

**THE CARIBBEAN:
CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA**

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The

CARIBBEAN:

CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA


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CARIBBEAN:
CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA

edited by A. Curtis Wilgus



1962

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Foreword

THE TWELFTH CARIBBEAN CONFERENCE continues the plan inaugurated last year of emphasizing the importance of the countries on the periphery of the Caribbean Sea. This year the Republic of Colombia is examined by experts from business, government, and educational organizations. Although contemporary Colombia is emphasized, the backgrounds of environment and history are treated so that a balanced picture results.

The subject of the Conference is especially appropriate for the University of Florida because for a number of years our College of Agriculture in particular has had numerous contacts with individuals and organizations in that country. It has been a pleasure, therefore, to welcome to our campus leading men and women from Colombia who have made such effective contributions to the content of these sessions. We feel sure that this volume of conference proceedings will have a wide and effective use as a book of reference concerning one of the leading South American states.

For the second time the School of Inter-American Studies enjoyed the cosponsorship of the International Petroleum Company, Limited, while for the first time we had the honor to have as a second cosponsor the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia, which added prestige to the meetings. It is a pleasure to express here our appreciation for their splendid cooperation. Appreciation is also expressed to the University of Florida Press for the high standard it has maintained in the publication of this series of conference volumes.

In this second decade of Caribbean Conferences, we look forward to the continued growth and influence of our inter-American program, which has developed steadily in scope since the formation in 1950 of the School of Inter-American Studies.

J. WAYNE REITZ, *President*
University of Florida

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Introduction

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE ANDES : A UNIQUE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT

IT IS SINGULARLY APPROPRIATE that, in a conference devoted to the Republic of Colombia, cultural and educational activities should be emphasized. Not only has Bogotá been referred to for several generations as the "Athens of America," but the country as a whole has produced innumerable scholars and writers of prose and poetry, history and fiction, and essays of a high order. The President of the Republic, Alberto Lleras Camargo, is himself a widely known author and for a number of years he served as Secretary General of the Pan American Union where he initiated and carried out a number of cultural and educational activities.

In the chapters that ensue, the participants in this conference have made a real contribution in the field of Colombian life and culture, not only by emphasizing the contemporary scene but also by introducing background material of historical and geographical significance in the development of the country. The educational system of Colombia has been discussed in detail in one of the chapters and has been mentioned in others. However, there is one significant development in education in Colombia that deserves special notice and emphasis. It is the establishment of the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá which has achieved a unique position in the national educational system. It seems fitting, therefore, in this introduction, to

examine this institution rather closely and to indicate something of its nature and influence at home and abroad and its significance as an example to educational leaders in Latin America who wish to bring their institutions and organizations into harmony with educational trends in the United States and Europe.

I

The idea of the University of the Andes began in the mind of Mario Laserna, a young Colombian who had a great thirst for knowledge. He was a brilliant young man, willful, hot-blooded, and, as some thought, an impractical dreamer. Because of his restlessness, his father sent him off to New York City where he attended Columbia University. There he proved to be a brilliant student. But not content with the education he received there, he went to Heidelberg, where he finally won a doctorate degree.

At Columbia University he became fascinated with the concept of academic freedom and he felt that here was a germ of an idea which should be planted in his native land. At the University he was amazed at the stability of the educational system, and at the lack of revolutionary ideas among students and faculty. He realized that in Latin American countries the one characteristic which was lacking in most educational institutions was stability. He conceived the idea that a university might well be formed by the will of the people who create and support it. These ideas were presented to some of his fellow students and professors at the University; later he mulled them over in his mind on a bicycle trip from the French coast to Paris, always trying to find a practical way to establish such a school.

When he returned to Colombia he made a nuisance of himself arguing for his idea among his friends. They knew that such a university, as he conceived it, would be contrary to the educational traditions in Colombia and indeed in Latin America. He discussed his ideas with industrialists, journalists, government officials, church people, educators, and others, many of whom were young men like himself.

This group of friends often met in the office of Laserna's father, a wealthy man who derided his idea, always arguing that in Colombia there were already thirteen universities. Out of these meetings grew a "declaration of principles" that has guided the University since its founding. Because of his attendance at Columbia University and because of his knowledge of other United States universities, Laserna felt that the University of the Andes should have ties with North American institutions and adopt the method and spirit of these institutions in its educational system. He believed that science and engineering should be stressed but that at the same time the humanities should be offered. The school must be coeducational.

Among the persons to whom Laserna talked was seventy-year-old Roberto Franco, an internationally known physician in Colombia. He was finally persuaded to serve as the first rector of the University; this at the very beginning put the institution on a high educational level. Among his successors as rectors were Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Angel and Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo.

II

Finally on April 24, 1949, when Laserna was about twenty-five years of age, the University opened with the blessing of the Ministry of Education and of Laserna's father, who gave some financial assistance. Total funds available for the project amounted to about 60,000 pesos. Seventy-eight students entered at this time, and the faculty numbered twelve teachers.

The University was located some 9,000 feet above sea level on the grounds of an old prison on a steep, rocky slope of the Andean Mountains, overlooking the capital, Bogotá. At the top of the mountain is the Shrine of Guadalupe; lower down, the buildings of the school are scattered on hilly ground with trees and shrubs growing in profusion. Even though the school seems far away from the center of Bogotá, it can be reached in a few minutes.

Two years after the University was opened the so-called study-abroad program was inaugurated. In this program qualified engi-

neering students are sent to North American universities for their junior and senior years. Scholarship money is borrowed from a rotating-loan fund, the loans being repaid at a rate of from 10 to 20 per cent of the monthly salary when the students return to Colombia and obtain positions.

Arrangements have been made with North American universities, including the University of Illinois, University of Pittsburgh, University of Texas, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to take the young engineering students at the beginning of their junior year. Other universities in the program are Michigan, Notre Dame, Vanderbilt, Arizona, New Mexico, and Kansas. The University of Illinois, the oldest of the collaborating schools, has graduated over a hundred Colombian students.

From the very beginning, the study of English was required of all students. This makes it somewhat easier for scholarship students to fit into university life in the United States. However, it frequently takes some time for these students to become accustomed to what they consider the frivolous side of campus life: the teenage behavior, the casual dress, and what appears to be a lack of close family ties. The Colombian students return to their native land eager to take on various occupations, some even hoping to become professors in the University of the Andes.

One way in which the University is striving to become more like North American universities is in the organization of its faculty. In most Colombian universities, and in other Latin American universities as well, the faculty consists of part-time persons who usually have occupations which provide income, while their teaching is more in the nature of a hobby. More and more teachers are now engaged in full-time teaching and it is the objective of the administration of the University eventually to have all teachers on full-time schedule. At present there are 143 teachers, of whom 67 are full-time. Ninety-seven are Colombians while the others came from the United States, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Great Britain, and Hungary.

The University has no official government connection and is non-denominational. It receives support from student tuition (about \$200 a year for each student) and from various grants and gifts from individuals and industries, most of the latter operating in Colombia.

One of its consistent supporters is the International Petroleum Company, Limited, affiliate of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. This company is employing many of the school's graduates.

There are between 700 and 800 carefully selected students at the University at the present time. Some 48 per cent come from Bogotá, about 51 per cent come from the remainder of Colombia, and about 1 per cent from other countries. About three times this number are regularly turned away because of the lack of teaching facilities. As it is, many professors have to use corners of classrooms as offices. There are about 200 girls attending the University.

Classes begin at seven o'clock in the morning and, since there are no dormitories on the campus, students commute in cars and buses, some from a considerable distance. The school day is long, but the students seem not to mind. Classes are held in corridors, attics, Quonset huts, and temporary structures. Engineering classes are held in a building that once was set aside for women prisoners. The library is in a classroom and there are frequently not enough chairs on which to sit when studying. The new science building, however, built by funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, is one of the most notable on the campus. Student life goes on much as in the United States. Couples stroll among the shaded walks and grounds, attend dances in the Quonset hut auditorium, hold picnics on the lawn, and go to the cafeteria for coffee-breaks and soft drinks.

The administration of the University consists of the faculty and the rector, who strive to maintain high educational standards. Faculty members are dedicated men who serve at low pay and undergo many inconveniences for the sake of associating themselves with such an interesting project. It is believed that by keeping the enrollment low and by making careful selection of students high standards of instruction can be maintained.

With the aid of an Advisory Board consisting largely of leading United States scholars and of a Board of Trustees of highly regarded Colombians, the present rector (December, 1961), Dr. Jaime Samper Ortega, is eager to expand the facilities and influence of his university. He looks forward to a program of publishing textbooks and scholarly works. He would like to bring high school teachers to the University in order to train them in science. He would like to make

further contacts with universities in the United States. Dr. Samper has been adviser to the University since its earliest days and he was a close friend of Mario Laserna.

The University of the Andes is today probably the only truly private university in all of Latin America. It is composed of six schools and nine different departments: the schools of architecture, economics, engineering, fine arts, philosophy and letters, and sciences. Within these schools, but autonomously organized, function the departments of bacteriology, biology, chemistry, humanities, modern languages (other than Spanish), mathematics, physics, Spanish, and a premedical department. There are also university extension courses where part-time students can study a variety of subjects ranging from Sanskrit to interior decoration. For these extension courses a certificate of attendance is given, whereas full-time students enrolled in any of the schools receive regular degrees recognized by the Ministry of Education of Colombia. It is thus possible for the young graduate from the six-year secondary system in Colombia to enter the University of the Andes as a freshman and pursue studies in the field of his choice. The University encourages a continuation of studies beyond the traditional level of college work and places particular stress on research work in its graduate school. Graduate research at the University of the Andes is offered in the school of science where research on mycology, bacteriology, plant pathology, embryology, cellular physiology, and protozoology is pursued.

In 1961 the Ford Foundation, after careful study of the University and its most crying needs, gave a grant of \$736,000. Of this, \$436,000 is for the establishment of a College of Arts and Sciences, effective in February, 1962, through which all students will have to go regardless of what career they eventually choose. The College of Arts and Sciences will therefore be a buffer between secondary education and university studies proper. This is a completely new idea for Colombia and it is hoped that it will be successful.

The remaining amount of the grant (\$300,000) was given for a Work Study Center which the University will build in 1962. This will house the new library, language laboratories, seminar rooms, and, of great importance, small offices for full-time faculty, who now have no place to work when they have finished their classes. This sum of

\$300,000 must be matched by Colombian donations, and a campaign for this purpose is now under way.

III

Some of the most important graduate investigations have been carried on, since September 1, 1958, in the Centro de Estudio sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE). This was organized by Dr. John M. Hunter from the United States who was invited to the University of the Andes for this purpose. The first investigative function in the Center for Studies in Economic Development was to examine the economic structure of Colombia. A second function was to provide research experience and training for young people interested in various problems concerning the Colombian economy. To accomplish this a library collection has been established in the Center building and bibliographies on various topics of development in the Colombian economy are being prepared. In all of its activities CEDE works closely with the Facultad de Economía.

The Center was established as a result of a Rockefeller Foundation grant to the University to include the salary and travel expenses of a director, to provide needed books for a library collection, to assemble statistical equipment, and to employ foreign specialists. For the first two years the Rockefeller Foundation made grants matched by the University of the Andes. In consequence, such matching funds had to be found by the director. If and when the Foundation grant is discontinued, it is hoped that the people of Colombia will be so interested that they will wish to provide funds for carrying on CEDE.

From the very beginning it was decided that CEDE was not to conduct business research but only economic research. This meant, as Dr. Hunter asserted, that they would not do research which was primarily designed to improve the profit and loss position of a single firm, since a number of business concerns were engaged in their own research on a commercial basis.

One of the immediate functions of the director was to recruit personnel and to train staff members. The first staff consisted of three young men with some research experience, whose work was done under the supervision of the director. An intensive study of Colom-

bian economic problems then began. Through the preparation of a bibliography, the dearth of materials on Colombian economic affairs was immediately discovered. The first bibliography to appear was annotated and contained several hundred items dealing with economic development in general and the Colombian economy in particular. A series of monographs based on research was soon begun.

Library materials were rapidly assembled and by June, 1960, there were 1,151 books and 1,411 reprints and pamphlets in the collection. Also a number of periodicals were regularly received. However, all activities were limited by the budget. Since there was no money for a librarian, the use of unskilled services was necessary for the library.

By the middle of 1960, when his term ended, Professor Hunter believed that CEDE had more than justified its two years of existence. Certainly, as President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress begins to move along economic lines, the CEDE of the University of the Andes will undoubtedly play an important part in helping to decide the economic needs of Colombia and how the economic problems may be solved. This will more than justify its creation.

IV

Today the University of the Andes is at a significant crossroads in its history. It has fulfilled the hopes and plans of its founders. It now receives an annual contribution of about 70,000 pesos from the national government, this subsidy being made possible by a law which provides a small fund to all college-level institutions in Colombia. Something less than one-fourth of the four million pesos annual budget comes from student fees. The Rockefeller Foundation has been more than generous. Besides providing for a physics laboratory some years ago, it provided in 1957, by a grant of \$570,000, for the establishment of a premedical school. An increasing number of business concerns in Colombia are providing modest funds for special purposes. But still the University is not free from financial worries. It needs more buildings so that more students can be brought to the campus. This will mean more faculty and a larger salary budget. From time to time the University has made attempts, with varying success, to seek funds from private sources in the United States. But

with all its worries and problems, the administration of the University of the Andes is determined to carry on and to expand its program of training leaders in business, the professions, and government services so that it may provide an ever-increasing educational function in the cultural life of Colombia.

A. CURTIS WILGUS, *Director*
School of Inter-American Studies

Bibliographical Note. Information for this survey comes chiefly from publications of the University of the Andes; from the International Petroleum Company, Limited; *Semana* (Bogotá), December 2, 1958; *The Lamp* (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey), Fall, 1959; *New York Times*, July 16, 1961 (report by Juan de Onís); The United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, M-113, April, 1961; The Rockefeller Foundation *Annual Report*, 1960 (New York, 1961); John M. Hunter, "Colombia's New Economic Research Center," *International Development Review*, June, 1961, pp. 38-42; and from the office of Dr. Jaime Samper Ortega.

Part 1

GEOGRAPHY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Robert C. West: THE GEOGRAPHY OF COLOMBIA

IN TERMS of both its natural environment and its people, Colombia is one of the most difficult of the Latin American countries to describe and analyze. Few other nations of similar size in the world have such a diversity of land configuration, climate, culture groups, and economies. Physically and culturally there are in reality many Colombias. This fact is reflected by a keen regional consciousness found everywhere in the country, and by political separatism that has sometimes erupted in civil strife. From a geographer's viewpoint the chief physical reasons for Colombia's complex pattern of landscape are seen in the highly varied land surface combined with its position within tropical latitudes. The cultural reasons for Colombia's geographical diversity are more complex. One may be the varied historical development and relationships of three racial groups and their cultural heritages: the native Indian of many different cultural levels; the Caucasian invaders of Spanish descent; and the African Negroes, imported as slaves into various parts of the country during the colonial era. Another cultural reason for diversity may be the prolonged isolation of particular groups of people within given areas due to difficulties of transportation and communication over rugged terrain and long distances.

In general the present political territory of Colombia is characterized by two greatly different areas. The western third of the country is the rugged northern Andean Cordillera with its three high

ranges separated by deep longitudinal valleys and fringed on the north and west by coastal lowlands. This is the most complex and important part of the country. Here live 98 per cent of Colombia's 14.5 million people. Since preconquest times much of this area has been one of the most densely settled and economically significant sections of South America. The eastern two-thirds of the country is Colombia's "empty quarter"—the vast, sparsely settled lowland plains of tropical grass and rain forest that have not yet been effectively incorporated into the national life. The contrast between western and eastern Colombia is fundamental in the country's geography.

I. The Natural Regions of Colombia

In order to simplify the presentation of Colombia's geographical diversity, many geographers have attempted to divide the country into various regions.^{1*} Below is the author's concept of Colombia's main "natural regions," which, for the purpose of this discussion, are based principally on physical criteria, such as land configuration, climate, and vegetation. In some instances, such regions at present are closely associated with a given culture group or a particular economy. It should be recognized, however, that cultural areas in the anthropological sense and natural regions in the geographical sense rarely correspond exactly, and that two peoples with different cultures or cultural values may utilize and transform a given physical setting in quite different ways. As shown in the outline below and in Figure 1, Colombia may be divided into five major natural regions. Only the more important subregions, however, are listed and mapped.

I. The Andean Core

A. Cordillera Oriental

1. The Altiplano
2. Santander Highlands
3. Suárez Basin
4. Western Versant

*Notes to this chapter are on page 21.

- B. The Magdalena Depression
 - 1. The Central Magdalena
 - 2. Magdalena Tolimense
 - 3. Magdalena Huilense
- C. Cordillera Central
 - 1. Pasto Plateau
 - 2. Antioquian Massif
- D. The Cauca-Patía Depression
 - 1. El Valle
 - 2. Popayán area
 - 3. Upper Patía Valley
- E. Cordillera Occidental
- II. *Caribbean Region*
 - A. El Cenú
 - B. Bolívar Savannas
 - C. Lower Magdalena and Coast
 - D. Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta
 - E. La Guajira
- III. *Pacific Coastal Lowlands*
- IV. *Llanos of the Orinoco*
 - A. Llanos Arriba
 - B. Llanos Abajo
- V. *Colombian Amazonia*

Of the five major natural regions the Andean Core is by far the most significant. Physically and culturally it is truly the “core” of the country. The other four natural regions, which almost surround the northern Andes, might be considered the “peripheral areas” of the country; for in terms of population densities, economic production, and political influence, these sections have been less important than the Andean area in the geography of Colombia.

II. The Andean Core

The three Andean cordilleras and the two intervening structural depressions (Magdalena and Cauca) form the physical and cultural heartland of Colombia. Owing to great differences in elevation, the resulting climatic and vegetational variations, and the extraordinary array of landforms, this region is the most complex area of the country. Here are found the altitudinal temperature zones familiar to every Colombian of this region: the *tierra caliente* of the valleys and



Fig. 1. Natural regions of Colombia

lower mountain slopes from sea level to 3,000 feet; the *tierra templada* between 3,000 and 6,000 feet; the *tierra fria* between 6,000 and 11,000 feet; above which lie the *páramos* and the snow fields and glaciers of the highest plateaus and mountain peaks. Throughout the

Colombian Andes two rainy seasons and two dry seasons annually further complicate the climatic pattern. Since preconquest times man has utilized the fertile lowland and highland valleys and adjacent slopes for farming; the cordilleras have yielded a variety of economically valuable minerals; but the fantastic ruggedness of this mountain area has made land transport extremely difficult, and in the past has often resulted in cultural isolation and stagnation in certain areas.

Cordillera Oriental. The Cordillera Oriental is the easternmost, the longest, and the widest of the three Andean chains of Colombia. It consists chiefly of thick deposits of folded and faulted sandstone, limestone, and shale, with highest elevations (18,000 feet) in the snow- and ice-capped Sierra de Cocuy.

Near the center of the cordillera is an area known as the Altiplano, a series of some fourteen highland basins of 8,500-9,000 feet elevation that extend for nearly 150 miles from Bogotá northward to beyond Sogamoso in the departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Fig. 2). Once covered by shallow lakes in Pleistocene times, the flattish floors of the basins contain fertile lacustrine soils. The largest and the southernmost is called the Sabana de Bogotá, the site of Colombia's capital city. Culturally these basins are the most significant features of the Cordillera Oriental. They were the sites of the Indian farming settlements that formed the Chibcha (Muisca) culture of preconquest times.² In the same localities the Spanish invaders of the sixteenth century founded the cities of Santa Fé de Bogotá, Tunja, Sogamoso, as well as large estates devoted to wheat and cattle production to form the core of the New Kingdom of Granada. And still today the basins of the Altiplano can be considered the heart of Colombia—the traditional political and cultural center and one of the most densely populated sectors of the country. Most of the rural folk of this basin are mixed Indian-white (mestizo), who are highly conservative and reticent, retaining a surprisingly large number of aboriginal traits. The traditional urban element of the population, although equally conservative, takes pride in its pure Spanish ancestry.

Northward from the Altiplano are other natural subregions of the Cordillera Oriental. One is the rugged, highly dissected highlands of Santander with its low, warm, dry valleys adjacent to steep slopes




Fig. 2. Central portion of the Cordillera Oriental and adjacent areas

and high, frigid *páramos*, or alpine mountain crests.³ Another is the temperate limestone basin of Suárez characterized by karstic landforms and dry soils where poverty-stricken farmers struggle to cultivate subsistence crops in small, scattered, hillside plots. The steep western and eastern flanks of the cordillera are frayed by deep canyons which have hindered transport and communication since colo-

nial days. The most formidable canyon is that of Chicamocha, which bisects the Santander Highlands and creates a difficult barrier to land travel between the central and northern portions of the cordillera. Since the close of the colonial period the heavy forests that once covered the cordillera's western flank overlooking the Magdalena depression have been almost destroyed by subsistence farmers who cultivate tiny fields on slopes of great steepness (45-50°). The western flank also contains one of Colombia's important coffee belts which lies within the *tierra templada* zone between 3,000 and 5,000 feet elevation.

The thick sedimentary strata of the Cordillera Oriental contains two special minerals that have given fame to the area since pre-Spanish times. One is the enormous deposits of rock salt within the Altiplano; the other, America's only commercially important deposit of emeralds, exposed at two points (Muzo and Somondoco) on the western and eastern flanks of the cordillera.⁴ First exploited by the Chibcha Indians for trade items, both minerals were extracted by the Spaniards during the colonial era, and the same deposits are worked today. At the present time the extensive coal and limestone deposits of the cordillera and the occurrence of iron ore near Sogamoso form the physical basis for the recently developed iron and steel industry of Colombia.

The Magdalena Depression. This depression, which separates the central and eastern cordilleras, forms an important subregion of Andean Colombia. Through this low, hot, elongated basin flows the country's longest river, the Magdalena. Since the beginning of the colonial period the lower half of this river has been regarded as Colombia's *calle real*, the main road connecting the Caribbean Coast with the interior. Despite its utility as a line of communication, most of the Magdalena's course is treacherous to navigate. It is a shallow river with shifting channels, bars, and snags that impede modern steamboat travel. Moreover, during the two annual dry seasons (December-March and July-August) the river stage may be so low that steam transport ceases. During the past one hundred years the deforestation and cultivation of the adjacent mountain slopes has so increased sedimentation that the river has become even less navigable. The head of navigation for large river boats occurs 500 miles up-

stream from the mouth, at the first rapids where the old port of Honda was established in 1560.

Physically the Magdalena Depression may be divided into three parts. The lower section, often called El Magdalena Central, is a wide alluvial plain—a steamy tropical zone originally covered by dense rain forest. Sparsely peopled, this area is now being slowly colonized by highlanders, and the exploitation of underlying petroleum reserves has resulted in the recent development of the Barrancabermeja industrial complex near the river. Upvalley within the department of Tolima the depression narrows, rainfall decreases, and the natural vegetation cover suddenly changes to a low scrub and grassland. This is the Magdalena Tolimense, famed since colonial times for its livestock economy evolved on the grassy terraces and alluvial fans that compose most of valley floor, now being developed for irrigated agriculture. The upper part of the Magdalena Depression within the department of Huila is even drier than the Tolima section and the basin floor is highly dissected by intermittent streams to form a low, rough, hill land.⁵ This is the home of the Huilense cowboys, who together with the cattlemen of Tolima, form a distinctive Colombian culture group whose traits have been recorded in national literature and song.

Cordillera Central. Westward from the Magdalena Depression the Cordillera Central rises abruptly as the highest of the three northern Andean chains. In contrast to the sedimentary cover of the Cordillera Oriental, the central range in part consists of geologically recent volcanoes and immense bodies of granitic intrusions called batholiths. In the middle sector of the cordillera the snow- and ice-covered volcanic peaks of Huila, Ruiz, and Tolima rise to heights that measure from 17,000 to nearly 19,000 feet above the sea. In the southern part of the range some volcanoes, such as Puracé near Popayán, are still active. On the lower flanks of the volcanoes highly fertile soils derive from the weathering of ash, pumice, and lava, while the highly mineralized edges of the great batholiths have yielded large quantities of precious metals, the exploitation of which has formed significant chapters in the aboriginal, colonial, and modern history of Colombia.

There are few extensive highland basins or level plateaus within

the Cordillera Central. A rolling plateau surface occurs near the southern end of the cordillera where it joins the western and eastern chains to form the high, wind-swept, almost uninhabited Gran Macizo Colombiano. South of this cold *páramo* near the Ecuadorian border is the Pasto Plateau, a high volcanic zone more akin to the Ecuadorian Andes than to those of Colombia. Many Quechua-speaking Indians as well as Spanish-speaking mestizos inhabit the fertile, densely-settled basin floors and adjacent slopes of this highland area. Culturally the Pasto Region is Ecuadorian, and anciently it formed the northern periphery of the Inca Empire.

Another plateau occurs near the northern extremity of the Cordillera Central. This is the large Antioquian Batholith, or Massif, whose rolling, weathered surface lies between 7,000 and 8,000 feet elevation (Fig. 3). The steep western, northern, and eastern flanks of the granitic mass are frayed by deep, narrow valleys; the Río Porce, a tributary of the Río Nechí, has carved a deep gorge through the middle of the Massif, dividing the Santa Rosa de Osos Plateau to the north from the Rionegro Plateau to the south. At the head of the Porce Gorge is a small, alluvium-filled basin called the Valle de Aburrá, which since the seventeenth century has played a role in Colombian history far out of proportion to its size; for this valley is the heart of Antioquia, a cultural and political area that vies with the Altiplano of Cundinamarca and Boyacá as the economic and political center of the country. Antioquia, which encompasses the Massif and adjacent slopes of the Cordillera Central between the Cauca and Magdalena rivers, is indeed another Colombia.

One of the most significant geologic-geographic aspects of the Antioquian Massif is the abundance of gold-bearing quartz veins within and around the periphery of the batholith. Streams, eroding into the deeply weathered surface, have uncovered many of the gold-bearing deposits, and have deposited gold dust and nuggets within their sandy, gravelly beds, forming rich placers. Moreover, the deep weathering of the granitic surface has formed easily worked layers of clay and gravel rich in gold. Thus the Antioquian Batholith and its drainage network was the chief source of gold that the Indians of the area in prequest times mined and fashioned into ornaments which they traded throughout northwestern South America. During the

second half of the sixteenth century, the same gold deposits, as well as the abundant golden artifacts buried in Indian graves, attracted Spanish invaders into the Antioquian Massif and adjacent rivers, where they established the third most productive mining area in the Spanish colonies. During most of the colonial period, the interest of the Spanish Crown in the New Kingdom of New Granada focused chiefly on the wealth of gold that came from the Antioquian Massif.⁶

Isolated from the colonial administrative seat in Santa Fé de Bogotá by long distances over rough terrain and the hot Magdalena Depression, the Antioqueño miners and their Negro slaves formed the base for the development of a special culture group in Colombia. Although much miscegenation of blood occurred, later in the colonial period the whites of Spanish descent kept to the high plateau surfaces, the Valle de Aburrá, and the adjacent malaria-free slopes, ordinarily above 3,000 feet elevation. The Negroes and mulattoes settled chiefly in the low, hot river valleys surrounding the Massif. After gold mining had declined at the end of the eighteenth century, the rapidly growing Antioqueño highland population began to expand north and south along the steep slopes of the Cordillera Central within the *tierra templada* belt.⁷ There the pioneer farmers felled the dense rain forest to grow maize and manioc and to plant pasture for their livestock. Later in the nineteenth century, the Antioqueño farmers became coffee planters, and still today produce the greater part of Colombia's leading export crop. South of the Massif the Antioqueños founded the towns of Manizales, Pereira, and Armenia, which today are leading commercial centers within the coffee zone. The Antioqueño is still a vigorous pioneer. Owing to population pressure in his homeland, he has crossed the Cauca Valley to the slopes of the western cordillera cutting the forest as he went, sowing grass for pasturing his white, black-eared cattle, and planting coffee for a cash crop. Within the Valley of Aburrá, the site of the capital city, Medellín, the richer of the Antioqueño families have established a thriving industry based chiefly on textile manufactures and food processing. Shrewd and thrifty but friendly and loquacious, the Antioqueño is widely known as the "Yanqui" of South America. In native dress, modes of speech, and philosophical attitude he is quite different from his more conservative compatriots of the Altiplano.

The Cauca-Patía Depression. The Cauca Depression separates the central and western cordilleras of Colombia. In the lower or northern half of the depression the Cauca River has cut a deep, narrow valley, and extensive dissection of former terraces has left little level land. The middle section of the depression, however, contains the elongated, alluvium-filled valley commonly called El Valle. Only ten to fifteen miles wide, El Valle extends north-south for a distance of 120 miles from near Cali to Cartago. Some 3,000 feet above sea level within the upper margin of the *tierra caliente*, this fertile stretch is today one of Colombia's most productive agricultural districts.⁸ The stagnant colonial economy of stock raising has been partially replaced by the cultivation of sugar cane, cotton, and rice on the well-drained alluvial fans that line the valley's eastern side; the low marshy grasslands along the Cauca floodplain are devoted to fattening of livestock shipped in from other parts of the country. Cali, founded on the western edge of the valley at the terminus of an important but difficult trail across the western cordillera to the Pacific, has been the commercial center of the district since its founding early in the sixteenth century. El Valle is a distinct cultural as well as a natural unit. The inhabitants call themselves "Vallecaucanos," and since the colonial era the towns of the valley—Cali, Buga, Toro, Caloto, and Cartago—have felt a bond of political, economic, and cultural unity. Negroes and mulattoes, products of colonial labor policy and recent immigration from the Pacific lowlands, make up a large part of the Vallecaucano population, but old white families of Spanish descent still hold most of the land in large estates.

Farther south, the Popayán area forms the highest part of the Cauca Depression. At this point large quantities of volcanic ash and lava ejected from nearby volcanoes in the Cordillera Central have partially filled the depression to an elevation of 5,000 feet above the sea. The cool climate and brilliantly green landscape of this delightful land contrast with the staid, conservative attitude of the townspeople, descendants of old Spanish families who once controlled much of the land in El Valle farther north.

The same structural rift that shapes the Cauca Depression continues even south of Popayán to form the upper valley of the Patía River. This small lowland is still another natural and cultural region

of Andean Colombia, for its dry, hot, scrub-covered hills and river floodplains are inhabited almost entirely by Negroes and mulattoes who live by subsistence farming and stock raising.

The Cordillera Occidental. This is the westernmost, lowest, but the most rugged of the three Andean ranges of Colombia. Its crest, whose maximum elevations rarely exceed 13,000 feet, is composed of sharp, isolated peaks weathered from a series of granitic batholiths. The steep slopes are completely clothed in dense forest, except where the Antioqueño farmers have hewn out small farm plots chiefly on the eastern flank of the range. Few alluvium-filled basins or plateau surfaces occur in this mountain land. In terms of man the chief functions of the Cordillera Occidental have been (1) a barrier separating the densely settled Andean Core from the almost empty lands of the Pacific lowlands, and (2) a source of precious metals contained in the many batholiths and later deposited in the beds of rivers that flow westward to the Pacific.

III. *The Peripheral Lowlands*

Around the Andean core of Colombia lie the peripheral lowlands: to the north, the dry Caribbean area; to the west, the rain-drenched Pacific Lowlands; and to the east, the vast grass- and scrub-covered Llanos and a portion of the Amazonian Forest. These are Colombia's main areas of *tierra caliente*; except for parts of the Caribbean area, they are sparsely inhabited; these are the lands that may offer possibilities for colonizing the expanding highland population and for the development of scientific tropical agriculture and stock raising.

The Caribbean Area

By far the most important of the peripheral zones is the Caribbean Area, one of the major natural regions of Colombia. At present it is second only to the Andean Core as the country's most densely populated sector, and for the past fifty years it has received substantial numbers of highlanders as agricultural colonists within the river floodplains and as industrial workers in the rapidly growing urban centers. Most Colombians know the Caribbean area as *La Costa* and its inhabitants as *Costeños*, who, like the Cundinamarquenses and Boyacenses of the Altiplano and the Antioqueños of the Cor-

dillera Central, have developed particular cultural characteristics in dress, dialect, and manner.

Although it contains a variety of landscapes, the Caribbean area has a semblance of physical unity. Physiographically it consists of low hills, one high mountain region, and many flattish alluvial basins. Of these, the wide, marshy floodplain and delta of the lower Magdalena is the largest, forming the central part of the lowlands. Several low coastal ranges confine the delta on the west, while immediately eastward an isolated mountain mass, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, rises abruptly from sea level to elevations of nearly 19,000 feet. The Caribbean area extends northeastward into the dry, desert-like Guajira Peninsula, and the alluvial plains of the Sinú and upper San Jorge rivers form its southwestern periphery. Except for the Sierra de Santa Marta, the Caribbean area is a hot land, with one half of the year (November-April) almost completely without rain, the other half (May-October) moist and muggy. Originally a low semi-deciduous and deciduous forest with scattered areas of tropical grass covered the hill slopes and alluvial flats, but today man has so altered the vegetation of this area that only spots of the natural cover remain.

Since prequest times the drainage basins of the Sinú and upper San Jorge rivers in the western part of the Caribbean area have been considered a natural and cultural unit, called El Cenú. Within the fertile river floodplains lived the Zenú Indians, expert goldsmiths and farmers, who buried golden artifacts with their dead.⁹ During the early sixteenth century, initial Spanish activity in this area was simply grave robbing; only later were stock ranches established on the Indian-made savannas. The grasslands of El Cenú and the adjacent savannas of Bolívar in the lower Magdalena became the cradle of Spanish cattle raising in New Granada.¹⁰ Stock raising continues today as the prime activity of the lowlands. As in colonial days, cattle are still driven overland from the pastures to markets in the Antioqueño highlands, though many are also taken to ports on the Magdalena for shipment upriver to the Altiplano. Within the last few decades the Sinú valley has seen a thriving development of tropical agriculture based on rice, cotton, and sugar cane, with an influx of farmers from Antioquia as new settlers. So strong is the feeling of cultural and political unity and so rapidly has population recently increased that

the area of El Cenú in 1952 was made the new department of Córdoba.

Eastward from El Cenú lie the extensive savannas of Bolívar and the lower Magdalena; today, as in colonial times, the most important cattle raising area of Colombia. Here, as well as in the Cenú, stockmen have destroyed much of the original forest and have replaced the coarse native grasses with the more nutritious Brazilian and African species such as guinea, pará, and jaraguá. In both areas a system of transhumance has developed in the cattle industry. During the rainy season when the low areas are inundated, herds are moved to the well-drained hill slopes planted to jaraguá grass; in the long dry season, when the hill grasses desiccate and the lowland floods recede, the cattle are driven into the moist river floodplains to pasture on guinea grass. Today more than fifteen million head of cattle graze on the planted pastures that fit so well into the climatic and hydrographic characteristics of the area.¹¹

Since the sixteenth century the Caribbean area has been Colombia's front door to the outside world. The specific gateways have been the colonial ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta and the more recent river port of Barranquilla near the mouth of the Magdalena.

The Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is a physical anomaly of the Caribbean area. Since the Spanish conquest its deep valleys and high, steep slopes have served as refuge areas for Indian groups that have retained much of their native cultures. In terms of modern economy, however, the vast alluvial piedmont plains formed at the base of the mountain mass are of special significance. The western piedmont south of Santa Marta is the site of Colombia's big banana plantations; the southeastern piedmont overlooking the César River basin is an area of recent agricultural colonization.

Finally, the dry Guajira Peninsula, like the Sierra de Santa Marta, is a refuge area for the populous Guajiro Indians, who since the conquest have changed from primitive hunting and gathering peoples to nomadic herders, breeding Old World goats, cattle, and sheep.¹²

The Pacific Lowlands

The Pacific fringe of Colombia is a world apart from the rest of the country.¹³ It is a hot, extremely humid, forested land of many

ivers. These in some parts have built narrow alluvial floodplains; in other parts they have dissected the lowland into a maze of rugged hills. The Pacific Lowland is a land of rain, few areas of which receive less than 200 inches annually; one area, the upper Atrato Basin, receives almost 400 inches per year—the wettest spot in the Americas. The Pacific Lowland is also a land of sparse population, 85 per cent of which is made up of Negroes and mulattoes who live as subsistence farmers, miners, and fishermen along the rivers and the coast.

The northern half of the area is called the Chocó, composed of a structural depression that lies between the Cordillera Occidental and the low Serranía de Baudó, and is drained by the Atrato and San Juan rivers. The upper part of these drainage systems forms the cultural center of the Chocó. There, particularly in the vicinity of Quibdó, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Spaniards exploited rich gold placers, importing large numbers of Negro slaves for labor. The present Negroid population of the Chocó is descendent from this colonial slave labor, and the washing of river sands for both gold and platinum still occupies a large number of native Chocoanos.

The southern part of the Pacific area consists of a coastal fringe of mangrove swamp backed by hilly, stream-dissected lowlands. There, too, gold placer mining along the rivers was the main colonial economy and the basis for the present Negro population. Despite the insalubrious climate and paucity of population, within this low coastal area have developed two growing port towns that may have increasing significance for Colombian commerce. One is Buenaventura, the colonial port of Cali, and now the most important coffee port of the country, serving most of western Colombia. The other is Tumaco, near the Ecuadorian border, which is the outlet for the southern highlands of Colombia and, formerly, of northern Ecuador.

The Pacific Lowlands offer few opportunities for future colonization and development of tropical agriculture. The only fertile lands are extremely narrow strips of alluvium along the rivers; the floodplain of the lower Atrato River forms a vast swamp unfit for production without enormous expenditure for drainage. Moreover, the hill slopes that cover most of the Pacific Lowlands carry highly infertile clay soils that are hardly suitable for successful pioneer settlement in the tropics.

The Llanos

The largest of Colombia's peripheral areas lies east of the Andes. The better-known area is the Llanos, the grassy plains that stretch eastward 400 miles from the Andean wall to the Orinoco River. The Colombian Llanos are actually a southwestern continuation of those of Venezuela, and reach their southern limit along the Guaviare River, where the vast Amazon forest begins.

Built of alluvium deposited by Andean streams, the Llanos form a great plains area that slopes gently eastward from the mountains. Tall, tropical bunch grass dominates the natural vegetation in the interfluves, but along the rivers grow strips of rain forest. During the wet season heavy rains cause the rivers to overflow, forming large shallow lakes in low areas; in the dry season the rivers shrink to shallow braided streams, the grass withers, and dust and smoke from burning grass fill the air. Possibly in no other part of Colombia are seasonal contrasts so sharp as in the Llanos.

Physiographically the Llanos consist of two zones: (1) the Llanos Arriba, the higher plains near the Andean foothills, and (2) the Llanos Abajo, the lower plains that approach the Orinoco. The former consist of great alluvial fans formed by streams flowing from the eastern Andean versant. Around the base of the sloping fans are wide belts of fine-grained, moisture-retentive alluvium, which supports clumps of rain forest. Such areas have proven well suited for agriculture. The Llanos Abajo are almost flat, grass-covered plains and, except along the rivers, are characterized by highly weathered, infertile soils.

Although the Llanos have been utilized for extensive stock raising since colonial times, they have always been sparsely populated. From the large cattle ranches and the ranch centers, or *hatos*, has developed the peculiar *llanero* culture, so memorably recorded in both Colombian and Venezuelan literature. Far from markets and plagued by flood, drought, and disease, the cattle industry of the Llanos has never attained full development.

The Llanos Arriba, however, has been the scene of recent colonization from the overpopulated Andean highlands.¹⁴ Productive farms of rice, maize, and plantains have been established, especially in the belt of fine soils at the base of the alluvial fans. The develop-

ment of tropical agriculture in the Llanos Arriba may be at least a partial solution to the vexing problem of growing population pressure within the Andean core of Colombia.

The Colombian Amazonia

In terms of drainage, vegetation, and culture, the southern part of eastern lowlands of Colombia belongs to the Amazon Basin. South of the Guaviare and Guayabero rivers a dense rain forest covers the undulating surface. Still partially unexplored, this is Colombia's least populated area and the one that is least incorporated into the national life. Only small groups of primitive forest Indians and collectors of forest products live along the rivers. A few spots along the Andean foothills, however, are being slowly settled by highland farmers from Antioquia, the upper Magdalena, and the Pasto area. This zone of colonization forms a southern continuation of that mentioned above for the Llanos Arriba.

IV. Conclusion

The presentation of the highly complex geography of Colombia by means of a gross regional breakdown as given above may serve as background for the papers that follow on aboriginal groups; colonial and modern history; economic, social, and political developments; and the cultural achievements of the Colombian people. It is a truism that human activity takes place upon the land and that man adapts himself to natural conditions according to his cultural attributes. Although natural regions and cultural areas are rarely synonymous, an attempt has been made here to relate Colombia's modern cultures and economies to the natural landscape. From this study one conclusion is outstanding: present-day Colombia, like so many of the Latin American countries, is a plural nation, made up of several different culture areas. To understand Colombia one must realize her regional differences.

NOTES

1. Pablo Vila was one of the first modern Colombian geographers to suggest detailed divisions, which he called "natural regions," based on the French concept of the *pays*, a locally recognized area having common physical and cultural characteristics. His system was first presented in a series of articles published in the magazine, *Colombia*, I, 1-4 (1944), and later condensed as a chapter in his *Nueva geografía de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1945), pp. 157-186. In 1947 Ernesto Guhl, one of Colombia's foremost geographers at present, published a map showing his concept of the physical regions of the country, based on physiography, climate, and vegetation (Ernesto Guhl, *Colombia, fisiografía, clima, vegetación* [Bogotá, 1947]). The most recent and detailed presentation of Colombia's natural regions in map and table form appears in the *Atlas de economía colombiana* (2^a entrega; Bogotá: Banco de La República, 1960). This material is based on previous work done by Eduardo Acevedo Latorre and Ernesto Guhl. Simpler regional divisions of Colombia appear in various textbooks, such as Preston James, *Latin America* (3d ed.; New York, 1959), and J. B. Butland, *Latin America, a Regional Geography* (London, 1960).

2. Robert C. Eidl, "Aboriginal Chibcha Settlement in Colombia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, XLIX (1959), 374-392.

3. Eduardo Acevedo Latorre, "Panorama geo-económico del Departamento de Santander," *Economía y Estadística*, LXXVIII (1954), 1-50.

4. Q. D. Singlewold, *Mineral Resources of Colombia*, United States Geological Survey Bulletin 964-B (Washington, D.C., 1950).

5. Eduardo Acevedo Latorre, "Panorama geo-económico del Departamento de Huila," *Economía y Estadística*, LXXVII (1954), 1-56.

6. Robert C. West, *Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia*, Louisiana State University Studies, Social Science Ser., No. 2 (Baton Rouge, 1952).

7. James J. Parsons, *Antioqueño Colonization in Western Colombia*, Ibero-America No. 30 (Berkeley, 1949).

8. Raymond E. Crist, *The Cauca Valley, Colombia; Land Tenure and Use* (Baltimore, 1952); Eduardo Acevedo Latorre, "Panorama geo-económico del Departamento del Valle," *Economía y Estadística*, LXXX (1954), 1-48.

9. Le Roy B. Gordon, *Human Geography and Ecology in the Sinú Country of Colombia*, Ibero-America, No. 39 (Berkeley, 1957).

10. James J. Parsons, "The Settlement of the Sinú Valley of Colombia," *Geographical Review*, XLII (1952), 67-86.

11. Herbert Wilhelmy, "Die Weidewirtschaft im heissen Tiefland Nordkolumbiens," *Geographische Rundschau*, VI (1954), 41-54.

12. Raymond E. Crist, "Acculturation in the Guajira," *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1958* (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 481-499; Homer Aschmann, "Indian Pastoralists of the Guajira Peninsula," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, L (1960), 408-418.

13. Robert C. West, *The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, a Negroid Area of the American Tropics*, Louisiana State University Studies, Social Science Ser. No. 8 (Baton Rouge, 1957).

14. Raymond C. Crist and Ernesto Guhl, "Pioneer Settlement in Eastern Colombia," *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1956* (Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 391-414.

Robert L. Carneiro: THE ABORIGINAL CULTURES
OF COLOMBIA

THE ENVIRONMENTAL VARIETY which marks Colombia is closely paralleled by, and indeed reflected in, the native Indian cultures that developed in that country. These cultures ranged from small, simple, seminomadic groups like the present-day Guahibo of the Llanos to the large, populous, and socially complex states of the Muisca (Chibcha) area, which in degree of political evolution ranked second only to the Inca empire in all of South America.

In a paper of this length, whose objective it is to present the indigenous cultures of Colombia in broad perspective, it is not only impossible but also undesirable to portray all of this cultural diversity. Some plan must be followed which simplifies the picture and at the same time brings out its most salient and characteristic features. In an attempt to do this I will consider Colombian cultures as falling into two principal types, the Tropical Forest and the Sub-Andean types. These are two of the four types used in the *Handbook of South American Indians* in its very successful classification and description of the native cultures of that continent. The Tropical Forest type consists of relatively primitive shifting cultivators dwelling exclusively in areas of rain forest. The Sub-Andean type (also called Circum-Caribbean in the *Handbook*) comprises the sedentary, better-organized, and more advanced peoples of the higher valleys and mountain slopes. Societies representing one or the other of these two types at one time covered almost all of what is now Colombia.

The native cultures of Colombia do not, of course, always fit neatly

into one or another of these types. Actually they form a graded series, the intermediate members of which could be classified in either of them. However in this paper the focus of attention will be on tribes typical of each of the two types.

To describe the Indian cultures of Colombia as they were at the time of first white contact requires dealing with them at different time periods. Most Sub-Andean societies of Colombia were first encountered by the Spaniards during the 1500's, and by 1650 they had lost not only their political independence but their cultural identity as well. On the other hand many Tropical Forest societies, especially those in the Amazon basin, have survived relatively unmodified into this century. A few of them, like the tribes of the upper tributaries of the Vaupés, are still very little known. And the much-publicized Motilones have entered into peaceful contact with whites only within the last two or three years.

I. The Tropical Forest Cultures

The Tropical Forest cultures of Colombia are today best represented in the Amazon lowlands south of the Guaviare River and on the Pacific coast. Generally speaking, societies of this type inhabit areas lying below 1,000 feet, the notable exception being the Motilones, who live at somewhat higher elevations in the well-forested Sierra de Perijá.

The typical Tropical Forest community consists of a small village, of perhaps 100 persons, which is autonomous both politically and economically. A number of villages together may be given a tribal name, but this means only that they speak the same language and share the same culture, not that they are organized into any higher sociopolitical unit. Villages are usually located at some distance from each other, but close enough to a river or stream to facilitate fishing, bathing, drawing water, and traveling by canoe.

House types and village plans show some variation from one region to another. Throughout the Vaupés area and also among the Motilones a single large dwelling, generally called a *maloca*, houses all members of the community. On the Pacific coast however the Chocó live in smaller, often single-family, houses that are widely scattered.

Both types of houses have a framework of stout posts and are thatched with palm leaves. Since rainfall on the Pacific coast is extremely heavy and there is frequent danger of flooding, Chocó houses are built on piles, with a notched log serving as a ladder. Many of the Vaupés tribes use slabs of bark for the lower part of the house wall, while the Baniva and other tribes near the Llanos sometimes make their house walls by interlacing withes and coating them with mud (wattle-and-daub).

The tribes of the Vaupés region sleep in hammocks, the typical sleeping arrangement of the Tropical Forest. However, the Chocó, Motilones, and other tribes that have been sufficiently influenced by Sub-Andean culture sleep on platform beds, the Chocó using a carved block of wood as a pillow.

Among all these tribes subsistence is based on slash-and-burn agriculture, a method of cultivation in which a section of the forest is cut over and allowed to dry out during the dry season, and burned and planted just before the onset of the next rains. The staple crop plant in the Vaupés area is bitter manioc. Elsewhere in Colombia only sweet manioc is known. Along the Pacific coast manioc is of only minor importance, maize being the principal cultivated plant. Besides manioc and maize the Tropical Forest tribes cultivate sweet potatoes, yams, and many kinds of fruits including papaya, guayaba, pineapple, and the pupunha palm (*Guilielma speciosa*).

Tribes of the Vaupés region remove the poisonous prussic acid from bitter manioc by soaking the root, grating it, and then squeezing the pulp, first through a woven sieve placed on a tripod and finally in an extendible tubular press known as a *tipiti*. The dried manioc flour is either stored as loose *farina*, or made into large, flat, circular cakes which when dried in the sun preserve indefinitely and are carried as provisions on long trips.

While not of paramount importance among any of the Tropical Forest tribes of Colombia, hunting does add significantly to the subsistence of most of them. The bow and arrow is the principal all-purpose hunting weapon, but the blowgun with curare-poisoned darts is particularly favored against arboreal game. Instead of curare the Chocó use two unusual poisons, one of which is the only New World poison known to have a specific effect on the heart.

For many tribes fishing is more important than hunting. All tribes fish with the bow and arrow, and in addition the Chocó use the spear thrower for catching manatees. The most productive fishing technique of all is drugging, carried out with any of a wide variety of plant poisons known collectively as *barbasco*. This type of fishing is generally practiced only during the dry season, since at high water the strong currents wash the drug away. Weirs are often built just before the *barbasco* is poured in the water in order to keep the fish from escaping downstream. Several hundred fish may be caught by poisoning, then smoked for preservation.

Among most Tropical Forest peoples clothing is either distinctly limited or lacking altogether. In the Vaupés area men wear a breechcloth of bark cloth, while women, who formerly went naked, later adopted beaded aprons. For painting the face and body, bija (*Bixa orellana*) and jagua (*Genipa americana*) are universally used. Bija is often mixed with oil before being applied and gives a vivid red pigment. Jagua yields an indelible black dye which is not only esteemed for decorative purposes but is also commonly thought to have protective magical properties.

Since cotton is rare in the region, Vaupés Indians do little weaving. However, the Chocó and a number of other lowland tribes raise considerable cotton which the women spin into thread with a spindle and weave into cloth on a backstrap loom. A few Tropical Forest tribes like the Yuko of the Sierra de Perijá weave long sleeveless garments resembling nightshirts, an obvious borrowing from neighboring Sub-Andean peoples. Vaupés ceremonial costumes of bark cloth covering the entire body are the most elaborate costumes of this material made anywhere in the Amazon Basin. The Chocó also manufacture bark cloth but use it only for sleeping mats.

Ceremonialism is particularly striking and elaborate in the area of the Vaupés. Among the Yukuna of the Mirití Paraná, for example, the botanist Richard Schultes witnessed a ceremony which continued without interruption for 24 hours, and in which 80 different dances were performed, each one representing an episode in the mythological history of the tribe.

The best-known of all the ceremonies among the peoples of this region is the *Yuruparí*. In part the *Yuruparí* is an initiation cere-

mony in which pubescent boys are subjected to severe whipping which they are expected to endure without flinching, thus demonstrating their manhood. During this ceremony large bark trumpets associated with ancestral spirits are played, and these instruments the women are forbidden to see under penalty of death. A drinking bout accompanies this ceremony, and before the festivities are over an entire canoeful of *chicha* may have been consumed. *Chicha* is a mildly alcoholic drink made by chewing and spitting manioc, maize, or almost any kind of fruit into a container into which some already-cooked drink has been deposited, the ptyalin in the saliva serving to promote fermentation. The Vaupés tribes prefer to use manioc for their *chicha* (or *cashirí* as it is called here), while the Chocó prepare theirs from corn gruel.

Many musical instruments including panpipes, flutes, trumpets, and skin-headed drums are used by the Tropical Forest tribes of Colombia. Outstanding among them is the hollow log signal drum, *manguaré*, which is found throughout the region of the Vaupés. These drums are played in pairs, the larger "male" drum producing a deeper tone than the smaller "female" one. To make such a drum the inside of a section of log is burned out with hot stones introduced through a slit cut into the log. The walls of the drum are then scraped down leaving the two "lips" forming the edges of the slit of different thicknesses so that when struck they will produce different tones. The drums are hung from a scaffold and are beaten with wooden drumsticks whose playing ends are covered with balls of crude rubber. Although the drums may be played in accompaniment to certain ceremonies, they are used primarily for signaling between villages, and on a still day can be heard for a distance of up to 15 miles.

Religious beliefs of the Vaupés tribes center around a large number of spirits with whom anyone, but especially shamans, can communicate. A person seeks to consult the spirits in order to gain supernatural assistance in recovering from illness, learning the identity of a sorcerer, and the like. The most effective way of getting in touch with the spirits is through the use of narcotic plants which produce extremely vivid hallucinations. *Cayapi* (*Banisteriopsis caapi*) and *borrachero* (*Datura* spp.) are commonly used for this purpose. Snuff ground from the seeds of a vine called *paricá* (*Piptadenia peregrina*)

is taken by shamans to produce a delirium during which they divine and prophesy. The use of tobacco is widespread. In the Vaupés it is smoked in the form of cigars held in large cigar holders shaped something like tuning forks. Another very important narcotic is coca which, chewed with ashes and its juice swallowed, arrests hunger pangs and imparts remarkable endurance.

Until recent times warfare has been extremely prevalent among the tribes of the Tropical Forest. The Motilones have become famous for the redoubtable manner in which they have prevented encroachment on their territory. The principal weapon of war is generally the bow and arrow, but some tribes rely on the macana, or sword club, as well. Attack is usually by stealth, and once it begins each attacker fights pretty much on his own. Societies subject to recurring attacks often seek to protect themselves by making their trails winding and disguising them well. Caltraps and pitfalls may also be employed in order to increase the hazards to the attacker.

Cannibalism of war prisoners was formerly quite frequent among Indians of the Vaupés. The purpose of this practice was to humiliate the enemy, while at the same time incorporating within oneself his outstanding qualities. Here and there some societies gave indications of esteeming cannibalism gastronomically as well as ritually.

A person who met a quiet death at home was generally buried. Burials often took place within the house, with the deceased either being wrapped in his hammock or else placed inside a canoe which served as a coffin.

II. The Sub-Andean Cultures

The three principal areas of Colombia where a Sub-Andean level of culture developed were the Cauca valley, the flanks of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, and the plateau east of the Magdalena in what is now the Department of Cundinamarca. The picture of Sub-Andean culture presented here is drawn from accounts of the three societies which best typify each of these three areas: the Anserma, the Tairona, and the Muisca or Chibcha.

In sheer numbers of people Sub-Andean societies far exceeded anything encountered among Tropical Forest tribes. The Anserma,

only one of several chiefdoms in the Cauca valley, had a population of about 40,000. The Tairona and adjacent peoples are estimated to have numbered 100,000. Most populous of all were the Muisca states which together contained approximately 1,000,000 persons. Sub-Andean populations were not only large but dense. In one valley of the Sierra Nevada it is reported that there were 250 towns, a few of the larger ones having more than 1,000 inhabitants.

Unlike Tropical Forest villages, which were rapidly erected and readily abandoned, Sub-Andean settlements were substantially built and generally permanent. Houses were either of pole-and-thatch or wattle-and-daub construction. The Anserma and Tairona used stone architecturally to the extent of paving plazas and roads with flagstones and of carving stairways into solid rock. But with the exception of the archeological San Agustín culture of the headwaters of the Magdalena, no Sub-Andean people of Colombia had learned to use stone for the construction of buildings.

The basis of subsistence of all Sub-Andean groups was intensive cultivation of the land. The early chroniclers speak of large, carefully laid out, and well-tended fields. The Muisca planted in *camellones*, or mounds, probably to conserve soil moisture. Irrigation is reported for at least one tribe of the Cauca valley, and the Tairona on the slopes of the Sierra Nevada are described as having a well-ordered system of irrigation canals. A few societies constructed terraces as well.

The principal agricultural implement of the Muisca and probably of other groups was a wooden spade. The Anserma used clubs to beat down the grass in their fields before burning and planting. Apparently no fertilizer was used on the soil, and the practice of crop rotation as a device for soil conservation was unknown. The relative permanence of Muisca fields is attested to by the fact that agricultural land was transmitted from father to son.

Maize was the leading crop of most of the Sub-Andean chiefdoms. The Muisca, on their moderately high plateau, were able to harvest only one crop a year, but the Anserma in the Cauca valley harvested two, and some tribes even three. Beans and squash, so often associated with maize throughout the Americas, were also grown. Root crops were of considerable importance too, and included, besides

sweet potatoes and sweet manioc, such less well-known plants as arracacha (*Arracacia esculenta*), oca (*Oxalis crenata*), and ulloco (*Ullucus tuberosa*). Fruit trees, often planted in orchards, also contributed to the diet.

The political units of Sub-Andean Colombia ranged in size and degree of organization from small chiefdoms in which a petty chief exercised loose control over a few villages, to the *señoríos* of the Muisca area, the largest of which virtually deserved to be called kingdoms. The rulers of the two largest Muisca states, who were known as the Zipa and the Zaque, are described by the chroniclers as being absolute monarchs with almost unlimited power and prestige.

The Zipa had not only a large compound in the capital of his kingdom but also residences at other points in the realm where, affairs of state permitting, he went to take his pleasure with his wives and 300 concubines. So exalted was his status that no one could look at him directly. When he traveled he was carried in a gilded litter and sweepers preceded him to clear the road ahead. Even his spittle was so highly regarded that it was caught on a towel and preserved.

At his death the Zipa was succeeded, not by his own son, but by his sister's son. During the coronation ceremony the new Zipa took an oath of office while the members of his court pledged him their allegiance. The famous legend of El Dorado arose from an episode which traditionally accompanied the installation of a new Zipa. As part of this ceremony the Zipa was daubed over his entire body with wet clay and then sprinkled with gold dust. Thus gilded, he was taken out in a canoe to the center of a lake where he plunged into the water and washed himself off. El Dorado, the Gilded One, was then originally a person. Only with later retellings was the story so transmuted that everyone today associates El Dorado with a place instead of with a man.

When the Zipa died he was buried in a grave which priests had secretly prepared beforehand. His body was placed in a sitting position on a gold-covered stool, and he was surrounded by his prized personal possessions. Buried with him also were his favorite wives and retainers who were not killed but only stupefied with *chicha*, tobacco, and *Datura* before being interred with their lord and master.

The rulers of other Sub-Andean states also commanded great re-

spect and received special privileges. The paramount chief of the Anserma wore a gold crown as a symbol of his office, and wherever he went was borne on the shoulders of his men. It was unthinkable that his feet should be allowed to touch the ground, and when he descended it was onto the thighs of his wives who gathered at the spot. When he died, his body was desiccated over a slow fire and, along with his wives and servants, he was buried in a stone cyst grave.

Social classes were well-marked among almost all Sub-Andean chiefdoms. Usually there were four classes: chiefs (or kings), nobles, commoners, and slaves. Although class membership was hereditary it was possible to rise in the social scale by performing outstanding service for the state in war. Class differences were made readily evident by differences in dress, and among the Muisca these differences were enforced by sumptuary laws.

The power of rulers over their subjects was very considerable. In time of war men were recruited to serve in the army, and in time of peace they were called upon to perform labor service for the state. Tairona conscript labor was generally employed in road building. Deviations from the prescribed norms of conduct were also the concern of the state. Among the Tairona indolence was punished, while an Anserma caught stealing was enslaved forthwith.

The economy of the chiefdoms and kingdoms of Colombia had advanced far beyond the level of subsistence. Many arts and crafts, including the weaving of fine cotton cloth and the working of gold and other metals, were in the hands of full-time specialists. Trading was important not only within each society but also between neighboring societies. Professional merchants were found among both the Tairona and Anserma. Muisca commerce was so far advanced that in large towns markets were held every four days. Salt, cotton, and gold were the most common items of trade in all areas. The Anserma and Tairona exchanged only by barter, but the Muisca not only bartered goods but also employed a form of currency consisting of gold discs.

Through their political and military power the rulers of Sub-Andean states were able to exact tribute and taxes from their subjects. The Muisca took tax collecting very seriously, and a person remiss in paying his taxes would have a mountain lion quartered in his house

until he paid. For every day it took him to settle his debt the offender was fined one cotton mantle. A state treasury building stood within the Zipa's royal compound and here collected taxes were stored.

The form of religious organization most characteristic of Sub-Andean societies was the priest-temple-idol cult. This cult provided a means for people to communicate with their deities through the mediation of temple priests who interpreted the oracular pronouncements of idols representing those deities. The priests of the Muisca, called *jeques*, were trained in a seminary. Their novitiate lasted 12 years and throughout this time they were expected to observe periods of fasting, to do penance, and to remain continent. When finally invested with their office by the Zipa, *jeques* were assigned to temples located at various points in the kingdom. Throughout their lifetime they continued to practice rigid self-denial including mortification of the flesh and ritual blood-letting. They were also expected to remain celibate, and for any transgression of this rule they were immediately unfrocked.

On occasions of public concern, such as during a drought or before a military engagement, *jeques* performed certain ceremonies in an attempt to bring rain, to assure victory, or to achieve whatever other result was desired. Prominent among these rituals were human sacrifices. The most common method of sacrifice was to impale a slave or a child on the lower end of a house post. Some of the children used in these sacrifices were especially reared by their parents for this very purpose.

Solar and lunar deities were common in Sub-Andean cultures. The Muisca believed also in a creator god, called Chiminigagua, but their most famous deity was the bearded god Bochica, who was a culture hero and a lawgiver as well.

Public celebrations and festivals were held at frequent intervals, and on these occasions enormous quantities of *chicha* were consumed. These feasts were marked by great sexual license, and ended with everyone either asleep or in a drunken stupor.

Of all the arts and crafts of the Sub-Andean peoples metallurgy was the one most highly developed. The metals in most common use were gold and copper and an alloy made from these two called *tumbaga*. Besides alloying, the techniques employed were cold ham-

mering, repoussé, filigree, and casting, the latter being carried out principally by a wax method which has been lost. Stylistic differences make it possible to distinguish the goldwork of the various areas of Colombia. That of the Quimbaya of the Cauca valley is generally considered to be the best, both technically and artistically.

We cannot conclude a description of Sub-Andean peoples without a brief account of war as practiced among them, since it was warfare and conquest that gave rise to the large territorial units and powerful political leaders so characteristic of the area. Among Tropical Forest tribes warfare consisted of little more than raids for taking women or avenging witchcraft. Sub-Andean warfare on the other hand was directed to the subjugation of enemy tribes, the exaction of tribute, the conquest of territory, and the capture of prisoners to serve either as sacrificial victims or as slaves. Large armies took the field: the Spaniards faced a Tairona army of 20,000 men, and even larger armies were marshaled by the Muisca. These armies were led by officers who were professional soldiers. The bulk of the army was chosen from among the able-bodied men of the society, but in addition to draftees the Muisca had a class of specially selected and trained soldiers called *güechas* who garrisoned border outposts in time of peace and who comprised the most reliable contingent of fighting men during war.

Armies marched and attacked in formation, and military tactics and stratagems were employed. Engagements were not simply skirmishes but often pitched battles in which many warriors were killed on both sides. To bring them good luck the Anserma carried with them into battle the mummified bodies of their most distinguished war leaders of the past.

Weapons of war included the bow and arrow, the spearthrower, slings, and sword clubs. In attacking an enemy village fire arrows were shot into the thatched roofs of the houses in an attempt to burn them down. For defensive purposes villages were often palisaded.

After winning a battle it was common for most Sub-Andean peoples to cut off the heads of slain enemies and to bring them back home and display them as trophies. Prisoners taken alive were also brought back, and those that were not sacrificed were kept as slaves.

III. Conclusion

When we compare the Sub-Andean chiefdoms of Colombia with the Tropical Forest tribes we find that in virtually every respect the former were more elaborate and more complex than the latter. Since the Sub-Andean peoples were once at the same general level of culture as the Tropical Forest tribes are today, it is evident that the process of cultural evolution went further in the Colombian highlands than it did in the lowlands. The stages of this evolutionary process can be discerned fairly clearly since among the various peoples inhabiting Colombia at the time of the Spanish conquest every gradation in cultural development between the Tropical Forest and the Sub-Andean levels was represented.

A variety of environmental factors has made the Tropical Forest an area unsuited for the development of high culture. However, in the mountain valleys and plateaus of Colombia the environment was more favorable, and the process of cultural development reached a culmination in the populous and well-organized Muisca states.

Perhaps the word "culmination" is not completely appropriate since the climax toward which the Sub-Andean cultures were heading was interrupted before it was fully achieved. It seems very likely that, had the Spaniards not arrived on the scene when they did, the entire Muisca area would shortly have been unified into a single political unit by force of arms of the Zipa. The next step might well have been the conquest of the chiefdoms of the Cauca valley. In fact, it is probably not too fanciful to suppose that had the Spanish conquest been delayed a century or two, a single large state, almost comparable to that of the Inca, might have exercised its rule over much of Colombia.

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Carlos Angulo V.: EVIDENCE OF THE BARRANCOID
SERIES IN NORTH COLOMBIA

DURING THE ARCHEOLOGICAL EXCAVATIONS recently carried out in the village of Malambo near the western bank of the Magdalena River in the department of Atlantic, Colombia, we found in the aboriginal pottery a style of decoration that is unrelated to the aboriginal pottery in the north part of Colombia. If that zone of the country, that is, the great structural depression which stretches from the foot of the last spurs of the Eastern Cordillera and from the lowlands beginning at the foothills of the Central and Western Cordillera to the Caribbean Sea, had not been intensively investigated so that we had a good idea of the aboriginal sequence for the region, the problem involved in the pottery from the archeological sites in Malambo would not have stirred in us the interest that it did from the beginning of the research. From the onset of our researches to define the cultural meaning and temporal sequence of the Malambo area, we had observed a series of traits in the decoration of pottery, that together with other cultural elements, furnishes a basis for correlating them tentatively with some of the phases of the archeology of Venezuela rather than Colombia. We hope that as our field work progresses, it will permit us to broaden the frame of spacial reference,

that is very limited at present, of this important aboriginal ceramic complex of the northern part of Colombia.

These archeological phases are those which Rouse and Crucent (1959) have defined as typified by an elaborate ceramic complex under the name of the Barranroid Series. For the purpose of our comparative study we have made use of the description they give of the large amount of material secured from systematic excavations and from surface collections, and supplemented in some cases with the data collected by archeologists who preceded them into Venezuela and neighboring areas.

It is pertinent to mention that Irving Rouse of Yale University had an opportunity to examine the collections in Barranquilla in 1957. Several modeled-incised potsherds from a surface collection from the Malambo area were of unusual interest. His opinion was that some of the decorative traits of the Malambo material were very similar to some of those of the various styles of the Barranroid Series of Venezuela, but that it would be necessary to carry out extensive excavations in order to know exactly the meaning of this material. In December of the same year, Betty J. Meggers and Clifford Evans of the Smithsonian Institution, archeologists who have worked extensively in various parts of South America, examined the same collection and also classified it as Barranroid. Finally, at the Seminar in Archeological Techniques which took place in June-July, 1961, in Barranquilla under the auspices of the National Science Foundation of the United States and the Organization of American States, archeologists from eight Latin American countries in addition to those of the United States, classified the pottery from two of the stratigraphic excavations made by the author in 1959 at Malambo. From these sherds, one of the classificatory units adopted, because of the distinct decoration of the pottery, was classified as material with Barranroid characteristics. Thus, what was once scant and inconclusive evidence to show relationships of the Malambo area with distinct archeological horizons outside of Colombia, by means of the Barranroid pottery of Venezuela, had now become a distinct cultural complex with a well-defined position in the time sequence for the area that could not be taken lightly and deserved careful consideration from the standpoint of what this meant in the aboriginal history of northern South America.

I. Location and Character

Malambo is located on the western shore of one of the many shallow bays, called *ciénagas*, made by the Magdalena River before it flows into the Caribbean Sea. It is 11 kilometers south of Barranquilla (Fig. 1). Properly speaking, Malambo is not on the river, because the Magdalena has already made a distinct turn at a distance of 11 kilometers from Barranquilla. The Malambo *ciénaga* is connected with the river through two narrow channels, called *caños*. The depth of both the *ciénaga* and the *caños* varies according to the seasonal fluctuations of the level of the water in the river. When at its lowest, during the dry season in the Andean region, the volume of water in the *ciénaga* is so reduced that only one of the many canoe landings can be used. This landing is called by the inhabitants "Puerto del Cerrito," or "Little Hill," because it is located in a zone relatively high but of short extension that belongs to one of the last offshoots of the complex hills, branching off from the western range of mountains of the department of Atlántico. The depth of the *ciénaga* at this point is in marked contrast with the level of the water all along the shore on the village's side, which in the dry season becomes a broad, marshy beach.

Malambo has the same climatic range as the coastal zone of northern Colombia, characterized by high temperatures and scarce rains. Its median temperature of 28° C. (82.4°F.) varies very little during the year and the precipitation only occasionally reaches as much as 880 millimeters (34.7 inches). The rain is irregular, distributed between the months of April and November, after which hardly a drop of rain falls. Beginning in December the drying effect and the violence of the trade winds from the northeast affect the vegetation. The trees lose their leaves as a protection against rapid dehydration and appear as part of the shrub-sized thicket where the grass and small plants live in a dormant stage awaiting the return of the rains.

The Malambo *ciénaga*, as all others in the zone, must have been in the past a great reservoir for fishing and for hunting water birds. Even today, notwithstanding the immoderate and unreasonable manner in which these activities have been carried out, the inhabitants can




Fig. 1. The Malambo Area

still obtain—although not without great endeavor—a number of species of fish and birds to supplement their diet.

Today, Malambo is a decaying pottery-making center. Only six families carry on the trade by means of a very rudimentary technique using a stretching method instead of coiling. Although the village is only 11 kilometers from Barranquilla, the main market for their wares, the potters still ignore the advantages of the potter's wheel and still bake the pottery in open fires at a low temperature. Both form and decoration are very simple. The globular and semiglobular pot with broad mouth and the bowl with low sides and rounded bottom are the favorite forms. They are made in all the workshops according to these standard forms without individual variation. The decoration is limited to incised semicircles with the opening downwards, made with a chip of the shell of the *totumo* fruit (*Crescencia cujete*). This decoration is placed between the upper part of the pot and the lower neck. Occasionally, this incision is combined with a decorated border, made by pressure exerted with the index finger and thumb. There seems to be little in this modern pottery tradition that is related to the past aboriginal pottery found at Malambo.

The large amount of potsherds that still crop out through the house yards and the village streets gives evidence of the great activity of this industry in the past. Indeed, in the first test excavations and later in the systematic excavations carried out by Angulo in 1959 it could be observed that this upper layer of pottery was from 10 to 30 centimeters thick. We estimate that this deposit of sherds could easily extend back in time to the earliest Spanish contact in the sixteenth century. However, without any doubt, much of the deposit is the result of the establishment of an Indian reservation at Malambo in the middle of the eighteenth century (Posada and Ibañez, p. 24). This layer is a mixture of aboriginal pottery and European-manufactured sherds showing porcelain enameling, majolica Spanish ware, and glass.

Underneath this bed of European cultural materials we found a layer of sterile soil deposited by flooding and ranging from 20 to 40 centimeters in thickness. Below this, the archeological materials of pre-Spanish times appear. (Fig. 2). It is this horizon that interests us in this paper.

II. Materials Found

Six excavations were made in the yards of four houses in Malambo. Only four of the stratigraphic excavations could be used because the other two seemed to have been dug in disturbed and backfilled dirt from various excavations made by the modern residents. The stratigraphic excavations were made in arbitrary levels of 10 centimeters, covering an area of 2 by 10 meters, with each cut at least 200 or more meters from the others. In all cases it was possible to notice a natural stratigraphy in the soil following the same pattern in each excavation: first a layer of 10 to 30 centimeters with historic items; then a layer of sterile alluvial soil 20 to 40 centimeters thick; followed by the aboriginal archeological layer ranging from 65 to 95 centimeters in thickness, resting upon sterile alluvial deposits. All the stratigraphic excavations produced an abundance of pottery, mostly in the form of sherds but with an occasional complete specimen, great quantities of bones of fish, turtle, caymans, rodents, birds, and large mammals such as deer (*Mazama americana*) and capybara (*Hydrochoerus capybara*). Shells were not found, indicating they made no use of this food source. Only in one excavation did we find human bones and these were in a very poor state of preservation, without any evidence of a distinct burial pattern.

In order to indicate the importance of the Malambo sequence and to be able to compare the Barrancoid Series of Venezuela with Malambo pottery, it is necessary to give a general description of the details of the pottery, such as form, paste, etc., in order to demonstrate the relationship of the paste and method of manufacture with the development and changes of certain styles of decoration. This will also permit the establishment of what may be called the Malambo complex, with the proposition of then placing this complex tentatively in a chronological sequence for northern Colombia.

The manner of fracture of the sherds indicates that the vessels had been made by a coiling process, a technique of manufacture that continues throughout all the aboriginal archeological material at Malambo. The temper is sand, but there is a slight variation throughout the history of the site. For example, in studying the seriation

tables from the site based on the classification of the pottery according to temper we note that in the deepest levels of the stratigraphic cuts a very fine sand was used that might be merely a natural mixture with the clay. However, in the middle and especially the upper levels, the sand grains are larger and could never have been the result of natural inclusions in the clay, but were intentionally added to the clay. This is especially noticeable in the large vessels so common in the upper levels of the cut. In 73 per cent of the sherds the core is gray to gray-black, indicating incomplete oxidation. Vessel wall thickness ranges from 3 to 11 millimeters with the majority of vessels being around 8 millimeters thick. Fire clouds, due to poorly controlled open firing, are frequent.

A distinct detail of the pottery of the Malambo site is the polishing of the surfaces on almost all the vessels. About 64 per cent of the sherds show this as a distinct feature, but bad erosion on some specimens makes the treatment indeterminable, so actually the percentage could be higher. The exterior surfaces have a distinct sheen, are smooth to the touch of the finger tips, and at times show distinct polishing lines indicating the use of pebbles in polishing. The colors range from light red or orange to gray as a result of uncontrolled firing techniques and incomplete oxidation. In the lowest levels of the cut no sherds have a slip applied to the surface, but in the middle to the upper levels in the stratigraphic cut the sherds have a slipped surface. This new characteristic coincides with the appearance of the addition of sand as a temper. The paste is well mixed, showing homogeneity, and there are no fissures or crackle lines. The well-polished surfaces have a strong resistance and did not erode easily. Surface hardness measured by Moh's scale is 3.5 to 4.0.

The most characteristic forms are: semispherical bowls with rounded base, rounded rim, and insloping walls (Plate 1, a); vessels with waist that is restricted as if drawn up by a belt, with rounded rim and an outflaring mouth (Plate 1, b); bowls with the walls vertical or slightly incurving (Plate 1, c); vessels with the shoulders curving outward giving a double silhouette (Plate 1, d); and boat-shaped vessels (Plate 1; e, f).

In the seriation table of forms for Malambo, the semispherical vessels are the most frequent in the lower levels in the stratigraphic

cuts until the middle levels of cut 1 and 3, when this form is related directly with the modeled-incised decorated tradition and with a low annular base (Plate 2; a, b). The naviform vessels appear only in the middle to lower levels of the cuts, showing up after levels 3 or 4 in strata cuts 1, 2, and 4. In the bottom levels the perforations in the annular bases are not abundant and are tubular, while in the upper levels the annular bases are higher and the perforations become larger and assume a semicircular form (Plate 2; c, d). In the lower levels there is also a type of support in the form of cylinders imitating a leg with a foot that is designated by simple incisions to show the toes (Plate 2; e, f, g, h). The rims that were originally plain and simple now are altered with small semispherical appliqué radiating from a central point (Plate 2; i, j). The platters or griddles are flat and open with rectilinear incisions all over the interior and are frequent in all the levels (Plate 3, a). These griddles could be the origin of large plates that have simple and double horizontal handles (Plate 3; b, c).

We shall now discuss the details of the decoration called modeling and incising, because this item in the decorative techniques offers the most important opportunity to compare the pottery of Malambo with certain styles that form the Barrancoid Series of Venezuela. The modeling and incising consist of geometric, zoomorphic, and anthropomorphic *adornos* or appliqué. These *adornos* vary but are proportionate in size to the various vessels upon which they are placed. The geometric type are the most varied, at times consisting of protuberances situated upon the rim, giving a sort of discoidal or curved outline, and upon which parallel lines are incised in the exterior and interior (Plate 3; g, h). At times the *adornos* are in the form of a vertical handle along the rim and continue inward to the vessel mouth with the head of an animal on the *adorno* (Plate 3, i). Small semispherical protuberances having a central point and marked around the base with continuing incised lines are other variations (Plate 4; a, b, c). The zoomorphic *adornos* represent a large part of the fauna of the region, such as ophidia (Plate 4; d-f), caymans (Plate 5; a, d), dogs (Plate 4; g, h), lizards (Plate 4, f), turtles (Plate 4, j), birds (Plate 5, i), and armadillos (Plate 4, l). The figures are always accompanied by semispherical appliqué with a central punctate dot that represent the eyes, the legs, the arms, or

the tail. Small appliqué almost always are found on the rims (Plate 5; f-j). Some of these are so well modeled and well placed along the rims that the impression is given of the animal in a state of rest or position of attack (Plate 4, f). The appliqué outside the area of the rim usually rest upon a tubular soil appliqué as a central portion of the decorative element near the border (Plate 2, a).

Incised lines or grooves are utilized to outline or emphasize the modeling and to fill up empty space, preferably on the head, body, or tail of the appliqué figure. These incised lines are made in spirals, concentric triangles, curvilinear motives, undulating frets, or straight lines (Plate 7; e-l). Other incised lines run along the base of the figure to accentuate the modeling (Plate 2, b). Another detail that contributes a distinct expression to the modeled-incised decoration is the tendency to use on certain appliqué *adornos* a double representation so that you can see one when you look at the exterior of the vessel and see the other when you view the interior (Plate 3; k, l).

The use of the incised-modeled technique on the body of vessels is very frequent and often this technique is used to represent human figures that were applied to the wall of the vessel. Actually there are no true figurines, but there are examples of small masks, one of which is complete (Plate 7; a, b).

The incised-modeled tradition of decoration becomes more frequent in the middle levels of the stratigraphic cuts, approximately at the moment that zoned red painting appears (Plate 3, n). Actually this is a complement to the modeled and incised tradition of decoration, for it is limited to the filling of free spaces between some of the modeled and incised motifs.

III. Comparisons and Conclusions

From the general description that we have made of the traits most characteristic of the aboriginal pottery of Malambo, it is the modeled-incised decoration that offers the greatest quantity of comparative elements with some styles of decoration that belong to the Barrancoid Series of Venezuela. These decorative elements are not related directly to any other pottery complex in Colombia and therefore the

comparison is of greatest importance to the reconstruction of the cultural history of aboriginal man in northern South America.

The Malambo pottery complex shows the greatest number of characteristics to be related to the El Palito style and to the La Cabrera style, both being the oldest styles of the Barrancoid Series. Rouse and Cruxent (1961, Table 1) have established a date of 1050 B.C. to 350 A.D. for El Palito, La Cabrera, and Las Barrancas styles. Some of these resemblances are more specific in the use of appliqué *adornos* in the form of small circular, semicircular, or oval *adornos*; ribs appliquéed at the side of the base with incised lines; the tendency to decorate the appliqué elements with incised lines and punctate dots and with units radiating from a central punctate dot; and the use of appliqué in the form of small semispherical units with a central dot combined with incised decoration on the rims and on the appliquéed parts of anthropomorphic or zoomorphic figures such as arms, eyes, etc. (Plates 3, 4, 5). The use of incised spirals on the appliqué parts and *adornos* is also very characteristic (Plate 3; g, h) of both areas (Rouse and Cruxent, 1959, Lam. 28). Other features showing direct relationships are geometric *adornos*, *adornos* in the form of zoomorphic or anthropomorphic figures, handles that end in zoomorphic or anthropomorphic *adornos* (Plate 6; a, b, c), mask type *adornos* (Plate 6; j-p), griddles, perforated or cut out annular bases, and small cylindrical supports (Plate 2).

According to Rouse and Cruxent (1961, p. 285) Malambo pottery has the following features: modeled-incised appliqué and *adornos* (Plate 5), handles in the form of D and in the form of the wishbone of a bird (Plates 2-3; see Rouse and Cruxent, 1959, Lam. 92); handles that end in the form of peg lugs (Plate 3, k); hollow *adornos*, especially those that represent birds (Plate 2; a, b); small, smoothed appliqué and *adornos* like protuberances with a line or a central dot or with a line outlining the base (Plate 4); vessel supports that resemble legs (Plate 2); incised decoration characterized by wide parallel lines, and grooves that are smoothed or polished (Plate 7; see Rouse and Cruxent, 1959, Lam. 94). There are also characteristics of pottery decoration in the incised motifs in Malambo that are common in Las Barrancas style, such as triangles incised one inside the other, frets, and wavy lines. The abundance of griddles in



Malambo, Cut 1



Malambo, Cut 4





Fig. 2. Malambo, Cut 1


PLATE 1. Pottery from Malambo



a



b




c



d



e



f


PLATE 2. Pottery from Malambo



PLATE 3. Pottery from Malambo




PLATE 4. Pottery from Malambo



a




b




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d



e



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
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g



h



j



k




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
PLATE 5. Pottery from Malambo




a




b



c




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e




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g




k




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m


PLATE 6. Pottery from Malambo




a



b




c



d




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
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
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


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
PLATE 7. Pottery from Malambo



a



b



c




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
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both cultures also suggests a similarity of food preparation.

Some scholars have insisted that the Barrancoïd tradition, due to its high frequency of griddles, had manioc but did not have maize. If this can ever be proven, then the same bit of evidence applies to the Malambo culture; however, it is more important at this moment to view the problem in terms of agriculturists versus shell fishermen. The Malambo culture was a sedentary people practicing agriculture of some sort, using manioc as well as other plants, depending secondarily on hunting of land game and on fishing from the bays, but making no use of shell fish. Since Carbon 14 dates have not been obtained for this area as yet, we cannot attempt to establish at this moment any absolute date for Malambo.

The pottery comparison of Malambo with the Venezuelan styles of El Palito, La Cabrera, and Las Barrancas (all of the Barrancoïd Series), gives us some indication of the time sequence along the north coast of Colombia. Since these styles in Venezuela are among some of the oldest, and widespread along the coast and Orinoco even to the very interior of the country along the Orinoco proper and certain of its tributaries, it is extremely interesting from the standpoint of routes of migration now to find the pottery of Malambo near Barranquilla to be related. However, this is not at all unbelievable, for the distribution of the La Cabrera and El Palito styles and the Las Barrancas style are extensive in Venezuela (see Rouse and Cruxent, 1961, p. 168). Without going into the details of further comparisons with certain styles that are still poorly known in Venezuela, it is sufficient to say that the close relationship between the Barrancoïd Series and Malambo causes us to reorient our thinking about the Caribbean coast of South America.

Since we have demonstrated that without any doubt the ceramic relationship now extends the Barrancoïd Series into Colombia along the coast, whereas previously it had been limited to the Orinoco and the Venezuelan coast, it is necessary to understand that this means that some of the aboriginal history of northern Colombia was more strongly influenced by it along the Caribbean coastline than had previously been thought. If the culture instead had descended into the area via the Magdalena River, then its origins would be in the Colombia highlands. This is not the case, for there is no evidence of

Barrancoid pottery coming from other parts of Colombia, in spite of the amount of archeological investigations that have been made in the area.

The Malambo archeological work opens an entirely new view of the Caribbean coast of Colombia and suggests that other influences might have come along the area, making Colombia, as an aboriginal culture area, more linked in many ways to the northern part of Venezuela and other parts of Middle America via the Caribbean than was previously believed. In view of the theme of this conference—Colombia and the Caribbean—it is highly significant that for the first time in recent years the archeological data from early pottery cultures, known previously only in Venezuela, have now appeared at sites near the mouth of the Magdalena River on the north coast of Colombia. This suggests that, at an earlier time than previously thought, this region participated in the aboriginal settlement of South America, at a time when pottery was characterized by a series of unusual modeled and incised traditions.

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Part II

HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

Theodore E. Nichols: COLOMBIA IN THE
COLONIAL PERIOD

COLOMBIA IS A LAND of great contrasts. This cliché, so often applied to Latin America, is particularly applicable to Colombia. It is hot, it is mild, it is cold. It is Negroid, it is Indian and mestizo, it is white. It has been politically democratic, and it has had its dictators. It has had brilliant scholars and poets, it has had illiterate masses. One could list such contrasts endlessly. The same could be done for most of the Latin American nations. Yet Colombia is unlike any other. Its geography, its culture, its history involve unique factors. Unfortunately even a rudimentary knowledge of the outline of Colombian history, let alone a deep understanding of Colombian culture, is lacking in most of the rest of the world.

To attempt to depict in a brief space the history of a sizable territory through three centuries of time is no simple task. A topical rather than strictly chronological approach has seemed preferable. In the following pages the writer has endeavored to place Colombia, or more properly New Granada, in its setting within the Spanish Empire, to trace the outline of political history of the colony, to touch upon economic and intellectual themes, and finally to emphasize the historic localism or regionalism which has resulted from geographical and other factors.^{1*} Such a brief sketch will omit more than it includes, and will probably satisfy no one familiar with Colombia. The writer shares that dissatisfaction.

*Notes to this chapter begin on page 71.

I

New Granada was a small part of Spain's vast territories. The king-emperor Charles V ruled, at least in theory, a large part of Europe and the greater part of America. When Charles retired to the monastery of Yuste, after spending 20 years of his 40-year reign in his non-Spanish possessions, he had, by a series of acts of abdication, divested himself of his great empire. He had also, by turning the Germanic lands over to his brother Ferdinand, created the situation which existed for the following century and a half—the existence of two branches of the Hapsburg family, Austrian and Spanish. His son Philip was left as king of Spain, the traditionally German-dominated Low Countries and Milan, and the non-Portuguese Americas. A Spaniard in contrast to his Lowlander father, Philip II never left Spain in the last 39 years of his reign. It was a difficult reign, beset with immense problems, but Spain reached its height under Philip II. Few can deny that the sixteenth century was Spain's century, and that the Spanish Empire, even without the Austrian possessions, was the world's mightiest. France's day was to await the Thirty Years' War and Louis XIV, and Britannia did not really rule the waves until at least the eighteenth century, if indeed she did before Trafalgar. Spain's American empire during the reign of Philip grew northward as far as New Mexico and southward to create Argentine settlements. Intermittently it held towns and presidios in southern Chile, and after 1580 for 60 years Brazil, along with the rest of the Portuguese Empire, was under Spain's rule.

The Hapsburg kings after Philip II were pale shadows of their predecessors, and Spain's decline, first hinted at with the defeat of the Armada in 1588, was clearly seen at Rocroi in 1643 and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The loss of Jamaica to the English in 1655 was a severe blow, and Spain in the next years was forced to recognize the legality of a number of English, French, and Dutch colonies in territories she had once claimed. When the reasonably able Philip IV was relieved of his European and American cares by death, in 1665, it was not the bright and promising heir, Baltasar Carlos, who ascended the throne (for he had died at 17, in 1646), it was Charles II, "the final, catastrophic fruit of generations of inter-

marriage with cousins and nieces, a cretin so malformed and underdeveloped that he never learned to speak or eat normally, so weak of intellect that he could not be taught the rudiments until he was ten, and whose mental age and tastes in manhood remained those of the nursery.”² Unfortunately Charles was on the throne for 35 years; most of these years were filled with plots and counterplots for the royal succession, and when Charles finally died without an heir the War of the Spanish Succession, first of the great international conflicts of the eighteenth century, must to some have seemed the final catastrophe. But out of it came the Spanish Bourbon line. One does not think of the Bourbons of France in the eighteenth century as accomplishing much more than making contributions to their own destruction, but to Spain and the Spanish Empire the family brought political and economic reform, intellectual enlightenment, and in general a considerable revival, including even territorial expansion into California and Texas. So feeble Spain had a last bright hour which has been compared to the intense glow of a light bulb's last moments. But then came the French Revolution and its international wars which involved Spain, then came Napoleon; and these developments helped to bring on the independence movements in Spanish America and the end of the empire there except for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

New Granada played what has usually seemed to be a relatively minor role in this story of empire. The conquest period was colorful enough, but it had no Bernal Díaz del Castillo, and even the vivid chronicles of the naive boy, Pedro Cieza de León, touched only peripherally on New Granada. Certainly there has been no Prescott to make the deeds of Rodrigo de Bastidas, Pedro de Heredia, and Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada as famed and classic in literature as those of Cortés and Pizarro. The conquest proceeded more slowly, for one thing. Only a year passed in each case between the voyages to Mexico of Hernández de Córdova, Juan de Grijalva, and Hernando Cortés. But from the first contacts with the Colombian coast by the Alonso de Ojeda-Juan de la Cosa expedition in 1499-1500, a quarter-century elapsed before the settlement of Santa Marta, oldest permanent city, was begun; another eight years passed before the founding of Cartagena de Indias; and still three more years elapsed

before Jiménez de Quesada began his southward drive from Santa Marta into the interior. That expedition is famous enough; it touches the imagination because of the hardships afforded by swamp, forest, and mountain, and the melting down of the Spanish forces from 800 to 166. Who can forget the meeting of the three European columns on the high *sabana*: that of Jiménez de Quesada from the north, the force that had already conquered most of the Chibchas and founded Santa Fé de Bogotá (named for the stone fortress on the hillside facing Granada from which the Catholic monarchs had completed the Reconquest); that of Sebastián Moyano de Belalcázar, donkey boy from Extremadura, lieutenant of Pizarro in the south, founder of Quito, Popayán, Cali, and Buenaventura; and the eastern column of Nicolás von Federmann, representative of the House of Welser, which had been granted rights in Venezuela by Charles V. Yet much of the conquest story is known only vaguely as compared to the fame of Spanish exploits in Mexico and Peru. Few people have heard the details of the Francisco César expedition which found a great treasure in gold in the Sinú country, or the story of Jorge Robledo's expedition into the Antioquia region. They too had no Bernal Díaz del Castillo or Prescott. Historians in this country should be embarrassed that the histories of the Sinú, Antioquia, and the Cauca Valley have best been studied by geographers.³ It is unfortunately true of Colombia, as William Atkinson has written, that "the country remains withal among the lesser known of the New World, and its history less known still."⁴ In any case the land and aborigines were gradually conquered and the colony slowly moved ahead. Not only was the name Santa Fé brought from southern Spain, but also that of Granada, for the *sabana* area came to be known as the "New Kingdom of Granada"; this small highland region was New Granada, strictly speaking, until the eighteenth-century founding of the viceroyalty of that name with its vast territory encompassing approximately the present Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. After Jiménez de Quesada lost out politically, as did the great majority of the Spanish *conquistadores*, the undeserving Luis Alonso de Lugo was governor both of the New Kingdom and of the port of Santa Marta. A series of governors followed until the royal *audiencia*, a court having administrative and some legislative powers,

was created in 1549. But political turmoil continued to prevail, one extreme example being the serious uprising of Alvaro de Oyón of 1552-1553, and another the arrest of two of the *oidores*, or judges, by a newly arrived *oidor* in 1552, and their death by drowning while being sent back to Spain.⁵ Conflicts between bishop, *audiencia*, and *audiencia* president were common, with clashes between these colonial agents and the home government all too frequent an occurrence. "That hypersensitive regard for rank and official position which was everywhere the characteristic bane of Spanish officialdom . . . there became the source of chronically bothersome and not infrequently extremely serious conflicts of authority."⁶ And as another historian has written, "The Crown never found its solution to the conflict between home interests in the colonies and those of the settlers. The *visita*, the *residencia*, were admirable checks on paper: who was to check the checkers, or certify them to be more upright men than the checked?"⁷ The administrative turmoil within and foreign threats from without pointed up the isolation of the colony, and the distance from the viceregal centers of Mexico City and Lima. Consequently one of the Bourbon innovations of the eighteenth century was the creation of a third viceroyalty with Santa Fé de Bogotá as its capital. It was formed initially in 1717 with Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero, member of the Council of the Indies, as temporary executive. In 1718 Jorge Villalonga, Conde de la Cueva, became the first viceroy. The foreign threat temporarily abated, whereas internal conflicts were not resolved, and so at the viceroy's own urgings the viceroyalty was abolished and the old order restored in 1723.

New Granada's internal strife was not unique. The Church-State conflict was seen everywhere, disagreements between governor and *audiencia* were always common. In studying Colombian problems one finds a microcosm of imperial problems. The Church-State conflict culminated in the royal expulsion of the Jesuits from all of the Empire in 1767, a policy which incidentally deprived 5,000 students of their 14 Jesuit *colegios* in New Granada,⁸ besides affecting the mission Indians.

What was the nature of the external threat? In the sixteenth century the French, English, and Dutch were all troublesome to Spain, ignoring her claim of monopoly over much of America. The problem

of military defense was universal throughout Spanish America, but it was especially great in areas touched by the Caribbean. Tierra Firme, the Caribbean coast of South America, was never really safe from attack throughout the colonial period. France and Spain were at war five times between 1521 and 1556, and even in the intermittent periods of peace it became an accepted fact that fighting could continue west of the Azores and south of the Tropic of Cancer. It was chiefly the Antilles and ships at sea, however, that were hurt by such corsairs as Jean Fleury, Francois Leclerc ("Pie de Palo"), and Jacques de Sores. Tierra Firme was more affected when the English arrived. John Hawkins' profitable slave-trading voyage to Africa and then to the Venezuelan coast and Riohacha in 1564-1565 startled the Spanish authorities, and was a factor in the slowly deteriorating Anglo-Spanish relations of the 1570's and 1580's which saw Drake's famous exploits, including his seizure and ransoming of Cartagena in 1586, and which culminated in open warfare and the sailing of the Great Armada in 1588. Meanwhile, the Dutch, as the world's greatest sea power, also became active in Caribbean waters during 80 years of rebellion against Spanish rule. All three powers gained Caribbean possessions in the seventeenth century, as the rivalry continued. Now appeared the buccaneers, many of them Frenchmen and Englishmen who had lost out as small farmers when the emphasis in the Lesser Antilles changed from tobacco minifundia to sugar and Negro-slave latifundia. From bases on Tortuga, Santo Domingo, and Jamaica they caused great trouble for Spanish shipping and such Spanish colonial ports as Cartagena. The fortifications of the major ports were steadily being strengthened, however. Beginning in the reign of Philip II, the major ports of Cartagena de Indias, Santo Domingo, Santiago and Havana, San Juan del Puerto Rico, Portobelo, and San Juan de Ulua (Veracruz) began to be increasingly fortified. Work was especially pushed in the 1580's and 1590's under the direction of the able military engineer Juan Bautista Antonelli. It is a well-known though perhaps apocryphal story that Philip was so impressed by the bills for Cartagena's defenses that he walked to a window in the Escorial, claiming that he should be able to see Cartagena's walls from there. Yet the famous walls and forts were barely begun in the sixteenth century, and were added to and rebuilt con-

stantly right on into the nineteenth century.⁹ A great system of outer and inner defenses was developed. The outer involved the submarine blocking of the Boca Grande, larger of the bay's two entrances, and the erection of forts and batteries to guard the Boca Chica. The entrance to the inner bay was also fortified at both sides. Another fortress was encountered at the edge of the city's harbor. Towering above the city was the great fortress of San Felipe de Barajas. The city itself was surrounded by massive walls, in some places 60 feet thick, and a series of batteries. Against all this, buccaneers were not too successful by the seventeenth century. Nor did they often succeed in doing much harm to the great convoyed trading fleets of that period.

By the late seventeenth century the picture changed from mere buccaneer harassment; a period of great international wars was begun. Royal dynasties of Europe now clashed in what has been called the Second Hundred Years' War. In the first of these conflicts, the variously named struggle of 1689-1697, England joined her old enemy Spain and other powers to block the expansion and growing strength of Louis XIV's France. In 1697 no mere pirate band but a great French fleet appeared off Cartagena. Consisting of hundreds of ships and thousands of men, it was led by Admiral Jean Bernard Desjeans, Baron de Pointis, and by the former governor of Santo Domingo, Jean Batiste Ducasse. The outer fortifications fell, and after a siege of 20 days the city capitulated and was virtually destroyed after being looted of all valuables.¹⁰ But the walls were restored, and the "Heroic City," as Bolívar later named it, was stronger than ever when the immense force of Admiral Edward Vernon attacked it during the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1741. This time the defenders, aided immeasurably by an unsolicited ally, yellow fever, were successful, and the invaders withdrew with huge losses.¹¹ The re-establishment of the viceroyalty in 1739, with Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava, a lieutenant general, remaining in Cartagena during the siege (and throughout his entire administration), undoubtedly strengthened the port or at least the morale of its defenders. The Heroic City was to experience other sieges on into the next century, such as those of 1815 laid by the patriot leader Bolívar and by the royalist general Morillo.

In the eighteenth century the viceroy could not solve all political and military problems nor weld such a vast area into one united

whole, and the creation of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela in 1777 almost completely removed the Venezuelan provinces from what had always been a loose and rather artificial union. But even within the area that is now Colombia and Ecuador there were other evidences of dissension and discontent. A good example is the *Comunero* Revolt of 1781.¹² It is difficult to describe this event in brief and simple terms. As Harry Bernstein has written, the *comunero* movement was one of protest, not of revolution.¹³ In 1779 Spain again went to war with England and needed funds for the defense of her colonies. Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Piñeres came to New Granada as *Visitador-General* and presiding judge of the *audiencia* in Santa Fé. With the viceroy in Cartagena seeing to its defenses, Gutiérrez de Piñeres was supreme in the capital. In 1780 he issued an *Instrucción General* for raising funds for defense measures. It included the collection of all existing taxes (some of which had been laxly enforced), a poll tax, considerable additions to the sales tax and to the list of items so taxed, and enforcement of the crown monopolies on such items as tobacco, liquor, and playing cards. He was also determined to root out private tobacco lands and confine the whole tobacco business to crown enterprise. There were angry reactions from the people in several centers, but the most notable was in the town of Socorro on March 16, 1781. When the *Instrucción* was posted, a crowd of men and women marched to the *alcalde's* house, shouting that they would not pay the taxes. The *alcalde* and another prominent man tried to calm them but with no success. A woman of the town, Manuela Beltrán, tore down the *Instrucción*, and the agitation continued until the *cabildo* suspended the collection of the taxes. Meanwhile, in other towns, crowds burned the monopoly buildings, the tobacco and playing cards, and poured out the liquor. In April people from a number of towns gathered in Socorro, some 6,000 strong. A junta or *común* was formed, headed by Juan Francisco Berbeo. The *comuneros* then marched on Santa Fé. One of the judges of the *audiencia* led troops out to meet the *comuneros*, but instead of fighting they surrendered to them. Gutiérrez de Piñeres now fled to Cartagena, and the remaining officials in Santa Fé, counseled by the enlightened Archbishop Antonio Caballero y Góngora, agreed to lower taxes and grant other concessions. Viceroy Flórez had

never agreed to any of this, however. He obtained troop reinforcements from Cuba, and since the *comuneros* had unwisely disbanded, the royal forces again gained control. When José Galán attempted a new uprising it was ruthlessly crushed, the leaders hanged and dismembered, their property confiscated, their descendants declared infamous. Although the movement had become really widespread, from Venezuela to Pasto, it collapsed. To the Spanish government it must have seemed a serious threat, however. It represented a Creole statement of the errors of Spanish rule in New Granada.¹⁴ It also seemed to tie in with the Indian revolt of Tupac Amaru II in Peru, since the *comuneros* advocated the abolition of Indian tributes, and referred to the theft of Indian lands.¹⁵ But peace seemed to be restored. Viceroy Flórez resigned in 1782, his successor died four days after taking office, and the popular Archbishop Caballero y Góngora became viceroy.

The peace was short lived. Various political and economic reforms fostered by the Bourbons did not relieve the discontent felt by the educated Creoles or the despair of the people of the lower classes, whose misery was unaffected by the scientific progress or political thinking of the Enlightenment discussed later in this study. The French Revolution had a tremendous impact on Spanish Americans. The intriguing theories and beliefs of Rousseau, Raynal, Montesquieu, and Voltaire came to have more meaning for the Creoles. The colonists in North America had already successfully rebelled; now the people of France were overthrowing tyranny. The nationalistic concept of *la patrie* helped to stir sentiments of *la patria* in colonial hearts, with New Granada rather than Spain as *la patria*. Although movements such as that of the *comuneros* had signified discontent rather than disloyalty, the activities of such "precursors" as Francisco de Miranda began more frankly to seek independence from Spain.

Miranda's celebrated and colorful career is more directly connected with the Captaincy-General of Venezuela than with New Granada, but it is possible to think of him as the father of the independence movements which eventually were to rend Spanish America from Chile to Mexico.¹⁶ Miranda's first revolutionary activities predate even the French Revolution, for his visit in the United States just after the close of its war for independence apparently involved dis-

cussions with Henry Knox and others regarding a liberating expedition to Venezuela. Then followed years of travel and residence in England and throughout the continent, participation in the French Revolution as a general, imprisonment by Robespierre, and continuous appeals to the British government for military aid for a Venezuelan revolt. With financial help from British and United States sources he made his ill-fated invasion of Venezuela in 1806. Back again in England, he seemed to gain at last his long-sought British expedition, but Wellesley's forces instead were sent to Spain for the Peninsular Campaign. Consequently the disgruntled but undefeated Precursor was still in London when Simón Bolívar, Andrés Bello, and Luis López Méndez arrived on their mission of 1810.

Meanwhile New Granada's own "precursor," Antonio Nariño, had been active.¹⁷ Born in Santa Fé de Bogotá in 1765, Nariño had been well educated, and at an early age was appointed to various responsible positions by the viceroy. He had a brilliant, searching mind, and read not only most of the great books which were officially acceptable but smuggled in and read many of the prohibited French revolutionary writings. In 1794 he translated and published the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, for which he was jailed. When an official search of his properties disclosed the forbidden works, he was tried by the *audiencia*, his property was confiscated, he was perpetually exiled, and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in Africa. His career was almost as colorful as that of Miranda. En route to Africa he escaped in Cádiz and made his way to London, where like Miranda he sought backing. The spring of 1797 saw Nariño back in Santa Fé and engaged in revolutionary activity. He was again arrested but because of ill health was allowed to stay at a country estate, and by 1807 he was again permitted to manage his properties. But in 1809 he was arrested once more and confined to the dungeon of Boca Chica in Cartagena.

Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 1807 with the ostensible purpose of occupying Portugal, traditional friend of England. The virtual occupation of Spain by French troops threw Spain into a turmoil. A plot was afoot to replace the weak Charles IV and the man who really ruled Spain, Manuel Godoy, with Charles' son Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias. The Spanish people felt that Godoy

was linked with the French and rose against him. Charles then resigned in favor of his son, who was proclaimed Ferdinand VII. Both father and son met with Napoleon at Bayonne and were forced to turn the crown over to the Emperor, who then named his brother Joseph king of Spain. The people of Spain, however, rose against this foreign king and formed a junta in the name of Ferdinand in Seville. News of these events threw the colonies into confusion and inevitably aided the comparatively few people who thought of independence.

Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the Wars of Independence, especially of their military aspects.¹⁸ The initial reaction in New Granada was about the same as in most of Spanish America. Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón called together an assembly which acceded to his proposal to acknowledge Ferdinand VII as king and proclaim a state of war with France. But news of the insurgent uprising of 1809 in Quito, in which the populace overthrew the president and *audiencia*, caused further turmoil—and some sympathy. The viceroy was determined to suppress this revolt, while at the same time he tried vainly to prevent news of it from spreading throughout New Granada. The regime became more oppressive; Nariño, recently released from prison, was again incarcerated. Discontentment was rife and there was a feeling that the Seville junta did not have adequate colonial representation. The year 1810 opened, in the words of Camilo Torres, the leading spokesman for the discontented, with “black clouds which threaten a terrible storm.”¹⁹

That year of 1810 saw an increasingly popular sentiment for colonial autonomy, since it appeared that the French would succeed in destroying the junta in Seville. The patriots desired equal status with Spain under a single crown, though some were beginning to think more in terms of complete independence because of the uncertain conditions in Spain. After feelings reached the point of mob violence in Bogotá a junta was formed, and the reluctant viceroy became its president. These events of July 20, 1810, cause that date to be considered as the beginning of the revolution and the founding of the nation, though independence had not actually been declared. Within a month the viceroy had been deposed. By 1811 the United Provinces of New Granada was proclaimed. But the real struggle had not yet begun.

The tumultuous events of the following decade will not be discussed here. The disastrous regional jealousies during the war period are treated elsewhere. The stirring events of the wars, the career of Bolívar and other heroes, seem more to fit the history of the nation than that of the colony. It is time to turn from the political theme to other aspects of colonial history.

II

Although New Spain and Peru were more brilliant in the colonial sky, New Granada had a considerable economic significance. For one thing, it became the heaviest gold-producing area of the Empire. The great bulk of Spanish treasure, the tons of ore that poured from Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Potosí, San Luis Potosí, the mines of Nueva Vizcaya, consisted, of course, of silver, not gold. But gold had been the subject of first interest in the Bahamas and Greater Antilles, and gold it was that César and later explorers found in quantities in the Indian *guacas*, or graves, of the Sinú River valley. Grave-robbing, or *guaquería*, was a major activity in the sixteenth century and led gold seekers southward into Antioquia as Robledo and later followers pushed into the region from the south.²⁰ Although *guaquería* has continued even into the present century and led colonization into the Cordillera Central in the late nineteenth century,²¹ its main period in the Sinú was past by the end of the sixteenth century. In the long run, placer mining was of much greater importance. By the late seventeenth century much of the placer mining of the Caribbean, Cauca, and Magdalena lowlands had played out, but the highlands of Antioquia reached their mining peak in the eighteenth century. By that time the Pacific lowlands—the Chocó—were also important, and in the early nineteenth century Humboldt estimated that the Chocó was producing over half of the viceroyalty's gold.²² At least in so far as the outside world was concerned, gold production was the chief *raison d'être* of New Granada.

James King has compared New Granada to the gold-producing captaincy of Minas Gerais in Brazil: "For just as slave-worked gold

deposits were the foundation of the prosperity of the great Brazilian *capitania* during the eighteenth century, so the gold washed from the streams of the Chocó, Popayán, and Antioquia by gangs of Negro slaves constituted the life blood of trade and commerce in the Vice-royalty of New Granada during the same period."²³ By the late colonial period increasing amounts of silver were also being produced. The exploitation of platinum had begun in the Chocó area and was a government monopoly. The old monopoly of emeralds continued.²⁴

The mining story has interesting and significant tangential themes. One is that of labor. Most of the Indian workers died off from European diseases, and Negroes became the predominant group of mine workers after the seventeenth century. They were able to work better in the New Granadan mines than in those of Mexico and Peru because the former were situated at lower elevations.²⁵

Related to the gold and slave themes is that of the growth in importance of the port of Cartagena de Indias. Cartagena's fine natural bay, its connections with the interior, and its fortifications are discussed elsewhere in this study. Most of New Granada's gold went to Cartagena, where it was picked up by the annual Tierra Firme galleons. This convoyed fleet sailed annually after the mid-sixteenth century.²⁶ The gold was carried along with Spanish goods to Portobelo, site of the trade fair for South America, and then back to Spain. So important was Cartagena for defense and trade that it had the only *consulado*, the powerful merchants' organization, of northern South America; Bogotá, unlike Mexico City, was never allowed to have an inland *consulado*.²⁷ After the decline of the fleet system in the eighteenth century, the port of Cartagena survived on the basis of *registro* ships allowed to trade directly with Spain. Cartagena was also one of the chief slave-trade ports of the Spanish Empire throughout the colonial period.²⁸ It was here that the famous San Pedro Claver devoted long years of his life to the alleviation of the diseases and other sufferings of the slaves.²⁹ The Bourbon economic reforms of the eighteenth century, easing restrictions on colonial trade, were favorable for Cartagena. Yet most of the trade of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on that coast continued to be illegal. This was probably simply one of a number of signs that New Granada was restlessly stirring, and outgrowing colonial status.

III

A further colonial theme is intellectual life, which again is far too large to more than merely mention here.³⁰ But it should be mentioned, for Colombia has always been proud of the intellectual and literary tradition that stems from the colonial centuries, and that Bogotá is "the Athens of America" is an ancient claim. The colony had some writers who became known beyond its borders.³¹ The first of note was a soldier of the conquest, Juan de Castellanos, who became a priest and in middle life began to write. He is particularly remembered for his *Historia del Nuevo Reino de Granada* and his *Elegías de varones ilustres de Indias*, chronicles of the conquest. A Franciscan, Fray Pedro de Aguado, wrote a *Historia de Santa Marta y Nuevo Reino de Granada* in the 1570's. A recent writer has stated, "Aguado absolutely lacks literary pretensions";³² if anything, this makes his work more useful today. Another Franciscan, Fray Pedro Simón, wrote a multivolumed work in the early seventeenth century entitled *Noticias historiales de las conquistas*. Another churchman was the famous Lucas Fernández de Piedrahita, whose seventeenth-century work, *Historia general del Nuevo Reino de Granada*, is one of the most important literary products of the colony. Juan Rodríguez Freile's *El Carnero* or *Conquista y descubrimiento del Nuevo Reino de Granada*, written early in the seventeenth century, has been cited and used elsewhere in this study. It emphasizes early events in Santa Fé de Bogotá. Perhaps in this brief sketch mention should be made of Francisca Josefa de la Concepción, usually referred to as Mother Castillo, who is held in high esteem by commentators on New Granadan literature.³³ Living her entire life in Tunja, this religious mystic wrote a number of works—most notable of which was *Sentimientos espirituales*—and has been compared to Santa Teresa. Few other writers stand out after this time. In any case Colombian literature will be more expertly discussed by another conference participant.

The schools of the colony, as elsewhere in Spanish America, were run by the Church. Although the elementary schools were free they tended, of course, to be for the privileged few. The Dominicans founded the Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Rosario in Santa Fé in

1657.³⁴ College seminaries were established in several towns and cities by the Society of Jesus. The Franciscans founded the College of San Buenaventura in Santa Fé. Perhaps the most famous Colombian school to this day is the Jesuit Colegio de San Bartolomé, also in the capital. Founded originally as the Colegio de San Luis it existed briefly in the late sixteenth century and became permanent under its new name in 1605. A Colombian has written, "From the halls of San Bartolomé and El Rosario have come most of the sages and patriots who honor our annals as well as the heroes and martyrs of our independence."³⁵

Education and scientific thought were traditional and even backward in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; there were adherents of scholasticism even in the nineteenth century. But the eighteenth century was a time of intellectual ferment and change. Cited by Spain's enemies and detractors as a "horrible example" of the lack of enlightenment,³⁶ Spain was slow to advance, compared to her stronger partner, France. But unorthodox ideas did penetrate Spain, and Spain herself under the new Bourbon dynasty fostered new concepts in her colonies. The universities and schools began to change, particularly after the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. But as Benjamin Keen has written, "The most significant cultural activity took place outside academic halls—in the Economic Societies . . . in private gatherings . . . and in the colonial press."³⁷ New Granada was much affected by the "New Learning" with its secular emphasis and interest in science. "The atmosphere of colonial New Granada became charged with revolution, Enlightenment, and intellectualism."³⁸ Of the many scientific expeditions which came from Europe to America in the eighteenth century, several came to or passed through New Granada. An example is the French-Spanish expedition of 1735, jointly sponsored by Louis XV and Philip V, which paused at Cartagena en route to Quito to measure one degree at the equator in order to calculate the circumference of the world. Several expeditions were made in the second half of the century, that of Alexander von Humboldt at the turn of the century being the most famous.

Several of the viceroys after 1750 were progressive and reform-minded.³⁹ José Solís Folch de Cardona in the 1750's worked to im-

prove transportation facilities and trade. Manuel de Guirior in the 1770's patronized the arts and recommended the establishment of a university in Santa Fé; this proposal was rejected by the Crown, probably because of opposition from the Dominican convent which was the sole degree-granting institution in the capital.⁴⁰ His successor, Manuel Antonio de Flórez, established the first printing press and authorized the creation of a public library. Yet it was he who faced the popular uprising known as the *Comunero* Revolt already described. Probably the most celebrated and "enlightened" of the later viceroys was the one who ruled after Flórez, the Archbishop-Viceroy Antonio Caballero y Góngora. Holding the highest posts in ecclesiastical and civil government during the years 1782-1788, Caballero y Góngora worked to expand and improve education and mission activity. But he also asked the king for mineralogists and German-trained foundry experts. This is one of the best examples of the "useful knowledge" aspect of the Enlightenment in which the authorities in Spain were interested. Juan José de Elhúyar was sent to Germany to study and then was brought to New Granada. Silver and emerald mines were reopened as a result. The Archbishop-Viceroy was also interested in other aspects of science. He will be remembered for his appointment of the Spanish scientist José Celestino Mutis to head the Botanical Expedition, one of three such ventures, the other two being in Mexico and Peru. Mutis was a physician from Cádiz who was prosecuted by the Inquisition for lecturing on Copernicus in Santa Fé de Bogotá in 1773.⁴¹ By the 1780's, however, the intellectual atmosphere was more favorable for scientific activity. The original purpose of the Botanical Expedition was to explore, to map, and especially to collect botanical specimens, between the Caribbean and the equator. It became, however, an institute and center of learning by 1791, and a section on zoology was also added. Painters were trained to paint flowers and animals. Thousands of specimens and pictures were collected, and the *Flora de Bogotá* was an impressive volume. In 1803 Mutis founded the first American astronomical observatory. World famous, Mutis was visited by the celebrated Alexander von Humboldt in the course of that renowned scientist's American travels.⁴² Mutis's work was carried on by his most celebrated disciple, Francisco José Caldas, whose important scientific

career was cut short by his execution early in the Wars of Independence. Caldas represents the prime example of how the questioning of traditional authorities in the field of science could lead to a questioning of traditional authorities in the world of government and politics. The mestizo physician Francisco Xavier Eugenio Santa Cruz y Espejo is another such example. He became an editor of Bogotá's first important newspaper, the *Papel Periódico de Santa Fé de Bogotá*, but had to flee to his native Quito because of persecution as well as prosecution from the government. He died in 1796 from the effects of several imprisonments.⁴³ A number of the leaders of the independence movements were such men, "who read Rousseau and founded *Sociedades Económicas*, who rejected metaphysics and started newspapers."⁴⁴

IV

The colonial theme which I wish most heavily to emphasize is a factor still present, that of geographical isolation and difficulty of communications. Possibly the most fundamental problem of Colombia has been the difficulty of moving people, goods, and ideas between the various *patrias chicas*, or isolated regional homelands. Perhaps this localism is partly inherited, for the *patria chica* viewpoint is an ancient one in Spain. But Colombian geography is certainly the major cause. Before the advent of the airplane, communications were extremely slow. In 1948 the writer, by shunning the air for land and water, spent nine days traveling from Cartagena to Bogotá. A year later the trip was reversed, but in the air, in a little over two hours. In colonial times and in the early nineteenth century, Santa Fé de Bogotá, although an *audiencia* seat and later a viceregal capital, was extremely inaccessible. Although flour was produced on the *sabana*, Cartagena obtained it from abroad because of bad and costly transportation.⁴⁵ Travel from the coast up the Magdalena River by *champán* or *bongo*,⁴⁶ propelled by men with poles, was an interminable and exhausting process. An Argentine visitor who made the trip upriver by *champán* in the nineteenth century wrote, "The trip . . . lasted in general three months, at the end of which the patient arrived at Honda, with thirty pounds less weight, eaten up by mos-

quitoes, starved, and paralyzed by the immobility of a posture of an Aztec idol."⁴⁷ And from Honda one still had to get over 10,000-foot mountains to reach the *sabana*, a trip which in the early days could be done only on foot or on the back of an Indian carrier. Other areas were similarly isolated. As late as 1830 it took six months for goods imported through Cartagena to reach Popayán.⁴⁸ The rivers were heavily relied upon, for there were no real roads and few bridges, and even trails were often impassable. The rivers, however, were not then and never have been really satisfactory or reliable as highways, though Colombia has always depended upon them. Before the advent of the steamboat there was less of a problem of miring and becoming hung on a sandbar, it is true. But both in the colonial and national periods there were many obstacles to travel from coast to interior via the rivers. Cartagena, the major colonial port, had a nearly perfect bay. But how were goods to reach the interior? The Bocas de Ceniza, mouth of the Magdalena River, had always been difficult to enter because of sandbars, adverse currents, and sometimes unfavorable weather. An example of the problem is that of a Captain Jerónimo de Aguayo, who in the mid-sixteenth century tried on several occasions during a period of five months to sail from Cartagena through the Bocas. Plagued by storms, he failed in each attempt. He noted the wrecks of several ships which also had tried.⁴⁹ Contact had to be made with the Magdalena if trade were to be carried on with the interior. One means which presented itself was a natural waterway, one of several prehistoric channels of the Magdalena which meandered from the future site of Calamar on the river to the Bay of Barbacoas just south of the Bay of Cartagena. Before the last quarter of the sixteenth century the idea had occurred to the Spaniards of making navigable this potential route between this major port and the river. Thus was born the Dique Canal, which has figured constantly in Colombian economic history ever since.⁵⁰ Not all of the vicissitudes of this channel's history can be discussed here. Suffice it to say that it was never satisfactory, perennially silting up and often not being reopened for several years. The canal was virtually abandoned during the long years of the Wars of Independence; new projects for opening it came with the national period.

That the colony's main port should have to depend on this channel

or on foot or horseback travel for contact with the interior indicates how dreadfully inadequate communications were. The second port was the older city of Santa Marta, and its communication problems if anything were even greater. The Bay of Santa Marta faces west like that of Cartagena but is not comparably enclosed. It is deep, however, and the peninsula and islands of its northern side give it protection from the winds. The colonial traveler from Santa Marta to the Magdalena River had a choice between braving the Bocas de Ceniza or making his way through the swampy *ciénaga* region lying between the river and the lower slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta to the east. This trip was usually accomplished partly on horseback and partly by *bongo* or *champán*, poled at great labor through the shallow *ciénagas* and vegetation-choked *caños*.⁵¹ Since no real efforts were made to improve these channels in the colonial period it is not surprising that Santa Marta did not compare in commercial or political importance to Cartagena.

The third port for the Caribbean coast was Barranquilla,⁵² founded in 1629, but never achieving real importance until the late nineteenth century. Barranquilla's communications problem was different from that of Cartagena and Santa Marta. It had a great advantage in being situated right on the Magdalena. But it did not have easy access to the sea. The river mouth was often obstructed. Consequently several satellite towns located on the nearby Bay of Sabanilla served in turn as the actual ports until well into the twentieth century. There was as great a problem in transporting goods from that bay to the river as there was from the bays of Cartagena and Santa Marta. A trail gradually evolved between Sabanilla and Barranquilla, a distance of 15 miles. But even in 1860 a report stated that there was no wagon road, "travel being on donkeyback over precipitous hills and through dust and sand drifts, rendering the carriage of heavy packages dangerous and almost impossible."⁵³ The alternative which occasionally served was the *Caño*, or Canal de la Pina. In prehistoric times one of the several successive main channels of the Magdalena, the Canal de la Pina by the eighteenth century was a narrow distributary leading from the river north of Barranquilla to the Bay of Sabanilla. As in the case of the more famous Dique Canal, there came a time when the channel became too choked by silt and vegeta-

tion to allow easy navigation even by small *bongos*. Contrary to what was done in the case of the Dique, no major efforts were made to clear the Pina in colonial times. Barranquilla remained insignificant in size and importance.

Buenaventura, the main Pacific-coast port of Colombia, was founded on the island of Cascajal where the Dagua River reaches the Bay of Buenaventura. It was intended as a port for Cali and other Cauca Valley settlements, but Indians burned the town and it virtually ceased to exist for many years. After its refounding it was of minor importance until the twentieth century. Again, one of the chief problems was poor transportation connections with the interior; they are still inadequate.

The isolation of New Granada's ports from the interior settlements, then, is an example of the general problem of isolation. This was an obvious cause of a political, social, economic, cultural localism which was born in the colonial period and which can still be seen today. The *costeño* of the Caribbean, the *bogotano*,⁵⁴ the *antioqueño* each developed his own accent and local usage of words, and in other ways showed and was proud of his differences from the others.

Especially notable was the independent way in which Antioquia developed. James J. Parsons, in answering the question "Who are the Antioqueños?", has written that they are

a homogeneous culture group which is one of the most remarkable products of the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Here is a pious, proud, and prosperous mestizo-mulatto people, self-styled "the Yankees of South America," whose extraordinary colonizing genius, community spirit, and cultural particularism have made them the dominant and most clearly defined population element of the republic. In breaking through the bounds of a long and effective geographical isolation they have emerged with a quality of democratic individualism and a sense of balanced living which, tempered by an underlying and determined conservatism, has given their land a unique and attractive personality of its own. Being Antioqueño means much more to them than being Colombian.⁵⁵

The old province of Antioquia, heartland of the *antioqueños*, was settled by gold seekers in the sixteenth century. It was very difficult of access, the settler or visitor having to pole up the Magdalena, then up the Cauca, and then travel for ten days or more over "mountain trails hardly fit for horses."⁵⁶ Few white women made this difficult

journey, and the *raza antioqueña* from that day to this has had strong mestizo and mulatto elements. The old idea of a heavy populating by Christianized Jews has been proven false, and seems to have been fostered by "jealous fellow countrymen in their painful awareness of the *antioqueños'* superior aptitude and facility for business and commerce." Rather it was other energetic people, Basques and Asturians, who constituted probably 80 per cent of the early settlers.⁵⁷ Large families have been an *antioqueño* tradition, and from the "heartland" of Antioquia province the growing population gradually spread, especially southward along the mountain ranges. Their connection with coffee cultivation and its expansion is not a part of this colonial discussion. Their development as a rather unique people, with such characteristics as strong family ties, religious devotion, strict social and moral codes, high literacy rate, low crime rate, frugality, and ambition,⁵⁸ has colonial origins. Their somewhat singsong accent is the butt of friendly jesting on the part of other Colombians.⁵⁹

Another distinctive region was the far South. Cali and Popayán had been founded by Belalcázar, and were administratively under the *audiencia* of Quito until the founding of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Ties with Ecuador and the port of Guayaquil continued, however, and were important for Quito with the decline of her textile industry. This trade extended north into Antioquia and helped the growth of Medellín. But Bogotá was effectively cut off from this intercourse by geography.⁶⁰ Cali and the Cauca Valley were eventually to depend more upon the port of Buenaventura, and while Cali has grown to the bustling metropolis she is today Popayán remains essentially colonial in size, atmosphere, and architecture.

Localism or regionalism reached the point of internecine warfare during the Wars of Independence. While a junta in Bogotá tried to centralize efforts, independent juntas were formed in Cartagena, Antioquia, Socorro, Mariquita, and elsewhere. Examples of strong rivalry were the Cartagena-Santa Marta and Cartagena-Bogotá feuds, and the Cali-Popayán fight. During the early war years, the period known as *La Patria Boba* (Foolish Fatherland), "the chief occupation of the *granadinos* appears to have been not preparation for a common defense against the Spanish enemy but rather the

drafting of constitutions. It was widely assumed that federalism was the perfect form of government; hence each province, and often just one section of a province, had to be a sovereign state."⁶¹ Cartagena struck for independence early; in November of 1811 the Republic of Cartagena was proclaimed. Santa Marta remained a loyalist center for some time; consequently actual military operations against each other were added to the older rivalry as ports. One of the most ironic episodes of the wars was Bolívar's siege of Cartagena in 1815, after that city had not complied with his request for arms and supplies for his expedition against Santa Marta. During the siege royalist Santa Marta offered help to patriot Cartagena.⁶² It was following this fiasco that Bolívar went into his voluntary exile in Jamaica.

Even more disruptive was the political rivalry between Cartagena and Santa Fé de Bogotá. It was seen as early as 1810, when the *cartageneros* resented Bogotá's pretensions to a "Supreme Junta." Cartagena, heading a Party of Confederation, called for a junta to meet in Medellín. Bogotá, representing a centralist faction, of course opposed this countermovement. In 1811 the United Provinces of New Granada was proclaimed in Bogotá, but Cartagena Province proceeded to declare its own independence as has been mentioned. This rivalry continued into the national period with the federalism-unitarism struggles of the mid-nineteenth century.

V

Is there any connection between this colonial survey and contemporary Colombia? The answer is obvious. There are physical relics of the colony: the massive walls of Cartagena; the churches and public buildings of that city, Bogotá, Popayán, and others. There are still difficulties of transportation and communications, and they are still related to Colombia's geography, for the mountains, the hot valleys, the silted rivers, the sometimes-flooded llanos of the East have not changed in mere human time and still offer problems to man. The faces of Colombians, some clearly Spanish, some showing Negro slave ancestry, others indicating Indian antecedents—these are reminders of the colonial era. But more subtle factors are present. The Colombian poet and scholar today is proud of his nation's intellectual tradi-

tion. And can we discern some of the spirit of the *conquistadores*, of the pioneering *antioqueños*, in the industrial pioneers of Medellín? Is there a bit of the enlightened eighteenth-century scientist-natural-rights defender in the conscientious, selfless adherents of democratic government in Colombia today? In spite of the bewildering changes of the twentieth century the colonial past still lives in Colombia.

NOTES

1. Since this paper is for the most part a synthesis rather than a research study, I have made no effort at complete documentation. The footnotes are largely for the purpose of suggesting sources for further investigation. It might be well in this first note to mention the *Boletín de historia e antigüedades* (Bogotá, 1903—) as a source of many articles on the colonial period, and the celebrated work of Dr. José Manuel Groot, *Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada* (5 vols.; Bogotá, 1889-1893) as a massive work that is chiefly on this era. Neither is specifically cited in the following notes.

2. Juan Rodríguez Freile, *The Conquest of New Granada*, translated and edited by William C. Atkinson (London: Folio Society, 1961), editor's statement on page 191. This document, long known by the Spanish title *El Carnero de Bogotá*, is a chronicle by a *santafereño* who lived from 1566 to around 1640. Atkinson, in this beautiful edition, uses the spelling Freile, but older untranslated editions sometimes give the spelling as Fresle.

3. See Burton Leroy Gordon, *Human Geography and Ecology in the Sinú Country of Colombia*, Ibero-Americana 39 (Berkeley, California, 1957); James Jerome Parsons, "Settlement of the Sinú Valley of Colombia," *Geographical Review*, XLII (New York, 1952), 67-86; and *Antioqueño Colonization in Western Colombia*, Ibero-Americana 32 (Berkeley, California, 1948). My later references to this work are to Parsons' unpublished thesis, "Antioqueño Colonization in Western Colombia: an Historical Geography" (Berkeley, 1948), rather than to the published and somewhat condensed volume for the Ibero-Americana series; Robert C. West, *Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Studies, 1952); Raymond E. Crist, *The Cauca Valley, Colombia: Land Tenure and Land Use* (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1952).

4. Rodríguez Freile, Atkinson's Introduction, p. 7.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 63; Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, *History of Colombia*, translated and edited by J. Fred Rippy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938). The Rippy translation and condensation of the two-volume Henao and Arrubla work is the only history of Colombia in English.

6. James Ferguson King, "Negro Slavery in the Viceroyalty of New Granada" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1939), p. 55.

7. Rodríguez Freile, Atkinson's Epilogue, p. 221.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
9. The best published study of Cartagena emphasizing colonial defenses is Pedro Julio Dousdebés, *Cartagena de Indias, plaza fuerte* (Bogotá: Ministerio de Guerra, 1948).
10. For the official French account of this attack see Jean Bernard Desjeans (Baron de Pointis), *Relation de l'expédition de Carthagène faite par les français en M.DC.XCVII* (Amsterdam, 1698).
11. There are several English accounts of this siege, including Edward Vernon's own writings: *Original Papers Relating to the Expedition to Carthagena* (London, 1744); a pamphlet attacking British ineptitude in the affair, *An Account of the Expedition to Carthagena, with Explanatory Notes and Observations* (London, 1743); and a defense in answer to this, probably authored by Vernon, *A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena, With Notes. In Answer to a Late Pamphlet* (London, 1744). I am not aware of any published Spanish account of these events.
12. Three of the several books on this subject are Manuel Briceño, *Los Comuneros, historia de la insurrección de 1781* (Bogotá, 1881); Eduardo Posada, ed., *Los Comuneros* (Bogotá: Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, I, 1902); and Germán Arciniegas, *Los Comuneros* (Bogotá: Editorial ABC, 1939).
13. *Modern and Contemporary Latin America* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1952), p. 583. Bernstein's discussion of the *Comunero* movement is one of the best to be found in English.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 584.
16. In spite of more recent writings, the standard biography of Miranda is still that of William Spence Robertson, *The Life of Miranda* (2 vols.; Chapel Hill, 1929).
17. Among the works on Nariño are José María Vergara y Vergara, *Vida y escritos del General Antonio Nariño*, a work originally published in 1859 and reproduced by the Colombian Ministry of Education in the *Biblioteca popular de cultura colombiana* in 1945; and Jorge Ricardo Vejarano, *Nariño: su vida, sus infortunios, su talla histórica*, published in the same series and in the same year.
18. All textbooks on Latin American history give the over-all picture. For greater detail see Henao and Arrubla, Part II, or José Manuel Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución de la República de Colombia* (4 vols.; 1858).
19. Torres to Ignacio Tenorio, May 20, 1810, *Boletín de Historia*, III (1905), as quoted in Henao and Arrubla, p. 195.
20. See West, pp. 6-7.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
22. Alexander von Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain* (4 vols.; London, 1811), III, 382, as quoted in King, p. 38. See also West, chap. I, *passim*.
23. King, pp. 27-28.
24. Bernstein, p. 585.
25. West, pp. 78-84; King, pp. 28-29.
26. The role of Cartagena in Caribbean trade has not been thoroughly studied. For general discussions see C. H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), and *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); and Bailey W. Diffie, *Latin-American Civilization: Colonial Period* (Harrisburg, 1945).

27. Bernstein, p. 592.
28. The work of James King previously cited discusses the slave trade at Cartagena.
29. See Angel Valtierra, S.J., *Peter Claver, Saint of the Slaves*, translated by Janet H. Perry and L. V. Woodward (Westminister, Md.: Newman Press, 1960).
30. Probably the best single work for this subject is Gabriel Porras Troconis, *Historia de la cultura en el Nuevo Reino de Granada* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1952). Porras Troconis indicates a good deal of pride in the culture of eighteenth-century New Granada, and on pp. 120-122 quotes extensively from Miranda's *Memorias* to show how "uncultured" Miranda found Boston, the most intellectual center of the United States, in comparison to his viceroyalty.
31. There are a number of general works on Spanish-American literature. For more detail on New Granada see José María Vergara y Vergara, *Historia de la literatura en la Nueva Granada* (Bogotá, 1905).
32. Francisco Elías de Tejada, *El pensamiento político de los fundadores de Nueva Granada* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1955), pp. 193-194. Chap. VII of this work is devoted to Aguado.
33. Porras Troconis, pp. 72-81; Henao and Arrubla, p. 157. The *Biblioteca popular de cultura colombiana* contains several volumes of the works of Mother Castillo.
34. Porras Troconis, p. 50. Porras Troconis writes that the *colegio* was founded by a *cédula* of December 31, 1651, and instruction was begun in 1657. Henao and Arrubla give the date of founding as 1653 (p. 119).
35. Porras Troconis discusses the Colegio de San Bartolomé in Chapter II.
36. This point is discussed in Arthur Preston Whitaker (ed.), *Latin America and the Enlightenment* (New York, 1942).
37. *Readings in Latin-American Civilization, 1492 to the Present* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), p. 161.
38. Bernstein, p. 580.
39. This point is well illustrated in the reports of the viceroys found in various collections. See, for example, Eduardo Posada and Pedro M. Ibáñez, (comps.), *Relaciones de mando. Memorias presentadas por los gobernantes del Nuevo Reino de Granada* (Bogotá, 1910), or the older work of José Antonio García y García (ed.), *Relaciones de los vireyes del Nuevo Reino de Granada, ahora Estados Unidos de Venezuela, Estados Unidos de Colombia y Ecuador* (New York, 1869).
40. "Relación del Excmo. Sr. de Guirior," in García y García, pp. 144-147, cited in Keen, p. 166.
41. See Keen, p. 166.
42. See Porras Troconis, chap. XVI.
43. Diffie, pp. 558-559.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 566.
45. David Bushnell, *The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1954), p. 3.
46. The *champán* might be sixty feet or more in length, with a covered section amidships; the *bongos* were usually dugouts of much smaller size. The boats, the colorful boatmen (*bogas*), and voyages on the Magdalena were described by a number of early nineteenth-century travelers, e.g., John Potter Hamilton, *Travels through the Interior Provinces of Colombia* (2 vols.; London, 1827); William Duane, *A Visit to Colombia in the Years 1822 and 1823* (Philadelphia, 1826); G. Mollien, *Travels in the Republic of Colombia in the Years 1822 and 1823*, translated by C. Knight (London, 1824).

47. Miguel Cané, *Notas de viaje sobre Venezuela y Colombia* (Bogotá, 1907), p. 47.
48. Robert Louis Gilmore, "Federalism in Colombia, 1810-1858" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1949), p. 2.
49. *Cartas y expedientes de personas seculares del distrito de Santa Fé vistos en el consejo*, quoted in A. Ibot León, "El canal del Dique de Cartagena de Indias," *América Española*, V (September, 1936), 5.
50. See the writer's "Cartagena and the Dique: a Problem in Transportation," *The Journal of Transport History*, II (Leicester, England, May, 1955), 22-34. Other articles as well as primary sources are cited therein.
51. Descriptions of this trip are scarce for the colonial period but plentiful for the 1820's and 1830's. See, e.g., John Potter Hamilton, Vol. I; *Letters Written from Colombia during a Journey from Caracas to Bogotá, and Thence to Santa Martha, in 1823* (London, 1824); John Steuart, *Bogotá in 1836-1837* (New York, 1838).
52. See the writer's "The Rise of Barranquilla," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXXIV (May, 1954), 158-174.
53. United States Consul J. W. Magill to Assistant Secretary of State John Appleton, March 30, 1860, Consular Despatches-Sabanilla, Vol. I, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
54. The term *santafereño* is also used. Also the name *reinoso* became applied to this highland resident of el Nuevo Reino de Granada by the coastal and llanos folk, and may still occasionally be encountered (King, p. 33, footnote 8).
55. This is a quotation from Parson's unpublished dissertation heretofore cited, p. 1.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 4a.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
59. For example, *bogotano* friends of the writer used to "kid" an *antioqueño* friend who had settled in Bogotá with the request, "¡Hable, no cante!"
60. Bernstein, p. 578.
61. Bushnell, p. 6.
62. Henao and Arrubla, pp. 265-266.

Robert L. Gilmore: COLOMBIA, THE NATIONAL PERIOD

ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE opened a new and difficult phase of Colombian development as a society. The easy optimism of 1810 had, under the impact of disaster, become by 1820 a grim intense resolve to ensure independence, to discard the old order, and to put on the new life of republican simplicity, dignity, and progress. There was nothing democratic about the *de facto* militarized government brought into being from 1817 to 1821 by Bolívar and the regional vice presidents. The succeeding government under the Constitution of Cúcuta, that of Gran Colombia (1821-1830), was at least republican. Both did a remarkable job of carrying through the war effort to a successful conclusion. The rule of law returned. The new nation secured recognition. Civilian-dominated political and economic patterns of early nineteenth-century Liberalism were provided to recast the relations of government with the people and the pressure groups among them.

Termination of the war effort by 1825 unleashed the nationalism of the three peoples joined together by Gran Colombia: Nueva Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador. The struggle between civilians and officers of the military services for political offices and consequent control of the nation took on the character of regional rivalry. In convenient but oversimplified terms, Nueva Granada represented the civilian side. It had more population and greater wealth. Its social structure was less disturbed and its population less militarized by the

struggle for independence. Granadians held most of the high national offices in Bogotá under the Liberal civilian-oriented period from 1821 to 1827. Venezuela was scantily populated. It had suffered greater economic destruction and social disorganization than either Nueva Granada or Ecuador. As the best organized and strongest element in society the military easily dominated Venezuela. In addition, the way in which the Wars for Independence developed decided that the great majority of officers in the armed forces of Gran Colombia, especially those in the higher grades, would be Venezuelans. Ecuador appears to have been the section in which the civilian and military sectors of the ruling groups joined forces to continue control of a largely Indian population. Disintegration of Gran Colombia (1826-1830) without serious intersectional conflict was accompanied in the end by repatriation of Venezuelan officers in local, departmental, and national offices, leaving the civilians in possession of Nueva Granada.

I

The state of Nueva Granada had been organized by 1832 as a centralized republic with provision for local autonomy. The social patterns confirmed by the constitution evolved very slowly in the following century. The economic base of the nation was an agrarian-commercial complex which reflected the political control of the nation by great landowners and merchants who constituted the upper class. The upper class in combination with middle-class professional men, government officials, clergy, and intellectuals constituted the ruling element in the nation. The profound divisions among the ruling groups influenced the ideals, political forms, and rationales they provided for Colombian society. The new nation possessed a nineteenth-century political superstructure, a colonial economy, and an eighteenth-century basic society living according to tradition. The chief link between the two institutional and social levels was the colonial *patrón-campesino* relationship. It enabled the land-owning families to determine the law of the land in their localities. It ensured their possession of provincial and national authority through control of the electoral process, whether limited and indirect or based on universal suffrage. The colonial *mandón* became the *gamonal* of the nineteenth

century, and he has been superseded in most localities by the cacique of the twentieth century. The cacique continues to be the political link between the rural population and the rest of the nation. His role exists because of the continuing dichotomy between urban and rural society in much of Colombia, and the disappearance of the one will be associated with the elimination of the other.

Caudillism has failed to dominate the political process in Colombia although it was never wholly absent. Lack of the intendancy system left the more diffuse pattern of political and social authority of the Hapsburg period relatively untouched, and the main colonial institutional base for provincial and national caudillism did not exist. Furthermore during the Wars for Independence the civil authority retained control of military forces until the last phase of the reconquest. Guerrilla forces with recognized social predominance in an area did not emerge on an important scale in Nueva Granada during the 1810-1820 period. The country was freed of Spanish control so rapidly in 1819 that guerrilla organizations and locally constituted militia companies did not develop as auxiliaries to the regular military units. The political pattern of *alcalde* and *cabildo* in town and city and of governor and *cabildo* in provincial capitals continued. There was, until 1823, a matching military structure to see that funds, supplies, and manpower were funneled to the army, but even this contributed to strengthen Granadian civilian orientation because of the great numbers of Venezuelans among the officers. The local power structure was unchanged and its rival groups identified themselves with the new parties as they formed.

Under such circumstances political conflict in the nineteenth century reflected the factions within the ruling groups in terms of personal and family ambitions, of municipal and regional conflicts, and of the desperation of one or another pressure group. After World War I a new dimension in politics was added to the rest: dissatisfaction of both rural and urban labor with the old order of things. Early establishment of political factions and parties served to channel the crude personalism of the time within the two broad political currents that still dominate Colombian political life. Colombian political violence has had, therefore, a larger meaning and a higher political form than simple caudillism.

Modern political violence may be dated from 1810, but its major manifestations began after 1836. It has been one of the strongest traits of Colombian politics. President Lleras Camargo has stated of the recent period that "Colombian politics are barely emerging from the backwardness characterized by *caciquismo* in the fields and villages; by crude alliances between landowners, clergy, and the military; by the prevalence of economic feudalism buttressed by religious fanaticism and party intransigency, or by screaming aggressive urban mobocracy." The most disturbing Colombian problems around which violence has focused have been the relations of Church and State, the form of government, party rivalry for sole possession of political power, and the development of an egalitarian republican society in town and country. The first two were partially resolved in the 1880's and the latter two remain today as major problems to be solved by the National Front.

Church and State relations in Colombia reflect a revolution consequent to political independence. A state-dominated church had to be adjusted to republican government. After 300 years of cold and hot war between Spain and the major European powers, the spirit of the century fell as a divisive spiritual deluge upon the ruling groups in Colombia. The Crown had held a tight administrative and fiscal control over the Church and the clergy had accepted its quasi membership in the government bureaucracy. In Colombia the clergy were used as political trouble-shooters in every social crisis after 1780, and during the same period the Crown developed the measures which nineteenth-century Liberals would use to reduce the Church to partial inaction in Colombia.

After 1810 some members of the Colombian clergy hoped for the independence of the Church, but this was thwarted by the continuing regalism of the new republican government. Moreover the Spanish and patriot authorities continued to use the clergy as political instruments in the 1810-1825 period, leaving them in an anomalous position before the new mentality of republicanism. It is probable that conflict would have developed anyway because the second wave of revolutionary leaders were resolved to make radical changes a part of their denial of the colonial past. Liberal predominance in the 1821-1827 period resulted in codification of the *real patronato* as a law in

1824. By 1840 the leading Liberals had abandoned regalism for a Benthamist solution. During the same period the Liberal party won the repute of being antireligious, atheistic, and even pro-Protestant. That renown has been given fresh stimulus from time to time by new philosophical currents. Moreover the most obviously a-Catholic and non-Catholic elements have normally gravitated to the Liberal Party. Besides ideological conflict there were other points of friction: education, social welfare, *fueros*, church property, state intervention in discipline, and the right to juridical personality. These were issues in the redemarcation of the functions of Church and State made necessary by republican reorganization of Colombian society. The result was a natural identification of interest between most of the clergy and the Conservative party which expected the clergy to serve its political interests in return for assistance. The intensely partisan spirit of Colombians is also present in the Colombian clergy.

After 1850 ultramontaniam began to develop in the Colombian Church's hierarchy as a moral recourse in the struggle with Liberalism. The Concordat of 1887, which finally established the basis for Church-State relations, attenuated ultramontaniam until the recurrence of difficult Liberal-Church relations after 1930. The Liberals then sought elimination of Church influence in public education and its content, acceptance of civil marriage and divorce, and some veto power over bishops appointed to Colombian dioceses. A revision of the Concordat signed in 1942 has not been ratified. The Liberal administrations (1930-1946) accomplished their goals in part by administrative measures. Other developments, such as juridical personality for Masonic lodges, increased Protestant activities, and the growing scale of Communist activities, added to new Liberal pressures against the Church's social action, stimulated a vigorous response leading to a Church-sponsored labor confederation, rapid increase of private Church schools and initiation of a parochial school system. For the countryside the Church has developed a rural social action program based on literacy and vocational training by radio, organization of *campesino* leagues, and promotion of agrarian reform. Despite significant growth of the Catholic Church in Colombia, the population is outstripping it.

The element in Colombian religious life which has attracted the

most notice abroad has been Protestant complaints of persecution. The operations of a Protestant community now estimated at 165,000 were hampered by administrative devices from 1946 to 1957. Some 116 Colombian Protestants have been identified by their churches as martyrs for their faith during a period which corresponds to the peak years of violence. Of all conflict, religious strife is regarded in the Western World as the least excusable and as anachronistic. According to this widely held attitude, the "new reformation" being attempted by the Protestant churches ought to be allowed to develop without friction. On the other hand, the external world has accepted with greater equanimity a grand total of nearly 300,000 Colombian dead as suitable offerings to the struggles of a society in transition towards the industrial order. It is astonishing that under the general conditions of violence religious controversy did not become much worse.

The problem of the form of government was settled with difficulty. Government at the municipal level was little affected by independence. Moreover, brief experience of intensely centralized military government and a more moderate civilian centralization of authority imposed by the Constitution of Cúcuta during the 1820's encouraged the reaffirmation of local autonomy by the rural elite. This was seconded by village and city discontent with local authority concentrated in family hands in a relatively few centers. Most centers of population asked to become corporate units with a town council and a local court. The movement picked up momentum after 1835 and the 135 local units of government grew to 816 by 1851. In addition, each important regional city successfully sought status as a provincial capital—there were 36 by 1853. Local government in the hands of unsalaried and frequently illiterate officials declined to a lower level of efficiency and equity than in the colonial period and did not begin to make significant progress until after World War I. Disappearance of the Spanish career official had removed the main check on the conduct of the *gamonales*, who held local power without responsibility.

These developments were accompanied by the delineation of the Liberal and Conservative political parties between 1821 and 1848. They acquired sharply hostile points of view, and bitter personal

feuds existed between major personalities of the two parties. These parties have channeled Colombian violence and have played an active role in it. The civil war of 1840-1842 was the first major inter-party test of strength. The radical reformism of 1849-1853 was punctuated by the brief Conservative rebellion of 1851 and given pause by the insurrection of 1854. By joint determination, between 1855 and 1857 the parties carved the country into spheres of interest called states. These strongholds were then linked together by the Conservative-sponsored Granadian Confederation of 1858, which was replaced in 1863 after a long civil war by the Liberal-created United States of Colombia. The new government was a loose association of states whose members were frequently engaged in interstate imperialism and warfare. The high cost of anarchy to the nation led a Liberal faction supported by the Conservatives to reorganize the nation in 1886 along the lines of the Constitution of 1832.

The new Republic of Colombia had a strong central government with provision for local autonomy. The Conservatives dominated the new government whose form had been advocated by most Colombian Liberal political thinkers from 1822 to 1853 and defended in practice by most Conservatives. Liberal resistance to Conservative domination lasted until the end of the War of the Thousand Days (1899-1902). Political leadership during the pre-1920 era, as well as after, was not exclusively upper class. Presidents, cabinet ministers, members of congress, and leading ideologists were as commonly of middle-class as of upper-class origin. This observation is applicable also to the officials of the major territorial divisions of the nation. In the local governments the *gamonal*, the *tinterillo*, and the *cura* were the triumvirate which headed the power structure. Since the opening of the century the role of the triumvirate has changed. The cacique has tended to assume the older dual role held by *gamonal* and *tinterillo* and, even as they, has found his chief rivals in other caciques or in the *cura*. The latter, under growing pressure from church authorities and the urban sector of the nation to end his political role, is still a power in many localities. He will continue to be so until the rural and village social structure takes on the traits of urban Colombia. The political role of the cacique and the *cura* will tend to disappear when rural society no longer has need for it.

II

Since World War I Colombia has been undergoing a slow-paced, unbalanced, violent change toward a modern industrial society. Many of the social and economic traits of this change belong to the nineteenth century. Transportation, communications, commerce, industry, fuel sources, capital accumulation, productivity, cities, and population have had moderate to high indices of growth. Education failed to keep pace, and agriculture has lagged even farther behind. Thus Colombia's population has been increasing at a rate nearly double that of the nation's basic food crops. Industrialization has only marginally influenced conditions in much of the countryside. As of old, the leaders of Colombian pressure groups have continued to respond very sensitively in their different ways to international currents of political and social ideas. The result has been sporadic manifestations of unrest in the city and a steady, remorseless growth of violence in the countryside since 1920. The ominous Lebrét Report, prepared in 1955-1956, proclaimed Colombia a society in danger of decomposition since progress in industrialization had not been matched in social developments. Under the impact of economic change, the old regime was disintegrating more rapidly than a new social order was taking shape to replace it. Current efforts designed to meet that need are having some success, but it is too soon to know if they are adequate.

Customarily the years 1948 through 1957 are considered the era of violence in Colombia. There has been a notable diminution since then. Actually three clearly defined periods of lesser violence preceded the maximum period. The early warning stage was the 1920's when all wages fell far behind the cost of living. During this decade measures were initiated to improve transportation, to modernize the banking system, and to establish budget control. These measures served the interests of the urban population and the coffee producers whose foreign exchange earnings would finance industrialization. *Campesino* violence in this decade culminated in the bloody repression, in 1929, of a strike by banana plantation workers in the Santa Marta area. This event also opened the second phase of violence. Concurrently the great depression began, and in 1930 the Liberal party won control of the national government for the first time since

1886. The victory was accompanied by the usual practice of the spoils system and satisfaction of old grievances. Interparty violence began to develop. The Leticia conflict with Peru moderated it temporarily. *Campesino* grievances grew worse as mounting population began to press against traditional property rights in rural areas. The unrest was augmented by ill-conceived pro-*campesino* legislation in 1936 which served only to convert a significant sector of stable rural population into migratory farm workers. In the cities the rapid growth of real wages and the rising political influence of the urban worker were checked, and they declined after 1938 when the nonlabor sector of the Liberal party won control of the presidency. By 1940 the resulting split in the Liberal party and the outbreak of World War II set the scene for the third phase of violence which lasted until 1948. The continuing decay of the Liberal party weakened organized labor, which was identified with the party. There was a rapid increase in the cost of living under the full impact of World War II and its aftermath. Ideological and party debate gained in incandescence, and control of the nation returned to the Conservative party, which applied the spoils system and savored political vengeance. An attempt at coalition government fostered by President Mariano Ospina Pérez (1946-1950) and more moderate Liberals could not dominate the intransigent majority in both parties.

The third phase of violence knew the rise of Colombian militarism. Colombia's very modest armed forces were greatly enlarged during the Leticia conflict, and their size was not reduced because of the troubled international situation and the problem of violence. Use of the armed forces for repression of interparty violence by intensely partisan governments involved the military in party politics. The first solid indication of the new militarism was the unsuccessful attempt to seize power in July, 1944. It was followed by ever wider use of court-martial for the trial of civilians involved in rural violence. As the political situation deteriorated, the armed forces grew in political stature as the best organized and best equipped pressure group in Colombia.

The maximum period of violence opened in April, 1948, with the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, whose role as voice of the working class in the Liberal party had finally made him leader of the

party less than a month before. The resulting days of mob violence in Bogotá and other Colombian cities were followed by organized guerrilla warfare between Liberal guerrillas and government forces and between Liberal and Conservative guerrilla units. Eventually the Communists became an added element in the conflict. The years from April, 1948, through 1957 witnessed a holocaust of nearly 300,000 victims to violence. No one has bothered to total those who died of the same cause from 1925 to 1948. Violence, largely limited to areas of subsistence agriculture and generally incited by urban elements, paid its way by preying on the coffee producer and the cattleman, by plundering homesteads and villages, by fees from land-grabbers, and by the protection racket. Growth in the urban sector of the economy was not checked. Indeed, the rapid inflow of population into the cities from 1950 on favored its growth by an abundance of cheap labor.

The Ospina Administration was followed by that of Laureano Gómez (1950-1953), intransigent leader of the most doctrinaire Conservatives. Violence grew in volume and the administration's repressive measures to impose peace and its proposed measures to reshape government excited widespread opposition. On June 13, 1953, Lt. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and the Armed Forces seized power. From its first hours the military regime enjoyed the consent of a peace-hungry population, and the Ospinista Conservatives expected Rojas to yield control of government to them. Prompt improvement in social peace ended in general disillusionment at the end of the year. Accomplishments by the new regime were overwhelmed by continuance of the state of siege, tightening censorship, and exploding corruption in government. A rapidly worsening economic situation after 1954 and the Messianic attitude of Rojas towards social and political institutions completed the alienation of most organized groups in Colombian society. Rojas frightened the parties into a negotiated settlement of differences. A national front of the two major parties won wide support. It became the vehicle for unarmed rebellion by the middle and upper sectors of society, to which organized labor acquiesced. Rojas resigned the presidency on May 10, 1957. The Armed Forces acted as broker in the matter and Rojas designated the military junta which supervised transition to normal

constitutional government, a process completed August 7, 1958, with the inauguration of President Alberto Lleras Camargo's National Front Administration.

The National Front is a compact between the Liberal and Conservative parties to share government equally. The presidency rotates between the parties every four years, and the factions in a party may compete for that party's share of offices and patronage. The pact was made part of the constitution by the December 1, 1957, plebiscite and subsequent amendments. Colombia has come a long way from the moral bankruptcy, political disruption, and economic chaos of the last year of the Rojas regime. The Armed Forces have resumed their role in support of constitutional government, despite regret on the part of some officers. The near elimination of social violence, as distinguished from rural gangsterism, has been an expression of confidence in President Lleras and the result of more effective cooperation between government agencies and local civic and religious organizations. Rehabilitation of areas ruined by violence and the relocation of refugees have been a valuable asset to the administration. Community Action programs to meet local needs through local action are becoming more successful, and the government is pushing hard for an effective Agrarian Reform program including the necessary roads and community services. Confidence in the urban sector has been restored by checking inflation, by an increase in real wages, and by reduction of the deficit in balance of payments. A fairly effective stabilization program exists, complemented by programmed social and economic development. Colombia has just entered the Latin American Free Trade Area.

Among the unfavorable factors are the quiescent guerrilla organizations, including those of the Communists, the demand among the lower classes for more rapid satisfaction of their socioeconomic needs, and the growing factionalism in the parties. Colombia's improved situation has eased the fears which limited political passions. Vigorous partisan attacks on the government by extremists of the right and left have added an element of instability as the national elections for 1962 approach. Only the majority factions of the major parties are cooperating to implement the National Front pact. Incitement to direct action by the political extremes is reinforced from

abroad. Successful election and inauguration of a Conservative president in 1962 is essential to evolutionary change in Colombia. The conduct of the new administration will determine whether or not Alfonso López Michelsen's leftist *Movimiento de Recuperación Liberal* (MRL) faction will win control of the Liberal party and wreck the National Front in the 1964 elections.

Federico G. Gil: COLOMBIA'S BIPARTISAN
EXPERIMENT

A REMARKABLE POLITICAL EXPERIMENT has been conducted in Colombia for the last four years. Although the outcome of this experiment is still unknown and its durability is in doubt, its uniqueness is such as to warrant some attention on the part of students of government. In an effort to cope with harsh realities of a social revolution in the making, Colombia adopted in 1957 a political scheme under which the two traditional parties, the Conservative and the Liberal, have agreed to absolute parity of representation at all levels of government, with the executive powers to be exercised alternatively by Liberal and Conservative nominees until 1974.^{1*} This bipartisan experiment has led to the establishment of a "controlled democracy"² of sorts, designed to educate the masses, as well as the two great traditional parties in existence, in their responsibilities in a democratic scheme of government. Its origins are to be found in domestic conditions peculiar to contemporary Colombia, namely, a bitter, cruel, and bloody political strife, characterized on one side by narrow partisanship and political intolerance which has rent the country asunder for several decades, and on the other by the relentless pressure of extreme social and economic cleavages in the body politic.

*Notes to this chapter begin on page 100.

I

Colombia has often been cited as the best example of a two-party system in Latin America. In most of the Latin American countries there existed in the early period of political life two parties which struggled for power and control. "The two great issues which determined party alignment during the first half of the century of independence were the separation of Church and State and centralization. These controversies of deep social and political significance divided the ruling and nonruling groups into embittered and hostile factions."³ The relatively simple partisan division of the early period under the classic Conservative-Liberal formula was later supplanted in many countries by a system of multiple parties. Colombia, however, through a series of historical circumstances was able to maintain the established dualism of parties. During the nineteenth century, with the masses deprived for all practical purposes of political participation, and the two traditional parties dominated by an aristocratic elite, political contests consisted substantially of quarrels among a small ruling oligarchy. Oligarchical domination was favored by geographic isolation and strong feelings of localism.

Since the turn of the century, and particularly since the end of World War I, the impact of modern technology, progress toward industrialization, and the rise of an incipient middle class have brought substantial changes in the political stage. Despite these facts, it is only recently that there has been a significant growth of popular political participation, and Conservatives as well as Liberals have yet to structure their organizations adequately to adjust to new socio-economic conditions. However, in response to growing demands and the increasing political consciousness from emergent social forces, both parties have slowly attempted to provide outlets for the upward pressures from below. In these attempts the Liberal party has been relatively more successful in providing articulation of the interests of the new social forces, but most observers would agree that both parties have been remiss in not fully accepting and recognizing the urgent need of finding positive and effective answers to the increasing social restlessness. In general, they have failed to perform the social mission

demanded of them. The riots of April, 1948, were only symptomatic of the intensity of this social pressure.

Traditionally, Colombia has been an agrarian country, where more than half of the population lives in the rural areas. And yet the relationship between man and the soil in Colombia is one of the explosive issues in that country today. Tenancy on a fixed rental basis and share-farming are widespread. Tenant farmers fall into two categories: the *agregados*, or *vivientes*, and the *terrazgueros*. The *agregado* lives on the estate and has the usufruct of a plot, in exchange for which he works for the landowner a given number of days at a prescribed wage. The *terrazguero* (found mainly in the western part of the Andean region) receives the usufruct of a small plot and in turn performs various services for the estate owner. In some instances this tenant laborer has to work for a number of days a month in payment for the use of his plot and several more as a wage laborer. The squatters, called *colonos*, are the main social problem facing the country because of their considerable number and the appalling conditions of poverty in which they live.⁴ In general, however, small farm holdings are prevalent in Colombia and the minifundio of five acres or less has resulted in low agricultural productivity and uneconomic utilization of the land. Rural conditions are worsened by the traditional exploitive mentality of landowners.⁵ While it is true that there is not as yet a serious crisis in rural areas, there is considerable unrest, and deep feelings of dissatisfaction as well as an increasing class consciousness are seen.⁶

As for the urban sector, the problem is even more serious. A huge urban proletariat, swollen by the flood of peasants to the cities—a phenomenon not unique in Colombia but aggravated there by conditions of strife in the countryside—represents a powerful and dangerous force pushing the country into the whirl of social revolution. Urban conditions are characterized by chronic unemployment, low wages, slum areas, and other factors tending to widen the gulf between the powerful, educated minority and the mass of the poor. The depth of poverty is further darkened by an estimated illiteracy rate of 44 per cent.⁷

The two traditional parties in Colombia have, over the course of time, reflected strong ideological positions but “their deepest doc-

trinal commitments have been to such timeless issues as federalism versus centralism, which cut across economic and social lines," and neither Conservatives nor Liberals have ceased "to subordinate the general welfare to narrow class interests"⁸ of an aristocratic elite. There are, however, differences in outlook.

In brief, the Liberal doctrine advocates separation of Church and State, wide popular participation in politics, state economic intervention to assure general welfare, religious toleration, and political centralization with administrative decentralization; while the Conservative dogma includes identification with the Church, limited suffrage, the maintenance of class privileges and continued elite rule, and a highly centralized governmental structure.⁹

Of course, neither party has always preserved the purity of its dogma and there have been frequent deviations dictated by political expediency. The Conservative as well as the Liberal elites have never been reluctant to retreat from party platforms whenever united action was required to protect class interests. But, in general, political competition has been characterized by aggressiveness and violence. As one writer puts it, "The Colombia party system may be likened to a voracious jungle in which concession is taken as a sign of weakness, while strength must be matched by yet greater strength and ferocity. Opportunism runs high, yet it is considered a legitimate function of party machinery. Politics becomes a matter of extremes; the dark is midnight black, the light as blinding as a snow-blanketed plain. Between, there is precious little grey."¹⁰ It was indeed this feature of Colombian politics that was to lead the nation "to within a millimeter of disintegration,"¹¹ and eventually to bring into existence the unique experiment with which we deal here.

II

It may well be in order to trace briefly the pattern of events leading to the political breakdown with which Colombia was confronted in the decade of the 1950's. Following the disastrous effects of the worldwide depression of 1929, the Liberal party returned to power after approximately half a century of Conservative control. A reformist wave brought to the presidency Alfonso López (1934-1938), a

wealthy patrician but also the first Colombian "to recognize fully both the political advantage and the national necessity of sponsoring the demands of the masses."¹² López' policy of *revolución en marcha* instituted land laws, labor reforms, tax revisions, and social welfare. Opposed by the right wing of his own party, López' reform program was halted by electoral defeat in 1938 and the election of Eduardo Santos (1938-1942), leader of the moderate Liberal wing. When López won the presidency a second time for the period 1942-1946 with his party immersed in internecine disputes, hopelessly divided and disoriented, his administration became characterized by frustration and corruption to such an extent that it was labeled ironically by some as the "reform of the reformer."¹³ Finally forced to step down in August, 1945, López was replaced by Alberto Lleras Camargo to serve out the remainder of his term. To forestall the imminent danger of civil war and as a holding operation Lleras formed a bipartisan government, *Unión Nacional*, in which the Conservatives held three cabinet positions.

A very essential part in the political destruction of Santos was played by the veteran Conservative leader, Laureano Gómez. A crafty politician of extreme rightist views, Gómez knew how to take advantage of Liberal dissension to marshal a combination of forces against the reformist movement. A figure of extraordinary following among right wing Conservatism, he has played a leading role in Colombian politics for over 30 years. López' retirement also resulted in the emergence of a new leader of the left wing of the Liberal party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, destined to become also a principal actor in the political arena until his assassination in 1948. A charismatic personality, a powerful agitator, and a nonconformist, Gaitán stood as the champion of the oppressed and the poor, and the opponent of oligarchical privilege, gaining in the process an extraordinary popularity.

The presidential election of May 5, 1946, proved to be decisive. With two Liberal candidates in the field, Gaitán and Gabriel Turbay, representing the reformist and moderate wings, respectively, Laureano Gómez succeeded in securing the election of Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez, whose nomination he personally had dictated. Conservatism was again in power, but on the strength of a minority win-

ner.¹⁴ True to his campaign promises Ospina continued the *Unión Nacional* scheme by giving the Liberals six cabinet posts and about half of the departmental governorships, but Gómez became the key figure in the government. The fragility of this coalition between Liberals and Conservatives was further aggravated by the implacable attacks of Gaitán, who had formally assumed the headship of the Liberal party and had isolated the Liberal members of the cabinet, eventually bringing the *Unión Nacional* to an end.

Under Ospina, social and economic problems became more serious. Inflation in the wake of World War II, black marketeering, and the rise of the cost of living contributed to the worsening of the economic plight of the Colombian masses, aggravating social tensions.¹⁵ Violent outbreaks began to occur in remote rural areas, and in the cities also, and the Conservatives initiated a relentless persecution of the Liberals. Partisan tensions brought death in many communities. Banditry made its appearance under the cloak of partisanship. Tragedy was approaching and Colombians seemed unable to grapple with it. The assassination of Gaitán on April 9, 1948, sparked off the explosion of bestial violence in the form of the unforgettable and appalling *bogotazo*. As John Martz puts it, "The people were demanding a social revolution in brutal terms."¹⁶ But even then there was reluctance on the part of Colombian leadership to recognize "that they had brought upon themselves this visitation of gathering fury by their adamant refusal to accept the changes in national life."¹⁷

Following the riots, the shaky coalition was restored. A new Liberal chieftain, Darío Echandía, was now holding the party together, and with Gómez absent (he left the country after the *bogotazo*), Ospina accepted back the Liberals on his own terms. The *mariage de convenance* lasted only thirteen months, while rural violence continued and the situation grew steadily worse. When Laureano Gómez returned to Colombia in 1949 to run for president, hostility between the two parties reached new heights. His election, facilitated by Liberal abstention from the polls in protest against violence, discrimination, and coercion, marks the beginning of an era of dictatorship; first, of a civilian type under Gómez, and later of a military character under General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.

Under Gómez' authoritarian hand, party involvement in rural

violence grew in magnitude while new splits within the parties appeared with the Liberals divided three ways on basic policy. Terror and death became commonplace, but "as the price of human life went down commodity prices rose, bank balances grew, and the export market boomed."¹⁸ Thus, while a civil war raged, Gómez brought prosperity to the upper classes without materially changing the dreary economic conditions of the masses. Many, who had once supported the dictator, including conservative followers of Ospina, became increasingly alarmed by the state of the nation. A new constitution, embodying principles of a corporate-fascist state, was ready for adoption in 1953, when at last the army stepped in and toppled the Gómez regime. "General Rojas Pinilla's bloodless coup was hailed by a weary country close to exhaustion after years of uncertainty and violence."¹⁹ With the Liberals having virtually destroyed themselves in internal struggles over reformist ideas, and the Conservatives split over the spoils of victory, there seemed to be no organized force capable of rescuing the nation save the military.²⁰

III

It is beyond our purpose to deal here with the period of military dictatorship, lasting almost four years, which followed. It will suffice to say that the place of the Rojas Pinilla regime in Colombian history will be the subject of controversy for some time. While some consider it "the most inept, incompetent dictatorship in the annals of Latin American despotism,"²¹ there are others who put greater emphasis on its alleged accomplishments claiming that it "turned the clock forward on social achievement for the masses."²² One thing does seem certain—the Rojas Pinilla regime rose as a result of the incompetence of the traditional parties to cope with a long-smouldering social revolution and to reform the basic structures to conform to change and modern demands.

Although temporarily successful in reducing civil violence, the military dictatorship did not pacify Colombia, which was kept in turmoil by religious, political, and economic strife. After what appeared to be a good beginning the Rojas Pinilla regime soon degenerated into a form of ruthless Caesarism. By the middle of 1957

national indignation against oppressive political measures reached new heights when Rojas Pinilla attempted to extend his presidential term to 1962 by action of a rubber-stamping constituent assembly. After colliding with the Church and losing its support, and in the face of solid Conservative and Liberal opposition, Rojas was finally forced to resign and go into exile on May 10, 1957.

In July, 1956, nearly a year before this event, foundations had been laid for the present experiment in bipartisan government which was to succeed the military dictatorship. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who by this time had become the chief leader of the Liberal party and the symbol of resistance to the dictator, traveled to Spain and met with the old Conservative autocrat Laureano Gómez at the village of Benidorm in the province of Alicante. After several days of discussions the chieftains of the two rival parties made public the "Pact of Benidorm." The essence of the pact was the union of both parties to oppose dictatorship and an appeal to all party members for joint action in the "re-establishment of liberty and constitutional guarantees."²³

During the transitional rule of a five-man military junta, Colombia returned to a coalition government. Three of the thirteen ministers were military while the rest included representatives of both parties. In July of 1957 Lleras Camargo again flew to Spain to meet Gómez for a second time at the resort town of Sitges, near Barcelona. The "Pact of Sitges" was the natural step to follow the Benidorm declaration. It outlined a scheme of bipartisan government for a period of twelve years, to be implemented by constitutional amendments, which provided for a system of parity in the distribution of federal, departmental, and local offices so that each party would share equally in the task of rebuilding the nation under the four-year presidency of first one party and then the other. The over-all plan was to be ratified by the electorate in a national plebiscite.²⁴ This was the formula that both parties hoped would help prostrated Colombia to emerge from the tragic twelve-year period of savage civil violence and dictatorship. During this period some 300,000 people lost their lives, entire communities were destroyed and torn out of the national fabric, immense tracts of land were ravished, and millions of dollars worth of property were wantonly destroyed.²⁵

The road to unity and *Frente Nacional*, as the scheme became known, proved to be difficult and progress was erratic. The situation remained almost at a standstill until the return of Gómez himself. On his return the powerful Conservative leader opposed the candidacy of his party colleague Guillermo León Valencia and began to back down on the proposed plebiscite. After shrewdly maneuvering the Liberals into agreeing to the holding of congressional elections in 1958 before the presidential contest, he finally agreed to the national plebiscite. The historic plebiscite took place on December 1. As submitted to the voters, constitutional revisions included slight variations and additions to the Sitges Plan. One provision called for congressional elections in March, 1958. Another extended the bipartisan arrangement for the presidency to sixteen rather than twelve years. The endorsement of the voters was overwhelming: of the 4,397,090 total vote, 4,169,294 approved the reform.²⁶ Colombia was now ready to enter into what Lleras Camargo, the chief architect of bipartisanism, had called the period of "democratic convalescence."

The tribulations of those engaged in building the "delicate-wrought bipartisan agreement," however, were not over. The Conservatives were now divided three ways: *laureanistas* representing with Gómez orthodox conservatism; *ospinistas*, following former President Ospina Pérez' moderate brand of conservative doctrine; and *alzatistas*, a falangist-inspired faction led by Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, attacking the whole notion of bipartisanism. Lleras Camargo, despite his undying faith in *Frente Nacional*, admitted that coexistence was difficult. "No one has thought," he said, "that other courses could be harder—for example, being eight years under a state of siege. But we have just done that, and I do not see why we cannot now coexist peacefully, rebuilding the country for twelve years."²⁷

IV

In the congressional election of March, 1958, the Liberals, united this time except for a small faction,²⁸ obtained an impressive electoral victory, outpolling the Conservatives by 58 to 42 per cent. The Gómez, or *laureanista*, faction emerged victorious among the Conservatives with 915,886 votes, compared with 340,106 for the Ospina

group and 287,760 for the extreme rightists of the Alzate Avendaño group.²⁹ Through his victory Gómez was able to prevent the Conservative nomination of León Valencia for president and to produce a deadlock. A few days later, Gómez suggested Lleras Camargo as the bipartisan nominee in the approaching presidential election. Lleras Camargo, contending that it had previously been agreed by the two parties that the first president under the new plan should be a Conservative, turned this offer down. However, with the Conservatives immersed in bitter disputes and public opinion in a state of agitation, and after refusing for a second time, he yielded and accepted the nomination, first resigning his position as head of the Liberal party.

The inauguration of Lleras on August 7, 1958, marked the return to constitutional order under the new basic law. As for the new president, his task was cut out for him. In his own words he would have to be "a magician, prophet, redeemer, savior, and pacifier who can transform a ruined republic into a prosperous one."³⁰ If there was anyone who could perform all of these roles, Lleras, the frugal, honest, able, politically broad-minded architect of the bipartisan plan, was the man. But he could not achieve the miracle without the cooperation and support of the traditional political organizations; and these, unfortunately, were soon engaged in their customary struggling for influence and jockeying for positions between rival factions.

After one year of bipartisan government, five separate Conservative factions had developed and even these were in a constant state of flux. In addition to the *laureanistas* who collaborated with the Liberals, there were the *ospinistas*; the group which remained loyal to Guillermo León Valencia (also supporting the *Frente Nacional*); and two right-wing elements headed by Jorge Leyva and Gilberto Alzate Avendaño. Sometime later *valencistas* and *leyvistas* practically faded from the political arena leaving the field to the Gómez and Ospina factions. As the 1960 congressional elections approached, *laureanistas* campaigned for support of the government while the Ospina and Alzate Avendaño factions, united in a strange alliance (*alza-ospinistas*), constituted the chief opposition.

On the Liberal side, a new faction (*Unión Popular Nacional*) was now led by Alfonso López Michelsen, son of ex-president López. This

faction, claiming to be the heirs of Gaitán's reformist movement, grouped under the banner of "health, education, and housing" (*salud, educación, y techo*). Although accepting the necessity for bipartisan government, this group opposed nomination of a Conservative president in 1962, in view of the predominantly Liberal sympathies of the electorate.

The unexpected outcome of the 1960 elections resulted in further shifting and manipulations and in greater displays of party irresponsibility. Among the Conservatives, the *alza-ospinistas* won a smashing victory over Laureano Gómez, who saw his majority in the lower house vanish. Election returns showed that 53 per cent of the party vote had gone to the Ospina Pérez-Alzate Avendaño group.³¹ In the Liberal struggle, the elated forces of López Michelsen captured 20 per cent of the party vote, and 14 of the 76 party seats. Again the Liberals had easily outpolled the Conservatives in the total national vote. The extent of voters' abstention, however, was significant. It could be interpreted as the way in which the electorate was expressing disgust with the shenanigans of politicians, desire for and a demand for a more vigorous pursuit of reforms, and some sense of responsibility. The impressive showing of the López Michelsen group was evidence of the lasting appeal of Gaitán and his cry for social reforms.³²

Gómez announced his retirement, placing immediate responsibility for the future of the Conservatives in the hands of Ospina Pérez and Alzate Avendaño, who promised support of bipartisan government and assumed the Conservative share of seats in the cabinet. The Liberals reorganized their leadership, while López Michelsen maintained an independent position and "cited returns as proof that the day of the oligarch was nearing an end."³³

As the bipartisan experiment passes the halfway mark of its third year, political maneuvering has not ceased. It is centered this time around the selection of a Conservative presidential nominee for 1962. The aging Gómez is now in the opposition, hoping to win the 1962 congressional election so as to be able, repeating his 1958 maneuver, to dictate the Conservative presidential candidate. Meanwhile, he denounces Lleras and the government. The *alza-ospinista* faction rallied behind Ospina Pérez after the unexpected death of Gilberto Alzate Avendaño in November, 1960. The Liberals regrouped be-

hind Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the President's cousin. López Michelsen and his group of dissident Liberals, now called *Movimiento de Recuperación Liberal* (MRL) are conducting an active opposition denouncing the government for trying to "impose" a Conservative on the Liberal majority of the electorate as the next president. To complicate matters, ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla, although stripped of political rights as a result of his 1959 trial by the Senate, is inspiring and encouraging violence against the government, having forced Lleras into declaring a "state of siege." Another addition on the political stage is the leftist *Movimiento Popular Revolucionario* (MPR), recently founded by Gaitán's daughter Gloria Gaitán and her husband Luis Emiro Valencia.

Thus the 1960 elections, far from bringing some order into the party picture, created an even more confusing situation than existed before. No party issues have been resolved while internecine feuding has increased in ferocity. Responsibility for governing lies almost entirely in the hands of the President, who continues struggling vainly to win constructive congressional support. President Lleras commented sadly on the situation saying that "Colombia was becoming a 'silent nation,' with political groups leaving the government with the representation of everyone and without the power to influence anyone."³⁴

V

It may not be premature to attempt to draw some conclusions in appraisal of the bipartisan experiment. An essentially artificial creature, the "parity" principle can only be justified in terms of the need for a period of truce and pacification. In this limited sense it has made some contributions to national politics, more substantially perhaps at the local level, where it has established some degree of cooperation among local leaders. However, in broader perspective it is clear that it has failed to put an end to bitter political partisanship and to develop a basic understanding of the processes of democracy. Whatever has been accomplished under the bipartisan agreement is to be credited almost exclusively to presidential action with little or no effective party participation through the legislature. Lleras Camargo's

record of achievements includes considerable success in the effort at pacification and a general economic revival accompanied by moves toward regional understandings with Colombia's neighbors, but the pace toward social reforms has not been sufficiently fast and vigorous to satisfy the ever-increasing pressures for revolutionary changes. Lleras' gradualist approach is being met with increased criticisms on the part of the urban proletariat, and the forces of the extreme left are finding new vigor throughout the country. And yet, a situation such as has developed precludes any party or coalition from receiving any kind of popular "mandate" with reference to policy issues. Therefore, there is, inevitably, a certain immobilism, or at least gradualism, with reference to any program of attack upon social and economic problems.

As noted by Martz, a striking feature of contemporary Colombian politics is the continued dominance of veteran political figures who have been politically prominent for at least 20 years.³⁵ Colombia is in dire need of a new generation of leaders. Insofar as the bipartisan agreement is concerned it is doubtful that it could survive under other direction than that of Lleras Camargo. His prestige, probity, courage, moderate temperament, ability to compromise, and high sense of responsibility will be difficult to duplicate.

It is extremely doubtful that the remarkable constitutional agreement will continue until 1974. The two men responsible for its creation—Lleras Camargo and Gómez—inevitably will suffer a decrease in influence after a new chief executive is elected in 1962. There has been increasing party criticism of the system as well as popular anti-*Frente Nacional* feeling. Some feel that its collapse will bring restoration of party supremacy; others believe that a period of four years is long enough to prepare Colombia for the exercise of full political freedom.³⁶ There are many who fear a Conservative president in 1962, as defined by the agreement, because of the past history of violence to the parties during recent Conservative administrations.

As for the future of the two-party system, the prospects do not appear too hopeful, with both Conservatives and Liberals approaching the dangerous point of disintegration through continuing factionalism. It could be said that the bipartisan agreement has resulted in a kind of truce between the two traditional parties but at the same

time in the increase of the factional fights within each of them. The bipartisan arrangement has tended to prevent the formal emergence of a third party because with spoils divided in advance between the two traditional organizations, every aspirant politician must bill himself as the one or the other unless he can afford to get along without any spoils at all. In spite of this, it may be ventured that the appearance of new forces in politics, which are competing for power with the older, traditional groups, and the increasing political role of organized labor may result in novel political alignments out of which other parties which will give more forceful and dramatic presentation of socioeconomic problems may arise. The impact of the Cuban Revolution in some segments of society should not be underestimated, and the ghost of Gaitán still roams the Colombian slums and countryside. Disillusionment with the traditional parties will strengthen the appeals to extremisms of both the Right and the Left. Impatient social and economic demands will heighten the attraction of drastic revolution (even if this is clothed in totalitarian garb) over gradualist democratic evolution.

NOTES

1. A scheme of collaboration of two major parties, the *Oesterreichische Volkspartei* (OeVP) and the *Sozialistische Partei Oesterreichs* (SPOe) has existed in Austria since 1945. Taking the form of a coalition government, it has some similarities with the Colombian experiment. For the evolution and nature of this coalition see, Herbert P. Secher, "Coalition Government: the Case of the Second Austrian Republic," *American Political Science Review*, LII, 3 (September, 1958), 791-808.

2. John Martz, *Colombia* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 249. This recent work is an excellent systematic analysis of contemporary Colombian politics. The author is much indebted to Mr. Martz for allowing him to use it in galley and page proofs form before its publication.

3. Federico G. Gil, "Responsible Parties in Latin America," *Journal of Politics*, XV, 3 (August, 1953), 336.

4. International Labour Office, *The Landless Farmer in Latin America* (Geneva: 1957), pp. 9-10.

5. Martz, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

6. Orlando Fals Borda, *Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes: A Sociological Study of Saucio* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955), p. 195.

7. Preston E. James, *Latin America* (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1959), p. 99.
8. Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-18.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
11. Gerardo Molina, *Proceso y destino de la libertad* (Bogotá: Biblioteca de la Universidad Libre, 1955), p. 255.
12. Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
13. Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), p. 66.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
15. Donald Marquand Dozer, "The Roots of Revolution in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1945), p. 283.
16. Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
18. Fluharty, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
19. Lewis Hanke, *Mexico and the Caribbean* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), p. 55.
20. Fluharty, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
21. Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
22. Fluharty, *op. cit.*, p. 316.
23. *New York Times*, August 2, 1956, p. 15.
24. For the text of the "Pact of Sitges" see Lewis Hanke, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-160.
25. E. Gordon Alderfer, "The People Sí—Colombian Communities Build a New Life," *Americas* (May, 1961), pp. 2-9.
26. Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 264. Also "Sume y compare," *Semana*, (March 24-30, 1960), p. 9.
27. Quoted in Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
28. *Frente Liberal Popular*, a leftist group of *gaitanistas* followers.
29. "Sume y compare," *Semana*, (March 24-30, 1960), p. 9.
30. Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-309.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-329.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

Part III

THE ECONOMY

Carlos Garcés O.: GENERAL ASPECTS OF COLOMBIA'S
AGRICULTURE

I. Introduction

COLOMBIA'S AGRICULTURE is much too complicated and is dependent on too many factors to cover all its aspects and all that has been written and discussed even in as general a report as this. One half of the Colombian population produces the food for the other half and productivity is extremely low. Colombia is making great efforts toward industrialization and is trying to mechanize the cultivation of crops such as cotton, rice, sugar cane, cereals, etc. The old-style farming methods are in marked contrast to the new farming techniques and the farmers located on the steep Andean slopes are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with mechanized production. There are many problems in Colombia, such as lack of rural education, small properties (minifundia), lack of communications and transportation, low per capita incomes, housing, etc. However, it is undeniable that great progress has been made during the last decade in housing, roads, transportation, textile industries, agriculture, and administrative organization.

This report presents only a general view of Colombia's agriculture and therefore omits many aspects which no doubt are very important but whose inclusion would make it much too extensive.

Geographical Location. Colombia, a growing, tropical country with impressive possibilities, lies south of Florida, in the northwest

corner of Latin America. It is located between $4^{\circ}13'$ south of the Equator and $12^{\circ}30'$ north, and between $66^{\circ}50'$ and $79^{\circ}0'$ east of the Greenwich meridian. It extends 750 miles along the Pacific, 1,000 miles along the Caribbean, and 5,840 miles along its frontiers with other countries.

Geography has exerted a considerable influence on Colombia's history. The high mountain ranges which constitute a series of climatic levels have also acted as barriers dividing the country into different regions, each with its own social and economic requirements and corresponding production, transportation, and distribution problems.

Three great finger-like mountain chains fan northwards across the country from the Ecuadorian Andean line. These three mountain chains are the Western, Central, and Eastern cordilleras. Nearly half of Colombia is made up of these cordilleras and their valleys. The Pacific Ocean lies along the foot of the Western Cordillera while the Llanos, or vast plains, lie along the foot of the Eastern Cordillera. Running toward the Caribbean are two rivers, the Magdalena (1,100 miles) and the Cauca (843 miles) which are vital arteries for the economic development of Colombia.

The Western Cordillera, approximately 750 miles long and comprising 29,200 square miles, is the lowest of the three, its highest peak being 16,000 feet.

The Central Cordillera is the highest. It averages 11,500 feet, its highest peak being 16,800 feet. This cordillera covers an area of about 42,300 square miles.

The Eastern Cordillera, comprising about 50,000 square miles, is second in height and first in length and breadth. The Savannah of Bogotá is located there at an altitude of 8,850 feet.

The two flat plains of the Cauca and Magdalena valleys, which are the potential agricultural areas of Colombia, are located between these cordilleras. East of the Andes lie the vast tropical plains and forests which extend toward the southern tip of Colombia.

The three cordilleras and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, which account for most of Colombia's total area and which in places reach altitudes greater than 15,000 feet, are too steep and abrupt for agricultural production.

The northern region of Colombia, the Guajira, and some parts of central and southern Colombia, such as Tolima and the northern section of the Huila, have not been economically exploited as yet because of their arid or semiarid characteristics.

On the other hand, the regions situated along the Magdalena and Cauca rivers in the north central part of Colombia, as well as the basin of the Atrato River in the Chocó and the southeastern regions, are composed of marshes which have not yet been explored and whose incorporation into agriculture would incur enormous drainage and flood-control expenses.^{1*}

It is estimated that these lands account for 12 per cent of the surface of the departments and 21 per cent of the national lands. The Llanos and the greater part of eastern Colombia are composed of mostly unexplored lands. Their vegetative layer is very poor and they need a great deal of improvement in order to be made suitable for cultivation.

Erosion and Logging. Kotschwar² calculated that 1 million square kilometers of present Colombia were covered with forests at the time of the discovery of America and that more than half of these forests have been destroyed up to the present day. This destruction is carried out at the rate of some 3,000 square kilometers a year and is tending to increase, because of the growth of population. Nearly 200,000 square kilometers of the lands cleared are now eroded and sterile.

Soil erosion is considered one of the most important problems affecting Colombia today. The continuous use of the land, in certain regions for 400 years, with no conservation techniques, no adequate use of fertilizers, no rotation, and the constant burning of brush, has resulted in a loss of fertility in the soil and has accelerated its destruction. Erosion has reached alarming stages in the departments of North Santander, Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Huila, Nariño, Cauca, and Santander. Sheet erosion affects the level areas, and the soil on slopes is continually being washed away by torrential rains due to the uncontrolled cutting of trees.

According to Lebret, the average amount of severe erosion in

*Notes to this chapter are on page 140.

Colombia is 7 per cent of the total area eroded. The area of intermediate erosion is 26 per cent and the area of slight erosion is 67 per cent of the total eroded area. The greater amount of severe erosion occurs in the departments.

The slopes of the cordilleras, with the exception of those on the Pacific and Llanos sides, have been heavily cleared. The clearing of extensive areas in Nariño, Huila, and Cauca has reached alarming proportions, and no effort has been made to reforest. The steep slopes and summits of the cordilleras have been cleared to make way for crops such as corn. This, too, accelerates the process of erosion. The faulty conservation of roadside banks and the permanent destruction of forests carried out along the rivers and waterways have helped to increase the washing away of the soil.

The estimated amount of soil lost through erosion is impressive. According to Lebret, technicians of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia in the Chinchiná Experimental Station have estimated that the equivalent of a 50-acre farm with a humus layer one foot deep is lost every day in the Department of Caldas. Passing through eleven departments, the Magdalena River deposits some 100 million cubic meters of sediment in the Caribbean every year.

Climate. The rains, the primary factor on which Colombia's agriculture depends, are distributed in two rather variable seasons (two winters and two summers) with a more intense periodic cycle approximately every 11 years. For many years, the lack of properly equipped and well-distributed meteorological stations has held back a more accurate estimation of the rainy seasons in Colombia. The rainy season starts at the beginning of the year in the southern areas of Colombia and moves north with the passing of the months. In the north the dry season comes in March and April. The Chocó region, a very rainy area, is an exception to this rule because of its location. After the first rainy season, which lasts two or three months, a dry period moves from south to approximately 8°N. From September to October, the rains sweep across the whole country from north to south, reaching a high degree of intensity at times.

The rainy seasons of the northern and southern areas of Colombia are separated by a central region influenced by the rainfall patterns on both sides. Thus, although this central region has two dry and two

wet seasons, the total precipitation exceeds the rainfall of either the northern or the southern area.³

The west coast has a very heavy precipitation: less intense in the central area and of the same intensity on both flanks of the Eastern Cordillera. Data for 1959 show that while Andagoya (Chocó) had a rainfall of 289 inches, Santa Marta had only 27.4 inches, Bogotá 30.4 inches, Villavicencio 208 inches, and Uribia 12 inches.⁴

Total Area in Colombia. Colombia has a total area of 1,138,538 square kilometers of which the departments account for 578,864 (51 per cent) and the *intendencias* and *comisariás* 559,474 (49 per cent). Of this total area, some 633,355 square kilometers (56 per cent) are uninhabited forests. The urban land consists of only some 15,000 square kilometers (1 per cent); agriculture accounts for 30,000 (2 per cent) and pastures are estimated at 320,000 (28 per cent).⁵ This means that less than one-third of the country is actually being exploited. Colombia occupies the last place in area cultivated in Latin America. Lebrecht feels that this is a good thing, since there exists the possibility of incorporating large areas into agriculture.

Of the 2,945,500 hectares at present under cultivation, 760,000 use mechanical equipment. This is only 7.6 per cent of the total area suitable for mechanization, estimated at 10 million hectares. The departments of Valle, Cauca, Tolima, Huila, Magdalena, and Córdoba are the most mechanized, averaging one tractor for every 100 to 147 hectares. The less mechanized departments of Antioquia, Caldas, and Nariño average a tractor for approximately every 2,400 hectares.

The areas suitable for mechanization in Colombia, which are the best lands due to their fertility and the slightness of their slopes, are used mainly for cattle or industrial crops, such as sugar cane and cotton. Other areas which show possibilities for mechanization, but are unusable at present, are being investigated to see if they can be reclaimed through irrigation, drainage, and flood control. It has been calculated that, once reclamation works are finished in the Department of the Valle, 96,000 hectares will be available for intensive production while the total area reclaimed for intensive use in the whole of Colombia will be a little over 1 million hectares, with an estimated cost of 1,500 million pesos.⁶

Table 1 shows that most of the land in Colombia is practically idle.

TABLE 1
PRESENT LAND USES IN COLOMBIA

Crops	Area (in hectares)	Total	Per Cent of Total
<i>Annual</i>			
Corn	700,000		
Wheat	175,000		
Rice	171,000		
Cotton	147,500		
Potatoes	115,000		
Beans	85,000		
Manihot	76,000		
Legumes	75,000		
Barley	53,000		
Tobacco	22,000		
Garlic and onions	20,000		
Sesame	17,000		
Other vegetables	17,000	1,673,500	56.8
<i>Permanent</i>			
Coffee	813,000		
Plantain	120,000		
Sugar cane (for brown sugar)	110,000		
Other fruits	77,000		
Bananas	45,000		
Cocoa	32,000		
Sugar cane (for mills)	29,000		
Fique (for fiber)	20,000		
Sugar cane (for molasses)	13,000		
Coconut (for copra)	5,000		
Coconut (for pulp)	4,000		
Rubber	4,000	1,272,000	43.2
		2,945,500	100.0

Source: Aguilera Camacho y J. Ramírez P. *Reforma agraria, proyecto de ley, pliego de modificaciones y ponencia de los HH. Representantes* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nal., 1959), p. 115.

Population. Colombia's population for 1960 was calculated at nearly 14,771,000 inhabitants, which represents an increase of 3,300,000 people over the 1951 census. The rural population for 1961 is approximately 51.2 per cent of the total population, and the urban population 48.8 per cent. It is estimated that the urban population in 1963 will surpass the rural, and that at the end of this decade the total Colombian population will reach 20 million people.

The distribution of the total population is very irregular, most of it being concentrated in the west, on the slopes of the cordilleras, and along the Atlantic coast. In 1960, roughly 2.4 per cent of the population occupied 55.2 per cent of the national area, which means that nearly all the inhabitants were located in the mountainous departments.⁷ Many social, economic, and political factors have tended to concentrate the population in the urban zones. While, according to Comisión Económica Para América Latina (CEPAL), the annual growth rate of the urban population between 1938 and 1958 was 4.2 per cent, the rural increased only 1.2 per cent annually.⁸ This is equivalent to an increase in urban population of 2,650,000 people and of 662,000 in rural population.

Colombia has one of the largest demographic growths in Latin America and, indeed, in the world. Its rate of growth is greater than that of Latin America as a whole. The yearly growth rate has been estimated at 2.9 per cent. Nevertheless, it is thought that Colombia has considerable possibilities for expansion of usable land and will be able to improve the living conditions of its people without any drastic birth-control measures being necessary.

The exodus of the rural population toward the cities has accounted for 40 per cent of the rise in urban population. This exodus to the urban areas has greatly increased the demand on public services, which are already inadequate. Housing has gone up and municipal services are poor. There is an increase in unemployment, yet at the same time economic activities have been increased, especially in industry.

The Colombian population is characterized as being a "young population" with a relatively low percentage of "active" inhabitants (15 to 64 years) and a large proportion of children and young people who add little to the productive total and cause an average low rate of production.

The present active population is about 7.8 million people. According to Planeación this group will increase within the next five years at an annual rate of 3 per cent, as shown in Table 2.

One of the biggest problems facing Colombia is the future utilization of its active population, which is continually increasing and demanding work. The urban working population has increased by

some million people from 1951 to 1960, the greater proportion being dedicated to industry, construction, commerce, and public services, while the active rural population during the same period increased by only 400,000 people. It is expected that the working population will continue increasing at an approximate rate of 150,000 workers a year, which must be absorbed mainly by the urban centers. The rural population will be a smaller and smaller part of Colombia's future population since the agricultural industry can absorb only from 30,000 to 40,000 additional people a year.

TABLE 2
COMPOSITION BY AGES OF COLOMBIAN POPULATION
(thousands of inhabitants)

Age groups	1951	1960	1971
0-14	4,984	6,538	8,640
15-64	6,174	7,829	10,928
65 and more	301	404	601
Total	11,459	14,771	20,169

Source: Colombia, Departamento Administrativo de Planeación, *Plan cuatrienal de inversiones públicas nacionales, 1961-1964* (1960), p. 278.

Since the factories employ only some 12,000 new workers a year, nearly 90,000 workers will be looking for employment in the cities, which cannot absorb them all.

The working force in Colombia for 1960 is estimated at 4.8 million people; 3.9 million men and 900,000 women. Since the growth rate is about equal to that of the total population, by 1965 this work force should have increased by some 770,000, that is, an average of 154,000 a year.

The distribution of the population in 1959 was approximately:

Agriculture	49.1 per cent	Industry	20.2 per cent
Mining	1.5 per cent	Services	29.2 per cent

On the other hand, the proportion of national production during the same year was the following:

Agriculture	34.2 per cent	Construction	3.7 per cent
Mining	4.1 per cent	Commerce	15.1 per cent
Manufacturing industry	17.2 per cent	Services	25.6 per cent

More than one-third of the national production comes from agriculture, which is not only the greatest source of work for the Colombian people, but which has more jobs available than any other activity.

The birth rate of the agricultural sectors is 3.3 which surpasses that of over-all population by 0.4. Although agricultural statistics are inaccurate and suffer many defects, the data collected up to the present indicate that the production of basic foods (corn, manihot, plantain, brown sugar, beans, garlic), which accounts for one-fifth of the agricultural production, has increased at the same rate as the population, and therefore there has been no increase in per capita production. Livestock (excluding its subproducts), which represents one-third of the agricultural production, has increased at a lower rate than the population.⁹

The gross internal income for 1959 was 19,337.8 million pesos, of which 4,244 million came from agriculture, including forestry, and 2,572.5 million came from livestock, including fishing. These are 21.9 per cent and 13.3 per cent, respectively, of the total income (1958 prices).

The annual development of production in agriculture and livestock has been slow in relation to other sectors such as industry and construction.

II. Land Holding

Land tenure arrangement in Colombia, developed throughout its history, plays an important part in Colombia's agricultural development and in the complex socioeconomic problems which have given rise to a general interest in a different system of land distribution. Because of this, it seems wise to make a general résumé of this distribution process, which has been studied by many people, among them H. Toro Agudelo, one of the initiators of agrarian reform in Colombia.¹⁰

During its conquests, the Spanish Crown took over many lands, later distributing these lands among the *conquistadores* as a reward for their services. The natives were assigned more or less large areas of land, or "reservations," and lands near newly formed towns were incorporated into their limits and called "the commons." The buying and selling system later took hold as a new way of obtaining lands as well as of the clearing up and legalizing of titles.

During the colonial period, vast areas situated around central towns passed into private and ecclesiastical hands, leaving these towns surrounded by huge properties.

During the Republic, Law 13 of 1821 abolished the Spanish system of appropriation but recognized the titles which had already been acquired through this system. Since then, idle lands have been acquired through the sale, occupation, prescription, and economic exploitation of the same. The general appropriation system now used by rural settlers is occupation, followed by the construction of housing, the formation of natural or artificial pastures, livestock production, etc.

Many lands were donated to the soldiers as a reward for their work and in several cases these lands have remained idle.

Law 200 of 1936 modified land tenure arrangements in an effort to stimulate and protect the rural settler. However, Law 100 of 1944 canceled many of these benefits.

The rural worker has managed to subsist in areas far from consumption centers by simply settling on the land and cultivating it. These areas lack roads and railroads, have bad sanitation, and in most cases have poor agronomical characteristics. The large areas of flat lands, or those suitable for agriculture found near towns and with high productivity, are in the hands of landholders and large farm owners, or in the hands of speculators who patiently await an increase in their value.

The native tribes held on to their lands, or "backwoods," which they cultivated and administered under a communal system for a long time. However, during the eighteenth century the Spanish Crown divided these lands among whites and half-castes, reserving the right to one-sixth in order to cover administration and school expenses. In this way, there came to be many small property owners

who frequently sold their lots, thus forming large dominions covering extensive areas.

The systematic despoliation of land from the Indians was a policy followed throughout Colombia's history. One of the main reasons for this policy, according to Toro Agudelo, was the wish to eliminate a collective type of economy and concentrate on the development of a more dynamic and stable agriculture through the creation of a large number of proprietors with pride of ownership. The Indians who received land, however, immediately proceeded to sell it, changing their status from that of land owners to land workers on large ranches. Some of them kept their lands, only to divide them still more among their heirs and successive generations.

The commons, or public lands which had been donated by the Spaniards to the respective towns for use as pastures and crop production, were greatly desired because of their nearness to markets and labor. In many instances these lands were illegally distributed and are still a cause of lawsuits and social revolutions.

The large properties, stemming, as has already been pointed out, from rewards made by the Spanish Crown to its soldiers for their conquests, gave rise to a class of landholders which spread rapidly throughout arable valleys and plains, using these lands for extensive livestock breeding which required little labor and long-term investments.

The distribution of land granted to the Church, which in 1861 through a decree issued by the government passed into private hands, did not have much influence on the land-tenure situation. The large properties simply passed from the Church into the hands of rich ranchers, without the small farmers having a chance to acquire any of it.

The colonization system operating in Colombia and the lack of organization and suitable credit facilities have all contributed to the formation of large properties in certain areas, since lands opened up in the forests and producing cash crops are then sold to ranchers who continue to expand their pastures for the breeding and raising of livestock. Transient farming as a means of agricultural exploitation is a vicious practice which has taken root in Colombia.

Land tenure systems in Colombia vary among departments.

Ranches prevail along the coastal regions where there is extensive livestock raising; on flat, mechanizable lands along the main rivers; and in some of the mountainous regions of the Andes. Large properties prevail in the Cauca Valley, Córdoba, and Tolima—flat mechanizable regions which cultivate sugar cane, rice, and cotton. Medium-sized and small properties are mainly located in the western coffee regions, on lands which are not suitable for mechanization. Small properties predominate in some parts of the coffee zone, especially in the departments of Nariño, in the southern parts of Colombia, and in the central regions such as Boyacá, Cundinamarca, and Santander. The ranches employ systems of technical cultivation which result in a greater productivity per unit of area and a better use and efficiency of manual labor. They generally use medium or large amounts of capital, and wage earners predominate. Cattle ranches, located in the Valle and Cauca, and cultivating also sugar cane, rice, and cacao, are examples of this type of exploitation.

The latifundio is a piece of large property which uses very little manual labor. Although the term "large property" (latifundio) is generally associated with great expanses of privately-owned land, there is no really fixed dividing line between the large property and the ranch. The difference is based more on the kind of exploitation carried out.

Colombia does not have accurate data on rural properties, nor does it have a census on agricultural production. The data obtained by the National Agricultural Samples and some local investigations cannot be taken literally and are useful only as a general source of information. Many properties are declared smaller than they really are in order to avoid taxes, and many properties have not been included in cadastral registers. There are, therefore, many indications that the concentration of rural properties is actually larger than we are led to believe by available statistics.¹¹

The large number of farms with less than one hectare is one of the main factors that influence the economy of the agricultural population of Colombia, and is one of the causes of the present social unrest.

The following table shows the distribution of rural properties according to their size.

TABLE 3
COLOMBIAN FARMS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO SIZE

Hectares	Number of Farms	Per Cent
Less than 1	324,374	18.51
From 1 to 5	513,826	29.33
6 - 10	417,176	23.81
11 - 20	299,950	17.12
21 - 50	116,401	6.64
51 - 100	50,007	2.85
101 - 200	10,268	.59
201 - 500	14,742	.84
501 - 1000	3,380	.19
1001 - 2500	1,450	.08
2501 - 5000	444	.02
More than 5000	75	.01
Total	1,752,093	100.00

Sources: Ministerio de Agricultura, *Documentación sobre explotaciones agrícolas, tenencia de la tierra, colonización y reforma agraria* (1959), 69 p.; Camacho y Ramírez, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

About 72 per cent of the farms are small properties, including those of up to ten hectares of land, and 2 per cent are large properties, including farms of more than 100 hectares. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Agriculture estimates that the owners of farms of up to five hectares represent 56 per cent of the total operators, yet they possess only 4 per cent of the total cultivated area; while the large property owners represent only 4 per cent of all landholders and possess nearly 64 per cent of the cultivated land.¹²

The great variation in the sizes of rural properties and the unequal balance which exists in land holdings are the reasons why two diametrically opposed systems of agricultural production have been established in Colombia: that of the small properties and that of the large properties. In general, large properties represent the concentration of the best lands in properties dedicated to livestock and administered in a very rudimentary fashion completely lacking in scientific techniques. To many landholders, their lands are purely a speculative business rather than an economic and productive investment.

On the other hand, the small property represents a very concen-

trated cultivation of poor land whose topography does not allow the use of mechanical equipment and whose cultivation is uneconomical. The majority of the Colombian farmers are located on the poorer lands, especially in the mountainous regions, and barely produce enough for their own living and certainly not enough to allow them to finance a better cultivation of their lands.

In 1956, 87 per cent of the land was in the hands of proprietors, while the colonization areas were only 5.4 per cent. Leasers occupied 3.3 per cent of the lands and the *aparceros*¹³ occupied 2.7 per cent. There is a great variation in tenure among growers of the different crops. Seventy-nine per cent of the coffee farms are operated by proprietors, while only 44 per cent of the cotton farms and 25 per cent of the tobacco farms are operated by proprietors. Also, 94 per cent of the coffee farms and 75 per cent of the cotton farms are less than ten hectares and 90 per cent of the tobacco farms are less than one hectare.¹⁴

III. Cultivation Systems

Colombia's agriculture may be divided into four types, each with its own characteristics.

Coffee Farms. Coffee being the main Colombia export and therefore the principal source of foreign exchange, its cultivation is the backbone of Colombia's economy. The coffee plantations are situated on the slopes of the Eastern and Central cordilleras, in a temperate climate, at an altitude between 1,800 and 2,200 meters. They are mainly concentrated in the departments of Caldas, Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Valle, and Tolima. The coffee industry is a specialized sector of the small property system; generally the production per farm is small and labor is usually kept within the family. Of a total of 400,000 coffee farms in Colombia, 87 per cent have less than 5,000 trees and consist of less than five hectares.¹⁵

Subsistence Agriculture. This system is characterized by the smallness of the holdings which vary from one to ten hectares. Labor is kept within the family and dedicated to an intensive cultivation of the land. No capital whatsoever is invested. The farms situated on the Andean uplands in the Eastern Cordillera are mainly dedicated to the cultivation of potatoes, wheat, barley, and vegetables. In the

warm climates, the cultivation is more diversified and includes cacao, plantain, yuca or sweet potato, corn and beans. In the temperate zones, they grow corn and beans, hemp (fique), citrus and other fruits, vegetables and flowers. This system yields only enough for the subsistence of the farmer and his family, any small surplus being sold in the local market each week, or sold to speculators who transport their purchases to the central markets for reselling, making more than 100 per cent profit on the way.

Cattle Ranches. The cattle ranches are situated on the fertile, flat or slightly rolling lands of the valleys and savannahs of the Cauca, Sinú, and Magdalena valleys, as well as in the eastern Llanos. New cattle ranches are opening up in Antioquia and Meta. Their characteristics and exploitation systems have already been described.

Commercial Crops. The exploitation of lands for commercial purposes has increased considerably during the last few years, thanks to several factors which have stimulated the production of food or of products utilized in industries. The cultivation of sugar cane for mills is concentrated in the Cauca Valley, while the cultivation of this crop for the manufacture of *panela* (brown sugar blocks) is widespread. Bananas for exporting are grown in the Santa Marta zone. Though this crop used to be in the hands of foreign companies, it has now passed into the hands of the small producers. New areas which could be utilized for the production of bananas, are being studied on the southern Pacific coast and the Urabá Gulf. The cultivation of cacao, which used to be a major export crop and which was produced extensively in Huila, Cauca, Valle, and Antioquia, has not increased in spite of the efforts made by the government and chocolate companies to boost its production.

The introduction of mechanized production techniques, the use of support prices, and the use of improved varieties with high yields have helped to develop an intensive commercial agriculture in large areas. These lands, which have been used for cattle or have remained idle, are now producing cotton, rice, or corn in the warm zones, or potatoes, wheat, or barley in the higher areas. This type of mechanized cultivation, generally carried out by city people who look for investments that promise quick returns, utilizes all the newest cultivation techniques except those used for fertilization.

By studying these four types of agricultural production we see the great difference in their methods, resources, and future outlook. Most of the progress in agricultural production has taken place in the mechanized cultivation of crops, such as sugar cane, cotton, corn, and wheat. These crops have had the economic backing necessary for the immediate adoption of new cultivation practices. Subsistence agriculture, on the other hand, continues along the same path it has always trod, and the new agronomical techniques brought by extension agents catch on very slowly. The main reason for this is that the country's culture is at a very low level and economic resources are scarce. Then too, the majority of Colombia's rural population can neither read nor write and there is a great lack of well-trained personnel to remedy the situation. Colombia has only 900 agronomists, of which a large percentage work individually or for semiofficial organizations. There is a calculated deficit of 1,890 of these professionals. The small farmers also lack modern tools to work with. Elementary practices, such as crop rotation, the use of fertilizers, the use of organic waste matter, the use of animals as a work force, contour farming, and pest and disease control, are almost unknown to them.

According to information gathered by the Oficina de Planeación, agricultural production in Colombia, including coffee, increased by some 19 per cent during the last ten years. This gives an average yearly increase of less than 2 per cent. This production rate is much lower than the rate of increase of population, and it is a clear indication that agriculture and livestock have increased at much slower rates than other economic sectors and production in general. Table 4 gives the total value of production in Colombia during the last ten years. Compared to the number of people in the agricultural sector, their per capita production is the lowest in Colombia. The government is trying to encourage the development of Colombia's agriculture to increase the per capita production of the principal crops and introduce more variety into its production. This would help to decrease present importations and to increase the exportation of agricultural products.

There is a clear difference between the production of raw materials for industry and of food products. While the latter have increased only by some 2 per cent during the last ten years, raw materials for

industry have practically doubled during this same period. Thus, while the production of raw materials for industry has expanded considerably, the production of foodstuffs has remained lower than the population growth.

TABLE 4
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
(prices of 1938, in millions of pesos)

Years	Agriculture	Livestock	Total Agriculture and Livestock	Total Agriculture and Livestock Except Coffee
1947-1949	3,419	1,741	5,160	3,450
1950-1952	3,530	1,589	5,119	3,494
1953-1955	4,028	1,547	5,575	3,760
1956	3,842	1,939	5,781	4,214
1957	3,946	2,057	6,003	4,296
1958	4,625	2,059	6,684	4,494
1956-1958	4,138	2,018	6,156	4,335
1959	4,608	2,075	6,681	4,633
Change in percentage 1956-1958 over 1947-1949	+ 21	+ 16	+ 19	+ 25
Average annual growth rate	+ 2.1	+ 1.7	+ 2.0	+ 2.5
Percentage over agri- culture and livestock total in 1956-1958	67	33	100	70

Source: Jorge Franco, "Departamento Administrativo de Planeación y Servicios Técnicos," *Informe al Congreso Nal.* (1960), p. 201.

On the other hand, the importation of agricultural commodities has been increasing since 1950, reaching a sum of \$80 million in 1959, CIF prices, which have remained stable since 1958. This increase of 15 per cent during the last ten years is due to the difference between home production and the increase in population.

The production of basic commodities, such as corn, beans, plantain, manihot, and potato, has increased very slowly while the production of industrial commodities, such as cotton, cacao, rice, barley, tobacco, sugar, and the oil plants, has increased tremendously

during the last few years, mainly because of the carrying out of promotion programs, improved production techniques, and prompt and efficient credit aid. The recent development of mechanized production has made possible the incorporation of level lands which, no doubt, has helped to increase the production of mechanizable crops whose products are used as raw materials by the manufacturing industry.

Foodstuffs, on the other hand, are produced on small areas not suitable for mechanization, along the slopes of the cordilleras. The influence of agricultural techniques has not reached these areas. This problem is very difficult to solve since it involves economic, social, and political factors, including inadequate use of natural resources, land tenure systems, and the lack of education for the rural worker including instruction in technical production methods and a correct use of the soil.

IV. Organizations in Charge of the Elaboration and Execution of Agricultural Programs

During the last thirty years, Colombia has tried to establish facilities which will help in the development of its agriculture. Governmental functions related to agriculture depend on official or semiofficial institutions created specifically to promote certain agricultural activities. The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of investigations and extensions through its experimental stations, demonstration farms, and National Extension Services. The Secretaries of Agriculture in each Department carry out extension programs. A few have experimental farms. Among the semiofficial institutions is the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia, which is in charge of all investigation, promotion, and sale of coffee. The Caja de Crédito Agrario, Instituto de Fomento Algodonero, Geographic Institute, and the Cattle Banks and Funds are also very important.

Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of Technical Development Programs, which are divided into six groups: Agricultural Extension, Investigations, Land, Crops, Cattle, and Natural Resources.

AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE

The Ministry's Agricultural Extension Service has 46 offices located in 14 departments and territories. Each office has a team comprised of an agronomist, a veterinarian, a home agent, and a practical agriculturist in charge of 4-H Clubs.

The Extension Service is administered directly by the Ministry or through contracts between the Ministry and other institutions. The American-Colombian Extension Service (STACA) is in charge of extension work in Boyacá, where they have already organized some 83 youth clubs with nearly 1,500 members. The Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca (CVC) is in charge of extension services in the Cauca Valley, with the cooperation of STACA and other institutions.

Besides the programs administered by the Ministry there are several extension services organized by associations, such as the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia, Instituto de Fomento Algodonero, and the Instituto Tabacalero, to improve the living conditions of the rural worker and to promote their respective crops.

Agricultural Extension, based on the North American system, has run into many roadblocks. Two of these are the lack of well-trained personnel and the lack of sociological investigations which could help remove the barriers existing between the technical personnel and the rural worker.

AGRICULTURAL INVESTIGATIONS

Agricultural investigations in Colombia are carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture's Agricultural Investigations Department (DIA) created in 1955 and run in cooperation with the Rockefeller Foundation through its Special Investigations Office (OEI).

The DIA covers all the climatic zones of Colombia through five principal investigation centers and eleven substations. It has a total of 129 technicians, 99 auxiliaries, 140 administrators, and 1,158 workers.

Investigations are carried out by DIA with a view to solving specific problems and are based on investigation programs throughout the nation. These programs are carried out at experimental stations, which have the necessary technical personnel and working facilities,

and are then duplicated at the substations and the adaptability of these results to similar areas of Colombia is determined.

The investigation programs are dedicated to the improvement of cereals, beans, potatoes, peas, sugar cane, and vegetables. The problem of bad forage, which has a tremendous influence on the raising of cattle, is also being studied to try to improve production and management of pastures, which is at present rudimentary and uneconomical.

The techniques acquired by Colombian professionals in North American universities have played an important part in the agricultural advance taking place in Colombia. These professionals are sent to the American universities by the Colombian government in cooperation with the Rockefeller Foundation. On their return these technicians join other personnel in the investigation branches and, together with North American technicians, have developed or are developing important experimental projects.

DIA is a specialized center for technical personnel, and most persons working on the investigation programs of many official or private organizations have belonged to DIA or have been trained at its experimental stations. Numerous professionals from other Latin American countries have also had the opportunity to work with this organization by means of scholarships granted by the Rockefeller Foundation.

According to data provided by the Caja de Crédito Agrario, the economic results of investigations carried out by DIA are very satisfactory and justify the capital spent on its maintenance. According to the Caja Agraria the use of improved wheat, corn, potato, and bean seeds during the five-year period from 1954 to 1959 resulted in an increase of \$66,244,726 in agricultural income.¹⁶ This income was obtained mainly through the greater yields produced by varieties and hybrids obtained at the experimental stations.

Cattle Banks and Funds. The Cattle Bank is an organization founded on mixed capital. Twenty per cent of its authorized capital of 100 million pesos comes from the state and 80 per cent from private individuals. The Bank can grant loans up to 50 per cent of its available funds, these loans being granted to the large and small livestock enterprises for farm improvement, water facilities, and other needed

farm improvements. These Banks also provide special technical services for the protection of the loan and assistance to the farmer.

The Departmental Cattle Banks and Cattle Funds, though they do not have the capacity of the Caja Agraria, play a very important part in the growth of the cattle industry. Through credit and management facilities they help in the breeding and raising of livestock. The profits are divided proportionally between the Fund and the cattlemen at the time of sale. These services have helped to open up new lands and improve pastures.

Law 26 of 1957, which legalizes the operations carried out by the Cattle Banks and Funds, states that not less than 70 per cent of its capital must be dedicated to the breeding and raising of cattle. This Law also sets a temporary tax of 1 per cent on the liquid assets for those cattlemen with more than \$15,000. The income from this tax must be invested in cattle.

Caja de Crédito Agrario. The Caja Agraria is an anonymous society established by Decree No. 1998 of 1931. It has as its objectives the carrying out of agricultural and livestock credit and promotion services; the importation and sale of materials needed by the farmers; the production, storage, and manufacture of agricultural and livestock produce. It also promotes colonization activities and is in charge of the parcelization of land and the construction of rural dwellings. The Caja has an authorized capital of 300 million pesos.

The Caja grants loans exceeding a billion pesos of which about 487 million are destined to agriculture and 517 million to livestock, comprising nearly a quarter of a million loans.¹⁷ The Caja has a total of some 6,000 workers, including agronomist engineers in charge of machinery, the production and increase of improved seeds, colonization, supervised credit, etc.

The Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute. This Institute, founded in 1935 as a branch of the Ministry of War, has been functioning since 1957 as a decentralized, autonomous society with legally recognized personnel. It has its own sources of income in addition to general tax sources. Among the Institute's functions are the elaboration of military, geographic, agrolological, and cadastral maps, and the study and classification of soils for agricultural purposes. These studies also serve as a base for cadastral evaluations.

The Institute has 450 employees, of which 50 are professionals and 200 auxiliary technicians. The remainder are office or field staff. The Institute's budget for 1959 was \$8 million.

The Agrological Department of this Institute is responsible for all photoanalysis and agrological studies in the field, physical and chemical soil analysis, soil valuation, agrological maps, and the elaboration of monographies.

An ecological map of Colombia, made in collaboration with the OEA, is almost completed. The first phase in a soil reconnaissance manual has also been completed.

Soil studies have been carried out on 19,718,256 hectares, or 17.3 per cent of the total area of Colombia. Of these, 11,912,182 have been studied under a general type reconnaissance, 3,082,061 under a semidetained survey, and 650,783 under a detailed survey. Though most of these surveys have been carried out by this Institute, a few have been done by IFA and other similar organizations and private technicians.¹⁸

Instituto de Fomento Algodonero (IFA). IFA was established in 1948 by the cotton textile industry of Colombia. This organization was established as a nonprofit organization, solely to promote the cultivation of cotton. Later on, the government signed a contract with this Institute for promotion, experimentation, and technical assistance of cotton production. Under this contract the administrative structure of the Institute was modified, and it passed into the hands of industrialists and producers, with a small economic grant from the government. The shares paid by the different groups were converted into a type of tax and a balance was reached between the interests of producers and industrialists.

V. Development of Agricultural Production

The investigation programs carried out by DIA are so numerous it is impossible to give details of each. For this reason a few of the most important in the solution of the deficit in production have been chosen. This will also give us an opportunity to present the work of DIA, whose organization and efficiency are on a par with the best experimental centers of the world.

Corn. One of the basic foods in most regions of Colombia, corn is one of the most widespread crops produced in this country, thanks to its multiple uses. It is grown at altitudes ranging from sea level to a little more than 2,600 meters.

The investigation program on the improvement of corn was initiated in Medellín by the Agricultural College in 1945. This program was intensified with the establishment of a Special Studies Office of the Rockefeller Foundation. This office was originally established in Medellín in the Tulio Ospina Agricultural Experimental Station, which at that time was annexed to the College. Lately, these programs have been carried out in various centers located at different climatic levels:¹⁹ for the tropical zone, in Montería (altitude 20 meters); for the intermediate zone, between the medium and temperate levels, in Palmira (1,000 meters); temperate climate zone, in Tulio Ospina (1,500 meters); the intermediate zone between temperate and cold climate, in La Selva (2,200 meters); and the cold zone, in Tibaitatá (2,600 meters).

These programs are directed towards obtaining selected varieties, synthetics, and hybrids with high yields and good agronomical characteristics. The production of double hybrids has been considerably increased in the Montería and Palmira centers, to supply demands from the Sinú and the Cauca Valley, agricultural zones with a high degree of mechanization.

Between 1953 and 1957, 2,467,236 kilograms of improved seeds were distributed, sown on 131,585 hectares with an average production of 3,370 kilograms per hectare. The average production of the common varieties was 2,800 kilograms per hectare. The value of this increase in production was \$29,606,626.

During 1958 more than 533,000 kilograms of improved corn seeds were distributed, sown on 28,439 hectares, and yielded a greater crop than before, with a value of \$6,398,753.

The International Bank of Germinal Plasma of Corn was established at the Tulio Ospina Experimental Station. This Bank is controlled by the Committee for the Preservation of Native Corn Breeds of the National Research Council (National Academy of Science) of the United States. In this Bank are deposited seeds from thousands of corn collections gathered from the various American countries.

These collections are periodically renewed by sowing small plots in DIA's experimental stations under similar climatic conditions to those found in the country of origin of the particular seed. The Bank provides many countries with material, as an example of international cooperation.

Wheat. The program for the improvement of wheat is in the hands of the Agricultural Investigation Center of Tibaitatá, the best equipped center in Colombia, and the substations in Obonuco (Nariño) and Bonza (Boyacá). These three experimental centers are located in the cold zone. Some experiments have also been carried out in the semiwarm climate center in Palmira.

National wheat production is approximately only 150,000 tons. Nearly 100,000 tons are imported, at a cost of 40 million pesos.

The improved varieties *Menkemen* and *Bonza* were the first varieties to be provided by the improvement program. These varieties, when cultivated in their adaptation areas with appropriate cultivation practices, have surpassed the yields of the common varieties by some 20 to 30 per cent.

The insufficiency of the present wheat production to meet demands and the need to find a crop suitable for rotation with rice in the mechanizable regions of the Valle and Tolima have induced investigations to find a variety of wheat which can be cultivated in these zones. It has been calculated that the sowing of 100,000 hectares, at present under rice or idle in these departments, would increase wheat production by nearly 200,000 tons a harvest.

A very important part of the wheat program is the finding of a rust resistant variety especially resistant to *P. glumarum* and to dwarfness. Dwarfness is believed to be a virus disease and is present in the southern parts of Colombia (Nariño).

The improved wheat seeds produced by the wheat program have been sent to various Latin American countries, as well as to Asia and Europe.

From 1953 to 1957, more than five and a half million kilograms of improved seeds were distributed. These seeds were planted on 56,000 hectares, with a production of 1.5 tons per hectare, while the common seeds gave yields of 0.8 ton. The results obtained with both improved and common seeds were as follows:

Total production in 56,000 hectares	Production in million kilograms	Value of production in million pesos	Greater yield
Improved seeds	84	74.9	35 million
Common seeds	44	39.9	pesos

In 1958, 1,900,000 kilograms of improved seeds were distributed and planted on 19,000 hectares, with the following results:

Total production in 19,000 hectares	Millions of kilograms	Cost in millions	Greater cost in millions
Improved seeds	28.5	\$25.42	\$11.87
Common seeds	15.2	13.55	

Potatoes. During 1958-1959, 586,784 kilograms of "Monserrate" potatoes, an improved variety, were distributed. These were sown on 293 hectares, with an average production of 20 tons per hectare, while the yields of common varieties were only 10 tons per hectare. The increase in value due to the increase in production was nearly a million pesos.

Beans. Though only 75 tons of improved bean seeds were distributed between 1954-1959, the yield increase of these varieties was 300 kilograms per hectare with a greater value of \$733,600.

The results obtained up to the present predict a considerable increase in agricultural production when improved seeds are distributed among the farmers. It is estimated that the 175,000 hectares now producing wheat, and which are producing 142,400 tons a year, will increase their production to 267,000 tons by using improved varieties. This is equivalent to an increase of 87.5 per cent. The 700,000 hectares under corn and producing 1,960,000 tons, could produce 2,319,000 tons, or 20 per cent more. Potatoes are produced on an area of 115,000 hectares with an annual yield of 1,740,000 tons. Improved varieties will increase this yield to 3,480,000 tons, which is an increase of 100 per cent. In the same way, the 85,000 hectares now under beans could produce 144,000 tons, instead of the 115,000 tons now obtained with the common varieties. This is a 25 per cent increase.

Cotton. At present occupying one of the first places in the national

economy, cotton presents an extremely promising future. The establishment, consolidation, and expansion of the cotton industry has taken place in only 12 years. During this period, the Instituto de Fomento Algodonero (IFA) has been in charge of its development.

Colombia produces two cotton harvests a year. The first takes place on the Atlantic coast; in the departments of Antioquia, Atlántico, Córdoba, Bolívar, Magdalena, and Santander; and in the Intendencia of Guajira. This zone accounts for a little more than one-third of the total area under cotton, and the volume of cotton produced barely meets the demands of the national industry during the first half of the year. Generally, sowing takes place in August and harvesting from January until the end of March. The second harvest takes place in the central zone, in the departments of Caldas, Tolima, Huila, and Valle. This harvest is sown in March and April and harvested from June to September. It was here, in 1936, that the production of cotton first took place, even though previous trials had failed completely. Although it is possible to obtain two crops a year from one area, there are severe restrictions which limit the cultivation in each zone to one crop a year. One of these is the necessity to control the development of plagues such as the Alabama boll worm, the pink boll worm, and others.

Colombia has other possible areas for the production of cotton which are being developed as fast as practicable. These areas are located near the zones already being cultivated or in zones which need irrigation or drainage works.

The production and consumption table for the decade 1951-1960 shows a constant expansion of the areas sown to cotton between 1951 and 1955, with a corresponding increase in production. The year 1955 was an exception due to meteorological conditions which lowered production per hectare. This phenomenon was reflected in the following two years in a reduced area being cultivated. In 1958 the increase began once more, and rose sharply in 1959. In 1960 there was a slightly higher yield, and a considerable enlargement of this crop is expected for 1961 especially in zones such as the Cauca Valley.

An inspection of production and yield data show that, although the area sown in 1961 increased by $3\frac{1}{2}$ times that sown in 1951, the production of seed cotton was 10 times greater and that of fiber nearly

11 times greater. This is due to the constant increase in yield of cotton per hectare as well as a higher percentage of fiber obtained.

The spectacular increase in production between 1958 and 1959 was due partly to a gradual improvement and technification of cultivation practices and partly to the incorporation of new areas located in more favorable ecological conditions. One such area is the Cauca Valley, where the fertility of the soils and better spaced rainy seasons contributed to higher average yields than those in other cotton zones (2,056 kilograms of crude cotton per hectare as against 1,202 in other areas).²⁰

The total area cultivated in cotton between 1951 and 1960 shows an increase of 380 per cent, which is an annual average increase of 38 per cent. During this same period the total production of cotton with seed went from 479 kilograms in 1951 to 1,272 kilograms in 1960.

The fiber yield per hectare went from 163 kilograms per hectare in 1951 to 451 kilograms per hectare in 1960, showing a progressive increase for each year within that decade.²¹

The production of cotton went from some 4,000 tons per year before 1949, to 4,700 tons in 1949. In 1956 this increased to 21,000 tons and was over 155,000 in 1959. The production for 1960-1961 is estimated at a possible 200,000 tons.

In 1959 production met the demands of national textile factories, and there was a surplus of 6,000 tons. These 6,000 tons were the first fibers exported, and were bought at lower prices than those found in local markets. The success of this exportation, thanks to its being of a higher quality than many other fibers being sold in the international market, stimulated new exportations and plantings. In 1960, 30,000 tons of fiber were exported for a total price of U.S. \$18 million.

In 1960, 147,333 hectares were cultivated, producing 193,672 tons of seed cotton, which brought a price greater than 328 million pesos.

The area cultivated in 1961 is estimated at 165,000 hectares which are calculated to produce 209,983 tons of cotton, valued at 357 million pesos.

The increase in areas under cotton, however, has reduced the production of certain foodstuffs, such as corn, beans, and rice, which had

to be imported this year. This situation is more apparent in the Cauca Valley, where corn and beans have been traditionally important.

Livestock. The clearing of pastures for the development of livestock production has been a general colonizing method in Colombia. Extensive pasturage systems and little labor have long been characteristics of the livestock industry. This explains why large properties have taken up cattle raising and why agriculture occupies an equivalent of a tenth of the area used for cattle. At present, this industry is characterized by the inefficiency and backwardness of its exploitation methods.

The cattle are pastured on poor-quality fields which cannot support many animals and produce low-quality meat. The high cost of concentrated foods makes prohibitive its use in the fattening of cattle. An intensive fattening of steers has been tried during the last few years on a very reduced scale.

Milk cows have fared better, thanks to the enthusiasm of many cattlemen who have invested large sums in importing highly pedigreed animals of different breeds from whose progeny are formed exceedingly productive dairy farms. These dairy farms are generally located in the cold regions of Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Caldas, and Santander, and in the Cauca Valley near the large consuming centers.

There is an urgent need in Colombia for a radical change in the management of the livestock industry. The country needs to increase its consumption of meat, milk, and eggs, so that the per capita protein consumption will reach at least the minimum set by the Nutrition Institute.²² Recent estimates indicate that the actual daily consumption per capita is only 57 grams of meat, when 80 grams daily are required. There is an even greater deficiency in the consumption of milk since the daily per capita consumption is some 18 grams, when the daily requirement is 485 grams.

This deficiency in the consumption of animal protein is incomprehensible, since Colombia has large resources available for livestock production. The present livestock population is calculated at 15 million head, which is greater than Colombia's population.

The rate of development of the livestock industry in Colombia is greater than Colombia's rate of population growth. While the total

livestock production has increased by 1.7 per cent a year from 1950 to 1959, the production per inhabitant index for the same period has decreased by nearly 10 per cent. Various factors have contributed to this decrease, such as the insecurity in the fields, poverty and bad management of the pastures, low birth rate, and high death and disease rates.

The Oficina de Planeación estimated that a 34 per cent increase in the availability of raw meat over that for the period 1956-1958 will be needed by 1964, and a 60 per cent increase by 1970, in order to attain the levels of per capita consumption advised.

Cattle account for 81 per cent of the total meat production, and pigs for 12 per cent. The consumption of chickens, sheep, and *caprinos* account only for a small proportion, though this proportion is increasing due to more scientific chicken production.

The cattle population has been estimated at more than 13 million in 1947 and nearly 15 million to date, though there has not been a steady increase during that period. This increase was at a standstill during the period 1950-1954 and accelerated between 1958-1959. The development of the cattle population seems to be severely handicapped by the fact that the breeding herds average less than a 50 per cent calving rate. There is also a high mortality rate of 8 per cent of the cattle population, which represents a loss of 200 million pesos.

Bad soil-management practices, absence of the owners from their properties, a sense of insecurity in the country districts, cattle thieves, as well as poor management of pastures, stables, and animals, have all contributed to a slow development of the livestock business. The acute lack of animal husbandrymen in the different branches of the livestock industry has been a factor in the continued application of inadequate management practices. This condition is aggravated by the shortage of veterinarians and the lack of knowledge of the prevention and treatment of endemic diseases. The Ministry of Agriculture has calculated that total livestock industry losses run to approximately 900 million pesos a year.²³

The production of livestock available for slaughter (including contraband livestock exports) is 13.06 per cent, which indicates a very low level of efficiency.

A program put into effect by the Ministry of Agriculture in co-

operation with other organizations for the development of the cattle industry in Colombia expects to raise the birth rate from 50 per cent to 54 per cent by 1964 and to 59 per cent by 1970. This program also expects to reduce the death rate from 8 per cent to 7.15 per cent by 1964 and to 5.30 per cent by 1970. These modifications, plus better commercialization methods, are expected to increase the utilization rate from the present 13.06 to 13.65 per cent by 1964 and to 15 per cent by 1970. This would be equal to a yield of 500,000 tons of meat from cattle by 1964, and 625,000 by 1970. This represents an increase of 19.6 per cent and 50 per cent respectively, for those years, over the 417,000 tons of meat produced in 1959. These objectives are not out of reach if an adequate program is carried out to improve the livestock industry.²⁴

The government is carrying out programs to improve the native breeds of cattle. The *blanco-orejinegro* (BON) breed is being selected for a better milk and meat yield. These investigations are being carried out with a view to improving the feeding and management of these animals. A few crosses are being tried between the BON and Jersey breeds, and though no remarkable improvement has been noted in the milk yield, some progress has been made.

Cattle investigations are being carried out in Tibaitatá, Montería, Armero, Palmira, and Villavicencio. Native and imported breeds are being studied, especially in relation to their management, feeding, and selection. Satisfactory results have been obtained in Tibaitatá with the Aberdeen Angus breed. A *Romosinuano* herd is being kept at Montería. This is a native meat breed which is being selected to try to improve its growth rate. The *Romosinuano* shows great promise as a meat producer in our tropical regions. The Cebú is being studied in Palmira and a local native breed is being used in the Llanos.

Chicken, sheep, and pig programs are also being carried out by DIA and by the Secretaries of Agriculture in various departments.

VI. Commercialization Problems

One of the greatest problems facing the development of Colombia's agriculture, and one which is related to an improvement in the economic situation of its farmers, is the lack of a properly organized market

for the various agricultural products. Such a market system must give sufficient guarantees for price stability and provide adequate information on the production perspectives of certain articles, information on insecticides, fungicides, fertilizers, etc. The lack of transportation and of storage, which would allow products to reach consumption centers quickly and thus lessen the large fluctuations in market prices, also aggravates the problem facing Colombia's agriculture. At present, the marketing of subsistence articles is almost completely controlled by intermediaries.

The Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos (INA) was founded in 1944 as a solution, within certain limits, to this problem. This Institute was created as an autonomous society at liberty to choose its own administration. The INA has an authorized capital of 50 million pesos, of which 17 million have been supplied by the national government, the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, and the Caja de Crédito Agrario.

In 1957-1958 INA had 11 silos for the storage of grains. Each silo could store 79,800 tons of grain. Also, for the purchase of agricultural products, INA counts on 26 agencies, which are located in the principal production and consumption centers of Colombia.

INA is a regulating organization, intervening in the market but also acting quickly in stimulating the production and better distribution, importation, and exportation of primary foodstuffs, regulating their prices, and preventing speculation. Its limited capacity has prevented it from exerting a greater influence in its particular field.

INA has tried to fix holding prices for the principal grains and products. In 1957-1958 it bought nearly 42 million pesos worth of six basic products, among them wheat, rice, and corn. During this same period INA imported more than 222,000 tons of agricultural products, spending approximately \$22 million, including \$5.5 million worth of agricultural surplus within the agreement between Colombia and the United States.

VII. The Social Agrarian Reform

The Colombian farmer lives under extremely poor conditions which exert a great social pressure on the country. This circumstance, aggravated by the violence that has erupted during the last ten years,

has forced Colombia to the verge of a social revolution. The situation has made it imperative to try to find an answer to the rural problem. The solution is thought to lie in a social agrarian reform, beginning with a redistribution of the land. This redistribution will provoke a political-social change in the rural population. It is hoped that later on the reform will bring about a more technical agricultural exploitation, raise productivity, and at the same time improve the living conditions of rural families. The following is the objective of this reform, which is now being debated in Congress.²⁵

To reform the social agrarian structure through the elimination and prevention of a concentration of rural lands, or their excessive parcelization; reconstruct adequate exploitation units in the minifundio zones and donate lands to those that have none, giving preference to those who will work the land themselves.

Secondary (though naturally just as important) objectives of this Law are: to promote an economic exploitation of idle or poorly utilized lands; to increase agricultural and livestock production through the use of appropriate techniques; to give greater social security to the farm workers; to improve the living conditions of the rural population by coordinating technical, credit, and health services; and to assure the conservation, defense, and utilization of Colombia's natural resources.

Based on the facts that Colombia's land tenure arrangements suffer grave defects and that the level of living of the rural population is extremely low, this Law is trying to find a solution to these problems.

The modification of land tenure arrangements is based on a direct method of distributing land belonging to the state (idle land) or the distribution of private lands acquired with appropriate compensation. These methods allow the poorer farmer to acquire much-needed land. A special tax on idle lands is also proposed, to force the owners to either cultivate or sell them. Forced sales, however, do not appear to be a good means of giving the farmers a suitable amount of land under favorable conditions, since the price of these lots would be too high for the small farmer, and an extreme parcelization of the property leads to minifundia which cannot produce enough to raise the level of living.

The National Agrarian Committee, which was formed to carry out the Agrarian Reform Statutes, considers that a social reform in the rural areas should have three different aspects: the implementation of a direct method of modifying land tenure arrangements which will facilitate land ownership for the landless workers or those with insufficient land; a fiscal reform which will stimulate a better use of the land and will avoid the parcelization of farms which cannot be economically exploited; and legislation for rural work which will protect the rights of those who work the land.

This Law gives priority to the management of idle lands, since the way in which they are actually occupied and cultivated leads to many ownership right disputes and to the destruction of natural resources. In spite of the fact that numerous poor farmers settle on land held by the state, many of these lands are bought by the large land owners to add to their already huge estates, and are used mainly for cattle raising. The adverse effects of these colonizations are based on the way in which the land is claimed. These settlers appropriate the lands by completely destroying the forests and burning weeds and brush. These practices destroy the humus layer and alter the water supply of the region. The adoption of legal reforms in this particular section would improve the administration of idle lands and at the same time prevent the extensive concentration of private properties. These reforms would also provide adequate support for the small settlers who take over these lands.

The Law provides for the creation of an Institute to act as a central and directive organ of the Reform. This Institute would act as a public organization having an autonomous administration and its own earmarked funds.

Besides administering the state's idle lands and directing their appropriation or sale, the Institute would be in charge of orienting the development of various zones of Colombia, the construction of communication lines or penetration roads, concentration of small lots, etc. The Institute would also coordinate the work of those services related to rural life, and would administer the National Agrarian Fund. This Fund, created by the same Law, would be made up of annual shares of not less than 100 million pesos from the national budget and foreign or internal loans obtained by the Government or

Agrarian Reform Institute for this Fund. Through Decree No. 1390 of June 30, 1961, the government has destined 100 million pesos to the Agrarian Reform. These funds are part of the loan of U.S.\$44 million secured from the Import Export Bank.

The economic development of water resources or regions which are useful because of their nearness to public roads or their potential productivity could be placed in the hands of regional development corporations. These organizations can be created by the national government or other administrative bodies, when approved by the Institute and the national government.

VIII. Operation Colombia

A new plan for the development of Colombia's resources has recently been proposed. It is presented by Dr. Lauchlin Currie, an economist with long experience in Colombia. Dr. Currie considers that the proposals of the Agrarian Reform Law to solve the farmers' problems by relocating them on better lands and thus increase their incomes are much too slow to do any good.²⁶

In Dr. Currie's view, the problem facing Colombia today is that "there are too many people trying to wrest a living from agriculture." Based on the fact that, in actual circumstances, the demand for food-stuffs is relatively inelastic, a general increase in production would not bring about an increase in the farmers' incomes. As a result, any measures taken to increase the area under cultivation by employing more labor, or other measures such as colonization and parcelization, would be harmful to the farmer since they would increase production without increasing demand. Any measures taken to slow up the rate of growth of the rural population would be equally harmful.

Moreover, transferring a million farmers to easily mechanized areas and providing them with the necessary tools for high commercial production, though desirable from a social and economic point of view, is improbable since it would absorb most of Colombia's economic resources. Too, this program would produce such a tremendous increase in agricultural production that prices would drop considerably and most farmers would be ruined.

Operation Colombia proposes a rapid rise in the level of living of the population; a lessening of the difference between various social

levels; an increase in exportations to obtain more foreign exchange; and a technically improved agriculture to speed industrialization.

This program is based on the incorporation of hundreds of unproductive workers from the rural zones into the national economy. These workers are at present barely surviving. The implementation would take place through a migration process toward the large cities. The program would provide these workers with housing, public services, employment, education, and protection for the health of their children. This program would also increase exportations, especially in the meat line; hasten scientific production practices; and recover nearly a million hectares of idle first-class lands.

It is estimated that this program would cost approximately 4,300 million pesos, of which 3,000 million would be invested in the construction of 300,000 houses in the cities which are absorbing the rural workers; public services are calculated to absorb another 1,000 million, and the remaining 300 million would be absorbed by the various programs to increase exportations.

Operation Colombia would be financed by private investments (1,400 million), by transfers from the National Budget (600 million), by a special fund for the project (1,300 million), and by a monetary expansion of 1,000 million pesos.

The project has its attraction and is considered soundly based, but it has been received with certain skepticism even though it has not been studied thoroughly. One of the main objections is that it is directly opposed to another program. This other program tries to avoid an excessive industrial concentration in the cities, by diverting new expansion toward small towns having transportation facilities.

Whether Colombia adopts one or the other of these proposed plans for the development of agricultural resources and the improvement of rural life, the first and most important step to be taken is the training of technical personnel for the implementation of the agrarian reform plans. The lack of well-trained technicians in all fields of modern progress is one of the biggest problems of Colombia. The solution to this problem, however, does not depend on the Colombians alone. We need cooperation and help. We hope that President Kennedy's Program of Alliance for Progress will be put into practice in the very near future to aid in fulfilling the above needs.

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James Eder: MINING AND MANUFACTURING
IN COLOMBIA

OUR GREATEST PRESENT INTEREST in mining and manufacturing is to learn how these two activities can help Colombia become a really great nation. We could study the development of any particular industry in detail; its past, present, and its possible future. Such a study would force us to give due consideration to the impact of other elements on that industry, such as the effects of education, politics, world events, bank credit, the Church, and the changing culture of the people. If such a study of a particular industry could ever be completed, we would still have to assume it were representative of the group. Could we possibly extrapolate the effect of the growth of the printing industry to cover the effects of the growth of the beer and the cement industries?

Suppose, though, that by use of data processing machines we were miraculously able to gather all information from all mining and manufacturing operations. We could then show a trend in material output. Is that trend in product output alone a good gauge of true progress? In the United States we tend to assume that the more flourishing an industry, the better for everyone. But if, as in Colombia, one industry flourishes at the expense of other elements of the economy, is that "good"? Sir Walter Scott, that practical romanticist, once remarked, "Plumbing does not make a great nation!" Accordingly, let us take a look at mining and manufacturing as related to the entire development of Colombia.

Why are mining and manufacturing important to Colombia's progress? Are they simply means to produce and to save foreign exchange? Are they aiding or hindering agricultural growth, without which Colombia will be a country of much misery? Are mining and manufacturing significant contributors to change from an almost totally rural population to one half rural and half urban? Is this move to the cities helping or hindering Colombia's advance? Is industry fostering the desire for material blessings at a greater rate than can be satisfied? Each of us has a slightly different answer to each of these questions, for *we* emphasize different factors. To avoid a difference of approach, therefore, let us look at parts of Colombia's history and see if we cannot agree on what it teaches.

The development of Colombia has been slow compared to that of the United States, even though Colombia had a head start of 100 years. Why? One of the chief reasons lies in the difference between the early settlers of the two countries. To the North came men who left Europe to build a new home for themselves; their ambition was to build. To Colombia came conquerors with a different ambition: their thoughts were for immediate profits; they wanted to send home gold, or, preferably, to take it back themselves. There were many exceptions to these generalities, but they hold. In what became the United States, the ambition of the early settlers was transferred from generation to generation, and hope of a land of unlimited opportunity became a reality for those of ambition and ability. However, in what was to become Colombia, the hope of opportunity became a myth, except for a minute part of the population. Ambition became a luxury reserved for the few. Why? All-pervading monopolies hamstrung development, killed initiative, and assured the continuance of the status quo.

I. *History of Monopoly*

At first Spain held her colonies as her own private monopoly. She went to great pains to prevent them from trading with any other country. The conquerors themselves, taking the one from the mother country, monopolized everything they could—trade, land, wealth, education. With control of these areas it was easy for their heirs to

remain in the *caballero's* saddle for the next 400 years. Everything was designed for ease in maintaining monopolies. Trade had its prescribed channels, and the right contact or appointment gave easy and complete control of a particular channel. Monopoly became a way of life with the upper class. Vast lands were given to just a few people, and no heavy taxes were imposed to induce them to part with them. (There are still no heavy land taxes, but only threats of them.) Wealth was easily amassed by those with land or in control of trade. Education, especially that obtained abroad, could be afforded only by those with wealth. We know full well that there were few saints among the early conquerors, so public spirit and altruism were rare. Education taught these men one thing: how to remain in power. Almost as though the rich planned it that way, the lower classes found any education almost impossible to secure. An exception was a type of blind religious education, which their *patronos* found was a convenient tool for controlling outbursts of dissatisfaction.

When Colombia attained independence, monopoly, as a way of life for the rich, increased. The oligarchs remained, only now they, instead of the king of Spain, were the ultimate masters. The disappearance of Spanish monopoly and the encouragement of trade with all nations should have changed the internal monopolistic situation. But it didn't because the grip on all wealth and education was held tightly by a very few.

So it was that the bulk of the people learned little new from the early conquerors or from their later masters. The lack of a sufficiently prepared and educated middle class still exists, and the lower class today could be considered even less well off than they were before the conquerors arrived. Then, they had the chance to till the land near a small community; today, an acre of good land, accessible to a city, costs two years' wages. The mentality of the oligarchs has changed little. The great social turmoil, the threat to democratic government, the precariousness of the capitalistic system, all are due to this mentality. Why do we blame the oligarchs? We blame them because they are the country's only educated leaders. When one meets them, one finds them highly intelligent and engaging. They speak charmingly and earnestly of their dedication and love of their country. Appearing most vitally interested in social problems, they really seem aware of a

great many details concerning the common man. Most United States citizens who talk with them at length are persuaded by their charm and brilliance. It is not strange that they think of themselves as blameless for Colombia's plight. Leaders seldom see their own faults. Besides, these Colombians grew up in a society that thought of monopoly as a way of life. What is surprising, though, is that these people believe one or the other of two opposites: either that they are powerless to stop the coming social explosion, or that their small improvements will suffice. Their culture, their experiences, their training, keep them from seeing what less able men in totally different types of countries could see immediately. As Arnold Toynbee remarked, "Bad habits that have been engaged in for 450 years cannot be eradicated by reason alone, even though reason can demonstrate that these habits are now going to prove fatal." My thesis is: Colombia's leaders must radically change their monopolistic habits, or their habits will radically change Colombia's leaders.

II. Mining

Neither the Spanish conquerors nor the Colombian oligarchs who followed them were interested in giving full education to any one except their own sons. Fortunately for the rest of the country, however, these oligarchs had to train others in order to obtain their own selfish desires. They wanted houses, bridges, and forts; above all, they wanted more gold. For the hard work of gold mining, they imported slaves from Africa. For the overseeing and difficult technical jobs, they had to train people. The oligarchs needed trustworthy, thinking, able men. Thus they had to provide some training for a small group of people. Later, foreign technicians and mining engineers were brought in to get more production from the mines. When given the chance to work beside such a skilled person, the Colombian has been quick to learn.

From the mines and elsewhere, Colombians with great ability emerged to improvise, and to utilize the tools and materials at hand. Here is an example which highlights this ability, compared to that of a Yankee: I am a graduate mechanical engineer from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a good technical institute. When I drove

my old car from Buenaventura to Cali in 1948 over a terrible road, through unpopulated areas, I was at a loss how to repair holes made in the gas tank, crankcase, or radiator. My two years of high school and college chemistry failed me. Yet my companion-chauffeur, who was not responsible for the damage I had done, saved the day, despite his having had only four years of elementary schooling. He pushed chewing gum into the crankcase hole since oil will not affect chewing gum. A piece of soap fixed the gas tank, as gasoline will not dissolve soap. Finally, he shoved a raw plantain into the hot radiator. The heat cooked the starch and the leak stopped instantly! Six years later when we brought my new Volkswagen over the same road, the juice of a banana was used to cement a carbon brush of the distributor which had broken, thus enabling the car to continue the journey. That companion-chauffeur is today one of 400 workers in a factory where he is constantly being criticized for lack of initiative and inability to think alone. Would that my companion on that trip had been the versatile head of that factory's machine shop; he would have carefully applied the herbs by the side of the road and converted my 1942 Packard into a brand new Cadillac!

Colombian ingenuity helped the development of gold mining and petroleum field work. It was a mutual assistance program. The contribution of the petroleum industry toward creation of foreign exchange is significant. Today, exports of crude oil total some U.S.\$80 million worth a year. Supply of U.S.\$90 million worth of petroleum products for the domestic Colombian market further helps the foreign exchange picture. An oil company might be tempted to say, though not quite honestly, that the petroleum industry contributes U.S.\$170 million a year to foreign exchange, or almost 40 per cent of Colombia's U.S.\$450 million of foreign exchange receipts. However, we know a dollar saved is not a dollar earned.

There are some five large petroleum companies and other smaller ones operating some 2,000 wells. They all train men, usually provide elementary schooling for their workers and send some of the better students to higher schools of learning. They employ some 20,000 workers, including those distributing its products.

Until recently, Colombia has not been too nationalistic regarding foreign oil operations. The final success of Mexico's government-

operated petroleum industry (after years of dismal failure) is constantly before it. But it is balanced by Venezuela's uninterrupted success with private capital. The heavy taxes that foreign oil companies have to pay is the result of the nationalistic feeling, prevalent throughout Latin America, that the oil belongs to the nation and that it is better to leave it in the ground than to part with it too cheaply. The incentive for further private exploration and development is consequently almost completely lacking. The government's own petroleum company could search for new areas, though such is a difficult task for government to pursue with vigor.

The petroleum industry's exports provide an important source of foreign exchange, and its local consumption contributes to industrial growth. As the country develops and uses more oil domestically, and as the reserves diminish, exports will decrease. It is estimated that by 1970 Colombia will be an importer of crude oil! Consequently, if exploration and development are not increased, Colombia will suffer a severe reduction in foreign exchange income. Unpopular as it may be, the quickest and surest way to increase oil production is to give foreign companies more incentive. One must remember that foreign capital and initiative were all-important to Colombia's petroleum development, whereas in Mexico government operation floundered for years. Lack of foreign exchange for the country's general development is a heavy price to pay for the cult of nationalism.

To analyze why gold was important to Colombia's development would be like making a scholarly report to our boss on why we wanted to get paid with money. Gold was the big reason for Spanish interest in the Western Hemisphere. The Spaniards took all they could from the Indians and then had to start doing their own mining. They found the Indians poor or unwilling workers; consequently they imported many slaves from Africa to increase gold production. It is difficult to estimate how much gold was taken from the Indians and how much was mined in those early days. But it is hard to give credence to stories that far more gold was produced in primitive ways than by today's modern methods. Today's yearly production of ten tons of gold, worth U.S.\$13 million, would look like an awful lot of gold in any age and could give rise to any number of stories of fantastic exports.

Today, two-thirds of the gold is produced by four companies with a total employment of 3,000. There are, besides, perhaps 10,000 individuals, descendants of the slaves, who pan gold on their own account as a means of livelihood.

The relative importance of gold mining in Colombia has decreased, but not to such an extent as in California. But gold was the prime factor in getting things started and its U.S.\$13 million of exports is an appreciable help in keeping things going.

One would think that Colombia's emerald mines, which produce the best-quality emeralds in the world, would be a sizable contributor to foreign exchange. But the mines work sporadically and the methods used are perforce primitive. No one expects these mines to produce huge quantities of emeralds. If they did there might be the problem of selling them at a good price. So emerald mining operations, both government and private, will probably not be intensified greatly.

Coal mining is a large industry, producing about one million tons annually, worth, let us say, U.S.\$4 million. The coal veins are narrow and do not lend themselves well to modern methods. For many reasons, not the least of which is costly transportation, talk of exporting coal is still talk. There seems little chance that coal mining can contribute to foreign exchange.

Neither can we expect that the government steel mill will be able to export steel competitively in the world market; so the purported large reserves of iron ore and coal will last for a long time. The government salt mines are large—Zipaquirá has 30 miles of underground roads. But even large exports of salt would net only a modest amount in foreign exchange. The government wishes to keep its salt stock, as its oil, underground, even though there is no risk of a salt-free diet at some future date.

The total output of the mining industry operated for export is today a minor element in the industrial growth of the country. Its 30,000 or so workers are but a drop in the bucket in the 15 million population. Mining filled a vital function to get the nation on the move and to give it the exchange for trade with the world, and it still has an important role. Though oil extradition is not expanding, it should expand for the good of the country. Those engaged in mining in general can be proud of the past, as well as pleased with the

organized way in which companies and people today, both Colombian and foreign, are working effectively together. They need not feel ashamed because mines are centers for labor strife. It is not the fault of the mine operators that the climate is poor, that there is no city life near by, or that it takes a lot of money and time for a worker to get in and out of these distant places. Fill these mines with North American laborers instead of Colombians and the labor strife would resound around the world. Life is not pleasant in the mines. Relatively good wages are not an effective antidote to a boring, monotonous life. Strikes at least break that monotony.

III. Manufacturing

There are notable differences in the history of the development of mining and of industry in Colombia. Whereas mining had its real inception centuries ago, industry was born as a result of World War I and it was still an infant as recently as 1930. Mining was almost completely dependent on foreign initiative and capital and still is largely foreign, but industry was always partly domestic, and domestic ownership will increase its preponderance. While mining has largely stopped expanding and keeps to the same fields, industry's progress and growth in the past 16 years has been phenomenal and it is expanding on an ever-widening front. This is fortunate, for it is mainly to industry that Colombia must look to absorb her rapidly increasing labor force.

Industry's responsibility to provide work is great. Today it employs 250,000 people, which is only 1.6 per cent of the total population. This compares unfavorably with 9.1 per cent in the United States, where there is a great deal more automation. In order to keep misery from increasing, industry must absorb its share of the 2.8 per cent population increase, or 7,000 new workers each year. But in addition, there is the population shift to the cities, which no one has been able to slow down. On this account, industry should absorb besides, say, 7,000 additional workers. Such a figure is reasonable when we consider that the United States farm population reduced from 75 per cent to 8 per cent in 100 years. It might take only 20 years to reduce Colombia's 50 per cent rural population to 25 per cent, for things

happen so quickly today. Of the 175,000 new urban dwellers, a mere 7,000 would go into industry.

To create employment for a new worker usually requires purchase of foreign equipment. Taking a figure of U.S.\$3,000 per worker, which historically is probably quite low, there would then be required for our 14,000 new workers an investment of U.S.\$42 million a year of foreign exchange. Although this looks reasonable at first glance, we must realize that it is only the beginning. The new industries will require large imports of raw materials. Old industries must also replace worn-out equipment. Yet the U.S.\$42 million is designed only to keep misery from increasing.

It is unmistakably clear that the need for foreign exchange for industrial expansion would be reduced if much of the needed equipment could be built in the country. Factories-to-build-factories are highly beneficial to the country, but they require a much more highly educated group of men to operate them.

Efficient land reform and good agricultural programs will be meaningless unless more productive work is created. Unless people have jobs they will have no money to buy food, no matter how plentiful or cheap. But let there be no mistake; if Colombians take in each other's wash, if inefficient or "disguised employment" is resorted to, just to make "jobs," the road ahead will be down, not up. Before we explore how industry could fulfill its part in this vitally important role of creating useful jobs and consequently creating wealth, let us first sketch briefly how industry developed in Colombia.

Before the Spanish conquerors arrived, there was little that could be called industry. The Indians desired few material blessings because they were unaware that these things existed. When they saw the things which their proud new masters introduced, the seeds of desire were planted. But the economy was not developing; and few, other than the very rich, could hope to buy anything, even were it available.

There was no urge to increase productivity. The rich and powerful had what they needed, and no one else counted for much. Social consciousness, so necessary for development of a country, was almost completely lacking. What consciences there were, were easily assuaged by "disguised employment." Employment was given for many small services, but this produced little industry. Development could

not be expected where each took in the other's wash—except a developing sense of embarrassment—for few had more than a single set of clothes. Whether spurred on by this embarrassment or not, the textile industry made a very modest beginning at the start of the twentieth century, at the same time as the sugar industry and a few others.

From about 1920 to about 1953, the Colombian government slowly increased aid to the improving industries by increasing tariffs on finished goods, while keeping duties low on raw materials. Importation of some finished goods was even prohibited at times, solely because they were made also in Colombia. After 1953, when the use of some raw materials became a drain on the foreign-exchange position, or when a company showed promise of filling the national need for a raw material, duties on that material rose accordingly. The Colombian materials, when of fair price and quality, found ready buyers, since buying locally saved tying up capital in import deposits, in goods in transit, and in high inventories. Establishment of basic industries for raw materials has increased rapidly with the increased tendency of government to protect them: their size today gives Colombia a sound industrial base.

It must be remembered that it takes more than capital, ability, and initiative to make a successful factory. There were many things which slowed Colombian industrial development. The market was not large, because few could earn much money. There were few of the necessary supporting elements such as electricity, supplies, or trained supervisors and workers who understood even the basic problems of factory operation. The greatest lack was that of good roads, so the market was limited. An idea of the state of road and rail transport can be deduced from the fact that only eight years ago metal furniture was shipped largely by air. Thus we see that industrial growth is dependent on a host of different factors.

A large factor for industrial expansion right after World War II was the dollar reserves built up by enforced wartime austerity. The retarding factor was the mentality of the rich. There were enough dollars for a large amount of consumer goods with dollars left over. Rich merchants made huge profits by simply importing and reselling. These commercial men were often the oligarchs who had monop-

lized trade for years and they did not want industries to end their monopoly. They used part of their profits to fight the increase of tariffs designed to protect young industries. Fortunately, the excess dollars made it easy to get exchange needed to start a new industry. Potential industrialists went ahead with importation of machinery even though they were not encouraged by promise of customs protection. As dollars became scarce again, these merchants were forced to become industrialists themselves. But their thinking processes, learned from their fathers and through years as merchants, have not changed yet; they still want to sell their products at the highest price. Somehow they must learn that mass sales, made possible by low prices, will afford the greatest development of their own particular industry. This same erroneous type of thinking is practiced by the large landholders. They are not thinking of producing more from their land, nor do they contemplate investing money in wells, dikes, mechanical shops, schools, and other things which would make their farms more productive. You may ask what farming has to do with manufacturing. It is simply that the owners of the farms are usually the wealthy people of Colombia—the effective rulers of the country. They decide policies and make economic plans which vitally affect industry. Strangely, it is they who lead the thinking of the industrialists. They are leading it in the wrong direction.

After World War II, industry prospered too and plants were expanded. New, expensive equipment was bought or the owners took their chances with used machinery from the United States. Some Colombians who started their own industries had been importing the product, but knew little about its manufacture. Others knew little about either the product or its mode of manufacture. So it was logical to rely on imported technicians for much of the operation of the business including the making of decisions. Many of these technicians were United States citizens and had worked only in mass-production plants. They were accustomed to getting help from competent people around them, including visiting salesmen. Imagine the predicament of the technician who suddenly is asked to pass judgment on accounting, purchasing, marketing, and labor relations, in addition to solving the technical problems of running the factory and planning its expansion. This is the excuse given by technical men from the United

States for never having had time to learn the language properly.

Industry soon realized that foreign technicians were too expensive to be used on a continuously expanding basis; besides, they were not always willing to stay on, despite good salaries. Where efforts were made to replace these foreign technicians, it was often found that Colombians did a better job. But there was an extremely limited supply of Colombians to draw from for replacements, or, for that matter, to fill any of the other new jobs. After all, there had been little industry and few schools or colleges. Many workers and supervisors came directly from farming, where a tractor was a rarity. As industry stole men from government and teaching, the barrel of competent available individuals went dry. Industry was forced to upgrade its own people. It has recently done a magnificent job through INCOLDA, whose teachers from the United States are first-class Point IV men. In their classes most phases of industrial management are covered for all levels of employees, at cram evening courses. But even this spectacular success has not kept industrialists from the dawning realization that general education of everyone in the country is of major concern to them.

Industry is slowly getting interested in, or is forced by government and unions to intervene in, the welfare of its workers and their families. United States thinking condemns these practices by calling them "paternalism." Socialized medicine; visiting company social workers; financial help from the company at times of births, deaths, or sickness; early retirement at two-thirds salary; transportation allowances; and a host of other practices are anathema to us. But out of it all has sprung some social consciousness, which must be fostered. It is yet but a small child compared to the set ways of monopoly, the desire for quick profits, and the low standard of straightforwardness shown in many businesses and industries.

IV. Faster Industrial Development

Not only does the 2.8 per cent yearly population increase require an expanding economy, but the rapid shift from country to city has compounded the magnitude of the problem. We could stop here and put the blame on civil strife in the countryside. We could argue the pros

and cons of keeping people on the land. But the fact is that the trend to the cities is a natural one; it cannot be stopped, and it is questionable how much it can be slowed, desirable though that might be. Regardless of differing opinions on the question of population shift, most people can agree that an expanding economy will lessen present social problems. Perhaps the seeds of a future ugly materialistic society are being sown, but the soil today is so poor that vigorous growth will be delayed for years. It will be long before most Colombians have refrigerators, washing machines, cars, and T.V. sets, or before the nation spends too much time in silly modern amusements. We know Colombian philosophers would wish to sound the warning in time; and we must profoundly pray that the faraway surfeit of material things will not eliminate from Colombia's history the goodly number of philosophers, poets, and artists that would be a leveling influence against such a trend.

Standard Formula for Colombia's Rapid Development. Colombian businessmen generally complain about inefficient workers, high taxes, and too many government fetters. Rarely do they blame business for existent problems but usually reserve their full abuse for the government. Past governments have been elected mainly by business and the rich oligarchs, with the hope that their interests will be fully protected. Soon after a new government takes office the abuse commences. The businessmen fight efforts of any government that tries to collect higher taxes or to initiate new programs. They feel almost altruistic in this attitude, because they have seen so much money wasted by previous governments and so many new programs that seriously hurt the country.

United States businessmen in Colombia have given and taken ideas from their Colombian counterparts. In fact, businessmen of both countries have been a big factor in molding the thinking of both our countries regarding the development program for Colombia. What, then, tends to form the opinions of the United States businessman? Quite naturally it is the desire for expansion of his business, for the remittance of profits in dollars, and for closer economic ties between our two countries. Generally he prefers Colombia to become economically part of the United States, rather than that he become part of Colombia. Seldom do we find the United States businessman

planning to retire in Colombia, except when, rarely, he marries a Colombian girl.

We will now see that the Standard Formula for Colombia's Development is compatible with the immediate desires of both United States and Colombian businessmen. Four of its many points are:

1. Loosen government controls; guarantee freedom of exchange; maintain a stable exchange rate—all this because foreign capital is considered the key to Colombia's development.

2. Borrow money from abroad for large, useful, public and private works. (Do not default on these debts whether public or private.)

3. Foster contacts between Colombians and foreigners, particularly United States citizens, so Colombians will learn from them.

4. Increase the national budget for education by cutting down elsewhere in the budget. Especially could cuts be made in military expenses and in the cost of maintaining diplomatic missions all over the world. Many more students should be sent to colleges in the United States.

The theory behind the first three recommendations is that the country would slowly build up materially and much would be gained from close contact with foreign-owned operations on Colombia's soil. Such operations, it is held, will train and, in a sense, educate all Colombians. Historically all this is doubtless true and, to some extent, it will continue to be true. But let us take a closer look at these recommendations and be thoroughly honest about what we see.

The first item of the Standard Formula concerns remittance of profits and freedom from controls. Colombia's imports amount yearly to about U.S.\$350 million. This is an outflow of foreign exchange which must be earned through exports. Most United States manufacturers in Colombia forget that the foreign exchange saved by their production results in a peso profit; that a dollar saved is not a dollar earned; that the only way extra dollars can be earned is by increasing exports. The United States manufacturer does not see clearly the full importance of petroleum in this regard. To forget the importance of exports, which today total about U.S.\$450 million, is to be guided only by thoughts of the present and to be oblivious of the future. If Colombia tries to expand her economy sufficiently to make her nationals contented, the U.S.\$450 million she obtains today from exports will not cover her needs. She needs foreign exchange for debt service on past loans received; for public projects; for machinery im-

ports; for new or expanding factories; for the raw materials needed to keep her factories going; for her students, businessmen, and diplomats abroad; and for a host of other miscellaneous needs. Thus there is a definite limit to the amount of dollar dividends that United States manufacturers can remit abroad, regardless of their ever-increasing peso profits.

There is, then, a limit to available foreign exchange with which to pay dividends of foreign-owned industries. Whatever this amount is—and I would guess it to be about U.S.\$50 million—it will not cover dividends on an increasingly large number of foreign-owned factories, whose profits tend to increase each year.

Accordingly, it is well to consider how to promote the more desirable foreign-owned industries and to hinder or eliminate those which do little or nothing for Colombia's development. A fixed amount of foreign exchange could somehow be reserved for dividend payments to foreign owners, thus loosening pressure on the exchange rate which upsets the entire economy.

The second item of the Standard Formula concerns borrowing. Borrowing to promote a useful end is good so long as the amounts borrowed are well within the country's ability to repay, in foreign exchange, both interest and return of capital. Note that the cost of debt service was as high as one-fourth of Colombia's foreign exchange receipts in 1957! Polonius' advice, "Neither a borrower nor a lender be; for loan oft loses both itself and friend," certainly applies to excessive loans.

The third item which recommends many contacts with United States citizens requires close study. I will return to this subject later. Suffice it to say here that there are many who should not be our contact men. They include not only the poor city delinquent and the rich gangster but also some workers and businessmen whose practices are well below par.

The fourth point covers the need for education. Whether many Colombians can benefit more by four years in a college in the United States than by spending that time in a good college in Colombia is a question I leave to the educators. However, it would be much cheaper in foreign exchange to send good professors to Colombia than to send students to the United States. Even were there no problem of foreign

exchange, we have to realize the great burden of keeping a Colombian in the United States. He is housed and fed in a country where the average factory wage is U.S.\$92 a week and has to be supported by a country where the average factory wage is less than a tenth of that. Figures will doubtless prove that ten times more education can be given in Colombia for the same money. Colombia might be ill advised in sending many students here—the exception would be the student whose record shows that there is an excellent chance that he will later repay his country in outstanding accomplishment.

V. *Social Consciousness*

I have indicated earlier that the oligarchs' lack of social awareness has been the greatest retarding factor to the country's development. The middle class is more socially aware than the upper class and the lower class often lives up to its social obligations better than either, despite intellectual and economic limitations. In this lowest strata, people are most apt to realize that the greatest source of happiness is helping one's fellow man.

Even today, manufacturers and businessmen are too little concerned with the development of the bulk of the population. Instead of thinking of the welfare of their employees and their families, they concern themselves with thoughts of maintaining their own monopolies and of impeding many of the government's new programs. If Colombia's leaders, especially the manufacturers who have such close contact with so many of their workers, were to demonstrate a real social consciousness, an amazing change would evolve and an awakening would soon occur at all levels. From a resurgent awareness that man is meant to help man, we could expect:

1. Better educational opportunities.
2. Better use of foreign exchange.
3. Better government, which includes: better planning, better laws; more respect for the letter and intent of the law; greater social justice; and greater stability and security.
4. Multiple salutary effects on individuals and businesses, which includes: more saving and planning for the future (*a sine qua non* for development); more pride and accomplishment in work; and a greater sense of responsibility at home, at work, and in politics.

5. Better cooperation between industry and government, with industry taking more responsibility for creating more jobs; more production at lower prices.

Colombia must improve its social consciousness, for the world is in the midst of social change. Dare Colombia allow a system of tycoons, power magnates, and robber barons such as once existed in the United States? Was not that what Cuba had just before Fidel Castro awakened the island's desire for social justice? What did Cuba learn from United States big business and from our wild, misbehaving tourists? Could Colombia learn such things from us?

VI. What Can the United States Do?

We could increase our loans and gifts to Colombia, but so doing might create fiscal problems for that country as well as for ourselves.

We can send missions of experts to Colombia. We certainly must do so when the need for large loans is imperative. These missions are helpful, but let us not forget that "an expert is the mechanic from the next town." He should not be given carte blanche to make sweeping changes. Good advice is helpful, but beware of advice grounded on ulterior motives, even if hazy, that could benefit the giver of advice more than the receiver.

There is a vast area where this country could help Colombia. This is in the area of setting a good example, rather than of giving advice. We set a pretty good example here at home when Colombians visit our country. However, as guests in Colombia, our example is too often a poor one. Yet, those of our people who go to Colombia are among our best and a large number are college graduates. The parent companies who establish branches in Colombia are among the most reputable at home. Both individuals and companies start with a genuine desire to help Colombia. What, then, goes wrong?

To begin with, our people try to meet Colombia's best families and soon fall under their charming spell. Soon their thinking becomes less democratic, more oligarchic, and more monopolistic. But further than this, they are unprepared to assume a leader's role in a society which is so new to them. Having never before been asked to contrib-

ute heavily to setting ethical standards, they find the experience too new and demanding for them to cope with it effectively.

I have listed examples of where our ethical standards have fallen short of the norm at home. I have been tempted to set down suggested remedies in each case. These suggestions are made in the spirit that we all have the duty to try to find the best solution. I do not claim that my suggestions are fully workable, carefully thought-out ideas; what I hope to have contributed to, with these examples, is a better recognition of our failings to set a good example.

VII. United States Business and International Relations

Of the men of our country working in Colombia, those engaged in manufacturing and mining are the largest in number; government men are in the minority. Our businessmen, therefore, must shoulder the major job of representing us. The contacts made in daily business life are natural and show the true nature of a man or a business, giving Colombians a picture of our country that we cannot change by words, for words only serve to blur the image.

Our foundations, especially the Rockefeller Foundation, have made a lasting impression of what United States altruism could do for Colombia, creating this impression by the example of good works done by capable men. Money often played the minor role. United States business should follow this shining example, for it is good business to be both ethical and altruistic.

In the long ideological world struggle, we want Colombia to be strong and free. No one keeps a friend by extolling his own virtues. Nor will Colombia be kept free by our selfish business propaganda. Let our task be to follow the road of honesty and truth. Let our actions speak louder than our words.

Andrés Uribe C. : ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN
COLOMBIA'S TRADE

FOR FIFTEEN YEARS, I have been a representative in the United States for the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia. Not only because of personal interest but also because of the nature of my work, I have followed closely the development of the emotional attitudes and of the political and economic framework within which trade and commerce are conducted between the United States and its neighbors to the south.

Perhaps nothing has given me more satisfaction and more hope than the steady growth in this country of an awareness of the need for rapid development of the countries of Latin America in order to ensure a better life for the masses of their inhabitants and an awareness of the importance to the United States that this development should take place in an orderly, peaceful manner and within the framework of the free society which is our heritage as well as yours, through our common descent from the civilization of Western Europe.

During these past fifteen years, my work has constantly taken me back and forth. I have been in practically every capital of Latin America, several of them as often as ten or fifteen times. In addition to visiting the big cities I avail myself of every opportunity to get away from the bright lights and see what is stirring in the rural areas. Here in the United States you have an excellent expression for what I mean: to observe the "grass roots." Our Latin American culture, derived from city-centered Mediterranean prototypes, tends to equate

the nation with urban elements. But the fact is that the rural areas are the source of a nation's dynamism. What is significant in Latin America today is the life that is stirring in those remote areas.

I

Some months ago I had occasion to visit the heart of the Colombian coffee country in the Department of Caldas. I know this area well. Not far away I spent several years as a coffee grower before I came to the United States. Here there is much fertile land. Here there is a magnificent climate. Here there is beauty of nature second to none in the world—the majesty and serenity of the Andes. Here, if anywhere on earth, man should live as God intended.

Yet it was precisely in this region that I developed a shocked awareness of what is actually happening in Latin America. Here is the real challenge for our generation, more significant for the future of mankind than nuclear fission, more threatening to the free world, if neglected, than the megaton bomb.

What has changed is simply this: a situation that was static has become dynamic. And that is something the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. One of the first things that anyone learns on beginning to study Latin America is that it has long been characterized by a static society. The forces of conservatism have been in command. This is no longer the case; the forces of change are on the move. Many factors are involved, but in the simplest terms two have been decisive. There are more people, and the people want and expect more.

Let me take the second aspect first. What sociologists have named the demonstration effect, or (as it has also been well called) the revolution of rising expectations, is a major factor. The man in the field no longer thinks as his father did. He is not only ready for change, he is eager for it, and he follows it with interest when it occurs in other parts of the world. I am absolutely amazed, for example, at the emotional impact made in Colombia in as little as fifteen years by the modern mass media which now blanket the entire country.

What one first notices is the quantity of printed material. In the bigger cities, the book stores and book stalls are everywhere, and they

are laden down with masses of materials geared to every level of intelligence and literacy. This includes propaganda from Prague, Moscow, and Peiping, as well as all sorts of offerings from the United States, including magazines, such as the Spanish edition of *Life*, which show in their pictorial and text content the extremely high standards that the ordinary citizens of the United States enjoy. In the country you find less written material, but some newspapers and illustrated magazines reach even the remotest villages. There is no longer anyone who does not have an idea of what the outside world looks like and how it lives.

Radio, of course, is everywhere. We have 120 transmitters in Colombia, and you sometimes get the idea that you are listening to them all simultaneously. In most places there is a chance to see a movie from time to time, and now television is spreading through the country. Even those who cannot afford a set are exposed to it in village halls, in community centers, and in the homes of enterprising individuals who make a few cents by charging admission to their neighbors.

The total effect of all this new experience is catalytic. In Colombia and in all Latin America, we are no longer dealing with what used to be described as stolid impassive peasants. Their ideas of what is possible and desirable may be naive. Mischievous propaganda often confuses them. But they want change. They want it fast. And, I may add, they are entitled to it.

The urgency is compounded by another factor. There are more people, far more than there used to be. For every two people when I lived there fifteen years ago, there are now three. In another ten or twelve years there will be four.

Let me correlate this population explosion, for that is precisely what it is, with the income level of the poor. In the first years of the period I am describing, the impact of the additional mouths to feed was not too serious. From the end of World War II to about the year 1953 there was a generally favorable relationship between the price at which coffee, Colombia's main exportable commodity, was sold on the world markets and the price at which we bought the manufactured goods needed for consumption and to develop our economy. These years, in fact, saw in Colombia a reasonable rate of economic

growth because the country was better able to finance the imports of capital goods and materials needed to expand its manufacturing industry. But for reasons totally outside Colombia's control, for reasons unconnected with its economy, a decline in the value of its exports set in early in 1954. Between that time and the end of 1958, the price of Colombian coffee fell in the New York market by 46 per cent, and the same trend has since continued, so that today's price is 53 per cent below that of 1954.

This, of course, would have been compensated for if there had been a corresponding decline in the cost of the manufactured goods we have to import. But there has been no such decline. On the contrary, while our export prices fell the cost of the goods we had to buy with our shrinking income continued to mount, causing a grave and continuing deterioration in the terms of trade. The generators, tractors, and fertilizers we must have to maintain and expand our economy and the vitamins and antibiotics with which we are warring on malnutrition and disease each year cost us more to import than they did the year before. The basic retail list price for one of the most popular automobiles manufactured in the United States, a two-door sedan, was \$640 in 1939 and \$1,002 in 1946. In 1961, it is \$2,261. The current price is more than three and a half times the price before World War II, an increase in 22 years of 353.3 per cent.

The impact of this tremendous deterioration in terms of trade on the economy of Colombia was, as you can imagine, very rapid. The trend towards rising standards of living and economic growth began to slow down in 1955. By 1958, it had come to a virtual standstill, and the annual increase in the gross national product of Colombia fell below the level needed to create jobs for our young people. The negative impact was particularly severe in the agricultural sector in all Latin America, being reflected in an actual decline in production in 1960 as compared with the previous years.

One factor, you may say, remains unexplained. In the United States, also, the cost of goods has risen during these same years. The population has risen also, not as fast as in Latin America but nevertheless at a substantial rate. Yet the living standards have not fallen. The people are eating better, dressing better, have better homes. Why cannot that happen in Latin America?

The question is not only legitimate, it is the one which I want you to ask yourselves. The difference is that the United States is a developed country with a dynamic economy capable of adjusting itself to a wide variety of stresses, that can make an asset of people by turning them into producers as well as consumers. Our static economies are impotent to deal with such stresses. The timing is against us. We are working against the clock and must telescope what should be a very long process into a few years; and that is something which we are incapable of doing by ourselves without outside help.

II

Let me emphasize the spontaneous reaction of a preindustrial society to the kind of pressures I have been describing. Allow me to set the scene in the Colombian coffee country, not only because it is the region I know, but because it is the most logical and significant setting in which to examine the factors of population explosion and rising expectations. While these factors, which from the viewpoint of the political analyst signify political and social instability and call for far-reaching changes in the social order, are present everywhere in Colombia, they are most developed in the coffee country, and consequently that is where they are most capable of provoking a crisis.

Colombian coffee, which is of high quality and greatly in demand in the United States and Europe, is grown on the steep slopes of the Andes, 2,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level in the temperate zone. Coffeegrowing in Colombia is a family concern. The number of coffee farms in production was listed at 213,000 in a survey recently made under United Nations auspices, and 92 per cent of all plantations were small units. *For the entire country the average coffee plantation is under eight acres.*

I stress these figures because I think it is not always sufficiently realized that the coffee industry in Colombia is essentially a peasant industry and that the part played by big producers is negligible. Coffee is in fact the lifeblood of Colombia.

However, coffee is no longer enough. Colombia has to find new sources of economic activity, both agricultural and industrial, in order to take care of its population and to raise its living standards.

That the possibility of such expansion exists is evident to anyone with even the slightest knowledge of the present distribution of population in relation to potential resources. The historic colonization of the country concentrated the people in a relatively small part of the national territory. Even today, half of all Colombians inhabit only one-eighth of the country, and one-half of the country has only one-seventieth of the population.

A glance at a relief map helps to explain how this happened. At the southern border the Andes mountains break up into three distinct ranges which fan out from the Pasto Knot and run parallel northward to the Caribbean Littoral. The great Central Cordillera is the backbone of the country. It has the rich Cauca Valley on the west and the long, equally rich valley of the Magdalena on the east. In these valleys, on the flanks of the mountains, and farther east in the savannah of Bogotá lying in a great basin of the Eastern Cordillera, the population is concentrated. It was not until the medical advances of this century that living became desirable in the low—mostly coastal—areas, and the great Eastern plains still lack the communications to permit large-scale development.

Communications are, accordingly, a primary factor. The coming of the air age has meant more for us than for practically any other country, for there is much truth to the saying that Colombia passed directly from muleback to airplane. We have taken full advantage of this new means of transport. We boast the first commercial airline in this continent, and airports and airstrips are dotted all over the country. But air transport has economic limitations. Efficient surface transport is still a necessity, and while today this has become technically feasible it is still extremely expensive.

Anyone who has had the experience of road building in mountain country knows how costly is both construction and maintenance. When to this are added tropical rains, bringing landslides and wash-outs, the problem is really complicated. Buenaventura has the unenviable record of a 14-inch rainfall in 24 hours. Quibdó, high in the Western Cordillera, once recorded 336 inches of rain in 229 days, after which—as a local wit said—the rain really started.

In other ways, too, the mountains add to the cost of surface transport. For one thing they increase the distance between points. From

Buenaventura to Bogotá is 210 miles in a straight line but 400 by road. You go up from sea level to 8,000 feet, down to 3,000, up to about 10,000, down to 800, up again to near 9,000—this in a distance less than from New York to Washington.

III

What it all adds up to is that immense capital outlays must first be made if we are to provide productive outlets for the energies and skills of a great and growing part of the population. It is certainly not enough to think in terms of a redistribution of the existing wealth, because the cruel fact is that today between 190 and 200 million Latin Americans produce only 15 per cent of the goods and services which are produced annually by 180 million people in the United States. To be significant, reforms must ensure a substantial increase in the per capita output of goods and services. To offset the population increase the output of goods and services must increase at least $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent annually, and to effect on top of this an acceptable improvement in per capita living standards will require an over-all growth rate of 5 to 6 per cent per annum. Such a rate is possible but it is far higher than we have been able to achieve over the past ten or fifteen years. Mexico alone of the twenty Latin American republics has been able to average such a rate of growth during the postwar years. If the rest of us are to imitate this lead, we need to introduce far-reaching social adjustments and invest vast amounts of capital. As a rule of thumb economists say that underdeveloped countries must invest an amount equal to about 4 per cent of the goods and services produced in order to increase the rate of output by 1 per cent. For a 5–6 per cent increase, accordingly, investment must equal 20–25 per cent of the gross national product. This is not only far more than has been invested out of savings in the past: it is far more than we can invest out of savings in the future, even under optimum conditions, so long as we retain the free way of life which is our dearest heritage. I repeat that our own efforts must be backed up by massive outside help.

I do not want you to think that nobody has been aware of these trends and these needs over the years or that nobody has been making any efforts to remedy the situation. On the contrary, for many years

the governments of Latin America have been trying to warn the people of the world and their own people of the gravity of the situation. President Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia, former secretary general of the Organization of American States, a longtime friend and sincere admirer of your country, made an official visit to the United States in the spring of 1960. In a series of policy pronouncements in Washington, New York, and Miami, including an address before a joint session of Congress, an address before the Organization of American States, a talk to the National Press Club in Washington, and a talk to the Pan American Society in New York, President Lleras presented in great detail and with a wealth of economic analysis the facts which I have here summarized. The same situation is outlined in many professional studies prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations, and in the records of its annual meetings.

At about the same time as President Lleras visited the United States last year, the government of Colombia published a program for economic development which set out the situation in terms which, to me at least, make perfect sense. We have, it said, to begin with an understanding of where we are, of what it means to live in an underdeveloped country.

Underdevelopment, it said, in a brief but excellent description of the phenomenon, means "the lack of government resources to provide public education, to care for public health, or to extend communications to all the regions of the country. It means unsatisfactory land distribution and low productivity, progressively impoverished small holdings, and large tracts of unused lands. It means inefficiency and the inability to solve technical problems because of the lack of professional and technical personnel. An underdeveloped country finds it difficult to balance the acquisition of equipment not produced in the country against the export of a single product whose prices fluctuate in foreign markets. Underdevelopment is bad housing, malnutrition, low wages, and the unemployment of millions of people who leave the countryside in search of uncertain employment in urban centers."

Having described the problem, the program of my government proceeded to compare the different possible ways to solve it. First, it

said, there is the Communist approach which assumes that it is necessary to sacrifice three or four generations, under conditions of forced labor and the denial of freedom, in order to attain the level of technological and industrial progress which prevails in the capitalistic economies. Rejecting this solution, my government noted that after forty years of such sacrifices and underconsumption, deficient productive organizations and a ruthless system of political tyranny continue to exist.

Without wading through a mass of detailed reasoning and evaluation, I can sketch the broad conclusion reached in this study—all the more easily because it is in substance the same conclusion presented more recently in President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and in the Declaration to the Peoples of America made by the special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August, 1961.

The conclusion is a positive one, namely, that it is possible to transform rapidly the economy of my country and of the countries of Latin America, in spite of their present stagnant economy and exploding populations. To do so, however, requires not only a total marshaling and organization of their resources but the favorable conjunction of a number of external factors not under their control, and this favorable conjunction of external factors can be achieved only with the positive agreement of the major developed nations on a series of principles governing their trading and investment policies.

Specifically, in the area of international trade, the Declaration of Punta del Este stated that it is necessary to develop cooperative programs to prevent the harmful effects of excessive fluctuations in the foreign-exchange earnings derived from exports of primary products. What such fluctuations mean to our economies I have already attempted to indicate by outlining some of the effects on the development of Colombia of the instability of coffee prices during the 1950's. As I mentioned earlier, we were able to maintain a reasonable rate of economic growth so long as the price of coffee moved in sympathy with the prices of manufactured goods during the years following World War II. But when the prices of primary commodities began to tumble in and after 1954 while the prices of manufactures continued to climb, the rug was pulled out from under us. We were forced

to run merely in order to stand still. And it must be remembered that there is no likelihood of any reduction for a considerable time in the population growth rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum. On the contrary, some factors are present which indicate a possibility of the rate going even higher. The discovery of new drugs and improvement in health services, for example, tend to cut infant mortality still further and to extend the life span of the average Colombian. Progress in this area has been notable. The life expectancy of a Latin American at birth was 35 to 40 years at the beginning of the century. Today it is 45 to 50 years. This is good, but it is still 20 or more years below life expectancy for a newborn infant in the United States, which is now 69 years. It is reasonable to anticipate considerable further progress in our countries.

Coffee, as I have already indicated, is of vital importance to the economy of Colombia, since its exportation provides up to 80 per cent of all the foreign exchange we earn through trade and commerce. It is likewise of major importance to many other Latin American countries. Fifteen of our sister republics grow and export coffee: it is in fact, with the sole exception of petroleum, our most important commodity entering international trade. For these reasons, the Punta del Este meeting took particular note of the coffee situation and presented a series of recommendations which I may describe as specific applications of the general principles it advocated for economic development of our countries.

For several years the coffee-producing countries have been trying by a series of short-term agreements among themselves to cushion the effect of the deterioration in the price of coffee in common with the prices of other primary commodities. Through a system of export quotas they have tried to maintain a stable relationship between supply and demand for coffee in the major international markets. The burden, however, has increased to an unmanageable extent and constitutes a major brake on development programs in our countries. Accordingly, we have been trying to reach a long-term agreement which would spread the burden among all the countries involved, consumers as well as producers, and which would provide a breathing space of several years to permit an orderly readjustment of coffee production ensuring a long-term balance of supply and demand

within an industry organized for maximum efficiency. The Punta del Este meeting endorsed this approach and proposed a series of concrete steps designed to implement it to include controls on coffee planting and production, combined with international help for economic diversification in coffee regions.

IV

Today the problems of the trade and commerce of Colombia, or of any country in like conditions, cannot be thought of in purely economic terms nor placed in a purely economic setting. Rather they must be presented against the broader background of the development of a society, of the need—the absolute and urgent need—of guaranteeing to the members of that society and their offspring, more food, more housing, more health, more education, more useful leisure, more respect.

Grave as is the situation, I do not regard it as by any means hopeless. There are, on the contrary, certain basic factors which in my opinion give hope that Latin America will be rapidly projected forward to a level of socioeconomic development comparable to what you today enjoy in this country. First of all, our free society taken as a whole does in fact have the material and human resources to initiate a self-sustaining economic growth not only in Latin America but in the entire underdeveloped world, and to do so rapidly and within the framework of our democratic institutions.

There is also a growing understanding that self-interest combines with humanitarian motives to compel the United States and the other developed countries to give priority to this enterprise. President Kennedy expressed one aspect of this situation in a magnificent phrase in his inaugural address. If our free society cannot help the many who are poor, he said, it cannot save the few who are rich. And this is true. If the dynamic factors of rising populations and rising expectations are allowed to develop in our countries to the point of negative explosion—of which we already have had some unfortunate experiences—it is very doubtful if the United States can survive the cataclysm. How high could you build the wall, and how long could you man it? History records a like fate for all great walls, from China

to Jericho to Troy to Britain to the Rhine. And how long could you maintain your supplies of strategic materials behind this wall, if cut off from their sources?

But I don't want to end on so negative a note. Rather, I would like you to ask yourselves what will be the effect on the economy of the United States of a development of Latin America such as I envisage. One of the curious things about economic development is that an increase in the productive capacity of a given area adds to its ability to buy and its need for the products of other developed areas. The progress of the South and West of the United States produced vast new markets for the industries of the East and Northeast of the country. The rapid growth of western Europe since the war has opened for the United States huge additional markets. The high point of United States exports to Latin America was reached in 1957, when they reached a value of \$4.7 billion, or an average of \$25 for each Latin American. In that same year per capita exports from the United States to Canada amounted to \$229, and 71 per cent of all Canada's imports came from the United States. If in that year the capacity to import of Latin Americans had been equal to that of Canadians, and if the smaller United States participation in Latin America's foreign purchases had been taken into account, your sales to us would have been more than six times as big as they were. The value would have been \$30 billion, and that is one and a half times your total exports to all parts of the world in that year.

A developed Latin America will thus add yet another dimension to your progress. It will also add a new dimension to your power. Four hundred million Americans, enjoying high living standards, dwelling together in peace with justice, will mean more than an immense market. They will constitute an impregnable force to guard their rights and benefits against any threat, an industrial base capable of supporting whatever defense burdens may be needed to protect their liberties. What greater impact on world opinion is thinkable than the example of a free and progressive continent? Against such a power neither cold nor hot war would have any meaning. We should no longer have reason to fear either the threats or blandishments of any competing ideology or system.

Mauricio Obregón: IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COLOMBIA

I

FOR MANY YEARS Latin America affected the digestions of the world only through its coffee and through its cigars. What is more, the problems of Latin America are not, even today, the most important or the most urgent in the world. In fact, the most we can say is that for a while Latin America was important to the European powers until she obtained her full independence; and also that Latin America was for a while important to the United States while the United States was consolidating its own territory, sometimes at our expense.

It is well to remember these things in order to conserve perspective; but all this is now past and there is no use dwelling on it any further.

What interests us now is that for the last several decades, and until very recently, Latin American affairs, and in particular Inter-American meetings of all sorts, concentrated on only three subjects. The first matter was to avoid or to patch up squabbles between our small states. The second was, from the Latin point of view, to get as much economic aid as possible out of the United States. And the third, from the United States point of view, was to keep the Latins relatively happy without diverting too many funds from those areas where history was really being made.

I for one was ashamed that our relations should lie in such a limited field, and so I am happy to note that recently there have been changes

due largely to the fact that the civilized world has become more conscious of the condition of its poorer neighbors, and also, let us admit it, due to the fact of Fidel Castro.

Now Latin American countries are distant and different from each other, but this in my opinion is often overemphasized. They are different, but they are not really more different than Texas is from Vermont. What really impresses me (and, I think, many people who know Latin America well) is that despite these differences and these distances the basic problems of Latin America are common problems, and that it is precisely these common problems which distinguish Latin America today from the rest of the world.

Since the United States has obviously decided that Latin America today requires considerably more attention than it was getting until recently, the first thing we must note is that there is a tendency to try immediately to apply to Latin America remedies—mainly massive economic aid—which have proved successful in other places, such as Europe after the war. The Alliance for Progress of which you have heard so much recently is an example. And this whole attitude is one which I think merits re-examination.

But before going on, I should like to make two points: One is that undoubtedly massive economic programs will be needed if Latin America is to be brought into the twentieth century before the dawn of the twenty-first. There is no doubt about that. Second, no Latin American can take economic aid for granted. Our problems are our own to solve, and neither the United States nor any other nation has any particular obligation to help us as you are doing now. So our first reaction must be to express our thanks.

This said, I would like to try to re-examine with you the remedies which have worked in Europe and their applicability to Latin America.

II

In Europe after the war massive economic aid proved dramatically successful. It was proved that with such aid you can reconstruct a group of nations or peoples who are endowed with technical skills, who have inherited a feeling of having a mission in the mainstream

of history. The question then is: Will the same methods work in Latin America? I think we must entertain some doubts mainly because of one syllable: in Europe the problem was one of *re*construction, while in most of Latin America the problem is one of construction.

At the same time we must remember that it is possible to solve the practical problems of our people and still to leave them as they are now, restless and without peace. And the reason for it is one we all know. It is simply that human problems do not end, they simply begin, with the satisfaction of physical needs; and for people to construct a durable society it is necessary for them first to have a sense of forming part of an enduring human enterprise. This sense is to me a prerequisite which existed in Europe after the war and which does not exist in Latin America today.

Some of you, many of you perhaps (since you are interested in the subject), have visited Latin America, have visited our capitals, and have come away with the impression that you have met people who are reasonably well educated, who have a good sense of history, and you ask: "Why shouldn't these people with the same help do for their own countries the job that similar people did for Europe after the war?"

So first I would like to point out that the Europeans before they got going on their reconstruction had to face one very great issue. They had to get rid of their colonial problems, and they did it (they haven't quite finished doing it yet) mostly by giving their colonies independence of one sort or another. Now you may be surprised to hear me say that Latin America has a similar colonial problem, but I maintain that Latin America is composed of civilized centers which are surrounded by vast areas in very primitive conditions, so that one can say that to a certain extent, the Latin American nations have the problems of nations with colonies, the difference being that their colonies are under them and around them, and peopled, not by strangers, but by their own brothers. So the straightforward solution of independence, of course, is not applicable in this case. And whereas the Europeans, once rid of their colonial problems, could count on a homogeneous population containing people of all classes who were used to orderly progress, we must face up to the fact that we Latin Americans have "internal colonies," as I would call them, whose

standards of living and whose sense of belonging to a historical stream are very different from that of our capitals or of our groups who have a certain amount of education and wealth.

Orderly progress of the sort that resumed in Europe after the war seems to me to depend on one of two things: Either it can be assured only by force, or by precisely this sense of historical purpose, this sense of belonging to an important human enterprise that justifies the defense of an orderly progress at all costs. This is what gives the leaders in a nation a sense of their own authority, and this is what allows a people to follow as free men and without the use of force. And the lack of this is what explains the spectacle of disorderly progress which has so far been almost synonymous with Latin America.

Historically, the fact is this: since independence, and while the United States was building a homogeneous nation comparable to those of Europe, and while the United States was assuming a position of world leadership, most of Latin America was lost in the backwaters of history.

The three basic problems of Latin America, therefore, are these: first, the satisfaction of the minimal physical needs of those parts of our nations which I have called our "internal colonies," which includes about half the population; second, the maintenance of an orderly process while this is being done; and third, the construction of a Latin American ideal, an ideal which will permit our people to persevere on a given road without requiring the use of force. These three problems must be attacked simultaneously.

III

If we look at things in this way, it seems obvious that Latin America (like other parts of the world) is faced with an alternative solution to all three problems. The Marxists have a very simple answer to all three. *First*, the minimal needs of primitive regions can quite easily be filled by state enterprise. (Luxuries are of course an entirely different problem; but the appetite for luxuries which private enterprise creates through its commercial propaganda very often produces more envy than it does progress, so the socialist solution is simply to eliminate such propaganda.) *Second*, the problem of order is simple to

solve: order is maintained by force. *Third*, the ideal is also simply solved: once you have nationalized all means of production, once you have decided that order will be maintained by force, you have time to allow people and leaders to become imbued with the feeling that they are part of an important idea, and this idea is simply the raising of man's standards by his own hand with no other god than the state, to which all rights must be sacrificed.

This same solution was proposed to Europe after the war; but it is very interesting to note that it has lost favor very rapidly in Europe, particularly among the young, while at the same time in Asia and Latin America it still seems to make progress. And the reason, as I see it, is this: Europeans could easily remember when basic needs were filled without handing everything over to the state. Europeans could remember long periods when order was maintained without the use of brute force. And Europeans remembered that orderly progress was worth maintaining freely, because they had a feeling of national purpose based on traditional objectives and on natural law.

Latin America on the other hand is different: the basic needs of "internal colonies" have never been filled, either by private effort or by the state. Order we have never known for more than a few years at a time. And no ideal has really moved our people since independence, not enough anyhow to ensure their persevering along an orderly line of progress.

So, what can be done about it?

The economists tell us that at the present rate of growth it will take about 200 years for the average per capita income of Latin Americans to equal one-third of that enjoyed by the average citizen of the United States. If this is true, it is quite obvious that neither free enterprise nor socialism can very easily move Latin America into the twentieth century before it is over. Whichever method is chosen, the job is going to be very long, and a great deal of patience and perseverance will be required. Which brings us back to the previously expressed point: either this patience, this perseverance will be assured by force after a violent revolution; or, if peaceful means are to be used, we will need an ideal to which people can subscribe with sufficient enthusiasm so as willingly to persevere and be patient.

Recently, and in reference to the Alliance for Progress, we have all

heard of several ideals that the United States has proposed as corollaries of the economic program. I shall take just two of them as examples, because I think they are the ones which have been underlined the most: Agrarian Reform and Free Elections. Both of these are part of the aspirations of most Latin Americans. In one form or another, one or both have existed in most Latin American countries for some time. Colombia has quite a long record of at least relatively free elections (with interruptions, of course; we are Latin Americans too!). And Agrarian Reform was carried out in Mexico many years ago. In Colombia we have just enacted the Agrarian Reform Law, and other countries have done it recently or are working on it.

The question is: are these ideals sufficient to fill the "motivation void" which I have tried to describe? In my opinion these objectives are worthy, but they are not sufficient. And they are not sufficient because Agrarian Reform, for example, can easily turn out to be in practice a disillusion to people who have neither the training nor the means to really exploit the land which they will receive. On the other hand, representative democracy cannot be expected to produce all its fruit quickly in a continent half of whose people are illiterate. So these objectives will be pursued, but I do not think they will do the job to which I am trying to refer.

IV

We need an ideal which will be felt more quickly and which will be larger. I want to suggest such an ideal, the only one I can see right now which can put Latin America on the road to solving its own problems in a more or less durable way; it is the ideal of the creation of a Commonwealth of Latin American Nations which can attack their common problems in common.

Some of you may feel that this is a difficult and a distant goal. I feel, on the contrary, that it is precisely the kind of goal that can really move a people which has memories of greatness. As you know, Latins as a whole are particularly prone either to dedicate themselves totally to some great ideal or to simply relax and enjoy envying their neighbors and navigating through their own disorders.

Practically speaking, the ideal I have suggested is riding on the

crest of a historical wave. Not only in Europe, but in Latin America itself a great deal of progress has been made toward a Central American Union; and some progress has also been made toward the Latin American Free Trade Zone. But the fact is that these efforts have been made on somewhat theoretical planes, and that the Latin American people as a whole do not feel yet that something important is afoot. It is also a fact that the United States, which after all, whether it likes it or not, occupies a place of leadership in the hemisphere, has not really pushed these ideas. It has given them a certain amount of moral support; but it has not really gotten behind them.

Now a suggestion that the United States should push such ideals might have met a few years ago with at least two objections.

1. From statesmen you might have heard the opinion that (from a purely political point of view) it is easier for the United States to handle twenty small neighbors than one big one. But experience has shown that in fact it is extremely uncomfortable to handle twenty small and disorderly neighbors. And, what is more, experience in Europe has shown that if it can be difficult once in a while to handle a large neighbor, it is also more difficult for this large neighbor to be dominated by an extra-continental power; and this is a problem which is very near to us now.

2. You might have heard objections from United States businessmen, such as, "Our business depends on selling manufactured goods to these small economies, and this is not going to be so easy if we have to deal with a large and diversified economy." But here again experience, I think, has taught the opposite. United States businessmen in Latin America have run into the same problem in almost all our countries: each country in turn has run out of foreign exchange and has had to implant currency regulations and import limitations. It has, therefore, forced United States firms which had markets and investments in Latin America to manufacture in each country. So the situation now is that large United States firms find themselves faced with an alternative: are they to expand, for example, a plant in Costa Rica to serve all of Central America; or are they to build a plant in Costa Rica, another one in Guatemala, another one in San Salvador, and so forth? Modern industrial methods simply will not allow this, for it is no longer economical to manufacture anything for a small public.

I think therefore, that the idea of an economic union in Latin America, which will eventually lead to the creation of a Latin American commonwealth, is today in the interests of all. And it seems to

me that there are a number of purely practical things which can be done about it right away.

1. I think that it is urgent that our inter-American organizations, all of them, should cease to be meetings of one donor and twenty recipients. I have served as ambassador of Colombia to the Organization of American States, and, though it is true that the Organization does a lot of good in the specialized fields, it is also true that its Council is still a body without an ideal. Today it is not enough to do good; it is necessary to do right, and in the right direction. I am convinced that if inter-American organizations as a whole were imbued with an objective such as the one I have suggested, they would be transformed and we would be surprised at the increase in effectiveness which would come about.

2. There is no doubt that education must be the spearhead of our effort. Today, we have twenty different educational systems, and we have thousands of different programs for sending Latin American students abroad on scholarships. Such programs are wonderful things, particularly for the individuals concerned, but it is worth remembering that they also created problems. A Latin American student who studies a profession in the United States or in Europe quickly becomes used to a standard of technical development which he cannot find when he goes home. So it is becoming more and more frequent that many of our students simply stay away and pursue their professions in more advanced countries; or that, on the other hand, if they come home they soon despair of making progress in their professions and give them up. And so they are lost to the field in which they were trained.

To me it would make more sense for us to make a definite and urgent effort to standardize our educational systems and for European and United States aid to concentrate on sending dedicated teachers who would train locally not only the students but the teachers that we need. This particular field is an excellent example of a problem that cannot be met by money alone. No one in his right senses will dedicate a life to teaching in the backlands of South America only for money: it is a problem of vocation, of an ideal.

3. I would like to refer to administrative problems and especially to communications. As we stand, divided, each of our relatively small countries has set up a modern bureaucratic state, and these bureaucracies have reached a point where, for each to operate efficiently, it would almost be necessary today for the state to employ all the people who can read and write in each country. The machinery is simply too big for nations divided as we are. So here a program of unification and standardization could do a very important job. For example, in the field of communications, is it not ridiculous that to travel from one Latin American country to another you need a pocketful of papers, when Europeans who have for

generations been at each others' throats have done away with all this? Yet no inter-American organization has even touched this subject. And I am not only referring to tourism, but also to the migration of workers to areas where there is work, and to movements which are socially more important than just tourism.

4. A lot of importance has been given to foreign investment in Latin America; but I would like to point out a problem which arises almost in a pattern and which has not been sufficiently noted. When large United States firms invest in Latin America, they do so either by owning an enterprise outright or by owning a large bloc or even a majority in an enterprise with local shareholders. In the first case there is no problem to begin with. Americans run their enterprises well on the whole, and their people are well paid; but the time always comes when somebody cries "Imperialism," and the problems start. When, on the other hand, United States investors are associated with local partners, there is another problem which is characteristic. A situation almost always arises in which the interests of the United States investor no longer coincide with those of his local partner. A United States firm is interested, for example, in making a profit in one country and a loss in another which can be written off against certain taxes at home, while the local investor, of course, is just interested in making profits locally. I have seen this problem come up time and again, and here once more I think it is a problem that can be solved only by trying to standardize our tax laws, to make them similar in spirit and objective, and particularly to aim not only at promoting foreign investment in Latin America, but at promoting it under such conditions that foreign investors and national investors will have similar interests, and problems will be avoided.

There is also the problem of Latin American capital invested abroad. The economists tell us that the capital that Latin Americans have invested elsewhere is quite comparable to the capital that foreign investors have invested in Latin America. Now this is clearly due to the instability of our own economic systems, and so long as we are not recommending a system of force, so long as we are trying to maintain economic freedom, it is obvious that Latin American investors of all sorts will tend to invest their excess capital in other countries with stronger currencies than their own. This does not mean that they are abandoning their own countries by any means: I refer only to excess capital. But it does mean that there is a great exodus of capital from Latin America. Again we have a problem that can be attacked only by doing away gradually with the uneconomic division of our subcontinent and by creating an integrated economy which will have a more varied support.

There is also a more immediate solution to this problem, and I am glad to say that it is now receiving some attention: that is, the frank support of prices of the basic exports of Latin American countries. You

all know that the United States supports its farm prices, so that this is not an outlandish program by any means, and it is not an expensive one, either; a mere part of the money that is to be dedicated to helping Latin America in any case, would suffice for these supports.

Before leaving these few practical examples I would like to cite only one statistic: inter-Latin American trade today (trade between Latin American countries) represents 10 per cent, at most, of their total exports. In Europe, inter-European trade represents 75 per cent, or more, of the total exports of the area. This gives you a measure of the job that can be done by integrating the Latin American economy, quite apart from my main contention—that what Latin America needs more than anything is an ideal.

V

But this is not the time and place to try to enumerate a complete program. I have made an effort to show you that perhaps economic programs alone are not sufficient. I have tried to suggest an ideal which will fill the void that will inevitably be left if progress is attempted only on the economic front. I have tried to give you some examples of practical measures that can be taken towards that goal. So I will be satisfied if I have suggested an area worthy of some thought.

As has been pointed out, Communist countries guarantee that order will be kept while their economic programs go to work; they guarantee it quite simply by force. We, I think, will have to make the same guarantee; but in keeping with our basic philosophy, we will have to guarantee order, not by force, but by the voluntary cooperation of the people. And this, if it can be done at all, can be brought about only by giving the people a real sense of purpose, a sense of belonging to a human enterprise which will not soon be forgotten.

We have heard a lot lately about "the revolution of rising expectations." In my opinion the revolution of rising expectations in Latin America can be met in only one of two ways: it can be met by a revolution of violence, or it can be met by a revolution of ideals.

Part IV

THE CULTURE



Orlando Fals Borda : BASES FOR A SOCIOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION OF EDUCATION IN COLOMBIA

THE ALL-ENCOMPASSING nature of education has been an obstacle to defining it in operational terms. Thinkers such as Fichte and Dewey wanted to include in the term "education" all processes of mental assimilation and multiplication that render men fit to face the problems of life through the handling of knowledge. But this master definition, which apparently says a great deal, does not help much in guiding specific educational research. In sociological jargon, such a definition would come closer to our concepts of "socialization" or "enculturation."

In order to convert this ample concept into terms more amenable to scientific analysis, sociologists have come to accept for "education" a more restricted meaning, referring to it as one of the fundamental social institutions. Education is, indeed, a part of the socialization process; the individual personality is strikingly affected by it. Education as an institution is considered as that organized body of norms, values, and ways of conduct designed to preserve and transmit specialized and technical knowledge. This is knowledge that can hardly be handled by the family or by other institutions, and that requires persons specifically devoted to the task, as part of their position in society. Thus an educational institution presents a core composed of two status levels: the teacher and the student, with various satellite statuses that refer to an array of bureaucratic positions. As is the case with other institutions, the structure of relationships between the status levels is both formal and informal, and often the formal func-

tions are deeply affected by the informal ones; moreover, these structures are functionally related to other social institutions and social systems. An educational institution expresses itself in a number of ways, depending on the culture; and the specific systems and groups that form within it carry the peculiar imprint of dominant values and norms.

It is the purpose of this paper to review the Colombian educational institution in the light of the foregoing frame of reference, and especially to focus attention on the nature and trends of some important educational values that appear to explain present situations and dilemmas. Documentation is offered whenever possible; but as a whole the argument is a theoretical statement that could have some heuristic justification.

Present-day education in Colombia offers strong traces of an early scale of values—the sacred tradition predominant during colonial times, with two institutional expressions: Catholicity and the school caste system. It also reflects the transition to a different scale, the secular-technical one, that started to gain prominence at the end of the eighteenth century. In addition, present education shows the influence of two more recent values: the goal of democratic education, which was ideological food for nineteenth-century political parties; and popular nationalism, a twentieth-century phenomenon that in fact is a composite of older secular values vigorized in the more subtle and inflammable atmosphere of contemporary social change, and that finds a specific outlet in the struggle for autonomous university teaching, research, and extension.

These currents of value formation run in the same vein, but in different directions. The sacred tradition, still strong, is counteracted by the values of secularity, democracy, and popular nationalism. In fact, it is claimed here that the strains produced by these opposing streams of attitudes and behavior are one more symptom of contemporary socioeconomic development in the country; and that the slow speed with which the three newer scales of values have been adopted by Colombian society as a whole is due to attempts to maintain, often by violence, the earlier scale. This, of course, implies that the situation described may be peculiar to Colombia, and that certain complexes will not be found in other parts of Latin America. Therefore, it is not

prudent to generalize for this subcontinent on the basis of the present paper. Comparative studies are necessary for this purpose.

Each one of the currents of value formation mentioned above is studied in turn.

I. The Sacred Tradition

The only definite indication of a formal educational institution among the Chibcha is the *moxa* school (*cuca*, or seminary) in which carefully chosen children were taught the performance of sun ceremonies during which they themselves were immolated.^{1*} Different Indian groups specialized in trades and arts, such as ceramics and jewelry work, but it seems that the transmission of this specialized knowledge was a function of the family.

The arrival of the Spaniards brought two types of schools for the local Indians: the indoctrination and the monastic. The indoctrination school was largely informal; it required the Indians to gather together every Sunday in the town square at the sound of bells, to repeat and learn by rote the chants and dogmas of the Christian Church. *Encomenderos* were required to support these schools. On the other hand, the monastic schools were designed to instruct Indian nobility in the Spanish language and sacred teachings. They were organized by the religious orders and had some support from the civil authorities. No arts and sciences were taught in these schools, except perhaps some handicrafts.

For the local Spanish children and rising Creole nobility, there appeared minor schools in private houses or convents, and *colegios mayores* under the care of religious orders.² It should be noted that the Spanish Crown did not found schools of any kind in its colonies; it left this task to private initiative; that is, to religious groups. The state merely encouraged such activity and at times helped with funds. The final word, especially in regard to the creation of institutions of higher learning, lay with the Pope.

Contrary to what could be normally expected, but consistent with the caste idea of education only for a select elite, the first educational

*Notes to this chapter begin on page 211.

efforts of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of the New Kingdom of Granada were directed at the creation of a university patterned after Salamanca. In this, local pride and internecine conflict among religious groups played an important role. The Dominican fathers, who had started informally some teaching of arts and grammar in the convent at Santa Fé de Bogotá in 1563, sent an emissary to Madrid in 1573 to request the creation of a university. Pope Gregory XIII, in 1580, by means of his bull *Romanus Pontifex*, agreed to convert the Dominican Convent of the Rosary into a university of "general studies," with all the rights and privileges accorded to universities in the metropolis; it was restricted to the ruling white minority.³

Unfortunately there were no resources to carry on this project until the heirs of a private citizen, Don Gaspar Núñez, bequeathed his estate for this purpose in 1608. But by this time the Dominicans were engaged in a bitter dispute with the Jesuits who also claimed local university rights. Kings and Popes had to intervene repeatedly, until both the Jesuits and the Dominicans founded separate universities, the Xaverian for the former in 1622, and the Thomistic for the latter in 1625, confirmed in August, 1639.⁴ However, because of the privileges already granted to the Dominicans, only the Thomistic University was entitled to confer degrees in theology and arts publicly, with all the traditional paraphernalia. This formality, added to the fact that the Thomistic University functioned only on paper, became a serious obstacle for the scientific development of the colony. Such a cultural monopoly could not be overcome until national independence was achieved.

While this protracted conflict was raging, some leaders started to think about the basic schools from which the future students of the university could be selected. A first attempt to found a minor seminary in the 1580's by Archbishop Luis Zapata de Cárdenas failed shortly afterwards. It fell to the Jesuits to lay the groundwork for the first *colegios mayores* of the colony, in 1604.

A group of four missionaries, recently arrived from Quito at the request of Archbishop Bartolomé Lobo Guerrero, started a grammar school in a small mortgaged house at Santa Fé, thereafter called "Las Aulas." Soon philosophy and moral theology were added to the cur-

riculum. This was the beginning of the "Colegio Real Mayor y Seminario de San Bartolomé," whose statutes were officially promulgated on October 18, 1605. Archbishop Lobo Guerrero ordered the creation of 18 annual fellowships for students to follow the ecclesiastical career, and opened the doors to the sons of noble lineage (*convictores*) who wanted to learn arts and theology for the payment of a fee. They all had to be literate (in Latin, which was the official language in schools), of more than twelve years of age, and of "pure blood." They were subject to strict rules that underlined the sacred nature of the local society: all seminarians had to pray 55 Ave Marias and five Pater Nosters each Sunday and Monday; the day's work would be started with a prayer of a quarter of an hour; no tobacco should be smoked; and so forth.⁵

The second "Colegio Real Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario" was founded at Santa Fé in 1653 by Fray Cristóbal de Torres, then archbishop, who gave it a special statute. However, the same caste system of selection of students prevailed. This institution was destined to become the most important in the colony, especially after the Jesuits were expelled in 1767 and their schools and the Xaverian University were temporarily closed. Within its walls there occurred the subsequent transition from the sacred to the incipient secular that was characteristic of the eighteenth century.

The Present Situation. This transition did not entirely eliminate the two main factors that emerged during the first period, Catholicity and private enterprise, both combined within the structure of a closed society. These factors have continued to play an important role in the educational structure of Colombia today, as witnessed by the following facts:

1. The Roman Catholic Church is still, by a Concordat with the Vatican signed in 1888, the moral overseer of national education. This position of predominance has been utilized by the Church: (a) to control whenever possible the content of what is taught, establishing official textbooks for the primary and secondary schools, many of which are authored by clerics; (b) to quell competitors, both lay and ecclesiastical, who might diminish the Church's influence, especially in the rural areas and in the great portion of national territory classified as "missionary," although the same may happen in urban areas; for example, the severe restrictive campaigns during the Gómez-Urdaneta

regime (1950-53); (c) to exercise influence on educational policy-making through government agencies and councils.

2. In spite of meritorious efforts, most of which have been rather recent, the Church is still geared to provide education to the upper elite, neglecting the middle and lower classes. This vacuum has been partly filled by public schools and other private institutions such as the Protestant missions (see below).

3. Private enterprise in education is gaining momentum, but it is delineating itself more as a profitable business than as a public service. This is a reflection of the inability of the state to keep pace with the development of the country. Kindergartens are almost entirely private in Colombia: 927 out of 951 such schools were thus classified in 1958. The trend toward private primary schools is also startling: in 10 years, from 1949 to 1958 inclusive, the proportion of students in these institutions, vis-à-vis those in public schools, rose from 4 to 15 per cent (30,354 to 225,330 students respectively). There has been a flourishing in private "universities,"⁶ to the point that 40 per cent of all students attended in 1958 the 9 now in operation (7,801 out of a national total of 19,011); this can be compared with 28 per cent in 5 such universities in 1935 (668 out of 3,050).⁷

Because of the permeating influence of the Catholic Church, one is led to believe that education tends to be a monopoly of the ecclesiastical. In reality these religiously-oriented attitudes are rooted in the conservative nature of peasant groups from which the country is drawing manpower for its current development. Besides, in time of distress, with dangers of national dissolution (such as the current *Violencia*), the Church has remained as practically the only force that has held the national structure together—at least it is an institution that binds most Colombians. Nonreligious forces, especially the political ones, have tended to polarize the population. Hence the special status of the Church in Colombia that has obvious consequences in its educational activities.

II. *The Secular-Technical Transition*

The excessive stress on the ecclesiastical and theological disciplines received a moderate setback at San Bartolomé in 1636, when for a very short period the Bishop's physician, Rodrigo Enríquez de

Andrade, taught some principles of medicine in Latin.⁸ The first real challenge, however, came in 1733, when the king expressly authorized the teaching of medicine at the Rosario school. This was the beginning of an intellectual revolution in the upper circles of the New Kingdom of Granada that reached a climax in 1774 when Francisco Antonio Moreno y Escandón presented his academic program.

Only jurisprudence (civil and canonical), mathematics, and some astronomy had dared make an entrance in the reduced academic world of the colony. In this sense, the arrival of physician and botanist José Celestino Mutis in 1762 gave a real impulse toward renovation. Father Mutis found in Santa Fé a "scarcity of rationality, so intense that any enlightened understanding is considered dangerous." With courage and persistence he started a noisy campaign that rippled the quiet surface of the select academic pond. Prominent and scandalous was his first presentation of the Copernican system of astronomy at the Colegio del Rosario, in July, 1774, when his views gave rise to hasty accusations before the Inquisition.⁹ This was a momentous occasion because for the first time important criteria were presented objectively, without the traditional philosophical trappings. The medieval structure of education was on its way out, at least for the aristocratic groups.

King Charles III and his progressive policies had much to do with this change of attitude. For instance, he had enforced the study of Newton and Copernicus in the metropolis. Besides, the king sparked a more democratic educational policy within his domains. Thus toward the middle of the eighteenth century the university classrooms in the New Kingdom of Granada started to be opened to the laity, and especially to the Creoles; the clerics were no longer the only recipients of studies at the Thomistic University. And the *cátedras*, or lectureships, were likewise dispensed to nonecclesiastical persons.

The emergence of the Creoles as a sociopolitical force was an important ingredient in this intellectual reaction. In spite of the vigilance of Spanish tribunals and councils, English and French books were received at Santa Fé and other New Granadan cities with enthusiasm. From these emerged a new vision of life and a stronger interest in the things of this world. The technical sciences were displacing the

juridical and theological disciplines; and the Creoles of good families soon took notice of the change.

Moreno y Escandón, ably seconded by Father Mutis, was the champion of this movement toward intellectual renovation. Three months after Mutis delivered his Copernicus speech, Moreno presented a new "Plan provisional de estudios" which practically overhauled the decrepit Thomistic University both academically and administratively. New subjects were included—physics and botany among them; others were supplanted—such as the old astronomy. This plan was finally revoked by the Council of Indies; but in the meantime it had successfully stressed two important points: intellectual liberty to choose among alternative systems, and experimentation above mere speculation. Needless to say, in these ideological innovations there was the seed for the subsequent attitudes in the elite that led toward national independence. Secularity started to be a social value; it was no longer taboo. And it is important to note that this type of secularity had a strong accent of locality in it—it meant the importance of discovering local facts.

This secularity of the immediate found a concrete outlet in Mutis' Botanical Expedition, organized in 1783. The expedition led toward a massive rediscovery of the country—its economic potential, its riches, its contrasts. Mutis' followers and disciples, among them scientists who thirty years later suffered martyrdom (Caldas, Torres), became apostles of America and advocates of the newly-found American "soul."

Another attempt at secularizing the Thomistic University was made, again unsuccessfully, by the Viceroy-Archbishop Antonio Caballero y Góngora in 1787, when he proposed another "Plan de estudios generales" to found the "Universidad Real Mayor de San Carlos." His reasoning is a good summary of the intellectual transition which in his time was taking place:

The entire purpose of the plan is to substitute useful exact sciences for those which are merely speculative and in which time has been sadly wasted until now. This kingdom is full of most precious products to exploit, forests to fell, roads to build, swamps and mines to drain, water currents to bridle, and metals to perfect, in such manner that it will certainly have more need for persons who know nature and who know

how to use calculus, the rule, and the compass, than for those who understand and discuss the nature of reason, the prime matter, and the substantial form.¹⁰

The Archbishop's proposals are interesting: the director of studies should encourage the sons of artisans, laborers, and the poor to take industrial arts, if they were incapable of pursuing other careers; the titles of professor and doctor are honorary awards given the very few and the very best (notice the contrast with the present condition); the professors should add new knowledge by analytic instead of by syllogistic methods; moderation and affability should be the rule in teaching, not severity and punishment. And the teaching of geography, algebra and trigonometry, static and hydrostatic mechanics, hydraulics, public and civil architecture, botany, natural history, chemistry, industrial arts, and anatomy was first proposed.¹¹

In spite of the amazing resistance of the Dominican university, the secular-technical revolution in education took place, but still without reaching the popular masses. This trend was accelerated as Colombia started to feel the impact of the industrial revolution. Thus men like Joaquín Acosta went to France and England to become engineers and geologists, to return to Colombia to help launch new schools, such as the School of Mines and Military Engineering and the Institute of Natural Sciences (circa 1845).

Soon secularity became a synonym of "practicality." President José Ignacio de Márquez set a new precedent in 1839 when he advocated the importation of European technicians to establish new schools of chemistry, mineralogy, botany, and agriculture, a wish that subsequent presidents Herrán and Mosquera realized in part. It should be noted that most of these new technical schools were founded in the provinces and not in the capital as theretofore had been the fashion; but still this type of education was directed at a selective minority drafted from Colombia's "best families" and apparently designed to underline class differences.

This exchange of technical culture-bearers had additional encouragement from a new academic plan proposed by the Minister of the Interior Mariano Ospina in 1841, which was partly an ideological counter-response to Santander's plan of 1826 (see below). Ospina wanted to stress the "practical sciences." As a result, he stimulated

a "return-to-nature" movement which materialized itself in Colonel Agustín Codazzi's Chorographic Expedition of 1850. Yet Ospina himself confessed that the majority of students still preferred the traditional to the new technical careers.

The Present Situation. The subsequent attempts at creating and supporting a true national university, plus the inducements fostered by the accelerated cultural contact between Colombia and the rest of the world, led to the increasing adoption of secular subjects and attitudes in the schools.¹² For example, civil engineering was adopted in 1861. It could not have been otherwise if the country wished to improve its material conditions. Thus new disciplines and careers made their appearance in university curricula: agronomy (1911), veterinary medicine (1920), pharmacy (1927), dentistry (1932), architecture (1936), social work (1936), chemistry (1938), psychology (1938), nursing (1944), public health (1947), economics (1951), sociology (1959), electronics (1960), public administration (1961), etc. A need was also felt to institutionalize the professional training of army officers (in 1907 with a Chilean Mission), navy officers (from 1907 to 1910; reopened in 1935 under a British mission), and other military personnel, which before had trained themselves in the heat of battles.

The careers offered in the faculties of Colombian universities are summarized in Table 1, as of 1957 and 1958. Medicine, engineering-architecture, and law have the most numerous student bodies. But besides agriculture, which has received official impetus, there is a notable emergence of social disciplines, especially economics (from 662 students in 1957 to 855 in 1958) and social work (from 56 students in 1957 to 103 in 1958); this can be compared with the increasingly marginal status of theology in the universities (ecclesiastical seminaries were excluded from this study). The great demand for sociological studies, often regarded as a symptom of secularity, should also be noted. It has fostered the creation of the first faculty of sociology in South America, with a student body selected from an increasing number of applicants.

The unloading of traditionalism and syllogistic thinking has not been an easy task; and the transmission of new knowledge and techniques has been severely handicapped by the low academic level and

the scarcity of teachers. In most cases, whenever new sciences and techniques have made their appearance, routine, obscurantism, and shortsightedness have found a way to prevail, at least for relatively short periods of time.

TABLE 1
CAREERS OFFERED BY UNIVERSITY FACULTIES IN COLOMBIA
ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS REGISTERED,
1957-1958

Careers (grouped)	Number 1957	Registered 1958	Per cent Increase
Medicine	4,564	4,966	8.8
Engineering-Architecture	3,851	4,553	18.2
Law	2,948	3,436	16.5
Natural Sciences	1,217	1,508	23.9
Social Sciences	1,075	1,459	35.7
Arts	353	1,058*	199.7
Agriculture	639	912	42.7
Humanities	452	545†	20.6
Education	262	287	9.5
Theology	127	98	—
Others	189	189	0.0
Totals:	15,677	19,011	21.3

* Including nonuniversity students (extension).

† Excluding languages (extension).

These attitudes seem to be connected, as in the past, with vested interests that are formed inside and outside educational groups. For example, the renovation of programs at the medical schools have met with resistance from old-time medical professors and professionals who fail to keep up with the latest developments; the new economic disciplines, first formed under the shadow of law schools, were viewed with suspicion by lawyers who saw in economists future competitors; psychology and sociology, some late additions to the academic family, have suffered the same symptoms in their growth; and animal husbandry has barely developed under opposition from veterinarians.

The case of sociology deserves some comment. Certain groups have opposed the promotion of this science, or at least are suspicious of it because it would "expose" present conditions; these conditions are taboo, and the status quo apparently should be preserved, ac-

ording to such groups. Ideological control of this science has been sought through the creation of classes on "Catholic sociology" or through the creation of departments where moral philosophy and doctrines are taught under the guise of sociology. These, of course, are obstacles to the growth of this science because they disorientate the general public. The struggle for open-minded secularity is, therefore, ever present, and it forms an integral part of today's picture of education in Colombia.

However, there is now a feeling of urgency to meet the technical problems of socioeconomic development. The Ministry of Education has ambitious plans in this regard. And a specialized bureaucratic agency, the "Instituto Colombiano de Especialización Técnica en el Exterior" (ICETEX), has sprung to meet the needs of training abroad those students who by the nature of their choices do not find suitable faculties in Colombia. It is probable that the traditional conservatism and rigidity of the educational institution is on the verge of facing a stronger and more definitive challenge.

III. The Quest for Democratic Education

The anti-Spanish reaction of the postrevolutionary period expressed itself in Colombian educational institutions in two different forms: (1) the drive to offer possibilities of schooling to all citizens regardless of race, a right which had been practically denied by colonial authorities; and (2) the drive to achieve tolerance and open-mindedness in the schools, especially by going adrift from the Roman Catholic Church, equated at one time with the royalist cause. These were, of course, highly political issues, and the incipient parties of the Great Colombia did not fail to jump at the opportunity of imposing their often diametrically opposed views whenever it was their turn at the helm of the state.

In general terms, the early Santanderista groups and subsequent liberal parties favored, at least as a doctrine in their political platform, the most ample opportunities of education for all the people. The early Bolivarian groups and subsequent conservative parties also favored popular education, but within bounds; at times they gave

the appearance of paying only lip service to this democratic value, while by deed proceeding to close schools and to restrict teaching to the upper class. Besides, the liberals have on the whole favored secular, free education, while the conservatives have sided with the Catholic Church in preserving its ideological-sacred dominance. As will be seen shortly, this political struggle permeated the history of education in Colombia almost from the birth of the nation.

In 1811, one year after the first anti-Spanish revolt, Precursor Antonio Nariño proposed the reorientation of local intelligentsia toward English thinkers, especially Jeremy Bentham. It was then clear that Spain had maintained education as a privilege for the local nobility and the white race, and that there were too few schools in the colony: only two *colegios mayores*, three seminaries, one university (on paper), and a few other monastic and private institutions in diverse cities.¹³ Moreover, there was a need to renovate pedagogical methods, a tendency which had shown itself in the writings of the Viceroy-Archbishop twenty years before.

A solution was found in the Lancasterian schools, which combined new methods of popular education with the current attraction of the English (versus the Spanish) way of life. Joseph Lancaster himself went to Caracas in 1824 to supervise the promotion of his schools, and became a good personal friend of Bolívar. An educational rage took over the country, especially by reason of Santander's dynamism and vision made concrete in his "Plan de Estudios" dated October 3, 1826, implementing the basic educational law of March 18, 1826. This law ordered free public education and limited voting to the literate. Seven new *colegios*, 16 high schools, 434 regular literacy schools, 52 Lancasterian schools, and three normal schools were founded from 1820 to 1827.¹⁴ A true national university, which had been difficult to develop because of the strictness of the Thomistic statute, started to take form. Other institutes of higher learning or of a scientific nature were founded in this dynamic period. "Literacy Sunday Schools" were organized as was the case in England in response to the impact of industrialization and the new capitalistic ethic; tracts and leaflets were printed and distributed by the hundreds of thousands. The London Bible Society was allowed to work openly in Bogotá, and the lectures of its envoy, Diego Thompson, were at-

tended even by the local Catholic hierarchy. Latin was proscribed as the scholastic language, and tolerance was advocated so strongly that Protestant teachers from France and England were locally engaged at work. Utilitarian textbooks were officially sponsored for schools until 1828 when after bitter politico-religious disputes Bolívar ordered the suppression of the works of Bentham, Tracy, and other European thinkers.

The educational pendulum started to swing to the right in Colombia by this act of Bolívar, then invested with dictatorial powers. In reality this was the beginning of a strong Conservative-Catholic drive to stop secular, anglicized, and popular education, a drive that took most of the nineteenth century until the claims of the Church were confirmed in the Concordat with the Vatican of 1888. The spearhead at that time was a fiery priest from the church of La Tercera, Don Francisco Margallo y Duquesne, who consigned the outspoken advocate of utilitarianism, Dr. Vicente Azuero, to hell and damnation. The government retreated, and shortly thereafter the Liberator ordered the teaching of "Catholic morality" at the university, reversing other educational policies as well.¹⁵

This created so much confusion that the initial impulse given to education by Santander was virtually stalled, as witnessed by men like Rufino Cuervo who occupied leading posts in state governments. When Cuervo became governor of Cundinamarca in 1831, he found that only 23 out of 98 *parroquias* (parishes or *municipios*) had schools, and that the laws had not been enacted that would abolish Indian reservations and would require the sale of a part of the collective property to build and maintain schools.¹⁶ With the change of regime (Bolívar died in 1830, and the Great Colombia was almost simultaneously buried), and the return of ostracized Santander to power, Cuervo and other government officials reinitiated their campaign in favor of popular education. In Cundinamarca alone, the number of schools rose to 62 in three years, where 2,007 children attended. By 1837 the national balance was more favorable: there were three universities, 26 *colegios* and high schools, two schools for girls, some 200 mutual or Lancasterian schools, and 850 regular private and public literacy schools.¹⁷

Cuervo had two additional merits in regard to the pursuit of popu-

lar education: he founded the first public school for women in Latin America (La Merced, 1832), and he launched the first agricultural extension communication service directed to the farmer in Colombia, which he tried to do by means of an informative technical weekly called *El cultivador cundinamarqués o periódico de la industria agrícola y de la economía doméstica* (1832). This short-lived weekly was distributed in the churches of all towns each Sunday, and read and explained to the illiterate peasantry by the local government officials.

Conservative Mariano Ospina, whose work was mentioned above in connection with his recognition of the need for technical sciences, produced in 1841 an academic plan which was promptly considered *cuartelario* (fit for soldiers) on account of its stiff regulations. The reaction came in 1850 when Liberal President José Hilario López swung to the opposite position by cancelling all academic degrees and proclaiming that in the future the holding of a diploma would not be necessary for the practice of a profession. This, of course, created much confusion—a state from which Colombia did not start to emerge until the ultraliberal Constitution of 1863 was repealed in 1886. By then the conservatives were on the upswing, and neo-Thomism had become the fashion in most institutions of higher learning.¹⁸

In this same period the first Protestant schools started in Colombia. It is pertinent to take notice of their development because they were a stimulus through social contact in the locally homogeneous Catholic society and because they made important innovations in educational practices and policies. Founded in Bogotá in 1868, the first “Colegio Americano” was an innovation in various ways: it definitely oriented itself toward the education of the urban middle and lower classes, thus filling an evident gap; it gave an impulse to liberal education for women; it introduced new pedagogical methods and also sports which later became national or regional symbols. Although definitely missionary (Presbyterian), these schools continued to innovate in technical matters. Recently they were among the first to use coeducation in high schools, a practice forbidden by the government upon insistence of the Catholic Church.¹⁹

The constitutional changes of 1863, imposed by the Liberal party,

marked another upsurge of democratic education in Colombia, although it was still consigned to the narrow margins provided by the governing groups. This was underlined by the approval of state taxation laws with the purpose of promoting schools. The first one for Cundinamarca, that in a way set the pace for the rest of the states, was one issued on August 13, 1869, which ordered a tax of one per thousand on the value of landed properties. It was followed by a supplementary tax of 15 cents for each one hundred pesos of real estate and movable assets in the districts, ordered by Article 42 of a law dated January 14, 1873; the revenue was devoted solely to building schools and purchasing school furniture. Unfortunately, by reason of civil strife the state and national treasuries became progressively starved, and these laws were repealed in 1878 with great damage to popular education.²⁰

But there might have been other reasons. The landowners had just had their properties reassessed by the rudimentary cadastral service and were paying more to the state; the additional tax for democratic education thus proved to be unbearable, but easy to discard because the landowners themselves were sitting in the state legislatures. Besides, the Catholic Church had actively encouraged a campaign to maintain the status quo in education, as witnessed by the open opposition to revise school curricula and resist other directives of the state in Cauca and other departments.²¹ Therefore, as the drive for "education for all the people" came to a standstill, the general pattern that emerged was the preserved tradition of education for an elite, a privileged group that was panicky at the prospect of change and that would defend its position by all means. There were more public schools, to be sure. But the chances for children of lower classes to come up the social ladder through education (as is common in most democracies) were quite dim. They were lucky if they could have two years of primary school.

Anyway, for the country as a whole Law 2 of 1870 became a fundamental instrument. By means of this law, the executive branch of government was authorized to reorganize public primary education and to establish modern normal schools in the capitals of the states. The regulatory decree was issued on November 1, 1870, most probably under the inspiration of an active and dedicated scholar

from Bucaramanga named Dámaso Zapata, then school superintendent for the state of Cundinamarca.

This decree, signed by President Eustorgio Salgar, is a classic piece of liberal thought. It regulated the founding and functioning of public libraries and of scientific, industrial, and literary societies; set up rules of conduct for teachers, and pedagogical and corrective measures; and most prominently, according to Article 36, it declared that "the government does not intervene in the religious instruction; nevertheless, school hours shall be distributed in such a way that students have enough time to receive said instruction from their priests or ministers, in accordance with their parents."²² This, of course, sparked again the opposition of the Catholic Church that eventually, with the change of regime, imposed its views.

Foremost was the creation of modern normal schools to prepare the teachers needed in urban and rural schools. The government decided to reorganize these schools technically, and for this purpose directed the Colombian minister in Berlin to secure the services of German educational experts. With some difficulties, the minister hired nine German professors who travelled to Colombia in 1871 to become the first directors of the state normal schools. Each one was to have a Colombian counterpart who would, after training, take his place. One normal school for women was also established in 1872, under the direction of the German Professor, Catalina Recker.²³

The work was conscientiously done, proceeding with care by means of rural and urban pilot projects (Tenjo in Cundinamarca had the first project of this promotion). Most of the German teachers (carefully screened as to their religious views and intentions before they were hired) proved to have apostolic dedication, and stayed in Colombia for the rest of their lives. Unfortunately their work was not lasting. With the political pendulum swinging to the right again in the 1880's and with the economic difficulties produced by the perennial civil wars, this important program came virtually to a halt. By 1886 the ex-Liberal President Rafael Núñez turned conservative and became very cool toward popular (and university) education.

In spite of all these adversities, the trend toward increased facilities for democratic schooling continued in Colombia. One index is the upsurge of female education, especially since 1930. There was only

one school for women (private) during colonial times; then La Merced was founded. Several high schools followed during the nineteenth century, and the new normal school for women became a strong stimulus; but university education was still forbidden for women. Tradition required them to stay in their homes and to follow an insipid domestic life. However, outside contacts and the effective campaigns of local feminist groups and leaders added impulse to the "liberation" movement, which started to hit the universities by 1935. The acceleration has been phenomenal: from 58 women registered in universities in 1935, the number rose to 100 in 1940, to 1,334 in 1950, and to 3,756 in 1958. This last figure is about one-fifth of the total enrollment.²⁴

The Present Situation

According to most observers, the present situation of democratic education in Colombia is critical. Especially in this century, and more exactly, after 1930, the governments have tried to build schools and to hasten the preparation of teachers; but the effort has been dramatically inadequate and full of obstacles. The over-all impression still is that education is a luxury monopolized by an elite. It reflects the general class structure of the country. However, with the rural-urban trend, the impact of industrialization, and the contacts sped by improved communication facilities, the cultural goals of the common people have had important changes. These people are no longer satisfied with their present condition and are aspiring to higher goals. One of them is evidently appropriate schooling for children; peasants in many communities in transition no longer are saving to purchase land, as was the custom, but to send their offspring to school. This is a significant change. Unfortunately, such changes in the cultural goals of the people have not been followed by adjustments in related institutional channels, which is one of the main reasons for national unrest and dissatisfaction. Several institutional bottlenecks frustrate the general population in achieving their goals: the lack of schools, the lack of teachers, and the lack of educational opportunities resulting from the maldistribution of wealth. Space allows here the treatment of the first two pertinent questions. The last one has been treated elsewhere, although tangentially.²⁵

There are 17,738 primary schools in Colombia (1958), of which 15,545 are public and 2,193 are private. They are distributed according to the sex of the students, as follows: for boys, 3,862; for girls, 3,912; mixed or alternate, 9,964. (Alternate means that boys come to school three days of the week and girls the other three days, which in fact reduces by one-half the scholastic year.)

Almost one-third of these schools (10,737, or 61 per cent) offer only one or two years of studies, which on account of the alternation provision in fact means six months and one year, respectively; a similar majority (11,946) is located in urban areas. Thus it can be seen that the farm population has the least opportunity to achieve an education. Moreover, 31 per cent of primary school buildings are structures that were not built for this purpose (they were mostly private homes or *chicha* liquor stores); 57 per cent of the buildings do not provide lodging for the teachers; and 38 per cent lack elementary hygienic services. Furniture is likewise grossly deficient.

No reliable figures are available for secondary education; including those having primary schooling simultaneously, the figure may pass the two thousand mark. And as stated above, there are 23 universities and colleges, of which 14 are public.²⁶

The attendance at these institutions is shown in Table 2. It may be seen that during the ten-year interval previous to 1958, there was a larger proportional increase in attendance at primary school; but the institutions at the secondary and university levels were unable to keep the same pace. The result is a high number of students who fail to register for lack of space. For 1961 it was calculated that 131,950 applicants had been refused in all schools, most of them (92,240) of primary levels. The accumulated yearly figures must be staggering.

More dramatic is the situation of the primary schools in relation to the population aged 7 to 11, which should be made literate. For 1958, out of a calculated population of 1,764,665 for these age categories, 33 per cent, or 583,086 boys and girls did not go to school. In 1954 the figure had stood at 46 per cent, or 750,598 persons who did not register out of a population of 1,615,807 in ages 7 to 11. In the five years between 1954 and 1958, the accumulated total of unregistered boys and girls was 3,208,790. Considering that a number of them go to school after they are 12 years of age, this figure is somewhat re-

duced. But it is a definite indication of the failure of the institutions of the nation to meet educational needs.²⁷

TABLE 2
STUDENTS REGISTERED IN PRIMARY, SECONDARY, AND
UNIVERSITY LEVELS IN COLOMBIA, SELECTED YEARS, 1938-1958

Year	Number of Students			
	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
1938	627,730	60,251	3,050	691,031
1943	679,273	75,474	5,113	759,860
1948	765,482	78,200	8,252	851,934
1953	1,054,696	108,755	11,629	1,175,080
1958	1,489,674	192,152	19,011*	1,700,837

* Adjusted. Cf. Table 1.

One obvious result is the persistence of a mounting number of illiterates, although the proportion of them to the general population is reduced each year. The situation can be studied in Table 3, for the period 1905 to 1951. Further analysis shows that the majority of illiterates aged 7 years and more (76.2 per cent) were in the rural areas in 1951; and that the rural-urban trend had affected the large cities; for example, Bogotá, with 84.6 per cent illiterate. The most backward departments in this regard in 1951 were Boyacá, Chocó, Cauca, and Nariño. Moreover, there was a larger proportion of female than male illiterates in 1951 (52.4 and 47.6 per cent, respectively).

TABLE 3
ILLITERACY FOR CENSUS YEARS IN COLOMBIA, 1905-1951*

Year of Census	Total Population	Illiterates	Per cent Illiterates
1905	4,544,770	2,856,270	63.0
1912	5,472,400	3,228,720	59.0
1918	5,855,070	3,372,520	57.6
1928	7,581,000	3,799,880	48.4
1939	8,701,810	4,150,760	47.7
1951	11,545,370	4,906,780	42.5

* The censuses prior to 1938 do not specify literacy by age groups. The proportion of illiterates aged 7 years and more was 47 per cent in 1938 and 42 per cent in 1951.

The high "student mortality" or low retention rate in Colombian schools also merits consideration. According to one source that based its studies on a nine-year period from 1951 to 1958, the number of students in primary grades is progressively reduced, computed in percentages as follows: 1st year, 100; 2d year, 62; 3d year, 28; 4th year, 19; 5th year, 13. In other words, only 13 out of 100 students reach and complete the fifth year of primary education.

The situation is just as serious for university students. According to the most recent available information, in 1957, 12,995 persons applied for entrance at Colombian universities, but only 8,437 could be accepted; in 1958, 16,416 persons applied and only 9,837 could be accepted. If these figures are correct, they are indicative of an alarming situation—that the rate of applicants is increasing at a much more rapid speed than the number of locations for students made available in the institutions of higher learning. In only two years, 11,137 persons were refused university training.

Once in the universities, the students are subject to several strains the nature of which is still undetermined but which, also, cause the retention rate to be dramatically low.²⁸ In 1958 the figures in percentages were as follows: 1st year, 100; 2d year, 58; 3d year, 42; 4th year, 32; 5th year, 21; 6th year, 9. On the average, 60 per cent of all university students do not reach the fifth year of their training. The falling off is especially noticeable from the first to the second year, when almost one-half of the students fail to continue—the tacit acceptance of this seems to be the continuation of the old standard of education for an elite, although, of course, some dropping out is due to deficiencies in high school preparation. Few crown their careers with success (Father Lebret calculated that only one out of 2,500 students who enter first year of primary school completes university studies); therefore the upper groups do not have competitors in numbers large enough to threaten their traditional position. The formation of a new elite, or the renewal of current types of elites is, of course, one of the main missions of universities; it can be seen that they are failing in this regard in Colombia.²⁹

As for the condition of the teaching force, the picture is likewise tragic. It is true that the number of normal schools has risen from those ten founded in the 1870's to 242, including all those supported

by the nation and the departments, and some private ones; but these schools are graduating an average of 1,800 teachers per year, which is entirely inadequate, as is the quality of their training. Out of a total of 38,061 primary school teachers in 1958—21,319, or 56 per cent—held no degree. They were as a rule persons hired locally through political connections. The rest were high school and normal school graduates.

These teachers were located mostly in urban rather than rural areas (24,678 and 13,383, respectively)—although the country is still 61 per cent rural—and the majority of the least prepared were located in public schools in the open countryside (10,661 out of 17,908). The reverse is true for private schools, but this is to be expected as there are very few such institutions in rural areas. The overwhelming majority of primary school teachers is female (29,787 out of 38,061), and they receive monthly pay ranging from 200 pesos to 700 pesos according to category (U.S.\$25 to \$87 per month). As for teachers in high schools and similar institutions, the proportion of those without any professional title rises to 80 per cent. But these schools, compared with the universities, have a relatively larger number of full-time teachers (32 per cent).

According to the available information, only 16.5 per cent of university professors dedicate their full time to teaching (485 out of a total of 2,937 in 1958); the rest are *catedráticos*, or professors paid by the hour. The situation is slightly better in other institutions of higher learning. The university professor is as a rule a highly capable and respected professional who accepts the position with a view more to earning prestige than money. Hence he will continue with his private practice or as an employee in another entity, often neglecting his duties as a teacher. Especially in social science faculties, he has a tendency to become an "encyclopedist"—a bookish eminence designed to impress the students but with little empirical background. This tendency, however, is on its way out in several universities, as the emphasis is rapidly shifting to technical studies.

New methods to teach the three R's to the mass of peasants have been locally devised, notably the use of the radio by *Acción Cultural Popular* (*Radio Sutatenza*), an important recent effort of the Catholic Church to reach and hold the swaying *campesinos*.³⁰ And modern

agricultural extension methods, introduced by an agency of the Point IV program in 1954, have been amply adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and most departmental agricultural secretaries. The Ministry and related agencies have 64 extension agencies in Colombia, staffed by agricultural engineers and home-improvement workers especially trained to make effective educational contact with the peasants in their own farms and homes. This is an important innovation useful for the program of rural life betterment and agrarian reform advocated by recent governments. But on the other hand, universities and institutions of higher learning have barely established extension services for the general citizenry, whether in classes or through libraries (see below).

The more sophisticated method of "community development" has been introduced to Colombia, but with considerable initial disorganization. Political and economic groups tried to seize the movement to divert it toward their own ends, thus warping the basic educational drive toward self-helping communities. Nevertheless, efforts are being made by several institutions to give to this campaign the technical and liberating meaning that has given good results in several countries.

In conclusion, it may be seen that democratic education is still far away in spite of efforts made sporadically to reach this goal. The weight of tradition, the nature of class structure, the interference of vested interests have delayed the necessary action. But the mounting number of illiterates in Colombia is proving to be a heavy burden which no modern nation can afford to bear. This illiteracy, plus the poor content of available education, and the lack of an ethical educational spirit are considered to be at the root of political violence and rural unrest. The government is now advocating a strong educational program, which has increased fivefold the budget for the Ministry of Education and imposed a constitutional amendment requiring the devotion of 10 per cent of the national budget for this Ministry. An ambitious plan now calls for the construction of 22,000 schools, the preparation of 9,540 new teachers, the academic improvement of 11,160 teachers now at work, and the increase of the student population in primary schools to 2,440,000 by 1965. There is disagreement still as to what should be taught and as to which institution should control education, whether the Church or the State (an issue already

settled in most other nations in the world). But on the whole there is now a consensus on the need to raise the level of literacy and technical preparation of the Colombian common people.

IV. Nationalism and University Autonomy

The rise of nationalism in Colombia and Latin America is an important phenomenon that is gradually saturating all aspects of local social life. This is a new type of group recognition: it is the discovery of ever-larger levels of integration by peoples who before had a most reduced *Weltanschauung*, and who now are achieving new concepts, a new philosophy of life, and new aspirations. It is a nationalistic feeling rooted in the workers and the peasants—persons who previously had little to do with setting the course of their society because this was the task only of the traditional power groups.

This transition from elite to popular nationalism has become increasingly prominent in this century, and it is today a major sociopolitical force.³¹ It is a significant factor in producing a fourth educational value in Colombia: an autonomous university with enough freedom to teach universal truths, enough liberty to investigate and interpret national realities, and enough resources to reach the mass of the people without interference. These factors seem to be the main components of what Latin American thinkers hazily call "the mission of the university." A heroic effort to achieve these values was made in the 1920's in Mexico, just as something similar was advocated by Max Scheler for Germany during the reorganization period after World War I. It is still a goal in Colombia, much discussed and pondered. But it is definitely achieving greater significance.

In Colombia this struggle has found a specific expression in the National University. Other universities too have recently sprung up as independent attempts to satisfy the impulse of popular nationalism, for example, universities in the provinces—Atlántico, Tolima, Caldas, Santander, Nariño. Another consequence of this impulse, peculiarly enough, has been the founding of universities patterned after North American standards—Andes, América, Valle. This "Americanization" of Colombian education has recently been the

cause of student strikes and the resignation of one rector of the National University; the leftist parties view it with increasing suspicion, as they claim that the American ideology (supposedly conservative) is being introduced along with the structure. Yet it can be seen that this movement may fall within the nationalistic trend as a reaction against the previous European orientations, which are attacked for their Parnassus-like, or ivory-tower, nature.³² Traditional attitudes were rooted in the idea of elite education, and not in the necessity for popular education, as the alleged "Americanization" movement proclaims.

It will be remembered that the efforts to have a true university during colonial times were warped by the monopoly of the Dominicans. Only at the Colegio Mayor del Rosario was there an atmosphere of higher learning. This situation was somewhat altered by Santander, who established the first National (Central) University in Bogotá in 1826, but the new entity actually only combined existing institutions (especially the two *colegios mayores*) and merely ordered them to complement their curricula. President Pedro Alcántara Herrán and his minister Mariano Ospina tried unsuccessfully to reorganize the National University in 1842; and José Hilario López gave it a serious blow, in 1850, when he proclaimed it unnecessary to have degrees in order to practice a profession in Colombia. It fell to President Santos Acosta to found, on January 3, 1868, the university that has survived to date under the name of Universidad Nacional de Colombia; this followed the pertinent law of September 22, 1867, which also ordered the creation of six schools or "faculties"—Law, Medicine, Natural Sciences, Engineering, Arts and Handicrafts, and Philosophy and Letters.³³

It is possible to speak of a certain type of "autonomy" for this first university: it had at least one essential ingredient—liberty of examination and discussion. Although its classes were taught, as a rule, in clerical institutions, there was ample freedom of teaching. However, the university as such did not have a visible entity; it was not a juridical person and it lacked facilities and symbols. The diverse schools never coordinated their curricula. In short, there could not arise any feeling of Alma Mater in connection with this university—rather, the professors and students tended to identify themselves

with their respective faculties. This cultural characteristic has persisted in the National University to this date.

The weak alliance of those fiefs which were the local faculties fell to the ground after the revolution of 1885 that consolidated the political power of the conservatives. The faculties received more ample authority, which practically killed the National University. A university council, formed by the Minister of education and the rectors of the faculties, was constituted in 1903 with little result. Then men like Rafael Uribe Uribe began to insist on the need to replan higher studies by making them more practical, and to convert the university into a centre of diffusion of knowledge for the population in general.³⁴

The chaotic situation of the uncoordinated faculties with their own rectors led Congress to approve Law 57 of 1923, ordering an investigation of public education. A German technical mission composed of three professors was brought to Colombia, to work with three Colombians.³⁵ This group made concrete proposals in 1925, including another important ingredient for the concept of university autonomy: the university, they said, should be a juridical person governed by its own legal bodies; that is, the faculty staff, the university council, the rector, and the representatives of the student body.³⁶ Unfortunately this initiative did not prosper in Congress; but it created a valuable precedent in regard to the legal aspect of autonomy.

Several politicians and intellectuals, among them Germán Arciniegas, agitated in favor of change at the university, until finally their proposals were adopted in his platform by President Alfonso López in 1934. López, in his inaugural speech, added a third ingredient to the concept of university autonomy: the obligation and the liberty to examine national facts and problems. Said he: "Our universities are academic schools disconnected from Colombian problems and realities. . . . The state governs an unknown country the possibilities of which are ignored generally by those in power, and about which all sorts of legends have been formed. We, the politicians, also do not know the social bases that serve as grounds for our experiments."³⁷

True to the word of López, and with the able assistance of Darío Echandía and Jorge Zalamea, the government gave entity, grounds, and symbols to the National University for the first time. Congress

approved Law 68 of 1935 (December 7), which laid the foundation for a complete institution of higher learning; soon the construction of the modern and beautiful "Ciudad Universitaria" (the main campus) was under way. The university city was to include appropriate housing for staff and students, stadiums, clinics, and other services, as well as the buildings for all the faculties. This constitutes, in fact, a fourth component of autonomy: that of particular services and facilities for its own personnel. Although some of these services are deficient and the students from the provinces still do not have enough living quarters at their disposal, the university project is today a handsome reality.

It will be noted that the four components of the concept of university autonomy mentioned above—freedom of teaching and discussion, juridical self-government, focused nationalism, and internal services—spring in one way or another from two main streams of value formations: the secular-technical scale and the quest for popular education. But the concept itself merits treatment as a new value complex that is in the process of formation. Although applied specifically to the National University, it is not a complex peculiar to this institution (in which case it would not be so important, sociologically speaking); it seems to be a secular expression of Colombian nationalism that finds an appropriate outlet at the university of the state. In a sense, the National University could be considered as the nation in a capsule.

This quest for autonomy, which seems to be just beginning, carries implicitly a series of secular, independent attitudes that would revolutionize all the educational institutions of the country. Once definitely adopted, it would produce a different sort of high school, with a different sort of graduate, subject to a different sort of teacher, all directed toward this new type of university and its ideology. It would also increase the facilities for the extension and diffusion of learning to the masses. Paramount are the consequences in the change of outlook of Colombia's intellectual and political elite now being formed at the National and at some private universities. Autonomy in this case represents a liberation from the heavy burden of mistakes made by myopic leaders in the past, and a preparation to live up to the expectations of the people's newly-found nationalistic sentiment.³⁸

It may be seen that the quest for university autonomy has wide ideological, political, and technical implications. For this reason, it has run head on against powerful vested interests, which explains the long delay in the formation of the complex. It took a German mission in a foreign-oriented country to break the superficial crust of resistance. But the struggle continues. Peculiarly, the role of defenders of autonomy has fallen to the students themselves. (Hence the prophetic intuition of the German mission which first proposed that the students be taken into consideration in the governing of the University, a task which on the whole they have done with dignity; in Germany the university students have been in the past active in the struggle for autonomy and popular education; in France they became a political force of resistance during Nazi occupation.) Diverse failure in leadership has caused the student body to consider itself inimical to established institutions, in which it claims to recognize the traditional vested interest groups. As in all conflicts, the opposing sides tend to take extreme positions from which they claim to derive most advantage. Thus the students may go so far as to proclaim the University campus a sanctuary in which the armed forces and the police are not allowed to enter at any time,³⁹ or they may commit themselves to support "all strikes" by workers against management either actively or through the award of "asylum" in the university campus to persecuted labor leaders, as happened in 1961. Likewise, the "vested interests," or lawful traditional institutions, proclaim against the "chaos" at the University and the "communist leanings" of the student body, with the improbable intent of closing the University or of setting back the clock of history.

It should be evident by now that this dynamic university process that started to gain momentum in 1925 will not be turned back, unless sheer force is used to stop it. But it might not restrain itself; it might next take a newer, more confused, and more violent shape; because this particular process seems to be intimately connected with the powerful trend toward popular (versus elite) nationalism and mass education that is promoting a swift reinterpretation of sacred and traditional values.

NOTES

1. Fray Pedro Simón, *Noticias históricas de las conquistas de Tierra Firme en las Indias Occidentales*, II (Bogotá: Editorial Kelly, 1953), 249-250.

2. Adolfo Dollero, *Cultura colombiana: apuntes sobre el movimiento intelectual de Colombia, desde la conquista hasta la época actual* (Bogotá: Editorial Cromos, 1930), p. 311.

3. José Manuel Groot, *Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada*, I (Bogotá: M. Rivas y Cía., 1889), 147-148, 303-304. Another important source for the history of education in Colombia is José María Vergara y Vergara, *Historia de la literatura en Nueva Granada*, I (Bogotá: Editorial Minerva, 1931), chaps. 3 and 9.

4. Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-306.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 223-225; Guillermo Hernández de Alba, *Aspectos de la cultura en Colombia* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 1947), pp. 97-98.

6. Colombia has 23 "universities," 14 national or departmental and 9 private, but many of these should technically be called "colleges."

7. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures reported for the present situation have been derived or computed from the following authoritative sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, *Resumen de la enseñanza primaria en Colombia, 1958* (Bogotá: DANE, 1960); Ministerio de Educación Nacional, Oficina de Planeamiento Educativo, *Educación primaria en Colombia, 1958* (Bogotá: Ministerio de Educación Nacional, Boletín No. 18, 1960); Asociación Colombiana de Universidades, *Educación superior, 1958* (Bogotá: Fondo Universitario Nacional, 1960); Alfonso Ocampo Londoño (Minister of Education), *Memoria al Congreso de 1961* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1961); Jaime Posada (Minister of Education), "Discurso en la Universidad Nacional," *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), October 29, 1961. Statistics are admittedly deficient, but are indicative of present trends.

8. Hernández de Alba, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-113. Cf. the following accounts that deal with the development of medical studies in Colombia: Emilio Robledo, *Apuntes sobre la medicina en Colombia* (Cali: Biblioteca de la Universidad del Valle, 1959), especially pp. 75-99; Pedro M. Ibáñez, *Memorias para la historia de la medicina en Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá: Imprenta de Zalamea Hermanos, 1884). Santander established the faculty of medicine on a professional basis in 1826.

9. Hernández de Alba, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-127; Vergara, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-413. The local professors and authorities did not pay attention to the fact that, after having included the book *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium* in the Index in 1616, the Church had officially reversed itself in 1758, when that book was stricken from the Index by order of Benedict XIV.

10. Antonio Caballero y Góngora, "Relación de mando," in Eduardo Posada y Pedro María Ibáñez, *Relaciones de mando* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1910), p. 252. Vergara, *op. cit.*, pp. 413-414.

11. Hernández de Alba, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-165.

12. For considerable information on the founding of schools and universities in this period, see Dollero, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-336.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 314-318.
14. Hernández de Alba, *op. cit.*, p. 215.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
16. Angel Cuervo and Rufino J. Cuervo, *Vida de Rufino Cuervo y noticias de su época*, I (Paris: A. Roger y F. Chermoviz, 1892), 210.
17. Hernández de Alba, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
18. Dollero, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-329.
19. For further information see Francisco Ordóñez, *Historia del cristianismo evangélico en Colombia* (Medellín: Tipografía Unión, 1956).
20. Ramón Zapata, *Dámaso Zapata: la reforma educacionista en Colombia* (Bogotá: Editorial El Gráfico, 1961), pp. 159-163.
21. Salvador Camacho Roldán, *Escritos varios* (Bogotá: Librería Colombiana, 1893), pp. 106-111.
22. Zapata, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-120.
23. Santiago Pérez, "Informe del Director General de Instrucción Pública," *La escuela Normal*, IV, 106-107 (Bogotá, January 18, 1873), 11-12.
24. The total number of university students in the respective years is as follows: 4,137 (1935), 3,850 (1940), 10,672 (1950), and 19,011 (1958).
25. Orlando Fals Borda, *Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955); *El hombre y la tierra en Boyacá* (Bogotá: Editorial Antares, 1957); "La reforma agraria," *Revista de la Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales*, XI, 42 (Bogotá, July, 1960), 93-95.
26. Historical information about well-known primary and secondary schools, such as the "Gimnasio Moderno," "Liceo de la Salle," is found in Dollero, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-367. Most of these schools have been restricted to the elite. For the southern section of Colombia, see Sergio Elías Ortiz, *Del Colegio de la Compañía de Jesús a la Universidad de Nariño, 1712-1904* (Pasto: Imprenta del Departamento, 1956).
27. In this regard see the informative and rare study of education in the Department of Norte de Santander conducted by the Instituto Piloto de Educación Rural, *Investigación educativa en Norte de Santander, 1959-1960* (Pamplona: Imprenta Departamental, 1960). In this department, 54 per cent of children of school age do not go to school, and the registration of children actually decreased in rural areas every year from 1957 to 1959, inclusive. Actual work days per year in schools are 160 and 80 for one-sex and alternate schools, respectively. The suggestions of farmers in regard to subjects they would like to see taught in schools were as follows: dressmaking, agriculture, home economics, carpentry, nursing, animal husbandry, shoemaking, and tailoring.
28. The Faculty of Sociology of the National University is currently making an investigation of the student body in several universities at Bogotá which might throw light upon this aspect of education in Colombia.
29. Cf. the important summary and policy discussion contained in Misión Economía y Humanismo (headed by Father Louis Joseph Lebret), *Estudio sobre las condiciones del desarrollo de Colombia*, I (Bogotá: Aedita Editores, Ltda., 1958), 299-359.
30. Although somewhat effective in combating illiteracy, the effects of this experiment have been most notable in derivative fields, such as agriculture and home improvement.
31. Orlando Fals Borda, "La transformación de la América Latina y sus implicaciones sociales y económicas," *La nueva economía*, I, 2 (Bogotá), 18-19.

32. The European influence may still be strong. According to the records of ICETEX there are more Colombians studying in Europe (especially in Spain, France, and Belgium) than in the United States of America (558 and 496, respectively, in 1960). However, other agencies send their fellows or applicants to the United States and Latin America almost exclusively.

33. Hernández de Alba, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

34. Ministerio del Trabajo (Colombia), *El pensamiento social de Uribe Uribe* (Bogotá: Biblioteca del Ministerio del Trabajo, 1960), pp. 45-46.

35. The Germans: Anton Keitel, Karl Decker, and Carl Glockner; the Colombians: Emilio Ferrero, Tomás Rueda Vargas, and Gerardo Arrubla (*ibid.*, pp. 65-66).

36. Cf. Dollero, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-342.

37. Alfonso López Pumajero, "Discurso de toma de posesión," in Manuel Monsalve M., *Colombia: posesiones presidenciales, 1810-1954* (Bogotá: Editorial Iqueima, 1954), p. 409.

38. In this connection see the informative "Manifiesto de la Asamblea Estudiantil de la Universidad Nacional: la revolución—autenticista de las instituciones universitarias," Bogotá, April 1, 1960 (mimeographed).

39. Actually this is the result of orders given verbally by members of the military junta that followed Rojas Pinilla, as a transitory measure to avoid personal clashes between the police and the students—these were then considered national heroes for having been active during the May, 1957, revolt that toppled Rojas. This established a precedent that the students have been quick to seize.

Luis Monguió: COLOMBIAN LITERATURE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

FOR THE PURPOSES of an interdisciplinary conference it has seemed both logical and profitable to speak briefly of a few writers and works of high quality, representative of the various trends in modern Colombian literature, rather than to cite many names and titles which can easily be found in the standard bibliographical aids. These remarks, therefore, have been restricted to the two main pure belletristic fields of poetry and prose fiction.

I. Poetry

During the first four decades of our century the eponymous poet of Colombia was, without a doubt, Guillermo Valencia (1873-1943). He was initiated into the rites of poetry in the atmosphere of *fin-de-siècle* modernism, but he was saved from the mere ornamental and precious writing, into which so many lesser modernists fell, by his firsthand knowledge of the Greek and Latin classics, as he was saved from the clichés of a then fashionable “decadentism” by the strength of his character and the values of his religious faith. True enough, in the first stages of his development, Valencia wished to appear, theoretically at least, as an ivory-tower poet. In the ivory tower, he wrote in a poem of 1897, Good and Evil, Men and Life, and Love could not reach and disturb him; there Beauty dwelt, “mute, impassive, glacial.” The following year he also said that he would “sacrifice a world to polish a verse.” One suspects, however, that these

extremely objectivistic statements were rather bridles set by Valencia on his own temperament, for we find that at that very same time he also wished, romantically, "to feel, to see, and to divine all." We have only to read his later work to discover that this strict early Parnasianism of Valencia's may be compared to a purgatory where he learned to avoid the pitfalls of the sentimentality of feeling and vulgarity of expression which the Romantics had left strewn on the ways of Poetry. Fortified by this exercise in objectivity Valencia could then write on any subject without falling into the sentimental, the trivial, the commonplace. He could range from an ode in praise of his home town of Popayán to a poem in sorrow for the causes of anarchism; from an adaptation of a Chinese classic to a translation from Stefan George; from the Biblical to the Hellenic; from the classical to the contemporary; always with a magnificent and selective vocabulary, with an extremely plastic and elegant imagery. His main works of poetry are collected in his *Ritos* (1899 and 1914), *Catay* (1929), and in his posthumous *Obras poéticas completas* (1948 and 1952). His culture was classical and cosmopolitan, but directed towards the construction of a cultural ideal for his own country; his art was aristocratic and exquisite, but he loved and served his people; he held his emotions in check, but he was far from impassive. The Beauty he searched for was not glacial—paraphrasing Rubén Darío we might say that it appeared marble-like, but that it was living flesh. Times change, and taste with them: Valencia was a poet of his time, the turn of the century; he was a modernist poet. The earmarks of his modernism may be signs of an era past and gone; but the essence of his work remains poetry.

Valencia stands as the prince of Colombian modernists and makes it superfluous to list any others. There is another Colombian writer, however, within that literary movement who warrants a reference because of the continental reputation he attained, owing more, very probably, to his pose as a Satanic, amoral, decadent human being than to his not inconsequential poetry. He is Miguel Ángel Osorio (1883-1942). In many ways, like so many symbolists in Europe and modernists in America, he is a delayed Romantic who inextricably mixed life and literature: his pose becoming his life, his mask his face. In rebellion against all conventions—mother-love, patriotism,

heterosexuality—he recanted in his last hour, and like the Romantic Zorrilla's Don Juan, in a minute of contrition he atoned for a life of sin. As a poet he showed extreme virtuosity in the use of meter and rhythm, always within the conscious formalism which seems to be a constant in Colombian poetry. He manifested an almost exhibitionistic delight in his knowledge and use of a rich and recondite vocabulary. His main themes were the horror of the inexorability of the passage of time and the coming of death—a tragedy for him because of his fear of nothingness and oblivion. The only salvation against these was biological procreation on the one hand and the eternity of poetry on the other. His is a combination of eroticism and despair, a sort of lugubrious lubricity, a Romantic agony clothed in the splendid language of modernism. The poetry of Osorio, written—as his life was lived—under various pseudonyms (Ricardo Arenales, Porfirio Barba Jacob, among others), was collected in a volume, *Poemas intemporales* (1944), in which the reader can detect the best and the worst traits of the modernist style.

Although modernism persisted with writers such as Valencia and Osorio, its bloom as a general literary movement was passing by the 1910's. Several causes, literary and extraliterary, for the consideration of which we have no time here, contributed to this decline. Of the literary fashions adopted by writers to replace the cosmopolitan, exotic, rare and exquisite modernism, one of the most noticeable is the use of subjects that the modernists would have considered apoetic, if not antipoetic, subjects taken from daily life—subjects of local, common, and ordinary import and experience. A number of writers, all born between 1883 and 1888, coincided in abandoning modernism through this same path: Carriego in Argentina, López Velarde in Mexico, Valdelomar in Peru, and Luis Carlos López (1883-1950) in Colombia. López added to the traits mentioned another trait unusual among the modernists: satire. The modernists were too self-conscious as artists, they took themselves and their subjects too seriously to be prone to satire. Luis Carlos López, who was an extremely skillful verse writer, who knew all the techniques of modernism inside out, turned them inside out to satirize himself and the world in which he lived. His humor is at times sentimental; more often it is harsh, bilious. Sometimes one feels that sentimentality and harshness

fuse into a single element, and that López laughs or sneers in order not to cry. A case in point might be his poem "A un perro" in which he compares a miserable dog to a politician with not the dog but the politician as the pejorative, the disparaging term of comparison. López' production still awaits a good complete edition. His books, from *De mi villorio* (1908) to the definitive text of *Por el atajo* (1922), are every day more difficult to find. Much of his work is dispersed in periodicals or collected in anthologies that do not do him full justice.

Paralleling those poets who in the use of subjects taken from daily, ordinary life beat a path away from modernism, other writers in Spanish America tended to abandon modernism by substituting a new view of Spanish America's land and nature for the Europe-centered world of their predecessors. In Colombia a representative of this tendency is José Eustasio Rivera (1888-1928), probably better known as the novelist of *La vorágine* (1924) but no less important as a poet. *Tierra de promisión* (1921) is a book in which he attempted to convey to us, within the strict form of a series of sonnets, a poetic vision of the forest, the plains, the mountains, and the animal life of his native country. Rivera is influenced in his technique and language by Valencia's Parnassian elegance, but he is also imbued with a Latin American passion which vibrates from the very title to the last line of the book. Rivera is not in these poems a nativistic writer in the populist or sociorealist style which in the 1930's became fashionable in a number of Latin American nations, but he is no longer interested either in the cosmopolitanization, the Europeanization of his country, in the modernist ideal; rather he is immersed in the admiration of America's primeval nature. In his sonnets, Spanish America, Eden-like, is a land of beauty and promise, not the violent, man-devouring land of his later novel; he poetizes it not realistically but projecting it into imaginative, aesthetic reality, somewhat as if he were transforming a rough mineral into a precious stone.

Another way through which many Spanish American poets moved away from modernism was that offered by the advance-guard, free-verse, irrationalistic techniques developed after World War I in Europe and in the great urban centers of Spanish America. Perhaps the only notable Colombian poet who might be included in this group

is León de Greiff (b. 1895), although even he theoretically balks at the pure irrationalism of creationists and surrealists. Rather, he is inordinately fond of playing with all the verse forms in the Spanish language. He may use them straight out of the treatises on versification or he may distort them, in either case showing his mastery over them. He defies and he refuses classification by requesting inclusion in all the literary tendencies, fashionable and unfashionable, of his time. Perhaps he is closest to the general philosophy of the postwar advance-guard schools when he indulges in his fondness for a poetry full of boutades, whims, verbal games, facetiae. On the other hand he is still close to the concepts of his modernist predecessors of poetry as music; and for this reason, I suspect, he enjoys using a large number of antepenultimate-accented words, alliteration, parallelism, repetition. Often his poems bear musical indications, and if one follows them in reading those poems aloud, one finds how well they mark at times the tempo and the mood of the poem; on other occasions, however, they are just a joke played by de Greiff on the literal-minded academic or bourgeois reader. The basic themes of his poetry seem to be his disdain for his surroundings, eroticism, and the anguish of a traveler stranded before his departure, the agony of a romantic who says: "I go; where, I do not know . . . and I do not know where I do not go." A selection of de Greiff's books since his 1925 *Tergiversaciones* was published under the title of *Antología poética* in 1942, a very interesting *Fárrago* appeared in 1954, and in 1960 the publication of his *Obras completas* was begun.

It is to be noticed that in Colombia, between the 1920's and the 1940's, neither a poetry of homespun subject matter, nor a land-oriented poetry, nor the poetry of the so-called advance-guardisms, met with any great response. Two of the most notable poets who appeared in the 1920's and 30's and who are among the most active practicing poets of Colombia, Rafael Maya and Germán Pardo García, cannot be included in any of the above categories.

Rafael Maya (b. 1897), from his first book, *La vida en la sombra* (1925), to his most recent one, *Navegación nocturna* (1959), has shown his allegiance to a Christianized Hellenic and Latin view of life, very much in the Hispanic tradition. His writing, which began as a bucolic, softly sentimental, intimate poetry, tended in later years to

a more vigorous expression of the poet's adoration of God in His creatures, to an elevation of the poet's mind and soul towards a center of life on high. Maya's views on God's patterns for cosmos and man give to his work a philosophical and moral tone which, while expressing his intellectual convictions and his faith, does not detract from their lyrical expression, but is, on the contrary, at its very core. Our years of turmoil and unrestrained violence in word and deed seem unpropitious for a sensitive poet; yet, though suffering all our anguishes, he is capable of expressing them in a disciplined manner and of resolving them on a plane above the physical and material, in a plane of metaphysical order. Pure in feeling, clear in mind, elegant in language, Maya is a poet who deserves to be better known outside his country than he is today.

Germán Pardo García (b. 1902) is one of the most sedulous, most dedicated of modern Spanish-American poets. Between his early *Voluntad* (1930) and his recent *Osiris preludial* (1960) he has published more than twenty books of poetry. It is not only their quantity that is astonishing but also their consistently high quality. Pardo García is a poet of intensities, material and spiritual. His is an affirmative poetry, affirmative of the reality of matter and spirit: "Life," "Instant," "Balance," "Perfection of Love," are typical titles of some of his early poems. Soon, however, the winds of anguish, of impulses uncontrollable and unclear shattered the perfection of his world, the "perfect clarity," the "certain plenitude," the "supreme elevation," of his vision. "In my presences, a shadow. But clarity, where?" he complained. Where, indeed, in the bloody 1940's, in the uncertain 50's? Perhaps only in the poet's will, in a human being's wish for a world in which, wounded and frightened, men still search for sweetness in the eternal pillars of life—productive earth, prolific animal life, organic health, Love, and God. The poet's function is, for Pardo García, to obtain stars of hope from these living rocks of reality. He has passed from a canticle to a cry, from a song to a call, from a certainty of being to a will to be. The necessity of re-establishing an order in a disordered world is reflected even in the poet's tighter and tighter form of expression: in his recent *Osiris preludial*, Pardo García chose the sonnet to ascend from Reality to Life, from Life to Existence, from Existence to his solid dream.

Of the poets of the age-group which follows that of Maya and Pardo García we might select Eduardo Carranza (b. 1913) as representative. His first book, *Canciones para iniciar una fiesta*, was published in 1936. In 1953 he gave the same title to an anthologic collection of his major work. Carranza belongs to a generation of Hispanic poets who rediscovered the classics of the language as living poets. Garcilaso, St. John of the Cross, Lope de Vega, Góngora, Quevedo, Bécquer were placed by them on the same level as living "classics," such as Juan Ramón Jiménez or Antonio Machado; they were looked at no longer as venerable monuments but as poets of flesh and blood. In those ancestral brothers (if one may be permitted such a phrase) Carranza found his essential roots, those of his linguistic and intellectual tradition. Let me say at once that in Carranza we are not going to find pastiches of the classics, as we find for instance in the "Recreaciones arqueológicas" in Rubén Darío's *Prosas profanas* of 1896. There is not in Carranza a single arty, self-conscious "A la manera de . . ." (In the manner of . . .). What there is, is a completely unself-conscious immersion in modes of being, feeling, and speaking which are of today and of always—at least of an always as old as the language he uses, as old as the people who began to mold it and have been molded by it. This attitude can be observed in a number of poets: Lorca and Alberti in Spain, Enrique Peña in Peru, Francisco Luis Bernárdez in Argentina, the very Quevedian Pablo Neruda of the late 1930's. Not a bad company for Carranza to keep! In this certainty of his roots, Carranza has thus found the basis of his Americanism and his universality. The world around him ("The Poet Sings the Rivers of His Fatherland," or "He Sings the Plains of His Fatherland Under the Metaphor of a Girl"), its lovely and loved objects ("Sonnet to a Rose," "Girl"), and that which gives it total meaning, God ("Sonnet to Christ"), are the main themes of Carranza's poetry in forms that go from the strictest classical and traditional to the freest modern. If Pardo García appeared to be a poet of intensities, Carranza might be characterized as a poet of certainties.

These certainties can be sustained of course only by strong convictions, by faith of one kind or another: in the case of Eduardo Carranza, by his Christian faith: in the case of a poet ten years younger,

Carlos Castro Saavedra (b. 1924), the conviction, the faith, is pegged to a revolutionary doctrine. His poetry appears involved in a revolutionary struggle for Colombia, for the Americas, even world-wide. The latter-day Neruda insists that poetry must be utilitarian and useful, ready to serve as a plow or a tool might serve. Castro Saavedra echoes him from Colombia stating that poetry must be militant and earthy, that poetry is truth, that it must make clear that "Prometheus does not exist; what does exist is a bound peasant." This similarity of views explains the preface that Neruda wrote for the Colombian's *Despierta, joven América* (1953). Many of Castro Saavedra's poems are straight political poetry, including an inevitable "Escucha, Norteamérica" (United States, Listen). Many more are lyric poetry, charged with revolutionary tensions. In "The Poet Writes to His Wife," for example, his longing for her, separated as they were on account of political events, is expressed in a combination of erotic feeling and social anger that is much more human and moving—and in the last analysis, more revolutionary—than for instance his "Dictators' Funeral March," with all its Vallejo-like and Neruda-like effects. Castro Saavedra may be cited here as an example among modern Colombian poets of those Latin American writers who are at the same time embodiments and prime movers of a revolutionary state of mind or feeling among their compatriots.

In closing this section on poetry one may say that from Fernando Arbeláez to Maruja Vieira—to pick names from the two ends of the alphabet—there is no dearth of active poets in poetry-loving Colombia.

II. Prose Fiction

Paralleling in prose fiction the leadership of Valencia in poetry, the master short-story writer and novelist of Colombia during the first forty years of this century was Tomás Carrasquilla (1858-1940). He was a writer, however, whose outlook on life and art was quite different from Valencia's. As a matter of fact, Carrasquilla's short stories and his short and long novels dealt exclusively with the people and the landscape of his native region of Antioquia rather than with cosmopolitan subject matter. His style was based on the spoken speech

of his region rather than on a search for the rare and exquisite. He thus showed that universal values can be discovered in local and humble subjects, and (because of his concern with the spoken language) that his own style could be at one and the same time popular and classical (as is the speech of his fellow antioqueños) and of an extraordinary originality. Carrasquilla's unerring ear could pick up and use in his writings a popular turn of phrase or he could create a turn of phrase entirely his own but so right in its context that it makes one feel that if it wasn't on the lips of the people it ought to have been. Most critics agree that outstanding in Carrasquilla's fiction are the conversations through which characters, events, and life are delineated; but there is more than conversation in his works. From his first book, *Frutos de mi tierra* (1896), to his last, *Hace tiempos* (1935-1936), and through his many intervening stories, the land of Antioquia on the one hand and the social atmosphere of the region on the other hand are splendidly drawn as a setting for the psychological development of the individual characters who are his subjects, particularly—and perhaps peculiarly, for he was a confirmed bachelor—women and children. In his longer works there are too many digressions and distractions, too many anecdotes, descriptions, and minor characters. However, even if structurally they slow down the main narrative they are still a part of the totality of the human comedy of Antioquia, which is what Carrasquilla was slowly writing in his own cumulative way. He used his region as a microcosm; the reader can see the world in it. Two editions of his *Obras completas* have been published recently, in 1952 and 1958. Although there are many gems (and at least one masterpiece, "A la diestra de Dios Padre,") in his separate publications, it is in these complete works that the full impact of Carrasquilla's purpose and creativeness can better be appreciated.

In the section on poetry, after a master such as Valencia, Miguel Ángel Osorio (Porfirio Barba Jacob), of Satanic pose, was mentioned. For symmetry's sake I might mention here among the short-story writers and novelists the name of José María Vargas Vila (1860-1933), also a man and a writer of a Lucifer-like reputation for rebellion and egomania in his day. His essays, political or philosophical, were perhaps the more scandalous of his productions, but his novels, from *Rosas de la tarde* (1901) to *Antes del último sueño* (1924),

were very much read all over the Hispanic world—not long ago I saw a number of them being still briskly traded in the secondhand bookstalls of Mexico City's Lagunilla market. He carried the traits of modernist prose to perhaps absurd extremes, but this very exaggeration made him most popular among the unsophisticated. Strangely enough, even some first-rate writers admired him, at least for a time. The Nobel Prize winner for Literature, the Chilean Gabriela Mistral, listed Vargas Vila with the Bible, Dante, José Martí, and Rabin-drath Tagore, as one of the great influences on her early writing.

A peculiar combination of the type of novel which, like Carasquilla's, is centered on one region of the author's native country, and of modernist prose which, like Vargas Vila's, tends to the rhapsodic, may be at the root of what is probably the best-known work of Colombian prose fiction in our century, José Eustasio Rivera's *La vorágine* (1924). In this work several novels are combined together: a novel of love, jealousy, revenge, and reconciliation, which provides the thread weaving together the other disparate elements of the book; a novel of social protest, relative to the exploitation of the workers in the rubber-tree forests; a political novel, relating to the evils of government, or misgovernment, in the peripheral regions of Colombia; and, over and above it all, a poetic novel, based on the author's obsessive views on the overpowering force of primeval nature, its destructive force, its violence. Throughout the work there is a constant point and counterpoint of violence leading to destruction, to annihilation of man by nature: a man is not only wounded by his human antagonist in a fair although brutal fight, he must be wounded by a man but killed and stripped of flesh down to his bones by man-eating fish; men do not just disappear in the jungle, they are physically swallowed by swamps, quicksand, beasts, living nature. Only the magnificence of the verbal imagery and the large portions of the novel which are poems-in-prose to nature have somewhat hidden the sense of fatality, and futility, the pessimism that pervades this work. The novel is a poem to Nature, yes, but to an unremittingly cruel Nature, not the mother but the destroyer of man. And man himself is a creature of violence, seemingly purposeless, led on by uncontrolled irrational urges, at the level of the animal.

There is, in fact, what seems like an inordinate amount of Colom-

bian prose fiction in which the violence of nature and the violence of man appear in a prominent manner. An excellent short-story writer, Francisco de Paula Gómez Escobar (Efe Gómez) (1867-1938), for example, wrote a number of tales dealing with brutal human actions set against the background of a brutal nature, in the forests or in the mining regions. He seemed to hold the view that man, in a primitive setting, urged on by primitive and unrestrained instincts, knew only the machete as a means to resolve situations involving primarily greed and lust.

Similarly, one of the best-known novels of the 1930's, *4 años a bordo de mí mismo: diario de los 5 sentidos* (1934), by Eduardo Zalamea Borda (b. 1907), is a novel in which the harsh nature of the salt flats of the Guajira region, its Indian inhabitants, and its "criollo" settlers, are all viewed through a lens which focuses on the search for food and alcohol, on sexuality, and on resulting violent death. The five senses mentioned in the title of the book seem to serve a single objective, sex. The brutality of nature, of man, of life in general, is in this novel a frame for the presentation of the sexual obsession of all its characters who apparently move without rime or reason, except that biological urge. They all are, it appears, underpaid and oversexed.

Another variant of this type of prose fiction is represented, for example, by *Risaralda: película de negredumbre y de vaquería . . .* (1935), by Bernardo Arias Trujillo (1905-1939). In this novel the author is interested in a detailed description of the settlement of a particular region of his country and in a description of the characteristics and customs of its inhabitants, especially because the latter belong to local "typical" types: the Colombian Negro, in the first part of the novel; the Colombian cowboy in the second part. There are in this novel many descriptions, much folklore, and many characters, whose speech, ways of living, of love-making, and of dying are minutely related. The author was also interested in showing the taming of the land by these vigorous people, and even—within certain limits, and with the passage of time—the taming of the more barbarous impulses of man by some sort of advance toward orderly living. In this novel—contrary to Rivera's view in *La vorágine*—man is stronger than nature. The energy of these men, even if some

of them perish, seems to show Arias Trujillo's confidence in the victory of man over his surroundings and even over himself.

All these novels belong to what has been called "the novel of the land," a type of novel which became common to all the countries of Latin America. The top-notch novelists of this type were Rivera in Colombia, Rómulo Gallegos in Venezuela, and Ricardo Güiraldes in Argentina.

Since the 1930's another type of novel dealing with the political, social, and economic struggles taking place in Latin America also became widely popular in all the nations of the continent. Given the extreme "politicism" (if this word be permitted) of Colombian life, it is logical that there should be a number of novels reflecting it. Two have been selected to represent here this type of fiction. One is the work of Enrique Pardo y Farelo (pen name: Luis Tablanca) (b. 1883). Its title is *Una derrota sin batalla* (1935). It is the story of a well-meaning Departmental governor and his finance secretary who try to rise above factionalism but who are frustrated by the irreconcilable political fanaticism of the two traditional Colombian parties, their entrenched officials, and their system of spoils, corruption, and arbitrary conduct of public affairs for private profit. The indictment of the system—its inefficiency, its injustices and brutalities—is no less severe because of the sly humor with which it is presented, and it is enhanced by the fact that the two central characters are not devoid of human failings and weaknesses. At the end of the novel they are not destroyed heroes; they are two fundamentally decent men, politically defeated and morally disgusted. The other novel referred to above is *El Cristo de espaldas* (1952), by Eduardo Caballero Calderón (b. 1910). It also deals with the political realities in rural Colombia. A sympathetically presented young parish priest is frustrated in his attempt to act and to cause people to act in a Christian way, regardless of political party interests and of personal convenience. He is defeated in this by the attitude of the local lay Catholics with whom he has to deal, by the attitude of the authorities and the political party that considers itself the defender of Roman Catholic principles, and by the "official" attitude of his own superiors in the Church. Christ has not turned his back on him; rather people have turned their back on Christ, even when His name is constantly on their lips but not in their

hearts. This is a starkly tragic novel. The difference between *Una derrota sin batalla* and *El Cristo de espaldas* consists in that the latter was written during one of the saddest periods of civil strife in recent Colombian history, religion appears in it as the façade for most un-Christian behavior, and no humor relieves the defeat of an evangelical and humane Christian by the powers of evil. The strength of *El Cristo de espaldas* lies in that it compels the reader to face essential problems that must be morally resolved if man is to survive in a condition above the bestial. This problem has engaged Eduardo Calderón's attention—albeit under different guises—throughout his novelistic work, from his early *El arte de vivir sin soñar* (1943) to *La penúltima hora* (1955).

The same is true of a brilliant series of short-story writers. Adel López Gómez (b. 1901) in *El hombre, la mujer y la noche* (1938), among other collections, looks with pity and love upon the plight of rudderless human beings. Hernando Téllez (b. 1908) in *Cenizas para el viento y otras historias* (1950) deals with the ambiguity of reality, events, actions, justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, an ambiguity which nonetheless does not absolve us from choice and action. Mario Franco Ruiz in *Los hijos de Job* (1960), using the techniques of free flow of the subconscious, expresses the hallucinatory but unbearably real quality of the dilemmas daily troubling man.

Whichever way they may turn, whichever technique these writers may use in their prose fiction, they all lead us to the problem of man's choices when surrounded by the realities of a disordered world. Facing those of Colombian everyday life, these writers transcend the local into the universal. In many ways they are the conscience of their country and of our time, searching for a moral solution to man's anguish.



Guillermo Espinosa : COLOMBIAN MUSIC AND
MUSICIANS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE

I

MANY ELEMENTS have contributed to the development of music in Colombia. Chief among these are the building of the first theater, in Bogotá in 1783, and the organization of musical ensembles, immediately following the country's independence in 1811. It was not until well into the nineteenth century, however, that great music came to be highly regarded as an art form and that people began to understand and appreciate its universal appeal. The starting point may have been the country's first Philharmonic Society, founded in Bogotá in 1846 by Enrique Price (1819-1863), an English-born musician living in Colombia, who in the following year (1847) also founded the first school of music with the cooperation of the Colombian pianist and composer José Joaquín Guarín (1825-1854). This school operated as an auxiliary of the Philharmonic Society and was designed to further the development of music education. This period saw the work of two other Colombian composers, Julio Quevedo Arévalo (1829-1896), author of some fine religious compositions, and José María Ponce de León (1846-1882), Colombia's first operatic composer, whose operas *Esther* and *Florinda* were given their premières in Bogotá with huge success.

An important and logical step in the country's musical development was made in 1882, when Jorge W. Price (1853-1946), son of

Enrique Price, founded the National Academy of Music in Bogotá. This school was the first to use modern teaching methods and was the precursor of the present Conservatory of Music of the National University of Colombia, the institution to which the country owes its musical progress today. At about the same time as the founding of the National Academy, the first Colombian concert artist appeared on the scene: the pianist Honorio Alarcón (1859-1920). It was also the era of the group of composers to whom the musicologist Andrés Pardo-Tovar refers as the "generation of the seventies," and who were the precursors of Colombia's modern nationalist composers: Carlos Umaña-Santamaría (1862-1917), Santos Cifuentes (1870-1932), and Andrés Martínez-Montoya (1869-1933).

After following in the footsteps of European composers, absorbing and imitating their techniques, composers in Latin America decided they must put some originality into their music. To do this, they turned to the folklore of their respective countries, and the resulting compositions might better be called folk music, rather than nationalist music. Representatives of this great period are still flourishing—composers who were born between 1880 and 1890, such as Guillermo Uribe-Holguín and Jesús Bermúdez Silva.

Other composers followed entirely different lines, because they believed that music is a universal rather than a national art, which, as such, should be composed with supranational purpose in an idiom that transcends geographical limits and is understandable to everyone. Two of the several composers who shared this viewpoint were Gonzalo Vidal-Pacheco (1863-1933), author of romantic piano pieces and important liturgical music, and Daniel Zamudio (1880-1950), organist and educator, who also wrote some notable religious works based on the liturgy.

II

In 1905 Honorio Alarcón, a pianist who had studied in Leipzig, became director of the National Conservatory. He was succeeded in 1910 by Guillermo Uribe-Holguín (b. 1880), composer and violinist, who remained in the post for twenty-five years. A student of Vincent d'Indy at the Schola Cantorum in Paris, Uribe-Holguín was the most

controversial musician in Colombia during the period he was director of the National Conservatory, since to him many attributed the stagnation of Colombia's musical development, particularly in the creative realm. The truth is, however, that it was Uribe-Holguín himself who introduced new aesthetic currents into Colombia, and, in addition, composed a vast amount of music clearly demonstrating his mastery of the art as well as his patriotic fervor. Partly universal, partly national, and partly eclectic in character, his work is technically excellent but has not succeeded in arousing universal interest in the musical world. Undoubtedly, Uribe-Holguín's most important contribution while at the National Conservatory of Bogotá was his support of the symphony concert society, which for many years was the only expression of musical artistic endeavor in the capital. In 1936, using this symphonic society as a basis, I organized the National Symphony Orchestra, which, in 1950, became the present Colombian Symphony Orchestra.

One of Uribe-Holguín's first compositions was the *Sonata No. 1, Opus 7, for Violin and Piano*, which he wrote in Paris. This was followed by more than one hundred works of all kinds, including one opera, eleven symphonies, ten string quartets, six more sonatas for violin and piano, a viola concerto, a piano concerto, two concertos for violin, some religious compositions, various chamber works, and the famous series for piano entitled *Trescientos Trozos en el Sentimiento Popular* (Three Hundred Pieces in the Popular Mood).

Jesús Bermúdez Silva (b. 1884) received his early musical training at the National Conservatory in Bogotá. In 1929, he moved to Madrid, where he studied harmony and composition under Conrado del Campo. He is the composer of an overture, a symphony in C major, and a series of national dances.

Among the contemporary composers born in Colombia between 1900 and 1930 are the following: Carlos Posada-Amador (Medellín, 1908), Adolfo Mejía (Cartagena de Indias, 1909), Roberto Pineda-Duque (Santuario, 1910), Santiago Velasco-Llanos (Cali, 1915), Luis Carlos Espinosa (Popayán, 1918), Fabio González-Zuleta (Bogotá, 1920), and Luis Antonio Escobar (Villapinzón, 1925).

Carlos Posada-Amador, who has been living in Mexico City for many years, received his training in Paris, under Nadia Boulanger.

He is a neoimpressionist composer and has recently given evidence of tremendous nationalist purpose. Adolfo Mejía studied in Bogotá and Paris and is a composer of songs and orchestral works, all showing a strong nationalist influence.

Pineda-Duque, Velasco-Llanos, and Espinosa were students of Antonio María Valencia, the well-known pianist, composer, and teacher, who was born in Cali, Cauca Valley, in 1904 and died in the same city in 1952. Valencia started the neoimpressionist trend in Colombian music, although in many of his works he gives himself over to the purest nationalism, or better said, an authentic Americanism. He strived to express in his music reality as he saw it, but actually his best compositions are those more universal in character, such as his songs and choral works. Among the latter, the *Requiem a Capella*, written in memory of the poet Guillermo Valencia, is outstanding. Here, the composer achieved a remarkable integration of modal counterpoint and expressive polyrhythm.

Velasco-Llanos, who completed his studies at the National Conservatory of Music of the University of Chile, is possibly the most academic composer of his group. This is evident in his *Short Symphony* and his *Fugue for String Trio*. More interesting in the output of Luis Carlos Espinosa, whose *a cappella* chorales and chamber works are truly distinguished. Among the latter group his *String Quartet in Three Movements* (Exaltation, Solitude, and Monotony) is worthy of mention. Espinosa's compositions (including some incidental music) are the direct and sincere expression of a sensitive, introverted personality.

Luis Antonio Escobar entered the National Conservatory of Bogotá when he was eighteen, and in 1947 obtained a fellowship from the University of Colombia to continue his studies abroad. He then enrolled at the Peabody Conservatory of Music in Baltimore, where he attended the classes of Nicolas Nabokov. Subsequently, he went to Germany where he studied under Boris Blacher. His compositions, which are numerous and of uneven quality, include orchestral and chamber works, vocal music, and music for the theater. Escobar's artistic career has been most interesting but at the same time disconcerting, because, in spite of his unusual creative facility, he has been either unable or unwilling to live up to the standard he estab-

lished with his *Concertino for Flute and Orchestra* (1954), his *Concerto for Harpsichord* (1956), and his children's opera, *La Princesa y la Arveja* (1958) (The Princess and the Pea). It is difficult to understand how the author of these works could also have written others so completely lacking in musical interest, so carelessly constructed, and even actually retrogressive, as a result of their ultra-nationalist inspiration. Escobar is, however, a facile composer in lesser musical forms and in the writing of music for the theater. Thus, his ballet, *Avirama* (1956)—the story of which is based on an old Colombian legend, dating from the Spanish conquest—is a positive achievement. On the other hand, his temperament does not seem to be well suited to the mastery of those areas of music in which a creative artist is required to analyze carefully and cannot allow himself to be dominated solely by his intuition and a desire to please.

III

In the opinion of authoritative critics in Colombia, the current musical trend is best represented by the works of Roberto Pineda-Duque and Fabio González-Zuleta. Pineda-Duque searches persistently for his own aesthetic personality and strives to master techniques already fully in use; González-Zuleta succeeds in transcending his youthful work by enlightened self-criticism and by arriving at a means of expression that is at once eclectic and extremely personal. Thus, of all Colombia's contemporary composers, these two best typify the country's present-day creative musicians.

Pineda-Duque and González-Zuleta are composers who were trained in their own country. The former had other teachers in addition to Antonio María Valencia. One who had a decisive influence upon him was the Italian composer Carlo Jachino (b. San Remo, Italy, 1887), with whom he studied modern harmony, twelve-tone technique, and musical morphology. Pineda-Duque is unquestionably a master of twelve-tone composition. This is evident in his most recent works, among the most significant of which are his *Piano Concerto*, his *Violin Concerto*, the incidental music for *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles, the *Second String Quartet*, and *The Zodiac*—a music cycle for tenor and string quartet, based on the short poems of the

eminent French humanist and composer, Georges Migot, which were translated into Spanish by Andrés Pardo-Tovar. All these works have been written within the last four years.

Fabio González-Zuleta's career as a composer really began with the writing of his *First Symphony* in 1956. This was an important year in Colombia's musical development, for it also marked González-Zuleta's appointment as director of the National Conservatory in Bogotá, where he continues his admirable methodological and administrative work. We are dealing here with a thoughtful, self-critical, eclectic composer, one endowed with great determination, who expresses himself with ease in the musical idiom. Such works as his *Third Symphony* and the *Abstract Quintet for Winds*—both performed for the first time at the Second Inter-American Music Festival in Washington (1961)—compare favorably with music being produced abroad and have won the deserved praise of critics and composers throughout the hemisphere.

Examples of González-Zuleta's modern musical language and his eclecticism also appear in his *Violin Concerto*, the *Suite de Ayer y Hoy* (Suite of Yesterday and Today) for winds, the *Piano Sonata in One Movement*, and the *Diptych for String Orchestra*, all written within a period of four years. A statement made by the composer himself sheds interesting light on his technical orientation. He says that in his compositions he has always tried to achieve "a balance between the traditional classic forms and the expressive polyrhythmic, polytonal, atonal, and serial elements."

IV

Besides the National Conservatory in Bogotá, which is part of the University of Colombia, the country has other schools of music: The Antonio María Valencia Conservatory in Cali; the Conservatory of the Department of Cúcuta; the Music Institute of Cartagena de Indias; the Medellín Institute of Fine Arts; and the recently founded Antioquia Conservatory of Music.

On the other hand, there is only one true symphony orchestra in the country: the Colombian Symphony Orchestra, which has its headquarters in Bogotá. The orchestra's permanent conductor is the

Estonian musician Olav Roots. Other musical ensembles of high caliber include the String Orchestra of the Colombian Society of Chamber Music; the Bogotá String Quartet; the Wind Quintet of the Colombian Symphony Orchestra; the Bach Choral Society; the Victoria Choral Group of Medellín, and the Palestrina Choral Group of Cali.

Colombia's distinguished virtuosos of today include the harpsichordist Rafael Puyana, the pianist Blanca Uribe, the violinist Frank Preuss, the soprano Lía Montoya, as well as other young concert artists who are now beginning their careers.

Courses given by the National Conservatory include those in composition, directed by González-Zuleta, Pineda-Duque, and Escobar; and those in musical morphology, created and directed by Andrés Pardo-Tovar. The conservatory also has its own instrumental and choral groups for advanced students, directed by other students who are in training to be symphony conductors, and also a Music and Folklore Studies Center for research and compilation of folk and popular music of the different sections of the country.

Cities like Bogotá and Medellín have a rich musical life. Of special importance elsewhere are the Music Festivals of Cartagena de Indias, the tenth of which took place recently with gratifying success. Plans are being made to hold the First Inter-American Forum of Composers in Cartagena de Indias in 1962. This would coincide with the Third Assembly of the Inter-American Music Council and the Eleventh Festival of Cartagena de Indias, in which the Colombian Symphony Orchestra and possibly another from abroad will take part, in addition to other musical ensembles and concert artists from all over the hemisphere.

Thus we see that, as there is contact with the artistic reality of the rest of the hemisphere, music in Colombia is becoming more and more up-to-date; it now has positive merits and effective organizations. This accomplishment is the result of the combined efforts of many Colombians who have been determined to overcome an evident spiritual isolation characteristic of a country proud of its Spanish traditions and in which an interest in serious music has always been subordinated to a preoccupation with literature.

Helen N. Gillin: THE OTHER HALF: WOMEN IN
COLOMBIAN LIFE

I

IT IS HARDLY ACCURATE, I concede, to say that women were discovered in 1921. The ladies, God bless them, or otherwise, have been around for a considerably longer period of time. Since Eve handed Adam a large, red apple they have been noticeably present.

But 1921 was a portentous date in this country, for in that year man handed woman a large, red apple labeled V-O-T-E whose appetizing meat provided a heady political diet which still has intoxicating effects. As history reports, the gift was hardly gratuitous for feminine claws were sharpened in the preceding fray.

However, having finally achieved the vote and having realistically recognized this as the beginning rather than the end, the well-organized suffragette group channeled its energies, under the leadership of Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, into the founding of the League of Women Voters of the United States which, for forty years, has been a training ground for future political party workers and office holders, a school for training in the complexities of United States government, and a constructive political influence on many issues of common concern. The strict nonpartisan policy of the League has provided the umbrella under which members of all political parties and beliefs can work harmoniously on problems whose solution is the obligation not of one party alone but of all responsible citizens.

By now, I am sure you are wondering what this has to do with South America or Colombia in particular.

My initial first-hand realization of the relation between suffragism and the Southern Hemisphere came in 1956, when, while I was on a leadership grant from the Department of State, I discovered in three different Latin American cities three different women's organizations founded by Mrs. Catt, herself, in the late 1920's. Though these groups had become "paper" organizations only, with no fruitful programs, some of the leaders in all three were the original women whom Mrs. Catt had contacted many years ago. Shocking as such interminable terms of office were to an organization-minded North American, I had already seen enough of Latin America during some ten previous trips to know that prestige, even though clothed in impotence, is ever dear to the *dignidad de la persona* in the Southern Hemisphere. Were she living now, I'm sure Mrs. Catt would share those last thoughts of Bolívar who, on his death bed, murmured, "I have sown my seeds in the sea." Inspiring as she was (and dramatic, too, in the long white flowing robe she wore when speaking), her timing was wrong. The Latin American woman was yet, and was still to be for some years to come, the woman behind the *rejas* whose life was encompassed by home, husband, children, kin, *compadres*, priests, charitable works, and relative indifference to the cultural and political structures which kept her so.

I do not need to remind an audience of Latin American experts that times have changed, that Latin American women are delightfully and abundantly in evidence everywhere. Their gradual emancipation was due to many factors, mainly social and political (especially with equal enfranchisement). There were the pressures of fast-moving world events, increased educational opportunities, advancing industrialization with job opportunities, the rise of the middle sector of society, and increasing mobility. Notable also were the "bootstrap" efforts they themselves exerted to be other than wives, mothers, managers of extensive and complex households and, in addition, political experts, even though segregated, we might say, on the end zone bleachers. The fact is that Carrie Chapman Catt's early disciples, eager but unready, have blossomed into the Latin American women of today, eager and anxious to be an active part of a world whose problems they consider to have been, thus far, ineptly handled.

In the area of active participation in the political arena, a final and

important stamp of approval came from Pope Pius XII, in 1954, when he wrote that women had a duty to be not only good wives and mothers, but good citizens as well. Women's responsibility for government thus became socially acceptable and mandatory.

This challenge is being met in a variety of ways in the different countries of Latin America. Without detracting from the effectiveness or importance of each, I will, nevertheless, confine the story I have to tell you to the movement in Colombia as it is unique in all of Latin America, and as I have been more personally involved there over a period of time than elsewhere.

My part in this came about through my membership on the board of directors of the Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters, formerly the Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, Incorporated. Happily this recent name change has provided, at last, a title translatable into Spanish, and will, I am sure, relieve our Latin American collaborators whose valiant efforts to spell, write, pronounce, address, or explain us by this previous title have kept them in a state of frustration.

The purpose of the Overseas Education Fund can best be presented in the words of its president, Mrs. John G. Lee:

Since 1947 the Overseas Education Fund has been engaged in sharing United States experiences and skills in the development of Liberty and the processes of democracy with people around the world. This is NOT an attempt to impose a United States pattern upon nationals of any other country; it IS an effort to build an understanding of the process and techniques of popular government and of the essential requirements placed upon citizens so that intelligent adaptations can be made.

A unique combination of circumstances, in the fall of 1957 in Colombia, led to the opportunity to demonstrate the workability of our thesis in the Latin American area. I was the fortunate person tapped to put it to proof in the field.

For ten tragic years the Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia had been waging a bloody civil war, referred to there as the *Violencia*. More than 100,000 persons had been killed and scores more widowed and orphaned. Many cities and towns were partially ringed by refugee slums housing the destitute survivors who had fled

to comparative safety from the rural areas where the *Violencia* was most violent.

The termination of this conflict was brought about by an agreement between the parties coauthored by Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, Liberal leader, and Dr. Laureano Gómez, Conservative leader, and called the *Frente Nacional*. It provided, among other things, for the alternation of the presidency each four years between a Liberal and a Conservative, and the equal division of major political jobs between the two parties, the plan to be in effect for sixteen years. Another provision granted women the vote in national elections. The country overwhelmingly approved the *Frente Nacional* in the *plebiscito* of December, 1957.

The seriousness with which women regarded this privilege was evidenced by a group in Medellín who invited Dr. Lleras to address them on the effective use of this new vote. Dr. Lleras was one of the few Latin American statesmen who had long recognized the need of incorporating women into the body politic. He said:

Colombian women have entered political life almost, one could say, by the kindness of the Congress. . . . As a result you are not prepared for public action, and even though many of you have a cultural level far superior to your fellow citizens who have been voting a long time, the truth is that you lack knowledge and understanding of how to be effective. . . . I believe you should use this unusual opportunity to maintain a frank independence and develop a critical opinion for using your vote with full autonomy. . . . It appears fundamental to me that women do not compromise themselves by joining parties like soldiers, shock troops, without deliberation as to their purposes. To avoid this risk various countries have established organizations, like the League of Women Voters in the United States, whose purpose is to provide an opportunity for discussion of and information on parties and candidates in order that voters may be independent and well informed. . . . When the politicians realize that you comprise half the electoral body, they will make every effort to win your support.

II

The impetus furnished by Dr. Lleras led to the founding of the Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia, or U.C.C. as we all call it. Medellín, an energetic industrial city, was the first place where it was

established, with Manizales and Armenia (both in the rich coffee-growing state of Caldas), and Bogotá, the capital, organized shortly thereafter. This organization duplicates no other existing women's organization: it would, in fact, fill a void. Also, in a country whose illiterates comprise some 57 per cent of the population, it could prove an innovation in supplementing the inadequate educational facilities available to women.

The circumstances were propitious. With the end of the *Violencia* life was becoming calmer. Though uncertain as to just how the *Frente Nacional* would work out, people were grateful for the relative peace it had brought. Confidence everywhere was firm in the leadership of Dr. Lleras, who became the first president under the *Frente Nacional*. Women were not apathetic about the newly acquired vote; on the contrary, they were surprisingly enthusiastic and serious. Yet U.C.C. was a daring undertaking.

1. Eschewing the customary charitable and welfare activities, it announced as its purpose the education of women in the processes and problems of government. The Church's stamp of approval on such activities did not offset the polite skepticism with which its initiation was regarded.

2. Despite strong regional rivalries and the provincial resentment of dependence on Bogotá, comptroller of all funds and many privileges, the group organized from the outset on a national scale. Manizales and Armenia in the state of Caldas, despite their own rivalries, shared a sensitive defensiveness against the still lingering resentment of Antioquia over the secession of Caldas some one hundred years before. Geographical barriers, too, despite wide air travel, had kept women in the various regions relative strangers to each other. These factors, plus the difficulties of maintaining communication with each other on a national scale, could impede united action.

3. U.C.C. broke tradition in opening its membership to all women regardless of social or economic class. To be sure, the first members were predominantly of the better-educated, more privileged upper class, although easily identifiable middle-sector women—librarians, stenographers, teachers—were also present. Lower-class women were predictably absent. Nevertheless, everybody was welcome, no sponsorship for membership was required, and the hope was that eventually members would represent all strata of society. The recognition by the founders that this must not be a restricted, elite group was a commendable appraisal of the changing class situation in the country.

4. The nonpartisan policy of U.C.C. was a radical concept in a country where political party affiliation is passionately espoused and bloodily sustained if necessary, as in the *Violencia*. Yet the four local branches agreed on the following statement adopted in their first meeting together in spring, 1959:

"The Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia is a nonpartisan organization independent of political parties and special pressure groups. As an organization it neither opposes nor supports candidates or political parties. The Board of Directors, as the voice of the members, must remain above any such pressures. Any Board member preferring to participate in the activities of her party must resign her office.

"The Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia believes that a system of political parties is an integral part of the government of Colombia. For this reason the members are free to work in their parties as individuals, but never in the name of the Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia. The Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia believes that no one party holds the solution to problems; this is the responsibility of all citizens. The Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia works for ideas, not for individuals."

Each member vehemently defended her party, and was free to do so, even though hard pressed occasionally to enumerate its particular policies when questioned. Actually, factional allegiance to a leader superseded party loyalty. Yet without the nonpartisan policy there would have been little justification for the Unión. Women might better have worked within their respective parties, even though discouraged from this by Dr. Lleras. This policy was to serve, as in the League, as an umbrella under which both Liberals and Conservatives could learn to cooperate harmoniously on the vital issues of government, not on issues of purely party or factional concern. Impossibly idealistic as this appeared to many, it was, nevertheless, the keystone on which the group's success and continuance depended. It was, without doubt, the most daring and radical of all the U.C.C. policies.

III

In addition to these tradition-breaking plans and policies, there was still another problem, that of the inescapable fact of lack of experience. We North Americans come by our organization-mindedness easily. It begins when we send our two-year-olds off to nursery school. Permissive though these schools usually are, there exists a dis-

ciplined pattern which produces, through the years, a reliance on group experience and the workability of cooperation and compromise. The same cannot be said for Latin Americans. Different temperaments and experience tend to verify the old Spanish saying that one Spaniard constitutes a political party, two a coalition, and three a revolution.

The volunteer work which would be required and the philanthropic attitude necessary for financial support of the group have no firm basis in Latin American tradition. Yet, without them, the Unión had little chance of success.

In the face of these problems of political innovation, regional rivalry, class distinctions, inexperience, the deep scars of the *Violencia*, and the rising threat of Communism, the survival of this organization would depend on the devotion, the determination, and the vitality of the women of Colombia. These traits, I assure you from experience with them, must never be underestimated.

The Overseas Education Fund received a request for help from U.C.C. almost immediately. While there was no doubt of our response, there were considerations involved:

1. Transplanting a League of Women Voters, indigenous to the United States as it is, would be meaningless in another culture. It would constitute, to our way of thinking, a kind of cultural imperialism. However, any League techniques useful or adaptable to the Colombian situation could be incorporated into the U.C.C. plan. In effect our help would be a nongovernmental, advisory type of technical assistance.

2. Fund help to the Unión should not be undertaken except with the firm resolve to see it through the crucial formative stages. Its own ambitious proposals would require close collaboration for some time. Plans should therefore include a consultant at regular intervals, useful publications, special training sessions, and whatever else would seem to be needed and possible within our available financial resources.

With these premises established, the Overseas Education Fund initiated a fund-raising program for this pilot project, and direct assistance to the Unión began.

The first of five trips by consultants—three by myself and two by three other volunteers—was made in March, 1959, for the first meeting of all four Unión groups together. As anticipated, I found U.C.C.

long on enthusiasm, short on experience. Nevertheless a surprising amount of activity had been going on, mostly in the form of lectures and information to members and voters. The Medellín branch even had a full page, weekly, in a local newspaper, no mean feat in an area where editorial policy governing news of women's activities is usually on a "no pay, no notice" basis. However, no clear statement of purpose had yet been formulated, so this as well as the nonpartisan policy was drawn up and adopted. This Declaration of Principles, still in effect, reads as follows:

Because the women of Colombia, having received the vote, thus share equal responsibility with men for the welfare of the country, and because the world today demands greater understanding and greater freedom, the Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia has been created. A nonpartisan organization, interested in furthering sound government, it is dedicated to the maintenance of the principles of a democratic, representative, and efficient state, with liberty, justice, and dignity for all the people.

By means of study and action, it will promote equal participation by all the citizens in the moral, economic, legal, and cultural welfare of the people. The Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia welcomes to membership all women citizens of Colombia who place the common welfare of all above personal prejudice.

The very nature of this organization created many problems which were exacerbated by the lack of experience and the highly individualistic Latin American temperament. The most serious of these was in the understanding of and adherence to the nonpartisan policy.

In attempting to carry out this policy, the organization had actually become both nonpartisan and bipartisan. Two of the groups had boards of directors with dual officers—two presidents, one Liberal and one Conservative, two vice-presidents, the same, and so on through the entire board—a kind of miniature *Frente Nacional* with each party serving as watchdog on the other. The other two groups differed in that they had adopted outright the *Frente Nacional* plan of alternation, rotating the presidency each term between the two parties and maintaining a strict numerical balance between them on the board as a whole. Operation of the Unión everywhere constituted a balance of power struggle between the parties. This was to plague them for some time to come, for decisions were too frequently made on a party basis. Dual officeholding required a division of responsi-

bility quite unmanageable. Mutual distrust was definitely impeding constructive accomplishment.

Resignations following policy disputes were numerous during the first two years. Seemingly the *dignidad de la persona* could be protected only by this device, harmful as it was to the public image of the group, to say nothing of the internal effect on the organization itself. Peaceful compromise of differences was not easy to learn when neither previous need nor precedent existed.

The Armenia group, shortly after the 1959 meeting, succumbed to political rivalry, one party accusing the other of using U.C.C. for its own political ends, despite protestations to the contrary.

IV

Not until after the first national convention in May, 1960, when a national board composed of two members from each local Unión was chosen, was leadership strong enough to overcome this internal problem of political rivalry. Bogotá provided the episode which finally disposed of it.

In revising its local regulations to conform to the new national by-laws adopted at the first convention, a dispute arose over a proposed provision for alternation of the presidency between the parties each term. The Conservatives, a minority in the group, favored it. The Liberals opposed it on the ground that alternation, being a purely political expedient, would increase political rivalry rather than reduce it. The new national board at its first meeting had adopted a resolution discouraging dual officeholding and alternation as being opposed to the nonpartisan policy. This was enforced for the first time in the Bogotá crisis. It prevailed, and although most of Bogotá's Conservative members promptly resigned, the determination and hard work of the remaining members saved the organization there. This positive action paralleled, in miniature, the Whiskey Rebellion incident in the early days of our own new Republic and established the national board as the authoritative voice of the Unión. Everywhere now, political rivalry is practically nonexistent and local boards of one officer only in each post are chosen on the basis of their ability and

interest. This achievement took nearly three years to accomplish, but it is now a fact.

V

Calarca, a charming rural town near Armenia in Caldas, had formed its U.C.C. in 1959. Its first meeting is the only one I have ever attended where a choice local wine was served while the votes were being counted. But the ladies of Calarca had already distinguished themselves by their outstanding work in rehabilitation of refugees of the *Violencia*. It joined the other three branches in the first national convention held in Medellín in May, 1960.

This convention was the important turning point in merging the local groups together in plans, procedures, and methods. Although each had done constructive work, the U.C.C., thus far, had really been national in name only. What was needed were national bylaws which would provide a democratic, flexible pattern of organization and a national board with authority to plan and act in the interest of all. Lacking experience, precedent, and tradition, it was not an easy job for the delegates who made up the *Delegación Jurídica*.

Political rivalry was nonexistent among the delegates, but regional rivalry was strong. The Colombian legal requirement of *Personería Jurídica* compounded this. Put in the simplest terms applicable to this situation, *Personería Jurídica* is the legal approval by the Ministry of Justice in Bogotá of the bylaws of every organization in the country. This approval insures the name and purpose of an organization to that organization obtaining *Personería Jurídica*. Thereafter no other group may use this name. Approval also covers the financial operation of each group including disposal of funds if the organization dissolves.

As a national organization the name Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia and the national bylaws were incumbent on each local group, present and future. Therefore, *Personería Jurídica* would have to be obtained for the national bylaws.

Unbeknownst to the others, Medellín had obtained *Personería Jurídica* for its bylaws without realizing that this would prevent the other branches from using the name, Unión de Ciudadanas de

Colombia. Bogotá, on learning this, threatened to boycott the convention. The other two branches were also provoked, but the opportunity to present a united front against the capital was tempting. However, after consulting lawyers and being advised of various solutions, Bogotá decided to come to the convention "to solve our problems and avoid conflict," as the delegates expressed it to me. Not unexpectedly, but unhappily, Bogotá, rather than the offender Medellín, was made uncomfortable. Regional rivalry, like party loyalty, can seriously impede even the most altruistic endeavor. Fortunately, the accumulated satisfaction and pride of all in U.C.C. prevailed and a satisfactory compromise was worked out which assured legal continuance of the organization. I might add that I, as the Fund consultant, advisory only and untutored in the intricacies of Colombian law, felt myself on trial as well as the Unión during this crisis.

During the year, the committee worked on needed revision of the compromise bylaws to present to the second convention. Again regional rivalries reared up. Bogotá, as capital, wanted the permanent office as required by law. Medellín, the founding group, felt that its seniority and performance entitled it to the office. A compromise was reached whereby the office would be in Medellín while the important *Comité de Estudios Jurídicos*, which would be responsible for study and action on national legislation, would be in Bogotá. To the alarm of the Medellín members, this committee was vested with such far-reaching powers that the authority of the national board was seriously threatened. Let me quote from a letter received after a final committee meeting, describing the meeting which solved the seeming impasse:

We met with the full committee of Bogotá, five, all lawyers, from 7:30 until 12:30 A.M. and it all went smoothly. There was no objection to our idea of moving the *Comité Jurídico* to put it under the national board. We then went through every article, reading, correcting, changing some, and finally approving each and every one. We were radiant when we adjourned. We had all been heavy with worry so that it was an unexpected and wonderful relief. I guess that a mass Emma had paid to be celebrated so that the Holy Ghost inspired us had something to do with it. It was such a cordial, harmonious meeting. A real U.C.C. spirit, until now not yet quite visible, was there, floating, uniting, inspiring, brushing aside

differences, almost tangible in its benefits. . . . If our congressmen and political leaders had a spirit like that . . . how much better for Colombia it would be. Instead, look at us, we seem to be receding.

Holy Spirit or no, cooperation and compromise had overcome regional rivalry. The revised bylaws were unanimously adopted at the 1961 convention.

The organization pattern is simple and workable, vaguely similar to that of the League. Each group retains full authority for the number and election of officers to its local board, for its local program and action, and for the naming of two representatives to the national board and the delegates to the national convention. All are united by the national bylaws and the national program, both approved at the annual convention, the supreme authority of the Unión.

The national board is the official voice of the organization and empowered to carry out the plans and recommendations of all local branches as defined by the assembled delegates at national conventions.

By this democratic, flexible pattern, the basic authority derives from the member, herself, thus encouraging a sense of individual responsibility for the entire U.C.C. with all its component sections. Even the national presidency is shared in that it is a rotating rather than a fixed office. Each local group will thus enjoy the prestige and the chores thereof. This pattern is unique in Colombia; indeed it is unique in Latin America.

Good program-planning which would accomplish the stated purpose of U.C.C. had been another problem since the inception of the organization. Programs had been mainly in the area of "civic education," an abstruse title dealing with loosely defined subjects on citizen responsibility and the rights and obligations of women citizens. These had been nebulous and had produced too little sense of accomplishment for the average member.

Lack of experience and an understandable lag in grasping the concept of the "process of democracy" were largely responsible. Government to many women seemed, from my observations as consultant, to mean: (1) Bogotá and the president; (2) the political party of each woman; (3) political manoeuvring; (4) a plague of

insoluble problems; or (5) local, state, and national elected bodies distinguished by personalities more than performance. No organization, however cooperative its members or efficient its bylaws, can be justified unless it has a dynamic program which makes its purpose alive and meaningful to its members and to the community.

The key in this case was a pamphlet, *What Every Woman Citizen Should Know (Lo que debe saber cada ciudadana)*, adapted for Colombia by the Overseas Education Fund from the League *Know Your Town* guide. This captured the imagination of U.C.C. and spurred a realization of the need to know about local government, its structure, and its obligation for education, welfare, services, and financing; in short, its responsibility for the community and all the citizens therein.

The work immediately involved many members in a first-hand exploration of their respective communities. The information they accumulated in a variety of ways, outlined in the pamphlet, provided specific substantive educational material for meetings and discussions. Local officials took a new look at these groups of women who were suddenly so curious and so interested in their offices and duties. Local government, illumined by facts and figures, became an absorbing topic in many homes, a serious subject introduced this time by the woman of the household.

From Cúcuta, a hot, windy town near the Venezuelan border in the state of Santander del Norte, organized by the Unión in 1960, came word that "the survey was done in three months with a committee for each section. The completed study is highly regarded by the town and it is hoped that it will be published and used as a text in the school."

Manizales reported that the "study [of local government] actually served to pull the organization together after it had become weakened by divisive quarrels and infighting; that the decision to undertake something worth while strengthened and saved a wobbling group."

Armed now with facts and figures, U.C.C. can reach throughout the community—in the barrios, in the schools—showing local government as the live, close instrument it actually is. Action directed to improvement and reform can follow now with a more informed public behind it.

The national board, exercising its responsibility to carry out the decision of the annual convention, appointed a committee to prepare material on the Structure of National Government, a program item chosen by the 1960 convention. This committee presented the 1961 convention with a completed, mimeographed pamphlet on the subject.

Thus the *raison d'être* of the Unión is being fulfilled with benefits extending beyond its own members and with deeper satisfactions for them. This is truly adult self-education in practice.

Dr. Lleras' admonition to "provide discussion and information on political parties and candidates" did not fall on deaf ears. Medellín undertook to question congressional candidates on a specific issue in the 1959 elections. Only one responded. The others ignored them. It was a discouraging first try. However, the truth is that candidates are unlikely to pay attention to a young, inexperienced, and relatively unknown group noted more for its zeal than for its accomplishments. Whether U.C.C. has achieved sufficient status to win their interest will be seen next year when the national organization, not just one local, makes a similar attempt to obtain objective biographical data on the candidates included. Although this will be difficult, it will, if successful, be an improvement over the traditional party methods of plastering lists of candidates, names only, on available walls around town. There is rarely any identifying data. It is doubtful, I think, if this voters' service work will sway many people from their parties, addicted as they are to them, but it will at least be a step in the right direction, toward informed rather than blind voting.

The political parties have largely ignored U.C.C. except in one place where a party tried to influence the group directly. It seems likely that the parties themselves were not enthusiastic about wooing women voters after most had stayed away from the polls in the March, 1960, elections because, as so many women explained to me, "all the candidates were equally bad."

But newspaper coverage of U.C.C. in the strictly partisan papers of Colombia has increased each year, indicating a growing recognition of the potential of the organization. The editorial interpretation varies, of course, according to party bias and the enlightenment of the local owners and editors.

VI

My third trip to Colombia as consultant in October, 1960, was to attend, in addition to the national board meeting, a special five-day conference in Medellín. It was called a *Curso de Orientación*. This was so well planned and staged that my services were hardly required and I could enjoy it in the role of welcome guest and observer.

All the local groups sent representatives, Cúcuta raising the plane fare for one of its delegates. Others paid their own way. Women from several towns interested in organizing also attended. Strikingly present and participating were interested women from all strata of Colombian society, many taking part in the panel discussions. I suspect the presence of one from a poor barrio outside Medellín was in the hope that the group might prove sympathetic in helping her get her son out of jail. Even though this proved fruitless, she attended every session and was awarded her certificate the last day, with the other regular attendants.

Discussions were held on the problems, policies, program, and development of U.C.C. In addition, a variety of subjects pertinent to the national interest were on the agenda; educational needs, the continuing *Violencia* in Tolima, the increasing peril of Communism, a review of the Organization of American States and the recent Bogotá economic conference, the constitution of Colombia, and other subjects were discussed by able speakers. Of particular significance throughout the week was the sense of shared responsibility, the expanded and matured interests, and the complete absence of rivalry of any sort.

The Overseas Education Fund has had only one training conference in the United States, this in the fall of 1959, for four women, one from each of the local groups in Colombia. Their itinerary took them to Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Boston; New York, primarily for the United Nations; and Washington, D.C. In each place they observed the League in action, visited groups and institutions of interest to them, and had a taste of home life in the United States. All along the way special sessions on organization techniques, program-planning, and other subjects related to their specific problems were provided. The benefits they derived were apparent in their work

when they returned home. Psychologically as well as educationally the study tour was valuable to U.C.C. in sparking their interest in the difficult early days and assuring them of our continuing help.

During the past year new groups have appeared in Colombia at a more rapid rate. There are now eight located in six different states. Two former ones, fallen dormant, are being reactivated, which will make a total of ten. The number of members is now around 450.

Except for a modest sum to U.C.C. to help with organizing, which is an expensive operation, financial support from the Overseas Education Fund has taken the form of travel and per diem expenses for unpaid volunteer consultants, publications, and the study tour in 1959. U.C.C. members alone have provided the funds to meet operating expenses, both on the local and national levels. The total has been far from enough to meet their needs and ambitions, but it has shown that, given a cause such as U.C.C., support is forthcoming.

VII

This then is the story, to date, of the birth, growing pains, and maturation of the Unión de Ciudadanas de Colombia. I have deliberately gone into detail on many problems because the deep Latin American cultural differences, of which so many North Americans are unaware, were actually the basis of many of them. That so many have been solved would seem like a miracle to me were I not so aware, from my experience with them, of the intelligence, the ability, and the dedication of Colombian women. I could easily relate to you many more problems just as I could relate many more accomplishments.

All this is not to say that U.C.C. has achieved maturity and is assured success: far from it. I believe it will survive and be a stabilizing influence as well as an educational asset to Colombia. However, in the volatile atmosphere of social revolution which is sweeping Latin America, U.C.C., like many other groups and institutions, is very vulnerable. This only makes its presence and continuance the more important.

This pilot project, we in the Overseas Education Fund feel, has

demonstrated some very important points, applicable to other Latin American countries besides Colombia :

1. Latin American women are determined to be full partners on the national scene. They have been left out in the past. They will not permit this again.

2. Their vitality and their fresh, untarnished points of view are desperately needed to alter the monotonous pattern of traditional political behavior.

3. The old-type charitable-welfare activities no longer satisfy them. They are well aware that these offer no permanent solution to social problems.

4. They want a new kind of organization, like U.C.C., which will give them the political know-how they recognize they are lacking. Non-partisanship is a prerequisite as their only defense against party domination that would throttle their independence.

5. Old historical problems, such as regional differences, blind partisanship, and class differences, need no longer be deterrents to progress. They can be tackled head on and overcome. U.C.C. has shown this.

6. They know time is running out. They are impatient. I ask, how can Latin America afford not to utilize this dynamic, powerful force which Latin American women have become? How can we in the United States, we women in particular, fail to respond to their pleas to share our long experience with them? The answer to both questions is simple. We cannot.

Part V

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

E. Taylor Parks: RELATIONS BETWEEN COLOMBIA
AND THE UNITED STATES

LA GRAN COLOMBIA^{1*} was the first of the Spanish American colonies to be recognized as independent. The United States was the first to recognize this status of independence.

North American political influence and commercial interest in northern South America extend far back into the colonial period. The example of the Thirteen English Colonies of North America in securing their freedom from European control and the adoption of the "Philadelphia Constitution" establishing the Republic of the United States inspired the people of the Viceroyalty of New Granada to break their bonds with Spain and to attempt independent self-government.

"Precursors" of independence and "patriot" agents sought out North American officials in Philadelphia, Washington, and New York, and diplomatic agents in Europe. The Precursor Francisco de Miranda felt equally at home in these cities and in such European centers as London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

In 1806, Miranda led an unsuccessful expedition from New York against the strongholds of the Spanish Main. During the same year, Simón Bolívar visited the United States. Don Manuel Torres, who was to be the first Colombian diplomat recognized by any foreign government, had already fled his native Venezuela because of his *opiniones liberales* and established residence in Philadelphia.

*Notes to this chapter are on page 278.

Through business associates and through Henry Clay, he was soon pleading for moral and material aid and later for the recognition of Gran Colombian independence.

Beginning with the overthrow of Spanish authority in Quito on August 10, 1809, the contagion of revolution spread throughout the Viceroyalty of New Granada. On July 20, 1810, the storm broke in Bogotá, and on July 5, 1811, the United Provinces of Venezuela sanctioned a "Solemn Act of Independence." The die was cast. It was war to the death with Spain.

Francisco de Miranda returned to lead the struggle, but royalist successes against him and his failure to command the confidence of his copatriots led to his capture and later his death in a Spanish prison. The great Simón Bolívar emerged as the leader of the revolutionary forces. For the next seven years (1812-1819), each patriot success was followed by depressive failure until the brilliant victory of Boyacá and the triumphant march into Bogotá on August 7-10, 1819. The destruction of the Royalist forces in Venezuela in the Battle of Carabobo (June 24, 1821), and of those in Quito on the slopes of Pichincha (May 24, 1822) and the Panamanian declaration of independence (November 28, 1821) made possible the creation of Gran Colombia.

I

North Americans, who had so recently won their independence from Great Britain, did not remain indifferent to the Colombian pleas for moral and material support.

There are numerous examples of meritorious services rendered by United States citizens to the patriot cause: volunteers in the Colombian army and navy, merchants and ship owners supplying the armed forces, and privateers destroying Spanish vessels.

However, the realities of international politics prevented official aid and comfort and forced the postponement of recognition until June 19, 1822, when Don Manuel Torres was received by President James Monroe.

North American officials had listened attentively to the New Granadian agents—Francisco de Miranda, Juan Vicente Bolívar, Telésforo Orea, Pedro de la Lastra, Nicolás Mauricio Omaña,

Palacio Fajardo, Manuel García de Sena, José Cortés Madariaga, Lino de Clemente, and Pedro Gual—but recognition was not seriously considered until after the battles of New Orleans (January 8, 1815) and Waterloo (June 18, 1815) had restored peace to North America and to Europe.

In Congress, Henry Clay became the principal advocate of recognition, partly because of “genuine sympathy” and partly because of “his desire to annoy the [Monroe] administration,” which, for obvious reasons, was forced to pursue a guarded course. The possibility of one or more members of the so-called “Holy Alliance” aiding Spain could not be overlooked. The best time to recognize a Spanish colony in revolt was not while the United States was trying to purchase the Floridas from Spain (Treaty of 1819). But Henry Clay and Don Manuel Torres continued their indefatigable efforts, finally overcoming the caution of Secretary of State J. Q. Adams.

The proclamation of the Floridas treaty (February 22, 1821), Bolívar’s victory at Carabobo on June 24, and the promulgation of the Colombian constitution in August moved Monroe closer to recognition of Colombia. In his annual message he stated his conviction that “no condition short of their independence would be satisfactory to them,” and on March 8, 1822, he informed Congress that “the provinces composing the Republic of Colombia . . . which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized.” Despite the immediate protest of the Spanish minister, Don Manuel Torres was notified that he would be received as Colombian Chargé as soon as his health and convenience would permit his trip to Washington. His reception by President Monroe on June 19, 1822, after a quarter of a century of patriotic effort, was a triumph tinged with tragedy. He had “scarcely life in him to walk alone.” So near the end was he that his death, on July 15, was not unexpected.

As early as 1810, Robert K. Lowry had been appointed United States “commercial agent” at La Guayra. He and special agent Alexander Scott attempted, in the face of Royalist obstruction and even of threats of expulsion, to distribute the \$50,000 in relief supplies appropriated by the United States Congress for the Venezuelan sufferers from the Holy Thursday earthquake (March 26, 1812). In 1820,

Charles S. Todd was sent as "Confidential Agent to Venezuela and New Granada" to obtain "correct information," to promote "friendship and reciprocal good will," to obtain "indemnity for certain claims," but not to discuss formal recognition. At the time of recognition, Robert K. Lowry was still in La Guayra. Within four years there were United States consuls serving in eight more Gran Colombian cities. Businessmen were seeking economic opportunities in the new republic. Colombia had at least seven commercial agents in North American cities. Minister Richard C. Anderson, the first North American diplomat accredited to a Latin American country, arrived in Bogotá in December, 1823. Some six months earlier, José María Salazar, Colombian representative of the same rank, had assumed his duties in Washington.

II

Early relations between the two republics were inclined toward cordiality, but were somewhat marred by unsatisfactory negotiations regarding (1) unsettled claims growing out of the destruction of United States shipping during the War of Independence, and (2) Colombian discrimination against United States importation of products of non-American manufacture.

The Colombian foreign minister, Pedro Gual, following in the steps of Torres, sounded Anderson regarding the formation of an American Confederacy or Confederation as defense against European interference in the affairs of the New World; (Henry Clay had advocated an "American System" in 1820) and although Secretary Adams approved the goal of such a confederacy, he felt that "no special agency" was necessary "to carry it into effect." When Gual in Bogotá and Salazar in Washington interpreted President Monroe's declaration (later known as the Monroe Doctrine) against European intervention or colonization in the New World as implying a willingness to negotiate an alliance, possibly even a confederacy, Secretary Adams answered that only Congress had the authority to determine the form of resistance to European forceful intervention. If such a rather improbable crisis should occur, he added, the President would make proper recommendations to Congress.

Meanwhile, Gual and Anderson continued their negotiations for

a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, minus any interpretation of President Monroe's message—such a treaty was signed on October 3, 1824, and proclaimed on May 31, 1825.

When it was reported, in 1825, that Colombia and Mexico were considering expeditions aimed at securing Cuban independence from Spain, the new Secretary of State, Henry Clay, stated: "Although the United States has no desire to acquire Cuba . . . any effort of Mexico or Colombia to seize it would be regarded with apprehensions, and the attempts at domination by European powers would be just cause for alarm." Minister Salazar denied any knowledge of such an expedition and expressed the opinion that the report was ill-founded.

The United States was omitted from Bolívar's list of those states to be invited to the Panama Congress. Bolívar seems to have considered the Monroe Doctrine of "minor importance," being convinced of the aggressive intent of the United States. If any non-Latin American power was to be invited, he preferred Great Britain. It seems that Vice-President Santander initiated the idea of United States representation. Bolívar very graciously gave in and Minister Salazar extended a formal invitation on November 2, 1825. Secretary Clay accepted and before the end of the year President Adams presented for Senate approval the names of Minister Richard C. Anderson (then in Bogotá) and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania as envoys. Senatorial approval of the nominations came on March 14, 1826, but the House of Representatives did not provide the necessary appropriation until April 22.

Anderson was ordered (June 6) to proceed to Porto Bello to await the arrival of Sergeant or further word. He was ill on arrival at Cartagena and died there on July 24. Sergeant's departure was delayed, thereby depriving the United States of representation. He was ordered later in the year to proceed to Tacubaya, Mexico, to attend the adjourned session, which never reconvened. President Adams in his annual message (1826) "sang a graceful requiem over the lost project."

Secretary Clay's instructions emphasized, not the importance of creating an "American System" as a defense against Europe, but such issues as the removal of trade discriminations; adoption of maritime rules of trade favorable to neutrals, during warfare; and the pos-

sibility of a canal across the Isthmus. The British agent-observer, Edward J. Dawkins, was unnecessarily determined to prevent the approval of "any project for putting the United States of North America at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe." Seemingly, Secretary Clay's enthusiasm for an "American System" had waned, besides, there was no United States representative at the Congress. However, Colombia was reminded by Dawkins that Great Britain had refused to join the United States in remonstrating with Colombia and Mexico against their "supposed intention" of aiding Cuba in securing independence. Dawkins certainly attempted to cultivate the Colombians, but it seems that United States influence suffered little from nonrepresentation at the Panama Congress.

While Bolívar was dreaming of a "federal union" covering the entire world with its capital on the Isthmus of Panama, as Byzantium had been the capital of the ancient world, the stresses and strains of the disparate parts of Gran Colombia presaged its dissolution. The fear that Bolívar desired to establish a monarchy, the emergence of regional *caudillos*, and the Liberator's long absences in Peru and Bolivia added to the confusion and danger. Only Bolívar's return prevented the triumph of the separatist movement in Venezuela in 1826. Concern over the worsening situation caused Chargé Beaufort T. Watts (March 15, 1827) and Minister William Henry Harrison (September 27, 1829) to appeal to the Liberator to return to Bogotá and rescue the nation from "a mess of chaos," to renounce "military despotism," and to emulate George Washington, whose fame did not rest "upon his military achievements," but upon his "devotedness to the interest of his country." The Watts letter was resented by Vice-President Santander. General Harrison's earlier indiscretions (real and alleged) coupled with his letter, would have led to a request for his recall, except for the arrival of the Jacksonian envoy, Thomas P. Moore.

The process of dissolution continued. With the secession of Venezuela and Ecuador in 1830 and the death of the Liberator before the end of the year, Gran Colombia's era of transient greatness had come to an end. There were now three nations: New Granada (including Panama), Venezuela, and Ecuador.

III

Meanwhile, the relations between the two countries were plagued by the Colombian failure to settle longstanding claims of North American citizens and the discrimination against the United States' importation of products of non-American countries. The claims of the Era of Independence had to await settlement under the treaties of 1857 and 1864. The growth of North American interest in Isthmian canal routes and the New Granadian fear of European aggression made possible the Treaty of 1846, under which New Granada removed the trade discrimination, and the United States guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama.

The early 1840's found European powers, particularly Great Britain, attempting to extend their influence, even their control, over areas containing or adjacent to possible canal routes. There had been a rapid growth of United States interest (governmental as well as private) in an Isthmian canal. A Senate Resolution of 1835 and a House Resolution of 1839 calling for possible negotiations were followed by the Charles A. Biddle and John L. Stephens Missions to New Granada (including Panama) and Central America, respectively. But nothing definite resulted.

Already, the New Granadian Congress had authorized, in 1834, the negotiation of a contract for the construction of a highway, railroad, or canal. Soon, Granadian diplomats in Europe were instructed to sound out the European powers regarding treaty guarantees of the Panama routes. It was implied that a guarantee from the United States would also be acceptable. With failure of European negotiations (1839-1845), President Tomás de Mosquera sounded the new United States minister, Benjamin A. Bidlack, after his arrival in December, 1845.

New Granada was now anxious regarding a guarantee that would neutralize possible French power and obstruct British territorial ambitions in the entire Isthmian area, and also was fearful of European intervention in nearby Ecuador in support of an invasion expedition under the exiled General Juan José Flores. Secretary of State James Buchanan, not sharing these fears, merely instructed Bidlack to use his influence to prevent the granting of "privileges to any other nation

which might prove injurious to the United States." However, Bidlack, in Bogotá, sensing possible European interference, if not aggression, gave in to the importunity of Foreign Secretary Manuel María Mallarino and agreed to a single treaty providing for the removal of discriminating duties and for the guarantees of the Isthmus—although his request for proper authorization from Washington had not arrived, and Mallarino knew that Bidlack lacked authority.

Under the Treaty as signed on December 12, 1846, (1) New Granada guaranteed "that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama . . . shall be open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States" and to the transportation of their "lawful commerce," which "shall not be liable to any import duties whatever . . ."; (2) the United States guaranteed to New Granada "the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed . . ."; and (3) the United States also guaranteed "the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory" (Art. XXXV).

President James K. Polk reluctantly submitted the Treaty for Senate approval, after convincing himself that no alliance was involved, that Great Britain and France were expected to make similar guarantees, and that such guarantees were essential for the construction of a railroad or canal across the Isthmus. In spite of the lobbying of the new Granadian Minister, Pedro Herrán, the Senate did not approve ratification until June 3, 1848. The Treaty was proclaimed on June 12, 1848—exactly one year and a half after its signing and nearly five years after the United States was apprised of New Granada's desire for a guarantee. The new Taylor-Fillmore Administration offered (with no success) to share the guarantee and its benefits with Great Britain and refused to extend similar protection to any other canal route. When it was rumored that Great Britain might seize the Isthmus (1849) in payment of New Granadian debts, Secretary of State John M. Clayton stated that the Treaty of 1846 gave the United States "a right to offer, unasked, such advice . . . as might tend to avert from that Republic [New Granada] a rupture with any nation which might covet the Isthmus of Panama."

There were some fifty-three revolutions, rebellions, riots, and outbreaks on the Isthmus between 1846 and 1903 (according to President Theodore Roosevelt); some forty chief executives exercising authority over the area from 1855 to 1903 (according to Tracy Robinson, a long-time resident); and eight landings of United States forces at Panama City, six at Colón, and two at Bocas del Toro, during the period 1856-1903. It is little wonder that New Granada (Colombia, after 1863) and the United States were forced into intermittent negotiations regarding disturbed conditions on the Isthmus, the failure (or inability) of the former to effect the guarantee of the open and free transit of persons and goods, and the efforts of the latter to keep the transit open and in doing so to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus and Colombia's sovereignty over it. During civil strife, the United States attempted to restrict the use of its intervening forces to the transit route, since the guarantee was of "international neutrality," not of success for either government or rebels. However, when the forces of either party in a civil war threatened the freedom of transit, the United States restricted the use of the Panama Railroad connecting the two oceans, which had been constructed by a United States company in 1850-1855. In 1901, the national troops were thus restricted; and in 1902, both the national and rebel forces. In 1903, the forces of both were prohibited from landing within fifty miles of the transit route. Since this prohibition prevented the suppression of the current revolt, Colombia held that it had been deprived of the "rights of sovereignty and property" which the United States had guaranteed under the Treaty of 1846.

IV

With the removal of discriminating duties under the treaty of 1846, the volume of trade between the two nations increased from the low of \$203,510 (1845) to \$2,108,910 (1855), \$8,666,584 (1865), \$16,717,030 (1875). With the failure of the United States' first efforts at reciprocity agreements, the trade level fell to \$6,161,081 (1890), but after the First International Conference of American States (Washington, 1889-1890), climbed to \$9,994,582 (1905).

Meanwhile, United States citizens made substantial investments in Colombia: the Panama Railroad Company, Chiriquí Improvement Company, New Granada Canal and Steam Navigation Company, United Magdalena Steam Company, American Transport Line, New York and South American Contract Company, the Cauca Company, Bogotá Street Railway Company, Snyder Banana Company, United Fruit Company, Boston Ice Company—to mention a few of the larger businesses. There were also smaller investments in agriculture, mining, forest products, urban real estate, loans, and merchandising. It is estimated that total investments reached \$14 million by 1881. By 1903, however, this figure was much reduced.

The disturbances on the Isthmus, especially the Panama Riot of 1856, brought new claims for damages to life and property and a firmer policy on the part of the United States. The treaties of 1857 and 1864 effected the settlement of many of the claims, some going back to the Era of Independence. Later ones grew out of the Cartagena Riot (1867), the Isthmian revolutions (1871 and 1885), and the Colón fire (1885). Another claims convention was negotiated in 1874, but Colombia persistently denied liability for damages due to the Colón fire, while paying under pressure for the suspension of the publication of the *Panama Star and Herald* and the *Estrella de Panamá* by General Ramón Santo Domingo Vila in 1886. The publishing company was owned by the Panamanian sons of a naturalized United States father and operated under a New York charter.

V

During the second half of the century, the United States policy regarding an Isthmian canal advanced from encouragement of “every practical route . . . either by railroad or canal, which the energy and enterprise of our citizens may induce them to complete . . . under the common protection of all nations, for equal benefits to all,” to a policy of United States governmental construction and control of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama.

The settlement of the Oregon question, the successful termination of the Mexican War, and the acquisition of vast undeveloped terri-

ories on the Pacific Coast made the question of an interoceanic communication a "matter of utmost practical importance." North Americans attempted to secure control of the three major routes—Panama, Nicaragua, Tehuantepec—but competition was keen.

The contract for the construction of the Panama Railroad (1850) shifted the canal interest to Nicaragua, where the British were found to be well entrenched near both termini of the canal route. The retiring Polk Administration dispatched Elijah Hise to Nicaragua, where he negotiated a treaty securing for the United States and its citizens the exclusive right and privilege to construct and fortify a canal. The new Whig Administration recalled Hise and sent Ephriam G. Squier with more definite instructions. Meanwhile, Commodore Vanderbilt and his Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Company of New York had acquired a concession. A new treaty provided for the protection of the enterprise and guaranteed the neutrality of the route, other powers to be permitted to join in the guarantee. (Neither treaty was ratified.) Meanwhile, a New Orleans group had purchased a grant via Tehuantepec.

The spring of 1850 found North Americans in control of exclusive concessions at Tehuantepec, Panama, and Nicaragua. The Tehuantepec grant was soon cancelled by Mexico, and a railroad was under construction via the Panama route, but the British controlled the city of San Juan and Tigre Island at the Atlantic and Pacific termini of the proposed Nicaraguan canal. Negotiations were shifted to London and Washington. The result was the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) by which each power agreed not to "obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal," to invite all friendly nations to join in the guarantee, and to extend the protection to "any other practicable communication." It was considered that United States self-interest was best served by temporary self-denial.

Soon a controversy was raging over the interpretation of the Treaty. By 1857, President Buchanan favored mutual abrogation, but new British treaties with Honduras (1859) and Nicaragua (1860) caused Buchanan to consider the matter "amicably and honorably adjusted."

The close of the Civil War in the United States brought a revival of canal interest. British and French concession hunters were also active. Although the renewal of the Panama Railroad Company

contract in 1867 saved that route temporarily from European pressure, Secretary William H. Seward favored new canal negotiations, more surveys, and efforts to secure the cooperation of certain "enlightened capitalists" of New York. Seward's enthusiasm led to negotiations in Washington and Bogotá in 1867-1868 and the signing of a treaty in January, 1869, which the Johnson Administration lacked strength to push through the Senate.

The Grant Administration set about the task of negotiation with equal eagerness and secured a new treaty in January, 1870. The Colombian Congress approved it with seventeen amendments on July 8, 1870. Grant had enthusiastically informed Congress of the negotiations and on April 1 submitted the treaty. On July 13, it was reported out of committee unamended, with its passage recommended, but the Colombian amendments made it unacceptable.

During the negotiations, Grant had secured permission to survey the various routes. Four were examined in 1870-1871, but only one was found practicable. Grant then created an interoceanic canal commission and obtained surveys of ten routes, eight through Colombian territory, between 1872 and 1876. On February 7, 1876, the commission reported unanimously in favor of the Nicaragua route. Now Washington became reticent about further negotiations and Bogotá anxious. With the shift of United States interest toward Nicaragua and the opening of negotiations with that state, the Panama route attracted the attention of Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had recently completed the Suez Canal. The subsequent concession to De Lesseps aroused Washington officials to uncompromising opposition. New spirit was breathed into a Nicaragua project. De Lesseps' efforts to win support for his project, even by a plan to graft an American advisory board onto his organization, failed.

President Hayes declared: "The true policy of the United States as to a canal across any part of the Isthmus is either a canal under American control, or no canal." Secretary Evarts sought to secure an additional understanding with Colombia, since the De Lesseps contract obviously conflicted with the Treaty of 1846; to encourage European nations not to extend guarantees of the contemplated canal; and to modify the self-denial provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The Colombian diplomat, who hesitatingly agreed to new

understandings, was almost mobbed as he returned home; the European nations seemingly had no intention of extending guarantees, which the United States had urged in 1848-1849; and the British refused to take seriously the arguments advanced for the abrogation or modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Before the Garfield-Arthur Administration left office, however, the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty (1884) was negotiated with Nicaragua, providing for an exclusive canal grant—contrary in spirit, if not in text, to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

Meanwhile, De Lesseps had begun operations in Panama. The possibility of the establishment of a French colony on the lands granted to the canal company and the outbreak of a sizable local revolution in Panama caused uneasiness in Bogotá. United States troops were landed on the Isthmus in March and April, 1885. President Núñez recommended to the Constitutional Convention (1885) that “opportune concessions” be granted to Washington to insure Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus. Assurance was even given that Colombia had given up the idea of a European guarantee. Many felt that the United States should act quickly, while the situation was favorable.

However, President Cleveland did not share this feeling of urgency. He was willing to use force to protect Colombian sovereignty but was opposed to assuming any additional liability. He withdrew the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty from the Senate before its approval, and announced that he was opposed to “propositions involving paramount privileges of ownership or right outside our own territory, when coupled with absolute and unlimited engagements to defend the territorial integrity of the state where such interests lie.” He favored a canal, but not one constructed, owned, and operated by the United States government.

The bankruptcy of the De Lesseps scheme in 1887-1888 revived North American fear of French governmental intervention, increased the determination to prevent French success, and gave new hope to the advocates of the Nicaragua route.

The French secured an extension of their concession and organized the New Panama Canal Company. In the United States, the battle was on between the advocates of the two routes. While engineers and

geographers were being converted to Panama, politicians and jingoes were invoking patriotism in favor of Nicaragua.

Soon the French company was in financial straits again, as were the various American groups attempting to construct a canal through Nicaragua. Yet the War with Spain (1898), especially the forced cruise of the *Oregon* around Cape Horn, and the acquisition of the Philippines clearly showed the strategic importance of a canal. Meanwhile, Secretary Olney, of the second Cleveland Administration, had advocated "a direct and straightforward application to Great Britain for a reconsideration" of the self-denial provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The new McKinley Administration agreed and approached Great Britain, with the result that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (November 18, 1901) restored American freedom of action.

Now the task was to choose a route. On November 16, 1901, the Isthmian Canal Commission (created in 1897, enlarged in 1899), had reported in favor of the Nicaragua route, not so much on the grounds of its superior merits as on the seeming inability to secure the unfinished Panama work at a reasonable price. It suggested the advantages of the latter route in case the interests of the New Panama Canal Company (valued at \$109 million) could be purchased for \$40 million. This suggestion brought an offer to sell for that figure.

After a bitter debate between the advocates of the two routes, Congress passed the Spooner Act (June 28, 1902) authorizing the President "to acquire from the Republic of Colombia . . . upon such terms as he may deem reasonable, perpetual control of a strip of land, [and] the right to perpetually maintain and operate" a canal. If satisfactory arrangements could not be secured from the French interests and from Colombia "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," he might turn to the Nicaraguan route.

The deal with the French interests was closed on February 17, 1903. Already, negotiations had begun with Colombia. After a long period of bargaining, the Hay-Herrán Treaty providing for United States governmental construction and operation of a canal was signed on January 22, 1903. The United States Senate approved it on March 17, and the Colombian Senate unanimously rejected it on August 12. The adjournment of the latter body without further consideration of the treaty was followed by the Panama Revolution of November 3.

The United States policy during the Revolution provoked lengthy and vehement debate in Congress and in the press. It was defended as "studiously correct"; "full duty, nothing more"; "a bit of honest statecraft"; and the "only possible" course. On the other hand, it was characterized as a "lamentable outrage"; "roughriding assault"; "territorial buccaneering"; "clear act of spoliation"; "international lawlessness"; "quite unexampled instance of foul play"; and "in every respect . . . nefarious."

The essential facts in regard to the Revolution, the roles of United States officials and naval forces, and the almost immediate recognition of the newly-born Republic of Panama are too well known to require narration.

The Roosevelt Administration defended the legality and morality of its policy and actions. As the President stated it: "Every action taken was not merely proper, but was carried out in accordance with the highest, finest, and nicest standards of public and governmental ethics." In light of this defense, recognition of Panamanian independence and refusal to arbitrate the matter with Colombia seemed logical to the Administration.

Naturally, the Colombians were much aroused, even acrimonious. There was talk of handing the American minister his passport, severing diplomatic relations, initiating an economic boycott, even engaging in hostilities against the United States. The government, however, contented itself with the unequivocal presentation of its case in Washington and a formal denial of the validity of the transfer of the canal concession.

The new Colombian President, Rafael Reyes, was more inclined to negotiation of the differences, particularly if Colombia were given essentially the same canal privileges as Panama, and Panama would assume its proportional share of the national debt, on Colombia's recognition of its independence. These bases seemed reasonable. Secretary Root, returning from the International Conference of American States (Rio, 1906) stopped for a few hours at Cartagena for conferences. Negotiations, soon under way in Washington, resulted in a triangular arrangement by which each state signed conventions with each of the other two (1907-1909). Panama and the United States soon ratified their two agreements with each other and Colombia.

The Colombian public expressed its opposition so strongly that President Reyes was forced out of office. The treaties were dead.

Former President Roosevelt's "I-took-the-Canal-Zone" speech on March 23, 1911, was interpreted in Colombia as a confession of guilt, therefore a basis for indemnity. Later in the year, President Taft dispatched a new minister, James T. DuBois, who frankly admitted his "sincere sympathies for Colombia." He found Colombian statesmen not "blackmailers" and "bandits," but men of "intelligence and respectability." On receipt of later instructions drawn with less "regard for Colonel Roosevelt's feelings," he opened negotiations in January, 1913. Even with a suggestion of an expression of regret for anything that had marred the friendship between the two nations, DuBois found the Colombian monetary expectations beyond his instructions.

Colombia obviously hoped the incoming Wilson Administration would be more generous. The new minister, Thaddeus Thomson, arrived in August, 1913, and soon began conferences. Colombia still desired arbitration, but agreed to negotiate. Thomson expressed a sincere desire "that everything that may have marred or seemed to interrupt the close and long-established friendship . . . should be cleared away and forgotten," but his monetary offer for the termination of the pending claims and differences still fell below Colombian expectations. However, the sum of \$25 million was finally agreed upon and the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty was signed on April 6, 1914. Colombia lost little time in approving it, but waited more than seven years for North American approval.

Former President Roosevelt denounced the Treaty as "merely the belated payment of blackmail with an apology to the blackmailers." Former Minister DuBois retorted that the Colonel was "badly misinformed," that the expression of "sincere regret" was not an apology but a "chivalrous act."

While public opinion was divided, it veered toward approval. But the interests responsible for the treaty were not strong enough to secure its immediate approval. Soon World War I pushed it into the background. Early in 1916, it was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with recommendations to make the expression of "sincere regret" mutual and to reduce the indemnity to \$15 million. Colombia protested. It was again reported from the Committee on

March 14, 1917, with suggested amendment, but the opposition was too formidable for passage. In April, the United States entered World War I.

After the fear of Colombian aid to Germany proved unwarranted, the Treaty was almost forgotten amid the pressing problems of warfare. On the return of peace, however, President Wilson (December 2, 1918) urged "early and favorable action." The following February, the Colombian President agreed to the elimination of the "sincere regret" clause and to certain minor changes. The Foreign Relations Committee reported it favorably on July 29, 1919, but the Senate did not approve it.

At this point, oil entered diplomacy. The Colombian decree of June 20, 1919, declaring governmental ownership of all hydrocarbons beneath the soil of the republic was interpreted as confiscation of oil deposits already acquired by United States operators. The Treaty was recommitted for further negotiation through the Department of State. The suspension of the decree and the offer to give "full guarantees" were not considered enough. The judicial confirmation of the American concessions and the enactment of a fairly satisfactory oil law (December 29, 1919) did not win sufficient support. The Treaty was again reported out of committee on June 3, 1920, but consideration was postponed until the following winter.

The opening gun in the final campaign for approval was sounded on January 3, 1921. The principal arguments advanced by different groups of advocates of ratification were: (1) The United States policy of 1903 was morally correct, but commercial and petroleum interests now made a settlement desirable and Colombian friendship essential; (2) Washington had committed no wrong, but did acquire valuable property at Colombian expense, therefore should provide proper compensation; (3) Roosevelt had sinned grievously, and the United States was fortunate to escape making an apology.

Although the debate was long and opposition loud and acrimonious, the Treaty received Senate approval on April 20, 1921, by a vote of 69 to 19.

The amended Treaty, stripped of the "sincere regret" clause and with somewhat reduced Colombian rights in the use of the canal, then went to the Colombian Congress for consideration. Approval

was secured in the midst of a financial crisis and after President Marco Fidel Suárez had been forced to resign. Ratifications were exchanged on March 1, 1922.

VI

In the early 1920's, Colombia was described as "a giant about to burst its bonds." It certainly possessed enormous potential wealth and exhibited signs of new activity. The futures of the United States and Colombia seemed "fatefully correlated." North American capital and energy demanded new fields of activity, while Colombia needed both capital and energy in order to insure its further economic development.

On his visit to Washington in 1922, President-elect Pedro Nel Ospina was enthusiastically welcomed, and banqueted at the White House. He pleaded for United States capital and talent. (Incidentally, the new Colombian President was a graduate of the University of California. Other prominent Colombians held degrees from Harvard, Cornell, and Columbia.)

Determined efforts dispelled the Colombian economic gloom of 1920-1921. Exports to the United States alone in 1923 were greater than the entire national trade in 1913. The total Colombian trade volume of 50 million for 1923 reached \$273,688,701 by 1928. Of the latter total, approximately 80 per cent of the exports went to, and 45 per cent of the imports come from, the United States.

Yankee geologists, engineers, contractors, industrialists, and capitalists literally poured into this new land of opportunity. Principal investments were in loans and petroleum development.

Colombian interest in petroleum antedated 1900. Probably the best-known concession, Virgilio De Barco (1905), came into the hands of the American-owned Carib Syndicate in 1918. The following year it passed to the Colombian Petroleum Company, owned by the Doherty Group of Pittsburgh; and later a controlling interest went to the Gulf Oil Company, owned by the Mellon Group. The status of this concession plagued good relations between Washington and Bogotá for almost a decade.

In February, 1926, the Colombian Minister of Industries declared

the De Barco concession void, because of alleged failure to develop it according to contract terms. The new Méndez Administration was slow in granting a hearing. The emergency petroleum act of 1927 brought additional complaints. It required operators to furnish within six months proof of ownership and lease contracts on all lands being explored or exploited, under pain of heavy fine or forfeiture of rights. Executive Regulation No. 5 (January 28, 1928) reduced the six months' period to 30 days, required drilling permits, and deprived those affected of any appeal to the courts. Naturally, there were protests. The Executive Regulation was voided on June 3, 1928, thereby suspending the petroleum act of 1927.

Diplomatic efforts to secure a judicial review of the status of the De Barco concession, owned by Gulf Oil Company, was resented by the Colombian Foreign Minister, who insisted that there could be no basis for "intervention" until the Supreme Court had reviewed the case. Secretary Kellogg expressed regret that Colombia had misunderstood his actions, adding that he would follow closely the judicial disposition of the case. President Méndez assured student demonstrations that Minister Samuel H. Piles had merely requested information and had not intervened in any manner. Here the De Barco case rested for a season. The other companies adopted a policy of watchful waiting.

To meet the critical situation, Colombia engaged a commission of foreign experts, including H. Foster Bain and J. W. Steele from the United States, to prepare new petroleum legislation. A more favorable law was introduced into Congress in 1929, but it failed passage before adjournment. Action awaited the Olaya Herrera Administration.

In spite of these difficulties, there were enormous increases in petroleum production and in investments in Colombia. The petroleum output climbed from 323,000 barrels in 1923 to 20,384,000 in 1929. North American bankers were hesitant regarding loans until 1924-25, but, before the end of 1928, more than \$200 million of new capital poured into Colombia.

VII

The presidential elections of 1930 brought into power Dr. Enrique Olaya Herrera and broke the Conservative party domination of 44 years. The President-elect, who had represented Colombia in Wash-

ington for the previous 8 years, returned to the United States before inauguration. He was well received by both official circles in Washington and the financial group in New York. But Colombia was definitely in financial straits. The price of coffee had declined, the oil industry was in the doldrums, and foreign borrowing had been curtailed by the great New York stock market crash of late 1929.

Olaya sought an equitable formula to protect Colombian rights, yet stimulate foreign investments in the development of his country's resources. His policy was cooperation, not litigation. He proposed to negotiate a large loan in the United States, secure the passage of reasonable oil legislation, settle the controversy over the De Barco concession, and freely use North American experts in the economic development of Colombia.

While in the United States, Olaya secured the promise of a \$20 million loan from a group of banks, on the condition of making certain financial reforms; and persuaded George Rublee, former petroleum adviser to Ambassador Dwight Morrow in Mexico, to become his consultant in the drafting of oil legislation and the settling of the De Barco concession dispute.

On arrival at Bogotá in late October, 1930, Rublee set about conferring with Colombian officials, representatives of North American oil companies, and Minister Jefferson Caffery. The new law was signed by President Olaya on March 4, 1931. It was considered workable by Rublee and by the Standard Oil Company, but other companies considered it as too restrictive and impracticable.

Meanwhile, Rublee had looked into the De Barco matter. The Gulf Oil Company, mistakenly thinking that it possessed negotiating advantages, proved to be difficult, but a new contract was signed on March 4, 1931, and approved by the Colombian Congress on June 20.

Meanwhile, the banks had imposed new conditions before the release of the full loan of 1930. Dr. Olaya considered them unreasonable, but was reminded of the effect of the world-wide depression on the money market. In any case, the last installment was released shortly after the new De Barco contract.

In April, 1933, Colombia announced suspension of interest payments on national government external funded debt and the guaran-

teed bonds of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank. The reason given was the heavy military expenditures in the war with Peru over Leticia, a small border town that had been seized by Peruvian forces. The Department of State withheld comment on the suspension until there were evidences of possible settlement of the difficulty. But soon other loans were in default.

A reciprocal trade agreement, signed December 15, 1933, never came into force, but was replaced by another such agreement, negotiated under the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934 and signed September 13, 1935.

During the same year, there were informal representations regarding the "compensation marks" arrangement for German purchase of Colombian coffee. It was found, however, that Colombia was none too happy about the dumping of the purchased coffee on the world market and the high prices placed on German products offered in return for the marks.

VIII

The enlightened administration of Dr. Olaya was followed by that of Alfonso López, who soon settled the Leticia dispute² with Peru, reformed the Constitution of 1886, and, in December 1937, offered Colombian assistance in the defense of areas near the Panama Canal.

President Eduardo Santos took the helm in 1938. He indicated his desire to cooperate with the United States at the forthcoming Eighth International Conference of American States, meeting at Lima in December; invited more North American capital and industry to Colombia; and suggested the sending of a naval mission to Bogotá and the raising of the respective legations to embassies. (Both military aviation and naval missions were sent in November, 1938, and the United States legation was raised to an embassy in January, 1939.)

During 1939-1940, the Department of State proffered its "good offices" in Colombian negotiations with the Foreign Bond Holders Protective Council, Inc., regarding the resumption of foreign debt payments (defaulted in 1933) and with United States lenders, public and private, regarding further financial assistance. These efforts led to an Export-Import Bank credit of \$10 million to the government

of Colombia through the Bank of the Republic, and a debt settlement proposal from Colombia that the Department considered "a fair effort on its part to adjust its obligations."³

With the outbreak of World War II, President Santos was outspokenly sympathetic toward the Allied Powers, while the leader of the left wing of the Liberal Party called for strict neutrality, and certain Conservative leaders reportedly expressed admiration for Hitler and Mussolini.

Both the United States and Colombia felt concern over the fact that the principal airlines in the latter were operated by Germans through Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos (SCADTA). Through cooperative efforts, the German influence was eliminated (June, 1940) by the establishment of a new line, AVIANCA, owned jointly by the Colombian government and Pan American Airways.

Almost immediately upon United States entry into World War II, Colombia severed diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers (December, 1941). Soon discussion began on cooperative defense measures. President Santos repeated assurances regarding surveillance of the coast line and the safety of the Panama Canal. It was agreed that United States military planes en route between the Canal and other bases might fly over Colombian territory. President Santos in an address to Congress testified to the "sincerity and good faith of the good neighbor policy." The Military and Naval Missions Agreements of 1938 were extended. Through the good offices of the Department of State, agreement was reached for the resumption of services on the defaulted bonds of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank and discussions were initiated regarding the Federal Dollar Bonds and the issues of several provinces and local governments (1941-1943).

Under informal staff agreements, a Colombian liaison officer was attached to the United States military authority in the Canal Zone, and the Secretary of State gave assurance of United States assistance with armed forces (if requested) to repel an attack of any non-American state.

In September, 1942, President López indicated a willingness to grant facilities for an emergency naval base at Cartagena. Resolution XV ("Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas"), adopted at the Second Meeting of the

Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, in Havana, July, 1940, was interpreted as authorization of such measures in the defense of the Hemisphere. Colombia signed a Lend-Lease Agreement on March 17, 1942, and also agreed, on July 1, 1942, to sell all exportable rubber to the Rubber Reserve Company (an official United States agency).

During 1943, Colombia sold two requisitioned Italian tankers to the United States, agreed to broader arrangements on the sale of strategic materials, and cooperated through various devices (including the Proclaimed List) to control financial transactions involving the Axis. The Export-Import Bank granted additional loans for public projects.

On November 27, 1943, the Colombian Senate approved by a vote of 33 to 13—the House of Representatives subsequently approving unanimously—a statement by the Foreign Minister that Germany was in a state of belligerency with respect to Colombia as the result of the sinking of the schooner *Ruby* by a German submarine. Essentially, Colombia was in a defensive, not offensive, state of war. On December 22, 1943, Colombia adhered to the Declaration of the United Nations.

Colombian Decree 2622, signed December 30, 1943, reaffirmed the state of belligerency with Germany and set forth a system of control over German property through expropriation, forced sale, and liquidation of the spearhead businesses. The closeness of Colombia to the Panama Canal also made necessary the surveillance of German nationals.

Colombia continued to cooperate in securing strategic materials, particularly rubber. Deliveries under the Lend-Lease Agreement were inevitably slower than Colombia desired. There were inconclusive discussions of the training of Colombian pilots in the United States for possible combat duty.

At the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace (Mexico City, February 21 to March 8, 1945), Colombia proposed a strengthening of the mutual defense system of the Americas that resulted in Resolution VIII (Act of Chapultepec), which declared: "That every attack of a State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political

independence of an American State shall . . . be considered as an act of aggression against other States which sign this Act." (Resolution XV, Havana, 1940, had covered only acts of aggression committed by a non-American State against an American State.)

At San Francisco, Colombia gave vigorous support to the recognition of the role of the regional systems in the United Nations Charter (Arts. 52-54), holding that inter-American defense action against aggression was not at variance with the idea of global security. As a member of the United Nations, Colombia has continued to play an important role in the activities of that body, being the only Latin American country furnishing combat troops to the United Nations forces against Communist aggression in Korea, 1951-1953.

IX

The Conservative Party returned to power in 1946. Colombia was host to the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948. The assassination of the left-wing Liberal leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, during the conference, was followed by a decade of virtual civil war, which created problems in Colombian-American relations.

Until the inauguration of President Alberto Lleras Camargo, supported by the newly-created National Front, in 1958, there were widespread irresponsible attacks on life and property, national and foreign alike. In such disturbed times, Protestant missionaries, churches, and schools suffered heavily. North American missionaries sought protection under Article XIV (Religious Freedom) of the Treaty of 1846.

The situation began to improve in 1958. Although missionaries in certain small communities continued to encounter difficulties, tensions definitely eased. In December, 1960, a public conference of Catholic priests and Protestant ministers was held in Cali. Leaders of both groups stressed the necessity of unity against world Communism.

In general, relations between the United States and Colombia have been rather close since 1930. The bitterness engendered by the Panama Episode and subsequent negotiations receded into the background with the development of more substantial economic independence and by a renewed understanding of common political and social objectives.

The decline in United States private investments in Colombia from \$302 million (1930) to \$289 million (1958),⁴ was due partially to bad experience with the Colombian bond issues of the 1920's, the relative lessening of interest in Colombian petroleum, and the rather substantial official loans and grants made to Colombia in recent years.

Under the Lend-Lease Agreement of March 17, 1942, aid was granted to the extent of \$8,120,000.⁵ Total assistance, from July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1961, amounted to \$319 million—military aid, \$30 million; economic aid, \$289 million. Of the economic aid, \$247,400,000 represented loans.⁶ Under the "Alliance for Progress," additional funds are being made available particularly for education, housing, and other social welfare programs. The first Peace Corps unit (62 young men) sent to South America arrived in Colombia in September, 1961.

Colombian-American trade volume of \$273,688,701 (1928) increased to \$433,300,000 (1948) to \$517,800,000 (1958). In 1958, Colombia's excess of exports over imports in its trade with the United States was \$104 million.⁷ In recent years, some 70 per cent of Colombian exports have come to the United States, and some 60 per cent of its imports from the United States.

President Lleras, through his National Economic Policy and Planning Council, is attempting to formulate and execute programs of economic development, social welfare, and public investments. Success depends much on the continued stability of the National Front. Congressional elections come in March, and presidential elections in May, 1962. Under the two-party agreement of 1957, the Conservatives are to take over the presidency. Both parties are split into several factions. The political situation is confused. In some ways, it is a race with time: Will evolutionary change come fast enough to prevent more drastic action? The United States must maintain its readiness to support Colombia's own efforts to solve its own urgent economic and social problems.

NOTES

1. Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama.
2. On the invitation of the League of Nations, Secretary Hull agreed to cooperate with the Advisory Committee set up to effect a settlement of the dispute.
3. See Press Release, December 31, 1940; Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941, pp. 12-13.
4. Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change of the University of Chicago, "United States Business and Labor in Latin America," *United States-Latin American Relations* (Senate Document No. 125, 86th Congress, 2d Session), p. 296. The 1930 figure includes both direct and portfolio investments; the 1958, only the direct.
5. *Twenty-Third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the Period Ended September 30, 1946*. The figure covers the war period up to September 2, 1945 (V-J Day).
6. International Cooperation Administration, *U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1961 (Preliminary)*, p. 3. These figures do not include assistance from international organizations (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, Inter-American Development Bank, United Nations Technical Assistance, and United Nations Special Fund) to the amount of \$223,400,000 through the fiscal year 1961.
7. Institute of International Studies and Overseas Administration of the University of Oregon, "Problems of Latin American Economic Development," *United States-Latin American Relations* (Senate Documents No. 125, 86th Congress, 2d Session), pp. 676-677.



Madaline W. Nichols: A COLOMBIAN PATTERN FOR
PEACE (1819-1830)

I

THE FIRST REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA, now usually known as Great Colombia, was created at Angostura, Venezuela, in 1819. As reported in the new state's fundamental law of December 17 of that year, it was formed by the union of the former Captaincy-General of Venezuela and the Viceroyalty of the New Kingdom of Granada, both of which had only partially won the independence they had declared. Included, though apparently without its knowledge or consent, was the still royalist Presidency of Quito, but there was no mention of the similarly royalist Panama which also fell within the boundaries lightly described as those of the former viceroyalty. The new republic was optimistically divided into three great departments—Venezuela, Quito, and Cundinamarca—and Simón Bolívar, leader of the struggle for independence, was named president.

The foundation of the republic was by no means sure. In Venezuela, in 1819, the little capital on the interior plains might declare independence, but Caracas and the northern coast were still in royalist hands. As for New Granada, the newly independent area centering around Cundinamarca was still threatened by the Spanish occupation of the port of Cartagena and the Spanish base in Panama, while to the south its own provinces were predominantly royalist in sentiment. Yet luck attended the patriots, and a January, 1820, revolt

of the army gathered in Spain to put an end to every impertinent idea of independence in Spain's American colonies compelled a new liberalism in the motherland and suggested the wisdom of at least a temporary suspension of the war in America. Despite Colombian skepticism over this trend of events, armistices were welcomed for an exchange of prisoners, but reconciliation with Spain became impossible after Bolívar's commissioners found themselves unable to carry out their instructions to arrange peace only on terms of independence. By the time the first formal congress of the Republic of Colombia opened at the border town of Rosario de Cúcuta, Bolívar's great commander, General Antonio José de Sucre, had been ordered to Guayaquil to begin his year-long campaign for the liberation of the Presidency of Quito; by the time the Congress had formulated the Republic's first constitution, Bolívar's June 24, 1821, victory at Carabobo and the subsequent capitulation of Caracas had assured independence in the Venezuelan sector of the Republic. In October, the surrender of Cartagena by its Spanish governor lessened the royalist threat in northern New Granada; in November, Panama promulgated its independence and requested an acknowledged incorporation in the Republic of Colombia. In the presidency of Quito, Guayaquil had ventured (October, 1821) to establish its own governing junta.

By the end of 1821, then, the Republic was ready to concentrate its attention upon the troublesome royalist sympathizers in its southern provinces and upon the final liberation of Quito. On April 7, 1822, Bolívar defeated the royalists at Bomboné, near the Colombian-Ecuadoran border and, after Sucre's great May 24 victory at Pichincha, the two commanders met in Quito, where the presidency was finally incorporated in Great Colombia, in fact as well as by the earlier declarations. Guayaquil, too, was "persuaded" to declare itself a part of Colombia, and the great design, as drawn at Angostura in 1819 and retraced at Cúcuta in 1821, was complete.^{1*} On June 25, 1824, a Colombian territorial division law marked the first step in the delineation of the boundaries which had been previously so lightly postponed to a more convenient *mañana*.

*Notes to this chapter begin on page 288.

II

With its government functioning and the national territory rounded out according to plan, Great Colombia turned to international affairs—aid to fellow-revolutionists, the signing of treaties of friendship and alliance, and the establishment of such a measure of union as would strengthen the defense of independence and provide a means for the peaceful settlement of disputes between the new states. Unhappily, military success, instead of bringing the hoped-for union in a greater Confederation of the Andes, was to lead to war with Peru and the melancholy disintegration of Great Colombia itself.

But first it led to the liberation of Peru and Bolivia. Despite the success of the Argentine and Chilean forces that José de San Martín had brought from Chile to aid the move for Peruvian independence, his July 28, 1821, declaration that independence had been won was premature. There were still strong and well-led royalist forces in the Andean mountain strongholds. After the first thrill of victory attending the occupation of Lima, the foreign troops began to long to return home; Peruvians soon became equally weary of the presence of these foreigners in their land. With scandalous disloyalty, Lord Cochrane sailed away from Callao, thus breaking contact between his commander and the Chilean base. When San Martín turned to Bolívar for help in a renewal of the campaign, their conference at Guayaquil (July 26-27) proved unsuccessful. Convinced that it was his own position of command which had prevented the grant of aid, San Martín convened the Peruvian congress to which (September, 1822) he resigned his title of "Protector" before withdrawing from the country. The various Peruvian governments established thereafter met only with disaster until renewed requests to Bolívar were answered by the June, 1823, arrival of several thousand troops under General Sucre, followed in September by Bolívar in person. After still more auxiliary forces had been voted by the Colombian Congress for continuance of the war, it was won by Bolívar at Junín on August 6, 1824, and by Sucre at Ayacucho on December 9. Peruvian independence was at last reality.

Despite this success and Sucre's further victories in Upper Peru, which in the following year brought the establishment of that Re-

public of Bolívar destined to become Bolivia, the Liberator soon became aware of the impossibility of his dream of any Confederation of the Andes. Aware, too, of disorders in the north, he acquiesced in the Peruvian withdrawal from the confederation plan and, leaving Sucre and Andrés Santa Cruz in control of the governments of Bolivia and Peru, he returned to Colombia and then went on to deal with the rebellion in Venezuela led by José Antonio Páez. His arrival at the end of the year and his January 1, 1827, decree restoring his former comrade-in-arms to the office of commandant-general—from which he had been suspended by the Colombian Congress—postponed the revolt, despite the general resentment still felt in Venezuela over a subordinate role in the common government and the final 1821 selection of Bogotá as its capital.

Not only in Venezuela was there local discontent with the government of Colombia. Angered by the continued presence of Colombian troops and the interference of Colombians in their affairs, the Bolivians and Peruvians were equally discontent. Sucre had accepted the presidency of Bolivia with reluctance, fully aware of the indignation of numerous Bolivians who had aspired to the office. In Peru, too, it was felt not only that too many of the benefits of independence were going to foreigners in the land, but also that both Bolivia and Ecuador should be rightfully Peruvian. From the beginning of 1827—a safe time after Bolívar's withdrawal for Colombia!—the Peruvian press began a bitter attack against the Liberator and the leaders whom he had left in control. General Agustín Gamarra stationed himself on the Bolivian border in anticipation of the invasion of Peru which, he warned, was to be expected from the Colombian troops left under Sucre's command. With native encouragement, and having taken heart at the sight of the Peruvian forces hopefully awaiting events on the frontier, the homesick Colombian guard revolted, and Gamarra was happily able to invade the country to save it from the anarchy he himself had instigated. In July of 1828 Sucre agreed to the Colombian withdrawal from the country. Bolívar had already declared war on Peru.

Though Bolívar's anger was described as "terrible" when he learned of the Peruvian invasion of Bolivia, it had by no means been the sole reason for his declaration of war. Control of territory in the

Presidency of Quito, specifically the border provinces of Jaén and Maynas in the relatively unknown eastern land along the Marañón, was at stake as well as influence in Bolivia.² Among other causes of Bolívar's declaration were Peru's failure to liquidate her debt for Colombian aid in her emancipation, the Peruvian encouragement of insubordination in Colombian troops, and the aid and comfort given by Peru to the eternal revolutionaries in Colombia's southern departments. Even more basic, perhaps, was the mutual distrust of the two former allies, intensified by the loud outcries over discourteous treatment of their diplomatic representatives and by what one distinguished Peruvian historian has described as the "exuberance of bellicose literature" in both countries.

Active hostilities began when a small Peruvian fleet bombarded Guayaquil (November 22, 1828). Driven off, it returned to blockade the port and finally force its surrender on February 1, 1829. Meanwhile the Peruvian president, José de la Mar, had invaded Ecuadoran territory. At Tarqui, on February 27, 1829, his vanguard was attacked by Colombian troops led by Sucre, fortuitously back from Bolivia. Among the surrender terms perforce accepted by La Mar the next day at the near-by town of Girón were the limitation of the military forces of both countries along the border; the fixing of that boundary by a joint commission in accord with the 1809 viceregal limits; the liquidation of the Peruvian debt; and the Peruvian promise to evacuate Colombian territory within 20 days.³ It was also agreed that in the future neither state would intervene in the domestic affairs of the other!

The treaty of Girón did not end the war. Not only did Peru refuse to surrender Guayaquil, but its Congress denied that President La Mar had any sole authority to ratify a treaty and commit his country to its terms. La Mar was promptly deposed, exiled, and succeeded by Gamarra, and the fighting continued until an armistice, signed at Piura on July 10, 1829, again provided for the return of Guayaquil and for the appointment of a commission to arrange peace. The final treaty, signed at Guayaquil on September 22, 1829, contained terms similar to that of Girón, but with the addition that any disagreement between the boundary commissioners must be referred to the arbitration of a friendly government. Despite all the mutual expressions of a

sincere desire to preserve "the peace and good understanding which [had been] . . . happily re-established by . . . [the] treaty,"⁴ however, the degree of peace which temporarily followed was due less to desire than to the internal dissensions which occupied each country. The demarcation of the treaty of 1829 was not undertaken.

III

For Colombia, the "dissensions" involved revolts in Venezuela and Ecuador; she was also preoccupied by conditions in Panama. Venezuelan dissatisfaction had continued, and when Bolívar returned to Bogotá after the end of the war with Peru he received the unwelcome request of Páez that the country be allowed to secede from Colombia and become independent. When a convention of delegates met in Valencia in May, 1830, to draft a constitution for the new nation, it received with becoming courtesy the delegates sent by the Colombian national constitutional convention to try to persuade a renewed acceptance of allegiance to Colombia, but it was no less firm than courteous in its decision for independence—a decision which the Republic of Colombia respected with a magnanimity rare in international affairs.⁵

As for Ecuador, hardly had the Liberator departed for Bogotá before an assembly in Quito decided to organize the departments of Guayaquil, Azuay, Quito, and such other towns as might be persuaded to join, into an independent state with Juan José Flores as its provisional executive. A constituent congress of delegates, meeting in Riobamba on August 14, 1830, formally declared independence, elected Flores as president, and framed a constitution. The boundaries of the new state were then extended to the north at the expense of Colombia, where towns of the provinces of Buenaventura, Pasto, and Popayán had rebelled against the authorities at Bogotá and declared their annexation to the southern neighbor.

For Panama, and especially for the adjacent islands, neither extent nor jurisdiction had been well defined, although the provinces of Panama and Veragua had been listed as Colombian in the 1824 territorial law.⁶ The few settlements on the isthmus were cut off from Colombia by the Atrato valley and Colombian authority had never

been particularly effective over them; still less was known or cared about the unsettled coast to the north until it was threatened with foreign invasion. A boundary treaty signed by Colombia and the United Provinces of Central America on March 15, 1825, did little more than agree to maintain and protect the status quo, doubtful though that status might be; both countries were by then far more concerned about the dangers from abroad than by any Spanish American assumption of authority. And in 1830, when Panama, like Venezuela and Ecuador, considered withdrawal from Colombia, it was the rumor that the province had offered to surrender its sovereignty to Great Britain in exchange for protection against any possible retaliation from the Bogotá government, which explains much of the Colombian relief over the eventual reconciliation.

IV

The same preoccupation with danger from abroad which had first led to the agreements of cooperation in the winning of independence also led to the treaties of union, league, and confederation which Bolívar signed with other Spanish American nations. In part, it also explains his desire to revolutionize Cuba and his Congress of Panama. In 1821, Bolívar had appointed Don Joaquín Mosquera as minister plenipotentiary to Peru, Chile, and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata and Don Miguel Santamaría to Mexico. They were instructed to call upon the new American governments to live together as sister nations and, with a pessimistic awareness that, despite any family relationship, problems between independent states would undoubtedly occur, they were also to suggest the wisdom of convoking an assembly of American states to serve for council in danger and as arbiter in disputes. On July 6, 1822, Mosquera signed the first of his prescribed treaties, that with Peru. A similar treaty with Chile followed on October 21, 1822, and, presumably a different one, with Buenos Aires in the same year.⁷ On October 3, 1823, Santamaría signed the treaty with Mexico and, finally, a pact of union, including an arbitration provision, was made in the treaty of March 15, 1825, with Central America. Included, also, were two provisions for the defense needed against any territorial encroachment by Spain or by

“unauthorized adventurers” and the suggestion that the Isthmus of Panama might be “the most convenient” site for the holding of a congress.

Danger from abroad, and immediately from Cuba, was not an unreasonable supposition in 1825. The island had served as a Spanish military base during the wars of independence, and might be expected to return to its former role now that even the feeble pretense of liberalism had ended in 1823, when a French army, delegated to the work by the 1822 Congress of Verona, invaded Spain and re-established the absolutism so dear to Bourbon monarchs. Also involved, however, was Bolívar’s desire to free the island—an extension of his great purpose for Spanish America as a whole—and it was perhaps even more fundamental in the Colombian scheme of joint action in cooperation with Mexico for the island’s liberation and the Liberator’s listing of the Cuban question to be among the topics for consideration at the Congress of Panama.

Bolívar had been planning his American congress from at least as early as 1821, and formal invitations to attend were sent by him to the Spanish American governments on December 7, 1824. Yet when the congress opened on June 2, 1826, the only Spanish American countries represented were Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Central America, and as with many a conference held before and since, the one at Panama did not measure up to expectations. A treaty of friendship and perpetual union was signed, with provision made that other states might subscribe to it should that be their desire. Four conventions were also signed, three of which dealt with details of defense and the fourth selected Tacubaya, Mexico, as the site for future meetings. Only Colombia ratified any of the agreements.

V

The degree of success in Colombia’s relations with Europe was perhaps more easily discernible, at the end of 1830, than that of Bolívar’s dream of a united and powerful confederation of independent American states. European relations were not made of the stuff of dreams, but concerned with problems of debts and loans, of commerce, and the recognition of the independence which Bolívar had done so much to

make real. The immediate need had been the restoration of credit, and in November of 1819, Bolívar sent Francisco Antonio Zea to Europe with instructions to obtain a loan and to attempt to win recognition of independence. Zea succeeded in getting loans, but under terms disastrous for his country and after the congressional revocation of his authority to contract them.⁸ He was even more unfortunate in his diplomatic mission, for he failed to win recognition from any European state. Vice-President Francisco de Paula Santander's attempt to establish official relations with the Holy See and his appointment of Dr. Ignacio Tejada (1821) as minister plenipotentiary to Rome met a similar failure. After the United States granted recognition in 1822, however, Great Britain determined upon a similar move, and, in April of 1825, she signed a commercial treaty with Colombia and named a *chargé* as her diplomatic representative.⁹ In 1826, France had accredited to Colombia a commercial agent who enjoyed consular rank; recognition followed in 1829. Portugal and Holland also recognized Colombian independence, though the former country sent no representative to Bogotá.

But even as Great Colombia won recognition in Europe, internal chaos was destroying the republic. The secession of Venezuela and Ecuador, the threatened secession of Panama, and domestic revolt verging on civil war convinced the council of ministers that only a constitutional monarchy could impose order and save the country. It was to two of the European diplomats in Bogotá—the representatives of England and France—that they turned for advice as to the wisdom and possibility of a change to a monarchical form of government. Then, in one of those strange coincidences of history, Bolívar died, on December 17, 1830, on the anniversary of that congress at Angostura at which he had proclaimed the Great Colombia—which now, with its creator, passed away.

VI

That the ministerial despondency had been premature, however, became evident in the popular reaction to the council's suggestion of a return to the past. The federal republican system had been so firmly established that Colombians would have no other. The eleven-year

record of their Great Colombia had been one of an accomplishment which any nation might envy. Colombians had won independence from Spain for themselves and aided its winning in Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. They had demonstrated the sincerity of their belief in freedom by acquiescing to the independence of all these nations even from any confederation with themselves. And in the succession of treaties from 1822 to 1829, as well as at the 1826 Congress of Panama, Colombia had set a pattern for a friendly and conciliatory approach to the settlement of international disputes, for arbitration as a preferred means of settlement, and for the union of independent states as the best foundation for the continued freedom of all.¹⁰

NOTES

1. Just as the Spanish governor of Quito, dependent upon Guayaquil as the Presidency's only port, had been helpless before its impertinent assertion of independence (after Peru's parallel war for independence had blocked all hope of aid from that quarter), so Guayaquil had no hope of maintaining either its own government or its connections with Peru after it was occupied by the troops from the north.

2. Though Colombia, in 1819, and Peru, in 1821, had claimed all the overlapping territory in the old viceroyalties, both had agreed, in a Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation signed on July 6, 1822, to postpone the determination of their common boundary for arrangement in a "conciliatory and peaceful" way by a special convention. The convention, signed on December 18, 1823, failed to win ratification, however; the Colombian June 25, 1824, territorial division law included Jaén and Maynas among the provinces in the department of Azuay, while Peru, in 1822 and 1826, had assumed a similar proprietorship by including the provinces in calls for the election of delegates to her Congress. See Gordon Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1938), pp. 185, 187.

3. According to a Peruvian account, "Los comisionados peruanos fueron transigentes, considerando que estaban lejos de la frontera, sin municiones, sin recursos, sin poder reunir a los dispersos, sin poder hacer maniobrar la caballería por tener que vadear ríos crecidos." See Jorge Basadre, *Chile, Perú y Bolivia independientes* (Buenos Aires: 1948), p. 131.

4. William Manning (ed.), *Arbitration Treaties Among the American Nations to the Close of the Year 1910* (New York: 1924), p. 9.

5. With a similarly singular generosity, Venezuela refused to incorporate the province of Casanare which had signified its own disapproval of the Colombian government by declaring itself a part of the territory of Venezuela. To accept this

annexation "would have been an act of hostility to New Granada," the Venezuelans declared, for Casanare had never been a part of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela. The rejected, and presumably humbler, province again became a part of New Granada, in December of 1830. See Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, *History of Colombia*, J. Fred Rippey (ed. and translator) (Chapel Hill: 1938), pp. 414, 423.

6. The basic documents involved were a royal cédula (March 2, 1537) which set Cape Gracias á Dios as the northern limit of Veragua; the August 20, 1739, royal cédula creating the Viceroyalty of New Granada to which were assigned the four provinces of Panamá, Porto Bello, Veraguas, and Darién, leaving the rest of Central America to the Captaincy-General of Guatemala; and the November 30, 1803, royal order by which "the islands of San Andrés and the part of the Mosquito Coast from Cape Gracias á Dios, inclusive to the River Chagres . . . [were] detached from . . . Guatemala and made dependent" upon New Granada. See Gordon Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in Central and North America and the Caribbean* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 164.

7. There is no record of the treaty with Buenos Aires in Manning's collection of arbitration treaties, perhaps because it lacked any arbitration provision; it was also, reportedly, the only one of the series without provision for a congress.

8. Zea's economic task was taken over after his death in 1822 by José Rafael Revenga and then by Manuel José Hurtado who finally (1824) secured a loan of 30 million pesos with which to pay all amounts already received, thus re-establishing the national credit and securing the funds to meet immediate administrative needs. For details, see Henao and Arrubla, *op. cit.*, pp. 366-367, 369, 372-373, 380.

9. The United States had signed a less favorable one on October 3, 1824.

10. Her own hundred-year record of the use of arbitration in settling boundary disputes with the seven nations on her borders in 1830 may, perhaps, compare only with that of Brazil in the difficulties involved and in the success attained. For the impressive record of these disputes with Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, see the two volumes by Ireland.

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Ernesto Carlos Martelo: TRAVEL IN COLOMBIA'S
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I

WITHIN OUR SHORT LIFETIME, travel has become one of the greatest forces for peace and understanding. President John F. Kennedy expressed this thought recently when he said:

As people move throughout the world and learn to know each other, to understand each other's customs, and to appreciate the qualities of the individuals in each nation, we are building understanding which can sharply improve the atmosphere for world peace.

Improved transportation facilities and the rising standard of living throughout the world have created a new kind of "ism" which one might term "mobilism."

This force . . . encouraged and developed by the travel industry and governments of the world . . . can play a significant role in the continued development of mutual understanding.

At the XVth Assembly of the International Union of Official Travel Organizations (IUOTO) in Buenos Aires—the first meeting of this group ever held in Latin America—Modesto Farolan, president of the organization, stated:

What governments cannot do, notwithstanding many years and decades of trying, tourism is quietly accomplishing; what diplomats alone cannot bring about with the deft word and subtle language, our program

(tourism) is effectively achieving; and what propagandists and exponents of one ideology or another are seeking to create, spread or impose to enslave minds, to divide or to hold peoples in bondage, to keep friends apart, to break family bonds, to isolate enemies or to provoke misunderstandings and conflicts, we must overcome with our work; tourism and travel must substitute for such iniquities the promotion of more fruitful relations and more harmonious associations that serve the interest of peace, orderly progress, and prosperity among all nations and races. When we succeed, we will have contributed to the realization of the noblest aspirations of the human family . . . the brotherhood of man. That's the priceless reward that awaits us.

But man cannot live by platitudes alone. In order to be able to accept this concept of the fellowship of man he must have food for the body as well as the soul. Tourism can supply this, too. As Professor Luis López de Mesa, former Foreign Affairs Minister of Colombia, said, at a meeting of the Inter-American Travel Association, "Travel is, in fact, the only perfect international transaction, since in exchange for money a country exports only the impressions it has made on the traveler."

Dollar for dollar, tourist promotion is, therefore, the best possible investment a country can make. It permits the country to exploit its national resources without depleting them. The mountains, rivers, forests, sea shores, and other scenic beauties are there and will stay there regardless of how many tourists see and enjoy them. Then, too, the tourist dollar seeps down to every part of the economy.

At first glance it would seem that those who benefit most from the tourist dollar would be those who are directly engaged in the tourist industry—hotels, restaurants, amusement areas, tour operators, gift shops. However, closer study reveals the tourist dollar to be a many-tentacled commodity that makes its way into every phase of the nation's economy. Farmers, fishermen, engineers, carpenters, bankers, gardeners, civil servants, manufacturers, doctors, all benefit—either directly or indirectly—from tourism.

So, tourism is an important factor in the economic stability of a country. For many countries, large and small, it has provided sinews for a distressed national economy, created employment, generated tax revenues for essential public services, and produced monetary reserves for imports necessary to a nation's welfare.

The United States, too, has recognized the benefits of a vital tourist program and recently established a United States Travel Office to develop the flow of two-way travel.

In his special message to Congress on gold and international payments President Kennedy emphasized this point by saying, "Foreign travel to the United States constitutes a large potential market virtually untapped. . . . Economic conditions in many foreign countries have improved to the point where a strong travel promotion effort by this country can be expected to yield significant results."

In a subsequent speech Mr. Kennedy went on to say, "To be effective both as an economic force and communications medium, travel must flow in two directions. We hope that our American citizens will continue to travel extensively abroad, to learn other countries' customs, and to give other peoples an opportunity to meet and know them. We in turn are embarking on a new program to bring other people to our country so that they may taste our hospitality and may learn our customs and way of living."

II

In relation to Latin America several points stand out clearly regarding the tourist picture:

1. Latin America needs greater understanding by the United States—this can be accomplished through travel.
2. Latin America needs the economic assistance of a more diversified foreign trade—this can be accomplished through travel.
3. Latin America needs the sense of being more intimately involved with the United States in the development of common goals and policies for the Western Hemisphere—this can be accomplished through travel.

It must be recognized, however, that the basic social and economic problems of Latin America are of such dimensions that necessary funds for the promotion of tourism have been channeled to more immediate social needs, such as adequate housing, education, public health, agriculture. Within the limited financial resources available it is impossible for Latin America to develop its tourist plant to the point where it can effectively compete with the more prosperous countries of Europe and the Orient.

We have been particularly hampered by the prohibitive costs of advertising in the United States. We all know that advertising is a prime factor in moving commodities in the United States. For example, in order to promote the United States tourist market, some 40 governments operate 61 information and tourist offices in the United States and spend about \$7 million in sales promotion annually. According to United States Department of Justice statistics, the ten areas with the largest expenditures during 1960 were as follows:

Nassau	\$1,296,378
Great Britain	1,132,855
France	811,519
Italy	353,650
Switzerland	330,292
Germany	249,378
Israel	212,057
Japan	201,684
Portugal	198,382
Ireland	183,418

And this is only a part of the money spent by foreign governments for tourist promotion programs in the United States, for these figures do not include expenditures for printed material such as folders, maps, counter cards, hotel lists, and posters, which usually are printed in the native country. This, then, is Latin America's competition—and it is a stiff one!

III

Following World War II the United States actively encouraged European and other governments to develop their tourist industry so as to attract more American visitors whose dollar expenditures might serve as a painless form of foreign aid. A large proportion of the money spent to stabilize the European economy through the European Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan, was directed to hotel construction and improvement of the tourist plant. As a direct result of this program, the European Travel Commission was formed. We all know how successful this plan was.

Therefore, I would recommend that the development of tourism, as was done in Europe, should be one of the most important facets of an effective aid program for the less-developed countries of the Americas; for helping Latin America to help itself is not just good politics but good business as well.

The highest percentage of dollars spent by United States visitors to South America returns to the United States. This is not so in heavily industrialized Europe, where the dollars remain at home. United States Department of Commerce figures show that in 1958, \$560 million was spent by United States tourists to Europe and the Mediterranean, while only \$37 million was spent by United States visitors to South America. For the same year, European visitors to the United States spent an estimated \$86 million while visitors from the Latin American republics spent \$125 million in the United States. For this same period, Western Europe imported \$3,297 million worth of goods from the United States and the South American republics imported \$3,589 million worth of goods.

Tourism is the one industry that could release Latin America from its long bondage to a one-crop economy. In Brazil 56.2 per cent of the economy is based on coffee, in El Salvador 62.1 per cent, in Guatemala 62.9 per cent, in Costa Rica 50.5 per cent. This would be particularly conspicuous in Colombia, where 71.7 per cent of the economy is based on coffee. The United States spent \$1,096 million on the importation of coffee from all over the world in 1959. This same year United States tourists spent \$2,380 million for foreign travel. In other words, if Latin America received its rightful share of the tourist market, the contribution to a stable economy would be fantastic.

IV

There have been sporadic attempts on the part of the United States to bolster the economy of their neighbors to the south through tourism, but these have not been sustained nor have they touched all the countries of Latin America.

As far back as 1946, Sir Winston Churchill and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met to discuss the creation of an organization to

raise the standard of living of the Caribbean area through tourism. As a result of this historic meeting the Caribbean Commission was formed. This Commission later developed into the Caribbean Tourist Association, an organization of which my own country, Colombia, is a member. The Association's purpose is to help strengthen the economy of its member countries through a coordinated program of tourist activities and tourist promotion between government members and the private tourist interests operating in the area. The Caribbean Tourist Association has grown in importance and has become an instrument not only for close cooperation between the various territories and countries concerned, but also for the dissemination of up-to-date information to the travel trade, the public, and the press. This organization, however, does not encompass all of the countries in Latin America. Only those countries bordering on the Caribbean are eligible for membership.

The beautiful, sun-drenched shores of the Caribbean, long a haunt of buccaneers and pirates, are now experiencing another type of "invasion." People looking for relaxation, romance, and something different have discovered the palm-fringed beaches, crystal-clear lagoons, the warmth of the tropical sun, and the joyous peoples of the Caribbean. Added to the bountiful benevolence of nature, the Caribbean offers luxurious hotels and tourist know-how. Certainly, what tourism has done for the Caribbean—particularly Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and formerly Cuba—could well be a shining example to the rest of Latin America.

Therefore, at this time when the Kennedy Administration's imaginative \$20 billion "Alliance for Progress" program is moving forward, the individual Latin American governments and the United States should recognize the important role that tourism can play.

The International Union of Official Travel Organizations took notice of the economic development programs being proposed for Latin America at their last meeting and stated, "It is hoped that the new economic cooperation programs now being sponsored by the Organization of American States will give travel as important a role (in Latin America) as it played in the postwar economic rehabilitation of Europe under the Marshall Plan."

Long-term, low-interest loans should be made available to develop

the construction of tourist facilities within the individual Latin American countries.

Then, too, the Latin American governments themselves must make a start by setting up a serious, autonomous, and permanent official tourist organization within each country. This nucleus could then be responsible for the development of the tourist plant within their country—new hotels, jet airports, exciting special programs, and the expansion of tourist destinations.

Once this framework is established, a comprehensive survey of the tourist potential of each country could be made. A study of the type needed for Latin America was prepared recently for the countries of the Pacific through the Pacific Area Travel Association, sponsored by the United States government and the International Cooperation Administration. This report is expected to give an evaluation of tourist movements and trends in all Pacific tourist areas; appraise the economic effect of tourism in each country; suggest how each country can earn extra tourist income; detail training, publicity, and promotional programs; suggest methods of setting up official government tourist organizations; recommend changes in facilitation; and suggest legislation to aid the tourist industry in each country.

Such a program could then be the foundation for a vital program of cooperative tourist action between the nations of the Americas. A proposal for the establishment of a Latin American Travel Association was made recently at a meeting of the Inter-American Travel Congress in Mexico City. This proposal called for the establishment of a travel office in New York City to promote tourism along the lines of the European Travel Commission, the Pacific Area Travel Association, and the Caribbean Tourist Association. The program was to be budgeted at \$300,000 a year for staff, overhead, advertising, public relations, and so forth. The budget was to be prorated among the Latin American Republics on the same formula as is used for subscription to the Organization of American States (OAS). But this proposal has bogged down in a mass of red tape.

A great spur for Latin American tourism lies in the soon-to-be-completed 22,000-mile Pan American Highway system that will eventually link the United States with Mexico, Central, and South America. The highway at the present time is passable only as far as

Panama, with the section between Panama and Colombia scheduled to be completed within the next few years. When we realize that the highway is the most important single source of tourist traffic between the United States and Mexico—carrying 40 per cent of the visitors to that country—we see what an important life line this highway will be to the rest of Latin America. It is estimated that approximately 348,000 United States tourists visited Mexico last year in 141,000 automobiles.

V

What, then, is happening in the rest of Latin America to prepare for this influx?

To date, my own country, Colombia, is the only South American republic recognizing the importance of tourism by establishing a tourist board in the United States. What we have attempted to do in Colombia on a limited budget could well serve as a "pilot project" to the touristically underdeveloped countries of Latin America.

Fully cognizant of the significant role tourism could play in stabilizing the national economy, the Republic of Colombia has attempted to create an effective tourist program over the last few years. This program has been limited, of course, because necessary funds are being diverted to more pressing social needs. However, in spite of a meager budget the results have been phenomenal.

The newborn infant which was Colombian tourism just four short years ago has grown into a full-sized wage earner. Tourism has jumped from next to nothing to Colombia's third largest dollar earner—after coffee and petroleum. However impressive this may sound we must bear in mind that 71.7 per cent of the economy is still based on coffee. So, in spite of its tremendous strides there is still much more to be done to make the tourist industry a vital economic force in Colombia.

A major part of this increase is due to the efforts of the *Empresa Colombiana de Turismo* (Colombia National Tourist Board) a semi-autonomous organization for the promotion of tourism set up by the Republic of Colombia and vested tourist interests within the country. In 1957, at the time the Board was established, foreign

tourists spent an estimated \$9 million in Colombia. In 1960, this figure skyrocketed to \$22 million, an increase of 140 per cent.

Official United States Department of Justice statistics indicate that air travel between the United States and Colombia increased 30.1 per cent during 1960 over 1959. Braniff International Airways reports that air traffic to Colombia has increased 50 per cent during the first six months of 1961 over the same period in 1960. Avianca, Colombia National Airways, showed a soaring 89.5 load factor in the month of July, a new high for any month since the carrier established operations in and out of New York's Idlewild Airport and Miami's International Airport.

The Board has placed special emphasis on two levels: (1) to establish closer liaison with tourist factions in the United States; and (2) to improve and expand the tourist plant within Colombia.

The keyman in selling tourism in the United States is the travel agent. Seventy-five per cent of all travel is sold through this vital channel. A well-rounded, effective tourist program must reach the travel agent through a coordinated program encompassing the airline and steamship carriers—who spend millions of dollars each year on advertising and sales promotion—and the Tourist Board.

Through both personal contact and a modest advertising campaign with ads appearing in *Holiday*, *Sports Illustrated*, *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, *Esquire*, *The Saturday Review*, and trade magazines Colombia has tried to stimulate interest in our country. Our advertising is geared to appeal not only to the individual traveler but also to special interest groups, such as the universities.

Special emphasis is being placed on the proximity of Colombia to the United States. "Colombia—Your Closest South American Neighbor" is the theme. Colombia also has the added advantage of being the first country one reaches when flying to the west coast of South America. Colombia is, in fact, the gateway to the exciting South American continent.

This winter there will be direct nonstop flights from New York to Bogotá, cutting the flying time between these two great cities to five hours. In addition, the opening of the new jet airport in Barranquilla, probably by the end of next year, will permit passengers to fly directly from the States, via jet, to Colombia's Caribbean coast.

One stumbling block to unrestricted world travel has been the rigid frontier formalities enforced by many countries. The United States has been one of the worst offenders in this area, with complicated, security-oriented visa procedures. In spite of the fact that visa regulations are usually a reciprocal agreement, Colombia has been one of the forerunners in South America in easing travel restrictions for United States visitors. Tourist cards (no passport is necessary for United States citizens) are now issued, immediately, free of charge, by all carriers servicing Colombia, and at any Colombian Consulate.

VI

Now we come to the second phase of our program to interest North Americans in visiting Colombia. For all that I have outlined in the first phase would be a complete failure without an effective campaign within Colombia to bring our facilities and attractions up to United States specifications. This is one of the major problems we have to tackle.

We have the natural resources: Colombia is a country of 14 million inhabitants with strong cultural ties not only to Europe and North America but also to its own rich Indian heritage. Its 445,000 square miles range from the sun-drenched shores of the Pacific and Caribbean to the pastoral slopes of the world's finest coffee plantations, to the soaring snow-crowned mountains of the Andes, and to the mysterious jungles of the Amazon. Our golden Caribbean coast on the Spanish Main is a storehouse of New World treasures with beautiful palm-fringed beaches, crystal-clear waters, and cities rich in Spanish American history. In addition, Colombia is the only country in South America with more than three large cities with over half a million population and six cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. Its bustling, modern capital of Bogotá is often called the "Athens of South America." Yes, we have the resources, all we need are more adequate hotels and surface-transportation facilities to attract United States visitors.

Opportunities for foreign investment in the tourist industry are unlimited in Colombia. Special ten-year tax benefits are in effect to spur foreign investment in this field. An indication of the impact of a new

hotel on both the community and its sponsors can best be illustrated by what happened in Bogotá when the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation opened the modern, 400-room Hotel Tequendama in 1953. Bogotá's tourist business was negligible up until that time—it had few attractive facilities for visitors. The Tequendama Hotel drew guests from more than 50 countries in the first year of operations and it is estimated that these visitors spent \$4,320,000 in the city. The hotel has been operating at capacity occupancy since its inception and this year a new "North Wing" was opened with 235 rooms, making the Hotel Tequendama the largest hotel in South America.

The Empresa Colombiana de Turismo, itself, is actively cooperating in the development of hotels. We are now in the process of building six new hotels. Most ambitious of these is a luxury hotel in San Andrés, Colombia's pivotal island in the Caribbean. However, additional facilities are urgently needed to develop Colombia's number one tourist attraction—the Caribbean Coast. Under way at the present time is a plan to provide better facilities in Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta. However, additional foreign capital investment is needed to carry this program to its completion.

Gay fiestas and carnivals have been created to attract the tourist: Manizales has an annual fiesta to celebrate the coffee harvest each January, complete with bull-fights and the selection of a Coffee Queen; Cartagena celebrates its Liberation on November 11 with a riotous carnival lasting four days, at which time a beauty contest is held to select "Miss Colombia"; Cali has a gay Sugar Cane Festival in December heralding the bullfighting season in South America; Barranquilla has a colorful Mardi Gras three days before and through Ash Wednesday; in February, an International Film Festival is held in Cartagena with films and film notables from the movie capitals of the world participating; and Popayán marks Easter with inspiring torch-lit processions during Holy Week. All these festivals are organized and sponsored by the Colombia National Tourist Board as a means of creating a tourist consciousness within the country and also stimulating folklore interest and a greater identification for the people with their rich historical and cultural background.

There is more to see and more to do in Colombia than ever before. Proof positive is that more United States tourists are not only visiting

Colombia, but they are staying longer. In 1960, the length of stay of United States tourists in Colombia was three times greater than in 1957. From 1959 to 1960, alone, these figures increased by 55 per cent.

This is a portent of what a really energetic and financially sound tourist program could do for Latin America and what a really adequate tourist budget could do for Colombia.

VII

In conclusion, let us consider the role of the universities, individual cities, and corporate interests in the United States in fostering two-way travel between the United States and Latin America.

Certainly, the School of Inter-American Studies of the University of Florida is to be commended for its valiant efforts in behalf of hemispheric understanding.

We all must recognize that foreign travel is a qualitative market usually attractive to the better-educated, mobile stratum of the population having a variety of cultural and sociological associations with overseas destinations—all these descriptions fit the university man. Thus, it is up to the universities to set the trend and to create interest in travel between the Americas.

Expanding the courses in Latin American studies is one way of stimulating this interest; a broader exchange of students between Latin American and United States universities is another. Also, it is incumbent upon the universities, together with United States corporations with interests in Latin America, to set up more scholarships to encourage Latin American students to attend United States universities.

Another approach to a more fruitful interchange of culture and visitors is the establishment of strong ties between individual cities. For example, the progressive city of Coral Gables, Florida, has designated historic Cartagena in Colombia as its Sister City. There has been a steady stream of visitors between these two cities and also an exciting program of cultural exchange.

Only through getting to know each other on a person-to-person level can we cement hemispheric solidarity—and, in a broader sense, global unity.

Zeb Mayhew: THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION IN
COLOMBIA

I

INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM'S TIES to education are close in Colombia, and our support of schools and universities takes many forms: the donation of books and equipment, fellowships, field trips by teachers and students to our installations, and so forth. We have recently undertaken a modest program, through the Institute of International Education, which will assist more Colombian graduate students in pursuing their studies in the United States.

Before I speak about our concept of the role of private enterprise in the community and nation, I should like to mention a few other activities of our company in the sphere of education and culture which will give you some idea of their scope.

Last year, for example, we brought to the United States the largest and most representative collection of Colombian art ever assembled. Called "3,500 Years of Colombian Art," the exhibit encompassed the pre-Hispanic, colonial, and modern eras and showed the evolution and continuity of Colombian culture as exemplified by the plastic arts.

This year International Petroleum is sponsoring the Esso Literary Prize, an award of 25,000 pesos, plus publication, for the best original novel by a Colombian author as selected by an outside, impartial board of judges. The contest is an attempt to foster and support the efforts of creative writers in Colombia.

I mention these examples of some of our activities in order to provide a background for a simple statement of my company's own concept of its functions and responsibilities.

First of all, of course, a company such as ours is organized to produce goods and services—and by so doing to make a profit. By producing goods—in our case, petroleum products—it creates wealth and benefits both the consumers and its owners, the shareholders. All this is so elementary that I shall not dwell upon it. But what else is it, or should it be, intended to do? As a corporate citizen, with all rights and duties except those of a political nature, the company should be actively concerned with and working for the entire community and nation. Such concern may manifest itself in various ways: in sound employment policies; in investments; in producing the best possible goods at the lowest possible price consistent with good management.

But a nation is not simply an economic mechanism. It is, rather, a living, dynamic society with intellectual, cultural, spiritual, and material aspirations and traditions. To play our full role in that society in which we live and work our company and others have broadened the old concept of the corporation as being solely an economic entity. We believe that we must accept our rightful place in the community by participating, within our limitations, in the responsibilities of corporate citizenship. Therefore I should like to comment upon a development which, without this introduction, might appear to be outside the field of business interest: community action.

II

I note that the discussion of community action is not formally on the agenda; yet, I think it to be of such vital importance to all of us interested in Colombia and its future that perhaps by opening up the subject I can make a small contribution to thinking regarding it.

Community action is a practical response to the need felt in many countries for improving the community services and the level of living in rural areas and in city slums. However, it is primarily needed in rural communities because it is there that the elemental requirements for better housing, schools, roads, sanitation, and other necessities are most sorely felt.

Colombia is no exception to this rule because, despite its considerable commercial and industrial progress, a majority of its people live and work on farms and in rural communities. And, as in other parts of Latin America, and indeed of the world, life in these communities has become increasingly less attractive than life in towns and large cities. The result, as elsewhere, has been a process of economic, social, and political dislocation as more and more people move from rural to urban areas. Many of them, incidentally, have not found decent living and working conditions in their new environment, but rather have aggravated health, education, housing, and employment problems in the cities in which they have settled.

I do not have at hand statistics relating exclusively to Colombia, but in all of Latin America since the war, urban population growth has increased three times as fast as that of rural communities. Not unnaturally, while the population has exploded, and new thousands have swarmed into already overcrowded cities, food production has not keep pace.

Consequently, although the need for additional capital investment, industries, and jobs remains pressing, our attention should also be focused on the plight of people in rural communities who are asking, and demanding, a better life for themselves and their children.

A large part of the answer lies in guiding and directing these people in doing things for themselves. Certainly the state, or society, or even the business community, cannot abdicate its responsibilities, but the massive effort required to raise education and living standards in rural communities, as it must be raised in all free societies, is the primary responsibility of the people themselves.

In a talk which he gave earlier this year Dr. Mauricio Obregón pointed out that while Communism promised a lot of abstractions and pie in the sky, it had the virtue of making people do things *now*. In the meantime, our free society, which can deliver so much more both in material and spiritual terms, often asks that the underprivileged wait for economic forces, industrial development, and other mysterious processes to work in their behalf. The wait can be somewhat distressing to those who can't read statistics—and, in fact, can't read—and who haven't the barest essentials of decent living.

That is why I agree, as a nonexpert, that community action offers

the best chance for a massive national effort to improve rural conditions soon; to put people to work on their own behalf; to demonstrate that free men, of their own will and desire, can mobilize themselves to create a better tomorrow soon.

I agree with Dr. Obregón when he says: "I am convinced that the man who is lost in the desert prefers to struggle towards a mirage than to sit and wait for help, and that simple people tend to judge a system, not so much by results proven elsewhere, but by the part they themselves can play."

But what, exactly, is community action? One expert defined it by saying that community action aims "to stimulate, assist, and teach the people to adopt new methods, ideas, or techniques; to help them adapt their traditional ways of living to changes they accept or which have been imposed upon them; and to maintain the community spirit during the transformation process."

In plain language, community action is a democratic process by which people determine their own goals for better living and work together to attain them. I should like to stress the word "democratic" because, in the process of doing, people also learn how to live together, how to cooperate, how to manage their own affairs, how to develop local leadership—in short, how to live as free and responsible men.

Recently, one United States news magazine, in describing community action in Colombia, said that it was a way of getting wells drilled and schools built. That is like saying that democratic local government is a way to build a city hall! Certainly, the wells must be drilled and the schools built; and a building, I suppose, is essential to the functioning of government. But, unless there is an idea and an ideal behind both, you will have neither democratic government nor community action, but rather a building and a hole in the ground.

The idea behind community action is that people can and should work together, as free men, for the common good; that no man stands alone, in his community or nation; that cooperative effort is needed to nourish a free society; and that, as a result of this collective ideal, individuals can live a better, freer, and more peaceful life.

This is the *mystique*, if you will, of community action. When we

have understood and accepted this concept, we will have harnessed a force which can compete with the "Big Brother" idea of those who tell the underprivileged that his kindest fate is to be a servant of the state, rather than his own master.

III

I think it is small wonder that the idea of community action has literally taken fire in Colombia since it was first proposed a few years ago and embodied in public law. It is encouraging to report that since then the Colombian government and many private entities have worked together to foster community action in almost every department of Colombia.

Some of the most fruitful work was done in the early days by the *polivalente* teams which operated in areas which had been plagued by rural violence. These teams of experts—usually a medical doctor, a nurse, agricultural specialists, and a home demonstration worker—were able to guide many towns and villages in re-establishing and improving community facilities.

Since those days, the Ministry of Education has selected and trained almost a hundred additional field workers who are operating in every part of the country. Other agencies, both official and private, have joined in the work of community action as well.

Perhaps the outstanding privately financed group working in community action is one of the cosponsors of this conference, the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia, which represents almost 500,000 coffee planters in Colombia. It has some 50 graduate agronomists, plus a larger number of practical agricultural experts, working to promote the well-being of its members through such programs as education in rural hygiene, the building of low-cost housing, training in better farming techniques, and the construction and maintenance of "rural school concentrations" which combine primary education and vocational farm training. The Federation has also begun a program for training community development promoters, with the first 52 young men having recently been graduated after six months of intensive training.

Needless to say, in a program of this magnitude there are many

agencies and groups participating. These include, to mention just a few, the Caja de Crédito Agrario, the Instituto de Crédito Territorial, the Cauca Valley Corporation, UNESCO, and CARE. All of them have a vital role to play if the program is to attain a scope commensurate with the problem.

If you are interested in obtaining a sharper, more precise concept of the dynamics of community action in Colombia, I should recommend highly that you read the report prepared last December by CARE. I was greatly impressed by the "case histories" in the report which demonstrate the resourcefulness, energies, and enthusiasm of the Colombian people in this self-help program.

Under the direction of the Division of Community Action, and with the direct supervision of CARE, some 64 young Americans of the Peace Corps, trained at Rutgers University and at Tibaitatá near Bogotá, will work side by side with their Colombian counterparts in the rural areas.

IV

At this point I should like to discuss a pet subject of mine that is quite apropos: in the very exercising of our corporate citizenship through the years in countries such as Colombia, we in industry have gradually removed one of our most valuable means of communication. By education and training we have followed a course that has gradually whittled down the number of our American and Canadian employees in Colombia. They have been and are continually being replaced by Colombians, which is a fine thing. However, it means that the marvelous opportunity that President Brisco of our Company had twenty-odd years ago in Colombia, and that I had in Venezuela, of working right out of college for years in the back country where you really get to know the people and their customs and their problems is for the most part no longer available in our company—at least to the young college graduate in the United States. This void somehow has to be filled and perhaps such experiments as the Peace Corps will help do it. The success or failure of the Peace Corps will be proven in Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and other places where young citizens of this country are working or will shortly be employed. We must certainly give it a chance.

In fact, I should not disagree with those who believe that the Peace Corps can serve as a symbol of our country's concern for the material and spiritual well-being of free people. At a time when a new and relentless world despotism has already intruded itself in our hemisphere, when the unwary are being lured by the false god of communist imperialism, I cannot take issue with an idealistic plan for helping others, and ourselves, by working together.

I believe that we will see a tremendous upsurge of interest among Colombian youth in carrying on community action projects in every part of their country. Certainly, no program could be more appealing to young people who will commit their own strength and determination to the challenge of building their own nation.

In this program, as Dr. Fals Borda can tell you better than I, Colombian universities also have a significant part to play. I recall with satisfaction that in September, 1960, our company supported the first Inter-University Seminar on Community Development, held in Bogotá. Here, objectives and methods of community action or development were discussed and defined, and a permanent mechanism was set up whereby Colombian universities will provide research, technical assistance, and other services for which they are uniquely equipped.

Within the modern corporate philosophy there is ample room for a determination to work in such important social fields as community action. We in International Petroleum are eager to do so, and we are studying how our assistance may be made most useful and productive. We should, in fact, be delighted to join hands with other companies and private organizations in Colombia in the support of community action for we believe that, as corporate citizens, this is both a duty and privilege.

D. R. Matthews: THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA AND
INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

AS MANY OF MY FRIENDS HERE KNOW, the University of Florida is my Alma Mater. Here in the Florida Union, where we are meeting today, I started my University career nearly thirty years ago. I watched this Union building go up brick by brick, and I had the honor of being its first director. Here through the years, I met literally thousands of the young people of our great state and many from foreign countries, especially from Latin America.

I had the good fortune to serve on the Administrative Council of this University under two great presidents and as a fellow member of the faculty with the distinguished incumbent President, Dr. J. Wayne Reitz. It is significant that these men, coming from different backgrounds and localities, and with a distance of years separating their regimes, all shared an enthusiasm for a strong program of Latin American affairs at this University.

Dr. John J. Tigert, at the time of his acceptance of the presidency, emphasized that Florida was a strategic location for the building of a strong Latin American cultural exchange program which would bring the peoples of this hemisphere closer together. It was primarily this challenge which induced him to come to the University of Florida. Soon after his arrival he inaugurated the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Little by little, students from Central and South America and from the islands of the Caribbean began to come here, and the Institute became a unique part of our educational program.

When Dr. J. Hillis Miller came twenty years later from New York State, his acceptance of the presidency was also motivated by the great opportunity afforded by Florida to make a real contribution in the field of Inter-American relations. He urged that the Latin American program become this institution's "hobby." The Institute was broadened in scope, and accent was placed on its graduate program. It became the School of Inter-American Studies. Dr. A. Curtis Wilgus, one of the outstanding Latin American scholars of our nation, was selected to direct this expanded program. Today nearly 500 foreign students are enrolled at the University, of whom 400 are from Latin America. This is a larger enrollment than the entire student body of the University a half century ago. I am told that one University of Florida Alumni Club in Bogotá, Colombia, now has more than fifty members—all active in the business, professional, and community life of this friendly, neighboring country. Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, the learned and progressive President of Colombia, is no stranger to this campus and has on at least two occasions participated in these Caribbean Conferences. President Reitz, I am happy to say, has continued without abatement the interest of his predecessors in Latin American affairs.

I

Realizing the great advances that have been made in Gainesville through our inter-American program, in spite of the limited resources which our state could provide for its support, and aware of the great potential for improved inter-American relationships that still lie in this type of program, I introduced in the Congress this year, at the suggestion of President Reitz, a bill, H.R. 3782, to provide for the establishment of an inter-American cultural and scientific interchange program at the Federal level in not more than 12 universities already having such programs in operation. I used as the basis for drafting my bill a prospectus prepared by the faculty of the University of Florida. At a hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, on H.R. 3782, which took place June 17, 1961, I made the following statement:

During the past several years, we have been called upon in the Congress time and again to approve relief programs for various countries, some of which were directly or indirectly tied to our mutual security. We have given untold millions and even billions of dollars' worth of agricultural surpluses to people in need. We have furnished technical assistance to distant undeveloped countries throughout the world. Some of these monumental efforts and expenditures have borne fruit. Most assuredly the Marshall plan helped the economic recovery of Europe following World War II. Europe, then, was prostrate, and billions of dollars in American aid became an imperative necessity to help her regain strength so she could once again stand on her own.

The plight of the poor among our neighboring countries in the Caribbean, in Central and South America seemed less acute at that time of world crisis, so their problems of hunger, illiteracy, inadequate housing, lack of scientific and industrial development, and so forth, were pigeonholed for attention at a more distant and hopefully propitious time.

A few unfortunate incidents occurred which should have reminded us that the time gap, which we had counted upon to give constructive assistance to Latin America in the solution of her problems, had begun to run out, and that the crises, one after another, which were developing in that hitherto friendly area might prove as disastrous to the world peace and security as some of those which beset Europe after the war.

May I say that I do not believe the United States can or should over a long span of years attempt to feed, clothe, provide shelter for, and otherwise interfere with the lives of countless millions of people in foreign lands. I think these people have a responsibility to help themselves and their own. I feel that we have a responsibility and should regard it as a privilege to assist them to achieve greater political maturity, economic development, literacy, and social and physical betterment than they have enjoyed in the past. The alternative is chaos compounded upon chaos for all concerned.

I am convinced, Mr. Chairman, that any permanent solution to the problems besetting Latin America and our future relations with the countries of that area cannot be found in the mere granting of financial aid, however great the amount, to bolster existing regimes, even though they may be friendly, or in gifts of food to feed the hungry people. Ways and means must be found to get at the root of their problems, to help the people of these countries to help themselves, and this sort of help is necessary in practically every area of human endeavor if the future peace and prosperity of this Hemisphere is to be secured.

The bill I propose, Mr. Chairman, would lay the foundation stones for such a future, where the cultural and scientific interchanges of today might awaken and vitalize many of our good but slumbering neighbors

to the south and thus assure them a better and more abundant tomorrow and assure us stable allies to help maintain our traditional liberties and the peace of the world.

The inter-American cultural and scientific interchange program which I propose is far broader in its concept and implications than the proposed hemispheric center in Puerto Rico which has recently been considered as a possibility. I gather that it is the consensus among a group of educators and experts familiar with Latin American needs that one hemispheric center in Puerto Rico would not meet the immediate needs of our nation in a frontal attack on the problems of Latin America. My proposal, on the other hand, calls for the establishment and operation at not more than 12 institutions of higher learning in the United States, including Puerto Rico, of a wide program designed for inter-American cultural and scientific interchange under the direction of the Secretary of State. It lays emphasis on the establishment and operation of degree-granting graduate institutes for specialized studies in the Caribbean, Brazilian, Central America, and Spanish South American regions, and in all other specific and needful fields and areas to be designated by the Secretary of State. It visualizes the establishment and operation of nondegree granting institutes specializing in North American culture and intensive language studies. It would provide for the stimulation of research and technology, and exchanges related thereto, by the creation of one or more Latin American research service bureaus. It would provide for conferences, short courses, and projects involving interchange of professors, lecturers, scientists, and other specialists. Very important, in my opinion, it provides for the preparation of teachers and researchers in Latin American fields, and for training students for professional, business, government, and industrial employment, all looking toward the development of better working relationships among the Americas.

My bill provides for grants, fellowships and other payments to outstanding scholars and authorities from Latin American nations as may be necessary to attract such scholars and authorities to participate in the program at such institutions; for grants, fellowships, and other payments to qualified students from the United States or from Latin America as may be necessary to enable such students to engage in study or training under such program; and making facilities available for study or training under such program to other qualified persons. I propose that training under such program shall be provided to not more than 2,400 students annually, divided approximately equally, to the extent practicable, between students from the United States and students from other nations.

This, in essence, Mr. Chairman, constitutes my proposal for tackling Latin American relations at the source.

A representative of the Department of State, who was present at

the Hearing, presented a departmental report signed by Honorable Brooks Hays, Assistant Secretary, which stated in part:

The Department is reviewing all aspects of our relations with the countries of Latin America, including proposals for strengthening United States-Latin American scientific and cultural exchanges. This review, although not yet completed, confirms the soundness of the basic premise of H.R. 3782: that it is desirable to promote advancement of Inter-American cultural and technical exchange through programs at several institutions of higher learning in the United States (including Puerto Rico).

The proposed Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (S.1154; H.R. 5203 and 5204) includes a brief but comprehensive provision related to the subject matter of this bill. It confers general authority upon the President to provide for the establishment and operation in the United States and abroad of "centers" (as contrasted with "programs" in H.R. 3782) for cultural and technical interchange to promote better relations and understanding between the United States and other nations through co-operative study, training, and research. It does not make specific provision for Inter-American needs, however. The Department believes that separate emphasis is warranted, for, although a number of universities in the United States already have special Inter-American programs or institutes, the need to strengthen and expand them is great.

Assistant Secretary Hays pointed out that there were already in existence some Federal agencies which could assume some of the responsibilities called for in my bill, and that my bill would thus overlap in some degree authority already existing.

I felt and still feel that the program I proposed offers our best hope for improved relations within the critical area of Latin American relationships during the decade ahead. Our Department of State, I believe, approved of the essential objectives, but felt that these should be a part of a broader program devoted to the whole world scene. I am hopeful that within the scope of this larger program more specific attention may be given to Latin America in the future than in the past. In some respects, parts of the recommendations in my bill are already being implemented.

I am, indeed, proud of the attention which President Kennedy is directing towards this area of our foreign relations. I am wholeheartedly in favor of his "Alliance for Progress" concept. Though

eager to get his Latin American program in motion, President Kennedy discerned that to make it a success he would have to have leadership of the highest order. He scanned the field and after careful deliberation selected the man he thought was the best qualified person in our nation to handle this important job. The gentleman to whom I refer is Mr. Robert Forbes Woodward.

II

Since we have such a wide representation from the countries of Latin America here today, it occurred to me that it might be of interest for them to know about some of the problems that we, in the Congress of the United States, have to face as we contemplate the grave world problems and try to do our part towards assuring the peace and freedom of this weary world. In all frankness, it must be said that many of our foreign-aid programs are not at all popular with the American people. At the present time we owe more money than all of the free nations of the world combined. We have a staggering national debt of nearly \$300 billion, and the only way, of course, that we can get money for the financing of all of our programs to help other nations to help themselves is by taxing our own people.

Taxing constituents, as you may surmise, is not a pleasant pastime. As a Congressman, I must look at every appropriation that is sought for Mutual Security, foreign aid, and other purposes on the basis of prudent consideration for the economic aspects as they may relate to our nation's economy and well-being. I have enthusiastically supported the President's "Alliance for Progress" program, but I voted against the initial appropriation for his Peace Corps in the belief that it necessitated the spending of additional large sums of money for administration and overhead expenses, which might be avoided if we had but incorporated the excellent and fine motives of the Peace Corps within existing Mutual Security programs.

I voted against backdoor spending to finance our Mutual Security programs. As you may recall, the President asked for authority to finance these programs on a long-term basis, without prior review or Congressional approval. In voting as I did, I tried to keep in mind that where our domestic programs are concerned, however small or

trivial they may be, it is necessary to justify every penny of expenditures. For example, there are much needed Rivers and Harbors projects in my Congressional District upon which I have worked for a decade. Two of these projects are very meaningful to many people in the area, but in order to get them started, it is necessary to go through a very long and tortuous process. To take a specific example: My people have long wanted navigational improvements on the Suwannee River. First, I had to seek funds for a survey and to this end placed a request before the appropriate legislative committee in Congress. After several years, a partial amount of the cost of the survey was appropriated. Within the next three-year period, the full amount of survey cost was made available. When the survey is completed, if a proper justification is shown for the navigational improvements, I must then ask for money to finance these improvements, which may take several sessions of Congress and several piece-meal appropriations to complete. If the survey does not indicate sufficient economic justification, that is to say it does not look like a practical project from a dollar and cents standpoint, then an unfavorable report is returned and no appropriation is allowed. Even under the most favorable circumstances, it sometimes takes years and years to bring a project to fruition.

The people of my congressional district, and I believe most American people, feel that we should give the same close scrutiny to expenditures that are made for projects abroad, especially gifts to other nations, as we do to those at home. In my opinion, it is very necessary for our foreign friends to realize the mechanics and processes for raising money here in America to finance our foreign aid programs. If they realize some of the problems that we face in our efforts to finance such programs as the "Alliance for Progress," perhaps they will have a greater appreciation of them and feel a greater obligation to carry their proportionate share of the burden.

III

Speaking again as a Federal Congressman, I should like to observe that the success of our efforts to help friendly nations to help themselves must rest on a firm basis of mutual understanding and coopera-

tion. The leaders of our great country and the leaders of the great countries represented by you who are delegates to this Caribbean Conference have repeatedly expressed the belief that the main effort and chief element in making our Latin American Aid program a success must come from the prospective recipient nations themselves. We cannot, in this country, expect love from our friends, I suppose, but I see no reason why we should not expect respect. In fact, I think we should insist upon respect and understanding.

The world's problems of today are difficult and may seem unsolvable. But I believe they can be solved by the combined efforts of men of good will and understanding. The threat of Communism is as old as tyranny itself. It is now being used by Soviet Russia to intimidate first and then to conquer, if possible, the nations of the world. It has the same old ingredients of hate, suspicion, and force, as opposed to those of idealism, love, respect, and tolerance. The United States of America is a country which is rooted in the belief in the Brotherhood of Man under the Fatherhood of God. It believes in economic and social progress and, above all, in the dynamic movement of freedom. As a nation we are determined to move ahead in these directions as we face the new year.

Often, in talks to groups in my Congressional District, I have said that the future of our beloved country is assured if we have enough men and women who are willing to give to America more than they take from it. I hope you will permit me to suggest that in this statement I include all the peoples of the Americas—North, Central, and South. I envision the same course for your respective countries as I do for my own. I believe there will be enough men and women, dedicated to the high ideals and finest traditions of their culture, who will accept their responsibilities as well as the privileges of citizenship in a democratic society and who will give more to their countries than they receive from them. It will be upon this basis of mutual sacrifice, mutual understanding, and mutual cooperation that we shall solve the problems that face us. And the University of Florida will play its part.

Part VI

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Eleanor Mitchell: CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA:
ITS BIBLIOGRAPHIC PRESENT AND FUTURE

ALL TOO OFTEN one finds that discussions of Latin American bibliography are couched in negative terms ranging from the lugubrious to the despairing, with nuances of bafflement, exasperation, wistfulness, and a downright plaintive air. In a more positive vein I should like to say immediately that, while no giant strides will be taken overnight, there are definitely hopeful signs for the future of Colombian bibliography.

In the present study attention is directed primarily to sources of information about contemporary Colombia. However, the bibliographic problems in that country reflect the general pattern which prevails throughout Latin America. The fact is that at the moment there is no sure means of knowing exactly what has been published, whether a book on a given subject has appeared, whether the work of a certain author has seen the light of day, or, if it has, whether a copy may be obtained or where. If these or any other remarks seem critical, it should be said that they merely echo those which have already been made by Latin American librarians and bibliographers. If, by repetition, they serve to prick in friendly fashion a bibliographic conscience, so much the better.

I. The Booktrade in Latin America

In spite of the repeated recommendations of inter-American conferences for the promotion of better bibliographic information and control, there is a long way to go. The state of bibliographic development in Latin America reflects the lack of organization of the book publishing industry, of distribution, and of exchanges.

Dr. Nettie Lee Benson of the University of Texas has provided two very revealing reports of her twelve months spent during 1960 and 1961 in nine countries of South America, including Colombia, as a traveling representative of the Latin American Cooperative Acquisitions Project (commonly spoken of as LACAP), which has been undertaken by Stechert-Hafner, Inc., of New York.^{1*} This project has grown out of recommendations made by the Seminars on the Acquisition of Latin American Library Materials (SALALM), which have been held in the United States each year since 1956. Dr. Benson has estimated that no more than a tenth of the annual Latin American book production, if that, is commercially published and distributed.

Publishing houses as we know them in this country are the exception rather than the rule. Many firms are called "editoriales," but on further investigation turn out to publish only textbooks or to be printing establishments. Because of the scarcity of publishing houses, the author must frequently turn to a printer to get his book produced. The printer does the job and delivers the books to the author for presentation to his friends and colleagues, often retaining no record of the job done or title turned out. The author sometimes places a few copies of his book with a bookseller, but rarely is there any planned distribution. The bookseller may not know how to reach the author in the event that his supply is sold out. As the printing is done at the author's expense, editions are small and copies may never reach the commercial market, or the librarian's or the bibliographer's eye. Because of poor communications facilities, books published or printed in the provinces do not always reach the capital, and vice versa.

The output of university presses is more likely to be available for

*Notes to this chapter begin on page 333.

exchange than for sale. This is also true of official publications not only of government bodies but likewise of institutions and societies. As in the case of the privately printed and commercially produced books (other than textbooks), editions are small, in general not well advertised or distributed. Library budgets are invariably small so that a library market for books is not assured. All this reflects a lack of faith in the marketability of books in their own country on the part of publishers and authors, and at the same time they underestimate the possible interest of North American libraries in acquiring their literary output.

II. The Booktrade in Colombia

According to the sixth edition of the Pan American Union's directory of book stores and publishers in Latin America, Colombia has a total of 185 entities concerned with the production and sale of books, of which 101 are in Bogotá.² A breakdown shows that they are divided as follows:

BOOK STORES, PUBLISHERS, PRINTERS*

	Book Store	Book Store Publisher	Book Store Publisher Printer	Book Store Printer	Publisher	Publisher Printer	Printer
Bogotá	49	2	1		38	9	2
Other cities	52			5	22	5	

* No distributors are listed.

Dr. Benson has remarked that there is only one real publisher in Colombia such as we know in the United States, namely the Editorial Temis of Bogotá, which is primarily concerned with legal works.³ Nevertheless, ten "publishers" from Colombia—a larger representation than from any other Latin American country (Argentina, 1; Brazil, 1)—took part in the 1959 annual international Frankfurt Book Fair in Germany.⁴

III. Colombian National Bibliography

In spite of a long literary tradition, Colombia's first national bibliography covered only the year 1951, and it was produced outside the

capital. In reviewing the record of the past decade one must take into consideration the fact that the country has lived through a period of political turmoil, dictatorship, and revolution. On the whole, dictators have not been noted for their bibliographic interests or accomplishments.

The National Library in Bogotá, from which one might normally hope for leadership, cannot assume such a role until a long-projected reorganization has taken place and it is adequately manned by professional librarians. This has not been achieved in spite of the many *leyes* and *decretos* which have been promulgated over the years in respect to its organization and personnel. The National Library has failed to carry out its logical bibliographic control responsibilities, implied in copyright legislation.

The basic copyright statute, Law 86 of December 26, 1946, is still in effect, though there appear not to have been added the "teeth" which would make it obligatory for publishers and authors to deposit printed works in a bibliographic control center. The Law does require that, in order for published works to be registered for copyright protection, they must be deposited within sixty days after their appearance. Three copies of such printed works must be presented: one to the National Library; one to the Library of the National University; and the third, with receipts for the other two and the application for registration, to the Registry. In 1951 the copyright office was changed from the Ministerio de Educación Nacional to the Sección de Propiedad y Prensa, Oficina Jurídica del Ministerio de Gobierno.

When so many books and pamphlets are job printed in small editions at the expense of the author, there is little worry over the protection of intellectual property and hence no feeling of compulsion to copyright. The resulting lack of bibliographic control, then, is the primary reason for the hit-or-miss pattern of Colombian bibliographic history.

The first attempt at a national bibliography was the *Anuario bibliográfico colombiano, 1951*, which was published in 1953 by the Biblioteca "Jorge Garcés B" in Cali. Actually the bibliographic compilation was the work of a Venezuelan, Pedro R. Carmona. This library collection formed the nucleus of the present Biblioteca Piloto Departamental. But this *Anuario* was not continued. It was the

Instituto Caro y Cuervo (ICC), Colombia's great center for language and literature study, which took over the responsibility for carrying on the *Anuario*. The Institute, formerly located in the National Library where an office is still maintained, now has handsome country quarters at Yerbabuena, about a half-hour's drive from Bogotá. There it has a library of 25,000 volumes, excellent facilities for research, and its own printing presses.

The Department of Bibliography, first established as a special section in 1951, is presided over by Rubén Pérez Ortiz, who was deservedly honored in 1959 by the Colombian Association of Librarians (Asociación Colombiana de Bibliotecarios), which named him "Librarian of the Year" in recognition of his contributions to Colombian bibliography. It was he who compiled the *Anuario bibliográfico colombiano, 1951-1956*, published by the Instituto Caro y Cuervo in 1958. The year 1951 was included, as some of the Cali *Anuario* entries were found not to be 1951 imprints and 200 new titles had been tracked down. In 1960 his *Anuario* for 1957-1958 appeared. In the introduction he remarks that hundreds of new cards of works which were published between 1951 and 1956 had been gathered and that a supplement was planned. It is likely that this will be the pattern of Colombian bibliography until there is achieved the bibliographic control on a national scale which he and his colleagues have repeatedly declared to be of the greatest urgency. The majority of the entries in the *Anuarios* refer to the humanities and social sciences. It is hoped that future bibliographies will have broader subject coverage.

UNESCO, to which Pérez Ortiz reported in 1950 and 1956 on the state of Colombian bibliography, has collaborated with the ICC in the development of its bibliographic program.⁵ So also has the Pan American Union in 1959 and 1960 through direct technical assistance, as a result of which the Institute is in a far better position to carry out its bibliographic labors. In 1960 the Institute published a second edition of the *Bibliografía de bibliografías colombianas* of Gabriel Giraldo Jaramillo, which first appeared in 1954.⁶ This volume provides the greatest number of citations of bibliographic sources relating to Colombia of any work published up to this time. It is therefore valuable for both current and retrospective bibliography. The Institute, incidentally, has gathered records of some

50,000 titles of retrospective works, though their emphasis is on current publications.

IV. Escuela Interamericana de Bibliotecología, Medellín

What may be the most important milestone on the Colombian bibliographic road achieved thus far was the opening on February 11, 1957, of Colombia's first professional library school at university level, the Escuela Interamericana de Bibliotecología at the University of Antioquia in Medellín. Such a school had for many years been one of the priorities on lists of Colombian bibliographic requisites. It came into being through the efforts of Dr. Ignacio Vélez Escobar, then Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University.

Dr. Escobar recognized that in order to become competent doctors medical students needed to have recourse to a good library and that such a library could not function properly without trained librarians. The establishment of the School was made possible by the generous financial assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation and by scholarship aid from the National University Fund (Fondo Universitario Nacional). The University has provided quarters, first in the Medical School and then in the Castillo de los Boteros, a former private residence on a hillside above the city commanding a sweeping panoramic view.

The School's contribution to library and bibliographic progress in Colombia is twofold. The human element is the more important for in the three-year intensified course these young people, the majority of whom have been Colombians, are learning to know books and how collections of them should be organized and recorded. The School's graduates and those to follow are the fair hope of Colombian bibliography, for it is they who will strengthen the library profession and, with their professional colleagues now serving in libraries, will provide a growing force of individuals alert to the needs and ready to work toward the bibliographic goals of the country.

The School has already made a contribution to bibliography through its publication program. One such work prepared for use in the bibliography course is that of the Director, Sr. Luis Florén, "Obras de referencia y generales de la bibliografía colombiana."⁷ The

Boletín de adquisiciones de la biblioteca of the Library School has, in fact, become an important source of information in regard to new Colombian publications. The School, the Instituto Caro y Cuervo, and the Centro Interamericano de Vivienda in Bogotá, whose exchange program Sr. Florén formerly headed, are reported to have the best organized exchange of publications programs in the country. Although apparently the definitive directory of scientific and cultural institutions is yet to be compiled, Sr. Florén made a start toward it in his contribution to the SALALM Meeting at Carbondale, Illinois, in July—"Publications Exchange in Colombia."⁸ He lists 191 sources for exchange and some 245 publications which they edit and distribute. These sources include 59 universities, 30 special libraries, and 102 institutions, societies, administrative departments of the national and provincial governments, and others. Some 700 sources are listed in his new "Manual para el canje de publicaciones colombianas," just published by the School.⁹ A. W. Bork in his 1961 SALALM paper lists 216 Colombian exchange sources—135 in Bogotá—used by American libraries, compiled from replies to a questionnaire.¹⁰

Some of the bibliographic chores in Colombia are being done by the students of the Library School in Medellín. The theses presented by the sixteen members of the first class which graduated in December, 1960, show their contribution. They include a bibliography of authors of Antioquia; a catalog and guide to Colombian medical publications; indices to various medical journals (6 theses); Colombian reference works; a guide to the libraries of Colombia; a who's who of Colombian library service; a special library; and four translations of United States library publications. Dr. Gaston Litton, Director of Studies at the Library School, has prepared a list of suggested thesis topics which should give encouragement to those concerned about the future of Colombian bibliography.¹¹

With the start given by the theses relating to Colombian medical periodicals, particularly those of Antioquia, the library of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Antioquia is working on a medical bibliography, beginning with publications bearing Antioquia imprints. Their goal, however, is the general bibliography of medical sciences in Colombia, including not only articles which have appeared in periodicals but also monographs and theses. The library has dis-

tributed a desiderata list of 189 Colombian periodicals in medicine and related fields, numbers of which are sought either for acquisition or on interlibrary loan for the purpose of indexing.

Cuba's bibliographic loss is Colombia's gain in the appointment of Dr. Fermín Peraza Sarausa as a professor at the Library School. For many years Dr. Peraza was Director of the Municipal Library in Havana and editor of the *Anuario bibliográfico cubano*. His bibliographic pursuits this year have resulted in *Fichas para el Anuario bibliográfico colombiano*, which is a mimeographed listing of 167 Colombian titles published between January and June, 1961, divided into Medellín imprints and those printed elsewhere.¹² He hopes to produce a list of additional 1961 titles in January, 1962.

Dr. Peraza is the Technical Director of the *Bibliography of Latin America*, formerly the *Bibliography of Central America and the Caribbean*, which is to be expanded at the suggestion of the Latin American Seminar on Bibliography, Documentation, and Exchange of Publications. It is planned that the *BAL* include all books and pamphlets printed annually in each of the Latin American countries and, when possible, publications about these countries published elsewhere in the world. Dr. Peraza's *Fichas* will therefore serve both national and international interests.

V. *Specialized Bibliographies*

A growing list of libraries, universities, institutions, societies, and sections of the government are publishing bibliographies in their special subject fields in addition to their lists of acquisitions. Pérez Ortiz has mentioned a few of the more important ones in his 1961 SALALM report, "Colombian Bibliography."¹³ References to others are to be found in other working papers of this Seminar which was devoted primarily to Colombia and Venezuela. A few book stores and "editoriales" from time to time publish their stock lists, and the Colombian Book Dealers' Association (Cámara Colombiana del Libro) began in March its *Libros Colombianos*, an annotated list of recently published titles.

The Colombian bibliographic works to which reference has thus far been made are all useful and contribute to the record of the

literary output of the country, but obviously in patchwork fashion. Only when bibliographic control on a national scale becomes a fact will Colombia and her friends be able to judge her true wealth of the printed word.

*VI. Meeting for the Exchange of Information on Documentation,
Bibliography and Scientific Information, Medellín*

An event of the last few weeks suggests that the climate for concerted bibliographic responsibility is more favorable than it has ever been. From October 13 to 15, 1961, a meeting was held at the Library School in Medellín, organized by the Colombian Association of Universities (Asociación Colombiana de Universidades) of the National University Fund. The purpose of the gathering was an exchange of information between universities and public and private institutions in respect to documentation, bibliography, and scientific information; to their effective utilization in accelerating economic, social, and cultural progress in Colombia; and to the needs of the country as a whole and specifically the needs of the participating institutions. Seventeen representatives from the twenty-five institutions invited to participate were present. As a result of their deliberations a National Seminar on Scientific Information, Documentation, and Bibliography was planned for the first two weeks of June, 1962.

The objectives of the Seminar are to study the following: (1) the effective means of coordinating and bringing up to date scientific information, documentation, and bibliography required by institutions interested in university and special libraries; (2) the creation of a National Center for Documentation and Bibliography (Centro Nacional de Documentación y Bibliografía); (3) the creation of a permanent commission on university and special libraries; (4) the coordination of technical standards for university and special libraries; and (5) the inventory of available resources (books, documents, personnel, equipment, budgets, and national publications exchange services). When accomplished, these will form the basis for the establishment of a national union catalog and the organization of cooperative book acquisition. The Library School has been charged with the responsibility of preparing the inventory. Here then

is a plan of action which, if it is carried out, offers great promise for the future of Colombian bibliography.

VII. New and Forthcoming United States Guides to Latin American Publications

Miss Suzanne Hodgman, Latin American Specialist in Acquisitions of the University of Florida Libraries, reported fully on "Information Available in United States Bibliographical Services on Latin American Printed Materials" at the SALALM meeting in July. As she has pointed out, these are of necessity based on the acquisitions of United States libraries, which in turn naturally reflect the interests of these libraries and their success or lack of it in bucking the hazards of the disorganized Latin American book industry. The activities of the Stechert-Hafner LACAP are beginning to bear fruit. Ten times more Latin American books (including those from Colombia) are already coming to this country as a result of this project.

There are at the moment a number of new or imminent United States publications, all of which provide information on Colombian titles and therefore should be included in this report. These have just been published, are in press, are about to go to press, or will go in the next few months. Miss Irene Zimmerman, Latin American Specialist in the Department of Reference and Bibliography of the University of Florida Libraries, has published this fall *A Guide to Current Latin American Periodicals: Humanities and Social Sciences*. She has listed and fully annotated 43 Colombian periodicals. The Library of Congress has provided facsimiles of 2,015 cards of Colombian entries in their recently published two-volume *Index to Latin American Legislation, 1950-1960*.

Some 729 Latin American 1961 imprints are included in the first quarterly issue of the R. R. Bowker Company's *Fichero bibliográfico hispano-americano*, which has appeared this fall. It is based on the acquisitions of the New York Public Library. It is the first general commercial bibliography of Latin American publications. Another fall, 1961, first quarterly issue is the result of the cooperative project of the Pan American Union and the New York Public Library, *Index to Latin American Periodicals: Humanities and Social Sci-*

ences, to be published by G. K. Hall. Thirty-five Colombian periodicals, which appeared in 1960-1961, are indexed, 15 of them completely.

The Pan American Union has also in preparation an *Index to Latin American Periodicals, 1929-1960*, likewise to be published by Hall. It will total approximately 200,000 entries based on the indexing of the Columbus Memorial Library. It will be useful for research on Colombia. Also in process at the PAU is a publication tentatively entitled, *Annotated List of Latin American Scientific and Technical Journals*, which is scheduled for publication in 1962. It will include approximately 1,200 titles currently published, with complete bibliographical information and descriptive annotations.

*VIII. Proposal for an "Inter American Bibliographic Institute"
to be Initiated by a "Pilot Center For Bibliographic
Information For The Caribbean"*

The Seminars on the Acquisition of Latin American Library Materials have done a good deal already to stimulate bibliographic activity in the countries and areas to which they have directed their attention since 1956. Upon the recommendation of the Carbondale meeting there has been proposed the creation of an Inter American Bibliographic Institute with regional centers, to be initiated by the establishment of a Pilot Center for Bibliographic Information for the Caribbean to be located in Puerto Rico. At the suggestion of United States government officials the proposal has been submitted to the Department of State for financial support.

The eventual plan is for a central secretariat to be located in Mexico to serve as a regional center for Mexico and Central America, and to coordinate and supervise regional centers in Lima, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, as well as San Juan. The purpose of the Institute is:

To assure adequate provision of bibliographic information on Latin American book and periodical production on an eventual commercial basis; to improve and strengthen the booktrade in the Americas, its production and distribution methods and possibilities, through an improvement in bibliographic coverage; to develop more current and

comprehensive national and regional bibliographic control; to provide rapid and efficient means of compiling subject and other types of bibliographies; and to assure prompt acquisition of new publications by libraries and interested individuals.¹⁴

The Pilot Center would presumably tie in closely with Colombian bibliographic activities. It would provide a valuable training ground and experiment station in preparation for the Colombian National Center for Documentation and Bibliography, which, it is hoped, will sooner or later be established. It is planned that the Puerto Rico Center would experiment with methods, supplies, equipment, and publication devices, using new mechanical, electronic, and photographic techniques of recording, retrieving, and disseminating bibliographic information. The activities generating from the Pilot Center would undoubtedly stimulate bibliographic enterprises in the co-operating countries.

IX. Conclusion

Bibliography in a sense may be a question of education and money. Education in this case does not mean only the professional training of librarians and bibliographers who will man and administer libraries, catalog and classify recorded knowledge, and prepare national and international, retrospective and current, general and specialized bibliographies. It means also the education of authors, publishers, printers, booksellers, and the general public as to the importance of the printed word and the realization that the proper and current recording of published works is a contribution to the national cultural heritage.

It costs money to prepare, publish, and disseminate bibliographies, but the theory of productivity holds for the book industry as well as for the manufacture of shoes. Without education and organization there is a vicious circle. Colombia, however, has broken her circle. In the establishment of the Library School in Medellín she has acquired not only a training center which will supply "more hands to the pump," but also a professional catalyst and agent. The National Center for Documentation and Bibliography, for which the Seminar next June should lay firm plans, has long been one of the most im-

portant goals of Colombian librarians and bibliographers. Now, with the added backing of a professional library school and the possibility of a pilot bibliographic center in the Caribbean, this dream seems more likely to be realized.

Thus, to professional colleagues in Colombia, so many of whom I know and hold in high esteem and affection, I would say, "Good luck in the better years ahead!"

NOTES

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2. *Directorio de librerías y casas editoriales en América Latina*, Sexta edición, Unión Panamericana, Bibliographic ser. 2, pt. 3 (Washington, 1958), p. xi.

3. "LACAP Report number 2," 4.

4. Peter S. Jennison and William H. Kurth, *Books in the Americas: a Study of the Principal Barriers to the Booktrade in the Americas*, Pan American Union, Estudios bibliotecarios, No. 2 (Washington, 1960), p. 57.

5. *Enquête sur les services bibliographiques conduite par l'UNESCO et la Bibliothèque du Congrès des États-Unis: Colombie* (Paris, 1950); "Los servicios bibliográficos en Colombia: informe presentado a la UNESCO en 1956," *Boletín de la Asociación Colombiana de Bibliotecarios*, I, Nos. 2-4 (1957).

6. *Bibliografía de bibliografías colombianas; 2. ed. corregida y puesta al día por Rubén Pérez Ortiz*, Instituto Caro y Cuervo, Ser. bibliográfica, I (Bogotá, 1960).

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