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The Hundred Years War (Part III)

Further Considerations

Edited by L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay

BRILL

The Hundred Years War
(Part III)

History of Warfare

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Anne Curry is Professor of Medieval History at the University of Southampton where she is also Dean of the Faculty of Humanities. She has published widely on the Hundred Years War, especially on the fifteenth-century phase, including Agincourt, and was also editor of the Henry VI section of the Parliament Rolls of Medieval England. She was co-director of the AHRC-project, *The Soldier in Later Medieval England*.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.R.	Archives générales du royaume
A.V.B.	Archives de la ville de Bruxelles
A.V.L.	Archives de la ville de Louvain
ACA	Archivo de la Corona de Aragón
AGN	*Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*
AN	Archives Nationales
ASF	Archivio di Stato di Firenze
ASV	Archivio Segreto Vaticano
B.C.R.H.	Bulletin de la commission d'histoire
B.E.C.	Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes
BL	British Library
BNB	*Biographie nationale de Belgique*
BPR	*Black Prince's Register*
C.B.	Chartes de Brabant
C.C.	Chambre des Comptes
CCF	*Chronicon* in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae sub auspiciis Leopoldi Primi serenissimi Belgarum regis*
CCR	*Calendar of Close Rolls*
CDS	*Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland Preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office*
CFR	*Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office*
CIM	*Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous* (*Chancery*)*, Henry III-Henry V*
CPR	*Calendar of Patent Rolls*
DKR	*Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records*
EHR	*English Historical Review*
JBS	*Journal of British Studies*
JHS	*Journal of Historical Sociology*
JMH	*Journal of Medieval History*
JMMH	*Journal of Medieval Military History*
Laughter	*Laughter for the Devil,* trans. Redinald Hyatte
LF	*Livre des Fais de bon messire Jean II le Meingre, dit Boucicaut*
N.B.W.	*Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek*

PGBR	*Procés de Gilles de Rais,* ed. George Bataille
PPC	*Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England*
PRO	Public Record Office
PROME	*The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504*
R	Registro
R.B.P.H.	*Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*
RIS	*Rerum Italicarum Scriptore*s
SR	*Statutes of the Realm*
TNA	The National Archive
Trial	*Trial of Gilles de Rais*

INTRODUCTION

The current volume is composed of sixteen articles by authors from the United States, Britain, and the Low Countries; it is the third in a series exploring the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) published in the Brill History of Warfare Series over the course of the last decade.[1] In compiling these three volumes, the editors have attempted to achieve a balance between traditional concerns of Hundred Years War historians and new directions the field has been taking; focusing especially on the question how best to view the larger conflict.

On the one hand, we have tried to gather articles that display new and innovative research relevant to the core struggle between England and France, a struggle fought out primarily on French territory. Three of these articles focus on one of the most important battles of the long conflict, that of Agincourt (October 25, 1415), and the psychological toll it had on the French populace.[2] Several take as their subject French and English leaders who played important roles in the military drama.[3] Still others deal with the high price English and French cities paid to support the decades-long conflict and to avert its worst consequences.[4] Several essays discuss how women of different classes experienced the war.[5] A few focus on the various ways English rulers funded the conflict and accumulated necessary supplies.[6] Finally, a number take as their subjects the various weapons

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[1] *Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus* [hereafter *HYWWF*], ed. by L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2004) and *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas* [hereafter *HYWII*], ed. by L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008).

[2] Clifford J. Rogers, "Henry V's Military Strategy in 1415," *HYWWF*, 399-427; idem, "The Battle of Agincourt," *HYWII*, 37-129; Megan Cassidy-Welch, "Grief and Memory After the Battle of Agincourt," *HYWII*, 133-50.

[3] Dana L. Sample, "Philip VI's Mortal Enemy: Robert of Artois and the Beginning of the Hundred Years War," *HYWII*, 261-84; Steven Muhlberger, "The Combat of Thirty Against Thirty: An Example of Medieval Chivalry?" *HYWII*, 285-94; Richard Vernier, "The Afterlife of a Hero: Bertrand du Guesclin Imagined," *HYWII*, 329-41.

[4] Peter M. Konieczny, "London's War Effort during the Early Years of the Reign of Edward III," *HYWWF*, 243-60; Paul Solon, "*Tholosanna Fides*: Toulouse as a Military Actor in Late Medieval France," in *HYWWF*, 263-94.

[5] James E. Gilbert, "A Medieval 'Rosie the Riveter'? Women in France and Southern England during the Hundred Years War," *HYWWF*, 333-61; "Jane Marie Pinzino, "Just War, Joan of Arc, and the Politics of Salvation," *HYWWF*, 365-96.

[6] Ilana Krug, "Purveyance and Peasants at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War: Maddicot Reexamined," *HYWII*, 345-65; Wendy J. Turner, "Mental Incapacity and the Financing of War in Medieval England," *HYWII*, 387-402.

used on Hundred Years War battlefields and precisely how they were wielded.[7] Together, these works shed new light on the Anglo-French conflict that engages most Hundred Years War historians.

At the same time, we have selected other essays that reflect our view of the Hundred Years War as a struggle that ultimately transcended its Anglo-French roots to become a far wider European struggle, with spillover not only into the adjacent Low Countries, but across the Pyrenees into Iberia, across the Alps into Italy, and eastward into Central Europe. While this extended geographical focus was most prevalent in the first volume, it has remained a significant theme pursued by the editor's throughout all three; a theme nicely summed up by the title of Kelly DeVries' leadoff article in Volume Two—"The Hundred Years Wars: Not One But Many." [8] In keeping with the view of the war as more than a conflict between England and France, our first two volumes contain articles that explore the different theatres and how they relate to the better-known struggle being carried out largely on French soil. Several center on the conflict in the Low Countries.[9] A substantial number deal with Iberian struggles of the fourteenth century that came to play an increasingly significant role in the Hundred Years War.[10] Others concentrate on Italy as a theater of operations that throughout the second half of the fourteenth century witnessed the

[7] Kelly De Vries, "'The Walls Come Tumbling Down': The Campaigns of Philip the Good and the Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder Weapons," *HYWWF*, 429-46; John Clements, "Wielding the Weapons of War: Arms, Armor, and Training Manuals during the Later Middle Ages," *HYWWF*, 447-75; David Whetham, "The English Longbow: A Revolution in Technology?" *HYWII*, 213-32; Russel Mitchell, "The Longbow-Crossbow Shootout at Crécy (1346): Has the 'Rate of Fire Commonplace' Been Overstated," *HYWII*, 233-57.

[8] See Kelly DeVries, "The Hundred Years Wars: Not One But Many," *HYWII,* 3-32.

[9] Sergio Boffa, "The Duchy of Brabant Caught between France and England: Geopolitics and Diplomacy during the First Half of the Hundred Years War," *HYWWF*, 211-37; Kelly De Vries, "'The Walls Come Tumbling Down," *HYWWF*, 429-46; L. B. Ross, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Visions of Burgundy, France, and England in the Oeuvres of Georges Chastellain," HYWII, 367.

[10] L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera," *HYWWF*, 3-70; idem, "Cut Off Their Heads, or I'll Cut Off Yours": Castilian Strategy and Tactics in the War of the Two Pedros and the Supporting Evidence from Murcia," *HYWII*, 153-82; Donald J. Kagay, "A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362-1363) as Military Financier," *HYWWF*, 117-48; idem, "The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366)," *HYWII*, 185-208; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "The Southern Valencian Frontier during the War of the Two Pedros," *HYWWF*, 75-115; Clara Estow, "War and Peace in Medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan Relations in the Mid-Fourteenth Century," *HYWWF*, 151-73; Manuel Sánchez Martínez, "The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona," *HYWWF*, 297-329.

arrival of mercenary manpower spawned by the conflict north of the mountains.[11]

The current volume continues the intellectual trajectories established in the first two. Like the others, it attempts not only to look at much-studied aspects of the Hundred Years War from fresh vantage points, but also to broaden the overall view of this long struggle to take in geographical regions as well as subjects that have not previously received adequate attention. The reader will ultimately determine to what extent we have succeeded.

The first section entitled "Sources" introduces the *Medieval Soldier Project* that has produced an important new research tool available online. Pioneered by English scholars, including leaders in the field such as Anne Curry and Adrian Bell, it consists of a massive data base that lays out the service records of Englishmen of all ranks during the period from 1369 through 1453. The article describes the background of the project, discusses the source materials used in compiling the database, and draws on that database to present a number of case studies. These include soldiers like Robert de Fishlake who came up through the ranks from archer to man-at-arms; William Clifford, an important magnate on the Scottish frontier who trod expertly between rebellion and royal service to emerge as on the region's important captains; and Owain Glyndwr, a descendant of a Welsh princely line who used his experience in the armies of Edward III (r. 1327-1377) to mount a serious revolt against his English masters during the reign of the first Lancastrian king, Henry IV (r. 1399-1413). Such vignettes suggest how important the *Medieval Soldier Project* (www.medievalsoldier.org) will be for writing the military history of late-medieval England.

The second section of the book—"War Leaders: Good and Evil"—presents five articles that view military commanders, all of whom in one way or another played a substantial role in the Hundred Years War. While some of the war leaders discussed saw most of their action on the battlefields of France, others functioned farther afield; in Italy, Spain, and as far away as the Ottoman Empire.

Christopher Candy deals with the cadre of knights that served Edward III as both court functionaries and trusted military agents. These household knights were crucial for the English monarch, not primarily because of the number of soldiers they brought to royal expeditions, but because Edward

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[11] William P. Caferro, "'The Fox and the Lion': The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy," *HYWWF*, 179-205; idem, "John Hawkwood: Florentine Hero and Faithful Englishman," *HYWII*, 295-326.

could always rely on the services of their smaller retinues. Besides their military role, such men served the king as garrison commanders, law enforcement agents, and even judges. In return, Edward III rewarded his household knights with lands and titles in England, Ireland, and France. In effect, what these men gave Edward were "middle-managers" from all across the kingdom who could help direct military and administrative institutions that were beginning to expand on the eve of the Hundred Years War.

Donald Kagay discusses the key military figures who held center stage in a lengthy Iberian struggle, the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366), that merged into the Hundred Years War. The two principals in this military drama were Pere III of Aragon (r.1336-1387) and Pedro I of Castile (1350-1366/1367-1369). According to Kagay, over the course this struggle, their difference leadership styles became readily apparent. Although the Aragonese monarch had overseen earlier conflicts stretching from Majorca to Sardinia, he had almost no battlefield experience. Consequently, in the first years of the Iberian war, he held back from personal engagement. By contrast, the Castilian king showed himself to be an audacious general who was clearly "battle willing" and proved it on numerous occasions. In the last years of the struggle, however, the roles were reversed. Pere burned to prove himself in battle while the once audacious Pedro avoided every confrontation. Kagay analyzes the martial attitudes of both men and then explores the causes for this striking change. He concludes that Pere took to the battlefield in an effort to prove himself worthy of his great reconquest ancestor, Jaume I (r.1214-1276) while Pedro, on the other hand, shunned battle from a growing suspicion of his own troops.

William Caferro continues his discussion begun in earlier volumes of English soldiers who left the conflict in northern Europe and moved to Italy where they served the Italian states of the 1360s as mercenaries, thereby changing the nature of warfare on the peninsula. In this essay, his focus lies primarily on one such English nobleman, Hugh Dispenser, whose tour of duty in Italy may well have played a role in the creation of the contemporary English poem, *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*. As Caferro demonstrates, this was the period that witnessed the introduction into Italian warfare of the cavalry formation known as the lance. While initially utilized only by the English in Florentine employ, the lance would soon be imitated throughout the peninsula first by mercenaries, later by native Italian forces.

The two remaining essays in this section deal with a pair of French heroes of the Hundred Years War and the very different reputations they

left to posterity. David Hoornstra discusses the military career of Jean II le Meingre who, like his father before him, bore the famous nickname of *Boucicaut*. Using in particular the contemporary "Book of Deeds" (*Livre des Fais*), a biographical account apparently commissioned by Boucicaut's supporters, Hoornstra follows the great hero's professional life from his apprenticeship, to his service as a captain for his boyhood friend, Charles VI of France (r.1380-1422), to his involvement in the ill-fated crusade that led to the disastrous defeat at Nicopolis in 1396, to his appointment as governor of Genoa in 1401 that thoroughly immersed the old soldier in Italian and especially papal politics, to his final service on the losing side at the battle of Agincourt (1415) and his death as an un-ransomed prisoner of the English in 1421. For many, Boucicaut represents what was best in French chivalry.

By contrast, there is the second hero, Gille de Rais (1404-1440. Elena Odio treats the career of this French soldier who "shadowed" Joan of Arc through much of her short, but successful career, but who could not prevent her capture at Compiègne in 1429. As Odio demonstrates, less is known about Gilles's military accomplishments than the disastrous turn in his private life that eventually led to his execution. After Joan's death in the early 1430s, this experienced soldier withdrew from the battlefield and engaged in a series of kidnappings and gruesome child murders that eventually gained for him the sobriquet "Bluebeard." Despite, or perhaps because of his evil end, Gilles gained a far greater notoriety that his older contemporary, Boucicaut.

The third division of this work, "The War's Effect on English Regions," traces the impact of the Hundred Years War on English lands that never witnessed the conflict first hand. Daniel Franke explores the military and naval effect of the conflict's early campaigns on both the economy and manpower of two East Anglian counties, Norfolk and Suffolk. He shows that the greatest influence these English efforts had on the region derived from the gathering of supplies through a broad-based purveyance and the steady confiscation of ships to serve as military transport. According to Franke, the role of East Anglia as a supplier of troops for the war in France seems to have been less pronounced than other regions, due primarily to a lack of powerful magnates with well-established affinities. His appendix of logistical operations between 1334 and 1340 is valuable for a deeper understanding of the scale of purveyance in East Anglia during the opening years of the conflict.

Adam Chapman, a member of the *Medieval Soldier Project*, explores the relationship of England to its first great conquest, Wales. Utilizing a wide

variety of sources, including Welsh poetry, he delineates the military role that the region and its inhabitants played in the conflict with France. Although the presence of Welsh archers in English armies extended back at least into the twelfth century, following the conquest of northern Wales in 1282, the numbers of Welshmen increased greatly as Edward I and his son, Edward II (1307-1337), stepped up recruitment for their invasion of Scotland. By the onset of the Hundred Years War in the reign of Edward III, such men had become an integral part of the kingdom's war machine. Chapman's article explores not only the impact of Welsh soldiers on England's wars, but also the effects these wars had on Welsh society. According to the author, the extensive presence of Welsh archers was due at least in part to the fact that the relatively poor economy of Wales was inadequate to support an expanding population, making the region "better equipped to provide inexpensive soldiers in quantity rather than supplying a small number of highly qualified men." Although the total number of Welsh soldiers may have fallen off after mid-century due to the rising costs of soldiering in smaller, but better equipped armies the English were putting into the field, English service continued to be essential for the training of Welsh leaders, including Owain Glyndwr whose lengthy rebellion against the first Lancastrian king was instructed by lessons he had learned when fighting against the French. Throughout the conflict, whatever their numbers, Welshmen had few compunctions about "taking the king's shilling" for service in English armies, but never lost their national identity with such activities.

In the fourth section, "English Colonialism," David Green argues that in some respects, the Hundred Years War was a colonial conflict that exhibited the same hallmarks as later colonial struggles. Green shows that England's experience of expansion within the British Isles—in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland—stood the kingdom in good stead for its efforts across the channel. In conquering and governing this medieval imperium—what Green refers to as "the first English empire"—the island kingdom faced a wide variety of legal, cultural, and political traditions, social customs, and languages, necessitating different approaches to governing the different regions. Upon occasion, when its rule became too heavy-handed, England faced colonial revolts in Wales, Ireland, and Aquitaine. Nevertheless, when all was said and done, the inhabitants of these territories, like colonists of a later age, were long joined in their subjection to the crown of England and its monarchs. For Green, the defeat of English arms in 1453 "not only put an end to the Plantagenet's Angevin ambitions in France, it also nearly broke the First English Empire."

Anne Curry focuses her attention on England's administration of Henry V's first conquest in 1415, the city of Harfleur. She portrays Henry's government of the city as having passed through several phases. During the first year after Harfleur's surrender, Henry moved to make it into another Calais by funding a strong garrison, repairing urban fortifications, and making the site an important English entrepot. But as the royal warrior extended his military activities further afield, eventually conquering the entire province of Normandy, including the principal cities of Caen and Rouen, Harfleur lost much of its administrative importance, a fact signaled by the progressive reduction of its garrison. Despite this decline in political importance, Harfleur retained a unique relationship to England as Henry V's first conquest in France, a distinction that contributed to the town's identity even after it came back under French control in 1450.

Philip Morgan views the Hundred Years war through the lens of a largely forgotten documentary source, a household account left by Thomas, Lord Morley (c. 1354-1415) not long after the battle of Agincourt. Having briefly outlined how the English crown raised its late medieval armies and sketched in Morley's military career that began in the mid-1370s and ended with his death in 1416, Morgan focuses on this fragmentary roll of eleven folios that dates to Lord Morley's final year. The revealing document records in considerable detail military expenditures involved in raising the retinue that accompanied him on what would become his last journey across the channel to joint Henry V in Calais. Comparing the retinue records of John Strother (1374) and Hugh Hastings (1380), as well as those associated with John of Gaunt's expedition to Spain (1385) with those of Morley three decades later, Morgan concludes that money payments rather than personal bonds increasingly underpinned recruitment for service both in England and on foreign campaigns. The article as well as the document that accompanies it help gauge just what it cost an important English captain "going to the wars."

In the fifth section–"Fiscal, Psychological, and 'Scientific' Aspects of the War"–Sean McGlynn examines the use of terror as a calculated tactic in medieval warfare, focusing in particular on the so-called *chevauchée*, a swift ravaging "designed to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy through the destruction of his resources." His article centers on one of the most famous such expeditions in medieval history, what is often called the Grand Chevauchée of 1355 that the Black Prince unleashed on southern France. Far from being random, the prince's actions were calculated acts of terror meant to intimidate and paralyze the French. In achieving this goal, he gave little or no thought to the sufferings of non-combatants.

McGlynn argues that while acquiring booty was an important consideration, especially to the common soldier whose infliction of torture was largely to uncover hidden possessions, the chief end of the *chevauchée* was to cow the population. Nevertheless, any desire the prince might have entertained to frighten the inhabitants into changing their allegiance proved illusory; consequently, this terrible English attack had little lasting effect.

Wendy Turner focuses her attention on one unusual solution explored by an English monarch, Henry VI (r.1422-1461/1470-1471), as a possible means of meeting the fiscal crisis brought on by the seemingly endless conflict with France—the practice of alchemy to turn base metals into precious ones. Throughout the last decades of his life, Henry, who suffered recurrent fits of madness, studied this subject against which his progenitors had passed laws, gave royal licenses to a number of would-be practitioners, and formed several commissions staffed by his doctors, important London merchants, and ecclesiastical leaders, all charged with investigating "the truth of alchemy." Turner shows that despite their lack of success, the alchemists of the fifteenth century laid the groundwork for those who followed under the Tudor Dynasty and, by extension, the development of a true science of chemistry in seventeenth century England.

The sixth section, "Royal Pardons," explores two different ways in which the crowns of England and France exercised the royal power to pardon crime during the Hundred Years War. Andrew Villalon focuses on the development of English military pardons issued during the reign of Edward III that excused any number of civilian crimes, however heinous, in return for military service already rendered or to be rendered in the future by the perpetrator. Using an old source, the extensive *Calendar of Patent Rolls* that has recently been uploaded onto the internet, Villalon explores royal patents conveying such pardons in two critical periods—the years 1346-1347 that witnessed the battles of Crécy and the siege of Calais and 1360-1361, when the treaties of Brétigny and Calais were being drawn up. Such patents of pardon were granted either individually or in "pardon clusters" in which a number of men, in one case well over a thousand, would receive the same benefits for fulfilling their military duty. Most such pardons for "good service" forgave acts of violence, though non-violent acts could also be pardoned. Even though Parliament repeatedly complained about the issuance of military pardons as the source of escalating violence back home, Edward III never abandoned their use and, in fact, employed them throughout his reign as a way of encouraging military service and gaining funds from those who wished to avoid it. Villalon's essay is accompanied by an extensive

appendix providing numerous examples of England's use of royal pardons in this period.

Aleksandra Pfau investigates pardons conferred by the French monarchy on individuals, most of them civilians, who committed crimes as a result of madness brought on by the war. While raising the question of whether or not post-traumatic stress disorder may have existed in medieval warfare, Pfau primarily looks at those who committed offenses as their own century would have viewed them, arriving at this through an extensive documentary base of what were called *lettres de remission* (the French term for a royal pardon). Through these letters, she is able to focuses on a number of villagers and peasants who suffered great losses due to the war and then committed crimes, including suicide, that they or their survivors argued should be excused on the grounds of madness.

The seventh and last section, "The War in the Low Countries," deals with the effect of English and French military and diplomatic activities on the various principalities of this volatile region. Kelly DeVries begins by briefly tracing the special relationship between England and the southern Low Countries that had begun to emerge even before the Norman Conquest. He then survey's the region's participation in the Hundred Years War. In the 1330s, Edward III opened the conflict when he used the Low Countries as a staging ground for his first attack on France. Thereafter, while most fighting moved farther to the south, the Low Countries not infrequently became the scene of renewed hostilities, especially during the period when the van Artevelde's, father and son, controlled Ghent and when the Bishop of Norwich launched his highly unsuccessful "Crusade." DeVries argues that in the past the documentary sources of the Low Countries, including those written in both French and Dutch, have been inadequately utilized by historians of the Hundred Years War who have tended to focus their attention too closely on English sources. His article calls for a more serious scholarly approach to such works as the *Chronique de Flandre*, the *Récits d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes*, and the *Chronicon* of Gilles li Muisit, as well as the *Brabantse yersten* and *Van den derden Eduwaert* of Jan Boendale.

As a continuation of an article published in the first volume of this collection, Sergio Boffa continues to trace the diplomatic relations between Brabant, England, France, and Burgundy as the powerful dukes of Burgundy moved inexorably to incorporate the Low Countries into their holdings. Boffa traces the attempts of Brabant and its leaders to retain independence of action in the face of this Burgundian encroachment. Even after the duchy accepted a Burgundian heir in 1406, its estates and towns continued to struggle for a degree of autonomy within the larger Burgundian state.



Map 1. France in 1328.



Map 2. French Territory Ceded to England after the Treaty of Brétigny 1360.



Map 3. England and France in the later Hundred Years War

The succession in 1328



The dates, years of death. French kings, in black type. Descendants of Edward I, in italics.

Genealogy 1



Genealogy 2



Genealogy 3

PART ONE

NEW SOURCES

THE SOLDIER IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: AN ONLINE DATABASE[1]

Adrian R. Bell, Anne Curry, Adam Chapman,
Andy King and David Simpkin

This essay is an entrée into the work of the "Soldier in Later Medieval England" project, based at the Universities of Reading and Southampton in the UK.[2] The main aim of the project was to produce a complete listing of every soldier serving for the English crown between 1369 and 1453 and make it available via an online searchable database. This is now accessible via the website www.medievalsoldier.org. The project also aimed to conduct a longitudinal study of service patterns over the period, including focusing upon political divides, especially the changeover in regime from Richard II (r.1377-1399) to Henry IV (r.1399-1413).[3] The methodology required the systematic collection and computerization of soldier names and service records and using "off the shelf" software (Microsoft Access) to design and build a relational database. We will describe the contextual background to the project and will also draw upon the database throughout by discussing the source materials, and by presenting individual soldier case studies.

Traditionally, the Middle Ages have been portrayed as the "Feudal Age" where men were given land in return for performance of unpaid military service. While this may have formed the basis of the English military system in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it was most certainly not the way armies were raised in the period of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453).[4]

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[1] A shorter version of this article previously appeared as A.R. Bell, A. Chapman, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, "What did you do in the Hundred Years War, Daddy? The Soldier in Later Medieval England," *The Historian: The Magazine of the Historical Association* 96 (Winter, 2007): 6-13.

[2] We are grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for funding this research project.

[3] An article looking at these questions in the context of Henry IV's campaign to Scotland in 1400 has been published: Anne Curry, Adrian R. Bell, Andy King, and David Simpkin, "New Regime, New Army? Henry IV's Scottish Expedition of 1400," *English Historical Review* [hereafter *EHR*] 125 (no. 517) (December, 2010): 1382-1413.

[4] However, note that these "feudal" armies also contained many soldiers serving for pay. J.O. Prestwich, "War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State," *Transactions of the Royal*

The crown paid all members of English armies of this late medieval period and, in theory at least, all soldiers were volunteers.[5] As Michael Prestwich and others have shown, the turning point had been the reign of Edward I (r.1272-1307): the king's many campaigns in Wales, Scotland, and France prompted the development not only of more reliable ways of raising armies but also of paying them.[6] Hence this reign is important in English military history as well as for the origins of Parliament. Some of the older feudal arrangements persisted under Edward I and Edward II (r.1307-1327), but by the time of the Scottish wars of Edward III (r.1327-1377), English armies were made up almost entirely of paid troops. When Edward invaded France in 1339 he took with him about 4600 men, but bought the service of 7,000 foreign troops.[7] For the campaign of 1346, however, which led to his great victory at Crécy and to the capture of Calais, his armies were raised almost exclusively in England and Wales?[8] Thenceforward, for over a hundred years, the crown sent expeditionary armies to France, until in the early 1450s the English were booted out of all of their continental possessions save for Calais.

I. *Sources and Campaigns*

Pay records can tell us much about the leaders of the armies of Edward III's Scottish and French campaigns down to 1360, but rarely allow us to penetrate to the lower ranks or even to be certain about total numbers and proportions of archers to men-at-arms.[9] A real turning point in the information available comes with the opening of the second phase of the Hundred Years War in 1369. After this date, all expeditionary armies were

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Historical Society, 5th ser., 4 (1954): 19-43, esp. 42-43. Also published in *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Studies in Late Anglo-Norman Warfare Military Organization and Warfare*, ed. Matthew Strickland (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1992), 59-83.

[5] An important exception to this are the Northern Marches, where men could be arrayed to serve under the March wardens when invasion was threatened.

[6] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996); D. Simpkin, *The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2008)

[7] These figures come from the Wardrobe Book of William Norwell: C.. J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp. English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 161.

[8] A. Ayton, "The English Army at Crécy," in *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, ed. A. Ayton and P. Preston (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2005), 159-251.

[9] For a discussion of the sources of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, see A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994).

raised by indentures. This system was prompted by the very modern desire to ensure that the crown's money, administered through the Exchequer, was being effectively and efficiently utilized. This process involved the sealing of a contract (in the form of an indenture) with the expedition captains. These captains then sub-contracted as necessary with other retinue leaders, to provide troops at agreed rates of pay and conditions (for instance, the sharing out of war booty) and for a fixed period of service, commonly six months. In order to check that the right numbers and types of troops had been provided in accordance with the terms of the indenture, and that they had the necessary equipment, Exchequer officials carried out a muster at the point of embarkation. These indentures, and subsidiary documentation such as muster rolls, exist in large numbers in the National Archives at Kew (TNA) along with other financial records, as well as letters of protection and attorney taken out by soldiers, and then held in the Chancery before they left England in order to protect their interests while away.[10]

The main campaigns of the period from 1369 to 1453 were to northern France. Major expeditionary forces, led for the most part by captains of the status of duke or earl, invaded France in 1369, 1370, 1373-1374, 1375, and 1380.[11] Armies were sent across the Channel almost every year between 1415 and 1450. The most notable, as well as the most sizeable, were those under Henry V (r.1413-1422) that brought about victory at Agincourt in 1415 as well as the conquest of Normandy between 1417 and 1419.[12] But the geographical spectrum of military activity was wider than it had been before 1360. In the 1380s, for instance, the English decided not to attack France directly but to damage the French king's allies in Castile (via England's own ally, Portugal), Flanders, and Scotland, a strategy fueled by the ambitions of Richard II's uncles. Furthermore, once Richard II had taken control of

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[10] The musters are to be found in the TNA series E101, Exchequer Accounts Various. They are listed in *PRO Lists and Indexes No. XXXV* (London, 1912) and its various supplements, as well as on the TNA searchable web-based catalogue at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk.

[11] For summary of activity 1369-1400 see, A.R. Bell, *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2004), 10; J.W. Sherborne, "Indentured Retinues and the English Expeditions to France, 1369-1380," *EHR* 29 (1964): 718-46; J. Sumption, *Divided Houses, Hundred Years War III* (Philadelphia, 2010).

[12] A. Curry, "English Armies in the Fifteenth Century," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), 45. The hardback edition of A. Curry, *Agincourt: A New History* (Tempus, 2005) contains a listing of all those known to have been serving on the campaign of 1415, but more names have since been found.

his government, renewed interest was shown in the relatively neglected lordship of Ireland. Richard led armies there in 1394-1395 and in 1399. The rebellion of Owain Glyndŵr in 1400 also led to several armies being sent to Wales over the next eight years. Finally, large armies were personally led by several of these monarchs in person to Scotland in 1385 and 1400.[13]

Nor should we forget naval activity. Large forces, directed towards the French coast and aimed at capturing bridgeheads, were raised in 1372, 1377-1378 and 1387-1388. Patrols at sea were also common, especially in clearing the waters of enemy ships in anticipation of launching expeditions to France. For all of these, soldiers as well as sailors were recruited in large numbers. In addition, garrisons were maintained within England (such as at the Tower of London), the Channel Islands, Wales (sporadically), Ireland, Scotland, and the northern marches. Calais often housed over a thousand men. Harfleur had 300 men-at-arms and 900 archers placed in it after its capture in 1415. Normandy as a whole housed between 2,000 and 6,000 soldiers during the English occupation of the fifteenth century.[14]

The indenture and mustering system was applied to garrisons both at home and abroad. We are fortunate that a large quantity of muster rolls survive within the archives of the French *chambre des comptes* for English garrisons in Normandy.

II. *Who Were the Soldiers? The Online Database*

The decades from 1369 to 1453 therefore offer a wide range as well as high incidence of military activity. Indeed, they stand as the most highly militarized of the whole medieval period. This era is also exceptionally well-documented, even down to the names of thousands of soldiers serving the English crown. There was no standing army (this was a creation of the seventeenth century), but we suspect that many men served in several expeditions and garrisons. Would we therefore be justified in speaking of a "professional soldiery" in later medieval England?

In order to answer this question and many more, the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funded a research project hosted at the Universities of Reading and Southampton. Led by Professor Anne Curry (who has worked extensively on the Agincourt campaign and the occupation of Normandy) and Professor Adrian Bell (who has written an in-depth

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13 Curry et al., "New regime, New army?"

14 Curry, "English Armies," 48-60.

study of the armies of 1387-1388), the project ran for three years between 2006 and 2009. The project team involved two research assistants, Dr Andy King and Dr David Simpkin. King is an expert on war on the northern frontier of England, and Simpkin on the armies of Edward I and Edward II so both brought a useful comparative element to bear. The project also included a doctoral award to work on the Welsh soldier between the conquest of Wales by Edward I and the end of the Hundred Years War (and in particular, of course, to examine the supposed role of the famed Welsh archers). This grant was held by Adam Chapman who successfully defended his thesis in December, 2009. Chapman's earlier MA work at the University of East Anglia investigated a palace in Norfolk held by Bishop Henry Despenser of Norwich. This cleric led a failed expedition to Flanders in 1383 under the guise of a crusade against the French and their allies who supported a different pope from that recognized by England.[15]

To date, we have collected 250,000 service records by drawing on the hundreds of muster rolls, protections, and letters of attorney surviving in TNA; and for the fifteenth-century occupation of Normandy, in archive repositories in France and England. Using these service records, the project has produced an on-line searchable resource of soldiers' names which has proved of interest to genealogists as well as social, political, and military historians. The team utilized a tried-and-tested research methodology developed by Bell for the analysis of the medieval military community. This focused upon the design, creation, population, and then analysis of a relational database using Microsoft Access. This database was then linked dynamically to the project website, to allow public searching of the data collected for the project. The database is fully searchable and holds data on first name, surname, status, rank, the captain name, the expedition commander, the year of service, and the nature of military activity being undertaken. The database also indicates the source from which this service record is drawn.

Using a case-study approach, this essay will now demonstrate the potential of the database by describing periods and regional aspects of the Hundred Years War and by elucidating soldier careers, building on the military service record information now accessible online. In order to focus the discussion, we will concentrate on the period of the Hundred Years War up to around 1400.

[15] N. Housley, "The Bishop of Norwich's Crusade, May 1383," *History Today* 33 (May 1983): 15-20.

III. *The Reopening of the War: 1369-1389*

Muster rolls relating to campaigns launched during the last thirty years of the fourteenth century contain approximately 40,000 records of soldiers (the number of actual individuals has yet to be established since many men served more than once.[16] These rolls record the names of men-at-arms, archers, and other personnel such as crossbowmen and artillerymen. These documents supply fascinating insights into casualties suffered and knighting rituals carried out on campaign, as well as of failures of men to turn up at muster. Indeed, the corpus of materials is generally more complete for abortive expeditions. For example, no fewer than thirteen retinue rolls are extant for Edward III's naval expedition of 1372, which came to a premature end due to foul weather shortly after it had sailed from Sandwich, whereas there is little material of this kind for the large force that disembarked at Calais in the summer of 1369. Nevertheless, at the very least, a few muster rolls and retinue rolls have survived for nearly all of the armies of these years, enabling the historian to identify a sizeable proportion of the thousands of soldiers who served at this time. This is important since the campaigns of the late fourteenth century have often been dismissed as insignificant compared with those earlier in the century. Of the seventy-four knights of the shire returned to the parliament of October, 1386, where Richard II's conduct of the war was so bitterly criticised, no fewer than fifty-one (69%) are recorded as previously having served under arms, all but one of them since the renewed outbreak of war in 1369. The exception was one Geoffrey Chaucer, whose only military service was in France in 1359-1360, when he was captured.[17] We are already seeing that soldiers who served alongside Henry V had military careers dating back into the 1370s and 80s– men such as Thomas, Lord Camoys, who led a retinue in the earl of Arundel's expedition of 1388 and commanded the rearguard of the victorious army at Agincourt, almost thirty years later.[18]

Looking at the micro-level and investigating military careers will help answer many questions. We are already able to elucidate the careers of Englishmen in arms by bringing in other information. Taken together, these

[16] Indeed it surely is not possible to work out the number of individuals, due to problems of identity. For instance 55 archers named John Smith served in expeditionary armies in 1439-50, 20 of them serving on the 1443 expedition alone, while 23 archers named John White served in these armies, and 15 named John Green.

[17] Andy King, "'What werre amounteth': The Military Experience of Knights of the Shire, 1369-89," *History* 95 (2010): 420-21.

[18] Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 92-93.

various sources might indicate that these soldiers combined service to the king in Scotland with fighting in France, or further afield, in Spain and Portugal. Or again, the sources might show them "crusading" with the Teutonic knights; fighting as *routiers*; or even serving with Sir John Hawkwood in Italy. In some cases, the sources speak of these men going on pilgrimage to the holy sites. Much of the evidence for the soldiers' service is taken from their own depositions in the Court of Chivalry, for instance in the famous case of Scrope v. Grosvenor.[19] These witness statements obviously feature the upper echelons of society–men such as Sir Alexander Goldingham, who in addition to his regular service in Brittany, Castile, and on naval campaigns, fought in Italy and even traveled outside the Mediterranean.[20]

While the evidence is better for nobles and knights, it can also highlight the military careers of archers such as Robert de Fishlake. Robert fought on numerous naval campaigns, joined armies in Brittany and Scotland, and also traveled as far as Jerusalem. He will serve as our first case study of a career in arms and we will supplement his own witness statement in the Court of Chivalry with evidence drawn from our soldier database.

IV. *Robert de Fishlake*[21]

By the later fourteenth century, it was common for English armies to comprise roughly equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers. In 1378, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster (1340-1399), indented to lead a naval expedition. In that year, the force he led contained 2500 men-at-arms and 2500 archers. Just a few years later, in 1381, the duke's younger brother, Edmund of Langley, earl of Cambridge, led a smaller army to Portugal, consisting of 3000 men. Once again, it was made up of roughly equal numbers of archers and men-at-arms.[22] This system of employing equal numbers of the two types of soldier dated back to the early years of the reign of Edward III, and had been largely responsible for the English victories at the battles of Crécy and Poitiers (1356). However, as we have noted, relatively few muster rolls

[19] *The Controversy between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry, A.D. MCCCLXXXV-MCCCXC*, ed. N.H. Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1832).

[20] A. R Bell, "The Fourteenth Century Soldier: More Chaucer's Knight or Medieval Career?" in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France (Leiden,2008), 301-15.

[21] This case study by David Simpkin was first published online as a soldier profile on the project website: http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/soldier/database/February2008.php

[22] Bell, *War and the Soldier*, p. 10 (table 1).

survive from the early stages of the Hundred Years War,[23] and we consequently have to wait until the reopening of hostilities in 1369 to be able to trace the names of large numbers of archers.

Creating career profiles of archers who fought for the English Crown during the Hundred Years War is far more difficult than reconstructing the careers of men-at-arms. As such men were socially more obscure than knights and esquires, they tend to be far more difficult to trace in the public records. Moreover, archers were rarely commemorated in effigies and brasses, they did not possess coats of arms, and chronicles were seldom interested in glorifying their exploits. However important archers may have been to the English war effort, the man-at-arms, armed with lance, shield, and sword, was generally regarded as the superior type of soldier and paid at double the rate of the mounted archer.

The relative dearth of knowledge concerning the military careers of archers is a great shame, for their activities could be just as prolific as those of their social superiors. One example of this is provided by Robert de Fishlake, who sometime between 1408 and 1410 testified on behalf of Sir Edward Hastings in his Court of Chivalry dispute with Reginald, Lord Grey of Ruthin.[24] In his deposition, Fishlake recalled that he had served on John of Gaunt's expedition to St Malo in 1378; in the ill-fated fleet commanded by Sir John d'Arundel in 1379, when the ships had been scattered by a violent storm; on the duke of Buckingham's expedition to Brittany in 1380; and on Richard II's campaign to Scotland in 1385.[25] This is a fascinating testimony that reveals many additional details about Fishlake's age, background, and military career. He stated that for the last eight years he had been living in the town of Elsing in Norfolk, and that he had spent the greater part of this period within England.[26] Elsing was the seat of the Hastings family; and the local parish church still contains the famous brass of Sir Hugh Hastings (d.1347), which includes images of Edward III, Henry, earl of Lancaster, and the earl of Warwick among the mourners.[27] Fishlake

23 Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 5.

24 The fullest transcription of these proceedings can be found at: College of Arms, *Processus in Curia Marescalli*, 2 vols. The National Archive [hereafterTNA]: Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], C47/6/1 Fishlake's deposition can be found at 1:429-35.

25 College of Arms, *Processus in Curia Marescalli*, 1:430-32; M. Keen, "English Military Experience and the Court of Chivalry: The Case of Grey v. Hastings," in *Guerre et Société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe-XVe siècle*, ed. Philipe Contamine, Charles Giry-Deloison, and Maurice Keen (Lille, 1992), 132, 139-40.

26 College of Arms, *Processus in Curia Marescalli*, 1:429.

27 For an image of and information about this brass, see N. Saul, "Bold as Brass: Secular Display in English Medieval Brasses," in *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England*, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), 179-80.

may have moved to Elsing in order to be nearer to his patrons. He may even have been a member of the Hastings household. His age at the time of the deposition is recorded as forty-six. This would have made him around sixteen years old at the time of his first spell of service in 1378; this accords with what we have discovered in our project about the ages of many first-time warriors during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. On the face of it, as Fishlake did not state his military rank when giving his deposition, it is difficult to say anything about his social status. He was definitely not a knight. The range of his military activities, as recorded in his Court of Chivalry deposition, suggest that his connections to the Hastings family had served him rather well. Indeed, he testified to having fought with Sir Hugh Hastings III "in the Eastern Mediterranean, to Jerusalem and elsewhere"; and he recalled that "in all the important places where he stayed (including the Hospitallers' Maison d'Honneur at Rhodes), Hugh left an escutcheon of his arms."[28]

What of evidence for Fishlake's service in the on-line database derived from muster rolls and letters of protection? It is not possible to confirm all aspects of Fishlake's own account of his career in arms.[29] There does not appear to be a record of his service on the naval expeditions of 1378 or 1379, nor of his journey north to Scotland in 1385. This reminds us that the muster roll evidence for the years following the reopening of Hundred Years War in 1369 is extensive, but far from complete. One would not expect to find any confirmation of his service in the Latin East, for this kind of activity was not financed by the crown and so fell outside the purview of the exchequer clerks. Nevertheless, one crucial piece of evidence relating to Fishlake's early military service does survive, and this concerns his participation in the earl of Buckingham's expedition to Brittany in 1380. A Robert de "Fysshlake" is named on a muster roll for this campaign;[30] and we can be sure that this is the man who gave a deposition at the Court of Chivalry case. He appears on the 1380 muster roll in the retinue of Sir Hugh Hastings, the immediate ancestor of Sir Edward Hastings on whose behalf he testified during the reign of Henry IV. Moreover, only one man of this name appears in Hastings' retinue, and there is therefore no reason to doubt that this Robert de Fishlake and the deponent were the same man.

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[28] Keen, "English Military Experience and the Court of Chivalry," 132.

[29] Information on soldiers has been taken from the AHRC-funded "The Soldier in Later Medieval England Online Database," www.medievalsoldier.org.

[30] TNA: PRO, E 101/39/9, m. 5d.

What is particularly intriguing about Fishlake's appearance on the muster roll for 1380 is the fact that he is described there as an archer. This is interesting as the great majority of soldiers who gave depositions at the Court of Chivalry were of relatively high social status. Indeed, the rival parties in such disputes tended to call on the testimony of the most high-ranking witnesses that they could find, for this increased their chances of winning their case. The word of an earl or a knight was, one can only presume, far more trusted than that of a social inferior. For a man like Fishlake, who had once served as an archer, to testify at the Court of Chivalry was probably quite a rare event. It may be that many of the knights who had served with Sir Hugh Hastings III were now dead, and that Fishlake's proximity to the Hastings family in Elsing made him a convenient witness to call upon.

Following the expedition of 1380, he went on to serve in Scotland and in the Latin East, and by the reign of Henry IV had become sufficiently respected to testify at the Court of Chivalry. This case suggests that the geographical and social horizons of archers during the Hundred Years War could be just as wide as those of the men-at-arms. Moreover, the fact that Fishlake served on three successive expeditions in 1378, 1379, and 1380, presumably in each case as an archer, shows that men serving in this capacity might be just as professional in attitude and outlook as knights and esquires.

If his Court of Chivalry deposition is to be trusted, Fishlake had been a young man of around eighteen at the time of the earl of Buckingham's expedition to Brittany. Consequently, further evidence from the database is required to discover whether Robert de Fishlake spent most of his military career as an archer or whether he was subsequently promoted to man-at-arms. His name appears on two further muster rolls during the 1380s: for successive naval expeditions in 1387 and 1388 led by Richard Fitz Alan, earl of Arundel. On the first expedition, he appears as an archer in the retinue of the earl of Arundel.[31] In the second, he had moved to a different retinue and was serving in the company of Thomas de Mowbray, earl of Nottingham and earl marshal of England.[32] Yet in both years, he is recorded as an archer. Was this the man who had served with Hugh de Hastings in 1380? This seems likely. The name Fishlake—variant spellings

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[31] TNA: PRO, E 101/40/33, m. 2d.

[32] TNA: PRO, E 101/41/5, m. 3d. For further discussion of Fishlake's service on the expeditions of 1387 and 1388, and a summary of his military career, see Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 145-46.

include "Fysshlake," "Fyshlake," and "Fischelake"—seems to have been quite uncommon, with relatively few men of this name appearing in the online soldier database. Furthermore, a search of the printed chancery calendars for this period reveals very few men of this surname, and none named Robert de Fishlake.[33] The fact that in his Court of Chivalry deposition Robert de Fishlake did not mention his service during the Appellant crisis of 1387 and 1388 should come as no surprise. After all, he was only required to testify concerning the period when he was a member of the Hastings family retinue.[34] As we have seen, he had served under different lords in 1387 and 1388.

It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that this Robert de Fishlake had served as an archer for at least ten years, between 1378 and 1388, and that his service in this capacity was more than just a passing phase. Given that archers were not drawn from the highest echelons of society, it must also be concluded that Robert de Fishlake was a man of relatively lowly social origins, and that his testimony at the Court of Chivalry between 1408 and 1410 represented something of an upward trajectory. The evidence of the muster rolls is of assistance here, for it enables us to trace Fishlake's promotion from an archer to a man-at-arms. In 1404, following a sixteen-year gap in his service record due to the truce between the realms of England and France during the 1390s, Fishlake appears on a muster roll, as Robert de "Fischelake," in the retinue of Sir William de Etchingham.[35] On this occasion, he is described not as an archer but as a *scutifer*: a man-at-arms equivalent to an esquire.[36] On the assumption that this was the same Robert de

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[33] On January 8, 1382, a William de Fishlake of Barton on Humber was mentioned as the owner of a ship, which he had been forced to abandon due to the threat of attack by the French: *Calendar of Close Rolls* [hereafter CCR]. *Richard II, 1377-1399*, 6 vols. (London, 1914-1927), vol. 2 (1381-1385), 34, 57. Later, in 1393 and 1398 respectively, a John Fishlake and a Thomas Fishlake were named in writs of supersedeas: *CCR*, Richard II, vol. 5 (1392-1396), 229; vol. 6 (1396-1399), 399. The name Fishlake comes from a village—Fishlake—in Yorkshire, so it is interesting to find that at least two men surnamed Fishlake were admitted to the freedom of York during the reigns of Edward III and Richard II, including a Robert de Fishlake, mariner, who was admitted in 1345: www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=48266; www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid+48265&strquery=Fischlake. David Simpkin has contacted the present vicar of the church of Fishlake, Reverend Eve Atherfold, about the subject of this piece, but neither she nor local historians have heard of a Robert de Fishlake. I acknowledge Reverend Atherfold's kindness in responding to my enquiries.

[34] See Keen, "English Military Experience and the Court of Chivalry," 124, where he makes a similar point about the deponents at the Scrope-Grosvenor case.

[35] TNA: PRO, E 101/43/32, m. 4.

[36] The evidence suggests that the terms *scutifer* and *armiger* were used interchangeably to denote men of the status of esquire. For example, in 1387 a certain William Arderne

Fishlake as the man who had served during the 1380s, he had finally managed to gain promotion to the rank of man-at-arms, almost two decades after his military debut. Such an ascent was not unheard of during this period. On the contrary, Sir Thomas Gray of Heton recalls, in his *Scalacronica*, that many young English soldiers in France began their careers in arms as archers, before later becoming knights and sometimes captains.[37] Famous examples of such social climbers among the English soldiery include Sir Hugh Browe, Sir Nicholas Colfox and Sir Robert Knolles.[38] The career of Robert de Fishlake provides a less famous and less astonishing instance of an archer who rose in rank, but one that is probably more representative of the common experience.

Further consultation of the soldier database adds to the impression that the Fishlake family straddled the social and functional dividing-line between the ranks of archer and man-at-arms.[39] Robert de Fishlake may have been the son or younger brother of a Hugh de "Fisselak" who had served at sea as a man-at-arms under Lord John Neville in 1371.[40] This connection to an older member of the family who had already served as a man-at-arms might explain why Robert eventually achieved this same

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served at sea under Sir Reginald de Cobham. He is described on the muster roll as an armiger: TNA: PRO, E 101/40/33, m. 6. In the mid-1390s a man of the same name served in Ireland under Sir John Neville, but this time he is described on the muster roll as a *scutifer:* TNA: PRO, E 101/41/39, m.1i. In 1372, William Barry served as a *scutifer* under Sir John de Clynton (TNA: PRO, E 101/31/33, m.4), but on the muster roll for the duke of Buckingham's expedition of 1377-1378 he is described as an *armiger*: TNA: PRO, E 101/36/29, m.2. A John Prescote served under Sir John de Charlton, in 1372, as an *armiger* (TNA: PRO, E 101/31/37, m.1), but in 1384 a man of that name was in the garrison at Berwick upon Tweed as a *scutifer*: TNA: PRO, E 101/39/40, m.1. The terminology used to describe men-at-arms of sub-knightly status seems to have varied according to the whim of the clerks who drew up the muster rolls. For example, a Richard Pocok served in Wales in 1377 as a *scutifer* (TNA: PRO, E/101/34/29, m.10i), but in the following year a man of that name was included on a muster roll among a group of men described as *gentils hommez armez*: TNA: PRO, E 101/39/40, m.1. Although it may be that such terms were used more precisely as the fifteenth century progressed, in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, when Robert de Fishlake was active, it seems that the terms armiger and scutifer meant exactly the same thing.

[37] Sir Thomas Gray, *Scalacronica 1272-1363*, ed. A. King, Surtees Society, 209 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2005), 157.

[38] M.J. Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism. Cheshire and Lancashire Society in the Age of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* (Cambridge, 1983), 182.

[39] The online database reveals that many other families straddled this dividing line between archer and man-at-arms. For example, the earl of Northumberland's retinue in Scotland in the mid-1380s contained a William Chamberlayn, man-at-arms, and John and Robert Chamberleyn, archers; a John Hedworth, man-at-arms, and a Nicholas Hedworth, archer; and John and Robert Corbet, men-at-arms, besides a John Corbet, archer: TNA: PRO, E 101/40/5.

[40] TNA: PRO, E 101/31/17, m. 1.

status after years of service as an archer. Later on, another man with this surname, John de Fishlake, clerk, served on the Agincourt campaign as an archer.[41] On this occasion, he was a member of the household of John de Mowbray, a descendant of the Thomas de Mowbray with whom Robert de Fishlake had served in 1388.[42] Given the continuing connection with the Mowbray household, a connection that has been identified by Rowena Archer,[43] it may be that Robert de Fishlake had once been one of Thomas de Mowbray's men.

Although John de Mowbray and many of his soldiers suffered from dysentery in the 1415 campaign and, as a result, were invalided home, John de Fishlake and other members of the retinue stayed on and fought at Agincourt.[44] Two years later, in 1417, John was serving in the garrison at Harfleur as a man-at-arms.[45] Since he had set out for France in that year as an archer in John de Mowbray's company, it may safely be assumed that his promotion took place at that time.[46] His service as an archer in 1415 and 1417 suggests that the Fishlake family remained of relatively modest status during the opening years of the fifteenth century, a point supported by the fact that not one member of the Fishlake family took out a letter of protection or attorney for their service in France.[47]

It was probably quite common for soldiers of the middling sort, such as members of the Fishlake family, to serve as archers early in their careers before later scaling the military and social pecking order. Furthermore,

41 TNA: PRO, E 101/47/38, m. 1.

42 For details of John de Fishlake's service as a member of John de Mowbray's household, see R.E. Archer, "The Mowbrays, earls of Nottingham and dukes of Norfolk to 1432," (D.Phil. thesis.,Oxford University, 1984), 173, 184, 318 n.4, and app. 2. John de Fishlake had very close links to John de Mowbray. In 1423 he acted as an attorney on the earl's behalf; and the accounts of the earl's receiver-general show that a 'John de Fyshelake', clerk, was in receipt of a fee from the earl: A. Curry, "Personal Links and the Nature of the English War Retinue: A Case Study of John Mowbray, earl Marshal, and the campaign of 1415," in *Liens, réseaux, solidarités et France et dans les iles Britanniques* (XIe-XXe siècle), ed. E. Anceau, V. Gazeau and F.J. Ruggiu (Paris, 2006), 157, 165.

43 Archer, "The Mowbray'", app. 2. Archer does not mention a Robert de Fishlake, but the records for the followers of Thomas de Mowbray are less complete than those for the followers of John de Mowbray.

44 Ibid., 318, n.4.

45 TNA: PRO, E 101/48/17.

46 TNA: PRO, E 101/51/2, m. 29.

47 Letters of protection or attorney were usually acquired by men-at-arms during the build-up to campaigns in order to protect their landed and other financial interests while they were away fighting: Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 156-64. The fact that not one member of the Fishlake family acquired a letter of protection or attorney may suggest, therefore, that they did not have many lands to protect.

John de Fishlake's service as both a household clerk and a soldier supports Archer's contention that "a position in the household did not render a man unfit for war, whatever his office."[48] Several decades later, a John de Fishlake was present in Lord John Talbot's field army of 1437 that was charged with the recovery of places in the Vexin.[49] One can easily imagine how stories of exploits on past campaigns must have been passed down from one generation of the Fishlake family to the next.

The story of Robert de Fishlake reveals something of what can be discovered about the military careers of English archers during the second and third stages of the Hundred Years War. It also reminds us of some of the difficulties of career reconstruction. Robert appears to have been a highly competent soldier, whose repeated service as an archer during the late 1370s and 1380s enabled him, by the early stages of the reign of Henry IV, to gain promotion. His progress from archer to man-at-arms shows that social mobility through military service was possible.

V. *The Anglo-Scottish Theater*

Throughout the whole period from 1369 to 1453, England and Scotland remained in a state of armed truce, punctuated by bouts of open warfare. The most serious of these outbreaks was during the 1380s, culminating in the famous moonlit battle at Otterburn in 1388 that witnessed the capture of Sir Henry "Hotspur" Percy. Although this was followed by a period of comparative peace, the threat of Scottish invasion remained real, exemplified by the attempt to besiege Berwick in 1417, taking advantage of Henry V's absence in France. It was to meet this threat that the crown appointed wardens of the Marches, who were paid large sums to maintain permanent garrisons along the border. These troops were based in castles in Carlisle, and in the Scottish towns of Roxburgh, Jedburgh, and Berwick, where the English continued to exercise a somewhat beleaguered lordship. Berwick, for one, remains in English hands to this day.

Given the longstanding presence of English garrisons on the Scottish side of the border, it is not surprising that a number of Scots remained in the English allegiance, and were prepared to serve under arms. For instance, when Lord Richard Grey, was appointed warden of the East March and

48 Archer, 'The Mowbrays," 318 (n.4).

49 Archives Départementales de l'Eure, IIF 4069.

keeper of Roxburgh in 1415, his retinue included several Scots from Roxburgh, and the surrounding area of Teviotdale, alongside a number of men from Northumberland and the English Marches. Nevertheless, the Marches were not defended exclusively by northerners. As we have described, some of those serving in the king's armies took out letters of protection; and these sometimes detail the recipients' home town or village. This additional evidence is included in the online database. Such evidence reveals that while the majority of those serving in the Marches were indeed from the northern counties, a substantial number came from further south, including men from Lincolnshire, Buckinghamshire, Norfolk, Surrey, Wiltshire, and even Cornwall.[50] Similarly, Lord Grey himself hailed from Codnor, in Derbyshire.

This traffic was not, however, all one-way. Many of the border gentry made highly profitable careers out of fighting the Scots. As experienced soldiers, their services were always welcome on expeditions to France. What is more for a time, England somewhat neglected the Scottish marches due to the outbreak of Owain Glyndŵr's rebellion in Wales in 1400, and then Henry V's enthusiastic resumption of the French wars in 1415. A telling illustration is provided by the Northumbrian Sir Thomas Gray of Heaton, whose family fortune had been made from service in the Marches, but who himself failed to prosper there when service against the Scots became less of a priority. As a result of his financial discomfiture, he became embroiled in the Southampton plot, aimed at deposing Henry V, while the English hosts were being mustered for the Agincourt campaign. By contrast, Gray's younger bother, John, had served in the Glyndŵr campaign with Henry before his accession to the throne. John now remained loyal to the king, and so following his brother's execution, he was granted the family lands. He repaid this mark of favor by serving with distinction in France, where he was granted the title of count of Tancarville, and elected a knight of the Garter, before being killed at the ignominious English defeat at Baugé, in 1421.[51]

[50] These included Walter Carburra and Peter Pollard, two Cornishmen who served with the Cumbrian Sir Richard Tempest in the garrison of Roxburgh in 1385.

[51] Anne Curry, "Grey , Sir John, count of Tancarville (1384x91–1421)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11546 [accessed December 2, 2010].

VI. *Sir William Clifford*[52]

We will delve further into the issue of border conflict by investigating the career of another northern knight, Sir William Clifford. Like Owain Glyndŵr, he was a rebel, but unlike Owain, he was also a notable political survivor. Sir William Clifford, appears in the online database on fifteen separate occasions, demonstrating that he regularly served in a military capacity. William appears to have been a cousin of Lord Thomas Clifford, an important Westmorland magnate, who also held the castle of Skipton-in-Craven in Yorkshire.[53] Since the Percy family also held lands in Yorkshire and in Cumberland, it is perhaps not surprising that William's first recorded military service was with Sir Thomas Percy, in a naval expedition of 1385.[54] Lord Clifford enjoyed a close connection with Richard II's court,[55] and it may have been this connection that drew William into Percy's retinue, for Percy was also a well-placed courtier. Nevertheless, this tie to the royal court did not prevent William from serving on a naval expedition in 1388 that was led by the Appellant Lord, Richard, earl of Arundel, one of Richard II's fiercest critics.[56] In a similar manner, his Percy connection did not stop him from serving with Thomas de Mowbray, earl of Nottingham, when in the following year the latter was appointed warden of the East March—an appointment that was bitterly resented by Thomas Percy's elder brother, the earl of Northumberland.[57] His service with Arundel may have provided

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[52] This case study by Andy King was first published online as a soldier profile on the project website: http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/soldier/database/January2008.php. A greatly expanded version has now been published as, A. King, "Sir William Clifford: Rebellion and Reward in Henry IV's Affinity," *The Fifteenth Century IX*, *English and Continental Perspectives*, ed. Linda Clark (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2010).

[53] Clifford's career is outlined by Chris Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity. Service, Politics and Finance in England, 1360-1413* (London, 1986), 228-29; Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 206.

[54] William Clifford, in the retinue of Sir Thomas Percy, TNA: PRO, E101/40/39, m 1. Note that the William Clifford Esq who served with Sir Phillip de Courtenay in 1372-3 (TNA: PRO, E101/31/31, m 5) was probably one of the Cliffords of Chudleigh, Devon, which would explain his connection with the Courtenays who were also a Devonshire family.

[55] Henry Summerson, "Clifford, Thomas, sixth Baron Clifford (1362/3–1391)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5662. [accessed December 11, 2007].

[56] William Clyfford, esq.: serving in the retinue of Giles Weston TNA: PRO, E101/41/5, m 18d.

[57] William Clifford: TNA: PRO, E101/41/17, m 2. For Northumberland's displeasure, see J.A. Tuck, "Richard II and the Border Magnates," *Northern History* 3 (1968): 44-45. Mowbray was appointed in place of Sir Henry Percy, a.k.a. "Hotspur," who had been captured by the Scots at the battle of Otterburn in 1388.

the opportunity for social advancement, for also serving on the same expedition was Thomas, Lord Bardolf, whose daughter Clifford would later marry.[58]

In October, 1391, Lord Thomas Clifford died young while on pilgrimage to Jerusalem.[59] His heir was his two-year old son, John; and during John's long minority, William Clifford was left as the effective head of the family. Thomas had been a knight of the king's chamber, and William was now recruited into the king's household in his place. As a result, he served in Richard's retinue for the expedition to Ireland in 1394, where he numbered among the household esquires when the king knighted him on October 26.[60] William returned to Ireland with the king on the ill-fated expedition of 1399,[61] but afterwards he wasted no time in abandoning Richard during the Lancastrian coup of that year. This is demonstrated by the fact that he was paid £18 4s. by the new regime for his service in Wales,[62] presumably with the force which so intimidated Richard after he had left the safety of Conwy Castle in the company of the earl of Northumberland. Clifford's prompt change of allegiance also brought him an even greater reward in the form of a grant of the manor of Ewloe in the county of Flint in north-eastern Wales. Not surprisingly, he also kept his position as a king's knight.[63]

Although his allegiance seems to have been given to the earl of Northumberland for the next few years, his prime loyalty remained to himself. He took out letters of attorney for service on the Scottish Marches,[64] and by 1403, he was Hotspur's lieutenant at Berwick Castle. When Hotspur rebelled against Henry IV in that year, his forces were raised mainly from Cheshire; and so Clifford avoided having to take the field against the king

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[58] Thomas de Bardolf: TNA: PRO, E101/41/5, m 3; and see Henry Summerson, "Bardolf, Thomas, fifth Baron Bardolf (1369–1408)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1360. [accessed December 11, 2007].

[59] Summerson, 'Clifford, Thomas." Thomas became a pilgrim to expiate his killing of the Scot Sir William Douglas, while they were both on crusade in the Baltic.

[60] Sir William Clifford, 1394: Shelagh Mitchell, "Some Aspects of the Knightly Household of Richard II," (D.Phil. thesis, London University, 1998), 308, citing TNA: PRO, E101/402/20, f 36.

[61] He took out letters for service in Ireland on April 24; *Calendar of Patent Rolls* [hereafter *CPR*], *Richard II*, 6 vols. (London, 1971), vol. 6 (1396-1399), 552. The William Clifford, esq., who served in Ireland under Sir Stephen le Scrope in 1395-1397 (TNA: PRO, E101/41/39, m 5) cannot be the same man, as our William had been knighted by then.

[62] Alastair Dunn, *The Politics of Magnate Power. England and Wales, 1389-1413* (Oxford, 2003), 99.

[63] *CPR*, *Henry IV*, 4 vols. (London, 1903-1909), vol. 1 (1399-1401), 51.

[64] TNA: PRO, C71/76, mm 8, 14.

at the battle of Shrewsbury, where Hotspur was killed. After the battle, the earl of Northumberland submitted to Henry at York, and agreed to surrender all the castles under his control. The royal castle at Bamburgh was secured with no great difficulty, perhaps because Percy's lieutenant there was dead, a probable casualty of Shrewsbury. On the other hand, the castles of Alnwick, Warkworth and Berwick, all under Clifford's command, refused to submit—despite Clifford having sworn an oath renouncing his Percy ties.[65] As the king judged that the continuing rebellion in Wales was a more urgent problem, the task of pacifying Northumberland was left in the hands of a commission of leading Northumbrian gentry. Their efforts proved singularly ineffective, and in January, 1404, it was reported that Clifford was distributing Percy livery badges.[66]

At this juncture, William Serle, a former esquire of Richard II's chamber, turned up, seeking Clifford's help in his efforts to foment rebellion against the Lancastrian usurper. However, the earl of Northumberland was now moving towards an accommodation with the king, and with a well-developed sense of self-preservation, Clifford saw an opportunity to regain royal favor by having Serle locked up. When Northumberland was reconciled with Henry at Pontefract in July, Clifford accompanied him, and handed Serle over to a singularly gruesome execution. In return, he was granted a pardon and 4,000 marks (£2,666) taken from Hotspur's goods, along with the custody of Hotspur's son.[67]

When Northumberland rebelled in 1405, Clifford held Alnwick castle in his name. However, as soon as the royal artillery train had demolished the walls of Berwick, he negotiated an agreement with the king to surrender. This submission earned Clifford a life-grant of lands in Cumberland that had been forfeited by the rebellious earl, who now fled to Scotland in the company of Clifford's father-in-law, Lord Bardolf.[68] In 1408, when the earl and Lord Bardolf raised rebellion in Yorkshire once again, Clifford was accused of unspecified "treasons." However, while both Northumberland and Bardolf were killed in battle at Bramham Moor, Clifford had no trouble

[65] *CPR*, Henry IV, vol. 2 (1401-1405), 294.

[66] *Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV*, ed. F.C. Hingeston, Rolls Series, 2 vols. (London, 1860), 1:206-7; Andy King, "'They have the Hertes of the People by North": Northumberland, the Percies and Henry IV, 1399-1408," in *Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, 1399-1406*, ed. Gwilym Dodd and Douglas Biggs (Woodbridge, 2003).

[67] *The Chronica maiora of Thomas Walsingham (1376-1422)*, ed. David Preest and James G. Clark (Woodbridge, Suffolk 2005), 332-33.

[68] *The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1812), 363-64; *CPR, Henry IV*, vol. 3 (1405-1408), 47.

in shaking off the accusations, and a year later, he was able to obtain his wife's share of Bardolf's lands.[69]

Throughout his career, this consummate opportunist was skilled at bending with the political wind; and even when he did defy the king, he proved adept at judging exactly how far he could go. His acts of rebellion were fairly passive, confined to refusing to surrender castles, or handing out livery badges, and he managed to avoid being caught in arms against the king in the open field. Combined with his good record of military service to the crown, this was enough to save his neck. Henry IV was generally anxious to conciliate rebels whenever possible, and in the Marches, where the removal of the Percies had left a vacuum of lordship, he had little choice but to try to win over the leading Marcher gentry. As acting head of the Clifford family, William was thus able to reap rich reward from acts of rebellion followed by swift submission. Doubtless, he did feel a genuine loyalty to the house of Percy, but unlike his father-in-law, Lord Bardolf, he did not take this loyalty to fatal extremes. In the end, Henry's policy of tolerance was vindicated, for William Clifford went on to serve Henry V faithfully. Clifford was appointed constable of Bordeaux on March 23, 1413 just two days after Henry's accession, and was also appointed captain of the nearby castle at Fronsac in July.[70] Although, the continental posting may have been intended to keep him out of trouble, it seems more likely that he earned it for his service commanding the border town of Berwick. Since Henry V held Gascony as duke of Guienne, rather than as the king of England, the allegiance of the Gascon nobility was not to be taken for granted; Clifford's personal experience of dealing with the Scots as well as with rebellious Englishmen who had sided with them would have been an invaluable preparation for the slippery world of Gascon politics. In this, it was his diplomatic rather than his military skills that Henry was subsequently to call on, for he was employed in high-level negotiations with both the French and the Burgundians.[71] This service brought him more reward, in the form of a grant of lands in Lincolnshire forfeited by the rebellious

[69] *CPR, Henry IV*, vol. 4 (1408-1413), 23, 95-96.

[70] James Wylie and William Waugh, *The Reign of Henry V*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1914-1929), 2:122-24; M.G.A.Vale, *English Gascony, 1399-1453* (Oxford, 1970), 247. He took out letters of attorney for service overseas in July and October 1413, and August 1417; *Forty-Fourth Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records* (1883), appendix, 543, 548, 600.

[71] Wylie and Waugh, *Reign of Henry V*, 1:94, 444; 2:301.

Henry Scrope of Masham.[72] Clifford died in office, in March, 1418,[73] as a wealthy man, demonstrating that a record of rebelliousness was not necessarily a hindrance to a successful career as a king's knight—always providing that the degree of rebellion was carefully calculated.

VII. *The Welsh at War, 1282-1400*

Once Edward I had taken Wales, the Welsh soldier formed an important part of the armies of the English kings.[74] In the first forty or so years of the fourteenth century the Welsh may have contributed as many as 10,000 infantry to a single army, as in the Scottish campaign of 1298 where the total army size was 26,000 men. Even in the Scottish wars of Edward III in the 1330s, the Welshmen often constituted between a quarter and one-third of the total infantry on any given campaign. For both the crown and the lords of the Welsh marches, the numbers of troops raised from their Welsh lordships were a potent reflection of their power and status in the land. Whatever the political consequences of Edward I's conquest of North Wales, its chief consequence for the Welsh people as a whole was consistent and heavy military obligation. Although English governance suppressed the Welsh princes, partially dismantled Welsh law, and placed burdens on Welsh society, in the military sphere it offered wider opportunities. It is no accident that the best known and most celebrated Welshmen of this period were military leaders, including Sir Gruffydd Llwyd (d. 1335), Sir Rhys ap Gruffydd (d. 1356), and Sir Hywel "y Fwyall" (Sir Hywel of the Axe).

After the resumption of the conflict with France in 1369, the marcher lords, like many of the English military elite, recruited retinues of mounted troops rather than community-based levies of infantry. By contrast, the retinues led by the only notable Welsh commander of the period—Sir Gregory (or Degory) Sais—show a strong Welsh element, particularly among the archers. This was echoed in those retinues raised and led by the Marcher lords themselves. In this period, however, the absolute numbers recruited from Wales were much smaller; hence, the opportunities for

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[72] *Calendar of Patent Rolls.Henry V, 1413-1422* [*CPR.H5*], 2 vols. (London, 1910-1911), vol. 2 (1416-1422), 116.

[73] TNA: PRO, E101/187/1. News of Clifford's death obviously took a while to reach England, for several letters of protection for men serving under his command at Fronsac were issued on April 16–three weeks after he had died. *Forty-Fourth Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper*, appendix, 604.

[74] Adam Chapman, "The Welsh Soldier, 1282–1422," (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2009).

Welsh commanders to lead their countrymen into battle were greatly reduced. With the loss of opportunities for leadership came a decline in the prominence of the Welsh elite as soldiers within English armies. This, in turn, led to reduced possibilities of patronage, prestige, and promotion at the very moment when the burdens imposed upon the Welsh population were increasing.

Nowhere is this more marked and commented upon, than in the relatively short military career of Owain Glyndŵr before 1400. His appearance in the retinues of Sir Gregory Sais at Berwick-upon-Tweed in 1384 and with the earl of Arundel in 1387 might be said to be pivotal to his later career. Among the ninety-eight squires serving with Owain at Berwick were friends and neighbors, many of whom joined him in rebellion. One of the themes that emerges very clearly from the "Soldier in Medieval England " project is the development of a "military community" in Wales. Though Owain himself was a descendant of pre-conquest Welsh princes, he was representative of a fully developed, bilingual elite in Wales which included the families of English settlers in its ranks for whom military service was an essential form of expression.

Owain Glyndŵr[75]

Before his conversion to the cause of Welsh independence, Glyndŵr had given sterling service on behalf of the English crown.[76] This was a fascinating part of his career, and one on which our project can shed some valuable light. As can be see from the database, in 1387, he fought at sea as an esquire in the retinue of the earl of Arundel, who led the expedition; and he was first in the list of esquires named on the muster roll for the follow-up campaign of 1388.[77] One can find these entries on the online database by searching for the first name Owen, or the surname Glyndouerdy. This surname derives from one of his estates at Glyndyfrdwy; the English variant, "Glendower" is a product of his appearance in Shakespeare's *Henry IV*.[78] The database throws up three entries: two for 1387, one from a retinue listing and the other from the muster roll; and one for 1388, from the muster

[75] This case study by Adrian R Bell, Adam Chapman and David Simpkin was first published online as a soldier profile on the project website: http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/soldier/database/SoM/December2007.php.

[76] See R.R. Davies, *The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr* (Oxford, 1997) for details of Owain's subsequent career.

[77] For details on these campaigns see Bell, *War and the Soldier*.

[78] For Owain's estates, see J.E. Lloyd, *Owen Glendower/Owain Glyndŵr* (Oxford, 1931), 9-16.

roll. Despite being recorded, the entry on the muster roll for 1388 has been crossed through, an indication that Glyndŵr did not turn up for that year's expedition.[79] In 1387, he served in Arundel's retinue alongside two other interesting figures from Welsh history: his brother, Tudor ap Gruffudd,[80] and Goronwy ap Tudor.[81] The latter figure came to a particularly nasty end after being captured at the beginning of the revolt in September, 1400. Having taken part in the opening attack on Ruthin, in northeastern Wales, he was drawn and quartered and the various parts of his body were later sent to Bristol, Ludlow, Hereford, and Chester to serve as a warning to the Welsh and possibly as reassurance to the English.[82] This attack was part of a general uprising in north Wales in which Denbigh, Rhuddlan, Flint, Holt, Oswestry, and Welshpool were attacked. Further risings took place in the north-west, including within Anglesey. The rebellion was suppressed by a swift three week campaign led by Henry IV. Afterwards in March, 1401, the crown issued a general pardon for North Wales.[83]

The future rebel served in Richard II's expedition to Scotland in 1385[84]; indeed, Glyndŵr testified to this in his deposition to the Court of Chivalry in the following year.[85] He may have served in the retinue of Sir Degory Sais on this campaign.[86] This is quite likely as Owain had been associated with Sir Degory in a military capacity since at least 1384. Owain and his brother can be found on two muster rolls dating from that year, which show

[79] For 1387 we will use the muster roll reference, TNA: PRO, E101/40/33 to denote service on campaign. Owain Glyndŵr, 1387: TNA: PRO, E101/40/33 m 1, listed as Oweyn Glyndou'dy, esquire, 48th in retinue of earl of Arundel and the 8th listed esquire. 1388: TNA: PRO, E101/41/5 m 1, listed as Oweyn Glyndouerdy, esquire, 33rd in retinue of earl of Arundel and the 1st esquire listed. However, this entry is crossed at the side and crossed out.

[80] Search database for first name Tudor. Tudor ap Gruffudd, 1387: TNA: PRO, E101/40/33 m 1d, listed as Tudor de Glyndore, esquire, 93rd in retinue of earl of Arundel. Not listed next to his brother Owain, but is listed next to Gronw ap Tudour, see following note.

[81] Search database for surname Tudor; in common with most Welshmen of this period this is a patronym rather than a fixed surname. Owain himself would be Owain ap Gruffydd Fychan (Owain son of Gruffydd the younger) for example. Goronwy ap Tudur, 1387: TNA: PRO, E101/40/33 m 1d, listed as Grono ap Tudour, esquire, 94th in retinue of earl of Arundel. Listed next to Tudor de Glyndore, see above note.

[82] Davies, *Owain*, 103.

[83] *CPR, Henry IV*, vol. 1 (1399-1401), 451-52.

[84] Anthony Goodman, "Owain Glyn Dŵr before 1400," *Welsh Historical Review*, 5 (1970-71): 67-70.

[85] *Scrope and Grosvenor*, 1:254 for Owain and 260 for Tudor.

[86] For the retinue of Sir Degory Seys, 1385: Lewis, "The Last Medieval Summons," 17, listed as Seys, Degory, knight, retinue consisted of 9 soldiers, including 3 esquires and 6 archers.

that they were serving in Sais' retinue in the garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed.[87]

That Owain and his brother should have served with the Flintshire knight, must come as no surprise. Not only was Sir Degory Sais[88] the only notable Welsh commander on the English side following the resumption of the conflict with France in 1369, but both his origins and experience placed him geographically close to Owain and his estates. Both his father and brother had served Edward, the Black Prince, as sheriff in Flint and Sir Degory's status within the Welsh community was equally significant. In common with much of the administrative elite of North Wales, he was descended from Ednyfed Fychan (d. 1246), the steward of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth.[89]

Glyndŵr's other early military connection was to Richard Fitz Alan, earl of Arundel. That this was a significant relationship is suggested not only by Glyndŵr's appearance in Arundel's retinue on successive campaigns in the late 1380s, but also by comments made in two fifteenth-century chronicles, where Owain is named as one of the earl's esquires.[90] Anthony Goodman notes that the relationship between Arundel and Glyndŵr was founded on a shared locality, for they were neighboring landholders in the Marches near to the border towns of Chirk and Oswestry. This regional connection probably accounts for Glyndŵr's service in Arundel's retinue and parallels the geographic link between Owain and Degory. Goodman believes that Arundel retained the services of Owain from at least 1385, and that he was possibly linked to the earl before this. If so, it is likely that Glyndŵr was one of the earl's chief supporters during the Appellant crisis of the late 1380s, when the earl took up arms against Richard II's favorites. In fact, Goodman speculates that Owain may have indented to serve the earl in peace and war, and that he therefore probably joined with Arundel in his defiance of the king at the battle of Radcot Bridge (December, 1387).

So what drove Owain to rebel against the new regime of Henry IV, given that his relationship with the earl of Arundel (and perhaps with the earl's son, Thomas) may have made him a natural supporter of the Lancastrian

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87 1384, TNA: PRO, E101/39/39 m.1, listed as Owen Glyndourdo and Tedyr Glynderdo; TNA: PRO, E101/39/40 m.1, listed as Owen Glyndouido and Tedyr Glynderdo.

88 Sais is a Welsh name that means "The English."

89 A.D. Carr, "A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War: Sir Gregory Sais." *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1977), 40-53.

90 *Euliogium Historiarum sive Temporis*, ed. F.S. Haydon, III, Rolls Series (London, 1863), 388; John Capgrave, *Liber de Illustribus Henrics*, ed. F.C. Hingeston, Rolls Series (London, 1858), 110.

usurper? It appears that Glyndŵr did not prosper under the new regime; indeed, he seems to have lost out in a dispute with one of his neighbours in north-east Wales, Reginald Grey, lord of Ruthin. Both had served under Arundel at sea in 1387.[91] Grey was a strong supporter of both the earl and Henry IV; and it would seem that the new king favored his support over that of the Welsh esquire. It has been suggested, moreover, that Grey deliberately caused the rift between Henry and Glyndŵr when he failed to deliver to Owain a summons for service in Scotland, which the king had issued!

Since Glyndŵr's family held its lands as tenants of the English crown, it was expected that they would serve the king in a military capacity.[92] Owain was fully aware of this relationship and expected to be called upon for military service.[93] The call, however, was not forthcoming. This sketch of a military career, taken mainly from the information contained in the online database, is illuminating. It demonstrates that during the 1380s Owain and his supporters served as soldiers in an English garrison force on the Scottish borders fought on the expedition led by Richard II to Scotland in 1385, and took part in the expedition led by the earl of Arundel in 1387. When Owain later led a rebellion against the English crown, he may well have used tactics taught to him while a soldier in the English army. It was by a cruel twist of fate, therefore, that Glyndŵr's former companions in arms later featured prominently in the effort to quench his rebellion.

VIII. *Conclusion*

With the database populated and available on line, our aim is now to carry out a full analysis of the data. Although we have been able to demonstrate the value of the database in aiding the reconstruction of military careers, there are important questions to be asked about the composition of armies and the level of military participation by different social groups. In particular, what brought about a significant change in the ratio of men-at-arms to archers. By the end of the period, English armies contained many more

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[91] Search database for surname Grey. Sir Reginald Grey, 1387: TNA: PRO, E101/40/33 m 1, listed as Sir Reginald de Grey, 9th in the retinue of earl of Arundel.

[92] A.D. Carr, "An Aristocracy in Decline: The Native Welsh Aristocracy after the Edwardian Conquest," *Welsh History Review* 5 (1970-1971): pp. 103-29.

[93] *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, ed. J.G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1935), 245-47.

archers than they had at the start of it. For example, in the late fourteenth century, there was still one archer for every man-at-arms. During the Welsh wars of the early 1400s, however, an optimum ratio of 3:1 developed. And by the 1440s, some armies had as many as twelve archers to each man-at-arms. Another question to be resolved: why did the number of knights participating in English armies tend to diminish throughout the period. Both this and a similar trend in terms of the military participation ratio of the nobility could be interpreted as indicative of the decline of older traditional habits of service that was now replaced by a professional soldiery independent of social status in civilian life. Can it be coincidence that during the last decades of the fourteenth and first decades of the fifteenth century the term "esquire" came to be used interchangeably with that of "man-at-arms," while "yeoman" became a synonym for "archer"? War was shaping society just as much as society shaped war. The team is currently taking on many of these themes in a jointly authored book that will discuss the period under investigation (1369-1453). It will consider how England's approach to warfare against France changed over time from expeditionary armies in the late-fourteenth century to forces of occupation in the fifteenth. It will look at what impact this shift in strategy had on the military service patterns of individual soldiers. We will also use the database to move the debate away from the war service of the English peerage by exploring the military careers of many other types of soldiers.

Fig. 1. Muster roll for the garrison of Roxburgh [TNA: PRO, E101/40/42].



Fig. 2. Indenture of Earl Richard of Arundel, 1388 [TNA: PRO, E101/41/14].



Fig. 3. Muster roll for naval expedition, 1387 TNA: PRO, E101/40/33.

Fig. 4. The Bishop of Durham's castle at Norham.

PART TWO

WAR LEADERS GOOD AND EVIL

A GROWING TRUST: EDWARD III AND HIS HOUSEHOLD KNIGHTS, 1330-1340

Christopher A. Candy

Edward III (r.1327-1377) relied on a fairly narrow group of men to provide the retinues of men-at-arms and archers who served at the core of his forces during the 1330s as he fought to assert control over Scotland. The majority of these men came from expected sources—the group who were trying to regain their lost Scottish titles, collectively known as the Disinherited;[1] the northern lords of England defending their regional interests; and the earls and major members of the household identified by James Bothwell as part of the "New Nobility"[2]—men such as Henry Grosmont, Thomas Beauchamp, and William Montague. Among the groups who provided Edward with the bulk of his men-at-arms, the most reliable were the lesser knights of the royal household. Not only did they provide consistent numbers for every campaign; but also from among their ranks came the generation of retinue leaders such as Thomas Bradeston and Reginald Cobham who formed the linchpin of Edward III's campaigns in France. This paper will investigate the reciprocal relationship between Edward III and these men during the first decade of his independent rule, and detail how Edward's trust in them was built as much through their non-martial services to the crown as through their direct contributions on the battlefields of Scotland.

I. *The Role of the Household Knights*

The traditional role of the household knight was obvious—to serve the crown as a highly skilled, heavily armed soldier, particularly in times of war. Alongside the squires and sergeants-at-arm also retained by the crown,

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[1] The best published secondary work defining the Disinherited and their activities in Scotland is still Ranald Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327-1335* (Oxford, 1965). More recent useful additions include Clifford Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000) and Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, v. 1: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990).

[2] James Bothwell, *Edward III and the English Peerage: Royal Patronage, Social Mobility and Political Control in Fourteenth-Century England* (Woodbridge,Suffolk, 2004).

they provided the center of the English cavalry force from the eleventh century to the mid-fourteenth.[3] It was also anticipated that these men would bring their own individual retinues to receive royal wages, multiplying their military power several-fold. This effect was enhanced by the addition of various knights who were not in receipt of robes and fees, yet were paid through the wardrobe and identified for accounting purposes as members of the king's household [4]

The primary role of the lesser household knights was to provide military force for the king, both in respect to quantity and quality. However, these individual contributions were tiny when compared to the number of men-at-arms provided by magnates such as the earls of Lancaster and Warwick. While the greatest bannerets of the household such as William Montague could match what established earls could provide, those of lesser rank could not compete.[5] Even though Lancaster provided 113 men-at-arms to the campaign in 1335, the typical household knight brought with him only half-a-dozen.[6] Nevertheless, these numbers did add up. Not including the great bannerets, the household could provide approximately 350 men-at-arms for Edward's major campaigns and sizeable, though smaller contingents for lesser actions.[7]

The greatest military utility of the household lay in its consistency: it could be counted on to provide similar numbers over the course of many campaigns. During the Great Offensive of 1335, which saw the largest English army assembled in the 1330s, the 334 men supplied by the household only comprised twelve percent of Edward's force; it was dwarfed by far by the 2242 men provided by magnates.[8] However, the previous winter campaign to Roxburgh in 1334 had seen magnates contribute only 818 men as compared to the household's 379.[9] This situation had enfuriated Edward to the point that he angrily threatened numerous knights for their failure

[3] Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 38-41.

[4] This was often done with contingents too small to be accounted for independently in the way that the retinues of the great earls or bannerets would be; see British Library [BL] Cotton Nero C VIII, ff.. 233-47.

[5] Of course, Montague himself would be made an earl in 1337 along with Robert Ufford, William Bohun, and William Clinton.

[6] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 236v.

[7] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, ff. 233-47.

[8] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, ff.. 236-39v.

[9] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, ff. 233-35v.

to appear despite his summons.[10] While the numbers of men-at-arms brought to any campaign by English magnates might vary radically, the military contribution of the household remained fairly constant. Regardless of conditions or the popularity of the campaign, Edward could depend on having at least this solid corps of men-at-arms supporting his military efforts. This is unsurprising; after all, fighting on behalf of the king was key to their positions in the household. It was the very purpose for which Edward III retained their services.

However, tracing the individual participation and achievements of the household knights in the fighting in Scotland presents challenges. Lesser members of the household appear in few writs relating directly to the Scottish campaigns. Several of these men, including such well-known individuals as Reginald Cobham, Maurice de Berkeley, and William FitzWarin, are conspicuously absent from much of the written correspondence that survives. We know these individuals served with the king in Scotland from various letters of protection, horse inventories, and royal accounting in the wardrobe books of the period, but little other correspondence indicates their presence fighting in the north. Even Robert Benhale, winner of a single combat against the Scotsman Turnbull before the battle of Halidon Hill (1333) is absent from mention in any writs for his contributions to the campaign.[11] The presence of these men in Edward's army is the most likely explanation for this lack of correspondence—this would make anything other than verbal communication redundant. During the 1334 fighting in Scotland, only two knights of the household were not serving at the king's side.[12]

Rather than serving in positions of command, most of these men constituted the rank and file, a fact reflected by their notable absence from the writs setting quotas of men for military campaigns from the various counties. Writs requesting men for the planned Irish expedition of 1332, an expedition that was diverted to Scotland, list only Ralph Neville, William Montague, William Clinton, Roger Swynnerton, and Robert Ufford—all bannerets—as commissioners of array.[13] Similarly, William Montague is the only household knight or banneret appearing in a call for infantry from Wales, this despite the fact that William FitzWarin, as constable of

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[10] *Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati*, ed. David Macpherson, 2 vols. (London, 1814), 1:292-94, 302.

[11] *Chronicon de Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke*, ed. E.M. Thompson. (Oxford, 1889), 51.

[12] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, ff. 233-35v; Nicholson, *Edward III*, 98.

[13] *Calendar of Patent Rolls* [hereafter *CPR*], *Edward III, 1327-1377*, 18 vols. (London, 1891-1914), vol. 2 (1330-1334), 487-88.

Montgomery Castle, would have been an obvious choice as commissioner for troops from county Montgomery.[14]

It is only towards the end of the decade that the household knights begin to play a greater role in both the administration and conduct of the war. Several are appointed to the commissions of array for raising troops: for instance in 1337, Giles Beauchamp was ordered to raise one hundred archers from the Forest of Dean.[15] They also are trusted with increasingly important missions on behalf of the king during the fighting in France. Walter Mauny would strike the first blow of the war against the French by briefly seizing the island of Cadzand in 1337,[16] while at Sluys it was Reginald Cobham who successfully spied out the order of the French fleet and the favourable conditions for the victory that followed.[17]

In short, while the household contingent was always an important part of the king's military power, it was not the source of the bulk of the forces raised throughout the counties of England and Wales during the 1330s. This task was left in the hands of local magnates and officials of the individual shires. Nor were the lesser household knights the men who actually led the troops levied either by local commissions of array or through indentured retinues that were not part of their own personal following

II. *Non-Military Duties*

We must now examine how else these men were employed and how they were rewarded for their services. We must also explain the level of trust that Edward III placed in his household knights and their overall significance in his planning. As part of their service, these men performed non-military roles that required the use of initiative, independence, and leadership, qualities that would translate well to military command. We also encounter a pattern of rewards meant to bind these men more tightly to the crown. As a result, the monarch forged a collection of trusted subordinates, men who could replace the generation of Montague, Bohun, Ufford, and Clinton during and after the 1340s.

The command of important royal castles was an obvious role for household knights, as their proximity and affiliation with the king made them

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14 *Calendar of Close Rolls* [hereafter *CCR*], *Edward III, 1327-1377*, 14 vols. (London, 1896-1913), vol. 3 (1333-1337), 26.

15 *Rotuli*, 1:480.

16 Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 143.

17 Sumption, *Trial By Battle*, p 216, 325.

trustworthy enough to maintain these centers of royal power. Such assignments did not cluster in any specific geographic area, but instead spread throughout the kingdom and tended to be close to the personal holdings and power bases of the knights. Thomas Bradeston, with his lands and interests in Gloucester, received the keepership of Gloucester Castle, a position he had held previously from Queen Isabella.[18] In a similar way, Giles Beauchamp became constable of Scarborough Castle,[19] Gawain Corder received Leeds Castle,[20] William Frank, Tickhill Castle,[21] and William FitzWarin, the important Marcher castle of Montgomery as well as Knaresborough in Yorkshire.[22] Not only did this assignment require the maintenance and upkeep of the castle and its garrison; it also often meant acting as jailer for imprisoned Scots such as Alexander Mowbray captured during the war.[23]

The care of royal forests received like treatment. Two key positions of this type—keepers of the forests north and south of the Trent—were reserved for bannerets, in particular Ralph Neville and Robert Ufford throughout the early part of Edward's reign.[24] On the other hand, individual forests were often assigned to the care of lesser-ranked members of the household. Examples of this include Giles Beauchamp being put in charge of Clarendon, Thomas Bradeston receiving Kingswood and Filwood in Gloucester, and William FitzWarin having charge of the woods surrounding Knaresborough Castle.[25] There was a decided preference for keeping control of the forests and the rights to the hunting and timber as closely under control of the crown as possible. Two typical commissions of this sort were those William FitzWarin received in 1332 and again in 1337 in order to deal with the poachers and illegal woodcutters in several forests of north Yorkshire as well as to enforce the royal rights to Knaresborough forest.[26]

The navy also saw service by members of the royal household, since it was key to both controlling the waters off Scotland and for the transport of soldiers and supplies necessary to maintain military operations in the

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[18] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 6.

[19] *CCR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1333), *passim*.

[20] *CCR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 45, 123.

[21] *CPR*, *Edward III*, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 294.

[22] *CPR*, *Edward III*, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 31, 84, 107-8, 344, 386, 441, 512.

[23] FitzWarin's deputy at Knaresborough accounted for the costs of Mowbray's incarceration in 1338. The National Archive [TNA]: Public Record Office [PRO], E 101/21/19.

[24] See *CCR*, Edward III, vol. 1 (1327-1330), vol. 2 (1330-1333), and vol. 3 (1333-1337), *passim*

[25] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 386, 537; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 201.

[26] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 386; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 441.

region. William Clinton, one of the better known bannerets, was appointed constable of Dover and had responsibility for readying naval forces supplied by the Cinque Ports. Lesser household knights with seafaring knowledge or connections to the southwest of England also handled naval matters. The Hainaulter, Walter Mauny, was active in this sphere, serving as admiral north of the Thames in 1332. Ironically, his capture of John Crabbe, a Flemish pirate serving the Scots, took place inland near Roxburgh.[27] Six years later, Reginald Cobham oversaw preparations for the planned crossing to Gascony.[28]

Household knights were also common recipients of custodies and wardships. By using them, Edward acquired trusted subordinates to temporarily manage the assets of vassals who had died or forfeited their lands. The discharge of these responsibilities also provided a financial reward to men for faithful and long-term service. One clear example of this can be seen in the crown's decision of November, 1334, to grant to Maurice de Berkeley stewardship over the lands and chattels of John Mautravers the younger. Another involved granting custody to Thomas Bradeston over the heir to the lands of Edmund of Kent.[29] Many opportunities arose for the crown to make such grants. For example, there were the lands of the Despensers, later those of Roger Mortimer, and still later the lands of Scots who supported David Bruce after the entrance of Edward III into the Scottish conflict. Even David Strathbolgie, who was identified with Edward Balliol's regime, found his lands in England forfeited and placed in Walter Mauny's hands during a brief period when he joined the Scots in the fight against England.[30]

Several members of the household also participated in an activity closely allied with their military role – that of law enforcement. A number of these knights regularly dealt with specific cases of malfeasance or criminal activity. Thomas Wake of Blisworth acted on commissions of oyer and terminer in Yorkshire in addition to his duties as sheriff of Northampton.[31] In 1332, John Sturmy regularly associated with the chief justice, Geoffrey le Scrope, and with Ralph Neville to investigate problems such as enforce-

27 *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland Preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office* [hereafter *CDS*], ed. J. Bain, 5 vols. (Edinburgh, 1881-1987), vol. 3 (1307-1357), no. 1086.

28 Reginald's activities here were undoubtedly helped by the presence of his cousin John. TNA: PRO, C 47/2/63/10. See below, note 57.

29 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 42,78, 471; *CCR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1333-1337), *passim*.

30 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 89.

31 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 170, 203.

ment of assizes in the city of Lincoln and the arrest of those persons disturbing the peace in fourteen different counties.[32] On several occasions, the crown also was assigned him to investigate trespasses within the household itself.[33]

William FitzWarin, much like Wake of Blisworth, was heavily used for these commissions both within and outside of the regions where he held a specific office. In 1332, while acting as constable of Montgomery Castle in the marches of Wales, FitzWarin received commissions to deal with attacks upon the hundreds of Chirbury and Halseton undertaken by the men of Kedewynk and Kery.[34] William also received royal commissions to investigate the *murage* collectors in Montgomery.[35] Outside of Wales, he investigated allegations of illegal prises by the king and queen's separate households in 1331 and again in 1335; he pursued poachers and oppressive bailiffs in Knaresborough Forest in 1332; and, in 1331, associated with John Lesturmy, he acted as a judge looking into trespasses within the household.[36]

Other household knights engaged in the grittier activities of direct enforcement—maintaining the peace and apprehending those already determined to have broken the law. Two other examples best illustrate this use of the household troops as enforcement officers. From 1336 onward, William Frank received commissions to keep the peace in various parts of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and Lincolnshire, including a commission issued in September, 1336, calling for the arrest of one Robert Breton of Panton, who had assaulted and robbed a tax collector in Yorkshire.[37] The other example concerns the actions of a hero of Halidon Hill, Robert Benhale. The crown used Benhale in East Anglia to investigate assaults on the king's wool fleet that had taken place at Orwell and to arrest specific individuals in the region.[38]

As in modern times, officers of the law did not achieve a complete success rate in carrying out their duties. William Frank never caught Robert Breton. In addition, writs issued in January, 1337 ordered Breton freed if he happened to be arrested, since he had already turned himself in and found

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32 Ibid., 199, 295.

33 Ibid., 137, 139, 582.

34 Ibid., 298; *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 84.

35 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 198. The *murage* was a tax levied for the repair of town walls or the construction of new urban fortresses.

36 Ibid., 139, 198, 386; *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 374.

37 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 362.

38 Ibid., 373, 576.

mainpernors to vouch for his future conduct.[39] However, Frank's failure pales in comparison to that suffered by Robert Benhale in his efforts to arrest Thomas Paunflote in Little Yarmouth. The attempts led to a riot in the town that caused the deaths of two of Benhale's men. This debacle occasioned further arrests ordered by the crown, and the dispatch of additional reinforcements, including Robert Ufford, now earl of Suffolk.[40]

Perhaps most amusing about Robert Benhale's involvement in law enforcement were his previous brushes in the law. In July, 1331, Robert needed the the king to intervene with the treasurer regarding certain unnamed offences so he could find mainpernors willing to guarantee his good conduct.[41] Other household knights also experienced such dubious incidents in their past. In 1334, Maurice Berkeley had to be pardoned for poaching within Sherwood Forest. At about the same time, he required another royal pardon for having sheltered the outlaw, John Mautravers, whose lands and chattels he would receive from the crown in 1335.[42] In such cases, a man's loyalty to the king and willingness to carry out his instructions trumped any royal concerns over the absence of a lily-white reputation.

Another common use for the household knights was as emissaries and diplomats to foreign kings and magnates. As personal retainers of the king, they could represent his interests overseas. In most cases, such a role was reserved for the bannerets of the household, whose high rank rendered them acceptable in the eyes of foreign potentates. There were, however, exceptions. Two lesser-ranking knights played a prominent in diplomatic dealings with continental powers. One of these was William FitzWarin, given charge of the mission in 1330 to secure alliances with the duke of Brabant and the count of Flanders. Five years later, Edward dispatched this same figure to Otto, duke of Austria. On this occasion, FitzWarin failed in his attempts to negotiate a marriage between Otto's eldest son, Frederick, and his master's daughter, Joan.[43]

Another knight who came more recently to the diplomatic game was Reginald Cobham, who would later become a significant player during the Hundred Years War. Cobham would serve as marshal during the Black

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[39] Ibid., 377. A *mainpernor* was a suretor who guaranteed that a defendant would answer charges in court on the appointed day.

[40] Ibid., 448; TNA: PRO, SC 8/241/12030.

[41] *CCR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1333), 330.

[42] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 563; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 111.

[43] TNA: PRO, E101/311/18; *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 7; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 191.

Prince's campaign in 1355.[44] In April, 1337, he was appointed along with William Montague and William Clinton to negotiate with the count of Flanders for the marriage of the count's eldest son to Joan. This was same woman for whom William FitzWarin had tried to negotiate an Austrian match two years earlier. The 1337 mission had as a second goal the establishment of a wool staple outside of England.[45]

III. *The Rewards of Service*

In return for their various services, the household knights could expect a number of rewards alongside the custodies, keeperships, and other paid positions that were part and parcel of the job. The official pay of the position, the robes and fees, was nowhere near the actual value of the job that the knights were undertaking, nor was it truly capable of paying for the expenses of these men to maintain their position and necessary equipment. In 1334, a banneret would receive 10 marks in fees and 8 marks in robes, £12 per year in total. A simple knight would receive half of this amount, only £6.[46]

However, few if any of the knights would have to depend solely upon these funds. All had lands and other means of support. If this was not enough for the household knights to fully maintain themselves independently of the king, Edward was very careful to provide the additional means of support to those men who required it. Just as the king conferred large grants to support the men, whom he created as earls in 1337, so too he supplied proportionally smaller grants of land to the knights of the household to uphold their enhanced status. Maurice Berkeley received the manors of Mawardyn and Wynforton "for his better maintainance"; Thomas Bradeston the life rent of the Gloucester farm; Reginald Cobham the manor of Cippenham, Buckinghamshire; and Thomas Lucy, Allerdale in Cumberland.[47]

Even if the lands were not currently available, the crown would still make its grants for maintenance of the household retainers. Ordinarily, the crown bestowed a certain value in pounds sterling per year, with the

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[44] Geoffrey le Baker, quoted in *Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince*, ed. and trans. Richard Barber (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1997), 61.

[45] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 421, 428.

[46] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, ff.. 223v, 225v. By comparison, esquires and the king's sergeant-at-arms received daily wages of 12 and 7½d. a day, respectively. R. Partlington, "Edward III's Enforcers: the King's Sergeant-at-arms in the Localities," in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. James S. Bothwell (York, 2001), 95.

[47] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 6, 145, 493; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 401.

exchequer ordered to provide the sum in lieu of actual lands. A common grant of this type was £20 to maintain the status of the recipient as a knight. For instance, in 1333, Thomas Lucy was granted this sum until lands could be found of the same value, while Edmund Ufford received the same amount in 1337. These grants could take years before being converted into actual land holdings; Lucy did not obtain the property of his Allerdale grant until 1354.[48] Similarly, in 1335 and 1336, Reginald Cobham was granted 100 and afterwards 300 marks per year for the maintenance of his rank of banneret, though he still drew robes and fees at a knight's wage in the following year.[49]

More common were payments for "good service," "long service," or "faithful service." Three examples from 1335 are Thomas Bradeston receiving the manors of Duns and Cherneside in Berwickshire; Walter Mauny £100 per year from the exchequer; and William FitzWarin, the life grant of Montgomery Castle and the hundred of Chirbury.[50] Combined with the custodies of lands, such as that which Thomas Bradeston exercised over the earldom of Kent, wardship of minors like Walter Mauny's over the son and heir of John de Shelton, and the keeping of castles or other royal properties, knights in Edward's service could expect quite a satisfactory income.[51]

That Edward would provide these rewards is unsurprising. Not only would it bind the knights of his household more closely to him, but it would also directly enhance his own military power by expanding the number of men that his household knights could recruit and bring on campaign. These grants did not come without some controversy, since many of them were based upon lands that had escheated to the crown through the mass forfeitures associated with the fall of powerful figures such as Thomas of Lancaster and Roger Mortimer. Heirs of these various disgraced men often expected the lands to be returned once they had regained royal favour. The grant of the castle and manor of Llanfair in Wales to Thomas Bradeston, for instance, was challenged by Alice, the widow of Thomas, earl of Lancaster, and by the late earl's brother, Henry.[52] While not as desirable as property unencumbered with legal challenges, such donations were another reason for the household knights to maintain their close ties to

[48] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 493; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 495.
[49] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 223v; *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 117, 346.
[50] *CDS*, vol 3 (1307-1357), no. 1181; *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 84, 90.
[51] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 478; vol. 2 (1334-1338), 180.
[52] TNA: PRO, DL 10/274; DL10/287; DL 10/288.

Edward; after all, they might need his support for their clouded titles to these lands.[53]

The household knights could also expect royal intervention to help repair losses they had suffered in the king's service. Amanieu Ffossato, a Gascon serving as a household knight, received £100 a year from the exchequer in partial compensation for damages his lands in Gascony had suffered due to "the late war in Aquitaine." In addition, the king might take action when his demands on his men caused them harm or expense, as, for example, when Edward Chandos was granted the custody of Horston Castle rent free in recompense for "expenses in staying continually at [the king's] side."[54] Such men also obtained compensation when relieved of the various spoils of war: Walter Mauny received 1000 marks when the king appropriated the ransom of John Crabbe, the Flemish pirate who had been captured near Roxburgh. Apparently, by this means, the king gained a notable siege engineer—John Crabbe can be found as a squire in the wardrobe book of 1334. For his part, Mauny would not suffer a financial loss when he surrendered Crabbe's ransom.[55]

Other advantages also accrued from royal service. Rents due the crown could be pardoned by the king, something that happened in the case of Thomas Bradeston in 1337.[56] Protections against prosecution while on royal business were regularly granted: Giles Beauchamp received one when serving in the Scottish campaign of 1333. Gawain Corder obtained three separate protections covering the period from March, 1332 until August, 1334 while he was overseas in the king's service. Edward also issued writs forgiving Corder for having failed to show up in court for a suit pressed against him by Roger de Isle during his absence.[57] Finally, household members could exert their influence by pleading on behalf of others. In this way, Reginald Cobham requested that Gervase Alard be pardoned[58] of all his

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[53] A more detailed examination of the various types of land grants and rewards that household knights and others could receive can be found in Bothwell, *Edward III and the English Peerage*, chap. 2.

[54] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 173; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 27.

[55] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 225v; *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 459; *CDS*, v 3 (1307-1357), no.1086.

[56] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 471.

[57] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 265, 401, 420, 461; *CCR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1333), 441. De Isle's suit regarding half the manor of Grafton in Northamptonshire had already been delayed for over a decade by 1330 [TNA: PRO, SC 8/54/2653].

[58] For more about English pardons and exemption, see L.J. Andrew Villalon, "'Taking the King's Shilling,' to Avoid 'the Wages of Sin': English Royal Pardons for Military Malefactors during the Hundred Years War," in this volume.

offences against Edward II and Maurice Berkeley successfully appealed to have Gerald Bossard and William de la Felde exempted from being called to serve on juries or as a royal official.[59]

Though a few of the household knights such as Maurice Berkeley had extensive holdings of their own, the majority appear to have been men without extensive lands or personal income. The necessity for a yearly income granted by the crown is ample proof of that. Even without large personal fortunes, such men tended to be well-connected. Their surnames demonstrate that a number of these men were related to major political players of the time. Maurice Berkeley was related to Thomas Berkeley; Norman Darcy was a cousin of John Darcy, a powerful figure in the northern England and the justiciar in Ireland. Reginald Cobham served alongside his cousin, John, a royal clerk, tax collector, and warden of the Cinque Ports.[60] The Chandos family was represented among the household knights by Edward Chandos. Giles Beauchamp was related to the earls of Warwick. Thomas Lucy was the son of Anthony Lucy and would ultimately replace him as sheriff in Cumberland. All of their own recruitment of men showed a definite attempt to build ties with an English nobility that had been so fractious under Edward II.

IV. *Conclusion*

Given the troubles experienced during Edward II's reign, it made sense that Edward III would start afresh in his choice of household retainers and would use that position to forge new bonds with those whom his father had alienated. There also seems to have been an attempt to recruit household knights from all parts of the kingdom. There were practical reasons for this geographical diversity: royal servants would be used for assignments throughout the kingdom, assignments that often required some local knowledge. This diversity would also help insure that royal connections with local magnates were firmly established in as many regions as possible, reducing the likelihood of strife.

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[59] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 2 (1330-1334), 8; vol. 3 (1334-1338), 564.

[60] John was responsible for the collection of the fifteenth agreed to by Parliament in 1334 in Kent and the collection of the Cinque Port's contribution of ships in 1335; *CCR*,, Edward III, vol. 3 (1333-1337), 218; *Rotuli*, 1:358-59; Peter Fleming, "Cobham family (*per.* c.1250–c.1530)" in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, New York, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/52781 [accessed October 6, 2010].

From the west came Maurice Berkeley, Reginald Cobham, and Thomas Bradeston; from the north, Thomas Lucy and John Sturmy; from East Anglia, the Uffords and Robert Benhale. Gawain Corder was most active in Kent while Thomas Wake of Blisworth, William Frank, Thomas Rous, and Edward Chandos hailed from the midland counties. Gilbert Talbot and William FitzWarin had intimate knowledge of Wales. There were men from the continent such as Walter Mauny from Hainault and Amanieu Ffossato from Gascony, men who provided knowledge of these regions, much as Otto Grandison had for Edward I. At the same time, there was a marked preference for continuing to recruit from the same families as those already admitted into the royal household. The best example of this was the Ufford clan, who witnessed a dizzying array of brothers and various cousins admitted into royal service throughout the decade.[61]

The use of household knights to fulfill many functions was by no means a novel development during the reign of Edward III. His grandfather, Edward I, had used these men to accomplish the same array of missions and administrative positions and to handle similar administrative posts. Even the geographic and familial patterns of recruitment were similar; the single major difference lay in Edward III's preference for Hainaulters instead of the Savoyards of Edward I's day.[62] One advantage that Edward III did have over his grandfather resided in his ability to reward his followers. The vast forfeitures of the periods of Edward II and Roger Mortimer gave Edward III the largesse necessary to enhance the status of an entire class whom Bothwell terms "new men."

Nor would this pattern disappear with the first generation of Edward III's knights. Chris Given-Wilson has shown how the role for the "knights of the chamber" (those that replaced the knights of the household after 1360) were domestically and administratively oriented, rather than having an essentially military function.[63] These later men were expected to carry out diplomatic missions and legal inquiries, to take on custodies of castles, and to handle various special commissions. In short, they assumed the same roles as we have seen in the case of Edward III's household knights.[64]

In conclusion, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Edward III relied upon his men for more than simple military service. They provided him

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[61] BL Cotton Nero C VIII, ff.. 223-26.

[62] M. Prestwich, *Edward I* (New Haven, Conn., 1997), 145-57.

[63] C. Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in England 1360-1413* (New Haven, Conn., 1986), 207-11.

[64] This runs counter to Chris Given's argument that the chamber knights are distinctly different from the household knights of Edward III's early reign.

administrative officials, law enforcement officers, diplomatic agents, and political advocates. They united the crown with many of the local magnate families in England. Their various roles required a number of the same abilities essential in a capable military commander, abilities necessary to command troops in battle. It seems unlikely that Edward III would have failed to take advantage of those abilities as they developed. Once they had demonstrated their capabilities in non-military roles, they were ready to make the transition to service in "the war of France."

BATTLE-SEEKING COMMANDERS IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: PHASES OF GENERALSHIP IN THE WAR OF THE TWO PEDROS

Donald J. Kagay

One of America's most prolific authors and speakers on medieval warfare, Kelly DeVries, wrote in 2008 that the Hundred Years War was not a unitary conflict that involved only England and France. It was instead, he asserted, a set of linked military actions that ranged from the Low Countries to the Holy Roman Empire to the Iberian states.[1] All of these international arenas of conflict, though originating from local causes with long and extremely complex histories, were eventually caught up in the widening struggle between the French and the English. A perfect example of this transformation of indigenous conflicts in the great maelstrom of international warfare was the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366), a contest between Castile and the Crown of Aragon that steadily expanded after the treaty of Bretigny (1360) freed mercenaries serving English and French masters to seek lucrative employment on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees.[2] To gauge how this Iberian military struggle altered as it was swept along by the burgeoning influence of the Hundred Years War, this paper will focus on the changing dynamics of generalship demonstrated by its two protaganists: Pere III of Aragon (r.1336-1387) and Pedro I of Castile (r.1350-1366/69).

I. *Iberia's Asymmetrical Warfare*

Thanks to the influence of the imperial military writer, Vegetius, it has long been understood that in the Middle Ages defensive operations were much

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[1] Kelly DeVries, "The Hundred Years Wars: Not One but Many," in *The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 2-32.

[2] For treaty of Bretigny, see G.P. Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), 92-93; John Palmer, "The War Aims and the Negotiations for Peace," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971), 59-60; John Le Patourel, "The Treaty of Bretigny, 1360," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5th ser. 10 (1960): 19-39. For the passage of mercenaries across the Pyrenees between 1361-1362, see Kenneth Fowler, *The Great Companies* vol. 1 of *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), 54-55, 61.

preferred to those of an offensive nature, except in the case of extended raids (*chevauchées*) which could carry great damage to the enemy with minimal risk.[3] In the Iberian Peninsula with long stretches of extremely fertile coastline divided from the interior by bleak grasslands and harsh uplands marked by the absence of readily accessible water,[4] the maxim of holding one's fire and waiting for the enemy to make a mistake seemed a prudent one. Because the Iberian landscape was even further dominated by strategically placed fortresses, all warfare in the region, no matter who engaged in it, was normally of a much reduced scale. The principal combat technique was the "lightning raid" (*algara*, *aciefa*, *cabalgada*), unleashing on the landscape what one modern military historian has called a "warfare of gradual erosion."[5] This regime of raiding normally existed without pitched battles, but instead put a force of under 1000 horsemen in enemy territory for a week or two. The aim of such operations was to produce maximum damage with minimum risk.[6] This was done by having the raiding force constantly on the move while dealing heavy blows to enemy territory by damaging settlements, destroying crops, rustling livestock, and taking numerous prisoners.[7] One fifteenth-century observer aptly described

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3 *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.P. Milner (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1996), 116 (III:26); *Maurice's Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy*, trans. George T. Dennis (Philadelphia, 1984) 15, 118 (I:3; XI:2); Donald J. Kagay, "The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366)," *The Journal of Military History* 71 (2007): 12-13; Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 58-59. For the effect of the *chevauchée* on civilian population, see: Sean McGlynn, "'Sheer Terror' and The Black Prince's Grand *Chevauchée* of 1355," in this volume

4 Richard Ford, *A Hand-Book for Travellers in Spain and Readers at Home*, ed. Ian Robertson, 3 vols. (Carbondale, Ill., 1966), 2:606-8, 3:1302-4, 1319-20; Karl Baedeker, *Spain and Portugal: Handbook for Travelers* (Leipzig, 1913), 160, 167; Naval Intelligence Division, *Spain and Portugal*, 3 vols. (London, 1941), 1:108, 137; W.B. Fisher and H. Bowen-Jones, *Spain: An Introductory Geography* (New York, 1966), 47.

5 Ana Echevarría, *Knights on the Frontier: The Moorish Guard of the Kings of Castile (1410-1467)*, trans. Martin Beagles (Leiden, 2009), 52-59, esp. 57. See also Francisco Garcia Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam: Estrategías de expansión tácticas militares (siglos xii-xiii)* (Seville, 1998) 65-66; Manuel Rojas Gabriel, "La capacidad militar de la nobleza en la frontera con Granada: El ejemplo de Don Juan Ponce de León, II conde de Arcos y señor de Marchena," *Historia, Instituciones, Documentos* 22 (1995): 500-1.

6 Manuel Rojas Gabriel, *La frontera entre los reinos de Sevilla y Granada en el siglo XV (1390-1481): Un ensayo sobre la violencia y sus manifestaciones* (Cádiz, 1995), 16-17.

7 Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter ACA], Cancillería real, Registro[hereafter R] 46, f. 283v; R. 236, f.222; Andrés Giménez Soler, *Don Juan Manuel: Biografía y estudio crítico* (Zaragoza, 1932), 339, 359-60 (docs. 155, 186); María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *Entre la Paz y la Guerra: La corona catalano-aragonesa y Castilla en la baja Edad Media* (Barcelona, 2005), 324; Juan Torrers Fontes, *Instituciones y sociedad en la frontera murciano-granadina* (Murcia, 2004), 175, 481-82; Manuel Rojas Gabriel, "La nobleza como élite militar en la

the effect of such raiding in the following terms: "we destroyed and burnt wherever we went, so that nothing was left behind us, for all was devastated."[8]

Even when larger armies took to the field, the same geographical determinants clearly affected the way in which they were maneuvered. As in the Latin East, campaigns were conducted "without battles," centering, instead, on castles and fortified urban sites.[9] Even expeditions of this type, however, involved unforeseen risks, such as the demise of Alfonso XI of Castile (r.1312-1350) at the siege of Gibraltar, not from a battlefield wound, but from a bubonic plague infection.[10] Rather than putting oneself in such danger, most commanders took the safe course of defending their frontiers and avoiding battle unless absolutely necessary. Unlike some of Christian Spain's greatest reconquest figures such as Fernando III of Castile (r.1217-1252) and Jaume I of Aragon (r.1214-1276) who looked on the conflict with Muslim *Hispania* as a "war fought in partnership with God" by combatants willing to die "in God's service,"[11] most Iberian commanders would wait out an adversary, even one who had crossed his border and did damage to his realm. Though opposed to modern views of chivalry in the Middle Ages, this cautious course was very much in line with such medieval Spanish political and military theorists as Juan Manuel (1282-1348) who counseled intelligent caution above vainglorious rashness for all who engaged in the unpredictable venture of war.[12]

II. *The Iberian Background to Peninsular War*

The longest and most destructive war of fourteenth-century Iberia had nothing to do with the rconquest, but was caused by a series of territorial disputes between the Christian ruling houses of Castile (the dominant

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frontera con Granada: Una reflexión," in *Actos del congreso de frontera oriente nazarí como subjeto histórico (s.XIII-XVI): Lorca, Vera 22 á 24 de Noviembre de 1994*, ed. Pedro Segura Artero (Madrid, 1997), 184-85.

[8] *Diary of Jörg von Ehingen*, trans. Malcolm Letts (London, 1929), 37-38; Echevarría, *Knights*, 58.

[9] Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (1992; reprint, Cambridge, 1995), 184, 207.

[10] Philip Ziegler, *The Black Death* (New York:, 1969), 113-14.

[11] *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon: A Translation of the Medieval Catalan Llibre dels Feyts*, trans. Damian Smith and Helena Buffery (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2003), 188 (chap. 207); Robert I. Burns, S.J., "The Spiritual Life of James the Conqueror of Arago-Catalonia, 1208-1276: Portrait and Self-Portrait," *The Catholic Historical Review* 62 (1976): 18.

[12] García Fitz, *Castilla*, 311-12; Echevarría, *Knights*, 57.

power of the central and southern portions of the Peninsula) and the Crown of Aragon (a ruling coalition of eastern Spanish states whose control stretched from the Pyrenees to south of Valencia).[13] The two polities with similar languages and cultures also had a long history of dynastic connections and disputes dating back into the thirteenth century. With the unexpected death in 1275 of Fernando de la Cerda, the oldest son of Alfonso X of Castile (r.1252-1284), his two sons, the so-called *infantes de la Cerda*, attempted to recover the Castilian throne for their family by manipulating and being manipulated by the Aragonese crown.[14] The bad feelings that simmered between the Castilian and Aragonese royal families eventually burst into open war in 1296 over the issue of Murcia, the rich Muslim principality below Valencia. Jaume I had conquered the region in 1265-1266, but had turned it over to his son-in-law, Alfonso X.[15] After the region had remained under Castilian rule for three decades, Jaume II of Aragon (r.1291-1327) invaded Muria in 1296, rapidly conquering all of it down to the Segura River.[16] Though the Murcian question was eventually settled by the pact of Torrellas in 1304, the region remained an international hot-spot dominated for the next five decades by over-mighty subjects of both kingdoms such as Juan Manuel and Prince Ferran (1329-1363), the royal *infante* who would play an important role in Aragonese and Castilian affairs to mid-century and beyond.[17]

In 1356, after five years of deepening tension, Castile and Aragon lurched into a state of war. Though accepting the young Castilian king, Pedro I as “a brother whom we greatly love and prize,” Pere III of Aragon soon came

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[13] For general histories of these two opponents, see *España cristiana: Crisis de la reconquista*, vol. 14 of *Historia de España*, ed. Ramon Menendez Pidal, 37 vols. (Madrid, 1963-1984); T.N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History* (Oxford, 1986); Joseph F. O’Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975).

[14] Eloy Benito Ruano, “El problema sucessorio de la corona de Castilla a la muerte de don Fernando de la Cerda,” in *VII centenario del Infante Don Fernando de la Cerda. Jornadas de Estudios Ciudad Real, abril 1975* (Madrid, 1976), 217-25; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Causes i antecedentes de la guerra dels dos Peres,” *Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura* 43 (1987): 446-50.

[15] Juan Torres Fontes, *La reconquista de Murcia en 1266 por Jaime I de Aragón* (Murcia, 1987); Josep-David Garrido i Valls, *Jaume I i el regne de Múrcia* (Barcelona, 1997).

[16] ACA, Cancillería real, Cartas reales [Pedro IV], no. 679; Bonifacio Palacios Martin, “La frontera de Aragón con Castilla en la época de Jaime I,” in *X Congreso de historia de l corona de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1975), Comunicaciones 1-2, 480-81; Giménez Soler, *Juan Manuel*, 231 (doc. 7); Jeronimo Zurita, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Angel Canellas Lopez, 8 vols. (Zaragoza, 1967-1985), 2:499-503 (V: xxi); Josep-David Garrido i Valls, *La conquesta del sud Valencià i Múrcia per Jaume II* (Barcelona, 2002), 38-50

[17] Garrido i Valls, *Conquesta*, 81-85; Donald J. Kagay, “The Dynastic Dimension of International Conflict in Fourteenth-Century Iberia,” *Mediterranean Studies* 17 (2008): 78-79.

to distrust his royal counterpart as a *provacateur* willing to use anyone or anything to have his way.[18] Distrust gave way to war in August, 1356, when Catalan privateers captured two Piacenzan merchantmen which stood at anchor in the Castilian port of San Lucas de Barrameda. Since Piacenza was allied to Genoa which had been at war with Aragon for two years, the Catalan captain felt that the vessels were legitimate prizes.[19] Unfortunately, Pedro did not share this opinion.

Within days of the incident, the Castilian king had written a scathing letter accusing the Aragonese ruler of dastardly waging war against Castile on several fronts.[20] Pere punctually responded to these complaints, adding a few grievances of his own against the enraged Castilian monarch.[21] With peace seemingly out of the question, the Aragonese sovereign announced to his realms that he intended to "personally go to the frontier ... [inflicting] such damage ... [as possible] on the king of Castile, ... his lands, and people."[22] For a number of reasons he had not fully understood at the time, Pere did not make good on this defiant pledge for some nine years. Throughout this period, he weathered one Castilian attack after another, but never forgot this burning desire to unleash "cruel war" on his "principal adversary."

As year after year of intermittent conflict slowly passed away, one personage at least, the pope, attempted to establish peace within the Christian portions of the Iberian Peninsula. After the establishment of a truce in the spring of 1357 and its rapid violation by Pedro, a papal legate took the process back to the drawing-board and, by May, 1361, led Aragonese and Castilian negotiators to agree to a treaty at Terrer. This "final, loyal, and true peace" was in effect for less than a year when the Castilian king again acted to overturn it.[23] After another two years of campaigning that brought him no closer to final victory, Pedro worked with an associate of the legate to get the Aragonese to the bargaining table. The result was yet another

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[18] ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1030, ff. 9v-10; Ferrer i Mallol, *Entre*, 587-89; Kagay, "Conflict," 80-83.

[19] Pero López de Ayala, *Coronica del rey don Pedro*, ed. Constance L. and Heanon M. Wilkins (Madison, Wisc., 1985), 83 (6th year, chap vii); Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), *Chronicle*, trans. Mary Hillgarth, ed. J.M. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 2:495-96 (VI:3).

[20] ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 12v-13v; Pere, 2:496-99 (VI:3).

[21] ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 13v-15v; Pere, 2:500-3 (VI:4).

[22] ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, f. 23; Kagay, "Defense," 22.

[23] Ayala, 97-98 (10th year, chap. ii); Ángeles Masiá de Ros, *Relación castellano-aragonesa desde Jaime II a Pedro el Ceremonoso*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1994), 2:460, 462, 464-65, 468-67, 473-74 (arts. 1-2, 11, 19-21, 28, 34, 37).

treaty of peace promulgated at the Valencian city of Unicastillo in June of 1363.[24]

The pact of Unicastillo managed to halt hostilities for only several months. By the late-summer of 1363, the Aragonese-Castilian war was back in full swing. During the last years of the conflict (1364-1365), its focus inexorably shifted southward into the realm of Valencia that during Muslim times had been known as "the ornament of the world" for its agricultural and commercial richness.[25] These last years of the War of the Two Pedros, marked as they were by large-scale and complex military operations across the hinterland of Murcia and southern Valencia, allow the modern investigator to assess the generalship of two very different types of military and state leader.

III. *The Two Antagonists*

To gain even a simple idea of Pere and Pedro as warriors and administrators of war, one must take into account the propaganda mounted by the Aragonese king and the ultimate victor in Castile, Enrique de Trastámara. The picture that remains of Pedro is somewhat like a reflection in a broken mirror. The legitimate son of Alfonso XI could thus be portrayed by one modern authority as a person "resplendent as a hero on the battlefield"[26] while being characterized by contemporary authors as an "unfit monarch" who made warfare a boundless source of vengeful gratification.[27]

Though Pere was remarkably careful in fashioning the portrait of himself he bequeathed to posterity, the image of the Aragonese ruler as a military leader is a difficult one to get at. The ambivalence modern investigators have about Pere as a leader of troops is perhaps due to a clear military evolution that took place during the Castilian war. In the first weeks of the conflict, he seems to reflect the over-the-top patriotism of a character in a nineteenth-century political opera. Within days of the war's beginning and

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[24] Ayala, 136-37 (14th year, chap. v); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:464-67 (IX: xlvi); Pere III, 2:538 (VI:34).

[25] Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christian Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston, 2003).

[26] Antonio Ferrer del Rio, *Examen histórico-crítico del reinado de Don Pedro de Castillla* (Madrid: C. Monier, Editor, 1854), 108.

[27] Louise Mirrer-Singer, *The Language of Evaluation: A Sociolinguistic Approach to the Story of Pedro el Cruel in Ballad and Chronicle* (Amsterdam/Philadephia, 1986), 84; Julio Valdeon Baruque, *Enrique II de Castilla: La guerra civil y la consolidación del regimen (1366-1371)* (Valladolid, 1966), 96-99.

on several occasions during the following years, he announced he "was making a bee-line (*via directa*)" to the frontier and asked all of his people to accompany him.[28] As the war dragged on and the king's frustration escalated, he once told one of his parliaments that he was ready to muster for an immediate attack on Castile, using the members of the assembly "on horseback, on foot, or only with the shirts on their backs."[29] Such campaigns of national righteousness did not take place, however, and Pere abandoned this higher tone and fell back on a "certain realism" that had long marked Iberian kingship.[30] As a constant seeker of "things profitable and honorable," the Aragonese king soon realized that his regnal and personal survival in a conflict where he was militarily outclassed had to comprise his long-term goals.[31] Survival of both sorts dictated to Pere that he assume the defensive in the conflict. This determination appears in his frank assessment of his own military abilities: "we have as great a will and heart as any knight to *defend* our crown and kingdom."[32]

IV. *An Analysis of Generalship*

To gain a better-defined picture of the two men's generalship beyond personal or contemporary estimates, we must turn squarely to the record of the campaigns in which they fought. In these sieges, raids, and direct conflicts, how did Pere and Pedro engage each other in battle and were their attitudes constant or variable throughout their careers? To use the language of modern military theory, were the two commanders engaged in the strategy of battle avoidance that John Gillingham, referring to the theories of Vegetius, claims the vast majority of medieval captains embraced? Or could their military endeavors be interspersed with clear examples of battle-seeking activity, a strategy that Clifford Rogers claims many commanders

[28] ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, f. 177v; R. 1380, f. 171v; Kagay, "Defense," 28.

[29] Donald J. Kagay, "A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362-1363) as Military Financier," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), 130.

[30] David A. Cohen, "Secular Pragmatism and Thinking about War in Some Court Writings of Pere III *el Cerimoniós*," in *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies around the Mediterranean*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2003) , 25.

[31] Ibid., 22; Pere III, 2:456 (V:3).

[32] *Epistolari de Pere III*, ed. Ramon Gubern, 1 vol. to date (Barcelona, 1955), 1:143 (doc. 20); *Parlaments a les corts catalanes*, ed. Ricard Albert and Joan Gassiot (Barcelona, 1928), 24; Kenneth Fowler, *The Great* Companies, vol. 1 of *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), 157.

across medieval Europe occasionally chose to follow.[33] Or, finally to echo Andrew Villalon's term, were they "battle-willing" that is, disposed "to risk the wager of battle under the right circumstances?"[34] To come to some conclusion, albeit general, concerning the martial stance of the "two Pedros," it will be necessary to examine how they conducted their war and determine if there were any changes in either man's conduct. Since Pere never ventured near the front until the closing years of the conflict, we must start by looking at those last campaigns. Afterwards, their actions on these occasions will be compared to their conduct during the earlier phases of the war.

The last phase of the long war between Castile and Aragon began in the fall of 1363 with the disintegration of the treaty of Unicastillo. Fearing his adversary would take advantage of the frontier zone between southern Valencia and Murcia that had been held by the now-deceased Prince Ferran,[35] Pere frantically began to resupply fortresses while reshuffling captains and garrisons across the region from Elche to Crevillente to Elda.[36] Unfortunately, these last-minute efforts that included sending the crown-prince, Joan, into the southern Valencian theater of operations did little good in holding off massive raids led by Pedro out of Murcia and across the Segura River in December, 1363.[37] These interlinked Castilian successes eventually put Valencia's capital in jeopardy and spurred Pere into mounting a large relief force. A decisive battle between the Aragonese and Castilian armies seemed in the offing. The operations to follow, however,

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33 John Gillingham, "Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages," in *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwick*, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1984), 78-91; reprinted in *Medieval Warfare 1000-1300*, ed. John France (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2006), 299-312; Clifford J. Rogers, "The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages," *Journal of Medieval Military History* [hereafter *JMMH*] 1 (2002): 1-19; idem, "The Offensive/Defensive in Medieval Strategy," in *XXII Kongreß der Internationalen Kommission für Militärgeschichte Acta 22: Von Crécy bis Mohács Kriegwesen im spätem Mittelalter (1346-1526)* (Vienna, 1997), 158-71

34 L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Battle-Seeking, Battle-Avoiding, or Perhaps Just Battle-Willing? Applying the 'Gillingham Paradigm' to Enrique II of Castile," *JMMH* 8 (2010): 131-54.

35 Ferran was killed on July 16, 1363 at the Valencian city of Castellon de la Plana when Pere decided to effect his half-brother's arrest for treason [Kagay, "Dynastic Dimension," 95].

36 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1194, f. 98; R. 1385, ff. 175v-76; R.. 1386, ff. 57v, 67r-v; R. 1572, ff. 23v-24, 28v-29; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "La organització militar en Cataluña en la Edad Media" Special Issue, no. 1 *Revista de Historia Militar* (2001): 488-89 (doc. 177); eadem, "The Southern Valencian Frontier during the War of the Two Pedros," in *Hundred Years War*, 107-8.

37 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 728, f. 163; R. 1192, f. 94; Ferrer i Mallol, "Southern Valencian Frontier," 108.

proved to be a strange type of dance in which Pere doggedly lurched toward this final struggle and Pedro just as assiduously avoided it.

The Valencian campaign—one of the largest in war—began in March, 1364, when an unofficial Valencian representative, a Franciscan missionary, sounded an "alarm" (*viafós*) in Pere's court at Sesa near Huesca. Because of a "dangerous scarcity of food" in the southern capital, Pere rushed to gather a force that would open provisioning links to Valencia, even if this meant confronting the Castilian king who had established himself at the Valencian dockyards (*grau*) to block the passage of all supplies into the city.[38] In comparison with their past campaigns, the size of the clashing forces was much greater than normal. Pere commanded an army of 1722 horse and 16,000 foot while Pedro was in charge of a force almost twice as large that contained a corps of 6000 horsemen. Even the Castilian fleet of some sixty vessels dwarfed Pere's naval arm of ten Catalan galleys.[39]

When the jockeying for advantageous positions began in the last days of April, 1364, Pedro seemed to be destined as the clear victor. By occupying the *grau*, the Castilian king could block the flow of supplies into Valencia and, in effect, close off the Guadalaviar River to Pere's ships. Pedro could then use the *grau*'s sheltered harbor as an anchorage for his vessels; it would also serve as an escape zone in the event that fighting went against him.[40]

In an attempt to unsettle his adversary's plan, Pere advanced from northern Valencia with two contingents, neither of which lit fires during the trek in order to disguise their positions. Leaving Burriana on April 28, the Aragonese vanguard under cover of darkness captured a Castilian barricade on the Palencia River that emptied into the Mediterranean outside of Murviedro. After suffering this surprise defeat by a much smaller force, the Castilian garrison commander of Murviedro informed Pedro of the Aragonese advance with the use of smoke signals. Let down by his spies who had "no news of the king of Aragon," the Castilian ruler, uncertain where the next attack might come, broke camp at the *grau* and moved his forces up the coast to Murviedro. If battle had ensued because of this troop movement, Pedro's abandonment of his advantageous position in Valencia's dockyard might have proved a crucial strategic error.[41] Yet even though

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[38] Pere III, 2:544-45 (VI:40); Ayala, 141 (15th year, chaps. i-ii).

[39] Pere III, 2:546-48 (VI:40); Ayala, 142 (15th year, chap. iii).

[40] For lay-out of Valencia and its surroundings, see Robert Ignatius Burns, S.J., *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Reconstruction on a Thirteenth-Century Frontier*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass, 1967), 1:16.

[41] Pere III, 2:547-48 (VI:40); Ayala, 141-42 (15th year, chap. ii).

the two forces, now scrambling for position, gave every indication that a bloody combat was imminent, at least one of the royal commanders had other ideas.

Shortly after the Aragonese advance guard had captured the Castilian barricade, the main section of Pere's army joined it and, by dawn of April 29, the unified force arrayed itself "in good order between Murviedro and the sea."[42] Though a sloping beach may not have been the best choice for a battlefield, at the advice of king's many experienced captains and his own self-proclaimed "daring and manly spirit," the Aragonese formation remained in place for two full hours, during which it was occupied by a frontal attack from 600 Muslim light cavalty (*jinetes*).[43] Such probing attacks often served as a prelude to larger battles in medieval warfare; however, in this instance that was not to be the case. Though Pere had afforded his opponent "an opportunity for battle," Pedro, whose main force was now nearby, refused combat and moved his troops into Murviedro. This left the royal road and Valencia's dockyard basically open to the Aragonese advance. Saved from slow starvation by Pere's troops and transports, the people of Valencia gave them a riotous welcome. Though Pedro hurled large numbers of Muslim cavalry against the city in the following days, these forces were easily beaten off and a major battle, it seemed, was again avoided.[44]

Once more, the juggernauts prowling the Valencian landscape seemed to have attained success in sidestepping each other. Upon arriving in Valencia, Pere received galling reports from the capital's inhabitants concerning his opponent's insulting views about his military competence. The Castilian king accused his adversary of using secrecy and guile rather than military prowess before the walls of Murviedro. According to Pedro, Pere had acted in a dishonorable way "by approaching as an *almogavèr*."[45] This was a reference to the mountain troops who lived off the land during Jaume I's thirteenth-century Valencian campaign and who eventually become some of the most feared troops in the Mediterranean.[46] The Castilian monarch was criticizing his Aragonese opponent for not living up to the accepted norms of contemporary warfare.

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[42] Ayala, 142 (15th year, chap. iii).

[43] Ibid.; Pere III, 2:550-51 (VI:41-42); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:499-504 (IX: liv).

[44] Ayala, 142 (15th year, chap. iii); Pere III, 2:551-52 (VI:42-43).

[45] Pere III, 2:552 (VI:44).

[46] *The Chronicle of Muntaner*, trans. Lady Henrietta Goodenough, 2 vols. (London, 1921), 1:22-23, n. 19; David Agustí, *Los almogávares: la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón*. (Madrid, 2004).

Furious at this affront, Pere openly—even gaudily—took his army out of Valencia on May 2 and left no doubts about his intention to fight. Moving back up the coast road, Pere broke his journey at what had been Jaume I's final camp in the Valencian campaign, Santa Maria de Puig. By May 4, he had pitched camp at Puçol, a few miles to the south of Murviedro. Before setting out, Pere had sent a messenger to Pedro assuring him that he did wish to fight and that his army would be in the Castilian king's sight by the weekend. Once established at Puçol, he sent two Castilian prisoners bearing a written challenge for Pedro "to come out to do battle."[47] When Pedro showed no signs of readying his troops for combat, Pere returned to Valencia, no doubt exuberant at having shown up his enemy, but perhaps with some secret relief.

The last martial aftershocks of the Valencian campaign took place down the coast in the bay of Cullera and across the mouth of the Júcar River. The fleets of the two monarchs entered the fray in the days after Pere's Puçol operation. A reinforced armada, now numbering thirty Catalan galleys under the command of the viscount of Cardona came up against a much larger Castilian-Portuguese fleet consisting of seventy vessels. When Cardona took his ships up the Júcar to avoid being overpowered, Pedro took this as a heaven-sent opportunity to bottle up the enemy whose maneuverability was severely restricted in the narrow river. In an attempt to prevent their escape, the Castilian king sank three of his ships at the river's mouth. Seeking to offset this Castilian advantage, Pere now moved a portion of his army from Valencia to Cullera, and from his position on the riverbank was able to thwart Castilian attacks and aid in his fleet's ultimate escape to sea.[48]

In the midst of this action, the unpredictable Mediterranean climate intervened. The balmy trade winds of mid-summer that normally blew to the north and west changed abruptly into a stiff easterly gale that began to buffet the Castilian fleet and threatened to blow it onshore where Pere's forces would make short work of any floundering Castilian vessels. With all the land moorings and most of the anchor cables sheered by the tempest, Pedro took an action that seemed completely out of character for him.

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[47] Pere III, 2:552-53 (VI:44).

[48] Pere III, 2:553-54 (VI:45); Ayala, 142 (15th year, chap. iiii); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:505-6 ((IX: lv).

Appealing to the Almighty, he made a promise to "go on pilgrimage and free prisoners" if divine providence would spare the fleet.[49]

When the winds did not turn, the Castilian king may have viewed this climatological setback as a sign of divine disfavor. In any case, it was at this time that he tired of the Valencian campaign. Leaving a sizeable garrison at Murviedro, he journeyed back to Castile through Canet and Segorbe. Pere's enthusiasm for war-making was not sated by his adversary's departure; in late June, 1364, he overpowered the Castilian garrison in the town of Liria and then swung to the east where he besieged Pedro's muscular outpost at Murviedro. Only then did the Aragonese monarch seek a temporary respite from fighting, not because he had tired of it, but due to pressing financial problems that made the paying of military salaries extremely difficult.[50]

Pere returned to Barcelona in time to hear the verdict read out against his long-time counselor, Bernat de Cabrera, who after a three-month trial, had been declared guilty of treason. Shortly after Cabrera was beheaded at Zaragoza on July 26,[51] his royal master was again called to the battlefront. Having receiving reports concerning the siege of Murviedro, Pedro once again assembled his army and re-entered Aragon at Calatayud in early August. For the next few weeks, the Castilian monarch focused his energies on attacking Castellhabib, a small village near Teruel. This former Castilian outpost had shortly before been rocked by a bloody insurrection of its Aragonese population that resulted in the expulsion of the Castilian garrison and the death of its commander. The violence at Castellhabib was one of many contemporary incidents in which Aragonese villagers rose up against Castilian occupiers. Burning to avenge his appointee, Pedro ringed the village with siege engines and captured it after two days of all-but constant artillery fire.[52] Though little record survives of his vengeance against the Aragonese population of Castellhabib, it was undoubtedly severe.

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[49] Pere III, 2:554 (VI:45); Ayala, 142 (15th year, chap. iiii). For mooring devices, see Robert I. Burns, S.J. "*Gegna*: Coastal Mooring in Crusader Valencia," *Technology and Culture* 47 (2006): 777-86. For Mediterranean wind directions, see: Fernand Braudel: *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York, 1966), 1:257.

[50] Pere III, 2:554-56 (VI:45-46); Ayala, 142-43 (15th year, chap.v). For Pere financial difficulties, see: Donald J. Kagay, "War Financing in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon." *JMMH* 6 (2008): 119-48.

[51] Kagay, "'Treason," 39, 48; J.B. Sitges, *La Muerte de D. Bernardo de Cabrera: Consejero del rey D. Pedro IV de Aragón* (Madrid, 1911), 68-69.

[52] Ayala, 143 (15th year, chap. vi); Ferrer i Mallol, "Southern Valencian Frontier," 108.

Pere's progress into the war zone was a fairly leisurely one. He moved through Zaragoza to Teruel and was established at the hamlet of Mora de Rubielon in mid-October when he was visited by representatives of Castellhabib who asked for immediate royal help. Before he could send it, however, the outpost had fallen back into Castilian hands. Afterwards, Pere shadowed Pedro's march to the southeast that eventually brought into his hands several Valencian outposts such as Ayora. In a series of forced marches over the next few weeks, Pere transferred his forces to the Valencian coast near the town of Vila-real and proceeded southward, skirting the capital city to take a position between Torrent and Alcira. During this grueling journey that took just over a month to complete, Pere's troops were constantly harried by Castilian outriders.[53]

By December 1, 1364, Pere and Pedro were once again locked in a series of parallel maneuvers that seemed destined to lead to the battlefield. The Aragonese force at Alcira consisted of 3000 horsemen and "many crossbowmen and lancers."[54] For his part,Pedro at Elche commanded 7000 horse and 40,000 foot.[55] The objective of both commanders was Orihuela, a small town on the Segura River said by some to be "the key to [Pere's] realms." It was currently in "great peril ... from a scarcity of food."[56] Since the Castilian army stood between Pere and this Aragonese outpost, the Aragonese monarch found it necessary to move quickly. Leaving Alcira on December 1, he went down the coast to Gandia and then turned inland to Alcoy. For the next two days, he rushed his troops through Favanella and Saix. Then turning southward through terrain characterized as "waste and desert" that nevertheless teemed with game from which an army could draw some support, the king arrived at La Matanza, a large plain to the west of Orihuela. In this wide-open zone, Pere's scouts caught sight of a battalion of 1000 knights commanded by the Castilian king himself. Rapidly drawing up his own troops in battle array, Pere impatiently waited for four hours for a combat that never materialized. Afterwards, moving his men down from the higher ground to a lower position, Pere received reports from his scouts that the main body of the Castilian army was nearby. Once again, however, nothing developed. Pedro moved off without offering to do battle. Consequently, Pere was free to advance to Orihuela where he

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[53] Pere III, 2:558-60 (VI:48); Ayala, 143 (15th year, chap. vi).

[54] Pere III, 2:563 (VI:52).

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., 2:560 (VI:48-49); ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1211, f. 63v; Ferrer i Mallol, "Southern Valencian Frontier," 109.

received a hero's welcome.[57] Despite this happy respite, Orihuela's situation worsened markedly in the next few months. Though characterizing the town's residents as "good people ... who so valorously and courageously have safeguarded our affairs," Pere did not adequately provision the town. As a result, the Orehuelans succumbed to yet another Castilian attack in 1365.[58]

Pedro's influence within the southern Valencian theater of operations quickly began to fade as all of northern Iberia fell under the influence of mercenary captains who found Iberia a lucrative theater of operations after the French and English had made peace in 1360.[59] When Enrique de Trastámara, a mercenary in his own right, began to expand his company with some of these fresh troops, Pedro, who was Enrique's half-brother, seemed to lose interest in the Aragonese conflict since he now faced a struggle for his very throne. As a result of this change in their king's strategy, Castilian garrisons and settlers throughout captured Aragonese and Valencian lands lost confidence in Pedro's ability to protect them and they began to return to their homeland.[60] Following hard on these desertions, many of Pere's subjects, who had lost their homes during the Castilian occupation now began to stream back into the regions evacuated by the Castilians.[61] As was often the case in such situations, the return of the natives caused legal complexities over property titles and municipal jurisdictions that would not be resolved for years.[62]

The extensive Valencian campaigns of the Castilian-Aragonese war were important sounding boards for understanding the willingness of its principal commanders either to engage in or avoid battle. The expeditions of 1364-1365 show how the martial attitudes of the two kings had changed between the war's beginnings in 1356 and its later campaigns.

In the first years of the conflict with Aragon, Pedro appeared supremely confident in his own leadership and in the ability of his troops. He was also disdainful of Pere's standing as a commander and questioned the over-all toughness of the Aragonese army. His belief in being able to achieve a final victory is apparent in the Castilian king's way of fighting during the war's first years. Fully trusting his captains, Pedro had no fear of dividing his

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[57] Pere III, 2:563-67 (VI:52); Ayala, 143 (15th year, chap. vii).

[58] ACA, Cancillería real, R. 727, ff. 164-65v; R. 1210, ff. 47r-v; R. 1211, f. 63v; Ayala,143 (15th year, chap. vii); Ferrer i Mallol, "Southern Valencian Frontier," 109.

[59] Ferrer i Mallol, "Southern Valencian Frontier," 109-110.

[60] Ibid., 110.

[61] Ibid., 111.

[62] Ibid.

forces which were able to cut wide swathes through enemy territory before reassembling.[63] One example from the middle years of the war is instructive. When the Castilian king decided to violate the peace of Terrer in 1362, he moved without hesitation to attack the strong Aragonese frontier town of Calatayud. Once he had invested the site with a large army and battered its walls with artillery, he waited for the reaction of his rival. Sending messengers to the Aragonese court at Perpignan, Pedro announced that he would give Pere forty days to relieve Calatayud. He then sat down to await the Aragonese response. He did not have long to wait. Rather than opting for a pitched battle, Pere had no choice but to inform the desperate Calatayud garrison that he could not relieve them. They were given permission to surrender without incurring a royal charge of treason.[64] Pedro, it seemed had learned that, despite Pere's bombastic talk about taking the fight to the enemy, the Castilian army could operate in enemy territory for long periods without facing any meaningful Aragonese response and certainly without ever laying eyes on Pere himself.

Pedro's transition from this confident battle-willingness to the avoidance of even the hint of serious combat springs from a personal insecurity increasingly exacerbated by the very person of his half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara. Without totally unbiased documentation, it is impossible to tell if Pedro's cruelty was the result of mental imbalance or part of a conscious strategy for political dominance or some combination of both.[65] What the historical record points to, however, is that the Castilian king, after long years of what he considered as national and personal betrayal, stood out as a "fierce spirit more inclined to rigorous vengeance than to clemency."[66] This royal personality trait might not have come to dominate the Castilian body politic as much as it did, had it not been for the brutalizing effect of the war on a monarch who seemed to see traitors at every turn. These were the years in which Pedro executed his own brother,

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[63] Kagay, "Defense," 18-20.

[64] Ibid., 28-29.

[65] Neurologist Gonzalo Moya who examined Pedro I's remains in 1968 claims that his speech impediment and "indecisiveness" (*abulia*) may have been the result of a cerebral palsy the king suffered from since his adolescence. Gonzalo Moya, *Don Pedro el Cruel. Biología, política y tradición literaria en la figura de Pedro I de Castilla* (Madrid, 1974); Estow, *Pedro*, xxxiii, 198. To gauge the king's violaent stance to Aragon durinf the War of the Two Pedros, see L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Cut Off their Heads, or I'll Cut Off Yours": Castilian Strategy and Tactics in the War of the Two Pedros and the Supporting Evidence from Murcia," in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008),153-82.

[66] Zurita, *Anales*, 4:289 (IX: I).

Fadrique, and his principal adviser, Gutier Fernandez de Toledo, for the unsubstantiated charge of conspiring with the Aragonese.[67] It was also the era in which Pedro executed garrison commanders such as Juan Alfonso de Benavides when he surrendered a hopelessly surrounded Castilian position after having fought off enemy attacks for weeks on end.[68] While an argument (however weak) could be advanced that these deaths were necessary to maintain order and contribute to the war effort, the murder of such victims as Prince Ferran's mother and brother as well as Enrique's youngest brothers can be attributed only to the king's desire to avenge himself on anyone he saw as a dangerous rival or, for that matter, anyone who had the possibility of becoming one.[69] The many episodes of day-to-day cruelty associated with war serve as a backdrop of the king's individual acts of brutality. In the last Orihuela campaign of 1365, for example, Pedro ordered his soldiers to "wage the cruelest war they could, cutting off the heads of everyone you capture, so that there will be no man of Aragon taken who is not killed."[70] As if to obey his own bloody command, Pedro had the crews of five captured Catalan galleys executed during the same year—a clear affront to the international laws of war.[71]

In logical terms, such rampant cruelty should have forcefully propelled Pedro to seek out an ultimate decision on the battlefield. When he did not do so, contemporaries, especially his Aragonese adversary, attributed this strange turn of events to either divine or psychological causes. Pere, who from the beginning of the Castilian conflict claimed that he was fighting a just war, was certain that he would prevail over his enemy–"that wicked and false traitor"–who would be "put to shame and covered with confusion."[72] Given this view of the justice of his cause, what was Pere to think when Pedro refused battle on several occasions except that his adversary feared that "God who is the judge of battles would be against him for

[67] Ayala, 90-92 (9th year, chaps. ii-iii), 116-7 (11th year, chaps. xvi-xvii); Estow, *Pedro*, 84, 190-92.

[68] L.J. Andrew Villalon, "The War of the Two Pedros: An Overview of the Conflict," (paper presented at the 35th annual meeting of Medieval Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Mich., May 5, 2000).

[69] Pere III, 2:493-95 (VI:1); Kagay, "Conflict," 92.

[70] *Documentos de Pedro I*, ed. Angel-Luis Molina Molina (Murcia, 1978), 162-63 (doc. 100); Villalon, "Cut Off their Heads, 165.

[71] Ayala, 144 (15th year, chap ix). For treatment of prisoners, see M.H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965), 160-61.

[72] Pere III, 2:548-50 (VI:41); Donald J. Kagay, "The Theory and Practice of Just War in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon," *Catholic Historical Review* 91 (2005): 602.

the great offense he had done … and was still doing against all reason and justice."[73]

For his part, Pedro makes few explicit references to any belief in cosmic influences shaping the results of battle. Like most medieval men, however, he believed in the power of saints to influence temporal events. This was clearly shown in 1364 after he escaped from a dangerous summer storm. To give thanks for his escape, he appeared as a penitent at the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Murviedro "with a halter around his neck … [wearing only] a shirt and breeches."[74]

Even if Pedro's apparent fear at submitting his fate to the vicissitudes of the battlefield did spring from a dread of divine retribution, it may also have consisted of much more mundane elements. The most important of these was understandably the distrust of his own men. Because many Castilian nobles had personally experienced the king's awful and seemingly mad vengeance that was directed against innocent members of their families, a great number had preserved their own lives by going into exile that normally put them into Aragonese service. A good example of this constant ebb of manpower serving Pedro's armed forces can be seen in the case of the *adelantado mayor*, Diego Pérez Sarmiento. For whatever reason, Sarmiento arrived too late to participate in the battle of Araviana (1360) at which Pedro's forces suffered a notable defeat. Rather than face the "great fury" of his royal master who interpreted his tardiness as treason, the great nobleman spurred his horse from the field and within a matter of days had defected to Trastámara's banner, never again to lay eyes on his former king.[75] The burgeoning number of such defectors to the enemy cause was bad enough, but those whom Pedro judged to be hidden traitors serving in the Castilian army seemed to be the source of the his greatest disquiet. Like American commanders afraid of being "fragged" by their own troops in the midst of combat,[76] Pedro's suspicion of his soldiers reached such a level that he would not trust them to engage in the confusing mêlée of battle for fear they would flee from the field or even turn their weapons against him.

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[73] Pere III, 2:553 (VI:44).

[74] Ibid., 2:554 (VI:45).

[75] Ayala, 108 (10th year, chap. xxii). For Pérez Sarmiento's stint as *adelantado mayor de Castilla*, see: Luis Vicente Diaz Martin, *Los oficiales de Pedro I de Castilla* (Valladolid, 1975), 21.

[76] Thomas D. Boettcher, *Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow from the Home Front to the Front Lines in Words and Pictures* (Boston, 1985), 399-400; Steve Hesske, "They Dare not Speak its Name," http://www.answers.com. (accessed August 12, 2009).

This dread of fully unleashing his army is apparent at Orihuela in 1364 when victory over the Aragonese seemed to be at hand and, with it, the transformation of the Castilian king into an "emperor of Spain." Pedro, clearly thinking otherwise, looked at a loaf of bread in his hand and said, "with this … I could satisfy the loyal men there are in Castile."[77]

No matter what motivations drove Pedro to avoid the wager of battle in the last years of the war, his refusal to answer challenges in the field had a severely detrimental effect on the confidence of his own troops as well as on his reputation as an accomplished warrior. While many medieval commanders followed the Vegetian doctrine that pitched battles should normally be shunned since they involved too many risks and their results were too final, Pedro seemed set on avoiding the battlefield even when he held a clear advantage in troop strength and a superior position. At Ibiza (1359), the first battle of Nájera (1360), Valencia (1363), the Valencian dockyard (*grau*), and Murviedro (1364) as well as the two campaigns of Orihuela (1364-1365), he seemed unwilling to risk the wager of battle. Given the state of the evidence, it is largely impossible to determine the Castilian king's motives for avoiding battle: was he shaken by fear of enemies or even of his own troops or had he begun to learn some of the defensive lessons his Aragonese adversary had mastered years before?[78]

V. *Conclusions*

The military portrait of Pere, like that of his opponent, changed drastically as the war progressed. From a rather timid defensive martial administrator throughout most of the 1350s, the Aragonese king seemed during the 1360s to become more offensive-minded and readier than he had been to embrace the dangers of the battlefield. Overshadowed and truly overawed by the glorious reputations of his ancestors, Jaume I and Pere II (r.1276-1285), this frail and crafty monarch of Aragon longed to enjoy a glorious victory in battle. For this reason, war was never a stranger to his reign, breaking out in almost every decade of his life. Despite his overseeing one conflict after another, none of Pere III's battlefield exploits lived up to those of his predecessors. When, year after year, his war with Pedro failed to produce any direct confrontation, Pere, who had spent all his time administering the war but never seeing it, grew increasingly anxious to prove himself in the

[77] Pere III, 2:565-67 (VI:52).
[78] Zurita, *Anales*, 4:503 (IX: liv).

field. His disappointment with the course of military events and his own failure to participate came to a head in the "parliament" of Monzón (1362-1363). After months of tediously negotiating a military subsidy, he finally screamed at the assembly "all those who wish to remain safe [on the home front] should die."[79]

From 1362 during the final years of the conflict, the king's desire to redeem his honor by personally taking up an active military command came ever closer to reality. When he did lead armies into harm's way in the next three years, we can gauge some of the attitudes he brought to the front by the "speech" (*arenga*) he delivered to his men before leading them onto the field of battle outside Valencia in 1364. His first duty in such orations was to communicate the "firm confidence" he felt that his cause was just and that God would allow him to act as His tool in the punishment of the king of Castile. Pere then had to convince his army that it was unified in its allegiance to him and to the glorious aim he had announced. He then gave the Castilians serving with him the right to cross over and join Pedro's army if they so wished. With these emotional words, he inspired his forces in a manner worthy of his famous ancestor, Jaume I.[80]

For most of 1363 at least, Pere was clearly "battle-willing" and in the next three years he seemed to move his troops toward open combat several times. This change from being a manager of a diffuse defense to a war leader who under many different conditions was ready to stand and deliver militarily resulted less from any new tactical understanding of the conflict and more from a desire to achieve personal fulfillment. Up until then, Pere had shown himself to be a talented and adaptable quartermaster able to see that his troops were fed no matter what the circumstances.[81] Above all, however, he longed to attain a reputation born of successfully commanding soldiers in battle. Though he never achieved his heart's desire during the war with Castile, it was not for want of trying. On several instances between 1363 and 1365, he offered battle; his desire to fight was rebuffed by Pedro on every one of these occasions. Failing in this martial enterprise was not a complete loss, however, since by showing his willingness to do battle, he had managed to "satisfy ... [his] royal honor."[82] This aim, though often expressed in Pere's official vocabulary from the war's very beginning, now seemed to mean more to him than ever before. Through his courage

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79 Kagay, "Parliament," 130.
80 Pere III, 2:548-50 (VI:41).
81 Ibid., 2:562 (VI:50); Kagay, "Defense," 30.
82 Pere III, 2:559 (VI:48).

and military competence he wished to impress not only the soldiers with whom he served but also posterity. In his autobiography, he described in loving detail how during the second campaign of Orihuela (1365) he had carefully coordinated troop movements through a range of bugle calls. He also proudly relived the series of grueling forced marches that had occurred during the expedition.[83] Taking into account Pere's well-known frailty, he had once openly admitted that he was not "a good foot soldier."[84] His ability to function under battlefield conditions is itself impressive. Though he did not hand his adversary a defeat, Pere had, at least in the eyes of his captains, shown Pedro to be a coward.[85] In this regard, perhaps no praise was sweeter to the exhausted Aragonese king than that of Enrique de Trastámara, who claimed that by Pere's dogged determination in repeatedly challenging Pedro, he had shown himself to be "a king and lord fit to maintain and defend ... [his] kingdom ... [who had] achieved the honor that was ... [his] due."[86] Though denied victory in battle, the Aragonese king returned from the Valencian expedition as a successful participant in the harsh realm of warfare. At least in his mind, this seemed to be quite a triumph in itself.

In reality, the martial stance of both kings represents both a personal and professional relationship. Both men were drawn to the battlefield by motivations that modern historians would characterize as psychological. Pedro set out to avenge a wrong or set of wrongs that he believed his people had experienced at the hands of the Aragonese. For his part, Pere desperately desired to live up to the reputation of his glorious reconquest ancestors. Both men acquired experience of war at different points in the conflict. Throughout most of its early years, Pedro had shown himself to be a daring leader of men who often struck where least expected. As time passed, however, he increasingly came to honor caution over boldness. This change surely explains the ragged nature of his last campaigns in the war with Aragon and, for that matter, in the civil war (1366-1369) with

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[83] Ibid., 2:559-61, 563-64 (VI:48-49, 51). Pere described the camp organization in the following way: (1) with a first blast of the trumpets, the soldiers would feed and ready their mounts for the day's march (2) at the second, they themselves would eat breakfast (3) at the third, the soldiers would gather their weapons and stand ready to advance, and (4) with the fourth, they would mount and follow the king.

[84] Ibid., 1:263 (III:28). Pere made this admission during the Balearic campaign of 1343 against his cousin, Jaume III of Mallorca (1324-1349).

[85] According to Pere's subordinates, his actions on this march had "destroyed ... [the Castilian king's] right eye" [Ibid., 2:561 (VI:49)].

[86] Ibid.

Enrique de Trastámara that followed. In his war effort, Pere followed a different trajectory. Throughout the early years of his conflict with Castile, his supervising and financing an extremely complicated defense made his frontiers difficult zones for an outsider to conquer and hold. Then, in the last years of the struggle, he seemed to abandon his perennial caution at the very time that his adversary was adopting it. The War of the Two Pedro, it seems, had as deep an effect on both of its royal participants and their psyches as indeed it did on the lands they ruled.



Map 4. Realms of Medieval Spain.



Map 5. Southern Valencia and Murcia.

EDWARD DESPENSER, THE GREEN KNIGHT AND THE LANCE FORMATION: ENGLISHMEN IN FLORENTINE MILITARY SERVICE, 1366-1370

William Caferro

I. *Introduction*

The decade of the 1360s was an important one for English military involvement in Italy. It began with the arrival of the White Company in 1361, after the peace of Brétigny (1360) temporarily halted the Hundred Years War in France. It ended with war in 1369 between Edward lord Despenser and Galeazzo Visconti, ruler of Pavia (r.1354-1378). Despenser had come to Italy the year before with Lionel, duke of Clarence, son of King Edward III (r.1327-1377), who was betrothed to Galeazzo's daughter, Violante. Lionel died suddenly after the wedding (October, 1368), touching off an "English revenge." Accusing their host of poisoning Lionel, members of the duke's retinue, led by Despenser, refused to give back the lands granted as part of Violante's dowry. The war inflamed much of Piedmont and northern Italy and reignited tensions between Visconti and his traditional enemies, the marquis of Montferrat and the pope.

The events received widespread attention among contemporary Italian writers. The White Company elicited the strongest reaction from local chroniclers, who praised its battle readiness but condemned its cruelty.[1] The Company quickly became the most feared of the marauding mercenary bands on the peninsula, ravaging (like Despenser) much of Piedmont, before descending on Tuscany in 1363, where it turned the tide in the Pisan-Florentine war. Meanwhile, Duke Lionel's wedding, before devolving into war, produced "one of the great moments in culinary history." The celebratory banquet involved fourteen lavish courses, with gilded meat and fish portions. It was attended by an array of notables, including the poet

[1] William Caferro, "The Fox and the Lion: The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy" in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), 179-209; idem, *John Hawkwood, An English Mercenary in Fourteenth Century Italy* (Baltimore, 2006); Adrian R. Bell, "The Fourteenth Century Soldier: More Chaucer's Knight or Medieval Career," in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France (Leiden, 2008), 301-15.

Francesco Petrarch, the chronicler Jean Froissart, and perhaps even a young Geoffrey Chaucer, for whom Lionel was an early patron.[2]

The assembly of famous men has fascinated modern scholars. Literary critics have taken the lead, speculating on the possible effects on Chaucer, who may have gained his first acquaintance with Italian literature there. They have also questioned whether the unknown author of the anonymous alliterative English poem, *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, or perhaps the poem's patron or even models for the green knight, attended the event. Candidates for one or the other include Amadeus, the "Green Count" of Savoy, who was Violante's uncle and helped arrange the union, and Simon Newton, an English knight known as the "green squire" (*scudifer viridis*), who assisted in marriage negotiations and was from the same region of England as the purported author of the Gawain poem.[3] Ann R. Meyer has recently connected Edward Despenser, the head of Lionel's wedding party, to the Gawain poet, on the basis of their ties to the Northwest Midlands and the circle of King Richard II (r.1377-1399), widely viewed as central to the authorship and patronage of the poem.[4]

Edward Despenser has the further distinction of being included in the "church militant" (*via veritatis*) fresco in the Spanish Chapel of the church of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. The fresco, on the eastern wall of the chapel, was painted between the years 1366 and 1369 by the artist Andrea di Bonaiuto.[5] Despenser stands toward the middle of the lower section of it, dressed in white, with a garter on his leg, the emblem of King Edward's Order of Garter, of which he was a member. T.B. Pugh has pointed out the singularity of the portrait, which is the first representation of an Englishman in Italy apart from Thomas Becket.[6] It stands as a precursor to the more

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[2] Albert S. Cook, "The Last Months of Chaucer's Earliest Patron," *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences* 21 (1916-1917): 1-144.

[3] J.R.L. Highfield, "The Green Squire," *Medium Aevum* 22 (1953): 18-23; S.R.T.O. D'Ardenne, "The 'Green Count' and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight," *Review of English Studies,* New Series, 10, no. 38 (1959): 116-17; W.G. Cooke and J.D. Boulton "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: A Poem for Henry of Grosmont?" *Medium Aevum* 68 (1999): 42-54. For Italian influences on the Gawain poet, see A.C. Spearing, *The Gawain Poet: A Critical Study* (Cambridge, 1970), 17-18.

[4] Ann R. Meyer, "The Despensers and the Gawain Poet: a Gloucestershire link to the Alliterative Master of the Northwest Midlands," *Chaucer Review* 35, no. 4 (2001): 413-29.

[5] Mary Aquinas Devlin, "An English Knight in the Spanish Chapel in Florence," *Speculum* 4, no 3 (July 1929): 270-81; Joseph Polzer, "Andrea di Bonaiuto's Via Veritatis and Dominican Thought in Late Medieval Italy," *Art Bulletin* 77 (1995): 263-89; Joachim Poeschke, *Italian Frescoes in the Age of Giotto, 1280-1400* (New York and London, 2005), 362-79.

[6] T.B. Pugh, "Edward Despenser (1336-1375)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7550?docPos=2 [accessed May 10, 2010].

well-known painting of his English counterpart, John Hawkwood, by Oaolo Uccello in the Florentine *duomo*.

It is the connection between Englishmen and Florence that is the focus of this paper. Edward Despenser's inclusion in the Spanish Chapel is significant. He shares space there with such luminaries as Saints Dominic and Thomas Aquinas and with contemporaries including Pope Urban V (1362-1370) and Emperor Charles IV (r.1347-1378). Sister Mary Devlin, who first identified Edward Despenser in the fresco, argued that he earned his place because of his joint service to the papacy, which the fresco commemorates, and to the city of Florence, which brought Despenser to the city and to the attention of the artist.[7] The presence of an Englishman in so prominent a place begs the broader question, however, of the nature of English service to Florence at this time. Who were the English soldiers in Florentine employ? The question can be answered, owing to the survival of detailed documentary evidence relating to the army, in particular budgets of the *camera del comune* that provide the names of soldiers in the service of the city.[8] The question is important because, as we shall see, the documents indicate that the years in question were transformative ones with respect to the organization of the Florentine army, a development in which English soldiers played a key role. Meanwhile, Edward Despenser's military service sheds additional light on the authorship of the Gawain poem.

II. *Florentine Military Reforms and the Development of the Lance*

When, according to his contract, Andrea di Bonaiuto began painting the Spanish Chapel in 1366, there were virtually no English soldiers on the Florentine payroll. The absence of such men is notable, since only two years earlier the city had many of them in its employ. In 1364, Florentine officials bought off much of the White Company, then in Pisan service, after it had penetrated to the town walls. The act averted sure defeat and filled the army with English soldiers. Within months, however, the Englishmen fell into dispute with their German counterparts, and Florence dismissed them. The two sides formed free companies and continued their fight, pursuing each other through Tuscany.

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7 Devlin, "English Knight," 274-75

8 The *camera del comune* was the principal office that handled communal monies. The *camarlinghi uscita* and *scrivano di camera uscita* list payments to troops made through the office of the *condotta*, which was responsible for hiring the men.

Despite reducing its army, Florence retained many of its German and Italian mercenary cavalrymen.[9] The lack of Englishman—whose overall numbers in Italy were always small relative to other nationalities—was due to several factors. Urban V siphoned off some troops for his crusade in Alexandria in 1365.[10] Others served under John Hawkwood, who had not taken Florentine bribe money and had embarked on a successful marauding career, joining with Ambrogio Visconti, the illegitimate son of Bernabò Visconti, ruler of Milan (r.1354-1385), at the head of the Company of Saint George.[11] Hawkwood's band functioned as a sort of magnet for Englishmen, offering, by dint of its success, substantial profits. For its own part, Florence, seemed uninterested in retaining Englishmen. The city for years had dealt with German and Italian mercenaries and had established a *modus vivendi* and generally good relations with them. But the English were new, and evoked fear and loathing unlike that of other mercenaries. Indeed, after Florence dismissed its English soldiers in 1364, the city surreptitiously gave support to the German free company that opposed them, in the hope that the former would "destroy" the latter.[12]

Florentine cameral budgets show that the city had only one Englishman on its payroll in 1366. This was "Oschino Arciere," who was first hired in the winter of 1365.[13] Arciere was the captain (*conestabile*) of a "banner," consisting of sixteen cavalry men including himself.[14] The banner, used in Italy since the thirteenth century, was the basic cavalry unit employed by the Florentine army at this time. It generally consisted of twenty to twenty-five cavalrymen under the command of a "captain" (*conestabile*) and was scaled back to sixteen or seventeen men (sometimes fewer) during periods of relative peace.[15] In 1366, Arciere served alongside German and Italian mercenaries, also arrayed in banner units of the same size.[16]

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[9] Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 106-120.

[10] Anthony Luttrell, "English Levantine Crusaders, 1363-1367," *Renaissance Studies* 2, no. 2 (1988): 143-53.

[11] Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 126-28.

[12] Ibid., 121.

[13] I have left the name in its Italian form as it appears in the budget. Archivio di Stato di Firenze [hereafter ASF], Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 27 f. 31v.

[14] ASF, Camera del comune, camarlinghi uscita, R. 177 f. 22. On the banner unit, see Stephan Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento* (Tubingen, 2001), 52-54

[15] Giuseppe Canestrini, "Documenti per servire alla storia della milizia italiana del secolo XIII al XVI,"*Archivio Storico Italiano* 1st ser. 15 (1851): lxi; Paolo Grillo, *Cavalieri e popoli in armi* (Rome-Bari, 2008), 153; Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 52-54; Daniel Waley, "The Army of the Florentine Republic from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century" in *Florentine Studies*, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, Ill., 1968), 85.

[16] ASF, Camera del comune, camarlinghi uscita, R. 177 ff. 23-30.

It is unclear how Arciere and his unit were integrated into the overall Florentine army. The budgets do not provide such information. What is known, however, is that he served Florence for the next four years, working on consecutive four-month contracts until 1370.[17] This type of long-term service on short-term contracts was common in the Florentine army.[18]

What is noteworthy about Arciere's service, which otherwise resembles that of the typical mercenary cavalryman in Florentine employ, is that he is identified in the sources by the nickname, the "green squire" (*lo schudiere verde*). This sobriquet first appears in the budgets of 1368, the same year in which Arciere is also cited as receiving a bonus of 100 florins beyond his normal salary for "certain services" he rendered on behalf of the city.[19] The payment suggests that Arciere had achieved a special status with his employer, since such rewards were rare and given only to the most trusted and esteemed mercenaries.

The presence of a "knight of color" in Italy in itself is not unique. Another Englishman of the same period, Richard Musard, who served as the personal bodyguard of the "Green Count" Amadeus of Savoy and was known as "the Black Squire." Musard distinguished himself both on Italian battlefields and on crusade for the pope. In addition, Arciere shared his nickname with another English green squire, Simon Newton, who, as J.R.L Highfield has argued, was in Italy at the same time, in papal service, and was likewise connected to the Gawain poet.[20] Simon Newton's brother, Richard Newton of Macclesfield in Staffordshire in the Northwestern Midlands, has been suggested as a possible author of the Gawain poem, and Humphrey Newton (1466-1536), a descendant of Simon, was the first to demonstrate an acquaintance with the poem.[21]

We may ponder whether Arciere and Simon Newton were connected or perhaps were even the same person. Their names were, of course, very different, and even taking into account Italian misspellings, the differences are hard to reconcile. But it was not uncommon for mercenary soldiers to

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17 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 32, f. 17v.

18 William Caferro, "Continuity, Long-Term Service and Permanent Forces: A Reassessment of the Florentine Army in the Fourteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History* 80 (2008): 219-51.

19 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 37, ff. 43, 45.

20 Highfield, "Green Squire," 16, 20

21 Rossell Hope Robbins, "The Poems of Humfrey Newton, Esquire, 1466-1536," *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association* 65 (1950): 259; Michael J. Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and Lancastrian Society in the Age of 'Sir Gawain and the Green Knight'* (Cambridge, 1983).

use pseudonyms at this time. For example, the English captain known in Italy as John Thornbury was John Wenlock at home. In addition, the activities of Simon Newton alluded to by Highfield do not preclude the possibility that he served Florence in 1366. According to Highfield, Newton worked for the pope until late in 1365, making Florentine employment possible, if just barely. Any further attempt to connect the two men is, however, unsuccessful. Newton returned home to England in 1368. His name appears in English records in February of that year, when he crossed from Dover to Calais in the service of Edward III (r.1327-1377).[22] As Florentine records make clear, Arciere remained with the city. In the end we must assume that there were two Englishmen in Italy with the same nickname at approximately the same time.

On the other hand, if our green knight/squire is not the same as Highfield's, he is nevertheless of substantial importance in terms of Florentine military history. Oschino Arciere's career provides insight into basic changes in the army of the city. His service as captain of a banner unit continued until December, 1367. On the eighth of that month, he was rehired according to a new contract that placed him in charge of a "lance," a smaller unit of cavalrymen. Arciere was the first captain employed by Florence in this manner, and was joined by four fellow Englishmen, Guiglielmo de Bocoste, Adoardo de Bertum, Uttieri di Loren, and Gianni da Londra.[23] Each led a contingent consisting of a single lance unit of three men and their horses.[24] On December 10, Florence hired fourteen more English captains arrayed in single lance units, and on the following day, the city engaged eleven of their fellow countrymen, again at the command of single lances.[25]

The month of December, 1367 was therefore a significant one for the Florentine army, because it was then that the lance made its decisive appearance. By the last quarter of the fourteenth century, the formation had become standard not only in the military establishment of Florence but also throughout Italy. The size of the contingents would grow much larger to a hundred lances or more, each under an individual captain. The leading role in this development played by the English confirms the oft-quoted assertion of Florentine chronicler, Filippo Villani, that the English were "the first in Italy who developed and conducted horsemen under the

[22] Highfield, "Green Squire," 22.
[23] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 32, ff. 22v-23.
[24] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 32, ff. 22v-23.
[25] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 32, ff. 23v-25v.

name of 'the lance'"[26] Villani, however, made this statement in 1363, with regard to the White Company, then in Pisan employ. He described the band as being made up of 1000 lances. It is thus unclear why the Florentine army adopted the unit in the winter of 1367, four years after the city seems to have first encountered it. Moreover, the military innovation occurred at a time when Florence was not at war. To be sure, it faced several external threats, including marauding companies, obstreperous feudal clans, and a burgeoning rebellion in nearby San Miniato al Tedesco. Nevertheless, the readjustment of the Florentine army took place at a time of relative peace, when the city undertook no major offensives or battles.

The precise meaning of the change bears closer scrutiny. Was it largely an administrative one or did it involve tactical considerations? The historian, Stephan Selzer, has emphasized the latter, interpreting the lance as facilitating in Italy the type of dismounting technique used by the English cavalry in the Hundred Years War.[27] Italian scholar, Paolo Grillo, has recently confirmed Selzer's observation, interpreting the lance unit as evidence of English influence on the methods of Italian warfare.[28]

On the other hand, it is not clear what the banner unit that preceded the lance actually looked like. We do not know, for example, how many horses a captain maintained or the number, if any, of ancillary personnel in each banner. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that the lance required more careful coordination of its personnel with its articulated structure of knight, squire, and page working in tandem, each with his own mount.[29] There is, nevertheless, more research needed on this issue.

The developments occurring within the Florentine army correspond to those taking place elsewhere in Italy. Selzer has traced a shift to lances in the armies of Perugia, Venice, and the papacy in the years 1367 through 1368. Two years later, this innovation spread to the armies of Milan and Modena.[30] While, it is possible that Florence was responding to these military developments taking place elsewhere in Italy, it still remains unclear why such a change occurred at this time. The English had not recently won any major victories on Italian battlefields, and their most

[26] Fillipo Villani, *Cronica de Matteo e Filippo Villani*, 6 vols. (1826; reprint, Rome, 1980) 5:258; Caferro "Fox and Lion," 189-90. *i primi che recarono in Italia il conducere la gente di cavallo sotto nome di lance*.

[27] Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 56-57

[28] Grillo, *Cavalieri e popoli in armi*, 154.

[29] Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 88.

[30] Ibid., Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 56-57.

famous soldier, John Hawkwood, had recently been defeated and captured outside of Arezzo in 1367.

It must be stressed that the shift to the lance occurred slowly in Florence. As of early 1368, such units in communal employ were smaller in size and coexisted with the contemporary banner units, which were far more numerous.[31] Thus the new formation did not simply "replace" the old one. Even among English mercenaries the banner unit persisted. Although Oschino Arciere switched to lances in December, 1367, his fellow Englishman, Richard Romsey, who would gain sizable reputation in Italy,[32] remained at the head of a banner of sixteen cavalrymen. The same held true for his other countrymen, Tommaso Corensie and Gianni Aguillant, all of whom Florence hired in December, 1367.[33] In fact, Romsey would continue to captain banner units well into 1368.[34]

What is more, it must also be stressed that the shift to lances in the Florentine army did not involve Hungarian cavalrymen, who were an important part of communal forces at this time. Unlike their German, Italian, and English counterparts, Hungarian cavalrymen were also bowmen, who shot arrows from their mounts. It is unclear, however, how these Hungarian units were integrated into the overall army.

Finally, the lance was not restricted to the English alone. Florentine budgets make clear that German, Italian, Burgundian, and Gascon mercenary cavalrymen soon adopted the formation. The Burgundians, for example, appear to have adopted it very early, perhaps at almost the same time as the English. The largest lance unit in Florentine employ at the beginning of 1368 was, in fact, a Burgundian one. It was led by Stefano di Santo Giovanni who employed twelve lances.[35] The Germans also moved decisively in adopting the lance. Indeed, German lances were the most numerous in the Florentine army in 1368, a development that reflects the overall large number of Germans serving the city. By comparison to the foreigners, Italian mercenary cavalry appear to have been slower in adopting the new formation, which does not seem to have become commonplace among them until 1369.

The documents trace a gradual military buildup and increase in the size of the Florentine army during the spring and summer of 1368. This reflected

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[31] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 26, f. 26.

[32] For Romsey's career in Italy, see Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, pp. 101, 146, 155, 163.

[33] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 32, ff. 30r-v.

[34] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 36, f. 23.

[35] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 37, ff. 40, 42.

the political state of affairs. Bernabò Visconti of Milan initiated war against the pope in April, 1368, and the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV (r.1347-1378) came to Italy to support the papacy in May. The appearance of Charles and his large army caused widespread confusion and fear throughout northern and central Italy. In September, Charles descended on Tuscany, touching off renewed rebellions against Florentine authority in San Miniato.[36] The situation grew substantially worse early in 1369, when the Milanese army moved into Umbria, to exploit unrest against the church in Perugia and political instability in Pisa.[37]

Despite an overall increase in its size, the Florentine army appears to have remained in substantially the same form as before. It continued to be a hybrid entity, consisting of small English, Burgundian, and German lance units, alongside the more numerous banners.[38] The size of the lance units was, however, beginning to grow. Having at last abandoned the banner unit, Richard Romsey stood at the head of ten lances. His fellow Englishmen, Gianni Aguillant and Giovanni Todinam, captained bands of seven and thirty lances respectively.[39] There were, in addition, German and Italian companies, each composed of fewer than ten lances.

By the summer of 1369, the transformation of English units was complete. All were now arranged in lances. And while the banner formation remained in use among German and Italian forces,[40] the size of English lance contingents continued to grow. In July, 1369, Oschino Arciere captained twelve such units and Gianni Todinam had forty lances.[41] By the summer of 1369, there were thirty-three English captains in Florentine employ, most of them in charge of seven, eight, and ten lances.[42]

As noted above, these changes in Florentine military organization took place against the backdrop of Visconti aggression in northern Italy. The entry of Milanese forces into Umbria in early 1369 pitted Visconti interests directly against those of Florence. At this point, the city abandoned its cautious neutrality and joined pope Urban V's anti-Visconti league in

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[36] Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, "Cronaca fiorentina" in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptore*s [*RIS*], ed. Niccolò Ridolico n.s. 30., no. 1 (Città di Castello, 1903), 269-70.

[37] Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 136-37.

[38] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 36, ff. 23v-45.

[39] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 37, ff.. 34r-v; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 38, 20.

[40] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 38, ff. 17-26; R. 42, ff. 20-37.

[41] ASF, Camera del comune, camarlinghi uscita,R. 189, f. 39.

[42] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 42, ff. 20-37.

November, 1369.[43] The city prepared for war. One prominent Florentine politican, Giovanni Corsi, suggested that the army be augmented with the hire of "as many Englishmen as possible."[44] Among those Florence tried to recruit was John Hawkwood, currently commanding the Milanese army. The attempt to lure Hawkwood into changing sides did not succeed. In fact, not only did Florence make little headway in hiring more Englishmen, but the city also appears to have lost some of those in its employ to John Hawkwood, who made a concentrated effort to lure away his countrymen currently in Florentine service. In November, 1369, on the eve of conflict with Hawkwood, the Florentine army had in its employ only eight English captains. Its largest contingent was that of Gianni Todinam, now commanding only five lances.[45]

The army of Florence met Hawkwood and the Milanese in the field at Cascina (near Pisa), at the beginning of December. The Florentine diarist, Donato Velluti, estimated that the force deployed by his home city numbered approximately 3,000 horse, including contingents in the service of Urban V, the city's ally.[46] Velluti also noted the presence of 500 lances, but did not give specific information as to their use.[47] By contrast, a careful examination of Florentine budgets for the months of October and November, 1369 suggests a smaller force of approximately 900 cavalrymen (organized into banners) accompanied by ninety-seven lances.[48] Facing this force was Hawkwood's Milanese army that, according to Velluti numbered some 3000 horses, but which an anonymous Pisan chronicle placed at 1200.[49] Neither source mentions whether Hawkwood used lance units or not. Another Florentine chronicler, Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, asserted that the larger force was put into the field by his city, but provides no further details.

At Cascina, Hawkwood defeated the Florentine army, avenging a loss five years earlier in the same place when he was a fledgling captain in Pisan service.[50] The sources suggest that he executed a flanking maneuver that

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[43] Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), Reg Vat, R. 250 f. 6v; Brucker, *Florentine Politics*, 239.

[44] ASF, Consulte e pratiche, R. 10, f. 5.

[45] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 44, f. 21.

[46] *La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti*, ed. Isidoro del Lungo and Guglielmo Volpi (Florence, 1914), 282

[47] Ibid., 283. Velluti's figures fluctuate, however, citing 3,000 cavalry then 2,000 (285).

[48] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 43, ff 31v-39; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 44, ff. 17-26.

[49] "Chronica di Pisa," ed. L.A. Muratori, in *RIS*, vol 15 (Milan, 1729), cols. 1055-56.

[50] Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 138-39.

succeeded in surrounding the enemy, whose horses got stuck in the soft mud near the banks of the Arno River.[51] Velluti lamented that "almost all of our people" were taken, including the captain of war, Giovanni Malatacca, who was also wounded during the battle.[52]

Florentine officials moved quickly to reassemble the army. They did so, in part, by recruiting for the first time larger lance units. All were German and included a contingent of 177 lances under the joint command of Oswald Buvolar and Konrad Chonz, as well as 170 lances led by Konrad Weitingen.[53] At the same time, the city also hired numerous banner units.[54]

The second battle of Cascina appears then to have encouraged the increased use by Florence of the new lance units. We may wonder whether the nature of the battle or the tactics employed by Hawkwood were factors in this development. It is difficult to judge since we do not know how the great English captain deployed his army in the field. Contemporary sources indicate that the Florentine army went on the offensive and that Hawkwood assumed a defensive position. Both Stefani and Velluti claim that their countrymen made a mad disorderly rush at the Milanese army. Both blamed the defeat not on Hawkwood's superior tactics, but on the Florentine ineptitude, particularly the actions of the captain of war, Giovanni Malatacca, who, according to Velluti, showed little desire to engage the enemy and got drunk before the battle to summon up his courage.[55] The Pisan writer, Ranieri Sardo asserts, however, that the Florentine army moved forward in good order, in three lines (*schiere*), toward Hawkwood, whose cavalrymen dismounted and waited for the enemy. The Florentine cavalry did the same and the two sides eventually engaged each other on foot.[56] But Sardo makes no mention of lance units in either army and in his rendering, the encounter between armies was chaotic, with Pisan defenders tossing rocks from local fortifications at the heads of Florentine horses, impeding their advance. The Florentines attempted a flanking maneuver, which ultimately failed, placing in jeopardy their entire force, which was then enveloped by Hawkwood.

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[51] John Temple-Leader and Giuseppe Marcotti, *Sir John Hawkwood: Story of a Condottiere* (London, 1889), 65-67.

[52] *Cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti*, 285-86.

[53] ASF, Provisioni registri, R. 57, f. 166v; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 44, ff. 30v-31v, 41, 167r-v; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 47, ff. 22-32.

[54] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 44, ff. 17-41v.

[55] *Cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti* i, 286; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, 271.

[56] "Cronaca di Pisa de Ranieri Sardo," in *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia*, ed. Ottavio Banti (Rome, 1963), 193-95.

The final result was, however, the same in all accounts. The Florentine army suffered an overwhelming defeat and much of its leadership was captured. It seems reasonable to assert that English tactics, notably dismounting from horses, played a role in Hawkwood's victory. But it would appear hyperbole to claim that the outcome at Cascina was linked specifically to the use of the lance formation or, more generally, that the tactics employed in the battle were substantially different from those of other battles of the day.

In any case, Florence's newly recruited lances proved largely unnecessary. Hawkwood and his army unexpectedly retreated from Tuscany after the victory, looting the environs of Pisa and then riding north to Lombardy. The decision perplexed Donato Velluti, who believed that Hawkwood's entry into Tuscany was part of a vast Visconti plan to take Pisa, Lucca, and ultimately Florence. The departure of the Milanese gave Florence breathing space to take San Miniato in May, 1370. Its conquest was the result not of battle but of the treachery, as the local castellan, a man known as Luparello, opened the gates of the town in return for a bribe.[57]

But the war with Milan was a turning point with regard to the development of the lance; thereafter, the Florentine military establishment came to rely increasingly on the new formation. The next time we see the city's army in the field was some five years later, when it fought against the pope in a conflict known as the War of Eight Saints. Here the cavalry was largely composed of lances. In fact, the joint allied force appears to have been made up of approximately 2,350 such units.[58] In general, the Florentines seem to have kept the number of lances units commanded by any individual captains fairly small, something I have referred to elsewhere.[59]

III. *Conclusion*

At this point we may return our discussion to Edward Despenser. According to Mary Devlin, Despenser was with the Florentine army that opposed Hawkwood at Cascina. It was this service that brought Despenser to the city, and to the attention of the artist, Andrea di Bonaiuto, who included him in the *via veritatis* fresco at Santa Maria Novella. Unfortunately, Dispenser's name appears nowhere in the copious Florentine documents,

[57] Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 137-39.
[58] Ibid., 169; Brucker, *Florentine Politics*, 297.
[59] Caferro, "Continuity," 29-33.

nor is he mentioned in the chronicle accounts relating to the war, either before or after the battle of Cascina. There is, in fact, no evidence that Dispenser was even in Tuscany at the time. Devlin based her assumption on a papal letter from January 6, 1370, in which Urban V requested that the Englishman come to him as soon as "the affairs of the Florentines are in a better and safer condition."[60] The date of the epistle is nearly a month after the battle of Cascina. Urban's statement is ambiguous and need not be interpreted as meaning that Dispenser was in fact already in Florence.

What is more, Devlin did not consult the actual letter, but a summary of it in the *Calendar of Papal Registers*. The original in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano states explicitly that Dispenser was not in Tuscany at this time, but in Piedmont with his men.[61] He was there fighting alongside his ally, the marquis of Montferrat, against Galeazzo Visconti in the war that occurred after Duke Lionel's marriage and sudden death.[62] In late August, 1369, Dispenser and Montferrat joined Urban V's league against Visconti and as a result they were in papal service at the time of Cascina. As late as October, 1369, the sources show that Edward was still up north, receiving a loan from Montferrat in return for the transfer of several towns he held as part of Lionel's original dowry and for the promise of eight months of service to his ally.[63] Thus, Despenser was contractually bound to Montferrat at the time of Cascina and Florence's war with Milan, making it still less likely that he would have left Piedmont to fight in Tuscany. When Pope Urban commended him for his feats of arms in a later letter in March, 1370, he specifically located those feats in "Lombardy," not Tuscany.[64]

What the papal letters do suggest, however, is that Urban likely sought Dispenser's services for the Florentine-papal army in Tuscany *after* the battle of Cascina, perhaps as part of the reassembly of the defeated force. However, if this is so, he arrived in Florence after the artist, Andrea di Bonauito, was supposed to have painted the *via veritatis* fresco in the Spanish Chapel. According to his contract, Bonauito was to complete the work in 1368. At that point, however, the Englishman was not yet allied to the pope, nor had he distinguished himself on any Italian battlefields.

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60 *Calendar of Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, ed. W.H. Bliss and J.A. Twemlow, 12 vols. (1893-1933; reprint, Nendeln/Liechtenstein, 1971), 4:28-29

61 ASV, Reg Vat, R. 250, f. 19.

62 Cook, "Last Months," 106; Eugene L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy* (Princeton, 1967), 261-62

63 Cox, *Green Count*, 106, 261.

64 Archivio Vaticano, Rev Vat., R. 250, f. 48; Devlin, "English Knight," 274. The letter was addressed to the duke of Lancaster.

Florence itself did not join this alliance until November, 1369. During much of the prior period the city was not on especially good terms with the papacy. As Gene Brucker has shown, Florence's policy toward Urban was the subject of intense political debates in Florentine political circles.[65]

If, then, the figure in the *via veritatis* fresco is indeed Edward Despenser, it was probably not drawn before 1369 or perhaps even later. Prior to that time, the English were largely at odds with the papacy. Urban V had not supported Lionel's marriage to Violante Visconti, in which Edward Despenser played a leading role. The pontiff had not wished to see his traditional enemy, the Visconti, strengthened by a martial alliance with the English royal house. When Lionel came to Italy in 1368, the pope sent envoys to try to dissuade him. He then attempted to limit the scope of the wedding, even forbidding celebratory jousts on the pain of excommunication. An extant letter from Bernabò Visconti to Edward III in 1367 thanks the English monarch for putting the English free companies at his service against the pontiff.[66]

The pope's diplomatic efforts against Lionel's marriage may nevertheless provide a clue to Edward Despenser's possible service in Tuscany. Papal letters show that among the envoys Urban employed to appeal to Lionel was a Sir Hugh Despenser, identified as "an English knight from the diocese of Lincoln." In August, 1368, the pope instructed Sir Hugh, along with the papal chaplain and auditor, an Englishman named Robert Stratton (also from Lincoln), to discuss with Lionel "matters touching on the health of his soul and body." The pope sent similar instructions to Sir Robert Ashton and Sir Ralph Basset, two other knights in Lionel's retinue.[67] As Albert Cook has demonstrated, this same Hugh Despenser, along with Ashton and Bassett, attended Lionel's wedding banquet and participated with Edward Despenser in the subsequent campaigns against Galeazzo Visconti after Lionel died.[68]

More pertinent to the subject at hand, Hugh Despenser appears on the Florentine payroll in May 1370, as a soldier at the head of thirty lances. The document refers to him as "Messer Ugo di Edwardo Despenser." The title "messer" indicates that he was knight, and his salary, 160 florins, reinforces this elevated status, as the sum was a large one.[69]

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65 Brucker, *Florentine Politics*, 194-243

66 Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 132

67 *Calendar of Papal Registers*, 4:26-28

68 Cook, "Last Months," 73.

69 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 46, f. 26v.

The document cited above clearly connects Hugh Despenser with an Edward Despenser ("Ugo di Edwardo Despenser"), who was his father. The reference cannot have been to our Edward Despenser, who had only one son named Thomas.[70] Instead, the reference relates to the father of our Edward, also named Edward, who lived from 1310 to 1342 and was in turn the son of Hugh Despenser the younger (d 1326). Thus, the two Despensers who attended Lionel's Italian wedding in 1368 were brothers.

Although he has not as yet been the subject of a biographical study, Sir Hugh Despenser had a distinguished career fighting abroad. He likely went on crusade in 1367 in Prussia, then served the papacy during his stay in Italy which lasted until at least 1373. In that year Hugh is mentioned in Paduan documents as receiving from John Hawkwood, commander of papal forces, an advance of 900 florins to pay off debts so he could take up papal service against Bernabò Visconti.[71] It is unclear when Hugh returned to England, but after his arrival at home he did he took up several important posts in his homeland, amassed significant landed holdings, and forged close ties to King Richard II (r.1377-1399), with whom he went to Scotland in 1384 and Ireland ten years later.[72] Hugh's last will and testament, published by A. Gibbons, suggests that he died around 1400.[73] The document makes clear that Hugh maintained close ties to his brother Edward, who is mentioned in the will as having given him in "gift" the manor at Essendine (Esyndon), where Edward had been born and which he himself had inherited from their father.[74]

Given the strong ties between the brothers, it is possible that the two joined Florentine service together in May, 1370. Both may have acted at the instigation of the pope, though only Edward appears on the papal payroll. Such familial arrangements were common in Italian armies at this time.[75]

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[70] I have previously incorrectly identified Hugh as the son of Edward Despenser, see Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 139. Martyn Lawrence, "Power, Ambition and Political Rehabilitation: The Despensers, c.1281–1400," (Ph.D. diss., University of York, 2005) and idem, "'Too Flattering Sweet to be Substantial'? The Last Months of Thomas Lord Despenser," in *Fourteenth-Century England*, ed. J.S. Hamilton (Woodbridge, 2006), 4:141-58.

[71] Benjamin G Kohl, *Padua under the Carrara* (Baltimore, 1998), 127.

[72] Colin Jonathan Dowse, "A Regal Asset or a Right Royal Disaster? King's Knights, Royal Influence and Local Administration in the Midlands, 1377-1399," (Ph,D. diss.,University of Leicester, 2008), 37, 58, 85, 86.

[73] *Early Lincoln Wills: An Abstract of all the wills and Administrations Recorded in the Episcopal Registers of the Old Diocese of Lincoln, 1280-1547*, ed. A. Gibbons (Lincoln, 1888), 98-99.

[74] 'Parishes: Essendine's, *A History of the County of Rutland*, 2 (1935): 250-54. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=66245 [accessed: May 23, 2010].

[75] Caferro, "Continuity," 248

If this is the case, then the two brothers must have joined the Florentine-papal cause after the recapture of San Miniato (March, 1370), at a time when the major fighting was over. Hugh Despenser remained on the Florentine payroll for approximately a year, until the spring of 1371, always at the head of thirty lances.[76]

Hugh Dispenser's verifiable presence in Florence and his service to the papacy, which included participation in a crusade, a major theme in the *via veritatis* fresco, suggests that he was a more worthy subject for inclusion in the Santa Maria Novella work than was his brother Edward. But we may exclude Hugh on the grounds that he was not a knight of the Garter.

Contemplation of Dispenser's career returns our essay to where it began—at Lionel's wedding banquet table and with the speculations of literary critics. Hugh Despenser's Florentine service connects him directly to the green squire, Oschino Arciere, who, according to Florentine budgets, gave surety for the repayment of the loan of 700 florins that Despenser received at the start of his service with Florence in 1370.[77] Arciere's new contract was for three months and twenty-one days; after that time he disappears from the Florentine registers forever. In fact, it is not unlikely that much of the force previously commanded by Arciere now moved over to serve Sir Hugh Despenser.[78]

If, as the literary critic, Ann Meyer, has recently suggested, the Dispensers were possible patrons of the anonymous Gawain poet, the connection between Hugh and Oschino assumes greater meaning. It opens up the possibility that our green knight, who, as we have seen, led the way in the adoption of the lance unit by the Florentine army, may have provided a model for the Gawain poet, mediated through Dispenser. Despite being identified in papal letters with the diocese of Lincoln, Hugh Dispenser also had extensive interests in the northwestern Midlands, a region that scholars have proposed as the possible home of the Gawain poet. Hugh's last will and testament shows that he held land in Staffordshire, the presumed location of Green Chapel mentioned in the poem. He held the avowson of the parish church in Stockport, Cheshire, whose rector, John de Mascy, has been singled out by some scholars as a possible author of

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[76] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 47, f. 18v; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 48, ff. 20, 44; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 50, f. 20.

[77] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 46, f. 43..

[78] ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 47, f. 19; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 48, f. 20.

the poem.[79] Despenser also had interests in Macclesfield, a place closely associated with the poem, and his name appears on charters along with Richard Newton and Thomas de Massey, men associated with the Cotton Nero A. x. manuscript, which contains the Gawain poem. Finally, Sir Hugh Dispenser was a member of Richard II's circle, a characteristic that Michael Bennett identified as a critical prerequisite for the patron of the Gawain poem.[80]

Whether Hugh Despenser was indeed the patron of the Gawain poet is a question best left to literary scholars. But what is clear from the preceding discussion is that the involvement of Englishmen in Italy had important consequences for military, artistic, and literary developments on both the peninsula and the island.

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[79] J.P. Earwaker, *East Cheshire: Past and Present; or a History of the Hundred of Macclesfield in the County Palatine of Cester*, 2 vols. (London, 1877), 1:336, 341; Meyer, "Despensers," 415, 420-21.

[80] Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and Lancastrian Society in the Age of 'Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*' and idem,"The Court of Richard II and the Promotion of Literature" in *Chaucer's England*, ed. Barbara Hanawalt (Minneapolis, 1992),

Table 1. English Captains in Florentine Service. Winter-Summer 1369

Oschino Arciere
Gianni Todinam
Richard Romsey
Gianni Aguillantur
Uttieri de Loren
Guglielmo Banchost
Gianichino Ottos
Gianichino Bottesten
Arrigho Unghiloso
Tommaso Crosbi
Rubino Bussi
Adam Ghuardel
Adovardo de Breeton
Ghualtiere Prendeghast
Rubino Stanton
Riccardo Grandison
Filipotto Ochan
Tommaso Mersden
Tommaso Cortese
Betto Marsden
Giovanni Rorch
Giovanni Treghol
Giovanni Borci
Rubino Schardiborough
Giovanni Secabor
Niccholo Ughetti
Giani de Boses
Gianichino Bottarelle
Riccardo de Balde
Arrigho Inghelass
Filippo Archati
Riccardo Guidifor
Dani Guardel

Source: ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 38, ff. 17-26; Scrivano di camera uscita, R. 41, ff. 19-20v; Scrivano di camera Uscita, R. 42, ff. 20-37.

Note: For simplicity and accuracy, I have retained the Italian renderings of the English names, as I have done throughout the essay.



Map. 6. Northern Italy.

BOUCICAUT *FILS* AND THE GREAT HIATUS: INSIGHTS FROM THE CAREER OF JEAN II LE MEINGRE, CALLED *BOUCICAUT*

David S. Hoornstra

In the English-speaking world, it has for too long been fashionable to repeat the historical cliché of the vainglorious French knight with more pride than brains, charging into a hail of deadly English arrows in armor more costly than effective against them. Using the less-well-known actions and interests of a man born to be marshal of France, this essay will show that the French knightly ethos contained as much hard work as vainglory—and a world-view that spread far beyond the English Channel. It will also clear up the confusion caused by the fact that there were not two but three Boucicauts who fought for the crown of France during the Hundred Years War. But its primary aim is to shed light on how a French knight lived, fought, and affected politics in that wider world. In the second volume of this series, Kelly DeVries called for a wider view from students of the Hundred Years' War.[1] This article will provide a modest contribution from Boucicaut's adventures beyond the Anglo-French theater.

Born in 1366, Jean II le Meingre was the younger of two famous soldiers, father and son, both named Jean le Meingre, both of whom became marshal of France, each characterized in his time by the nickname "Boucicaut."[2] Each fought the English during his portion of the War, but their lives overlapped by only two years. The third Boucicaut was Geoffroy, Jean II's brother, born a year later and referred to by Froissart as Boucicaut the Younger. Sometimes called "Le Petit Boucicaut," he signed himself as "Boucicaut's brother" (*Boucicaut son frère*) in the charter issued for Jean II's votive order, acknowledging his brother's greater renown. Geoffroy's career parallels that of his brother at a lesser level. He rose to become

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[1] Kelly DeVries, "The Hundred Years Wars: Not One But Many," in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 3-32.

[2] That "Boucicaut" *is* a nickname is made clear by the use of the phrase "dit Boucicaut" ("called Boucicaut") or simply "Boucicaut" by the sources nearest the man himself, e.g. his biographer. Others, usually writing at a distance of time or geography, use phases that misleadingly suggest surnames or lands held: "the Sire de Boucicaut," "the Mareschal de Boucicaut" and "Jean le Meingre de Boucicaut."

governor of the Dauphiné in 1399. In his study of the *nom-de-guerre* "Boucicaut," Denis Lalande says its roots suggest "baskets" or "panniers," used for the transport of loot won in a military endeavor. According to Lalande, it implies "wealth before honor."[3] Both Jean II and his brother, Geoffroy used the nickname for all that it was worth.

What most scholars know of Boucicaut *fils*—renowned jouster, marshal of France, and a general at Agincourt—would seem to support the cliché. Barbara Tuchman called him "the epitome of chivalry,"[4] in terms that suggest more pride than sense. Froissart wrote him large as a young tournament hero. A page on campaign at twelve, knighted at sixteen, a "crusader" at eighteen, a Holy Land pilgrim at twenty-two, and marshal of France at twenty-six, Jean II married well above his station and was not only embraced by kings, emperors, and popes, but also praised by the leading female writer of the age, Christine de Pizan.[5] He founded a votive order of chivalry, organized and fought in the most famous jousts of the fourteenth century,[6] and organized and participated on the French side at the most famous battle of the next. As a French hero he fell short only by not dying like Charny, holding the Oriflamme and guarding his king's person. His exit from the stage was anticlimactic—as a prisoner after Agincourt.

But there is far more to Boucicaut *fils* than what has heretofore been published in English works. Boucicaut *père* may have left his children a nickname with an anti-chivalric "loot-baskets" connotation, but he did not leave them much loot. What he did leave them—the memory of his service to the kingdom—put them in position at court to win their fortunes if they had what it took. Both sons did well, but Jean II is the one we remember. As the elder brother, as well as his father's namesake, he was first to benefit from being brought up with the heir to the throne—the future Charles VI (r.1380-1422)—and he took enough advantage of this connection to win vastly more renown than his father had achieved. On the other hand, Boucicaut *fils* paid a price for the glory he came to enjoy.

At Nicopolis in 1396, the wheel of fortune turned under our hero with a jerk. Not only did close and famous friends die in the battle and the after-

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[3] Denis Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre, dit Boucicaut, (1366-1421), etude d'une biographie héroique* (Geneva, 1988). See also idem, "La naissance d'un sobriquet: Boucicaut," *Revue des langues romans* 85 (1981): 115-23.

[4] Barbara Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror, the Calamitous 14th Century* (New York, 1978), 556.

[5] *Oevres Poétiques de Christine de Pizan*, ed. Maurice Roy, 2 vols. (Paris 1886-1896), 1:302-303, 220.

[6] Richard Barber and Juliet Barker, *Tournaments* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1989), 43.

math, he himself became a prisoner along with the count of Nevers—the future John the Fearless of Burgundy—and other high French nobles.[7] Blaming French chivalric culture for the disaster, Tuchman singled out Boucicaut's aggressive bravado for extra credit.[8] But Boucicaut was now thirty—an active battle-hardened knight of fifteen years experience and a marshal of France. What he learned from Nicopolis can be detected in many of his subsequent actions. To the French, it was the greatest disaster since Poitiers, but, despite his participation in this defeat, Boucicaut's reputation was, if anything, enhanced in the aftermath. He was later sent to rescue Constantinople, now under more pressure since Nicopolis, and then requested by the Genoese to be their next governor in 1401.

In that role, he was far from cautious, using the Genoese fleet to attack the Turks wherever he could, almost starting a war with Venice in the process. He became politically entangled with the Florentines over Pisa and with the schismatic pope, Benedict XIII (1394-1424). In 1409, while serving French interests in Milan, he and his French garrison were locked out of Genoa by pro-Ghibelline activists, never to return. Back in France, the crown employed Boucicaut in one crisis after another that rocked the French monarchy. Finally, he served as a general at Agincourt, where he was wounded and captured, never to be ransomed.

Throughout this saga, he is seen only rarely in direct combat with the English. That is primarily due to the fact that his life almost exactly coincided with several periods when the war between these two principal antagonists was in remission. This era of uneasy peace with England shaped the development of Boucicaut's entire generation of French chivalry in a way that contrasted with the chivalry known by his father. Even so, he was marshal of France, one of the top three military men of the kingdom, and when the conflict heated up, it was he who drew up the French battle plan for Agincourt. Whenever men spoke of chivalry, his name was a household word.

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7 For battle of Nicopolis (September 28, 1396), see Aziz Suryal Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934); Kelly DeVries, "The Effect of Killing the Christian Prisoners at the Battle of Nicopolis," in *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies around the Mediterranean*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2003), 157-72; David Nicolle, *Nicopolis, 1396: The Last Crusade* (London, 1999); J.E. Ruiz Domènech, "Misteriosa Nicópolis," *Mirabilia: Revista Electrònica de História Antiga a Medieval* 10 (2010): 258-66; Charles L. Tipton, "The English at Nicopolis," *Speculum* 37 (1962): 528-40.

8 Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror*, 556.

Tuchman calls Boucicaut "Knighthood's zealot,"[9] but then she sees a self-aggrandizing quest for glory in every knightly tradition, privilege, and action. Her criticism of nobles taking front-line places in battle carries less weight when you consider that, in Boucicaut's time, the front-line position rarely meant the glorious cavalry charge. In over thirty years of battles large and small, one can count his mounted charges on the fingers of a hand. For Jean II le Meingre, the front-line privilege was enjoyed *on foot*, whether assaulting a strong place, boarding an enemy ship, or, finally, slogging through the mud at Agincourt. It meant more time under fresher fire than anyone else, facing greater hazards than those to the rear. It meant more pressure in the "press" of bodies in a battle formation, and if wounded you were buried deeper in the pile. For a leader, it meant being the first to take the consequences of one's tactical errors. Such was the privilege Boucicaut's flesh was heir to—nowhere more clearly than at Agincourt.

I. *Sources*

There is a rich vein of historical material dealing with Jean II le Meingre. In addition to a large body of references in chronicles and other documents, there are a few key documents with very close associations with our protaganist. *Les Cent Ballades*[10] is a literary work he co-authored with Jean le Seneschal and Philippe d'Artois, Count of Eu, among others, and that is often confused with a work of the same title by Christine de Pizan. There is the *Book of Hours*[11] he commissioned from the artist known for a century only as "The Boucicaut Master," whose naturalistic techniques made him popular with the higher French aristocracy.[12] There remains a copy of a French battle plan for Agincourt uncovered several decades ago, of which

[9] Ibid., 556.

[10] Phillipe d'Artois (Comte d'Eu), Jean de Sainte-Pierre (Seneschal of Eu), Boucicaut, and Jean de Crésecque, *Le livre des Cent Ballades* (Paris 1905).

[11] *Heures du Mareschal de Boucicaut*, Musée Jacquemart-Andre, Paris. During his tenure as Governor of Genoa (c.1403-6), he commissioned a comparatively unknown workshop to execute a book of hours now famous in the world of manuscript illumination. The original painter, Jacques Coene, later created masterworks for some of the richest men of the French court, including the Duke of Berry. In it, Boucicaut and his wife are shown in devotional poses with different coats of arms displayed above them and on their prie-dieus. The armorial smorgasbord in this painting is due to Diane de Poitiers having had her arms painted over *part of* the original heraldry.

[12] Millard Meiss, *The Boucicaut Master* (London and New York, 1968). The Boucicaut Hours are said to be unusual for the use of green and white, possibly a reference to the *Escu Vert*.

Boucicaut may have been a principal author.[13] Most significantly, there is a contemporary biography tracing his career down to the year 1409, five years before his final battle. This work appears to have been commissioned by a group of friends and supporters.

The *Livre des fais de bon messire Jehan II le Maingre, dit Boucicaut, Governeur de Jennes*, was started around 1404 and brought to a finish of sorts in April of 1409, and has since appeared in several editions of widely-varying quality and completeness. As a result, it has enjoyed varying degrees of respect as an historical source. In his essay in *Teaching Chivalry*, Joseph Cotton categorized it as "chivalric biography,"[14] which can mean fanciful, romanticized or even fictional. Indeed, when you glance at a list of the feats and accomplishments described in the *Livre des fais*, the reader is reminded of the fictional Tirant lo Blanc,[15] and it is easy to dismiss it at first glance. On the other hand, we now have insights from French scholar Denis Lalande's highly-focused work that tends to bear out the realistic nature of this work.

In 1985, after publishing linguistic studies on what he declares to be the original manuscript, Lalande produced a carefully-researched French edition[16] of the Bibliothèque nationale [BN] Ms. ff 11432.[17] In an extensive introduction, he traces the relationship of all other editions, including the one cited by Cotton, to this manuscript. He notes that each derivative version has errors or serious lacunae. When comparing the writing style of the original biography with the work of Froissart, Lalande makes it clear that this is by no means a second-rate piece of literature. For his part, the unknown author, despite likening his subject to such popular heroes as Lancelot and Tristan, also makes a more realistic comparison to Otho de Grandson, the faithful and hard-working right-hand man to Edward I of

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13 Christopher Philpotts, "The French Plan of Battle for the Agincourt Campaign," *English Historical Review* [hereafter *EHR*] 99 (1990): 59-66.

14 Joseph T. Cotton, "Teaching The Motifs of Chivalric Biography," in *The Study of Chivalry, Resources and Approaches* (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1988), 588.

15 Joanot Martorell and Martí Joan de Galba, *Tirant lo Blanc*, trans. David H. Rosenthal (New York, 1984).

16 *Livre des Fais de bon messire Jean II le Meingre, dit Boucicaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes* [hereafter *LF*], ed. Denis Lalande (Geneva, 1985). He lists seven earlier French works on the biography itself, and 21 historical studies, of which 8 are Italian, 1 German, and 12 French, mostly written in the twentieth century.

17 *Livre des Fais de bon messire Jean II le Meingre, dit Boucicaut*, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes Bibliothèque National [hereafter BN], Ms. 11432. The date 1409 is inscribed in a later hand at the top of folio 1r and substantiated by the text itself.

England (r.1272-1307). In his own historical writing entitled *Étude d'une biographie héroique*,[18] Lalande has considerable success in filling in many of the gaps in the medieval account. Using a variety of historical sources, including Italian and Islamic works, he corrects errors, adds biographical detail, and points out omissions that are due to the author's partisanship.

In her 1995 essay on the authorship of the *Livre des fais*,[19] Helène Millet carries Lalande's work even further. She agrees with him that the BN manuscript is the original source of all other known versions of the biography, whether they are extant or not. She also concludes the work was started in 1404, and brought to a hasty finish during the Genoa crisis of 1409. According to Millet's argument, the manuscript was circulated in its present state—vacant picture boxes and all—among members of the French court in order to remind them of Boucicaut's long and faithful service. This hypothesis makes sense given not only his long career, but also current problems arising from his Genoese connection. While several scholars have been tempted to lay the manuscript at the door of Christine de Pizan, Millet accepts Lalande's demonstration that Christine could not have been its author, but disagrees with him in making a strong case for Nicolas de Gonasse, Boucicaut's confessor and a man highly active in his inner circle of advisers at Genoa. Gonasse entered Boucicaut's service around 1406, and therefore had some three years in which to compose his story.[20]

In its present state, the manuscript is a narrative up to the year 1409, plus a long chapter on Boucicaut's character appended to the work. It is written on parchment with the rubrics painted in, but with frames for four missing miniatures. Its first appendix contains a chronology of Boucicaut's life down to 1409.

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[18] See note 3. This book was based on an early work: Denis Lalande *Études sur le Livre de Fais de bon Messire Jehan le Maigre dit Bouciquaut* (Lille, 1983).

[19] Helène Millet, "Qui a ecrit Le livre des faits de bon messire Jehan le Maingre dit Boucicaut?" in: *Textes et etudes du Moyen Age: 2: Pratiques de la Culture Ecrit en France au XVe Siècle.* (Louvain-le-Neuve, 1995).

[20] Ibid., 136. Nicolas Gonasse was born in the Laon diocese of a poor family but through dint of hard work and grants from magnates like the dukes Orleans and Berry, slowly completed a course of education that brought him a bachelor's degree in 1396 and doctorate in 1403. He is best known for finishing up the translation from the Latin of a work by Valerius Maximus begun in 1375 by Simon de Hesdin.

II. *Historical Background*

Thirty years before our hero's birth, Geoffroi de Charny's *Book of Chivalry*[21] demanded moderation and restraint on the part of the knight, defining knightly success not in terms of tournament victory but in terms of service to one's lord and to Christianity, especially, but not exclusively, in battle. Charny emphasized the knight's role as leader, diplomat, administrator, and judge, expecting him to fulfill political roles knowledgeably when military events thrust him into administrative situations. Such circumstances Boucicaut experienced many times. While Richard Kaeuper plays down Charny's influence on the next generation of knights,[22] the lives of Boucicaut and a few of his contemporaries support a contrary view.

In dealing with the Middle Ages, many modern scholars struggle with a perceived dichotomy between chivalric idealism and pragmatic if not downright mercenary soldiering.[23] Neither Froissart nor Boucicaut's unknown biographer is troubled by such a dichotomy. The economic aspects of chivalry have been well examined elsewhere. Here, we will content ourselves with observing that neither of the first two Boucicauts was exceptionally deserving of the "loot-baskets" connotation attributed to their *nomme de guerre*. Even given the worst possible interpretation of his actions, Boucicaut bears no comparison with the real mercenaries of his era.

If Charny's book expressed the curriculum for French knights, their agenda was set by the times. It would be easy to assert that the times in which Boucicaut lived were suited better to the ruthless than the selfless. Born in 1366, he grew up with the Great Schism (1378-1417), facilitated by the disastrous mistake of Charles V "the Wise" (r.1364-1380) in supporting the Avignon popes, whose existence would dampen every approach to

[21] *The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation*, trans Richard W. Kaeuper and Elspeth Kennedy (Philadelphia, 1996). De Charny makes it clear that knighthood should be given to the young, and that rash courage is the stuff of youth. He also expects the knight to give up rashness with his youth, maturing into a leader and strategist with an eye on the safety of his men and the long-term benefits of his campaigns. He defines knighthood in terms of devotion—to service of lord, king and God. He advises conditioning the body and conserving one's resources. He demands *mesure*—doing each thing in the appropriate time and in appropriate degree, whether of speed or force.

[22] Ibid., 63.

[23] Steven Muhlberger, *Deeds of Arms: Formal Combats in the Late Fourteenth Century* (Highland Village, Texas, 2005), 12-16.

Anglo-French peace for the next forty years.[24] Boucicaut was only fourteen in 1380 when Charles died and left the kingdom to a young son who would grow up to be Charles VI, known to history as Charles the Mad.[25] Progressing from a minority dominated by four uncles to an adult life of frequent insanity with only four good years in between, the new king's reign truly earned the term "calamitous." Richard Famiglietti's book *Royal Intrigue* gives a vivid account of what can happen when four French dukes and the Bavarian queen of France fight for control of a government whose king is clearly insane a little less than half the time and a conscientious but behind-the-times administrator-king for the rest.[26]

The king's madness came on dramatically in 1392. For the rest of his life, he would recover for weeks or months, and then relapse.[27] During periods of lucidity, he would resume direction of the government, each time with progressively poorer results. For the first few years of the reign, France enjoyed relative calm, but in 1396 fortunes of the kingdom entered a steep decline. An "all-star" Franco/Burgundian army marched east to aid King Sigismund of Hungary (r.1387-1437) (later the Holy Roman Emperor) against Turkish pressure on his kingdom.[28] In its crusading zeal, this force invaded the Ottoman Empire, and was so thoroughly destroyed at Nicopolis that it took three months for the terrible news to be believed in Paris.[29] The 1407 assassination of the duke of Orleans by agents of John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (r.1404-1419), sparked a civil war that made Paris and the French royal family alternately players and pawns.[30] For the remainder of his life Charles VI appears to have signed any plausible-sounding decree put before him by those who held his person at the time.

Throughout Boucicaut's life, in spite of long periods of truce with England, many sections of France were still being fought over by both

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[24] For Charles V, see Joseph Calmette, *Charles V* (Paris, 1945); Roland Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, 5 vols. (Paris 1909-1931); Christine de Pisan, *Le livre de fais et bonnes meures du sage roy Charles V* (Paris, 1909).

[25] For Charles VI, see Goerges Bordonove, *Charles VI: Le roi fol et bien-aimé* (Paris, 2006); J. Saltel, *Le folie du roi Charles VI* (Toulouse, 1907); Jean Juvénal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI, et des choses memorabiles aduenuës durant 42 années de son regne* (Paris, 1653).

[26] Richard C. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392-1420* (New York, 1986).

[27] See Aleksandra Pfau, "Warfare, Trauma, and Madness in the French Remission Letters of the Hundred Years War," in this volume.

[28] Norman Housely, *The Later Crusades from Lyon to Alcazar 1274-1580* (Oxford, 1992), 76.

[29] DeVries, "Effect," 157-58.

[30] For this assassination, see A. Coville, *La question du tyrannicide au commencement du xve siècle* (Paris, 1932); P.S. Lewis, *Later Medieval France: The Polity* (London, 1968), 90.

English clients and independent companies. The nightmare of Breton, Norman, and/or Burgundian defection, as well as the ever-present threat from England, placed constant stress on the French leadership, undermining what little solidarity it had. After the defeat at Agincourt in 1415, the political axe-murder of Duke John the Fearless in 1419, the treaty of Troyes with Henry V of England (r.1413-1422),[31]and the subsequent disinheritance of the dauphin, the political fabric of the country was hanging together by threads.

In analyzing the career of Boucicaut *fils*, one must not be misled by the English threat. His father had lived through the horrors of the war against the English as a fact of everyday life. His son lived in a different France. By the time Boucicaut *fils* was entering his teens, most of the English gains from the earlier periods of warfare had been recovered by Charles the Wise and his constable, Bertran duGuesclin. No one growing up in the royal court could ignore the English as an enemy. By the late 1370s, however, the threat from England was becoming much less significant than it had been for decades. During this long hiatus in the conflict, the English were increasingly viewed as knights to be jousted with in an atmosphere of high idealism. As a result, the French warrior's eyes turned south and east.

III. *The Family Saga*

Boucicaut *pere*—Jean I le Meingre—was a career soldier from Touraine who became a marshal of France under French kings, Jean II (r.1350-1364) and Charles V. Although the le Meingre family once possessed broad lands in Touraine, these were not passed on to our hero. In a colorfully-rendered account, Froissart depicts the elder Boucicaut's good humor and *sang-froid*. Trapped with his 300 lances in the old castle of Romorantin by the entire English army, he is invited to surrender by Sir John Chandos. The old warrior replied,

> Chandos, Chandos, I don't consider myself a splendid knight, but we should be crazy to accept the kind of terms you are offering, and crazier still to give ourselves up when there is as yet no need for it. Please tell the Prince to do whatever he thinks best, and we will await him here in all confidence.[32]

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[31] Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, 38-41.

[32] Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, trans. Geoffrey Brereton (New York, 1978), 123-25.

The familiar tone may be Froissart's invention, but it is also likely the result of the men's prior acquaintance. In the event Boucicaut and his troop held out until incendiary missiles (Petitot says "Greek Fire") set the whole place ablaze, forcing them to surrender. The castle was left a ruin.

Boucicaut *père*'s close acquaintance with the English came largely on the battlefield rather than in the lists. In *War Cruel and Sharp*, Clifford Rogers notes his appearance in several military actions. He was taken prisoner twice by the English and he is described as having met with Edward III (r.1327-1377) while held in royal custody during 1352.[33] The elder Boucicaut was also one of the principal negotiators of the 1360 Treaty of Brétigny, the pro-English nature of which caused considerable discontent in France. In 1363, the aging nobleman accompanied the king, Jean II, when he returned to England.[34]

Although his first wife died childless, late in life he married into a noble family, begetting by his second wife, Fleurette de Linières, two sons, Jean and Geoffroy. Although Jean was only two when the elder Boucicaut died in 1367, he would later serve with many of the men who had once fought alongside his father.[35]

IV. *The Young Champion*

Boucicaut *fils* was forced to come of age rapidly; consequently his fifty-six years were very full ones. His richest patrimony was a name well-remembered at court. His coat-of-arms displaying a red spread eagle against a white background was well-known among the heraldic images of his age.[36] King Charles V, careful about his heir's education, placed the sons of his best soldiers and courtiers in the entourage of the young prince. The younger Boucicaut profited greatly from sharing the prince's education. From an early age, Jean II showed an aggressive, dominating personality, obsessed about knighthood and warfare.[37] Duke Louis of Bourbon, Charles V's cousin and brother-in-law, helped the young man's career on many occasions. Instead of equipping himself out of the 500 francs a year he

33 Clifford Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 299-300.

34 Froissart, *Chronicles*, 167.

35 *LF*, 11-16 (I: iii).

36 Navarre Herald (c.1370) lists arms for Boucicaut as "Argent, an eagle employée gules, barbed and beaked azure." Blazon modernized from *Armorial du héraut Navarre* (1368-1375), ed. Louis Douët-d'Arcq (Paris 1859).

37 *LF*, 16-19 (I: iv).

inherited, he was beholden in this respect to his sponsors, the king and the duke.[38]

At age twelve, he obtained leave from the king to accompany *le Bon Duc Louis* as a page on the 1378 Normandy campaign, one of France's last major bouts with England before the onset of the long hiatus. His biographer tells us that he delighted in being able for the first time to go "armed as well as he could desire."[39] During this campaign he was able to witness at first hand stratagems for reducing strongholds, and to approach the greatest warriors of the age, such as the Constable, Bertrand du Guesclin, then in his last years.[40]

When the English commander, Thomas Woodstock, earl of Buckingham, led a *chevauchée* from Calais through the northeast of France ending up in Brittany two years later, Boucicaut witnessed the last campaign in the battle-avoidance policy of Charles V. The fourteen-year-old page came in contact with the king's top generals and closest advisors, including the new constable, Olivier de Clisson.[41] The triumphal return of the French army to Paris was marred by the death of Charles V. Six weeks later, in November 1380, Boucicaut's boyhood companion and now close friend mounted the throne as Charles VI. At that time, both were minors.

The following spring the young warrior followed Marshal Louis de Sancerre on an expedition into southwestern France. Lalande states that Sancerre had fought alongside the elder Boucicaut on many occasions, especially against the Free Companies. It was on this campaign that the son gained his reputation for physical ability, climbing scaling ladders from the back using only his hands, and vaulting over a horse or onto the shoulders of another man—all in full armor.[42]

At the age of sixteen, he was knighted by Bourbon on the eve of the battle of Roosebeke (November 27, 1382).[43] According to his biographer, he performed in this battle in a manner befitting his new rank. During this final chapter of the Van Artevelde story, we may be certain he learned

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[38] Ibid., 19-21 (I: v).

[39] Ibid., p. 20 l. 33 (I: v).

[40] Richard Vernier, *The Flower of Chivalry: Bertran du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003), 178-81.

[41] *LF*, 21-23 (I: vi). For Clisson's relationship with Boucicaut, see John Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996), 41, 214.

[42] *LF*, 24-26 (I: vii)

[43] Ibid., 35-40 (I: x). For battle of Roosebeke, see Friedrich Mohr, *Die schlacht Rosebeke am 27 November 1382* (Berlin, 1906); Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War III: Divided Houses* (Philadelphia, 2009), 484-86.

something about warfare across class lines. When the army disbanded, the king left Constable Clisson in charge of the frontier guard. Characteristically, when the rest of the king's young entourage—*les enfants tendres*—returned to Paris, Boucicaut wintered with Clisson, a veteran who for decades had actually fought on the English side.

In January, 1384, during a truce with the English, the young man was recruited to go crusading by Zoellner de Rottenstein, grand-master of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia. The enemy was the pagan Grand Duke "Jagellon" (Jagiello) of Lithuania who also served as the king of Poland (r.1386-1434).[44] Some modern authorities assume that such crusading activity was not rigorous enough to change a young man into a battle-hardened veteran.[45] Whether or not this is true, since the Teutonic Order recruited its manpower from all western countries, Boucicaut now had an opportunity to fight alongside English knights and those of other nationalities.

By spring, he had returned to Paris, and then attended the peace conference at Boulogne. In September, he journeyed back to Prussia. This time the western allies' military efforts were crowned with the treaty of Konigsberg and by January, 1385 Boucicaut had again returned to Paris. He arrived in time to help prepare for Bourbon's campaign in Poitou where French lords were complaining of English-sponsored harassment. The campaign took most of the summer and culminated in the siege of Verteuil, which capitulated about the end of September.[46] The duke de Bourbon returned to Paris, leaving 250 men to hold the town under the command of several young knights, including Boucicaut, Jean de Châteaumorand and Renaud de Roye. This little army set forth to take other strongholds in the neighborhood complained of by French landholders.

In the Auvergne, before the castle of Chaulucet, the young warrior challenged a renowned Gascon, Sicart de la Barde, to engage in a joust, consisting of twenty passages with the lance. According to his biographer, the pair completed only three of the courses. In the first, Boucicaut's lance broke Sicart's visor buckles and lifted his helm partly off his head. In the third pass, Sicart's lance flew into pieces, but Boucicaut held him and carried the seemingly lifeless knight to the ground.[47]

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[44] *LF*, 40-42 (I: xi).

[45] Drawing on Tucoo-Chala, Professor Vernier calls these expeditions "safari-like." Richard Vernier, *Lord of the Pyrenees: Gaston Febus, Count of Foix* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2008), 47-48. Pierre Tucoo-Chala, *Gaston Fébus et la Vicomté de Bearn* (*1343-1391*). (Bordeaux, 1959).

[46] *LF*, 43-46 (I: xii); Sumption, *Hundred Years War III*, 704.

[47] *LF*, 47-51 (I: xiii); Muhlberger, *Deeds of Arms*, 166-67.

For those tempted to regard such jousts and *pas d'armes* as mere frivolities, a note on the equipment and its use might help illuminate the degree of strength and courage required to play. While there are many books in print that discuss the tournament,[48] few, if any, indicate just how much physical ability was needed to undergo the collision of two fully armored horsemen, using lances made of hardwood, often ash. Typically, they were twelve feet long and two inches in diameter at the thinnest part, weighing between fifteen and twenty pounds. Since no human arms and shoulders could sustain an unhorsing impact, the "stop" (*arrêt*) was invented to distribute the shock over the breast plate. In actual combat, the heavy, hardened steel tips were chisel-pointed to penetrate plate armor.[49] The target of choice was the opponent's visor, and the manner of use was to start with the lance vertical and let the point descend towards the target during the charge. Just to ride forward while seeing such a weapon descending toward one's eyes is a sufficient test of courage. Jousting in the fourteenth-century style would qualify at the top of any modern list of extreme sports. One can thus forgive Sicart for not continuing to the bitter end; after three passages, after losing his helmet, but sufficiently proving his valor.[50]

In the spring of 1386, the largest French army assembled in that era gathered in Picardy to invade England. Boucicaut had command of a company of 100 men-at-arms. While the army waited for favorable conditions in the notoriously contrary English channel, and for the arrival of the duke of Berry, Boucicaut challenged and jousted with Peter de Courtenay, an English knight of good family. At the same time, Thomas Clifford also came across the channel to measure lances with the young champion.[51] Since King Charles could not officially countenance such *pas d'armes* in these

[48] R. Coltman Clephan, *The Tournament, its Periods and Phases* (New York, 1919); Richard Barber and Juliet Barker, *Tournaments, Jousts, Chivalry and Pageants in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1989); Mary A Santina, *The Tournament and Literature* (New York, 1999).

[49] For jousting equipment, see David Edge and John Paddock, *Arms and Armor of the Medieval Knight* (New York, 1988); David Nicolle, *Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era, 1050-1350* (London, 1999); *Companion to Medieval Arms and Armour*, ed. David Nicolle (Woodbridge Suffolk, 2002).

[50] For the manner of play, see Sydney Anglo, *The Martial Arts of Renaissance Europe* (New Haven, Conn., 2000), 230–33, analyzing the riding manual by Duarte I of Portugal (1433-1438) written about 1434. In my own research for a paper on this subject in 2006, I found no surviving examples; David Edge at the Wallace Collection assured me there were none in Britain. For the form of the heavy lance, see the illustrations in *King Renée's Book of Love*. Reproduction of copy in the National Library, Vienna: Braziller (New York, 1975). For scale, see the earl of Sheffield's 16c. lance in the Tower of London. Although it is a breakaway version, the size is convincing.

[51] *LF*, 52-55 (I: xiv); Muhlbereger, *Deeds of Arms*, 177-78.

circumstances, Boucicaut accepted the captain of Calais, uncle of his adversary, as judge for the encounter. We can hope for no clearer illustration of his youthful faith in chivalry than this willingness to trust the enemy's noblesse even while openly preparing to invade his country. Boucicaut bore Clifford to earth "both horse and man," whereupon they continued with swords, daggers and axes.[52] Both encounters were again advertised as redounding to Boucicaut's honor and renown. It is not necessary to know who "won." The point was to participate and to handle oneself with courage and skill; to "acquit oneself well."

Not having accomplished any tangible results by the end of July, the army was disbanded. That same month, King Charles sent troops under Olivier du Guesclin, brother of the late constable,[53] and Pierre de Villaines to support Juan I of Castile (r.1379-1390) against the duke of Lancaster, who had launched an English invasion from Portugal in the name of his wife Constanza, daughter of Pedro the Cruel.[54] Two thousand more men arrived in early 1387, after which Louis de Bourbon brought a further 400 men-at-arms to aid the Castilians. Boubon's contingent included Boucicaut and his friend, Jean de Châteaumorand, the man who would later bring about the writing of Bourbon's biography.[55] When they got to Burgos, they found their journey pointless: Lancaster had already signed a truce and disbanded his army, some of which traveled home through France under safe-conducts.

Trying to make the most of their travel, the pair returned by way of the county of Foix, where Boucicaut experienced the brilliant court of Count Gaston Phoebus III (r.1343-1391), author of the celebrated *Book of the Hunt*. According to his biographer, the young man ate and drank with some English knights he encountered there, and who noticed in his behavior

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[52] The axe is a 4-to-6-foot "poll axe" with a point on each shaft-end and a heavy blade with two striking edges, one of which is typically a hammer, the other a beak capable of punching a hole in the forehead of a bascinet. See Edge and Paddock, *Arms and Armour*, 128.

[53] Lalande, *Étude*, 24, names Olivier du Guesclin, brother of the late Constable, as co-commander. Froissart, *Chronicles*, 330, says he is acting as "Constable of Castile."

[54] For John of Gaunt's Castilian expeditions, see Sydney Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt* (London, 1904), 301-33; Anthony Goodman, *John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 1992), 115-23.

[55] Far more than anyone's right-hand-man, Chateaumorand appears to have been a substantial figure in his own right. Ten years older than Boucicaut, he served the Duke of Bourbon for most of Bourbon's active career and was a principal contributor to his biography; Gustave Schlumberger, *Jean de Chateaumorand, un de principaux heros français des arrière-croisades en Orient a la fin de la XIV siècle et à l'aurore du XV* (Paris 1919).

"certain abstinences."[56] If, they said, this behavior was connected with some vow to perform deeds of arms, they would happily provide him the opportunity to do so. They soon arranged an encounter of twenty against twenty with Boucicaut leader of the French party and the lord of Chateauneuf, a relative of the count of Foix, serving as the leader of the English. The challenge came to nothing due to the unwillingness of both the count of Foix and Bourbon to either act as judge or secure the jousting field.[57] Afterwards, the duke's little army recaptured a few small strongholds along the Guyenne frontier from English partisans, eventually returning to Paris in October, 1386.

The biographer does not mention what "abstinences" precipitated this encounter, but this may be an early example of Boucicaut's dietary eccentricities. In the final section of the biography, the author details the knight's personal rules about dining:

> regardless of how many different meat dishes may be set before him, he takes but one, and that the first which comes to hand, be it boiled, roasted, chicken or fat … nor does he drink wine unless cut with water … nor does he delight in strange viands, sauces or spicing.[58]

The biographer gives a very sympathetic but oblique account of the young Boucicaut's love life centered on the court of France. We hear of an unnamed lady who attracts his gaze and inspires him to do great deeds. Since the biography was written less than twenty years later and intended for circulation among the young man's friends, it is not surprising that it contains little detail about Boucicaut's status as a lover. In the end, he was too shy to commit himself.[59]

Boucicaut, now twenty-one, embarked on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land with Renaud de la Roye, the first of several companions labeled in the biography as his "devoted friend." Froissart has him accompanied by Sir Jean de Carrouges, who had that year won the last judicial combat ordered by the Parlement of Paris,[60] Sir Jean Desbordes, and Sir Louis de Giac.[61] As chamberlains in the king's household, Boucicaut and Roye were allowed 1000 francs apiece for the journey. The first leg brought them to Venice,

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56 *LF*, 57, ll.39-40. (I: xv)

57 Ibid., 58 (I: xv); Muhlberber, *Deeds of Arms*, 73, 167..

58 Ibid., p. 415, ll. 18-23 (IV: vii).

59 Ibid., 31-34 (I: ix).

60 Eric Jager, *The Last Duel: A True Story of Crime, Scandal, and Trial by Combat in Medieval France* (New York, 2004).

61 Froissart, *Chronicles*, 314.

where they embarked for a voyage to Constantinople. Around February 1388, they obtained a safe-conduct to visit the Ottoman Sultan, Murad I (r.1362-1389), near Gallipoli. After three months at the Turkish court, the sultan supplied them an escort through Bulgaria to the Danube and Hungary.[62]

Lingering at the court of King Sigismund for three more months, Boucicaut went back to Venice, after promising to return to Hungary to help Sigismund fight the margrave of Moravia. Meanwhile, his companion, Renaud, headed for Prussia to take part in crusading activities there. From Venice, Boucicaut traveled to Palestine, and, in January 1389, visited the holy places. Having already sent his baggage to Prussia, he learned that a member of the French royal family was under arrest at Damascus. This was Phillipe d'Artois, count of Eu. The captive was about to be transferred to a prison in Cairo, where Boucicaut insisted on joining him. Their confinement lasted four months, ending only when the Venetian consul intervened on their behalf with the Sultan. Afterward, the young man joined the count on his tour of the holy places before the pair returned to France via Cyprus, Rhodes and Venice.[63]

It was during their imprisonment that Boucicaut collaborated with Phillipe of Artois, Jean de Sainte-Pierre, the seneschal of Eu, and Jean de Crésecque in writing *Les Cent Ballades*, a work that dealt in verse with various questions concerned with courtly love.[64] In this work, Boucicaut took the side of loyalty in love. Since most of the writing was by the count, it is impossible to attribute definitely any specific passages to Boucicaut. On their return to France in October, the work was offered to the itinerant royal court as the basis of a poetic challenge that was taken up by no fewer than thirty courtiers including the duke of Berry, who did not side with loyalty in love. This event took place as the king traveled through the south of France, where he was attempting to repair the damage done by the royal administration under that same duke of Berry.

V. *St. Inglevert*

It was during that same tour that Boucicaut, Renaud of Roye, and Jean of Sempey proposed holding a *pas d'armes* for thirty days against all comers

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[62] *LF*, 61-63 (I: xvi).

[63] *LF*, 63-64 (I: xvi). He traced his lineage from Robert, count of Artois, brother of Saint Louis (r.1226-1270).

[64] Robert D. Cottrell, "Le conflit des générations dans les "Cent Ballades," *The French Review* 37, n. 5 (Apr. 1964): 517-23.

with weapons of war or peace. The royal council hesitated to endorse this fete for fear that king's image might suffer, and since the three challengers were members of the king's household, his approval would amount to sponsorship. Some pointed out that two of the three young knights were of rather small of stature and the third was "but mediocre" in this respect. In turn, they responded with references to David and Goliath. In the end, Charles VI gave his permission, announcing that the event would take place in the following spring (1390). According to Boucicaut's biographer, the venue would be "St. Tin le Vert," a tiny but identifiable village twelve kilometers from the English-held town of Calais. It was hoped that such mock warfare would help deepen the peace with England. Its choice of location could mean nothing else.[65]

What may look like foolish knight-errantry should not distract the eye from what amounts to Boucicaut's determined, systematic self-schooling for military command and a life of knightly endeavor. These jousts, planned by the young man himself, were aimed squarely at the English knightly community since it was held a day's journey from Calais. Lavish hospitality and refreshment were standard fare at such events. The camaraderie engendered by a meeting of this sort would be strong, and the resulting mutual respect between the participants could offset Anglo-French rivalries.

During the thirty days at St. Inglevert, between sixty and a hundred knights—mostly English challengers—came to test the mettle of their French hosts, and went away well satisfied. Although Froissart gives the event lance-by-lance coverage,[66] the *Livre des Fais* provided only a selection of highlights. Most of the challengers chose weapons of war. Accounts differ as to results. According to the *Le Religieux de St. Denis*,[67] Boucicaut spent nine days bedridden from wounds and unable to fight. By contrast, his biographer asserts that none of the three was hurt. Froissart, who does not mention the wounds, asserts that Charles VI came, incognito, to watch one day's jousting. At any rate, the king made certain that the event was well-funded, supplying 500 *francs d'or* before it began and afterwards adding 2000 to each of the young heroes. The event was celebrated in ballads and the names of all three champions became part of a French proverb.[68]

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[65] *LF*, 65-74 (I: xvii); Steven Muhlberger, "The Combat of Thirty Aginast Thirty: An Example of Medieval Chivalry," in *Hundred Years War* (*Part II*), 285-94; idem, *Deeds of Arms*, 60-61

[66] Froissart, *Chronicles*, 373-85.

[67] *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys*, ed. M.L. Bellaguet, 6 vols. in 3 (Paris 1839), 1:680.

[68] Muhlberger, *Deeds of Arms*, 199-200.

In 1390, the duke of Bourbon led an expedition to "Barbary" (the north African litoral) in which Boucicaut had hoped to participate, despite his duties as royal chamberlain.[69] In the end, however, the king held him back while permitting his younger brother, Geoffroy, to accompany the duke. Later that year, the twenty-six-year-old consoled himself by returning to Prussia for another round of fighting. He was joined there by his brother, back from Barbary, and the two lingered for some months, hoping for further martial employment. Since service even in royal households did not necessitate year-round presence, the pair were literally free-lancers for some periods. On this occasion, they served in the same force with Henry, earl of Derby, the future King Henry IV of England (r.1399-1413).[70]

After a brief trip back to France, where they received news of war in Italy, the two joined Sempey in Prussia where another war was brewing inspired by the alliance of Lithuania and Poland against the Teutonic Knights. Among the many who came from all over Christendom was a Scottish lord, William Douglas of Nithsdale, brother of the earl of Douglas.[71] While Boucicaut was still on his journey eastward, William was killed in a brawl with the English. In what appears to be adherence to the Franco/Scottish alliance, the French champion now issued a challenge to the person or persons who had killed Douglas, whom he had probably never met. Since he never learned the identities of Douglas's killers, combat never resulted from the challenge.[72] In the ensuing campaign against the Lithuanians, Boucicaut unfurled his personal banner for the first time.

VI. *Marshal of France*

In 1391, while Boucicaut was in the East, the Sire de Blainville, one of the two marshals of France, died.[73] Although Boucicault was only twenty-five, the king, against the recommendation of his council, preferred him as a

[69] *LF*, p. 74, ll. 5-14 (I: xviii): L. Mirot, "Sur l'expédition française en Tunisie au XIVe siècle," *Revue des etudes historiques* 99(1931): 357-406.

[70] *LF*, 74-77 (I: xviii); J.H. Wylie, *History of England under Henry the Fourth* (London, 1884), 3:43, 159, 326.

[71] Michael Brown, *The Black Douglas: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland 1300-1455* (East Linton 1998), 207.

[72] *LF*, 76-77, ll. 58-78 (I: xviii).

[73] For the French office of marshal, see Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 170-71); Clifford J. Rogers, "Marshal," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers et al., 3 vols (New York, 2010), 2:576-77.

replacement over more experienced men. As a result, the son took the place of the man who had replaced his father in 1368. The post was Boucicaut's first steady job; a yearly salary of 2000 francs (an amount the young man had won in 1383 playing tennis against the reckless young duke of Orleans). He was now one of the three top military figures of the kingdom.[74]

In June of the following year, a murderous attack on the aging constable, Olivier de Clisson, was instigated by Jean de Montfort, duke of Brittany.[75] This touched off a campaign against his duchy. As the French army advanced, the king experienced the first episode of madness, cutting short the expedition. Just before the incident, Boucicaut had been appointed captain-general for Poitou, Berry, Auvergne, and all the lands of the duke of Berry in Guyenne. This was no sinecure. It was Boucicaut's task to firm up French rule in his bailiwick and chase the marauding Gascons from their strongholds. The appointment also serves to illustrate the flexibility of French military titles at this period: exercising the office of marshal did not preclude more specific, mission-oriented appointments. After taking le Roc d'Ussac by seige, Boucicaut returned to Paris for the winter.[76] At this time, his friend, the count of Eu, succeeded Clisson as constable of France. The following summer saw the two joined on a mission with the other marshal, Louis of Sancerre, against renegade Gascons, operating in the southwest. It did not come to much.[77]

VII. *The* Trés Riche *Heiress*

At age seventeen, Antoinette of Turenne was one of the richest heiresses in Provence. Her father was Raymond-Louis de Turenne, described by Lalande as an "ambitious and turbulent" adventurer employing *routiers* and bandits who engaged in pillage and massacre.[78] He had been at war since 1386 with the schismatic pope, Clement VII (r.1378-1394), and more recently with Marie of Blois, who was not only queen of Naples and Sicily, but also duchess of Anjou and countess of Provence. When Boucicaut entered the picture, the duchess had all but arranged for her son, Charles,

74 *LF*, 78-80 (I: xix).

75 Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson*, 152-71.

76 *LF*, 82-85 (I: xxi).

77 Ibid., 85-87 (I: xxi).

78 For the story of Boucicaut and the Turenne lands and their heiress, see Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre*, 46-56. On this remarkable story, the biography is silent.

prince of Tarento, to marry the wealthy Antoinette, with the approval of both Clement VII and the girl's grandfather. The king also approved the match since the vast Turenne domains would fall into the hands of the Angevin dynasty and Raymond's depredations against Provence would end. Charles VI even sent the duke of Bourbon to promote the marriage—but to no avail.

Raymond rejected the Angevin princeling in terms quite clear if a bit crude. Things came to a standstill until the dukes of Burgundy and Berry suggested a completely different solution. They managed to convince everyone that substituting Boucicaut as bridegroom could bring peace, law, and order to the embattled region. In turn, he played the docile beneficiary of their plot. Had he pursued it too openly, this would have placed him in opposition to his great benefactors, the duke of Bourbon and the king. All things considered, Boucicaut may have been a better choice from the crown's point of view. The Angevin dynasty was already a great power in France with ambitions in Italy. By contrast, the marshal would clearly be beholden to the crown for his good fortune.

Raymond went along enthusiastically with the new proposal, setting conditions on the marriage that would compel Boucicaut to help him regain his lost castles, at the same time offering a rich dowry of lands and castles currently occupied by his enemies. He sweetened the deal by promising an eventual swap of the dowry lands for the county and castle of Beaufort-en-Vallée. The marriage contract included many other clauses intended to settle all the disputes in the region; for instance, the dukes of Berry and Burgundy were supposed to intervene for Raymond with Pope Clement.

The nuptials took place on Christmas eve, 1393, and Boucicaut consummated the marriage by setting out with his father-in-law right after the ceremony to begin recapturing Raymond's territories. Counting on him to recover Charlus, Montredon, and Champagnac in the Auvergne, which the duke of Berry had agreed to release in his favor, Raymond gave Boucicaut a loosely-worded power of attorney that allowed him to occupy all of these castles for himself.

Meanwhile, however, the plot to pull the rug from under Raymond continued to unfold. The estates of Provence met in February, 1394 to consider how to proceed against his bandits, and appointed, of all people, Charles de Tarento to lead the campaign. In April, Clement issued a bull reinstating all the sentences previously passed against Raymond as a despoiler of the church. Marie de Blois refused to surrender to Raymond

any of his castles that she held. In short, over the next six years Raymond lost every piece of land he had held. Boucicaut profited hugely, doing homage to Marie de Blois for the County of Beaufort. He received the lifetime tenure of most of the Turenne estates, becoming viscount of Turenne only in 1413. In 1393, following the marriage and at the age of twenty-seven, Jean II le Meingre was at the high point on his personal Wheel of Fortune: positioned at the top of the military hierarchy of France, favored or even beloved by the highest figures in the realm, covered with chivalric renown, and now, by marriage, wealthy, and perhaps even happy.

VIII. *The Crusade to Nicopolis*

When Clement VII died in September, 1394, an opportunity arose to end the Schism. The French royal council dispatched messengers post-haste to the Avignon cardinals with an exhortation not to elect a successor. Led by Boucicaut, this diplomatic mission broke all speed records, arriving in just four days, but to no avail. The conclave was already in the process of electing Pedro de Luna as Pope Benedict XIII, who claimed he would be as ready to abdicate as to take off his hat.[79] Even though the French court supported the new pontiff, he put off everything but his hat for the rest of his life, which went on for decades.

Not long after this episode, Sigismund of Hungary, under increasing pressure from the Turks, appealed to the western monarchies for help. As David Nicolle states in his study of the campaign,[80] the secular nobles, for once, led this last crusade and the popes tagged behind. Boucicaut supplied seventeen gentlemen to the Burgundian contingent nominally led by the twenty-four-year-old count of Nevers, son and heir of the duke of Burgundy. The young nobleman's advisor was the veteran Enguerrand, Sire de Coucy, the focal figure of Barbara Tuchman's best-selling account of the fourteenth century, was also a prominent member of the expedition.[81] Once in Hungary, the allies wanted to do more than shore up Sigismund, preferring instead an invasion of Turkish territory.[82]

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[79] Alec Glasfurd, *The Antipope, Peter de Luna 1342-1423: A Study in Obstinacy* (London, 1965), 56-57.

[80] Nicolle, *Nicopolis 1396*, 14-18.

[81] For leadership of the crusade, see, Henry L. Savage, "Enguerrand de Coucy VII and the Campaign of Nicopolis," *Speculum* 14 (1939): 423-42; James Magee, "Crusading at the Court of Charles VI, 1388-1396," *French History* 12 (1998): 367-83.

[82] *LF*, 88-91 (I: xxii).

By mid-1396, the campaign was headed down the Danube from Budapest into the Ottoman empire. After some initial success, in which Boucicaut distinguished himself and hundreds of Turks were taken prisoner, the campaign bogged down before Nicopolis, secure on its rock overlooking the Danube. The allies had brought no siege engines, a fact leading Tuchman to label Boucicaut as rash, quoting him as saying, in effect, “no matter; ladders can be made on the spot and are worth more than siege trains when used by men of valor.”[83] His record to date could clearly have borne out this claim, but was of no help to him at Nicopolis.

The allies were trying to starve out the garrison when Sultan “Bajazet” (Bãyazîd) I (r.1389-1402) arrived to relieve the town with a sizeable army. The suddenly-nervous attackers killed their Turkish prisoners before sallying forth to face the enemy on September 25. The defeat they suffered was of legendary proportions. Thousands scattered and fled; some were drowned in the Danube trying to escape, and thousands of others were trapped and forced to surrender.[84] These captives included Boucicaut, Henri de Bar, the count of Nevers, the Sire de Coucy, and the contingents they commanded. Sigismund and much of his Hungarian army managed to escape down the Danube on the royal supply fleet.[85]

After the battle, the sultan discovered Turks massacred before the conflict had begun, and decided to behead a similar number of Christian prisoners.[86] With the help of a translator, he rounded up the highest-ranking of the surviving French nobles to witness the process and to spot other individuals who might provide rich ransoms. The massacre of the unfortunate prisoners not endowed with such wealth took place on the day after the battle, September 26. The count of Nevers, who would later come to be known as John the Fearless, spotted Boucicaut in the queue about to be beheaded, and grabbing Bãyazîd by the knees, begged for the marshal’s life. According to the traditional story, the sultan failed to understand him until he made a sign by joining fingers, suggesting the two were “like brothers.” According to Boucicaut’s biographer, the slaughter continued for most of the day. Nicolle places the actual number of knights and esquires beheaded at anywhere from 300 to 3000; Lalande cites Delaville le Roulx’s

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[83] Tuchman, *Distant Mirror*, 556. Also see *LF*, 96-97 (I: xxiv) for Boucicaut’s use of ladders for the assault on Rachawa, which occurred immediately before Nicopolis.

[84] *LF*, 102-13 (I: xxv).

[85] Houseley, *Later Crusades*, 76-79.

[86] Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (New York, 1977), 68-69.

estimate of 3000 such victims. This would have been from a total French force set at about 16,000.[87]

Afterwards, Boucicaut and the other noble prisoners were marched over 200 miles for internment at Gallipoli and neighboring towns. Three months passed before even the hope of ransom presented itself. When the first tattered survivors reached Paris, their unbelievable story led to their imprisonment in the Chatelet. Meanwhile, Boucicaut is said to have worked tirelessly, nursing his wounded comrades and negotiating with the sultan, eventually persuading him to consider ransoming his prisoners. The marshal's biographer theorizes that Bāyazîd feared a new, even larger French attack, and so planned to keep the nobles as hostages. On Christmas Day, 1396, letters from Boucicaut and the count of Nevers reached the royal court in Paris, and the fund-raising effort began. Ambassadors sent to arrange Genoa's submission also asked for aid in paying the ransom. At about the same time, in January, 1397, Boucicaut was paroled in order to approach the Genoese at their outpost near Gallipoli. Although a local lord from this site agreed to act as surety for the count of Nevers, it would be another year before he and the marshal, accompanied by only eight of the French nobles who had set forth, returned home. Both Henry of Bar (count of Eu) and Enguerrand de Coucy had been among those who had died awaiting ransom. Boucicaut arrived at Paris on November 1, 1397.

IX. *The Aftermath of Nicopolis*

On returning to France, Boucicaut discovered that the death of his old friend, the count of Eu, had elevated him to the position of first marshal while Louis de Sancerre moved up to become constable. In May, 1398, Boucicaut was assigned, on behalf of the duke of Orleans, to drive the condemned Archambaud VI, Count of Perigord, out of his stronghold of Montignac. Two earlier expeditions, in 1394 and 1397, had failed to bring the previous count to justice. Montignac is on a high rock in the bend of a river, with the land side protected by a deep ditch and high walls flanked by large towers. Assault by ladders failing once again, Boucicaut blockaded Montignac and gathered all the siege engines he could find. These included one that could throw stones said to weigh three hundred pounds and another engine that was twice as powerful, able to discharge eighty-nine times in a day. They reduced the fortress in two months. Archambaud placed himself under the protection of the duke of Berry and his surviving

[87] *LF*, 113-17 (I: xxvi).

troops were allowed to leave. Boucicaut kept his army in southwest France for the rest of the year to keep French brigands and English troops from taking advantage of the count's absence. Archambaud was banished and the Perigord became an appanage of the duke of Orleans. The count then fled to England where he would serve two successive kings.

Boucicaut was home only briefly in 1399 before being sent east again to relieve Constantinople, which was in even greater danger after the Christian defeat at Nicopolis. Freed from any western threat, the Turks blockaded the peninsular city by sea and attempted to starve its population into submission. The Emperor Manuel II (r.1391-1425) appealed to France and Venice for help and both promised to give it. Assigned this task before the end of March, the marshal assembled 400 men at arms, 400 armed valets and a number of archers. While Boucicaut had traveled by sea on several occasions, this was his first naval command. His squadron of four ships and two galleys weighed anchor at Aigues-Mortes on June 24. Arriving in the Bosporus some days later, Boucicaut's squadron defeated and burned a much larger Turkish fleet that was blockading the Byzantine capital. The marshal then raided Turkish coastal towns for food, sacked several towns, and destroyed an enemy castle on the Black Sea.

Within this same remarkably successful period, Boucicaut helped settle one of Constantinople's repeated internecine disputes. For Constantinople, this seemed to be no more than a temporary reprieve. Emperor Manuel wanted Boucicaut to arrange a state visit for him to the French court in order to beg for more help. Leaving Châteaumorand in charge of his troops in the East, the marshal returned to France to prepare the French court for the emperor's state visit. No longer a rash youth, Boucicaut, a mature man of thirty-three, was now a well-recognized military hero. He had grown into a sober, devout, and meticulous man with a strong reputation.

X. *L'Escu Vert*

By April 1400, the effects of the Nicopolis disaster had set in. Ladies widowed and orphaned as a result of the battle besieged the French court for help against marauders and even against close neighbors—who found their estates easy pickings. Boucicaut's reaction was to found a votive order of chivalry[88] entitled l'Escu Vert a la Dame Blanche to espouse the cause

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[88] For a discussion on the "votive" orders , see Jonathan D'Acre Boulton, *Knights of the Crown* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1987), xix-xx.

of these unfortunate women. He called upon twelve friends to join him, including Charles d' Albret, cousin to the king. While votive orders of chivalry are often dismissed as perpetrators of frivolous chivalric games[89], the circumstances suggest a more serious purpose for Boucicaut's enterprise. Nicopolis was a staggering blow not only to the French court but also to Boucicaut personally. While the count of Nevers and Louis of Bourbon survived the battle and subsequent imprisonment, Enguerrand de Coucy and Henry of Bar had not, and only a tiny fraction of the French force returned home. The noble widows and orphans begging for assistance were reminders of the tragedy. Boucicaut may have also felt guilt for his share in the military errors that had led to defeat. While the thirteen knights pledged to accept challenges to jousts—an element typical of votive order–, they were always required to take as their prime duty the protection of ladies and damoiselles against depredations.

For five years, the members would wear on their sleeves the badge of the white lady on a green background. The membership roll, known through Lalande's research,[90] demonstrates that Boucicaut won the loyalty of his associates to a remarkable degree. Most "votive" orders of chivalry in this period were founded by counts and dukes. Apart from the two Boucicauts (Jean and Geoffroy), all signers were landed nobles, Albret himself being a cousin of the king. Their willingness to join the order confirms Boucicaut as the rightful champion of women in the court of France during this time. Tuchman says that the idea for the votive order's symbol might have come from a vision of a white lady apparently seen in the sky during Bourbon's expedition to Tunis, thought nothing in Boucicaut's biography supports this idea.[91] Toward the end of this phase of his career, he participated in the "Court of Love" (*Cour Amoreuse*) sponsored by the dukes of Bourbon and Burgundy in 1401.[92] It would turn out to be the last time he saw Paris for quite some time.

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[89] Johan Huizinga, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chicago 1996), 326-27.

[90] The biography lists the thirteen: "Messire Charles d'Albret, Messire Boucicaut Mareschal de France, Boucicaut *son frère* (Geoffroy), Francois d'Aubissecourt, Jehan de Ligneres, Chambrillac, Castelbayac, Gaucourt, Châteaumorand, Betas, Bonnebaut, Colleville, and Torsay." Lalande expands the identification in his *Etude*.

[91] The badge devised was "a gold shield, enamelled in green, enclosing a white lady." Tuchman's cloud ladies carry a scarlet cross. *LF*, 163; Tuchman, *Distant Mirror*, 556.

[92] *La Cour amoureuse, dite de Charles VI*, ed. Carlos Bozzolo, Hélène Loyau, François Granges, 3 vols. in 2 (Paris, 1982-1992).

XI. *Governor of Genoa*

At the turn of the fifteenth century, Genoa was a city-state with sea power and colonies from Monaco to the Black Sea. During the past century, its rivalry with Venice had on several occasions erupted into war, and Genoa was licking its wounds.[93] Internally things were no better. For much of the preceding century, the city, along with much of northern Italy, had suffered through the Ghibelline/Guelf conflict, a dispute intensified by the Great Western Schism.[94] The city had tried republican government for the better part of a hundred years, but, in 1396, its people had decided to ask the French king to take over its administration. This suited the French, who got a navy in the bargain; when Bourbon invaded Barbary in 1390, he had used the Genoese. Noble houses with ambitions and connections across the Italian peninsula, such as the Anjou clan, which claimed the kingdom of Naples, were no doubt pleased as well.

The first few French governors were not highly successful. In 1400, having expelled the third such Frenchman to rule them in five years, the Genoese elected a dictator who was no better. Many inhabitants of the city had seen Boucicaut in action during his time in Constantinople and the east. He was by now everyone's favorite law-and-order candidate and the Genoese now requested him as governor. He was appointed in May, 1401, formally entering the city in October and going directly to work. Establishing a government whose strength exceeded the dictates of the Genoese constitution, he executed the former dictator, disarmed the populace, and instituted a new, comprehensive code of law[95] that included punishments as harsh as the loss of a hand for open conflict between Ghibellines and Guelfs. Things seem to have gone well enough in his office for the new governor to move his wife to the city after eight months on duty, but discontent seethed below the surface.

Boucicaut then turned his attention to the Genoese holdings in the Levant, sending a team of inspectors to take stock. On Cyprus, King Janus (r.1375-1432), had just begun besieging the Genoese seaports; after a diplomatic mission failed in 1402, Boucicaut sailed in person with a relief fleet. This made the Venetian senate exceedingly nervous, leading them to dis-

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[93] Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese 958-1528* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996), 236-42.

[94] For Guelf-Ghibilline conflict in Italy, see Daniel Waley, *The Italian City-Republics* (New York, 1968), 200-18.

[95] *Medieval Italy, an Encyclopedia*, ed. Christopher Kleinherz (New York 2003), s.v. "Genoa," 401.

patch a fleet to shadow his movement. Boucicaut's expedition actually had two missions, first, to neutralize Janus and second, to strike a blow at the Turks in revenge for Nicopolis. The first part was easy; reports vary on how successful he was with the second.

Boucicaut's fleet stayed in the eastern Mediterranean for a year. After several raids on Turkish coastal sites, he sacked Beirut on August 10, 1403, allegedly looting stores belonging to Venetian merchants. (Boucicaut's biographer asserts that the warehouses were empty when Boucicaut got there). This tipped the scale for the Venetian fleet captain, Carlo Zeno, who attacked the Genoese fleet as it sailed for home. Boucicaut turned and fought, leading to the sea battle of Modon on October 7, 1403.[96] After four vicious hours, the two fleets disengaged, with the Venetians getting the better of the exchange, though short of a clear victory. The Genoese lost 600 casualties, not counting the prisoners taken from two captured galleys. These victims included Châteaumorand. The governor returned to Genoa accompanied by only five of the ships that he had started out with, though he captured an unarmed Venetian ship on the way.

The incident led to much bickering and resentment. Boucicaut wanted to declare war on Venice, but was constrained by his king out of concern for the French and Genoese prisoners. In May, 1404, the two sides negotiated an uneasy peace, and the captives were freed. That done, Boucicaut sent a letter to the Venetian leaders he held responsible for the conflict, challenging them to personal conflict. His challenge was ignored and the peace was signed in 1406.

It is impossible to overlook Boucicaut's increasing belligerence since Nicopolis. One might get the impression that, in the wake of that daunting experience, fighting the Turks was all he cared to do. But he appears to have had time for much more. To quote one modern scholar:

> His lasting accomplishments were a new, comprehensive code of law and the founding in 1406 of Casa San Giorgio. This institution, originally intended to consolidate Genoa's vast public debt, became in the course of the fifteenth century the city's most important body, as it controlled public credit and functioned as a state bank and the chief tax collector. Machiavelli called Casa San Giorgio the "state within a state" because of its extensive political and economic powers.[97]

[96] Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, 1973), 198-99.

[97] *Medieval Italy*, 401.

XII. *Immersion in Italian Politics*

Other conflicts on the Italian Peninsula affected Boucicaut in his role as Genoa's governor and even after he had been removed from that post. With the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, duke of Milan (r.1395-1402),[98] his seventeen-year-old son, Gabriel Maria, was forced to seek French help to safeguard a part of his inheritance centering on Pisa. Boucicaut served as the commander who would attempt to carry out the Gallic promises of protection by establishing a garrison at Livorno. In this role, he served as an agent of peace with two other political players in the region: the Roman pope, Boniface IX (r.1389-1404)[99] and Ladislas Durrazo, king of Naples (r.1386-1414).[100] In his drive to become Christendom's only pontiff, the Roman pope fashioned secret agreements with Gabriel Maria Visconti and his protector, the governor of Genoa. Even the rumor of such back-room deals caused the Pisans to rise up against their young and feckless lord on July 20, 1404, driving the Visconti heir to desert his mother and seek Boucicaut's help.[101] When the marshal sent troops to Pisa, they came under immediate attack by the urban rebels.[102] After a year of such scattered unrest, Boucicaut was able to free his Visconti protege from the Pisan cockpit by selling all his rights in the city to Florence.[103]

Boucicaut's settlement eventually pleased no one and, within a few months, the Pisan had risen in rebellion against Florence. As a result, Charles VI accused his marshal of exceeding his authority in brokering the

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[98] For significance of Gian Galeazzo Visconti and his government, see Eric C. Chamberlain, *The Count of Virtue, Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan* (London, 1963); Daniel M. Bueno de Mesquita, *Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan* (*1351-1402*)*: A Study in the Political Career of an Italian Despot* (Cambridge, 1941); G. Lubkin, "Strutture, funzioni, e funzionementi della corte milanese nel Quattrocento," *Publications du Centre Européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes* 28 (1988): 75-83.

[99] For Boniface IX, see Matteo Fantasia, *I papi pugliesi: Bonifacio IX, Innocenzo XII, Benedetto XIII* (Fasano, 1987), 23-36.

[100] For King Ladislas Durazzo, see Alessandro Cutolo, *Re Ladislao d'Angio-Durazzo* (Milan, 1936).

[101] Agnes Mary Frances Robinson, *The End of the Middle Ages: Essays and Questions in History* (London, 1889), 340; Alison Williams Lewin, *Negotiating Survival: Florence and the Great Schism, 1378-1417* (Madison, N.J., 2003), 127.

[102] For general background to these events in Pisa, see Ottavio Banti, *Racconti Pisani: Antologia de brani de cronici pisani de secoli XIII e XIV* (Pisa, 2007); *Cronaca di Pisa de Ranieri Sardo*, ed. Ottavio Banti (Rome, 1963); Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, *Medioevo pisani: Chiesa, famiglie, territorio* (Pisa, 2005).

[103] *LF*, 325-27 (III: ix); Marvin E. Becker, *Florence in Transition*, 2 vols. (Baltimore, 1968), 2:243-44.

peace between Florence and Pisa.[104] When Boucicaut refused to give in to the threats of Duke John the Fearless of Burgundy (r.1404-1417) who also wanted to control Pisan affairs, he found himself in an impossible situation. Now allied to both Florence and the Burgundian ruler, the great captain temporized until the Florentines were firmly established in Pisa.[105]

The marshal also played an important role in France's attempts to resolve the Great Western Schism.[106] While still serving as Genoese governor in 1407, Boucicaut was charged by the French king to oversee security for a proposed meeting at the northwestern Italian city of Savona between the Roman pope, Gregory XII (r.1406-1417) and his Avignonese counterpart, Benedict XIII. Though instructed to safeguard both pontiffs, Boucicaut's strong arm was hardly needed since the contending popes distrusted him as much as they did each other.[107] The situation was muddied even further when the king of Naples occupied Rome on April 25, 1408.[108] Despite Benedict's stern warnings of excommunication for all who broke with him, Boucicaut kept his distance from the confusing situation that would play out over the next six years, only to culminate at the council of Constance (1414-1418).[109]

By giving even lukewarm aid to Benedict, the marshal, a French officer, was guilty of violating his country's best interests on several occasions. He may have engaged in this dangerous behavior because Benedict owed him sizeable sums of money and he was anxious to have his younger brother, Geoffroy, forgiven for his siege of the papal palace in Avignon during 1398. This pardon was worked out some two years later, and, after Geoffroy had performed a year-long penance, he even found employment with Benedict.[110]

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[104] For the treaty between Florence and Pisa, see *LF*, 327-30 (III: x).

[105] *LF*, 330-36 (III: xi)

[106] For the Great Western Schism see Vincente Alvarez Palenzuela, *El Cisma de Occidente* (Madrid, 1982); Daniel McCarron, *The Great Schism: Antipopes who Split the Church* (Dublin, 1982); Hélène Millet, *L'eglise du grand schisme: 1378-1417* (Paris, 2009); Paul Payan, *Entre Rome et Avignon: une historie de grans schisme, 1378-1417* (Paris, 2009); Walter Ullmann, *The Origins of the Great Schism: A Study in Fourteenth-Century Ecclesiastical History* (Hamden, Conn., 1967).

[107] Glasfurd, *Antipope*, 214-22.

[108] Ferdinand Gregorovius, *Rome and Medieval Culture: Selections from The History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, trans. Mrs. Gustavous W. Hamilton (Chicago, 1971), 349-52.

[109] Glasfurd, *Antipope*, 225-27. For Council of Constance, see John Hine Mundy, *The Conciliar Movement and the Council of Constance* (New York, 1961); Philip Stamp, *The Reforms of the Council of Constance (1414-1418)* (Leiden, 1994); James Hamilton Wylie, *The Council of Constance to the Death of John Hus* (Oxford, 1900).

[110] Glasfurd, *Antipope*, 162-71, 221.

After arranging this settlement, Boucicaut was understandably reluctant to do anything that would offend Benedict, despite the chill in relations between the French monarchy and the Avignon pope.[111]

Seeking some repose after this intense period he had just experienced, Boucicaut left Genoa to visit his wife. Unable to escape his martial fate even on vacation, the marshal had to fight off four Muslim pirates that attacked his ship along France's Mediterranean litoral. Landing at Toulon, he consulted with Louis II of Anjou about future campaigns before gaining some rest at the family chateau at Meyrarges, just beyond Aix.[112]

XIII. *The "Genoese Vespers"*

Despite the positive reputation he had built up in Italy and in the East, the mature warrior soon found that administration could be more difficult than battle, especially in Genoa's feud-ridden streets. In 1403, the Ghibellines of the city had plotted with a *condottiere* to overthrow French control. Two years later, the Pisans themselves tried to stir up Genoese resistance against the French. The Florentines foiled another anti-French plot by expatriate Genoese and Pisans in 1406, but scarcely two years later, the former Pisan ruler, Gabriel Maria Visconti was conspiring with Facino Cane, an exiled Genoese Ghibelline and former *condottiere* at Pavia,[113] to secretly retake his home city. Probably on Boucicaut's order, Visconti, natural son of the late duke of Milan, was executed in December, 1408. This eventually caused an uproar among the Genoese prelates who wrote to the French king asking that Boucicaut be replaced, accusing him of a long series of wrongs, and calling him, among other things, "the worst of tyrants."[114]

With the end of his biography in April, 1409,[115] Boucicaut entered one of the most unstable periods of his life. In the spring of this year, he led an expedition against Milan that Louis of Anjou hoped would remove Naples

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[111] For years, the town of Pernes-les-Fontaines has held a "Carneval Boucicaut" said to commemorate le Meingre's ten-year "reign of terror" over the community.

[112] *LF*, 378-82 (III: xxi).

[113] For this mercurial figure, see Nino Valeri, *La vita de Facino Cane* (Torino, 1940); Epstein, *Genoa*, 259.

[114] *LF*, 382-87 (III: xxii).

[115] *LF*, 390-92 (IV: i). Boucicaut's biographer wrapped up his narrative and ended the book with a chapter of praise for Boucicaut's morals and mode of life. Millet speculates that the manuscript, undecorated as it still is, was deliberately circulated at the French court to defend and raise support for Boucicaut's activities in Italy and beyond. Thus, the manuscript is more than a mere record of events; it is an artifact which may have had an effect on what followed.

from the control of his rival, Ladislas de Durazzo, who still held Rome after conquering it two years before. Ater leaving Genoa on July 31 with an army of over 6000 men, the marshal took Tortona, and, after crossing the Po, entered Milan in triumph on or about August 29. He was immediately recognized as governor and began to stabilize the city, by defending it against imminent Ghibelline counterattacks.[116]

The new governor's success was short-lived; for in the fall of 1409 he was attacked by a huge force commanded by the mercenary, Facino Cane, and Theodore II, marquis de Monferrat (r.1381-1418). They gathered mountain troops and waited to conquer Genoa while Boucicaut was busy with Milan.[117] When the commander of the city's French garrison decided to move his headquarters from the urban palace to the fortress, he was killed on a city street. The small French garrisons were enough to hold the two strongholds, but could not effectively protect Genoa. One of the city factions took this opportunity to break with the French and submit Genoa to the rule of the marquis, while buying off Facino with 30,000 florins. Several days after Montferrat's triumphal entry, the towns under Genoa's sway also threw off their French overlords. Facino left, doing his best to block Boucicaut's return journey from Milan. Boucicaut's troops were attacked twice on this relief mission and, as a result, he dug in at Gavi with his 5000 troops. He eventually moved his forces several times looking for a stronger position.[118]

In March 1410, Boucicaut's confessor and close associate, Nicolas de Gonesse, with two others, went to Paris and received empty promises of French royal help. On his return from the French capital, Gonesse found that his predecessor (Boucicaut's former confessor), now bishop of Savone, had been tortured by the rebels of that city, and was now being held in a cage for having plotted to restore Boucicaut's power in Genoa.[119] The French king and his council promised to send Boucicaut money as soon as possible and ordered their commander to keep trying to win back lost holdings, while recruiting more troops in Lombardy. With his situation daily becoming more desperate, Boucicaut had to pawn his plate and even his wife's jewels with Italian bankers simply to remain in the field. Some of the money promised by the French crown eventually arrived, but did not even begin to compensate the commander for his expenses. Of the 80,000 *livres tournois* that Boucicaut had spent to maintain his troops down

[116] Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre*, 158-59.
[117] Ibid., 172.
[118] Ibid., 158-59, 163.
[119] Millet, "Que," 139

to November 1410, he received a total of 42,000 l.t. and only after Charles VI had repeatedly insisted that his promise to his favorite captain be kept.[120] Unless more money was sent, the situation would grow increasingly hopeless. The marshal remained in Lombardy until November 10, when he was ordered back to France. The French rule in Genoa, which had lasted for some fifteen years, would never be reestablished. Boucicaut's fortune, too, was utterly ruined. Leaving Italy for the last time, he took a month's rest at his chateau at "Alais"[121] before returning to the court of France. The forty-five-year-old soldier was back in Paris at the beginning of 1411, broke and besieged by both Italian and French creditors. After the king's accountants went over his books for the Italian campaigns, the treasury paid him another 20,000, l.t. and announced that no more would be forthcoming of the 38,000 he had spent to maintain his troops.

Despite this breach of fiscal faith, Boucicaut remained a trusted commander, whom Charles VI dispatched in April to deliver royal peace demands to the duke of Burgundy. Because of the duke of Orleans's truculent attitude, the peace overtures were brusquely rejected and civil war loomed. In this conflict, Boucicaut was assigned 500 men to suppress the *routiers* still ravaging the outlying territory of Paris. When capturing such mercenaries, Boucicaut ordered them thrown in the Seine or hanged.[122]

Meanwhile, the Burgundian-Orleanist feud was getting worse. Charles, now leaning towards the Burgundian side, stripped the duke of Berry of his lieutenancies since he had sided with the Orleanists. This ultimately spread the conflict to Languedoc. In February, 1413, the king commissioned Boucicaut to secure and consolidate the French rule over Languedoc and Guyenne, which the duke of Berry had frittered away. The royal commander wasted no time in carrying out his orders. On May 28, he arranged for a truce with the counts of Foix and Armagnac that extended through the following Christmas. When the Parisians grew disillusioned with the Burgundian faction, the situation changed rapidy in the favor of the Armagnacs whom the king now supported. John the Fearless, his popularity gone, fled to Flanders. Later in the year, the king reinstated Berry, who in April, 1414 made Boucicaut his Captain-General for Languedoc.

The political situation went from bad to worse. In March, 1414, the king levied an aide to fight the duke of Burgundy and his partisans. This impost

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[120] Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre*, 163.

[121] The Chateau de Portes was probably in the modern town of Alés. Its curators, like those of Les Beaux, primarily associate its history with Raymond de Turenne.

[122] Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre*, 166.

proved exceedingly hard to collect in Languedoc, not only because economic conditions were depressed in the region, but also since Burgundy, now gravitating toward the English side, had dispatched agents into the territory to encourage tax revolts. This strategy had worked well in the southwest, especially around Carcassonne, where in May the citizens armed themselves, blocked the streets with chains, and reinforced the gates and towers. At the end of the summer, Boucicaut appeared, and, after rounding up the ringleaders of this tax revolt, had four of them beheaded, and then imposed strict penalties on the city.

It is difficult to imagine what the rapidly aging commander was going through at this point. His finances were in total disrepair, and, at the same time, his political and personal loyalties were deeply conflicted. We can only guess he would have welcomed the need to keep busy in the midst of this confusing crisis, but should not be too surprised if he responded brutally to those who crossed him.

XIV. *Agincourt*

In August 1415, Henry V launched a surprise attack in Normandy, taking only a month to capture Harfleur and expel all its French citizens. The main French army was not ready to intervene against the invader, but Boucicaut, recalled from Languedoc, was commanding an advance-guard between Paris and the English when the refugees from Harfleur began to arrive at Lillebonne. In October, Henry's force advanced toward Picardy and Calais. French detachments frustrated the English king's first few attempts to cross the Somme with the placement of strong guards at the lower bridges and fords.[123]

Ranging upstream along the left bank in search of a ford, the English were shadowed from the opposite bank by troops commanded by Boucicaut and his old friend Constable Charles d'Albret.[124] Despite their surveillance, Henry was able to break away, cross at an unguarded ford, and make for Calais. Because of the French scorched-earth tactics, the English army soon ran short of supplies, but for a short time only the French advance guard checked the progress of Henry's army. During this same period, Charles VI and his advisers decided to force the smaller English force into battle. In

[123] Ibid., 170; Matthew Bennett, "The Battle," in *Agincourt 1415*, ed. Anne Curry (Stroud, Goucestershire, 2000), 22-23; Desmond Seward, *Henry V as Warlord* (London, 1987), 71-72; Lt-Col Alfred H. Burne, *The Agincourt War* (1956; reprint, London, 1999), 38.

[124] Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre*, 170.

preparation for this event, the French army joined the detachments of Boucicaut and d'Albret near Agincourt.

According to Lalande, Boucicaut had been appointed captain-general for the campaign, but his advice (and that of d'Albret) that the French army should proceed cautiously was overruled by the dukes of Bourbon and Alencon. In Lalande's words: "Courage could not make up for the faults of strategy."[125] Another modern scholar, Andre Leguai, disagrees. "Charles d'Albret," he asserted, "was numbered as a Bourbon partisan and bore much of the blame for the defeat due to his asperity."[126] Some light has been cast on this disagreement since 1984, when a copy of the French plan for dealing with Henry's army was discovered. Boucicaut probably wrote or dictated this unique document since its opening phrase reads: "It seems to the Marshal and those with him that ..."[127] Boucicaut's responsibility for at least the initial phase of the battle is clear; for his plan assigned the positions and missions of all the French army's commanders.

For a general picture of the action, one can do no better than cite Clifford Rogers' analysis in volume two of this series.[128] Nothing in this work contradicts Boucicaut's plan. Rogers describes three main detachments (battles) of French men-at-arms arrayed on foot one behind the other, with cavalry units assigned to destroy the English archer units on the flanks. Boucicaut was in the front lines, probably in command of the second "battle." With the failure of the French cavalry attack and its retreat through the first detachment, this unit regrouped and marched to attack the English center. When these troops were mowed down by the English archers, Boucicaut's detachment slogged through the mud to attack the English men-at-arms who were now scattered by the first attacks.[129] The captain general was wounded in this action, and captured shortly afterwards. This turn of events effectively saved his life, since he was dragged from beneath a pile of French corpses by English soldiers scavenging for survivers who could be ransomed.

Some scholars have wondered why the third "battle" of the French did not overrun the exhausted English. The answer is simple; this contingent never moved to the attack. When members of his army cried out that the

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125 Ibid., 168-170.

126 Andre Leguai, *Les Ducs de Bourbon pendant le crise monarchique du XVe siècle – contribution à l'étude des apanages* (Dijon 1962), pp.

127 Philpotts, "Plan," 64.

128 Clifford J. Rogers, "The Battle of Agincourt," in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 37-132.

129 Seward, *Henry V*, 76; Bennett, "Battle," 32.

French had sacked the baggage train and were at the point of launching another attack, the exhausted and terrified Henry ordered that all French prisoners, except those of noble birth, be slain. Military historian, Desmond Seward, claims that the remaining French men-at-arms, horrified by the butchery, quickly deserted the field.[130] Another source tells us that Henry sent a warning to the leaders of the third wave that, if they attacked, he would order all the prisoners killed.[131]

Once again, Boucicaut narrowly escaped execution, but, with the dukes of Bourbon and Orleans as well as 1300 other French troops, suffered the inglorious fate of being a prisoner, who would be taken first to Calais and then to England. He was never able to negotiate a ransom since he had no money or movable wealth, after his expensive service in Genoa. His wife's wealth was also closed to him. In a codicil of 1416, his wife, Antoinette,[132] would reaffirm the earlier charter that had granted her husband use of her lands during his lifetime. With this grant and the access to wealth that it represented, he might have freed himself from English captivity, but with his wife's death shortly afterward, her family blocked Boucicaut from any further rights to the Turenne lands. Despite this disappointment, he did scrape together from his friends enough pledges to offer the English king 60,000 gold *ecus*, 40,000 when he was freed and 20,000 later. Even with a strong appeal from the pope who still wished to hire the French captain, Henry rejected this offer out of hand.

Still a prisoner in English hands in Yorkshire, Boucicaut died in 1421 at the age of fifty-six, leaving his Book of Hours[133] to his brother Geoffroy, his clothes to his squire, and jewels as well as a little money to his confessor and barber. He was buried in the town of his birth, near his father's tomb at the rear of the choir in the Basilica of St. Martin of Tours. His wife's body

[130] Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War: the English in France 1337-1453* (London, 1978), 149.

[131] Seward, *Henry V*, p. 80; Burne, *Agincourt War*, 86.

[132] Lalande, *Étude*, 56. Citing E. Baluze' assertion that Boucicaut maltreated his wife, Lalande points out that when Boucicaut was in an English prison losing all hope of release, she reaffirmed Boucicaut's life tenure of all her lands, presumably to prove his ability to pay ransom—not something expected of a disaffected wife. Her relatives didn't instigate it: when she died a few days later, they moved to block any access by Boucicaut to the Turenne lands and wealth.

[133] For Boucicaut's Book of Hours, see Gabriele Bartz, *Der Boucicaut-Meister: Ein Unbekanntes Stundenbuch* (Rotthalmünster, 1999); Albert Chatelet, "Les Heures du Maréchal de Boucicaut," *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie de inscriptions et belles-lettres* 137, no. 2 (1993): 505-17.

was re-interred next to him five years later.[134] Their funerary monuments were destroyed either during the religious wars of the seventeenth century or of the French Revolution, after which a street was put through the site.

XV. *Boucicaut's Motivations at Agincourt*

Aside from sheer courage and determination to carry out his battle plan, what could have led Boucicaut and his fellow-soldiers on the Agincourt battlefield to go on the offensive after the French cavalry charge had gone down to such obvious defeat? There are several reasons why this was necessary, even desirable, but we must limit any conclusions about such a decision to the time and place in which it was made, including the information available to those who decided to undertake this advance. Our after-the-fact descriptions, statistics and aerial-perspective diagrams demonstrate a reality much worse for the French forces than Boucicaut could have understood when it was time for his wave to advance. From the captain general's point of view, the majority of the bodies lying before him could have as easily come from the enemy army as from his own.[135] The mound of corpses already accumulated on the field may well have concealed from him the number and quality of English troops still to be defeated. The defeat of the French cavalry was surely demoralizing, but it clearly did not prevent Boucicaut from taking his men forward. What the mounds of dead could not conceal, however, were the all-too-apparent losses inflicted on the flanks of the French first wave by English archers. This terrifying event would surely have impelled Boucicaut to commence an attack, both to neutralize the archers and attack the English men-at-arms flanking them.

One can follow Rogers's reconstruction of the battle in order to recreate what Boucicaut might have seen and how well he could have seen it. While it seems logical that the French men-at-arms under his command might have lowered their heads to protect themselves from the cloud of incoming arrow fire, it also seems likely that Boucicaut's concept of what lay before him was as good as his vantage point would permit. Men in every group would be sneaking a peek between perceived volleys of arrows and giving a running commentary on what they saw before and during the advance. They would certainly have done so because their very lives and immediate futures depended on everyone having the best possible information about

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[134] Lalande, *Jean II le Meingre*, 173.

[135] Rogers, "Agincourt," 95-96; Burne, *Agincourt War*, 82; Bennett, "Battle," 33.

the stretch of battlefield that lay before them. Boucicaut and the other French leaders may very well have remained on their horses, the better both to see and be seen until the last moment before the advance.[136]

In addition to the information the French leadership of the second-wave could glean from the situation unfolding before them, strategic considerations motivating them to attack must also be considered. The French leaders at Agincourt were well aware that if Henry escaped from the field, he had a clear path of some sixty to seventy kilometers—two to three day's march—to Calais, from where his escape to England was assured. If ,on the other hand, the English king could be defeated, captured, or killed, his realm might have been thrown into another minority reign, and this surely was worth sacrificing even more men to attain. Another consideration, almost as urgent, was the logistical calculus of how long the swollen French army could be maintained in the field between the English forces and Calais.

Though it is clear that Boucicaut, while wearing sixty pounds of armor. still possessed the courage and physical ability to march 200 yards through deep mud against an extremely dangerous enemy, several motives besides the immediate exigencies of the battlefield might have forced his hand. In addition to the potential for real harm done if Henry should escape, it was the Council's clear decision to give battle. As their choice for military commander, he could never have made a convincing case to them for holding back the attack of his detachment. The absence of the duke of Burgundy from the conflict had shaken the entire French leadership. For Boucicaut, anything short of bloody zeal would invite questions about his courage in battle, which would have damaged both the captain general and the French cause.

While Boucicaut had surely fallen afoul of the political intrigue of popes and dukes during his Italian mission, he was now among friends doing what he knew how to do so well when he stood before the French army at Agincourt. Constable Charles d'Albret, an old friend and a member of Boucicaut's votive order, stood by his side and may well have invited him to devise the battle plan for the struggle. Both were now both working for their childhood friend, Charles VI, and other members of the aristocracy whom they had long known. In effect, they now stood together in defense of France itself.

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[136] Clifford Rogers agrees with this assertion.

One can thus visualize Boucicaut, motivated by causes of all sorts, urging on his men to a possible victory in high hopes that most of the English arrows had been fired and that his enemy on the opposite side of the field would be at least as tired as his men were when the two sides clashed. His most urgent hope, however, was that his men could drive through to final victory, no matter how many of them had to die in the process. All of his experience told him that if he went first, his best men would follow him, no matter the odds against them.

XVI. *Of Marshals and Armies*

It is a commonplace of French history that the French military had three top men: a constable and two marshals. This commonly held belief is as untrue as the statement that France itself had an army in Boucicaut's time. While these royal appointments were usually for life, and were arranged according to their perceived importance, they were in no way like the ranks of modern armies. A marshal could be made the commander of an army or of only a few commandos. His objective could be the conquest of a territory as large as Guyenne or as small as a single castle. His military operations could take him from Paris to the Black Sea. His mission could focus on communications, supply, combat, diplomacy, political administration, or all five. Despite being a military agent of the French king, he had the independence to take time off to go crusading. As a royal diplomatic representative, such French military officers could be given assignments as complicated as Boucicaut's governorship of Genoa—a city-state of great complexity and resources. Thus even though the pay of a French marshal was much smaller than that of a constable, his duties were every bit as expansive.[137]

Unlike modern commanders, medieval generals did specialize in finance, recruitment, armament, training, inspections, or logistics. Although Boucicaut played all of these roles at different times, at Agincourt it was his job to use armies put together by others. By contrast, Henry V's army, like all the forces brought to France from England during the period, passed through a series of fiscal and political filters that necessarily enhanced its efficiency when compared with any continental army.[138] The most impor-

[137] Rogers, "Marshal," 577.

[138] For organization of English armies of the fifteenth century, see Anne Curry, "English Armies of the Fifteenth Centuries," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (1994; reprint, Woodbridge Suffolk, 1999), 39-68;

tant of these factors was what it cost to recruit, train, arm, feed, and transport troops. Those troops that could not be recruited and maintained efficiently were not brought to France. The second component was motivation: those troops who did not want to go on foreign expeditions were usually left at home. The third determinant for English success was the proven survival skills of Henry's force in day-to-day fighting. His men had already lived through the ordeal of crossing the Channel, capturing Harfleur, and making a long march on short rations. In short, Henry's army was better bound together by common need and common danger than the much larger French force it faced. Like the French after Nicopolis, an English refugee in France stood little chance of easy survival.

The detachment Boucicaut received to form his advance guard had none of these qualities. The only factor that recommended it was a comparatively manageable size. It may have included a high percentage of courageous men-at-arms who might have emulated their legendary leader. On another, less constricted field, such a group might have done well against Henry's army, and most especially, his archers. Once reinforcements started coming in from all over the French realm, there was no time to turn this loosely organized group into an army, and no way to turn them away. As his plan showed, the French army had reached such a massive size that it would take eleven commanders to control it.

At the same time, the moral force of chivalric virtue as practiced by Boucicaut—idealism allied to pragmatic stoicism—was an essential motivation of the French troops at Agincourt. The medieval assemblage of knights, men-at-arms, and others labeled by modern scholars as "the French Army" depended far more on those qualities than on organizational excellence for what success it had. The French plan of battle was not so much a coordinated timetable of tactics to be executed as it was a place to stand, either to stop the English from gaining Calais or to place soldiers in a very straightforward manner where their prowess and courage could destroy the enemy. This force, fairly competent in its own way, mirrored the illustrious courage of its commander, but could not adapt to the terrifying and debilitating effect wrought by the English bowmen. The same could now be said for Boucicaut himself.

H.J. Hewitt, "The Organisation of War," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971), 28-50.



Map 7. Boucicaut's France.

GILLES DE RAIS: HERO, SPENDTHRIFT, AND PSYCHOPATHIC CHILD MURDERER OF THE LATER HUNDRED YEARS WAR

Elena Odio

It is well known that France emerged victorious from the Hundred Years' War, due in large part to Joan of Arc who joined the fray during the siege of Orléans in 1429.[1] Ten days after her arrival on the scene, the English retreated and within two months, under her guidance, the dauphin journeyed to Reims for his coronation as Charles VII (r.1422-1461). A quarter century later, the king she had helped put on the throne would expel the English from Normandy and Gascony, leaving England with only the port city of Calais of its once vast continental holdings and effectively ending the Hundred Years War.

What is less well-known is that Charles had assigned a seasoned warrior to accompany Joan when he gave her command of his troops. Her "shadow" at Orléans and devoted supporter until her capture and eventual execution was a member of the noted Laval family of Brittany—Baron Gilles de Rais (1404-1441).[2] But while de Rais is best remembered for his association with the Maid of Orleans, the rest of his life was fraught with "shadowy" episodes of a very different nature, episodes that ended in the complete reversal of his fortunes.

On October 26, 1440, Gilles de Rais, hero of Orléans, comrade of Joan of Arc, once one of the wealthiest and most powerful Breton nobles, was

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[1] For siege of Orléans, see Henri Baraude, "Le siège d'Orléans et Jeanne d'Arc, 1428-1429," *Revue des questions historiques* 80-81 (1906-1907): 31-65, 74-112, 395-424; Edouard Bruley, *Jeanne d'Arc à Orléans* (Orléans, 1929); M. Desnoyers, *Les armes du siège d'Orléans de 1428* (Orléans, 1884); Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Stroud, 1999), 54-96.

[2] The great interest in Gilles de Rais has not waned in the last few decades as is demonstrated by this far from complete list of recent titles: Matei Cazacu, *Gilles de Rais* (Paris, 2005); Pierre Combescot, *Pour ma plaisir et ma délectation charnelle* (Paris, 2008); Aleister Crowley, *The Banned Lecture: Gilles de Rais* (London, 1993); Tennille Dix, *The Black Baron: The Strange Life of Gilles de Rais* (Indianapolis, 1930); Emile Gabory, *Alias Bluebeard; the Life and Death of Gilles de Raiz*, trans. Alvah C. Bessie (New York, 1930); Jacques Heers, *Gilles de Rais* (Paris, 1994); Michel Hérubel, *Gilles de Rais, ou, La fin d'un monde* (Paris, 1993); Alain Jost, *Gilles de Rais* (Paris, 1995); Robert Nye, *The Life and Death of My Lord, Gilles de Rais* (London, 1990); Gilbert Prouteau, *Gilles de Rais, ou, La queule du loup* (Monaco, 1992); Philippe Reliquet, *Le Moyen Âge: Gilles de Rais* (Paris, 1982); Michel Tournier, *Gilles et Jeanne: récit* (Paris, 1983).

hanged by the neck at Nantes for a plethora of crimes, both civil and ecclesiastical, that included heresy, sodomy, kidnapping, and murder. Only a last minute reprieve from the chief judge of the civil court set aside the part of his sentence that called for his body to be burnt to ashes immediately following the hanging; the reprieve provided that it merely to be "singed" and afterwards afforded burial in a sanctuary of his choosing.

In examining the career of this once revered warrior whose name later became infamous, the present article will first consider the events of his youth, then trace his middle years that made him a heroic figure throughout France, and finally focus in on the tragic closing decade of his life. For it was during the period that followed Joan of Arc's death in 1431 that the always excessive Sieur de Rais, outdid himself, committing acts of profligacy that would dissipate much of his family estate and committing crimes that would make his name legendary.

I. *The Early Life of Gilles de Rais*

Born in 1404 at the family estate of Champtocé,[3] situated about twelve miles west of Angers on the Loire river, the real Gilles de Rais learned at an early age to live with loss. At the age of eleven, Gilles lost both his mother and his father, the latter in a gory hunting accident he may well have witnessed. Finally, on October 25, 1415, his uncle, Amaury de Craon, numbered among the thousands of French dead on the field of Agincourt.[4] As a result,

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[3] He was born in a section of the fortress that bore the foreboding name of "Black Tower" (*Tour noire*). Michel Bataille, *Gilles de Rais: Suivi d'une etude de Jean de Pesez sur Gilles de Rais, Jeanne d'Arc et ses campagnions* (Paris, 1976), 50. For the genealogy of Gilles de Rais extended family, see "Genéalogie de Gilles de Rais," *Cahiers Gilles de Rais* 4 (Nov. 1993): 148-49.

[4] Georges Bataille was a French scholar, archivist, and literary critic who published extensively in the mid-twentieth century, both under his own name and several pseudonyms. During his lifetime, some of his works were considered controversial enough to be banned. Although largely overlooked by the French literati of his day, following his death, Bataille became something of a cult figure whose work influenced such later writers as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. It was undoubtedly a fascination with human sacrifice that led to his study of Gilles de Rais. In 1965, Bataille published a book on Gilles entitled *Le Procès de Gilles de Rais: Les documents* which included a lengthy appendix reproducing among other documents the extensive trial records which had been translated from the original Latin into French by Pierre Klossowski. In 1991, both the text and documents were translated into English by Richard Robinson and published under the title *The Trial of Gilles de Rais, Documents presented by Georges Bataille* (Los Angeles, 1991). When the author of this article first embarked upon the study of Gilles de Rais, the 1991 English translation had not yet appeared. Hence, all footnote references throughout the essay are

the orphaned boy came under the guardianship of his powerful maternal grandfather, Jean de Craon, the only person other than Joan and the conjurer, Prelati, who ever seems to have exercised much influence over him.

From his youth, Gilles de Rais seems to have been a living embodiment of the term daredevil. In 1420, while still an adolescent scarcely sixteen years of age, he unabashedly kidnapped his cousin and wife-to-be, Catherine de Thouars, from her home, apparently in order to present disapproving ecclesiastical authorities with a *fait accompli*.[5] The bride was literally snatched away from her home at a time when there were a number of other suitors "virtually laying siege to the castle where she lived."[6]

It soon became apparent that the kidnaping of his sixteen-year-old cousin was not going to be an isolated case of violence in the life of Gilles de Rais. Not only did he seize Catherine by force, but further ignoring Church law forced a monk to marry them in haste and without the customary publication of banns.[7] Then, in a final gesture of effrontery, he applied to Rome to have the marriage legitimated on the grounds that his wife was now with child.[8] At a distance of nearly six centuries, it is no longer possible to ascertain whether Gilles was telling the truth or not, but no child was actually born to the couple until 1429[9] and that was both the first and the last. Nevertheless, Pope Martin V (r.1417-1431) seems to have accepted Gilles's word (and perhaps also his money),[10] for on June 26, 1422, a Church-sanctioned wedding was performed with all due pomp and circumstance.[11]

Catherine de Thouars would remain the only woman ever to wed Gilles,[12] but she was not to be the last, nor even the first, with whom his name would

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to the 1965 French version. All English translations from that version are the work of the author of this article. Whenever referring to the appended documents, she will identify the actual document being referenced [Georges Bataille, *Le Procès de Gilles de Rais: Les documents* [hereafter PGRB] (Paris, 1965), 107; English translation by Richard Robinson as *The Trial of Gilles de Rais* [hereafter*Trial*] (Los Angeles, 1991); See also: "Chronologie de Gilles de Rais," *Les Cahiers Gilles de Rais* 1 (June, 1992): 23].

[5] *PGRB*, 107; *Trial*; 72.

[6] Jean Benedetti, *Gilles de Rais: The Authentic Bluebeard* (London:, 1971), 45.

[7] This occurred on November 30, 1420, eight days following the abduction. Benedetti, *Gilles*, 45; Marc Dubu, *Gilles de Rais: Magicien et sodomiste* (Paris, 1945), 31; Bataille, *Gilles de Rais*, 72.

[8] Bataille, *Gilles de Rais*, 72-73.

[9] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 45.

[10] Bataille, *Gilles de Rais*, 72.

[11] A. Billaud, *Le Château de Gilles de Retz et son histoire* (1957; reprint, Olonne, 1962), 24; "Chrononologie," 24.

[12] One of Gilles' nineteenth century biographers reports that an earlier historian did not hesitate to assign Gilles several wives that he killed one after another. Armand Guéraud,

be linked. Even before their union, Gilles had been mentioned as a possible bride-groom in two prolonged matrimonial negotiations conducted by Jean de Craon, his guardian and maternal grandfather. Craon had contracted the first of these engagements with Charles Dinan, baron de Châteaubriant, the equally money-hungry grandfather of Jeanne Peynel, a Norman heiress, scarcely four years old at the time. Although papers were signed in January, 1417,[13] nothing ever came of the match, due perhaps to the death of the young bride,[14] or alternatively, to legal steps that were taken to prevent the betrothal.[15] A second arranged marriage to Béatrice de Rohan, niece of the duke of Brittany, also failed to materialize.[16]

In an attempt to cast a more favorable light on Gilles's actions, his apologists have sometimes pointed to the turbulent historical context in which they occurred. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to visualize the young nobleman as arrogant and ungovernable, a person whose every whimsy was to be satisfied, more out of fear than out of loyalty. By 1420, although Gilles was only sixteen, his aggressive nature manifested itself seemingly unchecked. It was perhaps even being fueled by his power-hungry grandfather.[17] John Hurrel Cook tells us that "aggressive children are likely to come from homes where the expression of aggression is not regulated by family rules."[18] And Gilles, whose parents had left him an orphan at age eleven and whom de Craon had since raised, seems to fit the pattern well.

That conclusion is further substantiated by subsequent trial documents that show him to have later committed countless acts of sodomy, dismemberment, beating, hanging, and strangulation, most directed against young

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"RAIS (1) (Gilles, Baron de)," in *Biographie bretonne*, ed. Prosper Jean Levot, 2 vols. (Paris, 1852-1857), 2:688.

[13] Jeanne Peynel was the granddaughter of Foulques, lord of Hambye [Benedetti, *Gilles*, 38].

[14] Most accounts inform us that Jeanne died before the marriage could be celebrated; on the other hand, Benedetti says that the ex-fiancée became a nun and eventually became abbess of Notre-Dame de Lisieux [Guéraud, "RAIS," 2:678; Benedetti, *Gilles*, 38].

[15] Billaud, *Château*, 23, tells us that the *Parlement* at Caen intervened; *PGRB*, 106; *Trial*, 71 says it was the Parlement de Paris.

[16] Beatrice de Rohan was the niece of Jean VI "the Wise" of Brittany (r.1399-1442), known by French reckoning as Jean V [Ernest A. Vizetelley, *Bluebeard: An Account of Comorre the Cursed and Gilles de Rais* (London, 1902), 127].

[17] *Trial*, 41.

[18] John Hurrel Cook, "Nature and Function of Territorial Aggression," in *Man and Aggression*, ed. M. Ashley Montagu (New York, 1968), 155. For the violence springing from such early aggression, see Mihailo Marković, "Violence and Human Self-Realization," in *Violence and Aggression in the History of Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Weiner and John Fisher (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), 238-41.

children.[19] In the detailed records of the ecclesiastical court that would try him in 1440, he is described as having spontaneously confessed and declared that ever since his youth, he had wickedly committed great and awful crimes against God and His commandments. He even begged those present who had children to teach them to avoid his example and to instill in them the habit of virtue during their adolescence and childhood.[20]

Although modern scholarship has learned to suspect some of the "spontaneous" testimony given during inquisitorial trials like that of Gilles de Rais, the witnesses who spoke out against him are so numerous that the evidence seems overwhelming.[21] Like the para-psychologist, Georges Meunier, most writers concerned with Gilles have ultimately acknowledged his guilt. Meunier speaks for many when he says that what is most responsible for the vices and crimes of de Rais is the education he received, or rather the education he did not receive.[22]

II. *The Wealth of Gilles de Rais*

The illustrious lineage and extensive properties of Gilles de Rais largely accounted for the power he was able to wield in this the terminal period of the feudal system. Gilles was the grandson of Thiphaine de Husson, herself a niece of the famed warrior, Bertrand DuGuesclin[23] (d. 1380) and her second husband, Guy de Laval, widely known for his valor as

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[19] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 284-85; *Trial*, 196-97; Reginald Hyatte, *Laughter for the Devil: The Trials of Gilles de Rais, Companion-in-Arms of Joan of Arc (1440)* [hereafter *Laughter*] (Rutherford, N.J., 1984), 114. The clearest description of these crimes is in clause 27 of the Articles of Accusation [*PGRB*, 254-55; *Trial*, 174-75; *Laughter*, 57-58. .

[20] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 283; *Trial*, 194-95; *Laughter*, 113.

[21] *PGRB*, 303-55; *Trial*, 209-45; *Laughter*, 100-9. Bataille estimates the number of witnesses at over seventy-five, other estimates exceed a hundred. See, for example : Émile Gabory, *La Vie et la mort de Gilles de Rais: dit, á tort, Barbebleu* (Paris, 1926), 234 ; Salomon Reinach, "Gilles de Rais," *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* 9 (Dec. 1904): 170.

[22] Georges Meunier, *Gilles de Rais et son temps* (Paris, 1949), 84.

[23] For Du Guesclin, see Michelaine Dupuy, *Bertrand du Guesclin, capitaine d'aventures, connétable de France* (Paris, 1977); Yves Jacob, *Bertrand du Guesclin, Connétable de France* (Paris, 1992); D.F. Jamison, *Bertrand du Guesclin. His Life and Times, A History of the Fourteenth Century* (London, 1864); Georges Minois, *Du Guesclin* (Paris, 1996); Enoch V. Stoddard, *Bertrand du Guesclin, Constable of France, His Life and Times* (New York, 1897); Richard Vernier, *The Flower of Chivalry: Bertrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003).

"Brumor."[24] From his father, Guy de Laval II, Gilles inherited the Rais barony with the castellanies and seigniories of Pornic, Machecoul, Saint-Étienne-de-Mer-Morte and Touvois, Prigné, Vue, and the Isle of Bouin. On assuming this title and the properties attached to it, he became the dean of all the barons who owed homage to the duke of Brittany.[25] He also received lordship over other Laval lands in Brittany and neighboring regions of France, including Blaison Chemellier, Fontaine-Milon (in the present Maine-et-Loire), Gratte-Cuisse (at Saint-Denys in Anjou), La Motte-Achard, La Morière (at Vairé in the Vendée), Ambrières and Saint-Aubin-de-Fosse-Louvain (at Mayenne).[26]

From his maternal grandfather, Jean de Craon, Gilles would eventually inherit the lands and castellanies of Suze (Sarthe), Briolay, Champtocé and Ingrandes (Maine-et-Loire), Loroux-Botereau, la Benaste, Bourneuf-en-Rais (Loire-Inferieure), Cheneche (Vienne), and la Voulte (at Vendoeuvre, Vienne).[27] Finally, marriage to Catherine de Thouars brought into his possession lordship over Pouzauges, Tiffauges (Vendée), Grez-sur-Maine (Maine-et-Loire), Chabanais, Confolens (Charente), Lombert, Savenay, Chateaumorant, and several other handsome estates.[28]

Unfortunately for the remaining members of the Rais clan, Gilles was to take this immense property acquired over a period of some three centuries[29] and squander it in less than a generation. According to the complaint registered in court by his heirs, he would habitually distribute money among his followers, including his grooms, his pages, his valets, and other people of low rank without ever asking for an accounting. As long as he always had his "mad money," he did not consider how or for what purposes his coins were spent.[30]

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[24] Guéraud, "RAIS," 679. See map at end of article.

[25] Father Ferdinand Charpentier , "Jeanne d'Arc et Gilles de Rais," *Revue du Bas Poitou* 22 (1909): 333-34, n. 1.

[26] Ibid., 334.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Eugène Bossard supplies a Rais geneology in the appendix to *Gilles de Rais: Maréchal de France dit Barbe-Bleue 1404-1441* (Paris, 1886) that goes back to 1161. This means that when Gilles married in 1420, some of his lands had been in the family's possession for up to three centuries. According to estimates made in 1945 by Marc Dubu, Gilles's liquid assets amounted to twenty million francs in annuities (about $17,000 in 1945), and to forty million in furnishings (about $34,000 in 1945), which, added to his real estate would make him a millionaire many times over [Dubu, *Gilles*, 54].

[30] *Mémoire des héritiers de Gilles de Rais pour prouver sa prodigalité*, quoted in Dubu, *Gilles*, 82.

The fate of Catherine de Thouars's inheritance superbly exemplifies the ruthlessness of Jean de Craon, a trait he would apparently pass on to his grandson. In 1422, the year in which the legal marriage between Gilles and Catherine took place, the bride's mother, Beatrice de Montjean decided to remarry. Her choice fell upon Jacques Meschin de la Roche Aireault, her deceased husband's squire. Their marriage threw into question the legal disposition of the Thouars lands that Gilles and his grandfather had appropriated at the time of Catherine's kidnapping back in 1420.[31] To head off a potential conflict, De Craon first bribed the captain of the guard at Tiffauges, after which he threatened Catherine's mother and tendered her an ultimatum that required her to "give up the castles ... allotted her under the [first] marriage settlement ... [or] ... be sewn up in a sack and thrown into the river."[32]

Although Beatrice never accepted these terms, her new husband finally did, but not before three of his emissaries had been detained at Champtocé and one of them had died there. When a government official, Adam de Cambray, subsequently came in to investigate on behalf of the parliament, he was beaten up and sent back to Poitiers. The fine that was imposed for this act of *lèse-majesté* was quite simply ignored by the perpetrators.[33] No one, regardless of bloodline, rank, or gender, was safe at the hands of de Craon and his ward, who had not yet reached the age of twenty.

Throughout much of their marriage, Catherine lived apart from her husband at the château of Ingrande, where he never came to visit her.[34] For his part, before reaching his majority, Gilles had twice flouted both convention and the law by having kidnapped two titled French gentlewomen. It was an appropriate beginning for a career that would end in infamy.

III. *Entering the Political Arena*

In 1415, when Gilles de Rais was eleven, the Hundred Years War, quiescent for a generation, once again broke out in a manner that proved disastrous for France. During mid-summer, Henry V of England (r.1413-1422) crossed

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[31] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 47.

[32] Ibid., 48.

[33] Ibid., 49. Benedetti asserts that in 1453 , long after the death of both Craon and Gilles de Rais, the fine had still not been paid. For legal theories of *lèse-majesté* in late-medieval France, see Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, *Dieu et le roi: La répression du blasphème et l'injure au roi à la fin du Moyen Age* (Limoges, 2002).

[34] Paul Lacroix, "Le Maréchal de Rays," in *Curiosités de l'histoire de France: Procès célèbres* (Paris, 1858), 51.

the channel, besieged and took the port of Harfleur,[35] and marched toward Calais. On October 26, St. Crispin's Day, he won England's greatest victory of the war at Agincourt.[36] During the ensuing several years, Henry's army overran the duchy of Normandy.[37] In 1420, when the sixteen-year-old de Rais was kidnapping his bride, King Charles VI "the Mad" of France (r.1380-1422), now old and suffering increasingly from the fits of insanity that had troubled him since his youth,[38] agreed to the treaty of Troyes, by which he accepted his recent enemy, Henry, as regent of France.[39] He also disinherited his own son, the future Charles VII (r.1422-1461), and placed into the succession the English monarch and his Plantagenet successors. When the state funeral of Charles VI was held on October 21, 1422, it seemed to many as if they were witnessing the funeral of the nation.[40]

Unfortunately for English aspirations, Henry's relatively short reign ended two years later when he and the French king died within several months of one another, long before Henry could cement his hold on the French crown. This set up a conflict between the English king's ten-month-old heir and namesake, Henry VI (r.1422-1461),[41] and the disinherited dauphin, Charles, who became known mockingly as "the king of Bourges"[42] due to his initial refusal to show any real interest in combating the English.

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[35] See Anne Curry, "Henry V's Harfleur: A Study in Military Administration, 1415-1422," in this volume.

[36] For the battle of Agincourt, see: Matthew Bennett, "The Battle," in *Agincourt 1415: Henry V, Sir Thomas Erpingham and the Triumph of the English Archers*, ed. Anne Curry (Stroud, 2000), 21-36; Philippe Contamine, *Azincourt* (Paris, 1964); *The Battle of Agincourt*, ed. Anne Curry (Woodbridge Suffolk, 2000); Christopher Hibbert, *Agincourt* (New York, 1978); A.R. Malden, "An Official Account of Agincourt in Carol and Ballad," *The Ancestor* 9 (1904): 26-31. One of the most detailed accounts of the battle is Clifford J. Rogers, "The Battle of Agincourt," in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*, Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 37-132.

[37] For English conquest of Normandy, see Anne Curry, "The Impact of War and Occupation on Urban Life in Normandy, 1417-1450," *French History* 1 (1987): 157-81; Richard Ager Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy, 1416-1424: A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare* (New Haven, Conn., 1924); Desmond Seward, *Henry V as Warlord* (London, 1987), 98-129.

[38] On this royal madness, see Aleksandra Pfau, "Trauma, Madness, and the Hundred Years War" in this volume.

[39] Frantz Funck-Brentano sums up the general French view of the treaty of Troyes when he refers to it as "shameful" [Frantz Funck-Brentano , *Les brigands et routiers* (Paris, 1937), 62]. For discussion of the terms of the treaty, see G.P. Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), 19-24.

[40] Ibid.

[41] For Henry VI, see Bertram Percy Wolffe, *Henry VI* (New Haven, Conn., 2001); John Lovett Watts, *Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship* (Cambridge, 1996).

[42] Reinach, "Gilles de Rais," 162.

A number of leading French nobles, principal among them the duke of Burgundy, adopted what seemed to be the winning cause by supporting the English claimant and his regent, the duke of Bedford.[43] By contrast, Jean de Craon and his unruly grandson, Gilles de Rais, adhered to the "continental camp" of Charles and his wife, Marie d'Anjou, at least in part due to their own connection with the queen's forceful mother, Yolande d"Aragon, who became a leading influence on the dauphin and, a few years later, a strong supporter of Joan of Arc.[44] Gilles's first documented meeting with the future Charles VII took place in October, 1425; it was, so to speak, his debut into "high society."[45] Until his dying day, Gilles remained loyal to Charles, even though his immediate liege lord, Jean VI, the duke of Brittany (r.1399-1422) vacillated continuously in his allegiance to the contending parties.[46]

During these years, Gilles and his grandfather experienced increasing discord. Although the grandson would not officially reach his majority until his twenty-fifth birthday in 1429,[47] at the age of twenty, he took over the administration of his entire estate, making use of it as he pleased, without advice from Craon who still held legal title.[48] Thus, by about 1424, five years before the appearance of Joan of Arc, Gilles was acting independently.

In 1425, at the urging of Yolande of Aragon, the dauphin appointed the popular Count Arthur of Richemont constable (*connétable*) of France; a move that signaled a strengthening of the crown's ties with Brittany since Richemont was the brother of Duke Jean VI. Despite its popularity, the appointment did little to stop the seeming inexorable English advance toward control of France. In March, 1426, the newly-appointed constable was routed by the English at Saint-James-de-Beuvron.

It has more than once been suggested that Richemont's defeat was engineered by Jean de Malestroit,[49] who, as both chancellor of Brittany and bishop of Nantes, was known to have collaborated with the English

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43 *PGRB*, 106; *Trial*, 73.

44 *Nouveau petit Larousse illustré, Dictionnaire encyclopedique* (Paris, 1956), s.v. " Yolande d'Aragon"; Gérard de Senneville, *Yolande d'Aragon: la reine que a gagné la guerre de cent ans* (Paris, 2008); Marie-Louise Sargentet, *La reine d l'ombre* (Le Coudray-Macouard, 2002).

45 *PGRB*, 110; *Trial*, 74.

46 Benedetti, *Gilles*, 52.

47 Dubu, *Gilles*, 34ff.

48 *PGRB*, 110; *Trial*, 80 citing *Mémoire des héritiers de Gilles de Rais pour prouver sa prodigalité*, ed. Dom H. Lobineau.

49 Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 146; *PGRB*, 111; Reinach, "Gilles de Rais," 164.

from whom he had received a pension and lands in Normandy.[50] In fact, Richemont later had Jean de Malestroit arrested, presumably in retribution for his pro-English stance. Since Gilles de Rais had recently mustered and equipped seven companies of men to support the constable,[51] he probably shared his commander's animosity toward the bishop.

Interestingly enough, it would be this same Jean de Malestroit who would later preside over the ecclesiastical court that found Gilles guilty of heresy and sodomy and handed him over to the secular authorities for sentencing.[52] It is tempting to see Malestroit as paying back a supporter of his old enemy, Richemont; unfortunately, there is no documentary evidence to support such speculation.[53] What is more, given the evidence against Gilles, the bishop would have had little choice but to find as he did.

During the late 1420s, the chronic contention among Frenchmen seems to have rankled Gilles de Rais more than most. We do have evidence of his violent patriotism as early as 1427. In that year, he personally assumed command of the Rais men-at-arms, afterwards emerging victorious from various encounters with the English. At the castle of Lude, de Rais killed with his own hands the English commander, a man named Blackburne.[54] Interestingly, the defeated English were usually allowed to escape with their lives; by contrast, if an anglophile Frenchman fell into Gilles's hands he was invariably executed as a traitor. One historian describes Gilles' treatment of such men.

> He would have them all hung from tall poles that were driven into the ground … Gilles would then stay to watch them fitfully kick, their necks in the noose, until the last spasms of their agony.[55]

In short, his military activity shows not only bravery in combat, but also a certain predilection for taking reprisals against Frenchmen who had supported the other side.

What is more, by 1427, Gilles de Rais was obviously developing a taste for sadism manifested in his post-combat massacre of prisoners, a taste that would continue to grow over time. The question arises, however, was

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[50] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 146.

[51] Ibid., 145.

[52] Leonard Wolf, *Bluebeard: The Life and Crimes of Gilles de Rais* (New York, 1980), 18.

[53] This did not prevent Gilles' first twentieth-century apologist, Reinach, from asserting that the bishop held both Richemont and Gilles in enmity from 1426 onward [Reinach, "Gilles de Rais, 164].

[54] Ernest Albert Vizetelly, "The Original Bluebeard," *Once a Week*, January, 1868, 17.

[55] Funck Brentano, *Brigands et routiers*, 65.

the battlefield simply providing him with a acceptable outlet for violent practices he had already pursued elsewhere? Years later, article twenty-seven of the indictment against Gilles would assert that he had embarked upon his career as a child-murderer beginning as early as 1426.[56] According to Gilles' own testimony, however, he never actually committed infanticide until the year in which his grandfather died, 1432, one year after Joan of Arc was burned at the stake.[57]

By 1427, Gilles de Rais had already publicly demonstrated a distinct nonchalance in the face of violence and death, whether or not he had exercised his private predilection for torturing and dismembering children. In this period of perpetual warfare, his ruthless shedding of blood could be considered heroic, at least to the dauphin and his supporters. When, in January of 1428, his overlord, Jean VI, took the duchy of Brittany into the English camp, de Rais himself remained loyal to Charles, and this must have been an inspiration to other young Bretons who had maintained their loyalty to the French sovereign. The tottering dauphin must have seen the wealthy de Rais as one of the last obstacles to English domination over Brittany.[58] For their part, the English were well aware of Gilles following the Blackburne episode; according to one historian, the duke of Bedford had plans to confiscate the Craon and Rais lands and re-grant them to one of his supporters.[59] By 1428, English inroads into French territory seemed unstoppable.[60] After hesitating between a massive offensive on Angers or the taking of Orléans, Bedford's council of war chose the latter.

IV. *Gilles de Rais and the Maid of Orléans*

In March, 1429, after Orléans had been under siege for several months, Joan of Arc appeared for the first time at Charles VII's court. The fateful meeting between the Dauphin and the Maid took place at Chinon.[61] For her part,

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[56] For the complete transcript of the indictment, see Pierre Klossowski's modern French translation of the *Acte d'Accusation*, "Comptes rendus des audiences," in *PGRB*, 236-50.

[57] Ibid., 269, 273. Since trial records indicate that Gilles accepted full blame for his crimes, there is little reason to doubt him on this small, slightly exculpatory point.

[58] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 150.

[59] Roland Villeneuve, *Gilles de Rais: Une grande figure diabolique* (Paris, 1955), 50 ff.

[60] For Bedford's campaigns after Henry V's death in 1422, see B.J.H. Rowe, "John, Duke of Bedford, and the Norman 'Brigands'," *English Historical Review* 47, no. 188 (Oct., 1932): 583-600; Ethel Carleton Williams, *John of Lancaster, First Duke of Bedford, Brother of Henry V and Regent of France* (London, 1963).

[61] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 154.

Joan had already encountered considerable resistance in gaining access to Charles, not only from her own family, but from several prominent people living in the Domrémy district from which she had come.[62] Now, at court, she was also greeted with wariness and suspicion.[63]

According to a story often told at the time, Joan "was made to go through some kind of testing charade in the course of which she identified Charles who had deliberately hidden himself in the crowd."[64] In reconstructing this test for the second scene of *Saint Joan: A Chronicle Play in Six Scenes and an Epilogue*, George Bernard Shaw goes so far as to make Gilles de Rais the impostor who takes the Dauphin's place in an attempt to fool her.[65] Unfortunately, despite its wide appeal and dissemination, the entire substitution episode may well be spurious. In *Jeanne d'Arc, sa personalité, son rôle*,[66] Jacques Cordier states that the myth originated a quarter of a century later, when two men who were not even present at Chinon gave testimony at Joan's rehabilitation proceedings, held between 1455 and 1456.[67] Another popular anecdote rejected by Cordier has Joan gaining the Dauphin's immediate confidence by removing the doubts he shared with his entourage concerning his own legitimacy.[68] Although Gilles de Rais may not have been as intricately involved with Joan's dramatic arrival as some writers would have us believe, he may at least have been present on that momentous occasion, as others contend.[69] After all, when not in

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62 Régine Pernoud, *Joan of Arc by Herself and Her Witnesses*, trans. Edward Hyams (New York, 1964),30-31; DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 40-41.

63 *Procés en nullité de la condamnation de Jeanne d'Arc*, ed. Pierre Duparc, 5 vols (Paris, 1977-1989), 1:289-90; DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 41.

64 Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 46.

65 George Bernard Shaw, *Saint Joan* (New York, 1924), 32-37. Edward Lucie-Smith embroiders even further on Shaw—as do a number of other writers—in his novel, *The Dark Pageant*. First Lucie-Smith has the count of Clermont stand in for Charles, and when this fails to deceive Joan, he has Gilles de Sillé push her toward Gilles in another unsuccessful attempt to have her fail to identify the Dauphin [Edward Lucie-Smith. *The Dark Pageant* (London, 1977), 77].

66 Jacques Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc, sa personalité, son rôle*, trans. Eva Rapsilber (1948; reprint, Wiesbaden, 1966), 110.

67 For Joan's "recognition" of the Dauphin, see *Procés de condamnation et de réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc dite La Pucelle*, ed. Jules Quicherat, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841-1849), 1:75-76; *Procés*, ed. Duparc, 1:400; Pernoud, *Joan of Arc*, 46; Pierre Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy: Captaine de Compiègne: Contribution à l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc et à l'etude de la vie militaire et privée au XV^{ve} siècle* (Paris, 1906), 23-24; De Vries, *Joan of Arc*, 46; Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 75.

68 Cordier, *Jeanne d'Arc*, 110.

69 *PGRB*, 112; *Trial*, 80; Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 45.

the field, he had been a member of the Dauphin's court for nearly four years.[70]

Joan's emergence on the scene early in 1429 and the meteoric career that followed began to turn the tide of war in favor of France. For Gilles, too, it was the most momentous year in his life. Before it ended, he signed a pact with his cousin, Georges de la Trémoille, a favorite of the Dauphin, watched over Joan during her greatest victories, entered Orléans at her side after breaking the English siege,[71] accompanied her to Rheims, had an honored place in the coronation of Charles VII on July 17, 1429,[72] received a marshal's baton, and, finally, learned that he had fathered a daughter.

Historians and creative writers alike have frequently argued over the meaning of the written promise of allegiance that Gilles gave La Trémoille on April 8, 1429.[73] This pact has usually been interpreted as having supplied Gilles a license to watch and, if need be, control the Maid in the upcoming Loire campaign.[74] At the very least, it made him Joan's "bearded chaperone" (*duègne barbue*).[75]

Contemporary accounts of Joan's battlefield accomplishments in the months that followed her interview at Chinon invariably extol the loyalty and devotion Gilles demonstrated for the Maid. One indication of the considerable military role played by the Breton nobleman during this critical period can be found in a surviving document from the Archives de la Chambre des Comptes, awarding Baron Gilles de Rais

> the sum of 1000 livres to recompense him for the great expenditure he had incurred by assembling, according to agreement, a certain large body of men-of-arms and bowmen, whom he has kept at his own expense and employed for the service of the King and in the company of the Maid, in

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[70] Joan arrived at Chinon around February 23, 1429; Gilles met the Dauphin on September 8, 1425. See Bossard, *Gilles de Rais: Maréchal*, 25-26.

[71] For Gilles de Rais's relationship with La Tremoille and his part in this siege, see *Procés*, ed. Quicherat, 4:163-64; Régine Pernoud, *La libération d'Orléans, 8 mai 1429* (Paris, 1969), 142-43; William A. Weary, "The House of La Tremoille Fifteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries: Change and Adaptation in a French Noble Family," *Journal of Modern History* 49, no. 1 (March, 1977): 1001-38; idem, "Royal Policy and Patronage in Renaissance France: The Monarchy and the House of La Trémoille (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1972); J. Russell Major, "The Crown and the Aristocracy in Renaissance France," *American Historical Review* 69, no. 3 (Apr., 1964): 631-46.

[72] For Charles VII's coronation, see *Procés*, ed. Quicherat, 4:23; Ferdinand de Liocourt, *La mission d Jeanne d'Arc*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1974-1976), 2:215.

[73] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 156.

[74] *Procés*, ed. Quicherat, 4:24

[75] E. Coarer-Kalondan, *La Scandaleuse Affaire de Gilles de Retz* (Paris, 1961), 36.

> order to reduce to obedience the town of Gergeau, which was held by the English.[76]

In several ways, the crown acknowledged his role. De Rais's appointment to the position of marshal was a singular token of royal appreciation. Perhaps the greatest honor of all, however, was bestowed upon Gilles at Charles's coronation on July 17, 1429, where he shared a position of honor with Joan and was entrusted with holding the sacred oil, a drop of which had been used at every Rheims coronation since the fifth century when St. Rémy anointed Clovis.[77] And sharing a privileged position with Gilles during the lengthy ceremonies of that memorable July 17 was his extraordinary comrade-in-arms, Joan of Arc.[78]

De Rais's loyalty to Joan has gone largely unchallenged by French historians over the centuries. There have, however, been a few exceptions. Accusations of treachery on his part seem to have first been raised during the nineteenth century in the edition of Jean Chartier's *Histoire de Charles VII* edited by M. Vallet de Viriville.[79] Basing his theory on the pact Gilles had with La Trémoille, Viriville accused him of spying on the Maid for the king's favorite and then abandoning her to her fate after their failure to take Paris in early September of 1429. On the other hand, several modern scholars, including ones who do not have all that much good to say of de Rais, take issue with these charges of disloyalty.[80] They view the purpose of the pact in a far less sinister light than did Viriville and find some evidence that Gilles may actually have hoped to rescue Joan from her captors in Rouen. Far from abandoning the Maid, they argue that he followed her from Chinon all the way to the ramparts of Paris. He seems to have left her company only when recalled by the king and may have remained faithful even after her capture at Compiégne.[81]

Not surprisingly, scholars over the centuries have at times raised the question of a sexual attachment. For the most part, writers of the twentieth

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[76] Gergeau, more commonly spelled Jargeau, was but one of several battles fought by Gilles and Joan in 1429. The quotation is from *Procès*, ed. Quicherat, 4:261, as translated by Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 158.

[77] For St. Remy (Remi), see *A Dictionary of Saints*, ed. Donald Attwater (London, 1976), 296.

[78] Wyndham Lewis, *Soul*, 74; Michel Bataille, *Gilles de Rais*, 119.

[79] Jean Chartier, *Histoire de Charles VII, roi de France*, ed. Auguste Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1858),169-70.

[80] Wyndham Lewis, *Soul*, 81; Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 50.

[81] Aubert, *Le Vieux Tiffauges*, 11. Aubert, who in other respects does not hold a high opinion of Gilles, argues for his loyalty to Joan.

century tend to reaffirm the sanctity of the Maid. By contrast, a passage from the Italian novelist, Raffaele Ciampini, illustrates the speculation to which the unorthodox relationship between Joan and her leading general might easily give rise. In an episode from his novel set before the battle of Patay in June, 1429, Ciampini writes that "the virgin [Joan] stood before Gilles, straight as a young chestnut tree, nervous and reckless as a fawn. And all of Gilles's heart and all of his flesh shouted the words of love."[82]

In a sense, Joan's meteoric rise ended early in the fall of 1429 when her army stood before the walls of Paris and made a brief attempt to take the city.[83] She initiated her attack at what some may have considered an inauspicious moment—September 8, a holy day commemorating the nativity of the Virgin, a day often regarded by the medieval mind as a period of truce.[84] Any uneasiness among her troops concerning the choice of dates may have seemed justified by the outcome: not only did the first day's assault on the St. Honoré gate fail completely, but that evening the Maid sustained a leg injury.[85]

Of greater significance to the outcome of the campaign were truce negotiations taking place at that moment between Duke Philip "the Good" of Burgundy (r.1419-1467), the English ally who was in command of the city, and the royal favorite, Georges de la Trémoille. According to one historian, these "made nonsense of everything Joan and Gilles and the other French commanders were trying to achieve."[86] Apparently, few if any within Joan's camp knew about the negotiations or if her watchdog, Gilles de Rais, was even aware of them. Even if he possessed such knowledge, he did not stop fighting gallantly throughout the day at Joan's side.

On the other hand, when orders arrived the following day from the king's camp in Saint-Denis, commanding the army to withdraw, Gilles obeyed, despite Joan's refusal to do so.[87] He apparently had no part in the plan to re-group French forces and renew the attack on the city from nearby Saint-Denis via a temporary bridge erected there for the purpose by the duke of Alençon. According to one historian, this plan was foiled "because the King,

82 Raffaele Ciampini, *Barba-Blu* (Firenze, 1948), 65.

83 For Joan's decline as military leader, see DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 156-81.

84 Benedetti, *Gilles*, 100.

85 *PGRB*, 116; *Trial*, 79; *Procés*, ed. Quicherat, 4:26-27, 87-88, 198-99, 392-93, 457, 464-66; Andrew Lang, *The Maid of France: Being the Story of the Life and Death of Jeanne d'Arc* (1908; reprint, London, 1929), 181; Alice Buchan, *Joan of Arc and the Recovery of France* (London, 1948), 117.

86 Benedetti, *Gilles*, 98.

87 *PGRB*, 116; *Trial*, 79; Lang, *Maid*, 180-84; Buchan, *Joan*, 115-22.

who had heard of the Maid's intention and the purpose of the duke of Alençon and other men of good will, had the bridge destroyed during the night."[88] In other words, Joan's efforts to take the capital were not being hampered as some have suggested by her own generals, in particular Gilles de Rais, but instead, by the actions of their still indolent commander-in-chief, the king, acting through and in support of diplomatic negotiations undertaken by La Trémoille.[89] With a truce in place, the court abandoned Paris and returned to the king's favorite haunts in the Loire valley.[90] Joan traveled in the royal entourage, reduced to what one author has called a mere "mascot."[91]

During the months following the abortive siege of Paris, the events of Gilles's life are little known. Apparently, he and his contingent retired to more familiar ground in western France. The birth of a daughter while the army was besieging the capital[92] probably gave him a welcome respite, an excuse to celebrate and indulge in some of his less violent pastimes which included those of the table. Ironically, the last recorded move made by the nobleman during his glory-filled year marks a turning of the tide of fortune. Having shortly before celebrated his twenty-fifth birthday, a date that may have taken place in the same month as his daughter's birth,[93] he began the divestiture of family property that would characterize the rest of his life, selling to an outsider the estate of Blaison.[94] This resulted in a swift and violent reaction by his grandfather. The ever-watchful Craon immediately re-acquired the property, but the ensuing quarrel between the two men was such that "thirty years later the inhabitants of Champtocé could remember Jean de Craon hurling abuse at his grandson."[95]

In the meantime, Joan had apparently grown restless at her enforced inactivity. In May, 1430, refusing to remain on the sidelines, she took it upon

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[88] Georges Chastellain, *Chronique des ducs d'Alençon* ed. J.A. Buchon (Paris, 1827-1828) as quoted in Benedetti, *Bluebeard*, 10.

[89] According to Benedetti, orders to dismantle the bridge had come from La Trémoille. "The bridge which d'Alençon had made was a temporary structure, consisting mainly of boats. The ropes mooring them had quite simply been cut and the whole arrangement allowed to float away down river" [Benedetti, *Gilles*, 100-1].

[90] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 170.

[91] Frances Winwar, *The Saint and the Devil: A Biographical Study of Joan of Arc and Gilles de Rais* (London, 1948), 149.

[92] Marie de Rais may have been born on the very day Paris was attacked [Benedetti, *Gilles*, 199].

[93] Bossard, *Gilles de Rais: Maréchal*, 5-8.

[94] *PGRB*, 118; *Trial*, 80.

[95] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 102.

herself, unaccompanied by de Rais, to go north to the town of Compiègne in the county of Picardy, currently under siege by the English and Burgundians. Arriving there on May 23, she led an unsuccessful sortie that same day against the Burgundian camp. In the retreat that followed, she was taken prisoner when she insisted on remaining with the rear of the defeated French column. Not long thereafter, her Burgundian captors sold her to the English.

Once before, the town of Compiègne had figured, however slightly, in Joan's campaigning. According to the contemporary chronicler, Jean Chartier, sometime in August, 1429, prior to the attack on Paris, "the King departed toward Compiègne and went into camp at a village named Barron, about two leagues from Senlis."[96] The English had sallied forth from Paris and a skirmish had taken place between Barron and the nearby Monespilloul. Though the encounter was more or less a standoff, Chartier specifies that one of the French columns was headed by "the Sieurs de Ray and de Boussac, Marshals of France."[97] The name of the place where this action occurred, Barron, would later take on a special significance for Gilles de Rais during the spectacular criminal trial that ended his life.

In 1430, the year of Joan's capture, Gilles and his grandfather combined forces to ambush and kidnap the king's mother-in-law, Yolande of Aragon, when she was peacefully touring Anjou, as regent for her absent son, René.[98] The attack may well have been masterminded by La Trémoille, who was currently at odds with Yolande.[99] Under any circumstances, the victim seems to have harbored no lasting ill will against her kidnappers; she soon afterwards employed both of them in marriage negotiations with one of the duke of Brittany's sons, the contract for which was signed at their castle of Champtocé in February, 1431.[100] Nevertheless, associations with the Maid notwithstanding, Gilles was obviously falling back into old habits, showing little respect for women, even when they were connected to the royal house.

In this period, Gilles also saw action in the northeast, again apparently in connection with the machinations of his cousin, Tremoille. Having been called upon to take command of the garrison in the town of Sablé on the Sarthe river,[101] he came into conflict with Jean de Bueil, then stationed at

96 *Chroniques de Saint-Denis*, trans. Pauline B. Sowers (San Francisco, Cal., 1938), xvii.
97 Ibid., xviii.
98 *PGRB*, 118; *Trial*, 81.
99 Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 89.
100 *PGRB*, 119;*Trial*, 82.
101 *PGRB*, 118; *Trial*, 81.

nearby Château-l'Hermitage and in the service of Yolande de Aragon. Several years younger than Gilles de Rais, de Bueil had already held several important posts in the region of Anjou and Maine and like his opponent was a veteran of the siege of Orléans. Decades later, de Bueil would record his recollections of their encounter in his semi-autobiographical account, *Le Jouvencel*, written in 1466, but not published until about 1483.[102]

As de Bueil tells it, he was still relatively inexperienced at arms when the château was attacked by Gilles's forces, though just how seriously that remark can be taken seems questionable given his career to date. Apparently, he was out on a raiding expedition when he learned that Gilles's force was about to attack l'Hermitage. He swiftly retraced his steps and successfully alerted the defenders, but, in so doing, was sighted and taken prisoner. Foiled in their attempt to seize the place, Gilles's men almost killed de Bueil in their fury. "Probably only the thought of ransom money saved him."[103] De Bueil was taken back to Sablé and incarcerated until he could be ransomed. He did not, however, sit idly in his cell, instead, he employed the time studying the fortifications from his window and devising a plan of attack. Once free, he pressed the plan upon his captain who waited until the day after the Feast of the Holy Innocents (December 28) to put it into effect.[104] The maneuver was a success, with the result that Gilles and his men were ousted from Sablé, though they would recapture it again in the not too distant future.[105]

According to one scholar, commenting on the enmity that came to exist between Gilles and de Bueil, the latter "was an eager accomplice in de Richemont's plot to assassinate La Trémoille at Chinon in 1433,"[106] a plot that failed due only to the victim's corpulence. The would-be assassin's eagerness was very likely due, at least in part, to memories of captivity in Sablé that were still fresh in his mind at the time he volunteered to destroy

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102 Jean de Bueil, *Le Jouvencel*, ed. Camille Favre and Léon Lecestre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887-1889), 2:69-70.

103 Benedetti, *Gilles*, 103.

104 The feast commemorates the infants massacred by Herod when he tried to kill the Christ child. The church celebrates their feast day on December 28. It was a day for which Gilles exhibited considerable devotion. Whether the hesitation to attack on that day had anything to do with the devotional practices of de Bueil's foe is never clarified by the author; it may simply have been in accord with the medieval custom of declaring a truce on major religious holidays, something Joan had failed to take into account during her attack on Paris [Bueil, *Le Jouvencel*, 2:82].

105 Benedetti, *Bluebeard*, 104.

106 Despite the failure of the attack, Tremoille's career as royal favorite would end before the year was out [Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 89].

the cousin of his former captor. Gilles, too, would probably harbor bitter memories of Sablé, connected with his inglorious expulsion.

To close this chapter in De Rais' life, there is some indication that he may have been involved in an attempt to rescue the Maid. When the English acquired Joan's person after her capture at Compiégne late in May, 1430, they insisted that she be tried by the inquisition for heresy. At that time, Gilles was assigned to the garrison at Sablé. By the end of 1430, the trial was well underway in the English-controlled city of Rouen, in Normandy, and there was little doubt as to its outcome.

Scholars writing about Gilles disagree on whether he made any attempt to rescue his former comrade-in-arms. While Jean Benedetti dismisses that conclusion, Michel Bataille argues that he did indeed seriously contemplate such an attempt, even at a moment when the king and most of her countrymen preferred to ignore her plight.[107] The evidence is slender—an IOU that Gilles may have signed in 1430 in the town of Louviers, far closer to Rouen than to Sablé. It reads in part as follows:

> To Rolland Mauvoisin, his squire, captain of Le Prinçay, the sum of eighty golden crowns for the purchase of a black horse (*cheval moreau*), saddled and bridled, which he promised to give to his very dear and well-beloved squire, Michel Machefert, captain of the men-at-arms and bowmen of his company, as soon as they arrived at Louviers.[108]

Was this evidence that de Rais was gathering forces there for an attempt to extract Joan as Georges Bataille would have it or simply one more indication of his habitual financial profligacy? The wording of the commitment could indeed suggest that it was made as part of an impending military venture, and this is an interpretation that has been endorsed by several authors, including Michel Bataille, Eugène Bossard, Ernest Vizetelly, and Fernand Fleuret.

Unfortunately, not only is there an absence of corroborating documentation, but there is some difficulty in ascertaining the correct date of the document in question. At least one expert on de Rais argues that it dates to December 26, 1429 rather than 1430; if so, this would undercut any claim that it signified an impending rescue attempt.[109] And while most authors opt for 1430, there remains the problem that according to *Le Jouvencel*, Gilles was unsuccessfully defending Sablé against attack three days later (the day after the feast of the Holy Innocents). So while the document may

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[107] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 104; Bataille, *Gilles de Rais*, 134-43.
[108] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 170 ff.
[109] Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 93.

indeed suggest a rescue attempt (one that did not get off the ground), this is far from certain.

V. *Closing Out a Military Career*

Gilles de Rais did not completely abandon the field when Joan died in May, 1431; nevertheless, despite his relative youth (he was only twenty-six at the time of her death), his active campaigning came to an end a few years later. Gilles was present at Beauvais in March, 1432, when a plan was drafted to surprise Rouen and kidnap the young English king, Henry VI.[110] Although the scheme came to nothing, in early August, he encountered the English near Lagny in what one author depicts as a repeat of Orléans, this time without Joan's presence. On August 10, Gilles attacked the besieging English forces with his usual vigor and the English commander, the duke of Bedford, was obliged to withdraw. This victory brought him "almost as much renown as Orléans."[111] Without Joan there to restrain him, however, Gilles allowed his men to pillage and plunder in the wake of the battle.

During 1433, the year in which his cousin, Georges de la Trémoille fell out of royal favor, Gilles did not undertake any known military activity. The following year, however, he made one final noteworthy appearance in the royal armies. Apparently, on this occasion, La Trémoille's enemies did not bear him any personal ill will. At Sillé-le-Guillaume in March, 1434, he fought alongside a number of those who had taken his cousin's place,[112] including the constable of Richemont, Yolande of Aragon's son, Charles of Anjou, and the would-be assassin of Trémoille, Jean de Bueil.[113]

As late as 1434, he answered an appeal by his now-disgraced cousin, La Trémoille, to relieve the town of Grancey, currently being besieged by the duke of Burgundy. Gilles received royal permission to recruit troops at Tours, but when it came to taking part in the actual campaign, he defaulted, leaving command of his detachment to his brother René. Shortly afterwards, Grancey fell into Burgundian hands.[114] Still hoping to regain the king's favor, La Trémoille again sought Gilles's military assistance early in 1435. The enemy was now Jean de Luxembourg, the man who had delivered

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[110] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 173.

[111] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 106.

[112] With the fall of La Trémoille, Constable de Richemont and Yolande d'Aragon became the king's new chief advisers.

[113] *PGRB*, 127; *Trial*, 87-88.

[114] *PGRB*, 128; *Trial*, 88-89.

Joan of Arc into English hands. Gilles half-heartedly complied, but when the troops protested that they were not being paid enough, he simply washed his hands of the entire matter. In 1435, France and Burgundy signed the Treaty of Arras by the terms of which Charles VII secured an alliance with Philip the Good. Although Philip subsequently took very little part in the war against England, his relatively neutral stand removed any immediate need to attack places like Grancey and Laon in eastern France.[115]

VI. *The Dissipation of a Great Estate*

As we have noted, the estate that came into the possession of Gilles de Rais through both inheritance and marriage, was centered in Brittany, but spilled over into the neighboring provinces of Poitou, Maine, and Anjou. Having been several centuries in the making, it ranked among the most important noble holdings in western France. During his last decade, the devil-make-care Breton nobleman who had never demonstrated much concern for his finances, managed to dissipate a sizeable portion of the family property, eventually propelling other family members into court where they tried to curb his ruinous excesses.

Increasing profligacy on the part of Gilles de Rais followed hard upon the death of Jean de Craon, the only person other than Joan who had ever exercised any control over him. Upon returning from the fighting around Lagny, Gilles found the old man upon his deathbed. Craon's demise in November, 1432, removed the last restraints on his grandson. No doubt knowing what would happen financially as soon as he was out of the way, in a last feeble gesture of disapproval, Craon refused to leave his the illustrious war hero the two things closest to a warrior's heart: his sword and his armor. He bequeathed them instead to Gilles's younger brother, René.[116]

It is ironic that at the same time Gilles was withdrawing from active military service, one of his major new expenses would be military. The young noble took on what one scholar has characterized as almost imperial trappings,[117] including a personal bodyguard of thirty knights and two hundred men-at-arms wearing his livery. Since members of this much expanded retinue received room, board, and all of their equipment, includ-

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[115] This treaty brought to a close the internal hostilities that had made Grancey and Laon necessary in eastern France; by signing it, "Charles VII of France, at heavy costs, secured the alliance of Philip the Good of Burgundy against England."

[116] *PGRB*, 120; *Trial*, 82-83.

[117] Benedetti, *Bluebeard*, 93.

ing horses, weapons, and three uniforms a year, they constituted a spectacular drain on their master's resources. It would be just one of several expenditures leading to the dissipation of the de Rais fortune.

During 1433, the year of seclusion that followed upon the fall of his cousin, La Trémoille, Gilles embarked upon his most ambitious and costly religious venture: the establishment of what he called the Chapel of the Holy Innocents. Such building projects were often undertaken by high nobles for the good of their souls; hence, at first there seems to have been little opposition to the decision. The chapel called for a staff of some thirty clerics, including choirboys, curates, archdeacons, a school-master, and a dean, all of whom Gilles appointed on his own initiative, without consulting the church authorities.[118]

Eventually, a pair of notaries was brought in from Orléans to draw up an official charter in which Gilles laid down provisions to insure the chapel's continued existence. He first called upon those closest to him, his wife and daughter, to see to its preservation. Foreseeing, however, that the cost of maintaining the chapel might lead to an attempt by his relatives to circumvent his wishes, he took the more extreme steps of arranging for Champtocé to be given to René d'Anjou, while having the remaining de Rais estates turned over to Duke Jean VI of Brittany, both of whom he called upon to underwrite the chapel. If these two noblemen failed to accomplish the task, Gilles called on the French king, the emperor, or the pope to accomplish it. As a final recourse, he placed in the line of secession the knightly orders of Saint John of Jerusalem and of Saint Lazarus.[119] After two years of construction, the Chapel of the Holy Innocents was formally incorporated in March, 1435.[120] Each time Gilles requested confirmation from Rome, Pope Eugene IV (r.1431-1447) refused. Despite this, in all likelihood, the chapter and chantry continued to pray for their munificent, and apparently devout, benefactor.

The time and money de Rais lavished upon his chapel points to a growing obsession with religion, an obsession that helps to explain his conspicuous absence from the campaign leading up to the battle at Grancey in 1434. Rather than join the forces he had recruited after having met with the king, he placed them under his brother's command, then traveled in a totally different direction, south toward Poitiers, there to be formally invested as canon of the church of Saint-Hilaire. There, he encountered

[118] Ibid., 123-24.
[119] Ibid., 131-32; Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 201.
[120] *PGRB*, 136; *Trial*, 93-94.

two choristers and was so taken by their singing that he appointed them prebendaries on the spot.[121]

Immediately after his investiture at Poitiers, Gilles undertook several journeys to Orléans, resurrecting fond memories of the exhilarating and glory-filled days he had spent there with the Maid. During these visits, he probably learned of celebrations that were being held annually on May 8 to commemorate the city's deliverance in 1429 and decided to become involved. In turn, this decision led him to produce what a number of scholars single out as the most ambitious and ruinous of his projects. In 1435, Gilles appears to have staged as part of the city of Orléans's celebration a medieval mystery play approximately 20,000 lines in length entitled the *Mistère du siège d'Orléans*.[122] While we do not know the play's exact date of composition or the name of its author or authors or even with certainty who commissioned it, overwhelming circumstantial evidence points to Gilles involvement in both its creation and presentation,[123] leading the majority of historians dealing with his career to identify him as the Maecenas who sponsored the unsurpassed festivities of 1435.[124]

The cost of staging such an elaborate medieval mystery, complete with scenery, a huge cast, and costumes, was vast. What is more, surviving records indicate that for most of the year 1435, "there was no hostelry in all Orléans which did not accommodate some of the splendid retinue of Monseigneur Gilles, Baron of Rais."[125] In the early 1970s, one historian estimated that over the course of that one year alone, he must have spent a sum that would, in the author's day, amount to over £1 million.[126] Late in 1435, in response to this latest instance of prodigality, Gilles's relatives

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[121] *PGRB*,129; *Trial*, 88.

[122] For text, performance history, and propaganda value of this 10,000 line play, see *Le Mistère du siege d'Orleans*. Ed. V.L. Hamblin (Geneva, 2002); V.L. Hamblin, "The 'Mistère du siege d'Orleans' as Representational Drama," *Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association* 42, no.1-2 (1988): 61-68; idem, "No Stone Unturned: Uncovering the Performance History of the Mistère du siege d'Orleans," *European Medieval Drama* 7 (2003): 149-58; P.S. Lewis, "War Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 15 (1965): 1-21.

[123] De Rais's long and extremely costly stay in the city throughout the celebrations, his fondness for all things theatrical, and the highly flattering portrayal he enjoys in the surviving version of the play all point to his integral involvement in the event.

[124] For example, Winwar states that Gilles came to Orléans especially to produce the play and "to enact his own role"; on the other hand, while Wolf alleges in a chapter entitled "The Theater of Blood," that "Gilles's spendthrift sponsorship in Orleans in 1435 of *The Mystery of the Siege of Orleans* was a culminating *acte gratuit* reflecting his longtime interest in theatrical presentation" [Winwar, *Saint and the Devil*, 245. Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 107].

[125] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 195.

[126] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 135.

banded together to obtain a royal interdict prohibiting him from continuing to pawn or peddle family properties to underwrite his costly pageantry.[127] Unfortunately, by the time the crown intervened by issuing its royal edict forbidding the nobleman from further alienating his French properties, most of the damage had already been done.

Despite the fact that his finances were collapsing and he faced a royal decree forbidding further alienation, Gilles de Rais stubbornly maintained his extravagant lifestyle.[128] Seeing the handwriting on the wall, some of his hangers-on left for greener pastures. While the names of some of these men are known,[129] one in particular has given rise to considerable historical speculation. Around the fall of 1435, a Jean Chartier left de Rais' household. This has led scholars to wonder if he have been the same Jean Chartier who composed a major source for the period, the *Chroniques de Charles VII*, and who later rose to the position of "principal cantor" (*grand chantre*) at the Abbey of Mareuil-en-Brie.[130]

While some of his retainers abandoned him, the many who remained still had to be paid. In a desperate attempt to recoup his wealth, the nobleman eventually resorted to the black arts. A *grimoire*, or occult manuscript, is known to have come into the baron's hands as early as 1426,[131] but with so much else to keep him occupied in the interim, he does not seem to have pursued this avenue until much later. By the mid-1430s, however, there was little else with which to pass the time of day. In addition, Gilles was often encouraged in magical pursuits by some of the clergymen in his employ; in particular Eustache Blanchet, a priest from the Saint-Malo dis-

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[127] Guéraud, "Gilles de Rais," *Biographie bretonne*, 2:683.

[128] *Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1968), q.v. "Arras, Treaty of." For conditions leading to the conclusion of the treaty, see: J.H. Munro, "An Economic Aspect of the Collapse of the Anglo-Burgundian Alliance, 1428-1442," *English Historical Review* 85, no. 335 (Apr., 1970): 225-44; Mark Warner, "Calculation and Miscalculation in Fifteenth-Century Politics: the Memoranda of Hue de Lannoy," *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 49 (2005): 105-24.

[129] For example, a Guillaume de la Jumelière abandoned Gilles in September, 1435 [Bataille, *Gilles*, 299].

[130] Vizetelly notes that Doinel first discovered Chartier's name among notarial papers concerned with Gilles's stay in Orléans. Bossard was the first to suspect that he and the chronicler might be the same. Vizetelly himself hesitates to make any positive identification [Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 407-8].

[131] Georges Bataille dates Gilles's encounter with a nobleman imprisoned on heresy charges to coincide with a visit to Angers in that year, adding, "Le chevalier possédait un manuscrit traitant des arts suspects, Gilles le lui emprunta" [*PGRB*, 79; *Trial*, 53]. Ernesto Ferrero follows suit in his biography, *Gilles de Rais, deliti e castigo di Barba-Blu* (Verona, 1975), 167. By contrast, Benedetti raises a dissenting voice, placing the encounter in 1436 [Benedetti, *Gilles*, 146].

trict, who, from 1435 onward, was employed to seek out people with a knowledge of alchemy.[132] They and others of his entourage seem to have quickly spread the word of his new interest, a fact that eventually attracted numerous charlatans attempting a magical resuscitation of his declining fortunes.

According to one author, Gilles was a particularly easy mark for the swindlers since he saw no other way to save himself financially.[133] For the next five years, he became the perfect dupe for dozens of traveling confidence men who wended their way to his door. A succession of sorcerers, conjurers, alchemists, and witches was to be found almost continually in and around his current dwelling. While some of the shady figures were French, others came from England, Germany, and Italy.[134] Such was their eagerness to profit from the marshal's new interest that two are known to have died while attempting to reach him![135]

Unfortunately for Gilles, even relatively small-scale projects such as experimentation into the transmutation of metals required funding. Apprised of his once formidable vassal's predicament, Duke Jean VI of Brittany was only too happy to be of assistance. Ignoring the interdict issued by Charles VII, he obligingly supplied Gilles with ready cash, in exchange for the choicest Rais lands, both within and outside of his duchy. Not surprisingly, the family again attempted to intervene. Early in 1437, Gilles's brother, René, and his cousin André de Lohéac (a member of the Laval branch) convinced René d'Anjou that he needed to step in on their behalf. Thereupon, René d'Anjou obtained from Jean VI the signed and sealed promise not to buy Champtocé. Jean VI swore to this upon the sacramental body of the Lord while a mass was being celebrated. Nevertheless, his solemn commitment did not stop him from discussing the terms of sale with his impecunious baron![136]

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[132] Benedetti, *Gilles*, 146-47. One of Blanchet's recruits was the infamous Francesco Prelati of Montecatini, who had been tonsured by the bishop of Arezzo [Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 125]. For his part, Antonio di Palerna was both a clerk and a member of the marshal's chantry who also served for a time as his chief alchemist [Vizetelly; *Bluebeard*, 240].

[133] Otto Krank, *Das Urbild des Blaubart* (Berlin, 1909), 72. For a similar interest in alchemy asa proposed funding source, see Wendy J. Turner London Businessmen and Alchemists Raising Money for the Hundred Years War" in this volume.

[134] For example, the Englishman Jean La Rivière (also called Jean l'Anglais) was one of the first to appear on the scene. From Germany came Thomas Onafrasimus and from Italy, Antonio di Palerna.

[135] According to Benedetti, "One was drowned on his way to the castle and another died almost immediately upon arrival" [Benedetti, *Gilles*, 148].

[136] Bourdeaut, *Chantocé*, 98.

To circumvent a feudal ban on purchasing property from one's own vassal, Jean VI simply had the paperwork made out either in the name of other people, including his sons, his treasurer, Geoffrey le Ferrron, or one of many other officials in his employ, including the chancellor of Brittany, Bishop Jean de Malestroit of Nantes. These shady practices would eventually lead to a clash with the impetuous Gilles de Rais, a clash leading directly to his spectacular trial.[137] In a final attempt to disguise his selfish designs beneath a cloak of friendship, Jean VI actually appointed Gilles lieutenant-general of Brittany in November, 1437, claiming that there was a Laval plot afoot against him, thus justifying the dismissal of the former lieutenant-general, André de Laval-Lohéac, who was one of those lobbying against the alienations.[138]

In the final analysis, family efforts to curb the self-destructive prodigality of its most famous member failed. The ruinous excesses of Gilles de Rais continued largely unabated until the end. As a result, not only did he bring about his own ruin, he also helped bring about the eclipse of his house.

One early twentieth century author who wrote about the Breton noble, Dr. Otto Krack, has advanced an interesting theory concerning the conspicuous extravagance of his later years. Krack argues that it was motivated not only by vanity and a growing religious obsession on his part, but by a need to distract public attention from his far more sinister activities. Gilles de Rais did not just want to dazzle people, he had to do so. In standing out so prominently, he was simply demonstrating the legerdemain of a magician, revealing one side of himself in order to conceal the other.[139]

VII. *The Crimes of Gilles de Rais*

While the prodigality of Gilles de Rais would ultimately alienate him from his family, it would be the spectacular crimes of which he was accused that would lead to his trial and execution during the autumn of 1440. Certain aspects of the judicial proceedings have inspired some scholars over the centuries, starting with Voltaire, to adopt a revisionist position concerning his guilt, several of them arguing that he was actually a victim of political

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[137] It was would be the Bishop who eventually took over Champtocé in the Duke's name apparently only days after Gilles and his men had hurriedly removed an incriminating pile of bones [Benedetti, *Gilles*, 142-43, 161].

[138] *PGRB*, 147; *Trial*, 102.

[139] Krack, *Urbild*, 55-56.

intrigue.[140] On the other hand, the seemingly overwhelming evidence against him has convinced most who have studied the case closely to agree with the court that the Breton nobleman was one of the most prolific serial killers in history, a man who tortured and then did away with scores of children brought to him by a coterie of procurers, several of whom accompanied him to the gibbet.[141]

In the detailed trial records of 1440, Gilles is described as having spontaneously confessed to having committed many terrible crimes against God and his commandments starting as early as his youth when he began to do whatever pleased him and indulging in every possible illicit act.[142] And while modern scholarship has come to suspect some of the "spontaneous testimony" given during inquisitorial proceedings like that of Gilles de Rais, so many other witnesses spoke out against him that it seems impossible to discount all of their testimony. George Bataille alludes to over seventy-five who came forward, while others place the number higher than a hundred.[143]

The forty-nine point indictment against the nobleman puts the number of his victims at roughly 140, an estimate based on the testimony of those who actually did come forward to bear witness against him.[144] There seems to be little doubt that the number would have been greater if anyone had spoken up on behalf of the war orphans, street urchins, and runaways who also flocked to Gilles's castles in search of alms.

Even members of de Rais's own family do not seem to have enjoyed immunity. During the fighting around Lagny in 1432, Michel de Sillé, a relative of Gilles and one of his lieutenants, was captured by the English.

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140 Exoneration efforts began with Voltaire in his *Essai sur les moeurs e l'esprit des nations* (1756; reprint, Paris, 1962). These were hesitantly pursued by historians Gabriel Monod and Charles Bémont, *Histoire de l'Europe et en particulier de la France* (Paris, 1891). Since Reinach, this movement has gained some momentum in scholarship and, to a greater extent, in fiction.. See, for example, Charles Langlois, *Notice sur Noël Valois* (Paris, 1918) ; Fernand Fleuret, *Le Procès inquisitorial de Gilles de Rais ... avec un essai de réhabilitation* (Paris,1921).

141 Para-psychologist Georges Meunier speaks for a number of scholars when he says that what is most responsible for the vices and crimes of de Rais is the education he received, or rather the education he did not receive [Meunier, *Gilles de Rais*, 84].

142 *PGRB*, 284-85; *Trial*, 195; *Laughter*, 113.

143 See note 20 for Bataille's list of witnesses. Salomon Reinach, "Gilles de Rais," *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* 9 (Dec. 1904): 170.

144 For the complete transcript of the indictment, see Pierre Klossowski's modern French translation of the *Acte d'Accusation*, "Comptes rendus des audiences," in *PGRB*, 232-62; *Trial*, 159-80; *Laughter*, 41-63. For the estimated number of victims, see *PGRB*, 233-36; *Trial*, 160-62; *Laughter*, 42-45.

It took several years before he was ransomed[145] and, in the meantime, his commander appears to have taken grisly advantage of his absence. In testimony supplied during the trial, Michel's widow, Jeanne Édelin, told of having lost her eight-year-old son at just about the time of her husband's captivity some eight years earlier. Shortly before the boy's disappearance, two other children in the Machecoul region had also gone missing. Fifteen days later, yet another had disappeared.[146]

Article twenty-seven of the indictment alleges that the accused had embarked upon his spectacular career as a child-murderer beginning as early as 1426. On the other hand, Gilles himself stated that he never actually committed infanticide until 1432, the year in which his grandfather died.[147] Since he eventually accepted full blame for his crimes, there is no particular reason to doubt his testimony on this point.[148]

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Étienne Corrillaut—alias "Poitou"—one of two co-defendants who accompanied Gilles to the gallows, first entered his household around 1427.[149] Nor was this the earliest point at which the young noble came in contact with those who would later be implicated in his crimes. His cousin, Gilles de Sillé, the accused procurer who vanished just days before Gilles' arrest, may have become attached to the family as early as 1420, when de Rais's grandfather, Jean de Craon, married Anne de Sillé and de Rais himself was still in his teens.[150] Another early arrival on the scene who seems to have encouraged Gilles's criminal tendencies without apparent compunction was Roger de Bricqueville, another cousin who was taken in at Champtocé when his family's Norman lands fell into English hands during the conquest of the

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145 In dealing with the year 1436, Benedetti states that by that time Michel de Sillé had "finally been ransomed"[Benedetti, *Gilles*, 138].

146 The testimony appears in *PGRB*, 373-74, *Trial*, 260; *Laughter*, 135-36. One story circulating at the time may have been concocted in an attempt to account for the disappearances. According to this tale that Henry Charles Lea mentions in his *History of the Inquisition*, Michel de Sillé, while still a prisoner of the English, had promised to turn over to his captors as part of his ransom twenty-four young boys who would then serve as pages. When that number had been reached, the disappearances would cease. Benedetti and others see the whole tale as a cover-up for the kidnappings being carried out by Gilles de Sillé [Henry Charles Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, 3 vols. (New York, 1904), 3:475; Benedetti, *Gilles*, 118].

147 *PGRB*, 254-55; *Trial*, 174-75; *Laughter*, 57-58.

148 *PGRB*, 258; *Trial*, 177; *Laughter*, 60.

149 *PGRB*, 112; *Trial*, 76.

150 Benedetti, *Gilles de Rais*, 198.

duchy. He became Gilles's associate and "wild friend" (*âme damnée*) as soon as he was able "to ride a horse and do service."[151]

In all fairness to Gilles and his defenders (whose numbers are, understandably, few), there is a very real possibility that he was not acting alone when he began to take pleasure in sadism. Both Bricqueville and Sillé had been implicated in the nobleman's crimes for far longer than either of the two men who accompanied him to the gallows. In his deposition, Henri Griart, alias "Henriet," who became the other accomplice to die with Gilles, states that while his master would sometimes cut the victim's throat, on other occasions, he himself, accompanied by Poitou and Gilles de Sillé, would undertake the deed.[152] As for Bricqueville, he is reputed to have "scoured the countryside for lovely children."[153] According to witnesses, Bricqueville would sometimes be accompanied in this search by Sillé and both men would show a decided indifference when parents begged to know why their son had not returned from a previous "errand."[154]

In addition to the male band of "receivers" (*empocheurs*),[155] with which he surrounded himself, the Sieur de Rais made use of an equally heartless team of kidnapping women. One of these, Perrine Martin, bore such nicknames as "La Peliczonne," "La Fée de Tiffauges," and especially "La Meffraie," this last being the name under which she too has become legendary.[156] About the other, Étiennette Blanchu, sometimes called Théophanie, virtually nothing is known except her names.[157]

The ease, even joviality, with which Gilles's retainers accepted their roles comes through in the testimony of Ysabeau Hamelin. On or about Christmas day, 1439, she sent two of her boys, aged seven and fifteen, to buy bread at Machecoul. The boys never returned. However, the next day, two of Gilles's

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[151] The characterization of de Bricqueville is that of Vizetelly who quotes the royal letters of pardon issued to the former accomplice a number of years after the trial [Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 266].

[152] "Comptes rendus des dernières journées," *PGRB*, 338-39; *Trial*, 234; *Laughter*, 92-93.

[153] Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 153.

[154] Ibid., 137. In his doctoral dissertation, the Abbé Bossard states categorically that Roger de Bricqueville was aware of everything concerning the crimes of Gilles de Rais and took part in a fair share of them. Interestingly, a large part of the material on which Bossard based his work had previously been presented to the Ministère de l'Instruction Publique by René de Maulde for inclusion in a historical series, but had been rejected in a fit of puritanical outrage [Bossard, *Gilles*, 204].

[155] Vizetelly indicates that as late as the mid-nineteenth century, this name "was only spoken with dread by the peasantry around Nantes, who ranked those robbers of children with the gnomes, the malignant sorcerers, and the werewolves" [Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 278].

[156] Lemire, *Maréchal*, 32.

[157] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 276.

men had come to her home asking strange questions that displayed an untoward knowledge of her affairs. One of them looked inside and seeing a son and daughter, asked if they were her only children. She replied that there were two more, but did not mention their recent disappearance. When the men turned to leave, she overheard one casually remark to the other that "two had come from that house."[158]

At least some of the child murders seem to have been tied directly to Gilles's involvement in the black arts. In May, 1439, an Italian named Francesco Prelati arrived at Tiffauges.[159] He had been recruited by Blanchet who had gone all the way to Florence for the purpose.[160] Gilles would never recover from the spell cast by this would-be magician. Even during the ecclesiastical trial, after Prelati had testified against him, he addressed his former accomplice in words so moving that the court reporter chose to leave them in Old French rather than transcribe them into the Latin of the official transcript.

> Farewell, my friend Francesco! Never again will we see each other in this world; I pray that God will give you suitable patience and hope in God that we shall see each other in the great joy of paradise! Pray to God for me and I shall pray for you.[161]

Ironically, it was Prelati who appears to have encouraged Gilles to become involved in diabolical sacrifices, leading to the death of a number of victims; yet he escaped punishment while Gilles went to the gallows. One historian sums up the relationship as follows: the handsome young Tuscan "was clever and entirely without scruple and it did not take him long to establish a complete ascendancy, both intellectual, and, one suspects, sexual, over his new master."[162]

Occult experiments by the pair aimed at repairing the nobleman's finances began almost immediately. Even a fairly skeptical co-conspirator like Blanchet appears to have taken the whole thing seriously. Prelati attempted to invoke in particular the aid of one demon whom he called Barron. It is interesting to note that this creature had the same name as one of the places where Gilles de Rais had successfully battled the

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[158] "Enquête des commissaires du Duc de Bretagne," in *PGRB*, 377-78; *Trial*, 263; *Laughter*, 138-39.

[159] *PGRB*, 157; *Trial*, 112-13. Prelati was one of the pair who had visited Isabeau Hamelin's home.

[160] Wolf, *Bluebeard*, 125.

[161] Ibid., 270.

[162] A number of modern writers have shared Gilles's fascination with this seemingly hypnotic personality [Benedetti, *Bluebeard*, 151].

English. The Italian would later claim that Barron had been a familiar of his for quite some time, even though he was never able to conjure him up while his employer was present. Despite this, he convinced Gilles that the demon would eventually reveal himself and get on with the business of replenishing the de Rais coffers if only Gilles would give him several body parts belonging to children "whereupon this same Gilles gave Francesco "the hand, heart and eyes of a young boy so they might be offered to the devil on his behalf."[163] After having provided a ritual motive for the crimes, it seems incredible that Prelati, who must also have been aware for some time of what Gilles had been up to during those nightly sessions in his chambers, could have been set free at the conclusion of the trial, yet he was.

While it was never demonstrated that Gilles and Prelati had killed a child to sacrifice to the devil, when the two were jointly questioned in the judges' chambers, their intention to do so was unmistakable.

> With others present, Francesco and the accused were interrogated together by the aforementioned lord bishop of Saint-Brieuc concerning the invocation of demons and the oblation of the blood and body parts of young children, concerning which Gilles and Francesco had just confessed .... Francesco replied [to the interrogation] that he had performed several demonic invocations, specifically addressing one named Barron, under orders from the accused, he being both absent and present. The accused said he was present at two or three invocations, especially at Tiffauges and Bourgneuf-en-Rais, but he said he had never seen or heard any demon. However, as both stated, the accused had conveyed a promissory contract, written and signed in his hand, to Barron via Francesco, according to which the accused surrendered himself to Barron and his rule, and promised to obey his commands, excluding the loss of his soul or his life. In addition, the accused had promised Barron the hand, eyes, and heart of a child, which he said he had had Francesco present to the demon, but based on what the accused and Francesco had fully declared in their recent confession, Francesco did not convey them.[164]

Apparently, Gilles took some pains to conceal his activities from the outside world, at least from those sectors of society that might prove dangerous to him. In this, he was aided by a small group of initiates, two of whom shared the nobleman's fate while others who escaped execution are generally believed to have participated in the bloody rituals. For example, during the ecclesiastical trial, the court heard evidence concerning the hasty removal of the remains of some forty children from the castle of Machecoul

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163 "Dépositions des témoins,"*PGRB*, 308-9; *Trial*, 212-13; *Laughter*, 72.

164 *PGRB*, 282; *Trial*, 194; *Laughter*, 111.

by Gilles de Sillé and another of Gilles's accomplices, Robin Romulart. The clean-up was undertaken in October, 1437, just prior to the arrival of other members of the family. Poitou told the justices that he believed his master, aided by Gilles de Sillé and Roger de Briqueville, had killed the children before he himself had arrived on the scene.

On another occasion, probably near the end of 1439, not long after Prelati's arrival on the scene, the "initiates" were again interrupted by an unwelcome guest, in this instance, the dauphin and future king, Louis XI (r.1461-1483).[165] Louis's visit may have had to do with the *Grande Ordonnance* of November 2, 1439 that prohibited any future brigandage by marauding mercenaries like those regularly employed by Gilles. The *Ordonnance* that more or less reserved military recruitment as a crown prerogative was designed to help do away with the private armies raised by great nobles.[166] In his trial testimony, Gilles tells how the results he believed he had been achieving in the art of alchemy were upset by the prince's arrival: ovens he had constructed at Tiffauges had to be destroyed before Louis entered the castle.[167] It was not long thereafter that Gilles transferred his residence to Machecoul, which lay in Brittany, safely outside of Valois territory.

The question naturally arises: was Gilles de Rais insane? His contemporaries did not seem to think so. Several modern scholars have pointed out that in the surviving written accounts, Gilles was portrayed as a strong, healthy individual who exhibited (at least publicly) no unusual mental quirks. In an age when writers often included in their accounts rumors of all sorts, there appears to have been no suggestion of madness.[168] From a modern perspective, Gilles' careful attempts to hide the evidence suggests that he was not insane in the legal sense of not knowing right from wrong. He realized full well that he had done wrong and that it needed to be concealed. The records also show that as his crimes grew in number, so did his endowments to churches and other religious causes, another indication that he was trying to expiate his guilt.

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[165] There is some debate over the precise date of this visit since Gilles does not specify when the royal intrusion occurred in his trial statement of October 15, 1440. For his part, Vizetelly alleges that the Dauphin never came "within easy distance of Tiffauges until December, 1439" [Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 244].

[166] Jean Pesez, "Supplément," in Bataille, *Gilles*, 292.

[167] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 269-69; *Trial*, 182-83; *Laughter*, 66.

[168] *PGRB*, 224; *Trial*, 147; Krack, *Urbild*, 187-89.

VII. *Trial and Execution*

On May 15, 1440, the last and one of the most spectacular chapters in the short, but highly eventful career of Gilles de Rais began, appropriately enough, with a kidnapping. In a fit of anger, Gilles seized a priest named Jean Le Ferron, while the latter was performing mass. After threatening Ferron's life, he had him imprisoned, first within Brittany, later in his castle of Taffauges, in a neighboring French province.

If we accept the testimony of Gilles de Rais, by the time this incident occurred, his murderous rampage against children had been going on for nearly eight years. If, on the other hand, the indictment was accurate in dating his earliest murders as far back as 1426, then he had actually been at it for fourteen years. Either way, it was a long period during which scores of children had been kidnapped and carried off into the nobleman's private hell. And while Gilles had made an effort to clean up after himself, his doings were known to quite a few and suspected by many others. What, then, accounted for the long delay before authorities finally acted against the man who may be one of history's most prolific serial killers?

There were several reasons for the delay. For one thing, the killer's peripatetic lifestyle helped disguise his activities. The baron's mobility made it less likely that "lucky" boys entering his service would be missed by their kin, who would assume that the boys were serving their new master in one of his many other holdings. This happened in the case of Peronnen Loessart. Although at first she resisted the recruiting efforts of Poitou, promises of an education for her ten-year-old son and 100 sous for herself to buy a new dress persuaded her to turn over the boy. At the time, she believed that her son was beginning a career as a page in the household of a great war hero. Only much later did she learn the truth.[169]

More important was the fact that Gilles de Rais was a wealthy and powerful noble while most of his victims were the children of commoners. (In this respect, Michel de Sillé's son was the exception.) It was an age characterized by sudden and early death, as war and disease stalked the land. More than half of the children born probably did not reach adulthood. And while this was true for medieval people in general, it was especially the case with those lower on the social ladder, whose lives were considered to be of lesser value. The attitudes of the day toward death and class had much to do with a society's failure for many years to prosecute the crimes of one

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[169] Later, Poitou delivered only 80 *sous*, and Peronne never again saw either him or her son [*PGRB*, 363-64; *Trial*, 253-54; *Laughter*, 129-30].

of its leading members, however horrendous those crimes might be. It helps explain why, despite the "public and frequent rumors" (*rumeur publique et fréquente*) telling of multiple kidnappings in the region, Bishop Jean de Malestroit did not feel obliged to issue his *Declaration d'infamie* against Gilles until July, 1440, two months after the latest kidnapping.[170]

At long last, the nobleman had committed an offense calculated to rouse the authorities and begin the wheels of justice turning. For this time, the victim had powerful supporters. Gilles had already learned what could happen if he moved against someone prominent. In May, 1436, he had suddenly seized Michel de Fontenay—one of the men his father had unsuccessfully appointed to be his guardian—and removed him from Angers to the dungeons of Champtocé. Eventually, however, protestations by the bishop and officials of the university forced Gilles to back down and release his prisoner.[171]

In 1439, considerably more powerful forces were backing his victim. The brother of the kidnapped priest was Geoffroy Le Ferron, treasurer to the duke of Brittany. Not only that, but the motives for the kidnapping touched the duke himself. For years, Gilles had been selling off family properties, often receiving much less for them than their actual value or in some cases never receiving full payment at all. In 1438, Duke Jean VI had acquired the property of Saint-Etienne-de-Mer-Morte from his vassal, using his treasurer, Ferron, as a front man to accomplish the transaction. Apparently, the purchasers failed to pay Gilles what they owed him, though they began to collect dues from his former subjects.[172] Ruing his decision to sell, and angry at the parties involved, Gilles rounded up a band of sixty men-at-arms and marched on Saint-Etienne. They arrived in the middle of a mass being celebrated by Jean Le Ferron. Taking no notice of this, Gilles charged into the sanctuary calling the priest a rascal, accusing him of beating his former vassals and illegally extorting money from them. He threatened to kill Ferron on the spot if he refused to come out of the church.[173] The priest promptly fell to his knees in terror and was whisked away to the castle dunjon, later to be transferred to Tiffauges. It was this childish caper which proved to be the marshal's downfall.

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170 "Actes préliminaires," Ibid., 227-38; *Trial*,155-56; *Laughter*, 39-40.

171 *PGRB*, 142-43; *Trial*, 99.

172 Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 315; Claude Bertin, *Les Assassins hors-série: Gilles de Rais. Petiot* (Paris, 1967), 15.

173 "Testimony of Marquis Lenano de Ceva," *PGRB*, 351-52; *Trial*, 242-43; *Laughter*, 101-2.

By this one act, de Rais had violated the rights of both the Church and the duke, for by marching on Saint-Etienne, Gilles had in effect levied troops against his liege lord. Since the priest was being held on French soil, Jean V appealed to his own brother, Constable de Richemont, thus effectively bringing in the French authorities.[174] No one, not even the fiery war hero, could hope to escape from the wrath of that many important enemies.

The trial of Gilles de Rais opened on September 19, 1440. Bringing such a powerful figure into a court of law, however strong the case against him, was always a delicate matter. According to one scholar, the authorities opened the prosecution in the ecclesiastical court, drawing the accused into inquisitorial proceedings where he would sacrifice his right to counsel.[175] At first almost little or no mention was made of the civil charges that involved kidnapping and infanticide. According to the court's opening statement:

> My lord Gilles, knight and baron, did declare, after having several accusations made against him by the prosecution—including that he had admitted to doctrinal heresy—that he wanted to appear personally before the reverend Lord Bishop of Nantes, and before any other ecclesiastical judges, as well as any inquisitors of heresy to purge himself of such accusations. At which time the reverend bishop set and assigned to my lord Gilles, aforesaid knight and baron, with his consent, the twenty-eighth of said month to appear before the reverend friar Jean Blouyn, vicar of the inquisitor in matters of heresy for the kingdom, to answer for the crimes and wrongdoings of which he is accused.[176]

However, nine days later, when the case actually came to trial, what had begun as a heresy proceeding immediately broadened out to include so many non-religious offenses that a civil case was opened to run concurrently with the ecclesiastical one. Grieving parents and relatives, all of whom had lost children under circumstances that cast suspicion on de Rais came forward and told their stories. The civil proceedings, which took place largely in the absence of the accused, ran only until October 8. The ecclesiastical trial lasted slightly longer, concluding on October 25.[177]

Despite an initial display of confidence on Gilles's part, it did not take long for him to realize that his accusers were deadly serious in their desire to bring him down. At first, he reacted defiantly, refusing to answer any

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[174] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 319.
[175] Reinach,"Gilles de Rais," 167
[176] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 232-33; *Trial*, 159; *Laughter*, 42.
[177] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 234-302; *Trial*, 159-208; *Laughter*, 42-68.

questions and claiming that the clerics on the bench had no right to sit in judgment of him. At one point, on October 13, he unabashedly insulted them, claiming that all of them, including the bishop of Nantes and Friar Jean Blouyn, the inquisitor's vicar, were scoundrels guilty of simony and that he, Gilles de Rais, would rather be hanged than answer to such clerics. The outburst led a few moments later to a peremptory excommunication.[178]

Two days later, for whatever reason, he returned to court a changed man. Gone was the defiance. Not only did he no longer protest the charges being levied against him, he began make self-incriminating admissions on his own. Toward the end of that extraordinary session, he actually fell to his knees and implored his judges to lift his excommunication. They were apparently enough moved by his change of heart to lift the ban.[179] Just what accounted for the baron's about-face remains a mystery. One modern authority believes that Gilles was tortured, though no evidence survives of anything more than a threat of torture.[180] Perhaps the court's excommunication had its desired effect upon a man who had become increasingly obsessed with religion during the preceding half-dozen years. For all intents and purposes, it was at that moment that the case was lost.

Ultimately, both courts handed down guilty verdicts. The ecclesiastical court found Gilles guilty of heresy (invoking the devil), sodomy, and violating church immunity (the Saint-Étienne incident). The civil court convicted him both of kidnapping and torture and of raising armed forces without the duke's permission.[181] In the case of the ecclesiastical court, punishment amounted to two more excommunications both of which were also lifted when the accused admitted his errors and expressed contrition.[182] By contrast, the civil authorities fined Gilles 50,000 crowns (payable to the duke), and ordered him hanged until dead in a public place, following which his body was to be incinerated and the ashes scattered.[183] Also found guilty and given a similar sentence were his two co-defendants, Henriet and Poitou. While certain anomolies in the court record have led some scholars

[178] Guéraud, "Rais (Gilles, Baron de)," *Biographie bretonne*, *p.* 685, col. 2, n. .l.

[179] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 264-65; *Trial*, 181; *Laughter*, 64-65.

[180] Fleuret believes that Gilles was actually subjected to torture, basing his argument on the fact that the confession he gave "in chambers" contains many of the formulae customarily found in torture chamber confessions. For his part, Lea argues that that in order to obtain more accusations, the authorities used torture against potential witnesses [Fleuret, *De Gilles*, 67; Lea, *History of the Inquisition*, 3:480].

[181] Meunier, *Gilles*, 173.

[182] "Comptes rendus des audiences," *PGRB*, 300-2; *Trial*, 207-8; *Laughter*, 124-25.

[183] *PGRB*, 405-8; *Trial*, 282-84; *Laughter*, 150-52.

to question the verdicts handed down against Gilles de Rais, they are in the minority.[184] By contrast, a considerable majority of those who have closely studied the case agree with the findings of the court that the accused was indeed a serial killer responsible for the deaths of scores of children.

Gilles accepted his sentence with resignation. According to the civil record, while affirming regret and contrition for his misdeeds, he also stated his belief that man could commit no sin so great that God, in his goodness and benevolence, would not forgive it, provided of course that the sinner be truly sorry and beg for forgiveness.[185] Learning that Henriet and Poitou had also been condemned to die, he requested that he be allowed to precede them to the gallows so that they would not die thinking that the man who was the cause of their misfortunes could have somehow survived. He also begged that he be allowed to comfort them and speak to them of salvation in the hour of their death.[186]

This show of loyalty and contrition so moved Pierre de l'Hospital, president of the civil court, that he amended Gilles's sentence: it now provided that the corpse would only be "singed" after hanging, permitting what remained to be interred in the sanctuary of Gilles's choosing.[187] De l'Hospital also conveyed a request the condemned man directed at the bishop: that to the bishop that a city-wide procession follow the three men to the gallows so that their hope for salvation might be bolstered by the prayers of their fellow men.

The bishop granted his request and so, on his last day on earth, Gilles de Rais managed to orchestrate yet another spectacle with himself as the main attraction. Not only did he succeed in mollifying the judges who had condemned him, he even managed to win a measure of forgiveness from some of the people who had suffered at his hands. Despite the fact that numerous witnesses had stepped forward with incriminating, often heart-rending evidence against him, after hearing mass, the population of Nantes came out into the streets to form a solemn procession that would escort the three men to their place of execution. Amidst prayers and chanting, this multitude wound its way through the streets and across bridges spanning the two arms of the Loire. All the while, the marshal continued pray-

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[184] Wyndham Lewis credits Gabriel Monod with first pointing out some equivocal passages of the proceedings in his 1891 study of medieval history [Wyndham Lewis, *Soul*, 189].

[185] "Comptes rendus des dernières journées," *PGRB*, 408; *Trial*, 284; *Laughter*, 155.

[186] *PGRB*, 410; *Trial*, 185; *Laughter*, 156.

[187] Ibid.

ing to God, the Virgin, and the saints, while exhorting his companions to have faith in divine mercy and die bravely.[188]

Gilles's remains were interred with great pomp in the Carmelite church of Nantes, where they remained until this sanctuary was partially destroyed during the French Revolution. [189] Some years later, his daughter Marie—described by some contemporaries as a near saint—erected an expiatory monument on the site of the gallows. It is known to have stood beside the Nantes Hôtel Dieu as late as 1837. Ironically, with time the monument became a shrine to "La Bonne Vierge de Crée-Lait"; in other words, a spot where nursing mothers would come to pray for abundant milk.[190] When Vizetelly visited Nantes around the turn of the twentieth century, only fragments of the monument could still be seen in the city's Archeological Museum.

One final irony, so typically medieval, accompanied the death of Gilles de Rais: such was the impression created by the child murderer's show of repentance and acceptance of his fate that parents all across the diocese embarked on a three-day fast. To be certain that the baron's misdeeds would be suitably impressed upon the children of Nantes, the townspeople whipped their offspring until the blood flowed! Documentation exists showing that this custom continued until well into the sixteenth century.[191]

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[188] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 366-67.
[189] *PGRB*, 193; *Trial*, 138.
[190] Vizetelly, *Bluebeard*, 366, 382.
[191] Krack, *Unbild*, 216-17.



Map 8. Gilles de Rais's French Possessions.

Fig. 5. Idealized portrait of Gilles de Rais.



Fig. 6. Trial of Gilles de Rais.

PART THREE

THE WAR'S EFFECT ON ENGLISH REGIONS

WAR, CRISIS, AND EAST ANGLIA, 1334-1340: TOWARDS A REASSESSMENT[1]

Daniel P. Franke

I. *Introduction*

The purpose of this article is to provide some analysis of the English war effort for the period 1334-1340, in order to better contextualize the famous governmental crisis of Edward III (r.1327-1377) and the criticisms often leveled at his management of the conflict.[2] The political and social aspects of the crisis of 1339-1341 have been well studied, whether through the parliamentary negotiations and personalities involved, or through the complaints made in Parliament or the Patent Rolls concerning purveyance, military service, and the abuses committed by royal officials.[3] However, the actual records of Edward's Scottish and French campaigns have seldom been used in the discussion, though they in point of fact offer considerable scope for corroborating, challenging, or otherwise contextualizing our view concerning three aspects of the crisis: logistics, naval service, and personnel. As I suggest below, changes in the scale and methods of purveyance (the forced "sale" of goods for the royal household or army) were not as

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[1] I would like to thank Richard W. Kaeuper, Clifford J. Rogers, Peter W. Sposato, and Christopher Guyol for their encouragement and critiques of this paper, which is part of a larger study I am currently conducting on the impacts of warfare on English society in the fourteenth century.

[2] The best overviews of this period are Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War I: Trial by Battle* (Philadelphia, 1990), Clifford J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), and for logistics and the "home front"; H.J. Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III* (Manchester, 1966).

[3] The classic study remains G.L. Harriss, *King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369* (Oxford, 1975); see also J.R. Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341*, *Past and Present* Supplement 1 (Oxford, 1975); E.B. Fryde,"Parliament and the French War, 1336-40," in *Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance* (London, 1983), 915-35; W.N. Bryant, "The Financial Dealings of Edward III with the County Communities, 1330-1360," *The English Historical Review* [hereafter *EHR*], 83, no. 329 (Oct., 1968): 760-71. For a recent excellent article purveyance (and one that has informed my analysis of the military records considered here), see Ilana Krug, "Purveyance and Peasants at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War: Maddicott Reexamined," in *The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 345-65.

important as the individual character of those doing the collecting. Furthermore, the financial burdens of the war, while certainly greatly exacerbated by the king's manipulation of the wool staple, were due in large part to the type of war in which England found itself: after 1336, it was a war against a larger and better-prepared opponent. It was Edward's somewhat bewildered attempts to organize an all-encompassing conflict of this type, rather than any mistakes in respect to his economic and "human resources" policies, that eventually precipitated the famous crisis. This article will suggest certain ways in which these problems developed on a regional level.[4]

After his dramatic coup against Queen Isabella and Roger Mortimer in 1330, Edward III rode a popular tide of relief and good will for nearly ten years.[5] Despite this, following his declaration that he would "henceforth govern his people according to right and reason, as befits his royal dignity," he had less political capital than it appeared. What is more, that capital was completely used up in a tidal wave of taxation and purveyance between 1336 and 1341.[6] Indeed, as J.R. Maddicott has argued, "in these six years the weight of taxation may have been greater than at any other time in the middle ages, greater even than in the years preceding the revolt of 1381."[7] In his classic study on royal finance, G.L. Harriss wrote that the Commons had readily supported Edward III's first French campaigns, in good part because "England had been conditioned to a state of emergency by the Scottish war but had not been exhausted by burdensome or widely unpopular levies."[8] This, of course, quickly changed as the full demands of the

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[4] This article generally avoids the contentious word "community," as there has been a backlash against the word for some time among social historians. See Christine Carpenter, "Gentry and Community in Medieval England," *The Journal of British Studies* [hereafter *JBS*] 33, no. 4 (Oct., 1994): 340-80. Be that as it may, when it comes to warfare, repeated association in common activities seems to breed a shared sense of belonging, as Andrew Ayton explores in his excellent article "Armies and Military Communities in Fourteenth-Century England, in *Soldiers, Nobles, and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen*, ed. Peter Coss and Christopher Tyerman (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2009), 215-239. I explore the concept of "community" in my larger study.

[5] For an excellent account of the coup, see Caroline Shenton, "Edward III and the Coup of 1330," in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J.S. Bothwell (York, 2001), 13-34.

[6] See W.M. Ormrod, *The Reign of Edward III* (New Haven, Conn., 1990), 6-7, 95-102 (chap. 6). Studies of the distribution of royal favors and patronage include Scott Waugh's *Lordship of the Realm* (Princeton, 1988) and J.S. Bothwell, *Edward III and the English Peerage: Royal Patronage, Social Mobility and Political Control in Fourteenth-Century England* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2004).

[7] Maddicott, *English Peasantry*, 45.

[8] Harriss, *King, Parliament, and Public Finance*, 235.

Cambrai-Thiérache campaigns were literally brought home by repeated and heavy exactions and unscrupulous collectors. The result was widespread discontent throughout England, culminating in the Commons' posing to Edward heavy conditions in return for their continued support. Edward's sudden return in February, 1340, to re-negotiate the support of English magnates and the Parliament and to "clean house," led to bitter confrontations with his chancellor, Archbishop Stratford, his peers, and with the Commons, who successfully persuaded the king to cancel all purveyance commissions and investigate the officials responsible. The overall result was an exposé of corruption and war-profiteering at nearly every level of English government.[9]

To what extent can this corruption and destabilization be verified in English military sources? From the amount and frequency of supply requisitions, is it possible to substantiate Parliamentary complaints and subsequent inquests? From the patterns of naval service, how might we gauge the merchant class's support of the "new" French war? From details of military service and the social dynamics of the military elite, can we determine how East Anglian society was affected by royal policy? Surviving evidence suggests an answer that is considerably more complicated than would follow from a straightforward acceptance of the standard narrative, a narrative that takes very much at face value complaints about the deleterious effects of royal policy. In the answer to these three questions lies a more nuanced story, one which underscores the lack of uniformity of outcome in royal policies—despite a uniformity of administrative method.

My general focus is East Anglia, in particular, the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk. The region of East Anglia, located on the eastern coast of England facing the North Sea, was settled by the Angles in the fifth century and conquered by the Danes in the ninth. From the tenth century onward, it remained a rich and productive earldom. Its principal counties, Norfolk and Suffolk, both bordered the North Sea.[10] The geographic situation of

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[9] See Ormrod, *Reign*, 10-17, 81-86 (on John Stratford), and 105-9. Also important are G.L. Harriss, "The Commons' Petitions of 1340," *EHR* 78, no. 309 (Oct., 1963): 625-54; and W.R. Jones, "Rex et Ministri: English Local Government and the Crisis of 1341," *JBS*, 13, no. 1 (Nov., 1973): 1-20. For a survey of Parliamentary legislation and the topics of political debate that provide the context in which logistics and the economic effects of war would have been discussed, see W.M. Ormrod, "Agenda for Legislation, 1322-c.1340," *EHR*, 105, no. 414 (Jan., 1990): 1-33.

[10] *The Houghton Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World* (Boston, 1997), 111; N.J. Pounds, *An Historical Geography of Europe* (Cambridge, 1990), 234; C.T. Smith, *An Historical Geography of Western Europe before 1800* (New York, 1967), 156.

these two counties particularly exposed them to changes in royal policy, both of the innovative and (if the word may be used) the "oppressive" variety. Their logistical support for the Scottish wars allows us to test the amount, the variety, and the frequency with which victuals were levied for Edward's wars, and to suggest patterns. Surviving East Anglian logistics records for this period show a general stability in the amount of goods purveyed, and details of their collection do not always support the type of negative change associated with purveyance during the period. Records of East Anglian naval service allow us to gauge more fully the effects of the crown's military reorientation from Scotland to France, thereby giving us a window into not only the demands but also the opportunities offered by the French war. Finally, the military service and experience of both the elites and the population at large can demonstrate the reception of royal policies, and also more clearly show what was at stake in regional politics due to these policies. Thus the experience of Norfolk and Suffolk holds great potential for testing and revising the English experience outside the normal channels of judicial and parliamentary records.

II. *The War Effort 1334-1340*

Before launching into these points of analysis, however, it is useful to give an overview of English military affairs from 1334 to 1340, both as a way of providing background and of emphasizing certain features of Edward's military administration after the battle of Halidon Hill in 1333. Laurence Minot, and the realm of England generally, may perhaps be forgiven for indulging in the euphoria of victory after that struggle:

> The Scottes now all wide will sprede, for thai have failed of thaire pray. Now er thai dare and all for drede / that war before so stout and gay.[11]

It was not the first time, and would not be the last, that a major English victory would raise false hopes of a speedy and permanent end to war. Within a year of Halidon Hill, the kingdom of England found itself mobilized once again. The resurgence of the Bruce party and the capture or defection of Edward Balliol's supporters in the autumn of 1334 made a new

[11] *The Poems of Laurence Minot*, ed. Richard H. Osberg (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1996), 34 (poem I, ll. 37-40). Minot's anti-Scottish verse might reasonably be taken as symptomatic of larger English attitudes. For an analysis of Minot as nationalist, see David Matthews, "Laurence Minot, Edward III, and Nationalism," *Viator* 38 (2007): 269-88.

campaign to the north virtually inevitable,[12] and Parliament on September 23 granted the first of what would become more-or-less standard grants of war taxation.[13]

The army that assembled at Newcastle in November, 1334 and operated at wages until February, 1335, was composed of Edward III's enlarged household,[14] leavened with a considerable sprinkling of pardoned felons and arrayed county troops, and backed by the retinues of six earls and various bannerets, as well as the forces raised by Henry of Lancaster, Ralph Neville, and Henry Percy.[15] Again, the burden of military service did not extend to all counties. It was born primarily by the north and the royal demesne in Wales, the latter supplying the bulk of the arrayed foot and a considerable proportion of archers.[16] Of East Anglian troops there was little sign. On November 6, 1334, John Norwich did receive a letter of protection for himself and an unspecified retinue, but he was appointed admiral of the North only on the following January 2. Therefore, it is unclear if he actually did join the king at Newcastle.[17] Returns of array for the 1334 campaign were considerably lower than Edward had expected, especially from Yorkshire, and there is every indication that desertion was a problem with those levies that did appear. The naval effort during the campaign was erratic at best, and betrayed uncertainty over how to use England's potentially overwhelming naval superiority against Scotland. Aside from

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12 Ranald Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career 1327 to 1335* (Oxford, 1965), 171-73. To date, Nicholson's remains the most thorough account of these campaigns. See also Ian A. MacInnes, "'Shock and Awe': The Use of Terror as a Psychological Weapon During the Bruce-Balliol Civil War, 1332-1338," in *England and Scotland in the Fourteenth Century: New Perspectives*, ed. Andy King and Michael A. Penman (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2007), 41-59; Chris Brown's *The Second Scottish Wars of Independence 1332-1363* (Stroud, 2002) is a short but useful overview of events post-1336.

13 *The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275-1504*, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, 16 vols. (Woodbridge, Suffolk/ London, 2005), CD-ROM, 4: 204.

14 For Edward III's household knights, see Christopher Candy, "A Growing Trust: Edward III and his Household Knights, 1330-1340," in this volume.

15 Nicholson, *Edward III*, 176-81. John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, sent a sizable contingent, although he did not attend himself. While we lack individual names for his retinue members, it is more than likely that there were several Norfolk men among them, as the earl held considerable property in Norfolk. See the Aid of 1346, in *Inquisitions and Assessments relating to Feudal Aids with Other Analogous Documents Preserved in the Public Record Office*, 6 vols. (London, 1899-1920), 3: 483-552.

16 Nicholson, *Edward III*, 181.

17 *Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati*, ed. David Macpherson, 2 vols. (London, 1814), 1: 286; *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, 60 vols. (Oxford, 2004), 41, q.v. "Norwich, John, first Lord Norwich (c.1299–1362)" by Anthony Verduyn.

privateers and a few royal ships, including the royal barge which had to impress its own crew, the "fleet" consisted of a mere nine ships.[18]

The sole result of the winter campaign of 1334-1335 was Edward's reconstruction of Roxburgh castle, and that was offset by Beaumont's surrender of Dundarg to the Scots on December 23. At this point, Edward did not feel that he had enough troops available to press further north; therefore, he ordered more levies, summoned more men-at-arms, and directed the seizure of ships throughout the ports of England. Much of this activity was accompanied by royal threats and complaints. Assembling these resources took considerable time, and, by the end of January, Edward seems to have realized that he would have to pause during the summer and concentrate his forces at Newcastle and York. By February, 1335 his army had essentially dissolved.[19]

Unlike the previous year's expedition, Edward's plans for the Perth campaign of 1335 developed slowly but steadily into a general endeavor that involved the entire realm. The Scottish truce concluded at Newcastle in March had allowed the king time to develop a two-front operation. He transported a considerable force from Ireland to the western theater of operations at Carlisle, while assembling one of the largest armies he ever commanded.[20] For the first time, troops were to be arrayed from every county, no special consideration being given to counties such as Norfolk that also had to support the effort logistically.[21] In practice, however, many counties chose to pay relief to the crown in lieu of actually assembling and sending troops to join the royal host. Norfolk paid three hundred pounds to be relieved of sending 160 hobelars, while Suffolk paid two hundred marks to be relieved of eighty hobelars. That neighboring Cambridge paid half as much for only twenty fewer hobelars says something concerning the uneven market rates for soldiers from county to county.[22]

The army that left Newcastle and Carlisle on July 12, 1335, numbered some 13,500 troops, mostly mounted archers and men-at-arms, supple-

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[18] Nicholson, *Edward III*, 182. The two privateering licences that Nichols cites in the *Rotuli Scotiae* (1: 283, 286) account for only two ships, so it may be optimistic to envisage a fleet of privateers descending on the Scottish coast in the middle of winter.

[19] Ibid., 183-87.

[20] See *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 206, the York Parliament of May, 1335; and Nicholson, 187 for Balliol's military advice to Edward III for the coming campaign, found in The National Archive [hereafter TNA]: Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], C49/6/29.

[21] Nicholson, *Edward III*, 194.

[22] Ibid., 198. See *Calendar of Patent Rolls* [hereafter *CPR*]. *Edward III, 1327-1377*, 18 vols. (London, 1891-1914), vo.l. 3 (1334-1338), 132.

mented by strong contingents of Welsh foot and shire levies. To some, it appeared the greatest army ever led by a king of England.[23] Thomas Brotherton, earl of Norfolk, seems to have stayed home. At any rate, he does not appear on the list of earls who accompanied Edward at Carlisle or Balliol at Newcastle.

The campaign itself saw no major engagements, but rather the general devastation of the countryside, including numerous religious houses.[24] Supporters of Bruce who were not captured or killed eventually opened negotiations with the English monarch. These were concluded on August 18, and on August 22, Edward wrote to the king of France, announcing that the Scottish war was over.[25] Occupying, and strengthening the Scottish realm against Balliol's enemies[26] became the main tasks at hand. Though he did not return to Berwick until September 30, [27] Edward now turned his attention back to tense negotiations with France.[28]

Concerns about Scottish or French invasions dominated much English strategy throughout the summer and autumn of 1335. Then, as the land campaign wound down, the naval effort increased.[29] John Howard, admiral of the north, had put to sea on April 17 where he remained until September, supervising and enforcing a de facto blockade of Scotland even while the truce was still in effect.[30] The Cinque Ports seem to have borne the brunt of the activity in the Channel, for one eighteen-day period (August 27-September 13) mobilizing thirty ships and 2000 sailors and archers.[31] The day before they returned to port, royal letters released all arrested ships from duty, signaling a temporary passing of the perceived danger.[32]

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[23] Clifford J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp* (Woodbridge, Suffolk 2000), 97-98; Nicholson, *Edward III*, 199-201.

[24] Nicholson, *Edward III*, 205.

[25] Rogers, *War*, 100-1.

[26] See Nicholson, *Edward III*, 224-27. The new plan, which took firm shape by October, focused on Edward's possession of Berwick, Roxburgh, Stirling, and Edinburgh, the latter under the command of John Stirling.

[27] Ibid., 224; Edward's arrival in Berwick marked the official end of the campaign, as his household troops stopped drawing wages at that point.

[28] Ibid., 218-21. The gradual disbandment of the army was signaled by the cancellation, on August 16, of further purveyance of grain in London. The Irish contingent arrived off western Scotland after this, and essentially conducted a separate campaign.

[29] Ibid., 207, regarding Edward's orders of July 22 for a greater naval effort in the south and west.

[30] Ibid., 195.

[31] Ibid., 209.TNA: PRO, E101/19/22.

[32] Nicholson, *Edward III*, 211.

Delays of this kind were inevitable: Ambrose de Novo Burgo and his associates did not render an account of their arrest of ships from southern ports until February 1336.[33] Despite the return of the fleet, naval activity never truly ceased. In February, 1337, the northern fleet, this time under Robert Ufford's direction, was ordered to reassemble at Orwell and to assist in transporting John Norwich and his troops to Aquitaine. These men were destined to support Oliver Ingham's defense of the duchy against French incursions.[34]

Once again, announcements that the Scottish war was over proved premature. The destruction of one of Balliol's armies by Douglas and Moray at Culblean on November 30 eventually revived the hopes of Scottish nationalists. The English military had to take in the field once again from 1336 to 1337. This force centered around the Percy and Neville retinues, supplemented by those of Despenser, Oxford, and Northampton.[35] It was accompanied by the earl of Salisbury's retinue for the siege of Dunbar in 1337-1338.[36] The action was a much larger affair than is often realized, and shire levies were sent north from December to June, in order to join Salisbury.[37] The attrition suffered by these levies—many of which were mounted archers—was considerable. During the first forty days, the men for Norfolk and Suffolk, led by Edmund de Steventon, fell in number from one hundred fourteen to forty-two. After fifty-four days, the levy from Lincoln had been reduced from one hundred twenty-one to fifty-three.[38] For counties such as Norfolk and Suffolk that had previously avoided sending arrayed levies, these losses must have come as a shock.

However, by the spring of 1338, both counties were more preoccupied with coastal defense—perhaps one of the most underrated aspects of Edward's military dilemmas at the start of the French war, and one that occupied far more of the average coastal Englishman's time than did land wars or even victualing operations.[39] It certainly reduced the number of

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[33] TNA: PRO, E101/19/23.

[34] *Rotuli Scotiae* 1: 482. Ufford is not named specifically as admiral, which post he was given only in March. The earlier appointment might be seen as something of a "trial run" to test his command and organizational skills.

[35] TNA: PRO, E101/19/36 (for Neville, Percy, Despenser, Oxford, and Northampton), and TNA: PRO, E101/20/17 (Neville and Percy).

[36] TNA: PRO E101/20/25, m. 3 for Salisbury's retinue.

[37] TNA: PRO, E101/20/25, m. 12 (Norfolk and Suffolk, Bedford and Surrey); TNA: PRO, E101/20/25 m. 13 (Wiltshire, Gloucester, and Leicester); TNA: PRO, E101/20/25 m. 14 (Hereford, Lincoln, Rutland, and Kent, etc).

[38] We do not know exactly what caused these reductions, whether desertion, sickness, or wounds. Most likely, given the time of year, it was a combination of all three.

[39] The best analyses on coastal defense remain Hewitt's *Organization of* War, chap. 1, and J.R. Alban, "English Coastal Defense: Some Fourteenth-Century Modifications within

troops that Edward could levy from these shires for his 1338 campaign. On the other hand, from the various mustering orders, this effect does not seem to have entered into his calculations or those of his advisors.[40] In July, a general scheme of coastal defense was initiated, with several "overseers of commissions of array" being appointed with broad powers to assess the male population and hold its members in readiness to engage the French wherever they might land.[41] In geographic terms, this meant that the population in a coastal strip, often averaging about six leagues but occasionally as deep as twelve, was off limits to external military use.[42] For a county like Norfolk, surrounded on two sides by water and contributing so heavily to the navy, this would have effectively exempted a significant proportion of the "arrayable" population, and in fact neither Norfolk nor Suffolk contributed levies to the king's expeditionary forces in 1338.[43]

Space does not permit a detailed account of Edward III's misadventures on the continent, so an outline must suffice. Complex negotiations and preparations lasted from 1337 into the following year, and the king finally set sail from Orwell on July 16, 1338. When joined by the other half of the fleet sailing out of Great Yarmouth, he possessed a force of roughly 5,000 men. The crossing to Antwerp took six days, after which no military activity of note took place for some weeks. Edward quickly discovered that virtually none of the 20,000 sacks of wool that he had been promised had arrived—not because of a shortage of shipping, as he at first thought, but because of problems in collection. His resulting lack of cash immediately crippled his negotiations with his German and Flemish allies, and the autumn months were spent scraping together money, meeting with allies, and throwing parties.[44]

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the System," in *Patronage, the Crown, and the Provinces in Later Medieval England*, ed. Ralph a. Griffiths (Gloucester, 1981), 57-78.

[40] Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 227, 237, discussing the low turnout of shire levies and the withdrawal of Salisbury's force from Dunbar in order to reinforce the royal army in June, 1338.

[41] Alban, "Some Fourteenth-Century Modifications," 64.

[42] Ibid., 69-70.

[43] Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 227. What seems to be part of the coastal array for Norfolk in 1336 (perhaps as a reaction to the "invasion scare" of that October; see Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 167) does survive, and indicates the very basic armament of these coastal defense levies—a core of picked men are armed with bows and some kind of armor, while the rest are listed as mostly carrying "axes and knives," the vintenars being armed with "lance, sword, and knife" (TNA: PRO, E101/19/37).

[44] News of these parties was not greeted with sympathy by many back in England, if Sir Thomas Gray's grumblings are indicative. Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 239-47; Sir

French raids on the English coast began at this time, culminating in the famous raid on Southampton on October 5, which resulted in the burning of a large part of the town, and immense embarrassment to the cash-strapped monarch. The French raided near Orwell in Suffolk in March, 1339, although the nascent English coastal defenses managed to drive them off. In late May, the French devastated Hastings.[45] It was in the aftermath of these events that Parliament began to put more pressure on the admiralties to perform, and Robert Morle, a Norfolk baron, proved himself the right person for the position of admiral of the North. Morle scored a number of successes against French merchantmen and raiders along the Flemish coast, and broke up a major attack on the Cinque Ports in July, 1339. He then proceeded to raid the French coast,[46] but despite these successes, Sumption is correct in arguing that the French had managed to disrupt Edward's campaign considerably.[47]

At last, in September 1339, the king began a tentative invasion of France, and laid siege to Cambrai. However, the city would not surrender. Philip VI (r.1328-1350) refused battle, and Edward led a destructive, but fruitless, raid throughout October that failed to bring on the general engagement for which he hoped.[48] The rest of the year was spent wrangling with his creditors, with his Flemish allies, and at a distance with Parliament and his chancellor, until matters reached such a pass that he had no choice but to return to England and assess the situation for himself. On the continent, Salisbury and Suffolk were left in command, but, in a fitting end for the campaign, they were surprised, surrounded, and captured while on a raiding mission near Lille on April 11, 1340.[49]

III. *Parliamentary and Popular Complaint Literature*

Edward III returned to England in February, 1340, to face a deteriorating political situation that had been developing almost since before he left. It is this political and social disaster caused by the Flanders campaigns and its consequences for English law, government, and social relations that

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Thomas Gray, *Scalacronica 1272-1363*, ed. and trans. Andy King (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2005), 126-27.

[45] Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 248, 261, 263.

[46] Ibid., 264-66.

[47] Ibid., 266-67.

[48] Rogers, *War*, 164-73.

[49] Ibid., 188; Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 311-12.

have drawn the attention of most historians. The seminal work on the effects of purveyance and taxation in 1330s England remains J.R. Maddicott's *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341*, which sets forth in stark detail the destabilization caused by excessive royal exactions in support of the French war:

> [There were] men leaving their holdings through fear of imminent taxation, the sale of seed-corn to raise money for taxation, and, more generally, the abandonment of arable land because its cultivators were so depressed by taxation and other disasters that they lacked the resources to work it.[50]

This sorry state of affairs can be attributed in large measure to two major changes in the methods of purveyance from the time of Edward I (r.1272-1307). First, assessments of the shire hundreds were no longer carried out by the sheriff and the royal official assigned to the region, and then distributed within the hundred according to village size and wealth. Second, instead, there grew up a "system" of specially appointed merchants and their associates, who were given sweeping powers over a region and were free to designate deputies as they deemed necessary to complete their tasks.[51] These novel arrangements afforded considerable scope to the unscrupulous, a fact that was amply revealed in the inquests following the arrest of Dunstaple and Walingford. This, in turn, renders many surviving accounts suspect in their accuracy.[52]

Purveyance was only one of several burdens placed upon population at this time; near-continuous taxation was another. The tenth and fifteenth, already levied for the Roxburgh-Perth campaigns, was voted again in 1336, and then as a triennial tax in Parliament in September, 1337.[53] In some ways, it was not so much the tax itself that was objectionable, as the method of its collection, which from 1334 on was in the form of fixed quotas imposed on communities, rather than sums arrived at by actual assessment. The crown, therefore, took no cognizance of changes in the prosperity of a village or hundred, or whether all members of the community were paying their fair share.[54] The yield of 1334 for Norfolk, approximately £3500, was

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50 Maddicott, *English Peasantry*, 64.

51 Ibid., 24-25, 54-56.

52 Ibid., 56-64. See also Sumption, *Hundred Year War*, 251-54. Documents such as Walingford's purveyance account of 1339 (TNA: PRO, E101/21/40) and Dunstaple's account for 1337-1338 (TNA: PRO, E358/1, m. 6d) should therefore be regarded as almost certainly not reflecting the full amount of goods taken, although the low amounts for East Anglia will be discussed below.

53 Ibid., 46; *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 231.

54 Maddicott, *English Peasantry*, 51.

repeated in 1336 and 1337, even though neither the crown nor later historians can be sure of the accuracy of these tax returns.[55] On the other hand, we can be fairly certain that, in a period of four years, the crown managed to extract something like £10,000 from Norfolk. Whether or not this considerable royal taxation had to do with the shortage of coin in England at this time, it certainly cannot have helped matters.[56]

Complaints about purveyance and taxation were voiced in several quarters, most notably Parliament. The gathering at Westminster in February, 1339, was the first to loudly air its grievances against purveyance, in contrast to the previous Parliament of 1338 that had acquiesced in Edward's demands for more funds, and agreed to levy a direct wool tax assessed on the entire population. In October, 1339, the crown promised to halt all current purveyance commissions and to arrest William Walingford and "other notoriously evil purveyors." At the time, Walingford was the Commons's *bête noire*.[57] Despite this royal concession, Parliament did not immediately grant the king his taxation requests. Instead, members cited the size of the amount requested and their need to consult "with the commonality of their regions."[58] The famous contemporary song, "Against the King's Taxes," often dated to 1338-1339, gives the most trenchant summary of the ills caused by these royal policies:

> Now the fifteenth runs in England year after year, thus doing harm to all … not half the tribute raised in the land reaches the king … Still more hard on simple folk is the wool collection; commonly it makes them sell their possessions.

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55 TNA: PRO, 359/8A, m. 8.

56 The complaint concerning the "scarcity" of coin occurs twice in the Parliament of October, 1339 (*Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 240, 243-44), but was a topic of concern at least as early as February, 1334, at the Parliament of York (*Parliamentary Rolls* IV: 201), so there were clearly other factors at work here. See W.M. Ormrod, "The Crown and the English Economy, 1290-1348," in *Before the Black Death: Studies in the "Crisis" of the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. Bruce M.S. Campbell (Manchester, 1991), 149-83, for the connections (or lack thereof) between the crown's economic policies and the shortage of coin. Regarding the wool levies, see Ormrod, "Crown," 171-75, where he shows that, even despite numerous exceptions, exemptions, and concessions to individual interests, these schemes did result in substantial profits for the crown, and did not cause a fall in prices as was once thought. The April, 1341 Parliament's county wool assessments put Suffolk at 959 sacks and 3 stone, and Norfolk at 2206 ¾ sacks, one stone, and 6 ¾ pounds—and this, it should be noted, is prior to collection, and on Parliament's recommendation. See *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 319.

57 *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 245.

58 Ibid., 4: 241.

And in a line decrying the collectors, the poet says "that they forcibly keep back two or three stones weight in the sack. To whom will this wool go?"[59] These complaints and others, substantiated at great length in the inquests that followed and preserved in judicial, chancery, and exchequer files,[60] are generally regarded as conclusive proof that Edward's initial prosecution of his French war was ill-considered and riddled with costly political assumptions, oppressive half-measures, and economically disastrous consequences. Interestingly enough, the contemporaty complaints did not extend to the military efficacy of these policies, the only basis on which Edward could have excused the bulk of these complaints.

IV. *Purveyance the Problems of Supply*

Despite this well-established set of abuses and oppressions, when we examine the logistical, naval, and personnel details of the 1330s, certain features emerge that allow us to understand how these abuses were experienced in East Anglia, particularly in Norfolk, which at that time was a more developed and prosperous county than Suffolk.

Logistics and purveyance naturally came under the most scrutiny, and in many ways were the most emblematic features of the king's war effort. Despite the changes in purveyance noted by Maddicott, English logistical arrangements were remarkably stable from the time of Edward I until the reign of his grandson. Given their effectiveness, this should not be surprising.[61] Also not surprising is the burden that war in France posed for the counties, as opposed to conflict in Wales or Scotland. Edward I's campaigns in 1296-1297 in many respects foreshadowed those of 1338-1340, and also produced similar popular complaints.[62] Indeed, it was the exchequer's

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59 *Anglo-Norman Political Songs*, ed. Isabel S.T. Aspin (Oxford, 1953), 112. Perhaps the most significant text protesting royal purveyance, William of Pagula's *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, composed around 1331-1332, was mostly concerned with purveyance for the royal household and for the king's horses; it is essential for a larger, detailed understanding of the issues plaguing purveyance operations in the 1330s. See *Political Thought in Early Fourteenth-Century England: Treatises by Walter of Milemete, William of Pagula, and William of Ockham*, ed. and trans. Cary J. Nederman (Tempe, Ariz., 2002), 63-139.

60 See Maddicott, *English Peasantry*,56-59 nn., and 62-63 nn.

61 See Ralph Anthony Kaner, "The Management of the Mobilization of English Armies: Edward I to Edward III," (Ph.D. diss.,University of York, 1999), for a synchronic survey of these techniques, and for a chronological reconstruction of recruitment and logistical orders.

62 For a discussion of these complaints of prise and purveyance under Edward I, see Michael Prestwich, *War, Politics, and Finance under Edward I* (London; reprint, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1991), 128-36.

questioning of the specified grain amounts that elicited Edward's famous reply that, if he ordered them to acquire all the grain of England, that was what they were to do. This royal outburst came after a staggering 26,500 quarters of grain and oats had been collected from only twelve counties.[63]

The supply structures of the northern marches did not change appreciably in fifty years. As Michael Prestwich has discussed, prevailing winds made the east coast much easier to supply than the west, thus rendering Newcastle and Berwick the main fortress-depots for any advance into Scotland.[64] This, combined with the fact that the east coast also had the best invasion routes to Edinburgh and Stirling, meant that it was those counties on the eastern seaboard that often bore the brunt of royal purveyance—whether or not an actual campaign was in progress.[65]

However, it would be a mistake to automatically assume that purveyance simply meant a chain reaction of exploitation.[66] Instead, there was always the possibility of economic advantage across a wide spectrum of the population. A prime example of this "economic stimulus" was the construction of the galley *Philippa* at Lynn in 1336, for which the brothers William and Thomas Melcheburn of Lynn were financially responsible. The *Philippa* wound up seeing service within months of being completed, first running supplies to Berwick in July, 1336,[67] and then in the Channel.[68]

The provisioning of the ship required a rather substantial outlay, not least in the expensive armaments required for its sixty men-at-arms and forty archers, as well as for fixed war engines such as ballistas and a springald.[69] The construction of the ship provided Lynn's carpenters with work for fifteen weeks, and the assembly of building materials and supplies made profits for merchants, artisans, and, presumably, farmers throughout Norfolk.[70] The victualling of Berwick, made by thirteen ships sailing from Lynn between May and July,1336, conveyed 900 quarters of grain and over

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63 Ibid., 120-21.

64 Ibid., 122.

65 Ibid., 122, 133-34; even for Welsh campaigns, Norfolk and Suffolk were called upon much more frequently than counties much closer to the theater of operations.

66 A point made very well in Krug, "Purveyance," 357-58.

67 TNA: PRO, E101/19/32.

68 TNA: PRO, E101/20/37, m. 3.

69 TNA: PRO, E101/20/37, m. 4.

70 TNA: PRO, E101/19/31. Thomas and William Melcheburn received over six hundred pounds from the Treasury for the ship's construction. Among the local merchants who did multiple transactions for the ship were local notables such as Thomas Drewe of Lynn, Hugh de Reppes (a favored royal agent for many years), and Ralf de Brunham.

1400 of oats, and cost the crown over £1000.[71] This operation was directed by William Melcheburn, one of the builders of the *Philippa*.

The Melcheburn brothers are perhaps the best case in point that the weakest link in the logistics effort from Roxburgh to Cambrai was the individual in charge of collections, and not the collection system itself. Both brothers enjoyed a long and fruitful working relationship with Edward III, receiving protections, licenses, contracts, and offices from the first year of the reign into the 1350s.[72] They proved, either together or separately, to be two of the crown's most dependable financial and logistics agents on the east coast, and, as such, were invaluable for the war in Scotland. Indeed, the earliest example found by Maddicott of the new purveyance system (based on the oppressive "roving merchant") is William Melcheburn in February, 1336.[73] In that year alone, he and his brother carried out four victualing operations destined for Berwick.[74] However, what Maddicott overlooks is the fact that for some time William had been fulfilling the same function: in 1334-1335, he had been one of several merchants responsible, under the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk's direction, for supplying a total of approximately 3400 quarters of grain to Berwick. These and other supplies such as fish and flour (the latter also transported in part by Melcheburn) were then distributed to the army. Here, the Melcheburn brothers played a vital role in supplying the king's forces throughout that campaign.[75] It is easy to envisage Melcheburn's advance in 1336 as the promotion of a reliable servant by a crown always looking for more efficient ways to fight its wars.

Both William and Thomas Melcheburn seem to have preserved this trust, most notably through the crisis of 1339-1341, during which Thomas acted as collector of customs in Lynn and of wool in Norfolk.[76] They were both investigated in the audits that followed Edward's return to England: Parliament ordered William to render his accounts by March, 1340, and audited Thomas for his offices in January, 1341.[77] Apparently these proceed-

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71 TNA: PRO, E101/19/32.

72 Thomas is listed as receiving a license to trade abroad as far back as 1319 [CPR, Edward II, 3 (1317-1321), p. 344], and received a contract to supply the army for the Weardale campaign via Newcastle in 1327 [*CPR*, Edward III, vol. 1 (1327-1330),104].

73 Maddicott, *English Peasantry*, 54; *Rotuli Scotiae*, 1: 409.

74 TNA: PRO, E101/19/30, 32, 33, and 34.

75 These details can be found in Robert Tong's account: TNA: PRO, E101/19/3.

76 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 4 (1338-1340), 290, 329.

77 *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 270; *Calendar of Close Rolls. Edward III, 1327-1377*, 14 vols, vol. 5 (1339-1341), 604-5. At the same time, as Thomas was investigated, a special commission

ings ended without mishap. On the other hand, with the revocation of their purveyor's licenses and pending the outcome of the investigations, it appears that they did not receive royal contracts: in the Parliament of January, 1340, the victualing of Berwick and Edinburgh was given to William Snoryng and John atte Fenn of Lynn, and to two Barton merchants.[78]

Nevertheless, both brothers were soon returned to royal favor: in December, 1341, William Melcheburn received a commission to search the coast between Boston and Lynn for smuggled wool, and was granted with his associate, William Gatgange, a tenth of all wool recovered.[79] This is even more impressive when one considers that their posts more-or-less required them to have extensive dealings with disgraced officials such as Walingford, for whom Thomas had purveyed 500 quarters of grain as well as other supplies in 1339.[80] Indeed, the sheer quantity of money and of supplies that passed through the Melcheburns' hands during this period is remarkable.

To cite but one more example, made notable because of the involvement of tax agents: in the early spring of 1336, working with the collectors of the tenth and fifteenth in Norfolk, Leicester, Cambridge, the dioceses of Ely, Norwich, and Wells, Thomas supervised the shipment to Berwick of 2000 quarters of grain (of which only 1831 arrived) and 1,000 quarters of oats (of which only 763 arrived).[81] The scrupulous nature of their accounts is instructive in one other respect: pricing rates. Wheat prices per quarter paid by the Melcheburns are uniformly higher than those paid by Dunstaple and Walingford. For example, in Dunstaple's account of 1338, grain taken from Norfolk is listed at an absurdly low two shillings per quarter. By contrast, Thomas Melcheburn's account with Wallingford for the following year lists grain purchased at five shillings per quarter; a higher rate more consistent with Melcheburn's accounts.[82]

In the final analysis, while the promotion of Dunstaple and Walingford may have had something to do with their ability to "get bottom dollar," they served alongside other apointees of the crown, both of whom had survived the crisis and who to all appearances had honestly and efficiently

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led by Thomas Wak of Lydell was appointed to Essex, Hertford, Norfolk, and Suffolk, to hear complaints concerning the king's officials.

[78] *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 254.

[79] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 5 (1340-1343), 365.

[80] TNA: PRO, E101/20/37.

[81] TNA: PRO, E101/19/30.

[82] Compare TNA: PRO, E101/24/4 and TNA: PRO, E101/20/37. See Appendix 1 for more information on quantities of supplies and prices per quarter.

carried out purveyance operations for the crown over a period of many years.

Before leaving this topic, some observations are in order. The quantity of supplies purveyed from Norfolk and Suffolk as well as from Cambridge and Lincoln did not suddenly "spike" with the onset of the French war. (See Appendix 1 for an overview of these amounts). Instead, quantities in the region of 1500 quarters of grain had been purveyed nearly every year since Edward III's Scottish wars had begun (and even well back into Edward II's reign).[83] Whether this was carried out through the sheriffs or through the merchants made no difference. It remains to be determined if the Melcheburns met their quotas by resorting to harsh measures such as closing markets and fairs, as purveyors were wont to do.[84]

The question of whether or not the Melcheburns used credit in their transactions is not an easy one to answer. There are, however, some indications that purchases on credit played a significant role in the process. In March, 1340, Parliament noted that the merchants of Barton and Lynn, who had supplied the northern fortresses, required reimbursement, since they had undertaken the task at their own expense.[85] In 1338, John atte Fenn, and his associates purveyed, among other items, 334 quarters of grain at six shillings per quarter. Their account was not closed by the exchequer until 1342.[86]

Finally, the expenses of purveyance theoretically stimulated a certain flow of money through the local economy. The more detailed accounts very specifically list the expenses of weighing the goods, packing, transporting, guarding, unloading, freighting, and holding them in various stages of their journey north. These were often paid for out of funds received from the exchequer. In short, while copious evidence of bureaucratic malfeasance does exist for the 1330s, we also have solid evidence that purveyance could operate in a way that, if not positive, was at least more benign than we normally think it to be.

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[83] Even having two or three different purveyors working in one region did not guarantee economic disaster; in William Walingford's massive purveyance account for the period February-October, 1339, Norfolk contributed only twenty-two quarters of grain, Suffolk six quarters and one bushel. Cambridgeshire, on the other hand, in inverse proportion contributed two hundred sixty-five quarters and six bushels. See TNA: PRO, E101/21/40, m. 1 (Cambridge) and TNA: PRO, E101/21/40, m. 5 (Norfolk and Suffolk). At the same time, Thomas Melcheburn contributed a separate levy to Walingford's total, and was arranging a much larger shipment of grain to Berwick. See Appendix.

[84] See Krug, "Purveyance," 345.

[85] *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 271.

[86] TNA: PRO, E101/21/15.

V. *Naval Policies*

If that was the case (and there is good evidence that it was), then East Anglia's negative reactions to royal warfare are likely to have been drawn from other experiences. Purveyance, after all, was only one way in which the "demands of the crown" manifested themselves in a locality, even if in purely political terms it was perhaps the most volatile. The forced purchase of victuals was not the only way in which royal policy impacted a region: the demand for naval and military service had an equal influence in determining the morale of the population. In this respect, the sudden, heavy naval requirements of the French war were particularly significant for East Anglia. What purveyance was to the farmer, naval service was to the merchant. Since maritime affairs were a preoccupation of this region, the collective reaction to naval service reveals much about their antecedent attitudes towards Edward's campaigns.

To a few port towns, the war was an opportunity—unless, of course, they lay along the southern coast and were exposed to French raiders. For Great Yarmouth, which to this point had been just one of many ports involved in the maritime efforts underpinning the Scottish campaigns, hostilities in France provided a chance to develop a position of naval dominance that the city would continue to hold until the Reims campaign of 1359.[87] In July, 1338, Yarmouth accounted for roughly forty percent of nearly £1000 spent on wages and expenses by England's northern fleet. It contributed over fifty ships of various sizes for the voyage to Brabant; at the same time, Lynn contributed roughly ten.[88]

There is an indication that this increased royal demand for naval service was particularly unappealing to the merchants of Lynn, who up to then had proved extremely reliable in running supplies to Scotland. Walter Manny's reports of ships refusing to serve in the northern fleet included twenty-seven ships from Lynn, more than twice the number of any other town listed. Among these were several captained by men who had previously served the crown in some capacity.[89] Great Yarmouth's merchants,

[87] TNA: PRO, E101/27/25, Robert de Woubrun's naval account for East Anglian ships transporting the English army in 1359. See A. Saul, "Great Yarmouth and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century," *Historical Research* 52, no 126 (Nov., 1979), 105-115, for his discussion of Great Yarmouth's military and economic position in the first phase of the war, and its decline after the treaty of Bretigny in 1360.

[88] TNA: PRO, E101/21/10.

[89] TNA: PRO, C47/2/30, mm. 1-2. This account would cover Manny's tenure as Admiral of the North in 1338. The merchants include Hugh de Betele and Thomas Brekerop, who

on the other hand, had fewer qualms; naval infrastructure meant construction and, with a little luck, some royal funding as well.[90] Already one of the largest "provincial" cities in the realm, Yarmouth in the 1330s saw several dozen of its vessels impressed yearly, and in 1337-1338, it benefitted from being the staging area of the royal army—the second, and last, time that this would occur.[91]

Another maritime aspect of the French war that particularly affected East Anglia was the gradual organization of naval power into something resembling an effective instrument of war. Given the way in which England organized its military effort at sea, it may be inaccurate to speak of a "naval" community as such.[92] Nevertheless without doubt, the majority of Norfolk denizens who experienced Edward III's wars did so from the deck of a ship. Yet how to get them on to that deck in some cases posed a problem for the crown. Early in his campaigns, Edward seems to have thought that his new earls, Suffolk and Salisbury, would forge a reliable naval network. Their terms of service as admirals of the North and West, however, lasted only a short time and brought little result.[93] As we have seen, although a reliable soldier, John Norwich had only a brief stint as admiral of the North, and, on the whole, the Scottish wars in general had been marked by desultory use of naval assets.

The situation began to change when Walter Manny and Robert Morle, both long-time members of the earl of Norfolk's affinity, were appointed to the northern command, Manny in 1337-1338 and Morle in 1339-1340. Both of these men, through persistent action and a longer tenure than other admirals had had in the 1330s, managed to lead the northern fleet on several effective raids to Flanders and the French coast.[94] The practice of raiding presented problems of its own since it engendered a rather cavalier attitude

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had assisted in the construction of the *Philippa* a couple years before. Lynn's contrariness continued during Robert Morle's tenure as admiral, where twenty ships are listed as refusing to serve in the fleet, a number outdone this time by Hull's twenty-eight (though in both towns several ships are listed as being registered elsewhere—five of Hull's are from the Baltic).

[90] Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 178.

[91] Ibid..

[92] Ibid, 173-79 for an excellent overview of the difficulties of using naval "power" in the Middle Ages.

[93] Ibid., 178. They were created admirals within days of their elevations.

[94] Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, 216, 264. Manny's raid of November, 1337 was extremely profitable, but also extremely destructive for the Flemings, and wound up causing Edward III much diplomatic trouble. Morle nearly caught the entire French fleet off guard at Rye in July, 1339, and went on to distinguish himself at Sluys the next year.

toward foreign ships, even those of royally-licensed merchants, and Yarmouth men found themselves in trouble more than once for seizing such vessels loaded with royal merchandise.[95]

Manny's account for 1338 clearly indicates the shift caused by the continental campaigns, and is a good snapshot of how the war in Flanders was far more highly organized than the lackadaisical naval efforts directed against Scotland. Indeed, the lasting impression supplied by naval records for 1333-1338 is one of uncertainty on the part of the crown regarding how best to use its seagoing assets. Admirals and ship owners were frequently plagued by arbitrary orders for assembly, which were then compounded by delays in embarkation and by the comprehensive appropriation of ships to insure that transport needs were met. Such problems rendered naval service unattractive. By contrast, raiding the Flemish and French coasts, or transporting a royal army across the Channel, presented fewer uncertainties.

Among English ports, Great Yarmouth benefitted the most from this change, since it served as the administrative and financial headquarters of both Manny and his successor, Morle.[96] At the same time, Great Yarmouth supplied more ships to the English fleet than any other port. For the voyage to Flanders itself, Great Yarmouth is listed as contributing fifty-two vessels of various sizes, five times as many as Lynn. From the administrative perspective, using the ships of Great Yarmouth made financial sense: after all, Manny did not have to pay these vessels until they weighed anchor on July 13, while the ships from other ports had been paid from July 6 when they sailed to join the king at Orwell.[97] Yarmouth therefore probably suffered substantial loss, as its ships (depending on when they had joined the fleet) were forced to wait in port longer than is reflected in the pay records. Add to this the ever-thorny issue of prompt payment, and the negatives for even an ambitious town like Yarmouth multiply. As Manny's service records show, the transport fleet was finished with its business by August. Yet the final accounting for wages was not compiled until mid-October, 1339 and even then many ship masters may have had to accept payment on credit.[98]

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[95] One of the most notorious instances of this was the seizure of a Flemish vessel carrying 16,000 pounds of merchandise (one assumes wool) to Flanders. Morle was named on the inquest committee in March, 1340, and the investigation dragged until at least 1342. *CPR*, Edward III, vol 4 (1338-1340), 491; vol. 5 (1340-1343), 513 , 516.

[96] TNA: PRO, E101/21/12, m. 1. All payments from the royal treasury were sent to Great Yarmouth.

[97] TNA: PRO, E101/21/12, mm. 4-5.

[98] TNA: PRO, E101/21/12. Dates of service from May to July, and ending in August, 1338, corresponding to Edward's departure for Antwerp. TNA: PRO, E101/21/10 is the later, final

On the other hand, while naval service could be damaging in respect to lost time and delayed wages, it often proved profitable in terms of plunder. Loss of cargo and lack of payment were two problems that always plagued the merchant mariners. Their refusal to serve and the resulting fines were another source of annoyance. Finally, a legal commission of 1342 documented considerable corruption in the northern admiralty: in regard to the appopriation of ships, it took the form of bribery. The commission discovered the extortion of "gifts" in return for being spared arrest and seizure.[99] In the focus on purveyance, scholars often fail to pay attention to these other royal exactions, arising from the war effort. For East Anglia, these other considerations were arguably just as important as grain seizure and transport in influencing how the counties viewed the king's war—in this case, it seems, with distinct ambivalence.

VI. *East Anglia's Military Role*

Finally, a brief analysis of the social structures and military experience in East Anglia should inform any assessment of its reaction to the 1339-1341 crisis of government. Setting aside naval service, in a strictly military sense, Norfolk and Suffolk had made only moderate personnel commitments during the Scottish wars. Even on those occasions when levies were taken from more than just the northern counties, East Anglia was often exempt, or was able to pay its way out of service. The one magnate in East Anglia at the time, the king's uncle Thomas of Brotherton, earl of Norfolk, did not fight in the north, despite the fact that his income and connections were such that he could have fielded a considerable retinue.[100] At the same time, there were some men from the region who did take part in the Scottish campaigns. Robert Ufford, who had his own connections to Edward III,

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accounting; both the account and the writ are dated to 1339–October 16 and August 13, respectively.

[99] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 5 (1340-1343), 592. No names are given, and the subject certainly demands more research. See also J.S. Kepler, "The Effects of the Battle of Sluys upon the Administration of English Naval Impressment, 1340-1343," *Speculum* 48, no. 1 (Jan., 1973): 70-77, esp. 71-73 for issues of corruption and the process of assembling the fleet for the battle of Sluys.

[100] See Alison Marshall, "An Early Fourteenth-Century Affinity: the Earl of Norfolk and his Followers," in *Fourteenth Century England* V, ed. Nigel Saul (Woodbridge, 2008), 1-12. Brotherton's relationship with his royal nephew was a complicated one, largely because it was his active support of Mortimer and Isabella's invasion of 1326 that gave the coup traction; after their landing at Orwell, he proffered his allegiance, housed them at his estates, and used his connections to augment their small army. See Marshall, "Affinity," 7.

fought alongside John Norwich in 1335, both of them as bannerets, supplying forty-three and twenty-six men-at-arms, respectively.[101] Though possessing a small retinue, Robert Morle had fought in nearly every northern campaign.[102]

Despite these exceptions, on the whole, East Anglia's commitment of personnel to the Scottish wars was nowhere near that of Lancaster, Surrey, Hereford, Yorkshire, or Warwick. And it should be remembered that at this time there was no concomitant naval requirement to siphon off East Anglia's manpower. Thus, aside from several small retinues, and any Norfolk men serving with the earl of Surrey, the region's contribution to the Scottish war effort was not of a high order. The siege of Dunbar, with its heavy losses to shire levies, and coming as it did in winter and at very short notice while England was in the midst of preparations for the "new war" with France, can hardly have predisposed the counties that had participated extensively to view the royal war effort benignly.

The social destabilization that coincided with the campaign of 1338 has perhaps been underestimated by historians. It must have engendered a mounting sense of frustration independent of purveyance or naval impressments. This instability began at the very top of the social structure, among the men who should have been leading East Anglia's soldiers and sailors. Robert Ufford had long been a member of Brotherton's affinity—as had Morle, Manny, and Seagrave among others. Yet Brotherton provided almost no leadership in the war, despite his title of marshal. As Alison Marshall has shown, reports of the earl's chaotic "leadership" led to the crown's appointment of Constantine Mortimer to audit the household in 1337.[103] During the previous year, Brotherton had given up lands worth £800 to William de Bohun—nearly a year before Bohun was elevated to the earldom of Northampton. On October 1, 1336, Brotherton had received permis-

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[101] Nicholson, *Edward III*, 248-49, citing figures in B.M. MS Cotton Nero C. VIII, ff. 236-38, 255-56. The two men were actually brothers-in-law, Robert having been married to John's sister Margaret in 1324, and the connection between the two families was quite close. See *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. q.v."Norwich, John," by Verduyn and "Ufford, Robert, first earl of Suffolk (1298–1369)," by W.M. Ormrod.

[102] For an overview of Morle's career, see *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, q.v."Morley, Robert, second Lord Morley (b. in or before 1295, d. 1360)" by Andrew Ayton.

[103] Marshall, "Affinity," 9. See also Marshall's dissertation, "Thomas of Brotherton, Earl of Norfolk and Marshal of England: A Study in Early Fourteenth-Century Aristocracy," (Ph.D. diss., University of Bristol, 2006), esp. chaps. 4-5; *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, q.v. "Thomas , first earl of Norfolk (1300–1338)," by Scott L. Waugh; David Green, "Edward the Black Prince and East Anglia: An Unlikely Association," in *Fourteenth Century England* III, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2004), 83-98, also presents some cogent analysis on the fate of Brotherton's estates and affinity.

sion to grant properties to Richard Burstede and William Dunstaple, in order that they could "re-grant" these same properties to him and his wife.[104] In 1337, he transferred the hundred of Loose in Suffolk to one of his yeomen.[105] The earl died in the autumn of 1338 at the age of thirty-eight, and his property was split between the Seagrave and Montagu families, thus altering the balance of power in East Anglia in the midst of a very trying military campaign.

As for the king's favorite, Robert Ufford, it must be said that he had very mixed success in his first three years as earl of Suffolk. After assuming office in March, 1337, he had received only a few properties from the crown to support his new rank, and the real estate market in East Anglia did not encourage further acquisitions at that time.[106] At this point, Ufford possessed neither the means nor the relationships to forge larger and stronger recruitment networks. As a result, Edward's appointment of his favorite had little effect on the numbers that Ufford could put in the field , even within East Anglia. Ufford's capture in April, 1340, did not help matters, as it was left to his son—also called Robert—to lead a sizeable retinue as a banneret at the battle of Sluys (June 24, 1340).[107] After being ransomed and returning to England in January, 1341, the earl of Suffolk found himself in the thick of the constitutional crisis of 1341, being one of the twelve chosen to decide the circumstances in which a peer could be tried.[108]

"Uncertain" is the word that perhaps best describes East Anglia's experience in 1338. Setting aside the social disruption process caused by the mustering of an army and the tendency of war-like behavior at home to effect negatively the king's peace,[109] the impression that one receives from

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104 *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 3 (1334-1338), 236 (Bohun) and 327 (Burstede and Dunstaple). Norfolk and Suffolk were not touched in the property transfer to Bohun. Robert Ufford was a witness to this confirmation.

105 Ibid., 467.

106 James Bothwell, "Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century England," *EHR* 112, no. 449 (Nov., 1997): 1111-40, esp. 1116.

107 He had brought eight knights and fifty-eight men-at-arms, as well as thirty-nine conscripted archers [TNA: PRO, E101/389/8; E101/389/8, m. 11.; m. 14]. My thanks to Clifford Rogers for his assistance with the circumstances and significance of Robert Ufford, Jr.'s retinue.

108 *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 308. It is perhaps significant as well that it was during Suffolk's absence on the continent that the rival Norfolk barons—Seagrave, Bardolf, and Morle, together with their frequent associates Despenser and Mowbray, among others—were extremely active in Parliament, especially the ominous gathering of October, 1339 (4: 240).

109 This latter is an especially rich topic, with several examples deriving from East Anglia during this period. The classic study on this theme remains Richard W. Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988).

the naval and land forces raised within the region is one of thoroughgoing instability. Admirals of the North came and went with dizzying regularity. Thomas Brotherton, the only magnate who might have taken a leading role in organizing the counties, died and the new earl lacked resources to take his place. Attempts at organizing coastal defense were at first laughable—witness the surviving record of the Norfolk array of 1336, where most of the arrayed were armed with axes and knives.[110] When it came to actually fighting the war "on the ground" in 1338, East Anglia fell victim to administrative confusion, fractured social networks, new and ambitious men lacking magnate affinity (or resources), and the destabilizing presence of both the royal court and the army it had recruited for the war in France. This, then, is the background against which one must assess complaints against purveyance and malfeasance.

VII. *Conclusion*

Meanwhile, for East Anglia the war continued without much pause. In March, 1340, John Seagrave was ordered to reinforce the Scottish border with forty men-at-arms and sixty archers.[111] In June, Edward managed to win the bloody but spectacular naval victory at Sluys, where East Anglian soldiers and sailors distinguished themselves.[112] Yet, as Edward III's campaigns and crises of government continued their course, the manner in which they were perceived was influenced by factors beyond purveyance and the episodic misdeeds of royal officials. The governmental crisis of 1339-1341 was "real," as were the abuses and sufferings of which literature, chronicles, Parliamentary petitions, and royal commissions complained. Of that there can be little doubt.

On the other hand, it is time to re-evaluate the causes and mechanisms of the crisis in a way that takes more cognizance of the multi-valent factors involved in a given region's experience with the events unfolding in and around it. The apparatus by which Edward III made war in Scotland had operated successfully for some years, but usually only in a limited number of counties. The expansion of this apparatus to the entire realm in 1335-1336, and the subsequent confusion caused by faulty intelligence, slow communications, and multiple military requirements that had no fixed termi-

[110] TNA: PRO, E101/19/37.
[111] *Parliamentary Rolls*, 4: 272.
[112] See Rogers, *War*, 191-99 for sources and details on Sluys.

nus, set the stage for the first campaigns the French war and the crisis that resulted from them. As war with France loomed on the horizon, the question facing the people of England was less one of how to cope with being "exhausted by burdensome or widely unpopular levies," but rather how to adjust to the military requirements of a two-front war, accompanied by the very real threat of invasion.

For Norfolk and Suffolk, military burdens as such were not new. In fact, one could argue they had largely been absorbed into their regional economies. The collective experience of purveyance in the 1330s was not nearly as gloomy as that of Yorkshire or Lincoln, nor, with the exception of the French raid on Orwell, as personally threatening as that of the southern counties. The social-military command structures in East Anglia were both fractured and relatively unstable, but whatever rivalries existed among the barons in Brotherton's affinity did not prevent them from giving the king effective service. The same seems to be true of most merchants responsible for purveyance and logistical arrangements throughout the 1330s, whatever their feelings concerning naval service may have been.

The usual context, then, can profitably be reversed: rather than viewing the war through the lens of popular and Parliamentary complaint, we can learn much about the reception of the conflict by viewing popular reactions through the lens of military service and logistics. The actual distribution of war burdens for the 1330s was uniform in neither kind nor degree, even after the king's decision to go to war with France in 1337. And when officials either individually or systemically abused the system (as did often happen), the results of their abuse did not have an equal effect. That, at least, is what this short analysis of East Anglia's experience suggests.

Table 1. East Anglia and the Supply Effort, 1334-1339[1]

Date	Destination	Merchant (M)/ Agent (A)	Originating City/ County	Goods and Amounts	Prices per quarter	Document Reference
1334, summer	Berwick	John Cailly, sheriff	Norfolk	c.1550q grain 322 q. oats 771q. peas	N/A	E101/19/3
1334-1335	Berwick and Newcastle	Eudo Stoke. John Maners	Lynn (T. Melche-burn)[2]	1000q grain	4S, 6D	E101/19/2
				4113q grain		
			Norfolk/ Lincoln (John Cailly)	720q oats 1312q peas/ beans		
1335	Newcastle	John Cailly sheriff to Robert Tong)	Norfolk and Suffolk	2491q grain 427q oats 343q peas	N/A	E101/19/6
1336	Berwick	Thomas Melcheburn	Not specified	2000q grain 1000q oats	7S,6D 4S	E101/19/30
1336	Berwick	William Melcheburn	Lynn	900q grain 1481q oats 65 bags of flour 277q peas/ beans 383q malt	7S, 6D 4S 52S, 6D 6S 7S, 6D	E101/19/3[2]
1336	[Not legible: “transmarine].	Thomas and William Melcheburn: Eudo Stoke	Not Specified	Grain, peas, beans, malt; 5000q total?	[document partly illegible[3]	E101/19/33

[1] This chart reflects records in the series E101 King’s Remembrancer Accounts Various. Totals do not include small scale shipments of such items as cheese, various quantities and types of Fish, or accounting adjustments for re-purchase and replacement of goods damaged or spoiled during transport. Partial amounts (i.e. of eight bushels in a quarter) are rounded off to the next lowest quarter. Surplus amounts derived from using raised measures are generally not included, unless clearly marked either as contributing to the final totals, or clearly indicated in the main entry (which is not always the case). (Often the entry will state that the grain was acquired using a “raised measure” that would yield “advantage” to the crown’s officer, but the total thus gained is not given.)

[2] E101/19/2 records two supply operations. The first was carried out late in 1334, and Melcheburn’s is the largest single grain shipment from this first operation; a good portion of the rest came from Lincoln. The second was directed by John Cailly, sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk, and was carried out in the spring of 1335.

Date	Destination	Merchant (M)/ Agent (A)	Originating City/ County	Goods and Amounts	Prices per quarter	Document Reference
1336	[not legible]	William Melcheburn	Norfolk	1000+q oats	[document largely illegible]	E101/19/34
1336-1337	Berwick	Thomas and William Melcheburn	Norfolk	c.1600q grain 840q oats 512q malt	N/A	E101/20/4
1337	Berwick	John Cailly, Sheriff	Norfolk/ Suffolk	152q grain[4]	N/A	E101/20/10
1337	N/A	William Dunstaple	Robert Causton, sheriff Norfolk/ Suffolk	186?q malt 32q malt	5S	E101/20/13
1337-1338	Berwick	Thomas Melcheburn	Lynn	200q grain	N/A	E101/20/32
1338, March 21 to August 10	Northern Fleet, Flanders Campaign	William Dunstaple	Norfolk/ Suffolk	123q grain 123 q malt 141 sheep 151 q grain 158q malt	2S	E101/21/4[5]
1338, July	Perth	Johnatte Fenn, *et. al*	Lynn?	334q grain 333q peas and beans	6S 6S	E101/21/15
1339	To Wm Walyngfordat Lynn	Thomas Melcheburn	Lynn	500q grain 168q peas/ beans 412q oats 500q malt	5S 4S 3S 5S	E101/20/37
1339	Brabant	William Walyngford	Norfolk and Suffolk [Lynn; T. Melche-burn]	28q grain 37q malt 119q oats [500q grain]	N/A	E101/21/40

[3] This document appears to be two separate shipments, one in February (largely illegible), and the second in July.

[4] Cambridge provided 691 quarters in this same accounting.

[5] E101/21/4 is the final accounting; E101/21/1 is a preliminary, single-membrane summary of receipts for the same operation, and contains slight variations in amounts purveyed. E358/1, m 6, is the Pipe Roll record of the same account, with minor variations in amounts.

Date	Destination	Merchant (M)/ Agent (A)	Originating City/ County	Goods and Amounts	Prices per quarter	Document Reference
1340[6]	Berwick	Thomas Melcheburn	Norfolk, Cambridge, Lincoln, prob. Suffolk	2000q grain 1000q oats	7S, 6D 4S	E101/22/24
1340	Berwick	William Snoryng and John atte Fenn	Lynn	222q malt 200q oats	9S 5S	E101/22/36

[6] 1340 is the date of the accounting, as Melcheburn is listed as using various sums received from 1337 to 1339 for this transaction. The month is badly smudged on the original document, but, given that the date for the last sum is April, 10 1339, would seem to be February 18, 1340. Robert de Tong reported receiving only 1831 quarters of wheat and 763 quarters of oats for this period.

Map 9. Eastern England and Scotland.

WALES, WELSHMEN, AND THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

Adam Chapman

The conflict between England and France now known as the Hundred Years War touched every part of the English realm and its peoples. At the time Edward III (r.1327-1377) first claimed the throne of France in 1340, the lands of Wales had been wholly subject to English rule for just over a half-century and its men regular members of English armies for far longer. It is unsurprising therefore that Welshmen were frequently called upon to serve the kings of England in their wars overseas. This has resulted in a popular modern view, of Welsh archers being responsible for winning English victories in some of the set-piece battles of the Hundred Years War, notably Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415). This view probably derives, in large part, from Shakespeare's Henry V, and the writings of Gerald of Wales, and probably bears only a distant relation to the activities of the majority of Welsh soldiers in this period. That said, the lives and careers of several Welsh soldiers from this period have received some of the attention they deserve.[1]

The intention of this paper is to address not only the involvement and impact of Welsh soldiers on England's wars, but the effects of these wars on Welsh society in the same period. In addition, it will also address how the governance of Wales and its geography was reflected in the military measures taken within Wales in relation to both the defense of the English realm and the conduct of English campaigns overseas.[2]

Wales as we know it today is largely a product of the Act of Union with England of 1536. Prior to that date, it was divided into royal shires that formed the principality, and marcher lordships. The shires of North Wales—Caernarfon, Meirionnydd, and Anglesey—fell to the crown fol-

[1] H.T. Evans, *Wales and the Wars of the Roses* (Oxford, 1915); D.L. Evans, "Some Notes on the Principality of Wales in the time of the Black Prince," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1926): 25-100; A.D. Carr, "Welshmen in the Hundred Years War," *Welsh History Review* 1 (1968): 35-41, idem, "A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War: Sir Gregory Sais," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* 22 (1977): 40-53.

[2] The definition of Welshmen, for the purposes of this paper, will be confined to those men living within the modern borders of Wales without making judgements on their "Welshness."

lowing the defeat of the last prince of Gwynedd, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, in 1282, while the acquisition of the shires of South Wales—Carmarthen and Cardigan—was piecemeal, haphazard and spread over two centuries. The acquisition of the marcher lordships by foreign lords was also a very lengthy process that began in the eleventh century and was only completed in the thirteenth with the dispersal of the lands between Conwy and Cheshire to some of the most important captains of Edward I (r.1272-1307) in his Welsh wars.[3] The division between the principality and the March was significant in legal, political as well as in military terms. To speak of medieval Wales as a corporate entity rather than as a place where Welshmen lived is an anachronism. This paper will, therefore borrow a contemporary formulation to discuss these political divisions; namely, the "Shires and the March" (*siroedd a'r mars*).[4]

It would be wrong to say that Welshmen dominated the military affairs of the war in France at any point between 1337 and 1453. Chroniclers of the period, following a long established tradition, when they mentioned the Welsh at all, tended to do so in order to add color to their narrative, portraying their seemingly crude manners, wild behavior, and incomprehensible language.[5] Part of Froissart's account of the battle of Crécy includes a rather graphic, and appropriate, example. The brutality of the Welsh—and Cornish—men (both subjects of Edward, the Black Prince) contrasts starkly with ideals of chivalric behavior.

> However, among the English there were pillagers and irregulars, Welsh and Cornishmen armed with long knives, who went out after the French (their own men-at-arms and archers making way for them) and, when they found any in difficulty, whether they were counts, barons, knights or squires, they killed them without mercy.[6]

The Welsh, not unnaturally, held a rather different view. England's wars in France were a constant refrain in the poetry dedicated to the leaders of the Welsh gentry and, occasionally their English lords, in the fourteenth and,

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[3] R.R. Davies, *The Age of Conquest: Wales 1066-1415* (Oxford, 1991), 363-64.

[4] From Lewis Glyn Cothi: elegy for Tomas ap Rhydderch cited by Dr Dylan Foster Evans, "Poetry and Marcher Identity, 1300-1550," [paper presented at Swansea, May 29, 2009].

[5] The most thorough survey of these external views is R.R. Davies, "Buchedd a Moes y Cymry." [The Manners and Morals of the Welsh] *Welsh History Review* 12 (1984): 155-79 (in Welsh with an English précis). My thanks to Rachel Evans for assisting me in understanding the Welsh version.

[6] *Oeuvres de Froissart, publiées avec les variantes des divers*, ed. K. de Lettenhove, 25 vols. (Brussells, 1867-1877), 5: 65-66. Translation from Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, trans. G. Brereton (London, 1978), 93.

more particularly, the fifteenth centuries. These Welshmen, with blood on their spears and the towers of France broken in their wake, were presented in a rather more heroic, even chivalric, light. War was a commonplace in Welsh culture, even among those who did not participate. Dafydd ap Gwilym, the finest of the fourteenth century poets, wrote of his relatives' efforts in the wars:

> Today there went most excellently
> with Rhys, to protect the generous, brothers in faith and foster—brothers
> And relatives of mine (I feel longing's sharpness),
> From the South to fight the French.[7]

That this poem expressed the wish that his lover's husband should not return perhaps only serves to emphasize the significance of the conflicts overseas even in the far west of Wales. Rhys was Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd of Llanrhystud, Cardiganshire, so significant a figure that no confusion could possibly arise among Dafydd's intended audience. Later in the same century, Iolo Gogh (c.1320-c.1398) described the pinnacle of achievement for another Welshman at the battle of Poitiers. The warrior in question was Sir Hywel y Fwyall (Sir Hywel of the Battleaxe, d. c.1381) of Eifionydd in the shire of Meirionnydd. Iolo supposes, despite evidence to the contrary, that Hywel himself put "a bridle on the head of the king of France" and where he was like "a barber in the agony of battle shaving heads and beards with spear and sword."[8]

Subsequent centuries, most particularly the nineteenth, have added a romantic gloss to Welshmen in the medieval past and the idea that "one Welsh archer was worth five Englishmen" at Agincourt or Crécy is still a popular one.[9] The general experience of Welsh soldiers in the Hundred Years War, of course lies somewhere between the extremes. Despite their prominence in the popular mythology of the conflict, Welsh soldiers in this period are strangely neglected by historians. It must be admitted, however,

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[7] From "I Ddymuno Lladd y Gŵr Eiddig" (To wish the Jealous Husband Killed), Dafydd ap Gwilym.net, www.dafyddapgwilym.net [accessed September 1, 2010]. The phrase "the South" here refers to the southern counties of the Principality. For Sir Rhys, see R.A. Griffiths, *The Principality of Wales in the Later Middle Ages: The Structure and Personnel of Government*, 1 vol. to date (Cardiff, 1972), 156-59.

[8] *Gwaith Iolo Goch*, ed. D. Johnston (Cardiff, 1988), 8 (II.76, pp. 80-82). For further discussion of this poem and Iolo's life and career, D. Johnston, "Iolo Goch and the English: Welsh Poetry and Politics in the Fourteenth Century," *Cambridge Medieval Celtic Studies* 12 (1986): 86-87. Though the situation regarding the capture of John II at Poitiers seems to have been somewhat confused, there is no evidence that Sir Hywel was among those who claimed to have captured him; H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition* (Manchester, 1958), 133.

[9] Comment from a studio guest during an interview on BBC Radio Wales, July 2009.

that evidence for their careers is often rather limited when compared to their English contemporaries. Fundamentally, for much of the period of the wars with France, the men of the Shires and the March were viewed as a military resource, and one of the questions this paper will address is the value of this resource. What it will not do, however, is to discuss the value of the longbow or the Welsh contribution to its development as a weapon since this has been extensively addressed elsewhere.[10]

The military role of Wales and the Welsh changed significantly between 1337 and the fall of English Gascony in 1453. The recruitment of Welshmen to serve in English armies was far from novel. Strickland and Hardy, while gathering together many examples of Welsh soldiers in English service in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, take pains to qualify the use of Welsh soldiers by marcher lords and English kings before and during the conquest of *Pura Wallia* between 1277 and 1282. Even before this period, from the twelfth century onward, Welshmen had been fixtures in English royal armies, their toughness and ubiquity being such that one modern biographer of Henry II (r.1154-1189) termed the Welsh "the Gurkhas of the twelfth century."[11]

By the beginning of Edward III's reign, Welshmen were integral parts of the English military machine. The wars against France gave the Welsh opportunities to display their military prowess, and for the Marcher lords and the English crown to exploit the military manpower of their Welsh lordships. A poor pastoral economy by English standards, incapable of supporting an excess population was better equipped to provide inexpensive soldiers in quantity rather than supplying a small number of highly qualified men. There was an extent to which the sheer scale of this resource could be said to have influenced military strategy. Edward I and Edward II (r.1307-1327) recruited enormous levies from both the Shires and the March for their wars in Scotland. Armies of 10-20,000 men would not have been a practical proposition without the resources available from Wales.[12]

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[10] See, for example, Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, *The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose* (Stroud, 2005); Robert Hardy, "The Longbow," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 161-82; David Wheatham, "The English Longbow: A Revolution in Technology?" in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 213-32; Russell Mitchell, "The Longbow-Crossbow Shootout at Crécy (1346): Has the 'Rate of Fire Commonplace' Been Overrated," in *Hundred Years War* (*Part II*), 233-51; Jim Bradbury, *The Medieval Archer* (New York, 1985); Clifford J. Rogers, "The Efficacy of the English Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries," *War in History* 5 (1998): 233-42.

[11] Ibid., 84-94. W.L. Warren, *Henry II* (1973; reprint, London, 1983), 40.

[12] See Michael Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (London, 1972), 90-102.

Edward III continued this pattern for his early wars in Scotland and, somewhat later, in France. For the campaign of 1346, to cite but a single example, perhaps 5000 Welshmen were among the 8000 or so infantry recruited.[13] Many more were employed during the subsequent siege of Calais, whose walls were sufficiently familiar to the Welsh elite to appear as a metaphor in the poems of Dafydd ap Gwilym.

> God, whose way is to protect,
> has granted a fortress to defend me,
> —the heart's fine power, the equal (for fear of man's vengeance)
> of Calais against his enemy.[14]

In the campaigns which followed the capture of Calais, however, the recruitment of poorly armed Welshmen who served predominately on foot became much less desirable. The development of the *chevauchée* and war based upon speed and movement made such troops a hindrance. Although levies continued to be recuited in the shires and the march of Wales as late as 1359, relatively few Welshmen actually signed up to serve overseas in the way that they had done in previous decades.[15] In part, this was a consequence of the comparative poverty of the Welsh economy. The development of mixed retinues composed of men-at-arms and mounted archers resulted in smaller, better equipped armies. Better equipment and the necessity of supplying a horse meant that the costs of going to war were increased even for those serving as archers. Warfare, therefore, became an occupation for those who could meet these costs or who could have them met. Some Welshmen were, inevitably, among the mixed retinues of their lords, but in notably smaller numbers than before.

There were some striking continuities however. Throughout the fourteenth century as in the past, the military service of Welshmen remained strongly tied to the great Marcher lords. Though it is unusual for the precise origins of Welshmen to be noted in muster rolls of the period and toponyms

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[13] Andrew Ayton, "The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346," in *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages*, ed. A. Curry and D. Bates (London, 1994), 253-68; idem, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994), 13-14; Clifford Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III*, 1327-1360 (Woodbridge, 2000), 217-72 and appendix 1; A. Ayton and P. Preston, *The Battle of Crécy, 1346* (Woodbridge, 2005), 181 and Appendix 1, pp. 230-51.

[14] Both Welsh original and English translation are from Dafydd ap Gwilym, *Caer Rhag Cenfigen* (A Fortress Against Envy), 17-20, edited text 122, Dafydd ap Gwilym, http://dafyddapgwilym.net [accessed September 1, 2010].

[15] A.E. Prince, "The Indenture System under Edward III" In *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, ed. J.G. Edwards, V.H. Galbraith, and E.F. Jacob (Manchester, 1933), 283-97.

were comparatively rare among the Welsh community, some examples of this continuing connection can be found. In 1375 in the retinue taken to France by Lord Edward Despenser there appear some unambiguously Welsh names. Ieuan ap Hywel ab Ieuan of "Seintgenet" was from the Commote of Senghenydd, in the eastern part of the lordship of Glamorgan where the castle of Caerfili still stands. Similarly, Grono ab Ieuan was identified with Tiriarll and Ednyfed ap Madoc with Neath on the boundary of the lordship of Gower in the west.[16]

This connection is something that the lords themselves were anxious to display. In the early years of the conflicts in France, men from the shires of north and south Wales and the earldom of Chester—in other words, in lands under royal control—were issued with tunics and hats in green and white. The Justiciars in a royal letter dated September 14, 1346, were instructed to provide each man with a short coat and a hat (*une courtepy et un chaperon partiez de meme le drap*) of these colors with green on the right (*le verte a destre*). D.L. Evans suggested that this was to inspire greater discipline in the "unruly Welsh" so often accused of "light-headedness," or, from the choice of color to inspire a national feeling, an *esprit de corps*. Pryce Morgan says something similar, hinting at some lost earlier significance and anachronistically relating the colors to the adoption of the leek as a national symbol.[17] The provision of uniforms was, in fact, part of a wider process, and shire levies routinely wore uniforms following the 1330s. This added considerably to the costs of recruiting an army, and to the irritation of localities obliged to pay for that recruitment.[18]

The choice of color seems rather more likely to have been intended as a statement by the prince of Wales, mindful of his rights, and more importantly, the opinion of his neighbors in the March.[19] Morgan, in his study of

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[16] TNA: PRO, E 101/34/3 m. 3d.

[17] Evans, 'Some Notes on the Principality of Wales," 56 and appendix II, p. 106; P. Morgan, "From Death to a View: The Hunt for a Welsh Past in the Romantic Period," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Cambridge, 1992), 80.

[18] Even as early as the 1330s, this wearing of uniforms in the English army was not entirely new. Contemporary references to white tunics or *blaunchecotes* occur in relation to recruitment of men from Launditch Hundred, Norfolk, for the abortive campaign to Gascony in 1295. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, 101.

[19] Red and white cloth was acquired for the Earl of Arundel's Welshmen going abroad in royal service in 1342. NLW Chirk Castle Collection, D. 9 (1342), cited R.R. Davies,*Lordship and Society in the March of Wales 1282-1400* (Oxford, 1978), p. 81; P.J. Morgan, *War and Society in Late Medieval Cheshire, 1277-1403* (Manchester, 1987), 104-5, 107. For example, the force of 400 archers recruited from Cheshire for the 1359 campaign was to be dressed in this manner. *Reg. B.P.* 3: 349.

the prince's lands in Cheshire, notes that he decorated in green a chamber in his palace at Westminster, and used green cloth for his exchequer in Chester, suggesting a heraldic purpose for this livery. That the men of the earldom of Cheshire—also serving under Edward—were dressed in like manner, albeit based upon later evidence, would seem to lend weight to this argument. In this way, the Black Prince could be seen to be demonstrating his superior lordship over both the land and the men of Wales. By having his men wear uniforms, he was visibly asserting his rights, and displaying his military prowess not only through his own mastery of arms, but through the weight of numbers serving under him. A distinctive uniform of this sort could serve only to heighten the impression of his control, at the expense of efforts made by the Marchers to remind him of their own rights.

The Welsh gentry had long formed their tenants into proprietary armies, under the standard of their lord, wearing his livery, and drawing pay from him. The prince, only recently established in his principality, understandably wished to remind his neighbors of the extent of his military power. It is possible that these uniforms were also worn by the men from the Black Prince's duchy of Cornwall. Froissart alleges that both Welsh and Cornish troops served under the prince at Crécy. The use of these uniforms also emphasizes the fact that war on a large scale provided an opportunity for display, not only of military talent, but of financial and landed resources, a display that enhanced the lord's "corporate image."

The attachment between Welshmen and their lords changed in the years after 1400, those which marked the beginning of the most significant period of Wales's participation in the Hundred Years War. On September 16, 1400, while Henry IV (r.1399-1413) and his son were on campaign in Scotland, Owain Glyndŵr proclaimed himself prince of Wales and began a rebellion[20] that, in one form or another, dominated the affairs of the Shires and March of Wales for the next decade.[21] Despite the regularly expressed fear by the English of Welsh "light-headedness" and internal discontent, it is noteworthy that Glyndŵr's was the only full-scale rebellion experienced in Wales during the course of the Hundred Years War. The men who shaped it had acquired their military experience in English service in Scotland, in Ireland,

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[20] For further discussion of this uprising, see Adrian Bell, et. al, "The Soldier in Later Medieval England: An Online Database," in this volume.

[21] For Owain Glyndŵr revolt, see R.R. Davies, *The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr* (Oxford, 1995); Elissa Henken, *National Redeemer: Owain Glyndower* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1996); Glanmor Williams, *Owain Glyndŵr* (Cardiff, 1993); T.W. Williams, " The Glyndŵr Rebellion: A Military Study," (Ph.D. diss; University of Swansea, 1979).

and in France and the survivors who were eventually reconciled to the English cause thereafter became prominent military retainers of the English crown. The origins of this revolt remain a matter of some debate and mystery: nevertheless it seems improbable in the extreme that a simple dispute between neighbors—Owain himself and Reginald de Grey, lord of Ruthin—would be sufficient motivation for even a man of Owain's princely lineage to declare himself prince of Wales. His appeal to the French for assistance won him Gallic backing, something that Owain Lawgogh had failed to achieve. This backing converted a superficially local rebellion within the English realm into a proxy for the wider international conflict. As with the Scots, the French rendered military assistance to the Welsh mounting a *chevauchée* across southern Wales in 1405. In return, Owain and his advisors pledged to adhere to the Avignon pope instead of recognizing an independent Welsh Church.

The Glyndŵr rebellion engendered among the English a wariness of the Welsh that persisted long afterwards. Even though in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion Henry V recruited companies of Welshmen from his estates, Welsh service in Lancastrian Normandy appears to have depended upon individual captains rising through their own ability. Into such a category one can place some of the Welsh heroes found in the poetry of the period: Mathau Gogh (Matthew Gough), Sir William ap Thomas of Raglan (the father of William Herbert, later earl of Pembroke), Sir Richard Gethin, and Sir Gruffudd Dwnn.[22]

Other characteristics of England in the fifteenth century also impacted the government of the shires and the management of the Marcher estates and, inevitably, the involvement of the Welsh in war. Many of these estates became subsumed into large landed complexes where the lord was routinely rather than occasionally absent. Throughout the period of the Hundred Years War, several of the great marcher families were blighted by minorities: the Despenser, Mortimer, and Stafford families were especially hard hit. For forty-one of the sixty-five years between 1349 and 1414 for example, the titular heads of the Despenser family, lord of the largest of the Marcher liberties, Glamorgan, were minors. This had a marked effect on the ability of Welshmen to participate in war since most were dependent

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[22] For Welsh archers in 1415 see TNA: PRO E 101/46/20 and Curry, *Agincourt*, 60-61. For Mathau Gogh, see Carr, "Welshmen in the Hundred Years War," 39-42; for Dwnn, Griffiths, *The Principality of Wales*, 201-2; and for William Thomas, see *Dictionary of Welsh Biography Down to 1940* (London, 1959), q.v. William Herbert, earl of Pembroke, 354. As yet, there is no readily accessible biography of Sir Richard Gethin.

upon the leadership of their lords. This barrier to military service was reinforced by a lack of parallel royal authority in the principality. For seventy of the 116 years between 1337 and 1453, there was no prince, and of the remainder, a decade was taken up with a contest between claimants: Owain Glyndŵr and Henry of Monmouth.[23] Military leadership, therefore, had to come from elsewhere, the native squireachy and gentry.

The process of reconciliation following the end of the Glyndŵr rebellion, ironically, brought Welshmen serving as soldiers to a greater prominence. Welsh esquires in retinues of magnates as well as of independent captains greatly increased their numbers after Henry V's invasion of Normandy in 1417. By the 1430s, at a time when the English interest in war was rapidly declining, Welsh captains were given more prominent commands from which the English nobility were increasingly notable by their absence. These personal connections arguably became more important as the fifteenth century progressed. The Welsh poet, Guto'r Glyn, wrote an elegy commemorating the fifteenth-century esquire, Henry Griffith (d. 1477), one which illustrates vividly the role such middling men played in bridging the distance between powerful, but remote lords and the men who served them in war.

> He took me to the Duke of York
> With the agreement that I should
> get eighteen marks.

The occasion for this poem can probably be identified as the prelude to Richard, duke of York's second term as lieutenant in Normandy in 1441. Guto is listed as an archer in York's personal retinue. Henry brought a separate retinue of his own.[24] Guto's military service, therefore, seems to have been an extension of his relationship with his patron, the duke, while Henry's role was that of an agent for his lord. By the close of the 1440s, war was no longer a sufficiently profitable occupation for many English gentlemen to justify the risk involved. Does this mean that contemporary Welshmen lacked gentility? No. What many Welshmen lacked was money and opportunity. Military service overseas could provide both and with the increasing remoteness of seigniorial authority in the lands of Wales, it seems that a great many Welshmen took advantage of it.

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[23] R.A. Griffiths, "Wales and the Marches in the Fifteenth Century," 63-64. It should be remembered that Edward, the Black Prince, never actually visited his principality in person.

[24] TNA: PRO, E 101/53/33. See also J.E.C. Williams, "Guto'r Glyn," in *A Guide to Welsh Literature*, ed. A.O.H. Jarman and G.R. Hughes, 7 vols.(Swansea, 1976-1984), 2: 218-42: *Dug fi at y dug of Iorc/ Dan amod cael deunawmorc.*

For such men, war provided opportunities for advancement and preferment. Attention in England has tended to be devoted to the knightly classes and the growth of the nobility and their affinities through the processes of "Bastard Feudalism."[25] Since no Welshman was ennobled until William Herbert was created earl of Pembroke in 1468, and even Welshmen of knightly rank were unusual, we have to view such moves at a lower level of society than is generally the case.[26] The Welsh squireachy, "brothers in arms of the gentry and knights of England," was essential to the functioning of Welsh society, since it provided leaders in war, agents of both the crown and marcher lords, and those in control of the majority of landed resources.[27] From the beginning of the wars with France, members of this group served not only as military recruiters and commanders in the field, but also as leaders of society at home.

The career of Owain Glyndŵr is, inevitably, the best known illustration of this. Owain, as a man of independent status, a Welsh baron, had his military career shaped by his personal and geographical connections. His father had been strongly associated with Richard Fitzalan, earl of Arundel and lord of the Marcher liberties of Oswestry and Chirk. Owain appears to have benefited: he served on the two naval expeditions led by Arundel in 1387 and 1388.[28] Earlier, he was a member of the garrison of Berwick, serving in the retinue of Sir Gregory Sais, an exceptionally experienced commander who had fought with distinction in the wars in France since the 1360s, and was also one of the circle of knights surrounding the Black Prince. Owain served in Scotland and at sea with his neighbors, men from the north-east of Wales and Cheshire. While Glyndŵr entered his middle years with no greater distinction than many of his contemporaries, his illustrious birthrite as heir to two Welsh princely dynasties combined with his personality gave him his authority.

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[25] K.B. McFarlane, "Bastard Feudalism," *Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research* 20 (1945): 161-80; P. Coss, "Bastard Feudalism Revised," *Past and Present* 125 (1989): 27-64; D. Crouch and D. Carpenter, "Debate: Bastard Feudalism Revised," *Past and Present* 126 (1991): 165-89: with reply by Peter Coss, "Reply," *Past and Present* 126 (1991): 190-203.

[26] For Welsh Knights in the fourteenth century, see A.D. Carr, "An Aristocracy in Decline: The Native Welsh Lords After the Edwardian Conquest," *Welsh History Review* 5 (1970): 103-29.

[27] R.A. Griffiths, "Wales and the Marches in the Fifteenth Century," in *King and Country: England and Wales in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. R.A. Griffiths (London, 1991), 61.

[28] A. Goodman, "Owain Glyndŵr before 1400," *Welsh History Review* 5 (1970-1971): 67-70; A. Bell, *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2004).

Military records shed light on issues of personal identity with relation to race and culture. The family of one of Glyndŵr's contemporaries, Sir Henry Conway of Rhuddlan, provides a useful parallel. Both his name and his career in the service of the English crown suggest that he was a member of the English community residing in Flintshire that was part of the royal earldom of Chester. His military service seems to have been predominately in Ireland rather than in France. Conway served there with Lionel, earl of Ulster, in the 1360s and during the following decade with Edmund Mortimer III, earl of March (d. 1381).[29] He had been retained, first as an esquire, and later, as a knight bachelor. His income was derived, in part, from two of Mortimer's estates, £40 from the issues of the Mortimer lordship of Cydewain and a similar amount from the revenues of the lordship of Denbigh. Such sizeable sums suggest a man with a prominent place in Mortimer's household. Conway was also a witness to his lord's will, made at Denbigh on May 1, 1380, prior to earl Edmund's fateful expedition to Ireland.[30]

Having retired from campaigning, Conway served as constable of Rhuddlan castle between 1395 and 1407. What is known of his family suggests that his background may have been a curious mixture of English and Welsh. Though his parents are unknown, it is probable that his mother was Welsh and certain that the family was at home within the Welsh community. His sister bore the Welsh name Gwenllian and his son, John, is known to have had children by a Welsh woman, the daughter of Rhys Wyn of Ffacknallt, who is believed to have died fighting with Hotspur at the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403.[31] The proximity of Flintshire to Cheshire assumed greater importance in the later years of the reign of Richard II. Conway's eldest son, Thomas, served as one of Richard II's archers, while one of Thomas's brothers, John, served in Scotland and at sea in the same campaigns as Owain Glyndŵr. He later profited from Glyndŵr's revolt and served as escheator for the county of Flintshire.

The case of the Conways should serve to remind us that the march of Wales was a mixed community where ideas of "Welshness" and

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[29] J.E. Messham, "Henry Conewey, Knight, Constable of the Castle of Rhuddlan, 1390-1407," *Flints. Hist. Soc. Journal* 35 (1999): 11-55; E. Roberts, "Seven John Conways," *Flints. Hist. Soc. Journal* 18 (1960): 61-74. In the retinue of Lionel as earl of Ulster and later duke of Clarence, 1361-3: TNA: PRO, E 101/28/18; TNA: PRO, E 101/32/25 mm. 2-3.

[30] The will, in French, names him as "Henry de Cornwaille." At this date, he was still an esquire; his knighting appears therefore, to have occurred on the campaign itself, a detail Messham fails to note [Messham, "Henry Conewey," 15.

[31] Ibid., 36; Roberts, "Seven John Conways," 61-74.

"Englishness" were somewhat fluid. Hence, the military contributions of those living in the shires and in the March cannot simply be categorized by ethnicity alone.

> Beware of Walys, Criste Ihesu mst us kepe,
> That it make not oure childes childe to wepe,
> Ne us also, if so it go his waye
> By unwarenesse; sethen that many a day
> Men have be ferde of here rebellione
> By grete tokens and ostanacione.[32]

[32] *The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of Sea-Power*, ed. Sir George Warner (Oxford, 1926), 40.



Map 10. Late-Medieval Wales.

PART FOUR

ENGLISH COLONIALISM

THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR, COLONIAL POLICY AND THE ENGLISH LORDSHIPS

David Green

The Hundred Years War has been defined in many ways: as a dynastic and feudal conflict, a civil war, an economic struggle, and as a bid for the French throne. But it was also, in some senses, a colonial war. This was not only because the origins of the war lay in friction surrounding the province of Gascony—what has been described as "England's First Colony."[1] The conflict was also colonial in the sense that its conduct depended upon utilization of the resources of England's many continental holdings or lordships. In this sense, the Hundred Years War also exhibits some of the hallmarks of later colonial struggles. Although by no means driven by some sort of medieval mercantilism, the importance of trade and of access to raw materials as well as markets in Flanders and Gascony should not be overlooked.[2]

Colony and colonial are, of course, problematic terms with a range of shifting meanings, and it is not the intention of this paper to suggest all the English lordships were colonies, at least in a modern sense, nor that they were the same sort of colony.[3] Indeed, a distinction between lordship and colony suggests, rightly, that there were substantial differences between the political character of these areas and the nature of their relationships with England. Legal systems varied widely as did cultural and political

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[1] Margaret Wade Labarge, *Gascony: England's First Colony 1204-1453* (London, 1980). Gascony became part of the English dominions in 1152. English lordship in parts of Ireland dated from 1169, and the antiquity of that connection was a source of pride to the Anglo-Irish colonists in the later Middle Ages: James Lydon, "Ireland and the English Crown, 1171-1541," *Irish Historical Studies* 29 (1995): 294.

[2] For a summary of the economic interpretations of the war see Philippe Contamine, "La guerre de cent ans en France: Une approche économique," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 47 (1974): 125-49. In *c.*1436, the author of the *Libelle of Englysche polycye* emphasised the importance of sea power and of protecting the Channel. He also suggested resources might be better concentrated on extending English colonial control in Ireland rather than attempting to do so in France, particularly given the situation following the congress of Arras [*The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of Sea-Power*, ed. G.F. Warner, ed. (Oxford, 1926); Russell Hope Robbins, "A Political Action Poem, 1463," *Modern Language Notes* 71 (1956): 245-58].

[3] In the same fashion there were two kinds of classical Greek colonies, *apoikiai* and *emporia*. The first were city-states, the second trading-colonies.

traditions, social customs, and languages. Furthermore, these relationships and characteristics altered throughout and because of the Hundred Years War. Despite this, however, these colonies shared a common identity deriving from their position as *pays subgiet au royaume d'Angleterre*, and the common status of their inhabitants as the king's subjects.[4] Certainly, when it suited them, communities within these territories described themselves as part of a greater whole. During the crisis of 1341, which witnessed the first major formulation of colonial grievances, the Anglo-Irish wrote to Edward III (r.1327-1377) stating that, although "various people of your allegiance, as of Scotland, Gascony, and Wales often in times past have levied war against their liege lord, at all times your English liege people of Ireland have behaved themselves well and loyally."[5]

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that these lordships were not all the same sort of colonies. Gascony, for example, an English colony for nearly two hundred years when the Hundred Years War began, experienced very little English settlement and maintained its own customs, church, and aristocracy. There was, for the most part, no attempt to expropriate land or build a new society on an English model.[6] By contrast, Wales and Ireland experienced, albeit unevenly, much higher levels of settlement, and the imposition of a new ruling class. Both were retained and maintained by the English as dependencies with firm control being exercised over policies and personnel. But, despite such distinctions between these parcels of land, whether they are termed lordships, dominions, principalities or colonies, they were, nonetheless, all held by the English crown and usually administered by a lieutenant or chief governor. As such they formed a diverse but united collective.[7]

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[4] Anne Curry, "Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown," in *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages*, ed. David Bates and Anne Curry (London, 1994), 236.

[5] R.A. Griffiths, "The English Realm and Dominions and the King's Subjects in the Later Middle Ages," in *Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society: Essays Presented to J.R. Lander*, ed. J.G. Rowe (Toronto and London, 1986), 84-85: "Those who were subject to English kings formed a complex series of interlocking and interrelated communities, between them enjoying several systems of law, acknowledging different traditions and bodies of custom, and speaking a number of languages; but they also had a common identity that derived from their history, status, and treatment as the king's subjects."

[6] Robin Frame, "Overlordship and Reaction, c.1200-c.1450," in *Ireland and Britain, 1170-1450* (London, 1998), 77-78.

[7] R.R. Davies, "Lordship or Colony?," in *The English in Medieval Ireland*, ed. James Lydon (Dublin, 1984), 157: "'Lordship or colony?' is, of course, a false alternative." Alternative titles include dominion (fourteenth-century chancery rolls speak of *dominia transmarina*: John Le Patourel, "The Plantagenet Dominions," *History* I (1965): 302 and lands ("Ireland was a

This collective, for theoretical and historical reasons, had distinctly imperial connotations. First, a "hegemonial" concept of empire asserted that a king who ruled over more than one kingdom, and was acclaimed as such, was an emperor; a claim Plantagenet kings, especially Edward I (r.1272-1307), sought to make good.[8] Furthermore, in the later Middle Ages, imperial concepts of kingship (*rex in regno suo est imperator*) became influential and, indeed, contributed to the growing tension between England and France that culminated in the Hundred Years War.[9] Second, from its inception, the Hundred Years War had distinctly *Angevin* overtones. Much of the war was fought for (or at least fought with the proclaimed intention of regaining) the lost colonies of the Angevin Empire.[10]

The loss of those continental colonies had allowed English monarchs to focus attention on their "British" lordships and their neighbours in the British Isles and Ireland to create what Rees Davies described as "The First English Empire." This initial major phase of colonization and Anglicization, including the conquest of Wales and the multiple incursions into Scotland, did not, however, reduce tensions between England and France.[11] On the contrary, the Franco-Scottish Auld Alliance (1295-1560) increased the political temperature considerably and bound together the vexed issue of the status of Scotland with that of Gascony, rendering any diplomatic resolution all but impossible. Additionally, these campaigns equipped the English with much of the military experience necessary for their early successes in France.[12]

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land, just like Aquitaine or any other land under the dominion of the king of England." Lydon, "Ireland and the English Crown," 282).

[8] J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, *The Barbarian West: The Early Middle Ages A.D. 400-1000* (London, 1962), 128. For the imperial connotations of Edward I's castle at Caernarfon, see Michael Prestwich, *Edward I* (New Haven, 1997), 211-14.

[9] The relationship established by Louis IX (1226-1270) and Henry III (1216-1272) at the treaty of Paris in 1259 became increasingly untenable in the face of ever-increasingly claims of regal sovereignty made by both Capetian and Plantagenet lawyers [*English Historical Documents, III*, ed. Harry Rothwell (London, 1975), 376-79; Pierre Chaplais, "The Making of the Treaty of Paris (1259) and the Royal Style," *English Historical Review* [hereafter *EHR*] 67 (1952): 235-53; W.M. Ormrod, "England, Normandy and the Beginnings of the Hundred Years War, 1259-1360," in *England and Normandy*, 198; Walter Ullmann, "This Realm of England is an Empire," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 30 (1979): 175-203].

[10] See M.G.A. Vale, *The Angevin Legacy and the Hundred Years War, 1250-1340* (Oxford, 1990).

[11] For discussions of Anglicization in the British Isles, see R.R. Davies, *The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles, 1093-1343* (Oxford, 2000), 142-71; Robin Frame, *The Political Development of the British Isles, 1100-1400* (Oxford, 1995), 142-68.

[12] Andrew Ayton, "The English Army at Crécy," in *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, ed. Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston (Woodbridge, 2005), 200-29; idem, "Sir Thomas Ughtred and the

This intense phase of Anglicization that occurred throughout the British Isles slowed in the reign of Edward II (r.1307-1327) and was re-galvanized only briefly during Edward III's early years. Attention, for the most part, returned to France and away from Ireland, Wales, and Scotland despite the fact that all of these were considered potential targets for a French invasion. Nonetheless, these British territories were not ignored: they needed to be utilized, maintained, defended, and governed. They were, potentially, an important source of manpower, revenue, and raw materials. Additionally, they provided various commanders and administrators with important practical experience. It is instructive to note that many Englishmen who served in the colonies in France had seen or would see service within England or on the Marches of Scotland and Wales. In this fashion a "colonial staff," including men such as Thomas Rokeby,[13] John Talbot,[14] and Richard, duke of York,[15] transferred its experience and approach to government throughout the English lordships.[16] In some cases,

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Edwardian Military Revolution," in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J.S. Bothwell (York, 2001), 107-32; Mathew Bennett, "The Development of Battle Tactics in the Hundred Years War," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 1-20, esp. 5.

[13] Rokeby served as chief governor of Ireland (1349-55, 1356-7) where his policies were coloured by his experiences on the Weardale campaign, as keeper of the castles of Stirling and Edinburgh (1336-42), and at the battle of Neville's Cross (1346). He appears to have tried to work with existing power structures where possible. In 1350-1 he retained Gaelic lords for military service as he had worked with *Scoti anglicati* in the north of England, and maintained a highly interventionist military policy. See A.J. Otway-Ruthven, "Ireland in the 1350s: Sir Thomas Rokeby and his Successors," *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland* 97 (1967): 47-49; Robin Frame, "Thomas Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire, Justiciar of Ireland," *Peritia* 10 (1996): 275. 285-6, 290, 294; idem, "Thomas Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire, the Custodian of David II," *The Battle of Neville's Cross, 1346*, ed. David Rollason and Michael Prestwich (Stamford, 1998), 50-56; idem, "Rokeby, Sir Thomas (*d.* 1357)", in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (online edn 2008).

[14] Talbot's official positions included: commander of the English garrisons at Montgomery and Bishop's Castle (1404); captain of Caernarfon (1409); lieutenant of Ireland (1414); lieutenant-general for the conduct of the war on the eastern front (1434); marshal of France (1436); lieutenant of Ireland (1445); commander of Lower Normandy (1448); lieutenant of Gascony (1452). See A.J. Pollard, "Talbot, John, First Earl of Shrewsbury and First Earl of Waterford (c.1387–1453)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (online edn 2008).

[15] York served as lieutenant of France (1436, 1440) and Ireland (1447). His influence, like magnates from the Royal Family such as the Black Prince and John of Gaunt, also extended through his estates that were scattered around England, the march of Wales, and Ireland. John Watts, "Richard of York, Third Duke of York (1411–1460)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (online edn 2009); T.B. Pugh, "Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), Duke of York, as the King's Lieutenant in France and Ireland," in *Aspect of Late Medieval Government*, 107-41.

[16] For some further examples of the colonial staff including Philip Courtenay, Nicholas Dagworth, Thomas Wetenhale, and Robert Wickford, see David Green, "Lordship and

the colonies might also prove to be a liability. Just as the king of England sought to exploit divisions in the wider kingdom of France, so the king of France sought to fracture and divide the dominions of the king of England.[17]

A consideration of the colonial dimensions of the Hundred Years War requires an engagement with two distinctive historiographical traditions. The welcome development in relatively recent years of a "British" tradition led by Rees Davies, Robin Frame, and Ralph Griffiths has, for good reason, paid comparatively little attention to events on the Continent in the later Middle Ages. The works of these authors also tend to bisect the period of the Hundred Years War.[18] They have, however, shown the importance of wider, comparative studies that do not conform to nor are restricted by traditional national boundaries. Indeed, Frame has suggested it is necessary to consider a broader canvas than just the countries of the British Isles when analyzing their national political cultures, in part because England's continental ambitions strongly influenced the character and tenor of Anglo-Celtic relations. In particular, royal ambitions in France defined and amplified a sense of English national identity which led to a greater awareness of political, cultural, and social differences between England and her neighbors in Britain and Ireland.[19]

Principality: Colonial Policy in Ireland and Aquitaine in the 1360s," *Journal of British Studies* [hereafter *JBS*] 47 (2008): 26-27 (nn. 116-18).

[17] For discussion of Edward III's "provincial strategy" in France, see John le Patourel, "Edward III and the Kingdom of France," *History*, 43 (1958), repr. in *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), 254, 258, 260-3. Jean de Vienne, admiral of the French fleet, also led a substantial force in a raid from Scotland on northern England in summer 1385 [Nigel Saul, *Richard II* (New Haven, Conn., 1997), 143-45. In 1405, French troops supported Glyn Dŵr. R.R. Davies, *The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr* (Oxford, 1995), 193-95].

[18] In addition to those works already cited see: R.R. Davies, "The English State and the 'Celtic' Peoples, 1100-1400," *Journal of Historical Sociology* [hereafter *JHS*] 6 (1993): 1-14; idem, "In Praise of British History," in *The British Isles, 1100-1500: Comparisons, Contrasts and Connections*, ed. R.R. Davies (Edinburgh, 1988), 9-26; Robin Frame, "Overlordship and Reaction, *c.*1200-c.1450," in *Uniting the Kingdom?: The Making of British History*, ed. Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer (London and New York, 1995), 65-84; R.A. Griffiths, "The Island of England in the Fifteenth Century: Perceptions of the Peoples of the British Isles," *Journal of Medieval History* [*JMH*] 29 (2003): 177-200; *idem*, "Crossing the Frontiers of the English Realm in the Fifteenth Century," in *Power and Identity in the Middle Ages: Essays in Memory of Rees Davies*, ed. Huw Pryce and John Watts (Oxford, 2007), 211-25.

[19] The corporate character of the English State required constant interaction between its various components and that in order to analyse its political character one needs to consider these components (lordships, dominions, principalities, lands, etc) as a whole. See Frame, "Overlordship and Reaction," 171, 182-3; W.M. Ormrod, "Edward III and his Family," *JBS* 26 (1987): 398-422; R.R. Davies, "The English State and the 'Celtic' Peoples,

Similarly, although authors concerned specifically with Anglo-French affairs are well aware of developments in the wider British Isles and Ireland during the period of the war, these developments are rarely considered in their writings.[20] The comparative approach offered here allows for a re-examination of a number of important questions regarding the Hundred Years War and the way it was conducted. In addition to surveying colonial policy, this paper will examine the extent to which the administration of and approach to the English colonial lordships in France was affected by those in Britain and Ireland (and perhaps vice versa). More fundamentally, such an approach may provide some insights regarding English motivations for fighting the war in order to ascertain whether it was viewed as a struggle to maintain or extend colonial interests in France or with an eye to the kingdom itself.

At the outbreak of the war in 1337 the English royal dominions comprised Gascony, Wales, Ponthieu, Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands, with the theoretical addition of Scotland. The war would add to these lordships. Calais and its March were conquered in 1347; in 1360 the treaty of Brétigny appended extensive lands to the duchy of Gascony creating the short-lived principality of Aquitaine; Normandy was conquered between 1417 and 1419; and the 1420 treaty of Troyes established English control over Paris and much of northern France. However, the treaty also changed the colonial status of the English king's French lands since thereafter he claimed to hold them either as regent and heir to the French crown (1420-1422) or as king of France.

Although, for the most part, England's attention turned away from her neighbors in Britain and Ireland after the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, these areas were not ignored. In particular, defensive preparations and improvements to fortifications were made regularly. Additional measures were also taken to utilize colonial resources and, when the opportunity arose, to insure that English dominance was asserted. For example, although English control over Ireland had already begun to lessen by 1337, serious attempts were made in the 1350s, 1360s, and 1390s to rein-

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1100-1400," *JHS* 6 (1993): 12-13; R.A. Griffiths, *King and Country: England and Wales in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 1991), 33-53.

[20] An exception to this is the role of Welsh soldiers on both sides of the conflict [A.D. Carr, "Welshmen and the Hundred Years' War," *Welsh History Review* 4 (1968): 21-46; Michael Siddons, "Welshmen in the Service of France," *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies* 36 (1989): 161-84; D.A. Trotter, "Merry, Welsh, or Both?: A Philological Perspective on the Company of Welshmen," *Welsh History Review* 17 (1994-1995): 452-61].

force royal control over the diminishing lordship and, indeed, to extend that authority.[21]

Meanwhile in Wales, the Edwardian settlement continued to maintain a firm grip on the population and the fourteenth century saw little large-scale opposition to English administration. Welsh soldiers would play an important role in a number of campaigns in France, especially in the victory at Crécy and in the capture of Calais, England's first colonial acquisition of the war. Perhaps as many as 7,000 Welshmen fought for England in 1346-1347 with 4,572 participating in the siege.[22] Ten years later, Avesbury referred to "a great number of Welshmen" (*magnaque numero Wallensium*) serving in England's armies, although there seems to have been only a relatively small Welsh contingent in both the *grande chevauchée* of 1355 led by the Black Prince, and at the battle of Poitiers in the following year.[23] Welsh troops—around 1,000—also participated in the Reims campaign of 1359-1360.[24] Despite this apparent support, English colonial policies, some of which were the necessary consequence of war and some implemented by Welshmen, led to the growing dissatisfaction that eventually found expression in the Glyn Dŵr revolt. This attempt to throw off colonial control led to the introduction of draconian policies to limit Welsh political

[21] This process was particularly evident during the administrations of Thomas Rokeby, Lionel of Clarence, William Windsor, and most potently in Richard II's two expeditions: see J.A. Watt, "The Anglo-Irish Colony Under Strain, 1327-99," in *A New History of Ireland, Volume II: Medieval Ireland 1169-1534*, ed. Art Cosgrove (Oxford, 1987), 352-96. In the period 1361-76 over £91,000 were spent on wages alone for armies sent to Ireland (£16,000 from Irish resources): P. Connolly, 'The Financing of English Expeditions to Ireland, 1361-1376', *England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1981), 117.

[22] Welsh troops were often organised alongside those recruited from Cheshire. The National Archive [hereafter TNA]: Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], E403/336/44; *Black Prince's Register* [hereafter *BPR*], 4 vols. (London, 1930-1933), 1: 7, 13, 68-9, 80; G. Wrottesley, ed. *Crécy and Calais from the Public Records* (Collections for a History of Staffordshire edited by the William Salt Archaeological Society, xviii), 58; Andrew Ayton, 'The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346', *England and Normandy*, ed. Bates and Curry, 261-62 (n. 55); *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales*, *ed.* J.G. *Edwards* (Cardiff, 1935), 193, 236-37; *A History of Carmarthenshire*, ed. John E. Lloyd, 2 vols (Cardiff, 1935), 1: 249.

[23] Robert of Avesbury, *De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii*, ed. E.M. Thompson (London, 1889), 425; R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1909-31), 1: 124 (n. 4); D.L. Evans, "Some Notes on the History of the Principality of Wales in the Time of the Black Prince, 1343-1376," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymrodorion* (1925-1926), 62-63, 80.

[24] TNA: PRO, E101/393/11 ff. 115r-v.; *BPR*, III, 331, 349-50, 367-68; *Foedera, Conventiones, Literae etc*., ed. Thomas Rymer 3 vols. in 6 pts. (London, 1816-1830), III, i, 415; *The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340*, ed. Mary Lyon, Bryce Lyon, and Henry S. Lucas (Brussels, 1983), 356-62; Richard Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince* (Woodbridge, 1978), 158.

or military influence in their own country. Some of these are comparable to the Irish "degeneracy" legislation imposed in 1295 and extended in the Statute of Kilkenny of 1366.[25] As a consequence, only 500 soldiers from south Wales were recruited in 1415 for the Agincourt campaign: Welshmen from the north were distrusted, although some may have served with the musters from Cheshire and Lancashire.[26]

Legislation such as the Statute of Kilkenny, "the most famous condemnation of the Irish and their way of life in an official record,"[27] as well as similar laws introduced in Wales suggests there was a complete contrast between English attitudes to Celtic countries and French dominions—the distinction based on whether their territory had been conquered on inherited.[28] On the other hand, this distinction became blurred in the context of the Hundred Years War. After all, Calais, much of the principality of Aquitaine, and those lands in Normandy and northern France acquired by Henry V between 1413 and 1422 were the product of conquest or, at the very least, of diplomatic settlements secured through military force. Indeed, those territories taken by Henry prior to the treaty of Troyes were referred to as the *pays de conquête*. Furthermore, as noted above, the prosecution of the war and the transference of staff and officers throughout the king's lordships guaranteed greater similarities of policy and practice between the English colonies in the British Isles and those in France. While such policies and practices reflected those at work in England, they did not all sit well in the different political environments.

The growth of what has been described as the Plantagenet "war state" was founded on the need to exploit national and extra-national resources for military purposes.[29] This imperative was transferred throughout the Plantagenet dominions. Most colonial governors were charged with

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[25] *Statutes and Ordinances, and Acts of the Parliament of Ireland. King John to Henry V*, ed. H.F. Berry (Dublin, 1907), 430-69; Seán Duffy, "The Problem of Degeneracy," in *Law and Disorder in Thirteenth-Century Ireland: The Dublin Parliament of 1297*, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1997), 87-106; R.A. Griffiths, *The Principality of Wales in the Later Middle Ages: The Structure and Personnel of Government, I: South Wales, 1277-1536* (Cardiff, 1972), xix.

[26] Anne Curry, "Sir Thomas Erpingham: A Career in Arms," in *Agincourt, 1415*, ed. Anne Curry (Stroud, 2000), 66; C.T. Allmand, *Henry V* (New Haven, 1997), 209. Welsh troops continued to be recruited throughout Henry's campaigns, for example in 1420. See TNA: PRO, E403/645/6.

[27] J. Lydon, "Nation and Race in Medieval Ireland," *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. Simon Forde, Lesley Johnson, Alan V. Murray (Leeds, 1995), 105.

[28] Le Patourel, "Plantagenet Dominions," 306.

[29] The value of this term is discussed in detail by Gerald Harriss, "Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England," *Past and Present* 138 (1993): 28-57.

improving the financial profitability of their territories, often in the hope that they could operate independently of English financial expenditures, and in time even make a profit for the English treasury.[30] This period, especially the years after the Black Death, also saw an attempt by the crown, buttressed by parliament and an expanding state bureaucracy, to exert a greater degree of control over its subjects. This was not only to insure the regular payment of taxation, but also to enforce greater social and political control.

The state began to intrude into new areas seeking to standardize such matters as dress, language, and employment. The labor legislation, sumptuary and game laws, so unpopular in England, were attempts to regulate and restrict social and economic mobility and they have much in common with legislation used to control colonial populations.[31] As a result, the English not only faced revolts in colonies such as Wales, Ireland, and Aquitaine but also in England in 1381 and 1450. In this context, certain aspects of colonial government and the sometimes hostile responses to it should not only be viewed in ethnic terms, but as a consequence of the growth of the English state during and because of the Hundred Years War.

The two main periods of English colonization in the Hundred Years War came in the late 1350s/early 1360s and in the ten years or so after 1415. Both periods of expansion were founded, in part, on battlefield successes—Poitiers and Agincourt—and the treaties that followed them. The English victory at Poitiers (1356) and the capture of Jean II of France (r.1350-1364) changed the political dynamic of the war.[32] Edward III had already expressed his wish to restore his Angevin inheritance, but that wish became a demand in the two treaties of London (May 8, 1358 and March 24, 1359).[33] When these demands were not met he launched an expedition to Reims

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[30] For the financial agendas of Lionel of Clarence and the Black Prince in Ireland and Aquitaine see Green, "Lordship and Principality," 20-22. For conditions in Anglo-Burgundian Paris and northern France, see G.L. Thompson, *Paris and its People under English Rule: The Anglo-Burgundian Regime, 1420-1436* (Oxford, 1991), 26-31.

[31] Chris Given-Wilson, "Service, Serfdom and English Labour Legislation, 1350-1500," in *Concepts and Patterns of Service in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. Anne Curry and Elizabeth Matthew (Woodbridge, 2000), 21-37; Colin Richmond, "An Outlaw and Some Peasants: The Possible Significance of Robin Hood," *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 37 (1993): 93; N.B. Harte, "State Control of Dress and Social Change in Pre-Industrial England," in *Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F.J. Fisher*, ed. D.C. Coleman and A.H. John (London, 1976), 139-40.

[32] Chris Given-Wilson and Françoise Bériac, "Edward III's Prisoners of War: The Battle of Poitiers and its Context," *English Historical Review* 116 (2001): 813-14, 829-30.

[33] Delachenal, *Charles V*, 2: 400-7; Clifford Rogers, "The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1354-1360 Reconsidered," in *Age of Edward III*, 205-7.

and then Paris in 1359-1360 resulting in the treaty of Brétigny-Calais (May 8, 1360). This went some way towards restoring the empire and formed a central element in a wider, albeit doomed policy of Plantagenet expansion and colonialism.[34]

For some years prior to 1360, Edward III had sought to create a series of lordships or colonies (perhaps *appanages*[35]) for his sons through various means—marriages, treaties, force. Negotiations opened for Edmund of Langley to marry Margaret of Burgundy, the richest heiress in Christendom, which, had the papacy granted a dispensation, would have created a Flemish empire. The succession to the Scottish throne was also at stake as David II (r.1329-1370), only released from English captivity in 1357 after his defeat at Neville's Cross (1346), was childless. For a while, another of Edward's sons, John of Gaunt, appears to have been the favored candidate to occupy the northern throne.[36] Although this did not take place, Gaunt gained a claim to a different throne in part because of the political relationship established with Castile and her king, Pedro "the Cruel" (r.1350-1366/69) during the 1360s.[37]

In 1362, on his fiftieth birthday, Edward III took two major decisions regarding the government of his colonial territories in the British Isles and France. Lionel of Antwerp, soon to be duke of Clarence, was despatched to act as the king's lieutenant in Ireland,[38] and his elder brother, Edward of Woodstock (the Black Prince), received the main colonial acquisition

[34] Rymer, *Foedera*, III: I, 343.

[35] Robin Frame noted Edward III hoped Lionel of Clarence's Irish lands "would form a significant part of an *appanage* of a cadet branch of his own family" ["English Policies and Anglo-Irish Attitudes in the Crisis of 1341-1342," in *England and Ireland*, ed. Lydon, 96]. Such a policy, or at least an attitude, continued throughout the Hundred Years War: in the 1430s John Hardyng commented that both Normandy and Gascony were possessions comparable to the Valois *appanages* [*The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. H. Ellis (1821; reprint, New York, 1974), 379 ["And Normandy and Guyan as appent remayn should to him [Henry V] and his heyres"].

[36] R. Nicholson, *Scotland: The Later Middle Ages* (Edinburgh, 1974), 161, 163, 170-1. Various schemes for one of Edward III's younger sons to inherit the Scottish throne were discussed from 1350 until 1364. *Knighton's Chronicle, 1337-1396*, ed. G.H. Martin (Oxford, 1995), 136 and 137 (n. 4); Michael Penman, *David II, 1329-1371* (East Linton, 2004), 153-54, 162, 166-67, 308, 313, 320-22.

[37] Rymer III, ii, 73. "The Anglo-French peace of 1360 facilitated a revival of Anglo-French competition for influence in Castile." The Nájera campaign following the treaty of Libourne (1366) was "presumably motivated by the conviction that an anglophile Castile would help to stabilise the prince's rule in a vastly extended English Aquitaine" [Anthony Goodman, "England and Iberia in the Middle Ages," in *England and her Neighbours, 1066-1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais*, ed. Michael Jones and M.G.A. Vale (London, 1989), 86].

[38] July 1, 1361: *Calendar of Patent Rolls* [hereafter *CPR*]. *Edward III*, 16 vols. (London, 1891-1914), vol. 12 (1361-1364), 44; Rymer, III, 2: 609-12. Additional grants to the royal family included: the earldom of Richmond and honour of Hertford (Gaunt); lands in Yorks and

of this period, the principality of Aquitaine, which had been created in the treaty of Brétigny.[39] This particular colonial experiment would ultimately bring about the reopening of the Hundred Years War as a result of a rebellion against the prince's regime and an appeal by the Aquitainian nobility to Charles V and the *parlement* of Paris.[40]

Edward III also took the opportunity to marry off his children for political advantage and with a view to extend his overseas and colonial influence. The king's daughters were found suitable husbands: Margaret was married to John Hastings, earl of Pembroke, and Mary to Jean de Montfort, claimant to the duchy of Brittany. Although Edward renounced his claim to the overlordship of Brittany in 1362, he tried to guarantee that it would remain in the Plantagenet (Angevin) orbit. After Mary's death, Jean de Montfort, without Edward III's approval, married Joan Holland, the Black Prince's step-daughter.[41] Further substantial territorial blocs were created through Gaunt's marriage to Blanche of Lancaster (1359), and the betrothal

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Lincs (Edmund of Langley); various manors (Isabella of Woodstock) S.L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III* (Cambridge, 1991), 123.

39 British Library, Ms Stowe 140 ff. 50v-56; Add. 32097 f. 108v.; Rymer, III, 2: 667.

40 Guilhem Pepin has argued vigorously and with good cause that the Black Prince's regime in Aquitaine has been characterised unfairly as despotic, oppressive and tyrannical ["Towards a New Assessment of the Black Prince's Principality of Aquitaine: A Study of the Last Years (1369-72)," *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 50 (2006): 59-114; idem, "The Parlement of Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine: The Three Estates of Aquitaine (Guyenne)," *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 52 (2008): 133-45]. Both articles provide a number of important insights and welcome correctives. They do, however, tend to emphasise unduly those "negative" views of the prince's regime expressed in recent works. For example, in the standard biography of the Black Prince, Richard Barber states "To be fair to the prince, his administration was far from being oppressive if measured in English terms" [*Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, 213]. W.M. Ormord, similarly, does not suggest the prince was a despot but rather that his "attempts to set up a strong, centralized regime indicated a complete misunderstanding of local political traditions [which] ultimately brought about a collapse of English rule in southern France" [*The Reign of Edward III: Crown and Political Society in England, 1327-1377* (updated ed. Stroud, 2000), 36]. I have argued that in accordance with normal procedure the Black Prince imposed a range of "English" governing practices which did not sit well with the Aquitanian nobility and that the revolt against his administration was, primarily, a failure of "good lordship," mainly because of cultural differences over what good lordship entailed [David Green, *Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe* (Harlow, 2007), 134-35; idem, 'Lordship and Principality', 3-30]. A case in point is Dr Pepin's comment that "The traditionally accepted view is that this *fouage* [that of 1368] was unilaterally imposed by the Prince on his Aquitainian subjects" ["Parlement of Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine," 142]. In fact, Barber states, "When the estates of Gascony met in January 1368, the prince asked them for a *fouage* of 10 *sous* per annum for five years" [*Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, 210]. See also Green, *Edward the Black Prince*, 137: "The catalyst for the rebellion was the *fouage* the Estates of Aquitaine granted following the Castilian campaign."

41 Michael Jones, *Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399: Relations with England and France During the Reign of Duke John IV* (Oxford, 1970), 18, 45.

of Lionel's daughter, Philippa of Ulster, to Edmund Mortimer, the heir to the earldom of March. These maneuvers created for the Plantagenets a major landed interest in Ireland.[42] However, the marriage for love of the heir-apparent, Edward, to Joan, "the Fair Maid of Kent," a widow with a further, albeit annulled marriage to her name, brought little by way of political, territorial or financial gain, and, indeed, in the long run, proved to be a liability for the dynasty.

Edward III's policy around 1360 appears to have been fashioned on earlier models. By the treaty of Montmirail (1169), Henry II (r.1154-1189) had designated his son, Henry, heir to England, Normandy and Anjou; Geoffrey was to have Brittany; and Richard, Aquitaine. Later, the king planned to hand Ireland over to John to form the chief inheritance of a cadet branch of the royal house. Irish scholar, Philomena Connolly, has compared Lionel's appointment as royal lieutenant with the arrangement envisaged for Ireland by Henry II at the Council of Oxford in 1177.[43] Similarly, in 1254, Henry III (r.1216-1272) granted Edward the chief lordships outside of England—Ireland, Gascony, estates in Wales and elsewhere. These were to be held with extensive powers, albeit with the proviso that they should never be separated from the crown.

Edward III's plans were shaped by political opportunism and, like those of Henry II, by the pressures of a large family for which he had to make provision.[44] His schemes foundered for various reasons. The treaty of Brétigny itself was flawed and the concluding *cest assavoir* clauses, by which French sovereignty over Gascony and English claims to the throne of France should have been renounced, were never signed. The opposition of the Francophile papacy insured the creation of a Burgundian principality rather than an Anglo-Flemish empire. The marriage of David II to Margaret Drummond in 1363 ended hopes of an Englishman acceding to the Scottish throne. The Castilian alliance failed with the murder of Pedro "the Cruel" at Montiel in 1369, although, through his marriage to Constanza (1371), Gaunt maintained a claim to that throne until 1388.

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[42] See further Brendan Smith, "Lordship in the British Isles *c*.1320-*c*.1360: The Ebb Tide of English Empire?" *Power and Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. Pryce and Watts, 153-63. Links were also forged with powerful families on the marches of Wales and Scotland [Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III*, 124].

[43] *CPR*, Edward III, vol. 12 (1364-1367), 20; Philomena Connolly, "Lionel of Clarence in Ireland, 1361-6." (Ph.D. thesis, Trinity College, University of Dublin, 1978), 20-21, 25-26, 220; A.J. Otway-Ruthven, "The Chief Governors of Medieval Ireland," *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland* 95 (1965): 228-29.

[44] Henry II had four sons and three daughters who survived infancy, by comparison with Edward III's five sons and four daughters [Ormrod, "Edward III and his Family," 398-422].

Therefore, England's wider empire in the reign of Edward III was stillborn, and in 1369 the limitations of the treaty of Brétigny became clear as war with France resumed. The additional territories which had composed the principality of Aquitaine were lost in about eighteen months, and for the next forty years the English *chevauchée* strategy in France brought no new territorial gains. But, as in the 1360s, an Anglo-French truce, secured by a treaty in 1396, provided the English king, now Richard II (r.1377-1399), with the opportunity to reinforce his authority in Ireland with campaigns in 1395-1396 and 1399. These achieved little. Richard's absence across the Irish Sea proved personally disastrous, while the disruption caused by the Lancastrian usurpation offered Owain Glyn Dŵr the opportunity to lead a Welsh revolt. It was a series of events, however, that had important colonial consequences. Further measures were introduced in Wales to subdue the population, and the revolt there offered the future Henry V (r.1413-1422) valuable experience before he embarked on the next major colonial program in the Hundred Years War: first, the capture of Harfleur and Caen in the Agincourt campaign, and second the conquest of Normandy between 1417 and 1419.[45]

It seems that Henry V's original intention was also based on historic claims, both Angevin and older: namely to gain Normandy in full sovereignty in addition to those territories surrendered by the French at Brétigny in 1360.[46] According to the *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, Henry "prepared to cross to Normandy in order to recover the duchy, which belongs to him by a right dating from the time of William the first, the Conqueror" and to make good "his divine right and claim to the duchy of Aquitaine."[47] In the event, Henry's successes at Agincourt and in Normandy, and the vicissitudes of the French civil war led Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy (r.1419-1467) to seek an alliance with the English king after the murder of the previous duke, John the Fearless (r.1404-1419), on September 10, 1419. The treaty of Troyes (1420) followed and with it the establishment of Anglo-Burgundian

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45 Allmand, *Henry V*, 16-38; Anne Curry, *Agincourt: A New History* (Stroud, 2005), 16-17.

46 G.L. Harriss suggested that the York Minster screen "may have been designed to celebrate and symbolize the recovery of Normandy, the ancient heritage of the English crown" [*Henry V: The Practice of Kingship* (Oxford, 1985), 29]. Anne Curry, however, has argued there is little contemporary evidence to suggest this was in the forefront of Henry's mind in 1415 ["Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?," 241-52]. In the treaty of Brétigny, the claim to Normandy had been abandoned, as it had been in the 1259 treaty of Paris.

47 *Gesta Henrici Quinti: The Deeds of Henry the Fifth*, ed. Frank Taylor and John S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), 16-18; John Palmer, "The War Aims of the Protagonists and the Negotiations for Peace," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971), 54-55; Juliet Barker, *Agincourt*: *The King, the Campaign, the Battle* (London, 2005), 14.

rule in Paris and northern France. The treaty also reshaped the colonial character of Henry's estates in France as he was now to be her king. For example, the duchy of Normandy, thereafter, was to be considered part of the kingdom of France, not a special English possession: Henry ceased to style himself duke of Normandy, as he had previously.[48]

Of the new territories acquired through the treaty of Troyes, the most important was the city of Paris. Clearly, it was considered a very different sort of colony from those elsewhere, and this was evident from the outset. The capital saw relatively few changes in its government, which had been under Burgundian control since 1418, and at least until 1429 remained in the hands of French Parisians. Consequently, there was limited English influence over the city's day-to-day administration and, indeed, only a token military presence. Parisians, it seems, were ready, albeit reluctantly, to ally themselves with the Lancastrians, at least after the murder of John the Fearless, but their chief loyalty was to Burgundy rather than England.[49]

Normandy, by contrast, had been acquired through military conquest and was a much more explicitly colonial territory; certainly it provides the chief example of English settlement during the Hundred Years War. Settlement, however, should not necessarily be seen as a key criterion for a colony. In a seminal article on the political character of Anglo-Ireland, Rees Davies noted that settlement and the displacement of natives did not necessarily lead to the establishment of a colony. Rather, he suggested that colonial status should be judged by governmental dependence on a "mother country," which also exercised legislative and judicial control, and wielded extensive political and social patronage.[50] Such an argument again suggests the importance of a broad definition of a colony in the medieval period. On the other hand, there is no doubt that wide-scale settlement could be an important element in establishing and seeking to maintain control over a colonial territory. This had been seen in the early years of English involvement in Ireland and through the establishment of the "Englishries" in Wales.[51] Gascony provides a different example in the fifteenth century: few Englishmen apart from those performing crucial mili-

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[48] Curry, "Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?," 237-38.

[49] Certainly, after the treaty of Arras, the Burgundians played a crucial role in recapturing Paris for Charles VII: Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 10, 37-44, 149-50, 159, 208-9, 238; idem,"Le régime anglo-bourguignon à Paris: facteurs idéologiques," in *La 'France anglaise' au moyen âge*, ed. R.H. Bautier (Paris, 1988), 53-60.

[50] Davies, "Lordship or Colony?," 151-52.

[51] R.E. Glasscock, "Land and People *c.*1300," in *New History of Ireland*, ed. Cosgrove, 212-16; R.R. Davies, "Colonial Wales," *Past and Present*, 65 (1974): 3-6, 11.

tary or administrative functions settled in the duchy; it is possible, however, that settlement was more substantial in the period of the principality of Aquitaine (1362-1372).[52]

In all these colonies, both British and French, the main concern of the English administrations was with establishing or maintaining political control, especially in urban centres either through settlement or other means. Either a substantial proportion of the native population would be displaced or attempts were made to establish good relations with that population. The latter policy was particularly difficult to achieve if the campaign preceding the capture of the territory or town had been especially harsh. The siege of Calais (1346-1347) is well known in this regard; the siege, which lasted for an entire year, was a bitter one and Edward's anger over this was such that good relations with the former inhabitants could never be established. Ultimately, they were expelled and the town completely repopulated with English settlers.[53] The first major territorial acquisition of the Hundred Years War, Calais became a vital part of the economic and political life of later medieval England, integrating closely colonial and domestic concerns. As the location of the wool staple that contributed a considerable proportion of the resources needed to administer and defend the town and surrounding "Pale,"[54] it also formed a diplomatic and military bridgehead for numerous operations during the Hundred Years War.

In the principality of Aquitaine, the Black Prince sought to establish good relations with urban communities by confirming the privileges of many towns and gaining support among politically important families and individuals. In Poitou, Saintonge, La Rochelle, and elsewhere, various liberties were confirmed or increased, and even though administrative offices usually went to Englishmen, roles in justice and finance were offered to Frenchmen. Famously, the prince had particular problems securing the loyalty of the Aquitainian nobility, but his record was not, by any means, one of complete failure. For example, one Aquitanian noble, Guichard d'Angle, had fought against the Black Prince at Poitiers, but gave his allegiance to him when he took up the principality of Aquitaine in 1363. He became a trusted member of the court, and after the revolt and the appeal

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[52] Robert Boutruche, "Anglais et Gascons en Aquitaine du xiie au xve siècles. Problems d'histoire sociale," in *Mélanges d'histoire dédiés à la memoire de Louis Halphen* (Paris, 1951), 57.

[53] Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, I: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990), 576-83.

[54] David Grummitt, "The Financial Administration of Calais," *EHR* 113 (1998): 277-99, esp. 278-79, 299. On Calais' later role in the Hundred Years War, see idem, *The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436-1558* (Woodbridge, 2008).

to Charles V of France (r.1364-1380) instigated by his fellow nobles, the counts of Armagnac and Albret, was appointed tutor to Richard II. In 1377, d'Angle became earl of Huntingdon.[55] By contrast, despite receiving various grants and offices , another of the Aquitanians, Guillaume Séris, returned to the French fold in 1369 and Charles V rewarded him with the office of president of the *parlement* of Paris.[56] The policy Lionel of Clarence employed in Ireland was similar: he gave charters, grants or privileges to nineteen towns and tried to secure the support of significant individuals and families.[57] But he too found conditions difficult. For example, within eleven years of the substantial territorial grants made to Philip Ballagh Barret, his family rose in open rebellion against the English administration.[58]

Such experiences may have shaped later English settlement policies in Normandy and northern France. It has been suggested there were fears that Normandy might see the creation of another "middle nation" such as that developed in Ireland—one both distanced from the mother country and also disliked by the indigenous population.[59] If so, such concerns proved prescient. While there is little doubt that Normandy retained a particular place in the popular imagination because of the duchy's ancient ties to England, few Englishmen proved willing to fund its defense in the long term.[60]

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[55] Jonathan Sumption, "Angle, Guichard (IV) d', earl of Huntingdon (c.1308x15–1380)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004; online edn 2006).

[56] Rymer, III, i, 548; Robert Favreau, "Comptes de la sénéchaussée de Saintonge, 1360-2," *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes* 117 (1959): 76-8; idem, "La cession de La Rochelle à l'Angleterre en 1360," in *La France Anglaise*, 222-27; Pierre Chaplais, "Some Documents Regarding the Fulfilment and Interpretation of the Treaty of Brétigny," *Camden Society* 3rd ser. 19 (1952): 52-53 (nn. 1-2).

[57] Delachenal, *Charles V*, IV: 18-20, 67; P. Boissonnade, *Histoire de Poitou* (Paris, 1941), 136-37; Émile Labroue, *Bergerac sous les Anglais* (Bordeaux, 1893), 66; Arlette Higounet-Nadal, *Périgeux au XIVe et XVe siècles* (Bordeaux, 1978), 148.

[58] For grant made on July 16, 1366, see K. Nicholls, "The Development of Lordship in County Cork, 1300-1600," in *Cork History and Society*, ed. P. O'Flanagan and C. Buttimer (Dublin, 1993), 169-71.

[59] C.T. Allmand, "La Normandie devant l'opinion anglaise à la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans," *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes*, 128 (1970): 355.

[60] Maurice Keen has shown the extent to which Englishmen came to identify with royal claims and aspirations in France citing James Gresham's letter to John Paston of August 19, 1450: "Today it is told Cherbourg is gone and we have now not a foot of land left in Normandy ["*Paston Letters*, ed. J. Gairdner (London, 1872), I, no. 103; Keen, 'The End of the Hundred Years War: Lancastrian France and Lancastrian England', *England and her Neighbours*, 297, 307]. Similarly, Jack Cade and his rebels demanded punishment for those responsible for the surrender of the duchy. However, parliament became increasingly unwilling to fund military operations, partly because of a general financial downturn exacerbated by the costs of Henry VI's marriage and his religious and educational projects. See G.L. Harriss,

In establishing the Norman colony, Henry V's policy shifted between brutality and leniency. In his early campaign, at Harfleur and Caen for example, hostages were taken, there were mass expulsions, and government records were destroyed. Henry's brutality assured that he would face little resistance elsewhere. Later, he and his successors sought to create a spirit of conciliation while maintaining an intimidating military presence. Towns such as Bayeux and Rouen had their privileges confirmed and townsmen were encouraged to petition the king in the hope that they would see him as a just and legitimate ruler. Like his predecessors, Henry recognized that a good relationship between ruler and ruled was vital for administrative, financial, and military reasons. For example, in many Norman towns, military responsibilities were clearly demarcated: the Crown defended the castle and the townsmen the walls.[61]

But Henry also saw the conquest of Normandy as the first stage in a wider program of expansion, one that would require something more than passive support for his regime. As a consequence, the king sought to populate the towns (especially Harfleur, Cherbourg and Caen) and the lands in northern France which were his "by right of conquest" (*par droite de conquête*) with a substantial English presence—men who would defend, maintain, or augment his territorial holdings as "a sort of military colonization" (*une sorte de colonisation militaire*).[62] As Christopher Allmand and Anne Curry have shown, Henry V, the duke of Bedford, their lieutenants, and successors gave these colonists a personal stake in maintaining "English France" (*La France Anglaise*) while also insuring they had specific responsibilities to do so.[63]

In the main, though, in order to establish or retain control over these colonies, English administrations worked with existing power structures and employed local men in official positions. In Wales, although high office was normally restricted, local government usually remained in Welsh

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"Marmaduke Lumley and the Exchequer Crisis of 1446-9," in *Aspects of Late Medieval Government*, 143-78.

[61] Anne Curry, "Towns at War: Relations between the Towns of Normandy and their English Rulers, 1417-1450," in *Towns and Townspeople in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. J.A.F. Thompson (Stroud, 1988), 149, 157-61.

[62] L. Puisseux, *L'émigration normande et colonisation anglaise en Normandie au XVe siècle* (Paris, 1866), 66. "Henry sought to expel some of the Harfleurais and to people his town with English on a colonial model" [Curry, 'Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?," 241].

[63] C.T. Allmand, "The Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy, 1417-50," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser. 21 (1968): 461-79, esp. 463-6. Major grantees included Salisbury who received Perche; Thomas, duke of Clarence, who received the three *vicomtés* of Aubec, Orge and Pontaudemer; and Edmund Beaufort who received the county of Maine.

hands. The Statute of Rhuddlan (1284) had not excluded Welshmen from holding official positions, although restrictions were introduced after the 1294-1295 revolt. By the middle years of the fourteenth century, over eighty percent of offices below that of sheriff were held by Welshmen.[64] This, too, was the case in Gascony and Aquitaine, where it was also necessary to maintain the good will of the aristocracy who played a vital role of the defence of the duchy/principality[65] and contributed troops to "English" expeditionary forces into the French interior. The retinues of Gascon nobles were particularly prominent in the 1355-1356 campaigns.[66] In Ireland, too, there was a need to entrust administrative and military responsibilities to the local nobility. There, as in Gascony/Aquitaine, a major problem in this process of delegation involved the various endemic feuds between major noble houses.[67]

In Lancastrian Normandy, apart from the creation of a *chambre des comptes* at Caen, much of the administration remained as it had under the previous Valois regime. For the most part, only lesser offices stayed in Norman hands while some new positions and practices were introduced, based on English and perhaps Gascon models.[68] Since there was only a limited English presence, the key priority in Lancastrian Paris was to secure the allegiance of the most important officers of the central government, especially members of the *parlement* and the *chambre des comptes*.[69]

As a result of these attempts to co-opt local support for the English regime, a venue for formal consultation was often a significant element in colonial government. English administrations provided this governmental

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[64] Griffiths, *Principality of Wales*, xviii-xix; James Given, *State and Society: Gwynedd and Languedoc under Outside Rule* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), 158-59.

[65] Pierre Capra, "Les bases sociales du pouvoir anglo-gascon au milieu du xive siècle," *Le Moyen Age* 4ème sér. 30 (1975), 276. For example, Berard d'Albret was a long-standing military servant of the English crown. From 1351-3 for a total of 833 days he supplied 100 men-at-arms, 100 *sergents à cheval* and 100 foot soldiers. It was through such men that "La défense du duché est abandonée au principal des nobles du pays" [Pierre Capra, 'L'évolution de l'administration anglo-gasconne au milieu du xive siècle', *Bordeaux et les Iles britanniques du xiiie au xxe siècle* (Bordeaux, 1975), 23]. For Albret's various contracts and payments, see TNA: PRO, E101/168/2 m. 3; 3/12v.; E372/199/39r. mm. 1-2; 207/14r. m. 2.

[66] Rymer, III, i, 305; *Calendar of Close Rolls, 1354-60*, 356; H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355-57* (repr. Barnsley, 2004), 44.

[67] "The prolonged feud between the houses of Foix and Armagnac is reminiscent of the Geraldine-Butler conflict in Ireland … while in Wales private war was a commonplace, protected in the law of the march and owing much to both the native Welsh bloodfeud, or *galanas*" [Peter Crooks, 'Factions, Feuds and Noble Power in the Lordship of Ireland, c.1356–1496', *Irish Historical Studies* 35 (2007), 434-36].

[68] Curry, "Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?," 250.

[69] Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 151.

structure in large part to make certain that taxes were raised with little opposition. Nevertheless, it had the added value of offering an opportunity to air complaints. During the Hundred Years War, the Irish parliament increasingly served as a forum to express dissatisfaction with the English administration. This began with a storm of protest in 1341, following Edward III's attempt to revoke various of the crown's Irish grants. By the end of the conflict in the 1450s, friction within the political environment had become so charged that the Irish parliament declared the colony a

> separate body corporate ... enfranchised from the operation of any specific law of the realm of England, save only those laws admitted, accepted, approved and proclaimed by the lords spiritual and temporal and the commons in great council or parliament.[70]

The three estates of Aquitaine were also keen, at various times, to emphasize both the independence of the lordship and its significance in the Plantagenet dominions. This legislative body was formed during the period (1362-1372) when Aquitaine was a principality under the rule of the Black Prince and his brother, John of Gaunt, who succeeded him.[71] Meetings were held regularly from 1364 until the outbreak of the rebellion that brought an end to the principality. During these years, the estates offered grants of taxation in return for the confirmation of privileges, liberties, franchises, and customs. Its members also raised questions over judicial procedure and authority which became a particular concern in the newly acquired territories after the right to appeal to the *parlement* of Paris was (theoretically) removed.

After the collapse of the principality, this legislative body continued to function. In the period 1390-1395, the estates formed the chief site of negotiations between Richard II and that part of the duchy that remained in English hands concerning a proposal to grant lordship to John of Gaunt. In the end, members of the estates refused to acknowledge Gaunt for fear that his appointment signaled the separation of the duchy from the throne of England.[72] This concern—the sovereign status of Gascony within the king of England's dominions—remained a matter for regular discussion.

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[70] H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, *The Irish Parliament in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1964), 260; Robin Frame, *Colonial Ireland, 1169-1369* (Dublin, 1981), 129.

[71] Many of the following comments are based on Pepin, "Parlement of Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine," 135, 137-38, 145-49, 153-56.

[72] J.J.N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom, 1377-99* (London, 1972), 152-65; C.J. Phillpotts, "John of Gaunt and English Policy towards France, 1389-1395," *JMH* 16 (1990): 363-86.

Formal relations in Lancastrian Normandy may well have been influenced by the English experience in Gascony. Undoubtedly, attitudes and procedures in the former region closely resemble those in the latter.[73]

Such formal points of contact may have served to lessen some friction between the colonizers and the colonized; however, as in England and elsewhere in Europe, taxation was a frequent cause for bitter complaint. The Black Prince's regimes worked hard, perhaps excessively so, to increase revenue; indeed in Wales his administration has been accused of "systematic financial rape."[74] In Aquitaine, the hearth tax (*fouage*), despite having been granted by the estates, touched off a rebellion exploited by Charles V and his lieutenant in Languedoc, his younger brother, Louis, the duke of Anjou, as a means of renouncing the treaty of Brétigny and resuming the Hundred Years War. In a letter to the nobles of Aquitaine, the royal pair expressed their opposition to the "ordiances, decrees, exactions, and collection of hearth taxes, as well as all other griefs and innovation" (*Ordonances, indictions et exactions de fouages et autres griefs et nouveletés*) inflicted on the population by the Black Prince.[75] Elsewhere, financial exactions had the same unfortunate effect on English rule. The policies in Ireland resulted in attacks on the regimes of Lionel, duke of Clarence, and William Windsor between 1369 and 1376. At the same time, the taxes demanded by the Anglo-Burgundian administration in Paris also proved extremely unpopular.[76] Finally, after years of care in securing local approval for taxation in Normandy the duke of Beaufort's arbitrary levies of 1443 caused a great deal of resentment.[77]

It was also important to establish or maintain control in a colony to make certain that resources and information were not passed to the enemy and to prevent the activities of spies. In Wales and Ireland, legislation was passed preventing native entertainers from performing since they were believed to be spying out English defenses. In both countries, however, exceptions were made: various native poets and musicians received

[73] During the English occupation of Normandy, there were sixty-four meetings of the full Estates and local assemblies [Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 171-86; Curry, "Towns at War," 159, 163].

[74] R.R. Davies, *Conquest, Coexistence and Change: Wales, 1063-1415* (Oxford, 1987), 403.

[75] *Histoire générale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pieces justicatives*, ed. Claude de Vic and Joseph Vaisètte; rev. ed., Auguste Molinier, 16 vols (Toulouse, 1872–1904), 10: 1404–6.

[76] Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 28-29.

[77] M.K. Jones, "L'imposition illégale de taxes en 'Normandie anglaise': une enquête gouvernementale en 1446," in *La France Anglaise*, 461-68.

licences to perform in English areas.[78] In the same fashion, contact between Lancastrian/Burgundian France and the "kingdom of Bourges" was strictly regulated by the English authorities during the fifteenth century in order to prevent unlicensed communication with the enemy. There were also longstanding concerns about the activities of French clergymen, many of whom were believed to be spies.[79] In a petition of 1373, the Commons in the English parliament requested

> that no French alien prior shall dwell within twenty leagues of the sea coasts; considering that they are French in their bodies, and from time to time spy upon the secrets and ordinances at parliaments and councils; and they send their spies and messengers to their abbots and superiors in the realm of France as well as bows and arrows, gold and silver, and other weapons, in comfort of [the king's] enemies and to the detriment of the country.[80]

Undoubtedly, the church and clergy were of key importance in gaining and maintaining control in the colonial territories. In Ireland, the Statute of Kilkenny provided that Gaelic-Irish clerics prove their loyalty to the English regime: those who did so were permitted to remain in office.[81] In Wales, the Black Prince used his powers of patronage excessively in order to offset the authority of the Welsh clergy who were often opposed to English rule. As Rees Davies has observed:

> No one exploited this power more blatantly or irresponsibly than the Black Prince: he presented his clerks to local churches such as Llan-faes (Anglesey); he promoted others to be canons, archdeacons, and precentors in the cathedral churches of Wales; he even managed to foist two of his closest confidants—John Gilbert, his confessor, and William Spridlington, one of his auditors—on the bishoprics of Bangor and St Asaph respectively.[82]

Only one Welshman was appointed to a Welsh see between 1370 and the outbreak of the Glyn Dŵr revolt. Such a policy itself may have contributed to the rebellion. On the other hand, not all such attempts were so "ham-

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[78] Berry, *Statutes*, 447. On October 25, 1375, one Dowenald Omoghane was permitted to ply his trade in the colony [*Rotulorum Patentium et Clausorum Cancellarie Hibernie Calendarium*, ed. Edward Tresham (Dublin, 1828), Pat. 49 Edward III, 94 no. 164].

[79] M.G.A. Vale, *Charles VII* (London, 1974), 122; Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 8-9.

[80] "Edward III: Parliament of 1373, Text and Translation," ed. W.M. Ormrod. *The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England*, ed. Chris Given-Wilson et al. (Leicester, 2005), CD-ROM, 2: 320 (item 32).

[81] J. Watt, *The Church and the Two Nations in Medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 1970), 201-3, 206.

[82] Davies, *Conquest, Coexistence and Change*, 398, 439. However, in 1366 the appointment of Alexander Dalby as bishop of Bangor was rejected by the pope on the basis of his inability to speak Welsh: [Glanmor Williams, *The Welsh Church from Conquest to Reformation* (Cardiff, 1962), 121-28].

fisted." Henry V used the church and its members much more effectively to bolster his regime in Normandy[83]; in Paris, English administrators attempted to secure the support of the clergy. What is more, ecclesiastical ritual, processions, and ceremonies were used widely, as in England, as a vehicle for English propaganda.[84]

Such an array of measures, some successful, others not, makes it difficult to judge attitudes among the "subject populations" to England, especially as pragmatic survival instincts inevitably determined responses. This was the case even in Paris where the Armagnac-Burgundian war created favourable political conditions for the English. There, as elsewhere, some insight may be gained through personal relationships. Marriages between colonizers and colonized were by no means uncommon. Some unions, no doubt, were influenced by the opportunity they offered women to preserve their property, livelihoods, and perhaps even their lives. Others were clearly the products of genuine affection, and when the Lancastrian position in Normandy collapsed, a number of Englishmen (and at least one Welshman) stayed with their wives.[85]

Attitudes to such unions differed throughout the English colonies. In Ireland, legislation was passed in 1350 and supplemented in 1366 to prevent marriages between members of the Gaelic and Anglo-Irish communities.[86] Although such concerns were, in part, ethnically motivated and drew on a long history of prejudice about Irish marriage practices, there were also wider political concerns.[87] In particular, it was vital to maintain the political and defensive integrity of the colony by limiting partiple inheritance and the fragmentation of lordships. It was also important to regulate marriages in Ireland because of differences between English and Gaelic law: Anglo-Irish women and their property were legally subject to their hus-

[83] C.T. Allmand, "The English and the Church in Lancastrian Normandy," in *England and Normandy*, 287-89

[84] Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 151, 158-59, 171-75, 179ff.

[85] Anne Curry, "Isolated or Integrated? The English Soldier in Lancastrian Normandy," in *Courts and Regions in Medieval Europe*, ed. Sarah Rees Jones, Richard Marks, A.J. Minnis (York, 2000), 192; Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 80; Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 208-9, 216-17; R.A. Griffiths, *The Reign of Henry VI, 1422-1462* (London, 1981), 516.

[86] Berry, *Statutes*, 431, 433.

[87] Fergus Kelly, *A Guide to Early Irish Law* (Dublin, 1988), 70-3; John Gillingham, "The Beginnings of English Imperialism," *JHS* 5 (1992): 403-5; *Marriage in Ireland*, ed. Art Cosgrove (Dublin, 1985); Bart Jaski, "Marriage Laws in Ireland and on the Continent in the Early Middle Ages," in *The Fragility of Her Sex? Medieval Irishwomen in their European Context*, ed. Christine Meek and Katherine Simms (Dublin, 1996), 16-42.

bands, Gaelic wives were not.[88] Similar concerns applied in Normandy where royal permission might be required for Anglo-Norman marriages, and in Wales, technically, English men who married Welsh women could not hold office. However, these regulations were often ignored.[89]

As pragmatism sometimes shaped the decisions of individuals to support or reject a colonial regime, so it determined wider communal loyalties. This was certainly the case when Limoges renounced its loyalty to the Black Prince in 1370. Upon the arrival of French troops, the town, long considered an English stronghold, immediately capitulated to the duke of Berry. This was a particular insult since the town's bishop had not only foresworn his oath of loyalty, but was godfather to the prince's eldest son, Edward of Angoulême. Consequently, despite his ill-health, the prince oversaw the siege and sack of the city personally. Froissart claims that more than 3,000 inhabitants—men, women, and children—were slaughtered. While the number of victims may be overstated, the laws of war and the dictates of chivalry meant that the city had abrogated all rights to mercy. Furthermore, in terms of seeking to maintain the integrity of the colony, this brutal action may have been considered necessary in order to prevent further defections.[90]

The English regimes in Normandy and Paris faced similar problems after 1435 with the collapse of the Burgundian alliance at the congress of Arras.[91] Certainly by 1449-1450, Charles VII (r.1422-1461) was able to capture numerous Norman towns without firing a shot. Although considerable loyalty had been shown to the English regime, self-preservation and fear of assault, pillage, and slaughter proved much more persuasive. Just as Henry V had been able to capture many towns without resistance, they returned equally willingly to Valois allegiance.[92]

On the other hand, this did not prove to be the case in Gascony. The precedence that England had conceded to Normandy over its other conti-

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[88] Gillian Kenny, "Anglo-Irish and Gaelic Marriage Laws and Traditions in Late Medieval Ireland," *JMH* 32 (2006): 41. See also idem, *Anglo-Irish and Gaelic Women in Ireland*, c.*1170-1540* (Dublin, 2007).

[89] Griffiths, "The English Realm and King's Dominions," 91.

[90] Paul Ducourtieux, *Histoire de Limoges* (1925, repr. Marseille, 1975), 53, 59; Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, 224-26 (n. 23); Maurice Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965), 120-21, 124. For further discussion, see Green, *Edward the Black Prince*, 90-93. I am grateful to Guilhem Pepin for sharing his thoughts with me on this matter.

[91] Allmand, "Lancastrian Land Settlement," 471; *A Parisian Journal*, 1405-1449, ed. and trans. Janet Shirley (Oxford, 1968), 318.

[92] Curry, "Towns at War," 153, 156-58, 165-66.

nental holdings had eroded Gascon loyalties, leading a number of families from Périgord and the Landes to transfer allegiance to Charles VII. On the other hand, during the 1430s and 1440s, Gascon resistence to the French army necessitated its use of extremely destructive methods in regaining the generally pro-English region. Only the development of a massive artillery train by Jean Bureau made it possible for the French to overrun Gascony in 1451. And when the English returned under Talbot some months later, sympathy for their rule remained considerable: Libourne, Castillon, Bordeaux, and other towns opened their gates to the invaders. That sympathy was also reflected in the heavy garrisons, high levels of taxation, and clear suspicion of the Gascons shown by Charles VII following his eventual victory at Castillon in 1453.[93]

Just as the political impulses driving the Hundred Years War altered throughout its course, so the role of the English colonies changed. It would be wrong to see the Anglo-French struggle solely as a colonial war, but those colonies supplied the English with their motivation for kings, parliaments, and individuals to continue the struggle. In some respects the colonies were drawn together by the war; in others the war drove them apart and distanced them still further from England. Unquestionably, the war generated a new sense of national identity in the island kingdom that in turn raised questions about the nature of relations it should have with its dominions.

Over the course of the war, territories in France tended to receive most attention: it was usually only during periods of truce that primary attention was paid to the "British" lordships. As a result other colonial administrations often felt abandoned, perhaps Ireland most of all. Letters were sent regularly to the king suggesting his lordship there was in jeopardy. Just as English control in France reached its greatest extent in 1428, Archbishop Swayne of Armagh wrote of Ireland, "All this Lond is severed."[94] Soon after, similar concerns were voiced in Paris and Normandy suggesting that unless military action was taken "totale perdition" seemed inevitable.[95]

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[93] On the fall of Gascony see Robin Harris, *Valois Guyenne: A Study of Politics, Government and Society in Late Medieval France* (Woodbridge, 1994), 3-8.

[94] *The Register of John Swayne, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland, 1418–1439*, ed. D.A. Chart (Belfast, 1935), 111. This was not merely the consequence of attacks from the Gaelic Irish but also the product of feuds within the Anglo-Irish community: in the fourteenth century between the houses of Desmond and Ormond, and in the fifteenth century between Ormond and Talbot [Crooks, "Factions, Feuds and Noble Power," 428-29].

[95] Thompson, *Paris and its People*, 40.

The end of the Hundred Years War is said to be marked by the fall of England's first colony. Not long before, Normandy had been lost once more, and conditions in Ireland were becoming increasingly untenable: it would only be forced back to English obedience when the resources of the Tudor State were unleashed. In a number of ways the Hundred Years War not only put an end to the Plantagenets' Angevin ambitions in France, it also nearly broke the First English Empire.

HENRY V'S HARFLEUR: A STUDY IN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION, 1415-1422[1]

Anne Curry

The capture of Harfleur was the first of many successes for Henry V (r.1413-1422) in France. Thanks to Shakespeare, it is also an engagement which has remained in the English consciousness in the centuries that have followed. Even in the first half of the fifteenth century, the town occupied a special place in English minds as well as in the English war effort. At the parliament that met in November, 1415, the chancellor recalled how Henry had taken Harfleur "which was the strongest town of this part of the world and the greatest enemy to the lieges of the king, by siege, without the shedding of the blood of his people."[2] The opening speech of the October, 1416 parliament called the town "the principal key to France" (*la principalle cleave de France*), an appellation also used by some chroniclers.[3] Both are justifiable descriptions of the significance of Harfleur. Although the capture of this city in September, 1415 did not immediately lead to further territorial gains in the duchy, English success in retaining possession of the town over the next two years contributed much to making possible Henry's systematic conquest of Normandy on his second campaign (1417-1419). Harfleur was indeed "key" to insuring control of the Channel and in facilitating movements of troops and victuals between England and France.

For the first five years of its occupation—from its conquest until the eve of the treaty of Troyes (1420)—Harfleur was in effect a second Calais, administered separately from England. Once Henry was in control of the whole duchy of Normandy and had the bigger prize of the inheritance of

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[1] An earlier version of this paper was published in French as "Harfleur et les Anglais 1415-1422" in *La Normandie et l'Angleterre au Moyen Age*, ed. P. Bouet and V. Gazeau (Caen, 2003), 249-63. For a fuller consideration of Henry's military strategy concerning Harfleur from late 1415 to 1416, including a discussion of the army raised for the rescue of the town in August 1416, see A. Curry, "After Agincourt, What Next? Henry V and the Campaign of 1416," *Fifteenth Century England*, 7 (2007): 23-51.

[2] *The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275-1504* [hereafter *PROME*], ix. Henry V 1413-1422, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2005), 115.

[3] *PROME*, ix, p. 177; C.T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy 1415-1450. The History of a Medieval Occupation* (Oxford, 1983), 3 notes similar phrase used by Waurin and in the "First English Life of Henry V."

the French crown in his sights, Harfleur lost its special military significance and was re-absorbed into the duchy. This essay aims to shed light on the evolution of this port city during this period, assessing how changing military needs affected administrative structures. The process took place in three phases:

1. From the town's surrender on September 22, 1415 to the establishment of an "exchequer" (*scaccarius*) and other administrative structures at the end of the year, in the wake of Henry's success at Agincourt

2. From the early months of 1416 until Henry's second invasion that began with his landing in Lower Normandy on August 1, 1417, a period which saw French attempts to retake Harfleur rebuffed by the English naval victory in the battle of the Seine on August 15, 1416.

3. From August 1, 1417 to January 21, 1420 when the separate *scaccarius* at Harfleur was closed and the town was integrated within the administration of the duchy as a whole.

This essay ends by assessing briefly the place of Harfleur in the last two years of Henry V's reign (1420-1422) and beyond. It became something of a military backwater once the whole of northern France was in English hands. This helps to explain the ease with which the French retook it on November 25, 1435. Not surprisingly given its symbolic significance as the first of Henry V's triumphs and its renewed military importance, the English now devoted a major effort to its recovery, which was finally achieved on October 28, 1440. It was lost again to the French on January 1, 1450, this time irretrievably.

Phase 1: 1415

Henry V laid siege to Harfleur on or around Saturday, August 17, 1415.[4] On September 18, its governors agreed that they would surrender on the twenty-second of the month if assistance was not forthcoming.[5] As the place was not relieved, formal surrender duly took place on that date.

[4] As noted in a letter Henry sent to the mayor and aldermen of London on September 22, printed in the original French in *Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre recueillis et publiés par Jules Delpit* (Paris, 1947), 216-7, and in English in A. Curry, *The Battle of Agincourt. Sources and Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 2000), 441-42. It is noted in *Calendar of Letter-Books Preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London, Letter-Book I*, ed. R.R. Sharpe (London, 1909), 131. For a discussion of the siege as a whole, see A. Curry, *Agincourt: A New History* (Stroud, 2005), chap. 4.

[5] *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. F. Taylor and J.S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), 51.

Seated in a pavilion on the top of a hill in front of the town (Mont Lecomte), Henry received the keys from the French captain, Raoul, Sire de Gaucourt. The king delivered these keys to his uncle, Thomas Beaufort, earl of Dorset, appointing him captain, and, according to a letter sent by Henry to the city of London on the day of the surrender, "providing him with an adequate garrison of men, of all kinds."[6] Henry entered the town on September 23. He remained there until October 6 or 8 when he began his march towards Calais.

Over these two weeks, the king's policy towards his new possession began to be revealed. According to the *Gesta Henrici Quinti* on the day he entered the city, he divided the population into several categories: those who had sworn fealty and those worth ransoming were kept in Harfleur but around 2,000 women, children and poor people were expelled on the next day.[7] In reality, we cannot know precisely how many inhabitants remained in the place or how many chose to leave at this stage or subsequently.

An important question is whether we should interpret Henry's first action as indication of an intention to create a second Calais by replacing both French people and customs with English? A charter granted to the town by Charles VIII (r.1483-1498) in 1492 implies as much. It claims that Henry had the municipal records and the title-deeds of the townspeople burned in the market place. Henceforward, the purchase and inheritance of property would be restricted to Englishmen, with the result that those Frenchmen who remained in the town were reduced to the status of lessees of their new English masters.[8] There are indeed no surviving urban records for Harfleur from the period before the English conquest, and as we shall see, the English crown subsequently issued licences to English men and women to settle in the town, granting urban property to the new inhabitants.

It is impossible to know whether Henry had a fully worked-out plan to establish a second Calais before his invasion, but it is entirely credible that he did. While it is true that the letter that Henry sent to the city of London on September 22 gave Henry no indication of his intentions to install Dorset and a garrison, the contents of a writ issued by John, duke of Bedford, the "keeper of the realm" (*Custos Regni*) in the king's absence, implies that

[6] For the letter to London, see n. 5.

[7] *Gesta*, 55.

[8] H. Lamotte, *Antiquités de la ville d'Harfleur* (Paris, 1799), 64. For the archives of the town see *Ville de Harfleur. Repertoire numerique des archives communales antérieurs à 1790*, ed. P. Le Cacheux and F. Blanchet (Rouen, 1947).

Henry had sent further instructions back to England. This writ, issued to the sheriffs of London on October 5, required them to make proclamation on two matters.[9] First, that all "knights, men-at-arms, and archers" (*milites, armigeri et valetti*)[10] who wished to cross to Normandy should go to the bishop of Winchester to receive wages. This reminds us that Henry was keen to have reinforcements for his intended march from Harfleur to Calais as well as for the large garrison needed to hold the town itself. These two needs were interlinked; the stationing of troops in Harfleur was a major reason why the expeditionary army was now reduced in size.[11]

Several surviving sources strongly suggest the size of the garrison Henry would leave at Harfleur. The earliest remaining muster rolls dating from the first quarter of 1416 gives the names of 300 men-at-arms and 898 archers. This is almost identical to the figures of 300 men-at-arms and 900 archers mentioned in the minutes of the royal council dated November 25, 1415.[12] This supplies a total of some 1200 men in the Harfleur garrison, around ten percent of the army with which Henry had left England in August, 1415.[13] By way of comparison, the city of Calais and its surrounding territory had been defended by 1200 men in the 1370s, and only 80 short of this under Henry himself.[14]

A large garrison was necessary not only to control the town and its residual population but also to deter and to defend against any early French counter-attack. Henry could not be certain whether the French, gathering with their king and dauphin before Harfleur, would attempt a prompt recovery. They had failed to dispatch the army by forced marches to relieve

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9 *Letter-Book I*, 159.

10 That these terms indicate military ranks is based on contemporary usage in muster rolls.

11 In the grant to the king for life of the wool subsidy and trade taxes by the Commons in the parliament of November, 1415, the position of Harfleur is noted as follows: "for the guard of the town he had put in certain lords and several other men-at-arms and archers at his great cost and expense and had made such arrangements for the safeguard of the town" *PROME*, vol. ix, p. 11.

12 The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Public Record Office: [hereafter PRO], E101/47/39. The figures of 300 and 900 are also found in the account book of Simon Flete as controller (TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 10r). For the council minutes, see *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England*, ed. H. Nicolas (London, 1835) [hereafter *PPC*], 2: 184-85.

13 For discussion of the size of the army at the outset and after the siege, see Curry, *Agincourt*, chaps. 3 and 5.

14 J. Sherborne, "Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France", in idem, *War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England* (London, 1994), p. 19, n. 107 citing TNA: PRO, E101/180/5 f. 5 et seq., and J.L. Kirby, 'The Financing of Calais under Henry V', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 23 (1950): 166.

the city, a fact that led to its surrender. And while Henry remained in the town with his entire army, the French no doubt reckoned that their enemy possessed too large a force to attack. Were the French therefore simply waiting until he moved off? Surely one of the reasons he chose to undertake a march northwards rather than simply returning directly to England was to draw the French away from Harfleur by encouraging them to attack him rather than the town.

Even after his departure, from the French perspective the presence of a 1200-strong English garrison at Harfleur remained a deterrent. After all, the place had been so well-defended that the English had taken six weeks to besiege it. Although its fortifications had suffered damage from bombardment and needed repair, the town was still defensible. Better, therefore, from the French point of view, to hope for early and complete success against Henry's army in the field, since this would surely lead to Harfleur's surrender. Some of the chronicles suggest that on the eve of Agincourt, French negotiators made an offer to Henry if he were willing to withdraw from France, renounce his claim to the throne, and surrender Harfleur, the French king would be prepared to let him have Guienne and Ponthieu. If Henry proved willing to accept these terms, he was to be granted the marriage and extensive dowry of Princess Catherine in addition to the ceded territories.[15]

Bedford's writ of October 5 also required the sheriffs to make proclamation on another matter, namely that all merchants, victualers and artisans who were willing to reside in the town of Harfleur should go there with all speed with their goods and equipment, and that the captain of the town would provide them with houses. Once settled there, the proclamation continued, the king would grant them a charter of liberties. This policy was reminiscent of that employed in aftermath of the capture of Calais by Edward III (r.1327-1377). What is more, the liberties granted to Harfleur by Charles VIII's charter of 1492 indicates that this was the English policy.

Henry had already realized that English troops were not numerically sufficient to defend the city over the long term, especially if he wished to make other conquests in Normandy. The presence of other loyal citizens would be required. It is highly unlikely that the remaining residents of Harfleur could be trusted at this stage to pay the "watch and ward" (*guet et garde*) traditionally owed by townspeople. A new population was needed

[15] *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint Remy*, ed. François Morand, 2 vols. (Paris 1881), 2: 251; *Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretagne a present nommé Engleterre par Jean de Waurin*, ed. W.L. and E.L.C.P. Hardy, 5 vols. (London, 1868), 2: 209-10.

to rebuild what English guns had destroyed, to boost the English defensive position, and to keep an eye on the remaining native population. Not until December 28, 1415, however, do we have reference to an actual grant of a house in Harfleur. On that date, Richard Bokeland of London was granted the "inn" (*hostellerie*) called the Peacock in reward for his having provided two vessels to assist the king during the siege.[16] A month later, on January 29, 1416, Sir John Fastolf, who had been invalided home after the fall of the town but had returned by at least December 31, 1415 to join the garrison, was granted the lordship over the neighboring manor of Frileuse.[17] A formally recorded distribution of houses and lands does not seem to have happened until Henry's second campaign was well underway, and only really took off after the fall of Rouen in 1419.

Some of the grants inscribed in the Norman Rolls in 1418-1419 indicate that the property in question had recently been vacant; others, however, mention a previous tenant, who from his name seems to have been English. This suggests that the English occupied larger numbers of houses in 1416 and 1417, but that no record of this survives. The charter of liberties that Henry had promised in the writ of October 5, 1415 certainly did not materialize until 1444 after the town had been briefly reconquered by the French.[18] We can speculate that the damaged state of the town proved unattractive to would-be English settlers, many of whom would worry about its precarious position and the possibility of French recovery. Such

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[16] 'Calendar of French Rolls', in *Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records* [hereafter *DKR*] (London, 1883), 44: 576.

[17] *DKR*, 44: 577, printed in T. Rymer, *Foedera, conventiones literae et cuijuscunque generis acta publica*, 4 vols., 3rd. ed (The Hague, 1739-1745), vol. IV, part iv, p. 153. The account book of the controller of the town, Simon Flete, indicates that Fastolf took charge of the town as lieutenant on March 2, 1417 when the earl of Dorset, by then elevated to the dukedom of Exeter, ceased to be captain; TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f.12r. On the 1415 campaign Fastolf had been invalided home, having crossed as an esquire in the retinue of Michael de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, who died at the siege; TNA: PRO, E101/44/30 roll 1, m. 9. He subsequently rejoined the garrison and was knighted by the time of the land grant.

[18] For the charter of 1444 see "Rôles normands et français et autres pièces tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765, et 1766," *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie*, 23 (1858): 234-46 (doc. 1343). It refers back to Henry's intentions, "not long after his noble conquest of his town of Harfleur, wanting and being inclined towards the safety and security of that place, that only English and no others should inhabit therein houses, buildings and other tenements, whether intact or ruined," noting that he made grants of properties under letters patent to Englishmen but on conditions that were burdensome, with the result that many settlers withdrew and the town fell into ruin. The charter aimed at making concessions to the English residents to ease this situation, which included trade concessions and the right to elect a mayor and town council, the elections to be carried out on the anniversary of Henry V's taking of the town or within six days thereafter.

fears remained even after the battle of Agincourt. None the less, Henry had made his intentions clear: Harfleur was his and he intended that it should remain so, peopled by his own subjects. The king's interest in the town even reached down to the appointment of Jean de Bourdin to a parochial benefice on January 3, 1416.[19]

Both during and immediately after the siege, Henry was keen to use Harfleur as a point of entry for much needed foodstuffs and other supplies. This is apparent in another decree issued in London inviting merchants and others to speed to the king at Harfleur with all kinds of victuals, clothing, and armor. This they were to accomplish within a week. The mayor of London was made responsible for assigning them shipping for the crossing.[20] The exact date of this proclamation is not known, but, in all likelihood, came between the surrender of the town and the proclamations resulting from the writ of October 5.

This action was taken as much to restock the larder of the king's army before it moved off towards Calais as to build up supplies for Harfleur itself. As an outpost in enemy territory, Harfleur had to rely almost entirely on provisioning from England, although it is likely that two sorties conducted by Dorset on November 18 and December 19 were designed to gather additional supplies in the locality. As we shall see, problems of supplying food and other equipment and transporting it from England were almost constant concerns, at least into the year 1418. The undated proclamation seems to have generated some response on the part of Londoners. On October 12, a commission was issued to John Laweney, citizen and grocer of the city, to take food, armor, and other necessary items for the provisioning and relief of Harfleur.[21] The commission was on-going: Lawney was to bring across to Harfleur such supplies whenever the king required them.

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[19] *DKR*, 44: 576. On June 18, 1418, William Esdale was presented to the church of St Martin of Harfleur, vacant by the death of John Bordilli, "Calendar of the Norman Rolls," in *DKR*, 41: 691. Bordilli was presumably the de Bourdin appointed in 1416, and may have been the same man as Jean de Bordiu who was archdeacon of Médoc, and who had been with the English army at the siege, and who was in Harfleur again in 1416. J. Taylor and J.S. Roskell, "The authorship and purpose of the Gesta Henrici Quinti," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 53 (1970-1): 431. De Bordiu wrote a letter from the siege camp to Bordeaux on September 3, 1415. *Archives Municipales de Bordeaux, vol. 4. Registres de la Jurade: deliberations de 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422* (Bordeaux, 1883), 257-58. This letter claims amongst other things that Henry would have Harfleur within the next eight days, and that he had heard that it was not the king's intention to enter the town but to stay in the field, and to advance on Montivilliers, Dieppe, Rouen and then to Paris.

[20] *Letter-Book I*, 161.

[21] *Calendar of the Patent Rolls* [hereafter *CPR*]. *Henry V*, 2 vols. (1910-1911; reprint, London, 1971), vol. 1 (1413-16), 364.

The problems facing the English in their possession of Harfleur were all too apparent and demanded the king's attention upon his return to London. On November 25, two days after his entry to the city, the royal council made the following recommendation to Henry: that he should send to Harfleur "an adequate person to observe the state of the town and especially its artillery and to make account and payment to the captain there and his soldiers and report thereon to the king."[22] The council proposed that this emissary should bring with him 1000 quarters of oats, the cost of which was to be deducted from the payment of £3640 owed to the garrison of 300 men-at-arms and 900 archers.[23]

Another version of the council minutes gives more detail on this, indicating that the royal emissary was to convey to the garrison wages for the quarter ending on December 31. The second version also includes a question addressed to the king on whether he thought there was a need for more artillery. This is reflective of Henry's personal role in such matters. The document also made clear the financial strain which the royal treasury was experiencing: there was no money in hand, and thus the various costs would have to be met out of a loan repayable from parliamentary taxation due to be collected on December 13. A final additional clause , set forth in the second minute, instructed the emissary to take over "governance of the town in the case that the earl of Dorset should wish to depart."[24] Two names were suggested for the post of emissary: on the one hand, there was William Loveney, who had a great deal of experience in supplying the royal household[25]; on the other, Roger Flore, a lawyer with

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[22] *PPC*, 2: 184.

[23] It remained royal policy throughout that the garrison should pay for the victuals it received. As R.A. Newhall notes in relation to subsequent years, "such provisions as came from England were consigned to the victualler of Harfleur and sold by him to the garrison, the returns forming a very considerable item in the city treasurer's receipts." *The English Conquest of Normandy 1416-1424* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), 256, citing TNA: PRO, E101/48/8, m. 2, 4.

[24] *PPC*, 2: 185. The earl remained captain until March 2, 1417, but was in England at the turn of 1415-1416 to renegotiate his contract as captain of Harfleur. He was also in England for much of the winter of 1416-1417.

[25] Loveney had much experience of victualling, having begun his career as clerk to the household and then keeper of the wardrobe of Henry Bolingbroke, taking up the keepership of the Great Wardrobe from the king's accession in 1399 to 1408. In 1405 he had been supervisor of victualling and array, and in 1412 was briefly keeper of the king's ships. It is less likely that he was the man chosen for the Harfleur mission since by the December 20 he was treasurer of the household of the dukes of Orleans and Bourbon and the other French prisoners at Windsor. He held lands in Brentford, Middlesex and Great Wendover, Essex, and died in 1435. For his career, see *The House of Commons 1386-1421*, ed. J.S. Roskell, L. Clark, and C. Rawcliffe, 4 vols. (Gloucester, 1992), 3: 634-36.

links to the wool trade and administrative experience in the duchy of Lancaster.[26]

It is not clear which if either was actually chosen for the task, nor whether the money and food was taken across as planned. But we do have evidence of possible results of the kind of inspection the council envisaged. On December 16, for instance, John Colchester, mason, was ordered to find stone cutters, tilemakers, tilers, and other laborers for the repair of the walls, houses and other structures in Harfleur. In the first four months of 1416, at least thirty-four masons were based in the town to repair walls, towers, and other fortifications damaged in the siege.[27] Considerable efforts were also made to bring in food.[28] Early in the New Year, the crown issued several commissions providing for the purchase of various foodstuffs for the town. These included wheat and malt harvested in the eastern and southern counties of England. The south was also instructed to send 1000 sides of bacon, while South Wales faced the task of finding 200 live oxen.[29] On February 3, Robert Barbot, who had been appointed captain of Harfleur, was given power to impress ships for the importation of 200 tons of wine and 1000 quarters of malt.[30]

Phase 2: 1416-1417

These first ad-hoc efforts to review the needs of Harfleur and to insure its resupply must be seen as the background to establishing a permanent and full-fledged English administration at the end of 1415. The simultaneous accomplishment of these two tasks bears witness to the fact that the English felt secure in their conquest and took all necessary steps to assure its sus-

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[26] Flore was Speaker in the parliaments of 1416, 1417, 1419 and 1422, and held lands and offices in Rutland. *House of Commons*, 3: 91-4.

[27] *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 1 (1413-1416), 412, printed in Rymer, *Foedera*, IV, iv, p. 152; TNA: PRO,E101/47/8, f. 17r-v. One master mason and 57 other masons from different parts of England served from January 31 to May 8. TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f.18v.

[28] On November 29, a protection was accorded to John Vincent, caster, to cross to Harfleur, presumably in connection with transportation of foodstuffs (*DKR*, 44: 575).

[29] Three hundred quarters of wheat, and 500 of malt were to be found in Norfolk and Suffolk and sent out through Great Yarmouth, with the same quantities being found in Kent and Sussex along with 1,000 sides of bacon and exported through Chichester. In addition, 200 oxen were to be bought in South Wales and taken to Haverford West, presumably on the hoof, although it is not clear whether they were to be killed before the crossing or not [*CPR*, Henry V, vol. 1 (1413-1416), 412]. On January 29, Richard Wode was given a standing commission to impress ships and barges from the ports of Rye and Winchelsea for the transportation of foodstuffs to Harfleur. Ibid, 413.

[30] *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 1 (1413-1416), 414.

tainability. Formal structures were now needed to facilitate the organization of both defense and victualing.

On January 22, 1416, Thomas Barneby was appointed treasurer of the town, accountable to the English exchequer and with powers modeled on those of the treasurer of Calais.[31] His surviving account book commences with the date of his appointment, and ends on January 21, 1420, when the separate *scaccarius* at Harfleur was closed.[32] On January 24, 1416, Reginald Curteys was appointed receiver and keeper of provisions (a post often described as that of victualer). It may have taken a short while for Curteys to take charge and replace the previous military-controlled administration with one that was essentially civilian in nature. As late as February, 1416, Robert Barbot, the captain of Harfleur appointed by the earl of Dorset, was still in charge of arranging the provisioning of the town. By April 14, however, he was functioning as deputy to Curteys, acting on the latter's instructions alongside the town's controller of finances, Simon Flete.[33]

Flete was appointed controller of finances on March 30, 1416, a post which was effectively a counterweight against the financial administration of Barneby.[34] It is likely, however, that Flete had already been present in the town before his formal appointment, for when his final account book was drawn up, its starting date was given as December 31, 1415.[35] It was on this date, therefore, that a *scaccarius* was deemed to have been established at Harfleur. This entity acted as a collecting point for receipts, whether these came directly from the English Exchequer, or from the treasurer of war when the king was on campaign, or from local revenues, including rents, court fees, and mill revenues. It also payed out the wages not only of soldiers and gunners but also of workmen involved in repairing the city fortifications. Taken together, the account books of Barneby and Flete provide considerable insight into the running of the town between the end

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[31] *DKR*, 44: 576. His account book reveals that he was to be paid a fee of £100 per annum 'as the treasurer of Calais had'. Barneby had been Prince Henry's receiver in Anglesey before 1403 before serving as chamberlain of Chester. He was later constable of Bordeaux and of Caernarvon, dying there in 1427 (R.A. Griffiths, "The Rebellion of Owain Glyndwr in North Wales through the Eyes of an Englishman," *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies*, 22 (1957): Flete was keeper of the privy wardrobe (TNA: PRO, E403/622 m.3).

[32] TNA: PRO, E36/79. A copy of the enrolment of Barneby's account on the Foreign account rolls (E364/63 m. 7-7d) is also extant at TNA: PRO, E101/48/8.

[33] *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 2 (1416-1422), 71. Barbot, who came from Rotherham in Yorkshire, was still in post in January 1419 at least (*DKR*, 44: 609).

[34] *DKR*, 44: 576 and 578 respectively. Barneby's account book was checked against that of Flete in audit, as the note on page 14 of E36/70 indicates.

[35] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f.1.

of 1415 and the beginning of 1420, at which time the separate *scaccarius* at Harfleur was closed and the financial administration of the town merged with that of the rest of Normandy.

The starting date of December 31, 1415, was chosen to tie in with the financial arrangements of the Agincourt campaign, for which English troops had received one quarter's pay in advance. The fact that some of the expeditionary army of 1415 had been assigned to garrison Harfleur while the rest had gone on to Agincourt made for difficulties in accounting terms. We know from deliberations in the royal council in March, 1417 that those who had served at the siege and battle were paid from July 1 to November 23, but those who had been assigned to the garrison were to be compensated for their service until the end of the second quarter that effectively ended December 31.[36]

The earliest military and fiscal provisions had largely been essentially emergency measures taken before a formal administration was established in Harfleur. No musters of the garrison appear to have been taken during the first months of the occupation. The arrangements confirmed in March, 1417 make clear that the oath of the soldiers themselves and of their captains or lieutenants would be adequate to authenticate their receipt of wages down to December 31. Once a *scaccarius* was established, however, troops had to be mustered by Barneby and Flete in order to receive pay. As a result, we have a summary of musters taken for the first quarter of 1416. These would have been presented as justificatory material supporting the accounts of Barneby and Flete when these were audited back in the English exchequer. These first musters list the captain, Thomas, earl of Dorset, four other peers (Hastings, Grey of Wilton, Bourchier, Clinton), twenty-two knights, 273 mounted men-at-arms, and 898 archers.[37] Many of these men had probably been present in the garrison as early as the city's surrender. There is certainly no truth in the assertion of J.H. Wylie that the garrison had been doubled at the beginning of 1416.[38]

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[36] Royal jewels were put up as security on the second quarter's payment. *PPC*, 2: 184-85, 225-26.

[37] TNA: PRO, E101/47/39, headed "extracts of this first roll of musters from the book relating to particulars of account of the treasurer of the town of Harfleur." For the choice of troops detailed to the garrison after the surrender, see Curry, *Agincourt*, pp. 113-4. In addition to this roll, there are five other surviving musters for the period between 1415 and 1422: TNA: PRO, E101/51/26 (retinue of Sir John Ratcliffe for period in Harfleur under Dorset, 1415 or 1416); E101/48/17 (1417, damaged); E101/48/6 (May 1418); E101/48/19 (Nov. 1418); E101/50/9 (June 1421). The names of troops are to be found on www.medievalsoldier.org.

[38] J.H. Wylie and W.T. Waugh, *The Reign of Henry V*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1914-1929), 3: 332. See also Curry, "After Agincourt," 29 (n. 29).

As early as the opening months of 1416, the French began preparations to recover the town.[39] This threat was undoubtedly a factor accounting for the English effort to resupply Harfleur during this period and to establish properly constituted local officials. In March, Dorset determined upon a sortie, the exact purpose of which remains unclear. The *Gesta* suggests that it was both to gather provisions and boost garrison morale.[40] The lot of a garrison soldier could be rather dull and might be lightened by the prospect of booty, a prospect they had missed out on by not fighting at Agincourt. Richard Newhall has argued that Dorset's sortie might have been aimed at securing the submission of other towns, especially since he took with him a force of 1000 men.[41] However, the figure supplied by the *Gesta* is almost certainly a chronicler's exaggeration; after all, it seems highly unlikely that he took with him almost the entire garrison. On the other hand, the fact that Dorset was appointed lieutenant of Normandy on January 27, 1416, with powers to accept submission of the local population and confirm its privileges, leads one to believe that more than a victualing raid was intended.[42]

The earl's party was attacked near Valmont on March 11 by a force under the count of Armagnac. Dorset and his men were lucky to make an escape. The French went on to maintain an effective blockade of the town, by land and increasingly by sea. By mid-April, the earl was desperate as is revealed by the tone of a letter that he sent from Harfleur to the council on April 14.[43] It notes that he had written on several previous occasions asking for artillery and supplies, but to no avail. He had subsequently despatched the treasurer, Barneby, and the victualer, Curteys, to England in the company of one of the garrison knights, Sir John Scudamore.

Once again, however, nothing had been sent from England. This proved

> very burdensome …, given the great necessity which the loyal subjects of my lord had suffered and still suffer daily [and] because of the lack of such things, the said subjects could no longer stay there without being provided with food and other things.[44]

There was a particular need for meat and grain. Dorset warned that if no food was sent he and the garrison would have to evacuate Harfleur, not

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[39] For details, see Newhall, *English Conquest*, 14 ff, and Curry, "After Agincourt," 31-32.

[40] *Gesta*, 115.

[41] Newhall, *English Conquest*, 18.

[42] *DKR*, 44: 577.

[43] *PPC*, 2: 96-97. For further discussion of the military situation and English plans for response, see Curry, "After Agincourt," 32-35.

[44] The account books show that Barneby was absent from April 6 to September 12 in England. He received a protection on May 18, 1416. *DKR* 44: 579.

least because of the great loss of horses they had incurred (presumably during the defeat by the count of Armagnac).

It would seem, however, that the king and council had already realized the need to provide Harfleur with more food. Orders went out on various dates between April 14 and May 11 to gather large quantities of wheat, malt, oats, peas, beans, sides of bacon, and oxen.[45] Also on April 14, Simon Flete, the controller, and Robert Barbot, the deputy of Curteys, were commissioned to impress ships to take over these supplies as well as workmen and artisans.[46] But the passage to Harfleur had now become more difficult in the presence of the French blockade. On May 12, the king ordered the earl of Huntingdon and Sir Edward Courtenay, commanders of the fleet for the defense of the south coast to escort the vessels loaded with food and personnel bound for Harfleur. Afterwards, the warships were to busy themselves against the French.[47] Despite these preparations, conditions within Harfleur were bad enough to force Dorset to negotiate a local truce with the French from May 5 to June 2.

At this time, the presence in England of Holy Roman Emperor, Sigismund (r.1410-1437), led to suggestions that Harfleur be temporarily surrendered into his hands and those of the duke of Holland as an attempt to restore peace between England and France. Whether Henry ever took these proposals seriously is difficult to know. One version of the *London Chronicle* tells us that around the first week of June, the king was of a mind to accept the proposal, but that the Commons expressed their fears of treachery.[48] According to Henry's official stance, the plan came to nothing because of the opposition from the French prisoners. As a result, he became intent upon leading a new expedition in person.[49] The summons he issued for this later campaign stated that its purpose was the defense of Harfleur. But by late-July or early-August, 1416, the king had decided he would himself cross to Flanders to negotiate with Burgundy and to leave it to his brother, Bedford, to command a naval expedition for the relief of Harfleur. On August 15, Bedford defeated the French fleet off the mouth of the Seine. This naval victory took pressure off the town as did the four-month truce agreed on with the French.[50]

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45 *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 1 (1416-1422), 7-8, 11.

46 Ibid., 71.

47 *PPC*, 2: 201.

48 C.L. Kingsford, *The Chronicles of London* (Oxford, 1905), 125.

49 *Letter-Book I*, 152. For full discussion of Henry's raising of an army and the subsequent expedition led by Bedford, see Curry, "After Agincourt," 35-39.

50 This truce ran from October 3, 1416 to February 2, 1417. Rymer, *Foedera*, 4: 178.

The garrison was kept at its original strength of 1,200 until September 1, 1416. At that point it was reduced to 1115 men (126 mounted man-at-arms, 184 foot men-at-arms and 815 archers).[51] This is not a huge reduction in total numbers but there were two important changes in composition, reflecting the fact that Harfleur was now deemed less vulnerable. The first was the introduction of a sizeable contingent of foot men. The second was a decrease in soldiers of high status. Up until September 1, there had been four men of baronial rank and twenty-two knights present. Afterwards, only twelve knights and no peers other than Dorset are to be found in the muster rolls. What is more, the earl himself seems to have spent at least part of the next few months in England. After December 1, 1416, there was a further reduction to a total of 893, with only four knights now in the garrison. Dorset's captaincy of Harfleur came to an end on March 2, 1417, when Sir John Fastolf took command as lieutenant, alongside two other knights, and with a total garrison of 817. In this same period the number of gunners in the town seems to have been reduced from eighteen to fifteen.[52]

The need to bring in victuals from England persisted even after the battle of the Seine had relieved French pressure on the town. In October, 1416, the crown ordered over 1,000 quarters of wheat to be taken to Harfleur, along with 200 oxen and cows. In November, 1,200 pigs were taken across the Channel.[53] The large number of protections for individual fishmongers and other provisioners enrolled in the French rolls in the autumn of 1416 suggests that trade on a regular basis was expanding. This may even have extended to commerce in wool, since woolmongers were also receiving protections to go to the town. Over the course of the year 1416, we also find large numbers of masons and carpenters working on repairs to houses, walls, towers, and other fortifications that had been damaged in the siege. These same artisans were also engaged in building new houses. At the same time, the Harfleur administration erected a new bulwark with two drawbridges, and had a great ditch dug on the western side of the town.[54]

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[51] These figures and those which follow are all derived from Flete's account book, TNA: PRO, E101/48/7 f. 10r-15v.

[52] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 16. Each gunner had his servant. Fifteen were still there in January, 1420.

[53] CPR, HenryV, vol 2 (1416-1422), 20, 55.

[54] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 22v-23r. It is interesting to note that prisoners were used as labourers but were paid a daily wage. That there was a shortage of labour is indicated by the sending there from mid-December of carpenters, sawyers, carters and labourers from England. *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 2 (1416-1422), 83-84.

By February, 1417, the king was again planning for a new expedition to France. The minutes of the council of February 23-24 note that Henry had ordered Sir John Popham and his forty-strong company "to pass in advance towards Harfleur, to stay there, and to maintain the town under his safe-keeping until the arrival of the king," and instructed that their muster should take place at Southampton on March 19.[55] The actual commission to muster the troops indicates that Sir John Pelham was to accompany them.[56] In the event, the king did not cross to Harfleur on August 1, but instead landed in Lower Normandy at the mouth of the Touques. At about the same time, Sir John Fastolf dispatched the treasurer of Harfleur, Thomas Barneby, to the same location on business concerning the town.[57]

In mid-June, while awaiting his troops at Southampton, Henry appointed Sir Hugh Luttrell as the new lieutenant of Harfleur. For his part, Dorset, now elevated to the dukedom of Exeter, was likely to be absent from the city for a long period campaigning with the king.[58] Another English victory at sea further assured control of the Channel and hence the safety of Harfleur. On June 29, 1417, the earl of Huntingdon defeated the French off the Chef de Caux.[59] Meanwhile, the town's defenses had also been improved by work in the spring and summer of 1417 on the northern bulwark. Here, the military authorities had workmen fill in a mine originally dug during the siege on the order of the duke of Clarence. Increased fortification also took place around the Porte Sainte Marie and the Westgate.[60] Indeed, what we are seeing here are Henry V's efforts to insure the security of Harfleur before beginning his second campaign in Lower Normandy on August 1, 1417.

Phase 3: 1417-1420

The success of Henry's invasion of Lower Normandy almost entirely relieved military pressure on Harfleur. Since the French no longer posed a military threat to the city, its civilian administration increasingly took control. On September 25, 1417, Henry appointed William Fynborough as keeper of the gates and William Over as bailiff of the water. The decision to make this latter appointment may have been an attempt to restore

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55 *PPC*, 2: 213.
56 *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 2 (1416-1422), 74.
57 TNA: PRO, E36/79, f. 61.
58 *DKR*, 44: 597.
59 Newhall, *English Conquest*, 55. See also Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 9-10.
60 Flete's account, TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, ff. 23r-v.

something of the old French administration. It was also symptomatic of the importance Harfleur was to have as a maritime and riverine base for the second campaign.[61] These appointments were made by the king at Caen and recorded in the newly-established Norman rolls. From August 1, 1417, only the letters of protection for men crossing to Harfleur remained on the French rolls; all other business concerning the town appeared on the Norman rolls, a sign that Harfleur might in time be included within the administration of Normandy as a whole, and in particular of Henry's *chambre des comptes* at Caen, established from at least November, 1417.[62] Nevertheless, despite these changes, the treasurer of Harfleur and his *scaccarius* remained under the direct control of the English exchequer until January, 1420.

It may be that at first Henry intended to administer Caen much as he had Harfleur. On September 30, 1417, he appointed Henry Bromley as gate keeper of Caen, giving him powers and wages "in the same manner as the gate keepers in our towns of Calais and Harfleur."[63] The royal appointment of Robert Spellowe as bailiff of Harfleur on September 16, 1417 emphasizes how the town was still looked upon as a second Calais. The new bailiff was was to exercise his office in the same manner and under the same laws as those prevailing in the courts of Calais.[64] This appointment is further proof of the increasing peaceful conditions that Harfleur was now coming to enjoy. On the day after he appointed Spellowe, the king granted him a house in Harfleur free of rent.[65] According to the grant, the previous owner of this dwelling was called Robert Wilkin, a name suggesting that there were indeed already English settlers and householders present.[66] The grant also obliged Spellowe to pay watch as was accustomed.[67] In attempting to

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[61] *Rotuli Normanniae in turri Londoniensi asservati Johanne et Henrico Quinto Angliae regibus*, ed. T.D. Hardy (London, 1835), 157. It is possible that Hugh Spencer had held this office earlier (TNA: PRO E101/48/7, f. 7r).

[62] See A. Curry, "L'administration financière de la Normandie anglaise: continuité ou changement," in *La France des principautés. Les chambres des comptes xive et xve siècles* (Paris, 1996), 83-103 ; eadem, "La Chambre des comptes de Normandie sous l'occupation anglaise, 1417-50 (textes et documents)," in *Les Chambres des comptes en France aux xive et xve siècles* (Paris, 1998), 91-125.

[63] Hardy, *Rotuli Normanniae*, 159.

[64] Ibid., 164.

[65] Ibid., 165.

[66] Several other grants of houses subsequently enrolled in the Norman rolls imply that there had been previous English holders.

[67] Note also that some grants of lands elsewhere in the pays de Caux included an obligation that the grantee should pay watch at Harfleur. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 52

exploit the traditional French duty of *guet et garde*, Henry was looking to supplement and even to some extent to replace an expensive royal garrison. Since the king needed all the troops he could gather for his second campaign, it is not surprising to see the garrison of Harfleur twice reduced over the summer of 1417. From June to August, it numbered approximately 705 men.[68] When Sir Hugh Luttrell entered the town as lieutenant on August 30, the number fell to 583. According to Flete's account book, the marshal of Harfleur, William Bernard, and the clerk of the watch, John West, had to arrange for an additional night watch on the walls between June 9 and September 12, 1417. This was necessary due to the inadequate number of soldiers for the safekeeping of the urban defenses.[69] Further additional watches were maintained through to January, 1418.[70]

Given the circumstances, it is not surprising that the crown attempted to increase the number of settlers obliged to participate in the watch. In the spring of 1418, as the king moved off on campaign towards Louviers, numerous royal grants conferred houses upon men identified in the documents as merchants and victualers of Harfleur.[71] Their presence in the town may have played a significant role in Henry's second campaign, during which English ships were able to ply the seas between Harfleur and Caen, keeping the Channel safe.[72]

Harfleur was also used as a point of entry for foodstuffs that could then be sent on to the king. On April 27, 1418, for instance, Richard Bristowe was given licence to ship 800 quarters of malt and other goods bought in England to the ports in Normandy.[73] Since few coastal areas were then under the control of the English, Harfleur served as a prime collection and distribution point for goods from England, with smaller ships no doubt taking food and other materials as necessary from there to the royal army.

Once the king initiated the siege of Rouen, Harfleur's position near the mouth of the Seine increased its importance.[74] On August 10, Henry wrote

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gives the example of Hugh Spencer's grant of April 28, 1419, from Archives Nationales Collection Lenoir (microfilm 104), 3/332.

[68] The entry for foot men-at-arms in Flete's book (TNA: PRO, E 101/48/7, f. 12r-v) is illegible but the figure is given in Barneby's book (TNA: PRO, E101/36/79, p. 35).

[69] TNA: PRO. E101/48/7, f. 27.

[70] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 27v.

[71] For example, *DKR*, 41: 691.

[72] See Newhall, *English Conquest*, 59 based on accounts of ships in TNA: PRO E101/48/23.

[73] *DKR*, 41: 681.

[74] Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 13, notes the importance of river transport for these supplies when Caudebec was still in the hands of the French. Caudebec did not surrender until after the fall of Rouen.

from the siege camp at Rouen asking Londoners that they "do arme as manie smale vessels as ye may goodly witth vitaille and namely with drinke, for to come to Harfleu and fro thennes as fer as they may up ye river of Seyne to Roan ward."[75] Twelve days later, all of the city's soldiers and sailors were ordered to place themselves under the authority of Sir Richard Walkstede.[76] This was in connection with an attempt to blockade the Seine against the passage of French ships during the early stages of the siege. Material taken from Harfleur was placed in the river near Rouen to prevent the enemy passing through that stretch of the Seine.[77] On October 7, 1418, the lieutenant of Harfleur was ordered to prevent certain warships from leaving the city's harbor until till they had carried out their duty of escorting merchant vessels taking provisions to the army around Rouen.[78]

Not only was Harfleur a critical point of entry for soldiers conducting the siege of Rouen, but it also became a place through which deserters passed on their way back to England. On August 15, 1418, the king ordered his lieutenant of Harfleur, Sir Hugh Luttrell, to make certain that all laws relating to the discipline of the army be strictly enforced and to hang anyone in the king's service found in Harfleur without special leave.[79] Two months later, Richard Walkstede, by now arrived in Harfleur, was commanded to examine all vessels in the harbor before they departed in an attempt to capture deserters.[80] Concern about desertion continued into 1419 even after Rouen fell. On August 22 of that year, the captain of Harfleur was instructed to prevent English subjects from returning home without licence. In September and November, Harfleur was again one of the places in which local authorities were instructed to check all travel permits.[81]

As noted, the number of men in the royal garrison at Harfleur had been reduced several times as Henry prepared to launch a second campaign. In

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[75] *Letter-Book I*, 197-98, cited in Newhall, *English Conquest*, 257.

[76] *DKR*, 41: 716.

[77] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 19v.

[78] *DKR*, 41: 717.

[79] *DKR*, 41: 716.

[80] *DKR*, 41: 718, October 22, 1418. On the same date Luttrell was ordered to punish those who had robbed Sir John Carbonnel of his goods whilst riding form the king's army to Harfleur, although whether the malefactors were English deserters in unclear. Ibid. On August 27, 1418 Luttrell had been ordered to receive one of the quarters of the body of John Lorendon condemned to death for treason and to stick it on a spear in prominent part of the town. *DKR*, 41: 716.

[81] In this context it is interesting to note that Sir Hugh Luttrell was appointed seneschal of Normandy in July, 1419, a post which may have given him general authority in terms of the maintenance of military discipline. *DKR*, 42: 325 (August 22, 1419); 328 (September 30, 1419); 355 (November 13, 1419); Newhall, *English Conquest*, 254-55.

theory, the king's targeting of Lower Normandy relieved pressure on the town despite the fact that local officials had found it necessary to boost the watch. Between November, 1417, and May, 1418, the garrison itself was brought back up to a total of 630 with the addition of fifty archers. This resulted from fears inspired by a large French garrison maintained at nearby Montivilliers.[82] In the early stages of the siege of Rouen, Henry commissioned Luttrell to negotiate a truce with the captains of Montivilliers and Fécamp, but to no avail.[83] At the same time, the garrison of Harfleur was launching some sorties into the pays de Caux. Flete's account shows soldiers gaining ransoms from the fortress of Vittefleur (south of St Valery) in March, 1418, and from the township of Blacqueville (north east of Caudebec) in August, 1418.[84]

The surrender of Rouen had a marked effect on the military position of Harfleur. The fall of the Norman capital on January 19, 1419, prompted the surrender of other French garrisons throughout northwestern Normandy and along the Norman coast. Montivilliers fell on January 23,[85] Lillebonne eight days later, and Fécamp on February 1. Dieppe followed on February 8, and Eu on February 15.[86] Meanwhile, the eastern approaches to Harfleur were secured by the fall of Vernon on February 3 and Gournay six days later. With the surrender of Honfleur on February 25, Harfleur's position on the estuary of the Seine was secured.

The garrison of Harfleur, which had risen to around 580 men in the summer of 1418, fell to 312 after March 31, 1419.[87] During the succeeding months, further reductions occurred: to 278 men in June; 232 in September; and 205 in December.[88] The garrison's stock of ordnance was also reduced. By August 22, 1419, the English began moving guns and ammunition held in Harfleur up to Rouen and Caudebec.[89] Between April 27 and August 24, 1419, Barneby and Luttrell journeyed on several occasions to meet with the

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[82] Ibid., 105.

[83] *DKR*, 42: 717 (September 12, 1418).

[84] TNA: PRO, E101/47/8, ff. 8r-v, the profits of which had to be shared with the king according to the usual arrangements.

[85] See *DKR*, 41: 740 (March 1, 1419, power for the lieutenant, treasurer, and controller of Harfleur to treat with the inhabitants of Montivilliers).

[86] See *DKR* 41: 746 for surrenders; 747. February 3, 1419 power for Sir John Fastolf to receive the *fortalice* of Fécamp into the king's hands.

[87] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 14v. Note an intriguing reference to a Roger Olyver in fetters in Ludgate gaol in London in July, 1419 on the charge that he had plotted to betray the town of Harfleur and, when in England, the king's death and overthrow. *Letter-Book I*, 227-31.

[88] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 15.

[89] *DKR*, 42: 325.

king, first at Vernon, and later at Mantes and Pontoise. Here, they not only collected wages for the garrison but also informed him about the state of the town.[90]

The reduction of the military threat meant that temporalities of religious houses in the area could now be restored.[91] With the victory in Normandy, the crown's efforts to encourage English settlement in Harfleur met with increasing success. On March 21, 1419, and again on July 26, Luttrell was given power to grant houses and vacant lands in the town to any of the king's subjects who agreed to live there.[92] As R.A. Massey has shown, this latest division led to a major increase in the number of property grants. Only one is known of for the year 1417 and nine for 1418. By contrast, in 1419 the number increased to 54, while the crown bestowed a further 286 in 1420, 141 in 1421, and 6 in 1422.[93] In all, 497 grants are known for Harfleur, nearly three times as many as for the next most "settled" town in Normandy, Caen, for which 178 grants survive.

Massey points out that some of those who were granted houses were members of the town's administration, such as Barbot, Flete, and Barneby.[94] Others were members of the garrison, including Sir John Gray, the captain of Harfleur from January, 1420,[95] and John Lymbury.[96] It is difficult to ascertain how many grantees actually took up their grants: the account books of Flete and Barneby note only thirty-eight holders of tenancies paying rent, with only some of the names tallying with those of known grantees.[97] Unfortunately, these books only cover the period to January 21, 1420, before the crown issued most of its grants. It is also possible that some people held houses rent free. The account books also record thirty-four lessees who had taken up properties for a fixed term of years. The first of these is dated to March 25, 1418, but only nine leases were taken out before the fall of Rouen.[98]

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[90] TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 26.

[91] *DKR*, 41: 734-35.

[92] *DKR*, 41: 762; 42: 325. On March 22, 1419, Luttrell was also given authority to appoint a victualer, presumably to replace Curteys. *DKR*, 41: 763.

[93] R.A. Massey, "The Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy and Northern France, 1417-1450," (Ph.D diss., University of Liverpool, 1987), appendix X.

[94] *DKR*, 42: 399 (January 20, 1421, Barbot); 410 (April 8, 1421, Flete); 366 (April 17, 1420, Barneby).

[95] *DKR*, 42: 352 (grant to Gray, March 9, 1420).

[96] Lymbury was also intriguingly accused of counterfeiting coins in the town in October, 1419, and who served in the garrison until at least the end of 1423. *DKR*, 42: 326.

[97] TNA: PRO, E101/47/8, f. 5v.

[98] TNA: PRO, E101/47/8, ff. 1-5v. The total income for the period of the account was £69 4*s* 8*d*. In some cases, the sites which they rented are described as having been vacant before they took up their lease.

Massey concludes that "Harfleur was first and foremost a military settlement and the craftsmen, traders and office-holders who chose to live there with these men-at-arms owed their livelihoods directly to the garrison forces."[99] This view may unwarrantedly diminish the commercial significance of the town and its English settlers. There can be no doubt that some merchants and craftsmen had been given houses. There was certainly enough interest in leasing the water mills, although admittedly this might have been for the sake of provisioning the garrison.[100] In his mill, William Pole obviously refers to himself enough as William Pole "of Harfleur," a good indication that at least one Englishman had settled in the city.[101] Christopher Allmand has observed that some English merchants were given grants of houses in both Harfleur and Caen. On the basis of this observation, he suggests that "by establishing personal ties [Henry V] was trying both to revive the fortunes of each of them and, perhaps, to forge links between the ports of Normandy and those of England."[102]

Certainly the town continued to be an important entrepot for the importation of grain, wool, and wine from England, Brittany, and Flanders.[103] To some extent, it operated as a port for the Norman capital of Rouen.[104] The water bailiff and the provost of Harfleur were responsible for policing the river between the two towns.[105] There are further signs of the developing civilian activity and trade following the surrender of Rouen. On June 6, 1419, Mahiet Guereit was appointed town crier in Harfleur and Montivilliers, and on November 7, John Holland was made keeper of the town's "salt warehouse" (*grenier du sel*).[106] In short, once peace came to Upper Normandy after the fall of Rouen, Harfleur could resume its importance as

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99 Massey, "Land Settlement," 190.

100 TNA: PRO, E101/47/8, f. 6. The lease was first taken up by Gilbert Hesketh on April 20, 1416, and subsequently by Robert Culvier and John Castell, Thomas Matthew, and Thomas Mulwarde. The total income from the lease was £48.10.5 over the period of the accounts of Flete and Barneby.

101 Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 57 (n. 24).

102 Ibid., 89-90, where the example of Philip Maidstone, clothier and grocer, is cited.

103 See, for instance, *DKR*, 42: 371 (March 27, 1420, order to the water bailiff of Harfleur concerning the restoration of wool of Leonard Rys, merchant of Bruges, which has been detained at Harfleur).

104 E.g., *DKR*, 41: 730 (February 7, 1419, safe conduct for Jean de Galuday of Rennes, merchant and master of the barge St Michael now in Harfleur, about to sail to Brittany to bring wine and other goods to Rouen).

105 *DKR*, 42: 452 (August 13, 1422, order to water bailiff of Rouen and John Selby to inspect the banks between Rouen and Harfleur, and destroy all boats not moored in the places assigned to them).

106 *DKR*, 42: 321, 330.

a commercial and shipping center which it had enjoyed before the English invasion, while, at the same time it retained its military significance.

On September 10, 1419, an Orleanist supporter assassinated John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, on the bridge of Montereau. This led to Henry's acceptance as heir and regent of France. This act had a negative impact on Harfleur.[107] Now that almost all of Normandy and a good deal of the Seine valley was in Henry's hands and his supremacy had been acknowledged by the French, the special significance of Harfleur diminished. Every English parliament between 1415 and 1417 heard the chancellor mention in his opening speech a reminder of Henry's taking of the town. By contrast, at the next parliament held in October, 1419, he recalls only Agincourt and the conquest of Normandy.[108] There was now no need for Harfleur to be kept separate from the rest of the duchy in terms of its financial and military administration. Consequently, on January 21, 1420, the separate *scaccarius* at Harfleur, accountable directly to the English exchequer, was closed and the town placed under the control of the *chambre des comptes* at Caen, which was by now showing signs of its own independence from English institutions. In this context, one might argue that Harfleur "returned to France" on January 21, 1420.

The accounts of the treasurer and controller end on that day and their offices terminated at the same time. Mention of a separate "royal council" (*consilium regis*) in an advisory capacity for the treasurer of the town come to an end. After January 21, 1420 Harfleur was administered from Caen by the treasurer of Normandy. Records of its administration must therefore be sought from this date onwards in the records of the Caen *chambre*. These were transferred to Paris after the Henry's death when Normandy was reintegrated into the crown of France according to the terms of the treaty of Troyes.[109] Harfleur ceased to receive money directly from the English exchequer, and its revenues were no longer audited by its own officials. Instead, these monies were placed under the control of a local viscount who forwarded them to the *chambre* at Caen when necessary. The treasurer of Normandy now assumed responsibility for the wages of the garrison. Before January 21, 1420, Harfleur had received orders from the king directly.

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[107] By October, 1419, the town was secure enough for the controller, Flete, to be sent on a mission into Gascony (*PPC*, 2: 267-68).

[108] *PROME*, 9: 231 (1419); 115 (November, 1415); 135 (March, 1416), 177 (October, 1416); 207 (November, 1417). Later parliaments speak of his victories in general and his success in gaining peace [e.g., 249 (December, 1420); 265 (May, 1421).

[109] See Curry, "L'administration financière," and "La Chambre des comptes de Normandie," cited in n. 63 above.

Henceforward, it would receive the same orders issued to all captains throughout the duchy. In short, the city and its garrison lost most of their independence.

Significantly, on the same day, Dorset's captaincy finally came to an end, and Sir John Grey of Heton was appointed in his place.[110] Luttrell seems to have stayed in his post for a little while longer,[111] but by May 2, 1421, a new lieutenant, Henry Mulso, had replaced him.[112] When Grey was killed at the battle of Baugé,[113] the crown appointed Sir Ralph Cromwell the new captain of Harfleur.[114] In his turn, Cromwell was succeeded on July 28, 1421 by Sir William Phelip, whose term in office probably continued until the appointment of William Minors in November, 1422.[115]

It is worth noting that by 1420 Harfleur's importance had diminished to the point that it no longer required a captain of noble rank, although all the captains appointed between 1420 and 1422 were men of knightly status close to the king. Afterward, we can discern an even more fundamental change occurring in November of that year when the crown appointed William Minors, who held the rank of esquire. Harfleur, it seems, had become something of a backwater.

At the same time, the number of new men serving on the town's garrison continued to diminish. While we do not know for certain the number of men serving under Grey, Minors's indenture included sixteen mounted men-at-arms, twenty-four foot men-at-arms, forty-eight mounted archers, and seventy-two foot archers, a total of 160 men, forty less than the number held by Lutterell in February, 1420.[116] The town authorities continued to supplement the royal garrison with *guet et garde* owed by townsmen and those in surrounding villages.[117]

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110 *DKR*, 42: 339. The appointment was made on January 20, 1420. Barneby and Spellowe were commissioned on January 29 to muster Grey's troops at Harfleur. (*DKR*, 42: 356)

111 He is still named as lieutenant on February 11 (TNA: PRO, E101/48/7, f. 16r). On April 18, Barneby and William Over were commissioned to muster his company although the instruction does not mention Harfleur. *DKR*, 42: 372.

112 *DKR*, 42: 426.

113 *DKR*, 42: 427 (April 26, 1421, commission to James Fenys and Henry Mulso to array the men of Sir John Grey, deceased, in the garrison of Harfleur).

114 *DKR*, 42: 410. For his particulars of account and a muster roll of the garrison under his command, see TNA: PRO, E101/50/9.

115 *DKR*, 42: 415; Bibliothèque Nationale de France, manuscrit français 4485, pp. 213-5.

116 TNA: PRO, E 101/47/8, f. 15v.

117 *DKR*,42: 437 (January 19, 1422, order to all captains including the captain of Harfleur to furnish the names of the villages around their castles and the number of inhabitants of such villages as have to keep guard at night).

Despite its diminished military and administrative status, Harfleur's significance as a point of entry into France did not lessen. In 1421, when Henry returned to England, he traveled by way of Harfleur.[118] The reinforcements he sent under his brother Bedford in May, 1420 came into Normandy through the port.[119] The body of another brother, Thomas, duke of Clarence, was shipped home through Harfleur after his death at Baugé.[120] Fears of desertion through Harfleur also persisted, though other ports witnessed this same phenominon. On April 3, the crown issued orders to lieutenants of Harfleur, Caen, and Cherbourg, and the captains of Honfleur and Dieppe to make certain that nobody left Normandy without a special licence under the great seal.[121] Harfleur continued to function as a port for Rouen; it features prominently in the transport of items needed by the king when he was based at the Norman capital between 1420 and 1422.[122] The town also remained an armory of sorts. In March, 1422, Henry ordered officials at Harfleur to supply him with stone shot as well as saltpeter, coal, and brimstone during the siege of Meaux.[123]

Although in administrative terms Harfleur was treated as any other place in Normandy from the beginning of 1420 onward, it is fair at the end of this essay to return to the point made at the beginning. England never forgot that it was Henry V's first conquest. Evidence from the muster rolls, especially those of the early years, suggests a high degree of stability in garrison membership. It must also be remembered that several men who rose to prominent positions in Lancastrian France began their careers at Harfleur. These included military leaders such as Sir John Fastolf, Sir John Radcliffe, Sir William Oldhall, and Sir William Mountford as well as those who had moved into civilian administration serving as "bailiffs" (*baillis*) within the duchy, such as Sir John Harpelay, Thomas Maistresson, and Hugh Spencer. Moreover, whereas Henry had soon been able to use French officials in governing the conquests made during his second campaign, Harfleur, from

[118] *PPC*, 2: 327.

[119] TNA: PRO, E101/49/36; *CPR 1416-22*, 319.

[120] Rymer, *Foedera*, IV, iv, p. 39 (June 20, 1420 order to Hugh Spencer, captain of Lillebonne, to provide shipping).

[121] *DKR*, 42: 428.

[122] Such items for royal use included money: in May (of either 1420 or 1422) exchequer officials wrote thus to the king "we ben in Harfleu with youre goode, that is in gold coyned XXXM, in silver coyned MM, and in weeges of silver drawing by estimation to halfe a tonne tyght," asking for instructions about transporting this to Rouen [Ibid., 42: 426, 429, 431; H. Ellis, *Original Letters*, vols. (London, 1824), 1: 83, cited in Newhall, *English Conquest*, 153].

[123] Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscrit français 26044/5712. The letter is probably in Henry's own hand.

the start, had been administered exclusively by Englishmen, a situation that seems to have continued for many years.

Scars left by of the siege of 1415 also remained visible long after the English conquest. Men were still being commissioned to carry out work on the fortifications long after the separate *scaccarius* closed.[124] In February, 1422, both Harfleur and Honfleur gained remission on taxes collected on the sale of wine and beer to fund rebuilding costs.[125] In 1424, the Estates General of Normandy earmarked tax revenues, specifically for construction at Harfleur, including a castle on the harbor side of the town.[126]

Although Massey argues that the number of English settlers decreased between 1422 and 1435, the sheer quantity of Englishmen living in Harfleur, combined with the fact that the town was the first place in which Henry V made extensive land grants, continued to make Harfleur stand apart from other places in Normandy. This special status was no doubt reinforced by the fact that lands held there by settlers could only be passed on to other Englishmen. There can be little doubt that Englishmen who held houses in the town before its loss to the French in 1435 returned after 1440.[127]

The fact that Harfleur was controlled by France from November, 1435, to October, 1440, may even have heightened this sense of Englishness among its inhabitants, a feeling that increased after its residents successfully petitioned the English crown for a charter in 1444. Harfleur was, as far as we know, the only town to which a charter was granted during the period of English occupation. This document provided for the election of a mayor on the anniversary of the town's surrender to Henry in 1415. It is thus not surprising that the French were particularly keen to reclaim the town during their reconquest of Normandy in 1449. They specifically demanded its surrender as part of the terms agreed upon by the duke of Somerset when he surrendered Rouen in October of that year.[128] Nor should we be surprised that Harfleur's English defenders at first refused to hand over their town until they finally saw that there was no hope of further aid from

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[124] *DKR*, 42: 409, 439 (March 21, 1422).

[125] *DKR*, 42: 423.

[126] Raoul le Sage was sent to the town in September, 1424 "to advise therein the location and place where should be erected a castle which has been advised to be placed on the harbor for the security and defence of the town and for the augmentation thereof". BN manuscrit français 4485, p. 36.

[127] Massey, "Land Settlement," 231.

[128] *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England*, ed. J. Stevenson, 2 vols in 3, Rolls Series (London, 1861-1864), vol. 2, pt., pp. 607-18.

England. Harfleur passed under French control once again on January 1, 1450. In response to news of its loss, one Englishman observed that it had been "a gret juell to all Englond."[129]

[129] *Paston Letters and Papers of the Fifteenth Century*, ed. N. Davis, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1971-1976), 2: 22.

GOING TO THE WARS: THOMAS, LORD MORLEY IN FRANCE, 1416

Philip Morgan

I. *Introduction*

In September, 1416, the staple and garrison town of Calais stood at the heart of European diplomacy. To its resident population of merchants, garrison troops, and workmen engaged in a constant battle against the sea, was added the latest tide of irregular merchants, spies, diplomats, lords, and visiting archbishops whose numbers routinely overwhelmed the townsmen. Two streets south of the great Market Place, in the Prince's Inn, was the now famously profligate entourage of the "superillustrious" Sigismund, king of the Romans (r.1410-1437), who had left England in the late summer in the hope of private talks with John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (r.1404-1419), whose promised appearance in the town had been the subject of rumor and gossip for many weeks. On September 4, the prospect of that visit also brought the English royal household. Henry V of England (r.1413-1422) took up residence in the castle in the west of the town, his court and council finding accommodation marked by royal messengers in inns elsewhere. Although celebrations of a great naval victory off Harfleur, which had relieved the French blockade of the Norman town, had been in progress in England since mid-August, Calais now played host to disembarking sailors and soldiers, and Harfleur's commander, Thomas Beaufort, earl of Dorset.

Among this great press of lodgers in search of rooms was the household of one of Harfleur's heroes, Lord Thomas Morley, who arrived sick with fever and dysentery. Several of the newcomers found space for a week from September 15-24, the day on which Morley died, in the town house of an Essex merchant, John Dunmow "de Calais." The anonymous royal chaplain and author of the *Gesta Henrici Quinti* commented that the knight had "winged his way to heaven to the grief of almost everyone." What was perhaps the apogee as well as the culmination of the old soldier's career took place on September 26 in the great town church of Notre Dame, favored by Calais's burgesses, as both Henry V and the Emperor Sigismund stood together with other visiting notables for the knight's exequies.[1]

[1] Henry Arthur Dillon, "Calais and the Pale," *Archaeologia* 53 (1892): xxx; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. F. Taylor and J.S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), 150-162.

Morley's reported heroism in the naval battle off Harfleur is, however, not the subject of this paper, but rather a household account that provides a remarkable view of the organization of his final campaign, from the recruitment and equipping of his retinue, to the conversion and fitting out of a ship for war at sea, and even to the repatriation of the captain's corpse. It is therefore a paper more about the going to war than the getting there, but one which thus casts some new light on an enduring part of the historiography of English warfare, the changing social contexts of military obligation and recruitment that have been seen as pointing towards the rise of a professional soldiery in the fifteenth century.

II. *Fifteenth-Century Military Recruitment and Reward*

Ever since the pioneering work of J.E. Morris on the Welsh wars of Edward I (r.1272-1307), historians have become more and more fully aware of the stages whereby the English crown moved, first from armies raised under feudal and communal obligations towards those mustered by contract and for pay.[2] Armies at the end of the thirteenth century, in which the relationship between feudal mounted cavalry and communally raised infantry was slight and distant, were replaced by others in the first stages of the Hundred Years War in which mounted men-at-arms and archers, now also mounted, owed a mutual loyalty to the captain of a retinue. Such retinues were raised by indenture and served for pay. To all intents and purposes, English warfare had been privatized, and the transition from feudalism to capitalism, so beloved of economic historians can, it seems, be followed equally well in the military sphere as in the relationships of lord and peasant.

It is true to say that the crown at the same time had increased the bureaucratic control of war, framing ordinances to govern the conduct of troops, the dispersal of booty, and the control of prisoners and ransoms. The king also controlled the wages of war and, through the parliamentary taxation that funded them, maintained royal and noble access to the wealth of the agrarian economy. At the same time, the communal obligations of service which had characterized the muster of largely peasant or urban infantry troops, as well as the personal military service of those who held grants of the crown, were redirected and articulated in increasingly sophisticated justifications of nationality and the "defense of the realm." But English soldiers also owned their own weapons and horses, and owed

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[2] John E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward I* (Oxford, 1901), 35-109.

immediate practical loyalty to the captains in whose service they had mustered and whose wages they drew.[3]

Thus, the normal process of military recruitment in England in the later Middle Ages was by indenture and muster, usually of retinues of varying sizes. This process has produced a voluminous record within the national archives. Soldiers so raised might also appear in other contingent records as they sought letters of protection for the duration of their service, were granted pardons for past crimes,[4] or received later payments (such as compensation for horses), and rewards. The complete record is essentially nominal and is predicated on the involvement of the state. Compiling that record into a highly user-friendly form is currently the subject of a major British *Arts and Humanities Research Council* project, "The Soldier in later Medieval England."[5]

Having contracted with the crown, a captain often raised his own forces on the back of different solidarities in local society, the communities of the estate, of parish and neighborhood, and within the kin group and the affinity. These connections, implicitly beyond formal documentation, are only reported in surrogate forms in the muster and pay rolls of the state. Mapping the retinue roll onto private estate records is possible only for a handful of retinues; assumptions about the reliability of toponymic surnames as an indicator of locality can only be suggestive rather than definitive. Nevertheless, despite the scarcity of evidence, social historians of warfare have argued that the structure of military recruitment must be sought in the local societies in which retinues were raised.[6]

Recognition that formal documents for military recruitment beyond those compiled by the state remit survive in private estate collections and, by extension, their use has recently given a greater nuance to the simplistic view that English lords moved straight from feudal and communal levies to paid musters of their tenants, neighbors, and friends. Another process, subcontracting, may have entered the equation by around the

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[3] Michael Powicke, *Military Obligation in Medieval England* (Oxford, 1962); Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996).

[4] See L.J. Andrew Villalon, "'Taking the King's Shilling' to Avoid 'the Wages of Sin': Royal Pardons for Military Malefactors During theHundred Years War," in this volume.

[5] http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/soldier/database/index.php. For the use of this database, see Adrian R. Bell et. al, "The Soldier in Later Medieval England: An Online Database," in this volume.

[6] Philip Morgan, *War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277-1403* (Manchester, 1987), chaps. 2, 4.

late-fourteenth century, further dispersing a great lord's obligations to the crown or his ties to lesser men. Anthony Goodman and Simon Walker have drawn attention to arrangements of this sort in the retinues of two knights, Sir John Strother in 1374 and Sir Hugh Hastings in 1380.[7] Other examples continue to appear, and reveal that subcontracting could reach to the very lowest level of the retinue, the service of a few archers. In 1386, for instance, Hugh Shirley, later a prominent Derbyshire Lancastrian retainer, entered into a formal indenture for the service of two archers for John of Gaunt's campaign to Spain.[8] Both men had earlier seen service on the Scottish border and may, in fact, have been professional soldiers. Lord John Audley had indented to garrison the lordship of Brecon in 1403, but had subcontracted the recruitment of archers to a squire named Peter Wilbraham. Audley later sued three of them who had received their six-month's pay at Twemlow (Chesh.) for desertion.[9] These contract and subcontracts have been seen as pointing to the rise of a professional soldiery that served solely for pay.

The lord who fought at the head of a retinue raised from among his tenants, neighbors, and friends represents a very different creature from the lord whose relationships with his retinue were entirely professional and contractual. The one represents a broadening of the arenas within which political and social prestige was exercised; the other stands as a pattern of professionalism and simple careerism. Ultimately, in the early years of the fifteenth century, the personal bond between a captain and his wider retinue began to break down, a development noted in particular in Lancastrian Normandy where the "personal company" of a knight might be both different from and smaller than his retinue.[10] Soldiers serving solely for pay may have been more prone to desertion than those bound by other more personal ties; certainly desertion was seen as a perennial issue in expeditionary forces in France.[11] The experience of John Mescowe may be not untypical. He had contracted with Richard Boston of Southwark, a

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[7] Simon Walker, "Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: the Subcontracts of Sir John Strother, 1374," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 58 (1985): 100-6; Anthony Goodman, "The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings, 1380," *English Historical Review* 95 (1980): 114-20.

[8] Leicestershire Record Office, 26D53/2543.

[9] The National Archive [TNA]: Public Record Office [PRO], Chester 29/107 m.13.

[10] A.J. Pollard, *John Talbot and the War in France, 1427-1453* (London, 1983), 68-75.

[11] Anne Curry, "The Organisation of Field Armies in Lancastrian Normandy," in *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium*, ed. Matthew Strickland (Stamford, Lincolnshire, 1998), 217-18, 229-30.

joiner, to provide an archer for six months in Normandy, but the man so recruited, John Marchall, deserted on disembarkation, and Mescowe now petitioned the chancellor for payment of Boston's high bond of ten marks.[12]

III. *The Career of Thomas Morley*

In 1416, Lord Thomas Morley was a soldier whose military career had spanned the lean years of the Hundred Years War after the treaty of Brétigny, and whose experience marched alongside the changes in recruitment that I have set out. Morley had served first in the Breton campaign of 1375 with Edmund Langley, earl of Cambridge, but was later mostly in the circle of the latter's younger brother, Thomas of Woodstock, later duke of Gloucester. He was with Gloucester, again in Brittany, in 1380, his presence at Ardres during Gloucester's long march to reach the duchy being noted by Froissart. Four years later, Morley took part in the expedition to Scotland mounted in 1385 by Richard II (r.1377-1399).[13] He may also have fought in the factional battle of Radcot Bridge in 1387 as a member of Gloucester's retinue since he applied for a pardon in 1398 after the latter's fall. He was with the duke on the abandoned crusade to Prussia in the autumn of 1391, when the fleet was driven back by a storm in the Skagerrak before it entered the Baltic.[14] And in 1399, Lord Thomas Morley accompanied Richard II to Ireland.[15]

Although Gloucester's execution had removed Morley's long-term patron, the knight spent the last part of his career as an adept reader of changing political circumstances. In 1397, he served as deputy to Thomas Mowbray, duke of Norfolk, in supervising the execution of the earl of Arundel, but may have joined Bolingbroke at Shrewsbury during the deposition campaign in September, 1399. In a move calculated both to serve the memory of his murdered lord, the duke of Gloucester, and to curry favor

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[12] TNA: PRO, C1/72/76.

[13] G.E. Cokayne, *The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom: Extant, Extinct, or Dormant*, 13 vols. in 14 (London, 1910-1956), 9: 216-18; Anthony Goodman, *The Loyal Conspiracy. The Lords Appellant under Richard II* (London, 1971), 101, 124, 133; Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Peter F. Ainsworth and George T. Diller, 2 vols. (Paris, 2001-2004), 1: 780-1.

[14] Goodman, *Loyal Conspiracy*, 38, 133; Andrew Ayton, "Morley, Robert, second Lord Morley (b. in or before 1295, d. 1360)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19290 [accessed January 3, 2011].

[15] Morley's grandfather had inherited a claim to the hereditary marshalship of Ireland.

with the new regime of Henry IV (r.1399-1413), Morley then brought an appeal for treason against John Montagu, earl of Salisbury, in the Parliament of 1399, accusing him of betraying Gloucester's counsel to Richard II. The case was brought to the court of chivalry and a trial by combat fixed for St. Valentine's day, 1400, although Montagu's death during the Revolt of the Earls in January rendered the duel a dead letter. Maurice Keen has suggested that Henry's regime connived in the appeal, and its success seems to have ensured Morley's favorable position in the Lancastrian court. He served on the new king's first expedition to Scotland in 1400 and became a knight of the garter in 1411.[16]

Reduced in this fashion to a mere list of campaigns, Morley's career marks him out as a soldier of varied experience. At the same time, another case brought before the court of chivalry—one that arose during the Scottish campaign of 1385—further illuminated his place in the military community. Extraordinarily, this campaign gave rise to two cases of disputed arms, the generally well-known case of Lord Richard Scrope of Bolton against the Cheshire knight Sir Robert Grosvenor concerning the arms "azure bend or," in which the poet Geoffrey Chaucer gave evidence, and the less renowned one of Lord John Lovel and Lord Thomas Morley concerning the coat-of- arms "argent a lion rampant sable crowned and armed or."[17] In both instances, however, the memories of military campaigns on which arms were routinely displayed and observed were solicited from a wide range of witnesses, many with memories that reached back to the early years of the fourteenth century.

The testimony he provided reveals, at least as far as evidence for Morley's claim goes, a family with a profound sense of martial identity and a tradition of military service on land and sea. The actions of Lord Robert Morley at the naval battles at Sluys in 1340 and Winchelsea in 1350 were noted by several witnesses. They also named captains under whom men served on many occasions. Andrew Ayton's analysis of the Morley witnesses, over

[16] *The Great Chronicle of London*, ed. A.H. Thomas and I.D. Thornley (London, 1938), 79-81; "Morley vs. Montagu (1399): A Case in the Court of Chivalry," ed. M.H. Keen and Mark Warner, *Camden Miscellany*, 34 (London, 1997), 153-60.

[17] Philip Morgan, 'Grosvenor, Sir Robert (d. 1396)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11671 [accessed 9 January 2011]; Joel T. Rosenthal, *Telling Tales. Sources and Narration in Late Medieval England* (University Park, Penn.,2003), 63-94; Andrew Ayton, "Knights, Esquires and Military Service: the Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry," in *The Medieval Military Revolution. State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price (London, 1998), 81-104.

thirty with intermittent military service, reveals two things: first, that regular service on the part of such men was common after the 1340s; secondly, that knights, even those with personal connections to the Morley family, were often inconstant in their service, driven by "restlessness, ambition and a willingness to fight in a variety of theatres of war."[18] By contrast, esquires seem more likely to have to sought regular employment by Morley and his predecessors, and were often men of some age rather than simply young men. On the whole, these ties can be seen as confirmation of the importance of military subcontracting in the last quarter of the fourteenth century.

For his part, Lord Thomas Morley had served largely as a member of expeditionary forces rather than in continental garrisons; therefore, he maintained a social position in his native Norfolk, rather than as a soldier-administrator of the kind to be found in Gascony and Aquitaine. His clear annual income has been estimated by Colin Richmond at £400 a year, accruing from the Norfolk manors of Hingham, Buxton, Swanton Morley, Foulsham, Aldeby, and Hockering, with the hundreds of Eynsford and Forehoe, most of them close to each other in a block to the west of Norwich. There were outliers in Essex at Great Hallingbury and in Hertfordshire at Walkern, each significantly about half way to London from Hingham.[19] Morley had followed the usual *cursus honorum* of the lesser nobility in the English counties, commissions of the peace and the usual run of administrative posts, including the keepership of the important seaport at Great Yarmouth.

During the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, he was, somewhat embarrassingly, one of the five knights seized by the rebels and forced to march with them towards London, later being sent with a large sum of money extorted from the citizens of Norwich as protection money in order to sue for a royal charter of freedom and pardon. A year later, now sitting as a justice in Norwich, Morley executed ten peasants following a renewed minor outbreak of revolt.[20] At Henry V's accession in 1413, Morley was sixty years of age. A century later this was the age at which the English state exempted men from "serving in the king's wars," although in his own time he was

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[18] Ayton, "Knights," 92-94.

[19] *Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem and Other Analagous Documents Preserved in the Public Record Office*, 25 vols. (London, 1904-2010), vol. 22 [Henry V, 1 to 5 (1413-1418)], 185-86; Colin Richmond, "Thomas Lord Morley (d.1416) and the Morleys of Hingham," *Norfolk Archaeology*, 39, pt. 1 (1984): 1-12.

[20] *The St Albans Chronicle. The Chronica maiora of Thomas Walsingham, I, 1376-1394*, ed. John Taylor, Wendy R. Childs, and Leslie Watkiss (Oxford, 2003), 490, 624.

much the same age as some twenty-five per cent of the nobility, and other men of his age also remained militarily active.[21] Hence, on April 16, 1415 he was among the lords assembled at Westminster who heard Henry's proposal for a renewal of the war in France. In May, he was appointed to the Norfolk commissions of array, but in the end he was among the peers chosen to remain in England, serving as the earl of Westmorland's lieutenant on the fragile Scottish border.[22]

Morley's return to the French war began in the following year, 1416, a year of largely naval activity. Henry's victory at Agincourt and the English occupation of Harfleur had prompted an alliance between the French king and the Genoese, a fleet of twenty carracks harassing shipping in the Channel from a base in Honfleur, mounting raids against the English coast at Portland and the Isle of Wight, and briefly blockading Portsmouth harbor. This fleet also laid siege to the English garrison at Harfleur.[23] From the late spring Henry V had commenced plans to lead his own fleet to clear the seas and lift the blockade. On July 16, Morley was appointed admiral of the king's ships assembling at Southampton "on the king's present voyage at sea." It is at this point that the often-sparse official records of appointment, indentures, protections, and payment of wages gives way to the more detailed and personal record of Morley's own household.

IV. *The Morley Document*

The document from Morley's household is a fragmentary roll for the period between March (the earliest date mentioned in the account) and September, 1416, some eleven folios stitched chancery-style and missing at least part of both the first and last folios.[24] The contents record only the payment of expenses, there is no record of the income against which the expenses were set, nor of the final calculation. It is possible therefore that

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[21] Deborah Youngs, *The Life-cycle in Western Europe,* c.*1300*-c.*1500* (Manchester, 2006), 170, 174.

[22] Thomas Rymer, *Foedera, Conventiones, litterae et cuiuscunque generis acta publica*, 3rd ed., 20 vols. (The Hague, 1739-1745), 9: 222-23, 257; Anne Curry, *Agincourt. A New History* (Stroud, 2005), 62.

[23] *The Navy of the Lancastrian Kings. Accounts and Inventories of William Soper, Keeper of the King's Ships, 1422-1427*, ed. Susan Rose (London, 1982), 48-49; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, 134-44.

[24] Staffordshire Record Office, D641/3/R/1/2. The roll is described and discussed in Richmond, "Thomas," 1-3. I am grateful to Professor Richmond for the generous gift of his unpublished Latin edition of the roll. All further references are to this roll.

the missing sections were deliberately removed rather than being accidental losses. One payment is to William Cole for his fees in "making a list of the debts of the said Lord Thomas," and for "his view of this account." This would suggest that we are here dealing with the view of account of Morley's foreign or riding household, and in particular the foreign household assembled for Morley's voyage (*viagio*) to France.

The foreign household of a lord differed in many crucial respects from the great household. The accounts, where they survive, differ in their details from the audited and often quite summary records of the steward. What is more, the great household accounts might be separated from the lord's actual presence. The great household could and often did function without the lord. For example, a great household account of Sir Hugh Luttrell, Morley's contemporary, kept by his steward at Dunster castle in Somerset, records, in the midst of other routine household payments, a small sum given to two sailors sent across the Severn estuary to search for news of the lord's whereabouts with the king in Wales.[25] Clearly, Sir Hugh was not present at the time of this expedition.

Colin Richmond thought that the foreign household account used in preparing this paper was perhaps the account of Morley's cofferer, William Garneys, whose business is threaded throughout the account.[26] Although written in a single neat hand there are some corrections of the kind usually associated with the process of audit, amongst the most poignant of which is the alteration of the tense of the verb which described Lord Morley's condition in Calais before his death. A careful and perhaps kindly auditor has altered "since the lord weakened in his illness" (*dum languidauit*) to "since the lord was weakening"(*dum languibat*).

Expenditure incurred after the process of the lord's death, and not connected with his repatriation and burial as laid down in a testament, might not be allowed. To an accountant's mind, then, the lord might be dying, but never quite dead. In much the same fashion and some fifteen years earlier Morley, accompanied by his civil lawyer, the chronicler, Adam of Usk, had duly made the long journey to Newcastle upon Tyne to fight his duel with the earl of Salisbury. Salisbury, as Morley and Usk both knew, had been dead for a month, but his failure to appear, Usk argued, meant that his sureties should be condemned in costs. Usk pocketed a fee of

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[25] P.D.A. Harvey, *Manorial Records of Cuxham, Oxfordshire, circa 1200-1359* (London, 1976), 58-60; *Accounts of the Stewards of the Talbot Household at Blakemere, 1392-1425*, ed. Barbara Ross, Shropshire Record Series, 7 (Keele, 2003), 29-63; Somerset Record Office, DD/L 37/1.

[26] Richmond, *Thomas*, 2.

100 shillings and twelve yards of scarlet cloth.[27] In some instances, death may indeed be irrelevant.

V. *The Costs of War*

How then did this elderly knight set about the business of going to war? Morley had probably first been retained with other captains at the end of May, 1416 (though no indenture survives). On June 6, he received the customary advance of half the first quarter's pay. He was only appointed as admiral later in the summer. Captains usually handed out some of this advance payment to their companies, often, it has been argued, as an inducement to service.[28]

Our account begins part-way through this advance of wages to the retinue. Morley's "personal company" was relatively small since it needed to be accommodated in a single ship. Payments were made to a chaplain, six musicians, three minstrels, and a waferer,[29] an embroiderer, two grooms, and a page, and two further men with undefined duties. The opening of the account is torn; as a result, we glimpse only part of the military retinue. Advances were made to three, possibly four archers. Since the total for this section survives, if we assume the standard proportions of men-at-arms to archers, Morley's retinue would have included perhaps eight men-at-arms and sixteen archers. For the eight days following his death at Calais, expenses were paid for the "lord's household" (*expensis familie*), which then ran to two knights, two esquires, the chaplain, and seven valets.

Each archer received an advance of 22s 8d or roughly half of his quarter's wages, an arrangement that seems remarkably generous. Most of the musicians, minstrels, and archers are described as "accompanying" the lord "by agreement" (*ex conventio*), that is by formal contract. Robert Sowdiaur is said to have been retained. The grooms, two of the musicians, the embroiderer, and waferer were simply paid a salary for their services.

The core of Morley's retinue, his "personal company," with the lord at its heart, was smaller than the great household. Its membership was perhaps in great measure newly chosen. Some were longstanding associates or neighbors of Morley, men like Sir Thomas Brampton of nearby Letton,

[27] Keen, "Morley vs. Montagu," 166.

[28] Just how much went to men already employed and how much asa bounty to join is not recorded in the document. Richmond, *Thomas*, 1; Curry, Agincourt, 67-68.

[29] A waferer was a seller of cakes or a confectioner. James Orchard Halliwell, *Dictionary of Archaic Words* (1850; reprint, London, 1989), 912.

who would go on to serve with William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, in the conquest of Normandy in 1417; others had been recruited not long before the voyage.[30] Many of these new recruits were the musicians and minstrels who seem to have been an important part of an itinerant household. The minstrels moved over from the service of Thomas, earl of Arundel, who had died of sickness outside Harfleur the previous summer; a trumpeter came from a Norfolk neighbor, once chamberlain to Henry IV (r.1399-1413), Sir Thomas Erpingham. In all likelihood, Morley's personal company was largely raised for the occasion and added to a much smaller number of men who were part of his permanent household. All the archers whose names survive, and perhaps others of the military retinue as well, appear to have been professional soldiers raised by subcontract. The retinue also included Morley's grandson and namesake, Sir Thomas Morley, who may have been a professional like his commanders.

The remaining parts of the account are divided into sections detailing such things as the purchase of cloth for Morley's wardrobe and for livery to the household, the costs of making the cloth into cloaks, the purchase of horses and saddles, the purchase and repair of arms and armor, the costs associated with fitting out and victualing the stern-castle of Morley's ship, and the administrative expenses of the household while preparing for the voyage. Not least were the costs associated with underwriting the expedition through a loan raised with the prominent London draper and royal financier, John Hende.[31]

All told, Morley's account records an expenditure of roughly £380. He had received an advance on the issue rolls of £291, and raised a loan of £300 with Hende. These are startling sums when set against the knight's annual landed income of £400. The potential costs of this expedition, some of which appear in this account, were clearly much higher than those suggested in the limited financial arrangements made between the king and a captain as revealed in indentures of the period.[32] At the same time, the nature of the costs reveals something about the ambition of a lord going to war, as well as the central importance of London in the organization and equipping of military retinues.

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30 TNA: PRO, E101/51/2, m13.

31 Jenny Stratford, "Hende, John (d. 1418)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/52249 [accessed 9 January 2011].

32 *The History of Parliament. The House of Commons 1386-1421*, ed. J.S. Roskell, Linda Clark and Carole Rawcliffe, 4 vols. (Stroud, 1992), 4: 819-21.

VI. *Preparations on Land and Sea*

The earliest date in the account is March 21, 1416.[33] During much of the accounting period, the household was resident in London, though Morley, accompanied by a small company, departed on two occasions. Although he was occasionally ferried along the Thames to converse with the king in Westminster, much of the real work of preparation was done by William Garneys. Several furnished rooms were rented from John Cokerell of London. No doubt banners bearing the lord's arms were hung from the window sill in the manner that Chaucer describes in his deposition concerning the arms of Robert Grosvenor during the Scrope-Grosvenor heraldic dispute in the 1380s. Display is a conspicuous thread of much of the expenditure for which Garneys accounted, and almost every item was to be stamped, embroidered, and painted with Morley's arms.[34]

Initial negotiations took place in Cheapside with the prominent London draper, Wiliam Weston, whom Carole Rawcliffe argues made a small fortune out of the war.[35] From him came some £20 of cloth for gowns for the lord, including a hood for the habit of the order of the Garter, to which Morley had been appointed in 1411. Twice that amount was spent on cloth for the gentlemen, valets, and grooms, most to be made into distinctive red and green liveries, the whole to proclaim forcibly the identity of the lord in whose service these men had mustered and whose pay they drew. John Gryffon, a tailor, and an embroiderer called Bryd were later paid for sewing the gowns, and also for producing a matching streamer and geton from some thirteen bolts of red and green worsted in the same livery to be hung from the stern-castle of Morley's ship. By contrast, no liveries of cloth were made for the archers in Morley's service. The boundary between the household and the retinue stood here; the intimate world which bound together lord and groom, gentleman and valet lay beyond the mercenary service of the professional soldier.

Lord Thomas Morley's own status as a seasoned soldier is confirmed by his purchase of horses, and by the arrangements made for his arms and armor. Much of this business required the lord's presence. Saddles and

[33] Lord Thomas left to "ride in Norfolk" for the six weeks between July 7 and August 23, and later to travel to Southampton and Winchelsea between September 2 and 14, 1416.

[34] The enormous importance attached to display in military endeavors is the subject of a recent book by Robert W. Jones, *Bloodied Banners: Martial Display in the Medieval Battlefield* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2010).

[35] Christopher Dyer, *Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages. Social Change in England* c.*1200-1520* (Cambridge, 1989), 55-56.

other horse equipment came from Martin Randolf, a saddler, while the horses were purchased from William Courserer. Lodowic the Armorer supplied the arms and armor. Forty-two shields were bought and painted, presumably also in red, green and white to be displayed at the ship's side. Thomas Poyntour, a painter who had previously been employed on such tasks, "stamped" a great number of coats of armor, banners, pennons, pensels and standards, again no doubt with the Morley arms. He was apparently given wine to speed up the work. Morley's own armament combined newly purchased with cleaned and repaired parts: the basinet, a sword, poleaxe, and lance, as well as two plates were new. The leg harness, rerebrace, and vambrace were cleaned and repaired.[36] While the purchase of cloth and victuals could be done by servants, cleaning and fitting new armor required the lord's presence; the account of these purchases duly records the consumption of wine as the knight waited upon the process of beating and fitting.

Morley's commission included his appointment as admiral of a fleet to muster at London before sailing to Southampton and thence across the channel. The expenditure on victuals to stock the ship amounted to £120, slightly more than a quarter of the whole cost of the voyage. The purchases included, as the Gawain poet would have said, "Good ber and bright wyn bothe." Indeed, even in a period of declining noble incomes, the voyage was clearly seen as an occasion on which a lord's wealth and largesse should be on display. It was not the moment to embrace the more usual and modest diet of bread, ale and mutton. Foodstuffs purchased for the expedition included fresh and salt beef, chicken, venison, wheat flour and white salt, red and white wine, malmsey, and several varieties of fish. To save some money, the venison was specially obtained from the Morley; only the cost of cutting out the deer charged to the account; the remainder of the foodstuffs were bought in the London markets. How typical of military service was Morley's provisioning? Did knights who disembarked in France for garrison duty or a lengthy *chevauchée* fare as well as Morley's retinue? It is difficult here, and elsewhere in the account, not to feel that a channel cruise may have been a cushy posting for an elderly and experienced soldier, and allowed Morley to balance his household against his retinue.

Fitting out the ship was also carried out on the Thames in London, though we do not know its name. Here too we are at a boundary in military

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[36] In another surviving household account of the Dunster knight, Sir Hugh Luttrell, the knight's steward had similarly paid for the oiling of his master's armor before Luttrell set out for Wales.

organization. For much of the Middle Ages, the English crown relied on the conversion of merchant vessels for their naval campaigns, mostly by the addition of minor modifications to the superstructure. The process declined, however, during the fifteenth century as specialized yards for the construction of military vessels proliferated. Morley's ship was to be both a military vessel and a residence for a lord. Most English ships of this period were clinker-built and had a single mast and sail, although Ian Friel has suggested that the capture of eight Genoese carracks in 1416 and 1417 may have produced a technical change in maritime construction.[37] Thereafter, the use of a second mast and sail, generally called a mizzen may have been introduced; the English crown seems to have employed sixteen in the period to 1422.[38]

Morley's ship may have been a two-masted vessel, perhaps a great ship of up to 1400 tuns, since his account refers to the purchase of 155½ ells of linen cloth for a sail "for the poop." While the term mizzen is not used here, the mention of a sail at the vessel's stern must surely refer to one. The ship, like most, was equipped with a defensive superstructure, though there is no reference here to a forecastle at the bow, but only to an aftercastle. It seems that this already existed since the account contains no reference to its construction. On the other hand, a good deal was spent on modifying and refitting it. First the planking seams were covered with tallow to render them more waterproof. What is more, roughly fifty planks were employed to construct a cabin there which would contain a bed for the lord. At the same time, what is referred to as a "somercastle" was erected above, either to provide additional cabin space or as a defensive structure for the military retinue. This addition was constructed of nine oak posts and a similar number of oak planks.

Shipboard cuisine was reflected in the expenditure for the fitting-out of a kitchen on board. Morley's household was to eat from pewter plates with best linen cloth for napkins and towels. Like many other soldiers, Lord Thomas obtained a portable altar—though his was of stone—duly blessed by the bishop of St. Martin. A great chest of Prussian oak completed the furniture complement of this lordly endowed vessel.

As we have seen Morley had drawn on a £300 loan for the fitting-out of his expedition, the money raised in London from the merchant, John

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[37] Ian Friel, "Winds of Change? Ships and the Hundred Years War," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), 183-93, esp. 192-93.

[38] Ian Friel, "The Documentary Evidence for Maritime Technology in Later-Medieval England Wales" (Ph.D. thesis, Keele University, 1990), 381-88.

Hende. But, such loans were far from straightforward, even for so prominent a royal servant. Lord Thomas retained Nicholas Rykell for a fee of 100s to help negotiate the loan, and the account is filled with revealing phrases that point to the customary business of oiling and smoothing its progress (*pro meliori expedicione*). The expenditures in this endeavor gradually accumulated, encompassing not only "diligent labor" at the "various negotiations," bu also the wine consumed and breakfasts eaten. Other sums were paid to Hende's servants, his valet, and the parson of his favorite church in Candlewick Street. Ultimately, the loan to be paid in cash, was held by the clerk of the Calais Staple for safe keeping.

On or about September 15, 1416, Morley's ship crossed the channel to Calais, where the knight disembarked mortally ill. Purchases of medicines over a period of a week failed to halt his decline, although he lived long enough and was conscious enough to summon a royal clerk, William Garneys of Norfolk, to whom he dictated petitions to the king and made some gifts. He gave a customary 6s 8d to the chapel of St George in the church of Notre Dame, no doubt reflecting his own status as a garter knight.

Morley died on September 24. Fifteen priests sang the dirge and a day or so later, another cleric said a further mass for his soul. Meanwhile, Garneys made the long journey from Geldeston near Beccles via Dunwich, Ipswich, Colchester, London, and Canterbury before sailing from Dover. On arrival in Calais, he settled the dead knight's affairs with the advice of Morley's friend and possible executor, Sir Thomas Erpingham. This operation was completed with the distribution of alms to twenty-four paupers. The body, its entrails removed and the cavity filled with spices, wrapped in a linen cloth and enclosed in a newly purchased coffin (*cista*) was now shipped home, not in the vessel that Morley had fitted out, but in a local merchantman, crewed by residents of Calais, that sailed from that port to Great Yarmouth. Having arranged the passage, Garneys now returned via Sandwich.

The deceased knight was accompanied on the homeward voyage by his own chaplain, John Vyrley. His coffin rested in the stern with two candles permanently lit. Final burial took place in the Augustinian friary at Norwich, a monastic house especially favored by the family.[39]

[39] William Worcestre, *Itineraries*, ed. John H. Harvey (Oxford, 1969), 236-38. Morley was also a protector of the college of the chapel-in-the-fields, Norwich. *Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions from All Souls MS. 182*, ed. M.D. Legge (Oxford, 1941), 125-27.

VII. *Inconsistencies in the Accounts?*

For six days after the burial, William Cole worked to compile a list of Morley's debts. Yet, the story does not quite end here. We began this essay with the report of the author of the *Gesta Henrici Quinti* that Thomas Morley had been greeted in Calais "on account of his valiant conduct in that battle" of Harfleur.[40] The battle had been fought on the August 15, at which time, according to our household account, Lord Thomas Morley was "riding in Norfolk." This considerable inconsistency was discussed by Colin Richmond.

William Garneys' account is continuous for the period March 19 to October 2, 1416. It breaks off only when the news of Morley's death reached Norfolk. At this crucial moment, the royal clerk claimed expenses for a period of three weeks and two days between July 7 and August 23, during which time Morley was said to be in Norfolk. But a span of three weeks and two days, if it started on July 7, would, in fact, have ended on July 30. This might have left a period between July 30 and August 23 unaccounted for, just barely long enough for Morley to have joined the fleet that would fight at Harfleur and then return to London to rejoin his retinue, before leaving again to go to Southampton. But the timing would have been tight and the account provided no substantiating evidence. This is a most unsatisfactory narrative and leaves two possibilities, first that Morley did indeed fight at Harfleur and was rightly feted in Calais in September, 1416, and, second, that the business of going to war, which commenced in March, 1416, had entirely overwhelmed the brief opportunity of actually getting there. It is entirely possible that Morley's war in 1416 lasted for precisely four days, the time that it took to cross the channel from Winchelsea to Calais. If, on landing there on September 15 fatally sick, he was feted by those already there, it was perhaps as the architect of the victory in its planning and the embarkation of the English fleet, rather than as a heroic soldier.

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[40] See above n. 1.

Editorial conventions: editorial additions and glosses are given within square brackets: manuscript emendations are shown within round brackets, editorial comments underlined.

[View of account of the household of Thomas, lord Morley, March-September 1416]

Table 1. Staffordshire Record Office, D641/3/R/1/2

The Household. Fees and Wages	
Paid to John Hayll archer for the said quarter against [the same wages at the lord's order	22s 8d
Paid to Dauit de Aldeby archer for the said quarter against the same wages at the lord's order	22s 8d
[Paid] to William Cook archer for the said quarter against the same wages at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	22s 8d
[Paid to ...] Turry of Blyburgh for the said quarter against the same wages at the lord's order (by agreement interlined)	22s 8d
Paid to John Vyrly chaplain accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	20s
Paid to William Edrych accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	6s 8d
Paid to John Wode, lute player, accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	20s
Paid to Robert Harponer accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	20s
Paid to Thomas Trompouter accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	40s
Paid to William Trompoter accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	40s
Paid to 3 minstrels lately with the earl of Arundel accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order (by agreement *interlined*)	6s
Paid to Thomas Trumpouter lately with Thomas Erpingham accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order	26s 8d
Paid to a certain embroiderer accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order	3s 4d
Paid to a certain waferer accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order	6s 8d
Paid to a certain Robert Sowdiaur retained with the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order	6s 8d
Paid to Thomas Pyk trumpeter by hand of Thomas Trompoter accompanying the lord on the said voyage at the lord's order	20s
(*in the margin* the said Thomas did not do service)	
(*in the margin* Total £40 13s 8d)	*Total £40 13s 8d*

Wages of the Grooms	
Paid to John Footman the lord's groom at the lord's order	6s 8d
Paid to William Chambre the lord's page at the lord's order	13s 4d
Paid to Thomas Chambre the lord's groom at the lord's order	13s 4d
(*in the margin*)	*Total: 33s 4d*

Purchase of Cloth for Lord Morley for the Said Voyage	
In 5 yards of scarlet bought from William de Weston draper of London for 1 gown [*epitogium*] made for the lord Morley at 10s 8d per yard	53s 4d
Item 5 yards of engrained Sanguine bought from the same William for another gown made for the said lord at 10s per yard	50s
Item for 4½ yards of green cloth bought from the same William for another gown made for the said lord at 4s per yard	18s
In 4½ yards of black cloth bought from the same William for lining a gown for the said lord at 2s 2d per yard	9s 9d
In 5 yards of green cloth bought from the same William for lining another gown for the said lord at 18d per yard	6s 6d
In 2½ yards of black Lyre bought from the same William for the said lord for hose at 6s per yard	15s
In 1 yard of black Lyre bought from the said William for a hood [*capitio*] for the said lord at 6s per yard	6s
In 1 quarter of black cloth bought from the same William for lining a cloak-bag [*mantice*] for the said lord	4d
In 1 yard of blue cloth bought from the same William for one hood of the Garter for the said lord	4s 6d
In 3 quarters of black cloth bought from the same William for lining the lord's cloak bags	20d
In 3 quarters of red cloth bought from the same William for lining the said lord's cloak-bags	2s 3d
In 2 yards and 1 quarter of Scarlet bought from the same William for a hood and 1 pair of hose for the said lord at 14s per yard (*corrected from* 21s 6d)	31s 6d
In 1 yard and 1 quarter of green cloth bought from the same William for the said lord at 4s per yard	5s
In 1 yard and half a quarter of black Lyre bought from the same William for the said lord at 4s per yard	4s 6d
In 1 yard and half a quarter (of black Lyre *interlined*) bought from the same William for the said lord at 2s 8d per yard	3s
In 4½ yards of green cloth bought from the same William for a hooded cloak [*hewk*] for the lord at 4s 6d per yard	20s 3d

In 5 yards of green cloth bought from the same William for lining [*pro dupplicacione et linura*] a gown for the said lord at 2s 5d per yard	12s 1d
In 4½ yards of black Lyre bought from the same William for a chimer for the said lord at 6s 8d per yard	30s
In 4½ yards of black cloth bought from the same William for the lining of the said chimer at 2s 2d per yard	9s 9d
In 5½ yards of engrained Sanguine bought from the same William for a gown for the said lord at 9s per yard	49s 6d
In 1 yard of black Lyre bought from the same William for a hood for the said lord	5s
In 1½ yards of green cloth bought from the same William for a saddlecloth for the said lord at 3s 3d per yard	5s
In 4½ yards of red and green cloth bought from the same William for livery to lord Thomas Morley knight by the lord's order at 3s 4d per yard	15s
In 4 yards of green cloth bought from the same William for the said Thomas by the lord's order at 2s 8d per yard	10s 8d
In 4½ yards of green cloth bought for the lord Morley from the same William for a gown at 4s 6d per yard	20s 3d
In 5 yards of green cloth bought for the lining of the said gown from the said William at 20d per yard	8s 4d
(*in the margin* Total £19 18s 2d)	*Total: £19 18s 2d*)

Cloth bought for liveries to the gentlemen, valets and grooms for the said voyage

In 49 yards and 1 quarter of red cloth bought from the said William Weston clothier of London for livery to the gentlemen Whose names appear in a bill remaining in the hands of the said William at 3s per yard	£6 7s 9d
In 57 yards and 1 quarter of green cloth bought from the same William for mixing [*participando*] with the said red cloth for livery to the said (gentlemen) at 3s per yard	£8 9s 11d
In 46½ yards of red cloth bought from the same William for livery to various valets retained with the lord for the said voyage whose names appear in the said bill at 2s 8d a yard	£6 4s
In 53½ yards of green cloth bought from the same William for mixing with the said red cloth for livery to the said valets at the lord's order at 3s per yard	£8 6d
In 13 yards of red cloth bought from the same William for livery to the lord's grooms at 2s per yard at the lord's order	25s
In 13 yards of green cloth bought from the said William by the said lord's order for mixing with the said red cloth at 2s per yard	26s

In 4½ yards of red, green and white cloth bought from the same William at the lord's order for liveries made and to be made in addition to the whole aforesaid livery at 3s per yard	13s 6d
In 4½ yards of red and green cloth bought from the said William and given to William Alderton by order (of the lord) at 2s 8d per yard	12s
In 2 yards of Mustervelers[41] cloth bought from the same William and given to a page of the said William Alderton at the lord's order at 2s 2d per yard	4s 4d
In 4 yards of russet bought from the same William and given to Nicholas Rykkell at the lord's order at 2s 4d per yard	9s 4d
In 11 yards of green and green medley cloth bought from the said William and given to 3 valets of the aforesaid Nicholas at the lord's order at 2s 2d per yard	23s 10d
In 5½ yards of green and red cloth bought from the said William for livery to John Hotot at the lord's order at 20d per yard	9s 2d
In 15 yards 3 quarters of blanket bought from the said William for the lining of various gowns of the valets and grooms at the lord's order at 14d per yard	18s 4½d
In 4 yards and 3 quarters of scarlet bought from the said William and given to Nicholas Rykkell at the lord's order at 12s per yard	57s
In 1¾ yards of murrey cloth bought from the said William and given to a certain clerk of the said Nicholas at the lord's order at 5s per yard	6s 7½d
In 1¾ yards of green cloth bought from the said William and given to a certain other clerk of the said Nicholas at the lord's order for making a hood at 2s 4d per yard	2s 7½d
In 1 yard of black Lyre cloth bought from the said William and given to Nicholas Rykkell at the lord's order for a hood	5s
	Total: £40 16s 9 ½d

Making the lord's gowns with worsted cloth and purchase of velvet

I(n) making 5 of the lord's gowns, with the gowns of various-gentlemen, valets and grooms of the lord above whose namesappear in a black paper remaining in the hands of the said William to be made by John Gryffon of London, tailor, by an indenture between the said accountant and Gryffon remaining amongst other warrants (*erased* and in this account)[42]	£6 4s
Paid to a certain embroiderer of Lombard Street for the embroidery of various gowns of the lord's gentlemen and valets at the lord's order	16s

[41] A grey cloth from Montivilliers, France: Seine Maritime

Paid for the embroidery of a chimer of black cloth for the lord done by Bryd of London embroiderer without tally at the lord's order	£6
In 13 bolts of Worsted bought as below for 1 streamer and 1geton for the poop of the lord in white red and green at the lord's order	73s 8d
Paid for making the same with embroidery by the said Bryd of London embroiderer at the lord's order	46s 8d
In 4 yards of velvet bought for a doublet made for the lord at 13s 4d per yard less 4d in total	53s
In lining cloth bought for the lining	4s 6d
	Total £21 17s 10d

Purchase of horses[43]

Paid to Robert Kene of London, horse dealer [*corsourer*] for 1 dunned courser bought from him for the lord for the said voyage at the lord's order	£8
And paid to a certain William Courserer for a pledge [*arnest-silver*] in part payment for 2 coursers bought from him by the lord at the lord's order	40s
In 1 grey courser bought by the lord from a horse dealer in Smithfield	106s 8d
Paid to the same horse dealer in Smithfield at the lord's order for the use of the same William for the said 2 coursers bought from him	106s 8d
	Total £20 13s 4d

A saddle purchased with the fittings belonging to it

Paid to Martin Randolf of London, sadler, for 3 saddles including 1 palfrey-saddle with 5 decorated harnesses for the horse of the said lord Morley	£13 6s 8d
In 4 pairs of *faux stiropes*, 3 leather halters, 3 leather polys, 4 girths and 1 curry comb bought from the said Martin for the said voyage	8s 4d
	Total £13 14s 11d

Purchase of arms with their improvements

Paid to master Lodowic *Armourer for 1 bascinet bought for the lord at the lord's order and the remainder for d......40s* (*erased*, and it remains with the said account interlined and crossed out, because it remains with the said William Garneys by the lord *interlined*	40s)

[42] *In the margin* enquire about the bill.

[43] £20 13s 4d added in the right margin.

Item in 1 pair of plates bought for the lord	100s
Item paid to the same Lodowic for the repair of 1 pair of vambrace, rerebrace and leg harness	13s 4d
Item given to the same Lodowic at the lord's order on various occasions as a reward for wine bought and drunk whilst theequipment [*harnesii*] was being cleaned	16d
Item in 1 pair of vambrace, 1 pair of rerebrace and 1 leg harness cleaned on the first occasion	6s 8d
In 1 lance bought for the lord	2s 2d
Item in 42 shields of which 2 for the lord bought from a joiner in Thames Street for the said voyage with their painting	54s 4d
Item in 1 poleaxe bought for the lord	10s
Paid to Thomas Poyntour for stamping 4 coatarmours, 4 getons, 4 banners, 10 pennons, 60 pensels, 1 sail, 2 standards, 1 helm (and) 1 crest for the said voyage and for an old debt owed by the lord of £6 13s 4d as appears by parcel in a bill remaining with the said account from the said Thomas Poyntour	£23 13s 4d
Item in wine given to the said Thomas Poyntour at the lord's order on various occasions during the stamping of all the said harness as a regard for the better expediting of the work	20d
In 1 staff bought for the helm	12d
In 1 pair of rerebrace bought for the lord	16s 8d
In 1 piece of leather called Hertshyd, 6 dozen poyntis and 1 belt of hartsskyn bought for the lord in gross	3s 4d
Item in black, white and green silk that is 17½ ounces bought for the banners and the pennons of the lord at 18d per ounce less 3d in total	26s
	Total £35 8s 10d [margin £37 8s 10d]

Small necessaries bought with household vessels and victuals for stocking the lord's poop. And with the lord's payment

In 1 spruce-wood chest [*cista de prus*] bought for the lord	6s 8d
In 1 pair of gallon bottles and 1 pair of half-gallon bottles bought for the said voyage	7s
In 4 leather pots	5s
In 1 wooden tankard with iron binding bought for the said voyage	
In 1 pair of trussing coffers bought for the lord	5s 6d
In 1 silver and decorated grip [*harnesium*] bought and fitted on a certain sword which the lord gave to the earl of Suffolk	19s 4d

In 1 sword bought for the lord Morley with the grip for the same And for velvet bought for the dressing the same sword	26s 8d
In 1 pair of decorated spurs bought for the said lord Morley	5s
In 3 pairs of spurs bought for the grooms [*hensmen*]	3s
In 1 pairs of spurs bought for Petyguyllam	13d
In 2 pairs of leather dressers [*corearum*] bought for Pety Gelam and Mylon Gros	6s 10d
In 4 pairs of shoes bought for lord Morley	2s 10d
In 1 pair of shoes bought for Pety Gelam	6d
Paid to Richard Page at the lord's order	4d
In 1 grate for the kitchen bought for the said voyage	12d
In 1 iron hammer for beating the stockfish	4d
In 7 ells of canvas bought for boardcloths	17½d
In 3½ ells of linen cloth bought for 3 porters and for carrying bread in the same at 5d per ell	17d
In 5 wooden lanterns of which 2 are large bought for the said voyage	4s 10d
In 1 tabeler with 1 chesmeyne bought	10d
In 2 quires of paper bought for stock and for writing letters bought at the lord's order	10d
In 1 lb of red gummed wax for sealing letters bought at the lord's order	8d
In 4 iron candle-plates bought	4d
In 8 ells of best linen cloth bought for napkins, porters and `towels for the said voyage at 8d per ell	5s 4d
In 7 yards of linen cloth for the esquires' towels at 6d per yard	3s 6d
Item paid for tallowing of the lord's poop against the said voyage	6s 8d
In 1 brass cauldron with iron bands containing roughly 24 Gallons, 1 four-gallon brass pot, 1 three-gallon brass pot, 1 two-gallon brass pot, 1 half gallon brass pot, 1 five-gallon brass spoon,1 four-gallon brass spoon,1 three-gallon brass spoon, 2 iron cooking dishes weighing [blank], 1 iron griddle, 2 iron tripods, 2 iron standards for holding up the cokking dishes, 2 iron hooks for lifting the cauldrons off the fire, 1 meathook, 1 skimmer bought for the said voyage in gross from a certain brasier on Cornhill in London	57s
In wooden spoons, bowls, dishes, plates, trowes, and wooden spigots [fauxcetis] bought for the said voyage in gross	18s 3d

In 12 pewter plates, 12 pewter dishes, 12 pewter saucers, and 2 pewter chargers, 2 pewter basins, 2 pewter ewers, 9 pewter cellars, 2 pewter half-gallon pots, 2 pewter quartpots and 1 pewter roundbasin bought in gross from a certain man in Eastcheap for the said voyage	29s 11d
In 1 pair of mustard querns	5s
In 1 barrel of black soap bought for washing the napperware	5s 6d
In 2 panerys and 1 fetyrlock for keeping the candles	10d
In 36 lbs of candles bought for the said voyage at 1½d per lb	4s 6d
In 6 stone pots of (*blank*) gallons, 6 stone half-gallon pots, and 12 stone pots [*crusis*] bought in gross for the said voyage	12d
In 1 pen-case with horn and pen-knife bought for the lord at the lord's order	16d
In 9 pieces of oak for 9 posts for making a somercastle in the lord's poop for the said lord's voyage	15d
In 46 planks called estrychboards[44] bought for making the said castle	15s 4d
In 24 planks called estrychboards bought for making the cabin in the said poop at the lord's order	8s
In 22 planks of oak bought for the same on another occasion	7s 4d
In 5 ells of canvas bought for making 1 boardcloth. In 2 streynowres bought	6d
In 2 ells of canvas bought	9d
In 4 wooden tankards bought for the said voyage	12d
In 2 iron cressets [lamps] bought for the said voyage	7s
In 300 nails called doornails bought	15d
In 600 nails called latchnails bought for making the cabin	18d
In 1 old bag of red silk for keeping the lord's money with black stringing and embroidery	2s
In 4 ells of linen cloth bought for an altar cloth at 6d per yard	2s
In 1 chalice [*calice*] bought for the lord value 13s 4d and the residue from the lord	6s 8d
In 1 portable stone altar bought	12d
Paid to the Bishop of St Martin for consecration of the said altar and altar cloth	3s 4d
In 1 tester half a selewre and 1 coverlet of red and white worsted and 1 douge bought for the lord's bed in the said poop	17s

[44] Usually Baltic or Norewgian timber.

In 2 lbs of various coloured thread for stock	16d
In 7 ells of canvas bought for the lord	17d
In 2 red and white worsted cushions bought for the lord	2s 1d
In 1 lb of red wax for sealing bought on another occasion with 1 box for keeping the said wax at the lord's order	10d
Item paid for ferrying the said lord Morley in London on various occasions before the said voyage from London to Westminster with his household to converse with the king and returning as appears by item accounted in the said black paper	14s
In 155½ ells of linen cloth bought for a sail for the said poop of the lord at 6½d the ell	£4 4s 2 ½d
In 1 supervisor in London obtaining a writ for the debts issued against the lord Morley at the suit of the executor of Jurdon of London	26s 8d
	Total £22 11s 5d

Likewise for the purchase of victuals to stock the said poop	
For 24 quarters of wheat flour bought from Gwido Baker of London for the said voyage at 9s per quarter	£10 7s
For 27 quarters of wheat flour bought from a certain baker near Billingsgate in London for the said voyage at 9s 7d per quarter	£12 18s 9d
For bread bought from the same baker for the aforesaid voyage	20s
For 8 quarters of malt bought for the said voyage at 8s 9d per quarter	70s
For 20 pipes of beer bought for the said voyage at 8s per pipe	£8
In 4 pipes of red wine bought for the said voyage at 50s per pipe	£10
In 5 pipes of white wine bought for the said voyage at 30s each per pipe	£7 10s
In 2 pipes of white wine bought for the said voyage at 26s 8d per pipe	53s 4d
In 2 vessels of Malmsey bought for the said voyage	36s 4d
In 3 hogsheads of vinegar bought for the same	15s
In 22 gallons of isayle bought for the said voyage	4s 8d
In 1 bushel of mustard seed bought	2s 6d
In 1 hogshead of white salt containing roughly 1 quarter 1 bushel bought for the said voyage	6s 9d
In 1 hogshead of grey salt containing roughly 1 quarter 1 bushel bought for the same	6s 2d
In onions and garlic bought for the said voyage	11s

In 1 barrel of butter containing roughly 8 gallons bought for the said voyage	5s 8d
In 20 oxen bought for the said voyage of a certain John Loteley of London, butcher, for the larder at 15s per head	£15
In 54 sheep bought from the same John at 20d per head	£4 10s
In beef and mutton bought and expenses of the lord's household in London in the market dealing with the same	8s
In 1 quarter of fresh beef bought and sent to the lord's poop at the same time at the lord's order	5s
In 4 muttons bought and expenses in the said poop of the lord at the same time	6s 8d
In expenses of John Bouker riding to Walkerne and Halingbury for catching and killing 8 great bucks for stock and the larder of the lord at the lord's command	12d
Given to a certain man of Walkerne and to a certain man of Halingbury searching out the said 8 bucks to the lord's poop at the lord's order at 8d each	16d
In 1 capon and 2 pullets bought and eaten in the lord's poop at the same time	11d
In 2 weys of grey salt bought for the lord's larder for the said voyage at 26s 8d per wey	54s 4d
In 12 salt fish, 200 stockfish, 2 barrels of haddock, 2 barrels of mackerel,1 barrel of salmon, 1 barrel of conger and 60 lampreys bought from Trokenell of London, fishmonger, for the said voyage	£17 8s
Paid to the same Trokenell for salt fish, stockfish, whiting, salt salmon, fresh salmon, plaice and other kinds of fish bought from him and eaten by the lord's household in London during the victualling of the said poop	24s
In 1 gross of pike bought from John Waleys, fishmonger, for the said lord at the said time	2s 10d
In victuals bought on various occasions for the lord's household by John Page, cook, as appears by an entry in a bill remaining with the same account at the said time and paid by the said accountant	10s
Paid to a certain clerk of Sir Walter Hungerford subadmiral for the modification of a poop store[45] for the carriage of the said victuals	13s 4d
Paid to William Beverych, grocer, for various spices bought from him for the said voyage as appears by an entry in an indented bill remaining with the aforesaid account	£7 10s

[45] Lit. *pro mutacione unius puppis vitaler*.

In 1000 billets bought for the fuel and the ballast [*carcatio*] in the said poop	6s
In 8 quarters of charcoal bought for the said voyage	4s 4d
In making a furnace from stone in the said poop in gross	26s 8d
In 1 ox bought and eaten by the lord's household from a certain butcher in Eastcheap at the lord's order	14s
In 24 capons bought and sent to Calais for the expenses of the lord's household there at the lord's order and by his letter at 4d per capon	8s
In 24 hens bought and sent there likewise as by the same letter at 2d per hen	5s 8d
[Rent of houses *in margin*] Paid to John Cokerell of London for rent of houses with utensils and beds of the household for the time when the lord with his household were lodged there for the said voyage at the lord's order	60s
Item to the same John on another occasion before the said voyage for the same at the lord's order	48s 4d
In expenses of John George riding to Norfolk on the lord's business at the lord's request	20d
	Total £119 16s 3d

Expenses of William Garneys dealing with the organisation above

In expenses of William Garneys and Thomas Clerk with a page of the said William and 3 horses from Norfolk to London for the aboves aid provisioning of the lord for 3 days and 2 nights counting everything in pence with provender for their horses for the same time	5s
In fodder for 2 horses of the said William in London from 21 March in the third [recte fourth] year of the reign of King Henry V until Friday 8 May then next following, for 7 weeks	13s 4d
Item in expenses of the same William and Thomas Clerk with one of William's pages staying in London after the lord's household had left at Easter in the fourth year of the said king for 8 days and as many nights with fodder for their horses for the same time on the lord's business at the lord's order	8s
In expenses and fodder for 2 horses of the said William in London. From the said 8 May until 22 May then next following nothing because with the lord. In expenses and fodder for 2 horses of the said William from the said 22 May until 7 July then next following for 6 weeks and 6 days for aiding various business for the lord at the lord's order for each week in bread, hay and oats for the horses 2s 11d	20s

Item in expenses of the said William and Thomas Clerk with 2 of their grooms with 4 horses for the same time from the said 7 July until 23 August then next following for 3 weeks and 2 days on various of the lord's business for the said voyage during which time the lord was riding throughout Norfolk, with wine given to various of the lord's esquires for smoothing affairs and at the lord's order	20s
In expenses of the said William, Richard Baynard and Nicholas Rykkell on various occasions at Easter in the fourth year of the said king for the loan of £300 borrowed from John Hende for the said voyage that is for food and feasts on various occasions at the lord's order	13s 4d
	Total £4 19s 8d

Gifts given for a £300 loan from John Hende with payment of fees	
Item given to 2 valets of the said John Hende to smooth affairs [*pro meliori expedicione*] touching the said loan	3s 4d
Item given to Richard Baynard for his diligent labour touching the said loan at the lord's order	60s
Item given to the parson of the church of St Swithin Candlewick Street for his diligent labour touching the said loan at the lord's order	33s 4d
Item given to William Rentgaderere servant of the said John Hende for his labour touching the said loan at the lord's order	6s 8d
Item given to John Warde valet of the said John Hende for his diligent labour touching the said loan at the lord's order	100s
Item given to a clerk of Nicholas Rykell clerk for his diligent labour in writing on various occasions touching the said loan at the lord's order	3s 4d
Item paid to Nicholas Rykyll for his fee at the lord's order in this fourth year	100s
Item in the expenses of the said William Garneys and 1 of his grooms in London with three horses from 23 August until 2 September next following for ten days on the lord's business there at the lord's order after which the lord left London for Southampton, together with the expenses of William Aldyrton and one valet from London to Southampton and of the said William Garneys with one valet for three days, and waiting there for six whole days at the lord's order, and afterwards riding with the lord from Southampton to Winchelsea and staying there with the lord for three days and returning from Winchelsea to London for three days and staying in London for eight days carrying out various business of the lord at the lord's order, and from London to Beccles in Suffolk for three days, that is in total for 36 days accounted in money with the fodder for his horses at 2s per day plus 2s in total	(74s *erased*) 53s 4d

Paid to the clerk of the Staple for his fees for the safekeeping of the said monies from the loan of John Hende at that time	20s
Paid to William Cole for his fees in making a list of the debts of the said Lord Thomas lately Lord Morley after his death staying in Norwich on one occasion for six days, and for his view of this account, writing continuously on various occasions, writing in all for six weeks on parchment and paper	40s
	Total £24 19s 8d[46]

Expenses of the aforesaid William Garneys from Norfolk to Calais

In expenses of the same William Garneys from 2 October in the aforesaid 4th year to (*blank*)

Firstly in the expenses of the same William with 2 valets and 3 horses riding from Norfolk to Calais by reason of a letter of the lord sent to him that he should come to speak with the lord weakening there in his illness, for 1 night at Dunwich, 12d, at Wickham (Market) for 1 refreshment [*baytyng*], 3d. For 1 horse hired in Dunwich by reason of the sickness of one horse of the said William from Dunwich to Ipswich at that time, 8d. Item in the expenses of the same William with the said three horses at Ipswich for one night. For 1 horse led from Ipswich to Colchester, 8d. In the expenses of a feast of the said William at Colchester, 9d. For 1 horse hired from Colchester to London at that time, 3s. Item in the expenses for 1 refreshment at Easterford 3d. Item in the expenses for 1 night at Chelmsford at that time, 12d. Item in the expenses for the same at Brentwood, 9d. In the expenses of the same William in London at that time with 2 horses for 2 days and as many nights in helping and furthering various business of the lord there, 3s. For 2 horses hired from London to Canterbury, and from Canterbury to Dover for 62 leagues at that time 5s 6d. For hay and oats for the aforesaid 2 horses bought and eaten whilst remaining in Dover for 21 days and as many nights whilst the said William crossed the sea to Calais and stayed there with the lord to hear various matters of the lord, and afterwards completed by the same William, 7s.

The lord died 24th September in the fourth year of the aforesaid King

In the expenses of the same William from London as far as Dover at the said time, 6s 8d. In the expenses of the same William with 1 valet from Dover to Calais by sea with hire of the boat, 4s 7d. In alms given to 24 poor people at Calais by order of Thomas Erpingham at the said time, 9s 4d.

The expenses of the burial of lord's body

In the expenses of 15 priests and clerks with the money given to them for saying one dirge there at that time for the soul of the said lord Morley then dead, 15s. In 1 coffin [*cista*] bought for the burial of the said lord's body, 3s 8d. In wax bought and lit in the lighting of the said body at that time, 6d. In various medicines bought by John Vyrley clerk for the lord since he was weakening in his illness [*corrected from* weakened] and paid by William Garneys, 2s. Item paid to John the lord's cook for various victuals bought in the market and consumed in the household of the lord at Calais whilst the lord lay and was weakening [*corrected from* weakened], 14s 10d. Item paid for the expenses of various servants of the lord staying in the house of John Dunmow of Calais for 1 week by the lord's order, 5s. Item

[46] This is the total for both of the previous two sections.

in the expenses of the lord's household [*familie*] in Calais after his death, that is Sir Thomas Morley, Sir Thomas Brampton, 2 esquires, John Vyrley and 7 valets for 8 days, 24s 10d. Item given to a certain priest saying a mass for the soul of the said dead lord, 12d. Item paid for the repair and building of a Chapel of St George in Calais by the gift of the lord, 6s 8d. In linen cloth and various spices bought in Calais for the burial of the said dead lord for carriage of the said body from Calais to Norwich for burial in the church of the Augustinian friars, 77s. Paid to a certain man of Calais for carrying the body of the aforesaid dead lord from Calais to (Great) Yarmouth by sea, 26s 8d. Item paid to John Vyrley clerk coming with the said body by sea from Calais to (Great) Yarmouth for his expenses and his diligenmt service, 26s 8d. For 2 wax candles burning at the poop around the said body of the dead lord, 3d. In wine bought and drunk in Calais for the interment of the lord held there, 12s. Item given to (....) Storion a clerk of the crown of the lord King for writing letters to the lord King for various petitions of the said deceased lord himself addressed to the King whilst he was weakening, 6s 8d. Item paid to the secretary of the lord King's Chancery for writing letters hurrying the said petitions of the aforesaid deceased, 3s 4d. Item paid to a certain Thomas Fylle carrying letters from Calais throughout Norfolk about the burial of the said deceased lord at that time, 3s 4d.

Expenses of the same William in returning from Calais to Norfolk

In the expenses of the same William Garneys and Simon Loot from Calais to Sandwich in returning to Norfolk (...)
2 horses

PART FIVE

PSYCHOLOGICAL, FISCAL, AND "SCIENTIFIC" ASPECTS OF THE WAR

"SHEER TERROR" AND THE BLACK PRINCE'S GRAND *CHEVAUCHÉE* OF 1355

Sean McGlynn

> "Frightening your enemy is the fundamental and presumably the oldest weapon of war."[1]

The historians who provide this quote were writing about the mass bombing campaigns of World War II, the aerial raids of destruction that shared common features with the medieval *chevauchée*: destruction of the enemy's economic base; attempts to undermine morale; and exposing the weakness of the enemy. If one accepts the veracity of their observation, as this writer certainly does, then it is but a short step to see this truth applying to the terrifying reality of medieval warfare and its *chevauchées*.

The popular image of the Middle Ages, and especially of its wars, is one of Hobbesian brutality. Jan Huizinga's influential work, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919), captures this perception with his chapter entitled "The Violent Tenor of Medieval Life." Thus when Slobodan Milosevic was on trial at the war crimes tribunal in The Hague in 2002, the chief prosecutor accused the former Serbian leader of "medieval savagery."[2] However, brutality in the wars of the Middle Ages was no more pronounced as a manifestation of a particularly medieval mind-set than at other times and in other conflicts; rather it forms a coherent and calculated attempt to employ fear as a central weapon in the medieval armory.[3]

This article will examine the role of terror and atrocity as deployed in the *chevauchée* in the Hundred Years War, with an emphasis on Edward the Black Prince's campaign in 1355 in Languedoc, placing actions first within the wider context of strategy in medieval warfare and then by exploring other motivations for atrocities committed against non-combatants.[4]

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[1] Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, and John Pritchard, *Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War*, 2 vols., 2nd ed (London, 1989), 1: 512.

[2] Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919; reprint, New York, 1949), 9-31.

[3] Sean McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare* (London, 2008).

[4] A non-combatant can be hard to define and even harder to identify (especially in

The savagery of the Hundred Years War should be surprising in some ways. Was not this the age of high chivalry? Were not the worst manifestations of war during this period reserved for the clash between religions and cultures on the periphery of Christendom? In fact, wherever they were fought—whether in the Holy Land or in the heart of France—medieval warfare displayed the same fundamental characteristics. Such wars involved political considerations, financial and logistical concerns, recruitment and retention of forces, and strategies that were based on ravaging of territory and the protection of strongholds. All conflict also made measured use of terror to intimidate the enemy into submission.[5] Recent studies of the Hundred Years War leave little room for doubt on just how brutal this conflict could be and how dreadful its impact on non-combatants.[6] As with other struggles before and after the medieval period, the Hundred Years War provides copious examples of terror in pursuit of a defined military objective. The *chevauchée* has come to symbolize the nature of warfare during the conflict, becoming almost synonymous with it. John Barnie has defined this maneuver as typical of the Hundred Years War, "the aim of which was to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy through the destruction of his resources."[7]

The word *chevauchée* simply means a swift ravaging operation of the type performed throughout the entire Middle Ages. The Old French chronicle by the Anonymous of Béthune, written in the early thirteenth century, used the term in the same context as it utilized during the Hundred Years

siege situations). For purposes here, the term is used in its broad meaning of any body outside a combat force, what we would today call civilians.

[5] The literature on medieval warfare is vast. For a detailed historiography of its constituent parts and commanders, see the articles by Kelly DeVries, John France, Sean McGlynn, Laurence Marvin and Michael Prestwich in *Reader's Guide to Military History*, ed. Charles Messenger (London, 2001); also John France, "Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300," *The Journal of Military History* 65 (2001). A comprehensive list of books on medieval warfare up to 2010 is to be found in the bibliography of Sean McGlynn, *Blood Cries Afar: The Forgotten Invasion of England 1216* (Stroud, 2010).

[6] See, for example, Nicholas Wright, *Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside* (Woodbridge, 1998), 62-79; Clifford J Rogers, "By Fire and Sword: *Bellum Hostile* and "Civilians" in the Hundred Years' War", in *Civilians in the Path of War*, ed. Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (Lincoln, 2002), 33-78; L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Cut Off Their Heads, Or I'll Cut Off Yours": Castilian Strategy and Tactics in the War of the Two Pedros and the Supporting Evidence from Murcia," in *The Hunded Years War* (*Part II*), ed. L.J. Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden 2008), 153-84; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 113-29, 179-84, 233-39.

[7] J. Barnie, *War in Medieval English Society: Social Values in the Hundred Years War, 1377-99* (New York, 1974), 10. See also the definition in Chris Cook, *A Dictionary of Historical Terms* (Basingstoke, 1998), 67, which highlights the Hundred Years War.

War.[8] One of the most famous of these ravaging campaigns was undertaken by Edward the Black Prince in 1355. What is often called Edward 's *Grande Chevauchée* into Languedoc offers an infamous example of attacking non-combatant targets in a sustained and deliberate manner. In ths campaign, extreme actions were by no means random, but were calculated acts of terror designed to intimidate the enemy. Edward led between 6000 and 8000 English and Gascon men from Bordeaux in the west of France across to the Provençal coast in the east and back again: a round trip of nearly seven hundred miles.[9]

The original purpose of this campaign against the lands of Count Jean of Armagnac was to provide a profitable diversion, one that could co-ordinate with English operations in the north. However, this large-scale raid soon took on a life of its own. As David Green has written, the 1355 *chevauchée* was quite extensive, involving an assault on over 500 villages, towns, castles, and other settlements, where the population was over-whelmingly non-combatant. It was "a remarkable exercise in devastation and destruction [...] perhaps the pre-eminent example of the *chevauchée* strategy."[10] Paul Solon judges it to be "one of the most destructive of the *chevauchées* in the annals of English warfare during the Hundred Years War."[11]

Having set out in early October, Edward's army marched in three columns abreast in order to inflict the most damage possible on the country-side. On one day alone (November 15) his troops torched four towns. At Carcassonne, he turned down financial offers from the city and burned its suburbs before returning to home territory by December 2. In fact, neither Edward nor Sir John Wingfield gave much thought to the suffereing that this campaign unleashed on non-combatants. They focused on the military and financial aspects of the campaign. Edward's despatch boasts that "not a day passed without a town, castle or fortress being taken," but notes indifferently about refugees fleeing before his forces at Samatan, and

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8 McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 233.

9 For an excellent analysis of the *Grande Chevauchée*, see Clifford J.Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodridge, Suffolk, 2000), 286-324. See also H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355-1357* (Manchester, 1958), 43-77; Richard Barber, *Edward: Prince of Wales and Aquitaine* (Woodbridge, 1978), 110-30; David Green, *The Black Prince* (Stroud, 2001), 53-58; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 233-9; Jonathan Sumption, *Trial By Fire*, vol. 2 of *The Hundred Years War*, 2 vols. (London, 1999), 175-87.

10 David Green, *The Battle of Poitiers 1356* (Stroud, 2002), 32.

11 Paul Solon, "*Tholosanna Fides*: Toulouse as a Military Actor in Late Medieval France," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), 263.

seeking refuge in Carcassonne and Narbonne.[12] On campaign with Edward, Wingfield excitedly (and probably exaggeratedly) writes

> since the war against the French began, there has never been such destruction in a region as in this raid. For the countryside and towns which we have destroyed in this raid produced more revenue for the king of France in aid of his wars than half of his kingdom [...] as I could prove from authentic documents found in various towns in the tax-collectors' houses.[13]

Robert of Avesbury offers a more personal insight, telling of people who, fearing "lest they should suffer the same fate" as had befallen others, fled "in terror to Avignon with such property as they could carry, that they might be under the protection of the pope."[14] Geoffrey le Baker offers the most detailed account of the campaign, cataloguing the places sacked and burned "to ashes" over two months, and telling us repeatedly of people fleeing in "sheer terror" to escape Edward's depredations. From such accounts, we gain a real sense of the extent of the ravaging and destruction, and hence its impact on the inhabitants of the region.[15] However, even this does not fully capture "the brutality of the raid's conduct,"[16] the killings, rape and torture that it inflicted on southern France. The great chronicler, Jean Froissart, writes of the "tremendous slaughter and violence" of the campaign. According to the chronicler, when the English soldiers "captured a townsman or a peasant they demanded ransom from him and if he would not pay they left him mutilated."[17] Hewitt says that the "butchery," "personal violence," and "slaughter" affected even Froissart. In describing English actions at Montgiscard, this author, who was usually so tolerant of soldierly excesses and so indifferent to the common people, expostulated "it was an occasion for pity."[18]

There were clear motivations for directing such widespread destruction and misery against the non-combatant population. The most obvious was financial. The expedition carried home roughly 1,000 carts filled with booty.

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[12] *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), 153.

[13] *Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince*, ed. Richard Barber (Woodbridge, 1979), 52.

[14] W.J. Ashley, *Edward III and his Wars, 1327-1360* (London, 1887), 166.

[15] Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 60-70.

[16] Solon, "*Tholosanna Fides*," 265

[17] Jean Froissart, *Ouevres de Froissart: Chroniques*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 25 vols. (Brussels 1867-1877), 4: 164

[18] Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 57, 75 where Hewitt assesses the personal impact of the raid on French non-combatants, who were left: "mourning, bewildered and fearful for the morrow." Froissart's more compassionate side is also seen at the sack of Limoges in 1370. McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 182-83.

In addition, prisoners seized in the course of the *chevauchée* were compelled to pay extravagant ransoms. Le Baker, Froissart and Le Bel speak of Edward's troops "enriching their own countries ... [securing so much] ... profit ... [that] they did not know what to do with it all."[19] In his perceptive analysis of the gains from 1355, Clifford Rogers makes the central point that

> the harm inflicted on the subjects of King Jean (1350-1364) was far, far greater than the amount gained by his enemies, for throughout their *chevauchée* the English and the Gascons had been careful to inflict as much damage as possible even when so doing brought no profit to them.[20]

Stores of food and wine were destroyed when they could not be carted off; mills and machinery were targeted; towns were not just plundered but burnt. At least a dozen walled towns and the residential and trading areas of three major cities were destroyed. The effects were deliberately long-lasting, forcing the French into a long program of recovery. For many communities, what little was left from tax revenues was directed to the essential task of rebuilding walls and fortifications. In Narbonne's case, this amounted to five years' worth of tax receipts; in other places it consumed revenues for an even longer period.[21]

With this in mind, the debate as to whether or not the campaign was a military success can be decided in Edward's favor: Even if no territory was taken and the prince failed to provoke a decisive battle, English financial gains coupled with French financial losses marked the 1355 *chevauchée* as a winning campaign.[22] H.J. Hewitt has noted the impracticality of occupying all of France. He argues instead that"the enemy was to be weakened by the destruction of his resources. Devastation was a negative, economic means for the attainment of the ultimate, political end."[23]

In one sense, Edward's military imperative was thwarted. He had, it is true, undermined the French king's prestige by exposing the monarchy's failure to protect its own people. The prince had also demonstrated his superior strength, punished rebels, and aided allies. Nevertheless, what amounted to a propaganda victory did not translate into long-term political gains in the region attacked. This was apparent at Carcassonne, where

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19 Froissart, 5: 351, 353; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 323.

20 Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 323.

21 Sumption, *Trial By Fire*, 184-85.

22 Rogers makes the case both for Edward's battle-seeking strategy and the attainment of a list of objectives. See Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 301, 322-23; see also McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 236-37.

23 H.J. Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III, 1338-62* (Manchester, 1966), 117.

neither the immense destruction nor the flight of refugees forced the French into cowering submission.

One aim of Edward's raid had been to "terrify the inhabitants into changing allegiance." However, the citizens at Carcassonne "feared French revenge at a later date more than they feared the enemy at the gates."[24] Immediate and explicit terror had been offset by an even greater terror—the dread of a future, prolonged retribution at the hands of the French. The refusal of Carcassone to capitulate reveals the limits of a ravaging campaign: while it might benefit the attackers and injure the defenders financially, it did not tend to produce long-term political results. Is it a coincidence that the English sources seem to suggest a greater willingness for battle after the failure to take Carcassonne?[25]

On the other hand, for non-combatants, the losses incurred by ravaging campaigns could be, quite literally, devastating. Jean de Venette offers a moving and telling account of the result of a *chevauchée* into his Beauvaisis homeland in 1359:

> The English, destroyed, burned, and plundered many little towns and villages capturing or even killing the inhabitants. The loss by fire of the village where I was born is to be lamented, together with that of many others near by. The vines in this region were not pruned or kept from rotting. The fields were not sown or ploughed. There were no cattle or fowl in the fields. No wayfarers went along the roads, carrying their best cheese and dairy products to market. The eye of man was saddened by the looks of the nettles and thistles springing up on every side. Instead of houses and churches there was the lamentable spectacle of scattered, smoking ruins to which they had been reduced by devouring flames. What more can I say? Every misery increased on every hand, especially among the rural population, the peasants, for their lords bore hard upon them, extorting from them all their substance and poor means of livelihood.[26]

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[24] Barber, *Edward*, 128.

[25] Perhaps "failure" is not the right word: Carcassonne was just one of a number of objectives, but was never fully invested. Barber claims that had it been, it would surely have fallen [*Edward*, 123].

[26] My abridgement from Rogers, *Wars of Edward III*, 169. Compare this with Thomas Basin's report on the effects of ravaging: "From the Loire to the Seine the peasants have been slain or put to flight. We ourselves have seen vast empty plains absolutely deserted, uncultivated, abandoned, empty of inhabitants, covered with bushes and brambles." *Those Who Fought: An Anthology of Medieval Sources*, ed. Peter Speed (New York, 1996), 213. A fuller transcription is to be found in Robert Boutruche, "The Devastation of Rural Areas during the Hundred Years War and the Agricultural Recovery of France", in *The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. P.S. Lewis (London, 1971), 26 (a reprint of the original 1947 article). The effects of *chevauchée* are also discussed in Wright, *Knights and Peasants*,

No wonder then, that the most common Latin verb for ravaging was the accurate one of *depopulare*. The economic damage caused to an enemy through targeting non-combatants is clear here: with loss of produce and markets and the concomitant tax revenues, and with the general depletion of the economic base, the ability to fund war was seriously undermined. As for burning, Henry V (r.1413-1422), that exemplar of medieval generalship, made it clear that "war without fire is as worthless as sausages without mustard."[27]

Robert Boutruche's study of the impact of ravaging in the Hundred Years War shows that many reports were exaggerated in order to win sympathy and financial support. Some areas, he argues, escaped the ravages of war completely, as Languedoc had done before Edward's raid in 1355 (something that made the impact of the campaign all the more shocking). However, Boutruche also shows that hard-hit areas would feel the consequences for years to come.[28] The 1355 *chevauchée* demonstrates how successful ravaging could be as a means of waging war. While profiting the attacker and imposing onerous expenses on the enemy, it also served as a propaganda statement and a diversionary tactic.[29]

But what of the specific acts of brutality that ravaging so often elicited? We have seen Froissart's comments on the "tremendous" slaughter and torture. The intent was in part to undermine the authority of King Jean, exposing his weakness and inability to protect his people, thus subverting the very relationship between a prince and his people. As the thirteenth-century *Schwabenspiegel* states: "We should serve our lords as they protect us; if they do not protect us, justice does not oblige us to serve them."[30] But

33-4; Matthew Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217* (Cambridge, 1996), 258-90; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 197-244.

[27] As claimed by Juvenal des Ursins in *Histoire de Charles VI* in J.A. Bouchon, *Choix des Chroniques* (Paris, 1875) 565. Henry was a keen advocate of using the threat of fire as a means of "compelling obedience by destruction." See Theodor Meron, *Henry's Wars and Shakespeare's Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1993), 117-18.

[28] Boutruche, "The Devastation of Rural Areas,"46-47. See also Rogers, "By Fire and Sword," 33-55. Josiane Teyssot argues persuasively that the countryside was hit harder than the towns. Teyssot, "Les Villes d'Auvergne pendant la Guerre de Cents Ans," in *La Guerre, La Violence et Les Gens au Moyen Age II: La Violence et les Gens*, ed. Philippe Contamine et Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, 1996), 49-57.

[29] For ravaging as a diversionary tactic, see Sean McGlynn, "Roger of Wendover and the Wars of Henry III, 1216-1234", in *England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III (1216-1272)*, ed. Bjorn K. Weiler and Ifor W. Rowlands (Aldershot, 2002), 195-96. I have analysed this topic in *Blood Cries Afar* in further detail.

[30] Cited in Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals* (Oxford, 1994), 37.

Froissart's mention of torturing victims for payment touches on a crucial motivation of individual troops inflicting atrocities—the lust for money. These individual acts of brutality caused even more terror than the loss of lands, livelihoods, and dwellings as they were both immediate and immediately life-threatening.

Such acts were also widespread. Modern scholarship has often tended to play down chroniclers' reports of atrocities as literary embellishments and monastic hyperbole. Increasingly, however, this view has been challenged by authors attempting to demonstrate the veracity of these accounts.[31] The sheer weight of evidence not only from the Hundred Years War, but from across medieval Europe is overwhelming. Bernard-Ezii, lord of Albret, admits in his will that not only had he destroyed villages and hospices, he had also "killed some peasants, ... molested churchmen and held merchants for ransom." In 1368, Walter Strael received a pardon for a litany of evil-doing. In the words of the pardon, he had "committed and perpetrated many murders, larcenies, robberies, sacrileges, ... killed men, women and children, set fires, raped women and violated maids."[32] Peasants and other non-combatants were not slaughtered just to deny the enemy the economic asset of manpower, but to provide soldiers with a financial, and often sexual, incentive to fight. Jean Juvenal des Ursins protested against "new kinds of torment used to extract money from the poor people": those who refused to pay ransoms (*patis*) had their houses burned and their ears cut off; "poor labourers" were killed either outright or starved to death in dungeons; peasants were incarcerated in "locked bins while their wives were raped above their heads, on the lids."[33] Edward's men gained a "fearful reputation for the 'injuries and inhuman tortures' which they were known to use against their prisoners."[34]

Compare the above with the following passage that Roger of Wendover wrote in the early 1220s, describing the civil war (1215-1217) that took place at the end of the reign of John I (1199-1216). The common thread is ravaging:

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[31] See McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 211-17, 249-52; idem, "The Myths of Medieval Warfare", *History Today*, 44, 1 (1994): 29; idem, "Roger of Wendover", 184-85; Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 294-304; Hugh M. Thomas, "Violent Disorder in King Stephen's Kingdom: A Maximum Argument," in *King Stephen's Reign*, ed. Paul Dalton and Graeme J. White (Woodbridge, 2008), 154.

[32] For Albret, see Robert Boutruche, *La Crise d'une Société: Seigneurs et Paysans du Borderlais pendant la Guerre de Cents Ans* (Paris, 1947), 515; for Strael, see Rogers, "By Fire and Sword", 36.

[33] Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 70.

[34] Ibid. Wright's important study of the effect of the war on the French countryside provides many specific examples of such atrocities and their motivations, especially 62-79.

> The whole surface of the earth was covered with these limbs of the devil like locusts, who assembled…to blot out every thing from the face of the earth, from man down to his cattle; for, running about with drawn swords and knives, they ransacked towns, houses, cemeteries, and churches, robbing everyone, and sparing neither women nor children. The king's enemies wherever they were found were imprisoned in chains and compelled to pay a heavy ransom. Even the priests, whilst standing at the very altars…were seized, tortured, robbed and ill-treated …. They inflicted similar tortures on knights and others of every condition. Some of them they hung up by the middle, some by the feet and legs, some by their hands, and some by the thumbs and arms, and then threw salt mixed with vinegar in the eyes of the wretched …. Others were placed on gridirons over live coals, and then bathing their roasted bodies in cold water they thus killed them.[35]

Wendover then makes clear the motivating factor behind the atrocities:

> The wretched creatures uttered pitiable cries and dreadful groans, but there was no one to show them pity, for their torturers were satisfied with nothing but their money. Many who had worldly possessions gave them to their torturers, and were not believed when they had given their all; others, who had nothing, gave many promises, that they might at least for a short time put off the tortures they had experienced once. This persecution was general throughout England, and fathers were sold to torture by their sons, brothers by their brothers, and citizens by their fellow citizens.[36]

This passage, perhaps more than any other, explains the rationale behind atrocities committed by soldiers on non-combatants in medieval warfare. It was all about money, about using the hollow legitimacy of war to steal from people. The tortures were not mindless sadism (though that undoubtedly played a part in some cases), but a means of extorting money. The worse the torture, the more the victim, and onlookers, would be terrified into giving what they had to stop further pain. Pain was the mangle that squeezed out every available drop of wealth. It is interesting to compare this passage closely with ones describing the atrocities committed by garrison forces. In Lancastrian Normandy, Juvenal des Ursins, writing two centuries later and across the Channel, laments that soldiers, under the cover of *appatis*, had

> taken prisoner men, women, and small children, without distinction of age or sex; raped women and girls; captured husbands and fathers and killed

[35] Roger of Wendover, *Chronica Rogeri de Wendover Liber Qui Dicitur Flores Historiarum*, ed. H.G. Hewlett, 3 vols. (London, 1886-1889), 2: 165-66. Note the close parallels with the account from 1359 given in Rogers, "By Fire and Sword," 49.

[36] Roger of Wendover, 166. The connection between excesses and money is also made in the *Gesta Stephani*, ed. K.R. Potter (London, 1955), 102-4, 108-9.

> them in the presence of their wives and daughters …kidnaped priests, monks, clergy and labourers; put them in shackles and other instruments of torture, and then beaten them, by which some were mutilated, others driven mad.[37]

In 1358, Hugues de Montegron produced a similar account of the treatment of non-combatants. He tells of shutting them up "in dark dungeons, threatening them daily with death, and continually making them suffer with whippings, wounds, hunger, and deprivation beyond belief."[38] In his impressive account of civilians in the line of fire during the Hundred Years War, Clifford Rogers raises a dissenting voice. In his view, soldiers on *chevauchéee* "generally had neither the time nor the incentive" to indulge in this sort of atrocity and "did not need to resort to murders or torture to inspire their victims to pay up."[39] By contrast, Roger of Wendover's account of torture during King John's *chevauchée* of 1215-1216 suggests otherwise. John's army marched from St Albans near London to Durham in just two-and-a-half weeks, a round trip of over 600 miles. According to the author, it managed during this time to wreak the type of havoc depicted in the passages quoted above. The Black Prince's *chevauchée* of 1355 took nearly two months, suggesting that there was much more time available for troops to get up to no good.[40]: The behavior of troops in medieval warfare, whether on campaign or when garrisoning in a contested zone, is remarkably consistent.

As Boutruche says of the use of torture in the 1355 campaign, "it was intended to force the sufferer to disclose the hiding place of a few coins. If peasants were recalcitrant, their throats were cut. Or they might be garrotted or roasted on a slow fire."[41] This had always been the way of warfare.[42] No wonder, then, as Geoffrey Queton explained in 1377 when faced with an approaching enemy force, he joined the other "country people who were fleeing to the fields, ditches, caves and woods like desperate men."[43]

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[37] Cited in Rogers, "By Fire and Sword," 47.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., 48.

[40] McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 234; idem, "Roger of Wendover," 186; Ralph of Coggeshall, Wendover's contemporary, confirms such actions: for example, Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicanum*, ed. J. Stephenson, Rolls Series (London, 1875), 177.

[41] Boutruche, "The Devastation of Rural Areas," 32.

[42] Fulcher of Chartres, writing of the First Crusade at the end of the eleventh century, tells us that crusaders would even split open the bellies of Saracens "so that they may pick out gold *besants* from their intestines, which they had swallowed down their horrible gullets." *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, ed. Edward Peters (Philadelphia, 1988), 90.

[43] Cited in Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 90.

While we take the ransom of knightly prisoners as a central feature and motivation of medieval wars,[44] it is easy to forget that, as the contemporary sources above illustrate, non-combatants were just as likely to be taken hostage. Ransoms for non-combatants were not inconsiderable, as Philippe Contamine has shown in an article on ransom and booty in English Normandy towards the end of the Hundred Years War. Contamine notes "it is striking to see that the ransoms of supposed non-combatants are not very inferior to those of the soldiers."[45] Indeed, they were often comparable. Contamine cites the case of Jean Guérard, a thirty-four-year-old married father who was twice taken hostage by French soldiers, first in 1419 and again in 1420. Guérard was forced pay twenty *moutons d'or* for his release on both occasions. In 1425, he was taken by English soldiers, and ransomed for twenty *écus*.[46] Even corpses could be ransomed. Failure to pay would deny their relatives the consolation of offering them a Christian burial. The going rate appears to have been half the price of a live hostage. During times of famine, there were even reports of corpses being dug up by soldiers on campaign not for booty or ransom, but for food.[47]

One further motivation for atrocity needs to be discussed. Since it is hard to quantify for the Middle Ages, this motivation attracts relatively little attention. The financial incentives for a soldier engaged in warfare have always been understood.[48] On the other hand, the psychological motivations have generally been neglected. Medieval chroniclers are not known for their psychoanalytical skills; consequently, it is necessary to examine more recent studies of combat atrocities and then apply their

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[44] For general discussions of ransoms of knights, see: Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 183-203; Richard Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry* (Woodbridge, 1995), 241-43; Richard W. Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988), 106-8; McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 75-76; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1994), 151-52, 255-6, 261-62. A more specific study, emphasising the business-like nature of ransoming, is analyzed by Michael K. Jones, "Ransom Brokerage in the Fifteenth Century" in *Guerre et Société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe-XVe Siècle*, ed. Philippe Contamine, Charles Giry-Deloison et Maurice Keen (Lille, 1991), 221-35.

[45] Philippe Contamine, "Rançons et Butins dans la Normandie Anglaise, 1424-1444," in *La Guerre et la Paix: Frontières et Violences au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1978), 258 (my translation).

[46] Ibid., 259.

[47] Green, *Edward*, 35.

[48] For the fourteenth century, see Andrew Ayton's important comprehensive survey *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994), especially 84-120. For the financial rationale behind torture and atrocity in the Hundred Years War, see Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 62-79 and Rogers' outstanding article, "By Fire and Sword". For an overall medieval context, see McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 141-241 *passim*.

lessons to the past. In his most recent book *The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil*, renowned psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, concludes that research into this area "might be as thick as a phone book," but to really comprehend what happens, we must understand not only the situation but also the individual involved and his reaction to that situation.[49] If ordered to kill non-combatants, the medieval soldier was most unlikely to refuse: there were not many conscientious objectors about. Often the soldier held in his hands the matter of life and death. Killing could be quite arbitrary: the same individual might strike down a non-combatant one day, but not the next. It could all depend on whether a campaign had been grueling or not; whether a comrade had been killed by disease or combat; whether booty and opportunity had been good so far; or any number of other factors. Chroniclers write that soldiers "killed whom they chose, and whom they chose they saved alive."[50] "Our men grabbed a large number of males and females ... killing some, and sparing others as the notion struck them."[51]

Medieval soldiers would have experienced unit loyalties and primary group cohesion—the "band of brothers" syndrome on the eve of the battle of Agincourt. Writing nearly two centuries after the event, Shakespeare attributed this phrase to Henry V. In reality, however, it applies just as readily to combatants from any era.[52] While, on the one hand, this comradeship is one of the noblest aspects of war, it can also lead to ugly manifestations of peer pressure producing terribly brutal results. As Christopher Browning observes in his seminal study of a Nazi execution squad, tellingly entitled *Ordinary Men*, "Within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressure and sets moral norms. If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?"[53] A closer parallel can be made with the Russian invasion of Germany in 1945. One historian characterized the atrocities committed by the Russian army in these terms:

> Marauders and rapists acted as a rule under the influence of alcohol, and they acted in bands, and thus under peer pressure—venting a collective

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[49] Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil* (London, 2007), 487.

[50] *Gesta Francorum*, ed. and trans. Rosalind Hill (London, 1962), 91.

[51] *First Crusade*, ed. Peters, 248-49.

[52] Shakespeare, *Henry V* (1599), Act 4 Scene 3. For striking examples of primary group cohesion in a more modern war, see Susan Mary Grant, "For God and Country: Why Men Joined Up for the US Civil War", *History Today* 50, no. 7 (2000): 23-24.

[53] Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (London, 1998), 189.

> rage .... One can well imagine the taunts at those unwilling to engage in a virile attack on German women .... Officers stood by passively during gang-rapes, or made sure every man had his turn.[54]

The point made about officers encouraging their men to engage in rape and other violence directed against the civilian population is verified in other accounts from other wars. In this regard, factors other than the financial one take on added importance. Longstanding grievances, the desire to punish and humiliate the enemy, the effort to forge group unity, and the approval—tacit or explicit—of commanders are all factors that, when taken together, greatly magnify the level of atrocity practiced by an army in any epoch.

There was also the role of blood-lust. As a sergeant fighting on the Somme in 1916 wrote, combat situations left a man "half-mad with excitement... when you start a man killing, you can't turn him off again like an engine."[55] A *chevauchée* was a raid into predominantly hostile territory; the Black Prince's of 1355 lasted some two months. Like any such extended campaign, it must have had a tense, psychological impact on the troops who frequently found themselves in combat. While we obviously do not have evidence in the forms of diaries and letters home written by ordinary medieval infantryman, a few accounts produced by the literate knightly classes permit us to see how similar the mind of the medieval warrior is to that of his modern contemporary. Bertrand de Born's infamous, almost psychotic early thirteenth-century paean to the unequaled glories of medieval warfare stress the sheer excitement and deadly thrill of combat. According to the troubadour, nothing compares to the experience of seeing the "great and small together fall on the grass of the ditches" and "dead men who still have pennoned lances in their ribs."[56] In the fifteenth century, Jean de Bueil writes in similar vein, emphasizing what may be called in modern terms primary group cohesion. He declares:

> You love your comrade so much in war .... A great feeling of loyalty and of pity fills your heart on seeing your friend so valiantly exposing his body to execute and accomplish the command of the Creator. And then you are prepared to go and die or live with him, and for love not to abandon him. And out of that there arises such a delectation, that he who has not expe-

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[54] John Connelly, "Rampaging," *London Review of Books* (June 22, 2006), 30.

[55] Ferguson, *Pity of War*, 380.

[56] Cited in J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, trans. Sumner Willard and R.W. Southern (1954; reprint, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1997), 37.

> rienced it is not fit to say what delight it is …. A man who does that feels so strengthened, so elated, that he does not know where he is.[57]

This bonding effect was undoubtedly a very real phenomenon in the Middle Ages. Matthew Bennett judges that by the twelfth century "military friendships transcend all others."[58] According to the German philosopher, Frederick Nietschze, warriors experience in periods of conflict a "dual polarity," viewing their comrades in an absolutely opposite manner from how they see the enemy. In regard to their adversaries,

> men are not much better that beasts of prey let loose. There they enjoy a freedom from all social constraint; they indemnify themselves in the wilderness for the tension […] as rejoicing monsters who perhaps make off from a hideous succession of murders, conflagrations, rapes and torturing in high spirits and equanimity of soul […] convinced that that the poets now have something to sing and praise for a long time to come.[59]

This passage from Nietschze seems to reflect the psychology of troops embarking upon a *chevauchée*.

The efficacy of fear as a weapon in the Hundred Years War requires a detailed examination at some future date,[60]as does the debate over whether the Hundred Years War became increasingly brutalized as time went on.[61]

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[57] Cited in Huizinga, *Waning of the Middle Ages*, 76.

[58] Matthew Bennett, "Military Masculinity in England and Northern France c.1050-c.1215" in *Masculinity in Medieval Europe*, ed. D.M. Hadely (London, 1999), 88.

[59] Friedrich Nietzsche, *A Nietzche Reader*, trans. R.J. Holingdale (London, 1977), 114-15. Cf. Freud's thoughts on soldiers, which include "we are, like primitive man, simply a gang of murderers" and "War … strips us of the later accretions of civilization and lays bare the primal man in each of us." See Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Time on War and Death" in *Civilization, War and Death*, ed. John Rickman (London, 1939), 1-25.

[60] Andrew Villalon offers some insightful analysis for Spain in the Hundred Years War, arguing for the counter-productivity of terror as a weapon in Villalon, "Cut Off Their Heads," especially 174-78. Note Colin Richmond's judgment that "killing only begets more killing," in Colin Richmond, "Identity and Morality: Power and Politics during the Wars of the Roses," in *Power and Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. Huw Pryce and John Watts (Oxford, 2007), 232. E.B. Fryde has also noted how the fear caused by pillaging could be counter-productive: E.B. Fryde, *Peasants and Landlords in Later Medieval England* (Stroud, 1996), 222. See also McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire*, 113-29, 179-85, 233-39.

[61] Anne Curry says that I have a "populist" view in believing that the Hundred Years War became more brutalized over time, citing the case of the 1339 *chevauchée* in the Cambrésis which "was considerably more damaging to civilians than any of the 15th-century campaigns" (Anne Curry, *BBC History Magazine*, July 2008, 65). However, such a view overlooks some major factors. First, the 1339 campaign was especially destructive as it was the first major one of the conflict, the region, like Languedoc when faced by Edward the Black Prince in 1355, being unprepared for the full onslaught of war. Secondly, the accumulative effect of numerous *chevauchées* can make more of an impact collectively than one major raid. As Robert Boutruche says about the end of the conflict, the devastation "was

But it is clear, as Colin Richmond rightly observes in a brilliant paper on the Wars of the Roses, that "violence engenders its own logic."[62] The use of terror on a *chevauchée* was all part of that logic: it undermined the enemy politically and economically. It provided financial incentives to the soldiers who participated in the campaign by permitting them to extract money and goods through torture. It recognized—and accommodated—the darkest impulses of the soldier functioning in the extreme environment of a sustained campaign through enemy territory. All this, the Black Prince understood and used to his advantage.



Map 11. The Black Prince's First Raid, October 5-November 28.

more extensive than at any other period." (Boutruche, "The Devastation of Rural Areas," 46). Most importantly, "damaging" is not the same as "brutalization": devastation of the land is one thing, physical ill treatment of the people on it is another, the latter ratcheting up the brutality. When Rogers asks "Why was this war ... so cruel?" he responds that part of the answer lies in the "duration of the conflict." (Rogers, "By Fire and Sword", 63). As Colin Richmond has rightly noted for the Wars of the Roses, "brutalization ... is also a feature of war, especially a long one, whether that war is pre-modern or de-modern" (Richmond, "Identity and Morality", 228). For the 1339 campaign see Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 157-73.

[62] Richmond, "Identity and Morality," 238.

LONDON BUSINESSMEN AND ALCHEMISTS: RAISING MONEY FOR THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR*

Wendy J. Turner

I. *London Merchants, the Calais Staple and the Hundred Years War*

In 1443, the earl of Suffolk, William de la Pole (he would become a duke in 1448), went to France to retrieve Margaret of Anjou, bride-to-be of the twenty-one-year-old king of England, Henry VI (r.1422-1461). The young king and his council had agreed that it was necessary to send an escort fit to accompany a future queen; as a result, Suffolk traveled with his wife and her ladies, five barons and their wives, as well as "17 knights, 65 esquires, and 204 valets."[1] Suffolk ran short of funds while waiting for Margaret to meet his party in Rouen. Although the exchequer had provided the healthy sum of £4,234, the trip, originally supposed to take about three months or perhaps four at the most, dragged on for six. In the absence of the tardy princess, a representative of William Cantelowe, a London merchant with close ties to Calais, heard of Suffolk's troubles and lent the crown £133 on the spot to help with the expenses. Ultimately, Suffolk's trip exceeded the budgeted amount by a total of at least £435,[2] with the shortfall either coming out of Suffolk's own pocket or being raised through private loans, such as that extended by Cantelowe.

Who was William Cantelowe and why did he so willingly lend money to the royal emissary without such a loan being requested or demanded from him by the crown? Why did it matter to Cantelowe or his agent that an earl and his family were stuck in France unable to pay their bills? Did other businessmen act in a similar manner; and if so, why? The answer has to do with the various hats that he and many others like him wore.

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[1] Henry's marriage to Margaret was the single most expensive event of his reign since his own journey to France as a child for his coronation as king [R.A. Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI* (1981; reprint, Phoenix Mill, Gloucestershire, 2004), 315-16].

[2] Ibid., 316.

While Cantelowe was a businessman from London, he was also an important figure in the city of Calais, a place that since its conquest in 1346 had served as England's major port of entry onto the continent not only for soldiers headed to France, but also for English products. In 1363, the crown had established a staple in Calais in order to regulate the wool trade, an organization of which Cantelowe was a prominent member. The Staple was intended to satisfy both the royal need to maximize tax revenue and the desire of producers for better prices. For many decades, most of England's wool passed through the city where it was graded and taxed, eventually fueling the cloth trade of the Low Countries.

The whole process was largely controlled by a guild of approximately 200 merchants, most of them residents of London, who formed the organization eventually known as the Company of the Staple (Staplers for short). It was they who collected the customs and subsidies on wool for the crown and delivered them to the Exchequer which in turned used part of the proceeds to pay the Calais garrison.[3] If upon occasion revenues fell short, the company of merchants would lend the Exchequer the money necessary to pay the garrison, knowing that they could recoup their loans through the wool exchange.[4] The ability to borrow money from a group of organized London merchants who enjoyed a monopoly on one the kingdom's most lucrative products was especially attractive to a crown perennially strapped for income to finance a costly foreign war.

Not only was William Cantelowe a prominent "stapler," he was also a royal official, having been appointed victualer to Calais in 1436,[5] with the expectation that he would help hold the city in readiness against any attack. Particularly threatening was the duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good (r. 1419-1467) who was fast consolidating his family's hold on the Low

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[3] Shortly after the Hundred Years War ended, the parliamentary Act of Retainer of 1466 altered the process, giving the Company of the Staple responsibility for paying the garrison directly out the customs and subsidies it collected, thus by-passing the Exchequer and increasing Calais's fiscal independence from the crown. E. Power and M.M. Postan, *Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 1933), 44-45 and David Grummitt, *The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436-1558* (Woodbridge, Sufolk, 2008), 78-79.

[4] Scott L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III* (Cambridge, 1991), 67-73, 195; Edwin S. Hunt and James M. Murray, *A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550* (Cambridge, 1999), 166-167, 256 (n. 8); Frank Rexroth, *Deviance and Power in Late Medieval London* (Cambridge, 2007), 132-35.

[5] Cantelowe remained victualer of Calais until at least 1448. See The National Archive: Public Record Office [hereafter TNA: PRO], E 404/64, m 73; *Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1216-1509* [hereafter *CPR*], 52 vols. (London, 1891-1901), Henry VI, vol. 3 (1436-1441), 203; and Griffiths, *Reign*, 202, 639, and 662 note.

Countries. For many years the stalwart ally of England, Philip had renewed his allegiance to France at the recent Congress of Arras (1435).[6]

While Calais's security might be of special concern to William, it was also important to all those London businessmen who played a role in the highly lucrative wool trade. They wished to keep the staple in this English-held enclave, a goal that necessarily meant preserving an English presence in France. In short, their financial and business interests left them no choice but to take an interest in affairs of the state surrounding the Hundred Years War (1337-1453).

By the mid-1440s, however, those affairs were becoming increasingly precarious. As early as the 1420s, the tide of war which had so favored England during the century's early decades had turned. In 1422, the death of the warrior king, Henry V (r.1413-1422), while still in his prime, left on the throne a one year old infant who even when he came of age lacked the martial spirit and military talent of his illustrious father. In 1429, the appearance on the scene of Joan of Arc (d. 1431), her spectacular relief of the siege of Orléans, and the subsequent coronation of the Dauphin as Charles VII (r.1422-1461) had done much to shake English confidence and increase domestic questioning of the war effort. The French resurgence that followed Joan's brief but spectacular career gained considerable impetus when, at the Congress of Arras in 1435, England's former ally, Burgundy, had for all intents and purposes withdrawn from the conflict, though a Burgundian attack on Calais from the neighboring Low Countries remained an ever-present threat.

During the 1440s, the conflict entered its final stages as the French instituted extensive military reforms that in the years immediately after mid-century would help put an end to the conflict. That end came at the battles of Formigny (1450) and Castillon (1453), when the much improved French army backed by it formidable artillery, decisively defeated the English, driving them from both Normandy and Gascony, leaving them in possession of only the region around Calais.

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[6] Griffiths, *Reign*, 199-200; and 193. For more about Burgundy and its duke in this period, see other articles in the volumes of this collection: Kelly DeVries, "'The Walls Come Tumbling Down': The Campaigns of Philip the Good and the Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder Weapons," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2004), 429-446. L.B. Ross, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Visions of Burgundy, France, and England in the Oeuvres of Georges Chastellain, in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008). 367-85; Sergio Boffa, "The Duchy of Brabant between France, Burgundy and England. Geopolitics and Diplomacy during the Hundred Years War (1383-1430)," in this volume.

As the military situation in France continued to deteriorate causing severe repercussions back home in England, Henry VI became increasingly desperate to find money wherever he could in order to replenish his near-empty coffers. On the one hand, the king followed the time-honored expedients of taxing his people and borrowing from anyone willing to lend, including merchants and businessmen in all the major cities of England. In this atmosphere, he was extremely grateful to men like Robert Gayton, another London businessman and grocer by trade, men who were willing to keep lending sums of money when others had begun to back away from extending credit to the crown.[7]

Naturally, a great part of this revenue stream was diverted to the defense of England's French holdings, an increasingly unpopular drain on the kingdom's finances that provoked heightened opposition and eventually even revolt as the English experienced that string of military disasters leading up to the war's end.

It was also during this period and against this backdrop that the crown began to experiment with a new, rather desperate fiscal expedient: the possibility of raising significant sums through the practice of alchemy. From the 1440s onward, Henry VI appears to have become increasingly enamored with the idea of paying the crown's burgeoning debts, including its war debt, with alchemical gold. To this end, he enlisted London businessmen to help investigate the "truth" behind the "science" of alchemy and engage in its practice. A number of these men would subsequently come to share the young king's interest in the possibilities of alchemy—both as a means of making money and of supporting the war effort.

II. *The "Science" of Alchemy in Late Medieval England*

Taking its name from Arabic, alchemy was the medieval "science" that would later evolve into chemistry. The principal goal of medieval alchemy was to transmute or purify base metals and various other substances into higher and more precious metals such as gold or silver. People who studied the subject were, for the most part, metallurgists working experiments on alloys and compounds. By the fifteenth century, techniques for combining

[7] Rather than being repaid, Robert Gayton seems to have been rewarded with a lifetime exemption from compulsory public service on January 25, 1444. *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 235.

and separating materials were well understood by various craftsmen including such essential medieval figures as the swordsmith and the distiller.[8] Later on, a few alchemical practitioners also dabbled with the idea of using these techniques to compound medicines for preserving and perfecting the human body, an effort that earlier medieval alchemists had never envisaged. One even smaller subset of the breed investigated, through metaphor at least, the possibility of alchemical theories being applied to the soul.

According to Bruce Moran, a leading alchemy scholar, by 1300, precious metals were increasingly hard to come by in Europe. As a result, several medieval rulers found it helpful to have alchemists debase their coinage. In this way, they could stretch farther their dwindling supplies of gold and silver.[9] On the other hand, alchemists in fifteenth-century England were probably doing just the opposite: extracting rather than alloying metals.[10]

English alchemists had their eye on the cheap French copper coins that were coming home with the troops. Copper and silver are often mined together when veins of the one lie in close proximity to the other. Coins made from such copper may also contain some silver. An alchemist would collect the cheap copper coins and after mixing them with lead, melt them in a furnace. The lead adhered to the silver and pulled it out of the mixture. After pouring off the lighter copper which had risen to the surface in a

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[8] Alchemists had long known how to make pure alcohol, useful in cleaning and in medicine. See Bruce T. Moran, *Distilling Knowledge: Alchemy, Chemistry, and the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 12-13. For more information on earlier English alchemy, see F. Sherwood Taylor, *The Alchemists: Founders of Modern Chemistry* (Melbourne, 1953).

[9] Moran, *Distilling*, 31.

[10] Moran's work contains very little about these alchemists of the mid-fifteenth century. His interest centers in a later period when the pursuit of alchemy in England blossoms due to the arrival of such figures as George Ripley, John Dee, and Paracelsus and for the study of which more sources are readily available. Much of Moran's information for his few paragraphs on fifteenth-century English alchemy seems to come from H.L. Ogrinc's "Western Society and Alchemy from 1200 to 1500," *Journal of Medieval History* 6, no. 1 (March, 1980): 103-32. Although Ogrinc does write at some length about Henry VI and the alchemists he commissioned, nearly all of his research is taken from late eighteenth century secondary sources which are not always accurate. For example, Ogrinc bases some of what he says on the writings of a German scholar, Karl Schmieder, who was himself working from a rather poor German translation of an an English work on the history of the British economy. See Karl Christoph Schmieder, *Geschichte der Alchemie* (Ulm, Donau, 1959); *A. Andersons historische und chronologische Geschichte des Handels von den ältesten bis auf jezzige Zeiten*; trans. Johann Peter Bamberger, 3 vols. (Riga, 1775), which is a translation of the English: Adam Anderson, *An Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce from the Earliest Accounts. Containing an History of the Great Commercial Interests of the British Empire*, ed. William Combe (London, 1801).

purer state, the alchemist reheated what remained at a higher temperature. This would break the bond between the lead-silver mix remaining in the bottom of the crucible. He now had silver—virtually from nothing—and could reuse his lead another day. Although the French copper coins were nearly valueless in England, their silver content was worth much more than the actual coins. It was probably this reductive process or something very much like it that young King Henry saw demonstrated and which sparked his interest in the first place.

In England, alchemy first came to the attention of the Lancastrian Dynasty in a highly unfavorable light. Early in the fifteenth century, Henry's grandfather, Henry IV (r. 1399-1414), began to receive complaints from the public against men regarded as posing a danger to English currency. Apparently, these complaints grouped together not only outright counterfeiters and men who were clipping coins, but also some people who claimed to be alchemists able to produce precious metals. During the fifth year of Henry IV's reign, this resulted in parliamentary legislation directed against those who would use what was called "multiplication" in order to create gold or silver.

> If any one should be convicted thereof, he should incur the pain of felony: because many persons, under pretense of the said multiplication, did make counterfeit money, to the great defraud of the king and damage to his people.[11]

Following his father's lead, Henry V (r.1413-1422) enacted a general statute in 1414, designed to curb various abuses of the coinage. Among its provisions was the following:

> Item: it is ordained and established that henceforth no one shall multiply gold or silver or use the art of multiplication [of metals], and anyone who does this and is attaint [guilty], he will incur the pain of felony in that case.[12]

Between 1414 and 1422, there were at least nine investigations into monetary fraud and debasement, several of which mention multiplication of metals.[13] As a result of this unfavorable attention leading to the passage of

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[11] *Rolls of Parliament*, vol iii, p. 540 as cited in Rogers Ruding, *Annals of the coinage of Great Britain and its Dependencies: from the Earliest Period of Authentic History to the Reign of Victoria,* 3rd ed., 3 vols. (London, 1840), 252.

[12] TNA: PRO, C 74/5, mem 14; *The Statutes of the Realm*, 11 vols. (London,1810-1828), 2: 144.

[13] See for example in 1419: TNA: PRO, C 145/297, mem 3; *Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous* (*Chancery*), *Henry III-Henry V* [hereafter *CIM*], 8 vols. (London, 1916-2006), vol. 7 (1399-1422), 337-38 (no. 578); TNA: PRO, C 66/401, mem 14d; *CPR*, Henry V, vol. 1 (1416-1422), 205-6; and *CIM*, vol. 7 (1399-1422), 329-30 (no. 570).

punitive legislation, alchemical practices in England appear for a time to have gone underground, largely disappearing from the record during the remainder of Henry V's reign. They would not re-emerge until the 1430s as the military situation on the continent began to turn against England and the crown became increasingly strapped for money to support the unpopular war.[14]

III. *Royal Licenses for the Practice of Alchemye*

In July, 1444, Henry issued to one John Cobbe what appears to be the earliest surviving royal license to practice a science which, to many, still verged on being a black art.[15] A haberdasher and tailor from the city of London, Cobbe was also an engineer and sometime Member of Parliament. He had served in the House of Commons in 1435 and would do so again at various times after he had his alchemical license.

For some time, Cobbe had been conducting experiments in his home. His neighbors, firmly convinced that he was doing something illegal, "disturb[ed] him in such experiments." His critics and ill-wishers "suppose[d] him to work by unlawful art."[16] Facing this harrassment, Cobbe requested that the crown license him "to operate on certain matters by the art of philosophy" (*artem philosophie operare vellet*); in other words, to engage in alchemy. His goal would be "to transmute imperfect metals from their proper sort into perfect gold or silver" as well as to extract such metals "growing in any mineral."[17] Judging that here was a man who understood the workings of nature and therefore might have a real chance to realize in practice the principles of alchemy, Henry decided to issue the desired

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[14] Ronald Pearsall states that the statute of 1414 was rarely enforced, meaning perhaps that alchemists were not actively pursued. This may also help explain their absence from the records during Henry V's reign. Ronald Pearsall, *The Alchemists* (London: 1976), 73.

[15] While there may have been earlier licenses, these have been lost or remain undiscovered. To the best of my knowledge, John Cobbe or Cobbey received the first of Henry's licenses to practice alchemy on July 6, 1444. TNA: PRO, C 66/458, m 9; *CPR* , Henry VI , vol. 4 (1441-1446), 275; *Foedera. Syllabus in English of the Documents Relating to England and Other Kingdoms Contained in the Collection Known as 'Rymer's Feodera'*, ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy, 3 vols. (London, 1869-1885), 3: 68-69; and Josiah C. Wedgwood and Anne D. Holt, *History of Parliament: Biographies of the Members of the Commons House*, 1439-1509 (London, 1936), 199-200.

[16] *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 275 and TNA: PRO, C 66/458, m 9. Ogrinc, "Western Society," 119 also mentions Cobbe briefly.

[17] TNA: PRO, C 66/458, m 9; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 275.

royal permission, at the same time clearly specifying that he "wished to know the conclusion of the work."[18]

According to Ronald Pearsall, in that same year, a second person obtained royal permission to practice alchemy. Richard Cope was authorized to "transmute the imperfect metals … by the art of philosophy and to transubstantiate them into gold or silver." Two years later, in 1446, the crown began to grant permission to other would-be alchemists not only to "transubstantiate" metals, but to seek the Philosopher's Stone and search for the elixir of life.[19]

In early April, the king issued a license to Edmund Trafford and Thomas Assheton to undertake the transmutation of metals.[20] The pair had fought in France and later joined their families in matrimony when Assheton's son married Trafford's daughter.[21] Now they wanted to experiment together with the new science. Several months later, on June 4, 1446, Henry licensed four more London merchants—William Hurteles, Alexander Worsley, Thomas Bolton, and George Horneby—to take up the study.[22]

It is worth noting that the 1446 royal licenses seem to have been issued at moments when the crown could anticipate increased expenses brought on by the English presence in France. When Henry married Margaret of Anjou, a truce had been negotiated, one which was supposed to expire on April 1 of that year. It was within days of this original expiration date[23] that the king licensed Trafford and Assheton to embark on their alchemical experiments. On the first of June, creditors refused Henry's request for a

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[18] TNA: PRO, C 66/458/m 9 ; *CPR* , Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 275; *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et cuiuscunque Generis Acta Publica*, ed. T. Rymer, 20 vols. (The Hague, 1704-1735), 11: 68, s.v. *De Transubstantiatione Metallorum*.

[19] Pearsall, *Alchemists*, 73.

[20] Trafford and Assheton's license for alchemy was issued on April 7, 1446 [TNA: PRO, C 66/462, m 14; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 450. Also see Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 25; and Ogrinc, "Western Society," 119.

[21] The marriage of their children might indicate that these two had been brothers in arms, though on this point my research is inconclusive. The two men did serve in France at roughly the same time and they applied for the license together. Joining their families was certainly another way of cementing a growing friendship if not an agreement of "brotherhood." My interest in "brothers at arms" during the period of the Hundred Years War was peaked by Chris Given-Wilson's talk, "Chandos, Audley, and the Herald: The Literary Creation of Reputation," at the *42nd International Congress of Medieval Studies*, Kalamazoo, Michigan, May 13, 2007.

[22] These alchemists also had minor public duties. Their license is dated July 4, 1446 [TNA: PRO, C 66/462, m 5; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 458; Taylor, *Alchemists*, 102; and Ogrinc, "Western Society," 119.

[23] As it turned out, there were two extensions that pushed the deadline back until April 1, 1447.

loan to journey to France for further peace negotiations. Three days later, the London merchants received their licenses.

After several years of inactivity, in 1449, the crown resumed its practice of granting permission to engage in alchemy. In that year, Henry issued separate licenses to Michael and Robert Bolton, both of London, either or both of whom may have been relatives of Thomas Bolton, one of the four merchants who had received a similar document back in July, 1446.[24]

As early as 1447, as the practice of alchemy became more widespread with the issuance of royal licenses, complaints began once more to arise concerning charlatans who claimed to have skill in the new science. In order to address this recurring problem, Henry established a royal commission and empowered it to arrest anyone in London who,

> pretending themselves expert in the science of multiplying gold and silver, have approached simple persons and received from them on such false pretences sums of money and jewels of gold and silver, making no restitution thereof, contrary to the statute of 5 Henry IV.[25]

On the other hand, the blanket prohibition of earlier reigns was not renewed. And the very wording of the document setting forth the commissioners' charge betrayed the king's lively interest in even these fake alchemists: those arrested on suspicion of being charlatans were to be brought *along with their instruments* before the king or his council.[26]

III. *Cade's Rebellion*

The year 1450 was a troubled one for both Henry and English businessmen working in or around London as opposition to the war and its domestic repercussions intensified. Not only did the English defeat at Formigny lead to the loss of Normandy, the dismal military picture coupled with ever-rising taxation and overspending by the crown, much of which involved the war, led to increased popular disaffection, which in turn spilled over into revolt. As early as January, 1450, the danger began to manifest itself,

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[24] Robert Bolton of London was granted a license in 1449. Robert Steele, "Alchemy in England," *Antiquary* 24, no. 142 [new series] (Sept., 1891): 99-105, esp. 101. The Pell roll petition reads in part: "Please it unto your Highnesse to Grant unto your humble and trewe Liegeman, Robert Bolton, youre gracious Lettres Patantes of Licence to be made unto him." See also: Ogrinc, "Western Society," 120; and *Middle English Dictionary, Part 2*, ed. Sherman M. Kuhn (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1979), 708.

[25] TNA: PRO, C 66/475, m 9d; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 5 (1446-1452), 583.

[26] *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 5 (1446-1452),583.

especially in the southern counties of Kent and Sussex, where French raiding along the coast and the fall of Normandy inspired growing fears of a full-scale French invasion.

In the spring of 1450, a local leader in Kent named Jack Cade, nicknamed John Amend-all by his supporters, began to organize the population of southern England which then issued a so-called *Complaint of the Poor Commons of Kent* listing grievances against the government.[27] The sentiments it expressed quickly won support not only among the populace, but also from some members of Parliament and various nobles who were concerned at how the international situation was developing. Its more radical provisions called upon the king either to solve England's problems or step aside along with his corrupt advisers and allow more competent people to take the reins. As if to echo the increasing radicalism, in May, 1450, when the duke of Suffolk, the man who had waited so long for Margaret of Anjou and a major target of popular discontent, was banished from the realm for five years, his ship was intercepted on its way to France, he was summarily beheaded, and his body was tossed into the Channel.

In that same month, a force of some 5000 men, led by Cade, began to gather on Blackheath, southeast of London from which spot they threatened the city and forced the king to flee. While the majority of the force was composed of angry peasants, they were joined by some like-minded townspeople and even several members of Parliament. On July 3, they crossed London Bridge, entering the city where many proceeded to engage in looting. In the process, they captured several of Henry's favorities, including the Lord Treasurer, and James Fiennes, the first baron of Saye and Sele, who suffered the same fate as the duke of Suffolk, though they underwent the added ignominy of having their heads displayed on a pike.[28] That night, Cade's forces re-crossed the bridge to their headquarters in Southwark.

The climax came the following day when a royal militia hastily raised by the officials of London fought a day long battle to prevent Cade and his men from reentering London. In the end, the rebels retreated with heavy losses. On July 5, after the battle had ended, the Lord Chancellor issued a general pardon aimed at getting them to disperse. Now that the two worst offenders, Suffolk and Saye, were dead and they had their pardon, most of the rebels were willing to go home. For its part the crown, as on other occasions, had no intention of honoring its promises. Although Cade escaped from London, royal forces caught up with and killed him on July 12. The

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[27] I.M.W. Harvey, *Jack Cade's Rebellion of 1450* (Oxford, 1991), 73.

[28] Ibid., 92-93.

crown retracted its pardon as soon as the immediate danger had passed and many of his followers were sent to the gallows. Despite this, unrest accompanied by intermittent violence continued for months to come, helping set the stage for the Yorkist uprising several years later that would become the War of the Roses (1455-1485).

During these months, the merchant community with its strong ties to the continent became a major focus of popular disaffection. This was especially the case with foreign merchants, as xenophobia was on the rise and many within the population came to fear and hate these wealthy non-Englishmen. Since their property seems to have been a target of the looting, not surprisingly, it was one of their number who took the lead in helping to quell the rebellion. At the darkest hour, Thomas Cook, a businessman and alderman,[29] was nominated on behalf of the city of London to negotiate with Cade. In turn, trusting in a safe-conduct, Cook walked into the rebels' camp where he discussed terms, after which he carried back their demands.[30] After the battle of London Bridge, Alderman Cook became a popular hero within the city and beyond.

V. *New Royal Licenses, a Royal Commission, and a Royal Illness*

Several years after Cade's rebellion ended, Henry once again began to issue licenses for practicing the transmutation of metals. In April, 1452, as England geared up for one final, costly effort on the continent, one such license went to John Mistelden, his son Robert, and their three servants. The concession to Mistelden was unusual in that Henry issued it "for life"[31]; most others were only for a year or two. In August, 1452, Henry put together a commission to investigate fraud, whose charge contained provisions touching on alchemy. The investigators included three London businessmen: John Hewet, an attorney and esquire; John Edmund, a mercer and member of Parliament who had served as a justice for the Court of the Common Pleas; and John Assheby, who may have been related to the

[29] An alderman held an office just below that of the mayor and had jurisdiction over a ward within the city.

[30] Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 217-18.

[31] John Mistelden (Messelden) and his son, Robert, with three servants were granted a license in 1452. *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 5 (1446-1452), 547 and Society of Antiquaries of London, Ms. SAL/MS/116: Royal Writ for Letters Patent for License, February 13, 1452 (Ellis, Item 14, f. 88).

Asshebys in London's goldsmith industry but, was, in any case, a purveyor for the king's household.[32]

Then, despite this new flurry of activity for several years, the licenses suddenly stopped coming. On July 17, 1453, John Talbot, last of the great English captains to have fought at Agincourt, attacked a superior French army, strongly dug in near the Gascon town of Castillon. In the ensuing encounter, the French won a decisive victory in what would prove to be the last great battle of the Hundred Years War. Much of the English army was annihilated; Talbot himself was killed by a French battleaxe while trapped under his fallen horse.

Not long thereafter, Henry VI collapsed for the first time with the illness that would plague him for the rest of his life. Whether or not there was any cause and effect relationship between the two events has been a subject of debate among historians.[33] Whatever the case may be, the king's illness would endure for the next sixteen months and affect him both physically and mentally.

Three doctors already working in the king's service were probably the first to see him after he was carried to his manor of Clarendon. Summoned shortly after the king's collapse, William Hatclyf, John Arundel, and John Faceby came as quickly as they could, armed with permission from the Privy Council to try a wide variety of medicines and treatments, including

> laxative medicines, ... clysters [enimas], suppositories, purges for the head, gargles, baths, ... shaving of the head, ointments, plasters, waxes, cupping, with cutting of the skin or without [and] provok[ing] bleeding, in whatever way may best be arranged.[34]

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[32] TNA: PRO, C 66/475, m 9d; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 5 (1446-1452), 112, 295, 410, and 583. See also Taylor, *Alchemists*, 103.

[33] Bertram Wolffe, *Henry VI: Reader in Medieval History* (London, 1981), 270; Griffiths, *Reign*, 715; R.L. Storey, *The End of the House of Lancaster* (1966; reprint, Gloucestershire, 1986), 136-37. Thomas B. Costain sets the date for Henry's collapse as early as July 6, 1453, in which case, he could not have known the outcome of the battle since it had not yet occurred. On the other hand, Costain's work lacks any notes informing the reader of where he got his information. What is more, none of the records I could find agrees with him; all supply a date of late July or even early August. Thomas B. Costain, *The Last Plantagenets* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962), 278.

[34] *Foedera* (new ed.) 5, part 2: 55 as quoted in and translated by Carole Rawcliffe, *Medicine and Society in Later Medieval England* (1995; reprint, London, 1997), 63. See also Robert S. Gottfried, *Doctors and Medicine in Medieval England 1340-1530* (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 97. A longer selection from the council's instructions is quoted in Wendy J. Turner, "A Cure for the King means Health for the Country: The Mental and Physical Health of Henry VI," in *Madness in Medieval Law and Custom*, ed. W.J. Turner (Leiden, 2010), 177-96.

Throughout the fall and winter, Henry's physicians did what they could for him. According to Carole Rawcliffe, the enemas, hot baths, and various other treatments numbered among those that medieval physicians regularly used for patients suffering from lethargy.[35] Since lethargy was regarded in the Middle Ages as a condition associated with the back part of the brain, physicians believed it to be consistent with a loss of memory. And in fact, afterwards, the king remembered nothing of what had occurred during this period.

As a result of Henry's amnesia, his inability to articulate, and incapacity to cogitate, those treating him believed their treatments were the correct ones for the royal patient.[36] However, when the king had shown no sign of improvement by April, 1454, two surgeons were added to the team, John Marchall and Robert Wareyn.[37] Finally, in December, Henry began to recover, and by January, he was up and around, attending meetings and traveling.

The reprieve was only temporary. At the battle of St. Albans in May, 1455, Henry once again began to display odd behavior. During the battle, he suffered a neck injury, which may or may not have touched off his second collapse. Within the month, however, the illness once again took hold of him. This time it would last until February, 1456. The medical team called upon the preeminent London physician, Gilbert Kymer, dean of Salisbury, twice chancellor of Oxford University, and formerly the personal physician to Henry's uncle, Humphrey, duke of Gloucester.[38] In their letter to Kymer,

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[35] Rawcliffe, *Medicine*, 64 and for a list of the physicians and surgeons who attended Henry VI, see p. 94.

[36] See, for example: *Healing and Society in Medieval England: A Middle English Translation of the Pharmaceutical Writings of Gilbertus Anglicus*, ed. John Caley et. al., 4 vols. in 7 (London, 1816-1869); *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England* [hereafter PPC], ed. Sir Harris Nicolas, 7 vols. (London, 1834-1837), 6: 166-67; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 147; Alfred Brotherstone Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-1959), 1: 49-50 and 2: 663; C.H. Talbot and E.A. Hammond, *The Medical Practitioners in Medieval England: A Biographical Register* (London, 1965), 115-16, 143, 168, 305, 398-99; and Basil Clarke, *Mental Disorder in Earlier Britain: Exploratory Studies* (Cardiff, Wales, 1975), 180.

[37] They were appointed March 15, 1454; the letters patent followed April 6. See *Foedera* (org. ed.), 11: 347; see also *Healing and Society*, ed. Caley.

[38] In the course of his career, Kymer had earned a master of arts degree, a doctorate in medicine, and a bachelor's degree in Canon Law. He and a group of other doctors petitioned the mayor and aldermen of the City of London, asking permission to found a college "for the better education and control of physicians and surgeons, practising in the City and its liberties." When the group founded the physicians' college, Kymer was sworn in as the "Master of the Mistery," or in other words, director of the guild. Talbot and Hammond, 61; Susan Reynolds, *An Introduction to the History of English Medieval Towns* (Oxford, 1977),

they wrote as if he were already well-acquainted with Henry's symptoms,[39] suggesting that his advice may have been sought on the previous occasion.

Interestingly enough, two of Henry's doctors, Faceby and Hatclyff, as well as his chaplain, Kirkeby, would later engage in the practice of alchemy, acting under licenses issued by the man they were now trying to cure. Perhaps one reason for calling in Kymer had to do with his well-known interest in the subject, one on which he would later publish a book.[40] It is a distinct possibility that his fellow practitioners hoped his alchemical knowledge might prove medically useful.[41]

VI. *New Alchemical Commissions and Licenses*

During his two long bouts with illness, Henry appears to have been unable to pursue his abiding interests in alchemy. Once recovered, however, the king quickly picked up where he had left off, establishing commissions and issuing individual licenses, in hopes that the resulting alchemical experiments might ultimately help ease the crown's severe financial problems. For such problems had not ended with the collapse of English military fortunes on the continent. Extensive royal debts, including those amassed during the war, remained to be paid and in the wake of defeat, Englishmen were increasingly angry at having to bear the burden. Just how far crown finances had fallen is indicated by the fact that the treasurer of England, Shrewsbury, had to lend his own office £2411 between 1456 and 1458 while his successor lent £1000 to the treasury in 1459. In all probability, neither man was ever repaid.[42]

165-66, 198; *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London, 1275-1498, Books A-L*, ed. Reginald R. Sharpe, 11 vols. (London, 1899-1912), Book K (under Kymer), ff. 6b-7b.

[39] *Foedera* (org. ed.), 11: 366.

[40] Gilbert Kymer's work on alchemy may no longer exist. On the other hand, since various contemporary authors refer to the work, it must be concluded that Kymer did indeed publish something on the topic. See: Thomas Norton, *Thomas Norton's Ordinal of Alchemy*, ed. John Reidy (London, 1975), 50. See also: Faye Marie Getz, "To Prolong Life and Promote Health: Baconian Alchemy and Pharmacy in the English Learned Tradition," in *Health, Disease and Healing in Medieval Culture*, ed. Sheila Campbell, Bert Hall, and David Klausner (New York, 1992), 147.

[41] For more information concerning such hopes, see: Anthony Gross, *The Dissolution of the Lancastrian Kingship, Sir John Fortescue and the Crisis of Monarchy in Fifteenth-Century England* (Stamford, 1996), xvii. Gross writes that the government was in need of "remedies which would simultaneously improve the king's health and the royal finances through a kind of cure-all magic potion, a philosopher's stone which would produce the much needed gold for a depleted treasury."

[42] Griffiths, *Reign*, 788.

What is more, loans from the business community were fast declining. True, Henry was still able to secure some funds from London merchants,[43] especially those engaged in the wool and cloth industries, many of whom had continuing interests in Calais and realized the cost involved in defending that enclave from the encircling French. Second only to London in its contribution to the financially beleaguered monarchy was the port city of Bristol.[44] Yet despite such exceptions, overall loans from the business community were drying up.[45] English merchants had simply grown tired of lending money to a government that never repaid it. In addition, as the shipment of goods through the staple at Calais became increasingly expensive and dangerous, a growing number of merchants became less interested in defending that expensive entrepot and clamored instead for permission to bypass the city and deal directly with other markets.[46]

As other sources of revenue disappeared, in a desperate attempt to avert financial disaster, Henry turned increasingly to alchemy, despite its disappointing yield to date. On May 17, 1456 he appointed nine of his trusted Londoners to a new commission charged with investigating the "truth of alchemy." It was three times the size of the commission he had set up back in 1452 before his illness. Six of the members had been or were currently serving as alderman and a majority were connected either to the cloth or gold industries.[47]

The first name to appear on the commission was William Cantelowe, the man whose representative had lent Suffolk money a decade earlier when the earl was awaiting the arrival of Marguerite d'Anjou.[48] At the time

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[43] London had a long history of supporting the Hundred Years War effort. See Peter Michael Konieczny, "London's War Effort during the Early Years of the Reign of Edward III," in *Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, 243-61.

[44] Griffiths, *Reign*, 107-11.

[45] According to R.A. Griffiths, "by the 1450s, the crown's credit with its wealthiest subjects was such that loans were few and far between." Griffiths, *Reign*, 788.

[46] For example, John Stevens was given a license to export 20,000 wool fells to Holland and Zeeland directly without going through the Calais staple [*CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 3 (1436-1441), 384, 441; and Griffiths, *Reign*, 472]. Other merchants also circumvented the staple: a shipment of wool owned by John Davy went directly "to Brittany and elsewhere and not to the staple of Cales [sic]." *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 49.

[47] In May, 1456, Henry had Richard, duke of York, searching for gold and silver mines hoping to find more precious metals in the traditional fashion [*CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 291].

[48] Griffiths makes it sound as if Cantelowe had been arrested during the April 1456 riots in London when he alleges that William "was required to appear before the king and council at Coventry early in October, presumably to explain why he had failed to control his fellows." On the whole, this seems unlikely, given Cantelowe's long record of supporting the crown and the fact that just a month later, he would be appointed to the new royal commission investigating alchemy. It is much more likely that Cantelowe had been sum-

of his appointment, William, a London alderman and master of the mercers, was currently serving a term in Parliament.[49] Nor was Cantelowe the only master of the mercers on the commission. He was joined by John Middelton, who had formerly served as sheriff, alderman, and member of Parliament.[50] The mercers, who dealt in fabrics, were closely involved in the import and export of wool and cloth and played a significant role in both the regulation of that trade and the collection of custom's duties. As a result of their activities, they had a close acquaintance with royal finances.

There were three wardens appointed to the commission, two of them—Thomas Cook and Thomas Davy—wardens of London Bridge, whose duties included making certain that the Bridge returned a profit.[51] Since they had access to all goods, including books, that entered or left London by that route, they appear to have had a fairly close relationship with the booksellers and other members of the Stationers Guild on Paternoster Row.[52] It may have been these men though their connections with the book trade that were expected to supply the crown with new information on alchemy. Both Cook and Davy were listed as drapers and therefore, like Cantelowe and Middleton, were also part of the cloth trade. Cook, who had achieved a measure of renown during Cade's Rebellion for having negotiated with the mob, had also been an alderman, a sheriff, and a justice.[53] For his part, Davy was active in London politics and had nominated to the position of aldermen two other members of the commission, Matthew Philip and Richard Lee. He too would later become a member of Parliament.[54]

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moned to discuss how things were progressing in London, particularly in respect to alchemy. Despite Henry's fall, Cantelowe would remain in the good graces of the crown; Edward IV knighted him in 1461 [Griffiths, *Reign*,793. Sylvia L. Thrupp, *The Merchant Class of Medieval London, 1300-1500* (Chicago, 1948), 328; Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 152-53].

49 *CIM*, vol. 8 (1422-1485), 83-84 (no. 137); TNA: PRO, C 145/309, m 8; *Calendar of the Close Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1227-1485* [hereafter *CCR*], 6 vols. (London, 1933-), Henry VI, vol. 5 (1447-1454): 345, vol. 6 (1454-1461), 127, 189, and 336. Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 152-53.

50 Thrupp, *Merchant Class*, 356. Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 590-91; *CCR*, vol. 5 (1447-1454), 260.

51 The third man, Ellis Horwoud, was listed on the commission as the "warden of the change of London" [TNA: PRO, C 66/481, m 13; *CPR*, vol 6 (1452-1461), 286].

52 The Commonalty elected the Wardens or Proctors of the Bridge each year beginning in 1311. C. Paul Christianson, *Memorials of the Book Trade in Medieval London: The Archives of the Old London Bridge* (Cambridge, 1987), 5-6, 48-53; and Gross, *Dissolution*, 20, 117-18.

53 TNA: PRO, C 54/298, m 32d; C 54/ 298, m 37d; C 54/302, m 21d; Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 217-18; *CCR*, vol. 5 (1447-1454), 20, 28, 133, 136, 163, 191, 255, 278, 333, and 439; *CCR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1454-1461), 50, 79, 252, 340-1, 427, and 433-4; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol.4 (1441-1446), 172, 212, and 383, and as sheriff 141, 152, 158, and 163; *Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1272-1509* [hereafter *CFR*], 22 vols. (London, 1911-62), 18: 193; Thrupp *Merchant Class*, 332 in appendix under "Cooke".

54 Wedgwood and Holt, *History*, 262.

There were two goldsmiths on the commission, Humphrey Hayford,[55] a former alderman, and Matthew Philip,[56] both an alderman and former mayor of London. Given their knowledge of precious metals, their presence on the commission comes as no surprise. They would be needed to test whether or not anything produced by the alchemists was actually gold. Rounding out the commission were two other London businessman—Robert Gayton and Richard Lee—both of whom are listed as grocers and had served at one time or another on the alderman's court. One of them, Gayton, had a long record of lending money to the crown, a fact that would have endeared him to the king.[57]

These were important men from the city of London, a city that had already played an unequaled role in helping finance the crown, including its war effort. Several of them, like Cantelowe and Gayton, had stood out in the past for their efforts in the king's behalf. In short, Henry had good reason to trust such men to whom he now turned in hopes of finding a way out of the current fiscal crisis.

The charge given this commission was unmistakable: the monarch wanted to know more about how to make gold and silver. Claiming that he already knew something about alchemy, he asked these men to find out more. "Whereas ... it has been shown to the king that there are honest men by whom the coinage of gold and silver can be easily multiplied," the nine commission members were instructed "to search out the truth [about] the said multiplication of the coinage, and ... the good or harm likely to ensue." In addition, they were expected to accomplish the task in a hurry. The royal instructions called on them to report back to the crown in writing by July, 1456,[58] roughly two months after their commission was first established. In order to carry out their charge, they were to consult experts in such matters and have recourse to written works on the subject, though the document did not actually specify which experts or texts were to be used.

This was only the first of several similar commissions established by the crown during the closing years of Henry's reign, as his defeat and deposition

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[55] Mentioned along with Matthew Philip in *CCR*, vol. 5 (1447-1454), 133 in a use. For more information on use, *see*: Robert Palmer, *English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348-1381: A Transformation of Governance and Law* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993), 110-23.

[56] TNA: PRO, Mss. C 66/475, m 8; C 145/318, m 8; E 149/213, m 11; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 235; *CPR*, Edward IV (1461-1467), 103 and 354; *CCR*, Henry VI, vol. 5 (1447-1454), 133 and 322 (alderman); Thrupp, *Merchant Class*, 360 in appendix under "Philip."

[57] See Thrupp, *Merchant Class*, 353 Thrupp., 370. *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 235 in appendix under "Lee". TNA: PRO C 145/319, no 6; and C 145/322, no 20; *CIM*, vol 8 (1422-1485), 176 (no. 291); vol. 8 (1422-1485), 212-13 (no. 382); *CCR*, Henry VI, vol. 5 (1447-1454), 400.

[58] May 17, 1456; TNA: PRO, C 66/481, m 13; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 286.

by the rival house of York grew ever closer. In March, 1457, Henry appointed another group to investigate the "means proposed to the king whereby within a few years his debts may be paid in good money of gold and silver."[59] This time four university educated men were placed on the list alongside five London merchants, two of whom—the draper, Thomas Cook, and the grocer, Robert Gayton—had served on the earlier commission. In addition, the current mayor of London, a grocer named John Yonghe, also appeared on the list.[60] Once again, they were ordered to "take council ... from other experts and to report their necessities and discoveries to the king or council in writing" within less than two months.[61]

Finally, in November 1457, the king appointed his last alchemical commission. With a membership of sixteen, it was larger than either of the earlier ones. Gone were the London merchants; among those serving this time around were men from higher rungs of the social ladder, in particular members of the upper clergy and knights who had served in France or had close ties to the exchequer.[62] There were two bishops—Richard (Beauchamp), bishop of Salisbury, and John Lowe, the bishop of St. Asaph and Rochester[63]—and four abbots.[64] Henry explained that his new reliance on churchmen resulted from their ability to perform the Eucharist; after all, if priests could already transubstantiate bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, they probably stood the greatest chance of transmuting base metal into gold.[65] Most members were staunch Lancastrians; only the bishop of Salisbury who had signed the letter inviting the duke of York to the great council during Henry's illness, might be

59 TNA: PRO, C 66/482, m 6; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 339.

60 There is an alchemical manuscript in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, which was owned by someone named Yonghe. It is tempting to draw a connection, but there is no evidence that John Yonghe was the owner. Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Ms. Digby 113.

61 TNA: PRO, C 66/482, m 6; and *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 339.

62 Among the non-religious members of the commission were John, viscount of Beaumont; Richard Byngham, justice of the Court of Common Pleas; Sir Peter Ardern, chief baron of the exchequer; Walter Moyle, a judge and one time member of Parliament; John Nedeham, currently a member of Parliament; Lord Thomas Scales, knight and advisor to the queen; Ralph Botiller, Lord Sudeley, a member of the king's household and one of his favorites; Sir William Nevile, brother of Richard Nevile, earl of Salisbury; and Sir John Fortescue, chief justice of the King's Bench.

63 *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 4 (1441-1446), 29, 271-72.

64 Thomas, abbot of St. Peter's in Gloucester; William, abbot of St. Mary's Abendon; John, abbot of St. Aldelin's in Malmesbury; and William the abbot of SS. Mary and William in Wynchecombe.

65 Moran, *Distilling Knowledge*, 32-33. See also: Ogrinc, "Western Society," 103-32.

considered to have been sympathetic towards the Yorkists.[66] One of the commission members, famously known for having an interest in alchemy, was Sir John Fortescue, chief justice of the King's Bench.[67] His appointment to the commission may well have increased his involvement in this arcane study. By 1459, he is known to have acquired copies of many alchemical works including those written by Roger Bacon.

Despite the changed makeup of the new commission, its charge read much the same as in both earlier cases:

> The king, having been shewn that there are means whereby within a few years he can satisfy his creditors in good money of gold and silver, has appointed by deliberation of the council [the members of this commission] to investigate touching the premises and to report thereon to the king and council on February 1 next."[68]

Throughout the period when these commissions were functioning (or at least attempting to do so), the crown continued to issue new licenses permitting individuals either alone or collectively to engage in alchemy. In May, 1456, Henry received a petition calling on him to continue authorizing alchemical experiments, signed by a number of men, including three of his former physicians—Gilbert Kymer, chancellor of Oxford,[69] William Hatclyff, and John Faceby—and the royal chaplain, John Kirkeby.[70] In granting this petition and later issuing a royal license,[71] the crown recognized that these were all men of "faith, circumspection, profound learning, and good will."[72] Ultimately, three names appeared on the license—Faceby, Kirkeby, and a London alderman named John Rayny. The crown called upon all three to "search the doctrines and writing of the wise ancients and to practice transmutation of metals."[73]

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[66] Helen E. Maurer, *Margaret of Anjou: Queenship and Power in Late Medieval England* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003), 96.

[67] Fortescue had connections to Thomas Cook, the draper who had turned up on both of the earlier commissions. The pair owned property together. See Griffiths, *Reign*, 7 for a quote from Fortescue's *The Governance of England* written in the 1470s.

[68] TNA: PRO, C 66/484, m 10; and *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 390.

[69] Kymer may have already been practicing, or at least studying the process. Jonathon Hughes, *Arthurian Myths and Alchemy: The Kingship of Edward IV* (Sparkford, 2002), 47.

[70] Another cleric who signed the petition was John Fowler, the clerk of the king's chapel.

[71] Oxford Museum of the History of Science, manuscript collection, Museum Ms. 84.

[72] For a transcript of this license, see D. Geoghegan, "A Licence of Henry VI to Practise Alchemy," *Ambix* 6 (1957-1958): 10-17, esp. 16-17.

[73] May 31, 1456; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 291; *Foedera*, 379-80.

Henry continued to grant licenses to practice alchemy until almost the end. On September 3, 1460, he conferred one upon William Sauvage, Hugh Hurdeleston, Henry Hyne, and their three servants, and another on Richard Trevys, a doctor of theology, John Billok, and William Downe.[74] In all likelihood, these were the last two issued by the Lancastrian monarchy.

VII. *Conclusion*

Henry VI's attempts to relieve the crown's growing insolvency through alchemy took place against a gloomy backdrop of royal corruption, civil disorder, and the ever-increasing hostility between two branches of the royal family, the houses of Lancaster and York, each descended from one of the powerful sons of Edward III (r.1327-1377). Fighting between private armies led by nobles aligned with either Lancaster or York became the order of the day. Meanwhile, Henry and his assertive wife, Margaret of Anjou, struggled to preserve the inheritance for their young son, Edward. In 1455, the two sides clashed at the battle of St. Albans which became the first encounter of the long if intermittent struggle known as the War of the Roses in which much of the Plantagenet Dynasty that had ruled England since the conquest would die off.

One of the first major victims was Richard, duke of York, who died at the battle of Wakefield in December, 1460, and whose head along with that of his son, Edmund, was placed on the walls of York. Several months later, in March, 1461, after the two sides exchanged victories in lesser encounters, Richard's eldest son, Edward, now head of the house of York, won the largest and most costly battle of the war at Towton and mounted the throne as Edward IV (r.1461-1483). He would hold his throne with only a brief interruption (1470-1471) until his natural death over two decades later, at which time his youngest brother, Richard III (r.1483-1485) succeeded to the English throne.

Interestingly enough, the royal interest in alchemy as a possible source of royal finances did not end with Henry VI's loss of the throne. Within several years, Edward IV followed the lead of his predecessor, issuing a license in October, 1463, to Sir Henry Grey, an alderman and salter, that authorized him to transmute metals "by the conning of philosophy."[75] In

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[74] Sept. 3, 1460; *CPR*, Henry VI, vol. 6 (1452-1461), 625; and *Foedera*, 462.

[75] TNA: PRO, C 66/506, m 17; *CPR*, Edward IV, vol. 1 (1461-1467), 285; Pearsall, *Alchemists*, 73, and Ogrinc, "Western Society" 121.

fact, it was Edward who first employed the term "alchemy" in a royal license; all of Henry's licenses had referred only to "transmutation of metals."[76] This interest later passed to the successors of the house of Lancaster, the Tudor dynasty that would rule England throughout the sixteenth century.

Henry VI began investigating the science of alchemy in hopes of finding a ready source of cash, much of which was needed to support England's military efforts in the final stages of the Hundred Years War. Once again, he turned to the business community of London, not only to lend him more money, but also to help investigate the science on which pinned so much hope. Although his alchemical efforts came to naught, he spurred an English interest in alchemy that would continue into future reigns. Ultimately, the result would be the seventeenth century evolution of the modern science of chemistry under the auspices of such famous scientists as the Irish nobleman, Robert Boyle, who did much of his work at Oxford, once the domain of Henry's alchemist, Gilbert Kymer. In this way, financial exigencies of a medieval war had at least some influence on the Scientific Revolution of future centuries.

[76] See W.J. Turner, "The Legal Regulation and Licensing of Alchemy in Late Medieval England," in *Law and Magic: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Christine Corcos (Durham, N.C., 2010), 209-25.

PART SIX

ROYAL PARDONS

"TAKING THE KING'S SHILLING" TO AVOID "THE WAGES OF SIN": ROYAL PARDONS FOR MILITARY MALEFACTORS DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

L.J. Andrew Villalon

Fans of William Shakespeare will remember a chilling episode from *Henry V*, when the king learns of the imminent execution of Bardolph, one of the boon companions of his misspent youth.[1] The condemned man is to be hanged for stealing from a church as the English army marched toward its immortal victory at Agincourt (1415). In this scene, one of several that the bard uses to symbolize Henry's coming of age, the young monarch confirms his friend's death sentence in these words:

> We would have all such offenders so cut off: and we
> give express charge, that in our marches through the
> country, there be nothing compelled from the
> villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the
> French upbraided or abused in disdainful language;

[1] After a "first run" at the University of Cincinnati Faculty Forum in early spring, 2006, the paper on which this article is based began its journey through a number of incarnations, in each of which it garnered new and important material for inclusion. In May, 2006, I delivered the first revised version during the 41st International Congress on Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University as part of a session on the financing of war. In October, the article became the topic of discussion in a luncheon seminar sponsored by the University of Texas history department. Yet another version saw the light of day during a conference entitled "England's Wars: 1272-1399" held at Reading University in July, 2009, under the auspices of The Soldier in Later Medieval England Project. Since its incipience, the article has been radically reshaped and expanded in light of further research and critique gleaned from a number of military and non-military historians. I would like to thank the following individuals and institutions for their good services at different points in the process: The individuals (listed alphabetically) include Adrian Bell, Jonathan Brown, Kelly DeVries, Elizabeth Dickenson, Alison Frazier, Daniel Gottlieb, Julie Hardwick, Janine Hartman, Lowanne Jones, Donald Kagay, Mark Lause, Roger Martinez, Janet Meisel, Sally Moffitt, Norman Murdoch, Charles Seibert, Blasco Sobrino, and Tom White. Institutional aid came from the University of Cincinnati Libraries, in particular, the Interlibrary Loan and the Photoduplication Services; the University of Texas library system, in particular, the Perry Castaneda; the University of Texas History Department and the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures at the University of Cincinnati whose members welcomed me in from the cold. Very special thanks must go to one of the editors of the *Journal of Medieval Military History* [*JMMH*], Clifford Rogers, whose careful reading of several drafts and continued suggestions for improvement have been an invaluable aid in carrying this piece far beyond its original scope.

> for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the
> gentler gamester is the soonest winner.[2]

For our purposes, the speech shows something beyond Henry's increasing maturity and/or hardening heart: the young monarch is concerned not so much with the morality of his old friend's act, but its impact upon his plans to conquer the kingdom of France. Unfortunately for Bardolph, his most recent theft violated a military discipline calculated not to antagonize the French. He had already escaped punishment for similar transgressions perpetrated during his civilian life back in England[3], largely due to the indulgence of the future king, but due also to his own willingness to participate in the "war of France."[4]

In human affairs, timing can be all. Had the unfortunate malefactor committed his crime before the English army departed for the continent (or even a crime considerably more heinous than the theft for which he would eventually be hanged) and had he lived to fight among the "band of brothers" on St. Crispin's day, it is not unlikely that he would have been spared punishment yet again. For in late medieval England, as in so many other times and places, military service not infrequently trumped civilian justice.[5]

The legal mechanism by which English men (and women) avoided the full rigors of statutory and common law justice for crimes they had committed was the royal power to pardon.[6] In law, a pardon is defined as

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[2] William Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act 3, Scene VI; an on-line version of which can be found in The Literature Network (http://www.online-literature.com/.)

[3] For the acquiescence of the madcap Prince Hal in the criminal activities of Bardolph and company during the years before he came to the throne, see, for example: *Henry IV*, Act 1, Scene ii.

[4] In fourteenth century English pardons, "the war of France" was a common way of referring to what would subsequently come to be called the Hundred Years War.

[5] The often conflicting, even mutually-exclusive relationship between enforcement of the law and military necessity is the theme of Richard W. Kaeuper's *War, Justice, and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988). Kaeuper argues that by the late medieval period "the king's government could not advance its capacities in war and in the broad sphere of justice simultaneously ... one goal or the other had to receive less of the attention and resources available to government. As war took more of those resources, justice got less." In his very brief treatment of the king's pardoning power, the author adds, "The tension between these basic goals of the medieval state is clearly evident in the policy of royal pardons for felonies." Despite this assertion, the author devotes only about a page to the subject, considerably less than one might expect from a book with its focus. See: Kaeuper, 1-9, 126-27.

[6] Variants of the verb "to pardon," appear in medieval Latin, old French, and Middle English. See: *The Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Third Edition, (Oxford, 1955).

> An act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It releases punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.[7]

In England, as in most medieval monarchies, the power rested with the crown, an integral component of the royal prerogative.[8] Although charged with enforcing the laws, a monarch could, under what he deemed "special circumstances," suspend or even reverse their functioning. In the case of a person accused of having committed a crime, this could be accomplished in one of two ways: either by pardoning the offender before the case came into court or, alternatively, by setting aside the court's verdict, thereby freeing the offender from any punishment.

The circumstances under which the crown might issue a pardon could vary considerably. On one end of the spectrum, such a grant could be used to achieve a just outcome when faced with an obvious injustice in the legal system. The best example involves the use of pardons in dealing with homicide. According to several scholars who have written extensively about medieval English pardons, common law did not adequately distinguish between the various forms of homicide, placing self-defense, accidental death, and even killing in the performance of one's duty on much the same judicial footing as murder. As a result, when the monarch issued a pardon excusing one of these lesser forms of homicide, justice was truly being served.[9]

By contrast, after reading through hundreds of royal pardons summarized in the *Calendar of Patent Rolls*—the principal source employed in composing this essay—it is hard not to conclude that a great majority of these documents failed to serve the ends of justice. Many extended forgiveness to individuals guilty of the most heinous crimes in return for a payment to the crown or to please some powerful person who had interceded

[7] *Black's Law Dictionary*, Deluxe 4th Edition (St. Paul, Minn., 1951).

[8] Although the power to pardon was primarily centered in the monarch, it could also be wielded by high-ranking nobles or churchmen who exercised sovereignty over the territories they held. One of the most famous cases of a non-royal pardon involved the talented, but somewhat sociopathic sixteenth century artist, Benvenuto Cellini, whose crime of having murdered a policeman or in the performance of his duty was pardoned by Pope Clement VII in order that work on a papal commission could go forward. See: *The Autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini* (Harmondsworth, England, 1980), 94-101.

[9] Naomi D. Hurnard, *The King's Pardon for Homicide Before AD 1307* (Oxford, 1969), see esp. vii-xiv. Helen Lacey, *The Royal Pardon: Access to Mercy in Fourteenth Century England*, (Woodbridge, England, 2009), see esp. 3, 22-25.

on their behalf or just to demonstrate royal power.[10] Many of those who "earned" such pardons were not only repeat offenders, but major villains with a lifetime of crime in their past. The cases of such men as Robert Darcy, his accomplice, Robert de Fissheburn, and Thomas Crispin (all of whose pardons appear in the appendices) illustrate just how far the crown might go toward condoning the activities of hardcore criminals.

Among the pardons issued by fourteenth century English monarchs, none have drawn greater criticism than those used to reward or recruit men for military service or, alternatively, to raise money that the crown could devote to its military endeavors. Such military pardons first appeared at the end of the thirteenth century, during the reign of Edward I (1282-1307).[11] Several decades later, in the opening stages of the Hundred Years War, that king's grandson, Edward III (1327-1377), made extensive use of them in his struggle to win the French crown. English parliaments of the period repeatedly condemned this expedient and their condemnation finds its echo in the works of nineteenth and twentieth century scholars. It was largely such pardons that the great constitutional historian, Bishop Stubbs, had in mind when he remarked "this evil was not merely an abuse of the royal attribute of mercy, or a defeat of the ordinary processes of justice, but a regularly systematized perversion of prerogative."[12]

By focusing on three eventful years in the opening phases of the Hundred Years War, this article will examine royal use of the power to pardon as a means of recruiting, retaining, and rewarding Englishmen who served in England's armies. The first two years—1346-1347—witnessed the battle of Crécy followed by a lengthy siege culminating in the conquest of Calais, a port city on the northern French coast that would remain in English hands

[10] The theme of pardons beeing granted to demonstrate royal power runs throughout Lacey's book, in particular, chapters 8-10 which deal with the most famous "group pardons" issued by the monarchy in the second half of the fourteenth century. For a further treatment of Lacey's work and the points she makes in regard to how the crown used the granting of pardons to demonstrate and enhance its power, see my review on the De re militari site. URL: http://www.deremilitari.org/REVIEWS/ Lacey_RoyalPardon.htm.

[11] Both Hurnard and Lacey trace the origin of military pardons to the late thirteenth century. According to Hurnard, one of the earliest instances dated to 1293 when Edward I pardoned a homicide committed by one Thomas de Luton as a reward "for his services in Wales." The following year, the king opened the floodgates when he began using the pardoning power to raise troops for his Gascon campaign. What may originally have been a temporary expedient soon became standard operating procedure for bringing men into military service in the Scottish wars. See especially: Hurnard, 247-50. See also: Lacey, 100.

[12] Quoted in Lacey, 9.

until another war returned it to France in the mid-sixteenth century.[13] The third year—1360—encompassed the negotiation and signing of the treaties of Brétigny and Calais, that signaled England's success[14] in the conflict's opening decades.[15] All three of these years were rich in military pardons. During each, the English crown granted hundreds of patents forgiving soldiers their often quite extensive civilian derelictions. Taken together, the patents from these years supply a solid data base for the study of military pardons.

I. *Historical Background*

As the dominant conflict in the west during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, the Hundred Years War (1337-1453)[16] deservedly ranks among

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[13] Patents issued during this two-year period appear in the *Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office*, vol. 7 (Edward III: 1345-1348) [hereafter, *CPR*, E3.7] (London, 1908). In accordance with the conventions of footnoting, after the initial full reference to each volume of the *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, all subsequent references will be abbreviated. The abbreviation reflects the fact that each king's reign begins at a volume 1 and continues from there until the end of that reign, at which point, there is a new volume 1 for the next monarch. In other words, there is a volume 1 for Henry III; a volume 1 for Edward I, and so forth. Consequently, in citing the *Calendar*, a reference should include not only the volume and the page, but also the name of the king issuing the patent, in our case Edward III. By way of example: Edward III's first pardon of 1346 was granted on January 5 at the Tower of London and appears in volume 7 of the CPR containing patents issued during his reign. In this article, its footnote abbreviation will be: *CPR*, E3.7:22 (Tower of London, Jan. 5). The same pattern will be followed throughout this article.

[14] A rather specious argument holds that England did not actually "win" this opening phase of the conflict since Edward III failed to make good his claim on the French crown. This ignores the reality that in military affairs, a victory need not be complete in order to be a victory. The terms imposed on the French at Brétigny and Calais leave no doubt that England won the opening round of the conflict. For an insightful discussion of this matter, see: Clifford J. Rogers' prize-winning monograph, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, England, 2000), 416-19.

[15] Patents issued during the year 1360 appear in the *Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office*, vol. 11 (Edward III: 1358-1360) [hereafter, *CPR*, E3.11] (London, 1913).

[16] Both dates exhibit chronological problems, symptomatic of the larger issues involved in defining the greatest conflict of the later Middle Ages, one that would not become known as the Hundred Years War until later. Although Edward III began to gather allies in 1337, large scale fighting did not break out until two years later, when the king launched his first attack on France. And although the English lost all of their continental holdings but Calais in 1453, no actual treaty ended the conflict. Not willing to concede that it was over, England once again dispatched armies to the continent in 1475 and 1492. For a insightful essay dealing with problems involved not only in dating, but in actually defining the conflict, see Kelly DeVries, "The Hundred Years War: Not One War But Many," in *The Hundred Years War, Vol. 2: New Vistas*," edited by L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 3-34.

the most widely studied topics in medieval history.[17] Since the pardons under consideration in this article all come from its initial stages, a very brief summary of the events of that period would seem to be in order.[18] In 1337, following confiscation of Gascony by the French king, Philip VI (1328-1350), Edward III landed on the continent and began gathering allies for the coming struggle. Two years later, fighting broke out in the Low Countries and in 1340, in the Flemish city of Ghent, Edward officially laid claim to the crown of France, a claim he based on direct descent through the maternal line from an earlier French king, Philip IV "the Fair" (1285-1314).[19]

Despite a lack of success in the opening campaigns fought in the Low Countries, Edward's armies soon began to win substantial victories on other fronts. In June, 1340, an English fleet crushed the French at the battle of Sluys fought off the Flemish coast, affording England naval superiority for decades to come. In late summer, 1345, England's ranking soldier, Henry de Grosmont, the earl of Lancaster,[20] led an outnumbered English force to major victories at both Bergerac and Auberoche in Gascony.[21] In late summer of the following year, the English king made his second descent on the continent and, while marching through Normandy, met and demolished

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[17] For an idea of how extensive a literature surrounds the conflict, see Kelly DeVries, *A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology* (Leiden, 2002), esp. 285-410.

[18] To become better-acquainted with the Hundred Years War from its beginnings to the treaty of Brétigny, the period during which all pardons examined in this article were issued, see: Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*. The best short treatment of the entire conflict remains the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article written in the early twentieth century by the dean of medieval military historians, Sir Charles Oman.

[19] By contrast, the Valois dynasty, recently installed on the French throne (1328), enjoyed only a collateral relationship to the house of Hugh Capet that had ruled France since the tenth century, albeit that relationship was by way of a male line. See genealogical table 1.

[20] Henry de Grosmont was created earl of Derby around 1337 "by the advice of the last [i.e. the most recent] Parliament at Westminster." Although this title was supposed to terminate at the death of his father when he would inherit the family's principal title, earl of Lancaster, documents in the *CPR* suggest that he may for a time have continued to hold both titles simultaneously. See: *Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office*, vol. 3 (Edward III: 1334-1338) (London, 1895), 400 (Westminster, March 18). *CPR*, E3.7:86 (Westminster, May 15); *Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office*, vol. 9 (Edward III: 1350-1354) (London, 1907), 134 (Tower of London, Sept. 21). The duke's principal biography is Kenneth Fowler's, *The King's Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster 1310-1361* (London, 1969).

[21] For a careful analysis of the Bergerac campaign, see the article by Clifford J. Rogers, "The Bergerac Campaign (1345) and the Generalship of Henry of Lancaster," in *JMMH* (Woodbridge, England, 2004), 2: 89-110.

a far larger French force at the battle of Crécy (August 26, 1346), after which he besieged and took Calais.

Rounding out this first flood tide of English success was another major land battle, fought in September, 1356, near the town of Poitier. Here, King Edward's eldest son and namesake known to history as the Black Prince (d. 1376)[22] not only defeated another numerically superior French army, but in the process, captured the French king, Jean II (r. 1350-1364), the king's youngest son, Philip "the Bold," future duke of Burgundy (d. 1404), and much of the French aristocracy.[23]

Although Edward III's grandiose campaign of 1359 ended in failure, the situation on the ground still overwhelmingly favored England when the two sides sat down to peace talks at Brétigny in spring of the following year. Here, they drafted a treaty that reflected more than a decade of English military success. Signed on May 8, 1360, it called upon Edward to renounce the French crown and all ancient Plantagenet claims on several of the great fiefs of France (in particular, Normandy). His renunciation, however, was handsomely compensated. The French were called on to pay an enormous ransom for their king (3 million gold *ecus*) while Edward was left with full sovereignty over much of the western part of the kingdom. On October 24, the two kings and their eldest sons reaffirmed these pro-English terms with only slight alteration in the Treaty of Calais.

II. *Secondary Literature*

Literature dealing with pardons granted during this period is far from extensive. Until recently the two best book-length treatments, one for

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[22] Most historians attribute this sobriquet, not mentioned in historical sources until long after the prince's death, to a penchant for wearing black armor. See, for example: Henry Dwight Sedgwick, *The Life of Edward the Black Prince, 1330-1376* (New York, 1993): 27. The best medieval account of the prince's life is to be found in a lengthy poem by an anonymous author known only as the Chandos herald, a surviving manuscript of which resides in Worcester College, Oxford. A critical edition from the turn of the century used in the preparation of this article contains not only the original text in meter, but also a useful prose paraphrase. While the introduction to that edition is overwhelmingly linguistic rather than historical in nature, the inclusion of voluminous endnotes, often cross-referencing to other chronicles, more than makes up for this. See: *Life of the Black Prince by the Herald of Sir John Chandos*, ed. Mildred K. Pope and Eleanor C. Lodge (Oxford, 1910). In addition, a somewhat freer English translation of the poem can be found in Richard Barber, *The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince* (London, 1979), a new edition of which has recently come out with Boydell and Brewer.

[23] Philip's epithet, "the Bold," is usually credited to his conduct at Poitiers where he stood with and helped protect his royal father until both were captured.

England, the other for France, examined periods that chronologically bracket the Hundred Years War. The more relevant of these for our study is Naomi D. Hurnard's *The King's Pardon for Homicide Before AD 1307*, which examines in considerable detail the medieval evolution of the English crown's power to pardon and thus serves as a starting point for any work on late medieval pardons, military or otherwise.[24] However, as the title indicates, Hurnard leaves off at the end of the reign of Edward I (1307), some three decades before the great Anglo-French conflict began. By contrast, Natalie Zemon Davis's more recent and better-known *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France*, picks up the story of pardons from a French perspective only after the conflict ended.[25]

Unfortunately, neither work focuses extensively on the crown's pardoning of crime in return for military service by the pardon's recipient. In Hurnard's case, this is highly understandable: after all, such pardons came into use on a regular basis only late in Edward I's reign, the reign with which she ends her study. Even so, she does explore their origins in the 1290s and leaves the reader in no doubt concerning her belief that they constituted an erosive misuse of the royal prerogative.

> In medieval England the king's prerogative of mercy, however worthy in conception, was certainly used to excess .... Criminals were pardoned before trial from motives which were unrelated to the circumstances of their crimes, with no suggestion of extenuation, and in complete disregard of the need to maintain the deterrent force of prospective punishment. The main motive for this was military necessity: recruits could be enlisted by the promise of pardon. But even before Edward I adopted *this disastrous expedient* it may be suspected that a great many criminals were pardoned *for equally irrelevant reasons.* [My italics][26]

By contrast, the omission of military pardons from Natalie Davis's work comes as something of a surprise. Her book contains but a single line related to the topic—"a few [recipients] were required to serve in the king's

[24] Richard Kaeuper cites Hurnard as his major source of information concerning English pardons while Andrew Ayton treats her book as the standard work on the subject. See: Kaeuper, 126. Andrew Ayton*, Knights and Warhorses, Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, England, 1999), 145 (n. 31); 163 (n. 129).

[25] Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France* (Stanford, California: 1987).

[26] Hurnard, vii. Ayton adds his imprimatur to Hurnard's argument for a late thirteenth century origin : "The terms whereby 'service pardons' could be obtained had not remained unaltered *since their introduction as a recruiting device in the 1290s*." [My italics] See: Ayton, 145.

army during their time of banishment"—leaving its reader wondering if the French crown largely eschewed making use of this expedient for recruiting and rewarding its soldiers.[27]

Recently, there has been a major addition to literature that focuses primarily upon pardons, a work chronologically-situated in the period of the Hundred Years War . The newcomer, written by Helen Lacey, is entitled *The Royal Pardon: Access to Mercy in Fourteenth Century England*.[28] Having drawn from a wide range of sources, both historical and literary, Professor Lacey provides her reader with a thoughtful and nuanced discussion of royal pardons as a whole and their impact on English society. Unfortunately, while she does mention military pardons at several points in her narrative, it is clear that they do not rank among her principal interests and, as a result, her treatment of them leaves much to be desired. On the whole, Lacey downplays their significance within the whole range of royal pardons.[29]

Useful albeit brief consideration of military pardons can be found in several works on the Hundred Years War that give a backseat to more traditional concerns (battle, strategy, tactics, and technology) and focus instead on recruitment, organization, movement, and supply.[30] Of particular note is H.J. Hewitt's ground-breaking book, *The Organization of War under Edward III*[31], in which the author suggested that royal pardons for

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[27] The author adduces only a single example in her notes to support this statement. See: Davis, 11.

[28] For the complete bibliographical reference to this work, see fnt. 9.

[29] I find Professor Lacey's treatment of military pardons not only sketchy, but to some extent, misleading. While I will not go into great detail here concerning this judgment, I would again refer the reader to my lengthy review of Professor Lacey's book posted on the website of De re militari, The Society for Medieval Military History at URL: http://www.deremilitari.org/REVIEWS/Lacey_Royal Pardon.htm.

[30] Not all works that focus on military organization and logistics during the period manifest significant interest in military pardons. For example, in a chapter on the rewards of military service, Michael Prestwich deals extensively with wages, voluntary service, military contracts, even the payment for horses lost in battle, but refers to patents of pardon only briefly, then in a single paragraph that sheds little light on the subject. Of four references to the subject in his index, two are mistaken as to the pages in the text. The author actually devotes considerably more attention to patents of protection conceded to individuals venturing forth on royal business, documents that bear a certain similarity to pardons in that they suspended judicial action against a recipient during the period of his service. See: Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 109-10, 126.

[31] H.J. Hewitt's *The Organization of War under Edward III* (*1338-62*) (South Yorkshire, England, 2004) first appeared in 1966 and was reprinted in 2004. In the introduction to the reprint edition, Andrew Ayton refers to it as a "groundbreaking and influential book," and

crime may have constituted a significant means of raising men to serve in Edward's wars, both in Scotland and on the continent.[32] Hewitt also touched on possible effects that pardoning so many men who had committed violent crimes might have had on the administration of English justice and on the men and women who had to live with the effects, citing the denunciations of this practice voiced by several English parliaments.[33]

Another treatment of military pardons appears in Andrew Ayton's more recent work, *Knights and Warhorses, Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III*, dealing with roughly the same time period as Hewitt.[34] Using charters of pardon as one of several tools available to help determine the size and make-up of Edward's forces, Ayton explores the number and nature of such documents. Of the two, Ayton does a better job than Hewitt in marshalling numerical evidence and conveying just how numerous these charters actually were.[35] On the other hand, neither author explores the matter in much detail.

In *Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages*, John Bellamy has approached the subject of royal pardons from a judicial rather than a military perspective; as a result, his focus is not on patents issued in return for military service. Nevertheless, chapter six—"Prison, Punishment, and Pardon"—contains a useful treatment of pardons in general. Rather than condemn military pardons out of hand, as Hurnard and those who follow her have done[36], Bellamy raises, if somewhat tentatively, a dissenting voice regarding their utility to king and country:

> Some justification for the special pardon issued in return for military service is readily apparent. It rid the countryside of dangerous misdoers for a while and provided the king with both cash and men who had a proficiency in the handling of weapons.[37]

None of the existing literature that touches on English pardons in the period of the Hundred Years War does more than scratch the surface, leav-

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endorses another historian's assessment that "nothing more significant in the field of English medieval military studies has appeared in the last half century." (See the Forward, vii.)

[32] Ibid., 29-31.

[33] Ibid., 173-75.

[34] Ayton, see especially 144-46 and 163-66.

[35] For the years 1346-1347, Hewitt speaks of "several hundred for service." Unless one interprets the word "several" in an unusually expansive manner, this vastly understates the number issued in that time period. "Several thousand" would be closer to the mark, as Ayton clearly states in his work: "the peak was reached for service during the Crécy-Calais campaign, for which several thousand were awarded." Hewitt, 30. Ayton, 164.

[36] Kaeuper (p. 126) cites Hurnard's strong disapproval of military pardons.

[37] Bellamy, 197.

ing room for a good deal more in-depth study of their role in the conflict. It is just such a study that this article seeks to undertake for the years under consideration.

III. *The Sources*

In medieval England, the crown conferred charters of pardon upon men and, to a much lesser extent, upon women through the use of royal patents. Formerly preserved among the patent rolls in London's Public Record Office (PRO), they are now housed in the National Archives at Kew.[38] A summary of these documents—the *Calendar of Patent Rolls*—was compiled by the English government and printed in 49 volumes, issued between 1891 and 1911. Thousands of entries refer to royal pardons, quite a number of them military pardons.[39]

Almost all such pardons mentioned in the present article have come from two volumes of the *Calendar*—volume seven covering the years 1346-47 and volume eleven for 1360.[40] Taken together, these provide an extensive, but manageable database for understanding what amounted to a royal trade in such charters, a trade that helped in several ways to underwrite England's war effort in the fourteenth century. Study of military pardons supplies insight into both the violent nature of medieval English society and several military benefits the crown regularly drew from that endemic violence.

In consulting this source, the web has again come to the aid of historians as it has so often done in recent years. The University of Iowa has made available a searchable electronic version of the *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, the presence of which greatly simplifies the research effort, providing not only electronic access to the source, but also a complete list of pages on

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[38] In addition to pardons of both the military and non-military variety, the patent rolls contain many other varieties of royal patents. These include property grants, licenses and mandates to undertake various actions, letters of protection bestowed upon foreigners visiting England or Englishmen going abroad on crown business, presentations to English ecclesiastical benefices, exemptions from various forms of royal service, promises made by the crown, often involving royal debts, confirmations and ratifications of other documents, and so-called exemplifications that clarified legal situations and usually entailed turning over to the recipient copies of some other specified document.

[39] *CPR*, vols. 1-49 (London, 1891-1911).

[40] Volume 7 catalogues patents dating to the years 1345-1348; volume 11, those from 1358-1361.

which the key term, the word "pardon," appears at least once, accompanied by a hot link to each of those pages.[41]

IV. *Pardons, Military and Non-military*

In writing about pardons issued by the English crown during the fourteenth century, scholars have categorized them in various ways. For example, in *The Royal Pardon*, Helen Lacey distinguishes three principal types—individual pardons, group pardons, and general pardons. For purposes of this article, we shall divide them along different lines—military and non-military pardons. Non-military pardons were those granted to individuals, both male and female[42], without any acknowledgment that the recipients had performed military service to earn them or any expectation that they would render such service in the future. By contrast, the defining characteristic of military pardons was a statement, usually consisting of no more than a few words, linking its issuance to either past or future military service. Not surprisingly, given their martial nature, such pardons went exclusively to men. While the majority of both military and non-military pardons forgave crimes on the part of recipients, a few excused people who had not committed any crime from paying royal taxes, rendering service they owed the crown, supplying fighting men, or even taking on the status of knighthood.

Some authors, including Ayton, choose to refer to them not as "military pardons," but as "service pardons." Although technically correct, there is an obvious drawback to using the latter term: not all service that earned a pardon from the crown was military in nature and therefore, not all service pardons were military pardons. For example, in February, 1346, the crown granted a pardon to Nicholas de Bokelund, an auditor of accounts in the king's chamber, by which he was excused from rendering any official

[41] For the presence of this invaluable source on the web, historians owe a debt of gratitude not only to the University of Iowa library system that posted it, but to G.R. Boynton, the professor who was moving source behind the project. See URL: http://www.uiowa.edu/~acadtech/patentrolls/.

[42] The following pardons were issued in 1346 to women: *CPR,* E3.7:29 (Tower of London, Jan. 10); 45 (Westminster, Febr. 16); 46 (Westminster, Febr. 10); 76 (Febr. 6, Westminster); 148 (Windsor, July 10); 149 (Windsor, July 6) 151 (Windsor, July 10); 155 (Windsor, July 30); 198 (Westminster, Oct. 4); 205 (Tower of London, Nov. 18); 211 (Tower of London, Dec. 2). While several involve illegal entry into possession of property, others forgave more "hard line" crimes such as homicide, theft, receiving stolen goods, etc.

accounting for his discharge of that office.[43] No mention is made of any *military* service that he had performed to earn that favor; what is more, auditor of accounts in the king's chamber is an unlikely springboard to martial glory. In a similar vein, in April, 1346, as part of a complicated property transaction, the king pardoned a "trespass" by his clerk, William de Cusancia, "in consideration of the long and laudable service of the latter."[44] Presumably, this referred to William's service as a clerk; again, the patent makes no mention of any military activity. In short, while all military pardons are service pardons, the reverse is not the case: not all service pardons are military. Hence, "military pardon" would seem a more precise term for describing the phenomenon being considered in this article.[45]

The majority of *Calendar* entries that record a military pardon are brief; usually totaling no more than two or three lines of printed text. Nevertheless, even the briefest among them must necessarily contain certain essential elements: Military pardons (and, for that matter, non-military ones) were primarily defined by the clause that either conferred a blanket forgiveness for all crimes committed or, alternatively, listed specified crimes the crown agreed not to prosecute. In addition to forgiving the original offense, more often than not the pardon also excused the perpetrator's subsequent flight or escape from prison and the outlawry that had resulted from his attempts to evade punishment.

Such patents invariably contain the date and place where the pardon was issued, the name of its recipient, and, in the case of military pardons, the statement that it was being conferred in return for military service. Some include along with the name of the recipient a small amount of personal information such as his parentage and residence or place of origin. In a military pardon, if the required service had already been rendered, the *Calendar* entry often indicates the venue (France, Scotland, Wales, Gascony, Brittany, at sea, etc.) In most cases, it also identifies an intercessor, the powerful individual who requested that the patent be issued. This was usually the captain under whom the recipient had served.

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[43] *CPR*, E3.7:60 (Westminster, Febr. 26).

[44] *CPR*, E3.7:268 (Reading, April 12).

[45] In March, 1346, the population of Carlisle received a pardon that cancelled payment of certain royal dues "in consideration of their great labours and charges in the safe keeping of their city and towards the repair of the walls." Although this clearly qualifies as a pardon *for service to the crown*, it is just as clearly not granted for military service within the understood meaning of the term, unless one construes regular construction work undertaken by a civilian population in that light. *CPR*, E3.7:54 (Westminster, March 12).

The following are typical examples of military pardons that appear in the *Calendar of Patent Rolls* for 1346-1347. The first lists specific crimes committed by its recipient; the second contains the standard clause conferring a blanket pardon. Both also excuse "any consequent outlawries."

> August 13, 1347
> Reading.
>
> Pardon, for his good service in the war of France, to John Tony of Long Stanton of the king's suit against him for robberies from Katharine Page and John Geffrey of Stanton, and for receiving John atte Halle and twenty-four hoggets stolen by the latter, as well as for felonies whereof he is appealed by John White of Bernewell, approver; and of any consequent outlawries.[46]

> October 28, 1347
> Westminster.
>
> Pardon, in consideration of good service done in Gascony in the company of Henry earl of Lancaster, to Thomas Cryspyn of the king's suit for all felonies, homicides, robberies, escapes from prison, arsons and other trespasses against the peace perpetrated by him before the last passage of the earl to those parts, and of any consequent outlawries.
> By testimony of the earl.[47]

While relatively few pardons conferred in 1346-1347 convey a great deal more information, several entries from these years are more expansive. In March, 1346, the crown pardoned a soldier named Roger Duket who had served under Lancaster in southern France:

> March 10, 1346
> Westminster
>
> Pardon to Roger Duket, in consideration of his good service in Gascony in the company of Henry, earl of Lancaster, as the earl has signified by letters in the chancery, and because he has found in the chancery Adam de Brantyngham and John de Lancastre of the county of Nottingham as his mainpernors that he will return in the king's service to those parts or elsewhere as the king shall order and stay there at his own charges one entire year, for all oppressions and trespasses whereof he was indicted and convicted before Nicholas de Cantilupo and his fellows, late justices of oyer and terminer in the county of Nottingham, as well as for his trespass or felony in breaking out of Nottingham gaol when detained there fore the same and

[46] *CPR*, E3.7:371 (Reading, Aug. 13).
[47] *CPR*, E3.7:295 (Westminster, Oct. 28).

> escaping, as well as the imprisonment, fine, ransom and whatever pertains to the king herein, and of any consequent outlawry.[48]

The lengthiest such entry in volume seven of the *CPR*, Duket's pardon is exceptional in that it supplies such added details as the names of the trial judge and the individuals who had agreed to stand surety for its recipient, as well as the fact that he had broken out of Nottingham jail. What is more, unlike the other two pardons which reward past service, Duket's patent contains the clause that would make charters of pardon an important tool for recruitment: it is granted on the condition that "*he will return in the king's service to those parts or elsewhere as the king shall order and stay there at his own charges one entire year*." In other words, in return for his pardon, the recipient agreed to serve the king militarily for a full year at his own expense!

Even a cursory perusal of the two volumes being used to prepare this article indicates that in all three years under study, pardons of both sorts—military and non-military—were a common fact of life.[49] The first pardon of 1346 was issued on January 5 at the Tower of London and was non-military;[50] six weeks later came the first military pardon, conferred upon one Peter de Catrall, setting aside "the suit of the king's peace" for rape.[51] As the year progressed, the numbers continued to mount and by autumn, with the English army beginning its investment of Calais, Edward III had ratcheted up the pardoning process to new heights, conferring patents upon hundreds of the men who served him. Although the numbers would subsequently decline, the totals for both 1347 and 1360 would still be considerable. During all three years, a decidedly disproportionate number of pardon charters were war-related, reflecting the fact that in periods of intense military activity or when it seemed that a war might coming to an end, such grants became particularly prevalent.

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[48] *CPR*, E3.7:58 (Westminster, March 10).

[49] Just how numerous pardons were in late medieval England cannot really be extrapolated from just three years (1346, 1347, and 1360). This determination will require more careful research into other years, including ones which were militarily far less eventful. In a paper entitled "Time Honored Lancaster: Pardons at the Request of John of Gaunt," delivered at the Medieval Congress in May, 2008, John Leland provides evidence strongly suggesting that the total number of military pardons issued during the reign of Richard II (1377-99) was relatively few when compared to any one of the three years from Edward III's reign that I have chosen to survey. See: *Catalog of the 43rd International Congress on Medieval Studies* (8-11 May 2008) (Medieval Institute, 2008), Session 348, 107. I am grateful to Professor Leland for sending me a copy of his paper.

[50] *CPR*, E3.7:22 (Tower of London, Jan. 5).

[51] *CPR*, E3.7:53 (Westminster, Febr. 22).

During each of the years under study, the vast majority of military pardons went to men for their service across the Channel. Although many such patents contain only the statement "for [in consideration of] good service in the war in [of] France," other formulae also appear, some of which supply slightly more information about a recipient's wartime activities.[52] In July, 1346, as Edward III embarked on his Crécy campaign, William Hammond obtained a pardon "for good service done to the king and especially at the present time in his passage to Normandy."[53] In the course of the same campaign, William le Bedel received his charter "for good service this side the seas"[54]; Ralph de Shelton for service "in the king's company at the battle of Cressy"[55]; and John Burdon "in consideration of his good service in the siege of Calais."[56] At the same time, a number of soldiers received their pardons for both "good service in Brittany and at the siege of Calais."[57] The king pardoned his yeoman, Philip de Whitten, "for good service in the time when he was lieutenant of the king's admiral from the mouth of the Thames westward"[58] while Peter de Scotenay received a charter "in consideration of good service done in the wars of France, Brittany and on the seas."[59] One of the most detailed summaries of a recipient's military service appears in a pardon conferred upon John, son of Margaret de Buthesthorn in July, 1360, "in consideration of manifold services done by him in the company of Henry, duke of Lancaster, in the king's wars and in the siege of Reynes in Brittany as well as in the king's last progress in France."[60]

In fact, this pardon was but one of many granted to men who over a period of nearly two decades fought under this great warrior. In 1346-1347, a substantial number received theirs "for good service in Gascony in the company of Henry, earl of Lancaster."[61] These were the veterans of England's first successful land campaign of the Hundred Years War, the effort, brilliantly led by Lancaster, to reassert English control over southwestern France. Long after the earl departed this theatre of the war, the crown would continue to grant pardons to men who had served in the

[52] For an extensive listing of formulas used in military pardons during the years 1346-1347, consult the Appendix.

[53] *CPR*, E3.7:483 (La Hogue, July 15).

[54] *CPR*, E3.7:534 (Calais, May 8).

[55] *CPR*, E3.7:291 (Reading, May 1).

[56] *CPR*, E3.7: 544 (Calais, July 11).

[57] *CPR*, E3.7:557 (Calais,

[58] *CPR*, E3.7:162 (Windsor, July 30).

[59] *CPR* E3.7:94 (Guildford, May 20).

[60] *CPR* E3.11:446 (Westminster, July 16) and 11:480 (Westminster, Oct. 28).

[61] *CPR*, E3.7:295.

campaign. One of the last of these Gascony pardons actually dated to 1360, fifteen years after the campaign and not long before the nobleman's death.[62]

Despite the fact that most military pardons were conferred upon men who had fought or were fighting on the continent, a certain number were earned through martial activities closer to home. In December, 1346, the crown pardoned Philip Syueker "for good service in the war of Scotland."[63] The following January, the monarch conferred eleven more military pardons upon men who had fought in Scotland, mentioning in particular their participation at the battle of Durham.[64]

One of the most unusual pardons issued to soldiers during this period actually involved a domestic dispute. In May, 1346, Edward III excused his keeper of Carlisle castle (who also happened to be the town's bishop) as well as the men under the bishop's command for destruction of life and property growing out of a fight between themselves and the townsfolk.

> Whereas of late certain debates and dissensions arose between the bishop of Carlisle, in the time when he was keeper of the castle of Carlisle, and the men with him in the garrison of the castle, of the one part, and the citizens and others of the city, of the other part ... wherein some men were killed and wounded and other trespasses were perpetrated, in consideration of the good service of the bishop the king has pardoned him the suit of the king's peace for all manner of homicides felonies and trespasses by him or his said men ... and of any consequent outlawries.[65]

Several days after issuing the initial charter, the crown drafted a follow-up document, listing by name thirty-two members of the Carlisle garrison and pardoning them their role in the fracas.[66] What makes this pardon unusual if not unique is the fact that it forgave not civilian offences committed by English soldiers serving outside of England, but instead the destruction of life and property visited on an English city by members of its royal garrison. In spite of this not-inconsiderable difference, these patents must be reckoned as military pardons, akin to ones granted men fighting at the battle of Crécy or the siege of Calais.

Although almost all military pardons forgave men who had actually performed the service or who promised to do so at some future date, on rare occasions, the crown might pardon not the recipient, but someone

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[62] *CPR*, E3.11:462 (Westminster, Oct. 10). Several other pardons of 1360 which went to men who had fought under Lancaster specified their more recent service in Brittany.

[63] *CPR*, E3.7:514 (Calais, Dec. 14).

[64] *CPR*, E3.7:515-16 (Calais, Jan. 10-24).

[65] *CPR*, E3.7:83 (Westminster, May 14).

[66] *CPR*, E3.7:88-89 (Westminster, May 14).

close to him. In June, 1360, Thomas, son of John de Veer, earl of Oxford, earned a post-mortem pardon for his father. At some point in time, the old earl had transferred a manor in Essex that he held from the king without having first obtained the necessary royal license.[67] Thomas now requested the post-mortem pardon for his father in order to head off any future legal challenges arising out of the earl's illegal action.

Almost all military pardons excused crimes of a non-military nature, usually taking place back in England. Malefactors like Shakespeare's Bardolph, who committed crimes while on campaign, do not surface in many patents. There were, however, rare exceptions. In August, 1347, Edward pardoned Ralph de Middelnye who had smuggled wool out of England during his first campaign in Brabant. Since Ralph had done so "to raise money for the sustenance of himself and his men, then in the king's service" he was pardoned "the forfeiture and whatever else pertains to the king in this behalf."[68]

In at least one instance, military service not only won a pardon, but at the same time served as an alibi for the crime alleged against its recipient. Thomas de Inges had been accused of bringing into England a thousand pounds worth of counterfeit coin over a period of three years. However, according to the testimony of several important witnesses, during the first two years in question, Thomas had been serving in Brittany and during the third, was with the king "on this side the seas in his service continually." As a result, the crown determined that he could not have committed the crime with which he was charged and in light of that finding, pardoned him.[69]

V. *Pardon Clusters*

Quite a number of military pardons issued in 1346-47 (including all three examples reproduced on pages 370-371) appear as individual entries in the *Calendar*; in other words, they are interspersed at random among the many other patents conferred by the crown. On the other hand, a substantial majority of military pardons during this two year period appear in what may be called "pardon clusters."[70] In such a cluster, in order to shorten the

[67] *CPR*, E3.11:435 (Westminster, June 28).

[68] *CPR*, E3.7:547 (Calais, Aug. 8).

[69] *CPR*, E3.7:557 (Calais, Aug. 30).

[70] By contrast, clusters of non-military pardons are rare and those that exist are unremarkable for their length. For an example of a typically short, non-military clusters, see *CPR*, E3.7:69 (Westminster, March 25).

work of record-keeping, the scribes who compiled the patent rolls apparently grouped together any number of pardons ranging from two to a thousand or more, linking them with a phrase such as "the like to the following."

By way of example, consider the pardon solicited in May, 1346, by the earl of Lancaster for twelve men who had served in his successful campaign in southern France. The first entry in this short cluster was granted to Robert Hotoft and specified "pardon for good service done in his [the earl's] company in Gascony." The next went to Richard de la Grene under the heading "pardon in like terms." The remaining ten names appeared after the phrase "the like to the following."[71] Although the word "pardon" appears only twice in the cluster, all told, twelve pardon charters have been issued.[72]

While pardon clusters of this sort can be found throughout the patent rolls, they are most common among patents that Edward III conferred during his stay on the continent. Following his landing at La Hogue in July, 1346, through the battle of Crécy in August, and the siege of Calais that began in September and lasted for nearly a year, the king granted several thousand pardons, most of them military. The vast majority of these, the scribes merged into several dozen clusters.

The most spectacular of all clusters dates to fall and early winter of 1346-1347, during the opening months of the siege. Between September 4, 1346, and January 24 of the following year, Edward acted favorably on hundreds of petitions, for the most part presented by captains of companies. During this period, the two most extensive petitions came from the Black Prince in one of which he named 45 individuals and in the other 32 for whom he sought pardons.[73] This greatest of all pardon clusters spills out over thirty-one continuous pages of the printed calendar and records a total of 1237 charters conferred during a period of slightly more than four months.[74]

The crown attached only a single condition to these pardons; in order to obtain one, a recipient had to remain with the army for the duration of

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71 *CPR*, E3.7:82 (Westminster, May 7-12).

72 In mid-January, 1347, the crown, again acting at the earl's behest, pardoned fourteen more of his soldiers "for homicides, felonies, and trespasses ... and any consequent outlawries." Only the first of these calendar entries, referring to the patent for one John Barry, uses the actual word "pardon" and specifies that it was being issued "in consideration of his [Barry's] good service in Gascony." The remaining thirteen are again covered by the phrase, "the like to the following." CPR, E3.7.222.

73 *CPR*, E3.7:489, 491 (Calais, Sept. 4).

74 *CPR*, E3.7: 483-513.

the siege. In the words of the royal patent, "that he do not withdraw from the king's service so long as he [the king] shall stay this time on this side the seas ...."[75]

Within this cluster, one day—September 4—stands out as perhaps the most spectacular in the history of English military pardons.[76] On that one day alone, Edward III issued a total of 1138 patents to a list of English soldiers that included almost fifty knights[77] and an earl.[78] Dozens of intercessors brought forth petitions for royal endorsement and royal scribes embarked on the laborious task of drawing up the pardons and recording them on the patent rolls. Even if not all of the paperwork was completed within a single day, just the logistics of this event must have been daunting

Of the total number of pardons granted that day, all but ten (1128) are grouped together within the cluster. Nevertheless, in keeping with the scribal shorthand used by those who compiled the patent rolls, only the first entry for September 4th, the one that established the terms under which all of that day's charters would be granted, actually employed the word pardon:

> General pardon, for his good service in the war of France to Thomas le Huntere, baliff of Belsted; on condition that he do not withdraw from the king's service, so long as he [the king] shall stay this time on this side the seas, without his [the king's] special license.[79]

Thereafter came the usual phrase "the like to the following," heading up a list of 1127 more names.

In November, as the siege entered its winter months, the king began adding pardons which his scribes placed within the same cluster. Newcomers to the royal list enjoyed the same terms as the original grantees: "for good service in France," Edward excused these men "all homicides, felonies, robberies and trespasses in England committed before September

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75 *CPR*, E3.7:483 (Calais, Sept. 4).

76 This one-day transaction occupies over twenty-six calendar pages. See: *CPR*, E3.7:483-508.

77 The forty-nine are specifically identified in the *Calendar* as "knight" or "chivaler." In addition, the *Calendar* also identifies a number of other recipients as sons of knights.

78 Actually, two pardons are mentioned as going to an earl, one to Thomas de Bello Campo, the other to Thomas de Beauchamp. Both, however, were undoubtedly issued in favor of the same individual, namely the earl of Warwick. Bello Campo and Beauchamp are simply two variants of that name; one Latin, the other French. Although other Patent Roll documents of 1346 refer to Lord Thomas more often as "Bello Campo", in this article I shall make use of the French "Beauchamp." *CPR*, E3.7:489.

79 *CPR*, E3.7:483 (Calais, Sept. 4) and *CPR*, E3.7:483 (Calais, Sept. 4).

4 last."[80] By the time the scribes terminated this lengthiest of Calais clusters by incorporating a few more patents from January, 1347, it had reached a grand total of 1237 pardons, despite which the word itself appeared only twice.[81]

VI. *Pardonable Offenses, Violent and Non-violent*

Royal pardons of both a military and non-military nature could forgive their recipients a wide variety of offenses. Although a considerable majority of these involved some form of violence against persons or property, others did not. Non-violent offenses mentioned in pardons included entering into possession of property without the required royal license, non-payment of monies owed to the royal exchequer, failure to provide a sufficient accounting of one's financial dealings after leaving an office that required such an accounting, failing to take knighthood when required to do so by royal decree, importing and exporting proscribed items to and from England, or undertaking illegal appeals to Rome. A fairly typical example of the crown pardoning a non-violent offense dates to June, 1346, at which time it issued a patent excusing John de Bello Campo for having acquired two manors in the county of Worcester from his powerful kinsman, the earl of Warwick, without first obtaining the necessary royal license. As in most such cases, the patent that pardoned his offense also conceded *post facto* the missing license.[82]

With that said, the fact remains that a considerable majority of pardons did involve some form of violent behavior; more often than not, the killing of one or more persons. In fact, pardons that excused two deaths were fairly common, while those pardoning even greater mayhem were not unknown.[83] According to one particularly lenient pardon conferred upon Robert Darcy

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[80] *CPR*, E3.7:509 (Calais, Nov. 16).

[81] The word pardon appears only on the first page of the cluster and on the twenty-seventh. See: *CPR*, E3.7:483 and *CPR*, E3.7:509. Although I have treated this as one continuous cluster, an argument could be made that what we are dealing with are really two clusters placed back to back, the first encompassing the 1128 pardons granted on September 4th, the second containing the 109 issued from November, 1346-January, 1347.

[82] *CPR*, E3.7:124 (Portchester, June 21). As Helen Lacey points out, when it came to property transfers requiring a royal license, it was often less laborious and less expensive to simply ignore the law and then pay the fine required to obtain a king's pardon. Lacey, 34.

[83] Far rarer are cases like that of William de Coumbe of Coventre, who received three separate patents issued within two days in September, 1347, each pardoning him for a different killing. *CPR*, E3.7:554 (Calais, Sept. 26 and Sept. 28).

in September, 1360, the recipient and his longtime accomplice were forgiven for committing three separate murders, as well as shielding from the law three men who had together committed a fourth. In hundreds of fourteenth century pardons examined for this study, such phrases as "for the death of" or "touching the death of" are repeated with depressing frequency.

Although violent offenses other than homicide appear less frequently in the record, they do appear. The crown regularly pardoned lesser forms of violent crime, including assault and battery, rape, burglary, highway robbery, arson and other forms of property destruction, poaching and animal rustling, trespass, illegal bearing of arms, and breaking out of prison. For example, in early autumn, 1347, amidst the scores of pardons excusing human carnage that were issued to soldiers at the siege of Calais, the crown forgave John Starkweyer and John Reyner for robberies each had committed; William de Hompton for two cases of animal rustling, each involving six oxen; Richard de Wircestre, for stealing four oxen and a cow; Thomas Dalne, for the theft of thirty sheep; William de Ayllinton, for six oxen; Nicholas Terry, three oxen and a robbery; Thomas de Wodehouse, an ox; and Nicholas Waldeshef for carrying away fish from a neighoring close.[84]

While it is probable that most of the killings mentioned in royal pardons did involve wrongful death, given the nature of medieval English law, this was not necessarily the case. As noted above, Naomi Hurnard has traced the development of a changing system for dealing with death from its Anglo-Saxon roots through the beginning of the fourteenth century. In the early Middle Ages, an individual's death had been largely a family matter, to be handled either through the payment of death money (*wergeld*) or, if adequate compensation were not forthcoming, the occasional blood feud.

Over the course of centuries, however, as the English crown increasingly assumed judicial control over cases involving death, the old system of private justice withered away, its place being taken by the courts of law. No longer could the parties involved legitimately avenge an injury or arrange between themselves for the proper compensation; instead, the matter was destined to go before a judge. Under this new system of royal law, if relatives desired punishment of the killer, they would have to seek it through the courts. If what they really desired was compensation, they would also have to bring charges, in hopes that the killer would pay up in

[84] *CPR*, E3.7:555 -56. These military pardons excusing crimes other than homicide were all issued in Calais between September 18 and October 8.

order to have those charges dropped. But whatever the actions of the family, the crown now had its own rights to pursue the case; even if the family chose to do nothing, the government might still proceed in the matter.

Given the increasing role of royal justice, it became customary among those responsible for another's death to seek a pardon from the crown, even if they had killed in self-defense, by misadventure, or while enforcing the law. Not infrequently, they made such an appeal in advance of any judicial proceedings. What is more, regardless of the circumstances surrounding a death, quite a few of those who killed chose to flee the jurisdiction rather than take their chances in a judicial system that necessitated pardons even for what might best be termed "justifiable homicide." In turn, such a flight led to the outlawing of the offender, necessitating either a separate pardon or one that would cover not only the original offense, but also the flight to escape prosecution.

While both military and non-military pardons regularly excused crimes that involved violence, it was the rare military pardon that contained a clause excusing a non-violent offence. Most of the exceptions involved repayment of debts owed to the crown that had been incurred in the course of the war. In December, 1347, Edward III issued one such pardon to Robert de Morle, former admiral of the northern fleet, freeing him from having to face legal proceedings over the collection of £. 136 he owed the crown as part of the war effort. It appears that Morle had secured this concession by coughing up 950 marks of silver "due for wages of 100 men at arms and 100 archers retained in the king's service in his company."[85] In a similar pardon, the king forgave Robert de Burghcher's non-repayment to the exchequer of £. 100 recently allotted him "for his expenses in going on the king's service to Brittany."[86] Another patent granted to the king's yeoman, Robert Chaundos,[87] suspended payment of the usual fee attached to holding a royal castle "in recompense of the great charges which the same Robert will have to make in his [the king's] war in staying continually by his side."[88] This suspension was to last for the duration of the conflict.

The other form of non-violent offense most frequently mentioned in military pardons involved a recipient's failure to take up the order of knight-

[85] *CPR*, E3.7:437 (Westminster, Dec. 1). The 950 marks paid by Robert de Morle far exceeded the debt of £. 136 owed to the crown. Forgiving the debt may have been the crown's way of picking up part of Morle's sizeable contribution to the war effort.

[86] *CPR*, E3.7:227, 228 (Eltham, Jan. 2).

[87] This variant of the more common spelling "Chandos" appears in the document.

[88] *CPR*, E3.7:259 (Reading, Febr. 26).

hood as required by the crown.[89] Knighthood not only conferred greater status, it also entailed added expenses and obligations; hence, not everyone wished to become a knight.[90]

Scattered throughout the patent rolls, there is another type of document, closely akin to a pardon, known as an exemption, of which the majority of recipients were individuals who already held knightly rank. For example, at the siege of Calais in the winter of 1346-1347, the crown granted exemptions to ten men, seven of whom were identified as knights, excusing each "from being put on assizes, juries, or recognitions, and from appointment as mayor, sheriff, escheator, coroner or other baliff or minister of the king, against his will."[91] Clearly, it was to escape such time-consuming duties, several of which could involve considerable effort and expense, that men avoided taking knighthood.

In July, 1346, Roger Normaund was excused his previous failure to take up the burdens of knighthood in consideration of military service he was about to render in Flanders and for a promise that he would accept his new status before returning to England.[92] In December, a similar pardon went to Thomas de Drokenesford who, despite foot-dragging, had finally relented and taken up his knighthood (albeit not in a timely fashion) while on the king's service in Gascony.[93]

Pardons for failure to take on a knighthood could vary in their terms. As in the case of John de Chaumont, the majority of these concessions simply excused the lateness and any resultant fine.[94] On the other hand, the crown's pardon might be more extensive. The king's yeoman and constable of Wyndesore [Windsor ?] Castle received a patent containing not only a pardon for his past failure to take up knighthood, but also an "exemption therefrom until two years from 20 August last."[95] In rare instances, such as that of John de Graunsete, the pardon promised permanent relief in that its recipient would not be compelled "to take the same [his knighthood] against his will."[96]

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[89] See, for example: *CPR*, E3.7:95 (Portchester, June 6), 147 (Windsor, July 12), 225 (Eltham, Dec. 22).

[90] Like military pardons, a number of non-military ones also excused the failure to take up a knighthood. See, for example: *CPR*, E3.7:257 (Reading, March 4).

[91] *CPR*, E3.7:481 (Calais, Nov. 26, 1346-Jan. 23, 1347).

[92] *CPR*, E3.7:147 (Windsor, July 12).

[93] *CPR*, E3.7:225 (Eltham, Dec. 22).

[94] *CPR*, E3.7:95 (Portchester, June 6).

[95] *CPR*, E3.7:416 (Westminster, Oct. 15).

[96] *CPR*, E3.7:257 (Reading, March 4).

By contrast to military pardons, a noticeably higher percentage of non-military ones excused non-violent crimes, many of which involved the illegal transfer of property. Since matters that involved property, especially landed property, cropped up far more frequently in non-military pardons, on the whole, more of these tended to be conferred upon individuals from a higher stratum of society whose denizens would be more likely to be involved in property issues of the sort requiring a royal pardon. It is here that members of the aristocracy show up with some frequency. In the words of Helen Lacey, "Petitioners in such cases are overwhelmingly of gentle or noble status."[97]

By contrast, among those obtaining military pardons that excused violent crime, one finds exceedingly few men of noble status. And while there are a certain number of knights—men of "gentle status"—they constitute a distinct minority. There were, however, some exceptions. Occasionally, even members of England's titled nobility availed themselves of such pardons, excusing them the usual list of heinous offenses. For example, in October, 1346, during the siege of Calais, the crown drafted a charter in favor of the earl of Suffolk, a man far more used to soliciting such documents for those serving under him than for himself.

> Pardon, for good service in the war of France, to Robert de Ufford, earl of Suffolk, of the king's suit for all homicides, felonies, robberies, larcenies, misdeeds, trespasses, conspiracies, unlawful assemblies and champarties as well as for oppressions by colour of his office when he was steward of the household or other minister of the king, and for trespasses, of vert and venison in the king's forests, parks, chaces, woods, and warrens, whereof he is appealed, and of any consequent outlawries.[98]

From the calendar entry, one cannot be certain that the earl had actually committed any or all of these offenses or if he was simply availing himself of an opportunity to get his sovereign's pardon as a precaution against future legal challenges. Still, what cannot be denied is the fact that Suffolk felt some compulsion to accept his sovereign's pardon, at least suggesting that he had been "appealed" on some of the charges.

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[97] Lacey, 34.

[98] *CPR*, E3.7:478 (Calais, Oct. 20). See also the pardon extended to the earl of Surrey. *CPR*, E3.7: 54 (Westminster, March 5).

VII. *General and Specific Pardons*

A majority of military pardons issued in the years 1346 and 1347, especially those that are grouped in clusters, tend to be general pardons. Here, some clarification of terms is necessary. The word "general" when used in reference to pardons is susceptible of several meanings. In her book, *The Royal Pardon*, Helen Lacey uses the term to refer to those grants of mercy that the crown on rare occasions extended to the entire English population; they were general in the sense that any Englishman (or woman) who wished to receive them could do so, usually in return for the payment of a fee.

By contrast, for the purposes of this article, the term "general pardon" will be used in a very different way, one that is fully consistent with its usage by scribes of the period.[99] A general pardon is one that forgave its recipient any and all crimes committed within the realm without actually specifying what those crimes were. As the following examples demonstrate, both military and non-military general pardons contain virtually the same wording.[100] A charter issued to John Barry for military service dismissed "the king's suit against him for homicides, felonies and trespasses … whereof he is indicted, and of any consequent outlawries."[101] Similarly, a patent making no mention of military service forgave Sir William Lovel "the king's suit against him for all manner of homicides, felonies, robberies and trespasses in England and of any consequent outlawries."[102] Nor was this wording limited to individual pardons of the sort conferred upon Barry and Lovel. Most of the hundreds of men granted pardons during the siege of Calais, pardons recorded by the scribes in extensive pardon clusters, were forgiven any and all crimes and outlawries.[103]

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[99] See for example, usage of the term in a number of the pardons on *CPR*, E3.1:116. See also the general pardon conferred upon 1128 men in the pardon cluster that begins on *CPR*, E3.7:483. Both of these appear in the appendix to this article.

[100] Occasionally but not often, the formula for a general pardon might be somewhat modified. For example, in January, 1346, the crown pardoned Roger Brykebek "for all felonies, receiving of felons, procuring of felonies, trespasses and extortions, as well as any consequent outlawries and issues forfeit for non appearance to answer to the king the same …" See, *CPR*, E3.7: 135 (Portchester, June 5).

[101] *CPR*, E3.7: 222 (Eltham, Jan. 12).

[102] *CPR*, E3.7:196 (Portchester, June 20). For other general pardons where no military service is specified, see: *CRP*, 7: 74, 128, 132.

[103] Among the Calais pardons, fewer than a dozen are conferred that mention specific crimes. See, for example: *CPR*, E3.7:481 (Calais, Nov. 20); 483 (Calais, Sept. 4); 518 (Calais, Jan. 18); 552.

Although general pardons predominate in the years 1346-1347, a not-insignificant number of patents, especially those that appear individually, specify the crime or crimes of which the recipient had been accused or adjudged guilty.[104] Furthermore, even though pardon clusters tended to be governed by the general clause, there were exceptions. A few specified the nature of the crime or crimes committed by each recipient in the cluster. For example, a cluster issued in May, 1346, contained pardons issued to twelve men for their service in Gascony. Of these, ten forgave the malefactor his involvement in the death of a single, named individual; the eleventh excused not only a homicide, but also the recipient's "breaking from Leycestre gaol wherein he was detained for the death"; while the twelfth pardoned in addition to a death certain "trespasses" committed against a cleric.[105]

In rare instances a pardon might turn out to be both general and specific. In July, 1347, John Pytyng was indicted for having brought into the country "false money"[106] which he then used to purchase goods "in divers parts of the realm."[107] The king decided to pardon the offense due in part to John's good service in the war, but also because he had learned "on trustworthy evidence" that the man was not guilty, his indictment having been procured through "the malice of his enemies." While the patent excused the specific charge, it went much further, pardoning its recipient "all misdeeds committed by him before 4 September last, as well as any consequent outlawry.

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[104] As noted elsewhere in this article, pardons granted by the crown in 1346 fall into two broad categories: (1) those issued in England; and (2) those issued on the continent after Edward III landed in France and launched the campaign that led to the battle of Crécy and siege of Calais. Of the continental pardons which constitute the majority granted that year, almost all are general in nature—part of the huge pardon clusters issued during the siege. By contrast, of the English pardons issued in England, fully 225 specified the crime or crimes being forgiven by the crown while only 90 were general in nature. While general pardons were occasionally worded somewhat differently, they had one thing in common: they all excused their recipient or recipients from royal prosecution for any and all crimes. In addition to these two main categories, there were approximately half a dozen pardons that might be considered "hybrids." These began by naming one or more specific crimes being pardoned, but afterwards stated that the pardon also covered any other crimes committed by its recipient.

[105] *CPR* , E3.7:82 (Westminster, May 7-12).

[106] In this and other cases involving illegal importation of currency, the coins are referred to as *Lucenburghers*.

[107] *CPR*, E3.7:545 (Calais, July 8).

VII. *Limiting Clauses*

In *Crime and Public Order*, John Bellamy argues that most pardons contained what he calls limiting clauses.

> They might cover only misdeeds done before a certain date, or particular categories of offences. For example, it was not uncommon for treasons, escapes from prison, or particularly offensive felonies to be expressly excepted.[108]

Obviously, most of Bellamy's limiting clauses could apply only to general pardons; other pardons that specified the crimes being forgiven were, by their very nature, self-limiting. However, a careful perusal of *Calendar* entries for the years 1346-1347 has turned up exceedingly few of the limiting clauses mentioned by Bellamy. An exception arises in a pair of general pardons issued in 1347, to John de Morleye and Chaplain Henry Sceymour, forgiving both men all crimes, "except the king's suit for the death of Michael de Ponynges the elder."[109] In most cases, however, recipients are said to have received their pardons for *all felonies* they had committed, with no exception being made for "particularly offensive felonies" or "escapes from prison." Far from being excluded, prison breaks are not infrequently listed among the crimes being excused.[110]

In fact, only one limiting condition is common for military pardons issued in 1346-47: more often than not, they were "date specific." In other words, they excused all crimes committed *before* a certain point in the past; any crime committed since then could be prosecuted. Such date limitations could be worded in various ways. In rare instances, the pardon might cover only the events of a single day. For example, in April, 1346, the crown excused William Mallerbe "all manner of felonies and trespasses done by him at Liverpool [Lyverpull] and elsewhere on the day of St. Valentine, to wit 14 February, in the king's nineteenth year, and of any consequent outlawries."[111] Usually, however, a pardon forgave all crimes committed before a certain date. In June, 1347, Nicholas, son of Laurence de Hodle, received his charter of pardon for both the rape of Margery, daughter of William Foulanare, and various robberies he had committed "before Whitsunday in the nineteenth year of the king."[112] In October, Thomas le

[108] Bellamy, 194-95.
[109] CPR, E3.7:534 (Calais, May 7-8).
[110] See, for example, the 1347 pardon to Thomas Cryspyn reproduced earlier in the text.
[111] *CPR*, E3.7:71 (Westminster, April 20).
[112] *CPR*, E3.7:290 (Reading, June 1).

Gentill obtained his "for all felonies perpetrated before Trinity in [the king's] sixteenth year."[113]

One interesting example of a date specific provision being imposed on multiple pardons involved those issued at the behest of the earl of Lancaster for the Gascony campaigns. In February, 1347, the earl surrendered his post as the lieutenant general in the duchy of Aquitaine in order to join the king during the concluding months of the siege of Calais.[114] Starting some weeks later, veterans who had fought with him in the south began to receive patents containing a new "date specific" provision not seen in earlier charters issued to his soldiers. The new pardons excused crimes the men had committed in England "before the passage of the earl to those parts [i.e. Gascony]," a clear signal that crimes committed after they had mustered out and returned to England would not be covered. One of the earliest pardons containing the new provision went to Philip de Somerton in mid-April, 1347.[115] By the beginning of May, however, it had become a regular feature of patents granted men who had fought under Lancaster in campaigns that were now several years in the past.[116]

An even more impressive example of limitation by date being applied to multiple pardons involves the Calais clusters. As noted, the first day on which these military pardons were granted was September 4, 1346, as the siege was beginning. Of the 1128 charters issued that day as part of the long cluster, all forgave crimes committed back in England up until that moment. Thereafter, the date became a terminus ad quem for almost all other Calais pardons issued during the following year while the siege was in progress. In fact, September 4 continued to appear on pardons granted even after the siege had successfully concluded, as witnessed by Philip Baru of Grymesey who received his in November, 1347, "for all trespasses in England before 4 September, 20 Edward III."[117] In the end, September 4 became the most extensively used "cut-off date" of the period, governing literally hundreds of pardons.

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[113] *CPR*, E3.7: 418 (Westminster, Oct. 21).

[114] *CPR*, E3.7:526 (Calais, Febr. 1).

[115] *CPR*, E3.7:271 (Reading, April 14)

[116] See, for example, the following pardons: *CPR*, E3.7:280 (Richard atte Putte: Reading, May 1); 280 (John Russhemer: Reading, May 1); 278 (John de Wyvelescombe: Reading, May 3); 278 (Richard de Langewath: May 3, Reading); 278 (Peter Reynaud: Reading, May 4).

[117] *CPR* , E3.7:423 (Westminster, Nov. 10).

VIII. *The Numbers Game*

Although the search function that the University of Iowa has attached to its posted *Calendar of Patent Rolls* can generate a complete list of pages where the word "pardon" appears, this is only the first step in determining just how many pardons were issued in a given time period; for example, in a given year. A careful counting produced the following result for the year 1346: Volume 7 of the *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, records charters of pardon in that year having been conferred upon a total of 1698 named individuals, mostly men but also a few women. In exceedingly rare cases, such as the earl of Warwick, several pardons might have been issued to the same individual; the vast majority, however, went to different people.

Among the pardons of 1346, military pardons greatly outnumbered non-military ones: of 1698, at least 1446—roughly 85%—were military. The enormous preponderance is due to England's intense martial activity on the continent that year, in particular the campaign led by Edward III that encompassed both the battle of Crécy and the siege of Calais. In 1346, before the monarch embarked for France, he issued 356 pardons, only 138 of which (less than 39 %) were military. Of these 138, all but a handful went for either past or future service in France, the relatively few exceptions being issued for participation in the Scottish wars. Fully 59 went to men who had fought in Gascony under the earl of Lancaster. Completely altering the year's balance were the numerous military pardons issued after Edward's arrival on the continent. Of 1342 pardons drafted during the summer and autumn of 1346, the vast majority—1308 or over 97%—were military. Almost all of these were granted during the siege of Calais and were conditional upon the recipients remaining with the English army for the duration.

The year 1347 is also recorded in volume 7 of the *CPR*, and while it is not as rich in military pardons as its immediate predecessor, it too produced a considerable number.[118] The total pardon count for 1347 stands at 777. Of these, 532 or just over 68%, were military. Once again, there is a notable disparity between those granted in England and those issued on the continent. In England, the crown granted 261 patents of pardon of which only 120 or 46% mentioned military service. By contrast, of the 516 pardons issued on the continent, 412 or nearly 80% specified such service. As in the preceding year, most of these continental pardons went to participants in

118 Of 306 pages in CPR vol. 7 that record patents from 1347, 164 (53%) contain one or more pardons. For more about this subject, see Appendix III: Methodology.

the siege of Calais, men who had not already received this special "incentive" to stay the course.

As close to accurate as these figures may be (they are as close as this author is capable of getting them), they still represent only a near approximation. While relatively few in number, the ambiguities in the record are sufficient to throw off the count, if only slightly. Although there are some difficulties involved in arriving at the total number of pardons recorded for any given year, far greater difficulty lies in determining precisely how many of these pardons were military and how many non-military.

For purposes of this article, all entries have been excluded from the list of military pardons unless clearly marked as such either by inclusion of one of the many standard formulas or being subsumed under the heading of "the like to the following." The problem arises from the fact that a fair number of pardons assigned to the non-military category on the basis of these rigorous criteria display a degree of ambiguity. For example, the same leading nobles, men such as the earl of Lancaster, regularly requested pardons, only some of which contain one of the formulas clearly marking them as military. This historian cannot help wondering if all such pardons are really non-military or were there some instances where the scribes who compiled the original rolls or the scholars who calendared them simply failed to mention the military justification for granting them? The situation becomes particularly doubtful where military pardons appear intermingled together with others not clearly identified as such or when purportedly non-military pardons are issued at a time and place where the vast majority are military, as, for example, during the siege of Calais. (For an example of this doubt-inspiring situation, see Document 4 in the Appendix.)

On the other hand, one thing seems safe to say: the rigorous principle of exclusion used in determining which pardons are military makes it almost certain the number of such pardons as a percentage of the total is understated in this article—to what degree is impossible to say on the basis of the sources employed.[119]

[119] Achieving greater certainty would almost certainly entail research in the National Archives at Kew, where the researcher could have access to both the original patent rolls on which the *CPR* is based and any original pardons that have been preserved in their entirety. This task lies beyond the scope of the present article, based as it is squarely upon the printed records set forth in the multi-volume *CPR*.

IX. *The Parliamentary Reaction*

Early in the reign of Edward III, parliament began to voice popular complaints against what it perceived as the crown's misuse of the pardoning power, a misuse that had the effect of freeing dangerous criminals from punishment and putting them back into society where the impunity they had enjoyed led them to commit further crimes. In 1328, during the king's second regnal year, a meeting held at Northhampton passed a statute condemning this aspect of the royal prerogative.

> Whereas Offenders have been greatly encouraged, because [the] Charters of Pardon have been so easily granted in times past, of Manslaughters, Robberies, Felonies, and other Trespasses against the Peace; It is ordained and enacted, That such Charters shall not be granted, but only where the King may do it by his Oath, that is to say where a Man slayeth another in his own defence, or by Misfortune ....[120]

The Northhampton statute set the tone for other legislation that would follow over the course of succeeding decades. The king should only grant pardons in accordance with his coronation oath, an oath that called on him to administer justice in accordance with the good of the realm. Two years later, a parliament meeting in Westminster once more raised the issue and, referring back to the earlier statute, reaffirmed its provisions.[121] In 1336 and again in 1340, further legislation expressed the continuing discontent with the royal pardoning power and tried to draw up rules for its use that would ameliorate some of the worst abuses.[122] Despite parliament's best efforts, the crown does not appear to have adhered to the law with any great regularity, especially as the war on the continent heated up and England found herself in need of soldiers.

During the years 1346 and 1347, both the sheer number of pardons issued by the crown, in particular for military service, and the unconditional nature of so many of them appears to have increased popular disaffection with this aspect of the royal prerogative; this, in turn, led to stepped up complaints in parliament. Over the next several decades, members would repeatedly petition Edward concerning the deleterious effect his pardons were having on the peace of the realm, arguing forcefully that they undercut respect for royal justice and put numerous evildoers back on the streets.

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[120] *Statutes of the Realm* [hereafter *SR*] (Edward III, 1328), 1:257, Statute 2 in HeinOnline, URL: www.heinonline.org.

[121] *SR* (Edward III, 1330), 1:264 in HeinOnline.

[122] *SR* (Edward III, 1336), 1:275, Statutes 2-3; *SR* (Edward III, 1330), 1:281, 286, Statutes 2 and 15 in HeinOnline.

A meeting held at Westminster in January, 1348, just months after the capture of Calais, presented the crown with two similarly-worded petitions[123] the second, and most detailed of which, read as follows:

> To our lord the king and his council; his commons pray: that whereas many murders, kidnappings of people, robberies, homicides and ravishments of women and other felonies and crimes are committed and maintained in the realm without number, and so many are favoured by charters of pardon and procure deliverance that neither the criminals nor the maintainers pay attention to or fear the law, to the great destruction of the people; may it please our lord the king to ordain such remedy by statute so that no such criminals and maintainers might be comforted or emboldened by any of the aforesaid reasons. *And charters of pardon should not be granted to such men without the assent of parliament.*[124]

Interestingly, this and other such petitions make no apparent distinction between pardons conceded for military service and those which were not, even though the significant rise in numbers could be traced directly to their use in recruiting and rewarding men who had fought in France. Instead, members treated all such charters as fundamentally the same, an exercise of royal prerogative that promoted "the great destruction of the people" and should therefore be substantially curtailed for the good of society. Almost as an afterthought, they suggested a radical solution. Such charters of pardon should not be granted "without the assent of parliament."

In its reply to the 1348 petition, the crown also failed to draw any distinction between military and non-military pardons. As is so often the case, the royal answer was short and very general in nature: "our lord the king will consider this further with his good council, so that no such charter will pass unless it is to the honour and profit of him and of his people."[125] The escape clause in this "commitment" left the monarch all the wiggle-room he could possibly desire: after all, it was Edward who would determine just what honored and profited him and his people. Not surprisingly, nothing was said concerning the parliamentary suggestion that in future royal pardons require the assent of parliament. Only a very weak medieval monarch or one compelled by extraordinary circumstances would agree to such

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[123] Parliamentary Petition (Edward III: 1348), items 53 and 62 in *PROME: The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275-1504*, edited by Chris Given-Wilson, et. al., (Scholarly Digital Editions and The National Archives, Leicester, 2005).

[124] Item 62 has added the "ravishments of women" to the list of crimes specified in item 53, not at all surprising since quite a number of pardons issued during this period wherein the crime is specified excused the recipient of rape.

[125] Parliamentary Petitions (Edward III: 1351), royal reply in *PROME*.

curtailing of his prerogative. Nevertheless, Edward's reply does indicate that he had heard and (to an extent) acknowledged the justice of the popular complaint.

Nor was it the last time this complaint would be placed before him. In the parliament of 1351, famous for enacting the Statutes of Laborers and Provisors, the commons once again raised the pardons issue, this time rather more firmly than three years earlier.

> Whereas it was formerly ordained by statute that no charters of pardons for homicide or for notorious felonies should be granted to anyone, except in special circumstances ... notwithstanding this statute, various charters, both general and specific, have been granted to various common felons and murderers, some of them receiving one, two or three charters, by which criminals are greatly emboldened to do wrong, in the hope of having such pardons, so that his people are in great fear of their lives. And as a result of the multitude of such charters the people of the counties do not dare to indict criminals, to the great harm of the king and to the great misfortune of the people. Wherefore may it please our lord the king that henceforth such charters shall not be granted to common criminals and murderers, nor to anyone, except in special circumstances where our lord the king should keep his oath and his conscience; on the contrary, such common criminals and murderers should be dealt with by the law, in order to maintain the peace and quiet of his commonalty.[126]

The petition stressed several points. Multiple pardons were going to career criminals helping them to pursue a life of crime with impunity. Some received "one, two or three charters" excusing even the most heinous offences. For their part, good citizens feared to indict malefactors when such men, having won easy pardons, could come back and harm them. As in other legislation concerning pardons, the king was implored to "keep his oath and his conscience" when making such grants, almost certainly a reference to that part of the coronation oath where a fourteenth century monarch swore to uphold the laws of the land established by parliament.[127]

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[126] Parliamentary Petitions (Edward III: 1351), item 26 in PROME.

[127] In the 1308 coronation oath administered to Edward II (1307-1327), the English barons inserted an additional clause in which the new king swore that he would observe "the rightful laws and the customs which the community of the realm shall determine." A similar provision became a regular feature of the oath. When asked, "Sir, we [sic] you grant to hold and fulfill and defend rightful laws and customs which the commons of your realm shall choose, to strengthen and maintain them to the worship of God after all your power? The king shall answer, "I shall grant and behold it." See: "*The Manner and Form of the Coronation of the Kings and Queens of England*, 1385 – 1460" in Internet Medieval Sourcebook: England, Fordham University at URL: www.fordham.edu/halsall/sbook1n.html.

Although the king specifically granted this petition, here too the wording had built into it a very adequate escape clause—"except in special circumstances"—again allowing Edward to do pretty much as he pleased. Although there was no specific statement that the issuance of military pardons constituted "special circumstances," the fact that the crown continued to issue them in considerable numbers strongly indicates that this was the royal mindset.

In 1353, parliament at last directly addressed military pardons, criticizing in no uncertain terms a common problem that arose from them, to wit, failure on the part of recipients to perform the promised military service.

> Because our lord the king ... has often granted his charter of pardon to well-known thieves and common murderers, who led him to believe that they are remaining overseas in his wars, when they have quickly returned to their country to continue their crimes, in deceit of the king and in disturbance of the commonalty of their regions; may it please our said lord, according to his good disposition, to redress such deceits, and to be better advised in such cases in times to come. Praying always to his good lordship that his grace shall always be open, as it has been previously to those who deserve it.[128]

With respect to this issue, the crown showed no hesitation in fully endorsing the petition of the commons. After all, while Edward might baulk at surrendering his power to recruit warriors by pardoning their crimes, he had an obvious interest in making certain that such men actually performed the service for which their charters had been issued.[129]

During the 1350s, parliament passed two statutes that had the potential of increasing and standardizing information contained within royal pardons. In the first of these, dating to 1353, the crown acknowledged that past charters of pardon had not infrequently been granted to individuals as a result of false representations made by intercessors "whereof much Evil hath chanced." As a result, "henceforth in every charter of Pardon of Felony, which shall be granted at any Man's suggestion ... the Name of him that maketh the Suggestion shall be comprised in the said charter." If the court later determined that the intercessor had misrepresented the facts, it could

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128 Parliamentary Petitions (Edward III: 1353), item 41 in PROME

129 The crown had already demonstrated its willingness to cancel patents on the grounds of non-performance. In October, 1346, it revoked a letter of protection granted to one William, son of Alice atte Forde, because he "was going beyond the sea on the king's service." Its revocation came as the result of the sheriff of Essex having informed the king "that he [William] has not gone, but stops in England attendant upon his own affairs." See *CPR*, E3.7:190 (Westminster, Oct. 13).

disallow the charter and proceed "as the law demandeth."[130] Four years later, in a statute that applied originally to Ireland, but later seems to have been extended to England as well, parliament provided "that no general pardon be ... granted, but [that] the felonies or Trespasses committed shall be specified and expressed therein."[131] Taken together, these two laws mandated future pardons to specify both the name of the intecessor and the crimes of the recipient. One upshot of this was to make such grants a good deal more useful to scholars doing social and military history.

Despite any and all complaints registered by successive parliaments, the English crown would go only so far in satisfying them. The king was willing to endure popular disaffection with his policy of pardoning criminals, particularly in the case of military pardons due to their perceived benefits in respect to the war effort. For the use of military pardons served Edward III well as a tool of both recruitment and finance.

X. *Pardons as a Tool of Recruitment and Finance*

While many pardons were conferred as a reward for past military service, many others were conditioned upon future service on the part of the recipient.[132] A certain number of these even called upon the recipient to perform that service at his own expense.[133] For example, in the winter of 1345-46, the crown granted eleven pardons to men serving the earl of Lancaster, "on condition that they should go on his service for one year at their own charges when summoned."[134] In most cases, the recipient of such a pardon could look forward to fulfilling his military service across the channel in France. On the other hand, some patents were issued to recruit soldiers for future military service closer to home, which in a fourteenth century context characteristically meant service in the Scottish wars. Thus, the crown granted Thomas le Gentill's his pardon on condition "that he will go on his service at his own charges for one year against the Scots."[135]

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[130] *SR* (Edward III, 1353), 1:330 in HeinOnline.

[131] *SR* (Edward III, 1357), 1:359 in HeinOnline.

[132] Among the many such grants issued by the crown was the pardon charter granted to Roger Duket, quoted earlier in this article.

[133] Admittedly, such pardons were rare. A careful count for the year 1346 has turned up fewer than a score providing for future service *at one's own expense*. The Duket pardon is the principal example.

[134] *CPR*, E3.7:44 (Westminster, Jan. 27).

[135] *CPR*, E3.7:418 (Westminster, Oct. 21). The Baliols were clients of Edward III, willing to recognize English suzereignty.

The most spectacular instance of a military pardon's value in recruiting (or, to be more precise, in "retaining") soldiers can be seen in the hundreds issued during the Calais campaign. Here, they were used not to bring men into the military, but to hold them there during what promised to be a long and difficult siege. With but few exceptions, the 1570 patents[136] conceded during that year long event were granted on condition "that [the recipient] not withdraw from the king's service, so long as he [the king] shall stay this time on this side the seas, without his [the king's] special license."[137] In fact, very few of these special licenses to withdraw were granted.

While many pardons issued for future service encouraged offenders to join or rejoin the military, others proved useful as a means of generating revenue. Not infrequently, the crown granted its pardon contingent upon future military service, only to commute that service into a money payment at some later date.

In some instances, the cancellation of military service resulted from influence in high places. In June, 1346, Geoffrey del Holt, who had received his pardon "on condition that he should go on [the king's] service for one year at his own charge" profited from his connection with the earl of Arundel who complained to the crown "that the said Geoffrey stays continually in his service and cannot be absent therefrom without loss." In response, the king rescinded Geoffrey's commitment, but not the pardon it had earned.[138] In January, 1346, in an even more blatant example of influence peddling, the king was forced to revisit patents issued to a number of men on condition that they serve Henry of Lancaster. When the queen mother asked him to excuse them, due to the significant part they played in the functioning of her household, her dutiful son "granted that they shall not be compelled to go on the said service."[139]

The failure in either case to mention any money payment to the crown makes these exceptions that prove the rule: for the most part, the major consideration in canceling future military service was financial.[140] Issuing

[136] Fewer than a dozen pardons granted at this time contain a specific statement that they are not covered by the provision that their issuance was dependent upon the recipient's willingness to remain with the king as long as he remained in France. I have arrived at the number 1570 by totalling up patents from both 1346 and 1370 that were issued during the siege.

[137] *CPR*, E3.7:483 (Calais, Sept 4).

[138] *CPR*, E3.7:131 (Portchester, June 21).

[139] *CPR*, E3.7:44 (Westminster, Jan. 27).

[140] According to Bellamy (p. 192), "to obtain a pardon there nearly always had to be a payment on the part of the recipient.

pardons conditioned upon such service and then allowing the recipients to buy their way out appears to have been a regular practice and fairly lucrative money maker for the crown. We see an illustration of this in the run-up to the Crécy campaign. A royal document of May, 1346, indicated that the king had issued general pardons to fifteen men "on condition that they should go to Gascony or elsewhere on his service for a year." However, when each man subsequently paid into the royal exchequer the considerable sum of fifty marks[141] (for a tidy total of 750), the king proclaimed "that [they] shall be wholly quit of going on his service."[142]

Payment for avoiding the service required by the pardon varied in amount, gauged undoubtedly on an individual's ability to pay.[143] In May, 1346, Otto de Halsale paid 4 £. to be excused from "service beyond the seas" called for his pardon. A few days later, other men who had their service cancelled were required to pay only four marks apiece.[144] An even more telling example of variable payment came during the following month when the crown excused twenty-two men from "going on the king's service for one year" in return for payments ranging from 20 shillings to 10 marks. The first entry in this list mentioned "proof tendered before the king that [the recipient] has not wherewith to maintain himself for such a time," strongly suggesting that these pardons, like the others mentioned above, had been given men for future military service *at their own expense*.[145]

In short, by the judicious (or perhaps injudicious) use of military pardons, the English monarch could secure either self-supporting soldiers or revenue with which to purchase the services of others. Given these benefits, he was unlikely to heed the *vox populi* calling for an end to the practice. And so, while Edward might willingly enact measures to eliminate loopholes and make certain that recipients actually performed the service specified in their charter, he was not about to cancel the use of military pardons altogether or even adhere to duly-enacted laws limiting their use. Pardons were simply too valuable as a tool of warfare; their use was covered under the time-honored principle "*necessitas non habet legem.*"

Does this mean that popular complaints voiced by parliament had no influence whatsoever on royal policy? The answer appears to be no. One must remember that the vast majority of military pardons in 1346 and 1347,

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[141] Fifty marks was roughly double an esquire's wages for an entire year.

[142] *CPR*, E3.7:77-78 (Westminster, May 7).

[143] Bellamy (p. 191) says of the fine, which he likens to a pardon, "To all appearances it was graded to what the offender's position in society allowed him to pay."

[144] *CPR* , E3.7:86 (Westminster, May 10).

[145] *CPR*, E3.7:122 (Windsor and Porchester, June 10-18).

including not only the great pardon clusters from the siege of Calais, but also many others granted over the course of the year, were general. In other words, they forgave recipients any and all crimes they had committed (or at least any they had committed before a certain date.) Later on, this began to change. After mid-century, blanket pardons became increasingly uncommon as the crown, acting in accordance with the provisions laid down for Irish pardons in 1357, took pains to specify the crime or crimes being forgiven. By the end of the fourteenth century, further parliamentary legislation mandated that no pardon for severe offenses should be granted unless those offenses be spelled out in the charter. The move in this direction may well have come about, at least in part, as a means of lessening the popular perception that government was allowing men to get away with everything in return for their military service.

In fact, a growing number of military pardons issued during the 1350s went beyond merely specifying the crime being pardoned, they actually supplied a dual rationale for their issuance: not only was the recipient being pardoned for his "good service," he was also innocent of wrong-doing or there were mitigating circumstances. Most such pardons involved a killing which the captain of the man's company represented as having been done in self-defense. Thus, the crown pardoned Philip Homme for the death of John de Scaldby in part "for good service in Brittany" under the now duke of Lancaster, but also because that illustrious figure testified "that he [Homme] killed him [Scaldby] in self-defense."[146] A similar pardon granted Roger de Wyneston for his role in the death of William de Breythdwayt not only cited Roger's service in Brittany, but also set forth the circumstances of the case: "[The victim] was killed in his [Roger's] presence by a groom of his in a hot conflict and not of malice, as the king's clerks William de Mirfeld and William de Sutton have informed the king."[147] Such changes in the process were firmly in place by the next great outpouring of military pardons.

[146] *CPR,* E3.11: 16 (Westminster, Febr. 21). In cases that did not involve military pardons, it would usually be a local authority who testified to a finding of "self-defense." The crown pardoned Geoffrey de Grantanete for the death of Richard Moriz "as the king is certified by an information taken by Nicholas de Styueele, sheriff of Cambridge, that he killed him in self defense." In this entry, not only did a duly appointed royal official testify, he even submitted an information concerning the circumstances of the death.

[147] *CPR,* E3.11: 20 (Westminster, Febr. 28).

XI. *Military Pardons in 1360*

In 1360, England and France signed the treaties of Brétigny and Calais which together established what was theoretically to be a permanent peace between the two kingdoms. Throughout the months when these highly pro-English treaties were being negotiated, the crown engaged in another orgy of pardoning in which hundreds who had served in the soon-to-be-ended conflict received charters forgiving crimes they had committed back in England.

As had been the case fourteen years earlier, Henry de Grosmont, now duke of Lancaster, remained the principal figure in respect to obtaining pardons for those who had served under him. Not only does he have the most pardons issued at his behest in the year's longest cluster, but a fair number crop up elsewhere in the volume as individual entries.[148]

Among the pardons issued to men serving under Lancaster, two went to a pair of unparalleled villains from Lincolnshire—a knight named Robert Darcy and his accomplice, Robert de Fissheburn.[149] The list of their crimes dating back for years if not decades included multiple murders, assaults, theft, extortion, highway robbery, assaulting a manor house, sheltering other felons, intimidating with death threats a justice of the peace, and forcing a cleric to accept as a nun in one of the houses under his control a woman of questionable virtue of their acquaintance!

Although Darcy's patent contains the year's longest, most heinous list of offences excused by the crown, his is by no means the only impressive criminal record to be found in the *Calendar of Patent Rolls* for 1360. Also unmatched by the entries for 1346-47 are patents which went to such hard core criminals as Thomas Cryspyn, serving the king's younger son, John of Gaunt[150] (perhaps the same Thomas Cryspyn who thirteen years earlier had won a general pardon for his service in Gascony under Gaunt's father-

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[148] See, for example: *CPR*, E3.11: 367 (Westminster, June 1); 462 (Westminster, Oct. 10); 463 (Westminster, Sept. 26); 472 (Westminster, Oct. 24); 480 (Westminster, Oct. 28); 494 (Westminster, Nov. 12); 510 (Westminster, Dec. 4).

[149] *CPR*, E3.11: 463-64 (Westminster, Sept. 26); 467 (Westminster, Sept. 26).

[150] During these years, one of the king's younger sons, John of Gaunt (a name derived from "Ghent," the city in the Low Countries where he was born) was fast coming into his own. In this same year, 1360, he received his first major property from the crown, the town of Hertford, once held by the late queen mother, Isabel. *CPR*, E3.11: 375 (Westminster, May 20) and 428 (Westminster, May 20). For a recent popular biography of this fascinating figure whose career is writ large in the pages of contemporary chronicles, see: Norman Cantor, *The Last Knight*: *The Twilight of the Middle Ages and the Birth of the Modern Era* (New York, 2004).

in-law)[151] and John Botyld.[152] As their pardons make abundantly clear, in civilian life both men, like Darcy and Fissheburn, had regularly terrorized the localities in which they lived. That one can determine the full extent of their villainy and the villainy of many lesser malefactors is due entirely to the near-complete replacement of general pardons forgiving all felonies with those specifying crimes committed by their recipients.

A close reading of the *Calendar* for the year 1360 turns up only four general pardons, two of which were granted in return for military service in France making this kind of grant a definite exception to the new rule of specificity.[153] In June, the crown pardoned Simon Symeon, using even more expansive wording than that found in most earlier general pardons:

> for all homicides, larcenies, robberies, felonies, extortions, oppressions, champerties, maintainings of false quarrels and trespasses of vert and venison in the king's forests, chaces, and parks whereof he is indicted and any consequent outlawries.[154]

During the same month, Robert Salle also received a pardon "for all felonies and trespasses whereof he is indicted" without any listing of what these were. At the same time, the crown added to Salle's grant of clemency a highly unusual clause that makes it sound more like a parole than a pardon: "if in time he be found in default towards the king or his people, it is the king's will that the present grace be of none effect."[155]

Although issuance of a general pardon would have substantially shortened the paperwork involved in cases similar to those of John Darcy and Thomas Cryspyn, it would not have satisfied the desire of contemporaries to see criminals "fess up" to their crimes nor would it have supplied historians with anywhere near the same insight into the society of fourteenth century England. While the switchover to specifically listing all crimes being pardoned may or may not have mollified English parliaments, it did establish a situation in which almost every patent recorded in the *Calendar* becomes a vignette of criminal activity in England. When looked at in combination, they tell us a good deal about the nature of crime in that society. It is precisely this information that differentiates the major pardon

[151] *CPR*, E3.11: 450-51 (Westminster, July 10). The 1347 pardon to a Thomas Cryspyn is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix II.

[152] *CPR*, E.311: 443 (Westminster, July 5).

[153] The two pardons that fail to mention any military component simply read "general pardon to." One went to a male, the other to a female. See: *CPR*, 11: 428 (Westminster, June 4); 435 (Westminster, June 30).

[154] *CPR*, 11: 431 (Westminster, June 16).

[155] *CPR*, 11: 371 (Westminster, June 6).

cluster of 1360 from those of the 1340s and makes them a much richer source for careful analysis.

XI. *The 1360 Pardon Cluster*

The calendar for 1360 contains in addition to a number of individual military pardons two pardon clusters, the first and most substantial of which occupies over twenty-six consecutive pages in the printed *Calendar*.[156] Its earliest entry dates to May 25, 1360; its last spills over to January 20 of the following year.[157] All told, it records a total of 408 patents conferred upon 411 different men[158], making it longer than all but one of the three clusters issued at Calais fourteen years earlier. By contrast to the Calais clusters, however, its provides fairly lengthy descriptions of the criminal activities and supplies more information about the individuals involved, victims as well as malefactors.

The first pardon listed went to one William, son of Benedict de Thoraldby, who was serving in the company of John of Gaunt, then earl of Richmond. It was earned "for good service done in the war of France"[159] and established "Michaelmas last" (September 29, 1359) as the new terminal date for any pardoned crimes.[160] Immediately thereafter came the statement extending the same provisions to every one else on the list: "The like to the following, for good service done in the company of the underwritten [the captains of companies], before the said feast."

Several more times over the course of the 26 calendar pages, similar wording extends the list, wording that usually appeared at the top of a new

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[156] *CPR*, E3.11: 375-402 is the main pardon cluster for 1360. The other one runs from pp. 503-506 and contains only 58 pardons.

[157] As is true of earlier pardon clusters, the recipients are not recorded in chronological order. Hence, instead of being first in the cluster, the earliest chronologically-speaking does not appear until page 380, the the sixth page of the cluster.

[158] As I have already stated in this article, all such pardons were conferred upon males. All but two of the 1360 cluster (a total of 406) went to a single individual. Of those two, one was issued in favor of three men serving under Henry, (now) duke of Lancaster, all of whom had been involved in the same killing. The other one went to two men with the same patronymic (very likely brothers)—John and Thomas Bouman—both of whom were also involved in the death of a single individual. *CPR* , E3.11: 376 (Westminster, July 1); 396 (Westminster, Aug. 10).

[159] *CPR*, E3.11: 375 (Westminster, May 28).

[160] Michaelmas is the feast day of St. Michael Archangel, held on September 29, observation of which was a requirement in the medieval western church. See: "St. Michael the Archangel" in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* posted at New Advent, url: www.newadvent.org/cathen/10275b.htm.

sheet (membrane) in the original document. For example, where membrane five begins, there is a pardon to Henry Dausone issued "for good service to the king done in his last voyage in France."[161] The next sentence reads, "Pardon in like terms to the following," after which the list of names resumes.[162]

In addition, several similar statements indicating that the pardon was issued for military service pop up more or less at random throughout the cluster. Edmund de Cretyng, a "chivaler" or knight, is said to have won his pardon "for good service in the battle of Poytiers as well as in the king's last voyage in France."[163] John de Standon obtained his "for good service done in Normandy, Brittany, and elsewhere."[164] In several other entries, the reason for the pardon appears in an abbreviated form: "for good service &c."[165] Nearly all of the pardons indicate their military origin either by naming the captain in whose company the malefactor had served or another military leader who had recommended them.

Although pardons were issued in each of the nine months between May and January, the vast majority in the cluster date to late spring and early summer. The first thirteen appeared at the end of May, several weeks after the Treaty of Brétigny had been signed. There followed the two busiest months: in June, the crown issued 210, over half the total for all nine months; in July, 99.[166] After July, numbers fell off substantially: In all of August, the crown granted only eighteen new pardons; November witnessed the issuance of another twenty-two; while September, October, and December, 1360, and January, 1361 returned only four apiece.

Calendar entries are not uniform. Several limit themselves to naming just the recipient and his victim or victims; for example, "William de Hasthrop for the death of John Traveys"[167] or "Walter Wulveleye, for the

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161 *CPR*, E3.11: 381 (Westminster, May 28) .

162 Similarly, membrane two (which appears in the *Calendar* after membrane five) also begins with a pardon to Walter Stayndrop issued "for good service done in the war in France," and is again followed by "the like to the following for felonies specified, done before the said feast."

163 *CPR*, E3.11: 397 (Westminster, Aug. 24).

164 *CPR*, E3.11: 398 (Westminster, July 14).

165 Examples of this abbreviated wording appear in seven pardons that appear sequentially at *CPR*, E3.11: 399 (Havering atte Bower and Westminster, July 30-September 29).

166 The four most active days were June 1 (20 pardons), June 3 (22), June 4 (36), and June 10 (22).

167 *CPR*, E3.11: 398 (Westminster, July 4).

death of Richard le Frye and Richard Prestford".[168] The majority, however, are more expansive. Most name the captain in whose company the recipient was serving. "Richard le Mansk, in the duke's company, touching the death of Richard le Boster."[169] Often the recipient and his victim are further identified by such traits as parentage, residence, profession, or social status. Not infrequently, the scene of the crime is specified. And if crimes other than responsibility for a death are involved, they too are listed. In one instance, a pardon mentions so many ancillary offences that the killing almost passes unnoticed.

> John Froylle, in the same company, for having with others unknown ravished and abducted Elizabeth wife of John, son of Richard de Wodeford ... on Wednesday after St. Katharine the Virgin in the thirtieth year, having with others unknown on the said Wednesday entered by night the manor of Richard de Wodeford at Carleton, beat the said Richard, John le Coc, Geoffrey le Coc and Henry de Blakeneye, abducted Elizabeth ... with a robe worth 5 s. with which she was clothed, and ravished her against her will, *and killed William Cartere* [my italics].[170]

Taken together, these pardons, like the others used in preparation of this study, reaffirm the existence of a violent society. If the *Calendar* entries are to be believed, then these 411 recipients had wrought at least as much mayhem and disruption in civilian life as they were likely to cause in anything other than an epic battlefield encounter. As a result of their collective activities, 369 other Englishmen and nine English women were dead.

Not surprisingly, the pardons suggest that much of the recipients' criminal activity had been local in nature. Of the 408 pardons, 157 clearly identify (1) both the residence of the recipient and that of his victim or (2) the residence of the recipient and the scene of his crime. In nearly half of these cases (68), the crime took place in the criminal's home town or was committed against another of its inhabitants or both. In two cases, men were forgiven for having killed their own brothers.[171]

Some of the violence, especially on the local level, involved men who worked at the same trade: In London, a saddle-maker (*saddler*) did away with one of his competitors[172] while an apprentice fishmonger killed his

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168 *CPR*, E3.11: 398 (Westminster, June 16).
169 *CPR*, E3.11: 376 (Westminster, June 1).
170 *CPR*, E3.11: 394 (Westminster, July 18).
171 *CPR*, E3.11: 397 (Rushenden, Sept. 15) and 398 (Westminster, July 1).
172 *CPR*, E3.11: 380-81 (Westminster, June 10).

master's servant.[173] One shoemaker (*souter*) from Croster killed another.[174] In Beverley, a leather worker (*skynner*) assassinated another leather worker who had, in turn, worked for a third member of the trade.[175] A chaplain named Roger de Mogynton killed the local priest.[176]

What one does not find on the 1360 list are many pardon recipients identified as belonging to a social elite. No pardons are issued to noblemen and only one went to an individual identified as a 'chivaler' or knight.[177] While a few pardons were conferred upon members of the church, none of these men stood any higher in the hierarchy than "vicar" or "chaplain." In fact, members of the social elite appeared far more frequently as victims of crime than as criminals. These included several abbots and a number of non-titled, but well-to-landowners. On the other hand, even as victims, their presence in this cluster is less pronounced than one might expect. The explanation may have been as simple as this: those who committed crimes against the higher echelons of society were far less likely to get an ordinary royal pardon, however noteworthy their "service in the war of France" may have been.

A few of the crimes being pardoned, when compared to the vast majority cited in the cluster, seem relatively innocuous. William Brodeghe of Wygan received his pardon "for wax carried away by him from Wygan church."[178] Robert Grymbald, a former apprentice in the town of Oxford, now serving Thomas Holland, earl of Kent, was forgiven "all felonies and trespasses done by him in the last conflict between the masters and scholars of the University of Oxford, of the one part, and the laymen of Oxford and the surrounding country, of the other."[179] In other words, the young man was being forgiven his participation in a town-gown riot, though admittedly such events sometimes produced untoward mayhem. And then, there was Henry Sleye, in the company of the Black Prince, who demonstrated admirable consistency in his crimes, having earned his pardon "for having stolen by night wheat of Roger Pyk in sheaves to the value of 40 d.,

[173] *CPR*, E3.11: 391 (Westminster, July 1) .

[174] *CPR*, E3.11: 376 (Westminster, June 3).

[175] *CPR*, E3.11: 391 (Westminster, July 8).

[176] *CPR*, E3.11: 392 (Westminster, July 12).

[177] *CPR*, E3.11: 397 (Westminster, Aug. 24).

[178] *CPR*, E3.11: 378 (Westminster, June 4).

[179] *CPR*, E3.11: 394 (Westminster, July 19). Two other military patents of 1360 that are not included within the cluster forgave their recipients, one of them an Oxford goldsmith, for involvement in the same event. *CPR*, 11: 425 (Westminster, May 12); 4 (Westminster, May 20).

barley of William Hogges in sheaves to the value of 40 d., and wheat of Robert Shirreve … to the value of 40 d ….”[180]

But these were the exceptions; for the most part, the actions being forgiven were of a more serious nature. A considerable majority of the pardons—368—involved at least one death. Fourteen pardons went to men who had killed twice. Interestingly, none contained in this cluster were issued to men said to be involved in three or more deaths, which might have suggested a fourteen century variant of "three strikes and you're out" were it not for the presence of other patents from 1360 forgiving that many deaths and more.[181] In the end, only forty pardons—less than ten percent of the total—were issued for crimes in which no one met a violent end.

Unfortunately, rarely does a calendar entry supply meaningful information about circumstances surrounding a death; the few exceptions come when that death is mentioned in connection with the commission of some other felony or felonies. For example, a pardon went to Richard Grenelef of Melbourn "for the death of Henry Braban, and a robbery from the said Henry at Kyngeswode."[182] Or consider one Robert Cok whose pardon marks him as a serious villain:

> Robert Cok of Colne, in the company of Alan de Bockeshull, for the death of William Gryme of Somersham, killed before Michaelmas last, and for having robbed him of 2 ½ marks, and come armed and besieged John de Brampton in his house at Somersham and shot twenty arrows at him to kill him and threatened to burn his houses and kill him, and for being a common malefactor and disturber of the peace.[183]

Since the deaths of Henry Braban and William Gryme both took place in the course of a robbery, both constitute clear cases of murder most foul. What is more, when Robert Cok attacked John de Brampton, he made no secret of his intentions to kill the man, making this an undeniable case of attempted murder.

Among the calendar entries from 1360-1361, there are a number that pardon an individual for both the death and "any consequent outlawry."[184]

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[180] *CPR*, E3.11: 400 (Westminster, Nov. 27).

[181] For example, see the patent granted to Richard de Yrwelham, serving under the duke of Lancaster, that pardoned the killing of four men. *CPR*, E3.11: 367 (Westminster, June 1). For his part, arch-villain, Robert Darcy, killed three and sheltered a criminal who had killed a fourth.

[182] *CPR*, E3.11: 387 (Westminster, June 26).

[183] *CPR*, E3.11:395-96 (Westminster, July 30).

[184] *CPR*, E3.11:375 (Westminster, May 28); 381 (Westminster, May 28), 397 (Westminster, June 4); 399 (Thorne, Oct. 4).

A few also forgive the recipient his abjuration of the realm, not all that surprising in a situation where men had escaped their past by serving outside of England.[185]

While a royal pardon did not necessarily set aside the right of the family to seek redress through the courts, it did surrender the crown's right to prosecute.[186] However, the fact that the crown had abandoned its own suit cannot help but have had a chilling effect on the further pursuit and prosecution of the case by others, including the victims.

As explained earlier in this article, just because an individual might feel the need for a royal pardon does not prove that the killing in which he had been involved was criminous. The act might have been committed in self-defense or by "misadventure." Not even subsequent outlawry necessarily implies a criminal killing; it merely indicates that the person responsible for the death had chosen to flee rather than face the law. Consequently, where there is no clear statement in the calendar entry concerning the circumstances surrounding a homicide, the only way to know for certain if the case was one of murder rather than death by accident or misadventure would be to find other relevant documentation; in particular, in the National Archives which serves as a repository for most materials concerning royal pardons.

While male victims made up the vast majority of those killed, nine pardons identify the victim as female.[187] Nor were these the only crimes committed against women. Five pardons, forgive the recipient for abduction, rape or both. Although most abductions, not too surprisingly, climaxed in rape, not all of them did. In this respect, Iseult, wife of John Arestre, seems to have gotten off relatively lightly. Her abductor, John de Lyford, "robbed her of 4 gold florins, a gold brooch, and a pair of paternos-

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[185] *CPR*, E3.11: 385 (Westminster, June 15); 386 (Westminster, June 16), 389 (Westminster, July 4), 397 (Westminster, June 15).

[186] While this issue could definitely use further investigation, the concensus seems to be that a royal pardon did not set aside the right of private individuals to seek redress. At several points in her book, *The Royal Pardon*, Lacey explains the process of "proving a pardon" which involved presentation in a public meeting where interested parties could register their objections, and if necessary, pursue the case on their own. For example, Lacey makes the following statement:

> Regardless of the circumstances under which a royal pardon was issued, it must be remembered that it only ever provided indemnity from prosecution at the king's suit. After an individual had received a letter of pardon he or she was obliged to have it "proved" in court, at which ime it was declared that any appellant wishing to bring a suit against the recipient of pardon should come forward. Lacey, *The Royal Pardon*, 20. (See also page 25.)

[187] *CPR*, E3.11:377 (Westminster, June 3); 378 (Westminster, June 4); 381 (Westminster, June 14); 387 (Westminster, June 4); 390 (Westminster, July 3); 397 (Westminster, June 4); 399 (Westminster, Aug. 15 and Aug. 20); 402 (Westminster, Jan. 14, 1361).

ters";[188] no mention is made of his having violated her person. Women are also mentioned as victims of housebreaking,[189] beating,[190] and, in the case of one Beatrice, daughter of John de Bauburgh, theft of a cow worth six shillings.[191]

While women appeared in the pardons only as victims, clergy showed up on both sides of the ledger, as both victims and victimizers. (In fact, since four captains of companies are identified as "clerk," ecclesiastical personages can be said to have appeared in all three capacities.)[192] Nine pardons were issued to men identified as clerk (*clerc*), chaplain, brother or parson, eight of which involved a killing. The sole exception was granted William de Blaby, a chaplain in the earl of Ulster's company,

> for having stolen a chalice, worth 21 s. 6 p. and a book, worth 26 s. 8 p., and for the rape of Maud, daughter of Robert son of Geoffrey de Alphamston; and for having carried away goods of the said Robert; and for being a common receiver of thieves.[193]

Fourteen churchmen are mentioned as victims; nine of these were killed.[194] In addition, the abbey of Leicester is said to have lost one of its non-clerical workers.[195] The five clerics who survived a crime include the abbot of Burton on Trent whose servant was killed; the vicar of Estdrayton, who fell victim to highway robbery, losing three horses; the vicar of Hethfeld, whose church was robbed of ornaments worth 10 £; the vicar of Berkele who lost an ox;[196] and a canon of Sulby Abbey who was robbed of "7 marks, 2 mazers, and other goods"[197] when thieves broke into his strongbox. In only one case were both malefactor and victim members of the Church: Roger de Mygynton, a chaplain serving in the company of the Black Prince, was pardoned for the death of Peter Botrel, the parson of his hometown church.[198]

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[188] *CPR*, E3.11: 389 (Westminster, July 1).

[189] *CPR*, E3.11: 388 (Westminster, June 28) .

[190] *CPR*, E3.11: 391 (Westminster, July 11).

[191] *CPR*, E3.11: 398 (Westminster, July 4).

[192] The four were Richard de Thoern (Thorn), avenor of the king's household; John de Saxon; William de Farlee, keeper of the wardrobe; and John Swynfe.

[193] *CPR*, E3.11: 390 (Westminster, July 4).

[194] *CPR*, E3.11: 379 (Westminster, June 12); 382 (Westminster, May 26), 383 (Westminster, June 4); 387 (Westminster, June 20), 392 (Westminster, July 12); 400 (Westminster, Nov. 27 and [Nov.] 29); 401 (Westminster, Nov. 29).

[195] *CPR*, E3.11: 395 (Westminster, July 22). The entry reads as follows: "William, son of John del Bank of Weryngton, in the same company, for the death of Thomas le Wryght of the Berneyard of the abbey of Leicester."

[196] *CPR*, E3.11: 383 (Westminster, June 4); 385 (Westminster, June 16); 392 (Westminster, July 10); 393-94 (Westminster, July 14).

[197] *CPR*, E3.11: 397 (Hadleigh Castle, Sept. 21).

[198] *CPR*, E3.11: 392 (Westminster, July 12).

Aside from killing, the crime most often forgiven involved some form of animal theft. Horses, cattle, sheep, swine, even swans were fair game. While the ordinary rustler made off with at most two or three animals, there were a few who showed greater enterprise. One of the army's most accomplished horse thieves seems to have been a man named Henry de Whalley who received his pardon

> for having consented to the larceny of a horse of John son of Cecily Fossar, and of a horse of Henry, son of Simon de Bradshawe … and for having stolen two horses of Robert Gynger at Walton … and a horse of Thomas de Birlegh … and a horse of Thomas, son of Henry [both] at Osbaldeston.[199]

By contrast, Nicholas Hallyng, who served the Black Prince, was less of a specialist, rustling any untended beast that crossed his path. The crown forgave him nine thefts that had netted forty-four sheep, ten oxen, and a horse.[200]

Interestingly, most animal thieves were not also killers, an exception being the swan stealer who received his pardon in respect to the death of John Lambard as well as his having taken twelve birds from the Thames and twelve from another river (no mean feat as anyone who has ever faced a swan will testify.)[201]

After naming the recipient, most entries in the cluster (374) identified the captain in whose company he had served. Only thirty-four of the 408 went to men without a captain being named[202]; what is more, of these thirty-four pardons, quite a few were issued on the word of other powerful military figures not listed as captains who testified that the recipient merited this manifestation of royal grace.

The list of eighty-seven men named as captains of companies represents a fair part of England's military leadership in 1360.[203] Eight of England's ranking war leaders secured pardons numbering in the double digits. *Primer inter pares*, once again, was Henry de Grosmont, duke of Lancaster. Of 408 pardons, the duke's company accounted for sixty-eight. He was followed by two of the king's legitimate issue. Edward's third son, John of

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[199] *CPR*, E3.11:396 (Westminster, July 21).

[200] *CPR*, E3.11:393-94 (Westminster, July 14).

[201] *CPR*, E3.11:380 (Westminster, June 1).

[202] Included in this total are two men said only to be of the king's company.

[203] To arrive at the number eighty-seven certain assumptions have been necessary: for example, that John de Saxon and John de Saxon, clerk, are the same person. Similarly, that John Botetourt, Butetourt, and Buttetourt with two "t"s are all one and the same. On the other side of the ledger, Thomas Cooun has been counted as a different fellow than Thomas Caon. A mistake in any of these assumptions will change the figures, but only slightly.

Gaunt, earl of Richmond and son-in-law to the duke of Lancaster (whose title he would soon inherit), received thirty-nine pardons. His eldest brother, Edward, Prince of Wales, had thirty-four. Rounding out the top eight were Thomas Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick and marshal of England, with fifteen; William de Bohun, Earl of Northampton, with thirteen; Ralph, Earl of Stafford with twelve; and both Thomas de Stafford, the king's sergeant at arms, and Guy de Brienne, the royal steward, with ten apiece. These eight noblemen account for a grand total of 201 pardons, just under half of all that were issued and over half of those issued to soldiers whose captains are named in the pardon.

In addition to the eight, 79 other leaders obtained a total of 171 pardons for the men in their service. On the lower end of the scale, 39 of these 79 received only a pardon apiece for those in their company, in all probability, a reflection on the size of that company.[204]

Conclusions

Charters of pardon issued by the crown in 1346-1347 and again in 1360 illustrate the important role such documents played in recruiting and rewarding an English army. An individual who had committed a crime or perhaps many crimes could seek to escape punishment by enlisting. If he survived (a not inconsiderable if, given death-rates within medieval armies), then he could look forward to being pardoned even the most heinous of his transgressions. Nor was this as good as it gets. In quite a few cases, the malefactor received his pardon up front, merely for promising to serve at some future date.

Benefiting from this traffic in royal pardons were the recipient, the captain in whose company he served, and the king in whose war he fought. English criminals received a significant incentive for "taking the king's shilling": they escaped punishment for their crimes. In particular, those guilty of murder won a reprieve from an offense habitually punished by hanging or some equally fatal alternative.[205] Captains of companies were

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[204] It might also be a reflection of their lesser clout with the monarchy. For a table listing the captains and the number pardons each received, see the Appendices.

[205] Death by hanging was a normal punishment for murder as well as a variety of other crimes in fourteenth century England, unless the particular town in which the offence had occurred had customs establishing an alternate means of capital punishment (burning, beheading, throwing off a cliff, burial alive, drowning, etc.) Lesser crimes might be punished by fine, imprisonment, whipping, mutilation or some combination of the above. Bellamy, 185-91.

handed a useful tool for attracting men of a violent nature into their service. Such men were their stock-in-trade. In a period before extensive military training, the crown got soldiers, many of whom were already inured to violence, to fill its armies. Alternatively, it received revenues in the form of payment by such men to avoid having to fulfill that military commitment leaving the crown free to purchase warriors of its own choosing.

As in any situation, there were also losers. These included victims and their families, and, if the complaints of parliament are to be credited, the peace of the realm. According to that body, royal pardons put violent offenders back into society, thus undercutting respect for the law and making ordinary folk afraid to render judgment against men whose release by the crown might put them at risk.

In more recent historical periods, at least in the organized armies of the west, it has become harder to escape punishment for civil crime through military service than was the case in the mid-fourteenth century. On the other hand, echoes of earlier practices, some faint, some not so faint, continue to reverberate over the centuries. It is by no means unheard of for contemporary judges to give a minor offender, particularly a young one, the choice between jail time and military service. Until relatively recently, some military organizations—legendary among them the French Foreign Legion—maintained a "don't ask, don't tell" policy in respect to a recruit's former life, thereby providing sanctuary for those fleeing a criminal past.[206]

In a few cases, a government's willingness to pardon even the most hardened of criminals exhibits a disturbing similarity to Edward III's policy. Consider mob boss, Lucky Luciano, whose "service" during World War II keeping American dockworkers in line, removed him from doing hard time and led to a much gentler retirement in southern Italy; or rocket expert, Werner von Braun, shielded by the United States from possible war crime charges, due to his military usefulness to the "free world."

The warlike fourteenth century monarch besieging the city of Calais would have had no difficulty recognizing such concessions in the name of military necessity.

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[206] For the classic representation of this policy in literature, see: P.C. Wren, *Beau Geste* (1924). A similar novel, not actually mentioning the Legion, was published a half century earlier. See: Ouida, *Under Two Flags* (1867).

APPENDICES

CONTENTS

A complication in citing the *Calendar of Patent Rolls* arises from the fact that the volumes are not numbered sequentially. Instead, within the reign of each monarch, volumes start again at number one and go forward to whatever number is needed in order to complete the patent rolls for that reign. In the case of Edward III, whose reign lasted for fifty years (1327-1377), there are 16 volumes. This paper is based largely on materials taken from two of those sixteen volumes: 7 (1345-1348) and 11 (1358-1361). In order to cite the *CPR* material, I have come up with the following system which will make it relatively simple for readers to find any document included in these appendices: *CPR*, Edward III, volume.page (year)

Appendix I: Documents

Document 1: Page 116 of the *CPR* from the first year of Edward III's reign on which the word "pardon" appears more frequently (11 times) than on any other page. *CPR*, Edward III, 1.116 (1327)

Document 2: General pardon displaying the normally-worded clause that forgave all crimes committed by the recipient. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.476 (1346)

Document 3: General pardon containing an alternative wording, more extensive than that found in Document 2. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.543 (1347)

Document 4: Military pardon that not only excused a specified offense, i.e. bringing false money into the realm, but also conferred a general pardon upon its recipient "for all misdeeds" and any resulting outlawry. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.545 (1347)

Document 5: Military pardon that excused a specified offense involving dereliction of duty on the part of the recipient, then conferred upon him a general pardon for all crimes. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.547 (1347)

Document 6: Military pardon issued to a royal captain who had violated England's laws governing the exportation of wool in order to provide money to sustain him and his men who were serving the king in Brabant. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.547 (1347)

Document 7: Page containing a pardon cluster made up of pardons solicited by the earl of Lancaster for men who had served him in Gascony. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.82 (1346)

Document 8: Opening page of the longest pardon cluster in the *CPR*. On the first day, September 4, 1346, the crown issued a general pardon to 1128 men. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.483 (1346)

Document 9: A subsequent page from within the longest cluster that contains the greatest number of pardons (75). *CPR*, Edward III, 7.489 (1346)

Document 10: Military pardon in which the same military service that earned the pardon also served as an alibi for the crime. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.557) (1347)

Document 11: Pardon (without the use of the word and not covered by "the like to the following") granted to Robert de Ferrariis and his fourteen companions for a death that occurred in the pursuance of their duty: they had beheaded one Adam de Peshale after he had resisted arrest *CPR*, Edward III, 7.36 (1345) and 7.123 (1346)

Document 12: Longest pardon employed in preparing this article listing the numerous crimes committed by a knight named Robert Darcy. *CPR*, Edward III, 11.463 (1360)

Document 13: Series of Military pardons and related patents illustrating the criminal record compiled by an English soldier,Thomas Crispin, over a period of several decades. See: *CPR*, Edward III, 4.494 (1340); *CPR*, Edward III, 4.557 (1340); *CPR*, Edward III, 6.275 (1344); *CPR*, Edward III, 6.297 (1344); *CPR*, Edward III, 7.243 (1347); *CPR*, Edward III, 7.295 (1347); *CPR*, Edward III, 10.322 (1355); *CPR*, Edward III, 11.450 (1360); *CPR*, Edward III, 12.7 (1361); *CPR*, Edward III, 15.176 (1371)

Document 14: Military Pardon granted Thomas de Veer, son and heir to the late earl of Oxford, forgiving an illicit property transfer conducted by the former earl during his lifetime. *CPR*, Edward III, 11.435 (1360)

Document 15: Mixed pardon cluster of military and non-military pardons. *CPR*, Edward III, 7.560-561 (1347)

Appendix II: Lists

List 1: Formulas used in military pardons (1346-1347)

List 2: English captains acting as intercessors in the principal pardon cluster of 1360

List 3: English captains acting as intercessors in the second major pardon cluster of 1360

Appendix III: Methodology

Appendix IV: Illustrations

Illustration 1: Recruiting Poster for English Soldiers (c. 1350) (created by L.J. Andrew Villalon and Martha Gail Moore)

Illustration 2: Pardon Machine of G.W. Bush (used with permission from the artist, Chad Crowe)

APPENDIX I : DOCUMENTS

Document 1: Edward III, 1.116 (1327)

Volume One of the CPR for the reign of Edward III contains patents dating to the opening year of the reign, 1327. In respect to the royal pardon, the contents of page 116 are particularly noteworthy for several reasons: (1) The word "pardon" appears eleven times on this page. No other page from the Calendar of Patent Rolls reproduces the word more frequently. (2) It is the second of nine consecutive pages of the CPR (115-123) exclusively devoted to pardons, an early example of what has been called in this article a "pardon cluster." (3) The 28 pardons reproduced within the page are both general and specific, military and non-military. It is worth noting that from the very start of Edward's reign, the crown was using the royal pardon as a tool for recruiting men to fight in its wars: a number of pardons bear the condition that the recipient fight in the king's Scottish wars.

1327

May 14.
Nottingham.
Richard son of Robert le Shepeherd of Selby for the death of Peter du Peek, killed before the coronation. By p.s.

May 16.
Nottingham.
Robert de Dygby, general pardon. By p.s.
Thomas son of Robert Kyngesman of Herlaston by Norhampton, general pardon for offences before the coronation.
John son of Roger le White of Norhampton, general pardon.

May 26.
York.
John son of Henry de Latheleye, general pardon.
Robert Bevyn for the death of Walter Russel of Kery, killed before the coronation.
Thomas le Harpour of Bernesleye for the death of John le Palefrayman, killed before the coronation, with the condition of serving against the Scots.
Nicholas de Boner for the death of John Pent, nailler, and Elias le Peyntour, killed after the coronation.
John son of Ranulph le Graunger of Great Melton, general pardon.
Peter de Ditton, general pardon, including arson.

William Baron for the death of William Russell.
Richard de Wilie of Turneye for the death of Walter de Helier of Turneye.
Walter de Waynflete, "bocher,' for the death of Alan le Bocher of Lynne.
William son of Thomas Godewyn of Bagworth for the death of Robert son of the said Thomas.
William Hamond of Skyteby for the death of Simon Toleray of Skyteby.

Killed before the coronation, with the condition of serving against the Scots [*This condition applied to the preceding five entries*].

William le Fitheler of Poklington for the death of Henry de Escrik of Cotyngwyth, killed before the coronation.

May 27.
York.
Robert del Dyche of Hatleborgh for the death of Walter le Mouner of Hatleborgh

Thomas son of Thomas del Bouke of Baynton for the death of John son of John Waryn of Baynton
William Gelleson of Great Edeston for the death of William de Appelton of Great Edeston
Killed before the coronation, with the condition [*Applied to the preceding two entries*]

William Drury of Gedeney in Holand, general pardon, with the condition.
William de Saye, general pardon, with the condition. By the same writ.
Richard Yong Kant of Skeftlyng for the death of Richard Capel, killed before the coronation, without the condition.

March 9.
Westminster.
John Jakeson of Racendale, general pardon, without the condition.

May 29.
York.
Thomas son of Roger Knocul of Whitechirche, for the death of William le Belward of Whitechirche, killed before the coronation, with general pardon, with the condition.
William son of Thomas Jery of Kirketon for the death of Mabel Jcry of Kirketon, killed before the coronation, with the condition.
William Henrismane de le Wythes, son of Alan le Porter of Miekelton in Tesdale, for the death of William Neucomen of Scorton, killed before the coronation.
Hugh de Osemtmdeston of Assheburn for the death of John Baret, killed before the coronation.
Thomas Sparwe of Gretham for the death of Peter son of John Maghtild of Overtynton, killed before the coronation; with general pardon.

Document 2: Edward III, 7.476 (1346)

An individual pardon issued at the beginning of the siege of Calais illustrates the typical clause forgiving all crimes committed by the recipient, the clause that defines a general pardon. Note that this pardon is conditional upon the recipient remaining in royal service as long as the king remained on the continent, a provision referred to in this article as "the Calais condition."

Sept. 4.
By Calais
Pardon, for good service in the war of France, to Richard de Overton of the king's suit for all homicides, felonies, robberies and trespasses whereof he is appealed, and of any consequent outlawries; on condition that he do not withdraw from his service so long as the king shall stay this time on this side the seas.

By K. and testimony of Thomas Ughtred.

Document 3: Edward III, 7.543 (1347)

Another instance of a general pardon, this one displays more extensive wording than the pardon in Document 2.

July 2.
By Calais.
Pardon at the request of Thomas, earl of Warwick, to Richard de Stonleye of the king's suit for all homicides, felonies, robberies and trespasses whatsoever, whether against the peace of the late king or of the present king, as well as for all oppressions and excesses in England against the king or his people and for any fines and ransoms received by him in the times aforesaid, whereof he is indicted or appealed or shall hereafter be indicted or appealed, and of any consequent outlawries. By K.

Document 4: Edward III, 7.545 (1347)

Military pardon that not only excuses a specific offense, i.e. *bringing false money into the realm, but also conveys a general pardon upon its recipient "for all misdeeds" and any resulting outlawry.*

Whereas John Pytyng is indicted of having brought false money, called ' Lucenburghers,' into England from parts on this side the seas and there used the same for good sterlings and traded therewith in divers parts of the realm, the king, on trustworthy evidence that he is not guilty of these misdeeds but that the indictment was set on foot by procurement and malice of his enemies, and for good service done by him in the war of France, has pardoned the said John the suit of his peace and whatever else pertains to him for all misdeeds committed by him before 4 September last, as well as any consequent outlawry. By K.

Document 5: Edward III, 7.547 (1347)

A military pardon that both excuses a specified crime and confers upon its recipient a general pardon. The recipient is first pardoned for his dereliction of duty, viz. having allowed the escape of a prisoner from his custody while he was serving as the sheriff of Norfolk's bailiff. He is then forgiven for "all felonies and trespasses" as well as "any consequent outlawries."

Aug. 7.
Calais.
Whereas John Lestraunge was lately indicted before William Scot and his fellows, justices of the King's Bench, of this, that, whereas Robert Denny of Ilsyngton, who with others had stolen 28 oxen and bullocks, was taken for that larceny at Little Walsyngham and delivered to him, being then bailiff of the sheriff of Norfolk, to be taken to the castle of Norwich, by his default and negligence the said Robert escaped from his custody; the king has pardoned him the suit of his peace by reason of the premises, and further, for the good service done by the said John on this side the seas, he has pardoned him the said suit for all felonies and trespasses done by him in England before 4 September last and any consequent outlawries. By K.

Document 6: Edward III, 7.547 (1347)

Military pardon issued to a royal captain who violated England's laws governing the exportation of wool in order to provide money to sustain his men who were serving the king in Brabant.

Aug. 8.
Calais.
Whereas Ralph de Middelnye in the king's first passage to Brabant took there certain wool, not customed or cocketed, to raise money for the sustenance of himself and his men then in the king's service, the king, for his future security, has pardoned him the forfeiture and whatever else pertains to the king in this behalf. By K

Document 7: Edward III, 7.82 (1346)

This page supplies another example of a pardon cluster, in this instance one solicited by the earl of Lancaster in May, 1346, for men who had served under him during his campaign in Gascony. It indicates the way in which royal scribes could group together a number of pardons containing the same conditions to save themselves the effort of repeatedly writing out the complete text of each identical entry. Note that the scribes have not grouped the pardons in this cluster into chronological order.

May 10.
Westminster.
Pardon, at the request of the said earl [Henry, earl of Lancaster] and for good service done in his company in Gascony, to Robert Hotoft of Botlesford of the king's suit for the death of Nicholas le Gaieller and William Couper, ' chapelayn,' of Botlesford, and for breaking from Leycestre gaol wherein he was detained for the death of the said William; and of any consequent outlawries. By K.
Pardon in like terms to Richard de la Grene of Everyngham, co. York, indicted of the death of Robert son of John de Shirburn of Herford Lyth. By K.
The like to the following :—

William le Qwhyte of Holton, for the death of Thomas le Holer of Chedestan.
John Kendale of Barleburgh, co. Derby, for the death of John de la Lane of Morehouse.
Thomas Prat of Botlesford, for the death of Peter le Taillour of Stokebardolf.
John son of Roger Lewyn of Suthburton by Beverle, for the death of Robert son of Thomas Passeron of Suthburton, the elder.
Thomas de Barnesleye, for the death of Adam son of Adam de Lidester of Silkstone.
William Wodeward of Newenton Soulny, for the death of Roger le Yonge of Blakwell. By K.
William son of John le Clerk of Shadwell, the younger, for the death of Robert le Taillour, the younger, son of Robert de Massam of Brandon. By K.

May 7.
Westminster.
William de Misterton, for the death of William de Corby. By p.s.

May 12.
Westminster.
Thomas son of Richard de Thorpe, for the death of John son of Elias de Thorpe. By K.

May 10.
Westminster.
Henry Fauconer of Ossyngton, for the death of Henry Graunger of Laxton Morehous.
By K. and by letter of the earl.

Document 8: Edward III, 7.483 (1346)

Opening of the longest pardon cluster in the CPR (Sept. 4, 1346-Jan. 24, 1347). This cluster begins near the bottom of page 483 by conferring upon the original recipient, Thomas le Huntere, a general pardon excusing him for any and all crimes he had committed and any resultant outlawry as long as he observes the "Calais condition" ("on condition that he do not withdraw from the king's service, so long as he [the king] shall stay this time on this side the seas, without his special licence.") This pardon is then extended by the phrase "the like to the following" to a list of 1127 other men. This particular cluster spills out over the next thirty-one pages of the CPR.

Sept. 4.
By Calais.
General pardon, for his good service in the war of France, to Thomas le Huntere, bailiff of Belsted; on condition that he do not withdraw from the king's service, so long as he shall stay this time on this side the seas, without his special licence. By K. and by testimony of Richard son of Simon.

The like to the following :—

William Norman of Mendisham. By K. and by testimony of Bartholomew de Burghassh.
[The rest of the list follows].

Document 9: Edward III, 7.489 (1346)

This page appears within the longest cluster, begun on September 4, 1346 (See Document 8). Although the page contains more pardons than any other in volume 7 of the CPR (a total of 75), the word pardon does not actually appear a single time. All of these men are covered by the same conditions set forth in the first pardon granted to Thomas le Huntere (see Document 8).

Membrane 13-cont.

1346.

Thomas Bolle of Aldeby, Roger del Peek, John son of Athelard de Welby of Fossedyk, Henry de Buxton, William de Coldenhale, Roger de la Hull, clerk, son of John de la Netherhull, John son of Robert son of Richard de Assheton subtus Lyme, Peter de Pykeston, John de Cokefeld son of Benet de Cokefeld 'chivaler,' Richard Aleyn of Refham the younger, John Sely of Wodehull, Nicholas son of Alexander de Shore of Rachedale, John de Burton, Richard son of John de Brynkhill, William de Redyng, William son of Roger Rasoursmyth of Otteleye in Wherfdale, Richard de Reppyngale of Hermethorpe, John atte Lane, Henry son of William del Asshes of Frodesham, Walter de Causton, Richard Pyndere of Thorpe by Belesby, Ralph son of Robert Est of Belesby, Thomas Arkell of Twenyng, Nicholas Waz, John de Aukeland, Geoffrey son of Lambert Curtcis of Fulskam, Randolf Iller of Thornton Watlous, John English of Wilton, William son of Simon de Suleswortch, Robert de Leighton, William Hunte of Groby, called 'Roulendesman,' Thomas Sclatere of Wyncelawe, John Arkell of Twenyng, John de Bosevill, son of James de Bosevill knight, William de Lenche, William de Rammeshull, Robert Hamelyn, William son of Thomas de Widerlee, Arthur, son of James de Bosevill knight, William. Cutt of Chastilton, John son of Thomas Arnald of Kenelworth, Alan de Hothe of Herbaldoune, Nicholas de Notewith, John atte Welle of the parish of Sullyng, Robert son of John de Shelton of Kirketon. By K. and by testimony of the prince of Wales.

Thomas de Bello Campo, earl of Warwick, John de Grey of Retherfelcl. By K.
Memorandum that these two charter are without the clause that he withdraw not from the King's service.

Membrane 12.

William le Bedel of Ichyngton, John le Clerc, son of William le Milleward of Bifel. By K. and by testimony of Thomas de Baddeby.

William son of Robert de Chirnely, John son of Robert de Chernely. By K. and by testimony of John de Strivelyn.

John de Neuport, John de Haukeston, John de Delves, Reginald Wyot, John de Chelle, John le Clerc of Bright Elmeston, Richard Hody, Humphrey Trumwyn, John de Ellale, John Salmon, James son of Nicholas Daudele, knight, Matthew de Bolston, Thomes de Welynton, Walter de la Garderobe, Walter le Mareschal. By K. and by testimony of the earl of Arundel.

John son of Henry Goldryng of Sudburgh, Thomas de Benehelde, Henry de Ilkeston. By K. and by testimony of Richard de Eccleshale.

John son of Reginald de Cleppham of the county of Bedeford, Robert Haymond of Herewich. By K. and by testimony of the earl of Northampton.

Gilbert do Kertmell of Richemond, clerk, Henry son of Thomas Wright of Scorburgh, Richard son of William de Scorburgh, John Hardladd of Esthaukeswell. By K. and by testimony of the earl of Warwick.

Document 10: Edward III, 7.557 (*1347*)

Pardon setting aside the indictment charging William de Inges with having over a three year period circulated "false money" in England. In this instance, the recipients military service served not only as an ameliorating factor, but as an alibi for the crime. According to a number of "men of credit," Inges had been fighting on the continent in each of these year, leading the crown to rule that he could not have committed the currency violation specified in the charge.

Whereas Thomas de Inges, son of William de Inges of Ludynglond the younger, and of Maud de Enges of Luthynglond, was lately indicted of having in the eighteenth, nineteeth and twentieth years of the king brought into and circulated in England from foreign parts false money to the sum of 1,000 £ of being counselling and consenting unto William Weer, Richard Souter and Robert de Keyleston, common passers and merchants of such money, and of receiving Thomas de Inges of Little Yarmouth at Norwich in the fairs of the Magdalen, in the said twentieth year, trading with the said money there; inasmuch as it has been testified before the king by men of credit that in the two first named years he was in Brittany and in the last year he was and still is in the king's army on this side the seas in his service continually, the king has pardoned to the said Thomas his suit against him in the premises. By K.

Document 11: Edward III, 7.36 and 7.123 (*1345-1346*)

In December, 1345, the crown assigned Robert de Ferrariis to arrest Adam de Peshale, a flagrant wrongdoer, and bring him into the king's presence dead or alive. Apparently, it took Ferrariis and the fourteen-man posse he had gathered five months to track down and capture their quarry. Cornered by his pursuers, Adam resisted arrest and was summarily beheaded. Since the death occurred in the performance of their duty, the crown made a commitment not to prosecute Ferrariis and his men for homicide.

Although this patent does not actually use the word pardon and is not part of a pardon cluster, that is certainly what it is.

Dec. 26 [1345]
Woodstock.
Commission to Robert de Ferrariis to arrest Adam de Peshale, lately attached by command of the king for homicides and divers other felonies, who has broken that attachment and escaped; and to depute in his place such person or persons as he shall think fit for this to execute the premises. By K. on the information of W. de Shareshull.

May 27 [1346]
Portchester.
Whereas the king lately appointed Robert de Ferariis to arrest Adam de Peshale, a common malefactor, lately arrested by his special command, who had broken the arrest and become a fugitive from justice, and bring him to the king alive or dead, also to depute others to execute the premises ; and whereas John de Ipstanes, William Tromwyne, Thomas de Kerswell, John de Breydeshale, John de Chestreshyre, John de Wytegrave, John de Norton, Thomas Chamberlein, Ralph de Ipstanes, William de Soinerford, Alexander de Whytington, William de Whytington, Adam Galpyn and Thomas Rousleigh, whom he had deputed pursuant to his commission to attach Adam, following him as a felon beheaded him at Kaynton, co. Salop, as lawful was for them to do because he offered resistance and would not surrender: the king for their indemnity grants that neither they or any others who were present at the death of the said Adam shall be impeached for the same death at his suit. By p.s.

Document 12: Edward III, 11.463 (1360)

The longest pardon used in preparing this article was granted in September, 1360, to Robert Darcy, a knight who had served Henry de Grosmont, the duke of Lancaster, forgiving a lengthy and highly-impressive career in crime that included theft, extortion, and sheltering fugitives from royal justice, as well as multiple murders. Note that in recording a pardon conferred upon his companion in crime, Robert de Fissheburn (see Edward III, 11.467, 1360), the scribes compiling the patent rolls avoided having to write it out in its entirety by simply referring back to Darcy's identically worded patent.

Sept. 26.
Westminster.
Pardon, for good service done in the war of France in the company of Henry, duke of Lancaster, to Robert Darcy, knight, indicted of this that he took 10 marks from Alan de Sculpeholm, tenant of the earl of Richmond, at Louth (Ludam) by extortion, that he and Ellen Fissh of Somercotes carried away 141/2 quarters of wheat, worth 10 £. at Somercotes from John son of Walter son of William son of Thomas de Somercotes and Agnes daughter of William son of Thomas de Somercotes ten-

ants of the said earl, that at Somercotes he took from the same John and Agnes 10 marks by extortion, that he by the name of Robert de Arcy, with others, wounded one Gilbert Doughty of Louth at Louth so that he by that beating lay sick for two months and then died, that he, by the name of Robert son of John Darcy, knight, with Robert de Fissheburn and others killed Robert Felter of Louth at Louth, that he and the said Robert and others for a whole year after the felony besieged the town of Louth and made ambushes against the men and merchants thereof so that none dare go about his business unless he had made fine with them, and when any made fine they took him into their protection and delivered to him a sign which he could shew to their men and relations, and that all of the town whom they met if they shewed not the sign quickly they beat, to wit Laurence Sperdore and many others and put him at a fine of 20s., and took them from him, and so with many others, assuming the royal power, that he with the said Robert de Fissheburn, killed William de Apol of Saltfleby at Manby Holm, that he and the said Robert with others unknown besieged William Haulay in his manor at Utterby for three days, laying to his charge that he indicted the said Robert Darcy of extortions and trespasses, so that he made ransom with him by 60s. to save his life, that he, by the name of Robert brother of John Darcy, knight, maintained William de Camelthorp, Iwan Darcy, son of John Darcy del Park and John Roos of Wynterton who killed John de Stretton of Louth, late constable of Louth, at Louth, knowing of the felony, that he, by the name of Robert Darcy, knight, assaulted William de Skipwith, late justice appointed to enquire of felonies and trespasses in the parts of Lyndesey, co, Lincoln when in session at Louth, drew his sword to kill him, took him by the throat and threatened his life, so that he could not do his office of justice, that he, by the name of Robert Darcy, 'chivaler,' threatened William de Nesse, sometime prior of Alvyngham and his men, so that the men dared not labour about the prior's business, and the prior could not have his good will otherwise than by admitting a woman on his nomination and making her a nun in the house at the charge of the house, and further gave a horse worth 100s. to the said Robert, that he, by the name of Robert de Arcy, knight, and Robert de Fissheburn made alliance that whatever he had the latter would maintain it, right or wrong, that he took from Alan de Skopholm 10 marks by extortion, that from the second to the twenty-ninth year of the reign he took from the said Alan and other men of Lyndeseye 200 £. by extortion, that he took from Robert de Elkyngton and John Malet 10 marks by extortion at Carleton, that he and Robert de Fissheburn took 10 marks by extortion and threats from Robert Mouter of Somercotes and William son of Ralph Mouter, that he and Robert de Fissheburn with others unknown at Somercotes entered by force the house of Walter son of William and of William, his brother, and carried away 14 quarters, 3 bushels, of wheat worth 8s. the quarter, and other goods, that he laid to the charge of William Haulay that he indicted him before Nicholas de Cantilupo and his fellows, justices, and threatened him so that he made fine with the said Robert by a falcon gentle which he bought for 60s. and gave him, and that, claiming right in the advowson of the church of Welton by Louth when he had none, he would have presented Robert de Fissheburn to it, which Robert entered the church and intruded himself into it until the prior of Ormesby the true patron, made fine with Robert de Fissheburn of a rent of 40s. to

have for his life, all which felonies &c. were perpetrated before Michaelmas last—of the king's suit for the same and of any consequent outlawries. By p.s.

September 26
Westminster.
Pardon to Robert de Fissheburn (as to Robert Darcy above). By p.s.

Document 13: Royal Patents relevant to Thomas Crispin (1340-1371)

The following patents dating over a thirty year period (1340-1371) all involve a man named Thomas Crispin [Cryspyn]. Information provided within these documents suggests that they chronicle the nefarious career of one individual. If so, then the fact that Crispin received not one, but a number of pardons for his military service tends to support a charge raised by contemporary parliaments, viz. that when the crown conferred multiple pardons upon such men, they were able to go on committing their crimes with relative impunity.

CPR, Edward III, 4.494 (1340)

April 25.
Westminster.
Commission of oyer and terminer to Ralph de Bulmere, William de Tweng, Richard de Aldeburgh, Robert de Scardeburgh and Robert Parnyng, on information that George Salvayn, knight, Alan atto Howe, Robert son of Robert Thoche, Robert Thoche ' taillour,' Robert son of Hugh Lourence, John 'Georgeschaumberleyn Salvayn,' Robert Palfrayman, Robert de Corome 'Georgesservant Salvayn,' Geoffrey de Haxby, William de Leven 'souter,' Richard Smyth, William his son, *Thomas Crispyn*, Richard Randolf, John Randolf, William Randolf, John 'Andreuservant de Alington' and others broke the close of the manor of Killome. co. York, which is in the king's hands by the death of William de Melton, archbishop of York, who held it in chief, hunted in the rabbit warren there, carried away rabbits and the clappers of the warren, and burned a house therein. By K. & C.

CPR, Edward III, 4.557 (1340)

May 28.
Westminster.
Commission of oyer and terminer to Richard de Wylughby, Richard de Aldeburgh, Robert de Scardeburgh, Robert Parnyng and John de Bolyngbrok, on information that George Salvayn, knight, Alan ate Howe, Robert son of Robert Tothe, Robert son of Hugh Lourence, John 'Georgeschaumberleyn Salvayn,' Robert Palfrayman, Robert de Corome 'Georgesservant Salvayn,' Geoffrey de Hayby, William de Leven, 'souter,' Richard Smyth, William, his son, *Thomas Crispyn*, Richard Randolf, John Randolf, William Randolf, John 'Andreusservant de Alyngton,' Geoffrey Randolf of Pokethorpe, Richard de Resteby, Richard Colous, Richard Bakester, Cicely his wife, William their son, Simon the clerk of Killum, John sou of Stephen, Ralph ' Georgesservant Salvayn,' Geoffrey de Langetoft 'souter,' John de Malton 'chuller,'

Andrew de Cundale, William de Preston of Killum, Alexander Frabright, Alexander Royns, ' chapeleyn,' and others have broken the close of the manor of Killum, co, York, now in the king's hands by the death of William de Melton, archbishop of York, who held it of him in chief, hunted in the rabbit warren of the manor, carried away rabbits and burned the clappers of the warren and a house in it. By K. & C.

CPR, Edward III, 6.275 (1344)

Feb. 3.
Westminster.
Writ of aid to the sheriff of Lincoln and others in favour of *Thomas Crispyn* and William Darcy, appointed by the king to arrest and bring before him and the council to abide their order John de Kyme of Waynflete, merchant of that county, under the following circumstances. Of late, on complaint by John Bole, merchant of Bruges in Flanders that the said John de Kyme when complainant came from Flanders to the king on a mission and was there staying with him prosecuting his mission, going to Bruges, obtained from complainant's wife and his servants goods and merchandise to the value of 300 £. on credit and bound himself to pay for the same on the feast of St. Nicholas last at Boston, but although in reliance on that promise complainant returned before that date to England and made stay on that account for a long time, John de Kyme did not satisfy any part of the debt but hiding and running to and fro in that county of Lincoln did his best to defraud him, to the king's disgrace and the great peril of merchants of the realm conversant in Flanders, the king charged the sheriff to take security from the said John de Kyme to be before him in the chancery on the morrow of the Epiphany to answer therein and the sheriff returned that he had gone to his house for that purpose but the said John refused to find such security. Thereupon the king charged the sheriff to attach his body and have him before him in the chancery on the quinzaine of Hilary but the sheriff returned that he is not to be found in his bailiwick. By K.

CPR, Edward III, 6.297 (1344)

June 10.
Westminster.
Commission of oyer and terminer to William Basset, John do Breus, John Darcy del Park and William de Skypwyth, on complaint by Simon de Founteney, mayor of Grymesby, that, whereas lie would have made execution of a judgment lately rendered before him and the bailiffs of the town on a plea before them in the king's court of Grymesby, without the the king's writ according to the custom of the town, between Peter de Burton and Geoffrey Humbercolt of Bevorley of a debt of 10 £. which Peter required of Geoffrey, *Thomas Cryspyn of Elsham,* John Crispyn, Gilbert Crispyn, Walter son of Roger de Aysterby, Ralph Olyve de John 'Wauterservant of Aysterby,' and others, at Grymesby, co. Lincoln, took by force from him some chattels of the said Geoffrey which he had taken for the debt and damages adjudged to Peter in that behalf and assaulted him in the execution of his office. By the chancellor, because sealed at another time by fine of 10s.

CPR, Edward III, 7. 243 (1347)

Jan. 28
Eltham
Pardon, at the request of Henry, earl of Lancaster, and for good service done in Gascony in his company, to William son of Nicholas ate Kirk of Claipoul of the king's suit for the death of Richard son of William de Hogesworthe of Dodyngton, killed before Whitsunday in the king's nineteenth year, whereof he is appealed, and of any consequent outlawry. By K. and testimony of the earl.

Jan. 28
Eltham
Pardon (as above) to *Thomas Cryspyn of Grymesby* with respect to all homicides, felonies, robberies or trespasses, committed before 17 August last. By testimony of the earl.

CPR, Edward III, 7.295 (1347)

Oct. 28.
Westminster.
Pardon, in consideration of good service done in Gascony in the company of Henry earl of Lancaster, to *Thomas Cryspyn* of the king's suit for all felonies, homicides, robberies, escapes from prison, arsons and other trespasses against the peace perpetrated by him before the last passage of the earl to those parts, and of any consequent outlawries.
By testimony of the earl.

CPR, Edward III, 10.322 (1355)

Dec. 8.
Westminster.
Pardon, at the request of Henry, duke of Lancaster, and for good service done by *Thomas Crispyn* of Elsham in his company in Gascony, of the king's suit for homicides, felonies, robberies and firings, also for coming to the house of Nicholas Hustwhait of Burton Stather, which he would have burned if the said Nicholas had not made fine with him, and all other trespasses done by him in England before 17 August, in the twenty-first year; and of any consequent outlawries. Renewed because sealed at another time by K. on the information of the duke.

CPR, Edward III, 11.450 (1360)

July 10.
Westminster.
Pardon, for good service done in the war of France in the company of the king's son John, earl of Richmond to *Thomas Cryspyn* of the king's suit against him for having assaulted William de Bolyngton, the king's bailiff of Grymesby chased him to his house there, besieged him longtime in the church there to which he fled for

fear of death, until he made a fine with him of 40 s.which he paid to him, to the retarding of the execution of the bailiff's office, for having done so with Adam Spenser of the same town and having beaten William Sywan at Grymesby and Walter Whyte, for having been a common disturber of the peace taking grievous extortions, for having with about eighty others, armed, assailed the house of Nicholas Husthwayt at Burton Stather and assaulted him, shot arrows at him and set fire to burn him in his house, whereby for fear of death he surrendered and made fine with him, and for having with others beaten Roger de Croxton, under-sheriff in the county of Lincoln, and the king's minister at Melton, and left him for dead. Pardon also to him under the name of Thomas brother of John Cryspyn of Elsham of the king's suit for having with the said John assaulted Roger son of William de Croxton at Melton; and to him under the name of Thomas Crispyn of Grymesby of the king's suit for his having taken white herrings to the value of 14s. 4d. in a ship of merchant strangers at Northecotes and stolen two barrels of white herrings called 'skoneheryng,' of William de Neuland of Elsham, worth 6 marks, at Humberstayn by Tetenay, and there by force compelled William de Wyum, carter of the said William de Neuland, to put the herrings in the latter's cart and bring them to Clee, assaulted the said William de Wyum there, and burgled the house of Emma late the wife of Philip de Wytheryn at Braddele by Grymesby and stolen a silver cup, worth 28 s. pledged with her, for having with Maud his wife broken the king's prison of Grymesby in which William de Thornton House of Grymesby and John his brother, John del Kychyn and John Baldewyn indicted before Thomas de Cave, late mayor, and Peter de Buiton and Hugh atte See, bailiffs of Grymesby of excessive lucre taken for victuals sold by them, and on that account taken by the bailiffs were imprisoned maintained the prisoners, and threatened the bailiffs in the king's full court of Grymesby and prevented them from dealing with them according to law,whereby the prisoners went away unpunished, and brought forth John Skot of Swalowe, ' couper,' out of the church of St. James, Grymesby, where he was in sanctuary for a burglar of the house of Simon de Fountenay of Grymesby at Grymesby which felony he was confessing before Henry Canoun of Grymesby, coroner of Grymesby in the coroner's presence, and made safe conduct for him out of the liberty of Grymesby without his making abjuration of the realm, and for having with John, his brother, stolen a horse of Thomas atte Wode of Grymesby at Grymesby and so threatened Thomas [ate Wode] that he dared not go out of his house or make suit for recovery of his horse by law, and for having broken the close of Richard de Tyvelby of Grymesby at Grymesby and stolen more than 60 salt fish called ' lubbes ' and ' lenges' of Robert de Appelby, king's serjeant at arms, and the said Richard, worth 4 marks, and for having with others robbed John Pygot of a horse and a sow (mala), and broken out of the king's Marshalsea prison when imprisoned there, all which felonies, larcenies and trespasses were perpetrated before Michaelmas last; and of any consequent outlawries. By p.s.

CPR, Edward III, 12.7 (1361)

April 20.
Westminster.
Pardon, for good service in the war of France in the company of, the king's son John, earl of Richmond to, *Thomas Crispyn* of the king's suit against him for having assaulted William de Bolyngton, the king's bailiff of Grymesby, chased him to his house and besieged him for a great time in the church there to which he fled for fear of death, until he paid him a fine of 40s.; for having done the like to Adam Spenser of the same town and beaten William Sywan at Grymesby and beaten and wounded Walter White; for being a common disturber of the peace taking grievous fines; for having with about eighty others, armed, assaulted Nicholas de Hustwayt at Burton Stather, shot arrows at him and put fire to burn him in his house, whereby for fear of death he surrendered and made fine; and for having with others beaten Roger de Croxton, undersheriff in the county of Lincoln, and the king's minister at Melton, and left him for dead. Pardon to him also, under the name of brother of John Crispyn of Elsham, of the king's suit against him for having with the said John assaulted Roger son of William de Croxton at Melton; also for having under the name of Thomas Crispyn of Grymesby taken white herrings to the value of 14s.4d. in a ship of merchant strangers at Northecotes and stolen two barrels of white herrings called ' skoneheryng ' of William de Neweland of Elsham, worth 6 marks, at Humberstayn by Tetenay, and there forced William de Wyum, the said William de Nuland's carter, to load the herrings in his master's cart and bring them to Glee and there assaulted the said carter; for having burgled (deburgavit) house of Emma late the wife of Philip Wytheryn at Braddele by Grymesby and stolen a silver cup worth 28s. pledged with her; for having, with Maud his wife, broken the king's prison of Grymesby wherein William de Thornton House of Grymesby, John, his brother, John del Kychin and John Baldewyn, indicted before Thomas de Cave, late mayor of Grymesby, and Peter de Burton and Hugh atte See, bailiffs of that town, of excessive lucre taken for victuals sold by them, and taken on that account by the bailiffs, were imprisoned, maintained the said prisoners, threatened the bailiffs in the full court of the king at Grymesby and prevented them from doing execution on the prisoners according to law, and taken John Skot of Swalowe, ' couper,' out of the church of St. James, Grymesby, where he was in sanctuary for burglary of the house of Simon de Fountenay of Grymesby when he was confessing the felony before Henry Canoun of Grymesby, coroner of Grymesby in the presence of the said coroner and let him have safe conduct without the liberty of Grymesby without making abjuration; for having with John, his brother. stolen a horse of Thomas atte Wode of Grymesby and threatened the said Thomas so that he dared not leave his house nor make suit for recovery of his horse according to law, and broken the close of Richard de Tevelby of Grymesby at Grymesby and stolen 60 salt fish and several fish called ' lubbes ' and ' lenges' belonging to Robert de Appelby, king's serjeant at arms, and the said Richard, worth 4 marks; and for having with others robbed John Pygot of a horse and a mail [*mala*] and broken the Marshalsea prison while imprisoned therein, which felonies, larcenies and trespasses were perpetrated before Michaelmas in the thirty-third year, and of any consequent outlawries. Renewed because sealed at another time by p.s.

CPR, Edward III, 15.176 (1371)

July 24.
Westminster.
Commission to John Dymmok and Walter de Kelby, escheator in the county of Lincoln, to make inquisition in the said county, in the presence of *Thomas Cryspyn*, steward and guardian of the fees of the count of Aumale, touching an information that the abbot of Thornton has acquired divers lands, rents and services in mortmain without the king's licence. By C.

Document 14: Edward III, 11.435 (1360)

In most cases, a royal pardon excused the actions of the person to whom it was granted. This military pardon conceded to Thomas de Veer is unusual in that it pardons not the recipient, but his father, the late earl of Oxford, for an illegal property transfer.

June 28.
Westminster.
Pardon, for good service done by Thomas son and heir of John de Veer, late earl of Oxford, in the king's last voyage in France, to him for the trespass of his father in demising for his life to Baldwin Buttetourt the manor of Douneham, co. Essex, held in chief, without the king's licence. The said manor reverted to the earl in his lifetime by the death of Baldwin, was taken into the king's hands after the earl's death with his other lands and was afterwards restored to the said Thomas as heir when the king had taken his homage, but Thomas fears that he may be disturbed hereafter on account of the trespass. By K.

Document 15: Edward III, 7.560-561 (1347)

The document is a pardon cluster mixing military and non-military pardons. According to the criteria for differentiating pardon types, of the twenty-two in this cluster, seventeen are non-military, only five are military. While several others might have been issued for military service, that fact is not specified by the CPR and therefore, they have not been counted as military pardons. For another example of the mixing of military and non-military pardons within the same cluster, see Document 1.

Sept. 28.
Calais
Pardon, at the request of Adam de Asshehurst, to Roger son of Adam de Hilton, his kinsman, of the king's suit for the death of Henry son of Hugh de Tildesley, Richard son of Juliana, sometime huntsman of Gilbert de Suthworth, and Joan late the wife of William le Neyler of Standysch, aa well as for breaking from the king's prison, wherein he was detained on that account, and of any consequent outlawries.

The like to the following :—

Sept. 19.
Calais.
Robert son of Adam de Hilton, for the death, etc. as above.
Avice late the wife of Adam de Hilton, for the death of Henry son of Hugh de Tyldesleye. By K.

Sept. 28.
Calais.
Adam de Donfrys, for the death of William Lousone of Gillesland; at the request of Agnes de Lucy. By K.

Oct. 2,
Calais.
John son of Simon de Blakey and John son of Nicholas atte Bothe, for the death of James de Merkelesden, son of Mabel (*Mibille*) de Touneby; at the request of Adam de Asshehurst, 'chivaler.' By K.

Oct. 1.
Calais.
John de Walton, for the death of Thomas Morgan.

Oct. 3.
Calais.
Robert son of Hugh de Tyldeslee, for the death of Henry son of Hugh de Tyldeslee. By K.

Oct. 1.
Calais.
Roger Fissher, for the death of Ralph Bishop of Bredon, co. Leicester. By K. on the information of J. de Bello Campo.

Oct. 6.
Calais.
Ralph Burre, for the death of Henry son of Ingelram Millesone of Eppeworth; at the request of John Darcy. By K.

Oct. 4.
Calais.
William Patyn of Kyveleye, for the death of Peter le Smyth son of Joan la Hayward of Kyveleye; for good service in the war of France and on condition that he do not withdraw, etc. By K.

Sept. 6.
Calais.
Richard Aloom of Undele, for the death of Nicholas Clerivaux. By [K.] on the information of John Grey of Ruifyn.

Oct. 4.
Calais.
Robert de Farnham of Querndon, for breaking from the Marshalsea prison, where he was detained for the death of Thomas le Chamberlein of the county of Essex; at the request of the prince of Wales. By K.

Oct. 7.
Calais.
John atte Wai of Aldenton, for the death of John Parys of Lymene; for good service done in the war with France. By K.

Oct. 6.
Calais.
John de Leyk of Walton of the county of Leycestre, for the death of John le Brun of Burton ; as above. By K.

Oct. 5.
Calais.
John son of Henry de Langeton of Wotton, for the death of Simon Ratan of Wotton. By K.

Oct. 8.
Calais.
Hugh Kene, for the death of Hugh Sampson ; for good service in Brittany. By K.

Robert Lowys of Wykes the elder, for the death of William Mayn of Bromel; as above. By K.

Oct. 4.
Calais.
James le Forester for the death of Richard Queynterel. By K.

Oct. 9.
Calais.
William son of Henry Freman of Mackeworth, for the death of John Selkyncopp. By K.

Oct. 8.
Calais.
John Palmer of Craule, for the death of Joan Roberti le Daye. By K.

Oct. 10.
Calais.
William de Gislyngham, son of William de Gislingham, for the death of William le Lung; at the request of Hugh le Despenser. By K.

Sept. 28.
Calais.
John de la Beche, for the death of John de Caythorpe; at the request of John de Coupland, king's yeoman. By K.

APPENDIX II: LISTS

List 1: Formulas used to convey pardons granted for military service

When studying military pardons reproduced in the CPR, it becomes clear almost at once that there was no single formula used by the crown to explain its reason for making such a grant. Instead, a number of different formulas were employed, some of which were very general in nature while others gave a more specific idea of just what service the recipient had rendered or was expected to render in the future. Some of the formulas varied by only a word or two; others displayed considerable difference. Although not definitive, the following list contains a great many of those that were employed by the crown in the period 1346-1347. All of them come from volume 7 of the CPR for the reign of Edward III (abbreviated E3.7, followed by the page number). They are arranged by the date on which they were issued.

1346

Jan. 2: ... on account of the wages of him and men-at-arms and archers going with the king on his service in his progress on the sea in his fifteenth year (E3.7.228)

Jan. 20: ... on condition of his seving one year in Gascony (E3.7.225)

Febr. 22: ... in consideration of his good service in parts beyond the seas while staying in the company of John Darcy "le fitz" (E3.7.53)

March 10: ... in consideration of his good service in Gascony in the company of Henry, earl of Lancaster (E3.7.57)

April 20: ... in consideration of good service done in the company of the earl in Gascony (E3.7.71)

May 7: ... on condition that he should go to Gascony or elsewhere on his [the king's] service for one year (E3.7.77)

May 10: ... for good service done in Gascony in the earl's company (E3.7.80)

May 20: ... in consideration of good service done in the wars of France, Brittany and on the sea and elsewhere (E3.7.94)

May 30: ... on condition that he go on the king's service as he shall be assigned and stay there for one year (E3.7.96)

June 6: ... because he will go with the said Thomas beyond the seas on the king's service (E3.7.95)

June 20: … he being at the time of his outlawry on the king's service in Brittany (E3.7.126)

June 21: … on condition that he should go on his [the king's] service for one year at his own charge (E3.7.131)

July 12: … to … who is going on the king's service to Flanders in the company of John de Monte Gomery (E3.7.147)

July 13: … for good service to the king done in Gascony in the earl's company (E3.7.144)

July 15: … for good service done to the king and especially in his passage to Normandy (E3.7.483)

July 16: … for good service done in Gascony in his [the earl of Lancaster's] company (E3.7.150)

July 16: … in consideration of his good service in Brittany in the company of William de Bohun, earl of Northhampton (E3.7.154)

July 28: … for service to the king in the present passage (E3.7.160)

July 28: … for his service in the king's last passage (E3.7.164)

July 31: … in consideration of his good service in the French war (E3.7.168)

July 30: … for good service in the present war (E3.7.158)

July 30: … for good service in the time when he was lieutenant of the king's admiral from the mouth of the Thames westward (E3.7.162)

Sept. 16: … in consideration of his good service on the seas (E3.7.190)

Sept. 20: … for good service done in the earl's company in Gascony (E3.7.190)

Nov. 11: … in consideraton of good service to the king done by him and his brother, Robert, beyond the seas (E3.7.212)

Nov. 20: … for good service in Brittany (E3.7.481)

Dec. 12: … for good service done by him beyond the seas (E3.7.217)

Dec. 14: … for good service in the war of Scotland (E3.7.514)

1347

Jan. 11: … for good service done in his [the earl of Lancaster's] company in Gascony (E3.7.217)

Jan. 20: … for good service in the war of Scotland and specially in the battle of Durham (E3.7.515)

Febr. 26: … in recompense of the great charges which the same Robert will have to make in his [the king's] war in staying continually by his side (E3.7.259)

March 3: ... in consideration of his good service and especially on this side the seas (E3.7.532)

April 6: ... in consideration of good service done on this side the sea (E3.7.531)

May 1: ... because he took knighthood in the king's company at the battle of Cressy (E3.7.291)

May 8: ... and for good service on this side the seas (E3.7.534)

May 12: ... on condition that he should go on his [the king's] service and find security for his good conduct (E3.7.289)

July 11: ... in consideration of his good service in the siege of Calais (E3.7.544)

July 20: ... for service in the war of Gascony in the company of Henry, earl of Lancaster, and in the siege of Calais (E3.7.524)

Aug. 25: ... on condition that he do not withdraw from the king's service so long as the latter be on this side the seas (E3.7.548)

Aug. 28: ... on condition that he do not withdraw from the king's service without license so long as the king remain on this side the seas (E3.7.552)

Sept. 20: ... in consideration of his good service in Brittany and at the siege of Calais (E3.7.559)

Oct. 18: ... in consideration of his good service in France (E3.7.296)

Oct. 20: ... for his good service beyond the seas in staying continually with the king from the time he put in at Hogges until 18 September last (E3.7.416)

Oct. 24: ... in consideration of his good service done in the king's company beyond the seas (E3.7.296)

Nov. 8: ... in consideration of good service in France (E3.7.425)

Nov. 8: ... for his good service in Gascony in the company of Henry, earl of Lancaster (E3.7.428)

Nov. 10: ... in consideration of his good service in the war of France (E3.7.426)

Nov. 21: ... for good service to the king in the war in France (E6.7.431)

List 2: Edward III, 11:375-402 (1360)

This list names all captains in the English army whose men received the 408 pardons that are grouped together into the major cluster of 1360-1361. The captains are listed by the number of pardons each one obtained for the men in his service, starting with those who received the most. The number of pardons issued to each captain is in p;arentheses following the name. Where more than one leader obtained the same number of pardons, those leaders appear in the same order they are in the pardon cluster. (E.g. Both Thomas de Stafford and Guy de Brienne obtained 10 pardons. Since Stafford's name appears first among the entries in the CPR, he is listed here before Brienne.)

10 or more Pardons (Total = 201)

Henry de Grosmont, Duke of Lancaster (68)
John of Gaunt, Earl of Richmond (the king's son) (39)
Edward Plantagenet, Prince of Wales and Count of Chester (34)
Thomas de Bello Campo, Earl of Warwick, marshal of England (15)
William de Bohun, Earl of Northampton (13)
Ralph, Earl of Stafford (12)
Thomas de Stafford, King's Serjeant at Arms (10)
Guy de Brienne (Bryenne), steward of the king's household (10)

5-9 Pardons (Total = 46)

William Latymer (7)
John of Wynnewyk (Wynewyk), Keeper of the Privy Seal (6)
Roger de Mortuo Mari, Earl of March (6)
Bartholomew de Burgherssh (6)
Richard de Thoern (Thorn), clerk, Avenor of the king's household (6)
Thomas Ughtred (5)
Robert de Ufford, Earl of Suffolk (5)
Edmund de Langele (the king's son) (5)

2-5 Pardons (Total = 86)

Roger Jolyf (Jolif) (4)
Reynold de Cobham (4)
Lionel, earl of Ulster (the king's son) (4)
William de Wyndesore (4)
William de Farlee, clerk, keeper of the wardrobe (4)
Richard de Ask (3)
Henry de Percy (3)
John Brocaz (Brocas) (3)
Lord of Roos (3)
John de Saxon (John de Saxon, clerk) (3)
John de Cobham, son of the countess Marshal (3)
William de Monte Acuto, earl of Salisbury (3)
David, earl of Atholl (3)
John Chaundos (3)
John Botetourt (Butetourt, Buttetourt of Weoleye) (3)
Bernard Brocaz (3)
James Daudele (3)
Lord John de Grey of Codenore (2)
John Herlyng, usher of the king's chamber (2)
Guy de Warrewyk (2)
John de Catesdenne (Catesdene) (2)
Miles de Stapelton (2)
John de Wyngefeld (2)

Roger de Hampton (2)
John de Ellerton, king's serjeant at arms (2)
John Crok (2)
John de Foxle (2)
Edmund Darondell (Darondel) (2)
John de Beauchamp "le cosyn" (2)
Emery de Sancto Amando (2)
Anian de Ines, captain of Melleroule (2)
John de Swynfe, clerk (2)

1 Pardon (Total = 39)

Roger de Clifford (1)
Master Robert de Manfeld (1)
William de Caryngton (1)
Roger de Beauchamp (1)
William de Hadham, the king's falconer (1)
John de Bello Campo (1)
Michael de Ponynges (1)
John Kyryel (1)
William de Dacre (1)
John Sturmyn (1)
William Selyman, yeoman of the king's buttery (1)
William Dachet (1)
William de Molyns (1)
Thomas Beauchamp of Warrewyk (1)
John de Beauchamp (1)
Master Thomas Ferour (1)
Nicholas de Loveyne (1)
Master John de Branketre (1)
Richard de Stafford (1)
William de la Pole (1)
Roger de Bello Campo (1)
William de la Zouche (1)
Thomas de Swynerton (1)
Ralph Basset of Drayton (1)
Ralph de Heton (1)
Thomas de Holland, Earl of Kent (1)
David de Heton (1)
Alan de Bockeshull (1)
Robert del Enes (1)
Walter de Wassyngton, captain of Villeray (1)
Thomas Cooun (1)
Thomas Caon, captain of Nyweburgh in Normandy (1)
Richard de Bosevyle, king's serjeant at arms (1)
Randolf de Tildeslegh (1)

Edward de Twyford (1)
John de Burbach (1)
Thomas Moigne (1)
Edmund Rose (1)
Henry de Sireston (1)

No individual captain named (Total = 34)

King's company (2)
No captain named (32)

List 3: Edward III, 11:503-506 (1360)

Captains in the English army whose men received 55 pardons that are grouped together into the second major pardon cluster of 1360-1361. They are listed by the number of pardons each one obtained for the men in his service, starting with those who received the most. The number of pardons issued to each captain follows his name. Where more than one leader obtained the same number of pardons, they are listed by their appearance in the pardon cluster. Several nobles who headed the list in the case of the earlier cluster are once again prominent here (e.g. Edward, the Black Prince; Henry Grosmont, duke of Lancaster; and John of Gaunt, earl of Richmond, later duke of Lancaster).

10 or more Pardons (Total = 14)

Edward, the Black Prince (14)

2-9 Pardons (Total = 26)

Robert de Herle (5)
Henry de Grosmont, Duke of Lancaster (4)
John of Gaunt, Earl of Richmond (4)
William de Bohun, (late) earl of Northhampton (3)
Thomas Ughtred (2)
Thomas de Beauchamps, earl of Warwick (2)
Ralph de Ferreres/Ferrers/Ferrariis (2)
Thomas Fogg (2)
Edmund Darundell/Darrondell) (2)

1 Pardon (Total = 15)

Earl of Ulster (1)
Earl of March (1)
Earl of Stafford (1)
James Daudele (1)
Edmund de Langeley (king's son) (1)
Captain de la Buche (1)

Miles de Stapelton (1)
Bartholomew de Bargherssh (1)
Richard de Ask (1)
Lord of Roos (1)
Nicholas de Loveyne (1)
Reynold deCobham (1)
John Pecche (1)
Edmund Rose (1)
Ralph Basset of Drayton (1)

APPENDIX III: METHODOLOGY

In any attempt to arrive at the number of pardons issued during any single year, the electronic version of the *Calendar of Patent Rolls* posted by the University of Iowa provides a useful starting point—but only that. The search function for the site can generate a complete list of pages where the word pardon appears.

In most cases, each individual pardon that actually uses the word uses it only one time. Although there are exceptions, they are relatively few in number. (For several individual entries from volume 7 that use the word "pardon" twice, see: *CPR*, E3.7: 29, 90, 271, 372, 479.) I have found only one instance of the word appearing three times in the same entry. (See the patent granted Ralph de Middelney at *CPR* , E3.7:372 (Bristol, Aug. 9).

On the other hand, any one of those pages identified as containing the word "pardon" can (and usually does) contain mention of more than one. It is by no means uncommon for the term "pardon" to appear on a single page three, four, or even more times.

By way of illustration, consider the page in volume 7 on which the word pardon appears most frequently—page 479. On this page, the word is used eight times, once in each of six individual pardons and twice in a seventh. However, the page actually records eleven patents conferring charters of pardon, four of which are covered only by the phrase "the like" or "the like to the following." Consequently, on this one page alone, the total number of times the word is used falls three short of the total number of pardons being recorded, despite the fact that in one of those pardons the word is used twice. This discrepancy is minimal when compared to many pages that involve pardon clusters.

The foregoing clearly shows why the number of pages on which the word "pardon" appears cannot be taken to equal the number of pardons.

The discrepancy between the number of time the word "pardon" is used and the number of pardons actually being issued is magnified enormously by the presence of pardon clusters; the larger the cluster the greater the discrepancy. While most

pardon clusters contain fewer than a score, several number in the hundreds, with one of them exceeding thirteen hundred. Whatever the length of the cluster, the actual word "pardon" tends to appear in only one or at most two of the opening entries, after which "the like to the following" (or some very similar phrase) extends the terms to a lengthy list of names. As a result, in a multi-page cluster, many pages replete with pardons will not contain the word.

Just how extensive this discrepancy may be becomes evident when considering that first pardon cluster generated during the siege of Calais. (See: *CPR*, E3.7:481-513.) Starting in September, 1346, and continuing into the following January, the English crown granted charters of pardon to 1305 named individuals involved in the siege.

As noted in the text, we know that two of these charters of pardon went to a single individual, Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. Hence, while there were 1305 charters granted, there were no more than 1304 recipients. Although what happened in his case may indeed have happened in others as well, without the considerable effort that would go into checking the entire list for duplicates, we cannot be certain precisely how many men we are dealing with.

The list of 1305 pardons constitutes a single cluster occupying thirty-three pages of volume 7. Since the word "pardon" appears only once at the beginning, thirty-two pages made up almost entirely of pardons do not contain the word. *Again, simply knowing what the electronic search function can tell us* (*to wit, the number of pages on which the word "pardon" appears*) *provides no clue whatsoever as to the actual number of pardons being issued in any given year.*

By contrast, a careful page-by-page counting of the sort required to arrive at any meaningful numbers produces the following result for the year 1346: Volume 7 of the *Calendar of Patent Rolls* that records patents issued between 1345 and 1348 contains a total of 570 pages, 258 of which contain patents of all sorts issued in 1346. Of these 258 pages, 161 (over 60%) contain one or more patents conferring a pardon upon the recipient. A majority of these pages contain more than one, in some cases many more. Twelve contain at least 50 pardons apiece (*CPR*, E3.7:484, 485, 488, 489, 491, 492, 494, 495, 496, 503, 505). The highest number for a single page is 75 (*CPR*, E3.7:489.)

All told, these 161 pages record charters of pardon conferred upon a total of 1698 named individuals, mostly men but also a few women. In exceedingly rare instances, such as the earl of Warwick, several pardons might be issued to the same individual; the overwhelming majority, however, went to different people.

The year 1347 is also recorded in volume 7 of the *CPR*. Of 306 pages recording patents from that year, 164 (53%) contain one or more pardons. The total pardon count for 1347 stands at 777. Of these, 532 or just over 68%, were military.

APPENDIX IV: ILLUSTRATIONS

Fig. 7. Recruiting poster for English soldiers (c. 1350).

"WANTS YOU"

Wanted: a few violent men!

Killed your priest or your brother?
Raped your lord's daughter or shot him full of arrows?
Robbed your local church?

Be All That You Can Be!!

Join the company of an influential English captain. Serve king and country in sunny France. Loot, pillage, and burn while receiving good pay, good wine, good women, and a pardon for good service when it's over over there!

Or just contribute to the crown's military effort and avoid front line service altogether.

English recruiting poster, c. 1350. Created by L.J.A. Villalon and M.G. Moore.

Fig. 8. Pardon machine of G.W. Bush (used with permission from the artist).

WARFARE, TRAUMA AND MADNESS IN FRENCH REMISSION LETTERS OF THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

Aleksandra Pfau

I. *The Case of Guille Cliquet*

The family and friends of Guille Cliquet saw the Hundred Years War as having significantly traumatized him, leading him to commit a brutal and bizarre crime. As the family explained in an appeal it addressed to King Charles VI in April of 1422, in the past, Cliquet had suffered from a mental condition: "he had been furious and out of his senses at some times and in diverse intervals, because of which he had been manacled, tied, and taken to Saint Mathurin de Larchant and on other pilgrimages. Sometimes he went into convalescence and then by lunar movements he fell sick again."[1]

On the other hand, during his healthy periods, he had been allowed to work on the farm in a small village in the Châtelain of Monceaux that he shared with his brothers. All of this information about his past was merely an explanation of the events that happened one night during the week after the village inhabitants had sung *Laetare Jerusalem* in church.[2]

> Certain routiers and soldiers going through the country passed through the village...and took, pillaged, and robbed many beasts, goods, and other things. Among other places, they went to the house of the said Cliquet and his brothers...where they took many beasts and goods and broke many household items and utensils belonging to the said house.[3]

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[1] Archives Nationales, Series JJ, book 171, folio 292, number 520 [hereafter abbreviated as follows: AN, JJ 171 f. 292 no. 520]. If a date is given, it will appear in parentheses after the reference. Saint Mathurin de Larchant was recognized as a "specialist" in cases of madness. See: Marc Verdier, "Introduction a la Vie de Saint-Mathurin in Larchant," *10,000 ans d'histoire* (Versailles, 1988), 101-114. In 1416, Queen Isabeau of Bavaria, wife of the mad king Charles VI, had paid for a pilgrimage to Saint Mathurin possibly on behalf of her sick husband. Denise Péricard-Méa, *Les pélerinages au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2002), 109.

[2] This would have been the fourth Sunday in Lent, which fell at the end of March, 1422. Consequently, the event must have occurred in the last days of March or the first days of April.

[3] Archives Nationales [hereafter AN], Series AN, JJ 171 f. 292, no. 520.

The pillaging soldiers did not provoke Cliquet into acting at that moment, but rather created a situation that exacerbated his already tenuous hold on sanity. In fact, had Cliquet responded directly to the actions of these soldiers, his violence could have been construed in terms of understandable, if regrettable, anger. As Jacqueline Horeau-Dodinau notes in her study of remission letters about pillaging soldiers, there was a standard narrative that could be used to explain violence against them.[4] Instead of acting against the persecutors, however, Cliquet's anger built over time, eventually culminating in an attack against members of his own household.

Believing that there was an urgent need to repair a damaged stone cellar, Cliquet began to work in the late evening hours. The letter of remission notes that "being otherwise in his sense, [he] was very angry and indignant" because the wanton destruction had required him to make these repairs.[5] Since he was working after nightfall, he had one of his sons hold a candle so that he could see what he was doing. While engaged in his work, one of their servants, Guille Talart, who had taken the cows into the woods to hide them from the soldiers, returned and asked for the light so that he could put the cows away for the night. When Cliquet refused, arguing that a light was not needed for that task, Tallart forcibly took the candle from his son. Under other circumstances, the letter suggests, this would not have been a serious problem. However, in this case, it proved to be quite different.

> Cliquet, considering the damage that the said soldiers had done to him, which he had strongly in his memory while repairing the said cellar, and the disobedience of … his servant … was greatly angered and troubled. In the heat and fury, which he entered into on this occasion, [he] turned suddenly towards his son and gave him a great slap on the jaw and on the ear, then with the handle of the tool that he had in his hand with which he was repairing the said cellar, he hit Guille Talart his servant … only one blow on the head from which the following Friday or thereabouts death came to the person of the said Talart.[6]

Though Cliquet's family acknowledged that he had a preexisting condition that might cause him to lash out violently, they argued that this particularly violent act had been brought about by the recent pillaging. For although Cliquet had in the past demonstrated occasional mental problems, his

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[4] Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, "La Vengeance du Paysan," in *Anthropologies juridiques: Mélanges Pierre Braun*, ed. Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau and Pascale Texier (Limoges, 1998), 385-423.

[5] AN, JJ 171 f. 292, no. 520.

[6] AN, JJ 171 f. 292, no. 520.

family had always been able to cope with them, taking him to visit a saint's shrine and welcoming his assistance in their daily tasks when he was mentally stable. Indeed, the family's petition suggests that some extreme external trigger was required to cause the "heat and fury" that led him to attack his own; for them the obvious trigger was the damage done by the soldiers who had visited their home so recently.

II. *Definition and Legal Basis of* Lettres de Remission

Guille Cliquet's story is preserved in a letter of remission (*lettre de remission*) granted by the king of France and recorded in the royal chancery. Such narratives requesting a royal pardon originated early in the fourteenth century (the earliest thus far uncovered dates to 1304) when French monarchs began to extend grace and mercy for offenses that were otherwise punishable by death.[7] At first, these documents, relatively few in number, were mostly granted to people who claimed to have been falsely accused or to members of the nobility who had been engaged in warfare that was not sanctioned by the crown. On the other hand, a growing number of French remission letters of the period provide narratives of "poor, simple" villagers who had to cope with unofficial brigandage and the official (or semi-official) *chevauchées* perpetrated by the various armies involved in the war with England and the civil war between the Burgundians and Armagnacs. This essay will examine several of these descriptions of mental illness resulting from warfare in order to consider how medieval people understood trauma and constructed madness as an expected response to it.

Over time, the numbers greatly expanded.[8] While *lettres de remission* began as a very small percentage of the chancery output (between 0 and 2 percent from 1304 to 1338), during the 1340s there was a sudden increase, until they made up roughly a quarter of the chancery records. In the 1350s,

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[7] The first remission letter appeared in May of 1304. See Claude Gauvard, *"De Grace Especial": Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1991), 1:64.

[8] Some of these early letters can be found at numbers 3759, 3914, 3986, 4054, 4177, 4231, 4322, 4357, 4603, 4767, 4788, 4841, and 5101 in *Règnes des fils de Philippe le Bel, deuxième partie: règne de Charles IV le Bel*, vol. 2 of *Registres du Trésor des Chartes*, ed. Henri Jassemin and Aline Vallée, 3 vols. (Paris, 1999). See also: Justine Firnhaber-Baker, "From God's Peace to the King's Order: Late Medieval Limitations on Non-Royal Warfare," *Essays in Medieval Studies* 23 (2006): 19-30; Justine Firnhaber-Baker, "'Guerram publice et palam faciendo': Local War and Royal Authority in Late Medieval Southern France" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2007).

the percentage rose to about half, then again to around three-quarters in the 1370s. Afterwards, the percentage held relatively steady at 75, with a few spikes every ten years or so, when some books record 90 percent or more of the chancery documents being remission letters. The output of such pardons did not fall off until the 1380s, when it again began averaging half of chancery production.[9]

Although the letters came out of the royal chancery, they were not simply royal documents; instead, they were products of a cooperative effort between legally trained notaries and the individual criminal or alternatively, members of the criminal's family. In an effort to compose an explanatory narrative that would function on multiple levels, those responsible for drafting the *lettres* carefully molded a story of the crime, focusing on the details of the particular event and providing background information if it was considered relevant.

Remission was only available for crimes for which the punishment was execution. If granted, such a pardon legally and rhetorically erased the crime, not only on the level of government officials, who could no longer prosecute the pardoned criminal for that particular crime, but also on the level of the community, since the letter restored the criminal to his or her "good reputation and renown."[10] Despite a royal power to extend mercy that transcended the law, a remission letter still needed to contain a large measure of truthful information, since the process called for it to be read aloud by the local judge in the presence of the aggrieved party, and if the latter raised an objection, it might well be annulled.[11] This emphasis on the facts of the case is somewhat distinct from practices followed in English

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[9] The rest of the chancery documents are made up of royal ordinances, letters conferring nobility or naturalization, concession or confirmation of privileges, etc. For a table with the number of remission letters and the number of total acts, see Michel François, "Note sur les lettres de rémission transcrites dans les registres du Trésor des Chartes," *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 103 (1942): 317-324, 321-324. Although I found some of his counting to be questionable (particularly for AN JJ 189 and AN JJ 204, where the number of remission letters exceeds the number of total acts), my own counting usually resulted in numbers close enough to his to allow these percentages to stand. Note that Claude Gauvard uses these same numbers to argue that the granting of remission letters decreased around 1400 due to public criticism. See the table in Gauvard, *"De Grace Especial,"* 1: 65. Nevertheless, remission letters remain a high percentage of chancery output throughout this time. In fact, the only true gap in the granting of remission appears between 1434 and 1441 (AN, JJ 175 and AN, JJ 176), when Charles VII was in the process of taking Paris from the English.

[10] See in particular F.R.P. Akehurst, "Good Name, Reputation, and Notoriety in French Customary Law," in *Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe*, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca, New York, 2003), 75-94; Barbara Hanawalt, *"Of Good and Ill Repute": Gender and Social Control in Medieval England* (New York, 1998), esp. 1-14.

[11] Gauvard, *"De Grace Especial"*, 67. See also Pascal Texier on this process of ratification, called *entérinement*. By 1394, if this was not completed within a year and a day, the remis-

law courts, where there were strict conditions for proving madness, dictating greater conformity among cases.[12]

Medieval chronicles, literature, and legal texts recognized the mental effects of warfare on both participants and non-participants, but they viewed the potential response of each group quite differently. What might be called the "berserker" response,[13] experienced by a soldier, was often celebrated; by contrast, the frenzy of the noncombatant was regarded with horror and, occasionally, pity. While the traumas of the battlefield were not believed to produce any negative mental effects on soldiers, medieval French men and women did characterize certain bizarre behaviors by non-combatants as the result of war-related mental illness. The uncharacteristic acts of such civilians were thought to grow out of the violence, loss, and experience of vulnerability that resulted from the attacks on farming communities during the Hundred Years War. In short, it is particularly noncombatants, those who did not have the soldier's expectation of being victims of the violence of warfare, who were perceived as responding adversely to its effects.

III. *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder?*

Whether or not one can detect Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the past has been the subject of ongoing debate. In the late twentieth century, Jonathan Shay and R.J. Daly argued that it is possible to find evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder in earlier ages; for example, in such different sources as Homer's *Iliad* and Samuel Pepys' diary. They do so, however, based on the assumption that psychological responses are universal and that past texts, despite being rooted in their own cultures, can be used for retrospective diagnosis.[14] On the other hand, as John Arrizabalaga has

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sion was automatically annulled. "La remission au xivieme siècle: genese et developpement" (PhD diss., Limoges, France, 1991), 324-38.

[12] See Thomas A. Green, "Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability for Homicide in Mediaeval England," *Speculum* 47, no. 4 (1972): 669-94, esp. 680; Wendy J. Turner, "'Afflicted with Insanity': The Care and Custody of the Feeble Minded in Late Medieval England," (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2000).

[13] In his extensive study of medieval French literary representations of madness, Jean-Marie Fritz argues that the "berserker" response to warfare came mostly out of Celtic literature. By contrast, in French literature, figures who manifest such behavior are usually driven to do so not by the experience of warfare but rather by love. See: Jean-Marie Fritz, *Le discours du fou au Moyen Age: XIIe-XIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1992), 74-80.

[14] Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York, 1994); R.J. Daly, "Samuel Pepys and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder," *British Journal of Psychiatry* 143 (1983): 64-68.

persuasively argued, even with physical diseases that seem to have a clear epidemiology, retrospective diagnosis can be deeply problematic.[15] Mental disorder tends to be more culturally-defined and is recognized and described most often through behaviors rather than somatic symptoms. Consequently, retrospective diagnosis in this area is particularly suspect.

Taking a very different view than Shay or Daly, Allan Young argues that post-traumatic stress disorder is not timeless, but is instead a product of "the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, treated, and represented and by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts and resources."[16] While he is careful to acknowledge that he is not challenging the reality of post-traumatic stress disorder for those who experience it, he examines how it has been "*made* real," looking at "the mechanisms through which these phenomena penetrate people's life worlds, acquire facticity, and shape the self-knowledge of patients, clinicians, and researchers."[17]

Another investigator into this complex issue, Edgar Jones, has traced the diversity of the labels and causal explanations of disorders related to warfare just over the course of the twentieth century, arguing that they "reflected popular health fears" current in the population at the time.[18] Given the extent to which scholars disagree on the issue, instead of seeking echoes of modern diagnoses in these texts from the past, this essay will allow the texts to speak for themselves, revealing the complex ways in which medieval people understood the effects of warfare on the mental health of individuals.

IV. Lettres de Remission *and the Suffering of Wartime*

Many fourteenth and fifteenth century remission letters did view war as a potential catalyst of mental disturbance, both for individuals like Cliquet, who had experienced episodes of mental instability in the past, and for individuals who had never had such outbursts before. Such letters were

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[15] Jon Arrizabalaga, "Problematizing Retrospective Diagnosis in the History of Disease," *Asclepio* 54 (2002): 51-70.

[16] Allan Young, *Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton, N. J., 1995), 5.

[17] Ibid., 6.

[18] Edgar Jones, "Historical Approaches to Post-Combat Disorders," *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences*, special issue: ("The Health of Gulf War Veterans") 361, no. 1468 (2006): 533-542, esp.533.

generally the despairing cry of a population affected by conflicts that they were unable to avoid, and the resultant mental damage was seen as inescapable and often irreparable.

Certainly not every individual who suffered losses during the war went mad; those who did, however, were seen as innocent victims of forces beyond their control. Discussions of peasants who, according to their families, were driven mad by the destruction of their livelihood at the hands of the soldiers indicate that whether or not such events engendered PTSD, war was indeed traumatic for the population at large. As in the case of Guille Cliquet, the actions that were interpreted as mad were generally violent attacks that were directed inward, towards the self or towards members of the household, rather than outward, towards the soldiers who had instigated the violence.

There are certainly narratives about violence against soldiers in the remission archives. On the other hand, such attacks were fully comprehensible as sane reactions to the damage done by these invaders.[19] Narratives about madness, on the other hand, focus on the inability of the individuals to cope in an expected way with their horrific experiences. Like Guille Cliquet, while their violence may have been inspired by "the damage that the said soldiers had done," it was directed towards those they ought to have loved and protected.[20]

In his magisterial *Histoire de France*, the great ninteenth century historian, Jules Michelet, used remission letters in addition to other contemporary sources in order to initiate a debate about whether French peasants were the greatest sufferers during the Hundred Years War, and whether or not their sufferings contributed to the peasant uprisings of the period.[21] Although these basic questions ignore the more complex levels on which *lettres de remission* construct peasant experience of war and provide an understanding of trauma, it is worth noting the ways they have been used in support of this argument and what that means for any reading of these particular narratives.

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[19] Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau has a fascinating study of the use of drowning in the murder of pillaging soldiers and brigands. See Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau"La Vengeance du Paysan," 385-423.

[20] The idea that the mad attack those they ought to protect is fairly common in medieval and early modern legal and medical texts. See Aleksandra Pfau "Crimes of Passion: Emotion and Madness in French Remission Letters," in *Madness in Medieval Law and Custom*, ed. Wendy Turner (Leiden, 2010), 97-122; Michael MacDonald, *Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in Seventeenth-century England* (Cambridge, 1981).

[21] Jules Michelet, *Histoire de France: Nouvelle édition, revue et augmentée*, 19 vols (Paris, 1876), 4:287.

Following in Michelet's footsteps, many scholars have subsequently entered into this debate over the degree of suffering experienced by different groups in the Hundred Years War. Using the term "noncombatants" to refer to the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century peasants, Christopher Allmand has carried on Michelet's argument, primarily making use of sermon literature and supplications to the papal court by French churches to show that peasant livelihoods were severely affected by the war.[22]

Nicholas Wright, though he does not deny that peasants did indeed suffer, focuses his attention on the suffering of combatants. He notes that the wholesale destruction of peasant property would not have been in the best interest of the nobility, which depended on peasant land cultivation for food and income, and indicates that this could differ noble armies from the brigands and pillagers who regularly took advantage of the war to wreak havoc in the countryside. He also suggests that peasants were often willing and able to fight back, using remission letters as evidence of such resistance to brigandage.[23]

Regardless of whether the peasants suffered "more" from the war than the *gens de guerre* who were fighting it, it is clear that the French countryside provided food and fodder for the armies that moved through it, whether these were sought under the guise of payment for protection or as the result of outright looting. While remission letters were not concerned with determining the relative degrees of damage, they did express general conceptions of grief, loss, and vulnerability and discussed the multiple ways in which peasants and their families responded to the war. France was often in a state of turmoil and, in the imaginations of the general public, the pillaging and brigandage surrounding both the war with England and the civil wars among the nobility was detrimental to the livelihoods as well as to the mental stability of the French people, in particular members of the peasantry.

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[22] Allmand first proposed this terminology, which he took from contemporary discussion of the Vietnam War. See especially: Christopher Allmand, "The War and the Non-combatant," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971), 163-183. A discussion of this issue can also be found in Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c.1450* (Cambridge, 1988) and idem, "War and the Non-Combatant in the Middle Ages," in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 253-72.

[23] See Nicholas Wright, "French Peasants in the Hundred Years War," *History Today* 33, no. 6 (1983): 38-42; idem, *Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1998); idem, "'Pillagers' and 'Brigands' in the Hundred Years War," *Journal of Medieval History* 9 (1983): 15-24; idem, "Ransoms of Non-combatants during the Hundred Years War," *Journal of Medieval History* 17 (1991): 323-332.

IV. *Suicide, Murder, Theft and Mental Illness in the* Lettres de Remission

Like Guille Cliquet, the people described in remission letters as mad due to the war were not active participants but rather the "non-combatants" discussed by Christopher Allmand. This may be due in large part to the legal situation in France as opposed to that which seems to have prevailed across the channel. In England, the mad were wards of the crown, so soldiers who returned from the wars in a mentally unstable condition were of direct interest to the king.[24] By contrast, in France, the king had no vested interest in the mad; consequently, French legal sources discussing insanity differ from the English sources.

Remission letters that framed a crime narrative in terms of madness constitute a distinct minority of such documents.[25] Between 1364 and 1498, the king's chancery filled one hundred and thirty-four registers, containing 52,622 acts, of which 38,860 are letters of remission, or seventy-four percent of the total. From this extensive base, a sampling of thirty-five registers, around a quarter of the total, contain 13,671 acts, 9,852 of which are remission letters. Adding a few letters from other sources has produced a total of 145 that mention madness, comprising approximately one percent of the letters examined. They are scattered throughout the registers, not clustered around particular dates, suggesting that madness was not a common trope in the genre but a relatively unusual manifestation for the royal

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[24] Wendy Turner has provided a fascinating study of madness during the Hundred Years War in England, where the legal situation focused considerably more on royal guardianship than in France. See: Wendy Turner, "Mental Incapacity and the Financing of War in Medieval England," in *The Hundred Years War Part II: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, the Netherlands, 2008), 387-402.

[25] For a more detailed treatment of this issue, see Pfau, "Madness in the Realm." Supporting documentation can be found in: *Les Pays de la Loire Moyenne dans le Trésor des Chartes: Berry, Blésois, Chartrain, Orléanais, Touraine 1350-1502* (*Archives nationales, JJ 80-235*). *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France,* ed. Bernard Chevalier (Paris, 1993); *Le Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartes*, ed.Yves Dossat, Anne-Marie LeMason, and Philippe Wolff (Paris, 1983); *Recueil des documents concernant le Poitou contenus dans les registres de la chancellerie de France*, *Archives historiques du Poitou*, ed. Paul Guérin (Poitiers, 1909); *Les pays de l'Oise sous la domination anglaise* (*1420-1435*) *d'après les registres de la Chancellerie de France*, ed. Christian Gut (Paris, 1996); *Actes de la chancellerie d'Henri VI concernant la Normandie sous la domination anglaise* (*1422-1435*), *extraits des registres du Trésor des chartes aux Archives nationales*, ed. Paul Le Cacheux (Rouen, 1907-1908); *Paris pendant la domination anglaise* (*1420-1436*)*: Documents extraits des registres de la Chancellerie de France*, ed. Auguste Longnon (Paris, 1878); *Documents nouveaux sur les mœurs populaires et le droit de vengeance dans les Pays-Bas au XVe siècle*, ed. Charles Edmond Petit-Dutaillis (Paris, 1908); *La Gascogne dans les registres du Trésor des Chartres Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*, ed. Charles Samaran (Paris, 1966).

notaries who recorded and helped compose them. Despite this relatively random distribution, the letters that do mention madness as a result of pillaging appeared most frequently during the decades of English rule that followed the battle of Agincourt (1415), at a time when the Burgundian-Armagnac civil war was raging.[26]

Unlike more common narratives found in the letters—for example, those involving murders that took place during tavern brawls—there were no recognizable conventions for writing about mental illness. Consequently, they provide unique access to stories that can be considered "case studies" of the people viewed as mad by their contemporaries. In this way, they provide evidence of how that society viewed the causes of madness as well as the crimes it associated with mental illness.[27]

The third most common crime attributed to madness brought on by warfare was suicide. Eighteen of the 145 letters about madness deal with self-murder. According to French scholar, Claude Gauvard, while suicide constituted a mere 0.4% of the crimes mentioned in remission letters during Charles VI's reign,[28] it made up fully 12% of the crimes committed by mad people.

In his study of suicide in the Middle Ages, Alexander Murray found that "a suicide, or suicidal thought or act, follows an event of social dislocation, whether from crime, disgrace, or financial ruin."[29] Crimes mentioned in remission letters appear to follow this pattern, describing the suicide as

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[26] Throughout this period, the political situation in France was in turmoil. After his victory at Agincourt, the English king, Henry V (r. 1413-1422), began to conquer much of northern France. He was aided in this endeavor by the Burgundians, whose young duke, Philip the Good (1396-1467), allied himself to England after the assassination of his father, John the Fearless (1371-1419), by Armagnac partisans during a parlay on the bridge of Montereau. This led in 1420 to the Treaty of Troyes in which the French king, Charles VI (r. 1380-1422), disinherited his own son, often referred to as the Dauphin, in favor of the English king who had married his daughter, Catherine. As a result, Henry V became regent of France for his father-in-law and continued cementing his hold on the kingdom. Although Henry died prematurely in 1422, English success on the continent continued unabated until the appearance of Joan of Arc (1429) and the ending of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance by the Treaty of Arras six years later. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War*; 34; Françoise Autrand, *Charles V: La folie du roi* (Paris, 1986); R.C. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392-1420* (New York, 1986); Bernard Guenée, *La folie de Charles VI : Roi Bien-Aimé* (Paris, 2004). See also Aleksandra Pfau, "Madness in the Realm: Narratives of Mental Illness in Late Medieval France" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2008), Chapter 2.

[27] Pfau, "Madness in the Realm."

[28] Gauvard, *"De Grace Especial"*, 1:242, See table 8.

[29] Alexander Murray,*The Violent against Themselves* vol. 1 of *Suicide in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1998), 1:317.

being due to a particular loss, despair, or illness, one that brought on the desire to die.

In the Middle Ages, suicide was considered both a religious sin and a civil crime. The Christian church, through the figure of Judas, informed people that suicides were damned for eternity. Medieval art usually depicted suicides in Hell, associated with the vice of Despair either hanging from a rope like Judas or stabbing themselves with a knife.[30] Leading medieval theologians expounded upon suicide in considerable detail. In *The City of God*, Augustine argued that it was clearly a violation of the commandment "thou shalt not kill."[31] In the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas Aquinas expanded Augustine's argument, building on the idea that suicide violated the commandment, and arguing that suicide further violated natural love and charity, according to which man should love himself. Perhaps most significantly, Aquinas stated that "every man is part of the community, so that he belongs to the community in virtue of what he is. Suicide therefore involves damaging the community."[32]

The concept that suicide injured the community as a whole by harming one member provides an interesting perspective on medieval laws against it. The secular government helped the church to regulate this sin by confiscating the body and the goods of suspected suicides. The body would not only be buried in unconsecrated ground, but would also be symbolically executed by being hanged as a murderer. The suicide's goods were confiscated by the crown, often leaving the remaining family destitute as well as destroying their reputation and standing in the community.[33] As a result, suicide was a crime not only against the self and the community, but also against one's surviving family.

Regardless of a perpetrator's guilt, a remission letter automatically erased the crime in the eyes of the government and, at least in theory, in the eyes of the community as well. The fact that the action had occurred during an episode of madness might further exonerate the individual in question, especially in the eyes of his or her community.

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[30] See Moshe Barasch, "Despair in the Medieval Imagination," *Social Research* 66, no. 2 (1999): 565-76, for an exploration of this phenomenon in art.

[31] Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. and trans. George E. McCracken, 7 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957), 1:90-95 (Book I.20).

[32] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, ed. James J. Cunningham, 60 vols. (London, 1964), 38:32-330 (2.2.6: Art. 5).

[33] Esther Cohen, *The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Culture in Late Medieval France* (New York, 1993), 141-42.

Exoneration due to madness tended to be an easier case to make for a person who had committed suicide than for one who was still living. In the case of a suicide, a family could not suffer the same serious repercussions for making a false claim of madness that it could if the individual were alive and could be produced for examination. There may have been a tacit agreement within local communities that surviving relatives of the person who committed suicide should not suffer any further punishment for the crime as indeed they would if the individual were not deemed to have been insane. For in the absence of a judgment of madness, the family's property was liable to confiscation by the crown.

During the summer months of 1424, three different women were granted *lettres de remission* for committing suicide because of madness brought on by the conflicts being waged in their neighborhood. In May, Henriette, wife of Jehan Charnel, died by her own hand in the town of Montagny-Sainte-Félicité near Senlis. According to her family and relatives, a company of soldiers had come to the town looking for provisions while her husband, Jehan Charnel, was away in Picardy selling apples. The soldiers found Charnel's mare and appropriated it as well as looting two robes from Charnel's house. When Henriette attempted to prevent them, she was so badly beaten for her pains that she lay bedridden for more than two weeks. Eight days later, the soldiers returned and found the couple's second horse. This time Jehan Charnel, who had returned home, tried to prevent the theft, but he was no more successful than his wife had been.

When the bedridden Henriette was told that their second horse was also gone, she became "troubled in her good sense and memory," repeating several times each day that they had lost everything by losing their horses.[34] On Wednesday, May 23, while her husband was again traveling to a neighboring town on business, she hanged herself. Henriette Charnel's anger and sense of vulnerability occasioned by the soldiers' brutality were seen by her husband as causing her to go out of her mind and then commit suicide.

The case of Martine, wife of Pierre Voyenoise, focused less on anger and more on despair. As her husband explained in the letter, for eight years, their town of Chambly had been under constant attack by brigands and soldiers, who took all the "gold, silver, jewels, clothes, and all other goods whatever they were."[35] Then in 1424 a troop from Picardy came to stay in the town. As a result, Martine and Pierre "lost in the same way all that was

[34] AN, JJ 172 f. 266, no. 474.
[35] AN, JJ 172 f.. 282v, no. 505.

theirs."[36] It was despair stemming from this experience of loss that drove the wife to take her own life.

A similar loss afflicted Perrote de Courcelles. According to the narrative composed by her relatives in 1424, Perrote had "lost her family and her goods in such a way that from anger and displeasure about it she was made to fall into a sickness which held her for the space of four or five months during which time she was totally idiotic without having true understanding."[37] In the end, due to this loss of not only goods but also people, she used a knife to cut her own throat.

In this way, remission letters speak to the psychological as well as the material devastation brought about by war. While a number of past articles and books have concentrated on the tangible damage done to peasants in the French countryside by warfare, they have not adequately considered the psychological effects. One recent study on women's roles during the Hundred Years War uses chronicle accounts and some letters to valorize the women in question, without addressing the ways in which these narratives of strong women joining in to help with the defense of a town may actually reflect the desires and goals of the chronicler or letter-writer, while hiding the psychological costs that such women suffered.[38]

Not only women, but also men (though fewer in number) committed suicide due to losses caused by war. In such cases, those who composed the *lettres de remission* used the language of grief and despair to explain their actions.[39] In 1412, three years before Agincourt, Jehan le Beau killed himself.[40] Although at one time a very rich man, losses resulting from the troubled state of war torn France left him incapable of supporting his wife and seven children, and so, having become "completely hopeless," he killed himself.

Like the women who would commit suicide a dozen years later, Jehan le Beau proved unable to live with the financial losses that drove him to despair. On the other hand, while the the remission letter granted to Martine Voyenoise mentions only despair due to the loss of property that of le Beau alludes to despair at his inability to support his family. This pressure to support the family often appears in remission narratives as a break-

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[36] Ibid.

[37] AN, JJ 172 f. 340, no. 614.

[38] James E. Gilbert, "A Medieval 'Rosie the Riveter'? Women in France and Southern England during the Hundred Years War," in *Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), 333-361.

[39] AN, JJ 130 f. 152v, no. 269 (1387).

[40] AN, JJ 166 f. 213 no. 317.

ing point for men whose illegal actions need to be explained. This was true not only of suicide but also in the case of less serious infractions.

The war-related madness of men is most often described in terms of "youthful folly," especially in cases where those men were seeking remission for fighting for the "enemy" or turning to brigandage. What is more, "lack of sense" was said to have caused a man who had lost his livelihood during the war to violate trade sanctions by selling food to the enemy or within enemy-occupied territory.[41]

Many narratives contained in *lettres de remission* seem to have used the term *folie* in a relatively minor sense. Just as today the terms "crazy" or "mad" can have a wide range of meanings, so too in the Middle Ages a word like *folie* could equally be applied to a spectrum of mental problems, ranging from minor to serious. Nevertheless, some of the stories of hardship leading to desperate and foolish choices characterized as *folie* reveal serious underlying problems connected to warfare that ultimately led to aberrant behavior.

In one instance, a knight returned from the war deaf, and his son was forced to seek alternative ways of supporting the family even though these lay outside the law.[42] The letter of remission eventually granted to Jehan de la Boche's dwells on the multiple losses suffered by the family due to its participation in the war. According to its narrative, Jehan's father, Regnant de la Boche

> lost practically all of what he owned, both his moveable goods and his inheritance, through our wars in which he was wounded so badly that he is now deaf and cannot hear. Also he was a prisoner of our enemies the English so that he and the said apellant, his son, and his other children did not have anything left to live on.[43]

This dire situation forced Jehan de la Boche to support his family by illegal means. Due to his "youth and folly,"[44] he had tried to accomplish this by despoiling his neighbors, again, people who should not have been the targets of his harmful activities.

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[41] For the "folie et jeunesse" leading to joining the enemy's army or brigandage, see AN, JJ 172 f. 66 no 131 (1422) and AN JJ 174 f. 101 no 228 (1428). For the "non sens" or "folie et ignorance" that caused people to sell flour or other foods to the enemy or in enemy-occupied lands, see AN, JJ 172 f. 261, no. 465 (1424); AN, JJ 172 f. 310, no. 558 (1423); AN, JJ 175 f. 133, no. 369 (1434).

[42] AN, JJ 146 f. 53, no. 111 (1394).

[43] AN, JJ 146 f. 53, no. 111. The technical term for someone appealing for a lettre de remission was an *exposant*.

[44] AN, JJ 146 f. 53, no. 111. The original French reads "sa jeunesse et folie."

In fact, theft was a common response to the losses sustained due to the warfare of the period. In 1425, Jacob de Bray and his pregnant wife who already had five children from her first marriage found themselves in serious difficulties.

> [Because] of the wars and divisions and also the pillaging expeditions of the soldiers in our said realm of France, [Jacob] was robbed many times and all his goods were taken away, to a point where he and his wife had fallen into such poverty and necessity that they did not have anything to live on, and therefore he fell into such a [state of] melancholy and desperation that he did not know what to do or say.[45]

For this couple, the war was so dramatically damaging to their livelihoods that it drove Jacob de Bray to "melancholy" and "desperation", language that is most often used to describe mental states that led to suicide or murder. This was not, however, what happened in Jacob's case. Instead, he found an alternative source of income by joining with three others and together going on a stealing spree. They robbed three homes in surrounding villages, an inn where they stayed overnight, and a vineyard near their home town of Peronne in Picardy. Unfortunately for Jacob, he and his confederates in crime were captured and imprisoned, leading him to appeal for grace and mercy from the king of France "considering his said poverty and that by the temptation of the Devil and in utter despair he had committed the crimes."[46]

Jacob de Bray understood the language of trauma, melancholy, and desperation and deployed these words consciously in an effort to mitigate the crimes he fully admitted perpetrating. Although his reaction had been considerably less dramatic than that of others such as Guille Cliquet, he was still able to argue that his criminal acts had been the product of a mental breakdown brought on by war-related losses.

In de Bray's case, however, the "king of France" to whom he appealed for grace and mercy was the infant king of England, Henry VI. It was 1425, five years after the treaty of Troyes had shifted the royal title to the Plantagenet line and a time when much of northern France was firmly in English hands. De Bray haled from the town of Peronne where the English held sway. What is more, his thefts had been in the surrounding villages of Dompierre and Bray-sur-Somme, also places under English control. Therefore, in asking pardon from the crown, he had no choice but to address his appeal to Henry. For its part, the regency government acting

[45] AN, JJ 173 f. 115, no. 228.
[46] AN, JJ 173 f. 115, no. 228.

in Henry's name, having assumed the regular functions of the French monarchy, granted the remission letter requested by its French subject.

In a similar manner, the constantly shifting boundaries of loyalty during the English occupation led several people to "foolishly" break the law by fighting for the enemy or violating trade sanctions. As in de Bray's case, such narratives were often couched within the larger framework of serious damage to the individual's livelihood and mental stability caused by the war. Although this kind of mental illness was certainly not as serious as that which led some to commit suicide, it was still perceived as an understandable explanation of actions that, in retrospect, were clearly against the actor's best interests.

For example, in the village of Malleville, located in the duchy of Normandy which had recently come under the control of the English,[47] an inhabitant named Guille Hantenersire claimed to have been greatly affected by the fighting. Although he eventually swore allegiance to the English crown, he had been imprisoned, tortured, and forced to pay ransom, leaving him unable to support his family. In the words of his remission letter dated May, 1424:

> He did not have the means to live because of the pain, grief, and distress inflicted upon him by the said enemies and adversaries in their prisons and because of the great ransom that they made him pay; as a result, he did not have anything with which he might uphold his household and nourish his father and mother, wife and children.[48]

Much like Jehan de Beau, Guille Hantenersire had a family that depended on him for their livelihood. Beyond the losses he had suffered due to *chevauchées*, he had been taken prisoner, "put in great pain and distress of his body,"[49] and forced to pay for his release, largely depleting his resources. As a result of all this, he had agreed to take goods to market in a nearby town that was still held by the French, thus opening himself to charges of illegally trading with the enemy. The narrative in his *lettre de remission* emphasizes devotion to family as a mitigating factor in his decision; on the other hand, it also claims that he had acted through "simplicity and senselessness."[50] Although Guilles was clearly not suffering from any serious form of mental instability, the tale constructed by his family and friends

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[47] Normandy had fallen into English hands as a result of Henry V's campaign of 1417-1419, capped by the brutal siege and capture of its leading city, Rouen.

[48] AN, JJ 172 f. 261, no. 465.

[49] AN, JJ 172, f. 261, no 465.

[50] AN, JJ 172 f. 261, no. 465.

to excuse his offense explained that his traumatic experiences had led him to make irrational decisions he would not have made had these misfortunes not occurred.

Narratives of "crazy decisions" to fight for the enemy or steal from neighbors reflect a pervasive sense of uncertainty in a country plagued by war, much of which, following the Treaty of Troyes, was under the control of a foreign king. In such an environment, lines of allegiance shifted rapidly and loyalties were not always clear, occasioning far greater anxiety among its inhabitants than was the norm. On the individual level, this increasingly led miscreants to seek remission letters excusing their criminal activities on the grounds that they were war-related. For its part, the state in the person of the English monarch proved increasingly willing to accept what might be dubbed the insanity defense in order to solidify its position and win over its new subjects. It is therefore unsurprising that the number of remission letters relating to madness caused by the war expanded during Henry VI's reign over France.

VI. *Conclusion*

The violence, loss, and experience of vulnerability on the part of French non-combatants produced by the campaigns of the Hundred Years War were clearly seen as mentally destabilizing by contemporaries. The king's own madness only exacerbated the problem, creating conflicts between the princes of the blood over just who should act as regent during periods of royal illness. After Charles VI died in 1422, further political confusion ensued accompanied by a civil war over who should have the crown. The dead king's son, the Dauphin Charles, had been officially disinherited by the Treaty of Troyes, and while Charles refused to accept his disinherison, he controlled only parts of southern France. His indolent behavior during these years led to his disparaging nickname, "the King of Bourges." On the other hand, the heir designate of the treaty, Charles VI's grandson, Henry, was just an infant at the time of his succession. And although Henry, with the aid of a talented English regent and the duke of Burgundy, held sway over much of northern France, including the capital city of Paris, he would turn out not only to be a mediocre ruler, but like his French grandfather, would eventually show signs of mental instability.[51]

[51] The political situation was so complex in part because of the king's madness, which left his legacy, shaped through the Treaty of Troyes, open to question [Pfau, "Madness in the Realm," 98-108].

Remission letters of this period clearly demonstrate the negative repercussions that on-going turmoil and confusion of loyalties had upon local communities. Some individuals responded to the traumatic situation they faced by committing suicide. Others directed their frustration outwards, killing or injuring family members or neighbors or "foolishly" seeking to recover their livelihoods through theft, brigandage, or trading with the enemy. When all is said and done, the French crown's willingness to issue *lettres de remission* of the sort considered by this article shows that all such aberrant behavior—suicide, brigandage, murder of loved ones, even the violation of one's political allegiance—could be excused by both the government and society as manifestation of mental illness brought on by seemingly unending warfare.

PART SEVEN

THE WAR IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

THE ENGLISH IN THE SOUTHERN LOW COUNTRIES DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY: THE MEDIEVAL "BELGIAN" PERSPECTIVE

Kelly DeVries

There are two purposes to this essay. The first is to briefly chart the historical connections between England and the Southern Low Countries during the fourteenth century, a subject which has interested me since the very beginning of my career, and which was one of my emphases in the essay appearing in the previous volume on the Hundred Years War edited by L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas*.[1] That this needs to be done is evident in light of the number of general works written during the last three generations that have interpreted the Hundred Years War narrowly, as an Anglo-French conflict (with side theaters), rather than as a more broadly defined Western Europe war.[2]

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[1] Kelly DeVries, "The Hundred Years Wars: Not One, But Many," in *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2008), 3-34. The Southern Low Countries' involvement in the early Hundred Years War was the subject of my PhD dissertation, "Perspectives of Victory and Defeat in the Southern Low Countries during the Fourteenth Century: A Historiographical Comparison," (Ph.D.,diss., University of Toronto, 1987) and has remained of interest to me since then.

[2] These include, but are in no case limited to, Edouard Perroy, *La guerre de cent ans* (Paris, 1945) translated into English, trans. W.B. Wells (New York, 1951); Alfred H. Burne, *The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360* (London, 1955); idem, *The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453* (London, 1956); Kenneth Fowler, *The Age of the Plantagenet and the Valois: The Struggle for Supremacy 1328-1498* (New York, 1967); *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971); Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War: The English in France, 1337-1453* (New York, 1978); Barbara W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century* (New York, 1978); Jean Favier, *La guerre de cent ans* (Paris, 1980); Robin Neillands, *The Hundred Years War* (London, 1990); Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450* (Cambridge,1988); *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994); Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War, 1337-1453* (Oxford, 2002); Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, 2nd ed. (Houndmills, 2003); John A. Wagner, *Encyclopedia of the Hundred Years War* (Westport, 2006); and the three volumes by Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War I: Trial by Battle* (Philadelphia, 1991); *The Hundred Years War II: Trial By Fire* (Philadelphia, 1999); and *The Hundred Years War III: Divided Houses* (Philadelphia, 2009). In fact, I know of no exceptions to this other than the previous two volumes in this series edited by L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald Kagay, *The Hundred Years*

In these the economic and geographic role of the Southern Low Countries has either been neglected or downplayed. The second and most important (therefore more lengthy) purpose is to chastise historians writing on the first half of this prolonged war who, in my opinion, ignore or disregard the numerous more contemporary Southern Low Countries' narrative sources while preferring to use later fourteenth-century English ones.[3]

I. *A "Special Relationship": The Background*

That there was a "special relationship"—to use a modern politico-economic phrase—between England and the Southern Low Countries during the Middle Ages is well known and has been discussed widely in historical literature. Economic ties are almost always cited: the English wool needed by Flemish, Brabantese, Hainaulter, and Liégeois clothmakers to weave their way to a prosperity that would make Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, Antwerp, Brussels, Leuven, Valenciennes, and Liège into some of the most important cities of Northern Europe, especially from the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries.[4]

But it was more than just economic ties that bound the island kingdom to the wealthier "Belgian" counties of Flanders and Hainaut, duchy of Brabant, and prince-bishopric of Liège across the Channel. During the Anglo-Saxon period, before wool, cloth or towns made their later impact on the two lands, the relationship was well established. Marriages were arranged between English and Southern Low Countries' kings and nobles, trade routes were established, missionaries were sent back and forth and cultural exchanges developed.[5]

By the eleventh century, the important Anglo-Scandinavian Godwin family had developed such a close relationship with the powerful Count

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War: A Wider Focus (Leiden, 2005) and *The Hundred Years War* (*Part II*)*: Different Vistas* (Leiden, 2008).

[3] This list here is extensive and includes many of the works cited in footnote 2. But, add to those the recent works by Clifford J. Rogers *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III*, 1327-1360 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000) and *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 1999) and Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston *The Battle of Crécy, 1346* (Woodbridge, 2005).

[4] See Eileen Power, *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History* (Oxford, 1941) and T.H. Lloyd, *The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1977).

[5] Paul Arblaster, *A History of the Low Countries* (Basingstoke, 2006), 30-31, and Patricia Carson, *The Fair Face of Flanders* (Ghent, 1974), 38-39. For the early history of the Southern Low Countries the best work remains Henri Pirenne, *Des origines au commencement du XIVe siècle*, vol. I of *Histoire de Belgique*, 5 vols. (Brussels, 1908).

of Flanders, Baldwin V (r.1012-1067), that the eldest son, Swegen, sought refuge in the county in 1047, when he was first outlawed, then again in 1049, during his second outlawry.[6] In 1056, Earl Godwin's second son, Harold, witnessed a charter in Flanders.[7] The third son, Tostig, married the count's sister, Judith in 1051,[8] and went into exile there in 1065-1066,[9] with the whole family, save Harold. For his part, Harold sought safety in the county of Flanders during his brief exile from Edward the Confessor's court in 1051-1052.[10]

Interestingly, this bond did not keep Baldwin from granting permission to many of his subjects to participate alongside the duke of Normandy, William the Conqueror (r.1066-1087), on his invasion of England in 1066. These connections between England and the Southern Low Countries continued throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially as the wool trade and cloth industry increased in importance and brought prosperity to both regions. Political and military ties also persisted,[11] although as in the Norman Conquest of William the Conqueror, these seem largely to have meant that aid and men went from the Low Countries to England and not vice versa, as witnessed in the hiring of Flemings and "Brabanciones" as mercenaries by many English kings.[12]

The flow of military assistance changed at the beginning of the thirteenth century, when King John (r.1199-1216) sent soldiers to assist the duke and duchess of Flanders in their rebellion against King Philip Augustus of France (r.1180-1223), which ended disastrously in 1214 at the battle of Bouvines.[13] The same phenomenon occurred at the end of the century

6 Kelly DeVries, *The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1999), 110-14.

7 Philip Grierson, "A Visit of Earl Harold to Flanders in 1056," *English Historical Review* [hereafter *EHR*] 51 (1936): 90-97.

8 DeVries, *Norwegian Invasion*, 169.

9 Ibid., 181-82.

10 Ibid., 93; Philip Grierson, "The Relations between England and Flanders before the Norman Conquest," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 23 (1941): 71-112.

11 See, for example, Elisabeth M.C. van Houts, "The Anglo-Flemish Treaty of 1101," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 21 (1998): 169-74; Renée Nip, "Political Relations between England and Flanders," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 21 (1999): 145-67.

12 See A. Mens, "De 'Brabanciones' of bloeddorstige en plunderzieke avonturiers (XIIe-XIIIe eeuw)," in *Miscellanea historia in honorem Alberti De Meyer*, 2 vols. (Leuven, 1946), 1:558-70; Eljas Oksanen, "The Anglo-Flemish Treaties and Flemish Soldiers in England, 1101-1163," in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France (Leiden, 2008), 261-74; David Crouch, "William Marshal and the Mercenariat," in *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, 15-32; and John D. Hosler, "Revisiting Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, and Problems," in *Mercenaries and Paid Men*, 43-60.

13 There is a need for a more complete study of this very important battle. Georges Duby's wholly inadequate *The Legend of Bouvines: War, Religion and Culture in the Middle*

when, in 1297, King Edward I (r.1272-1307) came to Flanders with an army of 670 cavalry and 7,000 infantry to assist Count Guy de Dampierre (r.1278-1304) in his rebellion against King Philip IV "the Fair" of France (r.1285-1314). The 1297 expedition proved to be an uncustomarily inept campaign for an English king who would redefine the art of medieval warfare with his fortified subjugation of Wales and his battlefield victories over the Scots. By the end of the year, any significant military efforts of Edward on the Continent had stopped, although English forces would not return home until after Edward and Philip agreed to peace in 1300. Guy was not included in this peace, however, and, after being captured a few months later, he was imprisoned (only being let out when he attempted to intercede on behalf of the French king in the 1302-1305 Flemish rebellion led by his sons and grandson).[14]

II. *England and the Low Countries in the Hundred Years War*

Edward I would die in 1307 and his heir, Edward II (r.1307-1327), for the two decades of his reign did not (or rather could not) involve himself openly in Southern Low Countries' affairs. But this was decidedly changed with Edward III (r.1327-1377) who usurped his father's throne in 1327. Needing first to clean up affairs with his nobles and Scotland, affairs left in chaos by his father, it was not until 1337 that this king was able to consider an invasion of France, although it seems to have been a goal since the time of his ascension. It was certainly a goal of his mother, Isabella, as she felt he had been kept from his rightful place as King of France.[15]

His reasons for doing so have been discussed frequently by modern historians.[16] However, one reason often forgotten is the rebellion of the Ghentenaars in 1337. English wool imports to Flanders had been embargoed in 1336 and the economic consequences to the cities across the Channel

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Ages, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Berkeley, 1990) is unfortunately the only book in English. Better choices are Carl Ballhausen, *Die Schlacht bei Bouvines, 27. Juli 1214* (Jena, 1907) and Alexander Cartellieri, *Die Schlacht bei Bouvines (27. Juli 1214) im Rahmen der europäischen Politik* (Leipzig, 1914), although both are dated.

[14] J.F. Verbruggen, *The Battle of the Golden Spurs: Courtrai, 11 July 1302*, ed. Kelly DeVries, trans. David Richard Ferguson (Woodbridge, 2002), 15-19.

[15] See Michael Michael, "The Iconography of Kingship in the Walter de Milemete Treatise," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 57 (1994): 35-47.

[16] For "origins" of the Anglo-French conflict, see Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, 2nd ed, 28-50; Malcolm Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy, 1250-1340* (Oxford, 1996).

were quickly felt. By late in the year, Ghent, the largest of these cities, had rebelled. The Ghentenaars had stayed out of the first two major Flemish insurrections of the fourteenth century: the uprising of 1302-1305 had been led by the Brugeois, although most of the Flemish cities except Ghent had quickly joined;[17] while the revolt of 1323-1328 had been fought largely by the citizens of Bruges and of the towns and villages around it.[18] Since Ghent did not participate in either of these, it is difficult to know exactly where the city's sentiments lay. Modern historians have suggested that it was Ghent's rivalry with Bruges that kept its citizens from joining any rebellion begun by the Brugeois. But after reading the anonymous Franciscan author of the *Annales Gandenses*, the most sympathetic chronicler of the 1302-1305 rebellion, who was actually in Ghent, it is impossible not to conclude that some Ghentenaars were firmly on the side of the rebels.[19]

In 1337, it was Ghentenaars who fomented the rebellion. A prominent local leader, Jacob van Artevelde, assumed control of the government after the Flemish count, Louis I of Nevers (r.1322-1346), went into exile in Paris.[20] With the most French of all Low Countries' princes out of the way, and having in his place a man whose entire rise to power was the result of a pro-English rebellion, certainly must have added to Edward III's reasons for setting his invasion to begin at that time.[21] When, in 1337-1338, English diplomats were able to secure alliances not only with Flanders but also

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[17] Verbruggen's *The Battle of the Golden Spurs*. Published as *De slag der guldensporen: Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Vlaanderens vrijheidsoorlog, 1297-1305* (Antwerp, 1952), this is still the best study of this conflict, but see also his later work, written with Rolf Falter for the seven hundredth anniversary of the battle, J.F. Verbruggen and Rolf Falter, *1302 opstand in Vlaanderen* (Tielt, 2002).

[18] There are unfortunately only a few modern commentaries on the rebellion of 1323-1328, and only one of these in English, William H. Tebrake, *A Plague of Insurrection: Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323-1328* (Philadelphia, 1993), although both J. Sabbe, *Vlaanderen in opstand, 1323-1328: Nikolaas Zannekin, Zeger Janszone en Willem de Deken* (Bruges, 1992) as well as Sabbe's articles in *Nikolaas Zannekin en de slag bij Kassel, 1328-1978: Bijdrage tot de studie van de 14de eeuw en de landelijke geschiedenis van de Westhoek* (Diksmuide, 1978), are necessary to gain a complete understanding of what occurred.

[19] *Annales Gandenses/Annals of Ghent*, ed. and trans. Hilda Johnstone (Oxford, 1951). The anonymous author goes decidely against the Flemings in his account of the Battle of Mons-en-Pévèle (63-75). In my chapter on this battle in *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1996), 32-48, I analyze the bias of this source against the Flemings.

[20] On Jacob van Artevelde see Hans Van Werveke, *Jacques van Artevelde* (Brussels, 1943); Patricia Carson, *James van Artevelde: The Man from Ghent* (Ghent, 1980); and David Nicholas, *The Van Arteveldes of Ghent: The Varieties of Vendetta and the Hero in History* (Ithaca, 1988).

[21] Henry Stephen Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326-1347* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929), 240-327, and Rogers, *War*, 79-81.

with Jan III, duke of Brabant (r.1312-1355), Willem II, count of Hainaut and Holland (r.1304-1337), Reinoud III, duke of Guelders (r.1318-1343), and Ludwig IV Wittelsbach, the Holy Roman Emperor (r.1314-1347). Edward no longer had any reason to delay his entry into the Hundred Years War.[22]

Of course, his campaign was delayed by his inability to pay these Low Countries' allies what he had personally promised them at Antwerp in July, 1338.[23] Much has been made of Edward's financial problems of 1338, and I do not wish to belittle their significance, but is also important to realize that the English king did not lose his allies when he could not pay them. They stayed with him in 1339, during his Cambrai-Thierache campaign, where they provided troops,[24] and, in 1340, where they were present in person (except for Ludwig) and with their armies at the siege of Tournai.[25]

Not that the relationship between these Low Countries allies and Edward was unproblematic. On the Cambrai-Theirache campaign, Brabantese troops grumbled so much about their lack of food that Edward had to promise them the food of his own troops. Even more telling was the fight between his allied leaders during the siege of Tournai which led to Jacob van Artevelde's killing of a Brabantese knight. This even occasioned increased fighting between Flemish and Barbantese soldiers, much more than either group had ever fought to the Tournaisians or the French.[26] Nor did most of these allies remain on the side of the English in 1346 when they returned to the region of the Low Countries, though their desertion also had much to do with the fact that Willem II, Reinoud II, and Jacob Van Artevelde had all fallen out of power, while the emperor, Ludwig IV, was embroiled in a leadership dispute with Charles IV of Luxembourg (r.1346-1378). In fact, by that time only Jan II still ruled with any real power, and his break with Edward at Tournai had never been effectively repaired.

It is interesting to note that one of the accusations fellow Flemings made against Jacob Van Artevelde, which ultimately led to his murder in 1345, was that he was going to make Edward, the Black Prince, count of Flanders.[27] Although economically tied to England, they also seem not to have wanted

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[22] Lucas, *Low Countries*, 204-15, 245-56.

[23] G.P. Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), 84-85; H.S. Offler, "England and Germany at the Beginning of the Hundred Years' War," *EHR* 54 (1939): 608-31.

[24] Lucas, *Low Countries*, 328-38, and Rogers, *War*, 157-73.

[25] Kelly DeVries, "Contemporary Views of Edward III's Failure at the Siege of Tournai, 1340," *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 39 (1995): 70-105; Clifford J. Rogers, "An Unknown News Bulletin from the Siege of Tournai in 1340," *War in History* 5 (1998): 358-66.

[26] Lucas, *Low Countries*, 417, and Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 354.

[27] Lucas, *Low Countries*, 516-27; Werveke, *Jacques van Artevelde*, 97-109.

to be ruled over by an English magnate. Despite these concerns, however, the Flemings allied themselves with the English in 1346. Some historians even claim that Edward's march across France from Saint-Vaast to Crécy was an effort to combine his army with the Flemings.[28]

This union of forces did not actually take place, and in fact Edward's capture of Calais following his victory at Crécy, he drove a further wedge between England and the Low Countries, for he no longer needed to have his wool staple in one of their ports. Previously, the staple had been located in Bruges, Antwerp, and Dordrecht. The Low Countries' cloth-makers still relied on English wool, now through Calais instead of directly from England. This lessened their control of the trade, and added to its costs. A military shift away from the Low Countries and northeastern France also diminished England's need for an alliance with the region.[29] Nevertheless, as evidenced in several contemporary sources, there remained an active "Engelse partij" in Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, and Holland, and even in the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, one that determined economic, if not political or military policies. This would last until well into the fifteenth century.[30]

My present narrative, however, will stop in 1383 with the attack that the bishop of Norwich, Henry Despenser, mounted against Flanders. Elsewhere I have argued that this crazy expedition, billed as a "Crusade" against supporters of Avignon, but carried out against fellow adherents of Rome, makes sense only if one sees some manipulation of the situation of the Ghentenaars, whose loss at Westrozebeke (Rosebeke) the previous year had shown that their rebellion against Count Louis de Mâle and his son-in-law, Phillip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, required assistance from outside in order to be sustained.[31]

III. *Sources from the Low Countries*

I will not repeat the arguments here as to why the Crusade of the Bishop of Norwich switched its target and attacked not the supporters of Avignon,

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[28] See, for example, Richard Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince* (London, 1978), 62.

[29] For example the campaigns in Brittany and Gascony [Rogers, *War*, 286-424, and Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 370-504].

[30] Henk Aleid van Vessem, *De engelse partij in het Koninkrijk Frankrij gedurende de honderjarige oorlog* (Utrecht, 1966).

[31] Kelly DeVries, "The Reasons for the Bishop of Norwich's Attack on Flanders in 1383," *Fourteenth Century England* 3 (2004): 155-65.

but those who, like the English owed their allegiance to Rome. Suffice it to say that the arguments are based on two important and neglected (at least for this campaign) Low Countries' sources, the *Chronique de Flandre* and Jean Froissant's third redaction of his *Chronique*.[32] A history of the first half of the Hundred Years War is seen differently when viewing it from a Southern Low Countries' perspective: what is more, this perspective can and should be derived from contemporary Southern Low Countries' sources rather than from later English and French sources as seems to be the tradition in recent Hundred Years War histories.

To begin with, there are Jean Froissart and his historiographic mentor, Jean le Bel. Both were born, raised, and educated in the Southern Low Countries, le Bel in the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, and Froissart in Valenciennes, Hainaut. Jean le Bel's father, Gilles, was a Liégeois *echevin* (or city official), as was his brother, Henri. Another brother, Gilles, served as canon of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Church in Liège. Jean le Bel was canon of Saint-Lambert Church, also in Liège. He came to the notice of Queen Phillipa of Hainaut and her husband, Edward III, through Phillipa's uncle, the seigneur of Beaumont, Jean de Hainaut,[33] for whom he performed some undisclosed service.

As a chronicler, Jean le Bel, came to greatly admire the English king and was with him on a number of his travels, including throughout the Scottish campaign of 1327. On this occasion, he claims a close proximity to the king and queen and dedicated his chronicles to the promotion of Edward's military prowess. Most historians of the Hundred Years War have come to view le Bel as a trustworthy, even if an extremely pro-English chronicler. His account of the war goes forward until 1361, when he presumably died.[34]

Despite le Bel's decidedly pro-English stance in respect to the campaigns of the early Hundred Years War, he is also not above criticizing Edward III. For example, he writes at the end of his account of the Cambrai-Thierache campaign of 1339:

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[32] *Chronique de Flandre,* in *Istore et croniques de Flandres*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1879-80), 2:281-320, and Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. S. Luce, 15 vols. to date (Paris, 1869-1975), 9:95-137.

[33] Not to be confused with Phillipa's father, Jean of Hainaut.

[34] On the life of Jean le Bel see Auguste Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie (1494)*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1901-1906), 4:4-5; Henri Pirenne, "Jean le Bel," *Biographie nationale de Belgique* [hereafter *BNB*], 44 vols. (Brussels, 1866-1986), 11:523; Antonia Gransden, *c. 1307 to the Early Sixteenth Century* vol. 2 of *Historical Writing in England*, 2 vols. (London, 1996), 83-89; and Diana B. Tyson, "Jean le Bel: Portrait of a Chronicler," *Journal of Medieval History* 12 (1986): 315-32. The best edition is: Jean le Bel, *Chronique*, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez, 2 vols. (Paris, 1904-1905).

> Although the English had devastated and burned a large part of the [French] kingdom, they had gained little from it, for the king still had more remaining of it, and if the King of England wished to conquer the kingdom of France, he would have to undertake many more of these types of *chevauchées*.[35]

Naturally, le Bel is far more critical of the French king and his soldiers, whom he characterizes unfavorably after explaining that the siege of Tournai was lost by Edward rather than won by the French.

Not to be ignored, however, is le Bel's affinity for the Southern Low Countries. His is among the best accounts of the battle of Cassel in 1328, as well as other Low Countries' military events prior to 1337. It is le Bel who informs us that the Brabantese troops were whining about their hunger on the Cambrai-Thierache Campaign. He writes of the permission granted by the count of Hainaut to English troops crossing through his lands to raid French territory during the siege of Tournai. He details the complaints of the Brabantese troops at that same siege, and indicates the instrumental role played by Jeanne, the dowager countess of Hainaut, in getting the Low Countries' princes as well as a very reluctant Edward III, to sign the treaty of Esplechin that ended the siege. Le Bel also tells of Edward's attempt to marry his daughter to Count Louis de Mâle of Flanders and the Flemish reinforcement sent to aid in the English siege of Calais. For many of these events, he is the sole reporter.

Like Jean le Bel, Jean Froissart cannot be separated from his Low Countries' origins and allegiance. Although born in Valenciennes, little is known about Froissart's youth until 1360 when he appears in England as a "secretary" under the patronage of Queen Philippa. His association with the English continued until Philippa's death in 1369, after which he enjoyed the patronage of various leading nobles, including Robert of Namur, Wenceslas, duke of Brabant, and Guy II of Châtillon, count of Blois (r.1381-1397). It is thought that he died in Hainaut sometime between 1404 and 1410.[36]

The size of his chronicle renders it impossible for this article to describe Froissart's Low Countries' historical interest in detail. Instead, I will focus on two examples. Froissart writes his account of the battle of the Sluys entirely free from Jean le Bel's influence, despite the fact that in most of

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[35] Jean le Bel, *Chronique*, 1:165.

[36] On the life of Froissart see Molinier, *Sources*, 4:5-18; Gransden, *Historical Writing*, 1:89-92; J. Stecher, "Jehan Froissart," *BNB*, 7:317-39; F.S. Shears, *Froissart: Chronicler and Poet* (London, 1930); Julia Bastin, *Jean Froissart: chroniqueur, romancier et poete* (Brussels, 1941); and the articles in *Froissart: Historian*, ed. J.J.N. Palmer (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1981).

his writing before 1361, he draws heavily on the earlier writer. In the three redactions of his chronicle, he includes this rationale for victory[37]:

> … the battle lasted from the first hour to the evening, and finally a great number of Flemings arrived, because early in the morning the bailiffs of Sluys had sent signals to Bruges and to the nearby villages. So all the villagers came and arrived on foot, on horse, or along the Roe River, coming to the aid of the English. And there assembled at Sluys a great number of Flemings, and they entered into boats and barges and large Spanish-type vessels, and they came to the battle all fresh and invigorated, they gave great comfort to the English.[38]

Thus, Froissart attributes the victory, in large part, to the men of Flanders.

The third, less pro-English redaction keeps this in the text, even adding a previously unmentioned tally of 8000 Fleming participants. It also adds an analysis of the poor French naval position with the French ships at rest and locked together. Froissart concludes that Edward's ability was a major reason for English victory.

It is also the third redaction that supplies my other example. This version of Froissart's *Chroniques* is undoubtedly the last to have been written. It exists only in one manuscript, now found at the Vatican Library (Reg. lat. 869), and is generally thought to have been written by Froissart when his patron was Guy of Blois.[39] Of the three versions, the third one also contains the broadest chronological coverage. It includes accounts of the Hundred Years War after the deaths of Edward III and his son, the Black Prince. In particular, the author gives a rich and detailed narrative of the Flemish Revolt of 1379-1385, within which is embedded an important account of the bishop of Norwich's Crusade of 1383. Froissart ties together these two events—the rebellion and the crusade—indicating that the Bishop's campaign was shaped by discussions with Ghent's leaders, now in serious need of reinforcements, in the wake of their defeat at the battle of Westrozebeke in 1382.[40] After their meeting, the bishop announced that the English would

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[37] Which is the first and which is the second redaction has been a matter of lively debate since the nineteenth century when the work's two editors, Kervyn de Lettenhove and Simeon Luce produced their "competing" editions. See *Chroniques*, in *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 29 vols. (Brussels, 1867-77) and *Chroniques*, ed. S. Luce et al, 15 vols. (Paris, 1869-1975).

[38] Froissart (ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove), 3:196-97.

[39] A more recent edition of this redaction alone is Jean Froissart, *Chroniques: Dernière rédaction du premier livre. Edition du manuscrit de Rome Reg. lat. 869*, ed. George Diller (Geneva, 1972).

[40] There is a need for a more scholarly approach to this battle and campaign. For a cursory look at the events see Robert Douglas Smith and Kelly DeVries, *The Artillery of the*

be attacking the Flemings, who were fellow supporters of Pope Urban, rather than the people of Boulogne or Saint-Omer, supporters of Pope Clement. One of the crusade leaders, Hugh Calveley, questioned the decision, reminding the bishop that the Flemings followed the same pope as did the English. Froissart writes that the Bishop's answer was:

> Sir Hugh, you would have us attack the kingdom of France and not elsewhere. But would it not be more profitable for us to enter along the rich frontier of the sea, against Bourbourg, Dunkirk, Nieuwpoort, and into the castellanies of Berques, Cassel, Ypres, and Poperinghe? And the lands which I have named to you, as I have been informed by the citizens of Ghent, who are in our company will not fight against us.[41]

Another Low Countries' chronicle that ties the bishop of Norwich's Crusade to the Ghent rebellion is the *Chronique de Flandre*. This work mentions that when the bishop came to Calais, he sent a knight to Ghent to announce that the English had arrived. In response, the Ghentenaars assembled a large army at Ypres to assist the English. Thus, the anonymous author suggests a coordinated and pre-planned strategy, by which the English and Ghentenaars would regain Flemish territory lost by Ghent the previous year.[42] These passages agree with the *Chronique de Flandre's* overriding interest in the Flemish struggles for independence from the French crown.

Admittedly, the use of this source presents some difficulties. For one thing, it is in serious need of a new edition. The existing edition, published by Kervyn de Lettenhove, completely confuses readers by throwing all the many versions of the chronicle together willy-nilly rather than discriminating among them as he had done in his earlier work on Froissart's *Chroniques*.[43] Another question arises from the issue of authorship. Lettenhove attributed the chronicle to a single author from the city of Ghent. By contrast, Pirenne argued that it was actually the work of two men from the French-speaking part of Flanders, one who carried the

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Dukes of Burgundy, 1363-1477 (Woodbridge, 2005), 63-66, and M. de Maere d'Aertrycke, "Recherches concernant quelques questions controversées à propos des batailles de Courtrai et de Rosebecque," in *Annales internationales d'histoire. Congres de Paris, 1900*, 1e section (Paris, 1901): 125-60.

[41] Froissart (Kervyn de Lettenhove edition), 9:94.

[42] *Chronique de Flandre*, 2:281.

[43] Lettenhove published Froissart between 1866 and 1876, while his *Chroniques de Flandre* appeared in 1879-1880. He calls his edition the *Istore et Chronique de Flandres*, the more commonly used title *Chronique de Flandre* was assigned by Henri Pirenne some decades later.

account to around 1342, while the second continued it until 1383.[44] Finally, there is some confusion between the *Chronique de Flandre* and the so-called *Ancienne Chronique de Flandre*, which may be nothing more than another version that Kervyn de Lettenhove drew on in compiling his edition.[45] Despite these problems, the *Chronique de Flandre* is an important and trustworthy source for the history of the Hundred Years War.

Another chronicler who came from Valenciennes is the author of what has come to be known as the *Récits d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes*.[46] Henry Stephen Lucas argues that this was actually written by Jean de Bernier, an official in the service of the Count Willem V of Hainaut and Holland (r.1356-1389). Lucas, however, is alone in this attribution. The editor of the chronicle, Kervyn de Lettenhove again, as well as V. Fris, among others, simply identify the author as "anonymous."[47] Lucas is not alone in believing that he was a highly educated citizen of Valenciennes who apparently had connections to Queen Philippa. If it was Jean Bernier, then he attended Edward and Philippa's wedding and was well acquainted with the English court.

The *Récits d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes* contains accounts of all the Low Countries' conflicts of the fourteenth century from the battle of Courtrai to 1366 and adds important, and often unique, details to each. For example, only the author of this chronicle writes that the French used trumpets, drums, and other musical instruments before the battle of Crécy "to cause fear" among the English,[48] while only he and the French *Grandes Chroniques* claim that the English soldiers took booty after Crécy. This contradicts Jean le Bel who asserts that no booty was taken in line with Edward III's order.[49]

Like his contemporary, Jean le Bel, another Low Countries' writer, Jean de Hocsem, was a canon of the Church of Saint-Lambert in Liège. Hocsem was probably somewhat older than le Bel since he died on October 2, 1348. Well educated and trained in law, he served as the ambassador from the prince-bishop's court to Avignon, Paris, and Orléans. His chronicle, the

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[44] Henri Pirenne, "Les sources de *La chronique de Flandre* jusqu'en 1342," in *Etudes d'histoire du moyen age dediées à Gabriel Monod* (Paris, 1896), 361-71.

[45] *Ancienne chronique de Flandre*, vol 23 of *Recueil des historiens de la Gaule et de la France*, ed. J.D. Guigniaut and J.N. de Wailly, 24vols. (Paris, 1738-1904).

[46] *Récits d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1877).

[47] Henry S. Lucas, "The Sources and Literature on Jacob van Artevelde," *Speculum* 8, no.2 (Apr.,1933), 125-49, esp. 127, and V. Fris, "Note sur les *Récits d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes*," *Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire* 70 (1901), 379-88. See also Molinier, *Sources*, 4:90.

[48] *Récits d'un bourgeois*, 232.

[49] Ibid., 235, *Grandes chroniques*, 9:284-85, and Jean le Bel, *Cronique*, 2:106-07.

Gesta Pontificum Leodiensium, is chiefly a record of the diocese of Liège, but also contains some observations on the warfare occurring in the neighboring Low Countries.[50] His unfavorable view of military conflict comes through at the beginning of his narrative of 1340, where he quotes the classical playwright, Terence, as having written, "All ought to be tempted by wisdom rather than war."[51]

Perhaps the most important contemporary chronicle of the early Hundred Years War is that of the Tournaisien monk, Gilles li Muisit. Working largely from his own remembrances rather than from other histories, he dictated his chronicle between 1346 and 1348, a work in which he comments on all military activities in the Low Countries since the year 1294. His account seems to have been taken from his own remembrances rather than from any other histories. Muisit was born in Tournai sometime in 1271 and was admitted to the Saint-Martin monastery in that city in 1289. He stayed there for sixty-three years, becoming abbot in 1331.[52] His chronicle is decidedly pro-Flemish and pro-English, as is witnessed by his coverage of the battles of Courtrai and Crécy, as well as the siege of Calais.[53] However, there is one important exception, the siege of Tournai in 1340. Here, his stance is pro-French, resulting from the fact that he endured the siege while living at Tournai and was greatly affected by the depravation the city's inhabitants suffered. He remembered how much prices rose and especially how the garrison's horses suffered. Many of the horses died, he writes, "but, blessed God, few [humans]."[54] Muisit was similarly sympathetic to the suffering of the people of Calais when that city was besieged.[55]

Muisit displays a pride in the objectivity his account brings to the battle of Crécy:

> Since the events of war are dubious, and as battle is harsh, everyone fighting tends to conquer rather than be conquered, and those fighting cannot con-

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[50] Jean de Hocsem, *La chronique de Jean de Hocsem*, ed. Godefroid Kurth (Brussels, 1927). See also Molinier, *Sources*, 3:203-4, and Godefroid Kurth, "Jean de Hocsem," *BNB*, 9:395-404.

[51] Hocsem, *Chronique* 294.

[52] On Gilles li Muisit's life see Molinier, *Sources*, 3:202-03; P. Wagner, *Gillon le Muisi, Abt von St. Martin in Tournai, sein Leben und seine Werke* (Brunn, 1869); Bernard Guenée, *Between Church and State: The Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, 1991).

[53] Gilles li Muisit, *Chronicon* in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae sub auspiciis Leopoldi Primi serenissimi Belgarum regis* [hereafter *CCF*], ed. J.J. de Smet, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1841), 1:194-97, 243-46, 263-76.

[54] Ibid., 225-33, esp. 232.

[55] Ibid., 274.

> sider anything going on away from them, nor are they able to judge well even those things which are happening to them. Yet afterwards the events must be judged. Because many people discuss many things and either refer to the conflict from the French side, with some supporting their arguments with things they could not know with certainty, and others refer to it from the side of the English, with some also supporting their arguments with things they do not know to be true; therefore on account of the diverse opinions I will not write that which I cannot prove. But I will write only those things which I have heard from certain trustworthy persons in order to satisfy the minds of future readers, not however affirming them to be completely what happened.[56]

For his unique and rich perspective, Gilles li Muisit requires more attention from modern historians.[57]

Several other Low Countries sources survive for doing work on the early decades of the Hundred Years War. One source from inside the siege of Tournai is the short but very passionate *Chronique de Tournai*, the only extant version of which is published in an appendix to Kervyn de Lettenhove's edition of Froissart.[58] Another short work, appropriately titled *Breve Chronicon Flandriae*, is a Flemish narrative of the years between 1334 and 1356. While most of its yearly entries contain little information, occasionally useful details and interesting perceptions can emerge.[59]

That brings me to the final but perhaps most interesting (and, with Gilles li Muisit) the most under-utilized contemporary chronicler of the Low Countries, Jan Boendale, or as he is sometimes called Jan de Klerk. Boendale was a secular "clerk" living in Brabant—Lucas claims that he served under the city officials (*scabini*) in Antwerp. It is two of the author's various works that are of concern here. Both were written in fourteenth-century Dutch vernacular: the *Brabantse yeesten* or *Rijmkronick van Brabant* and *Van den derden Eduwaert*.[60] The first of these is an impressive rhyming chronicle comprised of 16,318 verses that begins in 1318 and ends in 1350. (An anonymous fifteenth-century continuator takes the history to 1440, but this is of little worth.) This work treats virtually all warfare in the region with the

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[56] Ibid., 243-44.

[57] I strongly recommend the older *Corpus Chronicorn Flandriae* edition to that of the *Société de l'histoire de France* edition: *Chronique et annales de Gilles le Muisit, abbé de Saint-Martin de Tournai* (*1272-1352*), ed. Henri Lemaître (Paris, 1906).

[58] *Chronique de Tournai* in *Œuvres de Froissart*, ed. de Lettenhove, 25:344-65.

[59] *Breve chronicon de Flandriae*, in *CCF,* 3:11.

[60] *Brabantse yeesten of rijmkroniek van Braband*, ed. J.F. Willems and J.H. Bormans, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1839-1869), and *Van den derden Eduwaert, coninc van Ingelant: hoe hij van over die zee is comen in meyningen Vrancrijc te winnen ende hoe hij Doernic belach*, ed. J.G. Heymans (Nijmegen, 1983).

sole exception of the battle of Cassel. The second of Boendale's works exists only in an incomplete version, comprising 2018 verses, all of which record the campaigns of Edward III conducted in the Southern Low Countries between 1338 and 1340.

Boendale was especially interested in recording the reign of Jan III as duke of Brabant, though he apparently died before the duke's reign ended since there is nothing recorded in any of his writings after 1350. This fact has led modern historians to assume that this was the year of his death. At the same time, Boendale displays enormous admiration for Edward III. His *Van den derden Eduwaert* is a greater paean to the English king than anything written by the English chroniclers, including Robert of Avesbury or Geoffrey le Baker. His accounts of warfare are some of the most accurate of the period. For example, on the battle of Sluys, Jan Boendale writes in *Brabantse Yeesten*: "The French left there thirty thousand (that was many). The sea was colored red in blood. In many ships men stood with blood rising above their ankles."[61] And in *Van den derden Eduwaert*, he comments: "the French were so defeated, and they knew it so well that they leaped from the ships and with all hope lost they drown."[62]

In a number of passages, Boendale made clear his belief that God acted in history. For example, when speaking of the battle of Sluys, he states: "God sent his mercy in order to undo the evil, [an obvious reference to the French King] because this evil he would no longer tolerate."[63] Concerning the *chevauchée* conducted by the count of Hainaut into neighboring French territory during the siege of Tournai, Boendale writes:

> Now the hour that Christ spoke of may well be at hand when some of the people of this world will rise up against others and kill one another ... This time has indeed come. Now it is certain that Christianity has become divided into two groups: one is French, the other is Germanic. Now see how God hands down his judgment on this Christianity that he may take revenge for their sins.[64]

No doubt the vernacular Dutch in which many of the above-mentioned chronicles were written has discouraged most Anglo-French historians of the Hundred Years War from making use of Jan Boendale's works—there are no complete English or French translations. But by passing over these

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[61] *Brabantse yeesten*, 1:564.
[62] *Van den derden Eduwaert*, 124.
[63] Ibid., 123.
[64] Ibid., 131.

works, historians miss some very important insights and details concerning military engagements of the period. For where else does one find the reason why Jan III of Brabant broke with the alliance of Low Countries' princes forged by Edward III during his Tournai campaign? Apparently, he acted at the behest of Jeanne of Hainaut, the dowager countess, who in order to broker peace, asked him to intercede with the other leaders. This differs from the traditional explanation for the breakup of the alliance: that it occurred because the Flemish leader, Jacob van Artevelde, killed a Brabantese knight who had slandered his non-noble status. Jeanne spoke to Jan III's ego, indicating that: "if someone ends the war, people will continue to speak of him forever."[65] Only after having seen the Low Countries' leaders agree to the treaty of Esplechin did Edward III realize he had run out of money and the peace might actually be to his benefit:

> The king thought in his mind that this counsel may in part have been truly good since he had no silver or gold with which to pay his soldiers were they to continue this war. For nothing had come to him from his kingdom.[66]

A final work, the so-called St. Omer Chronicle, also presents some interesting details on the early stages of the Hundred Years War not recorded in other sources. Clifford J. Rogers is editing this vernacular French narrative that provides some very important insights, once again presenting a contemporary Southern Low Countries' perspective on the warfare that was raging throughout the countryside around the anonymous author's place of residence.[67]

IV. *Conclusion*

The focus of this article has been on the fourteenth-century involvement of the Low Countries in the Hundred Years Wars and the contemporary sources that chronicle that involvement. A major change would occur during the ensuing decades as the Burgundian dukes acquired first Flanders, followed by Hainaut, Holland , Brabant, Liège, and Guelders. Despite this change in ownership, the region continued to be involved in many of the

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[65] Ibid., 134.

[66] Ibid., 138.

[67] *The St. Omer Chronicle*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (forthcoming). Rogers has presented several papers on this chronicle, the latest of which was presented on 11 November 2010 at the Universidad de Extremadura, Cáceres, Spain, "Frontier Warfare in the St. Omer Chronicle." This and other papers show how rich this chronicle is for the early fourteenth-century history of conflict in Northwestern European warfare.

military actions of the conflict. Nor did the desires of the region for self-rule lessen, as the number of fifteenth-century rebellions attest. Without considering the regional perspective on these events, the history of the fourteenth century as well as the fifteenth century is at best only partially understood.



Map. 12. The Low Countries in Later Middle Ages.

THE DUCHY OF BRABANT BETWEEN FRANCE, BURGUNDY AND ENGLAND: GEOPOLITICS AND DIPLOMACY DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR (1383-1430)

Sergio Boffa

The military and the political reach of the Hundred Years War extended far beyond the boundaries of the kingdoms of France and England.[1] During the first phase of this conflict, the southern Low Countries played a crucial role, since it is from this region (the duchy of Brabant and the counties of Flanders and Hainault) that Edward III (r.1327-1377) launched his first attacks against France.[2] Although his successors chose other bases of military operations from which to strike their enemies, this conflict continued to have a strong influence on the Low Countries and particularly the duchy of Brabant.[3]

From the late-fourteenth century onward, the main players in this drama were no longer limited to the kingdoms of France and England. In 1369, Philip the Bold[4] married Margaret of Flanders, daughter of Louis de Male

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[1] Abbreviations: A.G.R.: Archives générales du royaume; A.V.B.: Archives de la ville de Bruxelles; A.V.L.: Archives de la ville de Louvain; BCRH.: Bulletin de la commission d'histoire; BEC.: Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes; CB.: Chartes de Brabant; CC.: Chambre des Comptes; NBW.: Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek; RBPH.: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire.

[2] This article continues S. Boffa, "The Duchy of Brabant Caught between France and England: Geopolitics and diplomacy during the first half of the Hundred Years War," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew. Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), 211-40. See also H.S. Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War* (*1326-1347*) (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929); C.J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp. English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 127-56.

[3] There is no good recent history of the duchy of Brabant. The new *Histoire du Brabant, du duché à nos jours*, ed. R. Van Uytven, C. Bruneel, A.M. Koldweij, A.W.F.M. Van De Sande and J.A.F.M. Van Oudheusden (Zwolle, 2004) is not sufficient. See F. Quicke, *Les Pays-Bas à la veille de la période bourguignonne* (*1356-1384*)*: Contribution à l'histoire politique et diplomatique de l'Europe occidentale de la seconde moitié du XIVe s.* (Brussels, 1947); H. Laurent and F. Quicke, *Les origines de l'État bourguignon. L'accession de la Maison de Bourgogne aux duchés de Brabant et de Limbourg, 1383-1407*, Brussels, 1939; P. Avonds, "Brabant en Limburg 1100-1403," in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* [hereafter *AGN*], ed. D.P. Blok, W. Prevenier, D.J. Roorda, et al., 15 vols. (Haarlem, 1977-1982), 2:452-82; A. Uyttebrouck, "Brabant-Limburg 1404-1482," in *AGN* (Haarlem, 1980), 4:224-46.

[4] R. Vaughan, *Philip the Bold, The Formation of the Burgundian State* (London, 2002).

and heiress of the county of Flanders.[5] With Louis's death in 1384, his son-in-law, an intelligent and ambitious prince, took control of the county, and the house of Burgundy became a formidable territorial power whose role steadily increased during the fifteenth century.[6] The years between 1380 and 1430 were marked by extremely important political, diplomatic, and military events within the Low Countries. We cannot focus on all of them, however, but will treat only those that influenced the complex diplomatic relations of the duchy of Brabant with the Holy Roman Empire, the kingdoms France or England, and the duchy of Burgundy. Military activities that arose out of these relations fed into the Hundred Years War.

Indeed, if the Hundred Years War has always been a field of interest and research for French, English, and even American historians, researchers of the Low Countries take little interest in the conflict or its influence on the region. The political and military historiography of the Low Countries in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is less developed than that of its neighbors. For this reason it seems important to address this topic and thus better understand the complex local history of this region.

I. *The Reign of Joan as Widow* (*1383-1406*)[7]

After the death in December, 1383 of Wenceslas of Luxemburg , Joan of Brabant (r.1355-1404) was already sixty years old and had no children. As a result, succession to the duchies of Brabant and Limburg became a paramount question and remained so throughout the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries. Because no direct heir existed, the struggle for the succession was between the collateral members of the duchess's family; namely, Marie of Brabant, Joan's sister and widow of the duke of Guelders, Renault III (r.1343-1361, 1371), Margaret de Male, Joan's niece, and the wife of Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy (r.1364-1404).[8] To these two candidates, there was added the name of Wenceslas IV, Holy Roman Emperor

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[5] A. Claeys, "Margareta van Male," in *NBW*, 3:540-47.

[6] B. Schnerb, *L'État bourguignon* (Paris, 2005) and the works of R. Vaughan.

[7] H. Pirenne, "Jeanne," in *Biographie nationale de Belgique* [hereafter *BNB*], 44 vols. (Brussels, 1866-1986), 10: 1888-89 (col. 454-63); K. Van T Land, "Prince ende vrouwe der lande vorscreven. Hertogin Johanna van Brabant in de ogen van haar chroniqueur," *Ex Tempore*, 17 (1998): 97-118; F. Quicke, "Itinéraire de Jeanne, duchesse de Brabant, de Limbourg et de Luxembourg (1383-1404)," *BCRH* 98 (1934): 155-218.

[8] The marriage of Mary with the duke of Guelders Renaud remained childless. The princess died before his elder sister, Joan (c.1399) [H. Vander Linden, Winceslas Ier, in *BNB*, 27:169-78; R. Van Uytven, "Wenceslas," in *NBW*, 2:935-40].

(r.1378-1419), king of Bohemia, and ruler of Luxemburg.[9] This was so since Brabant was an imperial fief that without legal heir would revert to the emperor's control. In addition, Wenceslas was the nephew of Wenceslas of Luxemburg, Joan's deceased husband. The competition over Brabant mainly involved the duke of Burgundy and the emperor. Because of the bitter nature of this dynastic struggle, it was essential for Joan to name a successor who would serve the best interests of the duchy.

In the beginning, the emperor seemed to have the upper hand. Indeed, on February 20, 1357, he concluded with Joan the treaty of Maastricht , in which she agreed that the duchy would revert to the house of Luxemburg if she and her husband died childless.[10] Wenceslas's claim was bolstered by the well-known imperial directive that women could not succeed to imperial fiefs. Thus, in 1383, without male heirs, it seemed that Joan's Brabantine inheritance would revert to the Empire, i.e to Wenceslas.[11] The competition to claim Brabant proved a bitter one, making it vital for Joan to insure that her successor would be able to serve the best interests of the principality.

The good diplomatic relation between Brabant and France and especially the friendship between the duchess of Brabant and Philip the Bold concerned Wenceslas. Since the house of Luxemburg controlled the imperial throne, it was naturally wary of France and close to England. In 1377, the marriage of Richard II (r.1377-1399) to Wenceslas's sister, Anne of Bohemia, sealed the rapprochement between the Empire and England. What is more, these two countries supported the Roman pope, while France remained a staunch supporter of the Avignon pontiff.[12] In late-1383,

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[9] H. Rieder, *Wenzel, Ein unwürdiger König* (Vienna—Hamburg, 1970); T. Lindner, "Wenzel," in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*[hereafter *ADB*], 56 vols. (Berlin, 1967-1971), 41:726–32; M. Kintzinger, "Wenzel," in, *Die deutschen Herrscher des Mittelalters. Historische Portraits von Heinrich I. bis Maximilian I. (919–1519)*, ed. B. Schneidmüller and S. Weinfurter (Munich, 2003), 433–45; M. Innocenti, "Wenzel IV," in *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Bautz, 31 vols. (Herzberg, 1970), 24: cols. 1521–31.

[10] A. Verkooren, *Inventaire des chartes et des cartulaires des duchés de Brabant et de Limbourg et des pays d'Outre-Meuse, 2e partie, Cartulaires, t. II (1312-1383)* (Brussels, 1962), 122; H. Laurent and F. Quicke, "La guerre de la succession du Brabant (1356-1357)," *Revue du Nord* 13 (1927): 81-121, esp. 111-3.

[11] J. De Klerk, *De Brabantsche Yeesten of rymkronyk van Braband*, ed. J.F. Willems and J.H. Bormans, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1839-1869), 2:393; E. De Dynter, *Chronique des ducs de Brabant*, ed. P.F.X. de Ram, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1854-1860), 3:145-49, 647-48.

[12] N. Valois, *La France et le grand schisme d'Occident* (Paris, 1896); J. Favier, *Les Papes d'Avignon* (Paris, 2006); M. Gail, *The Three Popes: An Account of the Great Schism* (New York, 1969); J.H. Smith, *The Great Schism: 1378* (London, 1970).

the political situation changed radically with the death of Joan's husband. In December, the dukes of Guelders, Julich, and Berg concluded a defensive alliance with the Holy Roman Emperor.[13] This pact helped Wenceslas reinforce his position in the region and assert his rights over the duchies of Brabant and Limburg. While visiting the Low Countries, he met Joan twice, once in Luxemburg (August, 1384) and then two months later in Maastricht.[14] Succession to her lands was surely on the agenda at both meetings.

In 1385, three marriages tied the family of Wittelsbach of Bavaria to the Valois.[15] On April 12, John of Nevers, eldest son of Philip the Bold, married Margaret of Bavaria, daughter of Albert Wittelsbach, while William, son and successor of Albert, wed Margaret of Burgundy, daughter of Philip the Bold. Three months later, on July 17, Charles VI of France (r.1380-1422) married Isabella of Bavaria.[16] Acting from good political motives, Joan was the great instigator of all these unions. Albert of Wittelsbach, regent of the counties of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland, had initially planned to marry his eldest son to the daughter of the duke of Lancaster.[17] Such a union was clearly contrary to the interests of Brabant's duchess. Since Guelders openly favored England, such a union would join Hainault, Holland, and Zeeland to Richard II's cause. As a result, the Brabant position, now surrounded by enemies, would prove particularly difficult. By engineering these three marriages, the duchess moved closer to France and Burgundy and was able to enhance the security of her lands by removing the specter of English encirclement.

Despite these actions, peace was not assured. Joan's reign would be disrupted by two major conflicts against the belligerent and staunch supporter of the English king, the duke of Guelders, William I (r.1371-1402).[18] In 1386, linking his hatred of Brabant with allegiance to the English cause, the duke of Guelders declared war on Joan, the duke of Burgundy, and the king of France. This action led to the second war of Guelders (1385-1390),

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[13] F. Quicke, "Oorkonden aangaande de betrekkingen tusschen de guliksche en Luxemburgsche vorstenhuizen op het einde der XIVe eeuw," *Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het Historisch genootschap te Utrecht* 49 (1931): 341-63, esp. 358-63 (nos. II-V).

[14] Quicke, "Itinéraire," 167-69.

[15] Laurent and Quicke, *Origines*, 118-36; B. Schnerb, *Jean san Peur, Le prince meurtier* (Paris, 2005), 35-49.

[16] J. Froissart, *Chroniques* (*1325-1400*), ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 26 vols. (Brussels, 1867-1877), 10: 344-52, 356-57; G.G. Sury, *Bayern Straubing Hennegau: La maison de Bavière en Hainaut, XIVe-XV^{e}s.* (Brussels, 2010), 203-4.

[17] Froissart, *Chroniques*, 10: 312-3.

[18] R. Ernsing, *Wilhelm III von Jülich als Herzog von Geldern* (Paderborn, 1885).

in which Philip the Bold played an important part.[19] While defending his honor, the duke of Burgundy also acted to protect his wife and safeguard her future inheritance. At the same time, he used his enormous influence at the court of Charles VI to convince the French king to undertake the famous "voyage of Germany" (*voyage d'Allemagne*). He even managed to divert the French army away from Brabant by directing it along a much more difficult and dangerous route through the Ardennes.[20]

While this expedition primarily served the interests of Brabant and Burgundy, it must not be forgotten that Guelders was allied to the English, and its duke had not hesitated in challenging the king of France, who then marched a huge force into the Low Countries. The second war of Guelders was thus a true episode of the Hundred Years War and not merely a local conflict between principalities of the Low Countries. Philip the Bold's participation in this conflict did not come cheap; instead, he received rich rewards from the duchess. On February 24, 1387, Joan granted him several lordships within the territory of Outre-Meuse.[21] Because of the military defeats of 1356-1357 (the war of succession in the duchy of Brabant)[22] and especially that of 1371 (the *chevauchée* of Baesweiler),[23] the lavish standard of living enjoyed by Wenceslas and Joan, a corrupt officialdom, and mounting expenses from the Guelders conflict, the duchy's finances were in shambles. This led Joan to pawn many of her possessions to repay her debts. As a result of these emergency measures, Philip the Bold would eventually claim the duchy of Limburg and lordship of Outre-Meuse.[24]

To justify these actions that were in clear violation of their inaugural oaths (the so-called *Joyeuse Entrée*).[25] Joan explained that the Burgundian duke would be her heir to "the said castles, villages, and castellanies ... [and these] by reason and nature should revert and come to her nephew because

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[19] L. Schaudel, *La campagne de Charles VI contre le duché de Gueldre en 1388* (Montmédy, 1900); A. Schulte, "Der Kriegszug König Karl VI von Frankreich gegen Jülich und Geldern im Jahre 1388," *Rheinische Heitmatsblätter* 3 (1826): 143-52.

[20] Laurent and Quicke, *Accession*, 137-64, 197-256; S. Boffa, *Warfare in Medieval Brabant, 1356-1406* (Woodbridge, 2004), 30-35.

[21] De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2: 664-65 (no. CXL); P. Bonenfant, J. Bartier and A. Van Nieuwenhuysen, *Ordonnances de Philippe le Hardi, de Marguerite de Male et de Jean sans Peur, 1381-1419*, vols. (Brussels, 1965), 220-21 (no. 141).

[22] Boffa, *Warfare*, 3-10.

[23] Ibid., 20-25.

[24] Laurent and Quicke, *Origines*, 186-96, 257-77, 278-314, 315-38.

[25] The *Joyeuse Entrée* was the inaugural oath take by a new duke. R. Van Bragt, *De Blijde Inkomst van de hertogen van Brabant Johanna en Wenceslas* (*3 januari 1356*). *Een inleidende studie en tekstuitgave* (Louvain, 1956).

of his wife, her very dear and beloved niece, Margaret of Flanders."[26] On September 28, 1390, the duchess granted Brabant in simple ownership to Margaret de Male and Philip the Bold while reserving usage of it until her death,

> seeing that our very dear and beloved niece, Margaret, duchess of Flanders, countess of Burgundy by reason and right of nature must succeed and inherit in our duchy and country of Brabant and that by our very dear and beloved brother, son of the king of France, duke of Burgundy, count of Flanders, our said county can be better, stronger and more safely maintained and governed in peace and tranquillity against any prince, lord or lady whosoever.[27]

This document was of course kept secret. Other examples bear out Joan's continuing intention of granting the duchy to her niece.[28] There was no doubt concerning Joan's feeling on this matter. The future of the duchy of Brabant would thus rest with with the house of Burgundy and not with that of the Holy Roman Empire.

Although William I of Guelders no longer enjoyed the unconditional support of Richard II who was now negotiating a marriage with Isabella of France, he did not tame his warlike habits. Rather than directly attacking the powerful Philip the Bold, he took on the closest Burgundian ally, the duchess of Brabant. The third war of Guelders (1397-1399), however, would take a very different course than that of previous conflicts.[29] Its first phase clearly trended in favor of the Brabançons.

In 1398, the duke of Burgundy, not without ulterior motives, decided to enter the fray. In March, after discussions with Joan and the estates of Brabant concerning how the war could best be continued, he assumed that he could benefit from his position as ally and capitalize on the assistance he would give. He again brought up the matter of the succession to Brabant, demanding the duchy be given to him and his sons after the death of the duchess and her sister. In exchange for this, he offered to link definitively the lordship of Mechelen and of Antwerp to Brabant and promised to help

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[26] De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:664-65 (no CXL); Bonenfant et. al., *Ordonnances*, 1:220-21 (no 141).

[27] AGR., CB, 6616; De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:674-76 (no CXLVII); Bonenfant et. al., *Ordonnances*, 1: 392-94 (no 257).

[28] J. Stengers, "Philippe le Hardi et les États de Brabant," in *Hommage au Professeur Paul Bonenfant (1899-1965), Études d'histoire médiévale dédiées à sa mémoire par les anciens élèves de son séminaire à l'Université Libre de Bruxelles* (Brussels, 1965), 383-408, esp. 387-88.

[29] Boffa, *Warfare*, 38-43.

in the recovery of the city of Grave.[30] He even agreed to give the city of Dendermonde to the Brabançons as a surety. Despite this, the Estates of Brabant refused to negotiate with the duke of Burgundy concerning these matters. On April 17, the members of the assembly announced that they would only acknowledge the duchess as sovereign, saying that after her death they would fulfill all their duties to her legitimate successor.[31] Despite the rebuff, the duke of Burgundy concluded an alliance with the duchess of Brabant and the bishop of Liège on April 19, 1398. Philip the Bold promised to send at his own expense a troop of 300 men-at-arms. He would only do so, however, under the following conditions. (1) the two other parties, Liège and Brabant, had to raise units of the same size (2) they had to protect Burgundian territories in Outre-Meuse, and (3) they could not negotiate with the duke of Guelders except with Philip's approval.[32]

Confronted with this great threat to his borders, the duke of Guelders was quickly forced to the bargaining table. On June 9, 1399, Joan and William I concluded an alliance.[33] The agreement, however, infuriated Philip. He had not been invited to the negotiations—a fact contrary to the earlier pacts. Moreover, he had already given instructions to his advisers to prepare a general peace treaty between Brabant, Liége, and Guelders.[34] Because of this, Philip was forced to negotiate separately with the duke of Guelders, concluding a treaty on August 31, 1400.[35] Although receiving little recognition from Brabant, the duke of Burgundy had once again become a stalwart ally. For this reason, he continued pleading his case before the Brabant estates. In September, 1401, shortly before the betrothal of his son, Anthony, to Joan of Saint-Pol, he hoped to come before the assembly and offer his son as the successor to the duchy of Brabant. His efforts, however, proved unsuccessful.[36] In April, 1404, he once more attempted to accomplish his goal, but fell ill and died on April 27, before an agreement could be formalized.[37]

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[30] The lordships of Mechelen and of Antwerp came under Flemish control after the war of Brabant's succession and while the lordship of Grave was still under the influence of the duke of Guelders.

[31] De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:381-394; Stengers, "Philippe le Hardi," 393-402.

[32] Bonenfant, et. al., *Ordonnances*, 1:269 (no 496).

[33] AGR, CB, 7.139; De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:691-93 (nos. CLX-CLXI); De Dynter, *Chronique*, 3:141.

[34] *Cartulaire de l'église Saint-Lambert de Liège*, ed.. E. Poncelet, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1893-1933), 5:19.

[35] AGR., CB, 7.170-7.171.

[36] Stengers, "Philippe le Hardi," 402-4.

[37] Ibid., 404-7.

The death of Philip the Bold simplified the political situation. On May 7, 1404, Joan turned over control of Brabant to her niece Margaret.[38] A few days later, the duchy's government was transferred to Philip's son, Anthony.[39] On June 5, 1404, he formally became governor of the region.[40]

Contrary to the claims of some modern historians, it should be noted that Philip the Bold wished above all to make Brabant his and, to gain that end, he would have to take over personal control of the principality. If the Brabançons scarcely appreciated the idea of being governed by Burgundian rulers, their disapproval rested less with being united to Flanders or coming under the rule of some despotic prince, than suffering the long-distance governance by a lord whose interests have been mainly directed towards France.

II. *Burgundy and Orleans as Rivals in the Low Countries*

The rivalry between the houses of Burgundy and Orleans was not limited to French territory, but also extended to the Low Countries. Louis, brother of Charles VI of France and duke of Orleans, sought to halt the advancement of Burgundian power in that region.[41] Around 1396, when his dreams of Italian domination failed, Orleans decided to direct his imperialistic ambitions toward areas in which Philip the Bold was also vying for power. Louis first turned to Emperor Wenceslas, with whom he had successfully maintained diplomatic contacts.[42] The duke had lent the emperor money on several occasions[43] and they finally sealed an alliance on March 31, 1398.[44] This pact surprised no one. After all, they both had the same enemy, Philip the Bold, who was both a rival to the French king and a competitor for succession to the duchy of Brabant. Through his land acquisitions and

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38 De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:710-13 (no. CLXVII).

39 Ibid., 2:714-19 (nos. CLXIX-CLXX).

40 Ibid., 2:719-20 (no. CLXXI). Despite her advanced age, Joan had no intention of resigning. The idea of a regency headed by Anthony of Burgundy had not yet occurred to Philip the Bold or Joan, but it had already been suggested by the Burgundian faction active in the duchy. A. Graffart and A. Uyttebrouck, "Quelques documents inédits concernant l'accession de la Maison de Bourgogne au duché de Brabant (1395-1404)," *BCRH* 137 (1971): 57-137, esp. 77-78.

41 E. Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis de France, duc d'Orléans* (Paris, 1889).

42 A. De Circourt, "Documents luxembourgeois à Paris concernant le gouvernement du duc Louis d'Orléans," *Publication de la Section historique de l'Institut royal grand-ducal de Luxembourg*, 40 (1886): 1-96.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 11-12 (no 35).

alliance policies, the French prince attempted to greatly increase his power in north-eastern France and the Low Countries.[45]

In the next few years, Louis of Orleans created a large network of allies from across the region. The most important of these diplomatic unions were with the count of Cleves (1398), the duke of Lorraine (1398), the lord of Reifferscheid (1401), the lord of Montjoie (1402), the count of Salm (1402), the marquis of Baden (1402), the count of Saint-Pol (1404), the lord of Heinsberg (1405), the marshal of the duke of Guelders (1405) and the seneschal of Hainault (1407).[46] In August, 1402, he acquired at the cost of 132,000 ducats the pawned duchy of Luxemburg, county of Chiny, and *avouerie* of Alsace.[47] Considering that Philip the Bold had been appointed administrator of the duchy of Luxemburg in March, 1401,[48] the magnitude of Louis of Orleans's victory is obvious .

Philip the Bold's demise did not slow Louis of Orleans's drive for power. In May, 1405, he declared himself the faithful ally of the duke of Guelders. Renaud IV (r.1402-1423) who had married Louis's cousin, Marie of Harcourt. According to the contract concluding this union, the duke of Orleans could, if necessary, occupy certain strongholds in Guelders.[49] This proved extremely important in light of the worsening relations in the early fifteenth century between the city of Liège and the towns of the principality, on one hand, and the elected administrator of Liège, John of Bavaria, on the other. In 1406, the cities rose in rebellion and drove the newly appointed official

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[45] J. Dabin, "La politique française à Liège au XVe siècle," *Bulletin de l'Institut archéologique liégeois* 43 (1913): 99-190; A. Minder, "La rivalité Orléans-Bourgogne dans la principauté de Liège et l'assassinat du duc d'Orléans par ordre de Jean sans Peur," *Bulletin de la Société verviétoise d'Archéologie et d'histoire* 41 (1954): 121-191; J. Schoos, *Der Machtkampf zwischen Burgund und Orleans unter den Herzögen Philipp dem Kühnen, Johan ohne Furcht von Burgund und Ludwig von Orleans mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Auseinandersetzung im deutsch-französischen Grenzraum* (Luxemburg, 1956); F. Petri, "Compte rendu de Jean Schoos, Der Machtkampf zwischen Burgund und Orléans unter den Herzögen Philipp d. Kuehnen, Johan ohne Furcht von Burgund und Ludwig von Orléans," *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter. Mitteilungen des Instituts für geschichtliche Landeskunde der Rheinlande an der Universität Bonn* 22 (1957): 292-315; P. Harsin, "Liège entre France et Bourgogne," in *Liège et Bourgogne. Actes du Colloque tenu à Liège les 28 et 30 octobre 1968* (Liège, 1972), 193-257.

[46] Ibid., 14, 25-27, 31-33, 36, 39, 52-53, 55-56, 58-59, 67 (docs. 50-51, 75, 96-98, 100, 102, 106, 109, 114-18, 121, 125-27, 182-83, 202, 209-10, 212-13, 240).

[47] A. Verkooren, *Inventaire des chartes et cartulaires de Luxembourg*, 23 vols. (Brussels, 1914-), nos. 1472-74.

[48] F.X. Würth-Paquet, "Table chronologique des chartes et des diplômes relatif à l'histoire de l'ancien pays de Luxembourg, Règne de Wenceslas II, 1383-1419," *Publications de la Section historique de l'Institut grand-ducal de Luxembourg* 3 (1870), 1-238, esp. doc. 370.

[49] Verkooren, *Inventaire*, nos. 1420-21; Jarry, *Vie politique*, 240, 250, 274-75.

to take refuge in Maastricht.[50] Louis of Orleans naturally sided with Liège. As an ally of the principality, he could block all Burgundian expansion eastward. This led him in January, 1407 to extend his activities into the lands of Outre-Meuse, where he claimed possession of Millen, Gangelt, Waldfeucht, and Fauquemont.[51]

All these actions were carried out in a territory that the duke of Burgundy considered as his natural zone of influence. Louis's creation of a political block consisting of Luxemburg, Julich, and Guelders as well as his diplomatic success in the principality of Liège and in the lands of Outre-Meuse helped establish a formidable bloc between the duchy of Brabant and the territories controlled by Burgundy. In frustration, the new Burgundian duke, John the Fearless (r.1404-1419) even attempted to have Louis assassinated[52] when Liège's militia commenced the siege of Maastricht.[53] This action was crucially important to John since Maastricht was the last city remaining faithful to John of Bavaria. Its loss would have led to the triumph of Thierry of Perwez and, therefore, the principality of Liège would have exchanged its Burgundian protectorate for the French prince's control.

III. *The Reign of Anthony of Burgundy* (*1406-1415*)[54]

Anthony, the second son of Philip the Bold, younger brother of John the Fearless and uncle of Philip the Good (r.1419-1467), was appointed governor

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[50] M. Tourneur, "Antoine de Bourgogne, duc de Brabant, la papauté et Liège, lors du schisme de Thierry de Perwez," *Bulletin de l'institut historique belge de Rome* 27 (1952): 293-316; A. Lallemand, *La lutte des États de Liège contre la Maison de Bourgogne, 1390-1492* (Brussels, n.d.); J. Lejeune, *Liège et Bourgogne* (Liège, 1968); Harsin, "Liège," 193-257.

[51] Verkooren, *Inventaire*, no.1472.

[52] B. Schnerb, *Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons, La maudite guerre* (Paris, 1988), 70-77; B. Guenée, *Un meurtre, une société, L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans, 23 novembre 1407* (Paris, 1992).

[53] G.D. Franquinet, "Les sièges de Maestricht en 1407 et 1408, avec annexes," *Annales de la société historique et archéologique à Maestricht* 1 (1854-1855): 205-37; J. Schaepkens, "Les sièges de Maestricht en 1407 et 1408, pendant le règne de Jean de Bavière et la bataille d'Othée," *Publications de la société historique et archéologique dans le duché de Limbourg* 38 (1902): 407-28; R.P.W.J.M. Van Der Heiden and F. Roebroeks, "De belegering 1407-1408 in beeld, Maastricht en de Luikse troebelen van het begin van de 15e eeuw," *Om de Vesting* 4 (1989): 7-20.

[54] A. Mathieu, "Antoine de Bourgogne," in *BNB*, 1:cols. 345-48; F. Quicke, "Antoon I van Brabant," in *Geschiedenis van Vlaanderen*, ed. R. van Roosbroeck, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1936-1949), 3:83-100; R. Van Uytven, "Anton van Bourgondië, in *NBW*, 1:cols. 36-43; S. Mund, "Antoine de Bourgogne, prince français et duc de Brabant (1404-1415)," *RBPH* 76 (1998): 319-55.

of the duchy of Brabant on June 5, 1404.[55] Shortly after the death of Margaret of Mâle, on April 11, 1405, the three heirs to the duchy of Burgundy had met to confirm the clauses of a former treaty sealed on September 27, 1401 which proclaimed that John the Fearless would inherit the duchy of Burgundy, the counties of Flanders, and Artois as well as the lordships of Mechelen and Salins. By this same document, Anthony of Burgundy would inherit the duchy of Limburg, the lordship of Antwerp, and the lands of Outre-Meuse.[56] Philip of Nevers would receive the counties of Nevers and Rethel.[57] This agreement is of prime importance since it shows that the sons of Philip the Bold were able to divide in a friendly manner their parent's patrimony, also pointing to their lasting friendship. This united front would allow effective action not only against the rival princes of the Low Countries, but also within the French court where political battles constantly raged.

The ties between the three brothers quickly grew stronger. On July 21, 1405, John the Fearless, Anthony of Burgundy, Philip of Rethel, and Duke William III of Bavaria (r.1375-1435), count of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland, concluded a defensive alliance.[58] On the same day, the duke of Brabant and the duke of Burgundy agreed to a similar alliance.[59] All these pacts were secretly directed against the duke of Guelders, an ally of Louis of Orleans and Brabant's traditional enemy. They also reinforced Anthony's position within Brabant. Although governor of the principality, he was also a foreign prince who had to confront the estates of the region. His predecessor, Wenceslas of Luxemburg, had discovered how painful ruling in Brabant contrary to the wishes of its parliament could be and Anthony himself would soon encounter the limitations on his own domestic and foreign powers.

With the death of Joan on December 1, 1406, Anthony was recognized by the estates of Brabant as the duchess's legitimate successor. He carried ou the ceremony of the *Joyeuse Entrée* in most of Brabant's cities, with the glaring exception of Maastricht, which refused to welcome him. In October, 1407, Anthony and his troops surrounded the recalcitrant city, forcing its

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[55] De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:719-720 (no. 171).

[56] It is important to note that following these dispositions, the duke of Brabant united once again a number of territories lost during the second half of the fourteenth century. Joan's policy was thus proved right.

[57] AGR, CB, 7252; De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:695-700 (no. 168); Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 7-8, 240-43. See also De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:701-3.

[58] AGR, CB, 7596; U. Plancher, *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne*, 4 vols. (Dijon, 1739-1781), 3: no. 247; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 32-33 and 242.

[59] De Klerk, *Brabantsche*, 2:733 (no. 186).

principal magistrate to accept the new duke. The main objective of this expedition, however, was probably an attack against the duchy of Guelders and not simply the submission of Maastricht.[60] In attacking Guelders, Anthony was acting against one of Brabant's fiercest enemies as well as a region linked to the duke of Orleans. Anthony's first expedition, then, was motivated far more by Burgundian interests then those of Brabant. Letting his brother attack Guelders in October and then having the duke of Orleans murdered in the next month, John the Fearless immediately reestablished a dominant position on the political chessboard of the Low Countries.

Other events disrupted the Low Countries during the same time. In September, 1406, Liège expelled its governor, John of Bavaria, and replaced him with Thierry of Perwez, a noble from Brabant.[61] William III of Bavaria[62] and John the Fearless,[63] his brother-in-law, quickly came to the assistance to the deposed prince. Both the estates of Brabant and Anthony preferred to remain neutral. Though the network of his family alliances might have pushed him to support John of Bavaria, he could not forget that Thierry of Perwez was one of his vassals and that having Liège under the control of such a subordinate would prove a clear advantage for Brabant. Keeping these geopolitical facts in mind, Anthony quickly emerged as an arbiter between the region's enemies. Despite his drive to maintain the peace, however, he could not prevent the passage across Brabant of Bavarian and Burgundian troops on their way to attack the rebellious citizens of Liège whom they crushed at the bloody battle of Othée (September 23, 1408).[64] Though bringing his armies into Brabant, John the Fearless understood the difficult position his brother was in and did not expect Anthony's open support.

On July 16, 1409, Anthony married his second wife, Elizabeth of Görlitz, niece of the Holy Roman Emperor/king of Bohemia, Wenceslas IV of Luxemburg.[65] Through this alliance, the emperor allowed the duke of

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[60] S. Boffa, "L'expédition d'octobre 1407 dirigée par Antoine, duc de Brabant, contre Renaud IV, duc de Juliers et de Gueldre," *RBPH* 77 (1999): 299-328.

[61] Tourneur, "Antoine," 293-316; Harsin, "Liège," 202-7; C. Gaier, *Art et organisation militaire dans la principauté de Liège et dans le comté de Looz au Moyen Age* (Brussels, 1968), 306-12.

[62] L. Devillers, "Documents relatifs à l'expédition de Guillaume IV contre les Liégeois (1407-1409)," *BCRH*, 4th serie, 4 (1877): 3-38.

[63] Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 57-66.

[64] Gaier, *Art*, 312-20; Y. Charlier, "La bataille d'Othée et sa place dans l'histoire de la principauté de Liège," *Bulletin de l'Institut archéologique liégeois* 97 (1985): 138-278.

[65] G. Wynans, "La conclusion du mariage d'Antoine de Brabant et d'Élisabeth de Görlitz (1408-avril 1409)," *Annales de la Société Royale d'Archéologie de Bruxelles* 50 (1961): 297-303;

Brabant to pay Josse of Moravia the surety hanging over Luxemburg, the county of Chiny, and the *avouerie* of Alsace. Josse's premature death might have proved catastrophic for Anthony who had not yet completed this transaction, but, on August 13-14, 1411, Wenceslas confirmed Elizabeth of Görlitz's dowry as it applied to these three territories.[66] In January of the next year at Bastogne, Anthony and his wife were formally inaugurated by the estates of Luxemburg.[67] Part of the region's nobility, however, refused to accept them as legitimate lords. This response was undoubtedly due to the nobles' fear of an authoritarian regime over the region as well as their scattered support for the Armagnacs. This opposition led the duke of Brabant to unleash three expeditions against Luxemburg between 1412 and 1413.[68] Though successful, these campaigns were not sufficient for the full and definitive establishment of his power. Instead, Anthony was faced with a virtual guerrilla warfare that drained Brabant's treasury, and, with his death, the dream of having a single prince ruling both Brabant and Luxemburg also faded.

Though brothers and allies, Anthony and John the Fearless did sometimes come into conflict. Since the thirteenth century, the cities of Antwerp and Mechelen had competed for the monopoly of the *droit d'étape* on salt, fish and oats; i.e., the right to require merchants to stop and sell their goods at local market.[69] In 1411, this economic dispute reached such a bitter stage

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A. Chevalier, *Les Fêtes et les Arts à la Cour de Brabant à l'aube du XVe siècle* (Frankfurt, 1996), 113-20.

[66] Verkooren, *Inventaire*, nos. 1523, 1756.

[67] N. Van Werveke, "Die Erwerbung des Luxemburger Landes durch Anton von Burgund, 1409-1415. Erster Theil : 1409-1412, Juli," in *Programme publié à la clôture de l'année scolaire 1899-1890, à l'athénée royal grand-ducal de Luxembourg* (Luxemburg, 1890), 1-20, esp. 14.

[68] N. Van Werveke, "Auszug aus der Rechnungsablage Jan Raimbauts für die erste Expedition Antons von Burgund, 1412, 2 Januar-20 Juli", in *Programme*, 1-24; idem, "Auszug aus der Rechnungsablage Jan von Schoenvorst für die zweite Expedition Antons von Burgund, 1413, 30 Juni-29 August," in *Programme*, 25-47; F. Quicke, "L'intérêt, du point de vue de l'histoire politique, économique et financière, du troisième compte des expéditions militaires d'Antoine de Bourgogne, duc de Brabant et de Limbourg, dans le duché de Luxembourg (1 septembre 1413-24 décembre 1414)," *Publications de la Section historique de l'Institut grand-ducal de Luxembourg* 64 (1930): 317-468; G. Wynans, "La rébellion des nobles luxembourgeois contre Antoine de Bourgogne, seigneur engagiste 1411-1415," *Tablettes d'Ardenne et Eifel* 2 (1963): 7-34; S. Mund, "Les relations d'Antoine de Bourgogne, duc de Brabant, avec l'Empire," *Publication du Centre européen d'études bourguignonne* (*XIVe-XVIe s.*) 36 (1996): 21-32.

[69] J. Van Balberghe, *Mechelen contra Antwerpen en Brussel. De strijd om de stapelrechten Mechelen-Antwerpen enerzijds, Mechelen-Antwerpen anderzijds, 1233-1785* (Malines, 1953); M. De Laet, "Mechelen versus Antwerpen. De strijd om het bezit en het behoud van de stapels voor vis, zout en haver (1233-1467)," *Handelingen voor de Koninklijke Kring voor Oudheidkunde, Letteren en Kunst van Mechelen* 90 (1986): 57-89.

that it soured relations between the siblings for two years.[70] Only in December, 1413 were they reconciled. The local conflict over the *droit d'étape*, however, would continue for years to come.[71]

On the other hand, such episodes of discord between the brothers were relatively rare. Throughout his reign, Anthony remained John the Fearless's faithful ally. He regularly led armies into France to help his brother against his enemies.[72] Although no major military operations of the Hundred Years War were taking place at the time, the kingdom of France was going through a troubled period in its history marked by the conflict of the Burgundians and the Armagnacs. The nature of Anthony's diplomatic stance in regard to the king of France was largely determined by his brother's relationship to the court of Charles VI.

Anthony's assistance to his brother was not limited to that of a military nature. Starting from 1413, when John the Fearless was out of Charles's favor, the duke of Brabant often functioned as a mediator between his brother and the French king. This position resulted from Anthony's popularity at the French court, which brought him many royal favors.[73] Even with the ascendance of the Armagnac faction, the duke was often mentioned as a member of the royal council.[74] In this central position, Anthony was very active in the negotiations leading to the treaty of Arras (September 4, 1414) that spelled out the official reconciliation between John the Fearless and Charles VI.[75] Indeed their duke spent so much time tending to the affairs of his brother that, as early as November, 1412, Brabant's Estates had already begun to complain concerning his neglect of local matters.[76]

Anthony does not seem to have sought contacts with England, even when the duke of Burgundy established in 1411 close relations with Henry IV (r.1399-1413).[77] For his part, the king of England tended to support Brabant's enemy, the duke of Guelders. By contrast, the duke of Brabant

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70 De Klerk, *Brabantsche Yeesten*, 3:102-4; De Dynter, *Chronique*, 3:188-89.

71 A.V.B., A Thymo, R. 3, f. 327v.

72 Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 29-35, 68, 80-83, 87, 90, 101, 142, 200-2, 242-43.

73 Van Uytven, "Anton," col. 40.

74 *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race recueillies par ordre chronologique*, 21 vols. (Paris, 1723-1849), 9:423, 343, 441, 489, 491, 492, 510, 513, 520, 546; 12:230.

75 J. Finot, *La paix d'Arras (1414-1415)* (Nancy, 1906); L. Mirot, "Autour de la paix d'Arras," *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 75 (1914): 253-327.

76 Mund, "Antoine de Bourgogne," 349; Uyttebrouck, *Gouvernement*, 2:847 (no. 891).

77 No English embassy visited Brabant at that time and there is no mention of the King of England or of one of his officers in S. Mund, "Liste chronologique des ordonnances d'Antoine de Bourgogne (1404-1415)," *Bulletin de la Commission royale des anciennes lois et des ordonnances de Belgique* 39 (1998): 147-264.

was clearly on the side of the French sovereign. He did, after all, meet his death at the battle of Agincourt as victim of the English.[78]

IV. *The Reign of John IV* (*1415-1427*)[79]

In 1412, in order to maintain good relations between the duchy of Brabant and France, John, eldest son of Anthony of Burgundy, was betrothed to Charles VI's daughter, Catherine of France.[80] This proposed marriage, however, never took place. Six years later, the duke of Brabant married Jacqueline of Bavaria, a rich princess who would inherit the counties of Hainault, Holland, and Zeeland.[81] This union proved an opportunity for John to expand the territory under his authority while thwarting an English attempt to engineer a marriage with the Bavarian princess.[82] If such a union had taken place, it would have resulted in the creation of a powerful Anglophile bloc in the Low Countries—something the rulers of France, Burgundy, and Brabant would do almost anything to avoid.

At the beginning of his reign, John, like his father, supported the French cause. A simple anecdote is enough to demonstrate this. In 1416, a diplomatic mission from Brabant to the future Holy Roman Emperor, Sigismund of Luxembourg (r.1410-1437), soured when it came to the delicate subject of the new duke of Brabant's inauguration. The exasperated Sigismund eventually shouted at the representatives of John IV, "Do you thus want to be French?" (*Vultis ita esse Francigene*?).[83] This statement clearly shows the very different state of minds that directed the situation. The court of Sigismund of Luxemburg still considered the duchy of Brabant as belong-

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[78] S. Boffa, "Antoine de Bourgogne et le contingent brabançon à la bataille d'Azincourt (1415)," *RBPH* 72 (1994): 255-84.

[79] C. Piot, "Jean IV," in *BNB*, vol. 10, cols. 275-80; J.M. Romein, "Jan IV," in *Nieuw nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek*, ed. P.C. Molhuysen and F.K.H. Kossmann, 10vols. (Leiden, 1911-1937), vol. 10, cols. 425-427; R. Van Uytven, "Jan IV van Brabant," in *NBW*, vol. 17, cols. 364-77.

[80] A.V.L., R. 5013, f. 80; A.G.R., C.C., R. 2396/1, f. 229 v; R. 2396/11, f. 107.

[81] C. Piot, "Jacqueline de Bavière", in *BNB*, vol. 10, cols. 59-64; F. Von Löher, *Jakobäa von Bayern und ihre Zeit. Acht Bücher Niederländischer Geschichte*, 2 vols. (Nördlingen, 1862-1869); F. De Potter, *Geschiedenis van Jacoba van Beieren* (*1401-1436*) (Brussels, 1881); H.P.H. Jansen, *Jacoba van Beieren* (Den Haag, 1976).

[82] D. Scott and L. Gilliodts Van Severen, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire des relations entre l'Angleterre et la Flandre de 1431 à 1473* (*Cotton Manuscript, Galba, B. 1*) (Brussels, 1896), 381-83.

[83] L. Galesloot, "Revendication du duché de Brabant par Sigismond (1414-1437)," *BCRH*, 4th serie, 5 (1878): 437-70, esp. 446-47.

ing to the Empire while the Estates of Brabant acted like an independent power and concentrated all their attention on the recently renewed Hundred Years War.

The diplomatic probing between France and England in the Low Countries would soon be pushed in a radically different direction by one terrible event. On September 10, 1419, John the Fearless was murdered at Montereau by a supporter of the dauphin, causing a sudden and complete rupture between the future Charles VII (r.1422-1461) and Philip the Good. The house of Burgundy, as well as its ally in Brabant, rapidly moved to the English side.[84] As a result, John IV's reign was marked by a series of almost uninterrupted internal squabbles over the establishment of the new duke's authority.[85] Worse yet, after her father's death in 1417, Jacqueline of Bavaria inherited the counties of Hainault, Holland, and Zeeland. John of Bavaria, brother of the deceased, contested the succession and war broke out in the region.[86] A Brabançon army invaded these territories, but failed in a siege of Dordrecht during the summer of 1418. A year after this failure, John IV concluded his initial treaty with his Bavarian rival.[87] This peace was short-lived, however, when John of Bavaria quickly resumed hostilities. During the summer of 1420, he captured Leiden, but failed in his attempts to win Amersfoort and Geertruidenberg. Soon weary of the conflict, the duke of Brabant opened negotiations with his wife's enemy. On April 21, 1420, he pawned the counties of Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland to John of Bavaria for a period of twelve years.[88]

Jacqueline was outraged by her husband's betrayal. She left him in 1420, fled from Brabant, had her marriage annulled, and three years later wed Humphrey of Lancaster, duke of Gloucester and younger brother of Henry V.[89] After having unsuccessfully demanded the return of the county of Hainault from the duke of Brabant, Jacqueline and her new husband landed

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[84] P. Bonenfant, *Du meurtre de Montereau au traité de Troyes* (Brussels, 1958).

[85] F. Favresse, *L'avènement du régime démocratique à Bruxelles pendant le Moyen Age (1306-1423)* (Brussels, 1932); Uyttebrouck, *Gouvernement*, 1:490-511.

[86] H.P.H. Jansen, *Hoekse en Kabeljauwse twisten* (Bussum, 1966); H.M. Brokken, *Het ontstaan van de Hoekse en Kabeljauwse twisten* (Zutphen, 1982); R. Vaughan, *Philip the Good, The Apogee of Burgundy* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2002), 31-51.

[87] F. Van Mieris, *Groot charterboek der graven van Holland, van Zeeland en heeren van Vriesland*, 4 vols. (Leiden, 1753-1756), 4:521-25; L. Devillers, *Cartulaire des comtes de Hainaut de l'avènement de Guillaume II à la mort de Jacqueline de Bavière*, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1881-1896), 4:250-60.

[88] Van Mieris, *Groot charterboek*, 4:545.

[89] G. Gijsels, "Le départ de Jacqueline de Bavière de la cour de Brabant, 11 avril 1420," in *Miscellanea historica L. van der Essen* (Brussels, 1947), 413-27.

at Calais in October, 1424 at the head of some 4200 men-at-arms.[90] They marched to Hainault, where they were enthusiastically welcomed. The estates of the county approved the actions of their long-absent ruler, soon supporting an attack on Brabant. John IV could do nothing but ask for help from his uncle, Philip the Good. This conflict threatened a reversal of alliances among France's enemies and to avoid this disastrous turn of events, the duke of Bedford, regent of France for his nephew Henry VI, tried to settle the dispute in the Low Countries by prohibiting the posting of new English troops into the region. This led to a precious period of peace for both Brabant and Burgundy. Grateful for this respite, John IV in the summer of 1425 transferred the administration of Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland to Philip the Good for twelve years.[91]

V. *The Reign of Philip of Saint-Pol* (*1427-1430*)[92]

With the death of John IV on April 17, 1427, Brabant's estates quickly moved to accept as their legitimate lord Philip of Saint-Pol, son of Anthony of Burgundy and Joan of Saint-Pol and the brother of the late duke. He began his rule with the best of prospects, and although it lasted for only three years, it was highly significant for Brabant and the region.

In September, 1427 while still single, Philip of Saint-Pol recognized his cousin, Philip the Good, as heir to Brabant in case he should die without a legitimate heir.[93] In the next year, when Philip the Good planned to lead a crusade against the Hussites, the new duke of Brabant pledged 300 men-at-arms for the expedition.[94] In the first years of Philip's reign, then, his relations with Burgundy were still excellent.

Although ruled by a Burgundian prince, Brabant did not actively participate in any of the military operations conducted by Philip the Good at that time. After all, the duchy had recently been involved in a war with England and its estates had decided to boycott English wool. As a result, it was then difficult for Philip of Saint-Pol to simultaneously help the house of Burgundy while defending his own interests or those of Brabant.

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[90] V.K. Vickers, *Humphrey, Duke de Gloucester* (London, 1907), 137-41; See also S. Saygin, *Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester* (*1390-1447*) *and the Italian Humanists* (Leiden, 2002).

[91] T. Van Riemsdijk, *De opdracht van het ruwaardschap van Holland en Zeeland aan Philips van Bourgondië, Bijlagen* (Amsterdam, 1906), 66-72 (n. 3).

[92] E. De Borchgrave, "Philippe de Saint-Pol," in *BNB*, vol. 17, cols. 321-24.

[93] Verkooren, *Inventaire*, vol. 4, no. 1608; Bertholet, *Histoire*, 8:Preuves, pp. v-vi.

[94] This expedition never happend [G. De Lannoy, *Œuvres*, ed. C. Potvin (Leuven, 1878), 242].

The relationship between Burgundy and Brabant grew more strained in 1428 when Brabant's duke entered into negotiations for the hand of Yolande, the daughter of Yolande of Aragon and Louis II of Anjou.[95] With the marriage of her sister, Mary, to the Dauphin on June 2, 1422, the young princess had become Charles VII's sister-in-law. Philip the Good had a very jaundiced view of this union. How could a member of his own family, after all, marry into the hateful clan responsible for his father's murder? What is more, Philip the Good's own sister, Catherine of Burgundy, had been ill-treated by the bride's father, Louis III of Anjou in 1413 before his death in Ghent at the age of thirty-two.[96] It is thus clear why Philip the Good determined to dissuade the duke of Brabant from marrying into the house of Anjou. After all, this was was a family that had clearly expressed its sympathy for the Armagnac side.

The bitter dispute between Philip of Saint-Pol and his uncle would eventually extend to the retainers of each man.[97] On one hand, Jan Bont,[98] chancellor of Brabant and Philip the Good's trusted retainer, was dismissed from his post on June 20, 1429.[99] On the other, the duke of Burgundy ordered his men to aid Engelbert of Nassau,[100] who expended a great deal of effort in neutralizing John (II) Schoonvorst,[101] a strong supporter of Philip of Saint-Pol.[102] Georges Chastellain writes that the duke of Burgundy threatened to take arms against his relative, but it is impossible to know if he really intended to carry out these threats against him.[103] During much of 1430, Philip the Good was busy in France with the siege of Compiegne and in the county of Namur, against which Liége's troops launched a series of surprise attacks.[104] It is thus not certain that he really wanted to fight on several fronts or was even prepared to do so.

An unexpected event would bring peace between these two members of the house of Burgundy. In August, 1430, Philip of Saint-Pol had fallen ill when he was preparing to join his French fiancée; he died on August 4. The duke's premature death was sufficiently startling to allow rumors of poison-

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95 AGR, CC, R. 5 f. 99.

96 G. Chastellain, *Œuvres*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 8 vols. (Brussels, 1863-1866), 2: 74.

97 Uyttebrouck, *Gouvernement*, 1: 516-18.

98 Ibid., 2:666 (no. 32); Britz, "Bont (Jean de ou van) Bontius," in *BNB*, 2: cols. 689-93.

99 A.G.R., C.C., R. 23, f. 160; P. Bonenfant, *Philippe le Bon* (Brussels, 1955), 47-48.

100 Uyttebrouck, *Gouvernement*, 2: 715-16 (no. 178).

101 Ibid., 2: 733-34 (no. 232).

102 Ibid., 1: 517-18 (no. 286).

103 Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2: 74.

104 Gaier, *Art*, 320-25; T. Loncin, "La guerre namuroise (1429-1431): un épisode de la rivalité Liège-Bourgogne au XVe siècle," *Bulletin de l'Institut archéologique liégeois* 106 (1994): 139-63.

ing to circulate through both Brabant and Burgundy.[105] For some, Philip the Good was obviously guilty of this act. Others blamed Pierre of Luxemburg, count of Brienne and Conversan and lord of Enghien.[106] This supporter of Philip the Good was not only a member of the duke of Brabant's council but would also succeed Philip in the county of Saint-Pol. To get to the truth, servants and officials of the late duke, including the chamberlain, John Tallevande, were tortured and physicians from the University of Leuvain performed an autopsy on Philip's body. Despite the rampant suspicion, the duke's death was ruled a natural one when an ulcer located between two walls of the stomach was discovered.

After the estates of Brabant had convened several times, Philip the Good was accepted as the new duke of Brabant. On October 5, 1430, he performed his *Joyeuse Entrée* into Louvain. From that moment, the destiny of the principality, though it maintained some privileges and a certain degree of autonomy, was closely linked to the fate of the "Burgundian empire."

VI. *Analysis and Conclusions*

Succession to the duchies of Brabant and Limburg proved a question of prime importance throughout the reign of Joan of Brabant after the death of her husband. The events described above reinforce the conclusions of our two great historians, Henri Laurent and Fritz Quicke, but also leaves room for new interpretations. It is true that Philip the Bold had made every effort to seize control of the duchies as well as the lands of Outre-Meuse. But his genius would never have been enough to accomplish these goals if Joan had not harbored a sincere affection for him which led to her support of her niece along with that lady's husband, the Burgundian duke.

Likewise, Philip's machinations would have accomplished little with the experienced estates of Brabant, which had regularly rejected his various projects. During this period, the indigenous dukes of Brabant as well as its estates had clearly not been influenced or overwhelmed by the prestige or the power of the house of Burgundy. Of course, in moments of weakness, as during the second Guelders war, these authorities were ready to make some concessions to their ambitious, Burgundian neighbor. But when the situation turned in Brabant's favor, as during the third war of Guelders,

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[105] De Dynter, *Chroniques*, 3: 497-98; De Klerk, *Brabantsche Yeesten*, 3: 668-69; Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2: 75-77; Monstrelet, *Chroniques*, 4: 399-400.

[106] Uyttebrouck, *Gouvernement*, 2: 709-10 (no. 161).

they did not hesitate to deal with extreme disrespect in regard to the Burgundian duke. This same scenario applies to Philip the Bold's "conquest" of the lands of Outre-Meuse and the duchy of Limburg. At this time, Joan had already realized that Brabant's future lay with the Burgundian dynasty. By surrendering her authority over these territories, she anticipated the inevitable while reducing her debt.

By the end of the fourteenth century, it was clear that Brabant had lost much of its power in comparison to the great swath of territories controlled by the duke of Burgundy. Brabant thus had few options but to seek both protection and geopolitical opportunities from its powerful neighbor. The resulting relationship was obviously not a union of equals, but was still one in which Brabant won as much as it lost while maintaining excellent relations with the Burgundian dukes.

It is thus not surprising that the duchess of Brabant chose to deal with the duke of Burgundy rather than her natural protector, the emperor. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the emperors had consistently displayed a distant indifference to Brabant's misfortune. Even during the reign of Wenceslas of Luxemburg, the emperor was an unreliable ally, even when on February 20, 1357, Joan had promised to return her duchy to imperial control in case she died without issue. By and large, the Holy Roman Empire played only a marginal role in Brabant's foreign policy during this period.

Anthony of Burgundy's accession was fortunate for Brabant. Even though he largely behaved as a Burgundian prince, he did not forget that he was also the duke of Brabant. In some circumstances, he avoided dealing openly with his brother so as not displease his subjects. This was clearly the case during Liège's political meltdown when he took great care to remain neutral in the events leading up to the battle of Othée. On another occasion, he chose to defend his duchy's interests, although this would lead to a period of tension with John the Fearless.

His overall policy was to continue Brabant's traditional policy of maintaining its independence; that is, to launch attacks against the duchy of Guelders (1407 and 1412-1413) and extend Brabantine influence to the east by attempting to gain control of Liège (1406-1408), Batenburg (1412-1413), and Luxemburg (1412-1415).

Anthony's involvement in eastern expansion was important not only for Brabant but also for Burgundy. These martial actions struck at a constellation of allies in the Low Countries with the house of Orleans at its center that directly threatened Brabant. In geographical terms, the duchy was

located between the Orleanist allies Luxemburg, Liège, Outre-Meuse, Guelders, and the county of Flanders. Several of these states, most especially Liège and Guelders, were Brabant's traditional enemies. Several lords of the duchy of Limburg and of the lands of Outre-Meuse, though normally numbered among Brabant's vassals, had recently rendered homage to Louis of Orleans. With these contemporaneous political events in mind, Anthony's tenacity in attempting to gain control of Luxemburg is not surprising. His actions did not merely represent an attempt to occupy a vast territory, but were also connected with his desire to eliminate the last memories of the house of Orleans's former dominance in the region.

The reign of John IV was a unique one. The international conflict over succession to the counties of Hainault, Holland, and Zeeland spilled into the Brabant duke's family life, leading directly to his divorce from Jacqueline of Bavaria. The duke had obviously been overtaken by events. This domestic dispute reached such a fever pitch in 1420 that John was obliged to name a governor for Brabant who would remain in power for the next two years. Through his marriage, the duke gained control over a large group of territories, including Brabant, Limburg, Outre-Meuse, Hainault, Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland. However, he was not able to take advantage of this territorial windfall. As Uyttebrouck has demonstrated, the process of centralization of the Low Countries had begun well before the emergence of Burgundian influence in the region.[107] One cannot help thinking that the fifteenth century would have been very different if Jacqueline of Bavaria had been recognized as the rightful authority over the land she had inherited from her father or if John IV or Philip of Saint-Pol had produced an heir. The duchy of Brabant might have remained an independent principality which very well could have prevented Burgundy's systematic acquisition of the various principalities of the Low Countries. In fact, Brabant's central position and the power the duchy drew from it ultimately provided an excellent platform for Philip the Good.

Although the reign of Philip of Saint-Pol lasted just over three years, it was highly significant for Brabant and the region. It overlapped with the years 1429-1430 which marked a turning point in the Hundred Years War, centering on Joan of Arc's short career, that saved the kingdom of France. Brabant, although ruled by a Burgundian prince, did not actively participate in any of the military operations conducted by Philip the Good at that time.

[107] On February 18, 1409, Pope Benedict XIII (r.1394-1424) named Anthony Governor General and Defender of the town and territory of Liège during the duration of the papal siege. This document is edited in Tourneur, "Antoine," 314-16.

Instead, the duchy had recently been involved in a war with England sparked by Humphroy of Gloucester's marriage to Jacqueline of Bavaria. It thus proved difficult for Philip of Saint-Pol to help his cousin, Philip the Good, and defend simultaneously the interests of his duchy. What is more, the same period saw numerous meetings of Brabant's estates enacting boycotts of England's wool exports. Although running the risk of a Burgundian backlash, Philip of Saint-Pol also engaged in several matrimonial negotiations that might have brought him closer to the French court.

Taken together the above-discussed reigns contributed to a gradual process. Anthony defended the interests of his family and that of his duchy. The ties that bound Anthony to John the Fearless were extremely strong. On the other hand, Philip of Saint-Pol evinced a completely different attitude. Choosing an independent course in the administration of his duchy, he was not always willing to be influenced by his Burgundian relatives. His role as head of Brabant thus outweighed any blood ties. He was thus not afraid to get closer to France, even if it made Burgundy furious . If Anthony could still be viewed by his subjects as a French or Burgundian prince, Philip of Saint-Pol acted like a true Brabançon.

To understand the decisions made by Brabant's rulers, it is important to remember that these men did not enjoy full freedom of action. They had to satisfy the duchy's estates as well as those of the region's cities.[108] Contrary to general opinion, the role of the estates was not limited to domestic policy. In the period between the deaths of John III (1355) and that of Philip of Saint-Pol (1430), a quarter of these parliamentary meetings focused on foreign affairs.[109]

These were not the only pressures on the duke. In his inner circle of advisers, the partisans of Burgundy, France, and England contested with one another in trying to win the prince for their cause. A common practice of the time was for lords to increase their influence in Brabant's ducal court by endowing the duke's councilors and vassals with numerous fief-rentes.[110]

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[108] J. Chabot, "Een geschil tussen Anton van Bourgondië, hertog van Brabant, en Reinald IV, hertog van Gulik en Gelre, in 1412 en 1413," *Gelre vereeniging tot beoefening van Geldersche geschiedenis, oudheidkunde en recht. Bijdragen en mededelingen* 45 (1942): 1-77.

[109] A. Uyttebrouck, "Phénomène de centralisation dans les Pays-Bas avant Philippe le Bon," in *RBPH* 69 (1991): 872-904.

[110] G. Boland, "Un siècle d'alliance interurbaines en Brabant," *Miscellanea historica A. de Meyer* 1 (1946): 613-25; P. Godding, "Le pouvoir urbain en Brabant au Moyen Age," in *Wavre 1222-1972* (Gembloux, 1973), 95-122; A. Uyttebrouck, "Le rôle politique des villes brabançonnes au bas moyen âge," *Bulletin trimestriel du Crédit Communal de Belgique* 116 (1976): 115-30; idem, *Gouvernement*, 1:429ff; Avonds, *Brabant*, 223-32.

Tossed between the Estates and their councilors, between the public good and their personal interests, dukes sometimes hesitated, changed their minds, or could not react quickly in times of crisis. Under so many conflicting pressures, it was sometimes very difficult to conduct a coherent foreign policy.

The Hundred Years War had an enormous impact on Brabant. The frequent rebellions in the county of Flanders and the French embargo against that principality advanced Brabant's economic development while the struggle against Guelders and its allies largely occupied Brabant's military attention during the second half of the fourteenth and early fifteenth century, almost leading it into bankruptcy. Finally, the attack on the duchy by Humphrey of Gloucester gave the first signal that the short-lived Anglo-Burgundian alliance was coming to an end.

The interest the great powers showed toward Brabant perfectly mirrored the rhythms of conflict between France and England in this period. When they managed to negotiate a truce, the rival sovereigns seemed satisfied with the duchy's neutrality. While Brabant played a crucial role during the first phase of the conflict, its importance to England and France faded when military operations shifted outside the Low Countries. Thus, according to the research of Mirot and. Deprez, twelve British embassies visited the duchy of Brabant during the last twenty-seven years of the reign of John III, while there were no more than four for the next seventy-five years. Indeed, three of these occurred in a single year: 1358.[111] With the incredible rise of Burgundy in the Low Countries, the kings of France and England would become much more interested in friendship with the Burgundian dukes than with the rulers of Brabant.[112]

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[111] Uyttebrouck, *Gouvernement*, 1:465.

[112] B.D. Lyon, "The Fief-Rente in the Low Countries : An Evaluation," *RBPH* 32 (1954): 422-65; idem, *From Fief to Indenture. The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); H. Laurent et F. Quicke, *Accession*, 81-86.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE: GENEALOGIES
MEDIEVAL POPES AND RULERS

I. Medieval and Renaissance Popes
II. Kings of England
III. Kings of Scotland
IV. Kings of France
V. French Noble Houses
    a. Anjou
    b. Brittany
    c. Burgundy
    d. Foix
VI. Low Countries
    a. Brabant
    b. Flanders
    c. Guelders
    d. Hainault
    e. Holland
VII. Holy Roman Emperors
VIII. Duchy of Milan
IX. German Noble Houses
    a. Hapsburg
    b. Luxemburg
X. Spanish Rulers
    a. Castile
    b. Crown of Aragon
    c. Navarre
    d. Portugal
XI. Muslim Rulers
    a. Granada
    b. Ottoman Turks
XII. Byzantine Rulers

Popes

I. *Medieval and Renaissance popes*

Nicholas IV (1288-1292)
Celestine V (1294)
Boniface VIII (1294-1303)
Benedict XI (1303-1304)

Avignon Papacy (1305-1378)
Clement V (1305-1314)
John XXII (1316-1334)
Nicholas V (1328-1330)*
Benedict XII (1334-1342)
Clement VI (1342-1357)
Innocent VI (1352-1362)
Urban V (1362-1370)
Gregory XI (1370-1378)

Great Western Schism (1378-1417)
Urban VI (1378-1389) [Rome]
Clement VII (1378-1394)* [Avignon]
Boniface IX (1389-1404) [Rome]
Benedict XIII (1394-1424)* [Avignon]
Innocent VII (1404-1406) [Rome]
Gregory XII (1406-1417) [Rome]

Council of Pisa (1409)
Alexander V (1409-1410) [Pisa]
John XXIII (1410-1415)*(?) [Pisa]

Council of Constance (1414-1418)
Martin V (1417-1431)
Clement VIII (1424-1429)*
Benedict XIV (1424)*
Eugene IV (1431-1447)
Felix V (1439-1449)
Nicholas V (1447-1455)

European Rulers and Nobility

II. *Kings of England*

Plantagenet Dynasty
Edward I (1272-1307)
Edward II (1307-1327)
Isabelle (1327-1330) [Regent for Edward III]
Roger Mortimer (1327-1330) [Regent for Edward III]
Edward III (1327-1377)
Richard II (1377-1399)

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* Anti-Popes

Lancaster Dynasty
Henry IV (1399-1413)
Henry V (1413-1422)
Henry VI (1422-1461; 1470-1471)

York Dynasty
Edward IV (1461-1483)
Edward V (1483)
Richard III (1483-1485)

III. *Kings of Scotland*

William "the Lion" (1165-1214)
Alexander II (1214-1249)
Alexander III (1249-1286)
Margaret (1286-1290)
John Baliol (1292-1296)

Interregnum (1296-1306)

Robert I "the Bruce" (1306-1329)
David II (1329-1371)

Stuart Dynasty
Robert II Stuart (1371-1390)
Robert III (1390-1424)
James I(1424-1437)
James II (1437-1460)
James III (1460-1488)

IV. *Kings of France*

Capetian Dynasty
Philip IV (1285-1314)
Louis X (1314-1316)
Philip V (1316-1322)
Charles IV (1322-1328)

Valois Dynasty
Philip VI (1328-1350)
John II (1350-1364)
Charles V (1364-1380)
Charles VI (1380-1422)
Charles VII (1422-1461)
Louis XI (1461-1483)

Charles VIII (1483-1498)
Louis XII (1498-1515)

V. *French Noble Houses*

a. *Anjou*
Charles I (1266-1285)
Charles II (1285-1309)
Robert II (1309-1343)
Joanna I (1342-1382)
Charles III (1382-1386)
Ladislas (1386-1414)

b. *Brittany*
Arthur II (1305-1312)
John III "the Good" (1312-1341)

– War of Breton Succession (1341-1364)
John IV (1341-1345))
Charles of Blois (1341-1364)

John V (1364-1399)
John VI (1399-1442)
Francis I (1442-1450)
Peter II (1450-1457)
Arthur III (1457-1458)
Francis II (1458-1488)
Anne (1488-1514), *marries Charles VIII of France*

c. *Burgundy*
Eudes IV (1315-1349)
Philip I of Rouvre (1349-1361)

– Valois Dukes
Philip "the Bold" (1364-1404)
John "the Fearless" (1404-1419)
Philip "the Good" (1419-1467)
Charles "the Bold" (1467-1477)

d. *Foix*
Gaston I (1302-1315)
Gaston II (1315-1343)
Gaston III "Phoebus" (1343-1391)
Matthew (1391-1398)
Archimbald (1398-1423)
John (1413-1436)
Gaston IV (1413-1472

VI. *Low Countries*

a. *Brabant*
Henry II (1235-1248)
Henry III (1248-1261)
Henry IV (1261-1267)
John I (1267-1294)
John II (1294-1312)
John III (1312-1355)
Joanna (1355-1404)

b. *Flanders*
Guy de Dampierre (1278-1304)
Robert of Béthune (1305-1322)
John (1304-1331)
Louis I (1322-1346)
Louis II de Male (1346-1384), *succeeded by the Valois Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Bold*

c. *Guelders*
– House of Wassenberg
Otto II (1229-1271)
Reinoud I (1271-1318)
Reinoud II (1318-1343)
Reinoud III (1343-1361)
Edward (1361-1371)
Reinoud III (1371)

– House of Jülich-Hengebach
William I (1371-1402)
Reinoud IV (1402-1423)`

d. *Hainault*
John I (1246-1257)
John II (1257-1304)
William III (1304-1337)
William IV (1337-1345)
William V (1356-1389)
Albert (1389-1404)
William VI (1404-1417)

e. *Holland*
Floris IV (1222-1234)
William II (1234-1256)
Floris V (1256-1296)
John I (1296-1299)

John II (1300-1304)
William III (1304-1337)
William IV (1337-1345)
Margaret (1345-1356)
William V (1356-1389)
Albert (1389-1404)
William VI (1404-1417)

VII. *Holy Roman Emperors*

Non-Dynastic
Richard of Cornwall (1257-1262)
Alfonso X of Castile (1257-1284)
Rudolf I of Hapsburg (1273-1291)
Adolf of Nassau (1292-1298)
Albert I of Habsburg (1298-1308)
Henry VII of Luxemburg (1308-1313)
Louis IV Wittelsbach (1314-1347)
Frederick of Habsburg (1325-1330)
Charles IV of Luxemburg (1347-1378)
Günther of Schwarzburg (1347-1349)
Wenzel of Luxemburg (1378-1400)
Rupert of the Palatinate (1400-1410)
Sigismund of Luxemburg (1410-1437)
Jobst of Moravia (1410-1411)

Hapsburg Domination
Albert II (1438-1439)
Frederick III (1440-1493)
Maximilian I (1493-1513)

VIII. *Duchy of Milan*

Visconti Dukes
Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1395-1402)
Gian Maria Visconti (1402-1412)
Filippo Maria Visconti (1412-1447)

Ambrosian Republic (1447-1450)

Sforza Dukes
Francesco I Sforza (1450-1466)
Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1466-1476)
Gian Galeazzo Sforza (1476-1494)
Lodovico Sforza (1494-1499/1500)
King Louis XII of France (1499/1500-1512)

Massimiliano Sforza (1512-1515)
King Francis I of France (1515-1521)
Francesco II Sforza (1521-1535)

Milan falls under Spanish rule

IX. *German Noble Houses*

a. *Hapsburg*
Rudolf I (1273-1291)
Albert I (1398-1308)
Frederick I (1325-1330)
Albert II (1330-1358)
Albert III (1358-1395)
Albert IV (1397-1404)
Albert V (1404-1439)
Ladislas (1440-1459)

b. *Luxemburg*
Henry VII (1308-1313)
John of Bohemia (1310-1346)
Charles IV (1346-1378)
Wenceslas of Bohemia (1378-1400)
Sigismund (1410-1437)

X. *Spanish Rulers*

a. *Castile*
Alfonso X (1252-1284)
Sancho IV (1284-1296)
Fernando IV (1296-1312)
Alfonso XI (1312-1350)
Pedro I (1350-1366/69)
Enrique II (1366/69-1379)
Juan I (1379-1390)
Enrique III (1390-1406)
Juan II (1406-1454)
Enrique IV (1454-1474)
Isabella I (1474-1504), *married to Fernando II of Aragon*

b. *Crown of Aragon*
– House of Barcelona
Alfonso II [Alfons I] (1163-1196)
Pedro II [Pere I] (1196-1213)
Jaime I [Jaume I] (1213-1276)
Pedro III [Pere II] (1276-1285)

Alfonso III [Alfons II] (1285-1291)
Jaime II [Jaume II] (1291-1327)
Alfonso IV [Alfons III] (1327-1336)
Pedro IV [Pere III] (1336-1387)
Juan I [Joan I] (1387-1395)
Martin I [Martí I] (1395-1410)

Interregnum (1410-1412)

– Trastámara Dynasty
Fernando I [Ferran I] (1412-1416)
Alfonso V [Alfons IV] (1416-1458)
Juan II [Joan II] (1458-1479)
Fernando II [Ferran II] (1479-1516), *married to Isabella I*

c. *Navarre*
Charles I "the Bad" (1322-1328)
Joanna II (1328-1349), *married to Philip of Evereux*
Charles II (1349-1387)
Charles III (1387-1425)
Blanca (1425-1441), *married to Juan II of Aragon*
Carlos of Viana (1421-1461), *regent in Navarre (1441-1451)*

Civil War (1451-1461)

Blanca (1461-1464)
Leonor (1464-1479), *marries Count Gaston IV of Foix*
Francisco I (1479-1483)
Catalina (1483-1512), *marries Jean d'Albret*

d. *Portugal*
Burgundian House
Afonso III (1245-1279)
Dinis (1279-1325)
Afonso IV (1325-1357)
Pedro I (1357-1367)
Fernando I (1367-1383)

Contest for Portuguese Throne (1383-1385)

– Avis Dynasty
Juan I (1385-1433)
Eduardo I (1433-1438)
Afonso V (1438-1481)
Juan II (1481-1495)
Emanuel I (1495-1521)

XI. *Muslim Rulers*

a. *Granada*
Naṣrid Dynasty
Muḥammad I (1232-1273)
Muḥammad II (1273-1302)
Muḥammad III (1302-1309)
Naṣr (1309-1314)
Ismāʿīl I (1314-25)
Muḥammad IV (1325-1333)
Yūsuf I (1333-1354)
Muḥammad V (1354-1359; 1362-1391)
Ismāʿīl II (1359-1360)
Muḥammad VI (1360-1362)
Yūsuf II (1391-1392)
Muḥammad VII (1392-1408)
Yūsuf III (1408-1417)
Muḥammad VIII (1417-1419; 1427-1429)
Muḥammad IX (1419-1427; 1429-1445; 1447-1453)
Yūsuf IV (1430-1432)
Muḥammad X (1445-1448)
Muḥammad XI (1448-1454)
Yūsuf V (1445, 1450, 1462-1463)
Sa'īd (1454-1464)
Abu'l– Ḥasan 'Alī (1464-1485)
Muḥammad XII (1482-1492)
Muḥammad XIII (1485-1487)

b. *Ottoman Turks*
ʿOṣman I (1290-1326)
Orkhân I (1326-1359)
Murâd I (1359-1389)
Bâyezīd I (1389-1402)
Mehmed I (1402-1421)
Murâd II (1421-1451)
Mehmed II "the Conqueror" (1451-1481)

XII. *Byzantine Rulers*

Paleologi
Michael VIII (1260-1282)
Andronicus II (1282-1328)
Michael IX (1295-1320)
Andronicus III (1328-1341)
John V (1341-1391)

John VI (1347-1354)
Andronicus IV (1376-1379)
John VII (1390)
Manuel II (1391-1425)
John VIII (1425-1448)
Constantine XIII (1448-1453)

APPENDIX TWO

BATTLES, CAMPAIGNS, TREATIES

1337	Jacob Van Artevelde's Uprising in Ghent and other cities (December, 1337-June 13, 1338) Cadzand, (November 9, 1337) (battle)
1339	First English Campaign: Invasion of France from the Netherlands (Autumn)
1340	Sluys (June 24) (naval engagement) Siege of Tournai (July-September)
1341	French invasion of Brittany (September-November)
1342	Hennebont (siege) English campaigns in Brittany (July-December)
1345	English invasion of Gascony (Summer) Bergerac (August) Auberoche (October 21)
1346	Edward III's chevauchée through Normandy (Summer) Crécy (August 26) Cortay (naval engagement) Neville's Cross (October 17)
1346-1347	Siege of Calais (August-August)
1347	Aiguillon (May) Le Crotoye (naval engagement) (August 24)
1350	Winchelsea (naval engagement) (August 29)
1355	*Chevauchée* of the Black Prince through Armagnac and Languedoc (October-December)
1356	Poitiers (Maupertuis) (September 19)
1357	Cadsand (November 10)

1359	Edward III's unsuccessful *chevauchée* through northern France (November, 1359-April, 1360)
1360	*Treaty of Brétigny (May)* *Treaty of Calais (October)*
1361	Brignais (April 6)
1364	Cocherel (May) Auray (September 27)
1366	Free Company invasion of Castile (Winter-Spring) Montauban (August 14)
1367	Black Prince's invasion of Castile (Winter-Spring) Nájera (Navarette) (April 3)
1369	Montiel (March 13) French attack on the Isle of Wight (naval engagement) Burning of Portsmouth (naval engagement) Lussac
1370	Siege and sack of Limoges (September) Pont Valain (October 2)
1372	La Rochelle (June 22) (naval engagement) Guernsey (naval engagement) Duke of Lancaster's *chevauchée* Chizai (July)
1379	Earl of Buckingham's *chevauchée*
1382	Beverhoutsveld (May 3) Siege of Oudenaarde (November) Roosebeke (Rosbecque; Westrozebeke) (November 27)
1385	Aljubarrota (August 14)
1387	Margate (March 24) (naval engagement)
1402	Homildon Hill (September)
1408	Othée (September 23)
1415	Siege of Harfleur (Autumn) Agincourt (October 25)

1416	Seine Mouth (August 15) (naval engagement)
1418	Siege of Rouen (surrendered January 19)
1420	*Treaty Of Troyes* (*May*)
1421	Beaugé (March 22)
1423	Cravant (July 31)
1424	Verneuil (August 17)
1428-1429	Siege of Orléans (October-May)
1429	Herrings (Rouvray) (February 12) Orléans (May 6-7) Patay (June 18) Siege of Paris (August)
1430	Siege of Compiegne (May)
1436	French retake Paris (April 13)
1450	Formigny (April 25) Blanquefort (November 1)
1453	Castillon (July 17)

APPENDIX THREE

ORIGINAL LANGUAGES

The original language of quotations translated into English are included under the author's name and are listed by footnote number.

Boffa

25: *considéré que lesdits chasteaux, villes et chastellenies, de reson et par nature, doivent escheoir et advenir à son dit nepveu, à cause de sa très chière et très amée niepce, Marguerite de Flandres, … sa femme.*

26: *Comme nostre très chière et très amée niepce Marguerite, duchesse de Bourgongne, contesse de Flandres, … par raison et droit de nature doye succéder et hériter en nostre duché et païs de Brabant… et que par notre très chier et très amé frère Phelippe, fils de roy de France, duc de Bourgogne, conte de Flandres, … nostre dit païs pourra mieulx et plus puissamment et seurement estre maintenu et gouverné en paix et tranquillité contre tous, que par autre prince ou seigneur ou dame quelconques.*

103: *Mais quant le duc bourgongnon apprint que ainsy en iroit, et que remède n'y sauroit mettre que par force, donna bien à entendre que par force et puissance y remédieroit bien.*

Chapman

7: *Ef aeth heddiw yn ddiwael/ Gyda Rhys i gadw yr hael/O frodyr ffydd a rhai maeth/A cheraint, mau awch hiraeth,/Ymy, i ymwrdd â Ffrainc.*

8: *Y ffrwyn ym mhen brenin Ffrainc… Barbwr fu fal mab Erbin, A gwayw a chledd trymwedd trin; Eilliaw a'i law a'i allu, Bennau a barfau y bu.*

14: *Ef a roes Duw, nawddfoes nawd,/ Gaer I'm cadw, gwiwrym ceudawd,/ Cystal, rhag ofn dial dyn,/ Â' Galais rhag ei elyn.*

Curry

2: *qui fuist le pluis fort ville cestes parties du mond et le pluis grande enemy as lieges du roy par seage en brief temps sanz effusion du sang de son peuple.*

11: pur la garde d'icelle ville y ad mys ascuns seigneurs et plousours autres gentz darmes et archers a ses graundes coustages et dispenses et tiele ordenaunce faite pur la save garde de la dite ville.

18: *non longe post nobilem conquestum suum ville sue de Harfleu volans et*

affectans pro tuicione et securitate ejusdem quod soli Anglici et nulli alii ipsam inhabitarent domos, edificia, et alia tenementa, tam integra quam ruinosa.

22: *un sufficient persone pour veoir lestat de mesme la ville et en especial de lartillerie* [*et de prendre laconte de* (*deleted*)] *faire paiement au capitaine illeoques et a ses souldeours et ent faire report au roy.*

24: *instruction touchant la governance de la dite ville en cas que le Conte de Dorset en vuille departir.*

37: *extracta iste primi rotuli monstracionum ex libro de particulis compoti Thesaurarii ville de Harefleu.*

44: *trespoysantz et ad tourne au grande disease vieuez toutesfois la grande necessite que les ditz foial lieges de mon dit seigneur ont souffrez et souffrent de jour en autre pour default des choses susdites les qu*els *lieges ne pourront bien longement endurer sans la stuffure des vitailles et les autres choses.*

55: *de passer avant vers la ville de hareflieu a demoerer sur la sauvegarde de mesme la ville jusques a la venue du roy illoeques.*

63: *eo modo sicut janitores nostri villarum nostrarum Calesie et Harfleu.*

126: *pour en icelle adviser le lieu et place ou se levoit ung chastel qui advise a ester fait ou hable de la dite ville pour la seurete et deffense de la dite ville et pour laugmentation dicelle.*

Odio

9: *plusieurs femmes qu'il fit mourir successivement.*

13: *il confessa spontanément et déclara qu'il avait commis et perpétré d'autres grands et énormes crimes, iniquement, depuis le commencement de sa jeunesse, contre Dieu et ses commandements et qu'il avait offensé notre Sauveur du fait du mauvais gouvernement qu'il avait eu dans son enfance, où, sans frein, il s'était appliqué à tout ce qui lui plaisait, et s'était complu à tous les actes illicites, et il pria ceux des assistants qui avaient des enfants de les instruire dans les bonnes doctrines et de leur donner l'habitude de la vertu pendant leur jeunesse et leur enfance.*

15: *Pour nous, les vices et les crimes de Rais, c'est, en majeure partie, l'éducation qu'il reçut, ou plutôt qu'il ne reçut point, qui en porte la responsabilite.*

25: *Dès qu'il veut de l'or, il en a! Mais c'est pour le distribuer incontinent …* [and here Dubu quotes directly from the complaints of the *Mémoire des héritiers* [heirs] of 1436:] '*…à ses poursuivants, à ses palefreniers, à ses pages, à ses valets,*

gens de bas état, qui l'appliquaient à leur profit et le convertissaient en folles plaisances; il n'en voulait jamais ouïr aucun compte ni raison, ni savoir même comment et en quels usages se distribuaient ses deniers; car il ne s'inquiétait nullement comment il en allait, pourvu qu'il eut toujours de l'argent à follement dépenser.

40: *La plupart des fêtes collectives, familiales ou publiques, dégénéraient en orgies.*

49: *vivait comme séparée de son mari, au château d'Ingrande, où celui-ci ne la visitait jamais*.

56: *Gilles à l'âge de vingt ans prend l'administration de tout son bien; il en use dès lors à son plaisir, sans prendre conseil de Jean de Craon, qui a encore 'en bail' le gouvernement de ses biens.*

58: L*e honteux traité de Troyes venait d'être signé, laissant les Anglais maîtres de la France.*

59: *Les funérailles du pauvre Charles VI, à Saint-Denis, le 21 octobre 1422, semblaient devoir être celles de la patrie*.

66: *il les fait tous pendre à de hautes perches qui ont été fichées en terre, avec des crocs à l'extremité pour tenir les cordes*. Furthermore, *Gilles de Rais est demeuré à les regarder s'agiter, le cou dans le lacet, jusqu'aux derniers spasmes de l'agonie.*

68: *l'année que le seigneur de la Suze, son aïeul, décéda*.

69: *qu'il les fit et les perpétra suivant son imagination et sa pensée, sans le conseil de personne,et selon son propre sens*.

73: *ledit sire leur coupait lui-même la gorge,* (but that on other occasions)*, Gilles de Sillé, Henriet et Poitou la leur coupait dans sa chambre.*

76: *Roger de Bricqueville n'ignorait rien, absolument rien, des plaisirs et des crimes de Gilles; il en a 'pris sa.*

95: *Chargé par le roi Charles VII de conduire Jeanne d'Arc et de veiller sur elle dans les combats, il la suivit de Chinon jusque sous les murs de Paris; il ne l'abandonna jamais et paraît même lui avoir été fidèle jusqu'aux environs de Rouen où elle était prisonnière.*

103: *l'oisiveté, une avidité insatiable de mets délicats et la fréquente absorption de vins chauds entretinrent principalement en lui un état d'excitation qui le porta à perpétrer tant de péchés et de crimes.*

109: *elle part sans ordres pour Compiègne. Elle y arrive le 23 mai* [*1430*]*, tente une sortie, est faite prisonnière le jour même*.

115: *que ledit Gilles de Rais lui donnât quelques membres d'enfant; lequel Gilles, après cela, donna audit François la main, le coeur et les yeux d'un jeune garçon, pour les offrir au diable de la part dudit Gilles.*

118: *la vergine era la, in piedi davanti a lui, diritta come un giovane castagno, mobile ed ardita come un cerbiatto. E tutto il cuore e tutta la carne di Gilles gridavano le parole di amore B*

125: *En telle manière advient souvent à ceulx qui vuellent faire à leurs testes sans croire conseil d'aultrui.*

150: *une simple démonstration de force, une parade.*

152: *Der masslose Aufwand den Gilles de Rais trieb, seine unsinnige Verschwendung und Grossmannsucht diente gewiss in erster Reihe dazu, seinem eitlen Herzen Genuge zu tun. Aber sein Auftreten hatte noch einen anderen Grund. Er wollte nicht nur, er musste die Menschen auch blenden, er musste ihnen Sand in die Augen streuen, damit sie blind blieben und ihn nicht in seinem wahren Licht sahen. Wenn er so viel hervortat, so zeigte er sich auf der einen Seite nur, um sich auf der andern zu verdecken. Und was hatte er nicht zu verbergen und zu verstecken in seinen dunklen, verschwiegenen Schlössern!*

156: *Gilles, une fois de plus, abandonne l'affaire commencée, s'il se peut laissant à son frère le soin de conduire les troupes à Laon.*

159: *lesdits enfants furent tués, à ce qu'il croit, par lesdits Gilles de Rais, Gilles de Sillé et Roger de Briqueville, avant que lui, témoin, ne demeurât avec ledit Gilles;»*

162: *Wie viele Schätze waren ihm nicht in die Wiege gelegtworden, nach denen andere Sterbliche ihr ganzes Leben lang vergeblich ringen und trachten, und wie hatte er sie benutzt? Und wenn er alle Wünsche frei gehabt hatte, er hätte kaum mehr begehren konnen, als er besass: einen grossen berühmten Namen, ein reines, fleckenloses Wappen, unermessliche Reichtümer, die herrlichsten Besitzungen, Ansehen, Ehre und Macht "Wer von seinesgleichen war so hoch gestiegen und war so tief gefallen? …Und wer trug die Schuld? Er allein, er ganz allein."*

163: *Alle schriftlichen Zeugnisse, die wir besitzen schildern Gilles de Rais als einen durchaus gesunden und kräftigen Menschen, an dem nichts Auffälliges, nichts Aussergewöhnliches zu bemerken war.*

175: *Il est "difficile de penser que le mystère joué sur le boulevard du pont en 1435 n'a rien à voir avec le Mistère du Siège, si nous sommes assurés qu'à la même époque l'assaut des Tourelles est représenté dans Orléans.*

183: *Die Versucher hatten leichtes Spiel mit Gilles de Rais, denn er sah keine andere Rettung.*

188: *il* [*René d'Anjou*] *obtient de Jean V la promesse signée et scellée de ne pas acheter Champtocé. Jean V jura même 'sur le corps de notre Seigneur, pendant le chant de la messe.*

195: *En son honneur Gilles a fait préparer dans l'enceinte du château un spectacle fabuleux qu'elle verra pour la première fois: le 'Mystère d'Orléans'.*

198: *Adieu Francoys, mon ami! jamais plus ne nous entreverrons en cest monde; je pri Dieu qu'il vous doint bonne pacience et esperance en Dieu que nous nous entreverrons en la grant joye de paradis! Priez Dieu pour moy et je prieray pour vous.*

201: Et, en la présence dudit Gilles, accusé, et d'autres assistants, François constitué en personne, et ledit Gilles, *accusé, furent interrogés ensemble par ledit Seigneur évêque de Saint-Brieuc, sur l'évocation des démons et l'oblation du sang et des membres desdits petits enfants--de quoi ledit évêque disait que lesdits Gilles et François venaient de se confesser* -- [*!*]

202: *Lesquels Gilles, accusé, et François répondirent que ledit François fit plusieurs évocations des démons, et expressément d'un nommé Barron, sur l'ordre dudit accusé, tant en son absence qu'en sa présence; et en outre ledit accusé dit qu'il fut présent à deux ou trois évocations, et spécialement auxdits lieux de Tiffauges et de Bourgneuf-en-Rais, mais il dit que jamais il ne put voir ni entendre aucun démon, bien que ledit accusé, comme tous deux le disaient, eût transmis une cédule obligatoire, écrite et signée de sa main, audit Barron, par ledit François, par laquelle ledit Gilles se soumettait audit Barron et à son mandement, et promettait d'obéir à ses ordres, sous réserve cependant de son âme et de la perte de sa vie; et que ledit accusé promit audit Barron la main, les yeux et le coeur d'un enfant, qu'il lui fit offrir par ledit François, ainsi qu'il dit, mais ledit François ne les donna pas, selon ce que ledit accusé et François disaient avoir déclaré pleinement dans leurs récentes confessions, en ce qui le concernait, ledit François se rapportant auxdites confessions.*

206: *il avait cru et croyait parvenir à des résultats dans ledit art* [*alchemy*], *si ne s'y fut opposée l'arrivée du seigneur dauphin de Viennois audit lieu de Tiffauges, où il avait fait construire et préparer des fours pour 1'exercice dudit art, qui, lors de cette arrivée, furent démolis.*

208: *Ils ont parlé ensemble des enfants qui avaient été perdus dans le pays de Rais...*

209: *qu'il en était sorti deux de cette maison.*

211: *messire Gilles, chevalier et baron, après plusieurs accusations de la part dudit promoteur contre ledit messire Gilles, à savoir qu'il aurait admis l'hérésie doctrinale, ainsi que l'affirmait ledit promoteur, déclara vouloir comparaître personnellement devant ledit révérend père, seigneur évêque*

de Nantes et devant n'importe quels autres juges ecclésiastiques, ainsi que devant un quelconque inquisiteur de l'hérésie pour se purger de pareilles accusations. Sur quoi ledit révérend père évêque fixa et assigna à messire Gilles, chevalier et baron susdit, et en cela consentant, le 28 dudit mois pour comparaître aussi devant religieux homme, frère Jean Blouyn, vicaire de l'inquisiteur de l'hérésie au royaume susdit, pour répondre des crimes et délits à lui reprochés.

215: *Ha, ribault, tu as batu mes hommes et tu leur as fait extorsion; viens dehors de l'église ou je te tueroy tout mort*!

219: *que lesdits seigneurs évêque de Nantes et frère Jean Blouyn, vicaire de l'inquisiteur, et tous les autres ecclésiastiques étaient des simoniaques et des ribauds; qu'il aimerait mieux être pendu la corde au cou que répondre à tels ecclésiastiques et à de tels juges.... Pierre Klossowski's translation* (*Le Procès, p. 233*) *of the following: .... Dixit dictos Dnnos Eppm Nanneten. et Fr. Joh. Blouym vicarium inquisitionis .... ac alios omnes viros ecclesiasticos esse symoniacos et ribaldos, et quem mallet per collum laqueo suspendi quam coram talibus viris ecclesiasticis et judicibus respondere.*

230: *d'avoir un grand regret et une grande contrition de leurs méfaits, mais aussi d'avoir confiance en la miséricorde de Dieu et de croire qu'il n'était si grand péché qu'un homme pût commettre, que Dieu ne pardonnât dans sa bonté et sa bénignité, à condition que le pécheur eût en son coeur un grand regret et une grande contrition, et lui en demandât merci avec beaucoup de persévérance.*

231: *peitschten ihre Kinder bis aufs Blut.... Und diese Sitte hielt sich nachweislich bis ins 16. Jahrhundert hinein.*

Pfau

21: *Les souffrances du paysan avaient passé la mesure; tous avaient frappé dessus, comme une bête tombée sous la charge; la bête se releva enragée, et elle mordit.... Dans cette guerre chevaleresque que se faisaient à armes courtoises les nobles de France et d'Angleterre, il n'y avait au fond qu'un ennemi, une victime des maux de la guerre; c'était le paysan.*

32: *homo est communitatis: et ita id quod est, est communitatis; unde in hoc quod seipsum interficit, injuriam communitati facit.*

34: *troublée en son bon sens et memoire.*

49: *mis en grant paine et destresse de son corps.*

50: *par simplesse et non sens.*

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