harmed in the process, so it is wrong to abuse musical instruments. They are not merely tools; they have a status nearer that of a person. As such, they deserve respect in their own right.

For the Indonesians, orchestras and the music played on them are invested with mystic or religious power through symbolizing earthly social structures and heavenly cosmological relations, including time itself (see Becker 1979;

DeVale and Dibia 1991). In the West musical instruments are not viewed similarly. The suggestion that they are respected as honorary people must be metaphorical and tendentious, at best. But it is not difficult to explain how Western musical instruments take on a special status through their relation to the person who plays them. The first, and in that sense primary, instrument is the voice. It is part of the musician who uses it. And other, 'external' instruments are held against the body, tucked into its crevices, or firmly grasped. They are placed in the mouth, or against the lips, or they are caressed by the hands. Even percussion instruments, including the piano, can be struck in a variety of ways and have a 'touch'. Moreover, the relationship between the instrument and the musician's body is reinforced by the years of practice that bring the two into seemingly ceaseless contact. The long history of this physical intimacy is apparent to anyone who watches a master musician at work. For the accomplished player, the instrument is experienced as an extension of the body, as continuous with it. Just as a walking stick projects its user's boundary, because the ground is felt at its tip, so the musical instrument extends the boundaries of the person who plays it. And this expansion is emotional and personal, as well as physical, to the extent that the instrument provides the player with new means for expressing her ideas, personality, and passions. This nexus of corporeal embodiment, action, and expression is melded indissolubly with the music that is sounded, which in its turn implicates the human body and organic processes through the ebb and flow of its pulse and rhythm, of its gestures and sighs, of its tensions and resolutions.

Michael Bach, the cellist, says: 'It's an extension of yourself, the instrument. It's not an object you [treat thoughtlessly] . . . It's an object you can use as an extension of your thinking' (quoted in Cage 1996: 272). Lydia Goehr (1998: 121) writes:

Performers seem to feel about their instruments as they do about their bodies and their voices, that they have both an inner and outer aspect. Externally, they see their instruments as objects belonging to the world upon which they, as intentional beings, act; internally, they hear their instruments from the inside as imposing musical sound upon their world. When they play musically, when they use instruments in their musical performance, they make the instruments act as if they are 'indwelling' within their bodies.

And she quotes (1998: 121) Franz Liszt as saying: 'My piano is to me what a frigate is to a sailor, what a war-horse is to an Arab, even more perhaps, because it is my speech, my life.'

Liszt's point deserves emphasis. Although all tools—credit cards, motor vehicles, computers—extend the capacities of their users, there is a special intimacy between a skilled musician and her chosen instrument. Moreover, this closeness is not solely private. It is publicly and plainly displayed to anyone who witnesses the live performance of music. Indeed, this revelation is central to the nature of musical performance.

III

Here is the idea, then. We regard musical instruments not merely as financially valuable artifacts, as carefully designed for a particular function, and as heirs to noble traditions of composition and performance, but as 'honorary persons' or, at least, as continuous with their user in virtue of their power to extrapolate the personal boundaries of the agent who employs them. As a result, we react to instrument abuse much as we do to certain forms of human injury. This hypothesis is empirical, of course. As such, it is suggestive of an experimental program. Instead of pursuing that, I conclude by testing and refining the analogy between instrument abuse and human injury. As will soon be apparent, the analogy must be refined if it is to seem plausible.

In the case of human injury, whether accidental or deliberately caused by another, and whether temporary or permanent, the object of our reaction is the patient, not their injury. If the broken stair causes you to twist your ankle, my feelings of concern are for you, not for your ankle as such, and, if I attend to your ankle by packing it in ice, this is because of my beliefs about how my action will affect your suffering. And if your eye is blackened by someone's unprovoked punch, it is you, not your eye as such, that is the object of my response. Admittedly, some kinds of bodily damage, such as castration and mastectomy, are more attention-grabbing than others. A scarred face is likely to produce a stronger response than a similarly marked back. But these cases are consistent with the point I have been making. It is precisely because some kinds or locations of damage influence more seriously and negatively the lives of those who suffer them that we find the relevant injuries of special significance.

In the respect just described, the analogy between human injury and the misuse of musical instruments is unconvincing. If the abuse of a musical instrument moves us as human hurt does, since we view that instrument as coextensive with its player's body and inner life, it should be the musician, not their instrument as such, that is the focus of our concern. Yet this is not so.

It is the instrument and the damage done to it to which we direct our attention.

The analogy between human damage and instrument misuse collapses again at a further point. If the instrument is an extension of the musician's body and the musician is the one who causes the harm undergone by the instrument, our attitude to instrument abuse should be like our attitude to self-inflicted harm, but it is not. The body-pierced adolescent, the artist who cuts off his ear, and the suicide are examples of agents who cause reflexive damage that is respectively temporary, permanent, and fatal. In these cases, as in those described previously, it is the agent-cum-patient, not the damage as such, that is the object of attention. Because the agent must take a share of responsibility for what he inflicts on himself, our reaction may not be so automatically sympathetic as it is for the victim of accidents or assaults. But that more complex, possibly more ambivalent, response is not like the wince or shudder instrument abuse provokes in the music lover.

There was an artistic movement in the 1960s, headed by the Wiener Aktionismus group, that made a fashion of self-mutilation. Günter Brus slashed himself with scissors, ate his own excrement, and worse, whereas Rudolf Schwarzkogler specialized in penile mutilation, dying of self-inflicted injuries in 1969. A similar movement developed in the USA. Dennis Oppenheim was stoned (literally) for half an hour in *Rocked Circle/Fear* of 1971. In *Shoot* (1971) Chris Burden was shot through the arm. In *Through the Night Softly* (1973) he crawled through broken glass with his hands tied behind his back. And in *Trans-fixed* (1974) he was nailed through his hands to the roof of a Volkswagen.

I do not think it is surprising that the cello is sometimes likened to a woman's torso or that the electric guitar is sometimes compared to a penis. And it is not coincidental that works involving the destruction of musical instruments came to the fore in the artworld at much the same time as the movement toward bodily mutilation. Both groups had art-political agendas that challenged the artistic establishment and rejected its values and power. Nevertheless, the reaction I have described as appropriate to instrument abuse is far in its character, degree, and tone from that aroused by the art of human self-destruction.

I have noted that our attitudes to damage to musical instruments and to people differ in some key respects. In the former case we focus on the treatment of the instrument, whereas in the latter the patient is of more direct concern than is her injury as such. It is not difficult to account for the difference. Musical instruments retain an autonomy and independence of

the musicians who use them as a result of which it is not useful to compare instrument abuse with self-inflicted injury. I have maintained that the instrument extends the body of the musician who uses it, and that it is in virtue of this that we react as we do to instrument abuse. Yet, with the exception of the voice, the instrument is not personal to the musician or her body. Anyone who uses it in the appropriate fashion thereby extends his body. Accordingly, it is more appropriate to see the musician as agent than patient. The musical instrument is the locus of damage, here, and the musician is the agent who causes that injury. Since the musician acts quite properly in following the composer's directives, it is the harm that is caused, rather than the agent's role in causing it, to which our attention is drawn. Secondly, we attend to the patient in the case of human injury, as distinct from the damage as such, because it is the patient who suffers the pain that results. No one undergoes the harm to which the musical instrument is subjected. There may be suffering indirectly caused by that harm, as when the audience is made uncomfortable by it, but there is no patient who experiences the harm as such.

IV

Despite the recent discussion, I wish to preserve the intuitions that we respond to the misuse of musical instruments in respects that are like our reaction to human injury and that this is because we view the musical instrument as extending the musician's body and inner life. For these intuitions to be plausible, I need to describe some types or circumstances of human hurt that are nearer the musical case than the ones mentioned so far. For the parallel to hold, there must be in the human realm harms that meet the following conditions, equivalents of which apply to instrument abuse: (a) the harming agent is doing her duty, (b) a person is injured, either temporarily or permanently, (c) the damage is not experienced by the patient as a harm and, thereby, (d) the audience's attention focuses on the harm rather than on the patient's suffering it, and, finally, (e) the audience is discomforted by the damage despite its awareness of (c).

Here is a case that appears to meet the specified requirements. Consider observing an anaesthetized person being cut open by the surgeon's knife. The surgeon is not acting wrongly in inflicting injury; the patient is damaged but does not suffer the damage inflicted on him; and you, the viewer, are likely to focus on the injury rather than on the insensible patient. All this is to say that the first four conditions are met. So too is the last if, as I believe is likely, you experience something akin to what is felt by the music lover who witnesses

instrument abuse. Of course, we expect surgery staff to be inured to such feelings, the better to do their job, but we also assume that the training period is a queasy and nervous one for them too.

To the person who thinks our reaction to anaesthetized patients arises only because we anticipate that they will suffer when they revive, I have this morbid reply. Suppose the surgeon is practicing not on living human beings but on fresh cadavers. Even knowing the person is dead, I would flinch to watch the knife enter their body. And you might (just did?) find yourself wincing merely at the thought of it. That shudder up the spine is what I experienced when I saw *A Little Water Music for Gamelan.*

Part Three
Expression

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Is Music a Language of the Emotions?[1]

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In discussing musical works and their appreciation we accept that they may be understood (and misunderstood) and that a person who understands a musical work can be asked to justify her understanding. The nature of aesthetic discussions and disagreements about music indicates that we accept that music is the bearer of meaning or sense and that it is this meaning or sense the listener comprehends when she is said to understand a musical work. Nevertheless, neither what it is that music means nor the way music bears its meaning is readily apparent. It is these subjects I consider below.

What is the meaning of a piece of music? It is whatever it is that we understand when we (can be said by others to) understand a musical work aesthetically; it is what interests us and what we value in musical works. On the phenomenological level, a typical understanding response to music is the experience of hearing the way one series of notes gives rise to another. It is to recognize that a musical continuation makes 'sense' (or does not make 'sense') as a consequence of what preceded it, even where the continuation might not have been predicted on hearing the antecedent passage. We experience music not merely as a succession of notes and chords but as developing, recasting, and otherwise exploring its materials in a connected way. Our attempt to understand music is premised on the belief that we can attempt reasonably to justify and not merely explain the course of the music.

If music never referred us beyond itself, so that all that was involved in understanding music was an appreciation of its structure, its texture, the

thematic relationships, and so on, then the nature of musical understanding (and, thus, of musical 'meaning') would raise few philosophical difficulties. But music does refer beyond itself, in that it is expressive of emotions, and there are considerable philosophical difficulties faced in attempting to account for this. Since it is arguable that the listener usually reveals her understanding of the music through her appreciation of, and response to, what is expressed in music (in those cases where the music is expressive), such difficulties cannot be dismissed in discussing the nature of musical meaning. I do not wish to claim that all music is expressive of emotions. But the importance attached to the appreciation of such expressiveness, where it occurs, as indicating that the listener understands the music, clearly suggests that the conceptually interesting difficulties in describing music as expressive of emotion are of central importance in a consideration of the philosophically interesting cases of musical meaning.

We would not say of a person that he understood a musical work if he was unaware, for example, that its themes were related, that some sections were texturally and harmonically denser than others, that some sections were relatively more tense than others, and so on. We would expect him to be able to give some account of such matters, though not necessarily in technical terms. But, if the music were expressive of some emotion, we would be dubious of the claim that the person understood the piece, even if he could provide a description of his experience of the relatedness of its themes, etc., if he failed to notice the expressiveness of the music. A musician with a complete grasp of the music's technical features may not be able to play it convincingly until told to play it as if in 'cheerful resignation' rather than 'tense foreboding'. Though not all music is expressive of emotion, our present notions of musical understanding and musical meaning would be quite other than they are if music were never experienced, and responded to, as expressive of emotion.

We sometimes say 'This music is expressive' without feeling that we can adequately answer the question 'What, then, does it express?'. A person may feel that he cannot convey in words what is expressed in a musical work when he is describing it to another who is not familiar with the piece, but if he says that the work is sad he has conveyed something about it, although he may not have captured the quality of the sadness that he finds so interesting (Wollheim 1980: 110–14; Scruton 1974: 78–83). Now, of course, to understand a musical work is not simply to be able to name the emotional states expressed in it. To justify an understanding of some particular work it must be described in such a way as to reveal it as the sole source of our experience of the emotion

expressed in it. In describing the emotions expressed in music one is led to describe the course of the music and the experience of its connectedness.

So far, I have suggested both that to understand the meaning of a musical work expressive of emotion will involve appreciating the emotions expressed in it and that we are not precluded from identifying and describing these emotions. I have also suggested that there are few philosophically interesting difficulties in accounting for the 'sense' or 'meaning' of music in which emotions are not expressed. In discussing musical meaning I will be considering the philosophically interesting case, that of how expressive music gets its meaning. The question is: How is musical reference to the expressed 'content' secured? In what follows it will be argued that music is understood neither as a (natural) language, nor as a nonlinguistic symbol system, before it is suggested that music is 'naturally' meaningful (in the Gricean sense) of emotions. I will be attacking the view that our *present* notions of musical understanding and musical meaning are best elucidated by showing that these notions are strictly analogous to the notions of linguistic meaning or of meaning determined by the conventions of a symbol system.

Several writers (see Meyer 1956, Cooke 1959) have argued that in understanding a musical work we appreciate it as having a propositional function. According to this theory, music has assertoric meaning in the way that declarative sentences have assertoric meaning; musical compositions are a means for the communication of information in the way that assertoric sentences of natural languages are. Music differs from natural languages only in that its field of reference is restricted to the world of emotions. Music, in this theory, is a semantic system with a vocabulary and a syntax.

One objection to this view is the following: To say that music is understood as having an assertoric function is to claim that music refers to emotions and goes on to describe the emotions to which it refers. In developing a parallel between music and language it is not sufficient to show that music may refer us to emotional states, it is also necessary to show how emotions are described in music. Though there may be a point to developing a description of the emotion expressed in a musical work in terms of the musical features through which the emotion is presented, it is not clear that music provides for the *completion* of one's thoughts about the expressed emotion in the way the predicate of an assertoric sentence provides for the completion of one's thoughts about the subject of that sentence. The emotion is announced through the music rather than described by the music.

The theory under consideration might attempt to meet this objection by claiming that musical 'sentences' are of the type called by Strawson (1964:

202–17) 'feature-placing sentences'. That is, it might be claimed that musical sentences perform the same function as a subclass of the class of assertions found in natural languages. The assertions in this subclass introduce neither particulars nor sortal universals (such as, fall of snow); they introduce 'feature universals' or 'feature concepts', as does, for example, the sentence 'It is snowing'. According to this view, 'The music is sad' can be analyzed as asserting: 'There is sound and sadness here'. Feature-placing sentences are not subject-predicate sentences; they introduce a universal, or 'stuff', and place it in space and time. It might be said that in feature-placing sentences the assertion is effected through the location of the subject.

This answer to the objection fails on two counts. First, it might be suspected it is 'particular-placing' rather than 'feature-placing' that is required. By feature-placing the subject is transformed into a universal (or, sometimes, a 'stuff'), so that 'Sadness is here' is not equivalent to 'The (bit of) sadness in which you are interested is here'. The counter to the objection loses the fact that our interest in the expressiveness heard in music is an interest in the particular expressiveness of a particular piece of music. Second, the possibility of feature-placing sentences within a language presupposes the possibility within the language of assertions introducing particulars and sortal universals (Strawson 1964: 214–15). That is, there could be no language, as the counter to the objection claims, in which all assertions were of the feature-placing type. The attempt to analyze 'The music is sad' as 'There is sound and sadness here' will fail. We will be forced to conclude that what is involved in musical reference is not feature-placing but, rather, something like brute 'naming'. And, as Rhees (1959–60) has argued, that is an idle, senseless game except within the context of a fuller language in which it is possible for people to tell each other things.

The second objection to the theory that music is understood aesthetically as a language like any other argues that musical meaning is unlike linguistic meaning in that whereas the latter depends on the possibility of truthful assertion, the notion of truth plays no part in the determination of the former. Two (contrasting) accounts of linguistic meaning (of an assertion) for natural languages are given in the contemporary literature. The first defines the meaning of an assertion in terms of the assertion's truth-conditions; the second defines the meaning of an assertion in terms of the assertion's verifiability-conditions or justified assertability.[2] Fortunately it is not necessary that we adjudicate between these accounts before we are able to argue that

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[2] I have in mind the views of Donald Davidson and of Michael Dummett.

music does not constitute a language of the emotions such as could answer to either of these views. Both definitions of linguistic meaning entail that language is essentially a *semantic* system, and it can be argued that music is not understood as such. Both accounts of linguistic meaning entail that the meaningfulness of linguistic utterances rests in all their uses on the possibility of truthful assertion. The non-assertoric uses of language depend on and follow from the possibility that those same words can have a use in the making of truthful assertions. Within the context of a semantic system by which communication can be effected, reference and meaning entail the possibility of truthful assertion. As Rhees (1959–60) has argued, there can be no language that admits of the possibility of non-assertoric uses of sentences that does not also admit of the possibility of an assertoric use of sentences.

To understand a musical utterance is not to know whether that utterance is true or false. We do not regard musical utterances as subject to truth-conditions or as meeting standards of assertive correctness or incorrectness of use. In respect of its meaning, music cannot usefully be compared to a language.

It might be argued that the above conclusion was reached too hastily. For, though music obviously is not a natural language, the appreciation of musical meaning and the appreciation of the meaning of a declarative sentence may be, in important respects, analogous. It might be argued, for example, that musical reference is like reference in the sentences of a natural language to the extent that both types of reference are secured by the conventions of a symbol system. The conventions, by means of which the symbols are systematized, serve to make manifest the symbolizer's intentions, and thus his meaning, to his audience. According to this view, music is understood as a nonlinguistic symbol system.

An account of meaning applicable both to linguistic and nonlinguistic symbol systems is offered by Grice (1957). He analyses utterer's occasion meaning—'The utterer meant by uttering x (an instance or token of an utterance type, such as a word, sentence, gesture, name, or whatever) that x'—as follows: For some audience, A, U uttered x intending (a) A to produce a particular response, r; (b) A to think (recognize) that U intends (a); and (c) A to fulfill (a) on the basis of his fulfillment of (b). This definition is inadequate as it stands to cope with some of the less usual instances of utterer's occasion meaning, but it is adequate for our purposes.

Now, if the utterance is a work of art and if the audience's interest in the work of art is an aesthetic one, then the third condition, (c), is not necessarily met. An aesthetic interest in the work of art concerns itself with the best (most

aesthetically rewarding) reading of the work of art, without treating the work of art merely as a vehicle for the communication of the artist's thoughts. An aesthetic interest is an interest in what the artist has 'to say', but an interest in what the artist has 'to say' need not necessarily be an interest in the artist's intentions (made manifest in the work of art or by their avowal) that the work of art be read and understood in one way rather than another. The audience may respond, say, to a poem as it was intended to respond, and it may also recognize that the poet intended it to respond this way, but the response, if aesthetic, is not *determined* by the recognition of the artist's intention. That is, the acceptance of the first condition, (a), does not rest on the recognition that the second condition, (b), is fulfilled. This is a general point about the way aesthetic interest differs from an interest in utterer's occasion meaning and about the way the aim of aesthetic understanding differs from the aim of understanding an utterance spoken on a particular occasion as communicating a meaning intended by the utterer. This point holds true of art (such as literature and representational paintings) that *could* be understood *nonaesthetically* according to Grice's model, because it constitutes or falls within symbol systems. The same argument shows that music is not understood as a nonlinguistic symbol system, but leaves open the question of whether music could be so understood.

In the same paper Grice distinguishes cases of 'naturally' determined meaning from 'non-naturally' determined meaning. Non-natural meaning (meaning$_{NN}$) is secured by the conventions of a symbol system that serve within the system to make understandable the meaning that the utterer intended to convey. Non-natural meaning may be either linguistic or nonlinguistic. Grice uses 'Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that "the bus is full" ' as his example of non-natural meaning. Natural meaning (meaning$_N$) is not determined by the conventions of a symbol system. Grice uses 'Those spots mean measles' as his example of natural meaning. Five points of difference between these two kinds of meaning are noted:

(1) '*X means that p*' with meaning$_N$ entails *p* (the person must *have* measles); but with meaning$_{NN}$ *p* is not entailed (the bus conductor can be mistaken). (2) With meaning$_N$ we cannot argue from '*x means that p*' to 'by those spots *it* is meant that he has measles'; but with meaning$_{NN}$ we can argue from the sentence to what is meant *by* it. (3) With meaning$_N$ we cannot argue from the sentence to the conclusion that someone meant by the spots so-and-so; but with meaning$_{NN}$ we can argue to the conclusion that someone meant that the bus was full. (4) With meaning$_N$ the sentence cannot be restated in such a way that 'mean' is followed by a sentence or phrase in reported speech (we cannot

say 'Those spots mean "he has measles" '); but with meaning$_{NN}$ we can do this. (5) With meaning$_N$ the sentence can be restated beginning with 'the fact that' (as in 'The fact that he has those spots means that he has measles') without changing its meaning; but with meaning$_{NN}$ a restatement of the sentence in this form does not preserve the meaning of the original version, although both statements may be true.

Representational paintings and the statements found in literature are clearly understood as non-naturally meaningful. 'This picture of Wellington means that "Wellington looked [or ' ... ought to have looked ... ', or ' ... might have looked ... ', etc.] like this" ' is substitutable for 'Those three rings on the bell mean that "the bus is full".' This is not to say, though, that an *aesthetic* interest in a portrait of Wellington is an interest in the Wellington likeness of the painting, nor that an *aesthetic* interest in the statements found in literary works is concerned with their truth. The appreciation of what a painting represents or what is stated in a literary work rests on recognition of the conventions of their respective symbol systems. However, 'This music means sadness' would seem more readily substituted for 'Those spots mean measles' than for 'Those three rings on the bell mean that "the bus is full" ', at least in (1), (4), and (5).

Grice's second and third criteria leave vague the way we should treat cases where something that is naturally meaningful is given an intentional use; for example, where a person frowns intentionally. As Grice points out, our recognition that the frown was intentional would normally require understanding it as non-naturally meaningful to the extent that one's concern is with what the frown is intended to convey rather than with the significance merely of the person's appearance. Since, usually, music presents in sound the appearance of the emotion that it was intended by the composer to present, it would seem that musical expressiveness should be analyzed as non-naturally meaningful after all. But the case of musical expressiveness differs importantly from that in which a person frowns intentionally. It is because one's interest in facial expressions normally follows from a concern with their indicating how the person feels that an intentional frown becomes non-naturally meaningful, whereas an unintended frown is naturally meaningful. By contrast, the expressiveness of music does not interest us as indicating how any person feels; our concern is with the *appearance* of emotion rather than with a particular feeling as indicated in such an appearance.

Grice's second and third criteria do not suggest that all intentional 'utterances' must be understood as non-naturally meaningful. Where the meaningfulness of the utterance depends on an appreciation of the intention, as is

the case with onomatopoeic words or where intentional frowns interest us as signifying a person's feelings, non-natural meaning is involved. But where the intention may be disregarded without this thereby altering the potential meaning of the 'utterance', the meaning of the utterance is natural rather than non-natural. In the case of musical expressiveness, the composer's intentions are essentially irrelevant. Though it may be the case that most music that is expressive presents the appearance of emotions that the composer intended it to present, the absence of such an intention does not affect the expressiveness heard in a musical work. Either the music presents the appearance of some emotion or it does not, independently of its being intended or not to present the appearance of this emotion. Once more there is an obvious contrast with representational painting. A painting of a man may resemble Wellington whether or not it was intended to do so. But representation (as opposed to mere resemblance) crucially involves intention. However much a painting may resemble Wellington, it does not represent him unless it was intended to represent him. The appreciation of representation involves the recognition of intention in a way that the appreciation of musical expressiveness (as the presentation of appearances of emotions) does not.

With the above argument in mind, it appears that music is naturally, rather than non-naturally, meaningful of emotions. Thus, music is not even like a language to the extent that musical reference to emotions is secured by the conventions of a nonlinguistic symbol system. Musical reference to emotions is natural rather than conventional. Music does not constitute a symbol system; the means by which music is expressive are importantly unique to each piece. There are conventions in music, but they are formal and stylistic rather than semantic; that is, they do not serve to reveal the composer's intention in order that we may appreciate what is expressed in the music. If composers have regularly expressed sadness by similar musical means, this is because those means are naturally expressive of sadness rather than because audiences have associated those means with intentions to express particular emotional states. Of course, recognizing what is expressed in a musical work may require some familiarity with the stylistic conventions (and so it may be difficult to appreciate the expressiveness of non-Western music, for example), but not because the conventions make the expressiveness understandable *as* the expressiveness the music was intended to convey.

With words and representational pictures we can ignore what was meant or what was represented and consider the meanings that may be put upon the words or what the picture is experienced as resembling. It is because we can

distinguish between what is meant and what is 'said' that an *aesthetic* interest in literature and representational pictures may ignore the artist's intentions as determining *the* meaning of his creation. Symbol systems that primarily serve the end of communication provide for the possibility of an interest in the meanings of 'utterances' that does not concern itself with *intended* meanings. But we cannot make a similar distinction between what a musical work expresses and what it is intended to express (except by means of independently conveyed information about the composer's intentions). Music does not lend itself to the Gricean analysis of utterer's occasion meaning in respect of its expressiveness. There is no way of recognizing the composer's intention to express some emotion within the context of the music except by taking what is actually expressed as realizing the composer's intention. Because it does not constitute a symbol system, the audience cannot fulfill (b) (recognizing that the composer intends a given response), the second part of Grice's analysis of utterer's occasion meaning, when appreciating the expressiveness of a musical work. The composer's intentions as regards the expressiveness of his work drop out at the second level of Grice's account of utterer's occasion meaning, and thus music could not be understood nonaesthetically as conveying such a meaning. In contrast, in the case of literature and representational painting, the second part in Grice's analysis becomes irrelevant only where an aesthetic interest leads the reader/audience to ignore the third part of intention (to produce the response intended by the artist as a result of recognizing that this was intended).

Having claimed that music is naturally meaningful of the emotions expressed in it, it remains to demonstrate an appropriate connection between the music and the emotional states to which it refers us. Obviously the connection is not a causal one, as is often the case with meaning$_N$ (where, for example, smoke means fire, or where a groan wrung from a person means that he feels sad). I have already suggested that music expresses emotions by presenting or exemplifying the appearances of emotions. How could a connection be established between appearances of emotion and the human world in which emotions are felt? That is, how can music refer to emotions by exemplifying their appearances?

The fact that a musical work exemplified some property, for example harmoniousness, would not normally lead us to say that it thereby *refers* to harmoniousness. Music presents many properties without thereby referring beyond itself. Why, where the features presented are expressive, are we inclined to understand the music as referring to the world in which emotions are felt? Normally we are interested in appearances of emotion as indicating

how the 'owner' of the appearance *feels*; our interest in the appearances of emotions is parasitic on a more fundamental concern with the feelings indicated in such appearances. Even where we interest ourselves in the appearances of emotions for themselves, a reference to the world of feelings remains implicit. We may divorce our interest in the particular appearance of some emotion, sadness, say, from a concern with the particular sadness felt by the 'owner' of this appearance, but the appearance alone could sustain such an interest only where it was taken as referring to sadness *in general*. So it is, I think, that the emotions expressed in music refer generally to emotions although they are not taken as signifying any particular person's feeling of an emotion, and so it is that we regard musical expressiveness as worthy of interest.

It remains to show how appearances of emotions may be presented in the sounds constituting a musical work. Before sketching my own answer to this difficulty I consider briefly the theory proposed by Susanne Langer. Although I wish to reject Langer's theory, it is of the type required by the preceding argument; that is, she argues that music is naturally meaningful of emotions and that it refers to them by means of presenting their 'appearances' or forms.

In the writings of Susanne Langer (especially 1942) we find an attempt to analyze music as naturally meaningful (in her terms, as a 'presentational' symbol). She specifically rejects the view that music is non-naturally meaningful (a 'discursive' or 'propositional' symbol). According to Langer, a presentational symbol brings to mind a conception of the subject symbolized. The appropriate response to a presentational symbol is a thought; not a thought about the subject referred to, but, rather, an idea or conception of the nature of that subject. One thing, S, can be a presentational symbol of another thing, O, by virtue of the fact that the *form* of S is 'iconic with' the *form* of O. No feature of a thing can be dismissed a priori as irrelevant to its form. The form of an object can be abstracted from it in thought (it can be known) but not in practice (it cannot be described, except via ostension). Where two forms are iconic, the essential relation between the elements of the two objects are identical, even though the 'materials' of which the elements are comprised may be unlike. Thus the relation between the aural elements of a musical work can be the same as the relation between the thoughts and sensations that constitute a feeling. When a composer symbolizes some feeling in her music she 'transforms' the relation between the elements of that feeling to a relation between auditory elements by applying the appropriate 'laws of projection'. She could not state these laws; they are applied unconsciously and intuitively. And when her audience appreciates her

music as a presentational symbol of that feeling, their recognition of the iconicity between the form of the feeling and the form of the music is unconscious and intuitive. Where one form is recognized as a transformation of another with which it is iconic, the audience becomes aware of the first form-bearer as a presentational symbol of the second form-bearer.

Langer's theory is founded on a questionable characterization of the nature of emotions and it might be attacked on this and many other grounds. However, in the following discussion it is the notion of a presentational mode of symbolism that is confronted. The central concepts of Langer's theory—indescribable forms, indemonstrable iconicity, and unstatable laws of projection—are unintelligible. If 'unintelligible' means here 'cannot be explained in language', Langer would agree. But, we might continue, the problem her theory 'answers' is such that it demands an explanation that can be given in language and, therefore, the unintelligibility of her theory is a crucial weakness. It is not nonsensical to ask how art can be a natural bearer of emotions in the way it is nonsensical to ask how (genuine) groaning can be expressive of, say, sadness. Because it is not obvious how (non-sentient) works of art can be bearers of (disembodied) emotions, the first question requires an answer where the second does not. By denying the possibility of an answer to the first question, Langer deprives her theory of significant content. Rather than solving the problem, as it purports to do, Langer's theory restates the apparent fact to which the nature of aesthetic discourse testifies—that we hear emotions in music, that music is naturally meaningful of emotions—in new and misleading terms.

Langer would claim, I presume, that the ultimate and only real test of her theory is that once we have understood what presentational symbols are like, we recognize that we appreciate works of art as presentational symbols conveying conceptions of emotions when we appreciate those works as expressive. When her claims are tested against our experience of the expressiveness of the music they prove false, however. The expressiveness of music sometimes seems to demand an emotional response from the listener. Whereas it is obvious that the presentation of an emotion in a musical work might sometimes compel an emotional response from the listener, it is not at all obvious that the presentation of the *conception* of an emotion would ever compel an emotional response. Langer's theory demotes emotion from art, replacing it with conceptions of emotions. In so doing, her theory removes the basis for emotional responses to musical works and makes mysterious the power of music to evoke emotional responses. That is to say, her theory severs the connection between emotions in music and emotions in life on which an

acceptable characterization of the nature of aesthetic responses and interest depend. In responding emotionally to musical works as we do, we are not responding to them as natural signs conveying *conceptions* of emotions.

Rather than arguing (as Langer did) that it is the forms of music and emotions that resemble each other, one might argue that music is naturally expressive because the dynamic character of music is experienced as significantly similar to human behavior expressive of emotions. Movement is heard in music. The relative highness and lowness of notes provides a dimension in aural space within which music moves through time. Thus, if the characteristic behavioral expression of an emotion, *X*, has the dynamic form *Y*, and if a musical work is heard as having the same dynamic form, then *X* is heard in the music.

Such a theory faces a major objection. However close may be the analogy between one's experience of musical movement and the dynamics of human behavior, it could never be the case that musical movement expresses emotions such as those expressed by human behavior, since there is no felt emotion that finds expression in music. Because music is non-sentient, musical movement could not be heard as expressive *just as* human behavior may be seen as expressive, since, in the paradigmatic cases, our recognition of the expressiveness of human behavior is founded on our understanding of that behavior as the expression of something that is *felt*. The objection rightly points out that emotion words do not retain their primary use (that of denoting the experience of an occurrent emotion) when used in describing musical expressiveness. The primary use of emotion words cannot be learned solely from musical examples; also, key distinctions, such as that between pretended and genuine expressive behavior, do not arise in the musical case. Furthermore, it will not be possible to meet the objection by arguing that emotion words are given a special, secondary use applicable only to musical expressiveness. Unless the sadness heard in music can be connected somehow to the sadness people feel and express, our interest in the expressiveness of music will be inexplicable. If it is only by chance that emotion words are given this special, aesthetic use, there is no *reason* why we should not be uninterested in musical expressiveness.

The objection can be met if we can show there is a secondary use of emotion words that applies to people and that this same use applies also to musical expressiveness. Though admitting that the use of emotion words in connection with music is secondary, it will be possible to demonstrate that this use preserves the meanings that the words have in their primary use by explaining how the same secondary use in connection with sentient beings is

parasitic on the primary use. Now, there is a secondary use of emotion words that does not involve (even implicit) reference to felt emotions. In this use we talk of the expressive character of an appearance; usually a person's or animal's appearance. Thus, one might say that a Saint Bernard is a sad-looking dog without meaning that Saint Bernards feel sad any more often than other breeds of dog. So, it might be possible to argue that music is naturally meaningful of the emotions expressed in it by showing that musical 'reference' to emotions is secured by virtue of the fact that musical movement mirrors the bearing, carriage, or gait of people, in that *both* music and people are experienced as wearing appearances that present emotion characteristics. That is, one might argue that the recognition in music of emotional expressiveness depends on an analogy between the experience of hearing expressiveness in music and seeing bearings, carriages, and gaits as presenting appearances of expressiveness (that pay no regard to what is felt).[3]

Of course, the view advocated above must be argued in detail. In particular, it will be crucial to explain *how* it is that music can be experienced as presenting the appearance of emotions; that is, how the dynamic character of music is appreciated as analogous to actions rather than to mere movements. In Davies 1980 I have tried to demonstrate that such explanations are possible. Here the concern has been to indicate that a consideration of the nature of musical meaning leads toward a theory of the kind proposed above.

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[3] Goodman (1968) analyzes expressiveness in art as involving reference through metaphorical exemplification. Though my own view retains the key notions of reference and exemplification, I have rejected in the above the claim that the predication of emotion words to works of art is metaphorical. It is an extremely narrow view of meaning that concludes that all non-primary uses of words are metaphorical; a view that fails to recognize that live metaphors die at the time when they are taken into general use. Emotion words have a general, perfectly licit (although secondary) literal use when predicated of works of art.

The Expression of Emotion in Music[1]

In this chapter I attempt to analyze the expression of emotion in music. The field of interest is restricted in two ways. First, by distinguishing between the expression of emotion *in* music and the expression of emotion *through* music. Here I am concerned only with the former; that is, with the emotions that music may be said to express in itself, and not with the emotions that may be given expression through the act of composition, or through the performance of music, or through a dramatic context in which music plays a part. This distinction suggests a second restriction, this time on the type of music to be discussed. If there is a problem in claiming that emotions may be expressed in music, then it is one that will be at its most obvious and acute in 'pure' music unencumbered by drama or words that may be expressive in themselves. For this reason opera, ballet, song, music with literary titles such as *La Mer*, and so on are specifically excluded from the discussion.

The difficulty in claiming that emotions may be expressed in music consists in this: In the nonmusical paradigmatic cases something that *is* sad *feels* sad. Since no one who says that a particular musical work is sad believes (or knowingly imagines) that the music feels sad, how is it possible to claim that music is sad and, at the same time, maintain that the word 'sad' retains here a use that preserves its meaning? Clearly we cannot say, as in the views that purely musical emotions are expressed in music or that disembodied mental states are expressed in music, that in their application to musical works emotion words have a uniquely aesthetic secondary use. For then we would be unable to explain why it is that, say, musical sadness interests and moves

us as it does. What is interesting about 'sadness' that is divorced from and in no way reflects on the world of felt emotions? Why does musical expressiveness compel from us emotional responses if that expressiveness is not related to the expression of human emotions? If the expression of emotion in music is seen as one of music's most important features, then it can be only because we recognize a connection between the emotions expressed in music and in life, because musical expressiveness reflects and reflects on the world of emotions. These considerations demand that, in their application to music, emotion words retain the meaning that they have in their primary use. One way this could be demonstrated is by showing that (a) there is a secondary use of emotion words in the description of human behavior and that (b) the use of emotion words in descriptions of music is significantly analogous to their use in (a). Thus it could be shown that although the use of emotion terms in describing music is secondary, it is a use that also finds application in the description of human behavior, and, via the parasitic connection between (a) and the primary use of emotion terms, a connection could be established between the emotions expressed in music and the emotions felt by sentient beings. This, then, is the route by which I hope to analyze the nature of musical expressiveness.

I

The emotions expressed in music differ from the emotions felt by people in that they are unfelt, necessarily publicly displayed, and lack emotional objects. Do emotion terms have a secondary use in descriptions of human behavior in which they refer to 'emotions' that are similarly unfelt, necessarily publicly displayed, and lacking in emotional objects? As the following case indicates, the answer is 'yes'. People frequently describe the character of a person's appearance or bearing by the use of emotion terms. They say 'He is a sad-looking person' or 'He cuts a sad figure'. In such cases they do *not* mean that he now *feels* sad or even that he often feels sad; they are referring not to any emotion, in fact, but to the look of him, to what I will call 'emotion characteristics in appearances'. Because this use of emotion terms involves reference to appearances and not to feelings, the sadness of a person's look cannot not be displayed, nor does it take an emotional object as his feeling of sadness does normally. Although we may sometimes be justified in overruling first-person reports of felt emotions, we are obliged to take such reports seriously and, in some cases, as definitive. We are under no such obligation when a person reports on the emotion characteristic worn by his appearance. He is as liable as

anyone else to be mistaken about that. The emotion characteristics in a person's appearance are given solely in his behavior, bearing, facial expression, and so forth. And, since a person's felt emotion need not be expressed, it can be privately experienced in a way the emotion characteristics in appearances can never be. A person who changes or suppresses the behavior that made him a sad-looking figure ceases to be sad-looking. Emotion characteristics in appearances do not take objects in the way that felt emotions do; to say that someone cuts a sad figure is not to say that he has something to be sad about or about which he feels sad. The emotion characteristics in a person's appearance may be socially appropriate or inappropriate to a context, but they are not appropriate or inappropriate to an object.

Of course it will sometimes be the case that a sad-looking person looks sad because he feels sad or because he is a person who is prone to feel sad. The point that I wish to make here is that there is a legitimate and common use of the word 'sad' in such sentences as 'He is a sad-looking person' that does not imply that the person feels sad or is prone to feel sad and, therefore, that does not refer to the person's felt sadness or proneness to feel sad. This no-reference-to-feeling use refers solely to the person's look. That is, emotion words can be used, are regularly used, and can be understood by others as being used without even implicit reference to the occurrence of feelings. Despite the fact that such sentences as 'He is a sad-looking person' may also be used implicitly to refer to the person's feelings, I wish to distinguish the no-reference-to-feeling use as a distinct use. In this latter use emotion words refer solely to what I have called emotion characteristics in appearances. The distinction invoked does not depend on a difference between verbal forms; for example, between 'He looks sad' and 'He is a sad-looking person'. The distinction drawn points to a difference in use, and the same verbal form may lend itself to both the uses I wish to distinguish. Where 'He is a sad-looking person' involves implicit reference to that person's feelings it does not point to an emotion characteristic in his appearance as I restrict that term's use.

The distinction made above and consequent restrictions on the use of the term 'emotion characteristics in appearances' are not arbitrarily imposed. This distinction is apparent in and gains its force from the ways expressions of emotions and emotion characteristics are discussed in everyday language. If when a person looks sad he feels sad, then his look expresses or betrays his felt emotion. By contrast, an emotion characteristic in appearance is 'worn' by, say, a face; it is not expressed by the face, nor does it express a feeling. When we use emotion words in describing people it is normally clear from the context, whatever verbal forms we employ, whether we are referring to their

feelings or merely to the look of them. If this is not clear we can sensibly ask for clarification. The need for this distinction is obvious. A person need not look the way he feels and, therefore, an interest in the way he feels need not be an interest in the way he looks. The criteria for sad-lookingness are given solely in appearances; it makes no difference whether the appearance is consciously adopted or worn naturally. A person who consciously adopts a sad look may attempt to deceive us into believing he feels sad (or into thinking he is a naturally sad-looking person) and, as a result, we may make false predictions about his future behavior (or future deportment). By this ruse he may mislead us about his feelings, but he could not deceive us about the emotion characteristic worn by his appearance. We may be mistaken in thinking, for example, that a person is sad-looking, but we are never mistaken about this as a result of that person's deception. A person who 'pretends' to be sad-looking cuts as sad a figure as someone who is naturally sad-looking. Strictly speaking, a person cannot *pretend* to be sad-looking or be *sincere* in being sad-looking except in respect of what he actually feels. Many of the notions—sincerity, pretence, the non-expression of felt emotions—on which our ordinary discussions of emotions center rely on the distinction formalized above in the definition of an emotion characteristic in appearance.

The use of emotion words in attributing emotion characteristics to appearances is secondary to and parasitic on the use of such terms in referring to felt emotions. It is not difficult to see how the meaning of emotion words has been extended to this secondary use. The behavior that gives a person's appearance its emotion characteristic is the same as the behavior that gives 'natural' expression to the corresponding felt emotion. To be a sad-looking person is to look as if one is feeling sad. Thus it is the behavior that characteristically and naturally expresses a felt emotion that, in other contexts, gives rise to the corresponding emotion characteristic in an appearance. This is why emotion words retain the same meaning, although they have a non-primary use, in referring to the emotion characteristics in appearances.

Three points emerge from the relationship between the behavior giving rise to emotion characteristics in appearances and the behavior that betrays or expresses the corresponding felt emotions. These points are:

(1) Some behavior that could give expression to a felt emotion could not also give rise to the corresponding emotion characteristic. Much behavior is seen as expressive because it serves to identify the emotional object of a person's emotion or the desires he entertains toward that object. In other contexts this same behavior would not be seen as expressive of any emotion.

Only what I have called naturally expressive behavior—that is, behavior that can be seen as expressive without further knowledge of emotional objects or without evincing emotion-appropriate desires—can give rise to emotion characteristics in appearances. This is important, because many emotional states lack characteristic modes of behavioral expression. It might be possible to distinguish between emotions 'proper' (sadness, joy, etc.) and what are generally called feelings (embarrassment, hope, acceptance, despair, puzzlement, annoyance, amusement, nervousness, etc.) by the fact that some of the behavioral expressions of the former can be seen usually as expressive of emotion although we lack a knowledge of the emotion's emotional object, cause, and context, whereas the behavioral expressions of the latter are not self-evidently expressive to those who lack such knowledge. The range of possible emotion characteristics in appearances corresponds with only one class of possible emotional states. There are no emotion characteristics in appearances corresponding to felt hope, felt despair, felt acceptance, and so on. To say that a person is hopeful-looking is to indicate either that we believe that he feels hopeful, or that we believe that he is a person who tends to feel hopeful, or that we are entertaining without belief the thought that he feels hopeful. To say that a person is hopeful-looking is not to attribute to his appearance an emotion characteristic as something that pays no regard to how he feels, for the hopefulness is apparent in his look only when we believe he feels or is inclined to feel hope or where we entertain without belief the thought that he feels hope.

(2) Not all the behavior that might naturally express a felt emotion is equally likely to occur in the corresponding emotion characteristic in appearance. A person who continually weeps (without cause and without feeling sad) is sad-looking but, usually, sad-looking people continually frown, say, rather than continually weep. Among the behaviors that are naturally expressive of felt emotions, those most likely to occur in giving rise to the appearance of the corresponding emotion characteristic are ones a face, gait, or deportment might fall into without intentional pretence or genuine feeling. Though a person may consciously attempt to adopt an appearance displaying a particular emotion characteristic, by no means all such appearances are consciously adopted.

(3) It need not be necessary that we are able to identify a felt emotion uniquely on the basis of the behavior that naturally expresses that emotion, if that behavior, in other contexts, is to give rise to an emotion characteristic in an appearance. If several felt emotions have the same or similar natural behavioral expressions then in other contexts those behaviors may give rise

to the appearance of one or more of the corresponding emotion characteristics. But of course this is not to say that just any naturally expressive behavior can give rise to just any emotion characteristic in appearance. We justify our perception of the emotion characteristic in an appearance by arguing that the behavior giving rise to it would, in appropriate contexts, naturally express the corresponding felt emotion. Where the naturally expressive behavior could be expressive equally of more than one felt emotion, we could justify equally seeing that behavior as giving rise to the different corresponding emotion characteristics in an appearance, but not to just any emotion characteristic. If the natural behavioral expressions of felt happiness and felt joy are similar then we may be able justifiably to support the claim that someone's appearance is both joyous-looking and happy-looking, but, given that the natural behavioral expression of felt sadness differs from that of felt joy and felt happiness, we could not justify the claim that the appearance was sad-looking.

The perception of an emotion characteristic involves the recognition of an aspect of the appearance that bears the emotion characteristic. As with other instances of aspect perception, it is sometimes possible to see an appearance as presenting first one emotion characteristic and then another. Because of the possibility that the same material object of perception may be seen under more than one aspect, aspect perception differs from 'ordinary' seeing despite remaining a perceptually based experience. To say that someone is 'hopeful-looking' where one believes that he feels hopeful or is prone to feel hopeful is to report an 'ordinary' perceptual experience. To say that a person is 'hopeful-looking' where one entertains without belief the thought that the person feels hopeful or is prone to feel hopeful is to report an experience of aspect perception. But this case involves what might be called 'seeing as if', whereas the perception of an emotion characteristic in an appearance involves what might be called 'seeing as'. Among the differences between these modes of 'seeing' is the fact that 'seeing as' does not involve the (willing) suspension of belief whereas 'seeing as if' does. When we see a person's appearance as wearing an emotion characteristic, our beliefs about his feelings are irrelevant.

It follows from the fact that the perception of the emotion characteristic in an appearance involves aspect perception that the emotion characteristic is like (without being) a simple property of the appearance in that there are no specifiable rules for its occurrence. There are no generalizable rules of the type: 'Whenever the ends of the mouth droop the person is sad-looking'. Though the behavior that gives rise to an emotion characteristic in an appearance is necessarily similar to the behavior that naturally expresses the corresponding

felt emotion, and though we might draw attention to analogies between the two in aiding another to perceive the emotion characteristic worn by the appearance, the perception of the emotion characteristic does not depend on the noticing of analogies. No amount of analogical evidence will entail that another who accepts the 'evidence' will perceive the appearance as wearing the emotion characteristic.

II

I consider now whether there are any important respects in which music is like human behavior. My concern is not to show that music may imitate or represent human behavior but, rather, to demonstrate that music is experienced as having features displayed in human behavior, especially the features of behavior giving rise to the emotion characteristics in appearances.

Music, like behavior, is dynamic. It is a straightforward fact about hearing that two notes an octave apart are heard as 'the same' and that notes are heard as relatively high or low. The relative highness and lowness of notes provides a dimension in aural 'space' within which music may move through time; that is, we hear movement between notes. Furthermore, like the behavior giving rise to emotion characteristics in appearances, musical movement is non-teleological. (Though notes may move, say, toward a tonic, the notion of a 'tonic' must be defined in terms of the course of musical movement.) In this respect both are unlike the behavior that expresses a felt emotion, which is frequently teleological because most such emotions take emotional objects.

The similarity noted above between musical movement and the behavior that gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances is hardly striking enough to establish my case, though. Much more important is the need to show that music displays the kind of intentionality on which the expressiveness of human action depends.[2] As the product of human actions, music does display intentionality, but this does not yet substantiate the sort of claim I wish to make, for the movements of a machine exhibit intentionality in this sense

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[2] My use of the term 'intentionality' is unusual. I do not mean 'intension', as in the directedness of mental attitudes with propositional content toward objects, events, or states of affairs, and I do not mean 'intentionality', as in the goals, purposes, or designs of an agent. As I intend the term and go on to explain, it refers to an appearance of rationality and coherence that is internal to the order and shape of the music. It arises in part from the fact that music making is a social practice governed by rules and conventions. The music's intentionality is apparent in the organization of its materials—as a function of the music's structure, tonality, syntax, and so on—whether that organization is engineered deliberately or not by the work's composer. The composer may harness the music's intentionality, but does not create it.

without being regarded as like human behavior in such a way as to be intrinsically expressive. The important difference between the movements of the machine and human behavior consists in this: To explain the movements of the machine we refer to its creator's intentions and to causal mechanisms. To describe the causal mechanisms is to show how the machine's movements are determined and, therefore, to explain fully those movements. This is all the explanation consists of; nothing else is needed. But this is not the case when we explain why a person behaves as he does; here a further dimension is apparently required. By referring to a person's motives, desires, feelings, and intentions we can give the causes of his behavior, but, at the same time, we recognize that these causes do not *determine* his behavior in the way that causal mechanisms determine the machine's movements. His behavior could have been other than it was and, what is more, it could have been other than it was and yet still be explained by the same motives, feelings, etc. Human behavior goes beyond the reasons explaining it in a way that mere movement does not (which is not to say that explanations of human behavior are in some sense incomplete). Explanations of human behavior do not stop short at the specification of causal mechanisms and entertained intentions. The difference between human behavior and mere movement is reflected in the terms used to discuss them. A machine may move jerkily, quickly and so forth, but it cannot move with hesitation, vivacity, abandonment; it cannot hurry. 'Hesitation' connotes behavior and not mere movement.

Returning to the case of music, it is possible to argue that music displays the type of intentionality characteristic of human behavior. Unlike an explanation of the movements of a machine, an explanation of the movement of music is incomplete if it refers merely to causal mechanisms and the composer's intentions. Much more to the point in such an explanation is an account of the reasons why the musical movement takes the course it does. We say, for example: 'This section develops the preceding motive and foreshadows the melody that follows'. The reasons for the musical movement are to be sought in the music itself; if the music makes 'sense' then its sense is given in the course of the music and an appreciation of the composer's intentions is not yet an appreciation of the musical sense. We recognize that the course of the music could have been other than it is; the possibility of alternative courses comes with the notes themselves. No causal mechanism determines the outcome. As in explanations of human behavior, we recognize that the reasons we give in explaining why the music takes the course it does could count equally well in explaining other courses the music might have taken. The movement of music is not governed by natural laws. At any moment a

musical work could pursue a number of different courses each of which would be consistent with and explained by the music preceding that moment. Like the intentionality of human behavior and unlike the intentionality displayed by the movements of a machine, the intentionality of musical movement does not derive directly from the fact that the music is the product of its creator's intentions. The analogy between musical movement and human behavior goes much deeper than the analogy between human behavior and the movements of a machine. It is noteworthy that the adjectives listed above as connoting behavior rather than mere movement find ready application to music.

My claim is that, because musical movement can be heard as making sense and because that sense is not determined solely by the composer's intentions, musical movement is sufficiently like the human behavior that gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances that musical movement may give rise to emotion characteristics in sound. Of course, musical movement can only be like human behavior that is indifferent to sentience in the way the human behavior that gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances is indifferent to sentience. 'That is a sad-looking face', where it involves no implicit reference to feelings, is not reducible to a statement about the way any particular person will look if he is sad-feeling and shows it, nor does it contain an implicit reference to an intention to wear any particular facial expression even where the expression was consciously adopted. The point is this: Anything that can wear an expression or have a gait, carriage, or bearing in the way a person's behavior may exhibit these things can present the aspect of an emotion characteristic in its appearance. Few non-sentient things will be able to meet these requirements, but among these few music will find a place.

Now, let us look more closely at the 'mechanics' of the process by which music comes to wear emotion characteristics. As I have already indicated, our appreciation of music's dynamic nature is essential to our appreciation of the analogy between our experiences of music and human behavior. This is apparent when we consider how we would attempt to get another to experience the sadness, say, that we hear in a musical work. At first we might describe the music as dragging and forlorn. If she could not hear the music in this way we would describe the dynamic character of the music in a fashion that would encourage her to hear the musical movement as dragging and forlorn. For example, we would draw her attention to the slow tempo, the faltering and hesitant rhythms, the irregular accents on unexpected discords, the modulations to 'distant' keys, the dense texture, and so forth. That is, we would encourage her to experience the musical movement as analogous to

(which is not to say imitative of) movements that, as part of a person's behavior, would lead us to describe that behavior as dragging and forlorn. Having led her to experience the music in this way, we would expect her to hear the sadness in the music, just as a person, seeing the appearance of human behavior as dragging and forlorn, would see that behavior as wearing the sadness-characteristic in its appearance. Of course, no amount of such evidence *entails* that the person we are trying to convince will be able to hear the music as dragging and forlorn, or to hear the sadness in the music. She may be able to hear all the musical features to which we draw her attention without being able to hear the sadness in the music. To that extent the analogy between human behavior and musical movement is irreducible. But to acknowledge this irreducibility is not to accept that it is impossible to help another to experience the sadness in the music by pointing musical features out to her. To say that the only evidence available cannot entail that the other hears the sadness when she accepts the evidence is not to say that we have no evidence at all and that argument and discussion are therefore irrelevant. The relevance, if not the conclusiveness, of the evidence is apparent from the following example. Would it be possible to argue that the brisk tempo, driving rhythm, open texture, bright scoring, etc. in the overture to Mozart's *The Marriage of Figaro* provide evidence that the overture is expressive of sadness? Would this not be like claiming that behavior properly described as vivacious and energetic could betray felt sadness? Even if our hearing of the musical features of slowness, etc. in a musical work does not entail that we will also hear sadness in that work, these features may be relevant to our experience of the music's sadness. They could not be used to support the mistaken claim that the music expresses happiness in the way they may be used to support the claim that the music expresses sadness. The ultimate irreducibility of the analogy between musical movement and human behavior does not preclude the possibility of drawing out the analogy in an instructive way and thereby helping others to experience expressiveness of which they were previously unaware in music. When there is disagreement about the expressiveness of a musical work, the debate centers on the applicability of the descriptions offered of the musical movement, not on the appropriateness of describing musical movement in terms more relevant to the description of human behavior than to the description of mere mechanical movement.

If the theory—that in hearing the emotions expressed in music we are hearing emotion characteristics in sounds in much the way that we see emotion characteristics in appearances—is correct, one might expect that

the limited range of emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances corresponds with the limited range of emotions that may be expressed in music (by contrast with the wider range of emotions that can be expressed through music). Indeed, I do wish to make this claim, but, because this correspondence is indemonstrable, the claim will remain a controversial one. Not all the emotions music may be said 'to express' (that can be expressed through music) can also be said 'to be' in music (can be expressed in music). Music can be said to express (someone's) sadness and can also be said to 'be sad'; sadness may be expressed both through and in music. But whereas music can be said to express hope it cannot be said to 'be hopeful'; hope can be expressed through but not in music. To say that hope is expressed in music is to refer implicitly to someone's felt hope expressed through the music.

In some musical works, if not in many, we may reasonably wish to say that hope is expressed in rather than through the music. I have suggested that only a limited range of emotions may be expressed in music—namely, one corresponding to the restricted number of emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances—and that hope is excluded from this range. How can these claims be qualified to accommodate exceptional cases?

It is arguable that, *as feelings*, emotions have natural progressions; for example, from slightly hysterical gaiety to fearful apprehension, to shock, to horror, to gathering resolution, to confrontation with sorrow, to acceptance, to resignation, to serenity. Such progressions might be used by the composer to articulate in his music emotions other than those that can be worn by appearances without regard to feelings. Thus, by judiciously ordering the emotion characteristics presented in an extended musical work, the composer can express in his music those emotional states that are not susceptible to presentation in mere appearances. These emotional states belong naturally within the progression of emotions whose characteristic appearances are given in the music. In this way hope, for example, may be expressed in music, although hope cannot be presented as the emotion characteristic in an appearance. Thus, the range of emotions that can be expressed in music, that music can be said 'to be', goes beyond the range of emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances. Nevertheless, the expression of such emotional states as hope in a musical work depends directly on and is controlled by the emotion characteristics in sound presented in the musical work. Before hope can be expressed in a musical work, that work must have sufficient length and expressive complexity to permit the emotions presented in its 'appearance' to form a progression in which hope occurs naturally. The

close relationship between the emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances and the emotions that music can be said 'to be' remains essentially unbroken by the exception considered here. We would allow, I think, that saying a musical work 'is hopeful', or 'is accepting', or 'is full of longing', etc. is unusual in a way that saying a musical work 'is sad' is not.

III

What evidence is there to support the theory that the emotions heard in music are presented to the listener as emotion characteristics in the 'appearance' or sound of the music? The most striking confirmation is provided by a consideration of the listener's emotional response to the expressiveness she hears in a musical work. Not only is there a close parallel between that response, where it is an aesthetic one, and a person's emotional response to the emotion characteristic that she perceives in another's appearance, but also the nature of the listener's response as an *aesthetic* response can be accounted for only as a response to an emotion characteristic she hears presented in the music. The listener's emotional response can be understood as an aesthetic response, as a response to the musical work that may be justified by reference to features of the music, only when it is regarded as a response to an emotion characteristic presented in the sound of the music.

How do we respond to the emotion characteristics displayed in human appearances? Note that, in so far as an emotion characteristic observed by B in the appearance of A may be believed (or knowingly imagined) by B to instantiate the formal object—to borrow Anthony Kenny's term—of some emotion, then it will be possible for B to respond to the emotion characteristic seen in A's appearance by feeling the appropriate emotion. Thus, for example, B may be annoyed by happy-looking A because B does not think that anyone should be happy-looking, whether he feels it or not, at a funeral. Such emotional responses, in which the emotion characteristic in appearance supplies the emotional object of the emotion felt, are unproblematic and philosophically uninteresting. However, other emotional responses to the emotion characteristics in appearances are possible. That is, surprisingly, when we have covered all the emotional responses for which the emotion characteristic in an appearance supplies the emotional objects of the emotions felt, we have not yet exhausted all the emotional responses that can be made *appropriately* to the emotion characteristic in an appearance. There are several points to make about these other responses, which take the emotion characteristic in the appearance as their perceptual object but not as their emotional

object. They are typical of the responses to emotion characteristics in appearances. They are typical in the sense that emotional responses of this form are characteristic of responses to emotion characteristics in appearances where they are not characteristic of responses to the felt emotions of others. Thus it might be an identifying feature of emotion characteristics in appearances that they invite emotional responses of this form.

The form of these 'typical' emotional responses to emotion characteristics in appearances is as follows: Provided there are no intervening factors, when one has an emotional response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance one will tend to respond by feeling the emotion that is worn by the appearance. The 'intervening factors' are just those things that, if believed or knowingly imagined, would make the emotion characteristic in an appearance the emotional object of one's emotional response. If one responds to an emotion characteristic in an appearance without taking that appearance (or any other thing) as the emotional object of one's response, then the felt emotion with which one responds will mirror the emotion characteristic displayed in the appearance. In support of this claim we can mention that if one wished to feel happy one might attempt successfully to do so by surrounding oneself with happy-looking people. The facts that one need not believe that the happy-looking people feel happy before their appearance can have a cheering affect on one and that no belief that they felt happy would have this affect on one if they never showed their happiness indicate that emotional responses of this kind are made to emotion characteristics in appearances rather than to felt emotions *per se*. The mood of a look is often contagious. Quite simply, happy-lookingness is extremely evocative of happy-feelingness.

Obviously, the typical emotional response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance takes the appearance as its perceptual object but not as its emotional object. The emotion characteristic is not the emotional object of the typical response and nor is anything else. It follows, therefore, that we cannot justify the typical response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance; or, at least, not in the way that we would justify a response that has an emotional object. To say that one believes that the object toward which one's felt sadness is directed instantiates the formal object of sadness is to say that one has reasons for responding as one does, that one sees the object as possessing sadness-relevant features. But when one responds 'reflexively' to another's happy look by feeling happy there are no similar reasons that justify one's feeling happy. One might argue that the other has a happy look and not a sad look, but one has no reasons of the kind that justify an emotional-object-directed response. 'Why does the happiness of his appearance make

you feel happy?' is often an odd question because the response is so natural. By contrast, it should always be possible to supply an answer to 'Why, when you do not believe that he feels happy, are you annoyed by his happy look?'.

That emotion characteristics in appearances do not supply emotional objects for the typical emotional responses that they evoke does *not* mean, however, that just any response to an emotion characteristic will be appropriate. Already I have suggested that the only appropriate response here is the emotion that mirrors the emotion characteristic displayed in the appearance. One argues for the appropriateness of the response of felt sadness to something that is sad-looking by arguing that that thing is sad-looking. To show that an appearance wears the emotion-characteristic that is mirrored in one's emotional response is to demonstrate the appropriateness of that response. The appropriateness of the mirroring emotional response to the emotion characteristic worn by an appearance consists in the fact that no other, non-mirroring, emotional-objectless response would be accepted in the same unquestioning manner as equally fitting. Because the same appearance may be seen as wearing more than one emotion characteristic, different emotional responses to the same appearance could be equally appropriate since more than one mirroring emotional response is possible. But an emotional response that does not mirror an emotion characteristic that can be seen in the appearance (and that does not take an emotional object) would be rejected as an inappropriate response.

IV

Is there a parallel between the listener's emotional response to the expressiveness heard in a musical work and an emotional response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance, to support the claim that music wears its expressiveness just as a person's appearance may wear an emotion characteristic? Apparently there is. The typical emotional response to the emotion heard in a musical work is the feeling of the emotion heard presented in the music. It is strange that this is rarely remarked on, for, in this respect, responses to music differ markedly from responses to others' felt emotions or to the represented content of a painting, where the emotional response rarely mirrors the emotion being expressed or represented. The question 'I know the music is sad, but why does it make you feel sad?' is strange in the way that 'Why does the happiness of his appearance make you feel happy?' is. The arguments employed in justifying the aptness of a mirroring

emotional response to a musical work take the form of showing that the music presents the emotion that our response mirrors and not some other emotion. And, lastly, although we cannot justify our response by showing that the music's expressiveness instantiates the formal object of our feeling, it is not the case that any other equally objectless, non-mirroring response would 'do' as well.

An aesthetic response can be taken as an index of the responder's understanding of the work of art to which he is responding; an aesthetic response can be justified by reference to features of the work of art *qua* work of art. From this it appears, paradoxically, as if an emotional response to a musical work could never be an aesthetic response, for such responses obviously do not take the musical work as their emotional object. The listener does not believe that the musical expressiveness instantiates the formal object of the emotion that he feels. Nor, since music is nonrepresentational (see Scruton 1976) and does not therefore provide any represented putative emotional objects for the listener's responding emotion, could the listener entertain without belief thoughts about a musical work that could, at the same time, make the work the emotional object of his response and aim at understanding the musical work. If emotional responses to musical expressiveness are non-emotional-object-directed then how could they be subject to justification and therefore be aesthetic?

The theory proposed here solves this apparent paradox. Although non-emotional-object-directed responses are not subject to justification as are emotional-object-directed response, some such responses, namely the typical response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance (and to musical expressiveness), are subject to criteria of appropriateness. This has been established above. So, the theory explains how an emotional response to a musical work can be both aesthetic and non-emotional-object-directed. That the theory deals with this counter-intuitive paradox counts very strongly in favor of it. Furthermore, the dissolution of the paradox cannot be robbed of its significance by the claim that emotional responses to the expressiveness heard in musical works are unique and strange in being both non-emotional-object-directed and subject to justification. By arguing that emotional responses to musical works are like emotional responses to the emotion characteristics displayed in human appearances, the required connection between aesthetic responses to works of art and responses to 'human' situations has been preserved.

I have been guilty so far of implying that emotional responses to musical works are much simpler than they are in fact. The appropriateness of the

typical, mirroring response to the expressiveness of a musical work can often be questioned, but this does not undermine the points made above. Consider the following example: In a musical work a prolonged sad section follows a brief, frenzied, gay section. It might be rightly felt that a person who responded to this work by feeling happy and then sad displayed a lack of sensitivity and missed the significance of the first section, the function of which was to heighten the poignancy of the second section. Here, the appropriate response to the first section need not be a feeling of gayness (nor need it be of sadness). That is, the mirroring response may not, *in the full context of the work*, be appropriate, because the work may provide reasons for overruling the mirroring response. Similarly, if a section can be heard as presenting the aspects of several different emotion characteristics, the subsequent course of the music may provide reasons why we should hear the section as presenting one rather than the other emotion characteristic and, therefore, why one of the possible mirroring emotional responses is inappropriate. In the unusual case where an emotional state such as hope is expressed in the music as a part of the natural progression of a sequence of emotions most of which are presented in the 'appearance' of the music, some thought may be required to appreciate that hope is being expressed in the music. If it is impossible to understand the music without recognizing that hope is expressed in it and if, as one would expect, this recognition depends on reflection and consideration, then the mirroring response is unlikely to be an understanding one. The more sensitive, sophisticated response may, in the kinds of cases just described, overrule a mirroring response that fails to take account of the full context provided by the complete musical work. The crucial point though is this: However sophisticated an aesthetic response to the expressiveness of a musical work may be, the mirroring response is ontologically prior to the more sensitive and sophisticated response and to be disregarded it must be overruled. And, sometimes at least, the typical, 'reflexive' response will be an understanding response. By contrast, an aesthetic response to a representational painting is necessarily sophisticated in that it must be thought-founded. There can be no ontologically prior 'reflexive' response that must be overruled to a representational painting; or, rather, the response to a representational painting as if it were nonrepresentational would itself be a sophistication on the ontologically prior response to it as representational.

Further confirmation of the view defended here is afforded by a consideration of the way the listener's emotional response to a musical work is identified (by others) as an instance of, say, sadness. Another's emotions are often revealed to us by his behavior; his behavior may identify the

emotional object of his emotion, or it may indicate the desires that he holds toward the emotional object, or it may betray or express the nature of his emotion. Now, if a listener to a musical work is delighted and intrigued by the ingenuity of the work's construction, then his response takes the musical work as its emotional object and may be identified in the usual way. But how, except by appeal to his reports, can others identify his emotional response to the work's expressiveness as one of sadness, say? Music is non-representational; it represents no subject that could be the emotional object of his emotional response and about which he could entertain the appropriate desires. Because his response has no emotional object nor any entertained emotion-appropriate desires, the listener's response can be identified by others only via the behavior that is naturally expressive of the emotion that he feels. Sometimes, at least, he looks and acts as if he feels, say, sad, and from this behavior we can identify the emotion that he feels. This is all very well in the case of sadness, which has a characteristic mode of behavioral expression, but what of emotional states lacking such distinctive natural expressions in behavior? How would one recognize that another's response to a musical work was a feeling of hope in the *music*? The answer is, I think, that one cannot and that, therefore, such emotional states are not felt as aesthetic responses to musical works. If a person avows he feels hope when listening to the music, he must be able to supply an emotional object for his feeling and, since no candidate for this object is given in the music, in doing so he makes obvious that his response is not an aesthetic one. He can make his response identifiable as one of hope only by indicating how the response is not a response to anything heard in the music. Again, there is an obvious contrast with responses to representational paintings. The subjects represented in paintings may be taken by the observer as emotional objects for his response. He may knowingly entertain desires about them. The emotions he feels or entertains may be identified by others via their emotional objects and his entertained desires, while remaining obviously aesthetic responses. Thus, a wider range of aesthetic emotional responses is available to the observer of a representational painting than is available to the listener to a musical work.

The range of aesthetic emotional responses that may be made to musical works corresponds to the range of emotions that may be mirrored by emotion characteristics in appearances. Only those emotions that may be naturally expressed in behavior can be mirrored by emotion characteristics in appearances, and only these same emotions can be aesthetic emotional responses to the emotions expressed in music. This was predicted by the theory presented, and its independent confirmation through a consideration of how emotional

responses to the emotions expressed in music are identified therefore supports that theory. I noted previously that the typical response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance is a mirroring response and that the ontologically prior response to the expressiveness heard in music takes this mirroring form. That no equally non-emotion-object-directed response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance would be accepted as an appropriate response suggests that the available range of non-emotion-object-directed emotional responses to emotion characteristics in appearances is restricted to what I called the typical, mirroring response. The fact that the range of aesthetic emotional responses to the emotions expressed in music is similarly restricted supports strongly the claim that the emotions expressed in music are best analyzed as emotion characteristics presented in sound.

V

Finally, I consider whether the theory is able to account for the importance and value we attach to the expressiveness heard in music. On my account music conveys to us what an emotion characteristic 'sounds' like. To say merely that music may enrich our experience, understanding, and appreciation of the emotion characteristics in (human) appearances is to make a claim that is perhaps too feeble to justify the importance we attach to the expressiveness of music. The claim can be strengthened, however, in the following way: The emotions heard in music are powerfully evocative of emotional responses in the listener. The listener who feels a response mirroring the emotion characteristic presented in the music experiences an emotion uncluttered by the motives, desires, and the need to act on his feeling that accompany the more usual occurrences of that emotion. He can reflect on his feeling of, say, sadness in a way he could not do normally. Because his emotion is divorced from the sort of contexts in which it usually occurs, he may come to a new understanding of it. The power of music lies in the way it works on our feelings rather than in the way it works on our thoughts. The view defended here quite rightly locates the value and importance music has for us in what it makes us feel.

Contra the Hypothetical Persona in Music[1]

The listener's phenomenal experience of music's expressiveness is more like a face-to-face encounter with someone who publicly and vividly displays his feeling than it is like hearing a dispassionate description of an emotional state. The expressiveness is immediate and direct, not filtered through an arbitrary symbol system. It is immanent in the music rather than something beyond the music's boundaries to which its sound refers. But if the experience of the expressiveness is as of an occurrent emotion, whose emotion could that be? Given that the music is non-sentient, it appears that an owner of the emotions expressed in it must be found.

Traditional accounts have identified the emoter as the composer or performer on the one side, or the listener on the other, but such theories encounter well-rehearsed difficulties. Serious objections apply to the expression theory, according to which the composer (or performer) discharges his feeling by composing in a fashion such that the resulting musical product discernibly bears the marks of his experience. Some composers sometimes convey their feelings to the music they write, but they do so by matching the inherent expressive potential of their materials to their moods, not by infecting the music with their emotions. No less problematic is arousalism or emotivism, according to which the music's expressiveness consists in a dispositional property or power by which it awakens an emotional response in the listener. Listeners do sometimes respond to music by feeling sad, for example, but the music is sad not because it calls forth that reaction. Rather, it is because the music is expressive that it invites the response. I do not find

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[1] First published in Mette Hjort and Sue Laver (eds.), *Emotion and the Arts*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 95–109.

these theories appealing as explanations of the nature of music's expressiveness, though they have their adherents (see Davies 1994: ch. 4).

Another possibility is this one: It may be that the emotions heard in music are those of characters designated in the work; are those, for instance, of Rodolfo, Mimi, Musetta, Marcello, and the others in Puccini's *La Bohème*. Against this, it can be noted that we often distinguish what is expressed in the work from what is experienced by a character in it; that is, we talk of what the work expresses in addition to considering how the feelings of those individuals it represents are conveyed. Moreover, in purely instrumental works no characters are indicated, though such pieces can be redolent with feeling.

By elimination, as it were, we come to this possibility: The listener imagines or make believes a person who undergoes the emotions expressed in the music. If the emotions expressed in music must be experienced by someone who is not the composer, performer, listener, or a character represented in the work, then that someone must be entertained by the listener. In hearing sound as emotionally expressive, we animate the music through an imaginative engagement that leads us to hypothesize an abstract or virtual persona. The movements, tensions, and resolutions then heard in the music embody her actions and sensations. As a result, the music comes to life in our experience of it. Call this view 'hypothetical emotionalism'.

Wait a minute! Is it respectable to treat purely instrumental works as if they are program music? Perhaps not—not, anyway, if the music is used to kick start the imagination, which then pursues a course individual to the listener, who uses the music merely as the occasion for a private reverie. That reaction is a common one, so evocative is music of private associations. But free association leads to inattention, not to a better understanding of the music.

Hypothetical emotionalism does not, however, recommend this kind of listening. The listener is to hypothesize the existence of a persona, but otherwise must carefully follow the unfolding progression of the music, for it is in this that the vicissitudes undergone by this persona are revealed. The 'dramatic narrative' of which the listener becomes aware must be uncovered in the music and be responsive to every subtle articulation of its structure. The 'story' developed by the listener should map directly on to all the work's parts; it is the 'story' of the piece's formal and expressive progress, these two being intimately and inextricably connected. The listener's hypothesizing, rather than leading away from the music, provides entry to the fullest comprehension of the piece's individual characteristics and, if it has them, to its overall unity and closure.

I

In acknowledging the importance of music's expressive dimension, hypothetical emotionalism is superior to crude formalism, which would dismiss such matters as irrelevant or impossible. The familiar difficulties of explaining the music's expressiveness in terms of the composer's, performer's, or listener's feelings are dodged. And the theory accords with the common phenomenology locating the expressiveness directly, unmediated, within the sound of the music itself.

How, though, does hypothetical emotionalism fare by contrast with what I take to be its main rival—let us call it 'appearance emotionalism'—which is the view that musical materials can be literally expressive as a result of presenting to audition sounds with emotion characteristics?[2] This alternative denies that music expresses occurrent emotions involving sensation or sentience, so it rejects the motivation given above for seeking an 'owner' of the feelings expressed in music. It maintains, rather, that music presents sounds that are expressive without regard to experienced emotions. Music is sad-sounding in much the way that basset-hounds or the mask conventionally denoting tragedy are sad-looking. Though it takes imagination to hear music's expressiveness, it does not take more than is needed to see face masks as wearing human expressions or willow trees as downcast. (For that matter, it does not require more imagination than is needed to view fellow humans as alive and intelligently aware rather than as androids.) Music would not be heard as expressive unless it were approached in terms of a certain attitude, called by Peter Kivy an 'animating tendency', but that attitude is our natural mode of experiencing the world in all its aspects. Its adoption requires no special kind of imaginative hypothesizing.

In comparing these two accounts of music's expressiveness, four points are worth considering, but only the last is decisive:

(1) Hypothetical emotionalists emphasize the extent to which the listener's impression of overall structure depends as much on awareness of the pattern of the musical work's expressive character and development as on knowledge of formal features, narrowly construed. This is an important observation, but it does not presuppose hypothetical emotionalism as such. It can be endorsed no less readily by an advocate of appearance emotionalism.

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[2] The best-known statement of 'appearance emotionalism', also known as the 'contour theory', is presented in Kivy 1980. I defend a version of this position in Davies 1994.

(2) Music's expressiveness frequently summons an emotional reaction from the listener. It is easy to understand why we would react to the feelings of a person, albeit one whose existence is hypothesized, but why would we react to expressive appearances that pay no regard to occurrent emotions? The advocate of appearance emotionalism could answer as follows: Expressive appearances are evocative of the kinds of responses that music elicits from the listener (Davies 1994: ch. 6). We can find such appearances moving, especially when they are contrived or appropriated in the service of artistic communication. The responses to which they give rise typically lack the force of the reactions provoked by the felt emotions of others (or fictions), because the beliefs (or make-beliefs) and desires (or make-desires) relevant in the latter context are absent from the former. This is consistent, though, with how listeners react to music's expressiveness and with their continuing interest in works that induce the negative reaction of sadness.

(3) Musical works often express emotions, sometimes contrasting markedly, in series. In listening, we expect development, connection, and integration within the music. Hypothetical emotionalism explains how we realize this expectation in following the course of the music's expressiveness. The listener is to seek pattern and order, such as one might find in the succession of a person's actions or feelings, within the work's expressive features. Just as when a person acts in character through time, one anticipates continuity in the progress of her emotional states, so, too, the auditor who imagines a persona in the music listens for, and can reasonably hope to uncover, a narrative thread tying together and clarifying the sequence of emotions expressed in the music. Hypothetical emotionalism invites the listener to regard the various emotions expressed within a single musical span as unified with respect to the emotional life and experiences of the imagined persona.

Because expressive appearances are typically fallen into, not adopted, their sequence is usually of no special significance. How, then, does the proponent of appearance emotionalism avoid treating changes in the work's mood merely as a procession of unconnected expressions? Two answers are available, depending on the case. Where the expressive progress of the work is central to its character, the unity and closure achieved within it can be explained as resulting from the composer's control of the material. Even if expressive appearances are not deliberately created normally, within the musical context they are shaped and ordered by the composer. This alone, without appeal to a narrative concerning a fictional persona, makes it appropriate to look for a connection between them and for the possibility of

reference through them to the world of human feeling. Alternatively, attention to the work's formal features is likely to be sufficient to explain the work's coherence and integrity if its expressiveness is not the prime concern.

(4) Only emotions with distinctive behavioral expressions can be presented in appearances. Those depending on a specific kind of cognitive content or sensation cannot be, for such things are absent from mere appearances. Sadness and happiness may be of the former type, whereas patriotism, shame, pride, embarrassment, envy, and hope are of the latter. Accordingly, appearance emotionalism countenances the expression of only a limited range of emotions within music. Purely instrumental works might be expressive of happiness or sadness, but could not be expressive of shame.[3]

Appearance emotionalism may allow that a few works express or hint at the expression of higher emotions, doing so by presenting expressive contexts in which such emotions find their natural homes.[4] If, however, such expressions are achieved mainly through the musical presentation or invocation of the cognitive contents and attitudes usually presupposed for occurrences of the higher emotions, then hypothetical emotionalism is better placed to explain how this occurs. To make believe someone personified in the music is to imagine that person as possessing beliefs, desires, intentions, and attitudes, even if the contents or objects of these are not transparently conveyed. To entertain that such a person is present in the work is also to make believe a context where cognitively complex emotions might be musically expressed. If it is appropriate to hear music as expressing not solely happiness and sadness but also more subtle, cognitively rich emotions, hypothetical emotionalism provides for this possibility. If instrumental music is often expressive of the 'higher' emotions, this can be explained by hypothetical emotionalism as it cannot be by appearance emotionalism.

What one makes of these two theories is likely to hinge on one's judgment concerning the frequency and musical constitution of expressions of 'higher' emotions. For my part, I am skeptical of the claims made by hypothetical emotionalists for the centrality and objectivity of the musical expression of these complex, sophisticated emotional states.

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[3] Note, though, that appearance emotionalism can allow that the manner of expression is no less particular to each work than are the notes generating its expressive content, even if the range of emotion types that can be expressed is restricted.

[4] I argue (in 1980; 1994: 262–4) that the pattern of expressiveness within the entire work can be relevant to assessing the local significance of elements and to the musical expression of higher emotions.

II

Before going further, it is appropriate to examine the claims that might be made in the name of hypothetical emotionalism as it applies to instrumental music. The first is a descriptive one: we can listen to music as conveying a story concerning the emotional life of a persona hypothesized by the listener on the basis of her auditory experience. This is undoubtedly true but it is also trivial. Equally weak is the insistence that some auditors do, indeed, approach music in this fashion. (Advocates of hypothetical emotionalism are presumed to be among this group.) A stronger thesis holds that listeners typically or characteristically hear music as the expression of a persona. (I believe this empirical claim to be false.) More interesting is this prescription: We should hypothesize a persona in listening to music. The normative force of this latest proposal is backed by the claim that this approach to the listening experience leads to a proper understanding of the music for what it is. Notice that, in this formulation, it is not denied that other styles or methods of listening are viable and might lead equally to a sympathetic appreciation of the works involved. A yet stronger version of the thesis is not so concessive. It maintains that we *must* listen to music in the specified fashion, for this provides the *only* route to its fullest comprehension. Those who hold that music expresses the higher emotions, and that these require the invocation of cognitive elements such as can be attributed to a person, are likely to advocate this last position.

A further matter to consider is that of scope. Are the previous claims made on behalf of all instrumental works or only some? And if the latter, will an advocate of hypothetical emotionalism insist on the stronger prescription for all the relevant works or only for those that are especially expressive and dramatic?

Those who promote hypothetical emotionalism might have different versions in mind, or differ about the theory's scope. They work from several backgrounds, perspectives, and motivations. Indeed, it is for this reason that I have so far outlined the theory without reference to its proponents.

The vogue for hypothetical emotionalism, for describing works of pure music in terms of narratives presenting episodes in the life of a fictional or virtual persona, is comparatively recent. The position has been presented variously by musicologists[5] and philosophers.[6] It may be that not all these

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[5] See Cone 1974; Newcomb 1984*a*, 1984*b*; Maus 1988; and, for a discussion, Guck 1994.
[6] See Callen 1982; Levinson 1982, 1990*c*, 1996*b*; Vermazen 1986; Robinson 1994; Ridley 1995, ch. 8; and Budd 1995. A philosopher and a musicologist, Jenefer Robinson and Gregory Karl, have collaborated on one paper—Robinson and Karl 1995.

authors share the same goals. The musicologists are keen to counter sterile formalism and undue focus on technicalities within their own discipline. Their aim is to humanize music criticism and theory. Accordingly, they stress the close relation between formal and expressive elements.[7] The philosophers, on the other hand, are perhaps more conscious of opposing appearance emotionalism in developing accounts that acknowledge a central place for the expression of higher emotions in music.[8]

III

'Hypotheticism' has become so popular in the philosophy of art that it is worth distinguishing the variety under consideration from its confrères, especially since some of the philosophers already cited are also 'hypotheticists' concerning literature (see Robinson 1985; Levinson 1992). In the case of literary works, it might be held that in interpreting their meanings or appreciating their styles we speculate not about the actual author's intentions and personality, but about those of an implied, apparent, or hypothetical author. A similar move could be involved with respect to the work's expressiveness. It might be, that is, that we move from the way the work appears to the emotions that someone might have experienced and expressed in producing it (Barwell 1986).

The point I wish to make is this: Whereas hypothetical emotionalism, as described earlier, imagines a persona in the work, the theories just mentioned speculate about a person who stands *outside* the work, as its imagined creator.[9] Hypothetical emotionalism concerns the work's world rather than a possible version of the actual world. The importance of the distinction is apparent from the following case: Suppose that in reading a novel we consider the narrator's personality, attitudes, feelings, and so on.[10] Suppose also that we

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[7] This is explicit in Maus 1988 and Newcomb 1984a, 1984b. Newcomb (1983) voices the same concern, without tying it to hypothetical emotionalism as such. This is no mistake. The projects outlined above do not commit their proponents to full-blown hypothetical emotionalism (although the musicologists cited take their accounts in that direction).

[8] Callen 1982, Levinson 1982, and Robinson 1994 make this clear in outlining their versions of hypothetical emotionalism. For my consideration of Levinson's position see Davies 1994: 211–16, 263.

[9] Walton emphasizes the distinction (in discussing literature and painting) and appreciates its significance. He is one who analyzes style in terms of the actions of the work's apparent creator (see Walton 1976, 1987, 1990), but he does not subscribe to hypothetical emotionalism as applied to music, although he thinks that much make-believing goes into the listener's awareness of and response to music's expressiveness (see Walton 1988a, 1994).

[10] Perhaps we entertain the existence of this narrator if none is explicitly introduced in the story. Currie (1990) holds that all novels should be approached in this fashion.

speculate about the intentions of the story's apparent author who, unlike the narrator, is external to the work's world. Now, what can be reasonably inferred about the former cannot be applied necessarily to the latter and vice versa. It may be apparent that the narrator is mistaken about what is true in the work's world but the apparent author is not. Moreover, the work might convey an aesthetic and moral vision that is attributable to the implied author but of which the narrator is patently oblivious.[11] In developing his version of hypothetical emotionalism in music, Fred Maus (1988) is clearly aware of the distinction. Some musical qualities that might be hypothesized of the persona in the music, such as surprise, could not reasonably be attributed to the work's composer (whether actual or hypothesized). Moreover, what is presented in the music has an indefiniteness that imaginings about the composer could not have. In entertaining thoughts about the work's composer we consider a single individual whose actions give rise to the entire musical structure, but in following the music we might not be licensed to hypothesize a definite number of musical personas or to regard any as generating through their actions all aspects of the work's detail and structure.

I raise this topic not because I think the philosophers who support hypotheticism in aesthetic/artistic appreciation across several artistic arenas are confused about the differences.[12] My goal is to mark the distinction for the sake of overall clarity, for it would be easy for the reader who browses the relevant literature to come away with the mistaken impression that all versions of hypotheticism are of a piece.

IV

I turn now to criticism. Of the possibilities sketched above, my interest lies in the strongest version of hypothetical emotionalism as it might apply to some, if not all, expressive works of absolute music. I review, that is, the position maintaining that to understand and appreciate some musical works fully the listener must hypothesize a persona and hear the unfolding of the formal and

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[11] Currie's (1990) account does not clearly separate the work's fictional narrator from its implied author. He is criticized on this score in Stecker 1996 along the lines I have indicated. For Stecker's more general criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism as applied to literature see Stecker 1987, 1994*a*, and 1994*b*.

[12] But, in fact, I think Vermazen (1986) is sometimes careless of the distinction, and I note that Robinson (1985) occasionally slides from talk of implied authors to talk of narrators internal to the work. Of course, there is likely to be allowable slippage between the two realms in cases in which there is good reason to suppose that the persona in the work acts or speaks for the work's (imagined) creator.

expressive elements of the music as actions and feelings of, or events affecting, that persona. I take this position to amount to the claim that the musical works in question must be heard as being about the emotional life of the persona whose presence in the work should be imagined.

What might one mean by the assertion that a musical work is about so-and-so? Four possibilities recommend themselves. A musical work is about so-and-so where (a) the composer intends it to be so; (b) it is conventional within the practice of artistic appreciation that such works are to be approached thus; (c) a sufficient number of suitably acculturated listeners would appreciate so-and-so upon reflection on the music; or (d) one cannot understand the music (fully) without invoking the presence of so-and-so within it.[13]

I intend to concentrate on the last of the proposed conditions for musical 'aboutness', so I will be brief with the first three. I doubt that there is much evidence to indicate that composers have intended the listener to hypothesize the presence of a persona in their instrumental works. In any event, the fate of (a) will depend on the viability of (b) or (c). Condition (a) must involve a robust notion of intention, I think. The composer could have such an intention only if she could give it public expression, that is embody it in the music, so that it might be acknowledged by the listener. It is not enough that a composer merely entertains the thought of her work's being about a persona and fondly hopes this will be recognized. The achievement (and, hence, the possession) of the relevant intention presupposes the existence of public conventions allowing for its communication via the musical work or, at least, for the widespread recognition of the intention. This is to say, (a) presupposes the possibility of (b), practices or conventions calling on the listener to hypothesize a persona in the music, or of (c), general agreement among listeners that such a persona is to be imagined, and coincidence in the descriptions then offered of the persona's emotional life. But again, it seems straightforwardly false that there are public conventions or consensus regarding such matters.[14] Mostly, proponents of hypothetical emotionalism offer their musical analyses as new and as revealing expressive subtleties that have been generally overlooked.

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[13] I adapt this last condition from the account of literature provided in Lamarque and Olsen 1994.

[14] Newcomb (1984a) argues that critics of Schumann's day heard his Second Symphony as involving struggle and conforming to a 'plot archetype' shared with Beethoven's Fifth Symphony—suffering finding its way to strength and health. If this is correct, it does not yet show there was consensus concerning the nature of a hypothesized persona. For a critique of the philosophical assumptions of this approach see Peter Kivy 1990b.

The crucial condition is (d). In relation to hypothetical emotionalism it amounts to this: To comprehend the music fully the listener must imagine the presence of a persona within it, and to follow the course of the music with understanding must hear in it the actions, experiences, and sensations of that persona. Obviously, this condition corresponds to what I identified above as the strong version of hypothetical emotionalism—that one must hypothesize the presence of a persona in order to grasp the subtle expressiveness of at least some musical works. And, as already noted, it is plausible to suggest that (d) can be met if many musical works express higher emotions, because their doing so depends on a cognitively rich context that might be supplied only by making believe that the unfolding of the music corresponds to the emotional life of an agent with beliefs, attitudes, and desires. The issue, as indicated previously, is not whether the listener might invent a story about the actions of, or events affecting, a persona, a story that matches the articulation of the music. That can be done easily enough.[15] Rather, the question is whether this mode of listening provides access to an understanding that is both truly of the music and unobtainable by any other kind of listening. To show that (d) is satisfied, it must be argued that the invocation of a persona is essentially implicated in an understanding reaction to the music. Doing so involves establishing that what is imagined is not idiosyncratic or irrelevant to musical understanding; it involves demonstrating that the work invites, controls, and limits what might be hypothesized, so that this approach leads to a revelatory experience of the music as no alternative can.

In discussing (d) I concentrate on recent work by Jenefer Robinson. With Gregory Karl, she outlines a version of hypothetical emotionalism. They argue 'that the expressive structure of some pieces of music can be interpreted as an unfolding of the psychological experience of [a] musical persona over time. . . . [The] formal coherence of the music often consists precisely in its embodying a coherent unfolding of psychological states in a musical persona' (1995: 405). The theme is developed in a detailed discussion of Shostakovitch's Tenth Symphony, which they believe to express false hope: 'The plot archetype to which Shostakovitch's Tenth Symphony conforms is conventionally interpreted as a progression from dark to light or struggle to victory (adversity to salvation, illness to health, etc.)' (1995: 406). The authors continue:

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[15] As a child I was given a record of a waltz from Tchaikovsky's *Nutcracker*. A 'voice-over' presented a story about mice endangered by a cat. To escape its attentions, the mice disguised themselves as flowers and danced by it. The story matched the music exactly.

Very often the formal and expressive threads of a work's structure are so finely interwoven as to be inextricable. Thus, in establishing our case for the musical expression of hope, we had to discuss not only the contours and conventional associations of our focal passage, but also its role in patterns of thematic transformation and quotation spanning the entire symphony. To demonstrate that our focal passage expresses hope we had to engage in a formal analysis of the work as a whole. Conversely, we suggest that in a complexly integrated work like Shostakovitch's Tenth, formal and expressive elements of musical structure are so thoroughly interdependent that the formal function of particular passages can often only be accurately described in expressive terms. Thus there is no 'strictly formal' or purely musical explanation for why our focal passage unfolds as it does in the central section of the third movement; its formal function just is to express the cognitively complex emotion of hope. (1995: 412–13)

So far, the account is familiar, though it combines the philosopher's preoccupation with the higher emotions and the musicologist's concern with the intimate relation between the work's expressive character and its large-scale structure. Attention to the structure of an entire work, interpreted as the emotional experience of a persona through time, provides access to sufficient cognitive content to allow for the musical expression of complex emotions, such as false hope. Formal coherence in music, it is recommended, often consists precisely in the work's embodying a succession of connected psychological states that are to be attributed to a persona.

Now, hypothetical emotionalism faces the problem of establishing that the listener's make believing a persona, and a cognitive context along with the presence of that persona, stems directly from an appropriate experience of the work's properties. If this cannot be done, the listener's imaginative contribution is gratuitous (and likely to be idiosyncratic). Robinson (1994) proposes a solution to this challenge. She argues for an intimate connection between primitive, largely noncognitive, responses aroused in the listener by the music and the process of imaginative engagement that leads the listener to construct a narrative about the experiences of a persona the listener hypothesizes to reside in the music. Though she allows that sad music might lead the listener to feel sadness, Robinson does not believe that music's expression of cognitively complex emotions is explained by its power to call forth such responses. She does maintain, however, that some 'primitive' feelings are predicable of music because they are evoked by it. She also holds that the thought-less reactions kindled by music feed and direct the hypothesizing that reveals in the music a persona who experiences cognitively complex emotions (such as 'cheerful confidence turning to despair', to use her own example).

In Robinson's view, the qualities attributed to music in virtue of its power to arouse the listener to a corresponding feeling include tension, nervousness, uncertainty, relief, disturbance, unease, surprise, reassurance, and relaxation. Music is tense whenever it tends to awaken that response in a listener who is familiar with the musical idiom. Whereas emotions are usually rich in cognitive content, involving beliefs, desires, and attitudes, the evocation of unease or relief by music requires little by way of cognitive involvement from the listener, so the response is triggered more or less automatically. The auditor must listen with expectations tailored to the style of the piece, but these are not explicitly called to mind, usually. The response that concerns Robinson is typically an unthinking reaction, a somatic feeling. She writes:

Music that disturbs and unsettles us is disturbing, unsettling music. Modulations that surprise us are surprising. Melodies that soothe us are soothing . . . [I]t seems to me that the expression of a feeling by music can sometimes be explained straightforwardly in terms of the arousal of that feeling. However, the feelings aroused 'directly' by music are not stabs of pain or feelings of unrequited passion, but more 'primitive' feelings of tension, relaxation, surprise, and so on. (1994: 19)

What interests her, Robinson notes, is

the way in which the simple feelings 'directly' aroused by music can contribute to the imaginative expression of more complex emotions . . . Now, just as the formal structure of a piece of music can be understood in terms of the arousal of such feelings as uncertainty, uneasiness, relaxation, tension, relief, etc., so too can we understand the expressiveness of that piece of music in terms of the arousal of those and similar feelings . . . If a piece of music is heard as successively disturbing and reassuring, or as meandering uncertainly before moving forward confidently, or as full of obstacles, this is at least in part because of the way the music makes us feel. Disturbing passages disturb us; reassuring ones reassure. Passages that meander uncertainly make us feel uneasy: it is not clear where the music is going. Passages that move forward confidently make us feel satisfied: we know what is happening and seem to be able to predict what will happen next. Passages that are full of obstacles make us feel tense and when the obstacles are overcome, we feel relieved. It is important to notice that the feeling expressed is not always the feeling aroused: an uncertain, diffident passage may make me uneasy; a confident passage may make me feel reassured or relaxed . . . As I listen to a piece which expresses serenity tinged with doubt, I myself do not have to feel serenity tinged with doubt, but the feelings I do experience, such as relaxation or reassurance, interspersed with uneasiness, alert me to the nature of the overall emotional expressiveness in the piece of music as a whole . . . [T]he emotional experience aroused by the music is essential to the detection of the

emotional expressiveness in the music itself. At the same time, the emotions aroused in me are not the emotions expressed by the music. (1994, 19–20)

Robinson plainly realizes that if one is made aware of no more than the unfolding of a pattern (of tensings and relaxings) while listening to an extended piece, then hers is no advance on Kivy's 'contour' theory, which is a version of appearance emotionalism. In her view, that theory cannot account for the expression of cognitively complex emotions, since none of these has a distinctively articulated contour. Her criticisms of Levinson (1982, 1990c) and Walton (1988a) reveal her view of what more is needed for an adequate account of such expressions. She complains that these authors (who agree that music is capable of expressing cognitively complex emotions) do not adequately explain how music could contain or convey the cognitive content required for the expression (and imaginative evocation) of such emotions. Robinson believes, apparently, that the largely noncognitive feelings aroused by music, or, rather, the accumulation and interrelation of these as generated by the detail of the work's extended form, suggest cognitive complexes and contents that are to be attributed to a persona hypothesized as subject to this musical narrative. It is the succession of thoughtlessly automatic reactions that first animates, then controls, the imaginative involvement revealing to the listener the higher forms of musical expression.

I begin my criticism of Robinson's position by reviewing her suggestion that the tension, and so forth, of music consists in its power to arouse a corresponding, automatic response in the listener. It can be argued that the relevant properties are possessed not as causal powers but intrinsically. The succession of discords and concords in music is the pattern of harmonically generated tensings and relaxings. The *initial* predication to music of such terms as 'tense', 'uncertain', and 'relaxed' might have been suggested by the sensational character of our reactions, but I doubt that the current use of such terms presupposes those responses. If the relevant properties are of the music, we might expect that they could be observed and recognized without also being undergone. Indeed, this seems to be the case. Often one can correctly attribute a pattern of tension and relaxation to the music without having an experience echoing that pattern. I hear discordant major thirds in medieval music functioning as high points of tension, but I doubt that I feel tense in attaining that awareness. Also, where a style of music is boringly predictable I might be quite indifferent while being aware of the tension of, say, a prolonged dominant seventh leading eventually to a triad on the tonic. And when I listen for the umpteenth time to a piece I know well I might come to a

better understanding than before of the pattern of tensing and relaxing it generates without experiencing feelings that mirror this. I accept that we must observe the flux of tensings and releasings present in its musical fabric if we are to recognize a work's expressive and formal character. I reject, however, Robinson's stronger claims, such as: 'The emotional experience aroused by the music is essential to the detection of the emotional expressiveness in the music itself' (1994: 20) and, again: 'The expressiveness of the piece as a whole can only be grasped if the listener's feelings are aroused in such a way that they provide a clue to both the formal and the expressive structure of the piece as it develops through time' (1994: 21).

Moving on, I turn to the connection Robinson finds between the arousal of primitive, automatic reactions in the listener and the listener's perception of the higher emotions expressed in the music. As I listed earlier, Robinson writes of our feeling nervousness, relief, disturbance, and reassurance, as well as tension, relaxation, and surprise, as unthinking responses to music. By its power to produce such reactions, music is properly described as tense, surprising, disturbing, reassuring, unnerving, and so on. Hearing an appropriate succession of these qualities in music leads us to find, for instance, bold progress checked by obstacles. As a result of hypothesizing a persona, we recognize in all this the expression of, for example, cheerful confidence turning to despair.

I think that nervousness, relief, disturbance, and reassurance typically come surrounded by an atmosphere of propositional attitudes, even where they are initiated automatically. An overdose of caffeine might put me on edge, but if my state is one of nervousness, this is because my sensations become located within a wider cognitive context, one where I contemplate some future state or action with apprehension. Now, if music triggers reactions of nervousness, relief, disturbance, and reassurance—and thereby is unnerving, relieving, disturbing, and reassuring—it is far from evident that these qualities *connect* with a cognitive content delivered or directed by the music, as opposed to one created by and imported from the listener. Because I think the listener interjects, instead of uncovering, the ideas that fuel her imagination, I doubt that Robinson shows that the music (via the automatic reactions she says it arouses) controls the listener's imaginative involvement with the work. But, even if I am mistaken in this final claim, the move from a succession of musical qualities such as nervousness, hesitation, and reassurance to the expression of higher emotions, and, further, to the unfolding life of a persona, requires more imaginative input than is required in following music with understanding. The given pattern of musical qualities is likely to

be consistent with many states of affairs not expressive of higher emotions, as well as with expressions of many different higher emotions.

As I see it, Robinson is no nearer than her rivals to establishing that higher emotions are expressed in musical works as a result of their possessing features both requiring the listener to make believe a persona and also controlling the cognitive contents fed into the narrative constructed about this persona's experiences. If this is correct, she does not establish the strong version of hypothetical emotionalism, according to which some pieces cannot be understood and appreciated except via such make believing.

V

My comments on Robinson's view are, of necessity, rather particular. I conclude by raising a more general objection to hypothetical emotionalism.

So far I have implied that according to hypothetical emotionalism, the listener is to entertain the existence of *a* persona whose tale is revealed in the music's progress. But the advocates of the theory often suggest that many personas might be identified within a piece. Cone (1974) sometimes talks of different instruments and individual themes as distinct personas within a single work. Newcomb (1984*b*) discusses thematic units in Schumann's Second Symphony as distinguishable personas. Callen (1982) suggests that a work should be thought of as presenting the emotional life of a single organism—or perhaps of several agents. Now, this would present no problem for the theory if the relevant distinctions of number could be preserved in musical works; a story can contain more than one character. Things are not so simple, though. Maus (1988) allows that there is no basis for hearing different agents, as against hearing various parts or elements of the music as the different limbs of a single agent. He concludes that, in respect of the number of personas involved (whether one, several, or many), music is irredeemably indefinite.[16] I believe he is correct in this. Walton (1994) makes a point like Maus's and plainly regards it as raising a problem for hypothetical emotionalism.

The difficulty is this: Where the invocation of a persona is essentially implicated in understanding a work, this is likely to be for the reason indicated by Robinson and Karl: the tale told will explain the structure and coherence of the work where a purely technical account will be inadequate.

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[16] He does not regard this as an objection to his version of hypothetical emotionalism, obviously. In that case, it cannot be the strong form of the theory he means to espouse.

But if any number of personas can be imagined, then (at least) that number of tales can be told, each matching the music.[17] And if these stories differ markedly in their content and form, it must be doubtful that any one of them accounts for the work's coherence (unless all do so, which is extremely unlikely). A work that might be heard as laying out the developing gloom of a depressed persona could be experienced no less convincingly as indicating the unconnected moods of a series of personas, each of whom is (independently) more depressed than the last. The music's structure and coherence cannot be explained by reference to one narrative if others, neither more nor less consistent with what can be heard in the music, misfire in this regard.

A reply to this point suggests that the hypothesizing strategy should be regarded as a form of inference to the best explanation. Where evidence underdetermines theory, we may still prefer some theories over others, discriminating among them in terms of predictive power, economy of elements, elegance of structure, and the like. Similarly, though more than one narrative might be hypothesized in accounting for a work's expressiveness, not all are equally acceptable. Where one narrative provides for the unity and closure we experience in the music, whereas another does not, the former is to be preferred. The indefiniteness of the music, as mentioned above, need be no barrier to our judging between competing narratives or to our comparing those that introduce several personas to those that rely on only one. The preferred narrative as well as matching the music's structure also encompasses other of its artistically significant properties, such as its unity and closure.

This view of things would be appropriate if the credentials of hypothetical emotionalism were established, but I doubt that it can be used in the theory's defense. In the first place, the 'evidence' is disputed. It is not agreed that music commonly expresses higher emotions or, for those cases where it might do so, that it is necessary to hypothesize a persona before this can be understood and appreciated. Secondly, hypothesizing comes after the recognition of musical unity and the like and, therefore, does not account for that experience. We can explain why we would prefer one narrative to another—for instance, one displays the kind of form and unity that is also presented in the work, whereas another does not, despite matching the articulation of elements at the local level—but the features of the preferred narrative do not themselves justify the experience of the music. The integration of disparate elements

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[17] Let us dodge the complication of considering the reactions to markedly different performances of a given work. Assume that only a single rendition is in question.

achieved in the work and experienced by the listener is independent of what is hypothesized. If the work strikes us as episodic and disjointed, it is not plain that we should prefer a coherent narrative over another that is less so. Our preferring one narrative to another presupposes, without explaining, a high level of musical understanding.

If the strong version of hypothetical emotionalism is to justify the force of the prescription that we must listen to (some) works as presenting dramatic narratives, it must show the formation of such narratives to be essentially implicated in the listener's understanding and appreciation of relevant works. I doubt that this has been demonstrated. If the listener's narrative is to be importantly revealing of the music, not just of herself, we should be able to explain why others who wish to understand and appreciate the music must listen in terms of that narrative. Music is too indefinite to constrain the contents of such narratives to the required extent. And though there are grounds for discriminating among various narratives all of which match the music in their detail, these criteria are not of a type that supports strong hypothetical emotionalism. They presume the possibility of the listener's grasping the music's nature, of her recognizing its unity, integrity, symmetry, and so forth, independently of the hypothesizing process. This runs counter to the claim that it is only in developing a narrative concerning the actions, experiences, and feelings of a hypothesized persona that she can come to the fullest appreciation of the music in question. It is not the case, I claim, that the hypothetical invocation of a persona is essentially implicated in understanding musical works displaying formal and expressive interrelation.

Philosophical   11
Perspectives on
Music's Expressiveness[1]

In this chapter I consider three puzzles, the first of which has dominated
philosophical discussions about music and emotion over the past two
decades. It observes that purely instrumental music is not the kind of thing
that can express emotions.[2] Music is not sentient and neither is its relation to
occurrent emotions such that it could express them. The second problem
concerns the listener's response, where this mirrors the music's expressive
character. When listeners are saddened by the music's sadness, apparently
they lack the beliefs that normally underpin such a reaction; for example, they
do not think the music suffers or that the music's expressiveness is unfortu-
nate and regrettable. The third perplexity concerns negative responses elicited
by music, such as the sad one just mentioned. Why do listeners enjoy and
revisit works that, on their own account, incline them to feel sad? (For a
summary of philosophical approaches to these three topics, and more besides
see Levinson 1997.) Before addressing these puzzles, it is useful to examine
philosophical theories regarding the nature of the emotions.

I

It was once thought, by Descartes for instance, that emotions involve
the subject's awareness of the perturbations of his animal spirits. It was the

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[1] First published in Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda (eds.), *Music and Emotion: Theory and
Research*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 23–44.
[2] The focus falls on instrumental music simply because the problem of music's expressive powers
is at its most acute where music is divorced from words, narrative, and drama.

dynamic structure of this inner motion, along with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure with which it was apprehended, that distinguished the various emotions. Call this the 'hydraulic theory' of the emotions. In this view, emotions are experiences passively undergone by the subject; they are only contingently connected to their causes and to their behavioral manifestations; they are essentially non-cognitive.

In the latter half of the twentieth century an alternative account, usually called the 'cognitive theory', has been developed (see Solomon 1976; Lyons 1980; Gordon 1987).[3] This allows that emotions possess a phenomenological profile, but regards this as only one element among several, all of which are necessary and none of which is sufficient alone for an emotion's occurrence. Emotions may be characterized by physiological changes, but, more importantly, they are object-focused. Emotions are directed toward their objects. This means they are usually outward facing, as when I fear the lion that is before me, though the emotion's object also may be one's own sensations or emotions, as when I am alarmed by how tense I feel or where I am ashamed that I am angry. Moreover, emotions involve the categorization of their objects; for instance, if the emotion is one of fear its object must be viewed as harmful and if the emotion is one of envy its object must be viewed as something both desirable and not already controlled or possessed. In addition, they include attitudes toward their objects; for example, though I judge you to be injured, my emotional response will depend on whether this is a source of concern, satisfaction, or indifference to me. Also, particular emotions find expression in typical behaviors; if I pity you I may try to comfort you and to change your situation for the better, and if I fear you I may fight, flee, or seek protection.

Philosophers disagree in the versions of the cognitive theory they espouse. Some insist that emotions require a belief in their objects' existence, while others think that cognitive attitudes, such as make-belief, also can play the role of securing the emotion's object. Some hold that emotions can be individuated in terms of their sensational patterns, without reference to the emotion's propositional component, whereas others regard its cognitive ingredient as crucial to its identification. (For a useful summary of the literature see Deigh 1994.)

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[3] The term 'cognitive' has a somewhat different meaning in philosophical theories of emotion than it has in psychological theories. In the latter the term implies a focus on underlying information-processing mechanisms, whereas in philosophical theories it refers to beliefs, imaginings, thoughts, intentions, desires, and like states of consciousness.

Many of these disputes can be resolved by acknowledging that emotions do not constitute a homogenous class. For instance, some, such as disgust, might be primitive, automatic responses that are not susceptible in their operation to changes in the subject's cognitive state, whereas others, such as patriotism, are marked more by their self-conscious, intellectual content than their sensational character. Even if there is a continuum of cases between these extremes, it is useful to distinguish emotions (such as jealousy, hope, and remorse) in which the cognitive elements are prominent, malleable, and sophisticated from those (such as lust, fear, and disgust) in which the cognitive elements may not be present to awareness and the reaction is inclined to be automatic and inflexible.[4]

Some further distinctions that may be useful are those between emotions and moods, and between emotions and mere sensations (or mere feelings). These distinctions are drawn roughly within folk psychological discourse along the following lines. Moods are not object-directed and involve rather general feelings. There can be moods of dread, depression, and happiness, but not of embarrassment or remorse, because these latter lack a distinctive experiential character and are distinguished more in terms of what is cognized about their objects. Meanwhile, emotions may involve bodily sensations but are not reducible to them. A person who sits too close to the fire might experience exactly the same sensations as another who is acutely embarrassed, but it is only the latter who feels an emotion.

II

Before outlining philosophers' theories of musical expressiveness, it is helpful to consider the desiderata that an acceptable theory must satisfy.

We could not account for the interest and value of expression in music, or for the emotional responses music calls from the listener, unless terms like 'sad' and 'happy' retain their usual meanings in connection with music's

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[4] Griffiths (1997) argues that the emotions do not form a 'natural kind' and that the cognitive theory applies to only some. He is impressed by experimental data supposedly showing that the neural structures dealing with the emotions are modular and cognitively opaque, thereby generating evolutionarily adaptive 'quick', 'dirty', and 'conservative' reactions to affective stimuli. (For work on this wavelength see LeDoux 1998.) But it seems to me that the cognitive theory is not so easily dismissed. Propositional attitudes—beliefs, desires, intentions—can be in play without being held before the mind. Yesterday I believed that the earth is round, though I did not bring the relevant thought to consciousness at any time. Nevertheless, though I suspect the experimental data referred to by Griffiths might be interpreted in ways consistent with cognitivism, as I have just indicated, later I argue that some of the most common emotional responses to music's expressiveness do not fit the cognitive model.

expressiveness. So, a principal task will be to indicate how, despite their manifest differences, music's expressing an emotion parallels the default case in which a person expresses an emotion they feel. In other words, an account explaining and justifying our attribution to music of predicates such as 'sad' and 'happy' must make clear how this non-primary use relates to these words' normal application to the occurrent emotions of sentient creatures.

As I see it, this constraint quickly rules out three approaches to the topic. It will not do to attempt to reduce music's expressiveness to a catalogue of technicalities and compositional devices. Even if it is true that all and only music in minor keys sounds sad, it cannot be that 'sounds sad' *means* 'is in a minor key'. Even if one can make sad music by composing it in the minor key, there must be more to the analysis of music's expressiveness than acknowledgment of this, for it is by no means clear how the music's modality relates to the very different kinds of things that make it true in the standard case that a person is expressing sadness. Musical features ground music's expressiveness, and it is interesting to discover what features those are, but identifying them is, at best, only an initial step toward an informative theory of musical expressiveness.

Another of the disallowed strategies claims that music's expressiveness is metaphorical and declines to unpack the metaphor.[5] The claim here is not merely that, as a figure of speech, music can be described metaphorically. It is, rather, that the music itself is metaphorically expressive. While this last assertion obviously locates expressiveness squarely with the music, its meaning is quite mysterious. The idea that musical expression is metaphorical must itself be a metaphor, since metaphor primarily is a linguistic device depending on semantic relations for which there is no musical equivalent. This approach indicates what is puzzling about music's expression of emotions—that it is hard to see how emotion terms could retain their literal sense when predicated of music, though clearly their application to music trades somehow on their literal meaning—but it offers no solution to that puzzle.

Also unacceptable is the theory insisting that music's expressiveness is *sui generis*; that is, of its own kind and not relevantly comparable to the default case in which occurrent emotions are expressed. That approach is not offering a theory, but, rather, is rejecting the philosophical enterprise that seeks one. I do not deny that when it comes to expressiveness music

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[5] In its strongest version, the theory denies the possibility of analyzing the crucial metaphor. For theories to which this claim is central see Goodman 1968 and Scruton 1997.

does its own thing. This is only to be expected: its medium is that of organized sound, not that of a biological organism evolved and educated to engage emotionally with its environment. What I repudiate is the suggestion that an analysis of music's expressiveness can avoid addressing whether and how the musical medium realizes a kind of expressiveness that is equivalent to the biological one.

III

One assumption common to the theories discussed below should be made explicit: Listeners must be suitably qualified if they are to be capable of detecting and appreciating music's expressiveness. (Unprepared listeners may miss, or misidentify, the music's expressive character.) Qualified listeners are at home with the type of music in question, with its genre, style, and idiom. They know when the melody begins and ends and when the piece is over. They can recognize mistakes and can distinguish predictable from unusual continuations. They may not be able to articulate this knowledge, most of which is acquired through unreflective exposure to pieces of the relevant kind. Indeed, the majority of qualified listeners have no formal music education and are not familiar with the musicologist's technical vocabulary (Davies 1994; Kivy 1990a; Levinson 1996a).

IV

First Problem: The Expression of Emotion in Music

When we say that something expresses an emotion, usually we mean that it publicly betrays or indicates a state that it feels. People's tears express their sadness only if they are experiencing sadness. Therefore, only sentient creatures can express emotions. Musical works are not sentient, so emotions cannot be expressed in them. Yet many of them do express emotions such as sadness and happiness. How could that be?

A first theory suggests that music operates as a symbol or sign, the import of which is purely associative and conventional. Though it bears no natural relation to an emotion, it comes to denote or refer to an emotion, and then to characterize it, by virtue of its place within a system. In this view, music picks out and conveys something about emotions after the manner of linguistic utterances; that is, through combining elements according to rules with the function of generating and communicating a semantic or propositional

content (Coker 1972). Musical signs, like linguistic ones, are both unlike and opaque to their referents.

Quasi-vocabularies sometimes have been described for music in its relation to the emotions, and music *is* highly organized according to quasi-syntactic rules governing the well-formedness of musical strings (Meyer 1956; Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983), yet there is not a semantics in music. Without that, the parallel with linguistic and other symbol systems collapses. It is not the case that music points or refers to emotions it then goes on to describe. There are no plausible equivalents in music to predication, to propositional closure, or to any of the other functions and operators that are essential to the meaningful use of linguistic and other truth-functional systems.

An alternative theory would have it that music refers to the emotions not within the framework of a symbol system but as a result of *ad hoc*, arbitrary designations and associations. For instance, certain musical gestures or phrases happen to be linked saliently with texts expressive of a given emotion and retain that connection over many years, so that purely instrumental music comes to be heard as expressive when it includes the relevant gesture or phrase (Cooke 1959). Or, music of certain kinds is linked with rites or events that otherwise are emotionally charged, and these ties persist, becoming commonplaces of musical expressiveness. In this theory, expressiveness involves techniques like those followed by Wagner in his use of leitmotiv, except that the relevant conventions are available to many composers and occur in many works, so widespread and entrenched are the associations that underpin them.

There is no denying that some aspects of music's expressiveness—for instance, the links between instruments and moods, as between the oboe and bucolic frames of mind, the organ and religiosity, or the trumpet and regality or bellicosity—seem to be arbitrary and conventional in ways that may depend on historical associations. Such cases notwithstanding, this last account is no more plausible or attractive than the first. It reduces music's expressiveness to something like brute naming; it indicates how music might refer to an emotion but not how it could characterize it.

These theories regard expressive music as referring beyond itself. As with language or signs relying on arbitrary associations, features intrinsic to the music are of interest only in so far as they happen to be relevant to its role as a symbolic vehicle. Though the music mediates contact with the emotion that is symbolized, listeners should not be distracted by its intrinsic qualities from pursuing its referential target. Because it is radically different from the

emotions it symbolizes, it is opaque with respect to them, yet the music is of interest only in its symbolic import.

This account is seriously at odds with the phenomenology of listeners' experiences of music's expressiveness. Registering music's expressiveness is more like encountering a person who feels the emotion and shows it than like reading a description of the emotion or than like examining the word 'sad'. While the dinner bell might, through association, lead us to salivate, we do not think of it as tasty. By contrast, we experience the sadness of music as present within it. Emotion is transparently immediate in our experience of music and our awareness of its expressiveness is not separable from, or independent of, our following the music's unfolding in all its detail. Moreover, the listener's connection is not with some general, abstract conception of the emotions but with a specific and concrete presentation.

Any theory of musical expressiveness must acknowledge and respect the phenomenological vivacity and particularity with which music presents its expressive aspect. Here, then, is a further constraint on acceptable theories of music's expressiveness, and it is one that is failed by the theories discussed so far. Music is not merely a vehicle for referring beyond itself in a fashion that largely ignores the intrinsic and unique character of its individual works.

The semiotic theory can respond to this objection if the link between music and emotion is transparent because it is natural, not arbitrarily conventional. Here is a first suggestion: There is a synaesthetic quality to certain timbres. The trumpet's upper notes are bright and the clarinet's low register is dark; the tone of the celesta is ethereal, while high string harmonics are brittle. Even if these connections are widely made, however, they lack the temporally extended complexity that could account for music's expressiveness. They might contribute to the work's emotional ambience, but they could not generate it.

A stronger form of natural connection is that of similarity, and this is emphasized in theories regarding music as an iconic or exemplificatory symbol. If music vividly resembles the emotions it expresses—indeed, if it depicts them in virtue of these resemblances—then it would be natural to respond to the symbol much as we respond to that for which it stands. Iconic symbols (such as representational paintings) are more transparent to their referents than are signs that rely on arbitrary associations or symbol systems (such as that of a natural language) to establish the connection. We regularly talk of pictures as if we are in the presence of what they depict, though this is not to say we are deceived by them. We do not react to linguistic descriptions

in the same way. Both Langer (1942) and Goodman (1968) have suggested that music is symbolic precisely because it is experienced as resembling or exemplifying what it denotes.

What is it about the emotions that music resembles? Not their thought components if, as was just argued, purely instrumental music is not equipped to convey the contents of propositions. It has been suggested that expressive instrumental music recalls the tones and intonations with which emotions are given vocal expression (Kivy 1980), but this also is dubious. It is true that blues guitar and jazz saxophone sometimes imitate singing styles and that singing styles sometimes recall the sobs, wails, whoops, and yells that go with ordinary occasions of expressiveness. For the general run of cases, though, music does not sound very like the noises made by people gripped by emotion. A more plausible source of resemblance lies in the music's dynamic structure than in its sound as such. We experience movement and pattern in music; we hear in music a terrain shaped by ongoing interactions between its parts, which vary in their pitch, complexity, teleological impetus, energy, texture, inertia, tension, and so on. If music resembles an emotion, it does so by sharing the dynamic character displayed either in the emotion's phenomenological profile, as Addis (1999) maintains, or in the public behaviors through which the emotion is standardly exhibited.

The first of these suggestions assumes that the phenomenological profile of some emotions is distinctive enough to provide for their individuation. I am doubtful both that cognitively rich emotions, like hope or jealousy, survive being divorced from their cognitive elements and that there is anything to distinguish the internal dynamics of bursting with joy from blowing one's top. Moreover, to suggest that music symbolizes the 'general form of emotions' (Langer 1942), not particular kinds or their instances, enfeebles the account. To those who have abandoned the Cartesian hydraulic theory in favor of the cognitive theory of the emotions, it is more promising to compare music with the outward expressions of emotions than with their experiential shape. A number of emotions have standard behavioral expressions that are partly constitutive of their nature, rather than dispensable concomitants, and these have distinctive dynamic physiognomies. A downcast bearing and slow movements go with sadness, whereas joy is upbeat and lively. Sometimes we can tell what a person is feeling from the carriage of their body, without knowing the cause of their feeling, their cognitive state, or the object of their emotion.

A fatal problem remains in explaining music's expressiveness in terms of this or any other resemblance between music's features and properties

displayed by emotions: In the normal case, the pertinent behaviors are expressive only if they stand in the relevant relation to an instance of the appropriate emotion. Someone might always display the behavior without feeling the way their behavior leads us to suppose. In that case, no occurrent emotion is expressed. And if a given physiological state is not accompanied by relevant thoughts, attitudes, desires, or behavioral dispositions, the experience of that state would not normally be regarded as an emotion. No matter how powerful the resemblance, the analogy fails to go through, since it cannot be supposed that music experiences or undergoes the emotions expressed in it.

Theories regarding music as a sign or symbol referring to the emotions accept the conclusion of the argument with which I commenced: Occurrent emotions cannot be expressed in musical works. They look for some other, more abstract, way music can connect with the affective life. But semiotic theories inevitably leave a gap between music and emotion. In consequence, they do not do justice to the direct and unmediated fashion in which emotional expression imposes itself on our experience of the music.

Proponents of a second kind of theory accept that only sentient creatures can express occurrent emotions, but deny that this counts against music's expressiveness. They hold that when emotion is expressed in a piece of music that piece stands to a sentient being's occurrent emotion as expressing it. Accordingly, they seek a sentient being whose emotion is given expression by the music. The prime candidates are the composer (or performer) or a persona represented in the music. Alternatively, they maintain it is the occurrent feelings of the listener, ones caused by his or her attention to the music, that license the judgment that the music is expressive.

The *expression theory* analyses the music's expressiveness as depending on the composer expressing her occurrent emotion through the act of composition. The chief difficulty for this theory is conveyed by O. K. Bouwsma's aphorism: 'The sadness is to the music rather like the redness to the apple, than it is like the burp to the cider' (1950: 94). In other words, we experience music's expressiveness not as a residue of feelings discharged in the compositional process but as inherent in its nature.

The expression theory seems to be empirically false, as not all expressive music is written by composers who feel emotions and try to express them. A more philosophical point is this: In the default case, sadness is expressed by weeping and the like, not by musical composition. The connection between the composer's emotions and the work she writes is by no means as natural or transparent as that between her emotions and the behaviors, like weeping or

whooping, that vent them. So, even if composers sometimes express their emotions in the works they write, this fact, rather than accounting for the music's expressiveness, needs to be explained. Indeed, in the most plausible account, the composer appropriates the music's expressiveness in order to make the connection with her own emotions. In other words, the composer is like the person who expresses his feelings, not by showing them directly, but by making a mask that wears an appropriate expression. Just as the mask is expressive whether or not it is used in this sophisticated act of self-expression, so too is the music. If composers occasionally match the expressiveness of the music to their own feelings, that is possible only because the music can present expressive aspects apart from its being appropriated in this fashion.[6] (For further criticism of the expression theory see Tormey 1971; Kivy 1980; Davies 1986, 1994; Goldman 1995.)

The *arousal theory* explains the music's expressiveness as its propensity to evoke the corresponding emotion in the listener. What makes it true that grass is green is that it arouses certain experiences in (human) observers under standard conditions; grass's greenness is its causal power to bring about appropriate experiences. Similarly, what makes it true that music is sad or happy is its causal power to bring about these or related responses in the listener (Matravers 1998).

I doubt that the correspondence between listeners attributing sadness to music and their experiencing feelings or emotions of sadness in response to it is sufficient to make the arousal theory plausible. In the case of color, the experience inevitably goes with the judgment and the two are pulled apart only when the observer or the conditions of observation are abnormal. The 'standard conditions' for music to produce its effects are those in which a qualified listener pays attention to the music. Those conditions are often satisfied. When they are, the arousal of a response in listeners who correctly judge the music to be expressive is not nearly as regular as the arousal theory requires. And it is unconvincing to claim that the relevant feelings, or dispositions to them, can be so weak as to escape the listener's notice. In fact, we have a clear sense of the music's expressive character as quite distinct from our (very variable) responses to it. This is not to deny that the music sometimes can cause an emotional reaction. What is denied is that this reaction is what makes it true that the music is expressive. Normally, we regard

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[6] Similar arguments can be ranged against the version of the expression theory that identifies the performers as the ones who express their emotions through their rendering of the music. Performers need not feel the emotions they present and when they do there is matching rather than direct expression.

the connection as reversed: it is because the expressiveness is apparent in the work that we are moved by the music.

Many theorists (but cf. Beever 1998) would subscribe to the following proposition: If we were never moved by music we would not find it expressive. This involves no commitment to the arousalist's program for analyzing music's expressiveness, though. Usually the conditional is regarded as reversible: If we never found music expressive we would not be moved by it. In other words, it identifies the close and mutual dependence of our experience of music and the judgments we make concerning its features; it does not imply that one takes explanatory precedence over the other.

Expression and arousal theories go hunting for an experiencing subject to whom the music might stand, either as the expression of her (the composer's) occurrent emotion or as the cause of her (the listener's) emotion-like response. Instead of actual persons and emotions, perhaps we should consider imagined ones. In the case of works generating fictional worlds, such as novels and films, we engage imaginatively with characters inhabiting those worlds. Maybe music's expressiveness connects to fictional or make-believe experiences of emotion. There are two possibilities. In the first, listeners imaginatively ascribe emotions to themselves on the basis of their make-believe engagement with the world of the work. In the second, listeners make believe that the work generates a fictional world to which they are external observers; they imagine of the music that it presents a narrative concerning the emotional life of a persona.

Both views are presented by Walton (1988a), but it is his version of the first that I consider. He suggests that a passage is expressive of sadness if the listeners imagine of their hearing of it that it is a cognizance of their own feeling of sadness. Listeners take their awareness of their auditory sensations to be an awareness of their own feelings and it is these feelings that the music can be said to express.

Even if one charitably allows that awareness of music's expressiveness could be as self-centered and introspective as this, the theory remains implausible. Reflecting on one's auditory sensations is not plainly similar to experiencing emotions, so it is difficult to see how what one imagines can be connected back to and controlled by the music, so that, ultimately, it is the music's expressiveness that is revealed.

The thesis that in hearing expressiveness in music we sometimes imagine a persona who is subject to a narrative that unfolds in the music is widely supported (Budd 1985b; Vermazen 1986; Walton 1988a, 1990; Robinson and Karl 1995; Ridley 1995). The idea could be offered as a heuristic—as a way of

helping people recognize the music's expressiveness—or as a claim applying only to particular works. The strongest position insists that this manner of hearing is always required for appreciation of the music's expressiveness. Levinson (1996*b*) comes nearest to the strong position by defining musical expressiveness such that a passage is expressive of an emotion if and only if it is heard (by appropriately experienced listeners) as the expression of that emotion by an imagined human subject, the music's persona.

A first objection denies that all qualified listeners imagine a persona as a condition of their awareness of the music's expressiveness. They might be able to say what it would be suitable to imagine, even if they do not imagine it themselves, but they do this in terms of an awareness of the music's expressive character that is not mediated by the imagination. Besides, I contend that what the listener imagines is too little constrained by the course and detail of the music to provide a theory regarding music's expressiveness as an objective property, which is what Levinson intends. In the case of novels and films, a great deal of information about the fictional world is conveyed to the audience, even if its members must entertain the reality of this world. Those data control what is to be imagined, and why and how, in following the story. Because it does not convey a definite propositional or depicted content, and hints at such things (if at all) only in the vaguest and most general fashion, purely instrumental music cannot direct and channel the content of the listener's imagining (Davies 1997). For instance, what is to determine how many personas he should make believe or the background of relations that might hold between different personas? Inevitably, what is imagined reveals more about the listener than about the music's expressiveness.

A final view, the *contour theory*,[7] abandons the attempt to analyze music's expressiveness as depending on its connection to occurrent emotions. It observes that certain behaviors, comportments, and physiognomies are experienced as expressive without giving expression to, or being caused by, occurrent emotions. Some faces, gaits, or movements are happy-looking. They present an emotion characteristic in their appearance. Basset-hounds are sad-looking dogs, but this is to say nothing about how they feel. The use of emotion terms to name the expressive characteristics of appearances is secondary, but it bears an obvious connection to those terms' primary use: the behaviors that display an emotion characteristic unconnected with an

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[7] Kivy's version of the theory (1980) often is called 'cognitivism' as a way of acknowledging his commitment to a cognitive theory of the emotions, especially as these concern the listener's response. His theory of music's expressiveness does not invoke the cognitive theory of the emotions, however, because it denies that the music expresses occurrent emotions.

occurrent emotion are the same (or very similar) to the ones that, where the emotion is occurrent, give direct and distinctive expression to it. Only those emotions that can be recognized solely on the basis of the outward expressions that betray them have corresponding emotion characteristics in appearance.

Turning now to music, the contour theory proposes that pieces present emotion characteristics, rather than giving expression to occurrent emotions, and they do so by virtue of resemblances between their own dynamic structures and behaviors or movements that, in humans, present emotion characteristics. The claim is not that music somehow refers beyond itself to occurrent emotions; music is not an iconic symbol of emotions as a result of resembling their outward manifestations. Rather, the claim is that the expressiveness is a property of the music itself. This property resides in the way the music sounds to the attuned listener, just as happy-lookingness can be a property displayed in a creature's face or movements. Because music is a temporal art, its expressive character is revealed only gradually and can be heard only through sustained attention to its unfolding. It takes as long to hear the music's expressive properties as it takes to hear the passages in which those properties are articulated.[8]

Consider Fig. 11.1. The car and the puppet are happy looking, and the dog and the weeping willow are sad-looking. These attributions apply to the appearances the depicted items present, not to occurrent emotions. Only the dog is sentient, and there is no reason to think it feels as it looks. (Besides, dogs do not display feelings of sadness, when they have them, in their faces.) These looks present emotion characteristics because they resemble bearings or expressions which, were they shown by people under appropriate circumstances, would express those people's occurrent emotions. I maintain that when we attribute emotions to music we are describing the emotional character it presents, just as we do when we call the willow sad or the car happy. In the case of music, this 'appearance' depends on its dynamic topography, as this unfolds through time. In general, music resembles gaits, carriages, or comportments that are typically expressive of human occurrent emotions, rather than facial expressions.

In discussing the theory that regards music as an iconic symbol or depiction of emotions, I have already considered objections to the view that music

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[8] In outline, this is the theory presented in Kivy (1980), as well as in Davies (1994), though the terms in which it is formulated are closer to my account than Kivy's. As observed earlier, Kivy is more inclined than I to find an expressive resemblance between music and the human voice (see also Juslin 2001). For further discussion of our differences see Davies (1994) and Kivy (1999) and for critical commentaries see Goldman (1995), Levinson (1996*b*, 1997), and Madell (1996).

Figure 11.1   Appearances with various emotion characteristics: (a) car, (b) puppet

Figure 11.1 (*continued*)   (c) dog, and (d) weeping willow

resembles expressions of the emotions. I concluded that the resemblance claim is at its most plausible when it compares music's dynamic pattern to that apparent in nonverbal, behavioral expressions of emotion. Yet, even if this is accepted, a further objection notes that resemblance alone could not ground music's expressiveness. Resemblances, which are symmetrical and, anyway, can be found between music and many things besides expressive appearances, are insufficient to explain why we experience music as powerfully expressive of emotion.

One might reply, as Kivy does, that we are evolutionarily programmed to 'animate' what we perceive. Or, one might simply say 'yet this is how we hear it', without committing oneself to an account of the mechanisms and triggers that underlie the response. Not just music but many things are experienced as redolent of emotions, despite lacking the feature one would assume to be crucial; namely, sentience. There can be no denying that crude representations of the human face can be emotionally compelling in their expressive power, though such responses are not strictly entailed by the resemblances that can be found. Consider the masks of comedy and tragedy or a simple drawing such as Edvard Munch's 'scream' face.

If these last observations are not fully satisfying, that does not reflect worse on the contour theory than on other analyses. For instance, the arousalist is reduced ultimately to saying 'simply, this is how music affects us'; and philosophers who regard music as an iconic symbol or as calling on us to make believe a narrative about a persona are no better equipped than the contour theorist to go beyond the perceived resemblances that are central to their accounts of music's expressiveness.

A different line of objection doubts that the contour theory can explain the significance we attach to expressiveness in music or the energy with which music engages our emotions. What can we learn from, and why should we be moved by, mere appearances of emotion that are not expressions of occurrent, deeply felt emotions? One answer draws attention to the fact that music is intentionally and ingeniously designed to be as it is. Though expressiveness is a property of the piece's sounds, we encounter it not as an accident of nature but as deliberately created and used, which adds considerably to its potential importance. Another response could question if it is true that music is valued as a source of knowledge about the emotions, rather than for the experience it provides, where this experience takes in much more than only its expressiveness.

The contour theory, more than any other, lends itself to the idea that music is a universal 'language of the emotions'; that is, to the suggestion that

expressiveness can be recognized cross-culturally. If, as some psychologists have claimed (Ekman 1980), certain emotions have characteristic appearances that are universally understood, and if music is experienced as expressive as a result of its recalling these same appearances in its dynamic character, then cross-cultural appreciation of music's expressiveness should be possible. And perhaps it is sometimes. When the musical systems of different cultures are parallel (for instance, in their principles of scalar organization and modalities), there may be sufficient transparency to allow members of one culture to correctly recognize expressiveness in the music of the other culture. Many Westerners can access sub-Saharan African music, and this is not only because it provided the seeds from which a number of popular Western musical types emerged.

Often, though, the music of one culture is expressively opaque to outsiders. There are several reasons why this can be so. The emotions appropriate to given circumstances can differ, so that one group sees death as an occasion for sadness where another views it as a cause for joyous celebrations. Until one appreciates the belief systems that determine the significance of the social settings in which emotions are situated, and then recognizes the connection of music with all this, it will not be a simple matter to read off expressiveness from foreign music. Even if music's expressiveness implicates 'natural' resemblances to behaviors that are transcultural in their import, these then are structured according to historically malleable musical conventions of genre and style, so that they are no longer apparent to those who lack familiarity with the culture's music. To take a crude example, whether a given pitch is 'high', 'middle', or 'low' depends on the range that is deemed available for use, and that can vary arbitrarily from musical type to type. The contour theory, no less than other analyses, supposes that qualified listeners can become such only by immersing themselves in the kinds of music that are their focus, and that listeners have no guaranteed access to the properties of foreign music, including its expressive ones, until they become appropriately experienced.

V

Second Problem: Mirroring Responses to Music's Expressiveness

People often respond emotionally to musical works. While there is nothing odd about a listener being moved by the work's beauty, it is strange that he should respond with sadness to the sadness it expresses. The listener's sad

response appears to lack beliefs of the kind that typically go with sadness. When I am sad because the dog has died, or because it is raining on your parade, or because you are depressed, I believe the death of the dog, or the rain, or your depression are unfortunate occurrences, but when the sadness of the music makes me feel sad I do not believe there is anything unfortunate about the music. Moreover, the response to another's emotion often does not mirror it. Another's anger is as likely to produce in me fear, or disappointment, or irritation, as it is likely to precipitate my anger. Yet the listener is not as liable to feel pity, or compassion, or evil delight at the music's sadness as he is liable to feel sadness. How is the listener's response appropriate to the music?

The problem is not a general one. Many of our emotional reactions to music conform neatly to the cognitivist model. We can marvel at the music's complexity and be shocked by its discordant novelty. These responses, in taking the music as their object, involve beliefs or thoughts of the kinds that normally accompany marvelling and shock. The problem case is the one in which listeners mirror in their reactions what the music expresses; where they are saddened by sad music or cheered by happy music.

Kivy (1989) denies the problem's existence: People are mistaken when they claim to be saddened by sad music.[9] They are moved by the music, certainly, but not to sadness. This explains why concert audiences neither display sadness nor act as if they are sad about the music; simply, that is not how they feel. People are not often wrong about the identity of their emotions (cf. Griffiths 1997), however, and Kivy's position will fail so long as some people sometimes react to the music's expressiveness by mirroring it in their own feelings. For these reasons, and by appeal to their own experience, most philosophers reject Kivy's stance (for discussion see Davies 1994; Goldman 1995). Any alternative theory that can deal with the problem without denying the phenomenon will be preferable.

If the listener believed music expresses a sadness felt by its composer (or performer), there would be no special puzzle about her reaction, for such beliefs are appropriate to a sad response. In this case, however, the object of the response would not be the music but the composer or performer. When we react to a person's emotional state, our response is directed to them, not to their expressive behavior as such, even if it was this behavior that alerted us to their condition. This account does not, after all, address the problem case,

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[9] Addis (1999) agrees that listeners are not aroused to sadness by sad music. He differs from Kivy, though, in holding both that they are aroused to a uniquely musical experience—a kind of stirring— and that this response does not take the music as its intentional object, though it is caused by the music.

that in which the listeners' responses are solely to the music's expressive character. To have this reaction, they need not believe that the music expresses emotions experienced by its composer; it can be sufficient that they acknowledge the music's expressive appearance, without supposing this to be connected to anyone's occurrent emotions.

According to the theory in which a persona is the human subject of the imaginary act of expression we hear as going on in the music, the problem response can be approached as follows: If that response is directed to the persona, then it will be targeted at the music, for it is in the world of the music that the persona is imagined to exist. And if we hear the persona as undergoing the emotional vicissitudes outlined in the music, then we entertain thoughts about the situation of the persona that are appropriate for mirroring reactions. Admittedly, these thoughts are make-believed, not believed, but if this presents no special difficulty in accounting for our reactions to fictional characters (as argued in Carroll 1998), then the response is also unproblematic in the musical case. So long as the cognitive theory of the emotions allows that the cognitive connection between the emotion and its object can be secured by the imagination in some cases, as well as by belief in others, the listener's response can be seen to be consistent with the cognitive theory of the emotions.

The claim that attitudes other than belief can play the cognitively central role in emotions is not accepted by all who support the cognitive theory of the emotions. And it might be thought that it is one thing to imagine of the emotion's object that it has emotion-pertinent features that one does not believe it to have, yet quite another to make believe that the emotion's object exists when one does not believe it to do so. In addition, there is the concern mentioned earlier: that it is not clear that what is entertained is sufficiently controlled by what happens in the music to count as belonging to the world of the work.

The arousalist maintains that what makes it true that the music is sad is that it arouses sadness in the listener; the listener's response is not to some expressive property possessed independently by the music. While the arousalist might deny that the listener's responses mirror an expressiveness that is independent of her reaction, still he must hold that the response correlates with the music's expressiveness by licensing the judgment that the music is expressive of what is felt by the listener. Given this, and also the fact that the causal relation between the music and the listener's response need not be informed by cognitions beyond those involved in tracking the unfolding of the music, a problem remains for the arousalist in characterizing the listener's reaction as emotional.

In a recent defense of arousalism Matravers (1998) acknowledges that the crucial response is a feeling, not an emotion as such, because it lacks the cognitive contents that characterize the emotions. For instance, the response feels like sadness or pity and this makes it true that the music expresses sadness, but the response is not an object-directed, cognitively founded emotion. This explains why listeners are not strongly inclined to act on their feelings; the prime motivators for action are beliefs and desires directed to an emotional object, but these are absent in the musical case. Because only a few feelings have distinctive phenomenologies, music can arouse only rather general feelings and thereby is capable of expressing only a limited range of emotions.

I endorse this approach, which can be disassociated from arousalism: If the listener does mirror the music's expressiveness, that response is caused by and tracks the music, but does not take the music or any other thing as its emotional object. This is not to agree, however, with the arousalist's claim that it is the listener's reaction that licenses the judgment that the music is sad.

My account can appeal to one resource that is not available to the arousalist. Earlier I suggested that inanimate appearances often strike us as expressive. To this it can be added that sometimes we find expressive characteristics in appearances highly evocative of responses of the mirroring kind (Davies 1994), not only in the musical case but in others (see Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). Whether through empathy or sociality, we often 'catch' the mood prevailing around us. Both high-spiritedness and despondency can be 'contagious'. The same applies sometimes, I claim, when we are confronted with powerfully expressive appearances that are not connected to occurrent emotions. There is no reason why appearances of sadness should make me feel gloomy if I do not think they show how anyone feels (and often they do not do so); which is to say, mere appearances of sadness are not a suitable object for sadness, since they are not thought to be unfortunate and the rest. Nevertheless, if I am roused to an emotion under those circumstances, it will be a mirroring one, because, in the absence of relevant cognitions, it is only through a kind of contagion or osmosis that my feelings are engaged.[10]

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[10] The view presented here requires rejection or revision of the cognitive theory of the emotions sketched earlier, since it countenances emotions that lack the appropriate beliefs or make-beliefs, the desires, and behavioral dispositions that would follow from these, and the relevant emotional object. As indicated, Matravers (1998) and Addis (1999) also deny that the mirroring response takes the music as its emotional object. Of course, this is not to deny that the music is the focus of attention and perceptual object of the response, which is a point apparently missed by Madell (1996).

VI

Third Problem: Negative Responses

Yet if we accept that music expressive of negative emotions sometimes produces an echo in feelings experienced by the listener, another problem emerges. People avoid sad experiences where they can because these are unpleasant. Those who are under no duty to listen to sad music often choose to do so. They report that such music gives rise to a negative emotional response, yet they offer this in praise of the music. Rather than fleeing, they are attracted to the music and they willingly return to it, despite predicting that it will again make them feel sad. Given that music lovers are not masochists, how is this to be explained?

For Kivy (1990a) there is again no problem. Listeners to sad music do not experience negative feelings, or if they do these are of the ordinary kind—as when one is disappointed in the poverty of the work's ideas or by its execrable execution—and provide reason for avoiding the emotion's object, the work, or the performers, in the future. Those who think that music can lead the listener to a negative, mirroring response cannot avoid the issue, though. Three argumentative strategies are available.

The first notes that there can be much to enjoy about musical works that arouse negative emotions; for instance, the work's beauty, the composer's treatment of the medium, and so forth. In addition, because it lacks 'life implications', one can savor and examine one's response, thereby coming to understand the emotion better while being reassured of one's own sensitivity (Levinson 1982). In this view, the negative elements are outweighed by positive ones. We listen to music that arouses negative emotions because it also does much more and the overall balance is on the credit side.

The position is not entirely convincing in its present formulation. If we can get the same or similar benefits from works that do not make us feel unhappy, we should prefer them. We should shun skilful, interesting works that make us feel sad in favor of equally skilful and interesting works that make us feel happy. To reply to this objection, the original view can be developed (as in Levinson 1982) by arguing that at least some of the benefits cannot be obtained from works other than those that are liable to induce negative feelings. The Aristotelian position, according to which we are better off for purging negative feelings in the context of art, pursues this line, as does the theory that our experiences of artworks educate us about the emotions in a setting that insulates us from the practical demands and dangers of the real

world. In this connection, it is also often held that the feelings experienced in regard to artworks are muted and undemanding compared to equivalents provoked by real-world situations.

These ways of addressing the objection are more convincing in the discussion of our reactions to narrative and representational artworks than to instrumental music, I find. If the response to music lacks the cognitive content of emotions, it is difficult to see how it could be a source of education and insight or how it is easier to tolerate than similarly unpleasant feelings caused by real-world phenomena. If music does not generate a contentful fictional world, the reaction to its expressive properties is not less a response to 'real-world' features than is, say, that in which an especially vivid shade of lime green induces sensations of dyspepsia in its observer.

The second approach to the issue derives from Hume (1912), who argued of the experience of tragedy that its negative aspects are transformed to positive ones through the delight taken in the narrative's construction, the natural attractiveness of representation, and so on. It is far from clear, though, what is the character of this conversion or how feelings such as sad ones could remain sad while becoming intrinsically pleasant. Perhaps what Hume was driving at is better articulated by the third strategy, which offers the strongest possibility for justifying the interest of someone whose sensitivities incline her to negative feelings on hearing music in which negative emotions are presented.

Even if we accept that the negative aspects of experience are unpleasant and that this gives a reason for avoiding them, it is plain that, for many, this reason is not always overriding. For music, that which is negative often is integral to the whole. Provided our desire to understand and appreciate the work is strong enough, we may be prepared to face those negative elements. The experience that results is not just good on balance; it is not as if the work would be better if we could ignore its negative aspects, for then we would not be engaging with it as such. In other words, experience of and reaction to music's negative expressiveness, where that expressiveness is important to the work, is something to be accepted if our goal is to understand and, through understanding, to appreciate the music. There is nothing irrational in pursuing that goal, though the experience to which it gives rise can be unpleasant in parts.

There is a different way of getting at the same point. It simply is not true that people always duck the avoidable negative aspects of life. These are recognized as essential components of many things we like and value. They come along with the territory, not solely as something to be endured but also

as contributing to its being the territory it is. This is true of the most important components of our lives: intimate personal relationships, child rearing, self-realization, career. To achieve a fulfilling life, the individual must honestly and seriously face these in all their dimensions, both positive and negative. Yet it is also true of the way we live generally, even apart from the big issues of survival and flourishing. Thousands of amateurs train for endurance races, such as marathons and triathlons. Other hobbies and activities, in which the challenge of the negative is no less central, are pursued with the same passionate commitment by other people, though they are under no compulsion to do so. Against this background, surely it is safe to deny there is a special problem about the fact that people willingly engage with something so rewarding as music, though they know that doing so will expose them to expressions of negative emotions that are liable to cause feelings that are unpleasant to experience.

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Part Four
Appreciation

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The Evaluation of Music[1]   12

In this chapter I discuss the evaluation and value of music. The essay is divided into three sections. A brief, and largely undefended, account of the nature of evaluation is offered in the first. The second section contains an argument against the view that musical works might be evaluated with equal legitimacy from any number of points of view. I argue that one point of view, in which one takes an aesthetic interest in musical works as music, has a special status, and that there is a presumption that standards of musical evaluation are relative to that point of view. Much of the section is devoted to characterizations of an aesthetic interest and of an interest in musical works as music. In the third section I discuss why music in general (as distinct from its instances) is valued. I attempt to describe the relation between the benefits of a concern with music in general and an aesthetic interest taken in particular musical works as music.

I

Evaluation is not, perhaps, a dominant concern in musical criticism, but it is clearly possible, common, and ultimately unavoidable. As well as particular musical works, evaluation can be made of particular performances, performers, composers, musical genres and styles, and of parts or sections of particular musical works. In the remainder of this chapter I write mainly of the evaluation of particular musical works, assuming that my remarks could be modified to apply appropriately to the evaluation of other musical objects,

matters, and people. In what follows I also ignore important differences between evaluative predicates—for example, 'balanced', 'unified', 'garish', and 'disorganized' plainly have a higher descriptive content than do 'good', 'beautiful', and 'self-indulgent'. In the remainder of this section I attempt to characterize the activity of evaluating musical works.[2]

Though not every evaluation is intended to be action-guiding, or is taken to be action-guiding, or could be taken as action-guiding, the activity of evaluation in general has as its point a prescriptive function.[3] It is not surprising, then, that evaluation is one of the activities essential in performing a teacher's role. The evaluation of students' works is a prominent activity where musical composition is being taught. However, most evaluations of music are evaluations that could not have the aim of guiding the composer in modifying the work because the works in question are complete (and more often than not their composers are dead). These evaluations are aimed at the (potential) impresario, or the (potential) performer, or the (potential) listener. People do not have an unlimited amount of time to devote to promoting, performing, and listening to music. So, evaluation of musical works is often intended to draw attention to those works on which time spent in promotion, performance, and listening is or is not time wasted.

Though it is a truism that no one has unlimited time for listening to music, listening to music is an activity for which time can be made. Accordingly, the evaluation of music does not take as its goal the identification of some single, best musical work that is listened to (once only?) to the exclusion of all other music. Critics and others do not attend to musical works, as one might attend to a sporting contest, with the aim of determining a winner. Standards of musical evaluation are conditional on the type of interest we take in musical works and the type of that interest is conditional in turn on (among other things) the way different experiences of music and experiences of different musical works are enjoyable. The pleasure taken in even the greatest of musical works becomes jaded through overexposure. Not all types of music are equally suited to differing moods and circumstances. The unfamiliarity of a work one has not heard before may be a source of pleasure (as may be also the familiarity of a known work). The interest we take in musical works

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[2] A view not unlike the one I favor has been defended in Simpson 1975. I cheerfully reject the supposed distinction between facts and values and between the 'is' of description and the 'ought' of prescription. A catalogue of alternative views is offered in Shusterman 1980.

[3] Beardsley (1966) rejects the theory of Stevenson (1963) according to which all evaluations are quasi-imperatives, but Beardsley accepts that the function of the activity of evaluation is generally normative. I share this view.

acknowledges a need for variety as well as for quality. And this is reflected in the fact that the evaluation of music aims at no more than a general grading; it aims at ranking particular musical works (or types of music) as better or worse rather than as 'best' versus 'others'. The pleasure one may take in a variety of musical experiences counts against the adoption of the more exclusive standard that aims fixedly at marking off only 'the winner'. Evaluation is essentially, though not always explicitly, comparative. The evaluation of musical works aims to identify those works that are worth knowing and reward renewed acquaintance. There is no problem in allowing that many works (and types of work) might so qualify.

Evaluations are usually presented as, and are to be understood as, judgments about their objects; they do not merely betray the speaker's psychological condition, nor are they merely the speaker's predictions as to the effects others might experience in the presence of and on attending to the object of the evaluation. The making of a judgment is an action. Typically, judgments are made deliberately and, so, they are not as a rule encountered unexpectedly in one's psyche. Sometimes, perhaps, judgments might also be made unconsciously and, hence, might take the judger by surprise. But, as actions (whether deliberate or not), judgments of value are subject to justification. Evaluations, if they merit respect and recognition, can be backed by reasons. And reasons are of interpersonal and not merely egocentric significance. That is, if a judgment of value is properly supported by reasons, those reasons must have at least some plausibility as explaining why any rational and reasonable person might arrive at such a judgment. If the 'reasons' offered in support of the 'judgment' can be understood only as idiosyncratic rationalizations explaining away the 'judgment', the 'judgment' is exposed as counterfeit.

Similarly, in holding as I have done that there is a connection between the enjoyment derived from listening to music and the standards by which music is evaluated, it is important for me to stress that the connection is impersonal rather than personal. No musical work is good simply because *I* like it, for any 'I'. One can say sincerely and without self-contradiction: 'This is good music but I don't like it' or 'This music is not worth listening to, but I have time to waste now and choose to waste it in listening to it'. Tastes in music differ and evaluations can be personalized in recognition of an individual's musical preferences. But the activity of evaluation presupposes that the response to music is not always merely a matter of personal taste and that there is a basis for uniformity in responses.

II

I hold by an instrumentalist account of value—the things that we value are things that meet our needs, and standards of evaluation measure the efficiency with which those needs are met. Since the interest we take in musical works is not normally motivated by moral or by pragmatic considerations, the need that motivates the exercise of such an interest is presumably a hedonic one. Music might give us pleasure of many kinds as a result of our taking different types of interest in musical works. And the standards by which music might be evaluated are those relative to the various pleasures that could be satisfied by the exercise of the different types of interest that might be taken in music. Now, if there were no reason to accord to any one (or group) of these interests a special importance, then there would be no theoretical limit to the variety of standards by which musical works could be appropriately judged. Evaluations from different (and perhaps contradictory) points of view would be incommensurable in that they would involve appeal to differing and equally legitimate standards of value. In that case, there would be no point in talking of the evaluation of a musical work without relativizing that judgment to some particular interest. And there would be no reason to assume that others would or should share the interests to which the evaluation is relativized.[4]

Against the view given above, I argue in this section that not all the interests that might be taken in musical works (and not all the pleasures such interests might satisfy) are of equal status. In particular, it is my contention that an aesthetic interest taken in a musical work *qua* music has a special importance among the interests that might be taken in musical works, for, were such an interest never exercised, music would be neither written nor performed, or it would be subsumed under some concept other than that of art. If the exercise of the interest were never pleasurable, its exercise would be without point; and if the exercise of the interest were without point, the writing and performance of music *qua* music would be rendered pointless. That is to say, our concept of music would not be what it is were it not the case that, more often than not, musical works invite and reward an aesthetic interest taken in them as music. (Obviously, this is no coincidence; composers are not usually unaware of the satisfaction of such an interest as one of their

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[4] Sparshott (1987) appears to approach such a view. Among the better-known arguments for the radical relativism of aesthetic judgments are those in Weitz 1962, Hook 1966, Goodman 1966, and Knight 1967. Generally sympathetic discussions of the view are given in Isenberg 1949, Stevenson 1963, Sibley 1968, and Tanner 1968. Taken to its limit, relativism becomes subjectivism, a famous statement of which was given by Ducasse (1929, esp. ch. 15).

goals.) Accordingly, I claim that when we speak of the value of musical works and of the standards by which they should be evaluated, those values are quite properly to be understood as aesthetic values and those standards are the standards relative to an aesthetic interest in musical works as music. The interest to which musical standards of evaluation are relativized has that privileged status as the interest without the exercise of which there would be no point in distinguishing music from sound, noise, birdsong, and so on. The remainder of this section is devoted to an account of the nature of an aesthetic interest in musical works as music.[5]

According to the traditional view, a version of which I shall defend, an aesthetic interest is a species of interest in something *for itself*. It is an interest taken in the *individuality* of its object. The object of interest is regarded not merely as a means to some independently specifiable end, but as of intrinsic concern. In what follows I shall outline the distinction between an interest in something for itself and an interest in it merely as a means to an end.

Where something, X, is valued solely as a means to Y, it must be (believed to be) the case that X has properties that are efficacious in producing Y. Any other thing that is (believed to be) as efficacious as is X in bringing Y about, whether in virtue of possessing the Y-making features found in X or in virtue of possessing other Y-making features, will be valued equally with X and will be substitutable for X just so long as its other properties do not detrimentally affect the realization of other goals. (The undetected murder of colleagues may secure promotion as effectively as does publication, but may not be a desirable substitute for publication because it has disadvantages not shared by publication.) Because an interest taken in X solely as a means to Y is an interest in X's Y-making features, and because those features may be instantiated in things other than X, a description of the interest in X need not acknowledge X's individuality. An interest taken in X solely as a means to Y is justified by describing X's Y-making features in such a way as to make clear their power to produce Y. The interest in X's Y-making features (and, thus, the interest taken in X) is determined by some logically prior specification of the sets of features at least one of which must be instantiated in a thing if that thing is a means to Y. Because an interest in X as a means to Y takes the

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[5] Similar points could be made about the evaluation of any item. Hammers could be instrumental in satisfying any number of differing needs and might have any number of differing interests taken in them. But if a hammer is judged good and the judgment is not qualified, then it will be understood as being relativized to that interest without which we would not distinguish hammers as hammers from other things. It will be relativized to some notion of the normal function of hammers. And since hammers are made to be functional, an account of their normal function can be tied more or less directly to an account of their intended uses.

production of Y as its goal, the interest is satisfied by the production of Y, whether or not Y is produced via X or in some other way.

By contrast, an interest in M for itself values M for being as it is. M is valued as, in principle, not substitutable, in that the identity of the object of interest necessarily is one of the identity criteria of the interest itself. That is to say, where there is a shift of attention from M as an object of interest for itself to N as an object of interest for itself, the interest taken in N must be a different instance of the same type of interest as that taken in M, for the individuality of each of these interests is specified in terms of the individuality of the object of interest. Now, when one takes an interest in M for itself, some of M's features will be more attention-grabbing than others. But there is no way of specifying in advance of one's taking the interest in M which of M's features will strike one as important. Rather, M's attention-grabbing features announce their importance in the experience of M. So, a justification of the appreciation of M that arises from taking an interest in M for itself takes the form of a description of some of M's features in a way revealing their importance as being given in the experience of M and not as available to prior specification. Where one's interest is taken in M for itself, only a change in one's experience of M can alter or destroy the appreciation of M. An interest taken in M for itself may be overridden by, or be abandoned in favor of, other interests or desires, but it cannot be satisfied except in the contemplation of M.

Of course, it is quite possible to take an interest in something as a means to an independently specifiable end as well as for itself. This happens where one is aware of the beneficial consequences of taking such an interest and would, at least in part, justify taking the interest in terms of those consequences, but where one would refuse to substitute for the object of interest another that is as or more efficacious in producing the valued end and that has no attendant disadvantages. That one takes an interest in something for itself does not preclude one's recognizing and valuing that thing also as generating consequences of value. This case should be distinguished from that where, merely as a matter of fact, there is only one means (valued solely as a means) to some desired goal—in the former case the valuable consequences are, ultimately, incidental to the account of the interest, whereas in the latter case the consequences are essential to an account of the interest.

Of the two types of interest discussed above, it is obvious, I think, that an aesthetic interest is an interest in things for themselves and not in them solely as means to independently specifiable and valued ends. So far, only the genus of the interest has been located, however. The love of a person, for example,

involves an interest in that person for herself, and not merely as a means, but is not an aesthetic interest.[6]

How is the focus to be narrowed from the genus to the species? How is it narrowed from any kind of interest in something for itself to an *aesthetic interest* in something for itself? One way of doing so would be by defining a class of properties as distinctively aesthetic and an interest taken in such properties for themselves as an aesthetic interest.[7] For reasons I cannot here discuss, I would resist this approach. Alternatively, one might attempt to define 'work of art' and characterize an aesthetic interest as, *primarily*, an interest taken in works of art for themselves. Of course, in taking this line one would not wish to deny that an aesthetic interest might be exercised with respect to any type of object or event. But one would argue that were it not for the existence of works of art and the cultivation of an aesthetic interest with respect to them, people would not be inclined to take an aesthetic interest in things that are not works of art as they do. On this view, things that are not works of art qualify as candidates for aesthetic interest, but they do so as a result of being approached as *honorary* or pseudo works of art.[8]

In recent years there has been a reluctance to embrace as wholeheartedly as I have done the notion of an aesthetic interest as having analytical and explanatory power. In part this reflects the unattractiveness of the standard view, according to which an aesthetic interest involves a distinctive psychological state or attitude (a type of disinterested attention), or a distinctive perceptual mode (a kind of 'seeing as'). Rightly, these views have faced severe criticism (for instance, see Dickie 1974). But, also, I think it is explained by the fact that the line I have supported is mistakenly seen as giving rise to

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[6] The similarities between loving a person and appreciating aesthetically a familiar work of art are striking, and it may not be fanciful to regard aesthetic appreciation as a species of love. One loves a person for qualities she displays, although one could not have specified in advance of an acquaintance with the person which of her qualities one would come to love. But, for all that, we can specify which qualities in general are lovable and which unlovable in persons. So, the fact that love does not involve treating its object merely as a means to an end does not entail that there can be no general specification of the kinds of qualities that are lovable. Similarly, one appreciates a familiar work of art for its individual qualities, but this appreciation does not preclude the formulation of general specifications as to which features are aesthetically valuable (such as unity in complexity) and which are not (such as boringness). The similarity between aesthetic appreciation and love is mentioned in Meager 1958.

[7] Well-known examples of such an approach are those by Sibley (1959), Hungerland (1968), and Meager (1970).

[8] The emphasis on artifactuality in Dickie 1974 seems to me well founded, so that one might extend the point by suggesting that there would be no such thing as a work of art, as we understand the notion, in a world in which nothing which might be a candidate for aesthetic appreciation were embodied in an artifact.

unacceptable corollaries. One of these corollaries is supposed to be that works of art are unique and are valued for what marks each of them as unique and not for anything they share with other things. From this it follows there can be no *general* standards of aesthetic value.[9] Against such a view one might reply as follows: An aesthetic interest, as an interest in the work of art for itself, does not presuppose the work's uniqueness. One might take an aesthetic interest in a pin—though it would be surprising if one found there much to satisfy such an interest—that is qualitatively indistinguishable from millions of other pins. An interest in something for itself is an interest in it as an *individual*. But individuality is distinct from, and does not require, uniqueness. Individuality, unlike uniqueness, is not compromised by common properties and shared class memberships. Works of art are not valued aesthetically for what distinguishes each of them from all other things; that is, they are not valued for what marks each of them as unique. Or, if they are valued for uniqueness, they are not exclusively valued for it. (In fact, most works of art are not unique as art and it is only comparatively recently that artists have pursued novelty.) So, there is no reason to suppose that standards of musical value might not be generalizable. Because an aesthetic interest in a work of art is an interest in its individuality but is not thereby an interest in its uniqueness (if it is unique), there is no logical peculiarity in holding both that there can be general standards of aesthetic value and that works of art are valued aesthetically for themselves.

So far, I have characterized the nature of an aesthetic interest in works of art, but I have not yet described such an interest in a musical work as an interest in music as such. I have talked of an interest taken in musical works *for themselves*, but there is as yet no account of what it is for a musical work to be itself. Is a Beethoven symphony to be approached simply as *music*, or as *classical music*, or as a *symphony*, or as an *early nineteenth-century symphony*, or as a *Beethoven symphony*, or as what? Consider the case of a Westerner who listens for the first time to Javanese gamelan music. Such a person may have no doubt that he is listening to music, but will have no idea of the classifications and conventions in terms of which such music is intended to be appreciated. Though one might concede that the person hears the music as music, one would be disinclined to treat the person's judgments as authoritative. Such a person treats the music as if its claim to attention is merely sensuous.[10]

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[9] Among those who argue that works of art are valued for their uniqueness and cannot therefore be evaluated by general standards are Macdonald (1949), Hampshire (1967), Strawson (1966), and Yoos (1967). Such views are attacked in Meager 1958.

[10] I doubt whether such 'innocent' listening is really possible, except as a sophistication on the normal response in which the music is heard in terms of conventions, traditions, etc. The hypothet-

In fact, it is music with a subtle and complex structure (that is not readily discerned) and with elaborate traditions of performance. A person ignorant of the conventions and the performance traditions of the music would be bound to hear and appreciate much less than someone privy to such matters. Similarly, a Javanese person hearing Western music for the first time would have an impoverished understanding of, say, a symphony by Brahms.[11]

On the view I support, music is at least in part a conventional practice that is to be understood as such. The pleasure that comes from the appreciation of music is, typically, the sort of pleasure that accompanies understanding and is not the sort of physiological or psychological tweak that accompanies merely sensuous delight. But, even allowing the possibility of a predominantly sensuous interest in musical works as music, it is apparent, I hope, that such an interest is not characteristic. Music can be appreciated as music at different levels—as musical sounds, as a symphony, as a symphony by Beethoven, and so on. An awareness of the traditions and conventions against which the work was written affects the way the work *sounds*, and does so in a way that enriches the enjoyment usually derived from an appreciation of the work. The fecundity that is characteristic of the appreciation taken in listening repeatedly to great music clearly depends on a cognitive and not on a merely sensuous appreciation of the music, for the merely sensuous palls with repetition in a way much music does not. Of course, none of this is surprising in view of the fact that music is designed by composers who themselves are familiar with, and presuppose the familiarity of their audience with, practices, classifications, and conventions of the time.

As I have described it, an aesthetic interest in a musical work for itself is not a form of disinterest requiring the listener to put aside all the knowledge and understanding of music she has gained through past experiences of listening to music. To take an aesthetic interest in a musical work is not usually to regard it as a totally isolated event to be appreciated and approached without reference to anything else. An interest in something for itself does not preclude one's bringing to one's experience of that thing a knowledge of the traditions and conventions within and against which it is intended to be

ical person mentioned here is more likely to attempt to understand the Javanese music through the filter of quite inappropriate conventions that, being transparent in their familiarity, are not recognized as being (mis)applied at all.

[11] My point is not one about the listener's ability to provide a technical description of the music, such as might satisfy a musical theoretician. Rather, it is one about the listener's appreciation and recognition, as a consequence of prolonged exposure to works typical of the genre, of musical norms. Such knowledge by acquaintance is discussed and perhaps overrated by those interested in information theory—see Sparshott 1987.

understood and appreciated. To take an aesthetic interest in a musical work is to take an interest in it for itself. Where the musical work is a symphony, for example, an interest in it for itself would appropriately be an interest in it as a symphony, and such an interest presupposes a familiarity with the practices, traditions, and conventions that characterize symphonies and help to distinguish them from other musical genres.[12]

There is something atypical in the interest in music of someone whose enjoyment of that music is supposedly purely sensuous and who resists any attempt by others to inform that interest with an appreciation of the traditions and conventions that characterize different styles and types of music. A very different case is atypical in a similar way. A person might take an interest in a musical work as music, but do so from a sense of duty, perhaps, rather than for the sake of a concern with music. For example, a student might be interested in a musical work solely as a means to passing an examination in musical appreciation. In studying for the exam the student concentrates on the piece as avidly and seriously as would a critic or a member of the audience at a concert. But, though I am happy to allow that the student's interest is one taken in the musical work *as music* (in that an account of the object of interest involves a description of that object as music), clearly such an interest in a musical work is unusual. What marks both these cases as atypical is the person's motivation. Ordinarily, one takes an interest in musical works for themselves for (or in the hope of) the pleasure an appreciation of music can provide. Because that pleasure is usually increased in appreciating the musical work in terms of the appropriate traditions and conventions, someone who is interested in music merely at the sensuous level and who rejects the more cognitive approach chooses thereby not to maximize the pleasure an appreciation of the music might afford. (Or chooses thereby not to discover the music's shallowness.) Similarly, a person whose interest in music is motivated solely by a sense of duty, or for some such reason, also reveals an indifference to the pleasure that might be derived through the experience of the music. Both of the interests described are interests taken in the music *as music*, but both interests are abnormal in not being motivated by a desire to maximize the pleasure attendant on the exercise of such an interest.[13]

[12] The importance of knowledge of conventions, classifications, traditions, and practices in the appreciation of art is now widely acknowledged by aestheticians. Two papers that seem to me of special interest are Ziff 1958 and Walton 1970.

[13] Dickie (1974: 117–18) allows that an aesthetic interest is marked by the reasons for which it is adopted. Here he seems to be referring to what I have called the motivation that typically drives such an interest. I differ from Dickie, perhaps, in characterizing an aesthetic interest without reference to the type of motivation giving it its point, so that, unlike Dickie, I would allow that someone whose

So, I have suggested that an interest taken in a musical work as music is one where the object of interest is described in musical and not extramusical terms, and that such an interest is typically motivated by a desire to appreciate music as such for the pleasure that attends such appreciation. Also, I have described an aesthetic interest in music as an interest taken in the individuality of musical works for themselves (as music). In what remains of this section I shall attempt to forestall two ways this view might be misconstrued.

The first is this: I have suggested that the value of music lies in its capacity to provide us with enjoyment; we listen to music usually for pleasure and not in order to survive nor out of a sense of duty. If the exercise of an aesthetic interest in musical works as music never resulted in pleasure, no musical works would be valued and our concept of music would not be what it is. Now, as an effect of listening to the music, the pleasure is independent of the music. Yet it is also obvious, I think, that the pleasure that often comes in appreciating a musical work could not be an end to which the music is *merely* the means. The pleasure of appreciating music is not some *frisson* to which the musical work stands *merely* as the cause or occasion, for, whereas such pleasure is indifferent to its cause, the pleasure of appreciating a musical work for itself *qua* music is not indifferent to the individuality of its object. As Ryle (1971) emphasized, most types of pleasure are logically bound up with the appreciation of the individuality of their objects, so that there is no description of the pleasure that is independent of an account of its object. The pleasure of a walk in the country is the pleasure of the walking, of the feel of grass under the feet and of the breeze on the skin, of the quiet peace of the scene, of the slowly changing vista and so on. To describe the pleasure is to describe its object as pleasurable. In the same way, the pleasure that may come from appreciating a musical work for itself can be characterized only through a description of features apprehended and appreciated in the musical work, where that description acknowledges the musical work as an individual. There is no incompatibility in allowing that an aesthetic interest in a musical work as music is an interest in it both for itself and as a possible means to a pleasurable experience, so long as it is realized that the pleasure to which the music is supposedly the means is a pleasure taken in and integrally bound to the individuality of the musical work.

The second point to emphasize is this: When I refer to an interest taken in a musical work *as music*, I mean by 'as music' that the individual that is the

interest in a particular musical work on a particular occasion is mainly motivated by a desire to pass an examination could be taking an aesthetic interest in the musical work as music. Note that it is not entirely clear where Dickie stands on the issue; see McGregor 1977.

object of that interest is recognized and appreciated as a musical (e.g. symphonic) *individual*. The object of interest is not an individual *tout court*, it is an individual *something*. Where the interest is taken in a musical work as a musical individual, the interest is taken in it as an individual piece, symphony, Beethoven symphony, or whatever. In particular, I do not mean by 'as music' that the particular musical work is of concern only as an *exemplar* of music or of a musical type in general. Musical works could be so treated, in which case the more typical they are of what they are represented as exemplifying the better they are as examples. But when musical works are so treated, they are not approached and appreciated for themselves as individual musical works.[14] Mozart's 'Prague' Symphony, K.504, is not a good example of a symphony, because it has only three movements. But, judged aesthetically and not merely as a means to the exemplification of symphonic characteristics, it is a good symphony; appreciated for itself as a *symphonic individual* (i.e. 'as music' in my use of the phrase) it is a good musical work.

To summarize, I have argued, against the view that music might be evaluated with equal legitimacy from any (including conflicting) points of view, that the evaluation of musical works *aesthetically* and *as music* has a special status. The specialness of those standards of evaluation derives from the specialness of the interest to which they are relative. Among the interests that might be taken in musical works, an aesthetic interest in musical works as music has a prime place as that interest without the exercise of which the creation and performance of music as music would be rendered pointless.

At this stage it might be expected that I would go on to catalogue the properties or relationships that are value-conferring within musical works. Such features are referred to in evaluative discourse. In general terms, there is commendation for such things as unity in variety, the combination of aptness and unexpectedness that is often found in a musical continuation, and so on. In particular terms, in symphonic works the economical use of materials, structural complexity, and the development of material are valued; in songs an appropriate interaction between the content of the text and the expressiveness of the music is valued; in performances of works with a written score we value the performer's creativity in realizing faithfully what is determined by the composer, and so on (Davies 1987). (Notice that the *absence* of the features mentioned is not always an indication of disvalue.) But, rather than attempt the difficult task of describing the truth-conditions (or conditions for justified

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[14] A similar point—that to value particular works of art for themselves is not to value them for the sake of art in general—is made in Beardsmore 1971.

assertability) for sentences in which musical works, performers, composers, and musical genres are commended or condemned, I turn in the next section to a discussion of the value of music in general.

III

Not only do we value particular musical works, also there would appear to be agreement that music in general is valued. There is agreement, I think, that an individual who takes an interest in music in general benefits somehow from doing so and that we value music in general as what rewards that interest. Of course there is no such *thing* as 'music in general'. To take an interest in music in general is to take an interest in an indefinite number of particular (but not of specified) musical works on an indefinite number of occasions; one qualifies as a person who takes an interest in music in general only by taking an interest in a sufficient number of particular works on a sufficient number of occasions. It is my claim here that there is a benefit that results from taking an interest in music in general. In other words, there is some benefit generated by one's taking an interest in a sufficient *number* of particular works that is additional to the aggregation of benefits that follow from the interest taken in each particular work.

What benefits might be generated by an interest in music in general? One answer to this question—that music is a source of pleasure as entertainment—seems inadequate to account for the high value attributed to a concern with the arts in general, including music. Perhaps if due weight were given to the role of entertainments in our lives—not just as diversions offering respite from the important matters of life, but as a vital part of the preparation that equips us to deal with such matters—then it would not be to underrate the arts to class them as entertainments. But so long as entertainments are viewed, by contrast with work, as trivial pursuits then the arts in general are underrated if they are valued merely as entertainments. For, the value of art in general, including music, seems to consist in the way a concern with art in general is life-enriching. That is, the value of art resides not wholly in the pleasure an appreciation of its instances might afford but also in the way a concern with a sufficient number of its instances affects our approach to and understanding of matters that are non-artistically important for us (Beardsley 1958).

To ask how a concern with the arts other than music might enrich our lives is to invite an answer drawing the obvious connection between the contents of those arts and the nature and requirements of 'real' life. Most nonmusical

works of art present a propositional or representational content that directs the attention of the audience to 'worlds' the appreciation and comprehension of which cannot help but reflect on the audience's attitude to and understanding of the actual world. To understand the complex of circumstances, beliefs, and events that leads Anna Karenina to act as she does is not to master any general moral principle which then can be applied in the actual world, but it may be to develop an appreciation of the complex richness of human feelings and motivations and of the diversity of backgrounds and circumstances against which different people act. From this appreciation may arise the kind of empathic sympathy without which life with others is awkward, confused, and grounded in ignorance and misunderstanding. The empathic sympathy that an interest in fictional narratives is inclined to cultivate encourages in a person the toleration of differences in and between others without which social life would be almost impossible.

But when the same question is asked with respect to music, no such direct connection with actual life suggests itself, except for those cases where the music is a part of an operatic or balletic or dramatic context, or a text is set. Of course, there are a number of ways music might direct our thoughts to nonmusical matters. But the point to be made here is that music is, in the first instance, an abstract art form and, when music is appreciated as music, it can be usually understood without any awareness of its extramusical connotations and associations (Scruton 1976; Sparshott 1987).

Nevertheless, there are at least three ways music, as an abstract art form, establishes a connection with life as such. These are: (1) Music expresses emotion; (2) Music presents patterns and forms in sound; (3) Music involves the dynamic movement of sound in time and 'aural space'. A concentration on such musical features (in a number of works and on a number of occasions) no doubt provides understanding or skills that are not without their useful application within life at large. Music not only presents the appearance of emotion, it moves people and, in doing so, gives them experience of emotions unencumbered by the desires and need to act that usually accompany the experience of emotion (Davies 1980). Also, music is perceived in terms of gestalts and forms rather than as mere successions and aggregations of notes; listening skills acquired in the appreciation of music no doubt find uses in more mundane contexts. And music, through the interaction of meter, pulse, and rhythm, is highly evocative of a coordinated, physical response in bodily movement, so that music encourages the control and regulation of motor responses.

The above describes, rightly I think, the benefits following from a concern with music in general. But a person who regarded the achievement of these

benefits as the primary motivation for taking an interest in particular musical works would trivialize the interest usually taken in particular musical works and would undervalue that interest. The trivialization of that interest is made apparent by the following consideration: Such knowledge or skills as are acquired through one's taking an interest in music in general might be acquired more efficiently in other ways. The character and tone of experiences of emotion might be appreciated as a result of a person being encouraged to use her imagination. A person whose ability to perceive patterns was subnormal, or whose ability to organize her perceptions into patterns was subnormal, could be trained to the appropriate skills by audiologists and psychologists. A person whose movements were inhibited or uncoordinated could he helped by a physiotherapist. The benefits of a concern with music in general might be more efficiently achieved in nonmusical ways, so the interest taken in particular musical works is made to appear unimportant where that interest is seen as aiming primarily at those benefits. And the undervaluation of that interest is made plain in the following: To regard particular musical works merely as a means to realizing the benefits attaching to a concern with music in general is to ignore the value each work has as a *musical individual*. To treat a particular musical work merely as a means to achieving the benefits of a concern with music in general is to treat it merely as an *instance* of music; it is to treat the particular work not as an individual for itself but as an individual instance of music that takes its importance as such from its increasing the likelihood that the benefits of a concern with music in general will be realized. The work is treated as a member of a series that has no *specified* membership, because the series's importance derives from its members' *number* and not their *individuality*. This indifference to the individuality of particular works points to the fact that such an interest taken in musical works is not an *aesthetic interest* in them as musical individuals. The interest in particular works merely as a means to realizing the benefits of a concern with music in general is not rewarded as an aesthetic interest would be. And to eschew the benefits that follow from taking an aesthetic interest in musical works as music is to undervalue them. It is to ignore the pleasure the exercise of an aesthetic interest in particular works as music is likely to produce.

My point is not that the intention to realize the benefits of a concern with music in general is self-defeating where the benefit is aimed at directly, in the way that a deliberate attempt to realize the benefits of spontaneity in general is self-defeating. If one aims at the benefits of spontaneity one is not being spontaneous and, hence, whatever benefits result are not benefits of spontaneity in general. By contrast, if one aims at achieving the benefits of a concern

with music in general, one may succeed in achieving them. But to produce that benefit as the primary goal of taking an interest in particular musical works is not to produce that benefit in the usual fashion. Usually, that benefit is an incidental (although valued) consequence of one's taking an *aesthetic* interest in (a sufficient number of) musical works as music. So, the point is this: Where the benefits of a concern with music in general motivate the prime aim of the interest taken in particular musical works, those benefits may be achieved, but they are achieved at the cost of weightier benefits; whereas if one takes an aesthetic interest in particular musical works as music, that interest is likely to be richly rewarded and the exercise of that interest (to a sufficient degree) also has the incidental consequence of generating the benefits that attend an interest in music in general. The view that construes the relation between an interest taken in particular musical works and the benefits of a concern with music in general as that between mere means and an end is mistaken *in fact*, and not in principle. That view misdescribes the relation in a way that both trivializes and debases the value of the interest typically taken in musical works. It is only where particular works are appreciated aesthetically and as music that the full value of music is realized, both in valuing the particular work aesthetically as a musical individual and by (contributing toward) realizing the benefits of a concern with music in general, where that concern is ultimately incidental.

On the view I favor, musical works should be appreciated *aesthetically and as music* rather than as mere means to the production of the benefits of a concern with music in general. But from this it does not follow, of course, that the repeated exercise of an aesthetic interest in musical works as music has no effects. Nor does it follow that we must be unaware of those effects. Nor does it follow that such effects could never be beneficial. That the exercise of an aesthetic interest taken in a sufficient number of musical works and on a sufficient number of occasions has beneficial effects, that this is recognized, that the effects are valued, and that the exercise of aesthetic interest is valued in part for such effects—all this is consistent with the account of aesthetic interest offered in the previous section.

The relation between the (repeated) exercise of an aesthetic interest taken in musical works as music and the generation of the benefits of that interest cannot be explained on the model of a means–end relation.[15] To treat the

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[15] A failure to distinguish the value of particular works of art from that of art in general can lead to confusion in discussions of aesthetic value, as is evident in Lipman 1975. It does not follow from the

particular musical works merely or primarily as means to the end of producing such benefits is to take an interest in them that is not aesthetic. How, then, is the relation to be analyzed? In the remainder of this section I shall describe one of our moral notions in a way that, I hope, not only characterizes that notion accurately, but also provides by analogy an appropriate model in terms of which to describe the relation between an aesthetic interest taken in musical works as music and the benefits following from a concern with music in general.

A person acts kindly in responding to the needs of others where the action is appropriately suited to meeting those needs and is performed simply in recognition of those needs and is aimed neither at 'doing the right thing', nor at future returns. Kindness is its own reward in the sense that any consequential benefits are incidental to the motivation of the act of kindness. But, although kindness is its own reward (for any particular act of kindness), kindness is a virtue because kindness (in general) has good consequences. Kindness (in general) facilitates and encourages the sort of cooperation on which social life depends. This is not to say that occasions calling for acts of kindness should be approached merely as means to achieving the benefits of kindness in general, for any act aimed solely at such an end is not thereby an act of kindness because it lacks the appropriate motivation. (The act is, perhaps, 'kind-to-be-benevolent', and that act is no more a kind act than is an act that is 'kind-to-be-cruel', though the material description of the acts might be the same in each case.) The relation between kindness (in particular) and the benefits of kindness (in general) should be characterized negatively in the following manner: Were we not reliant on cooperation and were we not the kind of beings that are more inclined to cooperate with those who show a spontaneous desire to help others in need, then kindness (in general) would not be regarded and acknowledged as a virtue. Given the way the world is, anyone, through no fault of his own, might sometimes need help, freely given, in meeting his obligations within the cooperative enterprise. So, the fact of kindness being a virtue depends on the demands of social life (see Ewin 1981).

The relation between an aesthetic interest in particular works and the benefits of a concern with music in general is like that between particular acts of kindness and the (social) benefits of kindness in general. That is to say, to take an aesthetic interest in a work is to be interested in it for itself and not

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fact that particular musical works do not take their aesthetic value from their nonaesthetic consequences that the further value of a concern with music in general does not derive from such consequences.

merely for the sake of its contributing to the benefits of a concern with music in general. Indeed, no interest in a musical work merely as a means to such an end would be an aesthetic interest. Nevertheless, the exercise of an aesthetic interest in a sufficient number of musical works has beneficial consequences, just as kind acts have valuable effects although not aimed primarily at the realization of those effects. And just as kind acts are valued over and above their contribution to the production of the benefits of kindness in general, so particular musical works are valued for themselves over and above their contribution to the production of the benefits of a concern with music in general. The relation between an aesthetic interest taken in musical works as music and the benefits of a concern with music in general is to be characterized negatively. Were we not creatures who rely on the ability to organize and recognize patterns in sound, creatures depending on freedom and coordination of physical movement, and creatures who require an understanding of emotion and an ability to recognize appearances of emotion in others, then we would not value music in general as we do.[16]

According to the position I have presented here, we value music primarily for the enjoyment that accompanies the exercise and satisfaction of an aesthetic interest in musical works. Individual musical works are valued aesthetically for themselves; in particular, they are not valued aesthetically as mere means to the cultivation of the benefits that are the incidental consequence of the repeated exercise of an aesthetic interest in musical works as music. I have also argued, though, that these incidental consequences condition our attitude to music. We would not value a concern with music as we do were it not the case that such a concern has beneficial consequences that have an importance for us beyond the narrowly musical context.

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[16] The analogy runs yet a little deeper. A person who takes an aesthetic interest in a musical work as music is like a person who acts kindly. A person who takes an interest in musical works with the aim of encouraging and developing in herself aesthetic sensibilities is like a person who, wanting to do the right thing and lacking a natural inclination to kindness, does out of conscientiousness what the kind person would do spontaneously. And a person who takes an interest in a musical work solely in order to pass an examination is like a person who looks to future benefits in doing what a kind person would do, and so acts prudentially or selfishly depending on the attitude to those future benefits.

Musical Understanding and Musical Kinds[1]   13

Suppose someone, call her Cecilia, is keen to understand the music composed by Mozart after 1778. She listens carefully and repeatedly to the first movements of the Sinfonia Concertante for Violin and Viola in E flat major (K. 364 of 1779 or later), Symphony No. 36 in C major (the 'Linz', K. 425 of 1783), the last of the piano concertos in C major (K. 503 of 1786), Symphony No. 41 in C major (the 'Jupiter', K. 551 of 1788), and the Clarinet Concerto in A major (K. 622 of 1791; the first movement was written in G for basset-horn in 1789). She reads (from the record notes) that each of these movements is in sonata form and she listens to them with that in mind.[2] In time she knows of each movement how it is put together.[3] Does she understand the music composed by Mozart after 1778?

Understanding comes in degrees and in various modes. The previous question might make more sense if it were posed in terms of understanding how, what, or why. Let me begin the process of clarification by laying aside some possible versions of the question. The question is not one about

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[1] First published in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 52 (1994), 69–81. Reprinted in P. Alperson (ed.), *Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music*, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998, 69–81.

[2] The title of the structure is misleading, for it is a form found within individual movements rather than a way of uniting movements in an entire sonata. Also, it is a form found in most extended movements, whether the work be overture, sonata, or symphony. At times the structure is also called 'first-movement form', but this is not an improvement, for the form is used quite extensively in other movements.

[3] One occasionally hears it said that Mozart and Haydn did not know what sonata form is, because they composed prior to the technical specification of the formal type by musicologists. I regard this view as silly. Mozart and Haydn may have lacked the terminology that was later codified, but they certainly knew the structural functions performed by the various parts of the music they wrote. I take that to be what justifies claims about their writing in sonata form.

Cecilia's abilities as a performer; I will suppose she lacks the practical know-ledge and skills required to perform or to direct others to perform in a way that might reveal her view of the work. My question is one about an understand-ing of the music that is revealed, if at all, through the descriptions she will offer of the works. But, just as the query is not one presupposing Cecilia's mastery as a performer, neither is it one presupposing on her part a detailed, technical knowledge of music theory or analysis. A final warning: the ques-tion is highly specific. I feel this discussion will have achieved a great deal if it says something useful about the understanding invited by the kind of music mentioned, which is central to the classical tradition, even if the dangers of generalizing beyond this case are only too apparent to those whose affection focuses on other kinds of music.

What does Cecilia know of these works so far?—roughly, how they are put together (in the sense of understanding how many bits there are and where the joins are found). She knows that some tune begins here and ends there, that it is later repeated, that parts of it are recalled in the bits between the main tunes, that it has an expressive character distinguishing it from the other main themes though it is more hesitant and equivocal in some of its statements than others, and so on. Sometimes one hears complaints against dry, academic formalism. If these are objections to a mechanical, formulaic, rigid approach to musical structure, or to an obsession with technical labels, they might have some point (even if, equally, there is a point in describing the broad outlines of structural types that are common to many works). But if they reject as irrelevant to Cecilia's goal of under-standing the given pieces a concern with their structure, then the objection strikes me as mistaken. If, after a number of listenings, one cannot hear the tunes, or distinguish one melody from another, or recognize that a melody is being repeated, or hear some difference where the key shifts from major to minor, or sense the instability of a passage passing through a series of transient tonal centers, or feel surprise in face of an unprepared modulation to a distant key, then it is far from clear that one can qualify as an appreciator of the work in question, for there must be doubt that one can distinguish the given work from any others. The recognition of musical structure, such as Cecilia now has achieved, just is an awareness of the overall pattern of such events. It is the recognition of repetition, similarity, instability, emphatic closure, and so on (but not necessarily of the technical devices by which such results are achieved), and more generally of patterns that emerge

from successions of such events, that amounts to the recognition of musical form.[4]

According to a common view of musical understanding, to know how a piece is put together is to advance a long way toward understanding it.[5] I disagree with this view, for I think that Cecilia might achieve a much deeper appreciation of the works that interest her were she to consider matters never mentioned by those who press this 'common view'. Her understanding is like that of the butcher who draws dotted lines where the cuts are most conveniently made. The butcher need not know why beasts are put together as they are in order to do his job; he need not ask why the legs are found at the corners. The physician or the zoologist will consider form with respect to function, as is appropriate when regarding a living animal rather than a corpse. Cecilia will find more to interest her in Mozart's works of post-1778 if she approaches them more as a doctor than a butcher. She needs to ask not just 'How are these works put together?' but 'Why are they put together as they are?'. This latter question, asked as one about function, involves a consideration of how the particular work differs from others of its kind, and that in turn requires a grasp of what it is that distinguishes one musical kind from another.[6] I find that such matters are almost entirely absent from the work of philosophers who have published on musical understanding.

[4] It should be apparent that, in discussing the work's form, I have in mind audible, macromusical chunks, like themes. The education of the ear, the concentration of the listener, the familiarity with the music, and many other considerations affect what an individual might find audible, but most of the features I mention in the example analyses are plainly audible, I think. Many inaudible features might give rise to audible, artistically important effects. A person aware of the causal influence of these features might, nevertheless, be unable to hear them doing their work. This is one reason why music analysts sometimes concern themselves with uncovering musical relationships that cannot be heard. Cecilia is not seeking this kind of understanding; she aims to enrich her experience of the work as sound so far as possible and to understand that experience. For my view of the importance of factors that are not readily audible see Davies 1983a. For further useful discussion see DeBellis 1991.

[5] See Beardsley 1981; Tanner 1985; Budd 1985a; Scruton 1987; Kivy 1990a; Levinson 1990d; Bowman 1991. I concur with much that these authors write—and in this differ from Cook 1990—it is what they leave out that concerns me. In fairness I should note that some (such as Levinson and Tanner) leave out less of what I value than do others.

[6] As will become evident, I believe that, because their identities and features depend very much on their historical/cultural location and their artistic categories, one can have the fullest understanding of a given work only if one has a similar understanding of all the works and conventions that establish its context, and these will include prior and subsequent pieces, as well as contemporary ones. Contextualism of this sort seems to generate a paradox: one cannot understand x without understanding y and z, but one cannot understand y without understanding x and z, and one cannot understand z without understanding x and y, and so on as the number of instances multiplies. It

So far, Cecilia has an idea of how each first movement of each work is assembled. She knows that each movement differs from every other and that all fit the pattern of sonata form, loosely characterized. As yet she has no way of sorting significant from incidental differences. What more must she do if she is to attain the fuller understanding this skill presupposes? First, she must listen to a sufficient number of Mozart's symphonies and concertos to reach a judgment about whether and how Mozart's treatments of these genres differ. Then she must ask why they differ as they do, expecting thereby to learn what (in Mozart's view) distinguishes the musical purpose or function of the symphony and the concerto. (Or one might put the issue this way: What 'problem' was acknowledged by Mozart in trying to compose a work of the given type such that what was written was an answer to it?)

The important question is not 'How is it put together?' but 'Why is its being put together this way rather than that significant to its being a concerto as opposed to being a symphony?'. As I have said, questions of this second type are ignored by most philosophers who discuss the nature of musical understanding. This surprises me, for I do not see how Cecilia can understand the particular works that interest her unless she is in a position to answer it. If the work is a concerto, knowing how it is put together will tell her next to nothing about whether it succeeds as a concerto unless she has some idea of what concertos are supposed to be for and what difficulties are presented to the composer in meeting that function within the broad confines of a sonata-form framework. Moreover, though she might know what features of the movement belong to it in virtue of its being in sonata form, without some idea of the treatment of sonata form appropriate to a concerto (as opposed, say, to a symphony) Cecilia cannot be sure which features of the work depend on its being a concerto and which belong to it as the particular concerto it is. Not all similarities between concertos need result from their being concertos; some such similarities might be coincidental, whereas others might depend on the composer's individual style, or depend on the fact that both concertos are written for fortepiano. Without a view on which similarities between concertos are essential to their being concertos and which are not Cecilia cannot be sure whether she is understanding the work merely as an instance of its type, or for the sake of its individuality, or for its success in combining and reconciling the two.

seems as if understanding never can begin. At least part of the solution to this paradox depends on realizing that understanding comes in degrees; understanding can be partial. One reason for thinking that the paradox must be soluble is this: The reasoning that generates the paradox also shows that no first language could be invented and that no individual could acquire a language.

Of course, Cecilia is not likely to pose the question so bluntly as I did above: 'Why is its being put together this way rather than that significant to its being a concerto as opposed to being a symphony?'. After she has listened to the first movements of Mozart's symphonies and concertos (of post-1778), I would expect Cecilia to ponder the following: 'Why do the concertos have more tunes than the symphonies and why do those tunes come where they do?'. (That is: What is it about the concerto that means it needs more tunes if it is to do what it should within the framework of sonata form?)

The opening movements of Mozart's post-1778 symphonies present a number of thematic ideas in different keys and play these off against each other, sometimes developing the possibilities of one or more at length and exploring a range of keys, until a modified version of the thematic material returns, firmly anchored in the home key. The symphony seems to be intended to reveal the musical possibilities of the material presented, aiming for the generation of interest and diversity from limited resources, so that economy, integration, and unity are no less important than is variety. For its part, the concerto gives special prominence to textural contrasts in that it aims to present a soloist as an individual (or a group of soloists as a unit) standing over and against the orchestral background. The tutti (full orchestra) sometimes opposes itself to the voice of the soloist; at other times material is shared in a conversation between the soloist and groups within the orchestra, with the former elaborating and decorating the ideas or commenting on them. Because the first statement of the exposition is reserved for the orchestra,[7] in order to establish the individuality of the soloist it is necessary to hold back important thematic material until the second exposition. As a result, the two expositions differ and so too will the recapitulation, in which material exclusive to each of the expositions must be integrated. The broad outlines of sonata form can be adapted to accommodate the rather different projects embodied in the symphony and the concerto. Mozart applies consistent principles to this adaptation, so that, as soon as one becomes interested in detail, the first movements of the symphonies and the concertos can be heard to belong to distinct structural types.

In some of the symphonies in question Cecilia finds that a slow introduction begins the first movement (K. 425, 504, 543). In all cases she finds that two subject groups are presented in the exposition. They contrast tonally, and/or thematically and/or in their expressive character. Roughly speaking,

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[7] The soloist plays along with the tutti but should not be conspicuous in doing so. A solo violin would play along with the first violins; a fortepiano would accompany the cellos' bass line and might act as a continuo instrument.

the first subject group is in the tonic and the second subject group is in the dominant major (or in the relative major if the tonic is minor). The second subject group frequently has a cantabile (singing) style, features chromatic decoration, and allows more prominence to the wind instruments as soloists. Each subject group might end with a codetta. The two groups are separated by a bridge passage that is modulatory. The key of the second subject group is usually preserved in a following bridge and coda. The coda and codettas are often related and share a strongly cadential character. The various bridges are sometimes related to each other. These bridges sometimes develop material shared with the subject groups; sometimes they contain sequential passagework of no thematic distinction; sometimes they contain new thematic ideas with sufficient character to stand on their own. The exposition is not always repeated in the performances Cecilia hears, but she reads that it is marked with a sign meaning that it is to be repeated. (K. 319 and 338 are the last of the symphonies from which the notated repeat is absent.) The following section is usually half the length of the (unrepeated) exposition and sometimes alludes to or develops earlier material, as well as containing modulations. In the earlier symphonies this section functions as a transition to the recapitulation; from K. 504 onward the development of material is more extensive, with contrapuntal passages and the like. The first subject is occasionally announced as if the recapitulation has begun but subsequent events reveal this not to be the case. The recapitulation is sometimes prepared by a pedal on the dominant. Also, the recapitulation always heralds a return to the tonic. Changes between the recapitulation and the exposition are usually confined to these: the modulatory passage preceding the second subject group is modified so that the key remains in the tonic; there may be some extension of the final coda; the second subject group and the music that follows are usually in the tonic key—where the movement's key is major, this frequently involves no more than transposition. Cecilia reads that in some symphonies (one version of K. 385, as well as K. 504) it is indicated that the combination of development and recapitulation should be repeated, though she notes that this instruction is not respected in the performances she hears. (Whereas most of Mozart's symphonies after 1778 conform readily to the general model, Cecilia notices that the first movement of Symphony No. 38, K. 504, does not.)

I offer only two examples.

The first movement of Mozart's last symphony provides a copybook example of the structural type (see Fig. 13.1; successive lines show bar numbers, themes, motives, and keys, with upper case for major and lower

for minor). The bridge to the second subject (B1) elaborates elements of the first subject in some detail. The recapitulation of this bridge uses a subtle touch in presenting material from the first subject in the tonic minor. (Cecilia observes that Mozart frequently slides briefly to the tonic minor, shading with darkness even the most cheerful of the works in major keys.) The second subject group involves internal repetition and development. Despite its fluid character and a certain amount of chromaticism, plainly there are motivic relationships between the first and second subject. The bridge to the coda begins in a startlingly powerful manner and introduces without preparation the tonic minor. The transposed version of this passage in the recapitulation is modified, with a shift from the minor to the major on the subdominant. The coda begins with a thematic idea of some distinction that, because of its character, sounds rather like a second subject.

My other instance is the 'Linz' Symphony of 1783 (see Fig. 13.2). The first movement of this symphony differs in minor respects from that of the 'Jupiter'. It begins with a slow introduction and shows some tonal variety in the second subject, the first part of which emphasizes the relative minor of

EXPOSITION							
1	20	40	60		80		100
F F C1	B1		S		B2		C2
	x	x'	m m n p	p'	q	r r'	
C		G			C	c	C G

EXPOSITION							
1	20	40	60		80		100
F F C1	B1		S		B2		C2
	x	x'	m m n p	p'	q	r r'	
C		G			C	c	C G

DEVELOPMENT			
121	140	160	180

RECAPITULATION								
189 200		220	240	260		280		300
F F C1	B1'		S		B2'		C2'	
	x''	x'	m m n p	p'	q'	r r'		
C	c B♭	G C			F	f F C		

Figure 13.1.   Symphony No. 41 in C, K. 551—the 'Jupiter'

INTRODUCTION	EXPOSITION					
1	20	40	60	80	100	120
I	F F' B1			S	B2 C	
						x
C		G a		G e G		

EXPOSITION					
20	40	60	80	100	120
F F' B1			S	B2 C	
					x
C	G a		G e G		

DEVELOPMENT		
123	140	160

RECAPITULATION						
163	180	200	220	240	260	280
F F' B1'			S		B2 C'	
					x'	
C		F C	G a	C		

Figure 13.2.   Symphony No. 36 in C, K. 425—the 'Linz'

the dominant in the exposition and of the tonic in the recapitulation. The shortness of the development section is not unusual for the earlier symphonies.

The first movements of Mozart's post-1778 concertos display a richer, more complex form than is found in his symphonies' first movements. There is never a slow introduction. The first, that is 'orchestral', exposition presents the first subject (F) and the orchestral second subject (OS) in the tonic. (This orchestral second subject is absent in K. 415 and 459; in K. 413 and 449 it appears in the dominant rather than the tonic, and in K. 466 a shortened version is stated in the tonic's relative major.) In two concertos (K. 467 and 491) the first subject returns before the close of the orchestral exposition. The second, that is 'solo', exposition is sometimes separated from the first by a bridge (K. 415, 450, 466, 482, 491, and 503) that introduces the solo instrument; otherwise the soloist enters with or alongside the first subject. In a number of works (K. 365, 450, 467, 482, 491, and 503), the orchestral second subject (OS) is replaced by a 'solo' second subject (SS). The second subject (OS or SS) appears in the dominant (or relative major where the tonic is minor) and is shared between soloist and orchestra, with the winds often prominent. In addition, the solo exposition usually includes a theme, sometimes in the minor, given for the soloist's exclusive use (L).

Typically, the second exposition is about a third as long again as the first. The development is generally half or more the length of the second exposition. It often features sequential passages from the soloist rather than thematic development as such. The recapitulation repeats the second exposition, but interpolates material not heard since the first exposition. If the orchestral second subject was replaced in the second exposition, it returns along with the solo second subject in the recapitulation (except in K. 365). In the recapitulation, the codetta that closed the second exposition is followed by the cadenza and the movement is brought to an end by a coda usually deriving from the first, rather than the second, exposition. Because it contains material exclusive to each exposition, the recapitulation is longer than either. Moreover, the cadenza often adds a further twenty bars or more to its length.

As examples I offer both K. 364 and 503 (see Figs. 13.3 and 13.4). It is instructive to observe how similar are these two, given that the first marks the early days of Mozart's maturity, whereas the second is among his last concertos. In K. 364 the first subject is truncated and decorated in the second exposition. In the recapitulation it includes elements from the versions in both

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────┐
│ FIRST EXPOSITION/TUTTI                     │ SOLO     │
│ 1         20       40         60           │          │
│ F              C1  OS   MC   B1            │ B2       │
│ a b    c       d                           │          │
│ E♭                                         │          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────┘

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SECOND EXPOSITION                             TUTTI  │
│ 78         100        120      140        160        │
│ F'    C2 L     B3          SS B4              C3      │
│ adad'                                                │
│ E♭        c     B♭                                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ DEVELOPMENT/SOLO                                     │
│ 168  180       200       220                         │
│                                                      │
│                                                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ RECAPITULATION/TUTTI          SOLO              ᵇ TUTTI                  │
│ 223      240      260       280      300    320  ᵃ 364        380        │
│ F"  B2   F'   C2 L'    B3       SS OS  B4       C3 ₂₅ B1    C2           │
│ ab'                                              CAD                     │
│ E♭              f  E♭    A♭  E♭                                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Figure 13.3.   Sinfonia Concertante for Violin and Viola in E flat, K. 364

FIRST EXPOSITION/TUTTI					SOLO
1	20	40	60	80	100
F	F C1		OS	C2	B1
	a m	n		p q	r
C	c C		G	c C	

SECOND EXPOSITION						TUTTI
112 120	140	160	180	200		220
F F	B2 C2 L	B3	SS	B4		C1'
	a'			a" s		m' n'
C	c G	E♭	G			

DEVELOPMENT/SOLO			
229	240	260	280

RECAPITULATION/TUTTI SOLO						TUTTI
290 300	320	340	360	380	400	420
F F	B2 C2 L	B5 SS'		OS' B4	C1"	C2'
	a'			a" s	m"	p q' r
C	c G	E♭	C			

CADENZA

Figure 13.4.   Piano Concerto in C, K. 503

expositions as well as the bridge that leads to the soloists' version. The solo subject (L) first appears in the relative minor of the tonic and is recapitulated in the relative minor of the subdominant before returning to the tonic. The orchestral second subject (OS), which is announced in the tonic, is replaced in the second exposition by a solo second subject (SS) presented in the dominant. Both themes return in the tonic in the recapitulation. The final coda combines bridging material first heard in the orchestral exposition (B1) with material that served as a codetta to the soloists' statement of the first subject (C2). (All of the codetta passages are related.) Mozart heard the famous orchestra at Mannheim in 1777, and elements of Mannheim style are apparent, especially a crescendo (MC—from which B1 is derived) featured both in the orchestral exposition and in the development.

K. 503 differs structurally from K. 364 in only a few respects: the treatment of the first subject is more orthodox (though the subject itself is more adventurous in that it merges with the bridge and includes a shift to the tonic

minor); the bridge between the two expositions (B1) does not return; the solo subject (L) is in the relative major of the tonic minor; the tonic minor is hinted at constantly in the expositions and makes a noteworthy appearance at the end of the first subject (motive 'a') and in the first statement of the orchestral second subject (OS); the orchestral second subject (OS) is repeated in the tonic major in the first exposition, but is stated only once (in the tonic major) in the recapitulation; the development is worthy of the name and is given over entirely to the orchestral second subject (OS); the final coda is based on the coda of the first exposition (C2); most of the bridges are closely related to, and develop material found at, the close of the first subject (motive 'a').

The first movement of Mozart's final concerto (see Fig. 13.5), K. 622, is a cruiser to K. 503's battleship. The orchestral exposition does not include a second subject (a device restricted to K. 415 and 459 among the piano concertos), but does develop the first subject in a manner recalled in the second exposition and recapitulation (B1). The development concentrates on the first subject and on the bridges based on it. In the recapitulation the

```
FIRST EXPOSITION/TUTTI
1            20            40
F    F    C    B1              C2   C3

A              E   A
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SECOND EXPOSITION/SOLO                                    TUTTI
57            80            100          120         140         160
F     F    B2         C4  SS       L          B1'         C1'   C5

A                 a C    e   E        c#   E
```

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DEVELOPMENT/SOLO
172               200          220             240
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```
RECAPITULATION/TUTTI                 SOLO     TUTTI
251   260         280          300   [CADENZA]  320       340
F     F    B2'       C4'  SS'         L      B1'             C1'  C2'  C

A            a C d a      A      f#  A
```

Figure 13.5.   Clarinet Concerto in A, K. 622

solo subject (L) follows the solo second subject (SS) and is presented in the relative minor of the key in which the second subject appears. The cadenza arrives unexpectedly early. A version of the codetta of the bridge (C2) introduced in the orchestral exposition is inserted before the movement's final coda.

Summary: Mozart's concertos of the period are much more complex in structure than are his corresponding symphonies, in that they introduce more thematic ideas and, in doing so, distinguish the expositions from each other and from the recapitulation. All this plainly results from the attempt to provide the solo instrument with new material (L and SS), so it stands out as an individual rather than having it simply repeat material presented by the orchestra in the first exposition. There is no similar reason for differentiating the expositions and recapitulation of the symphony, and the goals of economy and precision also count against a proliferation of themes. (Cecilia will notice, though, that in K. 503 and 622 the close relation between themes and bridges makes for a unity and intensity worthy of that of the symphonies.)

The comparison of the first movements of the concerto and the symphony in terms of Cecilia's question ('Why does the concerto have/need more themes?') was fruitful. A close listening to the works reveals a connection between details of their structure and the different functions served by each musical type. With that understanding, Cecilia now is capable of much finer discriminations than formerly, so that she hears Symphony No. 38, K. 504 (the 'Prague') as complexly structured (for a symphony) and K. 622 as comparatively simple (for a concerto), though the 'complex' symphony contains fewer thematic ideas than the 'simple' concerto. She can distinguish those aspects of structure belonging to the work *qua* concerto or symphony and those marking the particular work as an individual of its type.

As I said, the method was fruitful in one case, but is it generally useful as an approach to musical understanding? I believe so, and illustrate this now by considering a new example. I develop the contrast between the first movement of the symphony and the opera overture.

What is the function of the opera overture? It should introduce the opera, lasting long enough to allow the audience to settle but not so long that impatience sets in before the rise of the curtain. It should set the tone of the work, establishing not only the work's key, if it has one, but also a suitable mood. Finally, it should, if it can, establish a connection of some intimacy between itself and the body of the work (whereas it is not at all usual in Mozart's case that an explicit connection be established between the various movements of a sonata or symphony). What aspects of symphonic treatment

within sonata form count against the pursuit of these goals? In the symphony the first and second subject groups often contrast in their melodic and/or tonal and/or expressive character, and the emphasis and reconciliation of these differences gives the movement much of its character. By contrast, the opera overture should aim to present a consistent, uniform mood. Also, the argumentative, dialectical style of the symphony makes demands on the listener's attention and concentration that might not be appropriate in the context of the opera overture. Even if the overture should present a musically viable form, it cannot always do so merely by imitating the symphonic movement, though it shares with the symphony's first movement a general commitment to sonata form. One can predict that the formal model will be adapted to avoid undue contrasts (for example, in the second subject) and complexities (for example, in the development).

Cecilia listens to the overtures of the operas completed by Mozart after 1778.[8] *Idomeneo, King of Crete* (K. 366 of 1780), *The Abduction from the Seraglio* (K. 384 of 1782), *The Impresario* (K. 486 of 1786), *The Marriage of Figaro* (K. 492 of 1786), *Don Giovanni* (K. 527 of 1787), *Così fan tutte* (K. 588 of 1790), *The Magic Flute* (K. 620 of 1791), and *The Clemency of Titus* (K. 621 of 1791). She discovers a wide range of approaches, but it is possible to hear in many cases that the symphonic proportions and style of sonata form are modified for the operatic context. (One obvious change is in the absence of a repeat of the exposition.)

The overtures to *Impresario* and (especially) *Titus* allow for an orthodox development section, but Mozart's dissatisfaction with this approach is evident elsewhere. In *Giovanni*, *Così*, and *Flute* the development is relatively truncated. In *Idomeneo* and *Figaro* the development section is no more than a bridge connecting the exposition to the recapitulation. In *Seraglio* the development is replaced by the theme from Belmonte's aria (No. 1), presented in the minor rather than the projected major. These modifications require others if the formal balance of the overture is not to be upset. The overtures of *Giovanni*, *Così*, and *Flute* involve slow introductions, reducing accordingly the length devoted to exposition, development, and recapitulation. The developmental treatment of material is shifted back into the exposition in the overtures of *Così* and *Flute*. The arrival of the second subject group is delayed in *Idomeneo*, *Flute*, and *Figaro*, especially so in the latter case, where we arrive *at* the dominant in the expected place but do not reach the second subject group

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[8] Because the overtures were written last, the operas that were not completed do not have overtures.

until later, where a firm A major cadence announces that we are *in* the dominant. This 'squeezing' and 'stretching' of the formal parameters has the effect of downplaying the development, so that the style is not argumentative.

The importance and distinctiveness of the second subject is also reduced, resulting in a tendency toward uniformity rather than contrast. In the overtures of *Seraglio* and *Così* the second subject is directly derived from the first; in *Flute* elements of the first subject remain present in the accompaniment of the second. As mentioned above, the extension of bridging passages postpones the arrival of the second subject in *Idomeneo*, *Figaro*, and *Flute*, so it seems like an afterthought. In *Figaro*, *Giovanni*, *Così*, and *Flute* the second subject retains the expressive character of the first. In both *Idomeneo* and *Seraglio* the second subject group is excised altogether from the recapitulation.

The overtures show an affinity with their respective operas. Each overture establishes its opera's key. And in every case the emotional tone of the overture matches that of the work as a whole—skittish humor in the *opera buffa* (other than *Giovanni*) and majesty and pageantry in the *opera seria*. Chromaticism in the overtures of *Idomeneo* and *Giovanni* anticipates the sinister tragedies that are to follow; the fugal treatment of material indicates the underlying seriousness of the drama in *Flute*; the 'Turkish' music of the overture in *Seraglio* draws attention to the exotic setting and prefigures the musical style associated with Pasha Selim and his followers. In *Seraglio* and *Giovanni* the overture leads directly into the first 'number', which in the latter case involves a modulation from the overture's home key. In *Titus* the order of the first and second subjects is reversed in the recapitulation, so the overture closes with flourishes suitable to the scene on which the curtain opens.

The most intimate connection between overture and work will be established by quotation, but there are obvious difficulties in the approach. The melodies of arias are of a length that would interrupt the flow of the overture if they were quoted; besides, without words the dramatic context giving point to the aria is absent. Mozart replaces the development of the overture of *Seraglio* with a statement (in the minor) of the aria with which Belmonte begins the opera. (In this case the audience need not wait long before the significance of the melody is revealed.) More often, the overture shares with the opera no more than a motive or fragment. Only one brief figure is common to the overture of *Figaro* and the work as a whole (see bars 7–9 of No. 14); motives from the overture of *Idomeneo* return within the body of the work (note especially the chromatic figure in the first subject group that returns in No. 21, and parts of the second subject group hinted at in No. 8); flourishes first heard in the overture return in Act II of *Titus*.

Perhaps the most satisfactory approach to the thematic integration of overture and opera is that achieved in *Giovanni*, *Così*, and *Flute*. In these works a motive or idea, rather than a fully-fledged theme, is highlighted in the slow introduction of the overture and later takes on dramatic significance— in *Giovanni* it is the sinister, chromatic figuration accompanying the arrival of the avenging statue; in *Così* it is the 'così fan tutte' motive that returns with those words in No. 30; and in *Flute* it is the three chords associated with the three temples of Tamino's initiation (No. 9A). In the overtures of *Così* and *Flute* the motives return within the overture—in the former at the beginning of the coda and in the latter before the start of the development. In these cases, the shared material is rather brief but highly recognizable. The introduction of the quotation in the overture does not compromise the overall structure, as is the case in *Seraglio*, for the motive appears before the exposition and, if restated, is interpolated between formal sections.

It has been useful to take guidance from structural differences between the overture and the symphony's first movement as indicating their different functions and, thereby, to come to a deeper understanding both of those functions and of what it is in a given piece that marks it as an overture, as well as the individual overture it is. Encouraged by this, and with a deeper interest in music, Cecilia extends her careful listening of Mozart's music to other movements, and to other musical types. She wonders whether there are consistent differences between trios, quartets, and quintets, between serenades and piano sonatas, and so forth. She compares Mozart's dance music with the minuets of the symphonies. She returns to the concertos, wondering whether there are differences between the concertos for fortepiano and the remainder. She returns to the overtures also, looking for distinctions between those for *opera seria*, *opera buffa*, and *singspiel*.

After all this, has Cecilia achieved a profound understanding of Mozart's music and the concertos and symphonies with which she began? It is not clear that she can be expert, for as yet she has no basis for comparison between Mozart and other composers of the period, so that she cannot sort features of classical style from those individual to Mozart. She must broaden her horizons, comparing Mozart's last symphonies with Franz Joseph Haydn's 'London' symphonies, and Mozart's 'Haydn' quartets with Haydn's op. 33, 50, 54, 55, 64 sets, and so on. Perhaps she could have the fullest grasp of classical style only if she could find within it the seeds that were to flower into the romantic movement. So she might turn her attention to Beethoven, whose early symphonies, quartets, sonatas, and piano concertos imitate Mozartean structures.

Again, has Cecilia then achieved a profound understanding of Mozart's concertos and symphonies? Not yet. She knows nothing of the influences that shaped Mozart's personal style; neither is she familiar with the structural types from which the concerto and the symphony sprang. She regards the works as musical bastards, having no awareness of the lines of breeding that shape their forms. When she turns to works written by Mozart before 1777 Cecilia hears music influenced not by Franz Joseph Haydn and the Mannheim school but by J. C. Bach, Michael Haydn, and the Italian style. In structure, these earlier works owe far less to sonata form than to older, baroque formal types. The form of the *galant* concerto, for example, depended more on the alternation of sections for the full orchestra (tutti, or ritornellos) with those featuring the soloist than on thematic development or patterns of tonal change. The overall structure of Mozart's earlier original concertos might better be heard not in terms of sonata form but as tutti (first exposition), solo followed by tutti (second exposition), solo (development), tutti followed by solo, and, to close, tutti (recapitulation). Where the development is little more than a bridge or transition, such a work will come nearer to possessing a binary (TST/TST) than ternary (exposition/development/recapitulation) structure. Aspects of the early concertos that seem crude and puzzling when heard as aspiring to sonata form now will make more sense when heard as arising from the concerto grosso. And this way of approaching the music will carry over into a consideration of the later concertos, too, for now Cecilia will hear the form not so much as a departure from the symphonic ideal caused by the exigencies of writing for a solo instrument, but as the healthy issue of a successful marriage between the baroque concerto and the classical symphony. (She might also like to reconsider the first movement of K. 504, the 'Prague', in light of this idea.) Similarly, when she learns that the symphony arose from the sinfonia, which in the early baroque introduced the opera, she will be less inclined to view the operatic overture as a trivialized symphonic movement and more likely to hear both as the natural children of a common ancestor, each taking the course it does in response to its environment.

Earlier I emphasized that the 'problem' of the concerto arises from the fact that the first exposition is the preserve of the orchestra, so that the solo instrument has to establish its individuality in the second exposition. One way of solving this 'problem' would be by dispensing with a double exposition. Cecilia could not appreciate why this option was not available to Mozart without recognizing that he was heir to styles and conventions the composer might modify and enrich but that he was not free to reject out of hand. Until she considers the precedents against which Mozart works, she

treats the structures of his works as created *ex nihilo* and does not understand where Mozart was working with musical givens.

A grasp of the conventions with and against which Mozart worked is crucial if one is to appreciate not only the successes but also some of the failures. Early in the final, fourth act of *Figaro* both Marcellina and Basilio sing grand arias. The dramatic impulsion of the work, built up and sustained over more than two hours, here is halted and dissipated. But if the arias are cut (as now they commonly are), the final act lacks the length and weight needed to balance the mighty second act. Why did Mozart and da Ponte write those arias rather than something else? The answer, of course, is that they were bound to include those arias, whatever the price. They wrote within a tradition that emphasized (even more than now is the case) the star status of the singer. Many of the conventions of the genre were dictated by the singer's importance. Each major character had to be given at least two 'exit' arias. (The exit from the stage promotes applause and provides the opportunity for bows and encores.[9]) Each secondary character with more than a walk-on part was to receive at least one, large, exit aria. Those who sang the parts of Marcellina and Basilio had to be given their due—there could be no choice in the matter. In effect, Mozart and da Ponte had painted themselves into a corner; they had run out of plot before all the musical debts had been paid.

Mozart was aware of how the conventions worked against the marriage of music and drama, and he did much to alter the practice of the time, but there could be no alternative to working with and through the established tradition. The conventions provided the vehicle that, with da Ponte, he set in motion. Mozart's aim was to bring the characters to life in the music.[10] This can be achieved only if the action takes place in the 'numbers', rather than being confined largely to secco recitatives. Where the action takes place in the numbers, pace and timing, characterization, expression, humor, and dramatic/musical structure all fall under the composer's, rather than the librettist's, control. Mozart's progress as an opera composer might be charted

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[9] At the second performance of *Figaro* five numbers had to be repeated, at the third seven. Emperor Joseph II, in a note to Count Rosenberg on 9 May 1786, wrote as follows: 'To prevent the excessive duration of the opera, without however prejudicing the fame often sought by opera singers from the repetition of vocal pieces, I deem the enclosed notice to the public (that no piece for more than a single voice is to be repeated) to be the most reasonable expedient. You will therefore cause some posters to this effect to be printed' (quoted in Deutsch 1966: 275).

[10] By no means is this the only approach that might be taken to opera. The masque, from which opera evolved, was concerned with spectacle rather than drama. The element of spectacle retained its importance in later times— especially in the French tradition, where long ballets were included in the opera, for example.

through a consideration of the ways he attempted to achieve the goal of containing the dramatic action within the numbers. The accompanied recitative becomes prominent and is often merged with a following aria; there is a general tightening up of the introductions to arias and ensembles; arias tend to become shorter and less ornate; in some cases the aria is integrated into an ensemble. Where possible the aria involves action rather than reflection; vocal display, if used, serves a dramatic point. Ensembles become a focus of action—the ratio of arias to ensembles falls steadily. In particular, the finales (comprised of continuous music uninterrupted by recitative) become longer (extending toward the middle of the act rather than prolonging it).[11]

Mozart subverted, without rejecting, operatic conventions with the point of glorifying the singer, in his attempt to create a satisfactory dramatic form from a musical one. This is most evident in *Figaro*. Beaumarchais's play, adapted by da Ponte, was banned for its criticism of the aristocracy. The opera concerns the attempt of Count Almaviva to have first 'use' of Susanna on her marriage to Figaro, though the Count has officially renounced the *droit du seigneur*, and with the attempts of Figaro to thwart the Count's plans. The battle is between an aristocrat and his servant. As one might expect, this political conflict is highlighted in arias sung by the protagonists—Figaro hopes to play the tune to which his master will dance (No. 3) and the Count rails against his servant's cheek (rather than out of sexual frustration) (No. 17). That is to say, the political message is foregrounded by Mozart in his use of standard operatic techniques. But there is another agenda driving the action, and this is revealed no less clearly (though more subtly) in the music and the opera's structure. The opera is mistitled—it should have been called *The Marriage of Susanna*.

Susanna dominates the action, but does not occupy the spotlight in doing so. The plans she hatches with the Countess win the day—Figaro's plans all founder. Susanna controls the action through her relationships with others and not, as in the manner standard in opera of the day, through her arias. In fact, one way or another, her importance is masked throughout. She deals with others on a one-to-one basis (as in the duets), or she seeks the relative

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[11] Kivy (1988*d*: 259) writes of *Così*: 'Its "characters" therefore are not Fiordiligi, Dorabella, Gugliemo, Ferrando; they are *the* soprano, *the* mezzo-soprano, *the* heroic tenor, etc. They are instruments in a *sinfonia concertante*, instruments with proper names... [L]ike the characters of *opera seria*, the characters of *Così fan tutte* are as close to being character types as they can be without ceasing to be characters at all.' I can see how one might arrive at this view by approaching the work as if it were isolated from Mozart's earlier operas, but, given the pattern of development apparent in those works and its continuation in *Così*, either Kivy is mistaken or his claims need much more detailed support than he offers.

anonymity of shadows, or she disguises herself to present the public identity of others. But her importance is ever present in the music—she is above all Mozart's creation.

As a major character, Susanna is entitled to two arias, but neither is a set piece conforming to the standard model. The first concerns the dressing of Cherubino as a girl; usually, Susanna kneels by the side of the stage while the page steals the limelight. The second, a declaration of love, is brief and typically indirect in that, teasingly, it is addressed to the eavesdropping Figaro, who takes it, as he is meant to, as intended for the Count. Susanna's pivotal role is revealed in the ensembles. The opera contains six duets and Susanna appears in each. (Only Figaro shares more than one duet with her.) She is also featured in each of the two trios, as in all the other ensemble pieces. The first duet, between Susanna and Figaro, models the dramatic structure of the work; both Figaro and Susanna introduce their own thematic material, but by the end of the duet Figaro has joined with Susanna in singing her music. In several cases (Nos. 7 and 18) her music impels the action forward through the introduction of tonal contrasts. In the Finale to the second act it is Susanna's appearance that heralds the move to the dominant major which commits the Finale to the circle of fifths that drives it to its conclusion.

Susanna's part in the work cuts across the divisions of class by focusing on a more fundamental division between the sexes. Susanna mocks the men irrespective of their class status. She amuses herself at the Count's expense with feigned slips of the tongue (No. 16), just as she teases Figaro with his own vengeance music ('Di qua non muovo il passo' in the Finale of Act IV). Meanwhile, she cooperates as an equal with her 'class enemy', Rosina, the Countess. Those who view the opera as political while missing the centrality of her role do not take their analysis far enough, in that they fail to appreciate the sexual politics in accordance with which all women, who derive their outward status only from their husbands, make up a social class the status of which is lower than that of a male servant.

In *Figaro* Mozart operates within the context of conventions and forms that were known to the performers and audience, and with a plot drawing on familiar themes from the *commedia dell'arte*, all of which establish the foreground of dramatic action. But the opera has a more subtle structure, which is no less a musical than a dramatic form, created by Mozart. This form places Susanna at the opera's heart. It is the interplay between, and reconciliation of, these two structures that makes *Figaro* what it is. Cecilia could understand the opera—that is, could appreciate why it has the strengths and weaknesses that it does—only if she had an awareness of the conventions providing the

scaffold from which the composer works and of the historical (and social) context that gave those conventions their life.

The moral is simple: If a piece's being a quartet as opposed to a symphony, say, makes a difference to how it should be written that will be audible to the attentive listener, then the listener will need to have some notion of the relevant distinctions between quartets and symphonies. (What I take to be the same point can be put this way: If the quartet poses the composer problems—of form, instrumentation, or whatever—that differ from those raised by the symphony, then one cannot recognize the solutions for what they are unless one has some idea of the problem and its significance.) Learning what it is that makes a symphony a symphony in a given period involves a great deal of close listening, reflection on what has been heard, and some idea of the social place and function of such music. Though most philosophers who write on musical understanding emphasize the importance of close attention to the music with an ear to its macrostructure, they say next to nothing about the knowledge and experience required if the listener is to interpret the musical significance of that macrostructure. This is a serious deficiency in their views.

We live in an age in which it is regarded both as offensive and as false to suggest there is not democratic equality among all kinds of music in their artistic value and among all listeners in their understandings of music. It seems also to be widely held that understanding comes simply as a result of one's giving oneself over to the music (as if there must be something wrong with a work that does not appeal at first hearing). The ideas that there are worthwhile degrees of musical understanding that might be attained only through years of hard work and that there are kinds of music that yield their richest rewards only to listeners prepared to undertake it smack of an intellectual elitism that has become unacceptable, not only in society at large but in the universities. 'Anti-democratic' ideas are rejected not just for music, of course, but across the social and political board, but the case for musical 'democracy' is especially strong, since almost everyone loves and enjoys some kind of music. Nevertheless, the arguments I have developed above suggest to me that many music lovers mistake the enjoyment they experience for the pleasure that would be afforded by deeper levels of understanding.

Attributing Significance   14
to Unobvious Musical
Relationships[1]

Musical analysts, quite rightly, do not confine themselves to descriptions of the surface structure of musical works or to noting the obvious relationships within works. They maintain that the emergent features of musical works— their expressiveness, unity, and so forth—are generated from the notes consti- tuting the work. In so far as such emergent features are uniquely achieved in individual works, they cannot usually be explained in terms of surface struc- tures and obvious relationships that may be common to a large number of works. Inevitably, then, such features are explained as arising from unobvious structures and relationships. Accordingly, analysts have searched the musical 'background' of works in the quest for expressiveness-conferring relation- ships. But the claim that unobvious structures and relationships give rise to such musically significant features as expressiveness and unity faces a number of crucial objections. If it is possible that such relationships might hold between different works, how could we avoid saying that the different works are mutually expressive or mutually unified? Can we attribute such a special significance to relationships that composers might not have intended to create? How can listeners correctly predicate such features of music if they are unaware of the relationships that confer these features on the work?

Some analysts, in attempting to deal with the above difficulties, have developed elaborate theories of musical expressiveness, unity, and so forth

that allow for their approach to musical analysis.[2] I am not concerned here to review their theories; some such theories appear to be crude, inadequate, and importantly misleading. It is frequently claimed that the analyses reveal musical 'facts' that confirm the theories, whereas what counts as a significantly relevant 'fact' is determined by the conceptual structure of the theory and is in no sense independent of the theory. (This kind of point has been much emphasized by philosophers of science; see e.g. Kuhn 1970.) The analyses offered are best seen as illustrations of the theory rather than as evidence for it. Ultimately, the test for such theories involves considering whether or not they are convincing illustrations of the musical basis of the features in question.

   In what follows I argue that the difficulties mentioned above in attributing significance to unobvious or hidden musical structures and relationships can be met satisfactorily. I confine the discussion to the case of musical unity but, as I have already suggested, I believe the argument may be generalized to justify the analyst's search for the musical basis of other emergent features. The issues raised by the above questions are conceptual rather than technical; the legitimacy of an entire approach to analysis is in doubt, not the adequacy of any particular analysis. So, my method is both general and theoretical. It is the difficulty in attributing significance to unobvious relationships, rather than the technical procedures and problems in demonstrating such relationships, that is investigated here.

I

It might be claimed that, because of the nature of musical style, or even through the limitations imposed by a general system such as tonality, modality, or dodecaphony, it is inevitable that certain kinds of relationship will maintain within a work. These relationships cannot be unity-conferring within the work because qualitatively and quantitatively similar relationships will be common to other works. Since these various works are not unified with respect to each other, though they share many unobvious relationships, the relationships cannot provide the unity of individual works. The unavoidable ubiquity of such relationships deprives them of the sort of special significance they must have if they are to be unity-conferring.

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[2] I have in mind such writers as H. Schenker, R. Reti, H. Keller, A. Walker, L. B. Meyer, and D. Cooke.

This objection does not note merely that one work may quote from another, or that, say, the main themes of disparate works may closely resemble each other. It strikes at the heart of the analytical approach under review by denying that the sorts of unobvious relationships that are said to be unity-conferring could fulfill such an important function. This is not only a denial of the adequacy of particular analyses (though it could be applied in such contexts), it also attacks the theoretical foundation of such analyses. The objector might accept that a particular work is unified, but is denying that that unity is conferred on the work by the sorts of relationships exposed through analysis. He denies this by claiming that the same relationships could be shown to hold between disparate works that we would never claim to be mutually unified. Thus, though it may be true that individual composers may have distinctive 'fingerprints' and that some works composed as sets might be mutually unified, such points do not succeed in meeting the objection.

Two lines of reply to the objection are apparently available. One might deny that unity-conferring relationships of the kind described do hold between disparate works. Or, one might say that the fact that such relationships may be demonstrated to hold between disparate works does not commit one to the claim that they are mutually unified, so there need be no inconsistency in holding that such relationships might be unity-conferring within an individual work without being unity-conferring between disparate works.

There is some force to the objection. Clearly, we would be unimpressed by an analysis that identified as unity-conferring relationships that pervaded to an equal degree many other musical works, some of which would not be normally regarded as unified. It is reasonable to expect that unity-conferring relationships are sufficiently complex and distinctive that they occur with similar pervasiveness in only a few other, if any other, works. That is, to be convincing, the analysis must identify as unity-conferring relationships that meet a criterion of distinctiveness. This point would be readily conceded by most analysts. But it is important to note that this criterion need not be specifiable. The kinds of relationship identified as unity-conferring are usually of the type described by Wittgenstein (1968: 31–2) as 'family resemblances'. That is to say, one part of the work shares some relationship with other parts of the work, a different relationship with yet other parts of the work, and so on for all or most parts of the work. There is an unbroken web of unobvious relationships between all or most parts of the work, though there is no element or set of elements common to all parts of the work. Hence, there are no relationships necessary or sufficient to guarantee musical unity within

a work and, hence, no specifiable criterion for the successful analysis of the musical basis of a work's unity. (The analyst is committed neither to maintaining that the surface variety of the work is generated from a single musical idea nor to claiming that the surface contrasts are 'really' reformulations of a single musical idea. The importance of avoiding a reductionist account of the analytical procedure will be discussed presently.) The criteria settling the convincingness of any particular analysis are open-ended and there can be no rules guaranteeing the success of any particular analysis. What follows from this is that the analyst must exercise sensitivity and fine judgment in deciding that the relationships he is able to discover are complex and pervasive enough to justify the claim that they give rise to the work's unity. This is not to say that his judgment is subjective; it will be assessed by those who listen to the work in the light of his analysis. And, in the absence of a specifiable criterion, though it will not be easy to settle disputes about the convincingness or otherwise of some analyses, we need not admit that, in principle, such disputes are indeterminable. The analyst is not licensed to justify a poor analysis, obviously, by noting that his analysis must account for the work's unity since the work is unified and since these are the only relationships he can find in it.

In so far as the judgment of analysts is usually sound and in so far as the relationships they identify as unity-conferring are sufficiently complex and pervasive to ensure their distinctiveness, the first approach to the objection does much to remove its force. However, such claims would only remove the objection entirely if it could be shown that the relationships said to be unity-conferring must be unique to the work in question in their complexity and pervasiveness. But there is no way of guaranteeing the truth of this extravagant claim. Even if no other work shares the same relationships to the same degree at the moment (and how could one be sure of that?), there is no way of guaranteeing that a work composed tomorrow will not share the same relationships with the analyzed work. In that case, the approach so far adopted does not successfully meet the objection that two disparate works we would not regard as mutually unified could have in common the same unity-conferring features.

At this stage I turn to the second, more radical, line of reply to the objection. The objection confidently (and rightly) asserts that there are works we would not consider mutually unified, whatever the degree of relationships common to them both. But surely this does not suggest that we should follow the objection in concluding that internal relationships have no function in giving rise to musical unity. Rather, we should conclude that

there is a point to be made here about the grammar of the word 'unity' and not about the conditions under which unity is conferred. 'Unity' specifies an internal and not an external relationship and our reluctance to talk of the unity of disparate works reflects this fact without in any way reflecting on the conditions giving rise to unity *within* works (or sets of works). The fact that my brother stands to me in the same genetic relationship as my sister does not suggest that I should call him my sister (or that I should cease distinguishing between sisters and brothers). Another illustration: though the members of a family may display a family resemblance in that they variously share prominent ears, a recessive chin, and buckteeth, it does not follow that we would be prepared to regard any person displaying these features as a member of their family. In recognizing that prominent ears are an element in the creation of a family resemblance, one does not go on to say that anyone with prominent ears is a member of the same family. Prominent ears give rise to family resemblances but only within an independently specifiable family. Similarly, unobvious musical relationship may give rise to musical unity, but only within particular works that can be specified independently as particular works (perhaps by reference to the composer, the time of composition, and so forth). Thus, the fact that pieces independently identifiable as disparate works are not regarded as mutually unified though they share in common various musical relationships need not count against the claim that, within those works, those same musical relationships are unity-conferring.

The objection under consideration is best dismissed as confusing an important point about the grammar of the word 'unity' with a quite different point about the conditions under which unity might be generated within particular works. This is the claim made above. The first attempt at dismissing this objection was importantly unsatisfactory in that it conceded too much to the objection. Rather than exposing the conceptual confusion lying at the heart of the objection, it tried (unsuccessfully) to meet the objection by arguing that, in practice, the objection would find no application.

Notice how, in meeting the objection considered above, it was important to recognize that though musical unity may be generated by unobvious musical relationships, the unity and the relationships generating it are distinguished. Any reductionist account of musical unity—that is, one maintaining that to say that a work is unified is merely to report that certain kinds of relationships hold within the work—would be unable to meet the objection considered above. It is only by distinguishing the unity from the relationships from which it arises that one could maintain that unity arises within a particular work

from the work's interrelated themes or whatever, while denying that that work is unified with respect to a disparate work in which the same relationships are equally pervasive. As I will make clear later, reductionism would also lead to other difficulties. The irreducibility of unity is apparent from the fact that a person may notice all the relationships generating a work's unity while failing to recognize that the work is unified. The unity may depend on the unobvious relationships between the work's parts, but is no more reducible to those relationships than is a gestalt reducible to the dots from which it emerges.

The objection considered so far claims that the sorts of relationships said to be unity-conferring are too ubiquitous to fulfill such a function adequately. Against this it has been acknowledged that the relationships said to be unity-conferring should be both distinctive and pervasive enough that only a small number of works would have such relationships in common. This view invites perhaps an opposite objection; namely, that a work may be unified though it cannot be demonstrated to possess enough of the sorts of relationships the analyst claims to be unity-conferring. Now, if the analyst believes that such relationships are a necessary condition for unity, a work such as the one described would be fatal for his theory. However, the analyst need only be committed to the claim that relationships of the kind described provide a sufficient condition for musical unity. This claim, though refuted by disunified works possessing the appropriate kinds of distinctive and pervasive relationships, is not challenged by unified works apparently lacking the appropriate kinds of unity-conferring relationships.

II

I turn now to an objection that considers the composer's role in the creation of the work's unity. The objection allows that we might readily attach significance to unobvious relationships where it is known that those relationships were intentionally contrived or created by the composer, but it goes on to note that the relationships said to be unity-conferring are perhaps intentionally created only rarely. But if the relationships are not intended, they arise by chance, in which case we are forced to the unacceptable conclusion that the factors generating musical unity (and hence the unity itself) are beyond the composer's control.

A number of different replies might be tried. One might argue that all unity-conferring relationships are consciously intended by the composer. But this view seems simply false. As many unified works have been written by

uncalculating, intuitive composers as by those who painstakingly mould their material for use. Or, one might argue that not all unconsciously performed acts are unintentional. The composer may work on her material unconsciously as a result of the skill she has acquired at her trade, in the way a competent car driver changes gears unconsciously. But whereas it is true that skills, once learned, may be applied unthinkingly, it is by no means clear that this point meets the objection. Though actions may become unthinking as they become habitual, it is always possible to make such actions conscious at will. Though many aspects of composition might be unconsciously performed in this way (orchestration, for example), there is reason to doubt that the creation of unity-conferring relationships is an acquired skill that has become habitual to all intuitive composers. It seems reasonable to suppose that many composers create such relationships unconsciously in a rather stronger sense than the reply allows. Many composers may not be able to make the process by which such relationships are created conscious, however much they try to do so. The creation of relationships is, for such composers, unconscious and not merely unthinking. Or, one might argue that the unifying process takes place in the composer's unconscious, so that, though she cannot make this process conscious, the process is controlled by psychic forces in her unconscious mind and to that extent is unconsciously intended. But this view commits one to a theory, such as the Freudian one, about the structure of the psyche in a way that tells us (if anything) more about the composer's psychology than about the procedure by which the unity of her composition is generated. It might be rightly suspected that the notion of unconscious intention poses more problems than it solves.

   All of these replies to the objection, even were they freed of the difficulties already raised, are inadequate in that they concede too readily the force of the objection. They are attempts to meet the objection by showing that the creation of the relationships is intended, if not consciously then in some unconscious fashion. But it will be more effective to challenge the objection on the grounds that it attaches too much importance to the composer's intentions in suggesting that what is unintended is random and beyond the composer's control. A first, obvious, point: It is always possible that a person fails to fulfill her intentions. Presumably, most composers intend to write unified works, and many of them fail to do so. Moreover, even if the composer intends to make her work unified as a result of consciously producing unobvious relationships throughout the work, there is no guarantee of success. It is by no means unknown for a composer to compose out of existence a relationship when, instead, she was trying to create an unobvious

relationship. Conscious intentions may become so self-conscious as to defeat their aims. Clearly, then, the composer's intentions do not determine the properties or features that her work possesses, even though, more often than not, her intentions are realized.

Now, it is not the case that everything that is unintended is random in the sense of being beyond the agent's control. Unintended actions cannot be reduced merely to movements of one's body. We should distinguish between the intentionality apparent in social artifacts and the agent's intentions. The products of actions, including works of art, display intentionality in their organization usually, even if they do not display the agent's conscious intentions.[3] These two notions are conflated in the objection under consideration. It may well be the case that we are only prepared to talk of the unity of musical works because those works evidence intentionality and, hence, are clearly not random concatenations of sound. But from this it does not follow, as the objection supposes it does, that we only appreciate what is consciously intended in the work. Consider this case: A person speaks his mother tongue; his grasp of the semantics of his language is unconscious rather than unthinking; and he may be quite unable to describe the process that invests his use of the language with its semantic content. As philosophers are well aware, there are enormous difficulties in making explicit the semantic dimension of language, though native speakers have no difficulty in using and understanding utterances in their language. It would be quite misleading to say that the speaker intends to give his use of the language its semantic dimension (though it is appropriate to say that he intends to communicate something by a particular utterance). What would it be *not* to intend to mean something by the use of one's native language? (If one cannot not intend X, it makes little sense to say that one can intend X.) Language in general is meaningful because its use is intentional and not because all utterances convey the meanings they were intended to communicate. The meaningfulness of language in general does not result directly from utterers' intentions on occasions of utterance, but nor is language therefore random or spontaneous. The

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[3] My use of the term 'intentionality' is unusual. I do not mean 'intension', as in the directedness of mental attitudes with propositional content toward objects, events, or states of affairs, and I do not mean 'intentionality', as in the goals, purposes, or designs of an agent. As I intend the term, it refers to an appearance of rationality and coherence that is internal to the order and shape of the music. It arises in part from the fact that music making is a social practice governed by rules and conventions. The music's intentionality is apparent in the organization of its materials—as a function of the music's structure, tonality, syntax, and so on—whether that organization is engineered deliberately or not by the work's composer. The composer may harness the music's intentionality, but does not create it.

utterances that constitute a language are meaningful because they display intentionality rather than because they display intentions. If I say 'Tom Piper pecked a pickle', my utterance is meaningful whether or not it conveys the meaning I intended it to convey, and it is not deprived of meaning or significance if, in fact, it was something else I wished to say or if, indeed, I was not even conscious of uttering the words. From this discussion it is apparent that not all complicated human products derive their significance as a result of conscious planning or design. Though music is not a semantic system, it does display intentionality, and it is our awareness of this feature of music, rather than a belief that musical relationships are always consciously contrived, that licenses us to attribute significance to unobvious musical relationships. Even if composers are unaware of the musical processes unifying their works and are incapable of making such processes conscious, there need be no difficulty in claiming that such processes are capable of bearing the significance the analyst attributes to them.

The objection and the replies originally proposed perhaps rest on a tendency to think that if we can answer the question 'From where does the unity come?' we should also be able to answer the question 'From where do the unity-conferring properties come?'. But there is no reason to suppose that the second question can be given an answer in anything like the way that the first question can. It may be that the composer chooses among the possibilities that occur to her the continuation that feels right. That is to say, the composer might simply select from the fully formed musical ideas that come to her, without any prior manipulation or transformation of material already used, and without knowing exactly why she prefers one continuation to another. The unobvious relationships responsible for musical unity might be planned but, equally, they may be present already within some of the musical ideas from which she selects the continuation used. The intentionality apparent in the resulting composition might derive as much from a composer's exercise of choice as from her manipulative generation of material. The objection rejected above mistakenly supposes that musical analysis is significant only in so far as it exposes musical factors taken into account by the composer in the selection of her material, and then rightly suggests that the relationships identified by analysts as unity-conferring might not have been considered by the composer in her selection of continuations within her work. I have argued, however, that the analyst's attribution of significance need not be so restricted and could be thought to be so restricted only by those who mistakenly see musical analysis as an attempted answer to the second question asked above.

III

I turn now to an objection concerning the listener's status. How can a listener respond positively to a work's unity when he is unaware of the relationships supplying that unity? How can the listener appreciate the significance of the unity-conferring relationships, as evidenced by his appreciation of the work's unity, though he remains unaware of those relationships?

Two unconvincing lines of reply are the following: One might claim that only those who hear the unity-conferring relationships are truly capable of attributing unity to musical works correctly. It is a consequence of such a view that only a very few listeners are competent to predicate unity of musical works and, given that unity is value-conferring, appreciate the value of different musical works. Such a consequence will strike few as acceptable. Or, one might argue that though the listener may not be aware of the relationships, he recognizes and appreciates them unconsciously. Now, whereas one might wish to say that a person hears the ticking of a clock while he is oblivious of the sound as he concentrates on some other activity, it is not clear that such a notion of unconscious perception is adequate to meet the objection. We do not listen to everything we are hearing, so we are often not aware of hearing things. But the listener in question is one who does listen to the music and concentrates hard on listening to it and who, nevertheless, is unaware of the unobvious relationships within the work that are said to be unity-conferring. To claim that such a listener is hearing the relationships unconsciously surely is to beg the question against the objection by assuming, rather than by demonstrating, that the relationships can bear the significance the analyst attaches to them.

Again, I would argue the replies offered above concede too much to the objection. They attempt to meet the objection by suggesting that the listener is able to hear the work's unity because he is aware, unconsciously if not consciously, of the unity-conferring relationships. A stronger attack on the objection would accept that the listener is unaware of the unity-conferring relationships but go on to deny that this debars him from recognizing and appreciating the work's unity. Such a reply to the objection is possible, provided one makes no attempt to reduce the musical property of unity merely to the possession of the appropriate relationships. The reductionist must deny that someone who is aware of the unity is unaware of the relationships, but the non-reductionist need not deny this. One may appreciate the unity without recognizing the process by which the unity is generated (just as

one may perceive what is pictured in a newspaper photograph without being aware that the photograph is composed entirely of dots). Because the non-reductionist accepts the distinction between the unity and the relationships, though maintaining that the unity is an emergent feature of the relationships, he can accommodate equally well the cases where the listener hears the relationships but does not appreciate the unity and where the listener appreciates the unity but remains unaware of the relationships. The objection mistakenly conjoins an awareness of effects with an awareness of their causes, suggesting that an awareness of the one but not the other undermines the claim that the two are causally related. Clearly, such an objection could count only against a reductionist.

The objection under consideration overstates an important point the analyst must be prepared to acknowledge. It is this: The relationships exposed by analysis could have the significance claimed for them only if they were audible relationships. But here 'audible' does not mean 'recognized by those who correctly perceive the work's unity'; it means, instead, 'capable of being heard'. The analyst who sees in the score relationships that cannot be heard by anyone will not convince us that he has exposed the source of a work's unity. But the analyst whose analysis allows us to hear relationships of which we were previously unaware may well convince us. A convincing analysis, then, does not draw our attention merely to obvious, readily perceived relationships. It describes relationships many listeners would not have previously noticed but that, once attention is drawn to them, can be heard. This is not to say that the analysis makes unobvious relationships suddenly become obvious to the attentive listener (though this may happen). Skill and practice may be required in the appreciation of analyses. But it is to say that those with the appropriate skill should be able to perceive the relationships *after* those relationships are described in analyses. And if as a result of hearing the relationships the listener is prepared to agree to the analyst's claim that those relationships provide the concrete basis of the work's unity, the listener must also be prepared to accept that other listeners with the appropriate skill who hear the relationships, yet who deny that those relationships have the significance claimed for them, are mistaken. Those who claim significance for the relationships uncovered in their analyses are committed then to this: The relationships should be audible in the work for those with appropriate listening experience after they have considered the analysis and, on hearing them, most such listeners should accept that those relationships have the significance claimed for them and that others who deny this are mistaken.

IV

I have argued against the three most common and powerful objections to the view that the analysis of unobvious musical relationships may explain the musical basis for the correct predication of emergent features, such as unity and expressiveness, to musical works. I have suggested that these objections can be met, provided that reductionist accounts of such features are avoided and provided that the analyst accepts certain commitments as to the distinctiveness and audibility of the relationships for which he claims significance. The proposed answers to the objections in no way excuse inadequate analyses, and they do not necessarily support the theories analysts may espouse on the basis of their analyses. These answers make such theorizing possible without endorsing any particular theory that might have been or might be developed.

The Multiple Interpretability of Musical Works[1]

<div style="text-align: right">15</div>

In this chapter I discuss the role of interpretation in the performance and reception of musical works specified by scores.[2] Five types of interpretation (notational, editorial, performative, work-descriptive, and performance-descriptive) are likely to be involved, and in none of these is it customary to assume there is one correct interpretation.

I

Notational Interpretation

Performers can use others' musical works or ideas as the starting point for their own improvisations and variations, as in much jazz. Often, though, their goal is to present a performance of the composer's piece, rather than something inspired by, or after, it. For example, they intend to perform Haydn's Symphony No. 100. If this is their aim, they must undertake to follow the instructions Haydn directed to his work's potential performers, since it is by issuing such instructions that composers authorize and specify their works. For Western classical music, these instructions are communicated in a score,

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[1] First published in Michael Krausz (ed.), *Is There a Single Right Interpretation?*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 231–50.

[2] Not all musical works are for performance. For instance, electronic pieces issued as disks are not. They are for playback, which may have a ritual character, but does not involve the creative and interpretative contributions made by performers. Also, not all musical works are specified by scores. They can be perpetuated within purely oral traditions.

a musical notation historically connected to and reflective of the composer's acts of work creation. In undertaking to perform the given work, the performers commit themselves to obeying its score. Here, then, is the first kind of interpretation: the interpretation or reading of the score.

Like all symbol systems, musical notations are not self-explanatory; they are not transparent in their significance. Moreover, they cannot be interpreted according to any simple algorithm. Of the instructions expressed in the score, not all are of equal force. Some, such as written-out cadenzas in the eighteenth century, are recommendatory without being work-specifying; at that time the performer was free to improvise her own cadenza, even if one was recorded by the composer. Furthermore, even where they connect to work-determinative instructions, not all notations are to be taken at face value. Rhythmic values marked as dotted sometimes should be played as double-dotted; melodies that are written as 'plain' sometimes require decoration. And, finally, much that is required for the successful presentation of a work is not indicated in its score. For instance, the composer will assume that the violin's strings are tuned to the standard intervals and that its player will use an orthodox bow, playing the strings with the hair and not the wood. With respect to such matters, only departures from the norm, such as 'col legno', are indicated in the score.[3]

To read a score, the player needs knowledge of what might be called purely notational conventions. For example, an accidental applies to all other notes at the given pitch in the same bar unless and until it is explicitly countermanded. In addition, she needs to understand and appreciate the performance practice that is assumed by the composer as a heritage shared with the musicians he addresses. To be blunt, she needs to know what a violin is and how to play it, what counts as 'fast', and so on.

Performance practices are mutable; they vary from place to place and time to time. I mentioned above that the composer assumes the string players will employ standard bows in the orthodox fashion, but the design and shape of the bow, as well as the manner of holding and using it, have changed

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[3] The composer may include in the score annotations or written comments that are not instructions about what is to be done or sounded by the performer. If the conventions of music making do not allow such features to be work-indicative, they are not part of the work's specification. These annotations may be irrelevant to the music (e.g. the shopping reminder 'buy more beans'), or they may be revealing of it (such as Beethoven's 'Must it be? It must be!' in his String Quartet in F, op. 135). In the latter case they indicate the composer's thoughts, intentions, or feelings and are thereby suggestive of rewarding interpretative approaches, though they go beyond the work-determining function that is central for scores.

considerably over the centuries. What counts as 'standard' or 'orthodox' is relative to historical periods. When it comes to interpreting the work's score, the performance practices to be considered are those of the composer's day. In order to understand and follow the composer's work-determinative instructions, the score must be interpreted in the light of the notational conventions and performance practices the composer shared with the musicians he was addressing. The score can seem to be transparent to the work it encodes for the contemporary musicians to whom it is directed. When the performers are distanced from the composer's musico-historical situation, as is inevitable when they aim to play pieces from prior times or other cultures, the proper interpretation of the score might depend not only on considerable scholarship but also on the mastery of instruments and playing techniques that are unfamiliar. A great deal of study, along with sensitivity in using techniques and instruments that are not of the contemporary variety, might go into recognizing and executing the work-determinative instructions recorded by the composer.

Consider Example 15.1. A number of questions will occur to the player. How much should the opening chord be arpeggiated? Should the first semiquaver be given its full rhythmic value or shortened? In bar two, how long should the grace note be? How quickly should the trill be played, and should it end with a turn? How should the passage be bowed? Should vibrato be used, and, if so, are there rates of oscillation that would be unacceptably wide or narrow or fast or slow? Should the accents on the first and third beats of the measure be strongly marked? Are the indicated phrasings and decorations required, or only recommended? Most of these questions will have straightforward replies if the player can identify the work's vintage. If the music dates from 1720, the answers may not be the same as they would be if it was composed in 1920.

The instructions issued within scores are often indefinite. 'Allegro' means 'fast' (literally, it means 'cheerful'), but what is a fast tempo? Usually it is one falling between, say, 120 and 170 beats per minute. So long as a performance of a work with a tempo marked as 'allegro' falls within that range and holds

Example 15.1

consistently to its choice throughout the relevant section, it complies with the work's tempo specification. Tempo is among the work's identifying features, but the relevant tempo covers a range (only a narrow band of which should be employed in any particular performance). To put the point differently: the work-determinative instructions may be indefinite just so long as the work itself is indefinite in the relevant respects. Any particular performance must resolve the indefiniteness one way or the other, but many resolutions are consistent with the faithful presentation of the work.

Can an interpretation of the composer's score be *correct*? A performer who intends to discover in the score the composer's work-determining instructions reads the score incorrectly if she appeals to conventions and practices differing from those used by the composer. She might play a C sharp, failing to realize that the note should be read as a natural, or she might decorate in the wrong place or in an entirely inappropriate style. If readings can be incorrect, they can be correct also. A correct reading would be one that captured the composer's directives and appreciated their relative weight.

Is there *only one* correct interpretation of the composer's score? Well, it might be that the score indicates 'allegro' as the only correct tempo for a movement, or 'forte' as the volume. Since only one tempo and one volume is indicated, there is a sense in which there is only one correct interpretation for each notational aspect. These indications are indefinite, however. At the level of actual performance, a range of finely graded options is consistent with what is instructed. The performer deals with concrete notes, rhythms, timbres, volumes, and tempos. She must work with particulars, not abstract types, even if it is the latter the composer specifies. More than one sounded realization can be consistent with the notation's proper interpretation, and, in that sense, there is not only one correct interpretation of the composer's score.

II

Editorial Interpretation

We tend to think of works as ordered sets of pitched tones because it is at that level of detail that we hear performances. Many pieces are not so fine-grained as this, however. For instance, their scores specify notes, rhythms, or chords at the level of general types rather than that of particular tokens. This is the case with figured-bass notations in the eighteenth century, which indicate a bass line and the chordal skeleton that overlays this, but leave it to the performer to flesh out the bare framework. And the same applies to a

contemporary score directing the performer to role dice to settle which notes are to be given or the order in which the sections are to be played.

Indefiniteness must be distinguished from ambiguity. The vagueness implicit in 'Andante' or figured-bass notation indicates an *indefiniteness* in the work and does not represent an inadequacy or problem with the notation itself. (It is not as if the work is more definite, with the notation inadequate to convey this.) By contrast, *ambiguities* in the score equivocate over or fail to specify details that should be definite because they are work-constitutive. In a typical case of ambiguity, two scores purporting to be of the same work differ in details that are work-identifying in pieces of that kind and era. This could arise because of a copying error or because of a notational slip made by the composer. Such ambiguities are indicative of notational errors and misrepresent the work's identity. In yet other cases, ambiguity can be introduced deliberately. Bruckner revised many of his symphonies after their initial publication. If a composer does this, without indicating any particular rendering as authoritative, then there is an ambiguity that is best defused by talk of the work's multiple versions. For instance, Stravinsky gave *Petrushka* two incarnations, and it is appropriate, therefore, that a particular performance specifies which version it follows.

To complicate matters, notations can be overdefinite. This occurs where they record details of a performative interpretation that go beyond the work's indefiniteness. If we have two scores of a late eighteenth-century concerto, and one contains a written cadenza while the other indicates merely where the cadenza should be, there is no ambiguity. The performance practice of the day allowed cadenzas to be improvised. The written-out cadenza is not work-constitutive. It is either a record of a performance option that was once taken or a recommendation that the performer is free to ignore. The scores differ because the one indicates details of interpretation that go beyond the work, whereas the other merely indicates the respect in which the work is indefinite. For contrast, imagine that two versions of the score of a late Beethoven quartet differ in that a flat is canceled by a natural in the second violin at bar 100 of the first movement in the one but not in the other. In this case, we are likely to be facing an ambiguity, because Beethoven's late quartets, like others of the time, are not indefinite in the (relative) pitches of the notes that compose them.

Ambiguity invites editorial interpretation. If it arises from a copying error, the composer's original takes precedence. If the error is the composer's, the editor corrects the slip. If there is uncertainty about which alternative should be favored (though we know both cannot be right), the editor must exercise

her judgment if she is providing a performing edition. In some cases, it will be appropriate to tag the work with (e.g.) 'version of 1837'. In others, the editor will have to commit herself to one path or the other. Such decisions should be footnoted in the score.

From the way they are discussed by musicians and musicologists, indefiniteness, overdefiniteness, and ambiguity are often conflated. That is understandable, given that we are not always well situated to draw the distinction in considering old music, because our knowledge of the background of practice assumed by such music is inadequate. Such epistemic limitations do not undercut the usefulness of the distinction, however, and it can be applied clearly enough in many cases. A second basis for confusion resides in the fact that indefiniteness and ambiguity present the performer with similar difficulties and uncertainties. If she is to play the work, she cannot avoid committing herself to producing a specific sonic outcome. From her point of view, it makes no difference whether she faces a range of options because the score accurately represents the work's indefiniteness or because the score contains an ambiguity. In both cases she must go beyond the score in settling the concrete details of her performance.

Nevertheless, the distinction is crucial to the proper description of the choices the performer makes. In the first instance, that in which the performer resolves an indefiniteness in the work by choosing to play one way or another, her selection determines how she will realize and interpret the work. That decision focuses on how to deliver the work once its specification has been recognized. By contrast, the resolution of ambiguities in the work's notation is directed at a pragmatic identification of the work and, as such, is logically prior to matters of interpretation. Performative interpretation can begin only when the work that is to be the object of interpretation has been located and identified.

Is there one correct resolution for each ambiguity in a score? Where the ambiguity is deliberate, the editor should record rather than resolve it. It would be ontologically tidier if each work was specified unambiguously, but there is no reason to think the identity of a musical work is seriously undermined by its existing in several closely related versions. Musical works are robust enough to survive minor multiplicities. The craving for neatness is ideological, not ontological. Where the ambiguity is accidental, however, it should be removed if possible. In effect, the composer's creative intention is decisive, and we can sometimes know what that was, because our knowledge of the composer's works and other music of the time allows us to identify a notational solecism as such. In many cases, though, we cannot be sure if an

ambiguity is deliberate and, if not, how it should be treated. In some others, we cannot even be confident in distinguishing score ambiguity from indefiniteness.

III

Performative Interpretation

A performance is replete with sound. Some of this sonic filigree is distinctive to the particular performance; other detail belongs (predicatively) to the work and will be common to accurate performances of it. I call musical works 'thick' or 'thin' depending on how much of the performance's detail is constitutive of the piece. The less the minutiae of an accurate rendition are work-identifying, the thinner is the work and the more indefinite it is. The more the detail of the performance belongs essentially to the piece, the thicker and more definite it is.

In the nineteenth century it became the norm for Western classical works indicated by scores to specify notes and rhythms in sequences of particular individuals, tempo as beats-per-unit time, and instrumentation according to rather specific instrument types (e.g. 'violin'). Basically, every note to be sounded was indicated in the notation, along with many other details of the performance, and all these features were work-determinative. If one takes such works as paradigms of musical pieces, one might be tempted to decide that composers of prior times could not conceive of their creations as musical works and that we apply the notion anachronistically when we impose it on the music of those earlier periods. An alternative, the one I prefer, simply regards the works of the nineteenth century as thicker than those of earlier times, which were more indefinite and sometimes specified note types rather than particular tokens. There was not a radical upheaval in the practice of the nineteenth century, one separating it entirely from prior approaches to music; rather, there were changes that can be fully appreciated only as developing out of (and reacting against) earlier musical activities with which they were continuous in many vital respects.

Generalizing incautiously, one could say that the trend after the invention of musical notations was toward the specification of works that are thicker in their constitutive properties. The notation became more exhaustive. Sometimes this meant only that work-determinative details integral to the performance practice (such as required decorations) were taken into the notation, but in other cases (as in the move from verbal to metronomic tempo

specifications) this change probably corresponded to a thickening of the work itself. In any event, the notation became increasingly complex, instruments and ensembles became more standardized, the competence of musicians improved, printing became more widespread, and composers were less frequently involved in the presentation of their works. In consequence, more details of the work came to be notated and accepted as work-determinative.

There is a gap between a performance and the features that constitute the work the performance is of. Where works are specified by scores, the performance always is more detailed than the piece. In other words, musical works specified by notations always are indefinite with regard to some features of their sonic embodiment, while performances always are replete. Provided the performer is in control of the sounds she produces, it is she who decides how to bridge this gap. Where the composer's instructions are indefinite, she must choose what is to be sounded or how it is to be done. The performer's interpretation is generated through these choices. In order to have the work sound out, the performer must go beyond it, since the work's specification underdetermines many of the performance's sonic features. As a result, many different-sounding performances can be equally and ideally compliant with the composer's work-identifying directives. In other words, faithfulness to the work is consistent with significant differences between performances, and these differences will be attributable to the performer's interpretation.

The thinner the work, the more interpretative opportunities it affords the performer. Indeed, if the work is very thin (as is the case with many tin-pan-alley songs), almost all the value and attraction will lie in the interpretative aspect of performance. The thicker the work, the more the performer will take as her task the work's delivery to the audience for their contemplation. But even if the work is very thick, there remains considerable scope for the performer's interpretation, and the differences between performances are apt to be as interesting as what they share. Earlier I observed that nineteenth-century classical works were usually thicker than their predecessors. Yet it is plain that the symphonies of Brahms, say, are subject to a variety of interpretations. This is because their work specifications remain indefinite in many crucial respects, even if their scores specify each and every note to be played. If a note is marked as 'forte', still the performer must decide just how loud it is to be; if the melody is phrased, still the performer must decide how to articulate that phrasing. The musician controls an extraordinary range of options and shades regarding attack, decay, dynamics, articulation, color, pitch, and timing—far more than is specified in regular notations (and far

more than could be indicated in any functionally useful notation, as is apparent when one considers the quantity of 1s and 0s needed to specify musical files digitally). Moreover, she controls the way in which elements succeed each other to build themes, sections, and movements. In playing the phrase of the moment, there are very many ways she can shape it in order to bring out or suppress its connections to what has preceded and will come later. In exercising these options, she creates the performative interpretation.

I have said the musician's interpretation of the work is expressed in the choices she makes in performing it. It might be objected: Only those choices that are guided by an overall vision of the work could contribute to an interpretation; moment-by-moment decisions disregarding the whole do not qualify as interpretative.

There is a crucial unclarity in this objection. If the claim is that the performer must be able to describe an overarching interpretative vision and to say how local decisions contribute to achieving this, it is mistaken. I suspect that many highly skilled performers do not concern themselves with large-scale form and the like, being more involved with the minutiae of the moment. They might quite reasonably expect the form to take care of itself, so to speak, so long as they give due attention to the appropriate microstructures. Moreover, the kind of practical skill displayed by the performer is not always verbally expressible. Certainly, we would expect the performer to be able to tell us where the melody begins and ends and to show the usual verbal signs of musical literacy, but someone can satisfy this expectation without being able to recount a plausible and coherent narrative that makes sense of the work's totality and relates it to far-sighted performance decisions. Instead, we expect the musician to rely on her intuitions about what seems right, or seems to work, in taking her choices. Which gets us to the other side of the ambiguity: if 'being guided by an overall vision of the work' means relying on musical intuitions honed through careful practice and repeated playings of the piece, then it is not clear that an objection is being raised to what I wrote earlier. As I said, the interpretation that is the performer's overall vision of the work arises from her choices, assuming she relies on her musical judgment and experience in making them. (If her playing seems to be spontaneous and to focus more on the moment than the totality, she should be understood to be offering an interpretation under which these reactions are plausible responses to the work's qualities and mood.)

A different way of emphasizing that the player's interpretation presupposes her executive competence and a musical judgment informed by familiarity with the piece, or with stylistically similar ones, is to insist that she be able to

own the interpretation that is given. For the interpretation to be hers, she must be able to take responsibility for producing it. This explains why we attribute the interpretation to the conductor, not the orchestral members, in the case in which the conductor decides for the group. And it acknowledges that one individual might play an interpretation that is another's, not her own, by slavishly copying everything done (decided) by the other. This last observation brings to light another point: Just as works can have different performances, so too can interpretations. A particular interpretation can be instanced in distinct performances manifesting the same set of choices.

The function of a performative interpretation is to reveal the work in a certain perspective. If successful, the interpretation shows off the work clearly and (if possible) to advantage, allowing it to be understood and appreciated. Performative interpretations should be internally consistent so long as the work can be heard that way, because an account of the work that makes it seem incoherent is unlikely to do it justice. Moreover, the connection or proximity of parts usually should be stressed. Dramatic changes in mood, style, or technique are appropriate in interpretations only where they are called for in the work's specification (or in the established performance practice for such pieces). Despite what I have just written, lusterless or episodic performances can offer good interpretations if they are of works designed to exhibit such qualities; some works aim to represent repetitive, inhuman mechanisms or mindless disorganization and are best revealed through interpretations exemplifying these properties.

If it is the prime function of interpretations to present an interesting, revealing, and enjoyable perspective on the piece that is performed, then the value of a given interpretation will depend in part on the audience's knowledge and experience. What will be experienced as interesting or revealing in a performance of Beethoven's Symphony No. 5 relies on the listener's history of involvement with the work and playings of it. In standard cases, the professional musician can reasonably assume that she is dealing with a musically experienced audience. Under special conditions, it can be obvious that this is not the case, however, and this recognition should affect the interpretation offered. The interpretation that is apt for an audience of tyros is not so when offered to a convention of spent music critics.

Is there only one correct performative interpretation? No. Many are consistent with the faithful delivery of the work. Some of these will be poor, despite being true to the work. For instance, they might be uncompelling, implausible, and tasteless. Even among good interpretations, there is no

reason to expect similarity. Indeed, we value works for the fecundity of interpretations to which they give rise, and we value variety and contrast among interpretations. One rendition might stress drama and tension, where the other gives more weight to the lyric and expressive; one might invest the whole with an energetic undertow, while the other is more relaxed; one might treat the piece's moods as merely successive, while another tries to connect them within some wider narrative; one might give each climax full power, while the other accumulates their impact by building each a little more than its predecessors. The multiplicity of legitimate performative interpretations must be plain to anyone who has experienced many different performances of, say, Tchaikovsky's Symphony No. 6.

IV

Descriptive Interpretation of the Work

A performance embodies or instances the work it is of. Because the performance provides the primary route of access to the work, and because the performance would not exist as such independently of the piece it is of, there is a relation of mutual dependence between the two. Moreover, a performative interpretation shows the work in a certain light, but without describing it. By contrast, what I call descriptive interpretations of the work are verbal accounts that exist independently of the work and its performance.

A musically self-aware performer might develop her own descriptive interpretation of the work, or she might learn of and agree with a descriptive work-interpretation developed by another person. In these cases, the descriptive work-interpretation is likely to inform and affect the musician's performative interpretation. Similarly, a listener, critic, or analyst might come to a particular descriptive interpretation under the influence of a given performance. Nevertheless, the connection between these two modes of interpretation is not as strict as that of logical entailment. Different performative interpretations might be equally consistent with and illustrative of a given descriptive interpretation of the work, and different descriptive interpretations might be compatible with and exemplify a single performative interpretation. (For discussion of these and other relevant issues see Levinson 1993.)

The function of a descriptive interpretation is like that of a performative interpretation, in that it tries to find a manner of characterizing the work as a coherent whole, but whereas the latter does this sensuously, by presenting the

work in a certain way, the former is discursive. It provides a description or narrative that, if successful, tracks the course of the music and explains why it progresses as it does. The descriptive interpretation can be thought of as an adjunct to the listening process; it recommends an appropriate (rewarding, revealing) way of listening to the work.

Descriptive interpretations can be very diverse. Consider the following accounts of Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge* (op. 133), which was the original Finale of op. 130:

Roger Fiske (1957: 134) writes in these terms:

Here is a brief analysis of the tremendous fugue:

Introduction.   The theme in unison octaves … I shall call it A for brevity; next, three transformations of A, as they will occur in the three main sections of the fugue (fast, fairly slow, scherzo), but in the reverse order. All this takes less time to play than to describe.

First Fugue.   A double fugue. A being the counter subject; the main subject has wide leaps and a dotted rhythm. The energy generated in this section is overwhelming; the music is cruelly difficult to play and usually sounds a bit of a scrape. Very loud all through.

Second Fugue.   Fairly slow. A is again the countersubject and does not appear for some bars. Very soft all through.

Third Fugue.   Scherzo. A, here the principal subject, sounds very jaunty in 6/8 rhythm. This is a long section with reminiscences of what has gone before.

Coda.   Based largely on the dotted-rhythm subject in the First Fugue.

William Kinderman (1995: 305–6) says:

The parade of fugal themes in the 'overture' anticipates the main sections of the great finale in reverse order. As Kramer points out, this sequence proceeds from the clearest thematic statement to the most obscure—the gapped form of the subject that serves as countersubject in the huge opening section in B♭. Conversely, the main sections of the fugue unfold with a sense of progress from the obscure to the coherent; the most basic form of the subject is withheld until the final passages. The most emphatic assertion of this principal fugue subject in the tonic B♭ occurs only in the closing section marked *Allegro molto e con brio*, where it is prefaced by brief reminiscences of two of the other main sections (now recalled in the proper order). In the *Grosse Fuge* Beethoven combines smaller movements into a composite form using variation technique, while employing unusually elaborate rhetorical devices of premonition and reminiscence. In these respects the quartet finale bears comparison to the choral finale of the Ninth Symphony.

Charles Rosen (1971: 440–5) has this to say:

Beethoven's development of the fugue is best comprehended within the context of the transformation of the variation. The two fugal finales—the *Great Fugue* op. 133 (the last movement of the String Quartet op. 130) and the fugue of the *Hammer-klavier*—are both conceived as a series of variations, each new treatment of the theme being given a new character. Like the last movement of the Ninth Symphony, they both have the harmonic tensions characteristic of sonata-allegro form, along with its sense of a return and extensive resolution. They both, too, impose upon this another structural idea of several movements: this is particularly evident in the *Great Fugue*, which has an introduction, Allegro, slow movement (in a new key), and Scherzo finale as almost completely separate divisions; but the D major section of the *Hammerklavier* Fugue also provides a perceptible sense of slow movement before the stretto-finale. No one model, however, can exhaust the variety of ways in which Beethoven was able to integrate the fugue into a classical structure . . . The aspect of many of these late works is not ingratiating; to many, the Great Fugue is disagreeably harsh. But when it is played, as it should be, as the finale of the B flat Quartet op. 130, there is nothing eccentric in this harshness . . . What makes some of these works appear wilful is that they are uncompromising.

Melvin Berger (1985: 71–2) describes the piece as follows:

The intense and often frenzied *Grosse Fuge* baffles many listeners with its giant leaps, clashing dissonances, and overwhelming rhythmic drive. Harold Bauer . . . believed that the work was misinterpreted. 'The *Grosse Fuge* is more like a glorified polka-scherzo,' he said. 'People play it as if it were profoundly mystical which it is not. They put philosophy into it instead of music.' Most other interpreters and analysts disagree. They are stirred by its rage and vehemence and are awestruck by its grand proportions and symphonic elements. It is a brilliant paradigm of various fugal techniques, some harking back to the polyphony of Bach, others looking ahead to the advanced musical thinking of Liszt and Wagner. The brief opening section, marked *Overtura* by Beethoven, resembles the introduction to an opera, but instead of presenting tunes from the opera it sets out four different statements of the main fugal subject. It is first presented in broad, loud, accented tones: the next statement is much faster and rhythmically altered. The tempo then slows for a quiet, smooth, legato statement of the same theme. A final presentation, first violin alone, reveals the melody in note-by-note fragmentation. The *Overtura* is followed by the *Fuga*, the fugue proper, which starts with the violin flinging out a subsidiary subject, an angular, leaping melody against which the viola pounds out the fragmented main subject. For over 124 measures of the fugue Beethoven does not drop below a relentless *fortissimo* ('very loud') dynamic level, with accents to add even more power to the wild music. Then suddenly the music quiets, the key changes, and another fugal episode, based on the subsidiary theme and the main subject ensues, all *pianissimo* ('very soft'). The third episode, faster in tempo, is based on a rhythmic transformation of the main theme. Varied sections follow, all growing from the same material though reworked and refashioned into

an amazing variety of shapes and forms. The coda offers fleeting glimpses of the different subjects in a similar manner to the *Overtura* and then builds to still another climax and abrupt ending.

Sidney Finkelstein observes:

There are four main themes, which are musically connected but have each its distinct individuality. The introduction presents two of them, one which will be heard throughout the work, of great upward leaps of a seventh and a sixth, and another more relaxed and tender, flowing in sixteenth notes. After a repetition of the first theme, and the hesitant contrasting statement of the second theme, the fugue proper begins on a third theme, which has a strong rhythmic impact with its double 'hammer blows'. This theme is heard in succession from first violin, second violin, viola and cello, and in the rich fugal texture the introductory theme is heard as a counter-melody. Triplets give rhythmic variety as it runs its fierce course. Then comes the long, tender and plaintive interlude of rippling sixteenth-note figures, *Meno mosso e moderato*, using the second theme announced in the introduction. It is busily contrapuntal but not fugal. The tempo then changes to *Allegro molto e con brio*, and the fourth theme is heard, bright and dancing. The higher instruments devote themselves to it. A sudden modulation, without break, inaugurates a new development. The cello forcefully announces the opening theme of the work, under drooping figures by the second violin. It is taken up in turn by the viola, second violin, and first violin, and a new double fugue is on the way. It moves through complications to a succession of searing climaxes, of high notes antiphonally answered by low notes, or low by high. Finally the dancing theme is heard again, and the work moves to a meditative conclusion based on the first fugue theme.[4]

J. W. N. Sullivan (1949: 142–3) offers this account:

In the great Fugue of the B flat Quartet the experiences of life are seen as the conditions of creation and are accepted as such. The Fugue has been called an expression of the reconciliation of freedom and necessity, or of assertion and submission, and the terms may pass since they suggest the state of consciousness that informs the Fugue, a state in which the apparently opposing elements of life are seen as necessary and no longer in opposition. Beethoven had come to realize that his creative energy, which he at one time opposed to his destiny, in reality owed its very life to that destiny. It is not merely that he believed that the price was worth paying; he came to see it as necessary that a price should be paid. To be willing to suffer in order to create is one thing; to realize that one's creation necessitates one's suffering, that suffering is one of the greatest of God's gifts, is almost to reach a mystical solution of the problem of evil, a solution that it is

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[4] Sidney Finkelstein, notes to a Vanguard (Recording Society) 1971 four-LP set by the Yale Quartet.

probably for the good of the world that very few people will ever entertain. Yet, except in terms of this kind, we cannot represent to ourselves the spiritual content of the Grösse Fugue. The fugue opens with such an expression of unbridled energy and dominant will that it seems about to break the bounds of the string quartet. This vigorous, striving life is very different from the almost subhuman furious activity of the Fugue of the Hammerklavier Sonata, although it seems to promise an equally headlong course. But, with the entry of the opposing G flat major episode it changes its character. We become aware that a truly indescribable synthesis has been effected. There is no effect conveyed to us of anything being yielded up or sacrificed. Nevertheless, there is a change, a change that makes us conscious that opposites have been reconciled, although the Fugue marches to its close in indestructible might. This Fugue is certainly, as Bekker has rightly insisted, the crown and *raison d'être* of the whole B flat major Quartet.

How should we characterize these descriptions of the *Grosse Fuge*? A first point draws attention to the fact that many make comparisons with related works. Plainly, performative interpretations cannot draw such comparisons to the audience's attention; at best, the performer can hope the listener will make relevant connections for himself. Here, then, is an advantage discursive reflection has over musical production: it can help explain what happens in a given work by reference to how other pieces in the same genre or *oeuvre* are both similar and different.

Two other features are shared by all these accounts: each uses low-level technical terms (like pitch names), and each describes properties of the music by reference to the way it is experienced (energy, tension, harshness).

The interpretations differ considerably in the proportions with which they mix the technical and the non-technical. Fiske does no more than sketch the piece's geography. Kinderman goes further in that he discusses devices of premonition and reminiscence. Rosen outlines how a multi-movement pattern here is superimposed on a fugal structure relying more on variation than on traditional techniques of fugal development. He makes salient for unreflective listeners features they would easily miss, features that enrich the experience and the appreciation of the music when apprehended. As explanations of the music's progress, these three stories restrict themselves largely to musical technicalities. By contrast, Berger and Finkelstein pay no less attention to the mood conveyed by the piece than to its structure.

Sullivan's is the least technical and the most ambitious story. He sets out to discover the source of the piece's profundity: it reconciles apparently irreconcilable tensions, thereby intimating a solution to the problem of explaining why a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God would tolerate the

existence of undeserved suffering and evil. In my view, Sullivan is too quick to infer the composer's emotional and psychological commitments from the nature of the music. That inference cannot be guaranteed to go through, even if it is more plausible for Beethoven than for many others because he was so obviously trying to convey his personal response to the world through his music. Furthermore, I regard Sullivan's conclusions as pure whimsy, as going far beyond anything that can be substantiated solely by reference to the music and the context of its creation. But I quote Sullivan not to ridicule his excesses. I do so, instead, because he makes clear that the fullest explanation of the music's progress must take account of what he calls its 'spiritual content'. I think his exposition of this content owes a great deal to fancy, but I allow that he has taken on a more demanding and yet crucial task than the other critics in trying to address what is so humanly compelling and impressive about Beethoven's piece.

It might be argued that the point of a person's descriptive interpretation is to lead her interlocutor to an experience of the music's coherence. Any story—no matter how metonymic and fantastic—must be judged a success so long as it generates the desired experience. Sullivan's account will be as good as any other if it does the trick. I disagree, however. Though I am helped in following and understanding Prokofiev's *Peter and the Wolf* by the narrative that it illustrates, an equivalent story concerning 'Fred and the Serval' is not an interpretation of Prokofiev's Symphony No. 5, even if it succeeds as a prop by leading me to hear the work in some appropriate fashion. Neither is a story about the relation between creativity and suffering an interpretation of a work if that story bears no connection to the parts of the work and the manner in which they succeed and relate to each other. A descriptive interpretation must be about the work it characterizes. As such, it must deal with the work's elements (including expressive and not merely formal features) as contributing or not to the fashion in which the music unfolds, develops, and ends. A descriptive interpretation must be answerable to the work it is of. If we expect it to produce an appropriate experience of the work, we do so because we take it to be consonant with and responsive to the articulation of the work it outlines.

Should technical analyses be distinguished from descriptive interpretations? I think not. They have a specialist audience, but they are best regarded as a subset within the wider realm of descriptive interpretations. (For discussion of the relation between analyses and performative interpretations see Cone 1968, Berry 1989, Rink 1995, pt. 3.) Accounts that confine themselves to technical niceties usually are incomplete as interpretations because there is more to most pieces than is uncovered by a reckoning of formal or musical

elements narrowly construed. Most music has an expressive character, and the treatment of this usually is no less significant within the work than is attention to structure. Moreover, the expressive and the formal are not intrinsically opposed, and in many cases cooperate in propelling and shaping the course of the work.

This is not to say that accounts of mood, color, and expressiveness can be reduced easily to technical descriptions, or vice versa. The two kinds of description are not perfectly inter-translatable. They are complementary, though, not opposed. The listener who is not technically minded might gain as much (and much the same) from metaphorical descriptions as the music-ologist gets from an analysis.

Is there one true descriptive interpretation of the work? One might think so if one believed that a giant disjunction of each interpretative possibility could be achieved or would make sense. But that amalgamation would be an open-ended hodgepodge, rather than a singular, definitive interpretation. Alternatively, one might think so if one believed the work means only what its composer intended. But there is no reason to assume composers always have clear intentions about the significance or proper description of their work, or any reason to think there could not be more in the work than passes through the consciousness of its composer. Moreover, the fact that descriptive interpret-ations apply one medium of meaning and communication (the discursive) to a quite different one (the musical) provides a reason for expecting multiple mappings and relationships, rather than a neat one-to-one correspondence.

Notice, though, that this conclusion does not endorse theories insisting that interpretation is radically subjective or massively underdetermined. Descrip-tive interpretations can be false: it is not true that Beethoven's Symphony no. 5 is about the invention of the coffee percolator. And descriptive interpret-ations can be inapt and unrevealing. Also, the assessment of a descriptive interpretation is grounded publicly through a process that measures it against the work and against competing interpretations. There may be no one best descriptive interpretation, but this does not entail that all conceivable descrip-tions of the music are on a par.

V

Descriptive Interpretation of the Performance

If works exist as abstract particulars, distinct from the set of their possible performances, and if performances possess features that do not belong to the

works they embody, we will need to be careful in distinguishing between the performance and the work as the object of a descriptive interpretation. Not everything that is true of the latter will apply also to the former.

In the previous section I gave examples of descriptive interpretations of Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*. These interpretations are of the work, not of any performance of it. The descriptive interpretations provided by music analysts and the authors of program notes are bound to be of this kind. Where a particular performance is discussed, the primary focus still can fall on the work embodied in it. Plainly though, there are descriptive interpretations that target the performance rather than the work. The newspaper notices written by professional music critics usually devote attention to creative features of the given performance. These accounts could have the function I have earlier stressed for interpretations—that of making sense of the object of interpretation, which, in this case, is the original contribution made by the performers. They would do so where they are presented to other audience members or the performers. More often, though, such notices function as reports addressed to people who were not present at the concert and, hence, who cannot test how much sense the accounts make of the events they retell.

Is there one true descriptive interpretation of the performance? This is unlikely for reasons like those in terms of which I denied that there is one true descriptive interpretation of the work.

VI

Where the musician's goal is to play the composer's work, ambiguities in the notation by which that work is conveyed present problems, though these sometimes can be resolved easily enough by allowing that the given work exists in more than one version. Scores, even where they are not ambiguous, always are indefinite about much the performer will do and achieve in sounding out the work. They are so because the works they identify are similarly indefinite. This is not to say that such works are deficient. To the contrary, they are indefinite because they are created for performance. That they can be multiply interpreted is inevitable.

Something similar could be said of works with only one instance such as oil paintings, and of works whose multiple instances are more or less identical, such as printed novels. They, too, lend themselves to multiple descriptive interpretations. But they do not celebrate their interpretability as works created for performance do. The very mode by which the latter are

promulgated, in instructions that underdetermine the concrete details of their realizations, acknowledges and promotes the creative skill required for their rendition. In being designed for multiple and different performances, they are also created for multiple and different interpretations. They cannot be instanced independently of their being interpreted. The possibility of their various interpretations is integral to their nature and value as art.

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