1. The Heraion of Croton (Lacinium).

PYTHAGORAS AND EARLY PYTHAGOREANISM

AN INTERPRETATION OF
NEGLECTED EVIDENCE ON THE PHILOSOPHER
PYTHAGORAS

by

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To those scholars, both of the present and of past generations, who, each in his own way, has contributed essentially to a better understanding of the philosopher Pythagoras.

TO K. VON FRITZ
TO W. K. C. GUTHRIE

To the memory of FRANÇOIS LENORMANT
A. ROSTAGNI
A. DELATTE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The problem

We have all grown up with the idea that very little was to be known about Pythagoras. From contemporary evidence, we saw, he appears as a kind of 'shaman'. And can a shaman be a man of science?

Whatever one might be inclined to say in reply to this question, this much was certain, that the texts in which something like a Pythagorean philosophy of number and numerical proportions appears date from the fourth century B.C., this applying most probably also to the Philolaus texts. Now, whatever may be said, *the fourth century is not the sixth*. And is not this the limit by which we are strictly bound?

One thing that seemed of particular importance was the fact that in his chapter on Pythagorean philosophy in *Metaph.* A Aristotle never mentioned Pythagoras by name. He spoke of 'those who were called Pythagoreans' and of 'the Italian philosophers'. What could this mean other than that even for Aristotle the figure of the historical Pythagoras had vanished into the mist of a remote past? And had anyone remarked that at least in another book Aristotle spoke about Pythagoras mentioning him by name, no doubt we would have answered that there it was the 'shaman' he was dealing with and not the philosopher.

As to the three existing Pythagoras biographies and any later so-called Pythagorean texts, it was obvious that they could not be brought in as 'evidence' at all: they were all under the radical suspicion of being 'Neopythagorean hagiography' or, say, *falsification*.

This, then, was for us the state of the problem, as it is still for many others. And *was it not justified?*

I should like to point out that three things have not been taken into the account.

1. There is the fact that it is part of Aristotle's style, when he is speaking of for instance Plato and his followers, to mention Plato's

name only rarely, even if he is definitely referred to, or the name of any of his successors in particular – say Xenocrates or Speusippus – even if one of these is meant. Aristotle likes to speak of 'these men'[1] or of 'some people'[2], or of 'those who speak of ideas' or 'who posit the existence of ideas'[3]; of 'those who first posited two kinds of numbers'[4], or of 'those who maintain the existence of unchangeable existences'[5].

2. The Pythagorean Society was of such a character that the tradition was most carefully kept, so that a high degree of continuity may be supposed.

3. It is possible that earlier, say 4th century B.C., material is preserved in later sources (the Vitae), while the earlier sources may go back to a still earlier tradition.

It is the scope of this work to inquire into these possibilities and, in the case of positive results, to consider what is implied in this for the reconstruction of the philosopher Pythagoras.

To put it more concretely, it may happen that one day we will come across some passage in a Hellenistic or Roman writer of history, be it Diodorus or Pompeius Trogus, and find a picture there of Pythagoras' arrival at Croton coinciding with a moral break-down; next, a short account of how Pythagoras by repeatedly speaking to the people, at his request gathered together in four different social groups, brought them back to a strict rule of sober living, the women willingly giving up their precious garments, the men dismissing their concubines.

Is that an early sample of Neopythagorean hagiography (→falsification)? Or is it what these first century writers found in the Sicilian historian Timaeus who, writing the history of Southern Italy and Sicily, inquired into the local tradition still alive in those parts? – Next, if sufficient grounds are found to corroborate the substance of the above-cited short account, what then do we learn from this concerning Pythagoras, the man and the philosopher? Granting that the cosmic philosophy of number and numerical ratios, found in fourth or perhaps fifth century texts, had its origin in him, how should we incorporate the social activity of education of the masses into his philosophical personality?

[1] οὗτοι, e.g. 1090 b 2.
[2] οἱ μὲν οὖν φασιν –, 1080 b 11; τινες, e.g. 1084 a 12.
[3] οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας, 1073 a 18; οἱ τὰς ἰδέας τιθέμενοι, e.g. 990 a 34, 1090 a 16 (οἱ τιθέμενοι τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι), 1090 b 20.
[4] οἱ πρῶτοι δύο τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ποιήσαντες, 1090 b 32.
[5] οἱ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λέγοντες, 1091 b 13.

These are our problems. Let us now consider, first, what the evidence is, next what has been done by others about the reconstruction of the philosopher Pythagoras, both in the present and in previous generations.

2. The evidence

There is, first of all, a fragment by Xenophanes[1] that clearly refers to the doctrine of metempsychosis; next, a few lines by Heraclitus[2], who is obviously irritated at Pythagoras' 'polymathy'; some lines by Empedocles, who expresses his deep admiration for a man of unusual wisdom[3]. Add to this a few passages in Herodotus, who knows Pythagoras as a great Sage[4] and places him among the so-called Orphics[5], not to forget Ion of Chios[6], who says that Pythagoras 'wrote some things in verse' and put these in the name of Orpheus – a way of saying that he was the author of one or more Orphic hymns.

We can then pass on to the 4th century. In Plato we find very important evidence about the *way of life* by which the Pythagoreans differed from everybody else (βίος Πυθαγορικός)[7]; also the curriculum of those mathematical subjects which – as is expressly stated – were studied in the school of Pythagoras[8]; finally a praise of 'wise men' – anonymous but clearly referring to the Pythagoreans – who introduced a doctrine of τάξις and κόσμος, an order based on numerical proportions which should serve as norms also in human society[9]. Next there is Isocrates, who talks of Pythagoras' journey to Egypt[10]. We also hear of this in Strabo, who mentions Babylon as well as Egypt. Especially a journey to Babylon is by no means improbable, since recent investigations in the field of the history of mathematics have shown that Pythagoras obtained his knowledge of mathematics from Babylon.

In the second half of the fourth century mention is made of Pythagoras in a few fragments by Heraclides Ponticus[11]; about the prohibition of eating meat and beans; about what he calls 'knowledge of the perfection of the numbers of the soul' (according to Pythagoras

[1] Fr. 7 DK. [2] Fr. 40 and 129 DK.
[3] This fragment (129 DK), in which Pythagoras is not mentioned by name, must almost certainly refer to him.
[4] IV 95. [5] II 123 (an anonymous allusion); cf. IV 95.
[6] Fr. 2 DK. [7] *Resp.* 600 ab. [8] 529 d, 530 d. [9] *Gorg.* 507d-508a.
[10] *Busir.* 11, 28. [11] Fr. 40, 41, 44, 88 and 89 Wehrli.

happiness would have consisted in this); about Pythagoras' various incarnations; and finally about the term *philosophia*, which he introduced. Next we come to our most important witness about Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism: Aristotle. Guthrie rightly points to the importance of this testimony[1], which, however, has only partly been preserved. The brief description of Pythagorean philosophy which is extant in *Met.* A 5 is undoubtedly one-sided, but nevertheless important[2]. In it we are told that through intensive mathematical studies the Pythagoreans came to consider number as being a primary principle (ἀρχή) of the universe: number is the 'essence' of things, things 'resemble' numbers and the elements of numbers are at the same time the elements of all things. This last idea is undoubtedly connected with the opposing principles πέρας and ἄπειρον[3], which are at the head of the table of opposites, handed down in the same chapter. Together with number, 'harmony' is also mentioned by Aristotle as being a fundamental cosmic principle, a doctrine which we find clearly stated in the fragments of Philolaus, which, if they do not date from the fifth century, in any case date back to the fourth century[4].

In the table of opposites, stated in this chapter as being early Pythagorean doctrine, early Pythagoreanism is depicted as a dualistic way of thought[5]. We must undoubtedly look upon this as a reaction to the Milesians and also as the doctrine which, a little later in the sixth century, was strongly opposed by Parmenides.

Furthermore, there is in Aristotle a passage about the cosmology attributed to Philolaus[6]. The famous doctrine of the 'harmony of the spheres' was also handed down by Aristotle[7].

If we add to this fairly ancient description of Pythagorean doctrine

[1] *A history of Greek Phil.* I, p. 215 f.

[2] Guthrie (op. cit., p. 160) has rightly pointed out that the one-sidedness of Aristotle's testimony on the Pythagoreans as we have it is due to gaps in the tradition. Aristotle wrote a monograph on Pythagoras which has not been preserved. The scanty fragments that we have of this work show, however, that in it he did not disregard 'the other side' of Pythagoras' personality and philosophy.

[3] Cf. J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, pp. 126 ff.; Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* pp. 229, 242 ff.; Guthrie, op. cit., pp. 239ff.; 278f.

[4] For the present I will not enter into the question of their authenticity.

[5] Guthrie, p. 249, has rightly confirmed this.

[6] Aristotle refers to it in *Met.* A. 5, 986 a3-12; more explicitly *De Caelo* II 13, 293a 17ff.

[7] *De Caelo* II 9, 290b 12ff.

the fragments handed down in the name of Philolaus[1] and those of Archytas, we have the evidence by which we can say that nowadays most 'progressive' scholars use to construct a picture of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism before Plato. The three *Vitae* of Pythagoras that have been preserved – that by Diogenes Laertius, who certainly used Apollonius of Tyana as one of his sources, and those by Porphyry and Iamblichus – are still considered as belonging rather to the genre of hagiography than to history; and the Pythagorean texts further at our disposal all show such admixture with Platonism, Aristotelism and occasionally Stoic philosophical ideas that their later origin is unmistakable.

From what follows it will be apparent how impossible it is to restrict ourselves to the sources mentioned.

(1) The historian Polybius reports on the events connected with the setting fire to the Pythagoreans' house in Croton about the middle of the 5th century or a little later[2]. The description clearly shows that a whole popular movement was concerned, not only in Croton but throughout Southern Italy, – a movement which had a political background. Polybius obtained his information from the Sicilian historian Timaeus, who wrote the history of Magna Graecia in the second half of the 4th century. Timaeus is a very important witness: he must have known about the tradition concerning the part that Pythagoreans played in politics during the 5th century, and here and there even in the 4th century, from local sources. Polybius' testimony, therefore, is based on reliable authority. It shows us a side of Pythagoras' person and work of which we hear nothing in the above-mentioned sources.

(2) There is archaeological evidence – coins from Croton and other towns in Southern Italy and Sicily – which confirms the political

[1] Guthrie, 330ff., regards the fragments accepted by Diels as being authentic. This would mean that these texts were written in central Greece in the second half of the fifth century. Guthrie is undoubtedly right when he points out that the so-called *five Platonic bodies* were known long before Plato, and that it was not necessary for Philolaus to assume five elements in order to base a cosmogony on the five bodies (Guthrie, op. cit., pp. 267ff.). Nevertheless it seems to me that the fact that Aristotle does not know these texts at all is a serious argument against their authenticity. The hypothesis of Wilamowitz (*Platon* II, pp. 87ff.) that [Philolaus] Π. φύσιος was written in the fourth century (and why not *early* in the fourth century?) in the West by an author unknown to us is therefore still an attractive one.

[2] Text in my *Greek Philosophy* I, nr 47a.

influence of Croton in the time of Pythagoras and the generation after him. We may ask ourselves how this evidence should be interpreted: was it a question of territorial expansion on the part of Croton, of conquest[1], and do we have to imagine that at that time there was a great Crotonian empire centrally governed by the Pythagorean Society[2]? Or was the hegemony of Croton of a different, more modest character? Does the coin-alliance revealed by archeological discoveries mean that Croton had a wide sphere of influence without there being any question of conquest? Should not we rather suppose that Croton as a commercial and maritime power extracted *economic* privileges from the places concerned: landing-rights and permission to use the harbours? Again, was it the Pythagorean Society as such that ruled, or was it rather a certain group in the Society which concerned itself with governmental business? And if the latter was true, have we to suppose that this group formed the βουλή and held governing posts? Or were these Pythagoreans members of the Senate of Croton[3] together with others who did not belong to the Society, and should we suppose that, together with other men, they sometimes held high offices, in the same way as elsewhere in Southern Italy and Sicily Pythagoreans who came from the School at Croton must sometimes have filled important official posts in the towns they came from[4]?

These and similar questions may be asked. They need not be answered merely conjecturally, since there are texts that tell us about the political activities of the Pythagoreans. They are found in later authors, such as Diogenes Laertius and Pompeius Trogus (in Justinus' *Epitome*), but they go back to 4th-century sources: to Timaeus, partly also to Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus[5].

[1] E. L. Minar thinks on these lines. I must say that it seems to me very improbable that Croton should have conquered such places as Tauromenium in Sicily and even remote Himera (with which Croton had a coin-alliance) or a place like Posidonia (Paestum) on the Tyrrhenian Sea.

[2] This was the opinion of U. Kahrstedt, who wrote about the so-called alliance-coins in Hermes LIII (1918), pp. 180ff.

[3] According to Iambl. *V.P.* 45 the Senate of Croton consisted of 1000 members.

[4] This is the view of Von Fritz, *Early Pythagorean Politics*, N.Y. 1940. He puts great stress on the individual character of the political activities of these Pythagoreans: they did not rule *qua* Pythagoreans, he thinks, but were simply chosen for their posts according to the usual method. He compares the position of the Masons in the 18th century: they had considerable political influence but never governed as such.

[5] The texts concerning the 300 are to be found in my *Greek Philosophy* I nr. 21c, and Addit. to the 3rd. ed., p. 344f., nr. 11; in the present volume **T** 47.

(3) These texts do not only tell about the political activities of the Pythagoreans in the more restricted modern sense of the term, i.e. the part they played in the business of government both in their own town and in the surrounding districts. They also refer to what we would rather call the *social* activities of Pythagoras: his teaching to the larger circle of the people of Croton, the way in which he spoke to different groups of the population, a summary of this teaching. They also make some mention of the effect of this preaching, if one wishes to call it so, on his audience[1]. The fact that these things are reported by historians from the 1st century B.C. – so before the 'hagiography' of Apollonius of Tyana and the later writers who used his work –, historians who took their information directly from Timaeus, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus[2], should keep us from doing what so many who have written the history of Greek philosophy have done, that is pass this testimony by. On the contrary, they prompt us to have a closer look at the accounts by the scorned hagiographers, Porphyry and Iamblichus, who have something to say about these things[3].

(4) Some information about the internal organization of the Pythagorean Society – rules pertaining to the entry of new members and the way of life within the Order – also go back to Timaeus. This is demonstrably true, for instance, of the principle κοινὰ τὰ φίλων[4].

(5) The well-known story of Damon and Phintias, told in Iamblichus *V.P.* 235-237, goes back to Aristoxenus. It is also found in Diodorus[5] and is founded on the firmest possible historical basis (since Aristoxenus says that he has often heard Dionysius telling it). What is more important, however, is that this story which happened about the middle of the fourth century, is not isolated. If we want to understand something about Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism we shall have to 'place' it in its historical context, i.e. we shall have to take it from its isolation and understand it in the light of the spiritual background of Pythagorean thought. It is not only a fact, it is a σημεῖον: it refers back to the *thought* of the founder of the Pythagorean Society, the *philosopher* Pythagoras. The available texts definitely enable us to perform this task of placing Pythagoreanism in its historical context

[1] Text of Pompeius Trogus (Justinus): **T** 3.

[2] Pompeius Trogus must in any case have used Timaeus; the Sicilian historian Diodorus must have known Aristoxenus, and probably Dicaearchus as well.

[3] See nrs. 4-6 of my *Additions* (*Greek Philos.* I, 3rd ed., p. 341f.); **T** 6-9.

[4] **T** 20 c, 49.12.

[5] **X** 4.3-6. Cf. **T** 18.

and of interpreting it philosophically. Up to now too little use has been made of these texts.

These few points should suffice to make it clear that it is impossible to confine ourselves to Aristotle and the previous testimonies and Pythagorean texts if we want to reconstruct an acceptable picture of Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism. There were three more important witnesses in the fourth century B.C.: Timaeus, who, just because he was historian of Southern Italy and Sicily, is a very important authority; Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who as a Pythagorean must have been well-informed about the tradition within the School, and Dicaearchus, who as a writer on the cultural history of Greece also took an interest in the Pythagoreans of Magna Graecia. It is impossible to deny the importance of these witnesses. It may be objected, of course, that their works have not come down to us directly. Nevertheless Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus are often quoted by name by Porphyry and Iamblichus. And as to Timaeus, we know that his work was used by all who later on wrote the history, including the cultural history, of these regions; not only by Diodorus and Pompeius Trogus, but also for example by Strabo and Diogenes Laertius when they write about Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. Apollonius of Tyana also used Timaeus. Hence it is possible to find in Porphyry and Iamblichus, who read and used Apollonius' *Life of Pythagoras*, information taken from the Sicilian historian. This can be verified by comparison with other writers who also drew upon him, such as Diodorus and Trogus.

For the fragments of Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus we now have Wehrli's excellent collections; Timaeus' fragments with commentary are in Jacoby, *F.G.H.*, vol. III. Jacoby's opinion of Timaeus as historian is not unfavourable.

3. Interpretations and Source-books

The foundations of the modern critical interpretation of Greek philosophy were laid in Zeller's detailed work. In the German speaking countries it was followed by the three volumes of Th. Gomperz, dating from the end of the 19th century (fourth edition 1922, English translation ²1913-1929) and somewhat later by K. Joël's big volume on the period before Plato (Tübingen 1921). In none of these works has there been a systematic and careful investigation into the source

material after Aristotle for the reconstruction and interpretation of early Pythagoreanism, in particular of the figure of its founder. We are assured that he had 'disappeared into the mists of a distant past' before Aristotle's time, for Aristotle nowhere mentions him by name, but always speaks of 'the Pythagoreans'. This view has been a dogma for generations, and it still survives. All the later source material had been labelled *Neoplatonic apocrypha* by Zeller and was dated as belonging to the first century before and the first century after Christ at the earliest.

The basic collection of source material for Pre-Socratic philosophy was compiled by Hermann Diels; it was published in 1903 and bears all the marks of the above-mentioned view. This is still true of the sixth corrected impression, edited by W. Kranz, 1951. In the Testimonia on Pythagoras (14 A) there is hardly anything about Pythagoras' social and political activities and influence. The fragments of Timaeus are for the most part not mentioned. In 8a we find Porphyry, *V.P.* 18-19, in which Dicaearchus (fr. 29 *F.G.H.*) is quoted: a brief mention of Pythagoras' four speeches to the inhabitants of Croton, and of the foundation of the Societas. One gets the impression, however, that Kranz, who inserted this testimony, hardly took it seriously – the parallels in Pompeius Trogus (Justinus) and Iamblichus *V.P.* 35 ff. are lacking. In 13 he gives texts about Pythagoras' marriage. Here we find Timaeus fr. 78, which tells about Pythagoras' daughter, who as an unmarried girl was a girls' leader, and who later as a married woman was a women's leader. It is obvious, however, that the quotation is not meant to illustrate Pythagoras' social activities, even less as an aid to the understanding of the philosophical background, for it is simply put under the heading of *Personalia*. It is revealing that here Diels only quotes the last line from Justinus, in which we are told that Pythagoras' house in Metapontum was turned into a temple. From Iamblichus D.-K. only quotes *V.P.* 248-257 (about the catastrophe) in this section, as well as Polybius II 38.

In the section *Pythagoreische Schule*, fifth century (58), D.-K. gives under A the testimonies in Aristotle, under C and D various groups of 'related texts'. Under C ('Ακούσματα καὶ σύμβολα) we find Iamblichus, *V.P.* 82-86; under D (from Aristoxenus) Iamblichus *V.P.* 163 ff. (on Pythagorean medicine and music), *V.P.* 137 (on the general trend of the Pythagorean life; Delatte, who has important remarks about this, *Litt. pyth.* p. 296, is not quoted), *V.P.* 173 ff. (that in controlling human nature one must start with the gods; next follow state, law and

justice; that anarchy is the greastest evil and that traditions must be preserved.) Cf. Aristoxenus fr. 19 (from Stob.) and 18. Next we find Iamblichus, *V.P.* 233-239: on friendship (in these chapters is the story of Damon and Phintias, and the story of the Pythagorean who was taken ill on a journey), 200-213 (various ethical injunctions, in the first place that one should not take any notice of the opinions of the masses), and 230-233 (do away with rivalry in friendship; and always keep one's trust).

All this is carefully separated from Pythagoras. Moreover, some important passages are lacking, for instance, 229 f., and the parallels that could be cited. It is clear that the compiler of the *Fragmente*, also in their later form, did not consider these Pythagorean texts of any importance for obtaining an insight into the real basis of Pythagorean philosophy. There is a certain unmistakable arbitrariness in all this. Why, for example, is Timaeus fr. 78 cited among the testimonies on Pythagoras, but not fr. 77 (on the organisation of the Pythagorean Society)? Why only include the brief mention of the four speeches in Porphyry and not the parallel tests in Iamblichus and in Pompeius Trogus? If the reply is: "because Dicaearchus is quoted in Porphyry by name", then my answer is: is it then so certain that the text of the four speeches found in Iamblichus does not go back to Timaeus? And would it, from this point of view, not have been worth while to acquaint the user of a source book with these texts? And finally, do the texts on the purport of Pythagorean life, on friendship and on certain ethical injunctions not provide any information about Pythagoras? If it be answered: "in the form in which we have them they definitely do not go back to Pythagoras himself; we do not know what exactly he taught", my objections are not answered. For, why mention Porphyry 18 with its brief report of the four speeches and the founding of the Society? And who can state with any certainty that the contents of Iamblichus *V.P.* 137, 173 ff. and 229-239 are not of a very early date? If these texts are attributed to the Pythagoreans of the fifth century, is it then impossible that they should have preserved a school-tradition going back to the founder?

Meanwhile, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the work of J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* had appeared, a book that has often been reprinted and may be regarded as the foundation of a glorious tradition in the English-speaking countries. The great work recently started by Guthrie may be regarded as the ripe fruit of this tradition. Burnet distinguished two aspects in early Pythagoreanism: on the

one hand it bears the marks of a primitive religion, on the other hand it studied mathematical science – primitive taboos by the side of scientific principles. In the later history of the School these two lines have their own development: the 'acousmaticians' were the religious who preserved the early traditions, the 'mathematicians' (Aristoxenus was one of them) formed 'the more enlightened sect of the Order'. Burnet finds examples of primitive taboos in the *Vitae* of Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry and Iamblichus; the moralizing interpretation is of later date. This may be largely true – later writers did apply themselves to interpreting certain taboo injunctions of early Pythagoreanism allegorically – it should be pointed out, however, that Burnet had no eye for the *ethico*-religious character of the βίος founded by Pythagoras and for the essential connection of this aspect with the so-called scientific principles. He was guided by the essentially correct principle that 'what is most primitive is earliest in date'. Conclusion: what is most primitive must have belonged to early Pythagoreanism. Put like this, it is logically correct. If, however, it is concluded that *ergo* anything that is *not* primitive can*not* be attributed to the founder, one makes a logical mistake. There are no premisses to base *this* conclusion on.

In 1915 A. Delatte published his important study on Pythagorean Literature[1]. It was followed, in 1922, by his *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne*, and at the same time by a detailed examination of the sources of the Life of Pythagoras by Diogenes Laertius[2]. Delatte's studies are still of fundamental importance as inquiries into the sources. At about the same time as Rostagni, on whom I shall speak further on, and together with him Delatte was the first to go a way of his own in this matter. He recognized that much in the later Vitae is based on reliable sources, dating from the fourth century B.C. He argued that there must have been current a Ἱερὸς λόγος of Pythagoras which was ancient as to content, and which, although it need not have been put into writing by the founder of the Society himself, must have been recorded in his immediate circle in the fifth century, in all probability *in the first half of the fifth century*, when unity in the Order was still intact. The traces that have been preserved show that mixture of

[1] A. Delatte, *Etudes sur la Littérature Pythagoricienne*. Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes etudes, sect. philol. 217, Paris 1915.

[2] *La vie de Pythagore de Diogène Laerce*. Edition critique avec introd. et commentaire par A. Delatte. Acad. Royale de Belgique, Classes des lettres et de sciences morales et pol. Mémoires, 2ième série, T. XVIII, Bruxelles 1922.

primitive, religio-ethical and scientific elements which must have co-existed paecefully in early Pythagoreanism but which caused a schism as early as the second half of the fifth century. Finally Delatte clearly recognized the social-political character of Pythagoras' activity in Croton. He examined the Pythagorean political writings that have come down in the name of Archytas and others, found that the tradition regarding the speeches attributed to Pythagoras by Iamblichus goes back to reliable fourth-century sources, and that their contents have parallels in the earliest-known Pythagorean texts or those that are related to Pythagoreanism (Archytas and Alcmaeon). He assumes that the essence of the contents of these speeches goes back to early Pythagoreanism and argues for the authenticity of the work Περὶ νόμω καὶ δικαιοσύνας attributed to Archytas.

What Delatte did not realize, however, is the unity of Pythagoras' thought. He regards the Ἱερὸς λόγος as a complex of heterogeneous elements: philosophy, morals and rules of communal life. The connexion between these three escapes him. Pythagoras 'attempted', he says, to connect Orphicism and philosophy, because he had a certain affinity to both: "Entre les Orphiques et les Philosophes, il a oscillé". The doctrine of number and harmony is a philosophical doctrine. That the philosopher as such was bound to apply these principles, established as a divine order in the cosmos, also to man and society, in other words that, as a matter of fact, Pythagoras' thought was one all-embracing philosophical conception, that is what Delatte failed to see.

Strangely enough, others, too, have failed to integrate the results of Delatte's work, in so far as these laid more stress on Pythagoras' social and political activities, into the total picture of his personality as a philosopher. Almost twenty years were to pass before, in another part of the world, attention began to be devoted to this aspect of early Pythagoreanism, in the studies by K. von Fritz (New York 1940) and E. L. Minar (Baltimore 1942), which both were concerned with early Pythagorean politics[1]. These scholars clearly recognized that our knowledge of the social-political aspect of early Pythagoreanism is based on a solid foundation. Von Fritz included the archaeological material of the coins in his investigation of the literary sources and he subjected Kahrstedt's results to a critical examination. But for him, too, 'Pythagorean politics' is a separate chapter, obviously

[1] K. von Fritz, *Pythagorean politics in Southern Italy*, N.Y. 1940. E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean politics in practice and theory*, Baltimore 1942.

standing apart from philosophy. Minar concludes from the same material that Pythagoras was 'rather a shrewd politician', an aristocratic reactionary at a time of rising democracy – and that all this had nothing to do with philosophy.

Italian scholars have taken a lively interest in Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism. It was A. Rostagni who, in two lectures to the Academy of Sciences at Torino in 1914, laid the foundation of the chronology of Pythagoras' life and of the Pythagorean School till the early fourth century[1]. Later scholars, such as Delatte, Von Fritz and Minar, start from this basis[2]. In a later study, publised in 1922[3], Rostagni dealt with the four speeches attributed to Pythagoras in Iamblichus *V.P.* Struck by a certain similarity of ideas between the Pythagoras speeches and Gorgias, he found that the notion of καιρός, which had such an important place in the thought of the rhetor of Leontini, was of Pythagorean origin and apparently goes back to Pythagoras himself. Moreover, Rostagni defends the theory that Pythagoras actually was the founder of *the art of rhetoric*, as stated by Iamblichus, an assertion which till now has hardly been taken seriously. This study of Rostagni deserves careful attention, especially as it seems to have been little read.

[1] A. Rostagni, *La vita e l'opera di Pitagora secondo Timeo*, in Atti dell' Accad. di Scienze di Torino, vol. XL, 1914, pp. 373-395; and *Le vicende della scuela pitagorica secondo Timeo*, in the same volume, pp. 554-574. Both papers were reprinted in Rostagni's *Scritti minori*, II 1, Torino 1956, pp. 1-50.

[2] It should be observed here that Rostagni's results, however well founded, were on no account as new as the author and those who followed him seem to suppose. After all, the reproach made by Rostagni, that Lenormant was deprived of all sense of criticism (he calls 'l'esposizione di F. Lenormant priva d'ogni lume di critica') was unjust. Lenormant's work is written in a different style: it is not written as a 'technical' treatise, with precise references to sources, but as a literary work. Nevertheless the whole picture of Pythagoras and his school drawn in those pages is based on a careful and thoroughly critical study of the literary, archaeological as well as topographical evidence. Moreover, Lenormant's results are on no account so different from Rostagni's as the latter's rather fierce rejection of his French predecessor's work would suggest. On those points where Lenormant's chronology differs from Rostagni's it is always on some disputable question, where it is clear enough to the insider what evidence the French author drew upon.

[3] A. Rostagni, *Un nuovo capitolo nella storia della retorica e della sofistica*, in *Studi Italiani di Filologica Classica*, N.S. II 1922, pp. 148-201. *Scritti minori* I, Torino 1955, pp. 1-49. Cp. also the same author's study *Aristotele e l'Aristotelismo nella storia dell' Estetica antica*, in the same review, p. 55f. (*Scritti minori* I, p. 135f.).

Another work by the same author, *Il verbo di Pitagora*, Torino 1924, examines Ovid, *Metam.* XV, and finds in it the traces of a 'Ιερὸς λόγος of Pythagoras (not written down by himself, but recorded by pupils). Rostagni has called attention to a number of interesting problems, but in discussing Pythagorean texts he did not always recognize the characteristics of later thought, even where they are clearly discernible. What he is concerned with in this volume is the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, of nature and God, not with the social-political aspect of early Pythagoreanism.

In Mondolfo and V. Capparelli also we find little attention devoted to this side.

There was a clear reaction against the one-sided philosophical treatment of Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism immediately after the second world war. It came from two sides: (1) in O. Gigon's work, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie* (1945); (2) in Werner Jaeger's *Theology of the early Greek philosophers* (1947). These two authors have rightly pointed out that the pre-Socratic philosophers were by no means so exclusively natural philosophers as Aristotle's name οἱ φυσικοί seems to suggest; more particularly in Pythagoras the ethical-religious element must have been considerable. Gigon regards the transmigration of souls as central in Pythagoras' doctrine. He also recognizes its ethical implications and the development of 'cathartics', both in medical and in musical science. He admits the fact of the influence of the Pythagoreans in the political sphere. However, it is impossible to say anything in detail about this, for are we not already in the inextricable forest of the second half of the fourth century where Academic and Peripatetic concepts are inseparably mingled with Pythagoreanism?

In England, J.E. Raven[1] followed the lead given by Burnet and Cornford: he investigated more closely the connexions with the Milesians on the one side, and with the Eleatics on the other. It is again clearly the natural-philosophical aspect that is the centre of interest. This is also true of the source-book by Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 1957.

Mrs. Timpanaro-Cardini published at Firenze, in 1958, the first volume of her *Pitagorici*, Testimonianze e Frammenti, which contains the testimonies concerning Pythagoras. This collection presents nothing strikingly new after Diels. There is a note to Porphyry *V.P.*

[1] *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, Cambridge 1948.

18[1] stating that Pythagoras' speeches in Iamblichus *V.P.* 37-57 show 'an alteration of the tradition' and an 'amplificazione oratoria evidentemente posteriore'. A different view is quite possible. It is not necessary to suppose that Iamblichus changed the tradition arbitrarily. It is much more likely that he found the speeches in Timaeus, and it is by no means evident that the order of the speeches which Porphyry found reported in Dicaearchus is to be preferred. Delatte thought that the speeches in form date from the fifth or fourth century. 'Il est évident', he says[2], 'que nous nous trouvons ici en face d'une publication de quelque Pythagoricien du Ve ou du IVe siècle. Il avait imaginé cette fiction et choisi cette forme littéraire pour exposer les doctrines morales de sa Confrérie et présenter à ses coréligionaires des modèles de discours moraux'. Delatte assumes that the contents of the preaching are early Pythagorean.

Robert Joly, who belongs to the school of Delatte, goes a step further: the speeches date from the fifth century and were written by Gorgias – which in itself is not such a bad idea, for it was indeed typical of Gorgias to write 'speeches by Pythagoras'. However, it might well be asked whether, if he had done this, the speeches would not have come down to us in his name, as is the case with his *Helena*, *Palamedes* and *Epitaphios*. Only a thorough stylistic analysis will enable us to answer the question either in the affirmative or in the negative.

As against the bold thesis of Joly – who also maintains that the term φιλοσοφία, if not introduced by Pythagoras himself, was certainly used in the circle of his pupils, and that it was in this circle that in the fifth century the ideal of the βίος θεωρητικός developed[3] – there is the cautious but sceptic work of W. Burkert, who prefers to keep to demonstrable fact. When taking this view one can evidently only say that for the tradition of Pythagoras being the 'Urheber' of φιλοσοφία we have to rely on Heraclides Ponticus; that the term occurs earlier, it is true, but in a wider sense, and that the technical sense cannot be shown to occur before Plato[4]. All the same it is of course quite *possible*

[1] M. Timpanaro-Cardini, *Pitagorici* I p. 42 sub 8a.

[2] *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* p. 39.

[3] Robert Joly, *Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique*. Acad. royale de Belgique, Cl. d. Lettres et sc. mor. et pol. Mém. in 8°, 51.3, Bruxelles 1956.

[4] Walter Burkert, *Platon oder Pythagoras?* Zum Ursprung des Wortes 'Philosophie'. Hermes 1960, pp. 159-177. Not long afterwards the same author published a larger work: *Weisheit u. Wissenschaft*, Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos u. Platon, Tübingen 1962.

that before Socrates and Plato the word was used in a very special sense in Pythagorean circles. It cannot be said that fifth-century use of the word in general militates against this view[1].

I called Guthrie's *History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. I, published at Cambridge in 1962, a ripe fruit of the English tradition. This sufficiently indicates the high quality of the work, but at the same time a certain limitation. There are certain aspects of investigation with which the author has not concerned himself, certain insights which he has failed to attain, and a part of the literature whose importance he has not recognized. (I am only referring to the chapter on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans). Guthrie is a historian of religion, and it was to be expected that he would treat the doctrine of metempsychosis and the Pythagorean 'taboos' from this point of view. And so he does. His 'Outline of Pythagorean philosophy', in which, as I myself have done in *Greek Philosophy* I, he starts from Porphyry *V.P.* 19, begins with these doctrines and discusses them in detail. Ethical-religious aspirations came first for Pythagoras, we are assured by Guthrie; 'nevertheless' his doctrine of number and harmony was of scientific importance. This doctrine, which Aristotle was the first to describe, is then discussed in detail and very well, with occasional interesting personal insights. Rightly Plato's *Timaeus* is used to illustrate the Pythagorean theory of mathematical proportions in the cosmos.

Has Guthrie recognized and understood the unity of Pythagorean thought – or, as we may safely put it, of *Pythagoras'* thought and teaching? One might have expected this. He has clearly seen that for the philosopher of Croton the 'purification' of the soul, a term also used by the Orphics, is attained by study and rational insight, i.e. by understanding the numerical proportions in the universe. Since the cosmic order is a divine order, man has to imitate it in his own life. Guthrie has also clearly recognized that these principles are to be found in Plato: in *Gorgias* 507 e, in *The Republic* (e.g. 550 c, 525 b, 527 b, 529 d), and in the *Timaeus* (47 b-c). He probably would not dissociate the social-political aspect of Plato's philosophy from the core of Plato's philosophical thought. In the chapter on Pythagoras,

[1] Burkert is quite right when he points out that neither in Hrd. I 30 (about Solon who φιλοσοφέων travelled through many countries), nor in Gorgias, *Helena* 13 (where mention is made of φιλοσόφων λόγων ἅμιλλαι, denoting 'die eigentlich sophistischen Redewettkämpfe'), nor in Thuc. II 40 (φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας) the term is used in a 'technical sense'. I shall deal with this argument in VI 1 (pp. 100 ff.).

however, we find a few words devoted to the political activity and influence of this thinker in the section dealing with his life. We are assured that Pythagoras was undoubtedly "a religious and political leader *as well as* a philosopher".

Anyone expressing himself in these terms suggests that the two first-mentioned things have no concern with philosophical thought, – which means that the unity which existed for Pythagoras is lacking in the modern interpretation. Why should this be?

There are, it seems to me, two reasons for this. In the first place, like so many, Guthrie argues from a modern concept of school philosophy: though he does see that in Pythagoras' complex personality the element of scientific thought was not separated from the ethical-religious element, yet the 20th century English scholar cannot grasp the unity of the two in one philosophical conception that comprehends both the whole of cosmic and of human existence, so that the social and political activities organically flow from the very centre of the philosophical thought. For the modern scholar 'politics' stand apart from 'philosophy'.

Secondly, of course Guthrie knows quite well that there are more fourth-century sources for Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans then Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle. He also mentions Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus and Timaeus, but he makes the reservation that their testimony is at best hardly 'audible' to us because it has come down to us through later and often late writings. To cite but one example, he never proceeds to examine the speeches of Pythagoras mentioned in Diodorus, Pompeius Trogus and Iamblichus. All this is simply left aside. Neither is reference made to Delatte's important investigations into this matter, or to Rostagni's highly stimulating treatment of the speeches.

In doing so the author in his turn has not escaped from the charge of a certain arbitrariness. It is not true that for us uncertainty begins only after Aristotle, nor can it be said that everything that is later does not offer anything solid enough from which conclusions may be drawn with any likelihood. Indeed, Guthrie himself is occasionally by no means averse to making a very bold conjecture: he is even willing to assume that Pythagoras himself engraved certain old Croton coins. For *who* else could have done so at that time but he, the son of an engraver who, as was the custom in those times, will have learnt the craft from his father?

This hypothesis was put forward by Saltman, in Guthrie's immediate

circle. Even if no definite objections could be made – which I do not wish to discuss at this stage – we might feel bound to say that other possibilities have too easily been left out of account[1].

While thus, with some very few exceptions, the philologist-historians of ancient philosophy took great pains to pass by the testimony about Pythagoras' activities in Croton, based on fourth-century sources, the opposite was happening among archaeologists. The first to explore Magna Graecia from an archaeological point of view was François Lenormant. In the second volume of his great work *La Grande Grèce*, published in 1881, we find an important and surprising chapter: *Crotone et le Pythagorisme*. Lenormant is fully conversant with the source material and makes a sensible and sober use both of the archaeological evidence (the coins) and of the historians who go back to the fourth century. The picture he gives of the philosopher Pythagoras and of his activities in Croton shows precisely that integration of the historical data into the philosophical personality of the thinker which is usually lacking in the accounts given by the historians of Greek philosophy. I do not hesitate to say that in this case the archaeologist has shown a deeper understanding.

I quote the following passage to show how François Lenormant understood the real meaning of Pythagoras' thought.

> "L'originalité de Pythagore, la nouveauté de l'œuvre qu'il osa entreprendre consista en ce qu'il tenta le premier d'embrasser dans un même système tout ce que l'on avait jusqu'alors essayé séparément, de coordonner en une vaste conception encyclopédique puissamment enchaînée dans toutes ses parties et déduite de quelques principes fondamentaux, l'ensemble des choses matérielles et morales. Métaphysique, physique, science, religion, liturgie, morale, législation, et politique, la doctrine pythagoricienne englobait tout, ramenait tout à ses principes établissant entre ces choses diverses un lien étroit, les faisant découler les unes des autres, de manière à les concilier, en une sorte d'harmonieuse symphonie à la fois théorique et pratique. Et afin d'assurer le succès de son œuvre, de donner à sa doctrine plus d'efficacité pour rendre les hommes meilleurs, ce qui était son but principal, il eut l'idée véritablement de génie d'emprunter à l'Orient le principe de l'ascétisme, que les Grecs avaient jusqu'alors ignoré, dont ils n'avaient pas compris la force".

[1] On Saltman's hypothesis see below, p. 54.

Quite rightly Lenormant describes Pythagoras' activity not as having been confined to the foundation of a kind of monastic order but as a *popular mission:* a preaching which was addressed to the population of Croton as a whole and which met with a tremendous response. Thus Pythagoreanism was a real spiritual *réveil.* It is against this background that Pythagoras' political influence must be seen and understood. Lenormant interprets the historical data better than Kahrstedt and Minar did after him, even better than Von Fritz.

But let us examine the data ourselves and test the conclusions.

CHAPTER II

SOME DATES CONCERNING PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREAN SOCIETY

In Iamblichus, *V.P.* 11-19 it is reported that Pythagoras began his studies under Thales and Anaximander, and that he visited Pherecydes. He is 18 years old when he goes to study outside Samos. After four years he goes to Egypt where he spends 22 years. As a prisoner-of-war he comes to Babylon under Cambyses and there studies with the magicians. After twelve years he returns to Samos. He is then 56 years of age. After a few years, during which he tried to establish a school in Samos[1] and also visited Sparta and Crete[2], he left Samos for good, shortly after 430, to settle in Croton. He stayed there for twenty years. Then he retired to Metapontum where he lived for another nineteen years[3].

The concise biographical sketch in Pompeius Trogus (Justinus, *Epitome* XX 4) gives us little aid in establishing the chronology. This brief summary does, however, describe Pythagoras' life in the main as we find it described in Iamblichus: according to Trogus, too, Pythagoras studied under Anaximander, went on journeys to Egypt and Babylon and then visited Sparta and Crete to study their legislation; he, too, describes Pythagoras' activities in Croton as a successful popular mission (we shall have to return to this point because of

[1] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 21-24, tells a delightful story, which is our earliest example of 'study wages': When Pythagoras does not get any pupils he recruits in the gymnasium a young man who is very fond of sport but poor. Pythagoras promises the boy that he shall enable him to practise his sport provided that he is willing to become his pupil for a short time. He proceeds to teach him geometry – and pays him 3 obols per figure. Until he has spent all his money... But then the student says that he would like to learn without wages. "But I can't give you your meals any longer", says the teacher, "for I haven't any food for myself". Then the student undertakes to see to the finances and pays Pythagoras 3 obols per figure.

[2] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 25.

[3] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 265.

agreement with other sources); like Diogenes Laertius, he also refers to the ἑταιρεία of 300. Trogus does not state, however, for how long Pythagoras was away on his journeys nor how long he stayed in Metapontum. It is therefore hardly possible to conclude – as has been done by some scholars – that, because of its agreement with Justinus' *Epitome* xx 4, Iamblichus *V.P.* 11-19, 25 and 265 must go back to Timaeus. One can, however, assuming that 529 was probably the year in which Pythagoras settled in Croton[1], reconstruct a chronology, the individual points of which can then be tested by comparison with other data. This chronology, which was first defended by Rostagni[2] and most recently critically examined by Von Fritz[3], is given below as a basis for further investigation.

589	birth of Pythagoras
571-567	years of study
567-545	stay in Egypt
545-533	Babylon
533-529	Samos; journeys to Sparta and Crete
529-509	Croton
509-490	Metapontum
490	Pythagoras' death

The first objection made to this chronology is that, according to Timaeus, fr. 81, Empedocles 'heard' Pythagoras. This is impossible if Pythagoras died in 490. If one sticks to the maximum age of 'nearly 100 years old', mentioned by Iamblichus, this objection can be answered by reducing the length of Pythagoras' stay in Egypt and Babylon considerably. Indeed, there is another good reason for doing this: it is improbable that Pythagoras should have undertaken a completely new task in another part of the then civilized world when he stood 'on the threshold of old age'. It is much more likely that he was some twenty years younger when he came to Croton. This entails the correction that he must have been born c. 570 and lived till c. 470 at the latest. This was in fact assumed by Delatte.

It is *a priori* not impossible that Pythagoras should have lived to the age of nearly 100. However, three things should be pointed out: 1. our sources are by no means in agreement with regard to the age

[1] Maintained by Rostagni, Atti della R. Acc. delle Scienze di Torino, 1914, pp. 376 ff.

[2] Op. cit., pp. 373ff., 554ff.

[3] *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy*, N.Y. 1940. Ch. III.

of 100 [1]; 2. it would seem improbable that Empedocles (whose *floruit* is put in 444), as a boy of 14 at most and living in Akragas, should have met and have been inspired by the aged philosopher who for years had led a retired life in Metapontum; 3. but is it really very probable that, after his activities in Croton had come to an end, the famous philosopher should have lived in retirement in Metapontum for nearly 40 years? We hear nothing about this, not even in those accounts that fail to mention that Pythagoras died a few years after the attack of Cylon c.s.

To start with this last point, the reports which we have about Pythagoras' end are of two kinds. In the first place there are accounts which do not give a single detail about his death; besides this there are one or two reports in which his end *is* described. To the former belongs the report in Iamblichus 249. All it says is that, on account of persistent and bitter hostility, Pythagoras "left Croton for Metapontum and is said to have died there" (κἀκεῖ λέγεται καταστρέψαι τὸν βίον). What follows deals with the *continued* hostility of the party of Cylon (οἱ Κυλώνειοι λεγόμενοι) towards the Pythagoreans who, however, succeeded in holding their own and continued to enjoy the confidence of the neigbouring cities, ὥστε ὑπ'ἐκείνων οἰκονομεῖσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας. Until the final attack came: the setting fire to the synedrion in Croton. The meaning of this is clear enough to the unbiassed reader: the *continuation* of the hostility is that *after Pythagoras had died*. And the report rather suggests that this καταστρέψαι τὸν βίον occurred fairly soon after the first catastrophe.

"This is reported by Aristoxenus", Iamblichus concludes[2], and he follows it up with a variant of Nicomachus, who is in complete agreement with Aristoxenus, except that he himself says that at the time of the attack by Cylon, Pythagoras was not in Croton but on Delos, in order to nurse Pherecydes. This is also found in Porph., *V.P.* 54 (from Neanthes). It is disputed by Dicaearchus (in Porph. 56): he points out that Pherecydes had already died before Pythagoras came to Croton.

Iamblichus' third account also belongs to the category in which Pythagoras' end is not described in detail. It is the rather detailed account of Apollonius of Tyana[3], which goes back to Timaeus but, as

[1] In Diogenes Laertius VIII 44 it is stated that he lived to the age of 80 according to Heraclides, son of Serapion, and to 90 'according to most'.
[2] *V.P.* 251.
[3] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 254-264.

was rightly noted by Minar, does not fully report his text[1]. This account tells us about the division of the land of captured Sybaris: in the absence of Pythagoras the party in power allotted this land only to the propertied class, which caused a violent democratic reaction. This reaction turned, naturally enough, against Pythagoras. "On doit, du reste, dégager la mémoire du philosophe de toute responsabilité personnelle dans cette décision (sc. du Sénat de Croton) aussi blamable qu'insensée. S'il avait été présent, dirigeant lui-même son parti, il est probable qu'il l'en aurait détourné, car elle devait blesser son sentiment profond d'équité, son ferme bon sens et son mépris pour les appétits matériels". Thus François Lenormant in 1881[2]. There are good grounds for his opinion in the texts. It is an interesting counterpart to Minar who regards Pythagoras as a reactionary politician, by no means disinterested in material gain for his own class. We shall return to this. The passage has nothing to say about the end of Pythagoras.

The second category mainly comprises two accounts of Pythagoras' death, both reported by Dicaearchus and quoted by Porphyry[3] as well as Diogenes Laertius[4]. According to the first account Pythagoras, who had fled to Metapontum at the revolt of Cylon, took refuge in the temple of the Muses and died of starvation after having passed nearly 40 days without any food. "Others", says Porphyry, "tell that, when the house in which they were assembled was set on fire, the friends saved the master by forming a barrier against the fire with their bodies; but that he, left all by himself, did not wish to go on living and put an end to his own life."[5] Diogenes Laertius cites Heraclides in his Epitome of the lives of Satyros as the authority for this version, and reports how Pythagoras, having taken refuge in Metapontum, put an end to his life there by ἀσιτία, μὴ βουλόμενον περαιτέρω ζῆν.

However this may be, both versions suggest that the death of the philosopher occurred not long after the revolt of Cylon. And this is, in itself, not improbable. I can therefore understand very well why Lenormant dates Pythagoras' death in 503.

To sum up, we arrive at the following conclusions: 1. Pythagoras was probably born about 570. 2. He settled in Croton about 530/29. 3. As to the year of his death there are three possibilities: either he died about 470 at the age of about 100 (this on the authority of

[1] Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics*, pp. 54 ff., in particular p. 58.
[2] *La Grande Grèce* II, p. 88. [3] *V.P.* 57. [4] VIII 40.
[5] ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου ἐξαγαγεῖν.

Iamblichus), or in 490 (on the authority of the same author, who states that Pythagoras stayed in Croton for 19 years), or finally, fairly shortly after the attack of Cylon, towards the end of the sixth century. I must say that this last possibility seems to me the most probable one, while at the same time agreeing most with the accounts in the various extant *vitae*. The fact that this implies the rejection of some of Iamblichus' statements is no serious objection. More than one of Iamblichus' statements have to be rejected in any case as being either inaccurate or improbable.

For the sake of clearness I give a corrected scheme.

c. 570 birth of Pythagoras
558-554 years of study
554-533 stay in Egypt and Babylon
533-529 Samos; journeys to Sparta and Crete
529-509 Croton
509-{503 / 490} Metapontum

However this may be, it is a fact that the Pythagorean Society, and consequently the dominant influence of the Pythagoreans on political life in Southern Italy, survived till the middle of the fifth century. The catastrophe mentioned in Polybius II 39, the destruction by fire of the synedrion and the political disturbances throughout Southern Italy can be assigned with certainty to that period. Lysis, who is named as one of the two survivors[1], lived at this time; the alliance coins, proof of the hegemony of Croton, at this time give way to coins belonging to the various cities themselves.

According to Iamblichus *V.P.* 250, the Pythagorean influence in Southern Italy came to an end after Milo's house in Croton had been burnt: ἐπαύσαντο τῆς ἐπιμελείας οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι; i.e. this was the end of their social-political activities. Diogenes Laertius VIII 39 and Porphyry *V.P.* 55 also mention the setting fire to the house of Milo – 'the athlete', Porphyry adds for the sake of clarity – where the Pythagoreans were assembled. The tradition in fact knows Milo as one of Pythagoras' followers[2]. As, however, it also mentions in this context the escape of Archippus and Lysis, it is apparent that there has been some confusion here between the events of the year 509 and those of

[1] Iamblichus *V.P.* 249-250 names Archippus and Lysis; so does Porphyry *V.P.* 58. [2] Iamblichus *V.P.* 104, 267; Strabo 263.

some sixty years later. To which of the two catastrophes should the next report in Iamblichus (from Aristoxenus) of the ἐπαύσαντο τῆς ἐπιμελείας be taken to refer?

The evidence of the coins shows that it was not the year 509 which was the end of the hegemony of Croton. As this lasted till the middle of the fifth century it is probable that the events in Croton in 509 did not bring about a marked change in the political situation in Southern Italy.

The delightful story about Pythagoras, who after being expelled from Croton goes to Locri but is politely requested by the local authorities on the boundary of their territory to go elsewhere, because the Locrians were satisfied with their own laws[1], is characteristic of the Pythagorean ἐπιμέλεια in general, but does not argue for a general rejection of these activities throughout Southern Italy. Indeed, in Iamblichus 250 reference is made to an ὀλιγωρία τῶν πόλεων: "For although the Pythagoreans (in Croton) had been hit by such a terrible disaster, they were not concerned about it", i.e. they did not give them any aid.

Iamblichus mentions as a second cause why the ἐπιμέλεια of the Pythagoreans came to an end the fact that the chief leaders had died. This is followed by the statement that Archippus and Lysis were the only survivors. This points, however, to the events of about 450. And as it was at this time that the neighbouring places did in fact break away from the political domination of Croton, we may well ask ourselves whether the ὀλιγωρία τῶν πόλεων should not be taken to refer to the time of the later catastrophe. According to Porphyry (Dicaearchus), however, Locri was not an isolated case: Pythagoras turned successively to Caulonia, Locri and Tarentum, and had the same experiences everywhere[2], until he found a refuge – or, according to many, met with his death in Metapontum. "For everywhere there were serious political disturbances about which the people of these regions still talk today, calling them the troubles from the time of the Pythagoreans"[2].

This last report, coming from Dicaearchus, makes me a little suspicious. Is it really very probable that towards the end of the fourth century the people of that region should have remembered and talked about political quarrels of *two centuries* ago? It is conceivable

[1] Porphyry *V.P.* 56 (from Dicaearchus).
[2] In Porphyry, loc. cit.

that they remembered the so important events of the middle of the *preceding* century. It is true that there will have been no personal witnesses in the days of Dicaearchus, but those who were alive then may have heard about these events from their parents. Oral tradition may live for over a century. Did not we ourselves, when we were children, hear from our mothers legends about 'the court of King Louis'[1]?

Yet it seems to me quite well possible that after the revolt of Cylon towards the end of the sixth century there was roundabout Croton a certain animosity towards the Pythagoreans. Though certainly the case of Locri was not representative for the whole of Southern Italy[2], it is quite possible that Caulonia and Tarentum did not come under Pythagorean influence until a few years later. We have alliance-coins from Caulonia dating from the first half of the fifth century[3].

However this may be, the year 509 evidently does not mark the end of Pythagorean influence. Not until 450-40 is there a large-scale democratic reaction in Southern Italy and a break-away from Croton.

The account in Iamblichus (still *V.P.* 250) is contradictory:

1. They (the Pythagoreans) perished, all but two, i.e. Archippus, who went to Tarentum, and Lysis who escaped to Central Greece.
2. "The remaining Pythagoreans left Italy, except Archytas of Tarentum..."[4].

Are we to suppose that a group did escape after all, and that they fled to Sicily and settled in Rhegium later on? Archytas, however, who in 362 was head of the government in Tarentum, can hardly have been born by 450. It is not improbable that this is another instance of chronological confusion, and that the departure of the Pythagoreans from Southern Italy mentioned by Iamblichus in this context, did not take place until towards the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the fourth century.

In any case a group of Pythagoreans seems to have survived the catastrophe in Croton, for our text continues: "And assembled at Rhegium they stayed there together". Then follows an unfinished

[1] Louis Napoleon, 1806-1810.

[2] Cf. T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks*, p. 356.

[3] Cf. Colin M. Kraay, Caulonia and South-Italian problems, in *The Numismatic Chronicle*, London 1960, pp. 53ff. The coins show the tripod of Croton with the inscription KAYΛ.

[4] οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀπέστησαν τῆς Ἰταλίας, πλὴν Ἀρχύτου τοῦ Ταραντίνου (Deubner p. 134, 22).

sentence: "In the course of time, however, and when the political situation deteriorated"... This is immediately followed by the list of prominent Pythagoreans whom Aristoxenus knew. Among them there is at least one well-known to us: Echecrates, the companion of Phaedo, who was present at Socrates' death as a young man of perhaps 18.

According to Delatte the missing part of the sentence ran to the effect that the Pythagoreans in Rhegium after some time regained some influence. This is not impossible. None the less, since the story seems to have ended in the departure of all the Pythagoreans from Italy with the exception of Archytas, is it not more probable that something like 'they could not stay any longer' is missing?[1] The final exodus might have happened either towards the end of the fifth or in the early fourth century.

An argument for the earlier date is the fact that at the time of Socrates' death Philolaus had apparently been living in Thebes for several years and had his pupils there. Von Fritz[2] adduced as a decisive argument in favour of the later date that in the years immediately preceding the conquest of Southern Italy by Dionysius I (388) there must have been an atmosphere of political threat in these regions, which will have forced the Pythagoreans to a large-scale exodus. This event would then have to be dated about 390. He finds a confirmation of this dating in the fact that it is precisely in these years (shortly after 390) that the Πυθαγορισταί make their appearance in Attic literature, which points to an invasion of Pythagoreans "of a somewhat less aristocratic type, who live in extreme poverty". These arguments seem convincing. If things did happen in this way we must suppose that Philolaus left earlier. It is certain that there were still Pythagoreans in Greece towards the end of the fourth century; it seems, however, that there were no more Pythagorean communities after the fifth century. This begins again in Rome in the Pythagorean revival of the first century B.C.

[1] This is what Rostagni (Atti Turino 1914, p. 565) suggested. I should prefer this for filling the lacuna. For the rest R.'s suggestion that the Pythagoreans who stayed at Rhegium did not leave Italy but dispersed in that country is certainly not sufficient to exculpate Iamblichus from contradictions.

[2] *Pythag. Politics*, p. 75 ff.

CHAPTER III

THE SURVIVAL OF PYTHAGOREANISM AFTER THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

Is it to be supposed that there was any continuity between fourth-century Pythagoreanism and that of the first century? In Diogenes Laertius at least there is nothing that lends colour to such an assumption, for he mentions five people as being the *last* of the Pythagoreans, one of whom came from Chalcis in Thrace, and four from Phlious. They were, he says, pupils of Philolaus and Eurytus. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 251, mentions the same names. The fact that they are described as τελευταῖοι surely points to a break in the tradition. In any case these texts give no support to the otherwise attractive hypothesis of Holger Thesleff, that Pythagorean schools continued to live on in Southern Italy, that they flourished there in a cultural isolation, and produced a whole literature of school texts, written in the Doric of Archytas, in the course of the third and second century[1]. According to this theory Pythagoreanism then spread from Southern Italy to Rome where it was connected with King Numa. – Taken by themselves things might have actually happened in this way. But once again, the tradition argues emphatically against this: the 'last of the Pythagoreans' who Aristoxenus knew, did not live in Southern Italy, but in Northern or Central Greece.

Are there any archeological data which contradict this tradition? Of importance in this connexion is C. Láscaris Comneno and A. Manuel de Guadan's study entitled *Contribución a la historia de la diffusión del Pitagorismo*, which appeared in the *Revista de Filosofia del Instituto Luis Vives* 15 (1956). H. Thesleff is of the opinion that this study proves the continuation of Pythagoreanism.

If the occurrence of coins with pentagram in certain places in Southern Italy, Samnium and Etruria can be considered as evidence for

[1] Holger Thesleff, *An introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic Period* (Acta Acad. Aboensis, Hum. XXIV) Åbo 1961.

the existence of Pythagorean centres in such places, then it would seem that the necessary proof has been found. The question which must be asked, however, is whether these pentagrams – which occur from time to time, as well as many other decorative motifs, on the coins of the above-mentioned places – can indeed be ascribed to Pythagoreans. The two Spanish authors have rendered a great service in bringing this material to our attention. They also realized that the above-mentioned Italian coins cannot be treated in isolation, but should be considered against the background of a considerable number of other finds of coins with pentagrams, or pentagrams on buildings, stones etc., in various places around the Mediterranean, from Syria to Gaul and Spain. These finds date from the fifth century B.C. to some centuries A.D., when Neopythagoreanism became an influential spiritual movement which from the third century onwards is almost confused with Neoplatonism. However, just because of the importance of Thesleff's hypothesis, this material will have to be given closer consideration. Here and there it will have to be supplemented, and it will be more difficult to give a positive answer to the question raised above than the Spanish authors supposed it to be.

Next, even if the first question can be answered in the affirmative, a second question arises, that is whether, in view of the places where these pentagrams, in particular those on coins were found, it has indeed been proved – or to put it less strongly: has been made plausible – that there is a straight line connecting early Pythagoreanism in Southern Italy with that of the Pythagorean centres in the third and second centuries. Here follow the main points of Thesleff's theory.

1. Thesleff divides the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha into two groups: (1) Writings attributed to Pythagoras or members of his family, either about Pythagoras himself or his doctrine. (2) Writings attributed to various other Pythagoreans or to anonymous authors. Thesleff's explanation concerns the second group.

2. The writings of this group are almost all written in Doric prose: the Doric of Archytas, according to Thesleff.

3. Although this later Pythagorean Doric is a *literary* language, Thesleff assumes that the large majority of these writings were written in a place where Doric was spoken. "It is very probable indeed", he says, "that the majority of the writings of Class II were composed in the cities of Southern Italy about the middle of the 3rd century B.C. Echoes of this literature may have occurred in 3rd century Syracuse or elsewhere, and remoter echoes in Italy in the

beginning of the 2nd century. But the Class II is rather centred around 3rd century Tarentum"[1].

In this view Pythagoreanism, after Archytas, would have lived on *in Tarentum and surroundings*. What precisely are 'the cities of Southern Italy', where around the middle of the 3rd century most writings of group II were composed? – Apparently the places known of old around the Ionic Sea: Metapontum, Croton, Caulonia, perhaps also Rhegium. Which others? We could not say.

But this whole interpretation is purely hypothetical. It is not confirmed by the archeological data reported by Láscaris Comneno and Manuel de Guadan. For coins with a pentagram have never been found in these Southern Italian cities. It is doubtful whether there was a Pythagorean school in Tarentum at all. Archytas was undoubtedly a great figure who enjoyed the trust of his fellow-citizens. Iamblichus' text, however, rather suggests that as a Pythagorean he stood alone. Cicero[2] has Cato tell that as an adolescent in Tarentum, where he was the guest of the loyal pro-Roman Nearchus, he heard a speech by Archytas cited about *voluptas corporis* being the most pernicious human passion. Nearchus had heard these words of Archytas from older people. In the *Laelius*[3], another speech of Archytas is cited about man's need to have someone to share his joy with. These passages do suggest that Archytas gave 'addresses' to a wider circle, comparable with the speeches attributed to Pythagoras in Croton, and show that the memory of these lived on in the local tradition. That is certainly interesting, but it does not prove the existence of a Pythagorean school at Tarentum, either in Archytas' days or a century later as a continuation of this[4].

The only well-known city in Southern-Italy where coins with pentalphas were struck in the fourth – third century (before 268) is Velia, – undoubtedly a large and important town, but not a Doric speaking colony, and rather far away from the places which Thesleff had in

[1] Thesleff, op. cit., p. 99.
[2] *Cato Maior* 39-41.
[3] C. 88.
[4] Capparelli, *La sapienza di Pitagora* I 377f., speaks of 'the Pythagorean Nearchus'. His authority here is Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 2,3. Plutarch is, however, a secondary source. It cannot be said to follow necessarily from Cicero's text. Nor is the statement that Ennius 'without any doubt' was a Pythagorean because, coming from Rudiae in Calabria, he must have "studied in Tarentum which was then the centre of Pythagorean culture", very convincing.

mind. There is one other small place in Bruttium, called Nuceria in Latin, where round about the year 300 coins with the pentagram were struck. This small town Nuceria is not the city of the same name in South-Campania, situated between Nola and Salernum. It is a small place near Terina, the present-day Nocera Terinese, on the Tyrrhenian Sea. Even if we could assume that these coins with pentagrams are indeed evidence of the presence of Pythagoreans – even influential Pythagoreans – in these places, then this presence only very partly proves Thesleff's hypothesis. That Pythagoreanism came from Southern Italy to Rome, may in a sense be true, but we must by no means think along the lines Thesleff suggests. It apparently did not come from Tarentum, nor directly from Velia; and even less from Nuceria in Bruttium. Yet there seems to have been a certain continuity. In the second half of the fourth – beginning of the third century, coins with pentagrams were found in Populonia, a coastal town in Central Etruria, and at Cales and Teanum Sidinicum, both situated in Northern Campania. In both these Campanian cities pentalpha coins made their appearance shortly after the Roman conquest. After 268 in Samnium, now entirely under Roman control, coins with pentagrams were struck up to the middle of the second century.

Still arguing from the supposition that my first question can be answered in the affirmative, it may be concluded that because of these coins it is possible to assume that there was a certain continuity of Pythagoreanism: for it is not improbable that a line runs from Velia via Samnium and Etruria to Rome. We must point out, however, that the coins with pentagrams from Populonia date from the same period as those from Velia. And who can tell whether Pythagoreans came from Velia to Populonia? Is it not much easier to assume that amongst a number of other decorative motifs the pentagram was sometimes also used in this Etruscan port, whether because this symbol became known from Velia or from some other place? The borrowing of a symbol is in any case more plausible than the presence of a Pythagorean nucleus in the place concerned.

Further, is there a direct connection between Tarentum under Archytas (first half of the fourth century) and Elea (Velia) about the year 300? I see no grounds for answering this question in the affirmative. The tradition knows nothing of the continued existence of a Pythagorean school. Furthermore, Iamblichus' list of well-known Pythagoreans includes only one name from Elea: Parmenides. Nuceria does not appear in this list either. If in answer to this it is said that

the list refers to an older period, this would be an argument precisely against the continuity defended by the two Spanish authors.

However, – *one* name should surely not be absent in Iamblichus' list: *Melos*. For on Melos some coins with pentagrams dating from the fifth century were issued. And in another paper[1] Láscaris Comneno and Manuel de Guadan do indeed defend the existence of a strong Pythagorean nucleus on Melos in those years. The starting point of their argument in this article is a Melic stater which, on the reverse, bears a square divided into eight isosceles triangles[2]. The Spanish archeologists admit that the Melic coins from the fifth century display a great variety of emblems and that the Pythagorean symbols rarely occur amongst all these various figures. This is true indeed: in Babelon pages full of all kinds of other emblems can be found, and finally a single pentagram. It is, exceptionally, the main emblem on the verso of this Melic coin. On the coins of almost all the places mentioned up to now and those that will be mentioned, the pentagram only occurs as a small symbol unrelated to the main obverse and reverse types and on a par with numerous other decorative motifs[3]. While admitting that the geometric figure on the coin in the last mentioned article by the two Spanish authors was important for Pythagoras to prove his theorem, yet we should, I think, ask the question as to whether the Melic pentagram and the square divided into isosceles triangles give us sufficient grounds for assuming the existence of a

[1] C. Láscaris Comneno y A. Manuel de Guadan, *Intento de reconstrucción de una escuela pitagorica.* A propósito de una estátera de Melos, in: *La Ciudad de Dios*, Revista agustiniana, El Escorial, vol. CLXIX, 1956, pp. 73-89.

[2] Reprod. in Babelon, *Traité* III, nr. 1354, and Fitz William Mus., Mc Lean bequest, Cambridge 1923, nr. 7267, pl. 246-11. The coin with pentagram is reproduced in Babelon III, nr. 1357.

[3] Thus the coins of Populonia (*Fitz William Mus.* I, nr. 136, pl. 8 nr. 14: female head, behind neck a cross, to the right, a pentagram, very small), Cales (*Fitz William* I nr. 185, pl. 10, 7: a bronze drachme, bearing the head of Apollo laureate, one with a very small pentagram, others with other signs, such as a cock, a helmet, an oval shield). Teanum Sidicinum (*Fitz William* I 389, pl. 16: a bronze didrachme with head of Apollo laureate, rev. man-headed bull), Nuceria (*Fitz William* I 1842, pl. 58, 17: bronze, obv. head of Apollo laureate, rev. horse standing l., below, a small pentagram), Beneventum (*Fitz William* I 158, pl. 9, 7: bronze, obv. head of Apollo laureate, rev. horse prancing r., above, a small pentagram). Similarly the Attic tetradrachms of Babylonia under the Seleucides (*Fitz William* III, 9564, pl. 355 nr. 10, bearing on the rev. a lion, once with a small pentagram, but mostly with other signs, such as a triangle, or the anchor which was the symbol of the Seleucides). Cp. also the British and Gallic coins mentioned below.

Pythagorean nucleus on Melos. Iamblichus knows nothing of Pythagoreans on Melos, and nowhere we do hear of this.

Here again it is fitting to remark that the adoption of a geometrical or decorative motif is more plausible than the establishment of a philosophical school. Thus I am back again to my first fundamental question: whether the occurrence of the pentagram should always be attributed to Pythagoreans. By way of counter-check I am going to answer this question in the negative, and see whether the evidence cannot be interpreted more simply in some other way.

Let me begin with Melos. This island is said to have originally been a Phoenician colony[1]. But perhaps this formula is saying too much: it seems to be more true to state that the influences from Western Asia which were strong in the Aegean before the Doric invasion, had a particularly strong hold on Melos and even lasted on beyond that period, as can be seen on the Melic coins. There are thus two possibilities to explain how the Melians came to be acquainted with the pentagram: (1) it could be a direct import from the Middle East through the intermediary of the Phoenicians; (2) it could be Crotonian import, i.e. indirectly due to Pythagorean influence. This latter possibility is improbable, because among the Pythagoreans the pentagram and other geometrical figures were of a strictly esoteric character. It should be noted that Croton itself in the time of the Pythagoreans never had coins with a pentagram or a geometrical figure like the square divided into triangles. The first mentioned explanation is, however, very well possible. This will be confirmed presently when we shall see that the Jewish five-point star, drawn as a pentagram, as well as the six-point star, occurs centuries before Hellenism. This makes it certainly possible to explain the occurrence of the pentagram as a decorative motif on a par with many others on Greek coins since the fifth century B.C.

The same remarks are also true of the coins with pentagrams[2] from the fourth century B.C., found in the Thracian Chersonesus and Macedonia. According to Iamblichus, *V.P.* 251, one of the five last Pythagoreans came from Thracian Chalcis; but is this sufficient ground for assuming the existence of a strong Pythagorean nucleus in Thrace and Macedonia? Acquaintance with the pentagram can be more easily explained by admitting that it had the character of a decorative

[1] The two Spanish authors mentioned this in their article last cited.

[2] For the Thracian Chersonesus, see Babelon III, 993; for Macedonia, ibid. 535-538.

motif amongst many others than by ascribing it to Pythagoreans.

As to the coins with pentagram which have been found in the Western part of the ancient world, even the most fanatic 'Pythagorist' among modern numismatists would hardly go so far as to ascribe the occurrence of a gold coin on which a small pentalpha appears next to a trotting horse, by the side of other decorative motifs, in a few places in the South of England, to the existence of Pythagorean nucleii in those places[1]. Yet there have been numismatists who have tried to explain the existence of this coin, which was dated by Evans as from the first half of the second century B.C., and the more numerous silver coins with pentagrams found in Gaul (which cannot be dated earlier than the first century B.C.)[2] by assuming a connection between the Pythagoreans and the Celtic Druids. Evans refers to this explanation. It is true that he does this in the most reserved terms, but he nevertheless assumes that the pentalpha on this coin is not just a decorative motif along with many others – on the coin in question we see above the horse a ring ornament and a pellet; below, the pentalpha; behind, a star, whilst on other similar coins a great variety of symbols appear: wheels and pellets, flowers with eight or more leaves, crescents, a six-point star, a rosette, ring ornaments –; he is of the opinion that "there is little doubt that some mystic signification was attached to this figure". If it is justified to assume a connection between the doctrine of the Druids and that of Pythagoras, this may be true; but this is exactly what should be doubted of.

The Spanish archaeologists Láscaris Comneno and Manuel de Guadan, followed by Holger Thesleff, also cite these British and Gallic coins as evidence of a continuous Pythagorean influence in the whole of the ancient world. *Are they really?* I think that it is doubtful, and for the following reasons.

First, the supposed connection between 'Pythagoras' and the Druids is, if not a mere guess, certainly not sufficiently founded. We have a trace of an ancient tradition according to which Zamolxis, Pythagoras' slave, taught the Druids. It is in Hippolytus[3]. What

[1] Described by John Evans, *The coins of the ancient Britons*, London 1864, p. 98; reproduction on pl. E, nr. 14. Also in J. Lelewel, Atlas, Type gaulois ou celtique, pl. VIII, nr. 29. See pl. IIa in the present volume.

[2] See pl. IIb.

[3] *Ref.* I 2, p. 14 Dunker-Schneidewin: τῶν δὲ μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ οἱ διαφυγόντες τὸν ἐμπρησμὸν Λῦσις ἦν καὶ Ἄρχιππος καὶ ὁ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου οἰκέτης Ζάμολξις, ὃς καὶ τοὺς παρὰ Κελτοῖς Δρυΐδας λέγεται διδάξαι φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν Πυθαγόρειαν φιλοσοφίαν.

II *a*. British coin with pentagram, 2nd cent. B.C.
b. Gallic coins with pentagram, 1st cent. B.C.
c. Small symbols on the denarii of L. Papius, c. 78 B.C.

d. Inscription on a tombstone in Tortosa (Spain), 4th cent. A.D.



should we think of such evidence? The fact that this Christian author from the third century without any scruples has Pythagoras' slave together with Lysis and Archippus escape from the fire of the synedrion is not exactly designed to inspire trust. Also in Diogenes Laertius 'Zamolxis' appears as Pythagoras' slave. Further details are not given. He knows nothing of a connection with the Druids. However, we know the Thracian Salmoxis from Herodotus[1]: here, too, the tradition is reported that he served Pythagoras on Samos and later as a free man returned to Thrace, where he preached the doctrine of immortality. Herodotus, however, rejects this story on chronological grounds: he is of the opinion that Salmoxis lived long before Pythagoras. Porphyry neither mentions Zamolxis nor the Druids. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 151 is interesting: here we find that Pythagoras had himself initiated into 'the so-called mysteries': in Eleusis, on Imbros, on Samothrace and Lemnos, καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ τοῖς κοινοῖς (which apparently points to mystic groups or congregations), καὶ περὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. Here the relationship is the other way round: Pythagoras was a pupil of the Druids.

All in all we are on rather uncertain ground here. Add to this the presence of pentagrams on coins from various parts of Gaul, a presence which, considered on its own, can be much more easily explained in another way. There is perhaps also in all this some lingering notion of the association of the German word *Drudenfuss* with 'Druid'. Unjustly so. The word has nothing to do with Druids, but with *Drude:* in Southern German and Austrian popular belief a *Drude* is a female ghost who causes nightmares[2]. That an apotropeic power is ascribed to the pentagram against these and other evil spirits, as is also found in Goethe's *Faust*[3], might be a distant echo of the meaning that this geometrical figure had for the early Pythagoreans: the early Pythago-

[1] IV 95-96.

[2] Bächtold-Stäubli, *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens* VIII, col. 1173f.

[3] On the threshold of Faust's room a pentagram was drawn – in this case not a Pythagorean symbol, but a Cabbalistic sign. The following dialogue ensues. Mephistopheles to Faust:

"Gesteh' ich's nur, dass ich hinausspaziere,
verbietet mir ein kleines Hindernis,
der Drudenfuss auf Eurer Schwelle" –
Faust:
"Das Pentagramma macht dir Pein?
Ei, sage mir, du Sohn der Hölle,
Wenn das dich bannt, wie kamst du denn herein?"

rean symbol would have found its way as an apotropeic sign from late Antiquity through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to the so enlightened eigteenth century.

This would be remarkable indeed. The only problem is: *was it actually the Pythagorean symbol that was primary?* Does not the early presence of the pentagram elsewhere in Greece, and apparently independent of the Pythagoreans, point into a different direction? In fact, the Pythagorean symbol might turn out not to have been at the origin of this whole development: it might turn out to be one instance of a wider spread phenomenon which is to be traced back to a further removed origin, in Western Asia or, say, the Middle East. This is what we shall find confirmed by further evidence.

Second, with or without the adoption of the Pythagorean doctrine by the Celtic Druids, it is supposed that Roman legionaries introduced the pentagram as a Pythagorean symbol into Gaul[1]. This must have been in Caesar's time. This explanation, however, is based on a dual anachronism. (1) It can definitely not hold good for the British coins, as in the second century B.C. there were as yet no Roman legions at all in Gaul. (2) It is true that in the middle of the first century B.C. Pythagoreanism was coming into vogue in Rome, but, as appears from Cicero and from an unambiguous passage in Gellius[2], more in the cultured upper class than as a popular belief. The so-called Basilica at the Porta Maggiore – supposed that it was a Pythagorean place of worship – is definitely not older than the first century A.D., and it must be assumed that in the generations between (there were at least two)[3] a rapid development took place. In the middle of the first century B.C., however, Pythagoreanism was as yet not a popular religion the symbols of which could have been imported by soldiers.

How then should it be explained? In the most obvious way, i.e. that it is simply a question of the taking over of a motif, say a decorative motif, with or without some particular meaning, together with numerous others. In his 'Atlas' of Gallic or Celtic coins[4], J. Lelewel gave a survey of the emblems used: the five-point star appears here, as

[1] Láscaris Comneno and Manuel de Guadan assume this.
[2] *N.A.* 19, 14, 3. I shall return to this passage: *infra*, p. 50, with n. 7.
[3] J. Carcopino, *La basilique pythagoricienne de la Porte Majeure*, Paris 1927, p. 51, dates the basilica in the last few years of Claudius' reign. F. L. Bastet, in his doctoral dissertion (*De datum van het grote hypogaeum bij de Porta Maggiore te Rome*, Leiden 1958) arrived at a somewhat earlier dating, viz., the year 20 A.D.
[4] J. Lelewel, *Type Gaulois ou Celtique*, Atlas, Bruxelles 1840, pl. X.

well as the six-point star, as one of 132 different motifs. In explaining these Gallic and British coins it must first be stated that in these countries all coins are copies – sometimes very free copies – of certain Greek or Roman examples[1]. Thus the Southern English gold coin with the pentagram referred to above, and similar coins on which a trotting horse is depicted together with various decorative motifs, is a very free imitation of the gold stater of Philip of Macedonia. From the occurrence of the pentagram in one single instance amongst numerous other motifs, we can, I think, come to no other conclusion than that the pentagram as a decorative motif was apparently known to the Britons. How? Because of the early date it can not be attributed to Roman legions. The answer must be sought in trading relations. As we know from Diodorus[2] these were by land in that time: via Gaul. In the Greco-Roman world, as we found before, there were coins with pentagrams in circulation. In this way we shall have to explain the pentagrams on Gallic coins. They were struck at Massilia (first century B.C.), at Rheims, in the region of the Carnutes (between the Seine and the Loire) and in that of the Santones (Western Gaul, first century B.C. and first century A.D.). One can imagine that the pentagram came from Populonia to Massilia, and from Massilia further into Gaul.

We also find an instance of Roman Republican denarii with pentagrams in the first half of the first century B.C.: they were struck by the Roman L. Papius[3] and are dated by the Spanish archaeologists Comneno and De Guadan between 78 and 75 B.C., and by Sydenham[4] between 78 and 77 B.C. This was indeed the time of the rise of Neopythagorism in Rome, and it seems possible at least that the pentagram on these coins expresses something of the newly awakened interest. Yet, somehow this explanation is not satisfactory, for it ignores the fact that on these coins the pentagram occurs in a series of small symbols, unrelated to the main obverse and reverse types. Further, the denarii of L. Papius are not the only Roman coins that bear the pentagram: there are a few other instances, most of them from Southern

[1] Evans, *The coins of the ancient Britons*, pp. 18-25; K. Pink, *Einführung in die Keltische Münzkunde*, Wien 1950, p. 5, puts as 'oberster Leitsatz' above his chapter on 'Die Prägetechnik der Kelten', the pronouncement: *Alle Prägetechnik der Kelter ist nachahmend.*
[2] Diodorus V 22. On this see Evans p. 21f.
[3] Babelon I, Papia; Grüber 3054; A. Alföldi, *Schweizer Münzblätter* XII (1954) p. 27, f. See pl. IIc.
[4] *The Roman Republican Coinage*, London 1952, p. 127.

Italy or Sicily[1]. In all these cases the pentagram occurs as one of many small symbols, unrelated to the main types. Whatever might be the meaning of the pentagram on these coins, this much is certain that it does not have a greater significance than the other small symbols.

Is there any indication as to the meaning of those small symbols taken together? Fortunately we can answer this question in the positive: in the *Numismatic Chronicle* of 1931[2] Sydenham offered a perfectly satisfactory explanation. To begin with, the learned numismatist emphasizes the importance of the small symbols on Roman coins in general: they always have a direct bearing on contemporary ideas or events. Next, he explains the symbols occurring on denarii of the first century B.C., namely, those of L. Papius and of L. Roscius Fabatus, as follows. These symbols are intended to represent *in a kind of pictorial shorthand the various trades and professions included in the trades-guilds (collegia opificum) of Rome. The pentagram belongs to the symbols that represent the builders:* it occurs together with such symbols as the base of a column, a Corinthian capital, plasterer's float, trowel and builder's square. The coins of L. Papius are, according to Sydenham, 'an aggressively democratic coinage'. And so are the coins of L. Roscius, which, by similar symbols, testify to the revival of the Roman collegia opificum in 58 B.C.

No doubt this explanation is much more satisfactory than that of Comneno and De Guadan: it gives a complete account of the facts which are for the greater part neglected by the other hypothesis. Therefore in this case Comneno and the Guadan's explanation has to be rejected.

[1] Here are the exact references, for which I have to thank Prof. J. H. Jongkees (of the University of Utrecht):
(1) Sydenham, *Rom. Rep. Coinage*, p. 2 nr. 21: 241-222 B.C., Southern Italy;
(2) Brit. Mus., Catal. Greek Coins, Italy, p. 59, nr. 29; Haeberlin, *Aes grave*, pl. 68, nrs. 20-22 and 32; Sydenham, *Aes grave*, p. 103, nr. 117, pl. 13, 7. Unciae with pentagram, according to Haeberlin and Sydenham either from Rome or Campania, but according to later research certainly not from there, but probably from a more Southern region. The coins are of the same level as those of the city of Rome after 235 B.C. (Mattingly, *Roman Coins*, 1960, p. 12).
(3) Sydenham, Rom. Rep. Coinage, p. 16, nr. 154: 187-155 B.C., Southern Italy.
(4) Ibid., nr. 205; Grueber II, p. 213, nr. 293: 187-155 B.C., Sicily?
(5) Ibid., nr. 233; Grueber II, p. 163, nr. 76: 167-155 B.C., Rome?

[2] E. A. Sydenham, *Symbols on denarii of L. Papius and L. Roscius*, in: Numism. Chronicle 1931, pp. 1ff.

Can the same be said of the coins from this period which were struck at Gades in Southern Spain? The two Spanish authors are once more of the opinion that the case for this is very clear, since it explains how this town not long afterwards could produce an important Pythagorean philosopher, Moderatus. I must confess that this argument does not seem conclusive to me. (1) It must be remembered that Gades was a Phoenician colony which as an ally of Rome (after 206 B.C.) was permitted to continue its Phoenician coinage. The pentagram on some of these coins reminds us of the so-called Pythagorean coins of Melos, which was another place of Asiatic, perhaps of Phoenician tradition, and of the fact that in Israel the pentagram was used not unfrequently on earthen ware as early as the fifth century B.C.[1]. (2) As for Moderatus, he lived in the second part of the first century A.D., under Nero or the Flavii. It is true that in accordance with ancient usage we call him Moderatus of Gades, but this does not in the least mean to say that he always lived there. Rome was then the centre of culture and it is not improbable that it was here that Moderatus received his intellectual training, just as he apparently also trained pupils there[2]. Hence I regard the conclusion arrived at by the two Spanish authors that, in view of the coins with pentagrams, there must have existed a strong Pythagorean centre at Gades, as *at most* a possibility; it is by no means a necessary conclusion, not even a probable one.

Some centuries later, probably in the fourth century A.D.[3], we find once again in Spain a few clear pentagrams, not on coins this time but on an inscription on a tombstone, discovered at Tortosa (in the Valencia district). This time the pentagram has clearly nothing to do with Pythagoreans. It is a Jewish inscription, in Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The pentagram is at the beginning and the end of the Hebrew text, apparently functioning as a national distinctive (at the end of the Hebrew text together with the menorah, here a five-branch candlestick)[4]. We shall return to this inscription.

Let us now turn to the Eastern Mediterranean. About the year 300 B.C. a few pentalphas occur on coins of Diadochi in Syria and Babylonia. Comneno and De Guadan[5] again assume Pythagorean origin. Yet this is by no means the most obvious explanation. Why

[1] Infra, p. 41, with notes 3 and 5.
[2] This appears from the beginning of Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* VIII, 7.
[3] Infra, p. 42. [4] Pl. IId.
[5] Revista de Filosofia 1956, p. 198.

not state that the pentagram was a well-known symbol in the East, probably originating from Babylon, since the regular pentagon and the dodecaedron were known there[1]. It should be remembered that Pythagoras learnt his mathematics there.

A city where at a comparatively early date (the end of the fifth century B.C.) coins with pentagrams were found and where this symbol was used for centuries (up to the time of Augustus) is Pitane in Mysia. The Spanish authors have no doubts about this: of course Pythagoreans lived here, they argue; it is clear that they came from neigbouring Cyzicus. Iamblichus' list has no less than four names from this town! – This is all correct and yet –. How can it can be explained, for instance, that precisely in Cyzicus not a single coin with pentagram was struck, and that in Iamblichus' list Pitane is entirely absent? I must confess that here again I feel rather uncertain, just as in the case of Rhodes[2] and Eresos on Lesbos[3].

I do not mean to say that the Spanish authors have not put forward anything of interest. But I do think that the material adduced by them must be used much more carefully. It must also be supplemented. I would like to do this here with regard to a point that is particularly instructive and which has been mentioned a few times before, namely the occurrence of the pentagram in the Jewish world. As far as the Hellenistic-Roman period is concerned this material has been arranged and made accessible in the most admirable way by R. E. Goodenough[4]. From it we learn that the beautiful geometric pentagram which together with a hexagram is found on a frieze in the synagogue of Capharnaum, dating from the beginning of the third century A.D.[5], is by no means so exceptional in the Jewish world as Comneno and De Guadan think[6]: it had precedents in that world at least six centuries earlier and parallels in various places. Here are the references.

(1) In an early Hellenistic tomb (before the Maccabean era) grafiti were discovered scratched on the wide jambs within the doorway. One of them outlines an altar with what seems a burning incense bowl upon

[1] O. Neugebauer, *The exact Sciences in Antiquity*, Princeton, N.J. 1952, p. 46.
[2] The Spanish authors speak of 'la ciudad de Rhodas', and 'Caria' (p. 198 f.).
[3] Comneno and De Guadan, p. 198.
[4] R. E. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman period*, (Bollinger series) New York 1953, 8 vol.
[5] *Jewish symbols* III, nrs. 473 and 474; my pl. IV.
[6] Revista de Filosofia, 1956, p. 206. The Spanish authors see in this pentagram "a late echo of Pythagoreanism in Galilee'.



IV. Pentagram and hexagram on a frieze in the Synagoge of Capharnaum, 3rd cent. A.D.



III. Pentagram on Jewish jar-handles found in Palestine, probably 5th cent. B.C.

it, ..."and there were several pentagrams and hexagrams". Goodenough[1] does not give a reproduction of these grafiti but refers to Peters and Thiersch, *Painted Tombs in the Necropolis of Marissa*, London 1905, plate IIIa, and to pages 19 and 60[2]. Here the above mentioned symbols are explained as "signs of greeting in secret and friendly intercourse". Now in this sense the Pythagorean symbol of the pentagram may have been known to some Greeks of Alexandria to whom those signs may be due. According to Peters and Thiersch they are evidently 'the unauthorized scribblings' of chance visitors. – The tomb has Greek inscriptions of about 200 B.C.

More important for the question as to *whether the pentagram was originally also a Jewish symbol* is the remark added by Goodenough in n. 40 on the page cited: it refers to earlier instances of five- and six-point stars, from Jewish jar-handles, published by David Diringer, *Le iscrizioni antico-ebraiche Palestinesi*, Firenze 1934, pp. 130-132, and plate XVI, 3-12[3].

According to Diringer these jars come from the coastal area of Palestine (Tell Zakariya and Gezer) and from Jerusalem (the hill of Ofel). Some copies of them are found in the Jerusalem Museum[4]. The pentagrams are all inscribed in a circle, incised into the jar handles before firing as a kind of seal or stamp. They bear an inscription of five letters in the circle segments between the points of the pentagram. The interpreters do not agree about the order and consequently about the meaning of these letters, whether or not they contain the divine name JW. As to the date, Diringer thinks that the nrs. 11 and 12 of his plate XVI (reproduced on my plate III) might belong to the fifth century B.C. (others to the fourth cent.)[5].

(2) Besides the synagoge of Capharnaum[6] Goodenough mentions the fragment of a decorative frieze found within the synagoge of Chorazin[7], on which a five-point star is found 'with a smooth ring inside and outside it'[8]. The illustration shows that, as a matter of fact,

[1] *Jewish symbols* I, p. 68.
[2] No pentagrams and hexagrams are visible on pl. III, but according to the description given on p. 19 (with fig. 3) the pentagrams must be quite clear.
[3] See my pl. III. [4] Catal. nrs. 1114, 3562, 3563, 3644.
[5] Diringer, op. cit. p. 136: Crediamo quindi che questi iscrizioni debbano risalire al periodo di transazione (forse al V secolo av. Chr.).
[6] Described by Goodenough, *Jewish symbols* I, p. 187; illustrations in vol. III, figs. 473 and 474.
[7] *Jewish symbols* I, p. 195. [8] *Jewish symbols* III, fig. 495.

we are not concerned with a formal pentagram here but, so to speak with an 'implicit' pentagram. The one at Capharnaum was quite 'explicit', and the older ones on the jar handles as well.

(3) Two 'explicit' pentagrams are found on the tombstone in Spain, mentioned before[1]. Goodenough, who describes the inscription of this stone in his second volume, p. 58, and shows a picture of it in vol. III, nr. 858, does not mention the place where it was found[2]. As to the dating, he is inclined to adopt a very late date, say the sixth century (following Frey), though admitting that it might belong to the fourth or fifth. The stone bears inscriptions in Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The pentagrams appear at the beginning and the end of the Hebrew inscription, while the Latin and Greek inscriptions are clothed in Christian formulas. That is why Goodenough thinks it must be of rather a late period, since this Jewish family apparently "found it safer to use the Christian phrase in languages intelligible to their neighbours, while they announced their Jewish loyalty in Hebrew". The fact that the Latin and Greek are much better cut than the Hebrew seems to him another, though 'slight', support for his view.

In connexion with all this the following two points should be noted. First, it is very interesting to find the Hebrew inscription on this tomb denoted by the sign of two clear-cut pentagrams. We can hardly infer anything else from this fact but that the pentagram was for this Jewish family a national distinctive[3]. Second, though Goodenough is perfectly right in rejecting any earlier date than the fourth century, I think there is a good reason for not dating it later: after the fourth century the knowledge of Greek was rapidly declining in Western

[1] p. 39, with n. 4.

[2] As I mentioned above, the inscription was found in Tortosa, in the province of Valencia. Goodenough refers to Moise Schwab, "Rapport sur les inscriptions hébraïques de l'Espagne", in *Nouvelles archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires*, XIV (1907), fig. 1, and to J. B. Frey, *Corpus inscriptionum Iudaicarum* (C.I.J.), Rome 1936, vol. 1, no. 661. I give a reproduction of the photograph of the Hebrew inscription found in Schwab's publication (my plate IId).

[3] Goodenough mentions in a footnote (n. 71) that both the earlier editors of this inscription 'changed the five-point stars to six-point ones'. This might seem rather a barbarous procedure. As a matter of fact, what happened was probably that the printers did not possess a type of the pentagram while they had one both of the hexagram and of the so-called menorah (here a five-branch candlestick). Consequently where this Hebrew inscription was printed in neat modern Hebrew printed characters they just used the type of the hexagram which was available instead of the type of the pentagram which was lacking!

v *a*. Greek warrior with shield, on an Attic red-figured cup, early 5th cent. B.C.



b. The starfish as a decorative motif, on the ceiling of the tomb of Senmut (Thebes in Egypt, under Tutmosis III, 1493 B.C.).



Europe, and in the sixth century almost nothing of it was preserved. For this reason I think that the sixth century was definitely too late a date for this trilingual inscription, and even the fourth is more probable than the fifth.

(4) On Jewish amulets[1] stars are rather frequent, sometimes 4- or 5-point stars, more often 6-point, not seldom 8- or even 10-point stars. In the illustrations contained in Goodenough's third volume five-point stars are found in the nrs. 1153 and 1170 (here one five-point star among seven six-point stars), 1197 and 1204; perhaps also in 1191 ('star and crescent')[2]. The 'star and crescent' symbol is explained by Goodenough as originally denoting God as sun and moon[3]. As such it still survives in Islam as a symbol of Allah. Cp. fig. 1204: a crescent surrounded by 5-point stars; on the reverse the inscription IAΩ (denoting Jahweh).

(5) In vol. V, p. 166 f., Goodenough describes symbols found in Egyptian tombs. Both in the tomb of Rameses IX ((1153-1134) and in that of princess Tausert (end of the 13th century) designs are found showing numerous five-point stars[4]. These are not 'pentagrams', even hardly 'implicit' ones: they are merely small and sketchy designs like this: ✳ This is the hieroglyph used by the Egyptians to indicate the human frame. It is somewhat misleading to call this symbol a 'radial pentagram', as Comneno and De Guadan do: for the pentagram was originally a geometrical construction, while the Egyptian hieroglyph appears to have a different origin. It is a simplified starfish, a figure which is used as a decorative motif, e.g. on the ceiling in the tomb of Senmut[5].

Conclusions: From this evidence we can hardly draw any conclusion other than that the hexagram as well as the pentagram have been known to the Jewish world since ancient times: this is clearly shown by the data under (1). In the Hellenistic-Roman period an intensive amalgamation of cultures took place, so that it is difficult to say of a pentagram, for instance in the synagogue of Capharnaum, taken by

[1] Described by Goodenough in vol. II, pp. 214-295; illustrations in vol. III.
[2] Though the star seen above the head of the goddess is definitely not quite symmetrical, it looks more like a hexagram than like a pentagram.
[3] Goodenough vol. II, pp. 223 and 288.
[4] Goodenough vol. V, figs. 165-168.
[5] Pl. Vb. O. Neugebauer, *The exact sciences in antiquity*, Princeton, N.J. 1952, pl. 10. Also the so-called pentagrams on the head of a goddess, found in a tomb dating from the 5th dynasty (Hugo Prinz, *Alt-orientalische Symbolik*, Berlin 1915, pl. I, nrs. 13 and 14) clearly show their starfish origin.

itself, whether this is of Jewish origin or is a Pythagorean symbol, whether it was a purely decorative motif or had a magic significance. From the cases mentioned under (1) the latter is no more apparent than the first. What does appear from the older finds mentioned there, is that it has been wrongly assumed that only the hexagram was Semitic and the pentagram not. Consequently Pythagorean influence has been too readily assumed in the case of the synagogue of Capharnaum, as if origin from the Middle East was out of the question. The pentagram is a symbol originally belonging to the civilization of Mesopotamia. In ancient Babylon the regular pentagon was known[1], with the help of which the dodecaedron is constructed: and the regular pentagon presupposes the pentagram. Thus this geometrical figure found among the Jews and the Pythagoreans goes back to the same source[2]: it will have come from Babylon directly to Palestine and may have been used in various places in the Near and Middle East, without it being necessary to think of Greek import; again we remember that the place where Pythagoras learnt his mathematics was none other than Babylon.

In his chapter on 'Charms' Goodenough[3] repeatedly speaks about so-called Abraxas stones. As it happens, he does not mention any instances with a pentagram. There are some, although these are perhaps not of Jewish origin[4]. They are of interest to us because they are a clear example of the magic meaning of the pentagram, which was not yet apparent either from the Pythagorean use or from the Greek and Hellenistic coins. The Abraxas stones, cut into various forms, showing a variety of Cabbalistic symbols – usually a human frame with a bird's head and snake-like extremities – are called after the inscription Abrasax or Abraxas. Most of them were made as talismen in the Middle Ages. They were said to have come from Syria, Egypt and Spain. Indeed the name Abraxas comes from the Basilidians: they used it to denote the 365 ranks of spiritual beings which according to their doctrine originate from the supreme divinity (the Greek letters of Abraxas make up the number 365). Thus, in the κοσμοποιία of the Leyden papyrus J 395 the Sun is welcomed by the

[1] O. Neugebauer, *The exact sciences*, p. 46.

[2] For the use of the five-point star or pentagram in Babylon see Appendix A.

[3] In vol. II of *Jewish Symbols*.

[4] In vol. VII, p. 198f., Goodenough mentions a few Judaeo-Christian 'Charms' from the fifth century on which the pentagram occurs. One of these bears the inscription *aiona*, which points to gnostic origin.

words: "You are the number of the year, Abrasax"[1]. The Basilidian doctrine was brought by the Priscillians (end of the fourth century) to Spain. It is quite possible that the pentagram, amongst other symbols, was used by them. In gnostic as well as in late Neopythagorean-Neoplatonic circles magic played an important part. Iamblichus called himself a Pythagorean. He considered 'theurgy' more important than 'theory'[2].

Here in late Antiquity we are undoubtedly at the roots of the pentagram as a magic symbol in the Middle Ages: it was put on utensils and on buildings, on the doors of cow-sheds, in churches and on the gates of castles[3]. This usage is continued in Renaissance and post-Renaissance times, it is found throughout the 17th and 18th centuries and survives in the 19th and 20th, up till the present day[4]. What is new in the Post-renaissance period is the use of the pentagram as a

[1] Leemans, *Papyri graeci mus. Lugd. Bat.* II 1885; A. Dieterich, *Abraxas*, Studien zur Religionsgesch. d. spätern Altertums, Leipzig 1891, p. 6.6-11, p. 17.21-24, p. 182, 23-26:
ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς βάρεως φανεὶς συναναστέλλων κυνοκεφαλοκέρδων ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ ἀσπάζεταί σε λέγων·'σὺ εἶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ 'Αβρασάξ'.
"He who appears on the bark (ἡ βᾶρις, an Egyptian bark, gen. βάριδος or βάρεως) at the same time as the rising sun, a fox with a dog's head, welcomes you in his own language saying: "You are the Number of the year, Abrasax". French transl. by A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* I, *L'astrologie et les sciences occultes*, Paris 1950, p. 300f. On the name *Abrasax* which by its seven letters symbolizes the power of the seven planets united in the God who is called by that name, while at the same time it expresses the number 365, see Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, Leipzig 1904, p. 272f.

[2] Cp. Olympiodorus in *Phaed.* p. 123, 3-6 Norvèn; De Vogel, *Greek Phil.* III, nr. 1446 c.

[3] A good example of the pentagram on churchdoors was mentioned to me by Dr. J. Schouten, director of the municipal musea at Gouda. It is in the Romanesque church in Trauthain (near Leipzig), where a pentagram is found on the capital to the right of the door. The case of the cathedral of Rouen, which I found mentioned in an Encyclopedia article, seems to be less clear. Mr. A. Bloch, who kindly gave me some information, is rather hesitating about it.
As to the entrance of castles, I found a clear pentagram on the lower gate of the Schloss of Bentheim. One other instance: on the front of a 17th century house at the market-place of the little city of Groenlo (province of Gelderland, the Netherlands) there was a stone with to the left initials and to the right a pentagram. It is not at all certain that it belonged to a doctor's house (according to the post-Remaissance symbolism which I shall mention further on). It may be a simple apotropeic sign, as in so many other cases.

[4] Dr. Schouten informed me that amongst the Gipsies the pentagram is still used under cradles as an apotropeic sign.

medical symbol. It appears as such in the arms of a doctors' guild and, from the 16th century onwards, on the Pharmacopea. On an engraving of the Dutch humanist Coornhert, nowadays in the Museum of Gouda, Sanitas appears with three medical emblems: the pentagram, the urinal and the crane. In the same museum the room of the guild of the surgeons is open to visitors: among the furniture are two 18th century cushion-covers on which a pentagram is embroidered and a seventeenth century cabinet with a pentagram on it. Also the guild-glasses bear the sign of the pentagram. A number of similar instances might be cited[1].

When compared with the Roman denarii of L. Papius where the pentagram appears as a symbol of the builders, the emblem of the Gouda surgeons reveals to us the difference between the Roman coins of the first century B.C. and the 17th century symbolism in Holland: in Rome the pentagram appears as a geometrical figure, serving as such to symbolizing the builders; at Gouda it proves to be the symbol of health. In the first case the use of the pentagram has nothing to do with Pythagoreanism at all, in the latter case it has – and even more directly than the pentagram as an apotropeic sign or talisman. We must remember that in the 16th century Greek texts such as Lucian's were read and printed, and the symbolism of classical forms was cultivated by the humanists. No doubt the pentagram as a symbol of health is a 16th century renewal of the Pythagorean identification mentioned by Lucian in his treatise *In defense of a slip of the tongue in greeting*[2].

The passage is interesting enough to be cited. The disciples of Pythagoras, the author says, never began their letters with the usual greeting formula χαίρειν or with the less usual one of εὖ πράττειν (which was preferred by Plato in his Third Letter); they always began with the formula ὑγιαίνειν. For this was in their opinion the most suitable thing you could wish a person, both for the well-being of the soul and of the body. "Indeed the pentagram, the triple intersecting triangle,

[1] This is done in a recent study by Dr. J. Schouten, the author of a highly interesting iconological study on the Staff of Asklepios (Amsterdam 1963). It is to him I owe the above mentioned data about the pentagram used as a symbol of health from the 16th century onwards. His paper on the pentagram as a medical symbol will be published in the *Nederlands Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek*, Amsterdam 1965. It will include some very interesting material, on which nobody is more able to comment than he.

[2] Ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν τῇ προσαγορεύσει πταίσματος (*Pro lapsu inter salutandum*) c. 5 Jacobitz I, p. 330.

which they used as a token serving to recognize the members of their sect, they called *Health*"[1].

Now here the question arises of *How did Pythagoras or his followers come to call the pentagram 'health'?* How did they arrive at this direct identification? And it is here that I should like to suggest an explanation different from that which was proposed by Comneno and De Guadan: while they thought of the so-called radial pentagram which in Egypt came to denote the human frame, and hence might have become a symbol of the soundness of the body, I feel more and more inclined to suppose that in Babylon already the five-point star, whether it preceded the geometrical pentagram or not, on astrological grounds was considered as having some apotropeic force, and hence became a talisman and a symbol of health. Thus, after all, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans probably were not of any primary significance in that wide-spread phenomenon of the pentagram in the ancient world.

This view, which results rather clearly from the numismatic evidence, is strongly reinforced by the occurrence of a somewhat irregular five-point star on a warrior's shield represented on an Attic red-figured drinking cup[2]. For here, without any doubt, we are not concerned with a geometrical figure: it is a star, the downward angles of which are clearly asymmetrical, the right one reaching much lower down than the left. Moreover, what could it mean on a shield unless some protecting force was attributed to it? The emblem reminds us of the so-called 'shield of David', a name first used in the 12th century A.D. to denote the six-point star, which also is of Babylonian origin. It has been reasonably supposed that the designation 'shield of David' was inspired by an old tradition saying that David when fighting Goliath carried a shield with the emblem of a six-point star, an emblem which, no doubt, the Jews borrowed from Babylon[3].

One other instance of a five-point star on a shield is known to me: it is in the 14th century English poem *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*[4]. Here 'the Pentangle' is found on Sir Gawain's shield. Its essential character proves to be 'that it is endless everywhere', whence it was

[1] καὶ τό γε τριπλοῦν αὐτοῖς τρίγωνον τὸ δι'ἀλλήλων, τὸ πεντάγραμμον, ᾧ συμβόλῳ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοδόξους ἐχρῶντο, ὑγίεια πρὸς αὐτῶν ὠνομάζετο.

[2] Museo Gregoriano, prima ediz., parte seconda, tav. XC. It is reproduced in R. Eisler, *Weltenmantel u. Himmelszelt*, München 1910, vol. I, p. 306. See my plate Va.

[3] Robert Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 306ff.

[4] Vs. 642-690 (p. 49f. in the modern English translation by Brian Stone, Penguin Classics 1959).

called 'the endless Knot'. Moreover, in the same passage the number five is worked out into a general symbolism of the physical, intellectual and moral qualities of man which, so far as I can see, is not found in early Pythagoreanism nor anywhere else in the Greek-Hellenistic world. Though this last-mentioned form of symbolism seems rather an original development of the very general and wide-spread use of the pentagram in Medieval Europe, the aspect of this figure as being endless may go back to Babylon, even to the earliest period in which the pentagram is found: that of Uruk IV and III. And this very aspect may have given to the pentagram – whether geometrical or not – the character of a sacred emblem, whence some apotropeic or protecting power may have been attributed to it, even in the early Babylonian world.

Now let me say a few words more about the modern use of the five-point star or pentagram. Nowadays the five-point star is used as the trademark of certain industriel concerns[1]. We may assume that in these cases, too, the five-point star still has some symbolic significance and is not a mere decorative figure. In many other cases it is purely decorative.

Goodenough[2] cites a few examples of the hexagram being used as a 'religious symbol' in the present-day Arabic world, where it appears "still to have the value given to it by the Pythagoreans when they called it 'health'". In this statement he passes imperceptibly from the hexagram he is discussing, to the pentagram. The first of these, however, is definitely *not* Pythagorean, and the two existing side by side and being muddled up might seem to be a *proprium* of the Jewish world, if it were not that in Babylon already the five-, six- and seven-point stars occur side by side.

Many present-day examples of pentagrams could be cited in this context. I shall discuss a few of them in Appendix B.

Coming back to the pentagram in the Hellenistic world, we observed that in the case of the Jews it has apparently all too readily been ascribed to Pythagorean influence on the basis of one single late instance. It is more correct, as we have seen, to regard it as a symbol belonging to the Middle East which, if it was not known in Egypt, certainly was in India[3].

[1] Such as Texaco and Heineken. [2] *Jew. Symbols* VII, p. 200.

[3] In ancient India many symbols were known. Among these the pentagram was not very prominent, although it was known. The Greek geographer Ptolemaeus (VII 1, 57) calls a town situated on the Indus in the province of Indoscythia by the name Πεντάγραμμα. On this, see V. de St. Martin in *Mém. de l'Acad. d. Inscr.* V 2, 1858, p. 396.

We have also seen that in Western Europe (Gaul and Britain) a direct Pythagorean origin of the pentagram on coins is not probable either. It may be assumed, however, that in these countries the symbol of the pentagram was taken over, together with numerous other motifs, from Greco-Roman coins. In this case a direct influence from the Middle East is improbable. Only in the case of a place like Gades is this otherwise.

We found that in Italy, even in the case of the Roman denarii of L. Papius, dating from the first century B.C., no Pythagorean influence has to be assumed. On the other hand, it is probable that at the beginning of the third century a few Pythagoreans still lived in Cyrene[1]. Finally, the main thesis of the two Spanish authors and of Holger Thesleff, that the continuity of Pythagoreanism in Italy can be proved, can to a certain extent be made acceptable in another manner. What cannot be proved is the continued existence of a formal Pythagorean School, like the one which flourished for generations in Croton. But there are indications that the Orphic-Pythagorean ideas about the immortality of the soul and its transmigration lived on, together with certain ethical principles which are more or less connected with these ideas. This can be found here and there in literary sources: in Ennius, in the beginning of his *Annals*, and in the verse that he puts into the mouth of Scipio Africanus Maior[2], later in Cicero[3], and in the well-known passage in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*[4]. We saw that Cicero has Cato in his old age tell how as a boy in Taren-

[1] Reported by Comneno and De Guadan as being 'a clear case': Rev. de Fil. 1956, p. 197f.

[2] Ennius tells that Homer's soul is reincarnated in him. He has Scipio in his old age say on the day after his death: *mi soli coeli maxima porta patet* (Seneca, *Ep.* 108, 34). This idea undoubtedly existed in Southern Italy in the fourth and third century, as appears from the gold tablets with Orphic prayers which have been found there. The fact that in the necropolis of Sybaris, "where no doubt the last Pythagoreans were buried", such tablets were found next to the head or in the right hand of the dead, is cited by H. M. R. Leopold in *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* (Ecole Française de Rome) 1921-22, pp. 170ff., as a proof of the early fusion of Pythagoreanism and Orphism. Cp. also W. K. C. Guthrie, *History* I, pp. 150 and 198f.

[3] Cicero, *Tusc.* I 17, 39 says that Plato learnt from Pythagoras about the immortality of the soul. Cf. also *Resp.* I, 10, 16. In *Tusc.* IV 1, 2-4 he speaks about *vestigia Pythagoreorum* in Roman institutions; in *De leg.* I 33 and *De off.* I 56 he passes on from Stoic rationality to the Pythagorean ideal of φιλία.

[4] Ovid, *Metam.* XV, 153ff. The speech by Pythagoras in Ovid is dealt with in detail by A. Rostagni, *Il verbo di Pitagora*, Torino 1924, pp. 250ff.

tum, he heard his host Nearchus cite a speech of Archytas: that pleasure is a highly dangerous passion and the origin of all possible evil, and that one must try as much as possible to detach oneself from bodily desires[1]. In Pliny[2] we hear of a statue erected at the corner of the Comitium in honour of Pythagoras at the time of the Samnite war.

This happened at the beginning of the third century because of an oracle, and Pythagoras was here –nil mirari – in the somewhat frivolous company of Alcibiades ... Can we infer from this, as for example Carcopino does[3], that Pythagoras was very popular in the Rome of those days? It seems to me that all we can say is that apparently at that time in Italy Pythagoras still had a great reputation of exceptional wisdom, – a rather distant fame, as appears from the way he is here introduced in Rome.

Such a distant fame is also implied in the tradition according to which King Numa was a pupil of Pythagoras. Cicero[4] and Livy[5] have not a good word for this legend. Nevertheless it is certainly significant that somebody at this time made a fake case full of Pythagorean writings and then 'found' it. It can certainly not be said that in Rome in the first century the figures of Nigidius Figulus and the Sextii were something completely new, appearing after an interruption of several centuries. Cicero himself and his biographer Plutarch testify to the great influence which a man like Nigidius had in Rome[6]. One should however, not misinterpret the general purport of these reports. Nigidius was by no means a popular preacher. Gellius[7] says so emphatically, and refers to the *obscuritas* and *subtilitas* of his expositions as being *parum utilis*. It is true that Carcopino[8] could rightly present him as a religious leader rather than an academic scholar – "Chez lui, se tiennent des réunions qui n'ont rien d'une académie, mais qui ressemblent à des mystères" – but it would be

[1] *Cato Maior* 41. Cf. *Laelius* 88. Supra, p. 24. [2] *N.H.* 34, 26.
[3] J. Carcopino, *La basilique pythagoricienne de la Porte Majeure*, Paris 1927, p. 183.
[4] In *De re publ.* II 15, 28 he has Scipio pass severe judgment about this rumour: "Falsum est enim id totum, neque solum fictum, sed etiam imperite absurdeque fictum". It is, of course, chronologically completely impossible: Pythagoras came to Italy 140 years after the death of Numa!
[5] Livy I 18: Auctorem doctrinae eius (sc. Numae), quia non extat alius, falso Samium Pythagoram edunt –. Cp. Ovid., *Metam.* XV 479f.
[6] In the most important of his political actions Cicero would ask Nigidius' advice (Plut., *Cic.* 20; *An seni sit gerenda resp.*, 27, 8; 797 F). Cf also Cic., *Pro Sulla* 42.
[7] *N.A.* 19, 14, 3. [8] J. Carcopino, *La basilique pythagoricienne*, pp. 198 ff.

wrong to think that these conventicles were frequented by the simple and uneducated. It was clearly a matter of a cultured élite: Nigidius was a senator and a man of great authority, and the terms in which he expressed himself were apparently the reverse of popular.

To return to Holger Thesleff's theory: another objection to this hypothesis is that the author judges the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha onesidedly by the criterion of dialect form. Important and clear indications of later modes of thought have been passed over by him. Thus, for instance, he thinks that the treatise Περὶ ἀρχῶν, attributed to Archytas, could indeed have been written by that early fourth century Tarantine Pythagorean. This is, however, absolutely impossible. The three principles assumed in this short work – ὑποκείμενον, μορφή and an effective cause – not only presuppose the terminology and mode of thought of Aristotle, but the interpretation of ὑποκείμενον as ἃ ὠσία or ἃ ἐστώ is unmistakably Stoic. When in Timaeus Locrus the terms εὔροια βίου (104c) and τονοῦν (103d) are used, Thesleff does not wish to accept these terms, which clearly point to Zeno and Cleanthes, as 'indications of a deeper Stoic influence'. Even in Ecphantus, where we find ourselves in an altogether Stoic climate, when 'the nature of all things' is said 'to breathe together with the universe' and thus "bound together, to accompany the stream of the All, in both the best and in a necessary way"[1], he would hardly admit that there is some 'reflection of the idea of πνεῦμα'.

Whilst therefore a certain continuity of Pythagoreanism in Italy must be assumed, Thesleff's explanation of the rise of a literature of Pythagorean school writings in the third century B.C. in cultural isolation in Southern Italy meets with serious objections.

As to the fusion of Pythagoreanism and Platonism which took place in the Greco-Alexandrian world not so long after Plato's death, we shall deal with this in a later chapter[2].

[1] Ecphantus 4.271.16: συμπνείουσα (sc. the φύσις of all beings) γὰρ αὐτῷ (i.e. the universe), καὶ συνδεδεμένα τὰν ἁρίσταν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀναγκαίαν ἀκολουθίαν ὀπαδεῖ ῥυμᾷ τῶ παντός. Thesleff p. 68. It is true that such a passage does not *necessarily* presuppose Posidonius. It does contain a kind of compendium of the Stoic view of the universe; rather it is *penetrated* by the Stoic 'feeling' of the universe as an organic unity, living and in perpetual flux, ruled by an eternal Law, which is both wise and inexorable. That feeling is expressed there in terms which remind us rather of the later than of the early Stoa. [2] Ch. VIII.

CHAPTER IV

THE TESTIMONY OF COINS WITH REGARD TO EARLY PYTHAGOREANISM

Apart from literary, i.e. historical-biographical sources, we know something of the history of Southern Italy in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. from the numerous Greek coins which were issued in this region. As they form our oldest and only contemporary evidence about this period, together with the written sources which date from the fourth century they have a particularly important function. However, this evidence needs an interpretation if it is to be understood, and for this the written sources always prove to be indispensable. Two problems deserve our special attention.

1. The appearance of the oldest coins in S. Italy has been connected with the arrival of Pythagoras. The argument for this ran as follows. The introduction of coins in a country marks a very important step in its economic and, taken in a wide sense, its cultural development. Now we see that this highly important event in S. Italy took place exactly at the time when Pythagoras must have settled there. He came there from a country which was culturally and economically far in advance of Italy, and in Croton he soon acquired a position of great authority. Is it not then an obvious inference to assume that it was he who induced the inhabitants of Croton and later on those of the surrounding places to introduce coinage? Thus, François Lenormant – with some simplification of the available data (i.e. as if alliance coins were struck only in Croton, and as if these alliance coins were the very first coinage to be used) – wrote the following passage[1]:

> "C'est alors, ainsi que nous l'avons déjà dit, que toutes les cités de la Grande-Grèce, à l'exception de Locres, adoptèrent, comme signe matériel de cette union[2] un système uniforme de

[1] François Lenormant, *La grande Grèce*, Paysages et Histoire, Paris 1881, t. II, p. 75 ff.

[2] i.e., that of the Southern Italian confederation under the hegemony of Croton.

> monnaies, variées pour les types dans chaque ville, mais pareilles par le poids, la valeur intrinsèque, la composition du métal et le système du revers incus, c'est-à-dire frappé en creux. L'adoption de cette combinaison aussi simple qu' ingénieuse, qui réalisait une idée déjà conçue, mais moins parfaitement, au VIIe siècle, par les cités de l'Ionie dans leur monnayage d' électrum, constituait une réforme économique et financière des plus heureuses, qui réalisait l'unité monétaire, si utile au commerce, sur une vaste étendue de territoire en respectant tous les droits et tous les intérêts particuliers des souverainetés locales. Il n'est pas possible d'en refuser l'honneur à Pythagore ou du moins aux Pythagoriciens, car les monnaies incuses ont commencé à être fabriquées et l'ont même été en majeure partie au temps où cette école avait partout le gouvernement dans la Grande-Grèce, et la seule ville qui n'y ait pas pris part est précisément celle qui s'était fermée au pythagorisme[1]. Il est même à remarquer que l'on n'a jamais rencontré jusqu'à présent une monnaie des Grecs de l'Italie méridionale antérieure à cette série des incuses, qui révèle une métallurgie si savante et si sûre de ses procédés, qui résoud des problèmes de fabrication accumulés comme à plaisir. Il semble donc que ce fut Pythagore qui, de même que Solon à Athènes quarante ans auparavant, établit chez les Hellènes italiotes l'usage de faire une monnaie nationale."

A few lines further he goes on:

> "Avant d'être des poètes, des artistes ou des philosophes, ils (sc. the Greeks) étaient avant tout, et jusque dans les moelles, un peuple de marchands. Aussi chez eux les esprits les plus portés à l'abstraction se sont montrés en même temps pénétrés de l'instinct vrai des choses de commerce et de finances. Pythagore lui-même, en se lançant dans les régions de l'absolue métaphysique et en se présentant comme un révélateur divin, n'oubliait pas les leçons pratiques qu'il avait prises enfant dans le magasin de son père."

But this has not been the only inference. It has been taken further. These incuse coins of South Italy, which in most cities constitute the earliest series, and in particular those of Croton showing a tripod, are

[1] He is referring to Locri.

so strikingly beautiful, that the question has been asked, *who* at that time and in that region could possibly have possessed such artistic skill. The answer has been: *who else but Pythagoras*, the son of an engraver in Samos, who after the custom of those times will have learnt the art of his father[1].

Indeed a somewhat staggering hypothesis. Those who are concerned with the study of Greek philosophy have probably long ago given up all hope of ever seeing an opus from Pythagoras' own hand. And this is now offered to them – in the form of a coin: a silver coin on which a tripod is represented, beautifully executed. What can be said? Shall we say with Guthrie that this is 'a possibility that must not be overlooked'[2], and that it is hardly possible that Pythagoras should have had nothing to do with this apparently contemporary coin?[3] Or shall we say with another recent English author[4], that it is "the most reasonable explanation yet proposed for these curious coinages"?

No, we shall not. Regretfully we have to exclude this supposed possibility. Because the first premiss was false. The oldest incuse coins of Southern Italy were not contemporary with Pythagoras' arrival. They date from about the middle of the sixth century, that is some twenty years before Pythagoras settled at Croton. Moreover, the earliest coins known to us are not from Croton, but from Sybaris[5].

These facts are confirmed by our literary sources: both Justin (Pompeius Trogus' *Epitome*) and Diodorus speak of Metapontum and Sybaris as having preceded Croton as a leading city[6]. And the coins

[1] This theory was first put forward by the Duc de Luynes, who travelled through Magna Graecia half a century before François Lenormant did and wrote his brilliant work *La Grande Grèce*. Not long ago, however, De Luynes' hypothesis was defended anew by the English archaeologist C. T. Seltman (*The problem of the first Italiote Coins*, in *Num. Chron.* 1949). It is apparently still adhered to in Cambridge. See the recent work of W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. I, Cambridge 1962, pp. 176-177.

[2] Guthrie, op. cit., p. 176. [3] Guthrie ibid., p. 177.

[4] M. White in *Journal of Hell. Stud.* 1954, p. 43.

[5] A. M. C. Kraay, *Num. Chron.* 1960, p. 78.

[6] Trogus (Justin XX 2) says with a certain emphasis that the Metapontines were the oldest: we are informed that the Trojan horse was constructed at Metapontum. As a proof of this the iron tools with which the work was accomplished, were shown at the temple of Athena. The power and wealth of Sybaris were famous everywhere in Antiquity and left their trace in ancient literature. According to Diod. X 23, Sybaris had overwhelming power when it came into conflict with Croton. Cf. Diod. XII 9. Also T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks*, Oxford 1948, p. 356 f.

themselves tell the same tale: there are 'alliance coins' of Sybaris before the much discussed alliance coins of Croton[1]. It is quite certain, therefore, that the first appearance of the incuse coins had nothing to do with Pythagoras at all[2].

2. The second point is that of the alliance coins of Croton with a number of other cities in the South of Italy, perhaps Sicily as well. These coins belong for the greater part to the large group of incuse coins of S. Italy, though they are not among the earliest ones. Alliance coins are found not only of Croton but also of a few other cities. There are alliance coins of Siris-Pyxous, of Mystia-Hyporon[3], later (in the fifth cent.) also of Posidonia-Sybaris[4]. Much more numerous, however, are the alliance coins of Croton with a number of other cities. Kahrstedt mentions as certain the following combinations:

Croton - Sybaris
Croton - Temesa[5]
Croton - Pandosia
Croton - Caulonia
Croton - Zankle

He dates the alliance coins Croton - Sybaris shortly after 510, those with Temesa and Caulonia c. 480, and those with Pandosia shortly before 480. As to the alliance with Zankle, if the inscription ΔA denotes Zankle at all – which has been doubted by von Fritz[6], but

[1] See Kahrstedt, *Zur Geschichte Grossgriechenlands im 5 Jahrh.*, in *Hermes* 53 (1918), p. 180.

[2] See in particular Laura Breglia, *La coniazione incusa di Magna Graecia e la sua attuale problematica*, in *Annali del Istituto Italiano di numismatica*, Roma 1956, pp. 23-27. Also the same author's paper *Le antiche rotte del Mediterraneo documentate da monete e pesi*, in: *Rendiconti della Accad. de Archeol., Lett. e belle arti*, Napoli 1955, pp. 215-218.

[3] Head, *Hist. numm.*², pp. 83 ff.; Babelon, *Traité des monnaies grecques et rom.* II, 1 (1907), 1455 ff.; *Kahrstedt* in *Hermes* 1918, p. 180.

[4] Head, *Hist. Numm.*², p. 85; Kahrstedt, *Hermes* 1918, p. 187.

[5] Not Terina, as was suggested by Babelon, for the coins bear the emblem of the helmet, which belongs to Temesa, not to Terina.

[6] Von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy*, New York 1940, p. 82f., observes that, since these coins bear the symbol of the Crotonian tripod on both sides, the inscription might be the initials of the name of a Crotonian magistrate instead of those of the name of another city, the more so, since the side with the inscription ΔA shows a thymiaterion to the right of the tripod, and this is known as one of the insignia of magistrates. However, alliance coins bearing the tripod of Croton on both sides and an inscription denoting another city on one of them,

which is after all not improbable – the coins must belong to the year 460 or shortly after, since at that time exactly the fall of the tyrant Anaxilas came, and the city called itself for a short time by its old name.

Other inscriptions appear, of which ME has been identified as Medma, OP as Portus Orestis mentioned in Plinius, *N.H.* III 73, while IM apparently must denote Himera. Kahrstedt[1] is rather brief about these coins which he mentions in close connection with the preceding ones. He does identify the ME and OP inscriptions, but is silent on the IM (which, for the rest, is found together with the cock of Himera). "The other names remain unclarified", he declares. "They must have been places within the Crotonian Empire".

Here we arrive at the crucial question. *What did the alliance coins mean?* Granting that they indicate a *foedus iniquum*, since Croton always issued at the same time also coins of its own while the allied cities did not, the question still remains as to what precisely was the relation of Croton to the other cities. If there was a 'Crotonian Empire', as Kahrstedt likes to put it, does this imply that there was a central government, so that the allied cities had lost their autonomy[2]? Were they simply conquered, as Minar thinks they were?[3]

There is one conclusive argument against Minar's theory of the 'territorial expansion' of Croton, viz. that the coin-alliance was far too widespread. Kahrstedt glosses over this fact by keeping silent about Himera and by acting as if all the rest was uncertain. In fact he restricts his Crotonian empire to some six towns in Southern Italy, to which Zankle is finally added as a seventh. Even if only these six places were included, one could raise well-founded objections to the idea of territorial expansion. But be this as it may, Kahrstedt is not consistent when he states by way of summing up that, "all Southern-Italian towns to the south of the line Velia-Metapontum belonged to the Crotonian empire, with the exception of Laos, Skidros and Zankle".

are not unknown. There are coins of this type with the inscription KAYA (Caulonia) as well, whereas the suggestion that the letters might be the initials of a magistrate is merely a guess. As a rule the names of magistrates appear more frequently only in the second part of the fourth century and later (Head, *H.N.*, p. 87).

[1] P. 184 of the above cited article.

[2] This was no doubt what Karhstedt meant: the relation Croton-Sybaris was in his opinion not a special case; Croton's relation to other cities must have been the same.

[3] E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory*, Baltimore 1942, pp. 36-48.

In Southern Italy there were certainly more places than those mentioned. Two important ones were in any case Locri and Rhegium. Now these did not belong to the Crotonian empire, at least Locri did not.

Another point is that there are a great many coins on which the tripod of Croton appears with engravings of various animals on the reverse, with or without inscriptions. We know which towns these animals were the emblems of. Thus we find:

Pegasus with inscription ♀	: Corinth
octopus	: Syracuse, 5th century
owl	: Athens
hare	: Messana or Rhegium, after 480
crab	: Agrigentum
cock	: Himera, before 480.

All these are coins of little value, not incuse as the larger coins, but in dubble relief, although of the ancient type. As they bear the emblem of two towns, *per definitionem* they belong to the alliance coins. If one interprets this alliance not as an economic union, but as a military-political dominion, one gets into serious difficulties. This makes it necessary to revise the theory of territorial conquest.

The above-mentioned small coins ('monnaies divisionnaires') were discussed in a recent article by Colin M. Kraay[1]. He points to the difference in weight between the stater of Croton and that of Corinth: the latter was somewhat heavier. The Crotonian stater will therefore not have been accepted in Corinth and several other places without a small supplementary coin. They therefore testify to a regular trade between Croton and Corinth, Athens and several other places in Sicily.

However, I am willing to assume that at the time of this coin-alliance, i.e. between 510 and c. 450, a Southern Italian confederation existed under the hegemony of Croton. Indications of this are undoubtedly supplied by the coins. On the basis of archaeological-numismatic data that is all we can say[2]. For a further interpretation we are dependent on the written historical sources.

[1] *Schweizer Münzblätter*, Dez. 1958, pp. 99 ff.

[2] I consider it perfectly correct that Laura Breglia, in her article mentioned above on the incuse coins of Magna Graecia, devotes only one sentence to the alliance coins, restricting herself to stating the existence of a federation under the leadership of Croton.

CHAPTER V

THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORIANS AND BIOGRAPHERS ABOUT PYTHAGORAS AND EARLY PYTHAGOREANISM (1)

1. The preceding events

We find the history prior to Pythagoras' arrival in Croton briefly but clearly described in Justinus XX 2-3. Something about it can be found in Diodorus as well.

According to Justinus' account the three Achaean colonies – Metapontum, Sybaris and Croton – attacked the Ionic colony of Siris, at that time a rival of Sybaris. Locri chose the side of Siris. This support resulted in an attack by Croton on Locri. The Crotonians marched with enormously superior forces against the much smaller Locri – according to Justinus more than 120.000 on the side of Croton against 15.000 Locrians –, but contrary to all expectations they suffered a crushing defeat at the river Sagra at the hands of the Locrians who fought with the courage wrought out of despair[1].

The ancient sources only relate the story that the Locrians, fearfull of the superior power of Croton, asked Sparta for help and that the Spartans, who quite understandably were unwilling and not in a position to go on an overseas expedition, sent the Dioscuri to their rescue. It is related how they travelled with great ceremony on the ambassadors' ship to Locri and how they were seen up to the end of the battle dressed in scarlet and on white horses. Justinus (Trogus) gives a rational explanation when he says, "The Locrians, seeing their own small numbers, gave up all hope of victory and concentrated determinedly on communal death: and so great was the courage that fired each and everyone of them as the result of their despair that they considered themselfs victors should they not die unrevenged.

[1] Pausanias reports this famous battle in III 19, 11-13; Diodorus VIII 32; Justinus XX 2-3; Strabo 261. **T** 1.

But just because they sought an honourable death, they found a happy life: and their victory was caused by nothing but the fact that they had given up hope."

François Lenormant[1] made a study of the spot where this battle must have taken place. The Sagra, he notes, cannot on any account be the present-day river Allaro; it was the *Turbulo*, a somewhat more southerly situated wild mountain stream which cuts its way through narrow gaps between steep rocks. At the mouth of this stream lies the obvious way to cross from the country of Caulonia to Locri between inaccessible heights and the sea. It was a veritable Thermopylae through which the Crotonians had to take their army: as if made for a small but determined group to prevent the passage of a superior force. "Thus the result of the battle of the Sagra, which viewed from afar and to posterity appeared so extraordinary, becomes obvious and logical when one stands on the actual battlefield and considers how differently the two armies were composed": that of Croton was a people's army recruited from the whole region belonging to Croton, mostly composed of peace-loving Italian farmers, without any military training and not heavily armed, that of Locri composed of citizens of one Doric city, trained by Spartan methods, with the spirit and the equipment of heavily armed warriors.

This then was the battle of the Sagra: a famous battle, surrounded by fabulous stories and legends. 'After these events', Justinus says[2], "the citizens of Croton took no further part in training in bravery; they had nothing more to do with the arms trade. They had had enough of the business from which they had derived so little profit and would have fallen into a life of luxury (no different from Sybaris) – had it not been for the philosopher Pythagoras".

Dunbabin[3] dates the fall of Siris and the battle of the Sagra shortly after 540: this was the time when Sparta somewhat withdrew from her overseas interests on behalf of the Ionians in Asia Minor. A second argument: Croton produced a striking number of victors in the Olympic Games, but between 548 and 532 not a single one. This may point to a period of decay.

These are plausible arguments. They may, however, equally well lead to a somewhat earlier dating. For one thing, the polite rejection of the request for help against Croton on the part of the Locrians is also

[1] *La Grande Grèce* II, pp. 31/32.
[2] XX 4, 1-2. **T** 2.
[3] *The Western Greeks*, p. 360.

pre-eminently possible in the years 550-540, since it was precisely at that time that Sparta was involved in political complications with Croesus and Amasis. Hence the battle of the Sagra could very well be placed at about 545. The coins from Siris also point to a somewhat earlier fall of the city.

This then was the situation when Pythagoras came to Southern Italy.

2. Pythagoras' residence in Croton and his activities there according to the report of Pompeius Trogus

Why did Pythagoras, on his arrival in Italy, settle at Croton? Was this a matter of chance or choice?

The preceding paragraph enables us to answer this question. The fact that Pythagoras settled in Croton was no doubt not due to chance, but it was a deliberate choice. We may assume that Pythagoras, who was then in the prime of life and who had already for many years taught in his native city, came to Southern Italy with definite views: views on the structure of the universe, which he recognized as a divine order, views also on the nature of man and his place in the universe, and finally views on his own task and calling. What these views were is made clear to us in broad outline by the ancient sources. They are unanimous. All show us Pythagoras as a man who, because of his views on the cosmic order, felt called to form and lead a human community in order to teach people to take their appropriate place in the cosmos. With this purpose in mind Pythagoras will have wanted to settle in a large population centre of such political structure that it was not a priori cut off from new ideas, and of such a spirit that it was not too tied by material interests. At that time Sybaris was the largest and most powerful city in Southern Italy. It is clear why Pythagoras did not make his way there. Immediately after Sybaris in importance came Croton – Croton that was shaken and humiliated by the heavy defeat in the battle of the Sagra, and by these very circumstances was perhaps more open to a strong spiritual leadership than at a time of unbroken prosperity. Other places were much less important: Locri was much smaller and moreover a Doric, highly self-contained city; Tarentum, later an important place, was in the background at that time. Hence it is easy to understand in every respect why Pythagoras went to Croton.

Justinus gives us a concise report of the philosopher's activities

there[1]. He begins with a few words about his origin and intellectual background. "Pythagoras was the son of Maratus, a rich merchant of Samos. Educated by a solid training in knowledge and wisdom" – this *magna sapientiae incrementa* may remind us both of Pherecydes and of the than flourishing philosophical school of Miletus – "he left first for Egypt, later for Babylon in order to learn thoroughly the movements of the heavenly bodies and to consider the origin of the universe. In this way he had acquired a high degree of knowledge. After his return from Babylon to his native city he had gone to Crete and Lacedaemon to get acquainted with the laws of Minos and Lycurgus, famous at that time. After all this preparation he came to Croton and there by his authority called the people who had fallen into luxury back to the practice of sobriety".

Let us pause here for a moment and concentrate our attention on this single line in which the ancient historian summarizes the whole of Pythagoras' philosophy and activities:

> *Crotona venit populumque in luxuriam lapsum auctoritate sua ad usum frugalitatis revocavit.*

Should anyone now feel compelled to interrupt and to say: "Of course not, that is the political activity of Pythagoras; it has nothing to do with his philosophy" – then I would remind him of the words of Trogus which immediately precede the above cited passage:

> *mutassentque vitam luxuria, ni Pythagoras philosophus fuisset.*

I am not giving a modern interpretation according to present-day taste and preference; I am following the ancient historian, who according to the view of his time hands on the facts as they have come down: it was the *philosopher* Pythagoras who, he says, by his personal prestige brought back the people of Croton from luxury to sobriety.

That is one point. A second which we must consider is that he says *populumque in luxuriam lapsum ... revocavit.*

He brought *the people* of Croton back from luxury to sobriety. And this is what the ancient historian considers was Pythagoras' real and great achievement: not the formation of a circle of students of mathematical science, like a modern scholar with radically new insights and inner strength for winning over young people to a certain field of investigation succeeds in gathering around him first an audience and later fellow workers; nor the formation of an idealistic religio-ethical brotherhood, a kind of 'congregation' living according to a rule.

[1] Justinus XX 4, 3ff. **T** 2.

Pythagoras did do all that. He undoubtedly inspired young people to work on mathematical, musicological and astronomic problems; he founded his 'Brotherhood' let us say the *Societas Pythagorica* (S.P.)[1] – an organisation which does indeed, at least in Iamblichus' description[2], impress us as being of a highly monastic character. And this is what distant posterity, to which we ourselves belong, is still being told about Pythagoras in more or less detail, more or less documented, more or less illustrated by handbooks and monographs. But for the ancient historian the real achievement of the philosopher Pythagoras was something else: it was precisely that about which our historians of ancient philosophy are silent: *the education of the people of Croton as a whole.*

I wish to underline that we are concerned here with an historical fact, just as trustworthy and well-founded as anything else we may claim to know about Pythagoras.

We now quote further from Justinus about the methods used by Pythagoras in this task[3].

> "Every day he praised virtue and summed up the wrongs of luxury and the fate of states that had been ruined by that plague; and he induced so great a zeal for sobriety among the masses that it seemed incredible that some of them should live in luxury. He frequently instructed the married women, apart from the manfolk, and the children apart from their parents. He taught the women to be chaste, and to be obedient to their husbands, the children to be modest and diligent in learning. He admonished all of them that sobriety is as it were the mother of all virtues, and by constantly repeating these talks he had brought it about that the married women cast aside their clothes sewn with gold thread and the other ornaments according with their dignity, as only serving luxury (*instrumenta luxuriae*): they took all these to the temple of Hera and dedicated them to the goddess herself, openly declaring that chastity is the true ornament of womanhood and not clothes".

In this passage there are three interesting points. (1) It is clearly stated that Pythagoras addressed himself to *the people as a whole,*

[1] In the rest of this book the Pythagorean Society will be denoted by these letters.

[2] This is also corroborated by Diodorus. [3] XX 4, 6-12. **T** 3a.

including women and children. (2) The population is divided into *three groups* which were taught separately by the philosopher. (3) Emphasis is laid on the frequency of these talks and their regular repetition.

In other words: whereas elsewhere the teaching of Pythagoras is clearly and repeatedly described as being esoteric, the historian tells us that esoteric teaching in the S.P. was by no means the be-all and end-all of Pythagoras' activities. Pythagoras also addressed the wider circle, and not just once in a kind of propaganda-speech, to acquire followers, but in a systematic education of the people. That he devoted himself personally to this, is for the ancient historian the most impressive aspect of his activities.

Is this testimony unique, or is it corroborated elsewhere?

The testimony of Pompeius Trogus has its parallels: in his own century in the historian Diodorus, later in Porphyry and in Iamblichus. It is of importance to investigate whether in them Trogus' testimony is essentially corroborated or contradicted.

Diodorus expresses himself in rather vague, rhetorical terms, when he says (X 3):

> "His speech was so convincing and so elegant that almost the whole city turned to him daily: the whole population flocked together to hear him, as if it was for the appearance of a god. And not only did he show himself as a great man as to the power of speaking, but he also showed a moral character of great firmness and stability and for young people a wonderful example of a life of self-discipline, and he would keep those with whom he came in contact from extravagance and from luxury[1]."

Despite from their rhetorical form these few lines make it sufficiently clear that Diodorus goes back to the same tradition as Trogus: he, too, regards Pythagoras not in the first place as the founder of the S.P. and the leader of a closed circle. It is his activities before the people of Croton as a whole that are mentioned in the first place. His call to sobriety and his warning against excess are in particular underlined[2]. Finally Diodorus reports that Pythagoras in his talks with the people (διαλεγόμενος) gave 'many other prescriptions' for a controlled and virtuous life and because of this was honoured as a god by the Crotonians (ἴσα θεοῖς ἐτιμᾶτο)[3]. – This formulation again

[1] **T** 3b. [2] X 7, 1. [3] X 9, 9.

suggests some kind of pastoral work amongst the people of Croton as such rather than esoteric teaching within the School itself.

As for Porphyry in *V.P.* 18, he talks about Pythagoras' activities in Croton, for which he refers to Dicaearchus: he reports in the first place about his impressive physical appearance; then also his extremely pleasant voice, and furthermore his charming and good character[1]. It was through these qualities that Pythagoras influenced the citizens of Croton (τὴν τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν πόλιν) to such an extent that, first, he won over the senate in a long and beautiful speech (πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαλεχθείς); second, at the request of the senate he made a speech to the young men, third, one to the school children, fourth, one to the women at a special gathering called together by him.

Furthermore Porphyry reports (c. 19) that through all this Pythagoras attained great fame and many followers, both men and women.

Also many 'Kings and potentates' from the surrounding Italian country were to be found in his audience. "However, what he used to say to his audience" Porphyry continues," nobody can say for certain, for a systematic silence prevailed amongst them" (οὐδ' ἡ τυχοῦσα σιωπή).

Porphyry goes on to name the three main points of the Pythagorean doctrine, which can still serve as the basis for any discussion of it[2].

In connection with the above passage it must first be remarked that c. 18 describes a Pythagoras who speaks to the people in a clearly exoteric way, – or if one likes, as a preacher; in c. 19, however, there is a special circle of pupils who gather round him, once he has attracted attention by his public speeches and has gained people's confidence. Within the *intimate circle* a 'systematic silence' prevailed. This report in c. 19 does not conflict with the picture of Pythagoras appearing in public as reported in c. 18.

Porphyry does not go into the content of the teaching to the wider circle. He does, however, make mention of four groups of the population who were addressed separately: the senate, the young men, the schoolchildren and the women. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 37 ff., mentions the same four groups, but has Pythagoras first speak to the young men who assembled round him in the gymnasion and after that to the senate.

[1] χάριν τε πλείστην καὶ κόσμον ἐπί τε τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ ἤθους. **T** 4. The rather vague addition καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων means something to the effect that he by nature had got everything on his side.

[2] As I myself did in *Greek Phil.* I, and as has recently been done also by Guthrie in his *History*.

Modern scholars have sometimes found a reason in this for arguing that Iamblichus 'altered the tradition'[1]. The inference is not necessary. What, after all, is 'the tradition'? Pompeius Trogus and Diodorus have without doubt used Timaeus as their source. They both recognize a Pythagoras who regularly addressed large groups of the population of Croton and exercised a profound influence on them. Porphyry, who mentions Dicaearchus as his source, only slightly touches on this side of Pythagoras' work; his words rather give the impression that one speech was delivered to each of the four groups than that there was regular instruction. Iamblichus reports fully on the contents of the four speeches.

It should be noted in this connection that in the first place, especially as the effect was so profound, regularly repeated instruction would seem far more probable than four speeches given only once, secondly that it is highly improbable that Pythagoras should have been invited straightaway to give a speech to the senate of Croton; thirdly that it is much easier to imagine that he originally spoke to a group of listeners in the place where young men practised sports. Is there any ground for Porphyry's short report having any particular authority? Hardly, – unless in the eyes of those who have to defend a theory, according to which they consider Dicaearchus as the primary source, supposing that Timaeus (who may have written some ten years later) followed him. The theory, which forms the background of this view, originated in 19th century Germany, and hence spread all over Europe: it supposes that Dicaearchus who, in reaction to Aristotle's exclusive ideal of the βίος θεωρητικός, claimed the supremacy of the βίος πρακτικός, created the figure of the socio-political Pythagoras as a projection of his own ideal of life[2].

This means that Dicaearchus simply invented the story of the four speeches, and that Timaeus, the historian of S. Italy and Sicily, – instead of handing down a local tradition which he might have known by personal inquiry – just filled up the 'framework' offered to him by Dicaearchus.

If that would be true, Porphyry's short account on the speeches would be deserving of preference, indeed.

We may be short on this theory: it is refuted by the fact that, two generations before Dicaearchus, the four speeches of Pythagoras were

[1] Thus Mrs. Timpanaro-Cardini, *Pitagorici* I, p. 42.

[2] Both E. Rohde and Zeller held this theory. They were followed more recently by Werner Jaeger and by many others.

cited by Antisthenes, when he commented on the first line of the *Odyssea*, as an example of πολυτροπία[1]. Therefore, let us go on taking the historical evidence as it lies before us. We have no reason of disparaging the testimony of Timaeus: no doubt he knew the local tradition of the cities of S. Italy and Sicily. His testimony has the value of an independent source.

In the next chapter we will have a closer look at the contents of the speeches in Iamblichus attributed to Pythagoras. For the time being it may be stated that four of our sources – Diodorus and Trogus, Porphyry and Iamblichus – are in agreement on the important point that they all refer to the public activity of Pythagoras. According to Diodorus and Trogus, the effect of this activity was very intense. Porphyry (Dicaearchus) is silent about it. Iamblichus joins the first mentioned tradition, which most probably goes back to Timaeus.

Let us now return to Trogus' report. It forces us to consider the following points. First. The ancient historian shows us a Pythagoras different from the one we used to imagine. From the dimness behind the σινδών which hid him from the uninitiated[2] he now appears in the open. This presents him to us as a completely different person; we see him as a pastoral preacher, as a man who was aware that he had something to say to *everyone*, young and old, men and women, great and small; not just to an intellectual élite, but to everyone without exception.

Second. Although this is not in accordance with the picture we have held up to now, one cannot say it conflicts with this: the esoterism is not denied, it is only supplemented.

Third. We can well understand this aspect of the philosopher Pythagoras, however new and unexpected it may be to us, from his whole thought. For what is the sense of Pythagoras' doctrine of number and harmony which we know from other sources[3]? It is a deeper insight into the structure and laws of the universe comprehended as a cosmos: a universe having within itself its own laws, its divine order dependent on numerical ratios; a universe in which man is

[1] Dindorf, Scholia in Hom. *Od.* I 1. **T** 5. Infra, p. 118.

[2] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 72.

[3] This doctrine, which is principally known to us from Aristotle, *Met.* A 5, has often been discussed in the modern scholarly tradition, most recently by Guthrie. I consider it unnecessary to discuss again here what has already been well interpreted and generally accepted. I may presume that my readers are well acquainted with the traditional view of Pythagoras.

incorporated, of which he is part and in which only by understanding the whole he will be able to determine his own position and nature.

But what does all this mean for the task of the philosopher who more than anybody else has attained this deeper insight into the whole of things? What else than that it is *his* duty to lead his ignorant fellow-men and show then the way? The way to conform to the divine laws which prevail in the universe; the way to become a cosmos-in-miniature oneself, to effectuate within oneself the harmony which prevails in the great cosmos.

This must be the task of the thinker who has acquired an insight into the cosmic laws: his duty towards each of his fellow-men taken individually, but no less with respect to his fellow-men as citizens forming a state. For the individual never stands alone: he is a member of a community and has a duty towards it. The philosopher-educator will speak to him as such and make him aware of his duty and calling, both as a member of a political community and simply as a man in relation to his fellow-men.

It was with these ideas and ideals that Pythagoras came to Croton. If the historical sources from the fourth century B.C. to which the report of Trogus goes back contain some truth, then he made use of two methods to achieve his goal: not only education and instruction in his own institution with a closed character, but also systematic and repeated preaching to the people. The first of these undoubtedly had for one of its aims, just as later Plato's educational work at the Academy: the training of people who would be capable of taking up leading positions in the state – in Croton as well as other places – either as councillors or as executive government officials, or as legislators. It should not be imagined that *all* members of the S.P. were intended for this task – our texts, as we shall see, do not point in that direction –; but *there were some* who were considered suitable by the leader and who, as we may assume from explicit statements, were sent out by him when the occasion arose[1]. In this sense Pythagoras' teaching in his own school was a form of *indirect education of the masses*, just as later Plato's work in the Academy aimed at being and, up to a certain extent, actually was. Besides this, however, – and this is as regards method the surprising thing – the philosopher of Croton practised a *direct pastoral teaching*. This was far removed from anything that Plato and Aristotle did, – and it must be stated that, as

[1] See also *infra*: ch. VII, sect. 5.

a rule, we do not hear a word about it in modern historians of philosophy. When on the grounds of a historical testimony which is difficult to reject, the modern historian recognizes that Pythagoras' teaching 'indirectly' had a not unimportant political influence, he hastens to underline the indirectness as well as the non-philosophical character of this activity. As against this we must point out that according to the ancient sources there was indeed a direct education of the people by Pythagoras, and secondly, this education was not so much concerned with political influence, but with *character training* in a social context, with 'Sozialpaedagogik', as it was called by the Marburg philosopher Natorp; or if one wishes to express it in other terms: it was a kind of *mission*.

The question which now arises is whether the fourth-century tradition is trustworthy. Should we say that in the fourth century in those Greek cities of S. Italy, from which Timaeus and Dicaearchus derived their information, nothing more could evidently be known about the philosopher who had lived in Croton two centuries before?

It seems to me that we have to keep three or four things in mind.

(1) Generally speaking, the ancients conceived of the history of thought in terms of schools to a much greater extent than we are accustomed to doing. The *school tradition* was important in this conception.

(2) The closed community of the S.P. especially was an institution in which the tradition about the founder will have been carefully preserved.

(3) Undoubtedly from very early on legends grew up around the figure of Pythagoras within and outside the school. We can trace indications of this up to Aristotle[1]. On the other hand, the report about Pythagoras' speeches to the people, however extraordinary their effect is said to have been, does not contain anything miraculous. As far as Trogus, Diodorus and Porphyry are concerned, no reference is made to any superhuman powers. Iamblichus, it is true, says at the end of the third speech that 'everybody called Pythagoras divine', which is his manner of expressing how profoundly the philosopher of Croton was admired by those with whom he came in contact. It does not, however, give us any ground for relegating the speeches to the realm of legend. On the contrary, it is exactly what could be known in the S. Italian cities from information handed down, as it did not

[1] Cf. nr. 22 of my *Greek Phil.* I.

fall under the secrecy of the S.P., and must have been quite a sensational event in those parts.

(4) Can it be said that the combination of philosopher and pastoral preacher was a normal thing in the fourth century, or that it embodied an ideal which the writers of that time could have ascribed to the ancient Ionic philosopher as a sort of self-projection? Far from it. In the fourth century the method of the philosophical dialogue was known in Socratic circles. But it is impossible to say that the philosopher as a pastoral preacher was a fourth-century ideal.

In view of these considerations I am inclined to conclude that the fourth-century S. Italian tradition is trustworthy. Furthermore we shall find that as regards content it has a certain consistence and psychological probability. In general it must be said that this tradition is no more suspect and no less acceptable than other data about Pythagoras which we are used to accepting as trustworthy. The reason why despite this it is rejected by modern historians and philosophers is partly that the Dicaearchus theory still has its power over many minds, partly that the activities described here do not fit into the framework of what we are today used to calling 'philosophy'. This criterion is, however, unhistorical: it does not matter what *we*, according to *our* opinions, think Pythagoras can or cannot have done; what matters is how he himself looked upon and practised this. The ancient texts tell us more about this than has been recognized up to now. They force us to revise our traditional view of Pythagoras drastically.

CHAPTER VI

THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORIANS AND BIOGRAPHERS (2). THE SPEECHES IN IAMBLICHUS

1. The first speech[1]

Iamblichus says the following[2]:

> (37) A few days after his arrival at Croton Pythagoras visited the gymnasion. And when the young people there had assembled around him, he addressed them[3], as tradition has it[4]: he constantly exhorted them[5] to be diligent towards those older than themselves, pointing out that in the cosmos and in life, in political communities just as in nature, what precedes is more honoured than what comes later in time, e.g. the East is placed before the West, dawn before evening, the beginning before the end, coming into being before passing away; and similarly also the original inhabitants before those who come later. In the same way in colonies it is the leaders and the founders of cities who are most highly respected, and, generally speaking, gods more so than demons, demons more so than demigods and heroes more than ordinary people; and amongst the last mentioned always those who were the cause of birth above the young.
>
> (38) He said this by way of induction, in order to lead them to consider their parents their betters; for, he said, they owed them a debt of gratitude as much as a dead man would rightly owe to a person who had the power to bring him back to life.
>
> Further it was only fair to love those who were our first and

[1] **T** 6. [2] *V.P.* 37-39, 3.

[3] λόγους τινὰς διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς αὐτούς. Mark the plural: Iamblichus' wording suggests that Pythagoras did not just make one speech to the young people, but spoke to them repeatedly.

[4] παραδέδοται. [5] παρεκάλει.

> greatest benefactors above all others and never to cause them any sorrow; before our birth, however, only our parents existed with their benefactions, and ancestors are the cause of all the good wrought by posterity[1]. In the eyes of the gods one cannot do any wrong by showing that our ancestors are our greatest benefactors[2]. For it is obvious that the gods will be full of forgiveness for those who honour their parents in the highest degree; for it is from our parents that we have learned to honour the Divinity. (39) Hence Homer, by using this same name, honoured the king of the gods, viz. by calling him *father* of gods and mortals.

Let us pause here for a moment. The regulations for honouring gods and parents, as a primary human duty stated with the greatest emphasis, are well known to the readers of Plato's *Laws* and the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. It is worth while reading and comparing the passages concerned. These are Plato, *Nom.* IV, 715 e 7 - 718 a 6, and Xen., *Mem.* II 2.

Plato begins with the gods. "God has the beginning, the end and the middle of everything that is in his hands", thus begins the Athenian in his speech to the supposed citizens of the city about to be founded, and he added that the Divinity "according to Nature completes his circular course going straight on".

Περιπορευόμενος suggests the circular movement, and with it eternity, εὐθείᾳ the absence of deviation and with it the inexorability of the divine law, or the strictness of divine justice[3].

"And he is always followed by Dikè, who judges severely those who do not adhere to the divine law. He who wishes to achieve happiness follows her humbly and disciplined; but the proud and undisciplined remain behind forsaken by God, run into bad company and create confusion in social life[4]. – If the divine order is like this, what should a sober-minded man think and do with respect to it?"

With the figure of Dikè Plato adopts an old religious idea, which we know from Heraclitus[5] as well as from Parmenides' didactic

[1] Notice the Stoic looking term τὰ κατορθούμενα. I shall say a word on it later on.

[2] οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον (Deubner p. 22, 1. 16) means, practically speaking, παντὸς μᾶλλον. See Kühner-Gerth II 2, p. 316, n. 2.

[3] The scholiast says that εὐθείᾳ means κατὰ δίκην (E. B. England, *The Laws of Plato*, I p. 447).

[4] Abridged version. [5] Fr. 94 Diels.

poem[1]: there Dikè maintains the divine order prevailing in nature, the transgression of which cannot go unpunished. Cp. also the δίκην καὶ τίσιν διδόναι ἀλλήλοις in Anaximander.

Man must be humble and controlled in his attitude to the divine order: ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος, a typically Pythagorean view, expressed in a perfectly Pythagorean form. The same is true of 'creating confusion' (πάντα ταράττειν) and 'turning home and state upside down' (οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ποιεῖν), which occurs as a result of the inward estrangement from the divine law.

The solution to the problem posed here is of course: "that everyone must think of belonging to those who will follow God" (716b).

Τῷ θεῷ συνακολουθεῖν, the same formula which we also find repeatedly in the Pythagorean texts. Cp. e.g. Iambl., *V.P.* 137: ὁ βίος ἅπας συντέτακται πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ.

In Plato follows the statement that *"God is for us the measure of all things*, and much more so than, as is usually said, a human being". – These last words are an obvious allusion to the famous pronouncement of Protagoras: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, e.q.s.[2].

In this principle it is implied that man must try as far as possible to be like the Divinity, – and he can do this, Plato states, by being σώφρων: sober-minded and controlled. Only for him who possesses this state of mind is it good and profitable to sacrifice to the gods and to turn to them with prayers and votive offerings; for the impure this is both unseemly and improfitable (716 de).

Instructions follow which are in their formulation purely Pythagorean:

> "If one honours the chthonic gods after the gods of Olympus and the gods of the city, he will perfectly fulfil the requirements of piety when offering to these gods the even, the less good and the left part of the sacrifice, but to the gods of Olympus and of the city the uneven, the best and right hand part of the sacrificial animal[3]. And after having made sacrifices to

[1] Fr. 1, 1. 14ff; cf. Moira in fr. 8, 1. 37; Aetius II 7,1 (Diels *V.S.* 28 A 37). More about this in J.Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt*, Utr. diss. 1964 (Series: *Phil. teksten en studies*, Assen 1964), pp. 242 ff.

[2] Protag. fr. 1 in Diels; Sextus Emp., *Math.* VII 69; cf. Plato, *Theaet.* 151c. On the interpretation see my *Greek Phil.* I, nr. 171.

[3] About even – uneven, left – right, see the συστοιχία in Aristotle, *Met.* A 5, 986a 15ff. (*Greek Phil.* nr. 42). Further Iamblichus, *V.P.* 153; Delatte, *Essai sur la litt. pythag.*, p. 300f.

> these gods the sensible man will make sacrifices to the demons and after these to the heroes" (717a 6 - b 4).

Next the cult of the family gods (πατρῷοι θεοί) is mentioned, and lastly the revering of the living parents.

> "For it is only right that we should pay our first and greatest obligations, the oldest of our debts, and that we should believe that all we possess and have belongs to our parents, who have brought us up, to place it at their disposal for their support to the best of our abilities, first of all our material possessions, then our physical strength, and thirdly our spiritual wealth, repaying them for the care and trouble they devoted to us when we were young, repaying them when they are old and in their old age are in great need of support.
>
> "Throughout life one must to one's own parents in particular be polite and respectful in one's speech, without any exception, for rashly spoken words will be severely punished. For Nemesis, Dikè's messenger, is appointed to watch over all such things. And when parents are angry with their children and give way to wrath, whether in words or deeds, then the children have to give in, not taking it amiss in them, since a father is most rightly angry with his son if he thinks he is being unfairly treated by him" (717 b 6 - d 6).

So much for Plato in the *Nomoi*. There is an obvious close affinity with the ideas found expressed in Iamblichus in the so-called first speech of Pythagoras – there too there is great emphasis on the *ancient* nature of the duties to parents –; but at the same time we see a profound difference. In Plato the whole discussion is built up differently. The duty of worshipping the gods is not explicitly given priority in the Pythagorean text: it is apparently considered implicit in the cosmic principle that 'what is older is more honoured'; it is at first not at all emphasized and its moral implications are not, as is the case in Plato, elaborated into a primary law[1]. Yet the belief in the gods is constantly present in the Pythagorean speech, it is present in a somewhat primitive form, primary and unreflected; it has been learnt from one's parents and is corroborated by the poets; the speaker uses it in order to strengthen parental respect – and uses at the same time parental authority as a basis for belief in the gods.

[1] The sequence 'gods→demons→heroes→parents and benefactors' appears again in Iamblichus *V.P.* 100. Cf. also 144 and 175. Diog. Laert. VIII 23, the beginning.

Τιμιώτερον τὸ πρεσβύτερον. This was undoubtedly an early-Pythagorean adage[1]. Plato knows it and uses it in an ontological sense when he says[2] that the soul is 'older' than the body and anything bodily. He does not refer to it in the above-cited passage of *Nom.* IV. On the other hand, in our Pythagorean text the principle is immediately applied both to the cosmos and to human life: it is both a natural and a socio-political principle. By this usage the philosopher's adhortation to the young men of Croton appears entirely in a cosmic setting. Further, the wording itself in which the principle is expressed makes an apparently naive appeal to public opinion: μᾶλλον τιμώμενον τὸ προηγούμενον, "that which precedes is *more honoured* than that which follows". Together with the whole series of instances that follow, this way of arguing does give the impression of a very peculiar and archaic form of thought. I could hardly imagine that a fourth-century author should have expressed himself in such a form, when constructing according to his own ideas an address which he thought the ancient philosopher might have delivered. But I can imagine that thoughts from olden times have come down into a later century, and that somewhere in the fifth century – say in the latter half – some member of the School wrote down in this form what he heard by tradition about the Master's speech to the young men of Croton.

No doubt Plato, too, knew the parallel of on the one hand cosmic proportions and cosmic motion, and on the other human behaviour and human thought. In two passages at least[3] he expresses this Pythagorean principle, and in the first of these in a typically Pythagorean form. But, when comparing the supposed Athenian's address to the inhabitants of the City of the Laws with Iamblichus' first speech by Pythagoras, we find in the latter a rather striking primitivity which is entirely alien to Plato's parallel text[4].

A second parallel to Pythagoras' first address is to be found in Xeno-

[1] Cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 22: τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους τιμᾶν, τὸ προηγούμενον τῷ χρόνῳ τιμιώτερον ἡγουμένους, e.q.s.; Arist. ap. Iambl. *V.P.* 182. Delatte, *Litt. pythag.*, p. 302, says: this presupposes an ἄκουσμα in the form of: τί τιμιώτατον; – Reply: τὸ πρεσβύτατον. Cf. Arist. *Met.* A 3, 983b 32.

[2] *Nom.* X 892 a 2 -b 1 (*Greek Phil.* nr. 388). Cf. the *Timaeus*, 34 b 9-35 a1.

[3] *Gorgias* 507 d6-508 b3; *Tim.* 47 a-c.

[4] In case somebody should remark that in the passage quoted from the *Nomoi* a *philosopher does speak to the masses*, I would like to point out that this address is completely fictitious. It is true that Plato via legislation aimed at mass education, and did in fact practise it, but direct addresses to the masses were far from his thoughts. His 'Athenian' in the *Nomoi* does this at the most only on paper.

phon's *Memorabilia* II 2. Not that in this case there is any question of mass instruction – it concerns one individual case: one of Socrates' sons thinks he has well-founded grounds for complaint because of the behaviour of his mother. Socrates treats this as a case of ingratitude: he points to the deep obligations of children towards their parents, to the trouble and care each of us gave our mothers when we were small, to the constant care and – despite apparently angry words – the essentially kind disposition also in the case of *this* mother towards her son. Not at any time does Socrates take the side of his son. On the contrary, he finally points out to him that even the state, though ignoring all other kinds of ingratitude, inflicts penalties on the man who is discourteous to his parents, and rejects him as unworthy of office. 'And in the end', he says, 'you will be found without a friend, for all will cast you out when they perceive that you are ungrateful towards your parents'.

Modern commentators have sometimes blamed Xenophon for overlooking 'the *righteous* anger' of the young man, and with it 'the real ethical problem of the μήτηρ χαλεπή'[1]. That is a judgment from a modern point of view. The point is precisely that Xenophon, like Plato, in the case of children against their parents on principle *does not recognize righteous anger* – there is only complete guilt. Nor can it be said that this standpoint is unreasonable, for it is rationally founded by the πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα ὀφειλήματα. This can hardly be called primitive. It was classical Greek, even if it did have older roots. The way in which it appears in the Pythagorean text differs to the same extent from Xenophon as it differs from Plato: it has a character of its own, clearly not typically fourth-century, a certain primitiveness which by the above-mentioned features appears to be authentic.

As to the wording of these chapters, it cannot be said to have anything particularly postclassical about it. By ἐπαγωγῆς ἕνεκα the author probably means that Pythagoras cited all these instances in order to induce the young men of Croton to consider their parents more than themselves. The term is clearly postaristotelian[2]. As to κατορθοῦν in the sense of 'to accomplish successfully', though it became quite a technical term in the Stoa, it was classical Greek, used by Plato and the Attic orators as well[3].

[1] Thus Gigon in his *Memorabilien Kommentar* II, Basel 1956, pp. 94-96.

[2] Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* I 2, 1356 b1-25; *Top.* I 12, 105 a10-19.

[3] Plato, *Meno* 99c. Also in Lysias and Demosthenes.

The following lines of Iamblichus deserve careful attention, both for the thought expressed in them and for the wording in which it is expressed. Iamblichus *V.P.* 39, 4:

> And many of the other mythologizing poets have handed down that the king and the queen of the gods have diligently managed to preserve among themselves the divided love on the part of their children in respect to the existing parental ties, and for this reason have taken upon themselves the role both of father and mother: for Zeus brought forth Athena and Hera Hephaestus, who bore a nature the opposite to their own, in order to participate thus in the love further removed from them.
>
> (c. 40) All of those present then agreed that the judgment of the immortals is the strongest. Then he pointed out to the men of Croton, because Heracles was the ancestor of those who had settled there as colonists, that they must obey their parents in all that they were instructed to do: for they had heard from tradition that the god himself had achieved his works in obedience to another older than himself, and had for his father instituted the Olympic games to celebrate the victory of the accomplished works.

This reasoning is somewhat strange to us, and hence the form in which it is expressed, although not unclassical on the whole, is here and there not readily understandable. οἱ βασιλεύοντες τῶν θεῶν (Zeus and Hera), as the poets tell us, have diligently (πεφιλοτετιμημένους) managed to preserve 'the divided love of the children' among themselves. Except for the double reduplication of πεφιλοτετιμημένους which no doubt is due to Iamblichus[1], there is not a single word of this which is specifically unclassical. Φιλοστοργέω is used by Plato in the sense of family affection[2], and also φιλοτιμεῖσθαι for *striving eagerly to do* is not unusual in the same author[3].

[1] That Iambl.' *V.P.* contains a number of later forms of spelling, conjugation, syntax and style, was elaborately shown by Deubner in his *Bemerkungen zum Text der V.P. des Iambl.*, Sitzungsber. d. Preuss. Akad. 1935, Philol.-hist. Kl., pp. 621-659. Though the *V.P.* is a collection of rather loosely linked passages from different authors, Deubner admits that Iamblichus did alter something in the texts he used. The later forms of language, one of which is the above mentioned form πεφιλοτετιμημένους, in some minor points may be due to copists and in a few other cases to the direct sources, but no doubt a considerable number of cases is due to Iamblichus himself.

[2] *Nom.* 927 b. [3] *Phaedr.* 232 a, *Resp.* 336 c.

The love of the children, then, (of men evidently) is supposed to be divided between the Father- and the Mother-God. In order to save this love on behalf of themselves the Father undertakes the role[1] of a mother by producing a daughter, Athena, while the Mother, Hera, in begetting a son, somehow took over the role of the father; and thus, by producing offspring bearing a nature different from their own, they strove to participate in a love which was most remote from them.

This is the somewhat awkward train of thought expressed in this passage. The author does not even add a conclusion and a direct moral lesson. If he had, it would be probably this: that the young men of Croton, looking up to the βασιλεύοντες τῶν θεῶν who act at the same time as father and mother, should love their parents with an equal love, without preferring the one to the other.

However this may be, the Crotonian youth is said to have applauded the story, declaring that, evidently, the judgment of the immortals is strongest.

There is one word in this passage which requires special attention: that is the word ὑπόθεσις which I rendered by 'role'. This meaning, though listed in the lexicon of Liddell and Scott under 5 ('actor's role'), with a few Hellenistic parallels[2], might seem to have some strange implications: the question might be asked whether the ancient Greeks could have meant that Zeus and Hera, when bringing forth respectively a daughter and a son, took on either the role or function[3], the one (Zeus) of the mother, the other (Hera) of the father; which would imply that, normally speaking, mothers produce daughters while fathers beget sons. Certainly, strange things were said now and then by the ancients on the subject of human generation. Aristotle, for instance, was of the opinion that according to the 'intention' of nature – i.e. *normally speaking* – there should be no women at all: it only happens now and then that in the process of generation there is a lack of heat, – and in such a case, by some chance defect, a female being is produced[4]. But this was Aristotle, and we can leave it for his account. As for less sophisticated people, such as the ancient Pythagoreans, one may feel tempted to suggest that they might have rather meant that, normally speaking, it is a mother's 'proposed action' of 'intention' – say, wish – to bring forth a daughter, while it is definitely the father's intention to beget a son. In that case the use of the word ὑπόθεσις in

[1] ὑπόθεσις. [2] Plutarch, *Dem.*, 22; Epict. I 29, 38.
[3] The meaning 'function' is mentioned in L. and Sc. under 6.
[4] Aristotle, *De gen. anim.* IV 1, 765 b6-766 a24.

our passage of Iamblichus would not have anything unclassical about it, for in this sense the word occurs more or less frequently in fourth-century authors, such as Plato and Xenophon.

The first question to be asked in order to clarify the point will be: who were the μυθοποιοί referred to, and next, what stories did they tell.

First of all – there was, of course, Homer who refers to the myth of Athena being born from the head of Zeus: *Iliad* V 875, 880[1]. The story is told explicitly in the Homeric Hymn 28, 1.4-5[2]. Probably the Homeric names ὀβριμοπάτρη and Τριτογενεία contain a reference to the same myth.

Next there was Hesiod. We read in *Theog.* 927:

"Ηρη δ' "Ηφαιστον κλυτὸν οὐ φιλότητι μιγεῖσα / γείνατο –.

This myth, though not nearly so well-known – at least to modern readers – as the story of the birth of Athena, is certainly alluded to in our passage. It explains perfectly how an ancient Greek who knew his Hesiod as well as his Homer could say that, just as Zeus when bringing forth Athena took on himself the role of a mother, Hera in begetting Hephaestus played the role of the father as well. Therefore this translation seems to be correct.

It is here the place to ask ourselves whether the argument about Zeus and Hera in Iamblichus' first speech of Pythagoras in all its awkwardness is due to the primitiveness of an early age, or rather to the more sophisticated mind of a considerably later period. We are used to being suspicious about 'Pythagorean' texts coming from later Antiquity, and of course we are right in taking up this attitude. But the Νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν applies to our scholarly traditions as well. In the present case we have to observe first that Iamblichus' Zeus -and-Hera story does contain some form of allegoresis. However, it differs *toto coelo* from such later interpretations as are found, for instance, in Cornutus' 'Επιδρομή. There, the Gods are explained

[1] *Iliad* V 875ff. Ares wounded in battle by Diomedes and Athena goes to Zeus and complains bitterly

σοὶ πάντες μαχόμεσθα· σὺ γὰρ τέκες ἄφρονα κούρην,
οὐλομένην, ἣ τ' αἰὲν ἀήσυλα ἔργα μέμηλεν.–
ταύτην δ' οὔτ' ἔπεϊ προτιβάλλεαι οὔτε τι ἔργῳ,
ἀλλ' ἀνιεῖς, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ἐγείναο παῖδ' ἀΐδηλον.

[2] Hom. Hymn 28, 4-5:

Τριτογενῆ, τὴν αὐτὸς ἐγείνατο μητίετα Ζεύς,
σεμνῆς ἐκ κεφαλῆς.

either as physical elements, or as moral or intellectual qualities[1]. Nothing like that is found in Pythagoras' speeches. After all, what we find here is no more than a believer's reflexion on a story handed down to him by religious tradition. Its function is adhortative: for the speaker it contains a moral lesson which, for the rest, he does not define. In contradistinction to later allegorism we do not find here any kind of apology about anything that was felt as οὐ πρέπον[2].

On the other hand, it should be remembered that the kind of allegories known to us e.g. from Cornutus are exactly those which were said by Porphyry to go back to olden times and were attributed to a man who lived in Pythagoras' days and not far from Croton either, namely, Theagenes of Rhegium[3]. It is tempting, no doubt, to do what M. Detienne did[4], and conclude that, most probably, Theagenes was not the first, but that he borrowed his interpretations from the Pythagoreans, who he must have known at Rhegium. Detienne does not say that Theagenes borrowed his interpretations *from Pythagoras*. Yet Theagenes, who is said to have lived 'in Cambyses' days'[5], must have been his contemporary. And even if he did not know him per-

[1] Cornutus, *Epidrome* c. 19 says that most people attribute the arts to Athena and to Hephaestus; to Athena, "because she appears to be φρόνησις and ἀγχίνοια" (cf. c. 20: Athena is ἡ τοῦ Διὸς σύνεσις, ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προνοίᾳ), and to Hephaestus, because most of the arts and crafts produce their particular works by means of fire. For aether and the radiant and pure fire is Zeus; the fire we use, however, which is mixed with air, is Hephaestus, so named after ἧφθαι (both 'being touched' and 'having kindled'). "That is why he was said to be born of Zeus and Hera".

This is one line of the tradition. Cornutus knows the other line as well. "But some say he was a son of Hera only: for those flames that are so to speak thicker acquire their substance as it were from the air only, when it is being burnt through (ὡς ἐκ μόνου τοῦ ἀέρος διακαιομένου). The same tradition is found in Hyginus, *Fab.*, praef. 22.

[2] P. Boyancé, *Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs*, Paris 1936, p. 121f., rightly emphasized Pythagoras' profound respect for Homer and Hesiod, in this opposing him to Heraclitus and Xenophanes, and even to Plato up to a certain extent. For the concept of allegory cp. the discussion by Ragnar Höistad and J. Tate on the question "Was Antisthenes an allegorist?" in *Eranos* XLIX and LI (1951, 1953).

[3] Schol. B in *Iliad.* XX 67 (= Porph., *Quaest. hom.* I 240, 14 Schrader); Diels-Kranz, VS. I p. 51f. It is true that Plato, *Rep.* II 378d presupposes the allegorical interpretation of Homer as a method which was well-known and sufficiently practised to be considered as a danger.

[4] M. Detienne, *Homère, Hésiode et Pythagore*, Bruxelles 1962, p. 65 ff.

[5] Tatian. 31, p. 31, 16 Schw.; Diels-Kranz, VS I p. 51.

sonally but only came into contact with those of his pupils who lived at Rhegium, is it not rather a strange suggestion that, during the lifetime of the famous master, these pupils actually started the allegorical interpretation of the poets as a kind of apology, while the master himself did not? Further, if Theagenes borrowed it from the earliest Pythagoreans, how is it that Porphyry does not say a word here either of the Master or of his early disciples, but traces the method of allegorising back to a much less well-known man, Theagenes of Rhegium?

I think, this fact alone should keep us from making an inference which, however plausible it might seem in itself, is not supported by any direct evidence, but even contradicted. What seems probable after all, is that Theagenes did learn from Pythagoras, but for the rest went his own way. He was the first who wrote about Homer, and possibly he went further in allegorical interpretation than Pythagoras did. For Pythagoras presents himself to us as a traditionalist, though of a definitely reformatory spirit.

There is just one text which might seem to support the thesis that he must have criticized the poets rather severely, namely, the passage of Hieronymus of Rhodes, cited in Diogenes Laertius VIII 21, where it is said that, "when he had descended into Hades, Pythagoras saw the soul of Hesiod bound fast to a brazen pillar and squaeking, and the soul of Homer hung on a tree with serpents writhing about it, this being their punishment for what they had said about the gods"[1]. No doubt this much is true, that Pythagoras did select certain passages from Hesiod and Homer as particularly fitting for education, while probably he dropped certain other passages as not suitable to that purpose. But that he condemned Homer and Hesiod as greatly guilty, does not square so well with what we know for certain about the important place of these poets in early Pythagorean education. For the rest there is no indication that Pythagoras ever criticized the poets in an aggressive way[2], or even that his allegory took a clearly apologetic form.

[1] Transl. of Hicks, with a small alteration. The text is found in Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* X, Hieronymus of Rhodes fr. 42. It is discussed intelligently by M. Detienne, *Homère, Hésiode et Pythagore*, pp. 25-26. Cp. also p. 38.

[2] Iambl. *V.P.* 218, where it is said that Pythagoras refuted both prosewriters and poets in what was said badly in the myths (περί τε τῶν κακῶς λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς μύθοις διήλεγξε τοὺς λογοποιούς τε καὶ ποιητάς) should not be considered as a parallel, because that passage is clearly platonizing. See appendix D.

Coming back to our passage in the first speech we ask: could Pherecydes' devoted pupil have proposed this Zeus-and-Hera story to the youth of Croton in order to explain to them that they should love and honour both their parents with an equal reverence and love? – I think he could. And perhaps the omission of the moral lesson is in itself another argument for the primitive character of the passage.

The following argument of Heracles as an example both of obedience to a πρεσβύτερος and of πόνος presents no particular difficulties. When it is said that Heracles 'is present as a member of the family' (οἰκεῖον ὑπάρχειν) for those settled at Croton, this was quite a familiar thought to the ancient Greek world. I take διότι in the sense of ὅτι as depending on ἀποδεῖξαι. ἑτέρῳ πρεσβυτέρῳ, 'a different older one', indicates that Eurystheus was not Heracles' father. The reference to the Olympic games at the end made the argument particularly suitable to the young men of Croton to which it is supposed to have been addressed.

Once more, is it possible, or even probable, that Pythagoras used such an argument in speaking to the youth of Croton? I think it is.

> (c. 40, 8) And he declared that also in mutual intercourse they would be successful when they behaved in such a way as never to become hostile to their friends, and to show themselves friendly to their enemies as soon as possible. Moreover they had to practise their goodwill towards their fathers in their good conduct towards older persons, and their mutual relationship[1] with their brothers in their loving-kindness[2] towards others.
>
> Next he spoke about self-control[3], saying that the age of youngsters puts one's character to the test at the time when desires are at their height.

In this passage there is first the theme of φιλία towards all. It should be observed that here we have again the parallel of Diogenes Laertius, just as in the case of τιμιώτερον τὸ πρεσβύτερον[4]. Cp. also Zaleucus in Diodorus XII 20, 3, where it is urged on the citizens not to treat anybody among them as an enemy, on penalty of being judged as ἀνήμερος καὶ ἄγριος τὴν ψυχήν. No doubt the principle was based by the ancient Pythagoreans on their doctrine of cosmic harmony which was to them a living truth, penetrating human relations and transferred from family

[1] κοινωνία. [2] φιλανθρωπία. [3] σωφροσύνη.

[4] Diog. Laert. VIII 23. 3: ἀλλήλοις θ'ὁμιλεῖν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἐχθροὺς μὴ ποιῆσαι, τοὺς δ'ἐχθροὺς φίλους ἐργάσασθαι.

ties to all human relationships without exception. Yet in this summary of a popular speech no explicit reference is made to the mathematically founded doctrine of harmony in the cosmos: the exhortation takes its start from the natural feelings of family affection, and from there proceeds to the φιλανθρωπία πρὸς ἄλλους .

φιλανθρωπία is a term which often occurs in the fourth century B.C.: in Xenophon Cyrus appears as a model of φιλανθρωπία; the orators Isocrates and Demosthenes often use the word. In Lysias it does not occur, but in Aeschines it does. Plato uses it once for a human quality or virtue: at the beginning of the *Euthyphro* (3d), which is in any case not a late dialogue. But before the Socratic circle we do not find it, at least not in this sense. The gods were sometimes called φιλάνθρωποι, in Plato as well as Aristophanes. That is apparently an older stage of the use of the word. S. Tromp de Ruiter, who in an article in *Mnemosyne* 1931 has dealt with the history of the words and the concepts φιλάνθρωπος and φιλανθρωπία[1] gives the following survey of the use of the terms after and at the same time as Xenophon, in the fourth century and later:

φιλανθρωπία: in Isocrates 4 ×, in Demosthenes 32 ×, Polybius 4 ×, Plutarch 11 ×
φιλάνθρωπος: in Isocrates 4 ×, in Demosthenes 28 ×, Polybius 7 ×, Plutarch 40 ×
the adverb: in Isocrates 4 ×, in Demosthenes 10 ×, Polybius 2 ×, Plutarch 3 ×

He remarks that φιλανθρωπία in the fourth century B.C. became a 'cardinal virtue' and in Plutarch it reached its peak. He is of the opinion that the orators did more to promote the rise of this virtue than the philosophers: he doubts whether Antisthenes and the Cynics spoke about φιλανθρωπία at all. In the Stoa, where pity is not even recognized as a virtue, he considers they were nowhere near. He has more trust in the Pythagoreans. They are here given an honourable mention – although the question of the origin of this humane ideal which suddenly cropped up in the fourth century, is not seriously considered by the author. I have elsewhere[2] somewhat supplemented

[1] *De vocis quae est* φιλανθρωπία *significatione atque usu.* Mnemosyne 1931, pp. 271-306. See my remarks on this paper in my study *The concept of Personality in Greek and Christian thought*, in: *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, Washington 1963, pp. 40-45.
[2] In the above mentioned study on *Personality*.

the excellent work of Tromp de Ruiter on this point. What interests us here is the following:

(1) It is improbable that Xenophon, or Aeschines, or Isocrates, should have created the ideal of φιλανθρωπία. It must be remembered, however, that the first two belong to the Socratic circle, and that Socrates' attitude towards his fellow-citizens and fellow-men in general must have exercised a strong influence towards the forming of a humane ideal. It is significant that Xenophon used the epithet φιλάνθρωπος first of all with reference to Socrates[1].

(2) The good Xenophon had, however, nothing against the popular moral principle "that one must do good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies"[2]. He was thus, all things considered, far removed from what, according to our texts, Pythagoras admonished the youth of Croton to do. It would therefore be turning things upside down to suppose, on the basis of the term φιλάνθρωπος, that some fourth-century orator had attributed the 'ideal of his age' to the ancient philosopher of Croton. No, the idea expressed here is undoubtedly older: it has its roots in Pythagoras' ideas about cosmic harmony and applies this to human society. We shall presently find it again in the ὁμόνοια, the observation of which is advised by Pythagoras in his second address to the Crotonian Senate, just as we find it occurring again in the κοινωνία καὶ φιλία καὶ κοσμιότης etc., in Plato's *Gorgias*, 508a. It is there expressly attributed to 'wise men' who can be none other than the Pythagoreans.

What then shall we conclude from the occurrence of the term φιλανθρωπία in our Iamblichus text? – What else than that the Pythagorean who gave a literary form to the tradition which still lived on in his circle of the master's appearances before the people of Croton, probably lived towards the end of the fifth or in the beginning of the fourth century when the word φιλανθρωπία started to be used to denote a human virtue? Or possibly somewhat later. We shall discuss this point in more detail in section 7.

The next theme is σωφροσύνη, certainly not an improbable one in a philosopher's speech to young people. Our text goes on as follows.

> (c. 41, 4) Next he urged on them to consider that this virtue alone can and should be striven after by boys as well as girls,

[1] *Memorabilia* I 2, 60.
[2] *Memorabilia* II 6, 35; cf. II 3, 14, and *Cyrop.* VIII 7.

by married women and by elderly persons, and most of all by young people. Further he declared that only this virtue included both the good qualities of the body and of the soul, preserving health and desire for the most noble pursuits. This might also be illustrated by the opposite: for when the barbarians and the Greeks had set themselves opposite to each other, by one man's want of selfcontrol[1] both parties were struck by the most terrible disasters, some of them in war, others in sailing back; and for this sin only God fixed the penalty at ten years and another period of a thousand years, having revealed by an oracle both the capture of Troy and the sending of the maidens by the Locrians to the sanctuary of Athena at Ilion.

Next to φιλία, σωφροσύνη appears in this passage as the cardinal virtue, the virtue-for-all, young and old, man and woman; moreover, as of basic importance both for the well-being of the body and of the soul; and lastly, a virtue not to be neglected, since the lack of it will be most severely punished by the Gods. Which is illustrated by the story of the Trojan war, and by the yearly offering of two Locrian girls to Athena Ilias, an expiatory sacrifice for the sin of Aiax, prescribed by the Delphic oracle for a period of a thousand years.

There can be no doubt that the ethical doctrine contained in these admonitions bears an individual stamp: it cannot be explained as a projection of 'fourth-century doctrines', as is the tendency of some modern interpreters, thinking particularly of Plato. Now there is certainly a profound affinity between Platonic and Pythagorean thought, not least in the practical field. Yet Plato formed his ethics in a different way; his doctrine of virtue(s) has a different appearance, and even where he speaks of divine sanctions – which is not at all exceptional with him: it is done, for instance, in quite an impressive form in the *Gorgias* myth and in the myth of Er – the setting is rather different and the emphasis is on the life hereafter.

The word ἀκρασία is an Ionic form. Plato speaks mostly of ἀκράτεια.

The offering of the Locrian maidens is mentioned very briefly here, as if it concerned a fact which was generally known. This is not the case for the modern reader, including the one who knows his classics. He has to look for it. He will find detailed information in the *Geschichte*

[1] ἀκρασία.

von Troja und Ilion by A. Brückner, in Dörpfeld, *Troja und Ilion*, vol. II[1]. The evidence is as follows.

(1) Strabo XIII, 1, 40 (p. 600), citing Demetrius of Scepsis, speaks about the destruction of Troy and the sending of the Locrian maidens. He disputes the view that Troy was completely wiped out by the Greeks and that the sacrifice of the Locrian maidens had its origin in the violation of Cassandra by Aiax. 'The fact is', he says, 'that the Locrian maidens were first sent when the Persians were already in power'. For his first point Strabo appeals to what is told by 'the present day Ilians', and for his second he points out that the story of Aiax' crime does not occur in Homer. This is correct. Nevertheless it is certain that this myth goes back to ancient times: Brückner mentions 700 as the latest possible date, as the story was related in the *Iliupersis* and was depicted on the shrine of Cypselos[2].

That the sending of the Locrian maidens did not start before Troy was under Persian rule, is no more than a baseless assertion. It is definitely refuted by other sources.

(2) Polybius XII 5, speaks about the foundation of the Italic Locri. He remarks that he prefers the account of Aristotle about the colonisation of this city to that of Timaeus, because people there confirmed for him that Aristotle's version was in agreement with old family traditions. He then tells that in the colonisation some women went with the men from the hundred families out of which the maidens who were to be sent to Troy were chosen. The colony Locri Epizephyrii was founded about 700. The custom of sending the maidens to Troy thus existed before that time, and it is probable that the Italic Locri now and then was called upon to fulfil this obligation.

Athenaeus VI 264 C confirms that Aristotle wrote to this effect.

(3) As regards Timaeus, he was in agreement with Polybius as far as the story of the Locrian girls was concerned: he says that the expiatory sacrifice had been made by the Locrians for a thousand years, until they stopped it after the Phocian war, i.e. after 346. This is what the scholiast on the *Alexandra* of Lycophron says, who has preserved for us the Timaeus text with the description of the fate of the Locrian maidens[3]. The girls were silently put on land at night and had to try to reach the temple of Athena without being seen, whilst

[1] pp. 549-593. Further literature: W. Leaf, *Troy:* a study in Homeric Geograhpy (1912), pp. 130ff., 396. On the inscription found in 1896 near Tolophon on the Corinthian Gulf: below, p. 87 f.

[2] Described by Pausanias V 19, 5.

[3] Lycophron, *Alexandra* 1141-1173.

the Trojans hunted them down to kill them. If this succeeded, the Locrians were once again obliged to pay their debt. If the maidens reached the temple safely, their lives were saved but they had to serve as temple slaves: they had to sweep the temple daily and sprinkle it with water, but they were forbidden to go near the statue of the goddess and to leave the temple during the day[1]. This description is confirmed by archaeological data in Troy: the spring from which the water was drawn was placed in such a position that those who drew water could not see the statue of the goddess. Furthermore there is an underground corridor which emerges at the entrance to the temple. These facts corroborate the antiquity of the myth of the Palladion and the cult-custom of the flight[2] described by Timaeus, for through this secret passage the Locrians brought the temple slaves up to the temple.

(4) Aeneas Tacticus, who wrote his *Poliorketikon* towards the middle of the fourth century – i.e. a generation before Timaeus – knew this secret corridor in Troy and refers to it (*Poliorketikon* 31, 24) to illustrate how difficult it is to prevent anyone entering a city by means of a stratagem. He knew the Locrian offering as a custom which had existed from ancient times.

(5) Plutarch, in *De sera vindicta* 557d, says that up to shortly before his time the Locrian maidens were sent to Ilion. This does not necessarily conflict with the report in Timaeus that the Locrians stopped the offering to Ilion shortly after the war with the Phocians, as the thousand years had passed.

(6) It is clear from Aelianus, *Var. Hist.* fr. 47, that the offering had simply not been made for some time; after having been reprimanded by the Delphic oracle the Locrians gave king Antigonus the authority to arbitrate in this question as to which of their cities should send the

[1] Εἰ δέ τινες (τῶν Λοκρίδων) ἐκφύγοιεν ἀνελθοῦσαι λάθρα εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερόν, ἱέρειαι ἐγένοντο· ἔσαιρον γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔρραινον, τῇ δὲ θεῷ οὐ προσήρχοντο, οὔτε τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐξήρχοντο εἰ μὴ νύκτωρ.

[2] There is something about the myth of Aiax in the Excerpta of Proclus as table of contents of the *Illiupersis* of Arctinus; also in the Excerpta Vaticana from Apollodorus (*Mythogr. Gr.* I 245. 213). According to Pausanias X 26, 3, there was a painting by Polygnotus in the Lesche at Delphi, which depicted Aiax the son of Oileus, standing by the altar of Athena with a shield in his hand, ὀμνύμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐς Κασσάνδραν τολμήματος. Apparently Aiax is pursued by the Greeks. He flies to the altar of Athena and swears that he will make reparations to her. This provides an analogy with the cultic use of the flight of the persecuted Locrian maidens to Athena's temple.

tribute. Antigonus[1] decided this should be determined by lot. The Locrians who, according to the story of Aelianus, as a result of neglecting to pay the tribute were afflicted with divine punishment[2], will then have reinstated the custom of the annual offering, to the effect that by means of drawing lots one Locrian city was chosen. The Italian Locri will also have taken part in this drawing of lots.

(7) The next testimony we have concerning the Locrian sacrifice is a long inscription, found in 1896 in Western Locri near Tolophon on the Isthmus of Corinth. This inscription, first reported on by Adolf Wilhelm in the *Anzeiger der Kaiserlicher Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Vienna 1897, philol.-hist. Kl., p. 186 f., was published in the *Jahreshefte des Oesterr. Archaeol. Institutes*, Wien, XIV, dated 1911, but issued in 1913. The inscription is dated by Wilhelm between 275 and 240. W. Leaf, who dealt with the history of the Locrian maidens in his book *Troy* (1912), thinks that the inscription marks the end of the curse which had lain on the Locrian clan of the Aianteioi (descendants from Aiax the son of Oileus) since the fall of Troy and the sin of Aiax: the curse would have terminated then, in the first half of the third century B.C., 'possibly as late as 264'[3]. Wilhelm, however, interpreted the treaty contained in the inscription – a treaty by which the Aianteioi and the town of Naryca where they lived were freed from their state of outlawry and received civic rights – in the sense that the Aianteioi and the town of Naryca took over the obligation of the tribute to Athena from the other Locrians. It must be observed that the fact that Plutarch knew the sending of the tribute lasted until shortly

[1] Probably Antigonus I, which brings us to the date 305-302, i.e. some ten years after Timaeus wrote his History.

[2] αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἔτικτον ἔμπηρα καὶ τέρατα: "their women (continually) brought forth crippled children and monsters". Because of a strange kind of misunderstanding A. Reinach arrived at a curious interpretation of these words. The scholia of Tzetzes on Lycophron 1141 say that instead of young girls the Locrians sent one-year-old babies with their nurses. This happened after Antigonus' arbitration, Reinach thinks; and the children were left to grow up in Troy, because no new ones were sent. This tallies exactly: when the treaty which we shall mention presently was concluded towards 230, the babies sent out at the time of Antigonus would have become old women of 70 years, and, still serving in the temple of Athena Ilias, they would have brought forth ἔμπηρα καὶ τέρατα! (A. Reinach in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* LXIX (1914), p. 35: "je croirais volontiers que ce passage (sc. of Aelianus) ne s'applique qu'aux dernières hiérodules, celles qui, par punition, mirent au monde des monstres".)

[3] Leaf, *Troy*, p. 132; and in *Annual of the British School at Athens*, XXI (1915-1916), pp. 148 ff.

before his own days is definitely in favour of Wilhelm's interpretation[1]. This is also accepted by A. Reinach in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* LXIX (1914)[2].

Finally, Plutarch cites three anonymous verses in which the tragic fate of the Locrian temple slaves is described:[3]

> αἳ καὶ ἀναμπέχονοι γυμνοῖς ποσὶν ἤϋτε δοῦλαι
> ἠοῖαι σαίρεσκον Ἀθηναίης περὶ βωμόν,
> νόσφι κρηδέμνοιο, καὶ εἰ βαρὺ γῆρας ἱκάνοι.

By Wilhelm and Reinach these verses were attributed without any hesitation to Callimachus, as we know that he treated this material in his *Aitia*. Others[4] upheld Euphorion as the probable author. Be this as it may, it is clear that verses were composed on the Locrian maidens by Hellenistic poets.

All this clearly shows that the offering of the Locrian maidens was a well-known fact in the Greek world, which has also left its traces in literature. However, it must be noted here that, whilst the ancient and historical character of the custom is an established fact from historical-archaeological sources, the Locrian maidens first appear in literature with Alexandrine poets who had a marked preference for ancient, less well-known myths. As far as Plutarch is concerned the case is different: he lived in close contact with the tradition of the temple at Delphi and not far from the Opuntic Locri. The story of the Locrian sacrifice must of course have been well-known to him from local tradition. However, there are no traces of it in the Athenian literature of the fifth or fourth century. On the other hand we can be certain that in Southern Italy, because of the proximity of Epizephyrian Locri, which kept up this thousand-year tribute together with the Locri of central Greece, whenever this sad ceremony took place it must have been quite a well-known event.

Therefore, it seems probable to me that the reference to the

[1] It cannot possibly be assumed that Plutarch would have said of a custom which had been dropped three to four centuries before, that it had been continued until shortly before his time.

[2] Reinach suggests that the rite must have disappeared after the conquest of the Troad by Fimbria (89).

[3] In full the text of Plutarch (557 d) runs:
καὶ μὴν οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἀφ'οὗ Λοκροὶ πέμποντες εἰς Τροίαν πέπαυνται τὰς παρθένους, – (follow the three verses) – διὰ τὴν Αἴαντος ἀκολασίαν.

[4] E. Thraemer in *Hermes* 25 (1890), p. 55. See also J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina*, p. 40 f., Euphorion 53.

Locrian sacrifice in Pythagoras' speech to the youth of Croton is due to an ancient and South-Italian origin of this part of his argument.

> (c. 42, 9) He also summoned the young people to intellectual training[1], telling them to consider how absurd it is to judge the intellect as most important of all and with its aid to deliberate on all other things, and yet not to have spent any time or effort on the training of this faculty, and this while the training of the body is like to bad friends[2] and soon leaves you in the lurch, whereas intellectual training, just like excellent men, remains with you until death, and even on some bestows immortal fame after they have died.

This may have been substantially Pythagoras' teaching, though in its present form it is certainly of a later date, perhaps of the early fourth century, or somewhat later.

> (c. 43) And he put forward other arguments like these, partly from inquiries or observations, partly from his own opinions, pointing out that 'education'[3] is: the talents[4] of those who have excelled in every discipline, placed at the disposal of everyone. For their discoveries have become the material for the education of others. And education is by its nature so important that, whereas of the other things that are usually praised some are not transferable from one person to another – such as physical strength, beauty, health, courage – and others when given away are lost to the former owner – such as wealth, position and many other things that we pass over here –, education can be passed on without being lost to the giver himself.
>
> (c. 44) Likewise there are some things which it is not within the power of man to acquire, but to become an educated man is up to yourself. Next, having acquired it, when you come to take your share of the burden of the duties for your country,

[1] παιδεία.

[2] In later Greek the praesens of ὁμοιοῦσθαι and similar verbs is sometimes used in this meaning which, strictly speaking, would require the perfect tense. E.g. Pausanias VIII 25, 13: οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὐδὲ νηὶ παρισουμένας πορθμίδι παράσχοιτο ὁ Λάδων (a small river in Arcadia) νήσους. Dion. Halic., *De adm. vi Demosth.* 26 (init.): παρισοῦται δὲ τὰ τρία μόρια τοῦ λόγου τοῖς τρισί.

[3] παιδεία. [4] εὐφυΐα.

you will do so not from arrogance but by virtue of your ability[1]. For, I dare say, it is in their way of living that men differ from animals, Greeks from barbarians, free men from slaves, and philosophers from uneducated men[2]; and, generally speaking they are so much above others that of those who run faster than others seven have been found at Olympia to come from one city [namely, that of his audience], but of those who excel in wisdom only seven can be counted in the whole world. And in the period after this, in which he himself lived, one man excelled above all others in striving for wisdom (i.e. in *philosophia*). For this was the name by which he called himself instead of calling himself a wise man.

This then was what he said to the young men in the gymnasium.

This elaborate praise of education might be thought to fit particularly well into the cultural frame of the fourth century B.C., a period in which there was, at least in its chief centre Athens, a considerable amount of talk about παιδεία. This much is true. However, the question that should be raised is the following: whether any fourth-century rhetor or philosopher in writing a praise of παιδεία actually expressed himself in similar terms as those which are attributed to Pythagoras in our Iamblichus text. I am afraid that we are not able to answer this question in the affirmative, at least not without important reservations.

First let us take Plato. It is obvious that no similar recommendation of παιδεία is found anywhere in his works. Nonetheless, since it will be useful to have in mind how he used to speak about παιδεία, I will cite a few passages.

(1) *Phaedo* 107 d. The soul goes to Hades possessing nothing but its παιδεία καὶ τροφή, and this is esteemed either to be of the greatest help to it or of the greatest harm at the very beginning of that journey: (108 a 6) for the soul which is κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος follows its attendant genius quietly and without resistance; the soul that is full of bodily desires, however, is confused by its new surroundings and resists violently.

This passage clearly brings out that for Plato παιδεία, just as φιλοσοφία, implies a moral κάθαρσις and a detachment from the body and

[1] ἐκ παιδείας. [2] τῶν τυχόντων.

its desires, and this as the result of an intense intellectual life, directed towards what is called in the *Phaedo* (79 a) 'things invisible' and elsewhere (e.g. *Rep.* 509 d-511) νοητά.

(2) *Philebus* 55 d. Of the mathematical disciplines a part is δημιουργικός (is directed to production), a part is directed to the training and education of young people ('is περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν').

(3) *Rep.* 376 c-e. Plato is speaking here about the qualities required for being a good guardian of the city: such a man, he says, must be φιλόσοφος καὶ θυμοειδὴς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρός. Now, *how* are such men to be educated? (e 7) Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; – He replies that the traditional system of γυμναστική for the body and μουσική for the mind is best.

(4) *Protagoras* 327 d. Protagoras speaks of people that have no παιδεία, no civilisation, no laws, but are ἄγριοι ('primitives').

(5) *Protagoras* 343 a. Socrates is explaining a verse of Simonides. The seven sages, he says, were all admirers of the Spartan system of education (τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας).

(6) *Gorgias* 470 e. Socrates does not even call 'the great King' happy, as he does not know παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης: 'how he stands in the matter of education and justice'.

Here, as in the *Phaedo* passage, παιδεία denotes the result of παιδευθῆναι, which, if practised in the right way, leads to a state of inner purity and detachment from the body and earthly things, a state on which eudaemonia evidently depends. For Plato the way in which to attain such a state was both by training the body and the intellect; the latter by means of mathematical thinking as a preparation was directed towards the contemplation of pure νοητά.

When we compare this with our passage in Iamblichus, the remarkable difference is, in the first place, that in Iamblichus παιδεία is introduced only after social conduct, including regard for older persons, and the inner harmony of the soul (φιλία and σωφροσύνη) have been dealt with. Separated from those virtues παιδεία appears to be used here particularly of the *training of the intellect:* it is defined as an ἄσκησις τῆς διανοίας, διάνοια being 'the faculty by which we deliberate about the other things'. Moreover, it is opposed to the ἐπιμέλεια τῶν σωμάτων as the higher level to the lower one, as that which lasts only a short time to that which is permanent (c. 42).

The description which follows (ch. 43) also seems to underline the intellectual character of παιδεία: it is called 'the talents of those who have excelled in every discipline'; and it is stressed that only this can be transferred to others while not being lost to its original owner.

Lastly (ch. 44), it is said that it is up to us to acquire it and, after having acquired it (οὕτως – possessing it), one can accede to the πράξεις τῆς πατρίδος.

Now surely it was Plato's conviction that those who had passed through his philosophical παιδεία were morally *bound* to take upon themselves the highest governing posts. As a philosopher who loved the vision of the νοητά, he could not regard this as a privilege but rather had to feel it as a cruel duty: no doubt he experienced poignantly the conflict between the service to mankind to which he felt drawn for the sake of the Good, and on the other hand the vision of that 'true Reality' which he knew beyond this world. That is what gives such a peculiar pathos to these pages on the philosopher king.

Nothing of this is found in our passage in Iamblichus. Not that I would have expected that. Indeed I would not – for I know too well how strictly individual Plato's approach to these problems was, and moreover, – as he felt himself – how difficult to impart to others. But what I think is this: that one should finally stop saying that 'evidently' for Iamblichus' picture of Pythagoras' educational activity Plato served as the model. As a matter of fact, this is the information found in W. Jaeger's *Paideia*[1]. It is not correct. Firstly, when speaking of 'the late, semi-mythical traditions about Pythagoras' which 'emphasize above all else his influence as a teacher', the author simply ignores the fact that Trogus and Diodorus mention the same educational activity and influence; secondly he ignores the fact that Porphyry, when mentioning Pythagoras' four speeches, cites Dicaearchus as his source; thirdly he did not notice that Iamblichus' text of the four speeches contains some indubitable indications that Timaeus was the source, and lastly, he ignores that there are a few earlier texts in which reference is made to the speeches of Pythagoras to the larger circle[2].

It is certain that Plato did not serve as the model for the four speeches: for he never addressed such large congregations as Pythagoras is supposed to address here. In particular, Plato did not serve as the model for the first speech, neither in its treatment of the virtues (for in this Pythagoras in Iamblichus differs clearly from Plato in his

[1] *Paideia* I, p. 164: "The late semi-mythical traditions about Pythagoras emphasize above all else his influence as a teacher. Plato certainly served as the model for that conception of him". Cp. also note 76 on p. 456.

[2] I am thinking of Antisthenes in Schol. in *Odyss.* I 1 (below, p. 140 f.), and of a few lines in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazousae* which I shall discuss when dealing with the fourth speech, section 55.

dialogues) nor in our passage on παιδεία. For again, the ideal found in this passage is not Plato's style. It rather makes the impression of being a rhetor's admonition: "Cultivate your intellect" (διάνοια) "for that will enable you to take up positions as leaders of your country. It is up to you to make this choice!"

That is very far from Plato indeed. Never could he have used such language to a chance gathering of unselected young people. In his opinion there was only a small number, a *very small* number, endowed with the physical, moral and intellectual qualities necessary to pass through the παιδεία that would make a philosopher of a man, and hence a dignified ruler; and not just any young person could present himself as being fitted for such a position.

If what is written in this passage in Iamblichus is in the style of anybody in the fourth century B.C., it is rather that of Isocrates. Let me explain.

Firstly, it was Isocrates who found fault with philosophers and sophists who exhort people to self-control and justice by directing their summons to φρόνησις to individuals only. His own παιδεία, he said, was meant for the whole πόλις.[1]

Secondly, in Isocrates we actually find a summons to intellectual training – at least it sounds like that – in similar terms as in [Pythagoras]' first speech. Isocrates, *or.* 1, (*Ad Demonicum*), 19: "Don't hesitate to travel far to those who profess to teach something useful, for it is a shame that traders cross vast seas for the sake of increasing the goods they already possess, whereas young people do not even feel up to undertaking journeys by land for the sake of increasing their intellectual ability" (ἐπὶ τὸ βελτίω καταστῆσαι τὴν αὑτῶν διάνοιαν).

Thirdly, no different from Iamblichus' Pythagoras, Isocrates declares that the result of his παιδεία is that the young men will be able to play a leading part in politics[2].

Certainly, those who suggested that it was a rhetor of the fourth century who expressed his educational ideals in the so-called speeches of Pythagoras[3] were on this point at least nearer to the truth than those

[1] Isocrates, *or.* 15 (*Antidosis*), 85.

[2] Cp. on this point: Jaeger, *Paideia* III, p. 136ff. (Isocrates' defence of paideia).

[3] This is what A. Delatte thought of it. *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne*, Liège-Paris 1922, p. 39: "Il est évident que nous nous trouvons ici en face d'une publication de quelque Pythagoricien du Ve ou du IVe siècle. Il avait imaginé cette fiction et choisi cette forme littéraire pour exposer les doctrines morales de sa Confrérie et présenter à ses coreligionnaires des modèles de discours moraux".

who declared that Plato was the model. But let us be careful and, after having mentioned the points of similarity, mark the differences as well.

Ad (1). Isocrates wished to be of use to all. One should not imagine, however, that he ever delivered admonishing speeches to the people, as Pythagoras was supposed to do. Isocrates did write political discourses: that *On Peace* (or. 8) was apparently delivered by himself in the assembly of Athens when it had to deliberate on war and peace in the War of the Allies; that of Archedamus to the Lacedaemonians (or. 6) was probably commissioned, just as or. 3 (Νικοκλῆς ἢ Συμμαχικός), a speech by Nicocles to his subjects in the Cyprian Salamis. Isocrates also wrote forensic speeches (or. 16-20). To him all this was part of 'being of use to all'. However, when he delivers purely educational speeches – and he repeatedly did this – then they are directed not to a πλῆθος (that would not have been profitable either; for he asked high fees for his advice), but to one particular individual. Thus or. 1, *Ad Demonicum*, and 2, *Ad Nicoclem*.

The anonymous grammarian who wrote the summaries of Isocrates' speeches, asks the question why he did this: why not ἀδιαφόρως, as in his other speeches (those to the people or to a court of law)? He answers[1]: ὅτι Ἰσοκράτης βουλόμενος κοινωφελὴς γενέσθαι, φορτικὸν δὲ ἡγούμενος τὸ πρὸς πάντας γράφειν τὰς συμβουλάς, ἤθελεν ὡς πρὸς τούτους γράφειν.

That means: desiring to be of general utility, Isocrates *chose the literary form of addressing one particular person.*

Therefore, if the question be asked 'whether Isocrates, for instance, might have written Pythagoras' first speech in Iamblichus', we have to reply in the negative on that ground alone. As to the moral advice given in the chapters 37-42.9, we found its style too archaic and peculiarly Pythagorean to be attributable to Isocrates at all. Only the passage on παιδεία requires special attention. Somehow it does remind us of Isocrates. Let us then examine the second point.

(Ad 2). Isocrates' summons to the training of the intellect (διάνοια) found in *Ad Demonicum* 19 is followed by elaborate advice about how to behave in social life in order to be successful. What we find there are things like this: (1) Be friendly in your dealings with people you meet, easy in your manner of addressing them, and affable in your replies; (2) Be pleasant to all, but intimate only with the best; (3)

[1] *Or.* 1, *Ad Demonicum*, ὑπόθεσις ἀνωνύμου γραμματικοῦ.

Avoid frequent intercourse with the same persons, and long talks about the same subjects; (4) Train yourself to endure hard work; (5) Be sober in all those things whose sway over the soul is felt to be a shame; (6) Be silent about secrets, and trust only the good ones; (7) Do not swear an oath, except to save either your own honour or the life of your friends; etc. etc.

This sort of advice on social behaviour goes on for pages. At the end of the speech there is, by way of conclusion, an exhortation to strive for καλοκαγαθία, taking Heracles and Tantalus as examples, since of these two one was rewarded with immortality by Zeus for his virtue, whilst the other was made to pay a very severe penalty by way of punishment for his wickedness.

For the modern reader at least, all this has a somewhat surprising effect after the injunction to train the intellect. The comparison between merchants who cross vast seas in order to increase their wealth and the young people to whom even a journey by land is too much to improve their διάνοια strongly reminds one of Aristotle, *Protrepticus* fr. 5 Ross, p. 33 (= Düring B 53), where we read: οὐ δὲ δεῖ χρημάτων μὲν ἕνεκα πλεῖν ἐφ' Ἡρακλέους στήλας καὶ πολλάκις κινδυνεύειν, διὰ δὲ φρόνησιν μηδὲν πονεῖν μηδὲ δαπανᾶν.

But the φρόνησις of Aristotle is indeed a completely different ideal from the good condition of the διάνοια to which Isocrates urges the youth. Here is no question of pure θεωρία: the youth are admonished not to hesitate to go a long way to those who 'promise to teach you something *useful*': τι χρήσιμον. Of what is Isocrates thinking when he uses this word? Werner Jaeger summarizes it as follows[1]: "Isocrates assumes that all higher education of the intellect depends on cultivating our ability to understand one another. It is not an accumulation of factual knowledge in any sphere; it is concerned with the forces which hold society together. These are summed up in the word *logos*. Higher education means education to the use of speech in this sense – speech full of meaning, about the essential affairs of the life of society, which were called by the Greeks 'the affairs of the polis', τὰ πολιτικά or 'politics'."

This brings us straight to my third point: indeed, what Pythagoras says in Iamblichus c. 44, viz., that on the grounds of παιδεία one is suited and qualified to φανῆναι πρὸς τὰς τῆς πατρίδος πράξεις, fits in completely with this conception of παιδεία. We have reason to ask

[1] *Paideia* III, p. 143f.

ourselves if this really was Pythagoras' view, for by no means all the members of the S.P. were πολιτικοί, but only a limitid group[1].

Apart from c. 43 one feels inclined to say: Iamblichus *V.P.* 42 from 1.7 (the injunction to παιδεία and training of the διάνοια) and 44. 1-5 are strongly reminiscent of Isocrates both in the use of words and in thought. One feels oneself more in the fourth century here than in Pythagoras. *But* – between them is c. 43. And there it is evident at once that the παιδεία-ideal is not at all taken in the sense of Isocrates. Here it is not rhetorical training that is referred to, but theoretical-scientific culture. *This is Pythagoras:* he taught his pupils τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἱστοριῶν – things which he himself had heard from others (in Babylon!), τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ δογμάτων – and also things he had worked out for himself. For that which was discovered by those in former times who excelled in a certain branch of science, has become παιδεία for others. We are the heirs of a spiritual heritage: the acquisitions of others are for us a κοινὴ εὐφυΐα: a kind of natural wealth which is shared by all of us.

And then there is that comparison between other *bona* – bodily strength, beauty, health, courage, which one cannot give to others, or wealth and position, which can be given to others but not without losing them oneself – and the gifts of science which can be imparted to others without losing them. One might almost expect: which can be given away, but not without enriching oneself. The idea has an Eastern ring. Might Pythagoras have heard such a saying in Babylon? I consider it very well possible.

Be this as it may, c. 43 brings us from Isocrates back to Croton. I must say that the beginning of c. 44 does not fit in with this style. Also 44. 5-6 – the difference in way of life between man and beast – is remarkably like Isocrates: he works out the differences in his praise of the logos, *Nicocles* 5-6. The Pythagoras of history, however, laid more stress on our natural kinship with the animals. This is another argument for recognizing a fourth-century hand in this passage, and an idea that clearly differs from the real Pythagoras.

The final passage, 44. 9-12, about the large number of athletes and the scarcity of wise men, may be old. The author – not necessarily Iamblichus, but it may go back to a Pythagorean from the fifth or the early part of the fourth century – remarks here that in Pythagoras'

[1] Infra, ch. VII, section 5.

time only one man excelled in φιλοσοφία above all others: 'for by this name – φιλόσοφος – he called himself'.

It has been argued more than once that we have no older source than Heraclides Ponticus for the introduction of the term φιλόσοφος in the 'technical' sense by Pythagoras. Since Werner Jaeger argued in 1928[1] that the ideal of the philosophical life goes back to Plato and the Academy and that, where it is ascribed by later authors (e.g. by Diogenes Laertius) to Presocratic thinkers, this is due to a projection of the later ideal into a time where this was as yet unknown, this opinion has been repeated more than once and, roughly speaking, still prevails. According to this theory the term *philosophos* would have first been given its special meaning by Plato. Festugière, who in 1954 spoke at the First Congress of classical philologists at Copenhagen about the theme of the three βίοι[2] basically shares Jaeger's view. It is true that in an earlier work[3] he pointed to the remarkable fr. 910 of Euripides in which that man is praised as being 'blessed' who dedicates his life to the contemplation of the 'ever young order of immortal Nature'. As others did before him[4], Festugière sees in these verses a reference to Anaxagoras who in those years lived in Athens and who apparently to his own contemporaries incorporated the ideal of the βίος θεωρητικός in the same way as he did to a later generation[5]. Nonetheless Festugière thinks that it was Plato who gave its peculiar meaning to the term philosophy, since it was Socrates and Plato who first opposed the soul as a superior being to the body and matter. Festugière's contribution to the Copenhagen congress shows that in this he did not differ essentially from Jaeger. In the expositions of both scholars Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans are equally lacking.

Up to a certain extent Mondolfo had supplied this deficiency in a 'communication' delivered before the Academy of Sciences at Bologna in 1938[6]. Starting from the same fr. 910 of Euripides he argued that

[1] *Über Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals* (Sitzungsberichte der Preuss. Akad. der Wiss., Phil. hist. Kl. 1928, pp. 390-421). Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* I, Roma 1960, pp. 347-393.

[2] A. J. Festugière, *Les trois vies*, in *Formation of the mind*, vol. II of the *Acta congressus Madvigiani* 1954, pp. 131-174, Copenhagen 1958.

[3] *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1936, 1950², p. 34.

[4] Diels-Kranz VS 59 A 30; Fr. Boll, *Vita contemplativa*, Festrede Heidelberg 1920, p. 16.

[5] Cp. Arist., *EE* I 4, 1215 b6; I 5, 1216 a11. Cp. also *Protr.* fr. 10c and 11, p. 45 Ross.

[6] R. Mondolfo, *L'origine dell' ideale filosofico della vita*, in *Rendiconti dell' Accad. d. Scienze d. Istituto di Bologna*, Cl. di Scienze morali, 1938-XVI pp. 121-144.

the term ὄλβιος used in these verses points to the religious origin of the Greek ideal of the contemplative life: it was a *via salutis*. Just as the Orphics had their holy rites by which the soul was said to be purified and prepared for heaven, Pythagoras considered the contemplation of the cosmic order as a κάθαρσις of the soul and a preparation for eternal bliss. Mondolfo recognized better than Festugière, that, long before Socrates and Plato, Pythagoras and the Orphics knew about the soul's superiority to the body.

Before the publication of Festugière's contribution to the Copenhagen Congress an important study on the same theme was published by the Brussels Academy, 1956; it was the work of Robert Joly, a pupil of A. Delatte[1]. This author re-examined the whole problem in a study which is as comprehensive as it is penetrating. Although Joly's views need rather drastic correction on certain points, amongst which are Aristotle and Neoplatonism, he has the merit of having seen that it is not sufficient to point to the lack of texts older than the fourth century in order to substantiate the view that the terms *philosophos* and *philosophia* were not introduced by Pythagoras. But he has done more: he has put forward at least two strong arguments to the contrary which deserve serious consideration.

The first is the reference to Heraclitus, fr. 35 (from Clemens Alex., *Strom.* V 141), which says: χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι.

Joly sees in this an ironic remark of Heraclitus about the Pythagoreans who called themselves φιλόσοφοι and whose 'polymathy' (πολυμαθία) he severely criticized elsewhere (fr. 40 and 129). It is, of course, true that this in itself is no proof. It is an interpretation, but an intelligent one, which might well be correct. In my opinion no other interpretation can be given that would explain the text more satisfactorily.

The second argument: Zeno of Elea wrote a book entitled *Against the philosophers*. This must have been directed against the Pythagoreans, for these were from the beginning *the* opponents of the Eleatics. – This argument is also interesting. It does corroborate the first argument.

As a third argument Joly mentions our passage in Iamblichus. – The

[1] Robert Joly, *Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'Antiquité classique*, Acad. Royale de Belgique, Cl. d. Lettres, Mémoires in 8°, tom. 51, fasc. 3. Brussels 1956. Joly radically rejects Jaeger's thesis and tries in a way worthy of his teacher Delatte, to support the Pythagoreans' part in the rise of the philosophic ideal of life with the best possible arguments.

speeches of Pythagoras, he thinks, date from the fifth century: they were written by Gorgias, or if not by him, then by one belonging to his immediate circle. With this explanation Joly is on much less solid ground, although he is not the first to connect the λόγοι of [Pythagoras] with Gorgias or his school. Rostagni did this before him[1].

To a certain extent this is an attractive hypothesis. (1) The λόγοι undoubtedly display as to form a certain affinity to the technique of Gorgias, as Delatte has rightly remarked. (2) Gorgias was fond of writing speeches for people famous according to ancient tradition who were in more or less dramatic situations. Was it not then like him to have written λόγοι of Pythagoras?

To these arguments *pro* I would like to oppose the following considerations. (1) If Gorgias had done this, would not his λόγοι of Pythagoras have achieved a certain fame and have been preserved under his name, just as his *Helena* and *Palamedes*? (2) The λόγοι of Pythagoras in Iamblichus do not have the direct form which these speeches of Gorgias have[2]. (3) A study of the contents shows that in detail the speeches in Iamblichus have nothing of the spirit of Gorgias[3]. I hope to examine these points more closely in other sections of this chapter. For the moment this must suffice to reject the ascription of Iamblichus' λόγοι to Gorgias, or even to his school.

For the present, I think we have sufficient grounds for granting that the last lines in Iamblichus *V.P.* 44 are in principle a *possible* testimony to the early Pythagorean origin of the terms φιλοσοφία and φιλόσοφος. Our arguments are: (1) that, since these λόγοι were known to such historians as Pompeius Trogus and Diodorus, they were apparently in Timaeus; (2) that, as Timaeus will not have made them up himself, these speeches were apparently in circulation in the course of the fourth century; (3) that a great deal of their contents points to early Pythagorean origin.

We shall be able to give a definite opinion on all this after we have fully dealt with the four speeches. For the present it may be noted

[1] A. Rostagni, *Un nuovo capitolo nella storia della retorica e della sofistica*, in *Studi Ital.* 2, 1922, pp. 160ff. This important study was reprinted in the first volume of Rostagni's *Scritti minori*, Torino 1955, pp. 1-59. The author, however, did not attribute the speeches to Gorgias or his school; he rather thought that they were written earlier.

[2] Rostagni assumes that either Timaeus or Apollonius of Tyana transposed them into the direct form.

[3] It is true that the speeches to four separate groups remind one of Gorgias' doctrine of the multiplicity of virtues. We shall discuss this later.

that the recent study by W. Burkert, *Platon oder Pythagoras*, on the origin of the word 'philosophy'[1] does not seem convincing to me. Burkert discusses the question as to whether the anecdote about Pythagoras which Cicero, according to *Tusc.* V 8, found in Heraclides Ponticus[2] is ancient or not. He thinks that Heraclides has here put ideas of Plato's into the mouth of the old Pythagoreans, and contends that fifth-century word usage argues against the word φιλόσοφος already being used by Pythagoras or his followers. We do find the word several times before Plato, but always in a more general sense[3]. It was *Plato* who emphatically contrasted divine to human wisdom: in contrast to the Divinity, man is always merely φιλό-σοφος[4]. This explanation is lacking both in the story by Cicero, *Tusc.* V, and in Iamblichus, *Protrept.* pp. 4, 10 ff. [5]), where the introduction of the term is ascribed to Pythagoras: the term itself remains unexplained.

The author could have said the same of our passage: also in Iamblichus, *V.P.* 44 *in fine* the term φιλόσοφος is not explained.

But *must* we conclude from this that Pythagoras did not introduce the term in order to describe his own wisdom? – The conclusion drawn from the data before us can also be otherwise. Could not Pythagoras have introduced the term without the explicit explanation which Plato gave? Certainly, he who emphatically described himself as φιλόσοφος must in some way or other have felt that he was 'on the way'. He must have seen wisdom as *an ideal*, and his own life's work as an incomplete endeavour to achieve that ideal. *And cannot Pythagoras have felt exactly this?*

I do not think the texts provide us with any reason to deny this. But there is more. We have some positive evidence that Pythagoras criticized the so-called seven Sages: as we shall see, here and there he corrected some famous *dictum* of one of them in an *acousma* of his

[1] In *Hermes* 1960, pp. 159-177. See also W. Burkert, *Weisheit u. Wissenschaft*, Nürnberg 1962, p. 95. [2] Fr. 87 Wehrli.

[3] In Herodotus I 30 (about Solon who φιλοσοφέων travelled through many lands); in Gorgias, *Helena* 13 (where the λόγος is divided into three domains: (1) natural philosophy, (2) forensic eloquence, (3) φιλοσόφων λόγων ἅμιλλαι, i.e. 'die eigentlich sophistischen Redewettkämpfe'), and in Thucidydes II 40 (φιλοκαλοῦμεν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας). In the fifth century φιλόσοφος appears to have been used, similarly to φιλόκαλος, for 'Bilding und Geschmack'.

[4] *Lysis* 218a, *Symp.* 203d, *Phaedrus* 278d.

[5] Cp. Aristotle, *Protr.* fr. 11 Ross, pp. 44-45 (from Iamblichus *Protr.* 9); fr. 12 Ross, p. 47 (= Düring B 44).

own[1]. Does not it fit in perfectly with this attitude that, by way of a protest against those who were called the seven wise men, Pythagoras did not wish to be called by that name but emphatically called himself only a *lover* of wisdom?

Now this is precisely what can be read in Diodorus X 10[2].

It is true that elsewhere in the *V.P.* Iamblichus describes the 'wisdom' for which Pythagoras is said to have striven, in rather Platonic or late-Platonic terms[3]. Yet this is no reason to deny that Pythagoras called himself a *philosophos*, even if the said definition of σοφία follows immediately. There is a section in Iamblichus' *V.P.* where 'justice' is described in terms of οἰκείωσις and ἀλλοτρίωσις, which are notoriously Stoic. These lines follow immediately after a passage on the communal possession of property among the Pythagoreans. Now shall we deny the historicity of the κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων with regard to the earliest Pythagoreans because in that chapter of the *V.P.* a description of justice in Stoic terms follows?[4]

That would be bad reasoning.

With regard to the arguments put forward by Burkert, then, the following remarks can be made. (1) The introduction of the terms φιλοσοφία and φιλόσοφος is not only ascribed by tradition to Pythagoras where the three βίοι are being considered: sometimes the πανήγυρις-comparison is included, but sometimes not. (2) We will not attempt to decide whether the comparison was or was not introduced by Pythagoras. Perhaps it was not. What we must note here is that the term φιλόσοφος is repeatedly and expressly attributed to Pythagoras without the contrast to divine wisdom being mentioned. (3) From

[1] On the acousmata as being the same *genre* as the γνῶμαι of the seven Sages cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 83. On Pythagoras correcting the seven Sages: Delatte, *Litt. pythag.* p. 284f.

[2] *Infra*, p. 197, n. 4; **T** 49, 2b.

[3] In *V.P.* 59 the order of the heavens is said to be κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ, and σοφία is defined as ἡ τῷ ὄντι ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ περὶ τὰ καλὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀκήρατα καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα ἀσχολουμένη, ὧν μετοχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἂν εἴποι τις καλά. "And *philosophy* is the striving after this kind of *theoria*."

And in 159 σοφία is first defined as ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας. And by ὄντα he meant, according to Iamblichus: τὰ ἄυλα καὶ ἀίδια καὶ μόνα δραστικά, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀσώματα. Next, σοφία is called ἐπιστήμη τῶν κυρίως ὄντων, which again are described as ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως διαμένοντα (160).

[4] The section in Iambl. *V.P.* is 168. On the κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων see **T** 49, 12. See also K. von Fritz, *Pythag. Politics*, pp. 38-39.

this it might be concluded that Pythagoras introduced the term without giving the explanation so repeatedly given by Plato. (4) It is not true that then the term loses its meaning and that hence the above conclusion is incorrect. (5) The use of the words φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφεῖν in the fifth century also argues against this view: in this more general usage, too, the term makes sense, although the contrast to the divinity is not expressly made. (6) That in ordinary fifth century language the word was used in a wider sense is not proof that in the circle of Pythagoras and his immediate pupils it could not have been used in a special and very specific sense. (7) The first two arguments put forward by Joly retain their probability. They make the tradition concerning the introduction of the term φιλόσοφος by Pythagoras highly plausible. (8) That Pythagoras called himself by that name by way of a protest against the seven Sages, is confirmed by Diodorus X 10.

2. The first speech: summary and conclusions

Having come to the end of Pythagoras' first speech we will now summarize it.

1. Injunction to *always honour older people*, on the grounds of the general principle that what is older is of greater value. This includes in particular:
   - *a.* Parents must be considered more highly than oneself, for to them we owe everything.
   - *b.* One should love and honour one's parents equally because of the example of Zeus and Hera.
   - *c.* After the example of Heracles one should willingly obey one's elders and carry out orders.
2. Exhortation to *friendliness in one's dealings with others:* peaceableness and brotherliness (φιλανθρωπία).
3. *Self-control* (σωφροσύνη) is pre-eminently a virtue for young people. Divine sanctions: the 1.000 year tribute of the Locrians.
4. Exhortation to παιδεία: one must train one's intellect, learn what great predecessors discovered. Intellectual development makes a person suited to take up leading positions.
5. Introduction of the term φιλόσοφος.

Taken by and large this series of injunctions does not correspond with any code of morals to be found in Plato. Things are completely

different in the two great works of Plato which are devoted to educational problems, the *Politeia* and the *Nomoi*. The four virtues of the *Republic* – later called 'cardinal virtues' – are not mentioned in Pythagoras' speech; the Prooimia of the *Laws* begin differently. Undoubtedly Plato knew the principle that what is 'older' should be deemed superior on the grounds of its ontological priority. It is present more or less implicitly where he argues about the soul's priority to the body and to material things in general[1]. It is also implied in his assumption of one supreme Principle, called 'the Good', which is the Cause of all intelligible Being[2]. Yet, the principle of τιμιώτερον τὸ πρεσβύτερον is rather *implied* in Plato's metaphysical thought than explicitly expounded, as it is at the beginning of Pythagoras' first speech.

Further, Plato speaks with great emphasis about honouring one's parents, but only after the worship of the gods. The same sequence is implied in Pythagoras' speech, but it is by no means expressed in such clear words.

In his *Republic* Plato recognizes the ideal of brotherliness: the result of children not being brought up in the family and not knowing their parents must be, according to him, that they will behave and feel towards the whole older generation as they would towards their own parents, and that they will behave and feel towards their contemporaries as they would towards their own brothers and sisters. Who has priority here: Plato or Pythagoras?

This is not the place to answer this question conclusively: we shall find several other texts about the ὁμόνοια and φιλία πρὸς ἅπαντας in the Pythagorean circle. It can and should be noted here, however, that the injunction to live in harmony and to love one another *belongs organically to the Pythagorean view of the universe:* for the cosmic law of equilibrium and harmony is also valid for man. He must follow the order of the cosmos of which he is a part. Hence it can be stated with a high degree of probability that on this point priority belongs to Pythagoras. We know with enough certainty that he personally exerted himself to have certain principles accepted, both by training legislators and political leaders, and by directly educating a community of people in the place where he had settled. What principles? – It is said that we do not know, for everything that we hear about it was written down much later. Scholars are willing to assume, because of Aristotle's

[1] *Laws* X 892a-c.

[2] *Rep.* VI 508e-509b.

description of Pythagorean doctrine and on the strength of the fragments of Philolaus, that *number and harmony* were at least fifth-century Pythagorean principles. Is it reasonable, however, to ascribe these principles to the fifth-century Pythagoreans, but to deny them to the man who was the founder of this whole philosophical tradition? And does not Aristotle himself point out that *these* principles went back to the first generation of the school?

But Aristotle, it is said, nowhere mentions Pythagoras by name. He evidently thought that nothing could be known with certainty about the founder. Those who repeat this argument time and again apparently do not remember that Aristotle also liked to speak of the 'Platonists' as a school without mentioning any name[1]: he often leaves it to us to find out that *this* opinion was held by Plato, and *that* one by Speusippus or Xenocrates. We shall have to admit that Aristotle's report clearly points to the fact that Pythagoras taught that number and harmony were fundamental principles.

That order and harmony were regarded as principles for moral and social life by the early Pythagoreans can be found with unmistakable clarity in Plato's *Gorgias:* in this early dialogue[2] the Pythagoreans are referred to by the somewhat archaic name οἱ σοφοί. They teach κοινωνία and φιλία, κοσμιότης, σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη as *cosmic principles* which also embrace man and his life: 'for this reason they call this whole *cosmos*', a term which according to Aetius, was first used by Pythagoras[3]. Follows in Plato an injunction to observe the principle of 'geometric equality'. We know this principle from Archytas fr. 2, just as we know the ὁμόνοια from Archytas fr. 3.

Since Plato then himself refers to these Pythagorean doctrines as an old and venerable tradition, and this is corroborated by clear texts of Archytas, there is no point in trying to trace the doctrine of κοινωνία and φιλία to later fourth-century thought, either to Plato himself or to Isocrates. The Pythagorean tradition clearly preceded. It has a stamp all of its own which is lacking in Isocrates, while it is secondary in Plato.

It will therefore have to be admitted that all this goes back to fifth-century Pythagoreanism. Once more, is it reasonable to ascribe these principles to the fifth-century Pythagoreans but to deny them to the

[1] In his chapter on Pythagoras Guthrie, as we saw above, has very rightly pointed out this fact.
[2] To be dated at the beginning of the fourth century, c. 390 or earlier. The passage is: 507e6-508a8. [3] II 1, 1; Diels *VS* 14, 21.

founder? Is it likely that the fifth-century Pythagoreans were the first to act as teachers and socio-political leaders, and not their founder?

Certainly not: we have sufficient evidence to hold that it was the *founder* who was active as an educator, both in his own school and for a whole population. We also know that it was precisely this activity that made a deep impression in the surrounding country and left its trace in regional history. – What was the reason for this?

I am inclined to answer: because here people saw a leader before them whose moral preaching was grounded in a profound view of the world-order and a well thought-out explanation of all things; a man who for the Greek possessed *the nobility of the thinker*, and who at the same time devoted himself with his whole person to the task of realizing his theoretical views in life.

It is difficult to imagine that the Pythagorean doctrine of ὁμόνοια and κοινωνία (which we shall find again in the second speech), which had such a driving force that it lived on for centuries, was a secondary product of a second and third generation. We can understand it as being the spiritual creation of the great figure who was the originator of the whole Pythagorean movement: *Pythagoras*.

This then with regard to the peaceability and brotherliness which appear in the first speech. The details in which the exhortations sub 1 are worked out speak for an ancient origin. So does the way in which the gods are introduced: what we have here before us is not a 'philosophical religion', but the traditional mythological religion, with hardly any rationalisation and without any allegory in the later apologetic sense[1]. Thus the example of Zeus and Hera in 39, and that of Heracles in 40. In later Cynic literature Heracles becomes the example of a φιλάνθρωπος θεός[2]. He does not appear here as such: here he is held up as an example to the youth who in obedience to their elders have duties to fulfil. The setting is a local one: Heracles is the *oikistes* of Croton, and – what should not be forgotten – Croton has a glorious athletic tradition.

Ad 3. The virtue of self-control does not have a specifically Pythagorean character: in the fourth century it appears in all authors, in Plato and Xenophon as well as in Isocrates. But undoubtedly it did have an important place in Pythagoras' thought; for did it not directly follow

[1] See above, p. 78ff.
[2] About this see R. Höistad, *Cynic hero and Cynic King*, Uppsala 1948, pp. 26f., 48f., 60.

from the principles of number and of order? In this popular speech Pythagoras is sparing of the profoundest metaphysical grounds: he adapts himself to his audience and, in order to emphasize the importance of the virtue of self-control, he chooses two old historical examples, known through a very widespread tradition: that of the ordeal of the Trojan war and the 1.000-year tribute of the Locrians for the sin of Aiax. The latter example in particular argues against a fifth- or fourth-century origin. The motif does not appear until comparatively late in literature; in Southern Italy, however, because of the proximity of Locri this sacrifice must have been well-known.

Ad 4. Only the passage about παιδεία was to a large extent reminiscent of Isocrates. But not in its entirity. In this piece of rhetoric which savours of the fourth century we found a body of θεωρία which does not at all point to Isocrates or to any other rhetor.

Ad 5. Finally there was the introduction of the terms *philosophos* and *philosophia*. While granting that the introduction of these terms by Pythagoras cannot be strictly demonstrated, we have pointed out (1) that even the lack of direct evidence would not be in itself sufficient ground for denial; (2) that there are some highly probable indications for an early-Pythagorean origin of these terms.

3. The second speech[1]

> *Iamblichus V.P. 45.* The young people having told their fathers what Pythagoras had said to them, he was invited by the Senate to come to the Senate house: there he was praised for what he had said to the sons of the senators and he was requested, if he had anything of importance to tell the Crotonians, to say this in a speech to those in authority. Pythagoras advised them in the first place to set up a temple to the Muses, to preserve the concord which existed among them. For, he said, these goddesses are all called by the same name, by tradition they have always been mentioned together[2] and

[1] **T** 7.

[2] E. Rohde, *Zu Iambl., De V.P.* in Rhein. Mus. 34, 1879, p. 261, thinks the text μετ' ἀλλήλων παραδεδόσθαι incomprehensible. He suggests that before παραδ. something like διαγούσας or σχολαζούσας has been dropped. Deubner, however, appears not to have been shocked by the expression that the Muses 'were handed down together'. In fact, the expression is not all that awkward.

> rejoice most over a communal cult; and on the whole, the choir of Muses is always one and the same. Furthermore, this choir has unanimity within it, harmony, rhythmic order, in short all that produces concord. He also pointed out to them that the power of the Muses does not only extend to the most beautiful spiritual activities, but also to the concord and harmony of Being.

It does not seem likely that this opening was invented by a rhetor of the fifth or fourth century: there is nothing which gives us reason to suppose this. On the other hand, we know that Pythagoras held the Muses in great reverence: according to the tradition followed by Diogenes Laertius and Porphyry, after the attack by Cylon he fled to the temple of the Muses, and according to Iamblichus the street where he lived in Metapontum was called the Mouseion[1]. We can also place this within the framework of his philosophic thought, in which harmony based on numeric ratios played such an important part. For Aristotle's short account clearly implies that these principles had a cosmic function for Pythagoras and as such were also the foundation of the moral and social order. Here, too, Pythagoras, appears to have been a traditionalist with regard to popular religion: he knew how to assimilate certain elements of the mythological tradition and to give them a new religious meaning. Abstract thought is for him bound up with devotion, because the mathematical principles as the foundation of the *cosmos* are for him in the widest sense a divine law, which embraces the whole of nature and human life. The style of this passage is original: it is not that of later allegoresis, but rather the original and somewhat naïve expression of a much earlier period. In short, everything points to the founder himself. Delatte has seen this clearly; Rostagni, who was one-sidedly interested in parallels with Gorgias, did not notice it.

> (c. 46). He went on to say that they must look upon the fatherland as being a deposit which they had received in trust from the majority of the citizens. They should therefore govern it in such a way that they could hand on the pledge to the next generation. And this could not fail to come about if they

[1] Diog. Laert. VIII 40 and Porphyry 57 (both from Dicaearchus); Iambl. 170, *in fine*. P. Boyancé, *Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs*, Paris 1936, pp. 234ff.

regarded every citizen as equal and heeded nothing above the law. For, knowing that justice is essential in every case, man creates the myth[1] that Themis has the same place beside Zeus as Dikè beside Pluto and as the law has in states, so that those who do not carry out their ordained tasks according to the law will at the same time also appear to have transgressed against the whole cosmos.

This passage brings up a good many problems. As to the idea of a deposit, Delatte[2] has rightly pointed out parallels in the political literature of the fourth century. Yet the question must be asked whether the idea as it is expressed here is democratic in the usual sense. Certainly, it implies an awareness of responsibility to all citizens, but not that of the actual rendering of an account. The members of the senate of Croton are reminded that they are *morally* responsible for their policy, because the interests of the state have been entrusted to them. Finally they are urged to govern well, so that in time they can hand on the pledge with which they have been entrusted τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν. This can only mean: *to their sons*. Of course this may be taken in the wider sense of 'the next generation'. But it definitely implies that it was a certain 'clan' or social order which, from generation to generation, formed the βουλή. In any case this idea does not fit in with fourth-century democracy, nor even with that of the fifth. It points back to an earlier period.

Then there is the idea of justice and its foundation. The first requirement for those in authority is that they must be 'equal' to all. We might expect to hear something in this context about geometric equality, known from Plato, *Gorgias* 507 a b and Archytas, fr. 2. But there is nothing about this in our passage. Equality is mentioned without any further addition; an equality moreover with a traditional religious foundation which at least to us today seems more like something invented by the human mind: knowing that in all possible situations justice is 'required' *man makes up the myth* that Themis has a place beside Zeus etc.[3]. What have we to think of all this? Does this belong to the fifth-century Sophistic, people like Critias, Prodicus and Antiphon, or in what other way can it be interpreted?

[1] μυθοποιεῖν. [2] *Pol. pyth.* p. 40.

[3] Cf. Theages ap. Stob., *Ecl.* III 1, 117 (Hense III p. 79, r. 5ff.): Θέμις γῶν φατίζεται παρὰ τοῖς οὐρανίοις θεοῖς, δίκα δὲ παρὰ τοῖς χθονίοις, νόμος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Cf. also Soph., *Antig.* 450ff.; Hirzel, *Themis*, p. 150.

First, the tone of the passage is clearly not ironical and sceptical. The speaker's intention is not to state that the myths about Themis and Dikè are just a fiction, thought out in order to give some divine sanction to human law. On the contrary: what he means is that there is an objective and real order of equality and equilibrium indwelling in the cosmos, and exemplary of justice in human and social life; hence the religious tradition about Themis and Dikè expresses an eternal truth, and human law is in fact of the same order.

This is a simple example of allegoresis. There are more: there is for instance the curious explanation of the Sirens, referred to in the *Acousmata*[1]. It is definitely ancient: it may go back to the first generation of Pythagoreans, perhaps to the Master himself. Delatte has pointed out that the Pythagoreans practised the allegorical interpretation of Homer[2] long before the Stoics began to use this method systematically[3], and more recently M. Detienne, following in his footsteps, confirmed Delatte's view by further inquiry[4]. Similar to the instance of Themis and Dikè is the explanation of the fatherhood of Zeus, given in the first speech, ch. 39.

It is improbable that such interpretations should have been produced by some fourth- or even fifth-century rhetor, precisely because their background was very different from Pythagoras' theory of a cosmic order. On the other hand, why should it have been thought out by some fifth-century Pythagorean and not go back to the founder himself? For fifth- and also fourth-century Pythagoreans there were the morally dangerous parallels of such thinkers as Gorgias, Critias and Antiphon who, while giving verbally the same interpretations of mythological tradition, denied the background of cosmic reality which for the Pythagorean was its actual religious truth. Therefore, I am inclined to consider it much more probable that such interpretations of mythological tradition go back to Pythagoras himself. It is quite natural that he, when speaking to a large mixed audience, used to refer to traditional religion, showing it to be meaningful and objectively true.

[1] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 82: ἁρμονία ἐν ᾗ αἱ Σειρῆνες. See the explanation by Delatte, *Litt. pyth.*, p. 259; Guthrie, *History*, p. 289f.

[2] Delatte, *Litt.* pp. 109-136.

[3] A fifth-century instance of allegoresis is Prodicus' story of Heracles at the cross-roads, extant in Xenophon, *Memor.* II, 1, 21-the end.

[4] M. Detienne, *Homère, Hésiode et Pythagore*, pp. 62-81. Cp. supra, p. 80.

(c. 47) It was not seemly for the councillors, (he said), to use the name of any of the gods in vain, for swearing an oath: they should use such words that also without swearing an oath they would be trustworthy; and they should rule in their own homes in such a way that their political decisions could bear comparison with their private lives. Their attitude towards their children should be noble, since they are the only living creatures who are aware of this disposition[1]; and in their dealings with the woman who shared their life they should bear in mind that agreements with others are set forth in written documents and on stones, but that with one's wife in one's children. And they should try to be loved by their children, not because of natural ties – for the children could do nothing about this – but from their own free choice. For this benefit was voluntary[2].

We have here in the first place the theme of simplicity and consistency, concord and harmony in personal life: your words should be simple and trustworthy[3]. In politics the same principles must be applied as in family life. Next, there should be φιλία: for one's wife and children, and vice versa. But in the love of children for their parents the personal element of free will should be striven after. All this fits so perfectly into the framework of Pythagoras' cosmic philosophy and at the same time bears such a personal stamp, that I do not find any sufficient reason for attributing it to a later generation. Why not to the master himself?

(c. 48) They must also see to it that they knew their own wives only and that the wives on their part would not bring forth bastards, because they were neglected and badly treated by their own husbands. Furthermore they should consider that they had, as it were, carried off their wives like supplicants from

[1] Reading μόνους ... εἰληφότας with the archetypus Laurentianus (F). Deubner proposed μόνης ... εἰληφότων, which changes the meaning but does so without any necessity.

[2] Rohde, *Zu Iambl., De V.P.*, Rh. Mus. 1879, p. 261, observes that the words ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἑκουσίαν cannot be correct, since no εὐεργεσία has been mentioned before. He suggests the reading ταύτης, sc. τῆς προαιρέσεως. However, if the προαίρεσις is supposed to contain an εὐεργεσία, a Greek could also call it by that name. Transl.: "For the benefit which is contained in that is voluntary".

[3] The topic of being trustworthy without swearing an oath is also mentioned in Diog. Laert. VIII 22.

their hearths performing a libation, and in the presence of the gods had brought them to their own homes. In orderliness and self-control they should set an example both to members of their own family and to their fellow citizens, and they should see to it that nobody sinned in any respect, preventing that they should do wrong in secret for fear of legal punishment, but behaving so that they (sc. the others) would strive for justice out of respect for your noble character[1].

Pythagoras' insistance on pure marital relationships[2], on respect for woman, as wife and mother, seems to be an original trait: it does not only belong to the old tradition (in Diodorus and Trogus), but its foundation has once again that traditional-religious character which we have already come across on several occasions and recognized as an archaic element[3]. This character is found with a particular clear-

[1] τὴν τοῦ τρόπου καλοκἀγαθίαν. Cp. my comments on c. 54.

[2] Cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 21. Here Hieronymus of Rhodes is cited who says that, when he had descended into Hades, Pythagoras saw under torture those who refused to have intercourse with their own wives (κολαζομένους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας συνεῖναι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναιξί).

[3] For this foundation we may also cite Aristotle as a witness, (supposing that he is the author of *Oeconomica* I). In 4 (1344 a8) we read: ὑφηγεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ κοινὸς νόμος, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ἱκέτην καὶ ἀφ' ἑστίας ἠγμένην ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖν [δοκεῖν] ἀδικεῖν· ἀδικία δὲ ἀνδρὸς αἱ θύραζε συνουσίαι γιγνόμεναι.

L. Edelstein, *The Hippocratic Oath*, Baltimore 1943, p. 34, n. 108, observes that such reflections were rather unusual in ancient Greece: cf. Arist., *E.N.* 1130 a24ff., where adultery is considered wrong only if committed for the sake of gain; otherwise it is called self-indulgence. See also Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum*, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche u. Vorarbeiten VI, Giessen 1910, p. 232. Originally no difference was made between marital and extra-marital sexual relationships. By his attitude to monogamy Pythagoras introduces a moral viewpoint: he apparently taught that sexual intercourse within marriage with the intention of begetting children does not make one unclean, but outside marriage it does. Infra, c. 55. This is what in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 74, 53 we find attributed to Phintys. Also in Diogenes Laertius VIII 43. Φασὶν αὐτὴν ἐρωτηθεῖσαν ποσταία γυνὴ ἀπ'ἀνδρὸς καθαρεύει, φάναι· "ἀπὸ μὲν ἰδίου παραχρῆμα, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου οὐδέποτε". In Iambl., *V.P.* 132, the same view is attributed to Brontinus' wife Deino or to Theano. Cf. Diels-Kranz, *V.S.* 58 D 8, pp. 476, 4ff., and 477, 7 ff. To those who claimed that on the point in question Aristoxenus depends on Plato's ethics, Edelstein (*The Hippocratic Oath* p. 17, n. 41) replied that on the matter under discussion Plato's views certainly were more lax than those of the Pythagoreans; cf. *Laws* VIII, 841 d. For the usual Greek view of what Pythagoreans called γεννήσεις παρὰ φύσιν he points to Arist., *EN.*, 1148 b 29 ff. On this passage, see below, **T** 63, 6 and App. E.

ness in both the parallel passages in Iamblichus' *V.P.*, viz. 84, on wives being like supplicants, and 195, where the intercourse with the concubines is called ἄθυτος καὶ νόθη[1].

Τάξις and σωφροσύνη are in themselves not peculiarly Pythagorean; but there is some evidence[2] that they were Pythagorean before being Platonic, and once again, they fit perfectly into Pythagoras' cosmic philosophy which is dominated by the idea of order and harmony.

The concluding lines contain again an exhortation to develop a personal choice of what is good, and to do this by setting a personal example. To us this shows (1) the unity of educational principles in Pythagoras' speech, (2) their highly personal character.

> (c. 49) And he urged them to banish idleness from their actions; for there was no other good for every action than the right moment. And he laid it down as the greatest crime to separate children from their parents. He considered the best man to be he who can himself foresee what is good for him, the next best he who realizes what is in his own interest from the experiences of others, and the worst he who simply waits till through suffering he perceives what is best for him.
>
> Those who wish to achieve honour, he said, will not fail to attain their goal if they do as the victors in races: for they, too, do not do their opponents any harm, but they do wish to be victorious themselves. Likewise it is also fitting for political leaders not to be resentful towards those who contradict them, but to help those who listen to them. And he urged them, adhering to really good fame, always to behave personally in the way they wanted to appear to others; for advice is not as

[1] Von Albrecht translates rightly: "Pythagoras überredete die Krotoniaten, sich des Verkehrs mit Nebenfrauen, *die ihnen nicht religiös angetraut waren*, zu enthalten".

Similarly Plato, *Laws* 841 d, speaks of ἄθυτα παλλακῶν σπέρματα. Cp. Suidas, s.v. ἄθυτοι γάμοι.

In Iambl., *V.P.* 84 the addition καὶ ἡ λῆψις διὰ δεξιᾶς (after the ἀφ' ἑστίας ἀγόμεθα) is typical. I do not think it means "und (wir) empfangen sie (sc. the wives) durch Handschlag", as it is rendered by Von Albrecht, but rather: "and we have to touch them by the right hand" –which is a well-known Pythagorean taboo-prescription. Marriage is considered here not so much as a commercial transaction, but rather as a religious ceremony which has to be performed according to a strict ritual.

[2] Again, Plato, *Gorgias* 507 e ff.

> holy as praise, since advice is only fit for men, whilst praise is much more fitting for the gods.

This chapter at first sight gives the modern reader the impression of being a collection of rather incoherent injunctions and evaluations. First of all it seems to him that the use of γάρ after the condemnation of ἀργία is not very convincing. Should idleness be banished *because* καιρός is a necessary element in human action? Next, what is the connection between this and the statement which immediately follows? Supposing that καιρός is necessary in actions and that its presence is a good thing, does not the statement that the greatest crime is to seperate children from their parents follow rather abruptly? The threefold evaluation of those who are capable, to a greater or lesser degree, of recognizing what is in their own interest follows just as disconnectedly. After which follow the admonitions to those who strive after honour.

Moreover, καιρός as well as the theme of ambition point straight to Gorgias: for him both motifs are of pre-eminent importance[1]. What have we to conclude from this? Have we before us in this passage the work of a fifth- or fourth-century rhetor, who puts the ideals of Gorgias into the so-called speech of Pythagoras, as e.g. Gorgias himself put them into his speech of honour of the Athenians killed in battle? This suspicion will probably occur more readily to the modern reader than to look for the source of these well-known Gorgian motifs in early Pythagoreanism, as Rostagni did[2]. The modern reader's first reaction is to think that we have here the kind of enumeration of exhortations and virtues that we know from certain speeches of Isocrates[3]. If one looks more closely, however, our chapter appears to have more system.

Apparently we must insert a caesura after the words αἰσθέσθαι τὸ βέλτιον; i.e. the chapter falls into two parts, the first of which deals with καιρός, and the second with the striving after honour.

The first part comprises four points.

1. In human conduct there is but one ἀγαθόν, namely, καιρός.

[1] In his commentary on the *Epitaphios* of Gorgias, C.W. Vollgraff has discussed this in detail.

[2] *Un nuovo capitulo nella storia della retorica e della sofistica*, in *Studi Italiani di Filologia classica*, N.S. vol. II, 1922, pp. 148-201; = Rostagni, *Scritti Minori* I, pp. 1-59.

[3] E.g. in *Ad Demonicum* and *Ad Nicoclem*.

2. Hence ἀργία must be banished; for constant vigilance and immediate activity are essential, if one is to act rightly at the right moment.
3. The greatest sin against the καιρός is to seperate children from their parents.
4. Being able to see beforehand what is in our interest is another aspect of the vigilance and the ability to act immediately which are essential for the καιρός.

The passage about the striving for honour contains the following ideas.
(1) φιλοτιμεῖσθαι as such is not condemned, but certain conditions are imposed, both as far as its method and as far as its object are concerned.
(2) The method: in striving for honour one must not harm one's opponent. The fairness in sports competitions may serve as an example.
(3) The same applies to political life.
(4) The object: the striving for honour must be directed towards true εὐδοξία, based on the personal character of the agent: one must *be* as one wishes to appear to others.
(5) Finally a γνώμη follows: "For praise is holier than advice".

Giving good advice was according to traditional popular wisdom a religious duty. This is why Hesiod wrote the verses:

> "Whosoever digs a pit for another falls into it himself;
> bad advice is worst for him who has given it"[1].

Iamblichus mentions it among the Pythagorean ἀκούσματα, in the category of the τί πρακτέον: "And to him who asks your advice you must only give the best; for advice is holy"[2]. This can be found as a proverbial expression throughout Antiquity[3]. Pythagoras emends this old precept with a 'But I tell you: Advice is holy, but praise is holier – for the first is only applicable to humans, while the latter much more has its function with regard to the gods.'

[1] *Erga* 266: ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη.
[2] *V.P.* 85: καὶ συμβουλεύειν μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τῷ συμβουλευομένῳ· ἱερὸν γὰρ συμβουλή.
[3] [Plato], *Theages* 122b: καὶ λέγεταί γε συμβουλὴ ἱερὸν χρῆμα εἶναι. [Plato], *Epist.* V, 321c: δίκαιος δ'εἰμὶ καὶ σοὶ ξενικὴν καὶ ἱερὰν συμβουλὴν λεγομένην συμβουλεύειν. In Xenophon, *Anab.* V 6, 4 Hekatonymos says: Εἰ μὲν συμβουλεύοιμι ἃ βέλτιστά μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, πολλά μοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ γένοιτο. εἰ δὲ μή, τ'ἀναντία. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ἱερὰ συμβουλὴ λεγομένη δοκεῖ μοι παρεῖναι.
Thus too in Lucianus, *Rhet. praec.*, 1, and in the lexicon of Hesychius.

This is at the same time archaic and original. It undoubtedly points to the founder himself.

Meanwhile the two main points require some further explanation. It is perfectly true that καιρός as well as the striving for honour are fundamental principles in Gorgias. But long before him they had their place in Greek thought: not only κλέος ἐσθλόν of which the old epic is full, but καιρός as well. It appears in traditional proverbial lore.

> Μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος
> ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων,

says Theognis[1]. And Hesiod[2]:

> Μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ'ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος.

In the wisdom of the seven Sages καιρός is found repeatedly. Solon says: "Seal your words with silence, and your silence with καιρός". And Bias: "By καιρός you will have εὐλάβειαν": a good hold of things. Pittacus admonishes laconically: "Know your time" (καιρός), and Chilon declares: "All good things belong to καιρός"[3].

With respect to this folk wisdom, Pythagoras did the same as he did with the religious tradition – he adopted it, but not without putting his stamp on it. He *rationalized* it by giving it a place in his mathematically ordered cosmic system: hence the definition καιρός = seven[4], a number which for Pythagoras – and for many after him[5] – denoted a period of maturity in human life as well as in the cosmos as a whole[6]. And he also gave to this old principle an *ethical* meaning by linking it up with the fundamental principles of respect for older

[1] 401/2. [2] *Erga* 692.
[3] Solon: Σφραγίζου τοὺς μὲν λόγους σιγῇ, τὴν δὲ σιγὴν καιρῷ (Diels, VS I 63, 16). Bias: ἔξεις καιρῷ εὐλάβειαν. One can translate somewhat periphrastically: "By acting at the right moment you will act prudently" (VS I 65, 11).
Pittacus: Καιρὸν γνῶθι (ib. 64, 12). Chilon: Καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστι καλά (ib. 61, 13).
[4] Mentioned and explained by Alexander of Aphrod. *in Metaph. Arist.* 985 b 30.
[5] E.g. in certain Hippocratean writings, especially the Περὶ ἑβδομάδων . Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* VII 15, 1336 b37-1337 a1: Δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μέχρι ἥβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἥβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσιν διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς. The Stoics also knew this division of human life into periods of seven years, and we find it later in the Arabic Aristotelians, e.g. in the Life of *Hai ibn Jokdân* by Ibn Tofail.
[6] Alex. of Aphrod. mentions as critical periods in human life: birth at seven months, cutting of teeth at seven months after birth, puberty at 14, maturity at 21. The sun, the cause of all critical periods, was supposed to be the seventh of the heavenly bodies, counting towards the centre.

people, for those of great excellence and for those to whom we have special obligations. This is what we read from the account in Iamblichus, *V.P.* 180 ff.

The passage is about justice. Pythagoras says that it appears in an infinite number of varieties which, however, just as a certain geometrical figure, when squared can all be proved in the same way. Justice is also a question of human relationships. In these relationships one mode of conduct is appropriate, another not[1]. The modes vary according to ages, esteem, degree of kinship and obligations which exist with regard to the person concerned. For one mode of conduct is fitting amongst young people, but will not do with regard to older people. Not every form of wrath, or threat, or boldness is misplaced; this is, however, always the case with respect to older people. And the same is true of esteem: behaviour that is fitting amongst equals or towards younger people is unseemly with regard to those who are distinguished by outstanding excellence or those towards whom we have great obligations.

It should be noted that mere difference in social status is not used as a motive for greater respect: what is decisive here is the personal value of the person with whom one is dealing and the obligations one has towards him. Here [Pythagoras] – for the present I shall indicate Iamblichus' Pythagoras in this way so as to show some reservations – does not at all show himself to be a traditional aristocrat. It is therefore confusing to apply this term to him, as has often been done.

In Iamblichus (182) there follows this remarkable final comment:

[1] εὔκαιρος – ἄκαιρος. It is curious that we find εὐκαιρία again as a technical term in Stoic ethics. Cicero, *De fin.* III 14, 15 mentions it as the equivalent of *opportunitas*. Cf. *De fin.* III 18, 61: *Censent opportunitatis esse beate vivere, quod est convenienter naturae vivere.* In *De off.* I, 40, 142 he explains εὐκαιρία as *tempus actionis opportunum*. This is, he says, 'the place' of an action. To know how to put an action 'in its place' is called εὐταξία. That is, says Cicero, what we call *modestia*. It is defined by the Stoics as: *scientia rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo collocandarum. Vis ordinis* is thus at the same time *vis collocationis*. For they define *ordo* as *compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis*.

This use of the term εὐκαιρία in the Stoa has received little attention. The question which may be asked with respect to Iamblichus *V.P.* 180 is now: Is it Iamblichus who introduces here a Stoic term in his account of Pythagoras' doctrine, – or is this term, which was apparently used in the Middle Stoa, in some way or other an echo of an early-Pythagorean notion? In view of the meaning of καιρός in early Pythagoreanism we have good grounds for assuming the latter.

'Up to a certain point the καιρός can be learnt and it is not contrary to reason; it permits systematic treatment[1]. However, in general and as such[2] it has none of these characteristics. It goes together with and is, as it were, naturally bound up with the so-called 'right moment', 'the fitting' and 'seemly', and other such things".

This is Iamblichus' account. Is it down to the last line early Pythagorean? This seems doubtful to me. After the rational-ethical interpretation of καιρός, which finds its expression in the definition 7 and in its identification with the general basic ethical principles which are rooted in the natural order, we are here confronted with an irrationalism which hardly fits in. Rostagni has rightly concluded that what is said here closely resembles what Plato, in the *Gorgias*[3], attributes to the famous rhetor of Leontini: if καιρός cannot be comprised within a general concept and consequently does not allow scientific treatment – which is expressed here in such terms as that, speaking generally and absolutely, it is παράλογος and does not admit of any τεχνολογία –, then this means exactly what Socrates says of Gorgias' rhetoric, viz. that it is not at all a τεχνικὸν ἐπιτήδευμα, but a kind of στοχαστική. But this is precisely what Pythagoras did not mean. Furthermore, Iamblichus' formulation of the passage is clear enough, but not at all archaic[4].

These considerations lead us to the following conclusions. The end of Iamblichus' account presupposes the καιρός doctrine of Gorgias. There is a certain incongruity between this later form of the doctrine which is more closely related to old popular ideas, and the early Pythagorean doctrine. Apparently the later author realized this; hence his remark that *up to a certain point* καιρός can be learnt, is not contrary to reason and permits systematic treatment; after which he proceeds: "but in general and in an absolute sense καιρός is not rational".

Rostagni, in his interesting study of Pythagoras' speeches in Iamblichus, which we have cited before[5], rightly pointed out their similarities with Gorgias: in the four speeches to different groups of the population he recognized the καιρός principle of Gorgias and was reminded of the latter's notion of multiple virtues, which we find expressed by the Thessalian Meno in Plato's dialogue of this name[6]:

[1] τεχνολογία. [2] ἁπλῶς. [3] 463a.
[4] In the *Rhet.*, Aristotle uses the verb τεχνολογεῖν several times; the noun τεχνολογία is found in later grammarians.
[5] *Un nuovo capitolo* etc. [6] *Meno* 71e-72a.

there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of a child, of free men and of slaves, of rulers and of subjects, and a great many more. "For each of us has his ἀρετή in each of his actions and in each of his ages in all that he does[1]". In the words of Iamblichus' Pythagoras: εἶναι γὰρ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ πράξει καιρόν.

I should like to mention four points.

(1) In Pythagoras the four speeches fit in with existing social conventions: his reform plan is carried out within the framework of an existing social order. Gorgias' doctrine of the multiplicity of virtue, however, clearly represents a further stage in the theorizing about the nature of moral excellence.

(2) Although the principle of καιρός is important to both, the background of Gorgias' thought is completely different from that of Pythagoras. Rostagni did in fact feel this[2], although he stressed the points of agreement. What should in particular be emphasized is: that for Pythagoras καιρός is rooted in a cosmic-ontological order, whereas for Gorgias this background is completely absent. This makes for a radical difference; for it implies that for Pythagoras καιρός had its place within a τάξις and as such is of a rational-ethical character, whereas for Gorgias, where there is no such foundation, a complete irrationality remains.

(3) The line of Gorgias is continued in Aristotle. For in the first book of his *Politics*[3] he poses the question: Are there any virtues of slaves, women and children? Are for example the virtues of rulers and subjects the same? To which he gives the answer: all of them have their own special ἀρεταί. It is therefore misleading, as Socrates wished, to give one definition of 'virtue'[4]. "Those who enumerate the virtues separately, as Gorgias does, are much more correct than those who define virtue in that way[5]". Together with several other, no less characteristic traits[6] this is an indication of how great the influence of the orator of Leontini was on Aristotle[7].

[1] καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

[2] *Un nuovo capitolo*, p. 165. [3] I 5, 1259 b22-the end. [4] Cf. Plato, *Meno* 74bff.

[5] 1260 a28 v.: Πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων.

[6] I am thinking in particular of the concept of ἐπιείκεια, which is used by Gorgias in his *Epitaphios* in the sense of *aequitas*, famous through Aristotle, and praised as a supreme virtue. On this see Vollgraff, *L'oraison funèbre* pp. 11-12.

[7] It is strange that this was completely overlooked by Rostagni. We shall return to this later on in another connection.

(4) On the other hand, the line of Pythagoras' principle of καιρός continues where, as far as I know, it has up to now never been indicated, i.e. in the εὐκαιρία-concept of the Middle Stoa[1]. For there εὐκαιρία is an element of εὐταξία, the first being defined as *locus actionis*, while the latter is conceived as *scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo collocandarum*[2]. Τάξις is such a specifically Pythagorean concept, that the similarity of background should be obvious. Can it be proved that there is continuity here? I would say that, even if we cannot prove it, it is not improbable that there was some connection. Early Pythagorean ideas could for example have found their way into the Old Stoa by way of the Early Academy.

In the same paper[3] Rostagni suggests that Pythagoras, in a sense at least, identified justice with καιρός: "La giustizia è una specie di καιρός, e il καιρός una specie di giustizia". In what sense this is correct, will be clear from Iamblichus' above-cited explanation in *V.P.* 180 f. However, when in this context Rostagni adds a reference to Arist., *Metaph.* M 4, 1078 b 22, this might suggest to the reader that in that passage Aristotle confirms the identification. But that would be an error. What is said in the passage is simply that, before Socrates and Democritus, the Pythagoreans gave definitions of a few things and that they did so by connecting the rational aspects of these things with numbers, e.g. what is καιρός, or what is justice, or marriage. Evidently these are three instances, the one independent of the other. It certainly does not mean: 'what is καιρός or justice', in the sense that both would be the same. Such an interpretation would go against what we know from elsewhere about the Pythagorean definitions. For on the one hand we know that Pythagoras defined justice as the first square number[4], on the other hand that καιρός was defined by 7[5]. We must conclude that the definition of the two was not the same, –though it is quite true that, according to Iamblichus' account, Pythagoras said there was no δίκαιον unless the action was adapted to the person with whom one was dealing; which is vaguely indicated by the term 'the circumstances'. And this is exactly what Pythagoras meant by καιρός.

[1] Above, p. 116, n. 1.

[2] Cicero, *De off.* I 40, 142, cited in the above-mentioned note.

[3] p. 162f. = *Scritti minori* I, p. 17.

[4] Alexander of Aphrod. in Ar. *Metaph.* A 1, 985 b29. Cf. the Pythagorean description of justice as τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ (in *E.N.* 1132 b22); also *M.M.* 1182 a11-14.

[5] Alex. in Ar. *Metaph.* A 1, 985 b30.

This aspect of early Pythagoreanism can be denoted by the modern term *situationism*, however with this restriction that for Pythagoras the 'situation' was morally and rationally determined, as appears from Iamblichus, *V.P.* 180 f. By this situationism of Iamblichus' Pythagoras, Rostagni was reminded of the *Dissoi Logoi*. Here we do indeed find ourselves knee deep in situationism: the same thing is for some a good, for others an evil, and for the same person sometimes a good and at other times an evil. The writer agrees with this standpoint and illustrates it with numerous instances[1]. When speaking about justice and injustice he argues[2] that lying and deceiving under certain circumstances are justifiable; so are stealing the possessions of friends and inflicting violence on them, making slaves of people, housebreaking and perjury. Even robbing temples and murdering one's next-of-kin is under certain circumstances δίκαιον[3]. This work which, in view of an allusion to recent events, can be dated shortly after the Peloponnesian war, was first edited by Henricus Stephanus as a Pythagorean text, no doubt chiefly because it is written in the same Doric as a number of Pythagorean texts[4]. Up to the nineteenth century it was considered as such. It was especially Bergk who pointed out the sophistic contents of the work, which according to him was alien to early Pythagoreanism. And this view has up to the present been generally accepted. Rostagni expressed his disagreement with this[5]: sophistic ideas were, he considered, not alien to early Pythagoreanism; on the contrary, it was here that they had originated. There is a straight line running from Pythagoras to Gorgias, and the *Dissoi Logoi*, too, can be conceived as an extension of early Pythagorean thought.

Some reservations should be made here. To speak paradoxically: Rostagni has perceived something important – but *essentially speaking* the line of Pythagorean thought is continued more in Plato and the Stoa than by the sophists. The reason for this paradox is that Rostagni devoted too little attention to the *difference in background* of the καιρός-doctrine in Pythagoras on the one hand and that in Gorgias on the other, to the rational-ethical character of the 'situation' which determines the καιρός-δίκαιον in [Pythagoras] on the one hand, and the

[1] *Diss. Log.* I, 1ff. [2] *Diss. Log.* III. [3] In I 8.
[4] It is remarkable that some 400 years later exactly the same argument was used by the Finnish scholar Holger Thesleff; he also thinks that the *Diss. Log.* originated in Southern Italy (*An Introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic period*, Åbo 1961, pp. 76-81).
[5] *Un nuovo capit.* pp. 174-177; *Scritti Minori* I, p. 29ff.

situationism of moral arbitrariness expressed in the *Dissoi Logoi* on the other. Roughly speaking one may say that after the 'situationism' of [Pythagoras] that of the *Dissoi Logoi* only represents a further stage; on closer investigation, however, it will be seen that there is a gap between the principles of the old philosopher of Croton and the follower of the fifth-century sophists who speaks in the *Dissoi Logoi*. Can it be maintained, for example, that it is in keeping with the spirit of Pythagoras to teach that it is justifiable to commit perjury in order to save one's country from its enemies? Is it not clear that Pythagoras, who most emphatically warned against the rash swearing of oaths, would have said that in a case like this no oath should be taken at all?

And can it be maintained that it was in keeping with the spirit of Pythagoras' teaching to declare that in cases of retaliation it is just to murder one's next-of-kin –, one's father or mother? Far from it. The idea that it could ever be 'just' for a son to do violence to his father or mother, to whom he has infinite obligations, was entirely alien to Pythagoras. Moreover, Pythagoras condemned *any murder* and taught that every feud or enmity must be ended as quickly as possible and be turned into φιλία.

And can it be contended that it was in the line of Pythagoras' thought to accept all sorts of actions called ἀδικίαι in the case of friends and relatives, as δίκαιον in the case of those who are regarded as enemies? Once again, this is far from being the truth. Pythagoras did not accept any form of enmity as a basis and rule for human action. He taught that one should banish all enmity from one's life, turning it into ὁμόνοια and φιλία.

It is not the sophists, but Socrates and Plato who judged and guided human action in this spirit: when they teach that the just man shall never act unjustly in any situation, not even by way of retribution, they speak in the spirit of Pythagoras. Bergk and his followers were right: the *Dissoi Logoi* are in the sophist line of thought, where justice is said to be νόμῳ and not φύσει – a line which is continued in the theory of the *contrat social* in Epicurus and Carneades –; Pythagoras, however, belongs to the other line of Greek thought, where morality is considered to be rooted in a 'physical'-metaphysical ground. This is the line of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoa, each in their own way[1]. Hence, although Rostagni was right in thinking that

[1] It has been said that, by rejecting the transcendent ideas, Aristotle rejected the transcendent background of ethical concepts and hence made ethics a branch of empirical knowledge (e.g. Guthrie, *History* I, pp. 13f.). It should be

Gorgias could have learnt his καιρός-principle in Sicily from the early Pythagoreans, yet for the further development he did not draw the lines as they should be drawn. Gorgias gave to καιρός his own interpretation, and in so doing went a completely different way.

Returning to Iamblichus *V.P.* 49, we find that the statement that the greatest crime is to seperate children from their parents, follows organically on to what precedes. As to the principle itself, that it was well-known in Southern Italy in those days as being a basic Pythagorean rule of life, appears from Iamblichus, *V.P.* 262 where, after the catastrophe of 450, the principle is said to have been used ironically against the Pythagoreans themselves. Moreover, it should be observed that this is another topic on which Plato's educational views differed greatly from Iamblichus' Pythagoras: for Plato considered it to be the right thing that among the rulers and the guardians of his ideal state nobody should know his own children!

The remark that follows – about greater or lesser ability to realize what is in one's own interest – gives another aspect of καιρός, and thus deals with another aspect of human excellence: the gift of practical wisdom referred to here could certainly be called φρόνησις by the Greek: we are no longer concerned with δικαιοσύνη here. It is possible that Pythagoras did speak in this manner about this kind of practical wisdom. There is nothing in these lines that forces us to attribute them to a later author.

The second main theme in c. 49 was that of the striving after honour. Rostagni did not go into this. From his point of view wrongly so; for he could have found here a second fundamental point of agreement with Gorgias, and just as with the previous one, also an interesting difference. It is therefore our task to say a few words about it.

Δόξα as a motivating force for human action from the beginning played an important part among the Greeks: one need only think of the often recurring term κλέος ἐσθλόν in Homer, of εὔκλεον Ἄργος

recognized, however, that for Aristotle nature is dominated by eternal principles, called 'forms', which are present 'in' the things. These eternal principles are, so to speak, a divine Law, immanent in Nature, each thing's ἀρετή being: to actualize its form as perfectly as possible. Thus, man's ἀρετή is: to live up to the standard of the εἶδος 'man'.

In this sense it must be said that, according to its basic principles, *Aristotle's ethics were rooted in Nature*, – a Nature which was 'metaphysically' understood; not in nature as a whole consisting of contingent phenomena, but in that higher aspect of nature which in Aristotle's own terms was called ἀΐδια καὶ ἀναγκαῖα.

ἱκέσθαι, etc. The motive is also constantly present in Greek tragedy. In his commentary on the *Epitaphios* of Gorgias, Vollgraff has pointed to this tradition[1]. Literature here is the spokesman of the feelings which dominated the Greek male: the pursuit of honour governed the whole of life, at least for those who were called 'the best'. Vollgraff has rightly observed that in his educational ideals Plato went against this tradition, whereas Gorgias followed it. Gorgias himself, who was a very vain man and who practised the γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν as a professional, on principle did not go beyond the pursuit of εὐκλεία.

And what about Pythagoras? Was he a philo-sophos, as he claimed, or was he basically a philo-timos or philo-doxos, who also guided others in this direction? This is a question which we have to ask ourselves.

In the first place it should again be noted that Pythagoras is speaking to the wider circle of men who are not in any special sense his pupils, although they are prepared to accept advice from him on how to run their lives and to work as rulers of the city. This naturally makes a great difference. For those who wished to join the S.P. Pythagoras had a completely different standard[2].

For these well-disposed Councillors he does not condemn the striving for honour as such, but he tries to canalise it. Hence the injunctions about method and object. "He urged them to strive towards real εὐδοξία, and each one personally to be as he wished to appear to others"; i.e. he turns the φιλοτιμεῖσθαι into a striving after virtue and real nobility of character. And it is this exhortation which he finally seals with the γνώμη that 'praise' is superior to 'advice'. This is traditional, but original within the framework of the tradition; archaic but at the same time revolutionary with respect to the prevailing code of morals. That this was in fact the purport and effect of Pythagoras' speech to the Councillors is apparent from the end of the next section.

> (c. 50) Finally he added this, that the city of Croton is reputed to have been founded when Heracles, driving the oxen (of Geryones) through Italy, had been unfairly treated by Lacinius, whilst he had at night accidentally killed Croton who wished

[1] W. Vollgraff, *L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias*, pp. 116-132.
[2] Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 72, 1. 3-4. Porph., *V.P.* 32 says that Pythagoras urged *all* to avoid φιλοτιμία καὶ φιλοδοξία.
Below, ch. VII, sect. 4, the end.

to help him, thinking that he was an enemy; and after this he had promised that around Croton's tomb a town would be founded of the same name, when he himself would have obtained his share of immortality. Therefore, he said, it became the Senate of Croton righteously to administer the gratitude for the received benefit.

When then the Senators had heard this speech, they had the temple of the Muses built and dismissed the concubines they had according to the local custom.

They requested Pythagoras to speak separately to the children in the temple of Apollo and to the women in the temple of Hera.

Pythagoras ending his speech by reminding the authorities of Croton of the fact that the inheritance of Heracles is in their charge – a consideration which was bound to remind the Councillors most vividly of their obligation to act justly and to dispose them to behave with the greatest dignity in their private lives – is another of those traditional-archaic, yet original traits, which we have come across time and again in this and in the first speech. Such ideas do not originate in later sophistic. They have a character of their own, which fits nobody better than the founder of the Pythagorean school when he addressed the wider circle of the population of Croton and its leaders.

What is remarkable is the great moral influence which tradition attributes to Pythagoras: he was listened to, but not 'listened to' in the modern sense where listening does not involve any ensuing activity. 'Listening' is used here in the ancient sense, i.e.: the personal call which was contained in the spoken word awoke a response, and not only in a question of public interest such as the founding of the Mouseion, which did not call for any personal sacrifice on the part of the councillors, except perhaps for a financial contribution. A real sacrifice was made: without hesitation a way of life was given up which appeals to the strongest and most elementary of man's instincts. What is reported in these sober words of Iamblichus is indeed in the fullest sense a miracle.

4. The third Speech[1]

In compliance with the invitation from the senate [Pythagoras] next speaks to the children (i.e. probably the boys). He exhorts them as follows.

(c. 51, 2) They must not start to insult others, and (if others abused them) they must not defend themselves against the offenders. They should be diligent in learning: for παιδεία has been named after their age. Furthermore, a boy who behaves himself[2] can easily preserve his good character[3] throughout life; but for him who is not good in the decisive period of his life[4] it is difficult to stay good later on[5], – or rather, it is impossible after a bad start to get to the finishing post well.

Moreover he pointed out to them that they were most dear to the gods; for this reason, he said, in times of great drought children are sent by the states to ask the gods for water; for the divinity grants their prayers most; and as they are pure, they alone are allowed to tarry in temples without any restriction.

The first point in 'boys' virtue' appears for [Pythagoras] to be πραότης: the boys are in the first place exhorted not to be aggressive in their speech, and not even to give up their gentle bearing when abused by others. This is nothing other than an application of φιλία, ὁμόνοια and σωφροσύνη to the age and character difficulties of boys.

Next there is the injunction to diligence in learning. The word παιδεία is striking here: in ancient times it does not occur in this sense, but in the sense of *childhood*. Thus Theognis reminds a young boy of the fact that παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος / ὠκύτερον σταδίου. And a few lines further on he mentions the myth of Zeus carrying Ganymedes off to Olympus and making him a daemon, παιδείας ἄνθος ἔχοντ' ἐρατόν[6]. Aesch., *Sept.* 18 uses the term as a synonym of τροφή. The semantic comment on the word made by Iamblichus makes us suspect, however, that the use of the word as found in our passage might be early.

[1] **T** 8. [2] ἐπιεικής. Cp. my comments on c. 54.
[3] τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν. [4] κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρόν.
[5] Since καθεστάναι denotes the established order, the author apparently did not intend to say that, if one has not been good as a boy, it is difficult to *become* good later on, but it is difficult to *stay* a good man permanently.
[6] Theognis 1305, 1348.

This is followed by some reflections on the theme 'the child is father of the man'. The years of boyhood are of decisive importance for the moulding of character: they are called καιρός, a concept which we know from Aristotle to have had an important function in early Pythagoreanism. The terms ἐπιεικής and καλοκαγαθία are noteworthy here. The first fits into the framework of the views on καιρός which we came across in the second speech[1]. Καλοκαγαθία originates in the ancient code of morals of the nobility but is used here in a definitely 'modern' sense. It is found in this sense later in Isocrates, and in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, which for some scholars is an argument for the early dating of this work[2]. It is perfectly in keeping with the 'reform' movement of Pythagoras to have given this term, originating from the old standards of morality of one social class, a new, more general spiritual content; for the creation of a spiritual aristocracy and of a religion based on ethical principles was the goal of Pythagoras' preaching[3].

We repeatedly came across metaphors taken from sport in the previous speeches. Here again is the metaphor of the race track: start and finish. It cannot be said that all this points to a later time. Moreover, the great importance of the beginning was proverbial among the early Pythagoreans.

ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἥμισυ παντός

Galenus[4] cites from the Παραινέσεις Πυθαγόρου. Iambl., *V.P.* 162, explicitly ascribes this hemistich to Pythagoras himself. Delatte[5] takes it to be a fragment from the Ἱερὸς λόγος. Iambl., *V.P.* 182, mentions the principle in his account of καιρός: "And they taught that in everything the beginning is of the greatest value". The comments that follow, which deal not only with the great importance but also with the great difficulties involved in finding the ἀρχή in a theoretical investigation, may point to a later stage of epistemological reflection. The principle itself, however, must be ancient.

Next we find the idea that children are particularly dear to the gods. In this general form we know of no such pronouncement from classical

[1] *Supra*, c. 49. The term is old. Below, my note on c. 54 (p. 109f.).
[2] E.g. F. Dirlmeier; see his commentary in: Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, Berlin 1958, p. 425f. About καλοκἀγαθία: H. Wankel, *Kalos kai Agathos*, Diss. Würzburg 1961.
[3] Cp. also Iambl., *V.P.* 124 and 129.
[4] *Op.* X, p. 450 K.
[5] *Litt. pythag.*, p. 36.

Antiquity. It can, however, be stated that this belief existed implicitly, for children, and also boys and girls of marriageable age but as yet unwed, had an important place in ancient Greek cult[1]. This was undoubtedly connected with the notion of cultic purity[2]. 'Rain-making' is known to us from classical literature[3]. It is true that in those cases children are not mentioned, but it is not improbable that they were sent forth in ancient times, as drought was considered a punishment from the gods, and by preference cultically pure persons will have been sent in a penitential and supplicatory procession[4]. That only children could stay in temples without any restriction, is also connected with the precept of cultic purity. It was generally held in Antiquity that sexual intercourse made one impure. Τὰ ἀφροδίσια μιαίνει, Porphyry says[5]. The precept that after sexual intercourse one must not enter a temple for one or more days and then only after ritual purification, is known to us from many sanctuaries[6]. We know of similar regulations in Jewish law. They survive in the purification of Joseph and Mary after the birth of Jesus, and in the 'churching of women' in the Catholic Church, a rite which has only very recently fallen into disuse[7].

> (c. 52) It is also for this reason that those gods who are the most well-disposed towards man, Apollo and Eros, are painted and represented by everyone as boys. And it is generally agreed that some games in which the victors are given wreaths

[1] On this E. Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum*, pp. 112ff., 161f.
[2] On the development of this notion: Fehrle, op. cit., pp. 222ff.
[3] A few cases are mentioned by M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte d. griech. Religion* I, Handbuch d. Alt. wiss. 5 Abt., II 1, München 1941, ²1955, p. 369. *A history of Greek Religion*, Oxford² 1949, p. 89f.
[4] Fehrle, op. cit. p. 63, reports a rite common in Southern Europe to procure rain: a naked little girl is bedecked with flowers and herbs, led through the fields and sprayed with water.
[5] *De abst.* IV 20.
[6] Fehrle, op. cit., p. 155f. Cp. the statement of Phintys ap. Stob., *Flor.* 74, 53, cited *supra*, p. 111, n. 3.
An inscription from Pergamum, first century A. D., gives the following regulation concerning ritual purity: whosoever wishes to enter the temple of Athena Nikephoros has to purify himself or herself after sexual intercourse; if this was with one's own wife or husband, then the day after, if with somebody else, then after two days (Dittenberger, *Syll.* ², II 566).
[7] It is curious that in the Middle Ages there were Church rulings according to which married couples were not allowed to receive communion the morning after they had had sexual intercourse.

were instituted for the sake of children, the Pythian games because Python was defeated by a child, and the Nemean and Isthmian games in honour of children, to commemorate the deaths of Archemorus and Melicertes. Apart from this, at the founding of the city of Croton Apollo had promised to give progeny to the leader of the colonisation, should he found the colony in Italy.

That Apollo and Eros are called φιλανθρωπότατοι here is not so obvious to us. However, there is abundant evidence that Pythagoras held Apollo in particular reverence, and in this light the statement can be understood. Undoubtedly the Delphic Oracle, where the god constantly revealed his interest in the affairs of man, is thought of.

Eros represented as a young boy is well-known to us. We have more reason to question the statement that *Apollo* was always painted and represented as a boy (παῖς). For at the age of 18 or 20 a Greek no longer speaks of παῖς. Not even at 16 or perhaps a little younger. In this speech in particular by the use of παῖδες Pythagoras clearly did not mean what the Greek in the days of Socrates and Plato called μειράκια and νεάνιαι. He meant young boys, *children*. And can it be said that Apollo was pictured as such 'by all'? This is difficult to maintain. No doubt, the killing of Python was, according to the oldest form of the legend, ascribed to Apollo when he was a boy: in Delphi he killed the dragon with arrows. Apparently this is what was represented in the rites of the Septerion at Delphi[1]; the earliest reference in literature is in the Homeric Hymn[2]. According to a later version Apollo performed this deed even as a baby, a few days after his birth[3]. Our text allows both interpretations. And according to the legend both Archemorus and Melicertes perished as babies[4]. All this is true. On the whole, however, in ancient times Apollo was often

[1] A short description of the δρώμενα in this Delphic feast is given by Plutarch, *Quaest. Gr.* 12, 293 BC. An ampler discussion of these rites is found in the *De def. orac.* 15, 417 Eff. See also Strabo IX 422; P.–W. II A, col. 1553ff.

[2] So too Apollo Rhod. II 705: κοῦρος. Cf. Aesch., Prologue *Eumenides;* Plin., *N.H.* XXXIV 59, about the statue of Pythagoras of Rhegium.

[3] Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 1245ff.: Apollo fights the dragon as βρέφος from the arms of Leto. Macrob., *Sat.* I 17, 52 (in prima infantia); Hyg., *Fab.* 140 (post diem quartum).

[4] The Isthmian games were instituted in honour of Melicertes, also called Palaemon (Pausanias II 1, 3; Hypoth. Pind. *Isthm.* a, b, d). The story goes that the pursued mother Ino (Leucothea) jumped into the see at Megara holding

represented as a youth (κοῦρος), but sometimes as an older man. Later always as a *young* man, in a few known cases as a μειράκιον who has hardly reached the ephebic age[1], and also as a baby[2]. Now according to ordinary Greek usage one could not possibly say that he was *always* portrayed as a child, or even that this was *usually* the case.

The solution of this problem is, I think, to be found in a passage in Diogenes Laertius. Here it is stated that Pythagoras divided human life into four periods of 20 years each: the first period was called 'boyhood', and the term used by Pythagoras for this age was: παῖς[3]. In this sense Apollo represented as a κοῦρος could be said to be represented as παῖς.

This peculiar usage, which is the key to our passage, is to my mind an unmistakable indication of the early date of these somewhat strange-looking assertions.

That the god Apollo had a special interest in them is graphically described to the children of Croton by [Pythagoras] in recalling that the god had promised progeny to the oikist of Croton, when according to the custom the latter consulted the Delphic oracle at the beginning of his undertaking.

> (c. 53) From this they had to understand that Apollo had seen to it that they were born, and that all the gods took care of them. Therefore they had to prove themselves worthy of the love of these gods and train themselves to listen, in order to be able to speak themselves one day. And furthermore, they must from the very beginning take the path which they would continue to take till their old age, and follow those who had

the young Melicertes in her arms (Hypoth. Pind. *Isthm.* c; Ovid., *Metam.* IV, 512ff; Paus. 1.44,11; Hyg. *Fab.* 2).

Archemorus (nickname of Opheltes) came from Nemea and was buried there. According to the myth, the Argive army of the Seven against Thebes came down to Nemea and, being thirsty, they were guided to a drinking pool by the trophos of little Opheltes. Meantime the child who was left behind was strangled by a snake. The heroes held games to honour the dead child (Aesch. in the tragedy *Nemea*, ap. Nauck, *T.G.F.* p. 49; Hypoth. Pind. *Nem.*; Paus. VIII 48.2; Hyg. *Fab.*, 74, 273).

[1] E.g. in the *sauroktonos*, and in the cult statue of Apollo Smintheus in Chryse (Strabo XIII, 604).

[2] Sometimes Latona is portrayed with her two children, sometimes Apollo who as a boy killed the Python.

[3] Diog. Laert. VIII 10; *infra*, ch. VII, section 3, under (3).

already gone this way before them; and they must not contradict their elders in any respect. For in this way they would in later life have good grounds for demanding that young people should not rebel against them either.

It is generally agreed that by these injunctions he brought it about that nobody uttered his name, but that all called him divine.

The practice of rooting obedience in religion has here a similar traditional-archaic form as we found already several times in [Pythagoras]' speeches. There is also the ancient Greek notion that as a child one has to 'listen' (i.e. obey) in order to be able to 'speak' (i.e. command)[1] later, the theme of starting early and of the inner consistency of life. All this has a markedly archaic character.

That Pythagoras inspired such awe that people deliberately avoided uttering his name, reminds us of the words with which in the *Odyssea*[2] Eumaeus speaks about Odysseus:

τὸν μὲν ἐγών, ὦ ξεῖνε, καὶ οὐ παρεόντ' ὀνομάζειν
αἰδέομαι· πέρι γὰρ μ'ἐφίλει καὶ ἐκήδετο λίην.

Iamblichus quotes them in this same connection in *V.P.* 255, and says that none of the Pythagoreans would mention Pythagoras by name, but that in his lifetime he was described as 'the divine one' (τὸν θεῖον) and after his death as 'that man' (ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἄνδρα). Here Iamblichus' source is Apollonius of Tyana. But the tradition is undoubtedly old. Diog. Laertius VIII 41 mentions Hermippus as the source; compare also *Aristotle*, fr. 2 from Π. τ. Πυθαγ. in Ross, *Fragm. Sel.*, p. 132, and Iamblichus, *V.P.* 150.

5. The fourth Speech[3]

Iamblichus V.P. 54. Pythagoras is reported to have spoken to the women as follows about[4] sacrifices. First, if somebody else were to say prayers in their place they would wish him to be a morally superior person, as the gods lend a willing ear to such

[1] Compare the speech of Phoenix to Achilles in *Ilias* IX 439ff.
[2] *Odyssea* XIV 145f.
[3] **T** 9.
[4] On ὑπέρ for περί see Kühner-Gerth I 548, § 450a; Deubner, Sitz. Berl. 1935, p. 636.

people; well then, likewise they themselves should attach the highest value to moral excellence[1], that the gods might be willing to grant their prayers. Next, anything they wished to offer to the gods must be prepared with their own hands and taken to the altars without the help of servants, e.g. cakes, pastry, honeycombs and incense. But they must not honour the gods with bloody sacrifices, nor with a great quantity at any one time, as if they never intended to come again.

And as for their relationships with their husbands, he enjoined them to remember that their fathers, too, had allowed their daughters to love the men they had married more than their parents. It was therefore right either not to oppose their husbands at all, or to consider that they would achieve a victory, if they gave in to their husbands.

The precepts about moral presuppositions in sacrifices and prayers, about the simplicity of the sacrifice and the personal character of the gifts offered, and finally the forbidding of bloody sacrifices undoubtedly go back to the founder[2]. They bear the same traits of traditionalism coupled with thoroughly personal-ethical views, which we repeatedly encountered in Pythagoras' speeches.

It is noteworthy that there, just as in the previous speeches, the word ἀρετή is apparently avoided. Instead the terms καλοκαγαθία and ἐπιείκεια are used. It would certainly be a misinterpretation of the speaker's intention to render this last concept by 'seemly behaviour': [Pythagoras] is rather thinking of a 'fitting' *inner* state of mind. Compare the transition from ἐπιεικής to the τηρεῖν τὴν καλοκαγαθίαν in the case of the boys[3]. In the term ἐπιεικής, however, there is clearly that element of καιρός on which, as we saw, for Pythagoras the value of human action depends.

It may be worth while to notice that the word was used in ancient Greek both to denote moral excellence and ability. Thus, Herodot[4] says of the mute son of Croesus: παῖς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιεικής, ἄφωνος δέ. Socrates, in Plato's *Apology*[5], speaks of ἐπιεικέστεροι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν, and in *Symp.* 210 b Diotima speaks of ἐπιεικὴς

[1] ἐπιείκειαν. The translation 'fitting conduct' would undoubtedly stress the outward aspect too much.
[2] Compare Diodorus X 7; X 9, 6; Porphyry *V.P.* 36.
[3] c. 51. [4] I, 85.
[5] 22a. Cf. also Lysias 16. 11; Thuc. VIII 93; Xen. *Hell.* I 1, 30.

ὢν τὴν ψυχήν. Aristotle, too, used ἐπιείκεια frequently as the opposite of φαυλότης, or ἐπιεικής as a synonym of σπουδαῖος, clearly to denote moral value[1]. The connotation *aequitas* (clementia) was certainly not the primary one, though it is not Aristotle who introduced it but, so far as we can see, Gorgias. The Stoics never spoke of ἐπιεικής in the sense of σπουδαῖος, or of ἐπιείκεια in the sense of ἀρετή. Both the adjective and the substantive were used by them exclusively in the meaning of παραιτητικὸν εἶναι τῆς κατ' ἀξίαν κολάσεως[2], which in their opinion was not at all praiseworthy. Plotinus, however, speaks again of an ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον as 'a decent man' according to the average standard, which he opposes to the σπουδαῖος who lives on the level of νοῦς[3]. On the whole one might say that ἐπιεικής and ἐπιείκεια for moral excellence is an ancient usage of the word.

> (c. 55) At this meeting he also spoke the famous word that it is allowed by divine law that women after sexual intercourse with their own husbands should approach holy things[4] the same day, but after extra-marital relations, never.
>
> He also urged them throughout their lives to speak little and modestly [5] and to see to it that others could not speak ill of them[6]. They must not destroy the reputation they had acquired through tradition and not put the writers of myths in the wrong; on the grounds of their recognition of the justice of women, because they give away clothes and adornments without witnesses when others have need of them, without this trustfulness resulting in lawsuits or quarrels, these poets created

[1] *E.N.* X 6, 1175 b24: The ἐνέργειαι are different in moral value, ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι. Ἐπιεικής as a synonym of σπουδαῖος *passim* in the *Rhet.*, *Eth.* and *Pol.*, e.g.: *E.N.* III 7, 1113 b14: ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. *E.N.* IV 9, 1128 b 28: ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. *E.N.* V 4, 1132 a 3f: in corrective justice it makes no difference εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ. *E.N.* IX 8, 1169 a 15f: τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ'ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει.

[2] Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, p. 95, 24ff. W: οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ παραιτητικὸν εἶναι τῆς κατ' ἀξίαν κολάσεως. Cf. Diog. Laert. VII 123.

[3] *Enn.* I 4, 16. 4. Cf. also II 9, 9. 11: the φαῦλος ὄχλος is, as it were, χειροτέχνης τῶν πρὸς ἀνάγκην τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις. And III 2, 6. 12: that the bad ones (κακοί) are masters and rulers of the states, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς δούλους εἶναι, οὐ πρέποντα ἦν.

[4] προσιέναι τοῖς ἱεροῖς certainly did not only mean entering temples (which would have been εἰσιέναι), but it also implied for instance the idea of being present at sacrifices (which took place outside the temple).

[5] εὐφημεῖν. [6] The wording here gives a somewhat forced impression.

> the myth that three women had but one eye between them[1] because there was such concord among them. If one was to apply this to men and say that one who had first obtained something could easily part with it and even willingly added something of his own, nobody would believe it. For it is not in the nature of men.

The first remark in this chapter is, as we have already pointed out[2], most probably a protest against an old, generally accepted ritual precept that forbade entrance into the temple immediately after sexual intercourse. Pythagoras counters this by saying: sexual relations with one's own husband or wife do not make man impure in the eyes of the gods. In such a case, therefore, the prohibition is not valid according to divine law. On the other hand, as far as sexual intercourse outside marriage is concerned, the prohibition does not only apply immediately after the act, but for time without limit.

This accords completely with Pythagoras' attitude to marriage, as expressed in his speech to the senate[3]. Cf. also the remark about children always being pure[4]. Pythagoras differs from traditional ritualism in that for him impurity has a moral significance. However, he takes existing ritual precepts as his starting-point and corrects them discreetly, making as little explicit criticism as possible. This is the attitude which we come across everywhere in these speeches with respect to the religious tradition.

The injunction of εὐφημεῖν addressed to the women fits in completely with the ancient Greek attitude to the position of woman. The formulation τοὺς ἄλλους ὁρᾶν ὁπόσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εὐφημήσουσι for "being careful that others speak little of them and in so far as they say anything about them, nothing ill" is brachylogic, but clear enough and correct. The strangeness of the expression probably does not point to a late hand, but rather to a certain archaism.

The passage which follows displays a remarkable psychological insight: Pythagoras does not reproach women with being vain, garrulous, quarrelsome or jealous; on the contrary, he praises them, and this in a very original way. He calls women 'just', for they are willing to share what is their own with others, and this with perfect

[1] On the free order of the words in this sentence see Deubner, Sitzungsber. 1935, p. 649.

[2] *Supra*, p. 111 n. 3, and p. 127, with notes.

[3] *Supra*, c. 48 init. [4] c. 51 in fine.

ease and harmony. This will never be found in men, he thinks: they require legal security in the form of witnesses or a pledge, when they lend anything to others; or they do not lend things at all. The point is again illustrated by an old myth: the story of the Graiae who had but one eye between the three of them[1]. This is another example of Pythagorean allegoresis: application of an existing myth to a psychological fact observed by the speaker. As such it is in line with the remark about the fatherhood of Zeus in the speech to the young men[2], and can be compared with the passage about θέμις and δίκη[3]. Here again there appears to be a certain difference between Pythagorean allegoresis and the later kind, which for us seems to begin with the Cynics and is systematically practised in the Stoa: these later philosophers consciously set about allegorising the myths, their aim being to make the mythological tradition morally acceptable to a later generation. This apologetical tendency was not the primary concern of the early Pythagoreans. They rather intended to underline the moral character of certain human situations and actions, and to imprint this on non-philosophical minds by means of graphic examples. That is to say, they were not so much concerned with rationalisation of myths as with making ethical principles concrete: the myth illustrates life.

This is, I think, the place to remember that exactly the same remark about women lending precious things to one another without witnesses occurs in Aristophanes, *Ecclesiaz.* 446-451. The text runs:

> Ἔπειτα συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔφη
> ἱμάτια, χρυσί', ἀργύριον, ἐκπώματα
> μόνας μόναις, οὐ μαρτύρων ἐναντίον.
> καὶ ταῦτ'ἀποφέρειν πάντα κοὐκ ἀποστερεῖν,
> ἡμῶν δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔφασκε τοῦτο δρᾶν.
> – Νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, μαρτύρων γ'ἐναντίον.

How can this striking parallel be explained? Undoubtedly one of the two authors was dependent on the other. Was it Aristophanes who drew upon the Pythagorean tradition, – or was it the author of the speeches who, somewhere in the fourth century, drew upon Aristophanes?

Of course the adherents of the Dicaearchus theory had to decide

[1] The Graiae are mentioned as daughters of Phorcys by Hesiod, *Theog.* 270ff.; Aesch., *Prom.* 795 refers to the myth of the one eye.
[2] c. 39, init. [3] c. 46, in fine.

in favour of the latter possibility: according to them it was Dicaearchus who, by mere 'bizarrerie', borrowed this joke from the Attic comedian[1] and added the example of the Graiae. But the hypothesis which made Dicaearchus the inventor of the socio-political Pythagoras proved to be an error. Let us, therefore, try the other way round: Aristophanes drew upon the Pythagorean tradition. It was Rostagni who, in his interesting study on the four speeches[2], saw this and defended it by a good argument, viz. that being trustworthy without an oath and keeping faith with others was a peculiarly Pythagorean feature. For this he could cite the speech to the senators, ch. 47, the beginning, and Diog. Laert. VIII 22: ἀσκεῖν γὰρ δεῖν αὑτὸν ἀξιόπιστον παρέχειν. He might also have pointed to the strict fidelity of Pythagoreans in keeping appointments, an extraordinary example of which is mentioned by Iambl., *V.P.* 185[3].

But there is more. The *Ecclesiazousae* were performed in Athens in 392. Now this was exactly the same time as a stream of Pythagoreans leaving Southern Italy under the threat of Dionysius' aggression came into, or had just arrived in, central Greece. In the light of these events the text of Aristophanes spoken on the Athenian stage in 392 appears particularly meaningful: it refers to the text of one of Pythagoras' speeches, and apparently this text was read and discussed by the people of Athens at that very moment, having been newly introduced by the Pythagoreans coming from the West.

If this inference is correct, the passage on the lending without witnesses in Iamblichus' *V.P.* would provide us with a *terminus ante quem* for the dating of the speeches.

> (c. 56) This man, who is called wisest of all, who has ordered the voice of men, and who was in general the inventor of names

[1] This is, e.g., what Cobet said about it, *Collectanea crit.*, pp. 333 f. On the whole, commentators and translators of Aristophanes are silent about the Iamblichus passage. Van Leeuwen does not mention it. To οὐ μαρτύρων ἐναντίον he notes: "Neque potuissent adhibere si voluissent, nam lex 'διαρρήδην ἐκώλυε συμβάλλειν (that is, *to contract*, in the most general sense of the term) γυναικὶ πέρα μεδίμνου κριθῶν'". The reference is to Isaeus X 10. As V. L. used it, it would mean that Aristophanes' joke on the lending without witnesses was meaningless at Athens. Of course it was not: for if the women had wished to take some measure of warranty, nothing would have been as simple as asking their husbands to be present. Then they would have had a wittness!
[2] *Un nuovo capitolo* p. 198f. (= *Scritti Minori* I, p. 55f.)
[3] Infra, p. 157 f. How well-known the feature was, appears also from Iambl., *V.P.* 256.

– whether he was a god or a daemon or a divine man – recognizing that woman is by nature most inclined to piety, also gave to each period of her life the name of a divinity: the unmarried girl he called Kore, the girl given in marriage Nymphe, her who had borne children Métèr, and her who had grandchildren Maia, in accordance with Doric usage. This, he said, also accorded with the fact that the oracles at Dodona and Delphi were communicated to mankind by women. By praising their piety he effected, as has been reported, such a change with respect to sobriety of dress that henceforth nobody dared put on costly garments[1]: all left these clothes in the temple of Hera, – many tens of thousands of garments.

For the beginning of the passage, compare c. 53 *in fine* (πάντας θεῖον αὐτὸν καλεῖν), for σοφώτατον ἁπάντων c. 44 *in fine*. Also Emped. fr. 129; Herod. IV 95.

Pythagoras having 'ordered' the speech of man and invented 'names', credits him with more than we can verify: surely, we can hardly call him the inventor of language. What is meant by this praise? Apparently Pythagoras is credited with a decisive importance for the knowledge of language and the use of words. This tradition has probably some basis. What it will mean is that Pythagoras was the first in his school who thought about language philosophically. The acousma reported in Iamblichus *V.P.* 82 points in this direction. Τί τὸ σοφώτατον; – ἀριθμός· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον. How should we interpret the neuter here? Probably as referring to human reason. Reflection on language and 'names' was apparently a feature of early Pythagoreanism from the beginning. In this sense we can agree with Rostagni, who found the beginnings of rhetoric in the school of Pythagoras. We shall return to this in another chapter.

The names which Pythagoras gave to woman in the different periods

[1] It is again Rohde (Rh. Mus. 1879) who thinks that the text here is not right, because according to him there is something wrong with the logic of the sentence; for how could Pythagoras have induced the women to discard their costly garments just by praising their piety? Another injunction should be added: after διὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπαίνων one should read: πρὸς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν εὐτέλειαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν ἱματισμόν. – Deubner, who does not report this emendation in his apparatus, apparently thinks that the Crotonian ladies were sufficiently quick on the uptake to conclude from the preceding injunction to sobriety in their sacrifices that it did not behove pious people to wear extravagant clothes. I agree with him that we may credit them with that much intelligence.

of her life are also mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, where they appear to go back to Timaeus[1]. It is undoubtedly an ancient tradition which probably has a historical foundation. The same is true of the remark about the religious nature of women and their function at the oracles of Delphi and Dodona.

Finally Pythagoras' moral influence, which appeared so surprisingly after his speech to the senate, is also noticeable on the women; that they voluntarily placed their adornments and costly clothes in the temple of Hera, is also reported by Diodorus and Trogus[2]. It was clearly a sensational event, the memory of which lived on in Southern Italy, where Timaeus found this tradition.

It might well be asked why this positive effect of Pythagoras' preaching on the women is so generally reported, whereas the same historians are silent about the no less remarkable success with the men. It should be remembered that the one chapter that Trogus devotes to Pythagoras gives a very brief summary, while Diodorus is also sparing in his account. These authors report no more than what appeared to them to be the *summa fastigia rerum*. That does not in the least mean to say that there was not more in Timaeus. We can find this corroborated in several points.

(c. 57) It is said that he also discussed the following: that throughout the land of Croton the virtue[3] of a man with respect to his wife was widely known, viz. that of Odysseus, who refused to accept the gift of immortality from Calypso on the condition that he should forsake Penelope; that it was therefore up to the women to show their noble nature[4] to the men in order to earn equal praise.

In short, it is reported that by these meetings[5] Pythagoras acquired an immense fame and reputation, both in the city of Croton and throughout Southern Italy.

The subject of conjugal fidelity is illustrated with another well-known story, in the same way as the story of the Graiae served to illustrate a certain form of conduct. This time it is a man who set the example: this is a challenge for the women.

Thus Pythagoras' method remains the same to the end.

[1] Diog. Laert. VIII 11. [2] Just. XX 4, 10-12; cf. Diod. X 3, 3.
[3] The word ἀρετή is used here, just as in 41, 1.5. [4] τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν.
[5] ἐντεύξεις.

That through these speeches he acquired great fame and reputation far beyond the territory of Croton, is clearly shown elsewhere in Iamblichus, as we shall see in one of the next chapters. This account, too, will be seen to go back to Timaeus.

It should be noted that in the final sentence we do not hear of λόγοι – speeches or addresses – but of 'meetings': ἐντεύξεις. In Hellenistic Greek, however, this word is sometimes used for 'speeches'. Although there are not many examples, a few are to be found[1]. In our passage, then, the word may have actually meant this.

6. *Summary and conclusions on the 2nd-4th speeches*

The main points of the second, third and fourth speeches may be summarized as follows.

2nd speech. (1) Exhortation to found a temple to the Muses. The Muses as examples of ὁμόνοια and ἁρμονία. Cosmic significance.
(2) Keeping the fatherland in trust as a deposit given by the citizens. Themis, Dike and νόμος. Transgression is an infringement of the cosmic order.
(3) No swearing of oaths. Consistency of life: private life analogous with political life. To be good to wife and children; to win their affection.
(4) To have only one's own wife.
(5) To be oneself an example to others.
(6) Καιρός is necessary in every action.
(7) Striving after true εὐδοξία.
(8) Managing Heracles' inheritance.

3rd speech. (1) Never to be abusive, not even to defend oneself against abuse.
(2) Striving after παιδεία.
(3) The importance of a good start in life.
(4) Children are dear to the gods.
(5) Apollo and Eros represented as boys.
(6) The care which is bestowed by the gods on children.
(7) To be obedient now so as to be able to command obedience later.

[1] E.g. Dionys Halic., *De Thuc.* 50.

4th speech. (1) Moral disposition is important in sacrifices.
(2) Gifts must not be valuable, but the work of one's own hands.
(3) Always give priority to men.
(4) Sexual intercourse with one's own husband does not make one unclean.
(5) Speak little and well.
(6) Generosity. The example of the Graiae.
(7) Names given to women at various stages in life.
(8) Fidelity to one's own husband: Odysseus cited as example.

Effect of these speeches on the men and on the women. Fame of Pythagoras far beyond Croton.

Remarks. These speeches call for a few remarks.

1. [Pythagoras] does not make any mention of mathematical principles in these speeches to the wider circle; we do find, however, the cosmic principle of ἁρμονία – which is in fact based on numerical ratios. It is especially stressed in the speech to the senate, but it gets its foundation from the traditional religion. This is also true of the κοινωνία among the women, and the ἐπιείκεια of the boys.

2. Although the religious foundation in all these cases is traditional, the way in which the mythological data are handled is highly personal and original.

3. There is a repeated appeal to personal character qualities, to the necessity of gaining personal respect and affection, of setting a moral example in one's own home and to the wider circle.

4. It is noteworthy that the word 'virtue' (ἀρετή) is very little used here. The terms that are used time and again are καλοκαγαθία and ἐπιείκεια.

5. The καιρός-principle is said to be essential in human action. There is no explanation of the term here, but there is elsewhere in Iamblichus, *V.P.* The list of vices and virtues which is given here makes a somewhat incoherent impression because of its brevity, but it can be seen to fall under two headings: καιρός and εὐδοξία, both well-known motifs in ancient Greek popular wisdom. Pythagoras took these over but gave them a new rational-ethical meaning.

6. Also with respect to the cult Pythagoras, with all his traditionalism, clearly appears as an ethical reformer.

7. The frequent use of the imperfect in the exhortation formulas in these speeches (in 45 συνεβούλευεν, 49 διεκελεύετο, ὡρίζετο and παρεκάλει) prompts the question as to whether it should be supposed that Pythagoras addressed these groups of the population regularly. The grammatical argument is weakened by the fact that later Greek often uses the imperfect tense where classical Greek would have put the aoristus. Moreover, the speech to the senate is presented much more as an event that took place just once, and it is difficult to maintain that the request made at the end of this speech to speak to the boys in the Apollo temple and to the women in the Heraeum in its formulation gives any reason for us to assume that repeated and regular speeches were given. On the other hand, particularly the passage about καιρός and εὐδοξία gives the impression of being a very brief summary of points which require further explanation, and it must be admitted that this at least lends colour to the supposition that Pythagoras, if he did speak in this way to various groups of the population of Croton, will have done so repeatedly and at greater length.

8. Also the speeches to the schoolboys and the women as reported here give the impression of being merely a summary of the main points.

9. The profound reforming influence of Pythagoras' activity on life in Croton – a fact that apparently belonged so much to historical tradition, that its historical foundation can hardly be questioned – points rather to repeated appearances than to speeches which were delivered on one particular occasion.

7. *Historicity of the speeches. Who wrote them?*

(1) We may start from the fact that Pythagoras spoke to the wider circle of the population of Croton, and that he spoke to four categories. This fact has a solid historical foundation, just as solid as anything else that is assumed to be known about Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism on the basis of Aristotle's account, or even it is perhaps better founded; for mention of the four speeches was made half a century earlier, viz. by Antisthenes. This can be proved. According to the Scholia on *Odyssey* 1, vs. 1[1], Antisthenes explained the term πολύτροπος as: able to speak to people in *different ways*. He illustrates this with the example of Pythagoras: "for it is said that, when invited

[1] Dindorf, *Scholia graeca in Hom. Odyss.*, t. I, pp. 9-11: **T** 5.

to speak to the children, he composed speeches in a child-like style for them (λόγους παιδικούς), for the women speeches adapted to women, for the archons a speech in archontic style (λόγους ἀρχοντικούς), and for the young men speeches in a style suited to young men" (ἐφηβικούς). It is characteristic of wisdom, Antisthenes declared, to be able thus to adapt one's words to everyone. This is πολυτροπία λόγου, a varied use of the words. On the other hand, it is a sign of ignorance to be able to express oneself in one way only.

It is Rostagni who pointed out this passage[1]. The reference is very important, for it refutes the 19th-century hypothesis which attempted to explain the speeches in principle as a self-projection on the part of Dicaearchus[2]: the tradition concerning speeches delivered by Pythagoras to four clearly different population groups must in any case have existed by the end of the fifth century.

(2) That this tradition was an early Pythagorean heritage and not a recent creation dating from those years, is confirmed by the fact that a man like Archytas apparently also spoke to the wider circle on moral subjects, and that in Italy the memory of these speeches lived on for centuries. If Cicero – on the basis of a tradition which can be traced in detail[3] – still knew the content and purport of Archytas' speeches, is it then too daring to assume that in such a closed circle as that of the early Pythagorean School and in the world of Magna

[1] Rostagni, *Un nuovo capitolo*, pp. 150-159 = *Scritti Minori* I, pp. 3-13.

[2] This is the interpretation given by Zeller and Edwin Rohde, stated in detail by the latter in his study on Iamblichus' sources in his Biography of Pythagoras, Rhein. Mus. 26, 1871 p. 561, and 27, 1872 pp. 27-29. Of course the modern psychological term *self-projection* is not used by Rohde, but what he writes is literally the following. Alongside the 'phantastische Sagengestalt' of Pythagoras in the older tradition, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus in the fourth century 'suddenly' drew a much clearer and better defined picture. "Bei Dicaearchus zumal, dem hierin Timaeus gefolgt zu sein scheint, wird Pythagoras als jener *politische* Reformator geschildert, als welcher er dann bei den Späteren fortlebte; noch bei Aristoxenus finden sich von einer derartigen politischen Tätigkeit des Pythagoras im Ganzen nur leise Spuren, und ich zweifle nicht daran, dass Dicaearch nur durch seine Vorliebe für den πρακτικὸς βίος veranlasst wurde, diese ganz gewiss irrige Vorstellung von Pythagoras aus den wirklichen politischen Bestrebungen späterer, weltlicherer Pythagoreer zu abstrahiren" (Rhein. Mus. 1871, p. 561).

This picture of Pythagoras was taken over in its entirety by Werner Jaeger in his speech on the philosophic ideal of life, which he delivered to the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1928 (now reprinted in his Collected Papers: *Scripta minora* I, Rome 1960, pp. 347-393). It is again to be found essentially in the more recent work *Paideia*. *Supra*, p. 92 (with n. 1).

[3] Supra, ch. III, pp. 30 and 49f. (with n. 1).

Graecia, where the exceptional figure of the Master himself made his appearances and exercised an immense influence on the minds, the memory of these speeches to the people continued to live on for one or two centuries? Would it not be more correct to say that, *if* Pythagoras did speak to the people at all, it would have been almost inconceivable had the memory of these speeches *not* lived on in these parts?

(3) That by his speeches Pythagoras had a mighty moral influence on the people of Croton and through this gained the trust of the surrounding peoples in Southern Italy and Sicily, is an established fact on the basis of the testimony of the ancient historians[1]. Pythagoras did not, however, write down his speeches – or 'sermons' if one likes – for we hear nothing about this. On the contrary, it is expressly stated that he wrote nothing except a few religious hymns[2]. This report contains nothing improbable; on the contrary, it fits in with what we hear about Pythagoras in the earliest reports.

(4) As the tradition about Pythagoras' speeches is ancient, we have no reason whatsoever to assume that Timaeus was the first to write them down, or even Apollonius of Tyana, as those German scholars whom we have mentioned maintained[3]. It is much more probable that they were in circulation in the fourth century. The fact that the contents are for the most part of an archaic character argues in favour of this, as is shown in the Pythagorean fundamental idea of ἁρμονία, the cosmic order as the background to human action, the traditional-religious foundation, its personal-ethical interpretation, and certain

[1] Rohde c.s. know quite well that Diodorus and Trogus mention this influence of Pythagoras. They also assume that the reports of these historians go back to Timaeus, but they put forward the hypothesis that Timaeus followed Dicaearchus, and even 'filled in' the framework of the four speeches, as presented by Dicaearchus. These nineteenth-century critics do not take any account of the fact that Timaeus was fully conversant with local tradition, and that he must surely have had some information other than Dicaearchus' work. That in Aristoxenus there are hardly any traces of the so-called 'political' activities of Pythagoras to be found, is incorrect. Cf. *infra*, Ch. VII, the section on Pythagorean friendship.

[2] Ion of Chios according to Diogenes Laertius VIII 8; Clemens Alexandr., *Strom.* I 131.

[3] Rohde, Rhein. Mus. 1872, pp. 27 ff., supposes that Timaeus elaborated to some extent on Dicaearchus' indications, and that a "later author, used by Iamblichus" carried this process further. This can only have been Apollonius of Tyana who, according to Rohde, let his imagination run loose and who cannot in any way be trusted. This hypothesis, which was also accepted by Zeller, lives on until the present day.

local traits. In any case, Plato was not the example. There is the καιρός principle, in which traditional popular wisdom is absorbed but interpreted in a rational-ethical sense. It cannot be said that this presupposes Gorgias. On the contrary: it is true that, as Rostagni suggested, he might have learnt the καιρός principle in the Pythagorean circle, but he elaborated it in a spirit which clearly differed from Pythagoras. The παιδεία passage in the first speech is reminiscent of Isocrates, but also contains an element which is definitely alien to him. In their form the speeches show a certain rhetorical influence. Making abstraction of Aristoph., *Eccles.* 446 ff., we have good reasons for assigning them to the end of the fifth century or the first half of the fourth.

(5) The above-cited passage in Aristophanes gives us a *terminus ante quem:* the year of the performance of the *Eccles.*, 392[1]. We may conclude that, most probably, the speeches were written by a Pythagorean in Magna Graecia and came to Athens shortly before 392.

Is it possible to regard them as a product of the epideictic genre of Gorgias, written either by himself or by one of his school?

The answer to the first suggestion must, I think, be in the negative: these speeches were not written by Gorgias. A comparison with the extant authentic speeches of Gorgias – the *Helena*, the *Palamedes*, the *Epitaphios* – enables us to this conclusion. Not only are those λόγοι more brilliant in style, they are also full of Gorgias' ideas. Our speeches, however, belong on the whole to a peculiar spiritual climate which is not at all that of the famous rhetor of Leontini. The moral preaching is dominated by a view of the cosmic order, and pervaded with a religio-reformatory zeal which is entirely alien to Gorgias. There are a few points of agreement: the καιρός idea, the use of the term ἐπιείκεια, and the motif of fame. Closer investigation, however, yields the following result.

Καιρός appears in the second speech, c. 49, without any explanation. The train of thought in this chapter gives the impression of being incoherent. It is as improbable that Pythagoras himself should have expressed himself like this as that a brilliant speaker like Gorgias should have done so. It is much more likely that we have here a much abridged account of the contents of Pythagoras' speeches as preserved in the school tradition. The explanation in Iamblichus 180 f. approaches καιρός rationally: in one's behaviour one must take into account the

[1] Above, pp. 134 f.

age and dignity of the person concerned. The attitude towards justice fits in well with Pythagoras' general principles of τιμιώτερον τὸ πρεσβύτερον, and of dignity by virtue of moral and intellectual qualities. The statement that follows, however, about the irrational nature of καιρός, as Rostagni[1] remarked, very closely resembles what is attributed to Gorgias in Plato, *Gorgias* 463 a. Apparently Rostagni thought that it was this that was an account of early Pythagorean doctrine. This is very doubtful, (1) because the way in which this passage is formulated[2] is characteristic of a later period; (2) because the main thought does not connect up well with what precedes. Moreover it must be remembered that the καιρός idea is ancient and undoubtedly had its place in early Pythagorean thought. On these grounds I think that the use of the term καιρός in the second speech does not give us any reason to ascribe the four speeches to Gorgias (against which their decidedly archaic and clearly Pythagorean character argues), nor is there any reason to do this with c. 49.

The case is different with the account in c. 182. Both the use of the term τεχνολογία and the thesis of the fundamentally irrational character of καιρός point to a later revision of this passage. The same can be said of c. 39, the contents of which, it is true, give an archaic impression, but in which the use of the term ὑπόθεσις has only Hellenistic parallels. It is of course by no means impossible that as early as the fourth century this word was sometimes used in the same sense as we find it here, the more so as, compared with the use frequently found in fifth- and fourth-century literature, the difference in sense is merely one of nuance. Yet it is wise not to go back further than the fourth century for the wording of this passage.

The same is true of the παιδεία passage in the first speech, c. 42 ff. It is difficult to deny the influence of Isocrates here. Whether Pythagoras used the term παιδεία cannot be stated with certainty, but it is not improbable. Compare c. 51. It is chiefly this passage which, together with the comments on the καιρός idea in 182, is reminiscent of fourth- and fifth-century sophistic. Yet neither give us sufficient grounds for regarding the speeches as a whole as an epideictic product of the 5th- or 4th-century schools of rhetors. On the contrary, the predominantly primitive and Pythagorean character of these λόγοι should be emphasized. The most plausible hypothesis is that some fifth-century *Pythagorean* was the first to write down the speeches; that from

[1] *Un nuovo capitolo* p. 164 = *Scritti minori* p. 18.
[2] Iamblichus *V.P.* 182, the beginning.

the beginning they underwent a certain Gorgian influence in form, and that in the fourth century certain influences from that time found their way into the text.

Iamblichus' *V.P.*, in its account of Pythagorean doctrine, undoubtedly contains much that goes back to the founder. We shall find further corroboration when dealing with φιλία and ὁμόνοια. I would also regard cc. 180 ff., about the δίκαιον in its individual application, as belonging to these early-Pythagorean ideas, whereas at the beginning of 182 I find Gorgian influence.

To a certain extent c. 180 f. point to a *relativation* of the concept of δίκαιον amongst the early Pythagoreans. This prompted a comparison with the *Dissoi Logoi*. We found, however, that here too the character of the later work is in spirit very far removed from early Pythagoreanism. According to Iamblichus, Pythagoras pointed out the necessity of taking into account certain general principles of human dignity. It can certainly not be said that by doing this he relativized moral ideas. The author of the *Dissoi logoi*, however, wilfully rings the changes on these ideas according to the situation, without a higher moral viewpoint dominating. Here moral principles are indeed made arbitrary, since they are a matter of chance. We found that the nineteenth-century commentators were essentially right: the *Dissoi logoi* are sophistic in character; Pythagoras, however, whose thought is dominated by mathematical-cosmic principles, is far from being so. And the reason why Rostagni had so little success in convincing scholars of the correctness of his views is probably, that he did not mark the boundaries between Pythagoreanism and Sophistic clearly enough.

Indeed his treatment of the *Dissoi logoi* is along completely different lines from those indicated by me: whilst I contrasted the superficial relativism of the *Dissoi logoi* with the moral seriousness of Pythagoras, Rostagni[1] is evidently of the opinion, not only that the author of the *Dissoi logoi* is not so far removed from Gorgias, but also that with his 'reconciliation of the opposites' he is in line with early-Pythagorean thought, since according to Iamblichus *V.P.* 130, Pythagoras taught the mingling of opposites. This view is based on very controversial texts in both cases. As far as the *Dissoi logoi* are concerned, Rostagni is thinking of the conclusion at which the author arrives at the end of the first chapter: καὶ οὐ λέγω τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρῶμαι διδάσκειν, ὡς οὐ τωὐτὸν εἴη τὸ κακὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον. The

[1] *Un nuovo capitolo*, p. 177.

Italian scholar renders the substance of this sentence as follows: "It cannot be said what is good and what is evil, etc.; we can only say that they are not the same, but the one or the other according to the circumstances". – The first of these statements is not far removed from the scepticism of Gorgias, he asserts. In this we can concur with him. It is the second part of the sentence that raises problems. If the author means to say that good and evil are not the same, how should the rest of the sentence run? What is the meaning of ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον? We might supply: 'but that either ‹is something self-contained› or ‹'differs from the other'› .This last is simple and clear. It means inserting an ‹ἄλλο› after ἀλλ'. This simple emendation by Blass is adopted by Kranz. Diels dismissed it and explained: "Each of the two is good as well as bad". Objections to this interpretation are, first, that it would lead to a contradiction ("good and bad are not the same, but they are the same in each of them"), next that the translation is impossible unless one reads ἀμφότερα, or rather adds ἀμφότερα to the ἑκάτερον.

In the text as it stands there is no contradiction between the οὐ ταὐτόν and ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον, the latter explaining the first. Without altering anything one might easily supply ἔστι and interpret the text as meaning that each 'is' – i.e.: is something self-contained, which by its nature differs from the other.

Be this as it may, it will have to be admitted that the author of the *Dissoi logoi* is not entirely consistent. For he repeatedly states his agreement with those who teach the *identity* of opposites[1] and goes to the trouble of supporting this thesis with a number of examples. Hence, when at the end of ch. I he asserts that he denies this identity, we cannot take him seriously. He is just a superficial talker.

In Iamblichus, *V.P.* 130, on the other hand, we are really in deep water. There it is said that 'people' call Pythagoras the εὑρετὴν τῆς πολιτικῆς ὅλης παιδείας, and this because he taught 'that nothing that exists is pure': not only do physical elements 'contain parts of each other' – earth containing elements of fire and fire those of water, and air containing elements of these and these containing elements of air –, but also ethical and aesthetical notions contain part of their opposites, beauty – ugliness, justice – injustice, etc.[2].

[1] Thus in I 2, II 2, and III 1.

[2] εἶποντα μηδὲν εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μετέχειν καὶ γῆν πυρὸς καὶ πῦρ ὕδατος καὶ πνεῦμα τούτων καὶ ταῦτα πνεύματος· ἔτι καλὸν αἰσχροῦ καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκου κτλ.

Of course, Pythagoras could be called 'the founder of all political education'. This has its basis in the earliest tradition. But we have no proof whatsoever that the doctrine of all things containing elements of their opposites is early Pythagorean. What we have here is probably a product of that post-Platonic Pythagoreanism which first appears in Alexander Polyhistor[1].

For the present we will leave Iamblichus c. 130. Enough has been said about καιρός. Nor did the terms ἐπιεικής and ἐπιείκεια for moral excellence appear to give us any grounds for attributing these speeches to Gorgias: it is true that Gorgias did often use these terms, but in another sense, which he may well have been the first to give them. Their use in [Pythagoras]' speeches is in any case early Greek and not Gorgian. Finally, the theme of fame, too, was used by [Pythagoras] with respect to early popular wisdom in an ethico-reformatory sense which does not point to Gorgias, but is rather a sign of authentic Pythagorean origin.

We are unable to arrive at any more definite conclusions concerning the authorship of the speeches.

[1] Ap. Diog. Laert. VIII 25 ff.

CHAPTER VII

THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORIANS AND BIOGRAPHERS (3): FURTHER DATA

1. The influence of Pythagoras beyond Croton

Porphyry[1] and Iamblichus[2] both report that Pythagoras appeared as the 'liberator' of the Greek cities in Southern Italy and Sicily. The report to this effect, which both authors apparently derive from Nicomachus, who we know to have used Aristoxenus for his chief source, runs as follows: these cities, which had been subjected by each other, some for many years, and others since recently, he filled with the spirit of liberty; he had them liberated by local adherants. Croton, Sybaris, Catania, Rhegium, Himera, Acragas, Tauromenium and 'some others' are mentioned. He had these cities given laws by 'Charondas of Catania and Zaleucus of Locri', by which they had excellent laws for a long time and were the envy of the surrounding people.

Furthermore we learn[3] that Pythagoras put an effective stop to all strife, not only in the circle of his own followers, but also amongst their descendents for many generations, and in general in all cities in Southern Italy and Sicily, both within the cities themselves and in their relations to each other.

This confirms the principles of φιλία and ὁμόνοια which we know from the speeches. The passage presupposes that by his activity in Croton Pythagoras gained the trust of the cities in Southern Italy and Sicily, that young men from the neighbouring districts came to listen to him and became his pupils, and that in his school he trained lawgivers. We also find this picture in Iamblichus *V.P.* 129 f. Zaleucus and Charondas were older, but the tradition made them pupils of Pythagoras. Thus, too, in Iamblichus *V.P.* 130 and 172. In Iamblichus

[1] *V.P.* 21. **T** 11a. [2] *V.P.* 33. **T** 11b.
[3] Porphyry, *V.P.* 22; Iamblichus, *V.P.* 34. **T** 11ab.

V.P. 214 it is again stated that in other places, too, Pythagoras put an end to the rule of tyrants, that he regulated the constitution of these places and led them 'from slavery to freedom'.

Porphyry[1] tells the story of Simichus, the tyrant of Centuripae, a small town not far from Catania. Pythagoras' teaching made such an impression on him that he gave up his rule and divided his possessions between his sister and his fellow-citizens. This story is only found in Porphyry. However, he is not in the habit of adding figments of his own imagination to the existing tradition. In any case the story is characteristic of the spirit of early Pythagoreanism and of the way in which, according to the tradition which existed in these regions in the fourth century B.C., the influence of Pythagoras extended over Southern Italy and Sicily.

Both Porphyry and Iamblichus[2] furthermore relate that Lucanians, Messapians, Peucetians and Romans also came to Pythagoras. Porphyry mentions Aristoxenus as his source and has his account follow immediately after the story of the tyrant of Centuripae, after which the sentence quoted above about the peace-making activities of Pythagoras follows. He ends with the "often-repeated adage addressed by him to all and sundry, both in the larger circle and in that of the initiated", an adage also found in Iamblichus *V.P.* 34 and referred to in a few other passages[3]: *With all one's might one must banish, and with fire and iron and with every means within one's power one must cut off all round, illness from the body, ignorance from the soul, luxury from the stomach, discord from the state, strife from the home, in short immoderateness from all and everything.*

In Iamblichus the Messapians, Lucanians, etc. do not make their appearance until much later, where he speaks about ξένοι, who joined the Pythagorean School. Diogenes Laertius[4] also mentions these tribes, and in the same order as Porphyry, but in a somewhat different context. Whilst the context in Porphyry rather suggests that they came for political advice, in Diogenes the affiliation of these Italian tribes with the Pythagorean School is reported in a passage where Pythagoras' preaching of the doctrine of metempsychosis is given special attention. This doctrine, however, does not appear in isolation here; the introduction of weights and measures, which is attributed to

[1] *V.P.* 21. [2] Porphyry, *V.P.* 22; Iamblichus, *V.P.* 241.
[3] The adage is referred to by Iamblichus in *V.P.* 68, 78 and 187 (Deubner, p. 38, 15f., p. 45. 12 ff. and p. 104.5).
[4] Diogenes Laertius VIII 14. **T** 11c.

Pythagoras by Aristoxenus, and the identification of the morning- and evening-star 'as Parmenides says' are also mentioned here. Furthermore, Diogenes makes it clear that it was not just a matter of deputations of these tribes who came to ask for a consilium ad hoc, but definitely one of permanent affiliation with the school and interest in the doctrine[1].

The apophthegm cited above from Porphyry 22 is undoubtedly ancient. It clearly shows the basic principles of moderation and harmony which are so deeply embedded in the Pythagorean doctrine of the cosmic significance of number. The role of peacemaker attributed to Pythagoras must be seen against this background. We hear about it in greater detail in the section in Iamblichus which deals with φιλία and in the parallels in his own work and those of other authors.

2. *Pythagorean friendship*

In Iamblichus *V.P.* 229 we read:

> "Pythagoras taught very clearly friendship towards all by all, of the gods towards man through piety and a worship founded on knowledge, of doctrines towards each other, and in general of the soul towards the body and of the rational part of the soul[2] towards its irrational faculties[3] by means of philosophy and the theorizing inherent in it; and of men towards their fellow-men, of citizens among themselves by a sound observance of the laws, and friendship of people of different nations by a correct understanding of nature[4], of a man towards his wife or children or brothers and relatives through unperverted natural communion[5], in short friendship of all towards all; and moreover towards some of the brute beasts by justice, natural ties and solidarity, and of the mortal body within itself, a pacification and reconciliation of the conflicting forces hidden in it through health and a sober way of living directed towards this, after the example of the thriving prosperity in the cosmic elements. (230) All these cases are classed together under the name *friendship*. According to the general opinion it was Pythagoras who discovered it and gave it legal form. He taught

[1] προσεκαρτέρουν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν λόγων ἕνεκα προσήεσαν. [2] τὸ λογιστικόν.
[3] τὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου εἴδη. [4] διὰ φυσιολογίας ὀρθῆς. [5] κοινωνία ἀδιάστροφος.

> his followers a friendship so admirable that even to-day it is popularly said of people who are well disposed towards each other: "they are Pythagoreans" (**T** 12a).

The same passage, with the exception of the last sentence, is also found in Iamblichus *V.P.* 69-70, which means that Iamblichus came across this account in both his main sources[1]. It is true that the text shows clear traces of a later formulation, but as a whole it should be used as an explanation of the exhortations to φιλία, κοινωνία and ὁμόνοια in the speeches to the young men and the senate, the women and the children of Croton. Their purport is the same, and the same background of cosmic principles is present in both cases. The φιλία as described here – a concept which is so comprehensive that the term 'friendship' cannot embrace all its aspects – comprises six parts.

(1) The attitude of the gods to man. The means by which this benevolence of the gods towards man is achieved is piety and 'worship founded on knowledge'. The term ἐπιστημονική is undoubtedly one of the indications of a rather late hand[2].
(2) The interrelation of the 'dogmata'. Doctrine must not contain any conflicting elements: there must be 'harmony' in a philosophical way of thinking, coherence and consistence between its different aspects.
(3) In individual man the relation of soul and body and of the rational towards the irrational in the soul. The means by which the right relationship is brought about are philosophy and theoretical thought.
(4) The relations between man and his fellow-men. Here a distinction is made between (a) political relations within the state itself: ending of party conflicts (στάσεις) by good laws, (b) international relations.

[1] In his still important study on the sources of Iamblichus in his *Life of Pythagoras* (Rhein. Mus. 26, 1871, pp. 554 ff. and 27, 1872, pp. 23 ff.), Erwin Rohde argued that Iamblichus used two, and no more than two, sources: Nicomachus, in whom he read Aristoxenus, and Apollonius of Tyana. This may be mainly true. As to Apollonius, by comparison with Diodorus X and Diogenes Laertius VIII we know that he used Timaeus. Probably he did so in the present case. For Diog. Laert. VIII 16 speaks of Pythagoras as φιλίας ἐργάτης, and Diodorus (X 8) dedicates a chapter to Pythagorean friendship. **T** 12b, c. See further App. C.

[2] The term frequently occurs in Aristotle, always in connection with theory of knowledge. Later it is, for instance, similarly used by Philodemus, who speaks of ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις (perception which procures knowledge).

These are not dependent on laws. Instead the author speaks of a φυσιολογία ὀρθή. This, too, is a term which betrays a late hand[1]. The writer probably means a correct understanding of nature, i.e. that all men, qua rational beings, are related, and on the basis of this natural relationship must cherish brotherly feelings towards each other, – a doctrine which was later elaborated in the Stoa, albeit in different terms. It seems to have been consciously present in early Pythagoreanism. (c) Personal relationships, between a man and his wife, his children, his relatives etc. Here the words κοινωνία ἀδιάστροφος are used, another σημεῖον of a later redaction. Διαστροφή is a Stoic term for the perversion of nature which is the cause of sin[2].

(5) The relationship with some animals. At least, the text may mean this. There is question of 'justice, natural ties and solidarity', i.e. of mankind with these animals, – which is a possible explanation. It would refer to draught animals or animals which serve man in other ways.

However, the text also permits another interpretation: it is not necessary to have the words τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τινά after προσέτι depend on an understood πρός, but one may construe as follows: καὶ προσέτι (παρέδωκε) τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τινα (sc. φιλίαν εἶναι). "And moreover he taught that a certain friendship exists amongst animals": they have some kind of justice, natural ties and solidarity amongst themselves. (τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων is then interpreted as a subjective genitive, like the preceding genitives depending on φιλίαν and no different from the genitive σώματος which immediately follows).

(6) Of the mortal body within itself. Here the φιλία is again a state of inner harmony, defined as a pacification and reconciliation of conflicting forces which are hidden within the body. Such a state of inner harmony is health. It is achieved through a certain way of living, which is in the first place characterised by sobriety, and is brought about by imitating the thriving growth (εὐετηρία) of the elements in the cosmos.

[1] In Aristotle it means: inquiring into natural causes and phenomena (e.g. ἡ φυσιολογία περὶ τῶν φυτῶν, *Sens.* 442 b 25). Epicurus and his School, but also the historian Diodorus Siculus, the geographer Strabo, Philo of Alexandria a.o. used the term for philosophy of nature. Aristotle himself repeatedly called the pre-Socratic philosophers φυσιολόγοι.

[2] See Galenus, *De plac. Hippocr. et Plat.* V 5, p. 437 M. Cf. Diog. Laert. VII 89. In my *Greek Phil.* III nr. 1027. It is used for distortion (as a medical term) or perversion (moral) by other authors as well, from Aristotle onwards.

This is indisputably an account of Pythagorean doctrine; among the Pythagoreans the comprehensive term for all this was indeed φιλία and Pythagoras was held to be the 'discoverer' and 'law-giver' of it.

But was he?

This can only be denied if it is maintained that we cannot draw any conclusions from fourth-century Pythagoreanism about sixth-century Pythagoreanism. There are still many who consider this to be the correct scholarly attitude. And seemingly they are right.

Yet, it might turn out to be an error.

It will be useful to consider for a moment where exactly we get if we strictly follow the above line of thought. As a starting point we may put forward this thesis: "we only know fourth-century Pythagoreanism". Conclusion: ergo we know nothing about Pythagoreanism in the sixth or even fifth-century. We may then say: all we know about Pythagoras is that he believed in the transmigration of the soul and that at an early date a legend of miracles grew up round him. Not any scientific doctrine, mathematical or astronomical, can be attributed to him on any solid basis of fact, nor can any system of philosophical thought legitimately be called his.

Erwin Rohde went further: he held that the Pythagorean School of Aristoxenus' time *did not dream of regarding Pythagoras as a philosopher* 'in the proper sense'. Conclusion: *he never was one.*[1] We must simply consider him as a religious reformer of the sixth century, a man who, in accordance with the cult of the chthonic gods, taught that earthly life was a punishment to be borne for former sins; who believed in a purification in Hades and in reincarnation in an ever-changing form. Rohde is not entirely consistent, however. He thinks that a mathematical Pythagoreanism 'developed' much later – from what, one would like to ask? – Yet somewhere he remarks that Pythagoreanism never developed into a sort of mythological cosmogony as with the Orphics: apparently it had some scientific principle within it which prevented it from going that way. Rohde also assumes that politico-social Pythagoreanism was a 'development' of centuries later. Again we must ask – from what?

Behind all this is a serious historical error – radical distrust of a tradition which in this case especially might be expected to have

[1] E. Rohde, *Die Quellen des Iamblichus* in Rhein. Mus. 1871, p. 554 ff.

jealously preserved the ancient heritage. Furthermore, have we not early Pythagorean texts? Even if the Philolaus fragments are dated as belonging to the fourth century, can it be maintained that they contain no philosophical thought which duly shows its early origin? Again, what about Archytas, and the, even earlier, related texts of Alcmaeon? Finally, are there no historical facts? How can we account for a figure like Archytas if no politico-social Pythagoreanism existed in the sixth and fifth centuries?

Rohde is a clear example of the absurd consequences to which this, wrongly called, scholarly attitude leads. One should not be too impressed when he pronounces his veto on the 'liar' Apollonius in Iamblichus.

Is it possible for us to recognize the φιλία doctrine evolved in Iamblichus *V.P.* 229 f. as early-Pythagorean? I maintain we can. For what is stated here is merely a wide application of the cosmic principle of harmony, which we know from the best sources (Aristotle, the texts of Philolaus, Archytas and Alcmaeon) to have been the all-pervading principle in Pythagoras' philosophy. From these texts we know for certain that he applied this principle to human conduct and to human society[1]. The universality of this application and the moral seriousness behind it are expressed in a highly characteristic fashion in our passage from Iamblichus. Cf. Diogenes Laertius VIII 16 and 23; Diodorus X 8.

In the history of historical criticism of the last century we come across more than one attempt to explain a whole intellectual-ethical movement with a very definite character of its own as a 'development' without a beginning. I am thinking here of what has been called 'Socraticism'. It is much more likely that such a spiritual movement had its starting point in a great person in whom it originated, than that the movement – in some mysterious way – 'developed' later. This also applies to Pythagoreanism. That Socratic dialogues were written, is still best accounted for by assuming, as the best sources report, that there existed an Athenian Socrates who, in the market place of the city where he lived and wherever he came across people, entered into discussions of a particularly critical nature. The fact that in Antiquity people know of 'Pythagorean friendship' and Pythagorean

[1] Next to Aristotle, *Met.* A 5, for harmony as a cosmic principle one should compare in particular Philolaus, fr. 6 and 10; for the application of this principle to human life and action Archytas, fr. 3 D.: στάσιν μὲν ἔπαυσεν, ὁμόνοιαν δὲ αὔξησεν λογισμὸς εὑρεθείς, e.q.s. Delatte pointed rightly to the political metaphors in Alcmaeon, fr. 4 D. (τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυναμέων and τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν).

asceticism, of a Pythagorean doctrine of numbers and cosmology, is still best explained by assuming that, together with the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration of the soul, all this was one organic unity in the spirit of the founder.

Furthermore we hear the following about Pythagorean friendship in Iamblichus.

(1) With the Pythagoreans the injunction was in force to do away with rivalry and discord (ἀγῶνα καὶ φιλονεικίαν) in friendship, preferably in *all* forms of friendship, but in any case towards fathers, older people and those towards whom one has obligations[1].
(2) They said that in friendly relationships there must be as few wounds and sores as possible. Hence both parties must know how to give in and control their tempers, especially young people with respect to older people, etc.[2].
(3) Reprimands and admonishments, which they called πεδαρτάσεις[3], must according to them, be addressed very gently and cautiously by older people to young people – μετὰ πολλῆς εὐφημίας τε καὶ εὐλαβείας. In doing so one must clearly show fatherly care.
(4) In friendship one must always, whether in jest or in earnest, remain loyal (i.e. never betray each other, always keep promises and appointments, etc.)[4]. We find an instance of how strictly the Pythagoreans kept appointments in the curious story of Lysis and Eurypamus, in Iamblichus *V.P.* 185[5].
(5) Friendship should not be given up because of a misfortune or any other predicament which may suddenly occur in life. (What is meant here is, for instance, sudden illness or loss of freedom or possessions for political reasons). The only acceptable ground for ending a friendship is a serious and irreparable moral defect in the other[6].
(6) Never start enmity against people who are not completely depraved, and if there is enmity then act nobly in the conflict[7].
(7) Do not fight with words but with deeds. (What is meant here is undoubtedly: do not use terms of abuse or slander). An enemy is

[1] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 230; also in 101. **T** 13.
[2] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 231; also in 101. **T** 13.
[3] This apparently Pythagorean term is mentioned by Iambl. not only in *V.P.* 231 and its parallel 101, but in 197 as well: ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸ νουθετεῖν πεδαρτᾶν. Probably this is what should be read in Diog. Laert. VIII 20, where the mss have πελαργᾶν or πελαρτᾶν. **T** 14.
[4] Iamblichus, *V.P.* 232 and 102. **T** 15a. [5] Infra, p. 157. **T** 16.
[6] Iambl., *V.P.* 232 and 102. **T** 15a. [7] Iambl. *V.P.* 232; cf. *Carm. aur.* 7. **T** 15a.

justified by human and divine law (νόμιμον καὶ ὅσιον) if he fights as man to man (i.e. if in the conflict he is able to preserve human dignity)[1].
(8) In true friendship as much as possible must be ordered and regulated, and this should depend on good judgement and should not be just arbitrary[2].
(9) Friendship with aliens[3] was avoided deliberately, but ties of friendship amongst themselves were preserved for generations.

The same is also reported by Porphyry *V.P.* 59. In both authors the story of Damon and Phintias[4] follows as an example of Pythagorean friendship. After having mentioned Myllias and Timycha (cf. Iambl. 189), Porphyry's *Vita* abruptly breaks off. Iamblichus (237) goes on to mention cases in which Pythagoreans showed friendship to those who were of their way of thinking, even if they did not know them at all. First of all there is the interesting story[5] of the Pythagorean who on a journey took ill and died. The innkeeper who had nursed him during his long illness and had in the end buried him, never expected to get back the expenses incurred by him for a stranger. Before his death, however, the stranger had engraved a symbol in a wax tablet, and instructed his host to put this tablet by the roadside, for should any passer-by recognize the symbol he would liberally repay and thank him. A long time afterwards a Pythagorean came past, stopped and asked who had put the sign there. After having heard wat had occurred he paid the innkeeper much more than his expenses.

What sign was engraved on the tablet is not mentioned; but on the basis of a passage in Lucianus[6] we may assume that it was nothing other than a pentagram, which according to this text Pythagoreans had as a symbol of recognition, and they used it in their letters as a symbol of health.

[1] Iambl. *V.P.* 232. **T** 15a. [2] Iambl. *V.P.* 233. **T** 15b.
[3] τὰς ἀλλοτρίας φιλίας, i.e. with persons not belonging to the circle of the Pythagoreans. Iambl., *V.P.* 233. **T** 17. Cp. however, 237, the beginning: They treated each other as friends, even when they did not know one another. Schol. Deubner 149.20:

τὸν ἔσθλον ἄνδρα, κἂν ἑκὰς ναίῃ χθονός,
κἂν μήποτ'ὄσσοις εἰσίδω, κρίνω φίλον.

[4] **T** 18. Also Diod. X 4, 3; Cicero, *De fin.* II 79; Ambrosius, *De virg.* II 34.
[5] 237-238. **T** 19.
[6] Lucianus in his treatise Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ προσαγορεύσει πταίσματος 5 (Jacobitz I, p. 330) speaks of τὸ τριπλοῦν αὐτοῖς τρίγωνον, τὸ δι' ἀλλήλων, τὸ πεντάγραμμον, ᾧ συμβόλῳ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοδόξους ἐχρῶντο. See also the scholion to this passage, Rabe p. 234, 21.

Then follows[1] the story of Clinias of Tarentum, who had heard of a Pythagorean in Cyrene, called Proros, who was in financial difficulties. Immediately Clinias sailed with the necessary means to Cyrene and settled things.

A similar story is told[2] about Thestor of Posidonia, who just sailed to Paros with ample means in order to help a Pythagorean who had lost his possessions.

These stories have undoubtedly an historical foundation. Aristoxenus says that he heard the story of Damon and Phintias from Dionysius himself. The mighty man was apparently very touched by this display of true friendship, as were many others in Antiquity, for the story was famous.

Of the story about Lysis and Euryphamus, which is reported by Iamblichus as a sample of Pythagorean faithfulness in keeping appointments[3] one may think what one likes. It is curious enough. One day, when leaving the temple of Hera where he had performed his devotions, Lysis met his friend Euryphamus who was just about to enter the temple. Euryphamus asked him to wait for him and Lysis promised to do so. He sat down on a stone seat there and waited... Meantime Euryphamus, after having said his prayers, lost in thought had left the temple by another exit without realizing it, and had gone away. He had completely forgotten about Lysis. The next day in the large auditorium of the Pythagoreans he heard that they were looking for Lysis ... Then he remembered his appointment, – and found the faithful friend there in front of the Hera temple sitting on the stone seat; he had been sitting there the whole evening and night!

Erwin Rohde considered it 'eine alberne Geschichte'[4] and because of the silliness of the story he readily ascribed it to Apollonius. Yet, is it not a story which is characteristic of the mentality of these people? Time was of no account to them; when they had given their word, to be faithful to it went without saying and was absolute; these sober Greeks had very few material needs. True, one can hardly imagine any modern Western European who would sit patiently waiting on a seat for almost twenty-four hours on end. But an early Pythagorean could do this as if it were the most ordinary thing in the world, – and on top of it not become angry when the next day the

[1] Iambl., *V.P.* 239; Diodorus X 4, 1. **T** 20.
[2] Iambl., ib. [3] Iambl. 185, **T** 16.
[4] *Die Quellen des Iamblichus*, Rhein. Mus. 1872, p. 50: "Die alberne Geschichte in 185 ist entschieden dem Apollonius zu vindizieren".

other said to him: "One of the gods must have inspired me with this forgetfulness as a touchstone for your faithfulness in keeping appointments"...

We certainly would hardly appreciate this edifying interpretation.

The injunctions concerning friendship which are reported by Iamblichus, are on the whole undoubtedly ancient. They fit in with the admonishments in the speeches, they display the same underlying thought (respect for older people, ὁμόνοια and κοινωνία) and here and there terms are used which are apparently typically Pythagorean (πεδαρτάσεις, πεδαρτᾶν). What is remarkable is the respect for the individual which emerges from this early Pythagorean wisdom, also with respect to young people; authoritarianism on the part of older people, which could so easily arise with these principles, is strongly disapproved of.

It might be asked whether the injunction mentioned in (7) about 'humanity' in the waging of war does not point to a later period. This cannot be stated with certainty, but I consider it very well possible that the formulation ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ dates from the fourth century. It should, however, be remembered that the humanitarian notions which we find in the literature of fourth-century Athens certainly presuppose early Pythagorean φιλία[1].

Also the term ὡρισμένον (in 8) is reminiscent of the fourth century: it is one of Plato's terms from a late phase of his thought[2]. But, again, one must not forget that this late-Platonic thought presupposes early Pythagorean philosophy, where πέρας and ἄπειρον took the first place in the συστοιχία[3].

Of the other side of the Pythagorean φιλία we hear in Iamblichus *V.P.* 259, where it is said that the Pythagoreans revered their friends as if they were gods, but treated 'the others' like beasts, and 'had no esteem whatsoever for others'[4]. It is obviously an enemy who is speaking here: it is the annoyed tone of the outsider who does not

[1] Cp. my study on *Personality in Greek and Christian thought*, in: *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, Washington, Cath. Univ. Press, 1963 pp. 41 ff.

[2] I am thinking of πέρας and ἄπειρον in *Phil.* 25, and of the texts of Hermodorus and Sextus, cited in my *Greek Phil.* I, nr. 371. Cp. also Aristotle, *Protr.* fr. 5, and E. de Struycker in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-fourth Century*, Göteborg 1960, p. 86.

[3] Aristotle, *Metaph.* A 5.

[4] τοὺς δ'ἄλλους ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία χειροῦσθαι. In metric form:
τοὺς δ'ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ' οὔτ'ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ'ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

recognize that to a Pythagorean animals are not at all an object of contempt. What is in fact at the bottom of this annoyed reaction we can learn from the injunction reported sub (9), which also occurs word for word in Porphyry: the Pythagoreans were taught to be very reserved with respect to people with other principles and not too rashly strike up a friendship with persons who would turn out to be unworthy of it. This does not exclude the principle that their benevolence (φιλία in the wider sense) extended to everybody and that they were expressly taught never to take up an aggressive attitude. They must have been gentle and humane people towards everyone.

A few centuries later in the Stoa the oikeiosis doctrine provided the theoretical foundation for a humanitarian philosophy[1]: it is here that the basic principles were found for a doctrine of the rights of man as a rational-moral being[2], and thence for international law[3]. But it was in fact Pythagoras who in the Greek world first preached the doctrine of charity and who practised it in his own way. Nor was a theoretical basis lacking: it is the doctrine of harmony and order in the cosmos, based on numerical ratios.

So much for the Pythagorean doctrine of friendship.

3. Pythagoras as educator: formal principles

The tradition knows a Pythagorean theory of education, which has the following characteristic traits.

(1) Respect for personality; not only must younger people show respect to older ones, but the older ones must respect their juniors, as must those of higher status respect their inferiors. Hence the warning addressed to the older people to be considerate in their castigations and to show paternal care[4], the principle never to rebuke others in anger[5], and the repeated admonition not to taunt angry people[6].

(2) Music was used to curb the passions[7].

(3) Man's lifetime was divided into seven year periods. The tran-

[1] See *Greek Phil.* III, nrs. 999-1000; 1069 ff.

[2] Cic. *De off.* III 25: Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse.

[3] Cic., *De off.* III 28: Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem, e.q.s.

[4] Iambl. *V.P.* 101, 231. **T** 13.

[5] Iambl. *V.P.* 197; Diog. Laert. VIII 20. **T** 14 ab.

[6] Diog. Laert. VIII 18; Porph., *V.P.* 42; cf. Iambl., *Protr.* 21.

[7] Iambl., *V.P.* 64, 110-115, 164; Porph., *V.P.* 33. **T** 21-22.

sition from one period to another, it was felt, caused a significant crisis[1].

(4) A repeated admonition not to heed the opinion of the masses and to avoid coming into contact with them[2].

The form of the precepts mentioned under (1) indicates an early date. The words πεδαρτῆσις and πεδαρτᾶν for νουθετεῖν are mentioned as terms peculiar to the Pythagoreans[3], the admonition not to taunt angry people was, according to Diogenes Laertius and Porphyry[4], included in the *acousma* πῦρ μαχαίρᾳ μὴ σκαλεύειν. Burnet placed this with numerous others in the category of taboo-precepts. He judged that this type of precept was most primitive and therefore probably most ancient. The allegorical and ethical explanation was to be attributed to a later, more 'enlightened', generation. However acceptable this may seem to be, we possess clear indications that Pythagoras himself sometimes used images and metaphors: not only did he undergo a strong Eastern influence[5], but he consciously made use of Delphic oracular style[6].

Aristotle, as Porphyry says, mentioned a number of sayings of Pythagoras in which he expressed himself symbolically, 'in mystic fashion'[7]. For instance, he called the sea a tear, the Greater and Lesser Bears the hands of Rhea, the Pleiad the Muses' Lyre, and the planets the dogs of Persephone. The ring of bronze when it is struck he explained as the voice of some demon who is enclosed in the metal. Porphyry follows this up with such precepts as πῦρ μαχαίρᾳ μὴ σκαλεύειν, ζυγὸν μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν and στέφανον μὴ τίλλειν as a special group of *acousmata* used symbolically by Pythagoras. This is by no means improbable: fire is an obvious image for anger[8] for archaic man,

[1] Iambl., *V.P.* 201; cf. Aristox. ap. Stob. IV 1, 49 (W.-H. p. 15, 9 ff.) **T** 23.

[2] Iambl., *V.P.* 200; cf. the explanation given in Porph., *V.P.* 42, of the *acousma* "Not to walk on highways"; also Porph., *V.P.* 32: ἐκτρέπεσθαι δὲ τὰς μετὰ τῶν πολλῶν ὁμιλίας. **T** 25.

[3] πελαργᾶν (or πελαρτᾶν) in Diog. Laert. VIII 20, as observed above, is probably a corruption of πεδαρτᾶν, which is mentioned as a Pythagorean term in Iambl., *V.P.* [197. **T** 14a.

[4] Cf. the places mentioned in note 6, p. 159.

[5] Compare e.g. Porph., *V.P.* 41: ὡς παρὰ τῶν μάγων ἐπυνθάνετο.

[6] Porph., *ibid.*: καὶ ἄλλ'ἄττα ἐπαίδευεν ὅσα παρὰ 'Αριστοκλείας τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς ἔλεγεν ἀκηκοέναι.

[7] Porph., *ibid.*: ἔλεγε δέ τινα καὶ μυστικῷ τρόπῳ συμβολικῶς, ἃ δὴ ἐπὶ πλέον 'Αριστοτέλης ἀνέγραψεν.

[8] Cf. Heraclitus, fr. 85 D. and Verdenius' comments on it in *Mnemosyne* 1942, p. 115 ff.

whereas the knife represents the cutting, aggressive element. The balance beam of the scales indicates the measure of justice and injustice which may not be crossed without punishment; the wreath is a common metaphor for a bulwark, and the laws are the bulwark of the state, here, as well as in Heraclitus[1].

We found in the preceding passage several indications that the Pythagoreans made an early use of symbols and explained mythological data and ancient legends in an ethical-allegorical manner. It is by no means impossible that Pythagoras himself used this method when addressing a larger audience. All this confirms that it was not only a matter of illustrating a certain lesson with a striking example, but that according to an old tradition Pythagoras also gave his lessons themselves in symbolic form. Suidas, under *Anaximandros*, says that a younger Anaximander, who lived in the time of Artaxerxes (early fourth century) wrote a work entitled Συμβόλων Πυθαγορείων ἐξήγησις, which included the *acousmata* mentioned by Porphyry, *V.P.* 42. This is not to say that this Anaximander the Younger who was a historian was the first to moralize in his interpretation of these old-pythagorean precepts; but it does show that at least towards the end of the fifth century a number of Pythagorean precepts of symbolic form were current, which even then were given a moralizing and allegorical explanation. In any case, it is not to be imagined that this kind of allegorizing is the fruit of the rationalism of people like Aristoxenus and his contemporaries.

The notion that a Pythagorean would never rebuke another person in anger also belongs to an old tradition. Diogenes Laertius VIII 20 says, speaking of Pythagoras himself: "It was his wont never to punish in anger either slave or free man." Iamblichus, *V.P.* 197, narrates at some length that once Archytas of Tarentum on his return after a long absence saw that the slaves in the fields and their foreman were doing their work badly, and that he became angry – 'in so far as that was possible for him' – but for that very reason abstained from punishing them. To the slaves he said, 'as it seems', that it was their good fortune that he had become angry: otherwise they would not have escaped punishment[2].

Iamblichus who repeats a story here which as he says Spintharos,

[1] Heracl. fr. 44 and 114 D.

[2] εἶπεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὅτι εὐτυχοῦσιν ὅτι αὐτοῖς ὤργισται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοὺς ἀθῴους γενέσθαι τηλικαῦτα ἡμαρτηκότας (**T** 14a).

Aristoxenus' father, often told, is not very happy in his phrasing – if the text is sound –: doubtless the idea is that Archytas *later* said to the slaves that it had been their good fortune that he had become angry *then*. That is what we find in Diodorus X 7. And in fact Iamblichus himself says: "No Pythagorean ever punished a slave or rebuked a free man when angry: he always waited until his inner calm had been restored." No doubt that is what Archytas did in this case. Diels therefore wished to read ὡς ἔληγε (sc. τῆς ὀργῆς) instead of ὡς ἔοικε in the passage quoted above. But however neat as a conjecture, the usage of ἔληγε without τῆς ὀργῆς for inner calm being restored is highly improbably. One may interpret ὡς ἔοικε as meaning 'according to the reports', or 'as the story is told',[1] a somewhat imprecise usage, but not unusual. Iamblichus was not, after all, a great stylist.

If we sum up the contents of the precepts or principles mentioned under (1), we are struck by the respect for the human person, the tenderness and moderation in dealings both with younger people or people of lower status and with people of higher status or people in power. This is the expression of a certain attitude towards one's fellow-men, summed up by the Pythagoreans in the telling word φιλία. There is no reason to accept the idea that all this is the result of a later 'development'. Any development starts from a rudiment. The rudiment consists of a deep consciousness of cosmic unity and order. That is the secret of Pythagorean φιλία, which also pervades education. It expresses itself through a deep-seated interest for the individual, through an indulgent attitude towards human frailties, through trying to cure whatever disturbs order and harmony. It is the very heart of Pythagoras himself.

(2) Music as a cure for the passions.

The fact that music was regarded by Pythagoras as being of major importance in education should be accepted on an equal footing with any other principle which we are in the habit of attributing to him on the grounds of fourth century testimony. Pythagoras discovered number and harmony as primary principles in the universe. Was that an application of the other great discovery generally attributed to him, viz. that musical intervals may be reduced to numerical ratios? This explanation has been proposed, and had in fact been generally

[1] Thus Cobet: *ut aiunt*. Deubner agrees; rightly so: Iamblichus' *V.P.* exhibits several examples of this usage. E.g. in 204 (Deubner p. 111.27) and 210 (Deubner p. 114.23:); *infra*, p. 176 with n. 2 and p. 180 with n. 1.

accepted. Guthrie[1] however has recently pointed out that the most ancient testimony for the latter discovery is of a late date: it is found in Porphyry's commentary on Ptolemy's *Harmonica* (p. 31, 1 Düring) and after him in Theo of Smyrna, *Math.* p. 56 Hiller. Does that relegate Pythagoras' discovery of musicology to the realm of legend? Such a conclusion would be premature. Porphyry mentions older sources: Heraclides of Pontus and Xenocrates, in other words the Early Academy. Nor is that all; for in Plato's Timaeus the structures of the universe and the world-soul appear to rest on musical intervals. Behind all this lies early Pythagorean doctrine which Plato puts in the mouth of Timaeus of Locri. Archytas too is aware of the connexion between difference in pitch and numerical ratio.

Furthermore, the idea that each heavenly sphere causes through the speed of its orbit a certain tone which is symbolized by a Siren[2] is without any doubt a very early Pythagorean notion. In the Pythagorean Catechism[3] the tetractys is defined as 'harmony'. Why? Because the intervals are explained by the first four numbers (the ratio 4 : 2 or 2 : 1 = the octave, 3 : 2 = the fifth, 4 : 3 = the fourth). Thus the essential chords might be said to be enclosed in the tetractys. When explaining the tetractys by 'harmony' the Catechism adds: ἐν ᾗ αἱ Σειρῆνες, viz., the Sirens who, sitting on the heavenly spheres, each sound one note and together produce that cosmic music which is called the harmony of the spheres. We know this theory, though without the Sirens, from Aristotle's *De caelo* 290 b 12 ff. The basic idea was that very large bodies which move at very high speeds must make a sound. Since it was thought that the distances of the heavenly bodies could be explained in the same numerical ratios as musical intervals[4], the idea arose that the sound of the heavenly bodies was symphonic.

This is how the Pythagoreans elaborate the basic principle of a mathematically ordered universe[5]: all order is based on numerical proportion; that is why harmony is the universal, cosmic law and why the musical and mathematical sciences are related. In this sense Aristotle could say that the Pythagoreans "reduced all things to numbers or the elements of number" (i.e. the principles πέρας and ἄπειρον),

[1] *History*, I p. 222.
[2] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* X 617b. On this passage Delatte, *Litt.. Pyth.* p. 259; Guthrie, *History* I, p. 295 ff.
[3] The ἀκούσματα, in Iambl., *V.P.* 82.
[4] Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 35b-36c. [5] *Met.* A 5, 985b32 ff.; 986 a 21.

and that they described the entire universe as harmony and number[1]. This, together with the evidence of Plato and Archytas, brings us to the end of the fifth century at the latest. But it would be false wisdom to maintain that the question whether these notions go back any further must remain undecided, when in fact it is highly probable that they do. For (1) the theory of cosmic harmony is decidedly archaic in character; (2) the entire group of ideas set out above is much better explained if we accept that a particular great mind stood at the source than by attributing them to a later, anonymous development.

It should not be objected – as Guthrie rightly remarks – that Plato very rarely mentions Pythagoras by name and that Aristotle always speaks of 'the Pythagoreans'; no one doubts that Plato knew Pythagorean philosophy as an old and, to him, venerable school-tradition. The ancient philosophers think in 'schools' more than we do and only rarely quote by name. Once again, Aristotle in particular often speaks of 'the Platonists' without further specification if he means a particular man, even Plato himself.

The doctrine of the cathartic effect of music doubtless was of early Pythagorean origin: Plato and Aristotle were affected by it and the later authors who often mention the point derive their information from Aristoxenus; his authority needs no further proof. After this introduction let us see what Iamblichus has to say about music as a tool for education in the early Pythagoreans.

(*V.P.* 64)[2]. It was Pythagoras' opinion that certain rhythms and melodies had a healing effect on the human character and emotions: it restores the soul's strength to its original balance. For the members of his *Societas* (γνώριμοι) he put together so-called ἐξαρτύσεις (equipments) and ἐπαφάς (treatments) which were very subtly tuned so as to influence certain emotions: grief, anger, pity, jealousy and fear, all manner of desires and appetites, boastfulness, depressions and vehemence. (110)[3]. Pythagoras called healing through music a κάθαρσις[4]. In spring the Pythagoreans sang paeans accompanied by the

[1] That the theory of the harmony of the spheres is Pythagorean, is explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, *De caelo* 291 a 8. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on Aristotle, *Met.* A 985 b 32 ff. (p. 39.24 ff. Hayduck). It is almost certain that the theory is of Babylonian origin.

[2] **T** 21a. [3] **T** 21b.

[4] Cf. Cramer, *Anecdot. Paris.* I 172: ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, ὡς ἔφη Ἀριστόξενος, καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς.

lyre in order to create a cheerful mood; but in other seasons too they used music for healing. (111)[1]. Certain melodies were used for influencing particular emotions. Dancing also was used as a therapy. The sound of flutes was regarded by Pythagoras as unsuitable: it causes the listeners to become hybristic. Lines of Homer and Hesiod had their place in education. They were selected with a view to restoring the balance in the soul. (112 f.)[2]. Iamblichus mentions a few well-known examples. The first is the case of a drunk youth from Tauromenium[3] who at night wanted to put fire to the house of his rival. Pythagoras calms him completely by suddenly changing the wild Phrygian flute music to spondees. The second example concerns Empedocles: he saved his host, Anchitus, by using music to calm an excited youth who came rushing in to kill him. (114). Iamblichus then speaks about the development of this principle in the school: the so-called ἐξάρτυσις, συναρμογή and ἐπαφή were zealously studied and exercised throughout the school of Pythagoras. Before retiring they sang certain songs to cleanse the mind of the aftermath of the day's cares; in the morning they sang other songs, sometimes without words, to banish sleepiness.

(115 ff.) In the next chapters Iamblichus describes the methods by which Pythagoras is said to have invented his theory of harmony and intervals. Both Guthrie[4] and W. Burkert[5] have pointed out that these methods are impossible. More interesting is Iamblichus' addition in ch. 65 to what he says in 114 on giving the members of his *Societas* inward peace for the night, and activity and tension in the morning by using appropriate kinds of music. He himself no longer needed these aids, Iamblichus says, for through a special ability he could hear the cosmic music directly. It has a fuller and more beautiful sound than mortal music, and he tried to imitate it by strings and the human voice.

Here we have the explanation of the healing effect of music: earthly music is a μίμημα of heavenly music. It restores the soul to a state in which it can return to the stars, the realm of the blessed. Cf. the

[1] **T** 21b [2] **T** 22.

[3] The name Tauromenium appears repeatedly in the Pythagorean legends, even though the city bearing this name was not founded until later. In Pythagoras' day there was an old Greek colony named Naxos very near the place where Tauromenium was later built.

[4] *History* I, p. 223 f.

[5] *Weisheit u. Wissenschaft*, Nürnberg 1962, p. 354.

question in the *Acousmata* (Iamblichus, *V.P.* 82): "Which are the islands of the blessed?" – and the answer: "Sun and Moon".

The notion that the soul in its essence is related to the heavenly bodies which are divine beings is found in Pythagoras' circle, with Alcmaeon of Croton[1]. With some variations the thought returns in numerous later authors. First of all we have Plato, who teaches in the *Timaeus* that man's higher soul is made of the same substance as the star-souls, and that each individual soul comes from a particular star to which it will return[2]. Aristotle apparently still shared this doctrine in the comparatively early Περὶ φιλοσοφίας[3]. In Heraclides of Pontus we find the doctrine that the souls before incarnation stay on the Milky Way[4]. From this place Scipio Africanus' soul addresses his grandson in Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*[5]. The moon too plays a part as a temporary abode of the souls during their journeys upward or downward. In Plutarch's myth at the end of *De facie in orbe lunae* she appears as the cleansing place of the souls, which afterwards rise to the sphere of the sun[6]. Numenius' ideas on the ascent of the soul after death and its abode are found in a fragment of his comments on the myth of Er cited by Proclus, *In rempubl.* II p. 128, 26 Kroll[7]. In this passage he says: καὶ γὰρ τὸν Πυθαγόραν δι' ἀπορρήτων Ἅιδην τὸν γαλαξίαν καὶ τόπον ψυχῶν ἀποκαλεῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖ συνωθουμένων.

Cf. also Numenius in Porphyry, *De antro nympharum*, chapters 21 and 28. Lastly Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* I 11, 11, gives a detailed account of the descent of the souls from the Milky way[8].

All these are basically early Pythagorean thoughts. Their connexion with musical therapy may not be immediately evident to the modern reader – yet to the Pythagorean such a connexion did exist.

(3) The division of human life into four periods[9].

The tradition knows a Pythagorean theory of education. Man was studied in the various stages of his development. The life of man was

[1] Aristotle, *De anima* I 22, 405 a 29; Cicero, *De natura deorum* I 11, 27.
[2] *Timaeus*, 41 d-e.
[3] Cicero, *Acad. post.* I, 7, 26. Cf. my note in *Greek Phil.* II nr. 431 d, e. The Περὶ φιλοσοφίας dates, according to my later investigations, from Aristotle's first Athenian period. It must be older than the *Protrepticus*.
[4] Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 39 (fr. 98 W.)
[5] Cicero, *De republica* VI 26-38; cf. my note in *Greek Phil.* III nr. 959 B.
[6] Plutarch, *De facie*, chapters 28-30; *Greek Phil.* III, nr. 1192 d; cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* I 18, 42-19, 43, *Greek Phil.* III 1192 c.
[7] *Greek Phil.* III nr. 1356 a. [8] *Greek Phil.* III nr. 1356 b. [9] **T** 23-24.

divided into four periods: childhood, youth, manhood, old age. The duties of each of these periods are different, and the transition from one period into the other was realized to be a critical moment. Extracts from Aristoxenus on this subject are found in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* IV 1, 49. Iamblichus deals with it in *V.P.* 202 ff.

Iamblichus quotes as an especially Pythagorean expression the phrase "in human life as a whole a subdivision into certain periods of life has been made", i.e. is objectively given. By no means everyone knows how to join these periods to one another correctly; they expel one another by force if one does not give a man good and correct guidance from birth[1]. When a boy in his childhood has noble, moderate and manly guidance, an important part of this will of necessity be handed on to the period of youth; equally when training in the years of youth is good, manly and moderate, a large part of this will be handed on to the period of manhood. What usually happens with the masses is senseless and ridiculous. They feel that as a child one ought to behave properly, be modest and keep away from all that is rude and unmannered. But once the children have become youths, a large majority of people allows them to do as they like, and in this period of life two kinds of sin are combined: youths often commit the sins of children as well as those of men. It is a child's sin to avoid all seriousness and order and to seek levity, laxity and 'high spirits', and from childhood this attitude persists into the period of youth. From the period of manhood the years of youth get strong desires and ambition as well as other appetites and attitudes that are hard to conquer and cause disturbances. For this reason the period of youth needs the greatest care.

"In general one should never, according to them, allow a man to do as he likes without limitation: there should always be a certain amount of supervision, a legal authority, properly constituted, to which each citizen must be subject. For a living being left to itself and neglected, quickly slides into vice and depravity" (203).

"Why", they asked, "must one accustom children to order and temperance with regard to eating and drinking, if this is useless for the period of adulthood?" And the same applies to other habits. "Young dogs and horses are trained, too, for what they are to perform when grown."

[1] Ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ τῷ σύμπαντι εἶναί τινας ἡλικίας ἐνδεδασμένας (οὕτω καὶ λέγειν αὐτούς φασιν), ἃς οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ τυχόντος πρὸς ἀλλήλας συνεῖραι· ἐκκρούεσθαι γὰρ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἄγῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ γενετῆς.

Aristoxenus ap. Stob., *Ecl.* IV, 1,49 says: "It was their opinion that one ought to look after each period of life; that children ought to exercise reading and writing and other subjects, that young men should train in the customs and laws of the state, that men should be busy with activities and service for the public good, and old men with purely mental work, with the law, with advice and with all sciences, so that the children may not be dumb, the young men not like children, that the men may not behave like youths and the old men may not be lacking in wisdom."

This division into four periods of life is also found in Diod. X 9.5, and in Diog. Laert. VIII 10. There the periods are defined as 20 years each. Up to twenty years of age the word παῖς is used (cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 210, where the practice of aphrodisia is banned until the age of twenty), after that νεανίσκος, then νεηνίης, then γέρων. Mention is made of the parallel with the four seasons. Was Timaeus the common source for Diodorus and Diogenes Laertius? We know that both used his work, whether directly or indirectly. But it is possible that the Ionic form νεηνίης hints at a different source, viz. the work of the fourth century medical author Androcydes on the Pythagorean *Symbola*[1].

However this may be, the Pythagorean division into four periods of life is certainly younger than the division into seven periods which parallel the seven seasons. We find this division in the Hippocratic work Περὶ ἑβδομάδων. For the author of this work – or at least for the author of its cosmological introduction, chapters 1-11 – the number seven dominates the entire cosmos. The embryo takes on human form after seven days. The number seven rules the course of diseases. All things have a nature and form to which this number fits. There are seven spheres of the universe, seven winds and seven seasons, seven

[1] Iamblichus mentions this source at *V.P.* 145 (cf. *infra*, p. 183) when telling a story that illustrates the Pythagoreans' faith in providence. P. Corssen, in Rhein. Mus. 1912, defended the existence of a work on Pythagoras and the *Symbola* by Androcydes against the objections of Zeller and Diels. It was used e.g. by Plutarch and Clem. Alex. Corssen remarked that both Diodorus and Diog. L. touch on the Pythagoreans' faith in providence in the same passage in which they treat the four periods of life, for both mention the fact that the Pythagoreans used to pray for the good without any further specification. He thinks that Diog. L. 9-10 and 22-24 derive from Androcydes. In the latter chapter the ban on beans is explained on medical grounds. Cf. the *symbola* from Androcydes in Plut., *De puer. educ.* p. 12 E and in [Hippolytus], *Philos.* VI 27, 11. Burkert, *Weisheit u. Wissenschaft*, p. 151 f. does not believe in the 4th century physician Androcydes as the author of the book Π. Πυθαγ. συμβ.

periods of human life of seven years each. The human body has seven parts, the head has seven functions. Language has seven vowels and there are seven elements in the soul (force of life). And, finally, the earth likewise has seven parts.

The same theory is found in a few other Hippocratic works. Amongst them Περὶ σαρκῶν 12-13 (on the growth of teeth) and at the end (ch. 19: the growth of the embryo and the periods of human life); also Περὶ ἑπταμήνου (on the importance of periods of seven for the development of the embryo). Throughout the Hippocratic Corpus we find passages in which the occurrence of critical days is determined by periods of seven. According to W. H. Roscher[1] this is the earlier form of the doctrine. Later on other numbers are added. The importance of the number ten gradually increases and dominates in later works.

Censorinus, *De die natali* 7,2, has a passage showing that Hippo of Metapontum, who lived in Athens around 425, adhered to the doctrine of the special force of the number seven. He was known as a Pythagorean. With him however, the number ten also has acquired a special meaning.

The doctrine of hebdomads in Diocles of Carystus, also adopted by the Peripatetic philosopher Strato, is more old-fashioned. This doctrine is mentioned by Nicomachus of Gerasa, *Theol. arithm.* p. 46 f. Ast, and by Macrobius *in Somn. Scip.* I 6, 65 ff. Roscher thinks that they have used Posidonius' commentary on the *Timaeus*. Here we find the following[2].

The seventh hour after birth determines whether the child will live or not: children who have little chance to live die then. After seven days the remains of the umbilical cord must have been removed; after 2×7 days the child starts to react to light, after 7×7 days it turns its face to see movements. After 7 months it acquires milk-teeth, after 2×7 months it can sit upright without support, after 3×7 months it begins to articulate, after 4×7 months it is able to stand and walk, after 5×7 months it no longer wants to be breast-fed.

[1] *Die Hebdomadenlehren der griech. Philosophen u. Ärzte, Leipzig* 1906. Also: *Ueber Alter, Ursprung u. Bedeutung der Siebenzahl*, Abh. Akad. Leipzig 1911. After this by the same author: *Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl* hrsgeg. u. erläutert, in Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Paderborn 1913.

[2] Roscher, *Die hippokr. Schrift der Siebenzahl*, p. 92ff. gives the texts of Nicomachus and of Macrobius next to each other. Cf. also Philo, *De opif. mundi* 36 and 40 ff.; Varro ap. Gell., *N.A.* III 10.12; Censorinus, *De die nat.* 7.2.

After 7 years the child gets teeth and speaks correctly. Puberty starts after 2 × 7 years, growth of the beard after 3 × 7 years; after 4 × 7 years the body's growth is complete, also in width. The apex of physical strength is reached at 5 × 7 years of age. This lasts until the age of 6 × 7 years, after which follows a decline, though not immediately observable. For that reason most states do not call up men for campaigns after 42 years of age, never after 49. Finally, 70 years is the end term of life. Thereafter one ought to be free of all (physical) labour and devote onself entirely to the enjoyment of what (by Aristotle) is called εὐδαιμονία. Macrobius expresses this in the words: *ab omni officio vacuus soli exercitio sapientiae vacat.*

In Περὶ ἑβδ. the termination point of 10 × 7 is not mentioned. Here the division is as follows:

παιδίον	– up to the age of 7 (the loss of the milk-teeth)
παῖς	– up to the age of 14 (puberty)
μειράκιον	– up to the age of 21 (growth of the beard)
νεανίσκος	– up to the age of 28 (completion of physical growth)
ἀνήρ	– up to the age of 49
πρεσβύτης	– up to the age of 56
γέρων	– after the age of 56.

There are several other divisions of human life. Delatte reviews them in *Litt. pyth.* pp. 182 ff. The Paris. gr. 1788, f° 159 f. has the following division into seven periods:

βρέφος	– up to the age of 4
παῖς	– from the age of 5 to the age of 14
μειράκιον	– from 15 to 22
νεανίσκος	– from 23 to 44
ἀνήρ	– from 45 to 56
γηραιός	– from 57 to 67
πρεσβύτης	– from the age of 67 on.

As compared with all this the division into four periods which we found in Iamblichus and which agrees with Aristoxenus is very simple indeed. With regard to Περὶ ἑβδ., this has been called a Pythagorean work[1]. Roscher argued against this, dating the first half, the cosmology,

[1] Thus F. Z. Ermerins, who was the first to publish the Hippocratic Corpus after Littré. This edition was commissioned by the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences at Amsterdam (Nederlandse Koninklijke Academie van Wetenschappen). It

very early. According to him the author was a Milesian from the circle of Anaximander and Anaximenes. He has a few strong arguments of which the most important is the fact that in the world map in seven parts of Περὶ ἑβδ. 11 Ionia appears as φρένες, i.e. as cultural centre. This is unthinkable except in the sixth century. Furthermore, the Peloponnese is called 'the head', referring to Spartan hegemony, whereas the Isthmus as 'the neck' points to the period of Periander. Egypt, an ancient Milesian trade area, and the Northern colonies of Miletus are mentioned; Persia, Athens and Western Greece are lacking. This, Roscher thinks, must be pre-Pythagorean, and his are strong arguments. In addition the author is unaware of the old Pythagorean doctrine of the seven planets and the seven strings of the lyre.

Roscher's interpretation[1] was generally accepted at the time, with the exception of one scholar, viz. Hermann Diels. Of his arguments many are hardly persuasive. First of all the argument that, if the work were really archaic, Delphi should have been mentioned as the earth's umbilicus instead of Ionia as its midriff; moreover Lydia, as Ionia's most important neighbour, should have been mentioned. The Peloponnese as 'head' refers to the situation of the fourth rather than to that of the sixth century. Against these arguments[2] Roscher could maintain his position without much difficulty[3]. He is right in arguing that to an Ionian of about 560 not Delphi, but the oracle of the Branchidae – known from Hdt. I 157 – was the centre of the world, and that a Milesian of that period would include Lydia in Ionia. Egypt which does receive mention in the world map of Περὶ ἑβδ. 11, the Bosporus, Pontus and Maiotis were old Milesian trade areas. From this point of view the map was complete. To Diels the division of the human body in Περὶ ἑβδ. 7 is so absurd, that he finds it impossible to take seriously. Roscher replies, probably with reason, that this division, so strange to us, is caused by its very archaic character.

But there is one point where Diels seems to be right. The cosmology of Π.ἑβδ. 2 says that there are as many worlds underneath as above

appeared in Utrecht, 1859-65. T. III contains the two Latin translations of Π. ἑβδ. Robert Joly, too, has recently, in his *Recherches sur le traité ps.–hippocr. Du Régime*, Liège-Paris 1960, p. 52, expressed the opinion that Π. ἑβδ. 'very probably' was influenced by the Pythagoreans.

[1] Given in the above cited treatise of 1906.

[2] In *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 32, 1911, Sp. 1861-66.

[3] *D. Lit. zeitung* 1911, Sp. 1876 ff. See also the article *Das Alter der Weltkarte in 'Hippokr.' Π. ἑβδ. u. die Reichskarte des Darius Hystaspes*, in *Philol.* 70, 1911, pp. 529-538.

the earth. They move in circles around the earth which is central and motionless. The task of the "seven heavenly stars" is to bring about the succession of the seasons. The earth floats in the air in a balanced position at the centre of the universe. Its position is further described as follows: (the earth floats in the air at the centre) "so that for those who are underneath, what is above is underneath and what is underneath is above; and the same applies to right and left" – that is, what is left for one half, is right for the other. The doctrine of the spherical shape of the earth and of the antipodes is pre-supposed in Diels' judgement; but this doctrine does not belong to the sixth, it belongs to the fourth century.

The last remark is not entirely correct, for the spherical shape of the earth was known at least as early as the fifth century. More important is the fact that the spherical shape is not mentioned by the author of Π.ἑβδ. – and that his model as it stands entirely fits into the framework of Milesian cosmology. Anaximander teaches that the earth is situated in the centre of the universe, where it remains in place without support, because of its balanced position[1]. He does not picture the earth as a sphere, but as the drum of a column. Of its surfaces one is that on which we stand, and there is another opposite. The heavenly bodies revolve in circles below as well as above it. To make the balance perfect one must imagine human life on the other platform of the earth as well. They are the antipodes, and thus we have here every detail of the description of Π. ἑβδ. 2. The only point at which our author shows a concept more modern than Anaximander's is where he has the earth floating on air. This is Anaximenes' notion.

I think therefore that Roscher made a mistake in his reply to Diels when he remarked that it is *certain* that the spherical form of the earth was accepted by the ancient Pythagoreans and by Parmenides, and *probably* also by Xenophanes. We do not know when the ancient Pythagoreans taught that the earth is a sphere, nor do we know whether Pythagoras himself held this opinion. Parmenides' cosmology is closely connected with the cosmologies of the Milesians. He does teach the spherical form of Being, but Being is purely intelligible, and there is no reason to transfer its sphericity to the earth. Nor do we know how Xenophanes pictured the earth. In our context, however, that is irrelevant. The answer to Diels' most important argument for a much later date of Π.ἑβδ. is simply that the cosmology of ch. 2 closely

[1] Hippolytus, *Ref.* I 6, 3 (D.-K. A 11); Guthrie, *History* I, p. 98f.

resembles the work of the Milesians and that the notion of 'antipodes' fits in with this picture.

We possess an Arabic translation of Galen's commentary on Π.ἑβδ. which was first made available in part by Chr. Harder in a German version (1893)[1]. At Roscher's request the commentary was translated afresh and in its entirety by Dr. G. Bergstrasser of Leipzig. Roscher used this translation in his 1913 edition. The commentary shows that the Greek text often contained more than has been transmitted to us in the Latin translations. Of particular interest to us is a passage on 'the third part of the earth that is called Ionia'. It says this: "The inhabitants of this area are strong, of quick intelligence, insight and wisdom." Galen comments as follows: "Many commentators say that Hippocrates praises Ionia because he himself came from those parts, but that is not the reason. He rather says this because the Ionians conform with his notion of intelligence, insight and wisdom."

Roscher rightly maintains that this confirms the early date of Π.ἑβδ. Its cosmologist author was an Ionian who belonged to the circle of Anaximander and Anaximenes and for him Ionia was the centre of the world and of culture.

My conclusion is that the doctrine of the number seven in Π.ἑβδ. 1-11 is indeed early, earlier than the Pythagorean division of human life into four periods. It is true that the number seven, as we have said above when treating the definition of καιρός, had a particular importance for the ancient Pythagoreans as well. But their division of human life, known from Aristoxenus and Iamblichus, impresses us in its simplicity as far more modern. In this the division differs not only from the one in Π.ἑβδ., but from several others current in the Greek world. Whether the division into four periods derives from Pythagoras himself, we cannot say with certainty, but the possibility cannot definitely be excluded. The tradition followed by Aristoxenus in any case seems to be an old one.

A few remarks should be added about the origin of this doctrine of the peculiar importance attached to the number seven. The doctrine has its parallels in the near-Eastern world. We know numerous examples from the Old Testament: the seven fat and seven lean cows of Pharaoh's dream; the seven pairs of clean animals that went into the ark with Noah; the sevenfold vengeance that shall be taken on Cain, and seventy times sevenfold on Lamech; the seven-armed golden

[1] Rhein. Mus. 48, p. 433 ff.

Candelabrum in the temple and the holiness of the seventh day. The Revelation of St. John is full of the number seven, and Christ teaches men to forgive seven or even 70 × 7 times. In ancient Babylon seven was the number of divine fulness. There the seventh day was likewise holy[1]. In my opinion it is probable that Pythagoras learned the doctrine of the number seven in Babylon, where he learned so many other things.

Of course it is quite right that one need not suppose that one single work which is thought to head a tradition borrowed from an 'Eastern' source[2]. We have here, as in the case of the microcosm-macrocosm idea, a notion that was widely spread in Greek medical and philosophical circles. Yet it is probable that the author of Π.ἑβδ. did undergo Eastern influences. Following the examples of J. Filliozat and R. Joly I prefer to call this a question of 'cultural relations' rather than one of following a particular text. In the case of Pythagoras an oral tradition likewise seems more probable, but one which played a large part. The tradition in Aristoxenus on the periods of life on the other hand probably indicates that Pythagoras was by no means bowled over by the doctrine of the number seven in the sense that he wished to introduce it everywhere. On the contrary, the tradition rather suggests that he went his own way in explaining the seasons and the periods of human life.

(4) The fourth point, not to heed the opinion of the masses, is treated at some length in Iamblichus, *V.P.* 200[3]. "It is absurd to pay attention to every opinion and that of everybody, in particular the opinion of the masses; only a few possess a correct insight and judgment. It is clear that these only occur with those who have knowledge; and they are few.

"On the other hand it is likewise absurd to despise every insight and judgment. The man who is thus disposed will not be able to learn nor to be corrected."

[1] See J. Hehn, *Siebenzahl u. Sabbat bei den Babyloniern u. im A.T.* (Leipz. Sem. Studien II, 5, 1907); also J. Hehn, *Zur Bedeutung der Siebenzahl* in: Festschrift für K. Marti (= Beihefte zur Zeitschr. alttest. Wissenschaft 41, 1925) p. 128ff.; Fr. Heiler, *Erscheinungsformen u. Wesen der Religion* (= Die Religionen der Menschheit I), Stuttgart 1961, p. 167 ff.

[2] R. Joly makes this remark in his commentary on Π. διαίτης (*Recherches sur le traité ps.-hippocr. Du régime* p. 50) with regard to the microcosm-macrocosm idea in Π. ἑβδ. and several other Hippocratic treatises.

[3] **T** 25d.

Truly this is not the only place where saws and thoughts attributed to Pythagoras remind us of Socrates in Plato's dialogues. As an instance may be cited the Socrates of the *Crito* who mentions among the precepts that he has given others throughout his life and that still hold true for him the one "not to heed the judgment of the masses, but only the judgment of the expert." And again, we may take Socrates in the *Protagoras* and in the *Gorgias* trusting only the expert, while vigorously opposing the sophists who pretend to be able to speak 'well' about any subject. This similarity should not induce us to invert the sequence and to suppose that 'apparently' Socrates (or Plato) was the earlier and that what we read in Iamblichus is nothing but the 'projection' of a later period. We should learn in more than one respect that expressions and notions which *we* first encounter in Plato are in fact of early Pythagorean origin. Anyhow, why should not inner independence from 'the many' and trust in 'the few' who have knowledge have been a Pythagorean principle before it became a Socratic one? That is no reason to call Pythagoras an 'aristocratic leader' any more than Socrates was an aristocratic leader in this sense.

Among Pythagoras' symbolic precepts Porphyry (*V.P.* 42) mentions the one "not to walk on highways": τάς τε λεωφόρους μὴ βαδίζειν. He explains: "Thus he tried to keep his hearers from following the opinions of the masses."

Hence arise, too, the warnings against φιλοτιμία and φιλοδοξία[1], and the severe test to which, according to the tradition, Pythagoras subjected prospective members of the Pythagorean Society[2]. Porphyry who says he is following Diogenes here (in this case probably Antonius Diogenes[3]) adds to the first warning: 'and to avoid intercourse with the masses'. This piece of advice – later found e.g. in Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius*[4] – fits in well with the Pythagoreans' withdrawn style of life. They practised a kind of 'apartness' with respect to the majority of the citizens in whose midst they lived. Compare the description of the Pythagorean day in Iambl. *V.P.* 96-100[5], and the 'apartness' with which the political club of Three Hundred is reproached in Iambl. 254, the end[6].

[1] Porph., *V.P.* 32. [2] Iambl., *V.P.* 72.

[3] The author of the romantic story τὰ ὑπὲρ Θούλην ἄπιστα. Porphyry has used this work elsewhere in his *V.P.* as well. Cf. E. Rohde, *Der griech. Roman*, p. 254 ff.

[4] *Ep.* VII. [5] *Infra*, p. 185 ff. [6] *Infra*, p. 189 ff.

4. The moral philosophy of the Pythagoreans: the precepts

Immediately following his treatment of the four periods of life Iamblichus has a passage on the main tendency of the Pythagoreans' moral philosophy. *V.P.* 204[1]:

> On the whole, they said, the Pythagoreans advised those they met as well as those who came to live with them to guard against pleasure as much as anything one needs to guard against. For nothing causes us to fall as easily or throws us as deeply into sin as that emotion. On the whole, it seems[2], they aimed at never doing anything for the sake of pleasure – for that goal was dishonourable and, most of the time, harmful, but chiefly they tried to do whatever was to be done with a view to the good and the honourable, and only in second place with a view to the useful and advantageous, for which no common measure of good judgment was needed.

One may compare the speech of Archytas which according to Cicero[3] the young ('adulescens') Cato heard at Tarentum as repeated by his host Nearchus.

> Nullam capitaliorem pestem quam voluptatem corporis hominibus dicebat a natura datam, cuius voluptatis avidae libidines temere et ecfrenate ad potiendum incitarentur. Hinc patriae proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci; nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis inpelleret; stupra vero et adulteria et omne tale flagitium nullis excitare inlecebris nisi voluptatis. Cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihil mente praestabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono nihil tam esse inimicum quam voluptatem. Nec enim libidine dominante temperantiae locum esse neque omnino in voluptatis regno virtutem posse consistere.

Cicero may have given this thought its elegant Latin form, but we have no reason to doubt that Archytas spoke in this sense – not, to be sure, as part of his school teaching but in a wider circle – and that

[1] **T** 27a.
[2] This is another instance of ὡς ἔοικε = ut aiunt (above, p. 162).
[3] *Cato maior* 12, 39-41. **T** 27c.

the memory of this speech and of similar ones was still alive at Tarentum during the third century[1].

Lysis' letter (Iambl. *V.P.* 77-78) calls ἀκρασία and πλεονεξία the mother of all vices[2].

All these sources indicate that Pythagoras regarded τρυφή as the greatest evil both in man's personal life and in the community. For that reason the first great lesson that children should be taught from the very start, and that should be carefully kept up throughout the period of adolescence, is the control of one's desires. It is by no means only in the speech to the young men of Croton (Iambl. *V.P.* 41-42) that we hear of this: Pompeius Trogus says that the fight against *luxuria* is Pythagoras' really great contribution[3] and Diodorus, X 5, tells a remarkable story about it. By way of training in ἐγκράτεια, he says, the Pythagoreans did the following: they had a delicious meal served up, a real feast, and looked at this for a considerable period of time. After thus having aroused their desires, they had the tables removed and left immediately without having tasted anything of the meal[4].

And again in X 7: "He (Pythagoras) used to advise people to strive for simplicity, for luxury[5] and wealth[6] spoil men and their bodies. Most diseases are caused by indigestion and this very condition is caused by extravagance[5]. He persuaded many to live on raw vegetables and to drink water all their lives in order to attain the truly good".

Compare the diet mentioned Diog. Laert. VIII 19: honey, honeycomb or bread, no wine in the daytime[7], and by way of ὄψον mostly cooked or raw lettuce, rarely seafood. See also Porphyry, *V.P.* 34, where the same regime is mentioned[8].

[1] Diels-Kranz, *VS* 47 A 9 mention this passage among the *apocrypha* and regard it as a fiction with 'Anklänge an' Aristotle, *E.N.* VII 12. These reminiscences consist of nothing but the fact that in the passage mentioned we find a treatment of ἡδονή. The negative attitude of Diels-Kranz with respect to the Archytas-tradition probably still derives from the deep-rooted German school dogma which denies any social-political activity on the part of Pythagoras. Their inability to explain someone like Archytas is quite consistent with this premiss.
[2] **T** 27b.
[3] Justinus XX 4.2; 5-7, and 10. Compare Iambl. *V.P.* 171 (τρυφή, ὕβρις, ὄλεθρος) and 223, the end. Stob., Flor. 43, 49 has the sequence τρύφη, κόρος, ὕβρις, ὄλεθρος. **T** 29.
[4] **T** 28. Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 187. The method is referred to in 225/6.
[5] πολυτέλεια. [6] οὐσία.
[7] μεθ'ἡμέραν apparently means 'in the daytime', not 'in the evening', for at dinner they did have some wine. Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 98; infra, p. 186, n. 3.
[8] **T** 30.

This continuous advocacy of temperance and sobriety was rooted in Pythagoras' view of the laws of the universe: measure and harmony. That is why we find evenness and balance for the soul and its emotions as well as for the body recommended in all sources.

Porphyry, *V.P.* 35:

> For that reason, too, he maintained his own body in a carefully weighed disposition as it were, not healthy at one time and then again ill, nor sometimes fat and at other times thin; and through his outward appearance his soul showed always the same character, for he became neither more relaxed through pleasure nor more depressed through distress, and he never showed his joy or grief: no one ever saw him laughing or weeping[1].

Diog. Laert. VIII 19-20:

> He was never known to have diarrhea or sexual intercourse or to be drunk. He refrained from laughing out loud and from pleasantry in the form of jokes and vile talk. Nor did he punish either slave or freeman while in anger[2].

Ibid. 23 (Precepts):

> Take care not to laugh continually and not to look sullen. Avoid becoming fat[2].

Iambl. *V.P.* 196:

> They watched out that their bodies always remained the same girth and were not now thin and then again fat; for in their opinion this was an indication of irregular living. In the same way they took care also with respect to their moods so as not to be now full of joy and then depressed again, but always even tempered and in a mild joy. And they fought against anger, dejectedness and disturbance of their equanimity[3]. It was one of their precepts that nothing ought to be unexpected

[1] **T** 31a. Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 226: οἴκτων δὲ καὶ δακρύων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἴργεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐκείνους φασί (from Aristoxenus). The same in 234, init., and Porph. *V.P.* 59.

[2] **T** 31b.

[3] The battle against ἀθυμίαι and δηγμοί also in Iambl. *V.P.* 111 and Porph. *V.P.* 42. Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 224, where music is mentioned as a therapy for this and other emotions: ἦν δέ τινα μέλη παρ' αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ψυχῆς πάθη πεποιημένα, πρός τε ἀθυμίας καὶ δηγμούς, ἃ δὴ βοηθητικώτατα ἐπινενόητο, καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἕτερα πρός τε τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θυμούς.

> to people of sense, but that one should be prepared for all matters that lay outside one's power. And if it ever happened to them that they became angry or sad or something of that kind, they left the company of others and tried in solitude to conquer and heal that emotion[1].

Then follows the passage about not punishing in anger and as an illustration the story of Archytas and the lazy slaves.

Moderation with respect to *aphrodisia* is mentioned several times. Diodorus X 9, 3-4 has this to say:

> With regard to *aphrodisia*, too, Pythagoras gave wholesome precepts. He advised people to abstain from sexual intercourse during summer and not to practise it except with great moderation during the winter. For on the whole he regarded the aphrodisia as harmful and he felt addiction was a cause of weakness and total collapse.
>
> When Pythagoras was asked when one should practise sexual intercourse he said: when you wish to lose your self-control[2].

This tradition probably derives from Timaeus. We also possess Aristoxenus' evidence. As often happens, he is quoted by name in a passage of Stobaeus which also, but without the mention of a name, occurs in Iambl., *V.P.*[3]. The school doctrine is being treated here, but in such a form that an old tradition is clearly intended.

> On procreation they taught, it was said, the following[4]. On the whole they thought one ought to guard against the so-called precocious, for neither in plants nor in animals do the precocious specimens carry good fruits, but some time should pass before fruit-bearing, so that seeds and fruits may grow from strong and fully grown bodies. Therefore one should bring up boys

[1] **T** 31c. The same also in Iambl. *V.P.* 224-225 (from Aristoxenus).

[2] **T** 32a.

[3] Stob., *Ecl.* IV 37, 4 (p. 878, 15 ff. W.-H.) = Aristox. fr. 39 Wehrli. **T** 32b. Iambl. *V.P.* 209-210.
The entire passage Π. γεννήσεως, 209-213, may be found in almost identical form in Ocellus Lucanus, *De universi natura* IV 9-14 (p. 23-25 Harder). Infra, p. 236 f., **T** 32 cd.

[4] τάδε λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἔφασαν, i.e. the Pythagoreans who, for Aristoxenus, belonged to the older generation.

> and girls with bodily labour, body exercises and proper training, giving food that is fitting for a labour-loving, modest and hardened life. Many things in human life are of a kind that it is better to learn them late, and to those belongs sexual practise. A boy then ought to be brought up in such a way that he does not seek this type of intercourse before he is twenty years of age. Having come to that point he should rarely practise it. And this will come to pass, when a good inner disposition (εὐεξία) is regarded as valuable and beautiful. For intemperance and a good inner disposition definitely do not occur together in one and the same person.

A few lines further on we read this important statement:

> Those men, it seems[1], held the opinion that one should entirely exclude unnatural[2] and lascivious[3] intercourse and of natural and restrained intercourse retain only those instances which are aimed at producing children in a restrained and lawful manner.

The same thing is said with great emphasis in Ocellus' passage Περὶ γεννήσεως:

> First of all we ought to grasp the fact that we go to a woman not for pleasure but to beget children; for the very powers and organs and desire for sexual union were given to men by the divinity not for pleasure but so as to guarantee forever the continued existence of the race[4].

And a few lines further on:

> For those who have sexual intercourse with no thought of begetting children will sin against the most valuable institutions of the community[5].

This severe code later returns in Musonius Rufus and Plotinus[6].

[1] ὡς ἔοικεν, 'as it is said'. Another instance of the usage noted above (p. 162 n. 1).
[2] Both of incest and of homosexuality.
[3] of adultery.
[4] Ocellus Lucanus, *De universi natura* IV 1-2 (Harder p. 21 f.): **T** 32c.
[5] Ib. IV 4: **T** 32d. Cf. above, VI 3, p. 111 n. 3.
[6] Musonius fr. XII; Plot., *Enn.* III 5, 1. 50 ff. What is condemned as going against the natural laws is μῖξις not intended for procreation. Cf. *infra*, ch. X p. 237, with n. 3.

With regard to εὐεξία one should remember what we found in treating φιλία. The Pythagoreans spoke of a φιλία between soul and body and between the rational within us and the irrational. Bringing about this inner harmony which was also called a 'pacification' of the opposite forces within us was, they felt, the peculiar task of philosophy and of the intellect's proper function of contemplation[1]. In this sense one may say, as Delatte remarked with a fine insight in the Pythagorean view of life[2], that for them the θεωρία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ had the same meaning as the contemplation of the Forms had for Plato. Here, then, we have at the same time the close kinship and the immense difference between Plato and the Pythagoreans. We shall have to say something on this subject in the proper place.

One of the main commandments of Pythagorean moral doctrine, next to temperance and sobriety, was to speak the truth and to keep one's word, with which the precept to take few oaths[3] is connected. Diog. Laert. VIII 22 says simply:

"Do not swear by the gods; one should strive to be trustworthy (even without an oath)".

Porphyry mentions speaking the truth as the chief precept: "that is the only thing that can liken men to the gods"[4].

The line of measure and sobriety is drawn through to the religious rites; repeatedly we find the precept not to offer expensive sacrifices. Diodorus[5] adds that sacrificing ought to be done in clean and shining clothes, physically and mentally pure. Pythagoras' rejection of bloody sacrifices, known from Timaeus fr. 79[6], is connected with his vegetarianism. Its background doubtless is the motif of *respect for life:* we find this expressed in Diogenes Laert. VIII 23, in the precept not to harm any plant or animal that is harmless to man[7]. Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 186: to kill living beings is ἄνομον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, to kill a man is πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀθεμιτώτερον.

[1] Iambl. *V.P.* 69 and 229 (from Aristoxenus): καὶ καθόλου ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα λογικοῦ τε πρὸς τὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου διὰ φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῆς κατὰ ταύτην θεωρίας. **T** 12a.
[2] *Litt.*, p. 76 f.
[3] Diod. X 9.1 and 2; Iambl. *V.P.* 47; see also 144. **T** 33.
[4] Porph. *V.P.* 41: μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν· τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παραπλησίους.
[5] X 9, 6; cf. Porph. *V.P.* 36; Iambl. *V.P.* 54. **T** 34.
[6] = Censorinus, *De die natali* 2; also in Diog. Laert. VIII 13 and 22; Iambl. *V.P.* 25 and 35; cf. Macrob., *Sat.* III 6.
[7] The same in Iambl., *V.P.* 99, in the παραγγέλματα, spoken by the eldest after the evening meal. **T** 35.

Doubtless the precept simply to pray for the good, without further specification, is likewise early Pythagorean. We find it in Diodorus X 9, 7-8 and in Diog. Laert. VIII 9[1]. Diodorus mentions the Pythagorean statement that people of sense should pray for the good on behalf of the unwise, which reminds us of the anonymous poet's prayer quoted by Socrates in ps. Plato, *Alcib. Mai.*[2]:

> Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις
> ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν.

Delatte[3] detected a trace here of the Ἱερὸς λόγος, which, though not written by Pythagoras himself, was in his opinion composed in his immediate circle or one generation after him. The prayer of the *Alcib. Mai.* is Pythagorean according to a late author, Orion, *Anthol.* V 17. Cf. also *Anth. Palat.* X 108. There the lines have a slightly different form, which proves that the author does not quote the *Alcibiades.* This Pythagorean prayer in the *Alcib. Mai.* – which, though probably not written by Plato himself[4], doubtless originated in his school and is hardly later – indicates that the fourth century Academy possessed a collection of Pythagorean texts. So apparently did the Stoa; Chrysippus[5] quotes this Pythagorean line:

> Γνώσει δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντας.

These fragments allow us a glance at the ancient Pythagorean doctrine that one ought to submit to the divine will. This we find in Iambl., *V.P.* 145, who refers to Androcydes' treatise on the Pythagorean *symbola*[6]. He is probably identical with Androcydes, personal physician of Alexander the Great, who is mentioned in Pliny[7]. The fact that he is repeatedly mentioned together with Aristoxenus, Hippobotus and Neanthes, suggests that he was a Pythagorean, though not (as

[1] **T** 36.
[2] 143a.
[3] *Litt.* p. 24 ff.
[4] I regard E. de Strycker's arguments against the authenticity of this dialogue, in *Les Etudes Classiques* 1942, as still valid.
[5] In Gellius, *N.A.* VII 2,12. The line occurs in the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη, 54. According to Delatte it belongs to the Ἱερὸς λόγος.
[6] **T** 37a.
[7] Pliny, *N.H.* 58, says that Androcydes warned Alexander against excessive use of wine. According to Pliny XVII 240 he advised cabbage against the effects of wine.

Corssen rightly remarks) one of the strictest observers[1]. Iamblichus (l.c.) quotes him for the following story.

Thymaridas of Tarentum, a Pythagorean, once set out upon a journey. He was seen off by his friends. When he had boarded the ship they gave him their best wishes, one of them in this form: "May the gods grant you every desire, Thymaridas!". But Thymaridas rejected this with an indignant εὐφήμει and emended it to: "May I desire everything the gods grant".

Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 137[2]:

> All their decisions with regard to actions to be performed and to be avoided are directed towards agreement with the Divine: this is the first principle and their entire life is directed to following God[3]. The meaning of this philosophy is that man acts in a ridiculous fashion when seeking the good elsewhere than with the gods: just as if a man in a country ruled by a king were to honour one of the citizens as a governor neglecting the ruler of the country as a whole. This is how they think that people in fact behave.

Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 36[4] attributes to Pythagoras the exhortation: Ἕπου θεῷ, which is quoted elsewhere too, e.g. in Plutarch and Boethius. We cannot say with certainty whether Pythagoras said it in this form. But there is no doubt that the doctrine of divine providence and omnipotence belonged to the ancient Pythagorean tradition. Aristoxenus emphasized the need for a stern guidance in the following passage[5].

> (Iambl. *V.P.* 174) To think about the Divine being as existing and watching men and taking care of them – on their master's

[1] Androcydes, the author of a treatise on the Pythagorean *symbola* is mentioned in Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* VII 672, in Nicomachus, *Arithm.* p. 70 Ast, and in Iambl., apart from our passage, *Theol. arithm.* p. 40 Ast. Zeller III 2[4], p. 118 without further ado places the work among the *apocrypha* of the first cent. B.C. After him C. Holk maintained that the treatise was spurious in his Kiel dissertation *De acusmatis sive symbolis Pythagoricis*, 1894, p. 40 ff. P. Corssen's *Die Schrift des Arztes Androkydes* Περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων is important. He argues from the texts preserved in Pliny that Alexander's physician was a Pythagorean, albeit of somewhat free opinions, and that there is no reason to deny that he should have written a treatise on the Pythagorean *symbola*.
[2] = 86-87. **T** 37b.
[3] τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ.
[4] Wachsm. p. 49 line 16.
[5] Aristox. fr. 33 Wehrli (from the *Pyth. Apophth.*). **T** 38.

> authority the Pythagoreans held this to be a useful principle. For we need guidance of a kind that we dare not resist in any way; such in fact is the guidance of the Divine being. For if the Divine being is such, it is worthy of ruling the universe. For they rightly said that living beings are by nature insolent. They have a variety of impulses and desires and other emotions. Therefore they are in need of a supervising authority of a kind which engenders control and order.

We find here the same peculiar expression χρήσιμον εἶναι which also appeared in the exhortations of the first speech. It is certainly not to be thought that Pythagoras should have preached faith in God from mere utilitarian considerations. He certainly did see that man needs strict guidance; but he must have been equally convinced that such care and guidance by a Divine being did in fact exist. There are two sides to this matter: (1) divine omnipotence and goodness, (2) human inclination towards unruliness. From the latter derives the principle that ἀναρχία is the greatest evil for man (Iambl. *V.P.* 175[1]) and that it is the citizen's duty to support the law and to combat lawlessness[2], – from the former follows the gods' care for mankind.

Since Pythagoras believed in the omnipotence and goodness of the divine, faith in signs and miracles was for him and his followers a matter of course and a religious duty. "That is why they seriously study divination", Iambl. continues his exposition in *V.P.* 138; "for only divination interprets the gods' thoughts (with regard to mankind)"[3].

Pythagoras, then, feels it is man's primary duty to honour the gods. According to Iambl. *V.P.* 149, he himself did this 'by reverent silence' (εὐφημία). He called the gods and honoured them on all occasions: at meals he poured libations and he exhorted his followers to magnify 'the higher powers' with hymns (ὑμνεῖν τοὺς κρείττονας)[4].

The sequence gods – demons – heroes – parents, benefactors which we met at the beginning of the first speech (Iambl. *V.P.* 37) also occurs in Diog. Laert. VIII 23, Porph. *V.P.* 38 and in Iambl. *V.P.* 100[5]. Most probably it derives from ancient popular wisdom.

[1] = Stob., *Ecl.* IV 1, 49 (p. 15, 3 ff. Wachsm.); Aristox. fr. 35 W.; cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 183 and 203. **T**. 39.
[2] νόμῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀνομίᾳ πολεμεῖν. Aristoxenus apud Iambl., *V.P.* 100 and 223; cf. 176, Diog. Laert. VIII 23. **T** 39.
[3] **T** 40. [4] **T** 41.
[5] **T** 42. Cf. Plato, *Republic* III 392a, IV 427b and in particular *Laws* IV 713 ab. In Iambl. *V.P.* cf. also 144 and 175.

The precept that one should die in reverent silence doubtless belongs to the ancient Pythagorean tradition as well. In Plato it is found at the end of the *Phaedo*[1]. This is the place to recall Socrates' last commission for Crito: "Do not forget to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius". What meaning could these words have other than that to Socrates death was a kind of cure, viz. the entrance into a life that was somehow more natural and healthy? Modern scholars, it is true, have in a somewhat authoritarian manner tried to exonerate Socrates from having conceived this, according to them, silly thought[2]. But it is entirely consistent with the tenor of Socrates' thoughts in the *Phaedo* where the body is felt to be a hindrance for the soul and where a philosopher's life is called an exercise in dying[3]. These thoughts are undoubtedly connected with Orphic-Pythagorean ideas about life after death.

In this context the beginning of Iambl., *V.P.* 257 is interesting. "Pythagoras also prescribed the avoidance of speaking evil about anything or anyone at the last moment of our lives, but favoured just as at the beginning of a sea voyage eliciting a good omen by means of pious words or reverent silence[4], as one did before crossing the Adriatic sea"[5].

For a complete picture of Pythagorean education, we should reread Iamblichus' chapters on the Pythagorean day. The description occurs in *V.P.* 96-100 and is introduced as a definite sequence of ἐπιτηδεύματα prescribed by Pythagoras for those who lived under his guidance: οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὁδηγούμενοι, viz. the members of the School[6]. This introduction may be due to Iamblichus himself, while the description of the ἐπιτηδεύματα is probably of Aristoxenus. Yet it is quite possible that the essential of the account goes back to Pythagoras' own institution. I paraphrase the contents of these chapters.

> They started the day with a morning walk, alone and to a quiet spot, preferably with a sanctuary or a sacred grove. For they thought that one should not go amongst people before inward preparation.
>
> After the morning walk there was a meeting in a temple or a

[1] 117e.
[2] E.g. Wilamowitz, *Platon* II, pp. 57 f.: "Das Leben ist keine Krankheit, und Asklepios heilt kein Übel der Seele". Similarly R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo*, Cambridge 1955, p. 190.
[3] *Phaed.* 64a-68c; 80e-81a. [4] μετὰ τῆς εὐφημίας.
[5] **T** 43. [6] **T** 44.

hall suitable for such gatherings[1]. Apparently some teaching was done here – a kind of sermon, one might say, since a temple was chosen by preference and the teaching was not purely theoretical but had a moral intent as well: Iamblichus speaks of 'teaching and learning and improving character'[2].

After that came sports: running, wrestling, discus throwing, boxing – whichever was a suitable exercise for each person's physical constitution. Then followed a light meal – breakfast (ἄριστον) – consisting of bread and honey or honey in the comb; no wine was used during the day[3].

The hours after breakfast were used for matters of state and government[4], problems of foreign politics and relations with foreigners. All that had to be taken care of in the afternoon.

In the evening they took another walk, not alone this time, but in groups of two or three, speaking about serious matters. It was called an exercise in καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα[5].

After the evening walk they took a bath and then assembled for the communal meal. Libations and offerings of perfume or incense opened the ceremonial session. The meal itself had to end before sunset. Here one used wine, barley and wheat bread, something corresponding to the word ὄψον (which was rarely fish, as we know from other sources, possibly figs or olives) and lettuce, boiled or raw. Meat of sacrificial animals is mentioned here likewise, although we know that Pythagoras himself objected to bloody sacrifices and lived as a vegetarian, or at least rarely used the meat of sacrifices[6].

[1] In the earliest generation of Pythagoreans the morning meetings took place in the large hall built by themselves for this purpose. It was called the ὁμακοεῖον (Iambl. *V.P.* 30). We hear about it, for instance, in the remarkable story of Lysis and Euryphamus (Iambl., *V.P.* 185).

[2] Πρός τε διδασκαλίας καὶ μαθήσεις καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν.

[3] μεθ'ἡμέραν. Also in Diog. Laert. VIII 19. Cf. above, p. 177 n. 7. Obviously it does not mean 'after day-time', i.e. in the evening. For at dinner they did have some wine, as will be seen in the next chapter. But since ἡμέρα was often used for the *beginning* of the day or daybreak, the Greek could use the expression as it is found here. In Classical authors it is sometimes used as the opposite of νυκτός (e.g. Hdt. II 150) or of νύκτωρ (e.g. Demosth. 24, 113).

[4] Περὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς οἰκονομίας κατεγίνοντο.

[5] ἀναμιμνησκομένους τὰ μαθήματα καὶ ἐγγυμναζομένους τοῖς καλοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι.

[6] Porph., *V.P.* 34: σπανίως δὲ κρέας ἱερείων θυσίμων καὶ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐκ παντὸς μέρους. Aristoxenus gives a rationalistic interpretation (fr. 7 W.) when saying that Pythagoras allowed all ἔμψυχα to be eaten, except a plough-ox and a ram.

> After the meal, another libation took place, followed by a reading. It was the custom that the youngest member recited and that the oldest member gave directions as to what was to be read and in what manner. Before departure, more wine was poured for libation, after which the oldest member pronounced 'exhortations'[1]: do not damage or destroy cultivated plants that bear fruit; think with reverence of gods, demons and heroes, of parents and benefactors; support the laws, oppose lawlessness.
>
> When this had been said, they all went home. –

Iamblichus adds some remarks on the clothing customarily worn by the Pythagoreans. This was white, as were their bedclothes. Linen sheets and bedcovers were preferred to the (sheep) skins often used by the ancient Greeks[2]. Hunting was forbidden.

'Such advice', Iamblichus says in conclusion, 'was given daily to these men as (spiritual) nurture, in order to give their lives an upward direction'[3].

Modern authors are accustomed to speak of the Pythagorean Brotherhood as a kind of religious Order, thus creating the impression that the members, at any rate in Croton, lived together in something like a monastery. This impression is incorrect. The following are the points that may be retained from our text:

(1) Pythagoras did give a 'rule' to the members of his Society;

(2) According to this rule, the day's business was regulated in a fixed order including a gathering in the morning and a communal meal in the evening. But they did not live together. Doubtless that was impractical because of the large number of Society members.

In our passage Iamblichus does not speak of the daily examination of one's conscience known from the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη. Porphyry[4] however, has this to say:

> "He strongly advised them to give particular care to two important moments[5] of the day: the moment before retiring, and the moment of rising. For it was fitting at each of these

[1] παρήγγελλε.

[2] Diogenes Laertius VII 19, likewise mentions the white, clean clothes and the white στρώματα. But he adds: "of wool, for linen had not yet reached those parts". This sounds like an emendation of Aristoxenus. Apparently Diogenes' source (Timaeus) differs from a tradition current at that time.

[3] εἴς τε τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου ἀναγωγήν.

[4] *V.P.* 40; **T** 45.

[5] δύο καιρούς.

moments to enquire what had been done and what lay ahead of them, giving themselves an account of the past and meditating on the future. Before retiring they were each for himself to recite these lines:

"Do not admit sleep to thy soft eyes
before thrice enquiring into the works of the day:
Wherein have I transgressed? What have I accomplished?
What duty was neglected by me?"[1]

And before rising they were to recite the following lines:

"Having woken from sweet sleep thou shalt first
review all works to be accomplished during the day."

The lines themselves may be of later date, but it is by no means improbable that the self-assessment before retiring and the individual meditation in the morning derive from a precept of the Master. The morning sermon in communal session, the exercising, the administrative activities in the afternoon, the evening walk in small groups and the common meal to conclude the day may well be of old standing. The 'spiritual reading' and the 'commandments' at the end are curious. Festugière has called this reading 'le trait le plus monastique de la journée pythagoricienne', though certainly not a primitive trait. We should remember however that selections from Homer and Hesiod traditionally belonged to Pythagorean education. When did the ancient Greeks start to read? Was it perhaps towards the end of the sixth century? In the Pythagorean circle all this most probably started with a short recitation.

In the previous pages we have not touched on Pythagoras' methods of selection in admitting aspiring members to the Society. This is not to say that the selection had no pedagogical meaning. For the methods were based on the same principles that appeared in the pages above: reverence for older people, control of emotions and desires, trustworthiness were characteristics for which 'postulants' were tested severely[2]. Iamblichus adds the requirements of true thirst for learning and contempt of glory. The heavy test of a five year period of silence, imposed after the first three probationary years and after which one

[1] The three questions are reported in Diog. Laert. VIII 22.
[2] Iambl., *V.P.* 71 f.; **T** 46.

was finally admitted to the circle of disciples in the narrower sense (ἐσωτερικοί), is well known. My intention is to concentrate on 'neglected' evidence.

A question poses itself with regard to the daily programme. Did *all* members of the Society take part in the business of government? I shall discuss this question in the next section.

5. In how far were the ancient Pythagoreans active in politics? – The character of the Crotonian Confederation

We read in the programme of activities that the hours after breakfast were set aside for the business of government[1]. Are we to suppose that *all* members of the S.P. as such took part in this work? This does not seem to have been the case. We read in Iamblichus[2] that during the five year period of silence, the candidate's personal possessions were transferred to the community: "They were given to the members appointed for this purpose[3] who were called πολιτικοί. They also acted as 'managers and legislators'[4]. From this text one may conclude that not all members were πολιτικοί.

In Diog. Laert. VIII 3, we read that Pythagoras after his arrival at Croton legislated for the population[5] and, with his pupils, came to be regarded very highly: "being nearly three hundred in number, they governed the state excellently, so that its constitution was in effect a true aristocracy".

This text suggests that the Society in total consisted of almost three hundred men who actually ruled the state.

Justin[6] who uses the same source as Diogenes speaks of a *sodalicium* of 300 young men who formed a secret society bound by an oath and lived apart from the other citizens. These 'drew the state to themselves' [civitatem in se converterunt], which then wanted to burn them when they had gathered in one house.

This refers to the situation at about the middle of the fourth century and the catastrophe that took place at that time. Iamblichus speaks of it *V.P.* 254, mentioning Apollonius of Tyana as his source. Here it is said likewise that at a certain moment young men took over the government and formed a large political club (ἑταιρεία): there were

[1] πολιτικαὶ οἰκονομίαι (Iambl. *V.P.* 97); **T** 44.
[2] *V.P.* 72; **T** 47a.
[3] γνώριμοι, 'comrades', if one wishes.
[4] καὶ οἰκονομικοί τινες καὶ νομοθετικοὶ ὄντες.
[5] τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις; **T** 47b.
[6] XX 4, 14. **T** 47c.

'more than 300'[1]. They were only a small section of the citizenry and lived apart with customs and occupations different from those of the large majority of citizens.

It should therefore not be supposed that the same situation obtained in the days of Pythagoras. We know that in that period the Crotonian Council comprised 1000 members. Doubtless Pythagoras exercised strong influence on the political decisions of this Council during the conflict with Sybaris, but this is not to say that the entire Council consisted of Pythagoreans. Iamblichus' account in the chapters 254 ff. in which various threads are tangled (as Von Fritz has demonstrated)[2] contradicts this opinion in at least one place. In Ch. 257, it appears that there are opposing parties in the Council, opponents of the Pythagoreans who speak in favour of democratic institutions, and Pythagoreans who defend the πάτριος πολιτεία. As to the total number of members of the Society, according to different sources, this was at least 600[3].

From this evidence, we should, I think, conclude as follows.

1. The situation of the Pythagorean Society with respect to political activities was not always the same. In the days of Pythagoras himself it differed from the situation that seems to have existed towards the middle of the fourth century.

2. During the sixth and at the beginning of the fifth century there was no 'Pythagorean Rule' in the sense of a government directly administered by the Society as such, but it is true that the Pythagoreans indirectly exercised great influence because members of the Society acted in the bodies of government, both in Croton and elsewhere. They also acted as legislators when invited to do so.

3. The incidents of the middle of the fourth century indicate a new development. A certain section of the S.P., called the 'Three Hundred' having formed a political club, takes over the administration of Croton, a situation which leads to a catastrophe.

4. Later on the original form of political involvement of the Pythagoreans is again in evidence, e.g. in the person of Archytas of Tarentum.

The S.P. obviously had its centre in Croton. But that the Crotonian Confederation should ever have been a unified state governed from Croton by a Pythagorean government is more than either the literary or the archaeological evidence can prove. It is improbable on the

[1] **T** 47d. [2] *Pythag. Politics*, p. 56 ff.
[3] Diog. Laert. VII 15; cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 29 ff. **T** 48.

ground of the distance separating the several places where the so called alliance coins were found, as we argued in a previous chapter.

Von Fritz' interpretation in this respect is by and large correct. He tried to construe a coherent explanation of the entire history of ancient Pythagoreanism: "Ancient tradition does not provide the slightest evidence for the existence of anything like a real rule of the Pythagoreans in any of the cities of Southern Italy at any time"[1]. This is saying too much. There are texts which speak of such a rule in so many words and of historical incidents in consequence.

Von Fritz has tried to defend his thesis by arguing that the Three Hundred were not the Society as such, but merely a political club within the Society[2]. However, it can hardly be denied that this section of the S.P. acted *as Pythagoreans*, and that according to the descriptions which derive from Timaeus it was the very fact of organised political activity opposed to a rising democracy, that provoked strong resistance.

One will have to admit that apparently there was a period of a certain 'Pythagorean Rule', a direct administration by the political section of the S.P. at Croton.

The notion that these texts should be evidence for a Crotonian Empire under Pythagorean leadership existing in those days is incorrect, if only because there is no evidence that such an empire ever existed at all.

[1] *Pythag. Politics*, p. 95. [2] Ib., Appendix C.

CHAPTER VIII

PYTHAGORAS AND PLATO

1. Similarities and differences

The close relationship between Plato and the Pythagoreans has – entirely apart from the enquiry in the previous pages – long been clear. The following points of contact might be mentioned.

(1) The doctrine of the soul and the hereafter (*Apology, Crito* and *Phaedo;* eschatological myths of the *Gorgias* and *Republic* X).
(2) The arrangement of soul and cosmos in the *Timaeus*.
(3) The microcosm-macrocosm idea in *Phaedrus* 270c.
(4) The τάξις principle in *Gorgias* 506 d, the principle of geometrical identity (in *Gorgias* 508 a and in the *Republic*); the double μετρητική in the *Politicus* (284e-285c). Cf., too, the definition of health in Gorg. 504b[1].
(5) Number, the beginning of all philosophy, can be known through contemplation of the heavens (*Timaeus* 47a-c).
(6) Πέρας and ἄπειρον as first principles in the *Philebus* (24a-25b).
(7) The identification of Ἕν and Ἀγαθόν in the ἄγραφα (Aristoxenus, *Harm.* II, p. 30 Meib.).

A few words by way of explanation:

(1) It is no longer necessary to show that the eschatological myths in the *Phaedo*, the *Gorgias* and *Republic* X[2] have an Orphic-Pythagorean background. The doctrines of the immortality of the soul, of the rewards and punishments after death, and of a periodic reincarnation originate there. Certain details, such as the description of the spindle of Ananke in the myth of Er[3], show distinct Pythagorean traits. But

[1] Below, Ch. X, at the end.
[2] *Phaedo* 107d, 113d-114c; *Gorgias* 523a-526d; *Republic* X 614b-621b.
[3] *Republic* X 616c4-617d. Here we find the picture of a Siren sitting on each of the heavenly spheres and intoning one musical note.

these images are not only present in the myths. They form now and again a visible background in the *Apology* and in the *Crito;* the *Phaedo* is full of them. Later, in the tenth book of the Laws, Plato is highly critical of certain popular excesses in purification and initiation practices, but the foundation of his faith in the soul's immortality and in Divine Providence is unshaken. This is far from being a new theme in his late work; on the contrary, the conviction that is found in the Socratic dialogues is still present. Plato has always regarded these notions as supremely important in human life.

(2) The second point likewise needs little argumentation after the work of Taylor, Cornford and Guthrie. That the World-Soul is divided according to harmonic intervals[1] brings us back to Pythagorean theory. That the circles of the planets are fitted into the framework of the circles of the Same and the Different, which are the World-Soul's elements, is doubtless Plato's adaptation. But again, that the planets are the heavenly clock, the movements of which are the measure of time, was a Pythagorean theory. In the description of the circles of the planets we find once more the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 1, 3, 9, 27 used to denote the intervals between the seven unequal rings[2]: the same proportions that were used in the division of the World-Soul. Guthrie[3] was able to cite this passage by way of illustration of how the Pythagoreans 'ordered' the universe according to numbers.

(3) In *Phaedrus* 270c, we find the notion that one cannot think properly about the soul without thinking about the nature of the Universe; Socrates is the spokesman. Phaedrus adds that according to Hippocrates one cannot think about the body either without knowledge of the nature of the Universe. This microcosm-macrocosm idea in fact occurs repeatedly in the Hippocratic writings. Of these the first treatise that must be considered is Περὶ ἑβδομάδων, partly because in its introduction a clear parallel is drawn between nature and man, and partly because the formula Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος directly points at Π.ἑβδ. 12[4]. One may find here indirectly or implicitly the influence of Pythagorean thought which was permeated with the microcosm-macrocosm notion. Π.ἑβδ. has been regarded as a Pytha-

[1] *Timaeus* 35b-36b.
[2] 36d: "The double and triple intervals".
[3] *History* I, p. 214.
[4] The Arabic translation of Galen's commentary on Π. ἑβδ. 12, contains according to Roscher's edition, p. 17, the following sentence: "Wie beschaffen diese Dinge sind, lehrt die natürliche Vernunft, welche alles, was der Natur gemäss ist, umfasst".

gorean treatise, as we have seen[1], and although Roscher has, on good grounds, defended an early date, there remains on important points a close parallel between the images of the treatise and ancient Pythagorean notions. The importance of the number 7 is one, the very microcosm-macrocosm notion another. The Hippocratic treatises that contain this notion have, no doubt, been influenced not only by the introduction of Π.ἑβδ. – taking for granted that this part of the treatise dates back to the middle of the 6th century – but by Pythagorean theories as well. Socrates certainly finds himself in a Pythagorean climate of thought when he voices this notion in *Phaedrus* 270c.

(4) In the *Gorgias* (506d) virtue is derived from τάξις or κόσμος. An 'orderly life' is given the epithet σώφρων; 'the desires must not be without curb'. For a man who tries to satisfy his desires without restraint cannot be loved either by man or by the Divine: he is asocial, and where κοινωνία is lacking, φιλία cannot exist. "And the wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, and gods and men are kept together by κοινωνία and φιλία, by orderliness, self-restraint and justice; and, my friend, this is why they call the Universe *cosmos*, not lack of order and restraint. But it seems to me that you don't pay any heed to these things though you are a clever man, and that it has escaped your notice that geometrical equality has great power both with the Gods and with men. Yet you are of the opinion that one ought systematically to try and gain more than the others. The reason is that you don't pay attention to geometry".

It is clear that the Wise men referred to are the Pythagoreans. Their cosmic and universal thought is used by Socrates-Plato as the very basis of the doctrine of man's social existence just as they had always done themselves. Human virtue must be an imitation of cosmic harmony; the principle of order implies restraint of desires and therefore unity, justice, inward peace and happiness. Thus the Pythagorean ethic inspires Plato's social ethic; we find its elaboration in the *Republic* finally confirmed in the *Laws*.

The principle of geometric equality, which not only occurs in this place in the *Gorgias* but is a leading principle in the *Republic* where democracy is branded as the greatest injustice since it wishes to apply an *arithmetic* equality[2], may be found in Archytas, fr. 2.

(5) In the *Phaedo*, Plato recommends a prompt and radical turning

[1] Above, p. 170 ff.

[2] *Republic* VIII 558c: Democracy is a ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα.

away from visible things in order to see the things invisible by means of 'the soul in itself'. With the simile of the cave in the *Republic*, he says that education is to cause man to make a full turn, body and soul, from the shadows to true Reality[1], and he advises a ten year training in the mathematical sciences to accustom 'the soul' (as it is called) to the light, viz. to abstract thought. In astronomy, for example, he was not concerned with an empirical contemplation of the stars; he was concerned with the intelligible laws that determine their course. Therefore he warns us not to stop at 'seeing', as the Pythagoreans were in his view too much inclined to do, but to rise, here too, from the visible to the invisible. The attentive reader of the Platonic dialogues is therefore somewhat surprised to find, in *Timaeus* 47a, an eulogy of the sense of vision.

> "Sight, then, in my judgment is the cause of the highest benefits to us in that no word of our present discourse about the universe could ever have been spoken, had we never seen stars, Sun and sky. But as it is, the sight of day and night, of months and revolving years, of equinox and solstice, has caused the invention of number and bestowed on us the notion of time and the study of the nature of the world; whence we have derived all philosophy, than which no greater boon has ever come or shall come to mortal man as a gift from heaven."

Thus, eyesight is for man the cause of the greatest benefit. This, too, is Plato. He continues:

> "Let us speak of eyesight as the cause of the greatest benefit, for these ends: the god invented and gave us vision in order that we might observe the circuits of intelligence in heaven and profit by them for the revolutions of our own thought, which are akin to them, though ours be troubled and they are unperturbed; and that, by learning to know them and acquiring the power to compute them rightly according to nature, we might reproduce the perfectly unerring revolutions of the god and reduce to settled order the wandering motions in ourselves." (Transl. Cornford)

It is Plato who calls us to imitate in thought and life the regularity of the heavenly motions, but it is Pythagorean wisdom.

[1] *Republic* VII 518b-d.

(6) In the *Philebus*, we find the principles πέρας and ἄπειρον, the dominating opposites of the ancient Pythagorean συστοιχία[1]. Originally neither unity-plurality nor even-odd – πέρας and ἄπειρον were the *ultima principia*. How large a part they played in the philosophy of Plato's later years is hardly to be guessed at from the few relevant pages in the *Philebus*. But we possess Hermodorus' description in Simplicius[2] and a parallel passage in Sextus Empiricus[3]. They provide us with a clear picture of the importance of this doctrine[4]. One may also compare Aristotle, *Metaph.* A 6, 987b 18 ff.

(7) From a few passages in Aristotle and a very clear passage in Aristoxenus[5] we also know that in his late years Plato identified the determining principle, that he called The One, with The Good, the ultimate principle of the *Republic*[6].

One might perhaps be inclined to add the entire program of mathematical studies for philosophers-to-be in the *Republic*. For were not these four mathematical disciplines – arithmetic, geometry, musicology and astronomy – of Pythagorean origin? No doubt they were studied in Pythagoras' school and, what is more, had they not been introduced by him, as they were by Plato, for a 'cathartic' effect? Were not mathematics studied in the school of Pythagoras as a kind of cleansing of the soul and a contact with a higher, a divine reality?

It is true that these matters were studied in Pythagoras' school, but a sharp distinction is to be made, for here we are faced with the fundamental difference between Pythagoras and Plato. To Pythagoras number was the principle of a divine order in the Universe. The study of number and its laws therefore was the immediate contemplation of the divine Law by which everything is held together and to which the objects of nature owe their being and their essence, and to which man in his thought and life is likewise subjected. Basically, then, this study occupies itself with *sacred secrets*. It is therefore a kind of *initiation*, to which only those may be admitted who have been inwardly prepared. Hence the command of secrecy which it was a serious offense to transgress.

[1] Aristotle, *Metaph.* A 5, 986a 15-29.
[2] Simplicius, *Phys.* 247 30-248 15 (see my *Greek Phil.* I, nr. 371a).
[3] Sextus Empiricus, *M.* X (= *Against the physicists* II) 248-282 (*in Greek Phil.* I, nr. 371b).
[4] Cf. my *Problems concerning later Platonism*, in Mnemosyne 1949, pp. 197-216; 299-318.
[5] These passages may be found in my *Greek Phil.* I nr. 364.
[6] VI 509b.

In other words, to Pythagoras the study of mathematics was not a *preparation* for the contemplation of a divine Reality, *it was the contemplation itself*. It *presupposed* rather than effected a cleansing of the soul. The contemplation of divine Law, which was the content of the study of mathematics, was a direct contact with a divine Reality: Divinity immanent in the cosmos.

It was different for Plato. He adopts the Pythagorean notion that number is the principle of order in the cosmos and in life, but number as such to him is not yet a θεῖον. It points at a purely intelligible Number which is a 'Form' (εἶδος) – no immanent principle of order within the objects, but a transcendent Example. – This is the basic difference between the Pythagorean doctrine of number and Plato's Theory of Forms. Plato's philosophy is a metaphysic of the transcendent, the Pythagorean philosophy is a metaphysic of immanent order.

In Plato, therefore, the mathematical program of studies has a function different from that of Pythagoras. In Plato it is not contact with divine Reality itself; it is a preparation, a training of the mind, an exercise in abstract thought which by the very act of turning away from that which is visible prepares the mind for the contemplation of the Transcendent which is in reality the θεῖον.

I doubt whether Plato's rejection of the empirical method in astronomy as found in *Republic* VII[1] is directed against the Pythagoreans, as is held by some modern scholars. More probably Plato had the atomists in mind, Anaxagoras, Democritus etc.[2]. If in fact Plato was thinking of the Pythagoreans, this passage would be a striking illustration of the distance between them in the very field of common interest. But the Pythagoreans were no materialists and though they hardly distinguished the mathematical principles from the objects, doubtless there were others who studied astronomy in a more materialistic spirit.

So much for the well known points of agreement and more or less clear influence on Plato. As a result of the preceding discussion we have to add something that has not so far been noticed. It is no less than the fact that *Pythagoras appeared to be Plato's example in an essential and classical element of his philosophy*, viz. *the basic thought*

[1] 528e-529c.
[2] That Plato in this passage was thinking of the sophist Hippias, as Adam suggested in his Commentary on the *Republic*, seems to me an unfounded assumption.

that the divine order manifesting itself in the cosmos likewise establishes the standard for Man and the social order; from which he concludes that the philosopher who has an insight into this order has been called to lead human society. In Plato's view a school of philosophers fulfilling its natural function would educate politicians. This is what he wished to realize in his *Republic* and later in his *Laws*. His Academy was in fact a place where lawgivers were schooled. But this was not a new concept: something which has seemed for a long time to be Plato's proprium was in fact long before him the *proprium* of Pythagoras.

Because of the German Dicaearchus-myth, scholars have been insufficiently aware of this. Now that this myth has been refuted however, the reality of the social and political Pythagoras will have to be recognized. Nor was he a political Pythagoras who quite apart from his philosophy (supposing he had a philosophy) also took part in politics, but a *philosopher* Pythagoras whose thought because of a *metaphysical insight* included social order. Having recognized this one will have to accept that Plato followed Pythagoras in the essential tendency of his philosophy, viz. that there is no salvation for mankind unless the philosophers become kings or the kings become philosophers.

On this essential point, where there is a bond between the two philosophers, their difference likewise manifests itself immediately: both find the divine order *in a certain sense* present in the cosmos, both find its foundation in number, and therefore it may be called intelligible; but in Plato the cosmic order points beyond itself to a transcendent Reality which is 'behind' or 'above' it. For Pythagoras reality was immediately present in the mathematical number.

Nor should one be misled by the fact that Plato in the *Laws* gives as proofs of the existence of the Divine (1) the fact that the soul is superior to all bodily objects and as cause of motion is cause of the process of coming-into-being, and (2) the fact that the orderly element in the courses of the heavenly bodies presupposes a Noûs[1].

Scholars have wanted to deduce from this that Plato in his old age gave up the Theory of Transcendent Forms and replaced it by a doctrine of souls that are gods[2]. This is a misapprehension. People who believe this have not understood that Plato's metaphysic of the Transcendent is hierarchical in structure: *above* the *Ideas* stands as an ultimate ground the Good, later (as we have seen) called the One,

[1] *Laws* XII 966d-967a.

[2] Thus first Lutoslawsky in 1897. He has found several followers in recent years.

and *below* the Ideas – akin to them, but not on the same level – we find the soul. The soul is able to live on a higher and on a lower level. It may be closely bound up with the body even to the extent that it can no longer view the pure νοητά; but it can also place itself at a distance from the body and seek that which is above and to which it is more akin by nature. The soul which manages to rise this high is called divine, even 'god' by Plato: only through philosophy, he says, will the soul 'come to the race of gods'[1]. The same is found in the myth in the *Phaedrus*, where the perfect souls are gods. It is far from true that this doctrine appears only in the older Plato. The notion that it has replaced the doctrine of transcendent Ideas is the strange error of those moderns who themselves do not know what to do with a transcendental Order of three levels. By assigning an early date to the *Timaeus* which contains too obvious a treatment of the Theory of Ideas to be denied, they seek to give this dialogue a place immediately after the *Republic*. But in *Laws* XII 965 bc it appears that those who have supervision in the state as depicted in The *Laws* must be able "to look away from the many and unequal to the one Idea". Is this passage in the late works of Plato to that extent isolated? Passing over the *Timaeus*, what are we to think of a passage such as *Philebus* 59 a-c, where the opposition of 'eternal Being' and the world of constant change and coming -to-be is again present, as much as e.g. in *Republic* V 479a-480, and *Timaeus* 27 d 5-28a?

Finally, those who think that in the *Laws* the doctrine of a transcendent and intelligible world has disappeared have not realized that this great work was written not, as the *Republic*, for the education of philosophers, but for leading and educating the great mass of men. It is for them that Plato, in order to show the way to the Transcendent, points out that the soul is of a higher order than all corporeal being, and that the regular arrangement of heavenly motions presupposes an ordering Mind. His own convictions concerning a transcendent Order have not been radically changed, far from it; but for the non-philosophers whom he addresses, this is the nearest approach to the θεῖον[2].

[1] *Phaedo* 82 b 10: Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι.

[2] This was very well understood and explained by A. Diès in his introduction to the Budé edition of the *Laws*, p. XC ff.: *Le palier moyen*. Cf. also H. Görgemanns, *Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi*, München 1960 (*Zetemata* 25). The author takes the view that the *Laws* were a more or less popular work written for a wider circle.

But all this is more or less a parenthesis aiming at a clear stand over and against an incorrect modern interpretation which seems to lose sight of the fact that Plato's philosophy was, and remained to the end, a metaphysic of the transcendent. In Pythagoras himself one might say that the problem of transcendence versus immanence was hardly raised, if at all. Up to a point this is so, but only up to a point. It must be said that in his search for the final ground of being he has stopped too soon. The mathematical number as such already was the θεῖον. And even after many centuries one finds this inclination towards an immanent metaphysic in 'Neo'-pythagorean texts. We are then in a period when the *ultima principia* of the older Plato have long been fused with the ancient Pythagorean πέρας and ἄπειρον. Yet the Pythagorean retains the characteristic of immediate identification of mathematical number with the divine. From this climate of thought – which was never Plato's, not even in his late years – arise such titles as Θεολογούμενα ἀριθμητικῆς and Ὕμνος εἰς ἀριθμόν, the identification of certain numbers with certain Olympic Gods[1], and lines of verse in which number is addressed as Supreme God, Father of gods and men[2]. The Neoplatonic commentators, such as Proclus, Simplicius and Syrian hasten to explain that 'the eidetic number' is meant[3], but the strange thing is that nowhere in the

[1] There is a passage in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, p. 21 (Wachsmuth), which says that Pythagoras when comparing the numbers with the Gods called the *One* Apollo, the *Two* Artemis, the *Six* Gamos and Aphrodite, the *Seven* Kairos and Athena, *Eight* Poseidon and *Ten* Panteleia. Delatte, *Litt. pyth.* p. 196, has ascribed this passage to Moderatus, the two preceding passages being fragments of Moderatus as well (fr. 1 and 2 in Mullach II p. 48). The author's name is mentioned with the first of the three passages only, but quite probably the other two quotations are his too. Wachsmuth and Diels (*Doxogr.* p. 96) ascribed the last passage to Plutarch, and in fact Plutarch makes a similar remark in *De Iside et Osiride* 10 (p. 354 F): Δοκῶ δ'ἔγωγε καὶ τὸ τὴν μονάδα τοὺς ἄνδρας ὀνομάζειν Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ τὴν δυάδα Ἄρτεμιν, Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ τὴν ἑβδομάδα, Ποσειδῶνα δὲ τὸν πρῶτον κύβον, ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἱδρυμένοις, καὶ δρωμένοις νὴ Διὰ καὶ γραφομένοις. Since however, the doctrine of [Pythagoras] in Stobaeus is given a fuller expression and Plutarch's use of words is not precisely parallel, Delatte is probably right. Moderatus and Plutarch may have known the same neopythagorean source, which the first used somewhat more fully, the latter in more abbreviated form.

[2] Thus 'Orpheus'' line on the number *Six*, quoted in Lydus, *De mensibus* II 11:

ἴλαθι, κύδιμ' ἀριθμέ, πάτερ μακάρων, πάτερ ἀνδρῶν.

And the line in Simplicius, *Phys.* III p. 453, 12:

κέκλυθι, κύδιμ' ἀριθμέ, πάτερ μακάρων, πάτερ ἀνδρῶν.

[3] "The divine number arises from the Monad", Syrian and Proclus quote from a neo-pythagorean source. Proclus, *In Remp.* II p. 169 Kr., asserts in this

Pythagorean texts is this distinction made between the transcendent number as example and mathematical number. The immanence of 'divine number' is repeatedly alluded to or described in clear terms. For instance, against Valentinus' gnosis which teaches that the world was not created by the highest God but by a lower Demiurg who has no contact with purely spiritual Beings, Hippolytus appeals to a Πυθαγόρειος λόγος which says that ὁ μέγας γεωμέτρης καὶ ἀριθμητὴς Ἥλιος is the creator of all that has come into being, and that He "*has been fixed in the entire cosmos*, just as the soul in the body, as Plato says"[1].

We also have from Lydus, *De mensibus*, the information that [Pythagoras] called the Monad 'Hyperionides' as an intelligible Sun[2]. The (visible) Sun is called (in good Platonic fashion) its εἰκών, a term which as every reader of Plato knows, indicates both real likeness and an ontologically lower rank. In this instance the Neo-pythagoreans seem to have been well able to retain the transcendence.

But Justinus, *De monarchia* 2, quotes the following passage of 'Pythagoras':

εἴ τις ἐρεῖ. "θεός εἰμι", παρὲξ ἑνός, οὗτος ὀφείλει
κόσμον ἴσον τούτῳ στήσας εἰπεῖν "ἐμὸς οὗτος".

"If someone, apart from one (who really is), says 'I am God', he ought to put before us a world equal to this one and say 'This is mine'. Nor ought he merely to put it before us saying 'This is mine', but he should himself inhabit the world he has made. For this world (the one existing now) has been made by Him (who is God)"[3].

A curious passage, which shows us, even in this late period that

context that 'the cosmos is the Ten', which number 'has simplified all εἴδη contained in the Monad and determines cosmic plurality'. One might think that here the 'immanence' of the divine number is taught, but Syrian, in *Metaph.* p. 915b, assures us that those 'divine men' when speaking of the Ten, of course meant *the eidetic* number, which is a '*cosmic paradeigma*' and fixes a limit to everything...

[1] Hippolytus, *Adv. haer.* VI 2.28: δημιουργὸν δὲ εἶναι τῶν γενομένων πάντων φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος λόγος τὸν μέγαν γεωμέτρην καὶ ἀριθμητὴν Ἥλιον καὶ ἐστηρίχθαι τοῦτον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ e.q.s.

[2] Lydus, *De mensibus* II 6: Πυθαγόρας τὴν μονάδα Ὑπεριονίδα καλεῖ διὰ τὸ πάντων ὑπερεῖναι τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νοητὸς Ἥλιος ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα ἔχων τὸ εἶναι Ὑπεριονίδης κέκληται. ἀναφέρεται δὲ ἥλιος εἰς μονάδα ὡς εἰκὼν ἐκείνης, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν μονάς. The patronymic Hyperionides (for Helios) appears in *Odyssey* XII 176.

[3] Cf. also ps.-Justinus, *Cohort.* 19: αὐτὸς δὲ οὐχ, ὥς τινες ὑπονοοῦσιν, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσιος ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτᾷ, ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ.

Pythagoreanism, as distinct from Platonism, has never thought of the highest divine being as exclusively transcendent, but always in the fullest sense as inhabiting the world.

2. Plato's doctrine of Ideal Numbers and of ultimate principles

Plato had, in his later years, identified the Ideas with numbers, as Aristotle repeatedly says or indicates[1]. Elsewhere I have discussed at some length what exactly was the meaning of this identification[2]. Two points must be kept in mind:

(1) The 'numbers' with which the Ideas are identified were no mathematical numbers, but rather their archetypes which were thought to exist in the realm of transcendence. Their distinction from mathematical number was made clear: the latter was, as appears from the 'division of the line' in *Republic* VI[3] a semi- νοητόν, the Ideal number, on the contrary, was pure νοητόν.

(2) The identification is probably to be interpreted in this sense that the Ideas, which were infinite in number, were 'reduced to'[4] or subsumed under the ten ideal numbers.

The Ideal numbers were not the ultimate principles in Plato's thought of the later years: they presupposed, as was very well seen by Ross[5], a final determining and a final undetermined principle. Plato called the former "Εν and the latter ἄπειρον or the 'undetermined dyad' (ἀόριστος δυάς). He also used for the undetermined principle the term 'the Great-and-Small'. What precisely was meant by this curious term becomes clear from the passage of Hermodorus in Simplicius cited above[6]: Plato thinks of the ἄπειρον in which there is no determining factor as continually oscillating between two extremes, great and small, long and short, narrow and wide, etc. It never stops (it is ἄστατον), but moves eternally without determination (ἐν ἀκρισίᾳ τινι φέρεσθαι).

It is clear that Plato with this doctrine of ultimate principles approximated very closely to the Ancient Pythagorean doctrine of

[1] See the evidence in my *Greek Phil.* I, the nrs. 362-373.
[2] In *Problems concerning later Platonism*, Mnemosyne 1949.
[3] *Republic* VI 509d-511e.
[4] Theophrastus, *Metaph.* 6 b 11-14 R.F., speaks of ἀνάγειν εἰς.
[5] See the excellent chapter XII, on the Ideal Numbers, in *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951.
[6] *Phys.* 247.30-248.15 (in *Greek Phil.* I nr. 371a).

πέρας and ἄπειρον. One could even say that they were the same: only the terminology was different – or at least the way in which the Undetermined Principle was indicated differed. The term ἕν for that which determines was not foreign to the Pythagoreans. It is true that originally this term did not head the συστοιχία, but there is every reason to suppose that its importance grew through the discussions with the Eleatic School and that it came to be used for the determining principle as well. The expressions ἀόριστος δυάς, on the other hand, and 'the-Great-and-Small' were peculiar to Plato. This is the import of Aristotle's remark in his brief description of Plato's doctrine in *Metaph.* A 6:

> He agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else; and in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things he agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of the great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the Numbers exist apart from sensible things, while *they* say that the things themselves are Numbers, and do not place the objects of mathematics between Forms and sensible things[1].

The remark must be made here that in this passage Aristotle neglects the distinction between Ideal Number and mathematical number which he elsewhere clearly ascribes to Plato. This is simply the result of the fact that he himself only recognizes one kind of number, viz. mathematical number, and maintains that what might be an Ideal number[2] cannot be understood.

Because he summarized Plato's point of view briefly and in his own words, he was able to say that Plato in teaching that 'numbers' are the cause of the οὐσία (essence) of other things 'agreed with the Pythagoreans', and for the rest speak only of the difference between Plato and the Pythagoreans with regard to *mathematical* number. For according to Aristotle, Plato gave mathematical numbers, too, a certain 'apartness'; he placed them on a level of being in between sensible objects and the Ideas. But in fact not *mathematical* but Ideal numbers were in Plato's opinion the cause of both being and essence

[1] *Metaph.* A 6, 987b 22-29; Ross' translation.
[2] See the quotation from Π. φιλ. in Syrian, *Metaph.* 159.33-160.5 (= Π. φιλ. fr. 11 in Ross, *Fragm. Sel.*: ὥστε εἰ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς αἱ ἰδέαι, μὴ μαθηματικὸς δέ, οὐδεμίαν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνεσιν ἔχοιμεν ἄν· τίς γὰρ τῶν γε πλείστων ἡμῶν συνίησιν ἄλλον ἀριθμόν;

of the objects. It is the very transcendental character of this Number that explains its causality – which therefore is incomprehensible to Aristotle.

The Pythagoreans, however, were on the opposite side of the fence: they, too, did not distinguish between ideal and mathematical number. They did not reason, like Aristotle, that each number was just a number, a means by which human intelligence determined quantity. On the contrary, to them each number was immediately a θεῖον. Through this 'anticipation' they were able to think that they were in agreement with Plato when he taught that Number is the cause of being and essence of the objects.

Then there was Plato's doctrine of the two ultimate principles, the determining and the indeterminate principle. They had no difficulty in identifying themselves with this doctrine. The result was that not very long after Plato there arose a kind of blend of Platonism and Pythagoreanism, in this sense that we find Pythagorean doctrine expressed in specifically Platonic terminology.

This fusion is a fact in Alexander Polyhistor's account of Pythagorean doctrine in Diogenes Laertius VIII 25. The curious thing in this report is that Pythagoreanism no longer appears as a dualist metaphysic but as a clear-cut monism. "The principle of all things is the Monad; arising from this Monad the indefinite dyad serves as a material substratum to the Monad which is Cause; and from the Monad and the indefinite dyad spring numbers"[1].

This means that there are no *two* ultimate principles, there is only one: The ONE. No doubt an indeterminate principle is needed to explain the plurality of numbers – purely noetic numbers: this is the indefinite dyad. But the latter is not an independent principle next to or opposite the One; it is subordinated to it and derives from it.

With respect to ancient Pythagoreanism this doctrine is new: the συστοιχία which is ancient, implies a dualistic interpretation of nature and universe. And is not this doctrine equally new with respect to Plato? His terminology is used, but in a subordinating context, which seems to be absent in Sextus, *Adv. math.* X 275 f.: in the preceding sections (263 ff.) under the name of Pythagorean doctrine the same tripartition of being was expounded which is known to us from Hermodorus ap. Simpl. as the doctrine taught by Plato in his later years;

[1] Diog. Laert. VIII 25, the beginning: transl. by R. D. Hicks (with slight variations).

at the end the three *genera* are reduced to two ultimate Principles, the One and the indefinite Dyad[1]. This is dualism.

The curious thing is that at the beginning of the discussion, in 261, a monistic interpretation was given, in which the indefinite dyad was derived from the One. We shall deal with that passage presently[2]. In the meantime, I should like to recommend the following points for consideration.

(1) We know that Plato assumed the Good as the highest principle beyond intelligible being (*Republic* VI 509b) and we have seen that later on he also called this the One.

(2) We possess Hermodorus' description of the ἄπειρον-principle[3], which caused us to qualify this principle as *sub-sensible*. I have given it that place in earlier studies[4]. The following diagram results:

Τὸ Ἕν = τὸ Ἀγαθόν	•
νοητά: εἴδη = ἀριθμοί	————
μαθηματικά	————
αἰσθητά	————
ἀόριστος δυάς = τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν	• •

(3) We also know that Plato derived the Ideal numbers from the One and the Indeterminate[5], for a plurality cannot be explained on the grounds of Unity alone. But *does not this mean that Plato already accepts the principle of* ἄπειρον *on the level of intelligibility?* Or rather, that he accepts it even *before* the level of intelligibility, since it is said that the ideal numbers 'derive from' the One and the indefinite Dyad.

Thus we arrive at subordination through purely logical deduction: the dyad is to be placed directly underneath the One, for it is not of the same level.

Sir David Ross in re-thinking Plato's doctrine of the ideal numbers and the first principles has in fact drawn this conclusion which is unavoidable if on the one hand one remembers that to Plato the Indeterminate can never rank with the One, and on the other hand

[1] ἀνέκυψαν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω ἥ τε πρώτη μονὰς καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς. See the texts of Hermodorus and of Sextus in *Greek Phil.* I, nr. 371.

[2] In par. 3 of this chapter.

[3] Above, p. 203.

[4] In *Studia Vollgraff* (1948) and in *Problems concerning later Platonism*, Mnemosyne 1949.

[5] Aristotle, *Metaph.* A 6, 987 b 20-22: ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ (sc. τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ) κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη εἶναι.

that the plurality in the realm of intelligibility presupposes, apart from the One, an indeterminate principle as well.

Elsewhere[1], I have pointed out that the ἄπειρον is described by Hermodorus as *absolute non-being*: οὐκ ὄν, since every positive determining element is denied, whereas the μὴ ὄν in the *Sophistes* is *relative non-being:* reality different from other reality. The former was the ἄπειρον with respect to visible objects; the latter was the ἄπειρον that is presupposed by the plurality in the realm of intelligibility. It appears, then, that the indeterminate Principle in Plato must be conceived at two levels: the former was subsensible, the latter belongs to the order of intelligibility.

It is curious that in Alexander's version of what he calls 'Pythagorean doctrine' the ἄπειρον principle is *subordinated* as deriving from the One. Yet it is the same doctrine as the one found in Sextus *M.* X, 275 f. The one version has the two principles in juxtaposition – dualism, the other subordinates – monism. The two versions derive from one source: Plato's doctrine of *two* ultimate principles of which the second, whatever one might say, was never the equal of the first. It was the *second* principle. Alexander's source has expressed this in its own way. Sextus, however dualistic the end of the discussion quoted above may have been, was also aware of the monistic interpretation, which he even placed at the beginning of his version.

Thus the monistic interpretation gained the upper hand or so it would seem, at least from the 2nd century B.C. onwards, and possibly earlier by as much as a century[2]. In this sense Plato's doctrine of the ultimate principles was incorporated in later Pythagoreanism. This doctrine appears in Eudorus and Moderatus, both preserved in Simplicius[3], and not infrequently in anonymous Pythagorean fragments[4].

[1] In: *La théorie de l'ἄπειρον chez Platon et dans la tradition platonicienne, Revue philosophique,* Paris 1959, p. 32 f.

[2] See Festugière, *Hermès Trismégiste* IV, pp. 43-51, on *la monade* ἀρρενόθηλυς.

[3] Eudorus' deriving The Dyad from The Monad (ap. Simpl, *Phys.* p. 181, 7ff. Diels) is treated by Festugière, *Hermès Trismégiste* IV, p. 24 f. Moderatus' passage (ap. Simpl., *Phys.* 230-231) may be found in my *Greek Phil.* III, nr. 1285b.

[4] In so far as these repeatedly speak of 'The Monad' as the source of all being. Ps. Archytas, Περὶ ἀρχᾶν ap. Stob. *Ecl.* I, p. 278 ff. W. (in *Gr. Phil.* III, nr. 1281) *seems* to teach a dualism. But he placed one moving Principle above the two principles (one indeterminate, one determining). This moving Principle serves as αἰτία πρὸ αἰτίας, Syrian, in *Metaph.* XIV, remarks. Eudorus, then, derives the two opposite principles – one and the indefinite dyad – from an original Unity.

It found its most careful elaboration in Plotinus who treats the questions that have been posed in the previous pages in his doctrine of the two ὕλαι (*Enn.* II 4) and of the ἄπειρον in the Intelligible World[1].

3. The Characteristics of Post-platonic Pythagoreanism. Some examples

Two, or perhaps three, clear criteria have been found which enable us to distinguish Post-platonic Pythagoreanism from older forms with respect to the doctrine of ultimate principles.

(1) Where we find the term ἀόριστος δυάς indicating the Indeterminate Principle,

(2) Where the One has become the absolute First Principle from which all else is derived,

we are faced not with early Pythagoreanism before fusion with later philosophies – Plato first, afterwards also Aristotle as well as the Stoa – but with a Post-platonic Pythagoreanism.

(3) The term ἡ μονάς undoubtedly does not belong to the earliest Pythagoreanism either. In the συστοιχία the opposites ἕν-πολλά are found. But, as we have seen, the notion of unity did not head the list by any means. The term μονάς probably was not used before the 4th century. We find it in Philolaus fr. 8, which says that in Philolaus' view the Monad is ἀρχὴ πάντων. The passage is found in Iambl. *In Nicomachum.* It might be thought that here the later author has used 'μονάς', where the older Pythagoreans used ἕν. But the author adds: οὐ γὰρ ἕν φησιν ἀρχὰ πάντων. We have another witness in Theo of Smyrna[2] who says that Archytas and Philolaus used the terms ἕν and μονάς without distinction.

All this cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence, for Theo is a late author and several *apocrypha* existed under the names of Archytas and Philolaus. In fact we hear about Πυθαγορικαὶ μονάδες, but always in later authors. Aetius[3] for example says that Ecphantus of Syracuse was the first to teach that 'the Pythagorean monads' are corporeal; and Aristotle[4] says: "they (i.e. the Pythagoreans) assumed that the monads possess magnitude".

Taking all this into consideration I think it probable that the 4th

[1] References may be found in my paper on the ἄπειρον, *Rev. Phil.* 1959, p. 33, n. 1. I hope this paper will be available in English, together with a few other studies collected into one volume, within a few years.

[2] p. 20.19 (*V.S.* 47 A 20).

[3] I 3, 19 (*Doxogr.* 286).

[4] *Metaph.* M. 6, 1080b 20.

century Pythagoreans used the term μονάς. In discussions with the Eleatic school, i.e. in the course of the 5th century, the notion of unity must have grown in importance until towards the close of the 4th century a fusion with Plato's doctrine of the ultimate principles had become possible. Then, and only then, The One became the dominating principle in the sense that the ἄπειρον was derived from it.

We may then, I believe, formulate a 3rd criterion as follows:

Where The One is termed 'The Monad', we have to do not with the most ancient Pythagoreanism, but at best with a Pythagoreanism of the end of the 5th or the beginning of the 4th century.

Some examples.

I. The oldest example is to be found in Diogenes Laertius VIII 25, at the beginning of Alexander Polyhistor's version of the doctrine that he found in the Πυθαγορικὰ ὑπομνήματα, written, we may suppose, in the 2nd century B.C.

II. We have found a second example of Post-platonic Pythagoreanism in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* X. This is a rather long passage, 248-282, which also contains other doctrines known to be platonic: e.g. the tripartition of being which we know from Hermodorus, and the doctrine that physical bodies presuppose stereometric figures (στερεὰ σχήματα), the latter presuppose planes (ἐπίπεδα), planes presuppose lines and lines presuppose points, all these figures presupposing number which itself depends on the one[1]. This results, as we have seen, in a reduction of the three levels of being to two ultimate principles: The One and The Indeterminate Dyad. In this passage (276) they remained as ἀρχαὶ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω in juxtaposition. We had to conclude that this was dualism.

But if we read this section which is entitled Περὶ ἀριθμοῦ in its entirety, it appears *that the author gives the very monistic explanation that we know from Diogenes Laertius* VIII 25, except that it has been given a better philosophical foundation, and that he ascribes this interpretation to Pythagoras. He starts by arguing that we have to assume 'incorporeal ἀρχαί'. The atomists who assumed νοητὰ σώματα as foundation of the visible world did not go far enough: these νοητὰ σώματα must be founded in ἀσώματα. For[2] bodies presuppose τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα, they again presuppose the plane forms, the plane

[1] This doctrine is also present in Diogenes Laertius VIII 25. [2] 259 f.

forms in their turn lines, and the lines numbers: for the line, as drawn from a point to a point, involves the number two, and all the numbers fall under The One. Then follows:

> (261) Pythagoras, moved by these considerations, declared that The One is the principle of existing things by participation in which each of the existing things is called one; and this when conceived in its self-identity is conceived as One, but when, in its otherness, it is added to itself *it creates the 'Indefinite Dyad'*, so called because it is not any one of the numbered and definite dyads but they all are conceived as dyads through their participation in it[1].

This explanation of how the Indefinite Dyad derives from The One is curious in that the author apparently accepts that, somehow, in The One a principle ἑτερότης is present – from which one also may abstract in thought. In Eudorus a further step has been made. With him The One 'thought in itself' is placed ontologically beyond The One that is placed over against The Indefinite Dyad.

In Alexander Polyhistor's account of Pythagoreanism Stoic elements are not lacking though they are not very numerous[2]. The passage in Sextus Empiricus shows more critical reflexion: the criticism of Anaxagoras' and Democritus' atomism is dressed in terms first used by Aristotle and current among the Stoics[3]. Epicurus is quoted to confirm the doctrine of the ἀσώματα as ἀρχαί[4]. Of the platonic Ideas it is said that they do not constitute ἀρχαί, since they presuppose number. The line is explained in two ways: first as drawn between two points and therefore presupposing the number two (260), later (281f.) as 'flowing point'[5]. These mathematical theories were current in the

[1] ἔνθεν κινηθεὶς ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἀρχὴν ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μονάδα, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν λέγεται· καὶ ταύτην κατ' αὐτότητα μὲν ἑαυτῆς νοουμένην μονάδα νοεῖσθαι, ἐπισυντεθεῖσαν δ'ἑαυτῇ καθ' ἑτερότητα ἀποτελεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀόριστον δυάδα διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἀριθμητῶν καὶ ὡρισμένων δυάδων εἶναι [τὴν] αὐτήν, πάσας δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν αὐτῆς δυάδας νενοῆσθαι.
Transl. by R. G. Bury (with a slight alteration).

[2] Not only the term εἱμαρμένη in Ch. 27, there is also the doctrine of the elements interchanging and turning into one another (Ch. 25). This is Stoic Heracliteism.

[3] Aristotle speaks of ἀρχαὶ ἀσώματοι (*De anima* I 2, 404 b 31) and στοιχεῖα ἀσώματα (*Phys.* IV 1, 209a 16). On the Stoic doctrine of the ἀσώματα see E. Bréhier, *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoicisme*, Paris 1925.

[4] 257.

[5] τὸ σημεῖον ῥυὲν γραμμὴν ἀποτελεῖν (281).

days of Aristotle and the early Academy. Sextus' description need not be very late: the original author had a more critical mind than is evident in Alexander's ὑπομνήματα, but there is no reason why he should be dated much later.

III. According to our 2nd criterion the passage from Lydus, *De mensibus* II 6 in which it is said that Pythagoras called the monad Hyperionides "since in her essence (being) she rises above everything"[1], is likewise Post-platonic.

IV. For the same reason the Pythagorean fragment in Syrian, *in Metaph.* 893 a 19[2] is Post-platonic: it starts with the words:

πρόεισι γὰρ ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμός
μουνάδος ἐκ κευθμῶνος ἀκηράτου, –

V. The following lines, to be found in Stobaeus[3] and in Plutarch's *Placita* according to the 1st criterion are Post-platonic. Diels and Wachsmuth think that Aetius is the source.

> Of the principles Pythagoras on the one hand called the Monad God and the Good – viz. the nature of The One and the Noûs itself –, whereas on the other hand he called the Indefinite Dyad Daimon and Evil, – and it is with this that the plurality of matter is linked[4].

The word δαίμονα is a restoration based on Plutarch. In the latter μέν is lacking in the first clause, whereas δέ is lacking in Stobaeus.

In content this version of Pythagoras' doctrine shows the dualistic interpretation of Plato characteristic of Plutarch. The curious qualification of the Indefinite Dyad as daimon as well as evil, and the addition that this is the realm of plurality which here is called τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος, was by no means the usual interpretation: it was Plutarch's view and manner of speaking. The identification of 'the nature of The One' with 'the Noûs itself' likewise fits him perfectly. We know from the myth at the end of *De facie in orbe lunae* that he placed the

[1] διὰ τὸ πάντων ὑπερεῖναι τῇ οὐσίᾳ.
[2] Discussed in Delatte, *Litt. Pyth.* p. 211.
[3] *Ecl.* I p. 34.22; Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 302.
[4] Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, τὴν ⟨δ'⟩ ἀόριστον δυάδα ⟨δαίμονα⟩ καὶ τὸ κακόν, περὶ ἣν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος.

noûs above the soul and made it ascend to the high spiritual regions of the sun. That is a deification. From that point of view the identification of 'the Noûs itself' with The One becomes possible. – And in *De Iside et Osiride* Plutarch in fact identifies his highest god Osiris with the Ἀγαθόν (in the Platonic sense) and also calls him "The Word in itself, transcendent and impassible": λόγος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτόν, ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής[1]. But these are precisely the predicates of Noûs[2] which, like the λόγος itself, is conceived here (as it was by Philo) as the intelligible world.

I think it improbable that this dualist interpretation of 'Pythagoras' should come from Aetius' *Placita*. The interpretation was not sufficiently accepted. On the contrary: the Neo-pythagorean texts incline in every case towards monism. The present interpretation, however, belongs in Plutarch. And why should Stobaeus not have copied these lines from him?

VI. The so-called Pythagorean *acousma*

Τί ἐστιν ἡ φύσις; – Ἄλλο.
Τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός; – Ἕν

is also Post-platonic in accordance with the 2nd criterion mentioned above. This *acousma* is not found in Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry or Iamblichus; nor in Aelian. Delatte who treats at length of the *acousmata* is unaware of it. It was discovered by Rostagni[3]; not directly, that is to say, but indirectly. It 'had to' be something like this according to the forms of the Pythagorean Catechism. He refers us to Delatte[4]. Are the grounds for this 'reconstruction' sufficiently solid? I think not. Rostagni's *acousma* when we meet with it for the first time has a Platonic look: it reminds us immediately of the *Parmenides* and its last two hypotheses[5] where there is mention of τὰ ἄλλα as the

[1] Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.* 53f. (372 E-373 B). See *Gr. Phil.* III nr. 1313 and, for the myth of *De facie*, nr. 1192 d. Because of the parallel in Cicero, *Tusc.* I, 18, 42-19, 43, it is probable that this description of the soul's ascent comes from Posidonius. But our 'Pythagoras' fragment shows the ideas of the *De Iside*, and that is Plutarch himself.
[2] Cf. Anaxagoras, fr. 12, who says that only the Νοῦς μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐωυτοῦ ἐστιν. Cf. Aristotle on the noûs in *De Anima* III 5, 430a 17-18.
[3] *Il verbo di Pitagora*, Torino 1924, pp. 43-44.
[4] *Litt. Pyth.*, p. 274 ff.
[5] II B a and b according to my division in *Keerpunt* and in *Gr. Phil.* I 329; Plato, *Parm.* 164 b ff.

counterpart of the ἕν; and though, as I argued elsewhere[1], in the construction of the hypotheses of the *Parmenides* Plato starts merely formally, here his wording definitely suggests the sensible world.

But let us listen to Rostagni with all the greater interest. His reconstruction of the *acousma* rests on the conviction (1) that Pythagoras taught a doctrine of continual change in the world of matter; (2) that he placed the Divine as absolute One over against continually changing nature. In contradistinction to the ἕν of the Divine he indicated nature as τὸ ἄλλο. This is the doctrine we find in Ovid, *Metamorph.* XV 165ff.

This is the thesis Rostagni tries to defend. Its character is hypothetical and the reconstructed *acousma* is unable to support the hypothesis. But Rostagni's view is worthy of our attention, and all the more so because in recent years the mathematician Van der Waerden has given it his support and has adopted it for his picture of Pythagoras[2].

Rostagni's strongest support is to be found in Epicharmus, fr. 2 D.-K. Here in fact we find a doctrine of continual change in nature, and one contemporary with or even preceding Heraclitus. Rostagni thinks that this doctrine is in fact to be dated earlier than Heraclitus, for Epicharmus who staged his plays in Syracuse before the Persian wars[3] must have been considerably older than Heraclitus whose book appeared only after 479.

This chronological argument is not very strong. Τὰ Περσικά means 480, which is not very far removed from 479. We may suppose that Epicharmus and Heraclitus were more or less contemporaries. But even then the text remains curious. Diels assumes that Epicharmus must have known of Heraclitus. He finds support in Epicharmus fr. 4 where it is said that man is not the only one to possess wisdom, but that all living beings have a measure of rational insight. Only nature knows how things are with wisdom. Does not this presuppose Heraclitus' Logos-philosophy?

Theiler, who wrote an important review of Rostagni's book in *Gnomon*[4], sets out on a different road. He thinks that Epicharmus' doctrine of continual change derives from one of the early sophists who were travelling through the Greek world of Southern Italy. The

[1] *Een keerpunt in Plato's denken*, Amsterdam 1936, pp. 149-174.
[2] In the Dutch periodical *De Gids* CXII, 1949, p. 106 ff and 184 ff.
[3] Suidas, in Diels *V.S.* 6 23, A 1.
[4] 1925, pp. 146-154.

reason for his hypothesis is that when Plato in *Theaetetus* 152 discusses the doctrine of continual change he does not even mention Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans but only Heraclitus and Protagoras.

One might be mischievous and quote Herodotus in saying that in those days there was no greater sophist in S. Italy than Pythagoras. In any case there is no reason why we should doubt that the young Epicharmus heard Pythagoras among the wider circle of auditors (ἐξωτερικοί). This is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius as well as Iamblichus[1], and it is quite probable in itself. For Epicharmus whose birth is dated in 530 by L. Berk[2] was of student age when Pythagoras had reached the pinnacle of his fame, and nothing is more probable than that he – East-Sicilian as he was – should go and audit the famous philosopher in Croton.

Theiler's argument, however, remains important: neither Plato, nor Aristotle are aware of a Pythagorean doctrine of eternal flux. In the *Theaetetus*, 152e, and likewise in the *Cratylus*, 439d ff., the same expressions are found as in Epicharmus. Compare, too, *Cratylus* 432a where a similar example is given, with numbers. It is more likely that this indicates Heraclitus as a source than an anonymous author about whom nothing further is known. In fact it may be easily imagined that a Sicilian who was, as a writer of comedies, receptive to *rumores* – including pieces of intellectual news – had heard of Heraclitus and, as usual, played a bit with his thought.

In Rostagni's opinion, however, there was a difference between the Pythagorean doctrine of change in Epicharmus and the doctrine of change in Heraclitus. With the latter the constant element, the continuity of being in becoming, was the important point, which was not the case with the Pythagoreans. There is good reason to doubt, however, whether in Heraclitus' river simile the constant element is in fact the important point. But leaving that aside, in Ovid, *Metamorph.* XV 169-172 the soul is compared with wax which may accept all manner of shapes. And does not this comparison imply an element of continuity?

The picture of κηροπλαστική is also found in Ocellus[3]. He speaks of ὑποκείμενον, πανδεχές and ἐκμαγεῖον. This derives from Plato, *Timaeus* 50b, with a somewhat Aristotelian hue. The entire section in Ovid (260-452), excluded by Rostagni as being 'young' and 'Poseidonian',

[1] Diog. Laert. VIII 78; Iambl., *V.P.* 266.
[2] *Epicharmus*, diss. Utrecht 1964, pp. 3-6.
[3] II 3 acc. to the old numbering = § 20 Harder.

shows several parallels with Ocellus which does not strengthen Rostagni's theory. According to Seneca, *Epist.* 108, 18ff., the general doctrine of continual change was not originally connected with the doctrine of transmigration of souls. It is true that Euripides is aware of it, for he says[1]:

θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων,
διακρινόμενον δ'ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου
μορφὴν ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξεν.

Yet this is but an echo of the 5th century theories on coming into being and passing away: Anaxagoras in particular should be mentioned. It has nothing to do with Pythagoras.

In order to strengthen the ἄλλο of his *acousma* Rostagni also cites the following witnesses.

1. Aristotle, fr. 207 Rose, says that Pythagoras termed matter 'the other' (τὸ ἄλλο) "since it flows and is in a continual process of change". The fragment is found in Damascius, *De princ. Ar.* II, p. 172 Ruelle: 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τοῖς 'Αρχυτείοις ἱστορεῖ καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἄλλο τὴν ὕλην καλεῖν ὡς ῥευστὴν καὶ ἀεὶ ἄλλο <καὶ ἄλλο> γιγνόμενον, ὥστε δῆλός ἐστι καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλλα ἀφοριζόμενος. (The reference is to the *Parmenides*, the hypotheses II B *a* and *b*).

2. Aristotle, *Metaph.* N 1, 1087 b 26 mentions the term τὸ ἄλλο as distinct from τὸ ἕτερον. He says that 'some people' use it to denote the opposite of τὸ ἕν. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias these 'some people' are the Pythagoreans.

3. Porphyry (quoted by Rostagni as a Neopythagorean) makes a clear pronouncement in *V.P.* 49-50: "They called One the principle of unity, of identical and equal being, of preservation of the whole, of that which remains identical with itself –, but the principle of diversity and inequality, of all that can be divided (μεριστόν)[2] and is subject to change and continually becomes different, this principle they called the Dyad".

These passages call for some explanatory remarks. To start with the last: Rostagni calls Porphyry a Neopythagorean; he was a Neoplatonist, and there is a difference. Our text contains *Plato's* doctrine of the ultimate principles, in Plato's terminology – our 1st and our 2nd criterion. Rostagni who is followed in this respect by Van der Waerden does not take this into account. Both scholars accept without

[1] Fr. 839 Nauck[2].

[2] Plato, *Timaeus* 35.

reserve the confusion of those late authors who ascribe to 'Pythagoras' what was clearly Platonic.

But what about the so-called Aristotelian fragment, 207 R., mentioned sub 1? Is this not *proof*, one might ask, of the thesis that the identification of the One with the principle of order (πέρας) and with God, and on the other hand of the ἄπειρον with matter or plurality, does not originate as late as the 1st or 2nd century but is present in Aristotle, and, what is more, is ascribed by Aristotle to Pythagoras?

The following points must be made.

(1) Damascius, a late Neoplatonist of the 6th century, quotes a treatise of Aristotle on Archytas. We do not know this treatise. It is never quoted, which arouses our suspicion. It may be spurious.

(2) In this treatise Aristotle is supposed to have attributed a certain doctrine to Pythagoras. This is not his practice anywhere in his report on Pythagorean doctrine: in that report he does not mention Pythagoras at all. This strengthens our suspicion that the present passage cannot be regarded as a fragment from Aristotle.

(3) The doctrine according to this passage attributed by Aristotle to Pythagoras would contain the following elements: (a) Pythagoras indicated what Aristotle himself called ὕλη with the term τὸ ἄλλο; (b) he regarded this as 'flowing' and continually changing. – We are obliged to ask at this point: *What* was it that Pythagoras according to this passage called 'the other'? And what *may* he have called 'the other'? To Aristotle ὕλη is not the sensible world but its substratum which one arrives at by logical abstraction. It is not 'the objects' that are subject to continual change, nor is it 'nature'. Yet these are what Damascius apparently has in mind, as is clear from the addition that Plato determined 'the other' in this sense. But it is this very use of the term ὕλη that shows that this passage cannot be attributed to Aristotle.

Moreover, what could Pythagoras have called 'the other'? As that which is continually changing it must be conceived of as the opposite of the ἕν which is constant and identical with itself. But here we have the essential traits of Plato's thought in his later years: the term ἄλλο comes from the *Parmenides* and ἕν was the term used by Plato in his later development to indicate the highest principle.

We conclude that this so-called fragment of Aristotle is spurious and that its doctrine is to be classified as belonging to the category of later fusion of Platonism and Pythagoreanism, such as we found

in Alexander Polyhistor, Sextus Empiricus *M.* X and Moderatus.

The reference to Aristotle, *Metaph.* N 1087 b 26 fares no better. Aristotle is speaking about 'some people' who place τὸ ἄλλο, next to τὸ ἕτερον, over against τὸ ἕν. He is speaking of Platonists; there is no value in the remark of Alexander of Aphrodisias that Pythagoreans were meant. On the contrary, we are in a better position to judge.

Coming back to Rostagni's so-called ancient Pythagorean *acousma* we have to say first of all that it is not supported by other passages. We add the following remark: the fact that the term ἕν is used to denote God is the result of the development of Platonizing Pythagoreanism after the fusion. The One has become the absolute principle whence everything derives. It is only in that climate that the identification with God becomes possible.

On the grounds, then, of our 2nd criterion the ancient Pythagorean character of the *acousma* must be denied. It is unable to support Rostagni's theory. The dualism which the Italian scholar thought he had found in Pythagoras was *Plato's* dualism, and it was, if I understand the situation at all, at this very point that the historical Pythagoras differed from Plato: the real Pythagoras did *not* view nature as an ἄλλο over against a (transcendent) God. In his view nature was a unity-plurality, dominated by an immanent divine Law, which, with a slight personification, one may call 'God'. No opposition is intended: there is 'harmony': harmony *within* nature. And, in fact, Alexander Polyhistor, basing his intelligence on his Pythagorean books, informs us that 'God is harmony'[1].

That is true Pythagoreanism, with the immanence that was the original characteristic of this philosophy. But the opposition which Stobaeus[2] mentions under the name of Philolaus is Platonic: an eternally moving cosmos placed over and against "The One who remains forever identical with himself": καὶ ὁ μὲν εἷς ἀεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων, τὰ δὲ καὶ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά. This passage is equally unable to support Rostagni's thesis; the traces of Post-platonic thought are too evident.

VII. I mention a 7th example – not just to complete the seven! – this time from Iamblichus, *V.P.* 240: παρήγγελλον γὰρ θαμὰ ἀλλήλοις μὴ διασπᾶν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς θεόν.

[1] Diog. Laert. VIII 33. **T** 60a.
[2] Stob. I, p. 172 f. W., purporting to come from Philolaus Π. ψυχῆς. Diels, *VS* 44 B 21, correctly qualifies it as 'Gefälschtes'.

This Pythagorean precept is likewise Post-platonic according to our 2nd criterion: it presupposes the absolute supremacy of the One and also the identification of the One with God. *Early* Pythagoreanism, as we saw in a previous chapter, demanded the preservation of inner harmony, described as a φιλία between the rational and the irrational in man[1].

Some reader might be inclined to argue that harmony can also be called unity, and that therefore this thought is not foreign to ancient Pythagoreanism. My answer is that one may do so, but that in fact this was done only at a later period, when the One had begun to be viewed as the dominating principle and therefore as an Ideal to be persued. It is not found in Aristoxenus' precepts, it is in Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* IV 151, where we find the 'Pythagorean' precept 'that man is to become one'[2]. And this is the very result of the Post-platonic development.

[1] Above, Ch. VII 2, p. 150ff.
[2] Μυστικῶς οὖν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ Πυθαγόρειον ἐλέγετο· "ἕνα γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον δεῖν".

CHAPTER IX

PYTHAGORAS AND RHETORIC

Wisest of all who has ordered the voice of men and who was in general the inventor of names. – Iamblichus says this, as we have seen, in his presentation of Pythagoras' 4th speech[1]. What follows is a case in which he in fact has shown himself an 'inventor of names', viz. for woman in her four periods of life. The first three names are also mentioned in Diogenes Laertius[2] who mentions Timaeus as his source.

Doubtless this was not the only case in which Pythagoras acted as a εὑρετὴς ὀνομάτων. In a previous chapter we came across his four names for man's periods of life[3]. But there were several other instances in which the introduction of a term by Pythagoras is specifically mentioned or in which a terminology especially used by the Pythagoreans is in question. I made a note of the following cases[4].

1. Pythagoras is said to have been the first to use the term κόσμος: Aetius II, 1 (*Doxogr.* 327,8). Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 508 a 3.

2. It is said repeatedly that Pythagoras was the first to call his wisdom φιλοσοφία or that he referred to himself as a φιλόσοφος[5].

3. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 162 says the term ἐστώ was also introduced by Pythagoras. Compare Philolaus fr. 6: ἃ ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων.

4. The word τετρακτύς is mentioned in Iamblichus (*ibid.*) among Pythagoras' neologisms. We know it as a Pythagorean term from other texts as well[6].

5. We have seen[7] that Pythagoras, according to both of Iamblichus' main sources[8], was generally recognized as εὑρετὴς καὶ νομοθέτης τῆς

[1] *V.P.* 56, the beginning. **T** 9. [2] VIII 11. [3] *Supra*, p. 168. **T** 23.
[4] **T** 49.
[5] Φιλοσοφία in Aetius I 3, 8 (*Doxogr.* 280); Iamblichus, *V.P.* 44, the end; also 159; Diodorus X 10 (all these passages without the πανήγυρις comparison). Likewise in Diogenes Laertius VIII 8 (from Sosicrates).
[6] Philolaus A 11; also D.-K. 46, 4 and 58 B 15.
[7] Chapter VII 2, p. 150ff. [8] Above, p. 151 n. 1 and Appendix C.

φιλίας. Our text suggests that it was from him that this term received its comprehensiveness. We mentioned parallels in Diogenes Laertius[1] and Diodorus[2].

6. Basing the discussion on Plato, *Gorgias* 507 e 6-508 a 2 together with Archytas' fr. 3 and Iamblichus *V.P.* 45 is it too audacious for one to mention: ἁρμονία[3], κοινωνία, κοσμιότης and ὁμόνοια[4]? Perhaps ἰσότης may also be added from Archytas fr. 3.

7. Compare the expression φιλότης ἰσότης[5] which in Iamblichus *V.P.* 162 is specifically attributed to Pythagoras.

8. We found the specifically Pythagorean equivalents of νουθέτησις and νουθετεῖν: πεδάρτασις and πεδαρτᾶν[6].

9. Equally Pythagorean was the term ἐχεμυθία[7].

10. In Iamblichus, *V.P.* 95 the term κατάρτυσις is attributed to Pythagoras. It indicates the necessary docility on the part of the pupil.

11. Dealing with the treatment of the πάθη by means of music we found[8] the terms ἐξαρτύσεις and ἐπαφαί, συναρμογή and συναρμόζεσθαι[9] and, as a general term, κάθαρσις[10].

12. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 162 attributes the following hemistich especially to Pythagoras

ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἥμισυ παντός.

We mentioned it in connexion with the speech to the children[11]. Also the expression

ἀριθμῷ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν

"which he often pronounced before his entire audience"[12].

13. Authentic and ancient-Pythagorean is also the well-known expression κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, for which Timaeus is our witness[13].

[1] VII 16 and 23. [2] X 8.
[3] Ἁρμονία is known as an old Pythagorean principle not only from Arist., *Metaph.* A 5 but also from the fragments 6, 10 and 11 of Philolaus.
[4] Κοινωνία and κοσμιότης are in Plato, *Gorgias* 508a; ὁμόνοια in Archytas fr. 3.
[5] M. von Albrecht prefers the reading φιλότης ἰσότης, ⟨ἰσότης⟩ φιλότης, which is at least as old as Ms F. Deubner brackets the second φιλότης.
[6] Parallels have been mentioned above, p. 155 n. 3.
[7] Iambl. *V.P.* 188 and 225.
[8] Iambl. *V.P.* 64 and 114; above, p. 164 f. [9] The latter in 64.
[10] Iambl. *V.P.* 110; see Cramer, *Anecd. Paris.* I 172; above, p. 164 n. 4.
[11] Above, p. 126.
[12] Iambl. *V.P.* 162: ὃ δὴ πυκνότατα πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀπεφθέγγετο.
[13] Timaeus fr. 77 (= Diog. Laert. VIII 10); cf. Scholia in Plat., *Phaedr.* 279 (ed. Hermann, Vol. VI, p. 275) and Phot., *Lex.* 129 (Texts in Iacoby, F. G. H. III B, 566 F 13), and in my *Gr. Phil.* I, 3rd ed., p. 320 f.

14. The expression οἱ κρείττονες is probably Pythagoras'[1].

15. A specifically Pythagorean term used according to Iamblichus, by Pythagoras' first followers was the word ὁμακοεῖον. The term ὁμάκοοι is also used to indicate the Pythagoreans[2].

16. The term φυσιογνωμονῆσαι for studying a man's face and outward appearance as a σημεῖον of his character is probably Pythagoras' as well. It is mentioned both by Porphyry and by Iamblichus; moreover, it is cited by Gellius as a proprium of Pythagoras[3].

17. According to Iamblichus, *V.P.* 89, Pythagoras used to call geometry ἱστορία, a peculiar use of the term, which recalls Heraclitus, fr. 129.

All these words and expressions illustrate what the Ancients called "Pythagoras as the inventor of names". They also explain what to an Ancient Pythagorean was the meaning of the second answer to the question of the catechism: τί τὸ σοφώτατον; – τὸ τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον. This is what we read in Iamblichus *V.P.* 82. Aelian[4] also knows the *acousma* but quotes it in the personal form: ὁ...θέμενος, which probably is a later correction[5]. However this may be, this *acousma* doubtless is an ancient testimony to Pythagoras' interest in language in so far as it names things.

It is not our only indication of such an interest. We find repeated mention of the fact that Pythagoras consciously meditated on language as a means of communication: he consciously chose the form of catechistic questions (*acousmata*) and symbolic indication. Iamblichus discusses Pythagoras' symbolic manner of expression[6] several times and praises its profundity. Porphyry likewise, as we have seen, mentions the *symbola* as a special category of *acousmata*[7]. Apparently this manner of expressing oneself was very striking to contemporaries and one may ask whether Pythagoras was inspired to adopt it by his stay in Babylon. I regard that as not improbable.

Apart from mentioning his neologisms and his somewhat startling

[1] Iambl., *V.P.* 149: εὐφημία πρὸς τοὺς κρείττονας and ὑμνεῖν τοὺς κρείττονας.
[2] ὁμακοεῖον in Iambl. *V.P.* 30, also 185; ὁμάκοοι in 73.
[3] Porph., *V.P.* 13, Iambl. *V.P.* 71; Gellius, *N.A.* I 9, 2.
[4] *V.H.* IV 17. Thus Delatte, *Litt. Pyth.* p. 280. Deubner, on the contrary, refers to Plato, *Cratylus* 438 c.
[5] Cf. also Proclus, *in Crat.* p. 5, *in Tim.* p. 84 E; *in Alcib.* I p. 111 A, and Olympiodorus, *in Alcib.* I, p. 95.
[6] *V.P.* 103, 105, 161, 192, 227, 247. **T** 26. [7] *V.P.* 41 f.

use of symbolic language the three biographies do not speak specifically about Pythagoras' rhetorical achievements. Iamblichus who summarizes the content of the four speeches briefly refers to their effect; and right at the end[1] he says that Pythagoras was honoured in Croton, and indirectly in the whole of S. Italy, because of the ἐντεύξεις mentioned – in all probability this word means 'speeches' here[2]. Let us note that Pythagoras is not characterized by these authors as a great orator *but by implication;* it is not said anywhere that in his school an *ars dicendi* was taught either theoretically or practically. On the contrary: we hear of exercises in silence, never of exercises in speech.

But there is one author who explicitly describes Pythagoras as a great orator. He is Diodorus. I have quoted the passage in a previous chapter[3]. No doubt his source is the S. Italian-Sicilian tradition, probably Timaeus himself. Trogus is very brief but he, too, implies that Pythagoras was a great orator.

Finally, we read the following remarks in Iamblichus. He has just spoken[4] about music, medicine and mantic amongst the ancient Pythagoreans as well as the pedagogical value they accorded Homer and Hesiod, and he has dwelt at some length upon their practice of memory training[5]. Then he says (166):

> Because of these studies[6] it happened that the whole of S. Italy was filled with philosophers and that, though previously unknown, it came to be called Greater Greece because of Pythagoras. And very many philosophers, poets and legislators were with them. *For rhetorical technique and set orations as well as written laws were brought to Greece from them*[7]. And those who speak of the physicists mention first of all Empedocles and Parmenides of Elea, and those who wish for moral wisdom in proverbial form bring in the thoughts of Epicharmus – in fact almost all philosophers know those by heart. With all this enough

[1] *V.P.* 59. [2] See above, Ch. VI 5, the end.
[3] Diodorus X 3; above, Ch. V. [4] *V.P.* 163.
[5] The detailed recalling of one's activities of the previous day or the day before that does not indicate an examination of one's conscience in the present context, but memory training (164f.; cf. 256, Diod. X 5 and Diog. Laert. VIII 23). Probably this is a rationalistic interpretation of the examination of conscience deriving from Aristoxenus.
[6] ἐπιτηδεύματα.
[7] Τάς τε γὰρ τέχνας τὰς ῥητορικὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐπιδεικτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς γεγραμμένους παρ' ἐκείνων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα συνέβη κομισθῆναι.

> has been said about his wisdom and the manner in which he set all people on the road to wisdom as far as possible and according as they were able to participate in it, as well as about the perfection of his teaching.

Let us note first of all that this passage does not say that *Pythagoras* 'discovered' rhetoric, as he is called, for instance, the εὑρετής of φιλία. It is true that Iamblichus elsewhere calls him – as we have seen – "the discoverer of the entire πολιτικὴ παιδεία"[1], a thesis which is illustrated not by any reference to rhetorical studies but by the doctrine that 'no material objects are pure'[2], since the elements intermingle, and good and evil, justice and injustice, etc. are likewise confused. The passage demands close attention in the present context. Our objection was[3] that the doctrine of intermingling elements – "earth partakes in fire and fire in water, and πνεῦμα partakes in those and those in πνεῦμα" – reminds us of later theories (Anaxagoras), whereas the 'mixture' of ethical opposites transplants us into the spiritual climate of Sophistic. Let us read Iamblichus' explanation in *V.P.* 130-131.

> On the basis of this hypothesis (sc. of the mingling of opposite elements and opposite ethical notions) reason obtains its point of departure in either of two directions; there are two motions both of the body and of the soul: the one irrational, the other based on choice[4].
>
> He symbolized the constitutions in a figure of 3 lines, the ends of which touched. They formed one rectangle; one line contained the proportion 4 : 3, the second 5, and the third in between. When we calculate the proportion of these lines and their squares we obtain the best picture of a constitution. Plato usurped the fame of this discovery since he clearly speaks in the *Republic* of the base line in the proportion 4 : 3 which is connected with the 5 and which provides two harmonies[5].
>
> They say that he strove for moderation of the emotions and

[1] *V.P.* 130. [2] μηδὲν εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων πραγμάτων.
[3] Above, p. 146 f.
[4] Ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως λαβεῖν τὸν λόγον τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερον μέρος ὁρμήν. δύο δὲ εἶναι κινήσεις καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν μὲν ἄλογον, τὴν δὲ προαιρετικήν.
[5] λέγοντα φανερῶς ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τὸν ἐπίτριτον ἐκεῖνον πυθμένα, τὸν τῇ πεμπτάδι συνεζευγμένον καὶ τὰς δύο παρεχόμενον ἁρμονίας. Plato, *Rep.* VIII 546c.

> for the right mean[1] and also that each one personally should make his own life happy with the good he prefers[2]. In short he discovered the choice of what is good for each of us personally and of the tasks that fit us[3].

Though this commentary on the πολιτικὴ παιδεία contains little that regards rhetoric, it is worth the effort to look at it in its entirety: it shows how much use has been made of later terms and theories. Let us examine it point by point.

(1) I maintain my question mark against the mixture of opposite elements. My reasons are: (a) that our most ancient witnesses, Plato and Aristotle, do not mention such a doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, and (b) that Anaxagoras taught that everything participates in its opposite. With him we find the term μετέχειν[4]. Cf. also Diogenes of Apollonia fr. 5. We have no indication that this doctrine is older than the 5th century.

(2) The mixture of ethical opposites fits in with the spiritual climate of Sophistic. It is true that we found the principle of καιρός in Pythagoras, but not in the sense of rendering ethical notions relative in the manner of the *Dissoi logoi*, nor in the sense of an ἀντιλογική as in Protagoras and Gorgias. The explanation that reason obtains a ὁρμή to either of two sides from the mixture hypothesis greatly strengthens my doubt: I do not believe this to be older than the second half of the 5th century B.C. And in our passage this is the text that directly concerns rhetoric.

(3) The doctrine of a rational and an irrational element in the soul is probably old-Pythagorean: that is what the emphasis on internal φιλία, ὁμόνοια and ἁρμονία referred to. There is every reason to accept that this was the original doctrine of Pythagoras which is here translated into a more modern terminology, as appears from the words προαιρετικὴ κίνησις.

(4) The rectangular triangle with sides in the proportion 3, 4, 5 indicating the πολιτείαι is definitely old-Pythagorean and may go back to the founder.

(5) The term μετριοπάθεια is reasonably young; it is found neither in Plato nor in Aristotle, but is found in authors of the 1st and 2nd

[1] ἀσκῆσαι δέ φασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς μετριοπαθείας καὶ τὰς μεσότητας.
[2] καὶ τὸ σύν τινι προσηγουμένῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἕκαστον εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὸν βίον.
[3] καὶ συλλήβδην προσευρεῖν τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν καὶ προσηκόντων ἔργων.
[4] Fr. 6 (πάντα παντὸς μετέχει) and 8 (οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ κόσμῳ e.q.s.). Also Sextus Emp., *M.* VII 90 and Anaxagoras fr. 21a.

centuries and later (Philo, Plutarch, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry). Μεσότης and its plural is an old-Pythagorean mathematical term: according to Nicomachus, Hippasus knew of three types of μεσότης, arithmetical, geometrical and harmonic[1]. We also hear of it in Philolaus[2] and in Archytas' circle[3]. But in ethics it is an Aristotelian term. Pythagoras used different metaphors in this field, as we have seen.

(6) That each person with the ἀγαθόν he prefers should make his own life happy is a curious admonition, and certainly not an old one. The αἵρεσις τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν sounds rather peripatetic and influenced by the Middle-Stoic notion of *propria natura*[4].

The passage as a whole does not furnish us with any reason to accept its content as old-Pythagorean. External evidence is required for that purpose. In some details such evidence exists, but not in others. Using this criterion I believe that the text about the mixture of elements and opposite ethical notions in Iambl. *V.P.* 130 has no demonstrative force.

In that case what remains of the πολιτικὴ παιδεία attributed to Pythagoras? Once again, in a sense Pythagoras was in fact its *auctor*, viz. in so far as he educated politicians and legislators in his school. In the view of the schools of rhetoric during the second half of the 5th and the first half of the 4th centuries such an education definitely implied training in the art of speaking. However, it would be an anachronism to conclude that there existed a theoretical and practical study of rhetoric in Pythagoras' school during its first period on the mere grounds of its political and legislative activities. The governing and managing activities of the Pythagoreans of the period of Pythagoras and the first generation after him demanded some practical knowledge and insight rather than a training in speech-making. And once again, *Iamblichus (166) does not attribute the discovery of rhetoric to Pythagoras in person.*

It is important to note that. The text merely says that 'the art of rhetoric' and the λόγοι ἐπιδεικτικοί were imported into Greece *from the circle of the Pythagoreans* (παρ' ἐκείνων), as the written laws. In other words, in the course of the 5th century a beginning was made with the study of rhetoric in the Pythagorean school, and the first names mentioned – Corax and Tisias – are to be seen against this background. It did not start with Gorgias; he grew up in a period when language

[1] VS 18, nr. 15. [2] VS 44, A 24. [3] VS 47, B 2.
[4] Panaetius in Cicero, *De officiis* I 30, 107-31, 114 (*Greek Phil.* III, 1163).

and modes of expression as well as the λόγοι ἐπιδεικτικοί had already begun to be studied.

The next question is whether this datum of Iamblichus' text is supported by other evidence. Rostagni and Delatte have thought that this is the case. Rostagni in particular defended the existence of an early Pythagorean rhetoric[1], basing his thesis mainly on the presence of the notion of καιρός in Pythagoras with all the implications that we used to regard as characteristic of Gorgias: viz. that there is not just one virtue but many, varying according to age and social group, and that therefore the orator ought to be able to express himself not in one manner only but in a variety of styles. In this context, Rostagni quoted Antisthenes' explanation of the term πολύτροπος and referred to Pythagoras' four speeches. With regard to the question of the relationship between the two – "Are the so-called speeches of Pythagoras a creation of Gorgias' school or did Gorgias learn the καιρός-principle from the school of Pythagoras which, after all, was situated in his neighbourhood?" – Rostagni decidedly chose the latter. Antisthenes' text[2] (*in Od.* I 1) strongly favoured his thesis, for it proved that Antisthenes, who belonged to the older Socratics and who was deeply influenced by Gorgias, was aware of the tradition of Pythagoras' four speeches. This made the Dicaearchus-hypothesis impossible – and the creation of the four λόγοι in Gorgias' own circle had become at least improbable.

But Rostagni was still faced with one difficulty: viz. the fact that the Ancients who wrote the history of rhetoric make no mention whatever of an early Pythagorean rhetoric. How could one explain that? Rostagni thought that he had a satisfactory solution. The reason lay, according to him, in the fact that Aristotle, a mind totally different from Gorgias, was the first to write a history of rhetoric. Aristotle's view of rhetoric was onesided and rationalistic, as he wished to build a system with syllogisms and proofs. The Pythagoreans' oratory, unlike the γένος δικαστικόν, was essentially epideictic, and being based on an irrational criterion was a matter of persuasion and suggestion (ψυχαγωγία). This was the case with Gorgias as well.

In other words, we are to suppose that, since Aristotle's opinions on rhetoric differed totally from those of the Pythagoreans, he kept silent about the rhetoric that came into being among them.

[1] *Un nuovo capitolo nella storia della retorica e della sofistica*, in *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 1922. Repr. in Rostagni, *Scritti minori* I, pp. 1-49.
[2] *Scholia in Hom. Odyss.* vol. I Dindorf, pp. 9-11. **T** 5.

The very basis of Rostagni's thesis is incorrect. The Italian scholar did not see that with regard to rhetoric the differences between Gorgias and Aristotle are by no means differences in principle, and that on the contrary, the versatile genius and judge of human nature that we know to have been Aristotle experienced the influence of Gorgias in essential points to a degree that one might call him Gorgias' pupil. They are the very points that are shared (as Rostagni saw) by Gorgias and Pythagoras' λόγοι: the καιρός-principle, the doctrine that the virtues are many, and everything that pedagogically speaking is connected with these. Rostagni did not see that Gorgias' notion of virtue appears in full in Aristotle, *Politica* I 5[1]. Nor did he notice that the notion of ἐπιείκεια which, in the shape of *aequitas*, found its way through Aristotle into present day law, derives from Gorgias.

To think that Aristotle saw rhetoric as a discipline based on strict scientific proof is a curious error. It is unthinkable that the irrational element in human nature should have escaped this judge of human character. It is even more unthinkable that a philosopher who methodically distinguished between strict science on the one hand, having only ἀναγκαῖα as its object, and τέχνη on the other which deals with ἐνδεχόμενα should have treated any field of human praxis as a science based on strict proof. Aristotle more than anyone else makes a sharp distinction between a reasoning that proves scientifically and a reasoning that does not. The latter he terms 'dialectic'. If anyone, he knew that rhetoric entails a popular manner of reasoning which does not as such use the methods of scientific proof.

Rostagni's explanation of Aristotle's silence with regard to the old Pythagorean oratory was not a fortunate one, but do we possess one that is more satisfactory? I know of none better than the simple explanation that Aristotle regarded Gorgias as the great man who consciously created rhetoric.

Is this an acceptable explanation in view of the fact that Pythagoras' λόγοι were current during the 4th century? Is it possible, for example, that Aristotle was unaware of these λόγοι because they remained confined to the limited area of Southern Italy where they had been written in the closed circle of the Pythagoreans? This was not the case: the λόγοι must have been known at Athens shortly after the year 400,

[1] 1259 b 22 - 1260 a 34. *Supra*, p. 118.

as appears in the passage from Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazousae*, already cited[1], to which Rostagni directed our attention[2].

Aristophanes pokes fun at something, but what is it? It was, as has been seen, Pythagoras' address to the women of Croton, and in particular the passage of the Graiae. At this point I am convinced by Rostagni's arguments: (1) the two passages are not independent; (2) the author of the λόγοι does not borrow from Aristophanes, but Aristophanes presupposes awareness of the λόγοι in his audience.

Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazousae* were staged in the year 392. In one sense our conclusion may reach farther than Rostagni's but in another sense ought not to reach as far. Our conclusion was that in the year 392 the λόγοι of Pythagoras were current daily news in Athens: apparently they had become known only recently and were being read and discussed.

This took us back to Von Fritz's remark, quoted earlier[3], that during this very period a large number of Pythagoreans had come to Greece from S. Italy because of the threat of conquest at the hands of Dionysius I. This explains why it was at that particular moment that these texts became known in Athens. It does not mean that they were composed at that time; they may have been composed earlier, but since these pieces existed in the school in S. Italy the Pythagoreans took them with them when fleeing to Greece.

The Athenians probably took them for what they were: certainly no one thought they were authentic works of Pythagoras, and doubtless they were not regarded as Gorgias' work either, for the reasons which I gave in a previous chapter. Most probably they were accepted as anonymous school products.

Nor were they great literature. At the time they were 'in the news', a generation afterwards, they were, in all probability, forgotten. That was the time some 30 or 40 years after the *Ecclesiazousae* were staged, that Aristotle wrote his *Rhetoric*. He was probably unaware of the existence of these λόγοι.

Rostagni mentions a few other important texts. Apart from Iamblichus 166 he finds a few more traces of a tradition that ascribed the invention of rhetoric to Pythagoras rather than to Corax and Tisias[4]:

(1) *Scholia in Eurip. Hec.* 131 f., p. 26, Schwartz; [5]

[1] Ch. VI 5, p. 134 f. [2] *Un nuovo capitolo*, p. 197 ff. **T** 10.
[3] Ch. II, the end. [4] **T** 53. [5] Cited in Diels *VS*, Heracl. B 81.

(2) Timaeus ap. Diod. XII 53;
(3) fr. 3 of Timon[1], where one of Pythagoras' characteristics is said to be the art of verbal seduction:

Πυθαγόρην τε γόητας ἀποκλίνοντ' ἐπὶ δόξας
θήρῃ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίης ὀαριστήν.

Of the three passages the second contains nothing that is relevant: Diodorus declares that Gorgias of Leontini invented the art of rhetoric; neither Pythagoras nor the Pythagoreans are mentioned.

The scholion on Euripides mentions the title of a work ascribed to Pythagoras that is apparently referred to in Diogenes Laertius (VIII 8) as well. The scholion reads Κοπίδες, which means 'butcher's knives'. The source is Timaeus. Delatte[2] several years before Rostagni likewise mentions the title Κοπίδες, referring to Diogenes Laertius. He adds, quite abruptly: "C'est-à-dire traité de rhétorique". One should like to know what his grounds are, all the more so because Diogenes Laertius does not have the word Κοπίδες but Κοπιάδας. Delatte does not mention the Euripides scholion. Diels who, in an article of 1890[3], discusses the problems connected with this title and with the opening words as quoted by Diogenes Laertius, strongly opposes the idea that the Κοπίδες should have had anything to do with rhetoric. The scholion on Euripides, however, declares that this was in fact a name for rhetoric and that 'apparently it was not real butcher's knives' that Pythagoras was speaking of: ὥστε καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ τὸν Πυθαγόραν † εὑράμενον τῶν ἀληθινῶν κοπίδων. There is some ground then for an allegorical explanation: 'butcher's knives' – viz. weapons for defense or attack before the courts are orations such as the S. Italian orators Corax and Tisias wrote for their clients.

The first line of the Κοπίδες is found in Diogenes Laertius l.c. in the slightly corrupt form Μὴ ἀνααίδευ μηδενί. H. S. Long[4] suspects a lacuna before ἀνααίδευ. Delatte and Rostagni adopt the obvious ἀναίδευ, which makes good sense. Diels however thought it strange that a book with so aggressive a title should start with the peaceful admonition not to be unashamed in your dealings with anyone. He

[1] Acc. to Wachsmuth, *Syllograph. graec. reliqu.* In Diels, *Poetarum philos. fragm.* it is fr. 57.
[2] *Litt. pythag.* 1915, p. 284.
[3] *Ein gefälschtes Pythagorasbuch*, in: *Archiv für Geschichte d. Phil.* III, 1890, pp. 454 ff.
[4] Diogenes Laertius, Oxford 1964.

proposed the reading: Μὴ ἀναδίδευ μηδενί – explaining that this was an admonition not to become anybody's counsel... This is somewhat too blatant a conjecture ἐξ ὑποθέσεως: the author maintains that Pythagoras had nothing to do with rhetoric. In fact the meaning of ἀναδίδευ is not overly clear either.

Μὴ ἀναίδευ μηδενί on the other hand was an entirely clear admonition. We know it from Pythagoras' speech to the young men and from his exhortations to the children: one should always be 'polite', especially in the case of the young towards the old. For them this is a rule of the first importance, but not for them alone. Pythagoras also exhorted fathers to heed the personality of their children through kindness in their admonitions, husbands to respect their wives' personality, and masters never to admonish their subordinates or their equals in anger. The precept, then, Μὴ ἀναίδευ μηδενί was valid for everyone and at all times with Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. There is no problem here.

Did the Κοπίδες have anything to do with rhetoric? All things well considered, it appears probable. What is *certain* is, that Pythagoreans living at least a century after Pythagoras, at the end of the 5th and the beginning of the 4th centuries, were zealously studying rhetoric. The comic fragments quoted by Delatte[1] witness to this:
Alexis in the *Tarentini* ap. Athen. IV p. 161b:

Πυθαγορισμοὶ καὶ λόγοι
λεπτοὶ διεσμιλευμέναι τε φροντίδες
τρέφουσ' ἐκείνους, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἡμέραν τάδε·
ἄρτος καθαρὸς εἷς ἑκατέρῳ, ποτήριον
ὕδατος· τοσαῦτα ταῦτα.
Β. δεσμωτηρίου
λέγεις δίαιταν[2].

Cratinus in his *Tarentini* ap. Diog. Laert. VIII 37:

ἔθος ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἄν'τιν' ἰδιώτην ποθὲν
λάβωσιν εἰσελθόντα, διαπειρώμενον
τῆς τῶν λόγων ῥώμης ταράττειν καὶ κυκᾶν

[1] *Litt. pythag.* p. 283.
[2] "Pythagorisms and subtle words and polished thoughts feed those men, and their daily bread: one single loaf of pure wheat for each, a cup of water – that's all.
B. A prison's diet you tell me.

τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις, τοῖς πέρασι, τοῖς παρισώμασιν,
τοῖς ἀποπλάνοις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν νουβυστικῶς[1].

Jokes referring to the Pythagoreans' lean diet, their abstinence from meat, their poverty and dirty appearance, their piety and belief in a life after death are well known. In addition we find the theme of the 'subtle words' and carefully polished style. But all of that belongs to the 4th century. No conclusions are warranted here with regard to the existence of a Pre-Gorgian Pythagorean rhetoric any more than from the phrase attributed to Pythagoras in Diogenes Laertius VIII 32 (from Alexander Polyhistor): μέγιστον δέ φησιν εἶναι τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν πεῖσαι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν[2].

Rostagni does accept the existence of an early Pythagorean rhetoric, mainly because of the four speeches. He admits that if one goes by their style, they might be from the school of Gorgias, but the content causes him to prefer an early date: the καιρός principle, the doctrine of the many virtues, the scale of human values[3], the use of numerous historical and mythological examples of more or less local S. Italian stamp – all these indicate in his opinion an earlier period, not after Gorgias (initiative works of pupils) but before him (work finding its origin in surroundings where Gorgias himself received his education). The weakness of Rostagni's view lies, of course, in the fact that the content may be old, but that the actual writing need not necessarily ante-date Gorgias. The staging of Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazousae*, however, provided us with a *terminus ante quem*.

Thus, when Rostagni determines the character of early Pythagorean oratory by basing his views on the four speeches, we are obliged to reserve our judgment. We cannot say with certainty at what precise date rhetoric began to be studied as a τέχνη among the Pythagoreans.

[1] According to Hick's translation:
"They are wont,
If haply they a foreigner do find,
To hold a cross-examination
Of doctrines' worth, to trouble and confound him
with terms, equations, and antitheses
Brain-bunged with magnitudes and periphrases".

[2] The post-platonic date of Alexander's Πυθαγορικὰ ὑπομνήματα has been convincingly pointed out by Festugière in the *Revue des Études grecques* 1945, pp. 1-65.

[3] Rostagni, *Un nuovo capitolo* p. 192f., finds Anaximenes the Younger's scale of values in the speeches of Pythagoras as it were in elementary form.

Perhaps it was in the 5th century before Gorgias, perhaps even in the first half of the 5th century, so that Empedocles may have come from this school. He is repeatedly mentioned as the 'inventor of rhetoric', a tradition that derives from Aristotle. Thus we read in Diogenes Laertius VIII 57: "Aristotle in his *Sophistes* calls Empedocles the inventor of rhetoric, as Zeno of dialectic". And again in Sextus, *M.* VII 6: Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι. Diogenes Laertius VIII 58 quotes Satyrus as saying that Empedocles was both ἰατρός and ῥήτωρ ἄριστος. Gorgias was his pupil.

Quintilian III 1,8 mentions Empedocles, then Corax and Tisias, and after them their pupil Gorgias as *artium scriptores antiquissimi*[1].

Since, however, Empedocles was traditionally regarded as a pupil of Pythagoras, and since it was known in *Magna Graecia* that Pythagoras himself appeared as an orator before the people, it could be said that Empedocles had learnt this from Pythagoras, and that Pythagoras in fact makes the beginning of the history of rhetoric.

And this, in a sense, is true.

[1] On the beginnings of rhetoric see L. Radermacher, *Artium scriptores* (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik). Österreich. Akad. d. Wissensch., philol.-hist. Kl., Sitzungsberichte 227. Bd. Abh. 3, Wien 1951, p. 11ff. On Empedocles and Gorgias see also E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, Leipzig 1898, I, p. 16 ff.

CHAPTER X

PYTHAGORAS AND MEDICINE

We are justified in paying attention to the medical ideas of the early Pythagoreans which are closely connected and even largely identical with the moralism that we came across in a previous chapter[1]. Pythagoras' teachings against τρυφή and πολυτέλεια stemmed from care for the body as well as the soul and stressed evenness in girth as much as in state of mind. The precepts he gave in this context constituted a δίαιτα which aimed primarily at that balance of physical forces that is health, but through health at a balanced mind.

Diodorus[2] says:

> His advice was to strive for simplicity, for excess[3] destroys people's possessions as much as their bodies. Most diseases originate from indigestion[4] which in its turn originates from excess. And he persuaded many to live on raw food and to drink water all their lives in order to strive for the truly good.

In Iamblichus, *V.P.* 218, we read[5]:

> And he showed that the gods are not the cause of evil and that all diseases and bodily suffering arise from dissolute behaviour.

This chapter and its context evoke a number of questions. The statement ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ τῶν κακῶν εἰσιν ἀναίτιοι reminds us directly of Plato, as does the criticism of authors and poets on grounds of 'what is being said wrong in their myths'. But we also find distinctly Stoic terms such as λόγος προφορικός and ἐνδιάθετος, as well as a description of how all earthly phenomena are dependent on heaven, which gives a Stoic or late-Platonic impression. Boyancé (*Revue des Études Anciennes* 36 (1934)) defended the thesis that this entire passage in

[1] VII 4. [2] X 7. **T** 29a. [3] πολυτέλεια
[4] ἐξ ὠμότητος [5] **T** 57b.

Iamblichus (215-219) was borrowed directly from Heraclides Ponticus' dialogue *Abaris*, but he was not able to argue these later categories and terms away. That is why his otherwise attractive theory – which gives an elegant and convincing explanation of the unhistorical stage-setting of the conversation between Phalaris, the tyrant, Pythagoras and the Thracian Abaris – cannot be accepted without some reservations[1].

However this may be, the phrase quoted above concerning the cause of disease reminds us of Plato who was likewise of the opinion that τρυφή and πολυτέλεια are fatal both for the body and for the mind and that disease stems from excess. Yet it is very much in keeping with early Pythagorean principles that this view should derive from Pythagoras. Apart from the passage of Diodorus quoted above (which probably stems from Timaeus) we may cite the picture of Pythagoras the philosopher and opponent of *luxuria* as painted by Pompeius Trogus, as well as numerous passages in the Βίοι which originate with Aristoxenus and Timaeus.

We may suppose, then, that it was Pythagoras who preached a regimen of sobriety based on his insight into the cosmic laws of measure and harmony. Such a regimen he felt would be salutary for both the body and the soul. It was equally Pythagoras who prescribed daily exercises for the members of his sect so as to enhance their physical strength, their fitness and agility. We discussed these things in a previous chapter.

The three Βίοι unanimously assert that Pythagoras practised medicine[2]. Among the *acousmata* mentioned in Iambl., *V.P.* 82 the question is asked: τί τὸ σοφώτατον; after two answers the question is τί σοφώτατον τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν; – answer: ἰατρική.

In Iambl., *V.P.* 208, it is said that insight into the proper substances and quantities for nourishment is a matter of great wisdom, which is ascribed 'originally to Apollo and Paeon', later to the followers of Asclepius. These two passages doubtless indicate an early date for Pythagorean medical theories.

[1] See App. D.
[2] Diog. Laert. VIII 12: οὐκ ἠμέλησε δ' οὐδ' ἰατρικῆς, Porph., *V.P.* 33 speaks of music as a healing method. **T** 58. Cf. Cramer, *Anecd. Paris.* I 172; Iambl., *V.P.* 110f. and 224. Iambl., *V.P.* 163(= 244) speaks at some length about therapy. **T** 59. Definitions of ὑγίεια in Diog. Laert. VIII 33 and 35. **T** 60. Other parallels: Aetius V 3,2 (*Doxogr.* 417a b); Galen XIX 321 K. and 322 K. (*Doxogr.* 320 b 29, 417 a 21 and 418 a 5); Stob., *Ecl.* I 420; Celsus, *Med.* I. prooem. 6,7 (C.M.L. I 18). **T** 61.

Let us now read the longest passage on therapy, Iambl., *V.P.* 163 (= 244).

> With regard to medicine they approved of dietetics most of all. They practised it with great precision. To begin with, they tried to obtain indications with reference to the proper proportion of bodily strain[1], food and rest; then again they probably were the first to undertake the study and prescription of the preparation of the food that is taken. The Pythagoreans also applied fomentation more often than their predecessors. Drugs were less liked by them; they used them most of all for boils. Surgery and cauterisation however were totally rejected. In the case of certain diseases they also used exorcism. In their opinion music likewise adds greatly to health if used in a fitting manner[2].

The fact that this passage except for the last sentence appears twice in Iamblichus indicates, as we saw earlier, that he found it in both his main sources.

Dietetics were of the greatest importance in the Hippocratic writings; it is not a property of the Pythagoreans. The principle that health is due to a correct proportion of food and exercise is most categorically brought forward in Περὶ διαίτης I, ch. 2. I regard it as probable that this thought was expressed in our passage in the words πειρᾶσθαι πρῶτον μὲν καταμανθάνειν σημεῖα συμμετρίας πόνων τε καὶ σίτων καὶ ἀναπαύσεως: the idea corresponds with other information on the Pythagorean manner of life. It seems probable that the author of Π. διαίτης, a treatise which is now generally dated around 400 B.C., was influenced by the Pythagoreans in his theory of a συμμετρία of σῖτα and πόνοι, as he was elsewhere[3].

There was a general preference among Greek doctors for 'non-aggressive therapies' as Plato had it. This is not to say that surgical treatment was entirely rejected; on the contrary, surgery and cauterisation were generally accepted methods. The Pythagorean objection was an exception.

[1] Reading πόνων with the Laurentianus (F.). Deubner reads ποτῶν, which is found in 244.
[2] This last sentence does not occur in 244.
[3] Notably in I 8. Cf. W. H. S. Jones, *Hippocr.* IV, London 1953, Introd. p. XIV, and R. Joly, *Recherches sur le Traité ps. hippocr. Du régime*, Paris 1960, p. 35 and 52.

The fact that Pythagoras used ἐπῳδαί in the case of some diseases is mentioned repeatedly. Porphyry, *V.P.* 33, adds that he did so in the case of bodily diseases too.

In this context we have to mention a well known passage from the Hippocratic Corpus. The passage is not usually treated as Pythagorean, but L. Edelstein has shown its Pythagorean character in a brief but important publication (1943): I am referring to the so-called Hippocratic oath[1].

This is what the young doctor swears:

> I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In purity and holiness[2] I will guard my life and my art.
>
> I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw in favour of such men as are engaged in this work[3].

In these promises we find a rejection (1) of euthanasia, (2) of abortion, (3) of operative intervention, even in the case of kidney stones, which was regarded as a treatment as frequent as it was urgent.

The first point in particular needs some explanation. Edelstein comments well on it[4]. When the doctor promises not to supply his patient with poison if asked by him to do so nor to suggest that he take it, it is the prevention of suicide that is implied, not the prevention of murder. Was it necessary that a doctor should promise this? Indeed it was. In a time when anaesthesia and pain-killing drugs were virtually unknown, when people were virtually defenceless in the face of disease and pain, it was a common occurrence for a patient to ask his doctor for a deadly drug to ensure an easy and painless end. "Throughout Antiquity many people preferred voluntary death to endless agony. This form of 'euthanasia' was an everyday reality". Generally speaking the Greek medical profession acceded to such requests. They also, and without scruple, supplied women with abortive drugs[5].

[1] Ludwig Edelstein, *The Hippocratic Oath.* Text, transl. and interpretation. Baltimore, 1943 (Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Nr. 1).
[2] ἁγνῶς καὶ ὁσίως. [3] The translation is Edelstein's. [4] Op. cit., p. 6-10.
[5] Edelstein, op. cit. p. 10-12. "In a world in which it was held justifiable to expose children immediately after birth, it would hardly seem objectionable to destroy the embryo". On the medical practice of abortion see R. Hähnel, *Die künstliche Abortus im Altertum*, in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin*, XXIX, 1937, pp. 224ff.

Finally, they operated without scruple. In particular operative treatment for kidney stones was common, since this is a very painful disorder[1].

The oath, then, contains a view which was by no means generally accepted and it is impossible to suppose that all Greek doctors swore it. Yet it was a professional oath, but apparently applicable to a limited group only, which distinguished itself from the majority in its severe views, viz. the Pythagoreans. On religious grounds they were strictly forbidden to commit suicide: man is not allowed to dispose of his own life; he has been ordered to a certain station and should not leave it before being ordered to do so[2]. Their rejection of abortion is very much in keeping with their strict prescriptions not to kill living beings. The texts likewise show that the Pythagoreans were thoroughly conscious of the responsibilities of parents-to-be with regard to the offspring about to be begotten or born. For example, we know the precept that parents-to-be must take great care of their future children[3].

> First of all they must pay attention to their own preparation for acquiring children by leading moderate and healthy lives both before and during the gestation period, by not eating immoderately and at the wrong times and by not taking food or drink which causes the condition of the body to deteriorate, in particular by not being drunk – this least of all. For they thought that an inferior, inharmonious and restless disposition produces a bad sperm. And generally speaking they were of the fixed opinion that it is a sign of levity and carelessness if someone who wishes to engender a living being and wishes to bring it to birth and life should not take zealous care that the child's entry into life should be as lovely as possible. Dog lovers are zealous in the care of the offspring of their dogs, and so are bird lovers; and it is clear that all others who are concerned for a noble offspring of their animals go to great lengths to ensure that their reproduction is not left to chance. Human beings, however, show little concern for their own offspring:

[1] Edelstein, ibid. p. 24-32.
[2] Plato, *Phaedo* 62b. [3] Iambl., *V.P.* 211-213.
[4] The first paragraph has its parallel in Stob. IV 37, 4 (W.- H. V, p. 879), where Aristoxenus is mentioned as the author. The passage quoted above (p. 179 f.), **T** 32, from Ocellus Lucanus' Περὶ γεννήσεως (*De universi natura* IV 1-4, Harder pp. 23-25) runs to 213 inclusive.

> they engender children at random, without reasonable forethought, and afterwards they bring them up and rear them in the most careless of ways. This is the strongest and clearest cause for the badness and inferiority of the majority of men. With most of them reproduction takes place as it does with cattle: at random[1].
>
> These were the directions and methods practised by those men in word and deed with respect to sober-mindedness. They had received these precepts traditionally as oracles from Pythagoras himself.

The promise of the medical practitioners not to supply expectant mothers with abortive drugs no doubt fits into this moral climate. Those who drafted the oath which makes the doctor declare that he will preserve his life and his art ἁγνῶς καὶ ὁσίως apparently regarded the killing of the unborn foetus as a sin against the divine. This too, as Edelstein rightly remarks, fits into the moral climate of the Pythagoreans.

Similarly the promise that the doctor will not misuse his profession in personal relations "remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves" implies certain moral principles which were by no means generally accepted in Ancient Greece, but which agree with the Pythagorean way of life as we found it in Pythagoras' speeches and other texts that served as parallels. Edelstein[2] writes:

> Their views (sc. of the Pythagoreans) on sexual matters were severer than those of all other ancient philosophers[3]. They

[1] I do not think it necessary to accept the view that the interest in eugenics was transferred from Plato to Pythagoras by later authors: this, too, may be a case of Pythagorean influence on Plato.
[2] *The Hippocr. Oath*, p. 34f.
[3] This is not entirely correct. In a preceding chapter (p. 180) I mentioned Musonius Rufus and Plotinus. Musonius fr. XII says: Μόνα μὲν ἀφροδίσια νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παίδων συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ ᾖ.
See on this passage A. C. van Geytenbeek's comments on *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe*, Assen 1963, pp. 71ff. It is strange that Edelstein who has the Pythagoreans of the 4th century B.C. in mind seems to imply that adultery and homosexuality were condemned by no other philosophers. Plato did condemn both most severely in the *Laws* VIII 841c-842a. He terms homosexual relations like Musonius, a παρὰ φύσιν τόλμημα which more than any other is due to unbridled lust (*Laws* I 636c).

alone judged sexual relations in terms of justice, meaning thereby not that which is forbidden or allowed by law: for the husband to be unfaithful to his wife was considered to be unjust toward her[1]. The Pythagoreans upheld the equality of men and women[2]. They alone condemned sodomy[3]. Besides, in the performance of moral duties, they did not discriminate between social ranks. In that respect free-born people and slaves, for the Pythagoreans, were on equal footing[4].

Though his rendering of Pythagorean ethics here and there needs a slight correction or some supplement, Edelstein on the whole was perfectly right when pointing to the fact that everything stipulated in the Oath with regard to sexual continuence agrees with the tenets of Pythagorean ethics. When he adds: "in fact with the ideals of these philosophers alone", thinking of the fourth century (as he does) it would be more precise to say: "with the ideals of these philosophers rather than those of any other philosophers' school".

The silence which the doctor promises not only with respect to strictly medical matters but concerning anything he sees in the houses that he visits professionally is likewise regarded as a Pythagorean

[1] The moral aspect of the condemnation of adultery is obvious in the Stoa as well. See Origenes, *C. Cels.* VII 63: ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες διὰ τὸ κοινωνικόν· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ.
Cf. also Epictetus, *Diss.* II 4 (the whole treatise deals with adultery). Antisthenes ap. Diog. Laert. VI 94. Nor were the Pythagoreans alone in their positive evaluation of marriage, at least not in later Antiquity; one need not, however, wait until the time of Plutarch: some centuries earlier Antipater of Tarsus may be quoted. (See S.V.F. III, p. 254ff.).

[2] E. here refers to the presence of women in Pythagoras' school. As we know this was not uncommon in Greece as early as the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C., witness the early Cynics and Epicurus, as well as (theoretically) Plato and the Stoa. We may, however, suppose that Pythagoras introduced the idea. It is curious to note again Edelstein's (professed) opinion that we cannot know anything of the Pythagoreanism that existed before the 4th century.

[3] This is certainly incorrect. Apart from the quoted passages of the *Laws* one may compare Socrates' attitude according to Alcibiades' speech in *The Symposium* and Plato's implicit condemnation. See Van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus*, loc. cit.

[4] Edelstein thinks that no specific texts can be quoted in support. One may, however, quote the precept not to upbraid anyone in anger, be he free or slave, equal or subordinate. Iamblichus apparently found this precept in both of his main sources. Likewise the story of Archytas and the lazy slaves, which derives from Spintharus, Aristoxenus' father.

trait by Edelstein, since they exercised silence methodically in their school.

There is one more point in the Hippocratic Oath that is specifically Pythagorean according to Edelstein, viz. the doctor's promise to regard his master as a father, to have him share in his material wealth and to regard his children as his brothers; and again to teach the art to his own sons as well as to those of his master if they want to learn it, without any charge, and for the rest only to those who have signed the contract and have sworn the oath.

Usually this item was explained in this vein, that in Greece during the early centuries medicine like all other arts was passed on from father to son in closed family guilds. When at a certain time these organizations began to receive outsiders in their midst, those who wished to be admitted had to become members of the family through adoption. Thus the Hippocratic covenant was supposed to be an engagement signed by newcomers joining one of the medical artisan families.

As a matter of fact, Plato says that physicians taught their sons and that Hippocrates taught outside pupils for a fee[1]. Moreover, Galen asserts that the Asclepiads were for generations the sole possessors of medicine, but later shared their knowledge with people not belonging to the clan. Yet Edelstein thinks the evidence is not sufficient to support such an explanation. For instance, who would believe that the young Athenian Hippocrates of whom Plato speaks in the *Protagoras* would have considered paying a fee to the great Hippocrates for instruction, had that meant that he should enter the family of the Coan physician? W. H. S. Jones[2] therefore protested against the view that the Oath would have been the test required by the Asclepiad Guild: he does not find a word in the text to support that theory. "The Oath simply binds the student to his master and his master's family, not to a guild or corporation".

But Edelstein's criticism goes further: if through the covenant the student became the adopted son of his master, the question must be raised whether such a relationship was common among the Greeks of any period. This is in fact maintained by some scholars: during the period preceding that of the sophists, it is said, the teacher generally was esteemed as his pupil's father[3]. Edelstein objects that this

[1] Plato, *Protag.* 311b; *Laws* IV 720b. [2] *Hippocrates*, I. p. 293.
[3] Edelstein cites here E. Hoffmann, *Kulturphilosophisches bei den Vorsokratikern*, in *Neue Jahrbücher f. Wissensch. u. Jugendbildung*, V, 1929, pp. 19f.

assertion is not supported by any evidence but that of the Hippocratic covenant itself. But from the Oath one may certainly not deduce that the idea of a spiritual kinship between teacher and pupil prevailed through all schools and guilds of the pre-classical era. "There is no reason, then, to assume that the adoption of the pupil by the teacher was a common characteristic of archaic education. Nor is such a practice known to have been customary in ancient scientific or practical training at any other time." – Edelstein thinks there is only one exception, viz. *among the Pythagoreans*. With them in fact it was customary during the 4th century to honour the teacher as a father by adoption. Epaminondas is said to have so honoured his teacher[1]. And in Epaminondas' time Pythagoras himself was said to have revered his teacher Pherecydes as a son reveres his father[2].

This has supplied us with the correct explanation of the Hippocratic covenant: the specific way in which the pupil is bound to his teacher is an instance of the Pythagorean way of life, as much as the rejection of suicide, abortion and surgery were features of the Πυθαγορικὸς βίος. Such is Edelstein's conclusion.

We have some reservations with regard to this part of Edelstein's exposition as well. Correct as he may be in saying that the Pythagoreans regarded their teachers as fathers, his notion that they were the only ones is erroneous. It is definitely incorrect to say that apart from the Hippocratic Oath we possess no indications of the existence of such an attitude. Let us remember Socrates' and Plato's fierce opposition to the sophists who charged high fees for instruction. How, then, did Socrates live? He was not a wealthy man nor had he any income from labour. Plato and Socrates leave no doubt at all on that point: they think it goes without saying that a pupil shared his material goods with his master where needed, and doubtless the pupil also took care of his master in case of illness and disaster. Plato's *Crito* furnishes us with an instance, nor is that the only one we know of. In the school of Epicurus the situation was no different. We also know the example of Arcesilaus who took his mathematics teacher into his house and nursed him until he recovered from a mental disturbance.

[1] Diod. X 11, 2; cf. Plut., *De genio Socr.* 13, p. 583 C. Aristox. ap. Iambl., *V.P.* 250: καὶ πατέρα τὸν Λῦσιν ἐκάλεσεν (sc. Ἐπαμεινώνδας).

[2] Diod. X 3,4; Iambl. *V.P.* 184 (from Nicomachus). Diodorus' information probably derives from Timaeus, and Iambl. (Nicomachus) from Aristoxenus. Edelstein quotes the former only.

Let us also recall the Eleatic philosopher in Plato's *Sophistes*, who, when he is about to examine critically Parmenides' thesis that 'only being is', begs his partner not to regard him as a patricide. "We shall have to subject the thesis of our father Parmenides to a critical examination"[1].

I believe therefore that there are good reasons for supposing that in the ancient Greek world it was not all that exceptional for a pupil to regard his teacher as a father. The notion is found explicitly in the community of the Pythagoreans, but there is no reason to think that it was lacking in the Socratic circle or in the early Academy, or for that matter among others during periods earlier or later than the 4th century.

In this respect as in many others one is compelled to make some reservation. Yet Edelstein is right with regard to his main thesis that the Hippocratic Oath was not a standard acceptable to all Greek physicians, nor did they all swear the Oath. On the contrary, as a standard it was valid in a restricted circle and its text contains at least some points which compel us to say that in this circle the Pythagorean way of life was accepted.

Edelstein thinks that the Oath dates from the 4th century, no earlier – for we cannot know anything about the Pythagoreanism of the 5th or 6th centuries – no later, for after the 4th century Pythagoreanism fades away, at least as a movement of scholarly importance.

These arguments of Edelstein are unacceptable. It is incorrect to depict Pythagoreanism as flourishing during the 4th century while its pre-history is clothed in impenetrable darkness. The School flourished during the 6th and the first half of the 5th centuries, and if there is still a tradition of Pythagorean forms of behaviour during the 4th century, this is due to the things that were handed down by previous generations. The Pythagorean principles mentioned by Edelstein – not to kill, not to dispose of one's own or someone else's life, the reverence for life even if it is not yet born, the avoidance of surgery even in cases where others commonly used it, the reverence for the human person – all these were doubtless of ancient standing. One will be wise to remember Guthrie's *dictum*[2]: "It is permissible to remark that the known character of Pythagoreanism must lead us to expect the greatest possible continuity of doctrine".

* * *

[1] *Soph.*, 241d.

[2] *History* I, p. 217.

J. Schumacher[1] has recently treated the importance of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans for medical science. Discussing the excesses of the criticism of the 19th century he rightly maintains that we are by no means precluded from knowing the outlines of ancient Pythagoreanism or from understanding its importance for science, including medical science. He is equally right in his view that the medical theories of the ancient Pythagoreans must be understood against the background of their philosophy. It is a pity that in describing that background he works almost exclusively with old German literature. He may not have been able to read Guthrie's recent book, but at least he should have read, and read with care, Aristotle's description in *Metaph.* A 5 which is basic for our knowledge of the philosophy of nature of the ancient Pythagoreans. If he had done so his own presentation of Pythagorean philosophy would have gained a great deal. He would have gained equally if he had read Festugière's important work on Alexander Polyhistor in *Revue des Études Grecques* (1945). What we find now needs drastic correction, for the author simply identifies number as determining principle with πέρας. Like Philolaus[2], but without referring to him, he speaks of τὸ περαῖνον. The Pythagoreans were, after the Ionians who treated matter as the essence of things, the first to introduce a determining principle, he declares. This principle was number, precursor of the later notion of εἶδος and of the notion φύσις as found in the medical writers. Number is put over against Anaximander's ἄπειρον as its necessary complement. It is that which gives form and determines as the active opposite the passive principle which is matter. The combination of the two is what the Pythagoreans called *harmony*.

The importance of the introduction of number as a determining principle for science, including medical science, is enormous. Only by the Pythagorean notion of harmony was a definition of health and disease made possible. Only then could the influence of cold and heat on the body and of foodstuffs on health be checked systematically. Thus one could arrive at a definite δίαιτα (regimen). For these reasons the author has no doubt that the Pythagoreans laid the foundation for the most important theories of ancient medicine, or at least decisively promoted its advance.

The picture offered here agrees most of all with Philolaus' fr. 1 and 2

[1] Joseph Schumacher, *Antike Medizin*, Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Medizin in der griechischen Antike. Berlin[2] 1963, (1st ed. 1940), pp. 34-85.
[2] Fr. 1 and 2.

which do say that the cosmos and all that it contains is combined from determining and indeterminate factors, ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων. One also reads[1] in Philolaus that all that is known comprises number. Yet the expression "mixture of number and ἄπειρον" does not occur here any more than in Aristotle in *Metaph.* A 5. One does find in Philolaus (fr. 6), that the ἀρχαί from which the objects derive, viz. the determining and indeterminate principles, are heterogeneous and therefore could not be combined in an orderly whole, "unless harmony were added in some way or other". Which are the old Pythagorean ἀρχαί? The answer to this question must be based on the statement given by Aristotle, *Metaph.* 986 a 15ff.: ἀρχαί were in the last resort πέρας and ἄπειρον. From these two together derives the one, which is both even and odd, and from the one derives the number. The συστοιχία in which πέρας and ἄπειρον appear on top is in any case considerably older than Philolaus, and the oldest Pythagorean view apparently does not identify number with πέρας nor regards the objects as the product of number and ἄπειρον; on the contrary, πέρας and ἄπειρον in their view were the principles whence derives number, and number was itself identified with the objects[2].

With respect to the doctrine of opposites and the doctrine of harmony, Schumacher finds his point of departure in Alexander Polyhistor's exposition. He was unaware of the fact that this is a far cry from the most ancient Pythagoreanism. Two definitions of 'health' are found in Alexander. The one simply says 'ἁρμονία'[3]; the other: ὑγίειαν τὴν τοῦ εἴδους διαμονήν, νόσον τὴν τούτου φθοράν[4]. The modern author starts from the basic thought that "harmony of number and ἄπειρον" is health, and disturbance of this harmony is disease. He admits that there are not too many texts that provide proof(!), but he finds welcome support in Alexander Polyhistor's second definition: "health is the permanency of form, disease its destruction". 'Form' is the whole man; it implies totality, beauty, standard.

[1] Fr. 4; cf. fr. 11.
[2] See Guthrie's excellent discussion in *History* I, pp. 233-248, and W. Burkert's comments on the Philolaus fragments, *Weisheit u. Wissenschaft* p. 233ff., in particular p. 237. Burkert, p. 254, finds an incongruity between the fragm. 6 and 11, in that the latter almost identifies number with harmony (τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσις καὶ ἁρμονία) and opposes it to the nature of the ἄπειρον, while in the former harmony was added as a third thing to the pre-existing περαίνοντα and ἄπειρα. This is one of the reasons why B. rejects the fr. 11.
[3] Diog. Laert. VIII 33. **T** 60a.
[4] Diog. Laert. VIII 35. **T** 60b.

The only objection is that this text is definitely not early Pythagorean!

A definition of health found in Plato's *Gorgias* (504b) probably is early Pythagorean: ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνόμενον, that is to say a state effected in the body by order. Order is 'harmony' or 'concord' of opposite forces or elements. It is the φιλία in the body itself that is mentioned in Iambl., *V.P.* 229. It is not, as Schumacher wants us to believe, "the mixture of number and ἄπειρον", which as such would be of a nature totally different from the harmony of opposites (ἰσονομία) as mentioned by Alcmaeon[1]. A passage in Galen[2] which says that Pythagoras explained disease as one of the δυνάμεις gaining the upper hand is thought unreliable by Schumacher, since it too much resembles Alcmaeon[3]. It escaped his notice that other texts confirm Galen's statement.

Thus a reservation is necessary in the case of Schumacher's exposition as well. Yet his view of the Pythagoreans' importance for medicine is correct; his chapter on Alcmaeon is excellent.

[1] Fr. 4. [2] *Hist. phil.* XIX 344 K. [3] *Antike Med.*, p. 56.

CHAPTER XI

EPILOGUE

We have come to the end of our exploration. Both in general and in many details the results were surprising. In the course of this study Pythagoras has appeared with traits different from those we hitherto thought could be ascribed to him. The picture of the philosopher has changed considerably. Not only a belief in metempsychosis, a memory of previous lives, the discovery of the laws of number and harmony, nor only the founder of a kind of religious community is found, but it has been established on sufficiently solid grounds that Pythagoras spoke to the people of Croton, to the people in its several branches; that he influenced the life of this people directly and considerably, and that he did this on the basis of the philosophic principles that dominated his life and thought. Historical evidence presented Pythagoras to us with more concrete and personal traits than we previously had thought possible. Nineteenth century scholarship taught us that we cannot know Pythagoras at all. His person, it was said, had disappeared into the mists of a long forgotten past, even before Aristotle. His belief in metempsychosis admittedly could not be denied. But that could be referred to Pythagoras the religious preacher and man of supernatural gifts. A Rohde was able to maintain that he was not a philosopher at all.

It is this thesis that has recently been brought to life again and defended with great ability by Burkert. It did not lie within the scope of the present work to discuss at length the arguments brought forward by him to deny the existence of any early Pythagorean form of mathematical science or philosophy[1]. However, summarizing the main issue of his work and admitting his position for argument's sake, we find ourselves faced with the question: supposing that Pythagoras

[1] I do hope soon to find the time to go more closely into the details of his argument.

was a 'wise man' in the ancient 'shamanist' style and nothing more, supposing that his 'way of life' consisted of following taboo prescriptions without any deeper religious and ethical views, – that is, supposing that he was a merely formal ritualist and a δεισιδαίμων of the most primitive kind, – would it be possible for him to have fascinated a whole population? Burkert is not willing to deny the political influence of the early Pythagoreans. Indeed he could not. But can this influence be explained on the basis of his presuppositions?

In this he fails to convince me.

Except for Burkert there might seem to be a turn of the tide: in Van der Waerden 's work Pythagoras and early Pythagoreans are given an important place in the history of science, and as far as philosophy is concerned scholars feel that an outline of early Pythagorean doctrine may be reconstructed on the basis of Aristotle's evidence. Guthrie goes so far as to use Pythagoras' name. His political influence is no longer denied since Von Fritz' and Minar's work. Somehow or other, however, this aspect is kept apart from the picture of Pythagoras as a philosopher. A level-headed interpreter imagines little more than that politicians were educated within the Pythagorean Society and then left for their own states where they wielded influence. But even the implications of this interpretation for the portrait of Pythagoras as a philosopher have scarcely been elaborated.

There is more, however. If one wishes to have a historical picture of Pythagoras the philosopher, the neglected evidence that has been treated in the previous pages ought not to be left aside. On the grounds of this evidence Pythagoras in fact must be imagined as a preacher to the people; a preacher who knew how to persuade the people to lead sober and restrained lives. By what means? By the force of a philosophical theory, a cosmic view intensely experienced as the truth. Far be it from us to deny that primitive elements were mixed up with this theory. But if it be asked what made Pythagoras a conqueror of men (including women), I think we have to reply that it was *not* a formalistic ritualism, *not* a strong measure of deisidaemony; what made him a conqueror of men was a truly reformatory spirit which appealed to reason and moral rectitude. This is what left its trace in the written history of Southern Italy, perhaps more tangibly than the pursuit of mathematical science in the early Pythagorean School – which is indeed not so intangible as Burkert would have us believe.

THE TEXTS

1. Events preceding Pythagoras' settlement at Croton. The battle of the Sagra.

a. Pompeius Trogus (Justinus), *Epitome* XX 2, 3.10-3.

The Metapontines, the Sybarites and the Crotonians have taken the neighbouring city of Siris. The Locrians side with Siris.

(10) Itaque indignantes in oppugnatione Siris auxilium contra se a Locrensibus latum, bellum his intulerunt (sc. Crotonienses). Quo metu territi Locrenses ad Spartanos decurrunt; auxilium supplices deprecantur. Illi longinqua militia gravati auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere eos iubent. Neque legati responsum sociae urbis spreverunt profectique in proximum templum facto sacrificio auxilium deorum inplorant. Litatis hostiis obtentoque, ut rebantur, quod petebant, haud secus laeti quam si deos ipsos secum avecturi essent, pulvinaria iis in navi conponunt faustisque profecti ominibus solacia suis pro auxiliis deportant.

His cognitis Crotonienses et ipsi legatos ad oraculum Delphos mittunt, victoriae facultatem bellique prosperos eventus deprecantes. Responsum prius votis hostes quam armis vincendos. Cum vovissent Apollini decimas praedae, Locrenses et voto hostium et responso dei cognito nonas voverunt tacitamque eam rem habuere, ne votis vincerentur. Itaque cum in aciem processisent et Crotoniensium centum viginti milia armatorum constitissent, Locrenses paucitatem suam circumspicientes (nam sola XV milia militum habebant) omissa spe victoriae in destinatam mortem conspirant, tantusque ardor ex desperatione singulos cepit, ut victores se putarent, si non inulti morerentur. Sed dum mori honeste quaerunt, feliciter vicerunt, nec alia causa victoriae fuit, quam quod desperaverunt. Pugnantibus Locris aquila ab acie numquam recessit eosque tam diu circumvolavit, quoad vincerent. In cornibus quoque duo iuvenes diverso a ceteris armorum

habitu, eximia magnitudine et albis equis et coccineis paludamentis pugnare visi sunt nec ultra apparuerunt, quam pugnatum est. Hanc admirationem auxit incredibilis famae velocitas. Nam eadem die, qua in Italia pugnatum est, et Corintho et Athenis et Lacedaemone nuntiata est victoria.

b. Diodorus, VIII 32:

"Οτι οἱ Λοκροὶ ἔπεμψαν εἰς Σπάρτην περὶ συμμαχίας δεόμενοι. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς Κροτωνιατῶν δυνάμεως ἀκούοντες, ὥσπερ ἀφοσιούμενοι καὶ μόνως ἂν οὕτω σωθέντων Λοκρῶν, ἀπεκρίθησαν αὐτοῖς συμμάχους διδόναι τοὺς Τυνδαρίδας. οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις εἴτε προνοίᾳ θεοῦ εἴτε τὸ ῥηθὲν οἰωνισάμενοι προσεδέξαντο τὴν βοήθειαν παρ'αὐτῶν καὶ καλλιερήσαντες ἔστρωσαν τοῖς Διοσκόροις κλίνην ἐπὶ τῆς νηὸς καὶ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὴν πατρίδα.

c. Strabo VI 10 (p. 261):

Μετὰ δὲ Λοκροὺς Σάγρα, ὃν θηλυκῶς ὀνομάζουσιν, ἐφ'οὗ βωμοὶ Διοσκούρων, περὶ οὓς Λοκροὶ μύριοι μετὰ Ρηγίνων πρὸς δεκατρεῖς μυριάδας Κροτωνιατῶν συμβαλόντες ἐνίκησαν· ἀφ'οὗ τὴν παροιμίαν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας ἐκπεσεῖν φασιν "ἀληθέστερα τῶν ἐπὶ Σάγρᾳ".

2. The situation at Croton after the battle of the Sagra and Pythagoras' attitude.

Pomp. Trogus (Justinus) XX 4, 1-5:

Post haec Crotoniensibus nulla virtutis exercitatio, nulla armorum cura fuit. Oderant enim quae infeliciter sumpserant, mutassentque vitam luxuria, ni Pythagoras philosophus fuisset. Hic Sami de Marato, locuplete negotiatore, natus magnisque sapientiae incrementis formatus Aegyptum primo, mox Babyloniam ad perdiscendos siderum motus originemque mundi spectandam profectus summam scientiam consecutus erat. Inde regressus Cretam et Lacedaemona ad cognoscendas Minois et Lycurgi inclitas ea tempestate leges contenderat. Quibus omnibus instructus Crotonam venit populumque in luxuriam lapsum auctoritate sua ad usum frugalitatis revocavit.

3. Pythagoras' method and its result.

a. Pomp. Trogus (Just.) XX 4, 6-12:

Laudabat cotidie virtutem et vitia luxuriae casumque civitatium ea peste perditarum enumerabat tantumque studium ad frugalitatem multitudinis provocavit, ut aliquos ex his luxuriatos incredibile videretur. Matronarum quoque separatam a viris doctrinam et puerorum a

parentibus frequenter habuit. Docebat nunc has pudicitiam et obsequia in viros, nunc illos modestiam et litterarum studium. Inter haec velut genetricem virtutum frugalitatem omnibus ingerebat consecutusque disputationum adsiduitate erat, ut matronae auratas vestes ceteraque dignitatis suae ornamenta velut instrumenta luxuriae deponerent eaque omnia delata in Iunonis aedem ipsi deae consecrarent, prae se ferentes vera ornamenta matronarum pudicitiam, non vestes esse.

b. Diodorus X 3, 1-3:

"Οτι ἐπ'ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Θηρικλέους κατὰ τὴν ἑξηκοστὴν πρώτην Ὀλυμπιάδα Πυθαγόρας ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐγνωρίζετο, προκεκοφὼς ἤδη ἐν παιδείᾳ· γέγονε γὰρ ἱστορίας ἄξιος, εἰ καί τις ἕτερος τῶν περὶ παιδείαν διατριψάντων. γέγονε δὲ Σάμιος τὸ γένος· οἱ δέ φασιν ὅτι Τυρρηνός. τοσαύτη δ' ἦν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ λόγοις πειθὼ καὶ χάρις, ὡς καὶ τῆς πόλεως σχεδὸν ὅλης ἐπ'αὐτὸν ἐπιστρεφούσης καθ' ἡμέραν ὥσπερεὶ πρός τινος θεοῦ παρουσίαν ἅπαντας συντρέχειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν. οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν δύναμιν ἐφαίνετο μέγας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐνέφαινεν ἦθος κατεσταλμένον καὶ πρὸς μίμησιν βίου σώφρονος τοῖς νέοις θαυμαστὸν ἀρχέτυπον, καὶ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀπέτρεπεν ἀπὸ τῆς πολυτελείας καὶ τρυφῆς, ἁπάντων διὰ τὴν εὐπορίαν ἀνέδην ἐκκεχυμένων εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ διαφθορὰν ἀγεννῆ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

4. Porphyry, *V.P.* 18-19 (from Dicaearchus):

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπέβη καὶ ἐν Κρότωνι ἐγένετο, φησὶν ὁ Δικαίαρχος, ὡς ἀνδρὸς ἀφικομένου πολυπλάνου τε καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης εὖ κεχορηγημένου, τήν τε γὰρ ἰδέαν εἶναι ἐλευθέριον καὶ μέγαν χάριν τε πλείστην καὶ κόσμον ἐπί τε τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ ἤθους καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἔχειν, οὕτως διαθεῖναι τὴν Κροτωνιατῶν πόλιν ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχεῖον ἐψυχαγώγησεν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαλεχθείς, τοῖς νέοις πάλιν ἡβητικὰς ἐποιήσατο παραινέσεις ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων κελευσθείς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς παισὶν ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων ἀθρόοις συνελθοῦσιν· εἶτα ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ γυναικῶν σύλλογος αὐτῷ κατεσκευάσθη. γενομένων δὲ τούτων μεγάλη περὶ αὐτοῦ ηὐξήθη δόξα, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἔλαβεν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ὁμιλητὰς οὐ μόνον ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκας, ὧν μιᾶς γε Θεανοῦς καὶ διεβοήθη τοὔνομα, πολλοὺς δ' ἀπὸ τῆς σύνεγγυς βαρβάρου χώρας βασιλεῖς τε καὶ δυνάστας.

5. Our oldest testimony on the four speeches of Pythagoras.

Antisthenes comments on the word πολύτροπον in *Odyss.* I by observing that Homer in calling Odysseus πολύτροπον did not so much praise as

blame him: such heroes as Achilles and Ajax were not called πολύτροποι, but sincere and noble. Then he goes on:
(Dindorf, Scholia in Hom. Odyss. I, p. 9, 25): Τί οὖν; ἆρα γε πονηρὸς ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι πολύτροπος ἐκλήθη; καὶ μὴν διότι σοφὸς οὕτως αὐτὸν προσείρηκε. μήποτε οὖν ὁ τρόπος τὸ μέν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἦθος, τὸ δέ τι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν; εὔτροπος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ἦθος ἔχων εἰς τὸ εὖ τετραμμένον· τρόποι δὲ λόγων αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις.
p. 10, 6: εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοί εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἐπίστανται τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα κατὰ πολλοὺς λέγειν τρόπους· ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολύτροποι ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται πρὸς παῖδας ἀξιωθεὶς ποιήσασθαι λόγους διαθεῖναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικούς, καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας γυναιξὶν ἁρμοδίους, καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικούς, καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους ἐφηβικούς. τὸν γὰρ ἑκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας ἐστίν· ἀμαθίας δὲ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνομοίως ἔχοντας τῷ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι μονοτρόπῳ.

6. The first speech. Iambl., *V.P.* 37-44.

καὶ μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον. περιχυθέντων δὲ τῶν νεανίσκων παραδέδοται λόγους τινὰς διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐξ ὧν εἰς τὴν σπουδὴν παρεκάλει τὴν περὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἀποφαίνων ἔν τε τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον τιμώμενον τὸ προηγούμενον ἢ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ ἑπόμενον, οἷον τὴν ἀνατολὴν τῆς δύσεως, τὴν ἕω τῆς ἑσπέρας, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τελευτῆς, τὴν γένεσιν τῆς φθορᾶς, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς αὐτόχθονας τῶν ἐπηλύδων, ὁμοίως δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀποικίαις τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ τοὺς οἰκιστὰς τῶν πόλεων, καὶ καθόλου τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς τῶν δαιμόνων, ἐκείνους δὲ τῶν ἡμιθέων, τοὺς ἥρωας δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τούτων δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς γενέσεως τῶν νεωτέρων. (38) ἐπαγωγῆς δὲ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἔλεγε πρὸς τὸ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς γονεῖς ἑαυτῶν, οἷς ἔφη τηλικαύτην ὀφείλειν αὐτοὺς χάριν, ἡλίκην ἂν ὁ τετελευτηκὼς ἀποδοίη τῷ δυνηθέντι πάλιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ φῶς ἀγαγεῖν. ἔπειτα δίκαιον μὲν εἶναι τοὺς πρώτους καὶ τοὺς τὰ μέγιστα εὐηργετηκότας ὑπὲρ ἅπαντας ἀγαπᾶν καὶ μηδέποτε λυπεῖν· μόνους δὲ τοὺς γονεῖς προτερεῖν τῆς γενέσεως ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις, καὶ πάντων τῶν κατορθουμένων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγόνων αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς προγόνους, οὓς οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον ἑαυτοὺς εὐεργετεῖν ἀποδεικνύντας εἰς θεοὺς οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐξαμαρτάνειν. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς εἰκός ἐστι συγγνώμην ἂν ἔχειν τοῖς μηδενὸς ἧττον τιμῶσι τοὺς πατέρας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ θεῖον παρ' αὐτῶν μεμαθήκαμεν τιμᾶν. (39) ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον τῇ αὐτῇ προσηγορίᾳ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν θεῶν αὔξειν, ὀνομάζοντα πατέρα τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν θνητῶν,

πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μυθοποιῶν παραδεδωκέναι τοὺς βασιλεύοντας τῶν θεῶν τὴν μεριζομένην φιλοστοργίαν παρὰ τῶν τέκνων πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν συζυγίαν τῶν γονέων καθ' αὑτοὺς περιποιήσασθαι πεφιλοτετιμημένους, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἅμα τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λαβόντας, τὸν μὲν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, τὴν δὲ τὸν Ἥφαιστον ἐναντίαν γεννῆσαι φύσιν ἔχοντας τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκα τοῦ καὶ τῆς πλεῖον ἀφεστώσης φιλίας μετασχεῖν. (40) ἁπάντων δὲ τῶν παρόντων τὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων κρίσιν ἰσχυροτάτην εἶναι συγχωρησάντων, ἀποδεῖξαι τοῖς Κροτωνιάταις διὰ τὸ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τοῖς κατῳκισμένοις οἰκεῖον ὑπάρχειν, διότι δεῖ τὸ προσταττόμενον ἑκουσίως τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὑπακούειν, παρειληφότας αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ἑτέρῳ πρεσβυτέρῳ πειθόμενον διαθλῆσαι τοὺς πόνους καὶ τῷ πατρὶ θεῖναι τῶν κατειργασμένων ἐπινίκιον τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν Ὀλύμπιον. ἀπεφαίνετο δὲ καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμιλίαις οὕτως ἂν χρωμένους ἐπιτυγχάνειν, ὡς μέλλουσι τοῖς μὲν φίλοις μηδέποτε ἐχθροὶ καταστῆναι, τοῖς δὲ ἐχθροῖς ὡς τάχιστα φίλοι γίνεσθαι, καὶ μελετᾶν ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους εὐκοσμίᾳ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας εὔνοιαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλους φιλανθρωπίᾳ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς κοινωνίαν. (41) ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἔλεγε περὶ σωφροσύνης, φάσκων τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων ἡλικίαν πεῖραν τῆς φύσεως λαμβάνειν, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἀκμαζούσας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας. εἶτα προετρέπετο θεωρεῖν [ἄξιον], ὅτι μόνης τῶν ἀρετῶν ταύτης καὶ παιδὶ καὶ παρθένῳ καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ τῇ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τάξει ἀντιποιεῖσθαι προσήκει, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς νεωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ μόνην αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν περιειληφέναι καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, διατηροῦσαν τὴν ὑγείαν καὶ τὴν τῶν βελτίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπιθυμίαν. (42) φανερὸν δὲ εἶναι καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀντικειμένης ἀντιθέσεως· τῶν γὰρ βαρβάρων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀντιταξαμένων ἑκατέρους δι' ἑνὸς ἀκρασίαν ταῖς δεινοτάταις περιπεσεῖν συμφοραῖς, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀνάπλουν, καὶ μόνης <ταύτης> τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν θεὸν δεκετῆ καὶ χιλιετῆ τάξαι τὴν τιμωρίαν, χρησμῳδήσαντα τήν τε τῆς Τροίας ἅλωσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν παρθένων ἀποστολὴν παρὰ τῶν Λοκρῶν εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Ἰλιάδος ἱερόν. παρεκάλει δὲ τοὺς νεανίσκους καὶ πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι κελεύων ὡς ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη πάντων μὲν σπουδαιότατον κρίνειν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταύτῃ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν τὴν ταύτης μηδένα χρόνον μηδὲ πόνον ἀνηλωκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα τῆς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας τοῖς φαύλοις τῶν φίλων ὁμοιουμένης καὶ ταχέως ἀπολειπούσης, τῆς δὲ παιδείας καθάπερ οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν μέχρι θανάτου παραμενούσης, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀθάνατον δόξαν περιποιούσης. (43) καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα, τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἱστοριῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ δογμάτων, κατεσκεύασε, τὴν παιδείαν ἐπιδεικνύων κοινὴν οὖσαν εὐφυΐαν τῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῷ γένει πεπρωτευκότων· τὰ γὰρ ἐκείνων εὑρήματα ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις γεγονέναι παιδείαν. οὕτω δ' ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει σπουδαῖον τοῦτο, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπαινουμένων τὰ

μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι παρ' ἑτέρου μεταλαβεῖν, οἷον τὴν ῥώμην, τὸ κάλλος, τὴν ὑγείαν, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τὰ δὲ τὸν προέμενον οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτόν, οἷον τὸν πλοῦτον, τὰς ἀρχάς, ἕτερα πολλὰ τῶν παραλειπομένων, τὴν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ παρ' ἑτέρου μεταλαβεῖν καὶ τὸν δόντα μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτὸν ἔχειν. (44) παραπλησίως δὲ τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἶναι κτήσασθαι, παιδευθῆναι δὲ ἐνδέχεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν, εἶθ' οὕτως προσιόντα φανῆναι πρὸς τὰς τῆς πατρίδος πράξεις, οὐκ ἐξ ἀναιδείας, ἀλλ' ἐκ παιδείας. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῖς ἀγωγαῖς διαφέρειν τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους τῶν θηρίων, τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας τῶν βαρβάρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους τῶν οἰκετῶν, τοῦς δὲ φιλοσόφους τῶν τυχόντων, ὅλως δὲ τηλικαύτην ἔχοντας ὑπεροχήν, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θᾶττον τρέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων ἐκ μιᾶς πόλεως τῆς ἐκείνων ἑπτὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν εὑρεθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ τῇ σοφίᾳ προέχοντας ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης ἑπτὰ συναριθμηθῆναι. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἑξῆς χρόνοις, ἐν οἷς ἦν αὐτός, ἕνα φιλοσοφίᾳ προέχειν τῶν πάντων· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἀντὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπωνόμασε. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ τοῖς νέοις διελέχθη.

7. The second speech. Iambl., *V.P.* 45-50.

Ἀπαγγελθέντων δ' οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν νεανίσκων πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκάλεσαν οἱ χίλιοι τὸν Πυθαγόραν εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, καὶ προεπαινέσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς υἱοὺς ῥηθεῖσιν ἐκέλευσαν, εἴ τι συμφέρον ἔχει λέγειν τοῖς Κροτωνιάταις, ἀποφήνασθαι τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας προκαθημένους. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοῖς συνεβούλευεν ἱδρύσασθαι Μουσῶν ἱερόν, ἵνα τηρῶσι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ὁμόνοιαν· ταύτας γὰρ τὰς θεὰς καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἁπάσας ἔχειν καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων παραδεδόσθαι καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ χορὸν εἶναι τῶν Μουσῶν, ἔτι δὲ συμφωνίαν, ἁρμονίαν, ῥυθμόν, ἅπαντα περιειληφέναι τὰ παρασκευάζοντα τὴν ὁμόνοιαν. ἐπεδείκνυε δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐ περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα θεωρήματα μόνον ἀνήκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν συμφωνίαν καὶ ἁρμονίαν τῶν ὄντων. (46) ἔπειτα ὑπολαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη δεῖν κοινῇ παρακαταθήκην ἔχειν τὴν πατρίδα παρὰ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν. δεῖν οὖν ταύτην διοικεῖν οὕτως, ὡς μέλλουσι τὴν πίστιν παραδόσιμον τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιεῖν. ἔσεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο βεβαίως, ἐὰν ἅπασιν ἴσοι τοῖς πολίταις ὦσι καὶ μηδενὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσέχωσι. τοὺς γὰρ ἀνθρώπους εἰδότας, ὅτι τόπος ἅπας προσδεῖται δικαιοσύνης, μυθοποιεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἔχειν παρά τε τῷ Διὶ τὴν Θέμιν καὶ παρὰ τῷ Πλούτωνι τὴν Δίκην καὶ κατὰ τὰς πόλεις τὸν νόμον, ἵν' ὁ μὴ δικαίως ἐφ' ἃ τέτακται ποιῶν ἅμα φαίνηται πάντα τὸν κόσμον συναδικῶν. (47) προσήκειν δὲ τοῖς συνεδρίοις μηδενὶ καταχρήσασθαι τῶν θεῶν εἰς ὅρκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτους προχειρίζεσθαι λόγους, ὥστε καὶ χωρὶς ὅρκων εἶναι πιστούς, καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν οἰκίαν οὕτως οἰκονομεῖν, ὥστε τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐξεῖναι τῆς προαιρέσεως εἰς ἐκείνην ἀνενεγκεῖν. πρός τε τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν γενομένους διακεῖσθαι

γνησίως, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων μόνους ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας αἴσθησιν εἰληφότας, καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν τοῦ βίου μετέχουσαν ὁμιλοῦντας ὡς τῶν μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους συνθηκῶν τιθεμένων ἐν γραμματειδίοις καὶ στήλαις, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν τοῖς τέκνοις. καὶ πειρᾶσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀγαπᾶσθαι μὴ διὰ τὴν φύσιν, ἧς οὐκ αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἑκούσιον. (48) σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅπως αὐτοί τε μόνας ἐκείνας εἰδήσωσιν, αἵ τε γυναῖκες μὴ νοθεύωσι τὸ γένος ὀλιγωρίᾳ καὶ κακίᾳ τῶν συνοικούντων· ἔτι δὲ τὴν γυναῖκα νομίζειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑστίας εἰληφότα μετὰ σπονδῶν καθάπερ ἱκέτιν ἐναντίον τῶν θεῶν εἰσῆχθαι πρὸς αὐτόν. καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ παράδειγμα γενέσθαι τοῖς τε κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ἣν οἰκεῖ, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ προνοεῖν τοῦ μηδένα μηδ' ὁτιοῦν ἐξαμαρτάνειν, ὅπως μὴ φοβούμενοι τὴν ἐκ τῶν νόμων ζημίαν ἀδικοῦντες λανθάνωσιν, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνόμενοι τὴν τοῦ τρόπου καλοκαγαθίαν εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὁρμῶσι. (49) διεκελεύετο δὲ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ἀποδοκιμάζειν τὴν ἀργίαν· εἶναι γὰρ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ πράξει καιρόν. ὡρίζετο δὲ μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀδικημάτων παῖδας καὶ γονεῖς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διασπᾶν. νομίζειν δὲ κράτιστον μὲν εἶναι τὸν καθ' αὑτὸν δυνάμενον προϊδεῖν τὸ συμφέρον, δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβεβηκότων κατανοοῦντα τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, χείριστον δὲ τὸν ἀναμένοντα διὰ τοῦ κακῶς παθεῖν αἰσθέσθαι τὸ βέλτιον. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τοὺς φιλοτιμεῖσθαι βουλομένους οὐκ ἂν διαμαρτάνειν μιμουμένους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις στεφανουμένους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους οὐ τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς κακῶς ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς τῆς νίκης ἐπιθυμεῖν τυχεῖν. καὶ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις ἁρμόττειν οὐ τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσι δυσαρεστεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὠφελεῖν. παρεκάλει δὲ τῆς ἀληθινῆς ἀντεχόμενον εὐδοξίας ἕκαστον εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷος ἂν βούλοιτο φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχειν τὴν συμβουλὴν ἱερὸν ὡς τὸν ἔπαινον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς μὲν ἡ χρεία πρὸς μόνους ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοῦ δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. (50) εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἶπεν ὅτι τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ᾠκίσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ὡς λέγουσιν, Ἡρακλέους, ὅτε τὰς βοῦς διὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἤλαυνεν, ὑπὸ Λακινίου μὲν ἀδικηθέντος, Κρότωνα δὲ βοηθοῦντα τῆς νυκτὸς παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ὡς ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων διαφθείραντος, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπαγγειλαμένου περὶ τὸ μνῆμα συνώνυμον ἐκείνῳ κατοικισθήσεσθαι πόλιν, ἄν περ αὐτὸς μετάσχῃ τῆς ἀθανασίας, ὥστε τὴν χάριν τῆς ἀποδοθείσης εὐεργεσίας προσήκειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη δικαίως οἰκονομεῖν.

οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες τό τε Μουσεῖον ἱδρύσαντο καὶ τὰς παλλακίδας, ἃς ἔχειν ἐπιχώριον ἦν αὐτοῖς, ἀφῆκαν καὶ διαλεχθῆναι χωρὶς αὐτὸν ἐν μὲν τῷ Πυθαίῳ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας, ἐν δὲ τῷ τῆς Ἥρας ἱερῷ πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ἠξίωσαν.

8. The third speech. Iambl., *V.P.* 51-53.

Τὸν δὲ πεισθέντα λέγουσιν εἰσηγήσασθαι τοῖς παισὶ τοιάδε ὥστε μήτε

ἄρχειν λοιδορίαν μηδὲ ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς λοιδορουμένους, καὶ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν ἐπώνυμον τῆς ἐκείνων ἡλικίας κελεῦσαι σπουδάζειν. ἔτι δὲ ὑποθέσθαι τῷ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖ παιδὶ ῥᾴδιον πεφυκέναι πάντα τὸν βίον τηρῆσαι τὴν καλοκαγαθίαν, τῷ δὲ μὴ εὖ πεφυκότι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν χαλεπὸν καθεστάναι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐκ φαύλης ἀφορμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος εὖ δραμεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις θεοφιλεστάτους αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἀποφῆναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φῆσαι κατὰ τοὺς αὐχμοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἀποστέλλεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ αἰτησομένους, ὡς μάλιστα ἐκείνοις ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ μόνοις διὰ τέλους ἀγνεύουσιν ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς διατρίβειν. (52) διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τοὺς φιλανθρωποτάτους τῶν θεῶν, τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα, πάντας ζωγραφεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν τῶν παίδων ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν. συγκεχωρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν στεφανιτῶν ἀγώνων <τινὰς> τεθῆναι διὰ παῖδας, τὸν μὲν Πυθικὸν κρατηθέντος τοῦ Πύθωνος ὑπὸ παιδός, ἐπὶ παιδὶ δὲ τὸν ἐν Νεμέᾳ καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἰσθμῷ, τελευτήσαντος Ἀρχεμόρου καὶ Μελικέρτου. χωρὶς δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ κατοικισθῆναι τὴν πόλιν τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν ἐπαγγείλασθαι τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τῷ ἡγεμόνι τοῦ οἰκισμοῦ δώσειν γενεάν, ἐὰν ἀγάγῃ τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἀποικίαν. (53) ἐξ ὧν ὑπολαβόντας δεῖν τῆς μὲν γενέσεως αὐτῶν πρόνοιαν πεποιῆσθαι τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, τῆς δ' ἡλικίας ἅπαντας τοὺς θεούς, ἀξίους εἶναι τῆς ἐκείνων φιλίας καὶ μελετᾶν ἀκούειν, ἵνα δύνωνται λέγειν, ἔτι δέ, ἣν μέλλουσιν εἰς τὸ γῆρας βαδίζειν, ταύτην εὐθὺς ἐξορμῶντας τοῖς ἐληλυθόσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις μηδὲν ἀντιλέγειν· οὕτω γὰρ εἰκότως ὕστερον ἀξιώσειν μηδὲ αὐτοῖς τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀντιδικεῖν.

διὰ δὲ τὰς παραινέσεις ὁμολογεῖται παρασκευάσαι μηδένα τὴν ἐκείνου προσηγορίαν ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλὰ πάντας θεῖον αὐτὸν καλεῖν.

9. The fourth speech. Iambl., *V.P.* 54-57.

Ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν θυσιῶν ἀποφήνασθαι λέγεται πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἑτέρου μέλλοντος ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς εὐχὰς βούλοιντ' ἂν ἐκεῖνον εἶναι καλὸν κἀγαθόν, ὡς τῶν θεῶν τούτοις προσεχόντων, οὕτως αὐτὰς περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιείκειαν, ἵν' ἑτοίμους ἔχωσι τοὺς ταῖς εὐχαῖς ὑπακουσομένους· ἔπειτα τοῖς θεοῖς προσφέρειν ἃ μέλλουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτὰς ποιεῖν καὶ χωρὶς οἰκετῶν πρὸς τοὺς βωμοὺς προσενεγκεῖν, οἷον πόπανα καὶ ψαιστὰ καὶ κηρία καὶ λιβανωτόν, φόνῳ δὲ καὶ θανάτῳ τὸ δαιμόνιον μὴ τιμᾶν, μηδ' ὡς οὐδέποτε πάλιν προσιούσας ἐνὶ καιρῷ πολλὰ δαπανᾶν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας ὁμιλίας κελεῦσαι κατανοεῖν, ὅτι συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς πατέρας ἐπὶ τῇ θηλείας φύσεως παρακεχωρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶσθαι τοὺς γεγαμηκότας ἢ τοὺς τεκνώσαντας αὐτάς. διὸ καλῶς ἔχειν ἢ μηδὲ ἐναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἢ τότε νομίζειν νικᾶν, ὅταν

ἐκείνων ἡττηθῶσι. (55) ἔτι δὲ τὸ περιβόητον γενόμενον ἀποφθέγξασθαι κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον, ὡς ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ συνοικοῦντος ἀνδρὸς ὅσιόν ἐστιν αὐθημερὸν προσιέναι τοῖς ἱεροῖς, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μὴ προσήκοντος οὐδέποτε. παραγγεῖλαι δὲ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὸν βίον αὐτάς τε εὐφημεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁρᾶν ὁπόσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εὐφημήσουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν τὴν διαδεδομένην μὴ καταλύσωσι μηδὲ τοὺς μυθογράφους ἐξελέγξωσιν, οἳ θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν δικαιοσύνην ἐκ τοῦ προΐεσθαι μὲν ἀμάρτυρον τὸν ἱματισμὸν καὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὅταν τινὶ ἄλλῳ δέῃ χρῆσαι, μὴ γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς πίστεως δίκας μηδ' ἀντιλογίας, ἐμυθοποίησαν τρεῖς γυναῖκας ἐνὶ κοινῷ πάσας ὀφθαλμῷ χρωμένας διὰ τὴν εὐχερῆ κοινωνίαν· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρρενας μετατεθέν, ὡς ὁ προλαβὼν ἀπέδωκεν εὐκόλως, ἑτοίμως καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μεταδιδούς, οὐδένα ἂν προσδέξασθαι λεγόμενον, ὡς μὴ οἰκεῖον αὐτῶν τῇ φύσει. (56) ἔτι δὲ τὸν σοφώτατον τῶν ἁπάντων λεγόμενον καὶ συντάξαντα τὴν φωνὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ σύνολον εὑρετὴν καταστάντα τῶν ὀνομάτων, εἴτε θεὸν εἴτε δαίμονα εἴτε θεῖόν τινα ἄνθρωπον, συνιδόντα διότι τῆς εὐσεβείας οἰκειότατόν ἐστι τὸ γένος τῶν γυναικῶν ἑκάστην τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτῶν συνώνυμον ποιήσασθαι θεῷ, καὶ καλέσαι τὴν μὲν ἄγαμον κόρην, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρα δεδομένην νύμφην, τὴν δὲ τέκνα γεννησαμένην μητέρα, τὴν δὲ παῖδας ἐκ παίδων ἐπιδοῦσαν κατὰ τὴν Δωρικὴν διάλεκτον μαῖαν· ᾧ σύμφωνον εἶναι τὸ καὶ τοὺς χρησμοὺς ἐν Δωδώνῃ καὶ Δελφοῖς δηλοῦσθαι διὰ γυναικός. διὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπαίνων πρὸς τὴν εὐτέλειαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν ἱματισμὸν τηλικαύτην παραδέδοται κατασκευάσαι τὴν μεταβολήν, ὥστε τὰ πολυτελῆ τῶν ἱματίων μηδεμίαν ἐνδύεσθαι τολμᾶν, ἀλλὰ θεῖναι πάσας εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ἱερὸν πολλὰς μυριάδας ἱματίων. (57) λέγεται δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι διελθεῖν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν χώραν τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴ πρὸς γυναῖκα διαβεβόηται, Ὀδυσσέως οὐ δεξαμένου παρὰ τῆς Καλυψοῦς ἀθανασίαν ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν Πηνελόπην καταλιπεῖν, ὑπολείποιτο δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶν εἰς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδείξασθαι τὴν καλοκαγαθίαν, ὅπως εἰς ἴσον καταστήσωσι τὴν εὐλογίαν.

ἁπλῶς δὲ μνημονεύεται διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐντεύξεις περὶ Πυθαγόραν οὐ μετρίαν τιμὴν καὶ σπουδὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν γενέσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν πόλιν περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν.

10. A reference to Iambl. *V.P.* 55 (the 4th speech) in Aristoph., *Ecclesiaz.* 446-451:

ΧΡ Ἔπειτα συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔφη
ἱμάτια, χρυσί', ἀργύριον, ἐκπώματα
μόνας μόναις, οὐ μαρτύρων ἐναντίον,
καὶ ταῦτ' ἀποφέρειν πάντα κοὐκ ἀποστερεῖν·
ἡμῶν δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔφασκε τοῦτο δρᾶν.
ΒΑ Νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, μαρτύρων γ' ἐναντίον.

11. Pythagoras' influence outside Croton.

a. Porph., *V.P.* 21-22:

ἃς δ'ἐπιδημήσας Ἰταλίᾳ τε καὶ Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβε πόλεις δεδουλωμένας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰς μὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν τὰς δὲ νεωστί, φρονήματος ἐλευθερίου πλήσας διὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἑκάστης ἀκουστῶν αὐτοῦ ἠλευθέρωσε, Κρότωνα καὶ Σύβαριν καὶ Κατάνην καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ Ἱμέραν καὶ Ἀκράγαντα καὶ Ταυρομένιον καὶ ἄλλας τινάς, αἷς καὶ νόμους ἔθετο διὰ Χαρώνδα τε τοῦ Καταναῖου καὶ Ζαλεύκου τοῦ Λοκροῦ, δι ' ὧν ἀξιοζήλωτοι τοῖς περιοίκοις ἄχρι πολλοῦ γεγόνασιν. Σίμιχος δ' ὁ Κεντοριπίνων τύραννος ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ τήν τ' ἀρχὴν ἀπέθετο καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὰ μὲν τῇ ἀδελφῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις ἔδωκεν. προσῆλθον δ'αὐτῷ, ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστόξενος, καὶ Λευκανοὶ καὶ Μεσσάπιοι καὶ Πευκέτιοι καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι. ἀνεῖλεν δ' ἄρδην στάσιν οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀπογόνων αὐτῶν ἄχρι πολλῶν γενεῶν καὶ καθόλου ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ τε καὶ Σικελίᾳ πόλεων πασῶν πρός τε ἑαυτὰς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας. πυκνὸν γὰρ ἦν πρὸς ἅπαντας αὐτῷ πολλοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους τόδε τὸ ἀπόφθεγμα· φυγαδευτέον πάσῃ μηχανῇ καὶ περικοπτέον πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ μηχαναῖς παντοίαις ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμαθίαν, κοιλίας δὲ πολυτέλειαν, πόλεως δὲ στάσιν, οἴκου δὲ διχοφροσύνην, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ἀμετρίαν.

b. Iamblichus, *V.P.* 33-34:

λέγεται τοίνυν ὡς ἐπιτηδημήσας Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Σικελίᾳ, ἃς κατέλαβε πόλεις δεδουλωμένας ὑπ'ἀλλήλων, τὰς μὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν, τὰς δὲ νεωστί, ταύτας φρονήματος ἐλευθερίου ὑποπλήσας διὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἑκάστης ἀκουστῶν αὐτοῦ ἀνερρύσατο καὶ ἐλευθέρας ἐποίησε, Κρότωνα καὶ Σύβαριν καὶ Κατάνην καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ Ἱμέραν καὶ Ἀκράγαντα καὶ Ταυρομένιον καὶ ἄλλας τινάς, αἷς καὶ νόμους ἔθετο διὰ Χαρώνδα τε τοῦ Καταναίου καὶ Ζαλεύκου τοῦ Λοκροῦ, δι' ὧν εὐνομώταται καὶ ἀξιοζήλωτοι ταῖς περιοίκοις μέχρι πολλοῦ διετέλεσαν. ἀνεῖλε δὲ ἄρδην στάσιν καὶ διχοφωνίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἑτεροφροσύνην οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν ἀπογόνων δὲ αὐτῶν μέχρι πολλῶν, ὡς ἱστορεῖται, γενεῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθόλου ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Σικελίᾳ πόλεων πασῶν κατά τε ἑαυτὰς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας. πυκνὸν γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἅπαντας πανταχῇ πολλοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους ⟨τὸ τοιοῦτον⟩ ἀπόφθεγμα, χρησμῷ θεοῦ συμβουλευτικῷ ὅμοιον, ἐπιτομή τις ὥσπερεὶ καὶ ἀνακεφαλαίωσίς τις τῶν αὐτῷ δοκούντων [τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπόφθεγμα]· e.q.s.

c. Cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 14, the end:

τοιγὰρ καὶ προσεκαρτέρουν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν λόγων ἕνεκα προσήεσαν καὶ Λευκανοὶ καὶ Πευκέτιοι Μεσσάπιοί τε καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι.

12. Pythagorean friendship.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 229-230:

(229) Φιλίαν δὲ διαφανέστατα πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντας Πυθαγόρας παρέδωκε, θεῶν μὲν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δι' εὐσεβείας καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς θεραπείας, δογμάτων δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ καθόλου ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα λογιστικοῦ τε πρὸς τὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου εἴδη διὰ φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν θεωρίας, ἀνθρώπων δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, πολιτῶν μὲν διὰ νομιμότητος ὑγιοῦς, ἑτεροφύλων δὲ διὰ φυσιολογίας ὀρθῆς, ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἢ τέκνα ἢ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ οἰκείους διὰ κοινωνίας ἀδιαστρόφου, συλλήβδην δὲ πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντας καὶ προσέτι τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων τινὰ διὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ φυσικῆς ἐπιπλοκῆς καὶ κοινότητος, σώματος δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θνητοῦ τῶν ἐγκεκρυμμένων αὐτῷ ἐναντίων δυνάμεων εἰρήνευσίν τε καὶ συμβιβασμὸν δι' ὑγείας καὶ τῆς εἰς ταύτην διαίτης καὶ σωφροσύνης κατὰ μίμησιν τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοσμικοῖς στοιχείοις εὐετηρίας. (230) ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ σύλληψιν τοῦ τῆς φιλίας ὀνόματος ὄντος, εὑρετὴς καὶ νομοθέτης ὁμολογουμένως Πυθαγόρας ἐγένετο, καὶ οὕτω θαυμαστὴν φιλίαν παρέδωκε τοῖς χρωμένοις, ὥστε ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοὺς πολλοὺς λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρότερον εὐνοούντων ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἰσί.

= Iambl. *V.P.* 69-70.

b. Cp. Diog. Laert. VIII 16:

ἱκανός τε γὰρ ἦν φιλίας ἐργάτης τά τ'ἄλλα καὶ εἴ τινα πύθοιτο τῶν συμβόλων αὐτοῦ κεκοινωνηκότα, εὐθύς τε προσηταιρίζετο καὶ φίλον κατεσκεύαζεν.

c. Diodorus X 8, 1:

Ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μεγίστην ἐποιοῦντο πρόνοιαν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς φίλους βεβαιότητος, τὴν τῶν φίλων εὔνοιαν ἀξιολογώτατον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ διειληφότες.

13. Precepts on friendship and on castigation.

Iambl., *V.P.* 230-231:

παρεκελεύοντο οὖν οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι ἐκ φιλίας ἀληθινῆς ἐξαιρεῖν ἀγῶνά τε καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐκ πάσης, εἰ δυνατόν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔκ γε τῆς πατρικῆς καὶ καθόλου ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς εὐεργέτας. τὸ γὰρ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἢ διαφιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἐμπεσούσης ὀργῆς ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου πάθους οὐ σωτήριον τῆς ὑπαρχούσης φιλίας. (231) ἔφασαν δὲ δεῖν ὡς ἐλαχίστας ἀμυχάς τε καὶ ἑλκώσεις ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγίνεσθαι· ⟨τοῦτο δὲ γίνεσθαι,⟩ ἐὰν ἐπίστωνται εἴκειν καὶ κρατεῖν

ὀργῆς ἀμφότεροι μέν, μᾶλλον μέντοι ὁ νεώτερός τε καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων τάξεων ἔχων ἡνδήποτε.

τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις τε καὶ νουθετήσεις, ἃς δὴ πεδαρτάσεις ἐκάλουν ἐκεῖνοι, μετὰ πολλῆς εὐφημίας τε καὶ εὐλαβείας ᾤοντο δεῖν γενέσθαι παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τοῖς νεωτέροις, καὶ πολὺ ἐμφαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς νουθετοῦσι τὸ κηδεμονικόν τε καὶ οἰκεῖον· οὕτω γὰρ εὐσχήμονά τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ὠφέλιμον τὴν νουθέτησιν.
= Iambl. *V.P.* 101.

14. Do not admonish while angry.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 197:

λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων, ὡς οὔτε οἰκέτην ἐκόλασεν οὐθεὶς αὐτῶν ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἐχόμενος οὔτε τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐνουθέτησέ τινα, ἀλλὰ ἀνέμενεν ἕκαστος τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀποκατάστασιν (ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸ νουθετεῖν πεδαρτᾶν)· ἐποιοῦντο γὰρ τὴν ἀναμονὴν σιωπῇ χρώμενοι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ. Σπίνθαρος γοῦν διηγεῖτο πολλάκις περὶ Ἀρχύτου ⟨τοῦ⟩ Ταραντίνου, ὅτι διὰ χρόνου τινὸς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἀφικόμενος, ἐκ στρατιᾶς νεωστὶ παραγεγονώς, ἣν ἐστρατεύσατο ἡ πόλις εἰς Μεσσαπίους, ὡς εἶδε τόν τε ἐπίτροπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκέτας οὐκ εὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν γεωργίαν ἐπιμελείας πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ μεγάλῃ τινὶ κεχρημένους ὀλιγωρίας ὑπερβολῇ, ὀργισθείς τε καὶ ἀγανακτήσας οὕτως ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνος, εἶπεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὅτι εὐτυχοῦσιν ὅτι αὐτοῖς ὤργισται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοὺς ἀθῴους γενέσθαι τηλικαῦτα ἡμαρτηκότας.

b. Cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 20:

ὀργιζόμενός τ' οὔτε οἰκέτην ἐκόλαζεν οὔτ' ἐλεύθερον οὐδένα.

15 *a*. Be faithful in friendship and fair in conflicts.

Iambl. *V.P.* 232:

ἐκ φιλίας μηδέποτε ἐξαιρεῖν πίστιν μήτε παίζοντας μήτε σπουδάζοντας· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διυγιᾶναι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φιλίαν, ὅταν ἅπαξ παρεμπέσῃ τὸ ψεῦδος εἰς τὰ τῶν φασκόντων φίλων εἶναι ἤθη. φιλίαν μὴ ἀπογιγνώσκειν ἀτυχίας ἕνεκα ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀδυναμίας τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον ἐμπιπτουσῶν, ἀλλὰ μόνην εἶναι δόκιμον ἀπόγνωσιν φίλου τε καὶ φιλίας τὴν γινομένην διὰ κακίαν μεγάλην τε καὶ ἀνεπανόρθωτον. ἔχθραν ἑκόντα μὲν μηδέποτε αἱρεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς μὴ τελείως κακούς, ἀράμενον δὲ μένειν εὐγενῶς ἐν τῷ διαπολεμεῖν, ἂν μὴ μεταπέσῃ τὸ ἦθος τοῦ διαφερομένου καὶ προσγένηται εὐγνωμοσύνη. πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔργοις· νόμιμον δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὅσιον τὸν πολέμιον, εἰ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ πολεμήσειεν. αἴτιον μηδέποτε γίνεσθαι

εἰς δύναμιν διαφορᾶς, εὐλαβεῖσθαι ⟨δὲ⟩ ταύτης τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.
= Iambl. *V.P.* 102.

b. In true friendship as much as possible must be ordered and regulated.
Iambl. *V.P.* 233.

ἐν τῇ μελλούσῃ ἀληθινῇ ἔσεσθαι φιλίᾳ ὡς πλεῖστα δεῖν ἔφασαν εἶναι τὰ ὡρισμένα καὶ νενομισμένα, καλῶς δὲ ταῦτ'εἶναι κεκριμένα καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ, –

16. Faithfulness in keeping appointments.

a. Iambl. *V.P.* 185:

πρός γε μὴν συνταγὰς καὶ τὸ ἀψευδεῖν ἐν αὐταῖς οὕτως εὖ παρεσκεύαζε τοὺς ὁμιλητὰς Πυθαγόρας, ὥστε φασί ποτε Λῦσιν προσκυνήσαντα ἐν Ἥρας ἱερῷ καὶ ἐξιόντα συντυχεῖν Εὐρυφάμῳ Συρακουσίῳ τῶν ἑταίρων τινὶ περὶ τὰ προπύλαια τῆς θεοῦ εἰσιόντι. προστάξαντος δὲ τοῦ Εὐρυφάμου προσμεῖναι αὐτόν, μέχρις ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς προσκυνήσας ἐξέλθῃ, ἑδρασθῆναι ἐπί τινι λιθίνῳ θώκῳ ἱδρυμένῳ αὐτόθι. ὡς δὲ προσκυνήσας ὁ Εὐρύφαμος καὶ ἔν τινι διανοήματι καὶ βαθυτέρᾳ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐννοίᾳ γενόμενος δι' ἑτέρου πυλῶνος ἐκλαθόμενος ἀπηλλάγη, τό τε τῆς ἡμέρας λοιπὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν νύκτα καὶ τὸ πλέον μέρος ἔτι τῆς ἄλλης ἡμέρας ὡς εἶχεν ἀτρέμας προσέμενεν ὁ Λῦσις. καὶ τάχα ἂν ἐπὶ πλείονα χρόνον αὐτοῦ ἦν, εἰ μή περ ἐν τῷ ὁμακοείῳ τῆς ἑξῆς ἡμέρας γενόμενος ὁ Εὐρύφαμος καὶ ἀκούσας ἐπιζητουμένου πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τοῦ Λύσιδος ἀνεμνήσθη. καὶ ἐλθὼν αὐτὸν ἔτι προσμένοντα κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην ἀπήγαγε, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπὼν τῆς λήθης καὶ προσεπιθεὶς ὅτι 'ταύτην δέ μοι θεῶν τις ἐνῆκε, δοκίμιον ἐσομένην τῆς σῆς περὶ συνθήκας εὐσταθείας'.

b. Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 256, the end:

παραπλησίως δ', εἴ τις τῶν κοινωνούντων τῆς διατριβῆς ἀπαντῆσαι κελεύσειεν εἴς τινα τόπον, ἐν ἐκείνῳ περιμένειν, ἕως ἔλθοι, δι' ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτός, πάλιν ἐν τούτῳ τῶν Πυθαγορείων συνεθιζόντων μεμνῆσθαι τὸ ῥηθὲν καὶ μηδὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν· —

17. Avoid friendship with persons unworthy of it.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 233:

ἀλλὰ μὴν τεκμήραιτο ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τοῦ μὴ παρέργως αὐτοὺς τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ἐκκλίνειν φιλίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ σπουδαίως περικάμπτειν αὐτὰς καὶ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ δὲ μέχρι πολλῶν γενεῶν τὸ φιλικὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀνένδοτον διατετηρηκέναι, ἔκ τε ὧν Ἀριστόξενος ἐν τῷ περὶ Πυθαγορικοῦ βίου αὐτὸς διακηκοέναι φησὶ Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελίας τυράννου, ὅτε ἐκπεσὼν τῆς μοναρχίας γράμματα ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἐδίδασκε.
= Nicom. ap. Porph., *V.P.* 59.

b. A hostile version of the same precept. Iambl., *V.P.* 259:
τοὺς φίλους ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς σέβεσθαι, τοὺς δ'ἄλλους ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία χειροῦσθαι. τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην γνώμην ὑπὲρ Πυθαγόρου μεμνημένους ἐν μέτρῳ τοὺς μαθητὰς λέγειν·

τοὺς μὲν ἑταίρους ἦγεν ἴσον μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι,
τοὺς δ'ἄλλους ἠγεῖτ' οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

18. The story of Damon and Phintias.

Aristoxenus ap. Porph., *V.P.* 60-61:
(60) <βουλόμενος οὖν> ποτε Διονύσιος πεῖραν αὐτῶν λ<αβεῖν>, διαβεβαιουμένων τινῶν ὡς συλληφθέντες καὶ φοβηθέντες οὐκ ἐμμενοῦσι τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πίστει, τάδ' ἐποίησεν. συνελήφθη μὲν Φιντίας καὶ ἀνήχθη πρὸς τὸν τύραννον. κατηγορεῖν δ' αὐτοῦ Διονύσιον ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντος αὐτῷ· καὶ δὴ τοῦτο ἐξεληλέγχθαι κεκρίσθαι τ' ἀποθνήσκειν αὐτόν. τὸν δέ, ἐπεὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ δέδοκται, εἰπεῖν δοθῆναί γε τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ὅπως οἰκονομήσηται τά τε καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ κατὰ Δάμωνα· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἑταῖρον καὶ κοινωνόν· πρεσβύτερον δ' <αὐτὸν> ὄντα πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνειληφέναι. ἠξίου δ' ἀφεθῆναι ἐγγυητὴν παρασχὼν τὸν Δάμωνα. συγχωρήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Διονυσίου μεταπεμφθεὶς ὁ Δάμων καὶ τὰ συμβάντα ἀκούσας ἐνεγγυήσατο καὶ ἔμεινεν ἕως ἂν ἐπανέλθῃ ὁ Φιντίας. (61) ὁ μὲν οὖν Διονύσιος ἐξεπλήττετο ἐπὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις. ἐκείνους δὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰσαγαγόντας τὴν διάπειραν τὸν Δάμωνα χλευάζειν ὡς ἐγκαταλειφθησόμενον. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου περὶ δυσμὰς ἥκειν τὸν Φιντίαν ἀποθανούμενον, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντας ἐκπλαγῆναι. Διονύσιον δὲ περιβαλόντα καὶ φιλήσαντα τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀξιῶσαι τρίτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν φιλίαν παραδέξασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μηδενὶ τρόπῳ καίτοι πολλὰ λιπαροῦντος αὐτοῦ συγκαταθεῖναι εἰς τοιοῦτο. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Ἀριστόξενος ὡς παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀκούσας Διονυσίου ἀπήγγειλεν.
= Iambl., *V.P.* 234-237, init.

Also Diodorus X 4, 3.

19. The Pythagorean who died on a journey.

Iambl., *V.P.* 237-238:
καταχθῆναι γοῦν φασι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν τινα μακρὰν καὶ ἐρήμην ὁδὸν βαδίζοντα εἰς τι πανδοχεῖον, ὑπὸ κόπου δὲ καὶ ἄλλης παντοδαπῆς αἰτίας εἰς νόσον μακράν τε καὶ βαρεῖαν ἐμπεσεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπιλιπεῖν αὐτὸν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. τὸν μέντοι πανδοχέα, εἴτε οἴκτῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἴτε καὶ ἀποδοχῇ, πάντα παρασχέσθαι, μήτε ὑπουργίας τινὸς φεισάμενον μήτε δαπάνης μηδεμιᾶς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κρείττων ἦν ἡ νόσος, τὸν μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν ἑλόμενον γράψαι τι σύμβολον ἐν πίνακι καὶ ἐπιστεῖλαι, ὅπως, ἄν τι πάθοι, κριμνὰς τὴν δέλτον

παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐπισκοπῇ, εἴ τις τῶν παριόντων ἀναγνωριεῖ τὸ σύμβολον· τοῦτον γὰρ ἔφη αὐτῷ ἀποδώσειν τὰ ἀναλώματα, ἅπερ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ χάριν ἐκτίσειν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ. τὸν δὲ πανδοχέα μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν θάψαι τε καὶ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, μὴ μέντοι γε ἐλπίδας ἔχειν τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ δαπανήματα, μή τί γε καὶ πρὸς εὖ παθεῖν πρός τινος τῶν ἀναγνωριούντων τὴν δέλτον. ὅμως μέντοι διαπειρᾶσθαι ἐκπεπληγμένον τὰς ἐντολὰς ἐκτιθέναι τε ἑκάστοτε εἰς τὸ μέσον τὸν πίνακα. χρόνῳ δὲ πολλῷ ὕστερον τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν τινὰ παριόντα ἐπιστῆναί τε καὶ μαθεῖν τὸν θέντα τὸ σύμβολον, ἐξετάσαι τε τὸ συμβὰν καὶ τῷ πανδοχεῖ πολλῷ πλέον ἀργύριον ἐκτῖσαι τῶν δεδαπανημένων.

20. Other instances of mutual help.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 239:
Κλεινίαν γε μὴν τὸν Ταραντῖνόν φασι πυθόμενον, ὡς Πρῶρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, τῶν Πυθαγόρου λόγων ζηλωτὴς ὤν, κινδυνεύοι περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας, συλλεξάμενον χρήματα πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ Κυρήνης καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὰ Πρώρου πράγματα, μὴ μόνον τοῦ μειῶσαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν ὀλιγωρήσαντα, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὸν διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ κίνδυνον περιστάντα. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Θέστορα τὸν Ποσειδωνιάτην ἀκοῇ μόνον ἱστοροῦντα, ὅτι Θυμαρίδης εἴη ⟨ὁ⟩ Πάριος τῶν Πυθαγορείων, ἡνίκα συνέπεσεν εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν καταστῆναι ἐκ πολλῆς περιουσίας, πλεῦσαί φασιν εἰς τὴν Πάρον, ἀργύριον συχνὸν συλλεξάμενον, καὶ ἀνακτήσασθαι αὐτῷ τὰ ὑπάρξαντα.

b. Also Diodorus X 4, 1 tells the story of Clinias and adds:
καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πεποιηκότες διαμνημονεύονται.

c. Porph., *V.P.* 33, the beginning:
τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὑπερηγάπα, κοινὰ μὲν τὰ τῶν φίλων εἶναι πρῶτος ἀποφηνάμενος, τὸν δὲ φίλον ἄλλον ἑαυτόν.

For κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 10 (= Timaeus fr. 77); Scholia in Plato, *Phaedr.* 279 (Hermann VI, p. 275); Photius, *Lex.* 129. *Infra*, nr. 49, *12.*

21. Music as a cure for the passions.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 64:
(64) Ἡγούμενος δὲ πρώτην εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν δι' αἰσθήσεως προσφερομένην ἐπιμέλειαν, εἴ τις καλὰ μὲν ὁρῴη καὶ σχήματα καὶ εἴδη, καλῶν δὲ ἀκούοι ῥυθμῶν καὶ μελῶν, τὴν διὰ μουσικῆς παίδευσιν πρώτην κατεστήσατο διά τε μελῶν τινων καὶ ῥυθμῶν, ἀφ' ὧν τρόπων τε καὶ παθῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἰάσεις ἐγίγνοντο ἁρμονίαι τε τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, ὥσπερ εἶχον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, συνήγοντο, σωματικῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν νοσημάτων καταστολαὶ καὶ

ἀφυγιασμοὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπενοοῦντο. καὶ νὴ Δία τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντα ταῦτα λόγου ἄξιον, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν γνωρίμοις τὰς λεγομένας ἐξαρτύσεις τε καὶ ἐπαφὰς συνέταττε καὶ συνηρμόζετο, δαιμονίως μηχανώμενος κεράσματά τινων μελῶν διατονικῶν τε καὶ χρωματικῶν καὶ ἐναρμονίων, δι' ὧν ῥᾳδίως εἰς τὰ ἐναντία περιέτρεπε καὶ περιῆγε τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη νέον ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλόγως συνιστάμενα καὶ ὑποφυόμενα, λύπας καὶ ὀργὰς καὶ ἐλέους καὶ ζήλους ἀτόπους καὶ φόβους, ἐπιθυμίας τε παντοίας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ χαυνώσεις καὶ ὑπτιότητας καὶ σφοδρότητας, ἐπανορθούμενος πρὸς ἀρετὴν τούτων ἕκαστον διὰ τῶν προσηκόντων μελῶν ὡς διά τινων σωτηρίων συγκεκραμένων φαρμάκων.

b. Iambl., *V.P.* 110-111:

(110) Ὑπελάμβανε δὲ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ὑγείαν, ἄν τις αὐτῇ χρῆται κατὰ τοὺς προσήκοντας τρόπους. εἰώθει γὰρ οὐ παρέργως τῇ τοιαύτῃ χρῆσθαι καθάρσει· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ καὶ προσηγόρευε τὴν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἰατρείαν. ἥπτετο δὲ περὶ τὴν ἑαρινὴν ὥραν τῆς τοιαύτης μελῳδίας· ἐκάθιζε γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ λύρας ἐφαπτόμενον, καὶ κύκλῳ ἐκαθέζοντο οἱ μελῳδεῖν δυνατοί, καὶ οὕτως ἐκείνου κρούοντος συν�ᾠδον παιῶνάς τινας, δι' ὧν εὐφραίνεσθαι καὶ ἐμμελεῖς καὶ ἔνρυθμοι γίνεσθαι ἐδόκουν. (111) χρῆσθαι δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῇ μουσικῇ ἐν ἰατρείας τάξει, καὶ εἶναί τινα μέλη πρὸς τὰ ψυχῆς πεποιημένα πάθη, πρός τε ἀθυμίας καὶ δηγμούς, ἃ δὴ βοηθητικώτατα ἐπινενόητο, καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἕτερα πρός τε τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θυμοὺς καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν παραλλαγὴν τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς, εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἄλλο γένος μελοποιίας ἐξευρημένον. χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν. ὀργάνῳ δὲ χρῆσθαι λύρᾳ· τοὺς γὰρ αὐλοὺς ὑπελάμβανεν ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ πανηγυρικὸν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἐλευθέριον τὸν ἦχον ἔχειν. χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου λέξεσιν ἐξειλεγμέναις πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ψυχῆς.

Cf. Porph., *V.P.* 33.

22. Examples.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 112:

λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων Πυθαγόρας μὲν σπονδειακῷ ποτε μέλει διὰ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ κατασβέσαι τοῦ Ταυρομενίτου μειρακίου μεθύοντος τὴν λύσσαν, νύκτωρ ἐπικωμάζοντος ἐρωμένῃ παρὰ ἀντεραστοῦ πυλῶνι, ἐμπιπράναι μέλλοντος· ἐξήπτετο γὰρ καὶ ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο ὑπὸ τοῦ Φρυγίου αὐλήματος. ὃ δὴ κατέπαυσε τάχιστα ὁ Πυθαγόρας. ἐτύγχανε δὲ αὐτὸς ἀστρονομούμενος ἀωρί· καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν σπονδειακὸν μεταβολὴν ὑπέθετο τῷ αὐλητῇ, δι' ἧς ἀμελλητὶ κατασταλὲν κοσμίως οἴκαδε ἀπηλλάγη τὸ μειράκιον, πρὸ βραχέος μηδ' ἐφ'ὅσον οὖν ἀνασχόμενον μηδ' ἁπλῶς ὑπομεῖναν νουθεσίας ἐπιβολὴν

παρ'αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἐμπλήκτως ἀποσκορακίσαν τὴν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συντυχίαν.

Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 195 (Deubner p. 107, 15ff.). Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VI 8.

b. Iambl., *V.P.* 113:

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ σπασαμένου τὸ ξίφος ἤδη νεανίου τινὸς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ ξενοδόχον Ἄγχιτον, ἐπεὶ δικάσας δημοσίᾳ τὸν τοῦ νεανίου πατέρα ἐθανάτωσε, καὶ ἀίξαντος, ὡς εἶχε συγχύσεως καὶ θυμοῦ, ξιφήρους παῖσαι τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς καταδικαστήν, ὡσανεὶ φονέα, Ἄγχιτον, μεθαρμοσάμενος ὡς εἶχε τὴν λύραν καὶ πεπαντικόν τι μέλος καὶ κατασταλτικὸν μεταχειρισάμενος εὐθὺς ἀνεκρούσατο τὸ

νηπενθὲς ἄχολόν τε, κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἁπάντων[1]

κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, καὶ τόν τε ἑαυτοῦ ξενοδόχον Ἄγχιτον θανάτου ἐρρύσατο καὶ τὸν νεανίαν ἀνδροφονίας.

23. Human lifetime divided into four periods.

a. Aristox. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* IV 1, 49:

ἐπιμελητέον δὲ πάσης ἡλικίας ἡγοῦντο καὶ τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἐν γράμμασι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασιν ἀσκεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ νεανίσκους τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἔθεσί τε καὶ νόμοις γυμνάζεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας ταῖς πράξεσί τε καὶ δημοσίαις λειτουργίαις προσέχειν· τοὺς δὲ πρεσβύτας ἐνθυμήσεσι καὶ κριτηρίοις καὶ συμβουλίαις δεῖν ἐναναστρέφεσθαι μετὰ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ὑπελάμβανον, ὅπως μήτε οἱ παῖδες νηπιάζοιεν μήτε οἱ νεανίσκοι παιδαριεύοιντο μήτε οἱ ἄνδρες νεανιεύοιντο μήτε οἱ γέροντες παραφρονοῖεν. δεῖν δὲ ἕφασκον εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων καὶ τὴν τροφὴν τεταγμένως προσφέρεσθαι, διδάσκουσαν ὡς ἡ μὲν τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καλὰ καὶ σύμφορα, ἡ δὲ ἀταξία καὶ ἀσυμμετρία αἰσχρά τε καὶ ἀσύμφορα.

b. Diod. X 9, 5:

Ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι διῄρουν καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς τέσσαρα μέρη, παιδός, νέου, νεανίσκου, γέροντος, καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην ἔφασαν ὁμοίαν εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν ὡρῶν μεταβολαῖς, τὸ μὲν ἔαρ τῷ παιδὶ διδόντες, τὸ δὲ φθινόπωρον τῷ ἀνδρί, τὸν δὲ χειμῶνα τῷ γέροντι, τὸ δὲ θέρος τῷ νέῳ.

c. Diog. Laert. VIII 10:

Διαιρεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βίον οὕτως· "Παῖς εἴκοσι ἔτεα, νεηνίσκος εἴκοσι, νεηνίης εἴκοσι, γέρων εἴκοσι. αἱ δὲ ἡλικίαι πρὸς τὰς ὥρας ὧδε σύμμετροι· παῖς ἔαρ, νεηνίσκος θέρος, νεηνίης φθινόπωρον, γέρων χειμών." ἔστι δ'αὐτῷ ὁ μὲν νεηνίσκος μειράκιον, ὁ δὲ νεηνίης ἀνήρ.

[1] *Odyss.* 4, 221.

d. Iambl., *V.P.* 201:

ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ τῷ σύμπαντι εἶναί τινας ἡλικίας ἐνδεδασμένας (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λέγειν αὐτούς φασιν), ἃς οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ τυχόντος πρὸς ἀλλήλας συνεῖραι· ἐκκρούεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὰς ὑπ'ἀλλήλων, ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἄγῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ γενετῆς.

24. Usual methods of education criticized.

Iambl., *V.P.* 201 (continued) – 203:

δεῖν οὖν τῆς τοῦ παιδὸς ἀγωγῆς καλῆς τε καὶ σώφρονος γινομένης καὶ ἀνδρικῆς πολὺ εἶναι μέρος τὸ παραδιδόμενον εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεανίσκου ἡλικίαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῆς τοῦ νεανίσκου ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ ἀγωγῆς καλῆς τε καὶ ἀνδρικῆς καὶ σώφρονος γινομένης πολὺ εἶναι μέρος <τὸ> παραδιδόμενον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡλικίαν, ἐπείπερ εἴς γε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄτοπόν τε καὶ γελοῖον εἶναι τὸ συμβαῖνον. (202) παῖδας μὲν γὰρ ὄντας οἴεσθαι δεῖν εὐτακτεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι πάντων τῶν φορτικῶν τε καὶ ἀσχημόνων εἶναι δοκούντων, νεανίσκους δὲ γενομένους ἀφεῖσθαι παρά γε δὴ τοῖς πολλοῖς ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται. συρρεῖν δὲ σχεδὸν εἰς ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων· καὶ γὰρ παιδαριώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀνδρώδη τοὺς νεανίσκους ἁμαρτάνειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φεύγειν ἅπαν τὸ τῆς σπουδῆς τε καὶ τάξεως γένος, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, διώκειν δὲ τὸ τῆς παιγνίας τε καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ ὕβρεως τῆς παιδικῆς εἶδος, τῆς τοῦ παιδὸς ἡλικίας οἰκειότατον εἶναι· ἐκ ταύτης οὖν εἰς τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν φιλοτιμιῶν γένος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ὁρμάς τε καὶ διαθέσεις, ὅσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι τοῦ χαλεποῦ τε καὶ θορυβώδους γένους, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡλικίας εἰς τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων ἀφικνεῖσθαι. διόπερ πασῶν δεῖσθαι τῶν ἡλικιῶν ταύτην πλείστης ἐπιμελείας. (203) — ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ διαπορεῖν πολλάκις αὐτοὺς ἔφασαν, τίνος ἕνεκα τοὺς παῖδας συνεθίζομεν προσφέρεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν τεταγμένως τε καὶ συμμέτρως, καὶ τὴν μὲν τάξιν καὶ τὴν συμμετρίαν ἀποφαίνομεν αὐτοῖς καλά, τὰ δὲ τούτων ἐναντία, τήν τε ἀταξίαν καὶ τὴν ἀσυμμετρίαν, αἰσχρά, ὃ καὶ ἔστιν ὅ τε οἰνόφλυξ καὶ ἄπληστος ἐν μεγάλῳ ὀνείδει κείμενος. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν τούτων ἐστὶ χρήσιμον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡλικίαν ἀφικνουμένων ἡμῶν, μάταιον εἶναι τὸ συνεθίζειν παῖδας ὄντας τῇ τοιαύτῃ τάξει· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθῶν.

25. Do not heed the opinion of the masses, do not be ambitious, avoid contact with the masses.

a. Porph., *V.P.* 42:

τάς τε λεωφόρους μὴ βαδίζειν, δι' οὗ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ἔπεσθαι γνώμαις ἐκώλυεν, τὰς δὲ τῶν λογίων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων μεταθεῖν.

b. Porph. *V.P.* 32:

τὴν δὲ καθ' ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ διαγωγὴν ἀφηγούμενος ὁ Διογένης φησὶν ὡς ἅπασι μὲν παρηγγύα φιλοτιμίαν φεύγειν καὶ φιλοδοξίαν, ὥσπερ μάλιστα φθόνον ἐργάζεσθαι, ἐκτρέπεσθαι δὲ τὰς μετὰ τῶν πολλῶν ὁμιλίας.

c. Iambl., *V.P.* 72:

καὶ ὅντινα δοκιμάσειεν οὕτως, ἐφίει τριῶν ἐτῶν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, δοκιμάζων πῶς ἔχει βεβαιότητος καὶ ἀληθινῆς φιλομαθείας, καὶ εἰ πρὸς δόξαν ἱκανῶς παρεσκεύασται ὥστε καταφρονεῖν τιμῆς.

d. Iambl., *V.P.* 200:

περὶ δὲ δόξης τάδε φασὶ λέγειν αὐτούς. ἀνόητον μὲν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πάσῃ καὶ παντὸς δόξῃ προσέχειν, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ τῇ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν γινομένῃ· τὸ γὰρ καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν ὀλίγοις ὑπάρχειν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοὺς εἰδότας τοῦτο γίνεσθαι· οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν ὀλίγοι. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν διατείνοι εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἀνόητον δ'εἶναι καὶ πάσης ὑπολήψεώς τε καὶ δόξης καταφρονεῖν· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἀμαθῆ τε καὶ ἀνεπανόρθωτον εἶναι τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον.

26. Symbolic language.

a. Porph., *V.P.* 41-42:

ἔλεγε δέ τινα καὶ μυστικῷ τρόπῳ συμβολικῶς, ἃ δὴ ἐπὶ πλέον Ἀριστοτέλης ἀνέγραψεν· οἷον ὅτι τὴν θάλατταν μὲν ἐκάλει εἶναι δάκρυον, τὰς δ' ἄρκτους Ῥέας χεῖρας, τὴν δὲ πλειάδα μουσῶν λύραν, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας κύνας τῆς Φερσεφόνης. τὸν δ' ἐκ χαλκοῦ κρουομένου γινόμενον ἦχον φωνὴν εἶναί τινος τῶν δαιμόνων ἐναπειλημμένου τῷ χαλκῷ. (42) ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος τῶν συμβόλων τοιοῦτον. ζυγὸν μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν. μὴ τὸ πῦρ τῇ μαχαίρᾳ σκαλεύειν, ὅπερ ἦν μὴ τὸν ἀνοιδοῦντα καὶ ὀργιζόμενον κινεῖν λόγοις τεθηγμένοις. στέφανόν τε μὴ τίλλειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι τοὺς νόμους μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι· στέφανοι γὰρ πόλεων οὗτοι. πάλιν δ' αὖ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. μὴ καρδίαν ἐσθίειν, οἷον μὴ λυπεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀνίαις. μηδ' ἐπὶ χοίνικος καθέζεσθαι, οἷον μὴ ἀργὸν ζῆν. μηδ' ἀποδημοῦντα ἐπιστρέφεσθαι, μὴ ἔχεσθαι τοῦ βίου τούτου ἀποθνήσκοντα· τάς τε λεωφόρους μὴ βαδίζειν, δι' οὗ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ἔπεσθαι γνώμαις ἐκώλυεν, τὰς δὲ τῶν λογίων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων μεταθεῖν. μηδὲ χελιδόνας ἐν οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι, τοῦτ' ἔστι λάλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ περὶ γλῶτταν ἀκρατεῖς ὁμωροφίους μὴ ποιεῖσθαι. φορτίον δὲ συναναπατιθέναι μὲν τοῖς βαστάζουσιν, συγκαθαιρεῖν δὲ μή, δι' οὗ παρήνει μηδενὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συμπράττειν.

b. Iambl. *V.P.* 103:

Ἀναγκαιότατος δὲ παρ'αὐτῷ τρόπος διδασκαλίας ὑπῆρχε καὶ ὁ διὰ τῶν συμβόλων.

c. Iambl. *V.P.* 161-162:
εἰώθει δὲ καὶ διὰ κομιδῇ βραχυτάτων φωνῶν μυρίαν καὶ πολυσχιδῆ ἔμφασιν συμβολικῷ τρόπῳ τοῖς γνωρίμοις ἀποφοιβάζειν, ὥσπερ διὰ χειροχρήστων τινῶν λόγων ἢ μικρῶν τοῖς ὄγκοις σπερμάτων ὁ Πύθιός τε καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις πλήθη ἀνήνυτα καὶ δυσεπινόητα ἐννοιῶν καὶ ἀποτελεσμάτων ὑποφαίνουσι. τοιοῦτον δή ἐστι τὸ

ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἥμισυ παντός,

ἀπόφθεγμα Πυθαγόρου αὐτοῦ.

27. The main precept.

a. Iambl. *V.P.* 204:
καθόλου δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, διετείνοντο μηδέποτε μηδὲν πράττειν ἡδονῆς στοχαζομένους (καὶ γὰρ ἀσχήμονα καὶ βλαβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν σκοπόν), ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλόν τε καὶ εὔσχημον βλέποντας πράττειν ὃ ἂν ᾖ πρακτέον, δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον, δεῖσθαί τε ταῦτα κρίσεως οὐ τῆς τυχούσης.

b. Cp. Iambl. *V.P.* 77-78 (Lysis' Letter):
πυκιναὶ γὰρ καὶ λάσιαι λόχμαι περὶ τὰς φρένας καὶ τὰν καρδίαν πεφύκαντι τῶν μὴ καθαρῶς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ὀργιασθέντων, πᾶν τὸ ἄμερον καὶ πρᾶον καὶ λογιστικὸν τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἐπισκιάζουσαι καὶ κωλύουσαι προφανῶς αὐξηθῆμεν καὶ προκύψαι τὸ νοατικόν. ὀνομάξαιμι δέ κα πρῶτον ἐπελθὼν αὐτῶν τὰς ματέρας, ἀκρασίαν τε καὶ πλεονεξίαν· ἄμφω δὲ πολύγονοι πεφύκαντι. (78) τᾶς μέν νυν ἀκρασίας ἐκβεβλαστάκαντι ἄθεσμοι γάμοι καὶ φθοραὶ καὶ μέθαι καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἀδοναὶ καὶ σφοδραί τινες ἐπιθυμίαι, μέχρι βαράθρων καὶ κρημνῶν διώκουσαι· ἤδη γάρ τινας ἀνάγκαξαν ἐπιθυμίαι μήτε ματέρων μήτε θυγατέρων ἀποσχέσθαι, καὶ δὴ παρεωσάμεναι πόλιν καὶ νόμον καθάπερ τύραννος, ἐκπεριαγαγοῦσαι τὼς ἀγκῶνας ὥσπερ αἰχμάλωτον ἐπὶ τὸν ἔσχατον ὄλεθρον μετὰ βίας ἄγουσαι κατέστασαν. τᾶς δὲ πλεονεξίας ἐκπέφυκαν ἁρπαγαί, λαστεῖαι, πατροκτονίαι, ἱεροσυλίαι, φαρμακεῖαι, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά. δεῖ ὦν πρᾶτον μὲν τὰς ὕλας, αἷς ἐνδιαιτῆται ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ πάσαις μαθημάτων μηχαναῖς ἐκκαθαίροντας καὶ ῥυομένως τὸν λογισμὸν ἐλεύθερον τῶν τοσούτων κακῶν, τὸ τανικάδε ἐμφυτεύεν τι χρήσιμον αὐτῷ καὶ παραδιδόμεν.'

c. Cf. Archytas ap. Cic., *Cato Mai.* 39-41:
accipite enim, optimi adulescentes, veterem orationem Archytae Tarentini, magni inprimis et praeclari viri, quae mihi (Catoni) tradita est, cum essem adulescens Tarenti cum Q.Maximo. nullam capitaliorem pestem quam voluptatem corporis hominibus dicebat a natura datam, cuius voluptatis avidae libidines temere et ecfrenate ad po-

tiendum incitarentur. hinc patriae proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci; nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis inpelleret: stupra vero et adulteria et omne tale flagitium nullis excitari aliis inlecebris nisi voluptatis. cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihil mente praestabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono nihil tam esse inimicum quam voluptatem. nec enim libidine dominante temperantiae locum esse neque omnino in voluptatis regno virtutem posse consistere.

28. Systematic training in curbing desires.

Diodorus X 5, 2:
Ὅτι ἐποιοῦντο καὶ τῆς ἐγκρατείας γυμνασίαν τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. παρασκευασάμενοι πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς λαμπροτάτας ἑστιάσεις παρατιθέμενα πολὺν αὐτοῖς ἐνέβλεπον χρόνον· εἶτα διὰ τῆς θέας τὰς τῆς φύσεως ἐπιθυμίας πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν ἐκκαλεσάμενοι τὰς τραπέζας ἐκέλευον αἴρειν τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ παραχρῆμα ἄγευστοι τῶν παρατεθέντων ἐχωρίζοντο.

29. Exhortation to soberness.

a. Diod. X 7:
Ὅτι παρεκάλει τὴν λιτότητα ζηλοῦν· τὴν γὰρ πολυτέλειαν ἅμα τάς τε οὐσίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφθείρειν καὶ τὰ σώματα. τῶν γὰρ νόσων τῶν πλείστων ἐξ ὠμότητος γινομένων, αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐκ τῆς πολυτελείας γίνεσθαι. πολλοὺς δὲ ἔπειθεν ἀπύροις σιτίοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ὑδροποσίαις πάντα τὸν βίον ἕνεκεν τοῦ τἀγαθὰ θηρᾶσθαι τὰ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν.
Cp. Diod. X 3, 3 (*supra* nr. 3a) and Justin X 4, 2 and 5-7 (*supra*, nrs. 2 and 3a.).

b. Iambl. *V.P.* 171:
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὕβρις καὶ τρυφὴ πολλάκις καὶ νόμων ὑπεροψία ἐπαίρουσιν εἰς ἀδικίαν, διὰ ταῦτα ὁσημέραι παρήγγελλε νόμῳ βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀνομίᾳ πολεμεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην διαίρεσιν ἐποιεῖτο, ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον τῶν κακῶν παραρρεῖν εἴωθεν εἴς τε τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἡ καλουμένη τρυφή, δεύτερον ὕβρις, τρίτον ὄλεθρος· ὅθεν ⟨παρήγγελλεν⟩ ἐκ παντὸς εἴργειν τε καὶ ἀπωθεῖσθαι τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι ἀπὸ γενετῆς σώφρονί τε καὶ ἀνδρικῷ βίῳ.
Cp. 223, in fine.

c. Stob., *Ecl.* IV 1, 49:
Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου Πυθαγορικῶν ἀποφάσεων·
Καθόλου δὲ ᾤοντο δεῖν ὑπολαμβάνειν μηδὲν εἶναι μεῖζον κακὸν ἀναρχίας·

οὐ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον διασῴζεσθαι μηδενὸς ἐπιστατοῦντος. περὶ δὲ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων οὕτως ἐφρόνουν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντας ἔφασκον οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμονας ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρώπους δεῖν εἶναι· καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους οὐ μόνον πειθηνίους ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάρχοντας. ἐπιμελητέον δὲ πάσης ἡλικίας ἠγοῦντο –

For the rest of this passage see above, nr. 23a, in particular the last lines, in which it is said

ὡς ἡ μὲν τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καλὰ καὶ σύμφορα, ἡ δὲ ἀταξία καὶ ἀσυμμετρία αἰσχρά τε καὶ ἀσύμφορα.

The Pythagoreans seem to have given a rather detailed analysis of desires. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* III 10, 66 (from Aristox., Πυθαγ. ἀποφάσεις); Iamblichus *V.P.* 205. Wehrli, Aristox. fr. 37 and 38.

30. Diet.

a. Porph., *V.P.* 34:

τῆς δὲ διαίτης τὸ μὲν ἄριστον ἦν κηρίον ἢ μέλι, δεῖπνον δ'ἄρτος ἐκ κέγχρων ἢ μᾶζα καὶ λάχανα ἑφθὰ καὶ ὠμά, σπανίως δὲ κρέας ἱερείων θυσίμων καὶ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐκ παντὸς μέρους.

b. Cp. Diog. Laert. VIII 19:

αὐτὸν δ'ἀρκεῖσθαι μέλιτι μόνῳ φασί τινες ἢ κηρίῳ ἢ ἄρτῳ, οἴνου δὲ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὴ γεύεσθαι· ὄψῳ τε τὰ πολλὰ λαχάνοις ἑφθοῖς τε καὶ ὠμοῖς, τοῖς δὲ θαλαττίοις σπανίως.

Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 97, *infra*, nr. 44.

31. Preserve evenness and balance in soul and body.

a. Porph., *V.P.* 35:

ὅθεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὥσπερ ἐπὶ στάθμῃ τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξιν διεφύλαττεν, οὐ ποτὲ μὲν ὑγιαῖνον ποτὲ δὲ νοσοῦν, οὐδ'αὖ ποτὲ μὲν πιαινόμενον καὶ αὐξανόμενον ποτὲ δὲ λεπτυνόμενον καὶ ἰσχναινόμενον, ἥ τε ψυχὴ τὸ ὅμοιον ἦθος ἀεὶ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως παρεδήλου. οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ'ἡδονῆς διεχεῖτο πλέον οὔθ' ὑπ' ἀνίας συνεστέλλετο, οὐδ' ἐπίδηλος ἦν χαρᾷ ἢ λύπῃ κάτοχος, ἀλλ'οὐδὲ γελάσαντα ἢ κλαύσαντά τις ποτ'ἐκεῖνον ἐθεάσατο.

Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 226: οἴκτων δὲ καὶ δακρύων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἴργεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐκείνους φασί (from Aristoxenus).
Also in 234, the beginning. Porph., *V.P.* 59.

b. Diog. Laert. VIII 20 and 23:

ἀπείχετο καταγέλωτος καὶ πάσης ἀρεσκείας οἷον σκωμμάτων καὶ διηγημάτων φορτικῶν.

(23) αἰδῶ καὶ εὐλάβειαν εἶναι μήτε γέλωτι κατέχεσθαι μήτε σκυθρωπάζειν. φεύγειν σαρκῶν πλεονασμόν.

c. Iambl., *V.P.* 196:

καὶ ταῦτα δὲ παρέδωκε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις Πυθαγόρας, ὧν αἴτιος αὐτὸς ἦν. προσεῖχον γὰρ οὗτοι, τὰ σώματα ὡς ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ⟨ἀεὶ⟩ διακέηται, καὶ μὴ ποτὲ μὲν ῥικνά, ὁτὲ δὲ πολύσαρκα· ἀνωμάλου γὰρ βίου ᾧοντο εἶναι δεῖγμα. ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν ἱλαροί, ὁτὲ δὲ κατηφεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐφ'ὁμαλοῦ πράως χαίροντες. διεκρούοντο δὲ ὀργάς, ἀθυμίας, ταραχάς[1], καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς παράγγελμα, ὡς οὐδὲν δεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων συμπτωμάτων ἀπροσδόκητον εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα προσδοκᾶν, ὧν μὴ τυγχάνουσιν αὐτοὶ κύριοι ὄντες. εἰ δέ ποτε αὐτοῖς συμβαίη ἢ ὀργὴ ἢ λύπη ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ἐκποδὼν ἀπηλλάττοντο, καὶ καθ'ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος γενόμενος ἐπειρᾶτο καταπέττειν τε καὶ ἰατρεύειν τὸ πάθος.

32. Precepts concerning aphrodisia.

a. Diod. X. 9, 3-4:

Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Πυθαγόρας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐκλογιζόμενος τὸ συμφέρον παρήγγελλε κατὰ μὲν τὸ θέρος μὴ πλησιάζειν γυναιξί, κατὰ δὲ τὸν χειμῶνα προσιέναι τεταμιευμένως. καθόλου γὰρ τὸ γένος τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι βλαβερόν, τὴν δὲ συνέχειαν αὐτῶν τελέως ἀσθενείας καὶ ὀλέθρου ποιητικὴν ἐνόμιζε.
Ὅτι Πυθαγόραν φασὶν ὑπό τινος ἐρωτηθέντα πότε χρηστέον ἀφροδισίοις εἰπεῖν, Ὅταν ἑαυτοῦ θέλῃς ἥττων γενέσθαι.

b. Stob., Ecl. IV 37, 4 = Aristox. fr. 39 Wehrli.
Iambl., *V.P.* 209-210:

περὶ δὲ γεννήσεως τάδε λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἔφασαν. καθόλου μὲν ᾧοντο δεῖν φυλάττεσθαι τὸ καλούμενον προφερές (οὔτε γὰρ τῶν φυτῶν τὰ προφερῆ οὔτε τῶν ζῴων εὔκαρπα γίνεσθαι), ‹ἀλλὰ δεῖν γενέσθαι› τινὰ χρόνον πρὸ τῆς καρποφορίας, ὅπως ἐξ ἰσχυόντων τε καὶ τετελειωμένων τῶν σωμάτων τὰ σπέρματα καὶ οἱ καρποὶ γίνωνται. δεῖν οὖν τούς τε παῖδας καὶ τὰς παρθένους ἐν πόνοις τε καὶ γυμνασίοις καὶ καρτερίαις ταῖς προσηκούσαις τρέφειν, τροφὴν προσφέροντας τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν φιλοπόνῳ τε καὶ σώφρονι καὶ καρτερικῷ βίῳ. πολλὰ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἐν οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀψιμάθεια· ὧν εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν. δεῖν οὖν τὸν παῖδα οὕτως ἄγεσθαι, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν ἐντὸς τῶν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν τὴν τοιαύτην συνουσίαν· ὅταν δ'εἰς τοῦτο ἀφίκηται, σπανίοις εἶναι χρηστέον

[1] For the struggle against ἀθυμίαι and δηγμοί cp. Iambl. *V.P.* 111 (supra, nr. 21b) and Porph., *V.P.* 42. Also Iambl., *V.P.* 224f. (from Aristoxenus). Cf. *infra*, nr. 59, the end: cure by music.

τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις. ἔσεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν τίμιόν τε καὶ καλὸν εἶναι νομίζηται ἡ εὐεξία[1], ἀκρασίαν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὐεξίαν οὐ πάνυ γίνεσθαι περὶ τὸν αὐτόν. –

Ὑπελάμβανον δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκεῖνοι οἱ ἄνδρες περιαιρεῖν μὲν δεῖν τάς τε παρὰ φύσιν γεννήσεις καὶ τὰς μεθ'ὕβρεως γιγνομένας, καταλιμπάνειν δὲ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τε καὶ μετὰ σωφροσύνης γινομένων τὰς ἐπὶ τεκνοποιίᾳ, σώφρονί τε καὶ νομίμῳ γινομένας.

c. A parallel to the last paragraph is found in Ocellus Lucanus, *De universi natura* IV 1-2 (Harder, p. 21f.):

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο διαλαβεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα πρόσιμεν ἀλλὰ τέκνων γενέσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς πρὸς τὴν μῖξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δεδομένας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐχ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα δεδόσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διαμονῆς τοῦ γένους.

d. Ib. IV 4:

Οἱ γὰρ καθάπαξ μὴ διὰ παιδοποιίαν συναπτόμενοι ἀδικήσουσι τὰ τιμιώτατα τῆς κοινωνίας συστήματα. –

33. Speak the truth and keep your word. Avoid swearing on oath.

a. Porph., *V.P.* 41:

μάλιστα δ'ἀληθεύειν· τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παραπλησίους.

b. Diod. X 9, 1 and 2:

Ὅτι ὁ Πυθαγόρας πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήγγελλε τοῖς μανθάνουσι σπανίως μὲν ὀμνύναι, χρησαμένους δὲ τοῖς ὅρκοις πάντως ἐμμένειν.

c. Diog. Laert. VIII 22:

μηδ' ὀμνύναι θεούς· ἀσκεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν δεῖν ἀξιόπιστον παρέχειν.

Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 47 (*supra*, nr. 7) and 144.

34. Precepts about offerings.

a. Diod. X 9, 6:

Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Πυθαγόρας παρήγγελλε πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς προσιέναι τοὺς θύοντας μὴ πολυτελεῖς, ἀλλὰ λαμπρὰς καὶ καθαρὰς ἔχοντας ἐσθῆτας, ὁμοίως δὲ μὴ μόνον τὸ σῶμα καθαρὸν παρεχομένους πάσης ἀδίκου πράξεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἁγνεύουσαν.

Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 54 (*supra*, nr. 9).

b. Cp. Porph., *V.P.* 36:

θύων τε θεοῖς ἀνεπαχθὴς ἦν, ἀλφίτοις τε καὶ ποπάνῳ καὶ λιβανωτῷ καὶ

[1] For εὐεξία cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 69 and 229 (from Aristox.), *supra*, nr. 12a.

μυρρίνῃ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξιλασκόμενος, ἐμψύχοις δ'ἥκιστα, πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε ἀλεκτορίσιν καὶ τῶν χοίρων τοῖς ἁπαλωτάτοις. ἐβουθύτησεν δέ ποτε σταίτινον, ὡς φασὶ βοῦν οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι, ἐξευρὼν τοῦ ὀρθογωνίου τὴν ὑποτείνουσαν ἴσον δυναμένην ταῖς περιεχούσαις.

Procl. in Euclid. I 47 tells that Pythagoras sacrificed an ox on finding his theorem.

35. Do not kill living beings.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 23:

φυτὸν ἥμερον μήτε φθίνειν μήτε σίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ζῷον ὃ μὴ βλάπτει ἀνθρώπους.

b. Iambl., *V.P.* 99 (daily exhortation):

σπεισάντων δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτατος παρήγγελλε τάδε· ἥμερον φυτὸν καὶ ἔγκαρπον μήτε βλάπτειν μήτε φθείρειν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ζῷον, ὃ μὴ πέφυκε βλαβερὸν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, μήτε βλάπτειν μήτε φθείρειν.

c. Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 186:

καὶ τὸ ἐμψύχων δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι ἐνομοθέτησε διά τε ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰρηνοποιὸν τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυσάττεσθαι φόνον ζῴων ὡς ἄνομον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀθεμιτώτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἡγούμενοι κτείνειν οὐκέτ' ἐπολέμουν.

36. Pray for the good without specification.

a. Diod. X 9, 7-8:

Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπεφαίνετο τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι δεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς φρονίμους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφρόνων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀσυνέτους ἀγνοεῖν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν.

Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφασκε δεῖν ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς ἁπλῶς εὔχεσθαι τἀγαθά, καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ὀνομάζειν, οἷον ἐξουσίαν, κάλλος, πλοῦτον, τἄλλα τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

b. Diog. Laert. VIII 9:

οὐκ ἐᾷ εὔχεσθαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ συμφέρον.

Cf. [Plato], *Alcib. Mai.* 143a.

37. Submit to the divine Will.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 145:

ὅτι δ'οὐδὲν ᾧοντο ἐκ ταὐτομάτου συμβαίνειν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θείαν πρόνοιαν, μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ εὐσεβέσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, βεβαιοῖ τὰ ὑπὸ Ἀνδροκύδου ἐν τῷ περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων ἱστορούμενα περὶ

Θυμαρίδου τοῦ Ταραντίνου, Πυθαγορικοῦ. ἀποπλέοντι γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ χωριζομένῳ διά τινα περίστασιν περιέστησαν οἱ ἑταῖροι ἀσπαζόμενοί τε καὶ προπεμπτικῶς ἀποτασσόμενοι. καί τις ἤδη ἐπιβάντι τοῦ πλοίου εἶπεν· 'ὅσα βούλει, παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Θυμαρίδα'. καὶ ὃς 'εὐφημεῖν' ἔφη, 'ἀλλὰ βουλοίμην μᾶλλον, ὅσ' ἄν μοι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν γένηται'.

b. Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 86-87 (= 137):
ἅπαντα μέντοι, ὅσα περὶ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν διορίζουσιν, ἐστόχασται πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη ἐστί, καὶ ὁ βίος ἅπας συντέτακται πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας. γελοῖον γὰρ ποιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ζητοῦντες τὸ εὖ ἢ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ὅμοιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν βασιλευομένῃ χώρᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ ὕπαρχον θεραπεύοι, ἀμελήσας αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάντων ἄρχοντος· τοιοῦτον γὰρ οἴονται ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι τε θεὸς καὶ οὗτος πάντων κύριος, δεῖν ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἰτεῖν· πάντες γάρ, οὓς μὲν ἂν φιλῶσι καὶ οἷς ἂν χαίρωσι, τούτοις διδόασι τἀγαθά, πρὸς οὓς δὲ ἐναντίως ἔχουσι, τὰ ἐναντία.

c. Cp. Stob., *Ecl.* II 7, 3b.
Πυθαγόραν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· "Επου θεῷ.

38. Faith in Providence necessary to keep man in check.

Iambl., *V.P.* 174:
τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ θείου, ὡς ἔστι τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἐπιβλέπειν καὶ μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν αὐτοῦ, χρήσιμον εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι παρ' ἐκείνου μαθόντες. δεῖσθαι γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατείας τοιαύτης ᾗ κατὰ μηδὲν ἀνταίρειν ἀξιώσομεν· τοιαύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου γινομένην, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ θεῖον τοιοῦτον ⟨οἷον⟩ ἄξιον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος ἀρχῆς. ὑβριστικὸν γὰρ δὴ φύσει τὸ ζῷον ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὀρθῶς λέγοντες, καὶ ποικίλον κατά τε τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν παθῶν· δεῖσθαι οὖν τοιαύτης ὑπεροχῆς τε καὶ ἐπανατάσεως, ἀφ' ἧς ἐστι σωφρονισμός τις καὶ τάξις.

39. Anarchy and lawlessness the greatest of evils for man.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 175:
καθόλου δὲ ᾠοντο δεῖν ὑπολαμβάνειν μηδὲν εἶναι μεῖζον κακὸν ἀναρχίας· οὐ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον διασῴζεσθαι μηδενὸς ἐπιστατοῦντος.
= Aristox. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* IV 1, 49 (*supra*, nr. 29c).

b. Cf. Iambl., *V.P.* 203:
καθόλου δ' εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐατέον εἶναι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται,

ἀλλ' ἀεί τινα ἐπιστατείαν ὑπάρχειν δεῖν καὶ ἀρχὴν νόμιμόν τε καὶ εὐσχήμονα, ἧς ὑπήκοος ἔσται ἕκαστος τῶν πολιτῶν· ταχέως γὰρ ἐξίστασθαι τὸ ζῷον ἐαθέν τε καὶ ὀλιγωρηθὲν εἰς κακίαν τε καὶ φαυλότητα.

c. Iambl., *V.P.* 223:
ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀδιάλειπτος παρ' αὐτοῖς παράκλησις τὸ 'νόμῳ βοηθεῖν ἀεὶ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ πολεμεῖν'.
= Iambl., *V.P.* 100. Also in Diog. Laert. VIII 23.

40. Mantic.

Iambl., *V.P.* 137 (the end)- 138 (the beginning).
δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα πρακτέον, οἷς τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς χαίρων. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἰδέναι, ἂν μή τις ἢ θεοῦ ἀκηκοότος ἢ θεοῦ ἀκούσῃ ἢ διὰ τέχνης θείας πορίζηται. διὸ καὶ περὶ τὴν μαντικὴν σπουδάζουσι· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη ἑρμηνεία τῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν διανοίας ἐστί.

41. Honouring the gods.

Iambl., *V.P.* 149:
ἐχρῆτο δὲ καὶ εὐφημίᾳ πρὸς τοὺς κρείττονας καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ μνήμην ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τιμὴν τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε καὶ παρὰ τὸ δεῖπνον σπονδὰς ἐποιεῖτο τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παρήγγελλεν ἐφ' ἡμέρᾳ ἑκάστῃ ὑμνεῖν τοὺς κρείττονας.
Cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 24.

42. Gods - demons - heroes - men.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 23, the beginning.
καὶ θεοὺς μὲν δαιμόνων προτιμᾶν, ἥρωας δ' ἀνθρώπων, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μάλιστα γονέας.
Cf. Porph. *V.P.* 38.

b. Iambl., *V.P.* 100, the beginning.
ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις περί τε τοῦ θείου καὶ περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἡρωικοῦ γένους εὔφημόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ περὶ γονέων τε καὶ εὐεργετῶν διανοεῖσθαι.

43. The precept that one should die in silence (Plato, *Phaed.* 117e).

Iambl., *V.P.* 257:
κατὰ τὸν ὕστατον ⟨γὰρ⟩ καιρὸν παρήγγελλε μὴ βλασφημεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγωγαῖς οἰωνίζεσθαι μετὰ τῆς εὐφημίας, ἥνπερ ἐποιοῦντο διωθούμενοι τὸν Ἀδρίαν.

44. The Pythagorean day.

Iambl., *V.P.* 96-100:

κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑφήγησιν αὐτοῦ ὧδε ἔπρασσον οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὁδηγούμενοι. τοὺς μὲν ἐωθινοὺς περιπάτους ἐποιοῦντο οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι κατὰ μόνας τε καὶ εἰς τοιούτους τόπους, ἐν οἷς συνέβαινεν ἠρεμίαν τε καὶ ἡσυχίαν εἶναι σύμμετρον, ὅπου τε ἱερὰ καὶ ἄλση καὶ ἄλλη τις θυμηδία. ᾤοντο γὰρ δεῖν μὴ πρότερόν τινι συντυγχάνειν, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν καταστήσουσι καὶ συναρμόσονται τὴν διάνοιαν· ἁρμόδιον δὲ εἶναι τῇ καταστάσει τῆς διανοίας τὴν τοιαύτην ἡσυχίαν. τὸ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἀναστάντας εἰς τοὺς ὄχλους ὠθεῖσθαι θορυβῶδες ὑπειλήφεισαν. διὸ δὴ πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τοὺς ἱεροπρεπεστάτους τόπους ἀεὶ ἐξελέγοντο. μετὰ δὲ τὸν ἑωθινὸν περίπατον τότε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνετύγχανον, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ἱεροῖς, εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἐν ὁμοίοις τόποις. ἐχρῶντο δὲ τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ πρός τε διδασκαλίας καὶ μαθήσεις καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν. (97) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἐτρέποντο θεραπείαν. ἐχρῶντο δὲ ἀλείμμασί τε καὶ δρόμοις οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἐλάττονες καὶ πάλαις ἔν τε κήποις καὶ ἐν ἄλσεσιν, οἳ δὲ καὶ ἀλτηροβολίᾳ ἢ χειρονομίᾳ, πρὸς τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ἰσχῦς τὰ εὔθετα ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἐκλέγεσθαι γυμνάσια. ἀρίστῳ δὲ ἐχρῶντο ἄρτῳ καὶ μέλιτι ἢ κηρίῳ, οἴνου δὲ μεθ' ἡμέραν οὐ μετεῖχον.[1] τὸν δὲ μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον χρόνον περὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς οἰκονομίας κατεγίνοντο, περί τε τὰς ἐξωτικὰς καὶ τὰς ξενικάς, διὰ τὴν τῶν νόμων πρόσταξιν· πάντα γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἄριστον ὥραις ἐβούλοντο διοικεῖν.[2] δείλης δὲ γινομένης εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους πάλιν ὁρμᾶν, οὐχ ὁμοίως κατ' ἰδίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἑωθινῷ περιπάτῳ, ἀλλὰ σύνδυο καὶ σύντρεις ποιεῖσθαι τὸν περίπατον,[3] ἀναμιμνησκομένους τὰ μαθήματα καὶ ἐγγυμναζομένους τοῖς καλοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι. (98) μετὰ δὲ τὸν περίπατον λουτρῷ χρῆσθαι, λουσαμένους τε ἐπὶ τὰ συσσίτια ἀπαντᾶν· ταῦτα δ'εἶναι μὴ πλεῖον ἢ δέκα ἀνθρώπους συνευωχεῖσθαι. ἀθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν συσσιτούντων γίνεσθαι σπονδάς τε καὶ θυσίας θυημάτων τε καὶ λιβανωτοῦ. ἔπειτα ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον χωρεῖν, ὡς πρὸ ἡλίου δύσεως ἀποδεδειπνηκέναι. χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ μάζῃ καὶ ἄρτῳ καὶ ὄψῳ καὶ λαχάνοις ἑφθοῖς τε καὶ ὠμοῖς. παρατίθεσθαι δὲ κρέα ζώων θυσίμων [ἱερείων], τῶν δὲ θαλασσίων ὄψων σπανίως [χρῆσθαι][4]. εἶναι γάρ τινα αὐτῶν δι' αἰτίας τινὰς οὐ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι. (99) μετὰ δὲ τόδε τὸ δεῖπνον ἐγίνοντο σπονδαί, ἔπειτα ἀνάγνωσις ἐγίνετο. ἔθος δ' ἦν τὸν μὲν νεώτατον ἀναγινώσκειν, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτατον ἐπιστατεῖν ὃ δεῖ ἀναγινώσκειν καὶ ὡς δεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ μέλλοιεν ἀπιέναι, σπονδὴν αὐτοῖς ἐνέχει ὁ οἰνοχόος, σπεισάντων δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτατος παρήγγελλε τάδε· ἥμερον φυτὸν καὶ ἔγκαρπον

[1] Also in Diog. Laert. VIII 19.
[2] Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 72. *Infra*, nr. 47.
[3] Cp. Porph., *V.P.* 32, the end.
[4] Cp. Porph., *V.P.* 34, the beginning; Diog. Laert. VIII 19. *Supra*, nr. 30.

μήτε βλάπτειν μήτε φθείρειν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ζῷον, ὃ μὴ πέφυκε βλαβερὸν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, μήτε βλάπτειν μήτε φθείρειν[1]. (100) ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις περί τε τοῦ θείου καὶ περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἡρωικοῦ γένους εὔφημόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ περὶ γονέων τε καὶ εὐεργετῶν διανοεῖσθαι[2], νόμῳ τε βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀνομίᾳ πολεμεῖν[3]. τούτων δὲ ῥηθέντων ἀπιέναι ἕκαστον εἰς οἶκον. ἐσθῆτι δὲ χρῆσθαι λευκῇ καὶ καθαρᾷ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ στρώμασι λευκοῖς τε καὶ καθαροῖς. εἶναι δὲ τὰ στρώματα ἱμάτια λινᾶ· κῳδίοις γὰρ οὐ χρῆσθαι[4]. περὶ δὲ θήραν οὐ δοκιμάζειν καταγίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τοιούτῳ γυμνασίῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἡμέρᾳ ἑκάστῃ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνδρῶν παραδιδόμενα εἴς τε τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου ἀναγωγὴν τοιαῦτα ἦν.

45. Daily examination of one's conscience.

a. Porphyry, *V.P.* 40.

δύο δὲ μάλιστα καιροὺς παρηγγύα ἐν φροντίδι θέσθαι, τὸν μὲν ὅτε εἰς ὕπνον τρέποιτο, τὸν δ'ὅτε ἐξ ὕπνου διανίσταιτο. ἐπισκοπεῖν γὰρ προσήκειν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τούτοιν τά τε ἤδη πεπραγμένα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, τῶν μὲν γενομένων εὐθύνας παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον λαμβάνοντα, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων πρόνοιαν ποιούμενον. πρὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὕπνου ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ τὰ ἔπη ἐπᾴδειν ἕκαστον·

μηδ'ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπ'ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι
πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων τρὶς ἕκαστον ἐπελθεῖν·
πῇ παρέβην; τί δ'ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐξαναστάσεως ἐκεῖνα·

πρῶτα μὲν ἐξ ὕπνοιο μελίφρονος ἐξυπαναστὰς
εὖ μάλ'ὀπιπεύειν ὅσ'ἐν ἤματι ἔργα τελέσσεις.

Cp. Χρ. ἔ. 40ff.

b. Diog. Laert. VIII 22.

λέγεται παρεγγυᾶν αὐτὸν ἑκάστοτε τοῖς μαθηταῖς τάδε λέγειν εἰς τὸν οἶκον εἰσιοῦσι,

πῇ παρέβην; τί δ'ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

c. Explained as memory training in Diod. X 5, 1.

Ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ τῆς μνήμης μεγίστην γυμνασίαν ἐποιοῦντο, τοιοῦτόν τινα τρόπον τῆς μελέτης ὑποστησάμενοι. οὐ πρότερον ἐκ τῆς εὐνῆς ἠγείροντο, πρὶν ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνθωμολογήσαντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν προτέραν ἡμέραν αὐτοῖς πραχθέντα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς πρωΐας, τὴν δὲ τελευτὴν ἕως ἑσπέρας ποιούμενοι. εἰ δ'ἀναστροφὴν ἔχοιεν καὶ πλείονα σχολὴν ἄγοιεν, καὶ τὰ τρίτῃ καὶ

[1] Cp. Diog. Laert. VIII 23; *supra*, nr. 35. Cp. Porph., *V.P.* 36, *supra*, nr. 34b.
[2] Cp. *supra*, nr. 42.
[3] Cp. *supra*, nr. 39c.
[4] Also 149, the beginning; Diog. Laert. VIII 19.

τετάρτῃ καὶ ταῖς ἔτι πρότερον ἡμέραις πραχθέντα προσανελάμβανον. τοῦτο πρὸς ἐπιστήμην καὶ φρόνησιν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν πάντων ἐμπειρίαν τε τοῦ δύνασθαι πολλὰ μνημονεύειν...

Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 165 and 256.

46. Selection in admitting aspiring members to the Society.

Iambl., *V.P.* 71-72:

προσιόντων τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων συνδιατρίβειν οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρει, μέχρις ἂν αὐτῶν τὴν δοκιμασίαν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσηται, πρῶτον μὲν πυνθανόμενος πῶς τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις τοῖς λοιποῖς πάρεισιν ὡμιληκότες, ἔπειτα θεωρῶν αὐτῶν τούς τε γέλωτας τοὺς ἀκαίρους καὶ τὴν σιωπὴν καὶ τὴν λαλιὰν παρὰ τὸ δέον, ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους οἷς ἐχρῶντο καὶ τὴν πρὸς τούτους ὁμιλίαν καὶ πρὸς τίνι μάλιστα τὴν ἡμέραν σχολάζουσι καὶ τὴν χαρὰν καὶ τὴν λύπην ἐπὶ τίσι τυγχάνουσι ποιούμενοι. προσεθεώρει δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν πορείαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν, τοῖς τε τῆς φύσεως γνωρίσμασι φυσιογνωμονῶν αὐτούς σημεῖα τὰ φανερὰ ἐποιεῖτο τῶν ἀφανῶν ἠθῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. (72) καὶ ὄντινα δοκιμάσειεν οὕτως, ἐφίει τριῶν ἐτῶν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, δοκιμάζων πῶς ἔχει βεβαιότητος καὶ ἀληθινῆς φιλομαθείας, καὶ εἰ πρὸς δόξαν ἱκανῶς παρεσκεύασται ὥστε καταφρονεῖν τιμῆς. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς προσιοῦσι προσέταττε σιωπὴν πενταετῆ, ἀποπειρώμενος πῶς ἐγκρατείας ἔχουσιν, ὡς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐγκρατευμάτων τοῦτο, τὸ γλώσσης κρατεῖν.

= Timaeus in schol. ad Plat. *Phaedr.* 279c, p. 275 H.

47. Not all members active in governing duties.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 72:

ἐν δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ἑκάστου ὑπάρχοντα, τουτέστιν αἱ οὐσίαι, ἐκοινοῦντο, διδόμενα τοῖς ἀποδεδειγμένοις εἰς τοῦτο γνωρίμοις, οἵπερ ἐκαλοῦντο πολιτικοί, καὶ οἰκονομικοί τινες καὶ νομοθετικοὶ ὄντες.

b. Cp. Diog. Laert. VIII 3.

εἶτ' ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Σάμον, καὶ εὑρὼν τὴν πατρίδα τυραννουμένην ὑπὸ Πολυκράτους, ἀπῆρεν εἰς Κρότωνα τῆς Ἰταλίας· κἀκεῖ νόμους θεὶς τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις ἐδοξάσθη σὺν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἳ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους ὄντες ᾠκονόμουν ἄριστα τὰ πολιτικά, ὥστε σχεδὸν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν.

c. Justinus XX 4, 14:

Sed CCC ex iuvenibus cum sodalicii iure sacramento quodam nexi separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercerunt, quasi coetum clandestinae coniurationis haberent, civitatem in se converterunt.

d. The blame of 'apartness' held against the threehundred according to Apollonius ap. Iambl. *V.P.* 254.

ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων ὄντων ἐκ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασι καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις προεχόντων, συνέβαινε προαγούσης τῆς ἡλικίας μὴ μόνον αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις βίοις πρωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομεῖν, μεγάλην μὲν ἑταιρείαν συναγηοχόσιν (ἦσαν <γὰρ> ὑπὲρ τριακοσίους), μικρὸν δὲ μέρος τῆς πόλεως οὖσι, τῆς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔθεσιν οὐδ' ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐκείνοις πολιτευομένης.

48. For the total number of the members cp.:

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 15:

τῶν θ' ἑξακοσίων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐπὶ τὴν νυκτερινὴν ἀκρόασιν ἀπήντων αὐτοῦ.

b. Nicom. ap. Porph., *V.P.* 20:

οὕτως δὲ πάντας εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπέστρεψεν ὥστε μιᾷ μόνον ἀκροάσει, ὡς φησὶ Νικόμαχος, ἣν ἐπιβὰς τῆς Ἰταλίας πεποίηται, πλέον ἢ δισχιλίους ἑλεῖν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς μηκέτι οἴκαδ' ἀποστῆναι, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ σὺν παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶν ὁμακοεῖόν τι παμμέγεθες ἱδρυσαμένους πολίσαι τὴν πρὸς πάντων ἐπικληθεῖσαν μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, νόμους τε παρ'αὐτοῦ δεξαμένους καὶ προστάγματα ὡσανεὶ θείας ὑποθήκας ἐκτὸς τούτων πράττειν μηδὲ ἕν. οὗτοι δὲ καὶ τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς ἔθεντο καὶ μετὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸν Πυθαγόραν κατηρίθμουν.

c. By some confusion both numbers are mentioned in Iambl., *V.P.* 29-30.

(29) καὶ ἐν πρώτῃ Κρότωνι ἐπισημοτάτῃ πόλει προτρεψάμενος πολλοὺς ἔσχε ζηλωτάς, ὥστε [ἱστορεῖται ἑξακοσίους αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπους ἐσχηκέναι, οὐ μόνον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κεκινημένους εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἧς μετεδίδου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον κοινοβίους, καθὼς προσέταξε, γενομένους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκροαταί, οὓς ἀκουσματικοὺς καλοῦσιν] ἐν μιᾷ μόνον ἀκροάσει, ὥς φασιν, ἣν πρωτίστην καὶ πάνδημον μόνος ἐπιβὰς τῆς Ἰταλίας ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐποιήσατο, πλέονες ἢ δισχίλιοι τοῖς λόγοις ἐνεσχέθησαν, αἱρεθέντες αὐτοὶ κατὰ κράτος οὕτως, ὥστε οὐκέτι οἴκαδε ἀπέστησαν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦ παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶν ὁμακοεῖόν τι παμμέγεθες ἱδρυσάμενοι καὶ πολίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντων ἐπικληθεῖσαν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα, νόμους τε παρ' αὐτοῦ δεξάμενοι καὶ προστάγματα ὡσανεὶ θείας ὑποθήκας, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν ἔπραττον, παρέμειναν ὁμονοοῦντες ὅλῳ τῷ ᾽τῶν ὁμιλητῶν ἀθροίσματι, εὐφημούμενοι καὶ παρὰ τῶν πέριξ μακαριζόμενοι, τάς τε οὐσίας κοινὰς ἔθεντο, ὡς προελέχθη, καὶ μετὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸν Πυθαγόραν λοιπὸν κατηρίθμουν ὡς ἀγαθόν τινα δαίμονα καὶ φιλανθρωπότατον.

49. Pythagoras as εὑρετὴς τῶν ὀνομάτων.

(Iambl., *V.P.* 56, *supra*, nr. 9).

1. The term cosmos.

a. Plato, *Gorg.* 507e 6-508a 4:
φασὶ δ'οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν.

b. Aetius II 1, 1 (*Doxogr.* 327, 8):
Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως.

2. The term φιλοσοφία.

a. Aetius I 3, 8 (*Doxogr.* 280):
Πυθαγόρας Μνησάρχου Σάμιος πρῶτος φιλοσοφίαν τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι προσαγορεύσας.

b. Diod. X 10, 1:
Ὅτι Πυθαγόρας φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ σοφίαν ἐκάλει τὴν ἰδίαν αἵρεσιν. καταμεμφόμενος γὰρ τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ κεκλημένους ἑπτὰ σοφοὺς ἔλεγεν, ὡς σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὢν καὶ πολλάκις διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἰσχύων πάντα κατορθοῦν, ὁ δὲ ζηλῶν τὸν τοῦ σοφοῦ τρόπον τε καὶ βίον προσηκόντως ἂν φιλόσοφος ὀνομάζοιτο.

c. Iambl., *V.P.* 44, the end. See *supra*, nr. 6. Also Iambl., *V.P.* 159:
φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὖν πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὠνόμασε, καὶ ὅρεξιν αὐτὴν εἶπεν εἶναι καὶ οἱονεὶ φιλίαν σοφίας.

3. The term φιλόσοφος.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 8.
Σωσικράτης δ' ἐν Διαδοχαῖς φησιν αὐτὸν ἐρωτηθέντα ὑπὸ Λέοντος τοῦ Φλιασίων τυράννου τίς εἴη, φιλόσοφος εἰπεῖν. καὶ τὸν βίον ἐοικέναι πανηγύρει· ὡς οὖν εἰς ταύτην οἱ μὲν ἀγωνιούμενοι, οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν, οἱ δέ γε βέλτιστοι ἔρχονται θεαταί, οὕτως ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἱ μὲν ἀνδραποδώδεις, ἔφη, φύονται δόξης καὶ πλεονεξίας θηραταί, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τῆς ἀληθείας.
Cp. Cic., *Tusc.* V 3, 8-9 (from Heracl. Pont.).

b. Iambl., *V.P.* 58:
Λέγεται δὲ Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος φιλόσοφον ἑαυτὸν προσαγορεῦσαι, οὐ καινοῦ μόνον ὀνόματος ὑπάρξας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρᾶγμα οἰκεῖον προεκδιδάσκων χρησίμως. ἐοικέναι γὰρ ἔφη τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ

τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὁμίλῳ. ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖσε παντοδαποὶ φοιτῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλου χρείαν ἀφικνεῖται (ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπειγόμενος, ὁ δὲ δόξης ἕνεκα ἐπιδειξόμενος ἥκει τὴν ῥώμην τοῦ σώματος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τό γε ἐλευθεριώτατον, συναλιζόμενον τόπων θέας ἕνεκα καὶ δημιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων, ὧν αἱ ἐπιδείξεις εἰώθεσαν ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσι γίνεσθαι), οὕτως δὴ κἀν τῷ βίῳ παντοδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταὐτὸ ἀθροίζεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τρυφῆς αἱρεῖ πόθος, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἵμερος φιλονεικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν. εἰλικρινέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον, τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν, ὃν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλόσοφον.

4. τετρακτύς.
Aetius, *Plac.* I 3, 8 (*Dox.* 282):
ἐφθέγγοντο οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὡς μεγίστου ὅρκου ὄντος τῆς τετράδος·
οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥίζωμά τ'ἔχουσαν.
Also Iambl., *V.P.* 150 and 162 (*infra*, sub *12*).
Cp. Diels, *V.S.* 44 A 13; Theo Smyrn. 97. 14 Hiller; Sextus, *M.* VII 94ff.

5. φιλία, see above: **T** 12.

6. ἁρμονία, κοινωνία, ὁμόνοια, κοσμιότης, ἰσότης.

a. Philolaus fr. 6:
περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἁρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· –
τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσοταγῆ ἀνάγκα τᾷ τοιαύτᾳ ἁρμονίᾳ συγκεκλεῖσθαι, οἷᾳ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.–
Cp. also fr. 10. Iambl., *V.P.* 45: above, **T** 7.

b. Plato, *Gorg.* 507e-508a, *supra*, 49. *1a*, followed by these lines:
σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς.
Iambl. *V.P.* 40, supra, **T** 6.

c. Cp. Archytas, fr. 3:
Στάσιν μὲν ἔπαυσεν, ὁμόνοιαν δὲ αὔξησεν λογισμὸς εὑρεθείς· πλεονεξία τε γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τούτου γενομένου καὶ ἰσότας ἔστιν· τούτῳ γὰρ περὶ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων διαλλασσόμεθα.

d. For ἰσότης γεωμετρική cp. Archytas fr. 2:
Μέσαι δέ ἐντι τρῖς τᾷ μουσικᾷ, μία μὲν ἀριθμητικά, δευτέρα δὲ ἁ γεωμετρικά,

τρίτα δ'ὑπεναντία, ἂν καλέοντι ἁρμονικάν. – ἃ γεωμετρικὰ δέ, ὅκκα ἔωντι οἷος ὁ πρᾶτος ποτὶ τὸν δεύτερον, καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ποτὶ τὸν τρίτον.

7. For ἰσότης cp. also Iambl. *V.P.* 162, *infra*, **T** 49.*12*.

8. The terms πεδάρτασις and πεδαρτᾶν.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 101:
τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις τε καὶ νουθετήσεις, ἃς δὴ πεδαρτάσεις ἐκάλουν ἐκεῖνοι.

b. Iambl., *V.P.* 197:
ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸ νουθετεῖν πεδαρτᾶν.

c. Diog. Laert. VIII 20:
ἐκάλει δὲ τὸ νουθετεῖν πελαργᾶν.

9. The term ἐχεμυθία.
Iambl., *V.P.* 188, the beginning:
ἔτι δὲ ἐχεμυθία τε καὶ παντελὴς σιωπή.
= 225. Also in Gellius I 9.5.

10. The word κατάρτυσις.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 95:
ἐπεσκόπει γὰρ πῶς ἔχουσι φύσεως πρὸς ἡμέρωσιν, ἐκάλει δὲ τοῦτο κατάρτυσιν.

b. Cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 68, the beginning:
Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διὰ μουσικῆς ἐπετηδεύετο αὐτῷ κατάρτυσις τῶν ψυχῶν.

11. κάθαρσις.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 110:
Ὑπελάμβανε δὲ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ὑγείαν, ἄν τις αὐτῇ χρῆται κατὰ τοὺς προσήκοντας τρόπους. εἰώθει γὰρ οὐ παρέργως τῇ τοιαύτῃ χρῆσθαι καθάρσει· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ καὶ προσηγόρευε τὴν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἰατρείαν.

b. Cramer, *Anecd. Paris.* I 172:
ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, ὡς ἔφη Ἀριστόξενος, καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς.

c. Names for forms of treatment by music.
Iambl., *V.P.* 114:
ἔτι τοίνυν σύμπαν τὸ Πυθαγορικὸν διδασκαλεῖον τὴν λεγομένην ἐξάρτυσιν καὶ συναρμογὰν καὶ ἐπαφὰν ἐποιεῖτο, μέλεσί τισιν ἐπιτηδείοις εἰς τὰ ἐναντία πάθη περιάγον χρησίμως τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις.
Also in 64.

12. Various adages and names. Iambl., *V.P.* 162:
τοιοῦτον δή ἐστι τὸ

ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἥμισυ παντός,

ἀπόφθεγμα Πυθαγόρου αὐτοῦ.
Or also

ἀριθμῷ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

ὃ δὴ πυκνότατα πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀπεφθέγγετο, ἢ πάλιν ἐν τῷ 'φιλότης ἰσότης' [φιλότης], ἢ ἐν τῷ 'κόσμος' ὀνόματι, ἢ νὴ Δία ἐν τῷ 'φιλοσοφία'; ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ 'ἐστώ', ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ**, ἢ [τὸ διαβοώμενον] ἐν τῷ 'τετρακτύς'.

13. The adage κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 10 (= Timaeus fr. 77).
Εἴπέ τε πρῶτος (sc. Pythagoras), ὥς φησι Τίμαιος, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα. Καὶ αὐτοῦ οἱ μαθηταὶ κατετίθεντο τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ἕν. πενταετίαν θ' ἡσύχαζον, μόνον τῶν λόγων κατακούοντες καὶ οὐδέπω Πυθαγόραν ὁρῶντες εἰς ὃ δοκιμασθεῖεν.

b. Schol. in Plato *Phaedr.* 279 (ed. Hermann VI, p. 275).
φησι γοῦν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ Ε οὕτω· προσιόντων δ'οὖν αὐτῷ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων συνδιατρίβειν οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρησεν, ἀλλ'ἔφη δεῖν καὶ τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς εἶναι τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων. Εἶτα μετὰ πολλά φησι καὶ δι' ἐκείνους πρῶτον ῥηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

c. Photius, *Lex.* 129.
Κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Τίμαιός φησι ἐν τῇ Θ ταύτην λεχθῆναι κατὰ τὴν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα καθ'οὓς χρόνους Πυθαγόρας ἀνέπειθεν τοὺς ταύτην ἐνοικοῦντας ἀδιανέμητα κεκτῆσθαι.

14. The gods called οἱ κρείττονες.
Iambl. *V.P.* 149:
ἐχρῆτο δὲ καὶ εὐφημίᾳ πρὸς τοὺς κρείττονας καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ μνήμην ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τιμὴν τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε καὶ παρὰ τὸ δεῖπνον σπονδὰς ἐποιεῖτο τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παρήγγελλεν ἐφ' ἡμέρᾳ ἑκάστῃ ὑμνεῖν τοὺς κρείττονας.

15. The terms ὁμακοεῖον and ὁμάκοοι.

a. Iambl. *V.P.* 30:
... πλέονες ἢ δισχίλιοι τοῖς λόγοις ἐνεσχέθησαν, αἱρεθέντες αὐτοὶ κατὰ κράτος οὕτως, ὥστε οὐκέτι οἴκαδε ἀπέστησαν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦ παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶν ὁμακοεῖόν τι παμμέγεθες ἱδρυσάμενοι καὶ πολίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντων ἐπικληθεῖσαν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα, νόμους τε παρ'αὐτοῦ δεξάμενοι καὶ προστάγματα ὡσανεὶ θείας ὑποθήκας, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν ἔπραττον, παρέμειναν ὁμονοοῦντες ὅλῳ τῷ τῶν ὁμιλητῶν ἀθροίσματι, ..
Cf. 185.

b. Iambl. *V.P.* 73:
εἰ δ' ἀποδοκιμασθείησαν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ἐλάμβανον διπλῆν, μνῆμα δὲ αὐτοῖς ὡς νεκροῖς ἐχώννυτο ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμακόων.

16. φυσιογνωμονῆσαι.

a. Gellius, *N.A.* I 9, 1-2:
Ordo atque ratio Pythagorae ac deinceps familiae ‹et› successionis eius recipiendi instituendique discipulos huiuscemodi fuisse traditur: Iam a principio adulescentes, qui sese ad discendum obtulerant, ἐφυσιογνωμόνει. Id verbum significat mores naturasque hominum coniectatione quadam de oris et vultus ingenio deque totius corporis filo atque habitu sciscitari.

b. Porph., *V.P.* 13:
ὃ δὲ λαβὼν καὶ φυσιογνωμονήσας καὶ τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τὰς ἡρεμίας τοῦ σώματος ἐπισκεψάμενος ἐπαίδευεν. ταύτην γὰρ ἠκρίβου πρῶτος τὴν περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην, ὁποῖος τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστος εἴη μανθάνων.
Cf. Iambl. *V.P.* 71, the end. *Supra*, **T** 46.

17. Geometry called ἱστορία.
Iambl. *V.P.* 89:
ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ ἡ γεωμετρία πρὸς Πυθαγόρου ἱστορία.

50. Cf. the acousma in Iambl., *V.P.* 82:
τί τὸ σοφώτατον; ἀριθμός· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον.
Cp. Aelianus *V.H.* IV 17: ὁ...θέμενος.

51. Pythagoras as an orator. Rhetoric introduced into Greece by the Pythagoreans.

a. Iambl., *V.P.* 166:
ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων συνέβη τὴν Ἰταλίαν πᾶσαν φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ἐμπλησθῆναι καί, πρότερον ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς, ὕστερον διὰ Πυθαγόραν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα κληθῆναι, καὶ πλείστους παρ'αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας φιλοσόφους καὶ ποιητὰς καὶ νομοθέτας γενέσθαι· τάς τε γὰρ τέχνας τὰς ῥητορικὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐπιδεικτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς γεγραμμένους παρ' ἐκείνων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα συνέβη κομισθῆναι, καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ὅσοι τινὰ μνείαν πεποίηνται, πρῶτον Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Παρμενίδην τὸν Ἐλεάτην προφερόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, οἵ τε γνωμολογῆσαί τι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον βουλόμενοι τὰς Ἐπιχάρμου διανοίας προφέρονται, καὶ σχεδὸν πάντες αὐτὰς οἱ φιλόσοφοι κατέχουσι. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ καὶ πῶς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ πλεῖστον εἰς αὐτὴν προεβίβασεν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἦν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, καὶ ὡς παρέδωκεν αὐτὴν τελέως, διὰ τούτων ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω.

b. Vg. Diod. X 3, 2:
τοσαύτη δ' ἦν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ λόγοις πειθὼ καὶ χάρις, ὡς καὶ τῆς πόλεως σχεδὸν ὅλης ἐπ'αὐτὸν ἐπιστρεφούσης καθ'ἡμέραν ὡσπερεὶ πρός τινος θεοῦ παρουσίαν ἅπαντας συντρέχειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν.

52. Pythagoras as the discoverer of πολιτικὴ παιδεία.

Iambl. *V.P.* 130f.:
ὅλως δὲ εὑρετὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι φασὶ καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ὅλης παιδείας, εἰπόντα μηδὲν εἰλικρινὲς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μετέχειν καὶ γῆν πυρὸς καὶ πῦρ ὕδατος καὶ πνεῦμα τούτων καὶ ταῦτα πνεύματος[1], ἔτι καλὸν αἰσχροῦ καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκου καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ λόγον τούτοις (ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως λαβεῖν τὸν λόγον τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερον μέρος ὁρμήν· δύο δὲ εἶναι κινήσεις καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν μὲν ἄλογον, τὴν δὲ προαιρετικήν)[2], πολιτειῶν δὲ γραμμάς τινας τοιάσδε τρεῖς συστησάμενον, τοῖς ἄκροις ἀλλήλων συμψαυούσας, μίαν ὀρθὴν γωνίαν ποιούσας, τὴν μὲν ἐπίτριτον φύσιν ἔχουσαν, τὴν δὲ πέντε τοιαῦτα δυναμένην, τὴν δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀνὰ μέσον. (131) λογιζομένων δ' ἡμῶν τάς τε τῶν γραμμῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας συμπτώσεις καὶ τὰς τῶν χωρίων τῶν ἀπὸ τούτων, βελτίστην ὑποτυποῦσθαι πολιτείας εἰκόνα. σφετερίσασθαι δὲ τὴν δόξαν Πλάτωνα, λέγοντα φανερῶς ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ[3] τὸν ἐπίτριτον ἐκεῖνον πυθμένα τὸν τῇ πεμπάδι συζευγνύμενον καὶ τὰς δύο παρεχόμενον ἁρμονίας. ἀσκῆσαι δέ φασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς μετριοπαθείας καὶ τὰς μεσότητας καὶ τὸ σύν τινι προηγουμένῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἕκαστον εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὸν βίον, καὶ συλλήβδην προσευρεῖν τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν καὶ προσηκόντων ἔργων[4].

53. An early Pythagorean textbook of rhetoric?

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 8:
Αὐτοῦ λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς Κοπιάδας[5], οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· "Μὴ ἀναίδευ[6] μηδενί".

b. Cp. Schol. in Eurip. *Hec.* 131f., p. 26 Schwartz.

[1] For this doctrine of the mixture of opposite elements cp. Anaxagoras fr. 6: πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, and fr. 8: οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ κόσμῳ. Cp. also the Pythagorean doctrine of Alexander Polyhistor in Diog. Laert. VIII 25: μεταβάλλειν δὲ καὶ τρέπεσθαι δι'ὅλων. This is Stoic Heracliteïsm.
[2] See my comments in ch. IX, p. 223, sub (2) and (3).
[3] *Rep.* VIII 546c.
[4] *Supra*, p. 223/24, sub (5) and (6).
[5] Read Κοπίδας. [6] Read ἀναίδευ.

κοπίδας τε τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας <ἔλεγον> ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος οὕτως γράφων· ὥστε καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ τὸν Πυθαγόραν †εὑράμενον† τῶν ἀληθινῶν κοπίδων.

c. Cp. also Timon, fr. 3:

Πυθαγόρην τε γόητας ἀποκλίνοντ' ἐπὶ δόξας
θήρῃ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίης ὀαριστήν.

54. Comedy fragments referring to Pythagorean activity in the field of rhetoric.

a. Alexis in the *Tarentini* ap. Athen. IV p. 161b:

πυθαγορισμοὶ καὶ λόγοι
λεπτοὶ διεσμιλευμέναι τε φροντίδες
τρέφουσ' ἐκείνους, τὰ δὲ καθ'ἡμέραν τάδε·
ἄρτος καθαρὸς εἷς ἑκατέρῳ, ποτήριον
ὕδατος· τοσαῦτα ταῦτα.
B. δεσμωτηρίου λέγεις δίαιταν.

b. Cratinus in the *Tarentini* ap. Diog. Laert. VIII 37:

ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἄν τιν' ἰδιώτην ποθὲν
λάβωσιν εἰσελθόντα, διαπειρώμενον
τῆς τῶν λόγων ῥώμης ταράττειν καὶ κυκᾶν
τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις, τοῖς πέρασι, τοῖς παρισώμασιν,
τοῖς ἀποπλάνοις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν νουβυστικῶς.

55. Cp. Diog. Laert. VIII 32 (from Alex. Polyhistor):

μέγιστον δέ φησιν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πεῖσαι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν.

56. Various testimonies about the beginnings of rhetoric.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 57:

Ἀριστοτέλης δ'ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ φησι πρῶτον Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικὴν εὑρεῖν, Ζήνωνα δὲ διαλεκτικήν.

b. Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* VII 6:

Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι.

c. Diog. Laert. VIII 58:

φησὶ δὲ Σάτυρος ἐν τοῖς Βίοις ὅτι καὶ ἰατρὸς ἦν καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος (sc. ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς). Γοργίαν γοῦν τὸν Λεοντῖνον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι μαθητήν, ἄνδρα ὑπερέχοντα ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ Τέχνην ἀπολελοιπότα.

d. Quintilianus III 1, 8:

nam primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur. artium autem scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi, quos insecutus est vir eiusdem insulae Gorgias Leontinus, Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus.

57. Pythagoras' medical theories and practice. The background.

a. Diod. X 7, supra, **T** 29a.

b. Iambl. *V.P.* 218:

ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ τῶν κακῶν εἰσιν ἀναίτιοι, καὶ ὅτι νόσοι καὶ ὅσα πάθη σώματος ἀκολασίας ἐστὶ σπέρματα.–

58. His interest in medicine.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 12:

Οὐκ ἠμέλησε δ'οὐδ' ἰατρικῆς.

b. Porph., *V.P.* 33:

καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι μὲν αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς φίλοις) ἀεὶ συνδιέτριβεν, κάμνοντας δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐθεράπευεν, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς δὲ νοσοῦντας παρεμυθεῖτο, καθάπερ ἔφαμεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ μαγείαις τοὺς δὲ μουσικῇ. ἦν γὰρ αὐτῷ μέλη καὶ πρὸς νόσους σωμάτων παιώνια, ἃ ἐπᾴδων ἀνίστη τοὺς κάμνοντας. ἦν <δ'>ἃ καὶ λύπης λήθην εἰργάζετο καὶ ὀργὰς ἐπραΰνε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀτόπους ἐξῄρει.

59. Methods of treatment.

Iambl., *V.P.* 163-164 (= 244).

τῆς δὲ ἰατρικῆς μάλιστα μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὸ διαιτητικὸν εἶδος καὶ εἶναι ἀκριβεστάτους ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι πρῶτον μὲν καταμανθάνειν σημεῖα συμμετρίας πόνων[1] τε καὶ σίτων καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, ἔπειτα περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν προσφερομένων σχεδὸν πρώτους ἐπιχειρῆσαί τε πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ διορίζειν. ἅψασθαι δὲ [χρὴ] καὶ καταπλασμάτων ἐπὶ πλείω τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς φαρμακείας ἧττον δοκιμάζειν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τοῖς πρὸς τὰς ἑλκώσεις μάλιστα χρῆσθαι, <τὰ δὲ> περὶ τὰς τομάς τε καὶ καύσεις ἥκιστα πάντων ἀποδέχεσθαι. χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπῳδαῖς πρὸς ἕνια τῶν ἀρρωστημάτων. ὑπελάμβανον δὲ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν

[1] πόνων is the reading of the Laurentianus (F.). The parallel passage 244 has ποτῶν. For πόνων cp. Hippocr. II. διαίτης I 2: ὑπεναντίας μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοισιν ἔχει τὰς δυνάμιας σῖτα καὶ πόνοι, συμφέρονται δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα πρὸς ὑγείαν· πόνοι μὲν γὰρ πεφύκασιν ἀναλῶσαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα· σῖτα δὲ καὶ ποτὰ ἐκπληρῶσαι τὰ κενωθέντα.

μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ὑγείαν, ἄν τις αὐτῇ χρῆται κατὰ τοὺς προσήκοντας τρόπους[1].

60. Definitions of health.

a. Diog. Laert. VIII 33:

τήν τ'ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸν θεόν.

Besides the definition of health as harmony this second century Pythagorean text contains a curious testimony of Pythagorean immanentistic metaphysics: 'God' is identified with the world-order, symbolized in harmony.

b. Diog. Laert. VIII 35:

ὑγίειαν τὴν τοῦ εἴδους διαμονήν, νόσον τὴν τούτου φθοράν.

61. Celsus, *Med.* I, Prooem. 6, 7 (C.M.L. I 18):

Primoque medendi scientia sapientiae pars habebatur, ut et morborum curatio et rerum naturae contemplatio sub isdem auctoribus nata sit: scilicet is hanc maxime requirentibus, qui corporum suorum robora quieta cogitatione nocturnaque uigilia minuerant. Ideoque multos e sapientiae professoribus peritos eius fuisse accipimus, clarissimos uero ex is Pythagoran et Empedoclen et Democritum.

62. The Hippocratic oath; Heiberg, *Hippocr. opera*, C.M.G. I 1, 1927, pp. 4-5:

Ὀμνύω Ἀπόλλωνα ἰητρὸν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν καὶ Ὑγείαν καὶ Πανάκειαν καὶ θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάσας ἵστορας ποιεύμενος ἐπιτελέα ποιήσειν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κρίσιν ἐμὴν ὅρκον τόνδε καὶ ξυγγραφὴν τήνδε· ἡγήσασθαί τε τὸν διδάξαντά με τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἴσα γενέτῃσιν ἐμοῖσιν καὶ βίου κοινώσασθαι καὶ χρεῶν χρηίζοντι μετάδοσιν ποιήσασθαι καὶ γένος τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀδελφεοῖς ἶσον ἐπικρινέειν ἄρρεσι καὶ διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην ταύτην, ἢν χρηίζωσι μανθάνειν, ἄνευ μισθοῦ καὶ ξυγγραφῆς, παραγγελίης τε καὶ ἀκροήσιος καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς ἁπάσης μαθήσιος μετάδοσιν ποιήσασθαι υἱοῖσί τε ἐμοῖσι καὶ τοῖσι τοῦ ἐμὲ διδάξαντος καὶ μαθηταῖσι συγγεγραμμένοις τε καὶ ὡρκισμένοις νόμῳ ἰητρικῷ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί *(1)*.

διαιτήμασί τε χρήσομαι ἐπ'ὠφελείῃ καμνόντων κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κρίσιν ἐμήν· ἐπὶ δηλήσει δὲ καὶ ἀδικίῃ εἴρξειν.

οὐ δώσω δὲ οὐδὲ φάρμακον οὐδενὶ αἰτηθεὶς θανάσιμον οὐδὲ ὑφηγήσομαι συμβουλίην τοιήνδε· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πεσσὸν φθόριον δώσω.

ἁγνῶς δὲ καὶ ὁσίως διατηρήσω βίον ἐμὸν καὶ τέχνην ἐμήν. *(3)*

[1] On treatment by music cp. Porph., *V.P.* 33 (*supra*); Iambl., *V.P.* 110ff. (*supra*, nr. 21) and 224.

οὐ τεμέω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντας *(5)*, ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάτῃσιν ἀνδράσιν πρήξιος τῆσδε.

ἐς οἰκίας δὲ ὁκόσας ἂν ἐσίω, ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπ'ὠφελείῃ καμνόντων ἐκτὸς ἐὼν πάσης ἀδικίης ἑκουσίης καὶ φθορίης τῆς τε ἄλλης καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔργων ἐπί τε γυναικείων σωμάτων καὶ ἀνδρείων ἐλευθέρων τε καὶ δούλων *(6)*.

ἃ δ'ἂν ἐν θεραπείῃ ἢ ἴδω ἢ ἀκούσω ἢ καὶ ἄνευ θεραπηίης κατὰ βίον ἀνθρώπων, ἃ μὴ χρή ποτε ἐκλαλέεσθαι ἔξω, σιγήσομαι ἄρρητα ἡγεύμενος εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὅρκον μὲν οὖν μοι τόνδε ἐπιτελέα ποιέοντι καὶ μὴ ξυγχέοντι εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης δοξαζομένῳ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, παραβαίνοντι δὲ καὶ ἐπιορκοῦντι τἀναντία τουτέων.

The cursive numbers refer to the notes under 63.

63. Notes to the Hippocratic oath. *1.* Cp. Pyth.' piety towards his master Pherecydes.

a. Diod. X 3, 4:

Ὅτι Πυθαγόρας πυθόμενος Φερεκύδην τὸν ἐπιστάτην αὐτοῦ γεγενημένον ἐν Δήλῳ νοσεῖν καὶ τελέως ἐσχάτως ἔχειν, ἔπλευσεν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τὴν Δῆλον. ἐκεῖ δὲ χρόνον ἱκανὸν τὸν ἄνδρα γηροτροφήσας, πᾶσαν εἰσηνέγκατο σπουδὴν ὥστε τὸν πρεσβύτην ἐκ τῆς νόσου διασῶσαι. κατισχυθέντος δὲ τοῦ Φερεκύδου διὰ τὸ γῆρας καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς νόσου, περιέστειλεν αὐτὸν κηδεμονικῶς, καὶ τῶν νομιζομένων ἀξιώσας ὡσανεί τις υἱὸς πατέρα πάλιν ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν.

Also in Iambl., *V.P.* 184 (from Nicomachus).

b. Cp. Diod. X 11, 2:

Ὅτι Λῦσις ὁ Πυθαγόρειος εἰς Θήβας τῆς Βοιωτίας γενόμενος διδάσκαλος Ἐπαμινώνδου, τοῦτον μὲν τέλειον ἄνδρα πρὸς ἀρετὴν κατέστησε, καὶ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ θετὸς ἐγένετο δι'εὔνοιαν.

c. See also Aristox. ap. Iambl., *V.P.* 250:

καὶ πατέρα τὸν Λῦσιν ἐκάλεσεν (sc. Ἐπαμεινώνδας).

2. The relation pupil-master in other schools.

a. Plato, *Soph.* 241d:

ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΞΕ. Μή με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαί τινα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;
ΞΕ. Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.

b. Cp. Arcesilaus' behaviour towards Hipponicus, his master in mathematics. Diog. Laert. IV 32:
τοῦτον καὶ παρακόψαντα ἀναλαβὼν οἴκοι ἐς τοσοῦτον ἐθεράπευεν, ἐς ὅσον ἀποκαταστῆσαι.

3. For the strict prohibition of killing, *supra*, **T** 35. Cp. also Plato, *Phaed.* 62b:
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.

4. Cp. also Iambl., *V.P.* 211-213 (on responsibilities of parents-to-be). (211) ὑπελάμβανον δὲ δεῖν πολλὴν πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς τεκνοποιουμένους τῶν ἐσομένων ἐκγόνων. πρώτην μὲν οὖν εἶναι καὶ μεγίστην πρόνοιαν τὸ προσάγειν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν σωφρόνως τε καὶ ὑγιεινῶς βεβιωκότα τε καὶ ζῶντα καὶ μήτε πληρώσει χρώμενον τροφῆς ἀκαίρως μήτε προσφερόμενον τοιαῦτα ἀφ' ὧν χείρους αἱ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξεις γίνονται, μήτι δὴ μεθύοντά γε, ἀλλ' ἥκιστα πάντων· ᾤοντο γὰρ ἐκ φαύλης τε καὶ ἀσυμφώνου καὶ ταραχώδους κράσεως μοχθηρὰ γίνεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα. (212) καθόλου δὲ παντελῶς ᾤοντο ῥᾳθύμου τινὸς εἶναι καὶ ἀπροσκέπτου τὸν μέλλοντα ζῳοποιεῖν καὶ ἄγειν τινὰ εἰς γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν, τοῦτον μὴ μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς προορᾶν, ὅπως ἔσται ὡς χαριεστάτη τῶν γινομένων ἡ εἰς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἄφιξις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν φιλόκυνας μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σκυλακείας, ὅπως ἐξ ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ διακειμένων προσηνῆ γίνηται τὰ σκυλάκια, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοὺς φιλόρνιθας (213) (δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν ἐσπουδακότων περὶ τὰ γενναῖα τῶν ζῴων πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ γίνεσθαι τὰς γεννήσεις αὐτῶν), τοὺς δ' ἀνθρώπους μηδένα λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἰδίων ἐκγόνων, ἀλλ' ἅμα γεννᾶν εἰκῇ τε καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε σχεδιάζοντας πάντα τρόπον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τρέφειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν μετὰ πάσης ὀλιγωρίας. ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι τὴν ἰσχυροτάτην τε καὶ σαφεστάτην αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κακίας τε καὶ φαυλότητος· βοσκηματώδη γὰρ καὶ εἰκαίαν τινὰ γίνεσθαι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς.

5. See above, nr. 59, in Iambl. *V.P.* 163:
<τὰ δὲ> περὶ τὰς τομάς τε καὶ καύσεις ἥκιστα πάντων ἀποδέχεσθαι.

6. About aphrodisia, *supra*, **T** 32. Also Iambl., *V.P.* 48, *supra*, **T** 7. On the equality of free men and slaves, cp. Iambl., *V.P.* 197: *supra*, **T** 14. Adultery and homosexuality condemned in other philosophers' schools.

a. Plato, *Laws* VIII 841c-e:
τάχα δ' ἄν, εἰ θεὸς ἐθέλοι, κἂν δυοῖν θάτερα βιασαίμεθα περὶ ἐρωτικῶν, ἢ μηδένα τολμᾶν μηδενὸς ἅπτεσθαι τῶν γενναίων ἅμα καὶ ἐλευθέρων πλὴν γαμετῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικός, ἄθυτα δὲ παλλακῶν σπέρματα καὶ νόθα μὴ σπείρειν, μηδὲ ἄγονα ἀρρένων παρὰ φύσιν· ἢ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρρένων πάμπαν ἀφελοίμεθ' ἄν, τὸ δὲ γυναικῶν, εἴ τις συγγίγνοιτό τινι πλὴν ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἐλθούσαις εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ὠνηταῖς εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τρόπῳ κτηταῖς, μὴ λανθάνων ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας πάσας, τάχ' ἂν ἄτιμον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπαίνων νομοθετοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἂν δόξαιμεν νομοθετεῖν, ὡς ὄντως ὄντα ξενικόν.

b. *Laws* I 636c:
ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημ' εἶναι δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς.

c. About the Stoa cp. Orig., *C. Cels.* VII 63:
Ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες διὰ τὸ κοινωνικόν· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ.

d. Musonius Rufus, fr. XII:
Μόνα μὲν ἀφροδίσια νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παίδων συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ ᾖ.

e. Plotinus, *Enn.* III 5, 1. 50ff.:
Οἳ δ' ἂν ἐν παρανόμῳ καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐθέλωσι γεννᾶν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν πορείας ποιησάμενοι τὰς ἀρχὰς γενόμενοι παράφοροι ἐκ ταύτης οἷον ὁδοῦ ὀλισθήσαντες κεῖνται πεσόντες οὔτε ἔρωτα γνόντες ἐφ' ὃ ἦγεν αὐτοὺς οὔτε ἔφεσιν γεννήσεως οὔτε χρῆσιν κάλλους εἰκόνος οὔτε ὅ τι ἐστὶ κάλλος αὐτό.

64. Iambl. *V.P.* 215-219:

(215) πολλὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἔχοι τις ἂν λέγειν τεκμήρια καὶ πολλάκις αὐτῷ κατορθωθέντα, μέγιστα δὲ πάντων ἐστὶ τὰ πρὸς Φάλαριν αὐτῷ μετὰ παρρησίας ἀνυποστάτου ῥηθέντα τε καὶ πραχθέντα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑπὸ Φαλάριδος τοῦ ὠμοτάτου τῶν τυράννων κατείχετο, καὶ συνέμιξεν αὐτῷ σοφὸς ἀνήρ, Ὑπερβόρειος τὸ γένος, Ἄβαρις τοὔνομα, αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα ἀφικόμενος τοῦ συμβαλεῖν αὐτῷ, λόγους τε ἠρώτησε καὶ μάλα ἱερούς, περὶ ἀγαλμάτων καὶ τῆς ὁσιωτάτης θεραπείας καὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν προνοίας, τῶν τε κατ' οὐρανὸν ὄντων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν γῆν ἐπιστρεφομένων, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπύθετο, (216) ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρας, οἷος ἦν, ἐνθέως σφόδρα καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας πάσης

ἀπεκρίνατο καὶ πειθοῦς, ὥστε προσαγαγέσθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τότε ὁ Φάλαρις ἀνεφλέχθη μὲν ὑπὸ ὀργῆς πρὸς τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα Πυθαγόραν Ἄβαριν, ἠγρίαινε δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν Πυθαγόραν, ἑτόλμα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοὺς βλασφημίας δεινὰς προφέρειν καὶ τοιαύτας οἵας ἂν ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν. ὁ δ' Ἄβαρις πρὸς ταῦτα ὡμολόγει μὲν χάριν Πυθαγόρᾳ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐμάνθανε παρ'αὐτοῦ περὶ τοῦ οὐρανόθεν ἠρτῆσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖσθαι πάντα ἀπ'ἄλλων τε πλειόνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῶν ἱερῶν, πολλοῦ τε ἔδει γόητα νομίζειν Πυθαγόραν τὸν ταῦτα παιδεύοντα, ὅς γε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐθαύμαζεν ὡς ἂν θεὸν ὑπερφυῶς. πρὸς ταῦτα Φάλαρις ἀνῄρει μὲν μαντείας, ἀνῄρει δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς δρώμενα περιφανῶς. (217) ὁ δ' Ἄβαρις μετῆγε τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ πᾶσι φαινόμενα ἐναργῶς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ἀμηχάνοις, ἤτοι πολέμοις ἀτλήτοις ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις ἢ καρπῶν φθοραῖς ἢ λοιμῶν φοραῖς ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶ τοιούτοις παγχαλέποις καὶ ἀνηκέστοις παραγιγνομένων δαιμονίων τινῶν καὶ θείων εὐεργετημάτων ἐπειρᾶτο συμπείθειν, ὡς ἔστι θεία πρόνοια, πᾶσαν ἐλπίδα ἀνθρωπίνην καὶ δύναμιν ὑπεραίρουσα. ὁ δὲ Φάλαρις καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἠναισχύντει τε καὶ ἀπεθρασύνετο. αὖθις οὖν ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὑποπτεύων μὲν ὅτι Φάλαρις αὐτῷ ῥάπτοι θάνατον, ὅμως δὲ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐκ εἴη Φαλάριδι μόρσιμος, ἐξουσιαστικῶς ἐπεχείρει λέγειν. ἀπιδὼν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν Ἄβαριν ἔφη, ὅτι οὐρανόθεν ἡ διάβασις εἴς τε τὰ ἀέρια καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια φέρεσθαι πέφυκε, (218) καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀκολουθίας πάντων διεξῆλθε γνωριμώτατα τοῖς πᾶσι, περί τε τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτεξουσίου δυνάμεως ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀπέδειξε, καὶ προϊὼν περὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τελείας ἐνεργείας ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς, κἄθ'οὕτω μετὰ παρρησίας περὶ τυραννίδος τε καὶ τῶν κατὰ τύχην πλεονεκτημάτων πάντων, ἀδικίας τε καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης πλεονεξίας ὅλης, στερεῶς ἀνεδίδαξεν, ὅτι οὐδενός ἐστι ταῦτα ἄξια. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θείαν παραίνεσιν ἐποιήσατο περὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου καὶ πρὸς τὸν κάκιστον ἀντιπαραβολὴν αὐτοῦ προθύμως ἀντιπαρέτεινε, περὶ ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν παθῶν, ὅπως ἔχει ταῦτα, σαφέστατα ἀπεκάλυψε, καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον πάντων, ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ τῶν κακῶν εἰσιν ἀναίτιοι, καὶ ὅτι νόσοι καὶ ὅσα πάθη σώματος ἀκολασίας ἐστὶ σπέρματα· περί τε τῶν κακῶς λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς μύθοις διήλεγξε τοὺς λογοποιούς τε καὶ ποιητάς. τόν τε Φάλαριν μετ' ἐλέγχων ἐνουθέτει, καὶ τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ[1] δύναμιν, ὁποία τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅση, δι' ἔργων ἐπεδείκνυε, περί τε τῆς κατὰ νόμον κολάσεως, ὡς εἰκότως γίνεται, τεκμήρια πολλὰ παρέθετο, περί τε τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα παρέδειξε περιφανῶς, περί τε τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἔξω προϊόντος ἐπιστημονικῶς διεξῆλθε, περί τε νοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀπ'αὐτοῦ κατιούσης γνώσεως ἀπέδειξε τελείως, (219) ἠθικά τε ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐχόμενα τούτων δόγματα περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρηστῶν

[1] τοῦ τυράννου Deubner.

ὠφελιμώτατα ἐπαίδευσε, παραινέσεις τε συμφώνους τούτοις συνήρμοσεν ἐπιεικέστατα, ἀπαγορεύσεις τε ὧν οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖν παρέθετο· καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τῶν ‹κατὰ πεπρωμένην καὶ› καθ'εἱμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ νοῦν δρωμένων τὴν διάκρισιν ἐποιήσατο [καὶ τῶν κατὰ πεπρωμένην καὶ καθ'εἱμαρμένην], περὶ δαιμόνων τε πολλὰ καὶ σοφὰ διελέχθη καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

On the Babylonian origin of the pentagram

It is certain that the pentagram comes from Babylon. It is the Sumeric sign UB, first found in the Uruk IV period which, roughly speaking, can be dated at c. 3000; next in Uruk III, the Jemdet Nasr period, c. 2800-2700. See A. Falkenstein, *Archaische Texte aus Uruk*, Leipzig 1936, p. 118, under 453. Miss Beatrice L. Goff, *Symbols of Prehistoric Mesopotamia*, Yale 1963, p. 76ff., deals with the earliest writing of Mesopotamia which precedes the cuneiform texts and is commonly called pictographic. She points firstly to the fact that no precise translations are possible, since too little is known about the meaning of the signs; next, she points out that in the term 'pictographic' it is not implied that the signs could always, or even could usually, more or less directly be traced back to representational forms. There is a large group of signs which are supposed to be degenerate forms of something which was originally pictographic. In this last group miss Goff mentions 'a five-pointed star' (fig. 316). In fact this is clearly a pentagram, not quite regular, but formed by five lines. Miss Goff records it also as being found on monochrome vases at Jemdet Nasr (fig. 339) and once as being incised in a spindle whorl from the same provenance (fig. 464)[1]. These are regular pentagrams.

Miss Goff wisely warns us against tempting to simplify knowledge by assuming that the earliest signs used in writing represented a single meaning. "There was no simple, unvarying meaning of each symbol. The symbols were complex, ambivalent". – "By the time of the Early Dynastic Period" (that is, in the cuneiform texts of Fara, which are a little later than the Jemdet Nasr texts) "the ideograms were clearly used with a variety of meanings. Less is known about the Jemdet Nasr period. At this time to some signs already determinatives were

[1] See my plate VI.

a



b.



c.

Fara

d 1.

Sargon

d 2.

Assyrian

d 3.

VI *a*. The pentagram in the earliest writing of Mesopotamia (Uruk IV), c. 3000 or 2800 B.C.

b. The pentagram on a monochrome painted jar from Jemdet Nasr, c. 2700 B.C.

c. The pentagram on a spindle whorl from Jemdet Nasr, c. 2700 B.C.

d. 1-2. The pentagram in the earliest cuneiform inscriptions (the sign UB): (1) from Fara, c. 2600, (2) of Sargon, 2350-2300 B.C.
3. The sign UB in later Assyrian inscriptions.

added" (sc. when the sign had a number of possible meanings)[1]. – "The star too has a number of uses. That this symbol always has a specific unambiguous meaning continues to be an unsupported hypothesis"[2]. Though it must be said that the term 'star' for the pentagram is somewhat misleading, the above statements should be kept in mind when dealing with the significance of the Sumeric sign UB.

In cuneiform texts this sign is usually rendered by 'regions', heavenly 'quarters' or 'directions'. It is often found with the number four. There are four cosmic regions, four quarters of the heavens, and there are four directions: forward, backward, left and right. A. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, ²1929, p. 189f., suggests, since the early Babylonians imagined the universe as being ruled from above by a divine Power, that from four divisions they arrived at five. Thus, to the four directions mentioned above the upward direction could be added. This is illustrated by the Jewish Prayer of the Night: here four of the five directions are connected with the four archangles (Michael, Gabriel, Uriel and Raphael), while the fifth is connected with the Schekina, the emanation of the supreme Divinity. In Babylon the four directions were connected with the planets Jupiter, Mercury, Mars and Saturn. To these four Venus as the 'queen of the heavens' representing the upper world could be added as the fifth.

Thus the sign of the pentagram seems to acquire a cosmic significance. It should be noticed, however, that the number frequently mentioned with UB is four, not five; moreover, that the cosmic meaning of the sign UB cannot be proved for the earliest period, which is that of Uruk IV and III. Now, in this period the geometrical form of the pentagram is clearest.

Was the Uruk pentagram originally a geometrical figure? It is quite possible. Professor Jan van Dijk, Assyriologist in the University of Copenhagen, who as an epigraphist took part in the Uruk-Warka expedition, writes to me that he feels inclined to this interpretation. He mentions that the pentagram as a clearly geometrical figure was found on a corner-stone from the Uruk III period. "Here it certainly is the builder's mark. It does not have any apotropeic meaning. It simply means *angle*".

Of course one feels reminded here of the Roman Republican coins of Lucius Papius as explained by Sydenham. It would be simplistic, no doubt, to draw a straight line from Uruk III (say 2700) to the first century B.C. But some connecting link might be found.

[1] p. 78ff. [2] p. 119.

I am willing, of course, to accept that in that early period the figure of the pentagram did not have any apotropeic significance. But had it perhaps in a much later period of Babylonian civilization, say after c. 1000 B.C.? No doubt that would explain quite a few things in the later history of this symbol. However, it has not been confirmed to me by any clear evidence. What is frequently found on amulets of the period after 1000 is the division into four quarters by two intersecting lines (a cross), while something is incised in each of the four angles. But as far as I know the pentagram is not found on Babylonian amulets.

Three explanations have been suggested in order to explain a supposed apotropeic meaning of the sign UB. One of them was first put forward by Hugo Winckler, viz. that for the Babylonians the pentagram symbolized the planets, the number five being obtained by omitting the two evil ones (Mars and Saturn). This explanation, which was adopted by Jeremias and still figures in the second edition of his handbook (1929), p. 196, was on good grounds rejected by Robert Eisler, *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, München 1910, vol. I, p. 305, n. 2: not a single text exists in which a series of five planets is mentioned including sun and moon but omitting Mars and Saturn; on the other hand, there are many texts, from about 700 down to at least 523, in which the five so-called 'smaller planets' (without sun and moon) are mentioned together. Nor is there any indication that among the Babylonians the planets Mars and Saturn were considered as evil signs.

Another suggestion was made by Fr. Röck in *Globus* XCV (1909), p. 7ff. He posits that the Babylonian priests identified the goddess Ishtar with the five-point star, and that she was represented by the geometrical pentagram. What are his grounds for this somewhat startling assertion? For everybody knows that since early times the goddess Ishtar was represented by an eight rays star (Elam), and this is also found in Sumeric inscriptions; but we never heard of an identification of Ishtar with the pentagram. Röck starts from the fact that in cuneiform inscriptions Ishtar is indicated by the number 15. This much is true. But it is not altogether convincing that 'because of its 15 angles' the pentagram would have been symbolized by this number, nor that the fact that 15×15 was the revolving time of the planet Venus points to a connection of Ishtar with the pentagram. Doubtless this connection was made by the author in order to explain the fact that later (in the Greek-Hellenistic world) the pentagram is found as a symbol of good luck and health. For if in Babylon this

symbol was identified with the goddess of light, of course that would explain certain things which could otherwise not be sufficiently accounted for. This theory, however, does not seem to have found any adherents.

A third explanation was proposed by Allotte de la Fuije in *Babyloniaca* XIV (Paris 1934), in an article which bears the significant title *Le Pentagramme pythagoricien, sa diffusion, son emploi dans le syllabaire cunéiforme*. It is worth mentioning, because the author (a colonel Assyriologist) approaches the matter from the wrong side: starting from much later symbols and ideas he too projects them into the Babylonian world and by doing so arrives at purely phantastic constructions. He knows about the Greek and Hellenistic coins with the pentagram, from the Melian stater, from those at Pitane and in Cyrene on to those in Italy and Gaul. He has well seen that for instance the pentagram on the Melian stater cannot be explained by attributing it to Pythagoreans, nor does he feel tempted to explain it in that way e.g. in Pitane or Gaul. But he does start from the text in Lucian *Pro lapsu* 5, and hence concludes that no doubt in Pitane there was an important cult of Asclepios and Hygieia, the latter being symbolized by the pentagram. For this hypothesis – for nothing is known about such a cult at Pitane – he can find some support in Head, *Historia Nummorum*, which for the rest does not make the guess any more certain or even probable. Against it is the fact that classical Antiquity does not know the kind of symbolism which substitutes an attribute or symbol for the god himself. This is found in Renaissance and post-Renaissance times. Now one might think that this alone is a sufficient ground to reject the proposed explanation of the pentagram coins of Pitane as a failure.

But De Fuije goes further. Since he wishes to consolidate his hypothesis of the identification of the pentagram with Hygieia as existing before the Pythagoreans and independent of them, he explains the pentagram as a 'symbole anthropomorphique', a schematical representation of the goddess herself. Thus, the pentagram on Greek coins would be a 'pictographic' symbol. And does not this point to the earliest Babylonian writing, to the 'pictographic' signs of Uruk and of Jemdet Nasr?

Indeed, De Fuije finds his hypothesis most strikingly confirmed by a Jemdet Nasr tablet (nr. 46): here a human figure is represented, probably a woman, with the left hand holding a serpent's tail, while the right hand holds the serpent under its head. Now this

representation, our author thinks, is exactly the same as that on those Roman coins of the first century that bear the inscription SALUS AUG, 'la santé d'Auguste' (!). The Roman Salus = Gr. 'Υγίεια, with the symbol of the serpent. And here it is: in Jemdet Nasr, c. 2700 B.C., 'réunie au pentagramme'...

Striking indeed. But utterly uncertain. First, it is 'réunie au pentagramme' only to our author's mind: he 'unites' the woman-with-the-serpent with the pentagram which also occurs in Jemdet Nasr texts, but not on this tablet. Second, is it certain that the serpent on the Jemdet Nasr tablet symbolizes health? Why not prosperity in general? Cp. the Cretan snake-goddess and Nilsson's comments on it in *Greek Religion* p. 13; cp. also the serpent as protector of the house among the negroes in West-Africa. Third, is the *Salus Augusta* = ὑγίεια? No doubt, it does not mean the physical health of Augustus, but probably the prosperity effected by him. Fourth, whether in Uruk or Jemdet Nasr the pentagram was originally an anthropomorphic symbol, remains entirely uncertain. It is not before the 16th century A.D. that in Western Europe a human figure is inscribed in it. From this kind of post-Renaissance symbolism no conclusion can be drawn as to the original meaning of the symbol in Mesopotamia.

All in all, it is De Fuije who gives the most direct reply to the question of "How did Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans come to calling the pentagram *health*?" In itself the hypothesis is intelligent. Only, it is too much construed with the purpose of explaining a few data of some three millennia later. And this is of course an extremely hazardous undertaking.

The following three facts should be kept in mind.

1. There is an enormous space of time between Jemdet Nasr and Pythagoras' possible stay in Babylon (more than two millennia).

2. The pentagram, perhaps originally a geometrical figure, acquired a cosmic significance as early as in the third millennium B.C. (the connotation of heavenly region or quarter, already in the Fara texts, say c. 2600), while somewhat later it was connected with the planets. These ideas had already a long tradition at the time Pythagoras came to Babylon.

3. The use of the five-pointed star on a shield (in 5th century Athens) does not point in the direction of a geometrical figure symbolizing or implying certain proportions of the human body. It definitely points to an apotropeic or protecting significance. This either may be due to cosmological-astrological views in Babylonia

itself, or the Babylonian symbol may have acquired its apotropeic significance only in Greece. A third possibility was mentioned in my ch. III, namely, that the figure of the pentagram as being endless acquired the character of a sacred emblem and hence was considered as giving protection against evil. This idea might be early Babylonian. We found it in the 14th century English poem *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight.*

However this may be, the meaning of physical health connected with the pentagram by the Pythagoreans, will be not primary but derived.

APPENDIX B

The pentagram on flags and in arms

Here are a few present-day instances of the use of the five-point star or pentagram on flags and in arms.

1. It is on the national flag of the state Morocco; 2. it is to be found in the centre of the arms of Indonesia; 3. it is used with the crescent in the flag of Algeria; 4. an enormous pentagram is placed above the triumphal arch in Accra (Ghana). The interesting thing is, that even in these few cases one single explanation will not suffice.

In all those cases where the five-point star appears in modern flags together with the crescent there is no room for doubt: this is a Moslem symbol. The Algerian flag is not an isolated case: there are also Turkey and Pakistan, Tunesia and Egypt[1]. The symbol is an ancient one: we know it from the Hellenistic world as denoting the heavens and God[2]. It is probably originating from the Middle East.

Morocco offers the only instance of a constructed and explicit pentagram: it is in the centre of a red field. This, too, may be a Moslem symbol, since the Islam took it over from the Jews together with the hexagram. Both are still used as holy symbols in the Moslem world[3].

As to the five-point star in the heart of the arms of Indonesia, I

[1] The flag of Egypt has three small five-pointed stars with the crescent. It should be noticed that in all the above-mentioned cases the star(s) with the crescent are slightly inclined, while in all other cases where the five-point star is found alone it is in an upright position.

[2] Cp. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols*, cited above, p. 43.

[3] Goodenough, *Jew. Symbols* VII p. 200.

think it is a Moslem sign as well[1], denoting the religion which is of such great interest to a large number of people in that young state.

I feel less certain about the meaning of the five-point star of Ghana. This much is sure, that it must mean something to the leaders of that country. Is it a Moslem symbol? Hardly. Is it the five-point star of the Soviet-flag, which signifies the five parts of the world?[2] I do not think so. What in the world can it mean? – Before answering this question it must be observed that Belgian Congo, before becoming an independent state, had a five-point star in the centre of its flag: a yellow-star in a sky-blue field. What does it mean?

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of History s.v. 'flag' gives a short explanation of the meaning of the five-point star on flags. About Congo it says that the star symbolizes *hope*. It does not add how the figure of the five-point star came to have this meaning. Yet that question should be asked. I think we can give a plausible reply. While the symbol of star(s) and crescent comes from the Moslem world and there, just as the geometrical pentagram, was taken over from the Jews, the five-point star as a symbol of good luck – which is very near to hope – will derive from the Western Medieval and later use of the pentagram as an apotropeic sign. Since this Medieval and later use of the symbol was very widely spread and survives in modern times, we may suppose that the leaders of certain African countries knew it and took it over as a symbol of good luck and hope. No doubt this is the meaning of the black five-point star in the centre of the three-striped flag of Ghana. And perhaps the Moroccan pentagram has a similar meaning to the leaders of that country.

However this may be, the five-point stars of Congo and of Ghana have a fair chance of being far descendents – unconsciously and very far – from the Babylonian pentagram, from which the Pythagorean symbol of health derives as well. In many other cases they mean just nothing in themselves.

Such is the case of the stars of the U.S.A.-flag: that they are *five-point* stars will not have any particular meaning; the point is *that they are many*. I.e.: their multiplicity symbolizes the plurality of the North American states.

Taken by itself, the five-point star is not a symbol of unity. But it came to mean this because certain states placed one great five-pointed star on a blue field instead of the many U.S. stars. This is what happened in Liberia, and next in Chile. Cuba and Porto-Rico followed with a slight variation, placing their star on a triangular field, – one red, and the other blue –, and making their 'stripes' less numerous.

[1] I regret that the Embassy of Indonesia at the Hague was not able to give me any precise information on this point. For the rest, my experience in Morocco was similar: asking for information about the meaning of the pentagram on their flag seemed just an absurd question to the people in that country.
[2] The five-point star of the Soviet-flag is also found in the flags of the people's republics of China and Mongolia, possibly also in that of Albania (this star is drawn in white lines on a red field, just as in the Soviet Russian flag). I hesitate about Yugoslavia, where the five-point star appears without any other symbol: a red star with a white outline. Probably it is the Soviet star.



Panama, the flag of which has two five-point stars, possibly chose this symbol because the country is divided into two parts by the canal

APPENDIX C

On the problem of the sources of Iamblichus, V.P.

It is beyond the scope of this work to deal with the problem of the sources of Iamblichus' *V.P.* into every detail. Yet, since I am touching on this problem again and again, it will be useful to make a few remarks on it.

First, I should like to observe that in Iamblichus' *V.P.* as a whole there are a very limited number of passages that are obviously late, so as to betray the hand of the compiler himself. They are as scarce as they are easy to distinguish from the bulk of the work. The book

consists of passages from different sources, linked rather loosely by some sober sentences which, at least for the attentive reader, mark the transition from one passage to the other. Undoubtably Neoplatonic are: the ch. 59, 157-160, and 240. The first two passages contain a description of the θεωρία of the φιλόσοφος, made in clearly Neoplatonic terms; the third concludes a section on friendship by passing on to πολὺ θαυμασιώτερα, viz. the taking part in divine ἀγαθά, "the concord of the Spirit (νοῦς), and what was established amongst them on the divine Soul". It speaks of μὴ διασπᾶν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς θεόν, of θεοκρασία and of ἕνωσις πρὸς τὸν θεόν.

To these few passages two others must be added. The first is in ch. 70, following immediately after the passage on φιλία πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντας, of which Pythagoras was said to have been unanimously recognized as εὑρετὴς καὶ νομοθέτης. Here the author passes on to the ὁμιλία πρὸς θεούς, both in a waking state and sleeping: he says that more than anybody else Pythagoras knew how to lead people to this communion, viz. by healing them from all kind of perturbations of the soul and from ignorance. He healed and purified their soul like a superhuman being[1] and kindled the divine in it, saved it and led 'the divine eye' on to the vision of the intelligible World[2]. For only by this eye the Truth about all things[3] is seen. Raising the intellect towards this level he was always at work on purifying it[4].

The other passage is 228, at the end of the section that deals with ἀνδρεία and precedes the φιλία section, 229-230. 228 deals with the protecting and liberating Noûs from all the numerous impediments and bonds by which it was held fast from early childhood. "For Noûs sees all things and hears all things, and all the rest is dumb and blind", the author explains with a well-known quotation from Epicharmus, and he goes on speaking once more of κάθαρσις which is effected διὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὀργιασμῶν – an indubitable Iamblichus idiom.

The presence of such explanations, additions or digressions obviously does not disparage the immediately preceding or following passage which does not bear such characteristics and even is, be it explicitly or on the ground of some external evidence, traced back to some author of the fourth century B.C. As a matter of fact, all we can learn from

[1] δαιμονίως ἴᾶτο καὶ ἀπεκάθαιρε τὴν ψυχήν.
[2] καὶ ἀνεζωπύρει τὸ θεῖον ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀπέσωζε καὶ περιῆγεν ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν τὸ θεῖον ὄμμα.
[3] ἡ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἀλήθεια.
[4] ἐποιεῖτο τὴν τῆς διανοίας κάθαρσιν.

the presence of those five late Neoplatonic style passages is: that sometimes, though rather seldom, Iamblichus felt the need of explaining some very central idea (such as 'philosophy' where the term is said to have been applied by Pythagoras to his own wisdom) in his own words, or of adding something which he thought of the utmost importance (such as the θαυμασιώτερα in 240 or the training of the νοῦς in 228).

Second, there are a number of other passages – more frequent, though not very frequent either – in which obvious Platonic, Aristotelian or Stoic terms are used. I am thinking of 106 and 168 (οἰκείωσις), 130 (προαιρετικὴ κίνησις, probably also the interpenetration of the elements and of moral opposites), 131 (μετριοπάθειαι καὶ μεσότητες and αἵρεσις τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν), 190 (ἐπιστήμη τῶν φευκτέων καὶ ὑπομενετέων), 218 (αὐτεξούσιος δύναμις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τελεία ἐνέργεια, θεοὶ ἀναίτιοι τῶν κακῶν etc.), 219 (τὰ καθ'εἱμαρμένην – τὰ κατὰ νοῦν), 233 (τὰ ὡρισμένα), 246 (ζῆν and εὖ ζῆν).

To these I add such passages as 145ff. on Orpheus as the source of Pythagorean 'theology of number', 150 where the distinction is made between θεωρητικοί and on the other hand ἀκουσματικοὶ καὶ πολιτικοί, 157 on the ὑπομνήματα, 201 the expression οἱ σωθησόμενοι, 241 in which the preference for the Doric dialect is expressed, and lastly 245 in which those who are selling μαθήματα are violently attacked.

Certainly all this was not written by Iamblichus, but he will have found it in his primary sources.

Third. According to Rohde Iamblichus' primary sources were essentially two: Nicomachus and Apollonius of Tyana. We cannot prove this. On the whole, Iamblichus seldom mentions his sources. He mentions Aristoxenus only twice: as his source of the Damon and Phintias story (in 233, 234 and 237) and of his first account of the catastrophe (251). Apollonius is mentioned just once, viz. at the beginning of the other version about the catastrophe (254). Between the two versions there is Nicomachus' variant on the first account. That Iamblichus took not only his first version of the catastrophe from Nicomachus, but the Damon and Phintias story as well, is corroborated by the fact that the φιλία stories in Iamblichus 234 ff. are the same as those in Porphyry, *V.P.* 59-61, at the beginning of which Nicomachus is mentioned.

No doubt Iamblichus has some more passages from Aristoxenus, as can be seen e.g. in 209 ff., a passage which occurs in Iamblichus *V.P.* anonymously, but is found in Stobaeus under the name of Aristo-

xenus. Is it too hazardous to assume that Iamblichus borrowed *all* his Aristoxenus passages from Nicomachus? Certainly, we cannot prove it. Yet, all things considered it is a probable assumption, not only because it is probable that Nicomachus drew mainly upon Aristoxenus, but also because Iamblichus' *V.P.* has several *doublures*, the same passages on certain subjects occurring twice in the work in almost the same wording, a fact which, I think, can be best explained by assuming that the compiler used two main sources, one of which was, no doubt, Nicomachus, while the other must have been Apollonius. Certainly the latter was used by Iamblichus much more than only in the second version of the catastrophe (ch. 254-264), a passage which, for the rest, contains some very interesting information and is not so much without all historical basis as was supposed by Rohde. But that is another subject[1].

Generally speaking it may be expected that Nicomachus (Aristoxenus) is the source where mathematical philosophy, musicology and medicine are touched upon, while Apollonius is behind the passages of a more specifically biographical character.

Fourth. Iamblichus mentions a few other names: Aristotle's work *On Pythagorean philosophy* (31), Androcydes Π. Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων (145), Hippobotus and Neanthes (189), Spintharus (197). He neither mentions Timaeus nor Heraclides Ponticus.

As to Aristotle, the quotation found in Iamblichus 31 in which Pythagoras is characterised as some kind of superhuman being, has been enlisted by Ross as fr. 2 in the fragments of Π. τῶν Πυθαγορείων[2]. No doubt Iamblichus found it in Apollonius of Tyana's *Life of Pythagoras* which he used in this part of his work. Also the case of Spintharus is clear: since he was Aristoxenus' father, Iamblichus may have found his name in Nicomachus, from whom he drew that passage.

As to Androcydes, it is interesting to find that Rohde is rather inclined to eliminate him as 'probably a mere fictitious person'. About forty years later P. Corssen[3] saved him as a historical character, and

[1] I am thinking in particular of the question of the division of the land after the conquest of Sybaris: obviously this was not invented by Apollonius; on the contrary, it points to a historical source, and to a historian who had some idea about the actual causes of political changes and party movements. It is curious that Rohde even rejected the whole story of the Cylonian movement and its connection with the fall of Sybaris as a mere fiction by Apollonius! Nowadays nobody who has but the slightest feeling for historical problems would still defend such a theory.

[2] Ross, *Fragm. selecta* p. 132.

[3] Rhein. Mus. 67 (1912).

Bertermann even went so far as to attribute to Androcydes all those passages in Iamblichus' *V.P.* where mention is made of Pythagoras' teaching in the form of Ἀκούσματα καὶ σύμβολα; moreover, a number of other passages – e.g. on *regimen* – where Androcydes as a physician might be the author, or where the topic of providence is involved, as it was in 145. Of course all this remains somewhat conjectural, though it cannot be said to be without any foundation. Whether or not Androcydes was amply cited in Nicomachus, we do not know. But of course it is possible that Iamblichus read him there.

Lastly there are Hippobotus and Neanthes, both from the 3rd century B.C., the first a doxographer much used by Diogenes Laertius, the other a biographer, certainly used by Apollonius of Tyana, perhaps also by Nicomachus. No doubt Iamblichus may have found them cited in one of or in both his main sources.

Fifth. The fact that Aristoxenus, Timaeus and, say, Heraclides Ponticus were not Iamblichus' primary sources, does not disparage his testimony in such a sense that it would be altogether worthless. The only thing it does mean is: that we need some other evidence to enable us to see by comparison whether a certain passage does or does not come from this or that fourth century B.C. source. Now fortunately such additional evidence is not altogether lacking. E.g. certain passages in Iamblichus may be accepted as going back to Timaeus, because Iamblichus' text agrees with what we read in Diodorus X or in Pompeius Trogus or in this or that chapter of Diogenes Laertius, just as certain other passages are accepted as going back to Aristoxenus because in some other source (say, Stobaeus) his name is mentioned as the author of the same passage.

This, then, is what can be said on the problem of Iamblichus' sources, taken as a whole. Neither is everything uncertain, nor is it possible to attribute every particular passage of Iamblichus' *V.P.* definitely to some particular comparatively early source. Several things in Iamblichus *V.P.* do go back to fourth century B.C. sources, nor is this their ultimate origin. It must be kept in mind that both Aristoxenus and Timaeus (to mention only these two) found a tradition existing, the one in the Pythagorean School of his age, the other in the cities of Southern Italy and Sicily, where Pythagoreans lived and worked. And lastly, it should be borne in mind that this tradition must have had a particular vigour, a tough and vital strength, rooted in the life of several generations of those men and women who fed on the spiritual force of that one mighty character: Pythagoras.

APPENDIX D

On Iamblichus, V.P. 215-219. (**T** 64)

In these chapters a curious conversation is recorded, which is supposed to have been held by Pythagoras, Phalaris the tyrant of Akragas, and the Thracian Abaris who is said to have come for a visit to Pythagoras. Questioned both by the tyrant and his visitor, the philosopher gives rather an extensive exposé of 'metaphysics', of the connection between heaven and earth, on offerings, on the providence of the Gods and heavenly phenomena. Because of the obvious anachronism of the supposed talk, Phalaris having ruled Akragas some 25 years before Pythagoras' arrival at Croton, the passage was rejected as absurd by some 19th century criticists, such as Erwin Rohde. Krische in his thesis *De societatis a Pythagora conditae scopo politico*, Göttingen 1830, was the first to recognize that the *mise en scène* is due to Heraclides Ponticus in his dialogue *Abaris*, an hypothesis which was adopted both by Bertermann, *De Iamblichi V.P. fontibus*, Königsberg 1913, and by P. Corssen in Rhein. Mus. 1912. None of them, however, supposed that the whole conversation as we read it in Iamblichus was directly borrowed from Heraclides. Indeed, there seem to be several later terms and views, both Stoic and Neoplatonic, in Iamblichus' text. Nonetheless, in an article in the *Revue des Études Anciennes* 36 (1934), entitled *Sur l'Abaris d'Héraclide le Pontique*, P. Boyancé argues for a direct dependence of the whole section in Iamblichus on the author of the 4th century B.C.

His main argument is that Heraclides Ponticus was interested exactly in the kind of problems raised in our passage. As a point of particular interest he cites ch. 216 where Pythagoras, in teaching Abaris that 'all things depend on Heaven', supports this doctrine by the ἐνέργεια τῶν ἱερῶν. Boyancé understands these words as referring to the miraculous power which, according to an ancient religious tradition, dwells in sacred objects, such as images or statues of the gods. For this view he points to the title of a work of the late second century rhetor Claudius Aelianus, cited in Suidas, Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν. In fact, in that work mention was made of miraculous statues. And this is exactly, according to Boyancé, what we find in Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 46 W., the story of the catastrophe of Helice, told by Strabo VIII 384. The Ionian exiles from Helice had requested that the old Poseidon statue of the town either would be delivered to them or

placed in the sanctuary. Neither had been granted. The next winter the town was damaged by the flood. –

It must be observed, however, that the title of Aelianus' book was not Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν but Περὶ θείων ἐναργειῶν. This might be rendered by *Divine manifestations*, or: *The clearness of divine Presence*. Anyhow, this is no parallel to Iamblichus, *V.P.* 216. Next, we have no reason to suppose that by ἐνέργεια τῶν ἱερῶν in Iamblichus the miraculous power of statues in particular was referred to. That by Heraclides the catastrophe of Helice would have been directly ascribed to the power of the statue of Poseidon, appears rather improbable, since according to this author it was the wrath of the God that was raised by the citizens of Helice.

It is much more likely that by Iamblichus' expression ἐνέργεια τῶν ἱερῶν the working of sacrifices was meant. Indeed, this effective energy presupposes the interference of the gods in human affairs, and this by the influence of sacrifices. Now, this is exactly what we find in the fragments of Heraclides Ponticus' Περὶ εὐσεβείας. Thus, the thesis of Iamblichus' dependence on this author is confirmed, though not along the lines of Boyancé's argument.

A few lines further on Pythagoras, enlarging on the theme that everything on earth depends on heaven, declares that "from the heavens by nature there is a passage to the regions of the air and what is on the earth" (ὅτι οὐρανόθεν ἡ διάβασις εἴς τε τὰ ἀέρια καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια φέρεσθαι πέφυκε). Boyancé tries to convince us that this too goes back to Heraclides Ponticus. Unjustly so, for the air as an intermediate zône between the heavens and the earth is of Stoic, not of Platonic origin. We find it in Cicero, *Tusc.* I 42-43, and in Plutarch, *De facie in orbe lunae*, 28-30, both passages inspired by Posidonius and his platonizing Stoicism (cp. my *Greek Phil.* III, nr. 1192).

In the same passage the dependence of earthly things on heaven is expressed in the words ἀκολουθία πρὸς τὸν οὐρανόν. This wording is no classical Greek. ἀκολουθία with πρός is found in Galen[1], not in Plato.

According to Iamblichus Pythagoras subsequently proved that there is an αὐτεξούσιος δύναμις in the soul, and spoke on the perfect action of λόγος and of νοῦς. These terms are obviously Stoic or post-Stoic.

Next, the life of tyrants and its πλεονεξία is opposed to the best form of life, a few words are said about the δυνάμεις and the πάθη of

[1] *Nat. fac.* I 16: ἀκολουθία πρὸς τὸ κενούμενον (filling up a vacuum).

the soul, and, as the crown on all this, it is stated that the Gods are ἀναίτιοι τῶν κακῶν. This, evidently, points to Plato, – with the exception of the δυνάμεις καὶ πάθη, which rather is proper to Stoic psychology.

A word is also said about the criticism of poets and prosewriters. Next, Phalaris having been admonished μετ' ἐλέγχων, the power of Heaven is once more emphasized and illustrated δι' ἔργων; the justice of Law and its punishments are mentioned, next the difference between man and animals. The latter topic again points rather to the Stoa than to Pythagoreanism or later Platonism.

Follows the distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος which 'goes out'. Boyancé quotes Theo Smyrnaeus, p. 72f. as a proof that the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός are not exclusively Stoic. A closer inspection of the text of Theon, however, shows that this is an error: these terms are as certainly Stoic as that of λόγος σπερματικός, mentioned among many other non-Stoic varieties of λόγος summed up by Theon in the above-cited passage[1].

Then, Pythagoras is said to have spoken περί τε νοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κατιούσης γνώσεως. This betrays a clearly Neoplatonic view of knowledge: all knowledge, indicated by the general term γνῶσις, springs from νοῦς, descending gradually from the purely theoretical level until that of sense-perception. No doubt this is in line with Plato's thought, but it is not his language.

Pythagoras is said to have gone on with many other moral principles and prescriptions, and finally he is said to have made the distinction between that which happens κατὰ πεπρωμένην καὶ καθ' εἱμαρμένην[2] and that which is done by νοῦς. Though the words are ancient and the distinction itself goes back to Plato, it is not his way of expressing himself: in the *Timaeus* we hear about physical ἀνάγκη which is opposed to νοῦς. What we read in Iamblichus is the terminology of the Stoa and of later Platonism.

Thus, our conclusion must be that, though essentially the conversation reported by Iamblichus goes back to Heraclides' *Abaris*, it is not a mere transcription of his text. Possibly Iamblichus found the passage in one of his two main sources, most probably in the more biographical one, which was Apollonius of Tyana. Certain late terms and ideas may be attributed to Iamblichus himself.

[1] I dealt with the passage in Theon more extensively in Mnemosyne 1965, fasc. IV.

[2] According to Deubner's corrected text.

On γεννήσεις παρὰ φύσιν (to VI 3, p. 111 n. 3)

Edelstein, *The Hippocratic Oath*, n. 109 (p. 35), cites Aristotle, *N.E.* VII 15, 1148 b 29 ff., for 'the usual Greek point of view' concerning γεννήσεις παρὰ φύσιν. What Aristotle is speaking about in this chapter is: unnatural pleasures. He says that they are partly instances of bestiality (due to an inferior kind of nature), partly due to disease or habit. Thus, sexual perversion may either result from natural disposition or from habit, as in the case of those who have been abused from childhood. In neither of these cases does it fall within the limits of vice.

ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν is mentioned under the category of νοσηματώδεις (ἕξεις) ἐξ ἔθους, instanced by plucking out the hair, biting the nails, eating cinders and earth. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς· – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι δι'ἔθος.

The passage can be hardly cited to support the assertion that "generally speaking, in this matter the Greeks took a much 'laxer' point of view than the Pythagoreans". It is paralleled by Plato's more or less medical approach in *Timaeus* 86 c d:

τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος διὰ τὴν ἑνὸς γένους ἕξιν ὑπὸ μανότητος ὀστῶν ἐν σώματι ῥυώδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσαν νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονεν.

"The truth is that the intemperance of love is a disease of the soul due chiefly to the moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements by the loose consistency of the bones" (transl. Jowett).

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