

PLOTINUS, ENNEADS V 3 (49). 3-4¹

As is well known, nearly all of Plotinus' treatises cover a multiplicity of subjects. That is less true of V 3 than of most of them. It treats of self-knowledge, and of the relations between Soul, *Nous*, and the One with special reference to that question: its first nine chapters deal with Soul and *Nous*, the remaining eight with *Nous* and the One. It is important to note that it is one of the latest group of treatises (49th in the chronological order), and, incidentally, the only one of these, apart from some sections of I 1, which deals primarily with matters of metaphysics and epistemology rather than ethical questions like *eudaimonia* and providence. The reason for drawing attention to V 3's position among the last treatises is that it is sometimes thought, so notably by A. H. Armstrong, that in the two treatises of this group where such matters are discussed, viz., this one and I 1, Plotinus dropped his admittedly unorthodox and later notorious view that the individual human intellect stays above, in *Nous*²: if it still does not descend with the rest of the soul, it remains in the hypostasis Soul rather than in *Nous*³. As I have pointed out before⁴, it is by no means clear that this is what actually happened, and one of the most recent treatments of intellect in Plotinus, that by T.A. Szlezak, concludes that Plotinus is consistent and usually clear, and, moreover, that our chapters of V 3 are irrelevant to the question⁵.

Whether or not they are, and further, what the answer to the problem is, can only be determined by looking closely at the texts themselves; the purpose of this paper is to examine two chapters which appear to bear closely on the issue, namely the 3rd and the 4th of V 3. The position of *nous*, and its self-knowledge, is the first of the problems to which these chapters are relevant. They do, in fact, present a number of difficulties and ambiguities, not only on this but on other matters too. Another problem closely related to the question of the intellect above, *νοῦς ἄνω*, is that of individuation. If our intellect is one of the forms in the hypostasis intellect, and of equal status to theirs, then the principle of individuation is a form of each individual. Plotinus is generally agreed to be inconsistent on this issue (Rist, and, in his more recent work, Armstrong⁶). But if *nous* is permanently *ἄνω* in V 3, that treatise becomes part

of the evidence for forms of individuals in Plotinus, at least if *ἄνω* means in *Nous* rather than Soul⁷.

The third question arising from our chapters is a less problematic one, that is how Plotinus conceived the reception and processing of sense-data. That is a question I have recently discussed elsewhere⁸, and so shall say very little about it here.

Before we pass on to look at the texts themselves one further general point should be made. It is that it seems strange that, if Plotinus did drop his view about the undescended intellect, no mention of this change appears in the later Neoplatonists, who always cite him, once, oddly, with Iamblichus⁹, as the proponent of this view. It could just possibly be a function of what these later Platonists read: V3 is not referred to as much as some of the treatises, though at least one section of I 1 that would be relevant is cited by both Simplicius and Philoponus¹⁰. That raises the interesting question, which cannot be dealt with here, of how much Plotinus his successors actually read. And even if they did read the whole of the *Enneads*, one might wonder whether they were prone to see what they expected to see — a well-known characteristic of the later Neoplatonists' study of Plato and Aristotle — or whether they did really, after proper consideration, find these texts to be saying the same as all the others. In either case, it is likely that they will at least have started from the assumption that the intellect remains above. I propose to deal with the two chapters in question by offering a translation — for those not familiar with the problems of reading Plotinus I might add that in his case translation contains a higher element of interpretation than with perhaps any other ancient author — and then adding a commentary on points of interest which bear on the issues outlined above. This commentary will try to raise questions as much as to provide answers.

Before embarking on chapters 3-4, it might be helpful to summarise the two previous ones: chapter 1 asks if what knows itself must be multiple, or if what is not compound (*σύνθετον*) can have intellection (*νόησις*) of itself. Plotinus answers that if one part knows another, that is not self-knowledge, and that will not be what is being looked for, a knowledge that is *τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἑαυτόν*, a thing itself knowing itself; it will rather be *ἄλλο ἄλλο*, one thing knowing another. Self-knowledge, therefore, must belong to something simple (*ἄπλοῦν*). If there is no such thing, then we must abandon the idea of self-knowledge, which would

lead to absurdities. We must consider whether *nous* has self-knowledge, whether it is knowledge of itself or other things as well, how it has it, and how far it goes.

Chapter 2 tries soul (in the narrow sense) as a candidate. Soul deals with material from outside, namely that produced by sense-perception and by the impressions — τύποι — it receives from νοῦς: it fits the former to the latter. Does soul, that is the soul's *nous*, stick at this, or does it turn to itself and have self-knowledge? No, that is attributable to *nous*. If we grant it to this part (τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, 1. 17) we shall look at how it differs from what is above: if we do not, we shall go on to that and see what itself knowing itself, αὐτοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, means. If we give it to what is below, we shall discuss what the difference from self-intellection, τοῦ νοεῖν ἑαυτοῦ is. If we have none, then we have pure *nous*. We may comment that here Plotinus already sees self-knowledge as a defining characteristic of *nous*. The discursive reason, τὸ διανοητικόν does not turn to itself, but has knowledge of the impressions, τύποι which it receives from both sides. Hence chapter 3, of which the translation now follows, begins with sense-perception¹¹.

Plotinus, *Enneads* V 3. 3-4.

V 3. 3. For the power of sense-perception has seen a man and given the impression to the reason. What does it say? In fact it will say nothing yet: it has only taken cognisance and is at rest: unless it were to conduct discourse with itself <and ask> «who is this man?», if it has met this one before, and were to say, using its memory, that it is Socrates. If it were to deploy the form, it is splitting up what the imagination has given it. But if, if he is good, it were to say so, it has spoken on the basis of what it has cognized through sensation, but what it says about them it would already have from itself, as it has a standard of the good in itself. How does it have the good in itself? <In that > it is characterised by the Form of goodness, and has been given strength for the perception of the intellect which is of that kind (i.e. good) and illuminates it of things of that kind (= ἀγαθόν because intellect illuminates it.

For this (= *dianoia*) is the pure part of the soul and receives from *nous* the traces (sc. of higher being) which are on it. So why is not *this* intellect, and the rest, starting from the sensitive faculty, soul? Because soul must be involved in reasoning, and all these things, (sc. which we have been talking about) are functions of the reasoning power. Why <then> do we not attribute thinking itself to this part and be done with <the matter>? Because we gave it <the function of> looking at what is outside and busying itself with that, but think it right that intellect should <have the capacity to> to look at what belongs to it and what is in it. But if someone says «what prevents this from looking at what belongs to it with another power», he is not looking for the power of reasoning or calculation to add to it, but is touching on pure intellect.

What prevents pure intellect being in the soul? Nothing, we shall say. Must we further say it belongs to soul? No, we shall not say it belongs to the soul, but we shall say that intellect is ours, being other than what reasons, and going above it, but ours none the less, even if we were not to count it with the parts of the soul. In fact it is ours, and not ours. This is why we both make use of it <in addition to our other faculties> and do not make use of it — we always <use> reason — and it is ours when we use it, and when we do not use it it is not ours. What is this «using in addition»? Is it <we> ourselves becoming it, and speaking as it does? In fact we speak in accordance with it; for we are not intellect. We <speak> in accordance with it by means of the reasoning faculty which first receives it. For, indeed, we perceive with the senses even if we are not the percipients. Do we then think discursively in this way, and think thus through intellect?

No, it is we ourselves who reason and we ourselves think about the thoughts in the discursive reason. For that is what we are. The acts of intellect are from above in this way, just as those from sensation <come> from below: we are this thing, the most genuine part of the soul, a thing in the middle of two powers, a worse and a better: the worse is sensation, the better is intellect. But sensation seems to be agreed to be ours always — for we always perceive with the senses, while intellect is the subject of dispute, both because <we do> not always <think> with it and because it is separate. It is separate because it does not incline towards <us> but rather we to it, looking upwards. Sensation is a messenger for us, but intellect, in regard to us, is a king.

V 3. 4. We too are kings, when <we act> in accordance with it (= *nous*). In accordance with it has two senses, either <that we use> the things <that are in it> as if they were letters inscribed in us like laws, or that we are as it were filled with it and indeed able to see and perceive it as present. And we know ourselves by knowing the other things by means of an object of vision of that kind, either in accordance with the power that recognizes this kind of thing, coming to have knowledge of it with that very power, or actually becoming it. So that he who knows himself is double, the first knowing the nature of the soul's reasoning power, the other above this, the man who knows himself in accordance with intellect by becoming it. And that man <has the capacity> to think himself no longer as a man, but has become entirely other and has snatched himself up to what is above, dragging only the better part of the soul, which alone can grow wings for intellection, so that one might store up there what one has seen.

Does the reasoning faculty not know that it is the reasoning faculty, and that it has knowledge of what is external <to it>, and that it judges what it judges, and that it does so (κρίνει) with the standards in itself which it has from intellect, and that there is something better than itself which does not seek, but possesses <its objects> completely? Does it not know what it is when it knows what kind of thing it is and what kind of functions it has? If it were to say that it is derived from intellect and is second after intellect and an image of intellect, having everything in itself as though written <on it> since the writer — that is the one who has written — is there, will he who has thus acquired

25 knowledge of himself stop at these things, and will we, using the services of another power, [l. 25] see intellect knowing itself, or shall we, by participating in it, if it is ours and we its, know intellect and ourselves in this way?

30 <We must> necessarily <know it> in this way if we are to know what is «itself <knowing> itself» in intellect. A person has become intellect when he has shed the rest of himself and looks at that part with that part and at himself with himself. It is, therefore, as intellect that he sees himself.

COMMENTARY

V 3. 3. The chapter begins with the question raised at the end of chapter 2, namely, how reason, διάνοια, can have understanding, σύνεσις. Line 1. The past tense is used because what αἰσθησις does happens first: the verbs are not philosophical aorists. **2.** Τύπος is, of course, a stoic term, and therefore one with materialist implications, but often used by Plotinus, who is, however, careful to explain the immaterial sense in which he is using it (cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology*, The Hague, 1971, 70 ff., and Plotinus' description of the transmission of sensations of material objects as οἶον ἄμεση νοήματα at IV 7. 6. 22-24). φηοῖν and ἐφεῖ are standard Plotinian terms for affirmation by cognitive powers that they have perceived or thought something. **3-5.** This is parallel to other accounts of recognition and identification, cf. e. g. I 1. 9. 15 ff. *Dianoia* has in it, or available to it: (a) images from *phantasia*, which, if retained, are memory (b) information from above, sometimes described in terms of reflections on to *phantasia* (cf. IV 3. 30. 7-11). Recognition and identification are performed by fitting one to the other, cf. e.g. συναρμόττουσα τῷ παρ' αὐτῷ εἶδει κάκεινῳ πρὸς τὴν κρείονι χρωμένη ὡσπερ κανόνι τοῦ εὐθέος (I 6. 3. 3-5). **5-6.** The sense here is unclear. Do the words ἐξέλιπτοι...μερίζει imply treating on a level below its own? If so, one might expect μερίζοι ἄν, or μερίζει ἄν ἄ...**7.** ὅ stands, as often, for τοῦτο ὅ, the τοῦτο being the object of ἔχει. **8.** what it says *additionally*, and critically, cf. ἐπικρίνειν and ἐπιζητεῖν **8-9.** Κανόνα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρ' αὐτῇ : παρ' αὐτῆς means *in itself*, not *from itself*. Is this view different from that of V 1. 11 *init.* where we are told that reasoning about the question «is it good»? needs a fixed instance, ἐστὼς τι δίκαιον, which is a starting point for λογισμός in the soul? Then it must be not the soul which reasons, but the intellect which always has δίκαιον must be in us. Thus in V 1 *nous* is in us, and therefore we have the standard required for reasoning to take place, whereas here, in V 3, we have it

because intellect illumines soul, ἐπιλάμποντος αὐτῆ νοῦ. **10-11.** The second of the two translations is more likely to be correct, because if *dianoia* is ἀγαθοειδής, then a *fortiori nous* is, and there would be little point in saying so. There would be some point in saying that not only is *nous* itself ἀγαθοειδής, but that it is also able to pass on the power of cognizing ἀγαθά, which is not implicit in the nature of soul. It also gives more point to the words that follow: that is the kind of thing that the ἐπιλαμπις produces. **12-13.** The point of the question is that if can receive these ἴχνη, why should it not thereby become νοῦς (the Aristotelian model of perception is assumed) while the rest, starting from the αἰσθητικόν, becomes soul. The answer is somewhat dogmatic, whichever of two possible senses it has, namely either that ψυχή must consist in reasoning, or that what carries out the reasoning is ψυχή. Is the answer satisfactory, in either version? Yes: it probably depends on the point that νοῦς is not the same as ψυχή in respect of the transition and process, μετάδοσις etc., which go with reasoning. **15-18.** There follows a further question: why cannot we attribute self-knowledge to this part? Here Plotinus does give an argument. It is that we have given it the function of looking at what is outside and busying itself — doubtless we are meant to take the pejorative connotations of πολυπραγμανεῖν — with that, while *nous*, by contrast looks at what belongs to, and what is in, itself. **18-22.** What is, or could be, the other power referred to? There are two possible points here: (a) we have already said that self-knowledge belongs to *nous*; does it nevertheless use another *dynamis* to exercise this function, i.e. one that has not yet been mentioned? (b) does *nous* use *dianoia* to exercise the function, so that *dianoia* would thereby have self-knowledge? οὐ τὸ διανοητικόν... λαμβάνει: if someone adds the sort of question in quotation marks, then it is clear that he is talking about *nous*, not *dianoia* / *logismos*, and so ἄλλη δυνάμει cannot be a way of admitting *dianoia* / *logismos* as a candidate for self-knowledge. **21.** ἐπιζητεῖ here indicates that *dianoia* and *logismos* would be something additional to the *nous* — which is all that is needed. **21-23.** The discussion in the previous lines has taken *dianoia* and *logismos* to refer to ψυχή as opposed to νοῦς. Hence the question now put, can νοῦς be in ψυχή? He is, of course, talking about intellect in the sense of «pure intellect», not the intellect which he sometimes calls the *nous* of the soul. The straight answer to the question, which must be read with ἐν 'meaning strictly within, is «no». ἔτι in line 22 thus means «still», in the sense of even though we have excluded ἐν in the narrow sense. **23.** In earlier treatises

Plotinus would probably have answered «yes» because *nous* was more closely tied to, or connected with, *psyche*. What we have here looks more Aristotelian, or perhaps one should say Aristotelian in the way Alexander read Aristotle. In IV 8, on the other hand, Plotinus talks of *τι ταύτης* staying above, so that *nous* is seen as something belonging to the soul, not as something either separate from it, or actually an internal part of it. 23-24. Two translations are possible, either «*nous* is ours», or «but we shall say that it is (i. e. describe τοῦτο as) our intellect. The first is more likely, since ὑμέτερον seems opposed to ψυχῆς 23 ff. The position of this *nous* is above the part that reasons. The following words imply that it is therefore above *psyche* (though one might ask whether this means above *psyche* in the strict sense of the part of soul below intellect, or the wider one of soul including *nous*): hence ὅμως δὲ ὑμέτερον etc. This remark perhaps anticipates what will be said about ἡμεῖς at 31 ff. 28-29. Προσχρώμεθα. This verb is used four times in these two lines, and therefore must be intended to be significant: it implies the use of something additional, in this case additional to what ψυχῆ is. 28. There is a textual question here which cannot be definitively resolved. The uncial DIANOIAI may, of course, represent both δianoia and δianoia. Most editors have preferred the latter, against the almost unanimous testimony — only R differs — of the MSS, in accordance with which and their then policy Henry-Schwyzler printed the former in HS¹. HS² reverts to δianoia, which is grammatically easier, being simply dependent on προσχρώμεθα, and this is what I have translated. But δianoia gives good — if very similar sense: understand ψυχῆ or ἐν ψυχῆ εἰσίν. The anacolouthon is typically Plotinian. 29-31. Plotinus asks whether προσχρησθαι entails identification. ὡς ἐκεῖνος can mean either that we speak as (identical with) *nous*, or speak as *nous* <does>, understanding λέγει, *vel sim*. In either case there is a contrast with κατ' ἐκεῖνον which Plotinus offers as the correct answer: if we exist or act in accordance with *nous* there is no identification. But does Plotinus mean (a) that we do not become identical with it, negating γινόμενος, or (b) that we do not speak as *nous*, negating φθεγγόμενος, not because we are not identical with *nous*, but because *nous* does not speak, utter, etc.? The following words, οὐ γὰρ νοῦς ἡμεῖς, suggest the former, i. e. we do not speak ὡς ἐκεῖνος because we are not identical with ἐκεῖνος. 31-32. We speak, and perform other acts, in accordance with it by means of the λογιστικόν which first receives it. I take πρώτῳ as adverbial. Plotinus does not have a first and second λογιστικόν and if he did the first would be intellect rather than reason, and in fact be a

nous internal to the soul. 33. Another textual difficulty: the MSS καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι gives doubtful, though possible sense. It would be that, unlike what happens in the case of *nous*, we perceive through *aisthesis* and here we are still (i.e. even though there is an intermediary) the perceiver. Igal's καὶ <μή> ἡμεῖς gives better sense (and is neater than Theiler's <οὐχ> οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι) (a) because of what follows; (b) because καὶ γὰρ should explain what precedes. The case of *aisthesis* would do this if *aisthesis* is parallel to *noesis* in that we are not identical with what perceives, just as in the case of *noesis* «we» are not the same as what νοεῖ. One could, however, make sense of the MSS reading if one took αἰσθανόμεθα to mean perceive when our soul, in the narrow sense, does so (so too αἰσθανόμενοι in the next line) while δι' αἰσθήσεως means through the senses. 34-36. The text again: καὶ διανοοῦμεν οὕτως is grammatically unsound as well as being tautologous, and was deleted by all editors, from Kirchhoff to Bréhier. Since it is not a likely scribal addition, it must represent something else. Henry-Schwyzler's emendation in HS¹, διὰ τοῦ μὲν οὕτως, would give «do we think through *nous* in the same way», i.e. as we have self-knowledge, understanding a verb of thinking. Better perhaps is Igal's διὰ <νοῦ> νοοῦμεν οὕτως, translated here, giving the same meaning but making the mistake easier to account for. This is adopted by Henry-Schwyzler in HS², but in HS³ they favour deletion. Reading the text as ἄρ' οὐν καὶ διανοοῦμεθα καὶ διὰ τοῦ νοοῦμεν οὕτως not only gives good sense, but makes the answer clearly related to the question. The response is: no, we do not think discursively through *nous* because we do this ourselves — taking νοοῦμεν and νόηματα in line 35 as equivalent to διανοοῦμεθα and διανοήματα. Note that both occurrences of αὐτοί in the answer are in emphatic position, the second being immediately explained by the words which immediately follow, τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμεῖς. Just how technical is the use of ἡμεῖς here is open to question: it need not be technical at all. 36 ff. Having established that «we», in whatever sense, are connected with *dianoia*, Plotinus goes on to consider how *nous* relates to it and to us. Τὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργήματα ἄνωθεν is parallel to τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως in the following line. Does this mean that *nous* is above all soul so that we, in the non-technical sense, are below it, or is Plotinus just making the weaker point that intuitive thought is at a different level from discursive thought, and parallel with *aisthesis* in that way? He could, if he is making the stronger point, also, be saying that *nous* does not belong to *psyche* in the strict sense, just as *aisthesis* does not, because its activity involves the body. That would be an advance on the points already

made in 23 ff: the weaker point would be more or less repetitious — which does not of course prove that it is not the one Plotinus is making. We may wonder whether there is an intentional contrast between τὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργήματα ἀνωθεν and τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κάτωθεν, to indicate that the thinking is *in the psyche* though caused by what is above it, whereas the sense-perception is not, but that material comes to the *psyche* from it — in the form of τύποι. 38. What is meant by διττῆς? If the soul has a μέσον as well as αἰσθησις and νοῦς, then it is three. Can διττῆς δυνάμεως be equivalent to διατὶν δυνάμεων, a sense sometimes borne by διττὸς in Classical Greek? If *nous* were counted as part of a double soul, which would have to be divided into a rational and an irrational part, then what he is saying does not correspond with the views expressed earlier in the chapter. 41-42. There is a question about *nous*, says Plotinus, for two reasons, (a) ὅτι μὴ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ should we understand προσχωόμεθα with H-S, or simply νοοῦμεν? (b) ὅτι χωριστός. Two questions arise: firstly, is (a) a consequence of (b), and secondly, does (b) mean separate from body, from other parts of the soul, or from us altogether, so that *nous* is above and we have descended? That is implied by τῷ μὴ προσενεῖ and also by ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέποντας. We may ask whether this further explanation of χωριστός assumes that νοῦς is not ours. There is also a question about the reference of ὁ ἀμφοδοητεῖται: does it refer to others, and, if so, does Plotinus think they are right to raise the question? 44-45. *nous* as βασιλεύς πρὸς ἡμᾶς seems to be a reminiscence of Plato, *Philebus*, 28 c, νοῦς βασιλεύς ἡμῖν οὐραντοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, but the reference there is to cosmic and not individual intellect: that would not deter Plotinus from taking it to refer to the latter instead.

V 3. 4. 1-2. Can we extract any clear meaning from βασιλεύομεν, and will it help with the understanding of κατ'ἐκείνον? If we are to be taken to be βασιλεῖς, and βασιλεύς, and βασιλεύς is the hypostasis *Nous*, then being κατ'ἐκείνον means that we identify with it. If we are merely *like* βασιλεῖς, then we do not identify. The latter is perhaps more likely because of the words καὶ ἡμεῖς: we too, in our way... κατ'ἐκείνον διχῶς: the two senses are importantly different. They are: (a) because something from it is in us. (b) because we are filled with it (and so, again, not identical with it: this is to be contrasted with the notion to be found in other and earlier treatises, that we may become identical with *nous* by somehow switching on to it. (a) The text here has been questioned by R. Stark, «Emendationes Plotiniana», *MH*, 18, 1961, 227, but can, I think, stand, mean-

ing «by the things like letters, that is, something inscribed or written in us like laws, i. e. giving us rules, one of the senses of κανόνες which ch. 3 says we have from *nous*, and thus also something in us which is κατ'ἐκείνον. Stark suggests that we should read either κατ'ἐκείνον διχῶς τοῖς νόμοις οἷον or ὥσπερ γράμμασιν: either would be simpler than the received text, but misses the duality of the notion that a) something is as it were on a tablet — here one might compare Aristotle's view of the mind as a tablet in *de Anima* III. 4, 430 a 1. (b) that it is like a ruler or standard. 3-4. ἢ καὶ δυναθέντες is probably explanatory of the previous words; cf. HS in *apparatu*: *aut...aut... vel*. We know ourselves: (a) by learning everything else through (=by means of, reading, with HS2, αὐτοῦς <τῶν> τῶ and ἡ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν: this is the text translated) that kind of object of vision, that being what we are filled with. We may do this either by acting in accordance with *nous* or by becoming it. Or (b) reading ἢ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν — by learning, or knowing the power that knows that sort of thing, that is, it or oneself, by means of that power, in other words knowing *nous* by *nous* to which we have become assimilated, as suggested by ἢ καὶ ἐκείνο γενόμενοι if that reading is correct: if Stark's ἢ (*ibid.* 227 f., adopted by HS3: HS2 return to ἢ) is right, Plotinus is saying that the knowledge is produced by actual identification with the intellect, and not offering this as an alternative. (c) reading, with Stark (*ibid.*) [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, gives two further possible translations: (i) knowing that kind of thing in accordance with the power that knows <it> by that very power..., with τοιοῦτον as the object of μαθόντες: this is even closer to being tautologous than is (b); (ii) knowing in accordance with the power that knows that kind of thing, with τοιοῦτον as the object of γινώσκουσιν. Both (i) and (ii) would enlarge on τῷ...μαθεῖν; but μαθόντες is perhaps redundant in both alternatives. 7 ff. What we learn, in any case, is that the γινώσκων is double, double meaning that it has two senses; the first is that he knows *dianoia* (τὴν διανοίαν... φύσιν=διάνοιαν), with τῆς ψυχικῆς added to emphasise that it belongs to soul and not *nous*; the second is that he knows at a level above this: the second, further, may mean either that he knows himself according to that (ἐκείνον) *nous* (i.e. not the one that is *dianoia*) by becoming <it>, or that he knows himself according to *nous* by becoming it. There is not a great deal of difference, but the first would draw attention to the *nous* in question not being the *noûw* *cuxikòw* which is *dianoia*. 9. Is ὑπεράνω τούτου merely a reference to stratification, or does it mean something not really in *psyche*, as suggested by the following words, οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἐπ... παντελῶς ἄλλον etc.? If τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς

ἄμεινον is simply another way of saying δίανοια, as is strongly suggested by lines 14 ff., that too would indicate that *nous* is not part of *psyche*. That looks like the νοῦς ἄνω doctrine, but the *nous* in question is not part of us as νοῦς ἄνω is supposed to be. On the other hand, this *nous* will not have descended integrally with the soul as in Iamblichus' and Proclus' view of the incarnate human soul. Alternatively these words refer to *nous*, and so mean that intellect is in *psyche*, but that it must go higher to achieve self-knowledge. Returning to lines 9-10, we should consider whether they refer to an actual layer of existence, or rather to a state or activity, i. e. not what is above, but what is in a higher state. 15. The MSS have εἶδε(v) or ἴδε(v); Creuzer and subsequent editors before HS¹ emended to οἶδε, to which they returned in HS². All three are, of course, homophonous, and οἶδε and εἶδε give roughly the same sense. 14-28. What is the argument here? It seems to be as follows: (a) does *dianoia* know that it deals with what is outside, and that there is something better than itself? The answer to these questions is «yes»; (b) does it not then know what it is when it knows what sort of thing it is, and what sort of activity it has? Plotinus may be making either of two points here, namely that knowledge of substance requires a higher grade of knowledge than knowledge of οἶον etc., or that if it does know all that, then one might reasonably suppose that it does know itself; (c) if it knows its relation to *nous* will that not lead to self-knowledge, as in line 23, οὕτως ἀνω, while a different kind of knowledge of *nous* and self — by the use of ἄλλη δύναμις, possibly but not necessarily the δύναμις, of line 7 — is described in lines 24-27? The answer is that it must be the second way if we are to have true self-knowledge. Let us look further at the question of levels. In lines 20-21 the reason says that it is second, after *nous*, and an image of it — second meaning adjacent to — and that everything in it comes from νοῦς, ὁ γράφων καὶ ὁ γράψας. Is the point of the two different tenses that, διδασκαλίας χάριν one may think of *nous* having done it, while in reality it continues to do so? Some editors cannot accept what they see as duplication: thus Theiler deletes καὶ ὁ γράψας, and Stark wishes to emend to κατέγραψε, which HS³ reject on the grounds that the word is otherwise unattested in Plotinus: in any case I am not convinced that it gives good sense. Yet again, *nous* seems to be other than soul, cf. too 24-27 which ask whether (a) we look at *nous* knowing itself or (b) we participate in it because it is ours and we are its: again Plotinus is not saying that we are identical with it and *vice-versa*, though we may ask whether μεταλαβόντες means taking a part of, or being informed by. 27-28. Αναγκαῖον οὕτως: what is

being accepted? Is it the last suggestion, with νοῦν καὶ αὐτούς, implying assimilation, or is οὕτως, forward-looking, with γεγονώς, indicating identification rather than the degree of assimilation involved in line 27? That may be too fine a distinction. 29. αὐτῷ may or may not be reflexive, with different implications. The translation takes it as reflexive: if it is not then it refers to *nous* and may indicate that it is still other than the subject.

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- 1 An earlier version of parts of this paper was given to a seminar at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven. I am grateful to its members for their comments. Since then vol. 5 of Professor A. H. ARMSTRONG's Loeb edition of Plotinus has appeared, and has helped me to improve some matters of translation.
 - 2 Cf. esp. IV 8. 8 *init.*
 - 3 Cf. ARMSTRONG, *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 224-225; IDEM, Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus, *Dionysius*, 1, 1977, pp. 57-59: these pages contain comment on other points in these chapters, too; cf. G. J. P. O'DALY, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, Shannon, 1973, pp. 43-45; 57; Ph. MERLAN, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness*, The Hague, 1963, pp. 77-81.
 - 4 Cf. *Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of Demarcation*, *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Roma, Accademia Naz. dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura, 198, 1974, pp. 218-219.
 - 5 Cf. *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins*, Basel, Stuttgart, 1979, pp. 199-205.
 - 6 Cf. J. M. RIST, Forms of Individuals in Plotinus, *Classical Quarterly*, 13, 1963, pp. 223 sq., and A Reply to Dr. Blumenthal, *Plotin, Revue Int. de Philos.*, 24, 1970, pp. 298-303; ARMSTRONG, *Form, Individual and Person*, pp. 49 sq. For another view, cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology*, The Hague, 1971, pp. 112-133.
 - 7 On this cf. ARMSTRONG, *Form, Individual and Person*, p. 57; BLUMENTHAL, *ibid.*, p. 112.
 - 8 Cf. Plotinus and Proclus on the criterion of truth, in P. H. HUBY and G. C. NEAL (edd.), *The Criterion Of Truth*, Liverpool, 1987.
 - 9 Cf. SIMPLICIUS, *In Cat.*, 191. 9-10.
 - 10 Cf. IDEM, *In de An.*, 250 a 4-5; PHILOPONUS, in Moerbeke's translation, 88. 61-63 VERBEKE; cf. also (Ps.) PHILOPONUS=STEPHANUS, *In de An.*, 545. 4-5.

- ¹¹ The text translated is that of P. HENRY and H.-R. SCHWYZER's *editio minor*, vol. ii, 1977; this is referred to hereafter as HS²; the *editio maior*, 1959, as HS¹; the *addenda ad textum* in vol. iii of HS¹, as HS³. Note however that these were published in 1973. THEILER refers to the text in R. BEUTLER and W. THEILER's revision of R. HARDER's translation, *Plotinus Schriften*, vol. V, 1960. In the translation < > indicate words understood but not in the Greek, or added to show its meaning. At one or two places alternative translations are given, and shown by /.../.

Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology: Sensation, Imagination and Memory¹

That the *Enneads* contain a great deal of Aristotelian doctrine must be obvious to a fairly casual reader even without the explicit testimony of Porphyry.² Nevertheless it is not equally obvious in all parts of Plotinus' thought – sometimes, of course, he is in clear disagreement with Aristotle. For various reasons which we shall have to consider the use of Aristotle's ideas in the construction of Plotinus' doctrines of the human soul is pervasive, but does not present us with a simple case of absorption. That, in the nature of the case, would have been impossible, even if we forget Plotinus' capacity for subtle alteration of views, he might at first sight appear to be taking over as they stood, a process which Professor Armstrong has aptly called 'rethinking',³ but which might well appear as perverse interpretation. Plotinus, as is well known, claimed to be doing no more than expounding views whose antiquity could be vouched for by Plato's own writings (V.1.8.10-14). Many have referred to this claim in connection with Plotinus' relation to Plato. It is perhaps not equally well understood that a man who could think himself so good a Platonist would have been quite capable of thinking that those parts of his psychology which were Aristotelian were roughly the same as those of his source, or more importantly perhaps, that Aristotle's views were the same as his own. His attitude is not unlike that of those Aristotelian commentators who were later to claim that Aristotle's views were like Plato's if only one understood them aright.⁴