

THE INDEPENDENCE
OF
CHILE

A. STUART M. CHISHOLM



THE ABDICATION



OF O'HIGGINS

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LOS ANGELES

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CHILE

BY
A. STUART M. CHISHOLM

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PART I
THE SPANISH COLONY

“Mientras la tengamos, hagamos uso de lo que nos pueda ayudar, para que tomemos sustancia, pues en llegandola a perder, nos faltaria ese pedazo de tocino para el caldo gordo.”

ARANDA to FLORIDABLANCA.

July 21, 1785.

“While we hold it (America) let us make use of it as far as possible to strengthen us, for when we lose it we shall miss the piece of pork that makes our soup rich.”

“No he de dejar a los Chilenos ni lágrimas que llorar.”

MARCÓ DEL PONT.

“I shall not leave the Chileans even tears to shed.”

las Indias," was completed under Charles II, after many years of labor in which some of the greatest lawyers and statesmen of Spain shared. This summary was divided on the plan of the Pandects, into eleven Books, each book into several Titles, and under each Title were arranged the laws pertaining to the subject under which they were grouped; but while this revision and summary restored a degree of order to the previous confusion, yet it is even to-day extremely difficult, at any stage of Colonial history, to ascertain the exact relation which the law sustained toward that which it sought to regulate; and especially is this true when one wishes to trace the chronological development of particular subjects of legislation. Still, such as it is, the Recopilacion is the authoritative and ultimate voice of the King of Spain and of the Council of the Indies, and must serve as the basis of any broad and impartial review of Spain's method as well as of Spain's purpose in the scheme of Colonial government which is there elaborated with such scrupulous minutiosity of detail.

The immediate cause, which both manifested the necessity, and furnished the occasion, of the revolution, was the occupation of the Spanish peninsula by Napoleon in 1808, and the gradual extirpation of any central authority which might reasonably assume to represent the Spanish monarch. The anxieties of suspense, the fluctuations of fear, and the final consummation of the apparently hopeless extinction of Spanish authority, plunged the Col-

onies into an abyss of despair, from which, partly we must acknowledge, against their wish, they were led gradually into a twilight of loyalty, which eventually brought on the full day of independence.

It is this early dawn of freedom that Chile celebrates as the birthdate of her emancipation. Similar movements occurred simultaneously in Buenos Ayres, Mexico, and Venezuela, and rounded out the full circle of revolution, so that when Ferdinand returned to Spain in 1813 and remounted the throne, he faced an apparently concerted revolt of the greater number of his colonial dependencies. Even at this time, by the use of prudence and lenity, he might have conciliated all disaffection among his Colonies. A little relaxation of the commercial laws, a few abuses amended, even a promise of amendment, however vague, would have confirmed the wavering loyalty of the greater part of his subjects and have perpetuated indefinitely his dominion over his Colonies, who wanted only a pretext to resume their ancient allegiance; but perhaps there was never a sovereign less fitted for a work requiring patience and a generous placability.

After the "family party" at Bayonne, he wrote to Napoleon to thank him for seating Joseph on the Spanish throne and to Joseph himself to congratulate him on his accession. At the same time he sent a despatch to the Asturians, calling on them to assert their loyalty to himself and their

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hatred of the "perfidious Frenchman" who had deposed him. Then, four days later, he issued a proclamation to the Spanish nation, in which he required them to submit to the "beneficent purposes" of Napoleon. The truth was never in him, nor dignity, nor justice, nor human sympathy. Intrigue without sagacity, duplicity without tact, and selfish cruelty abounded in him, and transformed his early title, "El Deseado" into a later and more accurate one "El Despota." On his return to power in 1813, he proclaimed his purpose to establish absolute government, and persecuted the members of the Cortes, who had saved his throne. Like all the Bourbons, he had "rien appris, rien oublié." So the movement of 1810, which was not in any general sense directed against Ferdinand but against Napoleon, which was not the outcome of resentment but of sympathy, was forced to proceed along the path on which it had unconsciously and with trepidation entered.

The Colonial possessions of Spain in America in 1810, comprised the Viceroyalties of Mexico, New Granada, Peru and Buenos Ayres and extended from Alaska to Cape Horn. The various provinces of Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Chile, were subordinate, and in some matters of civil and military government, subject, to the Viceroy within whose jurisdiction the province in question was included.

The governor of a Province was appointed di-

rectly by the King, although the Viceroy or the Royal Audience has for two hundred years the right of appointment in commendam. As Chief Civil Magistrate he was entitled Governor, and he was the President of the Royal Audience and Captain-General of the military forces of his province.

The Royal Audience, or Supreme Court of Law and Justice, adjudged all civil causes, as a Court of ultimate jurisdiction, as well as all important criminal causes. It was composed of the President—the Governor—and Judges called Oidores, whose number varied from three to eight in different provinces. Seniority of service regulated precedence in the Royal Audience; the oldest Judge was Regent, the next oldest, Dean. In addition to the Judges, the Court included a Fiscal or Attorney General, an Asesor, a Protector of Indians and a Secretary. Of these none below the rank of Judge had a vote.

The title Asesor is not unknown to those familiar with the jurisprudence of Scotland, where it has nearly the same value as in Spain, the Asesor being the legal advisor of the civil magistrate. It is an office similar to that of Corporation Counsel in some parts of the United States, except that in the dominions of Spain the Asesor exercised also judicial functions, and at times even acted by delegated authority as the representative of the Governor.

The Alguacil Mayor, or Chief of Police, was an

officer of the Royal Audience. The composition of this body varied slightly in different provinces and at different times. The Audience was, however, more than a Supreme Court of Law. It possessed advisory and at times executive functions, and formed a Cabinet or Council which was often at variance with the Governor and occasionally even hostile to him.

The municipal government, called the Cabildo or Ayuntamiento, consisted of a Corregidor, or Mayor, as presiding officer, ten Regidores or Aldermen, a Fiscal, an Asesor and several subordinate officers. Some towns, instead of a Corregidor, elected two Alcaldes, who presided alternately. The Governor had no power of appointment or removal in either the Royal Audience or the Cabildo; though subordinate to him they were in a way independent of him. The Judges and the Regidores were named by the King or by the Council of the Indies acting in his name. Occasion will arise later to examine the manner in which these royal appointments were conferred.

ISOLATION

The complete isolation of her American Colonies was the first and most important means by which for several centuries Spain kept them in complete submission. This policy was inaugurated long before the magnitude of the project could be even foreshadowed, for in the letter in which Columbus imparted to Ferdinand and Isa-

bella the news of his discovery of a new world, are these remarkable words. "And I say that your Highnesses ought not to permit any stranger to set foot here but only Catholic Christians, for the beginning and the end of this adventure was the growth and glory of the Christian religion." (Navarrete "Coleccion de Viajes i Descubrimientos" tomo I., paj. 71.) Columbus having thus provided for the interests of religion, the Pope proceeded to protect the political interests of Spain, and in a bull dated May 4, 1493, Alexander VI threatened with greater excommunication any one who should come to the new world to trade without a special license of the King of Spain. Relying on this double counsel, Spain endeavored to keep the Pacific Ocean a private and closed sea,—a Spanish lake, and maintained her purpose in spite of the incursions of the great Elizabethan captains, Francis Drake, Thomas Cavendish and Richard Hawkins, and, in the following century, of Oliver de Noort and the Dutch. Lope de Vega himself sang of the exploits of the English in the Pacific.

But this was merely an episode, as was also the license given to the French, after the succession to the Spanish throne of Louis XIV's grandson, to engage in trade with the Colonies of Spain. This license was speedily revoked and never renewed. To such an extent had the advice of Columbus and the authority of the Pope, coinciding with and supporting the manifest interests of the crown, succeeded in establishing and perpetuating the iso-

lation of the Pacific Colonies. At the close of the Colonial period,—on the very threshold of freedom, in 1808, a careful census of the Kingdom of Chile showed, in a population of four hundred thousand, the scanty number of seventy-nine foreigners, who represented thirteen different nations. Nearly all of them were employed in offices and stores as clerks, and among them all there were only three individuals who were not communicants of the Roman church. The wonder is that these three were permitted to remain undisturbed in the country, and in fact, on the 9th of January, 1810, orders were issued by Governor Carrasco to expel them also from the territories of the province.

No accusation then could have been more absurd than the charge, made by M^{el}chor Mart^ínez, that the great cause of the revolution of her Colonies was due to Spain's neglect of the restriction originally suggested by Columbus and which was in fact carried out with such pertinacity during the whole Colonial period. This is the one offense of which, in the conduct of her transmarine affairs, Spain was not guilty, and is amply refuted by a review of the royal decrees that instituted and enforced the prohibition. By the first law of Title 26, Book IX of the Recopilacion, "no stranger shall leave Cadiz for the Colonies without royal license, under the penalty of the loss of his goods." The next law provides that "no stranger shall be allowed to embark for the Colonies without first being naturalized in Spain." Further laws under

the same Title decree that "if any stranger shall be found in the Colonies without the royal license he shall be sent back to Spain by the first returning vessel under sufficient guard"; that "even those strangers who have royal license to remain in the Colonies shall not be permitted to reside in any port or in any place near the sea, but shall be obliged to live apart in the interior under the surveillance of the civil magistrates, who are required to keep them under strict and constant watch even to the examination of their correspondence." Such barriers as these, it seems, should have been adequate to prevent immigration or travel to the Spanish Colonies; still, a few might surmount them. But these decrees were supplemented, these obstacles buttressed, by another law whose frequent repetition shows the importance that was attached to it by the King. December 15, 1558, Philip II decreed the following:

"We order and command that all persons who shall trade and traffic in the Indies, its provinces and harbors, with foreigners, of whatsoever nation,—who shall buy or barter gold, silver, pearls, precious stones, fruit or any other kind of merchandise; or shall buy or barter the spoils of battle or shall sell supplies, ammunition, arms or warlike stores and shall be found guilty of such sale, trade, barter or purchase, shall be punished with death and the confiscation of their property; and we command the governors and captains general of our provinces, islands, and harbors to proceed against such persons with all the

rigor of the law and to punish them without fail and without remission. And we withhold from our Royal Audiences all power of dispensation or remission in the execution of the aforesaid penalties, since our royal will is that the provisions of this act be enforced and fulfilled without change or favor. If any one shall disobey this law, whatsoever his state or condition, his life is forfeit and his goods shall be divided into three parts, of which one shall go to our royal treasury, one to the Judge, and one to the informer." Lib. IX, Tit. xxvii, Lei vii.

This law was reënacted November 5, 1570, March 24, 1596; by Philip III March 2, 1602, October 13, 1614, and was enforced until July 14, 1799, when the penalty was reduced to six years at hard labor for those of ignoble birth and for the same term without labor for gentlemen. Moreover the viceroys and governors of the Spanish Colonies were instructed to "regard any vessel, that entered the Pacific without the King's license, as an enemy; even if it were a vessel belonging to a nation in alliance with Spain." Amunátegui quotes a colonial adage. "Cada extranjero debe ser considerado por enemigo." Judge whether Spain seemed remiss as to the admission of foreigners to her Colonies.

Everything favored Spain's purpose to maintain the seclusion of her Colonies. More important than all else was of course their actual remoteness, which was greatly increased by the uncertainties of navigation, and by the timidity which length-

ened the effective distance between peninsular and colonial ports in quite a remarkable degree. When Don Francisco Ibáñez de Peralta, in 1700, came out from Spain, being appointed "Governor and Captain General of the Kingdom of Chile and President of the Royal Audience," he was two years in reaching the seat of his government. During the next century the time had been appreciably reduced, for when Don Bernardo O'Higgins reached Valparaiso in the summer of 1802, he had spent only a year in the voyage from Cadiz. Sixty years later, the introduction of steam again shortened the distance, for the *Resolucion*, leaving Cadiz on the 10th of August, arrived at Valparaiso the 5th of the following May.

Six months was the usual duration of a voyage from Callao to Valparaiso. For two centuries vessels hugged the Peruvian coast and breasted the Current of Humboldt. Juan and Ulloa, who were sent out by Philip V on a voyage of inspection to South America, said in their report, "Formerly, and even until a few years, the voyage to and from Callao and Chile was rarely performed in less than a twelve-month, but a European pilot, making his first voyage in the usual manner, and observing the direction of the currents, concluded that favorable winds might be found further out at sea. So in his second voyage, he stood out to sea and found that his conclusion was correct. He reached Chile in about a month, but this was considered so short a time for such a long voyage,

that he was suspected of sorcery and accused before the Inquisition. He was arrested and examined, but on showing his log and explaining his course, he was discharged; ever afterward, however, he was known by the name of "El Brujo—the Sorcerer."

Between Payta and Callao is less than five hundred miles, much less than the distance from New York to Charleston. The same observers report that the usual time consumed in the passage between these ports, "if very fortunate, may be from forty to fifty days." They heard a story in Lima which they thought well enough authenticated to quote at length in their memorial to the King, that "the master of a merchant-ship, who had just been married in Payta, took his wife on board with him for a trip to Callao. In the vessel, she gave birth to a son, who, when the ship reached Callao, could read distinctly; for after running to windward two or three months, the provisions failed and the master put into port, where several months were spent in procuring a fresh supply, and misfortune pursuing him, he spent some four or five years in tacking and victualling. Moreover, his ship was slow and ill-constructed, "so that the transaction," the authors conclude, "has nothing very wonderful in it." And really the most wonderful thing is the conclusion of two officers of the Spanish navy, who were so accustomed to the system of navigation then in vogue among their countrymen as to see "nothing wonderful in it."

RESTRICTIONS

The conventual isolation of the provinces being thus established, the Spanish monarch determined to forestall the possibility of political discontent arising among their inhabitants. The restriction of education seemed the most efficacious means to accomplish this end, and the method which had so fully succeeded and with such disastrous intellectual consequences in the Peninsula was carried out more easily and more completely in the new world. The time had long since passed when Spain was the university of Europe; but its decadence was in no way to be ascribed to the Spanish people, nor indeed can the church be held guilty in the full measure of blame that it has pleased many modern authors to attribute to her. It is to Isabella that Spain owed the revival of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which had existed in Europe from the time of Justinian, but had never attained eminence until it became informed with the intolerant genius of the Queen of Castile, from whose time it was sustained with a cruel energy of terror that finally drew a protest from the Pope himself. Similarly, the Index Expurgatorius did not originate with the Council of Trent but with the King of Spain, who, six years before the Tridentine Council was convened, drew up a list of prohibited books, which was sanctioned by the Pope and served as a model for later interdictions. But the Holy Office and the Index were but the beginning of the

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restrictions which were imposed upon the inhabitants of the Colonies.

Universities were founded in Lima, Mexico, Quito, Santiago de Chile and Guatemala, where canon and colonial law was taught and the theology of the Roman See. These institutions were under strict monastic discipline. A royal decree commanded that all the youth who should distinguish themselves in study be compelled to take holy orders; thus the university became the vestibule of the Church.

The result of this decree was naturally to rank the matriculants in theology above those of the other faculties. It was a favored study. The students in the college of San Martin in Lima for many years pursued no course but theology, and therefore earned the unqualified approbation of Philip IV in 1626. Still even such universities as these occasioned uneasiness to the King, who perhaps realized the difficulty and uncertain issue of prescribing definite limits to the discursive activity of healthy young minds. This uneasiness is reflected in many of the laws that were issued for the conduct of education in the Colonies. Before a student could receive a degree of any kind he must first swear allegiance to the King of Spain. Lib. iii, Title xxii, L. xv provides that "no one shall be permitted to receive the degree of Licentiate, Master or Doctor, in any faculty, nor that of Bachelor in Theology, who shall not first, in the presence of the officer who confers the degree and

of the others who are present, swear upon the mis-
sal that he will always sustain, believe and teach,
that the Blessed Ever-Virgin Mary, the Mother of
God, and our Lady, was conceived without original
sin in the first instant of her natural existence.
And if it should happen, which may God forbid,
that anyone shall refuse to take this oath, then
the degree shall be denied him." Charles IV re-
plied to a petition that a University be founded in
Merida, by refusing the request, saying that "he
did not consider it expedient that education should
become general in the Colonies." On the 21st of
August, 1812, the Chilean Junta recorded the fact
that until that day there had never been a school
in Santiago de Chile where girls were instructed.
This city at the time contained about fifty thou-
sand inhabitants; it was nearly the size of New
York, and held more people than Philadelphia and
very many more than Boston. On the 18th of
June, 1813, the Junta recorded that until then,
in the whole kingdom of Chile, there had never
been more than four common schools for children,
and those at different periods and for a short
time; and the population of Chile was over four
hundred thousand, a much larger population than
that of Vermont in 1910.

The ecclesiastical censorship of books had been
established in the reign of the Emperor Charles
V, in the hope of excluding from Spain the heret-
ical doctrines of Luther. Charles had adopted it,
with added measures of severity, as a political

weapon against the Protestants of Germany and the Netherlands, who embodied all the hostility with which the Emperor's favorite projects were threatened. In this two-fold form, ecclesiastical and political, it was introduced into the Spanish Colonies. Having passed the scrutiny of the Inquisition, the books that were destined for America were also obliged to pass the inspection of the board of Censors appointed by the Council of the Indies. This was not a perfunctory service. The Censors of the Council received, to be sure, no books that had not already been accepted by the Censors of the Inquisition, but they were obliged to read thoroughly and to report minutely upon all the books that were to be sent to the Colonies. This second inspection must then have been required for political purposes, since no subordinate board would be suffered to revise the judgment of such Censors as the Presidents of the Royal Audiencias of Valladolid and Granada, the Archbishops of Toledo, Seville, Granada and Burgos and the Bishop of Salamanca, who constituted the General Board of Censors. The Censors of the Council were enjoined not to permit the printing, sale, introduction or possession, of books treating of secular or mythical matters, or fictitious stories, in the Colonies. They were obliged to examine every copy,—“We command our President and official judges of the Casa de Contratacion of Seville, when books, approved by the Censors, are offered for transport to the Colonies, that they examine

carefully each copy, reporting to the Council the subject of which it treats, and accept them not until after such examination." Agents of the Council renewed this strict scrutiny at every Colonial port of entry, but lest any undesirable volume, through some oversight or casualty, should happen to pass undetected through this multiplied inquisition, Philip II, in 1556, charged the Bishops of the Church to "exhaust every possible means to ascertain whether in your diocese any such books are to be found and to seize them and send them to the Holy Office in Spain and by no means consent that any of them remain in your province." In the improbable case that books might be printed in the Colonies or introduced there surreptitiously for sale which, not having passed the various official Censors, might contain matter which the King would not approve, it was further decreed, that "Every person who shall print a book in the Colony or bring for sale books published elsewhere, without having received the royal license and the Inquisitorial sanction, shall be punished with death and the confiscation of his goods."

The Colonists were not absolutely forbidden to print books, but they were required to send twenty copies to Spain for the requisite examination and sanction before offering them for sale or otherwise disposing of them. The Rector of the University in Lima, which was practically, as we have just seen, a school of theology, having claimed the

right to print the theses of the students, was forbidden to do so as being "very irregular."¹

These laws show the attention with which Spain regarded the education of her Colonists, but she was never satisfied that her decrees were being obeyed. A suspicion haunted the royal mind which found utterance in many letters on this subject to the officials of his several Colonies. In 1686, Charles II, prompted by this vague mistrust, issued an order to the then Governor of Chile, Don José Garro,—“Inasmuch as my council has understood that, notwithstanding the well-known enactments of myself and of my ancestors, now in glory, many books have been published in the provinces of Chile, without my having received particular and especial knowledge thereof, thus failing to conform to the said laws, I have thought best to order and command you, as I now do, to remit to my Council, twenty copies of every book or pamphlet of any kind, even if scientific or historical, that may have been printed in the said provinces of Chile; omitting none, nor failing to obey scrupulously under any pretext. And I command that for the future you observe this order with punctual minuteness,” etc. This order was issued on the 8th of August, 1686, and in November, 1811, one hundred and twenty-five years

¹ “La universidad de Lima pretendió tener derecho para hacer imprimir los libros que escriben sus matriculados; y esto se calificó en real orden de 10 de agosto de 1785 por *muy irregular.*” Libro I., Tit. xxiv. Ley xv. (Note.)

later, the good ship *Galloway* from New York arrived in the harbor of Valparaiso, bringing the first printing press that Chile ever saw. A curious illustration of the prurient distrust with which Spain regarded her Colonies.

THE ROYAL CULT

With the yellow flag of Spain flying at every port and establishing a permanent quarantine of her provinces; and with their intellectual arrest secured by the utmost detail of repression, the King of Spain, partly by accident, partly by intention, developed a third potent and effectual source of power. He offered himself as the object of a kind of reverence that had in it a violent strain of fanaticism. How this was achieved, how a sentiment was fostered into a passion, how the King came to dispute with the Almighty for the worship of his people, I will attempt to make manifest.

As the language of love finds its loftiest expression in terms of worship, so the high spirit of loyalty takes for its ultimate utterance the language of devotion. When Virgil says of Augustus, "I will always regard as a God him who has endowed us with these blessings of peace,"¹ and when Horace writes to Augustus himself, "To you, while still living, we award divine honor and rear altars where vows may be registered in your

¹ "Deus nobis hæc otia fecit,
Namque erit ille mihi semper deus."

name; confessing that as the past has beheld, so the future will disclose, nothing equal to you,"¹ their language was not that of adulation, of which they were incapable, and which would have been offensive alike to them and to their Emperor, but of that spirit of sincere devotion that marks the culmination of loyalty.

So when Lope de Vega inserts the King's name in the creed and says, "Despues de Dios, creemos en el rei,"² the same spirit moves him, the spirit not of flattery but of devotion. They all uttered forth the sentiment of their generation, and as in Rome this spirit added a new god, Divus Augustus, to the Roman Pantheon, so in Spain it added in effect another person to the Trinity. Spanish poetry is so full of this spirit that Lupercio Leonardo de Arjensola seemed almost to transcribe the lofty strain of Horace, when he proposed that Philip II, then living, should be canonized, "in order that you might give advice to the Celestial Council concerning the government of the human race, of which your own reign would be the best example; in order that the storm-beaten sailor, hopelessly struggling in a hostile sea, might be saved by making a vow to visit your temple and make his thank-offerings there; in order that the ploughman, covering his seed in the earth, might

¹ "Presenti tibi maturos largimur honores,
Jurandasque tuum per nomen ponimus aras,
Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale fatentes."

² "After God, we believe in the King."

besech you, by your intercession with God, to bless and multiply it." This note runs through Spanish literature for three centuries. Don Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñan addressed Charles II, whom later writers called "El Imbecil,"—"Thou art the sun that doth enlighten us, the upright judge that doth direct us, the pious father that doth nourish us." Philip II was the Muse whom Ercilla invoked in his *Araucana*. The Jesuit Ovalle believed that America had been created to add lustre to the Spanish crown.

In the American dependencies of Spain this sentiment was intensified and extended. To the Colonists there was only one ruler of the earth. Their knowledge of the world can be compared with that of a child brought up from birth in a nunnery, and even such a child might at times hear a whisper from the outer world which could never reach the Colonists of Talca, Mendoza or Tucuman. They knew vaguely that, for some inscrutable reason, other nations were suffered to exist, nations like the English, who lived in the bleak north, subsisted on piracy, and were hateful to God, who had cast them out of His Church as heretics. Outside of these wicked people, who were given over utterly to the Devil, the earth was the King's and the fulness thereof.

There was scarcely any distinction in their minds between the Divine Majesty and the Royal Majesty; one was the title applied to the King of Heaven and the other to the King of the earth.

We cannot properly regard the Spanish Colonists in the same light with their European contemporaries; they knew less of England and France than the Romans in the days of the Republic knew of the Picts and the Parthians. Their seclusion was absolute and their ignorance of the world, beyond the narrow limits of their little parish, was complete.

The Spanish-Americans believed, then, that God, having reserved to himself the government of heaven, had entrusted to the King of Spain the temporal government of the earth. This belief was enhanced by the action of the Holy See, which delivered into the King's hands the spiritual supervision and control of his transmarine subjects, so that Philip and Charles held the peculiar relation toward their Colonies which resulted from the union in the same royal person, of the supreme control of both the temporal and the spiritual interests of their transmarine subjects.

This concession, which established the dependence of the Church on the King, was destined later to become a source of much regret and sorrow to the Church, when, in the fulness of time, the State, having succeeded to the King and inherited his rights, brought into perilous question the supreme authority of the Pope.

The devotion of the Colonists to their King was fostered carefully by His Catholic Majesty. Nothing that would stimulate their admiring awe was neglected. No sailor was allowed to embark

in the fleet for the Colonies without first renewing his oath of allegiance to the King and without having confessed and partaken of the Holy Eucharist. (Lib. ix. Tit. xxx. L. liv.) The "Procession of the Royal Standard" was made the great annual festival of the Colony. The members of the Cabildo, in ceremonial dress, on horseback and attended by a troop of cavalry, proceeded to the house of the Royal Standard Bearer (Alférez Real), and escorted him to the Governor's palace. Here that functionary was waiting with the Judges of the Royal Audience, and on the arrival of the procession they came forth and took their places in it. The Alférez rode at the Governor's left and the Regent of the Royal Audience at his right. The procession passed through the streets, crowded with spectators, and entered the plaza, which salutes were fired and the bands played. Thence they took their way to the Cathedral, where Mass was sung, the Standard was blessed and a sermon was preached, while the Alférez with the Standard sat in the seat of honor with a cushion at his feet. Afterwards there were feasting and rejoicing throughout the city, races were held, a bullfight took place in the plaza, and at night the whole country was illuminated with bonfires and rockets.

The Royal Seal was venerated with the same devotion as if it were a piece of the true cross. When a royal decree was received, the Royal Audience must be summoned, and while all stood un-

covered before the King's message, they swore in unison, as if they were chanting the Creed, to obey it as if it were the command of God. This formula was prescribed by the King himself, who forbade the Governor to open a royal letter except in the presence of the Royal Audience and with the formalities which I have in part described. The royal officials were so far above the colonists that they were regarded as beings of a superior order; how immeasurably above the ordinary attributes of humanity must His Catholic Majesty have appeared to the simple minds of the Americans, when such lofty personages as the Governor and the Judges of the Royal Audience prostrated themselves before a letter from the throne!

This sentiment did not wane as century followed century. It was inculcated in infancy, it was fostered by habitual obedience, it was increased by transmission from generation to generation. His supreme and unquestioned authority in all matters civil and ecclesiastical, his powerful hand that weighed so heavily upon them at the immense distance of seven thousand miles, their belief that they were born into the world expressly to become his subjects and slaves, combined with their ignorance of the world to invest the King with a divine sanctity and awe. Amunátegui has found a good expression for this sentiment. He calls it the "Dogma of the Royal Majesty."

It culminated in a passionate loyalty which borrowed the livery of heaven for the worship of the

King of Spain. On July 11, 1809, the Intendente of the Province of Coquimbo, having procured from some private and personal source the copy of a portrait of Ferdinand, issued a proclamation in which he informed the people of his province in glowing terms of its arrival, and appointed the 13th of July for a day of feasting and rejoicing.

“Receive it as if it were the King himself; offer it anew your vows and faithful service; hasten to throw yourselves before its royal feet, full of the profoundest reverence; that it may recognize in you the devotion that you profess, and that you may show yourselves worthy of the incomparable honor of being the slaves of the greatest and most beloved of monarchs, the peerless Ferdinand. Cover the walls of your houses with decorations and fill the streets with flowers that the idol of our hearts may be honored.

“JOAQUIN PÉREZ DE URIONDO.”

The path that led from Coquimbo, the port, to La Serena, the Capital of the Province, was not properly speaking a road,—it was rather a passage or a way, but during the two days before the fête, hundreds of citizens carried sand and stones in bags and baskets and filled up the holes, and covered the runlets with wooden bridges, and prepared the path to the city, that it might meet the royal approval. “When the day arrived,” the Notary, Pedro Nolasco de las Peñas, wrote to the Junta Central under date of July 22nd, “the portrait, surrounded by cushions, was placed

in a carriage, which was festooned with gilded ribbons and filled with flowers, and drawn by eight men, to whom, after much dispute, the honor had been finally awarded, along the new road to the city. Incense was burned, the devout people kneeled as the car passed, the priests in gown and vestment met the sacred image on its passage,"—really, if Clio were not insensitive to shame, she would blush to record the tale of Pedro Nolasco de las Peñas. However, the portrait at length reached the Cathedral, where the Dean and Canons received it and "with the utmost conceivable solemnity and splendor of ceremony," it was placed, with many prayers and prostrations, upon the high altar. Then a *Te Deum* was sung, while salvos of artillery shook the church and the people shouted aloud their joy and filled the plaza with *Vivas*. For three days and nights the celebration continued. With no greater reverence could they have received a holy fragment of the True Cross, or a finger of the Blessed Bartholomew. This was the apotheosis of loyalty and devotion.

To such a people the thought of independence would have seemed profanation. To withdraw themselves from the King's favor and protection would have seemed as horrible as to withdraw themselves voluntarily from the favor and protection of God. It would have been more than a sacrilege—it would have been a punishment too great for any crime. Liberty was the last thing they desired, if liberty meant for them to be

thrust from the service of the King, and to be cut off, like the heretic and piratical English, from the service of God. So Spain's extremity excited bitter grief and sympathy among her Colonists, but no one entertained any open purpose of separation. Men there were in the Colonies from whose eyes the scales had fallen; men like Miranda, Rózas, Hidalgo, Frétes and O'Higgins, who fell in love with Equality, Justice and Freedom when those three ladies wore the mask of treason and hid for fear from the eyes of men; but as yet their hope was faint and their purpose silent.

REVENUE

Simultaneously with this development of Power through the three channels of Isolation, Repression and King Worship, the real purpose and aim of the Spanish Court was being systematically and completely pursued. This purpose was Revenue,—that exploitation of the Colonies, which the Conde de Aranda, in his letter to the Conde de Floridablanca, described without unnecessary circumlocution in the picturesque style that marks all his State-papers. A hundred passages could be cited where the same purpose is stated less frankly indeed but not less convincingly. I have neglected to allude, in the consideration of this matter, to the spoils of the initial conquest. The histories of Robertson and Prescott at least are universally known, and reproduce, more or less accurately, the earlier annals and narratives of the

Spanish historians. My purpose is to unfold in part the organized system of exploitation through which for some centuries the King of Spain diverted to his royal purse the enormous sums which impoverished and ruined his country, and heaped up for himself in his Colonies, wrath against a day of wrath.

The history of Spanish Colonial commerce is largely a history of the Casa de Contratacion de las Indias, the Agency of Colonial Commerce, which for two hundred and seventy-five years possessed a monopoly of Colonial trade. The Casa de Contratacion was founded by a royal decree issued by Ferdinand and Isabella, at Alcalá on January 20, 1503. In 1717, Patiño, who has been called the Colbert of Spain, caused it to be removed to Cadiz, where its operations could be more satisfactorily controlled and more economically administered. In 1778, King Charles III, among many important reforms in Spain's transmarine service, withdrew this monopoly and extended the privilege to other Spanish ports. On the 18th of June, 1790, the Casa de Contratacion was by a royal decree, abolished, or as the Spaniards say, "extinguished." With this preliminary synopsis of the changes that the Casa underwent in the course of many years, I will explain the methods which it followed in its purpose to regulate commerce.

Every nation has a direct interest in monopolizing, if possible, its Colonial trade. In order to

simplify this attempt in Spain and to protect it perfectly, it was enacted that no vessels could clear for the Colonies but from Seville only. Barcelona, Malaga, Valencia and Cartagena could not legitimately engage in Colonial commerce. The edict of the King amounted to an effective blockade of these ports. It was a port-bill that was not resented by the Spaniards of those cities, who, without a protest, saw their maritime trade with the Colonies rated by the law with smuggling. In Seville, the houses that could engage in transmarine commerce formed a close body or Exchange. They alone possessed the coveted privilege.

This was not the only instance of the erection of a trading monopoly. In England, the East India Company possessed similar privileges under a royal charter, whose date ran back to the reign of Elizabeth, and which maintained its monopoly practically intact until 1680. But the Spanish Company continued to control Colonial commerce beyond the harbor of Cadiz. The merchandise was sent only to those merchants in the Colonies who were matriculated in the Casa, and, as the Company selected these and appointed them, they became simply the agents of the Casa. No Colonial resident could send an order for merchandise to Spain, even if he included the money with his order, except through one of these agents of the Casa; not until June 15, 1780, was the disability removed. Thus the Casa not only controlled the trade, but the Colonists were compelled to buy

what the Casa saw fit to send to them, at the price that the Casa elected to exact. The importance of this unrestricted monopoly, which gave the Casa the same power over the commerce of the Colonies that the Council possessed over their laws, would seem to have been immeasurably greater than that of the English Company, and should, in hands as unscrupulous as those of the members of the Casa, have rolled up fortunes compared with which that of Sir Josiah Child would have seemed penury. To establish beyond controversy the authority of the Casa, Charles I on November 17, 1553, issued a decree that "in the Indies the regulations promulgated by the Casa de Contratacion shall be observed and obeyed equally with other laws."

In reality the Casa was but the Commercial branch of the Council of the Indies, which supervised and controlled all matters pertaining to the Colonies; and, while seeming to have a free hand, it was wholly under the control of the Council. Membership in the Casa was subject to the approval of the Council and was indeed obtained by purchase from them; the purchase price of membership being calculated, after a careful examination of the books of the Casa, in such a way as to transfer the profits to the Council in advance. The supervision over the affairs of the Casa was constant and minute, so that the Casa became the mercantile agency of the Council,—its trade name. Thus at the center of the web sat the Council, and in the middle of the Council, the King.

Seville was the Custom House of America. It had its clerks in every port of entry of the Colonies, but they had no independent authority, and scarcely any discretionary power. The Council decreed an export duty of five per cent. on all goods shipped to the Colonies and an import duty of ten per cent. on the same goods when they reached their destination. This tax was the Almojarifazgo. "Between Spain and the Colonies, between any two Colonies, between any two ports in the same province, whether by sea or land, everything that was carried for sale, use or consumption, even to the ship's provisions that carried it," paid the Almojarifazgo to the royal treasury. Moreover, after the Almojarifazgo of five per cent. had been paid according to the valuation in Cadiz, the merchandise was again valued according to the price that the Casa de Contratacion had established in the Colonial port to which it was sent, and again paid its dues of ten per cent. on this new and arbitrary valuation. Under this system not only was all foreign competition eliminated but there was no rivalry among the merchants of Seville themselves, who proceeded under a fixed mutual agreement, and profited equally under the law, like a syndicate. Thus while an increase of three hundred to four hundred per cent. in valuation between Cadiz and Callao was usual, it was not uncommon for the value of merchandise to be increased nine hundred per cent. between the two points, which would make the import duty at Callao nearly equal

to the original valuation of the merchandise at Cadiz.

Some kinds of merchandise paid even much higher duties than this. Cheap table knives, for instance, which sold for four reals the dozen in the English market, brought a price of thirty-two dollars the dozen in the Colonies or sixty-four times the original cost. A jar of Olive Oil brought twenty dollars in America and a jug of rum fifty dollars. When the Casa could exact such payments as these, it is no wonder that they prohibited, under severe penalties, the planting of the vine and olive in America. To protect this monstrous monopoly by prohibiting competition with other nations the law was enacted on December 15, 1558, which I have already cited on page 11.

The effect of these measures was to enhance incredibly the value of commodities to the Colonists. Articles of wearing apparel became heirlooms to be handed down by will from father to son. In 1620, "Francisco de Ribéros bequeathed to his son Hernando, his trousers of black velvet which he declared in his will had cost him six hundred dollars, a sum equal to at least fifteen hundred dollars to-day, and they were without any expensive ornaments! A century later in Mexico a plain coat of European cloth cost a hundred dollars."

But the Casa de Contratacion did not forget that buying is as much a part of commerce as selling, and having sold their wares at the extortionate prices that their monopoly empowered them

to exact, they had no scruple in buying the Colonial products at a price so low as to discourage effort. Agriculture was abandoned and Chile became a pasture merely. Immense herds of cattle roamed wild through the upland valleys and evaded taxes by claiming no owners. They were hunted like wild beasts and for many years the only articles that Chile offered for export were their hides and fat, which were carried over the mountains on muleback and brought to Lima through Tucuman, which before the erection of Buenos Ayres into a Viceroyalty, was a part of Chile.

THE FLOTILLA

As Seville was the Peninsular seat of Colonial trade, so Vera Cruz was established as the port of Mexico (then called New Spain), and Portobello as the port of entry for South America. In each of the American ports a close supervision was maintained over all merchandise brought from Spain or offered for carriage to the Peninsula. Two fleets were sent yearly from Cadiz to the Colonies. In 1561 a royal decree was issued by Philip II. (Lib. ix. Tit. xiii. L. i.) "In order to further the development and security of Colonial commerce and navigation, we hereby establish and command that every year an Armada and two fleets, be fitted out in the River of Seville and Cadiz; one fleet for New Spain and one for South America, to be attended by the Armada in going

and returning." Another law fixed the date of sailing for the Colonial fleets in the month of March. The total amount of merchandise that the King's decree permitted these fleets to carry was twenty-seven thousand five hundred tons, but it appears from a memorial addressed to Charles II by Ossorio, that only one year during the whole seventeenth century witnessed the departure of a fleet from Cadiz with this maximum burden.

But not every fleet that left Cadiz reached its destination, as the records of the British Marine show (although the British vessels preferred to attack the fleet on its return to Spain bearing home the spoils from its Colonies); while not every year saw a fleet leave Cadiz for the new world. From 1590 to 1595, Spain was visited by the plague, which interrupted its commerce, and many a year during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the Colonial fleet detained in Cadiz by the English cruisers; so that in the period from 1580 to 1700 there were forty-seven years when no fleet sailed for Mexico and forty-nine when none cleared for South America.

These trading fleets consisted of ten or fifteen vessels, averaging two hundred to three hundred tons capacity, and each fleet was attended by four or five vessels of war. The largest cargo that during the seventeenth century was carried by the two fleets in a single year was twenty-seven thousand five hundred tons, of which, according to Ossorio's memorial, twenty-six thousand tons rep-

resented merchandise that had been imported into Spain from France and England.

Mignet says that "of eleven millions dollars' worth of merchandise sent from Cadiz to the Spanish Colonies, at least ten millions represented goods of foreign manufacture; while of every seventeen millions, that came into Cadiz, which was about the usual annual amount of gold, silver, precious stones and merchandise which the Colonies sent back to Spain, more than fifteen millions a year came into the hands of the traders and manufacturers of Genoa, Paris, London and Hamburg."

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the coming of the Colonial fleet, Portobello became the centre of great activity. Vessels from all the Pacific Coast filled the harbor of Panama, and the road to Portobello was choked with mules and wagons bearing the wealth of the new world, their annual tribute to the King of Spain. In Portobello the exchange and transfer of commodities lasted forty days, a period also fixed by royal decree. There seems to be only one instance recorded when this term of forty days was exceeded and Admiral Chacon acceded to the urgent requests of the traders to prolong the fair for a few days at a cost to them of two thousand dollars a day, which sum went to the royal treasury. The only fair of recent times that can be compared with the fair of Portobello is that at Nijni-Novgorod which occurs annually and continues for the same period of time. It is estimated that trading to the amount of ninety

million dollars is done at the Russian fair, but Alvarez de Ossorio, whom I have previously quoted, says that at Portobello—"The years of least concurrence saw two hundred million dollars in gold, silver, pearls, emeralds and other products of the Indies brought to Portobello."¹

Not all of this sum went to the royal treasury. It represented the annual trade of South America and Spain, but the sums that went to the royal purse were still enormous. In 1556, the royal exchequer received "seven millions dollars in gold and one million dollars' worth of tobacco, cochineal, vanilla, cacao and other American fruits." In 1625, Philip the IV received sixteen million dollars as his immediate share of the receipts of the Colonial trade for that year.

During the time of the fair, the King's officers busied themselves with their invoices and receipts, with their buying or exchange of merchandise and with levying the charges of transportation, freights, duties and taxes of various kinds. It was their custom to accept the simple verbal statement of the persons who offered merchandise for sale or shipment, in bales, boxes, or packages. No examination was made, no box or case was opened, no oath was required. And yet, in a period of time covering two centuries, and in the course of an annual trade amounting to many millions, there is only one recorded instance of

¹ "el año que ménos vienen, son doscientos millones de pesos en pastos de oro i plata, perlas, esmeraldas i demas frutos de las Indias."

fraud. If mistakes were afterwards discovered, restitution was faithfully made, even if the error were not detected for years.

The tax that was next imposed on Commerce was the *Avería* or insurance against loss, damage, shrinkage or other deterioration; and which varied from year to year from two per cent. to twenty-one per cent. This was a tribute to English prowess, and rose or fell as war or peace with England happened to obtain. In 1689, the Duke de la Pilata embodied in a memorial to the King, a calculation which was intended to support an argument in favor of creating a crown monopoly of paper. The invoice which served as a basis for calculation was a package containing twenty-four reams of paper.

Vicuña-Mackenna, in his "Historia de Valparaiso," copies the Duke's calculation as follows:—

Original cost	\$21.13
Export duties, Seville	1.25
Loading and other duties	6.50
<i>Avería</i>	2.75
Carriage—Cadiz-Portobello	13.25
License and duties, Portobello	9.75
Carriage to Panama	20.87
Carriage to Callao	12.00
Duties Callao	5.50
Carriage Valparaiso	12.00
Duties Valparaiso	5.00
Carriage to Santiago	3.00
	<hr/>
	\$113.00

40 THE INDEPENDENCE OF CHILE

Original cost	\$21.13
Duties, etc.	30.75
Carriage	61.12
	<hr/>
	\$113.00

These are merely the commercial impositions. An excise tax, the *Alcabála*,¹ was levied on all inheritances or transfers of property, on all sales and business transactions whether public or private, and on the barter or exchange of commodities between any two individuals. Fixed at first, June 7, 1576, at two per cent., it was afterwards established at four per cent., and there remained until July, 1776, when it was increased to six per cent. Even at the rate of six per cent. this impost, while excessive, does not seem prohibitive, but it continued to be imposed on each transfer of the article taxed, until according to the Viceroy of Peru, Don José de Manso, it often amounted, on successive sales, before reaching its ultimate owner, to a tax of fifty or sixty per cent. It has been estimated that the *Alcabála* averaged thirty-five per cent. on all merchandise imported.

Next in importance to the *Almojarifazgo* and the *Alcabála* came the *Diezmos*, or tithes. Selden traces the origin of tithes back to Melchizedec, but from the time of the Mosaic law it has always

¹ The *Alcabála* (*gabelle*) was not unknown to France, where, however, it was confined to a tax on salt, which produced during the administration of Mazarin a revenue to the state of twenty-seven million livres yearly.

been levied for the support of the clergy. By the bull of Alexander VI (who was himself a Spaniard, of the House of Borgia,) dated March 17, 1501, the ecclesiastical authority over America was vested in the King of Spain and continued to be exercised by him until the fall of the royal power in South America. The King filled the vacant Bishoprics as well as the inferior offices of the hierarchy, and collected the dues of the Church, the tithes.

“Inasmuch as the ecclesiastical tithes collected in the Colonies belong to us by apostolic concession of the Holy See,” begins the chapter on “Diezmos” in the “Recopilacion de las Indias,” (Lib. I. Title xvi. law I.), “we command the officers of our royal Hacienda of said provinces to collect and receive all such tithes as are due and payable from those inhabitants engaged in husbandry or the raising of stock.” “Of ten measures, one, and of those things that cannot be measured, of every ten, one; and this must be paid without taking out what may be required for seed and without allowing for rent or other expense whatever.—Moreover, the said tithes must be paid of lambs, goats, pigs, ducks, geese, chickens and pigeons, even of such as are eaten in the families of those raising them, and must be paid at the time when such animals may subsist without their parents.—Swarms of bees, milk, butter, cheese and wool, all fruits, all live stock, of ten measures, one, or of every ten, one, or of every five, one-half.”

In this and the following laws everything is specifically enumerated that could produce its kind or grow from seed. The annual value of the tithes in the diocese of Santiago alone, was estimated at two hundred and forty thousand dollars, notwithstanding the fact that the agents of the Casa de Contratacion had reduced the profits of agriculture to a point where the lands lay fallow and wheat was imported from Peru. A portion of the avails from this tax was used in paying the salaries of the priests and in the repairs and maintenance of the churches, and the rest went to the King's purse.

The profits arising from tithes were so important that a decree was issued by the King "that no resident of any city, town or village shall leave his place of abode without a certificate from the magistrate that he has paid what tithes are due from him and that none remains unpaid."—(Don Carlos, October 20, 1521.—Lib. I. Tit. xvi. l. xv).

The royal fifths, quintos reales, had always been due the King from ransom and the spoils of successful warfare. In America the tax was extended to the proceeds of all mining operations. Many of the most valuable mines and mining districts were royal property and poured their undiminished flood of gold into the royal exchequer; but of all other properties the fifth of the gross output belonged to the King. "Of all gold and silver extracted from mines or from placers, the fifth shall

be first taken out for the royal treasury; of gold, silver, pearls, or precious stones, taken in battle, siege or ransom, the fifth must be similarly given without any discount for the King's use; any precious metal will be confiscated that is not marked in such a way as to show that the Royal Fifth has been paid. Of amber, lead, tin, copper, iron and all other metals, the Royal Fifth must be paid into the Royal Treasury." The only method of extracting ores was by amalgamation, and mercury was a branch of the Royal monopoly, the price of which was fixed (Lib. viii. Tit. xxiii. l. viii.) at sixty ducats per quintal in Mexico, which would be the equivalent perhaps to-day of about thirty dollars the pound. This price was fixed by Philip III., October 17, 1617, and by Philip IV., July 13, 1627. Other monopolies were playing cards, tobacco, salt, pepper and spices, stamped paper and the postal revenues. In the summer, ice was a royal monopoly and the officers of the Royal Treasury sold, for the King's account, the snow that was brought from the Cordillera to refresh the residents of Lima during the hot weather. The profits from the bull-ring went always to His Catholic Majesty.

A volume might be written on the taxes of various kinds that were imposed upon the Spanish Colonists. Miguel Cruchaga enumerates ninety-one distinct taxes that were collected by the King from the Chilean Colonists, and even in his list there are several omissions, for example,

Primicias, or first-fruits.

Escusado, a tax "for the war against the Infidels."

Pulperías, tavern licenses.

Los Toros, bull-fights—a royal monopoly.

The "Bull of the Crusade" was one of the least of these taxes. This was an indulgence that every one was obliged to buy, every two years, *pena del infierno*. It cost one or two dollars for each inhabitant (Solórzano, "De Jure Indiarum," Vol. II. No. 3), according to his ability to pay, and was so productive that the Holy Crusade formed a tribunal only second in importance to the Holy Office of the Inquisition, and the post of treasurer, which as we shall see was the case with the majority of Royal offices, was put up for public sale, and brought the sum of twenty thousand dollars. This is at least the price that was paid for nomination to the office of treasurer of the Holy Crusade about the middle of the seventeenth century by Don Pedro Machado de Torres. The Crusades drew their last gasp before the walls of Tunis in 1270, when St. Louis turned his despairing gaze for the last time upon the unconquered city and fell dead in the arms of Joinville, but the business continued for centuries to be too profitable to be discontinued. In 1820, Lord Cochrane, then an Admiral in the Chilean Navy, having captured a Spanish vessel, discovered in the cargo "sixty enormous bales" of these indulgences, through the sale of which, the Indian slaves starving in the

mines of the Bolivian uplands were to be choused out of their scanty rations to contribute to the success of the expedition of St. Louis against the Saracens, in the middle of the thirteenth century.

Even the enumeration of the multitudinous taxes and exactions imposed upon the Spanish Colonies would be wearisome and unnecessary. "The Spanish Kings" (says Vicuña-Mackenna in his History of Valparaiso) "persisted in their efforts to turn everything possible into tributary gold by taxing the very vices of the Colonists, their remorse, even their crimes. Did they languish in the choking heat of the tropics, a tax was laid upon the snow from the mountains. Did they smoke the tobacco of their own fields, tobacco was made a crown monopoly, and the Chilean farmer must buy from the King of Spain the fruit of his own labor. The only luxury in which the old and the poor could indulge was maté drinking,—maté was made a crown monopoly. So was the pepper of the Chilean fields." In a word all that Spain could furnish the Colonists was loaded down with more than its value of taxes, while the indigenous products of Chile itself were monopolized by the Crown.

The grape and the olive thrive in Chile as well as in the most favorable districts of Spain. The grapes of Huasco are to-day made into raisins that are unequalled in the markets of the world and are regarded a worthy present to the King of England on his birthday; while the wine of Huasco

is finer than the old Madeira that our grandfathers enjoyed; but inasmuch as their cultivation would interfere with Spanish trade, they were not indeed taxed or monopolized but prohibited. The olive yards and the vineyards of America were forbidden by the King of Spain to bear fruit, and the laws of nature were annulled that the laws of the Recopilacion might pour gold into the coffers of His Majesty, the King.

In Chile, however, owing to its distance from Spain and to the consequent difficulties of Commerce, a certain laxity was permitted as to the planting of the vine and the olive. In the valley of the Mapocho near San Cristóbal are some very old olive trees still standing.

SALE OF OFFICES

Mention was made earlier of Machado de Torres' purchase of the Secretaryship of the Cruzada for twenty thousand dollars. This was not an isolated instance of the sale of an office of profit. It was the rule in the Spanish Colonies. As early as the 15th of October, 1522, (Lib. viii. Tit. xx. l. 1), a royal decree issued, ordering the public sale of forty-nine distinct offices in each of the provinces or colonies of America.


This law, promulgated by Doña Juana, was re-enacted by Charles I in 1557; by Philip II. in 1587 and 1591; by Philip III. in 1610 and by Philip IV. in 1615. It was never annulled but remained in force until the Revolution.

It provided for the sale, to the highest bidder, of certain specified offices of public trust and authority throughout all of the colonial possessions of Spain, and was followed by a series of enactments, providing, with exquisite minuteness, for all the details of its application. These offices were to be legally filled only by this process of public auction, and the Governor or Viceroy was directed to remit the proceeds to the Royal Treasury. Merit alone was a disqualification. The measure was found to be so profitable that the number was constantly increased of offices thus openly sold, until all were become venal, from the highest to the lowest. The control of this method rested securely in the hands of the Council in Madrid, since all offices from Viceroy to Corporation Attorney or Clerk of the Cabildo, were filled by appointment of the King. In 1709, Don Andres de Ustáriz bought the Governorship of Chile for twenty-four thousand dollars, and while José Antonio Rójas was in Spain, his family bought for him at auction, the position of Regidor in the Cabildo of Santiago. In 1715, Juan Bautista Tobar paid twenty-eight thousand dollars to be named Military Governor of Valparaiso, which port took on a feverish activity during the early years after the accession of the House of Bourbon to the throne of Spain in the person of Philip V.

The hope of speedy gain was the natural incentive to this mercenary competition, but often the emoluments of office would not immediately reim-

burse the successful bidder, while many of the subordinate offices were found to produce a sum less than the actual purchase money. This gave rise to complaints and claims which were carried from the colonial authorities and laid before the King, who on September 29, 1602, issued a decree providing that "after the sale of public offices the plea of deception or misrepresentation be not allowed and that this be stipulated as a condition previous to such sale." At any rate one would always have the resource of resigning from an unprofitable office? This was in some cases done, and gave occasion to a new decree which issued just two years later, September 25, 1604, and which closed this door also by providing "that all venal offices may be resigned by the payment in each instance of the sum fixed by the present law," that is, by the renewed payment of one-third to one-half of the cost of the original appointment. When the office thus became vacant, it was again put up for sale to the highest bidder, and the proceeds went as before to the Royal Treasury.

In its effect upon the people of Chile, the sale of offices produced even worse results than the ingenious system of multiplied imposts, that were levied wherever there was any chance of profit to the King; for this added the irregular extortion of individuals to the legal exactions of the crown, and reproduced all the ancient evils of the Roman pro-consular government.



About 500 miles Santiago to Concepcion

Talca half way

90 miles Valparaiso to Santiago

The Colonies were regarded as a field where needy adventurers, who had squandered their possessions at home, could speedily enrich themselves, and resume their prodigal career in Madrid. Residence in the Colonies was an exile, to be shortened in every way consistent with the necessary accumulation of wealth. It was possible in three or four years to amass a fortune in Peru and Mexico, and the officials in Chile endeavored to force from that colder and less favored land equal wealth with their brothers in those countries. The result was the hopeless degradation of the class whose industry furnished the only wealth of the Colony, for the farmers finding themselves deprived of even a meagre share of the profits of their own labor, gave over their fertile fields to neglect, and yielded themselves as vassal-tenants to their more powerful neighbors, who might be able to resist the injustice of the Crown officers, and who would at least afford them protection, shelter and food in return for service.

In comparison with the financial returns from this system of awarding public offices, the revenue derived from the sale of titles of nobility was not very large, and yet it was large enough not to be neglected. In Lima there were sixty-three provincial Barons, Counts and Marquises, whose original title had cost each of them ten thousand dollars, besides an annual fine, in some instances, of five hundred or one thousand dollars for entail. These titles, delightful to colonial pride, were re-

stricted to local recognition, and were a subject for the exercise of ridicule in the Peninsula by the very Court that received the fees for their grant.

INDIVIDUAL EXTORTION

One of the governors who carried this system of spoliation to its extreme was, Don Francisco Ibáñez de Peralta, who left Spain a bankrupt, and reached Chile after a passage of two years, with new debts following him from every port where he had landed. The salary then accorded by Spain to the Chilean governor was eight thousand dollars per annum. Ibáñez was friends with the Council of the Indies, who had promised him a free hand in Chile. They were perhaps among his Peninsular creditors and desired to get their accounts settled. On his arrival in Chile his activities began. He launched out into traffic of every kind;—raising cattle, buying crops, selling justice. He opened a market in Santiago, he started grist-mills, the Governor's palace in the Plaza del Rei became a store where all kinds of merchandise were to be purchased. He sold everything that was salable, but the other side of his ledger was a paradigm of lavish economy. He paid for nothing, overbearing his creditors with the most insolent threats. Among the accounts thus rendered famous during his Chilean service, was a bill for stable-rent that neither entreaties nor menaces could prevail on him to liquidate.

He sent agents throughout the province

among the Indians, who compelled them to buy goods that he could not sell in the city,—silk stockings, laces, eyeglasses,—things they had no use for, but which were forced upon them at exorbitant prices—razors, doorkeys, Spanish comedies, buttons. Among the northern Indians this was a profitable trade, but to compel the Araucans to purchase such things was as if General Custer had tried to compel Sitting Bull to buy “Rollo on the Rhine,” or as if General Crooke had forced upon Geronimo, “Dotty Dimple at Play,” for four dollars the copy. Still, undeterred by occasional failure, the trade went briskly on.

His mania for traffic led him to neglect the accounts of the Government, although the rumor ran that this seeming neglect only served to conceal his peculations. He caused several military tumults by withholding the pay of the soldiers on the frontier. The Council of the Indies answered the repeated petitions for relief that poured on them from Chile by imposing heavy fines upon the Governor-trader and keeping him in office. But these fines went not to the outraged and oppressed Chileans but to the purse of His Majesty, who thus acknowledged himself Ibáñez' accomplice.

How much money Ibáñez accumulated during his term of office, I have not found recorded, but his successor, Andres de Ustáriz, thought it a good speculation to pay twenty-four thousand dollars, a three years' purchase, for the opportunity to work the same field, and in the case of Ustáriz we

have the curious testimony of a letter written to King Philip V. on December 29, 1712, by the Bishop of Concepcion, Don Diego Montero del Aguila, in which he says that "the president having paid twenty-four thousand dollars for his office is now ready to return to Spain with five hundred thousand dollars and found a family estate." The most remarkable thing about this letter is that its date is less than four years after Ustáriz obtained the office in February, 1709.

Having said so much of Ustáriz, it may not be amiss to record that he was eventually disgraced, fined fifty-four thousand dollars and superseded by Don Gabriel Cano de Aponte, who ruled Chile for sixteen years of prosperity and honor.

Many estimates and many conjectures have been made as to the amount of revenue that the Colonies paid to Spain during the Colonial period. The consideration of this subject is not essential to the present purpose, but I may say that from Peru alone, between 1748 and 1754, the gold and silver carried to Spain amounted to one hundred and fifty-three million, eight hundred and forty-four thousand, four hundred and thirty-three dollars, or about twenty-five millions a year. The year 1749 contributed over thirty millions to this sum, while some earlier periods furnished much greater sums even than this; to which of course must be added the amounts forwarded from Mexico and the other Colonial governments. Don Jorge Juan and Don Antonio de Ulloa, who in 1735 made a tour of in-

spection through America and whose report was published in Madrid in 1749, narrate, among other curious and interesting facts, the discovery of the silver mines of Potosi which, they affirm, produced yearly over forty-one million dollars' worth of silver for ninety-eight consecutive years. It was not strange that the Conde de Aranda wished to keep the *pedazo de tocino para el caldo gordo* (the price of pork that makes the soup rich), and he was long since in his grave when Joseph Bonaparte seized the Spanish Throne, yet in the three years that followed the imprisonment of Ferdinand, the American Colonies, in addition to the enormous sums that the annual taxes wrung from them, sent to Spain the sum of one hundred million dollars as a voluntary offering to aid the Junta Central and the cause of the King.

It could hardly be expected that Spain, having expelled from her own soil the most industrious and intelligent portion of her population, who bore home with them to Morocco all the mechanical skill, all the manufacturing ability and all the agricultural information that existed in the Peninsula, would take any steps to encourage the establishment of factories or similar industrial ventures in her colonies; but one reads with surprise the reason that Philip II. openly gave to Luis de Velasco when he sent him out as Viceroy of Peru. He directed him, "by no means permit the manufacture of cloth or any similar industries,

for the reason that if it were permitted, the trade of those regions with Spain would be lessened." ¹

CONTEMPT OF AMERICANS

The European Spaniards looked upon the Spanish Americans with the most undisguised contempt, and when a Chilean, a Mexican or a Peruvian had the temerity to seek anything from the Peninsular government, however humble might be his aspirations, and however great the services that he had rendered to the crown, his plea was uniformly disregarded and his supplication encountered silence and disdain. If he sought in person the slightest favor from the Government he was allowed to wait in Madrid for years before an answer was vouchsafed him. True, it was not the American Spaniards alone who suffered the torture of suspense in awaiting the result of their petitions in the anterooms of Lerma and Garro. Gil Blas knew in Madrid the Captain, Don Aníbal Chinchilla, during an earlier reign. Chinchilla had lost an eye in Naples, in the service of the King, an arm in Lombardy and a leg in the Netherlands. "I wondered," said Gil Blas, "that, in his narrative of battles and sieges, not a boast escaped him, though he might easily be pardoned a word of praise for the half of his body that remained in honor of the other half that he had lost." Chinchilla lingered in Madrid until his

¹ "para que no se enflaqueciese el trato comercial con España." (Año. X. I. pg. 82.)

money was gone and he dined once a day on onions and garlic, until by a ruse he succeeded in terminating his affair to his own satisfaction.

José Antonio Rójas was a Chilean who waited in vain for seven years for a response to a simple petition in behalf of his friend and future father-in-law, Don José Perfecto Sálas, a gentleman who had all his life served the King of Spain as Judge and Attorney General (Oidor and Fiscal) in Peru and Chile, and who now only requested the royal permission to resign with honor on account of his old age. Rójas waited until Señor Sálas was dead, but he never succeeded in getting a hearing on the case in Madrid. Don Manuel Sálas, the son of the gentleman just named, having come from Chile to aid Rójas in his effort, himself spent several years in the same hopeless endeavor. Rójas wrote to his mother under date of August 7, 1777, "The condition of being a native of Chile is here regarded as something worse than a condition of original sin, for baptism will free us from this but from that there is no escape."

Sálas, however, was fortunate enough to achieve a success that touched with envy every admiring friend in Chile; he had the extreme felicity, as Amunátegui narrates, on May 30, 1778, to be "admitted to kiss the august hands of the royal persons" and on the 25th of December of the same auspicious year, "he saw the King eat." Otherwise his mission was without effect.

OFFICIAL RESTRICTIONS

The panic that was caused in the Court of Madrid by the rebellion of Gonzalo Pizarro in Peru in 1547, and by the rumor of a conspiracy of the sons of Cortés in Mexico in 1567, never wholly faded from the official memory of the King of Spain, and was the occasion of a series of decrees which should for all time prevent the possibility of any Colonial official forming a personal following in the transmarine possessions of Spain. The tenure of office, especially of high executive office, like that of Viceroy or Governor, was therefore a brief one. From the time of Valdivia, only one Governor of Chile, Don Gabriel Cano de Aponte, was continued in office for a period exceeding ten years, and during the two hundred and seventy years of Colonial history, the average term of office for the Governors of Chile was less than four years. Not only were the Governor's official duties prescribed so carefully as to permit him little latitude of construction or interpretation, but his personal conduct was regulated by a rigid system that confined his relations with the colonists of his government to the barest essentials of official intercourse.

The governor was forbidden to interest himself in any commercial business whatever, directly or indirectly; to lend or borrow money; to own any house, garden, farm or real estate of any kind; to be present at funerals or marriages, or to act as god father at baptisms; to receive gifts or to

contract friendships, either himself or his wife or children; to make or receive visits in any other than his official capacity; to permit his children or relatives to contract a marriage within the limits of his government; in a word to hold himself aloof from all the social, political and commercial life of the Colony which he governed. Don Alonzo de Ribera, having married a Chilean, was degraded from the position of Governor of Chile in 1604. Thirty-five years later, the Governor of Chile, Don Francisco Lazo de la Vega, at the close of a long and exhausting session of the Royal Audience, wishing to give the members of that body a day of pleasure, chose for the purpose a country-house whose occupants gladly absented themselves from home for the day. With studious respect for the King's commands, he provided everything that might be required, even to the drinking water, from his own residence in Santiago. No one was present but the Governor, the members of the Royal Audience and a few other high officials of the King's service and of Spanish birth. The offense was considered so flagrant that the King dismissed them all from office in disgrace, from which, however, he afterwards excepted one of the Judges, who was proved to have been too ill to be present, and who was thought to have furnished the King with the information on which he acted.

It was doubtless with a similar purpose, that the King, or the Council of the Indies in his name,

refused to entrust the higher administrative posts to colonists whatever their merit or capacity. "A main feature in her policy is that which constantly elevates the European and depresses the American character," observed Henry Clay. From the time of the conquest until the independence, in a list of over seventy governors, there is to be found the name of but one Chilean, Don Diego Gonzalo Montero, and he only served *ad interim* and for a few months. He was not so much Governor, as *locum tenens*, and was displaced as soon and as ignominiously as possible. According to a footnote by Vicuña-Mackenna in Lastárria's "Investigaciones sobre la Influencia Social del Systema Colonial," the statement was made by Don Manuel Moreno that no American was ever appointed Viceroy of Peru, New Granada or Buenos Ayres, while out of sixty-two viceroys of Mexico only three were born in America, or one in each century between Cortés and O'Donoju, between 1521 and 1821.

SECRET SERVICE

The chief result, as it was the main purpose, of the royal supervision of all offices, alike important and trivial, was, that holding directly from the King, the incumbents were bound only to the King. Thus no *esprit de corps* could ever arise in any governing body. Their traditions were the traditions of etiquette and of personal devotion to His Majesty and no other. Thus in addition to a secret service that would have excited the

envy of Dionysius, of Macbeth or Abdul Hamid, there was every incentive to the Colonial officials to act as spies and delators even in their own body.

A general conspiracy of distrust filled the secret archives of the Council of the Indies with voluminous reports of private as well as of public information. The minute particularity of these reports appears in many royal documents, of which I will quote in part one which appears under the date December 28, 1674.

“To Don Juan Henriquez, Knight of the Order of Santiago, Governor and Captain General of the Provinces of Chile and President of the Royal Audience of the same:

“We have been informed of the scandal and ill-example that have been caused in that city by Don José de Meneses, Judge of the said Royal Audience, in maintaining an improper intimacy with a single woman named Doña Elvira Tello; and that the Bishop of Santiago has directed his Secretary to warn her grandmother, Doña Beatriz de la Barrera, in whose house she lived, to keep a closer watch over her actions; and that, this proving insufficient, the same caution had been repeated through her aunt, Doña Aldonza Tello, a nun in the Convent of Santa Clara, with the like failure to impress her with the necessity of amendment; and that the Bishop of Santiago had summoned her, and had examined five witnesses, who deposed that they had heard a report that she had presented Don José with a daughter; and that the Bishop had thereupon directed that she be placed in a convent, but that her grandfather had

begged her off, that she might be sent to her aunts who lived twenty leagues from the city; that while she was on the road to her aunts, Don Lorenzo Laso de la Vega came riding up and while he engaged her in conversation, several masked horsemen appeared with drawn swords and seized her and brought her back with them to the city; and that the Bishop has ascertained that they had gone to the house of D. José de Meneses and had acted under instructions from him.

“These matters having come up before the Council of the Indies, it seemed incredible that you should not have known of this scandal concerning Don José de Meneses, as well as of that which involved also your brother, Don Blas Henríquez, in a similar offense with Doña Inez de Astorga. I have therefore resolved to place these details before you, that you may for the future be admonished to fulfill more attentively the obligations of your office. I have also, in a despatch to the Royal Audience under this same date, directed them to exact from you a fine of a thousand dollars to be sent to me in the usual way (*en la conformidad que se les ordena*).”

In all questions of mere service, the King's cause was not only paramount but unique, while in all questions involving fines, confiscations and forfeitures, he stimulated their loyalty by inciting their interest, in awarding a large part of such avails to the informer. Colonial history is full of these cases. The evil of such a system seems not to have been apparent to them. Envy and cupidity were not regarded as undignified weapons in the King's

service, for the King's cause hallowed them. Every official was trained to this practice, which was inculcated as the highest of duties. Thus every Judge of the Royal Audience was a check upon every other Judge, upon the President, upon the ecclesiastical body and upon the Cabildo, all of whom in turn fulfilled the same duty of spying upon each other. So great was this spirit of emulation, that when once suspicion pointed against an individual, all, even his colleagues, joined in the cry against him. I will cite one case from the records of the Royal Audience itself.

In 1614, one of the Judges of the Royal Audience in Santiago, was Don Pedro Alvarez de Solórzano, who had among other children a daughter named Florencia. Don Pedro Lispérguer fell in love with her, but though his family was the richest and proudest in Chile, and though he was a young gentleman of admirable accomplishments and thoroughly in love, yet the will of the King and the law of the Council compelled Solórzano to close the door to this very eligible aspirant. This he did sternly and definitively. Don Pedro, denied the door, forced the window, which perhaps on this occasion was not locked very fast, and carried off the Judge's daughter at midnight. The next day Solórzano, finding his daughter gone, sought her where he expected to find her, carried her home and laid before the Royal Audience a complaint against Don Pedro for seduction, as a result of which the young man was at once ar-

rested and imprisoned. Don Pedro in turn complained to the Vicar-General that he had received unjust treatment at the hands of the Audience, for he was betrothed to the young lady and was desirous of marrying her. He therefore prayed the Ecclesiastical Court, through the Vicar-General, to place her in a nunnery until such time as they could be married. This was done, and after a long delay Solórzano withdrew his complaint and the marriage took place in due form. This ought in all propriety to have ended the matter, but, a few days after, one of the other Judges observing a smile on Solórzano's face, inferred therefrom his pleasure at the marriage of his daughter. In a moment the suspicion arose that all this opposition, imprisonment, outcry and scandal, was the cover under which Solórzano and Don Pedro had concealed their concert. He immediately reported the whole case in a despatch to the King, and after he had thus established the priority of his accusation, he proceeded to denounce before his colleagues the treasonable compact through which Solórzano had mocked the Audience, and conspired with Lisperguer to baffle the law. There was nothing but suspicion put forward as a basis for this serious charge, but the Judges at once vindicated their zeal for the King's cause by suspending Solórzano from office until the King's pleasure should be known, and notifying the officials of the royal treasury to discontinue his salary. In vain Solórzano begged that he might plead his

case before his colleagues and establish his innocence; they paid no attention to him. Month after month he renewed his solicitations vainly. He then, realizing the futility of his efforts, set out for Spain, that he might at least put in an appearance before the case was decided against him. At Portobello, he had the good fortune to meet Don Francisco de Borja, Prince of Esquilache, who was on his way to Lima, where he had been named Viceroy. Happily, the Prince was yet in Spain when the charges against Solórzano had been received, and the King had commissioned him to take up the case and decide it. Solórzano returned to Lima in the Viceroy's company, and finally succeeded in persuading him of his innocence, but in the meantime, his wife had died, and he had endured two years of disgrace and suffering before he could procure his reinstatement as a Judge of the Royal Audience.

Such was the system by which for three centuries Spain governed her Colonial possessions. There is no indication, anywhere in these enactments, of any desire, however fleeting and ineffectual, to conciliate the good will of the colonists, to improve their material welfare or to promote their intellectual growth. No means was neglected, which the most strenuous and elaborate ingenuity of cupidity and injustice could devise, to secure the only end which the Spanish court sought to attain,—the acquisition of all the money that could

be wrung out of her colonies. There was even no subterfuge employed; this purpose is read in every decree that the Spanish King passed for the government of his colonial subjects. The establishment of the Church and the regulation of its functions in America is hardly to be regarded as an exception, since the authority of the Church was uniformly employed to sanction and gratify the insatiable avarice of the Spanish Court. Nor does there exist any record of any protest on the part of any member of the clergy against this degrading custom, and no resentment was ever expressed at the unworthy service which the King demanded and received from the Church.

Throughout the whole Colonial history the Church was the stronghold of royal power. Some of the lesser clergy, indeed, took an active part in the independence of Spanish America, as they had already done in that of the British Colonies of the North. Here we are familiar with the excellent renown of Eaton, Trumbull, Caldwell, Kirkland, Dwight, John Gano and Thomas Allen of Pittsfield. The clergy of the South when impelled by like noble impulses, ran a much greater hazard than those of the American colonies, since to the peril of war was added the penalty of excommunication which was not a hazard, nor contingent on defeat, but a preliminary certainty of their engaging in the cause of liberty. Cortés and Frétes, affiliés of O'Higgins in the Gran Reunion Americana, were priests, who in Venezuela

and Chile urged on the cause of independence and were excommunicated. The very greatest of them all, Hidalgo, left his parish in Dolores to inaugurate in Mexico a war that lasted without intermission for eleven years before its success was achieved. Hidalgo was excommunicated by the Inquisition and again by the Bishop of Michoacan, and this sentence was confirmed by the Archbishop, Lizana y Beaumont. Taken captive at Chihuahua, June 26, 1811, he was decapitated on the 30th of July, and his head was fixed upon the public granary of Guanajuato, for Spain did not recognize the revolution as even a state of war, but treated her prisoners like bandits—enemies of the Kingdom and of the human race. Camilo Henríquez was a priest, whose glowing eloquence and lofty patriotism found a voice in the "Aurora de Chile," the earliest periodical in South America. Driven from the Church, forgotten by the people he had served, he died in neglect and penury. Morélos was a priest before he became a patriot, and expiated his patriotism by an ignominious death in Valladolid, which a grateful country afterward renamed Morellia in his honor. So Don Mariano Matamoros was a priest, and Acuña and Larrain, and many of the inferior clergy throughout the broad colonies of Spain lent effective and unselfish service to the cause of liberty and humanity.

But these were individuals, who acted on a generous impulse that was not felt by the higher dig-

nitaries of the Church. As a slight extenuation of the hostile attitude assumed by the higher clergy, it may be conceded that they in reality formed a part of the Spanish system, and were too deeply involved in official custom and too dependent for their personal welfare on the perpetuation of the ancient order of government, to be easily influenced by disinterested considerations of humanity, justice and liberty; but from the early dawn of political emancipation, the most powerful and most persistent enemy of independence was the Church. The Bishop of Michoacan in a pastoral which on September 30, 1810, he fulminated against the "rebels," said, "If you continue stubborn, your souls will be destined to the eternal pangs of Hell and your bodies, refused Catholic burial, will serve as food for dogs and the foul birds of the air." A long experience had selected this Homeric curse as the most powerful one in the ecclesiastical armory, and they testified to their faith in its efficacy by its frequent repetition. With slight inflectional change, the Bishop of Popayan reviled the patriots:—"Heretics and detestable schismatics are they who seek independence, but they who defend the holy cause, strive for the holy religion, and if they die, fly direct to Heaven." The Bishop of Maínas issued a pastoral in which he said, "The mere name of liberty is the word most scandalous of all. Fly from it, children, as you would fly from Hell." The Archbishop of Lima added a pleasing figure, "The frightful howlings of the

infernal wolf have been heard in the quiet bosom of this tranquil fold." Don José Miguel Carrera, giving an account of the siege of Chillan, says, in his diary, "The priests preach that it is a mortal sin to fight for one's country, and refuse to absolve the dying unless they shall abjure their patriotism. These representations have a great effect on the people and even on the soldiers." In Concepcion, Father Gregorio del Valle recruited a body of men to whom he gave the name of "The Army of Extermination," which, however, fled in panic with their leader at the distant approach of the patriots.

After all hope had deserted the royal cause, the clergy continued to intrigue for the restoration of Spanish authority. Several years after the establishment in Chile of free government, Don Mariano Egaña, then Chilean minister in London, reported to his government that the Bishop of Santiago was busily occupied, in endeavoring, with the aid of the Peninsular authorities, to subvert the independence of the country and effect the restoration of Spanish authority, or, failing in his full purpose, at least to introduce such a condition of anarchy in Chile as would render that country a ready prey to Spanish intrigue. The Bishop proved so refractory, when his schemes were disclosed, that the government was finally compelled to insist upon his departure from the country.

The revolution of the English Colonies "was directed against the mere theory of tyranny," as

Henry Clay observed; "we had suffered comparatively little; we had in some respects been kindly treated." We had certainly for many years been left practically to ourselves, perhaps the most lenient and the wisest course that could have been taken for our own good; and had been permitted to develop our own capabilities without much supervision and without perceptible restriction.¹ But the Spanish Colonists, the devoted, affectionate and faithful subjects of Spain, had been overwhelmed and oppressed under the most intolerable servitude. Don Adolfo Ibáñez, an illustrious lawyer and Minister of Foreign Relations under President Errázuriz, once told the author, that "without question the Recopilacion de Indias was the most minute, exact and comprehensive special code that the world has ever seen. It is a monument to the oppression of Spain, it is the Utopia of Tyranny." Señor Ibáñez, in thus appreciating the Recopilacion, had in mind the spirit in which this code condescends to regulate the most insignificant details of legal and governmental procedure. Don José Victorino Lastárria, referring to the manner in which this is accomplished,—to the form which the code assumed, does not scruple to deride it as representing "the loftiest attainable altitude of imperfection."

¹ "They nourished by your indulgence!" said Barré, in reply to Charles Townshend's speech in Parliament on the state of affairs in the British North American colonies, "they thrive through your neglect of them."

Among these multitudinous decrees that blighted everything they touched, and that touched every human interest, one searches in vain for any acts of truly beneficent legislation. No scientific expeditions were sent out, no surveying or exploring parties were authorized by the King, no engineers commissioned, no attempt to encourage manufactures, to establish schools, to reform abuses, to build ships, to make roads, to reclaim waste lands. The *Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias* was a code of legislation not so much for colonial government as for colonial exploitation, and in this light, with all its formal imperfections, it deserves the encomium bestowed upon it by Don Adolfo Ibáñez.

Nevertheless, under all these multiplied exactions, the people of Chile were contented and loyal. When the hand of the King of Spain lay heavy upon them they felt no more resentment than when they were afflicted by the hand of God.

Nature conspired with the King and the Council of the Indies to make Chile the type of affectionate submission. She was the poorest and consequently the most neglected member of the Colonial family of Spain. Since the Straits of Magellan were forbidden to Spanish ships, Chile lay at the last nook of the world; beyond her there was geographically nothing; the road stopped there; if a Spaniard visited Chile, he could not go on, but must come back by the way he entered; therefore not many came so far. Into this for-

gotten corner, the news of the world, if it came at all, came only after it had traversed all other lands. The change of dynasties excited no interest here, the rumors of war failed to reach these distant shores. Henry IV., Cromwell, Sobieski, Marlborough, Frederick, might storm across the European stage and fill the world with the clash of arms—even their names were unknown here. The highest reach of personal ambition sought nothing more exalted than a seat in the Cabildo, or an empty title purchased from the Spanish Court. Petty interests filled their lives—the little affairs of their neighbors, the crops, the raising of cattle, the processions of the church. They led a simple bucolic existence, compared with which the life of Philemon and Baucis was a career of wild adventure.

PART II
THE SPANISH JUNTA

“Sin tomar en cuenta los antecedentes del levantamiento i revolucion de España, sin insinuar siquiera los hechos mas culminantes acaecidos en esa epoca fausta para la independencia de America, mal podrian valorizarse las causas morales i políticas que dieron por resultado la emancipacion del Nuevo Mundo.

“EL PRIMER GOBIERNO NACIONAL,
“TOCORNAL.”

“Unless we were to take into consideration the uprising and revolution of Spain and the important occurrences that befell in that period, so auspicious for the cause of American independence, we would necessarily fail to appreciate at their true value the moral and political causes that brought about the emancipation of her colonies.”

“Todas los dias, invierno i verano, iba a cazar hasta las doce, comia i al instante volvia al cazadero hasta la caida de la tarde. Manuel me informaba como iban las cosas, i me iba a acostar para comenzar la misma vida al dia siguiente, a menos de impedirme alguna ceremonia importante.”

“Every day, winter and summer, I went to hunt until noon, ate my dinner and at once returned to the hunt until night-fall. Manuel informed me how things were going, and I went to bed, to begin the same life the next day, unless some important ceremony prevented.

“CHARLES IV. to NAPOLEON at Bayonne.”

THE SPANISH JUNTA

On the 14th of December, 1788, died Charles III., the best King that had occupied the Spanish throne since the union of the crowns, and on the 17th of January, 1789, Charles IV., his son, was crowned King of Spain and the Indies. While still Prince of Asturias, Charles had married Maria Louisa of Parma, and an intrigue had commenced between her and a private soldier in the Prince's guards, named Manuel Godoy, which was destined to bear fatal fruit for Spain and work dreadful havoc to Spanish interests in America. The weak-minded Prince was himself fascinated by the man who had dishonored him, and Godoy was rapidly promoted. He was appointed Adjutant of the Prince's Guards, then their Colonel, Commander of the Order of Santiago, Adjutant General and Camp Marshal. When Charles ascended the throne, Godoy became Brigadier of the Royal Armies, Gentleman of the Chamber, Commander of the Royal Guards, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Charles III., Grande of Spain, with the title Duque de la Alcudia, Counselor of State and Superintendent Gen-

eral of Mails and Roads. In 1792 he supplanted the brilliant Conde de Aranda as First Minister of State and, in September, 1795, he became Principe de la Paz. Such a succession of royal favors astounded the conservative Court of Spain, but they were without power to interfere. Meanwhile, it would be an injustice to Don Manuel Godoy to deny his recognition of these obligations. There was little he could do in acknowledgment, but what he could do he had already done and done cheerfully. It was not in his power to conduct the armies of his Royal Master to victory, or to give his country a useful and dignified public service, but, that he might surpass the King himself in generosity, he bestowed upon his royal benefactor the enduring title—El Cornudo. The King knew the infamy with which Godoy had covered him, but did not resent it. On the contrary, on the 4th of October, 1801, he appointed him General-in-Chief of the "Armies and Navies of Spain," with precedence over all the Grandes of Spain. The Turk, that two and fifty kingdoms hath, bore not so tedious a style as Manuel Godoy. Thus Charles recognized the title of Cornudo, and added to it the culminating stigma of infamy,—Satisfecho.

The Spanish nation had watched with dismay the unexampled promotion of the favorite. They knew his obscure origin, his inglorious career, his ignorance alike of high service and of personal honor, and his incapacity for affairs; they knew

also the abominable source of the honors and dignities that had been lavished upon his unworthy head. Those whom for a moment and for his own base ends he had used, despised him, and the rest of Spain, proud, sober and chaste, knew itself disgraced and degraded through him and execrated him. The tale of the royal dishonor had been spread before the King's eyes, indirectly but convincingly, and the King had replied by a proclamation, that for the future, Godoy was "to be held and respected the same as the King himself." This proclamation was not addressed to the Queen but to the people. There was now no escape from the inference that Spain could only be rid of Godoy by some concerted and irresistible movement directed against him. They had no thought of killing the King; that purpose was indeed discussed, but not by the nobles of Spain.¹ It was discussed between Godoy, the King's beneficiary and Maria Louisa, his Queen, whom the King had befriended even in their amours. The nobles of Spain desired not the death of the King, but the removal of the favorite, and they conspired with Ferdinand that they might be freed from the intolerable infamy that oppressed them. Their loyalty to Charles himself was not in question.

There yet remains some degree of mystery as to how this intrigue—for it may hardly be called

¹ So Suffolk and Queen Margaret were accused, with less reason, of plotting the death of Henry VI.

a conspiracy, although known in history as the "Conspiracion del Escorial," where the court was then staying,—became known to the King, but Charles himself, acting either on information or suspicion, went into his son's room unexpectedly, and discovered, on making a search of Ferdinand's person, a letter in cypher, which being explained by the terror-stricken Prince, proved to be a letter of instructions from his associates. This paper Charles, with the delicacy of a father as well as with the dignity of a King, laid before his Council, although it bore convincing evidence of being directed merely against Godoy.

Ferdinand was overcome with terror. He humiliated himself before the Council, wrote penitent letters ¹ to the King and to the Queen, and, al-

¹ Ferdinand's letters have been preserved by the irony of history. They follow:

"Señor, Papá mio. He delinquido; he faltado a Vuestra Magestad como rei i como padre; pero me arrepiento i ofrezco a Vuestra Magestad la obediencia mas humilde. Nada debia hacer sin noticia de Vuestra Magestad, pero fui sorprendido. He delatado a los culpables, i pido a Vuestra Magestad me perdone por haberle mentido la otra noche, permitiendo besar sus reales pies a su reconocido hijo,

FERNANDO."

"Sir and Papa: I have done wrong, I have offended your Majesty both as my king and as my father; but I am sorry and I offer Your Majesty my most humble obedience. It was not my intention to do anything without Your Majesty's knowledge, but I was taken by surprise. I have denounced the guilty ones and I beg your Majesty to forgive me for telling him a lie and to permit me to prostrate myself at his feet in abject submission. Your grateful son,

FERNAND."

"Señora, Mamá mia. Estoy mui arrepentido del grandis-

though he must have known that the worst possible result of the matter, as far as he was personally concerned, was the severity of his father's displeasure, he divulged the names of all of his associates, and even wrote them down and signed the denunciation with his princely hand, leaving his friends naked and defenceless to the attack of an irritated king and an exasperated favorite. Ferdinand was in his twenty-fourth year when, on the 28th of October, 1807, the "Conspiracion del Escorial" was discovered.

This is a wretched tale. It was the King who himself carried his soiled linen to be washed in the Council, and it was the King who sent the narrative of his spotted home through all the provinces of his vast empire, and commanded his letters to be published in every household of his colonies. The first blow that the royal prestige received in the dependencies of the crown was dealt by the King's own hand. Ferdinand cleared himself from blame, but, while the Council absolved his associates, the King condemned them, some to exile and some to imprisonment. It was with the bitterness of de-

simo delito que he cometido contra mis padres i reyes; i con la mayor humildad la pido a Vuestra Magestad se digne interceder con papá para que permita ir a besar sus reales pies a su reconocido hijo,
FERNANDO."

"My Lady and my Mama: I am full of sorrow for the great offence that I have committed against my royal parents, and with the greatest humility I beseech your Majesty to deign to intercede for me with papa, that I may make my abject submission at his feet. Your grateful son,

FERNAND."

spair that the nobles of Spain learned the cowardice and treachery of their Prince, and knew that they had been basely betrayed by the highest living exponent of chivalric honor.

The Prince was as false to his father as he had been to his friends. Being excluded from their council, he entered into correspondence with Napoleon, for there could be no rest for Spain while Godoy held the highest offices of state. Ferdinand abased himself before Napoleon and invoked his aid with frantic entreaties and extravagant promises, whose only fulfillment was to be the ruin of his country.

Godoy, becoming at length convinced that his position was one of personal danger to himself from his infuriated countrymen, endeavored, with the assistance of the Queen, to persuade Charles to abandon Spain and transfer his throne to Mexico or Peru, as a few months earlier, the Royal family of Portugal had sought Brazil in order to escape the power of Napoleon. He represented to the King the utter impossibility of withstanding the Emperor, whose purpose to annex Spain to France was becoming daily more apparent; he dwelt upon the open hostility of the Spaniards to their King, and dilated on the loyalty of the colonies; and such was his power over Charles, that preparations were at once begun for flight. The court was at Aranjuez when the project was carefully and gradually divulged to those whose attendance the King desired on his

journey, but the terror and despair of the court at being thus abandoned by their monarch, quickly spread to Madrid, and in a frenzy of fear and resentment the excited populace on March 18, 1808, attacked the royal palace and compelled Charles to abdicate in favor of his son. Godoy barely escaped with his life. This was the "Conspiracion de Aranjuez."

But with Godoy out of power, many of the Spaniards preferred Charles to Ferdinand; the nation was divided and Charles retracted his abdication. Then came the "family party" at Bayonne, when Napoleon offered to arbitrate between the rival kings, and father and son, Charles and Ferdinand, resigned their pretensions into the Emperor's hands, each expecting to be favored by the Imperial award. Napoleon after examining the matter, settled it in his own swift way by ordering Charles and Ferdinand into captivity, while he placed his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne.

Confusion thus became worse confounded. There were now three kings of Spain,—el rey padre, el rey joven and el rey intruso. Each had his adherents, and the evils of a civil war threatened to add themselves to the less dreadful evils of a war of conquest. Moreover, that nothing might be omitted that would completely bewilder the affairs of Spain, both in the Peninsula and in the Colonies, another authority arose in the form of a Council which charged itself with the

duty of representing Ferdinand "in captivity." The Council took over the direction of transmarine as well as that of peninsular affairs and its authority was recognized generally at first throughout the Empire, although with increasing misgivings in Spain itself, as its fortunes waned, and with increasing distrust in the colonies, as their eyes became opened to the injustice of their oppression. The government fled from town to town before the advancing and victorious French, who easily gained, one after another, the important cities and strongholds of Spain, until Cadiz alone remained.

But while Spain is the easiest country in Europe to overrun, she is the most difficult to subdue, and the scenes of the War of the Succession, of a century earlier, were re-enacted in the miserable and distracted peninsula. The cities were delivered up by treason, the fortresses fell into the enemy's hands without opposition, but the people were staunch and loyal, and waged a guerrilla warfare that cut off stragglers and small bodies of the French, interrupted their communications and destroyed their supplies. It was no longer warfare, —it was murder, although sanctified by patriotism, when every tree sheltered a Spanish gun and every shot saw a Frenchman fall. It was the protest of peasant Spain against the invasion of Napoleon, and after their strongholds had fallen, their generals had become pensioners of Napoleon, and their nobles had betrayed their trusts to the enemy, the peasants took up the defense of Spain,

vindicated its honor and achieved its independence. Napier perhaps underestimated the valor of Palafox, but Wellington writing from Celorico, on May 11, 1810, to Lieut. Col. Graham, says of the character of the Spaniards, "They have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy, by which their situation might be gradually improved;" and in a despatch dated, December 2nd, 1810, he says, "I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet; after having been shut up in Cadiz for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defense, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers, on the danger of omitting them." No better judge had ever a better opportunity of forming an opinion. But, whatever faults of enterprise and discipline pervaded the regular troops, the Spanish peasants were excellently adapted to the prosecution of guerrilla warfare.

"War in Spain," said Macaulay, "has, from the days of the Romans, had a character of its own; it is a fire that cannot be raked out; it burns fiercely under the embers; and long after it has, to all seeming, been extinguished, bursts out more violently than ever. Spain had no army which could have looked in the face an equal number of French or Prussian soldiers; but one day laid the Prussian monarchy in the dust; one day put the crown of France at the disposal of invaders. No

Jena, no Waterloo, would have enabled Joseph to reign quietly in Madrid."

The Arabs in conquering Spain, achieved an absolute and complete conquest. They left no hamlet unsubdued, no mountain pass unoccupied. Many Christians were suffered to live among them, under such easy conditions of religious observance and personal service, that there is scarcely an instance of revolt breaking out among them, but, apart from these slaves of the soil, whose lives were purchased at the price of continuous submission, the Spaniards were slain without ruth or ransom until the last gasp of opposition was stifled. Among the mountains of Sobrarbe and Oviedo, a few desperate waifs, thrown madly upon these rugged rocks, where they clung like limpets, prayed only that they might escape detection, while they watched with wild eyes the movements of their enemies, as the receding wave of conquest settled in the plains below. Gradually they rallied from the stupor of utter defeat and began to engage in petty warfare with the Arabs, who scarcely heeded them in their disdain. Little by little, they pushed the invaders back, adding at first field to field like a miser, then capturing hamlet and pass and hilltop like a covetous baron. Slowly their possessions spread. One of their number, Pelayo, "The Fighter," they raised aloft upon their great Gothic shields and hailed "King." Then was first heard the battle cry of Spain, "Santiago i a ellos," which rang over the peninsula

through seven hundred years of warfare, until they had driven the Moslem across the narrow sea and retrieved in seven centuries what they had lost in a few months.—Not Russia, but Spain, was the rock upon which Napoleon split.

For many years Spain had followed Napoleon with the infatuation of an unmerited reverence. She had always done his bidding. It was Napoleon who shaped her foreign policy in peace and war, who dictated her treaties, who sent her fleet to destruction at Trafalgar. She was obedient to him to the point of servility. If instead of sending Murat across the Pyrenees with one hundred thousand men, Napoleon had requested Spain to furnish him with an army corps, his command would have been received with instant submission. His invasion of the Peninsula, the inconsiderate act of a self-confident despot, converted a subservient ally into a resentful enemy. He entered Spain as a burglar, in the pursuit of his professional aim, might enter at midnight the house of a devoted friend. The house and the household were already his, if he had cared to know it, but the one thing in the world of possibilities, that Spain would resent, and the only thing that he could not do with impunity, was the thing he did.

Being deceived and robbed by her friend Napoleon, Spain had yet to undergo the unpalatable humiliation of being succored by her hated enemy, England. No wonder that all Spain was lukewarm, and that Grandes and officers found it

easier to forgive Napoleon their spoliation, than to acknowledge the English to be their benefactors.

Meanwhile, the Council of Spain continued, after the fall and imprisonment of Charles and Ferdinand, to maintain the royal cause, and was recognized alike by the Peninsular and the Colonial Spaniards, as representing the King. But, accustomed merely to transmit the royal commands, the Council lacked confidence as well as experience in assuming the initiative in the urgent crisis that confronted the country, and feared to take the responsibility of active decision. They dreaded the King's anger, if they acknowledged the French usurper, and the French if they remained loyal to Ferdinand.

Quickly, as the result of this indecision, there arose throughout the Peninsula, local committees of provincial government, called Juntas, which disputed the authority and impaired the prestige of the Council. Joseph, now known as the King whom Napoleon had decided to give to them, was not slow to take advantage of this propitious division. By the adroit alternation of recognition and contempt, he depressed the reputation of the Council until it became an object of resentment to the Spaniards themselves.

As the importance of the Council declined, that of the provincial Juntas acquired a temporary predominance, but it soon became manifest that there could arise from them no unanimity of purpose and no provision for the general welfare of

the nation. Into the petty medley of selfish and local politics that ensued, it would be tedious to enter. The Juntas of Leon, Asturias and Galicia, neglecting the menace of a common enemy, were in open strife among themselves, while the internal condition of each province was one of family hatred, of local feuds and personal greed. Ignorant and incapable as the provincial gentry were, they became arrogant and haughty with the sudden assumption of unaccustomed authority. The provincial Juntas, led by such ignoble chiefs, denied aid to each other and refused to permit their militia to engage with the enemy beyond the narrow limits of their particular province, while they resented the control of any central authority as an injury to their pretensions. No concert was possible among provinces which denied any authority paramount to their own, and which even refused to recognize as equal to themselves the similarly constituted Juntas of any of the other provinces. Galicia refused openly to act with her neighbor, and Seville made no secret of her pretensions to supremacy among her equals, while the money and stores received from England were diverted from the provincial treasuries and appropriated to the use of the individuals composing the Juntas. The actual approach of the French and their subjection of province after province in their victorious march, were inadequate to allay the jealousy and hostility among the provinces that remained unsubdued, and to awaken them to

any general concert of action. Thus they lost all reputation for patriotism and efficiency, and became universally odious to the nation. They were suffered to exist, for there was no local authority that could under the circumstances be invoked to supersede them, but all hope was departed from their councils and all unanimity of effort seemed impossible.

In the general confusion and bewilderment, however, there arose at last among the provinces, a recognition of the absolute need of some national body which should direct peninsular and colonial affairs, and for a moment they laid aside their jealousies and sent delegates to Aranjuez, where a Junta Central was elected to take over the control of the state. Upon this body the general hope of Spain was fixed, and the national consent rallied to enhance its control and confirm its authority. The provincial Juntas also yielded their recognition to the new government, which from this acquisition of authority sprang at once into the uncontrolled exercise of supreme power.

But the first enactments of this body presaged the ineptitude of their administration. They declared:—

1st:—That their own persons were inviolable, and that disobedience or disrespect were to be regarded as high treason.

2nd:—That the President of the Junta should have the style of “Highness” and the other mem-

bers that of "Excellency," while the Junta as a body was styled "Majesty."

3rd:—That the President's salary should be twenty-five thousand crowns annually, and that of the members five thousand crowns.

The regulation of precedency and the discussion of a public ceremonial occupied their time and consumed the patience of the country for months. Not until these vital questions could be decided, was any thought taken to conserve the national territory, dignity and honor.

They next proceeded, in the pursuit of their own interests, to persecute the provincial Juntas, and for this purpose maintained spies in every province, to denounce secretly any person who might seem to incline to the French cause, or who might seek to disparage the authority of the Junta Central. Many persons thus denounced were seized and executed, without knowing who were their accusers and without learning the nature of their accusations. Meanwhile, they neglected the interests of the state and evaded the obligations of their alliance.

So far were the English from receiving any effective help from the Junta Central that even the supplies of money and arms that were furnished by England to fit out the forces with which Spain was to aid her allies, were either sold, appropriated or concealed by the Peninsular authorities. It is true that the English were fighting for their own

interests, that they were the enemies of Napoleon before they became the allies of Spain; it is true also that the sympathies of many Spaniards were more easily and more naturally enlisted on the side of Napoleon, whom they admired, than on the side of their hereditary foes the English, whom they hated; but the dignity of the nation was compromised infinitely by the Junta Central, the provincial Juntas and the Spanish nobility, who saw their country made a mere battlefield for the settlement of European politics, without venturing to take a decisive part with the allies who were fighting their battles as well as their own.

Such was the early history of the Junta Central. "In any other country," said General Napier, "the conduct of the government would have been attributed to insanity; continually devising how to enjoy the luxury of power without its labor, how to acquire reputation without trouble, how to be indolent and victorious at the same moment. So apathetic with respect to the enemy as to be contemptible, so active in the pursuit of self-interest as to become hateful." Their folly and their weakness were alike incredible. Their President was that Count of Florida-blanca, who had for fifteen years sat at the head of the council board under Charles III. and Charles IV. as Prime Minister, but he was now old and weak and worn-out and soon to die.

As the authority of Folly waned, that of Discord revived, and the provincial Juntas, with the

return of their local control, resumed also their mutual animosities. But these were not long to endure. As one province after another fell into the hands of the French, martial law was enforced, and the inhabitants who remained in the towns and villages were compelled to submit to French control, until the Junta of Seville alone survived to withstand the pretensions of the Junta Central, which was now become the object of universal contempt. On January 24, 1810, the Junta Central was dissolved and its members ignominiously dispersed by the Junta of Seville.

But before flying in disgrace from Seville, the members of the Junta Central took at length the advice that Sir Arthur Wellesley had long since given them, and named a "Supreme Council of Regency." This body succeeded in effecting its organization in Cadiz on the 31st of January, 1810. With a new name, a new purpose seemed to be infused into the government. Dignity and efficiency were recalled to the Spanish councils, and Wellesley learned that there yet remained to the Spanish character an integrity and a vigor which he had despaired to find. Still it was too late for the Spanish Council of Regency to retrieve the errors of the Junta Central in its colonial administration.

As the purpose of this brief sketch of the vicissitudes of the Junta Central was only rendered necessary to explain the impression on the colonists of the proceedings of the Peninsular authorities who conducted also Colonial affairs, it

would be entirely impertinent to enter into any consideration, however brief, of the conduct of the armies that marched and met and conquered or were defeated during the five years following 1808. Nor do the subsequent transactions of the Supreme Council of Regency fall within the scope of the present inquiry farther than to justify the remark that it was this body that stimulated the formation of the guerrilla bands (*partidas*), which contributed so largely to the success of Wellington's plans. General Napier underrates immensely the value of these irregular companies, because they offended the instincts and traditions of the trained soldier, but surely it was no slight help to Wellington to be able to send his despatches in any direction, to any distance and at any hour, while the French commander was obliged to detail a colonel with five hundred men to send a letter twenty miles from his headquarters. Of the further conduct of affairs by the Supreme Council of Regency, which remained in control for over three years, when it yielded its authority to the Cortes, it is only necessary to record here that they withdrew from service in the Peninsula the forces which from time to time they sent to America, and, but for the fact that England was fighting their battles at home, they would thus have exposed themselves, as far as it lay in their hands, to the complete destruction of their very existence as a nation.

PART III

THE BEGINNING OF INDEPENDENCE

THE BEGINNING OF INDEPENDENCE

“Albricias, Chile! ya la hermosa aurora,
Nuncio feliz del bello i claro dia,
Va saliendo.”

MANUEL FERNANDEZ.

“Good tidings, Chile! Now the happy
dawn,
Herald of prosperous and unclouded day,
Begins to break.”

The stars in their courses fought against Spain, and no one contributed more strangely to the independence of Chile than Don Ambrosio O'Higgins, the most energetic and devoted official that Spain possessed in America during the eighteenth century. Ambrose Higgins was an Irish lad, who was born about the year 1720 in Summerhill, County Meath, Ireland, about thirty miles northwest of Dublin. As a lad he entered as stableboy the service of the old Countess of Summerhill, “Condesa de Bective,” as the Spanish called her, whose estates lay in County Meath. Here for some years he remained, fulfilling his humble duties faithfully, but as he grew older the restlessness of an uncertain ambition drove him from Ireland to Spain, where through the aid or influence of an uncle who was in holy orders in that country, he hoped to improve his condition.

But for all his uncle's help, Spain offered little to gratify the eager ambition of the Irish youth. He learned the language of Spain and worked for a trifle of wages in the store of a merchant of Cadiz. Here also he remained for years, until the cumulative monotony of his narrow life convinced him that Spain was not for him the land of hope that he had thought, and compelled him to seek fresh fields. He turned to Peru, and with a little stock of merchandise that was entrusted to him by his employer in Cadiz, he landed at Callao. In Lima, on his arrival, he was thrown into prison by the Inquisition on the suspicion of heresy. His certificates were in proper form and his permit to leave Cadiz for Peru "for commercial purposes" was duly made out by the Council, but he was an Irishman, a foreigner, and necessarily a suspicious person. At length, however, he succeeded in satisfying the Peruvian Inquisitors as to his character and purposes and was discharged, but his goods, his merchandise, that had been seized at the time of his arrest, had disappeared, and on presenting a memorial pleading for restitution, he was haughtily informed that his release from imprisonment was an act of grace with which he must be contented and make no further requisitions on the Holy Office. Destitute now, and more than destitute, since he still owed for the little stock so summarily and so unjustly taken from him, but full of hope and courage, he started out as a peddler traveling from house to house through the country

with his pack on his back. Even in this he failed, not from any sloth or dishonesty, for these were never in him,¹ but from the continued opposition of the Inquisitors, who, in resentment of his temerity in requiring at their hands the restitution of his confiscated merchandise, subjected him to constant and harassing restrictions. Finding his little affairs involved beyond hope of extrication, and realizing the necessity of withdrawing himself if possible from the malevolent supervision of the Inquisition, he obtained from his creditors permission to leave Peru, and was even entrusted by them with the conduct of certain speculations that they wished to set on foot in Chile. To Concepcion he went, but misfortune again frustrated his expectations, and the project proved a total failure. An ordinary man would have been overwhelmed with despair after suffering these successive blows. Even an extraordinary man, who had endured such multitudinous reverses, would have lost confidence in himself and hope in the future. Higgins had now reached the age of fifty-three years, and if ever a man was justified in considering himself an absolute failure, it was he. But the Goddess of Destiny was at last worn out. Instead of subduing him, she had been herself subdued; when she buffeted him, she herself received the blow. Nothing could impair his courage; and now at last the wheel of Fortune began to turn, and, as before she had overwhelmed him

¹ *Nunquam animus negotio defuit, nec decretis labor.*

in disaster and ruin, so now there was no limit to his prosperity, and within a few years he attained the most coveted and most exalted position in the world, next to—or perhaps even including—royalty. He became Viceroy of Peru. Still the first step upwards might well have seemed the last step down. He enlisted in the Spanish army in Concepcion.

But now everything was propitious to him. The Araucans had long been restless and resentful, and in this same year of 1773, they arose with the purpose of sweeping the Spaniards into the ocean. The forts beyond the river Bio-bio disappeared like clouds before their furious onset, and the walls of the frontier cities were crushed as if they had been made of paper. Northward the furious horde swept like fire through forest pines, or Eurus over the Sicilian waves. Concepcion was invested and cut off from the rest of the kingdom. Terror fell upon Santiago, and all plans were bewildered by the sudden and irresistible onslaught. Higgins seemed the only person in Concepcion who retained tranquillity. He suggested to his Commander the wisdom of counteracting the rapid progress of the Araucans with a body of mounted light infantry or dragoons. His plan was accepted because it alone offered hope and the command was given to him. He succeeded in his purpose, succeeded even beyond his hopes, and was advanced to Lieutenant Colonel. His regiment was the salvation of Chile, and became

famous under the name "Dragones de la Frontera," and Higgins, whose name was now Don Ambrosio O'Higgins, became colonel. The war had by this time ceased, and Colonel O'Higgins busied himself with a system of defense for the kingdom both against foreign invasion and against the assaults of the Araucans. This plan was adopted by the Captain General, and the name of O'Higgins was mentioned with admiration in the Court of Charles III. It was at this time that he built the road from San Felipe over the Andes to Mendoza and erected the little stone casuchas for the shelter of travelers, in which the writer of this book has found a refuge and breathed his simple benediction on the memory of Don Ambrosio O'Higgins.

When fortune came finally to O'Higgins, she came with both hands full. He next became the Intendente of Concepcion, then the second city in the kingdom. But before this office was conferred upon him, he had found time to become the father of Don Bernardo O'Higgins, "the child of his love and his old age," who was destined to play a great part in the drama of independence. Bernardo was his greatest gift to Chile, but when, in 1788, he became the King's immediate representative, as Captain General and Governor of Chile, he effected a reform of unexampled importance in freeing the Araucans from servitude and placing them on the same political footing with the Chileans of Spanish descent. In

a despatch to the king dated from Quillota, on the 3rd day of April, 1789, Don Ambrosio announced the settlement of this really momentous question. This and this alone pacified the fierce tribes of the South, and prevented them from engaging actively with the Peninsular forces in the struggle for independence. For the continuous benefit of this final and complete settlement of the Araucan question, the Chileans of to-day owe him a burden of gratitude that they are not loth to confess. Spain, too, perceiving only the immediate benefit, and fearing, no more than O'Higgins himself feared, the effect of this conciliation upon the security of their dominion, was not remiss in rewarding its author, and from Baron de Vallenar created him Marquis de Osorno, and finally advanced him, the stable boy of the Countess of Summerhill, the drygoods clerk of Cadiz, the bankrupt peddler of Lima, to the post that the proudest Grandes of Spain longed for in vain,—the Viceroyalty of Peru.

In 1779, Colonel O'Higgins, then in the sixtieth year of his age, was engaged in perfecting the scheme that he had devised for the protection of the Chilean frontier. In the prosecution of this plan, he spent some time in Chillan and was, as Vicuña-Mackenna conjectures, a guest in the family of the Riquelme, one of the well-to-do proprietors of that district. In what manner or by the exhibition of what unsuspected graces, the elderly Irish soldier achieved the conquest

of the daughter of the house, one can scarcely imagine. His portrait, taken a few years later, still shows his erect figure unsubdued by the constant buffetings of adverse fortune, his severe face, his calm eye, his haughty carriage, his corpulent figure, but there is no beauty in him that Doña Isabel de Riquelme, a maid of fifteen, should desire him. However, in 1780 she bore him a son whom he acknowledged at once as his own, and for whose maintenance and education he provided liberally. It is not likely that there was any promise of marriage, for Don Ambrosio was not a man to make a promise that he had no intention to fulfill, and he knew well that his expectation of future power and authority would be blasted beyond all hope by a marriage with a Chilean, but there seems to have remained no resentment in the minds of her family at the issue of the affair, no importunate clamor was raised against him, and no reproach seems ever to have been directed against the young lady, who afterwards married Don Felix Rodriguez, and in time presented him with a daughter, between whom and Bernardo there ever existed the most beautiful fraternal affection. The family of Don Simon Riquelme, Isabel's father, was a proud one, tracing their pedigree directly from the treasurer of Francisco Pizarro, Alonzo Riquelme, whose corpulence attracted the attention of the Inca Atahualpa when, before his execution in the public square of Cuzco, he saw him standing with Almagro in conversa-

tion. "The fat one" said the Inca, "and the one-eyed one will kill me between them." ("De ese gordo i de este tuerto temo que me maten.")

When Don Bernardo was living in exile in Lima, in 1833, an ungenerous enemy wrote a libel on him, in which the charge was made that he owed his birth to chance. "Not to chance," said Don Bernardo, raising his eyes, moist with tears at this ignoble stab, "not to chance, but to Providence."

When Bernardo was nine years old, his father, now Governor and Captain General of Chile, sent him to Lima to be educated at the famous school "El Principe." Here he was entered as Bernardo Riquelme, for his father always refused to give him his own name, and pursued the life of a school boy in a brilliant city, until he had attained the age of fifteen years, when he was sent to England. Here he lived for five years, at school in Richmond on the Thames. There are extant some apocryphal narratives, by the imaginative Albano, of his presentation to George III., and of his intimacy with some of the most eminent contemporary Englishmen, but the journal of Bernardo himself, which is also extant, affords no support to these fanciful tales. He may have seen the king walking in his gardens at Kew. His Majesty may have observed the comely youth with red cheeks and blue eyes and curly hair; he may even have questioned him a little, and found out to his surprise that the lad with the Irish features was the son of the Viceroy of Peru, and an an-

cient subject of Great Britain, but there is no valid basis for any statement that he ever saw George III. and conjecture is without value on a subject that is, like this one, devoid of importance. Bernardo seems to have been supplied with ample funds by his father through Don Nicolas Cruz of Cadiz, to have spent his time studying mathematics, music and painting, and to have lived the simple, pure life of an English lad at a private school. Toward the end of his stay in England, however, he made one acquaintance which was destined to have the most momentous influence upon his own career, upon his father's life, and upon the future of Chile. This remarkable incident is much too important to dismiss hurriedly. Bernardo became intimate with Don Francisco Miranda.

Among the many men who contributed to make the year 1810 possible in Spanish America, the most influential was unquestionably Miranda. Born in Venezuela, he became, while still a youth, an officer in the army of Spain. He came with Lafayette to aid the American Colonies against Britain, having even at the early age of twenty become a Captain in the Spanish service. This incident in Miranda's adventurous life has given occasion to some historians to magnify, and to others to distort, the actual fact. Spain sent no "ejercito de auxilio" to the colonies in 1779, under the leadership of a youth in his twenties from Venezuela. Miranda probably came as a volun-

teer, and perhaps served on Lafayette's staff. At all events and under whatever circumstances, he came to aid the American colonies. Washington he revered above all mortal men, recognizing in him the realization of all the ardent ideals of his impulsive heart. Doubtless it was here in Virginia that the great purpose first entered his soul to devote his life to the emancipation of Spanish America, but he left no enduring mark of his presence here and any narrative of his activities on our soil would be apocryphal. In England, we hear of him as the friend of Fox, in Russia he was received kindly by the Empress Catherine, who set aside a sum of money for him to use in propagating his revolutionary schemes, in France he commanded a division of the Army of the Republic, and on his return to England he established a secret society, that soon became famous under the name of the "Gran Reunion Americana."

Erected on the model of the Lodges of Free Masonry that wielded such a beneficent influence for humanity during the eighteenth century, and conforming in great part with Masonic principles and methods, the "Reunion" included in its rolls many of the foremost patriots of Spanish America. There were found registered the names of Narino, San Martin, Frétes, Cortes, Yznaga, Bejarano, and many others who represented every Spanish American Colony from Cuba to Chile. When Miranda had satisfied himself that Bernardo possessed those qualities of character that would ren-

der him steadfast as well as enthusiastic, he opened before him the great purpose of achieving the independence of all of the Spanish Colonies in America by one concerted and irresistible movement, and O'Higgins joined the lodge and took the necessary oaths of fidelity and service. It is interesting to know that a few years later Simon Bolívar also joined the same order, took the same oaths and fulfilled with equal fidelity the solemn engagements which joined him with San Martin and O'Higgins in overthrowing the power in America of the King of Spain.

In July, 1799, Don Bernardo left England for Cadiz, filled with the most eager desire to return home that he might put into practice the precepts of his teacher, Miranda. Already he saw himself inaugurating in Chile the patriotic movement for liberty, and all good men and true rallying at his summons. A thousand plans passed through his excited mind, snatching him from sleep and immersing him in ardent and generous imaginings. But at Cadiz disappointment met him. Don Nicolas, Don Ambrosio's agent, had no money for his needs and no concern for his disappointment. A strange reticence fell between Don Nicolas, who offered no explanation of his discourtesy, and Don Bernardo, offended and humiliated, who was too proud to demand one. The young man might have made out to procure a passage from Cadiz for Buenos Ayres or Panama, whence he would be able to reach Lima, but the English fleet main-

tained a strict blockade and there was no hope of evading it. Then the yellow fever attacked Cadiz and Bernardo fell seriously ill.

After some months, when his health had returned from the yellow fever, he did secure a passage in a vessel of the fleet bound for Buenos Ayres, but within four days of their departure from Cadiz, a squadron of four or five English vessels of war appeared and captured the whole fleet almost without resistance. Bernardo told the story in a letter to his father after he had reached Cadiz from Gibraltar, where, for some reason that he does not disclose, the English ships put him ashore.

In these circumstances of disappointment and humiliation, a year and a half had elapsed since Bernardo had reached Cadiz from London in the expectation of an immediate departure for Chile, but the worst was not yet reached. Not yet had the ardent soul of the young enthusiast been sufficiently tried. One day Don Nicolas called him into his private office and coldly informed him that he had received a letter from Don Ambrosio wherein the Viceroy announced that he would no longer recognize him as his son, that he expelled him from his house, and required Don Nicolas to drive him forthwith from his household.

Bernardo was proud, but his pride was no support under this crushing blow; and for a time the keenly sensitive Irish heart of the young man suffered agonies worse than death. Perhaps the blow

to his pride was not much less painful than that to his affections for, warm and generous as was his heart, it must be remembered that there is no reason to believe that he had ever seen his father and there seems to be no evidence that his father had ever written him a letter in his life. Still, if a shattered world had fallen in on him, it could not more surely have deprived him of home, hope and career. Moreover, his ignorance of anything that could have caused such a revulsion in a parent whom he knew to be the type of justice and honor, and in whom he had felt that there existed the deep and tender love of a father for his only son, caused in him a bewilderment that was not far from insanity. Not for a moment, among the conjectures that flooded his mind, did any suspicion of the real cause occur to him, nor for ten years after his father's death did a ray of light illumine the bewildering mystery of his father's anger. In 1811, Colonel Mackenna wrote him in a few words the whole truth. "Vuestras relaciones con Miranda fueron denunciadas al gobierno Español, i no ignorais las atroces medidas tomadas en consecuencia contra vuestro venerable padre."¹

All was thus explained. The sudden hostility of the Spanish court toward Don Ambrosio, and the charges which he was ordered to go at once to Spain to answer; his sudden death in Lima, doubt-

¹ "Your relations with Miranda were denounced to the Spanish Government and you are well aware of the violent measures that were taken to destroy your venerable father."

less hastened by the brutal accusations of the Council of the Indies; the grief and chagrin of suffering in his old age for the offence of Bernardo, even if it were merely the offence of levity, (perhaps it would be more just to say, considering Don Ambrosio's character, especially if it were the offence of levity); and the final rupture of relations with his son. The result was much pain and suffering for Bernardo, but it was death for his father, who ended a magnificent career at the age of eighty-one, under the unmerited imputation of disloyalty, and his son was the occasion.

And yet Don Bernardo was without blame. The cleavage of great moral reforms does not respect the lines of kinship or of personal interest; it runs athwart the customs of families and divides communities and nations. Not peace but a sword. In the general disruption of revolution that soon tore Spain asunder and drenched the soil of South America with the blood of patriots, one cannot but admire that among the first victims of the sacred cause of liberty, should be the Viceroy of Peru, the incarnation of the pride, power and honor of Spain. It was not Bernardo that killed the Viceroy. It was the hand of fate using the unconscious son as a weapon. Perhaps Don Ambrosio recognized in his misfortune the hand of his ancient enemy and absolved his son of intentional complicity in his misfortune. At any rate, Don Bernardo succeeded quietly to his father's ample estate and assumed the name of O'Higgins, to

which he was destined to add a lustre that outshone even the radiance and prestige of the great Viceroy, who had first ennobled it.

After his return to Chile early in 1802, for the voyage from Cadiz to Valparaiso consumed a year, Bernardo Riquelme, who was henceforth to be known as Bernardo O'Higgins, lived the secluded life of a country gentleman on one of the estates in the south of Chile which he had received from his father. He seems to have contented himself with a mere perfunctory demand for recognition as heir to his father's titles of Baron of Vallenar and Marquis of Osorno, and to have reconciled himself easily to their loss. He may have recognized the impossibility of sustaining his claim before the Court of Spain, where his record was not one that would conciliate favor, but it is more probable that already his ambition extended to a higher and a nobler title than was in the power of the Spanish Court to bestow.

Of his life for the next few years there is little of importance to narrate. He became Alcalde of Chillan, he planted vineyards and attended to the details of the management of his estate. Sobered by his misfortunes, which had transformed impetuosity into expectation, he was content to watch the signs of the times, keeping in communication with his associates of the Reunion, and preparing himself for the great cause that lay before him. It was perhaps partly with this motive that he did not marry, but there is no doubt that his

love for his mother and sister filled his heart to the exclusion of any other passion. The affection that was so soon withdrawn from his mother by Don Ambrosio, and was apparently but scantily shown by her husband, was more than supplied by the loving devotion that Bernardo lavished upon her.

So he waited, scanning the horizon and with his ear open to the presaging winds from the North and East. In 1807, when the news of the English landing in Buenos Ayres came thundering into Chillan, he knew that the hand of the "Master," Miranda, had dealt the blow, and felt that the time was near when he too must throw himself into the red gulf of war, if perchance he might assist in winning freedom for his country.

From this time began his active efforts for the new cause. With an instinctive admiration of military life, he nevertheless realized that to recruit and drill mysterious levies in the face of the Spanish garrisons of Chillan and Concepcion, was not the way to advance his purpose. He had long since satisfied himself that the people of the South of Chile, inured to almost constant warfare with the Araucans, were the best stuff in the world for militia, and under a worthy leader would not yield in steadiness to veteran soldiers. Many of the officers too were Chileans, with whom O'Higgins was on terms of friendly intimacy, and to them, individually and cautiously, he opened up the purpose that was so dear to his heart, and there seems to be no instance where his confidence was

betrayed or, what is more remarkable, where his counsels and arguments did not succeed in their purpose. It seems to have been now also that the intimacy was confirmed between Don Juan Martínez de Rózas and O'Higgins, which strengthened the hands of both and proved so fertile of good for Chile. For from these two, Rózas and O'Higgins, Chile was destined to receive the direction and the impetus which have guided the natural genius of the Chilean people into the path of continuous achievement, and have bestowed upon their government that stability which, almost alone among South American peoples, has characterized their country until the present time.

On February 10th, 1808, died Don Luis Muñoz de Guzman, Governor and Captain General of Chile and President of the Royal Audience, and the duty devolved on the Audience to name a successor until the King might be informed of Muñoz's death and appoint a new governor. The selection did not seem to present any particular difficulty. The case was not a new one—the condition had often occurred and the succession had been prescribed by a royal decree published two years earlier, under which the senior military officer in the kingdom was designated as the proper person to be named. In fact, his election was a mere form, which survived from earlier custom when the Audience really had the electing power in commendam. It happened now, however, that the ranking officer in Chile was the old General, Don Pedro Quijada,

who was incapacitated by age and ineligible from physical disabilities. General Quijada being thus disqualified, the course was again perfectly clear, for the decree designated the Brigadier General, Don Francisco Ant3nio Garc3a Carrasco as the Provisional Governor. But the Audience delayed to act, being divided between General Carrasco and the Regent of the Royal Audience, Don Jos3 Rodr3guez Ballesteros. It doubtless seemed to them that if they could pass over General Quijada, they might go a step farther and suppress the claim of General Carrasco. Perhaps if they had acted at once and firmly, they might have succeeded in excluding Carrasco, but they hesitated to take the important step and let "I dare not" wait upon "I would." While they delayed, the preference of the people for Ballesteros became so outspoken that the Royal Audience was on the point of disregarding the order of succession in favor of the Regent, who indeed issued some unimportant decrees, when General Carrasco suddenly appeared in the Capital. Under advice from Don Juan Mart3nez de R3zas, he came up hastily from Concepcion to secure his rights, and constrained the Royal Audience to fulfill the provision of the royal decree. General Carrasco thus became the Governor of Chile and kept R3zas at his side, giving him the position of Asesor.

Don Juan Mart3nez de R3zas, although thus for the time serving as an official of the Spanish government in Chile, was destined to take the fore-

most part in the movement that resulted in the subversion of royal authority in Chile. He was born in Mendoza, then a part of Chile, in 1759. His father was a Spaniard who had attained a position of some importance in Mendoza, and his mother could count among her ancestors Jerónimo de Alderete (the first Governor of Chile who was named directly by the King Philip II.), and that Alonzo de Reinoso who put Caupolicán to death in the Plaza of Cañete.

He was sent as a lad to the University of Córdoba, in what is now the Argentine, and for several years pursued the usual university course of study, which consisted of Scholastic Philosophy, Theology, Canon Law, and the Patristic writings,—all of which required an intimate knowledge of Latin,—besides the *Siete Partidas* and the *Recopilación*. In 1780 at the age of twenty-one, he came to Chile, where he soon won the respect of the more learned class in the city by his attainments, the esteem of society by his modest kindness, and the goodwill of the Governor, Don Ambrosio de Benavídes, by his good judgment and his aptitude for affairs. In 1781, the Governor appointed him to teach philosophy in the College in Santiago, and he added of his own accord the innovation of a course in experimental physics.

Meanwhile, he continued the study of the law, and in 1784 was admitted as a lawyer, while two years later his proficiency in both laws was recognized by his receiving the highest scholastic and

literary distinction that the Colony could bestow,—the degree of LL.D. He was appointed by the Audience, “Defensor de Pobres,” and by the Governor, Professor of Law in the College in Santiago. He was then twenty-seven years of age.

It must have been about this time that his friendship began with Don Ambrosio O’Higgins, which remained unbroken until O’Higgins’ death in 1801, as Viceroy of Peru. There could scarcely be a higher test of honesty and extraordinary ability than the esteem of Don Ambrosio O’Higgins. In what manner these two eminent men became acquainted we do not know, but Don Ambrosio was so much impressed with the young lawyer’s character and ability, that he requested leave of Governor Benavídes to take Rózas with him to Concepcion as Asesor. Benavídes consented, and thus Rózas’ life became for several years closely connected with the conduct of affairs in the South of Chile. To him O’Higgins committed the execution of important reforms, and seems to have confidently relied upon Rózas’ energy and fidelity.

And yet O’Higgins, when in 1788 he became Governor of Chile, and when eight years later he was advanced to the Viceroyalty of Peru, left Rózas in Concepcion as Asesor. He wrote in the highest terms of eulogy to the Council of the Indies, concerning his young protégé,—he seemed as fond of him and as sure of him as ever, but he left him in the comparative obscurity of Concepcion. The Council of the Indies never, as far

as is now known, paid the slightest attention to the welfare of the young lawyer, except to take advantage of a technical absence from the city and supersede him as quickly as possible. To Rózas himself, conscious as he was of his own energy, integrity and enthusiasm, and especially with the encomiums of the Viceroy still ringing in his ears, this neglect and studied abandonment may have seemed unaccountable and captious, but it was in direct keeping with the consistent policy of Spain toward her servants in the Colonies. It was in obedience to this policy that Ambrosio O'Higgins preferred his ambition of power to his love for the girl who had borne him a son, and refused to destroy his future by a marriage with a Chilean. I have spoken already of this feature of the colonial policy of Spain. Rózas was a victim of it, and he must have known what would be the direct result on his own political prospects of his marriage in Concepcion with Doña Maria de las Nieves Urrutia Mendiburu i Manzános, the daughter of one of the richest and most illustrious families of the South of Chile. So for the next thirteen years, Rózas lived the life of a private gentleman in the studious retirement of an estate which his wife brought him at their marriage.

Here he studied political economy and history, as well as general literature. He composed a treatise "De arte poetica." He corresponded with Miranda and became enthusiastic for freedom and independence. He was Master of Lautaro

Lodge in Concepcion, where academic arguments on the abstract principles of government prepared the way for the great changes that were to take place in Chile. He continued to reside in Concepcion, where his wide range of general knowledge and his skill in the law were the admiration of all who knew him. It was Rózas whom Carrasco consulted in his uncertainty as to assuming uninvited the office of Governor, and it was at Rózas' suggestion that Carrasco claimed the fulfillment of the royal provision.

The population of Chile at the beginning of the nineteenth century was computed at four hundred thousand persons, of whom perhaps three hundred and ninety thousand lived in political and social dependence on the rest. Outside of the Capital, which Tocornal estimates at fifty thousand inhabitants, the only other considerable cities were Concepcion in the south, and Coquimbo in the north. Valparaiso contained about two thousand souls and was little more than a fishing hamlet. Vicuña-Mackenna calls Valparaiso very prettily the "Child of the Revolution." The rest of the inhabitants were scattered in the villages that clung to the Cordillera or that nestled in the bays along the coast, and in the estancias or country estates of the great proprietors, among whom there were some individuals who could recruit and equip a regiment on their respective estates. These proprietors, hacendados, had their residences in the Capital, where they spent the winter

months, and were all related, by ties of blood or of marriage as well to each other as to the aristocratic families permanently resident in Santiago. Don José Manuel de Astorga, who has been called the most famous of Chilean genealogists, in speaking of Chileans during the seventeenth century, said that "En Santiago, el que no es Lisperguer, es mulato,"¹ so extensively had the blood of that famous family permeated the higher class of Chilean society. This remark continued to be true in a broader sense during the whole subsequent history of the colonists, whose isolation necessitated intermarriage and whose simple and pure domestic life was blessed with a numerous progeny. From Santiago the "Kingdom" of Chile was ruled, for here lived the Governor, the Judges of the Royal Audience, the Bishop and all the important Colonial officers; but the leading part that Santiago played in the drama of independence was rather due to the residence in that city of the aristocratic authority and prestige of the Colony, for the whole country relied confidently on the initiative of the representatives of the great families in the Capital. The character of the Chilean aristocracy was not at that time very different from what it is now. The same serious dignity, the same courtesy, the same absence of ostentation, the same exclusiveness, the same lack of humor. Gentle in judging others and lenient toward their mistakes, they could dissemble, but never forgive,

¹ "In Chile, he who is not a Lisperguer is a half breed."

an intended affront, and looked upon the neglect of social courtesies as a serious offense to themselves. Never petulant, never resentful but with due cause, their enmity, once aroused, was not easily appeased, and there has perhaps never existed a people with greater inflexible pertinacity of purpose, with more unalterable loyalty of resentment, than the Chileans.

Then, even more than now, the real power of the kingdom, outside of the royal representatives, lay wholly in the hands of these few families, whose pride, wealth, and birth brought to their doors, like the clients of the old Roman houses, a multitude of retainers, tenants, and dependents, whose only purpose in life was to fulfill faithfully the commands of their masters. Among such families were the Larrain, Eyzaguirre, Infante, Aguirre Carrera, Vicuña and Aldunate. Intermarriage between the children of these houses was an almost unbroken rule and their families were very large. Don Martin Larrain i Sálas had twenty-four children, whose marriage confirmed the family ties that bound the Chilean aristocracy in a close band of sympathy, relation and fellowship. They were the large landowners, the wealthy merchants, the social leaders, and their influence was irresistible. On them depended the whole social, commercial and political fabric of Chile, and this united, patriarchal, power was openly hostile to Carrasco.

Displeased with the arbitrary manner in which Carrasco vindicated his right to the supreme power

in the Colony, they became progressively more hostile to him as each new measure offended them more seriously. It seemed that, if there were two paths before him, Carrasco always took the wrong one. He meddled arbitrarily in the election of a rector to the university and put himself in the wrong so violently and with such an obstinate lack of tact; he sneered so openly at the modest little social functions of the Capital; he preferred so shamelessly the excitement of his cock-fights to the more serious gatherings of the Chilean men of affairs, and disdained so pointedly to hold any personal intercourse with the very aristocracy of the country; that the Chileans came to think it unnecessary to show him the consideration that his position demanded, and did not hesitate to evince their resentment and contempt of him both personally and officially.

This in turn increased his violence. He interfered arbitrarily in the affairs of the municipality (Cabildo), which was the stronghold politically of the Chilean aristocracy, and in the affairs of the Audience, which was the centre of loyalty to the Spanish Court. He dictated the names of those who should be elected to the Cabildo and, then, by every means at his command, sought to exasperate that body into open revolt in order that he might disband them in disgrace. In the Royal Audience, Juan Martínez de Rózas had soon perceived the difficulty of his position as Asesor, and had resigned the office to resume his former life in

Concepcion. Don Pedro Díaz de Valdez, a lawyer who had come from Spain to practise his profession, was elected Asesor in Rózas' place. The new Asesor was married to Doña Javiera Carrera, a member of one of the wealthiest and most influential of the Chilean families, and, when the open rupture came between Carrasco and the aristocracy, the Governor, taking advantage of a sickness which, for the time, prevented Díaz de Valdez from performing his duties in the Audience, expelled him from that body and brusquely refused to permit him, after his recovery, to resume his office. The Audience resented this interdiction of a member of their body, and formulated a protest to which the Governor paid no attention. The Governor was not long in antagonizing the Ecclesiastical body, already embittered by his interference in the election of the rector of the University, and found the Cabildo, the Audience, the Church and the aristocracy arrayed as one body against him.

Still he was not warned. He was determined to overawe the people of Chile and establish his authority by intimidation if possible, by force if necessary. He knew well that the time for conciliation was gone by, if indeed he had ever contemplated resorting to it.

To appreciate at its apparent value from the Chilean standpoint the effect upon their minds of Carrasco's next move, it is necessary to consider

an incident of prior occurrence, which increased to a remarkable degree the distrust entertained by the Chileans in respect of the intentions of their Governor. A new embarrassment had suddenly arisen to complicate the already bewildering situation of Chilean politics. The royal family of Portugal had long since sought refuge in Rio Janeiro. Looking upon the cause of Spain as irretrievably lost, the Regent, Don Juan,—afterwards himself the King of Portugal,—regarded with longing eyes the fertile Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, and his wife, the Princess Carlota, who was the sister of Ferdinand, sought to influence the Colonists of the Plata to permit her to assume certain protectoral rights over that country. The issue of the intrigue was by no means clear, but the loyal Chileans took instant fright at what they regarded as a supersession of the rights of Ferdinand, to whose cause they clung passionately. Soon after this attempt was publicly known to be in process of adjustment, a courier arrived from the Princess Carlota with despatches for Carrasco. At once the Chileans became excited and, being repulsed when they sought information, their curiosity reveled in the wildest conjectures, and their imagination presented to their disturbed apprehension a whole world of calamities. As a matter of fact Carrasco might have published the Princess' letters in full without harm; indeed, if he had candidly disclosed their contents, he would have relieved the Chileans from much

anxiety and himself from much suspicion, but he was not inclined to take the people into his confidence and fatuously made a mystery of the matter.

The universal belief among them came to be that the Governor, being in secret correspondence with the Princess of Portugal, would use his power, in a favorable conjuncture of events, to overthrow the Spanish authority in Chile, in favor of the Portuguese Princess.

The despatch of Doña Carlota to Governor Carrasco was as follows:—

“I am informed by my cabinet courier, Don Federico Dowling, of the loyalty and love that all my countrymen profess for my beloved brother, Ferdinand VII. I am likewise certified by the same Dowling of the singular zeal and energy with which you support the rights of your Sovereign. As well in his name as for myself, I thank you sincerely and I am convinced that you will give me the assurance that you will persist in so laudable a course of conduct, whose merit Ferdinand VII., the most grateful and equitable of Sovereigns, will know how to appreciate and reward.

“Given in the Grand Palace of my dwelling of Rio Janeiro the 6th of May, 1809.

“CARLOTA JOAQUINA DE BORBON.”

This was manifestly an attempt to identify herself with Ferdinand's interests and perhaps obtain a reversionary claim to his possessions, but

no harm would have come from the publication of the despatch, while the injurious conjectures that its suppression caused was one of the first incentives to the formation in Chile of a power independent of Carrasco, which would insure the continued loyalty of Chile to Ferdinand VII. in the event of Carrasco's defection.

The Governor knew the people to be alarmed and confused, and now prepared a blow that he was confident would establish his authority on the basis of fear. He would intimidate them.

Meanwhile, from month to month, the news from Spain became more disquieting. Ferdinand, the "Desired one," (*El deseado*), who was endeared to his people by his misfortunes, was still "interned" at Valençai; the Junta Central, flying precipitately before the French armies, and shrieking aloud the story of its own incompetence in the ears of the startled and bewildered Colonies, had become simply tiresome and ridiculous. At this time Carrasco determined to disarm the Chileans and under pretence of devotion to the Peninsular cause, ordered all the weapons that could be collected to be sent to Valparaiso and shipped to Spain. Among these weapons, family relics of the Araucan wars and trophies of the early conquerors, were four thousand lances which had been long since hung up to adorn the walls of Chilean homes and having ceased to be weapons had become ornaments. These obsolete, these archaic, arms were, in spite of the official protests of the Cabildo,

actually sent out of the country, but the Chileans rightly regarded it as not so much a reinforcement of Spanish antagonism to Napoleon as an injury to themselves.

The Cabildo of Santiago was composed of two Alcaldes, ten Rejidores, a Procurator and an Asesor; of these the Rejidores were appointed by the King, the office (*vara*) being sold to the highest bidder, but the other officers were elected by the Rejidores for the term of two years. The Cabildo was the only corporation that was composed of Chileans, and represented therefore more nearly than any other body the sentiments and aspirations of the Colony. The Cabildo had never been considered a body of any prominence; its offices made honorable positions for those of the city who were ambitious of social distinction, but its principal functions were to see that the city was adequately policed, to adorn the religious processions, and to exchange among themselves at their meetings the daily news that was scantily furnished by a sleepy town. Their meetings were usually so ill-attended that scarcely once or twice a year could a quorum be found to transact the necessary business.

In December, 1809, there was an election of officers, and Don Agustin Eyzaguirre and Don José Nicholas de la Cerda were chosen Alcaldes, Don Juan Antonio Ovalle, Procurator, and Don José Gregorio Argomedo, Asesor. In this election the hand of Juan Martínez de Rózas was

plainly visible. The new Procurator, Ovalle, was a disciple of Rózas, and the others were Rózas' intimate friends, over whom he had much influence. Suddenly the Cabildo awoke to unaccustomed activity. Daily meetings were held at which all the members were present. Soon these meetings were found to be too short, and were supplemented by nightly sessions, wherein the news from Spain was warmly discussed and the affairs of the Colony ardently debated. Such activity had never before been known, and the Governor was enraged to discover that among other topics of discussion, he and his office and his acts were made the subject of hearty condemnation. Soon, instead of the Cabildo occupying their time in the exchange of news and anecdotes, Santiago began to take a consuming interest in the meetings of the Cabildo, and in some way a good deal became public which had been uttered in the secrecy of the town hall. The Royal Audience went to Carrasco with the rumored speeches of the officers of the Cabildo and required him to denounce their inflammatory proceedings to the Junta Central, which he did, and to order the Cabildo to keep their hours and to hold no adjourned sessions, which he also did; but this tyranny, as the Alcaldes called it, only gave them occasion for renewed criticism of the Governor, and in no way abated its virulence. Matters were in this rather unpleasant state between them when the Cabildo took up for discussion the matter of the shipment of the lances and voted to request

the Governor to rescind his decree, promising him to redeem the lances in the sum of four thousand dollars, which could be more conveniently remitted to Spain, and would perhaps be more serviceable to the Junta Central in the form of money than in that of a large consignment of useless arms.

Ovalle, the Procurator, was the member whose duty it became to take up the matter with the Governor on the part of the Cabildo, and he urged it with a pertinacity that strengthened the Governor's suspicions of their designs and quickened his resolve to get the arms out of the country. The only result of the act of the Cabildo was to increase the resentment of Carrasco and also to single out Ovalle as one of the dangerous men whom it would be expedient to remove.

It was only a very few days later that the opportunity came. On April 16th the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres, Don Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, having discovered the trail of the Gran Reunion Americana leading from Buenos Ayres to Chile, wrote to Carrasco that there existed in Chile a band of traitors to Spain who were carrying on a propaganda for emancipation and independence, and advising him to attack them at once. Cisneros named no one and Carrasco had no better information apparently to guide him than the vague caution from the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres, but he was anxious that his loyalty be not impeached nor his vigilance disparaged, and he was by no means destitute of a certain shrewdness of

conjecture, which, with the recollection of the Procurator's insistence on the retention of the lances in Chile, indicated Ovalle to be one of the conspirators.

Ovalle was one of the most excellent men in Santiago. He traced his ancestry back to Don Juan Pastene, one of the companions of Valdivia in the conquest of Chile. Pastene was himself of a famous Genoa family, whose history may yet be read in the archives of that ancient city. Ovalle had spent a long and blameless life in public service. Inheriting wealth, he had captivated the esteem and admiration of his townsmen. He was now over sixty years of age, and, being in infirm health, had gone to take the waters at the baths of Cauquenes, when the Governor ordered him to be arrested and imprisoned in Santiago.

Among the other aristocrats who had been foremost in opposing the Governor, those whom he selected to be Ovalle's companions, were Don José Antonio Rójas and Don Bernardo Vera y Pintado. Rójas was still older than Ovalle, having passed his sixty-eighth year. As a young man he fell into favor with the Governor, Amat i Junient, and followed him when, in 1761, Amat became Viceroy of Peru, and filled various offices under the Viceroy in such a manner as to win the confidence and esteem of his superior. He then passed some years in Spain, and collected a little library of books among which were Robertson's Histories and the "Encyclopédie." He remained in Spain until

1777, when he returned to Chile and married the daughter of Don José Perfecto Sálas, who had served as Judge in Chile and Asesor in Lima, and who was reported to have hoarded some fabulous sum amounting to many millions of dollars during his service in America. Rójas had held many subordinate but honorable offices in Chile, and was in his old age respected as one of the most generous and honorable of men. I have already in an earlier part given an account of his residence in Spain. Vera was a popular young man, a lawyer, a poet, an eloquent orator,—the most genial and best loved man in Chilean society. He was at this time about thirty years of age. He it was who wrote the Chilean National Hymn, the singing of which is still one of the inspiring features of the day of Chilean Independence. Vera's prominence was due to his own character and attainments, though he did not lack for social qualifications of a derivative kind, for his uncle had been Viceroy of Buenos Ayres during the early years of the century, and an ancestor of his was one of the founders of the first Royal Audience in Chile in 1566.

These three men were the ones chosen for Carrasco's purpose, and their selection proved the confidence of the Governor in the success of his scheme. But intimidation is an uncertain weapon, and may prove a dangerous one for him who rashly ventures to use it.

On May 25, 1810, Ovalle, Rójas and Vera, then, were arrested and confined in the prison of Santi-

ago and the excitement of the people of the Capital was without bounds. They clamored tumultuously to know the offenses that the Governor laid to the charge of their favorites and leaders. In the intimate friendship that existed among the members of the Santiago aristocracy, every man's life was an open book to his neighbors and friends. They formed rather a large family than a society, and they resented as something close and personal to themselves the imputation of crime which they well knew their friends incapable of committing. Carrasco was compelled to formulate his accusation. He charged them, first, with rejoicing at the misfortunes of Spain under the heel of Napoleon; second, with criticizing the course of the Junta Central in conducting the Spanish government; and third, with aspiring to independence of Spanish control.

Not one of these charges could endure a moment's scrutiny with any other result than ridicule. Perhaps Carrasco thought that the less valid his accusations were, the more would the Chileans be impressed with the power that could dispense with the assistance of justice, and enforce unaided its austere purpose upon the most eminent of its foes.

On the announcement of Carrasco's charges, there fell for a moment, as he had expected, a vast dismay on Chile. Who indeed could be safe if such offenses were to be punished, if a mere state of mind, like joy or despondency, were to be considered criminal? Moreover, if criticism of the Junta

Central were treason, then treason was become wellnigh universal, for the whole Spanish world was disgusted with the shameless incompetence of the Junta and no one hesitated to condemn it roundly and openly as disgraceful and futile. And when did aspiration become a crime, or hope receive any punishment except disappointment? Quickly, dismay was followed by resentment and anger that demanded action, the Cabildo remonstrated, and the tumultuous populace besieged the Governor's palace, crying aloud, with threats and curses, for the liberation of the prisoners. In reply they were told that the Governor had sent the accused under the guard of a detachment of soldiers to Valparaiso.

The issue was now squarely joined; the Governor felt confident of winning and the citizens were determined not to lose. For the time being, the contest centered about Rójas, Ovalle and Vera. The citizens contrived to send a Judge of the Royal Audience to Valparaiso to examine the accused men. Señor Bazo i Berri, the youngest Judge, was with difficulty persuaded to undertake this mission. From Santiago to Valparaiso was about ninety miles—a good day's journey. Bazo i Berri came back from Valparaiso and reported to the Royal Audience that there was no case against the prisoners. His report is extant in the judicial archives in Santiago. Armed with this report from a Judge of the Supreme Court, the people demanded the return of the prisoners. Up to this

time the mutual positions of the Governor and the people had been curiously transposed. It was the populace that proceeded in accordance with the law, and it was the Governor who resorted to violence and injustice. The strength of the people lay in the fact that they had yet the resource of violence which up to this time they had not used. Carrasco began to get a glimpse of the outcome, but did not appear to flinch. He pretended to be convinced by the report of the examining judge, and told the people that he would at once send a despatch to Valparaiso to have the accused brought back to Santiago where a fair trial would be accorded them. This promise he confirmed by the customary oath, and at once perjured himself by sending Captain Manuel Búlnes to the Intendente of Valparaiso with absolute instructions to send Rójas, Ovalle and Vera to Lima by the first vessel that left the port of Valparaiso for the north.

Captain Búlnes left Santiago for Valparaiso on the morning of the 6th of July, 1810, with a letter of credence for the Governor of the Port, and another for a Damian Seguí, who happens for the moment to be churned up to the surface of Chilean history, and a sealed packet containing instructions for himself, which was to be opened in Valparaiso. Carrasco had invested his mission with an injunction to secrecy, and Búlnes, who as yet knew nothing of his errand, foolishly boasted of the Governor's confidence in him in entrusting him

with a mission of great importance. To Captain Campino and to the Provincial of Santo Domingo, whom he met on the road, he made boast of his favor with the Governor, and they both rode into Santiago, full of curiosity as to his meaning. This excited anew the alarm of the city, and the strange tidings, as it spread from mouth to mouth, aroused a fever of suspicion and anxiety as to the Governor's purpose. He had invested his promise to recall Rójas, Ovalle and Vera with such candor, he seemed to be so willing to yield the point of jurisdiction to the eager citizens,—that for the moment they had believed him, but now their old distrust whispered to them fears of his sincerity, and doubt and care filled their minds.

In Valparaiso, Búlnes delivered to the Governor of the Port a despatch which directed him to place at Búlnes' disposal the first vessel that could be got ready to take the prisoners to Peru; the despatch to Damian Seguí was interpreted solely by Seguí's subsequent movements; and his own letter of instructions ordered him to embark at once the three captives on a vessel for Peru, to whose Viceroy a despatch was enclosed, to be carried by the Captain of the vessel, from whom Búlnes was to get a receipt for the prisoners and bring it back to Carrasco. Búlnes lost no time in carrying out his orders. He found the old frigate *Miantonomo* in the port and commandeered it for the Governor's purpose. On the 10th of July he led his prisoners aboard,—or at least Rójas and Ovalle, Vera being,

or pretending to be, too ill to be removed—and obtained his receipt for them. On their way to the landing, they were attended closely by Seguí and some forty armed ruffians, who insulted and threatened the bewildered bystanders, until their resentment of the abuse produced a riot in the streets. There was, however, no attempt at rescue, and except by Seguí and his followers, the peace of the quiet little village was undisturbed. The Governor of the Port, Alos, however, being appealed to by the insulted citizens, caused Seguí to be arrested and imprisoned.

Meanwhile the quiet of the Capital remained apparently undisturbed, but in the houses of the Larrain, Vicuña, Eyzaguirre and others, meetings were held where the perfidy of the Governor was the subject of excited harangues, and rumor bore about the city the fears of the leaders. Men hurried through the streets, bearing from reunion to reunion and from tertulia to tertulia, the news that a general order of arrest had been made out for a large number of the principal citizens; that the city troops had been directed by Carrasco to fire upon any street assembly; that Rójas, Vera and Ovalle were to be put to death in Valparaiso; that the Governor was minded to seize the power of the Colony and wield it in his own name, and that a general massacre of the inhabitants and the sacking of the city would inaugurate the new order of government.

This was, of course, the breath of unfounded

rumor, but when on Wednesday, the 11th of July, at nine in the morning, the first courier from Valparaiso brought the news that Rójas and Ovalle had actually been taken to Lima, where they were to be tried on inadequate charges before a tribunal where their accusers were not present, and that Carrasco's word of honor to bring them back to Santiago had been violated, their fear gave way to a sudden outburst of wrath. The city boiled with excitement. The shops remained closed and the streets were filled with angry tumult; the Plaza was crowded and the palace was besieged by a turbulent populace, clamoring for speech with the Governor. Carrasco kept himself in retirement in his palace, and admittance was refused without the consigne, while the open doors of the barracks on the other side of the Plaza showed the soldiers ready at a moment's notice to march out into the city. Though Carrasco made no sign, the citizens knew that within the sleepy palace all was alert and prepared to silence any show of violence on their part. Their leaders, Eyzaguirre and Argomedo, circumspect and capable men, sought a way whereby the people with becoming dignity might engage in the contention with Carrasco which was now at hand. Gradually the word went around that a *Cabildo Abierto*, which corresponds as nearly as possible to the New England Town Meeting, would be held in the Hall of the Chapter and that the doors would be open to all. Thither then the people streamed, filling the hall and chok-

ing the patio and the street without. Not much time was lost in denunciation of the faithlessness of the Governor, for the purpose of the meeting was thoroughly known. The Cabildo voted that a committee composed of Eyzaguirre, one of the Alcaldes, and Argomedo, who had been elected Procurator on Ovalle's arrest, should wait on the Governor and request him to come to the Chapter Hall, where the people desired to make known their complaints. Carrasco refused to admit the committee, but sent them word by a porter that he did not care to see them and advised them to go about their business. They returned with this insolent answer to the meeting.

Even then there were no speeches made, but, with a settled determination to force an issue, the mass of people, led by the members of the Cabildo, withdrew quietly from the Chapter Hall, and made their way to the hall where the Royal Audience was then in session. There they found Santiago Concha, the Dean of the Audience, and the three judges, Aldunate, Irigoyen and Bazo i Berri, but the Regent, Ballesteros, was with the Governor at the palace. The two Alcaldes and the Rejidores of the Cabildo entered, and after them a multitude of the best men of the city, and requested, since the matter was urgent, that the Audience send for Carrasco to come to them, that the Cabildo might receive satisfaction from the Governor in the matter of Rójas, Ovalle and Vera. Judge Irigoyen, went in person to the palace and re-

turned after a few minutes with the Governor and Ballesteros.

Then the Alcalde, Nicolas de la Cerda, stated to the Royal Audience in the presence of the Governor, who took his seat with a smile of insolent mockery on his lips, all the circumstances of the arrest of the three men.

He told of the petition that had been sent to Carrasco in behalf of the accused, and of the Cabildo having guaranteed their appearance if they were admitted to bail. He stigmatized as an act of exemplary injustice the removal of three innocent gentlemen, two of them advanced in years, without a trial or adequate evidence of guilt, and he demanded in the name of the Cabildo and the City of Santiago that an express should be at once forwarded to Lima, requesting the Viceroy to send them back for trial before the Audience, which had had up to this time no voice in the matter.

To all this Carrasco replied by denying the truth of what the Alcalde had said, and, his anger increasing, he warned them all to take care or they would be sent to keep the conspirators company. This threat only added to the vehemence of the opposition, and the Alcalde demanded that a curb be placed at once on the power of the Governor by enacting that no order of his should henceforth be obeyed which was not countersigned by Santiago Concha, the Dean of the Royal Audience. Before this could be passed, however, Carrasco, realizing that his yielding to their demand would

be a matter of little moment compared with the appointment of a guardian over his official acts at a time when he must have his hands perfectly free, gave up the point and agreed to send the required papers to Lima. So the despatch, duly made out for the Viceroy, was placed in the hands of the Alcaldes, who manifestly preferred to take the matter as far as possible out of the Governor's control. This was accomplished by half an hour after noon, on Wednesday, July 11, the express having only arrived from Valparaiso with the news of the embarkation of Rójas and Ovalle at nine o'clock.

Determined to lose no time, a little troop of gentlemen headed by Don Diego Larrain rode out of Santiago at two o'clock, with the necessary orders from the Royal Audience to avail themselves of any vessel to bear the despatches to Lima. The hope was general among them that a Norther might even have prevented the *Miantónomo* from proceeding on her way, but after covering the thirty leagues between Santiago and Valparaiso in seven and a half hours of hard riding, they reached the port to find that their hopes were disappointed, that their friends were indeed gone, and that the despatches to Lima must wait for another vessel.

In Valparaiso, however, they learned of the manner of their friends' departure and the Governor of the Port, Joaquin de Alos, showed them a letter that had come to Seguí after he had been impris-

oned, which was worth all the disappointment of their failure to find Rójas and Ovalle. This letter contained a sentence or two of such ominous import as to fill them with dismay and apprehension. Hurriedly they returned to the Capital, to lay this fatal missive before the Cabildo.

During the absence of Larrain and his associates, the quiet of the city was undisturbed. The citizens had made a move and scored a point, but they knew the game was not yet played out, and they were determined to effect the deposition of Carrasco and to do it without putting themselves in a wrong position, which would give him an excuse to call out the soldiers, as they well knew he was ready to do on the least pretext. They knew that, as far as their purpose went to depose Carrasco, the Royal Audience was with them, that the Cabildo was at their head, that the Church was on their side, and they were resolved to accomplish their purpose without delay. Still, for a time, a feeling of suspense pervaded the city which, Carrasco himself knew, would soon give place to a renewed attack on him. How it would come he did not know, but his soul was full of resentment and demanded vengeance upon those who had opposed and humiliated him. To thwart him he was sure was beyond their power, and he recalled to mind with a grim complacency that he had carried out his purpose with the three conspirators in the face of the Royal Audience, the Cabildo and the people. To secure himself from the attack that

was preparing, he sent couriers to call to the Capital the troops on the frontier, he ordered abundance of ammunition to be served out to the city troops, he caused cannon to be trained on the public square, he garrisoned and provisioned the palace and he reinforced the men and increased the supplies on Santa Lucia.

Although the Governor's preparations to resist, or rather to subjugate, the people of Santiago had been carried out as secretly as possible, yet the nerves of the people were too keen and their apprehensions too alert for them to remain in ignorance of his actions, to all of which they correctly ascribed a malevolent purpose. The middle of July is in Santiago the middle of winter, and the winter of 1810 was especially severe, but the Alcaldes, Nicolas de la Cerda and Agustin Eyza-guirre, were abroad the night of the 11th, providing against any sudden attempt on the part of the Governor. Under their command were all the young men of the best families in the city, to the number of eight hundred, patrolling the streets (not very well lighted in 1810), and guarding the residences of the city officials and those of the Judges as well, who had, by showing their sympathy with the Cabildo, intensified the hatred with which the Governor already regarded them. On horseback or on foot, the improvised city guard kept armed watch on every thoroughfare within the city. To this, as a measure of city police under the supervision of the Alcaldes, the

Governor could not openly object, but as he lay sleepless in the palace and heard the sound of feet and voices in the street without, and knew that the people were vigilant in the protection of their rights, some misgivings of the outcome must have entered his soul.

On Thursday, the 12th of July, Larrain and his companions rode into the city from Valparaiso, and at a secret session of the Cabildo the letter to Damian Seguí was read. It was dated the 9th of July, was signed with the execrated name of Rafael Díaz and closed with the injunction to Seguí to destroy it as soon as he had read it. Among other things it said: "His Excellency directs you to remain in Valparaiso until his orders to Captain Búlnes are executed, as I wrote you in my previous letter which I sent by Búlnes, and for you to return to this city with him. If possible bring your friends with you, and see that they are well armed. We fear trouble here after Búlnes returns, and for that reason it will be well for you and your friends there to come and join us in the dance."

The excitement that was caused by this letter is not to be described, and yet it was not needed to convince them that the malignant hostility of Carrasco was capable of invoking to his aid the most depraved and brutal agents, nor, strangely enough, as one of the Cabildo pointed out, could it be made a valid instrument of attack against Carrasco, who could simply disavow the letter or deny

his responsibility for its sentiments. However, the injunction of secrecy to Seguí did not determine the action of the Cabildo, and before night everyone in Santiago knew of the letter and its message, and for the first time it seemed as if the fury of the citizens would surpass the limits of moderation and legality that the Cabildo had set before them.

When Carrasco, this same day, July 12, learned of Seguí's imprisonment, he sent an order to Alos to "set at liberty at once my agent, Damian Seguí, that he may come and render an account of his commission." To this Alos replied as follows:

"SEÑOR CAPITAN-GENERAL: Although up to the present I am in ignorance of the commission which Your Excellency is pleased to inform me that you confided to the drunken deserter, Seguí, inasmuch as he presented no credentials to me from Your Excellency, I am compelled to believe that whatever commission was entrusted to him he has so far violated as to have disturbed the peace of the community and excited a tumult with an armed force of forty-seven men. This offense, of which I see Your Excellency has not been apprized, and of which the said Seguí is doubtless guilty, has induced me to suspend the execution of Your Excellency's order until such time as the case shall be concluded and sentence imposed, notice of which will be at once forwarded to Your Excellency for your information.

"JOAQUIN DE ALOS."

The polite insolence of this reply exasperated

beyond measure the Governor of Chile. He saw himself flouted by everyone, and in the antagonism of the Royal Audience, the Cabildo, the Ecclesiastical body, and even the citizens, he detected a strain of derision, that cut deep into his vain, passionate and arbitrary soul. Perhaps above all else the equanimity of the Alcaldes and their influence over the people were gall and wormwood to his proud spirit, conscious as he was, that, while the populace seemed to keep its temper, he had openly and violently given way to his own. His reply to Alos discloses fully his state of mind, but events were now hurrying to a crisis and before his despatch reached Valparaiso, Carrasco's violence was no longer to be dreaded.

But while the letter to Seguí added no increment of proof to the case against Carrasco, it certainly added an impetus to it that hastened the catastrophe. No man in Chile was hated and feared like Seguí. His life had been a continuous record of blood and violence, of crime and punishment. Centurio, the parasite of Celestina, was not a deadlier ruffian than Seguí; Gilles de Laval was not regarded with greater terror and hatred in Brittany than Damian Seguí in Chile. He was a deserter from the Spanish navy when he came first under the protection of Carrasco, and thenceforth the murderers of Banquo were less confident of immunity. At the suggestion of Carrasco he organized a band of ruffians, who executed his orders and shared his security. The writer of the

letter that the Governor of Valparaiso intercepted was Rafael Díaz, one of Segur's lieutenants in Santiago. At an earlier period this letter would have filled the Cabildo and people of the Capital with dismay; now it arrived to quicken their action and lend wings to their purpose. Day and night the Cabildo sat in constant session, day and night the city was patrolled by volunteer guards, and an incessant vigilance watched every move of the Governor.

Friday, the 13th, Carrasco visited the barracks, inspected the artillery train and had private conference with the individual officers. The government had at that time in Santiago two hundred infantry from Concepcion, a squadron of the Queen's Dragoons numbering fifty, and a battery of light artillery with sixty men and abundant supplies and ammunition. On the side of the Governor were also his official appointees and subordinates, perhaps a hundred in all, whom he provided with arms, and his household of twenty or twenty-five persons, all well armed and naturally zealous in his cause. The Spaniards of European birth were divided and ill at ease and lukewarm, leaning alternately, with the velleity of bewilderment, to either side.

It was suspected at that time and confirmed afterward, that Carrasco's purpose in visiting the barracks was to ascertain how far the officers could answer for the obedience of their men, and to what extent they themselves could be relied

upon to carry out his orders. That no uncertainty might exist in this matter, he told them plainly that he should expect them to order their battalions to fire upon the thickest of the crowd if he should give the word. This intimation evoked no promise of compliance.

To such a degree did the Chileans carry their intention to give Carrasco no excuse for violence, that they even permitted his couriers to pass out of the city, although they knew that frequent messages were sent to hasten the arrival of the troops from the frontier. They also on their side applied to the officers of the city troops to learn how far they would carry out the Governor's orders, and were reassured when the reply was given, "Violence will not be begun by the troops, they will not fire first." Thus Seguí and his Sicarii seemed all that the Governor could rely on with unquestioned confidence of support, and Seguí was in prison in Valparaiso.

While the Cabildo, now almost confident of the result, was engaged in discussing the form of government that should follow the deposition of Carrasco, the Judges of the Royal Audience were representing to the Governor the absolute impossibility of continuing in office without the support or countenance of any organized body or of any considerable number of citizens, and advising him to bend to the people's will and resign; but he with his heart in the troops that he had ordered up to the Capital from the Araucan frontier, and

in the expectation of Seguí's arrival, turned a deaf ear to their representations. It cannot be denied that the Royal Audience took a secret pleasure in the Governor's prospective discomfiture, and that this was doubtless increased by a feeling of personal and official resentment at his attitude toward them at the time of his coming into power. So it was with a grim complacency that they saw that their arguments were without effect. And yet their hope was that in the impending change, their own authority might not be swept away also, and that their own grasp upon the government might in some way be perpetuated.

In the meantime, after a continuous session of sixty hours, filled with plans practicable and impracticable, the Cabildo had decided upon its course. Their meetings had been to a certain extent public, in that other influential men of the city were in constant attendance and took part freely in the discussions, and yet those only were admitted in whose loyalty and fidelity the Cabildo had implicit confidence. And yet even among these, treason or timidity found two individuals, whose names have not come down to us, who wrecked the scheme and thwarted the purposes of the Cabildo.

On Sunday night, July 15, the conclusion was reached that, on the following day, the office of Governor, President and Captain General should be declared vacant, that the Cabildo should govern the kingdom for a period of five days, during

which they should summon a Cabildo Abierto who should appoint a provisional government to act until a Congress of Deputies should be elected by all the towns in the republic. Forthwith, the two unnamed individuals sought the residence of the Regent of the Royal Audience, Ballesteros, and laid before him the plan of the Cabildo. That gentleman saw in a moment the consequence of such a course to himself and his companions. He summoned them immediately and together they proceeded to the palace. The two informers disappeared into the darkness of unidentified personalities. Their treachery was accomplished.

Self-interest makes strange alliances; and rather than lose their positions, the Judges would without doubt have entered into an alliance with Carrasco at this juncture, if he on his part had been able to offer any guarantees of assistance; but self-interest demanded now that, in falling, Carrasco should not be permitted to drag them down also. His course was run, and they all knew it, but the service of the King of Spain must be continued, and they must be protected in their offices. Ballesteros read him the resolution of the Cabildo and with suitable courtesy requested his views on the subject. Carrasco taunted them by saying that it was the direct result of their countenancing the opposition with which the Cabildo had confronted him; that it was the due fruit of their own labor and that if he fell he was glad they were to fall also. To this Ballesteros an-

swered that it was to prevent this very thing that they had urged him to resign, that the King's cause might be served, whereas the horrible word, "republic," meant the loss of the Colony to Spain, as well as their own disgrace.

Carrasco, never very careful to observe the amenities of social usage, walked up and down the sala in his agitation. Suddenly he paused and ordered one of the guards to summon the three chief officers of the Infantry, Dragoons and Artillery. When they came he demanded with a sneer whether their consciences would permit them to observe the oath of loyalty to the King of Spain, now that the purpose was known to withdraw the kingdom of Chile from the King's allegiance and set up a hated republic. Colonel Reina replied that he would never hesitate to assert and uphold the authority of the King of Spain, but that his men would never fire upon an unarmed body of citizens; that not a man of the service would refuse to be killed in battle for the honor of Spain, but that purely civil matters had better be managed by the civil authorities, and the citizens had attempted no violence. Before awaiting the opinions of the others, Carrasco insolently ordered them to leave the room, saying, that he now knew what poltroons and traitors he had to deal with, and that he would deal with them accordingly.

When the officers had departed, Ballesteros, who during this stormy interview had regarded

the Governor with a stare of disdain, intimated coldly that their coming to the palace was purely with the purpose of giving the Governor an opportunity to save himself from the disgrace of deposition by a voluntary resignation, but that to them it was personally a matter of little importance, provided the King's cause did not suffer.

"You want to save your own skins," replied the Governor violently.

"No," said Santiago Concha, "we want to be in a position to tell the King that Your Excellency was not content with your own disgrace, but that you were determined also to destroy, as far as your power went, the Colony of Chile; that if Your Excellency must suffer, you are determined that the King's cause should suffer also."

"Your Excellency has accused these brave men of being poltroons and traitors," added Irigoyen, severely, "see to it that something worse may not be reported with greater justice of Your Excellency."

Ballesteros had continued to watch Carrasco closely and now, observing signs of yielding, he said, quietly:

"While nothing but praise can be uttered for the man who forgets his own resentments in the cause of the King."

At that Carrasco yielded, and after exacting a promise that the Royal Audience would represent the matter to his advantage in their report to the King, and continue his salary, he signified his

willingness to resign the office of governor the next day.

The Royal Audience, after a sagacious and admirably conducted campaign, had won a great victory. They had overthrown their enemy and discomfited their allies. The resignation of Carrasco spoiled completely the plans of the Cabildo. There was to be no Congress of Deputies, no Republic. The people were so pleased with the demission of Carrasco that they seemed to desire nothing further. Processions were formed, guns were fired, speeches were made, holiday prevailed. Meantime, before the Cabildo could readjust themselves and their purposes to the changed conditions, the Royal Audience announced that Don Mateo Toro Zambrano i Ureta, Conde de la Conquista, as ranking Brigadier, had succeeded to the government left vacant by the resignation of Carrasco. The Cabildo had been outwitted and discredited, having taken a lesson in strategy from the Judges of the Royal Audience.

There was to be no change, then, in the conduct of affairs. The Cabildo was to sink back into its previous condition of municipal inconsequence. The only result they had achieved was to exchange a hated ruler for one whom the people loved as well as respected, and the dream of self-government was dispelled; the cup of freedom was snatched from their very lips.

At this time there did not exist among the Colonial leaders in Santiago a condition of perfect

unanimity. This had been amply shown in the debates and delays that took place in the Cabildo before the "plan" was formulated which awakened Ballesteros to successful action. Among them some, who acknowledged Don Manuel Sálas as their leader, were averse from any attempt at self-government and desired reform under a continuance of Peninsular control and a Spanish government. They wished no innovations. They feared the consequences of even seeming to withdraw from the protection of Spain, and distrusted their ability and that of their countrymen to substitute a durable government in the stead of Spanish authority. These were Tories, not from self-interest but from conviction, and perhaps also from timidity. They were still dazzled by the distant and tarnished glamour of Spain.

The second class, among whom Don José Miguel Infante rose quickly to the rank of leader after the fiasco of the "plan" of the Cabildo, represented at first almost the whole Colony. They came to be called the "Moderados" after the rise of the third party, and we may already, in justifiable anticipation, so denominate them. Their purpose was to nominate a "Junta Colonial," which should "preserve the rights of the King in captivity," and remain subordinate to the Junta Central, taking no further step toward emancipation. It may safely be affirmed that the term "republic," which Ballesteros so freely denounced, was rather a flourish than an essential purpose; and the Con-

gress of Deputies was a concession to the more radical members and was not intended as a movement toward independence. The exact origin of the Congress may be explained in a few words. The Junta Central, anxious to conciliate the goodwill of the Colonies and to impress them with its paternal supervision of their interests, committed the mistake of directing their attention to the fact that they were not an inferior and accidental, but an intrinsic and integral part of the dominions of the King, whose style was "King of Spain and the Indies," and that, as such essential portion of the King's dominions, they were entitled by law to the same representation in the Cortes as the provinces of Spain; that, therefore, when the Cortes were again convened, the privilege, or rather the right, would be accorded them to elect one deputy from each of the Colonies, to sit in the Cortes. The mistake of the Junta Central lay not so much in apprizing the Colonies of their right to representation, as in their niggardly withholding the half of that right, for each of the Peninsular provinces was entitled to elect two deputies to the Cortes, whereas the very instrument that acknowledged the equal rights of the Colonies curtailed their representation to one. It was probably in resentment of this injustice that the election of deputies to a Cortes or Congress of their own, was discussed and finally agreed on by the Cabildo. Afterward the Chileans learned to interpret their other restrictions in the light of

this incident, and thus at length their eyes were opened and they knew that they had been always defrauded of their numerous rights of local town government, among other things; and of the levying of local taxes, the expeditures of public moneys, local courts of justice and some freedom of commerce and travel. But these considerations did not so much stimulate them to seek independence as confirm them in it when it was once attained, and when, looking back, they saw the hole of the pit whence they had been digged. So though they had wandered near the line that separates submission from independence, they had at present no purpose to cross it and declare their freedom.

Perhaps no revolution ever proposed to itself the exact end that it ultimately attained, or rested satisfied with the cessation of the abuse against which it was primarily directed. Yet among the Moderados, and of continually increasing influence, were a few men, the full extent of whose designs was concealed under the temporary cloak of expediency, but who were resolved that one step should follow another until perfect independence was obtained. To this party—subsequently known as Exaltados—belonged Rózas, O'Higgins and a few select spirits, members of the Gran Reunion Americana, imbued with the principles of the *Encyclopédie* and fearless of the future. Little did the Moderados foresee that the inexorable logic of events would sweep them and their

fragile Junta into the red road of revolution and war, but the disciples of Diderot and D'Alembert were wiser, and while working for the time in harmony with the Moderados, they gathered about them in a few months the most learned and influential citizens of the Capital. Infante himself was in time won over, with Eyzaguirre, Argomedo and the rest of the Cabildo; Sálas, too, the statistician and reformer—the son of the old Judge whose pathetic prayer to the King was never heeded, that he might die in peace and honor after a long life of devoted service—came to recognize the worth and assist the efforts of the Exaltados and thus round out the complete list of Chilean patriotism; but this happy fusion was delayed until after the death of Rózas, when the Chileans were brought face to face with the threat of an invading army.

During the progress of this irregular contest between the Royal Audience and the Cabildo, important tidings from Buenos Ayres had from time to time come to Santiago, which influenced very greatly the outcome of the struggle in Chile. To understand this influence we must consider briefly the state of affairs in Buenos Ayres. When, in 1806, England and Spain were again at war, Pitt, who understood public feeling in the Spanish Colonies even less than he understood that in England, endeavored to foment disturbances between Spain and her American possessions, by inciting them to revolt and offering them aid. In

the prosecution of this purpose General Beresford was sent with a squadron to take possession of Buenos Ayres. The results of this expedition were unexpected and momentous. Pitt had died in January, 1806, "killed at Austerlitz," as Wilberforce said, but there was no change in his policy. Beresford landed a body of men in Buenos Ayres, terrified the inhabitants by the display of military force, and took possession of the city. The Colonists, however, soon rallied, attacked the English and drove them to seek safety in their ships. Beresford crossed the river to Montevideo, which he captured, and in which for some months he remained awaiting reinforcements. These finally came, Beresford was superseded by General Whitlocke, and in the year of 1807 Buenos Ayres was invested a second time. But in anticipation of a renewed attack the people had improvised breastworks of dried ox-hides and though the city was stormed on July 5, 1807, the English were repulsed and obliged to capitulate under an agreement to leave the province and to desist from any further hostility.

The news of the English defeat rang through South America and echoed over the shores of Europe. The Buenos Ayreans became veritable heroes, not only in their own eyes but in the flattering encomiums of the neighboring provinces. Their self-consciousness of valor, instead of abating, increased to such an extent, that on May 25, 1810, when the news reached them that the whole

of Spain was in the hands of the French and that the Junta Central was dissolved, they proceeded to the palace and demanded the instant resignation of the viceroy. Cisneros yielded gladly to their demand, and in a moment the Buenos Ayreans found to their consternation that they were free. When Touchstone stood in the Forest of Arden and looked about him, he remarked with regret that when he was at home he was in a better place. There was, however, in the Argentine mind no perception of the humor that really lay in the Argentine situation. They had no wish to be free. They were filled with resentment at their own success, for they felt that they could not stand alone.

The system of Colonial subjugation which Spain had sustained for centuries in her American possessions, though everywhere an important obstacle to the inauguration of independence, was perhaps a less immediate cause of the anxiety and trepidation of the Buenos Ayreans than the turbulent and lawless character of the population throughout the surrounding country. Between the city of Buenos Ayres and the other towns and centres of population of the Argentine, there was a feeling of distrust, hatred, and fear. Disdain on one side and envy on the other have, even during a great part of their century of freedom, produced constant ill-will between them. Perhaps to the administration of General Mitre may be ascribed the inception of an era of goodwill. At

the period which at present interests us there was no mutual confidence between Buenos Ayres and the rest of the Argentine. So General Belgrano and Don Bernardino Rivadavia were sent to England to seek an English prince of the blood to rule them. In the event of England's refusal, they were instructed to make the same offer to France, Austria, Russia, and finally, in a frenzy of fear and impotence, they were directed to approach Spain with the offer of a renewal of their subjection under certain conditions, and, presumably, certain guarantees. This programme was not wholly carried out, but the attempt was an interesting one.

In much the same spirit of conscious weakness an embassy was sent to Chile, after the transaction of May 25, to solicit aid from the Cabildo of Santiago. This constitutes a very remarkable episode, which Tocornal, in his paper on the "Primer Gobierno Nacional," has involved in additional obscurity. Into a detailed narrative of this "embassy" or "mission," we may not at present enter, but, when stripped of its unnecessary mystery, it seems that the Buenos Ayres Junta despatched a secret agent to Chile to enter into relations with the Cabildo, to foment cautiously a spirit of resistance to Spain, and to procure in some way a force of men to support Buenos Ayres against the towns of the Argentine which threatened revolt, and against whatever army Spain might send to restore her fallen gov-

ernment. The envoy was Don Gregório Gómez, and there is no doubt that he strengthened greatly the Cabildo of Santiago in the prosecution of their plans, while one of the first acts of the Santiago Junta was to permit a body of three hundred men to be placed at the service of the Junta of Buenos Ayres. We now resume the interrupted narrative.

While the Royal Audience was congratulating itself on the success of its strategy in preserving the ancient government from innovation and the Audience itself from dissolution, the Cabildo was regaining its equilibrium and readjusting itself. It soon discovered that the plan of July 15 was rather disordered than impaired by the finesse of the Royal Audience, whose great victory was in reality only a skirmish, in which the Cabildo had been worsted without loss, and which perhaps, if skillfully retrieved, might prove to have only postponed the day of their ultimate success. In the continued prosecution of their labor, however, they took the precaution to exclude carefully any possible informers or traitors to the cause. They then formed the magnificent and audacious purpose not of thwarting or deriding their new Governor but of adopting him.

The Conde de la Conquista was an amiable gentleman of great age, for he was over eighty, of inconspicuous ability, of gentle manners, of considerable wealth and of Chilean birth, all of which qualified him admirably for the part that he was destined soon to play in the cause of in-

dependence. Of his three sons, the eldest, José, who was to inherit the title and entailed estates, and who moreover had married a Spanish lady, naturally clung to the royalist cause; but the other two sons, Domingo Toro and Joaquin Toro, were followers and ardent admirers of Infante, Argomedo and Eyzaguirre. The first step that the Cabildo took showed the Royal Audience that the great battle was now joined, for while Ballesteros was dilating with complacency over his strategy, the Cabildo persuaded the Governor to appoint as his secretary, Argomedo, the Procurator who had taken the chief part in formulating the "plan" which excited Ballesteros to action, and who had been especially bitter in his opposition to the late Governor. José Miguel Infante was elected Procurator in Argomedo's place.

The new Governor was himself a Chilean and the authority of the Cabildo was sympathetic to him in that it was composed of his personal friends who had his entire confidence. Persuaded by Argomedo, he began to refer to them many of the details of government, and Ballesteros saw with chagrin that the Count was become in reality an ally of the Cabildo rather than of the Royal Audience. It was at this critical time that news came from Spain that the discredited Junta Central had been driven out of Cadiz and had taken refuge in the Isla de Leon, and that the Junta had been replaced by a Supreme Council of Regency. Although this had taken place in Jan-

uary, 1810, it was not until the latter part of July that the news reached Chile. The Governor applied to the Cabildo for their advice as to whether he should recognize the new authority, and Infante quickly resolved his doubt. He characterized the Supreme Council as irresponsible and without authority; "any one has the same right to assume by arrogation a similar title, but who will deem such assumption adequate and competent? If we are an integral portion of Spanish territory, we alone are able to affirm and vindicate the privileges that the law guarantees to us, and constitute a government that shall conserve the authority of the King. In Spain the provinces have installed their own Juntas, and the people have delegated to them their authority, but no provincial Junta can compel the obedience of any other. Aragon cannot force Seville to submit to her, nor can any aggregation of Juntas or any Junta representing even a majority of the provinces, enforce her authority on the rest. We have the same rights as any other province of Spain, and may like them elect a Junta for ourselves which shall rule us in the name of Ferdinand. Let us then follow the example that the Peninsular provinces have given us."

But even the Cabildo was divided on this question, and on a vote being taken, a majority, fearing the action of the Supreme Council and being uncertain whether that body might not derive its authority from Ferdinand, decided to recognize

the new Supreme Council. The discussion had, however, taken some time, and the Royal Audience, vexed at the delay, sent a note to the Governor requiring him to publish the proclamation at once. On his applying again to the Cabildo for advice, however, the astonishing response was returned that they were willing merely to pass a resolution recognizing the Supreme Council, but would not yet take an oath of allegiance to it. In this manner and after a month's delay the proclamation was finally issued on the 22nd of August, with the imperfect concurrence of the Cabildo.

It would be difficult to explain the extreme indecision of the Cabildo, if one did not remember the fact that they were still under the Shadow of Spain, still under the spell of the monarchy. Their dread was the result of centuries of fear and awe; the "Dogma of the Royal Majesty" was still a part of their religion and of their daily life; they still feared death less than the restored majesty of Spain, and were timid and as yet untried in the rough path of revolution.

Review then for a moment the condition of affairs when the news came to the Colonies that the last Peninsular stronghold was in the hands of the French. The Junta Central, long since discredited; the object of contempt among its enemies and of suspicion among its friends; having forfeited its prestige by its misfortunes and its authority by its indecision; was yet more nearly

representative of the sentiment of the Spanish people than Charles IV., a captive at Fontainebleau, or Ferdinand VII., a prisoner at Valençai. Ferdinand's sister, the Princess Carlota Joaquina, had tried to subvert the loyalty of the Colonies; the English had seized a part of Spain's Colonial possessions and were greedy for more; the French were false; some of the Colonial governors, notoriously Don Juan de Casas, the governor of Venezuela, were known to favor the usurper, and all were suspected of disloyalty to Ferdinand. Had not many of the nobles and generals of Spain given in their adherence to Napoleon? Had not even Don Tomas de Morla, Captain General of Madrid, treacherously delivered the Capital of Spain itself into the hated hands of the French? Don Francisco de Saavedra had sent a list of thirty-two Spanish magnates whose estates had been declared confiscated by the Junta for their adherence to King Joseph. It seemed that all the world was in league against their King and that they alone were faithful to him. The English had already attacked Buenos Ayres, and the Colonies, trained and disciplined to dependence, felt powerless to defend themselves against similar attacks. Moreover, months passed before the events in Spain were known in the Colonies, and the whole world was to them involved in vertiginous uncertainty and impending ruin. Napoleon's efforts to induce the South American Colonies to separate from Spain were

not, as is well known, limited to mere persuasion; but, while his emissaries found little comfort to their hopes in the loyal devotion of the Colonists, yet the French intrigues added to the bewilderment and distrust which beset the distracted minds of the Spanish Americans.

Such was their condition when it became known that the Junta Central was dissolved and dispersed, and the last legitimate vestige of royal authority abolished. Spain was now entirely subjugated, and the end of all things was at last reached; and, while the colonies seemed to themselves impotent to withstand a hostile world, they still, in a kind of desperation, assumed the task of preserving the royal inheritance as far as possible and of vindicating their loyalty to their King.

By this time the relations of the various parties in the city had become definitely adjusted; on one side were the Royal Audience and the Clergy, and on the other the Cabildo, the Governor and the Capital; but the Audience occupied the anomalous position of being opposed to their President, the Governor; the Cabildo was not yet firmly united on any consistent plan which was pleasing to Infante, and the clergy was divided among themselves. And now a new element was introduced into the situation, which promised the Royal Audience a decisive triumph; the news came to Santiago that the Supreme Council had named General Francisco Xavier Elio as Governor and Captain General of Chile, and that he was on the

point of setting out for his new government. Moreover, Ballesteros persuaded the clergy of the city to send to each parish throughout the diocese of Santiago, a protest against the avowed purpose of the Cabildo to elect a Junta, this protest to be circulated by the parish priests and to be signed by all the male residents in each parish. They also went in a body to the palace and laid before the Governor a vigorous protest, complaining that he assisted the Cabildo at the expense of loyalty, dignity and honor, and warning him of the probable action of the newly named governor when he should on his arrival be informed of the Count's official derelictions. To this Ballesteros added that it would be a peculiarly reprehensible thing if the Count, being only Governor *ad interim*, should abet a party that was hostile to the King's interest, and should prepare scandal and trouble and danger for his successor. The mild old man was deeply wounded by these charges and insinuations, and petulently replied that he would do nothing at all in the future for either side; that General Elio when he came would find the matter where it was now and that he washed his hands of the whole subject. The Audience withdrew in triumph; they felt that the game was won.

But they reckoned without Infante, and Argomedo and Eyzaguirre and the Regidores Erázuriz and Juan Alcalde, who also learned of the appointment of General Elio and knew that their time was at hand. They succeeded in unit-

ing the Cabildo by representing to them the necessity of immediate action and the fatal consequence of delaying the settlement of the question of their local government until the arrival of the new governor should substitute an enemy for an ally. Infante then addressed them and succeeded in infusing into them some of the enthusiasm which filled him. Thenceforth there were to be no doubt and no hesitation in the action of the municipal body.

The matter of the clerical protest was disregarded for the time, until the next important demand was satisfactorily settled, and they decided that they would call on the Governor in a body and neutralize the action of the Royal Audience. It was characteristic of the chivalrous honor of the members of the Cabildo, that they apprized the Royal Audience of their purpose to interview the Governor, leaving it with Ballesteros to bring his colleagues if he thought fit. Ballesteros preferred intrigue to open warfare, but his courage was without question, and he brought the Royal Audience with him to the palace.

At eight o'clock on September 12th, the Governor received the members of the Cabildo and those of the Royal Audience in conference. There were also present the Governor's Asesor, Marin, his secretary, Argomedo, and a few of the more important representatives of Santiago society. There is no need of reproducing the arguments which both sides lavished upon the Governor, for the

issue was dubious and there was no result reached which satisfied anyone. The criminations of Ballesteros yet rang in the Count's ears and the Cabildo withdrew discomfited. But though they had seemed at the time to have produced no effect, the Count, after passing a sleepless night, informed them on the following day, Friday, September 14, that he had decided with them that a Junta should be elected and that he would appoint the following Tuesday, the 18th instant, for a Cabildo Abierto, when the members of the Junta should be named.

The joy of the Cabildo and the dismay of the Royal Audience at this announcement cannot be described. Don José Miguel Infante at once drew up a card of invitation to send to three hundred and fifty of the friends of the Cabildo, to ensure the presence of a body of adherents large enough to overawe opposition. It was conceived in the following terms:

"On the 18th of the present month the very illustrious Señor Governor with the illustrious Cabildo will receive you in the Hall of the Royal Tribunal to consider the best way to conserve the public safety and to discuss what system of government should be adopted to preserve this kingdom for our Señor don Ferdinand VII." ¹

¹ "Para el dia 18 del corriente, espera a vd. el mui illustre señor presidente con el illustre ayuntamiento en la sala del real tribunal del consulado á tratar de los medios de seguridad publica, discutiendose alli que sistema de Gobierno deba adoptarse para conservar siempre estos dominios al señor don Fernando VII."

The printing press was not introduced into Chile until the following year, and a hand stamp was used to print these cards of invitation. The Royal Audience at once replied to this challenge by a note to the Governor, protesting against the innovation, and repeating their arguments against the proposed change of government. The Governor replied through Argomedo, offering them his palace for another joint interview with the Cabildo, and promising to be guided by the majority vote of those present. The Royal Audience answered that to decide a question of infringing the King's rights by the vote of an irregular meeting was not sanctioned by the laws of Spain; that while the Cabildo outnumbered the Royal Audience two to one, it was not seemly to invite the latter body to a contest of numbers; that in accepting the Governor's offer they would expose themselves to unnecessary humiliation; and they ended by a renewed warning against his furthering the revolutionary purposes of the Cabildo.

On the 14th the Royal Audience procured a copy of the invitation and presented another remonstrance against the discussion of the system of government by the Cabildo "or any other incompetent body." Infante, who desired to conciliate the Audience, if it were in any way possible, at once changed the form of invitation. A new card was issued which was as follows:

"The very illustrious Governor with the illustrious

Cabildo expects you at the Hall of the Royal Consulate at 9 A. M. on the 18th inst., to consult and decide upon the most fitting means for the defense of the kingdom and for the public tranquillity.”¹

The clergy were then appeased by the assurance that no change was contemplated in the present system of Church Government, and that their interests were to be safeguarded exactly as they had always been. The guarantee of the members of the Cabildo was considered even by the suspicious priests as above suspicion, and their guaranty continued to be observed among all the vicissitudes of war and among all the fluctuations of civil government.

Many noble men has Chile given to the world, but among them all the members of the Cabildo of the city of Santiago in the year 1810 must forever occupy a distinguished place in her annals. When, during the few days that preceded the 18th—the “Diez i ocho”—of September, the accusation was made that the Cabildo was ambitious to extend its power and that the institution of the Junta would afford them the opportunity to gratify this ambition, Don Agustin Eyzaguirre, the Alcalde, did not hesitate to propose to his associates a self-denying ordinance that vindicates

¹ “Para el dia 18 del corriente, a las nueve de la mañana espera a vd. el mui illustre Señor presidente con el illustre ayuntamiento en las salas del real consulado á consultar i decidir los medios mas oportunos a la defensa del reino i publica tranquilidad.”

his dignity and the unselfishness of his colleagues. He proposed that no member of the Cabildo should occupy a seat in the Junta, and his suggestion was adopted unanimously, without debate; so anxious was the Cabildo to avert the imputation of personal ambition and so eager to convince their countrymen that for the good of Chile they willingly sacrificed their private interests. This action placed upon the new movement the stamp of a high purpose.

And now came on the great day—the day which Chile has for a century regarded as the actual birthday of the Republic; a day which is to Chile what the Fourth of July is to the United States. It is true that there was no declaration of independence,—no political creed to incite them to revolution or to justify them in it. On the contrary the authority of the King continued to be nominally recognized as well by the Junta as it had formerly been by the Governor; but the step was taken which proved to be the first step on the broad road of liberty—they decided upon their form of government and they elected the officers who should rule them. If the significance of this step was to a great part of them obscure, yet they soon learned that from that moment they had emancipated themselves from Spanish authority, and could never again be content to return to their former submission. The line between submission and independence was not in the history of Chile, a visible line, as a ship may cross from

one hemisphere to another without for the moment being conscious of the fact.

Before six o'clock in the morning, the militia and the Spanish troops had occupied the necessary city posts and were prepared to secure public order; the King's Regiment guarding the plaza; the Frontier Dragoons, the Queen's Regiment and the Regiment of the Prince being in double line on the streets debouching into the plaza. The Consulate entrance was guarded, and the sentinels were instructed to admit no one without the card of invitation issued by the Cabildo.

At nine o'clock several hundred citizens had arrived, at eleven came the Governor attended by his Asesor and Secretary, Marin and Argomedo, with the members of the Cabildo and the ecclesiastical and civil authorities of inferior grades. The Royal Audience, though invited, did not appear. The Governor walked at once to the dais and turning about to the assembled company, he laid his baton or staff of office on the table and said simply, "I lay down my staff. Dispose of it, for the government is in your hands." Argomedo then made a brief address in which he enumerated the Governor's reasons for yielding up his authority to the people, and he ended by saying,—“The Governor has thus ceased to exercise the functions of office; the people must decide what form of government should be adopted and elect the officers to whom we shall confide the direction of public business.” Infante followed

Argomedo.¹ He explained the condition of affairs in Spain, sketched the institution of the various provincial Juntas which directed its isolated energies, described and justified the activity of the Cabildo of Santiago in taking an unaccustomed lead in the general direction of political affairs, and vindicated the purposes of the assembly which he was addressing, by the citation of enactments and decrees which had issued from the Central Spanish authority. He then spoke in some detail of the system of organized oppression under which the colony had languished for centuries, and with vehement asperity condemned the tardy recognition by the Junta Central of their equality to the Peninsular provinces, as an act of belated justice whose only purpose was to prolong the injustice that it condemned. Still, he absolved the captive King of any complicity in the array of the Colony's wrongs, and loudly and sincerely proclaimed his devotion and that of the Cabildo to Ferdinand VII.

Don Cárlos Correa arose when Infante had finished and proposed that seven men should be elected to compose a new government, to be called the Junta Provisional Gubernativa. To this there was no objection and Infante offered to the assembly, one by one, the names that the Cabildo had decided upon. They were elected

¹ When Infante died, in 1844, he left among his papers some notes of his speech before the Cabildo Abierto of September 18, 1810.

without opposition, and the new government was composed of Don Mateo Toro, Conde de la Conquista, President; the Bishop Don José Antonio Martínez de Aldunate, Vice-President, and Don Fernando Márquez de la Plata, Don Juan Martínez de Rózas, Don Ignacio de Carrera, Don Francisco Xavier Reina and Don Juan Enrique Rosáles. Marin and Argomedo were named as Secretaries.

The composition of the Junta is a monument to the diplomacy of Rózas and Infante. All parties were represented with such sagacity as to secure the success of the movement while quieting every scruple and conciliating the goodwill and support of all classes. Only the Royal Audience cherished their animosities. On the 19th of September the members of that body were summoned to appear and take the necessary oath of allegiance to the government. Much to the surprise of the members of the Cabildo, they came and signified their willingness to recognize the Junta conditionally under the protests that they had already addressed to the late Governor in their official communications, their purpose plainly being to avoid committing themselves to the recognition of the Junta as a *de jure* government. The Junta, however, refused such limited recognition, and directed them to say at once explicitly whether or not they chose to recognize the authority erected by the people. Reduced to this alternative, they decided to acquiesce in the will of the people and

to take their unqualified oath of allegiance to the Junta, rather than risk the loss of their seats in the Royal Audience. Thus their great victory of July 15th had prepared the way for their ignominious surrender of the 19th of September.

Bishop Aldunate was one of the most eminent men in South America for his wealth, wisdom and generosity. He was living in his diocese of Huamanga, Peru, in September, 1810, and, resigning his bishopric, he hastened to Chile, but died before he could qualify as Vice-President. He was nearly of the same age with the Conde de la Conquista. Márquez de la Plata was also far advanced in years; as Judge of the Royal Audience of Lima and as Regent of the Audience of Quito, he was well known throughout Spanish America. A Spaniard by birth, though for some years a resident of Chile, he had received, only a short time before, the appointment to the Council of the Indies. This office he had resigned that he might serve the new Junta of Santiago. During the ensuing war with Spain and during the dark days of the Spanish occupation, he remained true to the service of his adopted state, and, after passing some years in exile, he returned to take the direction of the Chilean Court of Appeals. Carrera, a Colonel of militia, belonged like Aldunate to one of the old Chilean families. True to the revolution, he gave three sons to the cause of liberty and saw them die, victims of expediency, under the dubious stigma of treason. His second son, José

Miguel, was now on his return to Chile, after serving with honor as an officer in the Spanish Peninsular Army. Young, aristocratic, fascinating and successful (he has been styled the Alcibiades of Chile), José Miguel seemed the favorite of fortune; yet his name has spotted with blood the darkest pages of Chilean history, and the tragic mystery of his death on the plains of Mendoza time has hitherto refused to divulge.

Reina was the Colonel of Artillery who refused at Carrasco's demand to fire upon the people of Santiago and whom Carrasco covered with opprobrium before the Royal Audience. Carrasco was still living in Santiago and must have ground his teeth when he saw Reina's name as a member of the Junta. Rosáles was a wealthy Chilean gentleman, the head of one of the great Colonial families. He had been Alcalde of the Cabildo some years before and had interested himself in the matter of public education.

Among them all Rózas was the man of greatest prestige and the real leader. Infante, Argomedo and Eyzaguirre had acted throughout the campaign, that had now so happily terminated, under constant instructions from Rózas in Concepcion. Letters from Rózas, still extant, prove the extent of his influence over Ovalle and Rójas. They all called him "Master"; O'Higgins revered him as he had revered Miranda. Rózas was a statesman of wide and generous views. Among the maxims of political conduct which Miranda had given to

O'Higgins, on his leaving England, was the advice "to make no man a friend unless he found him to be well-read in the books that were prohibited in the Index." This qualification for political friendship Rózas possessed; his mind was unhampered by formulas or traditions. He caused the spirit of the Cabildo, which was also his own, to imbue the new government, for although the passage by the Cabildo of the self-denying ordinance prevented the members of that body from participating openly in the management of the Junta, they did not for that reason lose any portion of their influence in the conduct of the affairs of the new nation. The pure flame of disinterested patriotism had burnt all selfish dross from their souls, but their very abnegation of self increased their power. They had projected and established the Junta, they had named its members, and they continued to direct its energies. They worked in perfect agreement with Rózas. They formed in fact the legislative branch of the new government. Their decisions were accepted by the Junta and being promulgated as such, were obeyed throughout the Republic without demur. The one man who by his overpowering influence controlled the Junta, was the man to whom the Cabildo had confided the real conduct of the State, Juan Martínez de Rózas.

"The new government," says Tocornal, "represented all the interests of the country and conciliated all opinions. The President was wisely

continued in office that no intention might appear of disturbing the authority of Spain; the clergy obtained recognition in the highest clerical functionary of the Colony; the most illustrious Spaniard of peninsular birth in Chile, Márquez de la Plata, recently elected a member of the Council of the Indies, served as an additional guaranty of loyalty to Spain; Carrera and Rosáles represented the wealth and pride of Santiago; Colonel Reina continued in command of the army; Rózas, Marin and Argomedo personified the Revolution, and Rózas was expected to dominate the Junta."

PART IV

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

TO RANCAGUA

“No permitais que jamas se apodere de vuestro ánimo ni el disgusto ni la desesperacion, pues si alguna vez dais entrada a estos sentimientos, os pondreis en la impotencia de servir a vuestra patria.

“MIRANDA to O’HIGGINS.”

“Let not disgust or despondency enter your soul, for they will unfit you for your country’s service.”

The Revolution, thus inaugurated in Chile on the 18th of September, 1810, was the work of the Cabildo of Santiago alone, and, realizing the necessity of united action, the Junta at once proceeded to send envoys to all the cities and towns throughout the country to secure their formal adherence to the cause. Valdivieso was sent to Santa Rosa, San Felipe and Quillota; Irrarázabal to Iliapel, Solar to Coquimbo, Errázuriz to Valparaiso and José Maria Rózas and Cruz to San Fernando, Talca and the other centres of population as far south as Concepcion and Valdivia. By the 29th of October every city in Chile had recognized the Junta of Santiago as the governing body of the

country. No word was yet uttered openly of liberty and independence, the new Junta proposing merely, "to conserve the rights of the King during his captivity." On the 30th of October Don Juan Martínez de Rózas arrived in Santiago from Concepcion, and was enthusiastically welcomed as the man who should direct the new government of the nation.

In fact Rózas was the only member of the Junta of 1810 who thoroughly understood the significance of the new movement. He alone had a definite purpose to attain, and he determined to justify to the people of Chile the necessity of a complete change in the system of government before disclosing to them the fact that such a change was contemplated. Having long considered the evils of the Spanish dominion, he decided to take the necessary steps to convince the people of the superiority of a wise and just administration of public affairs, that they might themselves make the discovery of the advantages that the new government procured for them, and experience the benefits of the revolution.

The first enactment of the Junta was to suppress the custom of farming out the public revenues, taxes, excise and imposts of various kinds,—by which the subdelegates had oppressed the people and enriched themselves; and to appoint the Alcaldes as Collectors of Revenue, under a fixed system, which relieved the people from arbitrary exactions and added at once and continu-

ously to the effective revenue of the state. The sale of offices was then ordered to be discontinued, and the impartial administration of the Junta replaced the iniquitous exploitations of office for individual enrichment. Slavery was abolished, the extension of commerce decreed and its restrictions diminished, and schools of elementary instruction were established in every centre of population, while a powder factory was built and a military school equipped in the Capital. The system of royal monopolies was abolished and those restrictions removed that had prevented immigration and discouraged agriculture.

With the inauguration of these reforms, a general enthusiasm for the Junta began to pervade the whole country and the admiration for the new government was almost universal. So generally had popular favor been conciliated, that Rózas ventured upon a decree that might well have seemed hazardous to the point of temerity, but Rózas enforced his will upon his colleagues and the decree was issued that all residents of Chile, who were of Spanish birth and who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Junta, should be required to leave the country within six months. If Ballesteros's sense of humor had not been defective, he would have derived much pleasure from the decrees of a Junta that endeavored to defend the country from the very power to which it vowed allegiance, and which followed up this inconsistency by expelling from its tributary soil the sub-

jects of the monarch from whose name it derived its own authority; but it was not Rózas who was inconsistent. Indeed there was a grim logic in the measures that he took to prepare the country for the war that was sure to come. A league was formed with Buenos Ayres, the frontier regiments were purged of royalists and those officers who refused their allegiance to the Junta, dismissed. With admirable diplomacy, Rózas had contrived to carry his colleagues along with him until they were compromised beyond all hope of absolution, without perceiving that their steps had strayed from the narrow path of loyalty to Ferdinand. "Allegiance to the Junta" was the formula under which these changes were accomplished, and the Junta proclaimed its allegiance to the King. Moreover, its members were conscious of their own loyalty, and they thought that they constituted the Junta. Meanwhile every decree of the Junta brought out in sharper relief the inequity of the Peninsular administration and educated the people in the way of progress. Rózas was careful not to emphasize his supremacy in the Junta, and concealed his purpose by a scrupulous deference to his colleagues, while he effected an immense change in the popular sentiment of Chile toward Spain. The officers of the Spanish forces in Chile, having confidence in the Junta, easily for the most part took the required oath, and the soldiers followed the example thus set for them. Moreover, as the garrisons of the south had been

almost entirely recruited in Chile, their sympathies could be relied on to hold them firm to the cause of their country when the progress of events should disclose the actual separation of the colony from the metropolis, which Rózas was so rapidly and yet so imperceptibly effecting.

New levies were also quietly made. Don Bernardo O'Higgins wrote to Rózas from the Laja that he had recruited and was proceeding to equip two regiments of cavalry and one of infantry, while the adherents or agents of Rózas in every section of Chile were actively engaged in prosecuting similar activities. Colonel Mackenna, the best artillery engineer in the Spanish service, who understood the purposes of Rózas and furthered them with admirable energy and reticence, was appointed Governor of Valparaiso, whose defenses and garrison he quickly brought into serviceable condition. Everywhere there was activity and energy; the barracks and public squares hummed with the excitement of drilling the new levies, whose recruits worked with enthusiasm to perfect themselves in the art of war, while each day brought to the Capital the news of other adherents and the muster roll of additional companies and battalions.

Thus there suddenly came into existence a new sentiment in the kingdom of Chile, no longer to be called by that strange title—a kingdom that had never had a king,—but to be henceforth known as the Republic of Chile, a new sentiment, love of country, and a passionate devotion to her interests

that rivals the ancient patriotism of Aragon, Switzerland and Scotland. Never could she return to the condition of a Colony; never for a moment, after the first deep draught of liberty and glory on the 18th of September, could she have endured contentedly the rule of even the best of her old Colonial governors. Wisely and with a correct insight into the causes of events, does Chile look back to that day as the greatest day in her history. Sad and bitter days were in store for her,—days of defeat, humiliation, reconquest; when Ossório and Marcó renewed on Chilean soil the atrocities of Abascal in Peru, and anticipated those of Morillo in Venezuela, and of Calleja in Mexico, and when the inexperience of the Chilean generals and the interplay of their selfish ambitions invited disaster and encouraged treason. But Chile was rapidly learning the lesson of the 18th of September as it gradually unfolded its purpose of good government, and with the innate seriousness and stability of the Chilean character, was fitting herself to withstand rudely the bitter assaults of Spain. This was the work that Rózas accomplished for his country, and so great was his adroitness that the other members of the Junta yielded to his initiative without any suspicion of the purpose that animated him and which he was with their unconscious coöperation, steadfastly pursuing. So skilfully had he concealed the purpose of his reforms under the proclamation of allegiance, that on December 14, 1810, the Spanish

Ambassador in Brazil, the Marquis de Casa Irujo, wrote to the Chilean Junta "congratulating the new government on its patriotism, prudence and wisdom."

That Rózas was not a mere opportunist but a statesman of large views, is proved by his project for the formation of an International American Congress or Congress of American Republics, which, suggested by him in 1810, was embodied in the project of a Constitution unfolded by Don Juan Egaña in 1811. The purpose of this General American Congress was "to recognize the identity, promote the progress, and secure the establishment of the general interest of the American Republics, thereby providing a unity of purpose and a uniformity of development among them." The Rózas Doctrine was thus enunciated thirteen years before that which John Quincy Adams wrote for President Monroe. It proposed a political concert of independent states whose united action might guarantee exactly the same rights which the Monroe Doctrine entrusted to the protectoral prestige of the United States of America. While the Rózas doctrine was less altruistic and perhaps less practicable than that of Monroe, there was omitted from it that suspicious assumption of superiority on the part of any individual nation which has unnecessarily aroused misgivings on the part of some American States as to the exact scope of Monroe's famous dictum. Fifteen years after Egaña had formulated the doctrine of Rózas and three years

after that of Monroe was announced, a Congress of American States met at Panama; but even in 1826, the South American nations suspected the intentions of the United States and dreaded her power, to such an extent that the announcement of the appointment of Anderson and Sergeant as Representatives of the United States to that Congress, was of itself sufficient to break up the Congress before it had fully considered the manner in which the threatened pretensions of Spain might be effectively resisted. To-day the danger from Spain has passed away forever, but perhaps in the near future the Doctrine of Rózas may be again revived to prevent the descent of the militant hordes of a new Genghis Khan upon the defenseless shores of Peru or San Salvador.

Such are the claims to the gratitude of Chile which Rózas established during the purely tentative and conditional government of the provincial Junta. The Cabildo at first actively seconded his efforts, and it is impossible to-day to assign to Infante, Eyzaguirre and Errázuriz their due credit in all these innovations, so profound was their personal immersion in the development of the social and political regeneration of their country.

Rózas' colleagues in the Junta were content with the social consideration that their positions secured to them and were perfectly willing to let Rózas project and establish whatever reforms he deemed essential, so long as they shared the glory of his achievements. The Vice-President, Bishop

Aldunate, died during the early period of the Junta, but the President, the Conde de la Conquista, came punctually to all the meetings of the Junta and slept tranquilly from the beginning to the end. When he did awake for a moment during the sessions, it was to complain that no attention was paid to his suggestions and then drop asleep again. He was old and querulous, and on the 26th of February, 1811, he passed suddenly away, without realizing for a moment the great changes that were taking place in the country which he thought he still governed, and in whose annals his death is recorded as an obscure incident.

Early in 1811, Camilo Henríquez returned to Chile, having escaped from the dungeons of the Holy Office, where he had been immured for his liberal and revolutionary utterances, and whence he drew a profound hatred of the power that sought to enslave the consciences of men. It is probable that Rózas invited him to return, that he might become the apostle of liberty and independence, and propagate as an individual those great ideas which the country was now ready to receive, but which Rózas could not himself directly inculcate without destroying his authority with the Junta. It is difficult to conceive from reading the files of the *Aurora* in the National Library at Santiago, how such utterances could have aroused the Chilean spirit to so lofty a pitch of enthusiasm, but the fact is undeniable and illustrates the power of the living word. Camilo Henríquez, unfrocked,

excommunicated, disgraced, was a brilliant and beneficent power in the early history of Chilean independence. He was the pioneer of patriotism in Chile.

Thus the months passed; Summer came and withered into Autumn and the 1st of April was at hand, when the Junta had proclaimed that the election should take place of members to the Congress. But while the Junta was submissive and the people happy and the country prosperous, there were yet many persons in Chile who resented the altered spirit of the country, and who saw with regret the cause of the captive King neglected. Carrasco was still living in Santiago, the recipient of a pension from the Junta, and the Royal Audience still held in nominal control the supervision of justice, but they were filled with resentment and cherished the hope of vengeance for the affronts that had humiliated them. To these grew the farmers of the royal revenue and the agents of the former royal monopolies, as well as the merchants and ancient officials of the earlier régime who were of Spanish birth or of royalist sympathies, until they had become a compact body of dissent and disaffection, inflamed with animosity and eager for action. They tampered with Colonel Reina, a member of the Junta, they tempted the former military governor of Valparaiso, our old friend Joaquin Alos, they seduced Colonel Figueroa, who commanded the Dragoons stationed in the Capital.

In the circular for the convocation of the National Congress which issued at the end of March and appointed the 1st of April for the election, the Junta recognized the provisional character of its authority, and announced that with the election of representatives, the functions of the Junta would immediately cease, and that the Congress must determine how the country should be ruled in the future. The election of members to the Congress seemed to the royalists a suitable occasion to reassert the authority of the King, and the demission of the Junta a suitable opportunity to regain the control as it fell from the hand of Rózas and before it could be seized by the Congress. The first of April, then, was the date set for the counter-revolution, in order to prevent the election and to put an immediate end to the revolutionary innovations of this irregular but powerful Junta. Colonel Figueroa, at the suggestion of the Royal Audience, had manœvered to obtain for his dragoons the honor of guarding the Consulate during the election and his request had been formally granted. Early in the morning of the first of April, Colonel Figueroa marched his dismounted dragoons down the Calle Cathedral and formed them in the Plaza, while he himself passed on to the Hall of the Royal Audience. The Court was in session when Figueroa entered, and saluting them he addressed Ballesteros, "My arms support the religion, the King and the old régime."

"Hush!" said Ballesteros, "There is no need

for you to come here. Your work is in the plaza. Go there immediately and do your duty, and be sure that no one sees you leave this Hall."

At once on the departure of their unwelcome guest, Ballesteros wrote a note to Rózas warning him of the attempt of Figueroa, and gave the note to the messenger of the Audience with instructions to deliver it the following day.

But Rózas was already warned, and when Colonel Figueroa returned to the plaza, he found a detachment of troops under Comandante Vial drawn up opposite his own men. Vial had just finished an allocution to the dragoons as their commander came up. Fortunately for Vial, Figueroa was ignorant of the liberty that his inferior had taken, nor did he see the look of hesitation and distrust on the faces of the dragoons. He at once advanced and attempted to incorporate the new men into his own troop, claiming superiority of command over Vial. Vial resisted the claim, alleging the explicit direction of the Junta, and a hot discussion began between the two officers, when a sergeant in Vial's company fired his pistol in the air. An irregular discharge followed, and several soldiers and one or two bystanders fell. At once confusion ensued, shouts of foul play arose, and the dragoons took the opportunity to disperse and disappear. Their Colonel, finding himself alone, exclaimed, "I am lost! They have deceived me," and ran across the plaza and disappeared.

Anticipating this outcome, Rózas himself now

appeared with a squad of soldiers in the plaza, and directing Vial to hold his troops in readiness, he followed swiftly on Colonel Figueroa's track and entered the Convent of Santo Domingo a few minutes after the fugitive had disappeared therein. Guards were stationed at the gates and a careful search of the Convent was begun under the guidance of Father Gonzáles. All was in vain. Every corner was examined and Figueroa was not to be found, when suddenly a chance gust of wind from an opening door disarranged the priestly robe of Father González, and, on Rózas ordering him to be stripped, Colonel Figueroa stood revealed. He was led at once to the Junta and interrogated, but he refused to throw the least light upon the motive or the extent of the conspiracy, denied the complicity of the Royal Audience and abjured the words he was heard to utter in the plaza. He was shot the next morning at four o'clock. From subsequent revelations it was learned that the object of the conspiracy was to replace Don Francisco Antonio Garcia Carrasco in the Governor's chair, and to reinstate the Royal Audience in its former authority. The Royal Audience was immediately dissolved in disgrace and Carrasco was summarily expelled from Chilean soil. This fiasco was a fitting pendant to his course as Governor, and rounds out his Chilean career with a kind of romantic justice. The conspiracy of the first of April has the further interest for us in that when the news reached Curicó, Don Bernardo O'Higgins, then Lieutenant

Colonel of Militia, set out at once for the Capital, where he arrived on the 9th inst., and without changing his riding clothes, strode puffing before the Junta and offered them his sword.

On May 6th was held the election of representatives in the city of Santiago which had been interrupted by the conspiracy of the 1st of April, and on the 4th of July the National Congress began its sessions in the Capital. During the past few months there had been a growing estrangement between Rózas and the Cabildo of Santiago. While his authority in the Junta was become practically absolute, the Cabildo was watching with more and more disquietude the development of his power. There had always existed in the Municipal government a feeling that the time was not yet come for the final break with Spain. The Cabildo had always been a conservative body, being composed of representatives of the aristocracy, who had their titles and their wealth and their social position to consider in any event that might befall the country. These men, led by Eyzaguirre, were anxious not to compromise their country to such a degree that the restoration of Ferdinand might ensure its utter ruin. They followed Rózas in his developing projects of social improvement, but they feared that he might lead them too far and they gradually grew to distrust him. When Camilo Henríquez began his propaganda for liberty and independence, they complained to Rózas that Henríquez was threatening the peace and the

future of the country. They were dissatisfied with Rózas' reply and suspected that Rózas himself sympathized with and perhaps indirectly assisted the campaign of the ex-priest. Rózas in turn began to neglect the Cabildo, and, in the confidence of his power, spoke slightly of some of its members. After the incident of the 1st of April, this tension increased, and the aristocracy of Santiago, taking part with the Cabildo, began to complain openly that this lawyer from Concepcion should venture to usurp all the powers of the government and to override the Cabildo which had named him. Thus came about the distinct separation of the Exaltados from the Moderados. It is probable, nevertheless, that if the election had been held on April first, Rózas might have obtained a majority of the representatives, but during the following weeks Eyzaguirre and his followers bethought them of a scheme whereby they might assure to themselves the control of the Congress, by arbitrarily electing for the city an unlawful number of representatives. The decree of convocation had appointed to each district the number of its representatives, but now, while conceding the appointment for each of the other districts, the Cabildo announced that the Capital should have twelve members instead of six. They exerted their influence in the other congressional districts also, and when the Congress convened it soon appeared that among the thirty-four delegates, thirteen only could be relied upon to follow

Rózas and his Exaltados, while among the majority were several of Spanish birth and openly royalist prejudices. For some time there was no test of strength. The 9th of August was the date decided upon for the election of the new Junta, and the intervening time was pleasantly spent in making speeches, in discussing Peninsular events, and in listening to impracticable projects for a constitution for the country. Rózas indeed took a part in these exercises, for he had the greatest learning and the readiest wit among them all, but O'Higgins sat in gloomy silence. One day there suddenly burst upon this debating society a real question to decide. There had collected from the rents of the Crown the sum of one million six hundred thousand dollars in gold in the Royal Treasury in Santiago, and on the 25th of July, a vessel anchored in Valparaiso with credentials from the Supreme Council of Regency, empowering the Captain to collect all the funds which had accumulated in the Colonial treasuries. The Congress voted to send the money down to the port at once in obedience to the ancient custom. Only the thirteen radicals opposed it, and their voice was ineffectual until O'Higgins started to his feet and thundered out, "Although we are in the minority, we will know how to supply our numerical inferiority with our energy and boldness, and we will not lack hands to prevent the loss of this sum of money so necessary to our country at this time." Whether the Congress was intimi-

dated by his boldness or shamed by his words, the vessel was permitted to sail without the Chilean funds, and O'Higgins won his first public victory. This was the only intrusion upon the somnolent sessions of the Congress until the approach of the 9th of August.

Rózas was too expert a politician to mistake his position in the Congress. It was in vain that he had expostulated against the admission of the irregularly elected delegates from the Capital, he was defeated by a compact majority; it was in vain that he privately and publicly had employed the voice of reason and of wisdom to break this disheartening majority, he could not reduce the number of the opposition by the defection of a single member. In pursuance of a further expedient, he had contrived the nomination of Comandante Vial to the command of the city troops, but as soon as it became known that he was interested in this appointment, the Congress at once withdrew the command from Vial and commissioned Colonel Reina in his place. Rózas made up his mind to do without Vial, and on the night of the 8th of August an attempt was made to occupy the artillery quarters and effect a coup d'état, which should reinstate him in his interrupted office, but Colonel Reina had anticipated the attempt and it was immediately frustrated by his vigilance. No hope was now left to the Exaltados; they withdrew from the sessions of the Congress and on the 13th Rózas left Santiago to re-

turn to Concepcion, abandoning the country to the divided councils and varied impulses of a vain and incompetent Junta, composed of Martin Calvo Encalada, Juan José Aldunate and Francisco Javier del Solar, representing the three provinces of Santiago, Coquimbo and Concepcion. There was nothing in fact that Rózas could any longer do in the Capital. The Congress had so tied the hands of the new Junta, lest any individual should assume the undisputed authority which Rózas had attained in the provisional Junta, that even the ordinary process of executive authority was withdrawn from the Junta and exercised by the Congress, which entered upon a continuous and unrestricted control of administration as well as of legislation, and reduced the Junta to a condition where it could not command even general respect.

The withdrawal of Rózas thus involved the disappointment and perhaps the extinction of the general aspiration for immediate independence. There could be as yet no such thing in Santiago society as the determined expression of a consistent public sentiment, to which Rózas might appeal and which could effectively coerce the moderate leaders in the Congress; neither party made the slightest attempt to influence the people as a mass. Eyzaguirre did not appeal to them for support nor Rózas for vindication. When the citizens were dressed alike and carried muskets and kept step and were called soldiers, they as-

sumed a position of consequence in the State, but no one had the least respect for their opinion as a mere many-headed multitude; nor was there as yet among them a due estimate of their own value, for they had not learned their power. With the departure of Rózas, then, the best head in Chile was removed from the national councils and the hearts of his patriotic followers were submerged in gloom and despondency.

The English vessel, the *Standard*, which cast anchor in the road of Valparaiso on the 25th of July, bringing from the Supreme Council of Regency the demand for the money in the King's treasury, brought also to the Chilean shores a young officer who had served with distinction in the Peninsular war under the Duke of Albuquerque among the Spanish allies of the Duke of Wellington; and on the next day when Don Bernardo O'Higgins was winning an unexpected victory in the Congress, Don José Miguel Carrera was listening breathlessly to the narrative of his father, Don Ignacio de la Carrera, and was learning the history of the events which had changed Chile from submission to insurrection. José Miguel Carrera, after a wild and stormy youth, had been sent to Lima to escape the penalties of his misdeeds in Chile and, after an unprofitable residence in the City of the Kings, had made his way to Spain, where he had risen to the rank of Major of Hussars in the Spanish army. He was only twenty-six years old, but he had seen more active

service in war than any other Chilean. He was of an overpowering ambition and not without the illness should attend it.

He possessed an engaging personality, he was elegant and affable, with the prestige of social position, family wealth, and a record of bravery and conduct in the armies of Spain. It is probable that his military experiences lost nothing in his narration of them, and he immediately became the hero of the army and the lion of society. If he had tempered his ambition with true patriotism, if he had possessed political honor and personal integrity, he might have won a very high place in the history of South America. The sagacious statesmanship of Rózas was above his conception, and the modest patriotism of O'Higgins was beyond his attainment and perhaps beyond his sympathy. He sowed envy and he reaped hatred, his career began in treachery and ended in destruction.

But Rózas did not return to Concepcion to brood over his defeat and accuse the people of Santiago of ingratitude; his first step was to cause a *Cabildo Abierto* to be summoned wherein he narrated the history of the Congress. They decided at once to recall their delegates who had voted with the Moderados, and replaced them by others who could be relied on to follow Rózas. They then entered their protest against the double representation of Santiago and threatened, if this evil were not at once remedied, to erect a Junta

of their own which should control the southern portion of the country and withdraw their recognition from the National Congress. This final action was taken on the 5th of September and the ultimatum, for such it really was, was despatched at once by an accredited envoy to the Capital. But the people of Concepcion were too late; before their envoy had reached the Maule, he turned and hurriedly retraced his way to Concepcion, bearing news that effectively changed the plans of the Exaltados of the South.

The new government was upon the rocks before the new Junta was fairly on board. With no real power in their hands, they were expected to perform great deeds. The people of the Capital had become accustomed to a Junta which really accomplished something. They remembered Rózas. So when the new Junta neither accomplished nor promised to accomplish anything, since they were manacled and fettered by Congressional restrictions and Congressional usurpation, the people of Santiago became quickly disgusted with their new government. The Congress too was inactive. There seems to be no reasonable doubt, when one considers at this distance of time the course of events in Chile, that the Moderados agreed perfectly with Rózas as to the desirability of independence, but differed from him as to its proper method and period of attainment. Where Rózas was enterprising and sagacious, the Moderados were timid and dubitative.

Carrera was not slow to take advantage of this changed sentiment. He had two brothers who were officers, one of grenadiers and the other of artillery, and who were stationed in the Capital with their respective commands. He offered the services of his family to the Radicals in the city and a compact was entered into between them, as early as the 27th of August. On the morning of September 4th, Colonel Reina was arrested and imprisoned, every point of vantage was occupied, the grenadiers filled the Plaza, and Don José Miguel Carrera, resplendent in his uniform of Major of the Spanish Hussars, entered the Hall where the Congress was in session and imposed the will of the Exaltados upon the representatives. The Junta was dismissed, and a new Junta, composed of Rózas, Rosáles, Calvo Encalada, Mackenna and Gaspar Marin was proclaimed; the six supernumerary representatives of Santiago were dismissed and two of the members from Concepcion were displaced to make room for two Exaltados. Thus the blow which Rózas had contemplated for the 8th of August was exactly accomplished by Carrera on the 4th of September, and the Exaltados were in a moment restored to power with a majority of two in the Congress. This was the news which invalidated the mission of the Envoy-messenger from Concepcion, and sent him back to Rózas without accomplishing his now useless embassy.

Rózas, thus restored to power, resumed his in-

errupted plan of legislation. One of the great evils that had grown into the Church system was the imposition of parochial fees, whose excessive tariff placed some of the sacraments beyond the means of many of the people. Marriage fees especially were nearly prohibitive, and the majority of the community were raising families without the sanction of the Church. The first law passed by the new Junta put an end to the sale of the sacraments, and created an endowment or dotation for the support of the parochial clergy. A Supreme Court of Justice was also established, and three of the most distinguished lawyers in Chile, Juan de Dios Vial del Rio, Joaquin Echeverria and José Maria Rózas were named as its members.

The sessions of the Congress were made open and public to all who wished to attend them, and on the 7th of October it was enacted that all the discussions in the Congress and all the acts of the government should be published. On the same day it was enacted that on the first of every month Treasury reports should be issued, showing the amount and source of the menstrual revenue, the amount and destination of the sums disbursed by the government, and the balance remaining in the Treasury. More than all else, the Junta urged on the Congress the necessity of formulating the national rights and establishing a Constitution. "A review of the history of other nations admonishes us," said Rózas in a message to the Con-

gress, "that where the people fail to restrain themselves within the bounds of an enlightened liberty, their rulers will not be contented within the limits of a rational authority; the people are as naturally inclined to license as the rulers to tyranny. That government, then, which holds one to the due obedience, and the other to the impartial exercise, of the law, and which establishes this law as a centre of a common happiness and as the guaranty of a reciprocal security, will be your ideal in formulating the organic law of your country."

It was impossible that so many and so important innovations could be made in the government of Chile, without exciting some interest in the mind of Spain's principal representative in America, the Viceroy of Peru. In fact, the royalists in Santiago kept the Viceroy, Abascal, completely informed of the condition of political affairs in Chile, and the Junta were under no illusion whatever as to their relation toward the Viceroy. Rózas labored continually, almost without respite or refreshment, in his purpose to cut Chile off from any hope of reconciliation with Spain, and to establish a unity of sentiment throughout the whole country. He made no concealment now of his sympathy with Camilo Henríquez, and of his responsibility for the propaganda of the ex-priest, who, laying aside his breviary, preached opportune sermons from the "Contrat Social."

The Supreme Council of Regency also had been apprized of the dangerous state of affairs in Chile, and had instructed Abascal to watch zealously over the maintenance of the royal authority in that country. Pursuant to these instructions, Abascal wrote a threatening letter to the Congress, demanding an explanation of their convocation and a copy of the record of their transactions. To this the Congress returned a neutral response, but decreed the enlistment and equipment of a body of militia, in which should be compulsorily enrolled all inhabitants of the Colony between the ages of sixteen and sixty. This decree was published by the Congress with a copy of the letter that Abascal had sent, and so great was the resentment everywhere felt at the strictures and menaces of the Viceroy, that for a time the whole country was united in a spirit of resistance to the arbitrary authority of Spain. The message of the Viceroy had the effect of suddenly quenching the flame of hostility with which the Moderados had insisted on their manner of bringing about the same end for which the Exaltados were also striving; and in the face of a common danger, all distinctions of method and name were abandoned. Thus the Exaltados triumphed because they represented the logical progress of the revolution.

Meanwhile José Miguel Carrera had been entirely forgotten by the Junta that he had reinstated in power, and by the Congress that he

had purged of its Moderado majority. After chafing under this neglect for two months, he finally saw his hopes blasted by the complete fusion of both parties into one, among whose members harmony and mutual confidence reigned. Now at last he realized that he had nothing to expect from those whom he had befriended. The situation, to one of his ambitious and arrogant nature, was intolerable. Rózas's wise and judicious administration in no wise counterbalanced his own neglect or conciliated his own pretensions. Among the royalists in Santiago the message of Abascal to the Congress infused a sudden hope and an unwonted activity. Carrera, who had despised them, saw in this revival of royalist enthusiasm an opening for his own ambition. His two brothers had endured the same neglect as himself, and when he proposed to them another revolution in favor of the royalists, they readily assented to his proposition. Then Carrera brought together the royalist leaders and promised them to restore the ancient government, and they, knowing well the humiliation that he had suffered, looked upon him as their sure salvation and exulted riotously in the unexpected prospect of recovered power. Colonel Juan Mackenna was a member of the Junta and an ardent follower of Rózas. O'Higgins spoke of him, at a later period, as "the most accomplished soldier and the most accomplished scholar that has appeared on either side in the revolution." Mac-

kenna had married into the family of Vicuña, who were a branch of the patrician house of the Larrain, and had adopted the hostility that the Larrain entertained toward the Carrera. Mackenna had distrusted José Miguel Carrera from the time of their first meeting, and it was Mackenna who now laid before the Junta his suspicion of Carrera, for he had in some way divined the conspiracy that was being planned. The Junta unwisely forbore to take Carrera seriously, ascribed Mackenna's suspicions to personal dislike, and refused even to investigate the matter closely. But while Mackenna failed to stir the Junta into action, his accusation when made public was the means of precipitating the movement which he had predicted. On the night of November 14th Carrera's arrangements were completed, and before daylight on the 15th, the grenadiers and hussars were distributed throughout the city and the artillery had occupied the Plaza and trained their guns upon the principal streets leading into it. Meanwhile the members of the Junta and of the Congress, startled from their sleep by the commotion in the streets, had betaken themselves, half dressed, to their place of meeting, and declared themselves in extraordinary session, but they were too bewildered to reach any decision, and knew not what had in reality taken place. A message from Carrera was brought to them announcing that every quarter of the city was occupied with the troops, that every gun was loaded

with ball, and that they must instantly resign and depart in order that "the reforms that the people imperiously demanded might be accomplished without delay." Messengers were sent out by the Junta to assure themselves of the truth of Carrera's representations, and having verified his statements, the Junta, being convinced that their withdrawal alone would save the city from a massacre, offered their resignations to the Congress and left the Hall.

With the resignation of the Junta on November 15th, 1811, the public career of Juan Martínez de Rózas came to an end. His work was accomplished. What that work was has been briefly outlined in the preceding pages and forms a great epoch in the history of Chile. For the greater part of a year he had been a member of the governing body, but for only the past ten weeks had he enjoyed the active coöperation of his fellows. During the rule of the provisional Junta, he had dominated his colleagues by his intellectual superiority and his moral force, but he had also reconciled them to that domination by his kindness, his tact and his manifest altruism, for there was no single individual in the provisional Junta who had the slightest sympathy with the great aim and purpose of Rózas's efforts, or who even divined the lofty and noble motive that inspired him. During that year he had turned the tide of sentiment from subserviency

to independence. The mere enumeration of the legislative benefits that he showered upon his country would alone form the text for appreciative volumes. As if with a presentiment of the limited time for action, he worked with indefatigable zeal and insight for the good of the nation, and in a year he succeeded, beyond all example of human activity, in correcting the abuses which had taken deep root during three centuries of oppression and despotism. Rózas was in the fifty-third year of his age, when, by a sedition as vulgar as it was violent, since it was set on foot merely to gratify an ignoble ambition, he was thrust from the office which he had dignified by the exercise of a sagacious and admirable statesmanship.

The joy of the royalists was short-lived. Carrera, having carried through his coup with their assistance, showed his contempt of them by refusing them the credit of participation in the émeute that had raised him to power. He even refused to interfere when a complaint was laid before the Congress, accusing some of the royalists, his fellow conspirators, of an "attempt to disturb the public peace and withstand the constituted authority of the nation," and demanding that they receive "severe and exemplary punishment." He now announced to the Congress that it was his will that a Junta of three be named, and directed them to appoint as its members Don Bernardo

O'Higgins, Gaspar Marin and himself, which the Congress at once did and the new Junta entered into office immediately.

It was now evident that Carrera's purpose had been, not a change in affairs, but simply a vindication of his own right to direct them. Between him and O'Higgins there was never any sympathy, but there was as yet no actual hostility. Carrera regarded O'Higgins as a serviceable instrument, and O'Higgins felt an instinctive distrust of Carrera which was emphasized by the peculiar treachery of his sudden rise to authority. In fact Carrera realized the necessity of conciliating the good will of his associates, upon whom he had intruded his own pretensions in such a harsh and unwelcome manner, and he thought to succeed by the timely use of suavity, by his ingratiating speech, and by a fascination of manner which he imagined the rude Chileans could in no wise resist. O'Higgins for one was not imposed on by these superficial qualifications, and promptly resigned from the Junta together with Marin.

O'Higgins's resignation was in part due to the suggestion of Rózas from Concepcion, whither he had returned, and Carrera found that the influence of his predecessor outweighed all the personal excellencies with which he had thought to impress the Congress. He therefore dismissed the Congress on the 2d of December, and appointed José Nicolas de la Cerda and Juan José Aldunate as his associates in the Junta.

Meanwhile Rózas, feeling that the security of the country was threatened, actively employed himself in devising means to remove Carrera from power. If Santiago was the political and social centre of Chile, Concepcion was its military centre and Rózas was absolute in Concepcion. Moreover he possessed in Santiago much greater influence and resources now than were at his command three months earlier when he sent his ultimatum to the Congress which had disturbed his plans. Among those who took a strenuous part with him now in the Capital were Mackenna, Vial, the Larraíns, Vicuña and Argomedo. But it was written that Rózas's authority was not to be restored. Carrera was informed through his spies of the movement in Santiago and caused all the leaders to be placed under immediate arrest, while he sent for O'Higgins requesting an interview "for the good of the country." To O'Higgins he announced his entire concurrence in the movement which Rózas had imparted to the revolution, he represented the certainty of the coming war with Spain, and declared the absolute necessity of his being entrusted with the conduct of military operations, in which he must not be hampered by an unsympathetic Congress. He then explained to O'Higgins the plan of defense which he had drawn up, and appealed to O'Higgins's patriotism to assist him in the conduct of the war. He then pleaded with him to undertake the mission of satisfying Rózas of his sincerity and

patriotism, and of diverting him from any attempt against him (Carrera) which would divide the country, introducing discord where the only hope of success lay in perfect harmony. Moreover, if Rózas distrusted his purpose or his capacity, he besought O'Higgins to bring about an interview between them, when he would satisfy Rózas or withdraw at once from the direction of affairs. O'Higgins undertook the mission to Rózas, but he had no credentials from Carrera, and while Rózas and the Concepcion Junta placed firm faith in O'Higgins, yet they had no confidence in Carrera's promises or protestations. This reluctance to trust Carrera was justified in the progress of the negotiations, which continued until the following April before the differences between the two provinces were finally composed. During the latter part of this period Santiago and Concepcion were more than once on the point of engaging in civil strife, and an army of five thousand men had actually taken possession of the passes of the Maule, before Carrera finally yielded to the demand of Concepcion to summon another Congress which should restrain the Junta in the exercise of its authority. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the divided state of Chile, the royalists had possessed themselves of the city of Valdivia and were becoming active even in the Capital. Whether Rózas was deceived by Carrera's representations or feared to cause a civil war in Chile, he withdrew all his pretensions to

authority, although he might well despair of the future while it lay in the hands of such a man as Carrera. But Rózas was unfitted for so vulgar a contest. Not on the sordid field of personal ambition had his victories been won. He might well realize the value of his services to Chile and might well believe that they were too securely guaranteed by the sanction of his countrymen to fall before so inexperienced an innovator as Carrera. But while Rózas's laws might be safe, his life was not, for Carrera could not feel secure while he lived. A few days after they had parted at the Maulé, reconciled at least if not friends, Carrera suborned the royalists in Concepcion to raise a revolt against the local Junta and promised them his assistance. How any one could still put any faith in Carrera's promises it is difficult to understand, but he sent them also some six thousand dollars in money, which must have persuaded them of his good faith. So they carried out his directions and while the city was in the direst tumult, some of Carrera's emissaries seized upon Rózas and, aided by the confusion, carried him away and rode rapidly northward to Santiago. At the Maulé an order was received from the Junta of Santiago, directing Rózas to leave Chilean soil at once, and at the same time a passport to Mendoza was given him. So Rózas departed into exile, where he died within a month. Before leaving Chile, however, he wrote a letter to Carrera.

In this letter went no word of personal com-

plaint or resentment, no expostulation as to the atrocious injustice of Carrera in causing him to be kidnapped and exiled like a felon, no threat of vengeance or retribution. Rózas had never had any ambition for himself, and his last word to Carrera was directed solely to the welfare of Chile. He informed him that the city of Concepcion was the point at which the Viceroy's army would land, and exhorted him to take certain measures, which he proceeded to indicate, to prepare Concepcion to resist that attempt. Rózas was always great,—at the last moment he became sublime.

So Carrera for the present triumphed, or seemed to triumph; and yet he had by this time alienated the friendship of the majority of the best men in Chile. The army still supported him, and every act of his as a legislator had for its motive the strengthening of his hold on his soldiers and the erection of their officers into a privileged class. To this general rule there was one exception, which brings into significant contrast with the serious statesmanship of Rózas, the jaunty inconsequence of Carrera. He chose this very time, when a great part of the clergy were uncertain which cause to espouse, and when they might be of signal service to the country if conciliated, to issue a decree that "for the future the word Roman should be omitted from the title of the Church in Chile." The result was decisive. The clergy no longer hesitated.

The only other memorable occurrence of this

dreary period was the arrival in Santiago on the 24th day of February, 1812, of Mr. Joel Roberts Poinsett. He is spoken of always as the "American Consul," but his instructions were probably more diplomatic than commercial in character, and his arrival and reception by the Junta gave, as it was intended to give, an assurance of the sympathy of the United States for Chile which wonderfully strengthened the patriots in their purpose of independence. Mr. Poinsett by no means concealed his own interest in the cause of Chilean freedom, and seems indeed to have filled an honorary position on Carrera's staff. Two days after his reception, on February 26th, the *Aurora* announced that "Mr. Poinsett had sent to the United States for six thousand muskets, one thousand pistols and some light field pieces, besides uniforms, saddles and trumpets." Mr. Poinsett was afterward Secretary of War during Van Buren's administration from 1837 to 1841, and must have appreciated the significance of his activities in Chile.

In July, 1812, the royalists had taken possession of Valdivia. To Abascal, the Viceroy of Peru, this seemed the turning of the tide. On the 19th of October he sent a long despatch to the Chilean Junta, in which he overwhelmed the Junta with insults, and spoke of Chile with the utmost contempt, demanding the instantaneous reinstatement of the royal officials under the penalty of summary punishment by the royal armies. The

Cabildo of Santiago replied with a formal declaration of war against the Viceroy of Peru, and the Junta "took the matter under advisement," but made no reply to the Viceroy. Benavente, who was always an admiring friend of Carrera, says that the Viceroy "commanded the Junta to swear allegiance to the royal standard; to proclaim Ferdinand VII. as absolute sovereign, the Supreme Council of Regency as his only representative, and His Excellency José Miguel Carrera as Captain General and President of Chile." There is no such clause in the copy of the Viceroy's message which is in my possession, but even if the Viceroy had so instructed the Junta, it seems unlikely that Carrera could be deluded into accepting a commission which the temper of Chile must have assured him would have been of little value and of short duration.

On March 26, 1813, Brigadier General Don Antonio Pareja landed in the bay of Talcahuano with an army of two thousand three hundred and seventy men, sent by the Viceroy of Peru to subdue the kingdom of Chile, and summoned Concepcion to surrender. Carrera had despised Rózas' warning, and timidity and treason yielded to the royalists the immediate possession of the city without a gun being fired in its defense. Pareja left a suitable garrison in Concepcion and Talcahuano, and marched rapidly northward that he might surprise the country. He had expected to fill up his skeleton ranks with the royalists of Chile, and

his hope was verified, for when he reached Chillan on the 15th of April, his immediate command had increased to fifty-five hundred men, the whole of Chile south of the Maule was come under his control and every town and village was garrisoned with his soldiers.

Carrera, the autocrat of Chile and commander in chief of her army, had not taken a single effective step to prepare the country to resist the invaders. His "plan of defense" which he had flaunted triumphantly before the eyes of Rózas was a mere hoax, and was disconcerted by the very movement of which Rózas had fully warned him. The country, too, was divided into bitter factions and would certainly have been soon rent by civil war, if the advance of Pareja had not suddenly stilled every voice in Chile but the voice of patriotism.

When the news of the landing of Pareja reached Santiago on the 31st of March, Carrera fulminated a tardy declaration of war against the Viceroy of Peru; erected a gallows in the plaza to intimidate the royalists of Santiago, imposed an extraordinary contribution of four hundred thousand dollars on the Capital, and issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Chile. April 1st he marched to Rancagua, accompanied by Mr. Poinsett, Capt. Benavente and a sergeant and corporal of the Grand National Guard, with twelve soldiers. By the 5th he had advanced to Talca and established his headquarters there, and on the 9th of

April his army had increased to one hundred and eleven men; on the 12th came in the rest of the Grand National Guard amounting to two hundred and thirty men, who were armed only with their swords, for the government had taken their muskets to arm the militia which was collecting in the Capital. On the 14th Luis Carrera arrived with the artillery train consisting of sixteen small field pieces ill-mounted, two hundred soldiers, four hundred mules and seventy wagons containing supplies. The 18th saw his forces augmented by the battalion of grenadiers, six hundred strong, and by fifteen hundred mounted militia. Colonel O'Higgins was one of the first officers to reach headquarters, and offer his services loyally to the commander. Carrera in his "Diário Militar" says:—"I could not get a moment's rest. Among the duties that filled my hands were drilling the militia, organizing the treasury, creating a commissary department, collecting stores, purchasing horses and all kinds of supplies, ascertaining the physical character of the district that was to be the theatre of war, of which not even a sketch had been made, the necessary correspondence," etc. These were the things that were to be done in the face of an advancing enemy, by a general who had had seventeen months to prepare for this very emergency. Carrera is condemned as a general out of his own private diary. However, the enthusiasm and devotion of the soldiers counterbalanced for the time the incapacity of their general, and while

still outnumbered by Pareja, two to one, they awaited in eager expectancy the command to move against the royalists. By this time, too, Colonel Mackenna, Commander Vial, Brigadier General Juan José Carrera and other officers had come to headquarters in Talca full of hope and energy, and the affairs of the patriot army became daily more encouraging. Colonel O'Higgins had already stimulated them by an exploit that roused their enthusiasm to the point of impatience. General Pareja had sent Colonel Carbajal to Cauquenes to secure that important place, and Carbajal had despatched a body of eighty cavalry to Lináres to collect horses and to confirm the adherence of the royalists who were resident there. Colonel O'Higgins had learned of the presence of the detachment of Carbajal's dragoons in Lináres, and requested leave to surprise and capture them. His request granted, he set out in the evening with twenty-seven men, armed with sword and pistol, for Lináres. This place is somewhat over fifty miles south of Talca and it was eight o'clock the next morning when O'Higgins with his twenty-seven militia rode into the square in Lináres and surprised Colonel Carbajal's dragoons while they were eating their breakfast. He took them all prisoners and carried them away to Talca.

Pareja stayed but a few days in Chillan. On his way to Lináres he despatched to Carrera a summons to surrender, promising him personally the post of Captain General of Chile under the King,

and offering amnesty to his soldiers. Varela, one of Elorreaga's officers, was the bearer of Pareja's message. While Carrera was reading it, some shots were fired and two of the soldiers in the regiment of San Fernando were killed. Carrera at once put an end to the interview and ordered Varela to depart, which he was constrained to do, protesting his innocence of the affront. Carrera was deeply offended at such a flagrant violation of the usages of war and determined to read the offender a lesson. Elorreaga had about four hundred men in his detachment, which served as the advance guard of Pareja's army, which was supposed to be about a day's march to the south of Lináres,—and in the expectation that Elorreaga would quarter for the night in Yerbas Buenas, Carrera sent Colonel Puga with six hundred men from Talca to beat up his quarters.

Yerbas Buenas is situated in an open plain rising somewhat from the level of the river, and consisted at that time of a chapel and the adjoining house of the curate, the plaza being enclosed with a brush fence beyond which were a few thatched ranches. Riding along swiftly, Colonel Puga came unaware upon two or three sentinels whom he overwhelmed silently, and on riding confidently into the plaza in front of the chapel at three o'clock in the morning, he found that he had fallen upon Pareja's whole army. The General with his staff was sleeping in the curate's corridor, and his men were lying in the plaza and the sur-

rounding fields. With a shout "Death to the King!" the Chileans fell upon them. In a moment all was confusion. Stupefied with sleep and fatigue, the royalists fell a ready prey to the patriots' swords or endeavored distractedly to escape. There was no resistance. Pareja fled naked on a horse that was brought him, and in a few minutes his whole army had dispersed. In the chapel were found his stores and military chest, and Colonel Puga and his men returned to Talca laden down with spoils. How many of Pareja's men were killed, the despatch of the General in Chief to the Junta on April 29th does not say.

The result of the affair at Yerbas Buenas was very important. The enthusiastic delight of the Chileans was only equalled by the discouragement of the royalists. Mariano Torrente, the Spanish historian, says:

"This action must be considered as the beginning of all our subsequent misfortunes. The troops believed that such negligence in their officers must have been the result of treason, and this distrust led to the desertion of whole detachments of our army, and the desertion of the disaffected caused the desperation of those who remained. Pareja, yielding to his chagrin at his disgraceful defeat and to his rage at the desertion of his soldiers, fell an easy victim to an attack of malignant fever."

But Carrera failed to follow up his good fortune at Yerbas Buenas. Torrente himself con-

fesses that if the Chileans had attacked Pareja before he had crossed the river Nuble, the ruin of the King's army would have been inevitable. He was content to receive the deserters who joined him, and to learn that Pareja's forces went melting away as their retreat continued, but he threw the blame of his delay upon the Junta in Santiago.

When the Junta, of which Carrera was the dominant member, appointed him to the chief command of the army, he left his brother Juan José Carrera in his place in the Capital. Between the two brothers there had always been much ill-feeling. Juan José was the elder, and resented José Miguel's superiority of rank. He had no wish to remain inactive in Santiago, occupied solely in conserving his brother's place in the Junta, when he could advance his own glory in the field; so he left the Capital and came to the headquarters of the army at Talca. The two remaining members of the Junta, Agustín Eyzaguirre and José Miguel Infante, appointed José Ignacio Cienfuegos as their colleague, and they were all rather ill-disposed to Carrera. On the eve of the affair at Yerbas Buenas, Carrera had despatched Colonel Mendiburu to the Capital to request the Junta to forward the militia reserves and he delayed the active prosecution of Pareja until these forces should come up. But after Yerbas Buenas, the Junta decided that he would not need them to annihilate the already discomfited royalists, and that it would not be wise to strip the Capital of the forces needed

to secure internal order. So Carrera in resentment permitted his foe to gather up his fragments and reform, while he languidly followed him southward for over two weeks without seeking any occasion to molest him. On May 15, he unwarily came up with Pareja's rear guard at San Carlos, and a trifling engagement ensued which scarcely disarranged the order of Pareja's retreat, who without further loss gained Chillan, which he proceeded to fortify for his winter quarters. On July 10, Carrera sat down before Chillan and declared a state of siege. The winter rains had already set in.

To read without impatience the history of the early campaigns in Chile, it is necessary to put aside and forget for the while all that one has learned of the scientific conduct of war. In this series of contests, where the windfall of Yerbas Buenas and the rear guard incident of San Carlos are termed battles, and the session of Carrera before Chillan is called a siege, we must not expect to discover any consecutive plan of campaign, any continuous purpose, any objective whatever, save only the alternative proposition, "kill or be killed." The engagements recorded are not battles but fights. The Maipo is the only battle of the war. There was no strategy, no reconnaissance. Detachments stumbled on each other unexpectedly, and fell to fighting without premeditation, until one or the other gave way and ran. Pareja at Yerbas Buenas relied on a thin line of sleepy

pickets to guard his whole army. At Roble, Carrera and O'Higgins were surprised simultaneously and Carrera was ignominiously beaten. Strategy was almost unknown. There was no general at all worthy of the name on either side until San Martin appeared. Pareja was a naval officer. Colonel Elorreaga, who had served his apprenticeship to war in selling ribbon by the yard over the counter of a dry-goods store in Santiago, was a better officer than the Commander in Chief of the Chilean army, Brigadier General Don José Miguel Carrera, who had served as an officer under the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula. Bernardo O'Higgins, the incarnation of Chilean patriotism, was not a general at all, but a caballero-andante, a Knight-errant. As Napier said of Cuesta, "To rush headlong into battle constituted in his mind all the duties of a general." O'Higgins was Sir Huon of Bordeaux revived in the nineteenth century. At Chillan the army of the royalists was comfortably housed and fed to satiety, while that of Carrera, drenched with the rain and whipped with the cold wind from the Cordillera, perished from disease and starvation. When the Chileans entered the city from time to time, they scattered at once in all directions looking for food and clothing, while the only sallies made by the besieged were when foraging parties set out to ravage the country and returned unmolested with abundant supplies. This was the "Siege of Chillan," where the besiegers envied the besieged the

privilege of going where they pleased, and the enjoyment of all the comforts of life which they themselves lacked.

When Pareja entered Chillan on May 15, O'Higgins with thirty men was sent by Carrera to regain the cities of the south which had yielded to Pareja. O'Higgins's personal popularity throughout the province of Concepcion doubtless facilitated greatly his mission, for in less time than had sufficed for Pareja to subvert them, O'Higgins had received their submission. Only Los Angeles withstood his summons, but O'Higgins dashed into the town, repeated his exploit at Lináres, and Los Angeles resumed its interrupted allegiance. During this series of operations O'Higgins had increased his little band of thirty mounted militia, until it reached the respectable figure of one thousand men, whom he had armed, mounted and paid at his own expense, and with whom he returned in triumph to the siege of Chillan, where Carrera from the heights of Collanco was watching the beleaguered royalists.

As this burlesque siege continued, there gradually grew up in the minds of the two leaders of the opposite armies a sentiment which was almost akin to animosity. Each thought the other stubborn, but General Sánchez was the first to lose his patience. "On the morning of the 10th of August," writes Benavente, a staunch partisan of Carrera, "under cover of a heavy fog, the enemy sallied from Chillan, and when at seven o'clock the

fog lifted, we discovered his army in battle formation not far from our camp. A flag of truce advanced and delivered the following communication:

“To the General in Chief, Don José Miguel Carrera:

“Although without this formality I could easily destroy the miserable relics of the army which you command, such a step would conform neither with my merciful disposition nor with the pious intentions of my predecessor in office. It is, however, indispensable that you surrender at discretion, for otherwise I shall inexorably inflict upon you the unmitigated rigor of military law within the few moments that I shall need to cover the short distance that separates us. Now is the opportunity for you to prove the humanity of your heart in evading by surrender the destruction of yourself and of all the wretches who are in your company, which will inevitably result from the superior number and bravery of my troops who await with impatience the signal to give the attack. May God preserve you many years.

“The Encampment of the Royal Army in Chillan, Aug. 10, 1813.

“JUAN FRANCISCO SANCHEZ.”

“While this communication was being answered, our troops formed in line with extraordinary enthusiasm and decision, even refusing the rum that was served out to them, saying that their courage needed no stimulant.” The General in Chief replied by the following letter:—

“The miserable relics of the National Army await

with the greatest impatience the formidable army under your command. I would that you had omitted the ceremony of your message that we might have prevented the delay. The death with which you threaten me is the noblest reward that I could receive for my labors, and now that you defy me by fire and blood, I accept your challenge. I only regret that you should remain personally in Chillan instead of participating in the glory of your troops, but perhaps your heart is too tender to behold the destruction of my unhappy soldiers. May God preserve you many years.

JOSÉ MIGUEL CARRERA."

"After the departure of the envoy with his reply we were prepared for a bloody engagement and undauntedly awaited the onset of the enemy, but they at once turned and marched back into Chillan, and we began our retreat." So suddenly and so inexplicably was the siege of Chillan raised. "The Chilean poet who may seize on this episode of our revolution," continues Benavente, "will find therein the material for a sublime epic, noble flashes of patriotism, strokes of generosity, examples of civic virtues. There Don José Miguel Carrera will exemplify the gifts of Agamemnon and his brother Luis the indomitable valor of Ajax."

Meanwhile the army was discouraged and disorganized, without supplies, without ammunition, almost without arms. The soldiers had discovered that their idol, Carrera, had feet of clay; that he was merely a hero of the barracks in time of peace, and not a general to whom they could look with

confidence for wise and brilliant leadership in the day of battle.

After raising the siege of Chillan, Carrera led his forces to the south, leaving the road to the Capital unobstructed save by an inadequate garrison at Talca, while Santiago itself relied for its defense on some raw levies, sparsely armed and with no one to drill them or even to command them. He at once proceeded to commit the further disastrous error of subdividing his army into small detachments to guard the places of importance throughout the province of Concepcion. As a result of these fatal provisions, the strongholds of the South fell again, one after another, into the hands of the royalists, until the whole of the interior places of importance were lost to the patriots. A guerrilla warfare of surprises and inconsiderable actions now took the place of concerted opposition, and at this kind of warfare Carrera and his officers proved themselves greatly the inferiors of Elorreaga, Lantaño and Urrejola. Of all these numerous affairs one only was of consequence, that of Roble.

There, on the banks of the Itata, Carrera and O'Higgins had met to concert another attack on Chillan. At four o'clock on the afternoon of October 16, they encamped for the night on a slope that guarded the ford which took its name from an oak tree (roble) that marked the passage. Elorreaga with four or five hundred men, had clung close to O'Higgins's flank for three days, subject-

ing him to constant annoyance and some trifling losses, but without caring to engage at close quarters. O'Higgins's army of five hundred infantry, five pieces of artillery and a few mounted militia, were encamped at the summit of the slope or hill overlooking the Itata, and were protected by a palisade. Carrera with the mounted militia and dragoons, lay a little further down the river bank, while several squads of mounted pickets patrolled the river for a distance of a league above and a league below the camp. A portion of the Grand Guard was stationed on the road leading to the ford. At day-break Elorreaga fell upon the Grand Guard and killed them to a man, and simultaneously attacked the two camps. Carrera, roused from sleep, called for his horse and attempted to rally his men, but a shot killed his horse and his men had scattered beyond immediate recall. Carrera saw them making their way on foot up the slope to gain the protection of the other camp, but his aide dissuaded him from following them, and led him out by way of the river. He plunged in, avoiding the ford, and swam across. The attack on O'Higgins's camp was made at the same time. The panic was indescribable. O'Higgins sprang from his bed and rushed half clad to the palisade. In the early mist he saw the enemy tearing down the palisade and rushing into the enclosure, while his own men were running in all directions with no purpose but to escape. He snatched a musket from a soldier

who fell at his side, and brandishing it above his head, shouted aloud, "He who is brave, follow me! Live with honor or die with glory! Follow me!" Instantly the terrified soldiers rallied at his voice, and came from all sides at their leader's call. For three hours of hand to hand fighting the struggle lasted. Some one brought O'Higgins a horse, and he rode from one place to another encouraging his men. His horse was killed, a bullet pierced his own thigh, but he continued to animate his men with his voice and with his example, until the discomfited remnants of the royalists gave way and fled across the ford into the forest beyond. After the victory was won, the Commander in Chief returned, and by his safety completed the joy of his victorious soldiers. This was the battle of Roble, fought October 17, 1813.

On October 20, the Junta left Santiago and established the seat of government at Talca, "in order that they might become in earlier touch with the headquarters of the army," and on the 27th of November the Junta degraded Carrera from the chief command, and named O'Higgins in his place. It is probable that the Junta intended, from the time that the siege of Chillan was raised, to make a change in the general in chief, and there is no doubt that they hoped, by removing to Talca, to escape the hostile demonstration which they had reason to believe would be made against them if they remained in Santiago. For the people were beginning to have views and purposes, and

to express them with the emphasis that is peculiar to public sentiment, and Carrera was still popular with the people of Santiago, because he satisfied the civilian ideal of a general. Carrera was without doubt willing at first and even eager to be relieved of his responsibilities, but after a while his pride awoke and he began to intrigue with and against O'Higgins. He wrote O'Higgins that he regarded the action of the Junta with much suspicion, and feared lest there might lurk in it some concealed treason. These insinuations were expressed with a candor that might have beguiled even a shrewder politician than O'Higgins, but they could not deceive Colonel Mackenna, whose instant solicitation had great effect on O'Higgins.

No one knew better than O'Higgins himself that he was not capable of conducting the multitudinous operations of war, even against such enemies as opposed him. Modest as to his own capabilities and unselfish in his purposes, he knew that other qualities were needed for the command than those he possessed. He dallied with the offer of the Junta for two months. He was appointed on November 27, 1813, and it was not until January 28, 1814, that he finally overcame his indecision and suffered himself to be proclaimed. But this delay was fatal to the hope of Chile. Reinforcements arrived from Peru under the leadership of Brigadier General Gáinza, and Elorreaga captured Talca, whence the Junta had recently

returned to Santiago, and shut off completely all communication between the army and the Capital. The Junta realized the strategic importance of Talca, and sent the reserves from the Capital to recover it, but they suffered a complete defeat at the hands of Elorreaga; Talca remained in the enemy's possession and Santiago was left an unguarded prize, to any one who chose to enter and take it. Elorreaga had under his command a force that was scarcely sufficient to garrison Talca, and feared to lose the advantage that his present position gave the royalist cause by venturing an advance upon Santiago; so he sent a message to Gáinza describing the defenseless condition of the Capital and the necessity of occupying it at once. Gáinza lost no time in obeying the call, and set out immediately on his march of five hundred miles to Santiago. But O'Higgins was already in motion, having heard the rumor of the critical condition of the Capital, and when on the 3rd of April, Gáinza crossed the Maule he found O'Higgins's entire army drawn up at Quechereguas, between himself and Santiago. The march had been more disastrous to Gáinza than a defeat would have been, but, furious at having been outwitted by the patriots, he attacked them fiercely, again and again throwing his enfeebled squadrons upon the impromptu fortifications which O'Higgins had hastily constructed. For two days assault followed assault, but all were repulsed and Gáinza was compelled to fall back on Talca,

which he entered on the 10th of April. O'Higgins' men were scarcely in better condition than those of his adversary, but with the unstinted supplies from Santiago, they soon recovered their equilibrium, and their commander moved on Talca. The expectation of the final defeat and surrender of the royal army was now universal, and the patriots considered themselves at last assured of victory. O'Higgins's successful manœuvre had retrieved all the errors of two campaigns.

At this time the news reached Chile of the defeat of the French at Victoria and of the disastrous actions at Maya and in the Pyrenees. There seemed now no prospect that King Joseph could much longer remain in Spain. Ferdinand would then be speedily restored to his throne. This news produced a profound impression on the Chileans. The King's cause had many adherents throughout the Colony, and they were wonderfully encouraged at the prospect of his speedy restoration, while the patriots became suddenly, and for a time utterly, despondent. With Ferdinand's restoration and the cessation of the war in the Peninsula, there would be doubtless an army sent for the reduction of Chile, under officers who had won fame in conquering the armies of the great Napoleon. Lately, too, the defeat of the Argentine army under Belgrano at Vilcapujio and Ayohuma had occasioned a feeling of great distrust as to the outcome of the whole movement against the rule of Spain. This lack of faith in

themselves and in the justice of their cause induced misgivings that impelled them to accede to the request of Gáinza for a conference which should terminate the war under conditions which he assured them would be to their advantage. The government empowered O'Higgins and Mackenna to treat with General Gáinza and his auditor, Rodríguez-Aldea, who represented the royal army. An armistice was proclaimed and the sessions began at Lircai.

It is impossible to believe that either party acted for a moment in good faith. That is the most charitable explanation of the attitude of the Chilean envoys and of the concessions that they made without a protest. The winter was approaching, and they wished to avoid a repetition of the siege of Chillan and strengthen themselves for the next Spring. Gáinza had everything at an immediate stake and any result short of an ignominious surrender was a gain to him. Moreover, each was openly conscious that his opponent knew that he was not acting in good faith, for the royal envoys made out their own credentials, and the Chilean envoys were careful not to object to this irregularity. But the Chileans as yet had had as little experience in diplomacy as in war, and they had no Santa Maria or Blest Gana to conduct the negotiations for them.

By the terms of this shameful pact, Chile agreed to acknowledge the sovereignty of Ferdinand and the authority of the Supreme Council of Regency;

the present system of government in Chile was to remain as it was now constituted until the good pleasure of the Council of Regency, to which Chile was entitled to send a procurator, should be ascertained; Talca was to be given up to O'Higgins, the war was to cease, and Gáinza was to withdraw his forces from Chilean soil within thirty days; finally the armistice was to be continued until the treaty was ratified by the Viceroy of Peru. The only thing that seemed to afford a superficial advantage to Chile was the withdrawal of the royalist army within thirty days, and yet this was made subject to an approval that the Chilean envoys must have known would never be given, and how could an army be withdrawn within thirty days when it would take three months for the Viceroy's approval to reach them?

Such were the terms of agreement between Gáinza, whose army was reduced to the necessity of a speedy surrender, and O'Higgins, who turned his back on Fortune in the fatuous hope of deceiving an opponent whom he had only to reach out his hand to crush to powder.

However, the Government of Chile ratified what they called a treaty and which was not even a protocol; Gáinza was released from imminent peril and suffered to regain his hold on cities that were already slipping from his grasp, until the whole of Chile south of Talca was again under his control.

The indignation of the army and of the popu-

lace was beyond all description. The Capital was filled with tumult and the army with discontent and chagrin. Every patriot heart was rendered furious by this base betrayal of the national hope. Not even another siege of Chillan could have reduced O'Higgins's prestige like the treaty of Lircai. Carrera's name began to be mentioned with regret. The soldiers called for Carrera, the recollections of the people reverted to Carrera, but Carrera had disappeared; on the 4th of March, Carrera and his brother Luis had been seized by the royalists and imprisoned in Chillan as traitors to the King, and, while the treaty of Lircai provided for the release of all prisoners, a secret clause excepted the two Carreras from the operation of the treaty.

The "Treaty of Lircai" was signed on the 3d of May, 1814. A week later José Miguel and his brother Luis were permitted to escape from Chillan, and on the 14th Carrera presented himself before O'Higgins in Talca. They embraced like brothers but hatred was in their hearts. Each thought of his own errors; Carrera hated O'Higgins for Chillan and the Roble, O'Higgins hated Carrera when he remembered his own recent agreement with Gáinza. Carrera went on to Santiago and was received with enthusiasm. He can hardly be blamed of taking advantage of his rival's surrender of national rights at Lircai, and he found that he had touched a vital place in Chilean hearts. At once his ambition was aroused, he exercised

his most seductive arts, he headed a conspiracy, he overthrew the government on July 23d, 1814, and caused the appointment of a new Junta, associating with himself Uribe and Urzua, by whom he was restored to his former post of Commander in Chief of the Army.

O'Higgins would have availed himself gladly of any help toward breaking the treaty of Lircai, except the help of Carrera, but with Carrera he was determined to fight. The country was divided and the army was split in two. A civil war between the rivals was already begun, when the news came that Abascal had refused to ratify the treaty, and had sent another army under Ossório to take over the conduct of the war. In the face of a common danger, Carrera and O'Higgins patched up the appearance of a peace and prepared to withstand the forces of the Viceroy. On September 4th, O'Higgins resigned his command in chief to Carrera, though with the separate command of his own division. Ossório's advance from Chillan began, and already the rival chiefs of the patriot forces were again at issue over the selection of a suitable battle ground.

The river Maule was not only the boundary line between the provinces of Santiago and Concepcion, but it was also the strategical frontier of the Capital. The defense of the Maule had been neglected in consequence of the struggle between the two generals, and there was now no time to remedy this lamentable neglect. This

frontier was practically in the enemy's possession. Within the province of Santiago a second line of defense was formed by the Cachapoal, an affluent of the Rapel, but as the fords on the Cachapoal were numerous, and their defense necessitated an army many times greater than Chile could possibly furnish, Carrera determined to make his defense at the pass of Paine, but O'Higgins insisted on making an effort to resist the enemy at the Cachapoal. Thus the battle of Rancagua was in reality an act of insubordination on the part of O'Higgins. The first division, which O'Higgins commanded, comprised only five hundred and fifty men, which was, however, reinforced by the arrival of Juan José Carrera in command of the second division on September 26, with five hundred mounted militia and grenadiers. Nevertheless, the army of Ossório crossed the river on the 1st of October without opposition, and O'Higgins with Juan José Carrera fell back on Rancagua, their aggregate forces amounting to about one thousand men. Carrera with the third division was nine miles to the north at Las Bodegas del Conde.

In anticipation of this event, O'Higgins had thrown up a hasty barricade of logs and stones and bales of dried beef, and had protected the entrances to the town with what cannon he possessed, consisting of three eight-pounders and nine four-pounders. He expected if driven from Rancagua, to be able to make an orderly retreat to the position held by General Carrera, but Ossório

with something over five thousand men surrounded the town, and no passage remained save through the enemy's lines. An assault was at once made on the town from all quarters, but after hard fighting for an hour the royalists drew off and prepared themselves for new operations. The water supply was first cut off and then a redoubt was thrown up for some siege guns, which Ossório finally placed in position after a spirited sally from the town, in which eighty-five of his men fell, and two or three of his field pieces were captured. Under cover of the fire from the redoubt, a second assault was rendered, as fierce and as fruitless as the first, and toward night a third assault met with no better result.

Ossório now despaired of success and decided to draw off his forces, cross the Cachapoal and give up the field. He had not expected such sturdy resistance. Indeed, he had already given the command to depart, when he was dissuaded by Elorreaga and Urrejola, who convinced him of the impossibility of recrossing the Cachapoal without destruction in the face of such an enemy.

At midnight, O'Higgins despatched a messenger to Carrera for ammunition. He added, "If your division will come to our help in the morning the day will be ours." Carrera replied, "I can only get ammunition to you under cover of a cavalry charge. In the morning I will see."

The next day, Sunday, October 2d, at day-break, O'Higgins ascended the tower of the

church of La Merced, and gazed expectantly north to the road leading from Las Bodegas del Conde to Rancagua. Soon afterward, Ossório delivered a fresh assault at the southern side of the town, and O'Higgins descended to the aid of Captain Astorga, who was in command at that point. The ammunition was becoming scanty, and O'Higgins directed the gunners to fire only when an assault was made. During the intervals between assaults, then, the town was silent, but the guns of the redoubt and the field pieces that threatened the rest of the town, kept up an unceasing fire upon Rancagua. When this assault on Sunday morning was repulsed, a wall of bodies filled the approaches and choked the guns. At ten o'clock, a concerted attack was made on all sides, which was likewise repulsed with slaughter. By this time the condition of O'Higgins's forces was almost desperate. Their ammunition was entirely gone, for twenty-four hours they had been without water, their mortality was very great, the survivors had had little food and less sleep, and still they endured. Their disappointment at Carrera's absence was more dispiriting than all else. Suddenly all their ills were forgotten; from the tower of La Merced, where O'Higgins had stationed a watchman, the cry rang out, "They come! Viva la pátria!" A thick cloud of dust appeared coming from Las Bodegas del Conde. Soon the cavalry lines emerged and an infantry column drawing the guns came into view. It was Luis

Carrera coming with the third division to the aid of O'Higgins. From the parched throats of the patriots a shout went up loud, long continued, which drowned the roar of the enemy's guns. Suddenly Colonel Ramon Freire, who was at O'Higgins's side, touched his General's sleeve and pointed to the south. A column of dragoons was making its way from the camp of the royalists toward the ford of the Cachapoal. At its head rode a corpulent horseman with a white poncho. For a moment the attention of the group was diverted from Luis Carrera. "Who is the officer in the white poncho?" asked O'Higgins. "Don Mariano Ossório," replied Freire.

O'Higgins had now no doubt of victory. Relief was coming and the enemy was in flight. Either was enough to ensure victory and both were at hand. O'Higgins sent an order by Freire for the dragoons to mount and make a sally on the south and west. Captain Ibáñez rode forth with his detachment of dragoons and drove the enemy from his trenches, cutting them down as they fled, while one of O'Higgins' aides, Flores, led another detachment with like success against the trenches on the west. At eleven-thirty, Luis Carrera arrived with the mounted militia and attacked the enemy on the north.

When Ossório rode away from Rancagua, he considered the battle lost, and his purpose was to escape before a victorious enemy could harass his escort while crossing the river; but Elorreaga and

Quintanilla refused to accompany him, and remained undaunted by the succors then in sight coming from the north. The third division consisted of nine hundred and fifteen men, mostly mounted militia, which throughout the war had emulated the steadiness of regular troops, and Luis Carrera had proved himself in several actions a brave and capable officer. His reinforcement was fresh, well-mounted and well-armed, sufficient to turn the wavering scale decidedly in favor of the patriots. Yet almost at the first blow, the third division turned their backs to Elorreaga's men and rode away. Luis Carrera had at that moment received a despatch from his brother, the General-in-Chief of the Chilean army, Brigadier General Don José Miguel Carrera, to withdraw his troops from action immediately and return to headquarters. Luis uttered an imprecation, broke his sword over his knee, and obeyed the order to retire. Then fell the darkness of despair upon the devoted band thus infamously deserted in their dire need. Another general assault was ordered by Elorreaga, under cover of a furious cannonade during which the flagstaff was struck and the Red, White and Blue flag of the nation fell. As soon as this was observed, Elorreaga, thinking it was lowered in token of surrender, ordered the guns to cease firing, but in a few minutes the flag appeared again over the tower of La Merced. It appeared, but it no longer displayed its folds in the afternoon breeze, for

it was tied about the middle with a black band. The interrupted assault was resumed and repulsed.

Night was now approaching, Rancagua was a heap of ashes, all hope of succor from the General-in-Chief had been abandoned, and O'Higgins realized that there was no longer any safety but in flight. Over four hundred of his men were killed and all that remained were wounded. Of the militia and the grenadiers that guarded the quarter of San Francisco, Captain Astorga and three men alone survived. O'Higgins collected the maimed and blackened remnants of his men in the plaza. The enemy, renewing the assault, were entering the town without opposition from the east and south. Only a few minutes remained for escape. O'Higgins ordered the foot soldiers to mount behind the horsemen, Molina to lead the van and Astorga to defend the rear, and sabre in hand the shattered troop, two hundred and sixty-eight in number, rode out of Rancagua. A short but bitter contest at the trenches on the north, and the little band rode over the battalion of Captain Sánchez and immediately dispersed in single flight for the city of Santiago. The battle of Rancagua was ended, and the hope of liberty was destroyed.

PART V
THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
TO MAIPO
CHILE UNDER O'HIGGINS

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

TO MAIPO

CHILE UNDER O'HIGGINS

“Después ahora la muerte como siempre
la he despreciado en el campo de batalla.

“O'HIGGINS.”

“I disregard death to-day as I have al-
ways disregarded it on the field of battle.”

From the 2d of October, 1813, until the 12th of February, 1817, from Rancagua to Chacabuco, the unfortunate country languished under the severity of its reinstated oppression. It was not a return of Colonial life,—even the Spaniards spoke of this interval as the “Period of the Reconquest,”—it was the desolation of captivity. The harshness of the renewed rule of Spain found its first expression in the exile or the execution of the patriots, and in the confiscation of their property. Such was the bitter penalty meted out by Spain in the nineteenth century to those whose only aim was justice and equal freedom. Such was always the process by which sovereign states avenged themselves upon their consanguineous dependencies who sought equality with their oppressors.

Not until the United States of America became possessed of the Philippines, did the happiness and prosperity of a Colony become an object of unselfish interest to the paramount state. The government of the Philippines has influenced the councils of the world. Unfortunately, the subjugation of Corea by Japan shows that that influence is not yet imperative. England would, however, to-day, as little venture to undertake a war for the subjugation of Canada, as she would hesitate to overwhelm India with the horrors of another conquest.

A few words will suffice to describe the reversion of government in Chile. By a stroke of the pen Ossório rescinded the great work of Rózas and restored the old order. The royal monopolies were resumed with all the ancient exactions, parochial fees were renewed, slavery reëstablished, public instruction discontinued, and the Chinese wall of commercial restrictions re-ërected. Everything, whatever its merit, that savored of the insurrection, was swept away in contempt. During the time of the Colony, the Chileans had been despised as an inferior race by the Spaniards of peninsular birth, as José Antonio Rójas and many others had discovered when visiting Spain; now, however, that the disgrace of Chilean birth was augmented with the taint of rebellion, the natives of Chile sank to a condition of practical outlawry. It was no more a crime for a Spaniard to kill a Chilean than it was for a Spartan to kill a helot.

They were prohibited from possessing firearms. If a citizen picked up a stone in the street, or if he carried in his hand a stick or a cane, he was arrested and flogged. If a Chilean were found on the street after nine o'clock at night, he was imprisoned for a year and his property seized. Even the soldiers in Ossório's army were made to feel the shame of Chilean birth, and a majority of the royalist soldiers were Chileans. Hundreds of exemplary citizens were sent to Valdivia and to Juan Fernández, to languish in exile, and the prisons of the Capital and of Valparaiso were enlarged and dug deeper that they might contain those suspected of patriotism. Such a tyranny, so intolerable, and so indiscriminately applied to all Chileans, whatever their previous attachment or opposition to the principles of independence, consolidated the nation better than victories could have done. The most ardent royalists, who had resented the triumphs of the patriots, wept bitter tears of regret when they remembered the wise and gentle sway of Rózas. Through humiliation and contempt, the cause of independence took deep root in the Chilean heart. Defeat strengthened the national spirit and diffused its hopes better than success. Thus Ossório and his successor, Marcó del Pont, confirmed the freedom of Chile. Now, too, for the first time there appeared a genuine public sentiment. The people of Chile began to think, to make comparisons, to draw conclusions, to have purposes; and public

sentiment is the safeguard of popular government.

On March 26, 1815, there arrived in Santiago, Don Francisco Casimiro Marcó del Pont, appointed by King Ferdinand to supplant Ossório. Marcó's father was a fisherman of Vigo, who plied his calling about the Islands of Bayona, and who enriched himself by carrying on a contraband trade during the Peninsular war. Marcó's brother was a parasite of King Ferdinand, and Marcó himself wrote a dozen trivial titles after his name, wore a breastfull of medals, ribbons and royal Orders, and became Governor and Captain General of the kingdom of Chile and President of the Royal Audience. For the Royal Audience was also revived by Ossório, and three of the Judges who served under Carrasco reappear now after an interval of five years. These were José Santiago Concha, José Santiago Aldunate and Feliz Basso i Berri. To the titles that Carrasco wore Marcó added another. "Vice-Royal Patron of the Kingdom of Chile." Marcó was small, bloodless and nervous, with little, cruel eyes, such as Commodus must have had. The Chileans had suffered bitterly under Ossório, but Marcó's finger was thicker than Ossório's loins. In him culminated the tyranny and cruelty of three centuries of Colonial governors. Ossório was content to appropriate all the proceeds of Colonial thrift and the entire income of the inhabitants; but to satisfy his successor's demands, savings,

furniture, family jewels, heirlooms, horses, cattle, and all movable property were inadequate. "I will not leave the Chileans even tears to shed," he declared. Marcó surrounded himself with a camarilla of Spaniards to whose rapacity of extortion he could refuse nothing. The regiment of Peninsular soldiers that came to Chile with Ossório, which took a bloody part in the battle of Rancagua and whose name, "Talavera," became a terror to the people, he elevated to a sort of Varangian power in the state; while their hated leader, Colonel San Bruno, who had been a Carmelite friar in Spain, became the head of an irresponsible tribunal which possessed the same inquisitorial functions in civil and political life that was held in Spain by the Holy Office of the Inquisition, now recently reinvested by Ferdinand with all the power and all the terror of the days of Philip II. This new institution was called the "Tribunal of Vigilance." Every functionary in Chile, whether civil, judicial or military, was subject to the commands of this Tribunal, whose orders were as peremptory as those of Marcó himself. No Chilean was allowed to leave his place of residence without a special license signed by San Bruno. If any one were accused, "even by an untrustworthy witness,"—*aun por un testigo ménos idóneo*,—of communicating with the exiled patriots, he was immediately, without any process of law whatever, put to an ignominious death by hanging. If any one, however innocently, gave

food or lodging or other help or countenance to any one suspected or who should at any time thereafter become suspected of holding any correspondence, however trifling or personal, with any one in exile, he also was to be put to death without a hearing. From this Tribunal there was no appeal. No case was ever tried by this infernal Court. It shielded its informers with impenetrable secrecy, and shared with unknown accusers the proceeds of its confiscations. Burglars and bandits and highwaymen exercised their craft, under this code, without danger and with abundant and secure profit. The passes over the Cordillera were occupied by squads of soldiers, whose orders were to kill at once and without inquiry any one who should attempt to cross the Cordillera without a passport signed by San Bruno.

Ossório, in imposing an annual contribution on the province, had indeed exacted the uttermost farthing, but, recognizing the fact that an arbitrary imposition might in some cases exceed all possibility of payment, he had suffered the full demand to be modified in a few exceptional cases. Marcó assessed the full amount of this tax against the Collector, who thus was obliged to indemnify the Treasury for such losses from his own pocket; and as no Collector would willingly face a certain deficit for which he was personally liable, Marcó placed the army at his disposal to collect the full contribution. The amount of this annual con-

tribution, thus arbitrarily added to all the previous innumerable exactions of the government, amounted to the fixed monthly sum of eighty-three thousand dollars or a million dollars yearly. It is inconceivable that a small country like Chile, always sparsely populated and now for years devastated by war, whose agricultural population was so reduced by battle, enlistment and exile, that the crops rotted in the fields unreaped, whose commerce was annihilated, and who lived veritably within the shadow of death, could satisfy the infernal rapacity of its tyrant, but his demands were not yet completed. On November 2d, 1816, a decree was published that the government would issue bills, of denominations between fifty dollars and eight hundred dollars, which would be distributed for compulsory purchase among all the inhabitants of Chile, in agreement with an arbitrary scale of assessment made by the government for that purpose. It was well understood that such bills would never be redeemed. By this time the government had practically exterminated those who were suspected of favoring independence, and all who now remained in Chile were presumably royalists. Is it any wonder that the hearts of the royalists themselves among the Chileans longed for the return of O'Higgins and his patriots, that their only hope lay beyond the eastern Cordillera and that they hastened by their fervent prayers the coming of that army which should indeed be to them an army of deliverance?

They themselves realized now what kind of government had been that of Spain, when it reached its logical culmination in the intolerable tyranny of Marcó.

It is not conceivable that such measures could be enforced without encountering opposition. There gradually came into active existence various *quadrillas* or *partidas* in different sections of Chile, who waged an irregular war against the factors and agents of Marcó. The most famous among the leaders of this guerrilla warfare was a young lawyer, Don Manuel Rodríguez, at one time private secretary to José Miguel Carrera. Rodríguez conducted his operations throughout the rugged, difficult district of Colchagua, between the Maipo and the Maule. His story is as romantic as that of William Wallace, and the narrative of his escapes and exploits as interesting as that of the Scottish patriot. Colchagua was another Lanarkshire, similarly situated in the heart of the enemy's country, similarly full of caves and hiding places and of devoted adherents. His men were the sturdy shepherds and peasants of the foothills, without uniform or visible organization, apparently unarmed, but with suitable weapons hidden where they could be easily obtained when needed. The land owners, farmers and *hacendados* of the basin of the Rapel were his friends and assistants, and often concealed him when he was hard pressed by his pursuers. San Fernando, Melipilla, Curicó and many another town of Col-

chagua suffered from his daring, and Santiago itself was the scene of some of his individual exploits, when in disguise he held the Governor's stirrup for him to mount his horse, or posted on the walls the notices of the reward offered for his own head. While not always eluding discovery, he always evaded pursuit, until his name became a terror to Marcó and his camarilla; the mails were seized and the supplies of ammunition and money to and from the Capital rarely reached their destination unless they were attended with a detachment of troops strong enough to defy attack. Rodríguez was in constant correspondence with San Martín, and in person made many trips to Mendoza by way of the Maipo pass.

After General Manuel Belgrano, in October, 1813, had suffered the two disastrous defeats at Vilcapujio and Ayohuma which put a decisive end for the time to the efforts of the Buenos Ayreans to conquer Alto Peru; and had fled in terror and despair before the army of the Viceroy, San Martín had been appointed in his stead, and had succeeded in preventing the entry of the Viceroy's forces into the territory of Buenos Ayres. Don José de San Martín was born February 25, 1778, in the Misiones, to-day a province of the Argentine, his father being at the time governor of that district. At the age of fifteen, he was sent to Spain to be educated, and later he entered the Spanish army, where he attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He took a prominent part

in the battle of Bailen and was present at many actions between the French and the English under whose general, Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards the Duke of Wellington, he won much praise. In 1811, he retired from the Spanish service and the next year reached Buenos Ayres, whither the fame of his courage and conduct had preceded him. He early perceived the futility of invading Alto Peru—the Charcas of Pizarro's time, the Bolivia of to-day,—which was but the fringe of the Viceroy's garment, and conceived the bold idea of striking at the heart of the Spanish power in America,—Lima. The road to Lima he was convinced, lay through Santiago and not through the Charcas. He requested and obtained the post of Governor of the province of Cuyo, and took up his residence in the city of Mendoza, the capital of the province. He had hardly seated himself in his government when the refugees from Chile, swept over the Cordillera in irresistible panic, poured into his province and inundated Mendoza. Among them were the remnants of the Chilean army led by Freire, Astorga and Ibáñez. O'Higgins had yielded up his command, abjured war, and returned to private life; he accompanied as a friend the officers whom he had commanded as a general. But they were not all soldiers who came; old men, terrified women, children of all degrees of helplessness, torn from their homes without preparation, scantily clad and unprovided even with food, faced the long, rugged snow-

covered perils of the dreadful road, from the Resguardo to Uspallata. For days and weeks that human wave surged irregularly across the Andes and sank exhausted on the plains of Mendoza. San Martin welcomed and succored them.

Don Bernardo O'Higgins was already known to him by fame; they were also fellow-masons, and a strong bond of patriotic sympathy bound them closely together. San Martin realized O'Higgins's worth and easily persuaded him to resume his command. He then examined and reviewed the Chilean troops, and was impressed with their strength, courage and intelligence, though they were almost entirely without discipline as soldiers. Here were indeed the men, who, well-trained and under a good leader, could conquer Chile and Peru. San Martin has been accused of haughtiness, ambition and obstinacy, but his only aim in life was the high and righteous purpose to destroy utterly the power of Spain in America, and in this single purpose he compelled everything to yield to his inflexible will, and destroyed inexorably everything that could thwart or hazard his success. When Don José Miguel Carrera came eventually to Mendoza, San Martin distrusted him and refused to recognize him as General-in-Chief on the soil of Mendoza, and when Carrera haughtily insisted on recognition, San Martin, without a moment's hesitation, placed him under arrest and ordered him to be conveyed to Buenos Ayres under an escort of dragoons. There is no doubt that

Mackenna and Irisarri, who had been exiled by Carrera after he regained power during the Truce of Lircai, had convinced San Martin of his treachery and ambition; and there is no doubt that O'Higgins, in his narrative of Rancagua, had condemned without limit the fatal conduct of the General-in-Chief on that occasion; it was in Mendoza too that Rózas, after loading his country down with unexampled benefits, had died an exile, in order that Carrera's vulgar ambition might be gratified. Perhaps no man was ever disgraced with better warrant, and certainly San Martin was justified in refusing to associate with himself in his audacious purposes a man whose insane ambition of rule, combined with his inordinate incapacity of command, would inevitably ruin any righteous enterprise.

San Martin proceeded to organize and drill the "Army of Liberation" in Mendoza. The officers were also instructed in the duties of command. Every day there was an eight hour drill; sometimes they were roused at night for a hurried march of ten or fifteen miles to attack a supposititious enemy. They had no idle moments. Their accoutrements and uniforms had to pass a daily inspection and they were drilled in every duty which the exigencies of war and battle might at any time thrust upon them. The men of Chile had never known what discipline was, but no children ever hurried to play at the noon hour as these men hastened to take their place in the ranks for a midnight

march, for they were more than soldiers,—they were patriots.

But if the road for San Martin lay from Mendoza through Santiago to Lima, Abascal possessed greater facilities for traversing it in the contrary direction and vindicating the authority of Spain over these Colonial militiamen who now alone, in Buenos Ayres, withstood the power of Ferdinand, which had been restored in every other province throughout his American possessions. The preparations of San Martin were known to Marcó and to Abascal himself. Abascal did not forget the little centre of insurrection in Mendoza, but several revolts in his own country, notably one that flared up spontaneously in Cuzco and required an army to quench, kept his mind immediately occupied with Peruvian concerns. He certainly undervalued the importance of the activity in Mendoza and underrated the strength and character of San Martin. As for Marcó, he kept his army busy collecting difficult taxes, that he might soon return to Spain and buy a title of nobility. He had no thought or care for his sovereign's interests or for any interests but his own, and he evidently expected to depart from Chile before any attempt from Mendoza could disturb his plans or threaten his safety.

San Martin, however, was not content with probabilities; he was determined to take a bond of fate, and make Marcó himself an instrument in the perfection of his plans. It was important to learn

something of affairs in Chile, for since all correspondence by letter was interdicted as criminal, and since all persons who passed the Cordillera without San Bruno's passport were certain to be shot, the news that came to Mendoza from Chile was meagre and untrustworthy. There was in Mendoza a Spanish merchant named Castillo-Albo, who had formerly lived in Chile, but had been exiled by Carrera on account of his persistent and outspoken devotion to the cause of Ferdinand. No Spaniard in Chile had been better known or more highly regarded. His royalism was as unquestionable as his commercial integrity. He was still living in Mendoza, where he was engaged in a prosperous business. San Martin decided to use Castillo-Albo's name for the purpose of engaging Marcó himself in correspondence. He wrote Marcó a letter over Castillo-Albo's signature, in which he gave him presumably complete details of such matters in Mendoza as would probably interest Marcó, going to considerable length in describing San Martin's affairs. This he did in such a way as best suited his purpose of allaying any suspicion that the Governor of Chile might have as to his warlike preparations and purposes. He affected great solicitude concerning the King's cause and, after lavishing discreet praises on Marcó, proclaimed his willingness to contribute abundantly to the expenses of the Chilean government. Marcó answered this letter, and a regular correspondence ensued between the Governor of Mendoza and the

Governor of Chile, from which the former gleaned perfectly authoritative information, which was beyond price, and the latter was completely hoodwinked and deceived. San Martin's letters, directed to Marcó personally, passed easily to their destination, and those of Marcó, addressed to Castillo-Albo, were handed to San Martin in person.

Meanwhile, it was necessary to ascertain by which route an army comprising horse, foot and artillery, could most easily cross the Andes. San Martin burned his night-cap every morning; he had no favorites and no confidants, but he was a good judge of mankind and had always those about him who could serve him intelligently without asking questions. Among these devoted friends was Don José Antonio Alvarez Condarco, an excellent engineer, whom San Martin despatched in secret to report on the comparative practicability of the various passes. Alvarez set out by night, traveled alone, returned disguised and reported after dark to San Martin, until he had ascertained that none was suitable for artillery. Only the pass of Los Patos and that of Uspallata remained unexamined, and they were guarded through their whole extent by detachments of Marcó's soldiers. San Martin was not discouraged. He was full of resources and was never at a loss for expedients, some of which, except to a casuist, might well seem of questionable dignity. He wrote out a proclamation announcing that the provinces of Buenos Ayres had declared themselves independent of

Spain, addressed it to Marcó, added the customary seals, and sent Alvarez, with the credentials of an envoy, to Santiago. He was to go by Uspallata and return by Los Patos. Such an impertinence might well have cost the envoy his life. Marcó was in a towering rage. Still, an ambassador is not to be put to death without a little reflection, and Marcó, after doubling the guards at the entrances of the palace, turned Alvarez into the ante-chamber, while he made up his mind what to do with him. In the ante-chamber Alvarez found two of the officers of the army, and, deeming his case desperate, he made a peculiar motion with his hands, that he might learn whether among these enemies he might find a brother. They responded to his gestures and fell at once into confidential conversation with him. There Alvarez learned the disgust with which the tyranny of Marcó had filled the officers, and the hope that they all entertained of his speedy departure from Chile. A page now entered to conduct Alvarez back to Marcó. He had determined to call a council of war to try the daring envoy who came with such suspicious credentials. The Council was convened and Alvarez saw with much satisfaction that his friends of the ante-chamber were among them. He was quickly absolved and a passport was given him to return to Mendoza. He reported to San Martin that both the Uspallata pass and that of Los Patos could be traversed by the light artillery.

The next step was to deceive Marcó as to the

route that the Army of Liberation would take in its descent on Chile. San Martin wrote him, over the signature of Castillo-Albo, that San Martin had decided to lead his scanty, ill-equipped and untrained soldiers through the southern pass that enters Chile by the province of Concepcion, and that the Governor of Mendoza relied greatly on a patriotic rising to aid him in his attempt. Marcó promptly sent the greater part of his army to the south, and disclosed his plans in his reply to Castillo-Albo.

San Martin then caused the report to be circulated freely that a squadron of ten vessels had been fitted out at Montevideo with which a descent would be at once made upon the Chilean coast, Talcahuano, Nuevo Bilbao (Constitucion), and Valparaiso being especially menaced. This report was circumstantial and was sent to Marcó, who at once despatched several companies of regular soldiers to each of the places indicated.

Meanwhile San Martin, in the character of Castillo-Albo, wrote Marcó, that "while San Martin seems uncertain which road he will take, yet there is an increasing likelihood that he will finally enter Chile by way of Coquimbo, as he understands that he will probably encounter less resistance from the royal troops there than elsewhere." Marcó in consequence withdrew several additional battalions from his troops in Santiago and sent them to the north. He was distracted with uncertainty. San Martin moved and manœuvred and stationed

Marcó's troops as if he were their general, and from his cabinet in Mendoza, prepared Chile for his own invasion.

On January 21, 1817, the "Army of Liberation" started on its journey over the Andes, with provisions for twelve days. Major General Soler led the van, Brigadier General O'Higgins the centre, and General-in-Chief San Martin the rear. It comprised three thousand nine hundred and sixty men. On the 11th of February, San Martin marched from Santa Rosa, where he had rested his army, and approached the hill of Chacabuco, where the royalist forces had been stationed for the purpose of opposing him. Chacabuco lies among the foothills of the Cordillera, about twenty-five miles north-northeast of Santiago. The royalist army numbered twenty-five hundred men, all that were left to protect the Capital after the dissemination of Marcó's troops in obedience to San Martin's intimations from Mendoza. These troops had collected under their coördinate regimental officers and only the evening before the battle, Colonel Maroto rode up with a commission from Marcó to conduct the operations. In the meantime San Martin had reconnoitered the ground and made his arrangements. His plan of battle was simple. General Soler was ordered to make a détour to the right without attracting the attention of the enemy, and O'Higgins, with the seventh and eighth battalions of foot and a squadron of grenadiers, was ordered to cover this manœuvre

by a feigned attack in front, the rest of the army under San Martin being expected to sustain O'Higgins and fall upon the royalists, when General Soler completed his manœuvre and arrived to attack them on the rear.

The manœuvre was simple and ought easily to have been counteracted by falling back under cover of a line of skirmishers and taking up a new position beyond the arc which would bring Soler to his point of attack, but Maroto had never before had command, and probably San Martin realized that the simplest strategy would avail to deceive his opponents. Maroto had stationed two hundred horsemen on the summit of Chacabuco, with orders to resist any attack that might be made against them. O'Higgins had no instruction to attack them, but passed along the flank of the hill without regarding them, until, seeing the likelihood of being cut off by his advance, they hastily retreated to unite with their main body. The position of O'Higgins was by this act become so advantageous, that he determined to avail himself of it at once and, moved by a sudden inspiration, he conceived the audacious plan of converting his feint into a real attack, and followed by his grenadiers at a gallop and his two battalions of infantry on a quick run, he dashed against the ranks of the royalists. He led only seven hundred men and the number of the enemy was estimated at twenty-five hundred, but at this very moment the rear guard of San Martin appeared rounding the base of the

hill, and General Soler swung into position on the enemy's left flank. Before this concerted movement the royalists broke and fled, and the cavalry of all three divisions of San Martin's army followed them until exhaustion compelled them to abandon the pursuit. The presence of San Martin and Soler afforded O'Higgins great moral aid, but as a matter of fact the battle of Chacabuco was won before they came up. Colonel Elorreaga was among the dead. He with a handful of infantry made a stand on a southern spur of the hill, and attempted to stay the flight of his men, but he and his little company were crushed to a swift death by the rush of the infantry that followed O'Higgins.

Don Bernardo has been censured by some writers for his insubordination at Chacabuco, with which accusation the success of his charge has not been duly collated. He was insubordinate at Rancagua because he failed to effect his purpose; he had always in him the germ of insubordination, but on this occasion he deserves no adverse criticism, for the event proved that he made a skillful move at the proper time. Perhaps, when duly considered, war is the only field of human activity where success not only sanctions, but gives rules to, merit. Certainly San Martin found no fault with Don Bernardo. We find recorded one battle of which Chacabuco was an exact copy, when Antigonus led the army of the Achaeans against Cleomenes and his Spartans, who were posted

among the hills of Sellasia. Philopœmen was stationed with his horsemen among the Illyrian foot, and at a favorable moment in the battle, without awaiting for the signal from Antigonus, he executed a cavalry charge which caused the sudden rout of the wing opposed to him and threw the whole Spartan line into disorder. After the battle the charge of insubordination was made against Philopœmen, but Antigonus replied, "That young man acted like an experienced commander."

When the news of the battle reached Santiago, borne by terrified and wounded fugitives, the wildest tumult filled the city. Marcó and his camarilla and his soldiers fled, and the road to Valparaiso was swollen with a human flood hurrying to escape. Wild reports filled the air and the panic-stricken refugees, whipped with a sudden frantic fear, threw away their baggage, their clothes, their money, everything that could delay their headlong flight for safety. Marcó did well to escape, not from San Martin but from the people of the Capital, who would have torn him limb-meal if they could have found him. They filled the palace, seeking him, and scattered about in a fury of disdain the broken remnants of his powder-boxes, his phials of cosmetics and perfumery, his porcelains, his tapestries, his furniture,—but Marcó was gone.

The day after the battle, San Martin entered the city with his officers, and a Cabildo Abierto was summoned, over which Ruiz Tagle presided, which offered to San Martin the post of Supreme

Director. Twice he refused the office and O'Higgins was then chosen unanimously by a Cabildo of two hundred and ten citizens of Chile.

A few days later Marcó, who had wandered about without the courage or the wit to escape, was captured and brought to Santiago. He was led into the room where the General-in-Chief, San Martin, was seated, and with a profusion of ceremony presented his little sword, richly ornamented, to his conqueror, saying with a flourish, "I offer you my sword. You are the first in my life to whom I have yielded it."

"Keep it," replied San Martin, disdainfully, running his eye over his diminutive prisoner, "I have no use for such a weapon as that," and he held out to the discomfited Marcó a copy of the proclamation in which the Governor had offered eight dollars apiece for the heads of the patriots and one thousand dollars for that of the Argentine General. Marcó quivered with fear and stammered out childish excuses, but San Martin had no feeling but contempt for the man whom from Mendoza he had for months led around with a string like a puppet, and after a few days he sent him to Buenos Ayres, under guard of a corporal and four men.

There yet remained several thousand royalist troops in Chile, but the terror of Chacabuco possessed them, and while the greater part escaped by sea to Lima, Ordóñez, with those whom he could collect from the southern province, shut himself

up in Concepcion, the only point on Chilean soil which remained in the hands of the Viceroy's forces. San Martin reported to the government of Buenos Ayres: "In twenty-four days we have crossed the Cordillera, defeated the enemy, expelled the tyrant, finished the campaign, and given liberty to Chile."

Still Chile was not yet wholly purged of the royal soldiers, and while San Martin returned to the Argentine, to complete the arrangements that he had long contemplated, O'Higgins besieged Talcahuano. Before doing this, however, he appointed Don Hilario Quintana as his deputy in Santiago and organized a ministry consisting of Don Miguel Zañartu for the Departments of Government and Foreign Relations, and Don José Ignacio Zenteno for those of War and the Treasury, "with the same provisional character as the post that I myself occupy," said O'Higgins, "which will terminate with the final expulsion from Chilean soil of the last relics of the royal army, and give place to an administration of the state agreeable to the sovereign will of the people." They were all, including O'Higgins, members of Lautaro Lodge of the Gran Reunion Americana.

The time has now arrived to consider in such detail as remains possible, the activity of a society which exerted immense power in Chile during the period under present examination. This society is the Gran Reunion Americana to which reference has been made in earlier pages. While Miranda

was yet living in the United States, and was brought into an admiring acquaintance with Washington, he became initiated into a lodge of Free Masons in Virginia. It is useless to speculate on the peculiar attraction and influence that secrecy alone imparts to such mysterious organizations, but whatever the original stimulus in Miranda's case, and perhaps it was the reverence he owed to the character and achievements of his great ideal, he easily saw to what valuable uses a society founded on Free Masonry might be applied, in the condition of the American Colonies of Spain. There is something essentially tenebrific about the Gran Reunion Americana, but with its silent purposes and dubious achievements in the rest of America we have fortunately no present concern.

The grand lodge was in London, and branches or subordinate lodges were established through Spain and America. Spanish officers of regimental rank were those as a rule who were chosen members in that country. In each of the Spanish Colonies was established a subordinate Lodge, which in the case of Chile was for several years located in Concepcion. It was named Lautaro Lodge. Rózas was the Master while he lived. O'Higgins was a member of the branch Lodge in Concepcion. The office of Master was conferred for life. The subordinate Lodge was restricted to five members while the Grand Lodge had only thirteen. There was nothing in their constitution to prevent priests from joining the Lodge. In

fact it was expected that every Lodge should have at least one priest. Cortes, Frétes and Cienfuegos were priests who were members. It was strictly a political organization, and refrained in its constitution, from the most incidental reference to social or religious affairs. In 1812 the Lodge in Buenos Ayres was erected into a Grand Lodge with jurisdiction over all the branch Lodges in the Colonies, and San Martin became the Grand Master. This explains in part his influence in the Argentine, for Pueyrredon, the Supreme Director of Buenos Ayres, was a member of his Lodge. This also directed San Martin's preference to O'Higgins instead of Carrera as his assistant and representative. With the erection of the Grand Lodge in Buenos Ayres, the number of members for Buenos Ayres and Chile was increased to the full number of thirteen.

This was the organization which directed the movement for independence in South America, and educated the Colonists in the path of political equality and freedom. The Constitution of the Order was intended to perpetuate power in the hands of its members as being better fitted for authority than those who had been less identified with the propaganda of independence. It thus constituted an irresponsible Junta. Upon their own individual members they diffidently relied, and lest any should err through ignorance or passion, they adopted the following among the rules of the Order, a copy of which is before me: —

"ARTICLE 9. If it should happen that any one of the brothers be elected to the chief office in the state, he shall not decide anything of importance without having consulted the opinion of the Lodge, unless the urgency of the matter demands prompt action, in which case he shall justify such action in the first meeting of the Lodge.

"ARTICLE 11. He shall not appoint anyone to an office of influence or importance in the state, either in the Capital or beyond its limits, without the assent of the Lodge; this restriction being intended to apply to foreign envoys, governors of provinces, generals in chief of the army, judges of the Superior Courts, the highest officers of the Church, and includes Regimental Line officers and others of corresponding rank.

"ARTICLE 23. When the supreme government shall be in the charge of a brother, he shall not dispose of the fortune, honor or life of another brother without the assent of the Lodge."

Among its penal laws was the following:

"Any brother who shall reveal the secret of the existence of the Lodge, either by word or sign, shall be put to death in such way as may be most convenient."

Thus was erected and organized this secret body, the Lautaro Lodge, as powerful as the Council of Ten, as ambitious as the Society of Jesus, as mysterious as the Vehmgerichte of Westphalia. And yet this society, sinister as its constitution appears and irresponsible as its decisions must have been, was the seat of patriotism and the centre of popular government. So long as its power was con-

fined to such men as swayed its operations at this time, it wrought incalculable benefit to Chile, nor did it seek, apparently, to perpetuate its power after the occasion for its early exercise had departed. During the earlier part of O'Higgins's administration, we lose gradually all indications of its existence, and if perpetuated or revived, it must have become animated with a changed purpose. It is not uninteresting to observe that during the precise period of its known influence over Don Bernardo O'Higgins, the state was more prosperous, more progressive and happier than after it had ceased to be an active power in the government.

One of Don Bernardo's first official acts was to send a vessel to Juan Fernández to repatriate the proscripsts of Ossório and Marcó. Another was to rescind the decrees of his two predecessors and re-establish the sagacious and beneficent laws of Don Juan Martínez de Rózas, which were destined to leave their permanent mark upon Chilean legislation so long as Chile should remain a free country. But above all else in urgent necessity, was the prevention of any repetition of such division as resulted in the loss of the battle of Rancagua, and the destruction of the country in 1814.

The royalist party was one of these dangers and José Miguel Carrera was the other. The royalists, in the absence of any accredited representative of the King of Spain, sheltered themselves under the convenient robe of Bishop Rodríguez of

Santiago. He, fancying that this episcopal office would suffice to protect him in any intrigue which he might sanction or promote, ventured to offer protection to the most ardent and outspoken royalists, and was summarily sent into exile, while O'Higgins appointed a vicar to perform his duties. José Miguel Carrera had yet many personal and family friends in Chile who angrily resented any imputation to him of blame for the defeat at Rancagua. Carrera was himself in Buenos Ayres, having returned with an expedition from the United States. But the Lautaro Lodge baffled him and buffeted him in a hundred invisible ways, thwarted his plans, impaired his credit, destroyed his prestige, blasted his hopes and finally at this very time, took Juan José and Luis prisoners, and confined them in the jail in Mendoza, Carrera himself escaping with difficulty to Montevideo. In 1818 Juan José and Luis Carrera were put to death in Mendoza by the orders of Lautaro Lodge.

O'Higgins was disappointed in his purpose to take Talcahuano, now occupied by Ordóñez, although one of Napoleon's Generals in person, General Brayer, assisted in the operations. Don Bernardo knew well that there was yet to come the final test of strength between Chile and Peru, that Chacabuco was not decisive of the great question of independence, and he wished to destroy Ordóñez and deprive the Viceroy of the commodious and convenient landing place that Talcahuano would furnish. For this urgent reason he prolonged the

siege until the early rains drove him and his army to seek protection from the winter. Meanwhile he had visited the frontiers and inspected the garrisons and defenses of the towns throughout the province of Concepcion, that he might if possible prepare them to resist, when the army should come that the Viceroy would almost certainly send during the coming summer.

In the middle of January, 1818, this long expected army arrived in Talcahuano. It consisted of three thousand four hundred and seven men which, added to the seventeen hundred already under Ordóñez, made a total of about five thousand soldiers. Ossório came with them, having a commission from Pezuela, the present Viceroy of Peru, to supersede Ordóñez. Ossório had received the credit for the royalist victory at Rancagua, and Elorreaga was no longer alive to dispute his claim. Indeed the Viceroy Pezuela wrote to the war office in Madrid, under date of September 19, 1817, "I have determined to put in chief command Brigadier General Ossório, whose military skill and experience are well confirmed by the general opinion, since to him is due the glory of having entirely subjugated that country in the brief period of sixty days and restored it to submission."

Not without difficulty, humiliation and delay, had Pezuela succeeded in fitting out another expedition. Chile had long since come to be the granary of Peru. The need of Chilean wheat to support the population of Lima had put an end to

the absurd restrictions formerly imposed on inter-colonial commerce, and the annual amount of wheat sent to Lima from Chile amounted to twenty-three hundred tons. Pezuela computed at eight hundred thousand dollars yearly the trade between the two countries. Now the inhabitants of Lima were suffering from hunger and the Viceroyal treasury was empty. New taxes and contributions only increased the distress of the inhabitants without bringing any but inconsiderable returns to the Viceroyal exchequer. In this emergency, Pezuela entered into an agreement with ten of the merchants of Lima, by which he was to receive certain sums which he deemed adequate to his purpose, and in return for which he was to permit them to introduce into Chile without duty, sugar and tobacco and a few other specified articles of commerce, to an amount immensely exceeding the sums that they furnished for his necessities. Perhaps the difference between what he received and what he promised the syndicate, represents not only his urgent need but also the risk to them that the speculation involved. This contract is dated November 27, 1817.

San Martin had now returned to Chile and resumed his duties as Commander-in-Chief. So long as there existed any uncertainty as to where Pezuela's army might land, the Argentine general remained in Valparaiso with about two thousand men, that he might be present to repel any attempt of the enemy upon that port. When therefore he

was assured that Ossório had gone to Talcahuano, to incorporate with his army the soldiers of Ordóñez, San Martín despatched an aide to O'Higgins ordering him to proceed without unnecessary precipitation to Talca, that he might destroy all stores that could be serviceable to Ossório, and take measures to remove the inhabitants of the southern districts either to Santiago, where the army could defend them, or to the uplands, where they would be protected by the asperities of access. Ossório had no wish to delay long in Talcahuano or to consume much time in reducing the towns of the south. The facility with which, in 1813, these communities had admitted the garrisons and pretensions of either party, had shown him that the quickest way to occupy the country was to defeat the army of San Martín and O'Higgins, as he had no doubt whatever of being able to do. But however eager he was to consummate his mission, he found, almost as soon as he had landed, that it would be necessary, before advancing to meet the patriots, to conciliate the hostility of Ordóñez, for the two generals had had prior acquaintance, and Ordóñez was unwilling, even at the command of the Viceroy, to yield the conduct of the campaign to a general who spent his time on his knees before the Virgin of the Rosary, and who depended for success in battle on her intercession rather than on his own skill, and on the discipline, courage and endurance of his soldiers. However, after some stormy interviews which permanently embittered

their relations, the spirit of discipline finally prevailed, and Ossório led the army northward. Meanwhile on the 12th of February, the first anniversary of Chacabuco and the two hundred and seventy-seventh anniversary of the founding of Santiago by Don Pedro de Valdivia, O'Higgins issued the proclamation of the independence of Chile.

In Talca, San Martín joined O'Higgins, and being firmly persuaded of his superiority in discipline as in numbers, for the forces of the patriots amounted to sixty-six hundred men, he withdrew from Talca at the approach of Ossório, and left the line of the Maule entirely unguarded. It was his intention not merely to defeat Ossório, but to annihilate him. The patriot army retired to San Fernando, and Ossório crossed the Maule, not without surprise and some misgivings at encountering no resistance whatever at this important point. Under the continued influence of this suspicion, he advanced with great caution, throwing out small scouting parties in all directions, and endeavoring to fathom the tactics of his opponent. This careful advance was distasteful to Ordóñez, who wished to push on rapidly toward the enemy and come as soon as possible to a decisive encounter, and the animosities of Talcahuano were renewed between the two royalist generals. Still Ossório continued to proceed with the utmost circumspection. He was confirmed in his purpose by the fact that his mounted scouts were in almost continuous touch

with the flying squadrons of San Martin, under the command of Colonel Freire.

The circumstances under which Ossório had crossed the Maule and occupied Talca in 1814 were almost exactly parallel to those which attended his present passage of the same river on the 9th of March, 1818, but he was conscious of a new spirit that now actuated his opponents and a new will that now dominated them. In 1814, he delayed his advance until the rival factions of Carrera and O'Higgins, exhausted with the strife of civil war, might fall a ready prey into his hands; now he knew that a united and disciplined army was before him, while dissension was busy in his own ranks. He had also observed that a new spirit pervaded the country, for in his passage northward from Concepcion, his former welcome had now changed to a sullen silence which was full of menace.

When San Martin knew that the enemy had crossed to the north bank of the Maule, he moved his army from San Fernando and deploying his light cavalry in an extended line, he advanced to within a few miles of Curicó. Here he called in his mounted scouts and having assured himself that Ordóñez had taken possession of Curicó with his grenadiers, lancers and dragoons of the frontier, he determined, before coming to an engagement, to await the arrival of the main body of the royalists which lay near Talca. In the early morning of March 14th his scouts reported that

the cavalry that had occupied Curicó had withdrawn during the night across the Lontué, where they were now holding the fords of that river. San Martin at once marched his troops to the bank of the Lontué and on the morning of the 15th, directed Freire, with two squadrons, to force one of the fords and bring him word of Ossório. Freire crossed the ford in the face of a severe musketry fire and advanced, driving before him the grenadiers who had defended the ford, and who fell back in order until they rested on the advancing division of General Ordóñez, before which Freire retired, recrossed the ford and reported to San Martin that Ossório was not yet come up.

On the 16th, San Martin crossed the Lontué, having ascertained during the night that Ossório had advanced to Camarico with his whole body as soon as he knew of the affair between Freire and the division of Ordóñez, but when San Martin had crossed without encountering resistance, he found that Ossório had withdrawn southward again as soon as he had learned that there had been nothing but a trifling skirmish. San Martin had now reached a position of considerable advantage, where he was enabled not only to defend the road to the Capital and to threaten Ossório, but where he could avail himself at last of a road through the hills, by which he hoped to cut off the retreat of the royalists. But Ossório had already taken fright and realizing suddenly the disadvantage of his position, had withdrawn in haste toward Talca

San Martin, finding that his enemy was evading him, marched his whole force by the hill road as rapidly as possible to cut Ossório off from Talca and despatch him at once, but night approached before he could reach the enemy. At nightfall his advance guard of cavalry came into the main road leading to Talca, in time to have a brush with the rear guard of Ossório, but a general engagement was refused, and the patriot cavalry, after losing a few men, drew off, awaiting the arrival of the infantry. It was dark night, March 19, 1818, when the patriots encamped at Cancha Rayada about two miles from Talca, where Ossório lay.

Ossório fully realized his position. Before him lay a well-equipped and well-disciplined army exceeding his own by fifteen hundred men, eager for battle and under a skilful leader; behind him was the Maule which he must cross in the presence of the enemy. San Martin had finally succeeded in his purpose of forcing a battle where there was no hope of escape for the royalists if they were beaten. And now a strange thing happened. At Rancagua, Ossório had deserted his army and fled across the Cachapoal with a brigade of dragoons. At Cancha Rayada, instead of trying to save himself by flight as he could still do by deserting his soldiers, he decided to attack San Martin at once. He divided his troops into three divisions, one under Ordóñez, another under Colonel Latorre and the third under Primo de Rivera, and directed them to march in silence and fall upon San Martin.

It was now eight o'clock at night, and the Chilean general had given the command to shift the camp. The necessary pickets and sentinels having been posted, Lieutenant Colonel Arcos had moved the first division behind a ditch that had been hastily dug to protect the new position, and was transferring the second division to their place when shots were heard and the pickets fell back before the advancing royalists. At once the discharge of muskets became general, the Chileans extinguished their fires and fell into position, while several companies of infantry were posted quickly on the flanks and rear for protection from attack. Ordóñez, charging with his column on the place where he had seen the Chilean infantry encamped at nightfall, was disconcerted at finding them removed, and while he wavered, uncertain what direction to take, a furious discharge of musketry at short range decimated his ranks indeed, but showed him also where his enemies were stationed. He wheeled about and attacked the second division fiercely. The utter desperation of the royalists and their compact and unbroken formation gave them an immense advantage over the Chileans. In the darkness these could not see their officers, and the incessant firing drowned the commands which were necessary to control and direct them. Still they stood fast and fired into the night and prayed for day.

Meanwhile the first division had escaped dispersion. Their Commander, Colonel Quintana,

had ordered them to preserve their present formation until he returned from headquarters, whither he went for instructions, and as he had not returned, the commanders of the several battalions agreed to designate Don Gregório de las Héras as their leader until Quintana came. It was now midnight, and Las Héras determined to save his division from destruction by a retreat. He therefore formed his battalions into a square with the artillery in the front to preserve it from attack, and a few squadrons of cazadores to cover the rear. His division consisted of thirty-five hundred men.

San Martin, O'Higgins and their officers did not fail in their duty to their troops on this dreadful occasion, but the darkness, the noise and the general bewilderment rendered ineffectual all their efforts. They had the good fortune to extricate a battalion of infantry and some detached bodies of mounted grenadiers with which San Martin succeeded in reaching San Fernando, where he was gratified to learn that Las Héras was bringing north the first division almost intact.

The confidence of San Martin and O'Higgins in the unerring success of the campaign had been imparted to the residents of Santiago, who thought only of how they could fitly celebrate the coming victory, but when, two days after Cancha Rayada, the terror-stricken fugitives began to pour into the Capital, shrieking aloud that the army was destroyed, a sudden despair fell upon the city. Escape was the only thing thought of.

The Delegate Director Cruz endeavored in vain to quiet the panic and restore confidence to the city. Already the terrified men and women began to stream out of the city toward the Cordillera as they had done after Rancagua; already the public funds had been taken from the Treasury and loaded on wagons for instant removal. The terror of Ossório and of Marcó was upon the city, and they expected momentarily to see the royalist troops enter under their dreaded commander. In this sudden panic one man only, the Cabildo felt, could save the city. That man was Manuel Rodríguez, the young lawyer, the secretary of Carrera, the patriot of Colchagua, the hero and idol of the Capital. Being invited, he assumed command, and so great was the confidence of the people in him and so judicious his directions, that by the time San Martín and O'Higgins arrived with reassuring news of the army, the city was quieted and Rodríguez had collected a body of old men and boys and was drilling them for the defence of the Capital. He had imbued them with his own confidence and given them, to sustain the desperation of their courage, the title of "The Hussars of Death." (*Los Husares de la Muerte.*) By the 27th of March, the Chilean army had reached the effective strength of forty-five hundred men, and lay encamped a few miles from Santiago, awaiting the approach of Ossório from Talca.

Ossório had suffered considerable loss at Cancha

Rayada and a rest of a few days in Talca was indispensable. On the 24th he left Talca and marched north. He knew that the first division of the Chilean army had retreated in perfect order, and that the Chilean fugitives would speedily rejoin their regiments, and he therefore advanced with the same caution as before, reaching San Fernando without opposition on the 28th. Here his advanced guard of some two hundred cavalry met a detachment of sixty mounted grenadiers led by Captain Cajaravilla, who immediately attacked them and drove them back in some disorder and with the loss of forty men. On the 30th Ossório occupied Rancagua, and two days later crossed the Maipo by the ford of Lauquen. Here he halted until the 4th of April, when having reconnoitered the country and satisfied himself of the strength and position of the Chilean army, a council of war was held and the decision reached to take up a position on the hills about Las Casas del Espejo, after detaching a body of horse to hold the road to Valparaiso and cover their retreat in the event of their being compelled to retire. His position was skilfully chosen, his artillery well placed, his men in good condition and his forces nearly if not quite equal to his opponents and full of the confidence with which their success at Cancha Rayada had inspired them. The Chileans on the other hand knew that the supreme hour had arrived when they were to overcome the last obstacle that yet remained between

them and the realization of all their hopes. They drew their determination to conquer, as well from the past as from the future. The recollection of Marcó incited them as well as the hope of liberty.

Ossório's centre, protected by his main battery, occupied the adobe buildings of Espejo, his right under Ordóñez, and his left under Primo de Ribera, were stationed on the adjoining hills and all was in readiness when the Chileans approached. San Martín commenced the battle by advancing a battalion of Grenadiers from the right wing to attack Ribera, who in reply opened on it with four small field pieces, under cover of which his cavalry advanced to a counter attack; the Chilean troops drew together into close order and awaited them. At almost the same moment the Chilean guns opened fire on Ribera's cavalry and threw them into disorder, and the Chilean Grenadiers charged, driving them up the hill, where, however, they were received by such a volley of musketry that they promptly recoiled. Being reinforced, they returned again to the attack, and finally, after fierce hand to hand fighting, succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill which they seized and occupied. On the other wing, Colonel Freire withstood the charge of Ordóñez's whole body of infantry supported on the flanks by the Royal Lancers and the Arequipa dragoons; and suddenly taking the offensive, broke them by a sharp attack and dispersed them in all

directions. In the centre, Ossório's battery repulsed an attack of the Eighth battalion (which O'Higgins had led at Chacabuco), and drove them from the field almost entirely destroyed. The Second battalion repeated the charge, at a run, with fixed bayonets, but owing to the rugged character of the ground, they lost their formation and with it their confidence. While they wavered, the Chileans who had driven Ribera from his position opened a destructive fire on Ossório's flank from the neighboring hill, while San Martín ordered up the reserves under Quintana. Under cover of this support, the officers of the Second battalion restored order among their men, who advanced up the hill in the face of Ossório's battery and of a furious musketry discharge from his infantry. At this time Freire, having put Ordóñez to a complete rout, delivered a cavalry attack on the other flank. These concerted and almost simultaneous attacks in front and on each flank, threw the royalists into complete confusion and they gave way and fled.

When Ribera had been driven from his position on the left wing, he had quickly restored order to his ranks and was on his way to join Ossório when he met Ordóñez coming from the other wing with all that he could collect of his men. Together they approached the Casas del Espejo, where the final charge was taking place, but they were too late. Already the fugitives from the field apprised them that all was lost. Still they

advanced, hoping to retrieve the fortunes of the day, but after a bitter resistance they were compelled to yield their swords to Las Héras. Fifteen hundred of the royalists lay dead on the field of battle, and twenty-five hundred were taken prisoners, among them one hundred and ninety officers. Seven hundred only succeeded in making their escape to Concepcion, and Ossório was the first to arrive at that grateful harbor of refuge. The Chilean loss was about one thousand killed and wounded. O'Higgins was sick in bed at Santiago with septic fever following the wound he had received at Cancha Rayada, but he insisted on rising, and in fact succeeded in reaching the battle field in time to take part as a simple trooper in the final charge, under command of his old friend, Colonel Ramon Freire.

Thus ended the battle of Maipo, which sealed the independence of Chile and prepared that of Peru. San Martin was perhaps the only man in Chile whose heart was not stirred to its depths by exultation. To him it meant merely another rung of the ladder that led up to Lima. At Cancha Rayada he had lost a pawn, at Maipo he had taken a rook. Vicuña-Mackenna said well of San Martin, "He was not a man, but a mission."

José Miguel Carrera was the first Chilean to recognize the fact that the sea was the natural highway of Chile, and after Rancagua he went

from Buenos Ayres to the United States to procure aid in fitting out a maritime expedition against Ossório. This he succeeded in doing, and with four vessels he reached Buenos Ayres on February 9th, 1817, three days before Chacabuco. In Buenos Ayres he fell into the snares of the Lautaro Lodge and his great plans were frittered away gradually and irretrievably as we have already seen.

San Martin himself realized how important was the command of the sea in the prosecution of his undertaking, and on the very field of Chacabuco, O'Higgins replied to the felicitations of his friends, "This victory and a hundred more will be without effect unless we control the sea."

On the 17th of February, 1817, five days after Chacabuco, O'Higgins sent to the United States two hundred thousand dollars to buy or build vessels suitable for use in Chilean waters, and at the same time he sent Don José Antonio Alvarez Condarco to England with a like mission. He also directed that the Spanish flag be kept flying over Valparaiso, and a few days later, the Spanish brigantine *Aguila* unsuspectingly entered the port and was surprised and captured. O'Higgins put one of his cavalry officers, Raymond Morris, an Englishman, in command, with orders to bring home the exiles from Juan Fernández. In October, the *Aguila* captured the *Perla* of sixteen guns and, before the year 1817 closed, the frigate

Minerva and the brigantine *Santa Maria de Jesus* were added to the little fleet.

Up to this time the Chileans had avoided the sea. There were no coast cities of any importance; Concepcion was a military post, Valdivia a fort, Valparaiso a fishing hamlet; the Chilean towns occupied the middle plateau and the population was agricultural. Morris was taken from the cavalry to command the *Aguila*, and Manuel Blanco-Encalada was now detached from the artillery to take charge of the fleet. He had served a year as a midshipman in the Spanish navy, and he was now advanced to the rank of Rear-Admiral in command of the Chilean fleet. There were not a dozen men in Chile who could distinguish between the mizzen chains and the spanker, and yet, when once the Chileans were on the sea, they found themselves at home, and prize after prize was brought into Valparaiso, whose cargo was applied to the conduct of the war, while the vessels themselves helped to form the fleet with which Lord Cochrane began that amazing career in the Pacific whose exploits are among the most marvelous feats of naval warfare.

On October 10, 1818, Rear-Admiral Blanco-Encalada left Valparaiso with a squadron comprising the *San Martin* of sixty guns, the frigate *Lautaro*, forty-six guns, the corvette *Chacabuco*, twenty guns, and the brigantine *Araucano*, sixteen guns. The news had come to Chile that a fleet of twelve Spanish vessels was coming with

an army of three thousand men to renew the war. Concepcion was still held by Colonel Sánchez and was thought to be the port to which this fleet was directed. The warning came almost too late to be of service, for the *Maria Isabel* and three other vessels had just arrived at Concepcion, when the *San Martin* and the *Lautaro* entered the bay and began the attack under close fire from the guns of the four ships and of all the land batteries. The battle lasted several hours, but at the end the Chileans, having sunk one of the Spanish vessels, captured the others and sailed out of the bay in triumph. The *Chacabuco* and *Araucano* had equal success, and in thirty-eight days the Chilean squadron sailed into Valparaiso, with eight prizes filled with a Spanish army, with all kinds of military stores and with several hundred thousand dollars in gold. After this victory the Spanish vessels disappeared from Chilean waters.

When Rear-Admiral Blanco-Encalada returned to Valparaiso, where Zenteno had established the department which conducted the operations of the navy, he found that Lord Cochrane had arrived and would take over the command of the Chilean Navy with the rank of Vice-Admiral. In this appointment no one concurred with heartier goodwill and more genuine enthusiasm than Blanco-Encalada himself. He at once yielded up the command of the fleet, declaring that he would be proud to serve under so illustrious a commander. He retained, however, his rank of Rear-Admiral.

The Vice-Admiral immediately hoisted his pennant on the *Maria Isabel*, now christened anew as the *O'Higgins*, and proceeded to overhaul the fleet, which was finally ready for sea January 14, 1819.

Lord Cochrane was the eldest son of the Earl of Dundonald. His brilliant achievements in the Napoleonic wars would have added lustre to the fame of Nelson. He was as daring as his countryman John Paul Jones, and as fortunate. Sir James Mackintosh said of him, "He is such a miracle of nautical skill and courage, his adventures have been so romantic, and his achievements so splendid, that no Englishman can read them without pride that such things have been done by his countryman."

When Alvarez Condarco reached England, as agent for Chile, the great fame of Cochrane had apparently reached its apogee, but the Chilean agent pointed out to the eager enthusiasm of the Scotchman, a new field of glory and other laurels that awaited him in the Pacific, and as Amadis offered his single aid to King Perion of Gaul, so Cochrane, relying simply on his own genius, came to the help of Chile against Spain.

Over two centuries had passed since the great sea captains of Queen Elizabeth ploughed with hostile keel the tranquil waters of the Pacific. During that period no one had ventured to challenge the proud claim of Spain to the undisputed sovereignty of the Western Ocean. The pirates of Tunis and Algiers might destroy or capture

her vessels in the Mediterranean or ravage with impunity the coasts of Múrcia and Alicante; Essex might burn Cadiz, Rooke capture Gibraltar and Peterborough seize Barcelona; England might blockade every Atlantic port and prey upon the defenseless commerce of Spain; but Callao and Guayaquil were tranquil and secure from any hostile invasion, and in the Pacific at least her commerce was free from menace. That tranquillity was now to be disturbed, that security to be attacked, by the one country which she had most despised as a Colony and which less than two years earlier lay prostrate and gasping under the heel of her merciless despotism.

The attack on Callao by the Chilean fleet filled the world with amazement and revealed to Spain her precarious tenure of her Colonies. The Chilean fleet swept the whole American coast from Acapulco in Mexico, to Valdívía in the south of Chile, collecting prizes in every harbor, and capturing every vessel that ventured abroad, while the Spanish war ships cowered under the guns of Callao and Panama. One of these many prizes, the *Motézuma*, was laden with merchandise and money to the amount of five hundred thousand dollars. Thus the funds were furnished by Spain to liberate Peru, in much the same way as in the war of the American Revolution, the Colonies supported their armies by the sale of prizes and merchandise captured from the British vessels. Admiral Cochrane was a daring and fortunate com-

mander, and in nothing was he more fortunate than in the boldness and intelligence of the seamen who manned his ships, and of the soldiers whom he led to victory.

Valdivia was conceded to be the best fortified harbor on the Pacific. The Spaniards boasted that it was the strongest post in the world. Gibraltar had been captured, but Valdivia was impregnable. A narrow entrance from the sea gave admittance to a deep and commodious harbor, at the further bend of which, fifteen miles from the entrance, lay the city. This harbor was completely surrounded and dominated by nine forts, four on the southern and four on the northern side, while one, the largest of all, constituted the citadel. Each was guarded by a ditch and a parapet, behind which arose the steep cliff in which the works had been partly excavated and partly constructed. Each fort was separated from its neighbor by an interval of one-fourth to one-half a mile of rugged precipice, to which the forest trees clung thick and wild, while the adjoining forts were connected by covered galleries spanning these intervals, so narrow that but one person at a time could pass, and commanded at entrance and issue by twenty-four pound guns. Thus each fort, while being impregnable to attack from without, could defend itself perfectly from any assault from its neighbor, if an enemy should succeed in effecting an entrance there.

For two centuries the convicts from Spain and

Peru had expiated their crimes and exhausted their lives in continuous labor on the erection of this system of forts, which should secure the southern entrance to the Pacific from any attack that the nations of the earth could prepare against it. These fortifications were garrisoned with eleven hundred men, and through their embrasures one hundred and eighteen cannon denounced the immediate annihilation of any vessel that might enter the harbor with hostile intent.

Nothing of this was unknown to Lord Cochrane, and yet he determined to capture Valdivia and its forts; as he himself said, "when unexpected projects are energetically put in execution, they almost invariably succeed." To his genius nothing seemed impossible, and having tested the intelligence and intrepidity of his soldiers, he knew that they were worthy to execute his daring purpose.

At about four o'clock of the afternoon of the 3d of February, 1820, the Admiral with two small ships sailed into the harbor of Valdivia and anchored just within the bay. At once the alarm gun from Fort Ingles rang over the water of the quiet harbor, and Fort Ingles opened fire on the two Chilean vessels.

It seems incredible, but it is nevertheless an undeniable fact, that the artillerymen in the Spanish service had never been trained to take aim at the object they sought to hit. A general direction was all that they were taught to attain, and they fired less with the intention, than with the

hope, that their shot might hit the mark. It was winged with a prayer, but the prayer was seldom heard, for not one shot in a hundred could take effect at a distance of one hundred yards. Lord Cochrane was familiar with this peculiarity of the Spanish artillerymen. He had calculated his chances at different distances and took his risk willingly. So now, disregarding the fire from the fort, he ordered two boats to be lowered and manned, to carry a detachment of soldiers ashore. By this time the other forts had opened fire, and when the landing party approached the shore under Fort Ingles, they found themselves opposed by a company of seventy-five men, who had descended the steep slope of the outer wall and now, from behind the parapet, opened a hot fire from close range on the approaching Chileans. These, however, in a few minutes reached the shore and, dashing through the ditch, they climbed the scarp and the parapet slopes, to find that their enemies were clambering up the wall of the fort on their hands and knees to escape. Those above lowered some ladders to hasten their ascent, and withdrew them when once their comrades had reached the ramparts. Major Beauchef, who commanded the assault, watched them as they disappeared through the crenelles. Then he took off his hat, and, raising his voice, called out, "Thank you, gentlemen, for your courtesy in showing the way."

By this time all the Chileans were collected at the base of the wall, and Major Beauchef divided

them according to the prearranged plan into three bodies, which were by separate ways to scale the height between Fort Ingles and Fort San Carlos, and then unite in a general attack on Fort Ingles. By this time Fort Ingles had six hundred men ready to repel the attack, while the assailants consisted of two hundred and fifty soldiers, whom Freire had lent Cochrane for this purpose, and some of the artillerymen from the fleet.

Night fell while the Chileans were climbing the rough ascent under the cover of the trees. No one of the enemy offered them the slightest resistance. The Spaniards had lost sight of them and had forgotten the ancient aphorism of war that your enemy is never so near to you as when he has disappeared. After an hour's hard work the Chileans were mounted nearly to the level of the fort. There lay a stretch of open rock, smooth and sloping dangerously to the bay, between them and their object. This little transit of two hundred yards must be made in the full view of the fort. Beauchef stood in the shade of the trees and measured with his eye the distance. Along that perilous dome the path lay, where a single misstep might precipitate a score of men to destruction, and where they would be absolutely helpless against the fire from the fort. "Forward, in perfect silence!" he said, and stepping out from the shelter, he dashed across the intervening space followed by all his men. A sudden cry of alarm from the sentinels, and a vague

rattle of musketry that did no harm, saluted the little band, who in a moment swarmed up the battlements and leaped into the fort. Here the resistance was speedily overcome. The Spaniards fled in the confusion of terror. Some escaped by the gallery to Fort San Carlos, some leaped from the crenelles and were dashed to pieces on the rocks below, while the rest surrendered in instant fear. Leaving twenty men to guard the fort, Beauchef led the rest along the covered gallery and entered Fort San Carlos. Here he encountered no effective resistance, and Forts Amargas and Chorocoma also yielded with unexpected facility to his attack. At the entrance to Fort Corral, he expected resistance, but though two hundred Spaniards remained there, they offered scarcely an objection to his entrance, and at once gave themselves up as prisoners. At four o'clock in the morning, all the five forts on the southern shore of the harbor were in the hands of the Chileans, and by nine o'clock, the garrisons of the four remaining forts on the north shore had fled in terror, before Lord Cochrane had had time to send a party to assault them.

In Callao, he cut out the *Esmeralda* from under the fire of three hundred guns and carried her away in triumph. In the harbor of Callao lay the merchant fleet of Spain, protected by the guns of the shore batteries and guarded from attack by a line of battle ships which consisted of the *Esmeralda* of forty-four guns, a corvette, two

brigantines, two sloops of war, three large merchant vessels, which had been converted into armed cruisers, and twenty gunboats. The whole harbor was moreover protected with large floats fastened together with heavy chains, making a boom which effectually closed the harbor, and prevented entrance except on the north, where an opening had been left wide enough for the passage of single vessels. Outside of the cordon lay the *U. S. S. Macedonia* and *H. B. M. S. Hyperion*. Lord Cochrane prepared his plan of operations, selected from his squadron the men who should execute it and drilled them at night until they understood their individual duties. On the night of November 5th, 1820, he signaled all the Chilean vessels to leave the bay and pass outside beyond San Lorenzo, with sufficient ostentation of departure to persuade the Spaniards that the whole Chilean fleet had put to sea. All lights were extinguished on his flagship, the *O'Higgins*, to which the men had been transferred who were to assist in the operations of the night, and an hour before midnight, twelve boats put off from the *O'Higgins* in two parallel lines, a boat's length apart. Lord Cochrane in person headed one line and Captain Guise of the *Lautaro* the other. As the boats rowed silently toward the entrance of the harbor, they passed under the bow of the *Macedonia* whose officers prevented their sentinels from challenging them, while in a low voice they wished them good luck and a happy result. The

sentinels on the *Hyperion*, however, hailed them noisily, and continued to challenge them until they had all passed. At twelve o'clock the expedition penetrated the harbor and reached the line of Spanish gunboats, and a few minutes afterward they were alongside the *Esmeralda*, without any effective alarm having been given to the enemy. Lord Cochrane himself was the first to board the *Esmeralda*, mounting by the main chains on the port side, and despatching the single sentinel on deck, while Captain Guise climbed aboard by the forechains to starboard. In a moment the deck of the *Esmeralda* was thronged with Chilean seamen. By this time the alarm had been given and the crew of the *Esmeralda* rushed on deck. A hand to hand fight followed, while the Spanish officers from the quarter deck directed a noisy but vague fire against the boarders, and the Spanish seamen, seeking refuge from the invaders in the forecastle, opened a fire of small arms which aroused an indescribable tumult throughout the bay. The gunboats and the launches within the harbor discharged their broadsides without definite purpose, and the great guns of the shore batteries boomed into the night. Vessels began moving about and the gunboats filed up on either side of the *Esmeralda* and opened fire at close quarters. By this time the decks of the vessel were awash with blood, some of the boarding party were killed, and several others, including Lord Cochrane himself, wounded. They now cut

the cables and hoisted the topsails and top gallant sails and the *Esmeralda* got gradually under way and drew out of the harbor, being all the time under fire from the gunboats, and with her decks raked fore and aft by the fire from her own crew imprisoned in the bow and stern. The bay was a whirlwind of fire, and the *Macedonia* and *Hyperion*, displaying neutral lights, at the mizzen peak and at the jib boom, raised their anchors, set their topsails, and sailed out of this pandemonium of noise and wandering danger. Cochrane at once made the same signal of neutrality, and with the *O'Higgins*, followed the American and British ships out of the bay. Before three o'clock in the morning, the *Esmeralda* and two gunboats which she had captured, were beyond the reach of the guns of Callao. Of the crew of the *Esmeralda* one hundred and fifty-seven were killed and one hundred and seventy-three taken prisoners. The Chilean loss was eleven killed and thirty wounded. On the following day, Captain Downs of the *Macedonia*, felicitated Lord Cochrane on the success of his enterprise and added, "Never was a more brilliant achievement accomplished with greater dexterity." This exploit filled the Viceroy with unutterable dismay, and shook the empire of Spain to its very foundations. A hundred other achievements, less spectacular, indeed, but not less heroic, filled the early annals of the Chilean navy and formed the traditions under which Prat and Latorre and

Condell learned the great lessons of heroism and strategy.

Meanwhile, Chile was adapting herself to her changed condition, and, under the easy rule of O'Higgins, was resuming the agricultural and commercial life of earlier years. Now at last she began to experience the revived benefits of Rózas's rule, and, elated with the realization of their permanence, saw no cloud as yet on her horizon. To be sure, Sánchez continued to occupy Concepcion until the capture of the *Maria Isabel* put an end to his hopes of succor from Spain, and until the successful assault of Valdívía destroyed his authority in the south of Chile, after which he took his departure from the soil of the Republic; in the mountainous regions of Arauco, too, an organized band of assassins and robbers covered themselves with the name of Ferdinand, and under Benavídes, Pico and the two Pincheiras, ravaged the remote districts and waged a war of murder and fire on the scattered inhabitants of that difficult district; but these were never sufficient to form a menace to their independence, and but for the great preparations for the Conquest of Peru, would doubtless have been quickly exterminated. But every effort of the government was employed in the preparation of the army which was to proceed to Peru on its beneficent mission of liberation. This enterprise would have seemed impossible to anyone who was not under the immediate influence of San Martin. The nation, devastated

by hostile armies for ten years, was tired of war and exhausted by repeated sacrifices. Without the prizes which her ships acquired and the glory that they reaped on the sea, neither the resources nor the enthusiasm of the country could have sustained the effort of preparation. But finally the road was opened to Lima, and the army was ready to embark. San Martin led his troops aboard the fleet and sailed north.

With the departure of the army, thus equipped by Chile with a heroism and self-sacrifice rarely paralleled in the world's annals, the further history of San Martin passes beyond our present horizon. We must return and consider the progress of the civil administration of Chile under the virtual Dictatorship of O'Higgins.

On February 16, 1817, Don Bernardo O'Higgins was unanimously elected Supreme Director of Chile in a Cabildo Abierto held in Santiago, and composed of two hundred and ten Chileans. This election was enthusiastically confirmed by the whole nation without dissent, and for six years O'Higgins continued to rule Chile. After Chacabuco, San Martin returned to the government of his province, meditating constantly upon the best and surest way to achieve his ultimate purpose, the destruction of the King's authority in America. Nothing less could satisfy his lofty soul. This was his only ambition. He had refused with disdain the magnanimous offers of the Chileans to place their government in his hands. He was ab-

solutely without any personal ambition of power, and seemed almost to resent the invitation of Chile as an aspersion of his motives. Chile was to him the highway to Lima, and after Chacabuco, his path lay through the sea. For the present there was nothing for him to do in Chile, and he returned to Mendoza revolving in his mind the means of prosecuting his great purpose.

O'Higgins's presence being required with the army at Talcahuano and Concepcion, where Ordóñez lingered and perpetuated the threat of invasion, the Director named Colonel Quintana to exercise the delegated duties of the chief office in Santiago and went in person to conduct the operations in the southern province. Quintana was expected to attend to the simple routine duties of government, under the constant control of the Lautaro Lodge, but the real seat of government was in the Chilean camp before Talcahuano, and the Minister of War was at the army headquarters with O'Higgins. Even the perfunctory duties of Delegate were, however, beyond Quintana's skill to conduct without friction; he was moreover an Argentine, and the preference thus shown to a foreigner was annoying to Chilean pride. Strong in the conscious support of the Lautaro Lodge, he was little careful to respect the sensibilities of the Chileans, and attempted to introduce into civil life something of the austere control of military authority. Quintana had many of the qualities of Governor Carrasco, and when at the command of the Lau-

taro Lodge he laid his hand on the person of Manuel Rodríguez, and imprisoned him under the accusation of treason, the temper of the people gave way, and they demanded Quintana's immediate separation from command. Rodríguez was released and Quintana removed. Luis de la Cruz, also a member of the Lautaro Lodge, was appointed Delegate Director. Soon afterward, Ossório landed at Talcahuano and the war recommenced with the result that we have described. During this period of fourteen months, O'Higgins's only title to office was the one conferred upon him by the two hundred and ten members of the Cabildo Abierto of Santiago.

While the uncertain result of the final contest impended over Chile, everyone acquiesced in the necessity of avoiding any issue that might create division among the people and renew the animosities that had brought about the defeat at Rancagua. No Congress was convened, no constitution drawn up. The Cabildo of Santiago, through which, at the time of the provisional Junta, Rózas had promulgated his laws, represented to O'Higgins their willingness to assist him by conferring an additional legality upon his decrees, but the Supreme Director rejected their offer with disdain. In this he was doubtless justified, but after the total defeat of the Spaniards at Maipo the agitation for a constitution was carried on openly and widely.

In fact O'Higgins's power was now become

greater than that of any of the Colonial governors had been. There was no stated limit to his authority, and no Royal Audience to act as a check upon his will. Public and private rights had no other security than his personal sense of justice, and the liberty of Chile no other guaranty than his patriotism and the rectitude of his intentions. Such guaranties were insufficient for the future, and the only result for the present seemed to be a change of masters. The spirit of liberty was very strong in Chile, and was not to be satisfied until it was assured by a Constitution, which should confirm public liberty and private rights, and inscribe the powers of the government within due bounds.

O'Higgins recognized the temporary character of his office. He knew that his appointment was merely *ad litem*, but he also knew that until the Viceroy was expelled from Peru, the freedom of Chile was subject to permanent menace. This was not only true but urgent, and he realized that the achievement of this great purpose must not be left to the chance of caprice, or to the uncertainty of popular election. If the necessity of an absolute authority was manifest between Chacabuco and Maipo, that necessity, though less generally evident, was as real now that a more remote peril threatened the independence of Chile. Not for a moment could the future of Chile be assured, until the Spanish power in Peru was destroyed, and the more pressing became the de-

mands of the people, the more evident was their blindness to their peril.

In this emergency he had recourse to an expedient which, while safeguarding his country, he must have known would result in an injustice, perhaps an injury, to himself. It is impossible to believe that he was moved by the vulgar desire to prolong his authority for a few brief months at the ultimate price of the loss of prestige and the diminution of his fame. Glory was always dear to the heart of O'Higgins, but even glory yielded to the magnanimity of his patriotism. He knew that he must yield at least an apparent obedience to the will of the people, but he was determined that his country must be rescued from peril. He therefore announced in a public proclamation dated May 18, 1818, that "inasmuch as the present moment is manifestly inopportune for the election of a Congress, the Supreme Director, pending such election, will appoint a commission of seven individuals to prepare and present a provisional constitution, which may give direction to the deliberations of the Congress when elected, and shall serve in the meantime as the organic law of the country."

On the 8th of August, 1818, the commission submitted their protocol of a Constitution, which was published by the government, and accepted by the municipal corporations of Chile on the 23d of October. The first article of this Constitution, thus accepted by the country, after affirming the

sovereignty of the people, declared Don Bernardo O'Higgins to be the supreme head of the nation, allotting no term to his office and imposing no valid restrictions upon his power. The public clamor was for the time quieted by this subterfuge, and before it could again become importunate, Rear Admiral Blanco-Encalada, like another Duilius, led into Valparaiso on the 17th of November, a whole fleet of Spanish vessels. Then followed the glorious campaigns of Lord Cochrane, which swept the Spanish fleets from the Pacific and opened a passage to Lima for the army of Chile. This glory inundated the nation. It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm of the whole people, as the news came of success after success without a disaster to Chilean arms. They lived in a continuous ecstasy of triumph.

To O'Higgins belongs the glory of the magnificent achievements of the Chilean fleet, but the credit he must share with Zenteno, his Minister of War on land and sea. With no personal knowledge of naval affairs, with inexpert and impromptu assistants, and with little aid from an empty treasury and an impoverished people, Zenteno, without ostentation but without friction, maintained and supplied the fleet, paid the officers and sailors, and transported the army to Lima out of his own department. He not only made the navy pay for itself without other resource, but managed, out of the proceeds of the sale of prizes and captures, to furnish considerable sums toward

the expense of the civil administration. O'Higgins, too, had sold or mortgaged everything he owned in the world, and left himself absolutely without means of subsistence, that he might equip the army for its mission to Peru.

It was at such a time as this, that José Miguel Carrera, lifted his head for a last attack on his country. Although constantly buffeted by the Lautaro Lodge, he had managed to enlist the sympathies of family friends in Chile, and to recruit a body of men in the Argentine. He had even solicited and obtained the assistance of the Indians of the Pampas, in the execution of his enterprise. But Chile was now freed from the armies of Spain, and Carrera's expedition must then have been directed either against Chile as a nation, or against the government of the nation, which was O'Higgins. A casuist might be able to draw this distinction, but even Carrera, who was no casuist, must have known that to invade the territory of the republic with an armed force was treason and the penalty was death. That penalty was inflicted in Mendoza by the Lautaro Lodge, while O'Higgins, on the other side of the Andes, turned away his face that he might not seem even to concur in the sentence so justly executed. Carrera's ultimate purposes were variously regarded at the time, and have continued to exercise a wide ingenuity of conjecture among his countrymen. It seems to the present writer indubitable, that if Chile had yielded to the domination of his initia-

tive and assumed the impress of his personality, she would have become, under whatever specious euphemism, a monarchy. Applying to him the words of Daniel Webster, he possibly meant to exercise power usefully, but he meant to exercise it; he meant to govern well, but he meant to govern; he promised himself to be a kind master, but he meant to be master; he might have been a brilliant ruler, but he would have ruled alone. So Rózas thought, so O'Higgins felt, so San Martín concluded.

O'Higgins has been charged with the death of Carrera, as he was charged some years earlier with the assassination of Manuel Rodríguez, the hero of Colchagua, who had quieted the tumult of the Capital after the disastrous dispersion of the Chilean army at Cancha Rayada. Miguel Luis Amunátegui believed, and recorded his belief, that O'Higgins was guilty in both instances, in spite of extant documentary proof that not O'Higgins but the Lautaro Lodge decreed and enforced both the public execution of José Miguel Carrera, and the secret murder of Manuel Rodríguez, who was by far the most sympathetic figure of the Chilean Independence. O'Higgins's own abhorrence of the methods of this terrible tribunal may be inferred from the fact that henceforward its influence in the conduct of his administration becomes imperceptible if not entirely extinct.

However, the death of Carrera furnished a supply of ammunition to the enemies of O'Higgins,

who were not reluctant to use whatever weapon would serve them, and many of whom doubtless believed that the Director was unscrupulous enough to employ any means for the removal of his enemies. O'Higgins, conscious of his deserts as well as of the purity of his purposes, paid less attention to his enemies than they merited. The Ministry of Hacienda had been held by a number of incumbents, each of whom had failed to devise any adequate system of finance, and the Supreme Director now appointed to that office, which was become the most important in the administration, Don José Antonio Rodríguez-Aldea, a man of dubious antecedents, and of questionable integrity, whose malign influence over O'Higgins precipitated the disaster which was already hastening to overwhelm him. Rodríguez-Aldea was a fellow townsman of O'Higgins, but he had thrown in his lot with the royalist cause. He was the Auditor who had suggested to Gáinza the expedient by which that General, through the Treaty of Lircai, had extricated himself from an apparently impossible situation, and had been thereby enabled to maintain himself until Ossório came; it was probably Rodríguez-Aldea who had proposed the liberation of the Carreras from their imprisonment in order to introduce division into the army, and discord into the councils, of the patriots. He had also been dexterous enough to get himself appointed Attorney-General (Fiscal) by Ossório, and to remain in this very important position when Marcó became Gov-

error. It is true that he extended many favors to the Chileans who were suspected of the crime of patriotism, and it was alleged that he had betrayed the secrets of Marcó to the patriots beyond the Cordillera.

The ability of the new Minister might be denied, but his industry was indefatigable. He found the Treasury without funds and without credit. The capitalists refused to lend money to the government without the personal security of the individual officials. Meanwhile the salaries of these officials remained unpaid. Zenteno had, as we have seen, conducted the affairs of the navy so skillfully and so honestly that there had remained a balance to the government, which was paid into the general treasury as long as it was available, but with the fall of Lima in July, 1821, this little revenue stopped and the seamen clamored for their pay, while Lord Cochrane wrote threatening letters to O'Higgins, which made extremely disagreeable reading for that gentleman, who with the best will in the world, was absolutely unable to raise the necessary money. Rodríguez-Aldea, who was neither a financier nor an economist, succeeded where his predecessors had failed. He was called the Necker of the Chilean Treasury, but he more nearly resembled Calonne, for the money that filled the treasury was procured by the lavish gift, as a bonus for loans, of privileges, exemptions and monopolies to the new creditors, which, while procuring temporary relief, threatened the very ex-

istence of the republic. There were many men in Chile whose prevision easily detected the financial fallacy of the new minister, but O'Higgins had no feeling but gratitude for the agent who had released him from his immediate difficulties, and his former confidence in Rodríguez-Aldea was augmented by this service. This incident illustrates the essential weakness of O'Higgins. His generosity and patriotism were never questioned, but his political sagacity proved woefully inadequate on many important occasions. Impulsive and avid of glory as few men have been, he fell a ready victim to unworthy flatterers, and yielded a dishonorable compliance to the seductions of his new Minister.

Among those who recognized and denounced Rodríguez-Aldea as a dangerous charlatan, was his colleague in the Ministry, Don José Ignacio Zenteno. Rodríguez-Aldea struck at Zenteno through the Rear Admiral, Don Manuel Blanco-Encalada, who happened to be in Santiago, and whose patriotism at least might have been thought above attack since at Concepcion he had taken a Spanish fleet and led an army captive. But Blanco-Encalada also had severely criticised Rodríguez-Aldea's financial achievements, saying in effect that under such a system Chile would soon become worse than Turkey to live in. The remark was reported to Rodríguez-Aldea, who had the Admiral arrested on the charge of treason. Such an accusation, against so eminent a patriot,

urged by the late Attorney General of Marcó, was supremely absurd. It proved the exact truth of Blanco-Encalada's assertion. The case was at once dismissed, but Blanco-Encalada returned in disgust to his squadron in Valparaiso, while the utmost hostility ensued between Zenteno and Rodríguez-Aldea. O'Higgins, to quiet the acrimonious quarrels of his two cabinet Ministers, appointed the Minister of the Navy to the governorship of Valparaiso, and named the Minister of Hacienda as the Diplomatic Agent of Chile in Peru, each to preserve the portfolio of his Cabinet Ministry. Zenteno departed for Valparaiso but resigned from the Ministry, while Rodríguez-Aldea remained in Santiago and received the portfolio of War as it fell from the hands of Zenteno. Echeverría, the Minister of Foreign Relations, whom Vicuña-Mackenna declares to have been a man "of the most extraordinary mediocrity," was appointed to take over the direction of Naval affairs. Thus Rodríguez-Aldea dominated the government in all of its activities. There remained only one opponent whom he seemed unable to remove, to control, to corrupt, or to intimidate—General Ramon Freire, the Governor of the Province of Concepcion.

Four years had now elapsed since the project of a constitution quieted the popular clamor for an instrument which should acknowledge and confirm the independence of Chile, and during that time the freedom of the nation from foreign foes

had been secured by the expulsion of the last battalions of Spanish troops from Concepcion and Talcahuano, and by the fall of Lima. The Chileans had concurred in yielding obedience to the essentially military government of O'Higgins, but now they were beginning to feel that the enemy to their freedom was at home in Santiago, entrenched in power and supported by an army, and they were determined to have a Constitution. Since the fall of Lima, O'Higgins knew that such a demand was inevitable and would be irresistible, but he was loth to yield up his autocratic power, partly because it was so unquestionably delightful, but doubtless also because he thought himself the fittest person in Chile to rule the State. There is no question, too, but Rodríguez-Aldea clung to his delegated authority with a tenacity that had an immeasurable influence upon the Supreme Director. The Minister poured into the willing ear of his Chief assurances that he alone who had freed Chile could preserve her freedom, which under any other ruler must degenerate into either anarchy or despotism; that his duty to his country demanded his retention of office by all legitimate methods; that the blind multitude could not judge easily of their political needs, but were led by unscrupulous demagogues whose only purpose was self-advancement. O'Higgins listened to the fatal words of his flatterer and determined to silence the popular clamor by evading the popular demand. The road he was already familiar with, having traveled it

once before with a purer purpose. He issued a decree on May 7, 1822, calling for the election of delegates to a preparatory convention.

There was no law providing for the election of any representative body and no legislature that could formulate such a law. O'Higgins announced therefore in his decree of convocation, that each municipality in Chile should by a majority vote elect one representative or delegate to the Preparatory Convention. In this there was nothing improper or suspicious, but together with a copy of the decree which was sent to each municipality in the country, there went a note signed by the Supreme Director, containing the name of the delegate whom the government wished to be elected. Thus the elections were carried on, not by the free choice of the municipal bodies, but in the darkness and secrecy of the private apartment of Rodríguez-Aldea. Moreover, the minister intended that his command should be obeyed, for when the Cabildo of Valdivia had the temerity to pass over the name dictated to them and elect unanimously a resident of Valdivia by the name of Pineda, this gentleman was immediately arrested and imprisoned by the chief of the garrison and another meeting of the Cabildo was called which proved more tractable.

On July 23rd, 1822, the Supreme Director installed the Preparatory Convention with sufficient pomp, and after expressing his confidence in the result of their deliberations he placed in the hands

of their President, Ruiz-Tagle, a message containing his resignation as Supreme Director. The first official act of the Convention was to re-elect him by acclamation for a period that should be determined by the future Constitution. This was a pitiable farce, entirely unworthy of the character of Don Bernardo and entirely unnatural to him. The people of Chile were not represented by a single member. The Convention was packed and the whole of Chile knew it. The strings were too visible, the puppets too obedient to deceive any one. It is easy to recognize the hand of Rodríguez-Aldea; it has been affirmed, even by lukewarm admirers of O'Higgins, that the Supreme Director himself was one of the puppets; but no sophistry and no excuse can materially mitigate the pain with which we read the lamentable burlesque in which Don Bernardo O'Higgins played such an ignoble rôle. Fortunately for him, a different occasion was soon to show him in his true character, when the cowardly satellites of his power slunk from his side and left him standing alone before the people of Chile.

This incompetent Convention derived its powers from the decree of the Director and immediately transcended them, by proceeding to the consideration and adoption of a Constitution for the Republic. This Constitution was received with derision, for the people were in no mood to respect such an irregular and invalid instrument. A Constitution, however excellent, was not now the press-

ing need; the people were determined first of all to get rid of their Director, whose transparent subterfuge had exasperated them beyond endurance, for they saw in his conduct a menace to the State. To be sure, the new Constitution limited the term of the Supreme Director to six years which, at the expiration of that period, might be increased by four additional years, but even if the Constitution had been of valid origin, it was little suited to the demands of the country. It is not quite the exact truth that O'Higgins had become personally objectionable to Chile; he was not the real object of attack, it was the system under which an irresponsible Ministry could so abuse its authority as to become a source of danger. But O'Higgins was a part of this system and must share its fate. For six years they had generously entrusted him with their fortunes, their lives and the welfare of their country, without a guaranty on his part and almost without a murmur on theirs. He had respected that trust. Without limitations to his power, he had preserved their rights; without guaranties given or required, he had added glorious pages to the nation's annals. But the future must be safeguarded, and Don Bernardo had deceived their hopes and baffled their efforts, through the undignified machinations of an unscrupulous favorite.

Don Ramon Freire has from time to time appeared incidentally in these pages, but without disclosing, and without himself suspecting, that his

destiny was to succeed O'Higgins as Supreme Director of Chile. For nearly the whole period of O'Higgins' rule, General Freire had been in command of the province of Concepcion, and had been occupied in the protracted and discouraging effort to suppress the lawless and ferocious followers of Benavides and Pico, who when threatened, concealed themselves in the inaccessible woods of the Cordillera, or among the unsubdued Araucans, and when their immediate peril had passed, resumed their ravages and depredations on the plains below and on the cities of the plains. These bandits pursued simple rules; they burned every house, hamlet or town they captured, they killed the men and the children, and the women and cattle they carried off to their mountain fastnesses. They took no prisoners but women, and gave no quarter to any one. Benavides had at different times a thousand men under him, well-armed and well mounted, and did not hesitate to give battle to Freire himself. The Chilean forces were necessarily distributed as garrisons among the cities and forts of the province, and Benavides even captured the city of Concepcion and held it for weeks, against all the attempts that General Freire could make to recover it. In such a state of the province, the planting and raising of crops was impracticable, and the army was dependant for its supplies of food as well as of clothing and ammunition, on the Central government. So long as Zenteno was in charge of the War Department,

these supplies were sent with regularity, but when Rodríguez-Aldea supplanted him, the army was left to starve. In vain Freire wrote again and again that the soldiers went literally naked, and could not leave their barracks except under cover of night; that the residents of the whole province were starving to death, and that he was without powder even for the muskets of the soldiers. With tears in his eyes and rage in his heart, he implored the Minister to send him flour and powder at least, to enable the people to live and the garrison to repel attack,—Rodríguez-Aldea finally sent him powder and some corn, but the corn was insufficient, and when the powder barrels were opened, they were found to be filled with sawdust. The flaming remonstrances of General Freire at this inconceivable barbarity were directed to Don Bernardo, but they were answered by Rodríguez-Aldea; Don Bernardo never saw them. The line of endurance had been crossed; Freire took a vessel for Valparaiso with part of his army and the rest marched for the Capital by way of Chillan and Talca. All the southern province was in a flame of insurrection.

Meanwhile affairs in Santiago were also approaching a crisis. Early in January the details of Rodríguez-Aldea's iniquities were laid before the Supreme Director, who refused to believe them. Still his confidence in his Minister was shaken and, on the exhibition of convincing proof of the allegations, he dismissed Rodríguez-Aldea on the 7th

of January (1823). With the fall of the favorite, fell also the whole system of spoliation that he had built up, and his clerks and dependants, the army contractors and the farmers of the revenue, the jobbers and the discounters, scurried away into terrified obscurity. The accounts of his office disclosed a conspiracy of robbery that was beyond belief, but that never for a moment, in the suspicions of his worst enemies, involved the reputation of Don Bernardo, whose humiliation at this proof of the betrayal of his confidence was extreme.

With the fall of the favorite, the confidence of the people in their Director seemed to revive, but his faith in himself had received a severe blow in the recent disclosures. On the 16th, he decided to relinquish his office by a voluntary and absolute resignation, and he wrote Freire in Concepcion that he would appoint him as his successor until the will of the people could be effectually ascertained. He still considered valid the election made by the Preparatory Convention of 1822, which had named him Director for a term of six years, but he had made up his mind to yield up the office to Freire as soon as he could reach the Capital; the Constitution, under which his own powers were continued, giving him the right to name his successor. Freire was recently become a member of the Lautaro Lodge. But the leaders in Santiago, though they and the whole country concurred in the nomination of General Freire, were fixed in the resolve, to put

an immediate end to the present government, and on the 28th of January, Infante, Eyzaguirre and Errázuriz, with the Cabildo and the representatives of the important families of the Capital, convened in the Bishop's Palace and summoned Don Bernardo to a Cabildo Abierto.

Don Bernardo refused to obey the summons. He had made up his mind to resign, but he wanted to resign in his own way, and he resented the appearance of compulsion that the summons implied. A commission composed of his intimate friends was requested by the Cabildo Abierto to invite him to the Bishop's Palace.

"If they wish to speak with me," he replied, "let them come to me. I am not subject to the beck and whim of a pack of café-waiters and street boys."

The commission returned and were then directed by the Cabildo Abierto to induce Don Bernardo's mother and sister to intercede with him, as if he were another Coriolanus. They refused to do so. The Cabildo Abierto was now at a perfect stand. They were without means to compel the presence of Don Bernardo, or even to discover what his intentions might be. The garrison of the Capital, consisting of a regiment of Lancers, of a park of artillery well equipped and commanded, and of the Body Guard of the Director, was known to be completely under Don Bernardo's control, if an appeal to arms became necessary;

but the Cabildo had no intention to resort to armed force, and if they had had an army they would not have determined to use it. Still Don Bernardo's irascible disposition was well-known, and many of those present in the Bishop's Palace would gladly have retired and left the solution to chance or to Don Bernardo's decision, but Eyzaguirre and Infante were resolute to come to an immediate understanding with Don Bernardo, and withstood the dissolution of the Cabildo. Finally Cruz and Pereira, two of the officers of the city troops, were sent to represent to O'Higgins the necessity of his presence and to impress upon him the respectable character of the Cabildo. To their solicitations he finally yielded, and accompanied by the two officers, proceeded to the Palace, where the Cabildo Abierto awaited his presence.

It was now about six o'clock in the afternoon. The heat of the day was passing, the sun was descending in the West, and a feverish impatience pervaded the Cabildo. Don Bernardo entered the hall alone, and passed slowly through the throng that filled it, until he had reached the head of the room, when he turned about and faced them. Dignified and unperturbed, he stood for a moment and glanced over the assembly.

"What is the occasion of this meeting, and why was I summoned to attend?" he asked. A profound silence followed the question. Respect, admiration, gratitude for his great services, filled

every heart. Again, in the same assured voice, he put the same question and again awaited a response.

Egaña replied, at length,

“We all esteem and respect the Supreme Director as sons esteem and respect their father. We have called Your Excellency hither that we may together take counsel for the welfare of the State, and I, animated with the sentiments I have ascribed to all, venture to declare that it has become necessary for Your Excellency to resign his office.”

“If I resign my office,” responded Don Bernardo, in the same quiet tone, “I must do so before a body which represents the Nation, and this meeting seems not in any way to hold such representation.”

“That is true,” said Infante, “but the people of the Capital alone regard themselves as still under Your Excellency’s authority, and we have decided upon a change in the personnel of the Government of the Nation.”

“But,” rejoined Don Bernardo, without losing his composure at this brusque intimation, “I still fail to recognize the Nation in this very respectable assembly. What you do to-day the Nation may refuse to-morrow to ratify.”

The purpose of the assembly wavered under the imposing presence of Don Bernardo, and its members looked at one another in uncertainty. They forgot that this question had been decided upon by them beforehand, and they were thrown into con-

fusion by the calm reasoning of Don Bernardo. Here was no question of violence but of discussion and argument. Here, not force but reason must prevail. Errázuriz saw the hesitancy of his associates and said quickly,

"Concepcion and Coquimbo have declared their decision. They are not indeed here in direct representation, but we may safely assume under the circumstances to represent them. By yielding to us then, Your Excellency yields up your command into the hands of the Nation."

"I am in no wise intimidated by the action of Concepcion and Coquimbo, and may safely guarantee to preserve the Capital from their attack if necessary," replied Don Bernardo. "I shall expect to vindicate the office which I hold and exact the respect that is due to it."

"Do not deceive yourself," said Errázuriz, firmly, "the entire Republic requires Your Excellency to resign your office without delay."

The energy of Errázuriz had by this time roused the flagging will of his associates. Don Bernardo saw the effect of these words on the assembly. Fear fell from them, their forms became suddenly erect, every face was raised, and their eyes were filled with determination as they confronted his own. He read a challenge in the faces of the assembly. Taking a step forward he asked, haughtily,

"Who has authorized you to make such a demand upon me?"

But the assembly had regained all their courage. In a moment, by a universal impulse, they surged toward him, shouting,

“All! All of us! All!”

Don Bernardo saw their threatening faces and misunderstood their intent. He thought they were going to murder him, but he did not flinch and made no motion to defend himself from their onset, though his sword hung as usual at his side.

“Come, if you will,” he called, in a voice that rang over their heads and was heard in the plaza, “Come! I am not afraid. I disregard death to-day as I have always disregarded it on the field of battle.”

At that word the crowd recoiled as if every man had received a blow. Back upon itself it crushed, baffled and beaten. A breathless pause ensued. Don Bernardo was again the hero of Chacabuco. They felt as if their hands had been restrained from committing a sacrilege. And indeed with the violent access of sudden passion, they might have killed him without having intended his death. They shrank back as far as the mass of their associates would permit, appalled, as from a sudden gulf.

O’Higgins regained his composure in a moment. He knew now that he controlled the situation, but he knew also that the only use he could make of it was to resign.

“Since you represent the Nation,” he said quietly, “let us come to an understanding; but first

let the room be cleared of all unnecessary persons."

By this time the sun had set, and the early darkness began to invade the hall. In the patio without, the people were grouped about the doors and windows, and the voices of the Director and of the self-constituted commission were easily heard. Not a sound came into the hall from without; anxiety and suspense reigned.

"Now," resumed Don Bernardo, "that you assume, without credentials or other visible proof of authority, to speak for the Republic of Chile, tell me what it is that you intend to do, or rather tell me what you wish me to do."

Don José Maria Guzman, the Intendente of Santiago, answered,

"In order that there may be no question as to our credentials, I have to acknowledge to Your Excellency that, whatever other authority we might rightfully claim, we, who are here assembled in this apartment and in the patio without, are in reality nothing more than the people of the city of Santiago,—but I for one had the honor to be present at the *Cabildo Abierto*, which on the 16th of February, 1817, elected Your Excellency Supreme Director of Chile, and that assembly was far less numerous and representative than the one which now requests your abdication."

Don Bernardo could make no reply. He was conquered. He walked to the table and removed the ribbon from his chest and laid down

his staff of office. Then he turned to them and said:

“I regret that I may not lay down the insignia of my office before the National Assembly from which a few months ago I last received it, and I regret still more that I may not bring to completion the projects that I have meditated for the good of my country; but I leave her free from foreign domination or invasion, respected abroad, and at home covered with glory from her victories on land and sea. From this moment I am a simple citizen of Chile. It may be that during the years in which I held chief command, the respect due to my person or at least to my high office, has silenced complaint or shortened the reach of justice. Let such accusers now step forward and speak without impediment. What wrongs have I done, whose tears have I made to flow? I speak not now of the wrongs we have all suffered, of the tears we have shed together, of the evils that war and disaster have inflicted on every Chilean, but of those which my own evil passions may have caused. If any such have just cause of accusation against me, let them speak, and though I am so poor that nothing remains to me but the blood in my veins, I will pay them in that coin if any accuse me.”

At once a great shout went up in which the people of the patio joined:

“We have nothing against O’Higgins. Vive O’Higgins!” and then, a wonderful thing! the

shout suddenly died, and the voice of weeping filled the assembly.

O'Higgins was profoundly moved. He could not utter another word. He passed out of the apartment, through the patio and into the street. A throng of people followed him to his own door in silent honor and love. The morning sun as it rose above the eastern Cordillera, found many of them still standing at the entrance through which he had disappeared.

With the demission of Don Bernardo O'Higgins, the freedom of Chile was finally assured. The dread of personal despotism was expelled in 1823, as the dread of Peninsular domination had been expelled in 1818 at Maipo. Not that Don Bernardo was a despot, nor that his successor, Don Ramon Freire, could have become one; but the Constitution of 1823 formed an effectual barrier to any irregular attempt to impose on Chile the will of an autocrat, such as Prieto or some other ambitious egotist would have aspired, without such a barrier, to become. The people of Chile were just and generous. They were lacking in neither justice nor generosity toward O'Higgins in 1823, nor toward Freire, when, in 1830, he also was compelled to abandon his country and depart into exile. During these difficult years, Chile was struggling to find herself. The country was divided for a time between various theories of government; between the single Chief Magistrate of a

Centralized Union, or a Junta in which the three provinces of Santiago, Concepcion and Coquimbo should represent the confederated authority of a divided Nation. Many Constitutions and Projects of Constitution were elaborated by successive Congresses, until Don Diego Portáles succeeded, in 1833, in establishing the equilibrium of the Republic upon the basis of an oligarchy, a skilful compromise to which is due the subsequent stability of the Republic.

“Never was a country worse prepared for a republican mode of government than Spanish America,” said Amunátegui. Even the great men who led them to independence had, with the exception of Rózas, little faith in the capacity of their countrymen for self government. Bolívar was a patriot but not a republican. His continuous hope was to establish Presidencies for life in each of the five countries from whose necks he had assisted in striking off the Spanish yoke. Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolívia being thus, as he dreamed, governed by his creatures, his path to the Empire of all seemed clear. It is probable that in the famous interview between Bolívar and San Martin in Guayaquil,—famous rather from the conjectures that arose as to its character than from any knowledge of it that has ever been made public—the opinions of these great men clashed fatally on this one question. Bolívar’s purpose was not then entirely concealed, and has been amply illuminated by a care-

ful study of his words and of his subsequent actions. San Martin alluded to Bolívar's idea on a later occasion when he said, "We could never obey as a Sovereign a man with whom we had smoked cigars in camp."

That San Martin, in this interview with Bolívar, despaired of the future of popular government among the people of Spanish America, and concurred in the purpose of Buenos Ayres to invite a European prince to ascend the throne that the Argentines were anxious to erect for him, was admitted later by Bolívar himself, who derided the scheme, saying, "A European King in America would have none but frogs for his subjects."

In Mexico, Don Augustin Iturbide assumed the rank and power of Emperor soon after the rule of Spain was destroyed, and Mexico seems never to have entirely thrown off the imperial obsession.

In Chile we may only conjecture what purpose of personal grandeur was formed in the mind of José Miguel Carrera, for misfortune and defeat had filled his heart with *saeva indignatio* and had destroyed his career long before the murderer's bullet put an end to his life; but Don Bernardo O'Higgins attempted to prolong his power beyond all desirable limits, and was constrained to abdicate his office and live out his days in exile. "The ingratitude of the people," muttered O'Higgins, as he left Valparaiso for Lima. "The ingratitude of the people," said Bolívar, when on the 29th of April, 1830, his dictatorship came to an

end with the promulgation of a new Constitution and the election of Mosquera as President; and he added bitterly. "Our independence is the only thing we have achieved at the cost of everything else." San Martin wrote the same gloomy reflection to O'Higgins from the little farm in Mendoza, where, only five years after the battle of Maipo, he lived in poverty, already neglected if not forgotten. "Gratitude," he wrote, "is a private, not a public virtue."

But the people were wiser, wiser with the wisdom of unconscious intuition; wiser for themselves, for their country and for the fame and splendor of their heroes. It was necessary for the people to acquire the experience in politics that would fit them for self-government. The state could not, with dignity and moral profit, continue to be governed by individuals rendered irresponsible by prestige or gratitude. As to the heroes themselves, their work was done, and only time could mature, consolidate and perfect it. Moreover, their memory has become dearer and their luster brighter from the unmerited humiliation that obscured their last earthly years, and which has added something like the glory of martyrdom to the splendor of virtue.

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