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Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought

Paul Redding

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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE RETURN OF HEGELIAN THOUGHT

This book examines the possibilities for the rehabilitation of Hegelian thought within current analytic philosophy. From its inception, the analytic tradition has in general accepted Bertrand Russell's hostile dismissal of the idealists, based on the claim that their metaphysical views were irretrievably corrupted by the faulty logic that informed them. But these assumptions are challenged by the work of such analytic philosophers as John McDowell and Robert Brandom, who while contributing to core areas of the analytic movement, nevertheless have found in Hegel sophisticated ideas that are able to address problems which still haunt the analytic tradition after a hundred years. Paul Redding traces the consequences of the displacement of the logic presupposed by Kant and Hegel by modern post-Fregean logic, and examines the developments within twentieth-century analytic philosophy which have made possible an analytic re-engagement with a previously dismissed philosophical tradition.

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521872720

First published in print format 2007

ISBN-13 978-0-511-36762-5 eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-10 0-511-36762-7 eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13 978-0-521-87272-0 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-87272-3 hardback

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks must go first to Robert Brandom and John McDowell and, coming from the other direction, Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard, who have all demonstrated in their own ways the classically Hegelian truth that there is unity to be found between philosophies usually taken to be antithetical. For the example, and for the help, feedback and encouragement provided by each in their different ways, I am extremely grateful. Earlier in my career, the late Bill Bonney had introduced me to the contemporaneity of Kant, and György Markus, to the timelessness of Hegel. I am particularly grateful to have had teachers such as these.

The Sydney region has attractions beyond those of sun and surf – for one, it has a lively and diverse philosophical community. I have benefited from conversations with too many to thank individually, but would have to mention Rick Benitez, David Braddon-Mitchell, Bruin Christensen, Jean-Philippe Deranty, Moira Gatens, Stephen Gaukroger, John Grumley, Duncan Ivison, Jane Johnson, Simon Lumsden, David Macarthur, Justine McGill, Melissa McMahon, Paul Patton, Huw Price, Philip Quadrio, Robert Sinnerbrink, Nick (Nicholas H) Smith and Nick (Nicholas J. J.) Smith. Among those from further afield, I would like to thank Jim Kreines, Graham Priest, Marcelo Stamm, Bob Stern, Bob Wallace, Ken Westphal, Robert Williams and Günter Zöller. At different phases of the project I greatly benefited from the assistance of Kim Frost, Rachel Goodman, Melissa McMahon and Nandi Theunissen. Late in

the project I received excellent feedback from Francesco Berto, who clearly has been down many of the paths I have wandered into here. Wherever I have *failed* to take advantage of the good advice offered by all above, I have only myself to thank.

Two readers for Cambridge University Press (I can thank by name Robert Hanna, who outed himself as one of these) provided invaluable feedback on an earlier (larger, messier) incarnation, as did Robert Pippin, this time in his role of series editor. I also wish to thank Hilary Gaskin for her help with bringing the project to fruition, and Sara Barnes. Large parts of this project were undertaken with the assistance of a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council, for which I am most grateful.

Vicki Varvaressos, my life-partner, has been the sustaining source of spiritual support and love that for me is the absolute condition for doing anything whatever.

INTRODUCTION: ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE FALL AND RISE OF THE KANT–HEGEL TRADITION

Should it come as a surprise when a technical work in the philosophy of language by a prominent analytic philosopher is described as 'an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage', as has Robert Brandom's *Making It Explicit*?[1] It can if one has in mind a certain picture of the relation of analytic philosophy to 'German idealism'. This particular picture has been called analytic philosophy's 'creation myth', and it was effectively established by Bertrand Russell in his various accounts of the birth of the 'new philosophy' around the turn of the twentieth century.[2]

> It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think that the first published account of the new philosophy was

[1] As does Richard Rorty in his 'Introduction' to Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, with introduction by Richard Rorty and study guide by Robert Brandom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 8–9.

[2] The phrase is from Steve Gerrard, 'Desire and Desirability: Bradley, Russell, and Moore Versus Mill' in W. W. Tait (ed.), *Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein* (Chicago: Open Court, 1997): 'The core of the myth (which has its origins in Russell's memories) is that with philosophical argument aided by the new logic, Russell and Moore slew the dragon of British Idealism . . . An additional aspect is that the war was mainly fought over two related doctrines of British Idealism . . . The first doctrine is an extreme form of holism: abstraction is always falsification. Truth can be fully predicated of the absolute alone, not of any of Its constituents . . . The second Idealist doctrine is that external relations are not real', p. 40.

> Moore's article in *Mind* on 'The Nature of Judgement'. Although neither he nor I would now adhere to all the doctrines in this article, I, and I think he, would still agree with its negative part – i.e. with the doctrine that fact is in general independent of experience.[3]

Russell's accounts of his first eight years at Cambridge culminating in his rebellion against idealism convey a familiar picture of the precocious young man coming to find his distinctive voice. Philosophically, he found himself in an environment dominated by 'Kantians' or 'Hegelians',[4] and disappointment with the teaching of the mathematics to which he had been initially drawn led him to plunge 'with whole-hearted delight into the fantastic world of philosophy'. Initially he 'went over completely to a semi-Kantian, semi-Hegelian metaphysic',[5] and for the next four years became increasingly Hegelian in outlook, embarking on a series of Hegelian works on mathematics and physics. When the break with idealism came in 1898 however, his outlook was very different. It was experienced as a break with the 'dry logical doctrines' into which he had been 'indoctrinated', and as a 'great liberation, as if I had escaped from a hot-house on to a wind-swept headland'.[6]

This was a time, of course, when revolution was in the air, and Russell uses this term to describe the change in his approach to philosophy in 1898, this revolution contrasting with the 'evolution' of his views from that time on. From his descriptions of the change of outlook, however, it would seem more appropriate to talk of a reversal or perhaps inversion with regard to his relation to Hegelianism. As he tells it, it was his work on Leibniz that had led him to the topic of *relations* and there he discovered a thesis at the heart not only of Leibniz's metaphysics but also of the 'systems of Spinoza, Hegel and Bradley'.[7] This thesis he termed the 'axiom of internal relations'. Its content was that '[e]very relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms',[8] and it was ultimately based on Leibniz's assumption that 'every proposition attributes a

[3] Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959), p. 42. A similar account is given in 'My Mental Development' in P. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press, 1946).

[4] Sidgwick, 'the last survivor of the Benthamites', was the exception. Ibid., p. 30.

[5] Ibid., pp. 29–30.

[6] Ibid., p. 48.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 43.

predicate to a subject and (what seemed to him almost the same thing) that every fact consists of a substance having a property'.[9]

This idea that it was the adherence to the subject–predicate structure of the Aristotelian categorical judgement, and the syllogistic term logic based on it, that was at the heart of the idealists' metaphysical errors became the commonplace of Russell's various accounts. Thus, for example, in 1914, Russell writes:

> Mr Bradley has worked out a theory according to which, in all judgement, we are ascribing a predicate to Reality as a whole; and this theory is derived from Hegel. Now the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject, and from this it easily follows that there can be only one subject, the Absolute, for if there were two, the proposition that there were two would not ascribe a predicate to either. Thus Hegel's doctrine, that philosophical propositions must be of the form, "the Absolute is such-and-such" depends upon the traditional belief in the universality of the subject–predicate form. This belief, being traditional, scarcely self-conscious, and not supposed to be important, operates underground, and is assumed in arguments which, like the refutation of relations, appear at first such as to establish its truth. This is the most important respect in which Hegel uncritically assumes the traditional logic.[10]

This criticism of the logic presupposed by Bradley and Hegel of course highlighted the general philosophical significance of the *new* system of logic, the first order predicate calculus with 'quantification theory' ultimately based on a propositional rather than, as with Aristotle, a term logic. This new logic derived from the work of Gottlob Frege, and Russell was one of its earliest advocates and developers.

An intellectual revolution could, presumably, proceed by abandoning the old and developing some new approach to the problems under consideration – in this case, problems concerning the foundations of mathematics. But Russell's characteristic reaction to idealism, as he tells it, seems to have been not so much to *deny* its central axiom and replace it with a new one, but to assert its contrary – to replace the axiom of *internal relations* with that of *external relations*. 'Having become convinced that the Hegelian arguments against this and that were invalid' he notes, 'I reacted to the opposite extreme and began to believe in the reality of

[9] Ibid., p. 48.

[10] Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1914), p. 48.

whatever could not be *dis*proved'.[11] Thus in opposition to the *monism* which he believed necessarily flowed from the axiom of internal relations he opposed an *atomistic*, *pluralistic* view. As Ray Monk points out, Russell was fond of referring to the monistic idealism derived by his teachers from Kant and Hegel, as the 'bowl of jelly' view of the world to which he came to oppose his own 'bucket of shot' view.[12]

Russell's policy of 'believ[ing] everything the Hegelians disbelieved'[13] gave him his curiously pluralistic ontology of this early period: 'I imagined all the numbers sitting in a row in a Platonic heaven ... I thought that points of space and instants of time were actually existing entities, and that matter might very well be composed of actual elements such as physics found convenient. I believed in a world of universals, consisting mostly of what is meant by verbs and prepositions'.[14] In this Platonic realism Russell was clearly influenced by Moore who also had started out as an idealist influenced by Bradley but had swung around to a realism critical of Bradley in his 'Prize Fellowship' dissertation for Trinity College.[15] Moore's criticism was directed mostly to what he took to be Kant and Bradley's denial of the 'independence' of facts from knowledge or consciousness, and in its place construed judgement as the mind's direct grasp of mind-independent concepts, regarded as the constituents of the propositions constituting the world. Thus, although Moore was later known as an advocate of common sense, as Thomas Baldwin notes, 'it would be a great mistake to regard Moore's early philosophy as a reaction of common sense empiricism against the excesses of idealism; in its commitment to timeless being Moore's early philosophy is anti-empiricist'.[16] Moore's extreme Platonism perplexed members of the idealist establishment such as Bosanquet, who had examined Moore's thesis in 1898, complaining that *this* way of correcting

[11] Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, p. 10.

[12] Ray Monk, 'Was Russell an Analytic Philosopher?' in Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 42. The passage of Russell's account of Hegel's jelly-like universe that Monk discusses is from Bertrand Russell, *Portraits from Memory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 21. In Chapter 8 I argue against the implied idea that Hegel views the world as a single substance.

[13] Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, p. 48.

[14] Ibid., pp. 48–9.

[15] Peter Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 118–24.

[16] Thomas Baldwin, *G.E. Moore* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 40. Moreover, according to Baldwin, Moore not only misunderstood the nature of both Kant's and Bradley's ethical theories, but his *own* ethical theory, which is, Baldwin thinks, 'best reconstructed (I do not say interpreted) as an incomplete Kantian theory'. Ibid., p. 9.

the alleged subjectivism of Kant surely amounted to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.[17]

The choice of *Platonism* rather than empiricism as an alternative to his teachers' idealism has to be seen in the context of Moore's deep antagonism to forms of ethical naturalism, in particular that of J. S. Mill. Perhaps the most well-known doctrine from the major work of Moore's career – the hugely influential *Principia Ethica* of 1903 – was its critique of 'the naturalistic fallacy', and far from being an anti-idealist critique, the critique of naturalism in ethics had effectively been a staple of the idealist tradition. In the latter third of the nineteenth century it had been idealism which had claimed the anti-psychologistic high ground, Kant's comments on Locke's 'physiological' approach to the mind in the *Critique of Pure Reason* effectively having established the model for this kind of critique of reducing normative to natural facts.[18] In the last third of the nineteenth century, Hermann Lotze, whom John Passmore has referred to as the most pillaged philosopher of that century,[19] had revived the Kantian critique of this reduction of ethical normativity with a vengeance.[20]

In effect, Moore's criticism of Kant and Bradley in *Principia* was essentially that they had not gone *far enough* in their critique of psychologism. Bradley had differentiated between ideas as particular psychological states and the universal non-psychological contents or meanings of those states, but had stopped short of logical realism and thought of logic as 'incomplete' and in need of psychology.[21] In this, Bradley just

[17] Bosanquet's comments are quoted in Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 120–1.

[18] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A86–7/B119.

[19] John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1966), p. 49. On the relevance of Lotze to Frege in particular, see Gottfried Gabriel, 'Frege, Lotze, and the Continental roots of Early Analytic Philosophy', in Erich Reck (ed.), *From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[20] Thomas Hurka (in 'Moore in the Middle', *Ethics* 113 (2003), 599–630) points out that contemporary reviews of *Principia* did not think its central anti-naturalist claim particularly original. Hurka agrees with the gist of these claims, placing Moore in the middle of a tradition stretching from predecessors such as Sidgwick, Rashdall, Brentano and McTaggart, to successors including Prichard, Broad, Ross, Ewing, and, in the continent of Europe, Meinong and Nicolai Hartmann.

[21] 'Truth necessarily (if I am right) implies an aspect of psychical existence. In order to be, truth itself must happen and occur, and must exist as what we call a mental event. Hence, to completely realize itself as truth, truth would have to include this essential aspect of its own being. And yet from this aspect logic, if it means to exist, is compelled to abstract'. F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1922),

seems to repeat Kant's rejection of any notion of 'intellectual intuition' as a form of cognition of which finite human beings were capable. For Kant, the only *immediate* representations of which we humans were capable were ones based on our sensory, causal interaction with the world, and these could only be given epistemic status by being made the contents of non-conceptual forms of representation ('intuitions') to which further general representations ('concepts') could be applied. To see ourselves as capable of knowing things in themselves, unmediated by our sensory affections, was to attribute to ourselves the god-like powers of an infinite, non-embodied mind, the powers of 'intellectual intuition'. But the step beyond Kant and Bradley to something like intellectual intuition was precisely the step that Moore and, following him, Russell, seemed prepared to take.[22] The project of rendering ethics autonomous was one shared by Moore on the one hand, and the idealists on the other; the belief that this could only be done by a Platonic realist ontology was what separated them.[23]

The other major factor at play in the years around the turn of the century in the development of the new philosophy was, of course, Russell's rapid assimilation of the radical changes in logic and mathematics that had been developing in continental Europe for two decades. In *My Philosophical Development*, Russell describes the significance of learning, from Peano at the *International Congress of Philosophy* in Paris in 1900, of two technical innovations. The first was that universal affirmative judgements, such as 'All Greeks are mortal', should *not* be thought of on the model of a singular judgement such as 'Socrates is mortal', but should be analyzed as conditionals, as in 'for all things, if something is a Greek, then that thing is mortal'. The second was that a class consisting of one member cannot be equated *with* that member itself. These ideas gave him crucial tools for developing a logic of relations needed for his work on mathematics and with which he could oppose the 'axiom of internal relations'. Using these tools he quickly drafted much of *The Principles of Mathematics* which came out in the same year as Moore's *Principia Ethica*, making 1903 the official birth date of analytic philosophy. But just as the story of Moore's relation to Bradley

p. 612, quoted in Gerrard, 'Desire and Desirability', p. 67. This dependency also went the other way. Psychology was also incomplete, and stood in need of logic.

[22] Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, ch. 4.

[23] As is made clear by Christian Piller: 'What distinguishes Moore from Sidgwick and Kant is that Moore tries to secure the autonomy of ethics ontologically: its most fundamental object, the property of being good, is unique'. Christian Piller, 'The new realism in ethics', in Thomas Baldwin (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870–1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 279.

was more complicated than it appears at first sight, so was that concerning Russell's. While in 1959 he tells of first learning of the treatment of universally quantified judgements as conditionals from *Peano*, he also tells of his having read and assimilated Bradley's *The Principles of Logic* in the early 1890s, the significance of which lies in the fact that there Bradley had himself treated universally affirmative judgements as conditionals.[24] Moreover, Russell had already acknowledged this in a footnote in his groundbreaking essay of 1905, 'On Denoting'.[25] As will be seen below (Chapter 3), Bradley's understanding of universal affirmations as having the structure of *conditionals* is hardly surprising as it is implicit in Kant's own transcendental logic.[26]

Recent work on the origins of analytic philosophy has started to replace the myth with historical truth, but, as earlier idealists such as Schelling and Hegel had suggested, and as social scientists like Durkheim were coming to learn from empirical studies at the time of analytic philosophy's birth, myths are more than sets of mistaken beliefs about the world, they are cultural products which play constitutive roles in the formation and maintenance of group identities, exemplifying and reflecting back to their members the shared fundamental norms and values binding them as a group. To the extent that philosophers were starting to form a relatively coherent professionalized group, it would be unrealistic to think that they were free of such influences. Richard Watson has argued that Russell's 'shadow Hegel', a literary creation with little resemblance to the actual historical philosopher, had played a crucial role in the development of analytic philosophy: 'Russell's Hegel made some obvious errors that the developing philosophy of the day could correct. The shadow Hegel is the rock that logical atomism could

[24] Russell refers to Bradley's, *Principles of Logic*, (first edition) Bk. 1, ch. II. There Bradley says that in the judgement 'Animals are mortal': 'We *mean* 'Whatever is an animal will die', but that is the same as *If* anything is an animal *then* it is mortal. The assertion really is about mere hypothesis; it is not about fact'. Ibid., p. 47. Earlier Bradley notes that his account is derived by a correction of J. F. Herbart's more psychologistic way of taking all judgements as hypotheticals. Ibid., p. 43.

[25] Bertrand Russell, *Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 43.

[26] Not only that, the gist of Russell's other great lesson from Peano, that a class with one member cannot be identified with that member was also implicit in Kant's transcendental logic, appearing there as the difference between the notions of 'singularity' (*Einzelheit*) and 'particularity' (*Besonderheit*), a difference deriving from Aristotle that had been lost in the nominalistic English tradition, but not in the German tradition. This issue is explored below in Chapter 3.

take as a jumping-off place . . . The shadow Hegel's system authenticates the philosophy that casts off from and corrects it'.[27]

Philosophers may be just as prone to mythologize their collective existence as members of any other social group, but it should also be said that one of the values to which philosophy attempts to give expression in its myths is that of being consistently *critical* of such myths. In any case, we are fortunate now to have available a body of historical work about the tradition of philosophical analysis to counter the standard Russellian account. In contrast to the Russellian creation myth with its simple opposition between analytic philosophy and Kant-derived idealism, the actual picture presented in such works is much more complex. Many of the different strands that have been woven into analytic philosophy throughout its history can be characterized just as much in terms of their affinity to Kantian and Hegelian idealism, *rightly understood*, as they can be in terms of the radical opposition foregrounded in Russell. Russell's caricaturing of idealism, however, was so successful at a rhetorical level that generations of analytic philosophers, largely unconcerned with its history, have uncritically accepted the gist of Russell's account. Such an attitude is in turn expressed in the general easy dismissal of the idealist period of philosophy that goes beyond justifiable complaints about the density and unclarity of the prose in which it was often expressed, a density and unclarity that perhaps reached its apotheosis in the writings of Hegel. If a thinker is regarded as having something important to say, of course, then the project of trying to make that something clearer will generally be regarded as worthwhile. For the most part, however, the attitude within analytic philosophy for much of its history has been to regard such effort as largely a *waste* of effort. Given the fundamental and obvious philosophical errors *known* to lie at the heart of the idealist tradition – that is, those errors learnt about from Russell – what *could* be possibly learned from them? Thus, to a remarkable extent, post-Kantian idealism has been written out of the range of viable approaches to philosophy.

Kant's influence within the analytic tradition has, of course, endured to a much greater extent than has Hegel's – Kant's idealism generally being regarded as marking the outer limit of that which is assimilable from the Germans. Most obviously, Kantianism has remained a viable position within analytic *practical* philosophy, largely because of the fact that Moore's version of rational intuitionism never really succeeded in

[27] Richard A. Watson, 'Shadow History in Philosophy', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 31 (1993), 95–109, 99.

Reichenbach's 'non-empirical axioms of coordination' or Carnap's logical syntax of scientific language, would come to replace Kant's synthetic *a priori*.[31] But on Friedman's account, the positivists were Kantians in an even deeper way, in that while Russell and Moore were essentially *ontologists*, who read Kant and his successors likewise *as* ontologists, the positivists resembled Kant as he was understood by the late nineteenth-century *neo*-Kantians, who took their ontology from the best science of their day, and forewent the claim to any further philosophically-based ontology. The Newtonian science of Kant's day had been superseded, and so in shaping their account of the *a priori* to their contemporary science, the positivists were doing essentially what Kant *would have* done had he lived at the start of the twentieth century, and had he, like the neo-Kantians, seen beyond the troublesome dichotomy of appearances and 'things-in-themselves'. And by directing their attention to the non-empirically given framework conditions of scientific inquiry, the positivists were drawn into the distinctively holistic structures of language use. For them it was a proposed language of the physical sciences, but substitute the patterns of language use of *everyday life*, and much the same could be said of the later Wittgenstein and post-Second World War Oxford philosophy. Again, in contrast to the approach of Russell and Moore, there was a preservation of the Kantian impulse against what he had termed dogmatic metaphysics, and with it a turn to a reflection upon the forms in which we represent reality to ourselves.

But some of these movements might be described as equally Hegelian in spirit. Kant himself had lacked a sense of the historicity of the models of knowledge taken as authoritative, and just as he thought Aristotle had definitively established the basic forms of right inference, and Euclid the basic structures of geometric knowledge, so too he thought that Newton had definitively established the science of the phenomenal world. Looking back from the twentieth century, however, we see enough historical change in the objects of the sciences to incline

[31] Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*, pp. 7–8. For his part, Richardson (*Carnap's Construction of the World*, chs 4 & 5) describes the Positivists as retrieving a distinctly *methodological* dimension of the Kantian synthetic *a priori* by separating it from the further *epistemological* (as in its claims for the necessity of Euclidean geometry, for example) and *representation theoretic* (in its distinction between the formal properties of intuitive and conceptual representations) dimensions that it had in Kant's Transcendental Idealism. In their respective accounts, both stress the mediating role played here by contemporary neo-Kantians, such as Ernst Cassirer and Bruno Bauch, and point to the divergences between the Positivists, on the one hand, and the traditional empiricists, with whom they have been usually associated, on the other.

us to agree with Hegel rather than Kant on this matter. And this plasticity of epistemic structures is in turn linked to the fact that a definite 'linguistic turn' separates the respective approaches of Kant and Hegel, once more making Hegel the thinker on the side of the moderns. As Hegel had written in the 'Preface to the Second Edition' of the *Science of Logic*:

> The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and stored in human *language*. Nowadays we cannot be too often reminded that it is *thinking* which distinguishes man from the beasts. Into all that becomes something inward for men, an image or conception as such, into all that he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he has transformed into language and expresses in it contains a category – concealed, mixed with other forms or clearly determined as such, so much is logic his natural element, indeed his own peculiar *nature*.[32]

If 'conceptual holism' is one of the distinctive marks of Hegel, then Wittgenstein's later refinement of Frege's context principle is here significant: while in the *Tractatus* the relevant context for the consideration of the meaning of words was the proposition, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, it had become the language games and social practices within which words were used.[33]

Among the various figures of the generally post-positivistic period of analytic philosophers after the Second World War, perhaps the one whose work promised some type of reconciliation with the idealist tradition from which Russell and Moore had broken was the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars. In the course of his influential lectures delivered at the University of London in 1956, published as 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind',[34] Sellars broached the issue of the broadly Hegelian features of his work. Qua *metaphysician* Sellars was not an Hegelian but had combined elements from Kant with a form of scientific realism

[32] G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 31 (5.20). Note that for Hegel's works other than those in which the numbered paragraphs used in the translations cited and the German original coincide, numbers in brackets following the English pagination refer to the corresponding volume and page numbers of the edition *Werke in zwanig Bänden*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1969).

[33] See, for example, W. W. Tait, 'Wittgenstein and the "skeptical Paradoxes"'. *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986), 475–88.

[34] First published in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 1: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis*, ed. Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, reprinted in Wilfrid Sellars, *Science Perception and Reality* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991), and then as *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.

against which Hegel would have recoiled. Nevertheless, he planted the seed that was later to grow into a fruit-bearing Hegelian tree, and in 1994 were published two books which came to be regarded as among the major works in analytic philosophy from that decade – John McDowell's *Mind and World* and Robert Brandom's *Making It Explicit*. The remarkable feature shared by these works, in which Sellars's philosophy was divested of the realist elements of its metaphysical core, was the acknowledgement given in each to the continuing relevance of the philosophy of Hegel. While Hegel had typically been seen as exemplifying the worst from the pre-analytic tradition, not only did McDowell and Brandom claim to find a place for him within the contemporary philosophical debate, but each portrayed him as providing *the* solution to a central theoretical impasse afflicting late twentieth-century philosophy – a view essentially unthinkable from the perspective of early twentieth-century analytic philosophy.[35]

For both McDowell and Brandom, the analytic path to Hegel is *via* the innovations of Kant. Kant's views concerning the active contribution of the mind in giving conceptual shape to the world as known could become domesticated within analytic developments as with the positivists' *a priori*, for example, but this was so only because Kant had harnessed this idealism to a more sober empiricism. German post-Kantians such as Hegel, however, seemed to have renounced Kant's efforts to tether the mind to the empirical world and unleashed the monster of 'absolute idealism'. And yet both McDowell and Brandom argue that modern philosophy must follow Hegel's move beyond Kant in just this way. It is from Hegel and not Kant, at least not Kant as he had been understood for the most part within analytic philosophy, that we can learn how to reconstruct a coherent philosophical enterprise in the wake of Wilfrid Sellars's definitive exposure in the mid-twentieth century of modern philosophy's central myth, a myth whose pristine expression is to be found in Russell, the 'myth of the given'.

While such a change in attitude to Hegel will be for many philosophers trained in the analytic tradition perplexing, to say the least, it is far from unprecedented as McDowell's and Brandom's retrieval of Hegel have converged with the equally positive reinterpretations of Hegel within the realm of late twentieth-century English-language Hegel scholarship itself. A revival of interest in Hegel in the 1970s had been both signalled

[35] This is not to say that either book is *about* Hegel. There are, in fact, only a handful of references to Hegel in each of these books.

and amplified by the appearance of Charles Taylor's *Hegel*, but while Taylor's reading of Hegel allowed the reassimilation of much of his rich social and political thought, the book was still premised on the impossibility of taking seriously Hegel's 'central ontological thesis'.[36] A decade and a half later, however, the assumption that Hegel *had* a 'central ontological thesis' was being seriously contested by interpretations of Hegel that challenged the traditional thesis that Hegel had anything like the metaphysical thesis ascribed to him by Russell and others.

Perhaps the most systematic and influential of these new approaches has been that presented by Robert Pippin, most comprehensively in his 1989 book *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*.[37] Here Pippin, drawing on the work of a generation of post-Second World War German Hegel scholars, presented Hegel as a post-Kantian philosopher unencumbered with any bizarre 'spirit monism' of the type found by Taylor. Pippin's Hegel is a thinker who *furthers* Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics and who 'extends and deepens Kantian antiempiricist, antinaturalist, antirationalist strategies'.[38] On this reading, Kant's criticism of traditional metaphysics was seen by Hegel as compromised by his residual adherence to a 'subjectivistic' metaphysics, and Hegel had seen his project as that of 'completing' Kant.[39]

Pippin's post-Kantian reading of Hegel ran parallel to other attempts to retrieve the Hegelian project, including the 'nonmetaphysical' approach of Klaus Hartmann in which Hegel's *logic* was interpreted as a 'category theory' without metaphysical commitment.[40] As one of a number of American Hegelians who had been influenced by Hartmann's account, Terry Pinkard soon swung over to a more 'post-Kantian' orientation, and, influenced by Pippin, came to see Hegel as having set himself the task of solving a paradox within Kant's approach to the authority of the moral law. Kant had thought of pure reason alone as capable of determining the will: as Pippin has put it, 'speaking from the practical or first-person point of view, the very possibility of my awareness of the dictates of a purely conceived practical reason establishes *from that perspective* that I cannot deny that I am subject to such a law and thereby establishes

[36] Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 538.
[37] Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
[38] Ibid., p. 6.
[39] Ibid., p. 7.
[40] Klaus Hartmann, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (New York: Anchor Books, 1972).

that I can act accordingly'.[41] But Kant's way of putting this seemed to create an unbridgeable gap between this 'first-person' *practical perspective* and the 'third person' *theoretical perspective* within which one can regard oneself as *nothing other than* a component within a causally efficient natural realm. In Pinkard's terms, it required an agent 'to split himself in two – in effect, for 'me' to issue a law to myself that 'I' could then use as a reason to apply the law to myself'.[42] But although formulated in the language of *practical* philosophy, this 'Kantian paradox' concerns the authority or normativity of reason *per se*, the unity of which Hegel had insisted upon along with other post-Kantians like Fichte and Schelling. Regarded in this way, what the post-Kantians were struggling with was an issue that re-emerged in mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy in terms of the question of what it was to 'follow a rule' – the question of how to reconcile our claims to rational normativity with the naturalistic view of ourselves that rational inquiry itself had produced. Moreover, akin to the path taken by philosophers like Wittgenstein and Sellars, 'Hegel's resolution of the Kantian paradox was to see it in social terms. Since the agent cannot secure any bindingness for the principle simply on his own, he requires the *recognition* of another agent of it as binding on both of them'.[43]

Drawing on the work of Sellars, Pinkard, in his 1994 book *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, interpreted Hegel as developing a normative theory of the rational agency of individuals occupying positions within a shared and rule-governed 'social space':

> Within a "social space" individuals assert various things to each other and give what they take to be reasons for these assertions, and people impute certain reasons to them on the basis of the shared social norms that structure their "social space" – that is, on the basis of what they take the person to be committed to in light of what he does and their shared norms. All the various activities of reason-giving ... are themselves forms of social practice in which we in turn mutually evaluate each other's actions, in which we each assume certain types of epistemic

[41] Robert Pippin, 'Hegel's Practical Philosophy: The Realization of Freedom', in Karl Ameriks (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 185.

[42] Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 227. Moral self-legislation 'seems to require a 'lawless' agent to give laws to himself on the basis of laws that from one point of view seem to be prior to the legislation and from another point of view seem to be derivative from the legislation itself'. Ibid., p. 59.

[43] Ibid., p. 227.

> and ethical responsibilities, and in which we impute certain moral and epistemic responsibilities to others in light of their behavior. In the various social practices involving reason-giving, we also have principles of *criticism* for evaluating the reasons we give. Reason-giving, that is, is itself a social practice that goes on within a determinate form of "social space" that "licenses" some kinds of inferences and fails to "license" others.[44]

Pinkard's book appeared in the same year as the books of McDowell and Brandom, which similarly made connections between Sellars's account of the normative 'space of reasons' and Hegel's idealism, but from the Sellarsian end, effectively instituting a hitherto unthinkable research programme integrating Hegel into the context of a philosophical movement which had effectively been formed on the basis of a radical opposition to Hegel.

This book examines, on the basis of a broadly post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel,[45] the possibilities for the type of Sellarsian rehabilitation of an Hegelian position within current analytic philosophy along the lines that McDowell and Brandom envisage. The background question orienting the inquiry concerns the consequences of the shift from the Aristotelian logical structures still enframing the thought of Kant and Hegel to the post-Fregean structures generally accepted by analytic philosophers. One can read the work of McDowell and Brandom as responses to Russell's dismissal of the thought of the idealists as anachronistic. Of the two, it is Brandom who is most ambitious and systematic in his recovery of idealism. In short, Brandom assimilates Hegel to the Frege–Wittgenstein tradition in logic by creating a common terrain on which these two seemingly very different types of philosophy can meet – a terrain that Brandom calls an inferentialist theory of semantic content. For Brandom, Hegel's revolutionary philosophy can be prised free of those Aristotelian features for which it had been condemned a century ago by the developer and promoter of the logical new-wave. In contrast, while we only get glimpses of McDowell's Hegel in his writings, what comes across from the general tone of McDowell's work is a philosophy with distinctly Aristotelian features. But after a

[44] Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 7–8.

[45] In general terms, I take the substance of my own earlier account of Hegel as presented in *Hegel's Hermeneutics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) as broadly within the Pippin-Pinkard camp. Here, in Chapters 7 and 8, I re-raise the question of the senses in which Hegel may and may not be thought of as doing 'metaphysics'.

century of analytic philosophy this is no longer a criterion on which a philosopher can be automatically condemned, as in a variety of areas, *even* in areas such as logic and semantics, Aristotelian ideas have to some extent become reincorporated into the currency of contemporary analytic exchange.[46] While the *particular* features of the 'neo-Hegelianism' Brandom and McDowell each realize might be explained in terms of their own philosophical biographies, they reflect, I suggest, features implicit in the ambiguous and unresolved philosophy of Sellars himself.

In the following pages I outline some of the developments within that sprawling cultural practice called analytic philosophy that have made it possible for philosophers trained in that tradition to start taking seriously once more the ideas of Kant and Hegel. Clearly this is not meant to be a comprehensive account of the field; rather, figures and issues have been selected around the theme of the possibility of inheriting the tradition of Kant and Hegel within a tradition that had, at its birth, been effectively defined in opposition to those two figures. Even more specifically, however, this selection has been such as to further an understanding of how it could be possible for Sellarsians to have attempted to inherit the idealist tradition in this way. A different approach and different focus would have meant that other parts of the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy than those touched on here might have been shown to be crucial for understanding the possibility of this reconciliation.[47]

In the course of this I attempt to bring out features of the philosophical positions of both Kant and Hegel that the analytic achievements of Sellars and his followers allow us to see. Of course, the presentation of the philosophical views of others, especially those like Kant and Hegel, about which conflict seems the rule, is itself not a philosophically

[46] While Aristotelian ideas first established a niche within ethics with works such as G. E. M. Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (first published in *Philosophy* 33 (1958), 1–19, reprinted in her *Ethics, Religion and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers Volume III* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981)), the re-emergence of Aristotle has by no means been restricted to the context of 'virtue ethics'. Perhaps the most overt example of this in logic, the original site of Aristotle's dismissal, is that of the revival of term logic by Fred Sommers. See, Fred Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), F. Sommers and G. Englebretsen, *An Invitation to Formal Reasoning: The Logic of Terms* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), and David S. Oderberg (ed.), *The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

[47] For example, the types of issues I have broached in the context of McDowell's 'path to Hegel' could also be dealt with in a more North-American centred account in which the work of Kripke would be central.

innocent task. I would like to think of the interpretations of Kant and Hegel presented here as, respectively, Kant's and Hegel's *own*, but I have to be content with the fact that they are, inevitably, mine. On the other hand, I can at least plead that the views attributed to Kant and Hegel are not singular or idiosyncratic – not mine *alone* – but broadly align with established, but contested, positions within contemporary interpretative disputes about those philosophers. Not surprisingly, given the nature of this book, the views of Kant and Hegel I adopt place them in a generally positive light. It is to the detriment of analytic philosophy, I believe, that post-Kantian idealists such as Hegel have been excluded from the conversation.

Chapters 1 and 2, then, are devoted to tracing two *different* paths to Hegel from Sellars's critique of the myth of the given. The first is a path that is exemplified by the work of John McDowell and that results in a version of Hegel's idea of the *identity* of mind and world, an identity to which McDowell gives expression in his claim for the completely conceptual content of experience. Here it is shown that McDowell's Hegelianism develops from a combination of *Kantian* and *Aristotelian* strands implicit within Sellars's original critique of the given (the latter acknowledged by Sellars himself but largely ignored by many of his followers). On this reading of the critique of the doctrine of givenness, the fundamental idea is that what is *taken in* in experience cannot be regarded as made up of atomic and unconceptualized singularities – bare '*this*'es. Rather, what is received in experience is always an already conceptualized '*this such*', that is, something which has the categorical form of an Aristotelian *substance*. McDowell's development of this Aristotelian aspect of Sellars's thought is traced through earlier work on semantic issues from Russell and Frege that he had pursued with Gareth Evans, and which had drawn upon the work of a number of British analytic philosophers (in particular, Peter Strawson and David Wiggins) who also had re-introduced Aristotelian considerations into analytic philosophy.

The second path from Sellars to Hegel, traced in Chapter 2 and exemplified in the work of Robert Brandom, is also a Kantian one. In contrast to the McDowellian path, however, it is an overtly *anti*-Aristotelian one that leads analytic thought to a form of Hegelianism characterized by a holistic and inferentialist account of conceptual content. This version of Hegelianism is expressed in Brandom's rationalistic account of the language games of assertion and justification, a 'pragmatics' that develops ideas from the American post-positivist phase of

analytic philosophy, as found in Quine, Davidson and Rorty. Besides responding in a different way than McDowell to the myth of the *perceptual* given, Brandom develops Sellars's critique to the 'givenness' of *logical* truths as conceived by Russell.

Both McDowell and Brandom regard Kant as the originator of the Sellarsian critique of the myth of the given, and Hegel as the thinker who had more fully thought through its philosophical consequences. Chapters 3 and 4 then turn to the philosophies of Kant and Hegel themselves in order to assess the degree to which the Sellarsian readings capture the views of these historical figures. First, in Chapter 3, those aspects of Kant's transcendental philosophy are traced that have led some recent interpreters to treat it as anticipating key features of the logical revolution that later issued in philosophy's analytic turn. The situation here turns out to be complex, however, as while such 'Fregean' aspects can be found within Kant's transcendental logic, these nevertheless coexist with key features of a retained Aristotelian *term* logic and corresponding *syllogistic* conception of inference. The latter elements are tied to what seem to be more 'metaphysical' aspects of Kant that are in tension with his transcendental idealism, and, moreover, they are even more explicit in Hegel who uses them *against* Kant's transcendental idealism. Central here are the traditional 'term-logical' roots of Hegel's key notion of 'determinate negation' that is crucial for both McDowell's conception of the conceptuality of experiential content, and, (as shown in Chapter 4) for the 'inferentialist' aspect of Hegel's thought thematized by Brandom.

Classically, analytic philosophy is thought of as having developed from the most recent of a series of breaks of science with the Aristotelianism of the medieval world. The series had started with the early modern scientific revolution, and it culminated in the Fregean revolution in logic. But if Hegel's approach was, despite its modern 'Kantian' aspects, explicitly indebted to Aristotle's logic as suggested, how then might his form of idealism be construed as an *advance* on Kant's? Here, while the post-Sellarsians are followed in their rejection of the traditional interpretation which reads Hegel as returning to pre-critical remnants within Kant's philosophy, the key to the progressive nature of Hegel's thought is shown to be rooted in his *cognitive contextualism* as exemplified in his differentiation of the types of cognition he calls 'Perception' and 'the Understanding', and the types of *logics* that he characterizes as the logics of 'Being' and 'Essence' – logics that differ crucially in their respective conceptions of *negation*. It is this

contextualism, it is argued, that is reflected in the apparently different 'Hegels' that McDowell and Brandom each bring into focus.

Kant had thought of reason as having its purest expression in its practical, i.e., moral, form, while Hegel had wanted to re-unify the theoretical and practical dimensions of reason that Kant had distinguished. In turn, this relating of theoretical and practical reason has general features in common with the more generally *pragmatist* tenor of the thought of Sellars and his followers. Hegel's idea of the primacy of a type of judgement that is both theoretically 'world-guided' and practically 'action-guiding' provides another opportunity for his access to analytic philosophy via the revival, within analytic ethics, of Aristotle's conception of *phronetic* judgement. In Chapter 5, McDowell's early attempts to combine the idea of phronetic judgement with an otherwise *Kantian* account of practical philosophy is examined in the light of his later move to Hegelianism. Indeed, something of this Hegelian tendency can be discerned within the development of Kant's own conception of practical reason and his later appeal to *aesthetic* considerations in attempting to account for the conditions of the *application* of moral principles. In Chapter 6 it is then shown how *phronetic* evaluatively laden judgements, conceived broadly in the style of Kant's account of aesthetic judgement in the *Critique of Judgement*, are at the centre of Hegel's own account of judgement and the relation of judgement to inference. Hegel's appeal to Aristotelian syllogisms is shown here to be indebted to a way of reading Aristotelian logic that utilizes syllogisms for a purpose similar to what is now treated as a non-formal 'inference to the best explanation'. Any such attempt to rehabilitate Hegel's logic in this way, however, must ultimately face the hurdle that has disqualified him in the eyes of most contemporary philosophers from being taken as a serious contributor to logical thought – his attitude to the *contradiction*. This topic is then taken up in the final two chapters.

Traditionally Hegel's 'dialectical' logic has been condemned for its apparent *dismissal* of the law of non-contradiction, but against this view, Robert Brandom, like some earlier defenders of Hegel, portrays Hegel as *affirming*, rather than denying this fundamental law. Recently, however, non-classical 'paraconsistent' logicians such as Graham Priest have come to *applaud* Hegel for his percipient views about logical systems capable of *tolerating* contradictions. Against the background of these incompatible views, in Chapter 7 it is shown how Hegel's complex attitude to the law of non-contradiction is a consequence of his cognitive contextualism and of his associated need to employ the different

'negations' from term and propositional logics. Hegel employs the law of non-contradiction to express basic ontological features of objects that are normative for cognition, and such features, on his account, change with context. Thus objects in the process of being reflected upon undergo a type of change that cannot be thought of as merely limited to the *properties* of substances which maintain an underlying identity. This type of change Hegel thinks of as *contradiction*, and it is expressed in his 'law of contradiction' – the claim that 'everything is contradictory'.

While this may be regarded as a consequence of Hegel's employment of 'heterogeneous' logics in relation to his cognitive contextualism, it raises the difficult question of Hegel's metaphysical commitments. Given Hegel's claim for the *identity* of thought and reality, contradiction cannot be explained away as simply unavoidably endemic to thought: it must also be a genuine characteristic of *the world*. The Sellarsian neo-Hegelians have generally wanted to absolve Hegel from such metaphysically contentious claims, but how is this compatible with his advocacy of the contradictoriness of everything?[48]

In answer to this, in Chapter 8 it is argued that Hegel's seemingly most 'metaphysical' claim, his claim about the necessarily *subjective* nature of 'infinite substance', can be understood as a unique response to what he had regarded as the most problematic metaphysical feature implicit within ancient and modern forms of thought. This feature, characterized here as 'metaphysical positivism' and regarded as Platonic in origin, is in fact the metaphysical concomitant of the *epistemologically* conceived 'myth of the given'. Hegel's critical response to 'metaphysics' *qua* critique of *metaphysical positivism* differs from those responses to traditional metaphysics that have been more common in analytic philosophy – 'naturalism' and 'quietism' – and that are reflected in the Sellarsian neo-Hegelians. However, it is argued, Hegel is here rightly seen as being on the side of Kant and other moderns in aiming to free philosophy from the restrictions of ancient 'metaphysical' thought. But behind what is usually taken to be the limits of Aristotelian *substance* metaphysics, Hegel diagnoses the influence of Platonic metaphysical positivism, and rather than *disavow* the project of metaphysics his response is in line with his differing conception of *negation*: rather than advocate a *negation of* metaphysics, Hegel refashions metaphysics around the primacy of the notion of *negativity*.

[48] Here I must acknowledge a debt to Ghassan Hage who responded to a general talk on Hegel I had given in 2002 with the question, 'What happened to the dialectic?' These chapters might be thought of as a belated answer to Ghassan's appropriate question.

1

McDOWELL, SELLARS AND THE MYTH OF THE PERCEPTUALLY GIVEN

Few works of analytic philosophy published in the last few decades have attracted as much attention as John McDowell's *Mind and World*. Regarded in terms of the *range* of interest generated, McDowell's book might be compared with Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*,[1] the influence and challenge of which McDowell had acknowledged.[2] Many of the things typically said in praise of *Mind and World* – its way of situating central issues from recent analytic philosophy within the historical *big picture*, and the suggestive bridges it throws over the abyss separating professionalized Anglophone philosophy from works within the more historically reflective 'continental' tradition – were said about Rorty's book after its appearance in 1979. On the other hand, Rorty's book clearly touched a nerve, and to a considerable extent polarized the Anglophone philosophy profession, and similarly McDowell's has not entirely escaped the negative reaction that Rorty's attracted. From the orthodox analytic point of view, perhaps the claim most difficult to digest in the whole book is a remark, made almost as an aside at the end of Lecture II, where McDowell appeals to Hegel as

[1] Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

[2] John McDowell, *Mind and World*, second paperback edition with a new introduction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996), p. ix.

offering a way beyond one of the intractable problems of late twentieth-century analytic philosophy.

In this chapter, after sketching McDowell's diagnosis of the problems of analytic philosophy, I reconstruct his path to Hegel by way of Kant, mostly in the company of his former colleague Gareth Evans, but ultimately parting ways. The dispute over which they finally diverge, that over the issue of the 'non-conceptual content' of the experience of colour, will lead us into one of Hegel's most central concepts, that of 'determinate negation'.

1.1 Sellars's critique of the myth of the given

In 'Lecture 1' of *Mind and World*, McDowell sums up a dilemma that has been at the centre of many analytic philosophical disputes for the last fifty years. Recent philosophy, asserts McDowell, has been afflicted by an 'interminable oscillation'[3] between two opposed and equally untenable positions. On the one hand, the attempts of foundationalists in epistemology to secure the 'objective purport' of thought in some passively received experiential 'givens' have been subject to a number of devastating critiques; on the other, internalist coherentists, having rejected the idea of the given, seem to leave the application of concepts in judgement as unconstrained, and thought threatens to become a 'frictionless spinning in a void'.[4]

Wilfrid Sellars had pointed to the hopelessness of the first position by means of his somewhat Kantian criticism of the empiricist 'myth of the given'.[5] Empiricists have traditionally tried to justify perceptual judgements by invoking a capacity for some immediate and certain knowledge of items that lack propositional content – traditionally, sensory ideas, for example, or more recently, Russellian sense-data. But a judgement, Sellars argued, can only be justified to the extent that it stands in logical relations to further cognitive items, and this means items with propositional content.

Sellars's criticism of the notion of 'the given' is probably best known from an example, in sections 14–16 of *Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind*,

[3] Ibid., p. 9 and *passim*.

[4] Ibid., p. 11 and *passim*.

[5] Sellars's lectures delivered at the University of London in 1956 and published as *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* were originally titled 'The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind'.

concerning 'John', the necktie salesman. John has to learn to cope with the fact that new electric lighting has been installed in the tie-shop, and that ties, which seen in daylight appear *blue*, when seen in the shop he calls *green*. Is he to think that electric light *changes* the colour of things, so that while the tie is blue outside the shop, it *becomes* green inside? Or is he to think that all judgements of colour presuppose background theoretical assumptions concerning the optimal conditions for *making* such judgements? Sellars's complex analysis and resolution of John's conundrum is meant to bring out the fact that judgements about those apparently simple perceptual 'givens', such as the colours of neckties, can never be grounded in some immediate perceptual acquaintance with the type of items that classical empiricists had thought of as 'sensory ideas' or that Russell had thought of as 'sense-data'. The idea of items that are both relevant to knowledge and immediately 'given' to judgement is, simply, a myth.

While Sellars's classic taking apart of the myth of the given is his starting point, McDowell quickly points to the obvious danger awaiting the thinker rebounding from the lure of the given. Abandoning the myth of some passively received items capable of rationally constraining the active application of concepts in perceptual judgements can lead to the embrace of an equally implausible conception of the spontaneity of concept application in which 'exercises of concepts threaten to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game'.[6] McDowell finds this danger threatening in the approach of another critic of the given, Donald Davidson,[7] who, like Sellars, had been critical of the role of 'intermediaries' between mind and world, and had attempted to hold onto the idea of the world's constraining 'friction' on thought, by stressing the *causal* constraints exercised by the world on judgement.[8] Any such an account, thinks McDowell, cannot capture the *normative* role that experience plays in providing thought with its objective purport: what is needed is a way of maintaining the idea of experience as exercising *rational*, and *not simply causal*, constraint on belief. Rather than show how experience can justify belief, Davidson's causal account at best shows how it can offer

[6] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 5.

[7] And as triumphing in the thought of a thinker deeply influenced by both Sellars and Davidson, Richard Rorty.

[8] Indeed, such a focus on *causal* constraint in the effort to find a way around the problems of the Russellian approach to sense-data has been a prominent feature of much work in analytic epistemology in the second half of the twentieth century.

'exculpations'.[9] That is, rather than being relevant to the question of the believer's epistemic responsibility for their claims, it seems to absolve the believer *from* all such responsibility. We must, thinks McDowell, retain the *minimally* empiricist idea that we are, in our perceptual beliefs, *answerable* to experienced reality.[10]

Of course, any such minimal empiricism must come unencumbered by the 'mythical' interpretation of the given as some non-conceptual 'ultimate ground' or 'bare presence' to which we can gesture in justifying our claims. Sellars and Davidson had shown that no matter how tempting the idea of a constraining non-conceptual given may be, it is useless for the purpose of conceiving of the answerability of thought to experience.[11] As Davidson had expressed it, the only thing capable of justifying a belief is *another* belief.[12] But this move seems to efface the obvious distinction between judgements inferentially arrived at and the non-inferential judgements of perception. Insisting on experiential justification, McDowell's answer is to regard the 'deliverances of experience' or 'bits of experiential intake'[13] as necessarily *already conceptual* – and it is *this* idea that points McDowell in the direction of Hegel.

According to McDowell, Kant himself had been on the verge of a philosophy freed from the intolerable oscillation, but was himself still ensnared in a version of the myth of the given. At one level his idea that thought is constrained by the representations of the receptive

[9] 'But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications'. McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 8.

[10] Thus McDowell talks of making room 'for a different notion of givenness, one that is innocent of the confusion between justification and exculpation' (ibid., p. 10). This move certainly separates McDowell's position from the *hard-core* Sellarsianism of Richard Rorty, who sees these types of gestures as an abandonment of Sellars's thought. See especially his 'The Very Idea of Answerability to the World' in Richard Rorty, *Truth and Progress* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[11] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 7.

[12] 'Emphasis on sensation or perception in matters epistemological springs from the obvious thought: sensations are what connect the world and our beliefs, and they are candidates for justifiers because we often are aware of them. The trouble we have been running into is that the justification seems to depend on the awareness [of having the sensation], which is just another belief . . . The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes'. Donald Davidson, 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', in Dieter Henrich (ed.), *Kant oder Hegel?* (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1983), pp. 427–8.

[13] McDowell uses the phrases 'experiential intake' or 'bits of experiential intake' as a paraphrase of the Kantian term 'intuition' in a number of places in *Mind and World* (e.g., pp. 4, 6 and 9).

faculty – intuitions – seems innocent enough. 'From the standpoint of experience', Kant did not conceive of intuitions as making a *separable contribution* to the joint activity of the receptive and conceptual faculties and thus for him, 'experience does not take in ultimate grounds that we could appeal to by pointing outside the sphere of thinkable content'.[14] But Kant joined to the account given from this standpoint one described from another, 'transcendental', standpoint and 'in the transcendental perspective there does seem to be an isolable contribution from receptivity. In the transcendental perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be independent of our conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any that fits the ordinary empirical world'.[15] However Kant's successors, and in particular Hegel, had 'urged that we must discard the supersensible in order to achieve a consistent idealism', and this move, thinks McDowell, 'frees Kant's insight so that it can protect a commonsense respect for the independence of the ordinary world'.[16] It is this idea of the thoroughgoing conceptual nature of experience that leads McDowell to embrace a thought regarding the mind's relation to the world that has found very few advocates within a hundred years of analytic philosophy – the 'Hegelian' thought of the world itself as 'made up of the sort of thing that one can think'.[17] Thus at the end of Lecture II, McDowell makes his approximation to Hegel explicit when he notes that 'it is central to Absolute Idealism to reject the idea that the conceptual realm has an outer boundary, and we have arrived at a point from which we could start to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy'.[18]

Such tentative gestures in *Mind and World* towards Hegelian philosophy signal McDowell's willingness to embrace a consequence of the critique of the given to which Sellars had alluded but at which he had baulked. Sellars is commonly reported as having referred to 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' as his 'incipient *Meditations Hegeliènnes*' (*sic*),[19] but this is not quite the case. Sellars actually puts this

[14] Ibid., p. 41.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., p. 44.
[17] Ibid., pp. 27–8.
[18] Ibid., p. 44.
[19] For example, by Richard Rorty in his 'Introduction', to Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, p. 9, where Rorty refers to Sellars's 'wry description' of that work as his 'incipient *Meditations Hegeliènnes*'.

description of his own project in the mouth of an imagined interlocutor speaking from the position of logical atomism, so it can be read as a charge coming from the position that he is criticizing. For his part, it seems clear from what he says elsewhere that Sellars regarded Hegel as representing a path to be avoided.[20] McDowell's embrace of Hegel, however, is clearly dependent upon another interpretation of this controversial figure, one which sees Hegel as having brought out and developed the good side of Kant, who had 'almost managed' to supersede traditional dogmatic metaphysics, 'but not quite'. While Kant had offered the first challenge to the empiricist's myth of the given, it was a challenge offered from a position with residual commitments to the myth itself: 'Cartesian thinking confronts familiar difficulties about how to relate a subjective substance to objective reality, and Kant's conception is beset by what look like descendants of those difficulties'.[21] As we have seen, among the conceptions that spoilt Kant's insights was his conception of the supersensible or noumenal realm as determining the contents of the mind's empirical intuitions from a realm which the mind cannot reach. In response to this McDowell advocates that 'the way to correct what is unsatisfactory in Kant's thinking about the supersensible is ... to embrace the Hegelian image in which the conceptual is unbounded on the outside'.[22] But Hegel's critique not only stands for a critique of the Kantian supersensible realm. McDowell considers this post-Kantian idealist's critique of the supersensible as *equally* applicable to a realm which contemporary philosophers would regard as the very antithesis of the traditionally conceived supersensible – nature itself, conceived of as that which is disclosed by the modern natural sciences.

Scientific naturalists share with Kant's transcendental perspective the same 'sideways-on' view of the mind's relation to the world of which McDowell is critical.[23] Thus both Kant and the scientific naturalists think of concepts as existing within and structuring the contents of a 'bounded' realm, the realm of subjectivity, which stands opposed to a realm beyond the boundary, the *objective* realm. For Kant the objective is the realm of the supersensible or noumenal which is beyond the reach of the human

[20] Thus in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* Sellars speaks of the 'Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?)' – clearly not a recommendation for Hegel's alternative to foundationalism – 'Neither will do' (p. 79).

[21] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 111.

[22] Ibid., p. 83.

[23] Ibid., pp. 41–2 and 82.

mind, even when its reach is extended by the natural sciences. For the naturalists it is nature as revealed *by* the empirical sciences, but this is now conceived of as a realm radically different to that available to the scientifically unenhanced mind – radically different to what Sellars had referred to as the 'manifest image'.[24] Crucially, for both, it is a realm which stands in opposition to the mind, its states, processes and contents.

This means that McDowell's Hegelian gestures signal a demand that our concept of nature be radically rethought, and in this regard he calls upon the approach of another philosopher who had attempted to extract the views of an influential forebear from an unwanted supersensible ontology – Aristotle.[25] To deny the role of non-conceptual content in experience is to deny an approach that tries to ground our conceptual capacities in *natural* processes of the sort investigated by the natural sciences; but such a denial, claims McDowell, does not commit one to some *supernatural* ground for those processes. Rather, one can refuse the identification of nature *with* that which is revealed by the natural sciences, and advocate a picture in which *nature*, *qua our own sensible natures*, is conceived of as a realm within which the concepts of a 'sui-generis' rationality can be actualized, the picture McDowell finds in Aristotle. Thus McDowell's appeal to Aristotle and Hegel is bound up with a rejection of a stance in which we seem forced to choose between a scientistically conceived nature on one side and a Platonistic conceived supernature on the other. The way to circumvent the need for such a choice is to exploit an idea common to Aristotle and Hegel, the idea that individual humans can be characterized in terms of their *second natures* – natures not given to them from their merely natural endowments, but rather, ones inherited from the cultures into which they are born and which carry a *normative* dimension.

The idea that Hegel's critique of the Kantian supersensible realm can do service for a contemporary critique of scientistically conceived nature might suggest that for McDowell Platonism and scientific naturalism are in fact expressions of a single underlying metaphysical position. At least this is a suggestion I will try to make good in these chapters. While it can seem as if it is simply the early modern Cartesian or 'way of ideas' approach to the mind and its later survivals that is the fundamental

[24] In 'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man', in *Science, Perception and Reality*, p. 5 and *passim*.

[25] 'The best way I know to work into this different conception of what is natural is by reflecting on Aristotle's ethics'. Ibid., p. 78.

object of McDowell's 'Hegelian'-styled critique, a more careful reading suggests that it is rather a more *general* philosophical doctrine, better identified in terms of central elements of Platonism, that emerges as the real object of McDowell's criticism. In fact, one of McDowell's first published papers linked Russell, who, in the guise of the proponent of sense-data may be regarded as a prototypical advocate of 'givenness' in modern analytic philosophy, with Plato. If this is correct, it suggests that McDowell's appeal to Aristotle as well as to Hegel is not coincidental. Both stood as inheritors of powerful forms of thought that they tried to free from an 'other-worldist' ontology. Aristotle was a critic of the 'supersensible' in the form of Plato's theory of ideas, and this had systematic consequences for his way of thinking about the methodology he invented – 'analysis' – and which he opposed to Plato's own method – '*diaresis*' or the method of division. For his part, Hegel was critical of the supersensible aspects of Kant's philosophy and this also had systematic consequences for his way of thinking about Kant's transcendental methodology. And those *logical* aspects of their forebears' methodological thought which they attempted to transform were just those aspects that cohered with their other-worldist *ontological* conceptions, on the one hand, and their associated *epistemological* conceptions of 'givenness' on the other. Or so I shall argue.

If this rough characterization of McDowell's ambition sketched above is at all on the right track, we might sum up his attraction to Hegel by appealing to two of this 'absolute idealist's' most basic ideas: first, his idea that *Christianity* was the highest form of religion because of its central image of God becoming man; and next, his idea of *philosophy* as a form of inquiry that raises to the level of concepts a content that religion presents imagistically. It seems clear enough that in the early modern philosophical tradition the medieval Christian God had been largely reshaped into a 'philosopher's god' *qua* representing the norms of reason, knowledge and morality; and continuing this theological theme, what McDowell wants from Hegel, it might be said, is a workable conception of what we might call the 'incarnation of reason'. Seen in this way, Hegelian reason doesn't need constraining from any *outside*, since 'it includes as a moment within itself the receptivity that Kant attributes to sensibility',[26] that is, reason necessarily includes within it the finitude that belongs to us *qua* natural species. But neither does this *anthropologize* reason – after all, the idea of a

[26] John McDowell, 'Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality', *Journal of Philosophy* 95 (1998), 431–91, 466.

god that became human would hardly be a compelling thought if that god were just *another human* trying to live up to the norms of a god. To merely anthropologize reason in that way would surely be to repeat just that *psychologism* of which Frege was intensely critical at the beginning of the twentieth century, or the type of relativism-threatening 'ethnographic' approach to reason prevalent at its end. Thus, were Hegel able to make good on this promise of a philosophical version of the idea presented mythically in Christianity, then we could see how, rather than being a proponent of one side of the oscillation, the side of free-spinning thought unconstrained by the friction of natural processes, Hegel might offer us a way out of this apparently interminable oscillation.

In this chapter and again later in Chapter 5, I chart aspects of the surprising trajectory of McDowell's thought that takes him from paradigmatic analytic thinkers such as Frege and Russell to embrace a form of Hegelianism via a route through Kant. Thinkers who play major roles in the development of McDowell's thought, Donald Davidson, Gareth Evans and Wilfrid Sellars, might in fact all be thought of as reconstituting a variety of broadly *Kantian* positions within analytic philosophy. But McDowell finds problems in the thought of each of them, problems which in fact express a residual attachment to the given, and behind that, to a species of Platonist other-worldism, found, or at least threatened, in Kant himself. Thus, understanding the ways in which McDowell sees these liberating thinkers as still prey to the myth of the given, together with his suggested way of further liberating their thought from this myth, will also serve to help flesh out the nature of McDowell's implicit picture of Hegel.

1.2 Kantian 'intuition' as a demonstrative concept

At the outset of *Mind and World* McDowell appeals to Sellars and Kant in his criticism of the notion of the given: 'I derive from Sellars, and trace to Kant, a rejection of the idea that something is Given in experience, from outside the activity of shaping world-views',[27] but although the Sellarsian language is relatively new in that work, a critique of givenness had been central to McDowell's earliest work in the form of his critical revision and appropriation of Russell's notion of acquaintance. Significantly, the sentence quoted above appears in the midst of a critique of the way that McDowell's earlier colleague, Gareth Evans, had remained

[27] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 135.

entrapped within the snare of this form of thought *despite* the fact that he had been so fundamentally critical of it. As McDowell seems to regard Evans's thought as compromised in a similar way to that in which *Kant's* thought has been compromised, it will be useful to start with a survey of the complex shared terrain of their ideas and then later (in 1.5) to examine the issue over which they are opposed – that of the question of the role of a 'non-conceptual' component in experience. For McDowell, the problems inherent in Evans's insistence on the role for a non-conceptual component of experience brings out what is wrong with one reading of the ambiguous theoretical innovation behind Kant's 'transcendental turn', the distinction between concepts and intuitions as different species of representations (*Vorstellungen*).

Kant famously distinguished between intuitions and concepts as different species of the genus [*Gattung*] representation [*Vorstellung*], the *singularity* and *immediacy* of the former contrasting with the *generality* and *mediation* of the latter.[28] It is clear that he regarded his positing of this distinction as the key discovery issuing in his transcendental turn.[29] But to the extent that the sensory contents of Kant's intuitions could be thought of as the passive givens of noumenal affection, and yet as still somehow capable of rationally constraining the application of empirical concepts, as indeed the idea was understood by influential thinkers in the first half of the twentieth century such as Bertrand Russell and C. I. Lewis,[30] Kant *too* can be subject to the Sellarsian critique. If intuitions do not have a conceptual, or propositionally articulable content, how *could* this content be rationally constraining? How could such content enter into justificatory relations with propositionally contentful judgements? In short, how are intuitions in this sense able to occupy a place in what Sellars called the 'logical space of reasons'?

In his later 'Woodbridge Lectures',[31] McDowell pursues his attempt to liberate Kantian thought from the Cartesian remnants surrounding the notion of 'intuition' by developing an idea that had been put forward by Sellars in his Locke Lectures delivered in Oxford in 1965–66 and published as the volume *Science and Metaphysics*. Considering the

[28] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A320/B376–7.

[29] See, for example, Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 5.

[30] Russell had believed that Kant's account of intuition was essentially in agreement with his position on sense-data. See, for example, Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 85. C. I. Lewis, in his quasi-Kantian *Mind and World Order* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1929), introduced the notion of 'the given' later targeted by Sellars.

[31] McDowell, 'Having the World in View'.

structure of mental representations as analogous to the structure of linguistic representations, Sellars had treated Kantian intuitions as having a conceptual element by being conceived on the model of a demonstrative expression, 'this such'.[32]

Sellars relates the 'this such' of his interpretation of Kant to the '*tode ti*' of Aristotle's metaphysics.[33] On Sellars's reading, Aristotle had regarded reference to particulars as being not to bare pieces of 'matter' but to individual instances of *thing kinds*,[34] and importantly it is Aristotle's divergence from Plato here that is crucial. In works like *Phaedo* and *Timaus*, Plato had, Sellars notes, conceived of changeable spatio–temporal continuants as 'leaky bundles of abstract particulars' – bundles of what are commonly called 'tropes'.[35] That is, he had thought

[32] Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, ch. 1. On intuitions as concepts, Sellars notes that 'indeed, the moment we note that Kant's *primary* use of the term 'concept' is to refer to general concepts, whether sortal or attributive, a priori or empirical, it is bound to occur to us that what he speaks of as 'intuitions', at least in certain contexts, might well be, in a broader but legitimate sense, *conceptual*. And since it is clear that Kant thinks of intuitions as representations of individuals, this would mean that they are conceptual representations of individuals rather than conceptual representations of attributes or kinds' pp. 2–3. Sellars then builds on the idea of intuitions as 'in immediate relation to an object' and construes this 'on the model of the demonstrative "this"'. On the basis of the role of the productive imagination which is really the faculty of the understanding operating in a certain way, he then characterizes intuitions in terms of the 'this such' pp. 3–4.

[33] As sketched in 'Aristotle's Metaphysics: An Interpretation', in W. Sellars, *Philosophical Perspectives: History of Philosophy* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1967), to which Sellars refers in his discussion of intuitions in *Science and Metaphysics*, p. 5, n 1. Parallels to Sellars recourse to Aristotle's notion of substance in his criticism of early analytic phenomenalistic conceptions of 'givenness' can be found in Elizabeth Anscombe's work at the time. See, for example, her 'Substance', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume 38 (1964), 69–78, reprinted in G. E. M. Anscombe, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume II* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 37–43.

[34] For broadly similar treatments of Aristotle's notion of substance see, for example: Michael Frede, 'Substance in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*', in Allan Gotthelf (ed.), *Aristotle on Nature and Living Things* (Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications, 1985), republished in Michael Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Mary Louise Gill, 'Individuals and Individuation in Aristotle' in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles and M. L. Gill (eds.), *Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and Lynne Spellman, *Substance and Separation in Aristotle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 55–6. Aristotle touches on these issues in, *Categories*, ch. 5, and, especially, *Metaphysics* bk VII. I discuss this further below in Chapter 3.1.

[35] Sellars, 'Aristotle's Metaphysics', p. 77. For a recent treatment of Plato's metaphysics which adopts a similar interpretation of Platonic particulars, see Allan Silverman, *The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato's Metaphysics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 21. For a clear account of an ontology of tropes see Keith Campbell, *Abstract Particulars* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1990), and for a clear criticism of trope ontology from a *substantialist* perspective, E. J. Lowe, *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), ch. 9.8.

of a physical substance such as *Socrates* as a collection of features such as 'the white', 'the hot', and so on, features much like the 'property-objects' with which the pre-Socratics had populated their world. In contrast, Aristotle had reinterpreted the notion of changeable objects to being 'bundles of abstract particulars inhering in a substratum'.[36] In *Categories* Aristotle had identified this substratum *qua* subject of predication as the simple individual thing, but in *Metaphysics* had come to think of it in a more complex hylomorphic way as *the form* of the individual thing, that is, the thing now minus its inessential properties and determined in terms of that responsible for its being *what it is*. That is, with Aristotle, the Platonic form became a concrete enmattered form responsible for determining the *sort of thing* that it was, and designated by the '*ti*', the 'such', of the '*tode ti*'.

Indeed, this *quasi-Aristotelian* move looks relevant to the way that Sellars had conceived his own critique of 'givenness', since entities like Russellian sense-data seem to be just those 'abstract particulars' that Sellars had ascribed to spatio–temporal objects as *Plato* had conceived of them.[37] While Russell had thought of demonstrative expressions such as 'this' as 'logically proper names' that picked out individual sense-data,[38] Sellars is saying that demonstratives should rather be thought of as picking out spatio–temporal objects *qua* instances of kinds. In fact, as I will pursue later, the distinction between *sense-data* as conceived as referents of bare demonstratives, and individual instances of kinds conceived as referents of 'this such' phrases, appears to repeat a distinction found in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, between the objects of what he calls 'Sense-certainty' and 'Perception',[39] and, as we will see, a similar idea had appeared as a central feature of McDowell's early work carried

[36] Sellars, 'Aristotle's Metaphysics', p. 77.

[37] In the *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), Wittgenstein comments on Socrates' claim in the *Theatetus* that 'the essence of speech is the composition of names' that signify simples or 'primary elements'. He adds: 'Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) were such primary elements', § 46. One modern advocate of an ontology of 'tropes', Donald Cary Williams, had regarded the 'givens' of epistemology as exemplarily tropical. See his 'The Elements of Being', in *Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays*, (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1966), p. 86.

[38] For Wittgenstein's account of the 'occult' conception of reference presupposed by treating demonstratives as names, see, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§ 38, 45 and 410.

[39] See below, Chapter 3.2. Ultimately, this distinction will for Hegel be grounded in a strictly logical distinction between 'singularity' and 'particularity', a distinction which refers back to Aristotle's logic and which has been effectively effaced within modern logical thought.

out in collaboration with Gareth Evans. The context in which Sellars introduced the idea in the *Locke Lectures*, however, was that of a reflection on the nature of Kantian intuitions such that these might be grasped as *not* standing in some abstract contrast to *concepts*. Grasped in this 'Aristotelian' way, as demonstratives which are able to pick out objects *qua* instances of a particular *kind*, 'intuitions' can be regarded as already conceptual in the sense of being classificatory. From such a point of view then, an 'intuition' is really a sub-species of concept rather than a representation belonging to some distinctly *non*-conceptual species.

In *Mind and World*, this 'Aristotelian' thought – the thought that what is made present in a Kantian intuition is an instance of a thing kind – is reflected in the idea that the perception of particulars involves an 'actualization' of the conceptual capacity that is paradigmatically *exercised* in an explicit act of judging something *to be* an object of a certain kind. Using McDowell's terminology, one might say that in the judgement 'this cube is red', while the concept 'red' is *exercised* in its application as a predicate, the concept 'cube', is *actualized* in subject position but not *exercised* there. But the capacity to exercise 'cube' as predicate of a judgement is clearly presupposed by its actualization in the subject position: any person capable of making judgements of the type 'this cube is red', must also be capable making judgements of the type, 'this thing is a cube'. But the issues are, as we will see, more complex than this suggests, and more deeply rooted in the Aristotelian aspects of McDowell's thought than the reader of *Mind and World* might first suspect.

McDowell's Sellarsian orientation in *Mind and World*, as I have suggested, connects up with central elements of his relatively Sellars-free work through the 1970s and 1980s, work in which the relations to post-Kantian idealism *too* were much less visible. In particular, it can be seen in his development of ideas about the nature of singular terms and, in particular, demonstratives, developed in conjunction with Gareth Evans.[40] As we will see, the complex theoretical relations that McDowell maintains to Sellars and Evans have similarities both in respect to what he accepts and what he rejects from their respective approaches. In both cases, McDowell sees himself as faithful to their central insights and as freeing their insights from the residual traps of the myth of the given.

[40] Evans was a colleague of McDowell's who died in 1980 at the age of 34 and whose posthumously published book, *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), McDowell had edited.

1.3 Reinterpreting Frege and Russell, with Evans

Evans is largely known as a philosopher who, in his path-breaking book, *The Varieties of Reference*, had transposed much of the machinery of analytic philosophy of language to the register of thought and perceptual experience. Central to the position found in this work is a controversial interpretation of Frege's approach to the meaning of demonstratives,[41] and central to this innovation, as Evans himself pointed out in an earlier paper, was an extension to demonstratives of an approach to the semantics of proper names that had been put forward by *McDowell* in 1975 in a paper entitled 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name'.[42] In turn, Evans's complex thoughts about the semantics of demonstratives were taken up and extended by McDowell in a further series of papers which fed into the Sellarsian perspective adopted in *Mind and World*. To grasp the full significance of McDowell's thought it is, I suggest, necessary to see it against the backdrop of this earlier, somewhat more technically expressed, work.

In 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', McDowell took up a topic that had been at the centre of Strawson's Kantian challenge in the 1950s to Russell's early semantics – that of the nature of the reference of proper names.[43] Here McDowell presented a reconstruction of the Fregean notion of the 'sense' of a term in a way that drew upon the theory of meaning being developed at the time by Donald Davidson. Frege had famously distinguished between a term's 'referent' (*Bedeutung*) and its 'sense' (*Sinn*) to explain, among other things, how two sentences like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could have different cognitive values despite the fact that they were about one and the same object – the planet Venus.[44] If only the *reference*

[41] A seminal article here was 'Understanding Demonstratives', in H. Parret and Jacques Bourveresse (eds.), *Meaning and Understanding*, (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981), reprinted in Gareth Evans, *Collected Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). Here page references are to the latter.

[42] In 'Understanding Demonstratives', Evans mentions in particular McDowell's 'On Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', *Mind*, 86 (1977), 159–85, and 'Truth-value Gaps' in L. J. Cohen *et al*. (eds.), *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science VI* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982), both reprinted in *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Page references are to the latter.

[43] In the 1950 paper 'On Referring', *Mind* 59 (1950), 320–44, republished in P. F. Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), Strawson had challenged Russell's treatment of the semantics of ordinary language proper names in terms of definite descriptions.

[44] Gottlob Frege, 'On *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*', in Beaney (ed.), *The Frege Reader*, pp. 152–3.

of a name were needed for its contribution to the meaning of a sentence, then it would be difficult to explain what a speaker came to *learn* when she discovered that in fact, Hesperus, that star she observed in the morning sky, was the same object as *Phosphorus*, a body with which she was familiar when regarding the *evening* sky. She is just learning that *Venus is Venus*! At least as he had been interpreted by Michael Dummett, Frege had conceived of knowledge of a term's sense as something like the possession of a criterion for the recognition of its referent, typically by associating the term with some uniquely identifying definite description. Our speaker then would be thought of as associating a *different* description with the name 'Hesperus' ('the star seen at such and such a location in the morning') than that associated with the name 'Phosphorus' ('the star seen at such and such a location in the evening'). In 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', McDowell proposed a more modest, 'austere' account of what was known when one understood a term's sense.

In the Davidsonian approach to meaning on which he drew, an 'interpreter' attempts to construct a theory for some natural language by utilizing a 'theory of truth', a formal device that Tarski had employed for theorizing the semantics of formal languages. In Tarski's set-theoretic approach, a formal language could be constructed by first specifying axioms in which primitive elements were assigned semantic values – singular terms being assigned to objects within a certain domain and predicates being defined in terms of the notions of set theory – and then devising rules of combination for these elements such that the sentences constructed from them could be paired with statements of the necessary and sufficient conditions under which those sentences were true – their 'truth conditions'. Thus a sentence in the *metalanguage* of the theory would have the form '"s" is true if and only if *p*', where 's' refers to a sentence in the *object* language and 'p' the conditions (specified in terms of the meta-language) under which that sentence would be true. In Tarski's well-known example, it would specify that the English sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow were, in fact, white. Davidson had employed this idea in conceiving of meaning within natural, not just formal, languages, and had reversed the relation of meaning to truth. Here the interpreter would construct a Tarski-type 'truth theory' for the language of a speaker as part of a more general theory of explaining the behaviour (including the verbal behaviour, the 'speech acts') of that speaker. *Via* the theory, the interpreter would thereby come to have a type of knowledge that would allow her to understand sentences uttered

by the speaker; that is, she would have achieved a type of knowledge in some ways equivalent to that which the actual speaker possessed *without a theory*. By observing the behaviour of the speaker, the interpreter would come to posit that a sentence like 'Snow is white' expressed a belief, a belief that would be true if and only if snow were, in fact, white.

McDowell now transposed this approach into a consideration of Fregean 'sense'. For an interpreter to know the sense of a singular term '*a*', was for that term to appear in an axiom of the truth theory, and marked as standing for or designating some object: 'A clause like "'Hesperus' stands for Hesperus'" ... would figure in a theory that, for speech acts in which the name was uttered, warranted specifying their content by means of sentences in which the name was used, that is, sentences that mentioned the planet'.[45] Thus, the interpreter would grasp that a sentence like 'Hesperus is bright tonight' would be warranted just in those conditions where the planet *Venus* was, in fact, bright. But the interpreter would be able to do this only if she grasped that 'Hesperus' had a systematic role in the speaker's verbal behaviour.

> Such a clause would do no work in the description of a linguistic capacity actually possessed by a given speaker ... unless he showed an ability to use the name, or respond intelligently (with understanding) to uses of the name on the part of others, in speech acts construable as being about the planet.[46]

For McDowell this latter condition implied that there was a grain of truth in those theories of sense that, like Frege's, identified the sense of a proper name with some definite description picking out the name's bearer, in that 'a person who knows the sense of a name must have some beliefs about its bearer'. However, that in itself did not warrant the demand that such descriptions *uniquely identify* the referent. 'The concession I am envisaging is that the person must have some *beliefs* – possibly sketchy, possibly false – about the object; not that he must *know* truths about it, sufficiently full to be true of it alone, and thus capable of generating a definite description that could replace the used name in the relevant clause of the theory of sense'.[47]

McDowell envisaged such a revisionary view of sense as having a variety of consequences, one concerning how to think of 'empty

[45] McDowell, 'On Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', p. 182.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., p. 183.

names', that is, names without referents. Since definite descriptions were held to have a sense *regardless* of whether there were objects to answer for them, identifying the sense of a proper name with that of a definite description would imply that a name could have a sense even if it had no referent: 'a name without a bearer could, in Frege's view, have a sense in exactly the same way as a name with a bearer'. In contrast, on his own revisionist view this was impossible.

> An interpreter's ascription of propositional attitudes to his subject is in general constrained by the facts (as the interpreter sees them). This is partly because intelligibility, in ascriptions of belief at least, requires conformity to reasonable principles about how beliefs can be acquired under the impact of the environment; and partly because the point of ascribing propositional attitudes is to bring out the reasonableness, from a strategic standpoint constituted by possession of the attitudes, of the subject's dealings with the environment. Now, whether a name has a bearer or not (in an interpreter's view) makes a difference to the way in which the interpreter can use beliefs he can ascribe to the subject in making sense of the subject's behaviour. A sincere assertive utterance of a sentence containing a name with a bearer can be understood as expressing a belief correctly describable as a belief, concerning the bearer, that it satisfies some specified condition. If the name has no bearer (in the interpreter's view), he cannot describe any suitably related belief in that transparent style.[48]

In light of the thesis of *Mind and World*, McDowell's account of the more general philosophical commitments of the 'Fregean' view he was opposing are striking. In short, the Fregean view involved 'a suspect conception of how thought relates to reality, and ultimately a suspect conception of mind'.[49] On the Fregean view, the sense of a term is a possession of the mind that is unaffected by the fact that there may be nothing in the world to answer to it.[50] In bringing the presupposed view of the mind into question here, McDowell quoted Wittgenstein's remark, 'If God had

[48] Ibid., p. 185.

[49] Ibid., p. 186.

[50] 'The Fregean view would have to seek its support in the idea that thought relates to objects with an essential indirectness: by way of a blueprint or specification that, if formulated, would be expressed in purely general terms. Whether the object exists or not would then be incidental to the availability of the thought. Underlying that idea is the following line of argument. When we mention an object in describing a thought we are giving only an extrinsic characterization of the thought (since the mention of the object takes us outside the subject's mind); but there must be an intrinsic characterization available (one that does not take us outside the subject's mind), and that characterization would have succeeded in

looked into our minds, he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of'.[51] Frege's presupposed account of the mind, thinks McDowell, presupposes what he later calls the 'sideways-on' view, the view conceived as possessable only by a God able to see inside the speaker's mind to locate that speaker's 'sense' and, at the same time, able to view the world *external* to the speaker's mind and note the absence of a corresponding referent for that sense. *Inside the mind*, which McDowell glosses with the phrase 'that (mythical) repository', is simply:

> not the right place to look. God (or anyone) might see whom we have in mind, rather, by – for instance – seeing whom we are looking at as we speak. That sort of thing – seeing relations between a person and bits of the world, not prying into a hidden place whose contents could be just as they are even if there were no world – is (in part) what seeing into a person's mind is.[52]

We thus see in this paper an explicit criticism of the philosophical tendency that is relentlessly criticised in more Sellarsian terms in *Mind and World*, a tendency that assumes one's entitlement to a certain conception of the philosophical point of view, a point of view that would allow what might be called 'trans-realm' vision. Here, the theorist conceives of two realms, one inside the mind, containing such items as determinate *senses*, and one outside the mind, containing the *referents* to which those senses are somehow meant to give access. As we have seen, McDowell is equally critical of a type of trans-realm perspective that he finds in Kant's 'transcendental' standpoint, a perspective ruthlessly criticized by Hegel. But Aristotle too was critical of a similar 'trans-realm' conception of philosophical vision, that of Plato. Thus while McDowell often characterizes the view of the mind's relation to the world that he is opposing as 'Cartesian', exactly what he is opposed to *in it* seems somewhat *deeper* or more general. Thus, in the early modern 'way of ideas' tradition, the vision aspired to is one of the external realm on behalf of a solipsistically conceived subject. In the *ancient* tradition, it is a vision onto the inhabitants of the ideal realm from the point of a view of a soul fallen to earth. In the modern tradition of scientistic naturalism, it is a view onto the natural world as it actually is from the point of view of a mere natural mechanism within it. It was this

specifying the essential core of the thought even if extramental reality had not obliged by containing the object'. Ibid.

[51] The internal reference is to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, part II xi, p. 217.

[52] McDowell, 'On Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', p. 187.

opposition to a type of trans-world perspective, not now found in Frege but in Russell, that Evans was to take up in his theory of the semantics of demonstratives.

In 'Understanding Demonstratives' and then in Chapter 6 of *The Varieties of Reference*, Evans extended McDowell's treatment of singular terms to demonstrative expressions in a way he referred to as giving a *Russellian* gloss to Frege's own treatment of demonstratives. Transposed to the *psychological* realm, the notion of demonstrative thoughts could in turn be linked up to a conception of perception, Evans shifting the focus of work in semantics from language back to the more phenomenological focus of philosophy prior to philosophy's 'linguistic turn'.[53] Here, the Russellian gloss involved consisted in aspects of Russell's idea of 'knowledge by acquaintance' being brought to bear on Frege's conception of demonstrative reference. This approach, however, radically transformed the conception of Russellian acquaintance itself in the process. As Evans remarks: 'Of course many modifications have to be made to Russell's original conception of genuine singular terms before anything viable emerges'. Such modifications were indeed substantial, and crucially included the 'abandonment of the Cartesian conception of thinking to which the restriction of genuine reference to private languages can be traced'.[54]

In his early philosophy of logical atomism, Russell famously had distinguished knowledge by acquaintance from knowledge by description.[55] By 'knowledge by acquaintance', he conceived of a form of knowledge *close to* the early modern empiricist conception of the mind's immediate knowledge of its own sensory ideas. But Russell rejected the identification of sensory ideas with sensations themselves: rather, we should think of sensation as an *act* of awareness or knowing, and sensory ideas, now renamed 'sense-data', as immediate *objects* of such knowledge, objects he thought of as roughly equivalent to the contents of Kantian intuitions.[56] Furthermore, according to Russell, another problem with the early modern 'way of ideas' approach

[53] Michael Dummett considers that this makes Evans 'no longer an analytic philosopher'. Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 4.

[54] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 47.

[55] Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, especially Chapters 1 and 5.

[56] 'Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation *of* the colour, but the colour itself is a

concerned its failure to distinguish the immediate knowledge of sense-data from a totally different form of knowledge – propositional knowledge, or 'knowledge by description'. From the perspective of his reinterpretation of the classical empiricist conception, Russell now construed knowledge by acquaintance of those sense-data immediately present to the subject of experience as indubitable and as providing the foundation for the otherwise fallible knowledge by description. With this conception we were thus meant to understand all propositionally articulated knowledge of worldly objects as somehow rationally constrained by what is given to the mind with certainty in acquaintance, a paradigmatic version of the view that Sellars would later criticize as mythical.

The de-Cartesianized thought that Evans had attempted to extract from Russellian *acquaintance* via his treatment of demonstratives was the idea of a singular mental content – the sense of a singular term – which could *only* be intelligibly entertained on the condition of the existence of some single object to which it referred: 'a thought is Russellian if it is of such a kind that it simply could not exist in the absence of the object or objects which it is about'.[57] Evans's way to this was in terms of a transformation, along the lines suggested by McDowell, of Frege's conception of the sense of demonstrative linguistic expressions. Evans, however, argued that this general picture of sense was in fact, Frege's own view, rightly understood.[58]

As we have seen, Frege had been interpreted as assigning a sense to a singular term in such a way that its possession of sense was indifferent to the question of the actual *existence* of its referent. But for Russell, while such an analysis was appropriate for 'what pass for names in language, like "Socrates", "Plato", and so forth', which referred in virtue of some related definite description, it didn't apply to the way that *genuine* or 'logical' proper names, such as demonstratives, referred to genuine 'particulars': 'A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning [reference] is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted'. The only names 'in the logical

sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that *of* which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation'. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 12.

[57] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 71.

[58] Evans capitalized on Frege's idea that the sense of a sentence could be regarded non-subjectively as the 'thought' content that corresponded to it, and, further, that the sense of a term could also be considered as the 'mode of presentation' of that term's *Bedeutung*. It was considerations such as these that for Evans enabled the Fregean framework to be transposed to the register of thought, and philosophy of language to be utilized for a philosophy of *mental* content.

sense are words like "this" or "that"' which one can use as names 'to stand for a particular with which one is acquainted at the moment'.[59] Frege appeared *not* to employ any analogous distinction, however, and on the standard picture, for Frege all reference was *via* descriptive specification constituting the sense of the terms of phrases. Evans effectively extended McDowell's 'non-Fregean' account of the necessarily object-involving sense of singular terms to demonstratives, claiming that for Frege, demonstratives were such that they could only contribute to a meaningful utterance or thought on condition that they *actually* had a reference. For Frege, a demonstrative referred, he claimed, as a 'Russellian singular term' and thus had a necessarily *object-involving* sense.[60]

We need not be concerned at all with the complex question of the historical adequacy of Evans's interpretation of Frege;[61] it is rather what his analysis of demonstrative thought allows for that is of interest here, not the question of the historical accuracy of his views. For Evans, a suitably 'Russellized' Fregean approach to demonstrative thought or perceptual content made the very *having* of such thought – the very *possession* of such cognitively relevant perceptual 'content' – dependent upon the existence of their referent. This is the idea that McDowell was to develop further into a variant of direct perceptual realism, but in Evans this idea was then further linked to a quasi-cognitive scientific account describing the process by which such thoughts acquire their content, and this is where the approaches of Evans and McDowell would start to diverge. For McDowell, Evans's 'information link' looks suspiciously like a trans-realm bridge ensuring that we can see how, from a 'sideways-on' view, two radically different realms, the mental and the physical, are actually linked.

Elsewhere in his account of perceptual demonstrative reference, Evans describes the relation between, say, the perceptual content expressed by my uttering the phrase 'that book', and the book that I am now perceiving, as involving a necessary 'information link' between the object of my thought (the book) and the thought itself. This link, while necessary, was not sufficient, however, for my perceptual demonstrative to allow a genuine thought about the book. In order for it to do so I have to know *which object* is picked out *by* that demonstrative. I have to have a way of

[59] Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', in *Logic and Knowledge*, pp. 200–201.
[60] Evans, 'Understanding Demonstratives', pp. 295–6.
[61] For a criticism of Evans's views of Frege as anachronistic, see, for example, David Bell, 'How "Russellian" was Frege?' *Mind* 99, 394 (1990), 267–77.

specifying that object, and this requires the capacity to in some way *classify* it. Thus it is at this point that Evans's view links back to the 'description theory' of reference traditionally attributed to Frege.[62] This is why the genuine perceptual demonstrative contains a classifying 'such' rather than simply being a '*this*'. And so, while the 'information link' underlies the capacity for thought about an object, some *description-based* way of identifying the object is additionally necessary.[63]

According to Evans, having a thought like 'John is happy', requires the exercise of two underlying capacities, one concerned with having the thought *of that* which the thought is about, here *John*, and that concerned with *what is thought about* that object, here, *what it is* to be characterized by the property 'happiness'. That is, to have a thought about John presupposes the capacity to think *other things* of him – to think, for example, that 'John is sad'. Conversely, to have a thought about his *being happy*, would require the capacity to have thoughts about things other than John that might be considered to be happy too – thoughts such as 'Harry is happy', for example. Thus 'someone who thinks that John is happy must, we might say, have the idea of *a happy man* – a situation instantiated in the case of John (he thinks), but in no way tied to John for its instantiation'.[64] Evans uses the term 'Idea' to capture what in the case of thought about objects is analogous to the 'concept' said of a property, and to have an 'Idea' of an object requires knowing the *kind* of object it is. This is so because for any object we can ask what is it that makes any two presentations of it presentations of *one* object rather than two, and answering *that* question involves a reference to the *kind* of object it is. Following David Wiggins, Evans contends that even in the case of spatio–temporal continuants, appeal needs to be made to some kind or 'sortal' term in individuation, since 'although two *G*s may not be able to share a position at a time, a *G* may be able to share a position with a thing of a different kind: for instance a statue and a piece of clay'.[65]

This idea brings into consideration certain ideas associated with Wiggins's attempts to revive within the post-Fregean logical context the

[62] It is, of course, a move found in McDowell's retention of the idea that a singular term has to be connected up to certain *beliefs*, albeit possibly *false* ones.

[63] As McDowell points out, 'the essential background for Evans's account of demonstrative modes of presentation is the principle that to entertain a thought, one must know what it would be for the thought to be true'. McDowell, 'Discussions: Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content', *Mind* 99 (1990), 255–66, 256.

[64] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 103.

[65] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 107. Evans refers here to David Wiggins, 'On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time', *Philosophical Review* 77 (1968), 90–5.

relevance of a quasi-Aristotelian conception of substance. Specifically, Wiggins appeals to Aristotle's distinction between two logically different types of predication: what Aristotle had called predications in the category of substance and predications in the category of quality (a distinction which is analogous to Evans's distinction between 'ideas' and 'concepts').[66] As Aristotle puts it in the *Categories*, 'Species and genus ... do not merely indicate quality, as 'white' merely indicates quality. Accidents, that is, like 'white', mean a quality simply and merely. But species and genus determine a quality in reference to substance. They tell you *what sort* of a substance'.[67] This is precisely the appeal to substance as a condition of the perceptual individuation of objects that we have seen in Sellars's appeal to the '*tode ti*', the 'this such' in his reinterpretation of Kantian intuitions. Evans puts the point by saying that for any object we can specify '*the fundamental ground of difference* of that object':

> This will be a specific answer to the question 'What differentiates that object from others?' of the kind appropriate to objects of that sort. For example, the fundamental ground of difference of the number *three* is being the third number in the series of numbers; the fundamental ground of difference of the shape *square* is having four equal sides joined at right angles; and so on.[68]

Of course, what Evans appeals to with the notion of the 'fundamental ground of difference' of an object need hardly be the same as what *Aristotle* had thought of as a 'substance'. Nevertheless, the basically Aristotelian flavour of this move is clear, and the context in which Evans introduces this neo-Aristotelian element concerning the use of sortal or kind terms in the individuation of objects is just that of Sellars's use of this Aristotelian idea to free Kant's thought about intuitions from the trap of 'the given'.

Evans thinks that while demonstrative reference to an object does not depend on the thinker's *actually* having an idea of what kind of thing the

[66] See especially, David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance Renewed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The importance of distinguishing between sortal and attributive concepts on account of the role played by the former in the individuation of entities had also been stressed by P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1959). More recently, this neo-Aristotelian approach has been pursued systematically by E. J. Lowe in *Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

[67] Aristotle, *Categories*, in H. B. Cooke (ed. and trans.), *Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle I*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), ch. v, 3b18–22.

[68] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 107.

thing referred to is, it nevertheless relies on the possibility of *discovering* what kind of thing it is. Bare demonstrative reference can be a meaningful but not a *self-sufficient* linguistic practice: it relies on a background of the more basic form of demonstrative reference picking out the individual thing as a member of a kind or 'sort'.

> The idea of discovering the sort of a thing, identified demonstratively, would not make sense if there was not some ranking of sorts. . . . when the fisherman wonders what he has at the end of his line, the answer 'A statue' is a better answer than 'A piece of clay'. Since we seem to know this ranking, it is not important for us to enquire into its principles: a determinate answer can be given to the question 'What kind of thing is this?' provided a definitely extended object is indicated, and such an indication does not by itself presuppose any sortal.[69]

In fact, Evans's association of demonstrative reference here with the process of coming to *discover* a thing's kind overlapped with a more widespread revival of Aristotelian ideas within analytic philosophy in the final third of the twentieth century. David Armstrong, for example, had reintroduced universals into analytic metaphysics in a way that linked them to laws of nature,[70] and more strongly anti-Humean, neo-Aristotelian approaches, stressing the role of causal powers in *explaining* the law-like regularities of science, had subsequently appeared in a number of areas.[71] Evans's approach here, however, bears more of a family resemblance to the more explicitly *Kant*-oriented version of essentialism found in the work of Hilary Putnam.[72] Like Kant, Putnam focuses upon the role played by the subjective conditions of determinacy that allow our thoughts to have a content. Like Aristotle, however, (and like Hegel) Putnam thinks of the conceptual 'kind' structures

[69] Ibid., pp. 178–9.

[70] For Armstrong, natural laws do not simply express empirical regularities, but rather relations of necessitation that hold among universals. See, David Armstrong, *What is a Law of Nature*? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Lowe links a fully-fledged Aristotelian realism about kinds to the notion of natural laws in *Kinds of Being*, Chapter 8.

[71] In the philosophy of science, for example, with the work of Nancy Cartwright, *Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), as well as in analytic metaphysics in Brian Ellis, *Scientific Essentialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[72] In 1978 Putnam noted the recent turning in his thinking and that there was 'something Kantian in the view with which I end up'. Hilary Putnam, *Meaning and the Moral Sciences* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 5. By the 1980s his Kantianism was more explicit (see especially *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 60–4).

that individual thought tracks as 'in the world' rather than 'in the head'. Understanding McDowell too involves understanding something about the Kantian and Aristotelian features of the intellectual terrain that he inhabits. In the following section I trace McDowell's journey though this terrain in the company of Evans, and in the subsequent section, the parting of their ways and McDowell's embrace of Hegelianism.

1.4 With Evans to Kant

During the 1980s McDowell published a series of papers defending the substance and the historical accuracy of Evans's 'Russellized' Frege.[73] Indeed, such a conception was at the heart of McDowell's own evolving version of the mind's relation to the world that characterizes *Mind and World* in terms of the conception of 'openness to the world'. In this regard, McDowell's own contribution to emerging disputes between 'internalist' and 'externalist' approaches to semantics was significant.[74] For example, his employment of Evans's reading of demonstratives as 'Russellian singular terms' allowed him to side with an 'internalist' like John Searle, who adhered to the 'description theory of reference' that had been traditionally attributed to Frege as his theory of *sense*, but at the same time to distance himself from the overt *Cartesianism* of Searle's internalism.[75] Russellian singular terms, claimed McDowell, made the semantic contents of certain types of thought conditional upon the existence of everyday 'external' objects, in a way similar to the accounts of 'externalists'. However, while such objects were to be regarded as external in the sense of being not *in the mind*, they were still to be regarded as 'internal' in the sense of necessarily *accessible* from the thinker's particular cognitive standpoint. That is, they were *subjective* in the sense of anchored in the spatio–temporally located 'first-person' viewpoint of the subject involved, but worldly objects nonetheless. We might say that while he regarded mental contents to be object-involving as the externalists claimed, McDowell remained 'internalist' with respect to the 'aspects' via which such external contents were presented to the mind. Treating the Fregean sense of a demonstrative expression not as a recipe for identifying the referent but

[73] Again, I am not concerned here with the question of historical fidelity to Frege's writings.

[74] Evans comments on his own relations to the superficially similar thought of Kripke and his followers in *The Varieties of Reference*, chs 3.3 and 11.

[75] From McDowell's point of view, Searle would be a prime example of the view of the mind as something into which *God could look* so as 'to see there whom we were speaking of' (see above footnote 51).

as a *mode of presentation* of that referent brought into focus how misleading it was to think of sense as some *intermediary* standing between the mind and the world. As Evans had put it:

> In view of this we can appreciate how wrong-headed it is to consider a Fregean sense as necessarily *intermediary* between thinker and referent, as something which must, from a certain point of view, *get in the way*, or anyway render indirect what might be direct. A way of thinking of an object is no more obliged to get in the way of thinking of an object, or to render thinking of an object indirect, than is a way of dancing liable to get in the way of dancing, or to render dancing somehow indirect.[76]

In retrospect, this evolving *aspect-internalism* of McDowell's position in the 1980s can be seen as an important element in the evolution of his views towards Kant and Hegel. While his comments on Evans in *Mind and World* are for the most part critical and directed against Evans's notion of the 'non-conceptual content' of perceptual experience, an aspect of Evans's thought linked to his account of the 'information system', McDowell is clear that he regards this aspect of Evans's approach as peripheral and non-essential to his 'master thought'.[77] McDowell comments on the Kantian influence pervading Evans's work via the intermediary of Strawson,[78] and, moreover, representative of a reading of Kant close to that being sought by McDowell himself, one quite distant from the more Cartesian one familiar within the broad tradition of Anglophone interpretation.[79] Congruent with Russell's and C. I. Lewis's understanding of intuitions as akin to sense-data, Kant had been generally read within the analytic tradition as responding to Hume and as sharing his general *phenomenalism*. In contrast, the picture of Kant implicit in McDowell's aspect-internalist approach to thought is more that of a *direct realist* rather than a phenomenalist: the objects presented in perceptual contents are actual spatio–temporal objects rather than sense-data.[80] While the aspects of objects revealed to us are in some sense internal to the web of concepts with which we

[76] Gareth Evans, 'Understanding Demonstratives', pp. 302–303.
[77] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 106.
[78] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 107 n. 32.
[79] Cf. McDowell's reference to 'the pseudo-Kantian picture, in which thought has to break out of its own proper sphere in order to make contact with particulars otherwise than by specification' (*Mind and World*, p. 107).
[80] Indeed, this might be thought of as a version of Kant's own self-description as 'transcendental idealist' and 'empirical realist'.

grasp them, the *objects themselves* are independent of those concepts. Moreover, in this reading of Kant another aspect of his notion of intuition comes to the fore.

Kant had insisted against Leibniz that space and time themselves had a non-conceptual form – that of pure intuition. Essentially his claim was that we could not think of the relationship among parts of space (or time) in the same way that we thought of relationships among parts of space-time-occupying *things*. We might say that the very idea that concepts are applied to spatio–temporal continuants, rather than any kind of Russellian or Platonic *simples*, suggests that *locations* in space-time themselves, or relations between those locations, are not to be grasped 'conceptually'. This distinction between the 'concepts' applied to spatio–temporally individuated objects, and space and time as the *conditions of their individuation* – the distinction that Kant signals as a distinction between concept and intuition as structurally different species of representation – is, I will suggest later, *retained* by Hegel, but freed from the distinction between 'concepts' and 'intuitions' as distinct representational kinds. However, we have already glimpsed an alternative way of marking this distinction between Evans's 'ideas' (as what individuate objects) and 'concepts' (as applied to those objects in judgements), and this, as we have seen, looks like Aristotle's distinction between 'predications in the category of substance' and 'predications in the category of quality'. It is this 'Aristotelian' interpretation of Kant's 'concept–intuition' distinction, I will argue below, that allowed Hegel to retain Kant's *critical* use of the distinction while by-passing the risk of equating the content of 'intuitions' with the mythical 'given'.

If McDowell wants to retain a 'minimal empiricism' and a 'different notion of givenness' in order to avoid the dual traps of modern philosophy, we might then see why he would be attracted to views of this kind. In order to appreciate just how McDowell might get to Hegel, however, we will need to appreciate just how this non-phenomenalist Kant lines up with McDowell's reworking of *Evans's* reworking of Frege and Russell, and how tensions within the thought of both Kant and Evans motivate the move towards Hegel.

In the phenomenalist or 'Cartesian' reading of Kant, an empirical intuition *qua* singular and immediate representation or '*Vorstellung*' is classically regarded as a type of singular internal object akin to the classical empiricists' 'sensory idea',[81] albeit now fitted out with an *a priori* spatio–temporal form courtesy of the activity of the knowing subject. Thus, on this

[81] '*Vorstellung*' was the eighteenth-century German translation for the English 'idea'.

reading, the avowed *empirical realism* with which Kant had attempted to distinguish his views from those of Berkeley, seemed slight. After all, was not the 'external' spatio–temporal empirical world itself thought of by Kant as a type of *projection* by the subject? Stung by early criticisms of Berkeleyism, Kant had strenuously attempted to separate his idealism from that of Berkeley, re-writing sections of the first *Critique* for the 1787 second edition towards that end. Thus in this 'B' edition is found the 'Refutation of Idealism' with its attempt to establish the idea that perceptual representations present the subject immediately with external objects which can in no way be regarded as mere objects of the imagination. Nevertheless, Kant's language does often suggest the Berkeleian picture, as when he talks of that which is immediately known to the mind as *Vorstellungen* or 'representations'. Moreover, as he sometimes refers to 'sensation' as the 'matter' of those representations,[82] sensations to which the subject supplied a spatio–temporal form, the phenomenalist picture of the mind inspecting its own inner sensory states often seems hard to avoid.

As indicated above, within a developing line of Kant interpretation from the 1980s, defenders of Kant such as Henry Allison had taken Kant's attempts to distance himself from Berkeley at his word and had construed Kant more as a *direct perceptual realist* than as a phenomenalist.[83] On this reading, when Kant claims that what we are aware of in perception are representations rather than 'things in themselves', he is *not* to be taken as meaning that we are immediately aware of our subjective inner states, but rather that we are directly aware of objects in the external world grasped from within some determinate epistemic perspective.[84] When I perceive an object, it is the *object* I am immediately perceiving (not some internal image or likeness of it), but I am perceiving it from the perspective of my own epistemic conditions.[85] In short, on this reading, we might say that Kant's 'idealism' is concerned not with the *existence* of the perceived objects (it is not an *ontological* idealism) but rather with the *aspects* which those objects present to experience. Transcendental idealism is a type of *aspect-idealism*, or, using the term we

[82] For example, at A42/B59–60. Elsewhere, for example, at A20/B34, Kant talks of sensation as 'corresponding' to the matter of appearances.

[83] Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, revised and enlarged edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

[84] On this reading, the 'appearance' / 'thing in itself' dichotomy is thus not taken as alluding to two different kinds of objects – one subjective, one objective – but rather to subjective and objective *ways* in which a single object can be regarded by a finite epistemic subject.

[85] Moreover, while I cannot *know* the object in abstraction from these conditions, I can have a concept of it as such.

have applied to McDowell, an *aspect-internalism*, that is not only *compatible with* but *necessary for* Kant's espoused 'empirical realism'.

Indeed, it would seem that the Fregean distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, applied to capture the 'demonstrative' dimension of perceptual experience in the way urged by Evans and McDowell, would promise a way to fill out Kant's 'realist' intentions here. On the revisionist reading, what Kant had meant by the claim that we perceive appearances, not things in themselves, could be read in terms of the claim that perceptual experience *has* a 'sense', and that a perceived object as the *Bedeutung* of perceptual representation is presented to the mind in some determinate way in virtue of that sense. Moreover, the 'Russellized-Fregean' idea of the sense of demonstrative thoughts as *necessarily object-involving* would seem to capture *just* the notion that Kant was trying to convey in the 'Refutation of Idealism'.

It is something like this, then, that allows McDowell in *Mind and World* effectively to reinterpret Kant's distinction between intuition and concept *qua* species of representation as a distinction between the differently functioning faculties of sensibility and understanding – in McDowell's nomenclature, 'receptivity' and 'spontaneity' – such that the conceptual capacities *exercised* in understanding are also 'actualized', although not 'exercised', in sensibility. Thus only one species of representation is required – concepts – but concepts can be involved in thought in two ways: on the one hand as cognitive capacities actualized in what Kant conceived as empirical intuitions that are now to be thought of as perceptual demonstratives, and on the other, as those same capacities exercised in predicate position in judgements made about objects. Thus McDowell can now deny that the notion of 'intuition' conceived as non-conceptual can make 'an even notionally separable contribution'[86] to experience. McDowell sees this as in fact implicit in Kant himself, but as the renunciation of any 'abstract' dichotomy between concepts and intuitions was just what had been demanded by post-Kantians such as Hegel, this is a reinterpretation of Kant that moves in the direction of Hegel.[87] Sellars had already grasped that *his* way of reading Kant, in

[86] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 51.

[87] This problem was first picked up by Fichte, who appealed to what we might refer to as the 'interdependence thesis' to criticize the idea that when considered in isolation either concepts or intuitions could be regarded at all as representations: 'Concepts without intuitions we know to be empty. Self-consciousness, sensory intuitions and concepts, taken in isolation, are one and all, not representations'. J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 47.

which he tried to free him from the residues of the myth of the given, took him in the direction of Hegel. Sellars's 'Kant', therefore, is to some extent, an already 'Hegelized' departure from transcendental idealism. But in an important respect, McDowell was to take this even further. In the 'Woodbridge Lectures', Sellars is taken to task for having attempted to maintain something of the idea of a separable non-conceptual contribution to experience, and this particular critique of *Sellars* is effectively rehearsed in *Mind and World*, in McDowell's critique there of the same tendency in *Evans*. Thus in contrast to his work in the 1980s in which the focus was on the *defence* of Evans, in *Mind and World* McDowell focuses on that aspect of Evans of which he is resolutely critical: the view that there is a ineliminable 'non-conceptual' content of perceptual experience. From McDowell's perspective, both Evans and Sellars had found the way to save Kantianism from the residual traps of Cartesianism by transforming it into Hegelianism, but both had baulked at following this thought through.

1.5 From Evans to Hegel

For McDowell it is the ability to see through the need to posit a *non-conceptual* component of experience that marks the passage from a bad Cartesianized version of Kant on receptivity to a good Hegelian one. Evans's claim that experience must be understood as involving the application of concepts to the content of non-conceptual 'informational states' acquired in perception is the wrong way to think of the role of Kantian receptivity.[88] Rather, 'we must not suppose that receptivity makes an even *notionally* separable contribution to its co-operation with spontaneity'.[89] This is the move that removes all 'outer edges' to our conceptualizations of the world and transforms the world into an Hegelian one.

McDowell's criticisms of Evans here can be thought of as working at both generic and specific levels. Generically, the idea of constraint on judgements by non-conceptual 'informational states' cannot capture the needed sense in which such constraint is meant to be *rational*. More specifically, Evans's actual arguments for the necessity of non-conceptual content rely on an inadequate concept of 'concept'. At each of these levels McDowell arrives at general conceptions of the mind's relation to the world which have distinctly Hegelian features.

[88] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, ch. 5; McDowell, *Mind and World*, pp. 47–8.
[89] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 51.

In his general criticism of Evans, McDowell effectively treats the 'informational states' to which Evans appeals in the attempt to find something able to rationally constrain perceptual judgements as just a further instance of the mythical 'given' undermined by Sellars's critique. Such informational states may not be described from the first-person phenomenalistic point of view, as were Russell's 'sense-data', nor function to provide some subjective *certainty*, but they are subject to the same inadequacy. While one might, like Davidson, happily forego the idea of *rational* constraint and simply appeal to such informational states as relevant to the story of the *causal* connections between mind and world, this, as we have seen, is just the move that McDowell rejects as it leads to the idea of the mind as rationally *unconstrained*. If judgement can be rationally constrained in empirical experience it must be the case that what does the constraining is both worldly *and* conceptual, and it was Hegel who provided a way of thinking how this can be so.

McDowell broaches the Hegelian response to the myth of the given in the second lecture of *Mind and World* (Lecture II.3), where he reformulates a Wittgensteinian point into the claim that there is 'no ontological gap' between thought and world. To deny any ontological gap when one talks of the intentional relation between mind and world, says McDowell, is just to dress up a 'truism' in 'high-flown language'. 'When one thinks truly, what one thinks *is* what is the case . . . All the point comes to is that one can think, for instance, *that spring has begun*, and that very same thing, *that spring has begun*, can be the case'.[90] Putting this point in 'high-flown terms', McDowell adds, one is led to say things like 'the world is made up of the sort of thing that one can think', and this could be taken as 'slighting' or 'renouncing the independence of reality'.[91] This is the type of slighting of reality of which Hegel is, of course, traditionally accused, but, McDowell goes on, understood correctly, it does *not* amount to anything 'metaphysically contentious'. It is contentious if this relation is considered in one direction only, but 'we might just as well take the fact that the sort of thing one can think is the same as the sort of thing that can be the case the other way round', and, so, one should not look for 'a priority in either direction'.[92] Here, McDowell's

[90] Ibid., p. 27.

[91] Ibid., pp. 27–8.

[92] Ibid., p. 28. Elsewhere (in 'The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Towards a Heterodox Reading of 'Lordship and Bondage' in Hegel's *Phenomenology*', *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 47/48 (2003), 1–16, 3), McDowell speaks of Hegel's conception of the 'equipoise' between thought and its subject matter. A similar *bi-directionality* (or

claim that there is 'no ontological gap' between mind and world serves as a way of expressing the point that Hegel had put in apparently more 'metaphysically contentious' claims about the 'absolute unity of concept and objectivity' in the 'Idea'.[93]

Besides his more general, Sellarsian, objections, in *Mind and World* McDowell also raises objections to a more *specific* argument Evans employs in his defence of non-conceptual content. This argument, as McDowell relays it, is that 'the world as experience takes hold of it is more finely grained than we could register by appealing only to conceptual capacities expressible by general colour words and phrases'.[94] McDowell's apparently simple rejoinder here is that Evans's point looks plausible *only* on the assumption that the colour concepts at issue are ones such as ' "red", "green" or "burnt sienna" '.[95] Such concepts are too coarse-grained to capture our powers of colour discrimination: it is readily appreciated that a perceiver with only a stock of such terms might still be able to discriminate a variety of shades that would be grouped together by such general colour concepts. As McDowell points out, 'such words and phrases express concepts of bands on the spectrum, whereas Evans's thought is that colour experience can present properties that correspond to something more like lines on the spectrum, with no discernible width'.[96] However, McDowell continues, if we consider the use of *demonstrative* concepts such as 'that shade' we can see that nothing *other* than concepts is needed to articulate our discriminatory capacities. Thus 'one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as the experience, by uttering a phrase like 'that shade', in which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample'.[97]

Given Evans's role in the development of the account of demonstrative concepts that McDowell employs, there seems something ironic

'equipoise') is found in Brandom's notion of reciprocal sense-dependence between the language of thought and the language of objects. Robert B. Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 51.

[93] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), § 213. C.f., 'Here the subject and object of the Idea are one – either is the intelligent unity, the notion'. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind: Part III of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, § 381.

[94] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 58. Cf. Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 229.

[95] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 56.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., p. 57.

about McDowell's appealing to the idea of a demonstrative perceptual concept *against* Evans himself. Why is the idea of such a demonstrative concept, as McDowell notes, 'not so much as considered in Evans's argument?'[98] I suggest we interpret McDowell here as gently reminding Evans, in the course of an imaginary dialogue, of Evans's *own* views on the conditions of individuation, and as asking him to regard the question of the individuation of *colours* in the same way that he would regard individual instantiations of other kind terms or sortals. Just as we are to think of a kind such as 'horse' as essentially individuated into embodied instances capable of designation by 'this horse', we are to think of a colour such as 'red', say, as analogously individuated into individual *shades* that could each be designated with the phrases such as 'this (shade of) red' or 'this shade (of red)'.[99] There is a difference, of course, in as much as the kind 'horse' is individuated into necessarily *enmattered* individuations of form while we do not think of a colour as individuated into its constitutive 'shades' in quite that way – a shade does not have the type of spatio–temporal particularity of a horse. Nevertheless, there are, Evans thought, analogous rules for the individuation of colours, just as Frege had thought that there were rules for the individuation of numbers. As Evans puts it in *The Varieties of Reference*:

> For every kind of object, there is a general answer to the question "What makes it the case that there are two objects of this kind rather than one (or three rather than two)?" For example, we may say that shades of colour are distinguished from one another by their phenomenal properties, that shapes are distinguished from one another by their geometrical properties, that sets are differentiated from one another by their possessing different members, that numbers are differentiated from one another by their position in an infinite ordering, and that chess positions are distinguished from one another by the positions of pieces upon the board. There cannot be two indistinguishable shades of colour, two different shapes with the same geometrical properties, two numbers with the same position in the ordering, two sets with the same members, or two chess positions with the same arrangement of pieces.[100]

That is, using the quasi-Aristotelian notion of 'fundamental grounds of difference', Evans appeals to differentiable phenomenal properties as that which individuates 'shades' within the kind 'colour' in a way that is

[98] Ibid., p. 58.
[99] My point here is that we are to treat 'shade' as an ellipsis of 'shade *of*'.
[100] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, pp. 106–107.

analogous to the way *Kant* appeals to differentiable spatio–temporal locations as that which individuates individuals of the kind spatio–temporal continuants. It seems appropriate, then, to think of the 'this such' designation as the appropriate way to pick out what Evans thinks of as the 'objects' involved. There is no place here for anything like Russellian proper names. The *right* way to pick out a distinct shade of, say, red, is with locutions like, 'this (shade of) red' or 'this shade (of red)'.

There can still seem to be something unsatisfying in McDowell's (implicitly Evansian) account at this point, however. Kant had insisted that concepts needed to be completed by intuitions in order to make a thought determinate, and advocates of the givenness of sense-data seem to have the answer to Kant's demand. Without something 'given' thought seems condemned to indeterminacy. This is just the point Evans is making against McDowell's account, the account implicit in his own work on demonstrative reference. Is there not something more determinate *to the colour* I experience than can be caught by some (necessarily general, predicable) concept? Stripped of any epistemologically foundationalist role attributed to the given by the likes of Russell, can we not say that it is just the 'this' of the 'this shade of red' that distinguishes it from, say, '*that* shade of red?'[101]

Let us try to rethink what would be needed here in the way of a McDowellian response. The idea of determination by intuition looks to the use of the bare demonstrative for the purpose of picking out the given, and without this the boundaries of the semantic content of 'this shade' regarded conceptually seem intolerably indeterminate. But instead of thinking of the 'this–that' contrast as simply responding to some given play of identity and difference among an array of bare particulars, why not think of the play of identities and differences as equally determining the ways we use 'this' and 'that?' Note, this is not to simply *reverse* the direction of determination, but to refrain from looking for 'a priority in either direction'. But with this simple device we now seem to have an alternative way of thinking of the determinacy of the colour experience expressed by 'this shade': it *is* 'this shade' rather than some other we can designate with 'that shade'. Such a 'this *rather than* that' strategy is surely a common one, and seems to be the strategy that is at the heart of one of Hegel's most distinctive methodological ideas: an

[101] For a Kant-inspired critique of McDowell which uncouples the issue of non-conceptuality from any foundationalist assumptions, see Robert Hanna, 'Kant and Nonconceptual Content', *European Journal of Philosophy* 13 (2005), 247–90.

idea that is usually described, although perhaps not accurately, as coming from Spinoza: the idea of 'determination through negation' or 'determinate negation'. It is just such determinate negation that promises for Hegel a *Kant-derived* alternative to Kant's own idea of determination by intuition, an alternative needed because of his own criticisms of any doctrine of 'the given'.

The Hegelian theme of determination by negation is one which, as we will see in Chapter 3, takes us deeper into the Aristotelian dimensions of his thought, dimensions which, in fact, cohere with the broadly Aristotelian aspects of Sellars's critique of the myth of the given that we have followed in this chapter. Before turning to these issues, however, in Chapter 2 we will trace what can at first seem to be the very different development of Sellars's critique of the given found in Brandom that, however, *also* leads him to embrace what he recognizes as a form of Hegelianism.

2

BRANDOM, SELLARS AND THE MYTH OF THE LOGICAL GIVEN

In 1994, the year of the publication of *Mind and World*, another path-breaking work in analytic philosophy was published which was grounded in the work of Sellars and which signalled a radical realignment of analytic philosophy with respect to the idealist tradition. Again, Hegel was invoked as a thinker relevant for the resolution of deep problems within late twentieth-century analytic philosophy, but in *Making It Explicit*, Robert Brandom seemed to invoke quite different aspects of Hegelianism than had McDowell in *Mind and World*, and had drawn rather different consequences from Sellars's critique of the myth of the given.

Brandom describes the programme initiated in *Making It Explicit* as a post-Sellarsian 'inferentialist' alternative to the dominant 'representationalist' paradigm within modern philosophy, an alternative based upon a form of pragmatism that he describes as both rationalist and linguistic.[1] Representationalists typically think of awareness in terms of mental contents that somehow represent or picture worldly things, events, or states of affairs. However, the representationalists' picture, claims Brandom, is vitiated by its acceptance of the myth of the given. In contrast to representationism, the inferentialist approach to semantic

[1] Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), and *Articulating Reasons* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

content invokes Frege's 'context principle' as developed in mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy in the generally pragmatic approaches to language found in Wittgenstein and Sellars. Following Frege, Wittgenstein had, in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, regarded the proposition as the basic meaningful unit – 'only in the nexus of a proposition has a name meaning'.[2] In his later writings, however, he had held that sentences had to be understood in terms of the roles they played in 'language games'. Similarly, Sellars had looked to the role played by sentences in language games, but his interest was in the more rationalistically conceived language games of the asking for and giving of *reasons*.

This standpoint now provides a perspective from which the history of modern philosophy looks very different from accounts standardly given within analytic philosophy. For Brandom, the philosophers of the past who caught on to the idea of such an inferentialist approach to human cognition were the German idealist inheritors of Leibnizian rationalism, firstly Immanuel Kant. Brandom stresses the importance of Kant's recognition of the 'primacy of the propositional' in semantics – the idea that the 'fundamental unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum graspable, is the *judgement*'.[3] It is this which locates Kant on the Fregean side of the revolutionary break with the logic of terms.[4] But Brandom departs from those who would see Kant's doctrine of intuitions as allowing the clear separation of concept and object. For Brandom, the idea of intuition as that which allows the singular reference which ultimately ties concepts to the world – an idea also found in conventional Tarskian model-theoretic semantics – is a remnant of the type of atomistic representationalism that is ultimately *at variance* with the doctrine of the 'primacy of the propositional'. Rather, the progressive aspect of Kantian thought lies in the holistic idea that in a proto-inferentialist way locates the judgement within a community of judgements signaled by the notion of the 'transcendental unity of apperception'.[5] But this inferentialism was only implicit in Kant and 'it remained for Hegel . . . to

[2] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, § 3.3.

[3] Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*, pp. 159–60.

[4] 'The pre-Kantian tradition took it for granted that the proper order of semantic explanation begins with a doctrine of concepts or terms, divided into singular and general, whose meaningfulness can be grasped independently of and prior to the meaningfulness of judgements . . . Kant rejects this'. Ibid., p. 159.

[5] 'The subtlety and sophistication of Kant's concept of representation is due in large part to the way in which it is integrated into his account of the inferential relations among judgements'. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 92.

complete the inversion of the traditional order of semantic explanation by beginning with a concept of experience as inferential activity and discussing the making of judgements and the development of concepts entirely in terms of the roles they play in that inferential activity'.[6]

In this way, the post-Fregean inferentialist movement towards a type of conceptual holism found in Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Rorty and others effectively reprised the move found within post-Kantian idealism away from Kant's focus on judgements towards Hegel's on inferences, a move summed up by Hegel's dicta that 'the whole' was 'the true' and that the syllogism was the 'truth' of the judgement.

Like McDowell, Brandom regards much contemporary analytic philosophy as vitiated by the myth of the given which, despite analytic philosophy's official break with Kant, appears in the mainstream as the 'official' Kantian idea of a non-conceptual component of experience.[7] But in *Making It Explicit*, Brandom says relatively little about experience: the actual target of the 'inferentialism' developed there is not so much the 'myth of the given' considered at the level of experience – the critique of which he largely accepts from Sellars – but what might be described as its *logical concomitant*, a parallel myth of the *logical* given that is presupposed by the representationalist construals of semantics. And if Russell's account of sense-data can be thought of as representative of the version of the myth against which Sellars was arguing in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, so *too* might the early Russell be thought as the prototypical representative of the myth of the *logical given* against *which* Brandom's inferentialist development of Sellars is primarily directed. For Russell, the immediate intuitive apprehension of sense-data was only *one* of the applications of the idea of 'acquaintance'. Our *a priori* knowledge of *logical and mathematical truths* were also to be accounted for by this means.

Brandom's attempt to retrieve Hegel as relevant for an area from which he had been curtly dismissed by Russell and his followers, that of modern logic, is as brilliant as it is bold. In this chapter I will discuss the route within the analytic approach to logic that has led to the substantive position from which Brandom makes this claim.

[6] Ibid. In particular, Brandom finds in Hegel's methodological use of the combination of 'mediation' and 'determinate negation', ideas about the implicit structuring of the linguistic practice of the asking for and giving of reasons which are at the heart of his own rationalist pragmatism.

[7] 'Essential elements of Kant's dualistic conception of concepts are still with us today'. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 615.

2.1 Russell and the myth of the logical given

With his separation of intuition and concept, Kant had disavowed the availability to humans of any *Platonic* conception of intuitive knowledge of universals, 'intellectual intuition'. While we may conceive of a divine intelligence with such powers, *for us* finite cognizers *all* intuition is sensory and involves some ultimate causal affection by those objects that come to be discursively known through that affection, and, importantly, come to be known not as bare singularities but as bearers of conceptually determinate properties. In the context of his early logicist programme, however, in which he was concerned not with empirical knowledge but with foundational issues in mathematics, Russell had been happy to trade Kant's approach for the very type of Platonist intuitionism that Kant had rejected.[8]

Russell's relation to Kant in this early period was complex. First, parallel to Moore's criticism of naturalism in *ethics*, Russell was, like Frege, party to the critique of nineteenth-century *psychologism* in logic, a critique that had effectively been introduced *by* Kant and endorsed by later idealists and neo-Kantians alike.[9] Like Kant then, and in contrast to nineteenth-century empiricists such as Mill, Russell regarded logic as in no way reducible to *empirically* conceived psychological 'laws of thought'. Rather, the laws of logic would hold regardless of whether we humans actually applied them in our cognitive activity. However, under the influence of Moore's strongly anti-Kantian approach to judgement, Russell had, like Moore, turned the critique of psychologism against Kant himself. Moore had construed Kant's claims about the role of the 'I think' accompanying all judgements in a subjectivistic and individualistic way,[10] and analogously, Russell thus regarded *Kant* himself as having compromised the objectivity of both mathematics and logic by psychologizing, albeit 'transcendentally', these two types of knowledge: 'The thing to be accounted for is our certainty that the facts must always

[8] Or, at least, had rejected for the realm of theoretical knowledge.

[9] And influenced by *Moore*, he rejected empiricism in ethics for a quasi-platonic conception of the intuition of the good, a type of anti-naturalist stance that Moore shared with later nineteenth-century idealists despite his criticism of them.

[10] Thus in 'The Nature of Judgement' Moore notes: 'It will be apparent how much this theory has in common with Kant's theory of perception. It differs chiefly in substituting for sensations, as the data of knowledge, concepts; and in refusing to regard the relations in which they stand as, in some obscure sense, the work of the mind'. G. E. Moore, *Selected Writings*, ed. T. Baldwin (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 9. Moore's criticism of Kant thus presupposes what I have been calling the 'Russellian' interpretation of Kant.

conform to logic and arithmetic. To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account for this'.[11]

Following and building on the new developments in formal logic forged by Frege, Russell rejected the idea that mathematical truth evidenced the existence of what Kant had called 'pure intuition' and that provided experience with the form of space and time.[12] Mathematical truths were *analytic* not *synthetic*: it had only been Kant's slavish adherence to Aristotelian syllogistic logic, he claimed, that had led him to posit mathematic's *non*-analytic ground. But having eliminated Kant's way of holding onto the normativity of logic, Russell reverted to the type of Platonic intuitionism that had been espoused by Moore. Thus for Russell, the objectivity of logical laws was a consequence of the way that logical relations were ultimately grounded in *ontology*:

> In the discussion of inference, it is common to permit the intrusion of a psychological element, and to consider our acquisition of new knowledge by its means. But it is plain that where we validly infer one proposition from another we do so in virtue of a relation which holds between the two propositions whether we perceive it or not: the mind, in fact, is as purely receptive in inference as common sense supposes it to be in perception of sensible objects. The relation in virtue of which it is possible for us validly to infer is what I call material implication.[13]

Hence:

> What we believe, when we believe the law of [non-]contradiction,[14] is not that the mind is so made that it must believe the law of [non-]contradiction. *This* belief is a subsequent result of psychological reflection, which presupposes the belief in the law of [non-]contradiction. The

[11] Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 87. This aspect of Russell's criticism of Kant's approach to *formal* logic here is misplaced. For Kant it is 'transcendental logic' that is psychologized in this sense. Formal inferential structures are applicable to all logically possible objects, transcendental ones are applicable to possible objects of our experience.

[12] This was more radical than Frege, as Frege had retained the Kantian idea of the role of intuition in geometry. Russell's elimination of intuition from mathematics thus relied on a combination of Frege's logicist programme for arithmetic and Hilbert's *arithmetization* of geometry.

[13] Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 33.

[14] Here and elsewhere, I will render what is sometimes called 'the law (or principle) of contradiction' as 'the law of non-contradiction'. The latter name is more descriptive as contradiction is what the law *denies*. This terminology also has the advantage of reserving the 'law of contradiction' for Hegel, for whom *this* law states that '*everything is inherently contradictory*'. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 439 (6.74). I discuss this issue in Chapter 7.

> belief in the law of [non-]contradiction is a belief about things, not only about thoughts.[15]

With this, then, Russell, following Moore, had reverted to a position closer to Aristotle's representationalist interpretation of the logical categories than to Kant's. For Aristotle, it would seem, the categories *reflected in* the logical behaviour of our words reflect structures properly belonging to *being*, while for Kant the worldly structures – in the sense of the way that they are *for us* – reflect the logical structures of our judgements. So for Russell, the *laws* of logic are normative *for us* in so far as there can be questions of thought's form correctly or incorrectly representing the *world's* form. The laws of thought are made true by an ontology which we must be able to somehow directly grasp *if* we are to apply these laws in our thinking.

In fact, the universal principles of logic, and following them, the laws of pure mathematics, must be grounded in a form of acquaintance in which relations between universals are given in a way *analogous* to that in which *sense-data* are given to us in sensation. We must be able not only to intuit universals but the relations between them: 'It must be taken as a fact, discovered by reflecting upon our knowledge, that we have the power of sometimes perceiving such relations between universals, and therefore of sometimes knowing general *a priori* propositions such as those of arithmetic and logic'.[16] Thus while sense-data *might be thought* of as something like the singular contents of Kantian intuitions, the 'acquaintance' involved in our *logical a prioris* testifies to some equivalent 'intuition' of laws or rules – Kant's intellectual intuition. It was this founding Platonism of Russell's earliest position in analytic philosophy – the idea that logical universals are given to us in some sort of intuitive manner – that was subsequently to prove troublesome for the generally *naturalistic* tenor that came to define the newly emerging discipline after the Great War. Russell came to modify his initial ontology-driven position in various ways, stripping back his earlier richly pluralistic realism.

[15] Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 88–9. This was the basis of Russell's quip about logic as a general version of the science of zoology: the structures revealed by logic are simply the most general structures of the world revealed to the more concrete empirical sciences.

[16] Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 105. Again, here Russell followed Moore who, as Hylton puts it, held that 'the objects of thought can be treated in exactly the same way as the objects of sensation, so that arguments which show the latter to be independent of our minds will show the former to be so too'. Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 129.

2.2 Sellars and the critique of logical intuition

In a number of early papers written in the 1940s and 1950s, a time when the views of the logical positivists had come to dominate the analytic debate, Sellars reflected on the dichotomy between the rationalist intuitionism of the early analytic approach to logic and the naturalistic empiricist approach that had come to replace it, and suggested a *normatively construed* pragmatist response to it as a way of preserving the anti-psychologistic *normativity* of the former and the *naturalism* of the latter. Thus in a paper published in 1950, 'Language, Rules, and Behaviour', Sellars states as his intention the attempt, within the coordinates of a 'psychology of rule-regulated behavior', to map 'a true via media ... between a rationalistic apriorism and what, for want of a better term, I shall call "descriptivism", by which I understand the claim that all meaningful concepts and problems belong to the empirical or descriptive sciences, including the sciences of human behavior'.[17] Russell's early approach to the knowledge of logical truths *via* acquaintance can easily stand as an exemplar of the 'rationalistic *a priorism*' to which Sellars refers. In turn, the 'descriptivism' standing as the naturalistic alternative to any rationalistic form of intuitionism clearly represents the more recent directions taken by logical positivists like Carnap, and their even more radical critics such as Quine.[18]

Sellars's rival way of dealing with the logical knowledge that Russell grounded intuitionistically in acquaintance was to appeal to one's knowledge of the rules of one's own language, a move already made by the positivists, centrally Carnap. With Russell's elimination of Kantian synthetic *a priori* truths, Carnap had worked with a Humean dualism of two kinds of truths: synthetic *a posteriori* or empirical truths that are achieved in observation or experiment, and analytic *a priori* truths that are *logical* or *conceptual* truths that obtain in virtue of the rule-governed nature of the logical syntax of the language within which the empirical truths are expressed. Sellars refers to such an approach to logical truths as 'regulist' in that it appeals to *a speaker's knowledge of the rules or regularities of their language* to explain what the rationalistic *a priorist* explained by the idea of a non-empirical acquaintance with universals: 'Here we note that

[17] Wilfrid Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', in Sidney Hook (ed.), *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom* (New York: Dial Press, 1950), reprinted in Wilfrid Sellars, *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds: The Early Essays of Wilfrid* Sellars, ed. and intro, J. F. Sicha (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1980), pp. 129–30.

[18] Sellars notes that this paper had grown out of discussions he had had with Herbert Feigl.

where the *regulist* speaks of statements which exhibit the rules of the language in which they were formulated, the *rationalist* speaks of intuition or self evidence'.[19]

Sellars's suggestion here is that while regularist and rationalist seem to *speak of* different things, the content of *what* is said is, in some sense, equivalent. The regulist and rationalist, it might be said, essentially give expression to a single set of truths in two different languages: '[t]he regulist goes from object language up to meta-linguistic rule, whereas the rationalist goes from object language down to extra linguistic reality'.[20] In one sense it would seem that the regulist has the clear advantage, having no need to invoke some doubtful epistemic capacity that seems to be out of line with a generally naturalistic account of the human knower. 'The regulist explains the significance of the word 'must' as it occurs in arguments, in terms of the syntactical rules of the language in which it occurs' whereas 'the rationalist explains it in terms of a non-linguistic grasp of a necessary connection between features of reality'.[21] That is, the regularist seems to have the *Kantian* advantage of not having to explain an epistemic capacity that is necessarily beyond what a modern conception of the human subject allows. This, then, would seem to offer a way of developing analytic philosophy in such a way that the *uncritical* ontology of its early phase could be eliminated as an excrescence, and so avoid the worrying Platonism of the early Russell and Moore.

This type of resolution of the problems of Russell's logical atomism was, of course, part of the famed 'linguistic turn' in analytic philosophy,[22] but an objection to the 'regulist's' solution here was already looming around this time in the form of Quine's criticism of the empiricist 'dogma' of the analytic-synthetic distinction.[23] Basically, Quine was

[19] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 141.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] As has been often noted, the early analytic philosophy of Russell and Moore was not particularly 'linguistic', the 'linguistic turn' really being consequent on the work of Wittgenstein.

[23] Quine proposed radicalizing the positivists' 'scientific philosophy' in such a way as effectively to reduce *philosophy itself* to science. In particular, in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (in *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 20–46), Quine argued against the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths which underlay the 'regulist's' deplatonizing of Russell. In this work Quine thinks of logical principles as in principle revisable when we are faced with the task of reconciling our web of beliefs with experience. The degree to which such revision might be possible, however, has become a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophical logic. For example, could we ever revise the law of non-contradiction? This bearing that this question has upon understanding Hegel's attitude to contradiction is taken up below in Chapter 7.

arguing *against* the very idea of a domain of 'conceptual truths', truths that held in virtue of relations among intensional contents, that provided philosophers with their specific analytic tasks and that differentiated their work from that of empirical scientists. For example, in questions of meaning, rather than undertake some *a priori* analysis of concepts, Quine suggested a radically empiricist, behaviouristically psychological approach to the 'stimulus meaning' of concepts. Quine's naturalism, therefore, can be seen as an attempt to finally liberate philosophy from the remnants of Platonism, and as positioning itself at the antithetical pole to Russell's initial rationalist *a priorism*.

This, broadly, was the background against which Sellars's reflections on the nature of linguistic rules in 'Language, Rules and Behaviour' took on their philosophical relevance, reflections that had considerable overlap with the turn towards the pragmatic 'grammar' of language games taken by Wittgenstein after the 1930s. With his appeal to a 'psychology of rule-regulated behavior', or at least 'such anticipations of a psychology' since this science, as he says, 'as yet scarcely exists',[24] Sellars was effectively siding with the broadly behaviourist solution but asserting the need to keep the *normative* perspective that had, in different ways, underpinned the anti-psychologistic approaches of Kant, Frege and Russell. To some extent, then, the turn away from the early Russell was a turn *back* towards the perspective of Kant.

As Michael Friedman and others have argued,[25] the logical positivists had effectively brought Kant back into the contemporary debate in a late nineteenth-century 'neo-Kantian' guise, and here Sellars appeals to Kant in an effort to capture the sense in which the 'rule-regulated' behaviour with which he is concerned cannot be simply thought of as behaviour whose regularities are captured by descriptive laws. Thus 'the concept of rule-regulated behavior developed in this paper' he notes, is 'in a certain sense, the translation into behavioristic terms of the Kantian concept of Practical Reason. Kant's contention that the pure consciousness of moral law can be a factor in bringing about conduct in conformity with law, becomes the above conception of rule-regulated behavior. However, for Kant's conception of Practical Reason as, so to speak, an intruder in the natural order, we substitute the view that the causal efficacy of the embodied core-generalizations of rules is ultimately

[24] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 129.
[25] Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*, Richardson, *Carnap's Construction of the World*.

grounded on the Law of Effect, that is to say, the role of rewards and punishments in shaping behavior'.[26]

Sellars's point of departure in his sketch of a non-descriptivistic or normative variant of the positivist's anti-rationalistic stance is 'an examination of the forms taken by our appeals to standards and principles when we *justify* something we have done'.[27] Following Moore, Russell had counted basic *ethical* truths as, like the truths of logic and mathematics, knowable by a form of intuitive knowledge grounded in acquaintance, but Sellars rejects any suggestion that justification is grounded in any intuition-like grasp of non-empirical properties or relations. Perhaps 'we have already made a mistake in speaking of validity as a property which can be exemplified by psychological processes' as only then would we be forced into the dualism of descriptivism (thinking that behaviouristic psychology provided the proper approach) or rationalism.[28] The suggestion is that if we don't make the initial move of assuming that justification is about identifying some property called 'validity' then 'these alternatives do not even arise'.[29] In contrast, what is needed is 'an exploration of some typical contexts in which the terms "valid" and "correct" appear to be properly, shall I say correctly, employed'.[30]

Such an attempt to unearth the true status of normativity requires answers to two questions – 'What sort of a thing . . . is a justification?' and 'What sort of things does one who justifies justify?' – and Sellars addresses these questions by reflecting on two examples. In the first example, we are to think of Jones as justifying to Smith an aspect of his behaviour (his non-attendance at a meeting) by invoking a moral principle and subsuming his conduct under it. 'Jones: One ought to do what is conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and, as I could readily convince you, staying away from the meeting was so conducive'.[31] The second example concerns *epistemic* rather than moral justification. Jones asserts that it will rain shortly, and is asked by Smith to justify his assertion. If we think of what is being called into question

[26] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', pp. 139–40, n3.
[27] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 132.
[28] Ibid., p. 133.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid. Sellars is of course aware of this threat of circularity here: we should look to our *use* of terms like 'valid' and 'correct', but it is *correct* usages that are at issue.
[31] Ibid. Of course it is not the adequacy of the actual moral principle that Sellars is interested in here but the issue of what a person is doing when he or she invokes a moral principle.

here as the *act* of asserting, we can think of this exchange on the model of the first. Here Jones's proffered justification again involves appeal to some generalization – now not a *moral rule*, but some *natural law*. 'Clouds of kind X cause rain, and there are clouds of kind X overhead'.[32] The idea is that in *both* cases, justification takes the form of appealing to some further claim (the general moral law in one case, the natural law in another) and some identifying condition (the description of an action in one case, and of meteorological conditions in the other) from which the original claim can be seen to follow as the conclusion to some simple inference.

We might note two ways in which this assimilation of epistemic to ethical normativity is significant. First, by drawing the question of epistemic justification into the orbit of *ethical* justification, Sellars was bringing this issue into a context of a current debate which involved descriptivistic and rationalistic antagonists: on the one hand 'emotivists' reduced statements about what *ought* to occur to descriptive statements about the emotions and 'pro attitudes' of ethical judges while anti-naturalists in the tradition of Moore asserted the irreducibility of 'ought' to 'is'. While Sellars thinks moral intuitionism faithful to the 'phenomenology' of moral experience, he rejects its underlying rationalistic ontology which appeals to intuitable non-natural qualities like 'obligatoriness'. There is something right about the approach of the emotivist who doesn't acknowledge the existence of such properties, but Sellars redescribes the logical form of the sentences purportedly attributing them: for Sellars, rather than *describe* an independent reality such words *express* some subjective orientation towards the world, but what is expressed should *not* be thought of as *emotion* ('ought' is not like the 'harrah' of the football fan) but '*the observance of a rule*'.[33] This reinterpretation of the emotivist's criticism of the rationalist now, he contends, shows us how we should understand Kant.

Kant had believed he could bypass the problems of metaphysics because he could reconceive the project: in lieu of the search for any unachievable knowledge of the world as it is 'in itself', metaphysics was to be reconceived on the basis of the mind's *self-legislation*. In the 'Preface' to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant notes that in order to deal with 'reason itself and its pure thinking . . . I need not seek far beyond myself, because it is in myself that I encounter them,

[32] Ibid., p. 135.
[33] Ibid., p. 134.

and common logic already also gives me an example of how the simple acts of reason may be fully and systematically enumerated'.[34] But the solution wasn't to reconceive metaphysics as some sort of psychological project; rather the traditional task of metaphysics had to be refocused from speculative philosophy to *practical* philosophy – the realm of the rational being's moral self-determination. Sellars's reflections on the limitations of any *formal* approach to rationality suggests that Kant's conception of moral philosophy as self-legislation will be problematic in the same way that Carnap's conception of analytic knowledge was found to be problematic in the eyes of Quine. Even if ethical normativity is understood as derived from self-legislation rather than some non-empirical intuition, this cannot be conceived as something like subjecting oneself to some sort of self-prescribed formal principles. One must not over-intellectualize rule-following in such a way that it is dichotomously contrasted with the *naturalistic* condition of *causal* constraint. As Sellars had put it, one must think of the causal efficacy of rule-following as itself 'ultimately grounded on the Law of Effect, that is to say, the role of rewards and punishments in shaping behavior'.[35]

In the early nineteenth century Hegel *too* had complained about Kant's own reaction to the rationalism of pre-critical metaphysics in the same way. If the critique of traditional 'dogmatic' metaphysics was simply to rewrite metaphysics in the language of ethics, similar problems ensued from the 'formalism' of the conception of practical reason presupposed. Thus, in his attempt to position Kant's appeal to rules of practical reason *against* the background of that realm of historically given normative social practices – the realm of '*Sittlichkeit*' – within which an agent gained his or her 'second nature', Hegel too had appealed to something akin to the 'the role of rewards and punishments in shaping behavior' as a necessary part of the conditions against which rule-following nature, and hence the 'normativity' of behaviour could be understood.[36]

The second significant aspect of this assimilation of patterns of epistemic to ethical justification concerns the implications for Sellars's conception of logical normativity. Sellars notes that we should be happy with Kant's assimilation of 'ethical ought' to 'logical must', but should

[34] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Axiv.

[35] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 140 n3.

[36] Hegel definitely would *not* have described this as a matter of the normativity of behaviour being 'ultimately grounded in the Law of Effect'.

understand the assimilation with 'reversed polarity' – that is, assimilating the *logical* 'must' to the ethical 'ought'. He even suggests, we should assimilate the *physical* 'must' of *the laws of nature*, to this ethical ought as well. What can this mean?

In his example of the epistemic interaction of Smith and Jones, Sellars had invoked 'three directions the argument might take if continued beyond this point'. Justification can only succeed on the condition that *Smith* accepts both the causal major premise ('Clouds of kind X cause rain') and the historical minor premise ('there are clouds of kind X overhead'), but, of course, it may not be the case that these further justifying claims are accepted. *They too*, might be subject to the demand for justification. For example, if the former, law-like claim linking clouds of a certain type and rain is challenged, Jones, if he is in a position to do so, might then 'draw on his knowledge of meteorology in an attempt to derive this law from other laws relating to atmospheric phenomena'.[37] Sellars's point is that should the justifying claims be called into question, then, the relevant move will be to attempt to *justify them* in the same way, that is, by way of an appeal to some even more general consideration from which the challenged claim could be derived. Were this to be the case, we would, presumably, soon be deeply into the more abstract realms of this science.[38] Finally, however, Sellars adds that justification will also only succeed on the condition that Smith accepts the logical 'must' embodied in arguments.[39]

Sellars's point seems to be that if we consider the process of epistemic justification in the example, Smith must not only accept both the major, law-stating premise and the minor, condition stating one, but must accept that the conclusion, the original claim to be redeemed, actually *follows from* the conjunction of those two claims. But what if he accepts the premises but *doesn't* accept the conclusion? That is, what if he responds that while he grants both premises offered he still can't see why he should believe *that it will rain*? There is a temptation now to treat the dialogue as necessarily moving into the domain of *logical* theory in a way analogous to the way that it moves into the domain of meteorological theory when some lower order meteorological issue is challenged. But

[37] Ibid., pp. 135–6.

[38] It is significant that Sellars's essay had appeared in a volume dedicated to the work of John Dewey, who had explicitly regarded scientific investigation as being generated in a similar sort of way. See *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1939).

[39] That is, he must accept something like the idea that if you believe $p \rightarrow q$ and p, then you *must* believe q. How are we to think of that, however?

there are problems here. 'If Smith challenges these, Jones is likely to say "It is necessary because it is necessary, and that's all there is to it!" '[40] *Reason giving* presumably must run out here because what is being challenged concerns the very *conditions* for understanding what *counts as* a reason. Wittgenstein had made a similar point in the comment that 'If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do" '.[41] And as Lewis Carroll had famously pointed out in his account of Achilles and the tortoise, merely making the formulated logical principle available to the sceptic is unlikely to help here.[42] If Jones were unwilling to accept in practice an inference such as 'clouds of such and such a type generally cause rain; those are clouds of such and such a type; therefore it is likely to rain', then he would be *unlikely* to be convinced by being informed of the law of *modus ponens*. As Sellars will argue, we should not think of logic's normativity as being transmitted *from* a cognition of some rationally intuited abstract rule *to* some material case. We should think of the normativity of the explicated laws of logic as being derived from the socially based normativity of our pre-reflective 'material inferences', and not vice-versa. This is the key idea to Brandom's alternative 'expressivist' understanding of the semantics of our logical vocabulary and the normativity of logical laws.[43]

2.3 Rule-following and material inference

By broaching the idea of a then barely existent 'psychology of rule-regulated behavior' Sellars was led, like Wittgenstein around the same time, into the difficult area of what it was exactly for an action to be said to 'follow a rule'. Again, a dichotomy of rationalistic normativist and non-normative descriptivist positions threaten, and the challenge is to find a

[40] Ibid., p. 136.

[41] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), § 217.

[42] Lewis Carroll, 'What the Tortoise said to Achilles', *Mind*, 4 (1895): 278–80. Carroll's story was directed at the idea of taking an inferential rule as an axiom of a proof. When the inferential rule is made explicit to complete the deduction, a *further* rule is presupposed because a *new* inference has been created.

[43] Brandom finds these in the early work of Frege. 'Before he makes the fateful step from seeing logic as an attempt to codify inferences to seeing it as the search for a special kind of truth (which Dummett bemoans, and to which we owe much of contemporary logic), Frege's aim is to introduce vocabulary that will let one say (explicitly) what otherwise one can only do (implicitly)'. *Making It Explicit*, p. 108.

'via media' between them. First, Sellars points out, one must distinguish between an action which occurs *because of a rule*, which is in some sense 'internal to' the action, from one which simply *conforms to a rule*, such as the behaviour of a well-trained dog. If I successfully teach my dog to sit up when I snap my fingers, its behaviour will be rule-conforming, 'but we should scarcely say that the animal acts on the rule of sitting up when I snap my fingers'.[44] By distinguishing merely rule-conforming from genuinely rule-*regulated* behaviour Sellars largely repeats Kant's distinction in *the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* of acting 'in accordance with laws', from acting '*in accordance with the representation* of laws'.[45] For example, while all physical objects behave *in accordance* with Newton's laws they clearly cannot be said to 'follow' Newton's laws. Sellars calls this type of rule-conforming behaviour 'tied-behavior' because of its being *tied to* (that is, being merely causally responsive to) the environment, and he contrasts it with the 'freedom' characteristic of rule-regulated behaviour. But there is a converse *rationalist* position, exemplified by Kant's own understanding of acting in accordance with the representation of laws, that is to be similarly avoided. One must not think of rule-regulated behaviour in an overly intellectualized way, such that one would have to be *conscious* of *intentionally* applying the rules in acting in order for such acting to *count as* rule-regulated and not merely rule-conforming.

> We distinguished above between action which merely conforms to a rule and action which occurs because of a rule and pointed out that in so far as actions merely conform to it, a rule is not a rule but a mere generalization. On the other hand, we must not say that a rule is something completely other than a generalization.[46]

In 'Some Reflections on Language Games' first published in 1954 Sellars spells out the problems with such an antithetical attempt to capture the nature of rule-regulated behaviour. We might think that learning to use a language consists of learning 'to obey the rules for the use of its

[44] Sellars, 'Language, Rules, and Behavior', p. 137.

[45] Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Mary Gregor, intro. Christine M. Korsgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 24 (4.412). See also, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 98 (5.117). (Note that for these and all other of Kant's works, except the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the first page numbers given refer to the translation cited, while the following numbers in brackets refer to the corresponding volume and page numbers of the Academy edition, *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900–).

[46] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 139.

expressions', but this 'taken as it stands' is subject to a devastating refutation. Understood in a certain way, this would entail that one had to learn rules containing expressions of the language being learnt – 'use expression *k* in such and such a circumstance' – but that presupposes already *having* a language within which these rules could be formulated. And if to learn language (L) we already need to know a metalanguage (ML), the question arises of how we came to learn *it*?[47]

Sellars's attempts in these papers to find a *via media* between these two inadequate conceptions of rule-governed behaviour – conceptions that Brandom describes as 'regularist' (descriptivist) and 'regulist' (platonistically normative) – are suggestive, but far from lucid. We are to think of the rules as fundamentally embodied in the activities of the rule-following subjects, with a mode of existence 'as a generalization written in flesh and blood, or nerve and sinew, rather than in pen and ink'.[48] Brandom usefully compares Sellars's approach to norms to Wittgenstein's 'pragmatist conception' – 'a notion of primitive correctnesses of performance *implicit* in *practice* that precede and are presupposed by their *explicit* formulation in *rules* and *principles*'.[49] But for Brandom the key application that arises out of this attempt in Sellars effectively distinguishes the rationalistic form of Sellarsian pragmatism from the approach of Wittgenstein; this is the idea of the central role of 'material inferences' in the language games of reason giving.

Sellars's notion of 'material inference' is meant to mediate the dichotomy between the regulist way of thinking of the rule-governed nature of inference as presupposing the *explicit* application of rules and principles and naturalistic approaches such as encapsulated within Hume's idea of 'causal inference' based on the association of ideas. (Effectively Quine's naturalizing of epistemology came to represent a version of the Humean approach in the context in which Sellars was writing.) The transitions of material inferences are irreducible to either of these two orders: in the first, the inference is regarded as a type of abbreviated enthymeme in

[47] As Sellars puts it in the essay 'Inference and Meaning' in relation to *semantic* rules, 'Obeying a rule entails recognizing that a circumstance is one to which the rule applies. If there were such a thing as a "semantical rule" by the adoption of which a descriptive term acquires meaning, it would presumably be of the form "red objects are to be responded to by the noise *red*". But to recognize the circumstances to which the rule applies, one would already have to have the concept of red, that is, a symbol of which it can correctly be said that it "means red"'. Wilfrid Sellars, 'Inference and Meaning', in Sellars, *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds*, p. 284.

[48] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 139.

[49] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 21.

which the inference is secured by the application of a presupposed formal rule such as *modus ponens*; in the second, it is regarded as a matter of *mere* habitual association, like that of the dog's 'tied-behaviour'. These alternatives, of course, just repeat the rationalist-descriptivist dichotomy: the former *rationalizing* the normative nature of the inference in the bindingness of some explicit principle, the latter *de-normativizing* it by reducing it to a mere empirical regularity. Sellars's hint as to how this is to be done can be found in his comments concerning the way to de-rationalize Kant by grounding normative behaviour ultimately 'on the Law of Effect, that is to say, the role of rewards and punishments in shaping behavior'.[50] That is, the normativity of behaviour will be bound up with its being *treated by others* in terms of its measuring up to or failing to measure up to common norms. This will be an approach developed by Brandom in terms of what he refers to as a 'phenomenalist' approach to norms, and it is also central to Brandom's linkage of Sellars to Hegel. From the phenomenalist point of view 'norms are in an important sense in the eye of the beholder, so that one cannot address the question of what implicit norms are, independently of the question of what it is to acknowledge them in practice. The direction of explanation ... first offers an account of the practical attitude of *taking* something to be correct-according-to-a-practice, and then explains the status of *being* correct-according-to-a-practice by appeal to those attitudes'.[51]

The Sellars–Brandom idea concerning normativity here, rendered in Brandom's terms of the idea of a normativity *implicit* to human behaviour becoming *explicit* only to the degree that it is *acknowledged* and *treated* as normative – 'rewarded and punished' – by others, recalls Hegel's classic idea of a content that is implicit or 'in-itself', becoming *explicit* or 'for-itself', only by coming to exist 'for-another', its being *recognized* or *acknowledged* (*anerkannt*) by another.[52] Indeed, as soon as Sellars introduces and defends the idea of material inference, which he had derived from Carnap's idea of the 'transformation rules' of formal languages, he notes the pathway that opens up towards Hegel. Empiricists are happy to acknowledge that a certain concept's *logical form* accrues from the inferential relations linking the sentences in which that concept plays a role. But if *material inferences* play a role in language that cannot be reduced to or derived from formal patterns

[50] Sellars, 'Language, Rules and Behavior', p. 140 n3.
[51] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 25.
[52] See below, chapter 4.4.

of inference, then this suggests that concepts acquire not only their logical form but also their *content* from the role they play in inferences. This, he notes, is an idea 'universally relegated to the absolute idealisms and rationalisms of a bygone age'.[53] The idea that a concept's *empirical content* can be altered by the inferential relations within which sentences containing that concept stand had been the idea that Russell had condemned in terms of the 'axiom of internal relations'. Russell had believed he had banished this doctrine from philosophy with his semantic atomism, but the progressive abandonment of the platonic associations of this doctrine had, with Sellars, reintroduced the beast that Russell had thought he had driven away.

Sellars's allusion here to the possible reintroduction of the 'the absolute idealisms and rationalisms of a bygone age' might then be regarded as signalling an alternative, complementary route to the incipient Hegelianism of his position in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, a route that winds its way from the general direction of what I have called the critique of the myth of the *logical* given rather than the empirically given, the critique of the quasi-Platonic idea that we are capable of a direct and unmediated intuition of laws or principles that are then applied in behaviour.

2.4 Brandom's pragmatics for reason-giving language games

I have sketched some of the key features of the Sellarsian background against which Brandom has developed his inferentialist, expressivist alternative to logical intuitionism, the myth of the *logical* given. On this 'expressivist' approach to logic, the laws of logic cannot be seen representationally as mirroring the metaphysically fundamental structures of the world with which rational beings are somehow acquainted through a mysterious intuitive capacity, as they are in early Russell. Rather, they are seen as *expressing* certain normative regularities within patterns of material inference – patterns that in turn are able to be reflected on and made explicit within social contexts in which justifications are demanded and offered.

In *Making It Explicit* Brandom works out in great detail the semantic and epistemological consequences of this pragmatist conception of the primacy of material inference within the normative reason-giving language games within which the acts of asserting, justifying and explaining

[53] Sellars, 'Inference and Meaning', p. 265.

take place. If the normativity of material inferences is to be regarded as irreducible to the normativity afforded to *formal* principles, then it would seem that there must be a way of regarding the *content*, and not just the *form*, of concepts as accruing from the inferential relations of the sentences within which those concepts are expressed. In this way a *materially* inferentialist account of the origins of semantic content emerges as an alternative to the original view found in Russell with its reliance on the dual mythological 'givens' of particulars and universals that is required for empirical content and logical form. But of course it will no longer be Russellian logical atomism that is the relevant target of Brandom's critique. After all, well before the middle of the twentieth century Russell had himself abandoned the sort of picture of the 'dual givens' that I have sketched here. Indeed, analytic epistemology itself had over the second half of the twentieth century attempted to absorb and counter the sorts of objections that had been at the core of the Sellars work in the 1940s and 1950s. When we look in Brandom for the relevant target of his critique we find that the 'bottom up' view against which he develops his inferentialist account is one that had already given up a concern with a *phenomenalist* account of perceptual givenness for a naturalistic focus on the role of *causal processes* in perceptual knowledge. This is the 'externalist' approach to epistemology that came to be known as 'reliabilism'.[54]

Reliabilists might be thought of as having learned the lessons of Sellars's critique of the *phenomenally given* in perception, in that they hold that the right way to think of perceptual knowledge is to think of it as *reliably produced* true belief. That is, in place of the role given to justification in the traditional approach to knowledge as 'justified true belief', they insist on the relevance of the reliability of the belief-forming mechanism involved. Thus, the producing of a true perceptual belief

[54] With his sense-datum-centred account of givenness Russell saw himself as putting forward a type of empiricism, but, of course, empiricism need not be tied to such an intuitionistic conception of the mind's connectedness to the world that characterized logical atomism and to which Sellars was opposed. Neither is Brandom opposed to a certain 'platitudinous' empiricism which simply states that 'experience' is necessary for the knowledge of 'contingent matters of fact' and which asserts that there can be no content for concepts 'apart from its relation to perceptual experience'. Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*, pp. 23–4. Rather, like Davidson, he is happy to deal with the role of perceptual input here in purely *causal* terms, and this brings him into contact with a type of epistemology which in the second half of the twentieth century, might be thought to have come to replace the ill-fated Russellian approach to acquaintance – the *causality*, or *nomologically based* approach to epistemic justification which has come to be known as 'reliabilism'. In this sense, Brandom has brought the Sellarsian critique of the given into a context that essentially had not existed at the time of writing *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.

'*that p*' (say, the belief 'that it is raining'), counts as knowledge if *p* is true (that it is indeed raining) and if the belief has been produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism. Reliability, in turn, can be understood just in case a law-like relation holds between the producing of the belief and the conditions that make it true. Thus, in this case, in order for the belief to count as knowledge it is required that the mechanism would not have produced the belief that is raining, were it the case that it *had not* been raining. The beliefs produced by a reliable belief forming mechanisms must 'track the truth'.

Brandom here develops ideas put forward by Sellars in relation to forerunners of the 'reliability' approach in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Following Sellars, Brandom asks after the capacities that have to be attributed to a perceptual reporter if she is to be taken as a source of epistemic *authority*. What separates such a competent speaker's capacity for making empirical judgements from a mechanism that can merely reliably respond to stimuli? For example, what is the difference between a 'fanatical human red reporter' (presumably, a human who doesn't miss any opportunity to report the presence of something red in his or her environment) and a spectrophotometer linked to a tape-recorder such that it produced the noise 'That's red' when and only when it is radiated with light of the appropriate frequency, or alternatively, from the squawks made by an appropriately trained parrot?[55] All three are in some sense disposed to respond differentially to the presence of red stimuli in the environment in a reliable manner. We think of what distinguishes the *reporter's* behaviour from that of the parrot or the machine is that it involves some sort of *understanding*: 'The reporter's response is meaningful – not just, as in the case of the measuring instrument or the parrot, to others, but to the responding reporter personally. The spectrophotometer and the parrot do not understand their responses; those responses mean nothing to them, though they can mean something to us. The reporter understands the response he or she makes, attributes to it a kind of significance that the measuring instrument and the parrot are oblivious to'.[56] This, of course, is the common-sensical reply: saying the reporter, but not the parrot or machine, 'understands' is just another way of saying that the reporter has a mind. But that answer hardly takes us far enough. 'The challenge is to explain what sort of practical capacity the relevant kind of

[55] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 88.
[56] Ibid., pp. 88–9.

understanding consists in, without an ultimately circular appeal to semantic concepts such as intentional content, concept-use, or the uptake of representational purport (treated as an explanatory primitive)'.[57]

There are two levels to Brandom's attempt to meet this challenge to say something about the type of practical capacity that understanding consists in. The first is worked out in terms of a problem that Davidson had posed for Quine's account of a speaker's capacity to use a word to refer to an object. As will be recalled, Quine was just that type of descriptivist to whom Sellars was responding with his appeal to the science of a normative, rule-following behaviour. Quine's semantic *naturalism* had led him to account for the question of a word's reference in terms of a behaviouristic account of the responses of speakers to causal stimuli. But the difficulty in appealing to some sort of associationistic account like this, which effectively reduces the reference relation to some constant conjunction between word and object, is that that type of association holds between *too many* items. We might think of our learning the word for a particular thing as explained in terms of an association, like that which holds between some response to a ringing bell and the ringing bell itself. But in this case why single out the *ringing bell* as that which is referred to as 'the stimulus' rather than *any other event* which covaries with both ringing bell and response? As Davidson asked, why do we say that the response is to the ringing of the bell rather than 'the motion of the air close to the ears of the dog – or even the stimulation of its nerve endings?'[58] Davidson's response was to appeal to the idea of 'triangulation'. In attempting to understand the way that a language user's response can be taken as *referring* to an object in the environment we need to introduce the perspective of the *interpreter*. Reference as a normative relation is a necessarily three-sided, relating *two language users* and the worldly things referred to.

A naturalistic version of the triangulation principle had been developed by Fred Dretske who, in a refinement of reliabilism, had invoked the intersection of two causal chains,[59] but Brandom regards this as

[57] Ibid., p. 89.

[58] Donald Davidson, 'The Conditions of Thought', in *Le Cahier du College International de Philosophie* (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1989), pp. 165–71, reprinted in *The Mind of Donald Davidson*, ed. J. Brandl and W. Gombocz, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 36 (1989), 193–200, quoted in Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 426.

[59] Fred Dretske, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). Dretske's version of triangulation, Brandom notes, is 'a strategy for picking out or privileging one bit of the causal chain of covarying event types that reliably culminates in a response of a distinguished type, by looking at the *intersection* of *two* such chains. The

insufficient for capturing the semantic capacity of a speaker. As Sellars had made clear, using language involves the placing of claims 'in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says'.[60] Such 'being able to justify what one says' is a matter of being able to bring some *further claims* to bear on the first. It is being able to relate the first claim inferentially to other claims, and this, Brandom contends, is just what the parrot or the spectrometer *cannot do*: 'The parrot does not treat 'That's red' as incompatible with 'That's green', nor as following from 'That's scarlet' and entailing 'that's coloured',[61] but these are exactly the sorts of things the human asserter of the sentence would do were the relevant challenges and so forth, to be mounted.[62] Thus what determines whether a speaker's response is a genuinely cognitive, and hence normative, one, is whether they are already players of a language game involving the space of material inference, the 'space of reasons'. If we think of speech acts as akin to making moves in a game, then if a reporter were unable to move from the position represented by 'that is red' to that of 'that is coloured', or unable to move to the position 'that is red' from 'that is scarlet', then that speaker could not be said to *understand* the meaning of their response, 'that is red'.

The idea of the necessity of 'triangulation' within the cognitive context will point Brandom in the direction of Hegel by way of introducing a necessarily intersubjective dimension to cognition. In order for one speaker's utterances to be properly rule-*governed* or rule-*regulated* rather than simply rule-*conforming*, they must be *so treated* by other speakers. Players in the language games of the asking for and giving of reasons are so only inasmuch as they are the occupants of normative roles or 'statuses' irreducible to the natures they bring to those statuses, and here Brandom can connect his inferentialism to Hegel's concept of '*Anerkennung*' – the essentially reciprocal intersubjective 'recognition' or 'acknowledgement' that Hegel posits as a condition for the existence of fully self-conscious and free human subjects, and with which he demarcates the normative dimension of 'spirit' (*Geist*) from nature.

insight it develops is that the best way to pick a single *point* (the stimulus) out of a *line* (the causal chain of covarying event-types that reliably elicit a response of the relevant type) is to *intersect* it with another line – another causal chain corresponding to another reliable differential responsive disposition'. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, pp. 427–8.

[60] Sellars, *Empiricism and The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 76.

[61] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 89.

[62] As in McDowell's case then, the expression of colour experience comes to play a key role, at least as far as the 'model' is concerned, in Brandom's inferentialist account of semantic content.

In Brandom's pragmatist version of this Hegelian theme, for a speaker to be taken as making an assertion when uttering the sounds 'that's red', she must be *taken as* thereby being committed to a further range of other assertions entailed by it – committed to the further assertion 'that's coloured', for example. Moreover, as an assertion is a knowledge claim, an interlocutor can respond to the question of the speaker's *entitlement* to the belief expressed and ask for justification. To make an assertion, then, a speaker must at least in principle be able to bring to bear reasons for accepting the belief. Generalizing on Frege's idea that the *logical* form of a sentence must be understood in terms of the codification of inferences that it allows, Brandom then makes the move of conceiving of the semantic content of an utterance as constituted in terms of the changes of such *commitments* and *entitlements* that can be attributed to the speaker by an interlocutor. Language games need 'score-keepers' to keep track of the speaker–player's deontic commitments and entitlements at any time, but of course for the most part there are no separate umpires or scorekeepers – we keep score on each other, holding each other to our particular commitments and entitlements as we go along. The invocation of such complex patterns of holding others to and being oneself held to commitments and entitlements in this way is, then, Brandom's 'Hegelian' solution to the 'metaphysics of intentionality', and it is also the Sellarsian answer to the problem of the rational constraint on cognitive states unearthed by Sellars's own critique of the *false* solution offered by the myth of the given.

Both Kant and Frege, then, represent places on modern philosophy's way to Hegel, properly understood. Kant's idea that 'the understanding can make no other use of ... concepts than that of judging by means of them'[63] was to be echoed in Frege's idea that 'Only in a proposition do the words really have a meaning ... It is enough if the proposition as a whole has a sense; its parts thereby also obtain their content'.[64] For Brandom, however, these truths are grounded in the *pragmatic* fact that the sentence is the *minimal linguistic unit* with which one can make moves in the language game of giving and asking for reasons – that is, the minimal unit with which one can initiate a *change* in one's inferential 'commitments and entitlements'. This progressive insight had been compromised in both Kant and Frege by a contrary atomistic tendency

[63] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A68/B93.
[64] Gottlob Frege, 'The Foundations of Arithmetic', § 60, in Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Frege Reader*, p. 108.

to appeal to some atomic givens that play a role in fixing reference. In the case of Kant, this tendency had been expressed in the idea of intuitions as anchoring concepts in individual objects. In the case of Frege's logic, it was expressed in his later views, and especially in the model-theoretic approach developed by Tarski in which singular terms were regarded as mappable onto some domain of discourse. The *early* Frege, however, had provided an alternate 'inferentialist' way of thinking about singular representation, and in the case of Kant, a parallel movement beyond the representationalist paradigm was initiated by Hegel. Hegel, then, is paired with Frege as *freeing* modern thought from the residual effects of the traditional *term* logic that according to Russell had *damned* Hegel's philosophizing. While the thrust of McDowell's rehabilitation of Hegel had *linked* him to Aristotle, Brandom's is to link him to the generally *anti*-Aristotelian movement of modernity that results in the revolutions of modern logic with which analytic philosophy begins. But as will be clear, Brandom's inferentialist programme seems to inherit many of the features of the Davidsonian *recoil* from the myth of the given of which McDowell was critical. As McDowell had located the problem of this position in its inability to accord an adequately normative dimension to perceptual experience, the next and final section of this chapter will examine Brandom's attempts to grapple with what he freely admits to be the challenge that perceptual knowledge poses for the inferentialist programme.

2.5 Inferentialism and the problems of perception

As we have seen, Brandom is critical of the idea that in judgement we 'classify' with concepts entities somehow given prior to conceptualization – the idea found in the traditional interpretation of Kantian intuition. This, however, leads him to very different conclusions about perception than those embraced by McDowell. The idea of classification of a perceptual *given*, thinks Brandom, conflates two different senses of classification that can be separated according to what he refers to as Sellars's 'two-ply' account of perception.[65] On the one hand, perception involves the *natural* classifications of those 'reliable differential responsive dispositions' that we share with non-linguistic animals such as parrots and even non-animate objects like lumps of iron. Responses of this

[65] Robert Brandom, 'The Centrality of Sellars's Two-Ply Account of Observation to the Arguments of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' in *Tales of the Mighty Dead*.

type classify stimuli 'as being of a general kind, the kind, namely, that elicits a repeatable response of a certain sort. In the same sense, of course, a chunk of iron classifies its environment as being of one of two kinds, depending on whether it responds by rusting or not'.[66] On the other hand, the capacity for properly *conceptual* classification, which distinguishes us *sapient* beings from mere 'sentients' such as parrots or from simple physical objects, is to be explicated *inferentially*. After learning language, I do not simply respond reliably to stimuli with sounds such as 'red', 'blue' and so on, but make *assertions* such as 'this is red' and 'this is blue' – speech acts in which sentential contents are thereby placed in the Sellarsian 'logical space of reasons' where they can be questioned and defended, and which are to be understood in terms of the changes within the speaker's 'commitments' and 'entitlements' they enact.

For the most part, Brandom doesn't elaborate on the nature of such reliable differential responsive dispositions beyond the sorts of hints found in Sellars or in later 'reliabilist' accounts of perception. We can think of a parrot being trained or a machine being designed to discriminate colours, and these discriminating responses are entirely accountable in terms of causal connections or law-like regularities.[67] One might ask, however, how this *descriptivist* level of explanation is meant to be knitted into the supervening account of the normative capacities involved in making assertions within the game of deontic score-keeping, or how Brandom escapes the problems that McDowell ascribes to the likes of Davidson. Furthermore, Brandom himself acknowledges that perception poses a problem for the inferentialist, and thinks that Sellars's own account of perception is compromised in this way.

Brandom complains that Sellars himself takes inferentialism too far in his attempt to give an account of perceptual judgement.[68] Of course, a subject's merely *being* a reliable differential responder to *A*s is not enough to warrant the status of *knower* of *A*s. But Sellars goes too far, he thinks, in his demands that the genuine knower must also *know* that her responses *are*, in fact, reliable indicators of the presence of *A*s. The claim that a perceiver would have to be in the position of *being able to*

[66] Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*, p. 48.

[67] The early reliabilist account worked with the idea of causal connection, but problems of the sort raised by Alvin Goldman (in 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', *Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976): 771–91), necessitated the move to law-governed regularities captured in terms of counter-factual conditionals. See Brandom's discussion of Goldman's paper in *Articulating Reasons*, ch. 3.

[68] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, pp. 217–21.

justify their own assumptions about their capacity to reliably respond perceptually to *A*s is simply too strong. 'Securing entitlement to a claim need not always be assimilated to inferential justifying of the claim'.[69]

In his own account, an individual knower need not have this reflective knowledge of the reliability of their *own* responses – on this issue the reliabilists are correct. Where the reliabilists are wrong is in their assumption that reliability *per se* is sufficient to secure the status of knowledge, and here Brandom attempts to find a *via media* between the reliabilist 'externalism' and Sellars's 'hyper-inferentialist' internalism by shifting such judgements *about* the speaker's reliability to the scorekeeping *interlocutor*.

However, the problems inherent in accounting for perceptual or 'non-inferential' judgements within Brandom's inferentialist alternative to a 'representationalist' account of cognition go deeper. Later (in Chapter 3), it will be suggested that Hegel himself was able to find a place for perceptual judgement within a more generally 'inferentialist' framework, only because of his use of the structures of Aristotle's *term* logic – the type of logic Brandom sees Frege as having displaced. As will be seen, Hegel's concept of 'determinate negation', the concept that Brandom himself points to as Hegel's 'most fundamental conceptual tool',[70] relies on features of Aristotelian logic that have no simple equivalent in the Fregean logic that Brandom endorses.[71]

Hegel's notion of determinate negation, claims Brandom, can be understood in terms of the simple idea of 'material incompatibility'. We can know, for example, that an object's possession of one property excludes it from possessing certain others: if an object is *red all over* then it cannot also be *green all over*, if an object is *circular*, it cannot simultaneously be *square*, and so on. But these relations, he suggests, can be accommodated within the *inferentialist* approach to meaning:

> The proposition or property p entails q just in case everything incompatible with (ruled out or excluded by) q is incompatible with (rules out or is excluded by) p. For instance, having the property square entails having the property polygonal, because and in the sense that everything materially incompatible with square (for instance, circular) is incompatible with polygonal. In this sense, it is *impossible* for something to be

[69] Ibid., p. 218.

[70] Brandom, 'Holism and Idealism in Hegel's *Phenomenology*', in *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, p. 180.

[71] In fact, Brandom ties this notion tightly to Hegel's own *inferentialism* as one use to which the idea of determinate negation is put, he notes, is to 'allow the definition of *consequence relations* that are modally robust in the sense of supporting counterfactual inferences'. Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, p. 180.

> square without also being polygonal. So we can see (though Hegel never makes the point explicitly) that:
> ... Material *incompatibility* relations induce modally robust material *consequence* relations.[72]

In the following chapter I will argue that in Hegel, the idea of 'determinate negation' is tightly tied to his Aristotelian conception of the nature of the perceived object as a 'this such', a particular instantiation of a kind. Here, however, we may get an initial sense of the generally Aristotelian shape of this notion and the problems it poses for Brandom.

In numerous places Aristotle expresses the view that individual substances, while themselves never having contraries, nor contrary qualities at the same time, nevertheless are recipients of *contrary qualifications* at *different times*.[73] Probably the most well known contrary pairs in Aristotle are those of hot–cold and wet–dry, from which are generated the four primary bodies: earth (cold and dry), air (hot and wet), water (cold and wet) and fire (hot and dry),[74] but, such bi-polar features exhibited here pervade a wider range of phenomena and play a systematic role in his categorical thought. Such bi-polarity is, indeed, tied to his logic, and in particular, its treatment of *negation*.

In line with the idea that the minimal semantic unit is the proposition, Frege had conceived of negation as an operation applying 'externally' to a proposition (p) to give its contradictory (∼p). In contrast, traditional term logics typically had *two* forms of negation. First, one could negate either of the two terms (subject or predicate terms) making up the sentence, or secondly, one can *deny*, rather than *affirm*, the predicate *of* the subject.[75] Applied to the predicate term, negation produces the *contrary* of the term negated – for example, negating the predicate term 'beautiful' would produce a term having the meaning 'non-beautiful', effectively the term 'ugly'. In contrast, *denying* rather than affirming a predicate of a subject produces a sentence that is *contradictory* to the affirmation. Thus affirming a contrary predicate of a subject (affirming

[72] Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, pp. 180–1.

[73] Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. V, 3b25–4a10.

[74] Aristotle, *On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away*, trans. H. Joachim (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922), b3ff.

[75] For a helpful discussion of Aristotle's 'two negations', see Laurence R. Horn, *A Natural History of Negation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), ch. 1.1, and for an extended treatment of a contemporary form of logic using term negation, Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Languages*, and Sommers and Englebretsen, *An Invitation to Formal Reasoning*.

that Socrates is ugly, rather than beautiful, for example), is different to denying the original predicate (asserting that Socrates is *not* beautiful).[76]

Brandom relies on the mutually excluding contraries of Aristotle's term logic to capture the type of entailment relations that fit his inferentialist account. On asserting that an object is blue all over, for example, we commit ourselves to the further assertion that it is *not* red all over. At the same time, however, commitment to the Fregean thought of *the proposition* as the minimal semantic unit would seem to commit Brandom to the associated unitary conception of negation as *propositional*, and it is difficult to see how the relevant internal relations among predicates that he thinks of as 'determinate negations' can be maintained. The strain in Brandom's account of perception comes out, I believe, when we look closer at his attempt to marry these features of perceptual experience to the reliabilist account of perception.

The difficulty here concerns capturing the underlying capacity to discriminate in the terms employed by the reliabilist, that of nomological regularity, and this has to do with the fact that the objects discriminated typically belong to *kinds* of some sort such that there is an appropriate type of thing that one discriminates something *from*. For example, in the case used by Brandom involving chicken-sexing, the chicken-sexer discriminates male from female *chicks*.[77] That is, the very idea of discrimination seems to presuppose an *Aristotelian* conception of the perceived object – an instance of some kind capable of qualification by *contrary properties*. But such 'objects' are not neatly caught in the reliabilists' web.

Let us say that a human discriminator has been trained to respond appropriately to a male chick by uttering 'male'. To describe this as

[76] In fact, Aristotle seems to conceive of the logical form of the particular judgement as resulting from a complex series of negations: specifically *term negation* followed by *predicate denial*. First applying term negation to the *subject* term of a universal affirmative sentence, 'all As are F', converts the subject term into its contrary 'no As', giving 'no As are F'. But if one then *denies* the predicate F of the term-negated subject, one gets the sentence 'it is not the case that no As are F', or 'some As are F', Aristotle's *particular* judgement form.

[77] Elsewhere (*Making It Explicit*, Chapter 7, II, 3) Brandom supports the claim about the necessary role of sortals in individuation, pointing out that notions like '"[t]hing" and "object" are pseudosortals' which 'do not individuate as sortals must' (p. 438), and that '[i]ndividual proper names and demonstratives and other indexical expressions cannot properly be understood except in terms of their associated sortals' (p. 439). But this would suggest that utterances such as 'this is red' must be understood as shorthand for sentences about some *this such* – some 'this tomato' or 'this tie' or so on. Brandom, however, repeats Sellars's indefiniteness on this point. Thus, much of Sellars's discussion of observation reports in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* is couched in the langage of reports on the colours of 'objects' with sentences such as 'This is green' (see, for example, §§ 35–8) with no reference to the necessary role of sortals.

'discrimination' implies that there is something this person is differentiating the male chick *from*, and here the relevant discrimination is, of course, with a *female* chick, but on the reliabilist account it sounds as if the chicken-sexer is simply differentiating between some state of affairs in which a male chick is present and a *contradictory* state of affairs in which a male chick is *not* present. Such would be an odd form of 'discrimination' indeed: a reliable discriminator who by her *silence* classified female chicks with everything in the universe that wasn't a male chick would hardly be thought of as a *chicken* sexer.[78]

In contrast, Hegel, as we will see, is quite explicit in the 'Aristotelian' conception of the everyday objects of the cognitive outlook he calls 'Perception' [*Wahrnehmung*], a distinct cognitive orientation to the world and importantly different from the more reflective orientation characteristic of the sciences and that he calls 'the Understanding' [*Verstand*]. Hegel's distinction here is not unlike that which Sellars himself makes when he distinguishes the 'manifest' and 'scientific' images of the world. Hegel thinks of it as a task of philosophy to grasp how these two standpoints, each appropriate in their own context, can be reconciled – a task that *Sellars* identifies as the dream of traditional metaphysics, and as one that, in his Kant-inflected scientific realist guise, he is happy to abandon.[79] While the question whether *Hegel's* attempts to reconcile the manifest and scientific images (along with various other related dichotomies) takes him back to a type of pre-critical metaphysics will concern us in the last two chapters, in the next two chapters, the ineliminability of Aristotelian thought for Hegel will be examined from the point of view of the way that Aristotle's term logic contributes to his use of 'determinate negation' as well as his 'inferentialism'. This will be done by tracing the provenance of these two features of Hegelianism to Kant's own ambiguous 'Copernican' break with Aristotelianism.

[78] Perhaps the best the reliabilist could do here is to respond that the chicken sexer actually has two *unrelated* discriminating capacities, that of discriminating male chicks from the rest of the universe (including, of course, female chicks), and that of discriminating female chicks from the rest of the universe (including male chicks). This seems rather contrived as it suggests that there is no real difference between one person's discriminating male and female chicks from another discriminating, say, male chicks from red things.

[79] Sellars is also somewhat *Kantian* here, as he thinks of the *real* significance of the difference between 'manifest' and 'scientific' views as belonging to *practical* philosophy. Thus, he wants to make our moral attitudes to 'persons' autonomous and in no further need of metaphysical *grounding*. At the theoretical level, he thinks, we can accept the 'scientific view' of humans *without loss*.

3

INDIVIDUATION AND DETERMINATE NEGATION IN KANT AND HEGEL

In the minds of many, Kant's comments on Aristotle's logic in the opening paragraphs to the 'Preface to the second edition' of the *Critique of Pure Reason* have been sufficient to exclude him from consideration as a serious contributor to modern logical thought. Kant's claim that logic from Aristotle's time onward had 'been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore seems to all appearance to be finished and complete'[1] has been taken as indicating his unqualified commitment to syllogistic logic and his obliviousness to the coming revolution that was to unfold throughout the nineteenth century.[2] In this sense, then, Kant is typically compared unfavourably to Leibniz, who is commonly regarded as *anticipating* the later growth of mathematized logic.

Recently, however, this view has started to change. Mary Tiles, for example, comments that although Kant contributed nothing towards the development of formal or symbolic techniques, he was, nevertheless, 'the architect who provides conceptual design sketches for the new edifice that was to be built on the site once occupied by Aristotelian, syllogistic logic, but which in the eighteenth century was covered by

[1] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B viii.

[2] W. Kneale and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 354–8.

rubble left by Ramist and Cartesian demolition gangs',[3] and similar revisionist readings of Kant's logic as found in works by Manley Thompson, David Bell, Béatrice Longuenesse and Robert Hanna, bring out the modern features of Kant's hitherto largely neglected logical thought.[4]

3.1 Kant and modern logic

In a long article which challenges the generally prevailing analytic view of Kant's status as a philosophical logician, Mary Tiles has described Kant as having laid 'the groundwork for three important structural features of modern logic: the distinction between concept and object, the primacy of the proposition (or sentence) as the unit of logical analysis, and the conception of logic as investigating the structure of logical systems, and not merely the validity of individual inferences'.[5] With the first two of these features Tiles is clearly alluding to characteristics or consequences of Frege's so-called 'context principle', expressed in claims such as that '[t]he meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in isolation'.[6]

With the context principle, Frege had reversed the conception of predication as found in Aristotelian and scholastic *term* logic. For Aristotle, a judgement was formed by the copulation of independent subject and predicate *terms*, and syllogistic logic relied on the principle that a term that occurred in subject position could also occur in predicate position. Frege, however, challenged both of these assumptions. First, the context principle denied that such terms could be understood *as* independently meaningful: they must rather be understood in terms of

[3] Mary Tiles, 'Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic', in Dov. M. Gabbay and John Woods, (eds.), *Handbook of the History of Logic: Volume 3, The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege* (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2004), p. 85.

[4] Manley Thompson, 'Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology', *Review of Metaphysics* 26 (1972–3), 314–43; David Bell, *Frege's Theory of Judgement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and The Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Robert Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

[5] Tiles, 'Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic', p. 85.

[6] This is the second of three 'fundamental principles' that Frege lays down in 'The Foundations of Arithmetic', in Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Frege Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 90 (see also, p. 108). Ludwig Wittgenstein was to effectively repeat this claim in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C. K. Ogden, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), § 3.3.

their contribution to the *proposition*, which was now regarded as the basic meaningful unit. In turn, this transformed the very meaning of predication such that the traditional idea of the joining of symmetrical terms was replaced by one modelled on the *asymmetric* mathematical distinction between 'function' and 'argument'.[7] Thus, on the standard interpretation, this logical distinction is then seen as correlated with a *metaphysical* one between objects and the concepts applied to them.[8]

One can appreciate the forward-looking 'Fregean' character of Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions by contrasting him to Leibniz in this regard. Despite the modern look of Leibniz's anticipations of later algebraic approaches to logic started by Boole, the logic he presupposed was, as Russell stressed, the traditional term-logical system of syllogisms. Most importantly, in contrast to Kant's proto-Fregean grasp of the primacy of the proposition, Leibniz firmly held to an interpretation of the subject–predicate structure of the sentence in terms of the idea of *conceptual inclusion*, asserting that 'in all true affirmative propositions, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the predicate is always in some way included in that of the subject – the predicate is present in the subject – or I do not know what truth is'.[9] This understanding of conceptual relations in terms of the spatial metaphor of 'containment' was just what was responsible for what Russell was later to identify as the 'axiom of internal relations'.

Aristotle's syllogistic structures appear to be based upon Plato's method of *Diaresis* or 'division', the series of major, middle and minor terms of a syllogism representing a series of universals from the most general to the most specific, related *intensionally* because generated from successive 'divisions' by the application of specifying features, commencing with the major term. In this sense, they map relations between intensional contents of concepts, with the more general being 'contained' in the more specific. But from this perspective, how could logical structure be thought as bearing on our investigations of the empirical *world*?

[7] Arguments are singular terms regarded as standing for individual objects within some domain; and functions are incomplete expressions that take arguments and assign values as outputs *for* those arguments. For example, in the case of arithmetic, the relation '... + ...' will be considered as a function that yields numerical outputs for numerical arguments: '7' for the arguments '5' and '2'.

[8] Furthermore, in association with modern set theory, this seemed to square logic with a modern natural-scientific conception of the world.

[9] G. W. Leibniz, 'Letter to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686', in *Philosophical Texts*, trans. and ed. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 111–12.

Leibniz had believed that if the specification (effectively Plato's conception of division by 'specific differences') of a universal term were to be taken far enough, one would arrive at a *complete individual concept*, theoretically capable of determining an individual substance (monad),[10] but against this, Kant insisted that conceptual specification *alone* could never be sufficient to render a thought capable of referring to an individual thing. I might make the concept 'cat' more specific by adding concepts such as 'black', 'fat' and so on, but by itself conceptual specification could never achieve adequate representation of *this cat*, the existing single spatio–temporal unity presented to me *here and now* in perception.[11] For this, what was further required was *intuition*. Hence, Kant distinguished between concepts and intuitions as different species of representation, and between general (formal) logic, which abstracts concepts from their application to *any* objects at all, and treats them in terms of their intensional inter-relations alone, and 'transcendental logic', which considers concepts in relation to *possible objects of experience* for finite rational subjects such as ourselves.

With this focus on the semantic relevance of Kant's concept–intuition distinction, the lines for his logical rehabilitation, as we will see, seem reasonably clear. However, it is *just* this focus that seems to strengthen the case *against* Hegel, since the concept–intuition distinction was a doctrine of which he, along with other post-Kantian idealists, was most critical. Indeed, Hegel typically opposes the whole way of framing the type of 'semantic' idea that we can independently consider something *mindly*, some 'representation', and something *worldly*, an 'object', and *then* ask after the nature of the 'relation' of the former to the latter. How then could Hegel *deny* the concept–intuition distinction and yet *not* regress back into the framework from which Kant was breaking free?

[10] 'Now it is obvious that all true predication has some foundation in the nature of things, and when a proposition is not identical, that is to say when the predicate is not expressly included in the subject, it must be virtually included in it. This is what philosophers call *in-esse*, and they say that the predicate *is in* the subject. So the subject term must always involve that of the predicate, in such a way that anyone who understood the subject notion perfectly would also see that the predicate belongs to it. This being so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to include, and to allow the deduction of, all the predicates of the subject to which that notion is attributed'. Leibniz, 'Discourse on Metaphysics', § 8, in *Philosophical Texts*, pp. 59–60.

[11] Any further division of concepts will always yield more specific *but still general*, and further specifiable concepts. In Kant's equivalent of the 'Tree of Porphyry' there is no lowest level, no '*species infima*'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A658/B686, cf. A331–2/B388–9.

In fact, the relations between Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel here are more complex than the story told in this way suggests.

3.2 Intuitions, individuals and the singular-particular distinction

Clearly Kant regarded his having distinguished structurally different species of representation, concepts and intuitions, as his great breakthrough.[12] Besides this, his oft-cited comments in a letter to Marcus Herz in 1772 show his concern with what we now talk of as the semantics of our representational capacities: like others, he says, he had hitherto failed to address a question that was 'the key to the whole secret' of metaphysics, the question of 'the ground of the relation of that in us which we call "representation" to the object?'[13] With this focus on the semantic relevance of Kant's concept–intuition distinction, we can see how the distinction might be applied to a standing problem within the tradition of syllogistic logic: that of how to conceive of the place of judgements *about individuals* within inferential reasoning.

As Aristotle had pointed out in the *Posterior Analytics*, '[s]cientific knowledge cannot be acquired by sense-perception' as 'sense-perception must be concerned with singulars [*kath ekaston*], whereas knowledge depends upon recognition of the universal'.[14] *Logically* this exclusion of singulars from reasoning was reflected by the fact that Aristotle had distinguished the *particular* judgements that were found in syllogistic patterns from properly *singular* judgements that had no proper place in syllogisms. First, in his three-fold classification of judgements, in

[12] See, for example, Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, p. 186.

[13] Immanuel Kant, 'To Marcus Herz, February 21 1772', in *Correspondence*, ed. Arnulf Zweig, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 132–3.

[14] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, in Hugh Tredennick (ed. and trans.), *Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle II*, bk, 1 ch 31, 87b 28–39. The translator here has 'particulars' for Aristotle's '*kath ekaston*', but here I follow Whitaker who claims that 'Aristotle's own terms, 'singular' [*kath ekaston*] and 'partial' [*en merei*], are used clearly and consistently. The two terms used to translate them in Latin, however, and hence in English, have become somewhat confused. Aristotle's two terms were, at first, kept distinct, the former being translated by a word meaning single or individual ('singularis'), from which the English 'singular' is derived, while the latter was rendered as 'partial' ('particularis' or 'particulariter'), using an adjective or adverb from the Latin for 'part'. The misuse of the term seems to have begun with Aquinas, who sometimes spoke of the singular as partial'. C. W. A. Whitaker, *Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 89. The claim here, however, that Aristotle uses these 'clearly and consistently' seems overstated, as there seem clear cases where Aristotle intends to refer to an object *as a* particular (as a 'this such') but uses '*kath ekaston*'.

Chapter 7 of *De Interpretatione* the first group is described as containing judgements *about* individual substances (*singular* judgements) while the second and third groups contain judgements *about universals*. Judgements of the second group express truths about universals by predications *made universally* about their members, as in 'all men are mortal',[15] while those of the third group express truths about universals directly, as in judgements such as 'man (as such) is mortal'. Next, the 'particular judgements' found in syllogisms and discussed in the *Anterior* and *Posterior Analytics*, it would seem, belong to the second group.[16] That is, particular judgements are *also* 'about' universals, but in contrast to the judgements made about universals by saying something about *all* of its members, particular judgements do this by way of reference to *some* of its members – or more accurately, to *part of* its membership.[17] That is, Aristotle does *not* mean by 'particular judgement' what is now conventionally meant by this term – a judgement *about* 'particulars'. Modern 'particular judgements' are equivalent to Aristotle's category of *singular* judgements, which find no proper place in syllogisms.

Logically, the problem of the exclusion of singularity from syllogistic reasoning had been bypassed by scholastic logicians by simply treating singular terms *as* universals, and, so, singular judgements as universal judgements; and this was done on the grounds of certain logical properties shared between these different judgement forms. For example, both universally affirmative judgements and affirmative singular judgements can be considered alike in as much as they are both *exceptionless*.[18] In recent times this move has been effectively revived by Quine,[19] and

[15] Again, here I largely follow the interpretation of Whitaker, *Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic*.

[16] It had been argued, for example, by J. L. Ackrill, in *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. Translated with Notes and Glossary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), that particular judgements are what Aristotle meant by judgements belonging to the third group, but Whitaker (*Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, pp. 84–9) is convincing in his criticism of this. In any case, importantly, both interpreters of this classification agree that particular judgements are about universals.

[17] Judgements 'made partially' is Whitaker's apt term (ibid., p. 86). Preserving the etymological link between 'particular' and 'part', for Aristotle a particular affirmative judgement affirms the predicate of part only of that totality of members of the universal for which the predicate is affirmed when it is affirmed 'universally', and so, like the concept 'part' it depends for its sense on the idea of the judgement's being made universally.

[18] As Kant points out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A71/B96.

[19] Quine links his treatment of names as general terms with the 'attitude of logicians in past centuries' who 'commonly treated a name such as "Socrates" rather on a par logically with "mortal" and "man", and as differing from these latter just in being true of fewer objects, viz. one.' W. V. O. Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), p. 181.

Leibniz too had followed this scholastic practice. However, Leibniz had *also* employed the Aristotelian *particular judgement form* as a way of referring to individuals alongside the standard scholastic treatment of singular terms simply *as* universals, and seems to have regarded such singular and particular judgements as *equivalent*.[20] Kant's concept–intuition distinction *too* can be seen as addressing this problem of singularity, but also as directed against Leibniz's assumption of the equivalence between these two judgement forms.

If we think of intuitions as *singular* representations, then the role Kant gives to intuitions in his criticism of Leibniz can be read as revealing his proximity to Frege's later approach to logic and semantics. By assigning to intuitions the function of referring to individuals, and by distinguishing them from concepts with which something general is said *of* such individuals, Kant effectively anticipated Frege's asymmetrical distinction between 'arguments' and 'functions'. At the same time, however, Kant's picture is complicated by the fact that he effectively denies that there are any *properly* singular judgements,[21] as a subject term of a judgement must contain a (necessary general) *concept*. This has the implication that for Kant it is necessary to distinguish between the surface grammatical form of a judgement and its underlying logical form. Thus, as Longuenesse has shown, Kant clearly distinguished between the 'subordination' relation *between* the concepts involved as subject and predicate terms of the judgement, and the different relation of 'subsumption' that holds between a concept and the content of an intuition. Similarly Robert Hanna points to Kant's differentiation between what he calls 'concept-to-concept predication' (subordination) and 'concept-to-object predication' (subsumption).[22]

With this difference Kant could now conceive of the judgement as a complex action of the faculty of the understanding in which, as Longuenesse synoptically puts it, in virtue of the *subordination* of subject-concept to predicate-concept, 'the objects subsumed under the

[20] This is remarked upon by Sommers, 'Leibniz has an interesting variant of the traditional doctrine that singular terms are syntactically general. According to Leibniz, "Socrates is mortal" is a particular proposition whose proper form is "some Socrates is mortal". But "some Socrates is mortal" entails "Every Socrates is mortal" so we are free to choose either way of representing the sentence. Leibniz thus views the singular proposition as equivalent to a particular proposition that entails a universal one'. *The Logic of Natural Languages*, p. 15.

[21] An *aesthetic* judgement is a singular judgement, in Kant's account, but as he conceives of aesthetic judgements as making no truth claims about their objects, they are not 'judgements' in the sense at issue here.

[22] Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 61.

subject-concept are also subsumed under the predicate-concept',[23] an analysis of the structure of the judgement that he explicitly opposed to the traditional understanding of a judgement as a relation *between* concepts.[24] It is just this aspect of Kant's transcendental logic that makes him look as if he is anticipating, or providing 'design sketches' for, Frege, but this Fregean aspect in turn sets up a tension within Kant's account of judgement forms.

Following the traditional term logical treatment of judgement forms, Kant regards categorical judgements as the basic form of judgement that is presupposed by both hypothetical and disjunctive judgements,[25] but one of Frege's key ideas which marked his break with the earlier term logical approach, even with that of its algebraicised form found in Boole, was his conception of the form of a universally quantified affirmative categorical judgement *as* a conditional. Thus the logical form 'all men are mortal' should not be thought of as the same subject–predicate structure as that of, say, 'Socrates is mortal'. In saying 'all As are B' one is not predicating some property 'B' of 'all As' as if 'all As' named some type of thing. Rather, it is really to say of *anything at all* that *if* that thing is an A *then* it is a B, thus making the conditional (or hypothetical) judgement the more basic of the two forms. But when the concept–intuition distinction is used to specify the *logical* structure of a judgement by claiming that 'the objects subsumed under the subject-concept are also subsumed under the predicate-concept',[26] then Kant's approach seems to anticipate Frege's insight, as this seems to be renderable equally as '*if* something is subsumed under "A" *then* it is subsumed under "B"'. In this

[23] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 86. Among Kant's various formulations of the logical structure of the judgement, perhaps the one that most clearly expresses this idea is from the *Jäsche Logic*, where he unpacks the structure of the analytic judgement 'all bodies are extended' as 'To everything *x*, to which the concept of body $(a + b)$ belongs, belongs also *extension* (b)'. Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, § 36, quoted in Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 87.

[24] 'I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgement in general: it is, they say, the representation of a relation between two concepts ... I remark only that it is not here determined wherein this **relation** consists' (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B140–1).

[25] The translator of Kant's *Lectures on Logic* points out that Kant 'often speaks as though there were only categorical judgements and categorical syllogisms'. J. Michael Young, 'Translator's introduction' to Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, trans. and ed. J. Michael Young, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. xv.

[26] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 86. Conflating subordination and subsumption was just that of which Frege had accused Boole. Gottlob Frege, 'Boole's logical Calculus and the Concept-script' in *Posthumous Writings*, eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach, trans. P. Long and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 18.

way, the relation between concept and intuition in 'subsumption' (or alternatively, 'concept-to-object predication') resembles that between what Frege treats as functions and arguments.[27] It is what leads Manley Thompson, for example, to say that the formal logic presupposed by Kant's transcendental logic is that of 'first order quantificational logic plus identity but minus proper names or other singular terms that are in principle eliminable' rather than the syllogistic logic he 'officially' takes as the model of formal or 'general' logic.[28] But if it is Kant's concept–intuition distinction that holds the key to the *modernity* of his logical thought, then how does this *not* rebound negatively on Hegel,[29] given his trenchant *criticism* of this distinction? How could Hegel *deny* the concept–intuition distinction and *not* regress back into the framework that the distinction was instrumental in overcoming?

One possible answer is the one we have seen in Sellars and McDowell, in which intuition is understood as a *type* of conceptual representation, as modeled on a 'this such', a move which seems designed to avoid the problem of the 'myth of the given' seemingly infecting Kant's official understanding of intuition as a *non-conceptual* representation. But this, as we will see, is not a simple 'either-or'. Hegel's complex position on these issues is made clearer when we reflect upon the Aristotelian distinction that easily passes unnoticed by modern analytic readers – that between 'singularity' and 'particularity'. While Anglophone philosophical thought has effectively equated these two notions, Kant and Hegel kept them apart, and we might understand more clearly what the Kantian conception of 'intuition' entails if we distinguish the notions of representing some individual thing *as* a 'singular' on the one hand, and as a 'particular' on the other. The claim presented here is that there is an ambiguity at the heart of Kant's account, and that Hegel's complex relation to Kant has to be seen in the light of Hegel's attempt to address this ambiguity.

3.3 Kant's ambiguous conception of the nature of intuition

Kant's 'official' account of intuition was to characterize intuitions as 'singular' [*einzeln*] and 'immediate' and as such as opposed to concepts

[27] Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 62 n. 85.

[28] Thompson, 'Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology', p. 334.

[29] Even Russell, for example, had seen his own early account of the distinction between those 'sense-data' known by acquaintance and the conceptually articulated 'knowledge by description' as lining up with Kant's own distinction between empirical intuitions and concepts. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 85.

which are, in contrast, 'general' and 'mediated'.[30] However, as Charles Parsons has pointed out, it is far from clear that the 'singularity condition' and 'the immediacy condition' for intuitions amount to the same thing,[31] and this unclarity appears to be behind the competing possible readings of Kant's account of perception as *phenomenalistic* on the one hand or as *directly realist* on the other. Thus in some contexts Kant seems to imply that the objects presented in intuition are bare singular '*haecceities*', like Russellian sense-data, while in others, that they are instances of kinds.[32] On the latter, the reading I have attributed to Sellars and McDowell, we are to think of what is 'given' in the intuition as a 'this such' rather than a bare 'this', that is, as an exemplar of a kind and so as having the logical form of *particularity* rather than *singularity*. Furthermore, the McDowell–Sellars analysis of the representational nature of intuition suggests a way of conceiving of intuitive content *epistemically* rather than *logically*, linking the category of 'particularity' (rather than 'singularity') with 'immediacy'. This, I will suggest, was just the way that Hegel was to interpret Kant's ambiguous conception of 'intuition': what is 'immediately' given in perception cannot be regarded as something simple or something constructed out of simples – it is already conceptualized, and in this sense, already 'mediated' by relations able to be made explicit by further reflection.

Again, I suggest, we find the origin of this conception of experience in Aristotle, and in particular,[33] in *De Anima* where both 'thinner' and 'thicker' conceptions of perceptual experience are to be found. On the one hand, Aristotle portrays sense perception as based on a *non-conceptual* capacity of the sense organs to respond to proper sensibles of a certain type – colours for the eye, sounds for the ear, and so on – and it is in this

[30] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A320/B376–7.

[31] Charles Parsons, 'Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic', in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White, eds. *Philosophy, Science, and Method* (New York: St. Martins's Press, 1969), pp. 568–94. Indeed, Hanna argues that the different conceptions collapsed in Kant's notion of intuition are in fact more numerous than that. Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, ch 4.2.

[32] Thus, in the 'B Preface' to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he writes that 'we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e., as an appearance'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxvi. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' Kant calls an appearance an 'undetermined object of an empirical intuition'. Ibid., A20/B34.

[33] In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant treats these as distinct categories of quantity, although from his brief discussion there it is far from clear what hangs on the distinction. In the *Jäsche Logic*, however, the distinction is clearer. Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 598–9 (9.102–3).

sense that the *proper* objects of sense are *singulars* [*kath ekasta*].[34] But Aristotle also discusses perception in a 'thicker' way, such that the typical objects of human perception are to be regarded as individual substances *qua* instances of their kinds – substances which *cannot* in any sense be regarded as mere containers or envelopes for abstract particulars, as found in Plato. Such 'thicker' forms of perception are explicitly dealt with by Aristotle as 'indirect' or 'incidental' forms of perception.

In Aristotle's example of incidental perception, 'the white thing [*to leukon*] is the son of Diares',[35] the identification of the 'white thing' *as* the son of Diares already suggests the involvement of various concepts – the concept 'son of', the concept of identity, as well as the concept of an *individual substance* able to be modified by the quality 'white', for example. That is, 'incidental perception', it would seem, cannot be regarded *simply* as an episode of *aesthesis* but a product of the interaction of *aesthesis* with *noesis*.[36] Once more, Aristotle's 'singular–particular' distinction is relevant here. Strictly, the objects of the individual sense organs, the *proper sensibles*, are 'singular' objects akin to sense-data. However, human perception is able to take in more than this in that perception is typically that of *individual substances*, that is individuals *qua* modifiable instances of kinds. As such, perceptual objects that are equivalent to the objects of *particular* judgements, and this in turn introduced a feature of perceptual judgement that both Kant and Hegel were to exploit.

As Aristotle had developed in his *Metaphysics*, an individual substance considered as an instance of a kind, a 'this such', is to be thought of as a combination of form and matter. Considered from the side of its *form*, a particular substance will be the bearer of properties constituting its *essence*. Considered in terms of the particular way that it is *enmattered*, however, it will be further characterized by some set of inessential properties, each of which will instantiate one of two or more possible contrarily opposed properties. Thus, talking about some particular human being – the son of Diares, say – one could predicate of that person some essential property, such as mortality, or some inessential one, such

[34] Aristotle, *De Anima*, in W. S. Hett (trans.), *Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle VIII*, bk II, ch. v, 417b28.

[35] Ibid., II, vi, 418a20–22. The translator here renders '*to leukon*' as 'the white thing seen'.

[36] There is considerable interpretative disagreement over this issue, but here I follow the approach of Charles H. Kahn, 'Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 48 (1966), 43–81, and 'Aristotle on Thinking', in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

as his being pale or dark. It is not essential to being human that one is pale (or, conversely, dark) but there is something *about humans in general*, as opposed, say, to *numbers*, that allow them to be determined one way or the other. With this, then, Aristotle developed the idea first put forward in the *Categories* about individual substances being the recipients of *contrary qualifications* at *different times*.[37] It was Aristotle's later and more complex *hylomorphic* conception of substance that provided the *raison d'être* of this phenomenon: it was those properties inhering in a substance that did not belong to it in virtue of its form that had to be characterized in terms of such an array of possibility.

It is this conception of perceived objects as instances of kinds subject to qualification by contrary properties that will come to be at the heart of Hegel's notion of 'determinate negation', but it is significant that in his late pre-critical work, and so prior to formulating his classic 'concept–intuition' distinction, Kant had effectively utilized the same constellation of ideas in his criticisms of Leibniz. Thus in an essay from 1763, 'Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy',[38] Kant invokes a distinction between what he calls 'real' and 'logical' negation.[39] Logical negation, he says, is just that which holds between contradictory statements, the simultaneous affirmation and denial of some property of a thing: one statement thus affirms that this A is B and the other says that it is *not* the case that A is B, or to put it otherwise, it predicates of A the *contradictory* predicate, 'not B'. In contrast, *real* negation occurs 'where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other (*entgegengesetzt*), but not through the law of contradiction'.[40] Such oppositions hold between opposed and reciprocally canceling determinations, Kant's favoured example being that between mechanically opposed forces. As with this example, a number of others given similarly

[37] Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. v, 3b25–4a10.

[38] Translated in Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, trans. and ed. D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[39] Michael Wolff is one of the few interpreters of Hegel to point to the importance of Kant's early essay: the introduction of the concept of real negation in this essay, he points out, 'was of great (though little understood) significance for Kant's later philosophy, and also for post-Kantian, Hegelian, and materialist dialectic'. Michael Wolff, 'On Hegel's Doctrine of Contradiction', trans. E. Flynn and K. R. Westphal, *The Owl of Minerva* 31 1 (1999), 1–22, 12.

[40] Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, p. 211 (2.171). In an essay from 1755, 'A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition', Kant had noted: 'Every true proposition indicates that the subject is determinate in respect of its predicate. That is to say, the predicate is posited to the exclusion of its opposite' – a formulation that clearly expresses the idea of a determinacy achieved in virtue of Aristotelian term negation. Ibid., p. 13 (1.393).

involve opposed spatial directions,[41] but Kant *also* identifies as *real* oppositions those holding between a *credit* and a *debit* of an amount of money, and between amounts of pleasure and displeasure, good and evil, love and hate, and desire and aversion. 'Real negation' is essentially a development of the simple term negation from Aristotelian logic.

After his 'transcendental turn', Kant could now employ his concept–intuition distinction for the same purpose, as the structure of pure intuition may be thought of as exemplifying a subset of the earlier 'real' negations: the ones limited to space and time.[42] However, it is significant that rather than being simply abandoned or absorbed into the new notion of 'pure intuition', the notion of 'real negation' continued to play a role in the transcendental logic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the distinction between term-negation and predicate-denial being most explicit in his account of the categories of 'quality' in the 'table of categories'.[43]

The three categories of quality, 'reality', 'negation', and 'limitation' [*Realität, Negation, Limitation*] are derived from the three forms of judgement, affirmative, negative and infinite, [*Bejahende*, *Verneinende*, *Unendliche*] respectively.[44] From the point of view of formal logic (what Kant calls 'general logic'), in an affirmative judgement a predicate is attributed to a subject, while in a negative judgement it is *opposed* [*entgegengesetzt*] to it. By 'opposed to' here, Kant clearly means that the predicate is *denied of* the subject. However, formal logic abstracts from all content of terms, and so abstracts from any distinction between *positive* and *negative* predicates. From this point of view, both 'Socrates is beautiful' and 'Socrates is ugly [with the sense "non-beautiful"]' would be represented by the form 'a is F'. *Transcendental* logic, however, 'also considers the value or content of the logical affirmation made in a judgement by means of a merely negative predicate [*eines bloss verneinenden Prädikats*], and what sort of gain this yields for the whole of

[41] For example, a ship sails from Portugal to Brazil, and the miles travelled under conditions of an east wind can be designated by a '+' while those traversed when the ship is blown back by a west wind can be designated by a '–'. The miles traversed westwards by the ship are themselves just as real – just as *positive* – as those traversed eastwards, but one might count them as negative in opposition to the 'positive' eastward miles in the contexts of the ship's journey.

[42] That is, the earlier 'oppositions' are now reduced to the four oppositions of an egocentric space-time: front–back, up–down, right–left, and future–past.

[43] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A80/B106.

[44] Ibid., A70/B95.

cognition'.[45] Thus transcendental logic has a place for a *third* type of judgement, the infinite judgement, in which such a 'merely negative predicate' is affirmed of a subject, as when one says 'the soul is immortal'. Again, this 'infinite' judgement is the descendent of Aristotle's 'indefinite' predication by a contrary resulting from 'term negation'. Transcendental logic, therefore, explicitly distinguishes between the denial of a predicate involved in sentential negation, and the affirmation of its contrary predicate, a distinction that, like the earlier distinction between 'logical' and 'real' negation, can be traced back to Aristotle's two types of negation.[46]

Similar term-logical considerations manifest themselves in relation to other categories as well. Of the three judgements of 'relation', the first two, categorical and hypothetical judgements, correspond to the categories of substance and *event* causality respectively, and while these have been the subject of much commentary, until recently, the third judgement type, the 'disjunctive judgement', and its corresponding category of 'community' or 'interaction', have received relatively little attention. However, this category, like the third category of *quality*, is crucial to understanding the fate within Kant's transcendental logic of his earlier bi-polarly opposed concepts of 'real negation'. Moreover, it is also that part of Kant's transcendental logic that was crucial for the moves beyond Kant made by Fichte (who called the category of relation the 'category of categories'[47]) and it is the part that bears most directly on the Hegelian issue of determinate negation.

In 'Book 1' of the 'Transcendental Analytic' we learn that *disjunctive judgements* are judgements in which a concept is divided, not by the

[45] Ibid., A72/B97.

[46] In 'Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy' (in Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, p. 217 (2.177–8), Kant refers to the negative term of *real* opposition as designating a 'deprivation [*Beraubung*]' which he glosses with the Latin '*privatio*', and distinguishes *this* from 'lack [*Mangel*] (*defectus*, *absentia*)'. A body at rest may *lack* motion 'in so far as no motive force is present' but one that has its motion *cancelled* by an opposing force has been *deprived* of motion. It would seem then that Kant's real opposition cannot be equated with what is traditionally discussed as '*privatio*' – Aristotle's *sterēsis* – a negation which, in Kant's terms, designates a 'lack'. Thus, for example, John P. Anton, *Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1957), p. 79: 'Privation, as a principle in ontological analysis, acquires significant content in connection with a given locus in two possible ways: (*a*) it means relative absence of a determinate capacity in respect to degree of fulfilment, and (*b*) it indicates the complete absence of an aspect, or stands for a certain determinate incapability and loss'.

[47] J. G. Fichte, *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy* (*Wissenschaftslehre*) *Nova Methodo* (1796/99), trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 421.

presence or absence of a distinctive feature generating the familiar genus–species structure, but rather, in such a way that a set of mutually excluding contraries constitute a relation of 'logical opposition' (*logischen Entgegengesetzung*).[48] In the *Jäsche Logic*, Kant gives the example of dividing the concept 'learned man' into the type of man who is learned 'historically' on the one hand and the type learned 'in matters of reason' on the other, such that these two types now exhaust the superordinate kind.[49] The subordinate concepts of this type of division are thus such that their spheres are mutually exclusive. If one knows that this man is learned, and one knows that he is not learned *historically*, one thereby knows that he is learned in 'matters of reason'. In the first *Critique*, the example is more complex, but structurally the same. Kant notes of the disjunctive judgement, 'The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause'. Here:

> Each of these propositions occupies one part of the sphere of the possible cognition about the existence of a world in general, and together they occupy the entire sphere. To remove the cognition from one of these spheres means to place it in one of the others, and to place it in one sphere, on the contrary, means to remove it from the others. In a disjunctive judgment here is therefore a certain community of cognitions consisting in the fact that they mutually exclude each other [*eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, dass sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschliessen*], yet thereby determine [*bestimmen*] the true cognition **in its entirety**, since taken together they constitute the entire content of a particular given cognition.[50]

A disjunctive judgement, then, we might say, gives expression to the relations among the totality of Aristotelian 'indefinite' term-negated predicates,[51] and it is in virtue of such a judgement's belonging to a 'certain community of cognitions' that it can be *determinate*. Here, it would seem, we have a clear suggestion of a mechanism for

[48] 'Finally, the disjunctive judgement contains the relations of two or more propositions to one another, though not the relation of sequence, but rather that of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of one judgement excludes that of the other, yet at the same time the relation of community, insofar as the judgements together exhaust the sphere of cognition proper; it is therefore a relation of the parts of the sphere of a cognition where the sphere of each part is the complement of that of the others in the sum total of the divided cognition'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A73–4/B98–9.

[49] Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 603 (9.107).

[50] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A74/B99.

[51] Aristotle refers to the term negations of subjects and predicates as 'indefinite', *De Interpretatione*, x, 20a31–6.

determination that is independent of the idea of some 'Russellian' given as the content of an empirical intuition.[52] A judgement is determinate in virtue of its belonging to a certain *community* of possible judgements.

The importance of these often overlooked distinctions in the 'Metaphysical Deduction' is underlined when the issues are again broached in the 'Transcendental Dialectic', 'Chapter Three, Section Two', in the discussion of the 'transcendental ideal' or '*Prototypon transcendentale*'. Every concept, Kant says, 'in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle of **determinability** [*Grundsatze der Bestimmbarkeit*]: that of **every two** contradictorily opposed predicates [*kontradiktorisch-entgegengesetzten Prädikaten*] only one can apply to it'.[53] This 'merely logical principle' is just another way of expressing – Kant says it 'rests on' – the 'principle of contradiction [*Satze des Widerspruchs*]'.[54] Effectively it says that any object is such that if the predicate 'F' is true of it, then, the predicate 'not F' will be false of it. But while every *concept* falls under this principle, every *thing* stands under a *further* principle that he calls the 'principle of **thoroughgoing determination** [*Grundsatze der durchgängigen Bestimmung*], according to which, among **all possible** predicates of **things** [*Dinge*], insofar as they are compared with their opposites [*Gegenteilen*], one must apply to it'.[55] Thus, rather than considering every thing in relation to 'two mutually contradicting predicates [*einander widerstreitenden Prädikate*]', the principle 'considers every thing further in relation to **the whole of possibility**, as the sum total of all predicates of things in general; and by presupposing that as a condition *a priori*, it represents every thing as deriving its own possibility from the share that it has in that whole of possibility' and 'thus deals with the content [*Inhalt*] *and not merely the logical form*'.[56]

[52] Clearly, Russell's conception of the reality of the sense-datum would instantiate more Kant's first category of quality, 'reality', which *precedes* and is meant to be understood as independent of the second category, 'negation'.

[53] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A571/B599.

[54] Kant says it 'rests on' it.

[55] Ibid., A571–2/B599–600. The Kemp Smith translation of this passage obscures Kant's meaning by rendering the '*Gegenteilen*' that Kant uses of the predicate pairs relevant to the 'principle of thorough-going determination' of *things* as 'contradictory opposites' rather than 'contraries'. Here, Kant explicitly uses the terms 'contradictorily opposed predicates [*kontradiktorishe-entgegengesetzten Prädikaten*]' and 'mutually contradicting predicates' [*einander widerstreitenden Prädikate*] when speaking of the merely *logical* 'principle of determinability' of concepts, and is relying on the same distinction that elsewhere he renders as between 'real' and 'logical' negation.

[56] Ibid., A572/B600. Translation modified and final emphasis added.

We might, then, think of Kant's transcendental logic as containing a complex mix of features from rather different types of logic. As sympathetic defenders of Kant's logic from a modern point of view such as Tiles, Hanna and Thompson have pointed out, much of the apparatus of a 'modern' post-Fregean logic is already in place in Kant's transcendental logic. On the other hand, one can see, in the means that Kant employs to achieve this, elements of a traditional Aristotelian term logic that classically find *no place* in modern propositionally based system but do to some degree appear in revisionist approaches like those of Strawson and Wiggins, for example. Kant preserves the subject–predicate structure of the sentence, for example, and the Aristotelian idea that the individual is always reasoned about as the instance of a kind, rather than as an individual *per se*, and he employs Aristotle's complex combinations of term negation and predicate denial in place of the single 'external' conception of propositional negation of modern logic. Against this mixture of term and propositionally based logical considerations, Hegel's transformations of Kant's transcendental logic can be seen, I contend, as an attempt to systematize and reconcile these distinctions.

3.4 Hegel on determinacy and givenness

For the post-Sellarsians, Hegel was an exemplary critic of the 'myth of the given', and this stance is often thought as exemplified in his account of 'consciousness' in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology* where he charts the progress of a conscious subject through a series of what we might think of as separate epistemic–ontological attitudes that he labels, 'Sense-certainty [*die sinnliche Gewissheit*]', 'Perception [*die Wahrnehmung*]', and 'the Understanding [*der Verstand*]'.[57] Each of these attitudes is a version of a generally *realistic* orientation within which that which is

[57] Consciousness had started out taking the immediate qualitatively determined 'this' of Sense-certainty as the *truth* of its object and had come to learn that such immediately perceivable quality is just an aspect of the more complex object of *Perception*. In contrast to the simplicity of the 'this' of Sense-certainty, the perceived object has an internal structure such that an underlying substance has changeable phenomenal properties. But in turn *Perception* learns that *its* object is in truth more complicated again, the distinction between it and the Understanding roughly enacting the distinction between the everyday common-sensical and scientific or 'nomological' views of the world. While from the point of view of Perception we might think of the world as simply an assemblage of propertied objects, from the point of view of the Understanding, such objects will be integrated as interacting components of a single, unified, law-governed world.

known within experience is taken to be an *independent* 'in-itself [*das Ansich*]'. These three separate 'shapes' of consciousness are differentiated by the respective assumptions involved regarding the fundamental characteristics of that independent 'in-itself', and the advocate of the first of these – Sense-certainty – like the defender of non-conceptual content, thinks of that which is immediately and receptively *apprehended* as 'the *richest* kind of knowledge',[58] and thus issuing in a type of knowledge which exceeds conceptual *comprehension*. Furthermore, like Russell with his foundationalist appeal to acquaintance, the Sense-certaintist thinks of that which is immediately given as 'the *truest* knowledge'.[59] That is, what are presented in Sense-certainty are regarded as the ultimate simple components of being.

Like the official contents of Kantian intuitions, the objects of Sense-certainty are meant to be things given *immediately* in experience, and are meant to be given as the *singular* referents of a type of mental demonstrative – each presented as a 'pure "This"', the 'singular thing [*das Einzelne*]'.[60] Hegel will attempt to show the incoherence of the idea of anything's being 'given' in the sense of being immediately present to a consciousness while still being 'determinate' or cognitively relevant. Effectively, his charge against the Sense-certaintist will come down to the problem we have noted with respect to the idea of intuition, the problem that it fulfils the different conditions of immediacy and singularity. Hegel follows Kant in thinking of singularity as a type of *category* or *thought determination* and with the thought of something singular we posit it as something entirely independent of other things, as relationless. Thus in various places he describes the *singular* as belonging to the realm of mutual *externality* – it is the determination under which we think of a spatial *point* for example.[61] But taken in isolation from their relation to any other category, the elements of any such field cannot be kept apart in thought – cannot be individuated, but rather 'pass over' into each other. That is, it is the very immediacy of these supposed phenomenal 'contents' that precludes any relations of identity or difference from being established among them. In Evansian terms, such 'objects' lack any 'fundamental ground of difference'.[62]

[58] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), § 91 (3.82).
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid. § 91 (3.83).
[61] Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 20, remark.
[62] Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, p. 107.

The collapse of Sense-certainty as a cognitive attitude will result in its being replaced by a new shape of consciousness, 'Perception', the object of which is 'the thing with many properties'. Effectively, the immediate Platonic 'bare this'es of Sense-certainty, conceived of as something like the 'tropes' or abstract particulars populating both pre-Socratic and Platonic worlds, will be replaced by objects conceived as underlying primary substances within which properties inhere. The perceptual object will be a 'this such', and so instantiate *particularity*. In the first instance, says Hegel, the properties will be taken as simply inhering in the medium in a way that makes them 'indifferent' to each other, but if all such properties were in fact 'indifferent' to each other in this way, they could not be *determinate* 'for they are only determinate in so far as they *differentiate* themselves from one another, and *relate* themselves *to others* as opposed [*als entgegengesetzte*]'.[63] It is here, in the phenomenon that Brandom refers to as 'material incompatibility', that is where the principle of term negation manifests itself: in Hegel's example: '[w]hite is white only in opposition to [*in Entgegensetzung gegen*] black, and so on'.[64] The very *existence* of things *determinately* coloured *F* must, then, presuppose the existence of things determinately coloured *non-F*: 'the point of singularity (*Einzelheit*) in the medium of subsistence' therefore must 'radiat[e] forth into plurality'.[65] But the object so conceived in turn shows itself to be incoherent and develops into more complex conceptions of the structure of such perceivable objects, and are *ultimately*, with the transition to the Understanding, replaced by something else – something like nomologically interacting *forces* – the distinction between Perception and the Understanding roughly enacting the distinction between the everyday common-sensical or 'manifest' and modern 'scientific' views of the world.[66]

In considering the significance of Hegel's account of the forms of consciousness it is important to distinguish logical from epistemological issues. Hegel's critique of the 'given' considered as the presentation of a *singular* content is not meant to amount to a critique of the notion or category of singularity *per se*. It is not as if Hegel refuses to recognize as

[63] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 114 (3.95).

[64] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 120 (3.100).

[65] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 115 (3.96). The idea is that if, say, the world were monochromatically coloured *red*, then, from the point of view of 'perception', it could not even be thought to *be red*. Being (determinately) red requires the existence of other *non-red* things.

[66] Or alternatively, the understanding could be thought of as parallel to the specifically scientific type of knowing that Aristotle refers to as '*episteme*'.

significant, any thought about *individuals* as such, considered in abstraction from concepts or universals. Rather, his point is more that in thought about an individual as such, one is grasping it in terms of the categorical determinacy of 'singularity', and that that category, as a concept, is to be understood in terms of its relations to *other* categories such as particularity and universality. As Hegel puts the point in the discussion of Sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: 'An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an *instance* (or example [*Beispiel*]) of it'.[67] Anything purportedly present to us as bare 'this' is nevertheless present as an instance of the determination of singularity, an exemplification of 'thisness' in general. The 'singularity' of the object of Sense-certainty that the Sense-certaintist thinks she can grasp in a form of knowledge something like Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance' is not something understandable *in isolation* from the relations it maintains in cognition with other differently determined items. But Hegel's insight seems to be an idea already *implicit* within Kant's (and, perhaps, Frege's) version of the 'context principle'.

In Sense-certainty, what is conceived as given as the content of a bare 'this' has become, in Perception, the singular underlying substrate in which properties inhere, and in the Understanding, some 'force' expressed in its effects on other forces, and so on. The general trajectory of the thought is that the *singular* goes from being first naively conceived as something self-sufficient and 'given' to its being some part of a complex totality of interacting forces, and, moreover, like the abstract theoretical explanatory concepts of physics, as something *posited* and primarily *conceived*, rather than *given* or *intuited*. At the end of Chapter 3 of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, on the Understanding, 'consciousness' comes to grasp that the world is as it is, not simply 'in itself', as it had assumed throughout the shapes of consciousness, but 'for it', and so consciousness becomes *self*-consciousness, grasping itself in the radical idealist fashion of Fichte, as the 'truth' of what is presented to it. But it will subsequently have to learn the converse lessons to those learnt in the 'consciousness' chapters, concerning the *given* and *objective* contexts of its own *positing*.

If *epistemological* considerations are active in suggesting an understanding of Kantian intuitions as representations of *particulars*, it would seem to be more *logically* conceived ones that are active in conceiving them as *singulars*, the clue here having to do with Kant's claim for the

[67] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 92 (3.83).

systematic nature of all knowledge – the idea that all true judgements must be conceivable as logically united within a 'transcendental unity of apperception' in virtue of which they are judgements about the *one* world.[68] Were some ineliminable judgements to gain their reference to the world *via* a demonstrative concept term, a 'this such', the *necessary indexicality* of such judgements would then seem to compromise that very unity of the world as presented in the totality of *true* judgements about it. The 'transcendental unity of apperception' is by necessity universal, and hence cannot be identified with a particular 'point of view' *within* the world that it is concerned with making *known*.

The idea of reference to bare individuals, then, would again seem to link Kant to Frege, with the logical heart of a judgement conceived as a type of atomic proposition consisting of singular term designating an object and an abstract concept applying to it. But, of course, this is just the type of thinking about cognition that Hegel opposes. The 'empty abstractions of *singularity* [*Einzelheit*] and *universality* [*Allgemeinheit*] opposed [*entgegengesetzten*] to it' are, he says in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, along with the distinction between 'essence' and 'something unessential', the components of a ' "sound common sense" which takes itself to be a solid, realistic consciousness' but which is really only the play of '*abstractions*'.[69] Again, it is not as if Hegel thinks there is no *role* for this conception of cognition. Hegel's critique is rather directed to the tendency to take it as fundamental and in no further need of explanation. Here, Hegel's typical orientation to such an abstract structure is effectively to conceive it as a problem to be solved, and to show how these opposites in the form of singularity and universality can be understood as joined, and his method will be one which seeks the 'mediations' of 'particularity', the 'singular–particular–universal' relation constituting the form of what he terms 'the syllogism'.[70] For Hegel, the notion of

[68] Thus Kant describes a concept as resting on a 'function' by which is understood 'the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one' and as hence 'grounded on the spontaneity of thinking'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A68/B93. Judgements are thence described as 'functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one'. Ibid., A69/B94.

[69] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 131 (3.105).

[70] Hegel's method in this respect will have clear parallels to Aristotle's attempts to 'find the mean' and by his use of the structure of the syllogism to convert knowledge of a 'mere fact' (*to hoti*) to a knowledge of it as a '*reasoned* fact' (*to dioti*) by displaying its deductive structure. This will be further pursued in Chapter 4.2.

'syllogism' is not restricted to those *subjective* processes of thinking conceived as, say, normative patterns of inference for theoretical inquiry. Rather, 'syllogisms' exhibit the categorical structures and processes of the world itself, and the worldly structures and processes that syllogisms exhibit or make manifest are for Hegel invariably interactive ones which are modeled on the dynamically interacting substances of Kant's own natural philosophy.

3.5 Kant, Hegel and the world as a determinable interactive whole

We have seen above one use to which Kant puts the device of term negation in his discussion of the 'transcendental ideal' or '*Prototypon transcendentale*' of a conception of the world in which all things are thoroughly determined in terms of opposed predicates. As Mary Tiles points out, it was Leibniz who supplied Kant with the model for what would be required of a realm of particulars that were totally determined in this way. For Leibniz, this realm is determined in as much as every monad in it is determined by its complete concept, the totality of monads itself being pre-established as 'harmonized' by God. Nevertheless, '[s]uch individuals are positions in a coordinated system and so although all their determinations are internal, they nonetheless form an organic whole. If we take away the complete concepts and retain merely what this says about objects, what we have is the concept of objects forming a reciprocally coordinated whole'.[71] As we have seen, Leibnizian 'complete concepts' are just what Kant *does* take away, and with him the alternative to determination by such complete concepts is achieved by the process of determinate or 'real' negation with which can be defined an 'All of reality (*omnitudo realitatis*)'. It is this 'unlimited (the All)', that then grounds 'all true negations [*alle wahre Vereinungen*]' which are 'nothing but limits [*Schranken*]'.[72]

While these passages have often been read as mere remnants of Kant's pre-critical metaphysics,[73] recent interpreters have taken their 'critical'

[71] Tiles, 'Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic', p. 113.

[72] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A575–6/B603–4.

[73] For example, Kemp Smith declares that this section contains 'the most archaic piece of rationalistic argument in the entire *Critique*. It is not merely Leibnizian, but Wolffian in character'. Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, with a new introduction by Sebastian Gardner (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 522. As noted above in footnote 55, however, Kemp Smith ignores the relevance of the distinction between 'real' and 'logical' negation to his relation to the rationalists.

status more seriously. Thus Longuenesse, for example, claims that with the notion of the *omnitudo realitatis* Kant effectively achieves a *critical* version of the rationalist notion of a '*totum realitatis*' given to the pure intellect: 'it is true that the complete determination of the objects of the senses presupposes a *totum realitatis* not only as an idea, but as something really existing. But this is quite different from the illusory concept of the *ens realissimum*. It is a sensible, conceptually indeterminate whole necessarily presupposed as the background of any empirical given'.[74] This 'critically reduced' version of the intelligible totality of the rationalists is an element of the first *Critique* that, Longuenesse contends, looks forward to the more prominent role given to the conception of the world as a purposive whole that is found later in the *Critique of Judgement*.[75]

Longuenesse is not the only recent reader of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to find in Kant's elaboration of issues inherent in the third category of relation, that of 'community' or 'reciprocity between agent and patient', a tendency that goes against the grain of transcendental idealism as traditionally understood, and that appears to point in the direction of Hegel. Thus, for example, Jeffrey Edwards finds in Kant's treatment of the 'third analogy' and the transcendental principle of community on which it is based the postulation of a 'non-subjective and material'

[74] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 308. Longuenesse further develops this reading of Kant's transcendental ideal in Béatrice Longueness, *Kant on the Human Standpoint* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 8. Henry Allison has argued that while the givenness of the *omnitudo realitatis* is a 'product of transcendental illusion', Leibniz's metaphysical error properly hangs on the *hypostatization* of the notion and 'the subsequent identification of the *ens realissimum* with a being whose existence is absolutely necessary', that is, God. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 404–5. Allison points out, however, that this does not mean that Kant's account of the *omnitudo realitatis* and the *ens realissimum* are free from problems, with one source of these resting on Kant's continued use of the scholastic idea of 'the priority (both logical and ontological) of realities or positive predicates over negative ones' (Ibid., p. 399), a distinction already contained in the categories of 'reality' and 'negation' from the 'Transcendental Analytic'. Certainly Kant's treatment of the category of 'reality' in the 'Anticipations of Perception' in terms of 'intensive magnitude' makes it look as if the appropriate 'negation' of reality would, as represented by an intensive magnitude of 0, be conceived of as a 'lack' rather than a 'deprivation'. (See footnote 46 above.) As with the other conceptual triads of the categories, however, it is clear that Kant's third, in this case 'limitation', cannot be simply understood in terms of the other two, and that the negative predicates of 'limitation' cannot be understood as privative concepts in the traditional sense. Certainly with *his* idea of determinate negation, Hegel is strongly resistant to the logical and ontological prioritizing of positive predicates over negative ones, on the significance of which, see below, Chapter 8.

[75] Longuenesse's idea of a critical reading of the *omnitudo realitatis* has been criticized by Michelle Grier (*Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 235–52) to whom Longuenesse replies in *Kant on the Human Standpoint*, ch. 8.

condition of experience that is incompatible with any 'formalist' account of the understanding and intuition 'on the basis of which Kant claims to construct his theory of our *a priori* knowledge of sensible nature'.[76]

As the work of Longuenesse, Edwards and others demonstrates, Kant's position with respect to Leibniz was complex. Despite his criticisms of Leibniz's underlying logical and metaphysical assumptions, Kant had remained close to many aspects of Leibniz's natural philosophy. At the time of his earliest pre-critical writings on natural philosophy, Kant had attempted to separate Leibniz's dynamicist cosmology, with its appeal to 'living forces', from the *non*-interactionist metaphysics of his monadology, by combining elements of Leibniz with elements of the so-called 'physical influx' natural philosophy which stressed the reality of interaction. *Contra* Leibniz, and following his teacher Knutzen, Kant held that any change in a determinate property of a substance could only be conceived as having an *extrinsic* source.[77] Individual substances interacted in such a way as to reciprocally determine each other's accidental properties – the idea captured in a principle he called the 'Principle of Succession', the principle that 'no change can happen to substances except in so far as they are connected with other substances; their reciprocal dependency on each other determines their reciprocal changes of state'.[78] But Kant's view diverged from the standard physical influx view in virtue of a further principle, the 'Principle of Co-Existence'. Whereas physical influx theorists explained the interaction between substances in terms of various forces attributed to those substances, the 'Principle of Co-Existence' declared that 'finite substances do not, in virtue of their existence alone, stand in a relationship with each other, nor are they linked together by any interaction at all,

[76] Jeffrey Edwards, *Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge: On Kant's Philosophy of Material Nature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 2. For an attempt to extract from these aspects of Kant a 'transcendental proof' of *realism* which runs counter to the main claims of transcendental idealism, see Kenneth R. Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Both Edwards and Westphal have been influenced by Burkhart Tuschling's account of the genesis of the ideas in Kant's *Opus Postumum*. See his *Metaphysische und transzendentale Dynamik in Kants opus postumum* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), and 'Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's *Opus Postumum*', in Eckart Förster (ed.), *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three 'Critiques' and the 'Opus postumum'*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

[77] Eric Watkins, *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 52–3.

[78] Kant, 'A New Elucidation of the first Principles of Metaphysical Cognition' (1755), in *Theoretical Philosophy*, 1755–1770, p. 37, (1.410).

except in so far as the common principle of their existence, namely the divine understanding, maintains them in a state of harmony in their reciprocal relations'.[79] That is, for the young rationalist Kant, because individual substances were *conceivable* in isolation from each other, the nature of their actual interaction had to be explained by something other than the substances themselves. The 'ground' of their mutual law-like interaction had to be the 'divine intellect', the 'common principle of their existence'. Specifically, it was in virtue of the existence of a *schema* of the divine understanding – a schema at once both epistemic and creative – that such lawful interacting among the individual substances allowed them to constitute a single 'world'.[80] But by the time of the critical philosophy, this single cosmos had become the world of *appearance*, not the world 'in itself', and the 'schemata' securing its unity were now grounded in the *categories* structuring appearances for the finite rational mind, *not* the mind of God.

Kant's *critical* version of the 'Principle of Co-Existence' is to be found in his treatment of the third category of relation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the relation 'Community (reciprocity between agent and patient) [*der Gemeinschaft* (*Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden*)]'. This is, of course, the category of relation that is founded on the form of the *disjunctive judgement* discussed above. In a section added to the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant notes that in the four three-membered sets of categories, the third member 'always arises from the combination of the first two in its class' but that 'one should not think that the third category is therefore a merely derivative one and not an ancestral concept of pure understanding' as 'the combination of the first and second in order to bring forth the third concept requires a special act of the understanding, which is not identical with that act performed in the first and second'.[81] The category of community, then, is to be understood as in some sense built out of the first and second categories but as not simply reducible to or resolvable into them, and while Kant's

[79] Ibid., p. 40 (1.412–13).

[80] Ibid., p. 41. (1.413). Recent interpretations of Kant's pre-critical writings have pointed to the pervasiveness of this cosmological theme of the community of interacting substances, and to its relation to the problem of the 'community' of body and mind. Besides Jeffrey Edwards's, *Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge*, see, for example, Watkins, *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*; Susan Meld Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), and Eckart Förster, *Kant's Final Synthesis*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

[81] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 110–11.

category of community or 'reciprocal interaction' has been largely ignored within the recent English-language secondary literature, Kant's earliest followers took it to be central to his thought. Fichte, for example, described the first two categories of relation, substantiality and causality, as 'coordinated with each other' but as 'subordinate to the category of reciprocal interaction'.[82] By the idea that the first two categories, those associated with the ancient Aristotelian and modern Humean forms of explanation, are 'subordinate' to the third, Fichte presumably meant something like that they are to be *ultimately understood* within the context of the third.[83]

The notion of a total community of nomologically interacting substances or forces had not only been central to Kant's pre-critical attempts at natural philosophy. Human *moral* behaviour too, Kant seemed to think, could be grasped as somehow continuous with the law-governed interaction of material substances, as in both it was a matter of these substances (spiritual on the one hand, material on the other) acting according to the divine law. By the mid-1760s, however, Kant had come to think that this attempt to account for human moral behaviour in the same way as accounting for natural processes as radically misconceived because of its conflating descriptive (natural) and prescriptive (moral) laws.[84] Thus, by the time of his critical philosophy, the original idea of community is now to be found in separate natural and normative forms, appearing as the third category of relation in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* respectively.

In the first *Critique* it is clear from the discussion of the third analogy of experience that the accidental properties relevant to the critical version of the interactionist model have been pared down to physical determinations of spatio–temporal location. In short, the category of community is that *a priori* concept of the understanding that ultimately corresponds to Kant's transcendental individuating principle for objects of possible experience – their occupancy of a determinate position in space and time. A possible object of experience is one which must be able to be given in an empirical intuition – we might say, as a referent of '*this* thing' occupying some 'here' and individuated against some other '*that* thing'

[82] Fichte, *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy*, p. 421.

[83] In Hegel's terminology, the earlier categories would be said to be '*aufgehoben*' – sublated or integrated – within the third.

[84] A point that is made beautifully by Susan Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

locatable 'there'. The category of community and its associated disjunctive form of judgement will therefore form essential parts of the cognitive apparatus that makes the individuation of any body regardable as conceptually determinate and that specifies the *grounds* for that body's occupying the particular spatio–temporal location that it does.

In the 'Third analogy' of experience, the 'principle of simultaneity according to the law of reciprocity or community',[85] Kant attempts to cash out this supposed link between the logical form of the disjunctive judgement and the question of the conditions under which we experience two objects as existing simultaneously. It must be remembered that Kant rules out any simple answer to the experience of simultaneously existing objects in terms of some simple direct experience of two space-occupying objects in one's visual field. Recall that the 'objects' being experienced here are already conceptually determined in terms of the first two categories of relation: they are structured *particulars* understood in terms of the structure of essence and accident (first category of relation), and they are conceived as entering into rule-governed patterns of causal relation (second category of relation).

Kant presents the experience of simultaneously existing objects as itself unfolding in time with their being experienced *sequentially*, as when I look first at the moon and then down at the earth, or look first at the earth, and then up at the moon.[86] In the second analogy, he had employed a contrast between two different types of subjective orderings of temporal experience: when I experience the parts of a house in a particular sequence – say, starting with the roof, and then looking at the walls – I attribute no necessity to the particular order of my experiences.[87] I could as easily have started with the walls and then taken in the roof. In contrast, in my experience of the movement of a ship moving downstream, '[m]y perception of its position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream'.[88] In this case the temporal order is 'in accordance with a rule', and this necessity underpins the

[85] This is what it is named in the second edition. In the first, it is simply called the 'Principle of community'.

[86] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A211/B257.

[87] 'In the series of these perceptions there was therefore no determinate order that made it necessary when I had to begin in the apprehension in order to combine the manifold empirically'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A192–3/B238.

[88] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A192/B237.

objectivity of the particular sequence. This idea of an objective or irreversible temporal ordering was what was secured by the category of cause and effect, its associated hypothetical judgement being somehow mapped onto these spatio–temporal objects given in experience. Thus, the example of the ship shows how *events* conceived as changes in the 'accidental properties', such as the actual spatio–temporal location of the ship, are experienced as rule-governed or law-like. In the third analogy Kant effectively returns to the type of experience appealed to in the second analogy to contrast with that of objective temporal succession – the experience of simultaneously existing things exemplified in the experience of the parts of the house. There, such an experience had been simply taken for granted, but now Kant asks after the conditions of such experience of simultaneously existing objects.

As we have seen, the third category of relation is to be understood as somehow presupposing the first and second categories, so we are to think of simultaneously existing objects as substances with accidental properties *and* as participants within causally linked events. To take the parts of the house example, then, we would thus be meant to think of these elements as related in ways other than their being *merely* spatially juxtaposed. For example, rather than thinking of the parts from the point of view of a person doing a sketch of the house, we are presumably to think of them as related to each other in the way, say, an engineer would think of them – that is, as related *dynamically* in terms of the system of forces operative among them. Thus we are not to think of the roof as simply 'above' the walls, but are to conceive of its position as determined by various forces such as gravity, those responsible for the tensile properties of the material of the walls, and so on. Following the Fichtean approach, then, which stressed the *primacy* of the category of community within the three categories of relation, we would see the world not simply as an ensemble of objects with perceivable qualities, that is, in a limited 'Aristotelian' way, but as a *unified* system of posited interacting forces explaining the 'given' appearances. This is, in fact, just the view of the world at which 'the Understanding' arrives in the course of Chapter 3 of the *Phenomenology*. In Hegel's thought, the transition between 'Perception' and 'the Understanding' is akin to the transition in Kant's system from a form of thought that is limited to the first category of relation (substance-accident) to one with the resources of the third in which the first category along with the second is subsumed: the category of interactive 'community'.

In Hegel's account in the *Phenomenology*, the system of 'Perception' so conceived had to break down, and when it did it was, predictably,

replaced by substances which enter into a determining system of interaction. Such substances are *forces* which are made determinate by the fact that they enter into dynamic oppositions with each other – the intended picture here being the more modern view of the world not considered as a domain of propertied substances but as a law-governed dynamic system of mutually interacting forces of attraction and repulsion as is grasped by 'the Understanding'. In his natural philosophy Kant had taken these moving forces to be extensionless points,[89] thus the explanatory *posits* of the Understanding become the ultimate successors to apparently given singular *heres* and *nows* of Sense-certainty. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel explores this essentially *relational* approach to substances in the final parts of the *Essence-logic*.

In both his *Phenomenology* and *Logic* then, Hegel systematically utilizes conceptions that can be traced back to Kant's anti-Leibnizian idea of 'real' oppositions as opposed to conceptual negations – the idea that had come to be incorporated into the first *Critique* in the form of the contribution of the third category of relation to the cognitive conditions under which we are capable of having determinate thought about, and experience of, the world. This world, of course, Kant had *at least seemed* to oppose as 'appearance' to a world 'in itself', but such a distinction between two separate noumenal and phenomenal *worlds* was what Hegel, along with other post-Kantians, had refused to accept. And we have now seen the type of strategy that would be central to this rejection – a strategy that is just a *further* application of principle of determinate negation. To call the world of 'the Understanding' *appearance*, is just to assume another version of the contrast with some underlying indeterminate substrate or essence that had wrecked the initial version of the Aristotelian *perceivable* object. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, while the object of the Understanding marks the most developed form of an object for consciousness, it also marks the transition from consciousness to *self*-consciousness, and the assumption of a modern subjective Kantian orientation, in which consciousness grasps *itself* as, in its active positings, responsible for the constitution of those objects that it had *earlier* accepted as simply 'given'. Parallel to this, in the *Science of Logic*, it marks the transition from *objective* to *subjective* logic, the 'logic of concept', in which the object of concern is not the quasi-Aristotelian categorical make up of the world, but the unlimited

[89] Kant returned to these issues that had occupied his pre-critical years in *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, and again in his late writings forming the *Opus Postumum*.

activities of thinking itself – something like the activities of Aristotle's divine '*noesis noeseos noesis*', thought thinking itself.[90]

In the three chapters making up the first of the three sections of Book III of the *Logic*, one finds a treatment of those topics that one would most expect to find in a 'logic' textbook of his time: an investigation into the nature of concepts, judgements and inferences. Here the paradigm had been set in the early modern period by influential works like the heavily Cartesian *Port-Royal Logic* of Arnault and Nicole with its systematic treatment of *ideas*, *judgement* and *reasoning*, such that the elements of each section provided the materials from which the elements of each subsequent section were constructed.[91] But Hegel's account runs counter to the atomistic early modern approach by making each subsequent topic the context within which the proper function of the previous one can be understood. That is, like Kant (and later, Frege) Hegel makes the *judgement* the context within which concepts gain their significance, and then like Brandom, makes *inference* the context within which *judgements* gain their significance: in Hegel's dictum, the syllogism is the 'truth' of the judgement, rather than something that *consists of* judgements.[92] This is that part of Hegel's work that best stands as evidence for the thesis argued by Robert Brandom that at the heart of Hegel's philosophy stands an *inferentialist* account of semantic content, the account that extends in Wittgensteinian fashion the 'context principle' from judgement to inference. In the following chapter we will examine the resources of Hegel's own inferentialism to be found within Kant's transcendental logic.

[90] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, in Hugh Tredennick (trans.), *Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle XVIII*, bk. 12, ch. 9. I take up the issue of Hegel's appropriation of this already puzzling doctrine below in Chapter 8.

[91] Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, ed. Jill Vance Buroker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), commonly known as the *Port-Royal Logic* first published in 1662. Significantly, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* reproduces the structure of Arnault and Nicole's *Logic*, with the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' corresponding to the treatment of 'ideas', the 'Transcendental Analytic' to that of 'judgement' and the 'Transcendental Dialectic' to that of 'reasoning' Kant also reproduces Arnault and Nicole's fourth part, 'On Method' in his 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method'.

[92] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 669 (6.359).

4

THE KANTIAN ROUTE TO HEGEL'S INFERENTIALISM

Kant's legacy within analytic-styled *theoretical* philosophy tends to be centred on those parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that are dealt with in the 'Transcendental Analytic'. From this point of view, the lessons of the even longer 'Transcendental Dialectic' can be summed up in its generally *anti-metaphysical* purport: one cannot discover truths about the world from pure thought alone – or at least, pure thought when it is restricted to reasoning schematized by syllogistic logic. Viewed from this perspective, Hegel looks to be a regression, as he seems to want to re-instate some sort of metaphysics just on such syllogistic logical grounds. While Kant had warned in the 'Paralogisms' and 'Antinomies' that pure reason conceived *theoretically* ('metaphysics') would be wrecked on the reef of contradiction, Hegel seems to have taken this entanglement in contradiction as revealing something about reality itself – *its contradictoriness* – and this alone has commonly been taken as sufficient warrant to exclude *his* response to Kant from serious consideration.[1] But as we have seen, working from Sellars's critique of any idea of an intuitable logical 'given', Brandom claims to have resurrected the rational 'inferentialist' core of Hegel's very appeal to 'Reason' over 'the Understanding'. While Hegel's controversial approach to contradiction will be examined in later chapters, in this chapter I trace the complicated

[1] This aspect of Hegel is taken up in Chapters 7 and 8.

relations between Kant and Hegel on the status of inferential reason. In this regard, as we will see, Kant's own 'Transcendental Dialectic' cannot be reduced simply to the extended '*reductio*' of metaphysics that it is commonly taken to be.

4.1 The *syllogistic* deep structure of Kantian judgements

In her examination of Kant's account of the logical structure of judgement, Béatrice Longuenesse has pointed to the relations among Kant's various definitions of judgement. Sometimes Kant stresses the role of 'concept subordination', such as in the first chapter of 'Book 1' of the 'Transcendental Analytic' where he says that '[i]n every judgement there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object'.[2] This is the passage referred to earlier when stressing the 'modern' extensional look of Kant's conception of judgement: we should think of a judgement as involving the subordination of one concept (the subject concept) to another of greater universality (the predicate concept) such that those *objects* subsumed under the first (those that are presented as the contents of empirical intuitions to which the subject concept is applied) are thereby subsumed under the second.[3] Longuenesse comments: 'When we subordinate a concept to one that is more general, we attribute the marks pertaining to the concept of greater generality to all the objects contained under the first concept. But thereby every judgement, as concept subordination, is the potential major premise of a syllogism attributing the genus to the species and thereby the genus to all individuals in the sphere of the species'. She glosses this in a footnote with a comment that has crucial significance for our question of the relation of Hegel's *inferentialism* to Kant's transcendental logic. This idea, she has it, implies that 'the activity of reason, namely inference, is involved in the very form of the "capacity to judge" (*Vermögen zu Urteilen*). Every judgement carries within it a potential syllogism'.[4] This, then, suggests a Kantian source for Hegel's

[2] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A68/B93. Similarly, in the *Jäsche Logic* he describes a judgement as 'the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept'. Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 597, (9.101).

[3] See above, Chapter 3, footnote 23.

[4] Longuenesse, *Kant and The Capacity to Judge*, p. 90 and 90 n. 20. C.f., Reinhard Brandt: 'Judgement is investigated exclusively as an epistemic judgement ... and as a premise in a categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive inference. Just as concepts were characterized as predicates of possible judgements, so judgement is characterized as the major premise (and

inferentialism, the idea of every judgement 'carrying within it' a potential syllogism giving a Kantian provenance to Hegel's construal of the syllogism as the 'truth' of the judgement.

For Brandom, Hegel *completes* the 'inversion' of the representationalist into the inferentialist paradigm started by Kant, but it is not clear that this is the right way to view Hegel and his relation to Kant on this matter. After all, if one poses the question 'representationalist or inferentialist?' to Hegel's account of cognition, from what we have seen (in Chapter 3) it could be answered 'both!' The cognitive orientation of *Perception* adopts a classically Aristotelian 'object-centred' approach to judgement. On its basis, judgements initially appear to be as independent of *each other* as they are of the objects that they are about. Of course, this initial assumption collapses and perceptual judgements show themselves to be dependent on each other and ultimately dependent upon *the Understanding*, which contextualizes objects within patterns of interaction. And just as from the viewpoint of the Understanding, objects must be understood as being determinate in virtue of the interactive contexts within which they find themselves, the judgements *about* those objects will, presumably, be also understood as having a determinate content in virtue of *their* logical 'interactions' with *other* judgements about the objects with which the first *interact*. But the difference between objects as grasped by Perception on the one hand, and the Understanding on the other, testifies to the way that Hegel draws on different logical resources, those of term logic and something more like propositional logic respectively. All this, I will later suggest (in Chapter 7), is crucial for grasping the nature of Hegel's inferentialism and, in particular, his distinctive account of the role of *contradiction* in reason, which will pose problems for attempts to render Hegel's thought in the language of post-Sellarsian analytic philosophy. For the moment, however, we must first, following Longuenesse, probe more deeply into the ways that the activities of judging and reasoning are linked in Kant in ways which prepare the ground for Hegel.

Longuenesse links the approach to judgement focusing on 'concept subordination' to a further way in which Kant defines judgement in which the focus is on 'the relation of the discursive combination of concepts to *truth*, by defining judgement as assertion *under a condition*'.[5] In the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* Kant writes that judgements

thus also as the minor premise or the conclusion) of a possible inference'. Brandt, *The Table of Judgements*, p. 65.

[5] Longuenesse, *Kant and The Capacity to Judge*, p. 81.

'insofar as they are regarded merely as the condition for the unification of given representations in a consciousness, are rules', and in the *Jäsche Logic* defines 'rule' as 'an assertion under a universal condition'.[6] Longuenesse points out that Kant's term 'condition' is taken from the Leibnizian philosopher Christian Wolff and followers of Wolff such as Meier: a condition 'is related to [Wolff's] explanation of what makes a judgement true' and for a particular judgement will be equated with those 'marks' (conceptual parts) sufficient for grasping the judgement's truth or falsity.[7] These marks may be contained within the subject concept (in the way that the mark 'unmarried' is contained in the concept 'bachelor') or they may be 'added conditions', that is, marks of inessential attributes (for example, the mark 'bald' when added to the concept 'bachelor' in a judgement 'this bachelor is bald'). For these rationalists, of course, such 'conditions' were entirely *conceptual*, whereas for Kant, 'in most cases concepts function as conditions only insofar as they subsume (a priori or empirical) sensible intuitions, which are thus ultimately the true conditions of judgements'.[8]

In turn, the notion of the 'condition' of a judgement appears in Kant's distinction between the three judgement forms, as these forms are distinguished on the basis of the connection between 'an assertion and its condition', but, as Longuenesse points out, what is meant by this only becomes clear in Kant's treatment of *syllogisms*. What distinguishes the three judgement types is bound up with the type of *inferential* relation between one judgement and *another* to which appeal is made in considering the *grounds* of the former. Thus in considering the possible grounds for the categorical judgement 'Caius is mortal', Kant notes that while it could be derived 'from experience by means of the understanding alone', it could *also* be grounded inferentially by finding the relevant concept '(in this case, the concept 'man') that contains the condition under which the predicate (general term for what is asserted) of this judgement is given'. That is, by establishing that Caius *is a man*, the fact that 'mortal' is an essential mark of 'man', allows the cognition of the object (Caius) to be made determinate by the application of the predicate 'mortal'. Thus Kant says, 'after I have subsumed under this

[6] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science, revised edition*, trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 57 (4.305) and *Lectures on Logic*, p. 615 (9.121), quoted in Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 93.

[7] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 95.

[8] Ibid., p. 97.

condition taken in its whole extension ("All men are mortal"), I proceed, in accordance therewith, to determine the cognition of my object ("Caius is mortal")'.[9]

This example involving *Caius* must remind us, however, that singular judgements have no *proper* place within the traditional syllogism, *nor* in Kant's account of *judgement*. *Qua* representational forms, singularity is the characteristic of *intuitions* not concepts. Judgements, however, require subject concepts, and since there are no singular *concepts* to play the role of subject of predication in the overt structure of a judgement, there are (the not-genuinely-cognitive aesthetic judgements aside) no singular judgements.

Kant's position here certainly is confusing. Clearly *some* account needs to be given to judgements of the type 'Caius is mortal'. Formally, as Kant notes in the first *Critique*, singular terms *can* be treated as universals – this being the traditional scholastic solution to the problem of singular judgements which has found a recent champion in Quine. But while this would seem appropriate for general (i.e., formal) logic, it would seem *inappropriate* for the purposes of *transcendental* logic, which is at issue here. Individuals such as Socrates and Caius are, after all, possible objects of experience, and it is *as* possible objects of experience that we can come to know something about them *from* experience, come to know of their mortality, for example. But while Socrates and Caius are experienceable, universals, such as 'man' or 'Greek', are themselves not proper objects of experience. So, while 'Caius' could be treated as a universal for the purposes of deriving as a result 'Caius is mortal' from the pair of premises 'All men are mortal' and 'Caius is a man', it would seem illegitimate to so treat it in the context of a judgement that 'could be derived from experience by means of the understanding alone'.

The difficulty then is one of understanding how to think of the logical structure of 'Caius is mortal' considered *as* an empirical judgement, and I suggest that we have a potential answer by treating 'Caius' as functioning here as a *particular* term, not a strictly *singular* one. After all, in both Aristotle's and Kant's use of these proper names it seems as if we are already meant to know that it is *human beings* that are being referred to. In fact, Kant himself introduces the idea of a certain *gap* between the *formal* properties of representation and their possible uses when in the *Jäsche Logic* he denies that *concepts themselves* can be divided into

[9] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A322/B378. I have followed Longuenesse's own modification of the Kemp Smith translation in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 94.

'*universal*, *particular*, and *singular*', but notes that their '*use* (*Gebrauch*)' can be so divided.[10] We might, then, think of 'Caius' being used in some contexts *as* a universal and in others *as* a singular or a particular. Here, I suggest, we might then think of it as being used *as* a particular, for example, as short for 'this man Caius'.[11] But why then would it be necessary, as Kant seems to suggest, to *search* for the minor premise 'Caius is a man' if Caius' manhood is already assumed in the empirical judgement?

One possible answer, I suggest, has to do with the peculiar role that this particular property of Caius plays in the explanation of his mortality. After all, besides his being a man, many other things might be said of Caius, and many of these predicates would be irrelevant to explaining his mortality. For example, all of those properties that he shares with merely physical inanimate things, such as having a certain length or a certain weight, would be *per se* irrelevant. *Qua* human, Caius is essentially mortal, but *qua* physical object, he is not. Aristotle, as we shall see below, sometimes appeals to the use of syllogisms in just this way, such as when one employs them to move from a 'mere fact' to a 'reasoned fact'. Moreover, as we shall see in later chapters, this form of explanation is just the type of explanation that McDowell appeals to in his attempt to account for *practical* knowledge. But the relevance of the use of the kind term 'man' in picking out Caius here is also related to the point we have seen made by Evans, Wiggins and McDowell concerning the role of sortals in individuating objects. Here we want to know which of Caius's many properties are relevant for individuating him in the light of a certain kind of consideration bearing on his mortality. What is at issue here is the identity of the relevant community to which we are to assign him when picking him out *as* mortal.

These issues, I suggest, will be crucial for making sense of the role that Kant gives to inference in the context of transcendental logic, as from a transcendental point of view, inferences will be made precisely *about* the sorts of objects capable of being experienced. But transcendental logic must stand in a certain relation to general or formal logic, and as we will see in the following section, Kant distinguishes transcendental from formal readings of syllogisms in terms of the *direction* of the inference involved. In the example of Caius, movement from the observed fact of

[10] Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 589 (9.91).

[11] After all, there are certain kinds that Caius *couldn't* belong to for him to be mortal. 'Caius' couldn't name a number or a day of the week, for example.

Caius's mortality to the universal judgement made about *man as such* is the direction of explanation. In contrast, movement 'down' the syllogism from major premise to conclusion is the direction of *justification*. Were I trying to convince a doubter of the claim that Caius was in fact mortal, I could appeal to his being human as its *grounds*.

On Longuenesse's reading, this type of explanatory function seen in the categorical syllogism is distinctive, and the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms will be relevant to *different* types of explanation. For example, to use Sellars's example, in an explanation of why it is going to rain, I will appeal to a *causal* condition of rain by appealing to the clouds overhead, and for this purpose use the hypothetical syllogism and its relation of antecedent to consequent. And as with the categorical syllogism, here the form of explanation will function also as a form of *justification*. Were I to try to convince a doubter of my claim that it was about to rain, I could appeal to the presence of rain clouds overhead, and to the appropriate meteorological law.

On Longuenesse's reading of Kant, then, the *logical* form of judgements cannot be simply read off their different *grammatical* forms. Rather, the most basic distinctions will be among *types of explanation* – Longuenesse's 'inferential functions' – and the distinctions between the three judgement types will be derived from the type of judgement appearing as the major premise in each syllogism type corresponding to these functions. With this we then can see why Longuenesse wants to say that every judgement as either categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive, can be considered as 'the potential major premise of a syllogism'. If judgement forms are differentiated in terms of the way they function in forms of explanation involving inferences, then the classification of those inferential forms will have explanatory priority. But why use the other formulation, that every judgement 'carries *within* it' [my emphasis] a potential syllogism?[12] This, I suggest, is not mere looseness of expression. The very example of a 'syllogism' we have examined above shows why.

In the *explanation* of Caius's mortality, one wants to find which of the properties that Caius possesses are relevant, hence one wants to find the particular term, the 'this such' term, that could replace 'Caius' in the judgement 'Caius is mortal'. Here the relevant description is 'this *man*'. But 'Caius' can also function as a *singular term* for the purposes of formal

[12] Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 90 and p. 90 n. 20. Elsewhere Longuenesse says that the 'syllogism . . . is not a function of thought distinct from that of judging. On the contrary, this function is in some sense 'encased' in every judgement'. Ibid., p. 95.

demonstration, and the sentence 'this *man* is mortal' could be thought of as a judgement in which 'this man' subsumes Caius, *qua* object of a singular intuition, with the subordination of the particular term 'this man' to the universal 'mortal' being read as implying the subsumption of *Caius* under 'mortal'. That is, the original judgement can now be read as *containing* a syllogism which is made explicit in the explanation. All this, I suggest, means that Kant gives a much more *positive* role to reason than is traditionally acknowledged.

4.2 The positive role of inferential reason in Kant's critical philosophy

In the 'Introduction' to the 'Transcendental Dialectic' in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant distinguishes between two types of inference: immediate inference in which 'the inferred judgement already lies in the first one' and inferences in which a further judgement is needed to effect the conclusion. Kant gives as an example of the former type, which he calls 'inferences of the understanding' (*Verstandesschlusse*), the inference from 'All humans are mortal' to 'Some humans are mortal',[13] and as an example of the latter, 'inferences of reason' (*Vernunftschlusse*), the syllogistic inference from 'All humans are mortal' to 'All scholars are mortal', *via* the mediation of a second judgement, 'All scholars are human'. But as it turns out, understood in the usual way, that is, as formally valid deductive inference, this first figure syllogism is, according to Kant, really an inference *of the understanding*. It is only when it is regarded as an *ascending* informal inferential process – that is, one in which the inference is in the direction of greater generality – that it is a true inference of *reason*.

The idea of syllogisms linked into ascending chains that Kant, following Aristotle,[14] calls *prosyllogisms* plays a crucial role in his attempt in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' to diagnose the constitutive error of 'pure reason' itself – the error that leads the thinker, under the influence of the 'ideas' of pure reason, to try to extend his or her fragmentary knowledge of the world of appearance to encompass the entirety of existence *in itself* – and it is in this spirit that Kant refers to the transcendental dialectic as a 'logic of illusion'.[15] As Kant devotes the bulk of this long second division of the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements' to the criticism of this illusion in its various forms – this criticism is, after

[13] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 303/B360.
[14] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, bk. I, ch xxv, 42b5.
[15] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A61/B85-6; A293/B349.

all, the 'critique of pure reason' itself – it can sometimes seem that for Kant this in fact *exhausts* the theoretical relevance of these prosyllogisms. However, Kant also assigns to inferential reason a positive 'real' or 'transcendental' (what we might think of as an *epistemological*) function: 'As in the case of the understanding, there is in the case of reason a merely formal, i.e., logical use, where reason abstracts from all content of cognition, but there is also a real use, since reason itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles, which it derives neither from the senses nor from the understanding'.[16] Of course, the 'Ideas' of reason come into their own in the realm of *practical* reason, but even in the case of theoretical reason, 'even if no object can be determined through them' and their use is therefore not 'constitutive', they still have a 'regulative' function and 'serve the understanding as a canon for its extended and self-consistent use'.[17] As recent attention to the 'Transcendental Dialectic' by those interested in Kant's philosophy of science has shown, it is easy to underestimate the significance 'reason' has for Kant even under this restriction to merely regulative status.[18] Furthermore, when we add to this positive treatment of reason in its theoretical function the further development this topic receives in the later *Critique of Judgment*, Kant's attitude to these issues is revealed as more complex than it initially seems.

In the 'Transcendental Dialectic', the 'real' and 'logical' roles Kant assigns to inferential reasoning is modeled on the dual roles played by judgement within the transcendental analytic. Thus in relation to the systematic unification of judgements into a scientifically comprehended 'order of nature',[19] Kant appeals to the variety of forms of possible *inference* parallel to the way he appeals to the variety of forms of possible

[16] Ibid., A299/B355.

[17] Ibid., A329/B385.

[18] Kant's discussion of the explanatory uses of reason here, especially when taken together with comments made in the 'First Introduction' to the *Critique of Judgement*, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 20.2, 211, has attracted considerable attention to the 'transcendental dialectic' by those interested in Kant's philosophy of science. See, for example, Gerd Buchdahl, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969); Robert E. Butts, 'The Methodological Structure of Kant's Metaphysics of Science', in *Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 1786–1986*, ed. Robert E. Butts (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), pp. 163–99; Susan Neiman, *The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[19] Buchdahl stresses the Dialectic's concern with the systematically unified 'order of nature' in contrast to the Analytic's concern with 'mere' nature. Buchdahl, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science*, p. 503.

judgement in the deduction of the categories in the 'Transcendental Analytic', where experiential unification concerns the relatively momentary and contained experience of single or multiple objects or immediately connected events.[20] For any empirical judgement, reason, Kant tells us, will seek the 'universal condition' of that judgement considered as *conclusion*.[21] That is, using the available forms of inference, reason will look for some combination of major and minor premises from which the given judgement can be deduced. But in all such cases, the major premise or 'rule' of such an inference can be subject to the same demand, such that the condition is sought for *its condition*, generating an ascending prosyllogistic chain.

In Book 1 of the 'Transcendental Dialectic', Kant contrasts the prosyllogism *qua ascending* inferential chain with an *episyllogism* which proceeds in a *descending* or logically progressive direction.[22] Episyllogisms, which are effectively *formally* valid deductive chains, have 'very extensive logical use' and in them reason employs 'the laws of the understanding', but, Kant adds, they have no *transcendental* use. The ascending *prosyllogisms* however do have a transcendental, albeit a *subjectively* transcendental, status, matching their *regulative* rather than *constitutive* nature.[23] The significance of this directional difference is a result of an asymmetry in the conditioning–conditioned distinction. For the content of any judgement we can always ask about further cognitive contents that condition that content, or that are conditioned by it. For example, consider the universal categorical judgement that all humans are mortal. On the one hand, the mortality of all *animals* can be considered as a *condition* of mortality of humans, and the mortality of *scholars* as *conditioned by* the mortality of humans. Each relation of condition to conditioned can be represented as a categorical syllogism, with the common judgement 'all humans are mortal' linking them into a short syllogistic chain that we might represent as:

Animals are mortal. Humans are animals.
∴ Humans are mortal.

Humans are mortal. Scholars are human
∴ Scholars are mortal.

[20] It is a 'demand of reason' that the judgements of the understanding be unified – or as Kant says, that the understanding be 'brought into thorough-going connection with itself'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A305/B362.

[21] Ibid., A307/B364.

[22] Ibid., A331/B388.

[23] Ibid., A336-7/B393-4.

Clearly this chain could be extended in both directions. For example, extending it upward we might go to the more general condition of the mortality of all living things, while we might extend it downwards to the mortality of all scholars of history. When we consider extending the chain further in each direction, Kant claims, we will be led to the thought of a terminating highest member, and so to a totality of *conditions*, but not to a terminating *lowest* member, and so, neither to a totality of *conditioneds*.

The idea here is that when followed in an ascending direction the judgement contents will be grasped as parts of a systematically articulated *whole* that assigns the *prosyllogism* to the workings of the faculty of reason rather than the understanding. The whole, that absolute unity of reason, cannot of course be known as such – it is not a possible object of experience – and the concept of it is not a pure concept of the understanding but of reason: it is a transcendental *idea*. But the metaphysical impulse to speculate on this totality grows out of reason's *proper* demand to unify the results of the understanding. *Qua* regulative idea, the idea of absolute totality regulates cognitive moves which utilize the prosyllogistic structure to bring about some achievable unity within the understanding – a unity the achievement of which the unaided understanding itself would not be capable. With the idea of such unifying moves clearly Kant has in mind some cognitive process moving from more specific to more general cognitions, something like induction, but the situation is more complex given Kant's differentiation of the three prosyllogistic types.[24] In a categorical prosyllogism the inference is to a condition of *inherence*, in a hypothetical prosyllogism it is to the condition of *dependence*, and in the disjunctive prosyllogism, the condition of *concurrence*.[25]

Each of these three prosyllogisms are meant to play a regulative role in the way cognition seeks a unity among the empirical judgements formed in experience. Kant, of course, having abandoned the type of epistemological conception with which the categorical syllogism was originally meant to function – the intuitive grasp of conceptually defined 'essences' – had no use of an 'apodictic' type of reason in which 'the universal is **in itself certain** and given, and only *judgement* is required for

[24] 'Now every series whose exponent (whether that of the categorical or the hypothetical judgement) is given may be continued: hence the very same action of reason leads to a *ratiocinatio prosyllogistica*, which is a series of inferences, that can be continued to an indeterminate extent either on the side of the conditions (*per prosyllogismos*) or on the side of the conditioned (*per episyllogismos*)'. Ibid., A331/B387–8.

[25] Ibid., A336/B393.

subsuming, and the particular is necessarily determined through it'.[26] Rather, universal kinds are to be reached by reasoning from below – i.e., from experience – and are to be held 'problematically' from whence they would be able to be tested.[27] It seems clear that by the first of these ascending non-formal inferences, inference to the condition of *inherence*, Kant intends something like induction. Using his first example of the categorical syllogism, *all men are mortal; all scholars are men; therefore all scholars are mortal*, we are presumably meant to infer to the major premiss *all men are mortal* from the combination of conclusion *all scholars are mortal* and the minor premise, *all scholars are men*. Here inference is to the 'condition of inherence' because the major premise, as stating the condition of the inherence of the attribute of mortality in men, is what possibly *explains* the mortality of scholars. But from *all scholars are men* and *all scholars are mortal* one can infer *some men are mortal*, this being a syllogism in the third figure, and inferring from *some men are mortal* to *all men are mortal* is just what is usually regarded as induction.

Kant doesn't give an example of seeking the 'condition of dependence', but it would seem to involve something like the modern concept of 'inference to the best explanation' as the hypothetical judgement which forms the major premise of the hypothetical syllogism is the judgement form which supplies the logical framework relevant to the experience of causality. Such an approach broadly fits with what Kant says elsewhere about hypothetical reasoning. For example, in the *Blomberg Logic* he notes 'A hypothesis is an opinion concerning the truth of a ground based on its sufficiency for the consequence . . . if . . . I cognize the ground from the sufficiency of the consequences for the ground, then this is . . . an opinion . . . *a posteriori*, and thus a hypothesis. A hypothesis is, as it were, a presupposition. Thus a doctor makes hypotheses when he cures the sick[;] he has to subsume everything under hypotheses, and see whether the consequences that he now has before

[26] Ibid., A646/B674.

[27] Kant's comments here suggest something like what is now called the 'hypothetico-deductive method'. But here it is not the *hypothetical syllogism* that is being considered, but a categorical syllogism. All these forms of reasoning are 'hypothetical' in the sense of being non-formal inferences to 'problematically' held – uncertain – conclusions. Leibniz effectively describes the hypothetico-deductive method in *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 450, and Christian Wolff had argued that the idea of the Copernican universe was a product of such hypothetico-deductive reasoning. C. Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General*, trans. R. J. Blackwell (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).

his eyes follow therefrom'.[28] While here, Kant treats an hypothesis as a form of *opinion* (*Meinen*), in the first *Critique*, essentially the same example is given in discussion of a form of what here there calls 'pragmatic belief'.[29] While both 'opinion' (*Meinen*) and 'belief' (*Glauben*) are forms of uncertain 'holding-to-be-true' (*Fürwahrhalten*), the latter notion is used to cover cases where subjective certainty is sufficient to warrant action.[30] It is thus the link between diagnosis and treatment that confers the status of belief on the hypothesis in the latter example. Qua *opinion*, however, such a case of holding-to-be-true might be thought to lead to testing by another type of action – experiment rather than therapy – in which one would look for further consequences of the truth of the hypothesis or opinion. Again, this would be a form of reasoning that was part of a generally hypothetico-deductive method.

Kant associates inference to the condition of dependence with the hypothetical syllogism, but as has been pointed out by Young and others,[31] his appeal to this form of inference sits poorly with his apparent commitment to classically syllogistic inferences and categorical judgement forms. Here I suggest a different way of schematizing this

[28] Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 174 (24.220).

[29] 'The doctor must do something for a sick person who is in danger, but he does not know [or recognize, 'kennt'] the illness. He looks to the symptoms, and judges, because he does not know of anything better, that it is consumption. His belief is merely contingent even in his own judgement; someone else might perhaps do better. I call such contingent beliefs, which however ground the actual use of the means to certain actions, **pragmatic beliefs**'. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A824/B 852.

In the 'Transcendental Analytic' Kant effectively uses the same example in referring to the application of empirical concepts. General logic, he says, 'contains no precepts at all for the power of judgement' and there can be no rules for the application of empirical concepts in judgement. 'A physician therefore, a judge, or a statesman, can have many fine pathological, juridical, or political rules in his head, of which he can even by a thorough teacher, and yet can easily stumble in their application, either because he is lacking in the natural power of judgement (though not in understanding), and to be sure understands the universal *in abstracto* but cannot distinguish whether a case *in concreto* belongs under it, or also because he has not received adequate training for this judgement through examples and actual business'. Ibid., A132–4/B171–3. This task of application of concepts to the contents of empirical intuitions is subsequently discussed in the following section in terms of the *schematism*. It would seem that there may be no hard and fast distinction between the application of an empirical concept in a judgement and the appeal to hypothesis.

[30] Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 571–4 (9.66–70). Cf., *Critique of Pure Reason*, A823–4/B851–2.

[31] Young, 'Translator's introduction', p. xv. Norman Kemp Smith regarded the role of the syllogisms in the metaphysical deduction of the ideas as 'wholly artificial' (Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, p. 450). For Smith, 'the threefold specification of the concept of the unconditioned is really obtained directly from the categories of relation, or at least from the judgements of relation, and not from the corresponding species of syllogism'. Ibid., p. 451.

inference that both coheres with his commitment to the syllogism and parallels what he says in the 'Preamble' to the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* concerning the distinction between the 'analytic' and 'synthetic' methods in philosophy. There he points out that the following 'prolegomena' as 'preparatory exercises . . . ought more to indicate what needs to be done in order to bring a science into existence if possible, than to present the science itself. . . . They must therefore rely on something already known to be dependable, from which we can go forward with confidence and ascend to the sources [*zu den Quellen aufsteigen*], which are not yet known, and whose discovery not only will explain what is known already, but will also exhibit [*darstellen*] an area with many cognitions that all arise from these same sources'.[32] This distinction between the ascending inferences of 'analysis' and the formally valid descending ones of 'synthesis' appears to come ultimately from Aristotle's distinction, in Book 1, Chapter 13 of the *Posterior Analytics*, between inference to 'the fact' (*to hoti*) and inference to 'the reason' (*to dioti*) as transmitted to German philosophy *via* the logic of the Renaissance Paduan, Jacobo Zabarella, whom Riccardo Pozzo has described as the 'missing link between Aristotle and Kant'.[33]

[32] Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, pp. 25–6 (4.274–5). This account of 'analysis' and 'synthesis' as *methods* must be held apart from Kant's more well-known distinction between analytic and synthetic *judgements*. See his footnote on this in § 5 (4.276). Both conceptions, in fact, seem to be derived from Greek geometry. On this, see Hintikka's helpful discussion in terms of the difference between understanding the *geometrical* analytic–synthetic distinction *directionally* (as in Renaissance Aristotelianism), or *constructionally*, in which what is at issue is the role of auxiliary constructions in Euclidean proofs. Jaakko Hintikka, *Logic, Language-Games and Information: Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), ch. 9.3.

[33] Riccardo Pozzo, 'Kant on the Five Intellectual Virtues', in Riccardo Pozzo (ed.), *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), p. 176. Pozzo draws on the earlier philological work of Giorgio Tonelli. See, for example, his 'Conditions in Königsburg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy', in Alexius J. Bucher et al. (eds.), *Bewusst sein: Gerhard Funke zu eigen* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), pp. 126–44. Pozzo describes the logic and metaphysics of Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten and Meier that formed the object of Kant's critical attack as 'nothing else but the late products' of this Renaissance Aristotelianism. Pozzo, 'Kant on the Five Intellectual Virtues', p. 182.

On the more general influence of Zabarella's interpretation of Aristotle's logic on German philosophy, see Lewis White Beck, *Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 118, who identifies the logic of the Paduan Aristotelians, and especially that of Zabarella as 'the inspiration and the source of all the 'new' logic in Germany between Ramus and Leibniz'. A similar view is expressed by Neal Ward Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 213. Couturat notes that Leibniz had immersed

Aristotle gives the example of inferring that the stars are near from their non-twinkling as a case of inferring to the fact, while inferring that the stars do not twinkle *from* the fact that they are near as inferring to *the reasoned fact*.[34] Even where reciprocity of predication between the terms 'non-twinkling' and 'being near' holds, it is still the case that stars are non-twinkling, he points out, *because* they are near; their *non-twinklingness* is not the cause of their *nearness*.[35] In fact, Aristotle employs just the analysis of inference from effect to cause that Charles Sanders Peirce would repeat in the mid-nineteenth century in postulating a second form of 'ascending' inference besides induction that he called 'hypothesis' or 'abduction',[36] and that is generally now called 'inference to the best explanation': when one infers from the fact of the stars' non-twinkling to their being near, one is effectively inferring from the conclusion and the major premise or 'rule' of a syllogism in the first figure to the minor premise or

himself in the logics of Zabarella, Rubio and Fonseca when still a child (Louis Couturat, *La Logique de Leibniz: D'après des documents inédits*, (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961), pp. 33–4).

In the Paduan logical tradition Aristotle's distinction between inference of the fact and inference of the reason had been run together with Galen's account, drawing largely on Aristotle, of the distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' methods. For synoptic accounts of Zabarella's regressive method combining analytic and synthetic inference see Antonio Poppi, 'Zabarella, or Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science', in Pozzo (ed.), *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*; Nicholas Jardine, 'Epistemology of the Sciences', in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Kessler (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Charles H. Lohr, 'Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy as Sciences: The Catholic and the Protestant Views in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Constance Blackwell and Sechiko Kusakawa (eds.) *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). For an extended treatment of Zabarella, see Heikki Mikkeli, *An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo Zabarella on The Nature of Arts and Sciences* (Helsinki: SHS, 1992). Hegel himself claims that the 'form that the philosophy of Aristotle took with [the Scholastics] cannot be held by us to be the true form' and that 'it was not until the writings of Aristotle became better known in the West' that a new form of Aristotelian philosophy arose 'on the decline of scholasticism and with the revival of the sciences. For it was only after the Reformation that men went back to the fountainhead, to Aristotle himself'. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 vols*, trans. E. S. Haldane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), vol. 2, p. 130, (19.145).

[34] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, bk I, ch. 13, 78a27–31.

[35] Ibid., 78a31–39.

[36] See especially, Charles Sanders Peirce, 'Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis', in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol 1 (1867–1893)*, eds. N. Houser and C. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). It has been argued that besides the influence of Aristotle, both the inspiration *and* the term 'hypothesis' in Peirce's early formulations of abductive inference had come from Kant. See, Ilkka Niiniloto, 'Defending Abduction', *Philosophy of Science* 66 supplement (1999), 436–51, 436.

'case'.[37] We will return in the next chapter to this largely neglected topic of the influence of Paduan Aristotelian logic on Kant, as it is of crucial importance in understanding the continuity of the approaches to logic of Kant and Hegel. For the moment, however, let us move to the *third* type of prosyllogistic inference in Kant. If the first two of Kant's regulative prosyllogisms find analogues within a familiar distinction between *non-formal* heuristic processes of reasoning, what can we say of Kant's conception of inference to the condition of *concurrence*?

We have already seen something of the role played by Kant's idea of the disjunctive judgement in relation to Hegel's idea of determinate negation, and presumably the disjunctive syllogism will be crucial for him as well. We have also seen something of the nature of the inferences that disjunctive judgements serve. Knowing that the colour of this counter is *not yellow* I can infer something more, *that it is either* red, *or* orange, *or* green ... But what can be further discerned from Kant's account of this regulative application of the disjunctive inference?

Kant's account of the disjunctive syllogism is best known in the context of his critique of the use of such inference structures in transcendental *theology*. To take the idea associated with the disjunctive syllogism in a *constitutive* rather than regulative way, and to 'realize', 'hypostatize' and 'personalize' it, would result in the traditional theistic concept of God.[38] Kant, of course, employs his critical method here to undermine all possible metaphysical arguments for the existence of God, while maintaining the necessity of the *idea* of God *qua* regulative idea for morality. In the language of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, God is a necessary 'postulate' enabling our moral action. But as with the other two ascending prosyllogisms, Kant contends in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' of the first *Critique* that this type of reasoning is permissible, in fact, is rationally *necessary*, in aspects of theoretical inquiry as well, although, of course, it cannot exceed a *regulative* status.

[37] In Aristotle's example, when the sequence is ordered such as to show inference to the *reasoned fact*, it will be set out according to the figure *Barbara*: All things near are non-twinkling; the planets are near; therefore, the planets are non-twinkling. Inference to the *fact* (*hoti*) will thus be an inference that reasons from the conclusion (that the planets are non-twinkling) to the minor premise (that they are not near). Note that, for the reasons given above it is misleading to render any of the premises here, as does Tredennick, for example, as if they involved the *denial* of the predicate 'twinkling'. Rather, it is clear that Aristotle is *affirming* that stars and near objects are *non*-twinkling. On the relevance of this distinction, see below Chapter 7 section 1.

[38] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A583/B611 n.

As we have seen in Chapter 3, in his discussion of the 'the transcendental ideal' or '*Prototypon transcendentale*' in the 'Transcendental Dialectic', Kant takes up the quasi-Spinozist issues of determination as negation. While every concept stands under the merely logical 'principle of **determinability**' such that 'of **every two** contradictorily opposed [*kontradiktorisch-entgegengesetzen*] predicates only one can apply to it',[39] every *thing* stands under a *further* 'principle of **thoroughgoing determination**; according to which, among **all possible** predicates of **things**, insofar as they are compared with their opposites [or contraries '*Gegenteilen*'], one must apply to it'.[40] That '**whole of possibility**, as the sum total of all predicates of things in general' that is being presupposed as a *regulative* idea for the application of the forms of reasoning expressed in the disjunctive syllogism, is just what turns up in the traditional theistic concept of God. But in the process of being converted into the idea of God, this notion has not only been 'realized' but it has been 'hypostatized' and 'personalized' as well, and we might accordingly regard this 'whole of possibility' at the various stages of this multi-staged process. Mary Tiles points out that it was Leibniz who supplied Kant with the model for what would be required of a realm of particulars that were totally determined in this way,[41] but alongside Leibniz, we might see the figure of Spinoza. For Leibniz, this totality was made determinate by the fact that every monad in it was determined by its complete concept, the totality of monads itself being pre-established as 'harmonized' by God, but here Kant does away with both Leibniz's 'complete concepts' and pre-established harmony, and what remains, it would appear, is a totality made determinate by the process of 'real' negation. This is a conception not unlike that found in Spinoza.[42]

[39] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A571/B599.

[40] Ibid., A571–2/B599–600.

[41] Tiles, 'Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic', p. 113.

[42] As Paul Franks brings out, Kant was sucked into the 'pantheism dispute' initiated by Jacobi in the mid 1780s in virtue of Jacobi's use of Kant's holistic account of *space* to illuminate Spinoza's monistic account of *substance*. See Paul W. Franks, *All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), ch. 2.2. Given Kant's *own* analogy in the 'Transcendental Ideal' between the whole–part structure of space and the relation of the *omnitudo realitatis* to the manifold things making it up (A578/B606), that Kant could be construed as an implicit Spinozist by friends and foes alike is understandable. While Franks's illuminating reconstruction of the path from Kant to the post-Kantian idealists is in many respects convincing, the inclusion of Hegel within a general programme of a Spinozist 'Holistic Monism' linking the post-Kantian idealist projects neglects, I believe, logical features of Hegel's thought underlying his opposition to Spinoza. These are explored further below in chapters 7 and 8.

4.3 Inference and Kant's interactionist worldview

In a way combining elements of Leibniz's natural philosophy with the interactionist account of Knutzen, Kant had supported a 'dynamicist' version of the Newtonian world system in which the state of the whole was regarded as determined by interactions between forces of attraction and repulsion, and had in his earliest writings conceived of this whole in Leibnizian fashion as coordinated by a 'schema' in the mind of God.[43] By the time of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, of course, such a picture of the world 'in itself' had been abandoned as the content of a possible form of knowledge of which we finite and conditioned human knowers are capable – it is in no sense a possible object of experience. Nevertheless, it still has an epistemic function for us, as 'idea' or as '*focus imaginarius*' towards which our inferential reasoning must be directed in our attempts to unify the outputs of the understanding.[44] Thus, although they cannot be 'constitutive', transcendental ideas and the principles of reason are necessary for knowing reality in the way that modern science knows it, and therefore 'have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use'. Specifically they direct the understanding 'to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an idea (*focus imaginarius*) – i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension'.[45]

In those sections of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' where attention is directed to the generation of the 'Transcendental Illusion', Kant had stressed the *subordinate* role played by reason in relation to the understanding. Positing the universe as a unified whole is the result of mistakenly treating 'a mere logical prescription [*eine bloss logische Vorschrift*]'[46] as a transcendental principle. Seen in this light, in terms of their contrast with the principles [*Principien*] of the understanding, a *Grundsatz* of Reason is 'merely a subjective law of housekeeping

[43] Note that this divests this picture of certain features, such as the conception of matter as 'impenetrable', and its quasi-substantial conception of space and time – that is, divesting it of its dogmatically metaphysical 'transcendental realism'.

[44] It is just the view we have discussed as that to which 'the Understanding' is led in the opening chapters of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

[45] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A644/B672.

[46] Ibid., A309/B365.

[*ein subjektives Gesetz der Haushaltung*] for the provision of our understanding' which 'might make things easier for our understanding or help it extend itself'.[47] But with the focus on the *necessarily* regulative use of reason, a somewhat different picture, or at least different emphasis, emerges – one which has often been taken as contradictory to the 'negative' one. Here, to mistakenly take the rational unity of the world as 'objectively necessary' is simply to take it outside of the context shaped by our rational interest in it – outside of the 'interest of reason' – and to think of the judgements made by the understanding as '*in themselves* determined to systematic unity'.[48] In the project of coming to know the world, however, a project directed *by* the interest of reason, one *must* take the principles of reason as transcendental, and therefore, as, in some sense objective – at least as objective for a being that identifies him or herself *as* rational.

These principles *via* which reason 'prepares the field for the understanding' in the interest of the systematic unification of experience can be found hidden, Kant claims, within traditional hierarchical organizations of natural kinds.[49] Without transcendental principles articulating the world into such hierarchical categorical structures 'there could be no use of reason, because we can infer from the universal to the particular only on the ground of the universal properties of things under which the particular properties stand'.[50] Moreover, Kant now specifically denies such categorical articulation 'is merely a device for reason for achieving economy [*ein bloss ökonomischer Handgriff der Vernunft*]'. Rather, the logical principle of genera presupposes a 'transcendental principle' such that 'sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (even though we cannot determine its degree *a priori*), because without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible'.[51]

Of Kant's three principles, the first two are the principles of *homogeneity* and *specification*: the former licenses the subordination of particular concepts under more general ones, and the latter the further division of concepts into pluralities of subordinate ones. 'The first law ... guards against excess in the manifold variety of original genera, and

[47] Ibid., A306/B362–3. And reason itself is 'a merely subordinate faculty [*ein bloss subalternes Vermögen*]'. A305/B362.
[48] Ibid., A648/B676, emphasis added.
[49] Ibid., A657/B685.
[50] Ibid., A652/B680.
[51] Ibid., A654/B682.

recommends sameness of kind; the second, on the contrary, limits in turn this inclination to unanimity, and demands that one distinguish a subspecies before one turns to the individuals (*Individuen*) with one's universal concepts'.[52] The third principle that Kant calls the principle of *continuity* specifies that 'all varieties of species bound one another and permit no transition to one another by a leap, but only through every smaller degree of distinction, so that from each one can reach another; in a word, there are no species or subspecies that are proximate (in the concept of reason), but intervening species are always possible, whose difference from the first and second species is smaller than their difference from each other'.[53] Metaphysically conceived this principle corresponds to Leibniz's '*lex continuii*' prohibiting gaps and jumps in nature and ordering all monads into a continuously ascending series of perfection.

We can get a sense of how the principle of affinity might be relevant for understanding Kant's general hypothetico-deductive account of reasoning by the fact that the idea of 'transcendental affinity' is invoked in the transcendental deduction of the *categories of the understanding* in the 1781 edition of the first *Critique* as providing the ground of Hume's empirical law of association. 'The ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, insofar as it lies in the object, is called the **affinity** (*Affinität*) of the manifold'.[54] What Hume seemingly takes as just a simple compounding or 'association' of atomic ideas sequentially given *in* experience will, from Kant's perspective, in fact fit into a logically prestructured schema: effectively, we are meant to grasp that these 'givens'

[52] Ibid., A660/B688.

[53] Ibid., A659–60/B687–8.

[54] Ibid., A113. 'All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the whole possible self-consciousness. But from this, as a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable, and certain *a priori*, because nothing can come into cognition except by means of this original apperception. Now since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances insofar as they are to become empirical cognition, the appearances are thus subject to *a priori* conditions with which their synthesis (of apprehension) must be in thoroughgoing accord ... All appearances ... stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence in a **transcendental affinity**, of which the **empirical** affinity is the mere consequence'. Ibid., A113–14. For an extended treatment of the relation of the law of genera to transcendental affinity as discussed in the A edition of the 'Transcendental Analytic', see Kenneth Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism*, Chapter 3. Westphal's account of transcendental affinity in the 'Transcendental Analytic' differs at a number of points from the account given here, but he too sees both these sections of Kant's text as combining to provide a strongly anti-subjectivist thrust to the Kantian picture. In Westphal's terms, they provide 'transcendental proofs of mental content externalism' that is radically at variance with Kant's transcendental idealism. Ibid., p. 94.

are cognitively relevant only to the extent that they ultimately function as elements of *judgements*, forms of representation whose structure cannot be conceived as a simple *compounding* of atomic parts.[55] In terms of Kant's later description of the role of affinity in the 'Transcendental Dialectic', here we are to grasp how the categories derived from the possible judgement structures are meant to 'prepare the field' for the unification of intuitions from the received sensory manifold. And note why simple Humean compounding of atomic ideas cannot work – the judgement structure into which they are incorporated is complex, with an internal structure such that the subject of the judgement is picked out by a sortal and its possible accidental predicates belong to mutually excluding groups of contraries.

The role of 'transcendental affinity' in the subjective deduction of the ideas of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic might now be regarded as analogous to its role in the Transcendental Analytic. In the Transcendental Dialectic, it could be said, Kant is no longer concerned with the relatively momentary and contained experience of single objects or immediately connected events, but with the further systematic unification of experience regulated by the transcendental ideas. That is, here he is concerned with the progressive scientifically directed experiential uncovering of nature's law-governed interactive *order*. At the level of subjective experience, the 'synthesis' involved is no longer like that of any 'association of ideas' into presentations of objects but involves the progressive synthesis of judgements into larger inferentially articulated structures such as scientific theories. But as with the subjective deduction of the categories, the temporal synthetic process presupposes an underlying logically formal structure, such that the temporal synthesis 'ascends' what from a logical point of view is a 'descending' structure. This basic plan, however, needs a further modification.

After introducing the principles of homogeneity, specificity and continuity in the 'Appendix' to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant now

[55] Kant's brief discussion of affinity in § 31 of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. V. L. Dowdell (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996)) where he discusses affinity as the third of 'three distinct varieties of the sensory productive faculty' is particularly helpful. Kant likens affinity to chemical combination which 'creates a third entity that has properties which can only be brought about by the union of two heterogeneous elements' (7.177), a third element which is 'an entirely new entity . . . (somewhat like a chemical compound)' (7.177 n). Here the judgement which arises out of the synthesis of reproduced intuitions when brought into relation to rules (concepts) is a new type of entity. In the footnote Kant employs the 'epigenetic' model of creation that he employs with respect to the categories in the B Deduction of the first *Critique*, B167.

renames and *reorders* them to accord with their 'use in experience [*Erfahrungsgebrauch*]'. In the way that it is introduced, the point of this reordering is far from apparent, and the renaming is at first confusing. The significance of both moves becomes clear, however, when seen in the light of his earlier discussion of the difference between *transcendental* and merely *logical* principles. It will be recalled that the 'transcendental' significance of the chained syllogisms was associated with regarding as *ascending* ('prosyllogisms') structures that *qua descending* were to be read as formal deductive inferences ('episyllogisms'). But 'ascending' syllogistic chains represent forms of reasoning as they unfold in real time in experience, and this is just the ordering Kant reproduces here. Ordered in the new way, the principle of *specification* is now placed first, *continuity* next, and *homogeneity* last. Kant renames each such that the principles are now given as *manifoldness*, [*Mannigfaltigkeit*] *affinity* [*Verwandtschaft*], and *unity* [*Einheit*]. That is, in experience we start 'below' with the diversity of the manifold, and *via* the principle of affinity of elements *within* that manifold, 'ascend' analytically to the unity corresponding to the genus. But crucially, the shift from *logical* to *transcendental* perspectives coincides with a shift in the nature of that *which is unified*. *Qua* logical principles, the unity concerned was *formal*: the logical principles were of the homogeneity, specification, and continuity *of form*.[56] But Kant now says that '[t]he affinity of the manifold, without detriment to this variety, under a principle of unity, concerns not merely the things, but even more the mere properties and powers of things'.[57] The idea of the unity in question here is that of a cosmos, a 'world system, which for us is unbounded yet connected through one and the same moving force'.[58]

Earlier it was suggested that the role of affinity in the Transcendental Dialectic was *analogous* to its role in the Transcendental Analytic, and the new terminology suggests just that. As described in the Transcendental Analytic, 'affinity' was just the 'ground of the association of the [intuitive] manifold in so far as it lies in the object'. That is, affinity was what allowed the unification (association) of the manifold. But what we have seen of the tight links between the logical form of judgements and the types of non-formal inferential processes suggest that this is *more than* analogy. The principles of manifoldness, affinity, and unity linked to inferential

[56] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A657–8/B685–6.
[57] Ibid., A662/B690.
[58] Ibid., A663/B691.

reason are just the ones responsible for the 'empirical affinity' or 'association of ideas' discussed in the A edition of the transcendental analytic. But this is just what we should expect on the basis of what we have seen in Chapter 3, section 3 about the contribution of the category of community, the third category of relation, to the conditions of individuation of objects of experience. We know we have two objects rather than two presentations of one object when they occupy different locations at the one time. But the condition of two objects existing simultaneously is that they be regarded as belonging to a single universe ultimately conceived in terms of interacting forces of attraction and repulsion. However, understanding the world in *this* way requires the capacity to reason *inferentially*, and so requires that objects be identified as occupying definite places in a hierarchy of genera. Thus the transcendental principles of inferential reason would seem to be necessary for the presentation of the type of 'objects' (equivalent to Hegel's objects of *perception*), the conditions of judgements about which had been explored in the Transcendental Analytic.

It is in passages in the 'Appendix' to the Transcendental Dialectic such as the ones discussed that Kant seems to come close to doing away with the traditional way of regarding the relation between the judging understanding and the inferring reason. Kant *seems* to be saying that we must somehow conceive of the world system as a unified whole of interacting parts, a conception requiring the exercise of inferential reason, if we are to experience anything in it *as* an independent spatio–temporal continuent to which we can attribute properties.[59] This is the sort of picture we have noted in Hegel with his idea of the necessary transition from 'Perception' to 'the Understanding', but it *also* looks like the one Russell identified in Bradley and traced back to the influence of Leibniz on Hegel. However, to think of this along the lines sketched by Russell in his charge of holism is surely to misconstrue Kant's position, and, I will argue, Hegel's. Kant's comments here are surely *not* meant to reverse every consequence of the introduced distinction between intuitions and concepts, and the linked distinction between the *constitutive* judgements of the understanding and the *regulative* inferences of reason that were fundamental for his breaking with 'dogmatic' metaphysics. For Kant, there are still at least two crucial ways in which the ideas of reason are not

[59] It is this conception too that is linked to Kant's apparent postulation in the 'Third Analogy' of a conception of the world as a continuum of interacting forces which stands as a *material*, and not simply a *formal* condition for the experience of individuated objects *per se*.

'constitutive' even in the light of these seemingly 'revisionist' passages. First, they cannot be considered to 'constitute' objects *outside of* the context in which the *interests of reason* are operative. And second, that which is presented in transcendental ideas such as of the world conceived as a systematic whole cannot be a possible object *of experience* to which empirical concepts could be meaningfully applied. *A* possible object *of* experience, we have seen, is only determinate given its difference to and possible interaction with *other objects*. But, of course, there are no 'other objects' for the cosmos as a whole. Using Kant's way of putting the point across, there is here no 'schema' for the unification of the manifold of intuition into the world system *as a whole* as there is in the case of empirical objects – not even, I would suggest, a coherent schema as existing in the mind of God, as Kant had envisaged in his pre-critical natural philosophy. Nevertheless, he says, 'an **analogue** of such a schema can and must be given, which is the idea of the **maximum** of division and unification of the understanding's cognition in one principle'.[60] And the positing of such an analogue is necessary for us finite yet rational creatures.

4.4 Kantian reason and rational interaction

Such are those (often overlooked) aspects of Kant's first *Critique* that can be regarded as forming the starting point for Hegel's more explicitly 'inferentialist' approach working from the basis of the term-logic derived idea of determinate negation. Moreover, this dimension of Kant's first *Critique* can also be recognized as having elements in common with Brandom's own way of cashing out the 'inferentialist' point. As we have seen, in linking Hegel's idea of determinate negation into his own inferentialist pragmatics, Brandom attempts to draw a parallel between the way that objects can be thought to 'repel' or 'exclude' incompatible properties with the way that subjects exclude or repel 'subjectively incompatible commitments', or, adopting a more traditional locution, incompatible *beliefs*. Brandom, of course, prefers talk of 'commitments and entitlements' to talk about *belief*: belief talk can lead us to think of individual belief contents as somehow determinate *in themselves*, independently of the inferential relations in which those contents stand. That is, it leads us to think of beliefs atomistically and, from there, 'representationally'. Replacing belief talk with the talk of

[60] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A665/B693.

one's inferential commitments and entitlements is a way of making it explicit that what we think of as the semantic content of a 'belief' is a function of the inferential relations within which such a 'belief' stands.[61] But provisionally retaining the locution of 'belief' for the moment can be useful in bringing out some parallels between Brandom's position and that common to Kant and Hegel.

In Hegelian terms, talk about a subject with beliefs, just like talk about objects with properties, seems to work at the cognitive level of 'Perception'. After all, in early modern philosophy, following Descartes, the cognitive subject was classically conceived as a special kind of substance, and its cognitive states, such as its possession of beliefs, were conceived as 'accidents' of that substance. In the earliest phases of his pre-critical philosophy, Kant had even attempted to devise a type of epistemology on the basis of the interactions between the mind and objects *qua* mental and material substances respectively. According to the principles of 'succession' and 'coexistence', interaction between substances should be thought of as a process of mutual affection. Thus, when substances A and B interact, A will induce changes in the accidental properties of B and B will induce changes in the accidental properties of A. As we have seen, however, the *lawfulness* of these changes in properties was itself thought of as grounded in the mind of God.[62]

In what can look like an early variant of a 'reliabilistic' approach to epistemology, Kant, in his pre-critical period, had regarded the law-like relations holding among the states of the interacting substances involved as applicable also to interactions between physical and *mental* substances. Clearly what he had in mind was the way changes in 'sensations' follow in regular ways from our causal interaction with objects. I turn my eyes in the direction of the post-box, and 'experience red', for example. And so, if my cognitive states change on the basis of my perceptual interaction with physical substances, then the changes in my cognitive states must too be law-governed, and we can then see how these actual nomological processes in the natural world might be reflected in the patterns emerging within the realm of our changing mental states.

[61] First, the contents of belief are thought of in terms of that which is expressed and endorsed in assertive speech acts. Next, such acts are thought of as having an identity in virtue of their constituting moves in a type of language game, the game of the asking for and giving of reasons.

[62] Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770*, pp. 41–2, (1.413–14). See Watkins's discussion of this point in *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*, pp. 149–55.

But as has been discussed above, Kant's views along these lines underwent a radical change in the mid 1760s such that the *normatively* law-governed realm of moral action became differentiated from the nomological realm of nature. And if *moral* activity were to be considered law-governed in a normative sense, this would apply also to *epistemic* activity. That is, Kant came to grasp that changes in a subject's epistemic states, changes in its knowledge, had to be considered from a different point of view to that from which the changes undergone by material substances could be regarded. In the vocabulary advocated by contemporary Sellarsians, Kant came to see that to ascribe an epistemic state to a subject was not to describe their *empirical* state. Rather, to ascribe epistemic states to a subject was to adopt a *normative* stance towards that subject and attribute to them, or recognize them as having, a 'normative status'. Nevertheless, the idea of interacting material substances as providing a type of model for rational processes persisted after Kant's transcendental turn.

We have already noted how Kant's pre-critical idea of the law-like interactions of mutually conditioning substances turns up in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the third category of relation, but an explicitly *normative* version of this category of community or interaction also appears in the analogous table of categories in the *Critique of Practical Reason* – the 'categories of freedom with respect to the concepts of the good and evil'. There, the third category of relation, the relation '*reciprocally*, of one person to the condition of others',[63] is clearly meant to apply to the community of reciprocally interacting *moral subjects*. No independent justification is given for this table in the second *Critique* and Kant seems to have mechanically transferred the categories from the first. Beck, for example, comments that Kant seems to have simply assumed that the logic of practical reason is the same as that of theoretical reason.[64] But other factors suggest the parallelism to be more motivated than that. Consider, for example, Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* in terms of the 'principle of humanity', the imperative to treat every rational being as an 'end in itself'.[65] The ground of this principle, Kant says, is that '*rational nature exists as an end in itself*', and it is this peculiarity of the nature of others,

[63] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* p. 58 (5.66).

[64] Lewis White Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 145.

[65] Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 39 (4. 430).

their possession of an 'absolute worth' that dictates how they must be treated – treated *as* ends in themselves as opposed to *mere means* to the agent's ends, treated in such ways that their absolute worth is *respected*.[66] But, of course, as the agent constrained by their recognition of the value (the 'normative status') of others in this way is so constrained herself in virtue of *her own* rationality, this normative mode of interaction must be reciprocal. It is the form of universality of this principle that makes it, notes Kant, 'fit to be a law (possibly a law of nature)'.[67] In short, *rational* natures lawfully interact in a type of '*Wechselwirkung*' determined by the nature of each agent, the difference being that here the law is *prescriptive* not descriptive.

The parallel between the nomological interaction of natural substances and that of *rational* substances is brought out in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where, immediately following the discussion of the 'categories of freedom', Kant introduces the issue of what he calls the 'type' or 'typic' [*Typus*] of pure practical judgement by means of which we can indirectly or symbolically represent to ourselves the moral law. A *natural* law 'to which objects of sensible intuition as such are subject' can thus 'be presented [*dargestellt*] *in concreto* in objects of the senses' so as to give us an indirect presentation of a law that is for us *normative*. What is crucial is the 'form' of the law of nature – that is, its simple lawfulness that it shares with the moral law. In giving us a representation of a moral law *qua satisfied*, a natural law can thereby be considered 'the *type* [*Typus*]of the moral law'.[68]

Kant employs a similar example of natural law-governedness giving symbolic expression to normative law-governedness in a footnote in his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* where he suggests that we conceive of the *juridical* relation holding between human actions on the analogy to the *mechanical* relation holding between moving forces. 'I can never do anything to another' he notes, 'without giving him a right to do the same to me under the same conditions; just as a body cannot act on another body with its motive force without thereby causing the other body to react just as much on it'. In such analogies it is not a question of comparing similar things. Rather, the relation of similarity is of a higher order, holding among *relations between things*: 'Right and motive force are here completely dissimilar things, but in their relation there is

[66] Ibid., p. 37 (4.428).
[67] Ibid., p. 39 (4.431).
[68] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 59–60 (5.69).

nonetheless complete similarity'.[69] It is in virtue of this 'complete similarity' of relations, of what in the 'typic' he describes as 'form', that the interacting bodies are able to give an indirect 'symbolic' or 'analogical' sensible exhibition (*Darstellung*) to that which would otherwise lack any phenomenal presentation.[70] Thus in the example here, which is more or less repeated in the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Metaphysics of Morals*,[71] it is the law-governed nature of the relation holding between the mechanically interacting bodies that is 'completely similar' to the law-governed juridical relation holding between two actions, despite the fact that the things being related, material bodies on the one hand and legally considered acting agents on the other, are *dissimilar*, and, moreover, despite the fact that the law of the latter is not natural law but normative law specifying not how any two agents *do* but how they *ought to* interact.

As we have seen, for Kant, it is the same inferential 'reason' that is constitutive in the realm of *practical reason* that is, in its regulative role, necessary for theoretical inquiry as well. In the latter context, reason is not so much operating as a constraint on *maxims for actions* but rather as a constraint on *beliefs*. Perhaps then, when examined in this role, the image of mutually determining physical substances might be thought of as providing a 'typic' for our conception of mutually interacting epistemic agents just as much as for moral or legal ones. But the idea of mutually interacting *cognitive* agents seems close to Brandom's idea of the normative interaction between players of the language game of the asking for and giving of reasons. In Kant's interactionist natural philosophy, substances mutually determine changes in each other's properties in law-like ways. Regarded now as a model for *rational*

[69] Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, pp. 108–9 (4.358 n. 43).

[70] In a well-known passage in the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant distinguishes between two forms of *Hypotyposis*, or sensuous exhibition – *Darstellung* – of pure concepts: just as schemata are the means of the sensibilization (*Versinnlichung*) of concepts of the understanding, symbols sensibilize the ideas of reason. § 59 (5.351–2). It is ironic that this formulation appears in a work which, as I argue below, appears to undermine the very foundations of the distinction between symbols and schemata.

[71] Thus in the *Critique of Judgement*: 'Thus, by analogy with the law that action and reaction are equal when bodies attract or repel one another, I can also conceive of the community between the members of a commonwealth that is governed by rules of law' (§ 90 (5.464–5)). And in the *Metaphysics of Morals*: 'The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, the *construction* of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition *a priori*, by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the *equality of action and reaction*'. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 26 (6:232–3).

interaction, we will regard rational interaction as a matter of individual subjects influencing each other's *beliefs* in analogously law-like ways. The point of the model would be to show that the changes in beliefs of rationally interacting subjects are not random, but law-like, and the difference between the behaviour of rational and natural substances would mark the fact that the laws governing the epistemic changes in a 'rational substance' are *normative*. That is, the changes in belief that I undergo under the influence of others are not changes that simply 'happen' to me, they are ones that *I* bring about by holding myself *to* those normative laws. For example, I would exclude incompatible beliefs (by giving up one of them) in a way analogous to that in which an object 'excludes' incompatible properties, but I would do this by *holding myself to* a law – here, the law of non-contradiction.

There are, indeed, at least hints of such a picture already in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the section of the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method'. There Kant distinguishes a way of holding a belief, 'conviction' (*Überzeugung*), from that of mere 'persuasion' (*Überredung*). In the former the belief is justified or entitled by the fact that 'the judgement is valid for everyone provided he is only in the possession of reason', whereas the latter 'has its ground only in the special character of the subject'. The 'holding to be true' (*Fürwahrhalten*) of mere persuasion, Kant tells us, cannot be 'communicated' because no common ground can be appealed to in order to bring about the requisite agreement (*Einstimmung*) of other subjects. Such a communicative agreement forms a criterion for objectivity, or more precisely, for the elimination of merely subjectively valid representations:

> The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true ... Accordingly, persuasion cannot be distinguished from conviction subjectively, when the subject has taken something to be true merely as an appearance of his own mind; but the experiment that one makes on the understanding of others, to see if the grounds that are valid for us have the same effect on the reason of others [*auf fremde Vernunft eben dieselbe Wirkung tun*], is a means, though only a subjective one, not for producing conviction, to be sure, but yet for revealing the merely private validity of the judgement, i.e., something in it that is mere persuasion.[72]

[72] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A820-1/B848–9.

Kant himself was to develop something of this communicative approach to reason in relation to the notion of 'common sense' in the third *Critique*. Its more radical and systematic development, however, was to be found in Fichte and Hegel. Fichte had first elaborated the notion of 'recognition' in the context of a theory of legal right that had its starting point in Kant, and Hegel had then extended the theory more broadly to characterize the totality of normative relations existing between subjects in virtue of which they had their characteristic intentional capacities.

It is this theme of recognition that has become central to a number of the recent interpretative attempts to make sense of Hegel's notion of 'spirit',[73] and it is in this sense that it becomes for Brandom the key concept with which he links his own Sellarsian account to Hegel. Indeed, in relation to his account of epistemic *entitlement*, Brandom's use of the notion of recognition shows clear connections with the Fichtean provenance of this notion in the theory of 'right'. The connection with Kant's conception of 'common sense' alluded to above, however, suggests a somewhat different context for the operation of the notion of recognition – its role in *aesthetic* judgement. In the following two chapters I look at further links between Kant and Hegel that bear on Hegel's inferentialism in ways that centre on a particular type of judgement – *aesthetic* judgement as conceived by Kant in his third *Critique*, which stood as a model for judging and reasoning about matters of *value*. Again, 'Aristotelian' considerations come to the fore which can be seen in the work of McDowell and others in their approach to 'value'.

[73] See, for example, my *Hegel's Hermeneutics* for a synoptic account of the systematic role played by the notion of reciprocal intersubjective recognition in Hegel.

5

ARISTOTELIAN *PHRONESIS* AND THE PERCEPTUAL DISCERNMENT OF VALUE

In *Mind and World*, John McDowell invokes Aristotle's way of thinking about ethics to defend a form of naturalism within which a place can be found for the notion of a 'responsiveness to meaning' which avoids Platonic rationalist intuitionism. Our conception of nature needs to be broadened from being equated with the domain of objects of scientific investigation, the 'realm of law', as it is only *against* the backdrop of such an idea that we are tempted into the Platonistic conception of the space of reasons as *sui generis*. McDowell does not mention Moore, but would presumably have some sympathy for the critique of naturalism in ethics motivating Moore's turn to an intuitionist form of 'moral realism' in *Principia Ethica*. It would be Moore's conception of the *choice* involved, however, that would be seen as the problem: *were* one to start from a concept of nature as such a 'realm of law', then intuitionism – itself a version of the myth of the given – would present itself as the only alternative to the type of naturalistic ethics that they both oppose. McDowell's solution is to avoid either pole of this traditional debate – hence the need to reconceive the nature of 'nature'. It is thus to this end that McDowell invokes Aristotle's (and Hegel's) conception of a 'second nature', as a set of 'habits of thought and action' acquired in good upbringing that allows for the thought of a moral agent, *by dint of her training*, to be responsive to rational requirements.[1] In Hegelian terms,

[1] McDowell, *Mind and World*, Lecture IV, §7.

this is the type of nature or *character* that an individual acquires by belonging to some concrete normative form of social life – some particular form of '*Sittlichkeit*'.

McDowell's thoughts here about our experiential responsiveness to 'meaning' reach back to ideas he had developed in a series of papers from the late 1970s and early 1980s in which he invoked Aristotle's moral psychology to challenge a number of widely held assumptions in contemporary moral philosophy.[2] At the heart of the account of Aristotle in these papers was the idea of practical reason – *phronesis* – as a type of *perceptual* capacity a virtuous person has acquired in proper upbringing and by means of which that person is able discern the *practically salient features* of the situations in which he or she acts.[3] In their behaviour such persons express this type of sensitivity to the requirements of situations, and so *explanation* of such actions can simply advert to those relevant features of the situations to which the agent is sensitive. Consider the example of the behaviour of a *kind* person:

> A kind person can be relied on to behave kindly when that is what the situation requires. Moreover, his reliably kind behaviour is not the outcome of a blind, non-rational habit or instinct .... Rather, that the situation requires a certain sort of behaviour is (one way of formulating) his reason for behaving in that way, on each of the relevant occasions. So it must be something of which, on each of the relevant occasions, he is aware. A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behaviour. The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity.[4]

In these papers, which draw upon an interpretation of Aristotle's conception of moral deliberation by David Wiggins,[5] McDowell employs the idea of *phronesis* to problematize common but misleading

[2] 'The Role of *Eudaimonia* in Aristotle's Ethics', 'Some Issues in Aristotle's Moral Psychology' and 'Virtue and Reason' all reprinted in John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[3] McDowell, 'Some Issues', pp. 27–8, 'Virtue and Reason', p. 51.

[4] McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', p. 51.

[5] David Wiggins, 'Deliberation and Practical Reason', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 76 (1975/76), 29–51, reprinted with revisions in *Needs Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, second edition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). McDowell acknowledges his debt to this paper of Wiggins in 'Some Issues', p. 28 n. 13.

assumptions about the nature of practical reasoning itself and the role of perception within it. The most common way for practical reasoning to be conceived is to see it as playing an instrumental role in 'bridging the gap' between some specific desired end and the behaviour required to bring it about. This is one way in which Aristotle's account of practical reason in *Nichomachean Ethics* book 3 has been typically understood, and if we think of this form of reasoning as schematized by the practical syllogism, we will think of the major premise as specifying the content of some appetitive or 'orectic' psychological state understood as providing the relevant motivation for acting, while the minor premise would specify the action that would provide the means to satisfying that state. Conceived in this way the practical syllogism provides an explanation of why the agent acted as she did.

But as McDowell argues, this model of practical reasoning cannot capture what Aristotle had in mind with *phronesis*, as 'one of Aristotle's conditions for action to manifest ethical character (virtue in particular, if the character is as it should be) is that the action undertaken be chosen for its own sake'.[6] Thus, if we employ the model of the 'practical syllogism' to think of the nature of phronetic moral deliberation we will have to think of it in a different way. We can get an idea of what the shape of this reasoning is like, thinks McDowell, if we conceive of the role that perception must play within practical reason on Aristotle's account.

Aristotle's conception of *phronesis* does not sit easily with those characteristically *neo-Humean* instrumental conceptions of action, commonplace in modernity, that regard action as aiming at the satisfaction of some desire. We might wonder, then, about the possibility of a reconciliation of Aristotle with those idealist approaches that traditionally stand opposed to the instrumental, desire-based approaches to practical reason. A seemingly alternative conception of Aristotle's practical reasoning, found in *Nichomachean Ethics* book 6, assigns to practical reason a more deductive 'rule–case' picture of moral deliberation, but McDowell also challenges this as it seems not to accommodate perception in the right way. 'The most obvious role for perception is to contribute awareness that certain conditions, which are in fact the conditions specified in a rule, are satisfied'. But with such an approach to the role of perception it is unclear why moral upbringing would be a consideration: 'That kind of

[6] McDowell, 'Some Issues', p. 25. But neither can the 'rule–case' model be used for *phronesis* such that some general principle is found in the major premise as Aristotle, as McDowell points out, was entirely sceptical about the role of codifiable rules in moral life.

awareness is presumably available to anyone. It is hard to see why perception, so understood, should seem distinctive of someone whose practical intellect is as it should be'.[7] In contrast, what is delivered by the type of perceptual capacity to which Aristotle appeals with the notion of *phronesis* is not 'awareness of the truth of the minor premise (which is presumably afforded by ordinary cognitive capacities), but its selection from among other features of the situation *as* minor premise: as what matters about the situation'.[8] That is, what is at issue in *phronesis* is a type of *appreciative* perception which can take account of practically salient aspects of a situation. 'What I have described as selecting the right concern might equally be described in terms of the minor premise of the core explanation. If there is more than one concern that might impinge on the situation, there is more than one fact about the situation that the agent might, say, dwell on, in such a way as to summon an appropriate concern into operation. It is by virtue of his seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the salient fact about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather than that one'.[9] McDowell's description here suggests a type of weighing of different perceptual features of the situation – *this* feature as opposed to *that* one – so as to gauge the more relevant consideration. Furthermore, given what we have seen of the contraries of Aristotle's term logic, we should not be surprised to see a *perceptually based* discernment described in these terms.

While the language here differs from McDowell's later employment of the Sellarsian framework, certain general parallels can nevertheless be noticed. The non-instrumental deliberative structure into which, thinks McDowell, the action needs to be inserted in order to be understood does indeed look something like a Sellarsian 'space of reasons': 'the form of deliberation is a form into which we can cast an explanation by reasons, and such an explanation can be appropriate for actions that did not issue from prior deliberation'.[10] But its difference from the 'rule–case' model suggests a different way of being oriented in 'logical space' to that conceived by Sellars. Specifying the salience of the situation in the minor premise specifies the agent's reasons for acting because it describes the situation in such a way that one grasps it as *demanding* a certain type of response, and in this way McDowell's conception overlaps

[7] McDowell, 'Some Issues', p. 28.
[8] McDowell, 'Some Issues', p. 29.
[9] McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', p. 68.
[10] McDowell, 'Some Issues', pp. 23–4.

with that of the generally Hegel-influenced work of Charles Taylor, who stresses the role of action-guiding 'thick' predicates in such descriptions, predicates like 'courageous', 'cruel' or 'disgusting' which inextricably combine evaluative and descriptive aspects and which typically come in opposed pairs.[11] McDowell's account strongly suggests that these predicates must be understood in the same way by both the agent herself and the person seeking an explanation for the action. The explainer must grasp the situation in concepts that are part of the agent's own repertoire, otherwise it wouldn't give *their* reasons for acting, and, it would seem, they must be concepts that are also part of the explainer's own practical repertoire, otherwise they wouldn't give *reasons* for acting. That is, explanation here looks as if it must be in terms of some shared practical perspective. For any agent, then, experiencing and acting within the world as grasped from such a perspective, that some particular situation was, say, *desirable* or *lamentable* would come to be regarded as an objective affair, and not just some projection of *their* desires. From the viewpoint of another so located agent, the former would seem to be grasping things in ways that could be right or wrong, and what they would be right or wrong about, would be the *value* of things picked out in terms of the contraries of Aristotle's term logic.

Here again we can perceive a convergence with a dimension of Aristotle's thought that had been developed within the Paduan tradition that had influenced the German philosophical tradition. Denying the appropriateness of demonstration from principles for the realms of action or production, Zabarella had stressed the centrality of the analytic or resolutive method for *practical* reason. While physics integrated the analytic ascent from known effects to causes with the corresponding deductive synthetic demonstration of the 'reasoned fact', and mathematics restricted itself to synthetic demonstration alone, practical philosophy had to forego the certainty of deduction from principles as there it was not a question of reflecting an objective ontological order, but rather one of discovering truths for the sake of the ends of action or production.[12] In practical reason, then, the analytic method is to be combined with the dialectical contestation of opposing opinion to give

[11] See, for example, the account of the language of 'strong evaluation' in Charles Taylor, 'What is Human Agency?' in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[12] In Book 6 of the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle continually contrasts *phronesis* with *episteme* on the basis of the fact that it is concerned with changeable particulars such as *actions*. See, for example, the discussion at 1140a32-b4.

results that constitute something other than *episteme* or science.[13] Indeed, in *Nichomachean Ethics* book 1, chapter iv, Aristotle explicitly opposes his view to Plato's by appealing to the mere fact (*to hoti*), perceptually available to the person of right ethical training, rather than to something 'knowable in itself', as the relevant starting point [*archai*] for practical reason:

> And we must not overlook the distinction between arguments that start from first principles and those that lead to first principles. It was a good practice of Plato to raise this question, and to enquire whether the right procedure was to start from or to lead up to the first principles, as in a race-course one may run from the judges to the far end of the track or reversely. Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known. But 'the known' has two meanings – 'what is known to us,' which is one thing, and 'what is knowable in itself,' which is another. Perhaps then for us at all events it is proper to start from what is known to us. This is why in order to be a competent student of the Right and Just, and in short of the topics of Politics in general, the pupil is bound to have been well trained in his habits. For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so [*archi gar to hoti*]; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so [*tou dioti*].[14]

Elsewhere Aristotle gives a hint as to how to conceive of this resolutive ascent from the starting point of this perceived fact. Thus he claims that 'when deliberating one seems in the procedure described to be pursuing an investigation or analysis that resembles the analysis of a figure in geometry',[15] by which he appears to be referring to the method of solving geometrical 'problems'. In solving a problem in the Greek geometric tradition, one started *from* a problematic result and worked backwards, via constructions, to the principles – axioms or independently proved theorems – on the basis of which the 'result' could be established.[16] In a

[13] In particular, see Poppi, 'Zabarella, or Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science', pp. 52–5 on Zabarella's reading of Aristotle's account of *phronesis* in *Nichomachean Ethics*, bk 6.

[14] Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), bk I, ch. iv, 1095a29–b8.

[15] Ibid., bk III, ch iii, 1112b20–22.

[16] Both Pappas and Proclus, who were important sources for later discussions of 'analysis', had distinguished geometrical 'problems' from theorems. On Greek geometric conceptions of analysis, see especially Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes, *The Method of Analysis: Its Geometrical Origin and Its General Significance* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974) and Wilbur Richard Knorr, *The Ancient Tradition of Geometric Problems* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1993). Hintikka also argues that, in his use of the 'problematic concepts' of reason, Kant drew on the notion of 'problem' from the Greek geometric tradition (see his *Logic, Language-Games and Information*, chs 8 and 9). On the influence of Greek geometric analysis more generally on Aristotle see also Patrick H. Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* (Albany: State

parallel way, then, it would seem that in the context of practical reason, rather than being employed for the purpose of a deductive 'rule–case' form of reasoning, the syllogism provided Aristotle with a framework for a piece of 'regressive–analytic' reasoning, which ascends from a perceived 'mere fact' known to us to some posited principle 'knowable in itself' which rationalizes it.[17] This non-formal use of syllogisms, signaled by McDowell's critique of the 'rule–case' model, I will argue, was to play a crucial role within the approach to practical reason in the thought of Kant and, especially, Hegel.

5.1 The problem of value judgements

With the focus on sharable conceptually articulated perspectives, McDowell's early ethical thought lines up with the generally perceptual realist character of the position that I have referred to as his 'aspect internalism', the position that emerges from the approach to mental content that he developed together with Gareth Evans, although, in its concern with meaning or value it will obviously differ from the more standardly *epistemological* orientation of that other work. There, it will be remembered, McDowell was concerned with affirming a position which combines aspects of both 'internalist' and 'externalist' poles as these notions have been taken in the debates around the nature of mental content. Recent analytic *moral* philosophy had also been embroiled in such internalism–externalism issues, and here too, McDowell was unsatisfied with the terms in which the 'choice' between these positions was meant to be made.

In these moral–philosophical debates, the ethical *internalist* is generally seen as committed to the idea that in relation to any moral action, any statement or thought that could count as a *reason* for that action must have some connection to the agent's motivation, or, to use Bernard Williams's terms, must be relative to the agent's 'motivational set'.[18]

University of New York Press, 1997). (I am here particularly indebted to Melissa McMahon for bringing to my attention the geometric background to Kant's notion of 'problem' in her *Deleuze and Kant's Critical Philosophy*, PhD thesis, the University of Sydney, 2005.)

[17] To avoid confusing the difference senses of 'analysis' introduced by Kant, I will refer to this Zabarellan understanding of analytic as 'regressive–analytic'.

[18] Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', in Ross Harrison (ed.), *Rational Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), reprinted in Bernard Williams, *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 102.

Standardly, internalist positions here have been associated with Humean types of *non-cognitivism*, the very link between a statement or thought specifying a reason for acting on the one hand, and the agent's motivational dispositions on the other, being considered as sufficient to rule out its objectivity. On this *ethical* understanding of internalism, then, McDowell would not be considered an internalist because 'he believes that there are reasons for action independent of our desires'.[19] But neither does McDowell embrace the types of ethical *externalist* positions that internalists typically reject – for example, he agrees with Bernard Williams's rejection of the externalists' attempt 'to bring a charge of *irrationality* against anyone who is not motivated in some direction that the theorist thinks he should be motivated in',[20] and he must be opposed to any type of *rationalist* intuitionism that entertains the idea of some immediate unconceptualized connection with values, such as Moore's.[21] What McDowell objects to is the dichotomous choice of these exclusive alternatives in ethical theory – 'internalism' and 'externalism' so conceived – between which we are meant to decide.

We might say then that from the *later* McDowellian point of view, not only Moorean intuitionistic externalism, but also the variety of internalisms that result from the rebound against it and which relate practical reasoning ultimately back to some notion of the agent's *given* motivations and desires can be thought of as suffering from a *practical* version of the 'myth of the given' parallel to that which Sellars diagnosed in the context of theoretical reason. In Moorean intuitionism, the given is just that non-natural property 'good' somehow immediately perceived by the mind,[22] while in non-cognitivist internalisms, the given is regarded as something endogenously generated, a 'desire' say with which the agent is somehow directly acquainted. From the perspective of this *latter* version of myth of the given, rather than being understood as securing

[19] Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, 'Introduction', in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, *Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 17.

[20] McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?' *Mind, Value, and Reality*, p. 103.

[21] *Moore* rarely if ever becomes an interlocutor for McDowell, although many of McDowell's reflections on Plato's intuitionism, especially, might be usefully transposed to Moore's.

[22] Moore is careful to define the sense in which he is an intuitionist. Two different questions must be distinguished: 'the first in the form: What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes? the second in the form: What kind of actions ought we to perform?' G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. viii. For Moore, one intuits the simple non-natural properties of 'good' and 'bad': 'That which is meant by "good" is, in fact, except its converse "bad", the *only* simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics'. Ibid., p. 5.

the objectivity of the thought to which it is given, what is given is seen as *compromising* it: those features of the world that are picked out as relevant to the satisfaction of a subjective desire are thereby thought of as themselves *subjective*. But for McDowell, that the reasons for acting are 'internal' should not to be construed, as the neo-Humean picture construes them, as necessarily appealing to some given *inside* the agent. Rather, they are 'internal' to a public perspective, a way of cognizing and evaluating situations that is capable of being shared. Thus McDowell's thoughts here would seem to run along lines parallel to those exhibited in his anti-Cartesian form of direct perceptual realism, and yet what is at issue in this case is not a *mere* judgement as to the nature of something, but an *evaluative* judgement – a judgement about whether that which is judged lives up to some type of appropriate standard or expresses a particular value or meaning.[23]

This *perspectival* construal of what it is that makes something 'internal' in our practical reasoning comes to the fore in McDowell's idea that moral upbringing requires the child's initiation into the 'conceptual space' borne by tradition 'by way of being taught to admire and delight in actions in the right way'. The conceptual space is 'the one we move in as we read the subsequent character sketches of possessors of the particular virtues' and it is 'organized by the concepts of the noble and the disgraceful'.[24] It is this *public* space structured by evaluatively 'thick' concepts, then, that articulates the way in which the salience of some situation will be disclosed for an agent with the right character, and it will provide a space of reasons for acting for that agent. Thus, on this picture, reasons for acting will be internal to this space, but *external* with respect to any of the agent's individual private motivations. Thus 'ethical external reasons' McDowell notes 'are not external to ethics',[25] that is, not external to the reasons that can count in 'phronetic' deliberation and evaluation, although they *are* external to the private sources of egoistic motivation.

[23] Any parallels between McDowell and Moore on this issue seem significant in light of the view offered by Thomas Baldwin that Moore's position in *Principia Ethica* is, in fact, 'best reconstructed (I do not say interpreted) as an incomplete Kantian theory. But what it crucially lacks is a foundation in a philosophy which explains how the fundamental principles of morality can be both synthetic and necessary, as Moore, like Kant, takes them to be'. Baldwin, *G. E. Moore*, p. 9.

[24] McDowell, 'Some Issues', p. 39.

[25] McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?' p. 109.

Finally, we might also note that in these works, as in his later 'Sellarsian' writings, McDowell is centrally concerned with combating the effects of a scientistic form of metaphysics in this domain. Thus against Bernard Williams, who concedes much to the type of picture of practical reason that McDowell holds, but relativizes it by denying values a place in 'the absolute conception of the world', McDowell challenges the ultimately metaphysical assumptions behind this scientistic identification of objectivity with science. It is only on the basis of such an assumption that one will be forced to think of value in terms of something primarily subjective that is *then* projected onto a 'motivationally inert' world.[26] A wider notion of objectivity is available, he thinks, simply from the normative distinction 'between being right and seeming right',[27] a distinction for which one needs nothing more than the Wittgensteinian idea of 'rule-following', the sort of distinction that is sufficient for understanding the objectivity achievable by the exercise of *phronesis*.[28] In such contexts 'considering the matter aright' means achieving a consideration of things that can be justified in the standards of argument 'internal to some specific ethical outlook, not argument that would somehow win over someone unmoved by what one wants to represent as external reasons'.[29]

McDowell's recourse to Aristotle for the provision of an adequate moral psychology might at first seem to align him with a more general recoil over the latter half of the twentieth century away from the typical alternatives presented within modern moral philosophy – 'Kantian' deontological approaches on the one hand, and various forms of neo-Humean non-cognitivism on the other – and 'back' towards an Aristotelian 'virtue ethics', a recoil such as is found in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, for example.[30] This reading of McDowell would, however, rest on a mistake, as McDowell also employs Aristotle's idea of *phronesis* to re-interpret and

[26] And it is with this that McDowell can make contact with the effort of others to divest the idealists of the bizarre ontological commitments traditionally attributed to them. Against the background of a scientistically conceived world without values, what Hegel had in mind with his idea of *Sittlichkeit* or 'ethical substance' looks as if it requires some supra-individual mind as the source of that value 'projected' onto the world. It is in combating these sorts of assumptions that McDowell is led to the Aristotelian idea of 'second nature' which is also prominent in Hegel's ethical thought.

[27] McDowell, 'Two Sorts of Naturalism', p. 185.

[28] McDowell first introduced this analysis in 'Virtue and Reason' and then developed it in *Mind and World*.

[29] McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?' p. 109.

[30] Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

defend the *Kantian* side of the modern alternative. Thus in a number of essays McDowell effectively re-interprets Kant as, at least implicitly, espousing the type of virtue ethic he otherwise attributes to Aristotle.[31] In these writings McDowell points the way to what has been called for by Michael Slote, a decidedly modern *post-Aristotelian* approach to virtue ethics,[32] and he does so developing a form of thought with parallels to the moral philosopher to whom Slote appeals and whose views Kant had incorporated, the moral sensibility theorist, Francis Hutcheson. Furthermore, regarding McDowell's ethical writings in this way shows his relation to Hegel, and it is this path through Kant's third *Critique*, I suggest, that is the path from Kant to Hegel.

5.2 *Phronesis* and Kantian moral psychology

In 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives' McDowell defends a Kantian position against Philippa Foot's claim for the primacy of *hypothetical* imperatives in morality, but it is clear that McDowell sees himself here as faithful more to the spirit than the actual letter of 'Kantian moral philosophy' as it is generally regarded, as this does not translate into a defence of *categorical* imperatives. Kant, he thinks, was wrong in casting the imperative into the role of the relevant form of thought involved: the fundamental difference that Kant was aiming at with his distinction between two forms of the imperative was rather 'one between different ways in which conceptions of circumstances influence the will; that is, between different ways in which they function in the explanation of behaviour in terms of the agent's reasons. To a virtuous person, certain actions are presented as practically necessary – as Kant might have put it – by his view of certain situations in which he finds himself. The question is whether his conceptions of the relevant facts weigh with him only conditionally on his possession of a desire'.[33] Aristotle's conception of *phronesis*, reinterpreted along the lines of non-technical deliberation, gives us a way of conceiving of action as so explained by appealing to features of the situation to which virtuous agents are appropriately sensitive.

[31] Such an ascription of a 'virtue ethic' to Kant is unusual but not unprecedented. In this regard see Onora O'Neill, 'Kant After Virtue', *Inquiry* 26 (1984), 387–406, and Robert B. Louden, 'Kant's Virtue Ethics', *Philosophy* 61 (1986), 473–89.

[32] See Michael Slote, *Morals from Motives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[33] McDowell, 'Are Moral Requirements', p. 78.

By abstracting away from the form of the imperative in this way, McDowell sketches a picture of Kant's moral philosophy that is far from the rationalistic and formalist Kant of convention. And yet while McDowell writes at considerable arm's length from Kant's texts, a claim of fidelity to the spirit of Kant's moral philosophy is here plausible, as there is a considerable convergence between McDowell's sketch of a re-interpreted Kant, and various more developed 'revisionist' interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy that have emerged over the last few decades.[34] Moreover, in keeping with his general claims about Hegel in *Mind and World*, the image of Kant that one finds sketched in these papers bears a distinctly Hegelian *mien*. McDowell's is a version of Kantian moral philosophy, I suggest, that is refracted as much through the prism of Kant's third *Critique*, the *Critique of Judgement*, as it is the second, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and this is indeed a work that has a particular significance for such revisionist readings of Kant. It is also the work which suggests the greatest degree of continuity between Kant and Hegel.

Since the appearance of the much-read works in which Kant set out his critical version of practical philosophy – *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* – Kant's account of morality has been subject to a recurring form of criticism which was most famously expressed by Hegel himself. This criticism is directed both to the 'rigorism' of Kant's rigid opposing of duty to inclination and to the impractical consequences of its 'formalist' construction. The very abstractness of the moral principles 'deduced' and their dichotomous opposition to more natural principles of human motivation, it has been argued, essentially renders them impossible to apply in concrete situations. Similar objections are voiced within the more Humean types of internalism to approaches, like that of Kant's, that appear to prescribe norms which are *external* to the sorts of patterns of motivation that are natural to beings like ourselves.

However, this 'rigorist' and 'formalist' picture of Kant's practical philosophy, the revisionist Kantians argue, has been based on a one-sided distortion of his views which ignores the fact that there were *two* sides to Kant's project. One side, most centrally developed in the

[34] See, for example, Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), Christine Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Robert B. Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Groundwork and the second *Critique*, is concerned with justifying the objective status of the moral law by its transcendental deduction. But, they add, Kant did not intend to imply that coming to understand the moral law as objective in this way was sufficient for the *exercise* of morality, that is, its application in concrete situations in life. As something able to be applied in the moral actions of concrete psychological subjects like ourselves the moral law was subject to *subjective* conditions. As Kant put it in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (a work which had tended to elude discussion in the analytic reception of Kant), the demonstration of the objective conditions of the moral law itself stood in need of a complementary moral psychology or, as Kant named it, 'moral anthropology', which forms a 'counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole' and which deals with 'the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in *fulfilling* the laws of a metaphysics of morals'.[35] Reconstructing this complementary counterpart left undeveloped by Kant has been central to the project of these revisionist Kantians.

Viewed from such a perspective, Kant's moral anthropology deals with just those features of Aristotle's conception of *phronesis* to which McDowell appeals. Thus, for example, Barbara Herman has pointed to Kant's concern with moral education to the extent that it will inculcate principles of moral salience able to 'structure an agent's perception of his situation so that what he perceives is a world with moral features. They enable him to pick out those elements of his circumstances or of his proposed actions that require moral attention ... Typically they are acquired in childhood as part of socialization; they provide a practical framework within which people act'. Such rules of moral salience will effectively constitute the 'structure of moral sensitivity' of such a moral agent.[36]

Appeal to the *perceptual* 'sensitivity' here to salient features of practical situations, sensitivity to certain species of value and disvalue, suggests a type of capacity analogous to that of aesthetic taste. In this respect, not only has the revived interest in Kant's anthropology specifically directed

[35] Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 10 (6.217). Cf. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 'morals needs anthropology for its *application* to human beings', p. 23 (4.412)). Morals 'require a judgement sharpened by experience, partly to distinguish in what cases they are applicable and partly to provide them with access to the will of the human being and efficacy for his fulfilment of them; for the human being is affected by so many inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective *in concreto* in the conduct of his life'. Ibid., p. 3 (4.389).

[36] Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgement*, pp. 77–8.

attention to Kant's aesthetics, but McDowell too has utilized just these parallels in his account of the type of sensitive perception of saliences that virtue requires. Thus, the type of moral education that results in virtue will involve, he says, 'getting someone to see [a circumstance] in the special way in which a virtuous person would see it. In the attempt to do so, one exploits contrivances similar to those one exploits in other areas where the task is to back up the injunction "See it like this": helpful juxtapositions of cases, descriptions with carefully chosen terms and carefully placed emphasis, and the like. (Compare, for instance, what one might do and say to someone who says "Jazz sounds to me like a mess, a mere welter of uncoordinated noise.") ... That, together with the importance of rhetorical skills to their successful deployment, sets them apart from the sorts of thing we typically regard as paradigms of argument'.[37] These are not the sort of practices we regard as 'paradigms of argument' presumably because we typically appeal to the type of deductive 'rule–case' model. As he cites approvingly of Bernard Williams, moral reasoning involves the imagination and should be thought of as a type of 'heuristic'.[38]

Here as elsewhere, McDowell is concerned to avoid the oscillating alternatives served up by contemporary analytic philosophical culture. Against the ethical non-cognitivist who denies that evaluative judgements such as moral or aesthetic ones can be anything more than a projection onto a motivationally indifferent world of some subjective response, McDowell makes the point that such a view looks plausible only as an alternative to an obviously unattractive intuitionistic realism.[39] For example, clearly there is something amiss with the idea of events as 'funny' or 'humorous', if this quality is taken as somehow existing independently of the capacity to laugh – that there is something amiss, we might say, with the idea of events as funny or humorous 'in themselves'. But this does not warrant our assuming that the quality of being funny is thereby simply to be explained in terms of the projection of something 'subjective' *onto* the world: 'what exactly is it that we are to conceive as projected on to the world so as to give rise to our idea that things are funny? "An inclination to laugh" is not a satisfactory answer;

[37] McDowell, 'Are Moral Requirements', pp. 85–6. 'But these seem insufficient grounds for concluding that they are appeals to passion as opposed to reason: for concluding that 'See it like this' is really a covert invitation to feel, quite over and above one's view of the facts, a desire that will combine with one's belief to recommend acting in the appropriate way'.

[38] McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons', p. 97.

[39] McDowell, 'Projection and Truth in Ethics', p. 157.

projecting an inclination to laugh would not necessarily yield an apparent instance of the comic, since laughter can signal, for instance, embarrassment just as well as amusement. Perhaps the right response cannot be identified except as amusement; and perhaps amusement cannot be understood except as finding something comic . . . The suggestion is that there is no self-contained prior fact of our subjective lives that could enter into a projective account of the relevant way of thinking; in the only relevant response, the conceptual apparatus that figures in the relevant way of thinking is already in play'.[40] Undermining the projectivist's idea here of a 'self-contained prior fact of our subjective lives' is effectively McDowell's practical version of the critique of the myth of the given, the myth of the *endogenously* given.

McDowell clearly regards the meaningfulness of a value-concept such as 'funny' or 'humorous' as bound up with some affective response characterizing us as natural beings, and such an attempt to uncouple this form of ethical-internalism from a commonly associated non-cognitivism would seem to converge with Brandom's inferentialism. On Brandom's Sellarsian account of perception, *all* perceptual judgements involve responsive dispositions of some type: why then should we think there is anything that threatens the objectivity of a judgement like 'this is funny' if a perceptual judgement such as 'this is blue' is equally dependent on responsive dispositions?

Robert Brandom has indeed suggested that the concepts used in judgements about what he calls 'normative facts' are underpinned by reliable differential responsive dispositions in the same way that applies to the model of colour concepts. Thus, in an essay on Sellars's account of perception he notes that 'in Sellars's sense, one who mastered reliable differential responsive dispositions noninferentially to apply *normative* vocabulary would be directly observing normative facts',[41] and he goes on to suggest that the 'courage, sensitivity, cruelty, justice, and so on' that we refer to with the use of 'thick moral concepts' might be considered as unproblematically observable as any other perceivable properties.[42]

[40] McDowell, 'Projection and Truth in Ethics', p. 158. Cf. Wiggins, 'Amusement . . . is a reaction we have to characterize by reference to its proper object, via something perceived as funny (or incongruous or comical or whatever). There is no object-independent and property-independent, 'purely phenomenological' or 'purely introspective' account of amusement. And equally there is no saying what exactly the funny is without reference to laughter or amusement or kindred reactions'. 'A Sensible Subjectivism?' in *Needs, Values, Truth*, p. 195.

[41] Robert Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, p. 363.

[42] Ibid., p. 367.

Elsewhere, commenting on McDowell's view that 'normative facts are non-inferentially knowable' he observes that: 'It has always seemed to me to be one of the great advantages of the account of observational knowledge in terms of reliable differential responsive dispositions to apply concepts non-inferentially that it makes perfect sense of these claims. If I have mastered the use of some normative vocabulary (whether pertaining to meanings, or to how it is proper to behave non-linguistically), and if I can be trained reliably to apply it non-inferentially, as a differential response to the occurrence of normatively specified states of affairs, then I can have observational knowledge of those normative states of affairs: I can *see* (or at least *perceive*) what it is appropriate to do or say. Normative concepts are no worse off than concepts like *mu meson* in terms of their capacity to acquire observational uses'.[43]

As we have seen, McDowell thinks of evaluative judgements as capable of existing in a 'space of reasons', and thinks of the capacity to make such judgements as contingent on a type of 'training', an upbringing of the right (aesthetic, moral, etc.) kind, and in these works he too appeals to similar conceptions of rule-following, derived, however, from the later work of Wittgenstein rather than of Sellars. It is precisely their responsiveness to *reasons* which rescues the cognitivity of such judgements from their being reduced to the status of mere responsive dispositions of the organism. But Brandom's apparent assimilation of the form of judgements like 'this joke is funny' or 'that act is obnoxious' to a model exemplified by 'this is blue' seems to route all normativity to the social norms governing our conceptual responses to the world. The norms surrounding the feature 'blue', are fundamentally norms governing the application of the *predicate* 'blue'. There is no real sense to be given to the idea that there are things that 'ought' *to be* blue in some non-instrumental sense of ought.[44] But the phenomena that McDowell is concerned with are normative in a stronger sense than this. Jokes are simply supposed *to be* funny, for example – it is a requirement of the *sort* of things to which jokes belong. In short, on McDowell's model it is the perceived value of the thing that is meant *to be* the reason for the adoption of a certain orientation towards it.

[43] Robert Brandom, 'Placing McDowell's Empiricism', in Nicholas H. Smith (ed.), *Reading McDowell: On Mind and World* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 103.

[44] It is significant here that Aristotle explicitly discounts as a model of the type of perception involved in this type of judgement the perception of 'qualities peculiar to one sense', hence the model of *colour* perception. See Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, bk. 6, ch. 8, 1142a23–31.

Moreover, neither would it seem that evaluative judgements understood on the model of Kant's third *Critique* be conflated with non-evaluative ones in the way Brandom's suggests. Kant's insistence on the role of the felt subjective response – the role of the feeling of a peculiarly disinterested pleasure taken in the beautiful, for example – bears on the issue of an individual's *entitlement* to the judgement in question in a way that is appropriate to evaluative qualities, but not non-evaluative ones. Imagine, for example, the sociologist of humour who both *lacked* a sense of humour herself and had acquired a good knowledge about which characteristics of jokes typically elicited humorous responses in others. This knowledge would presumably enable her to be a reliable responder to the presence or absence of humour in jokes, and it is easy enough imagining her learning to express this knowledge in ways like her less comically challenged fellows. Moreover, she would also presumably be likely to be able to offer *reasons* for 'finding' *this* joke but not *that* one funny. (Indeed, given the way that she had acquired her humour detector she might be able to do the latter task *better* than many of her fellows who just 'know' that such and such a joke is funny, but cannot say why.) Nevertheless, one might have strong intuitions about the sociologist not knowing much about *humour*, albeit knowing a lot about its sociology. Lacking any independent sense of humour this person, we might feel, is not really *entitled* to have a judgement. There is no way that we can see her judgements as being distinctively *hers*, and that seems an important consideration for these types of matters: a *sense* of humour, we might say, is part of one's *character* that is *expressed* in one's disposition to react to jokes.

5.3 Kant and the fate of Hutchesonian 'moral sensibilism'

McDowell's approach to perceptual discernment of moral value has been described as a version of 'sensibility theory', a description that suggests points of contact with the sort of 'moral sense theory' that was classically found in the eighteenth century with Francis Hutcheson.[45] Indeed, Hutcheson too seems to confound the usual modern classification. On the one hand, Hutcheson like Hume appealed to the central role played by natural affective responses in evaluative judgements, and

[45] Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (in the synoptic 'Toward *fin de siècle* Ethics: Some Trends', *The Philosophical Review*, 101, 1 (1992), 115–89) refer to McDowell and David Wiggins as 'sensibility theorists' but do not draw any historical connection with moral sense theorists.

this, in the eyes of interpreters like Kemp Smith, has been enough to class him as, like Hume, a non-cognitivist.[46] And yet, when the stress is placed on the normativity of such judgement, Hutcheson had been regarded as a type of moral *realist*.[47] Nevertheless, on this issue one thing seems clear: if a 'realist' interpretation is able to be secured for Hutcheson's sensibilism it would seem to come at a considerable metaphysical cost, indeed, the cost of just that type of metaphysical conception of the universe which McDowell abjures. As a theist, Hutcheson could countenance the idea that we had been created by God in just such a way to make our natural reactions respond to just those morally salient aspects of the world which would make the actions based on them moral. Thus:

> The weakness of our reason, and the avocations arising from the infirmities and necessities of our nature, are so great that very few men could ever have formed those long deductions of reason which show some actions to be in the whole advantageous to the agent and their contraries pernicious. The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than some moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservations of our bodies. He has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action, and made virtue a lovely form, that we might easily distinguish it from its contrary, and be made happy by the pursuit of it.[48]

But if McDowell is not served well by being compared with Hutcheson for just this reason, then perhaps he would be better served by comparison with a thinker who attempted to hold onto aspects of Hutcheson's thought while extracting it from its metaphysical frame, and this, I suggest, is just what was attempted by Kant.

In his pre-critical period Kant had indeed been well-disposed to Hutcheson's type of moral sensibilism. '*Hutcheson* and others' he notes in his 'Prize essay' of 1764 'have, under the name of moral feeling (*des moralischen Gefühls*), provided us with a starting point from which to

[46] Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan, 1941), p. 29. Also William Frankena, 'Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16 (1955), 356–75.

[47] David Fate Norton, 'Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory Reconsidered', *Dialogue* 13 (1974), 3–23; 'Hutcheson on Perception and Moral Perception,' *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 59 (1977), 181–97; and 'Hutcheson's Moral Realism' in *David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[48] Francis Hutcheson, 'Preface to the Two Inquiries', in *Philosophical Writings* ed. R. S. Downie (London: J. M. Dent, 1994), pp. 4–5.

develop some excellent observations',[49] and Kant's lectures in moral philosophy around the same time show the same sympathetic attitude.[50] Yet such a view could not withstand the critical turn in Kant's thought, and already by around 1770, he had radically revised his views on moral feeling. Thus he notes in his lectures on ethics from around this time, 'The doctrine of moral feeling is more a hypothesis to explain the phenomenon of approval that we give to some kinds of actions than one which could determine maxims and first principles that hold objectively and tell us how we should approve or reject something, or act or refrain from acting',[51] and from this time on, according to Manfred Kuehn, Kant began 'to emphasize the *dependence* of moral feeling on a logically prior and independent rational principle'. Thus, as Kuehn quotes from Kant's lectures: '*The moral feeling is not an original feeling*. It is based on a necessary internal law that makes us view and feel ourselves from an external point of view ... The conditions without which the approval of an action cannot be universal (cannot stand under a universal principle of reason) are *moral* ... The approval of an action cannot be universal, if it does not contain grounds for approval that are without any relation to the sensible motives of the actor'.[52]

And yet throughout his critical period there are indications of a continuing favourable attitude on the part of Kant to Hutcheson's moral sense theory despite the overt dogmatic metaphysics underpinning it. Thus, in the *Groundwork* he asserts that 'On the other hand, moral feeling – this supposed special sense (however superficial the appeal to it is, inasmuch as those who cannot *think* believe they can help themselves out by feeling in what has to do merely with universal law, and however little feelings, which by nature differ infinitely from one another in degree, can furnish a uniform standard of good and evil, and one cannot

[49] Kant, 'Inquiry Concerning the Distinctions of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality', in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, p. 274 (2:300).

[50] Thus Manfred Kuehn comments that: 'The notes on moral philosophy show that Kant did indeed take the moral sense to be the basis of morality. He talked of Hutcheson and claimed that "one should investigate the feeling of the *natural man*, and this is better than our artificial one: Rousseau has visited (*aufgesucht*) it". The "supreme law of morality is: act according to nature. My reason can err; my moral feeling only when I uphold custom before natural feeling"'. Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, p. 131. The internal quotes from Kant are from Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. Peter Heath and J. B Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 5 (27.1, 6) (but the translation here is Kuehn's).

[51] Quoted in Kuehn, *Kant*, p. 201 (19:116f).

[52] Kuehn, *Kant*, p. 202, internal quote from Kant (19.103).

judge validly for others by means of one's feeling) – nevertheless remains closer to morality and its dignity inasmuch as it shows virtue the honour of ascribing to her *immediately* the delight and esteem we have for her and does not, as it were, tell her to her face that it is not her beauty but only our advantage that attaches us to her'.[53] Here we must remember that while, with the critical turn, Kant had dismissed the sorts of metaphysically teleological ideas of the type presupposed in moral sense theory, he nevertheless allowed, in fact *required*, that such ideas continue to play a *regulative role* in cognitive life, both in the pursuit of scientific knowledge and of morality, in the latter, for example, in the form of the *postulates* of pure practical reason. Thus, while not entering into the consideration of the *objective* conditions of morality, such teleological notions were exactly the sort of ideas that played a crucial role with the *subjective* conditions of morality, and so as relevant from the point of view of 'moral anthropology'. In particular, Kant attempted to give an account of the role of *respect* [*Achtung*] qua *moral feeling* as part of what has been described as a 'theory of moral sensibility' akin to the role played by the Transcendental Aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[54] Furthermore, as a number of commentators have pointed out, after the second *Critique* aesthetic considerations came to play a more central role in Kant's moral anthropology,[55] and so in this respect, we might say that for Kant, Hutcheson's link between aesthetic and moral response remained to the fore.

For Kant, in order for the moral law to be applied to concrete situations, that is, in order for pure reason to be 'practical', what were needed

[53] Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 49 (4.442–3). Kant adds in a note, however, that 'I count the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness that something affords, whether this happens immediately and without a view to advantage or with regard for it. One must likewise, with Hutcheson, count the principle of sympathy with the happiness of others under the moral sense assumed by him'.

[54] Andrews Reath, 'Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination', *Kant-Studien* 80 (1989), 284–302. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant points out that in contrast to the first *Critique*, here the 'Aesthetic of pure practical reason' which concerns 'the relation of pure practical reason to sensibility [*Sinnlichkeit*] and ... its necessary influence upon sensibility to be cognized a priori, that is, ... *moral feeling* [*vom moralischen Gefühle*]' must follow the 'Analytic'. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 76 (5.90).

[55] Thus Munzel, for example, comments on the 'seminal role' played by the *Critique of Judgement* 'in Kant's moral thought; specifically, in relation to the task of reason becoming subjectively practical'. G. Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The 'Critical' Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgement* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 126.

were ways in which moral ideas could be presented or exhibited (*dargestellt*) in *sensible* form, and Kant increasingly appealed to the relevance of aesthetic experience in this regard. For example, in the third *Critique* Kant appeals to beauty as able to function as a 'symbol' of morality,[56] and gives an indirect but important moral significance to the experience of the sublime in nature.[57] However, as Paul Guyer has shown by tracing these issues through Kant's lectures on anthropology through the 1770s and 1780s, the way in which the experience of beauty counted in the application of morality changed throughout this period, culminating in Kant's mature view as expressed in the *Critique of Judgement* in 1790.[58] Effectively, then, we might describe as a subsidiary project of Kant's third *Critique* the articulation of a *critical* version of the moral sense theory that he had always admired in Hutcheson and that he had alluded to in the *Critique of Practical Reason* with his discussion of respect. It is this developing *critical* version of moral sensibilism, I contend, that looks like a precursor to McDowell's project. But it also provides an important link to Hegel's post-Kantianism. Following Guyer's presentation of Kant's development here, we can single out two important transformations in his approach to taste which allowed this.

Guyer points out that in the 1770s Kant changed his views about the origin of aesthetic pleasure. By 1770, Kant had already settled upon his 'transcendental' separation of sensibility and understanding as modes of representation, thus depriving Baumgarten's rational intuitionist view of beauty the normativity that accrued to it in virtue of it being the clear but confused idea of a logical perfection. In line with this distinction, in Kant's lectures from 1772–73 'he argues that our pleasure in beauty is occasioned by the harmony between an object and the laws of our sensibility alone. An object is beautiful simply if it agrees with the laws of human sensibility and by so doing facilitates its own intuition'.[59] After the mid-1770s, however, 'Kant will argue that our pleasure in a beautiful object is caused by the harmonious play between imagination and understanding that it induces'.[60] This idea of aesthetic pleasure as

[56] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 59.

[57] Ibid., § 29. On the link between the experience of the sublime and what for Kant is the only genuinely moral feeling, *respect*, see § 27.

[58] Paul Guyer, 'Beauty, Freedom, and Morality: Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* and the Development of His Aesthetic Theory', in Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (eds.), *Essays on Kant's Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[59] Guyer, 'Beauty, Freedom, and Morality', p. 142.

[60] Ibid., pp. 141–2.

reflecting an achieved harmony between the sensible and intelligible forms in turn allowed Kant during the 1780s to develop ideas about the *moral* role of aesthetic judgement that came to be expressed in terms of his treatment of aesthetic genius, the moral relevance of the sublime, and the 'aesthetic idea'. But what Kant finally and crucially added to his consideration of aesthetic judgement, Guyer claims, was the connection with *teleology* which was achieved by the innovation of the idea of *reflective* judgement.[61]

I suggest that in the *Critique of Judgement* Kant was endeavouring to give expression to a type of Hutchesonian aestheticized moral sense theory within the critical framework. The third *Critique*, we might say, further developed the possibility of a type of theory of moral sensibility alluded to in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and it did so in a way parallel to that argued for by McDowell in the 1980s, providing an analogue of McDowell's 'partially re-enchanted nature'. The key here was the notion of reflective judgement which enabled sense to be made of judgements about value properties, both of aesthetic phenomena such as the beautiful and the sublime, and, by extension, moral phenomena, such as the moral character expressed in actions. Aesthetic judgement is central in the link of Kant to Hegel, because, I will argue, of the degree to which Hegel's account of recognition draws on central ideas from Kant's conception of reflective judgement.

5.4 Reflective judgement and aesthetic community

A key innovation introduced in the *Critique of Judgement* is that of the distinction between two forms of judgement, determinative and reflective. In the unpublished 'First Introduction' to the *Critique*, Kant introduces the distinction in this way: 'Judgement can be regarded either as mere[ly] an ability to *reflect*, in terms of a certain principle, on a given presentation so as to [make] a concept possible, or as an ability to *determine* an underlying concept by means of a given empirical presentation. In the first case it is the *reflective*, in the second the *determinative*, *power of judgement*. To *reflect* (or consider [*überlegen*]) is to hold given representations up to, and compare them with, either other representations or one's cognitive power itself, in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible'.[62]

[61] Ibid., pp. 137–8.
[62] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, pp. 399–400 (20.211).

The idea is perhaps clearest in the case of teleological judgements: it is because I *am* an agent capable of purposeful acting, that is, acting on the basis of a concept I have of the intended goal, that I can judge organisms as exhibiting an analogous purposiveness. One understands an organism 'as if' an end, purpose or design is built into and manifest in its structure and processes. It might be said (paraphrasing Dennett[63]) that for Kant we are capable of adopting a 'teleological stance' towards organisms because we are ourselves capable of acting for ends, but there is the suggestion in Kant of a reversed dependency as well: we are capable of acting for ends because of our capacity to cognize the world *from* such a teleological stance. The situation in the context of aesthetic judgement is in ways parallel, in ways different. It concerns a type of teleology that is subjective and manifested in our feelings rather than external to us as perceived in the functional organization of organisms. Examining the conditions of evaluative judgement in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* allows us to grasp the outlines in Kant of an approach to rational intersubjectivity which clearly prefigures aspects of Hegel's well-known approach to intersubjective recognition. Kant notes that if an individual subject is aware that their liking for something is without interest, then they must regard the thing itself as containing the ground for its universal liking. 'If someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone'.[64]

The idea that the object itself must contain the ground for my liking of it seems to come about by a type of disjunctive inference. Either my interest must be the ground of my liking, or this ground must be in the object itself. I am conscious that my interest is *not* involved, therefore it must be the thing itself that is responsible.[65] But if the thing itself is the ground, then the judgement must involve a type of rational intuition of the object's value. In the framework of Hegel's 'shapes of consciousness', we can think of this as an orientation toward value-laden objects akin to that of 'perception'. In Kant's next (long) sentence in this paragraph, however, he shifts his position. It is now no longer the *thing itself* that is appealed to as the explaining ground of the subject's disinterestedness;

[63] Daniel C. Dennett, *The Intentional Stance* (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1987).

[64] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 6 (5.211).

[65] This process has a clear *Fichtean* ring. Positing my own interest as negated goes together with the counter-positing of some quality in the object responsible for my liking.

rather, it is the subject's own *freedom* that must be the ground of its own disinterestedness. Moreover, Kant adds, this freedom is also something that can be presupposed in others. Thus: 'the judging (person) feels himself fully free in consideration of the pleasures which he devotes to the object: in this way then he can discover no private conditions as the grounds of liking on which he alone is dependent, and must regard it as grounded in something that he can presuppose in each other person'.[66]

We grasp, then, that it is the subject's recognition of himself and others *as* free, in the sense of each being capable of overcoming their own narrowly egocentric point of view, that is the true 'ground' of normative judgement. 'Consequently [this judge] must believe he has grounds to demand a similar liking from everyone'.[67] And with this so conceived social network of reciprocal *demands* for agreement we now have something that looks like the idea of reciprocal recognition developed by Fichte in the context of a theory of *rights*, and generalized by Hegel to a theory of the intersubjective conditions of human freedom and rationality. However, appealing again to the Hegelian array of shapes of consciousness, we have moved from a position like that of Perception, to one more akin to that of 'the Understanding' or its practical equivalent, where the grasp of an object's *essence* takes the form of a grasp of the law describing its *interactions* with other objects. That is, we are to conceive of the 'ground' of the aesthetic liking we have of objects as the normative interactive community to which we belong. On the analogy with Kant's moral philosophy, it might be said that in addressing my judgement to another I am addressing them as worthy of 'respect' and am simultaneously offering my own judgement as an act that is *itself* worthy of respect. I claim for myself, and demand of the other, that the aesthetic claims that pass between us express a type of quasi-moral character, the character of a person whose actions are not determined by their own narrow interests.[68]

The idea of an intersubjective ground for our judgements of taste is perhaps most visible in Kant's discussion of '*sensus communis*'. Judgements of taste lack the type of 'determinate objective principle' that would allow anyone making such a judgement to claim

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid. The translation has been modified.

[68] While this is the case for all judgements of taste, it is most obvious in the case of judgements of the sublime. When we contemplate the beautiful, we contemplate it as *indifferent* to our interest; in experiences of the *sublime* however, we esteem something that exists in *opposition* to our interests. Cf. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, p. 127 (5.267).

unconditional necessity for it. On the other hand, they differ from the interested judgements concerning the merely *agreeable* (judgements of 'the mere taste of sense' based in our individual desires), for which the idea of necessity or lawfulness does not even arise. Judgements of taste must then have a 'subjective principle, which determines only by feeling rather than by concepts, though nonetheless with universal validity, what is liked or disliked'.[69] Kant appeals to the criterion of universal communicability that he had invoked in the section 'On having an opinion, knowing, and believing' in the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method' of the first *Critique*.[70] But here, what needs to be so communicated is the appropriate *feeling* held towards the presentation in question, and so, Kant claims, the principle can only be identified with an existing 'common sense'.[71]

In his discussion of 'common sense' Henry Allison compares the role played by it as a subjective principle of taste to that played by pure intuition in the case of mathematics as treated in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. There 'Kant was concerned to uncover the condition under which mathematical knowledge could be both synthetic and *a priori* (a seemingly impossible combination). The answer provided was that such knowledge is possible only on the assumption of an underlying pure or *a priori* intuition (a likewise seemingly impossible combination), which is claimed to be possible, however, just in case this intuition contains nothing but a pure form of sensibility. What now needs explaining is something that seems equally paradoxical, namely, a *feeling* (something inherently private), which is connected with a claim of universal communicability. Thus, the idea of a common sense, as the only condition under which such a claim regarding a mere feeling is possible, plays precisely the same role in the case of taste as that of a pure intuition does in the case of mathematics'.[72] Allison's claim here thus fits in with comments made by others concerning the way that issues to do with the interaction of *practical* reason and our sensible natures hints at a 'theory of moral sensibility' in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*.[73] The idea seems to be that we can think of the 'space' of common sense, the framework that allows us to grasp objects in terms of their evaluative

[69] Ibid, § 20, (5.238).
[70] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A820–1/B848–9.
[71] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 21 (5.238–9) and § 40 (5.293–96).
[72] Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 148–9.
[73] Reath, 'Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility', p. 285, and footnote 4.

qualities, as analogous to the framework of pure intuition as that which allows us to grasp perceptual objects that are subject to our conceptual predications. Thus Philip Stratton-Lake notes that 'just as space is something which is necessarily presupposed in all sensible experience, so moral feeling is a necessary and universal ingredient of moral experience'.[74] But we have seen (in Chapter 3, section 3) a way to circumvent the rather confusing analogy of the role of space and time here. Kant's late pre-critical position is to deal with the peculiarities of the concepts of space and time in terms of the polar and ego-centric nature of their oppositions, conceptual structures generated within a term logic that were shared by other concept pairs, such as those of good and evil, pleasure and displeasure, and desire and aversion.

I have suggested throughout that among the devices used by Hegel in his attempt to extract the 'spirit' of Kantianism from its 'letter' by abandoning the idea of intuition as some non-conceptual given was his incorporation into *conceptual* structure of the idea of reciprocally opposed directionality that Kant in the critical period had regarded as characterizing the form of empirical intuition and, in the 'official' position, as something 'non-conceptual'. More specifically Hegel treats them as characterizing the categorial structure of a term-based 'being-logic' and as exhibiting the contrariety of the type of reciprocal limitation of the 'this' and 'that'. These in turn become the contrarily opposed predicates inhering in Aristotle's 'primary substances', the objects that Hegel treats as objects of 'Perception', the internal structure of which introduces a different sense of negation corresponding to 'predicate denial' and holding between the thing's *essential* and *inessential* properties. But we now have before us a further issue in relation to Aristotle. Aristotle's concept of essence was a strongly *normative* one: a thing's essence defines not simply what it is but how it *ought to be*. To the extent that the idea of essence has been brought back into twentieth-century analytic philosophy it has been deprived of this normative character, however: a thing's essence is just made up of those properties which that thing shares with others which behave in the same law-like ways. But the link between evaluative judgements and essences in Kant and Hegel restores this normative notion of essence. In fact, if we follow Hegel's account of the evolution of Aristotle's account of 'essence' we see that it inherits this evaluative dimension from the distinctly *value-laden*

[74] Philip Stratton-Lake, *Kant, Duty and Moral Worth* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 32.

polar concepts which were integrated into it: the polar pairs of the pre-Socratics.

5.5 The pre-Socratic origins of Aristotle's evaluative polarities

As we have seen, in *Categories*, Aristotle notes that while primary substances never have contrary qualities at the same time, they nevertheless are characterized by the capacity to be recipients of *contrary qualifications* at *different times*.[75] The actual example given immediately after this claim is striking as to the predicates chosen: 'One and the same individual at one time is white, warm or good, at another time black, cold or bad'.[76] We have also mentioned the apparent source of such contraries in the ontology of the pre-Socratics who thought of the world as populated by 'quality things', those 'abstract particulars' that seem to be taken over by Plato in some of his writings. Aristotle's decisive innovation here had been to move from a conception of everyday spatio–temporal objects as 'leaky bundles' of such abstract particulars to the conception of them as 'substrates' within which properties inhered. But, as treated in the *Metaphysics*, qua *matter* this substrate required a *form*, and so the individual object bearing these contrarily contrastive properties needed to be grasped as an instance of a kind, a 'this such'. However, as the list of contraries given above suggests, it would seem that Aristotle had also carried over something *else* from the pre-Socratic contraries. This was the differential *evaluative* charge that marked these opposed abstract particulars.

In his *Polarity and Analogy in Early Greek Thought* Geoffrey Lloyd has pointed to the significance played by the evaluative oppositions of pre-Socratic philosophical thought in Greece.[77] As Lloyd points out, the cosmological fragments of the pre-Socratics are pervaded by pairs of evaluatively opposed terms that seem to be loosely linked in analogical series. Aristotle had attributed the doctrine that 'most human things go in pairs' to Alcmaeon, and had linked this idea to the 'Table of Opposites' of the Pythagoreans.[78] But as Lloyd indicates, opposites were also common within 'the principles or elements' on which other early Greek

[75] Aristotle, *Categories*, V, 4a10.
[76] Ibid., V, 4a19–21.
[77] G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).
[78] Ibid., p. 16.

ontologies were based, citing not only Anaximander, Parmenides, Empedocles, and, with a distinctive twist which asserted the 'unity' of these opposites, Heraclitus,[79] but also the peculiarly dualistic medical doctrines of the Hippocratics.[80] In turn, Lloyd suggests, this type of crude categorical classification seems to have been linked to the predominance of *disjunctive* and *analogical* forms of arguments among the pre-Socratics. Thus while 'it is manifestly not the case that all the arguments and explanations' were of these two types, it is, nevertheless 'undeniable', claims Lloyd, that they were particularly common.[81] Moreover, Lloyd points out, nor were the early Greeks unique in this regard: similarly dualistically structured cosmologies have been found in a variety of pre-literate, pre-modern communities, as the work of ethnographers following in the tradition of Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss has demonstrated.[82]

Aristotle thought of the spatial determinations of up and down as exemplary of such ego-centric contrary pairs, and in relation to this the investigations by pre-modern, pre-literate communities by the Durkheimian scholar Heinrich Hertz seem particularly relevant, as it was Hertz who emphasized the role of *handedness* in the schemes of thought of such communities.[83] Hertz argued that such oppositions were generated out of the fundamental bodily-centred distinction between left and right that was in turn *symbolically* identified with the opposed secular and sacred realms respectively. Thus, by association, that side of a pair of opposites that was associated with the right rather than the left would thereby come to be valorized over its opposite. For Aristotle, however, it would seem that all three dimensions – right–left, front–back, and, especially, up–down – were marked by evaluative polarity. Thus commenting on the 'essentially psychological' orientation

[79] Ibid., pp. 16–17.
[80] Ibid., p. 22.
[81] Ibid., p. 431.
[82] Ibid., p. 28. The classic work in this regard is E. Durkheim and M. Mauss, '*Essai sur quelques formes primitives de classification*'. *L'Année Sociologique* 6 (1903), 1–72. The Pythagorean table of ten opposites are given by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, bk. I, ch v, 986a 25–9, as limited and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurality, right and left, male and female, at rest and moving, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and evil, square and oblong. These may be considered representative in its inclusion of right and left, male and female, and good and bad, in the way thematized by Durkheim and Mauss.
[83] Heinrich Hertz, '*Le Prééminence de la main droite: étude sur la polarité religieuse*', *Revue philosophique* 68 (1909), 552–80, translated as 'The Pre–eminence of the Right Hand: A Study in Religious Polarity', in Rodney Needham (ed.), *Right and Left: Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

of his account of the corporeal axes of living creatures, Lloyd has noted that for Aristotle 'these three pairs are not just spatial differentiations, nor are they value-neutral. They are each defined, so far as the animal body goes, in terms of a particular faculty of the soul: thus up is the direction of growth and that from which nourishment is taken in, right is the principle or beginning of movement, and front the principle of perception. These theories incorporate value-judgements – for the three terms that are principles are superior to their contraries – and they are invoked in a whole series of detailed explanations of anatomical and zoological facts, such as the relative positions of the windpipe and oesophagus, those of the two kidneys, and the position of the heart, down to such questions as why in general the right claw of crabs and crawfish is bigger than the left'.[84] In fact, Aristotle uses natural movement in his attempt to give a *non*-ego-centric sense to these directions, an attempt which is intuitively most plausible in the case of up and down, in which the natural movements of fire and earth respectively are invoked.[85] And this too, is the opposition in which the evaluative polarity is most obvious.[86] As Lakoff and Johnson have shown in their study of the role of metaphor in everyday life, this type of evaluative differential is fundamental: 'up is good!'[87]

In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle attributes a certain primacy to spatial opposites among the various forms of opposition found, noting that 'in defining *all* contraries, we seem to have space in our minds. For we call those things contrary which, being also within the same class, are *most distant* the one from the other'.[88] Elsewhere, he nominates right, above, front as all differentiated from their opposites in the fact that they constitute '*archai*', or starting points or principles,[89] and are thereby

[84] G. E. R. Lloyd, 'Aspects of the Relationship between Aristotle's Psychology and Zoology', in Nussbaum and Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, pp. 154–5.

[85] Aristotle, *Physics*, bk. IV, 208b8–25 and bk. VIII, 261b31–a6. For a helpful discussion of these issues see Benjamin Morison, *On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 38.

[86] In Aristotle this is linked, of course, with the idea that it is only circular movement as manifested by the heavenly bodies that is eternal and, hence, the primary form of movement, and in turn with the idea that God qua prime mover is located at the circumference of the cosmos. See, *Physics*, bk. VIII.

[87] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), ch. 4, 'Orientational Metaphors'. The psychologist Herbert H. Clark has also noted this valorization of the directions of up, front and right. See, Herbert H. Clark, 'Linguistic Processes in Deductive Reasoning', *Psychological Review*, 76 (1969), 387–404.

[88] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI, 6a15–19.

[89] Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, 284b 24ff.

more 'honorable' than their opposites.[90] Lloyd links the persistence of the schematic forms of polarity and analogy in societies to the simplicity and economy of their use in reasoning, and a similar theme has been developed by the French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu into a thesis about the role of oppositions in a 'logic of practice'.[91]

We might think of such Kant-inspired ethnographic studies as now adding some flesh to the skeletal sketch of 'second nature' as a set of 'habits of thought and action' passed down in tradition, the idea that McDowell retrieves from Aristotle and Hegel. Hegel, of course, did not have access to any such detailed ethnographic reconstructions of the determining structures of everyday life, although it is possible to find scattered through his writings many of the relevant ideas, especially that concerning the sex-linked evaluative polarities.[92] At the very least we may suggest that what ethnographic studies of these traditional communities with these largely 'symbolically' articulated categorical systems suggest is that the world into which the young are socialized is in general *not* a world of objects characterized by 'motivationally inert' properties. It is a world of objects, events and situations evaluatively 'coloured' in distinctive opposed ways and linked to each other in highly analogical or metaphorical ways. Indeed, we might hear in Kant's account of the analogically projected polarities of *aesthetic* value an echo of this ancient way of rendering embodied patterns of practical responses to the world.

[90] Aristotle, *Progression of Animals*, 706b 12ff. Moreover, Aristotle quite generally seems to regard change in quality, quantity or place as *movement* between such polar extremes, and as we have seen, the idea of a similarly ego-centric and *spatialized* schema of thought is crucial to Kant's attempt to distinguish intuition and concept.

[91] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). Working broadly in the tradition initiated by Durkheim and Levi-Strauss, Bourdieu has conceived of human practices as needing the articulation provided by socially generated symbolic systems which, in pre-modern societies, are objectified and transmitted in ritual and myth. On the neo-Kantian origins, but Hegelian tendencies of Bourdieu's work see my 'Pierre Bourdieu: From Neo-Kantian to Hegelian Critical Social Theory', *Critical Horizons* 6 (2005), 191–213.

[92] See, for example, his discussion of the polarity of the 'Yang–Yin' system in China in G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 122–3 (18.143–4).

6

KANT, HEGEL AND THE DYNAMICS OF EVALUATIVE REASON

While Kant called his third *Critique*, the *Critique of Judgement*, what the new work added to the critical project was a critique of two specific *kinds* of judgement – aesthetic and teleological judgements. It was then, at least in its first part, a critique of *evaluative* judgement, the type of judgement in which a *value*, specifically an aesthetic value, and not simply a *property*, was assigned to an object. But on an *inferentialist* reading of Kant, this would suggest the existence of a type of *reasoning* within which such judgements operated. After all, for the inferentialist, as Brandom makes clear, a judgement only has the cognitive status of a judgement *qua* its potential status as move in a reason-giving language game. In claiming, in the *Science of Logic*, that 'the syllogism is the truth of the judgement',[1] Hegel points in just this direction. Indeed, as we will see, his attempts to show the truth of this inferentialist claim is made specifically in the context of judgements of this type. To the extent that the claim of the continuity of the philosophies of Hegel and Kant is to be defended, we would then have to find some justification for thinking of Kant's third *Critique* as a critique of *evaluative* reason.

Throughout this book it has been suggested that there are two plausible ways of reading Kant's critical project – represented by Russell's

[1] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 669 (6.359).

phenomenalist reading on one hand, and the more *Aristotelian* reading of McDowell and Sellars, on the other – that effectively hangs on how one is to understand Kantian 'intuition'. On the phenomenalist reading, the content of intuition is understood as an empirical *singular* 'given', such as a 'sense-datum' presented to consciousness in Russellian 'acquaintance'; on the McDowell–Sellars reading, however, the phenomenally presented content of intuition is regarded as an individual instance of a *kind*, a 'this such'. One might then expect this ambiguity to have consequences for understanding Kant's account of reflective judgement. Moreover, this distinction maps onto Kant's peculiarly ambiguous attitude to the cognitive status of the aesthetic judgement.

We might expect on a phenomenalist reading aesthetic 'judgement' to be not really a form of *judgement*, in the Kantian sense, at all. Kant describes aesthetic judgements as singular, but strictly there are, it should be remembered, *no* Kantian singular judgements. On the other hand, to the extent that the Kantian world is, on McDowell's reading, already 'conceptual', there should be no place for any such 'non-conceptual' given: anything that is immediately available in experience should be properly judgeable. Evaluative judgements should therefore be, like any other, capable of placement within the 'logical space of reasons', and we have already seen a suggestion of this in McDowell's work on value from the 1980s. Kant's ambiguous attitude to the cognitive state of aesthetic judgement finds expression in his 'Antinomy of Taste' as well as in his belief that, while we can demand agreement of others on aesthetic matters, we cannot *expect* it. In Hegel, as we will see, it is just this demand *without* expectation that ensures for aesthetic judgement the pragmatic conditions that gives it not only a cognitive status but makes it an *exemplar* of such cognitive status.

6.1 Reasoning about value

A phenomenalist reading of Kant's approach to aesthetic judgement seems to fit neatly with Kant's claim to the *singularity* of aesthetic judgement, as well as its 'formalist' and strictly non-cognitive character. The singularity of these judgements would suggest that what is presented in them is not to be regarded as an instance of some general type and so as free from 'conceptuality'. It is this putative lack of conceptuality that is suggested, for example, by Kant's insistence that when we judge an object aesthetically we abstract away from the question of whether or not it lives up to some norm connected with the *type* of thing it is, a norm

that would be specified by the thing's *concept*.[2] For example, with some botanical knowledge I might assess the flowers of a certain plant in terms of their functional adequacy *qua* reproductive parts of the organism, but when appreciating the *beauty* of the flower I am meant to somehow comprehend the arrangement of its parts in some way *other than* the way I would, *were* I to grasp them functionally.[3] It is just such a suggestion of a type of presentation without the influence of the subject concept that seems to testify to the idea of the object of aesthetic judgement being some type of complex non-conceptual given, some formal arrangement, say, of 'sensory ideas' as in Hutcheson's Lockean picture of the mind and its contents.

On this reading, then, it would seem to be just this non-conceptuality following on from the singularity of aesthetic judgement that testifies to its *non-cognitivity*. Without being presented as already 'subsumed' under a subject concept, there is no way for that intuitive presentation to be incorporated into the subject position of a categorical judgement. The 'predication' involved in saying of some thing that it is beautiful would not really be a genuine case of predication at all, and there could be no fact of the matter as to whether the object is beautiful or otherwise. Thus, strictly it is not *the object* that we should think of as beautiful or not, and in line with the phenomenalist reading, Kant indicates that, rather than its being the object that is found beautiful or ugly, it is its 'representation [*Vorstellung*]' in me.[4]

This non-cognitive dimension of Kant's aesthetics, the idea that there is nothing about the object presented that makes the claim of its beauty true or false, is, however, countered by another. First, one should not, of course, take this 'non-cognitivism' in the way that it is taken in standardly *Humean* non-cognitivist accounts of value judgements. The pleasure taken in beauty is *not* that taken in objects that satisfy sensuous desire, Kant having taken from Hutcheson the idea of the 'disinterested' nature of aesthetic judgement. Moreover, in other places in the third *Critique*, the phenomenalist-sounding account of the nature of the object

[2] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, §§ 15–16.

[3] 'Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone apart from the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is [meant] to be; and even he, while recognizing it as the reproductive organ of a plant, pays no attention to this natural purpose when he judges the flower by taste'. Ibid., § 16 (5.229).

[4] 'We can easily see that, in order for me to say that an object is *beautiful*, and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I do with this presentation within myself [*was ich aus dieser Vorstellung in mir selbst mache*]'. Ibid., §2 (5.205).

of aesthetic taste, the '*Vorstellung* in me', is countered by a different conception which fits the McDowellian reading of Kant. Thus Kant sometimes says that what is found beautiful or ugly is the object's *mode of representation* [*Vorstellungsart*].[5]

Such a formulation is consistent with the idea that the value judgement be understood more like a *perspectivally relative* empirical judgement, as when I say, for example, that this parcel is *heavy*. While such indexically tied judgements may not be the stuff of physics, it is a rather extreme position to hold that they can be neither true nor false – there is clearly something being said of the object involved. On this *non*-phenomenalist, more *perspectival*, interpretation of the subjectivity of aesthetic judgement, the object presented in judgement should have the form of *particularity* rather than *singularity* – a determination which coheres with Kant's most general statements about the nature of reflective judgements.[6]

Here the historical influence of Hutcheson adds to the ambiguity in Kant. In Hutcheson, this disinterested nature of aesthetic judgement was a function of its *formalism*. The implicit picture is something like that of the mind contemplating the arrangement of sensory ideas in its own sensorium and finding beauty in their orderliness. Analogously, Kant talks of beauty being found in the arrangement of *Vorstellungen* 'in me'. However, counting *against* this Hutchesonian formalist picture is a feature of Kant's approach to beauty that is not often commented upon but which has recently been emphasized by Henry Allison.[7] Kant refers to the pleasure and *displeasure* characterizing aesthetic judgements, with the beautiful standing *opposed to* the ugly. Thus, as the opposing contraries of an '*Entgegensetzung*', beauty and ugliness must each be in its own way 'positive',[8] suggesting that evaluations of beauty are somehow similar in their conceptual structure to the generalized polarly opposed

[5] Ibid., § 6 (5.211). '*Taste* is the ability to judge an object, or its mode of presentation [Vorstellungsart], by means of a liking or disliking *devoid of all interest*'. Ibid.

[6] 'Judgement in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgement, which subsumes the particular under it, is *determinative* . . . But if only the particular is given and judgement has to find the universal for it, then the power is merely *reflective*'. Ibid., pp 18–19 (5.179).

[7] Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, pp. 71–2. As Allison points out, this is little noted (and sometimes explicitly denied) in the English language literature. Hud Hudson, 'The Significance of an Analytic of the Ugly in Kant's Deduction of Pure Judgements of Taste', in Ralf Meerbote (ed.) *Kant's Aesthetics* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991), is an exception.

[8] 'For these reasons, *aversion* can be called a *negative desire*, *hate* a *negative love*, *ugliness* a *negative beauty*, *blame* a *negative praise*'. Kant, 'Negative Magnitudes', in *Theoretical Philosophy* 1755–1770, p. 221 (2.182).

practical judgements of pre-modern cultures. In contrast, on the Hutchesonian *formalist* picture, the ugly could only be thought of as that which *lacks* the order that characterizes the beautiful arrangement.[9]

On the phenomenalist reading, beauty cannot be a genuine concept as concepts cannot be *predicated* of intuitions directly, but only of other (subject) concepts under which those intuitions are subsumed in an act of apprehension. But Kant *also* talks of beauty as a *kind* of concept, albeit an 'indeterminate' one, indeed, a concept of something 'supersensible', an *idea*. And along with this conceptual dimension of beauty goes at least the *issue* of the possibility of rational agreement in aesthetics: that we don't *expect* universal agreement about what is beautiful goes along with its non-cognitive status, but we do nevertheless *demand* it suggests a contrasting *cognitivity*.

These opposing dimensions of taste are brought together in the 'Antinomy of Taste' in which a thesis that a 'judgement of taste is not based on concepts; for otherwise one could dispute about it (decide by means of proofs)' is opposed to its antithesis, the view that such a judgement of taste 'is based on concepts; for otherwise, regardless of the variation among [such judgements], one could not even so much as quarrel about them (lay claim to other people's necessary assent to one's judgement)'.[10] Kant's own 'solution' to the antinomy of taste is to point to the different conception of 'concept' employed in the thesis and antithesis. While the conceptuality *denied* to the judgement of taste in the thesis understands the concept at issue as *determinate* [*bestimmt*], that *attributed* to the judgement of taste by the antithesis understands that concept to be *indeterminate* [*unbestimmt*], 'namely, that of the supersensible substrate [*übersinnlichen Substrat*] of appearances'.[11] With this, then, we seem to be back to Kant's founding and, from the perspective of his critical idealist appropriators, *problematic*, distinction between noumena and phenomena, but at least Kant's appeal to the distinction between beauty *qua* concept, on the one hand, and idea, on the other, opens up possible lines of investigation concerning how to understand the nature of normative predicates like 'beauty'.

We have seen throughout Kant's *Critiques* the recurring theme of the need to give *some kind* of phenomenal exhibition to 'ideas' so that they can

[9] It was this sense of negation as mere 'lack' (*Mangel*) that had formed the contrast with 'real negation' in 'Negative Magnitudes'. Ibid., p. 217 (2.177–8).

[10] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, §§ 56–57 (5.338–9).

[11] Ibid., § 57 (5.340–1).

be *applied* in practice,[12] and in the third *Critique*, beauty is called upon to provide just this type of role, its being treated as a 'symbol of morality', for example. The lesson of the first *Critique* was that we should never confuse the ideas we might apply in the interest of practice with the concepts we apply when we make cognitive claims about possible objects of experience. That is, we shouldn't treat such ideas in the way we treat empirical concepts – as *determinable* by the content of some intuitive presentation. But this does not prevent perceivable phenomena from being treated as *exemplifications* of such ideas, as, for example, when we regard the actions of a virtuous person as exemplifying a moral law. In our respectful deference to the moral quality of another's action, we recognize or acknowledge her as a free being acting on a law that she gives herself; but we should not confuse this with the attribution to her of, say, some causal power or inner disposition that is the non-natural *cause* of that action.

We have seen something of the same with relation to beauty. The idea of beauty must be able to be *exemplified*, otherwise there would be nothing experienced *as* beautiful. Rather, the issue of determinability must really reside with the question of the *ground* of something's beauty. In judging an object to be beautiful, although we tend to treat *the object itself* as containing the 'ground' of that judgement, the ground, as we have seen, is really to be found in those inter-subjective relations mediating the community of subjects who make and seek agreement for these sorts of judgements. The issue of the nondeterminable nature of beauty thus amounts to the claim that in saying something is beautiful I am not ascribing to the object some property which, as it were, is responsible for and which explains the fact of my finding it beautiful.

It is this peculiarity of the status of beauty as a value rather than a property that brings it into the orbit of Fichte's and Hegel's treatment of recognition. Judging an object to be beautiful is more an act of '*Anerkennen*' (recognition) than '*Erkennen*' (cognition), as in claiming something to be beautiful, I am recognizing or acknowledging that it lives up to or exemplifies some norm much in the way in which my affective respectful response to another's action acknowledges that action as an expression of the moral law.[13] Of course there are important differences. Kant's treatment of respect focuses on its relevance as

[12] See Chapter 4.3.

[13] But if this is not a type of empirical judgement, neither should I think of the action as *fixing* the norm in the way that, say, the famed metre bar in Paris is said to fix the norm of metrical measure.

providing a type of incentive to moral action that opposes the egocentricity of 'self-conceit',[14] and the feeling involved in aesthetic judgement does not, at least directly, work to motivate disinterested action in this way. It does, however, work to motivate disinterested *judgement*, disinterestedness in the realm of merely *verbal* realm of *assertion*. Even though the 'common human understanding' is not included as a part of the critique of taste, its principles can be compared to the '*sensus communis*' that shared taste must presuppose, principles summed up in the three maxims: '(1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently'.[15]

6.2 Hegel on the logic of evaluative judgement

The crucial role played by evaluative perceptual judgements in Hegel's account of the relationship between the logical structure of judgement on the one hand and inferential patterns on the other is revealed at the end of his treatment of the topic of judgement in the *Science of Logic*.[16] Two aspects of Hegel's account there are significant for us: first, his suggestion that evaluative judgement is the most developed of judgement forms, and next, that it is the very *contestability* of evaluative judgements that allows their development into the syllogisms of inference.[17] The simplest and most immediate judgement form is that of the qualitative 'judgement of existence', in which an empirical predicate is said of some individual thing, but at the end of the series of judgement forms which proceed from this is found the explicitly evaluative judgement in which evaluative predicates such as 'good', 'bad', 'true', 'beautiful', and so on, are predicated of some individual thing, also on the basis of

[14] In a discussion of the 'incentive of pure practical reason' in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant refers to the 'recognition [*Anerkennung*] of the moral law' as a 'consciousness of an activity of practical reason from objective grounds which fails to express its effect in actions only because subjective (pathological) causes hinder it', p. 68 (5.79). Elsewhere the moral law is described as 'an object of *respect* inasmuch as, in opposition to its subjective antagonist, namely the inclinations in us, it *weakens* self-conceit', p. 63 (5.73).

[15] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 40 (5.294).

[16] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 659–63 (6.346–51).

[17] The *true* objects of judgements are concrete universals, and the singular and particular subjects of the initial two judgement forms (qualitative and reflective) mean that they are hardly *judgements* at all, but rather 'propositions' (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 657 (6.344)). As we will see, however, that the actual object of the judgement is the concrete universal does not testify to the correctness of Russell's charge. Concrete universals *necessarily* particularize themselves. There can be no sense in which the 'real' subject of judgement is the absolute considered as a single entity.

experience.[18] It is this latter type of evaluative perceptual judgement, which has features in common with, but which cannot be reduced to, Kant's *aesthetic* judgement, that can be somehow expanded into a type of syllogism which exhibits its essentially rational structure. Following Hegel's account of the unfolding of the qualitative judgement into the assertoric judgement on the one hand, and the expansion of the assertoric judgement into the syllogism on the other, reveals much about Hegel's basic understanding of the nature of judgement and inference and the relation between them.

The immediate and qualitative 'judgement of existence' predicates some abstract universal as inhering in some *singular* subject, while in the more developed 'judgement of reflection', an 'underlying' or 'reflected' property belonging *essentially* to the thing is predicated of it. Thus when we say, for example, that 'this plant is curative', 'this body is elastic', 'this instrument is useful', or 'this punishment is deterrent' – examples of reflective judgement given in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* – the subject term can no longer be considered as a *mere* singular as it is now understood as instantiating some kind and determined by some defining power or disposition. As such it is understood 'as standing in relation to something else' – such as the illness to be cured in the case of the 'curative' plant,[19] for example – because such powers are expressed in the changes induced in other things with which they interact. But despite the fact that the 'immediate singularity of the subject is transcended' in terms of assigning the thing to some kind, Hegel notes that 'the concept of the subject is still not specified'.[20] Spelling out *that in virtue of which* the plant possesses curative properties, would, I take it, be the task of specifying its 'concept'. We might, then, imagine investigation as leading us to say something like '*this plant*, in virtue of its containing *such and such a compound*, is *curative*' and, as we will see, such specification is conceived by Hegel as displayed by *the syllogism* into which the judgement is expanded.

[18] Note that *contra* Kant, Hegel here does *not* separate beauty from goodness.

[19] Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 174 addition.

[20] Ibid. As with Kant, Hegel is interested in the *functional* determinations of singularity, particularity and universality and these can be at variance with syntactic form, and he in fact treats the distinction between singular, particular and universal judgement forms internally to the *judgement of reflection*. Nevertheless, there is a clear line of development through these judgement forms starting with the *singularity* of the subject progressing to its *universality* through the intermediary of *particularity*.

In the third judgement form, the judgement of necessity, the subject of the judgement now advances from the 'this such' of the reflective judgement to the status of *concrete universal*. The form of such a judgement as in 'the rose is a *plant*' should not be confused with that of simple qualitative judgement like 'the rose is red', as in the former case, what is being referred to is the rose *as such*,[21] the *generic* rose, not some single rose. But the judgement of necessity is, at least in this initial form, equivalent to an analytic judgement in which the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. The *final* form of this judgement type, however, is the 'disjunctive judgement', which, as in Kant, specifies the universal in terms of an array of mutually limiting *particulars* into which it is differentiated: '*Colour* is either violet, indigo, blue, green yellow, orange or red'.[22] Thus, the transition through these three judgement forms has gone in the direction of the increasing *universality* of the subject term which has gone from having the determination of singularity in the judgement of existence, to particularity in the judgement of reflection to, finally, universality in the judgement of necessity.

The fourth and final form of judgement is the 'judgement of the concept', the first sub-type of which (the assertoric judgement) is once again immediate, in as much as it is *directly* perceptual rather than 'inferential' like the reflective judgement. But in contrast to the simple qualitative judgement of existence the predicate is now an evaluative rather than a descriptive one – 'an *ought-to-be* [*ein Sollen*] to which the reality may or may not be adequate'.[23] In judgements such as 'this house is *bad*, this action is *good*',[24] the subject is posited as 'a concrete singular, [*ein konkretes Einzelnes*]',[25] and it is this determination of *singularity* which distinguishes this judgement form from the preceding judgement of necessity. In the judgement of necessity the universal had 'completed itself *in its particularization* [*Besonderung*]',[26] but Hegel, maintaining the traditional distinction between 'particular' and 'singular' judgements, can hold that those 'particulars' had *not* achieved the status of 'singularity,

[21] This is Hegel's equivalent of Aristotle's third type of judgement type from *On Interpretation*, ch. 7, judgements *about* universals made *non-universally*.

[22] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 656 (6.343). In the *Encyclopaedia Logic* he refers to the determinants of a kind displayed in the disjunctive judgement as 'the circle of [the universal's] self-excluding particularization'. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 117.

[23] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 657 (6.344).

[24] Ibid., p. 659 (6.346).

[25] Ibid. That is, this is Hegel's equivalent to the type of judgement that Frege considers the fundamental atomic judgement in which the concept applies to an individual object.

[26] Ibid., p. 658 (6.345).

[*Einzelheit*]'.[27] It is only with the *judgement of the concept* that the judgement can be thought of as somehow being directed to some object as having the degree of *independence* from the universal characteristic of the singular: *qua* singular, the thing is not *just* an exemplification of its kind.

Presumably, then, we must regard the subject term of such judgements, despite their syntactic form ('this house', 'this action') as able to function as properly *singular* terms (demonstratives without a sortal) and with this Hegel's analysis rejoins the Kantian construal of evaluative judgements as singular. But it is this singularity entering into the distinction between the judgement of necessity and the judgement of the concept that testifies to the degree to which for Hegel, now in contrast to Kant, the evaluative judgement can be thought of as establishing a *genuine* cognitive relation to an independent object.

Hegel portrays the initial manifestations of these evaluative judgements as *subjective* and *problematic* because each will be based on some bare assurance [*Versicherung*] which is able to be 'confronted with equal right by its opposite [*entgegengesetzte*]'.[28] Here, when the first judgement such as 'this action is good' is asserted with assurance, its 'opposite . . . "this action is bad" ' will have, he says, 'equal justification [*gleiche Berechtigung*]'.[29] The suggestion here is that such value judgements will be initially based on some contestable immediately felt assurance as to their rightness; they are bare assertions that can be met by their contraries offered in judgements by others who can have opposed assurances that they feel to be equally justified. Here it is the dimension of the singularity of the object, in its abstraction from *any* determining concept applicable to it, that would allow it to be evaluated differently by different judges, and which makes the connection between the object and the universal applied to it 'externally posited' rather than a function of the universal itself.[30]

Hegel's account of this judgement type deserves comment as enough can be recovered from its somewhat tortured expression to see it as bearing on the type of criticism found in Russell's 'internal-relations'

[27] The negative unity of the particularization of the universal, he says, 'has not yet determined itself to the third moment, that of singularity'. Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 660 (6.347). Miller has here 'contradictory'. There is, as will be shown in Chapter 7, a sense in which these judgements can be considered 'opposites' or contraries, and another sense in which they can be considered *contradictories*. In this context, however, it is important to see how the assertion is met by an *opposed* assertion in an analogous way to the way that a force is met by an *opposed* force in Kant's early account of real, rather than logical, negation.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., p. 659 (6.346).

claim. At first, these passages appear to be heading towards a type of sceptical, non-cognitivist analysis of the value judgement: while in such judgements a concept is brought to bear on an actual concrete individual thing (an act, a house, etc.), it is this bare singularity of the thing to which the evaluative predicate is meant to be applied – its 'externality', that is, its belonging to a realm whose 'proximate abstract forms', as Hegel says in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, are related by mere '*juxtaposition* and *succession*' – that seems to condemn this judgement to non-cognitive status.[31] It would seem that *no* justificatory reason-giving could subtend such judgements because such reason-giving demands the presence of a subject-concept, which is missing here, at least functionally.[32] Hence the seemingly sceptical import of the idea that here opposed claims will be equally justified. When Hegel talks of the determination of singularity that enters here, he thus seems to be referring to the 'external', non-relational aspect of the thing that renders it *independent of* all conceptualizations of it – its brute existence, as it were.

One must, of course, be careful in attributing views like this to Hegel. Like McDowell, Hegel refuses this picture of anything metaphysically 'external' to the concept – a world 'in itself' standing abstractly opposed to the (conceptualized) world as it is 'for us'.[33] We cannot think of nature and mind as separated in *this* way, but we can, according to Hegel, think of nature and the realm of conceptuality separated in *another* way. Nature, as he puts it in the *Philosophy of Nature*, is 'the Idea in the form of otherness', the Idea as 'external to itself', and not something that is 'merely external relative to this Idea'.[34] When we read such odd formulae with the emphasis placed upon the notion of nature *as* the Idea in the form of otherness or externality, they appear to signal a *refusal* to acknowledge what we think of as the 'otherness' or 'resistance' of the world to our concepts, a refusal that is often taken as characterizing Hegel's idealism *per se*. But when read alongside Hegel's analysis of the distinction between the disjunctive judgement and the judgement of the concept, they can also be understood as indicating something

[31] Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 20, remark. This singularity was, of course, just what Kant had aimed at catching with the non-conceptual representation of 'intuition'.

[32] Again, I am reading Hegel here as having something like *Kant's* account of aesthetic judgement in mind, it being essential for Kant that aesthetic judgement is made with no consideration of the thing's *essence*.

[33] That is, scepticism will itself presuppose the idea of two determinate realms, nature and the mind, separated by an unbridgeable gap.

[34] G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature: Part II of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, ed. and trans. M. J. Petry (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), § 247.

quite different.[35] In the context of the immediate form of evaluative judgement, the concrete object (a house, or an action) intended in its bare abstracted singularity is being judged *as* something 'external' to the conceptual realm in this way, but in another sense it cannot be entirely external to 'the Idea', simply because it *is grasped* as external, that is, *conceptualized* as 'external' by the judge: 'the connection [between universal and singular thing] is *externally posited*' and this 'means that it is, at first, only *implicit* or *internal*'.[36]

The tension here surely pertains to the very idea of applying concepts in empirical judgements. Put in its most blunt form, concepts or universals are *meant to be* applied to actual singular things 'external' to judgement (in the way that Frege was to insist upon) – the things that make those empirical judgements true or false. They are not meant as the mere realizations of some internal conceptual relations, as are found in the 'judgement of necessity', a conception of judgement that would condemn all judgements to what McDowell describes as 'moves in a self-contained game'.[37] This means that our very conception of an empirical concept to be applied in judgement must somehow include the idea of its being applied in this way *to* the singular, 'external', and contingent thing: 'The problematic element, therefore, concerns the immediacy of the *subject* which is hereby determined as a *contingency* ... The problematic element in the subject itself constitutes its *moment of contingency*, the *subjectivity* of the *thing* [*Subjectivität der Sache*] over against its objective nature or its concept, its merely *contingent mode* or its *constitution*'.[38] But of course as soon as we conceive of the object to which the empirical concept is applied in this way as something standing beyond the border of the conceptualizable, we have already *conceptualized* it. As Hegel puts it in the discussion of Sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: 'An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an *instance* (or example [*Beispiel*]) of it'.[39] Anything present to us as a bare 'this' is nevertheless present *as* an instance of the determination of singularity, an exemplification of 'thisness' in general – a '*this* this', as it were. As the

[35] Human self-conscious forms of life can be contrasted with nature in the sense that conceptuality pervades their constitutive recognitive interactions. *Conversely*, nature (and what is merely natural *in* humans) is not like this: it is *external* to the realm of concepts structuring the consciousness and self-consciousness of humans.

[36] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 659 (6.346).

[37] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 5.

[38] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 660–1 (6.347–8).

[39] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 92 (3.83).

Phenomenology of Spirit is meant to have shown, pure 'thisness' cannot be made determinate without it being contextualized as a moment of 'this suchness'. In judgement, the concept *is* brought into relation to something singular and external, but singularity here must come to be understood as only an *aspect* ('moment') of a more coherent, organized, and hence, conceptualized world.

Hegel can then ask the question: do we need (or does it make sense to demand) any *stronger* conception of 'externality' to the concept than the one in play here, the one that leads to the description of nature as *the Idea* in its externality rather than something external *relative to* the Idea? To answer 'no' here is to agree with McDowell when he denies that 'the craving for external friction' to counter the idea of thought as a 'frictionless spinning in a void' can be satisfied by the conception of a world beyond our thinking impinging on it from the outside.[40] This still leaves us with the *concept* of something 'external' to the concept applied in any actual act of judging, although not beyond the reach of concepts *per se*.

The antinomy involved here in the application of concepts is familiar, as it is essentially Kant's 'antinomy of taste' facing those similarly singular and evaluative *aesthetic judgements*. Effectively, Hegel's way of dealing with this antinomy is to reject as incoherent any dichotomy that looks to be a version of that between intuitions and concepts, thus a dichotomy between the ideas of a classically *singular* judgement (in which the object drops out of our cognitive purview as a 'bare particular') and a classically *particular* judgement (in which the object is grasped *just as* an exemplification of some universal). It seems that we must somehow think of both the concept applied in judgement and the object to which it is applied as having *two* sides: 'The *concept* is the universal essence of a thing or a fact [*Sache*] withdrawn into itself, its negative unity with itself; this constitutes its subjectivity. But a thing is also essentially *contingent* and has an *external constitution*; this may equally be called the mere subjectivity of the thing in contrast to the other side, its objectivity'. And in both cases these must be thought of as two sides of a unity: 'The thing itself [*die Sache selbst*] is just this, that its concept, as the negative of itself, negates its universality and projects itself into the externality of individuality. The *subject* of the judgement is here posited as this duality; those opposite significations of subjectivity are, in accordance with their truth, brought into a unity'.[41]

[40] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 11.
[41] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 661 (6.348).

It is this link between 'externality' and 'singularity' that is significant here. Russell looked to the object of singular reference as securing the link between judgement and the world by construing it as the object (sense-datum) of a peculiar kind of intuitive knowledge (acquaintance) – a view we have seen subject to Hegel's quasi-Sellarsian rejection in his treatment of Sense-certainty. And when we look to Hegel's own account, the link between judgement and the 'external' singular thing seems to operate in the service of an entirely opposed purpose. Hegel makes the link between singularity and something ('nature') that is external to the concept secure *not* some certain form of knowledge but a seemingly sceptical conclusion. The bare assertion of the thing's goodness or badness encounters a contrary *counter-assertion* equally felt to be justified, and it is just this disagreement that is wrought by the object's 'external' aspect. But the ultimate conclusion to be drawn from this is *not* a sceptical one. With the opposition of one *assertion* to another we are in the realm of *recognitive interaction*, such that the resulting dialectical contestation between apparently equally justified 'problematic' judgements drives this judgement type into its final form, the complex *apodictic* judgement in which the claimant attempts to give a *justification* for the initial claim. As in Kant, here the judge will try to *find* the conceptual resources to justify her judgement to the dissenting interlocutor, will *demand* agreement where it cannot be *expected*.

We see this in the transition from the second sub-type of the judgement of the concept (the problematic judgement) to the final sub-type (the apodictic judgement), for which Hegel gives the example, 'the house constituted thus and so is *good*', or, as he labels the structure in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, '*this* – the immediate singularity (*Einzelheit*) – *house* – the genus – *being constituted thus and so* – particularity – is good or bad'.[42] Such a judgement whose mediating term gives its justifying *grounds*, making explicit *why* the house is good, appeals to some rule or principle (the thing's normative essence) and could thus be set out as a syllogism as follows:

Rule: Houses are essentially constituted thus and so.
Case: This house is (is not) constituted thus and so.
Result: This house is good (or bad).

Laid out like this, the descending deductive inference shows the justification for the initial judgement of the house, the 'case' stating the initial

[42] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 179.

judgement's justifying grounds. When it is grasped that the house is good *because* it is constituted thus and so, the evaluative claim is converted from mere fact (*to hoti*) to reasoned one (*to dioti*) by virtue of its proposed explanation. Genetically, however, the inferential movement goes in the reverse, 'ascending' or 'regressive–analytic' direction. It goes *from* the 'result', the initial immediate assurance, *to* the 'case', while presumably presupposing the 'rule'. Two things should be noted here. First, as had been hinted by Kant in his analysis of the grounds of an aesthetic judgement, the very offering of a reason to an interlocutor here alludes to the ultimate ground of the objectivity of the judgement: it is the recognitive relation between subjects – here, their acknowledging each other as *free* in their conceptual capacities – that is the *ultimate* ground of the judgement, not some metaphysically conceived properties of the objects as they are 'in themselves'. Next, in his appeal to the implicitly syllogistic form of the evaluative judgement, Hegel alludes to the type of reasoning process that is the appropriate *inferential context* for understanding the nature of evaluative judgements themselves. Here Hegel is able to draw on a nexus to which Kant had alluded between the nature of aesthetic judgements and a peculiar type of inference, *inference through analogy*.

6.3 Kant and Hegel on the logic of evaluative reasoning

We have earlier seen something like the reasoning set out in the syllogism above: first (in Chapter 4, section 1), in relation to Kant's use of the syllogism to show the grounds of a categorical judgement modeled, it would seem, on the Paduan Aristotelian account of the 'regressive–analytic' demonstration of a 'reasoned fact' – and next in McDowell's approach to the perceptual discernment of the morally relevant features of situations within the context of practical reason. 'What I have described as selecting the right concern', McDowell notes, 'might equally be described in terms of the minor premise of the core explanation. If there is more than one concern that might impinge on the situation, there is more than one fact about the situation that the agent might, say, dwell on, in such a way as to summon an appropriate concern into operation. It is by virtue of his seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the salient fact about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather than that one'.[43] In the example of the house, presumably it is not

[43] McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', p. 68.

as if the features stated in the minor premise about the house's constitution are not already apparent. The trick of justification in this case is to point to *just* those features, as opposed to some others, as being salient. The goal is to bring the interlocutor to see the house's value in the light of *these* rather than some other features that it also happens to have.

C. S. Peirce had a name for a form of informal heuristic inference to the 'case' of a syllogism in the first figure from the result and the rule, calling it 'hypothesis' or 'abduction', and abduction, he argued, was different to that *other* type of non-formal inference that could also be pictured as running 'up' the formally valid descending deductive structure: induction, which inferred from the conclusion and the case to the *rule*.[44] But as we have seen, formally similar heuristic devices had become familiar within the German tradition up to Kant from Paduan Aristotelianism in which syllogistic logic had been extracted from the metaphysical use of the scholastics and used in the service of a more empirically based quasi-inductive 'method' for the natural sciences. While in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant had officially linked this second type of prosyllogistic inference to the hypothetical syllogism, I have suggested (in Chapter 4, section 2) that Aristotle's account of inference to a cause from an effect given in *Posterior Analytics*, book 1, chapter 13 is more adequate to the underlying structure of Kant's conception.

In the *Jäsche Logic*, however, Kant (and following him, Hegel) suggests another conception for a second ascending non-formal inferences able to be distinguished from induction: 'inference through analogy', and again, the distinction appears to have come ultimately from Aristotle. While Peirce was to derive his two forms of ascending inference structures from Aristotle's treatment in the *Prior Analytics* of *epagoge* (commonly translated as 'induction') and *apagoge* ('leading away', sometimes translated as 'reduction'), the 'inference though analogy' that Kant draws upon seems more that of *paradeigma* or 'example'. All this, I suggest, bears directly on the nature of Hegel's attempts to grapple with the logical form of reason-giving practices, specifically in the case of *evaluative* judgement.

[44] In terms of personal influence it would seem that the work of William Whewell is relevant in at least the early formation of Peirce's ideas about abduction. See M. Fisch, *William Whewell: Philosopher of Science*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 109–10. Whewell himself, however, was clearly influenced in his account of science by the idealists. See, for example, Michael Ruse, 'William Whewell: Omniscientist' and John Wetterstein and Joseph Agassi 'Whewell's Problematic Heritage', both in M. Fisch and S. Schaffer, *William Whewell: A Composite Portrait*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

Kant's discussion of 'inference through analogy' in the *Jäsche Logic* is frustratingly brief, but the notion of analogy itself is used extensively throughout his practical philosophy in relation to the analogical or symbolic *exhibition* of ideas, a form of indirect 'sensibilization' of ideas that forms a necessary *subjective* condition for their application in actions.[45] For example, as we have seen, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* a prescriptive moral law is described as capable of being made manifest in an *analogical* way by a law of nature which can be regarded as its 'type' [*Typus*].[46] And in relation to this example as repeated in the *Critique of Judgement*,[47] Kant makes the point that despite the fact of the analogy, I 'cannot transfer those specific characteristics (the material attraction or repulsion) to this [political] community, and attribute them to the citizens so that these will form a system called a state'.[48] That is, despite the analogy, 'we cannot by analogy draw an *inference* from the one to the other, i.e., transfer that mark of the difference in kind between them from one to the other'.[49] We have seen this at work in Kant's discussion of the ground of aesthetic judgement early in the *Critique*. We tend to think of the ground of our favourable response to the valued object as residing *in* the object as some type of objective quality. But this is not the case, the ground of the judgement is to be located in the normative relations between the *judges*.

But as Kant describes it in the *Jäsche Logic*, analogical *inference* does involve just this transfer of 'marks' that is prohibited where analogy is used in the service of the application of the ideas of practical reason. In the *Jäsche Logic* Kant gives the example of inferring that the moon is inhabited on the basis of an analogy between the earth and moon. Here, where the 'mark' or concept 'being inhabited' is just what is transferred in the analogy, it is clear that Kant has in mind the use of analogy in hypothetical explanation, a topic that he treats extensively elsewhere. But this is the move we are meant *not to make* in those situations where

[45] On the importance of symbolism in Kant's practical philosophy see Heiner Bielefeldt, *Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[46] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 60 (5.69).

[47] 'Thus, by analogy with the law that action and reaction are equal when bodies attract or repel one another, I can also conceive of the community between the members of a commonwealth that is governed by rules of law'. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, §90 (5.464–5). The same example is used in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 26 (6.232–3).

[48] Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 90 (5.465).

[49] Ibid., § 90 (5.464).

normative phenomena, the system of the state, say, is being understood on the analogy with non-normative phenomena, those of physics. It is just taking this analogy *as* explanatory that is the sin of traditional metaphysics.

Thus it would seem that Kant is saying that analogical inference in the service of explanation ought not to cross the boundary of that radical heterogeneity that analogical or symbolic *exhibition* is meant to bridge – that between the phenomenal and the noumenal. If analogy is to be used in the service of explanation, then it must be confined within a sphere not marked by such radical heterogeneity. This point is further spelt out in the *Critique of Judgement*. 'Analogy' Kant says there, 'is the identity of the relation between grounds [*Gründen*] and consequences (causes and effects) insofar as it is present despite what difference in kind there is between the things ... or between those properties themselves that contain the ground of similar consequences'.[50] For example, when we compare the constructive acts of animals such as beavers with those of humans, 'we conceive of the basis for such acts ... by means of the basis of such acts in man; i.e., we conceive of the former basis as an analogue of reason. In doing so we wish to indicate at the same time that the basis of the artistic power in animals, called instinct, while indeed different in kind from reason, still has a similar relation to its effect. But that does not entitle me to infer that because man needs *reason* in order to construct, beavers too must have it'.[51] That is, we cannot use the analogy as the basis for an inference which attributes to the constructive activity of beavers the basis or cause that is known in *man*. However, Kant immediately goes on to indicate that what we *can* infer from the similarity of constructive behaviours 'is that animals too act according to *representations* [*Vorstellungen*] (rather than being machines, as Descartes would have it), and that regardless of the difference in specific kind between them and man, they are still of the same generic kind [*Gattung*] (namely, as living beings)'.[52] The difference between this and the earlier aborted inference is that in this case we are drawing the analogy between beavers and humans *qua* natural beings. Thus the analogical transfer of properties involved in inference by analogy in the service of explanation must be restricted to transfer not only between possible objects of experience,

[50] Ibid., § 90 n. 64 (5.464 n), translation modified.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., translation modified.

but between objects belonging to experiential domains that can be conceived as unified under some higher generic category.[53]

But there would seem to be a *third* use to which analogy might be put. An analogy could be drawn between some concrete exemplification of an 'idea' and some *other* object for which that idea was normatively relevant, such that the first was being used as a model against which the second was being assessed in an evaluative judgement. A common ploy in the justification of evaluative judgements is for the justifier to try to bring the sceptic to see the disputed object as *relevantly similar* to some other object whose value is *undisputed*. If successful, the sceptic thereby learns to see *in* the disputed object the *same* qualities that are grasped as responsible for the value of the model. In this sense, the model or vehicle of the analogy can itself be regarded as exemplifying the rule that is playing the role of major premise in the underlying deductive inference. This means that this form of judgement and reasoning would by necessity rely on the disputants being able to call upon a range of shared *paradigms* of excellence: without *some* common elements in the appreciative lives of the disputants, such disputes would be simply at cross purposes, as what each *meant* by evaluative terms would be unavailable to the other.

Something like this use of analogy seems to be at issue in Kant's comments on respect in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. In explaining the relation between respect for the law and respect for a person, Kant says that 'respect for a person is properly only respect for the law ... of which he gives us an example'. Since we regard it a duty to enlarge our talents, 'we represent a person of talents also as, so to speak, an *example of the law* (to become like him in this by practice), and this is what constitutes our respect'.[54] That is, taking some virtuous other as an exemplification of the law allows me to consider possible courses of action when faced by the demands of some situation. I ask myself 'what would A do under these circumstances?' drawing an analogy between myself and A and the circumstances I am in and circumstances in which I have known A to act. Here the analogy being sought is between the

[53] '[M]y analogy between a real moral influx by spiritual beings and the force of universal gravitation is not intended seriously; it is only an example of how far one can go in philosophical fabrications, completely unhindered, where there are no *data*, and it illustrates how important it is, in such exercises, first to decide what is required for a solution of the problem and whether the necessary data for a solution are really available'. Immanuel Kant, 'To Moses Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766', *Correspondence*, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 92 (10.72).

[54] Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 14 (4.401n).

proposed action and the *model itself* as an exemplification of the law. Success here would be obtained if I could come to see my own action as similarly exemplifying the law.

A type of evaluative reasoning that required shared models of excellence presupposes, of course, certain types of social relatedness such as those typified more by the immediacy of the social relations found in the modern family rather than those found in 'civil society'. Indeed, it seems clear enough that Hegel thinks of education in the recognitive context of the family as proceeding largely along these lines. When, in the *Philosophy of Right*, he suggests that parents constitute (*ausmachen*) the universal and essential elements of things for their children,[55] it would seem that he has in mind the passing on of certain practically grounded ways of understanding those things by imitation. For the children, the parents are just the instantiation of the law.

6.4 The Hegelian shapes of subjective reason

In Book 3 of the *Science of Logic* Hegel was to employ Kant's 'inference through analogy' in the course of differentiating the syllogistic forms which correspond to different types of argumentation. Specifically it appears as an inference form within a type of syllogism he refers to as the syllogism of reflection.

Let us recall the 'reflective' judgement that Hegel had thought of as an intermediary between the simple qualitative judgement (the rose is red) and the evaluative judgement (the house is good). It is the type of judgement represented by 'this plant is curative', and in alluding to a reflective or essential property we allude to a dispositional property expressed in some law-like effect brought about by the thing in its interactions – here, the effect of 'curing' certain organisms of certain pathologies. One could thus envisage such a judgement being, like the evaluative one, 'unpacked' into a syllogism in the first figure:

Rule. – Plants containing such and such a compound are curative
Case. – This plant contains such and such a compound
∴ Result. – This plant is curative.

We can easily see how Peirce's way of generating abductive and inductive inferences could be applied to this judgement. Were we to

[55] G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge 1991), § 174, addition.

know the general 'rule' about the curative effects of plants containing a certain compound, as well as the 'result', concerning *this* plant being curative, we could hypothesize or abductively infer to the 'case': It *may be* that *this plant* contains this compound, as this would explain its actual effects. On the other hand, were we to know that this plant both contained this compound and was curative, and were we *also* to know that various other plants containing this compound were *also* curative, we might inductively infer 'the rule'. Hegel, in his discussion of the 'inferences of reflection' seems to be charting the general features of different heuristic explanatory strategies in a similar way, and he does so by similarly exploiting the logical structure of Aristotle's first figure syllogism.[56]

This traditional syllogism in the first figure above ('Barbara') forms the first of Hegel's three syllogisms of reflection (Hegel calls it the 'syllogism of allness') and is described as 'the syllogism of the understanding in its perfection'.[57] Hegel's way of schematizing Barbara is a variant of Aristotle's with the further *scholastic* device of using a *singular term* as the 'minor' term (the subject term of the minor premise or 'case'). Thus Hegel appeals to the traditional example:

All men are mortal
Now Caius is a man
∴ Caius is mortal.

As the middle term of such a syllogism is necessarily a *particularization* of the universal major term (*man* being a *particular* mortal) this syllogism can be represented as built out of the three terms representing 'universality', 'particularity', and 'singularity'. This allows Hegel to represent the general structure of Barbara as the sequence singular-particular-universal (SPU) to be read in the following way:

major premise:	PU	All men are mortal
minor premise:	SP	Caius is a man
∴ Result:	SU	∴ Caius is mortal.

This syllogism could thus be thought of as exhibiting the status of the result as a *reasoned* fact, the whole structure rendering Caius' mortality intelligible.

[56] I have explored this further in 'Hegel and Peircean Abduction', *European Journal of Philosophy* 11 (2003), 295–313.

[57] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 687 (6.381).

Peirce was to use the second and third of the Aristotelian syllogistic figures to schematize abduction and induction as different 'regressive–analytic' informal inference structures, and Hegel's efforts are directed to the same ends. Aristotle, it will be recalled, had distinguished the three syllogistic figures by the position within the premises of the 'middle term'. In the 'perfect' first figure, the middle term is subject in the major premise and predicate of the minor, but in the second and third figures the middle term is differently distributed: in the second, it plays the role of common *predicate* in both premises while in the third it plays that of common *subject*.[58]

The details of Hegel's rather complex reworking of Aristotle's three figures need not concern us. The general goal seems clear enough, however. Hegel wants to portray the general configuration of different inference types by exploiting structures that when read in a descending 'synthetic' direction are to be grasped as formally valid, but when read in a regressive–analytic direction are to be understood as fallible but necessary explanatory strategies. One configuration is meant to capture the rational structure of induction and the other, a type of reasoning by analogy. Hegel actually takes Aristotle's *second* figure (the syllogism in which the *predicate* term is common to the premises) as his *third*, and Aristotle's *third* (the syllogism in which the *subject* term is common to the premises) as his *second*. He then identifies his *own* second figure as 'the syllogism of induction', and his own third as the 'syllogism of analogy'. The reasoning behind all this seems to be the following.

First, Hegel is concerned with the logical status of the term (that is, singular, particular, or universal) playing the role of 'middle' in these schemas. The significant feature characterizing the structure of his *second* figure (Aristotle's third), the 'syllogism of induction', is that *singular* terms play the role of *middles*, that is, here play the role of *subjects* of the premises, while *what* is predicated of these subjects is 'some predicate or other that is common to all these singulars'.[59] But Hegel points out that the singularity [*Einzelheit*] involved here is 'not the *abstract* singularity' but rather is '*complete*, namely, posited with its opposite

[58] Because Aristotle can represent the syllogism as the sequence of the three terms he describes the middle term as moving in this way – in the second figure the middle term is 'first' in position and in the third it is 'last'. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, bk. I, ch. iv, 25b39-41 and bk. I, ch. vi, 28a14-15. Note that this order coincides with Aristotle's preferred representing of the judgement as being ordered with the predicate *preceding* the subject, an ordering which allows the 'perfection' of the first figure syllogism to be perspicuous.

[59] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 689 (6.384).

determination, universality'.[60] By such 'singulars' he thus seems to mean something like property-instances or *tropes*.[61] Hegel's descriptions here are awkward, but he is clearly trying to suggest something about the ontological assumptions typically accompanying thought about induction: singulars are treated as just those simples that can be grouped into classes on the basis of phenomenal identity or likeness, and universals just are classes of singulars so grouped. The middle term of the syllogism, he says, is 'all the singulars', and the syllogism is a 'syllogism of *experience* – of the subjective taking together of the singulars into the genus and of the conjoining of the genus with a universal determinateness because this latter is found in all the singulars'.

The third figure of the reflective syllogism in Hegel's system (Aristotle's second) is identified with *inference through analogy* and here the common middle term is understood as representing universality. Hegel uses Kant's own example of inference through analogy:

UP: The *earth* is inhabited.
SU: The moon is *an earth*.
∴ PS: Therefore the moon is inhabited.[62]

This issue here, as with analogy generally, is the use of a name with a singular reference 'earth' as a predicate or universal – here the predicate of the minor premise. Hegel notes that here this middle term is a 'universality that is the *reflection-into-itself of a concrete*', and also adds that the middle term is *also* 'a singular [*ein Einzelnes*] but a singular term taken in its universal nature'.[63] An individual object is therefore taken as exemplifying or representing a genus or natural kind, and the name of the object which is the *vehicle* of the analogy is thereby regarded as a type of sortal which can be predicated of other individuals – here it is predicated of *the moon*. But when the single entity is identified with the kind, there can be no question of distinguishing essential from accidental properties, and this effectively means that *all* the properties of the model will be transferred to the new subject of predication. In this case, the inference drawn – that the moon, being 'an earth', is inhabited – will turn out to be a faulty one. The problem with analogies and models is that one is likely to project non-essential,

[60] Ibid.
[61] That is, by saying the singular is not to be thought of as 'abstract' we presumably are not to think of it as some quality-less substrate which underlies the property predicated of it.
[62] Ibid., p. 692 (6.387).
[63] Ibid.

idiosyncratic properties to the recipient in the attempt to make it intelligible, but conceived as heuristic devices and understood from the perspective of a fundamentally *fallibilist* and *self-correcting* conception of knowledge like Hegel's this itself should not be regarded as a problem.

6.5 Logic and ontology

The 'syllogism of analogy', the most developed form of the 'syllogism of reflection', is actually the final form of Hegel's treatment of the syllogism in the *Science of Logic* as normative inferential pattern for thought – in his terminology, as a merely 'subjective syllogism'. The following 'syllogism of necessity' (whose subforms are the categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, i.e., those that correspond to Kant's three syllogisms in the 'Transcendental Deduction' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*), is the syllogism in the contrasting *ontological* sense of that which exhibits the categorical structure of 'concrete universals' themselves. It is thus this syllogism that Hegel notoriously describes as '*pregnant with content*'[64] and which leads into his treatment of the categorical structure of 'objectivity' in 'Section Two' of 'Book Three'. Here not only does the 'syllogism' seem to lose all relation to finite thinking subjects for whom it could be a normative form of reasoning, but equally to all 'externality' as that which is *reasoned about*. Now the determinations of 'singularity', 'particularity', and 'universality' become completely internally related, and we seem to be in a realm in which no 'otherness' is acknowledged – no difference between thought and being. While the structures and processes of Hegel's logic up to this point may be broadly interpretable in a language not all that distant to, say, contemporary philosophy of science, on moving beyond this point we seem to be plunged deeply into those notoriously pre-Kantian and 'metaphysical' aspects of Hegel's account – those aspects which seem to live up to his own designation of his philosophy as an *absolute* idealism.[65] But is this familiar interpretation the only one possible here? This is an issue that will be addressed more fully in the final two chapters, but here, as elsewhere, it might help to get an initial orientation by locating Hegel's position with respect to that of Kant.

We have seen how elements of his transcendental logic had pushed Kant towards an apparently much more substantive form of metaphysics

[64] Ibid., p. 695 (6.391).

[65] Indeed, this transition between the subjective conceptual structures being discussed to something *objective*, is commonly regarded as Hegel's appeal to a most *pre-* and *anti-*Kantian form of argument, the 'ontological' argument for the existence of God.

than that suggested by his official 'transcendental idealism'. Most crucially, while the concern of the 'textbook' Kant in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' is that of diagnosing and countering the effects of the 'transcendental illusion', and resisting the tendency to treat inferential reason as having more than 'regulative' significance, not all of what Kant actually writes there sits neatly with this classically critical perspective. As Edwards has pointed out, for example, with the third *category of relation* and the third *analogy of experience* built on it, Kant seems to be concerned with a 'deduction' of conditions of experience that are equally *material* as formal, while his account of the disjunctive syllogism seems to lead to a quite robustly metaphysical conception of the '*omnitudo realitatis*'. Both of these notions could be seen as contributions towards that 'Metaphysics of Nature' that Kant planned but never wrote.[66]

It is just such elements of transcendental logic with their apparent ontological import that became central for Hegel, but for him the concrete content generated out of transcendental logic could not be restricted to a metaphysics of *nature*. What was needed was an account of reality as an 'absolute substance' within which intentional subjects could enjoy 'perfect freedom and independence'.[67] That is, besides a metaphysics of nature, what was required was a 'metaphysics' of *spirit*, incorporating an account of that institutionally embodied and historically developing *objective* spirit capable of supporting the lives of *intentional* and not simply *natural* beings – beings with *subjective* spirit and, encompassing both, a conception of *absolute* spirit. Brandom has attempted to render Hegel's conception of spirit safe by identifying it with the normative, as opposed to the natural, realm and by conceiving the relation between the normative and the natural along the lines of those *functionalist* accounts of the mental that had become popular in analytic philosophy of mind in the last decades of the twentieth century. It is not clear, however, how this captures Hegel's notorious claim about the necessity of treating 'substance' itself as 'subject'. In the following two chapters it will be argued that this claim is itself another expression of yet another claim of Hegel's that has, at least until recently, been difficult to deal with within the framework of analytic philosophy: his *logical* doctrine about the nature of contradiction.

[66] Kant had announced his intention to write such a 'Metaphysics of Nature' in the 'Preface' to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Axxi.

[67] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 177 (3.145).

7

HEGEL AND CONTRADICTION

One of Hegel's constant complaints about the type of cognition characteristic of the Understanding is its static, mechanical and lifeless nature which he contrasts to the much more organic and dialectical form of thinking of 'Reason',[1] and notoriously he here appeals to 'contradiction' to capture the *vitality* of genuine thought.[2] In the history of logic, what is appropriately called the 'law of non-contradiction' is commonly called 'the law of contradiction', but when *Hegel* appeals to his 'law of contradiction', the title is apt. The law that Hegel calls 'the law of contradiction' states that '*everything is inherently contradictory*'. It is a law, Hegel says, that expresses the 'truth and the essential nature of things'.[3]

Brandom, like a number of other defenders of Hegel before him, claims that this thesis does *not* entail the denial of the law of non-contradiction.

[1] For example, in the *Science of Logic* Hegel accounts for the 'lifeless', 'dull', and 'spiritless' content of the modern reflective version of logic, in that 'its determinations are accepted in their unmoved fixity and are brought only into an external relation with each other. In judgements and syllogisms the operations are in the main reduced to and founded on the quantitative aspect of the determinations; consequently everything rests on an external difference, on mere comparison and becomes a completely analytical procedure and mechanical [*begriffloses*] calculation'. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 52 (5.47).

[2] '[C]ontradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity'. Ibid., p. 439 (6.75).

[3] Ibid. What others call the law of contradiction, and that I have been calling the law of *non*-contradiction, is what Hegel is opposing. It is the claim that '*there is nothing that is contradictory*' ibid.

Quite the contrary, Hegel 'radicalizes it', he says, 'and places it at the very center of his thought'.[4] Of course, those philosophers who have claimed that with his 'law of contradiction' Hegel *does* actually deny the law of non-contradiction have for the most part regarded this as amounting to a type of *reductio* of his philosophy. Like Aristotle, they regard the law of non-contradiction as the most fundamental and inviolable truth that is known, a truth on which all other truths are dependent. Not all defenders of Hegel have been as sanguine about the law of non-contradiction, however. Contrast Brandom's approach here with that of Graham Priest, who regards Hegel as one of the first philosophers to adopt an *appropriately* critical attitude to the otherwise dogmatically held belief in the truth of the law of non-contradiction. For Priest, not only does Hegel question the law of non-contradiction, he *denies* it, and while this would be sufficient to damn Hegel in the eyes of most modern logicians, Priest defends Hegel on just this count. Hegel's position is consistent, he claims, with the existence of systems of 'paraconsistent' logic – logical systems which tolerate contradictions such that in them it is possible to have true propositions of the form 'p and ∼p'.[5] Of course one must be careful with this notion as it could easily degenerate into irrationalism. First, paraconsistentists do not, of course, accept 'p and ∼p' as holding for *all* p, and they deny that a contradiction entails the truth of all other propositions.[6] True contradictions are posited as ways of dealing with such classical logical paradoxes of the form 'this sentence is false' (a version of the 'liar paradox'), and as allowing us to understand how it might be possible to conceive of and reason about logical impossibilities such as inconsistent theories.

Furthermore, while they provide ways of thinking about some possible worlds within which some contradictions turn out to be true, many contemporary paraconsistent logicians do not in fact believe that *this* world is one of them. That is, they do not believe that the *actual* world itself contains contradictions, so for *them* the mere existence of such

[4] Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, p. 179. Compare here, for example, McTaggart's similar denial that Hegel rejects the law of contradiction. 'If ... the dialectic rejected the law of contradiction, it would reduce itself to an absurdity, by rendering all argument, and even all assertion, unmeaning ... In fact, so far is the dialectic from denying the law of contradiction, that it is especially based on it'. J. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche Books, 2000), p. 15.

[5] G. Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought, expanded and revised edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[6] This is the so-called 'explosive' consequence that is supposed to follow from any contradiction.

logical systems alone would not itself be enough to rescue Hegel's 'law of contradiction'. To use paraconsistent logic to rescue Hegel requires the further step to the so-called *dialethic* position, such as that of Priest himself. For the dialethist, true contradictions are to be found not only in certain possible worlds, but in *this one in particular*.[7]

Priest's approach has the advantage of taking Hegel at his word when he avows *his* 'law of contradiction'. Moreover, by linking Hegel's alleged 'dialethism' to the issue of thought's *limits*, Priest locates Hegel's avowal of contradiction in just that part of the Hegelian programme where his complex relation to Kant is perhaps most significant. Kant had claimed that reason had limits that it itself nevertheless is *necessarily* driven to go beyond, and the cost of being so driven is that it entangles itself in the contradictions explored in the 'Antinomies of Pure Reason' in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thus in the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* Hegel describes as 'among [the] greatest merits' of Kant the fact that he freed dialectic 'from the seeming arbitrariness which it possesses from the standpoint of ordinary thought and exhibited it as a *necessary function of reason* . . . [T]he general idea on which he based his expositions and which he vindicated, is the *objectivity of the illusion* and the *necessity of the contradiction* which belongs to the nature of thought determinations'.[8] But Kant, of course, had not *embraced* the contradictions generated by the operations of reason, and did not draw Hegel's seemingly irrationalist metaphysical conclusion – that of the contradictoriness of all things. Rather, he saw it as marking the *limits* within which reason had to self-consciously restrain itself, at the expense of *foregoing* the type of knowledge that had hitherto been pursued as metaphysics.

Again, Kant's critique of *dogmatic* metaphysics, such as that of Leibniz, had hung on his use of the concept–intuition distinction. Judgements could have a determinate content when intuitions and concepts were combined in them. *Inferential* reason, in contrast, related judgements to each other in virtue of their conceptual content alone. It, therefore, could no more than *regulate* the independent operations of the

[7] The classic account is G. Priest, *In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). For a clear introduction to the field of paraconsistent and dialethic logic from the point of view of the law of non-contradiction, see J. C. Beall, 'Introduction: At the Intersection of Truth and Falsity', in G. Priest, J. C. Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.) *The Law Of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).

[8] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 56 (5.52). The illusion referred to is, of course, Kant's *transcendental illusion*.

Understanding. But to the extent that Hegel had rejected the notion of some non-conceptual empirical 'given' to the judgements of the Understanding, and had conceived of the semantic content of intentional states *inferentially*, it would seem that this distinction between the 'constitutive' claims of the Understanding and the 'regulative' status of inferential 'Reason' could not hold. The Kantian attitude to the role of contradiction in *Reason* would thereby have to be changed, the 'positive aspect' of contradiction embraced. This positive aspect was, Hegel claimed, 'nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual life'.[9] This, then, leads to the aspect of Hegel's thought that Priest applauds: Hegel, he says, 'above all philosophers, understood the dialethic nature of the limits of thought'.[10]

For the purposes of an interpretation and *defence* of Hegel the relative disadvantage of Priest's dialethic interpretation in contrast to that of Brandom lies in the sheer radicalness of the position to which Hegel is assimilated. Denying the law of non-contradiction, it is often said, undercuts the possibility of rational debate by removing its key logical condition – *adherence to the law of non-contradiction*.[11] But this attack seems to presuppose what I have been describing as the 'myth of the logical given', the notion that the truth of this principle can be known by some direct rationalist intuition as to its truth, and here it is significant that the questioning of the law has been defended along generally Quinean 'holistic' lines.[12] Alternatively, it could be questioned as to whether what is standardly *formulated* as the 'law of non-contradiction' *correctly* captures the norm that is to be adhered to for the preservation of rationality.[13] At the very least, what the recent analytic philosophical questioning of the law of non-contradiction has done has been to open a space in which Hegel's discussion of contradiction might be taken seriously.

[9] Ibid. Cf. *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 48 remark.

[10] Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought*, p. 7.

[11] A point made by David Lewis in his various responses to Priest. See for example, 'Logic for Equivocators', *Noûs* 16 (1982), 431–41, and 'Letters to Beall and Priest', in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb, *The Law of Non-Contradiction*.

[12] In response to the Lewisian type of criticism referred to above see O. Bueno and M. Colyvan, 'Logical Non-Apriorism and the "Law" of Non-Contradiction', in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb, *The Law of Non-Contradiction*.

[13] This defence of the current questioning of the law of non-contradiction from Lewis's criticisms is taken up by Michael D. Resnik, 'Revising Logic', in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb, *The Law of Non-Contradiction*.

While Priest is surely right in emphasizing Hegel's 'positive' attitude to contradiction, focusing on Hegel's attitude to the law of non-contradiction as expressed in modern post-Fregean ways cannot, I will argue, fully capture his position. In short, Hegel's meaning is masked if one approaches his logical claims exclusively from a fundamentally propositionally-based approach to logic, and ignores the irreducible role Hegel attributes to aspects of Aristotelian *term* logic. The claim here is that contradiction for Hegel is a necessary concomitant to his cognitive contextualism, and to the necessarily 'heterogeneous' conception of logic that this contextualism brings with it.[14] For Hegel, we might say, there is no *one* 'law of non-contradiction' that *could* be affirmed or rejected as normative for all thought. Given the fact that Hegel calls upon the underlying structures of both term and propositional logic, understanding what counts as contradiction for him will presuppose an understanding of how the concept of contradiction changes between its ancient and modern expressions.

7.1 Negation and the laws of non-contradiction

When we examine Aristotle's logic, it becomes obvious that Aristotle himself could not have meant *exactly* what modern logicians mean by 'contradiction', and so also could not have intended exactly what they mean by the 'law of non-contradiction', at least to the extent that modern logicians tend to regard contradiction as involving the conjunction of a proposition with its negation. Aristotle *seems* to invoke the modern idea of contradiction in *On Interpretation* when he says that 'it must be possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed, and to affirm whatever anyone has denied. Thus it is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation'.[15] Indeed, one translator has rendered Aristotle's latter sentence as 'Every such pair of propositions we, therefore, shall call contradictories'.[16] But it is an anachronism to regard Aristotle as here referring to a pair of

[14] I take the notion of a 'heterogenous logic' from Jon Barwise's treatment of the role of diagrams in logic. See, for example, J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy, 'Heterogenous Logic', in J. Glasgow, N. Hari Narayanan and B. Chandrasekaran (eds.), *Diagrammatic Reasoning: Cognitive and Computational Perspectives* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).

[15] Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, in J. L. Ackrill (trans.), *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. Translated with Notes and Glossary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 17a 30.

[16] Cooke, *Loeb Classical Library, Aristotle I* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

contradictory propositions (p and ∼p) as understood in modern logic. This is clear from the sentences that precede those quoted where Aristotle says that '[a]n *affirmation* is a statement affirming something of something, a *negation* is a statement denying something of something'.[17] As Laurence Horn points out in his study of negation, 'we should be aware that any translation of the term logic operation of predicate denial into the one-place truth-functional connective of propositional (or sentence) negation cannot faithfully render Aristotle's vision'.[18] Denying a predicate of a subject cannot be thought of asserting '*not* p' where 'p' is the content expressed in affirming that predicate of the subject. This is a consequence of Aristotle's basing his logic on *terms* rather than *propositions*, such that it is terms and not 'propositions' that are the primary targets of negation.

In a survey of approaches to contradiction, Patrick Grim has noted that contradiction can be thought of in ontological, semantic, syntactic and pragmatic ways, and he gives a formulation from Aristotle as an example of the ontological approach. 'On an ontological outline', he notes, 'a contradiction would be neither a single statement nor a pair of statements, neither a proposition nor a pair of propositions, but a state of affairs'.[19] The formulation he gives from Richard and Valerie Routley here, referring to a 'contradictory situation' as one in which 'both B and ∼B (it is not the case that B) hold for some B',[20] seems to fit with his characterization. However, Aristotle's claim in the *Metaphysics* 'that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect',[21] seems to conflict with it, rather than exemplify it. It is significant that when Grim himself refers to the 'contradictory state of affairs' at the heart of the ontological interpretation he uses two different formulations: 'A contradictory state of affairs would be one in which something had a particular property and also an incompatible property, or in which something both had a particular

[17] Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 17a 25.

[18] Horn, *A Natural History of Negation*, p. 21.

[19] Patrick Grim, 'What is a Contradiction?' in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb, *The Law of Non-Contradiction*, p. 53.

[20] R. Routley and V. Routley, 'Negation and Contradiction', *Revista Colombiana de Matemática*, 19 (1985), 201–31, 204, quoted in Grim 'What is a Contradiction?' p. 52. This quote from the Routleys, however, obscures the fact that they see negation as an operation applying equally at sentential and *sub*-sentential levels.

[21] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, bk. iv, ch iii, 1005b18–22, quoted in Grim, 'What is a Contradiction?' pp. 49–50.

property and lacked that property'.[22] The latter formulation, as with the other examples, appeals to the coexistence of a fact with its negation – some 'negative fact' – but the *former* does not, at least not directly, as it only appeals to an imagined situation in which some thing possessed incompatible properties, and this way of putting the point, I want to suggest, is the way that is natural from within an Aristotelian worldview organized with the resources of his own term logic. Moreover, Grim's implicit invocation of a negative fact in this context raises a topic that was a crucial one for Hegel – the treatment of negation in Greek philosophy initiated by Plato in the *Sophist*.[23]

Plato's discussion of negation in this dialogue is complex. Through the words of the 'stranger', Plato replies to Parmenides' claim that 'non-being is not', by the stranger telling Theaetetus that 'it seems that when we say *that which is not*, we don't say something contrary to *that which is*, but only something different from it'.[24] With this Plato opts for, perhaps initiates, what Laurence Horn describes as the 'asymmetricalist' position on the relation of positive and negative statements. Asymmetricalists regard negative statements as 'less primitive, less informative, less objective, less godly, and/or less valuable than their affirmative counterparts'.[25] Plato wants to *defend* the meaningfulness of negation against Parmenides, and he does so by interpreting negative claims as equivalent to some different positive claims. The idea here seems to be that one attributes meaning to a negative claim, say, that the apple is *not* red, by invoking its equivalence to a different positive claim, for example, that the apple is *green*.

Hegel's discussion of Plato's dialogue in *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* is helpful. On the one hand, Hegel's attitude to Plato's overall treatment of negation is favourable: Plato, he says, 'proves, against Parmenides, that non-being is' rather than, as Parmenides has it, that it 'is not'. The context of Plato's defence of negation here is important as he had appealed to the reality of 'non-being' as that which is correlated with *false* claims in order to criticize the sophists' relativistic 'doing away

[22] Patrick Grim, 'What is a Contradiction?' p. 53.

[23] On this, see Richard M. Gale, *Negation and Non-Being* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976).

[24] Plato, 'Sophist', trans. Nicholas P. White, in J. M Cooper, ed. *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 257B and C.

[25] Horn, *A Natural History of Negation*, p. 3. Horn describes Plato's stranger as 'introduc[ing] two of the recurring themes of our history: the view that negation can be eliminated by defining it away in terms of the (putatively) positive concept of otherness or difference, and the observation that negative statements are in some sense less valuable than affirmative ones, in being less specific or less informative'. Ibid, p. 1.

with the difference between true and false'.[26] That is, while the sophist would use the Parmenidean denial of non-being to *deny* that there could be anything (the *non-being* of redness) making a claim such as 'the apple is red', *false*, Plato would hold that it is the 'non-being' of redness that would secure the falsity of the claim by equating the non-being of redness with the 'being' of a different property, green, for example. And yet for Hegel, Plato has not gone far enough because in his defence of 'non-being' against the sophistic position, he 'holds the opposites [like 'red' and 'green'] asunder, as though they were simply opposed in a determinate way',[27] and fails to 'capture the unity of opposites [which] is present to us in everything we know'.[28] Clearly Hegel is here appealing to the type of 'determinate negation' holding between *opposing* or *contrary* and not just *different* terms. 'Round' and 'green' may be *different*, but 'round' and 'square' or 'red' and 'green', are *opposed*. Plato had presumably intended something like this, but his attempt to capture this in terms of *difference* is too weak. Thus, the tomato's being *round*, say, does not explain why it is false to call it *red*. Only invoking an opposed or contrary property will do this.

The type of stronger *oppositional* relation between properties required by Plato is just what is reflected in the arrays of contrary terms that are appropriate for predication of some substance term in Aristotle's schema. As we have seen, unlike modern propositional logics, in which negation is an operation applying 'externally' to a proposition (p) to give its contradictory (∼p), Aristotle's term logic has *two* forms of negation: first, one can negate the term predicated of a subject in a sentence,[29] or secondly, one can *deny*, rather than *affirm*, the predicate *of* the subject of the sentence. Term negation produces the *contrary* of the term negated, while *denying* rather than affirming a predicate of a subject produces a sentence that is *contradictory* to the affirmation.[30] Moreover, it seems

[26] Ibid., p. 63.
[27] Ibid., p. 64.
[28] Ibid., p. 63.
[29] One can negate the subject term here as well, but for our purposes the possibility of negating the predicate term will suffice.
[30] Thus the multi-dimensional account of negation given by Richard Sylvan (formerly, Richard Routley) in which it is seen as operating on 'a *range* of different types or categories – statements, attributes, modifiers and so on (or seen syntactically to such different parts of speech as sentences, predicates, adjectives and adverbs, and so on) – but not to all' is able to capture this Aristotelian difference whereas the classically Fregean account cannot. Richard Sylvan, 'What is that Item Designated Negation?' in Dov M. Gabbay and Heinrich Wansing (eds.), *What is Negation?* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 300.

natural from an Aristotelian perspective to treat term negation as presupposed by predicate denial. Typically, the basis on which I am going to deny *your* claim that, say this table is wooden, is not because I have acquired a belief about some negative state of affairs, the state of affairs of its *not being wooden*. Rather, my denial is likely to be based on some direct perceptual knowledge of its being determinately *non*-wooden, for example, metal or plastic. As Manley Thompson puts it, Aristotle's conception of the relation of a sentence like 'Socrates is non-ill' employing term negation to 'Socrates is not ill' resulting from predicate denial is one of 'implication with the first statement as antecedent'.[31] For reasons that we will see below, Frege was deeply critical of this way of thinking about negation. Hegel was also critical, but in a different way. In line with what I have called his cognitive contextualism, Hegel regarded term negation as appropriate in particular contexts and inappropriate in others. We can see these dimensions of his contextualism at work in his treatment of 'Perception' and 'the Understanding' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

By 'Perception', as he treats it in Chapter 2 of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel means that generally Aristotelian cognitive outlook which takes an unreflectively realistic attitude to perceptual objects conceived as individual instances of natural kinds that are modified by properties that at any time exclude their contraries. Such a conception of mutually excluding properties is linked to Aristotle's essentialism in the sense that the *kind* which the individual substance instantiates is relevant to determining which set of contraries any property belongs to. That is, for Aristotle it is *form* which individuates, and it is substances *qua individual forms* which are the ultimate subjects of predication. For example, Socrates' being either well or ill but not both, or wise or stupid but not

[31] Manley Thompson, 'On Aristotle's Square of Opposition', *Philosophical Review* 62 (1953), 251–65, 255–6. Thompson represents the term negation of 'ill' by 'not-ill', which I have here changed to 'non-ill' for consistency.

An approach to negation somewhat closer to Aristotle's has been proposed within 'relevance' or 'relevant' logic which draws on earlier work in quantum logic utilizing the binary relation of 'orthagonality' (symbolized by '$\perp$' and commonly called 'perp') to capture the idea of *incompatible* possible experimental outcomes. In situation theoretic approaches to relevance logic, for example, '$a \perp b$' indicates that situation a and situation b are incompatible, for example, a situation in which an object's being *white all over* is incompatible with one in which that object is *black all over*. (I am following here the helpful account of such approaches to negation in Edwin D. Mares, *Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 5. A similar approach utilizing the symbol '*' (star) originates with the work of Richard and Valerie Routley, 'The Semantics of First-Degree Entailment', *Nous* 6 (1972), 335–59, and 'Negation and Contradiction'.

both, is bound up with the fact that he is a human, and that humans are the kinds of things that can be well or ill, wise or stupid, but not both at the same time.

Hegel's treatment of Perception as *both* a 'shape of consciousness' and a *requirement* for the objectivity of the *contents* of such a 'shape' brings out how a version of the law of non-contradiction can be regarded as involved in the constitution of intentional objects and so as simultaneously 'logical' and 'ontological'. I have suggested that for Aristotle predicate denial presupposes term negation, and so we would expect that the law of non-contradiction expressed in terms of the impossibility of simultaneously affirming and denying some F of A would be dependent upon some more basic law *denying* that individual substances are capable of having incompatible properties at the one time and in the same respect – call it the 'law of non-compossibility of contraries'. Aristotle indeed makes claims of this sort in various places,[32] including these passages in the *Metaphysics* Book IV containing Aristotle's 'arguments' for the law.[33] While these issues are notoriously unclear, I want to suggest one reading which I think at least captures the general drift of Aristotle's thought.

In his criticisms of the views attributed to Heraclitus, Aristotle asserts that 'if it is impossible for contrary attributes to belong at the same time to the same subject ... and an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it, then clearly it is impossible for the same man to suppose at the same time that the same thing is and is not; for the man who made this error would entertain two contrary opinions at the same time'.[34] Aristotle can be read here as relying on the idea of the individual knower as a type of substance with thoughts or opinions conceived of *as its* properties such that the mind's inability to maintain contradictory beliefs is an instance of the more general law concerning the non-compossibility of contraries.[35] On such an interpretation, that the mind

[32] These are sometimes taken as corollaries to the more conventional law of non-contradiction itself. See, for example, Russell Dancy, *Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975).

[33] I refer to Aristotle's 'arguments' here because, while Aristotle does attempt to advance arguments, he also effectively claims that the law of non-contradiction is so fundamental that it cannot be argued for.

[34] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* bk. iv, ch iii, 1005b27–33.

[35] Cf. Whitaker, *Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, p. 185–6, who supports this reading of Aristotle on the basis of Aristotle's analogy in *De Anima* (424a) between the mind's reception of beliefs and a wax tablet's reception of impressions. Lukasiewicz had separated *logical*, *ontological* and *psychological* formulae of the principle in Aristotle (Jan Lukasiewicz, 'On

cannot instantiate *contradictory* thoughts (the logical expression of the law of non-contradiction) will be taken as an instance of the general rule prohibiting individual substances from instantiating *contrary* properties. From the point of view of the believer's mental substance, the impossibility of having contradictory thoughts about Socrates, that is, of simultaneously affirming and denying some F of him, would be explained by the impossibility of having contrary thoughts about him, simultaneously affirming some F and some incompatible non-F. Such an interpretation would suggest that the *ontological law*, the non-compossibility of *contrary* properties in a single substance, is the more basic idea from which the *logical* law of non-*contradiction* would be derived.[36]

In Hegel's treatment of the three 'shapes of consciousness' in the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology*, the normative conception of objectivity at work in each shape is fated to break down and to be replaced by the more developed conception of objectivity characterizing the succeeding shape. Thus, to the extent that Aristotle's fundamental version of the law of non-contradiction – that which I have been calling the law of the non-compossibility of contraries – is in Hegel's account bound up with a conception of objecthood that ultimately *fails*, it would seem clear that

the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle', trans Vernon Wedin, *Review of Metaphysics* 24 (1971), 485–509, (originally published 1910)), arguing for the equivalence of the logical and ontological formulae, and criticizing the *psychological* ones that were, he claimed, derived from them. The fundamental role played by the psychological conception has in turn been defended by Thomas Upton, 'The Psychological and Metaphysical Dimensions of Non-Contradiction in Aristotle', *Review of Metaphysics*, 36 (1983), 591–606.

[36] In surveying the variety of formulations that Aristotle gives to the principle of non-contradiction, Vasilis Politis notes that '[e]vidently Aristotle thinks that PNC [the principle of non-contradiction] is true both with regard to statements and with regard to things. But he appears to be especially interested in the question of whether PNC is true with regard to things'. Vasilis Politis, *Aristotle and the Metaphysics*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 123. In his study of Hegel and Aristotle, Alfredo Ferrarin offers a strong ontological reading: 'Aristotle's so-called principle of non-contradiction is not the logical principle that is typically read into [*Metaphysics Γ*]. It is, and is dialectically explained as, a principle of the determinacy of being, not of logic'. Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 194.

While in places Aristotle seems to appeal to the non-compossibility of contraries as either an *explanation* of, or a *justification* for, the principle of non-contradiction, in others he seems to suggest that the principle of non-contradiction is the more basic, claiming, for example, that 'since the contradiction of a statement cannot be true at the same time of the same thing, it is obvious that contraries cannot apply at the same time to the same thing . . . if it is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny a thing truly, it is also impossible for contraries to apply to a thing at the same time'. *Metaphysics*, 1011b17–21. In keeping with this, in *Metaphysics* Book F he suggests that of the types of opposition, (contradiction, privation, contrariety and relation), 'of these the primary type is contradiction', indicating that contradiction was not to be understood in terms of contrariety (1055b 1–4).

Hegel does not endorse *that* particular version of the law. What replaces the perceptual object as the model of independent objecthood in Hegel's story is the object of 'the Understanding', roughly, the object grasped from the modern 'scientific view'. From the point of view of the Understanding the world is grasped more like an interacting totality of forces, the dynamics of which is be understood in terms of universal causal laws, rather than a totality of perceivable, qualified substances. In the Kantian account of the understanding on which Hegel draws, causal relations are schematized in terms of hypothetical inferences, and so the logical categories structuring *this* world will fit more a propositional than a term logic. We might see how thinking could be driven to move from term- to proposition-based inference forms by reflecting on the circumstances in which a pair of *contrary* propositions might be transformed into a pair of *contradictory* ones. This, I suggest, is just what might happen in contexts of epistemic opposition or dialectical contestation.

7.2 Epistemic opposition and reflection

As we have seen in Hegel's discussion of evaluative judgement, in a dialectical situation a particular immediate claim on the part of one subject, some assertion with the form 'this A is F', is likely to be met with opposition if, from the point of view of the other subject, this A is experienced as having some other *incompatible* or *contrary* quality, its being *non*-F, *and if* the opponent thinks of themselves as justified in, and on behalf of, that experience.[37] Let's say Agathon's immediate perceptual response to Socrates' appearance is to describe him as *ugly*, while Alcibiades describes him as *beautiful*. When Agathon's opposing opinion is expressed *in relation to* that of Alcibiades, that is, as a mediated rather than an immediate claim, Agathon's counter-claim will be put as a *denial*: 'Socrates is beautiful' will now be met with claims such as 'Socrates is *not* beautiful'. And this will apply to Alcibiades too: he is likely to say

[37] Robert Wallace captures this aspect of Hegelian negation when he describes it as 'not simply the intellectual operation … that we might also call 'denying' the truth of a proposition or a predication … [but] the construction of a contrasting statement or position, one that addresses the *issue* that was addressed by the position that is being 'negated', while revising the first position's view of the issue'. Robert M. Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 59.

things like 'Socrates is *not* ugly'. In this context, then, we can see why negation will function primarily as an operator applying at the level of the sentence itself rather than the predicate, as each is denying *what it is* that the other is saying.[38] From Hegel's perspective, these changes cannot be understood as merely effecting the cognitive attitudes to some stable content. Rather, the transitions here must affect the categorical shape of the content itself – here, Socrates – under discussion.

In Aristotelian terms, a transition has here been effected *from* 'incidental' sense perception *to* belief, the latter but not the former involving some kind of explicit endorsement and being capable of engaging with reason. In the pre-contestative context, Socrates had been grasped *qua* instance of a kind, 'this man', say, and perceived as having one of two opposed non-essential properties: he is either ugly or beautiful. Regarded as substances with perceptual capacities – animals – neither Agathon nor Alcibiades could perceive Socrates as simultaneously both ugly and beautiful, just as Socrates himself, from this point of view, could not simultaneously *be* both ugly and beautiful. In such non-contestative contexts, one may not want to say that such contents stand *within* the space of reasons, but something more like the space of possible perceptual experiences.

We might get a sense of how a somewhat naturalistic reading of Aristotle's account of perception could look by considering the approach proposed by José Luis Bermúdez to cognition in non-linguistic animals, as he appeals to Aristotle's term logic to capture the way that the capacity to discriminate between contraries and reason disjunctively might function in such animals. Like Brandom, Bermúdez believes that 'elementary logical concepts' such as 'conjunction, negation, and disjunction and the material conditional' are dependent on linguistic communication and hence not available to non-linguistic creatures.[39] However, certain non-human animals clearly seem capable of a type of inferential reasoning about situations that involve appeal to non-perceptual properties. Consider an animal that might learn, for example, that gazelles and lions

[38] Cf. Horn on the typical pragmatic context of sentential negtion: 'Not every negation is a speaker denial … but the prototypical use … of negation is indeed as a denial of a proposition previously asserted, or subscribed to, or held as plausible by, of at least mentioned by, someone relevant in the discourse context'. *A Natural History of Negation*, p. 203.

[39] José Luis Bermúdez, *Thinking Without Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 140.

are never at the same watering-hole at the same time. If, then, that animal is able to see a gazelle there, it can 'conclude with confidence that the lion is not in the vicinity'.[40] The modern way to formalize such reasoning is as a disjunctive inference in a propositional logic – '*a* or *b*' and 'not *a*' therefore '*b*' – but if the dependence of logical concepts on language is correct, this couldn't represent that creature's thoughts. Thus Bermúdez turns to Aristotle's use of term negation (which he refers to as 'predicate negation') to model such thoughts: 'the important point is that the distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation gives us a way of understanding negation (or rather, *protonegation*) at the non-linguistic level as involving a thought with a negative predicate . . . as opposed to the truth-functional construction of a complex thought'.[41] Let's say that the animal possesses two contrary concepts that can be applied to waterholes – 'lionful' and 'gazelleful' – indicating mutually excluding properties. To perceive that a waterhole is gazelleful, is therefore to perceive that it is *lionless*, in the same way that perceiving that an object is red is just to perceive that it is non-green.[42]

Immediate perceptual responses in humans may be something like this, but this situation would have to change when these responses were expressed linguistically in dialectical situations. When Agathon and Alcibiades find themselves in dispute over Socrates, for example, each denying the claim of the other, their claims will no longer express possible perceptual experiences, but will be more like inferential judgements drawn from those immediate experience-based judgements. Such claims now no longer belong to the space of possible perception, they belong to the differently structured 'space of reasons'. The content of the attitude of each will now be 'mediated' by its *contradictory* rather than its *contrary*, and the law of non-contradiction *qua* norm governing the resolution of such opposition will now be the conventionally modern one expressed in terms of propositional contents for which *negation*

[40] Ibid., p. 141.

[41] Ibid., p. 143. Bermúdez uses the terminology of 'predicate negation' and 'sentential negation' to capture what I have described as 'term negation' and 'predicate denial' respectively. Nevertheless, it is clear that these are the same distinction.

[42] Concerning the genesis of the immediate, finite contents of the will, Hegel is content with the commonplace assumption that one such source is provided by our biological natures. Similarly, with regard to the contents of immediate perceptual *knowledge*, an inferentialist like Brandom will be content to attribute a role to an underlying dispositional nature – those 'reliable differential responsive dispositions' that, in his account, underlie our capacities to linguistically respond to situations by making assertions about them.

is now regarded as an external operation. We can see why this is so by looking to *Frege's* reasons for considering negation external in this way, and comparing Frege and Hegel on this issue.

Frege claimed that negation must be an operation that applies to complete propositions as in order to understand a proposition in non-assertive contexts such as interrogatives and hypotheticals we must understand the content independently of the question of its actual truth or falsity:

> When I raise the question whether the Sun is bigger than the Moon, I am recognizing the sense of the interrogative sentence
>
> 'Is the Sun bigger than the Moon?'
>
> Now if this sense were a thought whose being consisted in its being true, then I should at the same time see that this sense was true. Grasping the sense would at the same time be an act of judging; and the utterance of an interrogative sentence would at the same time be an assertion, and so an answer to the question. But in an interrogative sentence neither the truth nor the falsity of the sense may be asserted. Hence an interrogative sentence has not as its sense something whose being consists in its being true.[43]

The sense of the question, then, must not be affected by the actual truth or falsity of its answer, and it is such considerations that lead Frege to think of negation as 'external'. That is, if we think of the proposition p as the content of a question 'p?', whose possible answers are the pair of assertions 'p' and '$\sim p$', then the proposition p, considered independently of the issue of which of those assertions are true, must be taken to be the understandable sense of the question. It is significant that, in his comments on the law of the excluded middle, which in Aristotle is expressed as 'of one thing we must either assert or deny one thing',[44] Hegel argues for the existence of a 'third' that is indifferent to the opposition he describes as A and *not* A, which we are presumably meant to read as the supposedly exclusive assertion or denial of a predicate of some thing. This third is A itself without the '+' or '–' that mark the affirmation or denial of A.[45] Hegel describes this third as 'the unity of reflection into which the opposition withdraws as into ground', a unity

[43] Gottlob Frege, 'Negation', in Beaney, *The Frege Reader*, pp. 347–8.

[44] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, bk. iv, ch. vi, 1011b24–25.

[45] 'This A is neither $+A$ nor $-A$, and is equally well $+A$ as $-A$'. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 438–9 (6.73–4).

which looks analogous to the Fregean idea of a propositional content that must be able to be understood in abstraction from its being judged to be actually true or false.[46]

This 'signless' semantic content of a belief fits with the idea of a content in relation to which the asserter must come to stand under conditions of dialectical contestation. Faced with a counter-asserted *denial*, the asserter is thereby faced with the two opposed beliefs that stand as contradictories, p and $\sim p$, and is thereby faced with the dilemma that both cannot be believed at the same time. Such a subject is forced into 'reflection' to gauge which of the propositions, p or $\sim p$ (or alternatively, the assertion of F of A or the denial of F of A), is correct, and this change of stance requires a complete modification of the subject's conception of the nature of the original object of knowledge. Originally, qua *perceptual object*, it had been conceived as unproblematic and as immediately epistemically available to the subject: for example, one simply had to see it, feel it, smell it, and so on, in order to know its properties. Now, however, the 'object' is grasped as that which is possibly F or possibly not F (because possibly some *non*-F). *If* it is F, it will have to be understood as that which was responsible for its *appearing to the other* to be not F; and *if* not F, as that which was responsible for its originally appearing *to be* F.[47] Thus reflective knowledge must grasp the object as subject of a predication from which the question of assertion or denial has been for the moment abstracted. That is, it will have to grasp the thought 'A is (signless) F' in such a way that is indifferent to and underlies both 'A is + F' (the assertion of F of A) and 'A is –F' (the denial of F of A).

At the level of 'reflection', then, we might say that 'what' is known is propositional, some 'fact' or 'state of affairs', rather than some suitably

[46] The algebraic use of '+' and '–' to indicate the relation between negated terms in term logic is in fact employed by Sommers and Englebretsen in order to appeal to the signless 'absolute value' of a term 'as mathematicians talk of the absolute value of some number'. George Englebretsen, 'Trees, Terms, and Truth: The Philosophy of Fred Sommers', in Oderberg (ed.), *The Old New Logic*, p. 27. Thus for certain uses it will be appropriate that a term's 'charge' be ignored so that the absolute value of a term is understood as having either positive or negative value. (For example, one can speak of a man as 'four feet tall' even though being that height is, for a man, *short* rather than tall.) Michael Wolff links Hegel's treatment of signless A to the issue of 'absolute value' in mathematics in 'Hegel's Doctrine of Contradiction', p. 21, n. 14.

[47] Clearly, the object is now being treated as the subject of a *reflective* judgement whose *inner* non-apparent properties are manifested in terms of the *effects* the thing has on other things, namely, human perceivers.

qualified instance of a kind. The subject *qua* dialectical, and thereby reflective, inhabits a Tractarian world of 'facts' rather than an Aristotelian one of individual 'substances', and with this the categorical structure of the object as intended has changed. It started as an Aristotelian perceptual object – an individual instantiation of some kind capable of being qualified with contrary properties but not at the same time. It has become, however, the sort of object that is the correlate of a 'singular term' in Fregean sense, that is, as an argument taken by a function and semantically derivative from a proposition.[48] 'Facts' or 'states of affairs', I suggest, are effectively the 'objects' of the Understanding and stand in contrast to the qualified kind instances of Perception.[49] They are the elements revealed as fundamental within the law-governed natural realm of modern science rather than the furniture of Sellars's 'manifest' world.

The dialectical situation as I have sketched it here broadly coheres with Brandom's concept of the deontic scorekeeping language game of reason-giving which he links to Hegel's central notion of *recognition*. Robert Pippin has described Hegel as having appropriated and generalized the idea of recognition from Fichte's theory of rights, the 'root idea' of which had been 'that I come to develop a different relation to *my own desires and interests* when not only physically hindered by [an] other in the satisfaction of my desires but "challenged" or "summoned" by an other who *rejects*, does not just stand in the way of, my implicit claims to a piece

[48] Following Brandom we could think of the subject of a predication that has to be understood referred to by 'exporting' a term from a propositional content to form a '*de re*' locution.

[49] The inappropriate 'assimilation of facts to things' is what Strawson had criticised in 'Truth', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* (1950), reprinted in P. F. Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 149. That *term* logic will result in a conception of what it is to which a true claim 'corresponds' that is different from that encouraged by propositional logic is argued by Sommers. While Sommers agrees with Strawson's contention that facts are not 'in the world', he attempts to rescue the correspondence theory by treating them as *properties of* the world. (For a useful presentation of Sommers's views here see George Englebretsen, 'Trees, Terms, and Truth: The Philosophy of Fred Sommers', in David S. Oderberg (ed.), *The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005)). My claim is that Hegel's distinction between the objects of Perception and the Understanding maps onto just this distinction. For Hegel, however, neither of these conceptions of objecthood is simply *true* as the proponents of Perception and Understanding each take their conceptions to be. Just this is meant to be the lesson of the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

of the earth'.[50] Extending 'right' ('entitlement') here, as does Brandom, to *epistemic* right, we might paraphrase Pippin to say that interacting with others in the context of inquiring about the world 'I come to develop a different relation to' *my own beliefs* when '"challenged" or "summonsed" by another who *rejects*' and does not simply 'stand in the way of' them. That is, on Pippin's account, the concept of recognition is at the heart of just that relation of dialectical contestation that we have seen involved in the transformations of Aristotelian perceptual belief to modern theoretical, reflective belief.

This new stance, this new relation to one's own commitments, is the characteristic stance of modernity, but cannot be the complete story for Hegel, however. The reflective movement in which the mind divests itself of an immediate content taken as normative to one in which it stands to a content in such a way that its validity is in question is a dimension of a fully functioning rationality, but one which, when abstracted from *other* dimensions, in particular, the dimension of immediacy, is self-annihilating. We might apply to *belief* here, the same logic that Hegel applies to *the will* in the 'Introduction' to the *Philosophy of Right*, where he says that the will contains an 'element of *pure indeterminacy* or of the 'I''s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately though nature, through needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved; this is the limitless infinity of *absolute abstraction* or *universality*, the pure thinking of oneself'.[51] Epistemically considered we have the capacity to question or doubt *any* immediately given content of belief: to regard some special belief contents as immune from reflective correction just *is* the 'myth of the given'. And typically, beliefs are so brought into question by a dialectical opponent. But this moment of the will, says Hegel, is opposed by another in which the will posits itself 'as something *determinate*', and the '"I" steps into determinate existence [*Dasein*] in general', what he calls 'the absolute moment of the *finitude* or *particularization* of the "I"'.[52] To be an 'I' might presuppose the capacity to abstract from any 'given' belief contents by raising the question of its justification, but equally, to be an 'I' requires *having* particular belief contents.[53]

[50] Robert R. Pippin, 'What is the Question for which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?', *European Journal of Philosophy* 8 (2000), 155–72, 157.

[51] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, § 5.

[52] Ibid., § 6.

[53] In the twentieth century a similar idea was expressed by Wittgenstein about the background of 'certainties' that would always be presupposed by the capacity to *doubt*. Cf. Ludwig

We might think of this as moving from the position in which a thought is 'merely entertained', as is required for, say, hypothetical reasoning, to its *endorsement* or *assertion*, but Hegel's multilayered account of cognition suggests something more than this. What we might call Hegel's '*Aufheben* principle' implies that the more immediate levels of cognition such as the stances seen in Sense-certainty and Perception are somehow retained and integrated within the more developed attitudes such as that of the Understanding. The idea of the endorsement or assertion of some particular content can sound as if it is a matter of *merely* resolving upon the particular propositional content reached via reflection, but Hegel's stress on the *unity* of theoretical and practical reason suggests that the moment of 'particularization' of the epistemic 'I' be thought of as involving a reassertion of the type of perspectivity associated with 'Perception'. After all, if it is something like what we think of as *evaluative* reasoning that is paradigmatic for Hegel, then one would expect the outcome of such reasoning to be an attitude something like that found in Aristotle's *phronismos* where judgement is necessarily reflected in action.

Pursuing thoughts like these seems to allow one to entertain ideas of some ultimate reconciliation between idealisms of the types found in Kant and Hegel, and some form of the *naturalism* that tends to dominate in contemporary analytic philosophy including its post-Sellarsian *pragmatic* form. I have suggested that Hegel's cognitive contextualism motivates a type of heterogeneous logic such that the certain 'reflective' contexts require inferential norms more like those expressed in propositional logic while other more immediate ones require norms closer to those expressed in term logic. That the categorial shape of the object *changes* with such transitions means that the contradictions about which Kant warned are generated as a necessary part of thought itself. While Brandom's inferentialist reading of Hegel tends to work from within a uniformly *Fregean* approach to logic, there seems nothing substantial about his position that would not allow the considerations that have been appealed to here from being assimilated within the inferentialist project. Nevertheless, it would seem that from a strictly Hegelian position, Brandom's naturalistic *metaposition* would be regarded as working at the level of 'the Understanding' rather than 'Reason'. It was precisely

Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). Of course, such 'certainties' should not be confused with the *mythical* given. Individually they are fallible contents for which the question of their justification has not been raised, not infallible self-justifying ones.

in opposition to Kant's denial of a *constitutive* role to 'Reason' that Hegel had embraced 'contradiction', affirming that everything is 'contradictory'. It would therefore seem that for Hegel the 'law of contradiction' is in some sense, as it is for Aristotle, *equally* logical *and* ontological. While Brandom's pragmatist reading of Hegel has been embraced by those wishing to free Hegel's thought from 'metaphysics', does not such a focus on contradiction re-raise the question of Hegel's notorious 'metaphysics?'

8

HEGEL, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS

With the claim that Hegel's metaphysical inadequacies were consequent upon problems in the logic from which he started, the view expressed by Russell at the beginning of the twentieth century at least concurs on *one* issue with that of Hegel's sympathetic 'post-Kantian' interpreters at the turn of the twenty-first: it suggests the degree to which Hegel's 'metaphysics' was somehow grounded in or guided by *logic*, and as such suggests a distinctly Kantian dimension to Hegel's approach that is the point of contact between recent analytical receptions of Hegel and his contemporary 'non-metaphysical' interpreters. To bring into view what it is at stake in such debates over 'metaphysics', a three way comparison between Aristotle, Kant and Hegel may be helpful.

In a study of the relation of Kant's approach to the categories to that of Aristotle, Manley Thompson has suggested that Kant effectively reversed the relation of logic to ontology found in Aristotle's *Categories*.[1] First, for Aristotle the categories had a *primarily* ontological significance, while in Kant their significance becomes primarily *epistemological*. But Thompson further links this difference to that aspect of Kant that Brandom has emphasized and which he sees as the path to Hegel's inferentialism – Kant's turn to the *proposition* as the most basic meaningful unit of thought. Thompson describes this in terms of the different ways in which Kant and

[1] Manley Thompson, 'Philosophical Approaches to Categories', *The Monist* 66 (1983), 336–52.

Aristotle each use 'the notion of *combination* in determining the number of categories'.[2] For Aristotle:

> an expression in no way combined signifies an entity falling under a category, so that the number of categories corresponds to the different forms of uncombined expressions.[3] With Kant, on the other hand, the different form of combination (synthesis) disclosed by an analysis of combined (synthesized) expressions corresponds to the number of categories.[4] The two approaches may thus be contrasted roughly as one which begins with a classification of terms that signify things (categorematic terms) and proceeds to a classification of forms of propositions produced by combining these terms (as Aristotle proceeds from *Categories* to *De Interpretatione*), and one which moves in the opposite direction (as Kant proceeds from a table of forms of judgements to categories as concepts of an object in general).[5]

The idea of such a turn from an ontological to an epistemological account of the categories might be seen as summing up one possible sense in which the Kantian impulse can be taken to be 'non-metaphysical'. This is a sense in which 'metaphysical' is thought of as characterizing Aristotle's substance ontology – that is, just that aspect of Aristotle's thought that is classically regarded as having been *displaced* by the emergence of natural science in the early modern era. And yet, it might be objected, particular metaphysical commitments can nevertheless still be discerned within the philosophy that characteristically develops along with this displacement – *epistemology* – especially when tied to conceptions of 'the given'. It was in this sense that Hegel and other post-Kantians were critical of what they regarded was the degree to which Kant's transcendental idealism was still indebted to core metaphysical assumptions from the form of philosophy from which it had promised liberation.

Kant's reversal of Aristotle's approach to the categories was able to be seen as resting on the assumption that what was structured by his set of categories was a subject-relative *appearance* behind which stood the unknowable 'thing in itself'.[6] However, should not the idea of a

[2] Ibid., p. 341.

[3] Internal reference is to Aristotle, *Categories*, bk. iv.

[4] Internal reference is to Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A70–80/B95–106.

[5] Manley Thompson, 'Philosophical Approaches to Categories', pp. 341–2.

[6] Or at least that was how Kant was understood by Hegel as he has been by many others. Such a 'two-worlds' interpretation of Kant is, however, now commonly disputed. See, for example, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*.

conceivable but unknowable 'thing-in-itself' be regarded from the Kantian orientation as itself *just as* problematic as the conception of it as *knowable*? Kant's combination of conceivability but unknowability seems to take away with the one hand a quasi-divine epistemic take on the world – the so-called 'God's-eye view' – only to return something like a *semantic* version of it with the other,[7] and it was paradoxes like these concerning the limits to the thought of finite cognizers that had occupied Hegel. Indeed, much of his work can be read as an attempt to show how, while we are each fundamentally limited and conditioned in our particular cognitive capacities, we are, nevertheless, in virtue of our rational natures, somehow capable of going beyond those limits.[8] Moreover, the key to his solution was the idea of grounding our capacity for transcending such limits in the *recognitively* intersubjective structures of spirit to which we all belong, an idea he thought was expressed in theological imagistic form in the Christian myth of an incarnated God, who, after his death, continued to live in the 'spirit' of a certain kind of human community. From Hegel's perspective, then, there has to be a third possibility for thinking of this relation of categories to being: the categories, or thought determinations, do not reflect an independently determinate realm of objects, but nor do objects reflect an independently structured realm of determinations of thought. Rather, we must be able *somehow* to think of these two realms as *one*.

All this in turn gives to Hegel's approach the seemingly paradoxical result that features of Aristotle's 'realism' are reintroduced to counter Kantian subjectivism.[9] For Hegel the categories do not simply reveal the *form* of thought that is able to be conceived apart from and opposed to the world, they must also reveal features of the world *itself*, and in this way the Hegelian 'extension' of Kant's critical approach is meant to restore substantive *content* to philosophy by undermining that residually dogmatically metaphysical assumption responsible for Kant's apparent denial of it. But of course the type of 'ontology' restored here could not

[7] It is just this sort of worry that is observable in Kant's attempts to specify an entirely 'negative' conception of the concept 'noumenon'. As we will see, Hegel radicalizes such a 'negative' conception, noumena becoming marked by a characteristic that Hegel thinks of as *negativity*.

[8] The ubiquity of this theme, and its rootedness in Hegel's dialectical unfolding of the categories is brought out exceptionally clearly by Robert Wallace in *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God*. Wallace's treatment of Hegel's logic and my own converge on a number of points.

[9] Of course it is a characteristic of Hegel's approach to 'negation' (or *Aufhebung*) that what is so negated is in some way *retained* within the superseding account.

be that original type susceptible to Kant's critique. Rather, this post-Kantian, post-epistemological analogue to Aristotelian ontology should be understood from a logico-semantic point of view. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Aristotle's had been the metaphysics against which the critical philosophy had turned, Hegel, I suggest, found a model for the *completion* of this critical turn in Aristotle himself, and, ironically, in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

8.1 Hegel as critic of 'metaphysical positivism'

To reinstate this quasi-ontological aspect of the categories in such a way that it somehow includes the spirit of the Kantian epistemological critique, Hegel needed, of course, to forego any idea that what is revealed in them is a world of self-subsistent substances or things-in-themselves, that are either somehow unproblematically epistemically presented to a subject before whom they stand (Aristotle), or, alternatively denied to a subject epistemically restricted to appearances (Kant). It was in accordance with this necessity that he then returned to what surely to the modern mind seems to be the *most* 'metaphysical' aspect of Aristotle's philosophy – his account of divine thinking given in *Metaphysics*, book 12 chapter 9. In the sentences that Hegel quotes to conclude the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*,[10] Aristotle characterizes God as a process of thinking that is not directed to any object other than itself, but which is, somehow, its *own* content. Divine thinking is just the thinking *of* thinking itself '*noesis noeseos noesis*'.[11]

In these extremely puzzling passages about God as infinite substance,[12] Hegel had found a model for his own alternative to the other, more conventional conception of substance from *Metaphysics*, book 7, or the earlier *Categories*. What Aristotle's conception of the pure actuality,

[10] Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, § 577.

[11] In book 12, chapter 9, Aristotle starts by stating that while mind is held to be the most supernatural of things, if it thinks nothing 'where is its dignity?' as it is 'in just the same state as a man who is asleep' 1074b 16–19. Neither can it be 'the best reality' if something else determines its thinking. Continuing along these lines Aristotle concludes that 'thinking [itself] cannot be the supreme good. Therefore, Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking [*noesis*] is a thinking of thinking [*noeseos noesis*]' 1074b 33–35.

[12] Aristotle's various characterizations of God here include that which is both substance and actuality (1072a25–6), first principle (1072b14), and the substance that is 'eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things' 1073a 3–5.

energeia, of divine thought had provided was an alternative to *Plato's* version of the idea which lacked the principles of 'life' and 'subjectivity'.[13]

> While, therefore, with Plato the main consideration is the affirmative principle, the Idea as only abstractly identical with itself, in Aristotle there is added and made conspicuous the moment of negativity, not as change, nor yet as nullity, but as difference or determination.[14]

Thus, that which is seen here in Aristotle's conception of God is effectively that which Hegel famously describes in the *Preface* to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as 'the living Substance ... being which is in truth *Subject*'.[15] This *living* substance *as* subject is, he goes on, 'pure, *simple negativity*'.[16]

Care is needed with both Hegel and Aristotle here. In construing Aristotle's *noesis noeseos* as 'subjectivity', Hegel seems to be party to a questionable interpretation of Aristotle which equates *noesis noeseos* as a type of divine immediate *self-consciousness*, a view that has been derided as that of 'divine narcissism',[17] but this seems far from Hegel's intention. For Hegel, 'subjectivity' is a term of art meant to capture that which has existence in this form of 'negativity'. The distinctly *modern* conception of subjectivity as something like immediate Cartesian self-consciousness is to be understood as a particular instance of the more general

[13] Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 139 (19.153).

[14] Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 140 (19.153). The position that Hegel describes in terms of the priority of the affirmative principle can be seen as the view that Laurence Horn describes as the 'asymmetricalist' position on the relation of positive and negative statements, asymmetricalists regarding negative statements as 'less primitive, less informative, less objective, less godly, and/or less valuable than their affirmative counterparts'. Horn, *A Natural History of Negation*, p. 3. Horn describes Plato, when speaking through the 'stranger' of the *Sophist* as 'introduc[ing] two of the recurring themes of our history: the view that negation can be eliminated by defining it away in terms of the (putatively) positive concept of otherness or difference, and the observation that negative statements are in some sense less valuable than affirmative ones, in being less specific or less informative'. ibid., p. 1.

[15] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 18 (3.23).

[16] Ibid. Cf., Hegel's account of 'the Idea' in the *Encyclopadia Philosophy of Mind* as that in which subject and object are 'one', and identity which is '*absolute negativity* – for whereas in Nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalised, this self-externalization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself'. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, § 381.

[17] R. Norman, 'Aristotle's Philosopher-God', *Phronesis* 14 (1969): 63–74; reprinted in J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle* (London: Duckworth, 1979), 93–102. A recent example of an interpreter who *does* take Aristotle's God as immediately self-conscious in this way is K. Oehler, 'Aristotle on Self-Knowledge', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 118 (1974), 493–506.

conception, an instance in which 'subjectivity' is grasped, as it were, from the 'first-person' point of view in which the Cartesian 'I' is aware of itself *as* itself and yet as object *for* itself. This modern experience of subjectivity finds its most radicalized form in the immediately *self-positing* 'I' of Fichte. Fichte's '*Ich*', then, might be thought of as an exclusively *subjective mode* of the 'subjectivity' objectively construed as Aristotle's divine self-thinking. Of course any such comparison will raise a multitude of interpretative questions about the adequacy of thinking of both Aristotle and Fichte in such ways, but we may leave this issue aside and regard the alleged isomorphism simply for the purpose of attempting to understand Hegel's own approach.[18]

Specifically, focusing on Hegel's controversial reading of Aristotle's account of divine substance in this way allows us to bring into focus his own critical response to the traditional 'metaphysics' of substance that we have sketched above. To conceive of substance as *noesis noeseos* is to conceive of it in terms antithetical to those associated with the more conventional conception of *finite* substance in Aristotle, a conception which coincides, as we have seen, with the ontological reading of Aristotle's law of non-contradiction. Central to this traditional conception of substance is the idea of a stable and self-identical substrate of change, a substrate marked by the feature of that 'abstract' self-identity, the purported 'first law of thought', the empty and tautologous 'A = A'.[19] Such a conception of identity, associated with the law of *non*-contradiction and, hence, with 'reflection' and 'the Understanding' rather than speculative 'Reason', is what Hegel associates with what we might call the 'metaphysical positivism' of the 'affirmative principle' that he attributes to Plato in the quote above and that we have seen manifested in Plato's inadequate account of 'difference' in his response to the Parmenidean denial of 'non-being'.[20]

Moreover, other characteristics associated with Aristotle's finite substances are controverted in divine substance. For example, while finite substances are characterized in terms of the dualism of potentiality

[18] On the problems of Hegel's reading of Aristotle, see Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, chapter 3.

[19] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 413 (6.41). It was just this law that had appeared as the 'absolutely unconditionised first principle' of Fichte's 1794–5 *Wissenschaftslehre*. See Fichte *The Science of Knowledge*, p. 93. For Hegel, however, ultimate 'truth' of such a conception will turn out to be his own 'law of contradiction', the idea that everything is contradictory.

[20] In Chapter 7.1 above.

(*dynamis*) and actuality (*energeia*),[21] divine substance is *pure* actuality which has somehow left the actual–potential distinction behind.[22] We need not concern ourselves with the interpretative adequacy of Hegel's reading of Aristotle's *noesis noeseos* doctrine, but simply note how it is this allegedly 'speculative' dimension of Aristotle that allows Hegel to link Aristotle to two subsequent forms of thought. First, Aristotle is linked to the most developed form of Greek philosophy, Neo-Platonism or, equivalently for Hegel, *Neo-Aristotelianism*,[23] and thereby to the trinitarianism of the succeeding Christian theology.[24] Next, Aristotle is linked to post-Kantian views about 'self-positing' subjectivity developed by Fichte that Hegel wants to liberate from Fichte's *own* reliance on the Platonic conception of abstract identity.

One might think that it is *just* these aspects of Hegel that seem to take us as far from analytic philosophy in the twentieth century as it is possible to get (although Wittgenstein *too* had, in his own way, questioned the meaningfulness of the purported 'law of identity'[25]). However, attention to this *overtly* theological focus of Aristotle's doctrine of the *noesis noeseos* read in the light of the later development of Christianity allows us to glimpse the outlines of a way of reading even these parts of Hegel in a much less traditionally metaphysical spirit. First, it should be kept in mind that the conception of the God which is at issue in Aristotle's

[21] Given that an individual *this such* will instantiate one out of an array of possible contraries (say, this ball, for example, is blue) then its actually having the property that it does means that it will potentially have others (the ball is potentially red, green, and so on).

[22] On the changes of these terms between *Metaphysics* books VII and IX see Charlotte Witt, *Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). Schelling had used a similar conception of a self-actualizing potential or '*potenz*', a notion that seems to go back to Nicholas of Cusa and Renaissance Neo-Platonism. On this see my *Hegel's Hermeneutics*, pp. 60–2.

[23] Hegel notes that the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus 'may also be termed Neo-Aristotelian', Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 381 [19.410–1]. On Hegel's conception of Neo-Platonism as a development of the speculative Aristotle, see Werner Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus*, second edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), pp. 166–8, and Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, *Platonism et interprétation de Platon a l'epoch moderne* (Paris: Vrin, 1988), pp.180–2. In 1798 Novalis had commented on the similarity of the thought of Plotinus to that of Kant and Fichte. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus*, pp. 87–8.

[24] 'Through the Neo-Platonic philosophy we have come into quite familiar acquaintance with the Idea of Christianity, as the new religion which has entered into the world. For the Neo-Platonic philosophy has as its essential principle the fact that the Absolute is determined as spirit in a concrete way, that God is not a mere conception'. Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 1 (19.493).

[25] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 216.

account of divine thinking is clearly on the side of – is perhaps the prototype of – the 'God of the philosophers'.[26] Not only is this a conception of God that is meant to be accessible to human reason alone, it is meant to give expression to the very normativity of reason for humans. Next, the fact that for Hegel Christianity constituted the most developed form of religious thought, that is, the portrayal in *Vorstellungen* of a content properly conceptualized in philosophy, was a consequence of the way that it had overcome the abstract opposition between the divine and the human by its portrayal of a man, Jesus, as the *incarnation* of the divine. With this second thought, then, we might anticipate that the feature of Aristotle's metaphysics that will be problematic for Hegel will have to do with the unmediated gap between its conceptions of divine and finite (or supra- and sub-lunar) substances, or, alternatively, between divine and human thinking, for example, between the conception of thinking as *noesis noeseos*, and the type of account found in *De Anima*.[27]

The general shape of Hegel's resolution of this unmediated opposition is apparent in his resolution of the section 'Morality' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. *Qua* 'Spirit', the divine mind consists effectively of those norms instantiated in recognitively mediated patterns of interaction that make up the practices of mutual 'confession' and 'forgiveness' among members of the Christian religious community.[28] 'The word of reconciliation', says Hegel, 'is the *objectively* existent Spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself *qua universal* essence, in its opposite . . . – a reciprocal recognition which is *absolute* Spirit'.[29] The 'reconciling *Yea*' of mutual forgiveness 'is the *existence* of the 'I' which has expanded into a duality, and therein remains identical with itself, and, in its complete externalization [*Entäusserung*] and opposite [*Gegenteil*], possesses the certainty [*Gewissheit*] of itself: it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge'.[30] It is thus that

[26] Pascal had apparently sewn into the lining of his coat a piece of paper with the words 'FIRE / God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, / not the God of the philosophers and the wise men'. Georg Picht, 'The God of the Philosophers', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (1980), 61–79, 62.

[27] Hegel effectively equates Aristotle's *noesis noeseos* with the first person of the Trinity: 'Thought, as the object of thought, is nothing else than the absolute Idea regarded as in itself, the Father'. Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 149 (19.164).

[28] This is the reconciliation which concludes the experience of the 'beautiful soul' at the conclusion of Chapter VI, 'Spirit', in *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

[29] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 670 (3.493).

[30] Ibid., § 671 (3.494).

Hegel's account of God or Absolute Spirit comes at the culmination of a series of shapes of recognition that had been introduced with the well-known dialectic of lord and bondsman in Chapter 4. Hegel's remarkable conclusion that God – our creator and the source of our norms – just *is* the process of reciprocal recognition is thus a development of the idea that had been originally introduced in the original discussion of 'self-consciousness'. There, Hegel had asserted that with the idea of a being that 'in being an object, is just as much "I" as "object" ' we already had before us 'the notion of Spirit' and that what was to be yet discovered was the experience 'of what Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "I" '.[31]

Finally, it should be noted that both the Christian consummation of religion and what, in Hegel's eyes, constitutes the parallel between Aristotle's and Fichte's conceptions of the ultimate nature of existence – 'absolute substance' – must point to something about the very norm of rationality to which, Hegel thinks, humans aspire and which they personify in their gods. In Hegel's account of the dialectic of lord and bondsman, the lord, *qua* analogue of Fichte's immediately self-positing self-consciousness, had to learn that what *it* thought of as an objectivity, materiality or passivity *antithetical* to itself and represented in its *bondsman*, was in fact an irreducible aspect of its *own* existence *as* a free self-consciousness. But this, we might say, must be a lesson that Aristotle's God must learn as well. God must learn that to *be* a God is to be marked by the same fallenness into objectivity and material affectability: God *must* become man.[32] One way to translate this from the medium of religious *Vorstellungen* is to say that we should not even think of something like Kant's normative *transcendental unity of apperception* as perfect and free from the problems of the causal embeddedness of 'incarnation' and individuation.[33] Read in this way, Hegel's philosophy will be understood as a *radically* fallibilist one: it is not only that in our practices we can

[31] Ibid., § 177 (3.145).

[32] Thus 'God', or the ideal of free rational existence, cannot be that pure state of self-enjoyment that Aristotle envisages: 'Such, then, is the first principle upon which depend the sensible universe and the world of nature. And its life is like the best which we temporarily enjoy. It must be in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure'. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, bk. xii, ch. vii 1072b14–17.

[33] Another way of describing this is to say that the exemplification of norms in concrete, and so necessarily fallible, models is essential to the existence of norms themselves.

never perfectly live up to the norms to which we make appeal (hence the essentiality of 'confession', 'forgiveness', and 'reconciliation'): rather, we must even think of the norms themselves as in some way subject to this finitude (hence the necessity that *God* become a finite, suffering mortal) without losing their normativity. But this means, to continue in the theological register, that we will have to extend *our* capacity to forgive *to God himself* – even God cannot live up to the status we had thrust upon him. Otherwise expressed, the idea of the fallibility *of the norms* is that of their rational revisibility, an idea with which Hegel anticipates Sellars's conception of rationality as residing in its *self-correcting* nature, and it is just *this* idea that then allows Hegel to rescue his cognitive contextualism from any threat of relativism and connect it back to the unifying conception of reason in Kant. But if the norms change, including the norms as to what constitutes 'objectivity', then the objects served up by thought adhering to those changing norms must also be thought of as themselves changing. That is, those objects must be 'contradictory'. We cannot think of rational thought as working its way through changing perspectives onto a single, stable world. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the idea that thought works its way though a logically governed, or at least logically reconstructable, *order* in this process.

8.2 Naturalism and the possibility of philosophy after metaphysical positivism

We might now see how, with his account of 'substance' as equally 'subject' *suitably interpreted*, Hegel can be understood as attempting to go beyond the abstract opposition between the opposed Aristotelian and Kantian approaches to the relation of logic to ontology. From the perspective of works like *Categories*, or the treatment of substance in *Metaphysics* book 7, Aristotle exemplifies the Platonic or 'positivistic' approach that Hegel regards as controverted by the more genuinely 'speculative' approach found in the doctrine of *noesis noeseos*. But the modern Copernican or *epistemological* reversal of Aristotle's ontological approach, as found in Kant, is prey to being construed in a way that rests upon the same underlying positivism. In this Platonistic rendering of Kant, the world is split into two – a realm of appearances and a realm of things in themselves – with each of these realms being characterized in positivistic ways.

Within the realm of appearance, Kant's positivistic tendencies might, for example, be seen to be reflected in the treatment of the notion of

'*realitas phaenomenon*' in the 'Anticipations of Perception'.[34] There, the empirically real is treated as that which has 'intensive magnitude', the 'complete negation' of which would be represented by the value zero. But such negation by classical '*privatio*' itself seems to rely on Plato's 'asymmetricalist' attitude to negation in which negation is thought of as the mere *lack* of a determinate positive feature – that is, the abstract notion of identity at the heart of 'metaphysical positivism'. And while the doctrine of the 'Anticipations of Perception' might be thought of as an *epistemological* expression of such a positivism – as effectively a version of the 'myth of the given' – a more *logical* expression might seem presupposed by Kant's treatment of the *omnitudo realitatis* in the 'Transcendental Ideal'. Despite his criticism of the *realization*, *hypostatization* and *personalization* involved in the generation of the theistic conception of God, Kant, from an Hegelian point of view, *still* seems to hang onto the Platonic prioritization of the 'affirmative principle' since, as he puts it 'all negations [*Verneinungen*]' of the transcendental ideal 'are mere limitations [*blosse Einschränkungen*] of a greater and finally of the highest reality; hence they presuppose it, and as regards their content they are merely derived from it'.[35] But for Hegel, a critique of traditional theism in terms of its realization, hypostatization and personalization of the ideal would not go far enough if it still presupposed, as Kant seems to do here, the priority of the principle of affirmation.

It is his critical attitude to Plato's 'asymmetricalist' principle of affirmation that helps explain Hegel's attraction to the Neoplatonists, and especially to Proclus, who, in his commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* had challenged Plato on just this point.[36] While Plato 'declared Being to be

[34] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A168–9/B209–11.

[35] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A578/B606. Moreover, in going on to compare the negations of the ideal to the way that spatial figures are rightly regarded as 'possible only as different ways of limiting infinite space' draws attention to the way that his conception of pure intuition itself presupposes the priority of the affirmative principle.

[36] Hegel refers to Proclus in this context in his discussion of Plato's dialectic in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. '[T]he Neo-platonists, and more especially Proclus, regard the result arrived at in the Parmenides as the true theology, as the true revelation of all the mysteries of the divine essence. And it cannot be regarded as anything else . . .' vol. II, p. 60 (19.82). Elsewhere, Hegel refers to the 'great sagacity' expressed in Proclus' treatment of the one and its 'negations'. 'Multiplicity is not taken empirically and then merely abrogated; the negative, as dividing, producing, and active, not merely contains what is privative, but also affirmative determinations'. p. 438 (19.472). In his treatment of 'unity' which 'goes forth out of itself through the superfluidity of potentiality' which is 'actuality', Proclus, says Hegel, is 'quite Aristotelian', clearly referring to Aristotle's doctrine of *noesis noeseos*.

superior' to non-being,[37] Proclus had countered that it is *not* true 'that assertion is always superior to negation'. In particular, there is a special case in which assertion 'takes a second place' to negation and in which 'negation expresses that type of Non-Being which is beyond Being'.[38] It is precisely so in relation to 'the one', since conceiving of the one as 'non-being' exempts it from being the subject of assertion that 'wants to lay hold of some Form'. It is necessary to avoid treating the primal entity as 'being' because it 'is . . . above form, and it is not suitable to apply to it any of those attributes which are proper to secondary things, nor to transfer to it attributes proper to us'.[39]

Proclus' critique of Plato here has something of the character of Kant's own later critique of the realization, hypostatization and personalization of the one in the 'Transcendental Ideal': we should refrain from speaking of the one as if it were the type of thing that our categorical judgements can 'lay hold of', as that would construe it a possible object of sensory intuition. Moreover, we can see what, from such a 'Proclean' point of view, would be wrong with even *Spinoza's* conception of substance. In Kantian terms, despite the fact that Spinoza resists personalizing the transcendental ideal, he still 'realizes' and 'hypostatizes' it. In more Proclean terms, Spinoza's finite modes are conceived as negations of a positively conceived 'being', analogous to the way that for Kant determinate spaces are negations of a single unified *space*. We *should* conceive of finite modes as negations, not of something positive – 'being' – but of

Hegel's link to Proclus was not lost on Ludwig Feuerbach, who labelled Hegel 'the German Proclus'. Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, trans. M. H. Vogel, intro. T. H. Wartenberg (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), p. 47. For an extensive treatment of the relevance of Proclus for Hegel, see Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, *Platon et L'Idéalism Allemand* (1770–1930), Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), pp. 267–324, and Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus*, pp. 154–87. While traditionally the proximity of Hegel to neoPlatonic thought has usually been taken as evidence of Hegel's pre-critical metaphysical intentions, this need not be interpreted in such a way. The aspect of Proclus' work that I take to be relevant here is his logico-semantic approach to negation as explored by John N. Martin, *Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic: Order, Negation and Abstraction* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). Such a generally semantic approach to the NeoPlatonists has also be suggested by A. C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of NeoPlatonism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

[37] 'It is quite clear what relation Plato himself in the *Sophist* (258ab) declared Not-Being to have toward Being, and that he declared Being to be superior'. Proclus, *A Commentary on Plato's Parmenidies*, trans. John M. Dillon and Glenn R. Morrow (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 426.

[38] Ibid., p. 426.

[39] Ibid.

something conceived negatively – 'non-being'. Using Hegel's terminology, we should understand them as 'negations of negation'.[40]

Nevertheless, we can think of Kant and Hegel as drawing different consequences from the appeal to the primacy of negation for ontology. While Kant grasped this idea as an *interdiction* against saying anything 'metaphysical' here, Hegel's version of the Proclean 'non-being' of the absolute is to treat it as 'pure, *simple negativity*',[41] or 'negativity, not as change, nor yet as nullity, but as difference or determination'.[42] Kant's interpretation of this point remains at the level of epistemology, as it confines itself to denying that we can have an appropriately epistemic relation to 'the one'. Nevertheless, the very notion of such a knowledge remains an *intelligible* one, for Kant. In contrast, Hegel, I suggest, works more at the level of *logic* or *semantics*. 'The absolute', Hegel's way of referring to the Neoplatonic 'one', is not something talked *about* like a finite substance – an idea that even Kant seems to remain committed to with his conception of the type of knowledge that we, finite knowers, are *denied*. Rather, the absolute is to be thought of as something the structure of which is expressed or shown in the logic of our self-correcting attempts to talk about the world.

Looked at in this way, Hegel's approach to 'metaphysics' might be seen as having features in common with the approach within early analytic philosophy deriving from the Frege–Wittgenstein strand rather than the Russell–Moore one, and this, of course, is just what is urged by Brandom and McDowell. From within this approach to philosophy, one will not try to derive logical categories from assumptions about 'being', as Aristotle seems to do in the *Categories*, nor will one try to derive the structure of 'being' from the logical structure of one's assertions about knowable objects or states of affairs as Kant seems to do in the 'Transcendental Analytic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Rather, the structure of 'being' is that which *shows itself* within the logical structure of our *sayings about* particular 'beings', understanding 'logical structure' here as comprising those features of our sayings that mediate their inferential relations.

[40] These Proclean features of Hegel are neglected in Paul Franks's construal of Hegel as a belonging to a tradition of Spinozistic 'Holistic Monism' in Franks, *All or Nothing*. That Hegel's concept of determinate negation cannot be identified with the dictum that '*Determinatio est negatio*' is suggested by Laurence Horn. Hegel, he points out, stands Spinoza's dictum 'on its head' as Hegel 'interprets it as the claim that every significant negation is determination or limitation' (Horn, *A Natural History of Negation*, p. 64).

[41] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 18 (3.23).

[42] Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 140 (19.153).

McDowell draws on such a Wittgensteinian approach when he asserts that, for both Hegel and Wittgenstein, there is no 'ontological gap' between mind and world in this respect, but we must be mindful of the fact that from an Hegelian point of view the term 'world' here needs to be understood here in a very particular way.[43] We might say here that 'the world' (or 'being') in this sense should not be confused with the mere 'sum of its parts', although it contains nothing *more than* those parts, and this, I suggest, is why Hegel can call on Neoplatonist imagery of 'the one'. The world understood as such a unity must contrast with what Kant describes in his discussion of the 'Transcendental Ideal' as that grasped as a '**distributive** unity' by the 'use of the understanding in experience'.[44] By the world understood in *this* way Kant means something like the world as sum of what is known about in everyday perception and its scientific extension. Hegel's world as 'the absolute' must therefore be more like what Kant describes as coinciding with the '**collective** unity of a whole of experience' – the conception of which results from the hypostatization of the transcendental ideal under the influence of the transcendental illusion. However, the unity which Hegel seeks is not one of a 'whole of experience' – it is not a unity understood on the model of that possessed by, say, an object of perceptual experience that is then generalized *to* the whole. This is precisely what his use of his Aristotelianized Neo-Platonic paradigm was meant to avoid.[45] The world exhibited or '*dargestelt*' as a whole in logical thought should not be thought of as an object represented or '*vorgestellt*' in empirical cognition, or as the totality of such objects. Nevertheless, for Hegel, it is the same world – there is no *other* world.

One way in which we might start to think of this paradox is to think of the world that comes into view in logic as the world to which a thought refers when, as it were, the 'assertion sign' that normally accompanies thought content is bracketed. It is a world which can no longer be understood as, in Frege's words, one 'whose being consisted in its being true'. That is, this is the world that comes into view in reflection

[43] This point is well made in Christoph Halbig, 'Varieties of Nature in Hegel and McDowell', *European Journal of Philosophy* 14 (2006), 222–41.

[44] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A582/B610. The dialectical transformation of the distributive into the collective unity is just what Kant criticizes as the 'hypostatization' of the transcendental ideal. Hegel's Proclean understanding of the whole as negativity, however, is designed to resist treating the whole as an *entity*, which is the object of Kant's critique.

[45] Beierwaltes locates German idealism within such an '*aristotelisch-neuplatonische Denkstruktur*' in *Platonismus und Idealismus*.

when a thought or content is 'entertained' rather than simply believed. On Brandom's development of this non-representational concept of thought's semantic content via Wittgenstein and Sellars, we are to see such content as accruing from a thought's 'horizontal' inferential relations to further thoughts, rather than from any 'vertical' representational relations to things 'in' the world.

Employing this distinction between the world as exhibited rather than represented in thought we can see why from the perspective of this Fregean–Wittgensteinian strand within analytic thought, certain varieties of 'naturalism' within analytic philosophy will look misguided. The world that comes into view via the reflection on the normative dimension of thought cannot be thought of as mere sum of its parts represented *in* thought. It is in this sense that Brandom and McDowell can link their projects back to the idealist tradition. But this need not be taken as a regression to anything 'pre-modern' or 'theocentric' – anything 'metaphysically' idealist. Rather, from this point of view it is the promotion of a naturalistic outlook to a metaphysical status that looks beholden to traditional theological categories operating at the *semantic* level. Take, for example, the recurring disputes between realism and anti-realism over the coherence of the 'God-eye' or 'absolute' point of view, in which the dialectic is constrained within the boundaries of a traditional theistic conception of knowledge on the one hand and its privation on the other. It was, of course, just this 'abstract' opposition between the divine and the human or the infinite and the finite that Hegel had attempted to go beyond in his utilization of Proclus' 'neoaristotelian' theology.[46]

The naturalistic dimension of Hegel is manifested in what I have called his cognitive contextualism: it is the finitude of our individual natures that means that our particular knowledge claims will always be fallible and perspectival. And this, moreover, is a contextualism that even applies to the contents of philosophy itself. As Hegel's well known phrase attests,

[46] Stanley Rosen has helpfully distinguished two developments of ancient Neo-Platonism. In the early Christian period, thinkers such as Vitorinus and Augustine had appropriated the neoPlatonist 'one' for the purposes of a conception of God as both a transcendent *and* self-conscious being. But in the more immanentist, *Aristotelian* forms 'the world is present with the deity, which lacks self-consciousness'. Stanley Rosen, *G. W. F. Hegel, An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 52. Hegel's solution to the lack of self-consciousness of Aristotle's god lies in his immanentist reading of the Christian idea of the incarnated god. Philosophy as a human activity in which thought takes itself for its subject matter is itself the solution to the lack of self-consciousness of Aristotle's immanent deity.

'philosophy, too, is *its own time comprehended in thoughts*'.[47] Nevertheless, this does not preclude the idea that a type of infinite or 'divine' thought (correctly understood) lives on through our collective contextually constrained attempts to reflect on and make sense of ourselves and the rest of the world. Like Frege, Hegel thinks of a type of aperspectival 'thought' as somehow immanent within or borne by our subjective thinking or speaking, and like Frege *too*, he thinks of *logic* as revealing the structures that enable it to have this transcending feature. But like Wittgenstein and Brandom, he wants to deny any representational status to logical truth itself. As Brandom argues, Hegel should be thought of as an *inferentialist* and as an *expressivist* in this regard. Logical truths are what we arrive at when we reflect upon the norms implicit in our best reasoning about the world, and they do not add anything *to* the sum of our knowledge of the world. And yet, under the influence of something like Kant's transcendental illusion, it would seem that we tend to think of these truths as being made present to us in a type of unified determinate apprehension. Thus, in the early Russell, logic is seen as the vehicle for a determinate, scientific grasp of the ultimate features of reality itself.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein invokes the idea of 'the mystical [*das Mystische*]' in relation to the type of experience involved in grasping the logical structure of thought: 'There is indeed the inexpressible. This *shows* itself [zeigt sich]; it is the mystical'.[48] Wittgenstein's response to the temptation to *say* something about that which shows itself is summed up in the *Tractatus*' quietistic closing sentence: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.[49] What is actually sayable are those parts or aspects of the world, such as those represented in 'the propositions of natural science'. But while the logical positivists were to take this as licensing naturalism in philosophy, for Wittgenstein such propositions had 'nothing to do with philosophy'.[50] Wittgenstein's response here recalls Kant's similarly quietist response to the attempt to say something of the world considered as a totality. Like Kant, Wittgenstein is here critical of the temptation to speak of the world itself as having the unity characterizing things *in the world*, or, as he puts it, to speak of the world as 'limited whole [*begrentzes Ganzes*]' for which one has a 'feeling [*Gefühl*]' in mystical, or one might equivalently say,

[47] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, p. 21 (7.26).

[48] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, § 6.522. On this issue see, for example, B. F. McGuinness, 'The Mysticism of the Tractatus', *The Philosophical Review* 75 (1966), 305–28.

[49] Ibid., § 7.

[50] Ibid., § 6.53.

'aesthetic', experience. Wittgenstein was thus fighting on two fronts. Against the early Russell, he wanted to deny the 'pre-critical' idea of learning substantial truths about the world from some source other than sensory experience – that is, to derive substantive ontological knowledge from logic. But anticipating the positivists, he wanted to deny that this 'critical' move leaves us with an entirely naturalistic philosophy. Thus his 'quietism', which finds its echoes in McDowell, might be thought of as his strategy to maintain this opposition on these two fronts. And this strategy we might think of as having a something of the 'mystical' about it – a 'mysticism' of silence.

Hegel, in linking *his* opposition to metaphysical positivism to Neo-platonism, was also, as he acknowledged, thereby linking logic to *das Mystische*.[51] However, in doing this in his effort to oppose both pre-critical metaphysics and its naturalistic replacement, he was in no way advocating any mysticism of silence. Rather, more like Brandom, Hegel was committed to the project of rendering the whole 'felt' in mystical experience *explicit*, and in this project was happy to embrace the consequences of attempting to *say* what was otherwise *shown* in the logic of reason's material implications. That is, he was happy to embrace the consequences of 'contradiction'. However, as we have seen, in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy even *this* is not as worrying as is commonly supposed.

Until recently, even among those advocating the relevance of Hegel's philosophy in its application to particular areas of human life, Hegel's logic, especially when seen in relation to the 'bad company' to which Hegel is linked in his logical terminology, has standardly been taken as the ultimate stumbling block for the project of re-incorporating of his ideas into contemporary analytic philosophy. In the wake of work like that of Brandom and McDowell, however, it would seem that that obstacle might finally be ripe for removal. Analytic philosophy was meant to have been erected in a space opened up by the demolition of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, and it would be ironic if idealist insights were to be successfully brought to bear on core problems afflicting its current state. The idea of Hegelian analytic philosophy might even seem to be contradictory, but then, if we believe Hegel, *everything is* contradictory, even analytic philosophy.

[51] 'The expression 'mystic' often appears with the Neo-Platonists ... However, *mystirion* has not to the Alexandrians the meaning that it has to us, for to them it indicates speculative philosophy generally'. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 448 (19.484, n). See also Hegel's comments on mysticism in *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 82, addition.

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