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Emotions in Ancient
and Medieval Philosophy

SIMO KNUUTTILA

EMOTIONS IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Emotions are the focus of intense debate both in contemporary philosophy and psychology and increasingly also in the history of ideas. Simo Knuuttila presents a comprehensive survey of philosophical theories of emotion from Plato to Renaissance times, combining rigorous philosophical analysis with careful historical reconstruction.

The first part of the book covers the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle and later ancient views from Stoicism to Neoplatonism and, in addition, their reception and transformation by early Christian thinkers from Clement and Origen to Augustine and Cassian. Knuuttila then proceeds to a discussion of ancient themes in medieval thought, and of new medieval conceptions, codified in the so-called faculty psychology from Avicenna to Aquinas, in thirteenth-century taxonomies, and in the voluntarist approach of Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and their followers.

Philosophers, classicists, historians of philosophy, historians of psychology, and anyone interested in emotion will find much to stimulate them in this fascinating book.

Simo Knuuttila is Professor of Theological Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Helsinki, and Research Professor at the Academy of Finland.

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Aff. dig.</i>	Galen, <i>De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione</i>
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung</i> , ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase
BT	Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana
CAG	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
<i>Comm. in Cant.</i>	Origenes, <i>Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum</i>
<i>Comm. in Matth.</i>	Origenes, <i>Commentarius in Matthaeum</i>
<i>Comm. ser. in Matth. Conf.</i>	Origenes, <i>Commentariorum series in Matthaeum</i> John Cassian, <i>The Conferences</i>
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
DK	<i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz
EE	Aristotle, <i>Eudemian Ethics</i>
EN	Aristotle, <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>Ep. Hrd.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Letter to Herodotus</i>
<i>Ep. Men.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Letter to Menoeceus</i>
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte
<i>Inst.</i>	John Cassian, <i>The Institutes</i>
KD	Epicurus, <i>Key Doctrines</i>
<i>Leg. alleg.</i>	Philo, <i>Legum allegoriae</i>
LS	<i>The Hellenistic Philosophers</i> , ed. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley
MA	Aristotle, <i>On the Movements of Animals</i>
OCT	Oxford Classical Texts (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis)
PA	Aristotle, <i>On the Parts of Animals</i>
<i>Paed.</i>	Clement of Alexandria, <i>Paedagogus</i>

PG	J.-P. Migne (ed.), <i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca</i>
Phil.	Plato, <i>Philebus</i>
PHP	Galen, <i>De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis</i>
PL	J.-P. Migne (ed.), <i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina</i>
Prot.	Clement of Alexandria, <i>Protrepticus</i>
QAM	Galen, <i>Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur</i>
Rep.	Plato, <i>Republic</i>
Rhet.	Aristotle, <i>Rhetoric</i>
SC	Sources chrétiennes
ST	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Summa theologiae</i>
Stobaeus	Stobaeus, <i>Anthologium</i>
Strom.	Clement of Alexandria, <i>Stromata</i>
SVF	<i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i> , ed. J. von Arnim
Usener	H. Usener, <i>Epicurea</i> (Leipzig, 1887)
Vat.	John Duns Scotus, <i>Opera omnia</i> , ed. C. Balić <i>et al.</i>
VS	Epicurus, <i>Vatican Sayings</i>
Wadding	John Duns Scotus, <i>Opera omnia</i> , ed. L. Wadding
WM	<i>Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality</i> , selected and translated by A. B. Wolter

Introduction

Studies on the emotions became popular in the analytically oriented philosophy of mind in the 1980s. These have been accompanied by a great number of works on emotions in ancient philosophy, since it was realized that many central questions had already been discussed in classical texts. There has not been a similar boom in studies of emotions in medieval philosophy, though this is also a topic of considerable philosophical interest. In Chapters 1 and 2 I shall discuss ancient philosophical theories of emotions, their impact on early Christian literature, and the ideas which were specifically developed in ancient theology. The first part of Chapter 3 deals with the twelfth-century reception of ancient themes through monastic, theological, medical, and philosophical literature. The subject of the second part is the theory of emotions in Avicenna's psychology, which to a great extent dominated early thirteenth-century philosophical psychology. The development of the theory of emotions influenced by Avicennian faculty psychology is considered in the last part of this chapter. Chapter 4 is about the new issues introduced in early fourteenth-century discussions, with some remarks on their influence on early modern thought.

As for ancient theories, the recent works by Martha Nussbaum, Richard Sorabji, and some other authors have been of great help. I share the view of Nussbaum and Sorabji that ancient philosophy involves high-level debates on emotions in which rigorous philosophical analysis is wedded to philosophy as a way of life. Knowledge of ancient discussions is important for the study of later philosophical views, since ancient ideas were embedded in various ways in early medieval thought, medieval university teaching, and the early modern philosophy of the emotions. I shall pay attention to those ancient works which came to shape later philosophical and theological discussions of emotions, but I am also interested in ancient theories as such. The role of the cognitive subjective feeling is considered more systematically than in other recent works. The philosophical elements of early Christian views of earthly passions and religious feelings are analysed by discussing their historical context somewhat more extensively than is usual in philosophical studies.

There are no comprehensive studies of medieval theories of emotions, and I hope to show that this is an interesting research area where much further work can be done. The theory of first movement is one of the early medieval achievements which modified ancient philosophical ideas and left a permanent imprint on later Western thought until the modern period. Since this originally Stoic theory was associated with the Christian doctrine of sin, it gave rise to minute investigations of the voluntariness and involuntariness of emotional reactions and to conceptual analyses of the concept of will. Some of these were codified in twelfth-century discussions of the logic of will. Another influential early medieval issue was a continuation of ancient theories of spiritual experiences. The philosophically interesting aspect of this tradition is the combination of philosophical ideas of the therapy of emotions and attempts to describe subjective religious feelings, which are strictly separated from earthly emotions.

While these themes were mostly dealt with in monastic contexts, twelfth-century translations of philosophical and medical works introduced a new approach to emotions as part of philosophical psychology. A translation of Avicenna's treatise on the soul played an important role in this development, which dominated the philosophical discussion of emotions in the thirteenth century. Emotions were studied from the point of view of the behavioural changes which they produced. The detailed analyses of the causal connections between the faculties of the soul, the localization of these faculties in different parts of the brain, and the emotional effects of the systems of humours and spirits gave this theory a scientific image which added to its popularity in the universities. New aspects assumed importance among early fourteenth-century Franciscan thinkers, who in various ways questioned some of the earlier taxonomies of emotions and the traditional sharp division between the psychosomatic passions of the sensitive soul and the volitions of the higher intellectual faculties. They preferred to treat many of these as emotions which aroused feelings particular for them. While late medieval theories are philosophically interesting as such, it is also historically important that they had an impact on early modern discussions. This is often ignored in studies which identify medieval influence with the aftermath of Aquinas's works.

I became interested in the history of emotions through works in contemporary philosophy of mind. Systematic works on philosophical psychology are sometimes mentioned in the book, since I believe that some philosophical questions pertaining to emotions have remained the same since Plato's time. Answers to philosophical questions may vary, and

there are certainly new questions, as well as historical questions which are not ours. The philosophically significant aspects of a historical theory can sometimes be illuminated by comparing them with later views. This does not involve anachronism, provided that one does not maintain that past philosophers said something that they did not say or mean. Reading older philosophical works as philosophical involves understanding them as particular answers to questions which are dealt with in other ways by other thinkers. This systematic aspect is lacking in non-philosophical doxographic history of philosophy, which itself is an important branch of research.

I am mainly interested in the history of philosophical psychology as philosophy. While concentrating on philosophical and theoretical ideas rather than doxographic expositions, I also describe the context of the theories to the extent that I think is required for understanding them. It may be in order to state that this is primarily a study of the philosophical theories of emotions, not of the history of emotions themselves, but it does say something about ancient and medieval emotions as the authors saw them.

I use the terms ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ without intending any important difference in meaning—more often ‘emotion’, since the Greek term *pathos* and the Latin term *passio* do not usually suggest extreme emotions as the word ‘passion’ nowadays might do. Contrary to some authors, I believe that many of the emotional phenomena to which past philosophers refer are similar to those we are familiar with, though this does not hold of all emotions. It seems that the variability of emotions between cultures is associated with various practices. Some of the emotions dealt with by the Desert Fathers are not common in our days, nor are the practices in which they were embedded; but many descriptions of particular emotions in ancient or medieval philosophers do not differ from those described by contemporary writers.

Translating emotional terms involves various problems. Some are trivial, in that the meaning of unusual emotional terms was not clear even to ancient authors themselves. Another group of difficulties is associated with the fact that Greek terms were translated into Arabic and Latin, and the same things are called in modern languages by terms sometimes derived from Greek and sometimes from Latin. In speaking about Platonic parts of the soul, I used the terms ‘appetitive’ and ‘spirited’ in Greek contexts and the terms ‘concupiscible’ and ‘irascible’ in those Latin contexts in which these terms are commonly used by contemporary authors. A further complication is that *appetitus* is a generic term in Aquinas and ‘appetitive’

can refer to the concupiscible and irascible powers and to the will. Many authors use the term ‘distress’ for the Greek *lupē* when this is used in philosophical theories of the emotions. I follow this practice, although it creates some problems with Latin texts in which the authors sometimes use *dolor* and sometimes *tristitia*. I often translate *tristitia* by ‘distress’, but if *dolor* and *tristitia* are contrasted, I use the terms ‘pain’ and ‘sadness’ respectively. ‘Pneuma’ is used in Greek contexts and the Latin based ‘spirit’ in Latin contexts, only because this is a pretty common practice. There are further examples of such linguistic contingencies.

CHAPTER 1

Emotions in Ancient Philosophy

The philosophical analysis of emotion was introduced by Plato and developed further by Aristotle (sections 1.1–2).¹ Plato's theory of the parts of the soul, put forward in the *Republic*, involves the first detailed systematization of emotional phenomena. In his *Philebus* and other later works Plato moved toward a bipartite moral psychology based on the distinction between calculations and reflections on practical matters, on the one hand, and non-considered cognitive emotional reactions, on the other. Aristotle presents a detailed analysis of a number of emotions in the *Rhetoric*, distinguishing between four basic components of an occurrent emotion: cognition, psychic affect, bodily affect, and behavioural suggestion or impulse. A notable feature of Aristotle's approach is his interest in feelings, the pleasant or unpleasant modes of being aware of oneself in various situations.

Aristotle learned the idea of compositional analysis from Plato, but their general attitudes to emotions were different. In Plato's view the emotional reactions often entail misguided evaluations of contingent things. They bind the soul to earthly things in a way which disturbs the higher activities of the reasoning part. Emotions should be kept under strict control by continuously re-evaluating and often rejecting their behavioural suggestions. Aristotle did not share Plato's detached attitude to life. He thought that a considerable part of the good human life consists of participating in the various activities of civilized society and consequently in a

¹ There are discussions of emotions in archaic Greek poetry and tragedy in D. L. Cairns, *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); B. Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993); M. W. Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, Key Themes in Ancient History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). S. M. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) includes papers on emotions in Roman literature against their contemporary philosophical background.

complicated system of socially learned emotions which one should learn to feel in an appropriate manner.

Plato and Aristotle thought that emotions were acts of natural potencies and could not be eradicated. A contrary view was defended by the Stoics, who endorsed the unity of the rational soul without an emotional part, and consequently believed that one can learn to live without emotions, which they treated as self-regarding and action-initiating evaluative judgements (sections 1.3–4). In fact the Stoics considered emotions to be harmful mistaken judgements based on the childish habit of regarding oneself as the centre of things. People should follow cosmic reason and see themselves as its singular moments in the rational universe. The edification of reason and rational habits (*eupatheiai*) and the extirpation of spontaneous emotions (*apatheia*) are the basic constituents of a good life. Human beings are rational animals and can become convinced of the true philosophical world-view which, when interiorized, makes the emotions disappear. This is supported by cognitive therapy. While Chrysippus' analysis of emotion as judgement remained the orthodox view, there were philosophical debates about other aspects of emotional phenomena among the Stoics. In answering the criticism that *apatheia* is impossible, they developed the doctrine of the so-called first movements or pre-passions. This was meant to explain why there can be something similar to emotional affections even in philosophers. In his *On Anger* (*De ira*) Seneca writes that certain appearances can induce transient affective states and suggest an emotional reaction without being themselves emotions as long as they are not assented to. The theory of first movements was included in a modified form in early Christian theology and became an important theme in Western psychagogic literature.

Section 1.5 deals with the Epicureans and section 1.6 with the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists. The aims of the Stoic and Platonic therapy were often described by the terms *apatheia* and *metriopatheia*. While moderation (*metriopatheia*) was commonly called a Peripatetic conception, its Platonist adherents (Alcinous, Plutarch, etc.) were closer to Plato than Aristotle in their view of the value of emotions. For them the ultimate goal was the ascent of the soul through likening oneself to God, who is free from the passions. The Epicurean therapy was also concentrated on control, but was associated with another goal and with practices of its own (section 1.7). According to Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, moderation of the passions belongs to the good life in the form of civic virtues (section 1.8). The perfect soul seeks similarity to God, which implies freedom from lower emotions as far as possible. When the higher

part of a person lives in the intelligible spheres which do not evoke standard human emotions, it may receive special supersensitive experiences about the divine origin of being. A similar idea was developed by Origen and some other representatives of Christian mystical theology. The subject of the last section (1.9) is Nemesius of Emesa's *On Human Nature*. This late ancient work with summaries of contemporary philosophical views was translated into Latin in the eleventh century and became one of the sources of early medieval discussions of emotions.

1.1 Emotions and the Parts of the Soul in Plato's *Republic*

In discussing the good society and the good human life in his *Republic*, Plato divided the human soul into three parts: the reasoning (*logistikon*), the spirited (*thumoeides*), and the appetitive (*epithumētikon*). The reasoning part is able to love knowledge and wisdom. Ideally, it should govern the entire soul. The appetitive part pursues immediate sensual pleasure and avoids suffering, whereas the intermediate, spirited part is the seat of emotions connected with self-assurance and self-affirmation (*Rep.* 4.435a–441c; 9.580d–583a). Plato did not think that the activities of these powers would automatically form a harmonious whole; on the contrary, he took it for granted that they often struggle against each other.

In his earlier dialogues, especially in the *Phaedo*, Plato was inclined to see all appetites and emotions outside the reasoning part as taking place in the body. The soul–body dichotomy embodied a distinction between the functions of the immortal rational soul and the mortal and irrational parts of human beings (*Phaedo* 66b–c). It is part of Plato's early asceticism that he did not find anything positive in the desires and passions of the body. The philosopher was understood to aim at detachment from them as much as possible (*Phaedo* 66e–67a).²

In the *Republic* and some other middle dialogues, Plato treats desires and emotions as movements of the soul, and his attitude towards them is slightly different from that found in the *Phaedo*. The appetitive part contains the basic biological urges and drives which mechanistically avoid suffering and pursue immediate satisfaction. In this regard it is similar to the appetitive soul of animals, though it involves a greater variety of desires. People guided by their animal desires sway to and fro according to pushes and pulls initiated by changes in their bodies and in

² See M. C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 151–2; A. W. Price, *Mental Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1995), 36–40.

the environment (*Rep.* 4.439b–d; 9.580d–581a, 586a–c). Plato considers sexual desire, thirst, and hunger as the strongest appetites (*Rep.* 4.437d; 9.580e), but these animal forces do not exhaust the functions of the appetitive part of the human soul. It is aware of its movements as pleasant or unpleasant, and it is capable of evaluating things on the basis of anticipated pleasures and pains (*Rep.* 4.442a; 9.583e–584c). The desire for wealth belongs among the more cognitive attitudes of the appetitive part (*Rep.* 9.581a), but Plato thought that even the simple desires include something which can be characterized as answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a question (*Rep.* 4.437c). The strength of the appetitive level varies in people depending on how strong the desires and wants of the other parts are (*Rep.* 6.485d). Even though the vigour of the appetitive part is diminished in a good soul, it remains a potentially disturbing factor which must be continuously controlled (*Rep.* 4.442a–b).

The spirited part is primarily the source of aggressive self-assessment. Its acts share with those of the appetitive part the association with physiological changes, but, unlike it, the spirited part can be habituated to becoming a servant of reason. It is naturally disposed to this task (*Rep.* 4.440a–441a). Plato treats its emotional responses as cognitive. As the seat of admiration, honour, and pride, it can help the rational soul in its striving to reach knowledge and to behave in accordance with the true vision of the nature of human beings and their place in the universe. But in a disordered soul its passions nourish exaggerated aggression and vainglory (*Rep.* 4.441e–442c; 9.581a–b, 586c–d).

The tripartite model is argued for on the basis of the psychological observation that people who are tossed about by their irrational desires may at the same time feel anger at their own behaviour, thinking that they should act otherwise. Plato illustrated this in his famous story about Leontius, whose reason told him not to watch the dead bodies of executed criminals, but who wanted to look at the corpses at the same time. Leontius felt anger at his desire, but could not resist the temptation (*Rep.* 4.439e–440a). In this story the spirited part functions as a strengthener of the voice of reason, but their joint effort is not sufficient. Plato’s argument for the tripartition is based on the principle that the same thing cannot simultaneously act or be acted on in opposite ways in the same respect (*Rep.* 4.436b). He concluded that since people sometimes have simultaneous desires to pursue and avoid the same thing, these must be ascribed to different parts of the soul (*Rep.* 4.439b–441c).³

³ For recent discussions of how the conflict should be understood, see T. H. Irwin, *Plato’s Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 203–9; Price (1995), 40–57.

Plato treated the three parts of the soul as if they were three separate agents, one striving for knowledge and understanding, one for immediate sensual satisfaction, and a third one which may become habituated to helping one or the other in their strivings. Although Plato stressed the differences between the reasoning and the non-reasoning parts, he did not think that the appetitive and emotional parts are irrational in the sense of being wholly non-cognitive. They have representations of their own, and their acts can be construed as involving evaluative propositional attitudes. In so far as Plato does not treat the appetitive part merely as a collection of bestial impulses, it is a centre of interest in bodily pleasures and wealth. Its actual evaluative preferences are very simple, and its suggestions are always one-sided. The emotional responses of the spirited part are based on evaluations which are closer to those of the rational part than to those of the appetitive, but the scope of its interests is also limited in comparison to the rational part, which has a natural tendency to consider what is best for the whole soul. Furthermore, all parts are dynamic in the sense that each can initiate action (*Rep.* 4.441a–c; 8.550a–b, 553b–d, 560a–e). The agent nature of the parts is particularly clear in the passages in which Plato speaks about reasoning as appealing to other parts and their recognizing its authority or being disobedient (4.441e–442d, 443d, 444b).

Some authors have criticized the psychological model of the *Republic* as a homuncular theory. Its main problem is thought to be that the parts of the soul, which are identified in terms of their respective dominant functions, have the basic properties of human agents. They are like little persons (*homunculæ*) in a person. If mental conflicts are meant to be explained by referring to parts of the soul, each of which has both desiderative and cognitive resources of its own, the reduplication of the contending factors of the soul at the level of its parts brings us back to the very same problems.⁴ It is also possible to think that the 'parts' share certain capacities. In accordance with this it has been suggested that Plato's theory should be understood as a heuristic model for explaining some features of behaviour. Even though there are functionally different levels of the soul at which human beings can act as agents, there is only one conscious subject.⁵ Some scholars have been interested in the similarities between the divisions of the soul in Plato and Freud, whose terminology

⁴ See T. Penner, 'Thought and Desire in Plato', in G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ii: *Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 96–118, particularly 111–13; R. de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 24–7.

⁵ For slightly different interpretations, see H. Thesleff, *Studies in Plato's Two-Level Model*, *Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, 113 (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1999),

was influenced by Plato's works.⁶ It is worth noticing that Plato simultaneously applied the idea of tripartition to the moral psychology of individuals and to the political psychology related to the three classes in the state. This fact warns one against too straightforward an interpretation of the theory.

Independently of whether the constituents of the soul are real parts or different levels of forming beliefs and desires, their relative independence sheds some light on Plato's view of *akrasia*, or weakness of the will. In his earlier dialogues Plato inclined to accept the Socratic principles that virtue is knowledge and that no one does wrong willingly.⁷ In the *Republic* purely intellectual insight is no longer regarded as sufficient for effective moral knowledge.⁸ The inner struggle of Leontius was one between the desire of the appetitive part directed to what it regarded as pleasant and the desire of the spirited and reasoning parts directed to what they regarded as good. The lowest part was the strongest, and in following its suggestion Leontius acted against what the reasoning part regarded as good. He did it to his own disappointment, which shows that he wished to be moved by the higher part's evaluation. However, this wish was not sufficiently powerful to become effective in the situation. Plato believed that when people have conflicting desires due to the different interests of the parts of the soul, the resulting action is determined by the most powerful. If the reasoning part is not the strongest factor and its attempts are conquered by the lower parts, the person suffers from *akrasia*. One knows (in the reasoning part) what should be done, but is persuaded to let something else happen.

In describing the formation of different types of persons, Plato assumed that the akratic and vicious disorders are mainly caused by poor education and sometimes by diseases. (See *Rep.* 8.549c–550b for the timocratic man, 553a–d for the oligarchic man, 558d–561d for the democratic man, and

30–1; Irwin (1995), 217–22; Price (1995), 55–6. C. Gill, 'Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?', in J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, The New Synthese Historical Library, 46 (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1998), 130–6; J. M. Cooper, 'Plato's Theory of Human Motivation', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 1 (1984), 3–21, repr. in J. M. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 118–37; C. H. Kahn, 'Plato's Theory of Desire', *Review of Metaphysics*, 41 (1987), 77–103.

⁶ W. Charlton, *Weakness of Will: A Philosophical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 28–31; A. W. Price, 'Plato and Freud', in C. Gill (ed.), *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 247–70; G. Santas, *Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

⁷ *Laches* 199d; *Charmides* 165c; *Protagoras* 355a–358d, 361b–c; *Gorgias* 468b–d; *Meno* 77d–78b.

⁸ See also Irwin (1995), 237; R. Sorabji, *Emotion and the Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 305–10.

9.572c–573c for the tyrannical man.) *Akrasia* becomes practically impossible when the evaluative judgements of the reasoning part are sufficiently authoritative. This happens when one has undergone the philosopher's education. In the optimal case, the spirited part is habituated to listening to reason and is activated only by things which the reasoning part regards as worthy of emotional response, and the appetitive part is wholly satisfied with the limited role left to it (4.443c–444a; 9.589a–590d). But even a less perfect soul is not akratic if the controlling power of the reasoning part is stronger than the spontaneous suggestions of the lower parts (9.571b).⁹

In *Rep.* 9.588c–e the reasoning part is portrayed as a human being, the spirited part as a lion, and the appetitive part as a many-headed beast. The inner human being is said to be divine and immortal. The other parts seem to be mortal, belonging to the composite only through the soul's union with the body (*Rep.* 10.611a–612a). This is explicitly stated in the *Timaeus* (69c–d), where the mortal soul with its inclinations is said to be temporally united with an immortal soul. God tells the immortal souls before their incarnation that they are going to undergo union with the mortal soul and body and that they ought to control the desires and the passions and not let them govern themselves (*Tim.* 41d–42d).

In accordance with his dualistic view of the soul, Plato saw the goal of life as the improvement of the intellectual and immortal part through philosophy. The appetitive part is a hindrance to this task. Its interests disturb concentration on the important things which do not include the goals of the appetitive part, except those expressing the requirements of health. (For necessary desires and necessary pleasures, see *Rep.* 8.558d–559d; *Philebus* 62e, 63e.) Detachment from the unnecessary inclinations of the appetitive part is a necessary condition for the philosophical development of the soul (*Rep.* 9.571b–572b, 581d–e). The emotional patterns of the spirited part can be habituated so that they are helpful in the struggle against the lowest part, and they can have certain instrumental value in this sense, but without strict guidance they also lead away from the right

⁹ For discussions of Plato's view of *akrasia*, see also Charlton (1988), 26–33; J. C. B. Gosling, *Weakness of the Will* (London: Routledge, 1990), 20–4; Price (1995), 94–103. In *Timaeus* 86b–87b Plato deals with the diseases of the body and the soul as the causes of blameworthy behaviour. It is argued that the dispositions of the soul are determined by psychosomatic conditions and educational habituation and that vicious acts are involuntary. Improving the reasoning part is not sufficient for moral progress; the therapy of other parts is also needed. This is regarded as an example of the movement from intellectualism to anti-intellectualism in Plato's philosophy of education; see P. Rabbow, *Paidagogia: Die Grundlegung der abendländischen Erziehungskunst in der Sokratik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), 13–106.

insight that nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern (*Rep.* 8.550b, 553d; 9.586c–d; cf. 10.604c–d).

Even though the appetitive part also has other desires than those with a physiological ground and aimed at physical replenishment (*Rep.* 8.561a–d; 9.580d–581a), they are not analysed in detail.¹⁰ As Plato's discussions of the spirited part are pretty schematic as well, one might ask how certain more complicated emotions sometimes mentioned in the *Republic* should be located. There are signs that Plato himself was to some degree conscious of the limitations of the tripartite model as a basis for classifying emotions. In *Rep.* 4.443d it is suggested that there might be more than three parts. In discussing the distress, sorrow, pity, and joy which are evoked by poetry, Plato refers merely to a distinction between the reasoning and non-reasoning part, and the latter is said to be of a fretful and complicated character (*Rep.* 10.603d–604b).¹¹

In the *Republic* Plato locates most of the movements of the soul which we would call occurrent emotions in the lower parts, but this classification is not exhaustive. The rational part has its own desires and pleasures, its most salient dynamic feature being the love for truth and wisdom (*Rep.* 9.580d, 581b, 583a; 10.604d, 611e). The rational part seems also to be the seat of shame which is often accompanied by physical changes in the same way as the passions of the lower parts. In an often-quoted passage (*Rep.* 9.571c–d), Plato describes the state of a tyrannical soul in sleep when the reasoning part and the sense of shame are not actual:

It does not shrink from attempting to lie with mother or with anyone else, man, god, or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood. It abstains from no food and, in a word, eschews no extreme of folly and shamelessness.¹²

Plato thought that shame, which he later characterized as fear of bad repute and hence apparently located in the spirited part (*Laws* 2.646e–647b), plays an important controlling role in the soul.¹³ Shame

¹⁰ Proclus remarked that in so far as the parts of the soul are distinguished on the basis of simultaneous contrary desires, one could find further divisions of the appetitive part, since the love of money and the love of pleasures can also occur as contrary appetitive acts. See Proclus, *In Platonis Rem Publicam commentarii*, ed. G. Kroll, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899–1901), i. 225. 3–22.

¹¹ Price (1995), 68–9.

¹² According to Freud, 'Plato . . . thought that the best men are those who only *dream* what other men *do* in their waking life': *The Interpretation of Dreams*, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 5 (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1978), 67. In *Topics* 4.5, 126a8–10, Aristotle also refers to the view that shame is in the reasoning part, fear in the spirited, and distress in the appetitive.

¹³ See also *Protagoras* 322c–d.

imposes restraints, but what really makes the philosophical soul move in the right direction is intellectual love of true being and wisdom. Plato often applies the ambiguous notion of *erōs* and its derivatives in this context. (See, for example, *Rep.* 6.485a–b, 490b, 499c, 501d.) In many places *erōs* is connected with the sexual desire of the appetitive part, and in *Rep.* 9.573b–575a the tyrannical soul is described as being dominated by *erōs*—its passions share conspicuous features with obsessive and passionate sexual desires. There are no detailed descriptions of the rational *erōs* in the *Republic*, but it is extensively dealt with in the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium* and in Socrates' second speech in the *Phaedrus*.

1.2 Did Plato Change his Theory after the *Republic*?

In the *Phaedrus* Plato put forward the view that the immortal soul itself is tripartite. The basic metaphor of the *Phaedrus* is the famous simile in which the span of the better and the worse horse represents the pair of the spirited and the appetitive parts and the charioteer is the reasoning part (246a–256e). The better horse has no bad inclinations, and although much work is needed to habituate the worse horse (chiefly representing erotic desire) to move straight, it is now thought that its power is added to the whole when it is reined in, and consequently that it is better to take care of it than to try to extirpate it.

Martha Nussbaum argues in her book *The Fragility of Goodness* (1986) that in the *Phaedrus* Plato revised his indictment of the passions as follows. (1) Although Plato remains critical of bodily pleasures and appetites, at least the erotic appetite is seen also as possibly involving a complex and selective response of the entire soul. (2) The unruly horse requires continuous control, but it should also be well fed, and it can play an important role in the pursuit of the good and in teaching the person about the beautiful. (3) The passions are not invariably sources of distortion; their information may prove necessary to the best insight. (4) The intellectual element is not sufficient for the apprehension of truth and for correct choice—even its aspirations are advanced by a wider exercise of the entire personality.¹⁴

Nussbaum believes that the view presented in the *Phaedrus* was influenced by Plato's personal experiences with his Syracusan friend Dion—they led him to pay attention to emotions from a new point of view. The revised attitude can be also seen in Plato's later works as a deepened

¹⁴ Nussbaum (1986), 221–2.

interest in the psychology of emotions, reflected in Aristotle's approach to emotions as the central constituents of a person.¹⁵

In his study *Aristotle on Emotion* (1975), W. W. Fortenbaugh also maintains that Plato changed his view of emotions after having written the *Republic*. Fortenbaugh thinks that in the philosophical debates in Plato's Academy, some of the problems of the ethical and political theory of the *Republic* were traced back to its inadequate analysis of emotional response. This led to new investigations of emotions, some results of which Plato included in the *Philebus* and in the *Laws*. Signs of the new ideas can also be seen in Aristotle's *Topics*, and they were developed into a systematic theory in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.¹⁶

Fortenbaugh argues that the unsatisfactory features of the tripartite theory were realized when emotions were focused on as a topic of especially human psychology. While the appetitive part was associated with bodily drives not amenable to reason (hunger, thirst, sexual desire), it also extended to cognitive evaluations, as is clear from its avaricious desires. To call something simply a function of this part was not very illuminating without further distinctions. The spirited part, which in principle was more cognitive, was also extended to involve animal behaviour. This created problems with respect to the cognitive nature of spirited emotions. One might also ask why the emotion of shame seems to be located in the reasoning part.¹⁷

Fortenbaugh connects the development of Plato's conception of emotion with a transition from a tripartite view of the soul towards a bipartite moral psychology. Plato began to regard emotions as a special class of cognitive phenomena open to reasoned persuasion in a way that bodily desires are not, and, furthermore, he tried to develop a distinction between emotional response and reasoned reflection as two types of cognitive activities. Emotions were sharply distinguished from bodily sensations and drives, and the cognitive phenomena were divided into calculations and reflections, on the one hand, and pleasant and painful emotions, on the other. The distinction between reasoned and non-reasoned cognitive acts was, Fortenbaugh maintained, fully formulated in Aristotle's dichotomy between the logical and alogical halves of the soul. Aristotle gathered together all desires and emotions which involved

¹⁵ Nussbaum (1986), 228–9. Nussbaum's dating of the *Phaedrus* is hypothetical. The *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, and *Philebus* are commonly regarded as later than the *Republic*, but there is less agreement about their relative order.

¹⁶ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion* (London: Duckworth, 1975), 9–12, 23–5, 31–3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 32–8.

judgement and contrasted this group of cognitive acts with deliberation, reflection, and calculation.¹⁸

Fortenbaugh's account of the background of Plato's new orientation is somewhat speculative; from what is found in Plato's later works and in Aristotle's early works, it is assumed that Plato and his friends began to focus upon emotions after having realized that neglecting a detailed analysis of them led to problems in the *Republic*. Some kind of 'discovery of emotion' is assumed in Nussbaum's interpretation as well, but she identified it with Plato's personal experience, which allegedly gave rise to the views in the *Phaedrus*. Much praise is given to erotic desire and feeling in this work, but it seems that Plato's enthusiasm was later extinguished—his attitude towards emotions remained reserved in the later dialogues.

The new ideas about the emotions developed in the *Phaedrus* were related to love, and hence to one of the most discussed themes of Plato's philosophy. There is a useful discussion of love in the *Phaedrus* in chapter 7 of Martha Nussbaum's *The Fragility of Goodness*. In Socrates' first speech in the *Phaedrus*, *erōs* is assigned to the non-rational part. It is a special form of madness, which is contrasted to self-control (*sōphrosunē*) and insight (*nous*). In the second speech, *erōs* is the inspired madness of the person who is reminded of the form of beauty, growing from a passionate love between two people with a philosophical soul. Erotic love can make people lovers of beauty by making them aware of good and beauty as those aspects of reality which deeply affect them, and of themselves as persons who feel this affection and find its inducement to philosophical ascent compelling. In this way, the feeling of possession and fascination typical of erotic love can in Plato's view serve as a basis for love of the objects of the rational soul. The search for knowledge is given a passionate and erotically coloured interpretation—being affected by this love is described as experiencing the growth of the wings of the soul.¹⁹

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato was ready to integrate the emotional responses in some way with the immortal soul, but in the *Timaeus* they are placed in the mortal soul. According to *Timaeus* 69d, the pathetic dispositions of

¹⁸ Ibid. 26, 37, 46. For related remarks on the transition from the tripartite view of the *Republic* to the bipartite moral psychology in the *Laws*, see also Rabbow (1960), 202–3, 208.

¹⁹ For sex, love, and erotic emotion in ancient philosophy in general, see M. C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (eds.), *The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Sorabji (2000), 273–87. Studies on ancient sexuality have received much incentive from M. Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, ii and iii (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); *History of Sexuality*, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985–6). Foucault's work suffers from shortcomings in documentation; see e.g. B. Dykes, 'A Platonic Response to Foucault's *Use of Pleasure*', *Ancient Philosophy*, 22 (2002), 103–23.

the mortal soul are *hēdonē* (pleasure, ‘the greatest incentive to evil’) and *lupē* (distress, ‘that takes flight from good’), then *tharsos* (confidence) and *phobos* (fear), which are characterized as ‘two foolish advisers’, *elpis* (‘misleading’ hope), and *thumos* (anger ‘not easily comforted’). These passions are said to be connected with non-rational perception and love (*erōs*), which ‘shrinks from no venture’. In spite of the negative epithets, Plato says later in the same work that all parts of the soul have their own function and require proper care (89e–90a). He seems to think that when the reasoning part controls the other parts, the emotive evaluations and affections have a certain recognized role in this whole. (Cf. *Rep.* 9.586d–e.²⁰)

The *Timaeus* list is partially repeated in *Laws* 1.644c–d, but then the two foolish advisers are *hēdonē* and *lupē*; *tharsos* and *phobos* are referred to by the common name *elpis*, and are characterized as opinions about future pleasures and distresses.²¹ In the *Laws* 1.647a–d, 649b–c, 2.653a–c, and 3.699c–d Plato mentions some emotional dispositions which can have positive effects through education; these are *hēdonē*, *lupē*, *aidōs*, and *aiskhunē* (shame), *tharsos*, *philia* (friendly love), and *misos* (hate).²² The list of the movements of the soul in the *Laws* 10.897a involves pleasure,

²⁰ In *Timaeus* 69d–72d the rational part of the soul is situated in the head, the better part of the mortal soul in the chest, and the worse part in the belly. Plato adds some medical notes about the relationship between the activities of the mortal soul and the functions of the heart and liver. In 73b–c the marrow in the brain and elsewhere is regarded as the receptor of the three forms of the soul. In 86b–87b Plato deals with the diseases of the soul which are caused by physical shortcomings or dysfunctions. The vapours that arise from an acid and salt phlegm or a bilious humour can affect both the three seats of the soul and its movements. See T. M. Robinson, *Plato’s Psychology*, 2nd edn., Phoenix Supplementary Volume, 8 (Toronto and London: Toronto University Press, 1995), 107–10, and also T. Tracy, *Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle*, Studies in Philosophy, 17 (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1969), chs. 2 and 3.

²¹ *Elpis* is here an expectation of future experiences, whether pleasant or unpleasant. (Cf. Aristotle’s remark in *On Memory* 1, 449a12, that some people regard divination as a science of expectation, *epistēmē elpistikē*). In *Protagoras* 358d–e Hippias and Protagoras regard *deos* and *phobos* as synonyms and take them to mean ‘anticipation of evil’, but Prodicus thinks that *deos* means this and *phobos* something else, probably a more affective reaction. In *Laches* 198b *deos* is explained in the same way; the meaning of *tharros* involves the belief that one will succeed in one’s aims. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (= *EN*) Aristotle states that fear is said to be the anticipation of bad things (3.6, 1115a9). The coward is *dyselpis*, with disbelief in success, while the brave believes in it (3.7, 1116a2–4).

²² ‘In ordinary Greek *aidōs* and *aiskhunē* are synonyms, except when the latter refers to a disgraceful state of affairs rather than the individual’s reaction to that state’: Cairns (1993), 415. Cairns states that Plato uses the word *aidōs* in a traditional sense as referring to the fear of the censure of others, as connoting positive respect for those who deserve it, and also as referring to the feeling of one’s failure. In addition, Plato was familiar with the conception of self-directed *aidōs*, which is related to the standards one sets oneself and to one’s ideal of oneself, though he places more stress on other-directed senses. In Cairns’s view Democritus’ expression ‘heauton aideisthai’ (DK B 264) refers to an internalized standard which one has made one’s own (ibid. 365–81).

distress, confidence, fear, hate, and love. The shared part of the lists in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* is close to the influential Stoic fourfold classification (pleasure, distress, appetite, fear). In fact this list also occurs in Plato's works (*Laches* 191d; *Symposium* 207e; *Republic* 429c–d, 430a–b; *Theaetetus* 156b). A somewhat longer list of emotions which exemplifies the thesis that emotions are mixtures of pleasure and distress is presented in *Philebus* 47e. This includes *orgē* (anger), *phobos*, *pothos* (longing), *thrēnos* (lamentation), *erōs*, *zēlos* (jealousy, emulation), *phthonos* (envy, malice). Plato does not explain how these emotions are mixtures. In his attack on poetry and the emotions aroused by comedies and tragedies, Plato also mentions *eleos* (pity) (*Rep.* 10.606a–c).²³

Aristotle's list of emotions accompanied by *hēdonē* or *lupē* in *EN* 2.5 includes *epithumia* (appetite), *orgē*, *phobos*, *tharsos*, *phthonos*, *khara* (joy), *philia*, *misos*, *pothos*, *zēlos*, and *eleos* (1105b21–3). He also mentions *aidōs*, *aiskhunē*, *nemesis* (indignation), and *epikhairekakia* (malicious joy) in the same book (2.7, 1108a30–b6; see also *EN* 4.9). Most of the emotions Aristotle discusses in the *Rhetoric* are included in these lists, probably having some kind of model in Academic discussions.²⁴

When Plato says in *Timaeus* 69d that the irrational passions are mixed with non-rational perception and venturous love, he apparently meant that they are actualized without deliberation and that they can be understood as forms of desire or its fulfilment or frustration. In the *Laws*, the same list of basic passions is repeated, and its meaning explained by the famous puppet image: each person is a puppet whose actions are determined by a soft golden cord of calculative reason and by hard iron cords of pleasure, distress, fear, and confidence (*Laws* 1.644d–645a). Fortenbaugh thinks that Plato operates here with a dichotomy between two different kinds of cognitive activity, emotional response and reasoned reflection.²⁵ According to Fortenbaugh, the idea that an emotion involves a special

²³ In so far as Plato thought that emotions were mixtures of pleasure and distress and that some are dominated by pleasure and some by distress, he could have classified emotions into two generic groups of pleasure and distress, as some later authors did (p. 90 below). In the *Laws* 9, 864b, pleasure and desires are treated as one group, and fear and anger are treated as forms of distress. It seems that Plato was interested in the classification of emotions, but did not find a satisfactory taxonomy. His remarks on locating particular emotions in the parts of the soul are also sketchy.

²⁴ Aristotle refers to an existing list in the *Eudemian Ethics* (= *EE*) 2.4, 1221b34, and 3.7, 1234a26; cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachische Ethik*, trans. and comm. by F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, 6 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), 395; Aristotle, *Eudemische Ethik*, trans. and comm. by F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, 7 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962), 356–7.

²⁵ Fortenbaugh (1975), 24–5.

kind of judgement is one of the elements of Plato's revised view of emotional response, though the lower psychic elements were not divorced from cognitive capacity in the 'tripartite' model either. It is also worth noticing that Plato continued to treat the emotional part as a psychosomatic whole which can be controlled and educated but not eliminated by the reason. The emotional part involuntarily generates emotional reactions and its therapy is not merely cognitive, but also involves participation in controlled symposia, choir singing, and dancing, as described in Book 2 of the *Laws*.²⁶ In the *Phaedrus*, Plato paid attention to the subjective feeling of love, and even later considered the question of the nature of feeling in emotions to be a philosophically interesting subject. Let us have a look at this part of Plato's theory.

1.3 Feeling and Emotion in the *Philebus*

Plato begins his discussion of the bodily pleasures and pains by remarking that they can be characterized as processes of disintegration and restoration of the harmonious state of a living organism (32a–b), but he later adds that they must be perceived. The bodily process itself is not a pleasure or pain except in a derived sense. One must also have an awareness of it. To feel bodily pleasures or pains is to be aware in a special way of something taking place in the body (33d–34a, 43a–c). The point may appear simple, but it was not systematically discussed before Plato. He noticed that when people say that they have a bodily pain, there is something in the body which is called pain, but in reality the pain is an awareness of the physical condition which is called pain because it causes the experience of pain and is its object.²⁷

Plato thought that there are bodily processes that are not perceived and others that are (*Phil.* 33d). Of the latter, some are perceived neutrally, some are perceived as pleasant, and others as unpleasant. The perception of something as pleasant or unpleasant differs from the neutral perception in a way which is clear to those who are acquainted with such perceptions (43b–c).²⁸ Pleasant and unpleasant experiences of bodily changes can be remembered or anticipated and in this manner their feeling qualities can

²⁶ For education in the *Laws*, see Rabbow (1960), 89–96.

²⁷ Hunger and thirst are regarded as physical changes and pains (31e), but as pains or desires they do not belong to the body (35d). Bodily pleasures and pains are caused by physical changes (31d), but they are felt through an inner perception (33e).

²⁸ In *Timaeus* 64d Plato says that small physical changes are not perceived, while moderate changes are perceived in a neutral way.

also be felt without a process in the body. Psychic pleasures and distresses which do not arise from the body form the feeling component of all mixed emotions (47d). All these pleasures and distresses can influence behaviour both by directing attention to certain things and by generating attraction and aversion with respect to their objects. In this function, they are advisers, and can to some extent serve the well-being of the subject. They are, however, foolish advisers, since their suggestions are not based on deliberation (*Laws* 1.644c–e).

Aristotle took Plato's view of bodily pleasures as his point of departure in *Rhetoric* 1.11, characterizing pleasure as a movement of the soul and a perceptible restoration of a normal state (1369b33–5). He also qualified this conception—not the idea of pleasure as an inner perception, but the view that it is the perception of a process—adding examples of bodily pleasures of a different type (1370a5–9). In the *Eudemian Ethics* and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he stated that instead of treating pleasures as processes of restoration one should regard pleasures, whether bodily or psychic, as unhindered activities of natural faculties (*EN* 7.12, 1153a9–15) or as completing moments of such activities (*EN* 10.4, 1174b23–1175a3; 10.5, 1175b32–5.) I mention this topic here, because G. E. L. Owen has dealt with it in a well-known paper in which he also discusses a distinction relevant to Plato's conception of pleasures and distresses.²⁹

Contrary to the view of many commentators, Owen argued that it is misleading to speak about two different answers to the same question in the discussions of pleasure in Books 7 and 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle's critical target in *EN* 7 is the process view of pleasure. What is enjoyed is not a process but rather an activity. Pleasures are mistakenly identified as processes, because the activities of the faculties which produce processes may be pleasures. The discussion in *EN* 10 deals with a quite different theme attempting to distinguish enjoyment from what is enjoyed. Aristotle sheds light on enjoyment by explaining how the grammar of enjoyment-verbs differs from the grammar of process-verbs, such as building something or walking somewhere. According to Owen, *hēdonē*, like its English counterpart 'pleasure', has two distinct uses. We can say: 'Gaming is one of my pleasures' or 'Gaming gives me pleasure'. In *EN* 7 Aristotle mainly deals with the first alternative, identifying pleasure with the activity enjoyed, and in *EN* 10 he mainly treats pleasures as enjoyments.

²⁹ G. E. L. Owen, 'Aristotelian Pleasures', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 72 (1971–2), 135–52; repr. in G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, ed. M. Nussbaum (London: Duckworth, 1986), 334–46.

Owen's remarks on Aristotle's theories of pleasure are somewhat controversial, and it is not necessary to comment on them here.³⁰ I think that Owen is right in saying that Aristotle was interested in the difference between the two ways of speaking about pleasures. Owen presents the distinction as if it were introduced by Aristotle, but, as already noted, Plato's crucial point in the *Philebus* is that to feel bodily pleasure is to be in a certain way aware of a bodily process which can be called a pleasure in the derived sense of being the cause and object of awareness that constitutes enjoying. The discussion in the *Philebus* is historically significant, since it is the first attempt to systematically explicate the feeling aspect of pleasure and distress. Owen did not discuss the question of what in Aristotle's opinion constitutes the enjoyment of physical pleasures. As will be seen, Aristotle followed Plato in thinking that it is to feel something by being aware of things in an affective manner.

A large part of the *Philebus* concentrates on the question of false pleasures (*Phil.* 36c–50d). The theme is divided into discussions of (1) false pleasures of anticipation (36c–41a), (2) over-estimation of future pleasures (41a–42c), (3) mistaking a neutral intermediate state for pleasure (42c–44b), and (4) falsity arising from the mistaken understanding of a mixed condition (44c–50d). The discussion begins with some terminological remarks. Plato first distinguishes the pleasures and pains attached to actual bodily events from the pleasures and pains which are felt in anticipating such pleasures and pains (31d–32d). Anticipating a pleasure is part of a bodily appetite which Plato describes as a complex state involving an unpleasant feeling concerning the actual bodily condition and an activated image of a remedial pleasure. The ability to anticipate pleasures is based upon memory, which stores pleasant experiences and is able to remind the pained subject of how to improve its condition (35c–d). He states that when it seems obvious to the subject that the appetite will be fulfilled, a pleasant feeling is associated with the anticipation of the future experience, but when it seems obvious that the appetite will not be fulfilled, discomfort is increased (35e–36c). The pleasures which are embedded in bodily desires are not perceptions of physical conditions, but are felt in anticipating them. When the subject is hopeful, the expectation is pleasant, but when hope is lost, anticipation turns into unpleasant frustration. These remarks can be applied both to human beings and to animals (36b).³¹

³⁰ For a critical evaluation of Owen's interpretation, see J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 204–24.

³¹ Plato's animal psychology is discussed in R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate* (London: Duckworth, 1993), 10–11, 65–7.

Plato asks next whether pleasures and pains can be called true or false. In arguing that they are true or false, he first deals with the analogy between beliefs and pleasures. To believe something is to have an opinion of something and to regard this as true. Depending on whether it is true or false, the subject believes something truly or falsely. Similarly there is a subject of enjoying a pleasure and that about which the subject is pleased. Plato thought that believing an opinion and enjoying a pleasure are both intentional states of the soul. The former can be characterized as taking something as true and the latter as finding something enjoyable. If a pleasure is discussed from the point of view of the representational content of feeling, it is easily understood that a pleasure can be regarded as true or false (36c–38a). When Plato says that wicked people in anticipating future events ‘for the most part enjoy false pleasures’ (40c), he seems to mean that the contents of their present enjoyments are formed by false thoughts about future experiences (pleasures). ‘As to pleasure, it certainly often seems to arise in us with a false, and not with a right, judgement’ (37e).

Plato describes the existence of opinions in the soul as follows. The opinions formed by the operations of memory and perception are as if they were written in the book of the soul. They can be expressed in spoken language and are true or false. These opinions are also illustrated in the same book by pictures formed by imagination. When something pertaining to perceptions is believed, there is also a picture in the soul which shows the perceptual content as it was revealed to the subject (39a–40d). When Plato maintains that the anticipatory representations of physical pleasures and pains are true or false, he treats these as true or false propositions, and when he calls these acts of imagining pleasant or unpleasant, he assumes that the actuality of the presentations in the mind makes the subject feel comfortable or sad. The theory of a mental scribe and a mental painter seems to be purported to explain these two aspects. When an experience of a bodily pleasure is stored in the book of the soul, it contains a proposition which states that a certain activity was pleasant and, furthermore, contains the corresponding imagining of oneself as enjoying it. As far as the imagination actualizes the perceptual content of the experience, it is possible to remember the feeling quality of the experience by ‘feeling’ it in the same way as one can remember a colour by ‘seeing’ it in the soul. A vivid mental recollection of a past experience of pleasure or pain may affect the subject in a pleasant or unpleasant manner, and this is what happens in the anticipation of future pleasures and pains. Plato says that the feelings in this connection ‘depend entirely on memory’ (33c).

The anticipated pleasure of eating cake is a pleasure which is believed to take place in the future. Anticipating it is to have a representation of eating cake in the future. The representation is false if there will be no cake, but to imagine oneself to eat it is pleasant. This seems to be what Plato means in his first characterization of affective anticipations: ‘The hope of pleasures is pleasant and comforting while the expectation of pain is frightening and painful’ (32b–c). In 36b it is said that a person *qua* hoping for replenishment enjoys it by remembering, while *qua* lacking he is simultaneously in pain. The point is not that the person enjoys what has happened, though Plato says that people can do that as well (39c–d, 40d). In pleasant anticipation, the representation of what has been experienced by the subject is revived, and the feeling caused by it is regarded as a preamble to more intense experiences in the future.

According to Gosling and Taylor, Plato’s concept of anticipatory pleasures is based on the idea that people enjoy imaginative picturing. Plato thought that this enjoyment can be said to be true or false, because he mistakenly identified the content of a picture with the act of picturing.³² However, Plato stresses that pleasure in anticipation is based entirely on memory and caused by the content of the revived experience. Dorothea Frede argues that anticipatory pleasures are propositional attitudes, enjoyments of representations, thoughts, and pictures of assumed future things.³³ This is in agreement with how Plato applies his conception of pleasure and pain as present and revived experience in the discussion of anticipatory feelings.

In *Philebus* 41b–42c Plato explains how the present experience of pleasures or pains can lead to mistaken judgements in regard to the degree and intensity of feelings. After a more theoretical discussion of mistaking a neutral state for pleasure (42c–44b), Plato discusses the impurity and mixed character of pleasures as a source of mistaken evaluations. All bodily pleasures can show this falsity, because the awareness of replenishment is simultaneous with the awareness of a need and a disturbance. Plato classifies the mixed pleasures and pains in three groups, depending on whether the components are perceptions of actual bodily conditions, whether they are confined to the soul, or whether one component is of the first type and the other of the second (46b–c). As for the physical pleasures, Plato is mainly concerned with certain extreme and morbid pleasures

³² Gosling and Taylor (1982), 438.

³³ D. Frede (trans. with notes), *Plato’s Philebus* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), pp. xlv–xlviii.

which are intensified by pain. The discussion of emotions which are associated with poetry purports to exemplify the second group.

According to Plato, anger, fear, longing, lamentation, love, jealousy, and envy are emotions each of which is actual within the soul as a distress mingled with a pleasure (47d–50d). In this sense, the emotions are taken to include a component similar to the feeling aspect of the present and anticipated bodily pleasures and pains. Emotional feelings are not modes of awareness concerning changes in the body or recollections of such perceptions. Their object is something else. Plato thought that the mixed emotional pleasures and distresses are modes of being aware of what happens or may happen to oneself and others in various social situations described in poetry, ‘in the tragedies and comedies of life’ (50b). Through occurrent emotions one becomes aware of oneself in a pleasant or unpleasant manner through the painted inner pictures (*phantasma*); for example, a man who envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold ‘sees in this picture himself as beside himself with delight’ (40a).

The cognitive part of an occurrent emotion is an evaluation of a change in the existentially relevant conditions of one’s life. It arouses a pleasant or unpleasant feeling and an inclination to act in a certain way. These aspects are mentioned in Plato’s discussion of malicious envy and joy—unfortunately it is the only example of a somewhat more detailed treatment of particular emotions in the *Philebus* (48a–50a). Why do we laugh at the misfortunes of others instead of being sorry for them? Plato seems to think that we need to see them make fools of themselves. We more or less consciously regard others as our rivals, which implies a negative feeling, and we feel relaxed and happy when they come to harm. Plato states that we laugh at people only when we do not fear their revenge. It is not the intrinsic fun in what takes place that makes us laugh, but our judgement that we are in some sense better off than those who come to harm.³⁴

In *Philebus* 50e–55b Plato deals with simple, pure, and true pleasures that are unmixed with distress, of the right size, and have the objects which are pure, stable, and enjoyed in themselves. As examples of these he mentions the enjoyment of pure sights, sounds, and smells and the intellectual pleasure of learning.³⁵ Following his conception of pleasure

³⁴ See also *ibid.*, p. lii.

³⁵ Contrary to what is said about the pleasures of philosophy in *Rep.* 9, it is now stated that knowledge itself does not provide pleasure (55a). D. Frede thinks that Plato came to realize that speaking about the pleasure of philosophical knowledge is incompatible with the generic definition of pleasure as a process (*ibid.* 61 n. 3).

as filling of a lack Plato thought that even pure pleasures are fillings of some sort of unfelt lack (51b, 51e–52a). In the ranking of the good ingredients of human life (59b–64b), first is measure; second is harmonious mixture; reason and intelligence come third; less pure arts with true belief come fourth; and pure pleasures obtain fifth place. Necessary pleasures or pleasures associated with emotions are not mentioned. They are not simply bad, but they do not belong to the good things either, though they inevitably occur in a good measured mixture.

1.4 Aristotle's Compositional Theory of Emotions

In the *Laws*, Plato said that young people should learn to love and to hate correctly, so that when their ability to reason and reflect is developed, there will be no disturbing conflicts between emotional inclinations and what reason suggests (2.653b–c). According to Fortenbaugh, this abstract characterization of the goal of education is based on Plato's new bipartite psychology: that is, on the distinction between reasoned reflection, on the one hand, and cognitive emotions open to rational persuasion and habituation, on the other. He also says that Aristotle's contribution was not to alter this picture but rather to develop it into a considered philosophical position.³⁶ Nussbaum has likewise stressed that the deepened interest in the psychology of emotions visible in Plato's later works is reflected in Aristotle's approach to the emotions as the essential constituents of a person.³⁷ It is clear that Aristotle learned the idea of the compositional analysis from Plato, but their general attitudes to emotions were quite different.

Plato's ascetic ideal in the *Republic* and in earlier works was not very far from the ideal which the Stoics later called *apatheia*, though he did not consider the complete extirpation of the passions possible, given the psychosomatic constitution of human beings. Plato tended to regard spontaneous desires and emotions as affective overvaluations of contingent and temporal matters. They fill the soul with inappropriate interests and prevent it from concentrating on higher themes congenial to the immortal part. A summary of this line of thought can be found in the *Timaeus*:

When a man is always occupied with his appetites and ambitions, and eagerly tries to satisfy them, all his thoughts must be mortal, and he must become entirely mortal as far as it is possible, because he has nourished this part. But he who has

³⁶ Fortenbaugh (1975), 49.

³⁷ Nussbaum (1986), 307–9.

been serious in the love of knowledge and true wisdom and has exercised this part of himself more than any other part, must have immortal and divine thoughts, if he attains to truth, and he cannot fail to achieve immortality as fully as human nature is capable of sharing in it, and since he always looks after the divine part in himself and respects his inner *daimōn*, he will be happy (*eudaimōn*) above all others. (*Timaeus* 90b–d)

In the *Phaedrus* Plato gave erotic love a special epistemic and edifying role, and it seems that this more clear-cut view of emotions as cognitive phenomena deepened his interest in the psychology of emotions even after the erotic enthusiasm had faded, as can be seen from the compositional theory of the structure of occurrent emotions which was sketched in the *Philebus*. In the *Laws* the emotions are taken to have more intrinsic value than in the *Republic*, but Plato is mainly interested in them as controllable constituents of the inner coherence of the state: moderated anger, feeling mildly, confidence, and shame (as fear of bad repute) appear useful in this respect (*Laws* 1.646e–649e; 5.731b–d). The idea of a positive epistemic role for the emotions suggested in the *Phaedrus* was qualified by the Phileban conception of emotions, since as mixtures of pleasure and distress they were problematic and not very reliable sources of information.

Aristotle was not inclined to seek the meaning and end of life outside it, as Plato did, and correspondingly he did not think that detachment from appreciating contingent things and from associated emotions is what philosophy should teach people. In his ethics and politics, Aristotle took it for granted that human beings are rational and social by nature and that a good human life involves developing human rational abilities and participating in various forms of social life (*EN* 1.7–9; 2.1–5). He thought that there is a great variety of emotions connected with social institutions and human practices, topics discussed in practical philosophy, and that it is worthwhile analysing the cognitive content and motivating functions of emotions (*EN* 2.6–8). Socially learned emotional paradigms played an important role in Aristotle's theory of moral education: its main question was how to train and instruct young people to join in the emotional patterns of culture in such a way that the habits of feelings and emotions contribute to a good life. The basis of this programme is delineated as follows:

We can fear and be confident and have appetite and feel anger and pity and in general pleasure and distress both too much and too little, and in both cases not well, but having these at the right time, on the right occasions, towards the right

people, with the right aim and in the right way, is what is intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. (*EN* 2.6, 1106b18–23)

Forming emotional judgements and being affected by them are based on the emotional capacities of the soul (*EN* 2.5, 1005b23–5). These can be edified in the same way as other human capacities and can be turned into virtuous habits (*hexis*).³⁸ Aristotle argues that the morally relevant elements of behaviour are learned through guided participation in the standard situations of life in childhood and youth. These include cases of immediate desire and avoidance and occasions for more complex feelings and emotional responses. Learning to feel right through habituation improves emotional dispositions, and these in their turn can influence the disposition of forming practical judgements.³⁹

To regard emotions as essential constituents of the good life means that a vulnerable dependence on temporal matters is accepted as a basic human condition. In finding contingent things valuable and personally important, people give themselves a basis for various emotional responses when appreciated things are achieved or threatened or lost or when others achieve or damage or lose them. Aristotle's conception of the good human life included a positive evaluation of attaching oneself to contingent things which are not wholly under our control. This made it differ from other approaches to emotions in ancient philosophical ethics.⁴⁰

The Academy's interest in the emotions appears in some passages of Aristotle's early logical writings. In *Topics* 4.5, 126a8–10, he exemplifies a topical rule by stating that 'shame exists in the reasoning part, fear in the spirited part, distress in the appetitive part, for pleasure is also in this, and anger in the spirited part'. In *Topics* 2.7, 113a35–b3, the appetitive faculty and the spirited faculty are said to have contrary acts. It is suggested that one should place love within the spirited faculty, since its contrary, hatred,

³⁸ Aristotle's accounts of the relationships between *pathos*, *dunamis*, and *hexis* are slightly different in *EN* 2.5, 1105b21–1106a13 and *EE* 2.2, 1220b7–20. Emotional capacities are regarded as innate in both places, but only *EE* sees these as considerable traits, such as irascibility, while *EN* regards them as tendencies. See Cairns (1993), 397–411.

³⁹ On Aristotle's view of learning to feel right, see M. F. Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on Learning to Be Good', in A. O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1980), 69–92; L. A. Kosman, 'Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics', *ibid.* 103–16; N. Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

⁴⁰ Nussbaum (1986), 318–72; see also M. C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 78–101; G. Striker, 'Emotions in Context: Aristotle's Treatment of the Passions in the *Rhetoric* and his Moral Psychology', in A. O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), 286–302.

as accompanying anger, belongs within it.⁴¹ The tripartition is also mentioned in *Topics* 5.1, 129a10–16, and 5.4, 133a30–2.⁴² In his *Categories*, Aristotle refers to passions as feelings or emotions in two different places. In chapter 8 it is stated that there are passible qualities of the soul, such as madness and irascibility, and quickly subsiding conditions, such as occurrent anger, which are called passions, not qualities. In dealing with the categories of action and passion (chapter 9) Aristotle says that being pleased and being distressed are passions in this sense. The remarks in chapter 8 were considered problematic by some ancient and medieval commentators, because Aristotle first said that the third species of quality involved passible qualities and passions and then that the passions of the soul were not qualities.⁴³

The second book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains the first detailed and systematic analysis of a number of individual emotions in Greek philosophy. This survey serves the rhetorician's purposes, but it can be taken as a source of information about Aristotle's considered views. All the main themes of the philosophical analysis of emotion in Aristotle's later works occur in the *Rhetoric*. Let us first consider the notions of pleasure and distress in *Rhetoric* 1.10–11. These chapters can be read as an introduction to the discussion of emotions in the second book of the *Rhetoric*, for Aristotle thought that a pleasant or unpleasant feeling is a constituent of an occurrent emotion. (See below.)

In the last part of the first book of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle deals with rhetorical arguments pertaining to accusation and defence. He begins the discussion of the incentives to wrongdoing by examining the general principles of action (1.10–11). According to Aristotle, people act voluntarily when they know what they are doing and do it without constraint. The class of voluntary acts is larger than the class of chosen acts, which are based on preceding deliberation (1.10, 1368b9–12). (For a detailed discussion of the term *hekousion*, often translated 'voluntary', see *EN* 3.1.) The purpose of this initial remark is to divide wrongdoing into two classes: chosen vicious behaviour and spontaneous akratic behaviour (1368b12–14). Even later Aristotle thought that akratic persons act because of overpowering unpremeditated impulses, either before having

⁴¹ Aristotle thinks that erotic love belongs within appetite (*EN* 7.3, 1147a15), another kind of love within spirit (*Politics* 7.7, 1327b40–1328a5), and love of friendship and wisdom (as forms of rational wish) within reason (*Rhet.* 2.4, 1380b36–7; *EN* 1.6, 1096a14–17); see also Price (1995), 108.

⁴² The appetitive and reasoning parts are mentioned in *Top.* 5.8, 138a33–6 and 138b12–15.

⁴³ See S. Knuuttila, 'Locating Emotions in the Categories', in J. Biard and I. Rosier-Catach (eds.), *La Tradition médiévale des Catégories (XIIe–XVe siècles)* (Louvain: Peeters, 2003), 261–9.

completed their deliberation about what would be best to do, against the result of such consideration, or without any consideration (*EN* 7.6, 1149a24–b3; 7.7, 1150b19–28).⁴⁴ After this short remark, the term *akrasia* is used only twice in the *Rhetoric*, but Aristotle apparently took it for granted that much of what he said later in the work explained akratic behaviour. Acting in accordance with an occurrent emotion is typical of *akrasia*, but not all acts based on emotions are akratic.

Aristotle next states that actions due to people themselves (i.e. not due to natural necessity, chance, or force) have their origin in a habit or in a rational or irrational desire (*Rhet.* 1.10, 1368b32–1369a4). In accordance with the terminology of Plato's doctrine of the tripartite soul, rational desire (*logistikē orexis*) is separated from two types of non-rational desire (*alogos orexis*), which are called anger (*thumos*) and appetite (*epithumia*). Rational desire is called wish (*boulēsis*).⁴⁵ Aristotle treats wish in his later works as a dynamic attitude to those goals which make people deliberate about how to achieve them. 'Choice' (*prohairesis*) initiates action toward a premeditated goal (*EN* 3.2–4). In *Rhetoric* 1.10, acts initiated by desires are similarly divided into two groups, depending on whether reasoning concerning ends and means and their appropriateness has taken place or not (1369a17–18). The acts of the first type are caused by rational desire. Acts initiated by anger or appetite result from direct reactions to what is regarded as pleasant or hurtful. These are caused by non-rational desire. The distinction between acts which have their origin in rational and non-rational desires does not correspond to the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive behaviour. The term 'rational' in this connection means simply that considerations concerning a good goal and practical reasoning about the means for achieving it are involved. As some scholars have put it, non-rational actual attitudes, whatever value-thoughts they may contain, do not have investigations or considerations concerning their appropriateness in their causal history.⁴⁶ This is how Aristotle thinks about emotions

⁴⁴ On *akrasia* in Aristotle see *EN* 7.1–10; N. O. Dahl, *Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); S. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), ch. 5; the medieval discussions of Aristotle's theory are studied in R. Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 44 (Leiden: Brill, 1994).

⁴⁵ See also *On the Movements of Animals* (= *MA*) 6, 700b22; *EE* 2.7, 1223a26–7; *On the Soul* 2.3, 414b2; 3.10, 433a22–5; and the comments in M. C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary and Interpretative Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 334–6, and Cooper (1999), 241–4.

⁴⁶ A. Nehamas, 'Pity and Fear in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*', in A. O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays in Aristotle's Poetics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 297; repr. in D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University

in general. In his view it is usually better to act on rational desire than to follow non-reasoned suggestions. However, one can see from the second book of the *Rhetoric* that emotional responses and feelings were also regarded as sources of information for rational decision making and the well-educated emotions as supporting motivation for virtuous action. (For the ambivalent nature of emotions, see *Rhet.* 1.10, 1369a18–24.)

By way of summarizing the discussion in chapter 10, Aristotle states that all voluntary actions due to ourselves are motivated by what seems to be good or what seems to be pleasant. As for the former group, Aristotle refers back to his discussion of the expedient things in *Rhet.* 1.6. His next task, taken up in 1.11, is to investigate pleasant and unpleasant things and how they influence behaviour.⁴⁷ Chapter 11 begins with a definition of pleasure as a movement of the soul whereby it is perceptibly brought into its normal state (1369b33–5). This is the Academic view of the bodily pleasures. Aristotle says that it is usually pleasant to move towards a natural state, but he adds that those things are also pleasant which are habitual or not forced (1370a5–9). These remarks may indicate that Aristotle wanted to enlarge the category of pleasant and unpleasant things. He apparently found the Phileban restoration model too narrow.

According to Aristotle, to enjoy the pleasures, which are movements or new states, is to perceive them (1370a27–8). This terminology is derived from the *Philebus*. Since enjoyment lies in perception, remembering or expecting something can be sufficient for feeling pleasure (1370a30–1). There can be pleasures for both those who remember and those who hope, since imagination (*phantasia*) is a feeble sort of perception (1370a28–9).⁴⁸ (Plato did not use this formulation, but his view could be expressed in this way.) Enjoying a bodily pleasure is to be pleasantly aware that something

Press, 1994); Cooper (1999), 242–3. In *EN* 1.13, 1102b13–1103a3, Aristotle draws a distinction between rational and non-rational parts of the soul and divides the non-rational part into a vegetative element and a desiderative element which shares in reason. I shall return to this theory.

⁴⁷ As for anger, Aristotle refers to Book 2 at 1.10, 1369b14–15, but deals with appetite at the end of 1.10 and 1.11. Cooper (1999, 420) suggests that the omission of a discussion in Book 2 of appetite is planned; Aristotle explains in 1.10–11 what *epithumia* is by way of telling what gives pleasure to people. Appetite is included in the lists of emotions in *EN* 2.5, 1105b21–3, and *EE* 2.2, 1220b12–14. See also *Rhet.* 2.12, 1388b32–3: ‘By emotions I mean anger, appetite, and the like that are discussed already’.

⁴⁸ For imagination and pleasure, see also *EN* 7.7, 1150b28. On the notion of *phantasia* in Aristotle, see Nussbaum (1978), 221–69; D. Modrak, *Aristotle: The Power of Perception* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 81–110; M. Schofield, ‘Aristotle on the Imagination’, in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle’s De anima* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 249–77; V. Caston, ‘Why Aristotle Needs Imagination’, *Phronesis*, 41 (1996), 20–55.

takes place in oneself, and when one remembers something or hopes for something in a pleasant way, there is in one's mind an impression similar to that which is there when something pleasant actually takes place. This imaginative act involves a pleasant feeling about the content. To have this qualified imagination with an awareness that it is connected with either past or future is to feel pleasure about past or future events. The objects are not present, but being aware of them imaginatively is to be conscious of something pleasant and to enjoy it, though this enjoyment is not as vivid as when the object is actual.

Aristotle states that what is said about pleasure *mutatis mutandis* applies to distress as the opposite of pleasure (1.11, 1172a2–3). The terms *hēdonē* and *lupē* can refer to both physical or mental processes or activities (as objects of attitudes) and to awarenesses of these (as attitudes). In the latter case pleasure is a pleasant awareness of something convenient taking place in oneself, whereas distress is an unpleasant awareness of something inconvenient taking place in oneself. Aristotle later says in *On the Soul* 3.2, 425b12, and in *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.9, 1170a29–32, that when human beings perceive something, there is also a perception of perceiving. If pleasures as enjoyments are aspects of perceptions, they are always conscious. This is taken for granted in the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle's notion of perception refers both to receiving information and to being aware of receiving it. He did not separate these functions, and correspondingly did not think that there might be perceptions which are not noticed.⁴⁹ If pleasures and distresses are special modes or aspects of being aware of something, then one might think that even though perceptions themselves are conscious, these modes or aspects attached to perceptions are not necessarily so. This was not Aristotle's view. In *EN* 7.14 he speaks about excitable people who pursue an excess of pleasure because their body is ever in torment owing to its special constitution. 'For animals are always toiling as the students of natural science testify, saying that sight and hearing are painful, but we have become used to this, as they maintain' (1154b7–9). Aristotle's point is not that things which can be felt as painful are felt so without noticing it. Inner motions are not painful for those who are used to them and do not experience them as painful.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ On reflective consciousness in Aristotle, see Modrak (1987), 145–54; C. H. Kahn, 'Aristotle on Thinking', in Nussbaum and Rorty (1992), 364–7.

⁵⁰ In the same place Aristotle mentions 'melancholic' people (1154b11–15) who have bodily pains due to the bad mixture of the humours, and who continuously need pleasure as a medicine. A pleasure, if strong, drives out any pain. This is why melancholic people easily become profligate.

The purpose of dealing with the pleasant and unpleasant feelings in *Rhetoric* 1.11 is to shed light on the non-rational activation of the appetites. These are themselves divided into non-rational natural appetites and appetites associated with reason (1370a18–19). The point of this somewhat confusing terminology is as follows. Non-rational appetites are activated through bodily changes and perceptions related to them. Appetites associated with reason are conditioned by culture and presuppose specific beliefs.⁵¹ Aristotle assumes that an anticipatory pleasant feeling accompanies most appetites, because the soul connects the imagination of what is desired with the imagination of pleasant experiences in similar situations. He says that those pained by fever and thirsting for a drink recall how they have once drunk and thus, having a representation of pleasant drinking, feel pleasure. In a similar way, lovers feel distress in the absence of their loved ones, but while longing for their presence, they also enjoy the memories through which they, as it were, perceive the object of their affection (1370b15–28). Pleasant feelings associated with pleasant memories and pleasant anticipations, which may intensify appetites, are weaker forms of enjoying the things desired as present.

In the *Philebus*, Plato suggested that, in addition to the pleasant and unpleasant feelings associated with bodily changes, we also have such feelings caused by mental representations of ourselves and others in situations which he called the comedies and tragedies of life (*Phil.* 50b). Plato did not develop this idea further, but what he probably intended can be seen from how Aristotle made use of it. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle extends the discussion of pleasures and enjoyments from those connected with bodily changes and states to cases where pleasant or unpleasant awareness is self-regarding and its focal object is not the body but the self. These feelings are associated with changes in one's awareness of oneself in a certain situation:

Victory is pleasant, not merely to the competitive but to everyone, for there is produced an appearance (*phantasia*) of superiority and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for that... Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things, because they produce the appearance of oneself as possessing

⁵¹ See D. Frede, 'Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*', in Rorty (1996), 266–7. S. R. Leighton ('Aristotle and the Emotions', *Phronesis*, 27 (1982), 162–5, a revised version in Rorty (1996), 206–37) argues that Aristotle intended to exclude *epithumia* from the emotions because it is entirely irrational. G. Striker (1996, 301) remarks that Leighton overlooks this passage in which Aristotle distinguishes between bodily cravings (merely non-rational desires) and emotional desires, i.e. appetites with belief. In distinguishing between bodily and psychic pleasures in *EN* 3.10, 1117b28–32, Aristotle states that psychic pleasures are not occasioned by physical changes or states but by thoughts.

the qualities of an excellent man . . . A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is pleasant to love . . . and to be loved, for here again an appearance that one is good is produced, a thing desired by all people who are aware of it. (*Rhet.* 1.11, 1370b32–1371a20)⁵²

These examples involve some reminiscences of the processual model of pleasure. Desire includes the anticipation of self-restoration or self-completion. When one's position on the social scale or in some other relevant order improves, one feels pleasure.⁵³

Let us turn now to *Rhetoric* 2.1–11. Aristotle's purpose is to explain how the orator may change the judgements of the audience through giving rise to emotions:

Emotions, such as anger, pity, fear and all that are similar to them and their opposites, change people with respect to their judgements, and they are accompanied by distress and pleasure. (1378a19–22)

Since occurrent emotions are later described as involving beliefs, 'change with respect to judgement' can refer to judgements embedded in acquired emotions or other practical judgements which can be influenced by emotions. Aristotle treats separately twelve emotions: anger (*orgē*), feeling mildly (*praotēs*), friendly love (*philia*), hatred (*misos*), fear (*phobos*), confidence (*tharsos*), shame (*aiskhunē*), feeling kindly (*kharis*), pity (*eleos*), indignation (*nemesis*), envy (*phthonos*), and emulation (*zēlos*).⁵⁴ He does not present a general theory of the structure of emotion, but the analyses of the various emotions involve some similar elements. The same constituents are also mentioned in the analyses in his later works. They are as follows. (1) An evaluation states that something positive or negative is happening to the subject (or to someone else in a way which is relevant to the subject). (2) A pleasant or unpleasant feeling about the content of the evaluation is associated with the evaluation. These are accompanied by (3) a behavioural suggestion, a spontaneous impulse towards action, and (4) bodily changes.⁵⁵ In *On the Soul* 1.1, 403a24–b7, Aristotle says that (4) is a material cause of an emotion, and he seems to think that (1)–(3) form its

⁵² For love of honour and love of victory in Plato, see *Rep.* 9.581a–b.

⁵³ See also D. Frede (1996), 269–70.

⁵⁴ In *EN* 2.5, 1105b21–3, there is another partially overlapping list of the passions. For shorter lists, see *EE* 2.2, 1220b12–14, and *On the Soul* 1.1, 403a16–18. For similarities between the lists in Plato and Aristotle, see pp. 16–17 above.

⁵⁵ According to Cooper ('An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions', in Rorty (1996), 251, repr. in Cooper (1999), 422), Aristotle regarded (1)–(3) as central constitutive elements of the emotions in discussing anger in *Rhet.* 2. Aristotle's approach shows similarities to modern compositional theories and has influenced some of them; see W. Lyons, *Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); de Sousa (1987); P. S. Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons: An*

formal cause. While (2) is treated as the feeling aspect of (1), and these as the cause of (3) and (4) in some of Aristotle's descriptions of particular emotions, he did not give details of the causal relationships between these components. Possible further questions are those dealt with in Patricia Greenspan's compositional theory: an emotion has an external cause—that is, an object that gives rise to an emotional evaluation—and an internal cause of the affective feeling state—that is, the evaluation. The feelings are about the evaluations, which in their turn are about the external object. Emotions may involve bodily feelings, and physiological changes may yield emotions when they yield comfort or discomfort about some evaluative proposition.⁵⁶

Three of the above elements are mentioned in the definition of anger in *Rhet.* 2.2, 1378a30–2: 'Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by distress, for conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends.' In *On the Soul* 1.1 it is stated that emotions involve bodily changes and that a physicist would be interested in exploring them:

Hence a physicist would define each of these differently from a dialectician; the latter would define anger as an appetite for returning pain for pain or something of the sort, while the former would define it as the boiling of the blood or warm stuff round the heart. (403a29–b1)⁵⁷

The dialectician's approach is applied in the *Rhetoric* and in ethical works, although there are references to bodily affections as well. Aristotle does not pay much attention to bodily changes caused by psychic affects in his works on ethics and rhetoric; he did not regard the emotional feelings primarily as pleasant or unpleasant perceptions of physical reactions, even though bodily changes accompany occurrent emotions, and a perception of them may influence one's emotional state. There are, however, various considerations of the physical aspect in *On the Movements of Animals*, *On the Parts of Animals*, and *Parva naturalia*.

In accordance with his hylomorphic view of the body–soul relationship, Aristotle assumed that dispositional and occurrent bodily conditions may

Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York and London: Routledge, 1988); J. Oakley, *Morality and the Emotions* (London: Routledge, 1992); M. Stocker and E. Hegeman, *Valuing Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁵⁶ Greenspan (1988), 4–5, 15–17, 41–5, 178–80.

⁵⁷ For Aristotle's hylomorphism and the relationship between the mental and physical aspects of emotions, see P. J. van der Eijk, 'Aristotle's Psycho-physiological Account of the Soul–Body Relationship', in J. P. Wright and P. Potter (eds.), *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind–Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 57–77, at 66–9.

be relevant to the understanding of occurrent emotions as their contributory causes.⁵⁸ There are also physical changes which are caused by emotions and are regarded as signs of them, such as blushing with shame and shivering or turning pale with fear.⁵⁹ Aristotle assumes that such visible bodily changes are physically caused by the small expansions and contractions of the heart, the centre of psychic activities. These primary changes, which are produced by heating and chilling, are not perceived, but may cause large-scale emotional expressive movements and initiate intended action (*MA* 7, 701b24–32). The heating and chilling of the heart may be caused by perceptions, imagination, or thought (*MA* 7–9).⁶⁰ These cardiac movements are also associated with the expansion or contraction of the connate pneuma, an airiform substance, due to the changes of the vital heat in the heart (*MA* 10).⁶¹

⁵⁸ In describing the physiological basis of emotions in *On the Soul* 1.1, 403a19–21, Aristotle writes: ‘This is shown by the fact that sometimes we are not at all irritated or frightened, even though severe and obvious troubles befall us, while at other times we are stirred by small and insignificant things, when the body is swollen and is in the same state as when we are angry.’ While fear chills the body, the excess of water in the heart and watery blood also predispose one to fear, since water is cold, and fear is associated with low temperature (*On the Parts of Animals* 2.4, 650b27–33; 3.4, 667a14–19; 4.11, 692a22–5). Animals whose blood is thick and heats easily are courageous and liable to bursts of passion (*ibid.* 2.4, 650b33–5). The best of all animals are those whose blood is hot and thin; they are courageous and intelligent (*ibid.* 2.2, 648a9–11). There are some further examples of the two ways of causation across the dual aspect of affection in Price (1995), 122–3. Aristotle’s interest in the interplay between psychic and bodily affection extended to physiognomic considerations. In Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* 3.10 Socrates discusses with Parrhasius the question of whether painters can reproduce the character of the soul. Socrates’ concluding remark is that not only are the expressions of occurrent emotions artistically imitable; the visible features and bearing also reflect the habits of the soul and dispositional passions. Aristotle refers to physiognomic theories in the *History of Animals* 1.8–11. They were extensively dealt with in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Physiognomics*. For ancient physiognomy in general, see S. Vogt’s introduction and commentary in *Physiognomonica*, Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, 18. 6 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999) and the collection of texts in R. Foerster (ed.), *Scriptores physiognomnici graeci et latini*, BT, 2 vols., (Leipzig: Teubner, 1893).

⁵⁹ Those who feel shame blush, and those who fear death go pale (*EN* 4.9, 1128b13–14). Fear causes shivering (*MA* 7, 701b22, 32; *On Sleeping and Waking* 457b15–16). For passions and physical changes, see also Pseudo-Aristotle, *Problems* 27.

⁶⁰ In *On respiration* Aristotle states that the increase of cold near the heart, which may be due to disease or to fear, causes contraction and palpation. Correspondingly, pulsation and expansion are caused by an increase in heat. When the hot blood is concentrated in the heart, fleeing the increased cold, it is rushed into so small a space that sometimes life is extinguished and the animals die of fear (497b24–6).

⁶¹ For Aristotle’s sketchy remarks on the mechanism of heating and chilling and the movements of the innate pneuma (*sumphuton pneuma*), see Tracy (1969), 354–9, and the more detailed accounts in Nussbaum (1978), 143–64, and G. Freudenthal, *Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 134–7.

In *On the Parts of Animals* Aristotle states about the heart that

the movements associated with pleasant and painful things and in general with any perception are observed to start therefrom and to end there. (*PA* 3.4, 666a11–13)

Pleasure and pain are here regarded as forms of perception; in *On the Soul* 1.1, 403a7, Aristotle also calls anger, confidence, and appetite perceptions, apparently on the basis of their feeling aspects. (Cf. *On the Soul* 2.2, 413b23.⁶²) Even though the incipient cardiac changes which are associated with all emotions are not felt, it is possible that one becomes aware of strengthened physical affections in the area of the heart when experiencing occurrent emotions.⁶³

Some Aristotelian formulations suggest that he identified an actual emotion with the felt affect caused by an evaluation (see, e.g., *Rhet.* 2.5, 1382a21–2: ‘Let fear be a distress or a disturbance due to imagining some destructive and painful evil in the future’). In some places the evaluative representation itself is called an emotion (‘Shame is the appearance of disgrace’, 2.6, 1384a22), and sometimes it is the dynamic inclination (‘Anger may be defined as a desire’, 2.2, 1378a30). This variation shows that one can refer to an occurrent emotion by referring to the whole or to one constituent part of the whole. Referring to one constituent implies that the others are connoted, since Aristotle’s approach is compositional and there are causal connections between the parts.

Martha Nussbaum argues that Aristotle was inclined to regard beliefs as necessary and sufficient conditions of emotions, ‘as if the feeling were not even a proper part of the passion’. Referring to *Rhet.* 1378a19–22, quoted above, she writes that ‘Aristotle defines passions as followed by distress and pleasure’.⁶⁴ In *EN* 2.5, 1105b21–3, there is an analogous formulation using the verb *hepesthai*, which could be translated as ‘follow’ or ‘accompany’. I think that the verb refers to a conceptual link in these texts. In fact Aristotle explicitly defines many of the emotions discussed in *Rhetoric* as

⁶² T. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul: Argument and Refutation in the De placitis Books II–III*, *Philosophia Antiqua*, 68 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 170–1. Tieleman discusses Aristotle among the predecessors of the Chrysippian argument that emotional experiences in the heart support the cardiocentric psychological theory.

⁶³ This was a common view. In setting up the tripartite theory of the soul, Plato quotes *Odyssey* 20.17–18: ‘Bear up, my heart. You have had worse to endure before this’ (*Rep.*, 3.390d, 4.441b). See also B. Williams (1993), 38.

⁶⁴ Nussbaum (1994), 88–90.

forms of distress.⁶⁵ Nussbaum's point is to stress the cognitivity of Aristotelian passions. An emotional reaction involves a distinct mode of seeing things from the point of view of an emotionally sensitive being. Therefore a choice based on practical wisdom is described as either desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire (*EN* 6.2, 1139a23, b4–5). Practical reason functions in connection with the correctly disposed passions. One of its tasks is to elaborate the evaluations which are embedded in immediate emotional responses.⁶⁶ This has important consequences for Aristotle's ethics, in which good action is treated as a co-operation between the virtues of the character and practical reason.⁶⁷

It is assumed in many contemporary theories that an emotion always implies a belief characteristic of it. Patricia Greenspan, Amélie Rorty, and some others have denied this.⁶⁸ They grant that an evaluation of an intentional object is associated with an emotion, but they stress that it is not necessarily a judgement—it is often merely an evaluative thought. Since the words *phantasia* and *phainesthai* figure in the definitions of emotions in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric* and the imagination is sharply separated from belief and conviction in *On the Soul* 3.3, 428a18–b9, one might wonder whether Aristotle thought that a passive unreflective presentation at the level of imagination (*phantasia*) could arouse an emotion. This seems possible, since Aristotle often applies emotional terms to animal behaviour, and animals have imagination but not belief.⁶⁹ The definition of fear (*Rhet.* 2.5, 1382a21–2) also suggests that the mere appearance of something terrible may arouse a genuine fear even in the absence of any beliefs about its objects. However, in the subsequent

⁶⁵ Fear (1382a21), shame (1383b12), pity (1385b13), indignation (1386b8–11), envy (1386b18–19), and emulation (1388a32–4). Leighton (1996, 217–19) also argues that *hepesthai* is used to include pleasure and distress within the concept of emotion. In commenting on Aristotle's list of emotions in *EN* 2.5, Thomas Aquinas assumed that in Aristotle's view pleasure and distress were separate emotions taking place after the actualization of what is desired or avoided: *In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1964), 2.5.296.

⁶⁶ See Nussbaum (1986), 307–9. In her book *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Nussbaum states that Aristotelian feelings associated with emotions are not independent non-cognitive elements, but ways of thinking about emotionally relevant matters (63–4).

⁶⁷ Sherman (1989).

⁶⁸ Greenspan (1988) 17–20; A. O. Rorty, *Mind in Action* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 113–15.

⁶⁹ On the emotions of animals in Aristotle, see Sorabji (1993), 55–8; J. Sihvola, 'Emotional Animals: Do Aristotelian Emotions Require Beliefs?', *Apeiron*, 29 (1996), 105–44. One of the contexts in which Aristotle deals with animal emotions is the discussion of the physiognomic traits of people. In Aristotle's view these were best discerned by comparing people with animals. See p. 34 above.

discussion, beliefs and not mere impressions or appearances are involved in its occurrence. The existence of certain beliefs in the mind is also claimed to be able to prevent fear from being actualizing (*Rhet.* 2.5, 1382b30–2; cf. *EN* 3.8, 1117a20–1).

One could suggest that in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle limits his attention to the emotions of human beings, which are described as embedded in the noetic structures of the background beliefs of their subjects, but it is not clear that all emotions presuppose such beliefs as a constituent part or even as a necessary condition. Animals may thus experience fear and anger, which are pretty simple passions, but not pity, since it presupposes certain evaluative beliefs. However, in *Topics* 4.6, 127b30–2, Aristotle maintains that judgement is a necessary condition of an actual emotion: ‘Both distress and judgement (*hypolēpsis*) seem to be predicated of anger in what it is, for the angry man is both in distress and also judges that he is slighted’.⁷⁰ *On the Soul* 3.3, 427b21–4, states that imagination, as distinct from belief, is not a sufficient condition of an emotion: ‘When we believe that something is fearful or threatening, an emotion is immediately produced, and so too with what is encouraging, but when we merely imagine, we are as people who are looking at a painting of some fearful or encouraging scene.’⁷¹ Aristotle did not mean that a belief is fear; in fear the belief must be accompanied by a specific feeling (*Rhet.* 2.5, 1382a21–2) and an attempt to find out how to avoid fearful things (1383a6–7).

Further light may be shed on this question by considering Aristotle’s theory of the emotions as componential. Perceptions and imaginings may affect animals and arouse various feelings in them. They are not yet emotions, however; an evaluative judgement is also needed. Emotions which involve unpremeditated judgements are located within the non-reasoning half of the soul, which can be controlled by the reasoning half. This is the bipartite division which Aristotle employs in his moral psychology (*EN* 1.13, 1102b13–28). When it is related to biology, both halves are located within the biological faculty of reason (*EN* 1.7, 1097b33–1098a5; 1.13, 1103a1–3). Emotions involve judgements which the animals cannot make.⁷² On this interpretation, Aristotle could think

⁷⁰ See also *Topics* 6.13, 151a16–17; 8.1, 156a32–3. The word *hypolēpsis* covers knowledge (*epistēmē*), practical understanding (*phronēsis*), and belief (*doxa*). Belief involves conviction (*pistis*), which is not found in animals, though they have imagination (*On the Soul* 3.3, 427b25, 428a20–1).

⁷¹ Instead of ‘we are as people’, Ross translates: ‘we remain as unaffected as persons’. This is an addition based on the assumption that in Aristotle’s view an appearance or a thought without a judgement cannot affect people. This is not true; see e.g. *On the Soul* 3.9, 432b29–433a1.

⁷² Fortenbaugh (1975), 27, 67–9.

that there are emotions proper which involve a judgement and, furthermore, emotional phenomena which are similar to these, but have an affective representation and not a judgement as their cognitive part.⁷³

In dealing with Aristotle's view of catharsis, Jonathan Lear distinguishes between feelings which do not require a belief and emotions which do require beliefs.⁷⁴ He does not discuss any particular text in this context, but Aristotle's references to affecting images and thoughts mentioned above show that there are feelings which are caused by appearances. The behavioural changes of human beings can also be activated by imagination, as those of animals are (*On the Soul* 3.10, 433a10–12). It is not very surprising that Aspasius, a second-century Aristotelian thinker, argued that emotions as reactions to appearances do not require judgement.⁷⁵ Aristotle could have said the same and regarded the emotions based on judgements as a special group of emotions.

Let us look more closely at the feeling component of an occurrent emotion. According to Aristotle, emotions are underdetermined if it is merely noted that they are evaluative attitudes to states of affairs of a certain kind accompanied by a behavioural suggestion. They are always concerned with what seems good or bad for me or someone else related to me in a relevant way; but even this needs qualification, since emotional judgements are distinguished from non-affective self-regarding thoughts, such as prudential judgements and judgements pertaining to one's health and strength (*EN* 6.5, 1140a25–30). An emotion involves an affect which is the felt aspect of an evaluation. To feel bodily pleasure or pain is to have a pleasant or unpleasant awareness of something taking place in one's body; in many places the feeling aspect of an occurrent emotion is analogously treated as a pleasant or unpleasant awareness of what happens to oneself (or some others) in a personally significant situation. The emotional evaluative thought makes one see oneself (or others in relation to oneself) in a specific way, and this awareness is qualified as pleasant or unpleasant. It parallels the pleasant or unpleasant awareness of one's bodily states. (See the above examples connected with victory, honour, and love in *Rhet.* 1.11, 1370b32–1371a20.)

⁷³ Sorabji (1993, 56–7) argues that Aristotle did not regard judgements as necessary for emotions; they can also be aroused by *phantasia* alone, without a belief. Had Aristotle had animals in mind in the *Rhetoric*, he would have been free to describe the cognitive aspect of emotion as an appearance throughout.

⁷⁴ J. Lear, 'Katharsis', in Rorty (1992), 329.

⁷⁵ Aspasius, *In Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria*, ed. G. Heylbut, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 19.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1889), 44.33–45.16. The relevant passage is translated in Sorabji (2000), 134.

The role of the feeling as a specific aspect of self-regarding evaluation is often referred to along with the discussions of anger, feeling mildly, shame, pity, emulation, and other emotions. The analysis of anger and its opposite, feeling mildly (*Rhet.* 2.2–3), distinguishes between various kinds of slighting which the ill-treated consider unjustified attempts to belittle them and which are correspondingly pleasant to the other side. ‘The cause of the pleasure enjoyed by insolent people is that they think themselves greatly superior to others when ill-treating them’ (*Rhet.* 2.2, 1378b26–8). The distress which belongs to anger is caused by the thought of being belittled, and the pleasure which accompanies anger is caused by the thought of revenge which is an attempt to restore one’s value.⁷⁶ Fear is a distress arising from the appearance of an impending bad thing (*Rhet.* 2.5, 1382a21–6), and confidence is associated with the appearance of nearness of what keeps us safe and the remoteness of what is terrible (*Rhet.* 2.5, 1383a16–19). Both cases involve a thought about oneself as a subject to which encouraging or fearful things are near. Shame is characterized as the imagination of disgrace which is an unpleasant awareness of losing respect from others, such as those whom we admire and who admire us or with whom we are competing or whose opinion of us we respect. Shame involves a special form of self-consciousness, since people feeling shame think of themselves as being seen through the eyes of others (*Rhet.* 2.6, 1384a22–b1).⁷⁷ Emulation is distress caused by seeing good things in people who are similar to us, not because others have the goods, but because we do not have them ourselves (*Rhet.* 2.11, 1388a32–5).

When Aristotle says that in tragedies we fear for someone who is similar to us (*Poetics* 13, 1453a3–6), he apparently means that the realized similarity allows us to recognize that we may stand in the same danger as he or she did. Likewise, Aristotle says that pity is painful experience caused by a destructive event befalling someone undeserving and who is like ourselves, and, moreover, that whatever we fear in regard to ourselves we pity when it occurs to others, and *vice versa* (*Rhet.* 2.5, 1382b25–6; 2.8, 1385b13–16, 1386a27–9). Tragedy arouses pity in people who are aware of themselves in a manner that is congenial to what takes place in the scene.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ See e.g. *Rhet.* 2.2, 1379b7–13. In 2.3, 1380a24–6, Aristotle remarks that our anger ceases towards those who humble themselves before us; even dogs do not bite those who sit down.

⁷⁷ For shame and the eyes in earlier Greek literature, see Cairns (1993), general index: *aidōs*.

⁷⁸ In *Poetics* 6, 1449b27–8, Aristotle writes that by arousing pity and fear, tragedy produces catharsis of these emotions. For recent discussions of what this might mean, see the papers by Rorty, Halliwell, Nussbaum, Lear, Nehamas, and Janko in Rorty (1992). Nussbaum and Halliwell interpret Aristotelian catharsis as a homeopathic refinement of the cognitive emotions of pity and fear, ‘a clarification (or illumination) concerning experiences of the pitiable and

In *EN* 3.9, 1117b10–13, Aristotle states that people will be the more pained at the prospect of their death, the more they have complete virtue and the happier they are, for death is a greater loss to good people than to those for whom life is less worth living. In *EN* 9.9 it is similarly stated that being aware of oneself is the more pleasant, the more one is a good person (1170b3–5). This is one of the premisses of an argument for the view that friendship is among the constituents of the good life, a friend being ‘a second self’ (1170b6–7). Aristotle also states that wicked men, having nothing lovable in them, have no feeling of love for themselves. Being generally hated, they may have self-destructive feelings and even kill themselves. Their soul is rent by faction; ‘one part pulls them one way and another the other, as if they were dragging them asunder’ (9.4, 1166b13–26).

It is typical of Aristotle’s discussions of emotions and feelings that he attempts to individuate them by referring to the characteristic beliefs and thoughts which cause them and form their cognitive content. Nussbaum stresses this in underlining the cognitivity of Aristotelian emotions. Instead of being associated with one single judgement, they are often embedded in a rich cognitive structure of beliefs. Aristotle often states that beliefs cause emotions, but he also refers to concrete imaginations in this context. This is understandable; for one thing, Aristotle thought that we do not think without imagination (*On the Soul* 3.7, 431a16–17; 3.8, 432a12–14; *On Memory* 449b31–450a1), and, second, the feeling part of a self-regarding emotion is analogous to being aware of one’s body in a pleasant or unpleasant way—that is, being aware of oneself through having an affective appearance of oneself in a situation. Affective imaginations can cause intense pleasant feelings, and it is possible to be attracted by them (*MA* 8.702a5–7). In *Rhet.* 2.2 Aristotle writes that because anger is attended by pleasure, the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance. ‘The appearance (*phantasia*) which is called up is like a dream’ (1378b8–10). A lover is continuously doing things connected with the beloved, since these things recall memory and make one to perceive the beloved (1.11, 1370b20–2).⁷⁹

fearful kind’. The pleasure specific to drama arises from pity and fear through mimesis (14, 1453b10–13); it is a therapeutic recognition of the sorrowful aspects of life; see Nussbaum (1986), 390–1, and S. Halliwell, *Aristotle’s Poetics* (London: Duckworth, 1986), 184–200, 350–6. In his charge against poetry at *Rep.* 10.606a–d, Plato maintained that poetic imitation fosters the emotions and desires: ‘It nurtures and waters them when they ought to wither; it places them in command of our soul when they ought to obey.’ Aristotle’s remark on catharsis has often been regarded as an answer to Plato’s criticism. See Halliwell (1986), 185.

⁷⁹ This is also why speakers try to arouse emotions by bringing emotionally coloured things ‘before the eyes’ of their audience and making them ‘see’ what might happen to them (*Rhet.* 2.8, 1386a33–5, b5–7; 3.10, 1410b33–5).

Ernst Tugendhat refers to Aristotle's ideas in discussing Heidegger's view of emotions as modes of relating oneself to oneself—through emotions one is confronted with one's being in relation to a state of affairs which affects oneself. This confrontation is particularly clear in those affective states which are called moods (*Stimmungen*): states such as depression, cheerfulness, happiness, boredom, ill humour, and anxiety. Moods form a special class of emotions by virtue of not having a particular intentional object—in them one is confronted with one's being in the world as such. Moods are modes of self-consciousness and, as such, special modes of disclosure. They disclose the 'facticity' of existence.⁸⁰ Aristotle did not develop these kinds of considerations from the feeling aspect of emotions, and, as distinct from Heidegger, he regarded the affective relation to oneself as one component of an emotion only; but it is historically significant that, following the suggestions of Plato, Aristotle paid some attention to the feeling aspect as a mode of being aware of oneself in changing situations.

This aspect of pleasure and distress is not focal in the discussion of pleasant activities in Books 7 and 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle states that some people have equated pleasure with an activity, because these are not found apart, but in fact they are not the same (10.5, 1175b34–5). The pleasure is something that supervenes (*epigignesthai*) on an activity (10.4, 1174b31–3). Aristotle is more interested in the nature of the activities which are enjoyed than in the supervening pleasure, but he clearly assumes that the pleasure is a pleasant awareness of an activity and that the corresponding distress is an unpleasant awareness.⁸¹ The activities are said to be made better by their proper pleasure and worsened or hindered by distress; for example, people who find writing or doing sums unpleasant and painful do not write or do sums (10.5, 1175b14–19). This does not take place in an unconscious manner. Aristotle states that the activity of gods, which surpasses all others in blessedness, is contemplation. Similarly, the greatest human happiness with an intermingled pleasure is the activity of philosophical wisdom (10.7, 1177a22–7; 10.8, 1178b20–3). The remarks on pleasure and distress as supervening on activities are not in disagreement with what was said above about

⁸⁰ E. Tugendhat, *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979); in English: *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. P. Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), 178–87.

⁸¹ Since Aristotle's main examples of activities in *EN* 10.4–5 are perception and thinking, his remark that pleasure is not thought or perception (1175b34) does not imply, contrary to the view of some medieval commentators, that pleasure and distress are not forms of being aware of activities. See p. 284 below.

the feeling aspect of an occurrent emotion. The cognitive part of an emotion and the corresponding feeling can be simple, as the feelings supervening on activities are; but they can also be of more complicated cognitive structure and involve an affective awareness of oneself in a situation.⁸²

Aristotle's sketchy remarks on the parts of the soul are associated with various problems. Let us consider the nature of the emotional part (*to pathētikon morion*, *Pol.* 1.5, 1254b8). The emotional part is described as partaking of the reasoning part. The emotional level can give rise to suggestions which are contrary to rational wishes—these are complied with by akratic people, while encratic people resist them. The emotional reactions of virtuous persons are adequate (*EN* 1.13, 1102b14–28). In *EN* 1.13 it is assumed that emotions share in reasoning through their cognitive part, since they can be persuaded by reasoning. Elsewhere it is suggested that occurrent emotions can also contribute to considerations about what should be done.⁸³ Emotional evaluations as unpremeditated particular judgements are not acts of the reasoning part of the soul, though they are acts of reason. It seems that the reasoning and emotional parts make use of the same faculty of reason in different ways. The reasoning part involves the potencies and habits of theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, wish ('rational desire', *Rhet.* 1.10, 1369a2–3), choice ('desiderative reason', *EN* 6.2, 1139b4), and probably the ability of feeling intellectual pleasure (*EN* 10.7, 1177a25–7).⁸⁴ What is included in the emotional part which forms emotional judgements by using the faculty of reason, which primarily belongs to the reasoning part? It is taken for granted that the emotional part is the seat of behavioural impulses. In *Phys.* 7.3, 247a3–12, Aristotle locates the feelings which are associated with virtues in the perceptual (*aisthētikon*) part. These are said to be pleasures or distresses, either in actual perception or in memory or in anticipation.⁸⁵ In *EE* 2.2, 1220b12–14, the emotions are said to be accompanied by perceptual pleasure or distress, and these aspects are apparently located in the part of the soul which is called 'perceptual and desiderative' (*EE* 2.2,

⁸² See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems*, ed. I. Bruns, in *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.2 (Berlin, 1892), 117–63; trans. R. W. Sharples (London: Duckworth, 1990), 14.

⁸³ In *Pol.* 1.5, 1254b5, Aristotle states that the rational part should rule the emotional part in a political manner. This implies some kind of mutual influence. Cf. *Rhet.* 2.1, 1378a19–22.

⁸⁴ For the question of whether the faculty of the reflexive awareness of thinking is common sense or intellect, see Modrak (1987), 146–7, 151–2; Kahn (1992), 372–5.

⁸⁵ These pleasures are said to be physical in the α -version of the text but not in the β -version. See R. Wardy, *The Chain of Change: A Study of Aristotle's Physics VII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 221.

1219b23).⁸⁶ Thus there are powers and habits of feeling and moving in this part. The feeling dispositions influence the habits of forming emotional judgements. Even though an occurrent emotion can be suppressed by giving up the evaluative judgement, as is assumed in Aristotle's advice to speakers in *Rhetoric* 2, this is not always easy, since emotional evaluations can be supported by deep-rooted feelings which are not under immediate rational control (*EN* 2.3, 1105a1–3). It is also said that one should become habituated to feeling with an intensity that corresponds to the importance of objects and to evaluate things similarly. (See e.g. *EN* 2.6, 1106b18–23; 3.11, 1119a11–20; 7.7, 1150b26–8.) These remarks imply that there is a close connection between the habits of feeling and evaluating, but the explication of the mutual causality between them remains abstract.

Another influential and also problematic theme of Aristotle's philosophy of mind is the question of the nature of the soul. In *On the Soul* Aristotle argues that the soul is not a separate substance, but is the form and the entelechy of an organized body (2.2, 414a14–19). This view suggests that there are no psychic activities independent of the body, but Aristotle also thought that the acts of the part whereby the soul knows (3.4, 429a10) do not in themselves involve bodily changes (3.5, 430a17–19), as distinct from the acts of the part which perceives and imagines. The acts of the intellect themselves are not psychosomatic, though the psychosomatic part of the soul is always activated when the intellect thinks something. In thinking, it turns to the images which provide the sensual content of thought (3.8, 432a7–14).⁸⁷

When Aristotle looked at desiderative and emotional phenomena from the point of view of scientific psychology, he realized that lots of things assumed in the tripartite or bipartite models were in need of explanation.⁸⁸ The distinction between the reasoning and emotional parts of the soul could be understood as being based on an introspectively realized difference between spontaneous reactions and deliberated choices. This partition agreed very well with the compositional theory of emotions, but the connections between psychological events embedded in the emotional part were not explicated. As far as psychology should explain mental phenomena, it was clear that the traditional parts of the soul could not be treated as basic faculties or capacities. For this purpose the divisions were arbitrary, and, furthermore, the parts themselves had overlapping

⁸⁶ See also Price (1995), 117–18.

⁸⁷ For a concise survey of the immaterial side of the soul, see van der Eijk (2000), 69–77.

⁸⁸ See Price (1995), 104–14.

capacities of their own (*On the Soul* 3.9, 432a22–b7; 3.10, 433a31–b4). In *On the Soul* 3.9–11 Aristotle prefers to speak about capacities rather than levels or parts of the soul, and he offers a rough sketch of the interplay between the capacities required for the movements of animals and human beings, such as knowing and deliberation (in humans), imagination, sensation, and motive power.⁸⁹

Treating mental events as acts of increasingly specialized faculties sharpened the question of causal relations between psychological phenomena. Aristotle's achievements in this direction remained modest, but explicating various faculties and their co-operation became the dominant approach in thirteenth-century Aristotelian psychology, which was strongly influenced by Avicenna. (See Chapter 3.) It is worth mentioning that in Aristotle's view neither the soul nor its parts or faculties are the ultimate subjects of mental events. In the first book of *On the Soul* Aristotle writes:

Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as if one were to say that it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul. (1.4, 408b11–15)

Human beings are basically agents. In psychology it is sufficient to speak about the human agent and his or her faculties; in moral philosophy one could also speak about the parts of the soul as levels of personality, but it seems that Aristotle came to regard this as redundant.

In his book on Aristotle's philosophy of action, David Charles argues that Aristotle analysed all forms of desire using the same model. The starting-point of Charles's interpretation is the passage *On the Soul* 3.7, 431a8–14, where Aristotle treats the difference between perceiving an object and desiring it as analogous to the difference between stating a proposition and affirming a proposition. Affirmation is a mode of accepting a proposition and not merely stating it, and desire is another form of accepting a proposition. Charles formulates Aristotle's general analysis of desire as follows: actual desire is a mode of accepting an evaluative proposition which, under certain conditions, will lead to action

⁸⁹ In *On the Soul* 3.10, 433a9–12, Aristotle says that the motive power of animals is activated by imagination, and that the same is often true about human beings. If Aristotle has in mind emotional acts, which presuppose belief, does this mean that beliefs are not formed merely by the intellect, but may also be formed by imagination? Aristotle writes that all imagination is either rational or sensitive and that all animals partake in the latter (*On the Soul* 3.10, 433b29–30). 'Rational imagination' shows similarities to the later idea of a sensitive thinking faculty which can form particular emotional judgements. (See pp. 220, 248.)

by itself, or it is an activity which can be constructed by using this interpretative device. Acceptance is intellectual or sensitive desire, depending on whether it takes place with respect to good or to pleasure, and it is analogous to affirming or denying a proposition which is a form of acceptance with respect to truth. In this analysis the various forms of desire are treated as propositional attitudes of a certain kind.⁹⁰ This is compatible with many remarks in Aristotle, though he does not put forward his view as an articulated theory. The structure of an actual emotion is more complicated than that of a physical appetite, but Aristotle applied the idea of accepting a propositional content also to emotions. In so far as an emotion involves a belief, its cognitive part is first assented to in an epistemic sense and then accepted in an emotional sense—this involves a pleasant or unpleasant feeling and a behavioural suggestion. It seems that the same can take place without an assent with respect to affecting appearances. Aristotle does not think that animals accept propositional contents in any conscious manner, but he states, for example, that a lion rejoices at going to eat the animal which it has perceived to be near (*EN* 3.10, 1118a20–3).⁹¹

Let us conclude this section with some remarks on particular emotions in Aristotle. There are lots of phenomenological descriptions of emotions in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, since Aristotle believed that emotions largely guide human behaviour and that the virtues of character are dispositions to feel emotions aright. Moral virtues are described as dispositions between emotional excess and deficiency. While the virtues involve moderated emotional dispositions, they do not make one always display moderate anger, fear, or confidence, since not every situation admits of a mean. The threefold structure of a virtue between two vices strongly influences Aristotle's discussions of emotions in ethical contexts. As emotions are taken to be based on natural potencies, not to have occurrent emotions of a certain kind at all, or only to a small degree, may be a sign of mental illness, but it is more usual that these shortcomings show defective and blameworthy habituation. People who fall short with regard to pleasures and delight in them less than one should are

⁹⁰ D. Charles, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action* (London: Duckworth, 1984), 84–90.

⁹¹ For propositional perceiving and imagining in Aristotle, see Sorabji (1993), 17–19, 54–5. It seems that Plato was the first to treat pleasures as propositional attitudes; see D. Frede (1993), p. xlv. In the place mentioned Aristotle says that the lion does not rejoice at seeing a stag or a wild goat as such. C. Freeland ('Aristotle on the Sense of Touch', in Nussbaum and Rorty (1992), 238–42) argues that in Aristotle's view human perceptual capacities are less directly connected to appetite or anger than those of other animals and, therefore, are more suitable sources of information leading to knowledge.

hardly found, for such insensibility is not human (*EN* 3.11, 1119a5–7). Similarly, those who exceed in fearlessness are mad or insensitive, if they fear nothing, ‘neither earthquakes nor the waves, as they say the Celts do not’ (*EN* 3.7, 1115b24–8). One example of blameworthy deficiency is to feel no pity. This is a moral failing of those who think that they are above suffering (*Rhet.* 2.8, 1385b21–3, b30–1). In the same place Aristotle states that pity is also not felt by those completely ruined, who believe that no further evil can befall them.

Aristotle regarded these failures as forms of *apatheia*. In *EN* 2.3, while advancing eight arguments that virtue and vice are concerned with feeling pleasure or distress, Aristotle mentions that some people define the virtues as freedom from emotions (*apatheia*) and calmness (*ēremia*), ‘not well, however, because they speak without qualification such as “as one ought” and “as one ought not” and “when one ought or ought not” and the other things which may be added’ (1104b24–6).⁹² To feel no pleasure of body or fear or pity are examples of false *apatheia*, as is freedom from anger. It may be caused by mental retardation or a learned vicious habit:

The deficiency, whether it should be called unangriness, or whatever, is blamed. For those who do not get angry at things at which they should get angry seem retarded . . . for they seem to be without perception or distress. And a person who is not angry will not defend himself; but to allow oneself and one’s friends to be trampled underfoot and to overlook it is slavish. (*EN* 4.5, 1126a3–8)⁹³

In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle states that the person pitied must be undeserving of the misfortune which makes one feel pity and, second, that the person who pities must believe that he or she is similarly vulnerable. People who think that they are above suffering will not have pity, and the same holds for people who feel great fear. Nussbaum deals with Aristotle’s conception of pity as an example of an emotion with a rich cognitive structure. It is not individuated by describing the painful feeling as such, but as a pain at the thought of certain things taking place.⁹⁴ Other examples of detailed analyses of the cognitive part of an emotion are the discussions of anger, fear, confidence, shame, envy, emulation, love, and friendship. According to Aristotle, anger is a distress caused by a belief that one has been deliberately slighted, and it is attended by a certain pleasure

⁹² Cf. Sorabji (2000), 194–5.

⁹³ Aristotle deals with questions about moral responsibility and mental illness in *EN* 7.5. Plato also states in the *Laws* that people suffering from mental illness should not be punished for what they have done (9.881b; see also 11.934a–d and *Tim.* 86b–87b).

⁹⁴ Nussbaum (1994), 86–9.

that arises from the thought of retaliation. These feelings are associated with various abstract and concrete beliefs dealt with in *Rhet.* 2.2.⁹⁵ There is a longer analysis of the varieties of feeling friendly and the related beliefs in Books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁹⁶

1.5 The Stoic Theory of Emotions

Plato and Aristotle thought that there were irremovable emotional dispositions of the soul based on natural capacities which make people sensitive to various objects of emotional response. When the emotional powers are actualized through judgements peculiar to them, people have specific feelings and are inclined to behave correspondingly. The question of the functional parts of the soul remained a controversial subject in ancient philosophy after Plato and Aristotle, because the Stoics put forward a radically unitary theory of the human soul as entirely rational and corporeal. The Stoics and the Epicureans formed schools which represented philosophical doctrines in a more orthodox manner than was normal in Aristotle's school; this also had some consequences for Hellenistic discussions of emotions.⁹⁷ Zeno of Citium founded Stoa c.300 BC. Its next head was Cleanthes, and his successor was Chrysippus (c.280–c.206 BC). Panaetius (c.185–109 BC) and Posidonius (c.135–50 BC) are sometimes called Middle Stoics, and Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Hierocles, and Marcus Aurelius, Later Stoics.

According to the Stoics, the soul is a physical substance (*pneuma*) which is entirely mixed with the body. The centre of the soul is the governing faculty (*hēgemonikon*), which, extending like the tentacles of an octopus or

⁹⁵ For a psychological analysis of Aristotle's examples of anger in the *Rhetoric*, see Stocker and Hegeman (1996), 268–86. Aristotle's concept of shame is discussed in Cairns (1993), 411–31, and the concepts of fear and confidence in D. Pears, 'Courage as a Mean', in Rorty (1980), 171–87.

⁹⁶ A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 103–61; Konstan (1997), 67–78. For *erōs* in Aristotle, see also J. Sihvola, 'Aristotle on Sex and Love', in Nussbaum and Sihvola (2002), 200–21.

⁹⁷ When somebody told Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoa, that Theophrastus, the head of the Aristotelian Peripatetic school, had more students than he did, he answered that Theophrastus' chorus may be more numerous, but his was more harmonious (Plutarch, *How to Recognize One's Moral Progress* (*Moralia*, vol. i), 78e; Plutarch's works included in the *Moralia* are published with English translations in the Loeb Classical Library series). For the school attitudes of Zeno and Epicurus, see A. Kamp, *Philosophiehistorie als Rezeptionsgeschichte: Die Reaktion auf Aristoteles' De anima-Noetik. Der frühe Hellenismus*, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 33 (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: B. R. Gruener, 2001).

like a spider's web, serves as the centre of the sensations and other psychic functions.⁹⁸ The Stoic conception of the soul as a centralized system shows similarities to Hellenistic medical theories developed by Praxagoras of Cos and the Alexandrian scientists Herophilus of Chalcedon and Erasistratus of Chios. Praxagoras advanced the influential view that blood is distributed through the veins to nourish the body, and pneuma through the arteries to energize and sensitize the body.⁹⁹ Herophilus and Erasistratus made new discoveries about the nervous system, and Erasistratus explained the relationship between the system of arteries and the nerves by distinguishing between two kinds of pneuma. Air breathed moves through the 'vein-like artery' (the pulmonary vein) into the left ventricle of the heart, whence it is distributed as vital pneuma (*pneuma zōtikon*) through the arteries. Some of this is transformed into psychic pneuma (*pneuma psychikon*) in the brain and serves the living being's cognitive and motor activities in the brain and nerves.¹⁰⁰

Chrysippus, like Herophilus and Erasistratus, identified the soul with pneuma. The psychic pneuma is a special type of corporeal spirit, which Chrysippus describes as a spirit with sufficiently high tension (*tonos*). The psychic pneuma carries psychic capacities (cognition, voluntary motive acts), while other functions of a living being are associated with 'natural' capacities, as in Erasistratus. In spite of analogies, the question of the direct influence of Erasistratus on Chrysippus remains open.¹⁰¹ One of the differences is that Chrysippus located the centre of the soul and its cognitive activities in the heart. The main argument for this view was based on the common perception of the emotional movements in the heart.¹⁰² The corporeal theories of the soul among Hellenistic physicians, Epicurus, and the Stoics were apparently meant to provide an account of the interaction between body and soul as taking place between different

⁹⁸ For the Stoic conception of the soul, see A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers, I–II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 53A–Y.

⁹⁹ F. Steckerl, *The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and his School*, *Philosophia Antiqua*, 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1958), 10–22.

¹⁰⁰ See H. von Staden, *Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria*, ed., trans., and essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 155–61, 247–67; H. von Staden, 'Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen', in Wright and Potter (2000), 87–96.

¹⁰¹ von Staden (2000), 96–105; see also J. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), 20–6.

¹⁰² In the Hippocratic tract *On the Sacred Disease*, both the intellect and the emotions were assigned to the brain: *Die hippokratische Schrift 'Über die heilige Krankheit'*, ed. H. Grensemann (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), ch. 14. This seems to have been accepted by Herophilus and Erasistratus; see von Staden (1989), 247–9. For a detailed analysis of Chrysippus' arguments, see Tieleman (1996), part 2.

kinds of matter, and hence as more understandable than the interaction between an incorporeal soul and a corporeal body. These authors provided matter with standard psychic properties, hence their 'materialism' did not imply any drastic change in the semantics of psychological terms.

The governing faculty is the seat of appearance or impression (*phantasia*), assent (*sunkatathesis*), impulse (*hormē*), and reason (*logos*). (See Stobaeus 1.368.12–20 (*SVF* 2.826, LS 53K)).¹⁰³ Appearance is the power of receiving information through the senses; assent is the power of accepting presentations as true; impulse is the kind of assent which initiates action; and reason is the power of understanding. The rationality of the functioning of the soul implies that mental events are articulable in language and can be constructed as speech acts. It was taken for granted that perceiving and other psychological phenomena included self-perception or self-knowledge of the subject—this accorded with the conception of the unity of the soul.¹⁰⁴

A lot of distinctions were applied to appearances (*phantasiai*), the ways things appear to us. A standard perceptual appearance of an adult person was defined as a change in the soul which makes the subject aware of that change and, more or less clearly, of its external cause. An appearance of this kind was regarded as conceptually interpreted and as having a content which could be expressed in a proposition (*SVF* 2.54 (LS 39B)). It was thought that human beings learn naturally and undesignedly through accumulating experience via the basic interpretative conceptions. These were called preconceptions and distinguished from conceptions, which were culturally determined. The Stoic doctrine of the development of the conceptual interpretation of the world shows similarity to Aristotle's account in *Posterior Analytics* 2.19. The soul of a newborn human being is like a sheet of paper ready to be written upon. On this people write their conceptions, first with the help of perception. By perceiving something—for example, whiteness—they have a memory of it when it has departed, and the plurality of similar expressions is experience:

Some conceptions arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called 'conceptions' only, the former are called 'preconceptions' as well. Reason, for which we are

¹⁰³ *SVF* stands for *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed. J. von Arnim, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–5), indexes by M. Adler (Leipzig: Teubner, 1924), LS for Long and Sedley 1987, and 'Stobaeus' for Stobaeus, *Anthologium*, ed. C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1958).

¹⁰⁴ Annas (1992), 37–70.

called rational, is said to be completed from our preconceptions during our first seven years. (*SVF* 2.83, trans. LS 39E)¹⁰⁵

The best-known part of Stoic epistemology is the doctrine of an appearance which grasps its object (*phantasia katalēptikē*) and functions as a criterion of truth. It was assumed that when people have adequate conceptual abilities and their souls are not disturbed, a great number of their perceptual appearances give them an objective guarantee that the appearances represent states of affairs correctly. A cataleptic appearance was described as something that ‘seizes us by the hair and pulls us to assent, needing nothing else to achieve this effect or to establish its difference from other appearances’ (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, in *Opera*, vol. ii, 7.253–7 (LS 40K)). As for assent to what is not a cataleptic appearance, Plutarch refers to a Stoic classification according to which people are precipitate if they yield to unclear appearances, and deceived if they yield to false ones (*On the Contradictions of the Stoics*, in *Moralia*, vol. xiii, 1056e–f (*SVF* 2.993, LS 41E)). Cataleptic appearances that cannot be wrong form the basis of knowledge, which consists in grasping these appearances in systematic interconnection (Stobaeus 2.73.16–74.3 (*SVF* 3.112, LS 41H)). Scholars divide on the question of whether assent is only conceptually distinct from complete appearance, or whether it is a separate act.¹⁰⁶ The appearances are called passive and the assents active (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 8.397 (*SVF* 2.91)). This does not mean that an assent is free with respect to cataleptic appearances. In paying attention to them, sane and honest people cannot make a choice between assenting to them and suspending judgement with respect to them.¹⁰⁷ But appearances which are not of this kind can be left unassented to and are voluntary.

The Stoics discussed the questions pertaining to the functions of the rational soul from the point of view of an ideal model. The wise man infallibly assents to the propositional contents of appearances and principles whose cognitive status is certain, to the results of scientific demonstrations he is familiar with, and to objectively true value judgements. The souls of the majority of people are far from the perfect model. Even

¹⁰⁵ The standard Stoic view was that fourteen, not seven, is the age of rational maturity; LS ii. 241.

¹⁰⁶ The former interpretation is defended in T. Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 152–5. For the latter view, see Gosling (1990), 53–5 and LS i. 239–40.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Epictetus’ remarks on opposing evident truths in *Discourses (Dissertationes)*, ed. H. Schenkl (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1965), 1.5.

though they have lots of cataleptic appearances, they are also prone to assent to unclear impressions, to wrong opinions, and in particular to mistaken evaluations of things.¹⁰⁸

Some of the appearances which may be assented to are motivating (*hormētikē*, ‘impulsive’).¹⁰⁹ Assenting to them means that we make an evaluative judgement, and this is an impulse (*hormē*) to act in a way suggested by the evaluation. Chrysippus characterizes the impulse as ‘a person’s reason prescribing action to him’ (Plutarch, *On the Contradictions of the Stoics* 1037f (SVF 3.175, LS 53R)). The *hormē* is also defined as a ‘movement of the soul towards something’ (Stobaeus 2.86.19 (SVF 3.169, LS 53Q)). It is characterized as an intention to act (mental level) and a behavioural movement (physical level), if this is not prevented.¹¹⁰ An often-quoted formulation runs as follows:

They say that all impulses are assents but that the practical ones contain a motive element. But assents are to one thing and impulses towards another. Assents are to propositions and impulses are toward predicates, which are contained in a sense in the propositions. (Stobaeus 2.88.2–6 (SVF 3.171, LS 33I))

The text is somewhat obscure, but it seems that impulses *qua* assents contain a moving power. An impulse is an assent which is also an attempt to move toward a ‘predicate’. When something is regarded as worth choosing (*hairēton*), there is also something that is ‘to be chosen’ (*hairēteon*): namely, that one has what is taken to be *hairēton*. This is the predicate towards which the *hormē* is directed.¹¹¹

The Stoics divided emotions into four main types: pleasure (*hēdonē*) and distress or pain (*lupē*), which relate to the present, and appetite (*epithumia*) and fear (*phobos*), which relate to the future. Various specific emotions were then classified under these primary types. There are four main sources for these classifications. Stobaeus quotes a list from a former doxography (2.90.7–92.17 (SVF 3.394, LS 65E)).¹¹² Cicero makes use of a

¹⁰⁸ See the texts on knowledge and opinion in LS 41.

¹⁰⁹ ‘They say that what activates impulse is nothing but a motivating appearance of what is of itself appropriate (*kathēkon*)’: Stobaeus 2.86.17–18 (SVF 3.169, LS 53Q).

¹¹⁰ Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 175.

¹¹¹ See the discussions in Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 173–4; Annas (1992), 91–8; and T. Brennan, ‘The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’, in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 28–9.

¹¹² The summary of Stoic ethics in Stobaeus (2.57.13–116.18) is translated in B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, trans. with introduction and notes, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 203–32, and by A. J. Pomeroy in Arius Didymus, *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*, Society of Biblical Literature, Texts and Translations, 44 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999). Many scholars believe that Stobaeus adopts the summary by Arius, whose name occurs in Stobaeus’ work, and that this was Arius Didymus, Augustus’ court philosopher. This is

partially similar list in his *Tusculan Disputations* (*Tusculanae disputationes*, 4.11–22), as also do Diogenes Laertius and the author of the first-century treatise *On Emotions* (*Peri pathōn*) putatively attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes.¹¹³ In Pseudo-Andronicus the four generic emotions are defined as follows:

Distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be contracted. Fear is an irrational leaning away, or escape from an expected danger. Appetite is an irrational reaching out, or pursuit of an expected good. Pleasure is an irrational elation, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it is right to be elated. (*On Emotions* 1.1 (SVF 3.391, LS 65B))

One can see that pleasure and appetite are directed to something thought to be good, and distress and fear to bad things. Pleasure and distress are directed to the present, and appetite and fear to the future. These can be arranged graphically as follows:

		TIME	
		<i>present</i>	<i>future</i>
V A L U E	<i>good</i>	pleasure	appetite
	<i>bad</i>	distress	fear

This systematization was very influential in ancient times, and was often used also by authors who did not accept other parts of Stoic theory. (As shown above, it was often used in Plato's works as well.) The relations between the basic types are explained in Stobaeus' report (Stobaeus 2.88.16–21 (SVF 3.378, LS 65A)) as follows:

only a guess; see T. Göransson, *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus*, *Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*, 61 (Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995), 216–18.

¹¹³ Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* (DL), ed. M. Marcovich (Leipzig: Teubner, 1999), 7.110–14; Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes, *Peri pathōn*, ed. A. Glibert-Thierry, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, suppl. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 1.1–5. Glibert-Thierry's work includes a detailed analysis of the history of Stoic terms for particular emotions and an edition of Robert Grosseteste's Latin translation (c.1240).

Appetite and fear take the lead, the former in relation to what appears good, and the latter in relation to what appears bad. Pleasure and distress follow on these: pleasure, whenever we get what we desired or avoid what we feared; distress whenever we fail to get what we desired or experience what we feared.

The right-hand parts of Andronicus' disjunctive definitions of pleasure and distress are commonly regarded as Chrysippian. The corresponding definitions of fear and appetite are of the same type, but less elaborated. Chrysippus introduced the idea that an emotion is an evaluative belief (*doxa*) or judgement (*krisis*) that there is good or bad at hand, accompanied by the judgement that it is right or proper to react emotionally.¹¹⁴ The first judgement identifies a contingent object as good or bad, and the second is an assent to a hormetic thought which is typically associated with seeing an object in this light.¹¹⁵ This became the dominant Stoic analysis—it was one of the many ideas pertaining to the emotions which the Stoics derived from Chrysippus' very influential but unfortunately lost work *On Emotions*.

Posidonius wrote in his lost *On Emotions* (first century BC) that the definition of distress as 'a fresh belief that something bad is present' was put forward by Zeno in his oral teaching and written down by Chrysippus. Galen mentions this in his *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates* (4.7.2–4 (280.22–6)).¹¹⁶ In the same work Galen explains how the theories of Zeno and Chrysippus were related to each other:

In the first book of his *On Emotions* Chrysippus tries to prove that emotions are certain judgements of reason while Zeno did not regard them as the judgements themselves but contractions, expansions, elations and dejections of the soul which supervene on judgements. Posidonius, disagreeing with both, praises and accepts Plato's view. He disputes the view of the followers of Chrysippus arguing that emotions are neither judgements nor supervenient upon them, but certain movements of other irrational powers, which Plato called appetitive and spirited. (*PHP* 5.1.4–6 (292.17–25))

¹¹⁴ For these two judgements as the constituents of an emotion, see also Stobaeus 2.90.11, 14–16; Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.61, 3.68, 3.74, 3.76, 4.14, 4.59, 4.61; and Seneca, *On Anger* 2.4.1. See also Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 176–7; Sorabji (2000), 29–33.

¹¹⁵ The reactions which are regarded as appropriate seem to cover felt affects and actions. I shall return to the question of how these are related to the notions of contraction, elation, reaching out, and leaning away.

¹¹⁶ Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* (*PHP*), ed. and trans. P. de Lacy, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, V. 4.1.2 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978–84). Cicero also stated that Zeno added the characterization of 'fresh' to the definition of emotion; it meant the vividness of the affecting belief (*Tusculan Disputations* 3.75). The word was applied to pleasure and distress, and at Stobaeus 2.90.13 to fear; see B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 146–55. Cf. Aristotle, *EN* 10.4, 1175a3–10.

Pseudo-Andronicus did not comment on the alternative definitions quoted above and did not even say that they were Stoic, but they can be understood as reports of the positions attributed by Galen to Zeno and Chrysippus. The Zenonian view of emotions as supervening on judgements is reflected in the report of the Stoic definition of distress in Stobaeus: ‘Distress is a contraction of the soul that disobeys reason and is caused by the belief that some fresh bad thing is present in relation to which it is right <to be contracted>’ (Stobaeus 2.90.14–16 (SVF 3.394)). The difference between the views of Zeno and Chrysippus looks slight from the point of view of compositional theory—the central element of an emotion is either the affect (elation, contraction, and so on) which is occasioned by a judgement, or the judgement itself. However, the Stoic theory was not compositional, and the Chrysippian theory became the dominating Stoic position.¹¹⁷

Galen stressed the difference between Zeno and Chrysippus, because he wanted to demonstrate that Chrysippus’ and his followers’ unitary conception of the soul was weak, and that most other thinkers put forward views which more or less conform to Plato’s tripartite theory which Galen himself defended. Galen’s *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates* is our main source for Chrysippus’ and Posidonius’ views of emotions. It involves lots of quotations, but it is also tendentious. In his criticism of Chrysippus’ theory, Galen made use of Posidonius’ *On Emotions* in order to show that not even all Stoics could tolerate Chrysippus’ views. According to Galen, Posidonius accepted Plato’s tripartite psychology and criticized Chrysippus for not recognizing the irrational emotional faculties of the soul as distinct and separate from reason. He did not equate emotions with judgements, as Chrysippus did, or with movements supervening on judgements, as Zeno did, since there are also emotions which are aroused by the affective movements (*pathētikai kinēseis*) of the irrational parts. These are found in animals and in children from birth and do not require judgements.¹¹⁸ Some scholars believe that Galen’s general picture of Posidonius’ theory is basically correct, and that the quotations from Posidonius’ *On Emotions* support it.¹¹⁹ But there are others who do not accept this. They assume that Galen misrepresented Posidonius’ view,

¹¹⁷ The views of Zeno and Chrysippus are compared in Sorabji (2000), 55–65.

¹¹⁸ *PHP* 4.7.24–41 (286.7–290.6); 5.1.5 (292.20–5); 5.1.10–11 (294.16–20); 5.5.26–7 (322.11–14); 5.6.37–8 (332.31–334.8).

¹¹⁹ See I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius II: The Commentary (i–ii)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 163–72; R. Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus—Posidonius—Seneca: A High-Level Debate on Emotion’, in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 100–8.

and that a thinker who was usually considered as a representative of Stoic philosophy could not put forward a non-cognitive theory of emotions. It is said that instead of giving up the main tenets of the Stoic theory Posidonius paid attention to emotional movements as natural psychosomatic events which may influence the judgements of reason and accompany them.¹²⁰

Richard Sorabji thinks that, while exaggerating some aspects of Posidonius' Platonism, Galen correctly describes the main lines of his view on emotions. Posidonius recognized two Platonic irrational capacities of the soul besides reason; these form the emotional element (*to pathētikon*) of the soul. The movements of these capacities are always involved in emotions and usually, but not always, involve judgements. Emotions themselves are impulses, and even though they are normally judgements in an adult human, they are not necessarily so.¹²¹

Most scholars have thought that when the official Stoic definitions of the emotions referred to a belief concerning a present or future good or evil, the evaluation was meant to be part of the propositional content which was assented to. In addition to this, the Chrysippian definitions of pleasure and distress quoted above involve the judgement that it is right to react in an affective way. The definitions of appetite and fear can be completed in a corresponding manner. No detailed analysis of the propositional fine structure of an emotional evaluation has been preserved, but it was apparently thought that it could be constructed as a complex act, something like 'This is X and X is good/bad and it is proper to react to X in an emotional manner'.¹²² The Stoics agreed that emotions are disturbances of the soul and that one should try to get rid of them. It is commonly thought that the Stoics regarded the emotional judgements as mistaken, though this is not mentioned in the official definitions.¹²³ Emotional

¹²⁰ J. M. Cooper, 'Posidonius on Emotions', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 71–4, 81–90; repr. in Cooper (1999), ch. 19; see also J. Fillion-Lahille, *Le de Ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions*, Études et commentaires, 94 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1984), 153–69.

¹²¹ Sorabji (2000), 95.

¹²² According to Michael Frede, the Stoics regarded the emotional judgement as an acceptance of a particular propositional content (as contained in an appearance) which is thought of in a certain way. See M. Frede, 'The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul', in M. Schofield and G. Striker (eds.), *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences l'Homme, 1986), 93–110, and the comments in Brennan (1998), 44–52. I think that the above complex formulation is in agreement with Frede's analysis, in so far as his point is that an assented non-evaluative thought is embedded in a larger cognitive context.

¹²³ However, see SVF 1.208; 3.382 (Themistius' commentary on Aristotle's *On the Soul*) mentioned in Brennan (1998), 50, 59.

evaluations were taken to be based on people's mistaken self-images and inadequate conceptions of reality.¹²⁴ Let us have a closer look at this part of the Stoic theory.

The Stoics taught that any animal has a special constitution given to it by nature and a corresponding tendency to reject what is harmful to it and to accept what is appropriate to it (DL 7.85–6 (SVF 3.178, LS 57A)). The ideas of the natural form of life given to living beings by nature and activities proper to them (*ta kathēkonta*) form the kernel of the doctrine of appropriation (*oikeiōsis*). Human beings have an inborn tendency towards things which preserve their constitution in abstraction from reason, as can be seen from the behaviour of children, but as rational beings they also have a tendency to develop the ability to reason. If our reason develops properly, we proceed from instinctual self-concern to a consciousness of ourselves as rational beings who have a special status in the universe. We realize that acting in accordance with universal nature and with our nature as human beings is the primary value. The difference between the value of pursuing things rationally and other kinds of value was expressed in the thesis that only virtue is good. (See the summaries in Cicero, *De finibus* 3.16, 20–1, and DL 7.86–7.)¹²⁵

The Stoics select things which are natural advantages and avoid natural disadvantages, but they know that things as such are morally indifferent and that they represent only relative values or disvalues. Unconditional prescriptions pertain only to virtuous activities, and these are the only constituents of real happiness. It does not depend on those things conventionally regarded as good, such as long life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, noble birth, or their opposites. They are better than their opposites but they have no significance with respect to the objectively good life (DL 7.101–5 (LS 58A–B)). The Stoic development story begins from a natural tendency to self-love which in its developed

¹²⁴ For the relevance of the conceptions of self and self-perception in Stoic philosophy, see G. Striker, 'The Role of *Oikeiōsis* in Stoic Ethics', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 1 (1983), 145–67; B. Inwood, 'Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 2 (1984), 151–83; T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Stoic Philosophy and the Concept of a Person', in Gill (1990), 109–35; A. A. Long, 'Representation and the Self in Stoicism', in S. Everson (ed.), *Companion to Ancient Thought*, ii: *Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 102–20; repr. in A. A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 264–85; A. O. Rorty, 'The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 243–70; Sorabji (2000), 249–52.

¹²⁵ For the Stoic doctrine of appropriation, see Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoic Theory of Oikeiōsis*; Striker (1983); Long (1991); J. Brunschwig, 'The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism', in Schofield and Striker (1986), 128–44; B. Inwood and P. Donini, 'Stoic Ethics', in K. Algra *et al.* (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 675–82.

form is rational self-concern qualified by self-objectification. In addition to self-concern, there is also a natural appropriation of other-concern. This will develop from an instinctual attachment to family members and relatives into concern for every human simply in so far as he or she is human. A fully impartial concern for others and ourselves is the part of moral consciousness which forms the basis of Stoic social ethics.¹²⁶

The Stoic theory of moral development is idealized. It tells us what happens in the mind which matures ‘naturally’ without disturbances. Most people do not in fact develop that way. Suffering from retarded or defective development, they fail to go to the stage of rational self-objectification. Because of their inadequate conception of themselves they ascribe too much value to natural advantages and follow confused emotional suggestions instead of the judgement of right reason. The Stoic view on the causes of this state of affairs is described in Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*. At the beginning of Book 3 Cicero argues that therapy for the soul should be regarded as no less important than medicine. In fact it is of greater benefit, because the diseases of the soul are both more dangerous and more numerous than those of the body. This is not generally realized, because the souls which pass judgement upon themselves are sick and evaluate their own conditions on distorted criteria. Why is this sad state of affairs so common? Nature has given us the ability to discern the natural order of things through reason and to complete the course of life under its guidance. However, the faint inborn light of nature is largely quenched by false beliefs and bad practices. The seeds of virtue do not ripen as they should. We find ourselves in a world of erroneous beliefs and bad habits, and we start to adopt its morbid practices as soon as we begin to learn things. Through the influence of our nurses, parents, and teachers, we become infected with various deceptions to the extent that truth gives place to vanity and nature to erroneous opinions and the prejudices of society. This trend is strengthened by the authority of poets, public opinion, political leaders, and other successful people. We are then tainted with vicious beliefs, and our alienation from nature is so complete that we believe that the wholly mistaken values are right (3.1–7).

¹²⁶ See J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 262–76; Annas translates and discusses an often quoted passage from Hierocles’ *Elements of Ethics* (Stobaeus 4.671.7–673.11, LS 57G). According to Annas, appropriation is a disjunctive notion; it covers the rational development of two distinct instinctual sources of behaviour. Engberg-Pedersen (1990, 122–6) argues differently that rational persons extend their natural self-love (love of a rational being) to all rational beings.

Cicero did not refer to the Stoics in this prologue, but it is a rhetorical summary of Chrysippus' conception of the infections of the soul and their philosophical therapy. According to Chrysippus, emotional dispositions are generated through social interaction and 'through the persuasiveness of appearances' (Galen, *PHP* 5.5.12–20 (318.28–320.19), DL 7.89). Cicero mentions the influence of nurses, because the Stoics thought that the development of emotional patterns begins during the first contacts with the environment, long before the child grasps propositional judgments.¹²⁷

In his *Physical Postulates* Chrysippus delineates the relationship between ethics and other parts of philosophy as follows:

There is no other or more appropriate way of approaching the theory of good and bad things or the virtues or happiness than from universal nature and from the administration of the world... For the theory of good and bad things must be attached to these, since there is no other starting-point or reference to them that is better, and physical speculation is to be adopted for no other purpose than for the differentiation of good and bad things. (Plutarch, *On the Contradictions of the Stoics* 1035c–d (SVF 3.68, trans. LS 60A))

In the first sentence Chrysippus appeals to divine Reason. The Stoics thought that human reason is akin to this, 'by nature similar to that which rules the whole world'.¹²⁸ Because of their reason human beings are designed to find their fulfilment in conscious obedience to the rational code of reality:

Therefore, living in agreement with nature comes to be the end, which is in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of the whole, engaging in no activity wont to be forbidden by the universal law, which is the right reason pervading everything, and identical to Zeus, who is the director of the administration of existing things. (DL 7.88, trans. LS 63C)¹²⁹

Moral self-objectification can be understood as an attempt to see the world and oneself from the point of view of universal reason. This is what the Stoic wise man does and the reason why he is firm, solid, and stable. He is bound to immutable truths, and he does not see any independent value in particular things.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ See also Nussbaum (1994), 389–90.

¹²⁸ Posidonius, in *PHP* 5.6.4 (326.22–3).

¹²⁹ See also Inwood (1985), 106–11, 156–60. The idea of regarding oneself as a representative of divine reason and in this sense divine is particularly stressed in Epictetus' *Discourses*: e.g. 1.14.6; 2.8.9–14. Stoic philosophical theology is discussed in L. P. Gerson, *God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology* (London: Routledge, 1990), 142–84.

¹³⁰ For the Stoic view of the instability and weakness of the emotional soul and the stability of the ideal soul, see Nussbaum (1994), 390–401; Price (1995), 167–70.

Let us return to the question of why emotions are false judgements. The Stoic definitions of emotions are based on the assumption that an emotion has an object which is regarded as good or bad. According to the Stoic ethical theory, only behaving in accordance with virtue is intrinsically good, and behaving in accordance to vice is intrinsically bad. Since emotionally self-centred people wrongly believe that things other than virtues are of great significance in their lives, their judgements about the value of particular objects and the appropriateness of reactions to them are systematically misguided. Chrysippus stated that emotions were ‘irrational’, ‘contrary to nature’, and ‘excessive’. The excessive impulses are out of control, since reason does not consider them as it should—they are said to be ‘disobedient to reason’ or ‘to reject reason’ (Galen, *PHP* 4.2.8, 11–12 (240.12–13, 21–4, 28–9); Stobaeus 2.88, 8–9 (*SVF* 3.378, LS 65A)). All these characterizations refer to a deviation from the norms of nature and reason. The excessive aspect of emotions is described by the simile of a ‘runaway’ motion. Just as a person who runs is carried further by the impetus of the movement and is not able to stop where he or she should, so emotional dispositions and occurrent emotions make one weigh things more than is appropriate and behave accordingly (*PHP* 4.2.16–18 (242.2–11)). Another example cited by Cicero and Seneca is that people falling from a high place have no control of themselves and are unable to hold back or delay (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.42; Seneca, *On Anger* 1.7.4).

In Galen’s view these formulations contradict Chrysippus’ claim that emotions are judgements; this is his main charge of self-contradiction against Chrysippus (*PHP* 4.3.6–10 (248.14–32)). Many scholars have argued that Galen apparently did not understand what Chrysippus had in mind: namely, that emotions are rational in the sense of being cognitive propositional acts and irrational in the normative sense of reason, inconsistent with God’s or the Sage’s fully rational view of things. ‘Disobedience to reason’, ‘rejection of reason’, and other similar expressions refer to decisions against one’s better judgement or to sticking to an erroneous practical view without serious regard for whether this is what one should or should not do. The rules of right conduct are not necessarily unknown to emotional people, but their moral beliefs are weak and are easily overruled by affective judgements which make people more or less deaf to the voice of right reason (Stobaeus 2.88.22–90.6, LS 65A, C).¹³¹ Acting

¹³¹ Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 182–93; Cooper (1998), 79–81; Gill (1998), 116–18. Chrysippus’ discussion of Medea’s anger involves one example of disobedience to reason:

Medea, on the other hand, was not persuaded by any reasoning to kill her children; quite the contrary, so far as reasoning goes, she says that she understands how evil the acts are that she is about to perform, but her anger is stronger than her deliberations; that is, her affection has not

against one's better judgement as a result of emotion is an instance of *akrasia*. In describing akratic acts Plato and Aristotle could refer to a conflict between the psychic parts and a weakening of right judgement due to an emotional impulse; the adherents of the unitarian Stoic psychology tried to explain the same phenomenon by reference to swift changes in one and the same governing centre (Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* (*Moralia*, vol. vi), 446f–447a (SVF 3.459, LS 65G)).¹³²

In addition to the judgement that a present or future thing is good or bad, the Chrysippian definitions of the emotions involve the judgement that it is proper to be contracted (*sustolē*), to be elated (*eparsis*), to lean away (*ekklisis*), or to reach out (*orexis*) with respect to that which is regarded as good or bad.¹³³ There are various interpretations of these terms. The descriptions of the reactions approved in the case of pleasure and distress can be compared with Aristotle's conception of feeling as a positive or negative awareness of oneself in a situation. It is possible that something like this was involved in Chrysippus' classification, awareness of oneself as elated, downcast, turned forward, or leaning away. In Stoic philosophy, all mental events were thought to be embedded in physical events, and correspondingly these alterations were also treated as physical motions around the heart and said to be felt there.¹³⁴ But since the affective movements were taken to be reactions to what was regarded as good or evil, one might think that they were also understood as psychic feelings about what happens to oneself. The third possibility is that the movement terms refer to hormetic impulses to actions.

According to Brennan, the first value judgement and the judgement pertaining to reactions mentioned in the definitions of emotions are in

been made to submit and does not obey and follow reason as it would a master, but throws off the reins and departs and disobeys the command. (*PHP* 4.2.27 (244.2–7), trans. de Lacy)

Medea disobeys the judgement that she should not kill, whose validity she first acknowledges. Sorabji (1998, 154; 2000, 60–3) argues that 'disobedience to reason' usually means that one does not think about appropriateness, the second part of an emotional judgement, but is ready to act 'at all costs'. The above quotation is not an example of this idea, which seems to be employed in some other contexts.

¹³² For the Stoic conception of *akrasia*, see also Gosling (1990), 56–60. R. Joyce ('Early Stoicism and Akrasia', *Phronesis*, 40 (1995), 315–35) thinks that Plutarch presents his own construction of the Stoic view, but he does not put forward historical arguments against the received view that Plutarch reports the Stoic doctrine.

¹³³ These terms occur in Pseudo-Andronicus, *On Passions* 1.1; for other related terms used in this context, see Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 178.

¹³⁴ According to D. Sedley, 'swelling', 'contraction', and other similar Stoic emotions terms refer to changes of pneumatic tension and also to mental properties; see 'Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality', in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (eds.), *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 328–9.

fact identical to, or at least correlated with, an impulse, whether reaching out, leaning away, being elated, or being contracted. He assumes that Chrysippus did not draw a sharp distinction between the motions which are characterized as elation and so on, on the one hand, and the physical motions involved in goal-directed external actions, on the other. The kinetic terminology refers to physical alterations of the soul, of which the agent is directly conscious, and these are part of action.¹³⁵ Inwood thinks that pleasure and distress are impulses to changes in the pneuma in the soul, and that appetite and fear are impulses to attempts to get or avoid apparent good or bad. Only pleasure and distress are associated with feelings.¹³⁶ According to Engberg-Pedersen, there are two distinct elements in a passion, the affective and the desiderative. The affective elements are not the initial parts of actions, which correspond to actual impulsive evaluations. Being simultaneous with actions, they are feelings that qualify actions.¹³⁷ Nussbaum thinks that the Stoic remarks on the way passions feel are found mainly in the brief descriptions of particular emotions. 'What they insist is that, in each case, the thing that feels like this is an act of assent or acknowledgement.'¹³⁸ Sorabji argues that the contraction and elation as concomitants of distress and pleasure are involuntary movements of the pneuma and changes sensed near the heart. Reaching out and evading as concomitants of appetite and fear are behavioural acts. The judgement (impulse) that it is appropriate to react thus covers two different types of reaction; the first is internal, present, and involuntary, and the second behavioural, voluntary, and directed to the future.¹³⁹

These interpretative difficulties indicate that we have no definite idea of how Chrysippus thought about the relationship between feelings and actions associated with emotions.¹⁴⁰ Emotions are described as impulsive judgements, but the surviving quotations and reports leave it unclear whether the impulses are internal or external or both, whether feelings

¹³⁵ Brennan (1998), 30–3.

¹³⁶ Inwood (1985), 144–6; see also Price (1995), 148–9.

¹³⁷ Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 178–81; in this approach the terms *orexis* and *ekklisis* are also treated as referring to feelings in the Stoic definitions of emotions. According to Inwood (1985, 144) these terms are merely desiderative and not affective.

¹³⁸ Nussbaum (1994), 387.

¹³⁹ Sorabji (2000), 29–32. Even though contraction and expansion are involuntary, accepting or refuting them is voluntary (p. 45). Sorabji states that the Stoic conceptions of fear and anger are also said to involve some kind of contraction or expansion in Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.15; Galen, *PHP* 3.1.25 (172.20–6), 3.5.43–4 (208.22–31); and Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* (*Moralia*, vol. vi) 449a.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. A. C. Lloyd, 'Emotions and Decision in Stoic Psychology', in J. M. Rist (ed.), *The Stoics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1978), 239–40.

are associated merely with judgements about present things or also with judgements about future things, and whether feelings are merely sensations of physical movements or also acts of awareness of what happens to oneself in a situation. Cicero states that in Chrysippus' view people can abandon the prescription that one should react emotionally while maintaining the false judgement that something good or bad is at hand (*Tusculan Disputations* 3.76, 4.59–62). It seems that the prescriptive judgement pertains to both affective movements and actions. Chrysippus probably thought that if a person regards a contingent item as good, it is morally wrong to assent to the thought that one should be elated, independently of whether the elation is a feeling or a behavioural act or both. From the ethical point of view there was no need for a more detailed analysis.

Since Chrysippus equated emotions with mistaken non-evidential judgements, he regarded them as voluntary acts from which one can learn away. Many ancient authors found the idea of the voluntariness of emotions strange. It was more common to think, as Plato and Aristotle did, that at least feelings, which belong to emotions, are externally caused reactions rather than chosen states of mind (*EN* 2.5, 1106a2–3). In his critical discussion of Chrysippus' approach, Posidonius tried to analyse what is voluntary and what is involuntary in emotional phenomena. As Cooper and Gill reconstruct Posidonius' theory, affective motions (*pathētikai kinēseis*) are instinctive reactions to impressions, and their occurrence influences the formation of excessive emotional judgements. These motions are not impulses but rather inclinations preceding emotional impulses. Human beings, like other animals, are subject to non-rational affective motions. Since the correct way is to follow one's reason, 'by nature similar to that which rules the whole world' (*PHP* 5.6.4 (326.22–3)), the aim of education is 'preparation of the emotional part of the soul in such a way that it may be most amenable to the rule of the rational part' (*PHP* 5.5.33–4 (324.10–11)). The therapy of adults aims at decreasing the power of affective motions and deepening the understanding of why it is unreasonable to form judgements on the basis of irrational motions and feelings, even though one does not cease to have them altogether (*PHP* 5.5.35 (324.18–23), 5.6.4–5 (326.20–7)).¹⁴¹ Posidonius taught that affective motions can be moderated through listening to appropriate types of music (*PHP* 5.6.20–1 (330.8–13)). As for adults, he particularly recommended preparation, imagining in advance the circumstances which

¹⁴¹ Cooper (1998), 81–90; Gill (1998), 124–8.

would trigger emotions and dwelling on them and thus habituating oneself to them, so that one can bear them calmly (*PHP* 4.7.7–9 (282.5–14)).¹⁴²

Posidonius thought that he also improved on Chrysippus' theory of the emotions by offering a plausible explanation for the fact that human beings show certain basic types of emotion.¹⁴³ Furthermore, he believed that the theory of affective movements solved some more specific problems. Chrysippus taught that an emotion fades when the relevant judgement ceases to be fresh (*PHP* 4.7.12–14 (284.3–9)), but if the false judgement itself persists, why is the freshness relevant?¹⁴⁴ Posidonius could state that what needs to be fresh and unsaturated is rather the Platonic horses, the irrational forces of the soul (*PHP* 4.7.33 (288.9–12)).¹⁴⁵ In arguing against the sufficiency of judgements for emotion Posidonius also points out that a judgement alone fails to arouse emotion if we cannot picture the object (*PHP* 5.6.24–6 (330.25–31)).¹⁴⁶

Sorabji refers to the texts just mentioned in describing Posidonius' view that a judgement is not sufficient for emotion, but he further argues that Posidonius did not regard judgements even as necessary for emotion. Emotional movements can press so hard that the will cannot master them, as when people are unable to restrain their tears (*PHP* 4.7.37 (288.25–30)); children and animals have emotions without judgements (5.5.21 (320.23–8)), and the emotions aroused by music do not require judgement (5.6.21–2 (330.13–21)). Posidonius taught that emotions are impulses and normally depend on the assent of the rational power, but the impulses can also be caused by appearances.¹⁴⁷

Posidonius' analysis of feeling as preceding an emotion has been regarded as a predecessor of the later Stoic doctrine of first movements (*primus motus*) or pre-emotions (*propatheia*; in Latin *antepassio* or, more

¹⁴² Cooper (1998), 91–3; Gill (1998), 128–9; Sorabji (1998), 159–60; Sorabji (2000), 96–7. Since Posidonius believed that the emotional movements follow the dispositions of the body, he found food and drink relevant to emotional training. They can contribute to the balance of bodily qualities, as music can affect the movements of the soul. See Sorabji (2000), 238–9.

¹⁴³ Cooper (1998, 87–9) concludes this from *PHP* 5.5.21 (320.23–8).

¹⁴⁴ Cicero taught that the passion may go away as the result of continued reflection on the situation (*Tusculan Disputations* 3.53–4, 3.58, 3.74). See also S. A. White, 'Cicero and the Therapists', in J. G. F. Powell (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 219–46, at 240.

¹⁴⁵ For further texts, see Sorabji (2000), 112–13.

¹⁴⁶ Sorabji (2000), 114–15. Plato and Aristotle also thought that images are relevant to emotions; see pp. 21 and 40 above.

¹⁴⁷ Sorabji (2000), 109–10; for Posidonius' physiognomic views, see *ibid.* 258–9.

commonly, *propassio*).¹⁴⁸ This proved to be a very influential part of the Stoic theory. In Seneca's *On Anger* (2.1–4) there is a longer discussion of 'the involuntary motions of the soul that are not emotions (*affectus*) but the beginnings that are preliminary to emotions' (*On Anger* 2.2.5–6). Seneca's account of the origin of anger runs as follows. Anger must not only be aroused but must rush out, for it is an impulse, and there is no impulse without an assent of the mind. Therefore there is no anger when a man thinks himself injured and wishes to take vengeance, but is immediately settled down by some consideration (2.3.4):

So that first agitation of the mind which the appearance of injustice inflicts is no more anger than is the appearance of injustice itself. It is the subsequent impulse, which not only receives but approves the appearance of injustice, that is anger (2.3.5)

In addition to these initial mental shocks (*ictus animi*, 2.2.2; 2.4.2), there are physical initial shocks:

For with pallor, and falling tears, and irritation from fluid in the private parts, or a deep sigh, and eyes suddenly flashing, or anything like these, if anyone thinks that they are a sign of emotion and a manifestation of the mind, he is mistaken and does not understand that these are jolts to the body (2.3.2).¹⁴⁹

These bodily reactions may accompany the first agitation of the mind. Seneca says that there is no impulse without an assent, but in *Epistles*

¹⁴⁸ This terminology is used by Origen, Jerome, and other Christian authors; see M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1947–9), i. 307–8, ii. 154. Some authors argue that Seneca was probably influenced by Posidonius: e.g. Fillion-Lahille (1984), 163–9, and Cooper (1998), 99. In Sorabji's view (2000, 72–3), Seneca's theory of first movements is meant to defend Chrysippus from Posidonius' objections. Referring to similarities between Seneca's *On Anger* 2.1–4 and Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* (*Noctes Atticae*) 19.1 and some other texts, Abel argues that the theory of pre-passions was first put forward by Zeno and probably employed by Chrysippus; see K. Abel, 'Das Propatheia-Theorem: ein Beitrag zur stoischen Affektenlehre', *Hermes*, 111 (1983), 78–97. In his book on Stoic ethics, Inwood (1985, 180) sees similarities between Posidonius' and Seneca's views on passions, but in a later paper he stresses Seneca's originality and the compatibility of his view with Chrysippus' monism; see 'Seneca and Psychological Dualism', in Brunschwig and Nussbaum (1993), 150–83. The similarities between the passages in Seneca and Gellius just mentioned and Philo's *Questions and Answers on Genesis* 4: 73 are discussed in M. Graver, 'Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic *Propatheia*?', *Phronesis*, 44 (1999), 300–25, at 305–9. Philo also used the term *propatheia* in a sentence quoted by Antonius Melissa (*PG* 136, 789): 'Hope is a certain pre-passion, a joy before joy, being an expectation of good things', which corresponds to the Armenian text of *Questions and Answers on Genesis* 1: 79; see Graver (1999), 304–5. However, this seems not to be a typical Stoic pre-passion. The Armenian versions of Philo's *Questions and Answers on Genesis* and *Questions and Answers on Exodus* are translated by R. Marcus, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979, 1987).

¹⁴⁹ Both of the above quotations are from the translation of *On Anger* 2.2.1–2.4.2 in Sorabji (2000), 73–5.

113.18 he writes that an impulse precedes an assent. He might mean that there is some kind of provisional impulse before the assent and a genuine impulse.

In *On Anger* 2.4.1 these remarks are summarized in a passage which describes how anger begins, grows, and is carried away. 'The first movement' of mind is involuntary.¹⁵⁰ Seneca calls it a preparation for emotion, because it suggests an emotional interpretation of the situation, such as 'I am injured and I should exact retribution' (cf. 2.3.4). The presence of a proposition of this kind in the mind is not an emotion, however; the mind's assent (will and judgement, 2.3.5) is still needed. This assent of the mind is 'the second movement'. Unlike the first movement, the second is voluntary.¹⁵¹ The assent to the emotional interpretation may be weak, apparently in the sense that it could be removed by a judgement like the first movement (cf. 2.4.2), or obstinate, which means that people overthrow reason and are ready to act 'at all costs'. This blind insistence that one must react, come what may, is called 'the third movement'. It has been noticed that Seneca's third stage corresponds to Chrysippus' description of lovers or angry people who want to act 'whether it is better or not' (*PHP* 4.6.27 (274.35–9)).¹⁵² Independently of whether the emotional assent is weak or strong, it is an acceptance of an appearance in accordance with false general beliefs about good and evil. As distinct from first movements, the evaluative judgements of the second and third stage are morally bad things and in this sense equally evil.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ 'We cannot escape the first shock (*ictus*) of the mind by reason just as we cannot escape those things we mentioned which befall the body either' (2.4.2).

¹⁵¹ Cooper (1998, 99) characterizes this as the Posidonian and Senecan distinction between involuntary natural affect and assent-involving emotion.

¹⁵² This and some further terminological similarities are dealt with in Sorabji (2000), 60–2. Sorabji argues that by distinguishing the second and third stages Seneca wanted to defend the Chrysippian formulation that emotion is disobedient to reason; rejecting the residual appeal to the appropriateness of the second stage, the third stage ('at all costs') is disobedient to the erroneous application of reason at the second stage. Nussbaum (1994, 411) states that the point of distinguishing the two stages is to show that anger as a judgement can be modified by judgement but not once things have gone too far.

¹⁵³ There were lots of treatises on anger in ancient times; works known by title include those by Philip of Opus, Antipater, Posidonius, Plutarch, Sotion (the teacher of Seneca), Bion of Borysthenes and Melanthius of Rhodes. The surviving works are Philodemus, *On Anger*; Seneca, *On Anger*; Plutarch, *On Freedom from Anger*; Libanius, *On the Control of Anger*; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Against Anger*; and Lactantius, *On the Anger of God*. See also P. Rabbow, *Antike Schriften über Seelenheilung und Seelenleitung*, i: *Die Therapie des Zorns* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914); M.-L. Lakmann, *Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius*, *Philosophia antiqua*, 63 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 32–3; Kidd (1988) (2.1), 178–9. While the Middle Platonists found moderate anger morally appropriate, they thought, like the Stoics, that anger is not useful but rather bad for punishment; see Plutarch, *On Freedom from Anger* (*Moralia*, vol. vi) 459b–460c; Taurus in Aulus Gellius 1.26.1–11. For the Stoic and Epicurean views of punishment without

Seneca seems to think, possibly under the influence of Posidonius, that the first movements are ‘natural affects’ (*Epistles* 57.4) which even the sage experiences, simply because of our common human nature.¹⁵⁴ In *On Anger* 2.4.2 Seneca states that first movements cannot be overcome by reason, ‘though perhaps familiarity and constant attention may weaken them’. All people are disposed to experience first movements. This natural tendency is not curable, but emotions can be eradicated. It has been argued that the first movements are sensed bodily reactions, but this is only one aspect of them.¹⁵⁵ According to Seneca, the first movement which precedes anger is an agitation of the mind and caused by the apprehension that one is injured in a manner which seems to demand revenge (2.3.4–5). In a quotation from Epictetus in Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights* 19.1, 14–20 (LS 65Y)), it is similarly stated that a wise man may be disturbed by terrible appearances, but he neither consents to them nor sees anything in them that ought to excite fear. The first movements of the mind are reactions to thoughts and interpreted so, but it does not follow that ‘even the wise cannot escape momentary assent to overwhelming presentations’.¹⁵⁶ There is no necessity to assent to the appearance which causes a first movement.

In dealing with the Stoic view on physical pain, the Platonic philosopher Taurus (fl. c. AD 145) associates it with the theory of first movements. Pain can affect a subject before any judgement is made; even when it goes on, the Stoics do not assent to the proposition that the pain is something evil. Philosophers can feel pain and show signs of suffering, but they do not form the emotion of distress.¹⁵⁷ If the physical or mental pain becomes intolerable, it is permitted to commit suicide.¹⁵⁸

anger, see Seneca, *On Anger* 3.12.5–7, and Philodemus, *On Anger (De ira)*, ed. with translation and comments by G. Indelli (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988), 6, 31.24–34.5.

¹⁵⁴ Abel (1983), 82; Cooper (1998), 99.

¹⁵⁵ See Inwood (1993), 179. Inwood refers to 2.3.2 where Seneca speaks about bodily affections, but involuntary first movements are also called the agitations of the mind (2.3.5).

¹⁵⁶ Pace Price (1995), 170–1.

¹⁵⁷ Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 12.5.9–12; K. Abel, ‘Der historische Ort einer stoischen Schmerztheorie’, *Hermes*, 113 (1985), 293–311; Lakmann (1995), 138–43. Taurus refers to Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, as an adherent of the view that the Stoics may accept moderate emotions. This is probably closer to the truth than Cicero’s report on Panaetius as an adherent of *apatheia* in *On Duties (De officiis)* 1.67, 69; see also Sorabji (2000), 106–7. In *Epistles* 9.3 Seneca criticizes Stilbo and other cynics for equating freedom from the emotions with insensitivity. The Stoics overcome sufferings, but they feel them. See also *SVF* 3.574 and I. Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 131–2. Sextus Empiricus says that while the Sceptics cannot avoid physical pains, they moderate them by not forming judgements of them (*Against the Mathematicians* 11.158–9).

¹⁵⁸ See Sorabji (2000), 172–3.

Sorabji states that Seneca's first movements are contractions and expansions within the chest. They are not directed to objects of an agitating kind, though they are occasioned by them. They are not cognitive at all.¹⁵⁹ I think that even though they are not directed in the sense that they are impulses, they are directed to objects in the sense that their subject regards them as reactions to objects. Otherwise they could not be expelled by re-evaluating appearances (2.3.4). This is not in disagreement with Sorabji's general point that Seneca formulated the theory of three movements in defence of Chrysippus—it was purported to explain how reason can be disobedient to reason and why commonly experienced involuntary first movements, which are often mistakenly equated with emotions, are quite different phenomena and not causally sufficient for emotions, as Posidonius' emotional movements seem to be. Sorabji's remarks on the differences between Posidonius and Seneca cause problems for the conception of the Posidonian–Senecan doctrine of first movements.

Some scholars have stressed that the doctrine of pre-passions did not alter the Stoic theory of emotions in any fundamental way.¹⁶⁰ This may be true, but it had consequences for the Stoic therapy of emotions. If the appearances can arouse those psychosomatic changes which are wrongly regarded as proper reactions, and if the inclination to pre-passions is inevitable, it seems that not only freedom from false judgements but also the mastery of affective movements is included in the goal of therapy. The Posidonian therapeutic ideas of decreasing the power of natural affects through control, habituation, diets, and music made it possible to combine Stoic and Platonist elements of the cure of the soul, as some authors later did.¹⁶¹

There were slightly different Stoic lists of specific emotions classified under their primary types. In Stobaeus 2.90.19–91.9 (SVF 3.394, LS 65E), the emotions mentioned under appetite are (1) anger, sexual desire,

¹⁵⁹ Sorabji (1998), 156–7.

¹⁶⁰ See e.g. Cooper (1998), 99, and *Seneca: Moral and Political Essays*, trans. J. M. Cooper and J. F. Procopé (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 45 n. 4.

¹⁶¹ According to Seneca, the control of emotional expressive movements quietens affects and in the long run weakens the inclination to emotional reactions (*On Anger* 3.13.1–2; cf. Plutarch, *On Freedom from Anger* 455a–b). Hieronymus of Rhodes compared this with palliative treatment in medicine (Plutarch, *ibid.* 460c–d). These texts are regarded as ancient predecessors of suggestion therapy, which proceeds from expressive movements to psychic causes; see P. Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1954), 285–7. In *On Anger* 2.19–20 Seneca also refers to physiognomical views, stating that the affective effects of the mixtures of the elements can be weakened through diet and physical training. See also Seneca, *Epistles* 108.13–22.

cravings, yearnings, love of pleasures, riches, and honours. Those under pleasure are (2) rejoicing at another's misfortunes, self-gratification, trickery; those under fear are (3) shrinking, anxiety, terror, shame, confusion, superstition, dread, and consternation; while those under distress are (4) envy, emulation, jealousy, pity, sorrow, grief, anguish, annoyance, mental pain, and vexation. Detailed catalogues purported to offer more or less exhaustive classifications of the forms of false evaluations which give rise to morally wrong behaviour. They could be used in moral teaching as indices of vicious acts and as diagnoses for the therapy of emotions. (See section 1.7 below.) The purpose of the therapy was to extirpate emotions which the Stoics regarded as the main source of existential and social trouble. The Stoic ideal self is self-sufficient, integral, and constant. External things merely graze the surface of the skin of the wise man, who retreats into himself and lives with himself (Seneca, *Epistles* 9.17; 72.4–5).¹⁶² Openness to emotional responses with respect to particular things would destroy the autarchy of the perfect life and make it fragmented and uncontrolled (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.61).

Freedom from the emotions (*apatheia*) was in ancient times the best-known Stoic characterization of the conditions of the good life. It was also much criticized as both impossible and inhuman.¹⁶³ One popular argument was that the ideal was unrealistic, since Stoic philosophers themselves were not as calm as they should have been. Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* involves a famous example of this criticism, and also tells how it was met by means of the theory of pre-passions. Gellius' story, retold in Augustine's *City of God* (9.4), ends with a quotation from Epictetus to the effect that a wise man may be disturbed by appearances, but he does not assent to them (19.1, 17–18).

In answering the charge of inhumanity against the Stoic sage, the Stoics could also refer to the doctrine of good 'feelings' (*eupatheiai*).¹⁶⁴ It was said that the sage may react to things with well-reasoned elation which is joy, with well-reasoned shrinking which is caution, and well-reasoned reaching out which is wishing. There was no good feeling

¹⁶² Cf. Nussbaum (1994), 394–6.

¹⁶³ See T. H. Irwin, 'Stoic Inhumanity', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 219–41. Both aspects of the criticism were mentioned by Augustine and then often repeated in various contexts. For some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century examples, see G. W. McClure, *Sorrow and Consolation in Italian Humanism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 100–3; J. Cottingham, *Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and Psychoanalytic Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 94–5. For *apatheia* in ancient thought, see also M. Spanneut, 'Apatheia ancienne', *ANRW* 2.36.7 (1994), 4641–717.

¹⁶⁴ Pohlenz (1947–9), i. 151–3.

corresponding to distress.¹⁶⁵ In more detailed accounts of the *eupatheiai* it was said that wish (*boulēsis*) includes good will, generosity, kindness, and love; caution (*eulabeia*) includes respect and cleanliness; and joy (*khara*) includes delight, merriment, and cheerfulness (DL 7.116 (LS 65F)).

According to Julia Annas, the notion of *pathos* has its everyday neutral sense in *eupatheia* and its negative connotation of an exaggerated irrational motion in *apatheia*.¹⁶⁶ This is based on a view shared by many interpreters that the Stoics advocate the removal of passions not in the ordinary sense but only in the special Stoic sense of passion which requires a false belief in the goodness or badness of things which are preferred or non-preferred.¹⁶⁷ If this moderate interpretation is right, then the ancient charge of the inhumanity of Stoic *apatheia* rested on a bad misunderstanding. T. H. Irwin also argues against the charge of inhumanity, but he believes that the Stoics wanted to abolish the conditions which Aristotle called passions and which we broadly speaking call emotions. In his view the mistake of the criticism was not a false view of the Stoic notion of passion but the assumption that freedom from emotions is somehow morally bad. The Stoic extirpation of emotions is in Irwin's view clearly formulated in Seneca:

It has been asked whether it is better to have moderate passions or no passions. We expel them, whereas the Peripatetics temper them. I do not see how any moderate condition of a disease could be healthy or useful. (*Epistles* 116.1)

Irwin states that the view that the Stoics advocated the extirpation of emotions, as ordinarily understood, is strengthened by the doctrine of *eupatheiai*. The sages' *eupatheiai* are not good passions, but only the good parts of passions. They may be affected by the representations which normally result in emotional reactions, but they refrain from forming the false belief that something good or bad is then happening to themselves or to others.¹⁶⁸ Nussbaum thinks that *eupatheiai* are reasoned responses to preferred or non-preferred indifferent things. They are not standard emotions, but serene moods which are based on the denial of the intrinsic worth of contingencies. As far as this detachment is embedded in *eupatheiai*, they do not save the Stoic theory from the charge that the sages are alienated from everyday human sentiments which attribute intrinsic

¹⁶⁵ For different views of *eupatheiai* see Inwood (1985), 173–5; Nussbaum (1994), 398–401; and Brennan (1998), 54–7.

¹⁶⁶ Annas (1992), 114.

¹⁶⁷ See also J. M. Rist, 'The Stoic Concept of Detachment', in Rist (1978), 247–72; F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975); Brennan (1998), 36–7.

¹⁶⁸ Irwin (1998).

goodness or badness to particular things or actions or circumstances.¹⁶⁹ Brennan argues that since elation and contraction are never rational responses to indifferent circumstances, the *eupatheiai* are directed at genuine goods and evils. The question about the intentional objects of *eupatheiai* is controversial, but if *eupatheiai* are rational second-order attitudes to things, as Brennan seems to assume, one may wonder whether referring to them shows that the sages are not alienated from those human sentiments which are associated with the practices of love, sympathy, compassion, pity, and so on.¹⁷⁰

Epictetus, who was very ready to admit that there are natural affections for our family and friends, stressed that the Stoics should not let their feelings for others disrupt their mental serenity. He writes in an often quoted passage:

Furthermore, when you are taking delight in something, call to mind the opposite impressions. When you kiss your child, what harm is there if you whisper to yourself: 'Tomorrow you will die.' (*Discourses* 3.24.88)

Some of those who defend the Stoics against the charge of inhumanity have argued that while transformed feelings isolate the Stoics from other people, there is no moral shortcoming in the behaviour of the Stoics, since they conscientiously perform all their familial and social functions.¹⁷¹ Nothing morally relevant is lost through not having standard emotions, not even the information which is possibly embedded in occurrent emotions, since the Stoics also see the emotionally relevant aspects of things without assenting to them.¹⁷² The critics disagree. In their view, Stoic detachment makes people unable to see the value of the contingencies and adds to moral insensitivity in interpersonal relationships.¹⁷³

Before taking a closer look at the Stoic therapy of the emotions, let us compare its theoretical basis with the views of Plato and Aristotle. The Stoic theory is similar to Plato's earlier view and different from Aristotle's approach in its critical attitude toward emotions. In this respect it is more radical than Plato's theory, because the ideal Stoic person, as distinct from Plato's ideal philosopher, does not have emotions at all. While the theories of Plato and Aristotle were cognitive, in the sense that emotions are associated with beliefs, the Stoic theory was cognitive in the stronger

¹⁶⁹ Nussbaum (1994), 399; see also W. O. Stephens, 'Epictetus on How the Stoic Sage Loves', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 14 (1996), 195, 204.

¹⁷⁰ Brennan (1998), 54–7.

¹⁷¹ Stephens (1996), 204.

¹⁷² Irwin (1998), 234–8.

¹⁷³ See Nussbaum (1994), 416–17; Sorabji (2000), 173–5.

sense that emotions are regarded as judgements. Aristotle's theory is similar to modern cognitive compositional views and has influenced many of them; the Stoic theory shows similarities to those modern theories according to which emotions are essentially evaluative judgements. Plato and Aristotle treated emotions as the acts of the emotional powers which combined several faculties. In his *On the Soul* Aristotle showed some interest in the causal relations between the acts of the faculties associated with emotions, and there were analogous Stoic queries about the relationships between judgements and other emotional phenomena, particularly whether a feeling precedes a judgement or *vice versa*. Some scholars find these discussions, which were also relevant to the Stoic therapy of emotions, highly sophisticated and philosophically stimulating contributions to practical philosophy and the philosophy of mind.¹⁷⁴

1.6 The Stoic Therapy

Galen calls the fourth book of Chrysippus' *On Emotions* an ethical and therapeutic work (*PHP* 5.7.52 (348.28–31)). The remaining quotations from *On Emotions* show that alongside the philosophical analysis of the emotions it also contained a theory of the analogies between the treatment of physical diseases and the mental disturbances curable by philosophical arguments. The basis of the philosophical therapy is the Stoic conception of passions as mistaken judgements. For a more detailed picture, it is useful to have a look at the third and fourth books of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*; these are mainly based on the Chrysippian view of the eradication of the emotions and the therapy of the soul. According to Cicero, 'the souls which have been ready to be cured and have obeyed the instructions of wise men are undoubtedly cured' (3.5). This was the central theme of Chrysippus' therapeutic treatise.

The question discussed in the third book of the *Tusculan Disputations* is whether the wise are immune to all mental suffering, and the theme of the fourth book is whether they have any emotions. In both books Cicero turns to discussions of ways to treat those who, as distinct from the Stoic sage, are not totally free from emotional disturbances. After a longer survey of the Stoic divisions and definitions of emotions in Book 4, Cicero proceeds to the question of the analogy between bodily and mental disorders and therapies:

¹⁷⁴ Nussbaum (1994); Sorabji (2000).

Just as when the blood is in a bad state or there is too much of phlegm or bile, bodily disease and infirmity begin, so the disturbing effect of corrupt beliefs and their fight against one another rob the soul of health and introduces the disorder of disease. (4.23)

He states that Chrysippus devoted much attention to the similarities between diseases of the soul and diseases of the body. Even though Chrysippus' inquiries pertaining to this question were too minute for Cicero's taste, he regarded it as worthwhile to sketch the main points and to comment on them. Let us take a look at the basic distinctions (4.23–33).

The false evaluative beliefs make the confused mind unstable and changing and its feverish excitement leads to disease (Greek *nosēma*, Latin *morbis*) and infirmity (Greek *arrōstēma*, Latin *aegrotatio*).¹⁷⁵ Cicero does not see any great difference between these terms as applied to the soul (4.29). He says that *aegrotatio* was applied by the Stoics to persistent and deeply rooted false convictions about what one should desire or shun (4.26). Mistaken beliefs make people prone to outbursts of emotion and contribute to the diseased dispositions which make these emotional perturbations chronic. People are called anxious, envious, malicious, and so on, not because they always behave in a certain way but because their defects make them prone to do so. Cicero uses here the Latin word *proclivitas*, which connotes slipping; his word for good or neutral dispositional inclinations is *facilitas* (4.27–8).

Disease and infirmity are subclasses of defectiveness of mind (*vitiositas*). In addition to emotional disease and infirmity, there is a further form of defectiveness which is less destructive: weaker emotional inclinations which occur in those who are not far from wisdom. Actual emotions which can lead to morbid states do not themselves belong to the class of mental defects, because they are shifting disorders (4.29–30). The main lines of this somewhat imprecise classification can be explained as follows. A proneness to a particular passion consists in believing that certain types of contingent things are good or bad in a way that inclines the subject to form false particular evaluations and to behave affectively in accordance with them. A disease of the soul is a hardened form of such proneness, and an infirmity has a weakening effect on the soul. Examples of such diseases are love of money, love of fame, love of women, hatred of women, or

¹⁷⁵ Chrysippus called a chronic illness a *nosēma*, and a *nosēma* plus weakness an *arrōstēma*. See Stobaeus, 2.93.6–13 (*SVF* 3.421, LS 65S), DL 7.115, and I. Hadot (1969), 143–6. Cicero also states that disease plus weakness is infirmity (4.28–9). I shall not deal with various terminological problems of Cicero's account.

hatred of mankind (4.26–7). Perfect mental health exists in the Stoic sage only. His judgements and beliefs are concordant, and form a stable and firm whole. But there can be some degree of health of the soul of the unwise, too, ‘when the agitation of the mind is removed by medical treatment’ (4.30). ‘Medical treatment’ refers to philosophical therapy, *Socratica medicina* (4.24).

Cicero shows considerable sympathy for the Stoic idea of the radical detachment of the sage and the extirpation of the emotions as its corollary:

For what can seem very great in human matters to a man who is acquainted with all of eternity and the greatness of the universe? And what in human aspirations or in the short span of our life can seem great to the wise whose soul is always on the watch to prevent anything to take place as unforeseen or as unexpected or as completely new? (4.37)

Deeply rooted correct insights form the foundation of the virtue of the wise. His healthy soul is stable and consistent, and as such it differs from the labile confusion and dividedness of the sick souls drawn in different directions by various emotional judgements. Sick souls cannot master themselves, because they lack an authoritative centre; they are led by contending passions, and their bad state tends to become worse (4.34–6, 41–2). The Stoics shared an appreciation of self-sufficiency and tranquillity and the use of medical analogies with other Hellenistic schools, particularly the Epicureans. However, the Stoic conception of the good life was quite different from that of the Epicureans. The Stoic ideal consisted of acting in the world as a practitioner and proponent of divine Reason, something far removed from Epicurean withdrawal. Correspondingly, the function of philosophical therapy was toning up the soul, ‘developing its muscles’, as Nussbaum puts it, rather than accommodating it to the view of pleasure as the goal.¹⁷⁶ Cicero often stresses this point.

Cicero had familiarized himself with various therapies of mental suffering in trying to recover from the grief caused by the death of his daughter Tullia. The rival approaches which he applied in the lost *Consolatio* are summarized in the third book of the *Tusculan Disputations* as follows:

Some think that the sole duty of a consoler is to teach that the situation is not evil at all, as Cleanthes does. Some think that they should teach that it is not a great evil, as the Peripatetics do. Some distract from evil to good, as Epicurus does.

¹⁷⁶ Nussbaum (1994), 317.

Some, like the Cyrenaics, think it enough to show that nothing unexpected has taken place. But Chrysippus holds that the main thing in consoling is to remove a mourner's belief, in case he should think that he is performing something which is right and should be done. Some combine all these ways of consolation, since different people are moved in different ways; so in my *Consolation* I gathered everything into one consolation since my mind was inflamed, and I tried every remedy. (3.76)

In dealing with the extirpation of emotions, Cicero relates that Zeno and Cleanthes were satisfied with the thought that internalizing the Stoic doctrine of values makes a soul apathetic. Although Cicero believed that this is true, he did not regard the presentation of the theory as appropriate for calming actual emotions—the afflicted would then be treated as if they were wise. People with emotive dispositions and actual emotive states believe that the objects of their emotions are good or bad. To tell them that they should not do so and that they should be like the Stoics is to offer them an intellectually demanding philosophical world-view. That people in affective states would accept it is not probable, particularly because those states strengthen their false conviction of the significance of the affecting things (2.30; 3.77; 4.59–62). Cicero thus regarded this approach as therapeutically and didactically ineffective. Nor did he see much therapeutic value in the Peripatetic view that emotional responses are natural and useful constituents of a human life and should be moderated rather than extirpated. He thought that emotions are morbid, and that it is wrong to stop at ‘cutting the branches of misery’ instead of ‘digging out all its roots’ (4.38–57; cf. 3.13). Cicero found the Epicurean way of living enervated and cowardly; consequently, he did not see any good in their treatment of the mind. The idea of relieving suffering by turning the mind away (*avocatio*) and directing attention to other things (*revocatio*) is not bad as such, but the Epicurean advice to think about past and future pleasures is ineffective against heavy suffering and damages the soul (3.33–5). The premeditation suggested by some Cyrenaics and, in a different way, by the Stoics is more helpful. Thinking in advance about the ills that afflict human life neutralizes misfortune before it occurs, and recollecting the results of premeditation in actual cases reminds one of the more objective evaluation of the situation in a calm period (3.28–32, 54, 58).¹⁷⁷

For practical purposes Cicero was mainly interested in Chrysippus' strategy of extirpating emotions by showing that an emotional response

¹⁷⁷ For further examples of premeditation, see Rabbow (1954), 161–79, 281–3.

is always inadequate. This approach was based, as Cicero often states, on Chrysippus' analysis of an occurrent emotion as containing an evaluation of a situation and a judgement that an emotional reaction is right:

When a belief that something is very bad is joined with a belief that it is required, right, and a duty to be distressed at what has happened, only then does the serious passion of distress result. (3.61)

Cicero regarded the Chrysippian view of therapy as superior, because it shifts the scope of attention from evaluating the external things to the affective behaviour. This helps people to realize that an actual emotion involves a voluntary assent to the prescription that one should have an emotional response. It is then possible to ask whether this is appropriate, and this question makes sense independently of how people evaluate the object of an emotion (3.76; 4.59–63). Chrysippian therapy consists in discussing the various situations in which emotions are aroused and showing that they are, for one thing, neither necessary nor natural nor useful and, secondly, that they are bad and counter-effective modes of behaviour. It was thought that when people learn to avoid the thought that they should respond emotionally, their tendency to overestimate contingent things decreases, and they are moved towards the Stoic way of looking at things.

Beginning from the affections themselves was in Cicero's view the pedagogically and therapeutically most significant innovation of Chrysippus' theory. (Cf. Origen, *Against Celsus (Contra Celsum)* 1.64; 8.51 (*SVF* 3.474).) This criticism of emotions can be applied in all philosophical schools, and it also solves a problem which had gone unnoticed by Zeno and Cleanthes. When they said that it is wrong to be sad about misfortunes, someone could point out that either Alcibiades who, due to Socrates' showing him his vices, overcome with tears behaved wrongly or, if not, everyone lest the sage has good reasons to behave similarly (3.77). Cicero sketches the Chrysippian solution as follows:

This cure [advocated by Zeno and Cleanthes] cannot alleviate certain kinds of distress at all. Suppose someone were distressed at having no virtue, no spirit, no sense of duty, no integrity. He would indeed be worried because of evil things. A different mode of treatment should be applied in his case and of such a sort which can be accepted even by philosophers who disagree about everything else. For all must agree that agitations of the soul alien to right reason are vicious, so that even if the things which occasion fear or distress are evil and the things which occasion appetite and pleasure are good, nevertheless, still the agitation they occasion is vicious in itself. (4.61)

Alcibiades should not weep but intensify his efforts at self-improvement.¹⁷⁸

Before entering into a detailed discussion of how philosophy should be used as a medicine for the emotional diseases, Cicero gives a rhetorically coloured description of what he calls the Peripatetic view, which is characterized as involving a moderate emotional attachment to contingent things (4.38–46). The Peripatetics praise irascibility as a whetstone of bravery for warriors. They think that it is needed in serious political rule, and that orators should be able to kindle the anger of the hearer by feigning it in language and gesture. ‘In general, they do not regard anyone who does not know how to be angry as a man, and to what we call mildness, they apply the term indifference with a pejorative sense.’ They do not praise this particular form of desire only, but regard the appetite itself as something bestowed by nature for purposes of the highest utility. They claim that no one is able to do anything really well without having a strong desire for it. Distress has not been provided by nature without considerable advantage. One of its functions is that people guilty of trespass should feel pain at incurring correction, censure, and disgrace, since escape from the penalty seems granted to those who endure disgrace and shame without pain. ‘It is better to suffer the stings of conscience.’ Cicero quotes as an example a passage from Afranius in which an immoderate son says, ‘Ah, misery,’ and the stern father replies: ‘Let the pain be whatever it is, when it only is pain.’ As for the remaining forms of distress, they say that feeling pity makes us assist and relieve the misfortunes of others, and even rivalry and jealousy can be useful motivators. Similarly, moderate fear of the law, the magistrates, poverty, disgrace, death, and pain are essential to careful conduct of life. Cicero states that in saying this the Peripatetics admit the need to moderate emotions, but they believe that complete eradication is neither possible nor an acceptable ideal.¹⁷⁹

Cicero is quite willing to agree with the Stoics that emotional responses are neither necessary nor natural. As irrational and sick motions of the soul, they have no positive role in a good life. Against moderating them, Cicero remarks that it would be absurd to ask how much sickness or

¹⁷⁸ For the penitent’s paradox in Cicero and in Stoic philosophy, see White (1995), 243–6.

¹⁷⁹ We do not know much about Peripatetic ethics in the Hellenistic period; there are shorter reports in Seneca and Cicero and a longer doxography in Stobaeus 2.116.19–152.25. For Peripatetic elements in eclectic ethical theories, see Annas (1993), 276–90, 385–425. The Stoic criticism of Peripatetic ethics concentrated on the views that external goods are necessary for happiness, that emotional capacities are natural, and that emotions are useful for living beings and are among the constituents of the good life. See also Cicero, *On Duties* 1.88–9; *Academica Posteriora* 1.38–9; Seneca, *Epistles* 85; and I. Hadot (1969), 41–3.

viciousness is needed to make a life good. There are various rhetorical examples of the intrinsic loathsomeness of emotions in Cicero: 'What share have change of colour, voice, eyes, breathing, ungovernableness of speech and act in soundness of mind?' (4.52; cf. 4.35, 48). This popular Stoic approach does not constitute a real argument against the emotions. It rather shows how things are seen from the point of view of Stoic values. The Stoic descriptions of affective behaviour as unnatural, ridiculous, and ugly illustrate their thesis of the morbid nature of emotions.¹⁸⁰

A Stoic argument which was less idiosyncratic and which Cicero found very powerful was that emotions are not useful companions of virtuous acts. In all cases in which they are claimed to be beneficial, people can do the same things without affects by simply obeying the dictates of reason. In fact they can do them better when not disturbed by the emotions. If emotions are expedient for some people, it only shows that they lack better capacities. Those who cannot resort to reason resort to an emotion of the soul (4.55). This argument was often quoted in later ancient philosophy. It was also employed by some authors who accepted the moderate emotions, but did not find them useful.¹⁸¹

The idea of the counter-effectiveness of emotions was backed up by a slippery slope argument. Tiny emotional motions may seem innocent, but one should remember that they are irrational motions which soon become ungovernable. When an emotional judgement of a certain kind is repeated, the rational centre of the soul will be weakened and led by excessive thought (4.39–42). Because of the interrelationships among the emotions this effect is not restricted to that particular emotion, but affects all emotional dispositions. 'If the wise man were open to distress, he would also be open to anger...and also to pity and envy' (3.19–20). Similar arguments are found in Epictetus (*Encheiridion* 2; *Discourses* 2.18.8–11) and in Seneca (*On Anger* 1.7.2–1.8.2; *Epistles* 85.8–16). In

¹⁸⁰ Chrysippus writes about anger: 'sometimes if we have a sponge or (a piece of) wool in our hands we lift it up and throw it, as if we would thereby accomplish anything. If we had happened to have a knife or some other object, we should have used it in the same way... Often in this kind of blindness we bite the keys and beat against the doors when they are not quickly opened, and if we stumble on a stone we take punitive measures, breaking it and throwing it somewhere and all the while we use the strangest language': Galen, *PHP* 4.6.44–5 (278.34–280.6, trans. de Lacy). Seneca describes an attack of anger in *On Anger* 1.1.3–5 (trans. Nussbaum (1994), 393) as follows: 'His eyes blaze and sparkle; his face is red all over as the blood surges up from the lowest depths of the heart; his lips tremble, his teeth are clenched, his hair bristles and stands on ends, his forced breath makes a creaking sound, his joints make a cracking sound from twisting; he moans and bellows, his speech bursts out in hardly comprehensible words; he keeps striking his hands together and stamps the ground with his feet.'

¹⁸¹ See also Nussbaum (1994), 391–2; cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (*Opera*, vol. i) 3. 235–7.

arguing against the possibility of moderating anger and against its moral usefulness, Seneca refers to Aristotle and Theophrastus as representatives of the views he criticizes, apparently thinking that theirs is the strongest alternative position. Seneca tries to show that they cannot have allegedly virtuous emotional dispositions without committing themselves to what they detest: being increasingly led by emotions.¹⁸² There is an impressive formulation against moderate anger in a morally bad society in *On Anger* 2.9:

The wise man never ceases to be angry, if he once begins. Every place is full of crime and vice . . . If you want the wise man to be as angry as the baseness of the crimes demands, he must not only be angry, he must go mad.

The Stoic arguments against the necessity, naturalness, and usefulness of the emotions and against the possibility of moderating and cultivating them purported to refute the views of other philosophical schools, but at the same time they also incorporated the main points of the Stoic cognitive therapy. It was thought that emotions were essentially judgements and were extirpated by changing beliefs. The general arguments against the emotions and for the apathetic ideal had a therapeutic function as a general orientation, but focusing on the concrete and the use of instructive examples was also typical of Stoic therapy.¹⁸³

It was considered important that those willing to be cured have a clear idea of the goal and that they learn to face concrete situations in a new manner step by step. Epictetus shows his students how to deconstruct appearances without giving them an emotional interpretation. This cognitive therapy is accompanied by practical training, which consists in anticipating things through premeditation, applying key doctrines, and trying to participate in various situations without emotional responses.¹⁸⁴ Vituperation of emotions was also part of the Stoic therapy. Chrysippus thought that even though actual emotional states or dispositions may prevent people from accepting theoretical arguments, they do not make them deaf to the harsh criticism of odiousness, folly, or turpitude. Frank criticism also belonged to Epicurean therapy, but the Epicureans' remedy

¹⁸² See Nussbaum (1994), 388–9, and the detailed discussion of Seneca's arguments at 402–83.

¹⁸³ Ibid. 335–41.

¹⁸⁴ Epictetus, *Encheiridion* 4; *Discourses* 2.2.1–7; 2.13; 2.16.1–10, 18–23; 3.3.14–18; 3.8.1–5; 3.17.6. For the exercises of thinking about things without emotions, see also Seneca, *Epistles* 24.12–13; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations (In semet ipsum)* 3.11; 6.13; 11.2; and Rabbow (1954), 42–9, 135–40; for premeditation, see Seneca, *Epistles* 63.14; 91.3–4, 7–8; *To Marcia on Consolation* 10.3, Rabbow (1954), 160–9.

for actual immoderate emotions was to change one's attention—for example, by changing painful thoughts into pleasant ones.¹⁸⁵ Seneca and Epictetus stress the continuous evaluation of the quality of one's acts and moral development.¹⁸⁶ A common aspect of the Stoic methods of psychagogy, such as analytic premeditation, memorizing key doctrines, and examining one's intentions and acts, is to raise consciousness of one's role as a rational agent. The new philosophical way of living is dominated by continuous introspective supervision (*prosoikhē*) of one's thoughts and actions.¹⁸⁷

Following the Stoics, Cicero gives lots of examples of people whose passionate reactions make them act irrationally and of others who have acted well just because they had no emotional responses or because they did not let their affections influence their behaviour. The usefulness of examples is described as follows:

We see that distress is itself mitigated when we confront mourners with the weakness of an enervated soul, and when we praise the dignity and consistency of those who submit to the lot of mankind without chafing; and this usually happens with those who think such afflictions evil but nevertheless consider they should be endured with equanimity. Someone thinks pleasure a good, another on the other hand thinks money; all the same the one can be called away from gross indulgence and the other from avarice in the way I have shown. (4.60, trans. King)¹⁸⁸

In his account of the controversy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, Cicero states that his attitude is the same as that of the followers of the Academy. He will not be involved in the quarrels between the parties—he looks for the solution which seems most probable. Cicero considered the Stoic analysis of emotions as incorrect beliefs a useful and welcome therapeutic tool. It weakens the inclination to form inappropriate evaluations about contingent things and makes affects associated with the allegedly good and bad things more manageable. It seems impossible ever to be wholly rid of deep-rooted mistaken attitudes, but the souls can be improved even when the emotional dispositions are not wholly

¹⁸⁵ J. Procopé, 'Epicureans on Anger', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 171–96, at 184–5. Epictetus also advises confronting bad appearances and expelling them with better thoughts about ethical heroes (*Discourses* 2.18.25–6). This method shows some similarity to the Epicurean turning of attention (*revocatio*); cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.33–5.

¹⁸⁶ Seneca, *On Anger* 3.36; Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.18.12–18; Rabbow (1954), 180–8, 344–7.

¹⁸⁷ Epictetus, *Encheiridion* 33; *Discourses* 4.12.7–9, 15–18; 3.12.7–12; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 3.13. See also Rabbow (1954), 249–59; P. Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, 2nd edn. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), 18–22.

¹⁸⁸ On examples in Stoic therapy, see Nussbaum (1994), 339–41.

extirpated. Therefore philosophical therapy should concentrate on strengthening the will, through which people can control their proneness to emotional behaviour:

The whole train of reasoning which is concerned with disorder of the soul turns upon the fact that all disorders are under our control. They are all based on judgements and they are voluntary. (4.65)

1.7 The Epicureans

Torquatus, Cicero's Epicurean spokesman, describes one aspect of Epicurus' naturalist view of pleasure and pain as follows:

As soon as every animal is born, it seeks after pleasure and enjoys it as the greatest good, while it rejects pain as the greatest bad and, as far as possible, avoids it; and it does this when it is not yet corrupted, on the innocent and sound judgement of nature itself. Hence he says there is no need to prove or discuss why pleasure should be pursued and pain avoided. He thinks these matters are sensed just like the heat of fire, the whiteness of snow and the sweetness of honey, none of which needs confirmation by elaborate arguments; it is enough to point them out. (Cicero, *De finibus* 1.30, trans. LS 21A)

It is taken as an empirical fact that feeling pleasure and pain and seeking pleasure and recoiling from pain are the main motivational factors. Since the acts of small children and animals are not guided by reason, these movements take place in them, as it were, by the judgement of nature. (Cf. DL 10.137.) Paying attention to the conduct of children and animals was not unusual in Hellenistic philosophy. The Stoics argued that infants seek what preserves them and reject the opposite before either pleasure or pain has affected them (Cicero, *De finibus* 3.16). Certain naturalist ethical assumptions were thought to find support from the condition of creatures not influenced by cultural habits and beliefs. Nature was regarded as a healthy basis for development, which was later disturbed by the values and practices of education and other institutions of society.¹⁸⁹

According to Epicurus, the instinctual dynamics of pleasure and pain remain alive in adults. The consciousness of one's condition is always qualified by a pleasant or unpleasant feeling (Cicero, *De finibus* 1.38 (LS 21A)). A kinetic bodily pleasure is felt when a pain (lack or need) is being removed and a static pleasure, whether bodily or mental, is felt when pain

¹⁸⁹ 'The cradle argument' in Epicureanism and Stoicism is discussed in Brunschwig (1986).

is absent (*Ep. Men.* 130–1, DL 10.136 (LS 21R)).¹⁹⁰ The pleasures associated with bodily changes are secondary in comparison to the state of satisfaction, because when a creature has got what it needed, it does not seek anything else as the means of maximizing the good of the body. We need something when we are in pain from its absence (*Ep. Men.* 128).¹⁹¹

Epicurus rated the absence of bodily pain very highly:

The flesh's cry is not to be hungry or thirsty or cold. For one who is in these states and expects to remain so can rival even Zeus in happiness. (*VS* 33, trans. LS 21G)

This did not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being greater than those of the body (DL 10.137; Cicero, *De finibus* 1.55 (LS 21U)). Mental suffering is caused by empty appetites and misguided emotions. Freedom from them is the static pleasure of tranquillity (*ataraxia*), which together with the absence of bodily pain forms the end of life in Epicurean hedonism (*Ep. Men.* 128–32 (LS 21B); DL 10.136–7; *KD* 3–5 (LS 21C)).

Epicurus understood his philosophical writings as tools which help people to attain a life of enduring pleasure and happiness (*Ep. Hrd.* 82–3; *Ep. Pyth.* 85 (LS 18C); *KD* 11 (LS 25B); Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 11.168–9 (LS 25K)). The greatest pleasure can be characterized as the absence of all bodily and mental pain, since awareness of oneself as a rational bodily being with well-functioning natural faculties is pleasant in itself. Regarding it as a sufficient lifelong option is the basis of tranquillity and a proper conception of the end of human life.¹⁹² Epicurus' atomist theory was devoted to elimination of the fear of death and the divine. It did not directly influence the psychology of the emotions. Epicurus thought, like the Stoics, that the soul is material, and he also provided the soul atoms, different from those of the body, with distinctive psychic powers, thought and desire.¹⁹³

If the key to perpetual happiness is that simple, why is it so difficult to find it, and why are most people in a state of painful upset comparable to a violent tempest (cf. *Ep. Hrd.* 82; *Ep. Men.* 128, 132)? Epicurus believed that

¹⁹⁰ The references to Epicurus' works are to *Letter to Herodotus* (*Ep. Hrd.*, DL 10.34–83), *Letter to Pythocles* (DL 10.83–116), *Letter to Menoecus* (*Ep. Men.*, DL 10.121–35), and to two collections of numbered maxims, *Key Doctrines* (*KD*, DL 10.139–54) and *Vatican Sayings* (*VS*). All works are edited by G. Arrighetti in Epicuro, *Opere* (Turin: Einaudi Editore, 1973).

¹⁹¹ For interpretative problems pertaining to Epicurus' distinction between kinetic and katastematic (static) pleasure, see Gosling and Taylor (1982), 365–96; P. Mitsis, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 45–51.

¹⁹² Annas (1993), 334–50.

¹⁹³ See the analysis of *Ep. Hrd.* 63–4 (and some further texts) in von Staden (2000), 80–6 and the discussion of the psychological implications of the swerve of the atoms in Annas (1992), 180–8.

the values and practices of social life are to a large extent unnatural and wrong, and that people learn very early such beliefs and behavioural paradigms as distract them from the pursuit of the good life. Natural appetites are simple and easily satisfied (*KD* 18, 21 (LS 21E, 24C)). These become a source of disturbance only when associated with widely held false beliefs (*KD* 30 (LS 21E)).¹⁹⁴ Cravings for luxuries and delicacies are learnt in a culture which obscures the limit applying to natural desires. Its practices nourish the disturbing thought of the unlimited desirability of external things (*KD* 18–21 (LS 24C); *VS* 59 (LS 21G)). Nothing is sufficient for those to whom what is sufficient seems little (*VS* 68). The desire for wealth and public honour and respect is also unlimited (*KD* 15; *VS* 81 (LS 21H)). People by nature seek security against their fellow men, but it is a mistake to believe that they attain it through becoming famous or renowned (*KD* 7 (LS 22C)). The longings associated with love are based on confused thoughts; sexual intercourse itself is a trivial thing. It does not make anybody better, but it can be harmful (*VS* 51 (LS 21G); *DL* 10.118). The most important sources of mental upset are false beliefs concerning pleasures, personal survival, the soul, and the gods. They result in groundless desires and an irrational longing for immortality and a fear of the gods and of death (*KD* 11–12, 20 (LS 25B); *Ep. Hrd.* 81–2; *Ep. Men.* 124–8).¹⁹⁵

Epicurus assumed that empty desires and disturbing emotions have certain sets of beliefs as their necessary conditions, that people can improve their life by giving up misleading opinions, and that the relevant arguments and practical instructions are to be found in his writings. These provide people with the intellectual equipment necessary for the pleasant life, ‘sober reasoning which searches out the causes of every choice and avoidance, and which banishes the opinions that beset souls with the greatest confusion’ (*Ep. Men.* 132). In addition, Epicurus offered guidelines of a life among friends in a small community with sufficient possessions outside the alienated culture (*KD* 14). Security is an essential constituent of enduring pleasure, because it banishes fear. Taking leave of a disturbing social life is possible in a group of like-minded friends with

¹⁹⁴ Epicurus makes a distinction between desires that are natural and necessary, desires that are only natural, and desires that are neither natural nor necessary (*KD* 29; *VS* 20; *Ep. Men.* 127–8 (LS 21B)). Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 8.558d–559c; Aristotle, *EN* 7.4, 1147b23–31, 1148a22–6; 7.5, 1148b15–19; 7.7, 1150a16–18.

¹⁹⁵ Diogenes of Oenoanda wrote: ‘Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears of the gods, of death and of [pains], and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us’; fr. 34 in Diogenes of Oenoanda, *The Epicurean Inscription*, ed. with introduction, translation, and notes by M. F. Smith (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1993).

sufficient possessions (*KD* 39–40 (LS 22C)). It is particularly the confidence in the help of friends which contributes to tranquillity with respect to material things (*VS* 23, 34 (LS 22F)). The principles of atomist natural philosophy provide security against disturbing thoughts about the gods, death, and natural necessity. Lack of security against bad consequences is Epicurus' argument for being law-abiding. Injustice is not bad in itself but the fear arising from the suspicion that one will not escape punishment is. People who violate mutual contracts cannot be confident that they will remain undiscovered (*KD* 34, 35 (LS 22A)).

Epicureans commended altruistic friendship without very passionate attachments to particular people. Philodemus states that wise people are not very grateful for benefits nor very angry at wrongs, simply because nothing external matters much to them.¹⁹⁶ Lucretius' view of love brings home the same view: being in love entails care, distress, frenzy, and gloom, and should be avoided by having sex indiscriminately or by distracting one's attention otherwise (4.1037–1120).¹⁹⁷

Epicurus said that the wise person will be more gripped by certain emotions than other people. They are dissociated from hatred, envy, and contempt, but they feel pity and distress (*DL* 10.117–18). What they feel more than others is apparently pleasant feelings which are free from any disturbances of the soul. According to Epicurus, troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, which belongs to gods, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon other people (*KD* 1 (LS 23E); *Ep. Hrd.* 77 (LS 23C)). As far as human beings manage to free themselves from these, they become similar to gods, and their mortal life can be as pleasant as the eternal life of gods (*Ep. Men.* 10.135 (LS 23J)).

Epicurus understood himself as a doctor of souls.¹⁹⁸ This therapy model of philosophy became prominent and pervasive in later Epicureanism, as Martha Nussbaum has shown.¹⁹⁹ Using Epicurus' letters, fragments of his works, and some later Epicurean writings, Nussbaum

¹⁹⁶ *On Anger* 7.41.31–42.14, 43.20–5, 47.29–41; 8.48.12–24; Annas (1992), 197; *idem* (1993), 198.

¹⁹⁷ For a tension between the high evaluation of friendship and the hedonist concept of one's final end as one's own pleasure in Epicureanism, see Mitsis (1988), 98–128, and Annas (1993), 236–44. For love in Lucretius, see Nussbaum (1994), 140–91.

¹⁹⁸ Porphyry quotes Epicurus in his *Letter to Marcella* (31): 'Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul' (trans. LS 25C).

¹⁹⁹ Parts of chapter 4, 'Epicurean surgery', in Nussbaum (1994), were published in 'Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle', in Schofield and Striker (1986), 31–74.

develops a picture of how people who wanted to practice the Epicurean way of living were supervised by their teachers. The Epicurean novices probably knew that it was not philosophy as a dispassionate intellectual discipline that was being offered to them, but a cure of the soul in which philosophy played an instrumental role. In his letter to Pythocles Epicurus describes his teaching of a branch of natural philosophy as follows:

First, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial events, whether they be discussed with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than freedom from disturbance and firm conviction. (*Ep. Pyth.* 85, LS 18C)

The ultimate goal of teaching and learning in Epicurus' school was definitely practical. (See also *KD* 11 (LS 25B).)

Nussbaum pays attention to texts that stress that Epicurus' summaries of natural philosophy and ethics should be memorized and continually repeated.²⁰⁰ They formed the sufficient theoretical basis for tranquillity. Since a firmly defended view about physical matters was taken to liberate one from the fear of the gods or of death, one may wonder why it should be continually rehearsed. Apparently Epicurus had noticed that false beliefs owing their origin to education and social conformity were deeply rooted in the minds of the pupils, and that they easily reared their heads again if not continuously dispelled by means of the right doctrine. It is easier to understand why the principles of pleasurable life were repeated. They were needed as the basis of prudential practice, and therefore possessed continual relevance. An Epicurean supervisor habituated the pupil to applying the practical principles and, at the same time, helped him or her to get rid of particular false beliefs which resulted in disturbing emotions.²⁰¹

In his *On Frank Criticism*, the Epicurean Philodemus, Cicero's contemporary, describes this tutoring using elaborate medical analogies.²⁰² The teacher is a doctor, and the pupil is a patient. The relationship is very

²⁰⁰ Nussbaum (1994), 132–3.

²⁰¹ Repeating and memorizing key doctrines was a common method in ancient psychagogy; for Stoic and Epicurean examples see also I. Hadot (1969), 58–60, and Rabbow (1954), 127–30, 336–8.

²⁰² Philodemus' *On Frank Criticism* and *On Anger* are epitomes from the lectures of Zeno of Sidon (c.155–c.75 BC), who taught in Athens. The works are partially preserved as papyri found in Herculaneum. *On Frank Criticism* (*Peri parrēsiās*) is edited by A. Olivieri, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914); there is an English translation with introduction and notes by D. Konstan, D. Clay, C. E. Glad, J. C. Thom, and J. Ware, Society of Biblical Literature, Texts and Translations, 43 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998). On frankness see also Konstan (1997), 93–4, 102–5, 112–13, 151–2.

authoritarian—the patient must put himself or herself entirely in the hands of the doctor. Obedience to authority was stressed, because the cure was not wholly pleasant. It easily aroused resistance, since many of the pupil's preferences could prove to be empty desires and call for harsh criticism. The pupil had to understand that resistance was a symptom of the sickness and that the doctor, rather than the confused patient, knew what was good and what was not with respect to enduring happiness. Philodemus wrote:

for it is necessary to show him his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly. For if he has considered this man to be the one guide of right speech and [action], whom he calls the only saviour and to whom, citing the phrase 'with him accompanying me', he has given himself over to be treated, then how is he not going to show to him those things in which he needs treatment, and [accept admonishment]? (*On Frank Criticism*, fr. 40)

Confessional practice and frank criticism were the basic forms of the Epicurean cure.²⁰³ It was also considered good that the pupils tell their supervisor about the lapses of others:

For he will not consider a slanderer one who desires that his friend obtains correction, when he is not such, but rather one who is a friend to his friend. For he understands exactly the difference between these. (*On Frank Criticism*, fr. 50)

Nussbaum thinks that these and some related texts from the same work show that the Epicurean therapy model involved the idea of analysing unconscious motives. The recovery of the soul presupposed a comprehensive analysis of particular choices and a recognition of the webs of beliefs behind them. She argues that the role of the analysis of unconscious beliefs becomes even more clear in Lucretius' remarks on self-contempt, suicidal depression, the hatred of life linked to the longing for immortality, the anxieties of love, and the needy condition.²⁰⁴ There are interesting similarities to modern psychoanalysis, as Nussbaum states, but it seems that Epicurean theory and practice did not include anything that would

²⁰³ Even though Philodemus deals mainly with the confessions of pupils and the forms of frank criticism in relation to different types of pupil, he also mentions that the advanced members of the Epicurean groups may communicate their errors to their friends and be criticized. See cols. VIIa, VIIIa–XIa; the introduction to *On Frank Criticism* (1998), 19–20; and C. E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 81 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 152–60.

²⁰⁴ Nussbaum (1994), 197–9, 269–73.

correspond to the technical psychoanalytic notions of resistance and transference.²⁰⁵

The first two-thirds of Philodemus' *On Anger* demonstrates the remedial therapeutic technique of portraying the evils of the emotions. This shows similarities to the Stoic vituperation of emotion, but it stresses the unpleasant consequences of anger rather than its intrinsic loathsomeness. Philodemus also states that one should make the patient aware of emotional reactions 'which have been completely ignored or forgotten or not thought out' (3.6–8). As for actual unpleasant feelings, the Epicurean remedy was *avocatio*, calling the mind away from painful to pleasant thoughts remembered from the past (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.33, 3.76, 5.74; Usener 436–7).²⁰⁶ Contrary to Aristotle (*EN* 7.13, 1153b19–21), Epicurus claimed that the happiness of a philosopher is not disturbed by torture, though it can make him groan (DL 10.118). On his deathbed Epicurus wrote that while having intense bodily pains he felt the pleasure of recollecting philosophical discussions (DL 10.22 (LS 24D)).²⁰⁷ Plutarch comments on this:

Not one of us would believe Epicurus when he said that, while dying with greatest pains and diseases he was cheered on his way by the memory of the pleasures he had enjoyed before. (*That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible (Moralia*, vol. xiv) 1099d)

We have no source which would detail Epicurus' theory of the structure of emotions.²⁰⁸ It is clear that they were taken to involve beliefs. The Epicureans realized that changing those beliefs by argument may be cumbersome, because the reasons for having them may be unconscious. Simple feelings of pleasure and pain were treated as analogous to perceptions. Anger, fear, love, gratitude, and other emotions were also regarded as involving feelings, and they were mainly discussed from the point of view of whether they were pleasant or unpleasant. Epicurus' general attitude to spontaneous emotions was reserved—they are a threat to

²⁰⁵ Cottingham (1998, 58–9) remarks that the Epicurean therapeutic confrontation with the desires seems aimed not so much at making them more 'healthy', but rather at exposing them to the intellect as confused and confusing.

²⁰⁶ See Procopé (1998), 185. This therapeutic technique was rejected by Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and Plotinus, as far as it was taken to leave the mistaken evaluations of things unchanged. See Sorabji (2000), 233–4.

²⁰⁷ See also Rabbow (1954), 281–3.

²⁰⁸ For general discussions of the Epicurean psychology of emotions, see C. Diano, 'La psicologia d'Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni', in *idem*, *Scritti epicurei* (Florence: Olschki, 1974), 129–280; Annas (1992), 189–99; and, for anger, Procopé (1998) and D. P. Fowler, 'Epicurean Anger', in Braund and Gill (1997), 16–35.

tranquillity. Some emotions are natural, but they should be strictly controlled by reason, just as Plato taught. When people become conscious of their beliefs and, following the example of the Epicurean sage, detach themselves from external things, their desires and emotional dispositions are neither many nor strong.

1.8 Emotions in the Middle Platonists, Galen, and Plotinus

Cicero attended the lectures by Antiochus of Ascalon in Athens in 79 BC, and his works are the main source of the philosophy of Antiochus, who is regarded as one of the founders of Middle Platonism. Antiochus took Platonism in a new direction by giving up Academic scepticism and underlining the similarities, rather than the differences, between the doctrines of Plato, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics—in fact, he accepted too many Stoic views to be counted as a typical representative of Platonism. He identified the Demiurge, the World Soul, and the Stoic Pneuma-Logos, but, even though some later Platonists did the same, they stressed in addition the immateriality and transcendence of God, interpreting the Logos as his instrument and the ideas as God's thoughts.²⁰⁹

Antiochus' ethics was influenced by the Stoic ideal of life in accordance with nature, which he regarded as the core of the teaching of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics as well.²¹⁰ Later Platonists could refer to this ideal, but they preferred a more spiritual conception of the goal, the ascent of the soul toward God through likening oneself to God, which was derived from the famous passage of Plato's *Theaetetus* (176a–b).

Antiochus's eagerness for synthesis is seen in his claim that a doctrine similar to the Stoic *apatheia* was also part of early Platonic teaching, which allegedly involved the principle that 'the Sage is never moved by appetite nor carried away by pleasure'. In *Academica Priora* 2.135 Cicero questioned the historical correctness of Antiochus' view, referring to Crantor's treatise *On Grief* from the Old Academy and its message that the emotions are to be moderated rather than extirpated.²¹¹ Cicero asked:

I want to know when the Old Academy adopted views of that sort that the mind of the Sage does not undergo emotion or perturbation. Those people were upholders of the mean in things, and held that in all emotions there was a certain measure that was natural.

²⁰⁹ J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 82–3, 95.

²¹⁰ Annas (1993), 180–7.

²¹¹ See also DL 4.27. In *Tusculan Disputations* 3.12 Cicero quotes Crantor's criticism of the doctrine of insensibility (*indolentia*) 'which neither can nor ought to exist'.

It is possible that Antiochus' point was that one should avoid immoderate emotions, since he argued that the differences between the schools were often verbal rather than real.²¹² Instead of speculating about Antiochus' views, known only through Cicero, let us have a look at the standard Middle Platonist theory in Alcinous's *Didaskalikos*, a second-century handbook of Platonism.²¹³

In the ethical part of his treatise Alcinous states first (chs. 28–9) that the end for human beings is likeness to God (*homoiōsis theōi*) and that the ultimate happiness is found not in earthly matters but in seeing the eternal truths through the purified eyes of the soul (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 248b; *Rep.* 7.533d). In a note about the traditional methods whereby likeness to God may be attained, Alcinous refers to natural ability, good practice and habits, and improvement of reason through philosophical education 'in such a way as to distance ourselves from the great majority of human concerns, and always to be in close contact with intelligible reality' (28.4). In chapter 29 the virtues are divided into those of the rational part (wisdom), of the spirited part (courage), and the appetitive part (self-control). Justice is the harmonization of these three with one other (cf. Plato, *Rep.* 4.441c–443b). The virtues of the spirited part and the appetitive part make the emotions moderate and submissive to their natural master—that is, reason (29.2–3).²¹⁴

The author makes use of the term *metriopathēs* (30.5). This and the corresponding noun *metriopatheia* (moderation in the emotions) were employed in the Platonist descriptions of the goal of emotional education. The ethics of *metriopatheia* was regarded as more realistic and adequate with respect to human nature than the Stoic ethics of *apatheia*. The Platonists did not believe that the emotions could be wholly extirpated and criticized the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*. They taught that the emotional dispositions can be moderated by habituation, and that one should learn to master the occurrent emotions. The terminology of the Platonic moderation approach was influenced by Peripatetic views.²¹⁵ In the surviving

²¹² Dillon (1977), 77–8. Panaetius was a Stoic representative of moderation; see p. 66 above.

²¹³ The work is edited by J. Whittaker in *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990), English translation with an introduction and commentary by J. Dillon in Alcinous, *The Handbook of Platonism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). I shall quote Dillon's translation with minor changes.

²¹⁴ For virtues in the Middle Platonic literature, see S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 60–84.

²¹⁵ J. Dillon, 'Metriopatheia and Apatheia: Some Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics', in *idem*, *The Golden Chain: Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), essay 8, and Dillon's commentary on the *Handbook of Platonism*, 186–9.

texts the term *metriopatheia* occurs first in Philo of Alexandria (*Leg. alleg. (Opera, vol. i)* 129–32), though he did not introduce it—it also occurs in works without connection to Philo.²¹⁶ Philo was a first-century Jewish Platonist with Stoic sympathies. He related the ideal of *metriopatheia* to the lower degree of moral progress, and *apatheia* to perfection. The former is symbolized by Aaron, who was like a Stoic *prokoptōn*, a man still making progress, and the latter by Moses.²¹⁷

Alcinous' general characterization of emotions runs as follows:

An emotion is an irrational motion of the soul, in response either to something bad or to something good. It is called an irrational motion because emotions are neither judgements nor opinions, but rather motions of the irrational parts of the soul, for they come about in the affective part of the soul. . . . We say 'in response either to something bad or good', because the representation of a thing of indifferent value does not provoke an emotion; all emotions arise as a result of the representation of either something good or something bad. For if we suppose that something good is present to us, we feel pleasure; in the imminence of such a thing, appetite; while if we suppose that something bad is present, we feel distress, and if imminent, fear. (32.1)

This passage is based on the view that the soul is divided into a rational part and a passionate part, the latter being subdivided into spirited and appetitive (chs. 17, 24). The emotional reactions of the passionate part are caused by awareness of something good or something evil. These involuntary reactions incline to behavioural changes with respect to what is thought good or bad. The author stresses, against the Chrysippian view, that emotions are not judgements or opinions. They are said to be caused by an evaluative act, but it is not explained in which faculty of the soul those evaluations are formed. They may take place in the rational part or in some sub-rational cognitive capacity. Emotions do not always vanish when we have convinced ourselves that the evaluations on which they are based are false.²¹⁸ It is not said whether an evaluative thought must remain

²¹⁶ It is possible that Crantor made use of the term; see R. C. Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy: Greek and Christian Paideia in Basil and the Two Gregories*, Patristic Monograph Series, 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975), 83–5.

²¹⁷ Philo's works are edited by L. Cohn and P. Wendland in *Opera*, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1896–1915); an English translation by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker in *Works* (with 2 supplementary vols. trans. by R. Marcus), Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927–53). For Philo, see also pp. 91–3, 114–15, and 117–19 below.

²¹⁸ 'There are times, after all, even when we recognize that the sensations presented to us are neither unpleasant, nor pleasant, nor yet worthy of fear, when we are nevertheless driven by them which would not be the case had they been of the same nature as judgements; for judgements, when once we have condemned them (whether rightly or wrongly), we reject' (32.1).

in the soul, but this is probably assumed. Alcinous seems to think that when passionate people have accepted a thought, they keep to it because of the feeling which it rouses. It is also possible that he has in mind the continuation of emotional movements after a change of judgement. Since a strong feeling fixes the attention uncritically on its object, occurrent emotions cannot be expelled simply by argument. Improving emotional behaviour demands that the habits of feeling be re-educated. This cannot be achieved merely by saying how one should feel pleasure or distress, but by habituation and practice (30.3). Alcinous states that emotional reactions are immoderate when they deviate from right reason. Intemperate and cowardly souls are led to evil acts through exaggerated emotional reactions, and, furthermore, their emotional habits make them prone to interpret things wrongly from an improper emotional point of view (29.4).

Pleasure, distress, appetite, and fear, which are mentioned in the above quotation, are the four Stoic types of emotions. While some Stoics presented desire and fear as the basic types of emotion, and pleasure and distress as supervening them, Alcinous says that there are two simple and basic emotions, pleasure and distress, and that the others are compounds of these. He seems to think that pleasure and distress are felt affective states which are associated with assumptions about present or future objects. Other emotions involve a mixture of these as their feeling aspect (32.2–3).²¹⁹

Alcinous divides emotions into ‘wild’ and ‘tame’; the latter are moderated natural emotions, while the former are immoderate and unnatural. It is assumed that natural emotions are something which cannot be extirpated and which one should not try to eliminate, because they have a positive role in human life:

Emotions may show lack of measure either by overstepping what is proper or by falling short of it. For neither would someone who failed to become angry even at an insult to his parents, nor yet someone who became angry at every provocation, even the most trivial, be regarded as being moderate in his emotions, but quite the reverse. And again, similarly someone who shows no grief even at the death of

²¹⁹ Alcinous states that emotions can be classified as pleasant or unpleasant on the basis of the nature of the dominant part (32.2). The idea of dividing emotions into pleasures and distresses on the ground of their feeling quality was not uncommon in Peripatetic tradition; see Aspasius’ commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (41.28–43.32) and the Peripatetic ethical doxography in Stobaeus 2.142.20–2; cf. also the Pythagorean *On Virtue*, in H. Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965), 192.5–6 (Stobaeus 81.11–12).

his parents is seen as insensible, while someone who seems like to waste away with grief is held to be over-sensitive and immoderate in his emotions, but he who grieves, but does so to a moderate extent, is seen as moderate in his emotions. (30.5)

Even though Alcinous' attitude to emotions is not merely negative, his approach is closer to Plato's ideal than to Aristotle's view of the role of the emotions in a good practical life.²²⁰ After having mentioned some positive functions of the emotions, Alcinous states that pleasure and distress are intermingled, and their mixed nature lessens their value as constituents of the good life (32.7).

Alcinous considers the moderate emotion awakened by the death of one's parents virtuous and the corresponding Stoic attitude insensitive (30.4–5). Similarly, Philo of Alexandria states (*Abraham (Opera, vol. iv)* 256–7) that Abraham behaved exemplarily, on the loss of Sarah, 'neither fretting beyond measure, nor showing a complete lack of emotion (*apatheia*), but choosing the mean rather than the extremes, and trying to moderate his emotions (*metriopatheia*)'.²²¹ In dealing with the same theme, Plutarch summarized the main points of the Platonist criticism of Stoic *apatheia*. He stated that it is impossible and unnatural and socially detrimental as an ideal:

The pain and pang felt at the death of a son has a cause to awaken grief, which is natural and over which we have no control. For I, for my part, cannot concur with those who praise that harsh and callous freedom of emotions (*apatheia*), which is both impossible and unprofitable. For this will rob us of the kindly feeling which comes from mutual love and which above all else we must conserve. But to be carried beyond all bounds and to assist in increasing grief is contrary to nature...but a moderate emotion (*metriopatheia*) is not to be disapproved. (*Consolation to Apollonius (Moralia, vol. ii)* 102c–d, trans. F. C. Babbitt, with changes)²²²

²²⁰ See also Apuleius' remarks on pleasure in *On the Doctrines of Plato*, ed. J. Beaujeu in *Opusculum philosophiques* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973), 2.12.238.

²²¹ In *Questions and Answers on Genesis* 4.73, Philo comments on Genesis 23: 2–3. He says that Abraham was not mourning, since the Scripture does not present Abraham actually mourning but 'coming there to mourn'. 'The man of constancy' may be affected in some way, but the guiding reason repels the affect. This is regarded as an application of the Stoic doctrine of pre-passions in Graver (1999), 305–9. For the *apatheia* of perfect persons in Philo, see D. Winston, 'Philo's Ethical Theory', in *ANRW* 2.21.1 (1984), 372–416, esp. 405–14.

²²² The neglect of the social fellow-feeling was often repeated in ancient criticism of the Stoic position. See Augustine, *The City of God* 14.9. Lactantius wrote that 'they altogether separate themselves from the society by the rigour of their inhuman virtue': *Institutiones divinae*, ed. S. Brandt and G. Laubmann CSEL 19 (Vienna: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freitag, 1890), 6.10.11.

In his essay *On Moral Virtue* Plutarch states that moral virtue has the emotions as its matter and reason as its form. The ideal of *metriopatheia* is described as follows:

For reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (this is neither possible nor profitable), but imposes a limit and an order upon it and implants the ethical virtues which are not free from passion but bring due proportion and measure therein. (443c, trans. W. C. Helmbold, with changes)²²³

With formulations of this kind, it is somewhat strange that in his treatise on moral progress Plutarch states that complete freedom from emotion (*apatheia*) is a great and divine thing, whereas abatement and moderation of the emotions appertains to moral progress (*How to Recognize One's Moral Progress* 83e). He seems to mean that freedom from emotion shows the direction for moral improvement. As for progress, it is important to examine one's thoughts and feelings, to compare one's present mode of feeling a certain emotion to its former occurrences, and to be aware of the changes in the relative vigour and frequency of various emotions:

We must compare them with their former occurrences to see whether the appetites and fears and angry emotions now are less intense than they used to be, because we by means of reason rapidly get rid of the cause which kindles and inflames them. And we must compare them with one another, to see whether now we are more inclined to feel shame than fear, to be competitive rather than envious. . . . For just as the turning aside of a disease into the less vital parts of the body is an encouraging sign, so it is reasonable to assume that when the vice of those who are making progress is transformed into more moderate emotions, it is being gradually abated. (Ibid. 83e–84a, trans. F. C. Babbitt, with changes)

Plutarch regards it as a sign of moral progress that an activated emotional response can be mastered by rational judgement. Because of the affective aspect of emotions, one cannot improve the passionate part simply by argument. Making it moderate and controllable needs long training and habituation.²²⁴

Both Philo and Plutarch state that freedom from emotion is something great and perfect, and that moderation is a matter of progress. Why did they simultaneously praise moderation at the death of people close to one and criticize the Stoic *apatheia* in this connection, if it was something

²²³ For a similar view in the Platonist Taurus, see Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.26, 19.12. For *metriopatheia* and *apatheia* in scepticism, see Sorabji (2000), 198–200; see also R. Bett, 'The Sceptics and the Emotions', in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 197–218.

²²⁴ For Hellenistic psychagogic methods in Plutarch, see Rabbow (1954), 278 (frank discussion), 340–2 (meditation), 344–5 (examination of oneself); I. Hadot (1969), 65–6.

divine and perfect? John Dillon has noted some particularities in the manner in which the Platonists employed the notion of *apatheia*. Even though Plutarch's characterization of *apatheia* as a practically impossible and morally one-sided ideal was directed against the Stoics, he uses the term as if it refers to an extreme condition of the passionate soul, while *metriopatheia* is its moderate condition. Dillon states that this habit of thinking was quite common among Middle Platonic authors. They tended to deal with the Stoic doctrine of *apatheia* as a special position in their own model of the emotions of the soul; they were not very sensitive to the fact that the Stoic doctrine was based on quite different premisses.²²⁵ This may be true, but it does not explain why *apatheia* was sometimes criticized and sometimes praised. The concept was apparently employed in two different senses. The Stoic *apatheia* was criticized as a practical attitude to things; the Platonic *apatheia* of those who were perfect in likeness to God was not a practical attitude, but consisted in turning away from mundane matters without the loss of emotional dispositions.

I shall next make some comments on Galen (c.130–c.200), who was a Platonizing eclectic doctor and also interested in the healing of the passions. Galen describes his view on the curing of immoderate passions in *On the Diagnosis and Therapy of the Distinctive Passions of the Individual's Soul*.²²⁶ The main point of the philosophical therapy of these 'sicknesses of the soul' are summarized by James Hankinson as follows. Developing self-control involves the realization that we need to be cured and that long training is needed. It is easier to control the manifestations of the emotions than the emotion itself. Controlling the manifestations gradually makes the emotions begin to wither. The practical advices include that one should wait until the initial burst of emotion has subsided before attempting to act in accordance with it, and that one should frequently repeat the appropriate moral maxims and exhortations.²²⁷ There is nothing new here to those who are familiar with the Platonic view that excessive emotions are weakened by exhortations, continuous control, and suppression.²²⁸ Even though Galen sometimes states that the

²²⁵ 'Metriopatheia and apatheia', in Dillon (1990), essay 8, 510–18.

²²⁶ *De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione* (henceforth *Aff. dig.*), ed. W. de Boer, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, V.4.1.1 (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1937), English trans. in Galen, *Selected Works*, translated with introduction and notes by P. N. Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

²²⁷ J. Hankinson, 'Actions and Passions: Affection, Emotion and Moral Self-Management in Galen's Philosophical Psychology', in Brunschwig and Nussbaum (1993), 199–204.

²²⁸ 'To be free of anger is a goal one cannot achieve simply by wishing it; what one can do is to control the ugly manifestation of the affection. And if one does so frequently, one will actually

ideal is to be free from emotions, he means that one should learn to extirpate the immoderate emotional motions and to control the less extreme ones.²²⁹ Since the emotions of the appetitive part are not useful for any higher purpose, they should be disciplined and weakened so that they do not disturb the better striving of the soul. Like Plato, Galen thought that the spirited part can be habituated to act in a way that strengthens good intentions.²³⁰

Let us see how Galen's traditional psychagogic ideas were related to his influential medical conception of the human being. Until the Renaissance period, Hippocrates and Galen were the basic medical authorities in medieval Western and Arabic medicine; Galen's works also stimulated discussions of philosophical anthropology.²³¹ Galen heavily criticized Chrysippus' conception of the emotions, arguing that Plato (and Hippocrates) were right to recognize three parts of the soul which were located in distinct bodily organs and that the tripartite conception was much closer to the medical facts than the Stoic view of the unitary soul. As stated above, Galen maintained that the gross errors of the Chrysippian view obliged even such a famous Stoic thinker as Posidonius to adopt the Platonic tripartite psychology of reason, spirit, and appetite.

Galen divided the functions of the human organism into three large systems which were centred in the liver, the heart, and the brain. The main lines of the theory are as follows. Like Aristotle, Galen conceives things as composed of the four elements, each of which has two of the qualities of hot, cold, dry, and moist in various combinations. They exist in the bodies of animals in the form of the four humours: blood (hot, moist), yellow bile (hot, dry), black bile (cold, dry), and phlegm (cold, moist) and their

notice one's anger becoming less than it was previously, so that one no longer gets angry over either small or considerable matters, but only over great ones, and then only slightly' (*Aff. dig.* 16–17, trans. Singer). In his therapeutic programme Galen, like Plutarch, stresses the importance of controlling occurrent emotions, examining oneself, repeating the key doctrines, examining one's progress, and having a wise and frank supervisor (*Aff. dig.* 9–12, 20–1, 24–5, 30–2, 36, 53–6). Galen also mentions the common advice that one should never punish a servant while in a state of anger (21).

²²⁹ In *Aff. dig.* 11 Galen refers to Plato's *Theaetetus* 176b and assumes, as other Platonists did, that the similarity to God demands freedom from the passions in so far as it is possible for human beings.

²³⁰ 'I described in my work *On Characters* . . . how you can employ the power of the spirited part against the other power, called the appetitive by the ancient philosophers, which carries us unreasoning towards bodily pleasures . . . The discipline of this power consists in not allowing it the enjoyment of the objects it desires. If it does enjoy them, it becomes great and strong; if disciplined, it grows small and weak': *Aff. dig.* 27–8.

²³¹ Galenism is characterized as a medical philosophy by O. Temkin in *Galenism: The Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1973).

mixtures.²³² The nourishment consumed by animals is digested in the stomach, whence it enters the liver and is turned into the humours. The veins contain a mixture of the humours, predominated by blood, and this nourishes the tissues. Air is digested in the lungs and the heart, and the resulting vital pneuma vitalizes the organs through the arteries. In the brain some of the vital pneuma is transformed into psychic pneuma, which serves sensory and motor functions in the nerves and higher psychological activities in the brain.²³³ Galen was considerably indebted to Erasistratus' views of the distinction between vital and psychic pneuma and the functions of the brain and the nerves.²³⁴

Galen's medical theories were meant to be empirical and methodologically naturalistic in the sense that no separate immaterial soul was postulated. In *PHP* the psychic phenomena are often treated as special functions of the psychic pneuma, but instead of equating this with the soul, as Erasistratus did, Galen preferred to speak about the pneuma as an instrument of the soul and to leave the question of the nature of the soul open.²³⁵ While Galen sometimes restricts the psychic activities to cognitive and voluntary activities, as Herophilus, Erasistratus, and some Stoics did, he also applies the Platonic tripartition model and locates the three parts in the head, the heart, and the liver.²³⁶ Though the relationship between the mental level and the neural or metabolic level is not systematically analysed in Galen's works, it is worth noting that in the ethical context Galen deals with emotions and their components (feelings, bodily affections, behavioural suggestions) in a traditional manner. He apparently took the mental level as epistemologically prior to the physiological: one should recognize the emotions and feelings as mental phenomena before attempting to analyse the physiological changes with which they are associated in the medical theory.

²³² There is a longer analysis of the mixtures in Galen's *De temperamentis*, ed. G. Helmreich, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1904), English translation, *On the Mixtures*, by P. N. Singer in Galen, *Selected Works*.

²³³ *On the Natural Faculties (De facultis naturalibus)* 2.9, trans. A. J. Brock, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1916); *idem*, *On the Use of the Parts*, ed. G. Helmreich, *De usu partium*, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), 7.8; *PHP* 2.8.36–8; 3.8.29–32; 7.3; 8.4.

²³⁴ Von Staden (2000), 105–16.

²³⁵ According to Galen, the psychic pneuma is 'the first instrument' and 'the first home' of the soul, *PHP* 7.3.19–24 (444.1–15). The question about the substance of the soul is left unanswered in *PHP* 9.9.8 (600.6).

²³⁶ See von Staden (2000), 107–10. Galen sometimes suggests that the soul uses the psychic pneuma as an instrument (*PHP* 7.3.21) and sometimes that the parts of the soul are the forms of the organs; see *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur* (= *QAM*), in *Scripta minora*, vol. ii, ed. I. Müller, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1891), 4 (782–3), English translation *The Powers of the Mind Follow the Temperaments of the Body* by P. N. Singer in Galen, *Selected Works*.

In dealing with the powers and activities of the rational part of the soul, which uses the psychic pneuma as its instrument, Galen distinguishes between impression, thought, and memory (*PHP* 7.3.2 (438.30–1)). Later authors influenced by Galen associated these powers with four ventricles in the brain. The two front ventricles are the seat of perception and imagination, the middle ventricle of cogitation, and the hindmost of memory.²³⁷ Galen states that the appetitive part is physiologically associated with the qualitative mixture of the liver, and the spirited part with that of the heart. There is mutual causation between these mixtures (temperaments) and the functions of the metabolic system and the distribution of blood, heat, and vital pneuma. The structure and functioning of this physical level strongly influences the faculties and capacities of the soul.²³⁸ In Galen's view, the pathological states of the soul, such as delirium, mania, lethargy, epilepsy, and melancholy, have humoral causes.²³⁹ Excessive emotions can influence the humoral system, and changes in it have effects on emotional inclinations.²⁴⁰ The effects of excessive black bile on the melancholic temperament, occurrent mental disturbances, and on chronic mental illness are often mentioned.²⁴¹

²³⁷ For this localization, see Nemesius of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, ed. M. Morani, in *De natura hominis*, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987), 13, 204–7. The theory of the ventricles as seats of different capacities is not explicitly formulated in Galen's extant works, though some texts come close to it. See *PHP* 3.8.32 (230.24–6); 7.3.17 (442.30–1); and *On Affected Places (De locis affectis)*, ed. C. Kühn, in *Medicorum Graecorum Opera*, viii (Leipzig, 1824), 3.9 (174–5).

²³⁸ *QAM* 1 (767–8), 11 (821–2); *Ars medica*, ed. V. Boudon, in *Exhortation à l'étude de la médecine, Art médicale*, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000), 10–11, English translation *The Art of Medicine*, by P. N. Singer, in Galen, *Selected Works*. See also G. E. R. Lloyd, 'Scholarship, Authority and Argument in Galen's *Quod animi mores*', in P. Manuli and M. Vegetti (eds.), *Le opere psicologiche di Galeno* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988), 11–42.

²³⁹ Galen states that many questions about the details are without an answer: 'Why does a buildup of yellow bile in the brain lead to derangement? Or a buildup of black bile to melancholy? Why do phlegm and all the cooling substances cause lethargic complaints, which in turn lead to impairment of the memory and understanding' (*QAM* 4 (777), trans. Singer). For Galen's view of mental illness, see J. Pigeaud, *La Maladie de l'âme* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981); L. G. Ballester, 'Soul and Body: Disease of the Soul and Disease of the Body in Galen's Medical Thought', in Manuli and Vegetti (1988), 117–52; M. W. Dols, *Majnun: The Madman in the Medieval Islamic World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 17–37.

²⁴⁰ In the *Art of Medicine* (23.8; 24.8) Galen includes the passions of the soul (*orgē, lupē, thumos, phobos, phthonos*) in the list of things on which our health and illness depend. These causes, which were later called the 'six non-naturals', are also dealt with in Galen's *In Hippocratis Epidemiarum librum VI commentaria*, ed. and trans. E. Wenkebach and F. Pfaff, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, V.10.2.2 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), 484.3–7.

²⁴¹ The excess of black bile in the brain causes fear, anxiety, sadness, and misanthropy. These are also among the symptoms of pathological melancholy (*On Affected Places* 3.10, 190–1). For the history of the concept of melancholy in medicine and philosophy, see H. Flashar, *Melancholie und Melancholiker in den medizinischen Theorien der Antike* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966); R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy* (London: Nelson, 1964).

In asking whether anger, appetite, and the like should be called passions (*pathē*) or activities (*energeiai*), Galen explains that a movement can be called an *energeia* of the mover and a *pathos* of that which is moved:

In the same way anger is an *energeia* (activity) of the spirited part of the soul but a *pathēma* (affection) of the other two parts, and of our whole body besides, when our body is forcibly driven to its actions by anger. (*PHP* 6.1.7 (360.27–362.2), trans. De Lacy)

Galen thinks that there are natural emotional powers, and that their activities can cause passions (movements coming from some other thing) through affecting the other parts of the soul and the body. The excessive activity of a power is also a passion of this power in the sense that it functions against its nature (6.1.10–11 (362.12–14), 6.1.14 (362.31–364.2)).²⁴² In this analysis Galen does not call moderate activities of the emotional powers passions (*pathē*), though these powers also need an activator. By passions he means strong affects, which he also characterizes as morbid.²⁴³

Physiologically speaking, the emotions are movements in the systems of the liver and the heart which affect other functions of the inner systems. These movements can be caused by cognitive acts, but may also be initiated by physiological changes and incline the subject to form corresponding emotional judgements.²⁴⁴ Galen's medical therapy of the emotions consists largely in medicaments, diets, and gymnastics as securing a balance of bodily qualities. The long-term therapy involves habituation, through which the relevant physiological functions are slowly reorganized.²⁴⁵ Arousing awareness of one's emotional dispositions through

²⁴² Galen thought that Posidonius identified emotions with the movements of the irrational parts of the soul (*PHP* 5.1.5 (292.20–5)). This is a problematic interpretation of Posidonius' view, but it shows how Galen himself thought about emotional phenomena. While the nature of the movements of the soul remains unclear, the physical side of these movements is explicable in medicine.

²⁴³ Some scholars have argued that the Stoics did not advocate the extirpation of ordinary passions, and that by 'passions' they meant false hormetic judgements by which people are carried away (see p. 69 above). This a controversial interpretation of the Stoic view, but Galen thought in this way. In *PHP* 6.1 the term *pathos* refers to excessive emotional reactions, natural movements of the irrational powers of the soul not being called *pathē*. For passions as sicknesses of the soul, see *Aff. dig.* 22, 24.

²⁴⁴ In *Aff. dig.* 28–9 the irrational powers of the soul are described as being activated by occurrent impressions or beliefs. In *QAM* 4 (778–9) Galen says that the mixture of the body can make the soul sad, timid, and depressed. Wine can make the soul gentler and more confident. In *PHP* 6.1.19 (364.19–21) Galen states that the reasoning part may be carried away by the movement of the other parts so that its movement is neither from itself nor in keeping with its nature. For Galen's view of the psychic causes of bodily illness, see Ballester (1988), 148–52.

²⁴⁵ See Sorabji (2000), 253–60.

therapeutic discussions and applying other psychagogic methods belong to the more philosophical part of the therapy. In describing Posidonius' therapy, Galen states that the irrational is helped and harmed by irrational things, the rational by knowledge and ignorance (*PHP* 5.6.22 (330.20–1)).

Galen's agnosticism about the nature of the soul was not a typical Middle Platonist view, and nothing like this is found in Plotinus' Neoplatonic theory, according to which the immaterial individual mind is immediately aware of itself and can be aware of what is going on in the body and use it without being affected by its movements. Plotinus' basic assumption also shaped his view of the emotions. There are three longer passages in Plotinus' *Enneads* which deal with the emotions: 'On the Impassivity of the Bodiless' (3.6), chapters 1–5; 'On the Difficulties about the Soul II' (4.4.), chapters 18–21 and 28; and 'What is the Organism' (1.1), chapters 1–7.²⁴⁶ Plotinus' general descriptions of emotions do not differ from those of the Middle Platonists. He employs the Platonic doctrine of the tripartition of the soul and states in an Aristotelian manner that emotions are affections which are accompanied by pleasure and distress (*Enneads* 3.6.4, 1–8). A closer look at the passages about emotions shows that Plotinus' philosophical ideas entailed considerable reinterpretation of the received concepts. His problem was that while the passions were regarded as psychic by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, the soul's impassivity was one of the basic tenets of his own philosophy. If philosophy is said to help us to master emotions, one could ask, as Plotinus does, how this makes sense if the soul is already impassible. Why should one seek to make the soul free from passions through philosophy, if it does not suffer them (*Enn.* 3.6.5, 1–2)?

In answering this question Plotinus makes use of his theory of the parts of a human being: the organic body, the lower soul which provides the body with a 'trace of soul', and the individual human soul which is not directly involved in the functions of the compound of the organic body and the lower soul. The lower soul regulates the vegetative functions of the compound and various instinctive biological reactions. The individual soul, 'we ourselves', encompasses the higher psychic faculties such as that of reason, representation, and sense perception in so far as it is a

²⁴⁶ Plotinus, *Opera I–III*, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964–82), English translation by A. H. Armstrong in Loeb Classical Library, 7 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966–88).

pure cognitive faculty of discernment. Even the lower soul is impassible. The ‘trace of soul’ as an effect of the lower soul can be affected.²⁴⁷

Plotinus regards physical pain and pleasure as changes in the qualified body which is living through a trace of soul (4.4.18, 4–10). We ourselves, being different from the living body, perceive its pain and pleasure through the higher soul, which itself is not affected (4.4.19, 13–15). The soul, through its discerning power, is present everywhere in the body, but a particular pain is felt in a particular part, and not everywhere. If the soul itself were affected by bodily pain, it would be felt everywhere (4.4.19, 15–20). Plotinus thought that perception of pain is not pain but awareness of pain (4.4.19, 26–7); perception and awareness are activities of the soul, and not passions.²⁴⁸ Plotinus’ view of physical pain differs from the conception of pain as a mode of being aware of one’s body found in Plato and Aristotle—this is put forward in an often-quoted passage from the (pseudo?) Plutarchian essay *Whether Desire and Pain Belong to the Soul or the Body* in which Strato of Lampsacus’s view is paraphrased as follows:

not only our appetites but also our distresses, not only our fears and envies and malicious pleasures at others’ misfortune but also our suffering and pleasures and pains and in general all sensations come about in the soul. According to him, everything of this sort is a psychical event; we do not have a pain in the foot when we stub it, nor in the head when we crack it, nor in the finger when we cut it . . . we suppose the hurt from a wound is not where it is sensed, but where it originated, as the soul is drawn towards the source that has affected it. (Trans. F. H. Sandbach, with changes)²⁴⁹

Plotinus thinks that bodily pleasure or pain belongs to the lower level of the body and the ‘trace of soul’, and the awareness of these and not the passions themselves, as is mistakenly believed, belongs to the soul which constitutes the conscious person (‘we ourselves’). People can be more or less concerned with bodily pleasures,

²⁴⁷ See E. Emilsson, ‘Plotinus on Emotions,’ in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), 337–63, at 341; H. J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus’ Psychology: His Doctrine of the Embodied Soul* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 61–2.

²⁴⁸ Emilsson (1998), 343.

²⁴⁹ Plutarch, *Moralia*, vol. xv, ed. and trans. F. H. Sandbach, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 42–4; fr. 111 in F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, v: Straton von Lampsakos* (Basel: Schwabe, 1950). See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems*, 6. Questions pertaining to the relationship between the nervous system and the experience of pain were later widely discussed, as can be seen in Nemesius of Emesa’s comments. See p. 107 below.

more in proportion as we are weaker and do not separate ourselves (from the body), but consider the body the most honourable part of ourselves and the real man, and, so to speak, sink ourselves into it. (4.4.18, 16–19, trans. Armstrong)

Because of his conviction about the impassibility of the soul, Plotinus is led to skip the received distinction between pain as an experience of a noxious state and this state as the cause and the object of the experience. In order to avoid the consequence that we do not feel pain at all, he brings the feeling element back into the picture as the concern the soul may have about the pain. In so far as this is understood as the psychic experience of pain, it is only externally occasioned, not externally caused.

Analogously to his treatment of bodily pleasures and pains, Plotinus attributes the appetitive and spirited emotions to the level lower than the soul which we are. In describing the activities of the emotional powers, Plotinus employs two different models:

Of the affections some result from opinions, as when someone feels fear thinking that he is about to die, or is pleased thinking that something good is about to happen to him; the opinion is in one part, the affection is moved in another. Other emotions, as it were, of themselves take the lead without our volition in producing the opinion in the part whose nature is to form opinions. (3.6.4, 8–13)²⁵⁰

In the first case there is first an evaluative judgement about a present or future state of affairs which causes a change in the lower level of the organism. Plotinus describes the causal chain from a judgement to a bodily change by stating that an impression (*phantasia*) which is involved in the belief produces another impression in the lower soul. This is

a murky quasi-opinion and unevaluated impression, like the activity inherent in so-called nature inasmuch as it produces (as they say) each thing without impression. As for what had its origin in these impressions, the upset that occurs in the body, the trembling and the shaking of the frame, the pallor, the inability to speak—all these are already perceptible. (3.6.4, 21–6)

Plotinus thinks that certain opinions or judgements influence the lower soul, which then influences the trace of soul so that the organism reacts in an emotional way. The appetitive and spirited powers are equated with these reaction dispositions of the organism.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Trans. in Plotinus, *Ennead 3.6: On the Impassivity of the Bodiless*, trans. and commentary by B. Fleet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

²⁵¹ Emilsson (1998), 346.

The emotions of the second class are not explained in 3.6. From what Plotinus says in 4.4.20 and 28, they probably involve instinctive appetitive reactions of the compound to pains, such as hunger and thirst, of which the individual soul can be aware without being affected by them, but also sub-rational irascible reactions which arise spontaneously and, when perceived, can contribute to forming emotional judgements. These in their turn can strengthen the affections.²⁵² Plotinus stresses the bodily aspects of emotions. He separates judgement as the cause of emotion from the emotion, which is realized at the psychosomatic level, and does not regard judgement as necessary for emotion. While emotions which are caused by judgements seem to be more or less voluntary, non-judgemental emotions arise spontaneously. Plotinus' remarks on the emotions which precede judgements were possibly influenced by the Stoic doctrine of pre-passions.²⁵³

Plotinus embraced the Middle Platonist conception of likeness to God (*homoïōsis theōi*) as the highest good for humans (*Enn.* 1.2). It was asked whether the supreme divine principle possesses those virtues which human beings should have and, if this is not the case, what the role of moral perfection in the progress toward likeness to God is. Alcinoüs stated that the ultimate, wholly impassible, transcendent divinity does not have the virtues which imply some form of mastering the emotions. Since the virtues are essential to human perfection, likening oneself to God through practical virtues must be understood with respect to the Logos–Demiurge, which does not have bodily affections, but is the master of the World Soul and the active source of the cosmic order (*Didaskalikos* 10.3; 28.3). In *Enn.* 1.2.2, 13–20, Plotinus states that the moderating civic virtues are concerned with the passionate part of the soul. Since these virtues bring order and measure into the soul, they make it more similar to God than it is without this order.²⁵⁴ But there are also higher purificatory virtues which more directly assimilate the soul to the transcendental deity. These are the states of the souls which do not share in the opinions of sense and in bodily passions, which do not fear to depart from the body, and in which the reason rules without opposition. These higher states are described as follows:

So the higher justice in the soul is its activity towards Intellect, its self-control is its inward turning to Intellect, its courage its freedom from emotions (*apatheia*), according to the likeness of that to which it looks which is free from emotions by nature. (*Enn.* 1.2.6, 23–6)

²⁵² Ibid. 346–9, 353.

²⁵³ Sorabji (2000), 204.

²⁵⁴ J. Dillon, 'Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue', in Dillon (1990), essay 18.

The good life at the level of civic virtues involves the moderation of the emotions, but this is something which a perfect soul leaves behind. It seeks similarity to God, which implies freedom from emotions (*Enn.* 1.2.7, 23–8). Even moderate emotions direct one's attention away from the highest goal of assimilating oneself to the apathetic part of the soul which never left the intelligible world. When Plotinus said that the soul is impassible, he did not mean that no part of it is involved in emotions as their cause or as their perceiver. Making the soul free from emotions through philosophy is to improve it so that it does not itself form any judgement which gives rise to emotions. In *Enn.* 1.2.5 it is assumed that even purified souls have necessary pleasures and appetites as well as some other spontaneous emotional reactions; these are apparently among the emotions which arise without a judgement. The positive concept of *apatheia*, which in Philo and Plutarch was associated with the perfectibility of man, was based on the similar idea that the perfect soul lives as far as possible in the intelligible spheres which do not evoke human emotions. But Plotinus also believed that the highest part of the soul never descended from the intelligible world. We are seldom conscious of this part, which is aware of itself (5.3.5, 41–9), wholly *apathēs*, and continuously contemplating eternal truths and divinity (*Enn.* 1.8.4; 2.3.9; 1.1.1–2).²⁵⁵

According to Plotinus, the phenomena of the visible world are pale reflections of a more real and higher level. Similarly, the civic virtues are distorted versions of true cathartic virtues, and the senses and sensibilia of the noetic senses and sensibilia. The notion of the noetic senses refers to the special faculties of people who have ascended to the higher spheres and left everything subordinate behind. It enjoys special faculties corresponding to sense faculties, and through them supersensitive experiences of the transcendental origin of being. A similar idea is found in Origen and many other Christian mystics.²⁵⁶

Plotinus' theory of how the occurrence of passions is compatible with the impassibility of the soul became a familiar doctrine in later Neoplatonic philosophy. The commentary on Aristotle's *On the Soul* which is attributed to Simplicius stated that one group of passions consists of the vital changes in the organism, and that these are caused by the cognitive

²⁵⁵ See P. Remes, 'Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self: Unity, Reason and Awareness' (Ph.D. thesis, King's College, University of London, 2001). For *metriopatheia* and *apatheia* in later Neoplatonists, see Sorabji (2000), 205–6, 284–7. Later Neoplatonists tended to reject the doctrine of an undescended soul and the idea of a constitutionally apathetic kernel of the soul.

²⁵⁶ J. Dillon, 'Aisthēsis Noētē: A Doctrine of Spiritual Senses in Origen and in Plotinus', in Dillon (1990), essay 19.

activities of the soul. Another group consists of the pleasures and distresses of the lower organism. These are caused by external things and by bodily conditions, such as an excess of sperm or bile, and are perceived by the soul. Whether people are moved by these excitements or not depends on whether their rational soul is habituated to controlling the passions or not.²⁵⁷ According to Plotinus, the soul which aims at perfection will make the irrational part pure to the extent that its spontaneous affections will be few and can be promptly dissolved (*Enn.* 1.2.5, 21–4). For this reason Porphyry recommended vegetarianism and abstinence from sex.²⁵⁸ Porphyry systematized Plotinus' remarks on the virtues in *Enneads* 1.2 by distinguishing four groups: (1) metriopathic civic virtues, (2) purificatory virtues which obliterate the passions of the soul and help the assimilation to the divinity, (3) theoretical virtues of the apathetic soul that contemplates intelligence, and (4) exemplary virtues which reside in intelligence. Porphyry states that we should specially apply ourselves to purificatory virtues, 'believing that we can acquire them even in this life'. *Apatheia* without emotional dispositions seems to be possible only without the body.²⁵⁹ Porphyry's classification was known to medieval thinkers through Macrobius' paraphrase of it in his commentary on Cicero's *The Dream of Scipio*, which was a well-known book in medieval times.²⁶⁰

1.9 Nemesius of Emesa

Nemesius of Emesa was the late fourth-century bishop of Emesa in Syria and the author of a treatise on human nature, *De natura hominis* (c.400).²⁶¹ Nothing else is known about him. The work shows an

²⁵⁷ *Simplicius, In libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, CAG 11 (Berlin, 1882), 18.36–20.4; trans. J. O. Urmson, *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* (London: Duckworth, 1995).

²⁵⁸ *On Abstinence from Eating Animals*, ed. J. Bonffartique, M. Patillon et al., in *De l'abstinence*, 3 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1979–95), 1.32; 2.45.4; *Letter to Marcella*, ed. and trans. K. O'Brien Wicker, *Society of Biblical Literature, Texts and Translations*, 28, *Graeco-Roman Religion Series*, 10 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 35. While Porphyry's asceticism involved avoidance of all temptation, Iamblichus thought that moderate exercise of emotions can make them moderate or rid us of them. See Sorabji (2000), 285–7.

²⁵⁹ *Sententiae*, ed. E. Lamberz (Leipzig: Teubner, 1975), 32; for the ideal of *apatheia* in Porphyry, in *Simplicius, Commentary on Epictetus' Encheiridion*, ed. I. Hadot in *Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epictète*, *Philosophia antiqua*, 66 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), and in *Marinus, Vita Procli*, ed. J.-F. Boissonade (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1878), see I. Hadot, *Le Problème du néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978), 147–58.

²⁶⁰ *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970); English translation *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, by W. H. Stahl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).

²⁶¹ *Nemesius, De natura hominis*, ed. M. Morani, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987).

acquaintance with the basic ideas of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Platonism, as well as with some Christian works and Galen's medical treatises. The synthesizing approach makes Nemesius' book a valuable historical source for late ancient philosophical commonplaces. Nemesius' discussion of the emotions is based on a Platonic model of the soul, but he tries to combine it with the standard views of different philosophical schools. The chapters about emotions exemplify the knowledge that Nemesius' educated and philosophically orientated contemporaries might have had of the topic. The work was translated into Latin by Alfanus of Salerno in the second part of the eleventh century and by Burgundio of Pisa c.1165.²⁶² Nemesius' analysis of the emotions and the powers of the soul was also known through John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*, since it was copied and paraphrased there without a reference to the original author. *De fide orthodoxa* was also translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa c.1153.²⁶³

In the opening chapter Nemesius describes the nature of human beings, who are made up of a rational soul and a body, and are placed on the borderline between the realms of spirits and animals. Humans originally held a lofty position as the rulers of the visible creation, but as a result of the Fall, they have deteriorated. This is obvious from the fact that animals no longer obey them; similarly, their passions have become spontaneous and are mastered only through labourious effort. In spite of this development, one can still see in nature some traces of the original plan and understand that human beings were meant to act as God's viceroys on earth. Hence the study of human physiology and psychology can be of great significance to people who are looking for the right view of the goal of life.

In chapter 2 Nemesius discusses the nature of the human soul as a spiritual substance, and in chapter 3 he explains the union of soul and body. Chapters 4 and 5 contain a discussion of the four elements of the corporeal things and the corresponding humours of the animal bodies. This abrupt descent is based on Nemesius' view of the extremes of the

²⁶² *Nemesii Premnon Physicon a N. Alfano in Latinum translatus*, ed. K. Burkhard, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1917); *De natura hominis: Traduction de Burgundio de Pise*, ed. G. Verbeke and J. R. Moncho, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, suppl. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1975). Two further Latin translations, an Italian translation, and an edition of the Greek text were published in the sixteenth century. The work was translated in English in the seventeenth century. A modern English translation (with introduction and notes) is included in *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, ed. W. Telfer, *The Library of Christian Classics*, 4 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955). The edition of the translation by Burgundio of Pisa includes an introductory essay by G. Verbeke, 'L'anthropologie d'Némésius', pp. lx–lxxxv.

²⁶³ See p. 213 below.

ladder of visible being. In the succeeding chapters he again ascends from bottom to top. Much attention is paid to the argument that the human soul is a separate substance which is united with the body without being affected by the body, as explained by 'Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus' (3, 39.16–40.7). Nemesius regarded the human soul as an immaterial and immortal entity (2, 37.21–38.10). While the highest power of the soul seems to be able to grasp intelligible things directly, it is aware of the sensible reality through activities in which the sense organs are involved (6, 56.2–6, 21–3; 13, 68.18–69.15).²⁶⁴ Since Nemesius thought that being aware of something is a psychic ability, he apparently assumed that there is also a soul substance in animals, though it is not immortal. The cognitive capacities of the lower level of the human soul which co-operates with the senses are similar in human beings and in animals, except that the thinking power of humans is greater.²⁶⁵

The opening chapters of Nemesius' work are Platonist, but the concluding discussion of the voluntary act is largely based on the third book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The Galenic impact is particularly clear in Nemesius' descriptions of the functions of the human organism, which are divided into the systems of nerves, the heart, and the liver. The liver produces blood, which is a mixture of the elementary humours absorbed from the food. The blood supplies nourishment to the whole body through the veins (chs. 4 and 23). The heart distributes the natural heat and the vitalizing pneuma through the arteries to all parts of the body. The vital pneuma is produced from the vaporized blood which the artery sucks out of the adjoining veins (ch. 24).

In Galen the vital pneuma is turned into psychic pneuma in the brain, but Nemesius does not say this.²⁶⁶ The organ of the psychic functions is the brain, and particularly the psychic pneuma, which also mediates the

²⁶⁴ The chapters on the nature of the soul are based on Middle Platonist and Neoplatonist sources; see H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' 'Symmiktá Zetemata', Zetemata*, 20 (Munich: Beck, 1959). The relationship between the levels of understanding is not explained. See also Verbeke, essay cited in n. 262, pp. xx–xxii.

²⁶⁵ Nemesius was interested in the question of whether animals have a rational soul, discussed by Porphyry, Iamblichus, and other late Platonists (Sorabji (1993), 192–4). While admitting that animals have some cognitive capacities similar to those of human beings, Nemesius does not call the animals rational, because they do not have intuitive knowledge of the intelligibles, and their behaviour is based on instinctive impulses rather than on free choice (1, 4.12–16; 2, 35.14–17; 2, 36.13–37.2; 33, 99.15–16).

²⁶⁶ In 28, 90.20–3, it is stated that the psychic pneuma is generated from the air in the heart, but it is not clear whether this is meant to be the same pneuma which is found in the brain and the nerves. Telfer misleadingly translates 'the psychic pneuma' as 'the vital spirit' in many places; see pp. 333, 335, 341 (Nemesius 8, 64.10; 12, 68.12; 13, 69.20).

impressions from the sense-organs to the centre of perception in the frontal ventricles of the brain (6, 56.2–4; 12, 68.11–13; 13, 69.18–20).²⁶⁷ Perception itself is a psychic event based on changes in the sensory system (6, 56.5–6, 21–3). Through these changes caused by sensible qualities, the perceiving soul is aware of external sensible things and not only the changes in the organs (chs. 7–11). Imagination (*phantastikon*) is the centre of perception, the faculty through which the soul is aware of perceptible things and can also imagine things which are not present (6, 55.9–13; 57.5–7).

The psychic pneuma in the middle ventricle of the brain is the medium of judgement, assent, dissent, and impulse. Nemesius does not describe the details of the operations of this thinking faculty (*dianoētikon*), which is also the source of voluntary bodily movements through the nerves going from its organ to the muscles (chs. 12 and 27). The cognitive contents of the faculties of sense and thought are deposited in the memory, which is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain (ch. 13):

So, then, the faculty of imagination transmits to the faculty of thinking the appearances, while the faculty of thinking or reasoning receives them, passes judgement on them, and transmits them on to the faculty of memory. (13, 69.16–18)

As evidence for the localization of the faculties, Nemesius states that people have various psychological dysfunctions, depending on which part of the brain is hurt. This was a Galenic medical doctrine. Nemesius tells Galen's story of a man suffering from inflammation of the brain who threw various valuable things down from a window. He named them correctly, which was a sign that while his thinking power was diseased, his senses were intact (13, 69.20–71.4; cf. Galen, *On Affected Places* 3.9).

Nemesius begins his discussion of the passions with an Aristotelian distinction. He states that there are a rational level and an irrational level in the human soul, and that the latter is divisible into that which can be controlled by reason and that which cannot. The former involves the appetitive faculty and the spirited faculty, and the passions are acts of these two. The emotional faculties are motive powers in the sense that they can initiate action (16, 73.7–12). Emotional reactions, as distinct from choices, are immediate and not premeditated. Reason is the rational

²⁶⁷ Only the smell functions without a sensory nerve, vapours going directly to the brain (11, 67.17–23); cf. Galen, *PHP* 7.5 (462.13–19).

motive power and can control the actualization of emotional suggestions and to some extent the rise of occurrent emotions (chs. 32–3).

Nemesius thought, like Galen, that, physiologically speaking, the emotions are motions in the systems of the humours and the vital pneuma. The organ of the appetitive faculty is the liver, and that of the spirited faculty is the heart (16, 73.12–20). His more comprehensive psychological view of the emotions shows similarities to the compositional model, as is clear from the descriptions of emotions in chapters 17–21. An occurrent emotion, primarily an act of an emotional faculty, is associated with an activating representation of an object which is evaluated as emotionally relevant, a pleasant or unpleasant feeling, a behavioural suggestion, and inner movements of the emotional organs.²⁶⁸

Nemesius states that when one feels bodily pain or pleasure, the bodily change is one thing, and the pleasure or pain associated with it is another. Bodily pleasure or pain is the psychic sensation of what is going on in the body.²⁶⁹ Correspondingly, only those acts of the emotional faculties are passions (in the sense of emotion) which are associated with a pleasant or unpleasant awareness. It is possible that the acts of emotional powers are not perceived, but they are not emotions in this case (16, 73.21–74.7, 75.1–6). It remains somewhat unclear what the pleasant or unpleasant feeling is. Since Nemesius thinks that the emotional faculties are desiderative and that their acts typically initiate behavioural changes, the feelings could be pleasant or unpleasant modes of being aware of the things which activate these changes. Nemesius adds a paragraph on Galen's remarks on the terms *pathos* and *energeia* in *PHP* 6.1 (74.7–75.1), which he regards as further examples of uses of the term 'passion'. (See p. 97 above.)

In chapter 17 Nemesius first states that the appetitive passions are divided into pleasures and distresses, but he then discusses these following the Stoic division, pleasures and distresses being the appetitive acts with

²⁶⁸ Two general definitions of an emotional passion run as follows: 'Passion is a perceived movement of the desiderative faculty upon the appearance of something good or bad; or, otherwise, passion is an irrational movement of the soul due to regarding something as good or bad' (16, 74.3–5). The desiderative faculty (*orektikon*) involves the appetitive faculty and the spirited faculty. The inner organs of the passions are the heart, the organ of anger, 'apt to vigorous movement and ordered for hard service and vehement impulse', and the liver, the 'soft organ' for 'soft appetite' (16, 73.13–16). The appetitive acts of children and animals are described as follows: 'As soon as they see food, they are pleased, and are moved to it as if it were a familiar thing, and they feel distress if they do not manage' (32, 98.23–5).

²⁶⁹ Nemesius took for granted that to feel pain in one's foot is a form of perception which takes place in the brain. The perception itself is not painful; therefore one does not have an additional painful perception about the act in the head (8, 64.1–15).

respect to actual things, and desires and fears those with respect to future things. Evil passions arise in the soul because of defective education, ignorance, or poor bodily constitution. The therapy needed in the first case is rehabilitation, in the second case knowledge, and in the third a combination of diet, gymnastics, and medicine, which may improve the mixture of the humours.

Chapter 18 contains a longer discussion of pleasure. According to Nemesius, there are physical pleasures and psychic pleasures. Psychic pleasures are about the activities of the soul, such as those pertaining to learning and contemplation. Physical pleasures are about the activities of the body. These are not purely physical pleasures, since something is a pleasure only through a pleasant awareness of it in the soul. Some of the physical pleasures are both natural and necessary. They are associated with things without which life would not be possible. Others are natural but not necessary, such as natural and legitimate sexual intercourse. Still others are neither natural nor necessary, such as drunkenness, lasciviousness, and surfeits. Pleasures of the third group are merely harmful. In commenting on this traditional division, Nemesius states that those living according to God should have only pleasures which are natural and necessary, while people representing the second class of virtue can have some of the pleasures of the second group in a moderate and proper way. After having sketched Platonic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian views, Nemesius states that such pleasures are good without qualification which do not involve pain, cause repentance afterwards, give rise to other harms, exceed the limits of moderation, distract us from good works too much, or enslave us. The highest pleasures are those connected with religious meditation, theoretical knowledge, and virtues. Nemesius remarks that some people do not apply the word 'pleasure' to these things. The chapter on pleasure does not deal with the passion as such. Neither are we told which kind of appetitive act pleasure is, nor is it explained how this act is related to the pleasant awareness of it.

In chapter 19 Nemesius deals with the forms of distress (*lupē*): grief (*akhos*), anguish (*akhthos*), envy (*phthonos*), and pity (*eleos*). Grief is a distress which makes one speechless, anguish is one which oppresses, envy is provoked by other people's prosperity, and pity by other people's suffering. These terms are involved in the longer Stoic lists of the modes of distress. This choice apparently reflects Nemesius' wish to state that distress can be caused by evaluations of what happens to oneself or what happens to others. Quoting Galen's lost *On Demonstration*, Nemesius states that the pain which accompanies fear is caused by changes in the

pit of the stomach, more specifically by the bites of the yellow bile which accumulates there. This was meant to correct the common view that appetitive pain is felt physically in the heart, the organ of the spirited faculty (21, 82.5–14). The main organ of the appetitive faculty is the liver; Nemesius seems to think that this also employs the whole system of humours. His sympathy for the extirpation model of perfection is seen in the remark that contemplative people are apathetic with respect to earthly events. They feel no distress with respect to them and have only necessary pleasures. Good people who are not perfect may feel moderate non-necessary pleasures and moderate distress about unjust suffering.

The remarks on anger in chapter 20 begin with a distinction from Aristotle's *On the Soul*. Anger (*thumos*) is, physiologically speaking, the seething of the blood around the heart. Psychologically, it is a desire for revenge caused by the distress which arises when we think that we have been wronged. Nemesius adds that the heating of the blood is caused by exhalation coming from the bile or by thickening of the bile. There are three kinds of anger (*thumos*): incipient anger or wrath (*orgē*), which is also called cholera (*kholē*, *kholos*); rancour (*mēnis*), which is an inveterate wrath kept alive through the memory; and vindictiveness (*kotos*), which is wrath on the watch for an opportunity for revenge.²⁷⁰ Nemesius also mentions the Platonic idea that anger may become a servant of the rational part through strengthening its efforts emotionally.

Fear is divided into six species (ch. 21). Shrinking (*oknos*) is fear of taking action; terror (*kataplēxis*) is fear arising from some strong impression; consternation (*ekplēxis*) is fear arising from an impression without precedent; anxiety (*agonia*) is helpless fear of failure; shyness (*aidōs*) is a fear due to an expected reproach; and shame (*aiskhunē*) a fear due to having done a disgraceful deed. Nemesius adds that the terms *aidōs* and *aiskhunē* are also used as synonyms.²⁷¹ The physiological component of fear is that blood and natural heat are concentrated in the heart.

Nemesius' chapters on emotions are doxographic. Many of the emotions occur in the Stoic lists. Since the initial conceptual remarks are not developed further, there are no explanations of how the passions as acts of emotional faculties are related to accompanying pleasure and distress. It is stated that the distress which is associated with fear involves a feeling of

²⁷⁰ The terms *thumos* and *orgē* were often used as synonyms; some authors distinguished them by stating that *thumos* is an incipient anger and *orgē* a more established aggression. See p. 128 below.

²⁷¹ For the synonymy, see Cairns (1993), 415. The meanings were distinguished by the Stoics; see Stobaeus 2.61.10–11; DL 7.112.

physical pain, but it is not clear whether this is the whole content of feeling. The remarks about the physical organs are sketchy. In speaking about fear, Nemesius says that it involves pain felt in the pit of the stomach, but at the same time hot blood runs to the heart (21, 82.4). It also remains unclear how the passions are divided between the appetitive power and the spirited power.

CHAPTER 2

Emotions and the Ancient Pursuit of Christian Perfection

While early Christianity as a religious movement was not philosophical in itself, it was not possible to combine it with just any intellectual position, and Christians could thus not wholly avoid discussing philosophical questions. The philosophy with which Christian missionaries and apologists had to come to terms was a blend of Stoic and Platonist doctrines familiar to educated people.¹ The letters of St Paul and some other early Christian writings were to some extent influenced by popular philosophical views,² but the detailed Christian evaluations of philosophical doctrines came much later. There were then authors like Tertullian (*c.*160–*c.*220) who knew contemporary philosophy and stressed the radical discontinuity between it and Christianity. One of the most quoted ancient Christian slogans is Tertullian's rhetorical question: 'What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?'³ In Irenaeus' *Against Heresies* there is a short cosmological paragraph which is meant to show that heretical doctrines are not new but include, among other things, quotations from Greek philosophers.⁴ In Hippolytus' partially preserved treatise (*c.*220) all heresies are associated

¹ For early Christianity and its relations with Greek philosophy and literature, see H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); J. Daniélou, *A History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea*, ii: *Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture*, trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: Westminster Press; London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1973).

² One recent work on this question is T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000). The responses of Philo and Paul to the oratory sophistic movement are considered in B. C. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists*, Society for New Testament Studies, Monograph Series, 96 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

³ *De praescriptione haereticorum*, ed. R. F. Refoulé, SC 46 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1957), 7.9.

⁴ *Adversus haereses I–V*, ed. A. Rousseau, L. Doutreleau *et al.*, SC 100, 152–3, 210–11, 263–4, 293–4 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1965–83), 2.14.2–5. Quoting parts of Plato's *Laws* 4.715e–716a and *Tim.* 29e, probably found in a doxographic work, Irenaeus states that Plato appears to be more pious than the gnostic heretics (3.25.5).

with particular philosophical doctrines.⁵ But there were also thinkers such as Justin Martyr, who had a pretty positive view of philosophy as a serious search for truth and tried to combine the best elements in Plato and the Stoics with the Christian faith.⁶ The aim of the Christian life is similarity to God, who is free from passions, as the saints will be in heaven. In the present life one should keep the irrational movements of the soul under strict control.⁷ Justin's works may have been among the treatises which provoked the Platonist Celsus to write his attack on Christianity. Celsus was particularly irritated by the claim that in philosophy there was a partial apprehension of truths which were more completely explicated in Christianity. Celsus' work was written around 177–80, some 15 years after Justin's death, and is known through Origen's extensive quotations in his detailed answer to it in *Against Celsus*.⁸ At the same time Athenagoras, calling himself a Christian philosopher, wrote an apology for the Christians to the emperor Marcus Aurelius. Another treatise ascribed to Athenagoras on the resurrection involves a brief remark about the passions which shows some theoretical interest in the subject.⁹ Uncontrolled passions (pleasure, distress, appetite, fear) are the source of vices. Because the passions are partly physical, it would be unfair if the soul only were eternally punished, without the body (*On Resurrection* 21.3–8). In stressing the psychosomatic nature of the passions, the author may be following Galen, whose medical work *On the Use of Parts* is

⁵ *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, ed. M. Marcovich, *Patristische Texte und Studien*, 25 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1986).

⁶ R. M. Grant, *Greek Apologists of the Second Century* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1988), 50–73; J. C. M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, Chapters One to Nine* (Leiden: Brill, 1971); E. F. Osborn, *Justin Martyr* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973).

⁷ *Apologiae pro Christianis*, ed. M. Marcovich, *Patristische Texte und Studien*, 38 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1994); First Apology 10.2; 25.2; 58.3, Second Apology 1.2; *idem, Dialogus cum Tryphone*, ed. M. Marcovich, *Patristische Texte und Studien*, 47 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1997), 124.4; see also T. Rütger, *Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alexandria: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des christlichen Vollkommenheitsbegriffes* (Freiburg: Herder, 1949), 39–42.

⁸ Origen's *Contra Celsum* is edited by M. Marcovich, *Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae*, 54 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), and translated by H. Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). R. J. Hoffmann has translated the parts of Celsus' works quoted by Origen under the title *On the True Doctrine: A Discourse Against the Christians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). The question of whether Celsus was acquainted with Justin's apologetic writings is not settled.

⁹ Athenagoras, *Legatio and De resurrectione*, ed. and trans. by W. Schoedel, *Oxford Early Christian Texts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). The authorship of *On Resurrection* is questionable. In his new edition, M. Marcovich (*Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae*, 53, Leiden: Brill, 2000) assumes that the treatise was written in the late second century, but that the author was not Athenagoras.

employed in the treatise (5.3). In Tertullian's *On the Soul* there is also a brief comment on Plato's theory of the three parts of the soul, which are called *rationale*, *indignativum* (*thumikon*), and *concupiscentivum* (*epithumētikon*).¹⁰

Clement and Origen, the Alexandrian teachers of Christianity, formulated an influential, inclusive view of the relation between reason and revelation. Their approach is characterized as a synthesis of Christianity and Greek education. It is true that their criterion for what was reasonable was shaped largely by philosophy, but they also thought that revelation disclosed an absolute truth and brought with it new basic insights far removed from what one could learn in the schools of the philosophers. Of these authors, Origen was more reserved than Clement in evaluating pagan philosophy positively. In this chapter I shall deal first with Clement's and Origen's conception of the emotions (section 2.1) and its partial reception and modification by the Cappadocian Fathers (section 2.2) and the Egyptian desert monks, whose teaching came to influence Western thought through the works of John Cassian (section 2.3). The second part concentrates on Augustine's view of the emotions and the will (section 2.4). I conclude with some remarks on Gregory the Great, Pseudo-Dionysius, and other late ancient Christian authors (section 2.5).

2.1 Clement of Alexandria and Origen

The emergence of Christianity in Alexandria, the Eastern centre of Mediterranean culture, was probably associated with the Jewish community, but details of the early period are unknown. In the second century there were some representatives of Gnostic Christianity—Basilides taught in Alexandria, and Valentinus was educated and began his teaching career there.¹¹ Valentinus moved to Rome before the middle of the second

¹⁰ Tertullian, *De anima*, ed. with introduction and commentary by J. H. Waszink (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1947), 16.3. According to Tertullian, appetite (*concupiscentia*) and anger (*indignatio*) are perverted by the corruption of the soul. In Christ, however, they were wholly rational, and his soul is a model for Christians. Rational anger and desire characterize God, too (16.5–6). See Waszink edn. 229–35.

¹¹ B. Layton (trans. and ed.), *The Gnostic Scriptures: A New Translation with Annotations and Introductions* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 217–27, 417–19. Some Gnostic teachers combined popular philosophical ideas with their religious views. For the Stoic classification of the emotions in a Gnostic text, see the anonymous treatise edited in *The Apocryphon of John: Synopsis of Nag Hammadi Codices II,1, III,1, and IV,1 with BG 8502,2* by M. Waldstein and F. Wisse, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, 33 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 111. The daemons participating in the creation of the psychic body are called the masters of pleasure, appetite, distress, and fear. The lists associated with these types of emotions are also partially Stoic. There are further examples of references to emotions in Gnostic cosmology in Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, 1.4.1–1.5.1.

century, where he became known as a teacher alongside Justin Martyr and Marcion, an influential heretical theologian who wanted to drop all references to the Old Testament deity from Christian doctrine. The first known orthodox Alexandrian teacher was Pantaenus, a convert from Stoicism. Clement of Alexandria (c.150–c.215) was his pupil. No writings of Pantaenus have survived; Clement is best known for his works *Protrepticus* (*Exhortation*), *Paedagogus* (*Educator*), and *Stromata* (*Miscellanies*), which were intended to provide catechumens with the principles of Christianity and Christian morality.¹² Origen (c.185–c.253) was the greatest figure of Alexandrian theology and one of the most original Christian thinkers in ancient times. He studied philosophy, probably under Ammonius Saccas and the other Platonist teachers of Alexandria, and was long a teacher of the catechetical school of Alexandria. His disagreements with the bishop of Alexandria compelled him to migrate to Palestinian Caesarea, where he lived for some 20 years.¹³

Clement's works were much influenced by Philo (c.20 BC–AD 40), the learned leader of the Alexandrian Jewish community. Philo's philosophical theology was influenced by the works of Plato, contemporary Alexandrian Platonists, and the Stoics. Philo developed an apologetic and spiritual interpretation of the Pentateuch by applying the allegorical method employed by Stoic and Platonic philosophers and also by some Jewish authors. Philo thought that an enlightened exegete could explicate the deeper meaning of the Scriptures; this task was taken to benefit from contemplation and moral improvement, as well as from the studies of philosophical doctrines. Philo's conception of philosophy was influenced by his conviction that the Greek sages were indebted to the Pentateuch for some of their basic insights.¹⁴ Clement often made use of Philo's

¹² These works are edited by O. Stählin in the series *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (GCS), vols. 12, 15, 17 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1905–19). Revised editions are published in the same series. The *Protrepticus* is re-edited also by M. Marcovich, *Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae*, 34 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), trans. W. Butterworth, *Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1919). The *Paedagogus* is also re-edited by M. Marcovich with the assistance of J. C. M. van Winden, *Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae*, 61 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), trans. S. P. Wood, *The Fathers of the Church*, 23 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1954). *Stromata*, books 1–3, are translated by J. Ferguson, *The Fathers of the Church*, 85 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1991). *The Ante-Nicene Fathers* (repr. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1967) includes older translations of the works.

¹³ H. Crouzel, *Origen*, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: Clark, 1989); J. W. Trigg, *Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-Century Church* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1983). The main ancient source for Origen's life is Book 6 of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*.

¹⁴ See D. T. Runia, *Exegesis and Philosophy: Studies on Philo of Alexandria* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990); J. Mansfeld, 'Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo's Exegetical Strat-

writings, and there are far-reaching similarities in their theological approaches.¹⁵ Clement and Origen thought that the core of Christianity was the revelation of an inexhaustible mystery and source of wisdom which was the fulfilment of the Old Testament hopes and the quest for ultimate truth in general. Deeper understanding of the revealed wisdom demanded moral purity and proceeding beyond the letter of Scripture to its spiritual meaning. Christian allegorical exegesis was particularly developed by Origen, whose works consist mainly of sermons and biblical commentaries.¹⁶

Clement and Origen regarded the divine Word (*Logos*) simultaneously as the incarnate Christ and the cosmic principle of intelligibility. In dealing with this conception, they could find certain points of reference in the Stoic doctrine of cosmic reason and in the Middle Platonists' view of ideas as divine thoughts. The concept of the divine *Logos* as a mediator often occurred in Philo's works, and the Alexandrian Christian version was anticipated in the works of Justin Martyr as well.¹⁷ The *Logos* doctrine could have led to a positive attitude towards all search for knowledge, but in fact the Alexandrian theologians and those following them concentrated on the ascent of the soul to mystical knowledge of God (*gnōsis*) through meditation, spiritual exercises, and asceticism.¹⁸ Clement said

egies', in *idem, Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1989), essay 10.

¹⁵ A. van den Hoek, *Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the Stromateis*, Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*, 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1988).

¹⁶ H. de Lubac, *Histoire et Esprit: l'intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène* (Paris: Aubier, 1950). The biblical works which involve extensive discussions of emotions are the commentary on the Psalms, *Selecta in Psalmos*, PG 12, 1085–1320, 1409–1685; the *Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum*, and *Homiliae in Canticum Canticorum*, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 33 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1925); the *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, ed. E. Klostermann and E. Benz, GCS 40 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1935–7); and *Commentariorum series in Matthaeum*, ed. E. Klostermann and E. Benz, GCS 38 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1933). Origen's commentary on The Song of Songs (*Canticum Canticorum*) is partially preserved in Rufinus' Latin translation, and his homilies on the same book in Jerome's Latin translation. These works are translated by R. P. Lawson in *The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies*, Ancient Christian Writers, 26 (Westminster: Newman Press; London: Longmans, 1957).

¹⁷ See A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, trans. J. Bowden (London and Oxford: Mowbrays, 1975), i. 89–94, 133–49.

¹⁸ The thesis of the high evaluation of all knowledge by Origen is mainly based on a description by his student Gregory Thaumaturgus: 'He required us to study philosophy by reading all the existing writings of the ancient philosophers and poets': *In Origenem oratio*, ed. H. Crouzel, SC 148 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969), 13.151. Gregory does not tell how much time was used for study of the visible reality and how the study programme was influenced by the fact that Origen did not primarily appreciate knowledge as such but its significance for spiritual progress. See e.g. *Comm. in Cant.*, prol., 78.1–10 (Lawson, 44).

that the true knowledge deifies those who have it (*Prot.* 11.114.4) and that ‘the Logos of God was made a human being so that you might learn from this how a human being can become God’ (*Prot.* 1.8.4). The progress from being an image of God as a rational being to similitude through moral and spiritual perfection is preparatory to a more perfect divinization.¹⁹ Origen made use of the same scheme, but he put a more ascetic interpretation on moral perfection, and further developed the spiritual conceptions of the ascent of the soul and its mystical union with God.²⁰

Clement criticized the fideism of simple believers. They remained at the beginning of the road, while ‘the true gnostics’ sought progress in spiritual insight and in contemplation.²¹ Their religiosity was based on the fear of hell and the hope of heaven, while the more advanced Christians loved God and goodness for their own sake.²² According to Origen, simple believers were in the majority, and advanced Christians an exception in the Church. Like Clement, Origen also stated that their Christianity was based on fear of God’s wrath and the torments of hell. Their faith was literary, unscholarly, non-theological, and stagnant. Even though Origen reproached the religious immaturity of simple believers, his view of their morality was less critical. He believed that the worst Christians were better than average pagans and took this as a proof of the superiority of Christianity over philosophy. Nevertheless, simple believers did not achieve the ethical level of a perfect gnostic who is free from all earthly ties. Origen saw simple faith as a form of elementary spirituality which had not developed as it should. He accepted it as a saving faith, although it did not guarantee believers the same state of blessedness in the life to come as the advanced Christians’ faith in which Christ was present.²³

In the synergistic view of Clement and Origen, grace is something that helps those who do their best. Its significance is greater at the higher levels

¹⁹ See also *Paed.* 3.1.5; *Strom.* 4.6 (40.1); 4.26 (168.2); 7.10 (56.6); and W. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, 57 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1952), 109–15, 597–609.

²⁰ W. Völker, *Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes: Eine Untersuchung zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit und zu den Anfängen christlicher Mystik* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1931). For the idea of divinization (*theopoiēsis*) through knowledge in Origen, see *Commentarius in Iohannem*, ed. E. Preuschen, GCS 10 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1903), 32.338–40; cf. *Homiliae in Lucam*, ed. M. Rauer, GCS 49 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1959), 29, 171.18: ‘It will be necessary for you, too, become God in Christ Jesus.’ The mystical union did not imply a substantial union in the writings of the Alexandrians.

²¹ *Strom.* 6.10 (80.1–81.1); 6.11 (89.1–3); 6.18 (165.1).

²² *Strom.* 6.12 (98.3–99.3); 7.11 (67.2); Chadwick (1966), 42, 53.

²³ G. af Hällström, *Fides simpliciorum according to Origen of Alexandria, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, 76 (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1984).

of progress than at the stage of elementary moral improvement. Grace contributes to the growth of spiritual wisdom and to participation in divine love which is given to those who are pure in heart (*Strom.* 5.13 (83.1)):

In the end gnosis is granted to those fit and accepted for it, on account of great preparation and prior training necessary for hearing what is being said, composing one's life, and advancing through observance far beyond the righteousness of the Law. (*Strom.* 7.10 (56.2))

Origen wrote in his *Commentary on the Song of Songs*:

If, then, a man . . . has come to renounce the world and all that is therein, he will follow on from that point to contemplate and to desire 'the things that are not seen', and 'that are eternal'. To attain these, however, we need God's mercy, so that having beheld the beauty of the Word of God, we may be kindled with a saving love for Him, and He Himself may deign to love the soul, whose longings for Himself He has perceived. (Prol., 79.12–21, trans. Lawson 45–6)²⁴

Since Clement's conception of Christian morality was essentially based on obedience to the divine Word, and since he thought that detaching oneself from ties to earthly things was the first step toward perfection, he found the Stoic ethics and its therapy of emotions particularly congenial. The *Paedagogus* is modelled on the Stoic manuals of ethics, and includes excerpts from Musonius Rufus, the Stoic teacher of Epictetus.²⁵ The Stoic idea that the right insight is the basic medicine for the emotions occurs in Clement's works in the form of Christ as the Logos being the healer of the emotions (*Paed.* 1.1.2–3).²⁶ Obviously drawing on Chrysippus' definitions, Clement describes emotions as unnatural, excessive, and runaway impulses which are disobedient to reason.²⁷ According to Clement, the initial therapy of the emotions takes place first through moderation and control. This part of his theory was influenced by the ethics of Middle Platonism, and it shows much similarity to discussions in Philo. The task of reason is to keep the lower parts of the soul, the *epithumetikon* and the *thumoeides*, within strict limits, without completely eradicating them.

²⁴ For grace in Origen's theology, see Völker (1931), 38–43.

²⁵ See H.-I. Marrou's introduction to *Paedagogus*, SC 70 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1960), 51–2. For the Stoic classification of the emotions, see *Paed.* 1.13.101 (150.21–5).

²⁶ For similar formulations in Philo, see Lilla (1971), 96–8. Some Gnostics also taught that Christ's task was the healing of emotions; see Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* 1.4.5.

²⁷ *Strom.* 2.13 (59.6). In discussing the Stoic conceptions of the good life Clement also refers to Posidonius' view on mastering the irrational powers of the soul: *Strom.* 2.21 (129.1–5). See Kidd (1988) (2.2), 670–4.

Both Philo and Clement call this the *metriopatheia* view.²⁸ Clement thought that the Stoic alienation strategy was a useful tool for teaching moderation. Earthly things which strongly fascinate some people are described as superfluous, unnecessary, or harmful with respect to the natural functions of a rational being. Functional descriptions of various social events, equipment, and bodily organs are regarded as helpful. Like the Stoics, Clement saw this as a way of deconstructing the alleged emotional value of things:

We should keep from speaking while eating, for speech is inarticulate and ill-mannered when the mouth is full, and the tongue, impeded by the food, cannot function properly but utters only indistinct sounds (*Paed.* 2.1.13) . . . What difference does it make if the wash basin be only of clay? Will it not hold water anyway to wash the hands? (2.3.37) . . . Sandals are used for two things: one, as a covering for the feet, and the other, as a precaution against stumbling and against the roughness of climbing uphill, to protect the soles of the feet. (2.11.116–17, trans. Wood)

Moderation of the emotions was the elementary ethical level all Christians should achieve, but the ideal of perfection demanded more. The true Gnostics do not have emotional ties to earthly things. They imitate the life of Christ, who was apathetic, entirely free from human passion, and therefore sinless (*Paed.* 1.2.4; *Strom.* 7.1 (7.2)). Their goal is similarity to the impassible God (*Strom.* 6.9 (73.6)). Consequently, they pass from the simple moderation of the emotions to their eradication—that is, from *metriopatheia* to *apatheia*.²⁹ Thus an irrational initial fear of God will be transformed in those who make progress into an attitude which shows similarities to the Stoic caution (*eulabeia*) of right reason. It is the impassible fear of the impassible God (*Strom.* 2.7 (32.4); 2.8 (40.1–2)).³⁰ In describing caution Clement uses also the Stoic term *prosoikhē*, which refers to inner supervision of one's thoughts (*Strom.* 2.20

²⁸ Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 3.129, 132, 134; Clement, *Paed.* 2.164; *Strom.* 2.8 (39.4); 2.20 (109.1); Lilla (1971), 99, 103.

²⁹ *Strom.* 5.11 (67.2–4); 6.9 (74.1); 6.13 (105.1). For Clement's view of the eradication of the passions, see Rütther (1949), 50–102; Völker (1952), 183–94, 524–40.

³⁰ Clement stressed that the fear of God as an attitude of advanced Christians is not an irrational emotion. The law produces fear, and even though it first may be an emotion caused by the thought of punishment, it should become a rational fear of sin. This is not analogous to the fear of wild animals, which involves hatred, but rather to a son's reverential fear of his father which involves love. 'Anyone who fears to offend his father is showing love towards him' (*Strom.* 2.12 (53.4)). For similar remarks in Irenaeus, see *Adversus haereses* 4.16.5. These discussions were later systematized in the influential doctrine of the difference between *timor servilis* and *timor filialis*. See also Völker (1952), 272–8.

(120.1)).³¹ It is worth noting that in Clement's view the *apatheia* of the perfect Christians does not involve caution (*Strom.* 6.9 (74.2)). The Christian *apatheia* is associated with *agapē* love rather than with the Stoic *eupatheiai*.

There was a similar distinction between the lower *metriopatheia* and higher *apatheia* in Philo, who saw moderation and eradication of emotions as ideals for different people. In comparing Moses and Aaron, Philo said that Aaron practised moderation of emotions. He is characterized as a man undergoing improvement (*prokoptōs*, a Stoic term) while Moses, being perfect, did not aim at mediocrity, but completely cut off all emotions like a Stoic sage (*Leg. alleg.* 3.132). Philo illustrated the extirpation of the emotions by referring to Leviticus 8: 29, where Moses removes the breast from the ram of consecration. This image alludes to certain problems in combining Stoic extirpation with Platonic moderation, which were based on different conceptions of the soul. Philo seems to have realized that Moses could be a Stoic sage only by not having the lower parts of the soul.³² In interpreting Jesus' saying about people who have castrated themselves for the sake of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 19: 12), Clement says that they emasculate themselves from all desires (*Strom.* 3.7 (59.4)). Origen, who in his youth possibly understood the saying literally and castrated himself (Eusebius 6.8.1–3), stated later that 'they cut away the emotional part of the soul (*to tēs psychēs pathētikon*)'.³³ These metaphors are easily understood in so far as the emotional part is interpreted in terms of moral psychology. It is less clear what happens to the emotional part as a psychic entity or faculty.³⁴ Clement seems to think that it hardly has any function in true gnostics whose soul is dominated by the supernatural *agapē* love. They give up their mundane identity and the patterns of desire and self-assessment which belong to this level of the soul:

Love is no longer a desire of him who loves: it is loving affinity restoring the gnostic to the unity of faith, without his having any further need of time or of space. Already established by love in those things that he will possess, having anticipated hope by gnosis, he no longer longs for anything, having everything

³¹ See p. 79 above.

³² Dillon (1990), essay 18, 103.

³³ *Comm. in Matth.* 15.4 (358.23). The emotional part of the soul is said to involve the appetitive part and the spirited part: *Homiliae in Lucam*, fr. 187.9–10; *Selecta in Psalmos*, PG 12, 1465B.

³⁴ The Platonic tripartition occurs in Philo, e.g. *Leg. alleg.* 1.71–3; in Clement, e.g. *Paed.* 3.1.2, *Strom.* 5.8 (53.1); and in Origen, e.g. *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 33 (Leipzig: J. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1925), 340.1–4. See also Lilla (1971), 81–2, 97–9; G. Reydamas-Schils, 'Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground', *Ancient Philosophy*, 22 (2002), 138–9.

that he could long for. He remains then in the one unchanging condition, loving in gnostic fashion, and does not have to desire to be made similar to those who are beautiful, for he possesses beauty by love. What need is there now of courage or of appetite for this man who has attained affinity with the impassible God which arises from love and has been enrolled amongst friends by love? For us, the perfect gnostic must be removed from any passion of the soul. For gnosis achieves exercise, exercise then gives habit or accustoming, and this calming ends in *apatheia*, not in *metriopatheia*. (*Strom.* 6.9 (73.3–74.1))

The gnostic's new image of himself as a soul attached to divinity changes the attitude towards other creatures. They are loved, not as such and not out of a self-regarding interest, but as objects created and sustained by God:

He always loves God towards whom alone he is wholly turned, and, because of this, he hates none of God's creatures, and he does not strive after anything, for nothing is lacking for his assimilation to Him who is good and beautiful. He does not love anything with an ordinary love (*philia*), but loves (*agapa*) the creator through creatures. (*Strom.* 6. 9 (71.4–5))³⁵

Clement's image of a perfect Christian was an unattainable ideal for most of his readers, but it anticipated the spirituality of the monks who left secular society and were devoted to contemplation and religious asceticism. His short scheme for spiritual progress was later often repeated in this context:

Faith appears to us as the first leaning towards salvation; fear, hope, and penitence develop in the wake of faith, in association with self-control and patience, and lead us to love and knowledge. (*Strom.* 2.6 (31.1), trans. Ferguson)

³⁵ In his well-known book *Agape and Eros: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love*, trans. P. S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953) Anders Nygren states that what Clement calls *agapē* is in fact the heavenly *erōs* of the Platonists: i.e. an appetite seeking fulfilment through ascending towards the divine sphere. One certainly finds examples of this love in Clement, but Nygren finds it also in those very texts in which the seeking attitude is eliminated from the *agapē* love. (For a more general criticism of Nygren's interpretation see Völker (1952), 483–4.) H. Chadwick states that there is no word in Clement of the possibility of satiety. The true gnostic makes an infinite advance into the knowledge of God and prefers dynamic progress to static possession ('Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought', in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 178–9). Chadwick refers to *Strom.* 6.136, but apparently means 4.136; in this text Clement says only that the true gnostic would choose the knowledge of God even if it were not associated with everlasting salvation. Gregory of Nyssa taught infinite progress of the soul that is eternally satisfied and eternally desiring more with no final satisfaction. (See pp. 133–4 below.) Sorabji (2000, 388) states that in Origen's view there can be a desire which avoids the danger of satiety by ever increasing. However, it is not clear whether Origen thought about an eternal desire in *De Principiis*, ed. and trans. H. Görgemanns and H. Karpp, *Texte zur Forschung*, 24 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 1.3.8, to which Sorabji refers.

Like Clement, many authors combined detachment with love (*agapē*), putting forward slightly different views about whether *agapē* makes *apatheia* possible, or vice versa.³⁶

The more elaborated foundation of the higher part of this spirituality was established by Clement's protégé, Origen. In his twenty-seventh homily on *Numbers* Origen allegorized the journey of the Israelites from Egypt to the promised land as a pilgrim's progress of the soul.³⁷ Going out into the wilderness, the soul learns to separate itself from whatever attaches it to the values and practices of the fallen world. This takes place through mortification of the passions and evil thoughts and through perfect obedience to God. Growth in humility and freedom from the emotions is accompanied by the increasing influence of grace and, through this, by augmented spiritual understanding and participation in the love of God.³⁸ God reigns in the soul which is deified. The transformed soul is equal to the angels.³⁹

Like Clement, Origen could apply the Platonic jargon of controlling the emotions, but the more perfect goal was *apatheia*, a radical extirpation of all emotions directed to contingent things. Both authors speak about cutting away the emotional part (p. 119 above). In Book 7 of the *Stromata* Clement gives various examples of the true gnostic without emotional response to mundane pleasures or changing conditions of life (10.2; 45.3–4; 65.4; 84.1; 88.4–5). Origen's examples of mortification are often associated with sensual desires, but all self-regarding emotions concerning the mundane things belong to the same refutable group. A virtuous young man is described as free from anger, distress, fear, pleasure, and appetite; acquiring permanent freedom from them is to become apathetic (*Comm. in Matth.* 15.16–17 (395.8–398.28)).⁴⁰ When Jesus said that the disciples can learn something from children, he meant that they have neither sexual

³⁶ Völker (1952), 485–6; Sorabji (2000), 389.

³⁷ *Homiliae in Numeros*, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 30 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1921), 255–80. There is a detailed analysis of Origen's view of perfection in Völker (1931).

³⁸ For the progress through mortification to *apatheia* and spiritual perfection, see also *Comm. in Matth.* 12.36 (150.15–152.13); 15.17–18 (397.14–403.6); *Comm. ser. in Matth.* 94; *Commentarius in Epistulam ad Romanos* 6.1, ed. C. P. Hammond-Bammel in *Der Römerbrief-kommentar des Origenes: Kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufinus, Vetus Latina*. Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel, 16, 33, 34 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1990–8), trans. T. P. Scheck, *The Fathers of the Church*, 103–4 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2001–2).

³⁹ *Comm. in Matth.* 16.29 (373.29–374.15).

⁴⁰ Cf. *Homiliae in Ieremiam* ed. E. Klostermann, GCS 6 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1901), fr. 25, trans. J. C. Smith in *Homilies on Jeremiah, Homily on 1 Kings 28* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 3.2 (308.19–24).

desires nor ‘other passions or sicknesses or weaknesses of the soul’, such as anger, fear, or distress. As an example of their *apatheia* Origen mentions that they can play happily at the deathbed of their mother or father (*Comm. in Matth.* 13.16 (220.10–33)).⁴¹

Origen was not interested in emotions as such, but in the possibility of becoming a person who is not led by emotional suggestions and who ignores rather than moderates them. This *apatheia* accompanies the perfection of the soul through true beliefs and right conduct (*Selecta in Psalmos* 1600C). In dealing with this topic Origen sometimes speaks in a Platonic manner about the emotional part of the soul, but also employs Stoic psychological terminology.⁴² Origen was familiar with the Stoic distinction between pre-passions or first movement and assent, which he embedded in his conception of sin.⁴³ At the beginning of the third book of his *On First Principles* (*De principiis*) Origen states that many of the activities of the animals are caused by perceptions and appearances, and that these also create initial affective states in human souls. First movements, which are involuntary, are developed into actual emotions and desires by the assent of the governing faculty (*hēgemonikon*). These further developments are voluntary (3.1.2–4). The operations of the imagination and the governing faculty are described as follows:

But if someone maintains that what comes from outside is irresistible when it has happened, let him turn his attention to his own passions and movements and see whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the governing faculty to that thing on account of these incentives. For example, if seeing a woman has incited a man to act contrary to his purpose to be continent and restrain himself from sex, the woman is not the perfect cause of annulling his determination, for he commits the licentious act after wholly approving the titillation and the smoothness of the pleasure without wishing to resist it or to adhere to his decision. Another man in the same circumstances, with more

⁴¹ See also Völker (1931), 44–62.

⁴² In addition to the remarks on *apatheia*, he sometimes makes use of the Stoic descriptions of emotions, e.g. in *Comm. in Matth.* 13.16 (220.10–16); 15.16 (396.1–3, 396.29–397.1), and of the Stoic fourfold taxonomy of emotions, e.g. in *Homiliae in Ieremiam*, fr. 25, Smith, 293. Chrysippus’ theory of the therapy of emotions is mentioned in *Contra Celsum* 1.64 and 8.51. The term ‘pre-passion’ (*propatheia*) occurs in *Selecta in Psalmos*, PG 12, 1141D, 1144A–B, and in *Commentarius in Ephesios*, ed. J. A. F. Gregg in ‘The Commentary of Origen upon the Epistle to the Ephesians, part II’, *Journal of Theological Studies*, 3 (1902), 398–420, fr. 19.68–75 (420), and the term ‘first movement’ (*primus motus*) in Latin translations, e.g. *De principiis* (3.2.2); *Homiliae in Exodum*, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 29 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1920), 4.8 (181.8, 16).

⁴³ For the term ‘propatheia’ in Origen, see R. A. Layton, ‘Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions’, *Vigiliae Christianae*, 54 (2000), 262–71; Pohlenz (1947–9), i. 307; ii. 154.

knowledge and practice, also encounters titillations and incitements, but his reason, as being better strengthened and nourished by practice and confirmed by doctrine towards the good, or being near to confirmation, repels the incitements and weakens the appetite. (3.1.4 (198.12–199.11))

Origen connects the first motions and the pre-passions with bad thoughts (Greek *logismoi*, Latin *cogitationes*) and bad suggestions. They sometimes come from ourselves and are sometimes stirred up by demons. Occurrent suggestions are not culpable, but we should try to resist them by continually meditating upon Scripture and immediately repelling their occurrence.⁴⁴ In the *Commentary on the Song of Songs* the power of bad thoughts is described as follows:

For as long as a bad thought is only beginning, it is easily driven from the heart. But if it comes again and again, and goes on for long, it surely leads the soul to consent to it; and, once consented to and established in the heart, it is certain to result in the commission of sin. (3 (236.14–18), trans. Lawson, 256, with changes)⁴⁵

Origen makes use of the doctrine of pre-passions in asking whether Jesus was afraid or sad in Gethsemane. He states that Jesus was tempted in every respect as we are, yet had not sinned (Heb. 4:15). Therefore it is written that he began to be sad and troubled—that is, he had the beginning of sadness and fear but not the emotions themselves. According to Origen, it was the human nature of Christ which was subject to these beginnings of emotions and not his impassible divine nature. Similarly, Jesus asked in accordance with his human nature that, if possible, he could avoid suffering.⁴⁶ This became an influential exegesis of Matthew 26: 36–9. In commenting on Origen's use of the Stoic doctrine of first motions, Richard Sorabji argues that the change in the focus of attention to bad thoughts came to be typical of the Christian version of pre-passions. His interpretation of the difference between the Christian and the Stoic conceptions is expressed in the subtitle of his book: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ *De principiis* 3.2.4; *Selecta in Psalmos*, PG 12, 1144A–B, 1597D–1600A; *Homiliae in Iesu Naue*, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 30 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1921), 15.3 (386.27–388.9). Origen states in *Comm. in Epistulam ad Romanos* (6.1) that when one's thinking is wholly concentrated on the suffering of Christ, it is not possible for evil emotions simultaneously to occur in the soul. This was a commonly used cognitive tool for controlling emotions in Christian asceticism.

⁴⁵ See also *Homiliae in Iesu Naue* 15.3 (386.15–27).

⁴⁶ *Comm. ser. in Matth.* 90, 92.

⁴⁷ Sorabji (2000), 346–51. The difference is not always very clear. In *On Anger* 2.3.4 Seneca writes: 'Someone thinks himself injured, he wills revenge, but he settles down at once when

While Clement and Origen found the Stoic view of emotions as judgements congenial, they did not offer any detailed theory of how emotional judgements are influenced by the emotional part of the soul, simply assuming that it makes people prone to form emotional judgements. Their views show some similarities to Posidonius' theory of the emotions. In agreement with Posidonian and Middle Platonist views, Clement and Origen believed that an effective cure of the emotional part demanded moderate asceticism. For a Christian this involved fasting, vigils, and humiliation, which were taken to weaken the tendency to form sinful thoughts.⁴⁸ This was associated with other therapeutic methods partially derived from philosophy, such as increasing the consciousness of emotions as forms of sickness which demand treatment, cognitive deconstruction of emotional reactions, learning to expel occurrent emotions by other thoughts, continuous self-examination, and the control of one's progress. In commenting on the Socratic maxim 'Know thyself', Origen states that the soul should have exact knowledge of its dispositions and intentions. For moral perfection, it is necessary to know with respect to each relevant emotion whether it occurs often or seldom or never, how intense it is, on what occasions it arises, and whether one has made progress in controlling it or not. This examination of conscience is thought to be a continuous practice among Christians seeking perfection.⁴⁹ The aim of the therapy is the health of the soul; the therapy itself is merely of instrumental value, and not part of perfect Christian life.

As in Clement it is also somewhat unclear in Origen what happens to the emotional part of perfect souls, if it does not literally disappear. Origen states that 'if one progresses in virtue, the emotional part does not disappear, but will be in the state called sympathy'.⁵⁰ By 'sympathy' Origen means feeling the same as others. He also speaks about sympathy among Christians as the members of the body of the Lord, but it is not clear whether this is an emotion in perfect Christians or rather an instance of 'apathetic philanthropy'.⁵¹ Similarly, Origen deals with compunction

some consideration dissuades him. I do not call this anger, this movement of the mind obedient to reason' (trans. Sorabji (2000), 74). According to Origen, Jesus' will to avoid suffering was quite similar and was not fear.

⁴⁸ See J. A. McGuckin, 'Christian Asceticism and the Early School of Alexandria', in W. J. Sheils (ed.), *Monks, Hermits and the Ascetic Tradition*, Studies in Church History, 22 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 25–39. For Origen's criticism of exaggerated fasting and vigils see *Comm. in Matth.* 17.27 (658.32–659.30).

⁴⁹ *Comm. in Cant.* 2 (141.17–145.15), trans. Lawson, 128–33. See also P. Hadot (1987), 68. ⁵⁰ *Selecta in Psalmos*, PG 12, 1465B.

⁵¹ *Comm. in Matth.* 14.1 (277.12–14). In Basil of Caesarea, 'sympathy' similarly means feeling sad at the failure of others and joyful at their success: Basil, *Regulae brevius tractatae* (*Shorter*

(Greek *penthos*, Latin *compunctio*) as part of one's awareness of sinfulness and the hope of God's mercy. He finds this penitential sorrow, later called 'the gift of tears', very useful in the therapy of emotions and in moral improvement.⁵² The perfect gnostics do not have this feeling. When they suffer from the compunction of love, which is another form of compunction, it is apparently not located in the emotional part of the soul.⁵³ Origen thought that Christians could learn an apathetic manner of reacting to things without emotion. This does not mean that the emotional powers and the corresponding thoughts are not activated at all. There may be various temptations even in an apathetic soul. To protect oneself against them, one should concentrate on right thoughts, but the soul cannot continuously think about spiritual matters. Demons have the power of inciting tempting thoughts and first motions, and therefore even a perfect gnostic must be continuously watchful and ready to expel them.⁵⁴

Although Clement and Origen stressed the complete mortification of the mundane emotional habits, they could employ very affective terms in describing the mystical union of the soul with the Logos and God. In the Prologue to his *Commentary on the Song of Songs* Origen describes the elevated soul thus:

And the soul is moved by heavenly love and longing when, having clearly beheld the beauty and fairness of the Word of God, it falls deeply in love with His loveliness and receives from the Word Himself a certain dart and wound of love. (Prol. (67.7–9); trans. Lawson, 29)⁵⁵

The compunction of love belongs to the feelings of a true gnostic. Other related terms are the soul as a bride and the Logos as the bridegroom. The visitations of the heavenly bridegroom are 'kisses'. The soul's body is the 'bed' which the bride (soul) shares with the bridegroom (Logos).⁵⁶

Rules 29, 182 (PG 31, 1104A, 1204C). For Jesus as a teacher of apathetic philanthropy, see *Comm. in Matth.* 10.23, 33.3–4.

⁵² *Homiliae in Isaiam*, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 33 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1925), 4.3 (260.15–261.1). For the moderation of penitential sorrow (2 Cor. 7: 9), see *Comm. ser. in Matth.* 117.

⁵³ For compunction in early Christian thought, see I. Hausherr, *Penthos: The Doctrine of Compunction in the Christian East*, trans. A. Hufstader (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1982).

⁵⁴ *De principiis* 3.2.4.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Homiliae in Cant.* 2.8 (53.21–54.2): 'How beautiful, how fitting it is to receive a wound from Love. One person receives the dart of fleshly love, another is wounded by earthly desire; but do you lay bare your members and offer yourself to the chosen dart, the lovely dart; for God is the archer indeed' (trans. Lawson, 297).

⁵⁶ *Comm. in Cant.* 1 (90.25–6), 3 (175.3–5), trans. Lawson, 60, 172.

The believers sometimes feel the presence of the bridegroom in their souls and sometimes his absence 'until we become such people as He may condescend not only often to revisit, but to remain with.'⁵⁷ Emotional images are applied analogically when speaking about the will and consciousness associated with divine matters and spiritual experiences. In so far as all this takes place in an apathetic soul, the emotional part is not involved. As distinct from the standard emotions, the special sentiments of true gnostics are partially caused by the inhabitant Spirit.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the cognitive parts of these experiences are provided by non-standard spiritual senses. According to Origen, there are five spiritual senses, analogous to the bodily senses, which are awakened by grace and through which the soul in contemplation can experience God. Through the spiritual senses the souls can be directly aware of the divinity without being assimilated to it.⁵⁹ Supernatural spiritual perceptions and the experience of participating in divine love belong to transformed persons who exceed the limits of human capacities.⁶⁰

Origen's view of the progress of the soul and its union with God and his theory of the spiritual senses as the basis of mystical experience had great influence on later mysticism. In his biblical exegesis Origen distinguished between literal, moral, and spiritual senses. Since Origen thought that the canonical books are divinely inspired and that they often metaphorically refer to spiritual experiences, he saw the explication of the spiritual meaning as a particularly important task. In reading Origen's *Commentary on the Song of Songs* from the point of view of historical criticism, one cannot help but realize that its metaphoric exegesis is wholly arbitrary. There is no reason to believe that the first author meant what Origen found in his associative meditations. While Origen's work is an impressive contribution to meditation, its conception of spiritual knowledge is strange. There cannot be any argumentative or critical discussion about the alleged spiritual meaning behind the historical meaning, since the words are taken to refer to things grasped by spiritual perceptions which are available only to a

⁵⁷ *Comm. in Cant.* 3 (203.4–5), trans. Lawson, 211.

⁵⁸ *Comm. in Cant.* 4 (233.1–2); cf. *Homiliae in Ezechielem* 1.16 (340.4–8).

⁵⁹ *Contra Celsum* 1.48; *Comm. in Cant.* 1 (105.2–108.12, trans. Lawson, 79–83), 2 (167.23–168.5, trans. Lawson, 162). See also K. Rahner, 'Le début d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origène', *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, 13 (1932), 113–45; A. Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 67–71. Origen's and Plotinus' view are compared in Dillon (1990), essay 19.

⁶⁰ In the twenty-seventh homily on Numbers (279.5–6) Origen writes that when souls are ascending to the peak of perfection, they leave the mundane sphere and, like Enoch (Gen. 5: 24), are not found, for God translates them. For being more than a human being, see also *Comm. in Matth.* 16.29 (373.29–374.15).

few people. Even these people cannot solve interpretative disagreements by any rational procedure. Metaphoric references to the stages of moral progress are less problematic, since they have commonly understandable elements, but the assumption of reaching the intention of the original author is also arbitrary in this context. (See also pp. 150–1 below.)

Clement and Origen did not believe that natural emotions are necessary. The Christian version of *apatheia* is detachment from the values which are embedded in human emotions. This is combined with a new conception of oneself without self-will based on deificatory participation in God, who is *apathēs* and *agapē*. The Christian love of other creatures was a consequence of the love of God.⁶¹ Even though this love could be characterized as ‘apathetic philanthropy’, the love of God was described in highly emotional terms. The analysis of the experience of the deificatory union and the feelings associated with this is the original Alexandrian contribution to the theory of emotions. It was assumed that human emotions involve a consciousness of the self as attached to finite things, and that the mystical feelings of transformed persons involve a new awareness of oneself in relation to the divinity.

2.2 The Cappadocians

The Origenean heritage mediated in part by Gregory Thaumaturgus influenced the thought of the so-called Cappadocian Fathers: Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus.⁶² Their writings involve eclectic combinations of Platonic themes with a religious theory of the perfection of the soul through asceticism and meditation. They employed a conception of controlled emotions, which was based on the Platonic theory of the levels of the soul, and also made use of the idea of the mortification of earthly emotions. It was thought that in so far as man was created to be an image of God, this did not include those aspects which are similar to other creatures. The image of God is in the highest part of the soul. The emotional part was added to the soul as a help for life in the sensible world. It was originally meant to function wholly under the control of the higher part; it became a source of continuous trouble only after the Fall, when it gained the upper hand over rational virtue. An essential element in the Christian metamorphosis of human nature is the restoration of

⁶¹ Clement, *Strom.* 6.9 (71.5); Origen, *Comm. in Cant.*, prol. (70.1–32), trans. Lawson, 33–4.

⁶² Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus compiled excerpts from Origen’s writings in their *Philocalia*, ed. J. A. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1893).

the divine image, which is now stained by sin. This restoration is also deification (*theōsis*), a sharing in the very being of God, and involves a certain form of *apatheia*, since God is *apathēs*.⁶³

Basil wrote that one part of the soul is rational and intelligent, and the other emotional and irrational. 'Authority belongs to the former by nature and to the latter, submission and obedience to the reason.'⁶⁴ If the spirited part of the soul acts contrary to right reason, it causes much harm, but if it is habituated to co-operate with the rational part, it is serviceable in virtuous action. It produces courage, endurance, continence, and hatred of sin. Similarly, a man who abuses the appetitive part of the soul by making it subservient to impure pleasure becomes licentious, but one who directs this faculty towards the love of God and eternal goods is blessed and worthy of emulation.⁶⁵ The good use of the appetitive part also involves tearful penitential sorrow for one's sins. The tears are said to move God to mercy; experiencing this is joyful, and one receives the power to please God.⁶⁶

Basil thought that thinking about hell is very therapeutic for the appetitive part. Evil desires are suppressed by keeping in mind that the present delight will end in bitterness, the sinful flesh will suffer in everlasting fire, and the pleasurable excitement 'will beget the venomous worm that punishes us forever in hell'.⁶⁷ The best way of learning to repress anger is by recalling the humility of Christ and holy men:

Rid yourself, then, of these two faults: that you should judge yourself as meriting great rewards or think that any man is below you in worth. Thus anger will never be aroused in us, even when we are suffering indignities . . . Let that foe of yours upbraid you, but do you not upbraid him. Regard his words as a training ground in which to exercise philosophy.⁶⁸

⁶³ J. Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 281–95.

⁶⁴ *Homilia in illud, Attende tibi ipsi* (*Homily on the Words 'Give Heed to Thyself'*), PG 31, 213C, trans. M. M. Wagner in Basil, *Ascetical Works*, The Fathers of the Church, 9 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1950), 443. For Basil's life and works, see P. Rousseau, *Basil of Caesarea* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1994).

⁶⁵ *Homilia adversus iratos* (*Homily Against Those Who Are Prone to Anger*), PG 31, 365A–368A; in *Ascetical Works*, 456–7. For good anger, see also Gregory of Nazianzus, *Adversus iram*, PG 37, 838. 360–2; 840. 399.

⁶⁶ *Shorter Rules* 10, PG 31, 1088C–D. For penitential sorrow as a good movement of the appetitive part, see also Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 65C.

⁶⁷ *Homily on the Words 'Give Heed to Thyself'*, PG 31, 213B–C; in *Ascetical Works*, 443.

⁶⁸ *Homily Against Those Who Are Prone to Anger* 364A–365A; in *Ascetical Works*, 455–6. Basil characterizes uncontrolled aggression as temporary madness (356B–357A) and distinguishes between wrath (*thumos*), a sudden passion, and anger (*orgē*), which nurses a grievance (369A). For this distinction in Gregory of Nazianzus, see *Definitiones* 43–5, PG 37, 948–9.

Following the Alexandrian scheme, Basil distinguishes between three stages of religious progress. People may improve their life through fear of eternal punishment, which is a slavish disposition, through seeking eternal reward, which is a mercenary disposition, or doing good for the sake of the good itself, which is the disposition of sons.⁶⁹ When the emotional part of the soul is moderated and becomes wholly obedient to reason, the person masters the emotions in a way which corresponds to the original created order of the soul.⁷⁰ In Basil's formulations, Platonic psychology is accepted as a kind of anthropological fact. It is thought that people can very much influence the functioning of the parts of the soul. Through Christian education they can be habituated to react to appearances as interpreted in a spiritual and ascetic manner. This view of improving emotions through a new way of looking at things is also found in other Cappadocian works: for example, in Gregory of Nazianzus' poem against anger, *Adversus iram* (PG 37, 813–51).

Gregory's *Against Anger* follows the same structure as Plutarch's *On Freedom from Anger*. Like Plutarch, Gregory divides his work into a longer critical description of anger and a collection of further therapeutic advices. The description is meant to be therapeutic in the same sense as Stoic vituperation. It is like a mirror which shows how ugly one is made by anger.⁷¹ Gregory first deals with the nature of anger, its expressive movement and behavioural aspects (lines 31–182). The positive therapy begins with a longer passage on examples of mastering anger (183–303). This is a traditional therapeutic topic, as well as learning to repeat and memorize key doctrines against anger, the commitments of the Sermon on the Mount (304–53). After some comments on the naturalness of anger, God's anger and the anger of exemplary people (354–410), Gregory offers practical advice on how to meet the anger of others without anger (411–71). Like Basil, he stresses humility and the use of reason as well as prayer. His remarks on good anger (360–70) are also similar to those of Basil.⁷²

Gregory of Nazianzus' eclectic therapeutic work on anger is of low philosophical profile. Somewhat more advanced in this respect is the

⁶⁹ *Regulae fusius tractatae* (*Longer Rules*), PG 31, 896B; cf. Clement, *Strom.* 6.11.2 (98.3–99.3); *Strom.* 7.11 (67.2); Origen, *Contra Celsum* 3.78; *De principiis* 3.5.8. For Basil's ascetic writings, see Rousseau (1994), 190–232, 354–9.

⁷⁰ See the first homily on the creation of man in *Sur l'origine de l'homme*, ed. A. Smets and M. van Esbroeck, SC 160 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1970), 1, 8, 19.

⁷¹ On looking in a mirror as therapeutic advice, see *Against Anger* 87–90; Seneca, *On Anger* 2.36.1; Plutarch, *On Freedom from Anger* 456A–B.

⁷² For a detailed commentary, see M. Oberhaus, *Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen den Zorn*, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Neue Folge, 2.8 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1991).

discussion of emotions and their therapy in Gregory of Nyssa's *The Life of Moses*. In commenting on the story of the death of the first-borns of the Egyptians and the salvation of the Hebrews through marking the entrances of their houses with blood (Exod. 12), Gregory takes the entrance as an allegory of the Platonic soul: the side-posts are the spirited and appetitive parts, supporting the lintel, the intellectual part, on each side. Its power is joined to the side-posts so as to keep them together, and they hold it up. A well-ordered soul is trained for courage by the spirit and elevated to participation in the Good by the appetite. As long as the soul is kept safe in this manner, 'maintaining its firmness by virtuous thoughts as if by bolts', all the parts co-operate for good. But if this arrangement is upset, and the appetitive and the spirited trample upon the rational part, then the destroyer slips inside. In Gregory's allegory, to destroy the first-born is to destroy the first impulse to evil, and marking the doorposts with blood is to turn evil away by the power of the true Lamb (*The Life of Moses* 2.89–101 (60.1–64.5)).⁷³

In dealing with the death of the first-born of the Egyptians Gregory writes:

It does not seem good to me to pass this interpretation by without further contemplation. How would a concept worthy of God be preserved in the description of what happened if one looked only to the history? The Egyptian acts unjustly, and his newborn child is punished in his place, who in his infancy cannot discern what is good and what is not. . . . If such a one now pays the penalty for his father's wickedness, where is justice? Where is piety? Where is holiness? Where is Ezekiel, who cries: 'The man who has sinned is the man who must die' and 'a son is not to suffer for the sins of his father'. How can the history so contradict reason? (2.91, trans. Malherbe and Ferguson (60.13–61.4))

Following the Alexandrian exegetical tradition, Gregory was particularly interested in the spiritual meaning of the Scriptures. It is often obviously meant, but it must be sought as the intended interpretation where something seems to be morally out of place in a revealed text:

Do not be surprised at all if both things—the death of the firstborn and the pouring out of the blood—did not happen at all to the Israelites and on that

⁷³ Gregory of Nyssa, *De vita Moysis*, ed. H. Musurillo, in *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, 7. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1964); English translation with introduction and notes by A. Malherbe and E. Ferguson in *The Life of Moses*, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press; Toronto: Ramsey, 1978). I refer to the paragraphs of the translation; the references to the Greek text are in parentheses. For a related allegorical interpretation of destroying the first-borns in Origen, see *Homiliae in Exodum* 4.8 (181.6–24). The entrance allegory is similar to that in Origen, *Selecta in Exodum*, PG 12, 285A; cf. Philo, *Questions and Answers on Exodus* 1.12.

account reject the contemplation which we have proposed concerning the destruction of the evil as if it were a fabrication without any truth. For now in the difference of the names, Israelite and Egyptian, we perceive the difference between virtue and evil. Since the spiritual meaning proposes that we perceive the Israelite as virtuous, we would not reasonably require the first fruits of virtue's offspring to be destroyed but rather those whose destruction is more advantageous than their cultivation. (2.100, trans. Malherbe and Ferguson (63.12–22))

While the Egyptians were downcast at the fate of their first-born, Moses led the exodus of the Israelites. He had previously prepared them to take the wealth of the Egyptians away with them. Gregory says that the lawgiver did not enjoin those in want to rob the Egyptians, which would be inconsistent with the laws.

The loftier meaning is therefore more fitting than the obvious one. It commands those participating through virtue in the free life also to equip themselves with the wealth of pagan learning by which foreigners to the faith beautify themselves. (2.115, trans. Malherbe and Ferguson (68.8–11))⁷⁴

Let us return to Gregory's psychology. In addition to the Alexandrian entrance simile of the tripartite soul, Gregory employs Plato's image of reason as the charioteer and the emotions as his two horses. So long as the charioteer is in control of the horses and directs them towards objects that are real and good, 'the spirited will generate the virtue of courage, and the appetitive will desire what is divine and incorruptible'. But if reason loses hold of the reins and is dragged wherever the urge of the horses carries it, then the tendencies of the soul are changed to the passions we observe in the animals. The discussion of Plato's chariot is part of the dialogue between Gregory and his sister Macrina in the work *On the Soul and Resurrection* (*De anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 61B).⁷⁵ In section 49C–52C Macrina criticizes Plato's view. She thinks that the *epithumia* and the *thumoeides* do not belong to the essence of the soul, which is impassible reason. Like Philo, Macrina argues that Moses was superior to anger and appetite, obliterating all emotions (56A).⁷⁶ Gregory did not agree. The appetitive and spirited dispositions are a divine provision for life in the

⁷⁴ Gregory's moral criticism was preceded by Origen's rejecting the historicity of many biblical events.

⁷⁵ Plato's simile was used by Philo, *On Husbandry* (*Opera*, vol. ii) 72–3, *Leg. alleg.* 1.72–3, and by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.8 (53.1).

⁷⁶ See also R. Williams, 'Macrina's Deathbed Revisited: Gregory of Nyssa on Mind and Passion', in L. Wickham and C. Bammel (eds.), *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity: Essays in Tribute to George Christopher Stead*, Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*, 19 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 227–46.

sensible world; they become vicious only when the order of the soul is destroyed.⁷⁷ All emotional motions are wholly guided by the virtuous thoughts in a good soul. They are shepherded, like sheep, ‘by the will of guiding reason’ (*Life of Moses* 2.18 (38.23–5)).⁷⁸

In describing the ruin of the Egyptian army in the Red Sea, Gregory states that the story refers to the various passions of the soul by which people are enslaved. The horses that pull the chariot are the passions for pleasures, and in the chariot there are three drivers: the reasoning, the appetitive, and the spirited.⁷⁹ Those who are baptized must put to death in the water evil passions, such as covetousness, unbridled desire, conceit, pride, wrath, anger, rancour, malice, and so on (*Life of Moses* 2.122–5 (70.24–72.17)).

The gnawings of sinful desire are sometimes active in the faithful. The unruly desires are like serpents that inject deadly poison into those they bite, but there is an antidote for the evil emotions—the self-control helped by looking at Christ, who suffered for our sins. He keeps the bites of the serpents from causing death, though the beasts themselves are not destroyed. This is Gregory’s allegory of the brazen serpent. The bites of the serpents whose poison is made ineffective are similar to Origen’s tempting first movements which are not assented to. As long as these serpents are living, the lust of flesh against spirit has not completely ceased to exist, but it is possible to make progress in this respect (*Life of Moses* 2.269–77 (125.24–128.13)).⁸⁰ According to Gregory, ‘it is in our power to remain unaffected by emotion as long as we stay far away from the thing that inflames’ (2.303 (138.1–2)), and if the sinful appetite is continuously frustrated by living a disciplined life, the earth stops bringing forth serpents to bite one. Overcoming these does not mean being no longer liable to be seized by sinful passions; ‘the disease of pride’ may enter in their place (2.279–82 (128.22–130.9)). The Christian soul purified of the sinful passions and apathetic in this manner is ready to approach God. It is part of Gregory’s conception of *apatheia* that it pertains to sinful motions of the soul. If a person with a pure heart sees finite things from the point of view of ascetic faith, moderate emotional responses to them are right. In this sense the *metriopatheia* model is relevant to perfect Christians as well (2.287–90 (131.21–133.12)).⁸¹

⁷⁷ *De hominis officio* 18, PG 44, 192B–193D.

⁷⁸ For emotions in a well-disposed soul, see also *De virginitate* 18.3, in *Traité de la virginité*, ed. M. Aubineau, SC 119 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1966).

⁷⁹ Cf. Philo, *On Drunkenness* (*Opera*, vol. ii) 29.111.

⁸⁰ Philo said that the brazen serpent refers to self-mastery (*Leg. alleg.* 2.76–85).

⁸¹ See also *De virginitate* 17.2 and Aubineau’s introduction to his edition (n. 78 above), 167–8.

Freedom from sinful earthly emotions is one of the meanings the Cappadocians associated with the term *apatheia*. Even Macrina seems to concede that apathetic persons can put appetite and anger to good use by reason, though her ideal was Moses, who was wholly free from emotion.⁸² In dealing with the mystical ascent, the Cappadocian theologians could also apply the term *apatheia* to complete indifference with respect to self-regarding mundane emotions. This happens when the soul is wholly turned toward divinity. Through *apatheia* it becomes more than a human being and reaches the rank of angels. However, it is not implied that the emotional part disappears.⁸³ This is not very far from Plotinus' view, but *apatheia* was combined with love, and even apathetic spiritual people were thought to show pity and to grieve and to lament at a funeral, though not more than was compatible with their hope and trust in God (1 Thess. 4: 13).⁸⁴

Gregory's description of spiritual experiences is influenced by Origen's interpretation of the bride and the bridegroom and his theory of the spiritual senses, but there are also differences.⁸⁵ In his *Homilies on the Song of Songs*, Gregory speaks about the spiritual senses through which the presence of divinity is felt. The soul's experience of God takes place in the darkness. God himself cannot be known, but 'He gives the soul a sense of His presence, even while He eludes the clear apprehension, being concealed in His invisible nature' (11, 324.10–12). This is a feeling awareness of fragrance, involving the soul's delight in its experience of God. Having been 'mortally wounded by the arrow of love', the soul learns that every fulfilment of her desire generates further desire for mystical intimacy (4, 127.18–128.7; 12, 366.10–20). Gregory uses the terms *erōs* and *agapē* to mean the desire for union with the heavenly beloved, but, as distinct from the Alexandrian view, he regarded heavenly eros itself as the fulfilment. The soul's mystical ascent is understood as ever-increasing participation. There never is any final union with the unknowable God in the soul (*Life of Moses* 2.238–9 (116.15–23)). It was common to describe the spiritual life as a succession of steps towards eternal fulfilment, but Gregory made

⁸² *De anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 61C, 68A.

⁸³ Basil, *Sermo asceticus* 1.1–2, PG 31, 869D–873B; in *Ascetical Works*, 207–9; Gregory of Nyssa, *In Canticum Canticozum (Homilies on the Song of Songs)*, ed. H. Langerbeck, in *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, vi (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 1, 24.17–25.10; 5, 135.2–7; 10, 313.17–314.10; cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes* 26.13 (PG 35, 1245B).

⁸⁴ For sympathy in Basil, see p. 124 above; see also Gregory of Nazianzus, *Epistolae* 165.2 (PG 37, 273B); *Orationes* 7.1 (PG 35, 757A); and Gregg (1975), ch. 4.

⁸⁵ Louth (1981), 80–97.

the infinite progress and never-completed journey to God itself perfection. The same view can be found in Gregory of Nazianzus.⁸⁶

In the conclusion of *The Life of Moses* Gregory of Nyssa writes:

This is true perfection: not to avoid a wicked life because like slaves we servilely fear punishment, nor to do good because we hope for rewards, as if cashing in on the virtuous life by some business-like and contractual arrangement. On the contrary, disregarding all those things for which we hope and which have been reserved by promise, we regard falling from God's friendship as the only thing dreadful and we consider becoming God's friend the only thing worthy of honor and desire. (2.320, trans. Malherbe and Ferguson (144.20–145.3))

There is a similar threefold division of the progress in Basil's *Shorter Rules*, and related formulations in Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who regarded the ideas of rewards and punishments as something having pedagogic value but not relevant to perfect Christians, who love divine things for their own sake.⁸⁷

The Alexandrians and the Cappadocians were primarily interested in developing a spirituality of perfect Christians. They were not concerned to deal separately with the special conditions of those who did not cut their connections to mundane institutions, such as marriage, local government, professions, or business, thinking that these people are not perfect but should imitate the perfect ones as far as possible.⁸⁸ But the Cappadocians were bishops and came from local families, which made their approach to spiritual matters somewhat more practical than Origen's. St Basil's rules for the local ascetic communities stress the common life rather than seclusion, and the communities are meant to serve the churches by taking care of the poor and the sick.⁸⁹

The distinction between the perfect and less perfect Christians is also found in Nemesius of Emesa's *On the Nature of Man*, moderate Christians practising *metriopatheia* and perfect Christians representing *apatheia*. As for the pleasures and pains associated with the body, Nemesius states that

⁸⁶ J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique: doctrine spirituelle de Saint Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris: Aubier, 1944), 199–208, 291–307; Malherbe and Ferguson edn. 12–14, 185–6.

⁸⁷ See pp. 116 and 118 above.

⁸⁸ Because of their high opinion of the unmarried status as the basic form of detachment, Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers saw marriage mainly in the light of the Pauline dictum that it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion (1 Cor. 7: 9). Clement's view was not that depreciatory, but he also wrote detailed advice about how to have marital intercourse in a Stoic and impassionate manner. See P. Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 131–8, 169–77, 285–304.

⁸⁹ See Rousseau (1994), 143–4, 195–205.

perfect Christians feel only those pleasures which are necessary, while the others may have moderate pleasures of those which are non-necessary and natural. Similarly, perfect Christians do not feel distress with respect to any contingent things, while the second group may have moderate feelings about them:

Even if a good man may sometimes feel distress, for example when good men or children are killed or when a city is destroyed, he does so only because of the circumstances and not on the basis of an attitude or choice. But even in such a situation a contemplative is wholly apathetic, detaching himself from such things and cleaving to God, while the good man is affected by such things in due measure, not excessively, and he is not captured by those things but rather masters them. (19, 80.16–22)

John Chrysostom's address *On Vainglory and How Parents Should Educate their Children* shows how moderate Christians could be guided by the model of two-level Christianity.⁹⁰ The book deals with the education of those boys who will not become monks. John treats the soul as a city, and its different parts as citizens of the city:

The seat and habituation of spirit, we are told, are the breast and the heart within the breast; of the appetitive part of the soul, the liver; of the reasoning part, the brain. (65, trans. Laistner)

The spirited part should not be utterly eliminated from the youths. It should be reined in so that children learn to be patient when they suffer wrongs themselves, but sally forth courageously when they see another wronged. The spirited part can help the reasoning part in its striving for obedience to divine law. Its education takes place through a strong discipline:

The father is arbiter at all times in such matters. If the laws are transgressed, he will be stern and unyielding; if they are observed, he will be gracious and kind and will bestow many rewards on the boy. Even so God rules the world with fear of Hell and the promise of His Kingdom. So must we rule our children. (67, trans. Laistner)

Learning to deal with slaves is regarded as an important part of educating the spirited part. John says that it is useful to let the slaves provoke the

⁹⁰ *Sur la vaine gloire et l'éducation des enfants*, ed. A.-M. Malingrey, SC 188 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1972), trans. in M. L. W. Laistner, *Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1951), 85–122. John Chrysostom is regarded as a representative of the Antiochian exegesis which was critical toward Origenist spiritual allegory; see G. W. H. Lampe, 'The Exposition and Exegesis of Scripture to Gregory the Great', in G. W. H. Lampe (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the Bible*, ii (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 155–83, esp. 177–8.

boy often rightly or wrongly, so that he may learn on every occasion to control his passions (68). A Christian boy also learns moderation by not demanding from slaves what he can do for himself. If a servant or a slave breaks some of the possessions of the boy, such as tablets fashioned of fine wood and held together by bronze chains or silver pencils, and the boy refrains from anger, 'he has already displayed all the marks of a philosophical mind' (73).

The instructions pertaining to the appetitive part deal mainly with the sexual desire that is said to attack with violence after the fifteenth year:

How shall we tie down this wild beast? What shall we contrive? How shall we place a bridle on it? I know none, save only the restraint of hell-fire. (76, trans. Laistner)

The fear of hell is again regarded as the most salutary tool. John was not concerned about the mercenary nature of his educational ideas. Eternal punishment and its avoidance were in his view the main motivational factors for moderate Christians. The power of the appetitive soul and the attendant sexual desire are also diminished by a strict control of what children hear and see; by choosing companions who hold back from sensual matters so that the children will emulate them; by telling them constantly about people illustrious for their self-restraint; by letting them learn to fast on Wednesday and Friday and pray with much contrition and to keep vigils as much as possible. The father helps his children to control their sexuality by arranging early marriages (77–80). John believed that young people saw marriage as their ultimate earthly happiness. When the father has chosen a wife for the boy, his behaviour can be manipulated by describing the beauty of the girl and by referring to the possible cancellation of the marriage if he is not found worthy of it (82).⁹¹

2.3 Evagrius, Cassian, and the Egyptian Heritage

Let us turn to the fathers of the Egyptian desert, who were not much bothered about things other than their soul in relation to God. The classic forms of monastic life, which arose in Egypt in the late third century, involved the solitary life of the hermit, anchoritic monasticism (Greek *anachōrēsis*, 'withdrawal'), and communal life under a rule, cenobitic monasticism (Greek *koinos*, 'common'). St Antony (c.250–350) and Pachomius (292–346) are traditionally regarded as the founders of these

⁹¹ Peter Brown (1988, 309) states that in John Chrysostom, the young Christian husband and wife are to cling together in order to protect each other, by means of the 'suppressant drug' of sufficiently regular intercourse, from the beguiling pleasures of the city.

forms of spirituality, respectively, but they seem to have existed before. Ascetic monasticism arose in Syria and Palestine as well. At the time of Pachomius' death, there were reportedly thousands of monks living under his rule. Pachomian monasteries were known for their strict discipline and the obedience of the monks, but they are not much represented in the early collections of the sayings of the Egyptian monastic fathers (*Apophthegmata*).⁹² The centres of non-Pachomian monasticism were the settlements of Nitria, Cellia, and Scetis. The monks in Nitria, who numbered thousands around the year 400, lived in separate cells, but congregated in church on Saturday and Sunday. There were guest-houses for visitors and functionaries serving the community. Cellia and Scetis were more solitary than the semi-cenobitic Nitria.⁹³ The solitary life is described in *Historia Monachorum in Aegypto*:

They inhabit a desert place and have their cells some distance from each other, so that no one should be recognized from afar by another, or be seen easily, or hear another's voice. On the contrary they live in profound silence, each monk isolated on his own. They come together in the churches on Saturdays and Sundays and meet each other. (20.7–8, trans. Russell)⁹⁴

⁹² For the complexity of critical problems related to the *Sayings*, see D. Burton-Christie, *The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 76–103.

⁹³ H. G. Evelyn-White, *The Monasteries of the Wadi'n Natrūn*, ii: *The History of the Monasteries of Nitria and of Scetis* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1932); P. Rousseau, *Pachomius: The Making of a Community in Fourth-Century Egypt* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1985). The organization of female asceticism in Asia Minor and Egypt is discussed in S. Elm, 'Virgins of God': *The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

⁹⁴ The Greek text has been edited by A. M. J. Festugière, *Subsidia hagiografica*, 34 (Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1961); English translation by N. Russell under the title *The Lives of the Desert Fathers* (London: Mowbray, 1980). The Latin version (*PL* 21, 387–462) was previously thought to have been written by Rufinus, but is now regarded as a translation from Greek with some additions. This anonymous work is an account of a pilgrimage made through Egypt in 394. The *Lausiac History* of Palladius is another fifth-century collection of short biographies of individual hermits, ed. C. Butler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898–1904). Though important historical sources for the Egyptian monks, both works are also 'full of the strange and the miraculous', as Owen Chadwick puts it in his *John Cassian* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 6. The same holds true of many early Christian *Lives*. In Jerome's *Life of Paul of Thebes* the 90-year-old Antony decides to visit Paul, 113 years old, and he is guided by a centaur and then by a satyr who, as an envoy of its tribe, asks Antony to pray to the Lord for the satyrs. The story goes on as follows: 'In case any one has scruples about believing this, it was proved to be true by what took place while Constantius was emperor, witnessed by the whole world. For a man of this kind was brought to Alexandria alive, providing the people with a marvellous spectacle. Later, when it was a lifeless corpse, salt was sprinkled on it to prevent the summer heat causing it to putrefy, and it was carried to Antioch for the emperor to see it': Jerome, *Vita S. Pauli*, *PL* 23, 22B–24A; trans. C. White in *Early Christian Lives* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1998), 75–88.

There was a rule of some kind in all these centres. The monks were guided by a group of elders, and the junior monks were to show perfect compliance.

The renown of the Egyptian monastic movement as an effective pursuit of Christian perfection attracted both visitors and novices from the centres of Christianity. St Basil visited monks in Egypt and Syria before becoming bishop of Caesarea. Palladius, the author of the *Lausiac History*, came to Egypt in order to become an ascetic eremite, and so did John Cassian, whose *Institutions* and *Conferences* brought the Eastern influence into Western monasticism, together with the Latin translation of Pachomius' rule by Jerome in 404 and Basil of Caesarea's rule translated by Rufinus around 400. Rufinus of Aquileia, the famous Italian translator of Origen's works, spent some time in Egyptian monasteries before founding a community in Jerusalem on the Mount of Olives with the noble Roman matron Melania, who also visited Egypt. Before setting up his community in Bethlehem, Jerome studied Egyptian monastic life with his brother and Paula and Eustochium, two women of the Roman aristocracy. Both Rufinus and Jerome, good friends who became bitter enemies, were acquainted with the influential Alexandrian teacher Didymus the Blind.⁹⁵

A lot of the monks were simple people, but among them were also some educated Greek-speaking divines who developed monastic spirituality on the basis of the Alexandrian tradition and avowed themselves disciples of Origen. One of them was Evagrius of Pontus (c.345–c.399), characterized as 'the leading Greek theorist of the monastic life' and 'the chief theologian of the Origenist theory of the monastic life'.⁹⁶ Before taking a closer look at the works of Evagrius, let us see how the guide-lines for the monks are sketched in the *Life of Antony*, written by Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, soon after Antony's death. Antony is said to have taught:

As we rise daily, let us suppose that we shall not survive till evening, and again, as we prepare for sleep, let us consider that we shall not awaken. . . . If we think in this way, and in this way live—daily—we will not sin, nor will we crave anything, nor bear a grudge against anyone, nor will we lay up treasures on earth, but as people who anticipate dying each day we shall be free of possessions, and we shall forgive all things to all people. The desire for a woman, or another sordid pleasure, we shall not merely control—rather, we shall turn from it as something transitory, forever doing battle and looking toward the day of judgment. For the larger fear

⁹⁵ F. Murphy, *Rufinus of Aquileia (345–411): His Life and Works* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1945), 45; J. N. D. Kelly, *Jerome: His Life, Writings and Controversies* (London: Duckworth, 1975), 124–5.

⁹⁶ O. Chadwick (1968), 24–6.

and dread of the torments always destroys pleasure's smooth allure, and rouses the declining soul. (19, trans. Gregg)⁹⁷

The types of vicious passion mentioned here and their remedies are typical of fourth-century Christian instructions. It is assumed that when people are emotionally attached to earthly things and regard them as beneficial for themselves, they are helped by fear of eternal punishment and desire of eternal reward. Antony adds that people are less prone to sin when they have to report all sins to someone else and endure this shame. The sense of shame is kept alive by an obligation to report all thoughts to the brothers (55). Employing shame against other passions in this way was regarded useful at the beginning of the path to perfection. The same paragraph also refers to the importance of supervisors and continuous examination of oneself—central themes of philosophical psychagogy. The work involves long passages about the temptations caused by the demons, which are able to influence one's thoughts and perceptions. Other sources about the life of the monks in the Egyptian desert also stress the battle against demonic attacks as a central part of their spirituality. Antony's struggles with the demons and the devil are described in the first part of the book, while his miracles and healing activities are reported in the second half. In the summary of Antony's life he is called the doctor God granted Egypt, curing people of grief, sorrow, anger, dissatisfaction with poverty, discouragement, sexual desire, the torments of the mind, and the temptations caused by demons (87).

It is commonly thought that *The Life of Antony* is marked by tensions between Athanasian theology, monastic tradition, and hagiographical style.⁹⁸ Samuel Rubenson argues for the authenticity of Antony's seven letters which show him as a teacher of gnosis of the Origenist monastic tradition in Nitria and Scetis, which culminated in the works of Evagrius of Pontus.⁹⁹ The difference between the letters and the *Vita* is exemplified

⁹⁷ *Vita Antonii*, PG 26, 835–976; trans. R. C. Gregg as *The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus*, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1980). The Latin translation by Evagrius of Antioch (c.373) is translated by C. White in *Early Christian Lives*.

⁹⁸ Athanasius (c.298–373) was familiar with Origenist theology, but as bishop of Alexandria he stressed the ascetic control of the soul as the centre of spirituality rather than the contemplative conception of divinization. Athanasius designed his ascetic programme to increase the integrity of the Church in Egypt. While praising monastic renunciation, he claimed that there are different levels of ascetic spirituality, which also encompass ordinary Christians. See D. Brakke, *Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

⁹⁹ S. Rubenson, *The Letters of St. Antony: Origenist Theology, Monastic Tradition and the Making of a Saint*, Bibliotheca Historico-ecclesiastica Lundensis, 24 (Lund: Lund University Press, 1990), 59–88.

by remarks on how demons are described in the texts. In the letters the demons are primarily responsible for hatred, contempt, weariness, and despair through the thoughts (*logismoi*) which they can cause. In the *Vita*, the demons are described as visible actors 'playing against Christ in a cosmic drama visualized in Antony's struggle'.¹⁰⁰

Athanasius was critical of monks who tried to prevent the attacks of demons by sleeping as little as possible and those whose concern about nocturnal emissions diverted their attention to bodily matters and distracted them from meditation.¹⁰¹ In *The Letter to Marcellinus* Athanasius deals with the question of why psalms are chanted with melodies and strains. The first reason is that it is fitting to praise God in a voice which is richly elaborated. The second reason is therapeutic; referring to the Platonic tripartite conception of the soul, Athanasius says the melody helps to make the soul harmonious and moves it from disproportion to proportion.¹⁰²

Evagrius was the son of a Caesarean country bishop. He was ordained reader by St Basil in Caesarea and deacon by Gregory of Nazianzus in Constantinople. After attending the great Constantinople Council in 381, Evagrius had to leave Constantinople because of a love affair. He entered the community of Melania and Rufinus on the Mount of Olives, became a monk, and subsequently travelled to Egypt. He first lived for two years in the semi-eremitic community of Nitria and then in the anchorite settlement of Cellia, practising asceticism, acting as a spiritual leader for some visitors and younger brothers, and writing several works based on the Origenist ideal of Christian perfection.¹⁰³

Evagrius developed Origen's ideas into a system of monastic spirituality. Like Origen, Evagrius divided the ascent of the soul into three stages, which he called *praktikē*, *physikē*, and *theologia*. *Praktikē* is the life of struggle to overcome temptations and subdue the passions. *Physikē* is the contemplation of God through created reality, and *theologia* is contemplation of the Trinity in itself. Evagrius distinguishes two stages of natural contemplation: the lower contemplation of natural order and the higher contemplation of the divine principles and separate substances.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 87, 139.

¹⁰¹ Brakke (1995), 84–99.

¹⁰² *Epistula ad Marcellinum de interpretatione Psalmorum*, PG 27, 37d–41b, trans. Gregg (n. 97 above), 124–6. For the therapeutic effect of music in Posidonius, see p. 63 above; Evagrius also mentions psalm singing as therapy. See p. 142 below.

¹⁰³ See the introduction in *Evagrius Pontikos, Briefe aus der Wüste*, trans. with commentary by G. Bunge (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1986), 17–85.

Beyond this there is theology. The highest knowledge of God before the final vision is found in pure prayer, which is possible through grace for a soul that has stripped itself of its passions and approaches God without images of the imagination, without concepts derived from the world, and without discursive thinking.¹⁰⁴ In the *Gnostic Chapters* Evagrius refers to a theologian as follows: 'Blessed is he who has reached the ignorance that is inexhaustible.'¹⁰⁵ There is progress in theology, since there is always more to know for those participating in God's infinite knowledge, and correspondingly an unlimited ignorance.¹⁰⁶

The active life and the contemplative life, symbolized by Martha and Mary, were complementary in Origen: fighting against the passions and fulfilling God's orders allow the soul to approach the vision of God; conversely, approaching the vision of God allows the soul to do good. In Evagrius the active life means a fight against the passions and a mortification of self-will. Once the soul has attained a state of *apatheia*, it is able to receive love (*agapē*), which is the door to deepening knowledge of God. There are several degrees of contemplation, and the goal of the theoretical life is to progress up this ladder.¹⁰⁷

Evagrius' *Practical Treatise* was written for those in active life. It presents a spiritual method for purifying the emotional part of the soul (78). The battle against the passions is systematized by a classification of the temptations, which later developed into the doctrine of the seven capital sins (8–14). The monks in the wilderness are disturbed more by sinful thoughts than by occasions of crude, vicious acts. Therefore it is useful for them to know how the disturbing thoughts come to mind and how to react when they do come. The goal of the practical life is to strip the disturbing dispositional passions from the soul, the symptoms of which are perceptible in the tempting thoughts. The eight principal types of sinful dispositions are gluttony, fornication, avarice, distress, anger, acedia (boredom with the life of prayer), vainglory, and pride (6). Pope Gregory

¹⁰⁴ Louth (1981), 100–13.

¹⁰⁵ *Kephalaia Gnostika*, ed. A. Guillaumont, *Patrologia Orientalis* 28. 1 (1958), 3.86–8.

¹⁰⁶ See B. McGinn, *The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism*, vol. i: *The Foundations of Mysticism: Origins to the Fifth Century* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 155.

¹⁰⁷ O. Chadwick (1968), 87–8. Chadwick adds: 'Probably we are not to take this too literally or too rigidly. We shall find that when the distinction appears in Cassian it becomes erroneous to treat it rigidly. The active life still affects the contemplative and vice versa.' For Evagrius' thought in the *Practical Treatise* (*Praktikos*), see the introduction by A. Guillaumont in *Traité pratique ou le moine*, ed. A. and C. Guillaumont, SC 170–1 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1971), i. 58–112. For the degrees of *apatheia*, see *On Thoughts* (*Peri logismōn*) 10.15; 15.1, ed. P. Géhin, C. Guillaumont, and A. Guillaumont, in *Sur les pensées*, SC 438 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1998).

the Great later reduced the number to seven by combining vainglory and pride, as well as distress and acedia, and introducing envy into the list as a separate sin. He also changed the order to pride, envy, anger, distress/acedia, avarice, gluttony, and fornication.¹⁰⁸

Evagrius' writings were influenced by the Stoic ideas which were embedded in the Origenist tradition, as is seen from his conception of *apatheia* (*Practical Treatise* 56, 81) and his view of sin as an assent to tempting thoughts (6, 74–5). Evagrius believed that all vicious motions of the soul are caused by wrong evaluative thoughts (*logismoi*) and that the goal of the practical life is to make the soul wholly free from them (6, 82–3). He taught that *apatheia* is the necessary condition of *agapē*, the ultimate goal of the practical life (81, 84). In dealing with the emotions, Evagrius also makes use of the Platonic conception of the tripartite soul (86, 89). He thought that when a monk learns to master his thoughts so that things are not represented in the light of earthly interests, the tripartite soul will be wholly under the control of the highest part, being able 'to make use of the emotional part of the soul in an apathetic way'.¹⁰⁹ Evagrius calls this a therapeutic process (*Practical Treatise* 49, 78), and the apathetic soul healthy (56). The remedies for the evil dispositions of the desiring part of the soul are fasting, manual work, and remaining within the cell; for those of the spirited part, psalm singing, pity, and exercises in toleration; and for those of the reasoning part, reading Scriptures, vigils, and prayer (15). These are called the remedies of Christ, the doctor of the soul.¹¹⁰ As for the occurrent temptations, one should not assent to emotional evaluative thoughts, but expel them from the mind by other thoughts and images. The mind cannot simultaneously attend to two different representations of sensible objects.¹¹¹

The idea of not assenting to the appearances was part of the Stoic theory of pre-passions, or first movements. Evagrius employs this conception to his discussion of bad thoughts (*logismoi*), though his psychological model is eclectic in the sense that he also operates with the Platonic parts of the soul. Involuntary first movements are reactions of these parts.¹¹² The same model is also employed by Didymus (c.310–c.398), the famous

¹⁰⁸ O. Chadwick (1968), 95. Cassian made use of Evagrius' list; see p. 145 below.

¹⁰⁹ *The Gnostic (Gnostikos)*, ed. A. and C. Guillaumont, *Le Gnostique*, in SC 356 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1989), ii. 105; cf. *Practical Treatise* 78.

¹¹⁰ *On Thoughts* 3.31–40; 10.6–8; cf. *Practical Treatise* 54.

¹¹¹ *On Thoughts* 24. To expel vanity one may have to entertain another bad thought, e.g. one related to fornication, which can then be destroyed by a third thought (*Practical Treatise* 58).

¹¹² For Evagrius' view of the affects associated with bad thoughts as first movements, see Sorabji (2000), 359–60.

Alexandrian teacher who was personally known by monks such as Rufinus, Jerome, Palladius, and probably also Evagrius.¹¹³ According to Didymus, perfect followers of Christ should be free from anger and irrational desire. They may have tempting pre-passions, but they do not assent to them, and expel bad thoughts (*logismoi*) as soon as possible.¹¹⁴ Pre-passion is not yet sin. It is the beginning of a passion, not a passion as such.¹¹⁵ Like Origen, Didymus argues that Jesus' beginning to be sad and troubled (Matt. 26: 37) was a pre-passion.¹¹⁶ Didymus also refers to the Platonic tripartition, stating that the lower parts do not rebel against the rational part in a perfect soul.¹¹⁷ Jerome may have been influenced by Didymus in using the Greek term *propatheia* and its Latin form *propassio* in his commentary on Matthew. Following the Stoics, Jerome stated that the transition from pre-passion to passion takes place through consent (*consentire*). A pre-passion which precedes a sinful passion is not a personal sin (*crimen*), though it is a sign of the original sin.¹¹⁸

In Evagrius the perfect *apatheia* is not the same as refraining from assenting to tempting thoughts. It is a state of having no sinful thoughts either awake or asleep (*Practical Treatise* 54–6) and also involves a deconstruction of one's emotional memories (67). Repelling bad thoughts by

¹¹³ Murphy (1945), 44; Kelly (1975), 124–5.

¹¹⁴ Didymus the Blind, *Psalmekommentar (Tura-Papyrus)*, i, ed. L. Doutreleau, A. Gesché, and M. Gronewald, ii–v, ed. M. Gronewald, *Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen*, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt, 1968–70), 222.12–14; 246.3–5; 252.33–5; 263.9–12; 282.2–7. See also *De Trinitate*, PL 39, 384B–C, 860C. The authenticity of this work is uncertain, but it seems to have been written in late fourth-century Alexandria. See A. Heron, 'Some Sources Used in the *De Trinitate* Ascribed to Didymus the Blind', in R. Williams (ed.), *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 173–81. The commentary on the Psalms in the Tura papyrus seems to be based on lectures; the fragments of Didymus' more literary commentary are edited by E. Mühlenberg, in *Psalmekommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung*, *Patristische Texte und Studien*, 15, 16, 19 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1975–8). For pre-passion, see *ibid.* n. 793a14–18.

¹¹⁵ In the Tura commentary on the Psalms, Didymus distinguishes between the stages of sin as follows: *propatheia* is not a sin and is free from blame; *pathos* is moderately blameworthy; *diathesis* is evil; and the completed action (*praxis*) is even more sinful (43.23–5).

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* 43.20–2; 221.32–3; 222.8–11; 282.2–7; 293.6–11. Didymus thinks, like Origen (*Comm. ser. in Matth.* 90), that Jesus' pre-passion is a tempting thought without an assent. Both authors refer to Heb. 4: 15. In Sorabji's (2000, 351–9) view Origen and Didymus, while stressing the difference between pre-passion and passion, tend to regard a pre-passion as an incipient passion. See also pp. 123–4 above. Didymus' concept of *propatheia* is also discussed in Layton (2000), 271–81.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* 262.9–15. Didymus often refers to the Alexandrian distinction between fear of punishment and the perfect fear of God, which is not a passion and is compatible with love: e.g. 47.3–11; 151.27–152.1.

¹¹⁸ *Commentariorum in Mattheum libri IV*, ed. D. Hurst and M. Adriaen, CCL 77 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), 1. 605–14; 4. 1214–29; see also *Commentariorum in Hiezechielem libri XIV*, ed. F. Glorie, CCL 75 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1964), 6. 95–115.

psalms, hymns, and biblical quotations is the most useful technique of avoiding sins, both for novices and for those who have made progress.¹¹⁹ Analysing bad thoughts and the situations in which they occur adds to one's possibilities for avoiding them. Because the demons have the power of putting tempting thoughts into one's mind, even those who have mortified the vicious inclinations in their soul may be attacked by temptations (80). In the long run these attacks vanish—the demons are apparently frustrated by a perfect soul. According to Palladius, Evagrius said before his death that for the previous three years he had not been troubled by any earthly desires.¹²⁰

In discussing theological knowledge as spiritual seeing, Evagrius alludes to philosophical theories of sight, which assumed that in seeing, the eye's internal light reaches an object or meets the light coming from the object.¹²¹ The light of the mind which sees God must be pure—that is, the intellect must be apathetic and see nothing but its own light. Then the divine light must mingle with the light of the mind.¹²² This is based on grace and is felt as sublime love.¹²³ Louth states that since God is knowable and the mind can know him, there is no apophatic theology in Evagrius.¹²⁴ However, the direct acquaintance with divinity through the spiritual senses does not help to advance new cataphatic theological propositions. The unifying experience is apophatic.¹²⁵ It is preceded by awareness of oneself as transformed into a 'sapphire' receiver of the light in which God is seen.¹²⁶ However, the content of the vision transcends the standard cognitive powers and cannot be described by them.¹²⁷

The Evagrian interpretation of Origenist Christianity came to influence Western monasticism, particularly through the works of John Cassian (c.365–c.435), whose birthplace was probably Roman Scythia (now Romania). As a young man he entered a monastery in Bethlehem, together with his friend and countryman Germanus. Around the year 385, Cassian

¹¹⁹ *Practical Treatise* 15, 27, 71; *On Thoughts* 27.25.

¹²⁰ Palladius, *Lausiac History* 38, 122.15–17.

¹²¹ See E. Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-Perception* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 36–62.

¹²² *Antirrhethikos*, ed. W. Frankenberg, in *Evagrius Ponticus, Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Neue Folge 13.2 (Berlin, 1912), 6.16; *Practical Treatise* 64; *On Thoughts* 42.

¹²³ *De oratione (On Prayer)*, PG 79, 52; 58.

¹²⁴ Louth (1981), 109.

¹²⁵ *On Prayer* 117; *On Thoughts* 42.

¹²⁶ *Epistolae*, ed. W. Frankenberg, in *Evagrius Ponticus*, 564–635; German translation in Bunge 1986; 39.5.

¹²⁷ *The Gnostic* 41; *On Prayer* 70, 120.

and Germanus left for Egypt to visit monastic communities and to learn the pursuit of perfection. It seems that Cassian was particularly connected to the Origenist group and probably knew Evagrius, whose teaching influenced his works. In 399 a large group of Origenists had to leave Egypt after Bishop Theophilus of Alexandria had condemned them. Many of them went to Constantinople to get the aid and support of John Chrysostom. Cassian was in this group. After the fall of Chrysostom, the Origenists encountered new troubles. Cassian moved to Rome, and some years later he was in Marseilles, where he established two monastic houses, one for men and one for women.¹²⁸ About the year 420, Bishop Castor of the diocese of Apt wanted to found a monastic community and requested Cassian's help. The *Institutes* was Cassian's reply.¹²⁹ In Books I–IV Cassian presents the principles of monasticism by citing Egyptian experiences. Each of the last eight books of the *Institutes* is devoted to one of the Evagrian sins and advises the monks to free themselves from the vicious mental dispositions and the corresponding thoughts. This part of the work is similar to Evagrius' *Practical Treatise*, though it is less aphoristic. It is an introduction to monastic life and Christian ascetism. Cassian's second work, the *Conferences*,¹³⁰ was meant for those who were aiming higher, but in Cassian's works, practical and theoretical activities are interwoven.¹³¹ The *Conferences* is written as a report on Cassian's and Germanus' twenty-four conversations with Egyptian fathers. Even though parts of the story are a literary invention by Cassian, modern scholars believe that there is nothing in the work that suggests that the main doctrines are not an authentic presentation of moral and ascetic ideals practised in Egypt.¹³²

In the *Institutes* the capital sins are treated as vicious inclinations of the soul. The descriptions of these states and their effects make the monks conscious of the state of their souls and how it should be improved. The sins are often called sicknesses, and correspondingly the instructions for dealing with them are remedies by which they can be rooted out.

¹²⁸ For Cassian's life and thought, see O. Chadwick (1968); C. Stewart, *Cassian the Monk*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); R. Markus, *The End of Ancient Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 163–8, 177–97.

¹²⁹ *De institutis coenobiorum et de octo principalium vitiorum remediis*, ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1888); *The Institutes*, trans. B. Ramsey, Ancient Christian Writers, 58 (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Newman Press, 2000).

¹³⁰ *Conlationes*, ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 13 (Vienna: Gerold, 1886); *The Conferences*, trans. B. Ramsey, Ancient Christian Writers, 57 (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997).

¹³¹ Markus (1990), 181–9.

¹³² O. Chadwick (1968), 22.

An essential part of the spiritual life of beginners is taken to consist in fighting against sinful suggestions and in conquering vicious mental habits.

Cassian supposes that crude vicious acts are not probable in monasteries. But since the purpose of spiritual training is to root out the vicious inclinations themselves, the monks must recognize even their weak symptoms. Reacting against all thoughts which are attractive because of sickness and repenting of all concessions to them decrease the strength of the vice (except that of vainglory). This view necessitates continuous introspection and analysis of one's intentions and also the signs of unconscious inclinations. Cassian's portrait of a monk suffering from carnal pride (*Inst.* 12.27) is an example of how one can become aware of sinful inclinations by paying attention to one's partially unintentional gestures. In spiritual conferences, a proud monk cannot keep his gaze focused on one point, but casts glances here and there. He coughs on purpose, he plays with his fingers, and all his limbs are agitated. He is occupied by his own suspicious thoughts. He is not on the watch for something to learn for his good, but anxiously looks for reasons as to why such and such a thing is said and how he could raise objections. After the conferences his voice is loud, his talk harsh, and his behaviour high-handed. He is no friend of silence, except when nursing bitterness against others in his heart. His silence is a token not of compunction or humility but of pride and indignation. He is ashamed to apologize and irritated by the humility of others.¹³³

The chapter on how gluttonous desires can be overcome begins as follows:

The desire to gormandize, then, is the first thing that we must trample upon, to the point that the mind must be refined not only by fasting but also by vigils, as well as by reading and by frequent compunction of heart. In doing this it is made aware of when, perchance, it has been deluded and been overcome. At one time groaning with horror over its vices and at another set ablaze with desire for perfection and integrity, and both taken up with and possessed by concerns and meditations of this sort, it will at length recognize that the eating of food is not so much a concession to enjoyment as it is a burden imposed upon it at intervals, and it will see it as a necessity for the body and not as something desirable for the soul. (*Inst.* 5.14.1, trans. Ramsey)

The starting-point for healing the emotions is the internalization of a new way of life, with its new scale of values. This is why the question of eating is associated with the practice of penitence and desire for

¹³³ For the description of the passions as a therapeutic mirror, see pp. 77 and 129 above.

improvement—these form the centre of the preliminary practice in general, and are not a special method of the struggle against the lusts of the flesh. The monks should realize that the wants of the body play a very insignificant role in their lives. A formulation that reminds one of the Evagrian *apatheia* programme is that one should learn to regard eating as a bodily necessity and not a concession to pleasure, which would be typical of a *metriopatheia* approach. One should learn to think about food without any affection. Fasting, staying awake to pray, and reading the Holy Scriptures are the tools by which the appetitive part of the soul is reduced and the attention is directed away from earthly things. The cognitive aspect of detachment is described as one's despising the gratification of transitory things through having fixed the mental gaze on eternal things. These methods are mentioned in Evagrius' *Practical Treatise* as well.

Cassian tries to strengthen the new orientation by repeating that the monks should see themselves as the soldiers of Christ without having any self-will. The discipline pertaining to eating is an easy elementary step toward giving up old habits and internalizing the new identity in Christ's army. This is part of the total obedience that belongs to the basic therapy. The tutor of a new member of a monastery must

purposely see to it that he always demands of him things that he would consider repulsive. For, taught by numerous experiences, they declare that a monk, and especially the younger men, cannot restrain their yearning for pleasure unless they have first learned to mortify their desires through obedience. (*Inst.* 4.8, trans. Ramsey)

The healing obedience was absolute. The monks were supposed to do all those things ordered by their elders without question, as if they were commanded by God in heaven. It was not for them to ask whether what was ordered was possible or impossible. Impossible orders were given to test the progress of the monks (4.10; 12.32). The authoritarian nature of the discipline was increased by the order that the monks had to tell all their likes and dislikes to the senior and, without forming a judgement about them, to regard them as good or bad on the basis of the examination of the senior. The juniors could not leave their cells and not even 'satisfy their common and natural needs' without the knowledge and permission of their superior. They had no privacy at all (4.9–10).¹³⁴ The aim of the

¹³⁴ Compare this with the description of Epicurean therapeutic practices in Nussbaum (1994).

obedience is humility, which, when genuinely secured, helps one to ascend to 'love which has no fear' (4.39.3).

Cassian tells some stories of perfect obedience 'just by way of examples'. One of them is about the later abbot Patermutus, who was received into a monastery, contrary to cenobitic rules, together with his boy, who was eight years old. They were sent to live in separate cells so that the father might not be reminded that he was a father. This was a role belonging to the world he had renounced.

In order to find out more clearly whether he made more of his feeling for his kindred and of his own heart's love or of obedience and mortification in Christ (which every renunciant ought to prefer out of love for him), the little boy was purposely neglected, clothed in rags rather than garments, and so covered over and marred with filth as to shock rather than delight his father whenever he would see him. He was also exposed to the blows and slaps of different persons, which he often with his own eyes saw inflicted even arbitrarily on the innocent youngster, such that whenever he saw his cheeks they were streaked with the dirty traces of tears. And although the child was treated this way under his eyes day after day, the father's heart nonetheless remained ever stern and unmoved out of love for Christ and by the virtue of obedience. (*Inst.* 4.27.2–3, trans. Ramsey)

What was taken to be instructive here was that the father was indifferent with respect to such earthly things as the tears of his son and was only anxious about his love of Christ. The peak of this story is that the superior one day pretended that he was annoyed with the crying child and told the father to throw him into the river. He at once snatched up the child and carried him to the river-bank and threw him in. One of the brethren was set to watch the river and to prevent the death of the child.

The man's faith and devotion were so acceptable to God that they were immediately confirmed by divine testimony. For it was straightway revealed to the elder that by this obedience he had performed the deed of the patriarch Abraham. (*Inst.* 4.28, trans. Ramsey)

One may wonder that no attention is paid to the abuse of the child by the monks or to the divine approval of the father's attempt to kill an innocent child 'out of love for Christ'.

Cassian describes the special remedies against each disease, but they are largely modifications of the same basic thoughts. A monk must have a clear conception of the goal of the spiritual life. He must recognize the types of sickness which should be cured, and he has to make up his mind to expel them entirely from his heart, so that it will become a habitation of

the Holy Spirit. The emotional part of the soul is weakened by asceticism and discipline. Since the sicknesses are habits of thought and evaluation, the re-evaluation of things from the point of view of Christian doctrine and one's new conception of the self is the basis of the improvement (*Inst.* 4.43; 8.22; 11.19). The attractiveness of any sin is essentially decreased by comparing it with eternal punishment in hell and eternal reward in heaven. In the same spirit it is stressed that by committing a serious sin a monk nullifies his earlier achievements in the battle against it or other sins (8.22; cf. 7.23; 7.30). The evil habits of thought do not disappear immediately when one has decided to get rid of them. It is therefore important to watch 'the serpent's head' continuously (7.21)—that is, not to assent to sinful thoughts and to expel them by thinking of something else, hell and heaven, the suffering of Christ or the example of the saints. (See e.g. 6.4 for sexual temptations and 12.33 for pride.¹³⁵) In *Conf.* 5.12 Cassian mentions the cenobitic advice that those still troubled by carnal sins may repel the unclean suggestion by visualizing themselves as famous priests or something else which belongs to vainglory. It helps against carnal lust, and afterwards they can repel the suggestion of vainglory. The same idea occurs in Evagrius (*Practical Treatise* 58), but there vainglory is repelled by a sexual thought.¹³⁶

In the *Conferences* the Origenist view of the first motions toward sin and the freedom of assent is put forward by Father Moses as follows:

It is, indeed, impossible for the mind not to be troubled by thoughts, but accepting them or rejecting them is possible for everyone who makes an effort. It is true that their origin does not in every respect depend on us, but it is equally true that their refusal or acceptance does depend on us. (1.17, trans. Ramsey)

Evagrius was more optimistic about the possibility of getting rid of disturbing thoughts. Cassian did not mention Evagrius' name, and he preferred the less controversial 'purity of heart' to 'passionlessness'.¹³⁷ Following the traditional Alexandrian and Cappadocian schemes, Cassian states that a monk begins by acting well from fear of hell and then from

¹³⁵ In *Inst.* 6.13.1 Cassian writes that we must carefully watch out for the serpent's head—viz. the beginnings of evil thoughts. Nor should we allow in our heart the rest of his body—viz. an assent to pleasure. We should destroy the sinful movements 'while they are still young' and 'dash the children of Babylon against the rock' (cf. Ps. 137: 9).

¹³⁶ Cassian pays special attention to the question of sexual dreams. Frequent nocturnal emissions may indicate that there are unconscious sinful thoughts and desires in the soul of a monk (*Conf.* 12.8; cf. *Inst.* 6.10–11). Purity of heart should make one the same in sleep as one is at prayer (*Inst.* 6.20–2). For various advices on how to reduce the emissions, see *Inst.* 6.22–3; see also Brakke (1995), 95.

¹³⁷ For Cassian's terminology, see Stewart (1998), 42–8.

hope of gaining heaven. It is intended that he then comes to love of goodness in itself, and is in this sense similar to God, who never acts from fear or hope. In this stage he can be united with God through grace. Some kind of fear is also involved in the more perfect state, but it is not fear of punishment, which is appropriate to a slave, but fear in the sense of love and respect, which is analogous to the relation between a child and respectable and loving parents.¹³⁸ Prayer is the most central form of the contemplative spirituality in Cassian. ‘A monk’s prayer is not perfect,’ Cassian says, ‘if in the course of it he understand himself or what he is praying.’ Pure contemplative prayer is passive attention to the light of God without images, concepts, or thoughts. This shows similarities to Evagrius’ view of the ascent towards mystical union.¹³⁹

The Origenist idea of specific super-intellectual capacities of ascetics, allowing them to grasp the spiritual meaning of Scriptures is developed into a hermeneutic principle as follows:

Thriving on the pasturage that they always offer and taking into himself all the dispositions of the psalms, he will begin to repeat them and treat them in his profound compunction of heart not as if they were composed by the prophet but as if they were his own utterances and his own prayer. . . . For divine Scripture is clearer and its inmost organs, so to speak, are revealed to us when our experience not only perceives but even anticipates its thought, and the meanings of the words are disclosed to us not by exegesis but by proof. When we have the same disposition in our heart with which each psalm was sung or written down, then we shall become like its author, grasping its significance beforehand rather than afterward. (*Conf.* 10.11.4–5, trans. Ramsey)

The idea of re-experiencing an original experience is similar to the concept of interpretative understanding in the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, though the conceptual background is different in Cassian and the nineteenth-century authors.¹⁴⁰ Some of the problems of Origenist mystical theology are associated with this theory of interpretation.

¹³⁸ Cassian, *Conf.* 11.6.1; 11.13.1. The distinction between two types of fear, already discussed by Clement of Alexandria and Irenaeus, was a popular theme in patristic thought, and remained a focal theme in early medieval discussions. Analysing the forms of religious fear was considered an illuminating and instructive part of systematizing the emotional aspect of Christian spirituality; see R. Quinto, ‘Per la storia del trattato tomistico *de passionibus animae*: il timor nella letteratura teologica tra il 1200 e il 1230ca’, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, suppl. 1: *Thomistica*, ed. E. Manning (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 35–87.

¹³⁹ *Conf.* 9.31; 10.10.2; O. Chadwick (1968), 104–9; Stewart (1998), 95–9.

¹⁴⁰ For a critical discussion of Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s idea of understanding historical works through re-experiencing the original creative experiences, see H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 2nd edn. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965).

Let us consider the view that a biblical text has both a literal meaning and a spiritual meaning which expresses the mystical experience of its inspired author. It is assumed that experienced readers can recognize that the author is speaking about things which should be expressed exactly as is done, although there is no naturally understandable key to the metaphors. The experiences associated with divinization by Origen's desert followers are said to take place without any concepts and understandable representations.¹⁴¹ As super-intellectual experiences, they are apophatic and can only be referred to by metaphors which are found in various expressions of the Scriptures. It is not easy to see how a naturally understood expression can function as a metaphor in this context. Recognizing the meaning of a standard metaphor is to grasp a similarity between two representations, which are compared to each other. But if the super-intellectual experiences cannot be objectified, and consequently cannot be compared with anything, how can there be any understandable exegesis of mystical metaphors? One might suggest that the hidden meanings indicate how spiritual people should think about the experiences which in themselves cannot be described, but even then there is no natural explanation for why the revealed metaphors are what they are and not something else.

Treatment of emotions had a very central role in Origenist and Cappadocian theology. Moderating or extirpating them formed the main topic of the preparatory part of the ascent, and the mature spiritual life was described with the help of conceptions derived from emotional contexts, though the higher feelings were sharply separated from the ordinary emotions. There were no particularly remarkable theoretical insights in these discussions, largely derived from the theories of the emotions and their therapy in Hellenistic philosophy, except for the analysis of self-disclosure, which was associated with the feeling of divinization in a state of grace. Even this was partially influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy. The philosophically interesting themes in this context are Evagrius' notion of the consciousness of the mind of its pure subjectivity and the special subjective feeling which cannot be described and which is said to make one aware of the influence of divine grace, whether in the immediate unifying contact or, as in the Cappadocians, in the ascending motion toward divinity.

¹⁴¹ Cassian states in *Conf.* 10.11.6 that in meditating on psalms, 'once the mind's attentiveness has been set ablaze, it is called forth in an unspeakable ecstasy of heart and with an insatiable gladness of spirit, and the mind, having transcended all feelings and visible matter, pours out to God with unutterable groans and sighs' (trans. Ramsey).

2.4 Augustine

Augustine was born in 354 in the small town of Tagaste, in Roman North Africa. His father was a local official, and his mother Monica came from a Christian family. Augustine commenced his education first in his home city, then in Madaura, and in 371 he was sent to Carthage for higher education. After having acted as teacher of rhetoric at Tagaste (374–6) and Carthage (376–83), he left Africa for Rome, and became professor of rhetoric in Milan in 384. While studying in Carthage, Augustine became a member of the Manichaean sect. He maintained his association with Manichaean friends for many years, though his attitude to the doctrines of the sect became increasingly sceptical. In Milan Augustine was introduced to allegorical biblical exegesis by Ambrose, bishop of Milan, who was well read in Greek theology and to some extent in Greek Neoplatonism.¹⁴² Augustine was also acquainted with some Neoplatonic writings in Latin translations. In 386 he experienced a Christian conversion, which enabled him to give up worldliness more effectively than his adherence to Platonism had done. After a period of lay monastic life in Milan and Tagaste, Augustine was ordained a priest in 391. In 396 he became bishop of Hippo. During his episcopate he was involved in several doctrinal controversies, particularly with the Donatists and the Pelagians.¹⁴³ He died at Hippo in 430. Apart from numerous letters and sermons, his works include some 120 treatises.

During the first years of his episcopate Augustine wrote the *Confessions*, a work that has been translated into practically every Western language. The first nine books form the story of the religious, intellectual, and moral development of the author; it offers an interesting picture of how ancient theories of the emotions were employed in an autobiographical work.¹⁴⁴ Augustine's most extensive discussions of the philosophical conceptions of emotions are found in Books 9 and 14 of *De civitate Dei* (*City of God*). In this work historical events and epochs are interpreted as moments in

¹⁴² For Ambrosius' use of Plotinus' *Enn.* 1.6–8, see V. H. Drecoll, 'Neuplatonismus und Christentum bei Ambrosius, *De Isaac et anima*', *Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum*, 5 (2001), 104–30. His views on emotions and the Stoic *apatheia* are discussed in M. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), ii. 54–7.

¹⁴³ For Augustine's life and works see P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967). Useful introductions to Augustine's thought are J. M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹⁴⁴ Augustine, *Confessionum libri XIII*, ed. L. Verheijen, CCSL 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981); *Confessions*, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

building a society based on the love of God in a fallen world guided by the love of self. Book 9 was probably written in 415, and Book 14 in 418. Augustine's general view of the emotions in the *City of God* does not differ much from that in the *Confessions*, written some twenty years earlier.¹⁴⁵

Emotions in the City of God and in the Philosophical Schools

According to Augustine, all philosophical schools taught that the emotions are unconsidered responsive movements of the soul, and that the dominating part of the soul should impose laws on them. The emotions were thought to include an evaluation which affects the subject and a suggestion to act in a certain way. Even though the birth of an affective evaluation is not wholly under the control of the higher soul, lingering on it and accepting or refuting the behavioural suggestion are voluntary (*City of God* 9.4; 14.19).

The emotions passage in Book 9 of the *City of God* is part of a longer discussion of demons, based on Apuleius' work *On Socrates' God* (*De deo Socratis*). What made Augustine pay attention to emotions was the following description of demons in chapter 12 of Apuleius' work:

Hence they feel pity and anger, anguish and joy, and every aspect of human emotion; being subject, like men, to such movements of the heart and turmoil in the mind they are tossed upon a heavily sea by their thought. (9.3)

Augustine wanted to point out that to worship demons is silly. Demons are corrupt minds and much worse than human beings, who at least show moral effort. The argument runs as follows. According to the theories of the Platonists, the Aristotelians, and the Stoics, virtue and wisdom have their place in the superior part of the soul. This part should master the emotions that occur in the lower parts and keep them within strict bounds. But it is the rational mind of Apuleius' demons which is subdued to the tyranny of vicious passions. Consequently, the demons are not masters of their lives and are morally wretched rather than good, and are certainly not worthy of worship (*City of God* 9.3, 6).

Augustine thought that what he said about the Platonic and Peripatetic views was generally known and unproblematic, and that it was the Stoic theory about which there might be different opinions, because the Stoics claimed that a real philosopher had no emotions at all. In 9.4–5 Augustine wanted to show that in fact the Stoic view did not differ from the others

¹⁴⁵ *De civitate Dei*, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, CCSL 47–8 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955); *The City of God against the Pagans*, trans. R. W. Dyson, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

except terminologically. For this purpose he related the story from Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* (19.1) mentioned above (p. 66) The author was once on a sea voyage in the company of a Stoic philosopher. When the ship began to pitch on a stormy sea, the passengers were curious to observe whether the philosopher would be disturbed or not. After the storm had passed, there were comments on the signs of fear he had showed. Gellius asked the philosopher what the reason for his reaction really was. The man let him read a passage from Epictetus' work, which Gellius translated and which Augustine reports in his own words. It was stated, Augustine tells, that certain impressions arising from terrifying circumstances are bound to disturb even the mind of a philosopher. For a moment, he may get the jitters with fear or shrink with distress. It is as if these movements take place too quickly for the functioning of the mind and reason, but the philosopher will not form a judgement on the evil or consent to the emotional suggestions. This consent remains under his control. The fool consents to these reactions while the wise man, although experiencing them, still keeps his mind unshaken and holds firmly to its right decision about what ought to be pursued and what rejected.¹⁴⁶

Augustine first concludes that there is little or no difference between the opinions of the Stoics and of other philosophers, the Platonists or Peripatetics, on the subject of the passions, in so far as they are understood to be disturbances of the soul. Both sides think that the mind should not allow any of the disturbances to prevail against reason. Instead of consenting to them, it should resist them—this resistance establishes the reign of virtue. Augustine's second point is that the agitation of the Stoic in the storm shows that he felt fear. He thought that the Stoics were not willing to admit this, because they regarded emotions as erroneous judgements about good and evil which cannot befall philosophers. For this reason they claimed that their seemingly emotional reactions were something else, and that the evaluations preceding these differed from those which they called emotions. Augustine considered this only a verbal quibble:

For what does it matter whether things are more properly called 'goods' or 'advantageous', when a Stoic and a Peripatetic alike get the jitters and grow pale at the thought of losing them? They do not call them by the same names, but put the same value on them. (*City of God* 9.4)

¹⁴⁶ There are some noteworthy differences between the stories of Aulus Gellius and Augustine and their reports of what Epictetus wrote. While Epictetus speaks about the philosopher's shrinking and turning pale (*palescere*) in Aulus Gellius' report (*Attic Nights* 19.1.17) and Aulus Gellius himself says (19.1.21) that he got the jitters (*pavescere*), Augustine uses the expressions 'shrinking with distress' and 'getting the jitters with fear'. See Sorabji (2000), 375–81.

The distinction between considering something good and considering something advantageous does not occur in Gellius' story nor in Augustine's report of it. Augustine refers to this Stoic distinction because he thinks that Cicero's criticism of it as being more verbal than real can be applied to the Stoic view of emotions as well.¹⁴⁷ In Augustine's view it was idiosyncratic to claim that what is usually called fear is something else when it assails a wise man. Augustine maintained that the Stoic philosopher felt fear because he showed typical expressive movements, though the highest part of the soul was not affected. This is exemplified by Vergil's line:

Unmoved the mind, the tears flow in vain.¹⁴⁸

The Stoics would not have accepted Augustine's correction of their terminology, because they did not accept the Platonic view of the parts of the soul and, furthermore, their point was that a first movement does not involve any evaluative commitment. It is an affective reaction which can be repelled by giving no consent to it. It is worth noticing that Augustine pays special attention to the Stoic theory of pre-passions (without using the term). He interpreted a pre-passion as the first stage of an occurrent emotion rather than as a preparatory change of the mind toward an emotion.¹⁴⁹ Augustine apparently did not have any clear picture of the Aristotelian theory; he assumed that it did not differ significantly from the Platonic view.

In *City of God* 14.8 the Stoic doctrine of emotions is assessed from another point of view. Augustine refers to the three dispositions of the wise man, called in Greek *eupatheiai* and by Cicero, in Latin, *constantiae*. The will (*voluntas*) pursues the good; joy (*gaudium*) is felt in the attainment of the good, which the wise man attains in every situation; and caution (*cautio*) is instrumental in avoiding evil. Only the sage can possess will, joy, and caution. These states are strictly separated from the emotions, which belong to fools. Augustine takes this to mean that, according to the Stoics, a wise man is wholly directed by the rational part of the soul and is consequently immune to emotional suggestions and apathetic.¹⁵⁰ Augustine regarded this as an impossible ideal, adding that

¹⁴⁷ Augustine refers to Cicero's *De finibus bonorum et malorum*.

¹⁴⁸ Augustine implies that Vergil was talking about Aeneas, but in the *Aeneid* 4.449 the mind is Aeneas' and the tears Dido's.

¹⁴⁹ An incipient passion involves a judgement and assent of the emotional part, but this is not the content of the controlling will. See pp. 169–70. below and G. J. P. O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (London: Duckworth, 1987), 89–90.

¹⁵⁰ See Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.12–14.

even if it were possible, it would be a morally misguided model for life. Stoic detachment alienates people from socially relevant shared feelings and human sensibility. Emotions can also have a morally valuable motivating function (*City of God* 14.9; see also 9.5, and *Homilies on the Gospel of John* 60.3).¹⁵¹

Augustine sometimes calls emotions perturbations, as Cicero did, but he also uses more neutral terms, such as affections (*affectiones*), affects (*affectus*), or passions (*passiones*). There are brief comments on these terms in *City of God* 8.17, 9.4, and 14.5. Following Cicero, Augustine makes use of the Stoic classification of the basic emotions into four groups: pleasure (*laetitia*), appetite (*cupiditas*), distress (*tristitia*), and fear (*metus, timor*). (See *City of God* 14.5–9; *Conf.* 10.14.22; *On the Trinity* 6.8, 60.3.)¹⁵² The Stoic physiological descriptions of the affections are employed in *Homilies on the Gospel of John* 46.8. But Augustine also used the Platonic terminology and treated concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and anger (*ira*) as the generic movements of the irrational soul (*City of God* 14.19).¹⁵³ In dealing with sin Augustine sometimes speaks about threefold cupidity (*cupiditas triplex*), including lust (*cupiditas* or *libido*), curiosity (*curiositas*), and pride (*ambitio, superbia*). He thought that this classification was found in 1 John 2:16, where carnal lust, desire of the eyes, and false ambition are mentioned (*Conf.* 3.8.16; 10.30.41).¹⁵⁴

Even though negative characterizations are common in Augustine's remarks on the emotions, he did not share the Stoic view that the emotions are opposed to right reason.¹⁵⁵ He preferred to think, like the

¹⁵¹ *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV*, ed. R. Willems, CCSL 36 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954); trans. in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vii. 7–452. For criticism of Stoic *apatheia* in Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and Lactantius, see Colish (1985), ii. 42–7, 53–7.

¹⁵² *De Trinitate*, ed. W. J. Mountain with the assistance of F. Glorie, CCSL 50 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968); trans. S. McKenna, *Fathers of the Church*, 45 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). Augustine says that he prefers *tristitia* to Cicero's *aegritudo* and to Virgil's *dolor*, which are 'more generally employed of physical sensation' (*City of God* 14.7).

¹⁵³ *Concupiscentia* is a word which translates the Greek *epithumia*. It was used in the Latin Bible and was common among Christian authors. *Cupiditas* was used by non-Christian Latin authors. Augustine employs both terms in a psychological sense, but he often associates them with sinfulness. For Augustine's terminology, see O'Daly (1987), 46–8; G. J. P. O'Daly and A. Zumkeller, 'Affectus (passio, perturbatio)', in C. Mayer (ed.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*, (Basel: Schwabe, 1986–), i. 166–180; G. Bonner, 'Concupiscentia', *ibid.* i. 1113–22; *idem*, 'Cupiditas', *ibid.* ii. 166–72.

¹⁵⁴ See also *De vera religione*, ed. K.-D. Daur, CCSL 32 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), 69; *Of True Religion*, trans. J. H. S. Burleigh, in *Augustine, Earlier Writings*, The Library of Christian Classics, 6 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953). For these terms in Augustine, see J. O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), ii: *Commentary on Books 1–7*, 65–6, 191–2; iii: *Commentary on Books 8–13*, 203–8, 223–4.

¹⁵⁵ This formulation (cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.11) is mentioned in *City of God* 8.17.

Platonists, that there is an emotional level in the human soul. God and angels are impassible (*City of God* 14.5). Emotions belong to the present condition of human beings, and can even be of some moral value. However, because of original sin, the emotional dispositions are disturbed. Human beings suffer from exaggerated carnal suggestions, which they should continuously expel, and are prone to anger and vainglory. Augustine thought that philosophers had realized this and had agreed in seeing uncontrolled emotions as the main psychological source of the troubles in society and the life of individuals. Emotions have become relatively autonomous and cannot be left without strict regulation. This causes lots of work, one of the penal consequences of the Fall.¹⁵⁶ According to Augustine, the control of sexual desire differs from that of the other passions, since in its case not only is the first occurrence of desire autonomous, but also the sexual organs move without a command. In expressing anger through words or deeds, by contrast, one's tongue or hand is put in motion at the instigation of the will (*City of God* 14.19).¹⁵⁷

In the *On the Quantity of the Soul*, Augustine characterizes the primary level of the soul as the life-giving principle which also regulates the organic cohesion of embodied beings. The second functional level of the soul, which is restricted to animals and men, comprises the potencies of perception, movement, appetite, and avoidance, the instincts of sex and care for offspring, the power of memory, the abilities to imagine and to make certain kinds of judgements, and various habitual dispositions. The third function consists of the rational activities which are again divided into several subclasses (70–7).¹⁵⁸ Augustine had a fairly detailed theory of the sense perception associated with the second level of the soul. He thought that in addition to the five senses, the animals have an internal sense through which they are aware of their sensations and control and judge them in accordance with their instinctual tendencies to seek pleasure and to avoid harm.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ 'These are controlled by compulsion and struggle, and this is not a healthy condition in accordance with nature, but a weary one arising from guilt' (*City of God* 14.19). For Augustine's view of concupiscence as the permanent weakness which we have inherited from Adam, see Rist (1994), 135–7.

¹⁵⁷ Augustine thought that consent to sexual lust in marital sexual intercourse was a venial sin and pardonable. Augustine's and Julian's debate about sexual *concupiscentia* is discussed in Rist (1994), 321–7, and Sorabji (2000), 403–13.

¹⁵⁸ *De quantitate animae*, ed. W. Hörmann, CSEL 89 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1986); trans. J. M. Colleran, *Ancient Christian Writers*, 9 (New York: Newman Press, 1950), 70–7; see also O'Daly (1987), 11–15.

¹⁵⁹ *De libero arbitrio*, ed. W. M. Green, CCSL 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), 2.4–5; trans. T. Williams, *On the Free Choice of the Will* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993).

Human beings share the lower powers of the soul with animals, but they also have the rational soul and the powers of intellect and will (*City of God* 5.11). The acts of animals are morally indifferent—they cannot take place contrary to reason, which animals do not possess (*City of God* 8.17). Bodily feelings and some simple emotions are similar in animals and in human beings, but there are also emotions which are embedded in a complicated cognitive environment and have no analogies in animals. In associating the emotions with the irrational part of the soul, Augustine treats the distinction between the parts the soul as a dichotomy of moral psychology rather than natural philosophy. The task of the rational part is to rule the other elements, recalling them from courses they are wrongly moved to follow and allowing them to follow permitted lines of action (*City of God* 14.19).

Occurrent emotions are usually accompanied by bodily changes in facial expression, complexion, gesture, and the system of humours. The emotions themselves are special states of the soul involving evaluative judgements, behavioural suggestions, which are voluntarily complied with or repelled, and pleasant or unpleasant feelings. Augustine found the feeling element to be an interesting psychological mental phenomenon. Bodily feelings are special acts of being aware of the body, and similarly the feelings associated with the standard emotions and higher spiritual experiences are forms of affective awareness of being involved in various states of affairs.¹⁶⁰ As far as they involve pleasure in pride, vainglory, abuse of power, or other morally evil things, they are also signs of the sinful weakness of the soul.¹⁶¹

Augustine thought that occurrent inner feelings cannot be given any definite description. Those who have experienced them know what they are. In *Conf.* 10.14.21–15.23 he asks how feelings can be remembered. Augustine supposes that we must have a mental image of the past things

Like Plato and others after him (except Plotinus and his followers), Augustine stresses that the so-called pleasures and pains of the body are really pleasures and pains of the soul. 'For what appetite or pain can flesh feel in itself, apart from the soul? When the flesh is said to have an appetite or to suffer pain, it is either the person, as I have maintained, or else some part of the soul which is affected by what the flesh undergoes, whether a hard experience, producing pain, or a soft experience, producing pleasure' (*City of God* 14.15).

¹⁶⁰ In *City of God* 14.15 Augustine writes: 'the pain of the flesh is . . . a kind of disagreement with what happens to the body, in the same way as mental pain, which is called distress, is a disagreement with what happens to us against our will.' For Augustine's descriptions of how 'being wounded in the soul' is felt, see *Conf.* 4.4.9; 4.7.12; 9.12.30–2.

¹⁶¹ *On the Free Choice* 1.8; 3.25; *Enarrationes in Psalmos (Sermons on Psalms)*, ed. E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont, CCSL 38–40 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), 9.15; *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 28 (Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1894), 5.20.

we think about and that we receive these images from the memory, which retains them. But how can we remember pain? What would an image of it be like? Augustine thought it absurd to assume that when we think about sadness or fear, we experience grief or terror. The problem is that if the image of pain is not painful, how can it resemble pain? It seems that Augustine did not have a good answer. He says that we remember the affections of the soul by having 'notions' of them.¹⁶²

A typical feature of Augustine's theory of the emotions is that he calls them 'volitions'. This is more understandable when one realizes that Augustine made use of a narrow concept of will, which applies to a controlling faculty in the superior part of the soul, and a large concept of will, which applies to all kinds of desires and avoidances. (See pp. 168–9 below.) Applying the concept of will Augustine classifies the basic emotions as follows:

For what is appetite or joy but will (*voluntas*) which consents to what we will (*volumus*)? And what is fear or distress but will which dissents from what we do not will (*nolumus*)? When this consent to what we will takes the form of pursuit, it is appetite, and when it takes the form of enjoyment of what we will, it is joy. In the same way, when we dissent from something that we do not will to happen, that will is fear, but when we dissent from something which happens and we do not will it to happen, that will is distress. (*City of God* 14.6)

A similar formulation with the help of the notion of love runs as follows:

Love, then, striving to have what is loved, is appetite; and having and enjoying it, is joy; and love fleeing what is opposed to it, is fear, and experiencing this when it happens is distress. Now these are bad if the love is bad, and good if it is good. (*City of God* 14.7)¹⁶³

From texts like this one may get the impression that occurrent emotions are taken as chosen positions in a manner not very far from the Chrysippan conception of emotions as voluntarily chosen.¹⁶⁴ This association, although not wholly wrong, is misleading. Augustine thought, like Plato and Aristotle, that the functions of the emotional level of the soul can be manipulated by education; however, it remains a source of spontaneous

¹⁶² See also G. B. Matthews, 'Knowledge and Illumination', in Stump and Kretzmann (2001), 178.

¹⁶³ Cf. Nussbaum (1994), 388–9, about the Stoic view of the unity among the passions.

¹⁶⁴ In her article 'Augustine's Ethics' Bonnie Kent states that Augustine does not posit basic division between will and emotion; see Stump and Kretzmann (2001), 383. This is true for some but not for all uses of the term 'will' in Augustine; he also says that in paradise the emotional part of the soul was not set in motion in defiance of the right will, while now it often reacts without control (*City of God* 14.12, 19).

reactions. The arousal of emotions in various situations cannot be wholly controlled, but they do not automatically lead people to behave in a certain way. People can voluntarily consent to or dissent from emotional suggestions and also repel an occurrent emotion itself.

In systematizing the Stoic taxonomy by means of the concept of love in *City of God* 14.7, Augustine employs the notions of longing and enjoying and their opposites, thus getting four dynamic attitudes. He does not mean that love is the genus of these emotions; fear and distress are not forms of love. 'Love' refers to a person's commitment to a set of values, and this love can make him or her experience appetite, joy, fear, or distress in various situations. If the basic love is good, the occurrent emotions are good, and if it is evil, the emotions are evil. In a famous passage from the *Confessions* (13.9.10) Augustine writes: 'A body by its weight tends to move towards its proper place... My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying me.' The same idea is applied in the parallel systematization with the help of the concept of will quoted above:

What is most important is the quality of one's will, because if the will is wrong, it will have wrong movements, but if it is right, they will be not only blameless but even praiseworthy. (*City of God* 14.6)

Augustine's description of the different philosophical theories of the emotions is not very satisfactory. He did not enter into details, except some features of the Stoic view. In spite of this, his discussion shows more interest in the theories than other Christian approaches, with the possible exception of Nemesius of Emesa. Augustine's own view is compatible with the Platonic distinction between an emotional and a rational part of the soul, but he is more interested in conceptualizing emotional matters by means of the concept of will, which was also central in his theology of sin.¹⁶⁵

In criticizing Stoic *apatheia*, Augustine stresses that emotions are common to both good and bad, but 'the good have these in a good way and the bad in a bad way' (*City of God* 14.8). Christians fear to sin, desire to persevere, feel pain over their sins, and rejoice in good works. Referring to various passages in the Bible, Augustine describes the Holy Spirit as a rhetorician who evokes these emotions in believers (14.9). In this context Augustine describes Christian affects as natural emotions having a religious cognitive component. Even though the emotions of Christians are influenced by their faith, emotions are actualized in the emotional part of

¹⁶⁵ For Augustine's theory of emotions and its sources, see also O'Daly (1987), 40–54.

the soul, which requires continuous control because of its constitutional weakness. Before the Fall, human beings did not have the psychosomatic movements which are now referred to by emotional terms, and Christians will not have them in heaven (*City of God* 14.8–9). In paradise the emotions did not occur without being willed, and this original state will be restored in the spiritual psychology of the saints. The damned will also receive a new body, but they are going to feel eternal punishment as a bodily pain and as a continuous sorrow of the soul (*City of God* 21.9; 22.30). The blessed will remember the details of their earthly life without being affected by this knowledge (22.30).

Faith and Christian love are supernaturally caused, being effects of grace and the indwelling of the Trinity in the heart (*On the Trinity* 15.5). They are attitudes of the highest part of the soul, which should control the emotions. The feelings which are immediately associated with these attitudes differ from the movements which Augustine calls passions, partly because of their location and partly because of their causal history which includes divine influence. (See *On the Spirit and the Letter* 29.51; 32.56; 33.57–9.¹⁶⁶)

In addition to religious emotions, which can be treated as standard psychological phenomena, and the gladness associated with faith and love (*City of God* 14.10; *On Christian Doctrine* 3.10.16), Christians can have non-standard mystical experiences and feelings. Augustine subscribed to the doctrinal tradition of divinization, which he understood in the sense of adoptive sonship without a confusion of substance between God and humanity.¹⁶⁷ In *Conf.* 9.10.23–6 he describes the soul's ascent to an ecstatic experience of God by using parts of Plotinus' *Enneads* in the same way as Ambrose did, and he also employs the traditional conception of five spiritual senses through which one can be directly acquainted with divinity and have special supernatural experiences (*Conf.* 10.6.8; 10.27.38).¹⁶⁸ In ascending to the heavenly tabernacle, the soul follows a sweetness which causes an indescribable pleasure (*Sermons on Psalms* 41.9); an ascending person trembles with love and awe and feels this as divine activity in him or herself (*Conf.* 7.10.16). It has been stated that the fundamental issue in Augustine's mysticism is not the ecstatic vision as such, but the purification of the soul which prepares for it. It is also

¹⁶⁶ *De spiritu et littera*, ed. C. F. Urba and J. Zycha, CSEL 60 (Vienna: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1913); trans. P. Holmes, in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, ed. W. J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), i. 461–518.

¹⁶⁷ McGinn (1991), 250–1.

¹⁶⁸ Louth (1981), 134–41.

noticeable that Augustine, as distinct from Origen and Ambrose, avoids the erotic language of the Song of Songs in describing the encounter between God and the human soul.¹⁶⁹

Emotions in the Confessions

Augustine begins his autobiography from the first stage of childhood, saying that this part of the story is based on what has been told to him, on his observations of the behaviour of children, and on generally known facts about them. As a new-born baby, he expressed bodily pain by crying, and he felt pleasure while eating and being satisfied and smiled first in sleep and then awake. Before learning to speak, he was already conscious of himself as being related to other people, whom he regarded as servants to his increasing appetites. He tried to express his cravings through various signs, and when these were not understood or the adults did not comply with them, the frustration made him angry, and he took revenge by crying. This description of the early passions is in accordance with the Platonic view of the appetitive and spirited elements of the irrational soul. Augustine stresses the strength of the desire for immediate satisfaction and the tendency to egocentric domination, facets that are also manifested in the jealousy of infants (*Conf.* 1.6.7–8, 10).

After brief remarks on early childhood, there is the famous story of how children learn to speak through observing what things are called and how words are connected to various acts. Children are induced to learn language because they want to have a tool for expressing their feelings and desires and thus make others comply with their will (1.8.13). Augustine later adds that this learning is much facilitated by the friendly attitude of those taking care of children. He believed that children in general learn things much better in a friendly atmosphere than under compulsion and fear, and that his knowledge of Greek remained poor because of the unpleasant manner in which it was taught at school (1.14.23).

In his first-person account of language learning, Augustine mentions that he learned the words by attending to various kinds of ostensive and expressive movements associated with them:

Moreover, their intention was evident from the gestures which are, as it were, the natural vocabulary of all races, and are made with the face and the inclination of the eyes and the movements of other parts of the body, and by the tone of voice which indicates whether the mind's inward sentiments are to seek and possess or to reject and avoid. (1.8.13, trans. Chadwick)

¹⁶⁹ McGinn (1991), 259–61.

Augustine's ability to recognize that certain expressions referred to emotional states apparently implied that he understood much of them before having learnt to speak. Some kind of pre-linguistic understanding is also presupposed in his account of learning the names of things in order to be able to refer to them in a way understandable to everybody. The modes of affections are mentioned in accordance with the Stoic list of the basic emotions (appetite, pleasure, distress, and fear). Augustine says that through his newly acquired language skills he could communicate with others by using the signs of his wishes, thus being involved more deeply 'in the stormy society of human life' (1.8.13).

Augustine had a very low opinion of his early education. In his view, even his parents were more interested in a career providing him with an economically secure and socially respected position than in the improvement of his character (2.3.5–8). He was often caned at school, which caused suffering and constant fear. He prayed God that his teachers would not beat him. The prayer was not heard, as Augustine remarks, and he found it hurtful that his parents and other adults were only amused at his sufferings (1.9.14). When he later analyses his motive for stealing pears together with some friends and throwing them to pigs, he says that it was similar to a derisive laughter at those who would have willed them not to do such things (2.4.9; 2.9.17). One could regard this as a revenge on older people for their lack of responsiveness to his sufferings, which was emphatically mentioned before, but Augustine states that there was no pleasure in settling a score.¹⁷⁰

At school, beatings were later exchanged for rewards, but in Augustine's opinion this took place in a manner which nourished egocentric vanity. In summarizing the disturbing emotions of his soul before the age of puberty, Augustine refers to exaggerated pleasure in eating, playing, watching theatrical performances, and imitating them, as well as to the aspiration for honour and fame. These passions led him to tell lies, to steal from the cellar, and to behave arrogantly towards other boys (1.19.30). The list corresponds to Augustine's model of classifying the activities of the perverted soul as the sins of carnal lust, the desire of the eyes and pride.¹⁷¹ But he was not merely evil. He loved truth and learned things; he appreciated friendship and escaped pain, abjection, and ignorance. Augustine concludes that his soul, which was good as a work of God,

¹⁷⁰ For Augustine's extensive discussion of the pear theft, see O'Donnell (1992), ii. 126–43.

¹⁷¹ The role of this triple pattern in the *Confessions* is discussed in *ibid.* ii. 65–6, 191–2; iii. 203–8; 223–4. See also p. 156 above.

was emotionally attached to earthly things; it identified itself as a lover of such matters and had no ascending tendency (1.20.31).

Following the ancient habit of dividing life into periods, Augustine calls the first stage infancy (*infantia*), the second boyhood (*pueritia*), and the third adolescence (*adolescentia*) (1.8.13–14; 2.1.1). The second book mainly describes the development of sexual desire in early adolescence. Augustine paid much attention to it, because he thought that it was the unbridled libido which particularly fastened his soul to wrong matters. He tells that he did not experience any deeper conflicts of mind during the first period of his promiscuous sexual intercourse, though he became acquainted with jealousy, suspicion, fear, anger, and contention in his love affairs (3.1.1). He did not feel any shame for his sexual habits; on the contrary, he thought that they were even permitted religiously, and he felt shame only if he did not have the experiences that others talked about (2.3.7).

Augustine relates that his emotional life was radically changed when he read Cicero's *Hortensius* at the age of 18. He was filled with a strong love of immortal wisdom and began to consider his lower desires empty (3.4.7). This new orientation lasted through the next years when Augustine became an adherent of Manichaeism and then of Platonism until his conversion to Christianity in Milan in 386. Augustine regarded his ethical attitude during this period as a velleity rather than as an effective improvement, his prayer being 'Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet' (8.7.17). He was not able to get rid of the vicious movements of the soul to the extent he would have wished. Augustine explains this by referring to the inherent weakness of the human soul, the habits of the emotional part, and the effects of social instincts and group membership on behaviour.¹⁷² A further source was the influence of poetry and theatre, which Augustine also found interesting because of his professional education. Let us take a look at Augustine's remarks on this issue in the *Confessions*.

In his expurgation of poetry in Books 2 and 3 of the *Republic*, Plato excluded the representation of grief, sexual love, fear, and some other emotions from the depiction of heroes and gods. Plato thought that the attraction of theatre and poetry consisted in their imitation of irrational emotions. Eliminating these from poetry meant giving up the institution

¹⁷² See Rist (1994), 175–80. Augustine and his friends stole the pears just because it was the wrong thing to do, which shows the power of evil inclination. He had not done it alone, which exemplifies the perils of friendship without preceding love of God.

of free literary culture, which the philosophical rulers of an ideal state would be willing to do. Plato did not think that people would be helped to control their passions by seeing their devastating influence on the life of the people in tragedies. An educational approach of this kind would be risky, since the lower emotions are like infectious diseases, and repeated emotional responses strengthen the disturbing non-intellectual elements of the soul. Poetry ‘waters’ our emotions, and it is counter-effective with regard to the education which tries to improve the good ones among them and to weed out the bad ones (*Republic* 604e–606d).¹⁷³

The Stoics repudiated emotions more completely than Plato did, but did not reject theatre and emotional literature. They accepted a moralizing approach to representations in the arts as an educational tool. In his treatise *How a Young Person Should Listen to Poetry* (*Moralia*, vol. i) Plutarch contrasts the Platonic and Epicurean rejection of poetry and literary emotions with the alternative which he and the Stoics regarded as more suitable:

Shall we, then, stopping up young people’s ears with a hard and unyielding wax, as the ears of the Ithacans were stopped, force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and to avoid poetry and steer their course without it? Or shall we instead, setting them against some upright standard of reason and binding them there securely, guide and guard their judgement, so that it will not be carried away from the course by pleasure toward that which will harm them. (15d)

Chrysippus demonstrated his detached attitude by an allegorical interpretation of some works of art which *prima facie* were emotionally disturbing, but the point of the Stoic approach is seen more straightforwardly in Epictetus’ definition of tragedy as a presentation of ‘what happens when chance events befall fools’ (*Discourses* 2.26.31).¹⁷⁴

Augustine was largely satisfied with Plato’s criticism of the poetic fictions which were derogatory to the gods. In the *City of God* he said that when stories of this kind are made familiar to people through theatrical displays, they kindle the most depraved desires and give them a kind of divine authority. Quoting Cicero’s *De republica*, Augustine writes:

When cheers and the approval of the public uphold the poets, as if it were the praise of a great and wise master, what darkness these poets bring on, what fears they inspire, what appetites they inflame. (*De civitate Dei* 2.14)

¹⁷³ See also Nussbaum (1986), 157–8.

¹⁷⁴ M. Nussbaum, ‘Poetry and the Passions: Two Stoic Views’, in Brunschwig and Nussbaum (1993), 97–149. For Aristotle’s view of passions and poetry, see pp. 39–40 above.

In the *Confessions*, Augustine states that becoming acquainted with such stories in elementary school had a bad effect on the emotional part of his soul. He refers to the myth of Jupiter seducing Danae through a golden rain and quotes Terence's *Eunuch*:

But what a god (he says)! He strikes the temples of heaven with his immense sound. And am I, a poor little fellow, not to do the same as he? Yes indeed, I have done it with pleasure. (1.16.26, trans. Chadwick)

Augustine did not believe that the detached, Stoic approach to emotionally misguided poetry was of any educational use. With Plato, he thought that touching on the representations of lower emotions is always dangerous, since the soul hardly becomes immune to their ability to arouse it. Augustine tells a story of his friend Alypius, later bishop of Tagaste, who could not resist the vulgar desires in the circus where he was brought against his will (6.8.13). He thought that the same could be applied to the emotional impact of the theatre as well (3.2.2.).

Since Augustine's view of emotions was cognitive, he was interested in the question of why the audience feels happiness and distress with the actors, although they know that what happens is fictitious. He seems to think that knowing this does not influence the emotions, because people coming to the theatre are willing to feel those emotions. They forget their ordinary life and through their empathy with the actors they participate in events which take place on the stage. Although the story as such is fictitious, participatory evaluations are real and sufficient to activate emotions (3.2.2–3). Augustine was more intrigued by the pleasant feelings evoked by poetry and drama. In his view there was something strange in enjoying distress caused by what happens to fictitious persons. In recovering how he was taught to weep at fiction, Augustine states that 'had I been kept from reading this story, I would have been sad, because I could not read what made me sad' (1.13.21). One could ask whether it might be morally helpful to become habituated to feel emotions like pity and sympathy in drama. Augustine's answer is negative. When people go to the theatre, they want to feel compassion and distress and enjoy these feelings. This shows that theatrical compassion, although it is based on a fellow-feeling, is a degenerated form of this emotion, which we more usually feel or which we should feel outside the theatre without enjoying it. Augustine thought that wanting to have compassion for the suffering of others implies that one wants wretches to exist so as to be objects of compassion. This remark on malicious good will, as Augustine calls it, is an application of what is called the paradox of the Good Samaritan in ethics (3.2.3). (See p. 207 below.)

In Book 4 there is a longer description of a grief caused by the death of a friend. 'Everything was an object of horror' for his 'lacerated and bloody soul' (4.7.12). 'I had become to myself a place of unhappiness in which I could not bear to be; but I could not escape from myself' (*ibid.*, cf. 4.4.9). Augustine characterizes his reaction as madness. Because of his exaggerated love for a created thing, the sadness was not moderated in a proper manner (4.8.13). He was later glad to weep 'before God' for the death of his mother for a fraction of an hour (9.12.33).¹⁷⁵ In 4.5.10 Augustine asks why weeping is a relief to us when unhappy; is it some kind of shrinking from the memory of things which we formerly enjoyed?

The theme of inner division of the soul culminates in Book 8, where Augustine describes his conversion. Step by step it became clear to him that only Christian faith could offer the necessary medicine for his sufferings. Among the important factors were Ambrose's sermons and the stories about the conversion of Marius Victorinus and the life of Antony. Augustine felt a continuous struggle between 'two wills, the old and the new, the carnal and the spiritual'. The spiritual will lacked power, and consequently Augustine was not able to will his conversion effectively. He describes the inability to will what one wills to will as follows:

The mind commands the body and is instantly obeyed. The mind commands itself and meets resistance. The mind commands the hand to move, and it is so easy that one hardly distinguishes the order from its execution. Yet mind is mind, and hand is body. The mind orders the mind to will. The recipient of the order is itself, yet it does not perform it. What causes this monstrosity and why does this happen? Mind commands, I say, that it should will, and would not give the command if it did not will, yet does not perform what it commands. (8.9.21, trans. Chadwick)

Augustine's explanation is that the will does not will completely and does not command completely. If it were whole, it would not command itself ineffectually.

Therefore there is no monstrous split between willing and not willing. We are dealing with a morbid condition of the mind, which, when it is lifted up by the truth, does not unreservedly rise to it but is weighted down by habit. (8.9.21, trans. Chadwick)

Augustine stressed that in speaking about two wills he did not imply the Manichean doctrine of two natures or minds in one person. There are

¹⁷⁵ Most Christian authors, as distinct from Plotinus and the Stoics, advocated moderation, not eradication, of grief at death. See Sorabji (2000), 394.

contending desires and tendencies in one and the same person, whose actual will is determined by the strongest factor:

When I was deliberating on becoming a servant of the Lord my God, as I had planned for a long time, I willed it and I did not will it. It was I. (8.10.22)

Emotions and the Will

Augustine sometimes called all occurrent emotions ‘volitions’ (*City of God* 14.6–7). One might ask how they can be acts of will, if the will as a special faculty belongs to the superior part of the soul, as Augustine often states, and emotions are movements of the lower parts. As already mentioned, Augustine had both a broad notion of volition, which refers to all kinds of dynamic acts of the soul, and a more restricted notion, which refers to the acts of the dynamic and controlling power in the superior part. These notions are linked together by the fact that the movements of the soul can be controlled by the superior part. Even if emotions in their initial state are uncontrolled movements, the superior will can react to them either by consenting to emotional suggestions or by refusing them. Independently of what the superior will does, the emotional movements are voluntary as soon as they can in principle be defeated or consented to (cf. *On the Trinity* 12.12; *City of God* 14.19).

Many authors could have made remarks of this kind by combining elements from popular Platonist and Stoic works. What is new in Augustine’s approach is his attempt to relate all impulses and inclinations of the soul to the will as a dynamic centre of personality, which, as Dihle says, is a capacity relatively independent with respect to theoretical intellect and lower desires.¹⁷⁶ The tasks of the will are not, however, very different from those given to the dominant part of the soul by later Platonists. The controlling will is either rightly or wrongly directed, and its orientation determines its activities.

Let us have a closer look at the different ways in which things are said to be willed in Augustine’s works. (i) The faculty of seeing is said to be joined to the object of perception by the will, and similarly all acts of human

¹⁷⁶ A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1982), 127–9. Dihle argues that Augustine introduced the concept of will as a psychological faculty that functions as an ultimate and free arbitrator between possible modes of behaviour. For some discussions of Dihle’s thesis, see C. H. Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine’, in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), *The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1988), 234–59; S. Knuuttila, ‘The Emergence of the Logic of Will in Medieval Thought’, in G. Matthews (ed.), *The Augustinian Tradition* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), 206–8.

beings and animals which can be regarded as intended in some way can be said to be willed (*On the Trinity* 11.2).¹⁷⁷ (ii) All external actions and omissions which are not externally compelled and all perceptions, cognitions, and emotional movements (except their incipient activations) are counted as willed by the superior part of the soul. This claim is based on the view that the will is the controlling faculty, which, even when not initiating things with a particular act, can be regarded as letting all those things happen which it does not prevent (*Confessions* 8.9.21; *On the Spirit and the Letter* 31.53). (iii) All acts of the superior will are willed; they have no efficient cause other than the will itself (*On the Free Choice of the Will* 3.3; 3.17). (iv) Some preferential evaluations are willed in an optative sense. To will things in this way is to wish that they take place. The acts of the will are either effective or ineffective. Effective acts may correspond to preferential evaluations, but it is also possible that the actual act of will differs from what a person optatively regards as the best alternative. Augustine described ineffective wishful inclinations as incomplete acts of will (*Confessions* 8.5.11; 8.9.21). (v) Emotional activations can also be called voluntary in the indirect sense that their quality and strength are influenced by the voluntarily formed habits of managing them (*Confessions* 8.5.11; *On the Sermon on the Mount* 12.34).¹⁷⁸

Since Augustine regarded all those acts as voluntary which in principle could be prevented by the controlling will, he took as consented to pleasures all those pleasant thoughts which were not repelled as soon as they could be repelled. This is one of the basic ideas of Augustine's analysis of sinful acts. Its main lines are as follows. Concupiscence as the permanent inherited weakness we have for sinful things inclines us to evil desires. These are signs of original sin, but they are not counted as fresh additional sins if they are immediately defeated. They become sins only through consent. 'We do not sin in having an evil desire but in consenting to it.'¹⁷⁹ Consent can take place in two ways. A person may keep a pleasant sinful thought actual without any intention of behaving in the way it suggests, either directly by willing the cogitation or indirectly by lingering on it and not trying to damp it down. This consent is less significant than the decision to act in accordance with the suggestion. When Augustine says

¹⁷⁷ Dihle (1982), 125–6.

¹⁷⁸ *De sermone Domini in monte*, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, CCL 35 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1967); *Commentary on the Lord's Sermon on the Mount*, trans. D. J. Kavanagh, The Fathers of the Church, 11 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1951).

¹⁷⁹ *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos* (*Exposition of Some Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans*), PL 35, 2066.

that desire leads to action through suggestion, pleasure, and consent (*suggestio, delectatio, consentio*), suggestion refers to a thought which can arouse an actual desire, pleasure to its initial state, and consent to the acceptance of thinking about the deed with pleasure or the decision to act (*On the Sermon on the Mount* 12.34–5).¹⁸⁰

When the mind enjoys forbidden things merely in cogitation and, having not yet decided to realize them, revolves them and adheres with a pleasure to thoughts which should be expelled as soon as they enter into the soul, one cannot reasonably maintain that this is not a sin though far less than if it were also determined to accomplish them in an outward act. (*On the Trinity* 12.12)

Giving an allegorical interpretation to the biblical story of Adam, Eve, and the serpent, Augustine equates the serpent with temptations to sinful pleasures, Eve with the emotional level which tends to overestimate mundane things and to react positively to evil suggestions, and Adam with the highest rational and authoritative level of the soul. When the serpent makes the soul aware of a sinful attraction, and one thinks about it with pleasure without an intention to act, the woman begins to eat the forbidden fruit. If this movement is not prevented by reason, the person can be said to consent to the pleasure of cogitation. If an intention to act follows, the man also eats the forbidden fruit—that is, there is a consent of reason (*On the Trinity*, 12.12). According to Augustine, the suggestion is not a sin, nor is the incipient pleasure of cogitation, provided that it is destroyed by the highest part as soon as it becomes aware of it.

When our cupidity is not moved toward a sin by the suggestion, the intrigues of the serpent are baffled. If it is moved, the woman is already persuaded, but sometimes the reason manly stops the movement of cupidity and destroys it and so we do not slide into sin but win it by fighting. (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2.14.21)

Augustine's analysis of the sinful movements of the soul is similar to that of Origen in *On the Principles* 3.1.4, discussed above (pp.122–3). Both authors draw a distinction between the allurements and enticements which may take place in the soul before the commanding faculty is able

¹⁸⁰ For sin as assenting to concupiscence, see also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, ed. C. F. Urba and J. Zycha, CSEL 42 (Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky, 1902), 1.23.25; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum*, ed. C. F. Urba and J. Zycha, CSEL 60 (Vienna: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1913), 1.13.27; *Contra Julianum*, PL 44, 5.2.8; *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, ed. D. Weber, CSEL 91 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1998), 2.11.15–2.14.21; *Sermons on Psalms* 118.3.1. See also Rist (1994), 136–7. Kahn (1988) refers to similarities between Augustine's view and Seneca's and Epictetus' views of choice as something up to us.

to act. Its assent or dissent determines the moral quality of behaviour. Both authors derived this model from the Stoic theory of the first movements or pre-passions. Augustine interpreted the first movements as reactions of the emotional part of the soul, and therefore regarded them as initial emotions rather than precedents of emotions.

According to Augustine, the corrupted human will is not able to resist the improper lower impulses effectively. It yields to them and begins to seek satisfaction in the external world of changeable pleasures, instead of clinging to better inclinations. As people cannot repair the fragmented will by themselves, they are not able to begin to will right things wholeheartedly. Only divine grace can restore the right orientation and help the will to preserve it in the struggle against evil impulses. (See e.g. *Exposition of Some Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans*, PL 35, 2065–6.) This theological view determined Augustine's discussion of the questions pertaining to the will. Against this background, the only effective 'voluntarist' decision between different ends seems to be the choice through which a Christian can leave off the right orientation of will restored by grace.

Augustine's doctrine of control over those movements of the soul which become sinful soon after their arousal was very influential in early medieval thought. Another influential theme was Augustine's view of reluctant (*invitus*) actions. The basic type of reluctant action in Augustine is similar to what Aristotle called a 'mixed action' at the beginning of the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Mixed acts are such that no one chooses them as such, though they can be chosen as necessary means to an end in certain circumstances. Aristotle mentions the example of throwing goods from a ship floundering on a stormy sea. Augustine says that acts of this kind are said to be done reluctantly or unwillingly, because people do not like to do such things and they wish that they did not have to do them. They are done contrary to what is willed, when 'what is willed' means what is wished. But Augustine thought that the decisive will of a person is seen in behaviour, provided that there is no external compulsion, and therefore all reluctantly chosen acts can be said to be willed (*On the Spirit and the Letter* 31.53).

One of the best-known aspects of Augustine's theory of will is the idea that not just means to an end are sometimes reluctantly chosen. The basic orientation of the will itself can be reluctant. In Book 8 of his *Confessions* Augustine describes his conversion as an example of such a gap between evaluation and effective motivation. He was sure that it would be better to improve his way of living radically, but he continued to follow his settled habits. He did it willingly in the sense that will as the decisive power let it

happen. He willed that he would will to live otherwise, but his will to will it was ineffective and, as he said, partial and imperfect.

As for the effective will, Augustine thought that if S wills that p, S also wills that he or she wills that p. If S wills that p and claims to will that he or she does not will that p, this second-order will may correspond to S's evaluation, but it is a wish and an imperfect will as long as it remains ineffective. As for the effective will, Augustine accepts the form

(1) $W_p \leftrightarrow WW_p$.

If the first-order will operator refers to effective will in

(2) $W_p \ \& \ W - W_p$,

the second-order will operator is not taken in the same sense as the first-order operator, if (2) is possible. It refers to a wish.

In his analysis of the first movements in Augustine, Richard Sorabji stresses that Augustine was blind to the Stoic division between involuntary first movements and willed emotions. I think that instead of being blind to this distinction Augustine employed it with some qualification. What he wanted to change in the Stoic theory was the idea that first movements are somehow innocent and should not be regarded as the initial stages of emotion. In Augustine's view this is misleading, and prevents people from recognizing that human emotional patterns are contaminated by original sin. The initial stages of the emotions are not free volitions, but immediately become free when they can be expelled. First movements exemplify one's will in the sense that they are one's uncontrolled reactions to things. When their suggestions are not consented to, one does not regard this level of the will as one's authentic will.

2.5 Religious Feelings in Early Monasticism

Augustine, Cassian, Gregory the Great, and Jerome had a great influence on Western monastic spirituality, which was chiefly concerned with internal purification through ascetic exercises and the ascension of the soul. The traditional doctrine of the sinful first movements came to play an important role in monastic spirituality. It occurs in the influential Benedict's rule as follows:

When evil thoughts come into one's heart, one should dash them at once against Christ and manifest them to one's spiritual father.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ J. McCann (ed.), *The Rule of St. Benedict in Latin and English* (London: Burns & Oates, 1952), 4.50. Cf. Cassian, *Inst.* 6.13.1.

Within monastic culture, all wrongly directed movements of the soul were considered particularly harmful, because they hindered the ascent to divinity. Analysing the spontaneous thoughts and affects helped to diagnose the illness of the soul, and ascetic practice was a cure for lessening the vigour of sinful emotions and strengthening one's power to defeat them. As can be seen from the monastic works of the twelfth century, this introspective tradition favoured drawing fine distinctions between various movements of the heart and between the degrees of their sinfulness. I shall analyse this literature in Chapter 3. One widely discussed theme was whether a deviant movement becomes a sin immediately or not. Even though Peter Lombard made Augustine a spokesman for the former position, which he considered right, it was not Augustine's but rather Gregory the Great's view. Before Peter Lombard, many authors followed historical Augustine.

Augustine thought that a misguided emotional reaction becomes a sin when it is voluntarily controllable. A liable sin is consent to a vicious inclination, whether a conscious act of consent or a failure to expel vicious thoughts. According to Gregory, the wrongly directed movements of the soul become venial sins immediately, in spite of their being too quick to be controlled by the will. Gregory wrote to Augustine, bishop of the church of Canterbury, in a letter quoted in Bede's church history:

For all sin is committed in three ways, namely by suggestion, pleasure, and consent. The devil makes the suggestion, the flesh takes pleasure in it and the spirit consents. . . . So the seed of sin is in suggestion, the nourishment of sin in pleasure, and the maturity is in consent. It often happens that what an evil spirit sows in the thought, the flesh takes pleasure in it, but the spirit nevertheless does not consent to the pleasure. And since the flesh cannot get pleasure without the mind, the mind struggling against the desires of the flesh, is in some ways unwillingly bound down by carnal pleasure, so that through reason it refuses to give its consent, and yet is bound by carnal pleasure, but vehemently bewails its fetters. It was for this reason that the chief soldier in the heavenly army uttered his complaint saying, 'I see another law in my members. . . .'¹⁸²

Even though the inevitable and immediately expelled pleasant feelings with respect to sinful matters are not serious sins for Gregory, it is worth noticing that he does not operate with the distinction between what can and what cannot be controlled in this context. The text quoted above is part of an answer to a question about whether a man may receive

¹⁸² Bede, *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, ed. and trans. B. Colgrave and R. A. B. Mynors, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), I.27.9.

communion after a sexual dream. Gregory states that sexual dreams can be caused by bad thoughts during the day, and that these thoughts are more or less sinful depending on whether there is only a thought or also pleasure or consent. Sexual dreams and nocturnal emissions due to gluttony are less sinful than these, while for those caused by superfluity of seed there is no guilt.¹⁸³ The idea of the degrees of sin occurred in various ways in Patristic thought and was later developed into a detailed doctrine, which was called for by the pursuit of perfection as well as by the expanding penitential and casuistic practices.¹⁸⁴

Fear of hell, penitential sorrow, hope of reward in heaven, reverential fear and love of God were the common religious feelings in Patristic spirituality. Let us see how these terms occur in Gregory the Great.¹⁸⁵ Christian life is dominated by detachment from the world and by desire for God. A detached awareness of the wretchedness of the human way of living in comparison to God's original plan is a result of a special grace of conversion. It makes one think about one's sinfulness and distance from God and, correspondingly, heaven and hell as alternative options. These thoughts are accompanied by the compunction of fear and the compunction of desire. The term *compunctio* refers to a bitter feeling in connection with the fear of judgement and to a bitter and sweet feeling in connection with desire for God, one that includes a joyful thought concerning fulfilment and a painful awareness of distance. The content of the compunction of fear is the threat of punishment for one's sins. This feeling calls for penitence, which is a remedy for the wounds of sin. The practice of contrition and penitence leads to humility and sacrifice of one's autonomy. Simultaneously the compunction of fear becomes less ardent, and the sinner's feelings evolve to the compunction of love:

Who first cried that he should not be led to the punishment, afterward begins to cry more bitterly since he is delayed from the kingdom. For the mind contemplates what the choirs of angels, the very society of saints, and the majesty of inward vision of God might be like and it laments more being removed from these everlasting blessings than it cried earlier when it feared eternal punishment.

¹⁸³ Bede (1991); see also Cassian, *Conferences* 12.8. In *Confessions* 10.30.40 Augustine states that one is not responsible for what takes place in dreams.

¹⁸⁴ See e.g. P. Riché, 'Spirituality in Celtic and Germanic Society', in B. McGinn, J. Meyendorff, and J. Leclercq (eds.), *Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century* (New York: Crossroad, 1985), 163–76; M. Dunn, *The Emergence of Monasticism: From the Desert Fathers to the Early Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 148–51.

¹⁸⁵ What follows is based mainly on C. Straw, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1988). See also C. Dagens, *Saint Grégoire le Grand: Culture et expérience chrétiennes* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1977).

So it happens that when the compunction of fear is perfect it draws the soul to the compunction of love.¹⁸⁶

When the progress from fear to love is described in this way, it seems that a slavish fear is changed into a mercenary hope of reward; these attitudes were considered merely transient first stages in earlier spiritual literature. But Gregory thought that the compunctions take place at different levels. The sinners begin to be reconciled with God when they first burn their carnal identity in fear of judgement. A new self begins to emerge, and the Christian deems his or her future life to be an offering of loving obedience. This can take place in different ways. According to Gregory, transcending oneself in charity is the real proof of heavenly discipleship.¹⁸⁷ It is also the pre-condition for approaching the heights of contemplation in which knowledge and love are intermingled: 'When we love supracelestial things we begin to know what we already love, since love itself is knowledge.'¹⁸⁸ In dealing with contemplative knowledge, Gregory also employs the terminology of the doctrine of spiritual senses and feelings.¹⁸⁹ The soul does not remain at these heights for long. It falls by a sort of violent blow (*reverberatio*) and takes up its life of desire in the midst of temptations. Carole Straw stresses that Gregory more than his predecessors saw the spiritual progress as a dialectical whole of opposite and complementary moments. Joy in contemplation is fragile. Tumultuous thoughts force themselves back into the mind, and through sharpened religious discretion the difference between one's life and the ideal is seen as going much deeper than before religious experiences. Yet increasing awareness of this failure reconstitutes penitence and deepens one's awareness of humility and grace.

There were Patristic authors who treated the ascent of the soul as a progress more straightforwardly than did Gregory. Among these was the anonymous late fifth-century author who introduced himself as a disciple of St Paul and was later identified as Dionysius the Areopagite (Acts 17: 34). The works in the *Corpus Areopagiticum* were largely influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy.¹⁹⁰ Dionysius describes the union with God

¹⁸⁶ *Dialogues*, ii, ed. A. de Vogüé, SC 260 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979), 3.34.2; trans. in Straw (1988), 223.

¹⁸⁷ *Moralia in Iob*, ed. M. Adriaen, CCSL 143, 143A, 143B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979–85), 20.7. 17 (143A, 1016).

¹⁸⁸ *Homiliae in Euangelia*, ed. R. Étaix, CCSL 141 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 27.4; *Moralia in Iob* 28.1.2 (143B, 1396–7).

¹⁸⁹ *Moralia in Iob* 9.33.50 (143, 491); 30.5.19–21 (143B, 1504–5); *Registrum Epistularum libri VIII–XIV*, ed. D. Norberg, CCSL 140A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1982), 9.15 (576).

¹⁹⁰ See Louth (1981), 159–78; McGinn (1991), 157–82.

as an act of ecstatic love: ‘Those who are possessed by this love belong not to themselves but to those they love.’¹⁹¹ Referring to experiences that are beyond cognitive contemplation, Gregory of Nyssa writes: ‘Only in not knowing what He is it is known that He is.’¹⁹² Through the spiritual senses one is aware of divinity in divine darkness.¹⁹³ A related apophatic passage in Dionysius’ *Mystical Theology* runs:

Timothy, my friend, my advice to you . . . is to leave behind everything perceived and understood, everything perceptible and understandable, all that is not and all that is . . . By an undivided and absolute abandonment of yourself and everything, shedding all and freed from all, you will be uplifted to the ray of divine shadow which is above everything that is.¹⁹⁴

An example of deification is St Paul, who said: ‘It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.’¹⁹⁵ Dionysius describes spiritual progress by the triad of purification, illumination, and perfection. Those who have been purified should be free from all blemish. Becoming fully indifferent and apathetic to earthly things, apart from the necessities of nature, they can be ‘lifted up into conformity with God through complete and perfecting divinization.’¹⁹⁶ Dionysius’ works were translated into Latin in the ninth century, but little attention was paid to them before the mid-twelfth century. In the East, Evagrius’ and Dionysius’ views of *apatheia*, love, and mystical union were combined by Maximus the Confessor.¹⁹⁷ Evagrius’ spiritual *apatheia* (without Evagrius’ name) is the subject of the penultimate step 29 in John Climacus’ *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*, one of the most widely used handbooks of the ascetic life in Greek monasticism.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹ *The Divine Names* 4.13, PG 3, 712A.

¹⁹² *Homilies on the Song of Songs* 6, ed. Langerbeck, 182.2–3.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* 11, ed. Langerbeck, 323.10–324.12.

¹⁹⁴ PG 3, 997B–1000A, trans. C. Luibheid in Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Complete Works*, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 135.

¹⁹⁵ *The Divine Names*, 4.13.

¹⁹⁶ *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, PG 3, 433C; *The Celestial Hierarchy*, PG 3, 165C–D.

¹⁹⁷ See L. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis, 25 (Lund: Gleerup, 1965).

¹⁹⁸ *Scala Paradisi*, PG 88, 632–1164, trans. by C. Luibheid and N. Russell, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1982). For *apatheia* in Dorotheus of Gaza, see Hadot (1987), 71–8.

CHAPTER 3

Medieval Conceptions of Emotions from Abelard to Aquinas

Most detailed twelfth-century Latin treatments of the emotions are found in theological and spiritual treatises influenced by the monastic tradition. Though this literature was not philosophical as such, it contained various elements of ancient philosophy. As regards emotions, this is apparent in the development of the doctrine of first movements toward sin. Another philosophically significant element was the interest in subjective feelings and the special form of awareness of oneself as a feeling subject. I shall deal with the doctrine of first movements in section 3.1 and with the feeling aspect of spiritual experiences in section 3.2. Logic played an important role in early medieval thought and also influenced approaches to emotions. Section 3.3 involves a general account of the early development of the logic of the will and its relation to the discussion of emotions.

An impulse to discuss the emotions from a new point of view was supplied by early medieval Latin translations of philosophical and medical works. Among the influential medical works were the collection called *Articella* and the late eleventh-century partial translation of the medical encyclopaedia of ‘Alī ibn al-‘Abbās by Constantine of Africa, the *Pantegni*, which contained various remarks on the emotions based on Galen’s medical philosophy. Some elements of ancient medical and philosophical theories were also found in Nemesius of Emesa’s *De natura hominis*, first translated by Alfanus of Salerno c.1080 and again later by Burgundio of Pisa c.1165. Parts of Nemesius’ accounts of ancient theories of the emotions were copied in John Damascene’s *De fide orthodoxa*, which was translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa c.1153. The medical theories of the emotions and their impact on twelfth-century philosophy and theology are discussed in section 3.4.

Section 3.5 contains an analysis of Avicenna’s theory of emotions. The translation of the sixth book of Avicenna’s *Shifā’* (c.1150) by Gundissalinus and Avendauth, often called Avicenna’s *De anima*, involved an extensive

treatise on the soul. This became an important source-book for medieval philosophical psychology until the middle of the thirteenth century and influenced its terminology even later. Aristotle's *De anima* was translated c.1150 by James of Venice. Even though it was also studied in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, it did not become the dominant text in medieval philosophy of mind until somewhat later. The first commentaries on it were written in the 1240s. In his early thirteenth-century treatise on the soul, John Blund refers to Aristotle's *De anima* and to Avicenna's work as a commentary on it. Even though Avicenna made use of Aristotle's *De anima*, his work is not an Aristotelian commentary. It also incorporates Neoplatonic elements, and many of the arguments are Avicenna's own. He was particularly interested in the various faculties of the soul. Emotions were acts of the moving power of the sensitive soul, preceded by various cognitive acts and accompanied by bodily affections and behavioural changes. Even though Avicenna was also interested in subjective feelings, they did not have the same central status in his theory that they enjoyed in monastic literature.

Avicenna's faculty psychology and his conception of occurrent emotions, dealt with in section 3.5, formed the common basis of the discussions of emotions in early thirteenth-century philosophical psychology (3.6). An important doctrinal innovation was the new taxonomy in which the emotions were classified into contrary pairs of the concupiscible power and the irascible power. This was introduced in Paris c.1230 and was developed further in John of la Rochelle's *Summa de anima*. Section 3.7 consists of a discussion of Albert the Great's views, and section 3.8 deals with Thomas Aquinas's influential taxonomy of emotions. While Aquinas's theory can be regarded as the culmination of thirteenth-century developments, his attempt to systematize it by means of physical principles also indicates some of the problems inherent in this tradition.

3.1 First Movements

Anselm of Laon (d. 1117) was a biblical scholar who, together with his brother Ralph, turned Laon into a leading centre of theology in early twelfth-century Europe. One of Anselm's many students was Peter Abelard (d. 1142) who, in his eccentric manner, characterized Anselm as a fire that produced more smoke than light, a leafy tree without fruit.¹ Let us see how

¹ For Anselm as Abelard's teacher, see Peter Abelard, *Historia calamitatum*, ed. J. Monfrin, Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques, textes et commentaires (Paris: Vrin, 1959), 68.164–70.240. Abelard's evaluations of his other teachers were no more positive.

Anselm dealt with the Augustinian theory of the moments of a sinful movement of the soul.

According to Anselm, suggestion (*suggestio*) is a tempting representation which is put into one's mind by the devil or by one's carnality. Tempting suggestions as such are not sins, but penal consequences of original sin. Sometimes the suggestion immediately and involuntarily leads one to take pleasure (*delectatio*) in the thought of what is forbidden. If the pleasure is not willed and one fights against it as soon as possible, it is a venial sin, but letting the pleasure grow is regarded as consent (*consensus*) to a sinful feeling, and this is a mortal sin. The process leading toward a sinful act reaches its height in consent to an evil action (*opus*). Anselm says that unpremeditated, inevitable pleasure is an infirmity, and that it is also called a pre-passion (*propassio*). Because of the fall of Adam and Eve, human beings suffer from the infirmity that evil suggestions and pre-passions take place in them against their will. Even though sinful pre-passions are not wholly under one's control, they are counted as venial sins, and one has to show that one is sorry for them—not doing so would mean that they have been accepted. Anselm states that when one begins to consider (*dubitare*) whether to follow a sinful suggestion and to deliberate (*deliberare*) on it instead of expelling it, one begins to sin even if no pleasure is felt. He makes this remark in order to explain why some people say that there are four types of sin (*suggestio*, *delectatio*, *consensus*, *opus*) and not simply three (*delectatio*, *consensus*, *opus*). Suggestion as such is not a sin, but one is said to sin through suggestion when it is pondered on even though there is no pleasure in cogitation.²

In a commentary on Matthew attributed to Geoffrey Babion, who was Anselm's contemporary, the stages of sin are described as follows. After the suggestion (*suggestio*) there is a pre-passion (*propassio*), 'a sudden movement which does not involve deliberation about good and evil and which is a venial sin'. This is followed by a passion (*passio*), which is the mortal sin of taking pleasure either in cogitation about the sinful act without an intention to act or the same together with such an intention. The author says that the pre-passion is also called pleasure (*delectatio*), and the passion is also called consent (*consensus*).³ This was Jerome's distinction

² A collection of texts of Anselm and his followers is edited by O. Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, v (Gembloux: Duculot, 1959); for Anselm's discussion of the types of sin, see pp. 73–4. A historical study of the early twelfth-century theories of sin is R. Blomme, *La Doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques de la première moitié du XII siècle* (Louvain: Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis, 1958).

³ *Enarrationes in euangelium Matthaei*, PL 162, 1294D. The work is published under the name of Anselm of Laon in PL; it is often ascribed to Geoffrey, but the authorship is not clear.

between a pre-passion as a non-deliberated emotional reaction and a passion as an affection with consent.⁴ Jerome's remarks on the term *propassio* were often quoted in early medieval times.⁵ In the twelfth century *propassio* was used as a technical term for the initial state of an unpremeditated desire or emotional response and as a synonym for the more common expression 'first movement', as will be seen below.

The interest in questions pertaining to pre-passions and first movements was increased by the fact that twelfth-century theologians had different views on whether impulses toward forbidden acts were immediately sins or not. The competing positions could be characterized as Augustinian and Gregorian (see p. 173 above), but the historical picture is complicated by the fact that many medieval scholars accepted Peter Lombard's interpretation of Augustine's view, which made it similar to that of Gregory the Great.

When a pre-passion that was aroused by a sinful suggestion was called a venial sin, one could ask why it was a sin while the suggestion as another involuntary movement toward forbidden things was not. This was not a problem to Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, and some other authors who, following Augustine, argued that sin properly speaking is consent to what is forbidden. Paraphrasing Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury stated that sin does not consist in having desires but in consenting to them.⁶ William of Champeaux, one of Abelard's teachers, wrote that appetitive acts in accordance with luxury, avarice, and other vices are not sins as soon as they occur. If reason resists them, they remain pre-passions. They become passions and sins only when they are accompanied by consent.⁷ Abelard's discussion of desire and consent in his *Ethics* (*Scito te ipsum*) is particularly influenced by Augustine's *On the Sermon on the Mount*. After having

See B. Smalley, *The Gospels in the Schools c.1100–c.1280* (London and Ronceverte: The Hambleton Press, 1985), 20–1.

⁴ See Jerome's comments on Matt. 5: 28 and 26: 37 in his commentary on Matthew, 1. 606–14; 4. 1214–29; see also Jerome's commentary on Ezekiel, 6.95–115.

⁵ See the commentaries on Matthew by Pseudo-Bede, *PL* 92, 28B; Rabanus Maurus, *PL* 107, 811A–B, 1111D; Christian Druthmar of Stavelot, *PL* 106, 1309D; Paschasius Radbertus, *Expositio in Matheo libri XII*, ed. B. Paulus, CCCM 56, 56A, 56B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1984), 3.3054–73, 12.1314–15; *Glossa ordinaria* (Strasbourg, 1480–1; repr. Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), Matt. 5: 28; 26: 37; Rom. 6: 12. See also Isidore of Seville, *Differentiae*, *PL* 83, 53C–54A; Zachary of Besançon, *De concordia evangelistarum*, *PL* 186, 544A; and n. 47 below.

⁶ Anselm of Canterbury, *De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, in *Opera omnia*, ii (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946), 4 (144.4–12); cf. Augustine, *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos*, *PL* 35, 2066.

⁷ Lottin (1959), 222.

mentioned Augustine's examples of how desire changes into sin through consent, Abelard writes:

Now where does this lead us? It shows in short that in such things also the will itself or the desire to do what is unlawful is by no means to be called sin, but rather, as we have stated, the consent itself. The time we consent to that which is unlawful is in fact when we do not draw back from accomplishment and are inwardly ready, if given the chance, to do it. (14.14–19, trans. Luscombe)⁸

According to Abelard, to sin is to consent to something against the divine norms (4.27–31). A sin is mortal when one has in mind that the intended behaviour displeases God, and it is venial when one does not actually have this in mind.⁹ Even though Abelard gave up Anselm of Laon's theory of sins which precede a consent, his view was no more permissive. If there is consent to a pleasant but forbidden cogitation, it is a sin even if an intention to act is lacking. (Cf. 24.20–4.)

The view that even unavoidable movements toward a sin are immediately sins became a position more widely accepted than its denial, not least because it was defended by Peter Lombard (c.1095–1160). Peter summarized the theological doctrines of his time in the influential *Sententiae* (c.1155), which later became a university textbook and the text that students of theology were required to lecture and comment on as the last requirement for obtaining the highest academic degree.¹⁰ Based

⁸ *Scito te ipsum* was Abelard's main work on ethics and one of his last treatises (c. 1136–9). It is edited, with English translation, by D. Luscombe in *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). There is also a new edition by R. M. Ilgner, CCCM 190 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001). Referring to the distinction between desire and consent in Anselm of Canterbury and Abelard, David Luscombe states that 'in the school of Anselm of Laon the same attitude broadly prevailed' (14 n. 1). In fact Anselm of Laon did not regard consent as a necessary condition of sin as Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard did.

⁹ In the *Sententie Petri Abelardi*, which is a report of Abelard's theological lectures (c. 1132–5), the concept of sin is analysed as follows: 'Sin is nothing but guilt which often also occurs in people without vices, as we have shown. Guilt is nothing but contempt for the creator which takes place when we, against conscience, will to do things that we know to displease him and know to be forbidden by him or when we do not will to do things that we know to please him and to be ordered by him. . . . Some sins are venial and some are mortal. A sin is venial when in itself it is not sufficient for damnation. Of this kind are all those sins which at the time are not remembered as displeasing God. It cannot be said, however, that they are not against conscience, for though this is not remembered, the conscience does not accept them when one has this in mind again. A mortal sin is a sufficient ground for death and of this kind are all deliberated violations of conscience.' See *Sententie Petri Abelardi (Sententie Hermannii)*, ed. S. Buzzetti (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1983), 151.50–69. Abelard later preferred the term 'consent' over the term 'will' in contexts of this kind (p. 207 below). For act, intention, and consent in Abelard, see J. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 251–64.

¹⁰ *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. PP. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferatta: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81).

on quotations from Augustine and Jerome, Peter Lombard treated the doctrine of the stages of sin as an ascending order of suggestion, first movement, pre-passion, pleasure of cogitation, and consent (II.24.6–12; II.33.5.5). Lombard modifies Augustine's discussion of Adam, Eve, and the serpent as psychological symbols as follows:

As the serpent persuaded Eve into evil, she consented to it, gave the fruit also to her husband, and the sin was consummated in this way, so even now the sensual movement of the soul corresponds to the serpent, the inferior part of reason to the woman, and the superior part of reason to the man . . . The serpent persuaded the woman and she the man, and similarly in us the sensual movement which has conceived a temptation to sin suggests, like the serpent, sin to the woman, to the inferior part of reason, viz. the reason of knowledge, and if it consents to the suggestion, the woman eats the forbidden fruit. She gives it to the man, when she suggests the same temptation to the superior part of reason, the reason of wisdom, and if it consents, the man eats the forbidden fruit together with the woman. (II.24.7; II.24.9.2)

Peter Lombard explains the terms used in this passage by quoting from Augustine's *On the Trinity*. The sensual part is similar in human beings and in animals. It is directed towards corporeal well-being. Human beings can control the behavioural impulses of sensuality by means of the higher parts of the soul, which the animals lack. The lower 'female' part of reason is a capacity for understanding and evaluating the domain of temporal things. This is called knowledge (*scientia*), in contradistinction to the higher 'male' part, which is called wisdom (*sapientia*) and which is acquainted with eternal matters (II.24.3–5). As for the grades of sin, Peter Lombard states that when the sensitive part of the soul reacts to something in a manner which can lead to sinful consent by the rational part, the sin is venial and light. When there is pleasure of cogitation but no will to act, the sin is venial as long as the cogitation is of short duration. This is the consent of the woman (the lower part of reason) without the consent of the man (the higher part of reason). If the pleasure is of longer duration, it becomes a mortal sin even if superior reason does not consent, because 'in this case the man does not prevent the woman as ought to be done, and therefore it can be said that the man gives his consent'. Any consent of the superior part of reason to what is not permitted is mortal sin (II.24.9.3–12.1).

In calling the pleasure of cogitation the consent of the woman Peter Lombard follows Augustine, who said that consent to the pleasure of cogitation corresponds to the woman's eating the forbidden fruit. This movement of the soul is immediately a venial sin in Peter Lombard; it is

also a venial sin in Augustine, although not as soon as it occurs. Augustine operated with a distinction between the unavoidable initial stage of a movement towards sin and its continuation, which could be prevented by the controlling will. The first stage of this movement is not an imputable sin. Peter Lombard did not draw this distinction. By the consent of the woman he means that a sinful thought is found pleasant, whether transiently or for a longer time, but this is not the first stage of sin. Any positive reaction to a forbidden thing is immediately a venial sin. Peter Lombard thought that his account of the growth of sin was an explication of Augustine's doctrine, and many medieval thinkers accepted this view. This was the Gregorian interpretation of Augustine's position. It is also found in Hugh of St Victor's *De sacramentis christianae fidei*.¹¹

A view of the first movements similar to that in Peter Lombard is formulated in a mid-twelfth-century collection of questions attributed to Odo of Soisson:

Evil will is sometimes so strong that reason accepts it, and then it is a criminal sin, but when reason does not consent to it, it is a venial sin and called a pre-passion, for the first movements are not within our power. The consent of reason takes place when one decides to fulfil the will as soon as there is a proper time and place. . . Pre-passion, titillation and first movement mean the same. Adam sinned through a pre-passion; however, his sin was not venial, but criminal, because it was within his power to refrain from the first movements. This is beyond our power. There was in him nothing to make them rise, because nature was not yet corrupted, but there is such a basis in us. Therefore titillation is venial in us but it was criminal in him. Our sensuality first consents to evil will, and this consent is a venial sin; then reason consents to it which makes it a criminal sin.¹²

'Evil desires' were thought to arise from 'concupiscence' (*concupiscentia*), 'the tinder of sin' (*fomes peccati*), or 'original sin' (*peccatum originale*).¹³

¹¹ According to Hugh of St Victor (d. 1141), involuntary sexual desire is a penal movement of the soul and a venial sin (*De Sacramentis*, PL 176, 315C–316A, 391B). In the anonymous *Summa sententiarum* (from the same period) it is said that moderate sexual feelings are not sins as such, and that Gregory the Great's view of the sinfulness of any sexual intercourse should be understood as referring to immoderate sexual desires (PL 176, 156C–157A). Hugh's attitude towards first movements is not quite clear. He elsewhere says that to sin is to consent to what is forbidden (525B–D); for a similar formulation in the *Summa sententiarum*, see PL 176, 74B. Both these works were used by Peter Lombard.

¹² O. Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, ii (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont César; Gembloux: Duculot, 1948), 496–7; Lottin quotes the text from the edition by J. B. Pitra in *Analecta novissima Spicilegii Solesmensis*, altera continuatio, ii (Paris; Typis Tusculanis, 1888), 183–4. For the complicated question of the authorship, see A. Giusberti, *Materials for a Study on Twelfth-Century Scholasticism*, History of Logic, 2 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982), 113–51. Lottin's work involves a rich collection of texts in which the first movements are discussed.

¹³ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.30.8–9.

These common theological terms referred to an inherited tendency toward sinful behaviour, the penal consequence of the fall of Adam and Eve, which influenced the spontaneous acts of the sensitive soul described by the terms ‘first movement’, ‘tillation’, and pre-passion in the text quoted above. Medieval authors thought that the affective movements were originally (before the Fall) under the control of the rational will, and that their spontaneity was part of the penal weakness of human beings. In order to avoid terminological problems, some authors stated that some first movements of the concupiscible and irascible parts are not directed towards sin. If they are sinful, they are acts of these powers in so far as they are corrupted and inclining to sin—that is, of the concupiscibility of the concupiscible power or the irascibility of the irascible power. All these acts can be called movements of the sinful concupiscence.¹⁴ Through Augustine’s and Jerome’s works, twelfth-century theologians were generally acquainted with the Latin translations of the names of the Platonic parts of the soul, but there was much uncertainty about how one was to assign various emotions to them (see pp. 227–30).

Peter Lombard’s view of the sinfulness of the first movements was influential, but the question remained controversial. Those who did not regard the first movements as sins introduced various distinctions pertaining to them. Simon of Tournai wrote c.1160:

‘The first movement of sin’ is used in two ways. It may refer to a first movement toward a sin or to a first sinful movement. Furthermore, ‘the first movement toward a sin’ can refer to a primary first movement or to a first sinful movement after the primary first movement. This can be exemplified as follows. Tillation of the flesh is aroused in someone, but one does not take pleasure in it. This is a primary movement and it is called a sin in the sense of a defect and not a sin due to which one is a sinner. Therefore it is called a penalty rather than a sin and the saints call it the languor of nature or a tyrant or the tinder of sin. The Apostle called this a sin in the sense of a defect in himself: ‘I do what I do not will to do and it is not me but the sin which indwells in me that does it’. This movement is not imputed as a sin to a person. It is only a burden when it is driven back so that it does not proceed further. But if it proceeds and one takes pleasure in it without consenting to this pleasure or to an external action, it is called a venial sin and a second movement after the primary one and it is the first of those which are sins.

¹⁴ See the remarks by Prevostin of Cremona and Stephen Langton in the texts quoted in Lottin (1948), 503.18–25, 505.1–7. Stephen Langton stated that in theology the term ‘first movement’ means properly and strictly speaking only the acts of the pleasure-seeking fleshly desire (*motus concupiscentiae carnalis*). See also Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae II*, ed. P. S. Moore, J. N. Garvin, and M. Dulong, Publications in Medieval Studies, 11 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1950), II.19.509–27 (157–8).

Both are called movements towards a mortal sin, because they provoke one to sin mortally, but none of them is itself a mortal sin. When consent is given, there is a first movement with consent which is a mortal sin even though there is no external action.¹⁵

According to Stephen Langton, the distinction between a primary first movement and secondary first movement was introduced by Gilbert of Poitiers.¹⁶ Simon of Tournai applied it in arguing that one can repel a depraved movement before taking pleasure in it. By a sinful pleasure Simon means something not immediately involved in the movement, since all sins are voluntary in his view.¹⁷ If a tempting suggestion immediately creates a pleasant feeling, this is not a sinful pleasure before there has been an opportunity to repel it.

In his summary of views about the first movements, Peter of Capua (c.1202) refers to another distinction between primary and secondary first movements:

Sometimes a movement of the sensual part towards forbidden things, e.g. anger or fornication, arises without a thought or decision to realize or not to realize it, and this is always a sin, though a venial one. Some people draw a distinction here. They say that some of these movements are primarily first movements, namely those to which we do not offer any opportunity and which occur involuntarily, and they think that these are not sinful. Movements to which we offer an opportunity are secondary first movements, for example when someone goes to a party for recreation and something seen there gives rise to a first movement without cogitation, and these are venial sins. We call both venial sins, but the latter are more serious.

Peter of Capua refers to a theory in which a distinction is drawn between involuntary first movements and indirectly voluntary first movements, of which only the latter are regarded as venial sins. He thought that both types of movement toward a sin are sinful. The rest of his account of the first movement is a paraphrase of Peter Lombard's view:

¹⁵ Simon of Tournai, *Disputationes*, ed. J. Warichez, *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Études et Documents*, 12 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932), 44.1 (127.29–128.18); see also 60.1 (171.11–23); 60.3 (172.3–17); 72.3 (205.32–207.6).

¹⁶ Lottin (1948), 509.69–75. Gilbert of Poitiers (Porretanus) composed a commentary on the Pauline epistles and a commentary on Boethius' *Opuscula sacra* in the 1130s. His influence is seen in the works of Simon of Tournai, Alan of Lille, and some other 'Porretan' thinkers. Stephen Langton taught theology in Paris from c.1180 to 1206. He left a large number of theological questions and an incomplete *Summa*. See J. Marenbon, 'Gilbert of Poitiers', in P. Dronke (ed.) *A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 328–52; R. Quinto, 'Stefano Langton e i quattro sensi della scrittura', *Medioevo*, 15 (1989), 57–109.

¹⁷ *Disputationes* 44.2 (129.6–8).

It may happen that somebody cogitates upon a movement towards forbidden things and upon the pleasure associated with them without deciding to realize them even if there were an opportunity; if this cogitation is of short duration only, it is a venial sin, but if it lasts for a longer time and is not repressed, it is in a sense consented to, even though there is no decision to realize it, since man should immediately repel woman in order to be not involved in a lengthy pleasure. If a decision to act is made, one can say that man also consents. The mortal sin then becomes even more serious.¹⁸

One can see from this report how a theory of an ascending order of psychological commitment was produced as a by-product of the discussion of the degrees of sin. The following stages are dealt with: (1) an accidental emotional activation without any cogitative involvement, (2) the same in situations which the person could have avoided as probably stimulating in this way, (3) an emotional activation which leads to a short-term cogitation upon the realization of the emotive suggestion without a decision, (4) the same with a long-term cogitation which is counted as consent to the pleasure of cogitation even when there is no consent to action, (5) consent to an external act.

In arguing that a primary first movement is not sin, Alan of Lille (d. 1203) made use of the distinctions applied by Simon of Tournai. He said that it is not a sin on whose basis one is called a sinner, because it does not depend on one's will, and consequently does not merit a penalty.¹⁹ The authors who regarded it as a sin could appeal to the same point as a reason for calling it a venial sin and not a mortal one, as can be seen from the above-quoted text assigned to Odo of Soisson.²⁰ Competing views of these kinds are mentioned in an anonymous *Questions and Solutions on the Letters of Paul* from the same period. In answering the question, 'What does the law prohibit when it prohibits concupiscence?', the author states that this is not easy to determine, because the term 'concupiscence' can refer to various things, such as 'the defect of concupiscence (*vitium concupiscentiae*), i.e. the tinder of sin, the first movement which is called

¹⁸ Lottin (1948), 499.13–24, 29–36. For the distinction between the primary first and secondary first movements in other late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century authors, see Lottin (1948), 503, 507, 509, 513–15, 518–20.

¹⁹ *Regulae caelestis iuris*, ed. N. M. Häring, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 48 (1981), 78.

²⁰ Peter of Poitiers writes: 'The serpent is said to suggest without the consent of man or woman when a movement of the sensual part of the soul gives rise to an incipient form of sin without any pleasure of cogitation. This movement is the lightest sin, because the first movements are not within our power, and are removed by a general confession, when one says: "I confess my fault". The Greek term for them is *propatheis* and our term is *propassio*'. See Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* II.21.30–36 (164).

pre-passion, the second movement which is called passion or pleasure, consent, and conatus to an external action.' Some authors are said to deny that the first movements are prohibited because they cannot be avoided and the law would consequently be in vain and even irrational. The author's view is that the law prohibits the first movements which are not in our power in order to humiliate the proud one, to open the eyes of the blind one, and to prepare the elected one to receive grace.²¹

Peter of Poitiers stated that the first movements which are not in our immediate power are sins in us but not in animals, because we as human beings have reason, and hence can suppress the first movements.²² The view that behaviour not reprehensible in animals is such in rational beings was a traditional one, but why is this supposed to be relevant with respect to unavoidable first movements? Stating that they can be repelled after they have arisen does not change the fact that they are taken to be sins as movements not different from those of animals. Referring to this difficulty, Peter of Capua says that the first movements are sins in human beings but not in animals because God has provided human beings with a nature such that these movements are sins for them.²³ This was sufficient for Peter of Capua and some others who thought that the first movements are sins, even though they cannot be prevented, since they are not part of the originally intended human condition. But there were others who argued that the inevitability of a human first movement differs from the inevitability of the corresponding acts in animals. The human first movements are in a certain sense controlled by the will, and are therefore imputable venial sins. Two ideas proved to be influential in this connection: a statistical conception of evitability and a conception of indirect voluntariness.

The idea of the indirect voluntariness of the first movements towards sin was mentioned in the above quotation from Peter of Capua. Some authors thought that even though first movements probably occur in certain kinds of circumstances, people can avoid those situations and in this manner control their first movements by the will. Because of this possibility, the first movements were regarded as indirectly voluntary. The statistical conception of inevitability was originally meant to explain how the Catholic doctrine that all human beings necessarily sin is compatible with the view that liability implies some kind of voluntariness and

²¹ *Quaestiones et decisiones in epistolas D. Pauli*, PL 175, 474A, 474D–475A. For the idea of the good consequences of inevitable venial sins in Stephen Langton and Godfrey of Poitiers, see Lottin (1948), 508, 515.

²² *Sententiae* II.21.61–8 (165).

²³ Lottin (1948), 500.49–54.

freedom. The idea was that even though people necessarily commit sins, it does not follow that particular sinful acts are necessary. Simon of Tournai explains the distinction as follows:

Necessity sometimes belongs to the genus of things and not to the things of the genus. For example, this is necessarily coloured but not necessarily white, for it can be black, or not necessarily black, for it can be white or of an intermediate colour. Similarly it is necessary that a human being commits a venial sin, but not necessarily this or that or any particular sin. (*Disputationes* 44.2 (128.28–129.4); cf. 60.1 (170.26–171.3)).

William of Auxerre, the author of the influential *Summa aurea* (between 1215 and 1229), combined these two ideas in his theory that the first movements are sins just because they can be regarded as indirectly voluntary and as particularly, though not universally, avoidable:

The first movements are in our power singularly but not universally, because one can prevent any particular first movement from arising, but nobody can prevent first movements from arising with respect to all times, for when there is a first movement by which one lusts for a woman, one could have avoided it by concentrating on thinking about God and repenting of one's sins, but it is not possible to remain a longer time without any first movement being aroused. Similarly a steersman can prevent one wave from washing out the vessel but not another.²⁴

William argues that if a sinful thought and a corresponding first movement A can take place in his soul when he is not doing B, his not doing B makes the occurrence of A at that time voluntary, even though it is not willed. It is in his power to prevent A by doing B, and this can be applied to any particular first movement, though it is not possible that they never occur in one's soul, since it is practically impossible that one always does something to prevent them.

William of Auxerre's formulation of how the sinful first movements can be indirectly voluntary, generally necessary, and particularly avoidable was a theological compromise that became popular. It was not the last word on the subject, however. In his *Summa de vitiis* John of la Rochelle, a student of William and a colleague of Alexander of Hales,²⁵ describes the various positions regarding the question of whether the first movements are sins:

²⁴ *Summa aurea*, ed. J. Ribailier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16–20 (Paris: C.N.R.S.; Rome: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980–7), II.15.1.34–42 (vol. ii.2, 526–7). For the same point in Godfrey of Poitiers (from the same period), see Lottin (1948), 514.46–515.51.

²⁵ Alexander of Hales was the first Franciscan professor at the University of Paris, and he continued his teaching simultaneously with John of la Rochelle, who was the holder of the second Franciscan chair of theology. They both died in 1245.

Some authors answer this question by drawing a distinction between a primary first movement and a secondary first movement. The primary first movement arises suddenly and because it is not under our control, it is not a sin. The movement which takes place after this is a secondary first movement, and it is a sin because the primary first movement should be repressed as soon as it is felt. There are others who argue that all first movements are sins, but movements are first movements only when the will is involved. Movements taking place in the brute sensuality are not sins in any way. They are sins only in the human sensuality which involves an activity of reason. A better view is put forward by some others. According to them, there is only one sensuality in human beings and the first movement of forbidden pleasure in it is a sin because of the order between sensuality and reason: sensuality must be subject to the rule of reason and reason as superior must master it and repel its illicit desire. If it does not do this, it does not do what it should do and it sins.²⁶

The first opinion was the twelfth-century view found in Simon of Tournai and Alan of Lille, both of whom were influenced by Gilbert of Poitiers. There were probably other proponents of this position as well, because it is often mentioned as one of the competing views.²⁷ The distinction between brute sensuality and human sensuality mentioned in the description of the second view was part of William of Auxerre's attempt to distinguish between the wholly involuntary movements of the lower part of the soul and the movements that can be regarded as voluntary. Modifying the twelfth-century distinction between primary and secondary first movements, William says that primary first movements are irrational acts of our brute sensuality and as such no sins. The movements of human sensuality are secondary first movements and can be regarded as controllable by the rational will. In William's estimation, there are movements of the concupiscible and irascible faculties which are caused by necessary causes. This is the morally indifferent level of brute sensuality. Human sensuality consists of concupiscible and irascible movements in so far as these are caused by the evaluations of the estimative power of the sensitive soul and can be prevented in the indirect manner described above. Because of the corruption of the soul and the tinder of the sin, the sensitive evaluations tend to give impulses to movements towards illicit things. This can be partially prevented by concentrating one's attention on higher matters.²⁸

²⁶ Lottin (1948), 543.76–544.89.

²⁷ It was mentioned in the anonymous *Quaestiones et decisiones in epistolas D. Pauli* (PL 175, 474A–B) and in the discussions of the first movements by Prevostin of Cremona, Stephen Langton, Peter of Capua, and Godfrey of Poitiers (Lottin (1948), 499, 503, 509, 513).

²⁸ *Summa aurea* II.15.1–2.3 (vol. ii.2, 525–31); cf. III.6.1–2 (vol. iii, 77–82).

According to Lottin, the second opinion in John of la Rochelle's account is not that of William of Auxerre but the early Dominican view put forward by Hugh of Saint Cher and Roland of Cremona. Reinterpreting William's distinction between brute sensuality and human sensuality, these authors stressed that the first movements as venial sins are movements of human sensuality, which they associated with the lower part of reason. The rational part is involved in first movements either by consent or, as Roland says, by 'some kind of smile or applause'. Only directly voluntary movements were regarded as sinful in this approach, which differed from the Gilbertian position only terminologically. The third view was that of Philip the Chancellor, who criticized the Dominican interpretation of twofold sensuality and particularly the view of first sinful movements as movements of the lower part of the rational soul.²⁹

William of Auxerre's discussion of the sensitive powers of the soul was influenced by the new philosophical psychology, which began to gain ground in Paris in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries (see section 3.3 below). The same is even more true of Philip the Chancellor's theory. Philip preferred to speak about one human sensuality, which was created to be subservient to the rational power and therefore differs from the sensuality of animals.³⁰ He describes two parallel ways in which an action is initiated. First there is an apprehension of something by the intellect or by the imagination. This stage is followed by believing (through reason) that what is apprehended is good or by being aware (through sensuality) that what is apprehended is something good. The next step is to will in accordance with reason or to desire in accordance with sensuality. The acts of the concupiscible or irascible faculties are the concrete forms of sensual desire. Philip stresses that the lower part of the soul was originally controlled by reason. After the Fall it has become corrupted and tends to act autonomously. Whenever it is moved toward sinful things, its movements are venial sins, because they involve a desire for illicit things.³¹

John of la Rochelle combined the doctrine of a specifically human sensuality with the conception of the indirect voluntariness and statistical avoidability of first movements.³² His formulations are repeated in the

²⁹ Lottin (1948), 527–37.

³⁰ *Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki, *Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta*, 2 (Bern: Francke, 1985), 211.1–214.89.

³¹ *Ibid.* 161.54–162.90; 213.60–2; 215.24–32.

³² Lottin (1948), 544.90–107. See also John of la Rochelle's *Summa de anima*, ed. J. G. Bougerol, *Textes philosophiques du moyen âge*, 19 (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 2.104 (253.11–15).

Summa theologica Alexandri, which contains texts of Alexander of Hales and other Franciscan scholars, including John of la Rochelle.³³ This became the dominant approach in thirteenth-century theology. The Franciscan master William of Middleton characterized it as the view of those who taught that the first movements toward sin are venial sins.³⁴ It is found in Bonaventure, the leading thirteenth-century Franciscan theologian, as well as in many Dominican masters, such as Gueric of Saint-Quentin, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, who all thought that inordinate first movements are venial sins, generically unavoidable and indirectly voluntary as particularly avoidable.³⁵ John of la Rochelle describes the voluntariness of the unpremeditated first movements with the terms 'permitting will' (*voluntas permittens*) or 'permitting consent' (*consensus permittens*). He thought that when a first movement is not prevented, it is somehow accepted: 'silence is consent.'³⁶ In an anonymous mid-thirteenth-century text the term 'consent by interpretation' (*consensus interpretativus*) is used as a synonym for 'permitting consent'.³⁷ Bonaventure calls the first movements voluntary by interpretation.³⁸ In his description of contemporary theories, William of Middleton also made use of these expressions, but he himself preferred the view that the first movements of the sensitive soul are neither voluntary nor sins. They are

³³ *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica I–IV*, ed. PP. Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), ii, 440–5, iii, 301–5. For the conception of first movements as generically unavoidable and particularly avoidable in Alexander of Hales, see his *Quaestiones disputatae 'Antequam esset frater'*, ed. PP. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19–21 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), 33.5.6 (607.3–4).

³⁴ Lottin (1948), 566–657.

³⁵ Albert the Great, *Super Matthaicum*, ed. B. Schmidt, in *Opera omnia*, xxi.1–2 (Muenster: Aschendorff, 1987), i, 87.8–37, 123.22–33; Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, ed. R. Spiazzi, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, i (Turin: Marietti, 1964), 24.12c, 25.4, ad 1; *Summa theologiae*, ed. P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1948–50), II-1.74.3; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. PP. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, *Opera omnia*, ii (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882), II.41.2.1 (949–50). For Gueric of Saint Quentin, see Lottin (1948), 557–61.

³⁶ Lottin (1948), 544.97–103. For these terms in *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica*, see iii, 303.

³⁷ Lottin (1948), 552.100–3.

³⁸ *In II Sententiarum* 41.2.1, concl. (949); for some later examples of interpretative acts of the will, see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, ed. G. A. Wilson, in *Opera omnia*, x, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, series 2 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), 32 (271.1–12); John Pecham, *Quodlibet* IV.33, in *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, ed. G. J. Etkorn and F. Delorme, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 25 (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1989), 248–9; Peter of Falco, *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. A.-J. Gondras, *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia*, 24 (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1968), q. 24 (828).

something with respect to which the will can behave rightly or wrongly.³⁹ Thomas Aquinas taught that a first movement toward sin is a venial sin and can be regarded as voluntary in the sense that it could have been prevented by the will. The indirect voluntariness of a first movement does not imply that the rational part is somehow active with respect to it, nor is its sinfulness as such derived from consent or will by interpretation.⁴⁰ To will something and to consent to something are activities of the rational capacity of the soul. When there is an illicit sensitive movement in spite of the resistance of the rational part, its act is meritorious; when it contributes to its occurrence, its act is a mortal sin; and when it does neither, it commits a venial sin by a kind of consent.⁴¹

Henry of Ghent was an influential author in Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. In question 32 of his *Quodlibet* VI Henry summarized the doctrine of sinful first movements and the distinctions pertaining to the stages of sin. After having dealt with the notions of primary and secondary first movements and true and interpretative consent, he describes the ascending scale of sinful movements as follows: (1) movement of titillation (*motus titillationis*), (2) movement of pleasure (*motus delectationis*) in the sentient appetite, (3) movement of desire (*motus desiderii*) in the sentient appetite, (4) movement of pleasure (*motus delectationis*) in the will when the reason has apprehended the sentient desire and it is found pleasant (*condelectando appetitui sensitivo*), (5) movement towards pleasure (*motus in delectationem*) in the will, (6) desire based on surreptitious consent of the will (*desiderium consensus surreptitii*). Here is the limit of venial sins; the following stages are mortal sins: (7) interpretative consent of the will to pleasure, (8) true consent of the will to pleasure, (9) consent to act, (10) execution of act, (11) habit of acting caused by repeated acts, (12) desperation caused by a habit of acting, (13) obstinacy caused by desperation, (14) impenitence.⁴² The unsatisfactory feature of this dominant thirteenth-century doctrine is that the culpability of certain behaviour is argued for on the basis of the theoretical possibility of behaving otherwise. The antecedent control of the first movements is in many cases beyond human capacity. Duns Scotus stressed (in another context) that logical and theoretical possibilities are not sufficient in

³⁹ Lottin (1948), 568.

⁴⁰ *De veritate* 25.5, ad 5, ad 6.

⁴¹ *De malo*, ed. P. Bazzi and P. M. Pession, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, ii (Turin: Marietti, 1965), 7.6, ad. 6, ad 8. See also C. E. Murphy, 'Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions', *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999) 163–205.

⁴² *Quodlibet* VI. 32 (271.13–272.36).

discussing the freedom of the will. An act is free only when there are real alternatives.⁴³

In the discussions of first movements toward sin, the main biblical reference was to Matthew 5: 28, but some other biblical texts were also associated with this subject. One of them was Exodus 20: 5: 'I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation.' In his commentary on the book of Ezekiel, Jerome asked how this text is compatible with Ezekiel 18: 1–2: 'The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son.' Jerome's solution was an allegorical interpretation of the former text: the father is the first sensual stimulus toward an evil act, the son is the first stage of cogitating about it, the grandson is the decision to act sinfully, and the fourth generation is an acceptance of the committed sinful act. Jerome said that the first and second stages are movements which are called *propatheiai* by the Greeks.⁴⁴ This exegesis was discussed in many twelfth-century treatises. According to the influential *Summa sententiarum*, the father as a first movement is a suggestion of the flesh, the son a first cogitative impulse toward sin, the third generation is a sinful act, and the fourth generation is boasting of the sin (*PL* 176, 110C–D). Peter Lombard states that the father as a first movement is suggestion or cogitation, and the son is consent and pleasure of the woman (*Sententiae* II.33.5). In one anonymous text the son is regarded as the first generation (light cogitation) between the father (pre-passion) and the grandson (deliberation). The third and fourth generations are the same as in other texts. There were some terminological differences in such analyses, because the distinction between the suggestion and the incipient cogitation or pleasure was not very clear.⁴⁵

Chapter 7 of Paul's letter to the Romans and the story of Jesus in Gethsemane (Matthew 26) are two further texts that were often interpreted by referring to the theory of pre-passions. It was commonly thought that the Apostle referred to the first movements or pre-passions when he wrote (Rom. 7: 17): 'I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.'⁴⁶

⁴³ *Lectura* I.39, n. 49, 51, in *Opera omnia*, xvii, ed. C. Balić *et al.* (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1966).

⁴⁴ *Commentary on Ezekiel*, 6.95–115.

⁴⁵ A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 4.1 (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1955), 174–6, 184–9.

⁴⁶ For different views on whether these first movements should be regarded as sins or not, see Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in omnes D. apostoli Pauli epistolas*, *PL* 191, 1428C; Simon of Tournai, *Disputationes* 44 (128.7–9); 72 (206.6–7); Stephen Langton, in Lottin (1948), 505.4–5; *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica*, iii, 303.

Similarly, it was assumed that pre-passions occurred in Jesus' soul when he 'began to be sad and troubled' (Matt. 26: 37). These movements had to be (sinless) pre-passions and not passions, because the latter would have implied consent to the judgement that something evil was going to happen to him contrary to his will. The idea that Jesus' fear and sorrow were pre-passions was well known from Jerome's comment on Matthew 26: 37.⁴⁷ The notion of will was relevant in this context because Jesus said: 'My father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt.' According to the *Summa sententiarum*, there were two wills in Christ, divine and human. His rational human will (*voluntas rationis*) always agreed with the divine will, but he also had natural human appetites (*appetitus naturalis*) to which he referred as his will to avoid suffering and death (*PL* 176, 76A).⁴⁸ In drawing the same distinction, Peter Lombard used the terms *affectus rationis* (*mentis*) and *affectus sensualitatis* (*Sententiae* III.17.2) and Simon of Tournai the terms *voluntas rationis* and *voluntas sensualitatis* (*Disputationes*, 97 (281.11–22)).⁴⁹

It is not quite clear which faculty of the soul the sensual will is associated with in these texts. William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, and their followers stated that the specifically human sensuality is controllable by the rational power though distinct from it. In *Summa theologica Alexandri* the sensuality is also beyond the rational will, which involves rational and natural appetite. The rational appetite is the will which is determined by deliberation. Jesus accepted his suffering through this will. Natural appetite is inclined toward achieving naturally good things and avoiding bad things without deliberation—this will made the thought about suffering cause sorrow in Jesus' mind (iv. 201). Albert the Great employed a similar distinction with an explanation of how there can be contrary acts in the same power—the first orientation is regulated by the reasoned will.⁵⁰ This account of Jesus' twofold will in Gethsemane is

⁴⁷ In addition to the biblical commentaries mentioned in n. 5 above, see also *Summa sententiarum* (*PL* 176, 75C–D); Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III.15.2 (99.4–15); Alan of Lille, *Regulae caelestis iuris*, 105; Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* IV.48, *PL* 211, 1205C–1206A; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. PP. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 14 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1954), III.15.5 (152.15–16); *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica*, iii, 154; Bonaventure, *In III Sententiarum* III.15, dub. 4 (*Opera omnia*, iii, 342).

⁴⁸ In his *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo* Hugh of St Victor distinguishes between divine and human will, and the latter is divided into rational, pious, and carnal will (*PL* 176, 841B).

⁴⁹ For this distinction, see also John Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, ed. D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (London: published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1970), 21.27–32.

⁵⁰ *De incarnatione*, ed. I. Backes, in *Opera omnia*, xxvi (Münster: Aschendorff, 1958), 6.9 (227.39–228.6).

also found in Thomas Aquinas, who developed a general theory of natural will directed to objects as good or bad without deliberation and the rational will based on deliberated evaluations. Even though Jesus' natural will to avoid death was not dominating, the thought of its opposite was sufficient to cause distress.⁵¹ (See also p. 253 below).

Early medieval treatises on the first movements had an enduring effect on theoretical and practical discussions of emotions. This was the context of the theological commonplace that spontaneous movements toward sin can be mastered antecedently by avoiding certain kinds of situation and subsequently by replacing the cognition which causes an affection with a pious one. Even now this is the most popular theological device for inner control. Its legacy has not been confined to spiritual contexts; it is also employed in a less religious form in philosophical works on ethics and psychology. Descartes refers to the traditional introspective methods in the last part of his study of the emotions.⁵² In his *New Essays on Human Understanding* Leibniz deals with the question of how people can learn to master their spontaneous appetites. His answer is based on the traditional ideas of anticipatory prudence and subsequent manipulation of thoughts. Leibniz's new question is how these methods could be applied to unconscious and insensible first movements, which are often involved in actual volitions.⁵³

3.2 Spiritual Experiences

Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–1153) was the most influential representative of twelfth-century Christian mysticism and a powerful monastic leader, who is known for his activities in promoting the Second Crusade and the trials against Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, as well as for his spiritual writings, which brought him the epithet *Doctor mellifluus*. Bernard's conception of the ascent of the soul was based on the monastic spiritual tradition. In his treatise *On the Degrees of Humility and Pride* Bernard deals with twelve degrees of pride which the monks should avoid

⁵¹ *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum III*, ed. M. F. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1933), 17.1.1.3; 17.1.2.1; *ST III*.18.2–3, 5. See also A. Robiglio, *L'impossibile volere. Tommaso d'Aquino, i tomisti e la volontà* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2002), 16–33, 56–60, 153–7.

⁵² Descartes, *Les Passions de l'âme*, 3.211–12, in *Oeuvres*, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, xi (Paris: Cerf, 1909).

⁵³ G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 187–9, 195–7, 204 (*Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, ed. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt and Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1923–), vi. 6).

and twelve degrees of humility which they should achieve in preparing for higher experiences. This programme is associated with a scheme of three degrees of knowledge: the knowledge of one's misery, the knowledge of the misery of one's neighbour, and the knowledge of heavenly things. Realizing one's own state leads to sympathy with neighbours in their misery. These states of contrition and love purify the heart and prepare it for the grace of contemplating the mysteries and for the experience of union with God.⁵⁴ Bernard presents a great number of similar distinctions and classifications concerning spiritual progress toward deification, which he describes in traditional metaphors as follows:

To be affected in that way is to be deified. Just as a tiny drop of water falling into a great quantity of wine seems to be lost, taking on the taste and colour of the wine, just as red-hot glowing iron becomes like fire and seems to lose its earlier form, just as air flooded with sunlight seems to be transformed into that luminous clarity to such a point that it seems no longer to be illuminated but light itself, so should all human affection in saints then dissolve in an ineffable manner and flow wholly in the will of God. How can God be everything in everything, if something of man remains in man? His substance will no doubt continue to be, but under another form, another glory and another power. (*De diligendo Deo* 10.28, in *Opera* iii, 143.15–24)

Bernard's conception of deification does not differ from that of the earlier monastic tradition; achieving new abilities and losing individual interests belong to the union, but there is no confusion of the substances.⁵⁵ Analysing the metaphysical aspects of the mystical union is secondary to discussing it from the point of view of personal experiences and affections, such as spiritual affliction, desire, love, and intimacy.⁵⁶ The notion of affect has a considerable scope in Bernard's works. It refers to inner feelings and dynamic functions of the soul. A distinction between reason (*intellectus*) and affect (*affectus/affectio*) was important to Bernard's monastic conception of theology, which united contemplation with a

⁵⁴ *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae* in *Opera Sancti Bernardi*, ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–77), iii, 13–59. The scheme of twelve degrees of humility occurs in ch. 7 of the *Rule for Monks* traditionally attributed to St Benedict (p. 172, n. 181 above).

⁵⁵ The union takes place 'non substantiis confusos, sed voluntatibus consentaneos': *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum* 71.10 (*Opera*, ii 221.10). The metaphysical side of the union is the assumption of God's transforming presence in the soul.

⁵⁶ For the concepts of affect and experience in Berhard, see U. Köpf, *Religiöse Erfahrung in der Theologie Bernhards von Clairvaux*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 61 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980).

personal experience of love. The emphasis Bernard laid on descriptions of subjective experience had a strong impact on later mystical theology.⁵⁷

In dealing with emotions, Bernard often alludes to the traditional fourfold Stoic classification, but he also refers to the Platonic division of the emotions of the concupiscible and irascible parts.⁵⁸ Following Augustine, Bernard mentions the expressive motions which the Stoics associated with the main types of emotion:

Distress is the contraction (*contractio*) of the soul, joy its extension (*diffusio*), fear its flight (*fuga*), and desire or hope its reaching out (*progressio*).⁵⁹

Bernard compares these emotions to the four wheels of a vehicle (ii, 310.24–6; vi.1, 310.14–15; vi.2, 79.16–23).⁶⁰ They are said to belong naturally to the soul and may become the basis of virtues or vices, depending on whether one controls the emotions or is led by them (iii, 178.9–15; vi.2, 124.29–33). This is the moderation view rather than the Stoic extirpation approach. Bernard sometimes equates the affect with the will (v, 132.3; 133.20; 135.11), but since the will is a rational power which controls the senses and the appetite, as Bernard defines it in *On Grace and Free Will*, there is also a difference between the will and the movements of the lower parts of the soul.⁶¹ Bernard thought, like Augustine, that a movement of the soul can be characterized as willed in so far as it can be controlled by the will. He stated that we will the things which would not take place if we nilled them (iii, 194.27–8). In speaking about the acts of the controlling will, Bernard sometimes says that he uses the term ‘will’ as equivalent to ‘consent’ (vi.1, 196.18–197.1). In dealing with grades of

⁵⁷ See J. Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture*, trans. C. Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982).

⁵⁸ Bernard employs the Stoic schema with slight terminological variations: *amor* (*cupiditas*, *amare*, *diligare*), *laetitia* (*gaudium*, *laetari*, *gaudere*), *timor* (*metus*, *timere*, *metuere*), *tristitia* (*dolor*, *contristari*, *dolere*). See *Opera* vi.1, 271.16–17; vi.1, 310.14–15; vi.2, 124.25–125.21. For the Platonic division, see v, 358.18–23; vi.2, 170.26. See also Köpf (1980), 139–40.

⁵⁹ *Sententiae, series tertia* 86 (vi.2, 124.26–7). The terminology is quoted from Augustine’s *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 46.8.

⁶⁰ In *Opera* ii, 310.24–7 the four emotions are *ira*, *metus*, *cupiditas*, *gaudium*. The term *ira* replaces the term *tristitia* of the standard fourfold classification which Bernard usually employs. This is not a considered change, but shows some uneasiness about the fact that ‘anger’ is not an emotion type but a subspecies of desire in the Stoic classification.

⁶¹ *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2.3 (iii, 168.1–2). According to Bernard, there are three forms of freedom: freedom from sin, freedom from sorrow, and freedom from necessity. The will as a self-determining power of consent is free from necessity. After the Fall the will is not free from sin; it cannot change the scope of its free choices without grace. And it is not free from sorrow; even the saints are penitent and struggle against evil impulses: 3.6–5.15 (iii, 170.14–177.15). Cf. J.-L. Marion, ‘L’image de la liberté’, in R. Brague (ed.), *Saint Bernard et la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), 49–72.

sin, Bernard employs the traditional terminology of suggestion, first movement, pleasure, consent, and arrogance (vi.2, 174.10–25).

The Origenist doctrine of spiritual senses actualized in transformed persons plays a central role in Bernard's teaching on the mystical union. It is most extensively developed in the *Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles*, a monastic commentary in eighty-six sermons which Bernard composed over a period of eighteen years, reaching only the beginning of the third chapter of the Canticle of Canticles.⁶² The dominant spiritual sense for Bernard is that of taste. The experience of the sweetness of God is associated with the spiritual love which combines desire and fulfilment: 'O amor sanctus et castus. O dulcis et suavis affectio . . . Sic affici deificari est.'⁶³ The basic element of a higher spiritual affect is the feeling through which one is aware of an immediate act of divine acceptance and love (*sentire intra se actitari*).⁶⁴ Bernard often repeats the idea of perceiving in oneself an immediate effect of divine action. Some of Bernard's remarks on affective self-awareness were taken from Augustine, but he stressed the subjective aspect more than Augustine did.⁶⁵

Learning through experience (*experientia*) is another central theme in Bernard's *Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles*. He reads the book as an allegory about God's relation with a soul and its spiritual union with Christ, a union realized through charity. Bernard thought that in order to understand the dialogue between the bridegroom and the bride in the Canticle one should have some personal knowledge of love. The whole book is a poetic description of the experience of being affected by divine love. Like John Cassian, Bernard assumed that progress in understanding biblical texts consists in becoming more and more involved in the original affections of the inspired authors of the Bible. Through meditating on these texts Christians learn new modes of affection, which tie their souls closer to divinity if they receive the grace of being so affected. The biblical authors are religious teachers and authorities because of their experiences. Affective experience is the medium of understanding biblical texts and also the source of the certainty of faith.⁶⁶

Bernard did not analyse the psychological details of affective mental events. He assumed that mystical experiences take place through special spiritual senses, but he also stated that they may be accompanied by bodily

⁶² Leclercq (1982), 85. ⁶³ *De diligendo Deo* 10.28 (iii, 143.12–15).

⁶⁴ *Opera* ii, 10.28–9; v, 205.17–19.

⁶⁵ See the analysis of Bernard's conception of affective experience in Köpf (1980), 136–74.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 188–222; for Cassian's view, see pp. 150–1 above.

affects, such as tears, sighs, or elation.⁶⁷ The relationship between standard emotional dispositions and the affects of the spiritual part of the soul are not explained. Bernard thought that even though the will should control the lower emotions, its behaviour shows similarities to emotive spontaneity in the sense that it is easily led to regrettable volitions and cannot effectively change its basic orientation without the help of grace (v, 136.7–14).

Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Saint Thierry were the main representatives of twelfth-century Cistercian mystical theology. In addition to his spiritual works, such as the *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei*, William wrote an introductory treatise on the nature of the body and the soul (*De natura corporis et anima*, c.1140–5) in which he also dealt with some philosophical and medical topics.⁶⁸ William's work represented Cistercian theological anthropology, which concentrated on questions of the immateriality of the soul and the relation between the body and the soul. Other works of this kind were Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* (*Letter on the Soul*),⁶⁹ Alcher of Clairvaux's *Liber de spiritu et anima* (*On the Spirit and the Soul*),⁷⁰ and Aelred of Rievaulx's *De anima*.⁷¹ I shall return to these works in the next section.

The Augustinian Abbey of St Victor of Paris was another centre of monastic spirituality, its leading theologian in Bernard's time being

⁶⁷ *Opera* i, 46.22–6; ii, 190.8–22.

⁶⁸ William of Saint Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae*, ed. and trans. M. Lemoine (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1988); *On the Nature of the Body and the Soul*, trans. B. Clark, in B. McGinn (ed.), *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology*, The Cistercian Fathers Series, 24 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 101–52.

⁶⁹ *PL* 194, 1875–1890; trans. McGinn, in McGinn (1977), 153–77.

⁷⁰ *PL* 40, 779–832, trans. E. Leiva and B. Ward, in McGinn (1977), 179–288.

⁷¹ *De anima*, ed. C. H. Talbot, *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, suppl. 1 (London: Warburg Institute, 1952); *Dialogue on the Soul*, trans. C. H. Talbot (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1981). William of Saint Thierry was a friend of St Bernard. After having been abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Saint Thierry near Rheims, he became a Cistercian at Signy in 1135. Aelred of Rievaulx and Isaac of Stella were Englishmen; the former was abbot at Rievaulx and the latter at Étoile (hence the name Stella) near Poitiers. Aelred completed his treatise on the soul just before his death in 1167. Isaac of Stella wrote his *Letter on the Soul* at the request of Alcher of Clairvaux. *De spiritu et anima* consists of a compilation of passages from various works, among them Isaac's *Epistola de anima*. It is often regarded as Alcher of Clairvaux's answer to the treatise by Isaac, but this is not certain. These works were written in the 1160s. *De spiritu et anima* was later mistakenly regarded as a work of Augustine, and for this reason it was pretty influential until the time of Albert the Great. Albert frequently cites it as Augustine's work, but he also mentioned that it is regarded as the book of a Cistercian. Thomas Aquinas stated that Augustine is not the author of the book, which is 'said to have been written by a Cistercian': *Quaestio disputata de anima*, ed. M. Calcaterra and T. S. Centi, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, ii (Turin: Marietti, 1965), 12, ad 1. See also McGinn's introduction in (1977), 65–72.

Hugh of St Victor (1096–1141). His conception of mystical theology involved a more positive evaluation of theoretical and practical sciences than Bernard's.⁷² Hugh's main theological work, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* (PL 176, 173–618), and his introduction to the sciences, the *Didascalicon*, were very influential, as were his numerous spiritual treatises.

In a small work on the nature of love (*De substantia dilectionis*) Hugh puts forward an often-quoted distinction between the components and stages of love. Love (*amor*) is divided into mundane love of contingent things (*cupiditas*) and heavenly love of higher things (*caritas*). According to its general definition, love is a pleasure (*delectatio*) of the heart which is directed to an object because of that object (*delectatio cordis alicuius ad aliquid propter aliquid*). It is an affective attitude towards something (*affectio*) which becomes desire (*desiderium*) when it moves the subject towards the object (*per desiderium currens*, 'running there with desire'), and it becomes joy (*gaudium*) when the longing finds its fulfilment and the movement turns into rest (*requiescens per gaudium*, 'resting there with joy'). In this model appetitive acts which follow 'the pleasure of the heart' are compared with the moments of a physical movement.⁷³ This passage was also quoted in the Pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40, 813). In the same place Hugh describes the subjective mystical experience by referring to the doctrine of spiritual senses and making use of bodily metaphors:

The omnipotent God . . . created a rational spirit of pure love and without any necessity, so that it would participate in His beatitude. In order to make this spirit able to enjoy such a high beatitude, he provided it with love, a spiritual palate, through which it can sense the taste of internal sweetness, so that through this love it would taste the attractiveness of its felicity and cling to it with an indefatigable desire. Through love God joined the rational creature to Himself so that it would always cling to Him and affectionately suckle this beatific goodness from Him, drink it with desire and have it with joy in Him. Suckle, nursling, suckle. (86.61–88.77)

⁷² 'Faith consists in two things: knowledge (*cognitio*) and affect (*affectus*) . . . In affect is found the substance of faith and in knowledge its matter. Faith by which one believes is one thing, and the object of faith is another. Faith is found in affect and what it believes in knowledge. Therefore the substance of faith is in affect, for this affect itself is faith': Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, PL 176, 331B.

⁷³ *De substantia dilectionis*, in *Six opuscles spirituels*, ed. R. Baron, SC 155 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969), 82.10–12; 86.48–52.

After Hugh, the chief representative of Victorine spirituality was Richard of St Victor (d. 1173).⁷⁴ In *The Twelve Patriarchs* Richard presents the progress of the soul through a personification allegory. It is a treatise on the preparation of the soul for contemplation. *The Mystical Ark* is a treatise on the varieties of advanced contemplation. In the modern period the former has been called *Benjamin minor* and the latter *Benjamin major*. Richard's interest in various mental states and psychological powers is testimony to an increasing interest in philosophical psychology in Paris. Richard was aware of various psychological conceptions and sometimes used them without any detailed philosophical discussion.

In *The Twelve Patriarchs* Jacob represents the rational soul, his wife Rachel reason, and his wife Leah affection. Rachel's handmaid Bala is imagination and Leah's handmaid Zelpha is the power of sensation (chs. 3–5). The first personifications are qualified by the statement that Rachel is reason illuminated by God, and Leah is affection inflamed by divine inspiration. Jacob's sons, the twelve patriarchs, are grouped according to their mothers. Those groups represent successive stages of spiritual development. Leah's children are virtues—that is, ordered and moderated emotions. Richard states that an emotion is ordered when it is directed to that toward which it ought to be and moderated when it is as intensive as it ought to be. Ruben represents fear of God, Simeon distress, Levi hope of forgiveness, and Judah love of God. The author says that after Ruben has grown up, Simeon is born, 'because it is necessary that distress follow great fear'. The more vehemently a man fears deserved punishment, the more sharply he laments his fault. A heart is humbled by Ruben through fear and made contrite by Simeon through grief. 'In weeping it is pricked with compunction.' The consolation for those who truly repent is Levi, hope of forgiveness. The Holy Spirit restores confidence in the souls that condemn their sins. A kind of intimacy then arises between God and the soul. This is the birth of Judah, love of divine justice and mercy (chs. 7–12). These four spiritual virtues correspond to the standard doctrine

⁷⁴ Richard's main theological work is *On the Trinity*. For an analysis of his Trinitarian views, see N. den Bok, *Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St. Victor*, Bibliotheca Victorina, 7 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996). *The Twelve Patriarchs* is edited by J. Châtillon and M. Duchet-Suchaux, SC 419 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1997); trans. G. A. Zinn in Richard of St Victor, *The Twelve Patriarchs, The Mystical Ark, and Book Three of the Trinity*, The Classics of Western Spirituality (London: SPCK, 1979). Richard's view of the emotions in *The Four Degrees of Violent Charity* is discussed in I. van't Spijker, 'Exegesis and Emotion: Richard of St. Victor's *De quatuor gradibus violentae caritatis*', *Sacris erudici*, 36 (1996), 147–60.

that the compunction of fear and distress is the first stage of spiritual progress which draws the soul to hope and love.

Through the birth of Judah a longing for invisible goods arises in the soul, and Rachel, who wants to know, begins to desire children. Up to this point, she knows only visible things, and she has to think about higher matters by means of imagination, 'not yet having the power to see by means of purity of understanding'. Rachel gives her handmaid to her husband: her new sons, Dan and Naphtali, are activities of the imagination governed by reason. Dan puts the future evils before the eyes of the heart by means of imagination, and Naphtali speculates on future goods. These abilities of the religious imagination are particularly helpful in mastering the earthly motions of the soul. When advanced Christians perceive shameful thoughts in themselves and are spurred on to illicit delights, they are accustomed to placing future infernal torments before the eye of the mind and to expelling illicit thoughts before shameful delight arises. The first movements toward sin are here regarded as venial sins. They are expelled by thoughts concerning eternal punishment, and in this way those who make progress also immediately punish themselves through the consideration of punishment. Just as Dan helps to restrain upsurging evil desires, so Naphtali kindles good longings through consideration of the rewards (chs. 13–24).

Following the example of Rachel, Leah will also give her handmaid to her husband. The two sons of Zelpha are Gad and Asher, the rigour of abstinence and the vigour of patience (chs. 25–35). The love of abstinence and patience animates the soul to despise all earthly pleasure and to tolerate tribulation. This obedience is supported by Dan and Naphtali, by looking 'not only frequently but almost unceasingly on the torments or eternal rewards of future life' (ch. 27). This is a modification of the traditional mercenary picture of the psychology of the initial stage of perfection.

After the birth of Gad and Asher, Leah gives birth to Issachar, true joy, and Zabulon, hatred of vices. Gad has extirpated false delight, and Asher vain disquiet, thus preparing the soul to feel inner peace and heavenly joy. Zabulon is born after Issachar, because the taste of the sweetness of eternal reward strengthens the soul and fills it with hatred of vices. After Zabulon Leah gives birth to Dina. As a girl she has a special status among the patriarchs. Dina is the sense of shame for one's sinfulness. It prevents pride and vainglory, which easily attack a soul that has made progress. It also moderates Zabulon's attitude towards the vices seen in other people (chs. 36–60).

Richard calls the children of Leah the virtues of the affective part of the soul. They correspond to seven emotions: hope (*spes*), fear (*timor*), joy (*gaudium*), distress (*dolor*), love (*amor*), hatred (*odium*), and shame (*pudor*).⁷⁵ The preparatory part of the ascent of the soul concentrates on the religious education of these natural emotional patterns. Rachel's last children, Joseph and Benjamin, are virtues of the higher part of the soul. Joseph is discretion of knowledge, which should govern the affective virtues and lead to a full understanding of the spiritual nature of man. Benjamin represents ecstatic contemplation, which transcends all reasoning. Rachel dies at the birth of Benjamin. The role of Benjamin in this scheme is to represent the subject of the contemplation of God which takes place above the capacity of reason with divine assistance. The contemplative ecstasy involves special experiences and feelings, which are separated from natural human faculties (chs. 67–87). This part of Richard's work is influenced by Bernard's view of affective experience as the medium of mystical union.

It is not quite clear who in this allegory represents the free choice or consent of will, which Richard regarded as constitutive of a person. Like Bernard (and Augustine), he could equate will and affect while simultaneously stressing that consent is a free act of the primary will which in principle controls all other movements of the soul. He remarked that these are two different uses of the term 'will'.⁷⁶

Richard's account of the improvement of the emotions is meditative and not philosophical. There are discussions of various spiritual matters which are related emotions, but not much conceptual analysis. Richard's sense of phenomenological varieties of emotions emerges from chapter 22 of the third book of *The Mystical Ark*:

From that let him gather how the soul is changed in many ways. Now it raises itself up into confidence, at another time it falls into a lack of confidence; now it is fixed by steadiness, at another time it is shaken to the foundations by sudden fear. Now anger disturbs it, while at another time a great anger stirs it. It is not so great a marvel that it is affected at single moments by various qualities and diverse disturbances. But it is extraordinarily awesome that it is often touched at almost the same moment by contrary affections... But so that we may yet marvel more amply, if you wish to pay careful attention to one affection of man, you will see

⁷⁵ In *The Twelve Patriarchs* Richard states that the principal affects are these seven, and says, like Augustine, that they are good or bad depending on whether they are ordered and moderated or not (ch. 7). In *De statu interioris hominis* (34) he says that the basic affects are love, hate, joy, and distress (ed. J. Ribaillier, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 42 (1967), 102). The source of the list of seven affects is not clear.

⁷⁶ den Bok (1996), 395–416.

that concerning one and the same thing, the affection changes in many ways . . . But who would suffice to enumerate all the qualities of human affection? Who would suffice to explicate all the modes of its changes? (trans. Zinn)

Before leaving mystical emotions, let us have a look at the question about religious certainty.⁷⁷ Bernard and Richard regarded affective mystical experiences as the ground for certainty concerning one's salvific status, but the question was also discussed in a more general manner. According to early medieval theologians, God is present in all things through his power and through the ubiquity of his being. Furthermore, God is present in a special manner in the believers through inhabitant grace (*per inhabitantem gratiam*). It was thought that this special presence influences the meritorious love of God and one's neighbours. According to Peter Lombard, Christian love is the Holy Spirit which is given to believers, but the standard view was that the inhabitant Holy Spirit acts as a partial cause of love. Thomas Aquinas stated that the Holy Spirit is the uncreated grace, and its influence the created grace.⁷⁸ A question widely discussed in the twelfth century was whether people can recognize with certainty that certain movements of the soul are influenced by the Holy Spirit. The question was understandable, because faith and love were taken to be meritorious only when based on grace.⁷⁹ One could also ask more specifically whether there were certain criteria for the genuineness of mystical experiences. In contradistinction to the earlier teaching of the Church, the general answer to both questions came to be negative. It was admitted that inner experiences and changes of behaviour provide probable reasons for believing in the presence of grace, but these signs were

⁷⁷ I shall not discuss later medieval mystical texts which in a traditional way combined detachment from earthly emotions with openness to divine affection. One of the most influential authors influenced by this tradition was Meister Eckhart. Eckhart's sermons on detachment are compared with Stoic and Heideggerian ideas in R. Schürmann, *Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher*, translations with commentary, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Bloomington, Ind., and London: Indiana University Press, 1978); for a more contextual account of Eckhart's thought, see A. de Libera, *Maitre Eckhart et la mystique rhénane* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1998).

⁷⁸ See A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 1.1 (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1952), 220–37.

⁷⁹ The medieval theory of the process of justification (*processus iustificationis*) was a systematization of penitential theology formulated in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Its basic constituents were the infusion of grace, faith, contrition, and remission of sins. Faith and contrition were two voluntary movements of the soul based on grace, the former directed to God, and the latter to sins. The notion of faith included in the scheme was the Augustinian efficacious faith, i.e. 'faith working through love' or 'faith formed by love' (*fides formata caritate*). It was assumed that genuine faith is active in acts of love and contrition, and grace was taken to co-operate with free will in this meritorious activity, the aim of which was spiritual growth. See C. P. Carlson, *Justification in Earlier Medieval Theology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975).

regarded as insufficient to prove it. There was no way to decide with certainty whether an act of the soul was caused by the Holy Spirit or not.⁸⁰ This view became the standard opinion in medieval theology. It implied that any religious experience or affection could be a natural psychological event without direct supernatural causation and, furthermore, that there is no method of deciding with certainty whether divine causation might be involved. This had considerable consequences. Mystical experiences which were described by using metaphorical language could also be explained in natural terms. There was a more or less intentional naturalizing tendency in this approach to religious emotions.

3.3 The Logic of the Will and the Emotions

Augustine had a broad notion of volition, which included all kinds of dynamic acts of the soul, and a more restricted notion of volition, covering the acts of the controlling power in the superior part. These notions were linked together by the assumption that most of the movements of the soul called volitions in the broad sense were in principle submitted to the consent or dissent of the superior will. The dynamic acts of any parts of the soul can be regarded as willed by the superior will, and the superior will is liable for them as soon as it has an opportunity to react to them, independently of whether it actually does so. There are lots of examples of this use of the terms 'will' and 'consent' in twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions of the eventual sinfulness of the first movements. The importance of the theological question about culpability was one of the factors that led to the emergence of the logic of the will in the twelfth century. Another factor in this development was the central role of logic in early medieval erudition. It was realized that one could use elementary modal logic to investigate the logical properties of various concepts by seeing whether they influence the validity of consequence when added to the antecedent and the consequent in the same way. Let us see how Peter of Poitiers describes some discussions of this kind in Paris c.1170:

If it is argued: 'Abraham willed to obey God and he knew that he could not obey God without killing his son; therefore he willed to kill his son', some people solve the problem by stating that if a consequent follows from an antecedent, it does not follow, as with knowing, that he who wills or can do the antecedent wills or

⁸⁰ A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 1.2 (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1953), 57–74; see also Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, II–1.112.5.

can do the consequent. They want to show this by logical and theological examples. . . . 'If this person is in Rome in certain circumstances, he is in Rome; this person wills to be in Rome in certain circumstances, but he does not will to be in Rome.'⁸¹

Abelard dealt with similar questions in his *Ethics*. Contrasting 'consent' (in the sense of intention) and 'will' (in the sense of wish) he took it for granted that if a consequence is understood to express a relationship between a goal and a means, consenting to the antecedent (goal) implies consenting to a consequent (a means), though this does not hold for wish.⁸² Abelard also asked whether it is possible that the antecedent is permitted or obligatory while the consequent is forbidden.⁸³

These discussions were based on the principle for modal statements *de dicto* that if the antecedent of a good consequence is necessary/possible, the consequent is also necessary/possible. Let us call this principle M. It was thought that we can investigate the logical properties of concepts which show *prima facie* similarities with purely modal terms by substituting them for modal terms in M and seeing whether M holds for them with or without qualification. This was how the investigations of the concept of will, the epistemic concepts of knowledge and belief, and the normative concepts of obligation, permission, and prohibition were introduced as branches of applied modal logic in the Middle Ages.⁸⁴

The question of whether M might be universally valid for the concept of will was justified by the fact that M is valid for will in certain kinds of consequences. Augustine thought that willing the end effectively implies that what is thought to be a means to the end is also willed, even if it may be willed reluctantly. This principle, which Immanuel Kant called an analytic truth about will, was commonly accepted in the Middle Ages. If a means is treated as a necessary condition of an end, willing the antecedent efficaciously implies willing the consequent. But, as we have already seen, some twelfth-century authors noticed that M cannot be applied to efficient will without restrictions. It holds about the efficacious will in connection with the end–means relationship, but the necessary means are not the only consequents of what is willed. While discussing once again the example of willing to be in Rome in some way without willing to be in

⁸¹ *Sententiae* I.9.139–54 (82–3).

⁸² *Ethics* 8.21–10.2; 14.14–19; 16.11–18. It seems that Abelard also accepted that unavoidable and foreseen by-products of what is intended are consented to; see Saarinen, (1994), 51–60; Marenbon (1997), 258–64.

⁸³ *Ethics* 20.1–11.

⁸⁴ For further details, see S. Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1993), 176–96.

Rome, Peter of Poitiers formulated a counter-example as follows: if S repents of a sin, S is guilty of a sin, and S wills to repent of a sin, but S does not will to be guilty of a sin.⁸⁵ Stephen Langton's counter-example is of the same type: if a man visits his sick father, the father is sick. This man wills to visit his sick father, but it does not follow that he wills that the father is sick.⁸⁶

When it was seen that one cannot apply M to effective will without qualification, medieval authors took an interest in finding cases in which a rational agent does not will the consequent of what he or she wills. The examples from the works of Peter of Poitiers and Stephen Langton specify the case in which to will something in certain circumstances implies that those circumstances prevail, though this is something the agent does not will. This exception to M with respect to will was considered philosophically interesting, and it was later discussed in various contexts.⁸⁷

In dealing with examples in which an antecedent is willed while a consequent is not willed, Abelard had in mind the semantic point that 'willingly' or 'voluntarily' seems to imply 'with pleasure' or 'not reluctantly'. When the term 'will' was given this connotation, M was wrong even with respect to ends and means. Abelard stated that when a necessary means of achieving an end is of such a nature that it would not be separately willed, it is more natural to say that it is tolerated than that it is willed. Reluctant acts of this kind are voluntary, however, because they are a concomitant of the deliberate attempt to achieve something, and they are not externally necessitated (*Ethics* 10.2–6, 16.24–32). Abelard's point was not to deny M with respect to all intentional attitudes towards behaviour. He wanted to show that, because of the emotional connotations of the term, M does not hold for the term 'will'. Therefore, in order to avoid misunderstandings, one should employ the term 'consent' in speaking about imputable behaviour. In the Augustinian tradition the term 'consent' could be associated with all those acts of the soul which in principle are controllable by the rational will. In this sense Abelard's solution was traditional. However, his attempt to purify the terminology

⁸⁵ *Sententiae* IV.16, in *PL* 211, 1199.

⁸⁶ *Quaestiones theologiae*, quoted in R. Quinto, 'Die Quaestiones des Stephen Langton über die Gottesfurcht', *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin, Université de Copenhague*, 62 (1992), 77–165, at 129–30.

⁸⁷ Roger Roseth applied an analogous idea in his formulation of conditional obligations (contrary-to-duty imperatives). The basic texts of Roseth's logic of norms (before 1337) are translated in S. Knuutila and O. Hallamaa, 'Roger Roseth and Medieval Obligations Logic', *Logique et Analyse*, 149 (1995), 75–87. Roseth denies the validity of the principle that to will something which is not forbidden is permitted (cf. the so-called paradox of the Good Samaritan). William of Middleton put forward this point c.1250 (Lottin (1948), 568).

did not find followers. The majority view was that whatever is controllable can be regarded as willed, independently of whether it is found to be pleasing or not. The problem of calling reluctant acts willed was then solved simply by saying that things may be willed as such or they may be willed because of something else (*propter aliud*) only, and not as such.⁸⁸

Abelard's remarks about reluctant acts refer to wishful attitudes which are not inferentially consistent. As for the emotional acts of the sensitive soul, it was commonly thought that the sensuous act of finding an object desirable does not necessarily imply the sensuous act of desire. This was an axiom of the doctrine of the first movements and was also mentioned by Avicenna.⁸⁹ There thus is no logic (M) of simple likes and dislikes. But Avicenna also made remarks on the order of occurrence of the emotions in particular situations, and this part of his psychological theory was developed further in thirteenth-century taxonomies. According to John of la Rochelle, the standard sequences of the self-regarding acts of the concupiscent power are inclination–desire–joy–delight and aversion–abomination–pain–sadness. The connections between the acts of the irascible power are more complicated.⁹⁰

Weak sensuous desires were not considered the only group of inefficacious wishes—there were latent wishes also in the rational soul. In his *Summa aurea* William of Auxerre said that in the case of reluctant actions the means are willed together with the end (*coniunctim*) but not separately (*divisim*), and that the alternative, which is found attractive in itself but remains unrealized, may be called an object of conditional will (*voluntas conditionalis* or *velleitas*).⁹¹ The notion of conditional will was introduced in the late twelfth century, as can be seen from the distinction between *voluntas absoluta* and *voluntas conditionalis* which Stephen Langton discusses in question 96 of his *Summa quaestionum theologiae* (between 1180 and 1200).⁹² In Langton, 'conditional will' refers to a non-realized readiness to will something instead of the accepted alternative when conditions different from the actual ones prevail.⁹³ In the thirteenth

⁸⁸ For some twelfth-century examples, see Saarinen (1994), 60–3.

⁸⁹ *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus IV–V*, ed. S van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain: Éditions Orientalistes; Leiden: Brill, 1968), IV.4, 55–6.

⁹⁰ *Summa de anima*, 256–62.

⁹¹ I.12.4.4 (i, 235–7), III.17.5 (iii, 366–7).

⁹² See the edition in Quinto (1992), 140.

⁹³ Some authors discussed the distinction before Langton without using the term *voluntas conditionalis*. Peter of Poitiers wrote: 'There is a difference between "I would will to be a good person" and "I will to be a good person", and this is clear from many examples, e.g., "I would will to go to Rome if it were necessary or useful, but I don't will to go to Rome".' See *Sententiae* II.14.281–4 (98–9).

century, the notion of conditional will was understood in two ways. Some authors accepted William of Auxerre's formulation (*promptitudo volendi sub conditione*), which was similar to that of Langton.⁹⁴ Others said that the reluctant act of willing a means was an act of conditional will, because it was necessitated by the end as its condition. In this approach the term 'conditional will' could be applied to actual acts and not merely to the latent or yielding wish (*velleitas*).⁹⁵ In so far as *velleitas* was understood as a wish, its grammar was taken to be similar to that of sensuous likes and dislikes—one can simultaneously wish things which are incompatible.⁹⁶

Another relevant but more problematic idea was that the known side-effects of something that is directly willed can be such that they would not be willed separately. Are they willed in the same way as the means are sometimes willed reluctantly? One difference is that in the case of means one usually has to decide to do something, but this is not so with side-effects. Abelard's examples are adulterers who do not intend to commit adultery and a vassal who causes the death of his lord in trying to save his life.⁹⁷ Stephen Langton says that those who are punished for forbidden acts do not admit that they willed the punishment.⁹⁸ When something is a separately unwanted and foreseen side-effect of what is willed, it is willed more indirectly than a separately unwanted means to an end. Thomas Aquinas seems to think that the foreseen side-effect of a voluntary act which is not intended is not directly willed, though it is indirectly willed, because one could prevent its occurrence by giving up the direct act of will.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ See e.g. Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 226.92–7; Thomas Aquinas, *ST III.21.4*; *De malo* 16.3, ad 9.

⁹⁵ See Saarinen (1994), 77–81.

⁹⁶ There were several distinctions purporting to express the difference between effective will and wish. In his *Disputations* (150.3–8) Simon of Tournai distinguished between affective will (*voluntas affectionis*) and efficacious will (*voluntas effectiois*). This terminology was also applied by Guido of Orchellis (d. c.1229) in *Tractatus de sacramentis*, ed. D. and O. van den Eynde, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 4 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1953), 271.20–2; see also Robiglio (2002), 154–6. More influential became the distinction between incomplete or imperfect (*incompleta, semiplena*) will as *velleitas* and complete or full (*completa, plena*) will as the unqualified will. This terminology was used, e.g., by Philip the Chancellor (*Summa de bono*, 662.401–7) and also by Thomas Aquinas; see Saarinen (1994), 75–82, 129–31; Robiglio (2002), 82–9.

⁹⁷ *Ethics* 6.24–10.27, 16.16–22.

⁹⁸ S. Ebbesen and L. B. Mortensen, 'A Partial Edition of Stephen Langton's *Summa and Quaestiones* with Parallels from Andrew Sunesen's *Hexaemeron*', *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin, Université de Copenhague*, 49 (1985), 178.

⁹⁹ See *ST II.2.64.7–8* and *De malo* 2.1. In *De malo* 1.3, ad 15, Aquinas writes that if something evil is joined either always or for the most part to the good which one intends *per se*, one is not excused from sin although he or she does not intend this evil *per se*. This is regarded as an example of a foreseen effect which is beyond one's intention but still in some sense willed; see J. B. Boyle, 'Praeter intentionem in Aquinas', *Thomist*, 42 (1978), 660.

One can follow the discussion of the question of how M should be qualified with respect to will by tracing the comments on the widely known example of a man who ‘wills to be in the mud and have 100 marks’ (*in luto esse cum 100 marchis*). The example was considered ambiguous, and it was possible to interpret it (i) as a case of willing reluctantly to become dirty as a means of receiving 100 marks, (ii) as a case of willing to become dirty as a side-effect, or (iii) willing something in a situation in which one is going to become dirty in any case.¹⁰⁰ The last alternative, (iii), is the case in which willing the antecedent does not imply willing the consequent. Cases (i) and (ii) are those in which willing the antecedent implies willing the consequent, either reluctantly or in the sense in which a probable consequent beyond the intention is willed. It was mentioned above that there were mid-thirteenth-century authors who saw some similarities between the unpremeditated first movements and side-effects and referred to the voluntariness of the first movements with the expressions ‘permitting will’ or ‘permitting consent’ or ‘consent by interpretation’.

A further influential distinction pertaining to the concept of will was Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of twofold inclination. According to Anselm, the notion of will (*voluntas*) can refer to three things: the faculty of willing (*instrumentum volendi*), the natural inclination of the faculty (*affectio instrumenti*), and the employment of the faculty (*opus instrumenti*). There are two natural inclinations of the will. Through one it is directed to what Anselm calls justice (*iustitia*) or rectitude (*rectitudo*), and through the other to what he calls advantage (*commodum*).¹⁰¹ Anselm thought that both inclinations were goods which God has provided. People do not sin by seeking their own happiness; to sin is to seek one’s own happiness without seeking justice. Justice he considered to be an uprightness of will kept for its own sake. The inclination to justice, as distinct from that to happiness, people can follow freely. This makes them free moral agents. If the uprightness is lost, one cannot get it back unless it is returned by God’s grace, but the faculty of free choice itself is not affected by one’s having lost the opportunity to will uprightly.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ S. Knuuttila and T. Holopainen, ‘Conditional Will and Conditional Norms in Medieval Thought’, *Synthese*, 96 (1993), 115–32.

¹⁰¹ *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, in *Opera omnia*, ii (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946), 3.11 (279.13–281.12); *De casu Diaboli*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, in *Opera omnia*, i (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946), 12 (254.23–255.17). See also C. Normore, ‘Goodness and Rational Choice in the Early Middle Ages’, in Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri (2002), 29–47.

¹⁰² *De casu Diaboli* 14, 258.8–30; see also S. Visser and T. Williams, ‘Anselm’s Account of Freedom’, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 31 (2001), 221–44. For twelfth-century applications

The logical and semantic interest in emotional terms was not confined to the question of their behaviour in consequences. Irene Rosier and Gabriel Nuchelmans have noted the distinction between *actus exercitus* and *actus significatus* in early thirteenth-century logic and grammar, and its application to emotive terms.¹⁰³ When terms were divided into categorematic and syncategorematic ones, categorematic terms were taken to signify things which were conceived of by the mind, while the syncategorematic terms, such as conjunctions, were taken to have only some kind of con-signification when they occurred together with the categorematic words. Some authors thought that all linguistic items other than the categorematic terms shared certain features, on account of which they may be grouped together. Interjections that express emotional affects and syncategorematic words are alike, it was argued, because they do not primarily signify anything, but are rather indications of mental events. This somewhat surprising link between emotional interjections, such as 'eya', 'proh', 'vah', and logical constants, such as 'or', 'if', 'not', is explained by reference to the difference between words which express a mental act or passion and words which signify a concept and thereby the things which exemplify it. Thus 'eya' and 'not' express mental events, while 'joy' and 'negation' signify them. The act expressed as *actus exercitus* by an interjection or by a logical term is an act signified (*actus significatus*) by the corresponding noun.¹⁰⁴

Those who adopted this view apparently thought that the human mind is provided with fixed reaction patterns that are activated when the soul is faced with perceptions or cognitions of a certain kind. Some of these

of this distinction, see *Summa sententiarum*, PL 176, 97A–B; Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, PL 176, 291B–C, John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, ed. C. C. J. Webb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 5.5 (PL 199, 720C–D).

¹⁰³ G. Nuchelmans, 'The Distinction *Actus Exercitus/Actus Significatus* in Medieval Semantics', in N. Kretzmann (ed.), *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, Synthese Historical Library, 32 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 57–90; I. Rosier, 'La distinction entre *actus exercitus* et *actus significatus* dans les sophismes grammaticaux du Ms. BN lat. 16618 et autres textes apparentés', in S. Read (ed.), *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar*, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 48 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 230–61; I. Rosier, *La Parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIIIe siècle*, Sic et non (Paris: Vrin, 1994).

¹⁰⁴ In an early thirteenth-century *Syncategoremata*, syncategorematic terms are treated as expressing affects of the rational soul in the same way as interjections express emotional affects. Both signify *per modum affectus* and not *per modum conceptus*, as categorematic terms do. See H. A. G. Braakhuis, *De 13de eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische termen*, i (Meppel: Krips Repro, 1979), 141, 148, 153, 160, 162, 164. Although this approach found some adherents, more influential authors, such as Peter of Spain and Nicholas of Paris, gave up the view that syncategorematic terms signify *per modum affectus* (Nuchelmans (1988), 61–72).

passive capacities arrange the conceptual picture of the world, while some change the attitudes of the affective soul towards the perceived circumstances. Although the theory of the close relationship between interjections and syncategorematic words was not long-lived, the questions of the distinction between expressive and significative terms, the semantics of expressive terms such as interjections, and of the relationship between interjections and animal voices were discussed by many medieval thinkers. Interjections as emotive signs could be included in the descriptions of the typical changes which accompany an occurrent emotion.¹⁰⁵ Thomas Aquinas thought that there probably were expressive interjections even in the language of angels.¹⁰⁶

3.4 Emotions in Medical Theories

An impulse to discuss the emotions from a new point of view was supplied by philosophical and medical books which were translated into Latin in the first part of the twelfth century. Among the influential medical works was the collection of six Latinized medical texts later known as the *Articella*. It included the *Isagoge ad artem Galeni* by Johannitius (a considerably abbreviated translation of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq's Arabic work), the *Aphorisms* and *Prognostics* of Hippocrates, *De urinis* by Theophilus, *De pulsibus* by Philaretus, and Galen's *Tegni* (*Ars parva*). This anthology, which took shape in the twelfth century, entered the university curriculum in the thirteenth century and was still printed repeatedly in the sixteenth century. It seems that the *Isagoge* was translated by Constantine of Africa, who had connections with the medical school of Salerno. Constantine entered the monastery of Monte Cassino c.1078 and died there before 1098/9. He translated several works from Arabic into Latin, among them a part of the vast medical encyclopaedia of 'Alī ibn al-'Abbās al-Maḡūsī (known in the West as Haly Abbas). Constantine's translation covered the first part, which was called the *Theorica*, and parts of the second part, which was called the *Practica*. The work itself was called the *Pantegni*. The

¹⁰⁵ In addition to Rosier (1994), see also U. Eco, R. Lambertini, C. Marmo, and A. Tabarroni, 'On Animal Language in the Medieval Classification of Signs', *Versus: Quaderni di Studi Semiotici*, 38/9 (1984), 3–38; E. J. Ashworth, 'Aquinas on Significant Utterance: Interjection, Blasphemy, Prayer', in S. MacDonald and E. Stump (eds.), *Aquinas's Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 207–34.

¹⁰⁶ *ST* I.107.4, ad 2. For Aquinas's theory of the language of angels, see B. Faes de Mottoni, 'Thomas von Aquin und die Sprache der Engel', in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Thomas von Aquin: Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 19 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1988), 140–55.

practical part was mostly put together from various Arabic texts in the twelfth century. Stephen of Antioch's literal translation of 'Alī ibn al-'Abbās's work appeared in 1127 under the title *Regalis dispositio*. The Salernitan scholars used the *Pantegni* as a guide-book to the *Isagoge*, the Latin version of which was difficult to read.¹⁰⁷ Nemesius of Emesa's *De natura hominis* was translated c.1080 by Alfanus of Salerno, who was a member of the scholarly circle centred on Constantine of Africa. He was a monk at Monte Cassino and later archbishop of Salerno (1058–85).¹⁰⁸

Among the psychologically interesting parts of the *Isagoge* is a brief remark about three kinds of spirits: natural, vital, and animal. The natural spirit has its seat in the liver, from which it passes through the veins to the whole body. The seat of the vital spirit is the heart, from which it goes through the arteries to the whole body. The animal spirit emanates from the brain, and it penetrates through the nerves into the whole body.¹⁰⁹ There is a more detailed account of these spirits in the *Pantegni*. The vegetative powers of generation, nutrition, and growth act through the natural spirit, which is located in the liver and the veins. The vital (or spiritual) spirit is produced in the heart from the air and is distributed through the arteries to vivify the body. This spirit is transformed into the animal spirit in a net of arteries at the base of the brain. The animal spirit is the medium of the animal faculty located in the brain. This faculty comprises the powers of sensation and movement and the ruling power. Sensation operates through the sense-organs and the front of the brain, which are connected by the nerves. The power of movement is the system of the middle ventricle of the brain, the spinal cord, and the nerves branching from it. The ruling power includes imagination, cogitation,

¹⁰⁷ M. D. Jordan, 'Medicine as Science in the Early Commentaries on "Johannitius"', *Traditio*, 43 (1987), 121–46; D. Jacquart, 'Aristotelian Thought in Salerno', in Dronke (1988), 407–27; C. Burnett and D. Jacquart (eds.), *Constantine the African and 'Alī ibn al-'Abbās al-Maġīsi: The Pantegni and Related Texts*, Studies in Ancient Medicine, 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1994). There is a Renaissance edition of the *Pantegni* in *Omnia opera Ysaac*, ii (Lyons, 1515), and a working edition of the *Isagoge* in G. Maurach, 'Johannicius: Isagoge ad Techne Galieni', *Sudhoffs Archiv*, 62 (1978), 148–74. The *Regalis dispositio* was published in Venice in 1492.

¹⁰⁸ For the translations of Nemesius' work by Alfanus and Burgundio of Pisa, see Ch. 1, n. 262. Parts of Nemesius' discussions of the emotions are paraphrased in John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*, which was translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa c.1153; *De fide orthodoxa* (versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus), ed. E. M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 8 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1955), 119–24.

¹⁰⁹ *Isagoge*, ed. Maurach, 15–17; for various Latin translations of this passage see F. Newton, 'Constantine the African and Monte Cassino: New Elements and the Text of the *Isagoge*', in Burnett and Jacquart (1994), 41–2.

and memory, which are situated in the two front ventricles, the middle ventricle, and the rear ventricle of the brain, respectively.¹¹⁰ This Galenic localization is also mentioned in the Latin *Isagoge*. Its Arab original associated different kinds of spirits with different powers, but this is not found in all Latin versions.¹¹¹

In the *Pantegni* the emotions are dealt with from the point of view of the movements of the vital spirit and natural heat. Excessive joy and anger cause the vital spirit and heat to move from the heart to the extreme parts of the body, while fear and distress have the opposite effect of making them withdraw to the heart. These physiological concomitants of the emotions are similar in human beings and irrational animals. Animals are led by the emotions, while in human beings these are subject to the rational power.¹¹² The psychosomatic emotions were built into this system in a way that had medical consequences. Excess or lack of humours and weakness of spirits can cause somatic or psychic disease. It is part of a doctor's skill to cure the extreme dispositional emotions which are caused partially by the malfunctions of the systems of humours and spirits. The unbalanced emotional dispositions may be cured pharmaceutically or through other medical treatments of the humours and spirits (massaging, diet, blood-letting), but because of their somatic effects the emotions themselves can also be used as remedies. Timid men are cold, and their coldness increases their feeling of timidity, and vice versa. This cycle can be broken by inducing feelings of wrath or joy which make the vital spirit and natural heat rush out from the heart to heat and dry the body.¹¹³ The cure of melancholy, a disease of the brain with many varieties, from depression to lovesickness, involves medicaments and bathing as physical treatments and, furthermore, music, pleasant discussions, and other activities, which make a habit of joy and gladness and change the bad complexion in the

¹¹⁰ *Pantegni*, *Theorica* IV.1, 7, 9, 19 in *Omnia opera Ysaac*, fos. 14v–15r, 16v, 17v; E. R. Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Warburg Institute, 1975), 17–18; C. Burnett, 'The Chapter on the Spirits in the *Pantegni* of Constantine the African', in Burnett and Jacquart (1994), 99–120. For early medieval discussions of the medical theory of the localization of psychic powers in the brain, see G. P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952), 58–79.

¹¹¹ Newton (1994), 34–8.

¹¹² *Pantegni*, *Theorica* IV.7–8 (fo. 16v); V.109–13 (fo. 25v).

¹¹³ *Pantegni*, *Theorica* VI.109 (fo. 25v). The chapter about the causes of death (*Theorica* IV.7) involves an influential remark on dying of fear or joy. Excessive joy may cause the spirit to rush from the heart in such a violent manner that the vital spark is extinguished. Extensive fear may cause a violent opposite movement which chokes the vital spark. See also Harvey (1975), 16–17, 19. For this theme in Aristotle, see p. 34 above.

brain.¹¹⁴ The main lines of the Galenic medical approach were also presented in the translations of the medical works by Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (Razes) and Avicenna.¹¹⁵

The *Pantegni* lists six emotions or, as they were called, six accidents of the soul, which were regarded as relevant in medicine because of their physiological consequences: joy (*gaudium*), distress (*tristitia*), fear (*timor*), anger (*ira*), anxiety (*angustia*), and shame (*verecundia*).¹¹⁶ Two emotions (joy and anger) are associated with the movement of the vital spirit from the heart to the extreme parts and two others (anxiety and fear) with the movement toward the heart. These movements are further divided into slow (anxiety, joy) and quick (fear, anger). On the basis of the direction and intensity of the movements, the basic four emotions can be put into a fourfold schema. Using the term ‘distress’ instead of ‘anxiety’, as later authors often did, the classification can be presented as follows:

	Centrifugal	Centripetal
Slow	joy	distress
Quick	anger	fear. ¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ *Regalis dispositio, Practica* V.25. There are similar instructions in *Pantegni, Practica* V.25, derived from Ibn al-Gazzār’s *Zād al-musāfir* (trans. Constantine of Africa under the title *Viaticum*). See M. Wack, ‘Alī ibn al-Abbās al-Mağūsī and Constantine on Love and the Evolution of the *Practica Pantegni*’, in Burnett and Jacquart (1994), 195–6. For therapeutic intercourse for lovesickness, see also M. Wack, *Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: The Viaticum and its Commentaries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).

¹¹⁵ See Harvey (1975), 9–13, 21–30. Ar-Rāzī’s *Liber ad Almansorem* and Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine* were translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). Ar-Rāzī’s extensive work *Liber continens* was translated in 1279. In his treatise *De medicinis cordialibus* (or *De viribus cordis*) Avicenna discusses some details of the doctrine of the relationship between the emotions and the spirits. Parts of this treatise are included in medieval manuscripts of the Latin translation of Avicenna’s *De anima* and are appended to its critical edition; see Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus* IV–V, ed. S van Riet, 187–210 (note 136 below).

¹¹⁶ According to the *Pantegni, Theorica* V.1 (fo. 18r), there are six emotions, but the list given there contains only five: joy, anger, fear, anxiety, distress. Another list (VI.109, fo. 25v) contains anger, distress, anxiety, fear, and shame, and the short chapters about emotions (VI.110–14, fo. 25v) are about joy, anxiety, distress, fear, and shame. These vacillations notwithstanding, the meaning is pretty clear; there are six kinds of medically relevant emotions which are mentioned above.

¹¹⁷ See *Pantegni, Theorica* VI.110–14 (fo. 25v), and, for the diagram, P. Gil-Sotres, ‘Modelo teórico y observación clínica: las pasiones del alma en la psicología medica medieval’, in *Comprendre et maîtriser la nature au Moyen Âge. Mélanges d’histoire des sciences offerts à Guy Beaujouan* (Geneva: Droz, 1994), 196. In chapters VI.111–12 of the *Pantegni* distress (*tristitia*) is characterized as a movement toward the heart and away from it, and anxiety (*angustia*) as a movement toward the heart. In the *Regalis dispositio* the terms *tristitia* and *cura* (*angustia*) are used in reverse. See Gil-Sotres (1994), 196. Anxiety/distress and shame differ from

Medical authors often used this schema, and it was also known to other learned persons. John of la Rochelle, a Franciscan theologian, referred to it as a commonly known model in his *Summa de anima* (1235).¹¹⁸

The theories of the temperaments and spirits were discussed by Salernitan commentators on medical works and other pioneers in natural philosophy, such as Adelard of Bath and William of Conches. Adelard of Bath refers to them in his works *De eodem et diverso* (before 1116) and *Quaestiones naturales* (before 1137); in the latter work he also uses Nemesius of Emesa's *De natura hominis*.¹¹⁹ In his works *Philosophia* (c.1125) and *Dragmaticon philosophiae* (1149) William of Conches attempted to treat of the general structures of the world and the constitution of human beings. He often quotes the *Pantegni*, and also made use of the work of Nemesius.¹²⁰ There are also longer discussions about the spirits in Alfred of Sareshel's *De motu cordis* (c.1190).¹²¹

William of Saint Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae* is an early example of combining the new medical knowledge with theological anthropology. The first part of the work, which discusses the elements of the body and the physiological side of some psychological phenomena, is to a great extent derived from the *Pantegni*. The main sources of the second part are *On the Creation of Man* by Gregory of Nyssa (translated by John the Scot Eriugena under the title *De imagine*), *On the State of the Soul* by Claudianus Mamertus (d. 474), and *On the Quantity of the Soul* by Augustine. The author also quotes Nemesius of Emesa's *De natura hominis*.¹²² Even though William closely follows the *Pantegni* in describing the elements of the body and the functions of the various spirits, he only mentions the connection between the spirits and the emotions, without discussing the medical model of the movements of the vital spirits (1.20–8; 2.89). As for the details of the theory, the same is true of the works of Adelard of Bath and William of Conches. It may be noticed that even Bernard of Clairvaux

the simple emotions which give rise to one movement only. The former is centripetal when it is caused by desperation and centrifugal when there is new hope; the latter involves first fear, which is centripetal, and then defence, which is centrifugal.

¹¹⁸ *Summa de anima*, II.107.118–30 (262); John does not name the emotions, but he states that the intensive movements are those of the irascible power, and the others those of the concupiscible power.

¹¹⁹ Burnett (1994), 111–13.

¹²⁰ I. Ronca, 'The Influence of the *Pantegni* on William of Conches's *Dragmaticon*', in Burnett and Jacquart (1994), 266–85. For the spirits in *Dragmaticon philosophiae*, ed. I. Ronca, CCCM 152 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), see 6.15–16 (232–4).

¹²¹ *De motu cordis*, ed. C. Baeumker, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 23. 1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1923).

¹²² See the notes in the edition of Lemoine and McGinn's introduction (1977), 27–47.

mentions the connection between the emotions and the humours of the body (*Opera v*, 360.3–4). There is also a reference to anger and yellow bile in Peter Alfonsi's *Dialogue between Peter and Moses the Jew*.¹²³ In his *De medicina animae* Hugh of Fouillooy applies the new medical sources in elaborated spiritual allegories.¹²⁴

William of Saint Thierry's work is one of the Cistercian treatises on the soul from the mid-twelfth century, the others being Aelred of Rievaulx's *De anima*, Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima*, and Alcher of Clairvaux's *De spiritu et anima*.¹²⁵ Alcher refers to the doctrine of the natural, vital, and animal spirits or powers, offering brief descriptions of their functions.¹²⁶ The details of this theory are not presented in other treatises, but it was employed in the context of a question which was found worthy of intensive study. These Cistercian treatises represented a dualism between soul and body, and one of their main concerns was to explain how the corporeal and immaterial activities are linked together. The medical theory of the subtle corporeal spirits could be taken to offer some kind of physical medium between the corporeal body and the immaterial soul. Hugh of St Victor wrote in his *De unione corporis et spiritus* (c.1140) that the sublimated fire which constitutes the imagination in the anterior ventricle of the brain conveys its impressions as corporeal spirit to the middle ventricle. There they contact the rational soul. Hugh thought that even though this contact cannot be fully comprehended, it is made more understandable by the insight that the highest form and function of the body show lots of similarities to the lowest form of the immaterial soul.¹²⁷ Isaac of Stella repeated these ideas in his *Letter of the Soul*,¹²⁸ and Alcher copied them from Isaac.¹²⁹ Aelred's view is similar, though it is based on Augustine's views rather than on twelfth-century ideas.¹³⁰ All these authors considered their version of the mind–brain problem analogous to the question of how there can be two natures and one person in Christ.¹³¹

¹²³ See *PL* 157, 449D–550A. The author was a Spanish Jew named Moses, who on his conversion to Christianity received the Christian name Peter Alfonsi in 1106.

¹²⁴ See *PL* 176, 1183–1202. Hugh of Fouillooy, prior of an Augustinian abbey near Corbie since 1153, is better known for his work *De natura avium* (*On the Nature of Birds*).

¹²⁵ See n. 71 above.

¹²⁶ *PL* 40, 794–5.

¹²⁷ *De unione corporis et spiritus*, *PL* 177, 286A–288A.

¹²⁸ *PL* 194, 1881A–D.

¹²⁹ *PL* 40, 789–90.

¹³⁰ *De anima*, ed. Talbot, 72.5–75.12; 92.32–93.4; 143.3–12.

¹³¹ Isaac of Stella, *Epistola de anima* 1881C–D, *De spiritu et anima* 789–90; Aelred of Rievaulx, *De anima*, 86.8–22.

The theory of a mediating spirit was not the only explanation of the possibility of the union of soul and body. There was also a tradition according to which soul and body are knit together by harmonious proportions in the body which are akin to the immaterial soul. Independently of how the basis of this union was understood, many authors referred to the originally Augustinian view that the relationship between the body and the soul can be characterized as a kind of natural love or friendship.¹³² Even if the body is the prison of the soul, the soul loves its prison, feels fear of the death of the body, sorrow for its obstacles, and joy at its prosperity.¹³³

It was stated in the *Pantegni* that some philosophers wished to identify the spirit in the brain with the soul, and that others claimed it was the instrument of the soul. The second opinion was said to be closer to the truth.¹³⁴ Even though there were no twelfth-century Latin authors to defend the materialist position with respect to the human soul, it was considered less clear whether the souls of animals were material spirits or not.¹³⁵ Another related question is whether the emotions are identical with the movements of the spirits or not. In the *Pantegni* they are often treated as spiritual movements. This was part of the medical approach, and did not imply physicalist reduction. It was commonly thought that there was a cognitive cause or component in emotions even though they could be discussed as bodily affections in medicine. In Avicenna's works, which are discussed in the next section, this question received an influential answer.

3.5 Emotions in Avicenna's Psychology

Around the middle of the twelfth century, Aristotle's *De anima* and Avicenna's *De anima* were translated into Latin. Aristotle's *De anima* was first translated by James of Venice. Avicenna's psychology reached the West through the sixth book of his encyclopaedic work *al-Shifā'*. It was translated by Gundissalinus and Avendauth and called in Latin *Liber de anima*,

¹³² Augustine, *De genesi ad litteram*, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 28 (Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1894), 7.27; Cassiodorus, *De anima* 2 (PL 70, 1283D); Rabanus Maurus, *Tractatus de anima* (PL 110, 1111A); Honorius Augustodunensis, *Elucidarium* 7.27; 2.14 (PL 172, 1145A). See Talbot's introduction to his edition of Aelred of Rievaulx's *De anima*, 41–4.

¹³³ *De spiritu et anima*, PL 40, 789.

¹³⁴ For various formulations of the passage in the manuscripts, see Burnett (1994).

¹³⁵ William of Conches regarded the souls of animals as spirits in *Dragmaticon philosophiae*, 6.16.2 (234); see also Ronca (1994), 282–3. John Blund criticized this view in *Tractatus de anima*, 22.310–16.

or *Sextus de naturalibus* because of its place in the complete work. This sixth book contains five parts.¹³⁶ Avicenna's work more than other books gave rise to the discussions of philosophical psychology in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.¹³⁷ The legacy of Aristotle's *De anima* began later; the first Latin commentaries on it were written in the 1240s.

Let us have a look at those parts of the Latin translation of Avicenna's *De anima* which influenced the scholastic discussions of the emotions. Avicenna's theory of the soul is based on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic doctrines. The vegetable soul provides all living bodily beings with the faculties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Animals are differentiated by the animal soul, which endows them with these faculties and the faculties of apprehension and locomotion. Because of their special human soul, human beings have all these faculties and theoretical reason, practical reason, and rational choice as well. The human soul animates the body as its form, but this is only one of the functions of the soul, not its essence. In itself the soul is an immaterial substance (*De anima* I.1 (26.27–27.36); V.1 (80.58–63)). Treating the soul as an organizing and animating principle is the Aristotelian strand of Avicenna's dualistic theory. The conception of the soul as a substance is its Neoplatonic element.¹³⁸ As distinct from the vegetable soul and the animal soul, the human soul can subsist independently and by itself and be immediately aware of itself. Avicenna tried to demonstrate this through his famous flying man argument.¹³⁹ The human soul is also demonstrably immortal.¹⁴⁰

Avicenna divides the faculties of the sensitive soul into moving and apprehensive powers. The moving power is divided into two species: the

¹³⁶ Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. S. van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (I–III, Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1972; IV–V, Louvain: Éditions Orientalistes; Leiden: Brill, 1968).

¹³⁷ See D. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300*, Warburg Institute Studies and Texts, 1 (London: Warburg Institute; Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2000), and, for Avicenna's influence in general, R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme latin aux confins des XIIIe–XIIIe siècles* (Paris: Vrin, 1934).

¹³⁸ F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitāb al-najāt, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo Edition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 3–12; G. Verbeke, 'Le "De anima" d'Avicenne: une conception spiritualiste de l'homme', in Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus IV–V*, ed. van Riet, 20*–46*.

¹³⁹ In the flying man argument it is assumed that if a man were to come into being in an adult condition but floating in space so that he could not affirm the existence of his body, he could still be certain of his existence as a soul (*De anima* I.1 (36.49–37.68); V.7 (162.51–163.64)). See Hasse (2000), 80–7.

¹⁴⁰ See G. Verbeke, 'L'immortalité de l'âme dans le *De anima* d'Avicenne: une synthèse de l'aristotélisme et du néoplatonisme', *Pensamiento*, 25 (1969), 271–90.

one commands behavioural changes, and the other effects movements. The executive power operates through the nervous system and the muscles. Impulses to behavioural changes are also provided by instinctual tendencies, which are activated by certain imaginative or estimative acts. The apprehensive powers involve five external senses and five internal apprehensive faculties: common sense, imagination, the imaginative power, the estimative power, and memory. The intellectual human faculties, which do not necessarily require any bodily organ, are also divided into powers of knowing and acting. Human beings have all these faculties, but there is only one intellectual soul in them. The human soul is the organizing principle of a being with several functional levels.¹⁴¹

The external senses receive the sensitive forms of things. *Common sense* receives all the impressions of the five senses and turns them into distinct acts of perception. It also relates the sensible forms received through different senses to each other. Common sense is localized in the first ventricle of the brain. The sense impressions proceed to this part of the brain along the sensory nerves—the neural spirit provides the material medium for the acts of common sense and of the other internal senses. Common sense is the centre of sensation through which animals are aware of the sensible aspects of things. *Imagination*, which retains the sensations, is localized in the back of the anterior part of the brain. In the middle ventricle of the brain there is a power which can create various configurations of the sensible forms in imagination by combining and dividing them. This power is called *imaginative* in animals and *cogitative* in human beings, whose rational faculty is prepared by it for receiving the emanation of the active intellect. The other power in the central ventricle is called *estimative*. It evaluates the objects of the external senses from the point of view of their convenience or inconvenience. These aspects of things, which are not perceived by external senses, are called ‘intentions’. In animals the acts of this power are often immediate and instinctual (the sheep regards the wolf instinctually as dangerous), but it may also operate on the basis of earlier pleasant or unpleasant experiences (the dog regards the stick as painful because of an earlier experience). In human beings its acts are instinctual in children, but later they are mainly based on earlier experiences and learned attitudes. *Memory* is localized in the backmost ventricle of the brain. As a retentive power it stands in the same relation to

¹⁴¹ For a summary, see *De anima* I.5 (82.40–102.15); *Kitāb-al-najāt* II.6.2–4 (trans. Rahman, 25–33); Harvey (1975), 40–8. The elements of Avicenna’s psychology were also presented in the twelfth-century translation of al-Ghazālī’s *Metaphysics*, ed. J. T. Muckle, St Michael’s Mediaeval Studies (Toronto: St Michael’s College, 1933).

estimation as imagination to common sense (*De anima* IV.1 (1.4–11.50); IV.3 (37.19–40.57)).¹⁴²

All abstract concepts are emanations from the hypostatic Active Intellect. It illuminates the soul and makes it see the essences of the things with which it is acquainted through the sensitive faculties. The contemplative power of the intellectual soul should deal with universals and other intelligible things, while the active intellectual power should look downwards and keep the emotions in strict control so that the material level does not disturb the perfection of the soul.¹⁴³ According to an often-quoted simile of Avicenna, the rational part of the soul has two faces: one that looks downwards to the body and the sensitive part of the soul, and another looking upwards (*De anima* I.5 (94.8–14); *Kitāb al-najāt* 6.2.4, trans. Rahman, 33).

In describing the commanding motive acts, Avicenna assumes that the human estimative power first treats the objects of the sensitive representations in terms of whether they are pleasurable or painful or harmful. Depending on the state of a subject, it is possible that an affective evaluation does not actualize the commanding motive power at all, gives rise to a weak appetite, or gives rise to a vehement appetite. The first alternative shows that the appetitive acts are not simply evaluative acts of the estimative power. A weak appetite is a form of affective attention without an impulse to action. If the appetite is strong enough, it actualizes the executive motive power in animals, though not necessarily in human beings. This power is distributed through the nerves and muscles and contracts and relaxes the muscles and pulls and stretches the tendons and ligaments in accordance with the intended behaviour (*De anima* IV.4 (54.82–56.5; 59.46–8); *Kitāb al-najāt* 6.2.2, trans. Rahman, 26). By drawing a distinction between the commanding acts and the executive acts of the moving power, Avicenna wanted to provide human beings with an opportunity to control the actualization of emotional suggestions by their rational faculties. The will can prevent the acts of the executive moving powers.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Cf. *Kitāb al-najāt* 2.6.3 (trans. Rahman, 30–1) and *Liber canonis* (Venice, 1582), I.1.6.5 (fos. 27v–28r). For the functions of the estimative power, see D. Black, ‘Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions’, *Dialogue*, 32 (1993), 219–58, and Hasse (2000), 130–41. Many texts pertaining to the estimative power by medieval Arabic and Latin authors are translated in Klubertanz (1952).

¹⁴³ H. A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 95–102.

¹⁴⁴ See also Verbeke (1968), 58*–9*.

The commanding motive faculty is divided into two parts: the concupiscible and the irascible. The reactions of the concupiscible power are acts of desiring things taken to be pleasurable or useful for achieving pleasurable things. The reactions of the irascible power are acts of desiring to defeat adversaries and to repel things which are regarded as harmful or destructive (*De anima* I.5 (83.47–52), IV.4 (56.6–57.9)). The actions of animals are only partially guided by the commanding motive powers. They also have instinctual behavioural patterns which are directly actualized by certain imaginations and evaluations, such as releasing themselves from a trap, building nests, and taking care of their offspring. So the motive principles of the sensitive soul are the concupiscible power, the irascible power, and the estimative power in combination with instinctual inclinations. With the exception of simple reflex reactions, the motive acts either orientate toward a behavioural change without an impulse to action or are efficacious desires which initiate action if there is no hindrance (*De anima* IV.4 (57.10–58.25)). It is not quite clear why some instinctual estimative acts are thought to activate the executive motive power without first activating the commanding motive power.

The emotions of the soul, such as joy, distress, fear, and anger, are also called the emotions of the spirit, since they are accompanied by cardiac and spiritual changes.¹⁴⁵ According to Avicenna, the physical affections which are referred to by the names of the emotions are caused by the psychic emotions (*De anima* IV.4 (61.80–62.96)). Avicenna deals with the physiological aspects of the faculties and activities of the animal soul in the first book of the *Canon of Medicine*. This large work in five books was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). The doctrine of the spirits is also summarized in the *De medicinis cordialibus*. Avicenna's approach is similar to that of the *Pantegni*. In the medical contexts the sensitive emotions are treated as affects suffered by the spirit. When people experience the same emotion often, they become prone to have it because of the changes in the system of the spirits and humours and the habituation of the faculties which are induced by it. Medicines and diets can improve the quality of the spirit and lessen proneness to bad feelings and emotions. Even though the soul is the source of lower behavioural acts, it functions through a material medium, and its acts are influenced by the qualities of the spirits and, more indirectly, of the humours.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ *De medicinis cordialibus*, 190.48–9.

¹⁴⁶ Harvey (1975), 25–8.

In *De anima* Avicenna stresses the priority of the soul and form to matter. Forms determine the movements of matter in natural compositions, and similarly the presence of the forms in the soul can affect the material parts of living organisms. In illustration Avicenna refers to the healing power of positive thinking, which can surpass the effects of medical treatment, and to the difference between walking on a narrow board on the ground and above water—people lose their balance through imagining that they may fall. Avicenna thought that the cardiac and spiritual movements which are caused by the emotions are teleologically purposeful. When the estimative power gives rise to motive acts, it also causes cardiac and spiritual affects in a manner which serves the actualization of the emotional suggestions (IV.4 (62.88–96; 64.20–33)).

Avicenna's examples of concupiscible acts involve desires for food, wealth, and sexual intercourse, which are forms of seeking pleasure for oneself. Because of natural instincts, animals also have other inclinations which Avicenna did not locate in the concupiscible power, though he says that they are concupiscible in the sense that animals suffer when their actualization is prevented (*De anima* IV.4 (57.10–18; 58.32–59.35)). The irascible power is directed toward victory and repelling antagonistic things. Avicenna's examples of its acts are pain (*dolor*), sadness (*tristitia*), fear, and anger (*De anima* IV.4 (58.26–32)). One might think that Avicenna mentions pain and sadness here because the desiderative irascible acts are reactions to their causes, either attempts to overcome them when one meets with them, which is anger, or avoiding them by fleeing, which is fear. But he also says that pain and sadness are acts of the irascible faculty. It is also somewhat strange that these passions are mentioned in this context while pleasure and joy are not. Pleasure and joy are said to belong to the apprehensive power (*De anima* IV.4 (57.15–17; 59.34–5)). Avicenna seems to think that pain and sadness, as distinct from pleasure and joy, can involve a desiderative element. The object of the concupiscible power, the pleasurable, does not affect the irascible power, and the object of the irascible power, the harmful, does not affect the concupiscible power (*De anima* V.7 (158.90–3)). The two sensitive motive powers have contrary objects, but there are no contrary concupiscible emotions and no contrary irascible emotions.¹⁴⁷

Though Avicenna speaks mainly about the emotions of the animal soul as desiderative motive acts, his view of joy and pleasure as perceptions

¹⁴⁷ In *De anima* IV.3 (44.21–3) Avicenna states that fear is the contrary opposite of hope, and desperation is the privative opposite of hope.

shows that some emotions belong to the apprehensive powers. In *De medicinis cordialibus* Avicenna says that sensitive pleasure is a perception of the fulfilment of a natural appetite or of the good functioning of the organism. This perception is pleasant—pleasure is the feeling aspect of the awareness of something positive taking place in the subject. Pain and sadness are the corresponding feelings with respect to negative things (192.67–194.14). Sensitive pleasure and distress are primarily embedded in perceptions of bodily states, but they can also qualify other forms of awareness (*De anima* I.3 (65.21–66.33), IV.4 (57.15–18)).¹⁴⁸ Pain and sadness can apparently occur as apprehensive acts or as desiderative acts. Avicenna seems to assume that where there are desiderative emotions, the apprehensive acts activating them may already involve pleasant or unpleasant feelings. In addition, there are pleasant or unpleasant perceptions of the physiological changes which are caused by emotions.

In addition to emotions common to beasts and human beings there are also specifically human emotions. Avicenna assumed that there is a close co-operation between the active part of the intellect and the sensitive estimative power, which he treated as some kind of lower reason. The estimative faculty of animals makes emotional judgements on the basis of earlier experiences or instincts. The dominance of the instincts in animals makes their behaviour stereotyped. Their desires serve the survival of the species, and there are no variations in their social activities. The sensitive emotions of human beings are based on a more conceptual orientation to the world. Fear and hope with respect to not yet actualized future things presuppose a sense of time which animals lack. Similarly, human social life is based on learned attitudes and habits rather than on instincts. Shame at wrong action is an exclusively human emotion, which demands a concept of rules. Human beings distinguish between common and uncommon things, and accordingly they experience wonder at unusual things, which is expressed in laughter. It is also human to express anxiety by weeping (*De anima* V.1 (69.5–76.3)).

In discussing the relationship between the commanding and executive motive acts, Avicenna, according to the Latin translation of *De anima*, states that animals perceive their commanding acts, because otherwise they would not move themselves in an adequate way (*De anima*

¹⁴⁸ In his treatise on first philosophy Avicenna states that pleasure is an apprehension of agreeable as agreeable. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, V–X, ed. S. van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 8.7 (432.67–8). This was often quoted by Latin authors.

IV.4 (54.82–55.84)). The Arabic text also speaks about the perception of desire, but does not combine it with action in the same way. The Latin reading is probably based on what Avicenna says later in his argument for the unity of the soul (*De anima* V.7 (157.87–174.32); *Kitāb al-najāt* 2.6.15 (trans. Rahman, 64–8)). In this argument Avicenna takes for granted that the sensitive appetites are activated by the intentions of the same external objects to which their acts are directed. But if the estimative faculty has evaluated an object as annoying, how can the corresponding irascible act be directed toward the same object, since each faculty has a function of its own, and the irascible faculty does not identify or evaluate objects? Avicenna's answer is that the soul is a conscious subject. When various sensitive acts are directed to an object, they are so directed because they are acts of a subject which is aware of itself in relation to that object and which reacts to it through its apprehensive and motive faculties. Avicenna writes:

Again, we say 'when I perceived such and such thing, I became angry', and it is a true statement, too. So it is one and the same thing which perceives and becomes angry... But when one says, 'I perceived and became angry', one does not mean that this occurs in two different things in us, but that something to which perception transmitted its content happened to become angry... Its being in this status, even though it be body, is not due to its being body alone; it is then due to its being in possession of a faculty by which it is capable of combining both these things. (trans. Rahman, 65–6)

An occurrent emotion is primarily an act of an agent who evaluates the relevance of something to himself or herself and reacts emotionally to it. This event can be described as a sequence of the acts of various faculties, which form a causal chain, but this chain is an instrumental substratum of the level of conscious experience and intention. Mental events are analysed into various parts, each of which has a faculty of its own; the unity of these events is constituted by their being acts of a conscious subject. The souls of small children and animals are apparently also unifying centres, but they are not self-conscious.

Avicenna's view of the emotions of the sensitive soul shows similarities to Aristotle's compositional theory. Emotions have cognitive causes, and they involve feelings, behavioural suggestions, and bodily affections. However, Avicenna's phenomenological descriptions of particular emotions are sketchy. He is mainly interested in treating the generic components of emotional phenomena and in arranging them into causal sequences. Since the distinction between the apprehensive and the motive powers belongs

to the main issues of Avicenna's psychological theory, he accordingly divides the emotions into desiderative and non-desiderative, depending on whether their dominant aspects can be regarded as the acts of the motive powers or as the acts of the apprehensive powers. Avicenna does not develop this idea any further, and his remarks on feelings associated with desiderative emotions are succinct. While occurrent emotions seem to comprise various components which, according to the faculty theory, are acts of various powers, the emotions themselves are treated as motive acts or apprehensive acts. This layer of Avicenna's analysis proved to be more influential than his remarks on the synthetic structure of an emotional experience.

3.6 Emotions in Early Thirteenth-Century Philosophy

Dominicus Gundissalinus combined Avicennian views with the traditional Augustinian psychology in his *De anima*. It was only partially an independent treatise, consisting to a great extent of texts from the translation of Avicenna's *De anima*.¹⁴⁹ There was a theoretically more advanced reception of some themes of Avicenna's psychology of the faculties of the soul in early thirteenth-century works which concentrated on an analysis of the psychic powers, such as John Blund's *De anima* (c.1210), the anonymous works *De anima et de potentiis eius* (c.1225) and *De potentiis animae et obiectis* (c.1230), *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* by John of la Rochelle (c.1233), and *Summa de anima* by the same author (c.1235).¹⁵⁰

Almost half of Gundissalinus' quotations from Avicenna's account of the sensitive motive acts concern the question of how the acts of the concupiscible and the irascible powers are related to the changes in the heart and the spirit. In Avicenna's view, the concupiscible and irascible acts are partially caused by the acts of the estimative power, and are also influenced by the physical state of the subject. John Blund took this

¹⁴⁹ The text is edited in J. T. Muckle, 'The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus', *Mediaeval Studies*, 2 (1940), 23–103; excerpts from the passages on the emotions in Avicenna's *De anima* are quoted at 80.24–82.5.

¹⁵⁰ *De anima et de potentiis eius* is edited in R. A. Gauthier, 'Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d'un maître ès arts (vers 1225), introduction et texte critique', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 66 (1982), 3–55; *De potentiis animae et obiectis* is edited in D. A. Callus, 'The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 19 (1952), 131–70; John of la Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. P. Michaud-Quantin, *Textes philosophiques du moyen âge*, 11 (Paris: Vrin, 1964).

to mean that the various movements of the heart and the spirit give rise to the emotions of joy, distress, fear, and anger in the soul. He apparently thought that the cardiac and spiritual changes are the primary causes of emotions.¹⁵¹ There is a similar formulation in David of Dinant, whose views became known in Paris when John Blund was teaching there. In discussing emotions David writes:

That the things which befall externally are not joint causes of the affects which are formed in the soul, as some have thought, is clear from the fact that some people can experience joy and sadness without any external cause. And again, two men hear something equally grave for both of them, and one is moved to sadness, but not the other. . . . It is manifest therefore that although the suffering of the heart and the affect of the soul are formed simultaneously, nevertheless the suffering of the heart is the cause of the affect which forms in the soul.¹⁵²

It is thought that physical movements can have evaluations as their partial causes and that the emotions receive their cognitive intentionality from evaluations, but that they are caused by the movements of the heart.¹⁵³ Regarding physical affects as the causes of emotions shows some similarities to the James–Lange theory of emotion, but this did not find many adherents. The standard view was John of la Rochelle’s interpretation of Avicenna, according to which commanding motive acts are reactions to evaluative acts and cause behavioural changes and immediate inner affections. I shall return to John of la Rochelle’s view.

One of the widely discussed themes in early thirteenth-century philosophical psychology was the question of how various types of emotion should be classified with respect to the concupiscible and irascible parts of the soul. This was already a controversial topic among twelfth-century theologians. In his *De natura corporis et animae* William of Saint Thierry presents the Stoic classification of the emotions and the Platonic division of the soul in the same place, without explaining how they are related to each other (2.88–9). The life of the human soul is said to be deployed by the potencies of rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility. In a well-ordered soul faith (*fides*) is formed in the reason, hope (*spes*) in the

¹⁵¹ *Tractatus de anima* 25.380.

¹⁵² *Davidis de Dinanto Quaternulorum Fragmenta*, ed. M. Kurdzialek, *Studia Mediewistyczne*, 3 (1963), 36.11–21; the translation is quoted from E. Maccagnolo, ‘David of Dinant and the Beginnings of Aristotelianism in Paris’, in Dronke (1988), 438–9.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* 36–9, 67–8; see also M. Kurdzialek, ‘Die psychosomatischen Bedingungen sittlicher Laster nach der Aussicht einiger frühmittelalterlicher Ärzte und Naturwissenschaftler’, *Sudhoffs Archiv*, 62 (1978), 183–7.

concupiscibility, and love (*caritas*) in the irascibility (2.89).¹⁵⁴ William remarks that it is *prima facie* strange to associate Christian love with the irascible power, but he explains that love is compatible with human or rational anger, though not with beastly anger. Human anger is divided into zeal and discipline. These aspects correspond to the Christian dispositions of the love of God and one's neighbour, on the one hand, and the hatred of vices on the other. William stresses that the acts of the irascible power are characterized by a special fervour, and that the fervour of rightly directed love is the same as the fervour of rightly directed hate. There is no love of justice without a preceding hate of injustice (2.90–1). As far as William regarded the fervour as a proprium of the irascible faculty, he probably thought that the fourfold Stoic classification applies primarily to the concupiscible part, while anger and other fervent emotions belong to the irascible part. This is roughly what one learns from Nemesius of Emesa, whose division of the types of anger William employs (2.91). Bernard of Clairvaux stated that desire and avoidance belong to the concupiscible power, and joy and anger to the irascible power (*Opera*, v, 358.18–359.15). It is not explained why joy is classified in this way, but it seems to have the same spiritual context as William's remark about the connection between love and anger. A link between joy and anger occurs also in Richard of St Victor's *The Twelve Patriarchs*. Zabulon, hatred of vices, is born after Issachar, spiritual joy.

Another combination of the emotions and the affective faculties was put forward by Isaac of Stella. He describes the types of emotions by using the Augustinian reformulation of the Stoic division, and combines them with the Platonic parts of the soul as follows:

Affect is fourfold: as for things which we love, we either rejoice as present or hope for as future, while with respect to things which we hate we are already plunged into distress or else are in fear of being plunged into distress. And so joy and hope arise from the concupiscible power, while distress and fear arise from the irascible power. (*Letter on the Soul* 1878d)

¹⁵⁴ Of the sinful emotions of an uncontrolled concupiscible power, William refers to carnal lust, desire of the eyes, and the false ambition, which are found in the Bible (1 John 2:16) and associated by Augustine with the threefold desire of lust, curiosity, and vainglory (*Confessions* 10.30.41; *De vera religione* 69). The acts of beastly anger, cruelty, and hatred are the sinful motions of an uncontrolled irascible power (2.92). Beastly anger is divided into wrath, madness, and 'coitus'. Coitus is said to be 'the anger which only revenge satisfied, just as coitus satisfies the desire of the flesh' (2.91). This was based on Nemesius' division. It involved *kotos* which occurred as *cotos* (or *coitos*) in Alfanus' Latin translation. William misread this as *coitus*. Cf. *Premnon physicon*, ed. Burkhard, 104.

Isaac thought that the concupiscible emotions are reactions to things which are regarded as good and pleasant, and the irascible emotions in their turn are reactions to things which are regarded as evil and unpleasant. The idea of dividing the emotions in this way was not Isaac's innovation. There was a tradition of regarding the concupiscible as a power which naturally seeks good things and the irascible as a power which naturally avoids evil things.¹⁵⁵ Isaac's division was quoted (with minor changes) in the *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40, 782; cf. 814) and through it in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono* (748.133–749.146). A division of the emotions into those of the concupiscible and the irascible on the basis of whether their object is good or evil was also suggested by Avicenna's *De anima*, which added to the popularity of this view. Let us see how John Blund dealt with this question in his *Tractatus de anima*.

Following Avicenna, Blund states that there are apprehensive and motive powers in the sensitive soul. As far as the behaviour of an animal is concerned, the apprehensive power realizes what is harmful (*novicum*) and what is pleasurable (*delectabile*) and what is neutral in an actual situation. The concupiscible motive power makes an animal embrace that which is taken to be pleasurable, and similarly the irascible power makes it turn away from what is taken to be harmful or destructive. These commanding acts give an impulse to executive motive powers in the nerves and muscles, which in turn make the organism behave in an appropriate way (16.12–17.1). The author asks whether the concupiscible and irascible powers are two distinct powers or whether they are two forms of the same power. Referring to Aristotle and Avicenna, he argues that they are two distinct powers, because their acts are contrary to each other. But what about Aristotle's remark in the *Topics* (2.7.113a34–b3), which the author took to mean that the concupiscible power itself is the seat of contrary acts, such as love and hate? Following Avicenna, Blund thinks that appetite, love, and joy are in the concupiscible power, and aversion, hate, and distress in the irascible power. The Aristotelian idea that there can be contrary potencies and contrary acts in one and the same power should be understood as follows. Love and joy are in themselves acts of the concupiscible power, and hate and distress are in themselves acts

¹⁵⁵ According to Jerome and Gregory, the concupiscible part of a pious soul desires the virtues, and the irascible part turns away from the vices; Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew*, CCSL 77, 2.899–910; Gregory the Great, *In septem psalmos poenitentiales expositio*, PL 79, 551C–D. See also William of Conches, *Glosae super Platonem*, ed. É. Jauneau, *Textes philosophiques du moyen âge*, 13 (Paris: Vrin, 1965), 74, and Alexander Nequam, *Speculum Speculationum*, ed. R. M. Thomson, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, 11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3.90.

of the irascible power; but the acts of the first group can be said to be accidentally in the irascible power, and the acts of the second group accidentally in the concupiscible power. The point is that the acts of the power which are directed to good things can be understood as serving the power which is directed to avoiding evil things, and vice versa (18.22–22.16). In this passage John Blund also employs the Avicennian view that apprehensive and appetitive faculties are powers used by the unifying soul (20.25–21.7). Blund's solution is repeated in Alexander Nequam's *Speculum Speculationum* (3.91).

The conception of the concupiscible emotions as reactions to good things and the irascible emotions as reactions to evil things is also found in the anonymous *De anima et potentiis eius*. The emotions which are acts of the sensitive motive power are further divided on the basis of whether the activating cognitive acts evaluate things as easy or as arduous.¹⁵⁶ This terminology is also applied in the anonymous treatise *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, but it is now associated with the Aristotelian idea that there are contrary concupiscible acts. The contrary concupiscible emotions are reactions to sensually good or evil things, and the irascible emotions are reactions to great and arduous things.¹⁵⁷ In his *Summa de bono* Philip the Chancellor also made use of this new taxonomical principle, and it is mentioned in an anonymous treatise *De anima* (c.1235).¹⁵⁸ John of la Rochelle developed it further and associated it with a detailed classification of the emotions in the *Summa de anima* (c.1235). After this it became the dominant view.¹⁵⁹ John's taxonomy of the emotions involves some of the principles which were also applied in Thomas Aquinas's influential theory of the emotions.

In the second part of the *Summa de anima*, John of la Rochelle discusses the doctrines of the powers of the soul in *De spiritu et anima*, which he

¹⁵⁶ Gauthier (1982), see n. 150 above, 47.388–48.406.

¹⁵⁷ Callus (1952), see n. 150 above, 159.33–5, 164.3–5. The term 'arduous' (*arduum*) began to be used in the theory of emotions in the 1220s. *De potentiis animae et obiectis* is the oldest known text in which the object of the irascible emotions is characterized as arduous. See Gauthier (1982), 24.

¹⁵⁸ *Summa de bono*, 161.56–8. *Summa de bono* is traditionally dated to the early 1230s, but Wicki argues for an earlier date between 1225 and 1228: *ibid.* 63–6. See also Pseudo-Grosseteste, *De anima*, in L. Baur (ed.), *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 9 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1912), 266.

¹⁵⁹ For this division in Odo Rigaldi, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, see R. A. Gauthier, *Magnanimité. L'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne*, Bibliothèque thomiste, 28 (Paris: Vrin, 1951), 321–7. See also L. Sileo, *Theoria della scienza theologica. Quaestio de scientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230–1250)*, Studia Antoniana cura Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani edita, 27 (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Antonianum, 1984), 109–35.

took to be Augustine's work, John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*, and Avicenna's *De anima*.¹⁶⁰ As for the theory of emotions in *De spiritu et anima*, John quotes the passage which was copied from Isaac of Stella's *Letter on the Soul* (p.228 above) and makes some comments on it. There is then a more detailed account of John Damascene's classification, which, as mentioned above, was mainly copied from Nemesius of Emesa. The main part involves an account of Avicenna's analysis of the motive powers. In this connection John also develops his own classification of the emotions.

John of la Rochelle assumes that the behaviour of animals is led by appetites for pleasure and for self-assurance, and that these general inclinations also dominate the sensitive level of human beings. Correspondingly, there are two commanding motive powers: the concupiscible and the irascible. Following Avicenna, John says that the imaginative power moves these by presenting sensible forms of things, and the estimative power by presenting the emotionally relevant intentions of the sensible things, such as convenience, inconvenience, pleurability, or painfulness. The fantasy and the estimative powers are apprehensive faculties which can be called moving powers in the sense that their acts actualize the imperative moving powers. The genuine moving powers are the concupiscible and the irascible, the acts of which give impulses to external behavioural changes. These are realized by the executive moving powers infused in the nerves and muscles (II.101, 104–10 (248, 253–67)). John suggests that Avicenna's view of the moving powers can be interpreted as follows. In activating the executive moving powers, the concupiscible and irascible commanding powers also give rise to inner physical changes, and can thus be called affecting moving powers (II.104.30–5 (254)). The physical affects which accompany the imperative acts are described in accordance with the medical theories described above (II.107.118–30; 108 (262–5)). Emotional responses take place automatically in animals, whereas they can be controlled by reason in human beings. Because of this controllability, the first movements toward forbidden things are venial sins (II.104.13–15 (253)).¹⁶¹

John thinks that the moving powers are naturally inclined to react to certain kinds of estimations with certain kinds of impulses. The concupiscible power commands acts through which one acquires things which

¹⁶⁰ For the relationship between John of la Rochelle's *Summa de anima* and his earlier summary of various doctrines of the soul in *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* see Bougerol's preface to his edition of *Summa de anima*, 34–9.

¹⁶¹ For John of la Rochelle's theory of the first movements, see also pp.190–1 above.

are relevant for pleasure, while the irascible power commands acts relevant for honour and victory. Certain apprehensions activate the concupiscible power positively (*confortatio*), while others activate it negatively (*disconfortatio*). When it is activated positively, there will be a like (*placencia*) for the object. When it is activated negatively, there will be a corresponding dislike (*displacencia*). The corresponding irascible attitudes are strength (*corroboratio*) and weakness (*debilitas*). These are associated with various acts of the motive power with respect to arduous objects. For any kind of concupiscible emotion there is a corresponding contrary concupiscible emotion, and the same holds for the irascible emotions (*Summa de anima* II.107 (256–62)).

John does not explain what he means by these four different ‘dispositions’ of the sensitive motive powers. They are actual as long as particular motive acts are actual and function as partial causes of these acts. One might think that through this theory John wanted to add subjective feelings to his theory, but since he speaks about the dispositions of the motive powers, perhaps he had in mind primarily the different ways in which these powers are actualized, depending on the nature of representations and the state of the organism—for example, whether it is satisfied or not, or whether the systems of the humours and the spirits are apt to certain reactions or not. Bonaventure, who was a student of John of la Rochelle and Alexander of Hales, employed the terms *complacencia* and *displacencia* in discussing the distinctions pertaining to the acts of the will. One of Bonaventure’s ideas was to equate reluctant acts with the acts of *displacencia* and to distinguish these from other acts of the will. Here the terms seem to refer to the feeling aspect of willing (*In II Sententiarum* 41.2.1., concl., ad 1 (*Opera* ii, 949)).¹⁶²

Before analysing the details of John’s classification, let us take a look at some earlier lists of the emotions. The fourfold Stoic classification of the types of emotions (pleasure, distress, desire, fear) was the most commonly used systematization in the twelfth century, known, for example, through the works of Augustine and Boethius.¹⁶³ Through the works of Nemesius of Emesa and John Damascene, twelfth-century authors were also acquainted with a classification in which the basic types were pleasure, distress, fear, and anger. The same typology was used in the medical systematization of

¹⁶² See also S. Kitanov, ‘Bonaventure’s Understanding of *fruitio*’, *Picenum Seraphicum*, 20 (2001), 149.

¹⁶³ In an often-quoted passage from Boethius’ *Consolation of Philosophy*, the Stoic classification of emotions was put in verse; see *Philosophiae consolatio*, ed. L. Bieler, CCSL 94 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1957), 1.7.25–8.

emotions, and was also mentioned in Calcidius' partial translation of Plato's *Timaeus*, which was found in many monastic and episcopal libraries.¹⁶⁴ Nemesius of Emesa and John Damascene also put forward more specific classifications. These were sometimes mentioned, but seldom commented on; some of the terms used in those lists were apparently considered strange.¹⁶⁵ Isaac of Stella added to his modified fourfold classification a longer list of emotion terms which were used in moral and spiritual discussions in his time. The detailed list of the emotions of the concupiscible part involves delight (*laetitia*), hope (*spes*), propensity (*propensio*), titillation (*titillatio*), pleasure (*delectatio*), and affection (*dilectio*). The list of the irascible emotions includes distress (*dolor*), fear (*timor*), zeal (*zelus*), anger (*ira*), indignation (*indignatio*), and hate (*odium*). In Isaac all concupiscible emotions are associated with love (*amor*), and all irascible emotions are associated with hate (*odium*), love and hate being the two basic affective attitudes.¹⁶⁶ As already mentioned, Hugh of St Victor

¹⁶⁴ *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*, ed. J. H. Waszink, Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi, Plato Latinus, 6 (Leiden: Brill; London: Warburg Institute, 1975), 37.5–7. In his commentary on the passage Calcidius mentions titillation (*titillatio*), pleasure (*voluptas*), pain (*dolor*), sadness (*tristitia*), love (*amor*), hope (*spes*), fear (*metus*), anger (*ira*), and, furthermore, more specific emotions related to desire and pain: *aemulatio*, *invidia*, *obtractatio*; emotions related to pleasure: *in alienis malis gaudium*, *iactantia*, *gloriae vanitas*; emotions related to fear: *fuga*, *formido*; and emotions related to anger: *saevitia*, *feritas*, *calor* (216–17).

¹⁶⁵ The terms used in the translations of Nemesius' *De natura hominis* by Alfanus of Salerno (A) and Burgundio of Pisa (B) and in Burgundio of Pisa's translation of the corresponding passage in John Damascene (D) are as follows. Pleasures (*delectationes* A, *voluptates* B, *laetitiae* D) are divided into pleasures of the soul and pleasures of the body. Of bodily pleasures some are natural and necessary, others natural but not necessary, yet others neither natural nor necessary. There are four varieties of distress (*afflictio* A, *tristitia* BD): grief (*achos* ABD or *acedia* B) makes one speechless; anguish (*achthos* AB or *anxietas* B or *accidia* D) oppresses; envy (*invidia* ABD) is a distress over the good fortune of others; and pity (*misericordia* ABD) over the misfortune of others. Fear (*timor* ABD) is divided into six varieties: shrinking (*ocnos/pigritia* A, *desidia* B, *segnities* D) is fear of future action; shyness (*verecundia* A, *erubescencia* BD) is felt in expecting a blame; shame (*turbitudo* A, *verecundia* BD) is fear caused by a shameful act already done; terror (*stupor* A, *kataplexis* B, *percussio* B, *admiracio* D) a fear caused by an enormous impression; consternation (*obumbratio* A, *eclipse* B, *stupor* D) is fear caused by an unaccustomed impression; anxiety (*fatigatio* A, *agonia* BD) is fear of failure. There are three forms of anger (*ira* ABD): wrath (*furor* A, *fel* BD) is an occurrent aggressive act; rancour (*minis* A, *mania* BD) is an inveterate wrath kept alive through the memory; and vindictiveness (*cotos* A, *furor* BD, *cotus* D) is on the watch for an opportunity for revenge. See *Premnon physicon*, ed. Burkhard, chs. 18–21, 97.6–106.12; *De natura hominis*, ed. Verbeke and Moncho, chs. 17–20, 96.69–104.60; *De fide orthodoxa*, ed. Buytaert, chs. 27–30, 119–23. John Damascene's terms for 'fear' are discussed and explained by Guiard of Laon in a theological question from the 1220s, edited in Quinto (1995), 78.166–79.213. John of la Rochelle presented the lists of John Damascene with short comments in the *Summa de anima*. Albert the Great made some comments on the differences between the lists of Nemesius and John Damascene. See also Grosseteste's translations (Chapter I, n. 113) in *De bono*, ed. H. Kühle et al., in *Opera omnia*, xxviii (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951), 3.5.2, 202–6.

¹⁶⁶ *Epistola de anima*, 1878D–1879B; see also *Sermons*, ed. A. Hoste, 1, SC 130 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 17 (318.95–320.119).

presented an influential distinction between the stages of an appetitive motion of the soul. Love (*amor*) is an affective attitude towards an object (*affectio*) and involves a pleasant feeling (*delectatio*). Love becomes desire (*desiderium*) when it moves the subject towards the object and joy (*gaudium*) when the longing finds its fulfilment and the motion turns into rest. This analysis was also quoted in Alcher of Clairvaux's *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40, 813) and became a well-known conceptualization.¹⁶⁷

Let us turn to John of la Rochelle's taxonomy. The concupiscible power is the seat of the acts of enjoying or wanting things found pleasant and of the corresponding contrary acts. The basic states of the concupiscible power are liking and disliking, which alternatively accompany all its motive acts. The contrary pairs are classified as follows: (1) concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) versus (2) disgust (*fastidium*), which are the first orientating acts toward something that is considered good or rejectable; (3) desire (*desiderium*) versus (4) avoidance (*abominatio*), which are more intensive acts than concupiscence and disgust and initiate action; (5) joy (*gaudium*) versus (6) pain (*dolor*), which are felt when one is met with something good or bad; (7) delight (*laetitia*) versus (8) sadness (*tristitia*), which are caused when the actualized pleasant or unpleasant state of affairs will be objects of *usus* or *fruitio* or their opposites; (9) love (*amor*) versus (10) hate (*odium*), which are acts of desiring something good or something bad to somebody else; (11) envy (*invidia*) versus (12) pity (*miser cordia*), of which the former is an act of dislike with respect to another person's prosperity and the latter with respect to another person's troubles (II.107.1–49 (256–9)).

The acts of the concupiscible power are divided into contrary pairs in which one act is associated with liking (*placencia*) and the other with disliking (*displicencia*). The self-regarding acts are ordered in accordance with the model of the stages of movement (initial state, active state, end state) which was suggested by Hugh of St Victor. Thomas Aquinas also used this model in his taxonomy of the concupiscible emotions. John of la Rochelle's classification shows similarities to that of Thomas Aquinas, but the two are not identical. One of the differences is that while Aquinas sees the contrariety of the concupiscible emotions as movements in their being directed toward contrary ends, John of la Rochelle sees the contrariety in the contrary dispositions, like and dislike, which are associated with the motive acts. Consequently, it is not excluded that there may be contrary

¹⁶⁷ For love, desire, and pleasure, see also Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 682.128–683.157.

concupiscible acts with respect to the same evaluation of an object. There can be no dislike with respect to what is actual and regarded as good to oneself and no liking with respect to what is actual and regarded as evil to oneself. Therefore the contrarieties between joy and pain and delight and sadness imply that the evaluations are different. Similarly, there can be no liking of future things which are evil for oneself, but through a surfeit there may be dislike with respect to future things which the evaluative power regards as good for oneself. Therefore the contrarieties between concupiscence and disgust and between desire and avoidance do not imply that the evaluations of the objects are different (II.107 (258); cf. II.76 (209–10)).

The irascible power is directed towards things regarded as arduous and difficult. The basic attitudes of this power are strength and weakness with respect to an object. Of the acts of strength which aim at achieving good things, (1) ambition (*ambitio*) and (2) hope (*spes*) pertain to future honour and excellence, while hope involves a belief that they will be achieved; (3) arrogance (*superbia*) and (4) dominance (*dominatio*) are attempts to strengthen one's social ranking by climbing and by ruling inferiors, and (5) contempt (*contemptus*) by disdaining one's superiors. Of the acts directed towards evil things, (6) courage (*audacia*) is a desire to meet the enemy with the confidence that one is going to win; (7) anger (*ira*) is a desire for revenge; and (8) magnanimity (*magnanimitas*) is insurrection. The corresponding contrary acts which are associated with weakness are (1*) poverty of spirit (*paupertas spiritus*), the opposite of ambition; (2*) desperation (*desperatio*), the opposite of hope; (3–4*) humility (*humiliatio*), the opposite of arrogance and domination; (5*) reverence (*reverentia*), the opposite of contempt. John mentions three further emotions which represent various forms of the flight from evil and are somehow opposites of courage: penitence (*paenitentia*) toward past evil things, impatience (*impatientia*) with present evil things, and fear (*timor*) of future evil things (II.107.50–91 (259–61)).¹⁶⁸

John of la Rochelle simplifies Avicenna's theory in treating all emotions as acts of the motive powers which are accompanied by bodily changes. Subsequently the sensitive emotions were commonly discussed as appetitive acts and described from the point of view of the behavioural changes induced by them. It is possible that John tried to combine the feeling

¹⁶⁸ For an extensive, roughly contemporary list of concupiscible and irascible passions without further classificatory principles, see also William of Auvergne's *De virtutibus*, in *Opera omnia*, i (Orléansi and Paris, 1674), chs. 16–18.

aspect and the motive aspect in his taxonomy, but he concentrated on the motive component, and the same was done in many thirteenth-century theories of this kind.

3.7 Emotions in Albert the Great

In the 1240s philosophical psychology received new impulses from the commentaries and questions on Aristotle's *De anima*. Among the first commentaries are Peter of Spain's commentary on books 1 and 2 (up to 415b27–8, c.1240)¹⁶⁹ and three anonymous commentaries, one of them attributed to Peter of Spain by its editor but commonly regarded as anonymous,¹⁷⁰ one on books 1 and 2,¹⁷¹ and one on books 2 and 3.¹⁷² Averroës's commentary on *De anima* was increasingly studied at the same time.¹⁷³ New psychological questions were brought into the scope of attention through these works, but there was no sharp break with earlier approaches. The first commentators on Aristotle's *De anima* continued to employ the Avicennian doctrine of the faculties of the soul, and they adopted his dualistic conception of the soul as a form and as an individual substance.¹⁷⁴

Albert the Great (c.1200–c.1280) was a central figure in the rise of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century. He dealt with the emotions in many places by combining various sources in a somewhat eclectic manner.¹⁷⁵ In his treatise *De homine* Albert describes the apprehensive and motive powers of the sensitive soul by referring to views in Nemesius

¹⁶⁹ Peter of Spain, *Obras Filosóficas II: Comentario al 'De anima' de Aristóteles*, ed. M. Alonso, Instituto de Filosofía Luis Vives, serie A, no. 3 (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofía Luis Vives, 1944).

¹⁷⁰ Peter of Spain, *Obras Filosóficas III: expositio libri De anima*, ed. M. Alonso, Instituto de Filosofía Luis Vives, serie A, no. 4 (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofía Luis Vives, 1952). Rega Wood attributes this to Richard Rufus in 'Richard Rufus' *De anima* Commentary: The Earliest Known, Surviving, Western *De anima* Commentary', *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, 10 (2001), 119–56.

¹⁷¹ *Anonymi Magistri Artium (c. 1245–1250), Lectura in librum De anima*, ed. R. A. Gauthier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 24 (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1985).

¹⁷² *Anonymi Magistri Artium (1246–1247), Sententia super II and III De anima*, ed. B. C. Bazán, *Philosophes médiévaux*, 37 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie; Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 1998).

¹⁷³ *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, ed. F. S. Crawford, *Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem Versionum Latinarum VI.1* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953).

¹⁷⁴ See the editor's introduction to *Sententia super II and III De anima* (n. 172 above).

¹⁷⁵ For a partially outdated analysis of Albert's psychology, see A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen I–II*, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 4. 5–6 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1903–6).

of Emesa's *De natura hominis* (which he mistakenly attributes to Gregory of Nyssa), John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*, Avicenna's *De anima*, Aristotle's *De anima*, and some other sources. In dealing with the concupiscible and irascible powers, Albert puts forward traditional ideas with the qualifications found in John of la Rochelle's works and in some earlier treatises: emotions are acts of the sensitive motive powers which are actualized by the estimative faculty; the concupiscible power reacts to pleasurable and painful things, and the irascible power to arduous desirable and harmful things.¹⁷⁶ In *De bono* there is a longer discussion of the classification of the emotions and an evaluation of them from a moral point of view. Albert mainly follows the taxonomy in Nemesius of Emesa and its paraphrase in John Damascene, and comments on some details of this classification.¹⁷⁷ A question that Albert found particularly interesting pertains to the ontological nature of emotions as categorical passions. Let us have a look at Albert's discussion of this theme.

In chapter 8 of his *Categories* Aristotle states that the third class of quality involves passible qualities and passions and, furthermore, that there are passible qualities of the soul, such as madness, irascibility, and other permanent emotions, and quickly subsiding conditions, such as occurrent anger, which are called passions but are not qualities. Ancient commentators thought it confusing that Aristotle first says that the passions are qualities and then that the passions of the soul are not qualities. These queries were known to early medieval authors through Boethius' commentary on the *Categories*. He did not manage to explain the problematic title of the third class of quality. However, he stated that occurrent passions of the soul are not called qualities, and some authors took this to mean that they are qualities but are not called so.¹⁷⁸ Albert the Great

¹⁷⁶ *Summae de creaturis secunda pars, quae est de homine*, ed. A. Borgnet, in *Opera omnia*, xxxv (Paris: Vivès, 1896), qq. 66–7 (553–8). For Albert's views of physiological and medical aspects of sensitive acts, see P. Theiss, *Die Wahrnehmungspsychologie und Sinnespsychologie des Albertus Magnus*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe III: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften, 735 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997).

¹⁷⁷ Albert states that Nemesius' division of distress is based on a distinction between the objects and effects of distress, while the division of fear is drawn by distinguishing between the types of objects. Terminological differences in Nemesius and John Damascene are regarded as insignificant. Boethius' (Stoic) fourfold classification is said to be based on a distinction between the types of affecting causes; it does not involve anger, which is not a simple emotion (3.5.2 (204.81–90; 205.10–82; 206.4–60)).

¹⁷⁸ Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, PL 64, 245D–250C; S. Ebbesen, 'Anonymous D'Orvillensis' Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin, Université de Copenhague*, 70 (1999), 357–62. See also Knuutila (2003) 261–4.

followed this interpretation,¹⁷⁹ but he was particularly bothered by the question of what was meant when the passions were called the movements of the soul. Albert's answer in *De bono* is somewhat confusing. He first states that passions are qualities (3.5.1 (196.28–9)), then that they are movements by which the appetitive powers are actualized (196.42–4), and then that in truth they are not movements but qualities which are generated by movements (197.5–10). The last alternative is his official view (cf. 3.5.3 (208.37–41, 91–5)). In explaining this, Albert refers to the anonymous *Liber de sex principiis* which he and other medieval authors after him mistakenly attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers.

In his commentary on the *Liber de sex principiis* Albert defines the categories of action and passion and their relationship to movement as follows. Action is the agent's causation of change or movement, and passion is the reception of it. In so far as a movement is treated from the point of view of the category of action, it is an expression of the potency of an agent, and can be called the perfect act and the act of something perfect. When a movement is treated from the point of view of the category of passion, it is a subject's proceeding to an end under the influence of an agent, and can be called the imperfect act and the act of something imperfect. Action and passion are the two categories in accordance with which a subject can be related to a movement, either as an agent or as a patient. While being in movement and being at rest are qualities of a subject, a singular movement belongs to the same category as its term.¹⁸⁰

Albert then proceeds to explain the nature of the emotions which are mentioned in the fourfold Stoic classification. If a future object is considered as good, and the sensitive motive power reacts to it, there will be a new appetitive state, which is called hope. It belongs to the category of passion, since it is caused by an evaluating act, but it also belongs to the category of action, since it makes the heart dilate and the spirit diffuse and, furthermore, gives rise to an attempt to reach the goal. Similarly, an evaluation of a present object as good causes a passion of joy, which in its turn intensifies the dilation of the heart and the diffusion of the spirit and initiates enjoying. The same analysis is applied to distress and fear, which are caused by negative evaluations and which cause the contraction of the

¹⁷⁹ Albert the Great, *Liber de Praedicamentis*, ed. A. Borgnet, in *Opera omnia*, i (Paris: Vivès 1890), 255–8; see also William Ockham, *Expositio in Librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, ed. G. Gál, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica*, ii (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1978), 14.8 (279–81).

¹⁸⁰ *Liber de sex principiis*, ed. A. Borgnet, in *Opera omnia*, i (Paris: Vivès, 1890), 2.1 (320–1); 2.5 (326–7); 3.1 (331–2).

heart and the withdrawal of the spirit and initiate mourning or flight (3.1–2 (331–3)).

Albert treated occurrent emotions as actualizations of the concupiscible and the irascible powers of the sensitive soul. They are short-term emotional qualities caused and kept actual by the simultaneous agency of the estimative faculty. When the cognitive cause ceases to exist, the corresponding emotional quality vanishes. Emotions are passions, in being causally dependent qualities, and actions, in being motive acts. People are inclined to call them movements, since they are generated by alterations and give rise to bodily changes (*De bono* 3.5.1 (196.27–32, 42–53); 3.5.3 (208.31–41, 91–3)). In describing the passions as motive acts Albert refers to cardiac and spiritual changes and to external behavioural changes. This is in agreement with John of la Rochelle's interpretation of Avicenna's view, according to which concupiscible and irascible acts as commanding moving acts initiate external changes and as affecting acts give rise to changes of heart and spirit.¹⁸¹

3.8 Aquinas on Emotions

Thomas Aquinas was a student of Albert the Great and, like Albert, treated emotions from the point of view of thirteenth-century faculty psychology. Emotions are acts of the sensitive motive powers caused by external objects through the evaluations of the estimative power and necessarily accompanied by movements of the heart and the spirits. The human estimative power is called the 'cogitative power', or 'particular reason'. It makes particular judgements about things and can relate them to general value judgements of the intellect. This is how the intellect can control the concupiscible and irascible powers, which are analogous to the motive powers of animals. Aquinas discusses the emotions in many works. In *Summa theologiae* I.78.4 and I.80–1 there is a summary of the nature of the sensitive faculties. *Summa theologiae* II-1.22–48 involves a detailed theory of the emotions, the most extensive medieval treatise on the subject.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ The first Latin commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which discussed the doctrine of *akrasia* in Book 7 were Albert's first commentary (1248–53) and his second commentary (c.1263–7). For Albert's view of *akrasia* and the control of emotions, see Saarinen (1994), 94–118.

¹⁸² For recent works on Aquinas's theory of the emotions, see M. D. Jordan, 'Aquinas's Construction of a Moral Account for the Passions', *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 33 (1986), 71–97; C. Marmo, 'Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari... Egidio Romano e Tommaso d'Aquino sulle passioni dell'anima', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 2.1 (1991), 281–315; P. King, 'Aquinas on the Passions', in MacDonal and Stump (1998), 101–32; Murphy (1999).

A crucial difference between the philosophical psychology of Thomas Aquinas and that of his Latin predecessors was that Aquinas gave up the view of the soul as an immaterial individual substance which was commonly adopted by the masters of arts and theology at the University of Paris during the first half of the thirteenth century. Its most popular version was Avicenna's eclectic dualism. Averroës defended Aristotle's view of the soul as the substantial form of the body, and this is what Thomas Aquinas also did, though his view of the soul as a form was dissimilar to what Averroës taught.¹⁸³

In the prologue to question 6 of the *Summa theologiae* II-1 Thomas Aquinas states that after having dealt with the ultimate goal of human life (questions 1–5), he next considers the acts which are relevant for reaching that goal; first those acts which are exclusively human (6–21), and then those which are common to human beings and animals (22–48). These latter acts he calls 'the passions of the soul' (*passiones animae*).¹⁸⁴ Questions 22–5 deal with the passions of the soul in general: their seat, their classification, their mutual relationship, and their moral value. In answering the question of their seat (question 22), Aquinas takes it for granted that there are intellectual activities of higher cognitive and appetitive faculties and corresponding sensitive activities that take place through lower cognitive and appetitive faculties, the latter being divided into the concupiscible and irascible powers. (See also *ST* I.81.) This was the standard mid-thirteenth century view, the emotions being regarded as reactions of two sensitive motive powers activated by the sensitive estimative power.¹⁸⁵

In *Summa theologiae* II-1.22 Aquinas explains why the expression 'the passions of the soul' most properly refers to sensitive appetitive acts. It

¹⁸³ See B. C. Bazán, 'The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 64 (1997), 95–126.

¹⁸⁴ This expression is rendered as 'emotions' in the Blackfriars translation: *Summa theologiae*, 19, *The Emotions* (1a2ae 22–30), trans. with introduction and notes by E. D'Arcy (London: Blackfriars in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); *Summa theologiae*, 20, *Pleasure* (1a2ae 31–9), trans. with introduction and notes by E. D'Arcy (London: Blackfriars in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), *Summa theologiae*, 21, *Fear and Anger* (1a2ae 40–8); trans. with introduction and notes by J. P. Reid (London: Blackfriars in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

¹⁸⁵ Aquinas often refers to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics* and to various works of Augustine in dealing with particular passions. There are also some references to Nemesius of Emesa's discussion of emotions and its paraphrase by John Damascene, as well as to Pseudo-Dionysius, who was regarded as an important theological author in Aquinas's times. In addition there are references to Aristotle's works on natural philosophy and to works by Avicenna, Cicero, Boethius, Gregory the Great, and some others. See Jordan (1986).

does not suffice to say that these acts are externally caused, for even the acts of thinking and understanding are passions in this sense. A stricter use of the term 'passion' implies that the subject which is acted upon receives something, so that it simultaneously loses something that previously belonged to it. The passions of this kind must have a material subject, but they can indirectly belong to the soul by belonging to the soul-body composite. All acts of the sensitive faculties involve some modification of their organs, but while the changes which accompany the acts of the cognitive faculties may be merely spiritual and unperceivable, the acts of the appetitive faculty are associated with genuine physical changes, such as the increase or decrease in the heart rate and the enlargement or contraction of the heart. Consequently, the psychological episodes most properly called passions are the appetitive acts of the sensitive soul (22.2, ad 3; 24.2, ad 2).¹⁸⁶ Because of their necessary link with physical changes, the sensitive passions are essentially psychosomatic. Aquinas describes the physiological aspect of emotions as follows:

In the passions of the soul, the movement of the appetitive potency is like the formal element, and the material element is a bodily change, where one is proportionate to the other; accordingly, the appetitive movement is accompanied by a bodily change which resembles it and conforms to its nature. (*ST* II-1.44.1; cf. 37.4)

The relationship between the formal element (appetitive act) and the material element (physiological modification) is described as follows:

Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul naturally produces a bodily transformation. There is no parallel between this case and those spiritual intentions which are not naturally ordered to move other bodies which are not naturally movable by the soul. (*ST* II-1.37.4, ad 1)

In regarding the presence of an affective intention in the soul as the efficient cause of bodily affections, Aquinas follows the Avicennian view: the sensitive passions are necessarily accompanied by bodily changes, but the physical changes are not among the primary causes of the motive acts, as some early thirteenth-century authors maintained.

¹⁸⁶ A spiritual change, as distinct from a natural change, does not cause any perceptible physical change in the organ. When one sees something red, the eye does not become red, but it receives 'the intention of the sensible form' which exists in a spiritual manner in the organ and activates the power of seeing (*ST* I.78.3). For the conception of spiritual change in earlier commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, see the references in the anonymous work edited by Bazán (n. 172 above), 142, 252–3, 451.

The will is an immaterial intellectual appetitive faculty, and its acts are sharply distinguished from emotional passions. According to Aquinas, the names of emotions are sometimes applied to God and the angels, but since they are immaterial, their mental acts are not emotions (*ST* 22.3, ad 3; 24.3, ad 2). Furthermore, the emotions of the soul are motive acts actualized by the particular judgements of the cogitative power, while the cognitive causes of the acts of the will involve universal judgements of the intellect:

Now the sensitive appetite does not attend to the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good, for the concupiscible power attends to the notion of good which is proper to it, something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature, whereas the irascible attends to the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will attends to good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers so that there would be a concupiscible power and an irascible power in the intellectual appetite. (*ST* I.82.5)¹⁸⁷

After having explained the nature of emotions as passions, Aquinas argues that they can be divided into eleven different types. He thought that since the emotions as appetitive acts are directed toward an object or away from an object, one can define the types of emotions by explicating the formal features of the objects of appetitive acts:

The passions of the irascible and concupiscible faculty differ in species. Since different faculties have different objects, as we have stated [*ST* I.77.3], the passions of different faculties must have different objects. A fortiori then, the passions of different faculties must differ in species, for it takes a greater difference of object to say that faculties are distinct than to say it of passions or actions . . . the actions of different faculties will differ in genus, not just in species, whereas actions and passions with different specific objects which are involved in the common object of one faculty are like different species within the same genus. (*ST* II-1.23.1)

Emotions receive their genus, species, and subspecies from their formal objects (*ST* II-1.30.2). Their formal objects are related to them as the forms of natural and artificial things are related to those things (43.1). The formal object of the concupiscible faculty is sense-good or

¹⁸⁷ See also Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri De anima*, ed. R. A. Gauthier, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino doctoris angelici Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, 45.1 (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1984), 3.8.120–53.

sense-evil—that is, the pleasurable or the painful—and the formal object of the irascible faculty is sense-good or sense-evil as being arduous—its acquisition or avoidance involves some kind of difficulty or struggle. These are general characteristics of objects with respect to which adhesive or aversive acts take place. Since the objects of sensitive moving faculties are their activators (through cognition, 27.2), the modes of emotional movements can serve as further qualifications of the formal objects (23.4).

The general structure of Aquinas's taxonomy of emotions was not original. John of la Rochelle's more extensive classification included all those emotions occurring in Aquinas's list, and was also organized by distinguishing between the contrary acts with respect to good and evil or arduously good and evil. Aquinas does not refer to John of la Rochelle's *Summa de anima*, although he was probably familiar with it—the structure of Aquinas's *Questions on the Soul* (1266–7) follows that work.¹⁸⁸ Aquinas's innovative ideas pertain to the principles of classification rather than to its items. For one thing, he stresses that any act of the irascible faculty presupposes an act of the concupiscible faculty. The former acts are called for when an obstacle supervenes in pursuit of what is sensibly agreeable or in avoiding what is disagreeable or, as in the case of anger, when one encounters something evil and hopes for revenge. Even though the question of the relationship between concupiscible and irascible emotions was not original, Aquinas treats it more systematically than did his predecessors. Furthermore, he thought that the contrariety among the emotions and the order of their occurrence were not satisfactorily analysed in earlier approaches. Aquinas tried to resolve these questions by referring to theories about natural movements in Aristotle's *Physics*. He apparently believed that the systematic use of the principles of natural philosophy made his taxonomy of the emotions more scientific than those of his predecessors. This is the most idiosyncratic part of Aquinas's theory of emotions.

As for the contrariety of emotions, Aquinas states that since an emotion is a kind of movement, the criteria for contrasting two emotions will be the same as those for contrasting two movements or changes which Aristotle put forward in his *Physics* (5.5). The first contrariety is between an access to a term and a recess from the same term. This pertains primarily to the contrariety between generation and corruption, coming into being and going out of being. The second contrariety is based on the contrariety of the terms and pertains to processes; thus bleaching,

¹⁸⁸ Bazán (1997), 96.

the movement from black to white, is the contrary of blackening, the movement from white to black. In applying this distinction to the passions of the soul, Aquinas first states that there is no movement of the soul away from the sense-good without qualification, and similarly no movement towards the sense-evil without qualification. Consequently, all concupiscible emotions with respect to a good object are movements toward that object, and those with respect to an evil object are movements away from that object. There are no mutually contrary concupiscible emotions with respect to the same kind of object. Their contrariety must be of the second type (23.2). Aquinas's example of bleaching and blackening suggests that contrary movements are movements towards opposite ends. This is what Aristotle had in mind, but Aquinas could not put it in that way, because avoiding future evil is not directed towards an evil object but away from it. He says more generally that the contrariety between concupiscible emotions is based on their being reactions to contrary objects.

Some of the irascible emotions are mutually contrary in the way concupiscible emotions are—that is, as contrary reactions to contrary objects, for example, hope and fear—but it is taxonomically more important that they may be mutually contrary reactions with respect to objects of the same kind. Hope and despair are contraries with respect to an arduous good object, and fear and confidence with respect to an evil object that is difficult to avoid. These are emotions with respect to future objects. There is no such thing as pleasure or joy with respect to an agreeable object as arduous, because a good which is already possessed is no longer arduous. When the appetitive faculty capitulates with respect to an evil, its act is that of distress, which belongs to the concupiscible faculty, but if there is in addition a desire to attack the cause of suffering, the act is anger. It is the fifth type of irascible emotion and has no contrary (23.2–3).

The acts of the irascible power are thus divided into five kinds of emotions by combining the classification of their objects into future good and future evil with the classification of the directions of reactions (to and from) and by adding anger as a special case which, as distinct from the others, presupposes a concupiscible emotion with a present object. The acts of the concupiscible faculty cannot be divided in this way, since it cannot elicit contrary movements with respect to objects evaluated as good or bad. In treating them, Aquinas sketches a model of the stages of the natural movements of the elements. Following Aristotle, he states that the elements are inclined to move towards their natural places. A physical object has this tendency as an essential concomitant of its form. If an

element is outside its natural place and there is no external hindrance, it will move towards its place and come to rest upon reaching it:

Now every mover either attracts the patient in some manner or repels it. In the case of attraction it does three things in the patient. First, it produces an inclination or a tendency to move towards it. Thus a light body which is up will communicate lightness to a generated body through which it has an inclination or tendency to be up. Second, if the generated body is outside its proper place, this will make it move toward that place. Third, when it reaches that place, it will make it rest there. (23.4)¹⁸⁹

The six types of concupiscible emotions are distinguished with the help of this model as follows:

In the movements of the appetitive part, a good thing plays as it were the part of the attracting power and an evil thing the part of a repelling power. The good thing first produces in the appetitive power a kind of inclination or tendency or affinity towards the good thing. This pertains to the passion of love, and the corresponding contrary passion, which is caused by an evil thing, is hatred. Second, if the good thing is not yet possessed, it sets up in the appetitive power a movement towards attaining the good which is loved. This pertains to the passion of desire or concupiscence, and the corresponding contrary passion, which is caused by an evil thing, is aversion or abomination. Third, once the good thing is possessed, it makes the appetite rest in its possession. This pertains to pleasure or joy, and the corresponding contrary passion, which is caused by an evil thing, is pain or sadness. (23.4)

Aquinas states that the term 'pleasure' (*delectatio*) is applicable to the passions of human beings and animals, while the term 'joy' (*gaudium*) refers to pleasures which presuppose the use of reason.¹⁹⁰ The term 'pain' (*dolor*) can be used as a common term having as its subclasses pains caused by exterior perception and pains caused by interior perception by intellect or imagination, to which the term 'sadness' (*tristitia*) refers (35.2).

In the concupiscible faculty there are three pairs of contrary emotions corresponding to the three stages of the natural movements of inanimate things: (1) *amor* and (2) *odium* are the contrary basic orientations with respect to sense-good and sense-evil; (3) *desiderium* and (4) *fuga* are the corresponding movements towards and away; and (5) *delectatio/gaudium* and (6) *dolor/tristitia* are the emotions associated with encountering the

¹⁸⁹ For similar formulations of the physical model, see 23.4, 25.2, 25.3, 26.2.

¹⁹⁰ ST II-1.31.3. This was a traditional view; cf. Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis*, trans. Burgundio of Pisa 17 (98.20–2).

things desired or avoided. An occurrent irascible emotion presupposes a concupiscible emotion. If a desired object is arduous, it can activate the irascible appetite, and its reaction is either (7) *spes* or (8) *desperatio*. If a disagreeable object is arduously avoided, it gives rise to either (9) *timor* or (10) *audacia*. A present evil thing which already causes distress may give rise to (11) *ira*.¹⁹¹

After having classified the emotions into contrary pairs (with the exception of anger), Aquinas arranges them on the basis of their order of occurrence. First come love and hatred, since a positive or negative attitude towards an object is a pre-condition of any further affective involvement. Second come desire and aversion, third hope and despair, fourth fear and confidence, fifth anger, and sixth joy or sadness (25.3). If one were dealing with the emotions of the concupiscible part, then the last group would be the third one. There are no problems with the first and second level, provided that Aquinas's distinction between the inclination and the actual movement is regarded as an illuminating analogue of the distinction between love and desire.

When Aquinas deals with emotions of the third and fourth levels he states that hope, which is preceded by desire, precedes confidence, and that fear, which is preceded by aversion, precedes despair. Hope is a strengthener of desire; it is aroused by the arduous aspect of a desirable object. Similarly, fear is a concomitant of aversion which is intensified by the difficulty of avoiding the evil. There is something evil in the object of hope as arduous, and this is why confidence, which is a reaction against evil, is activated by an intense hope. Similarly, one is said to despair because of being afraid of the difficulty surrounding the good which is hoped for (25.1, 45.2). Because of these remarks, the third pair of the list of 25.3 should be hope and fear, and the fourth pair should be despair and confidence. The confusion is probably caused by the fact that Aquinas argues in the same article that the irascible emotions whose formal object is good—namely, hope and despair—have natural precedence over those whose object is evil—namely, confidence and fear. But the list is said to be about the order of occurrence, not about natural precedence. One could also ask why anger precedes joy and sadness, for Aquinas regarded pain or sadness as a cause of anger.

Aquinas was impressed by the idea that treating occurrent emotions as movements made it possible to systematize them with the help of the same principles which applied to the natural motions of inanimate things. Since

¹⁹¹ For the development of Aquinas's taxonomical views, see Marmo (1991).

these principles could be given a teleological interpretation, Aquinas believed that one can find the same teleological structure in the acts of animals. The basic teleological assumption in Aquinas's natural philosophy is the idea of an optimal actualization of natural potencies.¹⁹² As for inanimate beings, his standard example is the potential of the elements to move to their natural places. Remaining in its natural place constitutes the optimal being of a stone. It has an affinity (*connaturalitas*) with its natural place, and if it is elsewhere, it tends to move downwards. The affinity is called its 'natural love', and the movement exemplifies its 'natural appetite'. When it has reached its natural place, it remains there.¹⁹³ Aquinas states that inanimate things have an appetite for things which accord with their nature, not through their own apprehension of these beings, but through God's providential plan.¹⁹⁴ The tendency toward optimal actuality is realized in a different manner in animals, which are provided with cognitive and appetitive faculties.¹⁹⁵ Natural concupiscible passions initiate activities that serve the preservation of the species and their individual members (*ST* II-1.30.3; 31.6). The teleological functions of the irascible emotions are described as follows:

Animals have been endowed with the irascible power to enable them to deal with the obstacles which hinder the concupiscible power from attaining its end, either because some good proves difficult to obtain or some evil difficult to avoid. So it is that all irascible emotions terminate in concupiscible emotions. (II-1.23.1, ad 1)

Even though some of the basic functions of animals are guided by their appetitive faculties, they do not react to their objects as useful or obstructive to their well-being. Following Avicenna, Aquinas thought that the cognitive cause of an emotional response is an act of a cognitive power.

¹⁹² See the formulation of the so called fifth way in *ST* I.2.3; cf. *Summa contra gentiles*, ed. C. Pera, P. Marc, and P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1961–7), I.13.

¹⁹³ *ST* II-1.26.1–2. Aquinas writes: 'A natural agent causes a two-fold effect in the patient: first it gives a form and then a movement resulting from that form, for instance, that which brings a body into existence gives it both weight and the movement that results from weight. This weight which is the principle of the movement towards a natural place because of weight, may be called a natural love. Similarly a desirable object first produces a certain attraction for it in the appetite, a complacency with the desirable object (*complacentia appetibilis*). This gives rise to a movement towards the desirable object' (26.2).

¹⁹⁴ *ST* II-1.26.1c, 27.2, ad 3; cf. I.6.1, ad 2.

¹⁹⁵ 'Natural things desire the things that accord with their nature, not through their own apprehension of them but through the apprehension by the author of their nature, as we have shown in the first book. A second sort of appetite does follow apprehension by its own subject, but as a matter of necessity, not from free choice. The sensitive appetite in dumb animals is like this. In human beings there is something of freedom about it, to the extent that it is subject to rational control. Further, there is the appetite which arises both through apprehension and free judgement. This is the rational or intellectual appetite, commonly called the will' (II-1.26.1).

The content of this act is an emotional evaluation of a thing. This cognitive power is different in human beings and animals. Animals instinctually react to things differently, depending on whether they are teleologically useful or harmful. This is how the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it to be a thing to be shunned, and the bird, seeing straws which are fit for nest-building, judges them to be pursuable. Like Avicenna, Aquinas calls the emotionally relevant non-perceptive properties the intentions of things. In human beings the corresponding faculty is the cogitative power. It is an acquired ability and its evaluations can be controlled by the higher intellectual power:

It should be noted that there is no difference as regards sensible forms between human beings and other animals, for they are similarly transmuted by exterior sense objects. But there is a difference as regards the aforementioned intentions, for other animals perceive intentions of this sort only by a kind of natural instinct, whereas human beings do so through a kind of consideration. And so the power that is called the natural estimative in other animals is called the cogitative (*cogitativa*) in human beings. It discloses intentions of this sort through a kind of consideration. Accordingly, it is also called particular reason (*ratio particularis*). Physicians assign a determinate organ for this, namely, the middle part of the head, for it considers individual intentions just as intellective reason considers universal intentions. (*ST* I.78.4)¹⁹⁶

Aquinas's view of the sensitive cognitive powers is similar to that of Avicenna, but he drops Avicenna's imaginative power, which was called the cogitative power in humans in the Latin translation of Avicenna's *De anima*. Aquinas adds the functions of this power to those of imagination and calls Avicenna's estimative power 'the cogitative power'. As distinct from his predecessors, Aquinas stresses the reasoning ability of the cogitative power.¹⁹⁷ While Avicenna thought that animals grasp the emotionally relevant intentions of things by instinct or through experience, a view put forward also by John of la Rochelle (*Summa de anima* II.101), Aquinas states in the text quoted above and in many other places that the emotional evaluations of animals are instinctual. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Aquinas admits that animals can learn through experience up to a point.¹⁹⁸

In treating the emotions as movements, Aquinas chose a position which was criticized by Albert the Great. The latter argued that the emotions are

¹⁹⁶ See also *Quaestio disputata de anima*, q. 13.

¹⁹⁷ Relevant texts are discussed and translated in Klubertanz (1952).

¹⁹⁸ *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1977), I.1.15.

primarily qualities, not movements. One obvious problem of the movement terminology is that of the stages of natural processes (inclination, movement, rest) the first precedes a temporal process and the third follows it. Only the middle part seems to be a movement.¹⁹⁹ Aquinas was aware of this objection. He states that there are two sorts of movement in the appetitive faculty. One is the actualization of something existing in potentiality; this is movement as a temporal process as defined in the *Physics* (3.1). Another kind of movement is an act of what is not potential but actual. It is not essentially successive and is said to be a movement because it is an act of a potency which is kept actual through an activator. Pleasure is said to be a movement of this kind (31.1, ad 2).²⁰⁰ Aquinas's comments on the nature of emotional passions as movements remained somewhat sketchy—he apparently thought that the problems associated with the details of his conception were less important than its systematic weight.

Let us return to Aquinas's examples of the similarities between the movements of the soul and the movements of inanimate things. In the three-stage model, the second phase is a continuous movement to one's natural place. Aquinas sometimes describes desire, which corresponds to this second phase, as a movement toward a pleasurable object and sometimes as a movement of the appetite toward a pleasurable object. This terminological vacillation is a sign of some problems in Aquinas's approach. An example of the first formulation runs as follows:

It is clear that everything which is bent upon a goal first has a tendency or proportion to the goal, for nothing bends to a goal which is not proportionate; second, it moves towards the goal; third, it comes to rest in the goal once it has been attained. This tendency or proportion of the appetite to a good thing is love, for love is precisely the complacency with some good, the movement towards the good is desire or concupiscence, and the rest in it is joy or pleasure. (*ST II-1.25.2c*)

¹⁹⁹ Giles of Rome, who accepted the main lines of Aquinas's taxonomy with some changes, found problems of this kind in Aquinas's use of the term 'movement'. See *Expositio super libros Rhetoricorum Aristotelis* (Venice, 1515), 49vb; Marmo (1991), 296–301.

²⁰⁰ Referring to Aristotle's *De anima* (3.7, 431a6), Aquinas writes that there are two senses of movement: 'First, it can mean the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such; in this sense movement involves succession and takes place in time. Second, it can mean the act of something perfect, i.e. of something actually existing, e.g. thinking, sensing, willing, and the like, and also having pleasure. Such movement does not involve succession and does not in itself take time' (*ST II-1.31.2, ad 1*). See also *Sencentia libri De anima*, 3.6, 229–30. For a similar formulation, cf. Pseudo-Peter of Spain, *Expositio libri De anima* 346.19–25.

The second formulation (*motus appetitus in bonum*) is found in many places, one of them running as follows:

Thus the pleasurable, by attuning the appetite to itself in a way and making it conform, causes love; by attracting it to itself when absent, causes desire, and by bringing it to rest in it when present, causes pleasure. Desire therefore constitutes a species of emotion distinct from love and from pleasure. (ST II-1.30.2c; cf. 23.4)

In these texts the positive concupiscible emotions are described with the help of the physical model which Aquinas apparently associated with a pattern of emotional behaviour of the following type: a cat sees that there is milk in its dish, becomes attentive, walks towards its dish, laps up the milk, and then lies with satisfaction. This could be characterized as a sequence of acts caused by love, desire, and pleasure. The paradigm can be changed by adding something that makes it difficult to reach the milk and the acts corresponding to the emotions of hope or despair. A similar episode caused by acts of hate, abomination, and distress is easily imagined as well as its modifications by the acts caused by fear, confidence, and anger.

The problem with these examples is that they refer to behavioural changes, which are caused by the emotions, rather than to the appetitive acts, which are emotions proper. Aquinas himself drew this distinction, but it did not prevent him from vacillating between speaking about desire as a movement of an agent toward a pleasurable object and speaking of it as a movement of the appetite toward a pleasurable object. Equating desire with a movement which is caused by desire is confusing, but neither is the alternative conception of the movement of the appetitive faculty without problems. Aquinas mainly speaks about the emotions as acts of the appetite, but according to his theoretical view, these acts are the formal element of the emotions. Their material part consists of bodily changes, such as the movements of the heart, the spirits, and the humours (II-1.28.5; 44.1). Aquinas's remarks on this matter are based on traditional medical views. He also thought that inner physical changes can be regarded as initial stages of the behavioural movements which are caused by the appetitive acts:

But in those who are frightened an increasing frigidity results in the transfer of spirits from higher to lower regions. The frigidity itself is produced by an imagination of one's failing strength. Heat and spirits are not concentrated in the area of the heart but rather deflected therefrom. This is why those who are afraid draw back rather than press forward. (II-1.44.1, ad 2)²⁰¹

²⁰¹ This is part of a comment on Pseudo-Aristotle's *Problems* 27.3.

Why did Aquinas not include behavioural acts in the material part of the emotional passions, since they seem to be actual as long as the formal elements are actual? One obvious reason is that an emotion can be actual even though the external movements are prevented. All emotions involve internal physical movements, but Aquinas did not refer to them in explaining why emotions are movements. He thought that the acts of the appetitive faculties themselves should be treated as stages of goal-directed movements, some as successive and some not essentially successive. What these movements are, remains unclear; the only suggestion pertaining to desire is that it is an attitude with a varying intensity.

Even though the reactions of the concupiscible faculty are teleologically purposeful, they are caused not by evaluating their objects as useful or harmful but as pleasurable or painful. In the three-stage model this is expressed by calling the first stage of the natural movement of inanimate things inclination (*inclinatio*) or affinity (*connaturalitas*) or tendency (*aptitudo*), and the corresponding act of the appetitive faculty complacency (*complacentia*) (23.4; 25.2; 26.1–2). In John of la Rochelle the terms *placencia* and *displacencia* are the generic names of opposing concupiscible emotions: these may connote a feeling about an object in John of la Rochelle and in Aquinas's application of them to the movements of conscious beings.

There is no systematic discussion of the feeling aspect of the emotions in Aquinas, but his comments on pleasure and distress shed some light on his view. In *ST II-1.41.3* Aquinas asks whether any fear is natural. He states that some movements are called 'natural', because they are based on a natural inclination. These are of two kinds. The first is completed by nature without any apprehension being involved. The second is completed only through apprehension. He continues:

In the first sense of the term 'natural' some passions are sometimes said to be natural—such as love, desire, and hope, but others cannot be so designated, because love and hatred and desire and aversion involve an inclination to pursue the good and avoid the evil and this sort of inclination is also found in a natural appetite. Thus there is a natural love and we may even speak of desire and hope in natural things lacking cognitive power. But the other passions involve movements for which a natural inclination is altogether insufficient. First, the nature of these passions may entail perception or cognition. We have stated that pleasure and pain naturally require apprehension. Those who lack it cannot be said to experience pleasure or pain. Second, movements of this kind may be contrary to a natural inclination.

Aquinas refers to previous places in which he has stated that two things are needed for pleasure: attaining something good and being aware that one has attained it (II-1.31.1; 32.3; 32.5; 35.1). He is not interested merely in the cognition which precedes all appetitive acts, since this does not prevent one from treating the movements of inanimate things as analogous to the movements led by the animal soul. Instead, he assumes that there is a specific perception which is included in pleasure and distress and makes these incomparable with the movements of inanimate things. As appetitive acts pleasure and distress initiate behavioural changes, but they are also associated with an awareness of the presence of something agreeable or disagreeable. When inanimate things come to be established in a condition which is in harmony with their nature, they do not perceive it. Animals perceive it, and this perception apparently involves the feeling aspect of pleasure.

Aristotle spoke about a pleasant feeling either as a pleasant awareness of oneself in various agreeable situations or as a pleasant experience associated with unimpeded activities in accordance with one's abilities and ends. In Aquinas's text quoted above, the perception as an aspect of the passion of pleasure apparently involves a perception of oneself as obtaining what one desires. Aquinas also mentions that since anticipating this may be pleasant, love and desire may be accompanied by pleasant feelings (33.1, ad 2). The inconvenience of the object which is hated is perceived more sensitively (*sensibilius*) than the convenience of what is loved (29.3). In dealing with virtuous activities, Aquinas refers to Aristotle's more general characterization of pleasure as supervening on unimpeded activities. Acting in accordance with an acquired virtue is pleasant, though learning it may be unpleasant.²⁰²

Even though Aquinas refers to feelings, this is not a central subject in his theory of emotions.²⁰³ Following thirteenth-century philosophical approaches, he analyses emotions as motive acts and classifies them from the point of view of behavioural changes. Aquinas refers to Avicenna's view of pleasure as the perception of obtaining something agreeable, but, unlike Avicenna, he does not regard pleasure as a non-appetitive passion. Like John of la Rochelle and Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas treated passions as explanatory factors of behavioural change. The question of

²⁰² *In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, 2.3.265–6.

²⁰³ In commenting on Aristotle's remark on pleasure and distress as the concomitants of emotions (*EN* 2.5), Aquinas takes it to mean that pleasure and distress are acts which follow other motive acts: *ibid.* 2.3.269.

how feeling is embedded in occurrent emotions was not very important in this context. Pleasure involves an awareness of an object as pleasant, but basically it is an act of the appetitive power.²⁰⁴ Aquinas thought that all experiences of pleasure are somehow appetitive acts of enjoying what is found to be pleasant (*ST* II-1.33.1). This is based on the awareness of the presence of what is enjoyable which apparently is associated with a pleasant feeling.

In addition to the theory of emotions as movements and the taxonomy based on this view, Aquinas's treatise on emotions in *Summa theologiae* II-1 includes a great number of terminological, doxographical, psychological, and ethical remarks pertaining to each type of emotion. These are often independent of the theory of movements and show interest in emotional phenomena in themselves. It has been maintained that Aquinas did not see anything good coming out of passions as immediate reactions, and that he did not provide them with any positive epistemic role.²⁰⁵ This is too strong a claim, and does not follow from Aquinas's view that emotional reactions should always be controlled by reason (*ST* II-1.24.3). There is a distinction between a cognitive act and a motive act in Avicennian psychology, but both are involved in emotional reactions.²⁰⁶ The cogitative power grasps emotionally relevant aspects of things and determines the content of the appetitive acts. Emotions are cognitive in this sense, and provide information of what is good and evil to humans *qua* emotional beings.²⁰⁷ This first orientation which is guided by human sensuality and natural will (*voluntas ut natura*) must be re-evaluated by reason in forming considered choices of the will (*voluntas ut ratio*).²⁰⁸

In evaluating emotions from a moral point of view in *ST* II-1.24.3, Aquinas stresses that the moral quality of an intentional human act is

²⁰⁴ Ibid. 10.8.2054.

²⁰⁵ R. Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 262–3.

²⁰⁶ Pasnau states that in Aquinas emotions are entirely appetitive, and that this is not far from Aristotle's position. In Pasnau's view Nussbaum is wrong in saying that Aristotle gives the emotions a cognitive component (444 n. 25). It is true that Aristotle and his more or less orthodox medieval followers treated occurrent emotions as concupiscible or irascible acts, but these are cognitively determined and cannot be understood apart from this aspect.

²⁰⁷ For the cognitive role of emotions in Aquinas, see also J. Barad, 'Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity', in B. C. Bazán *et al.* (eds.), *Les Philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge* (New York, Ottawa, and Toronto: Legas, 1995), 642–53.

²⁰⁸ For this terminology, see *ST* III.18.2–5; 21.2, and further texts discussed in Robiglio (2002), 53–119. In *ST* III.18.3 Aquinas says that 'natural will' is what John Damascene called *thelesis*, and rational will what he called *bulesis*. Cf. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 36.8–11. Aquinas associated the terms 'velleitas', 'voluntas incompleta' and 'voluntas conditionata' with 'voluntas ut natura'.

wholly dependent on the quality of the judgement of the intellect. The passions of the soul do not justify the acts which they directly initiate or to which they incline the will. In fact, spontaneous emotional reactions which are not moderated by virtuous habits are often bad, and can prevent one from using moral reason. The emotions in a soul which has acquired moderating moral virtues can be controlled by reason.²⁰⁹ Some of the controlled emotions may contribute to morally good action by adding to its intensity (*ST II-1.24.3*). Aquinas's criticism of the Stoic view is partially based on what Augustine said in Book 14 of *The City of God*. Aquinas's own idea is that the Stoics did not distinguish between the will and the sensitive moving power and that they, by reason of this mistake, equated emotions with incorrect choices (*ST II-1.24.3*; 59.2). In commenting on Macrobius' description of the Neoplatonic scheme of four grades of virtues in chapter 8 of *On the Dream of Scipio*, Aquinas does not see any problem in exemplary divine virtues or moderated political virtues. As for the second degree, the cleansing virtues, which aim at freedom from emotions, and the third degree, the virtues of the purified soul, which ignore emotions, Aquinas states that Plotinus might mean inordinate emotions (*ST II-1.61.5*; see also p.103 above).

In describing various emotional phenomena, Thomas Aquinas makes use of some works of Aristotle which were translated by his contemporary William of Moerbeke, the *Rhetoric*, *On the Movements of Animals*, and some treatises of the *Parva naturalia*, of which there were also older translations. All these were used in later studies of emotions, but most important was Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Giles of Rome, who probably studied theology under Thomas Aquinas, included in his commentary of the *Rhetoric* a longer discussion of the types of emotions which was based on Aquinas's theory. While following the main lines of Aquinas's taxonomy, Giles stated that pleasure and distress should be regarded as the

²⁰⁹ According to Aquinas, the rational control of emotional movements takes place by evaluating the suggestions of the cogitative power and refusing consent to corresponding behavioural impulses (*ST I.81.3*). E. C. Sweeney writes about Aquinas's account of the passions in *ST II-1* that 'there is no more positive philosophical account of human emotion', and 'what Aquinas does not do is express any fundamental distrust of the passions or engage in any heavy-handed appeals to the need for rational control of the passions': 'Reconstructing Desire: Aquinas, Hobbes, and Descartes on the Passions', in S. F. Brown (ed.), *Meeting of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 222–3. This is an exaggerated view. Aquinas says in *II-1.24.3* that since the root of all human goodness lies in the reason and the sensitive appetite can be obedient to reason, the control of the emotions is an essential element of moral goodness. One should not accept emotional evaluations which precede rational practical judgement without a rational evaluation.

states after movements rather than movements, and that one should add mansuetude, the contrary to anger, to the class of irascible passions. There are also some considerations of the principles of the contrariety of irascible passions.²¹⁰ In his questions on the *Rhetoric* (2.2) John of Jandun employed Giles's version of Aquinas's classification.²¹¹ Aquinas's taxonomy of the passions was well known among later medieval authors, but it never became the dominant theory. Henry of Ghent and many others stressed that emotions are qualities rather than movements.²¹² While Peter John Olivi employed Aquinas's list of emotions, he argued that they are acts of one sensitive appetite and not of two distinct sensitive powers.²¹³ These views were known to John Duns Scotus, whose more radical departure from the received view will be discussed in next chapter.

²¹⁰ *Expositio super libros Rhetoricorum* 49rb–51ra; Marmo (1991), 292–311.

²¹¹ See the quotation from the unedited text in Marmo (1991), 314. For John of Jandun's view of emotional expressions, see also C. Marmo, 'Retorica e moti di spirito: una "quaestio" inedita di Giovanni di Jandun', in P. Magli, G. Manetti, and P. Violi (eds.), *Semiotica; storia, teoria, interpretazione* (Milan: Bompiani, 1992), 23–41. Emotions are also discussed in John Buridan's unedited treatise on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

²¹² Henry of Ghent, *Summae quaestionum ordinariarum*, repr. of 1520 ed., Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 5 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1953), 50.1 (vol. 2, 47v.).

²¹³ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, 3 vols., Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 4–6 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–6), 69 (2.626–8).

CHAPTER 4

Emotions in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy

In the previous chapter I dealt with two broad thirteenth-century contexts for discussing emotions: the theological doctrine of the first movements and the psychological theory of the faculties of the soul. A third relevant context was the rise of voluntarist psychology, which particularly influenced late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Franciscan thought, and evoked discussions of reflexive acts, free volitions, and the passions and virtues of the will.¹ Voluntarist views were supported by Bishop Stephen Tempier's condemnation of 219 propositions in philosophy and theology in 1277.² This list involved:

That the soul wills nothing unless it is moved by another. Hence the following proposition is false: the soul wills by itself.—This is erroneous if what is meant is that the soul is moved by another, namely, by something desirable or an object in such a way that the desirable thing or object is the whole reason for the movement of the will itself (194) . . . That it is impossible for the will not to will when it is in the disposition in which it is natural for it to be moved and when that which by nature moves remains so disposed (131).³

¹ For the views of Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, and other thirteenth-century voluntarists, see B. Kent, *Virtues of the Will* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), and E. Stadter, *Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit. Die ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung zwischen Bonaventura und Duns Scotus*, Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Instituts, Neue Folge, 12 (Munich: Schöningh, 1971). For the history of modern scholarly discussion of Scotus's voluntarism, see S. D. Dumont, 'Did Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?', in J. A. Aertsen, K. Emery, and A. Speer (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2001), 719–94.

² For the articles and their historical background, see R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277*, *Philosophes médiévaux*, 22 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Vander-Oyez, 1977); English trans. 'Condemnation of 219 Propositions', by E. L. Fortin and P. D. O'Neill, in R. Lerner and M. Mahdi (eds.), *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Source-Book* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), 335–54. The relationship between the condemnations and thirteenth-century voluntarism is discussed in Kent (1995), 94–149.

³ Trans. by Fortin and O'Neill in Lerner and Mahdi (1963), 350 (151, 160).

While psychosomatic emotions were traditionally separated from the naturally elicited or supernaturally influenced acts of the intellectual soul, it was also recognized that there were structural similarities between all these phenomena and that emotional terms, such as love or fear, could be applied to all of them. Franciscan theories embedded a tendency to transpose emotional phenomena themselves to the actions and the passions of the will. This was in agreement with their voluntarist orientation and increasing interest in particularly human psychology.

Apart from the theological aims of early voluntarist theory, it influenced psychological discussions by concentrating on questions which were not very important in faculty psychology. After a brief survey of these matters (section 4.1), I shall deal with the influential voluntarist theory of emotions in John Duns Scotus and William Ockham and their followers (section 4.2), Adam Wodeham's discussion of the theories of the emotions in Oxford in the 1320s (section 4.3), and some late medieval topics which influenced early modern theories of the emotions (section 4.4).

4.1 Intuitive Cognitions, Reflexive Acts, Free Volitions

In the opening question of his *Questions on the Soul* Thomas Aquinas refers to various Aristotelian texts which seem to imply that the notion of an individual substance applies to the composite of matter and form as well as to the form. In asking whether a human soul can be both a form and an individual substance (*forma et hoc aliquid*), Aquinas took up a question which was by no means new, but his intention was to demonstrate that the soul is a form and not a substance. This was a radical position, since most thirteenth-century masters of arts and theology had defended the view that the soul is a substance.⁴

One of the sources of medieval discussions of this topic was the translation of Nemesius of Emesa's treatise on human nature. Nemesius thought that the human soul must be an incorporeal substance (*substantia incorporea*), since the abilities of the soul are not properties of material elements or their combinations, and the soul, though using the brain and the body as instruments, is not dependent on the body for its existence. Even though Nemesius based his view of the psychology of action on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, he thought that Plato had understood

⁴ *Quaestio disputata de anima* (see Ch. 3, n. 71), trans. J. Robb in *St. Thomas Aquinas: Questions on the Soul*, Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, 26 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984); for this question and its historical background, see Bazán (1997).

human nature better than Aristotle, who regarded the soul as a form of the compound and a perfection of the body.⁵ The conception of the soul as an immaterial substance was a central Neoplatonic doctrine embraced by many Christian thinkers. Augustine, a high authority in early medieval theology, stated in his *On the Trinity*: ‘The nature of the mind is to be a substance and not to be a corporeal one’ (10.7.10). Avicenna’s *De anima* was a further important source for this conception. According to Avicenna, the soul can be treated as a form in so far as it is regarded as the principle of animation. However, this is only one of the functions of the soul, which is an immaterial substance. (See section 3.3 above.) Avicenna’s attempt to reconcile Plato and Aristotle was largely adopted by the masters of arts and theology before Aquinas.⁶ Albert the Great wrote: ‘If we consider the soul in itself, we must agree with Plato; if we consider it in the animating role that it plays *vis-à-vis* the body, we agree with Aristotle.’⁷ Another hybrid theory was found in Averroës, who defended the view that the soul is a form, and that the intellect as the highest cognitive power is not part of an individual soul.⁸

In explaining the nature of the soul as a form, Thomas Aquinas refers to Aristotelian hylomorphism, in which form is given ontological priority over matter. In Aquinas’s view there is a scale of degrees of superiority of form, whose peak is the rational soul. The human rational soul can abstract forms from matter and does not need a bodily organ for this abstraction (or other intellectual operations), though it needs the sensory representations from which the universal concepts are abstracted. The human soul’s operational independence from matter is not sufficient to constitute a complete substance. The soul is not a substance, but the formative principle of the substance; it can be called a *hoc aliquid* in a derivative way in so far as it is a subsistent form.⁹ Unlike Averroës, Thomas Aquinas attributed intellection to the individual human soul. Aquinas thought that whenever the intellect thinks something, a corresponding phantasm is simultaneously present in the sensitive soul. Even though the intellect thinks through concepts which are abstracted from perceptions, it cannot think anything by means of universal concepts

⁵ *De natura hominis*, trans. Burgundio of Pisa, 2 (24.28–30; 35.75–39.62; 49.81–4), 4 (69.24–70.33).

⁶ Bazán (1997), 106–13.

⁷ *Summa theologiae*, ed. A. Borgnet, in *Opera omnia*, xxxiii (Paris: Vives, 1895), 2.12.69.2, quoted in Bazán (1997), 111.

⁸ Bazán (1997), 104–6; see also Davidson (1992), 315–40.

⁹ Bazán (1997), 114–15.

without simultaneously turning to phantasms.¹⁰ Both the idea of the soul as a form and the conception of *conversio ad phantasmata* had consequences for Aquinas's view of self-consciousness; this notion proved to be somewhat cumbersome for him.

The Neoplatonic idea of immediate self-awareness played an important role in Augustinian and Avicennian metaphysics. According to Plotinus, self-awareness is part of the constitution of the highest soul, which never descended from the intelligible world, and to a lesser degree belongs to the descended part of the soul. Augustine also thought that the soul can be directly aware of itself, though it is not always so.¹¹ One of the Neoplatonic arguments for the immateriality of the soul was based on its capacity to be aware of itself without being aware of the body.¹² Both Plotinus and Augustine associated the soul's knowledge of itself with the self-reflexivity which accompanies all mental acts. I do not enter into the question of whether the self-awareness of the soul was thought to be independent of other acts. It is sufficient to realize that in Aquinas's view the Platonists thought that the intellect can be directly aware of itself. Aquinas did not accept this. Since the intellect is the power of understanding, it knows itself only through being aware of its particular acts. Aquinas describes the self-knowledge of the intellect as follows:

It is not by its essence but by its acts that the intellect knows itself. First, in particular, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul from the fact that he perceives himself thinking. Secondly, in general, when we consider the nature of the human mind from the nature of the intellectual activity. (*ST* I.87.1)

Aquinas assumes that when there is an act of intellect, one can be aware of it. In fact he seems to think, as Aristotle did, that we are aware of our mental acts. Aquinas does not explain the details of the reflexive awareness; one may well ask what the intellect's ability to apprehend its acts is

¹⁰ *ST* I.84.7; see also N. Kretzmann, 'Philosophy of Mind', in N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 142.

¹¹ See Remes (2001); L. P. Gerson, 'Introspection, Self-Reflexivity, and the Essence of Thinking according to Plotinus', in J. Cleary (ed.), *The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, series i, 24 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 153–3; G. B. Matthews, 'Augustine and Descartes on Minds and Bodies', in Matthews (1999), 222–32.

¹² Many scholars have noted the close similarities between Avicenna's flying man argument for self-awareness without a body and the analogous formulations in Plotinus and Augustine; see Rahman (1952), 9–11; Verbeke (1968), 36–9.

and what the phantasms associated with it are, if the intellect abstracts the universal concept of intellect from phantasms.¹³

The nature of the reflexive psychic act became a widely discussed topic in later medieval philosophy.¹⁴ Its importance in the voluntarist psychology of will is exemplified by Peter John Olivi's analysis of the freedom of the will, in which a free act of will is directed (1) to an object of which there is a cognitive representation, (2) to itself as an agent, since the will makes itself will the object to which it is directed when the act is free, and (3) to itself as willing, 'for we never will anything freely unless we will that we will'. The second and third aspects are called reflexive acts, the will's moving itself and its accepting its act.¹⁵

In so far as an act of will, which presupposes cognition, is directed to another act of will, there must be an awareness of the latter act in the intellect. Direct reflexive knowledge about various mental acts became one of the subjects of the general discussion of intuitive cognition (*notitia intuitiva*), which was developed into a theoretical epistemological conception by Duns Scotus and particularly by William Ockham. Referring to intuitive cognitions about mental acts, Scotus wrote that 'in the class of contingent propositions there are some that are immediate... and self-evident, and such are the propositions that refer to our acts'.¹⁶ William Ockham was particularly interested in the intuitive cognitions with sensibles as proximate objects and gave them an important epistemic role as partial causes of evidential judgements about the existence or non-existence of contingent things.¹⁷

¹³ For these problems in Aquinas, see A. Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993), 119–25.

¹⁴ For later thirteenth-century discussions of self-knowledge, see F.-X. Putallaz, *La Connaissance de soi au XIIIe siècle de Matthieu d'Aquasparta à Thierry de Freiberg*, Études de philosophie médiévale, 67 (Paris: Vrin, 1991).

¹⁵ Olivi, *Questiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 59 (2.552–3).

¹⁶ *Lectura* I.3.1.3, n. 181 (Vat. 16, 296). The text goes on: 'such as "I sleep" and "I am awake"'. This is a somewhat strange combination of examples; for a better formulation, see *Ordinatio* I.3.1.4, n. 238 (Vat. 3, 141). See also *Lectura* II.3.2.2, nn. 288–90 (Vat. 18, 322–3). The references to Scotus's works are either to the critical edition *Opera omnia*, ed. C. Balić *et al.* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–) (= Vat.) or, for the works not yet available in the critical editions, to *Opera omnia*, ed. L. Wadding (Lyon, 1639; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1968) (= Wadding) or to revised Wadding texts in *John Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, selected and translated with an introduction by A. B. Wolter (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1986) (= WM).

¹⁷ For Scotus's view, see A. B. Wolter, *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 98–122, and D. Langston, 'Scotus's Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition', *Synthese*, 96 (1993), 3–24; for Ockham, see M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 501–15.

In dealing with remembering, Scotus treats intuitive recollective cognitions as having the pronoun 'I' as the subject of the propositional attitude and of its content ('I recall that I have seen or known you to be sitting here'); he assumes that some kind of personal identity is presupposed in remembering, since there can be a remembrance only of one's own act and not of an act in another.¹⁸ If remembering first-order mental acts is described through iterated first-person propositions, one might ask whether a mental act is an object of awareness before it is memorized:

From this something controversial could be inferred and it is: Does the memory know the act, at the time it exists, which it will remember later as its immediate object? For it seems that if it did not know it then, it would not remember it later.¹⁹

Even though this is a tentative suggestion, it is clear from what Scotus says later that in his view the intellect is aware of its acts which it can remember and, furthermore, that the intellect is aware of its first-order acts through a separate act. Mental acts are put in the memory by an intuitive cognition of them. It is not said that the intellect is aware of its being aware of these first-order acts.²⁰ William Ockham also argued for the view that whenever a soul knows its act, this is a separate act of intuitive cognition. If people who have only one actual thought are asked whether they are thinking, they can know it only through a further intellectual act.²¹ Like Scotus, Ockham also assumes that whenever the intellect remembers its acts, they were apprehended by a separate act of intellect, though this act is not necessarily apprehended.²²

In the Scotist theory of recollection an immediate awareness of a mental act is regarded as a necessary condition for a later recollection of it. People

¹⁸ *Ordinatio* IV.45.3, nn. 4, 6. This question is edited (with an English translation) in A. Wolter and M. Adams, 'Memory and Intuition: A Focal Debate in Fourteenth-Century Cognitive Psychology', *Franciscan Studies*, 53 (1993), 175–230; see 195, 197.

¹⁹ *Ord.* IV.45.3, n. 7, trans. in Wolter and Adams (1993), 215.

²⁰ *Ord.* IV.45.3, n. 20: 'To put it briefly, the separated soul could remember all of those things it could recall when joined to the body, because those things of which there was sense memory are remembered intellectually because of the intuitive cognition that accompanied every perfect sense perception.' See Wolter and Adams (1993), 208, trans. 226.

²¹ William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, ed. G. Gál and R. Wood, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica*, v (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1981), 17 (388.18–389.7).

²² Ockham discusses memory in *Reportatio* II.13 (261–7), and in *Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, ed. G. Gál and R. Wood in co-operation with R. Green, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica*, vii (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1984), 14 (278–317). Ockham's view in *Reportatio* IV.14 is largely influenced by Scotus's *Ordinatio* IV.45.3 and involves the same view of the intuitive cognition and memory (292.11–23). For Ockham's views, see Wolter and Adams (1993), 181–4.

are supposed to be mainly conscious of their mental acts or states, but this immediate, non-voluntary intuitive knowledge is not necessarily conscious in the sense that one would notice it. Walter Chatton criticized this view. He argued that all mental acts are experiences and in this sense immediately known without a further reflexive act.²³ Chatton seems to think that when something is experienced, it is somehow registered in the mind to the effect that even if there were only one mental act, one could say that one had experienced it. In a treatise on Aristotle's *De anima* tentatively attributed to John Buridan, the author deals with this topic in the question of whether all cognition involves a cognition of itself. In answering an argument which is similar to Chatton's, the author criticized both it and the Scotist position as follows. If people remember that they were thinking about a stone in the morning, it is not implied that they were actually aware of this thinking, whether as part of their thinking or by a separate act. To recollect this act does not require that there was any actual awareness of it. It is sufficient that the act which will be remembered can be apprehended, as it can if it is recalled.²⁴

Let us consider some voluntarist views of the will and action and how they affected certain received ways of thinking. Aristotle's main means of describing the activity of practical reason was the so-called practical syllogism. In analysing akratic action with the help of this model in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (7.3), he refers to spontaneous passions as disturbing affects which can lead people to act contrary to what could be expected from their reasoning and in this sense against their rational intention. Aristotle regarded the inclination toward *akrasia* and practical inconsistency as a harmful character trait and as a sign of insufficient moral education. In combining the doctrine of *akrasia* with the theory of practical syllogism, Aristotle gave an influential form to the question of how to describe practical rationality and irrationality. He claims that the general starting-points of practical reasoning are not chosen, but are based on the values which constitute rational desires. When a particular practical end becomes actual in the mind, the desiderative attitude toward this end can be characterized as a potency for action awaiting a definite form

²³ Walter Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus*, ed. J. C. Wey, *Studies and Texts*, 90 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989), *prol.* 2.5.80–104 (121).

²⁴ *Le Traité de l'âme de Jean Buridan*, ed. B. Patar, *Philosophes médiévaux*, 29 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie; Longueuil, Québec: Éditions du Préambule, 1991); q. 3.11 (465.67–74). Nicole Oresme put forward the same view in his *Questions on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. B. Patar, *Philosophes médiévaux*, 32 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie; Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 1995), 3.12 (407.72–5).

which would make it initiate action. This is provided by practical reason, which continues its calculation until it can suggest a definite manner of acting. A choice then takes place and action begins if there is no hindrance. In Aristotle's terminology, 'choice' (*prohairesis*) does not mean a choice between alternatives—it is something that transforms thought into action.

Some historians of the theories of *akrasia* have claimed that because of biblical and Augustinian 'voluntarism' there was no real discussion of the problem of *akrasia* in medieval thought—all non-trivial behaviour was regarded as chosen by an autonomous will which freely accepts or refuses the suggestions of reason.²⁵ This is an exaggerated view. It is true that Augustine's psychology is dominated by the concept of the will as the highest controlling capacity, which is responsible for all acts which it can accept or prevent in principle, independently of whether it chooses them or not. However, this did not prevent Augustine and his followers from discussing cases not very different from Aristotle's examples of *akrasia*, though the explanations of what takes place in such cases were not the same. Furthermore, in medieval times there was an extensive discussion of Aristotle's theory of *akrasia* and practical reasoning.²⁶

The way of thinking codified in the practical syllogism was the basic medieval model of practical rationality. Augustine's influence can be seen in the role given to the notion of will in this context. Several authors associated the idea of the practical syllogism with the principle that if the antecedent expresses an end and the consequent expresses a means and a person believes that it is a good consequence, then willing the antecedent implies willing the consequent. If the agent does not choose the consequent, then (1) the antecedent is not willed effectively but only conditionally (in the sense of *velleitas*) or (2) the antecedent is genuinely willed but the knowledge of the consequent is temporarily overshadowed by an occurrent emotion or (3) the will does not will the consequent since it no longer attaches itself to the antecedent. The idea that the pertinent choice is prevented by an irrational emotional act overriding the rational will was how *akrasia* was interpreted by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In trying to show that a sinful akratic act may be chosen and not merely tolerated, Thomas Aquinas suggests that an emotional evaluation can make one form a mistaken practical judgement to the effect that such

²⁵ Charlton (1988), 5–7.

²⁶ See Saarinen (1994); B. Kent, 'Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis' Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics' (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984).

things should be chosen.²⁷ The Aristotelian element of this approach is the assumption that the will necessarily wills the constituents of the good life and happiness as they are understood by the intellect. In so far as moral reasoning in the form of the practical syllogism is taken to be ultimately based on a judgement about happiness as the final end to which the rational wish is necessarily directed, akratic acts must be explained without a change in the will at this level, either by referring to irrational impulses or mistaken *ad hoc* premisses suggested by occurrent emotions. These explanations are possible from a voluntarist point of view as well, but a choice can also be seen as a temporary deviation from the goal. In this theory the goals are chosen together with the means; when there is a judgement about a goal and a means, a human being can either will the means or give up the goal.²⁸

According to Olivi, the will is the self-reflexive cause of its acts, and is not effectively moved by anything else when it acts freely. The will needs the intellect only for the representation of objects; this was called by some others a cause *sine qua non* of volition.²⁹ In his first commentary on the *Sentences* (*Lectura*) Scotus also states that the will is a free cause, a power for opposites which is not determined by external causes, but he stressed that cognition is always a partial cause of volitions and included in the components of a free act.³⁰ While this was an attempt to impose distance from radical voluntarism, Scotus's later view is closer to it. In thinking that the idea of the *sine qua non* causality is defensible alongside his prior solution, Scotus apparently realized that if the will is a self-mover and the ultimate source of its own acts, the acts of the intellect cannot be more than necessary conditions.³¹ The acts pertaining to the means which are believed to be necessary conditions of a willed goal are not free, but conditionally necessary through willing the goal. Joy and distress as the passions of the will are neither free nor acts.³² (See the next section.) A free

²⁷ Saarinen (1994), 118–31; Kent (1995), 156–74. Kent writes (159): 'If the incontinent is to be held even partially responsible, he must will the act he performs.' In fact, an actual volition is not needed for accountability in Aquinas. A first motion toward sin is a venial sin and voluntary in the sense that it could have been prevented by the will. This indirect voluntariness does not imply that the will is active (*De veritate* 25.5 ad 5, ad 6).

²⁸ See Duns Scotus, *Ord.* II.6.1, n. 7 (Wadding 6, 529), III.15, n. 13 (Wadding 7, 335); William Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio)*, ed. G. Gál in co-operation with S. Brown, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica*, I (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1967), 1.6 (496.3–497.19).

²⁹ M. Yrjönsuuri, 'Free Will and Self-control in Peter Olivi', in Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri (2002), 99–128; Kent (1995), 129–37.

³⁰ *Lectura* II.25, nn. 69–70, 73, 78 (Vat. 19, 253–4, 255–6).

³¹ *Reportatio Parisiensis* II.25, n. 15 (Wadding 11, 370); see Dumont (2001), 744–73.

³² *Ord.* III.15, nn. 12–13 (Wadding 7, 335).

act is elicited by the will and can also be not elicited. There are two sorts of freely willed things, and the will is inclined to them by two Anselmian affections, *affectio commodi* and *affectio iustitiae*. The first is an inclination to what promotes happiness, and the second an inclination to justice. Scotus thinks that people would naturally seek only their own happiness if they could not control this inclination by acts of justice which people can choose on the basis of the second inclination of the will. Because of these two orientations, the will is not bound to a single end. Human action is correspondingly distinguished from the determined behaviour of such creatures as do not have will or have will with a single inclination.³³ In Scotus's approach an act not modified by justice can be morally evil and understandable in the sense that it is chosen by a subject in accordance with natural inclination in full possession of knowledge necessary to make a good choice.³⁴

4.2 Scotus and Ockham on Emotions

Scotus's general remarks on the nature of the emotions of the sensitive soul were not very original. Following thirteenth-century views, he regarded them as involuntary reactions which are associated with bodily changes. Their behavioural suggestions can be controlled by the will, and the emotional powers themselves can be to some extent habituated to function moderately. Scotus states that there are concupiscible emotions, which are reactions to the apprehensions of agreeable or disagreeable things (desire, avoidance, pleasure, and distress) and irascible emotions, which are reactions to the apprehension of offensive things:

³³ For Scotus's conception of free will, see T. Williams, 'Reason, Morality and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved', *The Modern Schoolman*, 74 (1997), 73–94; *idem*, 'The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral Philosophy', *The Thomist*, 62 (1998), 193–215; S. Lee, 'Scotus on the Will: The Rational Power and the Dual Affections', *Vivarium*, 36 (1998), 40–54; J. Boler, 'Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will', in Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri (2002), 129–53. Scotus's modal conception of synchronic alternatives as a presupposition of freedom is discussed in Knuutila (1993) and John Duns Scotus, *Contingency and Freedom*, *Lectura I* 39, introduction, translation, and commentary by A. Vos Jaczn., H. Veldhuis, A. H. Looman-Graaskamp, E. Dekker, and N. W. den Bok, The New Synthese Historical Library, 42 (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1994). Many twelfth- and thirteenth-century authors dealt with Anselm's two affections of the will; see e.g. Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet XIII*, ed. J. Decorte, in *Opera omnia*, xviii, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, series 2 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1985), q. 11. See also pp. 210–11 above.

³⁴ R. Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87–9. While Cross contrasts Scotus' view with Aquinas's conception of rationality, some authors have argued that Aquinas's remarks on natural will lessens the difference. See Robiglio (2002), 153–83.

Looking at this distinction in general, we should note that the concupiscible has to do with something agreeable or disagreeable of itself, so that on its part nothing more than apprehending such is required for an act of delight or sadness, or pursuit or flight, to follow. But the irascible does not have such things as its object. For the act of the irascible is to be angry. (*Ord.* III.34 (WM 358–9))

One of Scotus's deviations from thirteenth-century approaches was his denial that what is arduous is the object of the irascible emotions: 'The irascible, then, does not have as its object the arduous, as the concupiscible has the appetible, for its object is the offensive' (*Ord.* III.34 (WM 360–1)). Anger bears a dislike towards its object, not by turning away, as the concupiscible appetite flees what it dislikes, but rather by spitting at it or repelling it. It desires to remove the object or punish it. Scotus refers to Aristotle's definition of anger as desire for vengeance in a conspicuous way for a conspicuous slight (*Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378a31), but he thinks that basically anger is aggression towards an object which offends one or prevents one from getting what is desired. This is exemplified by a bird which, while eating, attacks those who disturb it.³⁵ An occurrent irascible act is said to involve distress as long as the irascible desire is not fulfilled. At the same time there is also concupiscible distress. Scotus argues that these two forms of suffering are not the same by referring to the medical theory of the bodily changes associated with sensitive motive acts. The organs of the physical affects caused by the concupiscible and the irascible are not the same:

The distress of both the concupiscible and the irascible appetite is accompanied by an organic change in the sensitive part of the soul. . . In the concupiscible the organs are restricted, just as they are expanded with the opposite delight. But the pain of the irascible makes one hot when the blood courses to the heart. And from this it follows that the concupiscible and irascible of the sensitive part have different organs, because the same organ could not be simultaneously moved in contrary ways. (*Ord.* III.34 (WM 361–3, with changes))³⁶

A further deviation from the received view was Scotus's criticism of the Avicennian conception that the emotionally relevant qualities of objects are 'intentions' which are grasped by the sensitive estimative power. According to Scotus, the convenience, inconvenience, and offensiveness which are said to activate the sensitive moving powers are relations

³⁵ *Ord.* III.34 (WM 358–63). Scotus's remarks on the nature of irascible passions were regarded as a systematic deviation from Aquinas's view by Gabriel Biel and Thomas Cajetan (see p. 286 below). A. Perreiah mistakenly considers Scotus's basic division of emotions the same as that of Aquinas in 'Scotus on Human Emotions,' *Franciscan Studies*, 56 (1998), 325–45.

³⁶ Peter John Olivi thought that there is only one sensitive motive power; see p. 255 above.

between the potencies and their activators. They are not ‘intentions’ in the objects, and they are not perceived by sensitive power.³⁷ In dealing with the natural reactions of animals, Scotus states that it is an observable fact that the apprehension of certain objects makes the animals move in one way or another.³⁸ Things which cause pleasure or pain may also become appetible or avoidable through learning. Repeated unpleasant experiences with respect to a certain object may change it from an activator of desire into an activator of repulsion. Referring to Avicenna’s example of a dog and a stick, Scotus explains how an animal learns to reject certain food on the basis of bad experiences, though it does not have the power of recollecting the past *qua* past.

Therefore, as soon as the food offered moves the appetite to eat it, immediately the image of the rod used for beating appears and causes the animal to shrink from the food as from something unpleasant. And if this very disagreeable image is repeated with great frequency, all the more will the animal be repulsed by the delightful than attracted to it.³⁹

Scotus did not follow Aquinas’s attempt to treat emotions as movements, preferring the view defended by Albert the Great that they are qualities of the third class.⁴⁰ While separating concupiscible and irascible sensitive emotions, Scotus thought that the same division could also be applied to the will:

As for the last argument, about the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul, I say that such a distinction exists not only in the sense appetite but also in the will. And when it is objected that the irascible and concupiscible has to do with arduous and delectable objects—whether this is a distinction of objects or not is discussed in the following question—the point is that this distinction can be found on the part of objects in relation to the will as well as in relation to the sense appetite. (*Ord.* III.33 (WM 340–1))⁴¹

In so far as emotional terms refer to the various reactions of the motive powers, they can be applied to the intellectual as well as the sensitive soul. This could be regarded as a terminological remark to the effect that emotional terms are analogously applicable to the operations of the will. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas also said this while arguing for a sharp

³⁷ *Ord.* III.15.7 (Wadding 7, 330).

³⁸ *Ord.* III.15.8–9 (Wadding 7, 332).

³⁹ *Ord.* IV.45.3; trans. Walter and Adams (1993), 218.

⁴⁰ *Ord.* III.15.9 (Wadding 7, 332); see also Ockham, *Expositio in Librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, 14.9 (282).

⁴¹ See also *Ord.* III.34 (WM 362–3).

division between psychosomatic emotions and intellectual volitions.⁴² Scotus's idea is more radical. He thought that emotions as affective non-voluntary changes in the experiencer are phenomena not merely of the sensitive level of the soul, but to some extent of the intellectual level as well. Learning to moderate emotions through moral education primarily pertains to the will, and traditional moral virtues are habits of the will rather than habits of the sensitive motive powers. Temperance is primarily moderation with respect to pleasure and distress of the will which are not free volitions.⁴³ Even though Franciscan authors before Scotus spoke about the passions of the will, it seems that he was the first to formulate a comprehensive theory of the emotions involving the sensitive passions and the passions of the will. This terminological revision contributed to the fact that early fourteenth-century Franciscan discussions of the emotions were largely concentrated on those of the will.⁴⁴

Using the terms which John of la Rochelle applied to the sensitive appetitive acts, Scotus states that the immediate acts of the will are complacency (*complacentia*) and dislike (*displacentia*).⁴⁵ These 'simple acts of the will' are not yet efficacious acts, which Scotus calls elections. Complacency and dislike are the first acts through which one's free will reacts to possible or impossible objects of choice in a particular situation. They presuppose a cognitive act and have the will as the efficient cause.⁴⁶ In addition to complacency and dislike with respect to the objects of possible choice, there can be complacency and dislike with respect to possible efficacious acts of the will.⁴⁷ These pertain to the first-order acts of complacency or dislike as considered in the wider context of

⁴² According to Aquinas, the acts of the will are not divided into concupiscible and irascible acts, since the will is moved by the judgements of reason, which evaluate things from the single point of view of goodness; see *Sentencia libri De anima* 3.8.120–53; *ST* I.82.5.

⁴³ *Ord.* III.33 (*WM* 330–4); *Ord.* III.34 (*WM* 366).

⁴⁴ For concupiscible and irascible acts of the will in Bonaventure, see *In III Sententiarum*, 26.2.5 (*Opera*, iii. 579–80); 33, art. un., 4 (*Opera*, iii. 717), and R. P. Prentice, *The Psychology of Love According to St. Bonaventure* (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1957), 30–4. Scotus criticized Henry of Ghent's formulation that the concupiscible and irascible are 'two powers of the will' in *Ord.* III.33 (*WM* 362–3); see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VIII.15, in *Quodlibeta* (repr. Louvain: Bibliothèque S. J., 1961), fos. 327r–328r.

⁴⁵ *Ord.* III.33 (*WM* 338). This was also traditional terminology; for *complacentia* and *displacentia* as the immediate orientations of the will in Bonaventure, see *In II Sententiarum* 25.1.1.6 (*Opera*, ii. 605); cf. I.17.1.2 (*Opera*, i. 297).

⁴⁶ *Ord.* II.6.1, nn. 3–5 (Wadding 6, 528–9). Scotus states that the acts of complacency may pertain to things which are regarded as good without an evaluation of whether they are possible or not. Many thirteenth-century authors remarked that the objects of conditional will or *velleity* may be impossible; for some examples in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, see Robiglio (2002), 55, 64–5, 88–9, 106.

⁴⁷ *Ord.* II.6.1, n. 3 (Wadding 6, 528).

compatibility with one's other preferences. According to Scotus, a choice is always preceded and accompanied by complacency, though what is chosen can be one of the things disliked and chosen merely because of some further reasons.⁴⁸ Of these second-order acts the overriding complacency seems to be the decisive cause of choice. The nature of primary complacency and dislike as immediate acts makes them resemble emotional phenomena. They are unpremeditated reactions to things in the same way as sensitive emotional reactions are.

Complacency (or love) as an immediate attraction, dislike (or hatred) as an immediate aversion, and the efficacious acts of the will with respect to the objects of these acts, are strictly separated from the pleasure and distress of the will:

Even if something is naturally convenient to the will, for example the ultimate end, it is in the last analysis convenient to it through the act of the will which accepts it and finds it complacent. And when there is a convenience of this kind through willing the object or a inconvenience through willing against . . . there will be an approximation of the object, namely the apprehension of the object of will or nill, and it seems that from this last thing there follows a passion of the will, joy or distress, which is caused by the object present in this way. (*Ord.* III.15, n. 12 (Wadding 7, 334))

Pleasure and distress, as distinct from complacency, dislike, and election, are not free acts of the will and are not under the control of the will except indirectly. Hence they are passions of the will:

That distress, properly speaking, is a passion of the will is seen from the fact that it is not any of its operations . . . This passion is not in the will through the will as its efficient cause, because then it would be immediately under the power of the will, as volitions and nolitions are, but this is false, for when one wills against something and it happens, it is seen that the subject does not have distress under his or her immediate power. If it had the will as its efficient cause, it would be an operation of the will, as a volition is caused by the will and is in the will. (*Ord.* III.15, n. 12 (Wadding 7, 335))

Before discussing Scotus's idea of the indirect voluntariness of the passions of the will, let us take a look at his list of things which can be sufficient causes of distress as a passion of the will. These are the apprehension that something takes place (1) contrary to one's actual will against something, (2) contrary to one's prima facie will against something which is actually accepted with the conditional will of the opposite, (3) contrary

⁴⁸ *Reportatio Parisiensis* I.1.3, n. 3 (Wadding 11, 26).

to one's natural inclination to happiness, when no particular act of will is actual, and (4) contrary to one's sensitive appetitive dispositions, provided that the will is not habituated to ignoring these. Of these (1) is the basic kind of distress which is caused by the fact that something takes place contrary to one's actual will; (2) refers to a reluctant choice which is associated with the conditional will (*velleitas*) of the opposite. Such conditional will is sufficient to evoke distress, as is the natural inclination to happiness (*affectio commodi*) when something takes place contrary to it (3), while (4) involves the same idea with respect to the inconveniences in the sensitive appetites.⁴⁹ The corresponding sufficient causes of the pleasure of the will are the apprehension that something will take place in accordance with one's actual will which is not qualified by a conditional will of the opposite or in agreement with one's natural inclination to happiness or sensitive appetite, without an actual act of will.

In speaking about the will, Scotus primarily means by 'pleasure' and 'distress' the subject's experience of enjoyment or suffering with respect to new states of affairs, but these terms may also refer to qualities which accompany some activities.⁵⁰ Pleasure and distress are not themselves free acts, which in Scotus's view is clearly seen in the fact that people cannot restore the state of pleasure by simply willing it.⁵¹ Pleasure may also be prevented by actual distress.⁵² Even though pleasure and distress are causally dependent states of the will and not its free acts, they are indirectly voluntary. Giving up complacency or love for an object makes one immune to the distress of loss.⁵³

Scotus regarded the intellectual soul as very emotional. The passions of joy and pleasure are aroused not only as concomitants of actual volitions, but can also occur without any volitional act when one is aware of pleasant or unpleasant bodily changes or external things taking place against the inclinations to happiness. Scotus thought that these states of the will can considerably influence human behaviour as motivators or hindrances. Having shifted the scope of the discussion of moral virtues from the sensitive appetite to the intellectual soul, Scotus saw the practical goal of moral education as giving strength to the inclination to justice, moderating the intellectual appetite for pleasure, and increasing one's

⁴⁹ *Ord.* III.15, nn. 14–17 (Wadding 7, 339–41).

⁵⁰ See e.g. *Ord.* III.36 (WM 390).

⁵¹ *Ord.* III.15, n. 12 (Wadding 7, 334–5).

⁵² *Reportatio Parisiensis* I.1.3, n. 5 (Wadding 11, 26). Referring to the *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.14 Scotus says that an intense distress may prevent any pleasure. In fact, Aristotle states that a pleasure can expel any distress (1154b13–14).

⁵³ *Ord.* III.15, nn. 12–13 (Wadding 7, 334–5).

ability to find virtuous action pleasant. Because of the indirect controllability of psychic pleasure and distress, one can learn to feel them in a proper manner by forming habits which change the conditions of the passions.⁵⁴

Apart from the theory of moral education, another context for dealing with emotions and the passions of the will was the discussion of the theological doctrine of ultimate enjoyment (*fruitio*).⁵⁵ Fruition or enjoyment was traditionally discussed at the beginning of the commentaries on the *Sentences*, since Peter Lombard dealt with Augustine's distinction between enjoying (*frui*) and using (*uti*) in the opening section of his work. According to Augustine, only God is to be enjoyed—that is, to be loved for his own sake—all else is to be used.⁵⁶ Scotus was particularly interested in the difference between the love of God possible in this life and love as the main component of eternal bliss. One relevant question was whether there is a real distinction between enjoyment and pleasure. The distinction between the free acts of the will referred to by emotional terms (complacency, dislike, love, hate) and the passions of the will which are not free was meant to explain the nature of eternal bliss as partly an act of love and partly as a pleasure or joy. The distinction between love and pleasure is exemplified by the devil, who can experience complacency, love, and fulfilment of desire without pleasure and joy. These are states which are naturally caused by the awareness of fulfilled desire; in the case of the devil, it is part of his punishment that the experience of continuous distress prevents all pleasure.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ *Ord.* II.6.2, n. 9 (Wadding 6, 540; *WM* 470–3); III.15, n. 17 (Wadding 7, 341); *Ord.* III.33 (*WM* 330–5); *Ord.* III.34 (*WM* 366–7). See also O. Boulnois, 'Duns Scot: existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?', in P. F. Moreau (ed.), *Actes du colloque de l'ENS Saint-Cloud: Les Passions*, Documents, Archives de Travail et Arguments, 23 (CERPHI: Saint-Cloud, 1998).

⁵⁵ *Reportatio Parisiensis* I.1.3 (Wadding 11, 26–7); K. Georgedes, 'The Serpent in the Tree of Knowledge: Enjoyment and Use in Fourteenth-Century Theology' (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1995), 147–89. Enjoyment remained a popular topic in Franciscan theology after Scotus, and was one of the main contexts for discussing the theory of the emotions. See S. McGrade, 'Ockham on Enjoyment—Towards an Understanding of Fourteenth-Century Philosophy and Psychology', *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1981), 706–28, and 'Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham: Philosophy, Psychology, and the Love of God', in A. Hudson and M. Wilks (eds.), *From Ockham to Wyclif*, Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 5 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 63–88.

⁵⁶ Peter Lombard's main source is Book I of Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine*. Another widely discussed distinction partially related to that between enjoyment and use was the distinction between two kinds of love: the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and the love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*). Amicable love is directed at the object for which a good thing is wanted, and concupiscent love is directed at the object which is wanted for someone; see Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II-1.26.4.

⁵⁷ For this and some further examples, see *Reportatio Parisiensis* I.1.3 (Wadding 11, 26–7).

Enjoyment is a form of love which has an actual object. In Scotus's view it is obvious that one can have complacency with something that is present with or without pleasure. When there is love with pleasure, love is a free imperative act, and pleasure is a quality which may accompany this act.⁵⁸ Scotus seems to think that pleasure and distress are cognitive psychic feelings the experience of which qualifies one's attitudes and behaviour. This may explain why he regards these non-imperative phenomena as the passions of the will, and not as feeling aspects of cognition, as Avicenna did.⁵⁹

William Ockham largely follows Scotus in his discussion of the emotions. There are appetitive sensitive passions which are caused by relevant apprehensions, accompanied by physiological changes and moderated through habituation. Their behavioural suggestions can be controlled by the will. Ockham's view of the will and its emotions is also similar to that of Scotus. Ockham distinguished between the acts that can be called passions in the emotional sense and pleasure and distress, which are not acts of the free power but passions caused by the acts of love or hatred, if not prevented by other mental events or states.⁶⁰ Ockham defends this view in a longer argument against Peter Auriol's analysis of fruition in *Ordinatio* I.1.3.

In dealing with the doctrine of ultimate enjoyment, Peter Auriol, a French Franciscan theologian (c.1280–1322), criticized Duns Scotus's distinction between fulfilment and pleasure. Auriol argued that sensitive and intellective appetites have a structure similar to that of natural appetites: there are two positive acts, which correspond to motion to a goal and rest at a goal, and two privative acts corresponding to avoidance of the opposite to a natural goal and restlessness in this state. The positive sensitive and volitional acts are forms of love (*amor*), divided into desire (*desiderium*) and pleasure (*delectatio*), and the negative acts are forms of hatred (*odium*), divided into aversion (*fuga*) and distress (*tristitia*). Auriol states that if there was love distinct from desire or pleasure, it should be complacency (*complacentia*), which precedes desire and gives rise to it, but this is an antecedent pleasure with respect to an absent

⁵⁸ *Reportatio Parisiensis* I.1.3, n. 8 (Wadding 11, 27).

⁵⁹ In *Ord.* III.15, nn. 10–11 (Wadding 7, 332–3), Scotus explains why sensitive pleasure and distress belong to the appetitive power rather than to the cognitive power.

⁶⁰ For Ockham's view of emotions, see V. Hirvonen, 'Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology' (Th.D. thesis, University of Helsinki, 2002); G. J. Etkorn, 'Ockham's View of the Human Passions in the Light of his Philosophical Anthropology', in W. Vossenkuhl and R. Schönberger (eds.), *Die Gegenwart Ockhams* (Weinheim: VCH, 1990), 265–87.

object. Dislike (*displacentia*) is the corresponding antecedent distress. In Auriol's analysis all pleasures are free acts; those distresses associated with love of friendship are free, while those associated with self-regarding love are not so. Referring to this schema, Auriol considered fruitional enjoyment to be, psychologically speaking, identical with pleasure, the act of the will as a response to gaining the object of love.⁶¹

Auriol's conception of love and hatred is a modification of Aquinas's treatment of concupiscible emotions transferred to the acts of will. Feeling was not a relevant classificatory concept for Aquinas, neither is it discussed separately by Auriol in this context. It is possible, however, that in treating complacence and fulfilment as two forms of pleasure, Auriol had in mind the pleasantness of experiencing these acts. Ockham found this confusing, because psychic feelings in his theory are not free acts, but sometimes their concomitants. Regarding them as acts of the will leads to a misguided conception of important mental phenomena and central theological issues.⁶² Ockham's main examples of complacence or fulfilled love without pleasure are the same as Scotus's, an evil angel's continuous love of itself and towards people's actual sinning and the fervent love for God without pleasure in some believers.⁶³ The only systematic difference between Scotus's and Ockham's approaches seems to be that in Ockham's view the passions of the soul are always associated with an actual act of the will—they qualify volitions and cannot occur as such with respect to a representation, as Scotus thought.⁶⁴

The originally Scotist distinction between the actions and passions of the will became very influential, partly because it was employed in William Ockham's theological works and with some changes in John Buridan's *Questions on Ethics*. In Book 10 Buridan writes:

the first act attributed to the will is favoring (*complacentia*) or disfavoring (*displacentia*) an object, which arises from apprehension of the object as good or bad, suitable or unsuitable . . . the will is not free as regards that act and is not

⁶¹ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, ed. E. M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 3 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1952), 1.1.7 (382–417). For Auriol's view and its theological context, see also Georgedes (1995), 190–244.

⁶² While Scotus and Ockham argued for a real distinction between love and pleasure in ultimate enjoyment, Auriol's thesis of their identity in relation to eternal fruition was accepted by the English Franciscans Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham, though they separated love and pleasure associated with finite objects. See McGrade (1987).

⁶³ *Ordinatio* I.1.3 (408.3–10); *Quaestiones variae*, ed. G. J. Etzkorn, F. E. Kelley, and J. C. Wey, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica*, viii (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1984), 6.11 (299.283–96).

⁶⁴ *Quaestiones variae* 6.11 (309.510–12).

its lord by lordship and freedom of opposition . . . Then, upon the act of favoring or disfavoring there sometimes follows another act which we are accustomed to call acceptance (*acceptatio*) or rejection (*refutatio*). This act properly speaking is called volition or nolition, because what I accept I will, and what I reject I will against, and vice versa . . . And third, from the act of acceptance or, properly speaking, of volition, there necessarily follows love (*amor*) and from the act of rejection hate (*odium*); or perhaps the acceptance is, formally, love and the rejection hate . . . But again, from this acceptance or rejection, if together with acceptance there is an apprehension of the thing accepted as something that is to be had but not possessed, there necessarily follows desire (*desiderium*); and if there is an apprehension of it as something had and possessed, there necessarily follows pleasure (*delectatio*). So also if there is an apprehension of a thing rejected as something had, there necessarily arises distress (*tristitia*), and if as something to be had but not had, there arises the opposite of desire . . . the will is not free regarding those acts, namely, of pleasure and distress, except perhaps ‘consequentially’, namely insofar as it is free regarding the preceding act or those acts upon which such pleasure or distress necessarily follows.⁶⁵

Buridan regards complacence (*complacencia*) and dislike (*displacencia*) as primary orientations of the will. They are caused by apprehensions and not free, but they can be freely assented to, which makes them proper acts of the free will. Scotus and Ockham regarded complacence and dislike as free acts. Otherwise Buridan’s analysis and terminology is close to the Scotist schema. Love and hate are freely chosen attitudes, as are desire and abomination, and pleasure and distress are not chosen acts, but feeling states which are associated with the positive results of desire or negative results of abomination. They are so associated because of complacence and dislike; according to Buridan, pleasure and distress as feelings may accompany any complacence and dislike, and some complacence or dislike is always embedded in the acts of the will. Scotus also thought that complacence or love without desire can be accompanied by pleasure. The idea that a positive or negative feeling can accompany any act of the will brought the compositional analysis of emotions (cognition, volition, feeling) into the discussions concerning volitions and nolitions and psychic feelings.

⁶⁵ *Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum* (Paris, 1513), 10.2, trans. S. McGrade in S. McGrade, J. Kilcullen and M. Kempshall (eds.), *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, ii: *Ethics and Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 518–19. For this terminology, see also Buridan’s *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima*, ed. J. Zupko in ‘John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of his ‘Questions on Aristotle’s *De anima*’ (Third Redaction) (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1989), III.18.

4.3 Adam Wodeham and the Discussion of Emotions in England in the 1320s

Adam Wodeham's *Lectura secunda* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* involves an evaluation of various views on eternal enjoyment and related subjects put forward by his English contemporaries in the 1320s.⁶⁶ In addition, Wodeham develops a controversial new theory of his own, which was vigorously criticized by some later fourteenth-century thinkers. In the opening distinction, Wodeham first continues the prologue's discussion of epistemological questions, and then turns to three which deal with enjoyment (*fruitio*): whether enjoyment is really distinct from the soul, whether it is distinct from all cognition, and whether it is distinct from delectation. The question about the distinction between enjoyment and cognition concentrates on an analysis of the cognitive nature of positive and negative acts of will, such as love, fear, and joy. Wodeham begins with a list of arguments for various views. He does not mention many names, and some of the works referred to have not survived. Historical problems notwithstanding, it is not difficult to see what Wodeham's own position is.

Many fourteenth-century authors tried to treat philosophical questions by means of the analytical tools of logic and semantics. As shown by historians of medieval thought, this led some thinkers to develop a new style of thinking and writing about questions in theology and natural philosophy.⁶⁷ Wodeham's philosophical psychology is influenced by this trend, though it is less extreme than, say, Roger Roseth's treatise on the *Sentences*, which concentrates wholly on constructing analytical rules for consistent use of various theoretical terms.⁶⁸ Wodeham's analytical ardour mainly concerns the nature of propositions and the structure of epistemic and other attitudes to apprehensive representations. One of his

⁶⁶ Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum*, ed. R. Wood and G. Gál (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1990). Adam Wodeham (c.1298–1358) was an influential Franciscan theologian who regarded John Duns Scotus and particularly William Ockham as his mentors. The date Rega Wood proposes for the *Lectura secunda* is c.1330. For Wodeham's life and works, see also W. J. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to his Life and Writings*, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 21 (Leiden: Brill, 1978).

⁶⁷ See J. E. Murdoch, 'From Social to Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Medieval Learning', in J. E. Murdoch and E. Sylla (eds.), *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, Synthese Library, 76 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), 271–339, and A. Maierù, 'Logic and Trinitarian Theology: *De Modo Predicandi ac Sylogizandi in Divinis*', in N. Kretzmann (ed.), *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*, Synthese Historical Library, 32 (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 1988), 247–95.

⁶⁸ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, forthcoming edition by O. Hallamaa.

best-known achievements is the theory of the complex significate of proposition.⁶⁹

In dealing with the foundations of epistemology, Wodeham distinguishes between direct acts (*actus rectus*), which are apprehensive acts about extra-mental things, and reflexive acts (*actus reflexus*), the objects of which include one's own acts (1.1.14 (206.23–207.37)). Some of the direct apprehensive acts necessitate the intellect assenting to their content, which is given a propositional form in mental language (*prol.* 6.13 (163.11–164.36)). The assent is described as a separate act by which the mind 'confirms' that things are as signified by the proposition (*prol.* 6.18 (173.13–19)). Some other apprehensions have the property of necessitating the intellect to deny the proposition (1.1.3 (184.23–4)). These simple cases involve propositions which are either self-evident or contradictory because of their terms. Necessitating an assent could be taken to mean that an apprehension causally brings about an assent if one wills to form a judicative act with respect to it. Since this is voluntary, an evidential apprehension does not automatically create a judgement (*prol.* 1.6 (18.22–5)). Immediate awareness about the presence of contingent things also evokes an assent pertaining to existential propositions. In the case of direct acts these are practically certain, provided that sensory illusions are excluded, though God could produce intuitive cognition of non-existent things. Some reflexive acts are not associated with the possibility of doubt—those who are aware that they are thinking cannot believe that they are not thinking (*prol.* 2.2 (37.69–72); 2.4 (41.9–11); 2.9 (51.48–58, 52.85–9); 4.8 (100.72–101.84)). Wodeham considered the possibility of equating the apprehension of an evidential proposition with judgement, but did not find this an attractive idea (1.6.20 (176.12–178.55)).

Let us turn to the discussion of love in the *Lectura secunda* 1.5. Wodeham first quotes several arguments for the view that love, fear, and distress at the intellectual level of the soul are not separate from cognitions, as well as Walter Chatton's arguments against the view that there is no real distinction between love and cognition. One strand of the question of whether love and enjoyment are cognitions was Augustine's remark

⁶⁹ See G. Nuchelmans, 'Adam Wodeham on the Meaning of Declarative Sentences', *Historiographia linguistica*, 7 (1980), 177–86. For Wodeham's conceptions of knowledge, meaning, and understanding, see O. Grassi, *Intuizione e significato: Adam Wodeham ed il problema della conoscenza nel XIV secolo* (Milan: Jaca Book, 1986); K. H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 22 (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 275–310; D. Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Philosophische Abhandlungen, 82 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002), 385–95.

that the mind itself, its knowledge, and its love are one and the same substance (*De Trinitate* 9.12.18); this is also dealt with in the preceding fourth question, 'Whether enjoyment is really distinct from the soul'. In the fifth question Wodeham is more interested in how acts of love and enjoyment are related to cognitive acts. At the beginning Wodeham formulates two principal arguments for separating enjoyment and cognition (272.7–17). First, an act of enjoyment has a cognition as its cause, but must be different from this cognition. This is later explained as follows. While enjoyment has a cognition as its partial cause, it cannot be this cognition, because a thing cannot cause itself (277.8–11). Second, love cannot be cognition, because this would imply that things equally loved are equally known, and vice versa, and when something is loved more than something else, it is also known better than that which is loved less. All this is contrary to experience.⁷⁰

The distinction between love and cognition in Wodeham's discussion seems to reflect the standard fourteenth-century Franciscan theory that cognition is not the sufficient cause of love, but is its necessary condition and specifies its intentional object. Love and cognition are different kinds of mental acts; one is an act of the cognitive faculty, and the other an act of the motive faculty. Some critics had stated that if a cognitive evaluation as a partial cause of love is really distinct from love, God could create an act of love without cognition, which sounds absurd (1.5.2 (274.2–3)). While regarding this as an illuminating remark, Wodeham found it important to argue that an occurrent love is a cognition, and has another cognition as its partial cause. He thought that the content of the cognitive cause must be included in love, so that the cause itself remains a separate act. This is possible if love itself is a complex cognitive act with the same content as the preceding cognition which is its partial cause.

Wodeham's considerations show similarities to some queries in contemporary philosophy of mind. In his *Perception, Emotion, and Action* I. Thalberg criticized the view that a cognitive evaluation is regarded as a separate cause of an occurrent emotion. An emotion seems to involve an evaluative belief without which it could not be identified. Thalberg suggests that emotions are componential, and that a belief is an inner cause of other components of emotions.⁷¹ Wodeham's idea of volitions as twofold

⁷⁰ Thomas Aquinas states that a thing can be loved better than it is known, for it can be loved perfectly without being known perfectly. See *ST* II-1.27.2, ad 2.

⁷¹ I. Thalberg, *Perception, Emotion, and Action: A Component Approach* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 31–6; for related ideas in contemporary componential theories of emotions, see de Sousa (1987) and Greenspan (1988).

cognitions is based on a similar insight. It does not make sense to speak about love or fear apart from cognition as their partial cause. This must be included in love or fear without equating them with their cognitive cause.

In describing the notion of judgement (*iudicium*), Wodeham states that it is a mental act of accepting, refuting, or doubting the apprehension of the significate of a proposition. The mind as it were says 'Yes' or 'No' or remains unsure. The act of assent is a veridical act with respect to the truth of an apprehension. In addition, there is a parallel non-veridical act of accepting or rejecting apprehensions from the point of view of their desirability. This is a volitional act (*prol.* 6.18 (173.13–37)). The actuality of a veridical act in the mind qualifies the subject as one who knows something or believes something, just as the actuality of a volitional act qualifies the subject as one who wills, loves, fears, enjoys, and so on (1.2.5 (219.35–40); 1.5.4 (280.74–81)). These evaluative cognitive acts are accompanied by corresponding behavioural inclinations of various intensities (1.5.9–10).

When one wills something, the first cognition involves either an apprehension of the significate of a proposition, as in the case of a veridical judgement, or an awareness of a single thing. The second cognition is the non-veridical acceptance of the content of the first cognition. Wodeham calls the first cognition a partial cause of volition, but he does not give any detailed analysis of how it is a cause, except that it is a necessary condition and does not necessitate the will (1.5.4 (277.4–11, 278.27–34)). In answering the principal arguments against the view that love and enjoyment are cognitions, Wodeham states in his concluding remark that the arguments are irrelevant when it is realized that love and enjoyment are composed of two cognitions (1.5.11 (293.3–9)). Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly, two influential later authors, did not accept Wodeham's view of volitions as cognitions, and found the theory of two cognitions pointless even if volitions were cognitions.⁷² They apparently did not understand Wodeham's idea that if volitions are treated as analogous to the propositional attitudes of knowledge or belief, the content of their cognitive causes should occur within the scope of a volitional operator. The statement 'S wills that p' is short for 'S thinks about p and this contributes to the fact that S wills that p'.

⁷² Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum I*, ed. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, Spätmittelalter und Reformation. Texte und Untersuchungen, 6 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), I.1.2.2 (212.2–217.7); Peter of Ailly, *Tractatus de anima*, ed. in O. Pluta, *Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des späten Mittelalters*, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 6 (Amsterdam: B. R. Gruener, 1987), 83–4.

Wodeham explains the similarities and dissimilarities between the epistemic and volitional attitudes by various examples. A volitional attitude is not necessarily propositional, since its object can be a non-complex thing, as in 'I love this', or a complex thing which can be expressed by a proposition, like 'I hope that you will become a bishop' (1.5.5 (281.18–39)). As knowledge and belief involve veridical judgements, Wodeham asks whether a complex volitional act similarly involves assent or dissent. He answers that some do and some do not. If a person does not will to take delight in something before being certain that it has really taken place, the actualization of the postponed joy takes place because of a later assent or, as Wodeham says, the joy itself can be regarded as assent. Optative acts or acts with a non-complex object do not presuppose judgements (1.5.5 (281.18–21, 282.40–52)). Another related question is whether volitions can be called true or false. Referring to Aristotle's *De interpretatione* 4, 17a12–15, Wodeham states that, since indicative propositions are true or false, the propositional part of complex volitions is true or false. Their content can be expressed in optative or some other non-indicative form, but they always have an equivalent indicative form, like 'that I am a Christian or a Franciscan' (1.5.7 (284.3–285.30)). It seems that there were others who held that volitions could be treated as combinations of a volitional acceptance and an optative content. In his questions on the *Sentences* (1331–2) Robert Holcot, an Oxford Dominican, defended this version of the compositional cognition theory of volition.⁷³

In question 6 of the first distinction of the *Lectura secunda* Wodeham asks whether the pleasure involved in enjoying God is really distinct from love and enjoyment. Wodeham, like Chatton, deviates from the view of Scotus and Ockham. He found it strange to think that there could be beatific enjoyment in any sense without pleasure.⁷⁴ Wodeham tried to explain the distinction between love and enjoyment as free acts and pleasure as something we undergo by stating that pleasure can be intrinsic to an act without being the object to which the act is directed (1.6.6 (306.35–307.47)). Pleasure is intrinsically embedded in beatific enjoyment,

⁷³ Robert Holcot, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum questiones* (Lyon, 1518; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 1.3.5. See also Blaise of Parma, *Quaestiones de anima*, ed. G. Federici Vescovini, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere 'La Colombaria', Studi, 30 (Florence: Olschki, 1974), III.9 (145).

⁷⁴ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* 1.6.2 (295.3–12); cf. Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias: Liber I, distinctiones 1–9*, ed. J. C. Wey and G. J. Etzkorn, Studies and Texts, 141 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 1.1.2.2 (41.13–25). The views of Ockham, Chatton, Wodeham, and Bradwardine are analysed in McGrade (1987).

and is also involved in some other forms of love, being an aspect of love rather than something separate from it. In fact, all volitional pleasures and distresses are forms of love or hate. In criticizing the view of Peter Auriol, Wodeham prefers to use the terms *complacencia* and *displacencia* in the same way as Scotus and Ockham did, and most of his examples of complacence or love without pleasure and dislike or aversion without distress are the same as in Scotus and Ockham (1.6.11–13). As far as Wodeham's discussion of the notions of pleasure and distress is meant to explain subjective feelings, as they were understood by Scotus and Ockham, the difference between the views that pleasure is an aspect of complacence or a separate thing caused by complacence is not very great. Since Wodeham thought that pleasure and distress as emotions are concomitants of volitions or nolitions, he would disagree with Scotus's view that they can occur without any act of the will (1.6.6 (307.42–5)).⁷⁵

Wodeham takes several pages to deal with a popular example which is used as an argument against separating fear of pain from cognition. The basic idea is as follows. Let us suppose that one's belief about a pain tomorrow causes fear with an intensity of x . If one comes to believe that the pain will continue the next day, the intensity of the fear will be $2x$, then $3x$ for three days, and so on. If one believes that the pain will be eternal, which was regarded as a real Christian option, the intensity of fear should be infinite. This is not possible, since there are no actual infinite intensities in finite beings. The theory must be wrong, since it implies something impossible (1.5.2 (275.55–66)).

Wodeham deals with many versions of this argument, which was also discussed by Ockham and later by Roger Roseth, who associated it with questions about whether pleasure could increase infinitely.⁷⁶ The popularity of the example was based on its religious significance and the role of the notions of infinity and the latitude of forms which were studied by many scholars in Wodeham's time. It is not very easy to see how the example was understood in the criticism of the distinction between fear and cognition. Perhaps it was thought that if an actual fear is a separate quality, it could increase infinitely. One solution was pragmatic: since people cannot have very vivid representations of future pain, the increase

⁷⁵ Wodeham calls Aristotelian pleasures which are supervenient on actions reflexive pleasures; these are not necessarily volitional pleasures (1.6.5 (302.21–7); 1.6.6 (306.14–24)).

⁷⁶ William Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, ed. J. C. Wey, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica*, ix (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1980), 2.13 (173.158–175.194); Roger Roseth, *Lectura* 5.2.

in fear become less and less intense. In the version of this argument which Wodeham ascribes to Ockham, it is stated that even infinitely increasing fear remains finite when understood in this manner (1.5.9 (291.61–9)).⁷⁷ Wodeham was not satisfied with this answer, because then a fear of temporal pain could be more intense than the fear of eternal suffering. He says that it is an empirical fact that the fear of eternal suffering is more intense than any fear of temporal suffering—a historically interesting remark about sentiments in fourteenth-century England (1.5.9 (290.57–9)). Wodeham suggests that since the propositions about increase and decrease which involve the term ‘infinite’ are analysed differently from those which pertain to finite cases, the fear of eternal suffering is a special kind of fear and is more intense than other forms of fear (1.5.10). I shall not enter into the somewhat complicated details of the argument, which is influenced by Wodeham’s theory of the latitude of forms.

Wodeham extends his discussion of beatific enjoyment to the acts of will in general and applies emotional terms to them. This was not anything new in itself, but Wodeham, as distinct from his medieval predecessors, thought that the phenomena of the will form the proper and sufficient context for dealing with emotions in general. Equating the analysis of emotions with the analysis of volitions had a theoretical basis in Wodeham’s refutation of the real or formal distinction between the sensitive and intellective souls. In his view the sensations are received immediately by the intellect, and similarly, the sensitive appetitive acts by the will. There are sensitive appetitive movements, but one can deal with them by concentrating on the will, since these are what the will follows if it does not control its immediate acts (*prol.* 1.2, 5–6). Wodeham’s transposition of the questions of the psychology of the sensitive powers to the psychology of the will and intellect and his analysis of volitions as cognitions makes his theory more similar to Stoic psychology than to any other historical alternative. Wodeham does not refer to the Stoics, but it is possible that some of the masters who had equated volitions with cognitions before him were influenced by Cicero or Seneca. There are some differences between Wodeham and the Stoics. For one thing, emotions are evaluative thoughts, but only some of them can be regarded as judgments. They are true or false, but this pertains to the content of emotional cognitions. Even though Wodeham characterizes pleasure and distress as

⁷⁷ The editors of the *Lectura secunda* assume that this might be Richard Fitzralph’s view (1, 275, 288–9).

forms of love or hate, and consequently as cognitions, he also treats them as the feeling aspects of volitional states. He does not explain how they are felt.⁷⁸

4.4 Late Medieval Compendia

The passions of the soul remained a central theme in later medieval philosophy, but, instead of new systematic or analytic ideas, the scholarly discussions in theology, ethics, and natural philosophy mainly offered expositions of earlier views and some comments on them. There were also writers who dealt with emotions from the point of view of spiritual or ethical guidance, without any great theoretical ambition. These approaches were partly associated with early Italian humanism and partly with the movements of religious reform, and could employ ancient works on consolation and therapy and the monastic spiritual tradition of the improvement of the soul. Many scholars have noted the increasing interest in Seneca's and Cicero's works in this context. Petrarch combined Christian and Stoic views, and some others—for example, Coluccio Salutati and John Gerson—found certain Stoic ideas useful but also criticized the doctrine of apathy.⁷⁹ Petrarch and Salutati were among the proponents of the influential humanist idea of rhetoric as a central educational institution for improving the passionate soul.

An influential brief treatment of emotions was included in Peter of Ailly's *Tractatus de anima* (c.1380), an introduction to psychology involving expositions of standard medieval themes, such as the nature of the soul and its powers and operations. Among its main sources were Aristotle's *De anima*, Pseudo-Albert's *Summa naturalium*, and Gregory of Rimini's commentary on the *Sentences*, but the author also made use of works by John Buridan, William Ockham, and some other sources.⁸⁰ While Peter of Ailly's work consists largely of quotations from the sources, it is more

⁷⁸ Wodeham states that pleasures and distresses as the acts of love and hate are often necessitated; Jesus' natural fear of death necessarily made him feel sorrow at the thought of his suffering (1.6.6 (307.48–52)).

⁷⁹ J. Kraye, 'Moral Philosophy', in C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 360–70; G. W. McClure, *Sorrow and Consolation in Italian Humanism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); L. A. Panizza, 'Stoic Psychotherapy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Petrarch's *De remediis*', in M. J. Osler (ed.), *Atoms, pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 39–65. For Gerson, see *De passionibus animae*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. P. Glorieux, ix (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1973), 8, 10–11.

⁸⁰ For the sources see Pluta (1987).

ambitious than it looks, aiming at separating psychology as a discipline of natural philosophy from the metaphysics of the soul and sketching the central topics of psychology as a science.⁸¹

The part on the sensitive soul in Peter of Ailly's treatise is largely based on the *Summa naturalium*, and consequently repeats the central ideas of Avicennian psychology.⁸² Passions are treated as the acts of the sensitive motive power which are activated by sensations through the acts of the estimative power. Passions are classified into four groups, as in the Stoic fourfold table, and, in a more detailed manner, as in Aquinas's taxonomy. The author also mentions the older idea of dividing passions into concupiscible and irascible movements, depending on whether they pertain to good things or bad things (30–1, 90–2; cf. p. 229 above). The main part of the treatment of the passions consists in explaining how the quality of the spirits is influenced by the conditions of the blood, which are the movements of the spirits and the heart which accompany sensitive motive acts, and how the medical theories dealing with these matters divide passions into pleasure, distress, anger, fear, anxiety, and shame. There is also a paragraph on how the acts of imagination may have causal effects on bodies other than one's own (31–2, 91–6).⁸³

Peter of Ailly, following Gregory of Rimini, states that the term 'passion' is sometimes used about all psychic acts, sometimes about the appetitive acts, and, most properly, about sensitive appetitive acts (89).⁸⁴ Brief remarks on the acts of will in Peter of Ailly are also derived from Gregory. Volitions can be divided into those of love (*complacentia*) and hate (*displacentia*). Pleasure and distress are forms of love and hate, though it is not the case, *pace* Auriol, that all love is pleasure or desire or that all hate is distress or avoidance. As mentioned above, Peter of Ailly also repeats Gregory of Rimini's criticism of Wodeham's cognition theory of volition (84–8).⁸⁵ Gregory of Rimini criticized the view of Scotus and Ockham that pleasure and distress should be regarded as passive states of the will, and

⁸¹ J. Zupko argues that this was also the aim of John Buridan, and that it is in Peter of Ailly's work 'written only a generation after Buridan, that we find the separation of psychology from metaphysics complete'. See J. Zupko, 'Substance and Soul: The Late Medieval Origins of Early Modern Psychology', in S. F. Brown (1998), 136.

⁸² *Summa naturalium*, which was frequently considered a work by Albert the Great, was a thirteenth-century compilation of Albert's views. The treatise is edited in B. Geyer, *Die Albert dem Grossen zugeschriebene Summa naturalium* (Philosophia pauperum), Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 35.1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1938).

⁸³ For the passions in medical literature, see p. 215 above.

⁸⁴ Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura* I.1.2.2 (226.18–26).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* I.1.2.2 (217.10–220.31, 233.8–20); see also n. 72 above.

not volitional acts.⁸⁶ Peter of Ailly leaves this question open in *Tractatus de anima*.

John Gerson, who succeeded Peter of Ailly as Chancellor of the University of Paris, put forward similar psychological ideas in his *On the Passions of the Soul*, though this work concentrates mainly on the psychology of spiritual experience.⁸⁷ In another summary of the passions, Gerson presented probably the longest medieval list of particular emotions; some 100 items are classified under the eleven types of Aquinas's taxonomy.⁸⁸ Gerson thought that Aquinas's classification of the types of passion, which pertains primarily to the acts of the sensitive motive power, can be applied to the acts of rational appetite, which is the will, as well as to the affective acts of the spiritual apex of the soul. Following the tradition of monastic mysticism, Gerson states that devoted people can have supernatural divine experiences through the spiritual senses. In dealing with sensitive emotions, Gerson repeated, as Peter of Ailly did, the traditional ideas about the qualities of the humours, the movements of the spirits and the heart, and the medical classification of passions. Gerson's idea of the parallelism between sensitive, intellectual, and mystical passions exemplifies the late medieval tendency to regard affective experiences as one class of mental phenomena, which is then divided into the reactions of the various psychic powers.

Peter of Ailly's treatise on the soul was later used as a source for short general introductions used in psychology teaching in the Arts faculties. Another group of pedagogical works included questions on Aristotle's *De anima*. These were meant to provide masters with sufficient information about the central issues of Aristotle's work, which was the basic textbook. An example of this kind of literature is provided by the works of two prominent Erfurtian teachers, Bartholomeus Arnoldi de Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter, who declared in a joint disputation in 1497 that philosophy at Erfurt follows the teaching of Ockham. They considered themselves representatives of what was called 'the modern way'. By referring to Ockham, they wanted to make clear that they were not followers

⁸⁶ Like Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini argued against the distinction between pleasure and the beatific vision (I.1.2.3 (240.31–241.10)). In regarding pleasure as a form of love, he thought that Aristotle's remarks on pleasures which are supervening on operations also refer to volitions. In his view Aristotle stated in *EN* 10.5 (1175b34–5) that pleasures in general are neither perceptions nor thoughts (I.1.2.2 (225.6–18)). While this is a misguided interpretation of Aristotle, Gregory correctly remarks that Scotus misquoted Aristotle's remark in *EN* 7.14 (I.1.2.2 (229.1–5)); see also n. 52 above.

⁸⁷ *De passionibus animae*, 1–25; see also the brief tract *De passionibus animae*, *Oeuvres* ix, 155–7.

⁸⁸ *Enumeratio peccatorum ab Alberto posita*, *ibid.* 160–1.

of thirteenth-century masters; they were not rigorous followers of Ockham.⁸⁹ Emotions are discussed briefly in Usingen's *Parvulus philosophie naturalis* (Leipzig, 1499), *Exercitium de anima* (Erfurt, 1507), and *Compendium naturalis philosophie* (Erfurt, 1507) and in the psychological eighth book of Trutfetter's *Summa in totam physicen* (Erfurt, 1514). Usingen's *Exercitium de anima* was based partially on John of Lutrea's *Exercitium in libros Aristotelis de Anima* (Erfurt, 1482); this represented the Erfurtian tradition of reading Aristotle's *De anima* in accordance with Buridianian guide-lines.⁹⁰ Usingen's *Parvulus philosophie naturalis* was modelled on Peter of Dresden's *Parvulus philosophie naturalis*, a concise fifteenth-century compendium.⁹¹ Usingen treats sensitive and intellectual appetites as analogous; both of these are divided into concupiscible and irascible acts on the basis of the nature of the cognitive evaluations which are associated with them.⁹² Sensitive passions are also considered from the point of view of physical affections. In a Buridianian manner, Usingen states that *complacentia* and *displacentia* as the first movements of the will are not free. Hence these are not sins, since according to Augustine only free volitions are sins.⁹³

In his discussion of the passions Trutfetter often refers to Peter of Ailly's *Tractatus de anima*, various works by William Ockham, and the *Collectorium* of Gabriel Biel.⁹⁴ Other authors are also referred to, among them Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Abano, and John Gerson.⁹⁵ Trutfetter deals with the topics discussed in Peter of Ailly's tract, but there are also longer discussions of first movements, habits, virtues, and conscience (*Summa in totam physicen* 8.1.2). Like Usingen, Trutfetter thinks that the passions of the soul can be divided into sensitive appetites and volitions. Usingen and Trutfetter were not very interested in detailed classifications. Trutfetter puts forward two tables which are derived from Peter of Ailly, one which involves traditional medical passions distinguished on the basis of

⁸⁹ See S. Lalla, *Secundum viam modernam: Ontologischer Nominalismus bei Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003).

⁹⁰ For the psychological works of Usingen and Trutfetter, see P. Kärkkäinen, 'Teaching of Aristotelian Psychology in Erfurt 1480–1520', forthcoming.

⁹¹ See Lalla (2003), 77–86. A more ambitious early fifteenth-century Italian compendium was Paul of Venice's *Summa philosophiae naturalis* (Venice, 1503). This involves questions on Aristotle's *De anima*; short remarks on passions are traditional.

⁹² *Exercitium de anima* P4r.

⁹³ *Parvulum philosophie naturalis* 113v; *Compendium naturalis philosophie* M4r.

⁹⁴ *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. W. Werbeck and U. Hofmann, 5 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973–84); *Indices*, ed. W. Werbeck (Tübingen: Mohr, 1992).

⁹⁵ Peter of Abano's *Conciliator differentiarum* on medicine and natural philosophy (1303) was printed several times in the Renaissance period.

quick or slow centrifugal or centripetal movements of the spirit, and another in which appetite and joy are regarded as concupiscible passions, and distress and fear as irascible passions.⁹⁶ For further reading, Trutfetter refers to the classifications in Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* II-1.22–48 and Gregor Reisch's *Margarita philosophica* (8.1.2, Dd3v; Gg4v-Hh1r).

Margarita philosophica was an encyclopaedic work with introductions to many topics in a brief compass. Its classification of the passions is derived, without reference to the source, from John of la Rochelle's *Summa de anima*. Through Reisch's influential work many sixteenth-century authors became familiar with John of la Rochelle's taxonomy, which in medieval times was overshadowed by Aquinas's classification.⁹⁷ Trutfetter's reference to Aquinas's theory did not imply that he accepted its classificatory principles based on the various contraries of movements. He apparently thought that Aquinas's list of the types of passions was useful, being aware that this was criticized by authors influenced by Scotus's scepticism toward received divisions. Gabriel Biel was one of the influential critics.⁹⁸ Cardinal Cajetan defended Aquinas's taxonomy and criticized Scotus's ideas. The diversification of views among Catholic theologians is shown by Suárez's finding no good reason for Aquinas's distinction between the concupiscible and irascible passions.⁹⁹ Since the views of emotions put forward in medieval faculty psychology, medical theory, and late medieval controversies continued to be discussed, along with other matters, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is somewhat arbitrary to stop here. It seems that these philosophical traditions are much more relevant to the psychology of emotions in Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, or Leibniz than is usually acknowledged.

⁹⁶ Gabriel Biel argued that the traditional Stoic fourfold schema can be applied both to concupiscible acts which are associated with pleasure and to irascible acts which are associated with aggression: *Collectorium* III.26 (473.5–474.32).

⁹⁷ Gregor Reisch, *Margarita philosophica* (Strasbourg, 1504), 12.4–5.

⁹⁸ Biel follows Scotus's distinction between concupiscible and irascible passions, and applies it both to sensitive appetites and to the will; see *Collectorium* III.26 (471.4–473.40).

⁹⁹ See P. King, 'Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions: Controversies in the Thomist Tradition', in Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri (2002), 229–58. The distinction was also abandoned in Juan Luis Vives's influential *De anima et vita* (1538) which was much influenced by traditional medical theories; see L. Casini, 'Emotions in Renaissance Humanism: Juan Luis Vives' *De anima et vita*', in Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri (2002), 205–28.

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