



Hundred Years War

A Wider Focus

*Edited by L.J. Andrew Villalon
and Donald J. Kagay*

BRILL

THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

HISTORY OF WARFARE

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L.J. ANDREW VILLALON AND DONALD J. KAGAY



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On the cover: (A detail of the) Battle of Najera: Henry of Trastamara, supported by the French, combats his brother, Peter the Cruel, deposed king of Castile, aided by the English under Edward, Prince of Wales, known as the Black Prince (1367). Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, fol. 312v, Flanders, Bruges 15th Century. BNF, FR 2643.

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CONTENTS

List of Illustrations	ix
List of Maps	xi
List of Contributors	xiii
Acknowledgments	xix
Abbreviations	xxi
Introduction	xxiii

PART ONE

THE SPANISH CONNECTION

Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera	3
<i>L.J. Andrew Villalon</i>	
The Southern Valencian Frontier during the War of the Two Pedros	75
<i>María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol</i>	
A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362–1363) as Military Financier	117
<i>Donald J. Kagay</i>	
War and Peace in Medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan Relations in the Mid-Fourteenth Century	151
<i>Clara Estow</i>	

PART TWO

OTHER THEATERS OF WAR

“The Fox and the Lion”: The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy	179
<i>William P. Caferro</i>	

- The Duchy of Brabant Caught Between France and
England: Geopolitics and Diplomacy during the
First Half of the Hundred Years War 211
Sergio Boffa

PART THREE

URBAN REACTIONS

- London's War Effort during the Early Years of the
Reign of Edward III 243
Peter M. Konieczny
- Tholosanna Fides*: Toulouse as a Military Actor in
Late Medieval France 263
Paul Solon
- The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its
Repercussions for the City of Barcelona 297
Manuel Sánchez Martínez

PART FOUR

WOMEN AT WAR

- A Medieval "Rosie the Riveter"? Women in France and
Southern England during the Hundred Years War 333
James E. Gilbert
- Just War, Joan of Arc, and the Politics of Salvation 365
Jane Marie Pinzino

PART FIVE

STRATEGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
COMBAT TECHNIQUES

- Henry V's Military Strategy in 1415 399
Clifford J. Rogers

‘The Walls Come Tumbling Down’: The Campaigns of Philip the Good and the Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder Weapons	429
<i>Kelly DeVries</i>	
Wielding the Weapons of War: Arms, Armor, and Training Manuals During the Later Middle Ages	447
<i>John Clements</i>	
Appendices	
Appendix One: Genealogies	477
Popes	477
European Rulers and Nobility	478
Kings of England	478
Kings of France	478
French Noble Houses	479
Low Countries	479
Holy Roman Emperors	481
German Noble Houses	481
Spanish Rulers	482
Crown of Aragon	482
Castile	482
Navarre	483
Muslim Rulers	483
Nasrid Dynasty of Granada	483
Ottoman Turks	484
Byzantium	484
Appendix Two: Battles, Campaigns, Treaties	485
Bibliography	489
Index	509

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Rosie the Riveter	362
Figure 2. Joan of Arc Driving out Camp Followers	363
Figure 3. Armored fighting employing “half-sword” techniques from Fiore die Liberi’s <i>Flos Duellatorum</i> , c. 1410	470
Figure 4. Fiore’s <i>meza spada</i> (“half-sword”) techniques for armored combat	471
Figure 5. Armored longsword fighting in a judicial duel from the 1443 edition of Hans Talhoffer’s <i>Fechtbuch</i>	472
Figure 6. Fighting with the poleax from the 1443 edition of Talhoffer	472
Figure 7. A half-sword technique according to Talhoffer teachings	472
Figure 8. Armored and mounted combat techniques from the <i>Solothurner Fechtbüch</i> , late-fourteenth century Swiss-German	473
Figure 9. The close-in actions at half-sword with long armor-fighting swords from the <i>Solothurner Fechtbüch</i>	474
Figure 10. The coup de grace with dagger and grappling techniques from the <i>Solothurner Fechtbüch</i> . Note the <i>estocs</i> or <i>tucks</i> , heavy, rigid spike-like rod weapons specifically designed for fighting plate armor	475

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. France in 1328	1
Map 2. French Territory Ceded to England after the Treaty of Brétigny 1360	li
Map 3. England and France in the later Hundred Years War	lii
Map 4. Realms of Medieval Spain	71
Map 5. Northern Spain	72
Map 6. The Nájera Campaign (Later Stages)	73
Map 7. Battle of Nájera	74
Map 8. Kingdom of Valencia (Catalan names in parentheses)	116
Map 9. Crown of Aragon	149
Map 10. Counties of Catalonia	150
Map 11. The Christian Reconquest of Spain	174
Map 12. Kingdom of Granada	175
Map 13. Northern Italy	210
Map 14. Low Countries in the Later Middle Ages	238
Map 15. Flanders and Neighboring Regions in the Fourteenth Century	239
Map 16. Textile Production Centers in Northwestern Europe in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries	240
Map 17. Medieval London	261
Map 18. Medieval Toulouse	295
Map 19. Medieval Barcelona	330
Map 20. Battle of Agincourt	428

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>ABL</i>	<i>Antiquiores Barchhinonensium leges, quas vulgus usaticos appellat cum comentariis . . . Jacobi a Monte Judaico, Jacobi et Guielemi a Vallesicca et Jacobi Calicii.</i> Barcelona, 1544.
ACA	Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó.
ADHG	Archives Départementales de la Haute Garonne.
<i>AEM</i>	<i>Aragón en la Edad Media.</i>
<i>AGN</i>	<i>Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden.</i>
AGR	Archives générales du royaume.
AHCB	Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona.
AMT	Archives Municipales de Toulouse.
ASF	Archivio di Stato di Firenze.
<i>ASI</i>	<i>Archivio Storico Italiano.</i>
ASPi	Archivio di Stato di Pisa.
ASS	Archivio di Stato di Siena.
ASVe	Archivio di Stato di Venezia.
AVB	Archives de la ville de Bruxelles.
AVL	Archives de la ville de Louvain.
<i>BAE</i>	<i>Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles.</i>
<i>BCRH</i>	<i>Bulletin de la commission d'histoire.</i>
<i>BEC</i>	<i>Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes.</i>
<i>BN</i>	<i>Biographie nationale.</i>
<i>CAVC</i>	<i>Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y principado de Cataluña</i> , ed. Fidel Fita y Colomé and Bienvenido Oliver y Estreller. 27 vols. Madrid, 1896–1922.
<i>CB</i>	Chartes de Brabant.
<i>CC</i>	Chambre des Comptes.
<i>CCR</i>	<i>Calendar of Close Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office.</i> Prepared under the Superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records, Edward III., 14 vols. London, 1896–1913.
<i>CCRCL</i>	<i>Calendar of Coroners Rolls of the City of London A.D. 1300–1378.</i> ed. Reginald R. Sharpe. London, 1913.
<i>CCSL</i>	<i>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina.</i> 177 vols. Turnholt, 1958.
CDACA	<i>Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la corona de Aragón</i> , ed. Próspero de Bofarull y Moscaró <i>et al.</i> , 41 vols. Barcelona, 1847–1910.

- I CHCA *Congrés d'història de la corona d'Aragó, dedicat al rey En Jaume I y a la seva època*, 2 vols. Barcelona, 1909, 1913.
- X CHCA *Jaime I y su Època, X Congrès de la història de la corona d'Aragò*. 3 vols. Zaragoza, 1979.
- XVCHCA *XV Congrès d'història de la corona d'Aragó [El poder real en la Corona de Aragón (Siglos XIV–XVI)]*. 5 vols. Zaragoza, 1993.
- CHJZ *Cuadernos de Historia "Jerónimo Zurita"*.
- CPMR *Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls*, ed. A.H. Thomas. Cambridge, 1926.
- CPR *Calendar of Patent Rolls*. 70 vols. London, 1891–1982.
- CRC *Cròniques de los Reyes de Castilla*.
- CWCH *Calendar of Wills proved and enrolled in the Court of Husting, London A.D. 1285–A.D. 1688*, ed. Reginald R. Sharpe, 2 vols. London, 1889.
- DS *Documenta Selecta Mutuas Civitatis Arago-Cathalaunicae et Ecclesiae Relationes Illustratiae*, ed. Johannes Vincke. Barcelona, 1936.
- EEMCA *Estudios de la edad media de Aragón*.
- EHR *The English Historical Review*.
- HGL Dom. J. Vaissete and Dom Cl. Devic, *Histoire générale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pièces justificatives*. 18 vols. Toulouse, 1872–1892.
- LB *Calendar of Letter Books*, ed. Reginald R. Sharpe. London, 1905.
- LF *Llibre dels fets del rei en Jaume*, ed. Jordi Bruguera. 2 vols. Barcelona, 1991.
- NBW *Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek*.
- NPNF *A Select Library of Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. 13 vols. 1906–1908; reprint, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1989.
- PL *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series latina*, ed. J.P. Migne. 221 vols. Paris, 1845–1890.
- PMR *Corporation of London Records Office: Plea and Memoranda Roll*.
- QGC *Les quatre grans cròniques*, ed. Ferran Soldevila. Barcelona, 1971.
- RBPH *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*.
- RIS *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*.

INTRODUCTION

I

This collection has emerged from a conversation that occurred some years ago at the Medieval Congress in Kalamazoo, Michigan. While debating the significance of the Hundred Years War for the history of southern Europe, one of the editors raised the question of its influence on Spain with a fellow Hispanist. The reply was immediate and categorical: “There was no Hundred Years War in Spain.”

In reading the first section of this volume, it will become readily apparent that the editors disagree. Starting around the middle of the 1360s, events in Spain significantly altered the course of the struggle north of the Pyrenees. Not only did Spanish involvement in the Hundred Years War propel that conflict in new directions, it also worked a profound effect on peninsular history, bringing a new dynasty, the Trastámaras, to the throne of Castile and cementing that kingdom into a French orbit for more than a century to come. A second spill-over of the war south of the Pyrenees occurred in the mid-1380s, albeit with less dramatic results. Nor was the Spanish experience unique. The great Anglo-French struggle that dominated western Europe had a noteworthy impact on the history of other neighboring regions, in particular Italy and the Low Countries.¹

¹ The Hundred Years War remains one of the most widely studied topics in medieval history. Others include the reign of Charlemagne, the Investiture Controversy, the Crusades, the destruction of the Templars, and the Black Death. For some idea of the extensive bibliography surrounding the Hundred Years War, see Kelly DeVries, *A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology* (Leiden, 2002), 285–410. General works on medieval military history that consider the Hundred Years War in its wider context include Charles Oman, *A History of War in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1924) and Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984). For easily accessible short histories of the conflict, see: Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War, The English in France, 1337–1453* (New York, 1978) and Robin Neillands, *The Hundred Years War* (New York, 1990). The most ambitious project underway is Jonathan Sumption’s multivolume treatment of the war, the first two volumes of which—*The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle* (Philadelphia, 1990) and *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire* (Philadelphia, 1999)—are currently in print. There are many books that provide illustrations of period arms, armor, and artwork; see, for example, H.W. Koch, *Medieval Warfare* (London, 1978) and Richard Humble, *Warfare in the Middle Ages* (London, 1989). Several of the contributors

The editors decided that a volume giving greater prominence to the issue of “geographic spillover” might carve itself a niche in the voluminous literature on the Hundred Years War. Later on, in speaking to scholars who studied areas on “the periphery” of the conflict, it became clear that many shared a belief that their regions’ involvement in the conflict had also received inadequate attention; as a result, a number of essays could be gathered which would place the Hundred Years War into this wider geographic focus.

The original plan was to achieve a “balance” between these essays from “the periphery” and others having a more traditional focus; however, a turning point came during a meeting with the editor of Brill’s medieval military history series, Kelly DeVries. Brill had already expressed interest in the collection and the editors hoped to tap DeVries’ expertise and network of contacts in order to help line up some of the more traditional contributors. Immediately, he cut to the chase: why not forego the idea of a balance and concentrate instead on matters which in the past have been considered “peripheral,” demonstrating their true relevance to the war. Such a collection could prove useful to scholars of the Hundred Years War at the same time that it broadened the general reader’s understanding of the conflict.

Once the decision was made to concentrate exclusively on this “wider focus,” only one thing remained: to widen it still farther. As a result, the collection not only looks at how the Hundred Years War affected geographical areas outside the main theatres, it also contains articles that either deal with understudied aspects of the war or revise old shiboleths. The response from potential contributors has been extensive enough to make possible a multi-volume work, the second volume of which will appear at a later date. It is for the reader to decide the extent to which our efforts to achieve “a wider focus” have been successful.

to the present collection have published books that deal largely or entirely with the conflict, while others are in the works. For example, see: Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (1996); Clifford Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360* (2000). A third contributor, Jane Marie Pinzino, is currently completing a manuscript entitled *The Grand Inquisitor, the Bishop and the Maid: Joan of Arc’s Nullification Trial and the Reform of Inquisition*.

II

The Hundred Years War was fought primarily between France and England in the years 1337–1453,² though (as we shall see in the course of these essays), it spilled over into surrounding regions such as Italy, Spain, the Low Countries, and western Germany. Viewed in a longer perspective, the war was really the last round in a 400-year struggle between two of medieval Europe's major dynasties to determine which would control much if not all of France, a fact that has led several prominent historians to refer to the conflict as "the second Hundred Years War."³ On one side stood the Valois Dynasty, a cadet branch of the Capetians who had controlled France since the elevation of Hugh Capet to the kingship in 987.⁴ Against these Capetian-Valois kings were ranged the Plantagenets, a family that had ruled England since William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy, had sailed across the channel in 1066 and seized the throne from its last Anglo-Saxon ruler.⁵

In the end, after many stunning reversals of fortune, the Capetian-Valois dynasty triumphed. In 1453, its current incumbent, Charles VII (1422–61), expelled his English rivals from all the lands they held on the continent, with the sole exception of the port city of Calais and its environs. Calais, seized early in the conflict (1346–47), would not fall back into French hands until another war was fought between the traditional enemies in the mid-sixteenth century.

While many factors helped precipitate the Hundred Years War, its most immediate cause lay in conflicting claims on the French

² Although these are the dates regularly assigned to the Hundred Years War, both involve chronological problems of the sort that characterize the conflict. For example, although which Edward III began to gather allies for his conflict with the French in 1337, he did not actually launch an attack on that country until 1339 and he officially claimed the French crown only in 1340. And while the final expulsion of the English from all French territory but Calais occurred in 1453, no treaty ended the conflict at that time. Not recognizing that the war was for all intents and purposes over, England again dispatched armies to the continent in 1475 and 1492.

³ James Westfall Thompson and Edgar Nathaniel Johnson, *An Introduction to Medieval Europe 300–1500* (New York, 1937), 879; arguably the finest medieval history text written in English.

⁴ For a list of Capetian-Valois monarchs who participated in the conflict, see Genealogical Charts at the end of the introduction and the list in the Appendix.

⁵ For a list of Plantagenet monarchs who participated in the conflict, see Appendix and genealogical chart.

crown.⁶ Having left behind three sons, Philip IV “the Fair” (1285–1314), whose actions had led to the creation of the Estates General (1302), the establishment of the Avignon Papacy (1305–1378)⁷ and destruction of the Templars (1307–1314),⁸ died in the full confidence that he, like his predecessors for many generations, had ensured succession by the direct line of Hugh Capet. Unfortunately for the Capetians, in just over a dozen years, each of his sons succeeded to the throne, only to die without male issue: first came Louis X (1314–1316), then Philip V (1316–1322), and finally, Charles IV (1322–1328).

A minor crisis arose in 1316 when the French aristocracy passed over Louis’s daughters and transferred the crown to his younger brother. The same happened again in 1322 and 1328, though on the last occasion, the problem was rendered considerably more serious by the fact that there were now no more sons of Philip IV available to succeed. Consequently, in 1328, the nobles passed over not only Charles IV’s daughter, Blanche, but also his sister Isabelle; instead transferring the crown to a male line descended from Philip IV’s brother, Charles of Valois. To justify what amounted to *disinheritance* of the daughters, the French reached far back into their history, citing a highly questionable legal precedent that has become known to historians as Salic Law, said to forbid the succession of a woman.

⁶ For the contributing causes to the conflict, see Malcolm Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy 1250–1340* (Oxford, 1996); J.R. Maddicott, “The Origins of the Hundred Years War,” *History Today* 36 (1986): 31–37; G.P. Cuttino, “Historical Revision: The Causes of the Hundred Years War,” *Speculum* 39 (1964): 463–77.

⁷ G. Mollat, *The Popes at Avignon: The “Babylonian Captivity” of the Medieval Church*, trans. Janet Love (New York, 1963), 3–6; Yves Renouard, *The Avignon Papacy: The Popes in Exile 1305–1403*, trans. Denis Bethell (1954: reprint, New York, 1994), 13–15.

⁸ Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978); *The Templars*, ed. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (Manchester, 2002), 243–328 (docs. 66–79); Alan Forey, *The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the early Fourteenth Centuries* (Toronto, 1992), 204–41. Among the numerous websites that deal with this most famous of crusading orders—a Google search conducted on April 3, 2004, produced “about 167,000” hits—there is one that is well worth accessing, if only to see the intense “buff” interest in this subject: Templar History, Home of Templar History Magazine, www.templarhistory.com. (As of the same date, the site claimed 1,072,107 visitors.) Despite its highly commercialized nature, Templar History contains some interesting historical material, including English translations of a number of relevant documents (the accusations against the Templars, an anonymous tract defending them, Clement V’s bull *Vox In Excelso*, ordering that they be disbanded, etc.).

Most of the great nobles soon swore allegiance to Charles of Valois's son, Philip VI (1328–1350). This included the young English king, Edward III (1327–1377), who owed homage for the remaining Plantagenet lands on the continent. Edward, however, possessed a rival claim to the French crown derived through his father, his mother, Isabelle, the passed-over princess who in 1308 had married Edward II (1307–1327). Although the young English king did not choose to press the issue seriously until the late 1330s, tensions began to mount well before that time. In 1337, Edward started casting about for military allies who might help him vindicate the claim that he would advance publicly three years later.⁹

What is called the Hundred Years War was by no means an unbroken century of conflict. Although this seemingly interminable struggle stretched out over nearly twelve decades, bursts of intense military activity alternated with years or even decades when hostilities were largely suspended. During each active phase, the fortunes of war tended to favor either one side or the other: for example, the years between 1345 and 1360 were characterized by an almost unbroken string of English victories, while those from 1369 to 1380 witnessed an equally dramatic turning of the tide in favor of France.

Traditional tripartite divisions of the Hundred Years War,¹⁰ while not incorrect, are most certainly inadequate if one wishes to convey any meaningful understanding of the ebb-and-flow that characterized the conflict. Consequently, this brief summary of the struggle divides it into eight periods:

1. 1337–1345: Preliminary maneuvering
2. 1345–1360: First floodtide of English victory

⁹ Powicke characterized this claim as the result of “family quarrels . . . [that] only gradually grew into national enmity.” F.M. Powicke, *King Henry III and Lord Edward: The Community of the Realm in the Thirteenth Century*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1947), 1:161.

¹⁰ In his *History of the Middle Ages* (forerunner to *An Introduction to Medieval Europe*), Thompson divides the conflict into three chronological periods: 1337–1380, 1380–1415, 1415–1453. His contemporary, Edward Cheyney, advances a rather different periodization, albeit one that is also tripartite: 1337–1360, 1369–1415, 1415–1453. By contrast, in what is perhaps the best short account of the war written for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Charles Oman envisages six periods: 1338–1345, 1346–1360, 1360–1396, 1396–1414, 1414–1420, 1414–1422, 1423–1453. For reasons too detailed to go into, the editors do not adhere to any of these earlier periodizations. See James Westfall Thompson, *History of the Middle Ages, 300–1500* (New York, 1931), 362; Edward P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era, 1250–1453* (New York, 1936), 158; *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Chicago, 1958), 11:889–93.

3. 1360–1369: The short hiatus
4. 1369–1380: The tide turns for France
5. 1380–1415: The long hiatus
6. 1415–1429: Another English floodtide
7. 1429–1435: Another French resurgence
8. 1435–1453: Final French victory

1. *Preliminary Maneuvering (1337–1345)*

Late in the 1330s, Edward III began to lay the groundwork for war. In 1337, he launched a diplomatic effort to gather allies on the northern and eastern borders of France, resulting in a loose confederation of princes and nobles whose lands stretched from the North Sea nearly to Switzerland. Among them, the most prominent were the dukes and counts of Brabant, Hainault, Lorraine, Holland, Guelders, Bavaria, and the palatinate of the Rhine. At the same time, Edward attempted to maximize his revenues, expropriating with parliamentary approval half of the annual wool export and soliciting loans from international banking houses, several of which would go under when Edward was forced to declare bankruptcy a decade later. Concurrent efforts in the south were less successful as the Spanish kingdoms and Naples leaned toward France.

Meanwhile, pressure was brought on the key county of Flanders, whose ruler, Louis of Nevers, had maintained his loyal to the house of Valois. When the Flemish refused to renounce French sovereignty and place themselves under English protection, Edward extended to Flanders an embargo on the export of all English goods to France. The resulting lack of English wool and food supplies inspired a Flemish uprising in 1377 that began in Ghent and spread to most other urban centers, including Bruges and Ypres. Its leader, a wealthy merchant named Jacob van Artevelde, arranged for Flemish neutrality in the coming struggle in return for England's lifting its embargo.

In 1338, Edward visited the continent, confirming the terms of his alliances and recruiting the Holy Roman Emperor who agreed to supply troops and to appoint him Vicar-General of the Empire west of the Rhine. The first campaign of the war occurred in autumn, 1339, when the king led an English army, backed by contingents from the Low Countries, into northeastern France on a plundering

raid that set the pattern for the devastating *chevauchées* of future decades. In 1340, Artevelde brought Flanders in on the English side of the conflict, by recognizing Edward III as the rightful king of France, a claim Edward voiced officially in the marketplace at Ghent.¹¹

Despite this promising start, England accomplished very little by the initial campaign of 1339 or the protracted and unsuccessful siege of Tournai the following year. Edward's grand alliance began to fall apart almost as soon as it was put together when a number of allies either withdrew from the conflict or changed sides. Soon after Tournai, the king agreed to a truce (the first of many) that would remain in force until 1345; he then returned to England, not to return to the Low Countries.¹² Only one encounter of note occurred during this opening phase of the conflict: in June, 1340, an English fleet defeated one made up of French, Spanish, and Genoese ships off the port of Sluys, thus winning control of the sea for nearly three decades. It was here that the English longbow, the most feared missile weapon of the conflict, first demonstrated its extraordinary value in continental warfare.

Despite the truce, conflict between England and France continued in the duchy of Brittany. In 1341, the childless death of the duke sparked a civil war between two claimants—the duke's brother, John of Monfort, and his niece's husband, Charles of Blois, a member of the French royal family. England and France quickly became involved on opposite sides: the English backing Montfort, while the French supported Charles. Neither the capture of Montfort soon after the war began, nor that of his opponent several years later diminished the intensity of the struggle, for in their absence, their redoubtable wives fought on without let-up. For over two decades, the war in Brittany would continue unabated and England and France, even in periods of truce, would face off through their Breton surrogates.

¹¹ G.P. Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), 84. For a general treatment of medieval diplomacy and diplomatic practices, see Donald E. Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J., 1967).

¹² Jonathan Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 325–29; Kelly DeVries, “God, Leadership, Flemings, and Archery: Contemporary Perceptions of Victory and Defeat at the Battle of Sluys, 1340,” *American Neptune* 55 (1995): 223–42.

2. *First Floodtide of English Victory (1345–1360)*

The second phase of the conflict began in 1345 when the five-year truce ended. An English army landed at Bordeaux and began operations against the neighboring province of Gascony. In 1346, Edward III returned to continent, landing in Normandy and launching a six-week campaign of devastation as he marched northward toward Flanders. Overtaken by a far larger French army commanded by Philip VI, Edward made a stand near Crécy on August 26 where he won the first of a series of spectacular English victories that would characterize the Hundred Years War.¹³ With the French army in shambles, its king fled the battlefield. At Crécy, the heir to the English throne, Edward, Prince of Wales (d. 1376), better known to history as the Black Prince, began making a reputation as the foremost soldier of his age.¹⁴

Following the victory, the English king immediately initiated the siege of Calais, which he took in the spring of 1347.¹⁵ To solidify England's hold on what would become her major port of entry to the continent, Edward expelled the French inhabitants and resettled the area with English colonists. Calais not only supplied England with an advance military outpost, it also provided a permanent home for the wool staple.

Although the ravages of the Black Death (1348–1352) and another truce (1347–1355) temporarily halted fighting, hostilities again broke out in 1355 when the Black Prince conducted a devastating *chevauchée* through Armagnac, Languedoc, and the Toulousain. The following

¹³ Alfred H. Burne, *The Crécy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War to the Peace of Brétigny* (1955; reprint, London, 1999), 169–223; Jules Viard, “La campagne de juillet-août 1346 et la bataille de Crécy,” *Moyen Âge* 27 [2nd ser.] (1926): 1–84; Henri de Wailly, *Crécy, 1346: Anatomy of a Battle* (Poole, 1987).

¹⁴ Recent biographies of the Black Prince include: Richard Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince* (1978; reprint, Woodbridge, 1996) and Henry Dwight Sedgwick, *The Black Prince* (New York, 1993). For easy access to some of the standard contemporary documents dealing with the prince's life, see: Richard Barber, *The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince* (London, 1979), a new version of which has recently come out with Boydell and Brewer.

¹⁵ Jules Viard, “Le siège de Calais, 4 septembre 1346–4 août 1347,” *Moyen Âge* 30 [2nd ser.] (1929): 124–89; Kelly DeVries, “Hunger, Flemish Participation and the Flight of Philip VI: Contemporary Accounts of the Siege of Calais, 1346–47,” *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 12 [n.s.] (1991): 129–81.

year (1356), Edward led a similar filibustering expedition northward from Aquitaine.¹⁶

As had been the case with Crécy tens years earlier, the English army was cut off by a vastly superior French force commanded by the new French king, Jean II (1350–1364) and his sons. At Poitiers, on September 19, 1356, the prince was forced to stand and fight. The ensuing battle became the second great victory of his career, marked by the death or capture of much of the French nobility, including the French king and two of the princes who now found themselves in English hands. The *dauphin*¹⁷ (the future Charles V) barely managed to escape from the battlefield; in his father's absence, he now became the regent of France.¹⁸

There followed four years during which the kingdom descended into one of the most chaotic periods of its history, as the very fabric of French society seemed to be dissolving. Although another short truce temporarily suspended open warfare, internal problems beset the beleaguered regent, including the establishment of a revolutionary government in Paris led by the provost of the merchants, Etienne Marcel, a serious attempt by the Estates General under Marcel's leadership to take over control of royal appointments and the kingdom's finances, and the great peasant uprising of 1358, known as the *Jacquerie*.¹⁹

By the end of the decade, the *dauphin* had weathered these challenges and managed to reestablish a measure of royal control. What is more, Edward III's last campaign of the period, the *chevauchée* of 1359, fizzled badly. Nevertheless, in 1360, Charles had no choice but to ratify the treaty negotiated at Brétigny and in large part confirmed at Calais, a treaty that called for the effective dismembering of France. In return for renouncing his claim on the French

¹⁶ H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–1357* (Manchester, 1958); Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales*, 110–29.

¹⁷ The title *dauphin* referring to the heir apparent to the French throne first appeared shortly before the Hundred Years War. Having gained the Dauphiné for the French crown, Philip VI established it as the hereditary property of the heir to the throne. The title became comparable to the English "Prince of Wales."

¹⁸ J.M. Tourneur-Aumont, *La bataille de Poitiers (1356) et la construction de la France* (Paris, 1940); Barber, *Edward Prince of Wales*, 136–48.

¹⁹ J. Russell Major, *Representative Government in Early Modern France* (New Haven, Conn., 1980), 12–17; Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, 283–86.

throne, Edward III received full sovereignty over vast stretches of southwestern France (Aquitaine, Gascony, Poitou) as well a lesser, but still impressive array of territories in the north, including Calais. What is more, the French king's ransom was indeed that—three million gold crowns.²⁰ Only at the height of Plantagenet power during Henry II's reign had England's holdings on the continent been greater. The question now became, could the English maintain their position?

3. *The Short Hiatus (1360–1369)*

The period was characterized by an uneasy peace between the two major combatants, during which the English governed much of western France. The key figure in this occupation was the Black Prince who, serving as governor of Aquitaine, held court in Bordeaux. Although his reputation as the foremost soldier of the age would be solidified by the events of this decade, the extravagance of his lifestyle, his inability to win the loyalty of the people whom he governed, and the financial crisis brought on by his campaign in Spain would together sew the seeds of future English defeat.

The period started inauspiciously for the French: by the terms of the treaty, Jean II was released from captivity and resumed the reigns of power from his far more talented son, Charles. The king returned only to find that the problems confronting his kingdom far outweighed his meager abilities. In 1363, after several years of “drift,” he did the most sensible thing of his entire reign: he seized a pretense to remove himself from the scene. When his son, Louis of Anjou, retained in England as a hostage, broke faith and fled, the debonair but ineffectual monarch voluntarily reentered his comfortable captivity across the channel, where he died the following year.

Jean's last act before departing would haunt the French monarchy for the rest of the Hundred Years War and beyond. Having secured the duchy of Burgundy for the crown, he promptly regranted it to his youngest son, Philip “the Bold” (1363–1404), who had earned his sobriquet fighting beside his father at Poitiers. At the same time, he convinced the emperor to invest Philip with the free county of Burgundy (Franche-Comté). Over the course of the next century,

²⁰ John Le Parourel, “The Treaty of Brétigny, 1360,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* [5th ser.] 10 (1960): 19–39.

Philip's successors would progressively extend their control northward into the Low Countries, thus resurrecting what was, in effect, a "middle kingdom," largely independent of French control, one that would continue to plague Jean's successors until reclaimed by his great-grandson, Louix XI (1461–1483) in 1477.

The most difficult problem that Jean had briefly confronted and been utterly unable to resolve involved the so-called "free companies." While the treaty of Brétigny put an end to *official* hostilities for nearly a decade, it did not spell peace. During this period, France experienced a serious threat from roving bands of soldiery, discharged by both sides for reasons of economy and then left to fend for themselves. These hard-bitten veterans banded together into quasi-military units known as "free companies," sometimes numbering in the thousands, always living off the land and its civilian population. For those regions of France that experienced their depredations, peace and war became indistinguishable.²¹ In spring, 1361, the newly restored king dispatched the count de la Marche to crush the companies; instead, it was the royal army that suffered a humiliating defeat at Brignais. After this, neither the government nor the population put up much further military resistance; some other means of dealing with the companies would have to be found.

John's death in 1364 brought to the throne the one truly fine French monarch of the Hundred Years War, Charles V "the Wise" (1364–1380).²² At the same time, however, France suffered another setback. In September, 1364, at the battle of Auray, Charles of Blois, the French-backed duke of Brittany, suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of his opponent, John of Montfort.²³ Charles of Blois died on the field and his general, Bertrand DuGuesclin, was captured by the English commander of Montfort's army, Sir John Chandos. The victory at Auray strengthened England's hold on western France and rendered regular seaborne contact with Aquitaine far more certain. This and the concurrent end of a conflict between France and Navarre over the duchy of Normandy also led to the

²¹ Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), 24–43.

²² The classic treatment of the reign is R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, 5 vols. (Paris 1909–1931).

²³ A valuable aid to understanding the Breton question is Michael Jones, *Ducal Brittany 1364–1399: Relations with England and France during the Reign of Duke John IV* (Oxford, 1970).

release of thousands of fighting men who, in their unemployed state, now swelled the companies' ranks. The fact that their depredations were not as extensive in English-held territory led many contemporaries to accuse England of sponsoring their activities.

Although a few of the companies had begun to filter across the Alps into Italy where they took service as mercenaries,²⁴ the majority remained an ever-present threat to France, a threat that Charles V now addressed. When an attempt failed to ship them off to fight the Turks in southeastern Europe, the French monarch looked for a solution closer to home. In 1365, he joined with the king of Aragon, Pere III "the Ceremonious" (1336–1387) and Pope Urban V (1362–1370) to engage the companies for service in Spain. The following year, under the leadership of the newly-ransomed Breton warrior, Bertrand DuGuesclin, they intervened in the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366) currently being fought between Aragon and Castile. Here, they decisively shifted the military balance, overthrowing the pro-English monarch of Castile, Pedro I "the Cruel" (1350–1369),²⁵ and replacing him with his pro-French half-brother, Enrique II (1366–1367, 1369–1379).²⁶

In 1367, these events forced the Black Prince to launch his own campaign south of the Pyrenees, culminating in his third great victory at Nájera. On April 3, he crushed the Castilian army and its Franco-Breton allies, putting Enrique to flight and taking large numbers of prisoners, including DuGuesclin. However, despite its military success, Edward's campaign ultimately turned into a costly fiasco when the restored English ally, Pedro, failed to pay his war debts, leaving the prince and many in his army to suffer and fall sick during the hot Castilian summer. Having returned to Aquitaine, Edward tried to recoup his expenses by collecting an extremely unpopular hearth tax (*fouage*) throughout England's continental lands.²⁷ The dis-

²⁴ For the companies' malignant influence on Italy, see William Caferro, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena* (Baltimore, 1998); idem, "Slaying the Hydra-headed Beast: Italy and the Companies of Adventure in the Fourteenth Century," in *Crusaders, Condotieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare Around the Mediterranean*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, (Leiden, 2002), 285–304.

²⁵ The best English account of this king's reign was written by a contributor to this volume. See Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel, 1350–1369* (Leiden, 1995).

²⁶ For a recent treatment of the Iberian invasions, see L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Seeking Castles in Spain: Sir Hugh Calveley and the Free Companies' Mid-Fourteenth Century Iberian Intervention," in *Crusaders, Condotieri, and Cannon*, 305–28.

²⁷ For the "hearth tax" (*fouage, focagium*) in France, see John Bell Henneman,

gruntled Gascon lords resisted, appealing their case to the king of France as the prince's overlord. Despite the fact that such an appeal breeched the treaty of Brétigny, Charles seized the opportunity to reassert sovereignty over the lost province by summoning Edward to Paris for trial. When the prince threatened to march on Paris instead, the French king declared him delinquent. Edward III now resumed his claim to the French crown and, in 1369, the conflict once again erupted.

4. *The Tide Turns for France (1369–1380)*

The next decade witnessed a complete reversal in the fortunes of war. The English renewed their strategy of launching grand *chevauchées*, one of which was conducted by the duke of Lancaster in 1372, another by his younger brother, the earl of Buckingham, in 1379. Although such expeditions devastated wide swaths of French territory, they were unable to provoke one of those set piece battles that during previous phases of the struggle had become the grave of French chivalry. Instead, Charles V, with the aid of his constable, DuGuesclin, and the latter's fellow Breton, Olivier de Clisson,²⁸ initiated a military strategy amounting to guerrilla warfare. The war now settled down into a succession of sieges and smaller engagements during which the French overran English-held strongholds and picked off out-numbered units. This new strategy maximized the French advantage in numbers while neutralizing tactical factors that had favored the English such as superior military cohesion and the greater firepower that resulted from use of the longbow.

As DuGuesclin and Clisson seized the military initiative, England lost her three greatest warriors. First to fall was John Chandos, long the right-hand man of the Black Prince, who met his end in 1369 during a minor skirmish on the bridge of Lussac. Several years thereafter, the prince, increasingly debilitated by the disease he had contracted at the time of the Spanish campaign, was forced to abandon active military service. Edward conducted his last campaign, the siege of Limoge in 1370, from a litter; the following year, he returned to

Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing 1322–1356 (Princeton, N.J. 1971), 4–5, 310.

²⁸ John Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France Under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996).

England after turning over command to his considerably less talented brother, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. Edward's condition continued to deteriorate and in 1376, he died, without having ever come to the throne. The prince's other leading captain, Jean de Grailly, captal de Buch, was captured in 1372, during fighting that led up to the French reoccupation of La Rochelle. Refused ransom or exchange by Charles V, he died five years later in a French prison.

The major military action of this period that cost England the capital's services centered around the port of La Rochelle. Here, in 1372, a fleet made up largely of ships supplied by Enrique II of Castile attacked an English squadron bringing to the continent the new seneschal of Poitou, the earl of Pembroke, as well as large sums to pay English troops. During the ensuing two-day battle, the people of La Rochelle refused to take part and the English suffered a severe defeat, in which the earl and many of the surviving nobles were taken prisoner and the troop payments were lost. The battle of La Rochelle effectively ended England's three decades of naval superiority. Not long thereafter, the port was retaken by the French.

Throughout this period, John of Montfort progressively lost his hold on the duchy of Brittany, due largely to his alliance with the English and the resulting opposition of many Bretons, including DuGuesclin and Clisson. At different moments, he was forced to take refuge in Flanders and even back across the channel in England. Despite being restored by the English in 1379, Montfort recognized how the wind was blowing and immediately entered into negotiations with the French. In 1380, following the death of his old enemy, Charles V, he signed a treaty with the new king, Charles VI (1380–1422), effectively changing sides and denying the English an important entry point to the continent.

By 1380, France had regained most of the lands lost by the treaties of Brétigny and Calais; England's remaining hold on the continent was reduced to the regions around Bordeaux in the south and Calais in the north.

5. *The Long Hiatus (1380–1415)*

A critical turning point came in 1380 when the principal architects of French victory, Charles V and DuGuesclin, died within a few months of one another. Their removal from the scene robbed the French campaign of reconquest of its impetus and set the stage for

a long hiatus in the war. Although no actual treaty was ever signed, a number of truces held the conflict in a state of suspension for over three decades.²⁹

Throughout this long hiatus, the attention of both countries turned inward. During the 1380s, France and England experienced severe social unrest, traceable in large part to the hardships resulting from decades of warfare. In 1381, the Peasant's Revolt³⁰ rocked English society while at virtually the same time, the French experienced the uprising of the *Mallotins* in such cities as Paris and Rouen.

The long and inauspicious reign of Charles VI began in a brief minority, during which the young king fell under the control of his uncles. In 1392, only a few years after achieving his majority, Charles suffered his first bout of insanity (he would eventually become known as Charles the Mad),³¹ after which the rest of his reign fell victim to an often-violent competition for power among noble factions. The most spectacular quarrel pitted the king's younger brother, Louis d'Orléans, against their most powerful uncle, Philip the Bold of Burgundy. In 1407, matters reached a crisis when the new Burgundian duke, Philip's son, John the Fearless (1404–1419), arranged the assassination of his rival. Louis' murder plunged France into a bloody civil war between the Burgundian and Orléanist-Armagnac factions, in which the contestants divided on a number of key issues, including whether or not to resume the contest with England.³² This infighting that continued to paralyze France for decades would also become a key factor in English success during the next phase of the conflict.

Meanwhile, across the channel, events also conspired to prevent any renewal of the conflict. The death of Edward III in 1377 had brought to the throne his eleven year old grandson, Richard, son and heir of the Black Prince. Here, as in France, a royal minority

²⁹ The most important of these, signed in 1396, was supposed to suspend fighting for thirty years.

³⁰ For the Peasant's Revolt, see Rodney Hilton, *Bond Man Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381* (New York, 1973); Phillip R. Schofield, *Peasant and Community in Medieval England 1200–1500* (Houndmills, 2003), 164–65; E.B. Fryde, *Peasants and Landlords in Later Medieval England* (Stroud, 1996), 1–6.

³¹ For the madness of Charles VI, see J. Saltel, *La folie du roi Charles VI* (Toulouse, 1907); E. Dupré, "La Folie de Charles VI roi de France," *Revue de Deux Mondes* 60 (1910): 835–66.

³² Burgundy and Armagnac also differed on the Great Schism (1378–1417), the former maintaining neutrality while the latter announced for Avignon.

provided an occasion for the king's uncles to seize control of the government. For the first half of his reign, Richard faced an ongoing struggle against the aristocratic factions that dominated English policy, a struggle that left little time to consider events in France.

Over the years, the English people, who had once supported the war, became increasingly disillusioned with the never-ending expense that produced less and less military success. England's attitude toward the conflict would only be hardened by the country's two major continental adventures of the period, both of which ended in failure: the notorious Norwich Crusade of 1383 that led to a parliamentary inquest aimed at its leaders and the duke of Lancaster's putative attempt to exercise his wife's claim on the Castilian throne three years later.

Interestingly, England sacrificed its best opportunity to renew the war on favorable terms when it failed to support the latest popular uprising in Flanders. Early in the 1380s, Philip van Artevelde, son of England's former ally, Jacob, assumed leadership in Ghent and in April, 1382, smashed Count Louis de Male's army before the gates of Bruges. Afterwards, many of the Flemish towns joined van Artevelde who assumed the title "regent of Flanders."

Both sides appealed for outside help: the count turned to the French monarchy and his son-in-law, the duke of Burgundy, while van Artevelde tried to resuscitate the old Anglo-Flemish alliance. Unfortunately for the Gantois, the English hesitated to become involved while the French launched a full scale invasion of Flanders led by the king, the duke of Burgundy, and the new constable of France, Clisson. When the two sides met at the battle of Roosebeke in November, 1382, a large Flemish force was virtually annihilated and Artevelde killed. Thereafter, most of Flanders surrendered to the French. Even though Ghent for a time continued to resist, England had lost its best opportunity for a long time to come.

In 1399, Richard's conflict with the English barony ended in his deposition and subsequent murder, bringing to the throne the Lancastrian Dynasty in the person of Henry IV (1399–1413), whose principal interest was to hold onto the throne he had usurped. Not until the succession of his war-like son, Henry V (1413–1422), would England once again turn its attention to France and put an end to the long hiatus with a spectacular victory.

6. *Another English Floodtide (1415–1429)*

The second period of English victory began in 1415, when Henry V, the third royal to prove himself a great general (all were English), landed in France with the intention of resurrecting his dynasty's claim on the throne. He would be greatly aided in this endeavor by the enduring Armagnac-Burgundian split.

Having besieged and captured the Norman port of Harfleur, his army marched toward Calais. On October 25, it smashed a vastly superior French force at Agincourt, producing yet another English victory to rival those of Edward III and the Black Prince.³³ Three years later, the king, having allied himself loosely with the Burgundian faction, conquered Normandy.³⁴ At about the same time, his ally, John the Fearless, occupied Paris. Members of the Armagnac faction who escaped the slaughter that followed moved south of the Loire River with the *dauphin*, the future Charles VII (1422–1461), where they established a shaky government.

Despite his English connection, the duke of Burgundy now began negotiations to end the civil war and form a united front against England. All possibilities of such an alliance ended for a time when, on September, 10, 1419, during what was supposed to be a peace conference on the bridge of Montereau, an axe-wielding Armagnac supporter in the royal entourage murdered Duke John.³⁵ The dead man's son and successor, Philip the Good (1419–1467) immediately strengthened his ties with England and, in 1420, helped force on the French crown the humiliating treaty of Troyes. The second major treaty of the war proved even harsher than that of Brétigny six decades earlier. Setting aside the Valois *dauphin*, it established the English king as heir apparent to the French throne. To cement this agreement, Henry V now married Charles VI's daughter, Catherine, and quickly produced a successor to both realms, the future Henry VI (1422–1461, 1471).³⁶

³³ Christopher Hibbert, *Agincourt* (New York, 1978); Philippe Contamine, *Agincourt* (Paris, 1964); Nicholas H. Nicolas, *History of the Battle of Agincourt and of the Expedition of Henry the Fifth into France in 1415* (1833; reprint, London, 1971); Christopher Phillpotts, "The French Plan of battle during the Agincourt Campaign," *English Historical Review* 99 (1990): 59–66.

³⁴ Desmond Seward, *Henry V as Warlord* (London, 1987), 111–43.

³⁵ Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, 40–41.

³⁶ Seward, *Henry V*, 143–46; Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy*, 19–24.

In 1422, Charles VI died. Unfortunately for the English, the near simultaneous death of Henry V threw the whole issue back into question. Once again, France became a divided realm ruled by competing monarchs: In the north, the English duke of Bedford, with support from the house of Burgundy, governed in the name of his nephew, Henry VI; in the south, the Armagnac faction acknowledged Charles VII as king, even though he had neither been crowned nor consecrated at Rheims, the coronation site of medieval French kings. Cowering in his châteaux of Chinon and Bourges, the young monarch cut such a poor figure that he was nicknamed by friend and foe alike, “the king of Bourges.”

During the 1420s, Bedford continued to build on Henry V’s success. Defeating the French at the battle of Verneuil in 1424, he extended his control farther into central France and by 1429, he was besieging Orléans, preparatory to attacking the Armagnac holdings south of the Loire. Despite appearances, however, the English presence, poorly supported by the faction-ridden government surrounding the young king, was sustained less by real military force than by the inaction of Charles VII, the myth of English invincibility born of past victories, and the continuing support of the house of Burgundy.

7. *Another French Resurgence (1429–1435)*

The critical turning point in the Hundred Years War came with what many regarded (and many still regard) as a miracle: In spring, 1429, an uneducated, seventeen year old peasant girl from Domrémy, named Joan of Arc, appeared at Chinon, headquarters of the erstwhile *dauphin*. Inspired by her “voices” whom she identified as Saints Catherine, Marguerite, and Michael, Joan claimed that it was her mission to conduct the *dauphin* to his coronation at Rheims and to free France from the English.

Having convinced the indolent monarch, she was sent to join a French army gathering for the relief of Orléans. The inspiration provided by her presence paid enormous dividends. Early in May, 1429, Joan participated prominently in the French victory that broke the English siege. A month later, she was present during another French triumph at Patay. And, in July, she led Charles on a triumphant

procession through northern France that resulted in his belated coronation at Rheims.³⁷

For Joan, the coronation at Rheims proved to be the highpoint in a meteoric career. During September, 1429, without adequate support from her king, she failed to retake Paris. In May, 1430, while trying to break the siege of Compiègne, she was captured by the Burgundians who sold her to the English. Tried before an ecclesiastical court dominated by the English, Joan was found guilty of heresy and witchcraft and on May 30, 1431, she was burnt at the stake in the town square at Rouen. Despite her later failures, the Maid of Orléan supplied France with the inspiration that would ultimately lead to English defeat and, six centuries later, to her own canonization.³⁸

In 1435, the rise of French military fortunes initiated by Joan reached another important milestone at the Congress of Arras, called to explore the possibility of a peace treaty. Despite Burgundian warnings that the duchy intended to reach a peace with France, the English ambassadors arrogantly withdrew from the negotiations when their extravagant demands were not met. This left France and Burgundy free to sign a treaty that ceded extensive territories to the Burgundian duke in return for a guarantee that he would switch sides and aid Charles VII against the English. During the six years between 1429 and 1430, England lost both the initiative and its principal ally.

8. *French Victory (1435–1453)*

While the events of the preceding period set the stage for a final decision, they did not bear full fruit until nearly two decades later.

³⁷ Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc, The Image of Female Heroism* (New York, 1981); Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Stroud, 1999). The proceedings of Joan's trial are available in English; see: *The Trial of Joan of Arc, being the verbatim report of the proceedings from the Orleans Manuscript*, trans. W.S. Scott (Westport, Conn., 1956).

³⁸ The sentence against Joan was reversed by the Nullification Trial of 1457. In 1909, Pius X beatified her and in 1920, during the pontificate of Benedict XV, Joan became Saint Joan. Thompson and Johnson (incorrectly) give the canonization date as 1919. Donald Attwater, *Avenel Dictionary of Saints* (New York, 1979), 187. Thompson and Johnson, *Medieval Europe*, 892.

Although Charles VII recovered Paris in 1436, the troubles besetting his kingdom continued. In 1439, the Burgundians made a separate peace with England, effectively withdrawing from the war entirely in order to pursue their territorial ambitions in the Low Countries. In 1440, the new *dauphin*, the future Louis XI (1461–1483), organized a revolt against his father (*la Praguerie*). Meanwhile, the “free company” scourge of the preceding century enjoyed a resurgence in the so-called *écorcheurs*, bands of out-of-work soldiers who lived up to their name by “flaying” whole regions of France.

In 1439, in the midst of these woes, the Estates General once again stepped into the breach, passing laws that afforded the crown a monopoly on military recruitment and training and that provided a direct tax known as the *taille* to support a new royal army. In 1445, the much-needed military reforms reduced the private companies that were troubling the peace, merging many of them into the crown’s newly-established cavalry force, the so-called *compagnies d’ordonnance*. Provision was also made for recruiting a native infantry, the “free archers” (*franc archiers*), whose name derived from the fact that as part of the condition for their service, they were freed from paying the *taille*. Perhaps the most significant reform involved a massive increase in the reliance on gunpowder weaponry that converted the French artillery into the finest in Europe.

In 1449, backed by a rejuvenated military establishment and employing the financial talents of men like Jacques Coeur,³⁹ Charles VII was now able to begin the final round of the conflict. Within a year, the French had won the battle of Formigny and driven the English from Normandy. Without pause, their army marched into Aquitaine, the longest-held and now last-remaining English stronghold in southern France. In 1450–51, the cities of Bayonne and Bordeaux were taken.

England’s last gasp came when the neighboring region of Gascony, always troublesome to whomever held it, revolted against French control and called on the English for help. The government of Henry VI dispatched a force led by the last great veteran of Agincourt, John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury. On July, 17, 1453, Talbot and his

³⁹ Kathryn L. Reyerson, *Jacques Coeur: Entrepreneur and King’s Bursar* (New York, 2005).

Gascon allies were crushed at the battle of Castillon (Chatillon),⁴⁰ by a superior French army and its formidable artillery. Within several months, France had reclaimed the rebellious provinces and the Hundred Years War, for all intents and purposes, came to an end.

III

The first article in this volume, Andrew Villalon's "Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera," introduces Part One, "The Spanish Connection." Villalon examines how, in the mid-1360s, the conflict spilled over across the Pyrenees where it merged with a decade-long struggle, the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366), currently being fought between Castile and Aragon. In 1366, the dreaded free companies, thrown out of work by the Treaty of Brétigny and the cessation of hostilities in both Normandy and Brittany, intervened in Spain, touching off a round of the Hundred Years War in which France and England, while nominally at peace, confronted one another through their Spanish surrogates. Peninsular events of this period had enormous repercussions for all involved: they reignited the conflict north of the Pyrenees, brought a new dynasty, the Trastámaras, to the throne of Castile, forged a long-lasting Franco-Castilian alliance that played an important role in French military success throughout the 1370s, laid low England's greatest soldier, the Black Prince, and completed the military education of his French counterpart, Beltran DuGuesclin.

The next three articles explore in greater detail aspects of the Iberian struggle that in 1366 became inexorably intertwined with the Hundred Years War. In "The Southern Valencia Frontier during the War of the Two Pedro's," Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol examines how that conflict unfolded in one of its major theaters, the border region separating the kingdom of Valencia, southernmost of the realms that composed the Crown of Aragon, and the neighboring Castilian province of Murcia. In this region, that saw much of the war's heaviest fighting, military activity took the form of a long series of sieges and raids, devoid of any set-piece battles. Ferrer i Mallol's

⁴⁰ Alfred H. Burne, "The Battle of Castillon, 1453," *History Today* 3 (1953): 249–56.

article explores the social cost of this ten-year struggle on southern Valencia and highlights the “nationalistic” antagonisms born of the bitter struggle that subsequently clouded relations between Castile and the Crown of Aragon throughout the later Middle Ages.

Donald Kagay’s article, “A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362–1363) as Military Financier” focuses on a crucial meeting (*parlamentum*) of representatives from all three realms composing the Crown of Aragon-Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon proper. The general assembly held in Monzón, like others during this crisis-filled decade, was called for one reason: to fund Pere III’s war effort aimed at throwing back the Castilian armies that were progressively overrunning extensive territories along the southern and eastern borders. All such meetings were held against a backdrop of simmering frustration with a crown that always seemed to come up short militarily while consuming ever greater sums of money. The delegates demanded that Pere address their “grievances” before they would supply new funds for the conflict with Castile. Meanwhile, Catalan representatives, who found their region underwriting a disproportionate share of a war being fought largely to protect the other two realms, moved to take over from the crown the entire process of military funding. They won the power to appoint tax commissioners, hire soldiers, and even decide where they would be stationed. Extremely detailed records left by this *parlemantum* indicate just how diffuse the Crown of Aragon actually was, with the different realms squabbling bitterly among themselves in the midst of national crisis.

The final essay in Part One, Clara Estow’s “War and Peace in Medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan Relations in the Mid-Fourteenth Century,” tracks the influence of the Hundred Years War beyond the borders of Christendom, into the one remaining Islamic outpost in western Europe, the kingdom of Granada. Estow examines the improbable survival of that small state, hemmed in to the north by an expansionist Castile and reeling from defeats suffered during the first half of the fourteenth century. She argues that Granada owed its continued existence to two factors: first, Castile’s war against Aragon, a conflict that diverted its military attentions eastward and led inexorably to a growing involvement in the struggle north of the Pyrenees; second, a masterful diplomatic and military policy exercised by the contemporary Granadan ruler, Muḥammad V (1354–1391), who skillfully played his Christian neighbors off against one

another. It was Muḥammad's careful maneuvering of the 1350s and 1360s that spared the Muslim kingdom at a critical moment and helped postpone its demise for over a century.

Part Two of the collection considers the “spillover” of the Hundred Years War into two other neighboring regions, Italy and Brabant. In “The Fox and the Lion”: The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy,” William Caferro traces the arrival of the free companies on the peninsula, exploring the early history of one of the most famous of these mercenary bands, the so-called White Company, and its legendary leader, John Hawkwood, an English renegade whose mortal remains now rest in the cathedral at Florence. Caferro shows how the presence of these refugees from the Hundred Years War encouraged the future growth of their native counterparts, the Italian *condottieri*—a phenomenon roundly criticized a century and a half later in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli.

While the Hundred Years War spilled over into Spain and Italy, no neighbor suffered from the on-going hostilities more than the Low Countries. Lying between the two great antagonists and tied economically to both, the cities and feudal principalities of this region veered back and forth in their allegiances as changing circumstances dictated. Although one thinks first of the county of Flanders, site of leading commercial cities such as Ghent and Bruges and home to the Van Artevelde, other regional powers, including Hainault and Brabant, also played their role. In his article, “The Duchy of Brabant Caught Between France and England: Geopolitics and Diplomacy during the Hundred Years War,” Sergio Boffa explores the conflict's impact upon this small state and its reigning dukes. In steering their duchy through the vagaries of war, these fourteenth century nobles shifted sides several times and although ducal self-interest played an important part in dictating these diplomatic moves, it was by no means the only factor at work. Such things as the economic well-being of Brabant's inhabitants and even popular sentiments helped shape policy decisions. Boffa defends Duke John against some of the charges laid at his door by later historians, in particular the accusation that he did not fulfill his commitment to England during the early stages of the conflict.

Part Three looks at urban reactions to the Hundred Years War, focusing upon three important, but geographically diverse cities—London, Toulouse, and Barcelona. In “London's War Effort during the Early Years of the Reign of Edward III,” Peter Konieczny

discusses how the lord mayor and other city authorities went about fulfilling requests from Edward III to provide military assistance against England's enemies. Londoners had to send soldiers, ships, supplies, and money for various mid-fourteenth century campaigns, including those fought across the channel to vindicate the king's claim on the crown of France. In addition to examining how the city carried out its military responsibilities, Konieczny shows the reaction of ordinary London residents to the demands for their support resulting from the war effort.

In 1355, the destructive English *chevauchée* through Languedoc gave the inhabitants of Toulouse a rude awakening. Although the Hundred Years War had been in progress for nearly two decades, its affect on the region had been minimal. Now, for the first time in more than a century, the city faced a true military threat. Even though no attack on the formidable city walls materialized, the people of the *Toulousain* watched as their fields and villages burned and the French governor general, the count of Armagnac, stood by helplessly. In his article, "*Tholosanna Fides: Toulouse as a Military Actor in Late Medieval France*," Paul Solon traces the impact of this event and the war of which it was a small part upon one of the great walled towns of France, know to contemporaries as the *bonnes villes*. Toulouse resumed the vigilance of an earlier age and went back on the defensive in a serious way. Throughout the rest of the Hundred Years War and for sometime thereafter, the city assumed control of its military and diplomatic destiny, maneuvering between two powerful regional rivals, the counts of Armagnac and Foix, alternately negotiating or fighting with the mercenary bands that troubled the countryside, repairing walls and raising forces, both to defend itself and serve the crown. According to Solon, during this period, the elites of Toulouse conducted an independent and creative policy that helped shape the regional balance of power. The city carefully applied its military and logistical capacity as well as its diplomatic clout to achieving its own policy objectives. As the conflict progressed, this policy increasingly involved supplying men and materiel to Valois armies, even when those armies were operating far from Toulouse.

In an article entitled "The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona," Manuel Sánchez Martínez provides a detailed treatment of how the major city of eastern Spain recruited its troops during this volatile period. Since

the great Catalan law code, the *Usatges of Barcelona*, first surfaced in the 1150s, Aragonese monarchs had increasingly invoked the so-called “national defense clause” (*Princeps namque*) contained in article 64 as a means of raising military forces. Now, during the war-torn 1360s, the city council of Barcelona launched a fiscal experiment, which it hoped would supply a cheaper and more efficient way of providing men for the war effort. It diverted taxes assessed on urban households (*fogatge*) to both the hiring of military professionals and the payment of a militia raised from among the city’s male population. Using a wealth of contemporary documentation, Sánchez Martínez traces the extent to which this experiment succeeded in the face of royal attempts not to lose control of military financing.

The fourth part of the volume deals with one of the most under-considered medieval topics, “Women at War.” James Gilbert’s essay, “A Medieval ‘Rosie the Riveter’?: Women in France and Southern England during the Hundred Years War” examines the ways in which medieval women and the warfare raging around them had a profound impact upon one another and how contemporaries perceived female involvement in conflict. Gilbert, who establishes a number of useful categories for gauging female participation, argues that for the Hundred Years War, the stereotype of women as non-combatants is badly oversimplified. Women played an active role in the struggle, even if that role was almost exclusively defensive in nature. The author demonstrates that while women took little to no part on the battlefield, they were regularly involved in the raids and sieges that characterized period warfare, often defending hearth and home against both regular soldiers and routiers and, on a few occasions, assuming leadership roles. The offensive actions of Joan of Arc, the principal female figure of the conflict (arguably the most famous individual of either gender), were an exception to the general rule. What is more, according to Gilbert, many of her actions, when viewed from a larger perspective, might actually be categorized as defensive.

In her article, “Just War, Joan of Arc, and the Politics of Salvation,” Jane Marie Pinzino treats just war theory as it relates to Joan. When the Hundred Years War resumed early in the fifteenth century, the Christian doctrine of “just war” infused the struggle waged by the Armagnac faction to liberate France from its foreign oppressors and uphold the sacred kingship of the Valois line. This ideology was highly spiritual, claiming God’s command to take up arms against

the prideful English invaders who had defiled French soil and caused profound suffering for the French people. While there exists an extensive scholarly literature on the development of medieval just war doctrine among the educated elite, its role as a popular movement voiced by the uneducated as well as educated, poets as well as soldiers, women as well as men, peasants as well as nobles, laypeople as well as clergy, has heretofore been overlooked. During the closing phases of the struggle, the diverse strata of French society united in a political resistance to the English that embraced a prophetic piety and instilled “a broad-reaching spirituality of *peoplehood* that would ultimately energize a new humanism across Europe.” It is in the context of French society’s freshly evolving sense of self-identity that the Maid of Orleans’ successes are best understood. Joan demonstrated heaven’s ability to grant even the lowliest members of a society threatened by unjust war extraordinary powers to promote the common good.


The final section, “Strategy, Technology, and Techniques of Combat” contains three articles, each of which is in its own way an exercise in revisionist history. In “Henry V’s Military Strategy in 1415,” Clifford Rogers reexamines the English monarch’s decision to march overland from Harfleur to Calais in 1415, a decision which led to the battle of Agincourt. Conventional wisdom holds that Henry had intended to score a propaganda victory by traversing the territory he claimed, while at the same time, moving so quickly that he would avoid having to do battle with the French. Only when left with no alternative did he turn and fight. Based on the king’s strategic situation, personal experiences, and knowledge of history, Rogers argues convincingly that, in fact, Henry recognized the need for an early battlefield victory if he hoped to win a strategic success in his French campaign. Consequently, the march to Calais was really designed to lure the French into combat—at a time and on a field of Henry’s choosing.

Examining the experiences of two Dukes of Burgundy, Philip the Good and Charles the Bold, Kelly DeVries revisits the old question of just how effective fifteenth century gunpowder artillery really proved to be when directed against traditional medieval fortifications. DeVries shows that despite possessing one of the most advanced artillery trains in western Europe, the dukes had surprisingly little success in attacking cities whose walls were still medieval in nature and argues on the basis of this that cannon of the period were not as effective


against “old fashioned” fortifications as “military revolution” historians would have us believe.

The last essay in the collection is of a somewhat different nature from the others. It is written by one of the foremost medieval and Renaissance martial artists (not to be mistaken for “reenactors”), John Clements, director of the Association for Renaissance Martial Arts [ARMA].⁴¹ Many years of hands-on experience with a wide variety of medieval weaponry have left Clements well-versed in the medieval practice of arms. Based in large part upon little-known combat manuals of the later Middle Ages as well as its author’s personal experience, this article provides the reader with information on the weapons commonly in use as well as how men actually trained and fought with such weapons during the so-called age of chivalry.


⁴¹ ARMA’s fascinating website can be found at www.thearma.org.



Map 1. France in 1328.




Map 2. French Territory Ceded to England after the Treaty of Brétigny 1360.




Map 3. England and France in the later Hundred Years War.

The Succession in 1328

Philip III, 1285




The dates, years of death. French kings, in black type. Descendants of Edward I, in italics.



Genealogy 2

France, Burgundy, and Naples



CAPITALS denote kings of France.
 SMALL CAPS denote kings of Naples of the *first* house of Anjou.
Italics denote kings (titular) of Naples of the *second* house of Anjou.

PART ONE

THE SPANISH CONNECTION

SPANISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR AND THE BATTLE OF NÁJERA

L.J. Andrew Villalon
University of Cincinnati

On April 3, 1367,¹ as the sun rose over northern Castile, largest of five kingdoms that shared the Iberian peninsula,² two of the century's greatest armies faced each other across a field awaiting orders that would propel them into one of the century's greatest battles. From across the Pyrenees, by way of the neighboring kingdom of Navarre, came the invaders, an Anglo-Gascon force, battle-hardened in the Hundred Years War and commanded by England's most famous soldier, Edward Plantagenet, known widely as the Black Prince (d. 1376).³ Eldest son of Edward III (1327–1377) and heir to

¹ Earlier versions of this article were presented as papers in February and May, 1990, first at the University College Faculty Forum, later at the 34th International Congress on Medieval Studies meeting (as always) at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. I would like to thank the following archives, libraries, and individuals for their assistance during preparation and production of this essay: the Archivo Historico Nacional and Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid, the Archivo General in Simancas, the British National Library in London and the Bodleian at Oxford and (in alphabetical order) Judith Daniels, Julian Deahl, Kelly DeVries, Dan Gottlieb, Janine Hartman, Donald Kagay, Mark Lause, Sally Moffitt, Paul Moran, both the elder and younger, Marcella Mulder, Norman Murdoch, Mark DuPuy, Clifford Rogers, Charles Seibert, Blasco Sobrinho, Ann Twinam, Theresa Vann, and Thomas White. My special thanks to Brill's reader who critiqued the penultimate version and not only gave me good advice for reshaping my treatment of the battle, but even saved me from an outright error. The University of Cincinnati is largely free of both blame and credit for this or any other work I have published. It has done little to encourage, promote, or support research conducted by members of the two-year faculties operating under its aegis. There are, of course, exceptions: I must thank the tireless workers at the University of Cincinnati Libraries, in particular the reference department, archives, and interlibrary loan and photo duplication services; the University of Cincinnati Research Council that in 1991 and again in 1997 supplied small summer grants to underwrite work in Spain; and the Department of Romance Languages and Literature, that let me come in from the cold.

² The Christian kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Portugal, Navarre, and the Moorish kingdom of Granada.

³ Most historians attribute this sobriquet, not mentioned in historical sources until long after Edward's death, to a penchant for wearing black armor. See, for example: Henry Dwight Sedgwick, *The Life of Edward the Black Prince, 1330–1376* (New York, 1993): 27. The best medieval account of the prince's life is to be found in

the English throne, the prince had entered Spain to restore his country's ally, Pedro I "the Cruel" (1350–1366; 1367–1369),⁴ to the Castilian throne from which he had been unceremoniously ousted a year earlier.

Standing against the invaders was a Castilian army that included a considerable part of the kingdom's upper nobility. While it consisted primarily of light cavalry (*ginetes* or *geneteurs*) of the sort spawned by medieval Spanish warfare, it also contained a large body of native infantry, drawn from the northeastern region of the kingdom where the campaign was being conducted. Fighting alongside the Castilians were sizeable contingents of Aragonese "volunteers" and Franco-Breton mercenaries, the latter like their opponents hardened veterans of the decades-long struggle between England and France. All of these men served Pedro's illegitimate half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara, who in 1366 had managed to seize the crown with remarkable ease and now styled himself Enrique II (1366–1367, 1369–1379).⁵ They too had at their head one of the era's greatest warriors, the future constable of France, Bertrand Du Gueslin

a lengthy poem by an anonymous author known only as the Chandos herald, the most reliable surviving manuscript of which resides in Worcester College, Oxford. A critical edition from the turn of the century used in the preparation of this article contains not only the original text in meter, but also a useful prose paraphrase. While the introduction to that edition is overwhelmingly linguistic rather than historical in nature, the inclusion of voluminous endnotes, often cross-referencing to other chronicles, more than makes up for this. See: *Life of the Black Prince by the Herald of Sir John Chandos* [hereafter Chandos herald], ed. Mildred K. Pope and Eleanor C. Lodge (Oxford, 1910). The prose paraphrase mentioned above has now appeared on a website of medieval sources entitled Blackmask Online (URL: <http://www.blackmask.com/books46c/chandoshar.htm>.) In addition, a somewhat freer English translation of the work can be found in Richard Barber, *The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince* (London, 1979), a new version of which has recently come out with Boydell and Brewer.

⁴ The most widely-used edition of the Pedro's chronicle, the one cited in this article, is Pedro Lopez de Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Pedro Primero* [hereafter Ayala], in *Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla* [CRC] 1, *Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles* [BAE] 66 (Madrid, 1953), 393–614. For a more recent edition, see: *Crónica del rey don Pedro*, ed. by Constance L. Wilkins and Heanon M. Wilkins (Madison, 1985). In *Pedro the Cruel, 1350–1369* (Leiden, 1995), Clara Estow has contributed a fine full-length biography of the king. Another useful book for the study of the reign, one that reprints a number of key documents is J.B. Sitges, *Las Mujeres del Rey Don Pedro I de Castilla* (Madrid, 1910). For my own assessment of Pedro and his highly impolitic policies, see: L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Pedro the Cruel: Portrait of a Royal Failure," in *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow (New York, 1997), 205–216.

⁵ Enrique dated his reign from his coronation in 1366; most historians, however, date it from 1369, the year in which Pedro I died.

(d. 1380), who in the next decade would drive the English from most of their continental holdings.⁶

By day's end, the English and their Gascon allies had achieved an overwhelming victory while their Spanish, French, and Breton opponents had sustained one of the century's most crushing defeats. For the prince, it became the capstone victory of his career; for Du Guesclin, it ushered in another frustrating period of captivity. In what turned out to be a highly unequal contest, the defeated side suffered losses vastly outnumbering those of the victors, the majority having been killed or wounded not on the field, but during a panicked flight westward that followed the collapse of both wings of Enrique's army, a flight that ran out of ground when funneled onto a single bridge across the swift-flowing Rio Najarilla.⁷

Today, the encounter is best known as Nájera (or Nájara), a name given it by the losing side, though the winner's designation, Navarette (Navaretta), still appears in the literature, especially in works by English historians.⁸ Both names are something of a misnomer, since the field lay several miles from either of these two towns in which opposing forces had encamped on the eve of the battle. Whatever one chooses to call the clash of arms that occurred on April 3, 1367, it ranks with the greatest of the "calamitous" fourteenth century,⁹ comparable to such other memorable encounters as Coutrai (1302),

⁶ Born in Brittany around 1320, Bertrand Du Guesclin (rendered in Spanish chronicles as Beltran de Claquin or de Claquí) was one of the most famous and talented commanders of the Hundred Years War. The exploits of the man who would become constable of France under Charles V and would drive the English from much of the territory they held after the Treaty of Brétigny resound through the chronicles of the period. His prominence made him the principal subject of a number of late fourteenth century accounts, including a lengthy poem by a Picard troubador, named Cuvelier. *Chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin par Cuvelier*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1839). Short selections from the poem are reprinted in G. G. Coulton's excellent sourcebook, *Life in the Middle Ages* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930): 100–11. For more information concerning medieval works on Du Guesclin see the "Notice sur Les Mémoires de Du Guesclin," in *Collection Complete des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1824), 4:4–23. For a recent biography, see Richard Vernier, *The Flower of Chivalry: Bertrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003).

⁷ For lists of those who participated, who were killed, and who were captured, see the appendix.

⁸ For example, Harbottle's entry for Nájera is "see Navarrete" under which heading he has placed his account of the battle. *Harbottle's Dictionary of Battles*, 3rd ed., rev. George Bruce (New York, 1981), 179.

⁹ This colorful characterization of the fourteenth century has been made famous in what is probably the modern era's best-selling work on the Middle Ages, Barbara W. Tuchman's *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century* (New York, 1978).

Bannockburn (1314), Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), Roosebeke (1382), Kossovo (1389), and Nicopolis (1396). It is, however, almost certainly the least well-known and probably the least widely-studied among them.

In an attempt to redress the balance, the present article will (1) place the battle of Nájera into its larger historical context; (2) explore the campaigns of 1366 and 1367 that led both sides to the battlefield; (3) examine in detail the strategy and tactics that both adopted; (4) look at the surprising aftermath that ultimately reversed the judgment won on the field; (5) trace the profound if unexpected impact the events in Spain had on the Hundred Years War; and (6) suggest why the encounter has drawn relatively scant attention from medieval historians.

Background to Conflict

Although a battle can be successfully studied as a discreet event, with little or no attention paid to the broader historical context,¹⁰ the relatively unexamined case of Nájera cries out for contextual treatment. On that field, a bitter conflict between Castile and the Crown of Aragon¹¹ known as the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366) intersected with the even greater struggle being waged north of the Pyrenees, with enormous consequences for all involved. A chain of events stretching back to mid-century inexorably drew the kingdoms of Iberia into the vortex of the Hundred Years War.

On March 27, 1350, a new king succeeded to the Castilian throne when plague carried off Alfonso XI (1319–1350),¹² Europe's high-

¹⁰ John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* (New York, 1976), successfully examines three famous encounters from different eras (Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme) while supplying only the barest minimum of context for each. As Keegan indicates in the introduction, his purpose was to explore what it must have been like to participate in a great battle and how human beings have reacted to that participation over the centuries, a purpose perfectly suited to the non-contextual analysis which he adopted.

¹¹ The Crown of Aragon is the collective designation for three political units which coalesced during the High Middle Ages to form a single kingdom, i.e. the county of Catalonia and the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia. (See accompanying maps.)

¹² [anonymous] *Crónica del Rey Don Alfonso el Onceno* [hereafter *Crónica de Alfonso XI*] in *CRC* 2, BAE 66.

est-ranking victim the Black Death.¹³ Alfonso, who perished along with much of his army while besieging the Moorish stronghold of Gibraltar,¹⁴ left as his successor sixteen-year-old Pedro I, his only surviving legitimate child by his marriage to María of Portugal. Better known to history by his contrasting sobriquets as either “the Cruel” or “the Just” (one’s choice depends upon how one views his sanguinary activities), Pedro occupies a niche in Spanish history which the English reserve for Richard III; and while there is no literary portrait of the king to rival Shakespeare’s Richard, his similar reputation as a blood-thirsty tyrant has endured.

While almost nothing is known concerning Pedro’s youth,¹⁵ there are indications that he experienced a troubled, even dangerous childhood,¹⁶ arising out of his father’s indifference to the queen and infatuation with the royal mistress, Leonor de Guzmán, one of the most notorious “other women” in Spanish history. Guzmán would ultimately provide Pedro with a flock of illegitimate half-siblings,¹⁷ at least three of whom he later murdered.¹⁸

For the first half dozen years of his reign, Pedro found himself surrounded by competing aristocratic factions, several of which joined in 1354 to seize control of the government. Their coalition proved short-lived, due in part to judicious royal bribery, but mainly to their failure to overcome problems medieval nobles habitually faced when trying to present a united front—jealousy, conflicting ambitions,

¹³ In its own time, the disease was called by other names including “the great dying” (*la mortandad grande*); only later was it dubbed the Black Death. For the plague’s influence in Spain, see Philip Ziegler, *The Black Death* (New York, 1969), 113–16; Amada Lopez de Meneses, *Documentos acerca de la peste negra en los dominios de la Corona de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1956).

¹⁴ Ayala, 393–94.

¹⁵ Anything said concerning Pedro’s youth is rendered problematic by a gap in the chronicle record affecting the last half dozen years of his father’s reign. Alfonso XI’s anonymous chronicler treats in excruciating detail the king’s most famous campaign which led to the conquest of Algeciras in 1343–44. Thereafter, the chronicle falls silent except for a tacked-on final chapter detailing the 1350 siege of Gibraltar at which the king met his death. See: *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, 388–92. Although recent work by such historians as Nicholas Agrait of Fordham University has shed new light on the events of Alfonso’s later years, this has not extended to Pedro’s youth.

¹⁶ Several cryptic passages in the chronicle hint at Pedro’s troubled youth. Ayala, 435, 442, 507.

¹⁷ *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, 230. Ayala, 405. Pedro Salazar de Mendoza, *Monarquía de España*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1770), 1:189.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2:481–83, 500.

personal antagonisms, and family feuds. By 1356, nobles who had not made their peace with Pedro (and who had managed to escape execution or imprisonment) had fled en masse into exile. Principal among these refugees from the king's wrath was his eldest half-brother, Enrique of Trastámara, who settled first in France and later moved to Aragon, where he increasingly became a focal point around which opposition to Pedro rallied.

During the following decade (1356–1366), the king's power reached its zenith. His murderous purge of all internal opposition, real or imagined, alienated an ever growing number of Castilian nobles and earned him both of his famous sobriquets. The events of these years made clear his character to friend and foe alike: the king was a suspicious and vindictive man, capable of employing deceit and savage cruelty when dealing with opponents. A long memory and unforgiving nature combined to make attempts at reconciliation hazardous; many who reposed their trust in royal assurances learned too late that to do so might well prove fatal. Not even an unbroken record of loyal service was a sufficient shield against the king's wrath.¹⁹

Eventually, the majority of those who escaped Pedro's clutches joined his illegitimate half-brother, Enrique whose following grew to several thousand, including quite a number of the realm's great nobles. It had become clear to these men that even if they reached an accommodation with the king, they could place little trust in him to abide by it. Realizing there would be no safety for them in Castile while Pedro ruled, they increasingly pinned their hopes on the royal bastard who, by the early 1360s, had reached a decision to claim the throne.

Despite the burgeoning opposition among his own subjects, Pedro would probably have retained the crown had it not been for the utter failure of his new foreign policy, one that represented a radical break with the previous reign. Alfonso XI had devoted most of his military and diplomatic talents to prosecuting the age-old struggle against the Muslims in southern Spain, known as the *reconquista*. Toward that end, he had cultivated good relations with his Christian neighbors on the peninsula, including Aragon. During his final decades, when the Hundred Years War became the overriding concern of

¹⁹ Two examples of royal ingratitude toward men with a long record of loyal service can be seen in the execution of Gutier Ferrandez de Toledo (1360) and imprisonment of Juan Alfonso de Benavides (1364). Ayala, 507, 536.

western Europe, Alfonso adopted a cautiously pro-French stance; one, however, which would not encourage intractable hostility on the part of England. At the time of his death in 1350, both sides were actively courting Alfonso's favor, while he enjoyed moderate success in playing them off against one another.²⁰

Pedro had barely laid his father to rest when he began to jettison the old policies. Not only did he abandon the struggle against Granada, the peninsula's only remaining Islamic kingdom, he even formed a close alliance with its king, Muḥammad V (1354–1359; 1362–1391), who would on several occasions supply Castile with military aid.²¹ In 1356, having defeated the aristocratic coalition and solidified his grip on power at home, Pedro redirected Castile's military energies eastward against Aragon.²² The brutal war of conquest that ensued²³ dragged on for nearly a decade with only one short intermission (1361–1362) when adverse circumstances forced Pedro I to call a temporary halt by signing the peace of Terrar²⁴ with his adversary, Pere III "the Ceremonious" (1336–1387).²⁵

At his first opportunity, the Castilian king violated the treaty, reinstating hostilities through a surprise attack on the Aragonese city of Calatayud.²⁶ For the next four years, with some aid from Portugal, Navarre, and Granada, Castilian armies won most of the engagements in a war that consisted largely of raids and siege operations against towns and fortresses along the frontier. By 1366, the last year of the conflict, Castile had made significant gains, especially in the areas west of Zaragoza and south of Valencia and it seemed to many that Aragon would come out of the conflict substantially reduced in size.

²⁰ Georges Daumet, *Etude sur l'alliance de la France et de la Castille au XIV^e au XV^e Siècles* (Paris, 1898), 1–18.

²¹ Ayala, 408, 494, 515–20. For a detailed account of relations between Pedro I and the kingdom of Granada, see the article in this volume by Clara Estow entitled, "War and Peace in Medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan Relations in the Mid-Fourteenth Century."

²² Ayala, 473–6, 488–90.

²³ For a detailed account of the opening phase of the the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1361), see the article in this volume by María Teresa Ferrer i Maillol entitled, "The Southern Valencia Frontier during the War of the Two Pedros."

²⁴ Ayala, 511.

²⁵ Known as Pere III in his Catalan-speaking territories, this monarch was called Pedro IV in his other two realms of Aragon and Valencia. He is the other Pedro from whom the war takes its name.

²⁶ Ayala, 522.

Despite this nearly unbroken string of military successes, Pedro's war ultimately played into the hands of his domestic enemies for as soon as hostilities broke out, Pere III called upon the Castilian exiles under their leader, Enrique of Trastámara, to join the fight against their common foe.²⁷ Thereafter, except for the one brief period of peace between the two kingdoms,²⁸ Aragon provided its Castilian allies with financial support and a base from which to operate against their king. In return, Enrique fought on the Aragonese side of the conflict, launching periodic raids into Castile and winning over converts to their joint cause. In March, 1363, Pere and Enrique signed the secret treaty of Monzón, the first of several such agreements by the terms of which Aragon agreed to back Enrique's bid for the crown of Castile, obtaining, in return, promises of extensive territorial compensation at Castile's expense.²⁹

Regardless of the ever closer ties between Aragon and the exiles, Pedro continued to prove more than a match for all of his Iberian enemies combined. In the end, it would be his alienation of two leading players north of the Pyrenees, France and the Avignon Papacy, that would decisively shift the balance against him. During his early years, advisers held over from Alfonso's reign had maintained Castile on its moderately pro-French course, even managing to strengthen the alliance of the two monarchies by arranging for the young king to marry a French princess, Blanche de Bourbon.³⁰ Ironically, a match designed to further Franco-Castilian friendship had precisely the opposite effect. Pedro, who was thoroughly infatuated with his mistress, María de Padilla, came to resent both the marriage and the advisers who forced it on him. Within hours of

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 473, 476; Pere III, *Chronicle* [hereafter Pere] trans. Mary Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 2:509–11 (VI:8).

²⁸ One clause in the treaty of Terrar called upon Pere to expel the Castilian exiles and deny them the use of Aragonese territory for their continued resistance. As soon as hostilities broke out anew, he recalled them from southern France. Ayala, 522; Pere, 2:536–37 (VI:33).

²⁹ Jerónimo Zurita, *Anales de la Corona de Aragon*, ed. Angel Canellas Lopez, 6 vols. (Zaragoza, 1967–75), 4:457 (IX:xliv). Interestingly, there is no mention of these negotiations in the chronicles of Ayala or Pere III. The Monzon agreement is printed in its entirety in Sitges, *Mujeres*, 81.

³⁰ For the first three years of the reign, policy was largely dictated by the king's principal adviser, Juan Alfonso, lord of Alburquerque, who continued Alfonso XI's pro-French orientation. Ayala, 51.

the wedding, he abandoned Blanche and began to move against members of the pro-French party.³¹ As the years passed, Pedro withdrew even the limited military assistance his father had given to France, while at the same time subjecting his French-born queen to increasingly harsh and humiliating treatment.³²

Although alarmed by the widening rift with Castile, France was at first in no position to respond forcefully. Pedro's consolidation of power in 1356 coincided with the French defeat at Poitiers, after which the country experienced a decade of crisis rarely equalled in its history. In 1356, with the French king, John II (1350–1364), a captive in England, his eldest son, Charles, was forced to assume the regency. During the next four years, the young regent faced one severe crisis after another—the rebellion of Paris led by Etienne Marcel, the attempt of the Estates General of 1356–7 to assume control, and the *jacquerie* of 1358, one of the greatest peasant revolts of the Middle Ages. In 1360, both the king and his son were forced to accept the disastrous treaty of Brétigny, by terms of which sovereignty over much of central and southwestern France was ceded to the English crown. No sooner had official hostilities ceased than thousands of unemployed soldiers banded together into the so-called 'free companies' that terrorized much of the kingdom.

As long as Castile maintained even an uneasy neutrality, the French could ill-afford any action which might propel its monarch straight into the arms of England. Then, early in the 1360's, Pedro abandoned the last vestiges of his father's policy by negotiating an alliance with the English king, Edward III.³³ There now remained no reason for France to conciliate Castile's despised monarch. The following year, the debonair, but ineffectual French king died, still a prisoner of the English, bringing to the throne his son, Charles V (1364–1380), who would become one of the great medieval monarchs, earning the sobriquet Charles the Wise. While still regent, the soon-to-be king had begun looking for ways to bring Castile back into a French orbit; he now redoubled his efforts.

³¹ Ayala, 434–38.

³² *Ibid.*, 433–36, 512.

³³ The treaty of London, dated June 22, 1362, was ratified by the English early in 1363, and by Castile in the fall of 1364. Thomas D. Hardy, *Syllabus (in English) of the Documents relating to England and Other Kingdoms contained in the collection known as Rymer's Foedera*, 2 vols. (London, 1869), 1:422, 426, 435.

During these years, Pedro's activities added yet another powerful foreign enemy to the two he already faced—the Avignon papacy.³⁴ His abandonment of the Granadan War, increasingly anti-French stance, violation of the marriage vows and treatment of his queen, persecution of high churchmen, and adamant refusal to cooperate in papal efforts to restore peace between Castile and Aragon convinced two successive popes of the need for drastic measures. As early as 1357, Innocent VI (1352–1362) excommunicated the Castilian monarch; less than a decade later, Urban V (1362–1370) deposed him.

By the mid-1360s, conditions were ripe for Pedro's enemies to unite in an effort to overthrow him. The Castilian exiles had concluded that a safe return to Castile depended upon eliminating their royal persecutor. The Aragonese realized that only Pedro's removal could put an end to the long and draining war that which they were losing. Both France and the papacy wanted a Castilian king more amenable to their interests, rather than one aligned with England.

Ironically, it would be another serious threat to the French that served as catalyst to the fateful alliance of Pedro's enemies. A lull in hostilities following the treaties of Brétigny and Calais released thousands of unemployed soldiers (*routiers*) onto the French countryside. These battle-hardened veterans formed roving bands, sometimes numbering in the thousands, known as “free companies.”³⁵ For regions of France that experienced their worst depredations (Champagne, Burgundy, and the Languedoc), peace and war became virtually indistinguishable. Neither royal army nor papal crusade proved adequate to remove this scourge from the land. In the words of Jean Froissart, the period's leading chronicler and one who showed an

³⁴ The relationship between Pedro and the papacy is treated in great detail in two late nineteenth century works by George Daumet: *Étude sur les relations d'Innocent VI avec D. Pedro Ier, roi de Castille au sujet de Blanche de Bourbon* (Paris, 1899); and *Étude sur les relations politiques du Pape Urbain V avec les rois de France Jean II et Charles V (1362–1370)* (Paris, 1887).

³⁵ The best book treating the overall role of the “free companies” during this period is Kenneth Fowler's *Medieval Mercenaries, Volume 1: The Great Companies* (Oxford, 2001). Their influence on early Renaissance Italy is presented in exquisite detail in William Caferro, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena* (Baltimore, 1998). See also Caferro's article in the present collection, “‘The Fox and the Lion’: The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy.” For my own take on their invasion of Spain in 1366–67, see my article: “Seeking Castles in Spain: Sir Hugh Calveley and the Free Companies' Mid-Fourteenth Century Iberian Intervention,” in *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare Around the Mediterranean*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2002), 302–28.

intense interest in the free companies, “the wisest of the kingdom declared that if something were not speedily done, either by fighting or getting them out of the country, they would destroy the noble kingdom of France!”³⁶

One of the crying issues Charles faced upon coming to the throne was how to handle this burgeoning threat, a concern shared by Urban V. Chronicles tell of several occasions when the *routiers*, eager to extort church wealth, held Avignon to ransom.³⁷ One attractive solution—shipping these unruly bands off to southeastern Europe where they might fight the Turks—foundered on their refusal to journey so far from home. Charles and Urban then decided that an even better solution lay closer at hand: just across the Pyrenees ruled the figure whom both men detested, against whom they might unleash the free companies.³⁸

The Sources

Although less extensively covered than either Crecy or Poitiers, the campaigns leading up to battle of Nájera as well as the battle itself did capture the attention of most major western European chroniclers. They noted in particular that it was the third and last of the great victories won by the Black Prince.³⁹ For at least one of these writers, Jean de Vanette, a cloistered monk living in the vicinity of Rheims, Nájera became the last significant entry in his chronicle.⁴⁰

³⁶ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles of England, France, and Spain and the Adjoining Countries from the Latter Part of the Reign of Edward II to the Coronation of Henry IV* [Froissart], trans. Thomas Johnes, 2 vols. (London, 1857), 1:339.

³⁷ Daumet, *Étude sur Urbain V*, 46–64.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 52–57. Froissart, 1:339.

³⁹ According to Froissart, in the wake of Nájera, the reputation enjoyed by the Black Prince reached its zenith:

News was immediately carried through France, England, Germany and other countries that the prince of Wales had defeated King Enrique . . . in a regular battle. The prince was therefore the more honoured and renowned for it wherever true knighthood and deeds of enterprise were esteemed, particularly in the empire of Germany and England. The Germans, Flemings, and English declared the prince of Wales was the mirror of knighthood, and that such a prince was worthy of governing the whole world, who, by personal prowess, had gained three glorious victories: the first at Crecy in Ponthieu, the second at Poitiers ten years afterwards, and the third in Spain, at Najarra.

Froissart, 1:377.

⁴⁰ *The Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, ed. Richard A. Newhall, trans. Jean Birdsall (New York, 1953), 136–42.

On the other hand, despite the general interest, most accounts are relatively brief and therefore contribute little to our understanding of what happened. There are only four significant narrative sources that supply historians with most of their reliable facts and it is from these that the present account has been taken. Two of the writers, Pedro Lopez de Ayala and the Chandos herald, are generally believed to have been present on the field, fighting on opposite sides.⁴¹ Two others, Jean Froissart and Pere III of Aragon, while not there in person, add credible information.

Born in Vitoria in 1332 to an old Basque family,⁴² Ayala received a brief education at Avignon, after which he entered the royal court of Castile as a page.⁴³ Although he and his family stoutly supported Pedro for more than a decade, in the pivotal year of 1366, they joined a mass defection of aristocrats to the side of Enrique de Trastámara.⁴⁴ and during the three years of civil war that followed (1366–1369), helped their new master overthrow their old one. Ayala himself was captured at the battle of Nájera, but following a period of captivity, succeeded in securing his release, after which he rejoined Enrique for the closing months of the struggle.⁴⁵ Thereafter, for more than three decades, he continued to serve successive members of the new Trastámaran dynasty, including not only its founder, but later his son, Juan I (1379–1390), and his grandson, Enrique III (1390–1407). In 1385, Ayala was once again captured fighting for the crown, this time at the battle of Aljubarrota that ended Juan I's ill-starred invasion of Portugal.⁴⁶ In 1398, he capped his long political career with a brief stint as lord chancellor of Castile, after which he retired into

⁴¹ While this is a certainty only in Ayala's case, it is widely assumed to be true of the Chandos herald as well.

⁴² The chronicler's father, Fernán Perez de Ayala, is first mentioned in his son's chronicle in relation to the events of 1351, at which point he is identified as a "natural" of the Basque province of Vizcaya. The first biographical treatment of Lopez de Ayala appears in Fernán Perez de Guzmán's, *Generaciones y Semblanzas*, an early fourteenth century work in which the author supplied thumbnail sketches of his contemporaries. Guzmán states that the family had branched off from the older, very illustrious line of Haro. Ayala, 416. Fernán Perez de Guzmán, *Generaciones y Semblanzas*, ed. J. Dominguez Bodona (Madrid, 1965), 37–39.

⁴³ The first reference to the author contained within the chronicle appears with events from the year 1353, the fourth year of Pedro's reign, at which time Ayala is identified as a "doncel" or royal page. Ayala, 431.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 539.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 579.

⁴⁶ Pedro Lopez de Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Juan Primero de Castilla e de Leon* in *CRC 2 BAE 68* (Madrid, 1953), 104–6; Perez de Guzmán, *Generaciones*, 38.

a Geronymite monastery near the Basque country where he had been born. Here he died in 1407.⁴⁷

Despite the busy years of public service, in later life Ayala found time to write a chronicle for each king he had served, the last of which remained unfinished at his death.⁴⁸ The most ambitious—and most controversial—of these works, dating to the mid-1380s,⁴⁹ was devoted to Pedro I and contained Ayala's account of Nájera.

In contrast to Ayala, about whom a fair amount of information survives, little to nothing is known about the Chandos herald, including even his name. He is saved from complete anonymity by the closing statement of his work, "this hath the Herald of Chandos related, who gladly made record."⁵⁰ The herald's account takes the form of a poem approximately 4000 lines in length of which two manuscript copies survive. Neither bears a title, though on the basis of its subject matter, it has become known simply as "The Life of the Black Prince." The metered French in which it is written suggests an author raised in or around the county of Hainault, birthplace to both Jean Froissart and his patroness, Queen Philippa of England, wife to Edward III. Since the poem follows the life of the prince down to his demise in 1376, its completion clearly postdates that event. The *terminus ad quem* of composition is supplied by the only other reference in the poem (line 1816) that casts any light on

⁴⁷ For a modern, full-length account of the chronicler's life and work, see Michel Garcia, *Obra y personalidad del Canciller Ayala* (Madrid, 1983). This work appends several of the contemporary sources that supply our information concerning Ayala. An earlier biography in Spanish by Luis Suárez Fernández, *El Canciller Ayala y su Tiempo* (Vitoria, 1962) is seriously flawed. English readers should consult Helen Nader, *The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance 1350–1550* (Rutgers, 1979). Nader's third chapter, entitled "Pedro López de Ayala and the Formation of Mendoza Attitudes," provides a fine capsule biography of the great chronicler, a penetrating analysis of his chronicle of Pedro I, and valuable bibliography. See also: Clara Estow's recent article, "Royal Madness in the *Crónica del Rey Don Pedro*," *Mediterranean Studies*, 6 (1996), 13–28. A new biography of Ayala has just been completed by Estow and should appear in the near future.

⁴⁸ Pedro Lopez de Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Enrique Tercero del Castilla e de Leon*, in *CRC* 2, *BAE* 68 (Madrid, 1953), 161–257.

⁴⁹ Estow, who has studied Pedro's reign extensively, places composition of his chronicle around 1384. Internal evidence from the chronicle on which Estow bases this judgment strongly suggests that Helen Nader is wrong when she states "after [Ayala's] last visit to Avignon in 1396, he wrote chronicles of the reigns of the four kings he had served" unless Nader means that during the closing years of his life, he *put finishing touches on works started earlier*. Estow, "Royal Madness," 16 n. 11. Nader, *Mendoza Family*, 61.

⁵⁰ Chandos herald, 170.

the author or his work: in referring to Enrique's triumph (1366) and the prince's subsequent expedition (1367), the author states that these events had occurred "not twenty years ago."⁵¹ This suggests that the herald was still in the process of drafting the work around the years 1386 or 1387, at about the same time Ayala was preparing his chronicle of Pedro I.

Since both Ayala and the Chandos herald appear to have been present during the 1367 campaign and to have played an active role in the fighting, they provide our best information concerning the movement of the two armies, their order of battle, and how the encounter unfolded on the field.⁵² In addition, Ayala's chronicle is crucially important for two other reasons: first, it supplies the only extensive account of the campaign of 1366; secondly, it explains in detail the falling out between Pedro and his English allies that occurred in the the days and weeks immediately following their victory. The present article assumes that if and when a discrepancy arises between these two first hand accounts, each author will be correct in respect to things happening on his side of the line.

There are, in addition, two other writers to whom the historian should have recourse when dealing with these events. Pere III of Catalonia was born in 1319, came to the throne in 1336, and died in 1387; his fifty-one year reign ranks among the longest in the history of Spain.⁵³ In speaking of Pere, the great Aragonese historian of a later day, Gerónimo Zurita, said that "he ruled for over fifty years and was always at war."⁵⁴ The king battled one opponent after another including his cousin, the king of Majorca; his nation's great maritime rival, Genoa; his own rebellious subjects; and successive

⁵¹ Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 108.

⁵² Early in the last century, several articles were written about a recently-uncovered dispatch that the Black Prince sent home after Nájera. In fact, aside from confirming names of various participants (especially those killed or captured), this document adds virtually nothing to our knowledge of the battle. See: Eugene Déprez, "La Bataille de Nájera (3 Avril 1367) Le Communiqué du Prince Noir," *Revue Historique* (Janvier-Avril, 1921) Paris, 37-59; A.E. Prince, "A Letter of Edward the Black Prince describing the Battle of Nájera in 1367," *English Historical Review* vol. 41, no. 163 (July, 1926), 415-17.

⁵³ For a recent treatment of the political policies of this devious monarch, see David Cohen's article, "Secular Pragmatism and Thinking about War in some Court Writings of Pere III el Cerimonios" in *Crusaders*, 19-53.

⁵⁴ Zurita, *Anales*, X, 39. Quoted in J.N. Hillgarth's superb introduction to the English translation of Pere's chronicle. See: Pere, 1:2.

monarchs of Castile, one of whom, Enrique II, turned from being a close ally in the War of the Two Pedros into a dangerous enemy during the period that followed. Although these conflicts gained for Aragon the kingdom of Majorca, tightened its hold on Sardinia, and preserved it from the depredations of Castile, the strain placed upon royal finances was severe. As a result, Pere increasingly fell back upon support from the principality of Catalonia and its great maritime city of Barcelona, the wealthiest of his realms and the only one that never rebelled against him. In turn, the king was forced to concede to his Catalan subjects ever greater rights of self-government, including a much strengthened *corts* with increased control over the raising and spending of revenues.

Possessed of wide-ranging intellectual interests, Pere established a creative atmosphere in the Aragonese court. His patronage of the arts and literature bore considerable fruit, including original works of poetry and prose, translations, and artistic projects such as the royal tombs at Poblet. In the footsteps of his famous progenitor, Jaume I “the Conqueror” (1213–1276),⁵⁵ Pere assumed a major role in composing his own chronicle, a work written in the first person plural (“we”).⁵⁶ Most modern scholars agree that the king contributed a good deal of the actual wording as well as dictating its overall form.⁵⁷ Despite minimal importance for understanding the campaign and battle of Nájera (all the events of 1367 are condensed into one relatively brief passage),⁵⁸ Pere’s chronicle provides what the other three cannot, a window into the mind of a major policy maker during the crisis. From a decidedly Aragonese perspective, he sheds light on the negotiations that brought the free companies into Spain, the price of their services, the return of frontier properties seized by Castile that accompanied the 1366 campaign, the escape of Enrique into Aragon following his disastrous defeat, and the subsequent rebuilding of his army in southern France.⁵⁹

Last (and in this case, least) there is Sir Jean Froissart, a relatively minor cleric who would become the major chronicler of the period.

⁵⁵ Pere, 1:83–86.

⁵⁶ For the king’s role in the drafting of his own chronicle, see Hillgarth’s introduction, Pere, 1:58–65.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:61–64.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2:578–79 (VI:61).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2:571–81 (VI:57–62).

Froissart was born around 1337 at Valenciennes in the Flemish province of Hainault where he spent his first several decades.⁶⁰ Thereafter, he traveled around Western Europe, moving from patron to patron, meeting the many men and women who would contribute information to his chronicle. Unlike the Chandos herald, Froissart was not one to hide his light under a basket; enough personal anecdotes are sprinkled throughout his work to supply a fair portrait of his life. Around 1360, he journeyed to England where he secured the patronage of his countrywoman, Queen Philippa (d. 1369), and became chronicler royal to her husband, Edward III. For nearly a decade, he continued to live in England, making side trips to Scotland, to the court of the Black Prince in Aquitaine (1366–1367), and eventually to Milan (1368), where he accompanied the prince's brother, the duke of Clarence, for his wedding to a Visconti. In the 1370s, Froissart returned to the Low Countries where he successively served an impressive list of patrons. He lived for a time in northern France, serving as chaplain to the count of Blois; he visited the county of Foix (1388–1389) and its famous count, Gaston Phoebus; he sought (unsuccessfully) to secure further ecclesiastical preferment at Avignon during the Great Schism (1389); he paid a return visit to the England of Richard II (1394); finally, he died in or around his native Hainault sometime after 1404. During this eventful career, Froissart produced several versions of the chronicle, each reflecting to some extent the political allegiance of his current patron.

The value of Froissart's chronicle for the study of Spanish affairs varies considerably, depending upon just what he is writing about. His presence at the Black Prince's court in Aquitaine during the winter of 1366–1367 afforded him a superb vantage point from which to view initial preparations for the Nájera campaign: the disagreement among the prince's advisers over the wisdom of helping Pedro, the negotiations between Edward and the deposed king concerning terms for such aid, the preparations for the expedition, and the actual

⁶⁰ G.G. Coulton, *The Chronicler of European Chivalry* (London, 1930). *Froissart: Historian*, ed. J.J.N. Palmer (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1981). Peter F. Ainsworth, *Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction in the Chroniques* (Oxford, 1990). The Palmer volume contains a superb collection of essays evaluating Froissart by an impressive group of twentieth century historians who have made extensive use of his chronicle for their work on differing aspects of fourteenth-century history. The list includes Richard Barber, John Bell Henneman, Michael Jones, P.E. Russell, and Philippe Contamine.

mustering of the army at Dax, south of Bordeaux, to which place Froissart travelled in the prince's train. By contrast, Froissart's account of the campaign itself is largely derivative. (A substantial part seems to have come from the Chandos herald to whose work he had access.)⁶¹ The chronicler never entered Spain; from Dax, he was sent back to England.⁶² And as one modern historian has pointed out, his knowledge of the geography south of the Pyrenees is so confused as to be useless in tracing the movement of troops through that alien landscape.⁶³

On the other hand, during later years, Froissart did manage to piece together a good deal of information by interviewing participants. And he placed what he found into historical context better than either Ayala or the herald; consequently, if used with care, the great Flemish chronicler can supplement the other three (undoubtedly better) sources.⁶⁴

Invasion of the Free Companies (1366)

Throughout much of 1365, negotiations went forward between Pere III, Charles V, and Pope Urban and by autumn, they had reached an agreement: each would contribute one hundred thousand gold

⁶¹ In the brief introduction to his translation of this source, Richard Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, states (84), "Froissart often mentions him as a source" and "Froissart's account of the Spanish campaign . . . is directly derived from his information."

⁶² Coulton, *Chronicler*, 33; P.E. Russell, "The War in Spain and Portugal," in *Froissart: Historian*, 86.

⁶³ Froissart's exposes his shaky knowledge of Iberian geography when speaking of Pedro's 1366 journey through Portugal; the chronicler makes it sound like an afternoon's jaunt. In fact, the journey required several weeks. Compare: Froissart, 1:342; Ayala, 542-43.

⁶⁴ For a contrasting opinion, see P.E. Russell, author of what is still the best book dealing with the fourteenth century English involvement in Spanish affairs. Russell largely dismisses Froissart as a credible source:

There can be no doubt whatever that Froissart is a hopelessly inaccurate and ill-informed commentator on Spanish affairs. He had no first-hand knowledge of the Peninsula and no effective means of estimating the veracity of the stories told him by returned veterans of the campaigns there; much of his narrative can be refuted either by documents, by more reliable chroniclers, or by the perusal of a map. Convenient though he is as a source Froissart must, therefore, be discarded except when no alternative is available or when other evidence supports his statements.

P.E. Russell, *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955), xi. See also: idem, "War," 83-98.

florins to purchase the services of the free companies.⁶⁵ These, in turn, would cross the Pyrennees into Aragon, then advance against Castile where they would join the struggle against their employers' mutual enemy. At the papal court in Avignon, the deal was brokered by the king's uncle, Prince Pere, once the leading royal adviser, now retired into the Franciscan order.⁶⁶ Since the companies would be operating in his backyard, the Aragonese monarch demanded assurances from all concerned that they would not attack any towns or castles in his realm currently held by his forces.⁶⁷ Christmas found some 10,000 or more of these men⁶⁸ gathering around the city of Barcelona where Pere welcomed them warmly.⁶⁹

To lead the expedition, Charles V arranged for the ransom of Bertrand du Guesclin, the intrepid Breton warrior who, despite relatively humble origins, had already begun his transformation into the foremost soldier of France. Du Guesclin had been languishing in English hands since his capture at the battle of Auray a year earlier (September, 1364).⁷⁰ According to Froissart, his ransom was set at 100,000 francs (though others sources name a lower figure), half to be paid by the king of France, the other half jointly by the king of Aragon and the Count of Trastámara.⁷¹

At the same time, since so many of the companies were English or Gascon, an attempt was made to recruit a high-ranking Englishman to share command. The obvious choice, John Chandos, already had employment as the Black Prince's constable of Guienne and so declined the offer. On the other hand, several out-of-work English captains did sign on—the most prominent among them being Sir Hugh Calveley, a giant of a man who had had spent most of his military career in Brittany where he had shared command of the winning side at Auray.⁷² Chroniclers leave little doubt that Calveley

⁶⁵ Pere, 2:570–72 (VI:56–57).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2:572 (VI:57).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Froissart (1:341) places the number as high as 30,000. On the other hand, Russell, citing Ayala, scales the number back by nearly two-thirds, to 10–12,000. Russell, *English Intervention*, 37.

⁶⁹ Pere, 2:573 (VI:58).

⁷⁰ Froissart, 1:341.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² For a detailed treatment of this interesting figure, see my article: "Seeking Castles in Spain: Sir Hugh Calveley and the Mid-Fourteenth Century Intervention of the 'Free Companies' in Iberian Warfare."

soon became the acknowledged leader of the English contingent.⁷³ Just as Du Guesclin had been promised the town of Molina and the County of Trastámara for his participation, Sir Hugh was slated to receive Carrion, also with the title of count.⁷⁴

In January, 1366, the free companies, joined by Enrique of Trastámara and his Castilian supporters as well as a large force of Aragonese ‘volunteers’ under the count of Denia, marched westward toward Zaragoza and the Castilian frontier. First contact with the enemy was assigned to Calveley who moved against Castilian forces occupying the Aragonese towns of Borja and Magallon. When these garrisons retreated without putting up any resistance, Enrique and Du Guesclin brought up the main body of the army and began the march toward Burgos where Pedro awaited them.⁷⁵

The expedition leaders had concocted an arrogant ultimatum to Pedro, demanding that he immediately make peace with Aragon, restore all Aragonese territory, and afford their army free passage through Castile to “go on a holy expedition” against Granada. This cynical invocation of the crusading ethos proved in the event to be nothing more than a propaganda ploy aimed at securing the moral high ground; no such “holy expedition” ever actually materialized. As expected, the Castilian king disdainfully rejected the demands, supplying yet another (if somewhat belated) pretense for the invasion.⁷⁶ Having cleared northwestern Aragon of the enemy,⁷⁷ the expedition now crossed into Castile. Since leaving the Aragonese capital of Zaragoza, Du Guesclin and the other leaders had all urged Enrique

⁷³ Calveley is one of the half dozen leaders Pere mentions by name and was the only Englishman seated with the king at the high table during the welcoming feast. Pere, 2: 573, 575 (VI:58–59). See also: Froissart, 1:340–41. Ayala, 538.

⁷⁴ Ayala, 538, 541. Pere, 2:573 (VI:58).

⁷⁵ Pere, 2:575 (VI:59).

⁷⁶ The Castilian monarch reacted precisely as his enemies had calculated that he would:

He, who was proud and disdainful, and feared little the power either of them or others, conceived sore displeasure thereat in his heart, and said that he would esteem himself but little if he obeyed such people.

Chandos herald, 149.

⁷⁷ The Chandos herald indicates that the expedition freed all Aragonese lands still occupied by Castile; however, he is almost certainly mistaken since much of that captured territory lay far to the south, in the kingdom of Valencia. The Aragonese territory directly liberated by the companies lay along their line of march, in the region around Tarazona. A more accurate account of how the rest was reclaimed is provided by Pere. Chandos herald, 150; Pere, 2:576–78 (VI:60).

to declare himself king, a step he took as soon as he entered Castilian territory at the town of Calahorra.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, unaccustomed to defending his own territory from attack, Pedro began making decisions that would ultimately prove disastrous. Late in 1365, he passed up an opportunity to “buy off” many of the free companies which owed their primary allegiance to his English ally.⁷⁹ Then in spring, 1366, with the full force of the companies bearing down on him, he ignored his advisers and evacuated Burgos at the enemy’s first approach, leaving most of his bewildered followers to fend for themselves. The king and a small entourage fled southward first to Toledo, then on to Seville. Enrique entered Burgos in triumph and, at the monastery of Las Huelgas, staged an elaborate coronation.⁸⁰

Hearing of Pedro’s discomfiture, Pere now turned his attention to re-occupying all Aragonese territory seized in the last decade by Castile. In a last ditch attempt to throw back the invaders, Pedro had ordered his garrisons to evacuate Aragon, destroying whatever could not be carried away. For the most part, the speed of their withdrawal prevented them from executing this scorched earth policy. Pere now retook Calatayud, Terruel, and a host of smaller places, capturing vast quantities of food and war materiel that the Castilians had abandoned. He rewarded towns that had most strongly resisted Pedro and contributed to the reconstruction of those that had suffered heavy damage in the war.⁸¹

Meanwhile, Pedro’s flight from Burgos triggered a mass defection among his followers, most of whom now shifted their allegiance to Enrique. Within weeks, the greater part of the kingdom had gone over to the usurper who led his mercenaries on a triumphal march southward in pursuit of his rival. Crowds of Castilians along the route hastened to join the winner.⁸² When even Pedro’s beloved city of Seville deserted him, he hurriedly crossed the border into neighboring Portugal. An attempt to carry away the entire royal treasury failed and much of it subsequently fell into Enrique’s hands.⁸³

⁷⁸ Ayala, 538.

⁷⁹ Ayala (537), the only chronicler who mentions the potential “buy-off,” indicates his belief that Pedro’s decision to reject the offer stemmed from miserliness.

⁸⁰ Ayala, 539.

⁸¹ Pere, 2:576–78 (VI:60).

⁸² Ayala, 539–41; Pere, 2:575 (VI:59).

⁸³ Ayala, 542–3.

When the Portuguese king proved less than welcoming, Pedro fled northward through his unwilling host's kingdom and reentered Castile near the port of La Coruña, in the far northwestern corner of the peninsula.⁸⁴ His one hope of regaining the throne now lay in the English alliance he had signed three years earlier; consequently, with only two galleys and a small entourage, Pedro sailed eastward across the Bay of Biscay, heading for the duchy of Aquitaine from which the Black Prince governed England's continental territories.⁸⁵

For his part, Enrique, after taking Seville, decided to dismiss the majority of the free companies, the services of which were costing him dear, while wreaking havoc on territory that now acknowledged his rule. Despite the strain on his treasury, he dealt generously, after which he sped them on their way out of his newly-won kingdom, retaining only the services of the Bretons under Du Guesclin and a few hundred Anglo-Gascon followers of Calveley.⁸⁶

Diplomatic Maneuvering (1366–1367)

In summer, 1366, before leaving La Coruña, Pedro sent letters to Edward, requesting English aid in recovering his kingdom. Chroniclers closest to the prince disagree on how this request was received. The Chandos herald passes over any dissent among the councillors making it sound as if support for the expedition were unanimous.⁸⁷ By contrast, Froissart states that many of the prince's advisers repeatedly warned him against having anything to do Pedro.⁸⁸ On the whole, given Froissart's connection with the court and the controversial nature of the suppliant, his reconstruction seems the more likely one.

Nevertheless, both sources agree that the prince himself favored intervention from the start.⁸⁹ Perhaps the events of 1366 now left Edward believing that he had little choice. Enrique's near-bloodless victory in Castile must have been seen (if only in retrospect) as a dangerous defeat for England. The new monarch, who owed his crown to French aid, could be expected not only to resurrect the

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 542–43.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 543–45.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 545–46.

⁸⁷ Chandos herald, 151.

⁸⁸ Froissart, 1:345–46, 151.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 1:345; Chandos herald, 151.

Franco-Castilian alliance, but to align the two kingdoms more closely than ever. And Castilian seapower, were it to come into play, could endanger the existing naval balance that had favored England since early in the conflict. Only Pedro's belated restoration might forestall such undesirable consequences.

A second consideration may also have loomed large in Edward's mind: it had been a decade since his brilliant victory at Poitiers, years of relative inactivity, consumed by the dull business of governing. A Spanish campaign would give this consummate warrior a chance to get back into the field.

Having consulted his principal councillors (John Chandos and the brothers, Thomas and William Felton), the prince decided that for the enterprise to succeed, he would first have to secure cooperation from one of the most unreliable figures of the age—Charles II (1349–1387), king of Navarre, appropriately known as Charles the Bad.⁹⁰ The eastern portals into Spain all lay in enemy hands; consequently, any expedition against Castile would have to cross the Pyrenees at the fabled pass of Roncevaux (Roncesvalles), then traverse the mountainous kingdom of Navarre before reaching its goal. When negotiations over the army's safe passage began, Charles, always keen to maximize his own profit, chose to engage in a torturous double game, promising first one side and then the other that he would help them. Not until some months later would he finally end his waffling and fully commit his kingdom to the prince's invasion.⁹¹

The prince also dispatched Felton to Bayonne, with orders to sail to Galicia and escort Pedro across the Bay of Biscay, a voyage which became unnecessary when the deposed monarch arrived at the port in his own ships.⁹² During the late summer and autumn of 1366, Pedro and the prince held a series of meetings at which they arranged the terms of intervention.⁹³ Pedro turned over what jewels and money he possessed and promised to pay the rest of the expedition's expenses after having regained his kingdom. He also promised the English leaders vast estates in Castile, including the entire province of Vizcaya

⁹⁰ Froissart, 1:318.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1:348. The treaty between Pedro I, Charles of Navarre, and the Black Prince, dated September 23, 1366 and spelling out their reciprocal obligations is reprinted in Sitges, *Mujeres*, 279–92.

⁹² Ayala, 548; Chandos herald, 151.

⁹³ The agreements reached were embodied in a series of documents dating to September, 1366, reproduced in Rymer's *Foedera*. See: Hardy, *Syllabus*, 432.

and the city of Castro de Urdiales for Edward. Chandos was to receive the region around Soria. Meanwhile, the king's daughters and the wives of several of his supporters were to remain in Bayonne as hostages until Pedro was restored and the terms of the agreement fulfilled.⁹⁴

While the prince clearly favored the expedition, his father, Edward III, would have the final say. To this end, a delegation of four knights was dispatched to England. Landing at Southampton, they caught up with the king at Windsor where letters from the prince and Pedro were presented and read. After consulting with his own privy council, the king gave permission for the enterprise to go forward.⁹⁵ Having learned of this, the prince called up his leading vassals,⁹⁶ stockpiled arms and armor,⁹⁷ and sent Chandos to sign up members of the free companies, many of whom had just returned from Spain, where they had fought on the other side.⁹⁸ In addition, Edward sent heralds into Castile, summoning Englishmen and Gascons who were still serving Enrique, but who owed their primary allegiance to him.⁹⁹

The Campaign (1367)

When all was ready, the prince stayed in Bordeaux just long enough to witness the birth of his son, the future Richard II (1377–1399).¹⁰⁰ Fifteen days after Christmas, he rode south to Dax, where much of the invasion force had gathered. Those not mustered at Dax waited still farther to the south, where many of the free companies had spent an uncomfortable winter in the mountainous Basque country, eagerly awaiting the start of the new campaign.

⁹⁴ Ayala, 549.

⁹⁵ Froissart, 1:316–17.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1:355–57, 383, 391, 394, 396. Two of those alerted were the count of Armagnac and the lord d'Albert, leading nobles from the English-held lands in southern France, with both of whom Edward would eventually quarrel as a result of the Spanish adventure.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:355; Chandos herald, 152.

⁹⁸ One large party, trapped in the Basque country, was extricated by Chandos, who had been dispatched for that purpose. On the march to Bayonne, they mauled a French force sent against them from Narbonne. Ayala, 546; Chandos herald, 151–52; Froissart, 1:349–54.

⁹⁹ Froissart, 1:349.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 1:357.

At the last moment, Edward's younger brother, John of Gaunt, recently installed as duke of Lancaster, decided to come from England to join the expedition. Landing in the north, he and a large party rode quickly through Brittany. The duke stopped in Bordeaux only long enough to see his new nephew and give his sister-in-law news from home, before hurrying on to join his brother.¹⁰¹ Lancaster's late arrival had less to do with holding up the expedition than did the weather. Edward planned to enter Spain by way of the *via francorum*, the well-travelled pilgrim route to Santiago de Compostela. Winter still lay upon this road where it crossed the Pyrenees and the pass at Roncevaux was shrouded in snow and ice.

Equally unsettling was the ambiguous attitude of Charles the Bad. Although he had met with Edward and given his guaranteed of safe passage, the Navarrese monarch had done so reluctantly. The other side had promised him extensive territorial compensation in return for his support, all of which he would lose by helping the English. Consequently, after his meeting with the prince, Charles once again sat down with Enrique and, in return for further concessions, reaffirmed his earlier commitment not to open the pass.¹⁰²

Doubting that Charles would honor their agreement, Enrique had no sooner returned to Burgos after their meeting than he put his waiting army in motion, marching eastward to the town of Santo Domingo de la Calzada, which lay midway between the enemy's two most likely invasion routes, either westward up the Rio Araquil to Vitoria or south to Logroño and then west on the main road to Burgos.¹⁰³

It was during the march to Santo Domingo that Enrique's English and Gascon mercenaries under Hugh Calveley took their leave and continued eastward into Navarre to await the coming of the prince. Although their former employer seems to have been sympathetic to their plight—after all, Edward was their liege lord—other Castilians along the route were less inclined to observe chivalric niceties, and indications are that this force had to fight its way out of Castile.¹⁰⁴ Arriving in Navarre, the mercenaries went on a rampage, seizing several places including the city of Miranda.¹⁰⁵ Whether or not these

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 1:357; Chandos herald, 153.

¹⁰² Ayala, 550.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 551.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 551; Froissart, 1:358.

¹⁰⁵ Froissart, 1:358.

activities enjoyed the prince's approval, they certainly served his purposes; Calveley's depredations highlighted just how precarious the Navarrese monarch's position might become were he to maintain an alliance with Enrique and oppose the English crossing. When Charles complained to Edward, the latter pointedly reminded him that he had not lived up to commitments reached in the course of their dealings. The implication was clear: if Charles wanted the prince to call off his captain, then Charles had better mend his ways. Shortly afterwards, a chastened ruler once more met with Edward's envoys and reaffirmed his promise to let the English pass through his kingdom—a promise which he now kept.¹⁰⁶

On February 14, 1367, Edward's vanguard crossed the Pyrenees at Roncevaux and encamped on the plains around Pamplona. During the next two days, the rest of the army followed.¹⁰⁷ To make certain that Charles would not once again change his mind, he was compelled to accompany Pedro and the prince on their march through the pass and so the crossing went unchallenged. Nevertheless, it was by no means uneventful. Troops had to contend with ice, snow, and bone-chilling cold. Men and animals fell off the mountain and, in the heartfelt if hyperbolic words of the Chandos herald, "since the just God suffered death for us on the cross, there was no such painful passage."¹⁰⁸

Having learned of these developments at his headquarters in Santo Domingo, Enrique initiated a war of words. In a first letter to the prince, he expressed his "great wonder" at the English invasion, "for I have never done you wrong . . . wherefore you should . . . take from us that little land that God has lent us of His will." He then challenged his adversary to name the point where he intended to enter Castile, that they might meet there to do battle.¹⁰⁹ When a herald

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1:358–61.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:359–61.

¹⁰⁸ Chandos herald, 154. See also Froissart, 1:361.

¹⁰⁹ Chandos herald, 155. See also Froissart, 1:362. There appear to have been as many as three letters exchanged, albeit none of the chroniclers mentions all three. Enrique's opening letter and Edward's response are reproduced, with slight variation, by both the herald and Froissart. For his part, Ayala does not mention Enrique's opening communication, but includes both Edward's letter and a subsequent response from Enrique. See Ayala, 555–56. The letters of April 1 and April 2 are printed in Rymer's *Foedera*. See: Hardy, *Syllabus*, 444. They can also be found in Sitges, *Mujeres*, 92, 94.

brought this message to Pamplona, Edward and his council drafted a suitable reply, but delayed for a time sending it.¹¹⁰

Meanwhile, the prince dispatched a scouting party under Sir Thomas Felton to gather information about the enemy's movements. Felton rode southwest through Navarre, crossed the Ebro into Castile at the city of Logroño,¹¹¹ and moving forward to the village of Navarrete, set up a listening post, a mere thirty kilometers from the Castilian camp.¹¹²

It was at this moment that the actions of Charles the Bad descended to the level of farce. Despite having promised both sides that he would serve in their respective armies "with his body," the king had no intention of risking life or limb with either. He had already reneged on his commitment to Enrique. Now to escape Edward, he connived at his own capture by a Frenchman serving on Enrique's side. As a result, Charles spent the next several months comfortably ensconced in a castle in Aragon. Only after the battle of Nájera was over did he contrive to "escape" this captivity, managing in the process to cheat his captor out of the promised reward.¹¹³ By prior arrangement, the king's principal adviser, Martin de la Carra, assumed the title viceroy of Navarre and the obligation to serve 'with his body!'¹¹⁴

Having rested the main army around Pamplona, Edward began his advance; however, instead of following Felton southward, he directed his march west along the Araquil, entering Castile near the Basque town of Salvatierra, which immediately surrendered to Pedro to avoid being stormed.¹¹⁵ From here, it was only a short march for the vanguard to reach the principal city of the region, Vitoria.

Why did the prince strike out westward rather than follow Felton's reconaissance south to the Ebro for a crossing at Logroño, one of the few places in Castile said to have remained loyal to Pedro? The Castilian army had taken its original stand at Santo Domingo de la

¹¹⁰ Ayala, 555; Chandos herald, 160; Froissart, 1:368.

¹¹¹ Chandos herald, 156; Froissart, 1:362–63.

¹¹² Logroño supplied a point at which to cross the Ebro River. Ayala (543) specifically names it as one of the few places in Castile that remained loyal to Pedro [*tenia su voz*] when much of the realm deserted to Enrique in 1366. Ayala, 544, 554.

¹¹³ Ayala, 550–51; Froissart, 1:363. Only the Chandos herald (156) confirms the alleged "capture" of Charles the Bad any credence.

¹¹⁴ Chandos herald, 156, 163.

¹¹⁵ Ayala, 553.

Calzada, ready to move in either direction to meet the prince. Had the English initially marched south, Enrique and Du Guesclin might well have gotten to Logroño first, thus cutting off Edward's entry into Castile. It might be argued that from the very start of the campaign, Edward planned the westward move as a feint, designed to draw the Castilian army north to Vitoria, after which the prince could race southward and cross the Ebro at Logroño unopposed. If so, it was an elegant strategic move, uncharacteristic of medieval warfare.

There are, however, several problems with this argument. First of all, when Edward originally selected his route, he knew very little about Spanish geography and was almost certainly unaware of the enemy's current location. His only conceivable up-to-date source of information concerning Castilian forces, Calveley's returning mercenaries, had taken their leave quite some time before Enrique bivouaced at Santo Domingo. It was only when Felton's reconnaissance rejoined the main body around Vitoria that the prince gained meaningful intelligence, long after such intelligence would help him to plan a feint westward followed by a forced march to the south.

Another problem with interpreting the opening phase of the campaign as deliberate deception lies in the extent to which Edward committed his own forces upon arrival at Vitoria. Had the initial move westward been intended only to draw in the Castilian army, one would expect to see the prince begin his swing to the south almost as soon as Felton rode into the English camp with news that Enrique had invested the heights overlooking the city. Instead, the prince doggedly brought up his entire army and subjected it to several weeks of demoralizing conditions, while showing every sign of awaiting a battle that never materialized. In the end, to visualize the westward march as a well-designed manoeuver is to credit Edward with more than his share of strategic foresight. Instead, it almost certainly came in response to the unfavorable military circumstances encountered around Vitoria.

Another possible explanation for the initial move up the Araquil lies in the uneasy relationship at the start of the campaign between Edward and his unwilling ally, Charles the Bad. Given his earlier dealings with that slippery figure, the prince had no reason to repose much trust in him; consequently, he may have decided that an advance westward was simply the fastest way out of Navarre. Arguing against this explanation is the fact that with the English army safely

through the pass at Roncevaux and encamped around the Navarrese capital, there was not all that much Charles could do to injure it and any move he made in that direction would subject his own kingdom to massive retaliation, dwarfing Calveley's depredations of the preceding winter.

When all is said and done, the simplest answer is probably correct: the route along the Araquil looked to be the fastest way to enter Castile and move against its northern capital, Burgos. At Pamplona, the traditional pilgrim's road to Santiago split, one branch going south to Logroño, the other west to Vitoria. The two rejoined on the approach to Burgos. As the crow flies, the way through Vitoria was shorter; little wonder that the prince, in his ignorance of Spanish topography might follow it without realizing the splendid defensive capabilities it afforded a battle-avoiding enemy, or more properly, an enemy willing to give battle only under inordinately favorable conditions.

As soon as Enrique learned that the prince had indeed turned westward, he crossed the Ebro and marched north to Vitoria, where anchored on the royal castle of Zaldiarán, his army occupied high ground overlooking the town. At this point, Felton, who had shadowed the Castilian advance, rode into the English camp and informed the prince of the enemy's arrival.¹¹⁶ Hoping for a speedy engagement, Edward brought up the rest of his force and issued a challenge to Enrique to come down and fight.¹¹⁷ Despite the defiant tone of his earlier letter, Enrique continued to heed the advice of his French captains who, following orders from their own monarch, Charles V, urged upon their current employer a strategy of delay. As a result, Enrique failed to take up Edward's offer and the latter found that he could provoke a battle only by assaulting a strongly held position, thereby placing his own army at considerable disadvantage.¹¹⁸

Although not yet ready to exchange a commanding position for the wager of battle, Enrique was fully prepared to engage in hit-and-run tactics. In the wee hours, a Castilian raiding party of several thousand, led by his two surviving brothers, Sancho and Tello, quietly slipped off the sierra and, riding down a valley, proceeded to attack English foraging parties and exposed units of the vanguard.

¹¹⁶ Froissart, 1:364.

¹¹⁷ Ayala, 553; Chandos herald, 156.

¹¹⁸ Ayala, 553; Chandos herald, 159; Froissart, 1:367.

Among those caught unaware was Hugh Calveley, whose campsite, well in advance of the main army, was just waking for breakfast when it was overrun. Some of Calveley's men were slaughtered in their tents while the rest fled, losing much of their baggage (which may have included loot acquired through their earlier activities in Castile and Navarre).¹¹⁹ Panic swept the ranks, threatening to grip the entire vanguard until the duke of Lancaster, awakened by the noise, grabbed his armor and hurried to a nearby hill where he raised his standard, around which the fleeing troops could rally. Meanwhile, the prince and Chandos hurriedly advanced from the main camp, forcing the now much outnumbered Castilians to withdraw. About a league west of Vitoria, the retreating Castilians stumbled upon Felton and his men, most of whom were either killed or taken prisoner.¹²⁰

Overjoyed at this initial victory, Enrique's confidence began to grow; however, once again the French introduced a cautionary note, arguing that rather than risk a pitched battle, they should seize the passes behind the prince, cutting off not only his supplies, but also his line of retreat. Even Du Guesclin, who had just returned from France with several thousand newly-hired mercenaries and whose bravery was legendary, concurred in this advice. For a time, Enrique continued to listen.¹²¹

Still hoping to draw his enemy off the heights, the Black Prince maintained his position despite the fact that it was rapidly deteriorating. A cold, wind-driven rain fell on the English camp. Provisions ran short. In constant skirmishing, the Spanish light cavalry, which formed the basis of any Spanish army of the period, showed to its best advantage, sorely pressing the heavier English knights.¹²² A few days of this proved more than enough for Edward. Now, in what became the best strategic move of the campaign, he suddenly broke camp, retreated into Navarre, and swung southward, crossing the mountains through the pass of La Guardia, camping briefly at Viana, and then entering the city of Logroño on Thursday, April 1, 1367,¹²³

¹¹⁹ Chandos herald, 158; Froissart, 1:365–66.

¹²⁰ Ayala, 553–54; Chandos herald, 158–59; Froissart, 1:365–67.

¹²¹ Chandos herald, 159.

¹²² The hardships endured by the English army before Vitoria are graphically depicted by the Chandos herald whom most historians believe shared them. Chandos herald, 159. See also Froissart, 1:367–68.

¹²³ On April 1, 1367, Pedro wrote to the city council at Murcia informing it of

by way of the bridge across the Ebro.¹²⁴ The move brought him back onto Castilian soil, astride the main pilgrim route to Campostela, just 106 kilometers east of Burgos. Not only had this manoeuvre allowed the prince to cross the Ebro unopposed; it also placed him on terrain which did not inordinately favor either side, a far cry from the Basque mountains where he had operated at a distinct disadvantage. Here, he could force Enrique either to fight or let his pass unmolested into the heart of Castile.

While the move momentarily threw the Castilians off balance, Enrique and Du Guesclin recovered quickly. Although they had failed to make any attempt to impede the English retreat into Navarre, they now hurried southward and recrossed the Ebro. Despite the prince's headstart, they were operating along interior lines and were therefore able to arrive at the town of Nájera, twenty-nine kilometers west of Logroño, in plenty of time to block his path. Here, they established a new camp in the vineyards west of the Rio Najerilla, a small, but swiftly-flowing river which lay across the road. While lacking the tactical advantage they had enjoyed in the mountains around Vitoria, they still held a river line that Edward would have to force in order to proceed farther into Castile.

It was here that Enrique finally received the reply to his letter, pointedly addressed to "the Duke of Trastamare who . . . styles himself for the present time king of Castile."¹²⁵ In it, the prince justified English intervention on the grounds, first, of the 1363 alliance with Pedro and, secondly, his desire to maintain the natural order of things: he told Enrique, "you must know in your heart that it is not right for a bastard to become king by disinheriting the lawful heir."¹²⁶ Despite its strong tone, the note was in part conciliatory: Edward offered to help reconcile the brothers and get back Enrique's lost lands, if only he would surrender the crown to its rightful holder.

In the verbal exchange that preceded the battle, Enrique would have the last word. Despite the refusal to address him as king and the aspersions cast on his birth, he replied courteously that Edward

his arrival in Logroño, extolling the people of Murcia for their loyalty, and commanding that they seize all followers of "the traitor" on whom they could lay their hands. The letter is reprinted in an editor's footnote to Ayala, 554.

¹²⁴ Chandos herald, 159.

¹²⁵ Chandos herald, 160. Froissart, 1:368; Ayala, 555. The version of the letter reproduced by Ayala is somewhat less insulting in its address.

¹²⁶ Chandos herald, 160.

had been misinformed of the facts, that under Pedro's rule the people of Castile had suffered more than they could endure, and that his adversary's flight from Burgos, that had cost him the crown, had been inspired by a just God, seeking to protect his people against further oppression.¹²⁷

At the time this reply was dispatched, Du Guesclin issued his final warning about the dangers of seeking a general engagement, only to find that Enrique was now determined to fight. While publicly expressing confidence in the ability and steadfastness of his army, the Castilian king appears to have had his doubts: he privately voiced fears to his war council that any failure to fight the English might trigger a second mass defection—this time to Pedro's side.¹²⁸

Consequently, on Friday April 2, both armies began to prepare for battle. The Black Prince broke camp and advanced to Navarrete. Meanwhile, Enrique, again acting against French advice, made the most serious tactical blunder of the campaign. Rather than maintain a position west of the Najerilla, where the river line would bolster his defences, he determined to cross over and fight on the large plain to the east.¹²⁹ Ayala, who at least in retrospect regarded this as an unwise decision, attributed it to Enrique's courageous and spontaneous nature: "King Enrique had a very great heart and was a forceful man, and he said that by all means he meant to give battle on a flat place without any [undue] advantage."¹³⁰ It is even possible that the move was inspired by sound military doctrine—ideally, light cavalry should operate more effectively on an open plain than in defending a river line, though had this been Enrique's motive for advancing, one would have expected Ayala to at least mention it. Whether the decision to sacrifice what little tactical advantage remained

¹²⁷ Several felt that since the prince had seen fit not to address Enrique as king, any reply should be equally discourteous. However, the majority view—that "even among enemies it is well to appear to be a courteous person"—ultimately prevailed. Ayala, 557.

¹²⁸ Although only one chronicler relates this conversation, it is Ayala, the one in the best position to know what was discussed within the Spanish camp. Ayala, 553.

¹²⁹ Only Ayala's account (556) speaks of the river crossing. On the other hand, even though the Chandos herald fails to mention it, he does speak of a lengthy pursuit across the plain following the battle and the trapping of the Castilian army at the bridge across the Najerilla. Had Enrique not crossed the river and advanced out onto the plain, such a sequence of events could not have taken place. Chandos herald, 164.

¹³⁰ Ayala, 556.

resulted from sound military considerations or a misplaced sense of chivalry or possibly even overconfidence on the king's part, it helped set the stage for one of the worst defeats of the century. That night, each side slept under arms, fully aware the battle would come on the morrow.

The Numbers Game

How many men fought at Nájera? In writing about any medieval battle, the hardest questions usually revolve around the number of participants. Given the nature of the evidence, rarely does there exist a fully satisfactory answer—if, in fact, there is any answer at all. This holds true for Nájera: when it comes to “the numbers game,” the sources are both confusing and contradictory. Estimates for the size of Edward's army range from 7,000 to nearly 40,000; yet even this considerable disparity pales by comparison to the wildly different estimates placed on the Franco-Castilian force, ranging from an unbelievably high figure of nearly 100,000 to an equally unbelievable low of 4500 first-rate men-at-arms supported by an unspecified number of poorly armed foot soldiers. Faced with such disagreement and the absence of clarifying sources (such as military payrolls or unit rosters), one must tread cautiously.

The principal English source, the Chandos herald, fails to provide what one might reasonably expect from him: a total figure (whether accurate or not) for the strength of his own army. His only numbers come when writing of the three-day passage of Roncevaux where he places the vanguard that crossed on the first day at 10,000 horse and the main body that crossed on the second at 20,000. The principal problem lies in the herald's failure to supply any number for the rear guard that followed on the third day. It is possible that his figure of 20,000 was supposed to encompass both the main body and rear guard. (After all, if the crossing presented as great a difficulty as the herald indicates, why would the prince have tried to put twice as many men across the mountains on the second day as he did on the first?) Nevertheless, in the absence of any specific statement to that effect, all attempts to reconcile the herald's figures concerning the Anglo-Gascon total remain speculative.

Another problem in the herald's account arises from a reference to these troops as “horse.” Since it seems highly unlikely that every-

one in the English army (archers as well as men-at-arms) was mounted, does the number given properly refer only to those who were on horseback, leaving uncounted a large contingent of footsoldiers? Or does that number, despite the reference to “horse,” encompass both cavalry and infantry? At no point does the herald clear up these questions. When describing the actual battle, he does not give any further information concerning the size of the Anglo-Gascon left, right, or center. By contrast, in writing of the other side, the herald’s figures are fairly precise. He places in the Castilian center under Du Guesclin 4000 men-at-arms (the mercenaries accompanied by some Castilian and Aragonese troops), 12,000 Castilian horse on the left under Don Tello, and 15,000 “armed men” on the opposite side under Enrique for a total of some 31,000.¹³¹

Unfortunately, here too problems arise. The herald speaks of 4500 barded (armored) horse grouped on the Castilian right, leaving it unclear whether or not this was part of the 15,000 under Enrique’s command. He also mentions as having been present in Enrique’s wing “many men of the country”—“crossbow-men, villeins, varlets, with lances and sharp darts, and slings to throw stones”—without any estimate as to how many. Finally, the herald relates a conversation between Enrique and DuGuesclin on the eve of the battle in which the king regales his general with substantially different figures for their troop strength.¹³²

Ayala’s numbers differ considerably from those supplied by the herald. According to the Castilian chronicler, Du Guesclin’s heavily armed and dismounted division contained 1000 men-at-arms. The left wing under Don Tello consisted of 1000 cavalry, as did the right wing under the count of Denia. The mounted center, placed just to the rear of Du Guesclin and commanded by Enrique, contained 1500 horse. Thus, according to Ayala, the Spanish force totalled only some 4500 first line troops, mounted or on foot, accompanied by an unspecified number of footsoldiers (*escuderos de pie*).¹³³ The English force is also considerably scaled back. Ayala estimates a center of 3000 men-at-arms, a right wing of 2000 lances, and the left, a further 2000 men-at-arms. Assuming that he was not using the

¹³¹ Chandos herald, 161.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 160.

¹³³ Ayala, 552.

lance in a technical sense, but rather as a synonym for man-at-arms (a dangerous assumption that is nevertheless probably true in this instance), this would put the army at 7000, a far cry from the 30,000 or more estimated by the herald.

Further complicating matters, are the numbers supplied by Froissart. While his figure of 30,000 for the English army (10,000 in each of three divisions crossing the Pyrenees) accords well with the herald (from whom he may have taken the number), his estimates of the enemy range from about 64,000 (60,000 Castilians and at least 4000 Franco-Breton mercenaries under Du Guesclin) up to 100,000.¹³⁴

With these not insubstantial discrepancies in mind, what conclusions can be drawn concerning the numbers involved? First and foremost, that it is impossible to arrive at any meaningful figures for the size of either army on the basis of even the best sources. Ayala and the herald disagree so fundamentally that, without further information (information that does not seem to exist), there is no basis to decide between them. On the other hand, the figures provided by these two chroniclers do suggest that unlike other great battles such as Crécy, Poitiers, and later, Agincourt, Nájera was probably a fairly equal contest, at least in a numerical sense. Only Froissart give the Castilian army a huge numerical edge. This rough numerical equivalency, if indeed it did exist, suggests why the English might depart from their *modus operandi* in the other great battles, launching an attack rather than merely standing on the defensive.

Although the question of numbers remains (and probably will remain) a matter for speculation, there can be little doubt that the English enjoyed a considerable advantage when it came to combat effectiveness. After all, unlike the Spanish light cavalry which made up the majority of Enrique's force, most of those who followed the Black Prince had fought in the cutting-edge conflict north of the Pyrenees and brought with them into Spain their heavier arms and armor. While the heavier armament of the English might impede them in skirmishes of the type fought near Vitoria, during a fullscale battle, it could prove to be a decisive factor.

¹³⁴ Froissart, 1:360–61, 373.

The Battle of Nájera (Saturday, April 3, 1367)

Before dawn, the two armies began their final deployment. Enrique and Du Guesclin had the easier task since their camp near Nájera lay closer to the battlefield.¹³⁵ They picked a likely spot along the main road from Logroño, down which they believed the enemy would come. In the center of their formation, in a slightly advanced position, they placed what both probably regarded as their most reliable troops, the several thousand Franco-Breton mercenaries, dismounted and under the personal command of Du Guesclin and the French Marshal d'Audrehem, both of whom had seen a great deal of action and had even been captured in earlier battles fighting the English.¹³⁶ Most of the men they led were also battle-hardened veterans from north of the Pyrenees, who had faced this same enemy and were therefore well-acquainted with English arms and tactics. They were accompanied by the elite of the Castilian army, members of the Order of the Sash (*orden de la banda*), also dismounted and led by Enrique's brother, Sancho. Among those fighting in this company was Pedro Lopez de Ayala, the future chronicler, who carried the order's banner.¹³⁷

To the rear of the dismounted center and on either of its flanks, Enrique stationed the thousands of Castilian and Aragonese light horsemen (*ginetes*) of which his army was largely composed. He assumed personal command of the largest contingent, stationed immediately to the rear of Du Guesclin and the marshal. On the right wing, Don Alfonso, count of Denia, a member of the Aragonese royal house and the highest ranking of his countrymen involved in the battle, had charge. Finally, in what would become his second great error (crossing the Najarilla had been the first), Enrique entrusted command of the left to his other brother, Tello, who despite success in the recent fighting around Vitoria, had a long record of being notoriously unreliable.

¹³⁵ In Ayala's chronicle, the order of battle appears rather out of place in the narrative. Ayala sets it forth in a passage (552–53) placed before his treatment of English march to Vitoria and the events that occurred there.

¹³⁶ After the battle, Edward would hold a makeshift court of chivalry in which the marshal was compelled to answer charges that in taking part at Nájera, he was breaking the parole given him after his earlier capture. He was found innocent on a technicality, something that seemed to please everybody including the prince. Ayala, 558–59.

¹³⁷ Ayala, 552.

In addition to the thousands of light horsemen, there was a large force of native infantry, mainly made up of local levies drawn from the regions north and east of Burgos.¹³⁸ While its placement on the battlefield is uncertain, it most likely brought up the rear. With the exception of slingers, “darters,” and crossbowmen, who found their way into the thick of the fighting and for a short time competed with the English archers,¹³⁹ these footmen seem to have played a negligible role, serving only to swell the number of fugitives and magnify the casualty lists.

As the prince marched westward from Navarrette, he had one last surprise in store for his adversary. Before reaching the battlefield, he turned off the main road and, crossing a line of low hills, entered the plain from a somewhat different direction, forcing a hurried readjustment of the Castilian line.¹⁴⁰ When the two forces came face to face, the English vanguard under the duke of Lancaster and John Chandos took up its position in the center where it confronted Du Guesclin’s division. Behind them stood the main body, commanded by the prince. Part of Edward’s division, led by the Captal de Buch, the lord d’Albret, and the king of Navarre’s stand-in, Martin de la Carra, would eventually angle forward to become the right wing of the English army. (Whether or not they made this move before the battle began is uncertain.) From this position, they would face the Castilian left under Don Tello. Last to arrive on the field, the English rearguard commanded by the king of Majorca, the count of Armagnac, and Sir Hugh Calveley executed a similar, oblique advance to the left where it moved up to occupy a small hillock. Here, it became the army’s left wing, facing the Castilian right commanded by the count of Denia.

As the sun rose, both armies stood poised in the cool morning air while leaders conducted the last minute business of medieval chivalry. Enrique, Pedro, and the prince all conferred knighthood upon deserving followers. The pageantry of this phase is epitomized in the actions of Sir John Chandos. Splendidly attired, he galloped down the line between the armies. Reining in before the prince, he

¹³⁸ Ayala (552) mentions in particular the provinces of Asturias, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya as having supplied large numbers of footmen (*escuderos de pie*).

¹³⁹ The Chandos herald (162) mentions crossbowmen and slingers trading volleys with the English.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 161.

pledged in a loud voice his undying loyalty, and asked Edward to “bless” the banner which would lead his own contingent into battle. Afterwards, he rode back to his men and in this emotion-charged atmosphere had them swear their own undying allegiance.¹⁴¹

Meanwhile, the prince exhorted his leading knights and others who clustered around him, in a speech that combined the usual appeal to God, honor, and material considerations. Having beseeched divine aid and called upon his subjects to do their duty, Edward reminded these hungry men that abundant food supplies could be found just across the field in the enemy camp:

You well know that we are nigh overtaken by famine, for lack of victual, and you see there come enemies who have plenty of provisions, bread and wine, salt and fresh fish, both from fresh water and the sea, but we must conquer them with blows of lance and sword.¹⁴²

According to Ayala, many on both sides wore on their person or had painted on their shields heraldic devices that would easily identify to which army they belonged: Castilian troops sported a distinctive sash on their surcoats while the English wore white surcoats containing the cross of St. George, whom they loudly implored for victory as they advanced against the enemy.¹⁴³ With the battle about to begin, the prince turned to his ally and uttered words to the effect: “Sir King, today you will know if ever again you will have Castile.”¹⁴⁴

Which side opened the encounter? According to the herald, it was the English center, commanded by Chandos and Lancaster, that set the battle in motion when, at a signal from Lancaster, it advanced against the strong Castilian center anchored by the French and Breton mercenaries under Du Guesclin.¹⁴⁵ In his account of Edward’s victory at Poitiers ten years earlier, that same chronicler leaves no doubt that it had been the French, present in overwhelming force,

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 161–62.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 162.

¹⁴³ Ayala, 557.

¹⁴⁴ Chandos herald, 162.

¹⁴⁵ The herald has the duke initiating the attack with the following command: “Forward, forward banner. Let us take the Lord God for our Protector and let each one acquit himself honorably.” If indeed, the herald was present at the battle, he would probably have been stationed in the company of his lord and so should have know better than most the sequence of events in the English center. Chandos herald, 162.

who had launched the attack. On that occasion, the badly outnumbered prince had even attempted (albeit briefly) to extricate his army from the battlefield.¹⁴⁶ By contrast, when speaking of Nájera, the herald mentions no such reticence to fight. For Edward, the Spanish campaign was not a *chevauchée*, the success of which would be measured in burning and pillaging enemy territory, but a fullscale invasion, expected to produce a battle—unless the enemy simply melted away as Pedro's forces had done a year earlier. Nor was the English army in Spain vastly outnumbered as had been the case at both Crecy and Poitiers. Consequently, at Nájera, the prince had no need to stand on the tactical defensive, as other outnumbered English armies had done in the past and would continue to do in the future.

In fact, for some weeks, Edward had been doing everything he could to provoke a general engagement. At Vitoria, he had been frustrated by the enemy's unwillingness to trade an unassailable position for the wager of battle. His subsequent withdrawal and swing southward to Logroño was undertaken in order to force a battle under more favorable circumstances. It should come as no surprise that now, on the plain east of Nájera, the prince would seize the tactical offensive as the herald credits him with doing.¹⁴⁷

In contrast to the herald, Ayala conveys a somewhat different impression. He states that on the morning of battle, as the two lines faced one another, the Castilian contingent from San Esteban del Puerto suddenly abandoned Enrique and went over to Pedro's side of the field. To prevent further defections, Enrique launched his attack.¹⁴⁸

Actually, this seeming contradiction on the question of who began the battle may be more apparent than real. Each side appears to have attacked the other—only in different parts of the field. In the center and on their own right, the English seized the initiative. By contrast, on the Castilian right (the English left), it was the great mass of Castilian light cavalry who flung themselves against a smaller, but unyielding English left wing (the force that had been the rear guard during the march to the battlefield.)

Such discrepancies between the accounts of Ayala and the Chandos

¹⁴⁶ Chandos herald, 144.

¹⁴⁷ Chandos herald, 141–48.

¹⁴⁸ Ayala, 556–57.

herald probably result from their differing battlefield perspectives and when looked at closely may, in fact, yield significant clues concerning the battle's progress. One such enlightening discrepancy involves the differing placement of Enrique in the two accounts. According to Ayala, the king began the battle in command of the main body of Castilian horse, just to the rear of Du Guesclin dismounted force. By contrast, the herald has him in charge of the Castilian right, a wing that according to Ayala, was actually commanded by the the Aragonese count of Denia. The chroniclers agree that Enrique did not hold back, but instead participated actively in the battle, fighting bravely before being forced to join the rest of his army in flight.

When combined, the information given by the two accounts suggests that at some point fairly early in the battle, the king wheeled to his right, merging the main body of cavalry that he commanded with the count's force, and having assumed overall command of that wing of his army, led the mass of his horsemen in an all-out attack on the English left. This may well have occurred after a first assault against the English position by the count had been thrown back, since both chroniclers speak of Enrique desperately trying to rally his forces.¹⁴⁹ Whether or not the king was present for the opening sally, it was only on the Castilian right that his army temporarily managed to seize the initiative and launch its one offensive effort.¹⁵⁰

Meanwhile, it was in the center that the hardest fighting of the day would develop. While the Franco-Bretons of Du Guesclin may have waited stolidly for the on-coming English, it is just as likely that they surged forward to meet the enemy. The speed with which the two sides closed on one another and locked in a deadly, hand-to-hand combat may have limited the effect of missile weapons in this part of the field, though the herald indicates that even after the two armies came together, English archers managed to exchange point blank fire with crossbowmen and slingers in the Castilian force. However, since there was always a danger of hitting one's own comrades when fighting in such close quarters, the archers may have quickly abandoned their archery and entered the melee, either

¹⁴⁹ Ayala, 557; Chandos herald, 163.

¹⁵⁰ My conclusions concerning who attacked whom at Nájera have been carefully reconsidered in light of a discussion of this issue that I had several years ago at the Medieval Congress with Clifford Rogers. I wish to thank him for his insights.

wielding their bows as clubs or drawing their other weapons.¹⁵¹ In the poetic words of the herald, “Then, of a surety, was no heart in the world so bold as not to be amazed at the mighty blows they dealt with the great axes they bore, and the swords and daggers.”¹⁵² The experience of one English captain as recorded by his herald, was probably not atypical of combat on the individual level: having grappled with a Castilian, Chandos and his foe wrestled one another to the ground where, after a desperate struggle, the Englishman managed to dispatch his larger opponent with a dagger.

When the advancing English center met such strong resistance, the main body under the prince’s command moved forward to assist in the attack. First came those on the lefthand side of Edward’s division, led by Lord Percy and a young Breton noble named Olivier de Clisson. In 1367, Clisson was still fighting on the side of England and the English-backed duke of Brittany, John of Montfort. A few years later, however, he would return to his French allegiance. During the 1370, he and fellow Breton, Du Guesclin, fighting on the same side, would lead France in its successful war effort against Clisson’s former allies.¹⁵³

The new arrivals under Percy and Clisson almost certainly came up to the left of Chandos and Lancaster, thereby extending the English line farther in that direction, outflanking Du Guesclin’s already hard-pressed troops. There followed the rest of the main body under Edward; it appears to come up directly behind the vanguard and added its weight to the fray.¹⁵⁴ Ironically, despite the intensity of this combat in the center, it was not here that the battle would ultimately be decided, but out on the two wings.

In contrast to what was happening elsewhere on the field, no interpolation is needed to understand events on the English right (the Castilian left), where Enrique’s younger sibling, Don Tello, commanded another sizeable contingent of *ginetes*. Not only did Tello fail

¹⁵¹ Compare to John Keegan’s reconstruction of the role of archers at Agincourt in *The Face of Battle*.

¹⁵² Chandos herald, 163.

¹⁵³ See John Bell Henneman’s recent biography of this fascinating figure, *Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France Under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996).

¹⁵⁴ The Chandos herald (163) devotes a full paragraph to the battlefield deeds of his namesake, including a victorious hand-to-hand combat between Sir John and a Castilian knight whom he identifies as Martin Fernandez.

to follow the example of Castilian forces on the other end of the line who were attacking the English position; when one part of the English main body detached itself and charged forward under the Captal de Buch, Martin de la Carra, and the Lord d'Albret, Tello refused to stand and meet it. Instead, the king's brother once again demonstrated his unreliability. Rather than fight, he immediately turned and fled.

In the cryptic, but damning words of the Chandos herald, "before [the two sides] could come together, Don Tello departed."¹⁵⁵ He was followed in short order not only by those around him, but by most of the now leaderless left wing of the Castilian army. Ayala's account is equally critical of the king's younger brother: "he and those with him did not wait [for the enemy to approach], but withdrew from the field in complete flight."¹⁵⁶ While some part of the English right undoubtedly pursued the fleeing Castilians, preventing any significant rally on their part (if indeed, any such rally could have been contemplated), the rest, now almost unopposed, wheeled inward to fall on Du Guesclin's flank, at approximately the same time that the prince's division was joining the attack on the Frenchman's front.

Although events on the Castilian right played out differently, ultimately, the outcome proved to be largely the same. Here, led by the king and the count of Denia, the Spanish cavalry acquitted itself far better than the very similar force commanded by Tello. It put up a fight against the English, even charging the higher ground that the enemy initially occupied. It was, however, to no avail, for on this side of the field, the technological realities of fourteenth century warfare decided the contest.

At Nájera, Enrique's army appears to have lacked the numbers of crossbowmen that had accompanied the French in their great battles against the English. Judging from the herald's account, many of those who were present seem to have been stationed in the center with Du Guesclin.¹⁵⁷ As a result, on the right hand side of the line, the Castilians had mainly slings and javelins with which to reply to one of the most terrible weapons of the day—the English longbow. The fourteenth century "queen of battles," it compared favorably to the best crossbows, possessing nearly equal accuracy and penetrating

¹⁵⁵ Chandos herald, 163.

¹⁵⁶ Ayala, 557.

¹⁵⁷ Chandos herald, 163.

power, and five or six times the firing rate. Clearly, English longbowmen against Castilian slingers was an unequal contest. Three times Enrique managed to rally his troops for an attack on the Englishmen and Gascons defending the hillock, three times the withering fire drove them back. The Chandos herald described the scene:

The Spaniards hurled with might archegays, lances, and darts. [English] archers shot thicker than rain falls in winter time. They wounded [Enrique's] horses and men, and [when] the Spaniards perceived well that they could no longer endure, they began to turn their horses and took to flight.¹⁵⁸

Froissart elaborates upon the herald's account:¹⁵⁹

The Spaniards and Castilians had slings, from which they threw stones with such force, as to break the helmets and skull-caps, so that they wounded and unhorsed many of their opponents. The English archers, according to their custom, shot sharply with their bows, to the great annoyance and death of the Spaniards. . . . The Spanish commonalty made use of slings, to which they were accustomed, and from which they threw large stones which at first much annoyed the English; but when their first cast was over and they felt the sharpness of English arrows, they kept no longer any order.¹⁶⁰

There can be little doubt that in the end, the main body of Castilian light cavalry and their lightly armored horses broke in the face of a terrifying weapon that relatively few of them had ever before faced in combat.

With the right wing fast disintegrating despite his best efforts to rally it, Enrique realized that the battle was lost. Entertaining no illusions about the quality of mercy he would receive from Pedro, the once and future king now sought his own safety in flight.¹⁶¹ The collapse of the cavalry apparently occurred before the sizeable contingent Castilian infantry could even come into play. These men now joined the fugitives desperately trying to escape the field. Although

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ While Froissart was not present and may have taken much if not most of his account from the herald, including the part about the unequal contest between English longbows and Castilian slingers, still his testimony has a certain probative value. After all, in later years, Sir John had access to many veterans of the battle and was in a good position to check the herald's account against their testimony. Thus, his imprimatur upon this point is worth noting.

¹⁶⁰ Froissart, 1:371, 372–73.

¹⁶¹ Ayala, 559; Chandos herald, 164.

the French and Breton veterans in the center and the Castilian elite troops fighting alongside them held out as long as they could, stripped of support on both flanks, nearly surrounded, and now the sole target of English firepower, their collapse became inevitable. Few if any had an opportunity to flee as English knights and longbowmen closed in for the kill. Ayala estimates that more than 400 of the army's men-at arms fell at this crucial point in the line; the herald puts the number at 500. In the midst of this carnage, many high-born prisoners were taken, including Du Guesclin and his second-in-command among the French, Marshal d'Audenham, the king's brother, Sancho, his illegitimate son, Alfonso, and the Aragonese commander, the count of Denia, who appears to have fallen back on the center rather than join in the flight of the right wing where he had been stationed when the encounter began.¹⁶²

The differing placement of two noteworthy figures—Sir Hugh Calveley and the count of Denia—seems to shed important light on the closing phases of the contest. The Chandos herald has Calveley marching in the army's rear guard where he shared command with the king of Majorca and the count of Armagnac. According to this account, upon reaching the field, the rear guard moved to occupy the left hand side of the English line, where it repulsed several Spanish attacks. By contrast, Ayala portrays the Englishman (whom he almost certainly knew personally from the events of the previous year and whom he would have recognized) as having fought in the English center, under the duke of Lancaster.¹⁶³ In the count of Denia's case, Ayala indicates that he was assigned overall command of the Castilian right wing, while the herald numbers him among those captured fighting in the Castilian center.¹⁶⁴ It is possible that these contradictions are simply errors on the part of one or the other of these warriors-turned-writer—in which case, the rule of thumb comes into play and one assumes that the herald was correct in respect to Calveley while Ayala was right on Denia. Here the rule is reinforced by the fact that each chronicler appears to have fought with the center and would be pretty certain to know whether or not a major figure like Calveley or Denia had begun the battle stationed on his part of the field.

¹⁶² Ayala, 557; Chandos herald, 164.

¹⁶³ Ayala, 552.

¹⁶⁴ Ayala, 557; Chandos herald, 164.

On the other hand, another explanation for the discrepancy, one that reconciles the testimony of the two chroniclers, demands consideration. It is clear from reading the accounts that each chronicler is indicating where the important figure fighting on his own side *started* the battle, not where he ended it! Ayala's assertion that Calveley fought in the opposing center may reflect the fact that as soon as the Castilian left (where Calveley started) drove the Spanish right from the field, those who did not participate in the pursuit joined in the attack upon the Castilian center. If this interpretation is correct, Caveley who was famous for his love of a good fight could have started the battle on the left side (where the herald places him), but ended up fighting in the center where Ayala would have noticed if not encountered him at the time he and others who had fought there were surrendering.

A similar thing could explain the contradictory placement of the count of Denia. Early in the battle, the count participated in Enrique's massive attack on the English left. When this manoeuver failed and most of Enrique's men were put to flight, a few such as the count may have fallen back on the still-fighting Castilian center, accounting for his presence there when shortly afterwards the center surrendered.

The withdrawal of both wings turned the battle into a rout that in turn became a massacre. All across the plain, Englishmen and Gascons pursued the foe, slaughtering scores while herding the rest inexorably westward toward the Rio Najarilla. The narrow bridge near Nájera, that might have aided Enrique had he remained west of the river, now became a deathtrap for his army. In the grip of panic, hundreds were killed at the bridge or fell into the water and drowned. In the words of the Chandos herald (later echoed by Froissart), "there might you see knights leap into the water for fear, and die one on the other; and it was said that the river was red with the blood that flowed from the bodies of dead men and horses."¹⁶⁵ Of those who made it across the clogged bridge, many got no farther than the town of Nájera, where they were killed or taken prisoner before being able to escape farther. Among them, the grandmaster of Calatrava was found cowering in a cellar, while the master of Santiago and the prior of the Hospitallers were dragged down from their hiding place high on a wall.¹⁶⁶ The herald speaks of 7700 slain

¹⁶⁵ Chandos herald, 164.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

in the pursuit or possibly just at the bridge (the statement is somewhat ambiguous) and a further 1000 in the town.¹⁶⁷

The Spanish Aftermath

Following the battle, Pedro sought out the Black Prince and fell to his knees in gratitude. The prince raised him up and, in good medieval style, credited the victory to a higher power.¹⁶⁸ The only shadow darkening the moment was the failure to discover Enrique's whereabouts. Despite his heroic conduct, when it became clear that the battle was lost, the king had joined his army in flight. He soon found, however, that the large gray charger which he had ridden in the battle was too tired to carry him to safety. When Enrique's horse faltered, his squire, Ruy Fernandez de Gaona, turned over his own mount and the royal fugitive made good his escape, accompanied by a few of the nobles who eluded capture that day.¹⁶⁹

As a result, patrols sent out to recover Enrique's body came back empty-handed. Only later did Pedro and the prince learn that their principal foe had arrived safely in Aragonese territory, followed in short order by his wife and family.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, despite this failure to kill or capture him, Enrique's prospects seemed bleak, especially when his former ally, Pere III, impressed by the English victory

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 165; Froissart, 1:375.

¹⁶⁹ Ayala (559) names specifically only three men who accompanied the king—Fernand Sanchez de Tovar who later became admiral of Castile, Alfonso Perez de Guzmán, and Ambrosio Bocanegra, son of the current admiral, but indicates that there were others as well. The story of Enrique's salvation is not dissimilar from that which occurred nearly twenty-years later when Enrique's son, Juan I, escaped from the battle of Aljubarrota (1385) on a horse given him by one of his leading advisers, Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza. At Nájera, Mendoza, who had fought on the left with Enrique and the count of Denia, had been captured but managed to survive the battle. At Aljubarrota, he would not be as lucky. Minus his horse, he was killed by the Portuguese who, in their pursuit of the Spanish invaders, were considerably less inclined to take prisoners. For further information concerning this great fourteenth century noble and his house, see my dissertation, "The Law's Delay," *The Anatomy of an Aristocratic Property Dispute (1350–1577)* (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1984). One of the best existing treatments of both Nájera and Aljubarrota can still be found in Charles Oman's classic *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (New York, 1924), 1:179–195.

¹⁷⁰ Ayala, 559–60; Chandos herald, 165; Froissart, 1:377.

and angered by Enrique's refusal to turn over the promised territory, began opening lines of communication with the prince.¹⁷¹

Incredibly, at this point, the newly-restored monarch managed to seize defeat from the jaws of victory by alienating his English allies. The rift between Pedro and the prince began to open in the later stages of the battle. According to Ayala, Pedro had agreed that he would not execute any of his captured subjects "until they had been legally judged, except for those he had already sentenced [to death]."¹⁷² Despite this pledge, he had murdered several highborn Castilian prisoners. One particularly flagrant incident involved Iñigo Lopez de Orozco, a man who had remained loyal to Pedro until the mass defection of 1366. Shortly after his capture by a Gascon soldier, Orozco had the misfortune to encounter his former master who, in a fit of rage, stabbed him to death. Robbed of a healthy ransom, the Gascon complained bitterly to the prince.

Edward rebuked his ally for such unchivalrous and unprofitable conduct. In turn, Pedro suggested a means of making it profitable (if not chivalrous)—he would pay ransom to the English for each Castilian noble captured. Here, the prince drew the line. Regardless of what his ally might pay, he would not surrender the prisoners to be butchered. The prince informed Pedro that "those lords who had come there in his service, had fought for honor and the rewards of this world" not for the dubious pleasure of killing captives. He went on to say that "even if [Pedro] offered a thousand times what each prisoner was worth, he [Edward] would not surrender any of them in as much as he believed [the king] was paying to kill them."¹⁷³ In the end, the prince prevailed upon his reluctant ally to pardon the Castilian prisoners, on the grounds that by doing so he might win back their allegiance.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Ayala, 561.

¹⁷² Ayala, 558–9, 562–3. Neither the herald nor Froissart mentions these battlefield murders.

¹⁷³ Ayala, 562–63.

¹⁷⁴ According to both the herald and Froissart, there was one exception to Pedro's pardon of the Castilian prisoners. The unlucky individual was Gomez Carrillo [Garilz] de Quintana, who had earned the king's special enmity. After some discussion, Edward conceded his ally this lone victim. Following the pardon of the others, Carrillo was publicly executed, apparently by having his throat cut. While Ayala does mention Carrillo as one of those who fell victim to Pedro's wrath following the battle, he makes no allusion to a ceremonial execution. Chandos herald, 165. Froissart, 1:375; Ayala, 558.

In other circumstances, this might have been a wise political move. However, given Pedro's past conduct, including his murderous rampage on the battlefield, the captives were not about to be won over by a pardon forced on him by the English. Instead, most removed themselves from his presence at the earliest possible moment; and, when word reached them that Enrique was rebuilding his army, many filtered back across the border into southern France to join up.

The gap that opened over treatment of the prisoners widened into a gulf when Pedro balked at paying his war debts. While recruiting for the expedition, he had not hesitated to make extensive commitments; now, he began to hedge. The restored monarch raised an argument that the prince's treasurers had given him an unfair rate of exchange for his Castilian money and had undervalued by half the jewels he had turned over. While reaffirming his earlier commitments, he demanded access to the expedition's books and some correction of this "inequity" at the final accounting. Whatever the justice of Pedro's claim, pressing it at this time made him look miserly and ungrateful in the eyes of his benefactor.¹⁷⁵ What is more, at Bayonne, Pedro had promised the prince lordship over Vizcaya and had granted Sir John Chandos, the territory of Soria. While continuing to pay lip service to these grants, he now placed every obstacle he could in the way of their accomplishment, clandestinely ordering the inhabitants not to comply.¹⁷⁶

After some hard bargaining, the allies finally agreed that within four months Pedro would pay a mutually acceptable sum; in the meantime, he would go south to raise the money.¹⁷⁷ It was the last Edward would ever see of him. The date for payment came and went with the Black Prince and his army still quartered in northern Castile, suffering through the hot Castilian summer.¹⁷⁸ Messengers to Seville came back loaded only with excuses. Pedro had informed them that he was unable to collect money while a foreign army was occupying and pillaging his northern territories. He claimed that the companies had killed and looted several treasurers bringing part of the payment. He suggested a new arrangement, by terms of which, Edward and most of his army would evacuate Castile, leaving behind

¹⁷⁵ Ayala, 562–67, 575; Froissart, 1:375–77.

¹⁷⁶ Ayala, 566.

¹⁷⁷ Hardy, *Syllabus*, 444.

¹⁷⁸ Chandos herald, 167.

only a select force of English knights for whose services Pedro would pay.

Finally, the prince decided he had had enough. With his army rapidly deteriorating and his own health failing in the unaccustomed heat of northern Spain, Edward found that he had little choice but to retreat back across the Pyrenees. Having witnessed Pedro's battlefield brutality and waited in vain for payment, he began the long march home to Aquitaine all the while complaining bitterly of his ally's perfidy.¹⁷⁹

English withdrawal sealed Pedro's fate. In the autumn of 1367, when Enrique led his rebuilt army back into Castile, many of the nobles who had not already rejoined him in France flocked to his banner. To confront them, Pedro could muster only his Castilian supporters, not a few of whom were of dubious loyalty, and a force of Moorish auxiliaries, supplied by his last ally, the king of Granada. Gone were the battle-hardened English veterans and their longbows that had achieved victory at Nájera.

There followed some months of indecisive sparring. Then, on March 13, 1369, Du Guesclin, who had returned to Spain after being ransomed, ambushed and smashed an army Pedro was leading north to relieve the siege of Toledo. The defeated monarch was forced to seek shelter in the nearby castle of Montiel.¹⁸⁰ Ten days later, with provisions running out, the king and a few close supporters tried to escape by night through the French lines. The attempt failed. Pedro was captured and brought into the French camp where, in one of the great scenes of the Middle Ages, he faced Enrique. Almost immediately, an unequal struggle broke out between the two men during which Enrique and several of his followers stabbed Pedro to death. By the grace of God (and the stroke of his poniard), he was now truly Enrique II of Castile.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ According to Froissart, 1:379:

His people, who were anxious to return (for the air and heat of Spain had been very hurtful to their health; even the prince himself was unwell, and in low spirits) recommended a retreat, and declared that don Pedro had shamefully and dishonorably failed in his engagements.

¹⁸⁰ Ayala, 588–90.

¹⁸¹ The story surrounding these dramatic events is told, with certain key variations, in a number of chronicles. See Froissart, 1:388–89; Ayala, 591–92; Pere, 2:580–81 (VI:62); (anonymous), *Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois* (Paris, 1862), 198–99.

The Strategic Conundrum

One outstanding strategic issue remains to be addressed. Why did the English crown permit English and Gascon free companies to participate in the 1366 expedition that replaced a pro-English monarch with a pro-French one, thus necessitating the prince's invasion of the following year?

This is one of the most perplexing questions to confront any scholar studying the period. There are several possible answers, the cogency of which depends directly upon just how free the free companies really were. The simplest answer may well be correct. During the 1360s, the men who made up these companies were unemployed, having been thrown out of work by the signing of the treaties (1360) and the end of long-lasting conflicts in Normandy and Brittany (1364). As a result, they were indeed free to offer their services to anyone who would hire them, especially when service to the would-be employer did not place them in direct conflict with king and country. Thus, in 1366, it may have been nothing more than a matter of economics: unable or unwilling to employ these men, the English crown had no recourse, but to sit back and watch them earn their keep across the Pyrenees.

A significant piece of evidence lends support to this "simple" explanation: the English crown did make some attempt (however inadequate) to head off Anglo-Gascon participation in the 1366 expedition. In December, of that year, as the free companies were converging on Barcelona, a letter was circulated among a number of English captains ordering them to stop English subjects from entering Spain.¹⁸² That these commands went largely ignored, even by such a prominent military figure as Calveley, does suggest that the companies were at that moment acting free of English control.¹⁸³

On the other hand, the events of 1367 raise a serious question concerning just how much freedom those companies really enjoyed.¹⁸⁴ The ability of the Black Prince to recall Calveley and his men in

¹⁸² Hardy, *Syllabus*, 439.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* Calveley was one of those specifically addressed by the crown.

¹⁸⁴ I first posed this question of free company independence (or lack thereof) several years ago in my article on Calveley. William Caferro has raised the same issue concerning John Hawkwood and the companies operating in Italy. See: Caferro, "The Fox and the Lion": The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy" in this volume.

the midst of the struggle illustrates the degree to which their actions were dictated by their pre-existing military allegiance. Thus, the events of 1367 lend weight to an oft-voiced French complaint that even in a period of ostensible peace, the English crown retained considerable control over Anglo-Gascon companies and may even have directed their operations against French territory. Perhaps if the English crown had made a more vigorous attempt in 1366 to control the actions of men like Calveley, it would indeed have been able to head off their involvement in the Franco-Aragonese expedition.

If, for purposes of argument, we assume that the English could exercise such influence, why did they fail to do so, thereby permitting their companies to take part in a campaign that seriously undercut England's military position? One possible explanation would involve a dramatic reversal in English policy during this two-year period. It is possible that in 1366, England's leadership decided to allow Anglo-Gascon participation in hopes of winning some claim on Enrique's gratitude and therefore his future neutrality, only to conclude later on that this had been a mistake, and that English interests would be better served by Pedro's restoration. Unfortunately, while such a drastic "mid-course correction" of policy would help explain the seemingly inexplicable, the sources do not even hint at any such thing having happened.

On the other hand, again assuming that the English authorities could have controlled their companies, a more likely explanation would involve simple miscalculation on their part; in particular, on the part of the man best situated to observe events as they unfolded, the Black Prince. Edward's failure to bend every effort to keep the Anglo-Gascon companies out of Enrique's 1366 expedition may have resulted from a serious misreading of the potential consequences. In the prince's defense, even the best strategic thinkers of the age would have been hard put to predict just how drastically free company intervention would alter the Spanish balance. Little wonder if Edward, always a better tactician than grand strategist, might miscalculate the threat, then find himself compelled to intervene in order to save a bad situation for which he bore partial responsibility.

Alternatively, the English failure to act decisively in 1366 may have been motivated by a lack of concern for results, rather than simple miscalculation. Hubris born of a string of great victories may have convinced English authorities that whatever situation emerged from the events of that year, English arms could put matters right.

In one sense, the prince vindicated such confidence. By the resounding victory at Nájera, Edward did indeed smash the new military balance on the peninsula established less than a year earlier by Enrique and Du Guesclin. In a period of only several months, he achieved his military goals, restoring his ally to the throne and putting his enemies to flight. What he did not adequately consider was the way in which his ally's very nature would ultimately negate the military effort. With victory in his grasp, Pedro was lulled into believing that he no longer needed the services of those who had made possible his restoration. This conviction shaped his subsequent dealings with the English, dealings that in turn led Edward to withdraw from the war.

The Wider Significance of Nájera

In the mid-fourteenth century (as in the twentieth), a Spanish conflict became the surrogate for the clash of great powers from beyond the Pyrenees. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between the experience of these two historical eras: The Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 played virtually no role in touching off World War II nor did it have any major effect upon that struggle. By contrast, the events of 1366–1367 led directly to a renewal of the Hundred Years War and greatly influenced its next phase—one that witnessed a nearly complete reversal in the fortunes of the two combatants.

The conqueror's welcome Edward received upon his return to Aquitaine late in 1367 could not erase the fact that his glorious adventure in Spain had turned into an costly fiasco. Pedro never paid his debts, leaving the prince with only two impecunious princesses to show for his trouble.¹⁸⁵ Yet unavoidable expenses remained to be discharged. Most of those who had signed onto the expedition had done so due to Edward's guarantee of compensation; consequently, in the end, he was forced to absorb much of the cost. This strained an already overtaxed treasury to the breaking point.

To recoup his losses, Edward imposed an extremely unpopular hearth tax throughout all English lands on the continent, a move that cost England much support. Some of England's continental subjects, led by the increasingly discontented lords of Gascony, refused

¹⁸⁵ Ayala, 549.

to pay and, instead, appealed to Charles V for help. The French king, seeing an opportunity to win support in the territories he hoped to regain, now decided to intervene. He agreed to adjudicate the matter and summoned Edward to appear before him. Furious at this interference in territories ceded outright by the treaty of Brétigny, the prince arrested the French messengers, threatened an attack on Paris, and began to collect his tax. The Gascons rebelled, France came to their aid, and, by 1369, the Hundred Years War was back in full swing.¹⁸⁶ This time, however, the results were very different. Employing a Fabian policy put together by the king and his constable, the French won back much of what the English had taken from them in the first two decades of conflict.

Ironically, English intervention in Spain helped bring about exactly what Edward had sought to prevent. Enrique II's gratitude to France grew immeasurably when, after the disaster at Nájera, Charles V not only gave him sanctuary, but helped rebuilt his shattered army for another try. As a result, in November, 1368, Enrique renewed the French alliance and entered the conflict against England.¹⁸⁷ Castile's major contribution to the war-effort came in 1371, when its navy smashed an English relief fleet off the port of La Rochelle, after which the inhabitants surrendered to a besieging French army.¹⁸⁸ This and similar engagements helped the French regain control of the Bay of Biscay and the initiative in the war at sea. In the long run, events of this period ushered in a Franco-Castilian friendship that would remain in place until late in the fifteenth century.

The war in Spain completed the military education of Bertrand Du Guesclin. In his youth, Du Guesclin had earned a well-deserved reputation for reckless audacity. It was during the Spanish campaign of 1367 that one sees the beginnings of his metamorphosis from valiant warrior into an effective military leader. While serving as Enrique's chief military adviser, Du Guesclin adhered to the cautious instructions of his own monarch, Charles V, repeatedly recommending that his Spanish ally adopt a Fabian policy not unlike that later used north of the Pyrenees, one that would force the

¹⁸⁶ Froissart, 1:381–84, 390–96. Neither Ayala nor the Chandos herald explains the connection between the Spanish expedition and the renewal of the Hundred Years War.

¹⁸⁷ Hardy, *Syllabus*, 448.

¹⁸⁸ Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Enrique Segundo de Castilla* in *CRC* 2, BAE 68 (Madrid, 1953), 3–7, 14–17, 22. Froissart, 1:469–74.

English to give up their endeavor without having to fight any general engagement.

When Enrique abandoned that policy for the wager of battle, Du Guesclin reverted temporarily (and with apparent misgivings) to the hard-fighting nature that had already made him famous: he held the beleaguered center of the Castilian line until the flight of both wings left it virtually surrounded and himself forced to surrender. Nájera, coming so closely on the heels of Auray, could not have failed to impress Du Guesclin with the lesson all great battles in this first phase of the Hundred Years War held for the French and their allies: that a general engagement with a disciplined English force backed by the longbow could completely turn around a campaign that might have been won by adherence to a more cautious strategy of manoeuver.

Du Guesclin's actions thereafter strongly suggest that this critical lesson was not lost on him. Following Pedro's death in 1369, he returned to France, where Charles V appointed him constable and placed him in charge of the war effort. Throughout the last eleven years of his life, during which time French forces drove the English out of most of their continental territories, he never again fought one of those set-piece battles that had become the grave of French chivalry. Instead, he chipped away at the English position, besieging towns, overwhelming small groups of Englishmen, fomenting rebellion among England's subjects—in short, carrying on the kind of war that minimized the battlefield advantage of the longbow while maximizing the numerical advantage that France always enjoyed.

In a recent biography of another French captain from this period, John Henneman has suggested a re-interpretation of the Fabian policy that brought victory to France during the 1370s. According to Henneman, it was not the perennially-reckless Du Guesclin who pioneered the winning strategy, but rather his fellow Breton, once an enemy, but later a close ally, Olivier de Clisson.¹⁸⁹ Henneman dates the strategic shiftover to 1372, the year Clisson came over to the French cause.

As evidence for his revisionist view, the author points to Du Guesclin's earlier record, arguing that such recklessness was unlikely to spawn the cautious policies that ultimately led to French victory. In

¹⁸⁹ Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson*, 55–57.

summing up Du Guesclin's career, however, Henneman conveniently ignores the Spanish experience of the late 1360s, mentioning neither Du Guesclin's cautious advice in the 1367 campaign nor the effect that the disastrous battle of Nájera (a battle the constable had not wanted to fight) must have had on this valiant, but not unintelligent warrior. Du Guesclin's subsequent actions indicate that he never forgot lessons learned at first hand while fighting in Spain.

At the same time the Spanish war was "educating" Du Guesclin, it may well have cost England the man most likely to have opposed him with success, the Black Prince. Shortly after evacuating Spain, Edward began to manifest symptoms of the serious illness that would first disable and then kill him. By the beginning of the next decade, he was no longer fit for active campaigning; in 1370, his failing health forced him to conduct the siege of Limoges from a litter.¹⁹⁰ Early the following year, after an unsuccessful attempt to continue directing the war from his sickbed, the prince relinquished command to his younger (and considerably less-talented) brother, the duke of Lancaster, and went home to England. Here, he died in 1376 without ever having succeeded to the throne.

As is true for most medieval instances of illness, there is no way to determine with certainty what this progressively debilitating disease may have been nor is there any absolute consensus as to when and where it was contracted. The Chandos herald states that symptoms first manifested themselves in Angouleme, some months after the prince's return from Spain;¹⁹¹ Froissart, on the other hand, indicates that Edward first fell ill during the hot summer months around Valladolid.¹⁹² Not a few modern historians would trace to that Spanish illness the onset of the mysterious disease, characterized by fevers, dysentery, and dropsy that ultimately killed England's greatest soldier.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Froissart, 1:451–54.

¹⁹¹ Chandos herald, 167.

¹⁹² Froissart, 1:379.

¹⁹³ Seward, 110.

Conclusion

The English victory at Nájera was not only one of the most splendid of the century, it was also the most futile. Each of England's other great victories in the Hundred Years War (Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt) for a considerable time cemented the island nation's hold on continental lands claimed by its monarchy. By contrast, the great victory in Spain had virtually no positive effect on English fortunes. Within the space of a few months, the losers (aided by the personality of the Castilian king who had beaten them) managed to reverse entirely the judgment of battle. The events south of the Pyrenees forged a Franco-Castilian alliance that would flourish for over a century. They completed the military education of England's most formidable foe and, in all probability, led to the death of England's greatest warrior.

It is very likely this disappointing outcome that has afforded Nájera the dubious distinction of being the fourteenth century's most "underestimated" and least studied great battle. While it may not fit the classic definition (a battle in which the winners suffer greater casualties than the losers), Nájera was indeed a Pyrrhic victory. The ancient Greek king who won the battles but lost his war with Rome, would have empathized strongly with England and its Black Prince.

APPENDIX A:
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE CHANDOS
HERALD'S CHRONICLE

Anglo-Gascon Army

Pedro I, King of Castile
Edward Plantagenet, Prince of Wales
Sir John Chandos, Constable of the Army
Duke of Lancaster
King of Majorca
Count of Armagnac
Lord d'Albret
Captal de Buch
Don Martin de la Carra, Regent of Navarre (substitute for King
Carlos)
Sir Thomas Felton, Grand Seneschal of Aquitaine
Guiscard d'Angle, Marshal
Stephen Cossington, Marshal
Sir Hugh Calveley
Sir Robert Knolles
Lord of Clisson
Thomas d'Uffort
Hugh of Hastings
William Beauchamp (son of the earl of Warwick)
Lord of Neville
Lord de Rays Lord d'Aubeterre
Messire Garsis de Castel
Gaillard de la Motte
Aimery de Rochechouart
Messire Robert Camyn
Cresswell
Messire Richard Taunton
William Felton
Willecock le Boteller
Peverell

John Sandes
John Alein
Shakell
Hawley
Louis de Harcourt
Eustace d'Aubréchicourt
Baron de Parthenay
Brothers de Pommiers
Lord de Curton
Lord de la Warre
Viscount de Rochechouart
Lord of Bourchier
Seneschals of Aquitaine, Poitou, Angoumois, Santonge, Périgord,
Quercy
High seneschal of Bigorre
Lord of Mussidan
Bernard d'Albret
Sir Bertucat d'Albret
Bour de Breteuil
Bour Camus
Naudon de Bageran
Bernard de la Salle
Lami
Hugh of Stafford
Messire Simon Burleigh
Thomas Holland
Hugh de Courteney
Philip [de Courteney]
Peter [de Courteney]
John Trivet
Nicholas Bond
Raoul Camois
Walter Ursewick
Thomas d'Auvmetri
Messire John Grendon
Degori Says
Ralph de Hastings
Gaillard Beguer
Mitton

William Alby
 Curson
 Prior
 Eliton
 William of Ferinton
 Messire Robert Briquet
 William Beauchamp
 Jean d'Ypres
 John Devereux
 Lord of Sévérac
 Lord of Ferrers

Killed (Anglo-Gascons)

William Felton (died in fighting around Vitoria)
 Lord of Ferrers (died at Nájera)

Castilian Army

Enrique II (regularly referred to as the Bastard Henry)
 Don Tello
 Don Sancho
 Count of Denia
 Marshal d'Audrehem
 Sir Bertrand DuGuesclin
 Sr Jehan de Neufville
 Le Begue de Villaines
 Gomez Carillo, Prior of St. Jean
 Master of St. Jacques
 Master of Calatrava
 Martin Fernandez
 Le Begue de Villiers

Killed:

Martin Fernandez
 Le Begue de Villiers
 Gomez Carillo (formally executed after the battle)

Captured:

Bertrand du Guesclin
Marshal d'Audrenhem
Count of Denia
Count Sancho
Begues de Villaines
Jehan de Neufville
Prior of St. Jean
Master of St. Jacques
Master of Calatrava

APPENDIX B:
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN AYALA'S
CRÓNICA DE PEDRO I

One of the significant contributions of Ayala's account was to name most of the major figures fighting in the Castilian army, information that comes from no other major source. When combined with the chronicles of the Chandos herald and Froissart, Ayala supplies the historian has a fairly comprehensive idea of who was present at the battle.

Castilian Army

Castilians:

Enrique II, King of Castile, former Conde de Trastámara
Don Tello, Conde de Vizcaya e Señor de Lara (Enrique's brother)
Don Sancho, Conde de Alburquerque (Enrique's brother)
Don Alfonso (Enrique's son)
Don Pedro, Conde de Trastámara (Enrique's nephew, son of his twin brother, Fadrique)
Pedro Moñiz de Godoy, Master of Calatrava
Gomez Perez de Porres, Prior de Sant Juan
Ferrand Osores, Comendador mayor de Leon (Order of Santiago)
Pero Ruiz de Sandoval, Comendador mayor de Castilla (Order of Santiago)
Pedro Manrique (Adelantado Mayor de Castilla)
Pedro Lopez de Ayala (the chronicler "que levaba el pendon de la Vanda")
Ferrand Perez de Ayala (the chronicler's father)
Iñigo Lopez de Orozco
Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza
Pedro Fernandez de Velasco
Gomez Gonzalez de Castañeda
Pedro Ruiz Sarmiento
Ruy Diaz de Rojas
Sancho Sanchez de Rojas

Juan Rodriguez Sarmiento
 Rui Gonzalez de Cisneros
 Sancho Fernandez de Tovar
 Suer Perez de Quiñones
 Garci Laso de la Vega
 Juan Remirez de Arellano
 Garci Alvarez de Toledo (former master of Santiago)
 Juan Gonzalez de Avellaneda
 Men Suarez (Clavero de Alcántara)
 Garci Gonzalez de Ferrera
 Gonzalo Bernal de Quiros
 Alvar Garcia de Albornoz
 Pedro Gonzalez de Agüero
 Ambrosio Bocanegra (almirante de Castilla)
 Alfonso Perez de Guzman
 Juan Alfonso de Haro
 Gonzalo Gomez de Cisneros

Ayala states that among the Castilian supporters of Enrique, the only major figures absent were Gonzalo Mexia, Master of Santiago, and Juan Alfonso de Guzman who had been left in charge of Seville (and probably, by extension, of southern Castile.) A editor's note to the text of Ayala indicates that despite Ayala's assertion, neither of the Guzmán brothers could have been at Nájera since Juan Alfonso was in Seville and Alonso Perez had been killed in the siege of Orihuela.

Franco-Bretons:

Beltran de Claquin (Bertrand Du Guesclin)
 Mariscal de Audenhan, Marshal of France
 el Besgue de Villaines (created count of Ribadeo by Enrique II)

Aragonese:

Don Alfonso, Count of Denia and Ribagorza (grandson of King James II and son of the infante, Pedro) (created Marqués of Villena
 Phelipe de Castro (an Aragonese *rico hombre* married to Enrique's sister)
 Juan Martinez de Luna
 Pedro Boil

Pedro Ferrandez Dixar
 Pedro Jordan de Urries

Anglo-Gascon Army

Edward, Prince of Wales (Gales)
 Pedro I, King of Castile
 King of Naples (son of deposed king of Mallorca)
 Duke of Lancaster
 John Chandos, Condestable de Guiana
 Captal de Buch
 Count of Armagnac (Armiñaque)
 Lord d'Albret (Señor de Lebret) ("e sus parientes")
 Hugo de Caureley (Calveley)
 Oliver, Sehor de Clison (Olivier de Clisson)
 Guillen (William) de Feleton
 Señor de Mucident
 Señor de Rosen
 Raul Camois
 Espiota ("e muchos capitanes de compañías")
 Many English and Breton knights and squires
 King of Navarre's men
 Count of Foix's men

Killed and Captured (Castilian Army)

Killed:

Garcilaso de la Vega
 Suer Perez de Quiñones
 Sancho Sanchez de Rojas
 Juan Rodriguez Sarmiento
 Juan de Mendoza
 Ferrand Sanchez de Angulo
 Iñigo Lopez de Orozco
 Gomez Carrillo de Quintana (son of Rui Diaz Carrillo)
 Sancho Sanchez de Moscoso, Comendador mayor de Santiago
 Garci Jufre Tenorio (son of Almirante Alonso Jufre)

Captured:

Sancho
Beltrán de Claquin
Marshal de Audenehan
Vesgue de Villaines
Felipe de Castro
Pero Ferrandez de Velasco
Garci Alvarez de Toledo
Pero Ruiz Sarmiento
Gomez Gonzalez de Castañeda
Juan Diaz de Aillon
Juan Gonzalez de Avellaneda
Melen Suarez, el Clavero de Alcantara
Garci Gonzalez de Herrera
Pero Lopez de Ayala
Sancho Ferrandez de Tovar
Juan Remirez de Arellano
Conde de Denia
Conde Don Alfonso
Conde don Pedro
Pero Moñiz
Men Rodriguez de Biedma
Alvar Garcia de Albornoz
Beltran de Guevara
Juan Furtado de Mendoza
Pero Gonzalez de Mendoza
Pero Tenorio (later Archbishop of Toledo)
Juan Garcia Palomeque (Bishop of Badajoz)
Pero Gonzalez Carrillo
Pero Boil
Juan Martinez de Luna
Pero Ferrandez Dixar
Pero Jordan do Urries
Ferrand Osoreo
Garci Jufre Tenorio
Sancho Sanchez de Moscoso
Gomez Carrillo de Quintana, Camarero mayor

APPENDIX C:
PARTICIPANTS NAMED BY FROISSART

Of the chroniclers who deal with Nájera, Froissart takes the greatest care to name those who participated in the campaign on the English side. His most extensive list appears when he writes of the crossing of the Pyrenees at Roncevaux (Roncesvalles). Although, by his own admission, he does not supply every name, his list is formidable. By contrast, he does nowhere near as good a job when naming those who fought on the Castilian side.

Anglo-Gascon Army

Pedro I, King of Castile
Edward Plantagenet, Prince of Wales
Sir John Chandos, Constable of Aquitaine
John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster
Don Martin de la Carra, Regent of Navarre and substitute for the king
Captal de Buch
Sir William Felton, High Steward of Aquitaine
Sir Thomas Felton (brother of Sir William)
Guiscard d'Angle, Marshal of Aquitaine
Stephen Cossington, Marshal of Aquitaine
Sir Hugh Calveley
Sir Robert Knolles
Sieur Olivier de Clisson
James, King of Majorca
Count of Armagnac
Count of Comminges
Count of Perigord
Earl of Angus
Viscount de Carmaing
Viscount de Chatelleraut
Viscount de Rochechouart
Sieur d'Albret

Sieur de Partenay
Sieur de Pons
Sieur de Raix
Sieur de Pinaue (?)
Sieur d'Aubeterre
Sieur de Cannabouton (?)
Sieur de Chaumont
Sieur de Mucident
Sieur de l'Esparre
Sieur de Condon
Sieur de Rosem
Sieur de Pincornet
Sieur de la Barde
Sieur de Pierre Buffiere
Sir Bernard d'Albret
Sir Thomas Holland (the prince's stepson)
Sir William Beauchamp (son of the Earl of Warwick)
Sir Matthew Gornay
Sir Louis de Harcourt
Sir Hugh Hastings
Sir Ralph Neville
Sir Garses du Chatillon
Sir Richard Causton
Sir Robert Cheney
Sir John Tyrrel
Sir Aimery de Rouchechouart
Sir Gaillart de la Moitre (Gaillard de la Motte)
Sir William Clayton
Sir Nele Loring
Sir Thomas Banaster
Sir Louis de Merval
Sir Ayman de Marnel
Sir Petiton de Courton
Sir Aimery de Tarse
Sir Bertrand de Caude
Sir Perducas d'Albret
Sir Thomas Hufford
Sir Gaillard Viguier
Sir Ralph Hastings
Sir Hugh Stafford

Sir Richard Caseston
 Sir Simon Burley
 Sir Garsis du Chastel
 Sir John Charnels
 Sir Petiton de Courton
 Sir Walter Urswick
 Sir John du Pre
 Sir Thomas de Demery
 Sir John Grandison
 Sir John Draper
 Sir John Devereux
 Sir Richard de Pontchardon
 Sir Thomas Despenser
 Sir John Combes
 Sir Thomas Combes
 Sir Eustace d'Ambreticourt
 Sir Baldwin de Franville, Seneschal of Saintonge
 Sir Ralph Camois (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Walter Loring (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Thomas Danvery (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir William Firmeton (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Aimery de Rouchechouart (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Girard de la Motte (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Robert Briquet (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Philip Courtenay (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Denis (Hugh?) Courtenay (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir John Covet (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Nicholas Bond (knighted during the campaign)
 Mr. Cotton (knighted during the campaign)
 Mr. Clifton (knighted during the campaign)
 Mr. Prior (knighted during the campaign)
 Souldich de la Traue
 Souldich de l'Estrade
 William Allestry (carried the Chandos banner)
 Villebos le Bouteiller et Pannetier
 Richard de Pontcharden
 Bastard de Breteuil
 Nandon de Bagerant
 Aymemon d'Ortige

Perrot de Savoye
 Bertrand de la Salle
 Le Bourg (Bastard) de l'Esparre
 Le Bourg (Bastard) Camus
 Le Bourg (Bastard) Espiote
 La Nuit
 John, Elias, and Edmund de Pommiers (three brothers)
 (Unnamed) high stewards of Saintonge, la Rochelle, Quercy, Limousin,
 Agenois, Bigorre
 Sir Walter Huet *
 John Treuelle *
 Sir Rabours *

*When listing those who crossed at Roncevaux, Froissart mentioned "all other captains of the free companies." This probably referred to men, listed a few pages earlier in the chronicle, whom the prince had recalled from Spain to take part in the expedition. While most are again mentioned at some later point in the chronicle as having taken part in the campaign, these three are not, though in all likelihood Froissart meant to convey that they were present.

Castilian Army

Enrique, King of Castile (formerly Count of Trastámara)
 Beltran DuGuesclin, Constable of Castile
 Marshal Arnold d'Andreghen
 Don Tello (brother of Enrique)
 Don Sancho (brother of Enrique)
 Sir Robert Roquebertin, Viscount of Aragon
 Sieur d'Antoing
 Alard Sieur de Brisueil
 Begue de Villaines
 Begue de Villiers
 Sir John de Bergettes
 Sir Gauvain de Bailleul
 L'Allemant de Saint Venant (knighted during the campaign)
 Sir Bertrand de Budes
 Sir Alain de St. Pol

Sir William de Bruce
Sir Alain de Couvette
Gomez Garilz [Carrillo]


Killed and Captured (Castilian Army)

Killed:


Begue de Villiers
Gomez Garilz (Carillo) (executed after the battle)

Captured:


Beltran DuGuesclin, Constable of Castile
Marshal Arnold d'Andreghen
Don Tello (brother of Enrique)
Don Sancho (brother of Enrique)
Sir Robert Roquebertin, Viscount of Aragon
Sieur d'Antoing de Hainault
Alard Sieur de Briseuil
Sir John de Bergettes
Sir Gauvain de Bailleul
Sir L'Allemand de Saint Venant
The Grandmaster of Santiago
The Grandmaster of Calatrava




Map 4. Realms of Medieval Spain.



Map 5. Northern Spain.



Map 6. The Nájera Campaign (Later Stages).



Map 7. Battle of Najera.

THE SOUTHERN VALENCIAN FRONTIER DURING THE WAR OF THE TWO PEDROS

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Of all of the conflicts which characterised the reign of Pere III “the Ceremonious” of Aragon (1336–1387), the long and cruel war with Castile known as the “War of the Two Pedros” was the worst. Unlike the other wars of his reign, Pere neither provoked nor wished this one. It was instead brought on by the Castilian king, Pedro I “the Cruel” (1350–1369).² This lengthy conflict (1356–1366) grew out of tensions which had been building between the two realms and members of the respective royal families for a considerable time. In an era of growing frustration, it is hardly surprising that such a costly and significant war could be provoked by such a minor incident.³

¹ This article appeared in a much longer form under the title “La frontera meridional valenciana durant la guerra amb Castilla dita dels Dos Peres,” in *Pere el Cerimoniós i la seva època*, ed. María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 1989), 245–357. The original article was translated expertly from Catalan to English by Dr. Brian Catlos of California State University-San Diego. The longer version was then substantially abridged by Dr. Donald J. Kagay of Albany State University and Dr. Catlos. The editors have chosen to use the English translation of the Castilian title of this long conflict (the *Guerra de los Dos Pedros*), instead of the Catalan (*Guerra dels Dos Peres*). This is done for volume-wide consistency, but also to adhere to historical accuracy since the conflict was fought between two royal warriors named Pedro. Though known as Pere in his Catalan lands, the same ruler was referred to as Pedro in Aragon and parts of Valencia.

² Catalan spellings have been used for the names of the rulers of the Crown of Aragon, their families and dependants, and Castilian spellings for the kings and inhabitants of Castile. The Crown of Aragon was comprised of the kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia, Mallorca, the Principate of Catalonia and Sardinia. Culturally the ruling family was predominantly Catalan and the main capital was Barcelona, but “King of Aragon” was Pere’s most prestigious contemporary title, and is utilized exclusively in this article. To make the place name usage of this article consistent with other papers in this collection, the editors have used modern Castilian spelling. At the first occurrence of each place-name in the text, the Catalan name for the settlement is included in a parenthesis after the Castilian form.

³ Regarding the events leading up to the war, see María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Causes i antecedents de la guerra dels dos Peres,” *Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura*, 43 (1987): 445–508.

It is the purpose of this paper to assess how the southern Valencian frontier adapted to an intermittent, but often bitter war which raged across the Iberian landscape for a full decade. The region focused on here, referred to loosely as the district of Further Jijona (Xixona), contained the important cities of Alicante (Alicant), Orihuela (Oriola), and Elche (Elx), but it was far more important strategically because of the long and sparsely defended border it shared with Castile. As a microcosm of the War of the Two Pedros, the southern Valencian frontier explains the larger conflict on several levels.⁴

I

The spark that caused the conflagration of 1356 was a minor naval action near the Castilian port of Cádiz. In late summer, Francesc de Perellós, a Catalan privateer in the service of the French crown against the English, captured two Piacenzan merchantmen claiming they were allies of Genoa, currently at war with the Crown of Aragon and therefore legitimate targets.⁵ This took place before the very eyes of the Castilian king, Pedro, who happened to be in Cádiz at the time. Indignant, he demanded that Perellós release the ships and was incensed when the Catalan skipper refused.⁶

In the maritime lands of the Mediterranean, such naval disputes

⁴ For the Jijona district and its cities, see Fernando Galiana, *Historia de Jijona* (Alicante, 1995); *Orihuela en sus documentos*, ed. Antonio Luis Galiano Pérez, Javier Sánchez Portas, and Victor Sánchez Gil, 4 vols. (Murcia, 1984); Juan Manuel del Estal, *Orihuela de villa a ciudad: Compendio de una historia bicentennial desde Alfonso X el Sabio de Castilla al rey Magnánimo Alfonso V de Aragón (1243/50–1437/38)* (Alicante, 1996); idem, *Alicante: De villa a ciudad (1252–1490)* (Alicante, 1990); María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *Organizació i defensa d'un territori fronterer: la governació d'Oriola en el segle XIV* (Barcelona, 1990); Juan Bautista Vilar, *Historia de la ciudad de Orihuela*, 3 vols. (Orihuela, 1975–); José Pastor de la Roca, *Historia general de la ciudad y castillo de Alicante: Descripción de sus monumentos, antigüedades, y ruinas* (Alicante, 1854); Antonio Maciá Serrano, *Elche: La ciudad de misterio* (Madrid, 1964).

⁵ For war between Genoa and the Crown of Aragon, see David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200–1500: The Struggle for Dominion* (London, 1997), 178–79; G. Meloni, *Genova e Aragona* (Padua, 1971).

⁶ Pere III, *Crònica* in *Les quatre grans cròniques*, ed. Ferran Soldevila (Barcelona: 1971), 1124 [6.3]; Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), *Chronicle*, trans. Mary Hillgarth, ed. J.N. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 2:495–96; Pedro López de Ayala, *Crònica de D. Pedro I de Castilla*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 66 (*Crónicas de los reyes de Castilla*), ed. E. Llaguno y Amírola, 3 vols. (Madrid: 1953), 1:473–74 (1357:7–8); Jerónimo Zurita y Castro, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Angel López Canellas (Zaragoza, 1967–1985), 4:292–93 (IX.i).

were normally settled by intense diplomatic efforts. The guilty party normally paid an indemnity to his victims or accepted their reprisals and then the matter would be closed. Such events seldom led to a declaration of war. Following this diplomatic course, Pere (as Perellós's lord) apologised to Pedro and promised he would thoroughly investigate the incident and properly punish the malefactor.⁷ Pedro, however, reacted by declaring war, provoking Pere to write to Perellós in a state of shock, informing him that this relatively minor incident at Cádiz had led his Castilian adversary to commence hostilities.⁸

On the Castilian side, Pedro moved quickly, imprisoning Catalan merchants in his ports and confiscating their goods. In the midst of military preparations, he antagonized Pere by launching attacks even before he formally declared war in September, 1356. In August of that year, Pere received a Castilian ambassador at Barcelona, who delivered a list of his master's grievances. These focused on: (1) attacks by Catalan corsairs on Castilian and Genoese vessels at the mouth of the Guadalquivir, including the Perellós affair (2) Aragonese support of the Castilian king's political rivals, and (3) Pere's refusal to recognise the recently-elected masters of the orders of Calatrava and Santiago within his realms.⁹ Since Pedro was not satisfied with his adversary's reply, he dispatched another envoy, who arrived at Perpignan on September 4, bearing a letter that amounted to a declaration of war. As fighting had already broken out, Pere accepted the letter and the war it announced.¹⁰

In Valencia, one of Pere's most exposed realms, hostilities erupted immediately. On July 31, Pere's uncle, Prince Ramon Berenguer, count of Ampurias (Empúries), and Garcia de Loriz, governor-general of Valencia, informed the southern capital of rumors that Pedro, was about to attack Valencia and Aragon with a large naval force, aided by Pere's step-brothers, the princes Ferran and Joan. Spurred to action, the council appointed a committee of twenty-eight members to supervise defensive operations. This body immediately began to alert Valencian municipalities and undertook a series of preparatory measures. These included provisioning the capital and its castles, to

⁷ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:297 (IX.ii).

⁸ Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó [ACA], Cancelleria real, R. 1293, ff. 45v–46r (September 1, 1356).

⁹ López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:474–75 (1356:10); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:289–98 (IX.ii–iii).

¹⁰ Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1125–28 (6:3–4); Pere III, trans. Hillgarth, 2:496–503, include the texts of both letters.

replacing any untrustworthy castellans, and organising townsmen into formal military brigades. The smoke and fire signal system was revised and spies were sent into Castile. Castilian subjects were expelled from the kingdom, and the governor instructed to appoint “frontier captains” (*frontalers*) in significant border districts.¹¹

These actions were well-timed, since even before declaring war, Pedro had begun to harass Pere’s southernmost kingdom. On August 14, the Aragonese sovereign complained that his lands had been attacked “unnecessarily”; ten days later he informed Jaume Marc that the Castilian king was exerting pressure on all of his kingdoms, but that he would resist “by force of battle.”¹² On August 30, Pere wrote to Prince Ramon Berenguer, putting him in charge of Valencian defences. He did not dispatch an army southward at this time, since Valencia was not a suitable spot for launching an attack on Castile, posing great logistical difficulties as it did.¹³

Desperate for foreign help, Pere sent Perellós and his naval squadron up the French coast with orders to deliver letters to the mercenary’s former employer, King Jean II of France (1350–1364). Perellós was also ordered to harry any Castilian shipping he might encounter along the way.¹⁴ Pere followed up this unofficial mission by formally dispatching an ambassador, Bernat Acçat, to the French court in hopes of gaining military support from his adversary’s father-in-law, Duke Charles of Bourbon.¹⁵ Acçat was also ordered to visit Pedro’s step-brother, Count Enrique of Trastámara (who was in exile in France) and offer him sizable inducements of land and money to enter Pere’s service. The Aragonese envoy was also given the unenviable task of collecting money the French king owed Pere.¹⁶

¹¹ S. Carreres Zacarés, *Libre de memòries de diversos sucesos e fets memorables e de coses senyalades de la ciutat e regne de València (1308–1644)* (Valencia: 1930), 1:50–1.

¹² ACA, Cancillería real, Cartas Reales, Pere III, nos. 5615 (August 14, 1356) and 5620 (August 24, 1356).

¹³ *Epistolari de Pere III*, ed. Ramon Gubern, 1 vol. to date (Barcelona: 1955), 1:123–29 (doc. 17). For the strategic situation of the Kingdom of Valencia, see Zurita, *Anales*, 4:300–1 (IX:iii).

¹⁴ ACA., Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 45v–46v (September 1, 1356).

¹⁵ In 1353, Pedro married Blanche, the daughter of the Duke of Bourbon, in order to cement an alliance with France. A year later, he separated from her and ordered the bishops of Avila and Salamanca to annul the marriage. Blanche was imprisoned and died in 1361, undoubtedly on the king’s orders. Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350–1369* (Leiden, 1995), 140–41, 153; Frances Minto Elliot, *Old Court Life in Spain*, 2 vols. (New York, 1894), 2:1–54.

¹⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 43r–v. See also the letters addressed to the

The battle of Poitiers (September 19, 1356) brought the greatest of these diplomatic efforts to nothing since Bourbon was killed on the battlefield and King Jean taken prisoner there. Despite these setbacks, Acçat was able to negotiate the neutrality of King Charles II “the Bad” of Navarre (1349–1387) and to obtain the ultimate service of two Pyrenean marcher lords, Viscount Roger Bernat III of Castellbó and Count Gaston III of Foix.¹⁷

II

In the midst of these frantic diplomatic efforts, the territories of Further Jijona prepared for war. However, since much of the region was still under the dominion of the rebellious princes Ferran and Joan who in turn were aligned with Pedro of Castile, they followed a course aimed primarily at self-defense. The Orihuelans forbade the export of wheat and horses and ordered that the grain of its hinterland be stored in the town. The town council designated 104 of its inhabitants as “armed cavalry” (*cavallers*) and organized citizens without horses into companies, each of which was commanded by a “non-com” and held responsible for guarding one of the urban towers. The council also saw to the repair of walls, the dredging of moats, and the securing of gates. Rows of houses built too closely to the town walls were destroyed. Each household was obliged to financially support one member of the army of labourers who carried out these works. War supplies, including stone, iron, wood, hemp, pine resin, and *herba de ballestes* (used to poison arrows) were stockpiled and livestock was pastured in fields closest to the town where they would be safer. The council posted sentries and patrols within the town and in watchtowers on Oriolet, the adjacent mountain.

duke of Bourbon and the count of Trastámara, to the abbot of Eroles and Pauquet de Bellcastell, the ambassadors of king Pere to the French king, and to the castellan of Amposta. ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 42r–v (August 20, 1356), cited in J.B. Sitges, *Las mujeres del rey don Pedro I de Castilla* (Madrid: 1910), 157–58.

¹⁷ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:302 (IX.iii); Luis Suárez Fernández, “Castilla (1350–1406),” in *Historia de España*, ed. Ramon Menéndez Pidal, 37 vols. (Madrid, 1963–1984), 16:48–49. For embassy to count of Foix, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 44–45; for letters to the count of Foix and viscount of Castellbó, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 43v (August 25, 1356) and 45.

Since Orihuela shared borders with Monovar (Monòver) and Jinosa, both of which remained loyal to Pere, the town council determined to negotiate with Joan Ximénez de Perencisa, Ferran's official and the border captain of Vall d'Elda about setting up warning signals. Convinced that companies loyal to Pere were assembling for an attack on Orihuela, Perencisa instructed the men of Elda to send up smoke signals in the hills of Crevillente (Crevillent) as a sign of danger. To shield these signals from enemy view, the messages were to be relayed to Orihuela by way of Callosa. In the end, these precautions became unnecessary when both Jinosa and Monovar were sacked in August, 1356, by Castilian forces under the command of Diego García de Padilla, master of the order of Calatrava.¹⁸ Because of these rapid Castilian operations along the frontier, the lands of Further Jijona stretching from Jumilla to the Valencian border remained loyal to Ferran and therefore sided with Pedro of Castile in the opening stages of the conflict.

Meanwhile, Aragonese officials and members of the Valencian city council had written to the townsmen of Orihuela warning them of the Castilian incursion against Alicante while ordering them to remain loyal to Pere and to resist Pedro and his ally Prince Ferran.¹⁹ The warnings had little effect. Neither propaganda nor threat moved the Orihuelans to abandon their allegiance to Ferran and on September 8 Alicante opened its gates to the Castilian king when he arrived with a company of 200 cavalry and a small squadron of poorly-armed galleys.

Shortly after this, Pere received a letter from two of his officials who expressed their regret that the king had sent no reinforcements. Pere, however, was following a cautious policy. He decided to await an opportunity to defeat his Castilian adversary if the latter foolishly attempted to cross the mountains that separate Valencia and further Jijona.²⁰

While Pedro occupied Alicante, Prince Ferran, now bearing the Castilian title of "governor" (*adelantado*) of the frontier, captured Orihuela on September 27 with a large body of troops.²¹ Here, he hoped

¹⁸ ACA, Cartas Reales, Pere III, no.: 5746; Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1128 (6:4); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:310 (IX.vi); and P. Bellot, *Anales de Orihuela (siglos XIV-XVII)*, ed. J. Torres Fontes (Oriola: 1954-1956), 1:26-29. Pedro's forces also unsuccessfully attacked Castalla and Onil at the same time.

¹⁹ Bellot, *Anales* 1:29.

²⁰ *Espistolari*, 1:129-34 (doc. 18).

²¹ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:30-32.

to be viewed not only as Pedro's representative but also as the leader of the old Valencian-Aragonese *Unión*.²² By gaining sympathy from the still disgruntled sector of the population that had formed the *Unión*, Ferran hoped to disguise Castilian aggression while rekindling to his own advantage another insurgency against the Aragonese crown. With these goals in mind, he arrived at the village of Biar on October 18 and issued a proclamation ordering the inhabitants of the town to obey him rather than his royal step-brother, the rightful king. He denounced Pere as a ruler who had led his subjects into pointless wars against a host of adversaries: the Genoese, the Milanese, the judge of Arborea in Sardinia, the Dorias and, now, the king of Castile. As the result of these unending conflicts, Pere had made the lives of the Aragonese unbearable with excessive taxes and duties.²³ Ferran's embassy, however, proved distinctly unsuccessful with the residents of Biar who responded by firing arrows at the prince. Indeed, Ferran's proclamation became a "smoking gun" for Pere who used it to justify the confiscation of his step-brothers' lands. Accusing both Ferran and Joan of treason, the Aragonese king claimed that Ferran's crime was the greater one, since he had delivered Alicante, the "key" to the kingdom of Valencia, into the hands of Pedro.²⁴

In the meantime, Aragonese troops under the command of the count of Denia and Pere de Xèrica managed to retake Alicante for Pere, when its inhabitants opened its gates to them in exchange for certain privileges. Representing the crown, the princes Pere and Ramon Berenguer renewed Alicante's charter, which the king ratified

²² The Aragonese *Unión* was a league of nobles and town councils founded in 1265, 1283–1284 to defend Aragonese national interests against Catalan hegemony, and which succeeded in obtaining certain concessions from the kings. The *Unión* reappeared in 1347 when Pere named his daughter Constança as heir, effectively disinheriting his brother, Jaume, count of Urgell. The movement extended to Valencia, which formed its own *Unión*. A civil war resulted (1347–1348) which Pere won. After the death of the Jaume of Urgell, the *Unión* adopted Ferran as its figurehead.

²³ ACA, Cartas reales, Pere III, no. 5654 (October 18, 1356); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:310 (IX.vi).

²⁴ On December 8, 1356, Pere ordered García de Loriz, the governor of Valencia, to initiate a suit against Queen Elionor and his sons for the affair of the *Unión*, but on the eleventh of the same month decided to suspend the case. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1532, ff. 54v–55 (December 8, 1356) and 55v (December 11, 1356).] Later he decided to base the case on charges of treason in the war with Castile. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1532, ff. 56–58 (December 17, 1356); Cartas reales, Pere III, no. 5682 and 5683 (January 10, 1357); cf. Bellot, *Anales*, 1:36–39.]

on December 7, 1356.²⁵ One of the most revealing of the royal promises to the town was defense of it people against any charges of disloyalty that might arise as a result of their surrender to his troops. (Anyone who dared accuse them in this manner would be punished by death.) This concession is interesting because it shows that allegiance to the local lord (here, Prince Ferran) was considered binding even when it came into an allegiance owed the king. The inhabitants of Alicante, who had clearly remained loyal to Pere during the period of the *Unión* and had suffered Ferran's hatred since that time, were afraid of future punishment should the prince again recover the town.²⁶

Alicante's situation remained precarious. Although not presently under siege, it remained an isolated outpost in enemy territory and its relatively poor agricultural yield had to be supplemented by supplies imported either by sea or overland.²⁷ Because of these difficulties, the town was granted special permission on December 16 to buy grain, legumes, and other foodstuffs from anywhere in the Crown of Aragon without having to pay sales taxes or tolls on these provisions.²⁸

Early in 1357, while Ferran and Joan led a raid into Valencian territory,²⁹ other Castilian troops laid siege to Alicante. In response to these attacks, Catalan and Aragonese reinforcements streamed into the region under the command of Eiximèn d'Orís.³⁰ Ferran now attempted to seize Jumilla, a town held by Pero Maça. This proved

²⁵ Prince Pere, the fourth son of Jaume II and Blanche of Anjou, inherited the title of count of Roussillon-Ampurias and then acquired that of count of Prades. He was King Pere's uncle and major adviser, as well as a principal actor in the Castilian war. Ramon Berenguer was the fifth and last son of Jaime and Blanche. He inherited the county of Prades and exchanged it with his brother Pere for the county of Ampurias-Roussillon in 1341. A natural leader of the Catalan nobility, Ramon Berenguer was also an important adviser and military figure in Pere III's reign.

²⁶ María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *Organització i defensa d'un territori fronterer. La governació d'Oriola en el segle XIV* (Barcelona, 1989), 483–84 (doc. 171).

²⁷ Pere was partial to this plan, declaring that some of the 500 or 600 horsemen then in Valencia could be sent to escort the relief convoy. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1151, ff. 38v–39 (November 29, 1356).]

²⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 889, ff. 154v–155.

²⁹ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:314 (IV.vii).

³⁰ *Epistolari*, 1:155–59 (doc. 21); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:311 (IX.vi). Up to this time, the town had been under the command of the count of Osona, who had been sent as a substitute for the master of Montesa and Pere Arnau de Perestortes, the Hospitaller Master of Catalonia.

no easy task, however, as the siege dragged out for over four months, during which time the prince had to rely on Castilian reinforcements, including 2,000 Muslim horsemen and militiamen from Orihuela.³¹ Finally reduced to starvation, the Jumillans surrendered on May 18, 1357. Ironically, this took place only days after a truce had been signed by the two warring kings. Because of this, the Aragonese claimed Jumilla's capture was illegal, but the Castilians maintained that it was legitimate since news of the truce had not reached Further Jijona until May 22 and they were thus unaware of it when the town was taken.³²

Despite this military activity, the lands of Further Jijona played a minor role in the first phase of the war, which was largely contested on the Aragonese soil where Pedro had gathered the bulk of his forces and was probing along much of the frontier. According to Pedro López de Ayala, the Castilian king launched operations in the Aragonese theatre with 7,000 cavalry and 2,000 Muslim "light horsemen" (*jenetes*) as well as a large number of foot soldiers.³³ For his part, Pere could muster only 3,000 horsemen as support for his infantry.

The king's uncle, Prince Pere, was well aware of Pedro's superior troop strength, and advised his nephew not to face the Castilians in battle. Responding to his uncle's concerns, Pere made the opposite case: for immediately confronting his enemy and forcing a pitched battle. He recalled that his ancestors had faced their enemies on the battlefield with only a 1,000 cavalry, while admitting that the poor state of his treasury would not allow a long, drawn out war. He argued for a rapid engagement, putting his faith in God, and hoping that Pedro's relative youth and inexperience, coupled with the uneven loyalties of the Castilians, would turn the war to his advantage.³⁴

Despite these brave words, no battle took place. Pere later claimed that he had been waiting at Magallón with his army in May, 1357 and that Pedro had avoided him.³⁵ By contrast, Ayala, however,

³¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 982, ff. 113–114 (January 14, 1358); Andrés Giménez Soler, "La Corona de Aragón y Granada," *Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona* 4 (1907–1908): 286.

³² Bellot, *Anales*, 1:44–49, 51.

³³ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:329 (IX:ix); Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:478 (1357:IV).

³⁴ *Epistolari*, 1:134–51 (chap. 20). Concerning the hostages taken by Ferran from Orihuela and Alicante, see Ferrer i Mallol, "Causes," 464–67 (docs. 20–21).

³⁵ Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1132 (6:12); Pere III, trans. Hillgarth, 2:513–4.

claimed it was Pere who had avoided combat. He based this conclusion on the Aragonese king's delay in moving toward the appointed field of battle, while, in contrast, his adversary had rapidly taken up a position.³⁶ Pedro's penchant for carefully avoiding pitched battles lends credence to Pere's account. is probably the correct one.³⁷

III

In February, 1357, as the first year of the war ended, a papal legate, Cardinal Guillaume de la Jugée, arrived at Zaragoza to begin peace talks. After three months of intense negotiations, the cardinal was able to broker a year-long truce, intended to evolve into a full-fledged peace treaty. During the initial period of the truce, the legate would take control of the towns and fortresses captured by the two combatants and their allies.³⁸ When Pedro attempted to use these negotiations to redraw the borders of Murcia in his favour, Pere countered by citing the treaty of Torrellas (1304) which gave his house full title to the Murcian lands at issue.³⁹

Starting on May 13, 1357, Pere complied with the terms of the truce, surrendering to the papal legate Alicante and all the other sites won from Pedro.⁴⁰ By contrast, Pedro refused to surrender Tarazona and the other border castles he had stormed and instead, surrendered no more than the keys for these locations to the legate after rendering homage to him. As a result, Tarazona, Alcalá, Jinosá, Monovar, Sot, Bordalba, and Los Fayos remained in Castilian hands. In the face of this failure to honor the truce, the legate excommunicated Pedro and put his lands under interdict. When in November, 1357, the Castilian king had still had not submitted, the legate levied

³⁶ Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:478 (1357:IV). According to Zurita, it was possibly the cardinal-legate who avoided this action. Zurita, *Anales*, 4:329 (IX:xi).

³⁷ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:325–26 (IX:x).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 4:325, 328–32 (IX:x–xi).

³⁹ ACA, *Cartas Reales*, Pere III, no. 5746; Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1132 (6:14). Murcia, a small Muslim principality to the south of Valencia, was conquered by a joint Castilian-Aragonese force in 1265–1266 and ceded to Alfonso X. Under Jaime II, several expeditions were launched against the territory and, by the treaty of Torrellas (1304), Further Jijona and Murcia were removed from Castile and bound to the kingdom of Valencia. Josep-David Garrido i Valls, *La conquesta del sud Valencià i Múrcia per Jaume II* (Barcelona, 2002).

⁴⁰ ACA, *Cancillería real*, R. 1394, ff. 11v (May 13, 1357), 13 (May 17, 1357).

the fine of 100,000 silver marks, provided for by the terms of the truce.⁴¹

During this steady slide towards a resumption of hostilities, Pere's most trusted officials began to negotiate with his step-brother, Prince Ferran, who seemed ready to make peace now. For his part, Pere was interested in *détente* with his rebellious sibling, in order not only to weaken his Castilian foe, but also to restore peace to those parts of his realms where Ferran held power. For his part, the prince hoped to recover revenues from his captured properties and to escape the dangerous inner circle of Pedro the Cruel, which had proved fatal to so many others. Insisting that he, his brother Joan, and their mother should recover all their lands in the Crown of Aragon, Ferran also demanded compensation for his Castilian holdings which he would surely lose as the result of changing sides. He also asked for Pere's help in defending his Aragonese and Valencian towns and castles that lay near the Castilian border. To safeguard his family, the prince further required that the Aragonese king not make peace with Castile without his prior assent. In addition, he submitted a list of Valencian Unionists to the king, requesting that Pere pardon them and reinstate their titles and lands. Finally, to cement their new relationship, Ferran requested that Pere re-appoint him as general procurator of the entire Crown of Aragon.

On receiving the conditions, Pere agreed to return the properties he had seized from the princes and their mother.⁴² Although the king admitted to Ferran that returning Alicante "was a difficult thing for him to do," he promised that he would surrender the town if the prince swore not to mistreat its inhabitants for having opened their gates to Aragonese forces. In addition, Pere reminded Ferran that Alicante could not be immediately turned over, since it was currently being held in trust by the papal legate.⁴³

⁴¹ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:334–37, 341 (IX:xii–xiii).

⁴² These included Queen Elionor's castles of Gudalest and Berdia and Ferran's vicarate of Tortosa along with the castle and town of Alicante.

⁴³ The king had a deputy in the castle and another in the town, as well as a garrison of 100 men-at-arms. Ferran was given the option of placing his own men in these positions, but, instead, had the royal garrison render homage to him. Pere put some restrictions on this exchange of personnel: (1) the castellan had to be Catalan or Aragonese rather than Castilian (2) he also had to be either a knight, or a "noble" (*home de paratge, generos*), and (3) despite any loyalty he owed to Ferran, he would also have to swear to hand over the castle whenever the king required this.

Although Pere accepted most of Ferran's conditions, he was only prepared to appoint the prince as procurator general for one year. The king already had a son and heir, Joan, who by custom was supposed to hold this post. In an attempt to placate Ferran, Pere promised the prince another prestigious position to replace the lost procuratorship. In turn, Ferran would have to restore to Pero Maça Jumilla and any other holdings he had captured. Finally, Pere insisted that Ferran make peace with his rivals within the Crown of Aragon (including the king's allies, the count of Luna and the Trastámaras), give no further support to the *Unión*, and participate on the Aragonese side in the war with Castile. The negotiations reached their conclusion during a secret meeting between the parties at Cañada del Pozuelo, a forest near Albarracín.⁴⁴

Even with this agreement, however, Ferran remained little more than a lukewarm ally in the war against Pedro. The king quickly realized this and, on January 6, 1358, complained bitterly to his step-brother regarding the latter's lack of support. To this stinging rebuke, the prince responded that it was better for the "commonwealth" (*cosa pública*) that he not fight Castile. Pere retorted that the many concessions he had granted Ferran demanded that the prince reconsider his position.⁴⁵ Ferran's reluctance to fight Castile may well have sprung from the fear that Pedro would retaliate against himself or his family.

In order to establish a pretext for breaking off relations with the Castilian king, Ferran complained to Pedro that members of the Castilian court had treated him disrespectfully. He also protested Pedro's demand that he send hostages as a guarantee of his allegiance. On January 14, 1358, Pedro replied, denying that his counsellors had insulted the prince or that he had demanded hostages. In addition, he complained about Ferran's refusal to surrender Jumilla and ordered him to do so immediately. According to the Castilian king, Ferran had been receiving money as a Castilian commander at the time of the town's capture; he was thus obliged to surrender the castle when ordered to do so.⁴⁶ Despite this stern warning, Ferran

⁴⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1532, ff. 72v–73 (December 7, 1357), 85–111v (December 9, 1357). See also, ACA, Cartas reales, Pere III, nos. 5858, 5861; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:342–46 (IX:xiv); Sitges, *Mujeres*, 108–9.

⁴⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1532, ff. 58v–60 (January 6, 1358).

⁴⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 982, ff. 113–114 (January 14, 1358); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:352 (IX:xvi).

honored his new agreement with his step-brother and ordered Jumilla surrendered to Pere's agent, Pero Maça.⁴⁷ Pere's treaty with Ferran remained secret until January 24 when it was made public at a Valencian *corts*. Here, the king asked the deputies to respect the "safe-conduct" (*guiatge*) he had granted the prince.⁴⁸

IV

When Pedro learned of Ferran's desertion, he violated the truce by sending Castilian troops against Jumilla in the spring of 1358.⁴⁹ The town held out until May 26 and then surrendered, after gaining generous terms.⁵⁰ Since the Castilian incursion had clearly violated the truce, Pere demanded that the papal legate immediately return to him Alicante and the other fortresses.⁵¹ With no binding agreements to hold him back, Pere sent the counts of Luna and Trastámara across the Aragonese frontier into Castile, and Ferran, south from Valencia toward Cartagena. While gaining no territory from these raids, Pere's troops did ravage a large portion of Murcia, one of his adversary's favorite staging points.⁵²

Enraged, Pedro unleashed a carefully-targeted reign of terror that quickly claimed the lives of his own half-brother, Fadrique, the master of Santiago, as well as Ferran's mother, brother, and sister-in-law.⁵³ Pere informed Ferran of these grisly events on June 24, 1358, and demanded that the prince avenge his family tragedy by attacking

⁴⁷ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:70.

⁴⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1532, ff. 60–62 (January 24, 1358). On December 7, 1358 at La Cañada del Pozuelo, Pere had conceded a *guiatge* to his step-brother. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 153, ff. 62–63.]

⁴⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1158, f. 35 (April 1, 1358).

⁵⁰ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:352–53 (IX:xvi) and Bellot, *Anales*, 1:68–70.

⁵¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 982, f. 125 (May 26, 1358); *Cartas Reales*, Pere III, no. 5744 (no date). The communiqué related to the breaking of the truce and the request for the return of Alicante and other territories was also addressed to the cardinal of Sainte-Sixte, who had been substituted for Guillaume de la Jugée as Cardinal-legate. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 982, ff. 125v–126 (May 26, 1358).] Pere had accused Guillaume of partiality and the Pope had replaced him. [Sitges, *Mujeres*, 234]. Alicante was to be turned over to Guillem Arnau Patau, doctor-at-law, and Pere Díaz, Ferran's personal chaplain.

⁵² Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1134 (6:20); Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:485 (1358:VIII); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:354, 356 (IX:xvi); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:173–74.

⁵³ Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:481–85 (1358:III–VII); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:353–54 (IX:xvi).

Castile.⁵⁴ For his part, Pedro protested that his actions had been justified, the truce had expired and, at any rate, it was the Aragonese who had again begun hostilities. In his mind, at least, it was he who was doing God's work, work that included bringing on the "down-fall" of the Aragonese king.⁵⁵

Pere angrily responded to his adversary's version of current events, pointing out that Pedro had started the war in the first place and subsequently had violated the truce by not turning over Tarazona to the legate. He also reminded the Castilian monarch of his brutal capture of Jumilla and Ferrellón, which had both been Aragonese for over a century. Finally, he lashed out at Pedro for his recent string of political assassinations. Arguing that their retainers shared "little responsibility for these matters," Pere proposed to determine the war's final outcome through trial by combat in which a specified number of knights from each side would fight to the death.⁵⁶ This proposal, as many similar offers, came to nothing.

Borrowing a page from Pedro's book, Pere had also utilized the truce of 1357 to prepare for the next round of conflict if and when it came. On July 20 of that year, he had allied himself to the Marinid king of Morocco, Abu Inan (Boannen) (1351–1358). He entered into this arrangement to counter Pedro's influence in Granada; despite a papal rebuke that the alliance was a case of undisguised political expediency.⁵⁷ When Pope Innocent VI (1352–1362) opposed Pere's signing of a treaty with infidels, the Aragonese sovereign countered that blame should be laid on Castile which had previously allied itself with Granada and had used Muslim troops against the crown of Aragon.

⁵⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1160, ff. 45v–46v (June 24, 1358); 69 (July 11, 1358).

⁵⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1159, f. 176 (July 3, 1358). Cf.: Zurita, *Anales*, 4:356 (IX:xvii).

⁵⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1159, ff. 176–177 (July 26, 1358). Concerning the letter to the King of Castile, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1159, f. 176; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:356–57 (IX:xvii). In his letter, Pere failed to mention other Castilian actions that had violated the truce. For example, in March, 1358, the merchants Francesc d'Aguilar of Valencia and Pere Pelleig of Perpignan had been attacked and robbed while travelling between Lorca and Murcia. Trusting in the truce, they had chosen to return overland from Granada to Valencia, thus losing their cargo of silks, gilded cloth, and jewels valued at more than 30,000 *sous*. Pere claimed goods of equal value to those lost to the Castilians. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1158, f. 16v (March 7, 1358).]

⁵⁷ Giménez Soler, "Corona," 286; R. Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrides (1323–1492)* (Paris: 1973), 107; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera amb l'Islam en el segle XIV. Cristians i sarraïns al País Valencià* (Barcelona, 1988), 152–54.

Soon afterwards, Pedro attempted to break up this new alliance, and, though failing to do so, he secured a guarantee from the Marinid ruler that he would aid the Castilian ruler in any campaign launched against Ferran. This Castilian tampering brought yet another Aragonese embassy to Morocco on June 1, 1358. Through his ambassador, Pere attempted to explain to Abu Inan that southern Murcia had been Aragonese for over fifty years and that Ferran was the region's rightful lord.⁵⁸

In 1357, Pere also took advantage of the truce with Castile to secure a treaty with the other important Muslim power, Granada.⁵⁹ On April 29 of that year, he notified the Naṣrid king that Ferran had returned to his service and thus the lands and vassals in Further Jijona would now fall under the protection of the truce between their kingdoms.⁶⁰ This diplomatic offensive seems to have brought little advantage to Pere, since the Granada monarch, Muḥammad V (1354–1359; 1362–1391), remained loyal to Pedro and promised to support him whenever the war heated up again.⁶¹ Pere's efforts to court Portugal were equally ineffectual, for that kingdom also aligned with Pedro in the subsequent phase of the war.⁶²

Seeking to consolidate his position, Pere tried to rid himself of possible domestic enemies. One of these was García Jofre de Loaysa, lord of Petrer, with whom Ferran negotiated a non-aggression pact on May 10. Ferran had forcefully reminded Loaysa of the homage he and his father had sworn to Pere, who had never harmed them in any way.⁶³ Despite this, Loaysa remained an adamant ally of the Castilian king and fought on his side after the recommencement of hostilities. As a result, he lost the castle of Petrer to Ferran.⁶⁴

Pere also used the truce to decide the fate of Elche and Crevillent, which had been without a lord since the murder of Prince Joan. On

⁵⁸ ACA, Cartas reales, Pere III, no. 5910 (June 1, 1358): *los regnes e regalies del senyor rey e quel dit infant hac les dites terres per heretament e donació del senyor rey n'Amfós senyor e pare seu.*

⁵⁹ See Clara Estow, "War and Peace in Medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan Relations in the Mid-Fourteenth Century," in this volume.

⁶⁰ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 557, f. 249 (April 29, 1358).

⁶¹ Arié, *Espagne*, 106. See also *El reino nazarí de Granada (1232–1492). Política, instituciones, espacio y economía*, ed. M.J. Viguera Molins, in *Historia de España*, vol. 8, pt. 3 (Madrid, 2000).

⁶² López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:480 (1358:I); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:341 (IX:xiii).

⁶³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 982, f. 121v (May 10, 1358).

⁶⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1161, ff. 42r–v (January 2, 1359). Ferran was guaranteed title to the fortress by Pere's privilege of four months earlier.

July 13, the king ordered Ferran to occupy the towns in the name of the crown, something he was entitled to do since his brother, Joan, expired without a male heir. Though the “good men” (*prohoms*) of the towns surrendered them to royal officials, Ferran filed suit against the crown, claiming that Joan had willed these properties to him. Ultimately, the crown won this case and reclaimed the two towns.⁶⁵ Pere then assigned them to his younger son, Martí; however, since Martí was still a minor, the properties were put under the wardship of the queen.⁶⁶

V

In August, 1358, Pedro resolved to take the war into the lands of Ferran in southern Murcia which would be for many months to come the most important theatre of conflict.⁶⁷ On August 21, Pere received word that his enemy had invaded Murcia a week before with a fleet of sixteen galleys and twelve “ships” (*naus*) along with 1500 horsemen.⁶⁸ Pedro’s army pillaged the hinterland of Orihuela before unloading siege engines and marines to begin the siege of Guardamar. The town fell the next day, but the castle, commanded by Bernat de Cruilles, held out. At this point, a storm blew up and caught the Castilian fleet unmanned. As a result, only two vessels survived. With his supply line effectively cut, Pedro retreated to Murcia, having burned a large part of Guardamar and his remaining

⁶⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1160, f. 76 (July 13, 1358). The king wrote to Pere de Xèrica, Arnau Joan and Pere Boil regarding the same matter. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1160, ff. 76v–77.]

⁶⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1547, ff. 7v–10v (August 8, 1358), ff. 59v–61 (December 28, 1358), also ff. 30–32v (June 3, 1359) and f. 32v (June 8, 1359) and ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1161, ff. 44v–45v (December 28, 1358). Pere was married at the time to Elionor of Sicily, his third wife.

⁶⁷ ACA, Cartas Reales, Pere III, no. 5746 (undated but before May 1357): *quant a ço que diu del regne de Múrcia açò és cosa que”l rey d’Aragó posseex justament e per justs títols e emblament respon al fet d’Albarrasi e de Fariza*. Pere had long rejected the Castilian claim to these lands, once saying that, “when the Kingdom of Murcia is spoken of, this is a thing which the king of Aragon possesses by right and by just title, just like Albarracín and Fariza.”

⁶⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1159, ff. 193v–194 (August 21, 1358); R. 1160, ff. 114r–v; Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:485 (1358:IX). Ayala sets the number of galleys at eighteen. In this case, “Murcia” refers to Valencia territory which had formerly been part of Castilian Murcia.

ships. Although the Orihuelans did not dare a full scale attack on the retreating army, they did harry its rearguard.⁶⁹

Hearing of the attack on Guardamar on August 23, Pere sent a relief party commanded by Ferran to the beleaguered city.⁷⁰ Before Ferran's arrival, however, a Valencian unit under García de Loriz had already reached the ruined town. The Orihuelans begged the royal force to stay; however, having received word that Pedro was now marching towards Aragon, these troops decided to leave Further Jijona to its own devices. This incensed the leaders of Orihuela, pointed out that soldiers from Pedro's garrison in Murcia would surely renew the attack once they heard that García de Loriz had left.⁷¹

In the next few months, while the war's main action shifted to the Aragonese frontier, Orihuelan territory remained under constant threat from Castilian troops based in Murcia. On October 4, 1358, a thousand horsemen and an unspecified number of infantry overran Favarella. Although this force sacked the town of Callosa de Segura, the population managed to take refuge in its castle. Afterwards, the raiders proceeded to ravage nearby lands and burn several of Orihuela's hamlets (*aldeas*). Proceeding to the territory of Elche, they burned Marxena and all of the territory up to Portitxol de Alicante. Rustling the livestock, this force finally returned to Murcia burdened with prisoners and cattle. The question of the prisoners was particularly worrisome to the Orihuelans since some of the captives had come under the control of Muslim troops from Granada who had no qualms about selling them into slavery. Thus, the leaders of the beleaguered town let it be known that they would sell all their Castilian prisoners to North African slave merchants unless the liberty of their own people was respected.

Another minor Castilian incursion took place on December 4, 1358, and this was followed by a number of small raids during the early months of the new year.⁷² Bellot mentions two Castilian attacks of this period: one on Orihuelan territory and the other on Vall d'Elda. In the first action, the Orihuelans drove off the Castilian

⁶⁹ Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:485 (1358:IX); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:359–60 (IX:xviii); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:78–80.

⁷⁰ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 982, f. 149v (August 23, 1358).

⁷¹ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:78, 80. Pedro had also left behind 500 Muslim cavalrymen sent from his Granadan ally, Muḥammad V.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 1:81–83.

companies commanded by Fernando Enríquez and Alvar Pérez de Guzmán. In January, 1359, they continued their record of success when Pero Maça and other frontier officials ambushed a contingent of 200 Castilian cavalry.⁷³ Despite such setbacks, Castilian “skirmishers” (*almogavers*) continued to mount raids on the Orihuelan hinterland.

Meanwhile, during a counterattack into Castilian territory, the Alicante captain, Joan Jiménez de Perencisa, was killed near Yecla.⁷⁴ The nearby village of Cabdet remained the center of intense fighting.⁷⁵ Given the site’s strategic value, measures were taken to ensure that it was adequately supplied with foodstuffs, arms, and whatever else it required to withstand Castilian attack.⁷⁶

Conversely, Petrer, which was technically under Pere’s jurisdiction, supported Pedro and in reprisal for this disloyalty was besieged on January 2, 1359 by a force commanded by Ferran. To encourage the prince, Pere promised him the castle of Petrer as a *honor*, a tenure free of the usual obligations to render service to the king.⁷⁷ Though the result of this campaign is uncertain, it is known that Pedro ordered García Jofre de Loaysa to Petrer with 100 men-at-arms in April, probably to relieve the siege. Yet, on arriving, Loaysa betrayed Pedro and joined forces with Ferran, who gratefully rewarded the defector’s newly-pledged allegiance by making him lord of Petrer. For his part, Ferran promised to protect Loaysa and his brother, Alvar Núñez, both of whom had betrayed Pedro.⁷⁸ By October, 1360, however, there was reason to suspect Loaysa was a double agent and that he planned to turn over to Castile the castle of Petrer. On October 28, Pere ordered Ferran to convince Loaysa to surrender his castle to him, and even induce the new ally’s brother to aid in seeing that this was done.⁷⁹

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1:87–88; ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1161, f. 119v (January 31, 1359). Pere warmly congratulated Pero Maça for this success in a letter of January 21.

⁷⁴ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:92–93.

⁷⁵ ACA, Cartas reales, Jaime II, no. 2405 (September 23, 1305); Cancillería real, R. 479, ff. 76–77v and 81–82 (July 10, 1329).

⁷⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1161, f. 18 (December 9, 1358); R. 1163, f. 95 (October 12, 1359); R. 1170, f. 147v (May 6, 1360); R. 1172, f. 136 (August 20, 1360); and R. 1173, ff. 144r–v (April 8, 1361).

⁷⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1161, ff. 42r–v (January 2, 1362). Ferran held Orihuela, Alicante, and his other possessions in this form of tenure.

⁷⁸ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:373 (IX:xxii); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:93, 96.

⁷⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1172, f. 190v (October 28, 1360).

VI

While these minor skirmishes and intrigues took place in Further Jijona, Pedro was busy assembling a great fleet of Castilian, Portuguese, and Granadan vessels in Seville for a largescale naval attack on the eastern Spanish litoral. Pinning all his hopes on this expensive operation, the Castilian king showed little interest in the peace negotiations fostered by the new papal legate, Cardinal Gui de Boulougne. The conditions that Pedro demanded were so unreasonable that only a completely vanquished enemy would have accepted them and Pere was not in such a position. The terms included: (1) the extradition of Francesc de Perellós (2) the expulsion from the Crown of Aragon of renegade Castilian nobles, including the Trastámaras, and (3) the return of the castles and towns of Orihuela, Alicante, Guardamar, Elche, and Crevillente as well as all of the Vall d'Elda. Despite the outrageousness of these claims, Pere offered to compromise by submitting the situation of Further Jijona to papal arbitration. But Pedro broke off negotiations, further complicating the situation by killing his aunt, Queen Elionor, along with Juana de Lara (Don Tello's wife), and Isabel de Lara (the deceased Prince Joan's wife).⁸⁰

With its mission freed of diplomatic restrictions, the Castilian fleet, composed of 112 vessels of various types and accompanied by three Granadan galleys, departed from Seville in mid-April. It paused at Algeciras to await the arrival of the Portuguese contingent (ten galleys and one *galíota*), but proceeded to Cartagena after these failed to appear. Orihuela received news at the end of the month of the flotilla's arrival at Cartagena, provoking Ferran to bolster coast defenses, especially at Alicante and Villajoyosa. In mid-May, the Castilian fleet pulled out of port and sailed towards Guardamar which surrendered to Pedro after a few days of siege by land and sea. The ease of this victory led Pere to believe the town had been handed over by treachery and moved him to accuse that certain of Ferran's troops there, particularly the Castilians, had failed to carry out their feudal obligations to the prince and mount an effective defense against Pedro's troops. Indeed, in one of his letters, the king

⁸⁰ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1164, f. 3; Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:487–94 (1359:I–IX); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:368–72 (IX:xxi). According to Pedro, these properties had been acquired illegally from Castile by Jaume II, who took advantage of the tender years of Pedro's grandfather, Fernando.

claimed that the Guardamar garrison had “consented” to hand over the town, implying that they had been induced to do so by others. Some of his advisers suggested that the king should withhold the Castilian contingent’s pay and give it instead to the Catalan troops. Pere, however, was unwilling to do this without Ferran’s prior approval.⁸¹ In any event, judging by the king’s later attitude towards the town and its inhabitants, it seems clear that Pere was not accusing the townsmen of treachery, but merely of failing to put up sufficient defense. By contrast to the king it was Ferran confiscated the goods of several of the townsmen (most especially, Pere Galindo and his wife Castellana), and distributed these properties to his followers. Later after Ferran’s death, when the town came under Pere’s control, he himself appropriated some of these confiscated properties, perhaps because the original recipients had exhibited uncertain loyalty during the war.⁸²

After capturing Guardamar, the Castilian fleet sailed past Valencia and up the Catalan coastline, where it was joined by the Portuguese squadron. This combined fleet then attacked Barcelona, but was forced to retire with nothing to show for its efforts. The invaders then made for the Balearics, where they laid siege to Ibiza, only to ignominiously retire with the arrival of a Catalan fleet, led by Pere. Retreating southward harried by yet another Catalan squadron, the Castilian fleet temporarily dropped anchor at Calpe(Calp). Here, they landed a contingent of troops that skirmished overland all the way to Alicante.⁸³ This operation led Queen Elionor to suspect that Pedro was planning an amphibious siege of the city. She anxiously wrote to her officials on July 24, 1359, calling for the muster of a relief force.⁸⁴ The Castilian fleet, however, returned to base without making any such attempt.

⁸¹ ACA, Cartas reales, Pere III, no. 6003 (June 6, 1359); Cancillería real, R. 1164, f. 99v (June 15, 1359), Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:494–95 (1359:X–XI); cf.: Zurita, *Anales*, 4:373–74 (IX:xxii).

⁸² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 911, f. 16v (October 10, 1364); R. 726, ff. 179r–v (September 20, 1366); R. 733, f. 108v (June 10, 1367), R. 917, ff. 151r–v (July 14, 1369). The properties which had belonged to Pero Galindo and his wife, Balaguer Mató and his wife, “Ginés,” Miquel and his wife, Pere Ortal and his wife and sister-in-law were re-granted to Alfons Capellades and his sons, Martí Sòtol, and others.

⁸³ Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1134–36 (6:22–26), Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:495–98 (1359:XII–XVIII); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:373–82 (IX:xxii–xxiv).

⁸⁴ ACA, Cartas reales, Pere III, nos. 6025–6035 (July 24, 1359).

VII

With his southern frontier again in danger, Pere sent companies of horse led by Pere de Xèrica to protect the territory around Orihuela, Elche, and Crevillente in early September, 1359.⁸⁵ These troops must have been late in arriving, however; for, on September 30, Elionor complained to the king that the region still lacked sufficient protection. Indeed, Ferran had departed for service on the Aragonese frontier, without leaving behind the small detachment of horsemen he had promised to defend Crevillente. Reacting to his wife's concerns, Pere sent Ponç d'Altarriba to inspect the garrisons of Calaforra and Crevillente. He eventually ordered the fortresses to be provisioned with necessary munitions and supplies, and, to see that this was done, allowed Elche and Crevillente to sell off confiscated Castilian property or to borrow money, even at usurious rates.⁸⁶ Almost a month later, the queen finally convinced Ferran to send Ramon de Blanes and sixty of his 500 horsemen to Elche.⁸⁷ It is unclear, however, if Blanes took up his post; for, on May 20, 1360, the queen requested once more that he go to the town, this time at the head of 100 cavalry.⁸⁸

Over the next few months, the southern frontier remained fairly peaceful as action shifted northward toward the Aragonese border with Castile. Here, Pere's captains won impressive victories at Araviana

⁸⁵ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:384 (IX:xxv).

⁸⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 23v–24v and 24v–25v (September 24 and 30, 1359). The king determined that Crevillente would have a garrison of 50 salaried crossbowmen (or 30, if there were also 50 horsemen). The crossbowmen, charged with guarding the castle, were billeted in the town, but the local Muslims complained that they demanded lodging and other necessities free of charge. [Ferrer, *Aljames*, 248 (doc. 85)]. When the salary which had been allotted for these soldiers ran out on January 25, 1360, the queen ordered Berenguer de Codinacs to pay them for another month while the king sought some other solution. The castellan of Crevillente, Berenguer Togores, objected to the queen's proposal that twenty-five of these crossbowmen be Muslims. [Ibid., 249–50 (doc. 86) and ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 44v–45 (February 6, 1361) and the letter to Berenguer, R. 1569, ff. 45r–v]. The crossbowmen were paid secretly with money which had been officially earmarked for the cavalry, because the *Generalitat* had forbidden that the money which they had authorised be diverted from the approved recipients. [R. 1382, f. 132 (May 3, 1360) and R. 1569, ff. 55r–v (May 8, 1360)]. This arrangement continued until May 20, 1361 when the Peace of Terrer was signed. Crevillente's garrison continued to include Muslims despite Berenguer's objections. [R. 1569, f. 92v (May 20, 1361); cf. Ferrer, *Organització*, 211–12].

⁸⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, f. 29v (November 30, 1359) and ff. 32r–v (December 4, 1359).

⁸⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 56r–v (May 8, 1360).

and Tarazona in the fall of 1359.⁸⁹ With the new year, however, Aragonese fortunes faltered in an engagement at Nájera and Pere's army was soundly beaten.⁹⁰ Then at the end of May, campaigns in Further Jijona again heated up as the two sides jockeyed for position across the lightly-defended Orihuelan territory.

The six-month period during which the Valencian *Generalitat* had agreed to defend the realm had expired, and the 500 cavalrymen they had hired were now gone. Though Queen Elionor attempted to have new units stationed in the region, they had not arrived by May 25, when she again wrote of the matter.⁹¹ At the same time, 800 Castilian and Muslim cavalry troops attacked Orihuela's "suburb" (*raval*). This quarter had been walled in two years earlier, and, although its defences were not particularly strong, the invaders did not succeed in breaching them. Nevertheless, the raiders pillaged the lands around the town for five days, destroying, in the process, the towers of Molina and Moquita—important look-out points and smoke signal stations. The Castilians also took Almoradí, Catral, and Albaterra, later using these positions to reconnoitre the region and block the arrival of any relief force.

The Orihuelans appealed for help to Ferran and crown-prince Joan, complaining that the Castilians outnumbered their defensive force of 100 cavalry eight-to-one. In response, the king rapidly dispatched his cousin, Count Alfons of Ribagorza and Denia, at the head of 250 horsemen.⁹² This force had not even reached Elche when it was forced to go on the offensive and disperse Castilian companies raiding in the Orihuelan district. Afterwards, the count remained on the frontier for two months, and this allowed the Orihuelans a period of relative tranquillity.

At the end of June, however, a Castilian force from Murcia raided in the vicinity of Guardamar (which was still under Pedro's control), rustling livestock at Almoradí, Catral, and Guardamar. Count Alfons caught up with them at Almoradí, routed them, and then recovered

⁸⁹ Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:499–500 (1359:XXII–XXIII) and 502–3 (1360:VI); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:383–90 (IX:xxv–xxvi).

⁹⁰ Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:503–5 (1360:VII–IX); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:393–98 (IX:xxvii).

⁹¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 55r–v, 56 (May 8, 1360), ff. 54v–55 and ff. 56r–v (May 10, 1360).

⁹² Alfons, Pere III's cousin, held the title of count of Denia and also became count of Ribagorza with the death of his father, Prince Pere, who was the king's nephew.

all their booty they had captured.⁹³ On July 16, Pere, now at Pertusa, received this happy news from the Valencian general bailiff, Pere Boil.⁹⁴ Boil had been given control of Elche and Crevillente until the matter of their lordship, disputed between the king and Ferran, could be worked out.⁹⁵ Even after this dispute had been settled, however, this official remained on the frontier carrying out Pere's orders, which included sending out spies to monitor the movement of Castilian troops. On July 16, Pere expressed his contentment with Boil's subversive activity, alluding to the fact that he had a number of spies on the frontier. After asking for specific information concerning, "that evil man who had tried to take Orihuela," Pere ordered Boil to return to Valencia.⁹⁶

By early July, on the basis of this intelligence, Pere began to suspect that Orihuela would be the target of Pedro's next attack. On the third of that month, he ordered Pere de Xèrica to put Crevillente on a state of high alert.⁹⁷ Pere claimed to know that his adversary, "was making efforts to come to Orihuela and those places which used to be part of the kingdom of Murcia" to damage and retake them if possible. Thus, he ordered that all castles in the region not strong enough to resist attack be destroyed in order to prevent their use by the enemy. He added, however, that before such drastic measures were taken, an actual Castilian attack in this sector should be confirmed.⁹⁸ Even before he received these orders, the count of Denia had moved the bulk of his troops out of Orihuela by July 7, leaving only a few horsemen under Ruy Sánchez de Calatayud to guard the frontier. Not surprisingly, when news of the count's departure reached Murcia, the Castilian garrison troops responded with a raid on Orihuelan territory near Molina.

⁹³ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:98-104.

⁹⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1171, f. 89v (July 16, 1360).

⁹⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1447, ff. 30r-v (June 3, 1359), 45v-49 (May 29, 1359) and 59v-61 and 61-64r (December 28, 1358); R. 1161 ff. 32v (December 30, 1358) and 44v-48v (December 28, 1358). Pere Boil had been given charge of the defence of both places. On December 30, the king ordered Ferran to send twenty horsemen to aid these towns' defence [R. 983, f. 39].

⁹⁶ See note 104.

⁹⁷ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:103.

⁹⁸ ACA, Cancillería, R. 1171, ff. 69r-v (July 3, 1360). The same instructions were sent out to the count of Denia, the royal counsellor at Valencia, and the wardputies in Valencia. Shortly before, on June 18, Pere had advised García de Loriz and Pere Boil that Crevillente was in danger and that they should see to its defence [R. 1171, f. 59v].

After this, the beleaguered citizens of this beleaguered town wrote Ferran to demand that he send his general procurator, Ramon de Rocafull, to their aid, with cavalry companies strong enough to protect them. They also insisted that these troops be hired for an extended period. This latter request was based on the experience that Valencian units were usually paid for a month, and almost all of this period was taken up in their journey to and from Orihuela.⁹⁹

At the same time, the town leaders sent an envoy to the war council at Valencia complaining of the precarious state of their defences. At this point, in addition to their own municipal forces, they had at their disposal a contingent of 50 horse commanded by Pere de Centelles. While the latter group received a salary from Count Alfons, who had sent them, the town's forces were unpaid. To rectify this situation, the Orihuelan leaders asked that their troops also be paid. Without such fiscal support from Valencia, they warned, the defense of their section of the frontier would be gravely endangered.¹⁰⁰

On August 18, 1360, the king sent his uncle, Alfons, at the head of 250 horsemen to defend the southern Valencian frontier. Ferran bitterly complained that his Valencian lands were under constant attack and might fall to Castile, unless Pere bolstered the frontier garrisons. He insisted that the king had an obligation to defend these territories because of their alliance. When Ferran found out that the Castilians were planning a frontier raid for the specific purpose of destroying the region's "lesser grains" (*blats menors*), his insistence increased.¹⁰¹ Before any help could be organized, however, the Castilian garrison at Murcia raided across the border, destroying great amounts of wheat, "lesser grains," vines, and trees in the process.¹⁰² It must have come as small comfort to Orihuela and its neighboring villages when the Valencians agreed to their request and offered to send 50 additional horse to augment their troops.¹⁰³ Indeed, it is uncertain if these Valencian troops actually appeared on the frontier; although Alfons certainly did come to Further Jijona. The count reached

⁹⁹ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:100, 103, 105.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 1:106.

¹⁰¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1172, ff. 129r-v (August 18, 1360). These were grains, including sorghum, harvested later than wheat.

¹⁰² Bellot, *Anales*, 1:107.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 1:107.

Orihuela on September 15 after stopping at Alicante to inspect its garrison.¹⁰⁴ As had happened so many times before, however, these forces did not remain on the frontier for long. By the end of October, Alfons had departed, leaving the master of Calatrava as his frontier captain. This churchman himself remained in the war zone for only a short time, abandoning Orihuela by mid-October.¹⁰⁵

Further Castilian attacks followed. The Hospitaller Prior, who was in command of Murcian garrison, took advantage of Orihuela's weakness to raid near Callosa on November 16, burning homes and sacking the crops in the region.¹⁰⁶ On December 1, Castilian forces attacked Orihuela and, although the urban defences held, a number of townsmen were killed or wounded. The Castilians were well aware of the weaknesses of that town and of the entire district of Further Jijona; Pedro's spies repeatedly advised him that it would be easy to capture. This undoubtedly explains the state of panic that gripped the townfolk who were now suffering daily attacks at the hands of Castilian raiders.¹⁰⁷ Their fears were finally acknowledged by the government and, early in 1361, despite the refusal of a Valencian assembly to dispatch a frontier captain to Orihuela,¹⁰⁸ the war council of the kingdom appointed Luis Manuel as *frontaler* and sent him to the beleaguered town in command of 286 horse.¹⁰⁹ As usual, however, Manuel's stay on the frontier was a short one, and when news came in early February, 1361, that Pedro's army was again moving toward Aragon, Manuel took all of his troops out of Orihuela and toward the new zone of conflict.¹¹⁰

Once again the Orihuelan frontier was denuded of royal troops and defended only by its inhabitants. Only Queen Elionor fully understood the gravity of the situation; on February 27, she declared that Elche and Crevillente were so poorly defended that they would

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 1:108–10.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 1:112.

¹⁰⁶ The prior of the Hospitallers in Castile had not been on good terms with Pedro. His appointment as captain of the Kingdom of Murcia worried the Aragonese king all the more because one of his brothers was currently in the service of Ferran or of Trastámara. Pere wrote letters to both of these warning them not trust the Prior's brother and to dismiss him and his men from their service [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1174, ff. 12v, 13v]. For the attack on Callosa, see Bellot, *Anales*, 1:112.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:113–6.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 1:112.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 1:118.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1:118; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:408 (IX:xxxii).

not be able to withstand even the smallest enemy attack.¹¹¹ On the next day, Pere gave in to the concerns voiced by the queen, concerns now echoed by a number of his other advisers, and provided for 200 horse to be sent the “southern frontiers” to act as a permanent garrison for Orihuela.¹¹² For the moment, however, this order was little more than an exercise in good intentions, with no discernible results. It was not until March that Pere finally ordered Ferran, Gilabert de Centelles, Berenguer d’Abella, Count Alfons of Denia, Berenguer de Codinacs, and Arnau Joan to send the troops and supplies to Orihuela, assuring them that their expenses would be reimbursed by the *corts*. Pere apparently feared that since Alicante was at risk, the defence of the entire frontier and ultimately that of all of Valencia was in jeopardy.¹¹³ Yet, despite the royal orders no new troops arrived, and as a result, the Orihuelans could not prevent yet another Castilian raid on the region’s crops and vineyards in mid-April.¹¹⁴

As it was, even when joined with the small companies of Elche and Alicante, Orihuela’s force of 106 cavalymen were powerless to stand up to the garrison of 400 horse at Murcia, the 100 cavalymen at Lorca, and other smaller Castilian levies in the region. On short notice, the Castilians could muster some 700 mounted fighters,¹¹⁵ while the Valencian frontier towns were so badly maintained that they could provide only marginal military service.

In June, 1358, the Orihuelans had demanded that the villagers in their region who could provide a horse be granted a salary for military service, because, without this stipend they would be unable to maintain their mounts. Pere initially rejected their request, saying it was their responsibility to defend their own homes and that only noblemen (*homes de paratge*) and permanent members of Ferran’s household were entitled to military pay. Meanwhile the prince’s forces

¹¹¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 82v–83 (February 27, 1360). The castellans of the castles of Crevillente and Calaforra (Berenguer and Berengueró de Togores) complained that eight months and twenty days had passed since the salary of the five horsemen of Crevillente and that of Calaforra had been paid. They warned that if the money was not forthcoming they would have to abandon the defence of the two sites. [R. 1174, ff. 86v–87 (March 11, 1361)].

¹¹² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1173, ff. 45r–v (February 28, 1361).

¹¹³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1173, ff. 55 and 65v (March 3, 1361).

¹¹⁴ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:118–20.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1:119.

amounted to some 300 cavalry, half *armats* (fully armoured) and the other half *alforrats* (lightly armoured).¹¹⁶

Besides, the issue of salaries, manpower was so short that when the *diputació* of Valencia turned to the problem of Orihuela in September 1360, it had only been able to recruit 47 horsemen, despite the fact that the king had paid for seventy.¹¹⁷ By the following year, when 100 horsemen of Orihuela were eligible to receive a salary from the Valencian government, only eighty-six were declared fit for service by parliamentary inspectors.¹¹⁸ In addition, the continuous raiding which the Castilians were carrying out had caused a shortage of fodder which reduced the capacity of the region to furnish serviceable mounts.

Elche's situation was no better; from October, 1358, its inhabitants had become so poor they could not even afford to arm themselves. On October 28 of that year, Pere acknowledged this situation by ordering Berenguer de Condinacs and Arnau Joan to provide the townsmen with weapons.¹¹⁹ After receiving a request similar to that of the Orihuelans, the king eventually agreed to fund Elche's standing force of five locally-mustered cavalry. Since this levy represented the share the town was bound to pay for frontier defence, its council demanded that the five soldiers be recruited from among Elche's citizenry rather than from outsiders. It is uncertain why Pere funded Elche's soldiery after refusing to do so for Orihuela. Whatever the reason on October 23, 1358, he ordered Ferran to enlist a force of horsemen from the town and pay them the wage he had promised.¹²⁰

VIII

Throughout the war, the towns of the southern frontier bent every effort not only to free themselves from taxes for defence imposed on

¹¹⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1158, f. 104 (June 22, 1358). The letter was sent to Francesc Dirga and Joan Gener, who were to send the king a list of the troops present at the first muster, indicating which of them had a horse and were sufficiently armed. For similar musters in Barcelona ten years later, see Manuel Sánchez Martínez, "The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona," in this volume.

¹¹⁷ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:108–10.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1:119.

¹¹⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1547, f. 16 (October 28, 1358).

¹²⁰ ACA, Cancillería real., R. 1547, ff. 22v–23 (October 23, 1358).

all of Valencia, but also to obtain pay for those of their citizens who could provide a horse and weapons. To reinforce their request for tax exemption, they repeatedly claimed the war was impoverishing them, and that they were already giving enough by directly defending the frontier and engaging in such essential activities as espionage, civil defence, prisoner ransoming. Finally, they warned Pere that if he pushed them much further, they would have to abandon their homes and leave the frontier undefended. Generally, the request for military funding, such as that made by Elche met with more success than the call for tax exemption. This was unfortunate because the latter would have benefited the population as a whole, while the former alleviated the suffering of only a few of the wealthiest townsmen (those who had a horse and arms).

By September, 1359, Queen Elionor (who administered these lands in the name of Prince Martí, still a minor) lamented that she could not comply with the demands of the inhabitants of Elche and Crevillente regarding the remission of taxes. She claimed this was a matter for the *corts* to decide and, thus, out of her hands.¹²¹ Nor could Pere help; the deputies of Valencia turned a deaf ear to his plea that the towns of Further Jijona should be exempted due to the damage they had suffered during the war. Were they to become depopulated, he argued, their defence would be rendered ever more difficult.¹²² Nothing was left for Orihuela except to try, unsuccessfully, to evade the tax by resisting the officials who came to assess their number of households in 1360.¹²³

Despite all of these setbacks, Orihuela did manage to pay its cavalry in 1360. In August of that year, the council complained to Ferran of the precarious state of their defences and the prince passed on their plea to the king. The town's argument was convincing enough and Pere finally decided to approve a daily salary of four *sous* for up to sixty cavalymen, despite his earlier directive against paying town residents for defending their own town.

The king had not planned to be so generous at the outset, and had only wanted to pay the Orihuelans a half-salary of three *sous*

¹²¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 23v–24v (September 30, 1359).

¹²² ACA, Cancillería, R. 1172, ff. 130v–131 (August 18, 1360).

¹²³ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:103–4, 111–12. According to the payment schedule of the *fogatge* of 1360, the town paid 8 *sous* per year per household.

and six *dinars* per horse. In to a letter delivered to the town by Ramon de Rocafull, he had refused them outright, saying that for all he cared they could leave and seek a salary elsewhere, and that the king and Ferran would defend the border themselves. In the end, however, Pere gave in and funded a salary for sixty cavalry and ten men-at-arms who were to be placed under the command of Rocafull.¹²⁴

Notification of this decision was sent on August 18 to the Valencian deputies, who would administer the payment of 500 horse under the command of Pere de Xèrica. Both parties were reminded that because of the lack of frontier troops in Ferran's lands of Further Jijona, the Orihuelans had seen their crops looted and destroyed, thus preventing a harvest for that year. Pere finally understood that the Orihuelans who had horses could not maintain them, and if they did not receive royal help, they would have to desert the town. Pere admitted that this would be a significant setback; for he truly believed that they could render effective service since they were militarily capable and well-acquainted with the land. Without them, he felt, the lands of Valencia's southern frontier could not be defended.¹²⁵ The Orihuelans were due to begin receiving this salary in August, 1360,¹²⁶ but, by February 3, 1361, the king had once again changed his mind, saying now that instead of the seventy salaried cavalrymen which they had at the time (their sixty plus Rocafull's ten), they would receive an allotment of 100 in order to safeguard their crops from Murcian raiders.¹²⁷

This royal change of heart seems to have come as a result of the petitions of Ferran and the townsmen, but it was also approved by the Valencian royal council. A few days after authorizing this larger force, Pere justified his action to his close advisers, while assuring them that it was they who had the final decision in this matter. The royal council, it seems, had proposed to grant a salary of two *sous* and six *dinars* to each *alforrat* horse.¹²⁸ It was probably because of these negotiations that the Orihuelans with horses were forced to

¹²⁴ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:107–8.

¹²⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1172, ff. 128r–v (August 18, 1360).

¹²⁶ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:106.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:118; ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 163r–v (February 3, 1361).

¹²⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1173, ff. 45r–v (February 28, 1361). The majority of the Orihuelan troops fell into this category.

wait so long to receive their pay, about which they complained bitterly, eventually sending agents to Valencia to collect.¹²⁹

Eventually, some of the men of Elche and Crevillente were also hired as salaried soldiers by the Valencian *Generalitat*; of the thirty horse which the civil government had agreed to send to those towns, twenty were to be locals. In a letter to Ramon de Blanes dated March, 1361, the queen justified this requirement by pointing out that local levies would be useful "because they know the land better than anyone else."¹³⁰ The king also tried to convince the *Generalitat* to grant a tax exemption to Orihuela that summer; in August and September, he interceded on behalf of Elche, informing the Valencian government that the town had suffered so much because of its frontier position that its inhabitants were barely surviving. According to the king, the zone was "on the point of depopulation and loss."¹³¹ The deputies paid him no mind, however, and sent an agent to Elche to collect the defensive taxes which it owed.

Depopulation of the frontier zone was a very real concern, and many people had left for more secure lands in spite of prohibitions which condemned those who left to having their goods confiscated. At Orihuela, public criers announced decrees, threatening not only those inhabitants who fled the kingdom, but also any who bought or rented the properties of the refugees.¹³² In order to help induce people to stay in the area, Pere authorized compensation for the inhabitants of the houses outside the walls of Elche, whose homes had been destroyed as a precaution against attack during the siege of Guardamar in 1358. This offer was made by the king himself, who argued that in time of war it was better that everyone should stay put.¹³³

In addition to immigration, death in battle and capture must also have reduced the population. To alleviate this effect, Castile and the Crown of Aragon negotiated treaties for the return of prisoners. One such agreement, negotiated by Ferran, was approved by Pere on September 20, 1359.¹³⁴ A few months later, Queen Elionor ordered

¹²⁹ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:119.

¹³⁰ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, ff. 83r-v (March 11, 1361).

¹³¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1547, ff. 44v-45 (September 7, 1361).

¹³² Bellot, *Anales*, 1:114, 116, 118.

¹³³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1547, f. 15v (October 27, 1358).

¹³⁴ ACA, Cancillería, R. 1163, f. 83v (September 20, 1359).

Prince Martí's representative at Elche to name an *eixea*—an officer who would be responsible for the ransoming of the many inhabitants of Elche and Crevillente who had fallen into the hands of Castilian forces from Murcia and Guardamar.¹³⁵

Obviously, the decrease in population made defence problematic. At Orihuela, for example, there were not enough inhabitants to man the walls.¹³⁶ In 1358, the “fortified suburb” (*albacar*), of the castle of Alacante had to be abandoned. In order to repopulate it, Pere authorized Ferran to find fifty men from the Kingdom of Valencia to settle there, promising as an inducement a moratorium on their debts for five years if they were inhabitants of royal lands, and of ten years, if they came from lands held by clergy, noble, or townsmen.¹³⁷

The risk of death or capture made carrying on normal life in the zone all the more difficult, and the countryside, on which the region depended for its supplies, remained extremely vulnerable. As a result of the systematic destruction of harvests by the enemy and the abandonment of fields, supplies had to be brought in from outside. In 1360, the king managed to guarantee the provision of grain for the whole district by ordering free transport of cereals from other regions.¹³⁸ But such measures were of limited effectiveness. Orihuela, for instance, could not receive the supplies designated for it; since, with the constant raiding by the Murcian garrison, the town was effectively in a state of siege, and would largely remain so for the next five years.¹³⁹

IX

In the meanwhile, as dynastic events conspired to destroy his alliance with Granada, Pedro had given into the pressure for peace exerted by the papal legate and agreed to a treaty with Pere.¹⁴⁰ The

¹³⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, f. 34r (December 6, 1359).

¹³⁶ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:114, 116.

¹³⁷ ACA, Cartas reales, Pere III, nos. 6025–6035 (July 24, 1359).

¹³⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1172, ff. 129v–130 (August 18, 1360).

¹³⁹ Bellot, *Anales*, 1:114, 116.

¹⁴⁰ See the letter in which Pere approved of Ferran's negotiations. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1163, f. 83v (September 20, 1359); L.P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain 1250 to 1500* (Chicago, 1992), 209–17; M. Becerra Hormigo, “La conexión catalana en el derrocamiento de Ismail II,” *Miscel·lània de textos medievals* 4(1988): 301–17; Arié, *Espagne*, 108–10.

resultant peace of Terrer that returned to the *status quo ante bellum* established by the truce of 1357.¹⁴¹ The ink was hardly dry on this accord, formally accepted on May 1, 1361, however, when its two signatories began seeking new allies to prepare themselves for the next round of war.¹⁴² Thus, the battered Aragonese and Valencian frontiers were given little respite. By late summer, 1361, Pedro, whom Pere characterized as “the type of person who often decides to do what he ought not to,”¹⁴³ had begun to engage in minor border skirmishes as a prelude to the formal re-commencement of hostilities. Thereafter for several years, the Castilians, now bolstered by the support of Pedro’s old ally, Muḥammad V of Granada, swept from one victory to the next across the Crown of Aragon’s lightly defended southern and western frontiers. By autumn, 1361, Pedro had won Crevillente, Tarazona, Borja, Teruel, Segorbe, and a great number of fortresses.¹⁴⁴ During this entire period, Pere and Queen Elionor frantically attempted to re-supply their remaining frontier outposts within the embattled Valencian and Aragonese borderland, but were often stymied by the expanded Castilian presence.¹⁴⁵ In a desperate attempt to strengthen his military position, the Aragonese king renewed his alliance with Enrique de Trastámara in April, 1363, officially recognizing his claim to the Castilian crown.¹⁴⁶

Having won these spectacular victories at a relatively small cost in money and manpower, Pedro now failed to take full advantage of his successes. Laying the groundwork throughout the spring for the conquest of Valencia city (a feat which would have fatally weakened his Aragonese adversary), the Castilian sovereign inexplicably pulled back from the brink of victory in June, 1363.¹⁴⁷ Using a papal

¹⁴¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1176, ff. 11, 90 (May 21, 1361); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:122; López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:611–12 (1361:I–II), Zurita, *Anales*, 4:412–18 (IX:xxxiii).

¹⁴² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1178, ff. 86r–v (May 25, 1361); R. 1179, ff. 36 (May 22, 1361); 44r–v (May 27, 1361); López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:519–20 (1362:VII), Zurita, *Anales*, 4:424–28 (IX:xxxvi).

¹⁴³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1074, ff. 129v–130 (June 25, 1362); R. 1181, ff. 73v–74 (October 20, 1362).

¹⁴⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1569, f. 146 (August 31, 1362); R. 1572, f. 2 (September 9, 1362); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:439–54, 457–61 (IX:xliv–xlv).

¹⁴⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1074, ff. 129v–30 (June 25, 1362); R. 1569, f. 145 (August 17, 1362); R. 1572, ff. 4v–5 (December 31, 1362).

¹⁴⁶ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:457 (IX:xliv).

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4:461–64 (IX:xlv–xlvi).

representative as an intermediary with Pere, Pedro again agreed to peace—or at least the appearance of it—by concluding a treaty at Murviedro on July 2, 1363. Desperate for time to rebuild his sagging political and military fortunes, Pere grudgingly accepted the Castilian gains and the change of lordship they implied.¹⁴⁸

Having bought external peace with this painful agreement, Pere immediately set out to bring stability to his own lands by dealing ruthlessly with his troublesome step-brother, Ferran. With Enrique de Trastámara steadily rising in Pere's favor, Ferran became thoroughly estranged from the king. For his part, Pere openly asserted that Ferran had "put us in danger of losing the crown and the kingdom."¹⁴⁹ Thus, with his patience finally exhausted, the king ordered Ferran's arrest. The prince was killed on July 16, 1363, allegedly resisting the royal officials who had been charged with detaining him.¹⁵⁰ Though Pere officially proclaimed his "great injury of heart and shame" because of this turn of events, he nevertheless moved swiftly to confiscate Ferran's lands in Further Jijona.¹⁵¹ Though Orihuela resisted the transfer of lordship from Ferran to Pere for over a year, it finally complied, swearing fealty to the king on July 19, 1364.¹⁵² After working out alliances with the Navarrese king and the Trastámara family, the king next turned on his intelligent and loyal counselor, Bernat de Cabrera, who paid for his fall from royal favor with his life.¹⁵³

Finally, Pere attempted to ready the much-neglected southern Valencian frontier for the looming hostilities with Castile by making

¹⁴⁸ Ferrer i Mallol, "Frontera," 284–85.

¹⁴⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1189, f. 206v (July 16, 1363).

¹⁵⁰ Zurita, *Anales*, 464–74 (IX:xlvi–xlvii). For Pedro's explanation of the prince's death, see Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1140 (6:35). Cf.: López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:528–29 (1363:VII).

¹⁵¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1190, ff. 374v (July 18, 1363), 428v (July 16, 1363), 429v (July 17, 1363), 430 (July 16, 1363), 434 (July 20, 1363); R. 1191, f. 477v (September 10, 1363).

¹⁵² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1188, f. 40 (October 6, 1363); R. 1197, ff. 139r–v; R. 1199, f. 503v (May 24, 1364); R. 1200, ff. 551v–552 (June 13, 1364), Bellot, *Anales*, 1:129, 134–35.

¹⁵³ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:476–80, 483–84, 488, 491, 515–9 (IX:xlvi, l, lii, lvii); Sitges, *Mijeres*, 19–23; Donald J. Kagay, "The 'Treasons' of Bernat de Cabrera: Government, Law, and the Individual in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon," *Mediaevistik* 13 (2000): 44–46.

arrangements for stable military salaries, stockpiling of supplies, and appointing commanders in the principal towns and fortresses of Further Jijona.¹⁵⁴ Unfortunately, few of these preparations, well-intentioned as they were, came to fruition. Thus, when Castilian forces again started raiding along Valencia's southern border in December, 1363, a great number of Pere's border outposts fell with very little resistance.¹⁵⁵ Following up these small-scale victories, Pedro intensified his military efforts throughout 1364, winning Elche, Alicante, Biar, and Vila-real for his efforts.¹⁵⁶ Yet even with this overwhelming show of Castilian force against Valencia's southern outposts, the region's population remained emotionally attached to the Crown of Aragon, and, as such, posed a constant danger of rebellion for its new masters.¹⁵⁷ Pere, however, was unable to capitalize on any possibility of using an Aragonese "fifth column" behind Castilian lines, and was unable to mount an offensive across the Valencian border before the fall of 1364. In the meantime, he attempted to raise money to pay his remaining local militias, all the while exhorting the garrisons of isolated towns and fortresses of Further Jijona to resist the Castilian onslaught "like the brave men that you are"¹⁵⁸

During the spring and summer of 1364, Pedro engaged in a massive assault along the southern Valencian frontier which eventually overran many of the region's strongholds.¹⁵⁹ With many of his key frontier towns and fortresses in enemy hands, Pere gathered an army

¹⁵⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1194, f. 98 (November 13, 1363); R. 1385, ff. 175v–176 (November 3, 1363); R. 1386, f. 57v (October 17, 1363); ff. 67r–v (November 3, 1363); R. 1572, ff. 23v–24 (November 12, 1363); 28v–29 (November 4, 1363); Ferrer, *Organització*, 488–89 (doc. 177).

¹⁵⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 728, f. 163 (September 26, 1363); R. 1192, f. 9v (December 6, 1363).

¹⁵⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1192, f. 37v (December 20, 1363); R. 1198, f. 234v; R. 1201, ff. 2r–v (January 15, 1364).

¹⁵⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1197, ff. 139r–v (May 14, 1364), 179v, 188 (May 28, 1364); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:130–31.

¹⁵⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 911, ff. 10v–11 (September 24, 1364), 14r–v (September 24, 1364); R. 1189, f. 304 (April 18, 1363); R. 1192, ff. 72r–v (January 4, 1364); R. 1195, ff. 111r–v (October 12, 1364), 170v (October 8, 1364); R. 1202, ff. 54–56v (September 29 and 30, 1364), 59, 60 (September 30, 1364); 133v (September 28, 1364); R. 1199, f. 403 (July 14, 1364); R. 1203, ff. 32 (September 26, 1364), 32r–v, and 32v–33 (September 25, 1364); R. 1205, f. 42v (March 17, 1365); Ferrer, *Organització*, 491–92 (doc. 182); 492–93 (doc. 183).

¹⁵⁹ L.V. Díaz Martín, *Itinerario de Pedro I de Castilla: Estudio y regesta* (Valladolid, 1975), 410 (doc. 888).

of 3000 horsemen and 16,000 foot and led it into Valencia.¹⁶⁰ Since Pedro's force was over twice as large as Pere's and victory seemed so close at hand, the Castilian king received more than one smug congratulation to the effect that "today you will vanquish the said king of Aragon, and God willing, you will become king of Castile and of Aragon and emperor of Spain." But while he admitted the superiority of his forces, Pedro also cynically revealed his lack of trust in them, asserting that "with this bread that I hold in my hand, I think I could satisfy the number of loyal followers I have in Castile."¹⁶¹

To save Orihuela, "the key to his realms," from Pedro's imposing army, Pere led his forces back into northern Valencia, harried all the way by Castilian outriders.¹⁶² Although he had departed, he encouraged the garrisons he had left behind in southern Valencia with effusive and inspirational praise despite leaving them meager supplies. In the king's words, the townsmen of Orihuela were "good people . . . who so valiantly and courageously have safeguarded our affairs up to now, for which they have gained great fame"¹⁶³ However, Pere's material neglect of Orihuela and the other endangered sites would have dire consequences. When the town came under massed Castilian attack in the spring and summer of 1365, the townsmen sent one desperate message after another to their sovereign, all to no avail. Finally, oppressed by "great hunger" and Pedro's unnerving promise to "to obliterate and take by force of arms [the town], killing and destroying all of its inhabitants," the Orihuelans eventually surrendered in mid-summer, 1365.¹⁶⁴

The sudden Castilian victory of that year constituted a disaster of the first order of the population of Orihuela, who suffered vilification by their sovereign as traitors and then saw the execution of seven or eight of their fellow citizens as "scapegoats" by the victorious Castilian monarch.¹⁶⁵ Thanks to his reputation for brutality, Pedro's

¹⁶⁰ Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1147 (6:51-52).

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1147-48 (6:52). Translation adapted from Pere III, trans. Hillgarth, 2:566.

¹⁶² Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1148-9 (6:53); ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1211, f. 63v (May 27, 1365).

¹⁶³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1210, ff. 47r-v (March 14, 1365).

¹⁶⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 727, ff. 164v-165v (September 11, 1366). R. 1211, f. 79r-v (June 9, 1365); López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:535 (1365: II).

¹⁶⁵ Some documents say there were eight dead. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 727,

sweep through Further Jijona sent a wave of refugees into Pere's other realms.¹⁶⁶ To maintain these "exiles" as a viable military force, Pere attempted to see to their needs by direct salaries and tax exemptions.¹⁶⁷ Pedro, on the other hand, shared out much of the conquered southern Valencian rural lands and all of the urban properties in the region with his army. Subjects loyal to Pere who were now subordinated to the Castilian "principal adversary" and often came under intense pressure to sell their land—at an artificially low price.¹⁶⁸

Despite this, there was no time for the southern Valencian borderland to change into a truly Castilian territory. With the treaty of Brétigny (1360), hostilities between France and England had ended (at least temporarily) and the great mercenary companies, thrown out of employment in the north, enriched themselves in service of the northern combatants, began to stream across the Pyrenees in search of military occupations.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately, it would be Enrique de Trastámara, long a mercenary captain himself, who would make the best use of the new forces. Establishing his command over the Great Companies in autumn, 1365, he methodically proceeded to drive his step-brother from the throne, assuming the Castilian crown on March 5, 1366.¹⁷⁰ With Pedro's defeat, the nascent Castilian rule in southern Valencia collapsed, as many of the new settlers, fearing Aragonese retaliation, deserted their new lands and returned to Castile.¹⁷¹ Most of the border outposts were left unmanned and drifted back under

ff. 164v–165v (September 1, 1366), R. 728, ff. 145v–146r (September 21, 1366).] Another says that seven died and one fled. [R. 737, ff. 183r–v (January 20, 1368); R. 735, ff. 111–116 (January 15, 1368).] López de Ayala, *Crónica*, 1:535 (1365: II).

¹⁶⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1207, ff. 113v–114 (July 22, 1365); R. 731, ff. 11r–v (November 20, 1366); R. 1209, f. 179v (July 7, 1365); R. 1204, f. 143v (July 5, 1365).

¹⁶⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 726, ff. 140v–141r (August 6, 1366); R. 1207, ff. 173v–175v (October 20, 1365); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:535 (IX.lxi).

¹⁶⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 901, ff. 111r–v (July 6, 1357); R. 1569, ff. 10v–12 (June 5, 1359); 46v (February 6, 1360), 52v–53 (April 23, 1360).

¹⁶⁹ For the treaty of Brétigny, see J. Le Patourel, "The Treaty of Brétigny, 1360," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 10 (5th ser.) (1960): 19–39. For passage of mercenary companies into Spain, see Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), 1:155–222.

¹⁷⁰ Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1150–51 (6:57); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:537–42 (IX: lxii); Suárez Martínez, *Castilla*, 14:100–1; J. Casañ y Alegre, *Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General del Reino de Valencia* (Valencia, 1884), xxiii, xxv.

¹⁷¹ ACA, Reial Patrimoni, Mestre Racional, R. 1711, ff. 29r–v; Cancillería real, R. 727, f. 78 (June 14, 1366); R. 910, ff. 99v–100, 111v–112 and 127v–128 (September 10, 1366), and 112v–113 (September 16, 1366); R. 1576, ff. 9–10 (September 10, 1367); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:146; Ferrer, *Organització*, 501–3 (docs. 195–96).

Pere's control by early summer of 1366. As the Aragonese refugees and exiles returned to their lost homes, however, the final settlement of the region was complicated by the fact that local Valencian nobles and churchmen had taken advantage of the power vacuum by occupying places deserted by the Castilians that had originally been confiscated or extorted from their inhabitants.¹⁷² The legal complexities caused by these events would not be resolved for some years to come.¹⁷³

The reestablishment of Aragonese power along the southern Valencian border was briefly jeopardized by the return of Pedro, now supported by a English army headed by Black Prince. But even after winning a solid victory against Enrique at Nájera (April 3, 1367), and temporarily regaining his throne, the Castilian ruler was fatally handicapped by the deep mistrust of his own supporters.¹⁷⁴

In the meantime, however, Pedro's victory put all of Pere's frontiers on high alert. In southern Valencia, the Aragonese sovereign re-supplied and re-garrisoned his border fortresses against a Castilian invasion that, in fact, never came.¹⁷⁵ Lacking the money to pay his English mercenaries, Pedro attempted to cut costs without losing too much ground by negotiating a truce with Pere in regard to the Valencian territories.¹⁷⁶ Ironically, this sensible act of diplomacy was ultimately undermined by Pedro's continuing desire to avenge himself on Pedro López de Ayala and other Trastámara supporters who had taken refuge in southern Valencia.¹⁷⁷

In the end, Pedro would have no opportunity for vengeance; with the departure of the Black Prince in August 1367, his military

¹⁷² ACA, Reial Patrimoni, Mestre Racional, R. 1711, ff. 2, 7, 13v, 26, 27, 29r-v; Cancillería real, R. 1077, ff. 50 (June 17, 1366); 79v (July 26, 1366); 79v-80 (July 29, 1366); R. 1547, ff. 73r-v (September 1, 1366) ff. 79v-80r (29 July 1366).

¹⁷³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 728, f. 44v (September 22, 1366); R. 730, ff. 127v-128 (February 4, 1367); R. 1077, ff. 77r-v (July 26, 1366); R. 1572, f. 68 (October 4, 1366).

¹⁷⁴ For Nájera, see P.E. Russell, *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955), 95-107; Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350-1369* (Leiden, 1995), 241-42; L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera," in this volume.

¹⁷⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 728, f. 44v (September 22, 1366); R. 735, f. 111-116; R. 1217, R. 182 (may 6, 1367); R. 1576, f. 8v (August 28, 1367); Ferrer i Mallol, *Organizació*, doc. 198.

¹⁷⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1079, f. 78v (July 28, 1367); R. 1822, ff. 180v-181v (February 20, 1388); Ferrer i Mallol, *Organizació*, docs. 199-200.

¹⁷⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1218, f. 2v (September 6, 1367); R. 1576, f. 3 (April 24, 1367); Díaz Martín, *Itinerario*, doc. 985.

capacity was too drastically reduced. Meanwhile, Enrique's power began to increase. For a year after Nájera, Pedro avoided pitched battle with him. Finally, the Castilian king was taken prisoner and murdered by his step-brother and hated rival at the castle of Montiel on March 23, 1369.¹⁷⁸

Despite the removal of Pedro from the political scene, the Crown of Aragon and Castile never became close allies. Though linked by their hatred of Pedro, Pere and Enrique de Trastámara, crowned as Enrique II (1369–1379), were soon haggling over many of the same issues that had precipitated the war a decade before. Claims and counter-claims to lands on either side of the southern Valencian-Murcian frontier continued to sow distrust between Pere and Enrique until the end of their lives when the old combatants died and passed their crowns on to less bellicose monarchs.¹⁷⁹

X

The effectiveness of the “destructive raid” (*chevauchée*) was well understood in northern Europe long before the Hundred Years War.¹⁸⁰ This strategy, which endeavored at once to undermine the military capacity of the enemy while destroying his resource base, was also well-known in Spain and had been honed fine in the long centuries of reconquest warfare waged against the Muslims of the Peninsula.¹⁸¹ In the War of the Two Pedros, cross-border raiding and small scale sieges became the principal means of carrying out armed conflict.

No region exemplifies the *chevauchée* mode of fighting better than the southern Valencian frontier between 1356 and 1379. Indeed, the all-but-constant warfare seriously impacted on the region's ability to feed itself. During an entire decade of warfare, the repeated destruction of standing grain, olive trees, and vineyards by the Castilians

¹⁷⁸ Fowler, *Mercenaries*, 220–22; Estow, *Pedro*, 258–59; L.J. Andrew Villalon, “Pedro the Cruel: Portrait of a Royal Failure,” in *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow (New York, 1997), 201.

¹⁷⁹ Ferrer i Mallol, “Frontera,” 336–57.

¹⁸⁰ Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 198–206.

¹⁸¹ Elena Lourie, “A Society Organized for War: Medieval Spain,” *Past and Present* 35 (1966): 54–76.

assured that “nothing [in southern Valencia] would remain to be harvested.”¹⁸²

Judging from the poignant letters to and from Pere and his queen, the agricultural distress and looming signs of starvation among the frontier garrison was clear for all to see.¹⁸³ Because of this human disaster which could not be ignored, the royal couple and their officials spent a good of energy buying supplies and finding pack animals to transport them to the embattled frontier.¹⁸⁴ When Castilian incursions broke this tenuous royal supply line, Pere often allowed his southern Valencian garrisons to buy grain wherever they could at whatever price, assuring them they would be reimbursed for their outlays. As the war dragged on, however, royal promises became exceedingly difficult to keep.¹⁸⁵ Since the southern Valencians were tied to Pere as both sovereign and feudal lord, the king felt it well within his rights to demand service of many different types in the deepening military crisis that southern Valencia represented. Eventually agreeing to pay local men a daily salary for garrison duty, he then tried to get even greater service for his money by insisting that they aid their town and village councils in the repair of walls and in the destruction of indefensible castles or of suburbs which had grown up outside fortress walls and might aid the enemy siege efforts.¹⁸⁶

The material destruction of the War of the Two Pedros in southern Valencia was matched by its psychological and legal toll. Pere’s

¹⁸² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1572, ff. 4v–5 (December 31, 1362); Díaz Martin, *Itinerario*, 403 (doc. 864); A.L. Molina Molina, “Un año de la “guerra de los Pedros” (junio 1364–junio 1365),” *Anales de la Universidad de Murcia* 28 (1969–1970): 171.

¹⁸³ The fact that the residents of Orihuela were at the point of starvation is attested to not only in the letters which they sent to the king, but also in third-party reports, such as that of Gonçalvo Martínez de Torres, who reported that during the siege they had seized and eaten his horse. In 1371 the king granted him 2000 *solidi* for goods which he lost due to the siege and occupation, including the said horse. Eventually, the townsmen even resorted to cannibalism to survive. [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 735, ff. 111–116 (January 15, 1368); R. 1211, ff. 78v–79 (June 9, 1365), 79r–v (June 9, 1365); R. 1232, f. 40v (September 18, 1371); Ferrer, *Organització*, 513–6 doc. 209.]

¹⁸⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1195, ff. 111r–v (October 12, 1364); R. 1202, f. 60 (September 30, 1364); R. 1204, ff. 72v–73 (April 16, 1365); Ferrer, *Organització*, 495–97 (docs. 187–88).

¹⁸⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1074, ff. 129r–v (June 25, 1362); R. 1569, f. 145 (August 17, 1362).

¹⁸⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 911, ff. 14r–v (September 24, 1364); R. 1181, ff. 73v–74 (October 20, 1362); R. 1183, ff. 14r–v (July 18, 1362); R. 1194, f. 98 (November 13, 1363); R. 1387, f. 11v (December 1, 1363).

frontier vassals lived with the fear of sudden Castilian raids, a fear intensified by Pedro's well-earned reputation for savagery. This dread was deepened by the Castilian use of Muslim troops who marched against the Valencian outposts with the clear understanding (communicated by Pedro), that they should take no prisoners but rather decapitate all of Pere's subjects they captured.¹⁸⁷ When the Valencian outposts fell to Pedro, however, the tables were soon turned and it was the Castilian king who found his new subjects an ungovernable lot, ever ready to rise in rebellion.¹⁸⁸

As for Pere, although he normally supported his frontier troops, he often seemed to speak to them with two voices. He might praise as "good people who safeguard our affairs" garrisons that held out against great odds and with almost no help from their king or his government,¹⁸⁹ but was just as ready to vilify the "baseness of [those] who have not acted as they were supposed to."¹⁹⁰ This royal scorn was normally heaped on castellans and garrisons who violated "the custom of Spain" (*costum d'Espanya*) and were considered traitors when they surrendered their fortress to enemy forces without royal permission to do so.¹⁹¹ It was thus not unheard of for men to be hailed as glorious defenders of the Aragonese crown and then branded traitors—all within a matter of a few days.

The fluidity of the military situation along the southern Valencian frontier often caused significant legal changes. Pedro's military successes of 1364–1365 saw the transferal of great swaths of territory from Valencian to Castilian law and back again in only a few months. Ironically, Pere himself at time had just as destructive an effect on the legal stability of his frontiers. Granting and renewing the privileges of the towns and villages of southern Valencia to keep the region's defenders in place and to attract new soldiers to fight at their side, he utilized his own law to threaten town populations who would leave their homes rather than stand up to Castilian invasion.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ Molina y Molina, "Año," 183–84 (doc. 2); Díaz Martín, *Itinerario*, 404 (doc. 866); ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1822, ff. 180v–181 (February 20, 1388).

¹⁸⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1197, ff. 139r–v (May 14, 1364), 179v–188 (May 28, 1364); Bellot, *Anales*, 1:130–31.

¹⁸⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1210, ff. 47r–v (March 14, 1365).

¹⁹⁰ ACA, Cancillería, R. 1192, ff. 72r–v (January 4, 1364).


¹⁹¹ M.T. Ferrer i Mallol, "La tinença a costum d'Espanya en els castells de la frontera meridional valenciana (segle XIV)," *Miscelania de Textos Medievales* 4 (1988): 6–7 (docs. 22, 24–25).

¹⁹² Ferrer, *Organització*, 488–89 (doc. 177).

While the king often bent legal rules to reward his subjects who had fought well, he was just as prone to punish those whom he labeled traitors by removing their privileges or even downgrading the legal status of the settlements in which they lived.¹⁹³

The War of the Two Pedros, like the Hundred Years War which ultimately consumed it, had wide ranging social, political, and economic repercussions and the southern Valencian frontier presents a microcosmic mirror of the problems and challenges faced by king and their subjects. These were rooted in part in the vagaries of medieval political power, of imprecise boundaries which were a function of personal authority rather than territorial extension. A king's power rested on the feudal, but often self-serving allegiance of his subjects; his ability to effect policy was frequently hamstrung by fiscal limitations over which he could exercise little control. The administrative weaknesses of the crown directly effected the general population, especially when these failures exposed them to the devastating effects of warfare. The War of the Two Pedros was, at its core, a bitter, often personalized, struggle between two sovereigns and the governments that served them. By its very duration and the increasing brutality with which it was waged, the conflict brought tragedy and hardship to both the great and the humble, undermining any contention that medieval warfare was an activity limited to the knightly classes.

¹⁹³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 911, f. 15v (October 2, 1364).



Map 8. Kingdom of Valencia (Catalan names in parentheses).

A GOVERNMENT BESIEGED BY CONFLICT:
THE PARLIAMENT OF MONZÓN (1362–1363)
AS MILITARY FINANCIER

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The emergence of the medieval dinner theater in the later twentieth century (which allows both effete scholars and ill-informed laymen to gawk at the antics of armored warriors while sampling the all-but-uneatable cuisine of the epoch) reflects a well-entrenched series of historical myths concerning the supposed standards of war current in the Middle Ages.¹ Rather than being a mere stage for the theatrical combat of headstrong champions, war in the medieval centuries, like its counterpart in ancient and modern times, was a complex mixture of planning and adaptation. One of the least understood aspects of this martial organization was the fund raising which kings, clergy, nobles, and townsmen across Europe engaged in to keep troops in the field. To shed some light on this fiscal background in the Crown of Aragon of the mid-fourteenth century, this paper will focus on the parliament of Monzón (1362–1363) and its remarkably detailed ordinances on the raising and dispersal of money for the payment and supply of troops as well as for the upkeep of fortresses during the massive War of the Two Pedros between Castile and the Crown of Aragon (1356–1366).

I

As the conduct of war became increasingly regularized in the early modern era, so did its cost.² Even writers as critical of the excesses of the battlefield as François Rabelais knew full well that “war waged

¹ Sean McGlynn, “The Myths of Medieval Warfare,” *History Today* 44/1 (January, 1994): 28–34.

² Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1988), 61–64.

without monetary reserves is as fleeting as a breath.”³ The truism that government war was based on government money was as true in the later Middle Ages as it would in Rabelais’s time. In eastern Spain, as in most other regions of Europe, sovereigns of the period found it increasingly difficult to finance troops while keeping their governing establishments in the black. Until the thirteenth century, this process was largely accomplished without money by linking the mechanism of the feudal host with the fiscal apparatus of the crusade.⁴ Thereafter, Aragonese sovereigns were increasingly faced with the choice of limiting their military enterprises or finding new sources of revenue. The first master of this altered military landscape was “the Conqueror,” Jaume I (1213–1276), who doubled the lands under his control by victories against the Muslim dominions of Valencia, Jativa, Murcia, and the Balearics.⁵ Because of the duration of these campaigns (from two to four years),⁶ the king utilized every customary financial resource available to him, eventually even seeking out novel or underused fonts of revenue. On the domestic scene, these included voluntary and forced loans from individuals and groups, including Christians, Muslims, and Jews, confiscation of property, support of privateers, and the sale of plunder shares for upcoming campaigns.⁷ On the foreign level, royal financial expedients ranged

³ François Rabelais, *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (Chicago, 1952), 54–55 (chap. 46); J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620* (Baltimore, 1985), 232.

⁴ Donald J. Kagay, “Army Mobilization, Royal Administration, and the Realm in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon,” in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Robert I. Burns, S.J.*, ed. P. Chevedden, D. Kagay, and P. Padilla, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1996), 2:98–99; Robert I. Burns, S.J. “The Many Crusades of Valencia’s Conquest (1225–1280): An Historiographical Labyrinth,” in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O’Callaghan*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and Theresa M. Vann (Leiden, 1998), 172–77.

⁵ Derek W. Lomax, *The Reconquest of Spain* (London, 1978), 141–42, 148–49; Alvaro Santamaria, “La expansión político-militar de la corona de Aragón bajo la dirección de Jaime I: Baleares,” in *Jaime I y su Época, X Congrés de la història de la corona d’Aragó [X CHCA]*, 3 vols. (Zaragoza, 1979), *Ponencias*, 93–146; Antonio Ubieto Arteta, “La reconquista de Valencia y Murcia,” in *X CHCA, Ponencias*, 149–65; Josep-David Garrido i Valls, *Jaime I i el Regne de Múrcia* (Barcelona, 1997).

⁶ Duration of campaigns: Balearics: three years; Valencia: four years; Jativa: 1 year; Murcia: 1 year.

⁷ Mikel de Epalza, “Islamic Social Structures in Muslim and Christian Valencia,” in *Iberia and Mediterranean World*, 2:184; *Repartimiento de Mallorca* in *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la corona de Aragón [CDACA]*, ed. Próspero de Bofarull y Moscaró *et al.*, 41 vols. (Barcelona, 1847–1910), 13:1–141; *Repartimiento de Valencia* in *CDACA*, 11:143–656; Francisco Bofarull y Sans, “Los judíos en el territorio de Barcelona (siglos X a XIII): Reinado de Jaime I (1213–78),” in *Congrés d’història de*

from obtaining papal support (which turned local clerical funds and special crusading monies over to the sovereign) to negotiating loans from international bankers to receiving direct military aid from international military contingents.⁸

The most obvious, but in some ways most troublesome source of military funding which Jaume returned to time and again was the parliament (*corts*, *cortes*). An amalgam of royal court and extraordinary assembly, the parliament was summoned for a number of reasons, including coronations, legislation, and the granting of money.⁹ Sovereigns could use these assemblies to claim such extraordinary grants as the Aragonese *monedaje* and Catalan *bovatge* that could then be employed in any way they chose. Unfortunately for the king's long range military plans, these grants could be claimed only once during a reign.¹⁰ As his military activities intensified, Jaume on more than one occasion found himself in the humiliating position of asking a parliament for war funding, only to be rebuffed by the men of the assembly.¹¹ By the end of his reign, Jaume encountered an even more alarming resistance among his Aragonese and Valencian nobles and townsmen who from 1265 onward often bound themselves by oaths into "brotherhoods" (*uniones*, *empresiones*, *hermandades*) which eventually evolved into the *Unión*. This organization, which went through several reincarnations until 1348, employed the trappings of

la corona d'Aragó, dedicat al rey En Jaume I y a la seva época [I *CHCA*], 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1909, 1913), 2:924–5, 934–5 (docs. 131, 150); Kagay, "Army Mobilization," 98, 101–3; *Llibre de ls fets del rei en Jaume* [*LF*], ed. Jordi Bruguera, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1991), 2:289 (chap. 382).

⁸ Thomas N. Bisson, "Las finanzas del joven Jaime I (1213–1228)," in X *CHCA*, *Comunicaciones* 1–2:151–208; idem, *Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the Early Count-Kings (1151–1213)*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1984), 1:86–150; Kagay, "Army Mobilization," 98, 101–3; Robert I. Burns, S.J., *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Reconstruction of a Thirteenth-Century Frontier*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 1:76, 132, 163, 227, 214; 2:308.

⁹ Donald J. Kagay, "The Emergence of 'Parliament' in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon: A View from the Gallery," in *On the Social Origins*, 222–24; Luis González Anton, *Las Cortes de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1978), 30–34; Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, *Las Cortes de Aragón en la Edad Media* (Zaragoza, 1979), 30–32.

¹⁰ Sarasa Sánchez, *Cortes*, 98–102; Luis García de Valdeavellano y Arcimus, *Curso de historia de los institucionales españoles de los orígenes al final de edad media* (Madrid, 1968), 609; Ferran Soldevila, "A propòsit del servei del bovatge," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 1 (1954): 753–787; Carmen Orcástegui Gros, "La reglamentación del impuesto de monedaje en Aragón," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 5 (1983): 17–21; Tomas Lopez Pizueta, "Sobre la percepción del 'bovatge' en el siglo XIV: Una aportación al tema de la tasación directa en la Cataluña bajomedieval," in *Estudios sobre renta, fiscalidad y finanzas en la Cataluña bajomedieval* (Barcelona, 1993), 335–46.

¹¹ *LF*, 291–304 (chaps. 385–407).

a Roman corporation to marshal baronial dissent and hem in the “excesses” of royal government which was itself based on Roman legal principles.¹²

In the later years of Jaume I and during the reigns of his successors, Pere II (1276–1285) and Jaume II (1292–1327), the financing of war became increasingly difficult since all the rich Muslim states within easy reach had been conquered and the Crown of Aragon now struggled with such Christian adversaries as Genoa, France, Navarre, and Castile over non-religious issues like market share in the Mediterranean, border security along the Pyrenees, and quarrels within the Iberian peninsula itself.¹³ A tradition of small scale raids bolstered by steady saber rattling brought the Crown of Aragon a number of possessions in the central Mediterranean and trade monopolies along the north African litoral.¹⁴ Far from expanding the military status of eastern Spain, the Mediterranean outposts, especially the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, proved money pits that swallowed up whole generations of war funding while bringing very little profit to the Iberian mother country.¹⁵ While Jaume I’s successors followed the fiscal road he had blazed to ever greater military spending, they were soon overwhelmed by a “great and immense flood of expenses” brought on by the longer duration and greater frequency of wars as well as the escalating use of mercenaries and siege artillery.¹⁶ Because

¹² Luis González Anton, *Las uniones aragonesas y las cortes del reino (1283–1301)*, 2 vols. (Zaragoza, 1975), 1:53–54; 2:348–49; Esteban Sarasa Sanchez, *El privilegio general de Aragón: La defensa de las libertades aragonesas en la Edad Media* (Zaragoza, 1983), 17–3; Donald J. Kagay, “Rebellion on Trial: The Aragonese *Unión* and its Uneasy Connection to Royal Law, 1265–1301,” *Journal of Legal History* 18 (1997): 30–32; idem, “Structures of Baronial Dissent and Revolt under James I (1213–76),” *Medievalistik* 1 (1988): 66–67; Joseph F. O’Callaghan, “Kings and Lords in Conflict in Late Thirteenth-Century Castile and Aragon,” in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World*, 2:125–26, 130–32.

¹³ J. Lee Shneiman, *The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire, 1200–1350*, 2 vols. (New York, 1970), 2:309–66; William D. Phillips, Jr. “The Spanish Kingdoms and the Wider World in the Later Middle Ages,” in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World*, 2:412–15.

¹⁴ Robert I. Burns, S.J., “The Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305–1311,” *Speculum* 29 (1954): 751–71; Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq, “Vers la Méditerranée orientale e l’Afrique,” in *XCHCA, Ponencias*, 7–90; Phillips, “Spanish Kingdoms,” 415.

¹⁵ David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200–1500: The Struggle for Dominion* (London, 1997), 82–88, 107–32.

¹⁶ Arxiu de la corona d’Aragó [ACA], Cancillería real, R. 83, ff. 27–28v; R. 306, f. 1; R. 331, f. 46; Gonzalez Anton, *Uniones*, 2:398 (doc. 273); *Documenta Selecta Mutuas Civitatis Arago-Cathalaunicae et Ecclesiae Relationes Illustrantia* [DS], ed.

of this meteoric rise in military spending, both Pere II and Jaume II strove to make more effective use of such earlier mechanisms as the feudal host. From 1285, during a French invasion of Catalonia, the crown grew increasingly dependent on the most important article of the *Usatges of Barcelona*, the Principate's traditional law. This article, known as *Princeps namque* from its incipit, allowed the sovereign to invoke the aid of all his subjects whenever Catalonia was attacked by foreign troops.¹⁷ This experimentation was necessary since the parliaments of eastern Spain were becoming increasingly reluctant paymasters. Under the wildly successful influence of the *Unión*, sovereigns could no longer expect to bully these assemblies into granting unfettered military funds. Increasingly, the *cortes* of Aragon and Valencia and the *corts* of Catalonia had learned that they did not have to grant their sovereign *carte blanche*. Instead, in return for funding the king's wars, they could demand the royal settlement of grievances and recognition of the parliament as an institution which would meet on a regular basis to tend to the "good estate and reformation of the hinterland."¹⁸

II

The evolving methods of war funding in the Crown of Aragon altered during the reign of Pere III (1336–87), not in substance, but in scope. A man of "absolute lack of scruples" who projected "a tragic atmosphere over his entire court," Pere found himself surrounded by foreign and domestic enemies who were clearly as devoid of honor as

Johannes Vincke (Barcelona, 1936), 30–31 (docs. 57–58); Paul E. Chevedden, "The Artillery of King James I the Conqueror," in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World*, 2:47–94; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1990), 117; Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "La organización militar en Cataluña en la Edad Media," *Revista de Historia Militar*, extract, 2000, 178–81.

¹⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 248, pt. 2, f. 131v; R. 264, f. 104; R. 236, f. 190v; 274, f. 37; R. 329, f. 177; *DS*, 43–44, 70, 118–9, 288–89, 291 (docs. 80, 122, 181, 400, 403); Shneidman, 2:467–68. For the national defense force associated with the Catalan law, *Princeps namque*, see Donald J. Kagay, "Princeps namque: Defense of the Crown and the Birth of the Catalan State," *Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1999): 55–85; Manuel Sanchez Martínez, "La convocatoria del *usatge Princeps namque* en 1368 y sus repercusiones en la ciudad de Barcelona," *Barcelona Quaderns d'Història* 4 (2001): 79–107; Ferrer i Mallol, "Organizaci6n," 156–62.

¹⁸ Real Academia de la Historia, Colección de Salazar y Castro, Ms M-139 (*Anales de Aragón*), f. 10 (art. 29); ACA, Cancillería real, R. 47, ff. 59r–v; Gonzalez Anton, 57–67; Sarasa Sánchez, 35–40.

he.¹⁹ Though Pere continually affirmed that it was his duty to “defend the lands, property, honor, and profit” of his people, he soon found himself in a bitter civil war with his Aragonese and Valencian barons that ended only with the royal destruction of the *Unión* at the battle of Epila (June 21, 1348).²⁰ Beyond his own lands, Pere was the architect of a number of ill-fated alliances that involved him in a number of unsuccessful wars with France, Navarre, and Genoa.²¹

Pere III’s “principal enemy,” however, was the “fundamentally unstable” sovereign of Castile, Pedro I (1350–1369). Despite the overarching ambition that marked both men during their long conflict (1356–1366), there was little history of active dispute between their countries in the decades before the war began.²² Pere was painfully aware of the potential adversaries that surrounded him and took it as a “grave peril” to wage war against either the French or the Castilians.²³ The Crown of Aragon, though an aggressive power in the fourteenth century, focused most of its energies on the Mediterranean while Castile, under Alfonso XI (1312–1350), attempted to cut off the Straits of Gibraltar to North African invaders and then conquer the isolated Muslim kingdom of Granada.²⁴

¹⁹ Rafael Tasis i Marca, *Pere el Cerimoniós i els seus fills* (Barcelona, 1980), 9–10; Ferran Soldevila, *Història de Catalunya*, 3 vols. (Barcelona, 1934), 1:342–43; J.N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms 1250–1516*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), 1:347–48.

²⁰ Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), *Chronicle*, trans. Mary Hillgarth, ed. J.N. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 2:436–38 (IV:48–50); Manuel Dualde Serrando, “Tres episodios de la lucha entre ‘Pere el del Punyalet’ y la Unión aragonesa, relatots por el monarca a su tío Pedro, conde de Ribagorza,” *Estudios de la edad media de Aragón [EEMCA]* 2 (1946): 351–52; Pere III, “Tractat de cavalleria,” in *Tractats de cavalleria*, ed. Pere Bohigas (Barcelona, 1947), 99; José Angel Sesma Muñoz, “La fijación de fronteras enonómicas entre los estados de la Corona de Aragón,” *Aragón en la Edad Media [AEEM]* 5 (1983): 148–49.

²¹ Abulafia, *Western Mediterranean Kingdoms*, 174–80; Phillips, “Spanish Kinddoms,” 414–5; Jesús Lalinde Abadía, *La Corona de Aragon en el Mediterráneo medieval* (Zaragoza, 1979); Charles E. DuFourcq, *L’Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles* (Paris, 1966).

²² Shneidman, *Catalan Empire*, 2:353–54; Kenneth Fowler, *The Great Companies*, vol. 1 of *Medieval Mercenaries*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2001), 161; L.J. Andrew Villalon, “Pedro the Cruel: Portrait of a Royal Failure,” in *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow (New York, 1997), 210–11.

²³ Pere III, 1:240–41 (III:13); Jeronimo Zurita y Castro, *Anales de le Corona de Aragon*, ed. Angel Canellas Lopez, 9 vols. (Zaragoza, 1967–1985), 4:289–94 (IX:1); Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel of Castile 1350–1369* (Leiden, 1995), 182–86.

²⁴ Ferrer i Mallol, “Organización,” 169–73; Antoni Arribas Palau, *La conquesta de Cerdèna por Jaume II de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1952); Nicolás Agrait, “The Reconquest during the Reign of Alfonso XI (1312–1350),” in *On the Social Origins*, 149–65;

With this background of mutual military and diplomatic disinterest, the speed with which the War of the Two Pedros escalated and the depth of regional fervor it engendered proved extremely confusing for combatants and observers alike. Stemming from a relatively minor event in the late fall of 1356,²⁵ the war assumed an unprecedented scale for Iberian conflicts of the era. Taking the offensive from 1357 to 1359, Pedro I raided across the Aragonese and Valencian borders and even mounted naval attacks against Catalonia and Valencia.²⁶ By 1360, Pere had launched a massive counterattack along the Aragonese frontier.²⁷ With stalemate looming, the exhausted combatants gave in to constant papal pressure and the steadying influence of Pere's main adviser, Bernat de Cabrera, agreeing to peace at Terrer in May, 1361.²⁸ Pedro seemed motivated to take this action from fear of the growing popularity of his half-brother, an ally of the Aragonese ally, Enrique de Trastámara.²⁹ With Pere, it was surely the fiscal strain of so much combat in such a short time that made peace a necessity.

III

Never ending financial pressure that accompanied Pere's Mediterranean and peninsular ambitions slowly transformed the traditional

Norman Housely, *The Later Crusades from Lyons to Alcazar 1274–1580* (Oxford, 1992), 278–82.

²⁵ Pere III, 2:495–503 (VI:3–4); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:289–94 (IX:i); Estow, *Pedro*, 182–85. The immediate cause of the war was the capture of two Genoese galleys by an Aragonese privateer in August, 1356. Since the Genoese were allied to the Castilians, Pedro called for compensation from Pere. A number of other long-standing grievances, generally tied to dynastic and family disputes, were also cited as reason for war. Zurita claims that the struggle had resulted from a “terrible enmity” which had long existed between the two cousins.

²⁶ Pere III, 2:503–23 (V:5–24); Antonio Guitiérrez de Velasco, “La conquista de Tarazona en la guerra de los Dos Pedros (Año 1357),” *Cuadernos de Historia “Jerónimo Zurita”* [CHJZ] 10–11 (1960): 69–97; idem, “Las fortalezas aragonesas ante la gran ofensiva castellan en la guerra de los Dos Pedros,” CHJZ 12–13 (1961): 7–39; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:295–388 (IX:ii–xxiv); Estow, *Pedro*, 193–98.

²⁷ Antonio Guitiérrez de Velasco, “La contraofensiva aragonesa en la guerra de los Dos Pedros: Actitud militar y diplomática de Pedro IV el Ceremonioso (años 1358 a 1352),” CHJZ 14–15 (1963): 7–30; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:388–90 (IX:xxvi); Estow, *Pedro*, 199–200.

²⁸ ACA, Cartas reales, Pedro IV, no. 6233; Pere III, 4:528–31 (VI:29); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:414–6 (IX:xxxiii).

²⁹ Pere III, 4:522, 536 (VI:21, 33); Estow, *Pedro*, 148–49.

way of paying for war in the Crown of Aragon. The early history of royal courts in Aragon and Catalonia was marked by a growing professional specialization and accountability of the officials serving the crown.³⁰ By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the collection, dispersal, and auditing of royal funds had bifurcated into two offices: on the one hand, that of the treasurer and on the other, that of “master of accountants” (*mestre racional*).³¹

This bureaucratic transition was also reflected in the kind of imposts that supported the royal establishment. In an earlier period, the monarchy relied financially on low level feudal dues and tolls. Now, the tax gathering efforts of the crown were increasingly directed at corporate entities, such as towns, villages, and Jewish and Muslim communities (*alhamas*).³² This change in royal finances also reflected a growing fiscal complexity of town governments as well as the emergence of townsmen as important members of parliaments in eastern Spain.³³

As Pere III entered his prime, so did his need for funds to carry out a number of military operations, often at the same time. Pushing his own exchequer to the brink of bankruptcy on more than one occasion, the king found it necessary to turn to his parliaments. These assemblies (often under bitter duress) voted extraordinary military aids which would be collected over a period of two to three years. Such subsidies, drawn from every clerical, noble, and urban “hearth” (*foch*) of Pere’s realms, were known as a *fogatge* in Catalan

³⁰ Jesus Lalinde Abadía, *La gobernación general en la Corona de Aragón* (Madrid, 1963), 96–97; idem, “El ordenamiento interno de la Corona de Aragón en la época de Jaime I,” in *X Congrés de història de la corona d’Aragó (Jaime I y su época)*, 3 vols. (Zaragoza, 1979–1980), *Ponencias*, 186–90; Jaime Caruana Gomez de Barreda, “Los mayordomos de Aragón en los siglos XII y XIII,” *Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas, y Museos* 62 (1953): 349–77; Garcia de Valdeavellano y Arcimus, *Curso*, 488–92; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “El ejercicio de poder real: Instituciones e instrumentos del gobierno,” in *XV Congrés d’història de la corona d’Aragó [El poder real en la Corona de Aragón (Siglos XIV–XVI)] [XV CHCA]*, 5 vols. (Zaragoza, 1993), *Ponencias*, 1:104–15.

³¹ Christian Guilleré, “Les finances de la corona d’Aragó,” *L’Avenç* 133–143 (1992): 55–56; T.N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History* (Oxford, 1986), 98, 117.

³² José Angel Sesma Muñoz, “Las transformaciones de la fiscalidad real en la baja edad media,” in *XV CHCA, Ponencias*, 238–43.

³³ Pere Verdés, “L’impacte de la fiscalitat reial a Cervera (1350–1356),” *L’Avenç* 202 (1996): 23–24; Max Turull, “Finances i fiscalitat municipals a Catalunya durant la baixa edat mitjana,” *L’Avenç* 133–43 (1992): 60–65; Sesma Muñoz, “Transformaciones,” 244–54.

and an *ayuda* in Aragonese.³⁴ These imposts, which were assessed and collected by deputies of the *cortes* itself, supposedly freed Pere's realms from his voracious appetite for funds for at least a few years. Yet with the dawning of the Castilian conflict in 1356, the king was repeatedly forced to announce to his subjects that he was in "intolerable need of funds" and if they failed him, they "[could all] be sent to perdition."³⁵ During the first years of the Castilian war, the fiscal crisis of the monarchy was reflected in the behavior of national assemblies throughout the Crown of Aragon. Nobles in these meetings followed an age-old strategy of denial by refusing to participate in the *cortes*, by sending procurators with no power to act, or by bolting before the crucial subsidy vote was taken.³⁶ The other parliamentary estates, the nobility and clergy, were less resistant to the all-but constant monetary demands, viewing them as a painful duty to the sovereign and to their homeland. Their support, however, was not free; it was bought at the expense of the crown relinquishing control over the fiscal side of the war with Pedro I. The *cortes*, now acting very much as a government in its own right, entered into a new phase of development. This independence of action would clearly come to the fore at arguably the most significant assembly of the era, the general parliament (*generales curias; cortes general*) of Monzón.

IV

Following the peace of Terrer of 1361, Pere and his lands attempted to recover from the ravages of four years of war. For his part, Pedro used the treaty to gain some much needed time to prepare for a renewal of hostilities. He began by replacing the current emir of Granada, Muḥammad VI "*El Rey Bermejo*" (1360–1362), with his longtime ally and supporter, Muḥammad V (1354–1359, 1362–1391),

³⁴ Ferrer i Mallol, 166–67; Sesma Muñoz, "Transformaciones," 258–61, 266–67; Verdes, 22. For a similar impost in France, the *fouage*, see Fowler, 1:232.

³⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1148, f. 131v; R. 1149, f. 77; R. 1327, f. 201; R. 1150, f. 143v; DS, 420, 424–25, 434 (docs. 557, 560, 571); *Epistolari de Pere III*, ed. Ramon Gubern, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1955), 1:124 (doc. 17); Sesma Muñoz, "Fijación," 149–50.

³⁶ J.M. Pons Guri, "Un fogatjament desconegut de l'any 1358," *Boletín de Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona* 30 (1963–1964): 339–46; Kagay, "Rebellion," 34–36.

thereby stabilizing the situation on Castile's southern border. In June, 1362, having rebuilt his army, Pedro suddenly attacked the sparsely-defended Aragonese frontier. In a short period of time, the Castilian monarch overran a number of Aragonese border villages and then took the city of Calatayud on August 29 after a short siege.³⁷ "Not believing it evil or a crime to break the peace," Pedro demonstrated few qualms about delivering a serious blow against his old enemy without any formal declaration of war.³⁸

Caught in panicked surprise, Pere scrambled to put into the field whatever military units he could immediately muster. Appointing trusted advisers to command, he sent them to the front with orders to stop his "principal enemy" from posing a threat to the entire kingdom. The king then hurried to Barcelona where in early August, 1362, he received from the Catalans the promise of limited military help. Though he had summoned an Aragonese assembly to Barbastro for late August, Pere was not able to attend.³⁹ In September, he left his beleaguered realms and traveled to Perpignan where he re-established his alliance with Enrique de Trastámara, Pedro's exiled half-brother and a powerful mercenary captain who had spent the last year in France.⁴⁰

Having arranged this professional military support, Pere now turned to the crucial matter of paying the troops. As it happened, on October 10, 1362, the same day that the Enrique's men began crossing the Pyrenees into Ribagorza (the county above Aragon), the king had arranged to convene a general assembly of Majorcan, Valencian, Aragonese, and Catalan representatives at Monzón, a centrally-placed town which had been used before for such joint parliaments.⁴¹ The

³⁷ Zurita, *Anales*, 4:432-33, 439 (IX:xxxviii-xl); *CDACA*, 48:xiii-xiv; L.P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain, 1250 to 1500* (Chicago, 1990), 210-11; Rachel Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane des temps des Nasrides (1232-1492)* (Paris, 1972), 111.

³⁸ *CDACA*, 48:13, 70; Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1977), 49, 62, 64, 89, 101, 140, 194, 203; Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, eds., *The Reader's Companion to Military History* (Boston, 1996), 124-25.

³⁹ *CDACA*, 48:xiv-xv; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:445-46 (IX:xlii).

⁴⁰ Pere III, 509-10, 531, 536 (VI.8, 30, 33); *CDACA*, 48:xv; Fowler, *Mercenaries*, 4-5, 48. Trastámara had been in Pere's service from 1356 to 1361. With the Peace of Terrer in 1361, the Castilian emigré sought military work in France for a year until the summer of 1362 when he was re-employed by Pere.

⁴¹ For the joint assembly which was also called a *parlamentum*, see Donald J. Kagay, "The Emergence of 'Parliament' in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon: A View from the Gallery," in *On the Social Origins*, 228-29, n. 21; Sarasa Sánchez, *Cortes de Aragon*, 69-70.

summons stressed the danger posed “by the evil endeavors of the [Castilian] king,” and demanded “subsides, provisions, and other preparations for the defense of the republic of our kingdoms and lands.”⁴² Because of the rapid unfolding of military events on several fronts, Pere not only failed to keep his first appointment with the parliament; he actually postponed its opening meeting seven times. Not until November 23, 1362, did the delegates finally gather in the “large palace” of the fortress situated above Monzón where the royal court was staying.⁴³ The many postponements were due both to “the great wickedness of the Castilian king” and to a myriad of other war-related matters which held Pere’s attention. These included the repair of city walls throughout eastern Spain, the return of pack animals used to transport military supplies, the suppression of private feuds, and the hammering out of an alliance with France.⁴⁴ At times, even nature seemed to conspire to pull Pere’s attention away from the parliamentary proceedings as in March, 1363, when a strong earthquake did damage up and down the Catalan litoral.⁴⁵

In at least the first session of Monzón, the traditional protocol was maintained.⁴⁶ Seated before the principal clergy, nobles, and town representatives who were ranged by realm and estate, Pere delivered his opening speech or “proposal” (*praepositio*). Like his great-grandfather,

⁴² CDACA, 48:13.

⁴³ Ibid., 48:14–19, 50–54. For configuration of Monzón’s buildings, see Richard L. Kagan, ed., *Spanish Cities of the Golden Age: The Views of Anton van den Wyngaerde* (Berkeley, 1989), 150–54. The meeting was prorogued to November 4, 10, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, and 23. The description of the meeting site (*in illo palacio quod est in castro Montissoni ubi dominus rex hospitabatur*) surely refers to the castle which overlooks the city. In later general parliaments, the castle proved too small for the royal court and many of the officials were accommodated in the Hospital de Santo Tomás in the plain across the Cinca River.

⁴⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1179, f. 69; R. 1183, ff. 195, 203; R. 1184, ff. 1, 19v; Pere III, 2:536 (VI:33); José Coroleu y Juglada, *Documents historichs catalans del segle XIV* (Barcelona, 1889), 16–17, 19–20, 89–91, 98–100.

⁴⁵ *Noticiari*, 214. For similar seismic disasters in the medieval Crown of Aragon, see Eduard Fontseré and Josep Iglésies, *Recompilació de dades sísmiques de les terres catalanes entre 1100 i 1906* (Barcelona, 1971), 88–94; Robert I. Burns, S.J., “A Medieval Earthquake: Jaume I, Al-Azraq and the Early History of Onteniente in the Kingdom of Valencia,” in X CHCA, *Comunicaciones* 1–2, 209–12.

⁴⁶ For the protocol of eastern Spanish assemblies, see Donald J. Kagay, “The Development of the *Cortes* in the Crown of Aragon, 1064–1327,” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1981), 389–94; Luis Gonzalez Anton, *Las Cortes de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1978), 119–20; Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, *Las Cortes de Aragón en la Edad Media* (Zaragoza, 1979), 112–6.

Jaume I, Pere hoped to state his case and ask the assembly “to help and stand by him.”⁴⁷ Describing graphically the desperate situation caused “by the iniquity of the Castilian king,” Pere claimed that the safety of the families and homelands of the representatives were in their own hands.⁴⁸ Three days after this somber beginning, a “general response” (*contestatio*) was delivered for the entire assembly by Pere’s much traveled half-brother, Ferran, the marquis of Tortosa.⁴⁹ He claimed that hiring Trastámara and a thousand-man company was “expedient and profitable for the defense of the commonwealth,” but opening the borders to an unlimited flood of *routiers* would cause unlimited “damage” (*dampnatge*) to Pere and his realms.⁵⁰

Fear of escalating military costs and the possibility that they might lose control of pledged funds disquieted the “negotiators” (*tractatores*) who had been appointed by the full parliament to collect and disperse the subsidy requested by the king.⁵¹ After ten days of wrangling, these fiscal agents of the estates gave in to a deal engineered by Pere’s counselor, Bernat de Cabrera, that contracted for the service of Trastámara and 700 horsemen as well as of 1000 French mercenaries.⁵² Though little official action took place over the Christmas season, the members of the *corts* engaged in a number of behind-

⁴⁷ *LF*, 2:58–60, 290 (chaps. 48–49, 383); José Coroleu y Juglada, *Las Cortes Catalanas* (Barcelona, 1876), 99; Thomas N. Bisson, “A General Court of Aragon (February, 1228),” *English Historical Review* 92 (1977): 107–24; Ricard Albert and Joan Gassiot, eds., *Parlaments a les corts catalanes* (Barcelona, 1928), 9–10.

⁴⁸ *CDACA*, 48:54; *Parlaments*, 10. Among the “afflictions” Pere mentions in this speech was the conquest of Calatayud which had taken place on August 29, 1362.

⁴⁹ Coroleu, *Cortes*, 106; *Palaments*, 13–14; Bisson, 112–4; Joseph F. O’Callaghan, *A History of Medieval History* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), 410–11, 422, 424; Estow, *Pedro*, 181, 194–95, 216–7. Ferran, son of Alfons III and his second wife Leonor of Castile, was created marquis of Tortosa in 1332. From this inheritance he became the most important landholder in Valencia. As the leader of Valencian *Unión*, he was forced into exile with the unionist defeat at Epila in 1348 and became a fixture in Pedro I’s court. In 1357, Pere reached an accommodation with his half-brother who defected from the Castilian side and became a military commander on the Aragonese frontier. There was now love lost between the two siblings and in 1363, Pere had Ferran executed for treason.

⁵⁰ *CDACA*, 48:55–56; *expedient et profitos a la deffensio de la cosa publica*.

⁵¹ For parliamentary tax deputies of this era, see Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Els primers diputats de la Generalitat de Catalunya (1359–1412),” in *Miscel·lània d’Homenatge a Miquel Coll i Alentorn en el seu vuitante aniversari* (Barcelona, 1984), 223–32; J.A. Sesma and J.A. Armillas, *La Diputación de Aragón: El gobierno aragonés del Reino a la Comunidad Autónoma* (Zaragoza, n.d.), 15–17.

⁵² *CDACA*, 48:56.

the scenes battles with Pere and his officials over the size and use of the subsidy.⁵³

Shaken by the obstinacy of the *tractatores* and the news of fresh Castilian victories along the Aragonese frontier near Tarazona, Pere lost all patience with the fiscal gridlock and called for a new panel of thirty-three deputies that the parliament swore in on February 4, 1363.⁵⁴ After two days of closeted negotiations at the Franciscan monastery in Monzón, the negotiators returned with a subsidy agreement, calling for the payment of 250,000 *libras* during the next year, a sum to be divided among the four realms on the basis of their population and economic strength. Though some disagreements about the tax burdens of the various estates remained, the *corts* seemed genuinely pleased that the subsidy negotiations were finally completed. When asked if they accepted the arrangement, many members of the parliament began to shout "in thunderous voices" "Yes! Yes!", repeating it many times.⁵⁵

Despite this apparent fiscal triumph, Pere could not contain his frustration at the humiliations that the parliamentary process of war funding had forced on him. Meeting with the full *corts* on the afternoon of February 11 in the Church of Santa Maria, the furious sov-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 57-58. *ad persecutionem guerre et defensionem republice.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 58-59. Names of new deputies: Aragon: (clergy)—Pedro Bishop of Tarazona, Pedro Ramon de Montelongo doctor of laws and vicar of the Archbishop of Zaragoza; (nobles)—Ferran marquis of Tortosa and lord of Albarrazin, Blasco de Alagon; (knights)—Pedro Jordan de Urres, Arnau de Francia; (town councils)—Zaragoza [Pedro Lope Sarnes, Miguel de Capiella], Daroca [Eximen Pedro Gil]. Catalonia: (clergy)—Pere Archbishop of Tarragona, Romeu Bishop of Lerida, Guillem Bishop of Urgel; (nobles and knights)—Ug Viscount of Cardona, Ramon de Pujol, Ramon de Pinello; (town councils)—Barcelona [Pere de Sant Clement], Lerida [Pere ces Comes], Perpignan [Ermengaud Martin]. Valencia: (clergy) P. de Tous Master of Montesa, Bernat Ordi official of the Bishop of Valencia, Asbert de Tous Commander General of Montesa; (nobles and knights)—Vital de Vilanova, Francisco de Spelluncis, Guerau de Fonte; (town councils)—Valencia [Jaume de Claramunt, Martin de Torres], Jativa [Francisco Carbonell]. Majorca: (clergy)—Jaume de Robes, Bartholomeu de Podioauluto, Brother Martin Magister; (town council)—Majorca [Joan de Mora, Ferran Umbert], Menorca [Bernat Dalmau].

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 60-63: In the words of the document, *voce tumultuosa responderunt "oc, oc" vicibus replicatis*. The subsidy was divided in the following way: Aragon: 60,000 *libras*; Catalonia: 122,000 *libras*; Majorca: 15,000 *libras*; and Valencia: 53,000 *libras*. Disputes arose between the Catalan clergy and nobles on one side and the Catalan townsmen on the other. It was finally "amicably settled" that the two groups would each pay half of the 122,000 *libras*. A dispute also arose about how each of the major Balearic islands would contribute to the subsidy and it was decided that the smaller islands of Menorca and Ibiza would contribute according to the level of earlier subsidies. The Balearic nobility would contribute to the tax fund of the Catalan nobles.

ereign delivered a bitter assessment of the meeting's work to that point. Hurt at the suggestions that he was not the military equal of his glorious ancestors, Pere angrily replied that "no knight living or dead could better defend the crown" than he,⁵⁶ this despite "the great disaster and misadventure" caused by the Castilian invasion, in which Pere stood to lose in fifteen days what had taken his predecessors five-hundred years to gain. By contrast, the *corts* and its negotiators had amassed such a "deficit of legal questions and debates" that they had wasted many precious months. Rather than being willing to make sacrifices for the good of the country, they had thought only of how to protect their "privileges and liberties."⁵⁷ If the front line troops ever found out about their selfishness, Pere was certain that the brave soldiers' bitter disapproval would echo across the contested frontier: "Let all these negotiators die in despair; let all those die who wish to remain safe."⁵⁸

It was now all too obvious that Pere was sick of both formal and backroom negotiations. The time for action had come and if they were to die, the exasperated king demanded that they do so with honor. All the assembly "on horseback, on foot or only with the shirts on their backs" should follow him to Zaragoza and there take on the Castilian interloper.⁵⁹

As if to bear out the royal exasperation, the *corts* met on the following day and continued to bicker over the distribution of expenses. While agreeing on the subsidy levels for the next year, many of the delegations attempted to lessen their own fiscal responsibilities by shifting them, at least partially, to their fellows in the other estates. In the Valencian deputation, at least one procurator for the clergy tried to avoid the agreed-on tax obligation by saying that he could only act for his principal, but could not oblige those who held benefices from that cleric. Such a well-worn excuse failed to satisfy an increasingly desperate sovereign who soon forced all the Valencians,

⁵⁶ Ibid., 63. *negun cavaller que sia al mon de morir o viure per defendre la nostra corona.* Pere is surely referring here to the glorious military exploits of his grandfather Pere II and his great-grandfather, Jaume I.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 63–64. *gran desastre e gran desaventura; desavenencia de questions et debats, privilegis et . . . libertats.*

⁵⁸ Ibid., 64. This cry would go up "from Tarazona to the Salses River and from the Salses River to Guardamar." *Muyren tots en malguany aquells tractadors; muyren que axi.ns volen fer a tuyt morir.*

⁵⁹ Ibid. *si cavalcant o a peu o en camises.*

even the legally scrupulous ones, to accede to the subsidy division.⁶⁰ For their own part, the Aragonese estates were less opposed to paying taxes, but had to decide how these would be reapportioned if any of the tax paying frontier towns or villages fell to the Castilians.⁶¹

Not surprisingly, the delegates from Catalonia proved the most litigious of all.⁶² Catalan clergy and nobles claimed that a number of villagers and other vassals who had previously been assigned to the tax rolls of the nobility should remain on the rolls during the tax levy of 1363. The urban estate firmly opposed this as “an innovation and an alienation” (*novacio e alienacio*). The king ultimately agreed with his townmen. In a second suit, smaller cities led by Lérida opposed Barcelona and Perpignan over how the urban tax burden would be assessed and collected. The two great cities wanted grants to be negotiated for each town; by contrast, the smaller towns insisted that the *fogatge*, the customary way of gathering war funds by assessing each urban hearth, be retained. Pere, sensing that Barcelona and Perpignan were attempting to avoid their fair share of taxes, sided with Lérida and its allies, ruling that the *fogatge* was the only “reasonable way” (*raonable . . . manera*) to equitably share war financing among all the Catalan towns.⁶³

By March 3, 1363, all the fiscal wrinkles had finally been ironed out and the king again stood before a full *corts* in the church of Santa Maria to have the subsidy ratified. Pere asked if the delegates approved of the financial package and they replied “in a single shout”: “It pleases us, lord. It pleases us.” At the same time, some of the parliamentary leaders held aloft the documents on which the proposed subsidy and its conditions were contained.⁶⁴ Theoretically,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 48:64–65. The syndic was Bernat Orti, the bishop of Tortosa’s representative. The Valencia subsidy division for 1363 was as follows: (clergy)—12,000 *libras*; (nobility)—15,000 *libras* (townsmen)—25,000 *libras*.

⁶¹ Ibid., 48:66–67. The Aragonese division was as follows: (clergy)—17,000 *libras*; (*ricoshombr*es and knights)—12,000 *libras*; (*infanzones*)—3,000 *libras*; (townsmen)—28,000 *libras*.

⁶² The fifteenth-century preacher, Vincente Ferrer, characterized the Catalan legal profession as “birds of prey who profited from drawing out lawsuits and filled books with useless words.” Antonio Aunós Pérez, *El derecho catalan en el siglo XIII* (Barcelona, 1926), 170–72; James S. Amelang, “Barristers and Judges in Early Modern Barcelona: The Rise of a Legal Elite,” *AHR* 89 (1984): 1266–67.

⁶³ *CDACA*, 48:67–68. See note 54 for Catalan distribution of 1363 tax among the estates.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 48:69. According to the document, “*simul et semel voce tumultuosa*”; “*Plau-nos senyor, plau-nos, . . . elevantes in altum aliqui ex eis scriptuaras in quibus continentur oblatio et condiciones sub quibus sit dicta oblatio.*”

by obtaining the much debated subsidy, Pere had finally won the first round. The *corts*, however, would now have the last say when the practicalities of the grant were worked out.

V

After the triumph of March 3, Pere engaged in almost a month of negotiation with the parliament before issuing ordinances for collection of the subsidy throughout his four realms. The king also ratified specific statutes for Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon. He used this period of “end-game” to resolve the grievances of various groups and individuals.⁶⁵ The royal “proposals” made to a number of these sessions are instructive, showing Pere’s unshaken view of his own sovereignty. Reminding his subjects of his “continuous zeal and anxiety” in service of the state which had led to countless “sleepless nights,” he proudly claimed that it was part and parcel of his royal majesty to see to the care of the Republic and seek out the advantage of his subjects so the utility of the realms and lands committed to him by the Almighty would persist unimpaired.⁶⁶

Despite these highflown sentiments, Pere knew he would not be able to stand up to the iniquitous Pedro I who commanded “a copious multitude of warriors” unless he surrendered some of his authority—at least temporarily—to the evolving fiscal administration of the war that the Monzón *corts* now claimed.⁶⁷

Pere’s desperation and the opportunism of the parliament made for an emerging political and economic system, marked by an ill-defined and fluctuating border of power between crown and *corts*. Pere was still the ultimate arbiter of military matters and when his realms suffered a surprise attack, the king could mount on his own initiative a national defense by invoking *Princeps namque* as he had done in 1359 when Pedro attempted an amphibious assault on

⁶⁵ Ibid., 48:70–218. The fiscal ordinances of Catalonia and Aragon were issued on March 6; those of Valencia on March 15. The statutes of Catalonia were issued on March 8 and those of Valencia on March 15. Ordinances were issued for the nobilities of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia on March 8; laws were enacted in regard to the city of Barcelona on March 12.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 48:151: *Quia decet regiam maiestatem ita rei publicae curam genere ac investigare comoda subjectorum ut regnorum et terrarum utilitad incorrupta persistat . . . nobis est studium et sollicitudo . . . a nobis cotidie cum labore aguntur et noctes transimus insomnes.*

⁶⁷ Ibid., 48:196–7.

Barcelona.⁶⁸ In contrast, in the on-going campaigns fought along the Castilian frontier, Pere's military actions were channeled by parliamentary directives.

In theory, Pere was able to choose how best to "convert" the subsidy "to the use of the war," and this meant allocation of war funds throughout his four realms in any proportion or manner he saw fit.⁶⁹ In reality, however, the royal war effort meekly followed the directives of its parliamentary financiers. What is more, the royal establishment had to be content with the income provided through these parliamentary grants. It was not to demand any further loans or extraordinary contributions of "money, silver, gold, wheat, fodder, or anything else" during the two years the grant was in effect.⁷⁰ The *corts* also disallowed for the same period any royal collection of ecclesiastical tithes, even those approved by the pope. Furthermore, it insisted that first fruits which came into royal coffers should be used exclusively for the repair of castles and urban fortresses.⁷¹

They would begin collecting the subsidy but only if the king moved to settle all of their grievances, whether connected with the war or not.⁷² Once the collection process began, the members of parliament

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 48:98 (art. 41); *Colección de las cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y Valencia y el principado de Cataluña* [CAVC], ed. Fidel Fita and Bienvenido Oliver, 27 vols. (Madrid, 1896–1922), 15:444–45; Pere III, 2:522–23 (VI:22); Zurita, ed Canellas Lopez, 4:376–79 (IX:xxiii); Kagay, "Prínceps namque," 68; Ferrer i Mallol, "Organización militar," 158–59. The Catalan national defense clause, *Prínceps namque*, was opposed by the Catalan towns in the 1362 assembly, who pledged the salary for three-hundred knights to hold the Pyrenean region of Roussillon against the threat of "great companies" (*grans companyes*) which would eventually spill out of Navarre into Catalonia. If such a full scale invasion occurred, the Catalans would put up a thousand knights. The king would have to name "a notable person" (*notable persona*) as a commander, to provide the supplies these troops would need, and to arrange for surveillance at the Pyrenees under the national defense clause. The townsmen were insistent that the other estates of Catalonia help them in this venture and assured the king that this minor theater of defense would not interfere with the two-year subsidy they had just voted for.

⁶⁹ *CDACA*, 48:108 (art. 13).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 48:119 (art. 14).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 48:110, 120–21, 126 (arts. 19, 20, 22, 37). Pere disagreed with the restriction of the tithe money and on March 7, 1363 divided equally for the next four years the tithe money between his clergy and himself [*CDACA*, 48:199]. For the military use of papal tithes and first fruits in the Crown of Aragon and other Iberian realms, see Kagay, "Army Mobilization," 103–4; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, *Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252–1369)* (Madrid, 1993), 203–10.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 48:94, 99, 146 (arts. 31, 46, 47). Grievances were to be presented to the king by a committee of eight, two lawyers and six other men, two from each estate. The complaints, which touched on the war, ranged from the royal practice of shanghaiing men to serve on fleets rapidly assembled to meet Castilian invasion

insisted that the king and his officials stay out of their way, warning that they would not obey royal orders that hampered their work.⁷³ Despite this defiant stance, the estates fully understood the potential jeopardy their activities might cause and so forced Pere to agree that he would assume ultimate responsibility for all fiscal actions taken in 1363–1365. The *corts* were also to guarantee that the activities of parliamentary tax collectors would not endanger the customary privileges of the realms composing the Crown of Aragon. Nor would the parliamentary agents during the next five years have to answer to the royal law for any alleged wrongdoing caused by the subsidy collection.⁷⁴

VI

In many ways, the financial arrangement that evolved from Monzón's stormy sessions constituted a "shadow government," one that leaned on the royal administration at many points, but, at the same time, firmly insisted on a jealously-guarded autonomy of action. The first question the *corts* had to answer was how much money did they owe the crown and when did they have to pay it. A second pressing concern focused on the division of the subsidy between the realms and their various estates. Despite bitter parliamentary wrangling over these issues, the ultimate determinant of how much money was collected and where it was used was the scale and general direction of the Castilian threat. Even a group as notoriously conservative and stingy as the Aragonese nobility had to admit that if more money was needed to defeat Pedro I, they would have to pay it.⁷⁵

The estates of Monzón were forced to make a number of crucial decisions about how the impost would be collected and who was subject to pay it. Though Catalan in origin, the *fogatge* provided a model of hearth tax assessment that could be used throughout all of Pere's realms.⁷⁶ This new model established a more equitable

to the *infante* Ferran's routine, though uncustomary use of "hospitality rights (*cena*) in Valencian cities and villages.

⁷³ Ibid., 48:85, 95, 97, 101, 107–8, 119–20, 124 (arts. 7, 12, 16, 32, 34–35, 39, 51).

⁷⁴ Ibid., 48:137, 139, 147 (arts. 24, 31, 42).

⁷⁵ Ibid., 48:84–85, 116–8 (arts. 5, 8, 9, 10). For parliamentary debates over tax divisions, see notes 54 and 62 above.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 48:92, 100–1 (arts. 23, 50); Maria Teresa Ainaga Andrés, "El fogaje

means for assessment for smaller sites that stood to pay much higher levels if the larger towns were able to bargain for one-time grants to the war effort which would significantly discount their contribution.⁷⁷ Even with this drive for equal fiscal responsibility, disputes would soon arise over how taxes would be apportioned if tax-paying frontier areas were overrun and how marginalized groups should be entered on to tax rolls.

The determining principle for such decisions remained how such groups were taxed in the past and what tax rolls they had appeared on. The precedent of past taxation became the determinant of present imposts. Thus the Pyrenean region of Coll de Paniçars above Catalonia and Aragon paid into Catalan coffers as it had in the past. Urban residents, even those with non-urban property paid their tax with the estate of the cities and towns. Jewish and Muslim populations throughout the Crown of Aragon contributed to the war effort at the same financial level as their Christian neighbors.⁷⁸

Even with these varied rules for a speedy and efficient collection of the war subsidy, the Monzón legislators realized from their earlier fiscal experience that certain pitfalls had to be overcome. The *corts* patently forbade any exchange between individuals or towns of the tax assessments levied upon them. This included attempts to trade extended military service of one group for the higher tax rates of another.⁷⁹

Despite their efforts to have the collection carried out as specified on paper, the members of the *corts* were experienced enough to realize that their king had already borrowed large sums to put troops on the endangered Aragonese frontier and that they too would have to borrow in the short term. Thus they thus allowed groups such as town councils to raise short term cash by borrowing from both Iberian and international bankers and farming out future revenues for a lump sum. It was hoped that all of this front end spending would be reimbursed over the next two years as the installments of

aragones de 1362: Aportación a la demografía de Zaragoza en el siglo XIV,” *Aragón en Edad Media* 8 (1989): 38–40; J. Iglesia Font, “El fogaje de 1365–1370,” *Memorias de la Real Academia de Ciencias y Artes* 34 (1962): 254–62; Josiah Cox Russell, *Medieval Regions and their Cities* (Newton Abbot, 1972), 168–69. For extraordinary imposts in contemporary Castile, see Ladero Quesada, 210–6.

⁷⁷ *CDACA*, 48:101 (arts. 52, 54). See note 62 above, for earlier debate between larger and smaller Catalan cities.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 48:94, 100–1, 104, 138 (arts. 2, 26, 29, 50, 53).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 48:120–21 (arts. 17, 23).

the subsidy came in.⁸⁰ Although such shaky financial practices that depended heavily upon loans would in the future become the norm for financing wars in eastern Spain, it was clear that the lawmakers of Monzón were concerned about escaping as quickly as possible from the burden they had shouldered in 1363. Their fiscal angst was reflected in disagreements over what would happen if a truce or even a peace treaty be concluded during the two year period of subsidy collection. On one hand, Valencia and Catalonia, totally distrusting the Castilian king, agreed with their own sovereign that the gathering of the impost should continue until the two-year period was completed; on the other hand, Aragon, almost bankrupted by over four years of war, insisted that if peace came, the payment of the subsidy should cease on that very day.⁸¹

Because of the great amount of time and effort needed to collect the subsidy and allocate this money to frontier troops, the general membership of the *corts* at Monzón turned the responsibility over to its representatives, many of whom may have come from among the thirty-three tax commissioners chosen in February, 1363. A delegation was selected from each realm to carry out the raising and allocation of funds during the term of the grant. This body came to be known as the *Diputació del General* or *Generalitat* (*Generalidad* in Aragon). Ultimately, it developed into three separate institutions existing alongside but distinct from the parliaments of the three peninsular realms.⁸² Gaining clear pledges from the king that neither he nor his family, nor their officials would interfere in the collection process, the members of these three tax delegations (referred to as the *generalidades* or *diputats*) would meet at a village centrally-located between the three realms where they would divide the tax receipts equally between Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. Money destined for the Balearics was often administered by Catalonia.⁸³ This recognition of the consolidation of three separate fiscal policies into one was perhaps most surprising in regard to Catalonia which often viewed the Aragonese, Valencians, and Majorcans less as allies than trading rivals.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 48:113, 123–24 (arts. 27, 31).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 48:91, 93 109–10, 125, 140–41 (arts. 17, 22, 34–35, 42).

⁸² Sesma and Armillas, *Diputació*, 17–23; O'Callaghan, *History of Medieval Spain*, 443–44; Bisson, *Medieval Crown of Aragon*, 118; José-Luis Martín, "Los Corts Catalanes del 1358," *Estudis de Història Medieval* 4 (1971): 80–81.

⁸³ *CDACA*, 48:123 (arts. 29–30).

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 48:76–77; 99–100 (arts. 4, 45, 49); *CAVC*, 2:251–60; Johannes de Socarrats,

Though freed from the interference of royal government, the taxmen of 1363 did not fully escape the fiscal example set by the Crown. The principal officials collecting the subsidy in many ways adapted royal administrative models. Thus they had as much in common with the king's financial officers as they did with municipal officials who carried out similar duties.⁸⁵ These functionaries included (1) the "tax collectors" (*cullidores*, *collidores*) who gathered money according to the tax lists given them;⁸⁶ (2) the "distributors" (*distribuydores*) who, "at their own expense and cost," transported the tax money to certain central collection points; (3) the "receivers" (*reebedors*, *recibidores*) who took control of the money which they eventually transported to the capital where other members of the *Diputació* would keep it safe in a strongbox fitted with three separate keys. The funds were eventually moved to the military frontier where they were used to pay companies of cavalry and garrison troops.⁸⁷

The accounts of officials who gathered the tax money and then transported it to its final destination were subject to intermittent inspection by "treasurers" (*clavaris*, *tesoreros*) and "overseers" (*oidors*, *definidors*, *administradores*). These auditors could "impugn, judge, absolve, condemn and rule on" the accounts as they saw fit.⁸⁸ They had ultimate responsibility for the allocation of military funds and the posting of troops.⁸⁹ Each of them had the right to appoint a support

In Tractatum Petri Alberti Canonici Barchinonensis de Consuetudines Cataloniae inter Dominos & Vassalos ac Nonnullis Aliis que Commemoraciones Petri Alberti Apellantur (Barcelona, 1551), 385–86, 390–95; José Angel Sesma Muñoz, "La fijación de fronteras enonómicas entre los estados de la Corona de Aragón," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 5 (1983): 155–61; Jaime Vicens Vives, *Manual de historia economica de España*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1964), 1:218–9. Even though the Catalan estates at Monzón agreed to use the subsidy money to defend the other states of the Crown of Aragon and claimed "good discretion" (*bona discreció*) to pay Catalan troops which accompanied the king outside of the Principate, this altruistic approach ran counter to long held beliefs which surfaced as late as 1358 and claimed that the Catalans did not have to render military service "in remote places" for "foreigners." This perception that the Aragonese and Valencians were foreign was born out by a five-percent tax gained by the Catalans at Monzón on all foreign cloth coming into Catalonia, including that from their partners in the Crown of Aragon.

⁸⁵ Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, "Cities and the State in Spain," in *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, ed. Charles Tilly and William P. Blockmans (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 170.

⁸⁶ *CDACA*, 48:90, 105–6, 118–9 (arts. 3, 4, 11, 17).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 48:87–88, 90, 105, 130 (arts. 1, 3, 13–14, 20).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 48:108–9, 120, 133 (arts. 9, 15, 18).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 48:87, 105, 116–7, 107–9, 120, 122–23, 130–34, 136–37 (arts. 1, 4, 6–10, 13, 15, 19, 23, 27–28).

staff, all members of which were paid a daily salary according to their status and the nature of their work.⁹⁰

The auditors were representatives of the parliamentary estates; those appointed from the clergy and nobility served for the entire two years while urban appointees held office for a much shorter period, after which they were replaced by new men from other major cities of eastern Spain. If any person appointed by the *corts* fell ill or for any other reason were unable to continue carrying out his duties, the overseers or the *corts* itself would name a replacement who would serve out the rest of the grant period.⁹¹

All the taxmen of 1363 swore before the king, royal officials, and their estate in the Monzón assembly that they would carry out their duties well and loyally . . . and advantageously as they could . . . for the advantage of the war effort and [would not be swayed] by the fear or love of the king or . . . of any other person.⁹²

Nevertheless, the temptation of financial aggrandizement and of settling old scores often proved impossible to resist. Since the collectors and receivers now possessed an authority not dissimilar to that of royal fiscal officers, their possibilities for extortion and small scale embezzlement seemed endless. For their supervisors who issued "assessments of money needed" (*estimes*), collected "receipts" (*mostres*) and paid off "IOUs" (*albaras*), the attraction of easy money by manipulating accounts was only held in check by the occasional audit conducted by members of the royal treasury.⁹³

⁹⁰ Ibid., 48:88, 106, 122, 132, 134–35 (arts. 5–6, 8 14–17, 19, 27). In Catalonia, the standard daily salary rate was 25 *sous* for most of the officials appointed by the *corts*. For the keepers of the strongbox, the salary depended on their class: clergy and nobles received 60 *sous* a day; others received 30 *sous* if they traveled and 20 *sous* if they did not. In Valencia, the rate for travel days was 20 *sous* and for all others was 15 *sous*. The salary level was not specified in Aragon but was controlled by the overseers and treasurers and assessed "from their duties and the demands of their office."

⁹¹ Ibid., 48:89, 93, 103, 107, 110, 134, 136–37 (arts. 8, 13, 15, 18, 23, 26, 58). In Catalonia, the first specified urban appointees were chosen from the town councils of Barcelona and Lerida. After six months, they would be replaced by representatives from Perpignan and Gerona. In Valencia, the urban representatives served annually. In the first year, two each were sent to serve from Valencia and Xativa. In the second year, Alcañiz, Morella, Murviedro, and Burriana would each send one representatives. The Aragonese ordinances did not specify which towns would be represented, but it seems clear that Zaragoza was dominant in this regard.

⁹² Ibid., 48:88, 107, 122–23, 132 (arts. 7, 8, 14, 28): *be e leyallment; como mellor e mas proveytosament podran; proveyto de la guerra; temor o amor del senyor Rey ni . . . de nenguna altra persona.*

⁹³ Ibid., 48:87, 105, 116, 131–33 (arts. 1 6, 8, 11, 14). This provision of royal fiscal inspection was largely due to Pere's insistence.

All royal attempts to subordinate the activities of the upper rungs of the Monzón tax establishment to Pere's own treasury were decidedly unsuccessful. With control over tax receipts and such extraordinary sources of revenue as security bonds, penalties, and a portion of the plunder won by frontier troops as well as the right to let contracts and purchase anything they deemed necessary "at any price," the deputies controlled a formidable financial network. Often, they had to answer for their misuse of these powers only to the estates which appointed them.⁹⁴

As great an enticement for the tax officials as embezzling or extorting cash was the very considerable authority their offices conferred upon them. Granted by the *corts* "full and sufficient power" (*pleno e bastant poder*), they could issue documents which were authenticated by a "common seal [issued] by the authority of the *Corts*," set tax levels, and vote penalties for recalcitrant taxpayers.⁹⁵ The Monzón tax officials investigated each case of non-compliance to the grant and took appropriate action. If persons on the tax rolls had fallen into poverty, their share for the subsidy would be reapportioned within the group to which they belonged.⁹⁶ The officials were empowered to "destrain" (*fer execucions*) the goods of those who refused to pay into the subsidy and to carry out such confiscations "without a legal suit, a written directive, and only by their own authority."⁹⁷

Since the collection schedule was firmly set, "no delay, appeal, or bond (to assure future payment)" would be tolerated. The collectors were authorized in any way they saw fit to force into compliance those "who had refused or neglected to pay" their share. If an armed force was needed to accomplish this end, the recalcitrant taxpayer would eventually pay for it as well.⁹⁸ When officials did resort to armed force to bring in taxes, both they and the delinquent taxpayer suffered great "threat and dishonor" as well as "damage and peril."⁹⁹ To avoid a tax war between his subjects when they were already locked in conflict with the Castilian king, Pere gave towns and villages the right to defend themselves from overzealous collectors

⁹⁴ Ibid., 48:91, 93–95, 105, 110, 131–33 (arts. 1, 7, 10, 21, 28, 30, 32).

⁹⁵ Ibid., 48:88, 92–93, 96, 105–6, 131 (arts. 1, 4, 6, 14, 24, 27, 36). This certifying instrument was similar to the "Seal of Catalonia" (*Segell de Catalunya*).

⁹⁶ Ibid., 48:93 (art. 27).

⁹⁷ Ibid., 48:118–9, 131 (arts. 5, 11, 15): *sens plet e sens scrit e solament de nua paraula*.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 48:118 (art. 11).

⁹⁹ Ibid., 48:144 (art. 48).

who often exceeded their authority, becoming little better than tax vigilantes. The king repeatedly insisted that tax disputes be settled by royal or local officials who were instructed to use arbitration more than constraint in their collection of the subsidy.¹⁰⁰

In many cases, the promises of the Monzón tax personnel to make “good, useful, and necessary provisions” for the gathering of the subsidy and then “deliver good, truthful, and accurate accounts” proved hollow ones.¹⁰¹ Though in desperate need of the money the subsidy would produce, Pere was extremely suspicious of the complex tax organization that emerged from the *corts* in 1363. On several occasions when the assembly was in session, he attempted to tether it to oversight by his own treasury and judicial officials. The *corts*, fearing that they might be held responsible for malfeasance proclaimed that they themselves would investigate and punish any official wrongdoing associated with the subsidy collection.

Blocked from immediate judicial oversight, the king settled on a long term strategy: all those chosen by the *corts* to collect the subsidy were forbidden to obtain posts in royal government for a period of ten years. What is more, they were to submit their accounts to a formal royal audit after six years. By this judicial patience, Pere hoped to finally punish the “crimes and excesses” he was certain the subsidy collection would cause.¹⁰²

VII

If the crown was worried that the tax establishment fashioned at Monzón might usurp some of the prime functions of its own government, it was also troubled by the military role that the *corts* had assumed in 1362–1363. As “head of the commonwealth of all his realms and lands,” Pere was willing (if only grudgingly) to allow parliamentary autonomy in the gathering of the subsidy. He also agreed to listen to the delegates’ “good and sane counsel concerning the conflict with the Castilian king.” On the other hand, he was not prepared for how far the estates would ultimately go in assuming

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 48:138, 145–46 (arts. 26, 44–45).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 48:132, 137 (arts. 8, 25).

¹⁰² Ibid., 48:97, 140 (arts. 34, 40).

control over the army in the field.¹⁰³ For the king, such actions represented a clear violation of his traditional military prerogatives.¹⁰⁴

When the king insisted that the duty the parliament was restricted to “distribution of the [grant] money,” the estates of Monzón retorted that their broader fiscal activity could not be divorced from the control of the troops paid for by this money. Consequently, they empowered their deputies to consult with such war captains as Enrique de Trastámara, Bernat de Cabrera, and Prince Ferran concerning the number of troops needed and where they should be posted along the frontier.¹⁰⁵ The warriors, however, were junior partners in this arrangement; the deputies set the daily rate of pay and issued a number of ordinances which attempted to assure that they received full value for their investment. The salaries were paid not to individuals but rather to contingents. Each unit of “heavy cavalry” (*cavall armat, caballo armado*), consisted of a knight, a mounted squire, and two footmen, and was distinguished by its heavier armor and a greater range of weapons. By contrast, a unit of “light cavalry” (*cavall alforrat, caballo desarmado*), consisted of only a knight and two footmen, all of them possessing lighter armor.¹⁰⁶

For the *corts*, the funding of the frontier troops allowed extensive parliamentary regulation of these men, even though they answered directly to their own leaders. The grant money and how it was spent was naturally the estates’ main concern. Adamant that the process of mounting a defense against Pedro would entail as little waste as possible, they insisted that Pere use the collected subsidy strictly for military purposes—carrying out actual battle operations, garrisoning

¹⁰³ Ibid., 48:99, 115 (arts. 3, 44): *cap de la cosa publica de tots sos regnes e terres; su consello . . . bueno e sano de la batalla con el rey de Castiella.*

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 48:98, 108, 142 (arts. 15, 40, 41). The Aragonese and Catalans allowed Pere to raise and direct “a general host or cavalcade” (*ost o cavalcada*) according to traditional norms, the Valencians specified with extreme clarity who would have to serve in such a force “for the protection of the utility of all . . . the realm” (*esguarda la utilitat de tot . . . regne*) and what would happen to them if they did not.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 48:119, 134–35 (arts. 12, 19).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 48:84, 119, 135 (arts. 5, 13, 18); *CAVC*, 15:445; Ferrer i Mallol, “Organización militar,” 168–70. The daily salary set by the Catalans was 7 *sous* of Barcelona for heavy cavalry; 5 *sous* for light cavalry; for the Aragonese, it was 7 *sous* of Jaca for heavy cavalry and 5 *sous* for light cavalry; for Valencia, it was 6 *sous* for heavy cavalry and 5 *sous* for light cavalry. The normal daily rate for crossbowmen was 6 dinars. For money in the Crown of Aragon and Castile, see Fowler, 1:306–7; Felipe Mateu i Llopis, *Glossario hispánico de numismática* (Barcelona, 1946), s.v. *dinar* (*dinero*); *dobla*; *florin*; *libra*; *maravedi*; *sou* (*suelto*).

castles, and relieving his own towns “besieged and attacked by war engines or trebuchets.”¹⁰⁷ When the Monzón assembly spent money on companies of cavalry to patrol the embattled borders or to employ corsairs to protect the Catalan and Valencian coast, it felt no qualms in closely regulating such units and their leaders.¹⁰⁸ Though given some freedom of action within the framework of the Monzón ordinances, the hired commanders and “captains of the fleet” were held legally responsible for any crime they or their men committed while on the parliamentary payroll.¹⁰⁹

Beyond the fear that it might lose control of its hired warriors, the *corts* was also gravely concerned that grant money destined for largescale military campaigns might be openly misspent. To avert fiscal malfeasance, the Aragonese towns ruled that there could be no distinctions made between the knights sent to fight Castile. As equals, they would all receive the same salary and equipment, thus heading off disputes and facilitating the accounting process.¹¹⁰ The Aragonese and Valencians, the people most directly affected by the war, attempted to prevent fraud concerning the service of their military employees by declaring that only those whose names were listed on the pay vouchers and muster rolls would receive a salary. This expedient was designated to prevent anyone from sending a substitute. If men or horses were killed in combat, they would be removed from the pay lists.¹¹¹ The Aragonese and Valencians also discouraged individual offenses among the troops by withholding salaries until men had taken up their military posts. If these troops did not go to the frontier or left it without the permission of their captain before completing their term of service (two to six months), the parliamentary deputies could force them to return all or part of the salary they had received to that point.¹¹²

This close supervision proved extremely unpopular with field commanders and their men as did the parliament’s insistence that the royal fifth customarily deducted from all plunder won would be paid into the subsidy fund. Unmoved by any altruistic affection for the

¹⁰⁷ *CDACA*, 48:107, 142 (arts. 11, 39).

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 48:86 (arts. 11–12).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 149, 188 (arts. 40, 54).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 48:107 (art. 10).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 48:110–11, 135–36 (arts. 19, 20–21, 23).

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 48:161 (arts. 28–30).

crown, the legislators of 1363 looked on captured booty as merely another source of profit that could be utilized to pay military salaries and arrange for the transport of supplies.¹¹³

While control of war funding was foremost to the lawmakers of Monzón, they did not stop there. Instead, they proceeded to issue even broader regulations for the frontier troops specifying such things as the proper standards of weaponry and armament for both heavy and light cavalry and the means by which they were to be supplied. In line with the ancient norms of host duty, the ordinances of 1363 not only called for frontier troops to be fully armed when going on active service, but even set forth in detail what they were expected to bring with them.¹¹⁴ For the “heavy cavalry” the knight had to have a “padded doublet” (*perpunt*), “chain mail” (*loriga*), and “other knightly weapons.” The “light cavalry” were required to have a “breast plate” (*cuyrase*), a “mail shirt” (*camisol*), a “helmet” (*bacinet*), a “leather shield” (*darga de scut*), and an “*assegai* or lance” (*atzagaya, lança*). The equipment of the two ranks seemed to differ only in the more extensive armor for horses and footmen characteristic of the “heavy cavalry.” The *corts* considered proper weaponry so important for all of its hired soldiers that it empowered the deputies to confiscate or hold back half of the salary of ill-equipped troops.¹¹⁵

While the troops thus used much the same equipment, they themselves were an amalgam of clerical, aristocratic, and urban contingents. It was not unusual for noble commanders to lead town units into battle. In an attempt to prevent the breakup of urban companies, the Aragonese estate representing the towns insisted that their troops fight as a detachment under “insignia and banners” of the urban council that had sent them to the front. Members of an urban company could transfer to other units, but only with the permission of the town leaders who had presumably funded their service.¹¹⁶

At Monzón, the estates regarded the troops stationed along the Aragonese and Valencian borders as particularly crucial in the war

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 48:113, 136 (arts. 21, 28).

¹¹⁴ For host service, see Antonio Palomeque Torres, “Contribución al estudio del ejército en los estados de la reconquista,” *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 15 (1944): 231–53; Fernando Fondevilla, “La nobleza catalano-aragonesa por Ferran Sanchez de Castro en 1274,” *I CHCA*, 1:1097–99, 1117–20, 1129–30, 1132–33, 1150–53; Kagay, “Structures,” 64.

¹¹⁵ *CDACA*, 48:135 (art. 18); Contamine, *War* 175–88.

¹¹⁶ *CDACA*, 112 (art. 25).

effort against Castile. As a result, they paid special attention to supplying these units in a timely manner. In earlier campaigns, stockpiling of sufficient supplies had always been a problem for royal military administrators; for their part, the parliaments found transport of war material an even greater obstacle.¹¹⁷ During the first phase of the conflict (1356–1361) the royal government has engendered a good deal of ill will by confiscating mules and pack horses (*atzemblas, bestias*) and then failing or refusing to return them to their owners. To avoid a repeat of this, the *corts* ruled that its deputies could only transport military supplies on pack trains consisting of animals registered by local judges. If the army failed to return these animals to their owners or to pay the required fee for their use, the parliamentary officials would confiscate or hold back a portion of the salary of any military units to which the pack train had carried supplies.¹¹⁸

VIII

Shortly after the *corts* of Monzón promulgated the detailed subsidy ordinances so repugnant to Pere, he left the assembly, the scene of so many months of frustration and humiliation, and moved his court closer to the Aragonese frontier. It was his hope to settle at long last his score with the iniquitous Castilian king—a hope never to be fulfilled.¹¹⁹ Monzón had been a galling necessity for Pere who, like his royal counterparts in medieval England, considered it the king's prerogative to raise and disburse the funds in fortifying castles, paying soldiers' wages, and undertaking other necessary military functions.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Kagay, "Army Mobilization," 110–11.

¹¹⁸ *CDACA*, 48:109, 188 (arts. 16, 41). For muleteers and pack trains, see *CDACA*, 4:11–12; Richard W. Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), 230; Thomas Savery, "The Mule," *Scientific American* 223 (1970): 104; J.L. Allhands, *The Mule* (Los Angeles, Calif., 1965), 13–14; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York, 1973), 1:189, 384–85.

¹¹⁹ Pere III, 2:536–40 (VI:33–35); Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, "Los Ingleses en España (Siglo XIV)," *Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón* 4 (1951): 215–30; L.J. Andrew Villalon, "The War of the Two Pedros: An Overview of the Conflict," (Paper delivered at the Thirty-fifth Annual Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Mich., May 7, 2000), 9–12.

¹²⁰ Richard FitzNigel, *Dialogue of the Exchequer*, ed. Charles Johnson (Edinburgh, 1950), 2; Jim Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), 74.

This truism was even more painfully true for Pere who faced a multi-front war conducted along lightly-defended boundaries against an implacable foe. Because of the critical state of affairs brought on by Pedro I's "sudden invasion," the Aragonese king did not dare let slip the mask of royal dignity that medieval monarchs fashioned for their office and attempted to wear on occasions of pomp and ceremony such as the meeting of a parliament.¹²¹ Before and during the *corts*, Pere continually portrayed himself as "a just, wise, and prudent ruler" as well as "a hardy, battle-tested, valiant [general]."¹²² According to his self-portrait, he acted only for the "common good" and equated this with the ultimate defeat of his archenemy, a man beyond the pale of honor and civilization. He linked the Monzón estates to this sanctimonious job description by graciously turning over to them full control of the subsidy which he could hardly do without since success in the Castilian war "meant more to their interest than to anyone else's."¹²³

Behind this facade of altruistic common action stood Pere, a man who despite, manipulative skills of a diplomat, could easily give way to his brutal temper. Increasingly, his patience wore thin as the estates at Monzón muddled their way through month after month of debate, without (from Pere's perspective) few practical results to show for it. Rather than straining to safeguard the "public utility" as they had sworn to do on a number of occasions, the members of parliament, at least in Pere's troubled mind, were only thinking of "their own private interests."¹²⁴ By the end of this interminable process, the king had reached his breaking point. Throwing aside empty ritual, he delivered an impassioned speech on February 11, 1363, in which he vented his frustration with the "self seeking" estates. In the course of this oration (surely one of the greatest in eastern Spanish parliamentary annals), Pere threatened to face his adversary without funds and accompanied by only the small band

¹²¹ Donald J. Kagay, "Rule and Mis-Rule in Medieval Iberia," *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 21 (2000): 48–51; *The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), 34–39.

¹²² *Parlaments*, 42–48; Alfonso X, *Las Siete Partidas*, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott, ed. Robert I. Burns, S.J., 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 2001), 2:271–72 (Part. II, tit. II, l. 5–6); Teofilo F. Ruiz, "Unsacred Monarchy: The Kings of Castile in the Late Middle Ages," in *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages*, ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia, 1985), 123–24.

¹²³ *CDACA*, 48:99 (art. 44).

¹²⁴ Contamine, *War*, 275–76.

of faithful retainers who would follow him on to the battlefield, arguably, to certain death. While some of this speech was colored by rhetorical flourishes, it accurately reflected the king's growing disdain for the pettiness demonstrated by the Monzón estates, as well as his fear of the political autonomy their group action was beginning to fashion.

Pere's assessment of the assembly of 1362–1363 was in some ways extremely accurate. The general *corts* held in Monzón was indeed a collection of loosely bound lobby groups whose concern for the enhancement of their local privileges, and of the protection of their "homelands" (*patrias*), far outweighed any concern they had for the other lands ruled by their sovereign. What the king could hardly afford to recognize was the fact that divisions between and within his major realms were often the result of royal policies in place for well over a century, policies that promoted one land or class over another.¹²⁵ These fissures became readily apparent in the give-and-take required for the passage of Monzón's ordinances. These were promulgated not as one set of laws for the entire Crown of Aragon, but as particular and transitory statutes. They applied separately to the realms of Catalonia, the Balearics, and Valencia. Within Aragon, however, each parliamentary estate issued ordinances that bound only the members of that group.

Though ruled by the same sovereign, these realms seldom engaged in joint action and viewed each other economically and politically as foreigners.¹²⁶ In 1363, the level of taxation in each of these realms accurately reflected its economic well being (what we might call its gross national product): Catalonia paid the most, thereafter came Valencia, Aragon, and the Balearics, in that order.

Within each realm, divisions between estates were particularly glaring at Monzón. The clergy and aristocracy tended to act in tandem to reduce their tax burden and shift it to the urban estate on the pretext that towns, as centers of trade and manufacture, were more prosperous and thus better fitted to pay higher tax levels. The means of subsidy collection also lay bare societal fault lines. The *fogatge*, though assessed on each household, did not fall equally on all tax-

¹²⁵ *LF*, 2:296 (chap. 392); Sesma Muñoz, "Transformaciones," 283.

¹²⁶ José Angel Sesma Muñoz, "Estado y nacionalismo en la baja edad media: La formación del sentimiento nacionalista aragonés," *Aragon en la Edad Media* 7 (1987): 251–53. See note 84 for Catalan economic exceptionalism.

payers; in fact, this form of impost collection, that could be carried out quickly and at relatively low cost, extracted from rural families a much greater portion of their real income than it did from those living in cities. Even within the cities, disputes over means of collection arose between the larger centers which, as a result of their wealth, might negotiate significant tax discounts and the smaller one which could not compete in this way and thus demanded the equal assessment without regard to size.¹²⁷ On all these levels, Pere drew an accurate portrait of Monzón when he accused the members of the assembly of only “wishing for your own good and guarding your own privileges and liberties.”¹²⁸

Even with his frustration at parliamentary gridlock, Pere could ill-afford to complain about ready cash that would flow into his military coffers at regular intervals for the next two years.¹²⁹ Fiscal desperation and a desire to gain fuller control over the allocation of military funding formed a powerful symbiotic relationship between crown and parliament, one which would remain long after the conflict had ended.

Theoretically, the cautious and farseeing action of the *corts* was designed to put the royal war effort on a firmer footing for two years to come. In reality, Pere ran through the money before this term had expired; consequently, in 1364 and 1365, he again appeared before parliaments, requesting further revenues to continue the fight against Pedro.¹³⁰ It is uncertain if the subsidy ordinances enacted at Monzón were followed in all respects during these later collections.¹³¹ However, even with these variations in the way war subsidies were gathered, the *Diputació del General*, an institution given its birth certificate in the general parliaments of 1359 and 1362–1363, prospered and by the turn of the century had found a regular place in the governing structures of all three realms—Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia. In the process, it had transformed itself from an extraordinary tax commission to a permanent executive board of the national assembly.¹³²

¹²⁷ Sesma Muñoz, “Transformaciones,” 285–89.

¹²⁸ *CDACA*, 48:64: “*volets vostre ben propri et guardats vostres privilegis et vostres libertats.*”

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 48:115 (art. 3).

¹³⁰ Arxiu Capitular de la Catedral, Barcelona, Ms. 30411–30414; *CAVC*, 2:232–329; Ferrer i Mallol, “Organización militar,” 168; Sesma Muñoz, “Transformaciones,” 282.

¹³¹ *CDACA*, 48:91, 98, 149 (arts. 21, 43, 56); Ainaga Andres, 49–57.

¹³² Sesma and Armillas, *Diputació*, 27–54; Ignacio Rubio y Cambroner, *La Diputació*

Not surprisingly, the constant financial drain caused by the War of the Two Pedros also revolutionized war funding in Castile, but there the royal bureaucracy, rather than the parliament, made paying for war its business.¹³³ Though this latter model for war funding would eventually be adapted in eastern Spain after the marriage of the Catholic Kings in 1469, Monzón was an important milestone in the formation of a national fiscal system for most of Iberia (excluding Portugal), a process which one important economic historian of modern Spain reminds us was “a living element which evolves to the rhythm of society and as such . . . is a continual transformation.”¹³⁴

del General de Catalunya, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1950), 1:135–53; José Martínez Aloy, *La diputación de la generalidad del reino de Valencia* (Valencia, 1930); Sesma Muñoz, “Transformaciones,” 286–89.

¹³³ Luis Suárez Fernández, “The Kingdom of Castile in the Fifteenth Century,” in *Spain in the Fifteenth Century 1369–1516*, ed. Roger Highfield, trans. Frances M. López-Morillas (New York, 1972), 93.

¹³⁴ Sesma Muñoz, “Transformaciones,” 237.



Map 9. Crown of Aragon.



Map 10. Counties of Catalonia.

WAR AND PEACE IN MEDIEVAL IBERIA:
CASTILIAN-GRANADAN RELATIONS
IN THE MID-FOURTEENTH CENTURY

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Osama bin Laden, in a message broadcast in October, 2001 said: "Let the whole world know that we shall never accept that the tragedy of Andalus would be repeated in Palestine. We cannot accept that Palestine will become Jewish."¹ While the precise intent of bin Laden's analogy is not clear, the fate of the two regions, from a Muslim perspective, evokes a strong sense of loss. More to the point, bin Laden's words pay homage to a long tradition lamenting the demise of al-Andalus, medieval Europe's sole Islamic state, of which the kingdom of Granada was its last incarnation.

Echoing the reaction of other religious fundamentalists when facing reversals of fortune, those of Islam have attributed Granada's eventual demise at the close of the fifteenth century to an absence of piety and the neglect of religious duties in favor of vainglorious and worldly pursuits, such as "art, music and poetry."² Although the Granadans were accomplished in the arts, especially during the latter half of the fourteenth century,³ this attribution does great injustice

¹ Osama bin Laden's declarations were widely circulated; the version cited here is from *The Militant*, vol. 65/No. 41, October 29, 2001 (www.themilitant.com/2001/6541/654156.html).

² María Jesús Rubiera Mata, "Al Andalus, Palestina y Osama bin Laden," *El periódico on line*, www.elperiodico.es/EDICION/EDO_11011/CAS/CARPO1/texO27asp. On the subject of Muslim nostalgia over the loss of Al Andalus, Professor Rubiera Mata refers the reader to the work of Pedro Martínez Montávez who has studied its literary manifestations from the Middle Ages to the present.

³ Granada was the cultural center of medieval Islam in the West and a magnet for Muslim artists and intellectuals from throughout the western Mediterranean. Several prominent individuals were associated with Granada during this period, not all born in the Peninsula; Ibn al-Khatib, a Granada native and Muhammad V's vizier, combined his official responsibilities with extensive writing in several genres, poetry, epistolary literature and history, among them. Much of what we know about Granada and North Africa in the fourteenth century is derived from the works of this prolific writer as well as from Ibn Khaldun's, the great Tunisian historian and philosopher of history, who had extensive contacts with Granada, where he lived

to the historical record. The fate of the Iberian Muslim kingdom of Granada, in fact, exemplifies just the opposite; its relatively long life, not its death, begs for an explanation. As Francisco Vidal Castro recently observed, Granada's very existence might well be one of her most unique characteristics.⁴ Indeed, medieval Granada persevered in the face of extraordinary odds.⁵

This essay will examine in some detail one important chapter in the story of Granada, namely the kingdom's survival during the upheavals that shook western Europe in the second half of the fourteenth century. Since neighboring Castile was Granada's most persistent territorial rival, an analysis of the interaction between the two kingdoms sheds light on the resilience of the Granadans and their success in fending off frequent, and at times overwhelming, external threats. Much of the credit belongs to the Granadan monarch, Muḥammad V (1354–59, 1362–1391), whose sagacity and good judgment combined to steer his kingdom through perilous times. In the pages that follow, the story of his reign will be a principal concern, as much because his achievements deserve to be better known⁶ as

in the early 1360's. The poet Ibn Marzuq, bom in Tlemcen, spent time in Granada as well, where he established numerous political and intellectual contacts. The Granadan emirs Ismā'īl I and his son, Muḥammad V, are credited with the building of the Alhambra palace; Muḥammad also founded the first and only Granadan *madrasa*. For architecture and the visual arts, see *Al-Andalus. The Art of Islamic Spain*, ed. Jerrilynn D. Dodds (New York: 1992), esp. 127–71; Antonio Fernández-Puertas, "El Arte," in *El reino Nazarí de Granada (1232–1492). Sociedad, vida y cultura. Historia de España Menéndez Pidal*, vol. VIII:4 (hereafter 4), ed. María Jesús Viguera Molins (Madrid, 2000), 193–284. See also Rachel Arié, "Les échanges culturels entre le royaume Nasride de Grenade et les pays Musulmans de la Méditerranée," *Aspects de l'Espagne musulmane. Histoire et culture* (Paris, 1997), 65–81; *Historia del Reino de Granada [HRG]*, vol. 1, *De los orígenes a la época mudéjar*, ed. Rafael Peinado Santaella (Granada, 2000).

⁴ Francisco Vidal Castro, "Historia política," in *El reino Nazarí de Granada (1232–1492). Política, instituciones, espacio y economía. Historia de España Menéndez Pidal*, vol. VIII:3 (hereafter 3) ed. María Jesús Viguera Molins. (Madrid, 2000) 49–75, esp. 49. The same sentiment is echoed by other contributors to this excellent and much-needed study of medieval Granada. For a detailed map of the progress of the Castilian Reconquest in relation to Granada, see María del Carmen Jiménez Mata, "La división administrativa," in *El reino Nazarí*, 3:276. See also Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, "El Reino de Granada y la Corona de Castilla en la Baja Edad Media," in *HRG*, 1:189–210.

⁵ The bibliography on medieval Granada is quite extensive; the works cited in this essay pertain directly to the issues at hand and represent only a small sample; for a comprehensive listing see *El reino Nazarí*, 4:446–534.

⁶ The only lengthy treatment of his reign is Ahmad Mukhtar Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada en la época de Muhammad V* (Madrid, 1973).

for the fact that the fundamental qualities of his statecraft have much to teach us about the fourteenth century—and about our own. His friendship and collaboration with his Castilian counterpart Pedro I (1350–1369), are of special interest. Finally, in historical junctures like ours, when discerning who is a friend and who is an enemy is no easy task, it is useful to examine how two historically antagonistic medieval kingdoms on the periphery of Europe, responded to the threats of the Hundred Years War.

I

Muḥammad V ascended to the Granadan throne in 1354, four years after his kingdom narrowly escaped defeat at the hands of an international Christian army commanded by Alfonso XI of Castile (1313–1350). In the next decades, Muḥammad distinguished himself as much for his ability to safeguard his kingdom's frontiers as for his political longevity; his reign is the second longest of the Naṣrid line and his accomplishments unrivaled in the history of the dynasty.⁷

Muḥammad succeeded his father Yūsuf I (1333–1354), following the king's assassination at the hands of an unbalanced stable hand. He reigned from 1354 to 1359 when he was overthrown by his half-brother Ismā'īl, Yūsuf's favorite younger son by a second wife. Ismā'īl reigned briefly as Ismā'īl II (1359–1360) and was himself overthrown by Abū Sa'ād, a cousin and co-conspirator, who then ruled as Muḥammad VI (1360–1362). In 1362, Pedro I of Castile (1350–1369) provided Muḥammad V with the necessary support to regain the crown by force of arms.

Granadan rulers, like Muḥammad V, his father, and his several rivals, often fell victim to palace coups, assassination attempts, and other forms of political subversion, many orchestrated by their own relatives.⁸ During the second stage of his reign that lasted until 1391,

⁷ Muḥammad I (1232–1273) the dynasty's founder, enjoyed the longest rule, some thirty-nine years.

⁸ Muḥammad III was deposed by his brother Naṣr in 1309, himself overthrown by Ismā'īl II in 1314. Ismā'īl was assassinated in 1325, and was followed on the throne by his son Muḥammad IV, who was also assassinated in 1333. His brother and successor Yūsuf I, Muḥammad V's father, suffered the same fate. Ladero Quesada, "El Reino de Granada," 190–91.

Muḥammad managed to escape the fate that had earlier befallen him. Given the fact that internal political stability (or lack thereof) often played a decisive role in Granada's response to and conduct of external affairs, this long respite was a crucial feature of the kingdom's survival. Moreover, this prolonged period of political stability fostered unprecedented artistic, commercial and cultural developments, which greatly enhanced Granada's standing in the Peninsula and throughout the Muslim world.

II

The Naṣrid kingdom, of Granada inherited by Muḥammad was founded in 1232 by Ibn al-Amar Naṣr (1232–1273). The dynasty's founder developed a realistic policy that included accommodation with an increasingly confident Castile, a flexible and masterful diplomacy with neighboring states (both Christian and Muslim) exploiting their weaknesses and frequent territorial clashes, and an effective use of scarce resources to safeguard Granada's frontiers.⁹ With an estimated population of only 300,000, compared to Castile's several million,¹⁰ Granada was no match for its neighbor to the north. And

⁹ Granada became a vassal to Castile, and was obligated to pay tribute (*parias*) to the Castilian crown.

¹⁰ Cristóbal Torres Delgado, "Aspectos generales de la población, las ciudades y la economía," in *El reino Nazarí*, 4:533–561, esp. 537. Notwithstanding the dearth of data, the figure for Granada is accepted by most researchers, including M.A. Ladero Quesada, *Granada: Historia de un país islámico* (Madrid, 1989) and R. Arié, *España musulmana (Siglos VIII–XV)* (Barcelona, 1983). Population estimates for Castile vary substantially for the fourteenth century, from a low of three million to a high of six; for the former, see Bernard F. Reilly, *The Medieval Spains* (Cambridge, 1993), 138; for the latter, Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), 459. The size, and population, of the various peninsular kingdoms in the fourteenth century has been estimated as follows: Granada, 30,000 square kilometers, 300,000 inhabitants; Castile, 355,000 sq. kms, 3–5 million inhabitants; Aragon, 120,000 sq. kms, one million inhabitants; Navarre, 10,000 sq. kms, 100,000 inhabitants; Portugal, 90,000 sq. kms., 800,000 inhabitants. Reilly, *Medieval Spains*, 139, 191. With regard to their armies, mutual encomia and respect for the other's military prowess aside, including reference to the fact that Muslim soldiers were the first to use gunpowder in the Peninsula (1324), the renown of the Muslim light cavalry, and Muḥammad V's boast that Granada had 14,000 watch towers, Castile enjoyed military superiority over its neighbor. According to M.J. Viguera Molíns, "Granada . . . [unlike Castile] was unable to develop new political, economic and social structures in its armed forces, and to its clear disadvantage did not apply new defenses, strategies and arms to modernize the army" (my translation) ["El

while scholars continue to be puzzled by why it took so long for Granada to succumb,¹¹ one must bear in mind that in the political environment of late medieval Iberia, territorial clashes and realignments among the five peninsular kingdoms—Castile, the Crown of Aragon, Navarre, Portugal and Granada—were the norm.

Muḥammad V's immediate fourteenth-century predecessors had to contend with additional players on the already crowded Iberian political stage. From their power base in Fez, the Marinids established themselves strategically in the Peninsula, where they remained for some one hundred years.¹² Moreover, at several junctures in the fourteenth century, England, France and the Papacy¹³—along with bands of mercenary soldiers in their employ¹⁴—arrived in Iberia to fight for or against one or more of the five peninsular kingdoms. Even the allies of such a force had much to fear from it.

During the first half of the fourteenth century, territorial control over the Straits of Gibraltar influenced greatly diplomatic relations

ejército," in *El reino Nazarí*, 4:431–75, esp. 431–32. See also Cristóbal Torres Delgado, *El antiguo reino nazarí de Granada (1232–1340)* (Granada, 1974), 355. For a fourteenth-century, Granadan treatise on much valued horsemanship skills, see Ibn Hudayl, *Gala de caballeros, blasón de paladines*, ed. M.J. Viguera (Madrid, 1977).

¹¹ Theories abound; one researcher has recently asserted that the vigor of Granada's economy allowed its inhabitants "to resist the Castilian efforts to complete the Reconquest," and even "threaten the Castilian monarchy on multiple occasions." The geography of Granada is cited as a crucial strategic advantage for the Muslim kingdom, which along with circumstances in Castile, such as population shortages, psychological unpreparedness, and political instability, militated against its absorption into Castile; see Torres Delgado, "Aspectos generates," in *El reino Nazarí*, 4:539.

¹² A contemporary source is Ibn-Khaldun, *Histoire des Berbères et des Dynasties Musulmanes de l'Afrique Septentrionale* 4 vols., trans. M. le Baron de Slane (Algiers, 1856). Although the two were nominally allied, the Naṣrīds, at times, had as much to fear from their Moroccan coreligionists as from their Christian neighbors. In 1292, for example, Muḥammad II of Granada and Sancho IV of Castile, with naval assistance from Aragon, jointly defeated the Marinid emir and recovered Tarifa. For an informative discussion of the one hundred years of Marinid presence in Iberia (1275–1374), see Miguel Angel Manzano Rodríguez, *La intervención de los Benimerines en la Península Ibérica* (Madrid, 1992), esp. 132–58; for a full bibliography on the Marinids and other North African dynasties, see Manzano Rodríguez's bibliography, 405–61. See also Rachel Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrīdes* (Paris, 1990), 75–101, and Francisco García Fitz, "La frontera castellano-granadina a fines del siglo XIII," *Relaciones exteriores del Reino de Granada. IV Coloquio de historia medieval andaluza*, ed. Cristina Segura Graiño (Almería, 1988), 23–35, esp. 27.

¹³ Their involvement will be described briefly below.

¹⁴ A recent study of mercenaries in the Middle Ages is Kenneth Fowler, *The Great Companies*, vol. 1 of *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001); for their adventures in Iberia, see 123–28; 146ff., 170–71.

between Granada and neighboring states, chiefly Castile, Aragon, and Fez.¹⁵ Large international armies assembled in the region in 1333,¹⁶ 1340,¹⁷ and 1344.¹⁸ In 1350, Castilian forces conducted an unsuccessful siege of Gibraltar.¹⁹

Alfonso XI of Castile (1312–1350), an energetic and ambitious ruler, had begun an aggressive policy of territorial expansion in 1327, with Granada as the target. Not since the reign of Fernando III (1217–1252) had Castile seen such a determined warrior. Thwarting Marinid intrusion in peninsular affairs and gaining control of the Straits of Gibraltar were key features of Alfonso's military policies, for which he set aside differences with his often rebellious and recalcitrant subjects, negotiated alliances with other peninsular kingdoms, secured papal support, and recruited distinguished warriors from across the Pyrenees.²⁰ While awaiting Gibraltar's imminent capitulation, Alfonso died, Europe's highest-ranking victim of the Black

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 182–87. Granada had gained control of Algeciras, Gibraltar, Málaga, Almería and Ceuta, giving the Naṣrid rulers effective command over the Straits of Gibraltar. Elaborate negotiations ensued between Castile and Aragon, and Aragon and Fez in 1309 to wrest the Straits away from Granada. In the attacks that followed, Ceuta fell to the Marinids, the Castilians besieged Algeciras and won Gibraltar, and the Aragonese surrounded Almería. When all seemed lost for the outnumbered and outflanked Granadan defense, the Granadan emir negotiated a separate peace with the Marinids, which effectively spoiled the much-anticipated victory for the Castilian-Aragonese coalition. The author, frequently in awe of the Naṣrid's wily diplomacy, suggests that, unlike the Castilians, Marinid control of Iberian territory could not be permanent.

¹⁶ The Marinid emir Abū 'l-Ḥasan (1331–1351), as an ally of the Granadan Muḥammad IV (1325–1333), retook Gibraltar. After a six-year truce, Abū 'l-Ḥasan joined the Granadans in the siege of Tarifa and met an equally impressive international army led by Alfonso XI of Castile (1312–1350). For a map of the Marinid holdings in Iberia, see María del Carmen Jiménez Mata, "La división administrativa," *El reino Nazarí*, 3:259. See also Manuel García Fernández, "La defensa de la frontera de Granada durante el reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla, 1321–1350," in *Relaciones exteriores*, 37–54.

¹⁷ In the battle of Salado (1340)—so named after the river near where it took place, known in Muslim sources as the Battle of Tarifa—the Muslim host was crushed. The fleeing emir was forced to leave behind a rich booty, including his harem, a great treasure, and large numbers of captives. *Crónica del rey don Alfonso el Onceno, Biblioteca de autores españoles*, vol. 66 (Madrid, 1953), 172–392, esp. 319, 325ff. And while this defeat marked the last personal military intervention by a Marinid ruler in the Peninsula, the Marinids remained in Ronda and Gibraltar—the latter until 1374—and their presence continued to influence Granadan affairs.

¹⁸ Algeciras capitulated in 1344.

¹⁹ Viguera Molíns, "El ejército," in *El reino Nazarí*, 3:431–75, esp. 436.

²⁰ Papal designation of Alfonso's war efforts as a holy crusade enhanced the Castilian's prestige and encouraged the military involvement, for a time, of a number of Europe's most accomplished warriors.

Death.²¹ Had he lived, the anticipated surrender and expulsion of the Marinids from Iberia would likely have inspired him to “conquer Africa,” as he had informed the Pope;²² closer to home, he would certainly have been poised to complete the Reconquest by marching against the city of Granada. With his death, neither came to pass.

III

Following Alfonso’s death, the siege of Gibraltar was suspended. The king’s successor, sixteen-year old Pedro I, negotiated a peace accord with his Granadan counterpart, Yūsuf I. For all intents and purposes, this put an end to the military momentum generated during the previous ten years. Pedro proved willing to sign this pact despite the fact that internal discord in Fez and strained relations between the two Muslim allies might well have provided a propitious juncture for Castile to press its attack.²³ By 1350, the Marinid empire in North Africa was on the verge of collapse. Without assistance from Fez, and rebuffed by other coreligionists from as far away as Cairo,²⁴ the Naṣrid rulers of Granada were thrown back upon their own resources. Even in the face of this threat, Granada not only did not succumb to Castile, but entered the most illustrious period of its history.

²¹ For the jubilation among Granadans and other Muslims following the news of Alfonso’s death, see *Correspondencia diplomática entre Granada y Fez (siglo XIV)*, [*Correspondencia*], trans. and ed. Mariano Gaspar Remiro (Granada, 1916), 245–52.

²² O’Callaghan, *History*, 413–4.

²³ The Marinid threat, which had played such a crucial role in checking Castilian territorial ambitions for decades, would soon become negligible. Abū ’l-Ḥasan, the architect of the impressive, albeit ephemeral, Marinid-controlled empire in North Africa and across the Straits, was overthrown by his son in 1348. The territorial hegemony from Morocco to Tunis he had created had begun to crumble, victim to endemic dynastic wars and tribal conflicts. Abū-’l-Ḥasan’s death in 1351 effectively closed the most brilliant period of Marinid history. At the same time, there was a cooling off of relations between Yūsuf I of Granada and the Marinids when Granada offered refuge to two brothers, Abū-’l-Ḥasan’s children, following their father’s overthrow by a third rival brother, Abū Inan Faris, who became Marinid sultan. Pedro I invited the fugitive brothers to Castile and sponsored the return to Morocco of one of them, Abū l-Faṣl, to challenge Abū Inan; Abū l-Faṣl was assassinated in 1355. Yūsuf had died in 1354, knifed to death by a servant. R. Arié, *El reino nassí de Granada (1232–1492)* (Madrid, 1992), 42.

²⁴ Vidal Castro, “Esplendor y apogeo,” *El reino Nazarí*, 3:131–50, esp. 132 (notes 15, 16), 145; Arié, *El reino nassí*, 43.

A student of Castilian affairs of the late Middle Ages must wonder why Pedro, in 1350 and later in his nineteen-year reign, did not go after Granada, the big prize. Like much about his opaque character and kingship, one can only provide a cautiously tentative answer. In general, history has not been kind to Pedro; had he succeeded in Granada, he might enjoy a considerably better reputation. Instead, he is the only Castilian king of that name and is known as “the Cruel.” He owes his ill fame to a notable record of swift punishment meted out to his real and suspected enemies and an alleged inclination to favor Jews and Moors. This general assessment would suggest that Pedro did not pursue the war against Granada because he held Granadans in special esteem, directing his wrath, instead, at his Christian and domestic enemies. Even if this bias had some basis in fact—his infamous cruelty may have appeared more tempered vis-à-vis his Muslim allies—a more credible explanation would seem to lie in the resilience and tactfulness of the Granadans themselves.

The personal story of Pedro, this essay’s second protagonist, is similar to Muḥammad’s in a number of interesting ways. Neither Muḥammad nor Pedro was his father’s favorite, nor were their respective mothers accorded, for very long, the undisputed privileges of a reigning queen. Both rulers ascended to the throne, suddenly, at the age of sixteen, and their rights to the crown were violently disputed by a favorite half-brother. Both were forced to flee their court under dangerous and humiliating conditions. Subsequently, Muḥammad and Pedro had to place themselves at the mercy of their reluctant foreign allies and rely on external aid to regain their thrones. These parallels can only take us so far, of course, but they suggest that the two rulers might have understood each other beyond the official boundaries of their diplomatic exchanges.

IV

Of immediate concern to Pedro upon assuming the throne in 1350 was settling the messy domestic situation his father had created by favoring his mistress, Leonor de Guzmán, and their numerous children over Pedro and his mother, the Portuguese princess María. Pampered, powerful, and rich, Pedro’s eight surviving half-brothers and their mother revealed their ambitions immediately after Alfonso’s

death. They attempted to safeguard their position by seeking the protection—without Pedro’s consent—of a number of important lords. These, in turn, began maneuvering in an effort to play as active a role as possible in the ordering of Pedro’s new court. Pedro had other ideas; he responded vigorously by checking his step-family’s aspirations—deploying force instead of diplomacy to persuade—and appointing courtiers whose interests were more aligned with his own.

Two other factors contributed to Pedro’s early challenges. First, the Black Death, aside from claiming his father’s life, had serious economic and demographic repercussions throughout Castile, as elsewhere. Whether for the sake of his subjects or his treasure, Pedro sought to alleviate these conditions by convening a meeting of the *cortes* in 1351, during which a number of economic and fiscal measures were approved.

Secondly, Pedro had inherited from his father a generally cautious, self-protective and relatively neutral model of diplomacy with other European courts. This was no easy task, given the ongoing hostilities between England and France, known as the Hundred Years War, which at times threatened to entangle Castile. Toward the end of his reign, Alfonso’s sympathies began to tilt in favor of the French. In a move intended to cement closer bonds, he negotiated the marriage of his heir Pedro to the French princess Blanche de Bourbon, niece of the France monarch. This dynastic union might have been of little consequence had the marriage not been such a complete disaster. Instead, the misalliance became a source of great embarrassment to the French, distracted Pedro for much of his reign, and ultimately proved very costly to him and to Castile.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the first six years of his reign Pedro made good use of the period of peace that followed the lifting of the siege of Granada. He devoted himself to pressing domestic matters; he settled family feuds, ordered his court according to his liking, took measures to stimulate economic and demographic recovery, repressed his internal foes, got married, and even began a trusting, long-term relationship with his mistress, María de Padilla.

V

To the benefit of his Muslim neighbors, the next chapter of Pedro’s reign reveals, in some essential ways, a clear departure from his

father's chosen course. With impressive single-mindedness, Pedro entered a conflict against Aragon (1356–1366), offering Granada a long and profitable reprieve. While hardly unprecedented, Pedro's campaigns do stand out for both their intensity and duration. Territorial clashes were a common feature of Iberian history in the Middle Ages. The fluidity of peninsular frontiers, the overlapping and rival inheritance claims arising out of dynastic intermarriage, competing historical rights over certain territories, broken alliances, personal ambition, slights, and real or imagined grievances created a climate in which war was a perennial possibility. Any of these conditions, at any given point, could trigger armed conflict. When in 1356 Pedro declared war on Aragon, he was incited by most of the above. In this environment, the religious differences separating Granada from Castile were not nearly as compelling in the king's mind.

Early in 1357, hostilities began in earnest.²⁵ Castile experienced a series of easy victories, after which Pedro and the king of Aragon, Pere III "the Ceremonious" (1336–1387),²⁶ agreed to a truce. In addition to seeking aid from the French and the pope, under whose auspices the truce was negotiated, Pere signed a treaty with both the sultan of Fez and the emir of Granada, in which he secured their neutrality. He, in turn, promised no Aragonese assistance to Castile, should Pedro decide to go to war against either Granada or Fez.²⁷ This pact was the latest in a long series of diplomatic and

²⁵ Pedro attacked Aragon along two separate fronts. His army is reported to have consisted of "7000 armored knights, 2000 light cavalry, and more foot soldiers than it is worth counting." The most complete contemporary source for Pedro is Pero López de Ayala, *Crónica del rey don Pedro*, *Biblioteca de autores españoles*, vol. 66 (Madrid, 1953), 399–593. For a study of Pedro's reign, see Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel of Castile (1350–1369)* (Leiden, 1995); Pedro's motives and early stages of the Aragonese war are discussed in 180ff.

²⁶ Although known as Pedro IV in Aragon, he was also Pere III of Catalonia. Hereafter he is referred to as Pere to minimize confusion with his Castilian counterpart.

²⁷ The text of the treaty, signed by both Muslim rulers in 1357, is reproduced in Antonio de Capmany y de Montpalau, *Antiguos tratados de paces y alianzas* (1786: facs. ed., Valencia, 1974), 18–25. Diplomatic correspondence between Aragon and Mediterranean Muslim kingdoms in the fourteenth century is published in *Los documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón*, trans. and ed. Maximiliano A. Alarcón y Santón and Ramón García de Linares (Madrid, 1940). From the number of total entries in this collection, it is clear that Pere took active interest in developments throughout the Mediterranean. In addition to military alliances, the documents pertain to other issues, such as commercial relations, the redemption of captives, and negotiations over acts of piracy perpetrated by both sides. For Aragonese relations with North Africa, see Maria D. López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb en el siglo XIV (1311–1410)* (Barcelona, 1995); idem, "Las rela-

commercial agreements between Aragon and Muslim rulers in the southern Mediterranean, the Marinids among them.²⁸ If any pattern arose from these arrangements, it is this: that Granada and its partners—in North Africa and Aragon—recognized their mutuality of interests when it came to protecting trade in the western Mediterranean and the need to counterbalance and check the power of Castile and its commercial allies of choice, the Genoese. Granada used the profound differences between Castile and Aragon in the second half of the fourteenth century to its advantage and that, in the long run, impeded and delayed the eventual reconquest of the kingdom.

The Castilian-Aragonese war was welcome news for Granada, and for Fez. Relations between the two Muslim kingdoms warmed for a time, as Muḥammad V sent emissaries to Abū Inan's court in Fez.²⁹ The latter attempted to persuade his new ally to take advantage of the deteriorating environment in Christian Iberia by denying Granadan tribute to Pedro. Muḥammad wisely rejected this advice and continued to maintain good relations with both Pedro and Pere, as well as with Abū Inan (d. 1358) and his successor.³⁰ Muḥammad's ability to sustain amicable ties with all his neighbors, Castile in particular, proved to be a wise course and a hallmark of his long reign.

ciones comerciales y diplomáticas entre la Corona de Aragón y los estados norteafricanos durante la Baja Edad Media," *Anuario de estudios medievales* 20 (1990): 149–69. See also next note.

²⁸ López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón* is especially valuable for details of the extensive Aragonese role in the international commercial network of the late medieval Mediterranean. For relations with Fez, see pp. 55–118. For relations between Aragon and Muslim *Hispania*, including Granada, see Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera amb l'Islam en el segle XIV. Cristians i sarraïns al País Valencia* (Barcelona, 1988); Robert I. Burns S.J. and Paul E. Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain* (Leiden, 1999); Mariano Arribas Palau, *Las trugas entre Castilla y Granada firmadas por Fernando I de Aragón* (Tetuan, 1956).

²⁹ Relations between Granada and Fez were quite volatile; Abū Inan was presumed to have territorial ambitions in the Peninsula, which Muḥammad V understandably feared; but it was the expectation of Pedro's armed support in defense of Granada that kept the Marinid emir from attempting to cross the Straits. Thwarted in his territorial ambitions, Abū Inan tried, instead, to break the bond between Muḥammad V and Pedro; for this version of events see, Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada en la época de Muḥammad V*, 24–25. It is not clear, however, that the Marinid emir had the resources to re-enter the Peninsula or that his North African neighbors would not seek territorial advantages at his expense had he done so. This last author makes extensive use of Arabic sources, citing the work of Ibn al-Khatib and Ibn Khaldun, in particular.

³⁰ Arié, *El reino nasrī*, 44. Arié suggests that the Marinid sultan negotiated a pact with Pere after Muḥammad V refused to heed his advise vis-à-vis Castile; in fact, Pere made alliances with both Granada and Fez at the same time, under identical terms.

When the truce between Castile and Aragon collapsed in 1358, Granada came to the aid of Castile, providing three armed galleys to assist Pedro along a third front opened on the Mediterranean coast. In the months that followed, Pedro readied an impressive forty-one galley fleet and sailed against Aragonese-territory. Barcelona withstood three days of attack; next came Ibiza, where the Castilians successfully landed, only to abandon their advantage upon hearing news of Pere's imminent arrival with a strong fleet of his own. In the end, the two forces never met in battle. In late July, 1359, Pedro disbanded his fleet, having accomplished very little. Between then and the signing of the peace of Terrer in spring 1361, Pedro still commanded an impressive army and was poised to inflict serious damage on his adversary, from both land and sea. Instead, he squandered several promising opportunities to gain a lasting advantage, having expended a great deal of money and personal prestige in the process.

VI

Given the disappointing outcome of this stage of the war, Pedro's motives and behavior seem, indeed, quite puzzling. Why did he divide his forces along three fronts? While on the coast of Barcelona, why did he not sustain the attack? Why, in spite of a superior force, did he avoid a sea battle with Pere? One possible answer may be found in the political events in Granada, which had the effect of upsetting the balance of power on the Peninsula.

Throughout these years, Muḥammad V openly encouraged and supported Pedro. In addition to offering three galleys, he extended permission for the Castilian fleet to land and re-provision in Málaga—both clearly in violation of the terms negotiated with Pere two years earlier. The Granada ruler had also intended to send a contingent on Pedro's behalf into contested territory along the Granada-Murcia frontier.³¹ However, this last incursion never took place. In August, 1359, Muḥammad was overthrown in a palace coup and his half-brother Ismā'īl II (1359–1360) succeeded him to the throne.

Muḥammad survived the conspiracy and from Guadix sailed to

³¹ *Ibid.*, 44–45.

safety across the Straits where he was granted asylum in Ceuta by the Marinid sultan, Abū Salim. Ismāʿīl II's rule lasted only a few months. He himself was overthrown by his cousin Abū Saʿād (1360–1362), who reigned as Muḥammad VI, known to the Castilians as “Bermejo” for the reddish color of his hair. Abū Saʿād radically altered Granada's pro-Castilian stance. Evidence suggests that the coup securing him the throne was carried out with the collusion of the Aragonese, and he, in turn, instituted a markedly pro-Aragonese policy.³² He stopped the payment of *parias* to Castile.³³ And even sent a cavalry unit to assist Pere in the war against Pedro.³⁴

Although the political events of 1359–1360 in Granada offered Pedro an opportunity to intervene, for a time he chose not to take it. Despite unrivaled military strength, he neither attacked Granada nor pursued his efforts against Pere, with whom he signed a peace treaty in 1361. Before Abū Saʿād's coup, Granadan involvement on Pedro's behalf had been more symbolic than real; three galleys in a fleet of forty-one is a minimal contribution, and even if Granadan soldiers had fought alongside Pedro, their numbers, some 100–200 cavalry, would pale in comparison to the strength of the royal force, made up of several thousand. Granadans, wisely, appeared disinterested in using their resources to protect the interests of others.³⁵

It is useful to wonder, therefore, how much weight should be assigned to political turmoil in Granada as the leading cause of Pedro's change of strategy with regard to the Aragonese war. One must keep in mind that Pedro had disbanded his fleet before Muḥammad V's

³² Ayala reports that Muḥammad had affirmed his friendship with Pedro. *Crónica de Pedro*, 326. Extant correspondence between Muhammad and Pere, however, leaves no doubt about Muḥammad's close relations with Aragon, even after the peace treaty of 1361; Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 42–45. Their closeness is evident in four extant letters they exchanged between 1360–1361. *Documentos árabes diplomáticos*, 139–46 (docs. 71–74).

³³ This might have been political posturing on the part of Muḥammad because there is evidence that *parias* were not being paid to Castile at this point; Arié, *Espagne musulmane*, 110.

³⁴ Arié, *El reino nasrī*, 46, citing M. Becerra Hormigo, “La conexión catalana en el derrocamiento de Ismaʿīl II,” in *La frontera terrestre i marítima amb l'islam* (Barcelona, 1988), 302–17; this last author asserts (p. 304) that Ismāʿīl declared war on Aragon. Aragonese involvement in the overthrow of Muḥammad V is also cited in López Pérez, *La corona de Aragón*, 105 (n. 143).

³⁵ Internal conditions in Granada following the overthrow of Muḥammad are described in contemporary Muslim sources as precarious and dangerous; Granadan citizens from all walks of life sought to escape hunger and insecurity by fleeing to Morocco and Castile. Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 36–38.

overthrow and he continued to maintain cordial relations with Muḥammad's successor, Ismā'īl. Not until Bermejo ascended to the throne did relations between Castile and Granada severely deteriorate, a result of the new Granadan ruler actively seeking closer ties with Aragon.

The papal legate sent to negotiate the treaty between Pedro and Pere urged the two Christian rulers to make peace and join forces to fight against Muslim Granada; neither complied.³⁶ Despite Abū Sa'ād's coup, Pedro chose to follow his own course. Although Granada alone posed little threat to the fulfillment of Castilian aims in Aragon, the question remains whether the new Granadan-Aragonese closeness seriously threatened Castilian interests. Ultimately, the specter of a rapprochement between Aragon and Granada does appear to have been a serious matter to Pedro. Exiled in Fez, Muḥammad could not induce his host to restore him to the throne; consequently, his best hope seemed to be an alliance with Pedro. In turn, Pedro became the self-appointed champion of legitimacy in Granada and set himself the goal of restoring Muḥammad V to the throne. For Pedro to succeed, he had to remove Bermejo; but first he had to persuade the Marinid emir to release his distinguished guest.

Initial reluctance on Abū Salim's part to allow Muḥammad to leave Fez vanished when Pedro threatened to invade the last Marinid positions on the Peninsula, a threat the Marinid ruler took seriously. By August, 1361, the Granadan ruler was on his way back to Iberia. Muslim sources inform us that a strong Castilian fleet awaited his arrival in Ceuta, with instructions to escort him across the Straits.³⁷

This was more than merely a courtesy; Pedro clearly wanted to show that he was prepared to use force to get his way. In the end, Abū Salim not only relented but even lent Muḥammad six galleys which, combined with five from Castile, permitted him to begin a naval assault against Bermejo. Abū Salim also committed Marinid land troops to Muḥammad's venture, thus tilting his sympathies in favor of Castile.³⁸ Bermejo, in turn, requested ten galleys from Pere,³⁹ to defend against the Marinid ships, while Granadan galleys took on the Castilians.⁴⁰ The direct involvement of the Marinids, however,

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 46.

³⁸ López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón*, 106.

³⁹ Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 47.

⁴⁰ López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón*, 106 (n. 144).

was brief. A series of palace coups between 1361 and 1362 claimed both Abū Salim and his successor.⁴¹ When Pedro renewed his offensive against Aragon, the throne of Fez was occupied by yet another claimant, Abū Zayyan.⁴²

Negotiations for the removal of Bermejo were complicated as well. It is worth noting that Muslim and Christian sources offer somewhat different versions of the terms agreed upon by Pedro and Muḥammad leading to Bermejo's ouster. The former asserted that Muḥammad committed himself to nothing more than permanent, peaceful relations with Castile in return for assistance in regaining the throne. Christian sources, on the other hand, allege that Muḥammad pledged to hand over to Castile all Muslim areas whose residents did not rise up in spontaneous support of his rule, but instead had to be won over by force. If true, the Christian version reveals a highly confident Muḥammad who believed that his popularity would serve as an effective insurance policy to safeguard his kingdom.

Muḥammad became even more dependent on Castilian aid when, upon Abū Salim's death by assassination in September, 1361, the Marinid troops and fleet went home to Fez. A joint Castilian-Granadan army began operating together in the early months of 1362. Curiously, as Pedro was preparing for war against Bermejo, he put aside recent events and his profound hatred of Pere, to ask the Aragonese king for help. Pere pledged naval support, which likely never materialized.

By the end of 1361, Pedro had assembled an army of 6000. Although the initial invasion of Granada enjoyed some success, the Castilians suffered a serious reversal in January, 1362, when a strong Muslim force of 4600 surprised a Castilian contingent lured into looting the seemingly abandoned city of Guadix. The campaign continued, however, and by early spring, Castilian troops had occupied a dozen Granadan places. Muḥammad enjoyed a success of his own, forcing the surrender of Málaga.⁴³ An increasingly beleaguered Bermejo

⁴¹ Leadership changes were often difficult to track; the Aragonese king, for example, wrote a letter to the Marinid emir three months after he had lost the throne; *Ibid.*, 106–7.

⁴² Following one of the seemingly endless palace coups in Fez, Abū Zayyan sought refuge in Castile in 1361, Muḥammad helped him return to Morocco, for which the Marinid ceded him Ronda. Pedro and Abū Zayyan maintained friendly relations while the latter ruled Fez (1362–1366). Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 49, 58.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 52.

decided to plead his case with Pedro, face to face.⁴⁴ Whatever hopes the Granadan emir might have had, they were soon disappointed. After an elaborate entertainment in his honor, Pedro ordered Bermejo's death.⁴⁵ By spring 1362, Muḥammad V was back on the Granadan throne, this time for a considerably longer stay.

According to Al-Abbadi, a modern historian of his reign, Muḥammad V, upon his return to the Granadan throne, pursued a deliberate foreign policy of which close ties with Castile was the key feature.⁴⁶ As for Pedro, he seemed satisfied with his ally's return. Although occupying considerable Granadan territory, the Castilian king showed little interest in making these gains permanent. Instead, he renewed his war with Aragon. While it is not known what direct role, if any, Muḥammad played in Pedro's decision, he could only watch the resumption of hostilities between Castile and Aragon with relief.

VII

When Pedro initially assembled his army to fight against Granada in support of Muḥammad, he was assisted by a contingent of foreign knights, Hugh Calveley and Jean d'Armagnac among them.⁴⁷ Their entry into Iberian affairs was motivated by a mixture of crusading zeal and a strong dose of personal ambition, in which dreams of carving out a territory for themselves at the expense of the Muslims and a sense of religious mission were largely indistinguishable.⁴⁸ It is not known what particular inducements, if any, Pedro offered these captains. After the end of his campaign in Granada, however, the Castilian king renewed his agreement with Armagnac. At the same time, he signed a new alliance with Charles II of Navarre (1349–1387).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 52–53. Muslim and Christian sources also differ on this last detail; the former attribute Bermejo's move to Muḥammad's success, while the latter to Castilian victories and growing discontent among Granadans with the state of affairs.

⁴⁵ Ayala reports that thirty-seven of Bermejo's men also lost their lives; their heads were sent to Muḥammad V, as a token of friendship. *Crónica de Pedro*, 347–48.

⁴⁶ Other features of this policy were cordial relations with Aragon, as long as these did not jeopardize relations with Castile; fending off the Marinids; and closer ties with Tlemcen, Tunis, and Egypt. Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 55.

⁴⁷ *Crónica de Pedro*, 517.

⁴⁸ Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1:147–48.

Beginning in the summer of 1362, Pedro, Carlos, Armagnac, and his Gascon knights, and additional troops sent by Portugal and Granada⁴⁹ launched attacks on several fronts against Aragon. By spring, 1363, the Castilians had managed to occupy a number of Aragon's towns. By year's end, they were encamped on the outskirts of Valencia, the conquest of which by Castile would represent a serious blow to Pere's rule. Little, however, came of this display of force by Castile. Upon hearing of Pere's imminent arrival, Pedro simply withdrew into Castilian territory. Moreover, Castile's hitherto good fortune at arms ended when, from his base in Murviedro, Pedro attacked the Aragonese fleet but barely escaped alive from a shipwreck brought on by a sudden storm.

The middle years of the 1360s witnessed great diplomatic activity on all fronts, not the least of which resulted in military alliances between Aragon and France and, in due time, Castile and England. These agreements internationalized the peninsular conflict and drew Castile gradually yet inevitably into the maelstrom of the Hundred Years War.⁵⁰ While no clear, single purpose could at first be discerned from all this activity, its effect eventually became clear, as Pedro went from dreams of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Aragon to fighting for his throne, and then for his life. The coalition against Pedro brought together many disparate elements and ambitions.

The Aragonese, at the very least, wanted to check Pedro's territorial incursions; Pedro's half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara, aspired to the Castilian throne, and the Castilians who joined Enrique's cause expected to profit from his success. The French sought Castilian naval support against the English and a dose of revenge. Overtly, Muḥammad remained loyal to his Castilian benefactor. He repeatedly refused Pere's entreaties that he withhold support from Castile.⁵¹ At the same time, however, he tried to follow a cautious policy of self-protection. No doubt recognizing the inevitability of a peninsular

⁴⁹ *Crónica de Pedro*, 526. Muhammad sent 600 *jinetes* (light horsemen).

⁵⁰ Aspects of Castile's involvement in this war will be examined elsewhere in this collection of essays.

⁵¹ Pere, through personal emissaries, sent frequent entreaties to the Granadan emir and other Muslim rulers in the southern Mediterranean; his requests ranged from calls for men to fight against Pedro to assurances of neutrality. Al-Abbadī, *El reino de Granada*, 62.

war, he reacted to the prospect with a mixture of great apprehension and a strong dose of pragmatism; apprehension because of the magnitude of the impending clash; pragmatism, because he quickly sought alliances with his coreligionists across the Straits, should Granada, not Castile, turn out to be the strategic target. Later, when it became clear that Pedro would lose the throne, Muḥammad lost little time in signing pacts with the Castilian king's enemies and taking as much advantage as possible of the chaos that ensued.

VIII

In the winter of 1365–1366, a large army commanded by Bertrand du Guesclin, made up principally of mercenaries paid for in equal parts by Charles V of France (1364–1380), Pope Urban V (1362–1370), and Pere, entered the Peninsula via Barcelona. By March, they had reached Calahorra, where they proclaimed Enrique de Trastámara, king of Castile. At the time, Pedro was encamped in Burgos at the head of a large army of his own, which included 600 Granadan cavalry.⁵² As the enemy approached, he chose to leave the city, fleeing south to Seville. The mercenaries now advanced to Burgos, where Enrique was crowned king in the monastery of Las Huelgas. Here in a symbolic gesture that cost him nothing, Enrique granted Granada to du Guesclin and crowned him king of the Muslim realm.⁵³

Meanwhile, the French captain had received offers of naval assistance from Pere, to fight against the enemies of the faith in the Peninsula and across the Straits.⁵⁴ Although it is likely that Pere's generous offers of military support were motivated primarily by a desire to encourage the mercenary captains to pursue ventures as far away from Aragon as possible, Muḥammad still had much to fear as Enrique's army left Burgos and traveled south in pursuit of Pedro.

Seville, Pedro's favorite city, offered him little solace; Pedro López de Ayala, the chronicler of Pedro's reign, relates how the *sevillanos* rioted in reaction to rumors that the king had expressed more confidence in the loyalty of his Muslim allies, Muḥammad in par-

⁵² *Crónica de Pedro*, 539.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 541.

⁵⁴ Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1:147–48; 170–71.

ticular, than in that of his Christian subjects. As Pedro's efforts to bribe the insurgents proved futile, the uprising unleashed mobs of marauders who looted the royal *alcazar*. A French source reports that a plot to open the city to Enrique's sympathizers was discovered and foiled by Pedro, who subsequently had the suspects executed, an act that was bitterly resented.⁵⁵ Unable to restore order, the king fled to Portugal, accompanied by only a handful of courtiers still loyal to him. Rebuffed by his uncle, Pedro I of Portugal (1357–1367), the royal refugee traveled to Bordeaux to seek assistance of the Black Prince.⁵⁶

To attribute the uprising in Seville to Pedro's alleged favoritism toward Muslims, what Arié calls his presumed "*maurofilia*,"⁵⁷ is intriguing, as is his purported remark about the *sevillanos'* lack of loyalty. Whether true or not, what matters here is the undeniable propaganda value of such an assertion. Propaganda played a crucial role in securing international support against Pedro, and the Seville episode echoes at least two of Pedro's fatal flaws as publicized by his enemies: his "*maurofilia*" and his exceptional love of money. (Presumed to have great amounts of the latter, he was prepared in this case to use some of it to spare his *alcazar* and himself.) A further indictment of Pedro (certainly apocryphal) has the king promising Muḥammad to abjure Christianity and to hand over to him the main cities of Andalusia in exchange for his aid.⁵⁸

If, indeed, Pedro's loyalty to Muḥammad was as strong as his critics would have us believe, it was not entirely reciprocated. Muḥammad's support of Pedro was not so blind as to lead the Granadan ruler to incur great risk on his behalf or, for that matter, to squander the opportunity to make territorial gains at Castile's expense. In correspondence with North African rulers and with his own subjects, Muḥammad urged his coreligionists to join him in a holy war (*jihad*) against the enemies of the faith. He blamed the pope for bringing together warring groups of Christians with the purpose of fighting

⁵⁵ Ibid., 1:182–83, citing J. Cuvelier, *Chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin*, ed. E. Charrière, 2 vols. (Paris, 1839), 1: lines 9355–645.

⁵⁶ In Gascony, Pedro expected the Black Prince to fulfill pledges of support made earlier by his father, the English king, Edward III. Estow, *Pedro*, 218, 223. For recent views on the reign of Edward, see *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1999).

⁵⁷ Arié, *El reino nasrí*, 49.

⁵⁸ Al-Abbadí, *El reino de Granada*, 63.

against Islam, and referred to their anticipated move against Granada as the worst threat his kingdom had ever faced.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, he ordered reinforcements along the frontier,⁶⁰ and carried out a number of successful attacks against strategic positions within Castile. In May and June, 1366, he seized two important fortresses and regained the town of Iznajar, which Pedro had earlier taken for Castile during his war against Bermejo.⁶¹ Muḥammad went on to take the city of Sahla, near Gibraltar, with the help of troops from Tlemcen.⁶²

In May, 1366, with Enrique's army approaching Seville and Aragonese ships threatening the Granadan coast, Muḥammad faced yet another uprising led by a local commander in Almería seeking to overthrow him. Aware of Enrique's success throughout Andalucía, the Naṣrid emir wisely sent emissaries into Castile, offering his vassalage to the Castilian usurper.⁶³ Muḥammad explained his actions noting that, given the time of year (late summer) he wanted to protect the Granadan harvest and stifle the revolt.⁶⁴ His concerns for the future of Granada also led him to negotiate a three-way pact with Aragon and Morocco in 1367, in which he pledged to withhold all aid to Castile.⁶⁵

IX

Meanwhile, Pedro had successfully negotiated with the Black Prince to commit a large force to help him regain the Castilian throne. In April, 1367, this army met Enrique's polyglot force at Nájera, where Pedro and the English won a resounding victory.⁶⁶ Although following the battle, Enrique managed to escape to France, Pedro was, once again, king of Castile. At almost the same time, Muḥammad,

⁵⁹ *Correspondencia*, 383. The Pope is described as "as he who is obeyed by all and who has no opposition . . . has turned his attention to the brothers of the king of Castile . . . who are all against the Muslims," 387–88; for the announcement of aid from the Marinids, 385.

⁶⁰ Al-Abbadī, *El reino de Granada*, 64 (n. 4).

⁶¹ *Crónica de Pedro*, 544. Arié mistakenly attributes the victory to Enrique. *El reino*, 49; *Correspondencia*, 274; Al-Abbadī, *El reino de Granada*, 65.

⁶² *Correspondencia*, 273–76.

⁶³ Arié, *El reino nasrī*, 49.

⁶⁴ Al-Abbadī, *El reino de Granada*, 67.

⁶⁵ López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón*, 109–10.

⁶⁶ For details of the battle of Nájera (April 3, 1367), see L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Spanish Involvement in The Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera," in this volume.

who had remained in Andalucía, enjoyed a victory of his own at Utrera, a town near Seville.⁶⁷ He burned the city, and seized a rich booty, including thousands of captives.⁶⁸

In the succeeding months, Pedro busied himself trying to replenish his empty treasury, to pay the debt he had incurred with the English, and to deal with myriad complications arising out of the war with his brother. During this period, Muḥammad and Pedro restored their good relations.

At the same time, Muḥammad continued to take advantage of the turmoil in Castile. In September, 1367, his armies marched against Jaén, a city that had risen against Pedro. And while this campaign had the appearance of being carried out in support of the Castilians, Muḥammad represented it quite differently to his coreligionists. In fact, Muslim and Christian sources assign very different motives to most of the Granadan armed expeditions along the frontier. For his part, Ayala strongly suggests Pedro's collusion, leading to the inevitable sense that Pedro's "*maurofilia*" and friendship with Muḥammad caused Castilian loss of life and territory for the benefit of the Muslim ruler. Muḥammad, on the other hand, links his actions to nobler and worthier causes. In the particular case of Jaén, for example, he cites his duty to avenge the Christian attack and pillage of Alexandria carried out in 1365.⁶⁹

After scoring another success at Ubeda,⁷⁰ the Granadan army joined Pedro's forces in Casariche and together they marched against Córdoba, a city that had declared for Enrique and continued to resist Pedro even after the battle Nájera.⁷¹ Although estimates differ—

⁶⁷ *Correspondencia*, 281–84.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Al-Abbadī mentions 5000 captives; *El reino de Granada*, 69. Ayala describes a series of Muslim successes against Castilian positions; some won by Pedro some won by his predecessors; for Utrera, he cites 11,000 captives, including men and women, old and young. *Crónica de Pedro*, 583.

⁶⁹ *Correspondencia*, 286–88, 291–94, 329. The first letter, addressed to the sultan of Fez, relates how at the end of the siege a Castilian squadron arrived at the Muslim encampment outside Jaén, requesting their help. In return, they were promised a royal pardon for their destruction of Jaén; he adds that the Castilian commander broke into tears because of the desolation he saw around him. Muḥammad continued on to Priego, and then to Ubeda. According to this version, then, the best Pedro could do at this point was "pardon" Muḥammad for what were, clearly, acts of aggression against Castile and the result of joint Castilian-Granadan efforts to help Pedro hold on to the throne.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 299–302.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 307–11; additional details about this campaign are provided in a letter written in 1368 to the sultan of Tunis; 317, 325–33.

between 5000–7000 cavalry and 30,000–80,000 foot soldiers—their combined force was impressive by any standard. In spite of heated exchanges and clever strategies on both sides, little came of this show of force; the citizens of Córdoba withstood a five-day assault, aided in no small measure by providential rains that flooded the attackers' camp.⁷²

By the end of 1368, Muḥammad had taken full advantage of the Castilian civil war to reclaim territories lost to Castile in the course of the first half of the fourteenth century.⁷³ While the Castilian conflict provided him with unexpected opportunities, Muḥammad continued to assist Pedro until the end. When Pedro again met his archenemy, Enrique, in the early months of 1369, the Castilian king was commanding an army composed of 3000 lances, accompanied by 1500 Granadan cavalry. Counting the troops contributed by his Granadan ally, Pedro possessed a force comparable to if not larger than that of his opponents. In the ensuing battle of Montiel, Pedro was outmaneuvered and tricked. Additional reinforcements from Granada and Andalucía failed to arrive in time to participate in the battle. Falling into the hands of his half-brother, Pedro was killed on the night of March 13, 1369.⁷⁴

X

Enrique's victory over Pedro did not immediately put an end to the troubles in Castile. The late king's support for Pedro's cause, albeit scattered, continued. Although victorious, the usurper found himself debt-ridden and beleaguered by enemies. For reasons of their own, the kings of Portugal, Aragon, and Navarre had all turned against him. In the months that followed his victory over Pedro, the new Castilian king had little energy to devote to Granada, a situation from which Muḥammad sought to profit by rejecting the Castilian's

⁷² For details of how Christian and Muslim sources offer different versions of this episode, see Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 76–81.

⁷³ *Crónica de Pedro*, 583. While the chronicler notes that Pedro had ceded these territories to Muḥammad, it is more likely that the Muslim ruler had seized them while Pedro was powerless to stop him. For the Muslim sources on these events, see Al-Abbadi, *El reino de Granada*, 82 (notes 1, 3).

⁷⁴ Citing al-Khatib, Al-Abbadi asserts that Pedro's death and the end of the Castilian civil war deprived Granada of important advantages; *El reino de Granada*, 83.


overtures for peace. Instead, Granada, in conjunction with Fez, allied with Aragon and Portugal, Enrique's enemies. The Granadan proceeded to capture the city of Algeciras in July, 1369, and went on to attack other Castilian towns in Andalucía, among them, Marchena and Osuna.

Finally, in May, 1370, Enrique and Muḥammad, each convinced of the threat the other posed to their respective frontier, signed an eight-year truce which, with extensions, lasted until Enrique's death in 1379. As if to close another unfinished chapter, Muḥammad intervened in North Africa to create internal unrest among the Marinids; his strategy worked out as planned, and Granada was then able to retake Gibraltar.⁷⁵


Throughout the rest of his reign, Muḥammad continued to take advantage of the weaknesses among his neighbors. He and his kingdom had escaped relatively unscathed from some twenty-five years of peninsular strife, during which the enemies of the faith, singly in the case of Castile, or collectively in the case of the mercenary companies, could have, at any given point, delivered a fatal blow.

The historical lesson of Granada seems not to affirm bin Laden's view of the past. The remarkable thing is not Granada's collapse, but the fact that this small Muslim enclave in southern Spain survived in the face of potentially overwhelming, Christian enemies, who were often motivated by violent anti-Islamic forces. Only through the arts of diplomacy, tact, and frequent and flexible negotiations did Granada manage to defy the odds. The long and eventful reign of Muḥammad V epitomizes the qualities that helped to preserve Granada for over a century after his death.

⁷⁵ Manzano Rodríguez, *La intervención*, 304.



Map 11. The Christian Reconquest of Spain.



Map 12. Kingdom of Granada.

PART TWO

OTHER THEATERS OF WAR

“THE FOX AND THE LION”:
THE WHITE COMPANY AND THE HUNDRED
YEARS WAR IN ITALY

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One of the consequences of the Hundred Years War was an increased flow of English mercenary soldiers into Italy. Especially during times of truce, men-at-arms crossed the Alps seeking profits and adventure in the service of wealthy Italian states. After the peace of Brétigny (May 8, 1360), numerous Englishmen entered Italy, including the famous band known as the White Company. The White Company was an offshoot of the Great Company, which had, during the winter and spring of 1361, ravaged southern France and harassed Pope Innocent VI (1352–1362) at Avignon.¹ Innocent hired the band and sent it to Piedmont to work for his ally John Paleologo II, the marquis of Montferrat, then at war with their mutual enemy, Bernabò Visconti, the lord of Milan (1378–1385).²

The advent of a foreign mercenary company in Italy was not in itself noteworthy. The peninsula had long been home to such bands, known locally as “companies of adventure” (*compagnie di ventura*). Several German “Great Companies” had been active there since the third decade of the fourteenth century. The involvement of English mercenaries was also nothing new. They had fought in Italian armies (albeit in small numbers) since the thirteenth century. But the White Company was special. It distinguished itself as a singularly effective fighting force. In modern times, it has enjoyed an unparalleled fame. Scholars and dilettantes alike have trumpeted the band’s deeds, often in purple prose. John Ruskin wrote admiringly of the Company in his lectures.³ Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, author of the Sherlock Holmes

¹ Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), 35–36.

² Ferdinando Gabotto, “L’età del Conte Verde in Piemonte,” *Miscellanea di Storia Italia* 23 (1895): 120; Francesco Cognasso, “L’Unificazione della Lombardia sotto Milano,” in *Storia di Milano*, ed. Carlo Castellaneta vol. 5 (Milan, 1955), 408–14.

³ John Ruskin, “*Fors Clavigera*, part I,” in *The Works of John Ruskin*, ed. E.T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn (London, 1907).

series, immortalized the band in fiction.⁴ As a consequence, the Company has come down to us as a highly romantic entity. The limited literature devoted to mercenaries in fourteenth-century Italy has allowed such notions to stand.⁵ Modern historians have not gone much beyond the parameters set by Ruskin and Conan Doyle, and, worse, have shown an unsettling tendency to use what new information they have found to reinforce the preexisting popular image.⁶ Thus for all its fame, little is actually known about the White Company. We remain uniformed about such basic issues as the composition of the band, the genesis of its name, manner in which it fought, and, most of all, why it was so successful. The following essay is an attempt to fill part of the enormous lacuna.

I

Whatever romantic notions have been handed down to us about the band, it is clear that its first moves on Italian soil were intensely brutal. It entered the Piedmont region in May, 1361, setting fires, raping women, maiming non-combatants, mistreating prisoners and generally spreading panic and fear.⁷ The Milanese chronicler, Pietro Azario, called them “better thieves than any others who have preyed on Lombardy.”⁸ He recounted various tortures, including a rather creative one whereby soldiers shut captives in boxes and then threatened to drown them in order to hasten the payment of ransoms. Azario described in chilling detail the band’s habit of dismembering victims, cutting first the hands, then the nose, the ears and leaving the trunks in ditches outside castles to be eaten by dogs. Such crimes

⁴ Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The White Company* (1891; reprint, New York, 1988).

⁵ For a summary and evaluation of the literature on mercenaries in fourteenth century Italy, see William Caferro, *The Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena* (Baltimore, 1998), xiii–xx.

⁶ See John Temple-Leader and Giuseppe Marcotti, *Sir John Hawkwood* (London, 1889), 11–17; Geoffrey Trease, *The Condottieri* (New York, 1971), 55–72; Fritz Gaupp, “The Condottiere John Hawkwood,” *History* 23 (March 1939): 311. The White Company is mentioned briefly in Michael Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters* (Totowa, N.J., 1974), 36–37 and in Kenneth Fowler, “Sir John Hawkwood and the English Condottieri in Trecento Italy,” *Renaissance Studies* 12 (1998): 137–38.

⁷ Jehan Servion, *Gestez et Croniques de la Mayson de Savoye*, ed. F.-E. Bollati di Saint Pierre, 2 vols. (Turin, 1879), 2:118.

⁸ Petri Azarii (Azario) “Liber Gestorum in Lombardia,” ed. Francesco Cognasso in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores [RIS]*, vol. 16, pt. 4 (Bologna, 1925–1939), 128.

stand out, even if we acknowledge the tendency for hyperbole in local chronicles. The nineteenth century Italian historian, Ercole Ricotti accused the English of “grotesquery.”⁹ The band’s misdeeds seemed all the more perfidious because they were initially perpetrated not against the lands of the enemy, the Visconti, but of those of Amadeo VI, the count of Savoy (1342–1385), who was technically neutral in the war. In fairness to the band, however, the responsibility for the subversion lay with the marchese of Montferrat, who wished to profit at Savoy’s expense.

Shocked by its excesses, Italian contemporaries nevertheless admired the band’s readiness for war. These were battle hardened men, possessed of a ferocity that was not common among foreign mercenaries. German mercenaries, the most numerous in Italy, were a decidedly uneven group. Many were little more than restless, impoverished nobles with limited experience in war apart from jousts or local conflicts of relatively small scale. The men of the White Company, on the other hand, had learned their trade in actual battle. Francesco Petrarca (Petrarch), who witnessed first hand the ravages of war up north, spoke of a veritable transformation of the English race. In a letter written about the time the White Company entered Italy, Petrarch said:

In my youth the Britons . . . were taken to be the meekest of the barbarians. Today they are a fiercely bellicose nation. They have overturned the ancient military glories of the French by victories so numerous that they, who were once inferior to the wretched Scots, have reduced the entire kingdom to fire and sword.¹⁰

The Florentine chronicler Filippo Villani specifically praised the conditioning of the men. He said they were “young, hot and eager . . . accustomed to homicides and robbery, current in the use of iron, having few personal cares.”¹¹ Both he and Azario spoke of their ability to endure the elements, to bear both cold and heat, to travel large distances quickly. Villani compared the men not only to the ancient Romans, but also to the Carthaginians. He stressed the band’s

⁹ Ercole Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie di ventura in Italia*, 6 vols. (Turin, 1844), 2:141–42.

¹⁰ Francesco Petrarca, “*Familiars*, XXII, 14 (27 February 1361),” in *Petrarch, an Anthology*, ed. A. Bernardi and D. Thompson (New York, 1971), 184–85.

¹¹ *Cronica di Matteo e Filippo Villani*, 6 vols. (Florence, 1826), 5:259–60.

ability to intimidate its opponents, and in several places likened its members to “lions.”¹²

At the same time, Villani also emphasized the band’s talent for maneuver and deception, describing it—and the English race in general—as “by nature fox-like and clever.”¹³ Villani thus affixed to the Company the attributes of the lion and the fox, a metaphor common in Tuscany at the time and made famous by Machiavelli’s use of it two centuries later. For Machiavelli, the metaphor served as the blueprint for the qualities of the ideal prince. “One must,” he wrote in *The Prince*, “be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves.”¹⁴ As we shall see, these were the same traits that made the White Company successful in Italy.

The precise composition of the Company when it entered Italy will never be known for sure. The best evidence comes from an extant contract dated November 22, 1361 (see appendix). The document, curiously overlooked by a generation of scholars, was published in 1923 by Francesco Cognasso. The contract was, however, drafted a full seven months after the band arrived in Italy and was preceded by three earlier ones none of which have survived.¹⁵ In the meantime, the composition of the band fluctuated. The English chronicler, Henry Knighton, spoke generically of an ebb and flow of soldiers between Lombardy and France.¹⁶ Matteo Villani (father of Filippo) told the story of a woman, “*la donna di siri Ricorti*” (perhaps the wife of Jean V, count of Harcourt), who crossed the Alps with the marquis of Montferrat, but apparently turned back.¹⁷ Pope Innocent recruited additional English soldiers for Italian service directly from King Edward III (1327–1377) in July and August, 1361.¹⁸ Some of the men who initially came to Italy with the Company broke off and went elsewhere on the peninsula. The Scottish knight named

¹² *Ibid.*, 5:237.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 5:256.

¹⁴ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Luigi Ricci (New York, 1966), 62.

¹⁵ The prior contracts were for two-months (twice) and for four-months. G. Romano, “Niccolò Spinelli da Giovenazzo,” *Archivio storico per le province napoletane* 24 (1899): 378; Cognasso, “Unificazione,” 414; *idem*, “Note e documenti sulla formazione dello stato visconteo,” in *Bollettino della Società Pavese di Storia Patria* 23 (Jan–Dec 1923): 23–169.

¹⁶ *Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337–1396*, ed. G.H. Martin (Oxford, 1995), 183.

¹⁷ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:59–60.

¹⁸ *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. Edmund Martene and Ursinus Durant, 5 vols. (New York, 1717), 2: cols. 882–83.

Walter Leslie, who had been one of the commanders of the Great Company at Avignon, passed into Italy, but sold his services not to Montferrat, but to the city of Venice.¹⁹

The contract of November 22 is nevertheless the earliest one that has survived and as such constitutes an important source. It makes clear that the leadership of the Company was largely English. Although the document lists the German mercenary, Albert Sterz, as captain general, he is assisted by seventeen corporals, fifteen of whom appear to have English names (see table 1).²⁰ Italian contemporaries most often identified the band as English. The French-speaking chronicler of Savoy, Jehan Servion called it the “*compagnez des angloys*.” Latin documents use the term “*societas angliciis*,” as does the chronicler Azario.

The men represent an array of veterans of the French wars: some of their names are familiar, others obscure, several undoubtedly used assumed names, a common practice among soldiers, particularly those who had committed crimes.²¹ John Kirkeby was probably the same person who fought in the Breton campaign in 1342/1343 in the retinue of Sir Walter de Mauny. William Folifet was likely a relation of Thomas Folifet, a mercenary captain who took part in the famed battle of the Thirty in France. Hugh Heton may have been related to David Heton, who rode with Robin Knowles’s Great Company through Normandy and the Loire in summer of 1359. One example of the problems involved in identification is presented by Adam Scot, listed in the document as a corporal. Scot may have used his real surname or taken a nickname based on his nationality. If he did the latter, then he may have been a relative of the erstwhile captain of the Company at Avignon, Walter “the Scot” Leslie. If he did the former, he may have been a relation of William Scot, who fought with the Black Prince at Poitiers, or even Robert Scot, a mercenary leader eventually executed in France for his activities.²² It is also quite possible that he was not related to any of the above.

¹⁹ David Ditchburn, *Scotland and Europe: The Medieval Kingdom and its Contacts with Christendom, 1215–1545*, 1 vol. to date (East Linton, Scotland, 2001), 27.

²⁰ Jonathan Sumption’s recent supposition that the English were “a minority” in the band is unsupported. Jonathan Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, vol. 2 of *The Hundred Years War*, 2 vols. to date (Philadelphia, 1999), 468.

²¹ Determining the identity of soldiers is, however, a most inexact science, and any hypothesis must be offered cautiously. Kenneth Fowler has announced a volume on the Company in Italy which will no doubt shed light on the issue.

²² For identification of the above, see H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition of*

One name that is easily identified, however, is that of John Hawkwood. He is listed in the contract as “Iohannes de Hakeude,” a form nearly identical to that used in English documents of the period.²³ Hawkwood became the greatest of the English mercenaries in Italy, and achieved a fame that eclipsed that of the Company itself. But the contract makes clear that at this point Hawkwood was merely a corporal, and not, as some scholars assert,²⁴ the captain of the Company. It is, however, probable that Hawkwood’s status was relatively high within the band. His name is among the first listed of the corporals, a common convention in Italian contracts to indicate elevated rank.

On the other hand, the chronicler Servion gives more attention to another corporal (also among the first listed) Robin du Pin. Du Pin has sometimes been taken for the renowned English mercenary Robin Knowles,²⁵ but more likely was a relative of the French mercenary, Guiyot du Pin. Servion relayed du Pin’s deed in several places and mistook him for the captain general of the Company. An even more conspicuous corporal was Andrew Belmont or Beaumont. Andrew was probably an illegitimate son of Henry Beaumont, earl of Buchan (d. 1369), a distinguished soldier who had fought in the Scottish wars at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill and had once come to Italy in 1322 on behalf of Pope John XXII (1316–1334).²⁶ Andrew captured the attention of local writers not for his military ability, but for his exceptionally good looks. The Florentine diarist Pagolo Morelli described Andrew as “very handsome and very young.”²⁷

1355–1357 (Manchester, 1958), 206, 211; *John of Gaunt’s Register, 1379–1383*, ed. Robert Somerville (London, 1937), 215; Fowler, *Mercenaries*, 9, 19, 22, 104, 129, 149, 153, 175, 326; Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), 183, 240, 263; Simon Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity, 1361–1399* (Oxford, 1990), 37, 204, 264, 272; Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 2:354–55, 357.

²³ I deal with this in my forthcoming book, *John Hawkwood: English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy* (Baltimore, 2004).

²⁴ See Trease, *Condottieri*, 55–72; Gaupp, “John Hawkwood,” 308–12.

²⁵ Temple-Leader speaks of Knowles or “Cannoles,” but makes the odd claim that the name was German. Temple-Leader and Marcotti, *Hawkwood*, 13–15.

²⁶ Andrew may also have been related to another corporal Thomas Beaumont, whose name corresponds to that of one of Henry Beaumont’s legitimate sons. But it seems rather unlikely that Thomas, the legitimate son, would hold a lesser position within the Company than his illegitimate brother. Charles Mosely, *Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage*, 2 vols. (London, 1999), 1:227–28; J.R. Maddicott, “Sir Henry Beaumont,” in *The Dictionary of National Biography (Missing Persons)*, ed. C.S. Nichols (Oxford, 1994), 52–53; Clifford Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 30–39, 56–57.

²⁷ Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli, *Ricordi* (Florence, 1969), 307.

The November 22 contract makes no mention of the size of the Company. Scholars have had to rely on chronicle accounts—an inherently dubious enterprise. The most widely accepted figures are those of Matteo Villani, who claimed that the Company was composed of 3,500 horses and 2000 infantry.²⁸ But Villani's calculation was made nearly two years after the band arrived in Italy and, in any case, bears uncomfortable resemblance to an earlier one he gave for the German Great Company. The Milanese chronicler, Azario, who saw the band with his own eyes before Villani did, estimated the number of horsemen at 2,000.²⁹

A more precise means of approximation is to compare the 1361 contract with one involving the Company drafted four years later. The second contract states explicitly the size and composition of the company. It had 5,000 horsemen commanded by thirty corporals and a captain general; therefore, theoretically, each corporal had charge of 167 men. If the Company in 1361 was configured in the same way as the one in 1365, it would have had approximately 2,839 horsemen, a figure midway between that of Villani and Azario. This makes the White Company larger than the German Great Companies of 1350 and 1358, estimated by the historian Stephan Selzer at 2375 and 1500–2000 horsemen respectively.³⁰ More importantly, the White Company was larger in size than many of the towns it initially opposed in the dominion of the count of Savoy. (Savoy, a rugged Alpine country, possessed few places with more than 2,000 inhabitants.)

It is important to stress, however, that figures are only approximate. Each corporal's contingent need not have been of equal size. Even regular English armies at this time lacked such uniformity. For example, captains within the English army in 1359 had retinues ranging from 9 to 1,500 men.³¹ Moreover, the size of contingents in the White Company undoubtedly fluctuated over time, not only as a result of the above mentioned flow of men to and from the

²⁸ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:203.

²⁹ Azario, "Liber," 110.

³⁰ Stephan Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento* (Tübingen, 2001), 64–65.

³¹ There is little evidence of the way armies were organized in the field and the command structure, according to Prestwich, was primitive. Michael Prestwich, "'Miles in Armis Strenuus': The Knight at War," *Transactions of the Royal Society* (6th ser.) 5 (1995): 214–17; A.C. Ayton, "The English Armies of the Fourteenth Century," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), 31–34.

band, but also from attrition caused by the plague that was ravaging northern Italy when the band arrived. Azario tells us, for example, that the Company suffered heavy losses when it entered the pestilence-ridden town of Romagnano in the spring of 1362. He estimated that the band was reduced to only 500 horses.³² The turnover was clearly significant, since only a handful of the names from the contract of 1361 also appear in the contract of 1365.³³

Although the November 22 contract referred to the band as the "Great Company of the English and Germans," mention of the latter nationality was probably a nod to Sterz: there is no evidence that it contained substantial numbers of German soldiers. The considerable preponderance of Englishmen in the company apparently led to the final and most intriguing clause in the agreement. In it, the Company explicitly refused to oppose "another society of Englishmen or any subjects of the Lord King of England if they should come to Lombardy."³⁴ The same clause can be found in contracts involving English soldiers throughout the century. For example, the Englishmen who fought with the city of Florence in 1387 all had the provision in their contracts.³⁵ There is no immediate equivalent in the contracts of German and Hungarian soldiers, though both races clearly manifested strong national solidarities of their own.³⁶

Why the overt statement should exist only in English contracts is uncertain. It nevertheless lends support to Christopher Allmand's assertion that war with France helped bring members of English society under the "umbrella of national consciousness" and more generally that the war helped encourage a sense of allegiance to the crown.³⁷

³² Azario, "Liber," 131.

³³ Augustin Theiner, *Codex Diplomaticus, Domini Temporalis S. Sedi*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1862), 2:419–26. Fowler has stressed the change in the personnel of English bands until 1373. Fowler, "Hawkwood," 137–40.

³⁴ Cognasso, "Note," 160.

³⁵ Archivio di Stato di Firenze [ASF], Dieci di balia, deliberazioni e condotte e stanziamenti, 3, ff. 8–12.

³⁶ Stephan Selzer spoke of a strong Swabian character to the Great Companies, with many of their captains and corporals coming from that region of southern Germany. Germans set their co-nationals free "with a wink and a nod" when taken on the battlefield. Hungarian soldiers were mostly from the nobility, which had close ties to the king and often took orders directly from him.

³⁷ Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300–c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1994), 4.

On the other hand, the “fidelity clause,” singular though it might be, did not extend to a complete unwillingness to fight fellow Englishmen. At the same time that it refused to attack king and country, the Company promised to serve Montferrat faithfully against enemy forces, even those that contained English contingents. Apparently, to kill their countrymen was acceptable, just so long as those killed were not serving the crown.

The original name of the band, the Great Company, was the same it had used north of the Alps when threatening Avignon and indicated a continuity. Upon its arrival in Italy, however, a new name increasingly came to the fore, the White Company. This title was popularized in modern times by John Ruskin, Arthur Conan Doyle, and others. It is not clear where this name originated. Ruskin said it derived from the band’s habit of wearing highly-polished plate armor, notably breastplates, which appeared “white” in the sun, an explanation that has become standard.³⁸ In fact, at least by the fifteenth century, plate armor had become known in Italy as “white” armor, and English soldiers wore breastplates, while German soldiers preferred mail shirts, and Hungarians used little more than hardened leather for protection.³⁹

On the other hand, Ruskin based his account of the Company on Filippo Villani and Villani does not link the practice of polishing metal to the name White Company.⁴⁰ In fact, no contemporary writer does. While both the English chronicler, Thomas Walsingham, and Villani’s father, Matteo, refer to the band in this manner, neither explains why.⁴¹ Azario did not use the term at all and gave a description of the armor that is not easily reconciled with that of Villani. According to Azario, the band arrived in Italy only modestly armored: some soldiers wore iron breastplates, but others had only hardened leather doublets; some men were fitted with bacinets, others had no helmet at all.⁴² The discrepancy may have derived from the fact that Azario witnessed the band when it was impoverished, just after it

³⁸ Mallett, *Mercenaries*, 37.

³⁹ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 39–40; Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 3:176–79; Giuseppe Canestrini, “Documenti per servire della milizia italiana del secolo XIII al XVI,” *Archivio Storico Italiano [ASI]* (1st ser.) 1, no. 15 (1851): xxxiii–xxxiv.

⁴⁰ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:260.

⁴¹ Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H.T. Riley, 2 vols. (London, 1863–2864), 1:295–96; Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:49, 203.

⁴² Azario, “Liber,” 128.

crossed the Alps; while Villani saw the band later, after it had received large advances on pay from the city of Pisa. In either case there is no evidence that the name White Company had anything to do with the band's armor. An extant code governing the outfitting (armaments and weapons) of the Florentine army in 1369 in fact confirm Azario's account. It allowed the English (along with the Hungarians), according to their custom, to wear less armor than other soldiers in Florentine employ.⁴³

It is likely then that the name White Company derived from something other than the band's armor; perhaps, as some have suggested, from the custom of wearing surcoats.⁴⁴ Andrew Belmont was described at one point by a local writer as "dressed all in white." The Knights Templars—an impressionistic model for mercenary companies since the days of the fallen Templar Roger Flor—usually wore red surcoats over their armor. White was connected with crusading and service to the church, and the band came to Italy in the employ of the pope. But this does not explain why Matteo Villani also applied the term to the band that had harassed Lyon just after the treaty of Brétigny in 1360.⁴⁵ That company was clearly not in the service of the church.

In any case, the nickname did not become firmly attached to the Italian-based company until it took up service in Tuscany. Only then do the Italian term "*societ bianca*" and the Latin term "*comitas alba*" (and various combinations) appear regularly in documents. Tuscans may have preferred the name White Company to Great Company to differentiate the band from at least two other Great Companies then operating in central and northern Italy. The chronicler of the city of Perugia, Del Graziani, claimed that there was also a "Black Company" in the region at the time.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ricotti, *Storia*, 2:104–5, 315–28.

⁴⁴ On the use of the surcoat see David Edge and John Miles Paddock, *Arms and Armor of the Medieval Knight* (London, 1996), 41, 45, 57–59, 73, 77. For reference to white surcoats and the English, see Barbara Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century* (New York, 1978), 225.

⁴⁵ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 4:331–32.

⁴⁶ Del Graziani, "Cronica della città di Perugia," ed. F. Bonaini and F. Polidori, *ASI* 16 (1850): 193.

II

It was not the band's name, however, but its ability to make war that most distinguished it in the eyes of Italian contemporaries. Modern historians have generally attributed the band's success to tactics brought to Italy from the Hundred Years War. In particular, they point to the band's habit of dismounting and fighting on foot in open battle and its use of the longbow—the same methods that proved so effective for the English in the great victories against the French at Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356). The German scholar Fritz Gaupp placed emphasis on the “magnificent” archers, which made the English “far superior” to their opponents.⁴⁷ Geoffrey Trease called the archers the “essential part of the White Company.”⁴⁸

Both Azario and Filippo Villani describe the practice of fighting on foot and the use of the longbow. According to Azario:

It was their custom when it was necessary to fight in the field to do so on foot. . . . [The archers fought at] the posterior of the battle formation . . . They had great bows, which they held from their head to the ground and from which they shot great and long arrows.⁴⁹

Villani added the detail that the dismounted men-at-arms left their horses with pages during battle. He did not say how the longbowmen were deployed, but described them as “ready and obedient” and “highly skilled.”⁵⁰ Fighting on foot clearly set the English apart from other major mercenary groups operating in Italy. Germans favored cavalry charges, while Hungarians eschewed frontal assaults and instead harassed opponents by shooting arrows from their mounts.

Filippo Villani credited the English with introducing into Italy the basic cavalry unit known as the “lance” (*lancia*),⁵¹ and while Michael Mallett has shown that the lance predated the advent of the Company in Italy, the English deserve credit for exploiting the unit's potential in the context of fighting on foot and for popularizing it throughout the peninsula.⁵² The unit consisted of a man-at-arms or knight,

⁴⁷ Gaupp, “The Condottiere John Hawkwood,” 311.

⁴⁸ Trease, *Condottieri*, 57.

⁴⁹ Azario, “Liber,” 128.

⁵⁰ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:260.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 5:258.

⁵² Mallett, *Mercenaries*, 36–37.

supported by a squire and a page. The knight and squire had their own horses; the page, often a boy or teenager, rode a pony.⁵³ The formation was well-adapted to fighting on foot; the knight left his mount with the page during battle, the squire provided reserve and support.

Prior to the arrival of the English-German *barbata*, consisting of two men and two horses, the Italian banner, composed of 20–25 individual horseman, was the most common cavalry unit in Italy. But already in 1364, a German mercenary band employed by Florence to oppose the White Company had arranged itself into lances and by the 1370s, virtually all armies throughout Italy had followed suit. The shift is already apparent in Perugian armies in 1367, papal armies in 1368, Milanese armies in 1370, Florentine armies in 1371 and Siense armies in 1372.⁵⁴

While the precise manner in which the English fought on foot is not clear, several hints as to their tactics do survive. Azario described the dismounted men at arms as arrayed in serried ranks holding “very large lances with very long iron tips.” “Mostly two, sometimes three of them, handled a single lance so heavy and big that there was nothing it could not penetrate.”⁵⁵ Filippo Villani said that the English battle formation was “almost round.” Two soldiers wielded a single lance and fought “in the manner in which spearmen hunt a wild boar.” They advanced toward the enemy in small steps with their lances held low.⁵⁶

The formations do not have obvious parallels in the battles fought in France; however, the circular array of closely packed man with long spears recalls the Scottish *schiltrom*, which performed well against English armies. And the movement of soldiers toward the enemy with their lances pointed downward is similar to the technique of Swiss pikemen of the later fourteenth and fifteenth century.⁵⁷ What seems indisputable, however, is that the formation was very difficult to break and had strong counter offensive potential.

It is not certain from the chronicle descriptions whether, as in

⁵³ Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984), 67–68; Prestwich, “*Miles*,” 215.

⁵⁴ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 56–58.

⁵⁵ Azario, “*Liber*,” 128.

⁵⁶ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:260.

⁵⁷ Charles Oman, *A History of War in the Sixteenth Century* (1937; reprint, London, 1989), 76–77.

France, the English primarily took the defensive posture in battle. Azario and Villani also say little about how the longbow was used: whether, for instance, archers let go formidable volleys of arrows at the start of battle as at Crécy and Poitiers. We know that John Hawkwood often employed the defensive stance during his long career, and earned his greatest victory, at Castagnaro in 1387, in that manner—a battle that has rightly been compared to Poitiers. But there is little specific evidence that the tactic was regularly used by the White Company. Rather than patience, Villani continually stressed the cupidity of the Company, its overweening desire to fight, its penchant for what he called “excessive boldness” (*tropo baldanza*). In fact, he saw this as the Company’s only real flaw, which made it fearsome in the field, but at times careless as well, particularly in how it set up its camps.⁵⁸

Unfortunately, battle descriptions are often too imprecise and confused to provide meaningful detail. A case in point is the battle of Caturino on April 22, 1363, the White Company’s greatest victory in its initial years in Italy. The English descended from their horses at the start of battle. The enemy, commanded by the renowned German mercenary, Konrad von Landau, did the same. Azario does not say who attacked first. Landau won an initial skirmish, but this was prior to the dismounting of the men. The Company ultimately shattered Landau’s army and killed Landau himself. But according to Azario, the decisive factor was the desertion of Landau’s Hungarian cavalry at the height of battle. He says nothing of tactics.⁵⁹ Still less certain is the role played by the longbow. Azario and Villani indicate only that the winning forces had archers, who were skilled. They do not give subsequent evidence that they were instrumental in the band’s success. Azario makes no mention of them at Caturino.

The modern historians Gaupp and Trease claim that the archers existed in large numbers in the band. Michael Mallett implicitly accepted this assertion, and argued that the numbers “declined” over the years.⁶⁰ But we do not in fact know how many archers originally were in the band. We get a sense of numbers only from later archival documents. These indicate that the archers were few. The Englishman John Clifford fought for Bologna in 1377 at the head

⁵⁸ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:259–60.

⁵⁹ Azario, “Liber,” 164.

⁶⁰ Mallett, *Mercenaries*, 38.

of 107 lances, with only 32 longbowmen. John Beruch served Florence in 1379 at the head of 55 lances with 20 archers.⁶¹ John Hawkwood in 1386 worked for Florence commanding a brigade of 246 horsemen, which contained 40 archers. The next year his brigade of 300 horsemen included 55 archers.⁶² On the basis of such figures, there is no reason to suppose that the White Company had more than a relatively small number of archers when it arrived in Italy. In any case, the configuration of the White Company, and subsequent English bands in Italy, differed significantly from contemporary English armies in France, where the number of archers was reaching parity with the number of men at arms. If, as has been argued, the efficacy of the longbow depended on large numbers and the ability to send a torrent of arrows on the enemy, it is unlikely that the longbow was decisive in Italy.⁶³

This is not to say that the weapon was unimportant. It clearly impressed both Azario and Villani. And the examples given above indicate the English in Italy integrated longbowmen with men-at-arms, much like they did for war in France.⁶⁴ There is also evidence that non-English brigades in Italy imitated the English ways and (to the extent possible) incorporated the longbow in their own cavalry brigades. The Italian mercenary, Giovanni da Barbiano, who fought for the Florentine in 1390, enrolled 18 longbowmen in his contingent of 212 lances.⁶⁵ But this was done infrequently.

Given the glaring lack of studies of Italian warfare at this time, it is difficult to gain adequate understanding of the longbowmen (or, for that matter, any other component) played in local armies. The primary sources do suggest, however, the overall importance of projectiles and ballistic weapons to Italian warfare. Armies always contained significant numbers of crossbowmen, as well as rock-throwing trebuchets, the latter for use not only against towns, but also opposing forces in the field. Soldiers themselves sometimes hurled rocks

⁶¹ ASF, Camera del comune, uscita 238. f. 122v.

⁶² ASF, Camera del comune, provveditori, poi massai, specchi, poi campioni di entrata e uscita, 4, f. 81; Camera del comune, provv, poi massai . . . 5, f. 85; Archivio di Stato di Bologna (ASBo), Tesoreria 14, f. 4.

⁶³ Ayton, "English Armies," 31; and idem, *Knights*, 140. For a general discussion of the longbow in battle see Jim Bradbury, *The Medieval Archer* (New York, 1985), 91–115.

⁶⁴ Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages* (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 125; Ayton, *Knights*, 17.

⁶⁵ ASF, Dieci di balia, deliberazioni e condotte e stanziamenti, 5, f. 147.

at the enemy at close quarters. At Caturino, Konrad von Landau was initially felled by a rock. In all probability, English longbowmen took their place alongside crossbowmen and other “artillerymen” (*tiratori*) in Italian armies and played a similar role in battle. Giovanni Barbiano’s brigade of 1390 in fact contained 80 crossbowmen in addition to the 18 longbowmen.

The documents also suggest that the English may have tried to make up for the small numbers of longbowmen by adding Hungarian archers to their contingents. An extant contract between an English captain and the city of Florentine in 1384 allowed him to enroll Hungarian archers in lieu of longbowmen in his brigade.⁶⁶ This may explain the apparent frequency with which the White Company took in Hungarian reinforcements. Azario reported that Hungarians joined the band after the losses suffered capturing the town of Romagnano in the spring of 1362. According to the Perugian chronicler Del Graziani, the White Company added as many as 400 Hungarians just before it came to Tuscany. While impossible to confirm, the figure suggests considerable recruitment from this other nationality group.⁶⁷

But it would be erroneous to place too much emphasis on English weaponry and tactics for the success of the White Company. Both Villani and Azario repeatedly stress more basic military virtues such as *esprit de corps*, discipline and good leadership. Azario praised the captain general, Albert Sterz, and claimed that his “virtue at war made all the others virtuous.”⁶⁸ Sterz’s success owed in no small part to his ability to speak the English language and thus communicate directly with his corporals.⁶⁹ Azario likewise lauded the band’s loyalty to its employer. He reported how the Visconti tried numerous times to bribe the soldiers without success. According to the chronicler:

They said that they were prepared for war, that they had entered Lombardy to wage war as stipendiaries of the Marquis of Montferrat, whom they wished to serve loyally, just as they were currently doing.⁷⁰

Azario portrayed Sterz as very canny in such matters, responding to the “artful” attempts of the Visconti with “art” of his own. We

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2, f. 2v.

⁶⁷ F. Bonaini and F. Polidori, ed., “Cronaca della Citta di Perugia (Diario del Gaziani),” *ASI* 16 (1850): 193.

⁶⁸ Azario, “Liber,” 128.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 129.

might suspect Azario's motives here; he undoubtedly exaggerated the virtue of the English to further denigrate Milan's own troops, whose loyalties were then suspect. The desertion of the White Company from Pisan service three years later would show that the English were not inherently more moral than other mercenaries.

But the comradeship of the band was genuine enough, and, consistent with the final clause in the contract of November 22, seems to have revolved in large part (at least initially) around a mutual sense of English identity. This "Englishness" is apparent in the band's capture of the town of Lanzo, where it trapped Amadeo, the count of Savoy and his entourage in a local fortress. One of the prisoners taken at this time was William de Grandson, an Englishman. According to Servion's account, William was allowed audience with his countrymen, who knew him from his stint as Edward III's ambassador to the Great Company in France back in summer of 1360.⁷¹ In the ensuing negotiations, William prevailed upon the band to withdraw from the fortress and release the count of Savoy in return for a bribe.⁷²

Azario's account of the battle of Caturino, sketchy though it is, reinforces the portrait of the White Company as a highly-disciplined and well-ordered entity. It also suggests that the band maintained better relations and formed a more cohesive whole with the non-English units that made up the rest of Montferrat's army. The White Company shared space at Caturino with German, Genoese and Hungarian brigades. Konrad von Landau's multi-national army disintegrated underneath him, a relatively common occurrence in Italian war. But Montferrat's army held firm. The precise reasons for this will never be known, but it is likely that the success of the White Company in amassing victories, and with it booty and loot, helped bind it to the others, who saw in the English a more sure means of profit.

For all the discussion of tactics in battle, it nevertheless must be emphasized that the White Company rarely opposed other armies in the field. It passed the bulk of its time ravaging the countryside,

⁷¹ H. Denifle, *La désolation des églises, monastères et hôpitaux en France pendant la guerre de cent ans*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1899), 2:253, 385; Aimé Chérest, *L'Archiprêtre, épisodes de la guerre de cent ans au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1879), 125–28; Fowler, *Mercenaries*, 27–28.

⁷² Servion, *Geste*, 2:120–21; Eugene L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy, Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton, 1967), 159.

burning harvests and farms, an activity that most closely resembled the *chavauchées* in France. Such raids were fundamental to Italian warfare, which favored inflicting economic damage to decisive battle. Local conflicts were generally based on attrition: an army challenged another to a full scale battle only when the terms were clearly favorable. The anonymous author of the Milanese *Annals* stated the matter openly when he wrote that “the outcome of war is doubtful” and thus “pitched battle should be avoided where possible.”⁷³

Italian writers repeatedly praised the White Company’s ability to negotiate local terrain, to move large distances quickly, and to strike with devastating effect. Matteo Villani credited the band with a capacity for “boundless travel” (*smisurato viaggio*). The Company enhanced its maneuverability by breaking into small units. This allowed the band to avoid traps. It also facilitated provisioning and maximized the area over which the band could inflict damage. It did not take a particularly large brigade to overwhelm poorly defended rural lands. When the Company attacked the outskirts of Milan in January, 1363, it fanned out over a wide area, simultaneously damaging fields near numerous towns and villages. The practice had the additional virtue of giving corporals of the Company, who usually led the small contingents, valuable “executive” experience in the field. This fact may help explain why Italian chroniclers, like Servion, were often confused about who actually commanded the overall army.

What was most impressive of all about the White Company was its talent for seizing modest-sized towns and fortresses. It accomplished this by what Azario called a combination of “zeal and artifice.” The band used the element of surprise to stunning effect, launching many of its attacks in the middle of the night.⁷⁴ Indeed, it was these nocturnal activities, more than the longbow or any other feature, that distinguished the Company in its initial days in Italy.

It demonstrated this skill in its very first offensive. Advancing on the town of Rivarolo, 25 km north of Turin, the Englishmen in the middle of the night, scaled the town wall, and robbed the surprised inhabitants.⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards, they did the same at Lanzo and

⁷³ L.A. Muratori, ed., “Annales Mediolanenses,” in *RIS* (Milan, 1730), 16: col. 750.

⁷⁴ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:120.

⁷⁵ Cox, *Green Count*, 157–58; Gabotto, “Etá,” 122, 275 (doc. xviii).

again at Tortona.⁷⁶ The attack on Milan in 1363 took place at nightfall, catching local citizens completely off guard, while they were out socializing and playing checkers. According to Azario's evocative description, the company displayed a remarkable greed, seizing everything in sight, gathering "fat spoils" which he estimated at more than 100,000 florins. Azario noted that the band robbed women of their jewelry, but did not violate them. He attributed this not to moral rectitude, but to haste and the desire of soldiers to move quickly elsewhere to gain more loot.⁷⁷

The band's success at entering towns was facilitated by effective scaling ladders, described by Filippo Villani as consisting of small sections that could be fitted together and made large enough to surmount even the highest walls.⁷⁸ But, as was generally true in Italy, the Company often succeeded by treachery. A traitor among the inhabitants of Tortona, a substantial-sized town which would have been difficult to take, opened the gates to the company.

That the band could deploy and attack at night is a tribute to its discipline and remarkable adaptability to its new environment. It may well have received instruction in the method from its employer, the marquis of Montferrat. The marquis's father, Theodore Paleologus, had written a military treatise, which advocated nocturnal attacks and gave details on how to effect them.⁷⁹ Although Theodore wrote the treatise in his native Greek during the first half of the fourteenth century, it was soon translated into French under the title *Les Enseignements*. Paleologus specifically pointed out that the ruse depended on outstanding discipline in the ranks and excellent guides. The tactic had been employed successfully in Italy prior to the advent of the Company. In 1315, a Milanese army took the city of Pavia at night.⁸⁰ But such instance were rare, and the White Company deserves credit for exhibiting singular skill in the difficult tactic.

Contemporaries subsumed night-time attacks under the general rubric of "craftiness" and "deceit" in warfare, attributes viewed as

⁷⁶ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:111, 120; Azario, "Liber," 110, 128; Cox, *Green Count*, 158; *Storia di Milano*, 415.

⁷⁷ Azario, "Liber," 160.

⁷⁸ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:259–60.

⁷⁹ *Les Enseignements de Théodore Paléologue*, ed. C. Knowles (London, 1983), 73, 76, 97–98; Aldo A. Settia, "Gli 'Insegnamenti' di Teodoro di Monferrato e la prassi bellica in Italia all'inizio del Trecento," in *Condottieri e uomini d'arme nell'Italia del Rinascimento*, ed. Mario del Treppo (Naples, 2001), 19, 21–22.

⁸⁰ Settia, "Insegnamenti," 22.

indigenous to the English. Local writers called John Hawkwood “*Acuto*” not because they could not pronounce his last name (though they had trouble), but because the word honored his most prominent martial trait, “acuteness” or cleverness. The Florentine poet Antonio Pucci, somewhat less charitably, compared the English to a horde of serpents. Pucci notwithstanding, deceit and artifice were in fact generally acknowledged as virtues in war. Two ancient authorities, Vegetius and Frontinus, enthusiastically advocated such methods.⁸¹ Their works were available in Italy in vernacular translation in the fourteenth century. Frontinus devoted whole sections to the art of deception. His chapter include such headings as “concealing one’s plans . . . laying and meeting ambushes while on the march . . . concealing reverses . . . deceiving the besieged . . . , [and] surprise attacks.”⁸² He gave specific examples of how great Roman and Greek generals had employed these ruses. In the Italian context, the great sixteenth century humanist, Niccolò Machiavelli specifically lauded the captain who used “fraud” on the battlefield, describing it as a “praiseworthy and glorious” trait in Book Three of *The Discourses*.⁸³

Like Machiavelli’s ideal prince, the White Company coupled fraud with intimidation, the fox with the lion. The mistreatment of prisoners and the polishing of its armor were intended to make the band, as Villani wrote, “more frightening” (*piu spaventoso*).⁸⁴ The English also let go “fearful shouts” when they advanced forward to attack, a habit that contrasted sharply with that of Hungarian mercenaries, who moved forward silently, slapping their saddle bag to signal their assent to their commanders. Villani noted how local Florentines viewed the English not so much as men, but as beasts.⁸⁵ A measure of the fear the band evoked in the region is seen in the fact that it won its first victory in Tuscany before it actually arrived there. While the White Company was still in Lombardy preparing to move south to take up Pisan service, Pisan officials, hard pressed by a Florentine army just 20 km away, sent its own army out of the city in the middle of the night and instructed it to ride back

⁸¹ Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.P. Milner (Liverpool, 1996), 74–77, 83–86; Frontinus, *The Strategems and the Aqueducts of Rome*, trans. Chares Bennett (London, 1925); Contamine, *War*, 210–18.

⁸² Frontinus, *Strategems*, 6–7, 88–89, 204–205.

⁸³ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, ed. Leslie J. Walker (New York, 1989), 513.

⁸⁴ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:260.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 5:230.

during the day, making as much noise and raising as much dust as possible. Officials hoped to sham the Florentines into thinking that the White Company had arrived—by means of its characteristic nocturnal march. The ruse worked, and the Florentine army, then besieging the town of Montecalvoli, withdrew.⁸⁶

III

The White Company fought in Piedmont and Lombardy for two years. In July, 1363, it moved to Tuscany to serve Pisa in its war against Florence. The reputation of the English was by then assured and suffused widely throughout the peninsula. An anonymous Pisan chronicler described them as “the most valiant men of war.”⁸⁷ Piero Farnese, the captain of the Florentine army, said (through Villani) “there were no better men, other than those of Caesar.”⁸⁸ The Florentine diarists, Donato Velluti and Pagolo Morelli, praised the company⁸⁹ and criticized their own government for not hiring it. Velluti argued bitterly that hiring the English would have meant victory in the war. “Through avarice we incur much shame and damage.”⁹⁰

The demand for the services of the English extended beyond Tuscany. In December 1363, the Venetians sent Peglio de Vonico to recruit English mercenaries to help put down a revolt on their colony of Candia (Crete).⁹¹ Peglio described the English in his dispatches as “the best of all mercenaries” and hoped to hire 300 men. He offered in addition to pay such emoluments as free passage to the Holy Land via Cyprus and Rhodes on Venetian ships at the termination of the contract, should the soldiers wish to go on crusade. Despite such inducements, the Venetians succeeded in hiring only 110 Englishmen, under the command of a captain identified

⁸⁶ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:213–14; L.A. Muratori, ed., “Specimen Historiae Sozomeni Pistoïensi (Sozomen of Pistoia),” *RIS* (Milan, 1729), 15: col. 1072.

⁸⁷ L.A. Muratori, ed., “Chronica di Pisa,” *RIS* (Milan, 1729), 15: col. 1041.

⁸⁸ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:204.

⁸⁹ Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli, *Ricordi*, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence, 1969), 306–7; Donato Velluti, *La Cronica Domestica di Donato Velluti*, ed. Isodoro del Lungo e Guglielmo Volpi (Florence, 1914), 231.

⁹⁰ Donato Velluti, *Cronica Domestica*, 231.

⁹¹ Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe), Collegio secreti e lettere secret, registri, 1, f. 114. The folio numbers refer to those written in pencil on the document.

only as “lord Thomas.”⁹² The documents cite a middleman in negotiations named “John of England,” whom a modern Venetian archivist has claimed was John Hawkwood. But this is probably false. John was a common name among English mercenaries and Englishmen in general, and there is no reason to believe that Hawkwood was involved in the episode. More to the point, Venice’s limited success in hiring the English, despite offering favorable terms, indicated that there were relatively few soldiers of that nationality in Italy.

When the White Company arrived in Tuscany in 1363, it was wealthy from its prior success and from advances on its pay. Both Florentine and Pisan writers emphasized the band’s affluence, as well as its greed for more profits. The fragmentary nature of Pisan archival records make it difficult to get any idea of its composition. At the same time, these records do show that Sterz remained the captain general, while Andrew Belmont, John Hawkwood, William Boson, and William Thornton were still among the corporals. Eventually, Hugh Mortimer della Zouche, identified by Jonathan Sumption as the grandson of the famous paramour, Queen Isabella, joined the band.⁹³ Pisan sources provide additional names, such as Robert Astor, Robin Castel, Thomas Berton, William William and two soldiers known only as Jack of London and “the bastard.”⁹⁴ They also show that by now the Company contained large numbers of German mercenaries, many of whom were undoubtedly survivors from Landau’s army who joined up after the defeat at Caturino. The band also took in numerous Hungarians, among them Nicholas Thod, a prominent captain who had likewise deserted Landau.⁹⁵ At this time, Villani estimated the Company’s numbers at 3500 cavalry and 2,000 infantry. Sozomen, the chronicler of Pistoia, confirmed Villani’s cavalry total, but gave the number of infantry as 2,500.⁹⁶ Apparently, the size of the band could fluctuate significantly. Just months after it arrived in Tuscany, Villani adjusted his figures downward to 1500 cavalry and 500 infantry.⁹⁷

⁹² ASVe, Collegio secreti e lettere secreti. registri. 1, ff. 132v, 137.

⁹³ Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 470.

⁹⁴ Archivio di Stato di Pisa (ASPi), Com A, f. 33.

⁹⁵ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:204; Morelli, *Ricordi*, 306; *Storia di Milano*, 416, 419; Donato Velluti, *Cronica Domestica*, 231.

⁹⁶ Sozomen, *Specimen historiae*, col. 1073.

⁹⁷ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:236.

In Pisan service, the Company continued the ways that had made it a sensation in the north. It demonstrated the same rapidity of movement and grim efficiency. It continued to attack at night. It seized the town of Pian di Ripoli while the local citizens were still in their beds.⁹⁸ When challenged in the field, the band dismounted from its horses. Villani makes this clear in his description of the band's first offensive. Outside of the town of Barberino, just north of Florence, a group of a hundred or so English encountered a band of German mercenaries. At the start of the encounter, the English descended from their horses and assumed the defensive posture, waiting for the enemy to attack. But before the group could fully dismount, a single German mercenary, a corporal named Heinrich Paer, made a mad dash at those still on horseback, lance raised in the air. He dislodged ten soldiers, killing two. "We have with pleasure recorded this deed," wrote Villani, "because in our days such prowess is rare."⁹⁹ On this occasion, the English withdrew.

The Pisan-Florentine war represented a somewhat greater challenge to the Company because the scale of operations was greater and the towns it was sent to oppose, were more formidable than in Lombardy. Nevertheless, the band again distinguished itself by ravaging the countryside, setting fires, and wreaking havoc. Villani called them "warriors without rest."¹⁰⁰ Once again, however, they earned their reputation without having to fight many battles. At first, the Florentines offered little resistance, preferring to clear the countryside of goods and to remove citizens to safety in local fortifications. Later, the Florentines put forth a more active defense. The Company then gained its two most significant triumphs of the campaign: the seizure of the towns of Figline and Incisa. Figline was taken by a combination of intimidation and treachery: the frightened population let the band in.¹⁰¹ The Company established the city as its base, and from there conducted raids on local castles.¹⁰²

The band next moved on Incisa, where it defeated a Florentine army, forcing the surrender of much of the high command. Villani and Sozomen give very vague descriptions of the fight. Although

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 5:269.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 5:277.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 5:330.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 5:239–40.

they speak of arrows launched, rocks thrown and, generally, of English skill and intensity, rather than credit the English with the outcome, they blame their own army for the defeat. And instead of military issues, they focus primarily on the financial rewards gained by the Company. Luca di Totto da Panzano, who participated in the battle and was captured, wrote account of his experience without relaying any information of the battle: "I was taken wounded in the face and led away. I lost that day horses, arms, supplies, a silver belt and gold rings."¹⁰³ Giovanni Sercambi, chronicler of nearby Lucca, claimed that "the English had . . . become rich."¹⁰⁴

IV

In the winter of 1363/1364, a shift took place in the White Company. John Hawkwood became its captain. At the same time, the Pisan government dismissed all other troops from its service and made the White Company in effect the Pisan army.¹⁰⁵ The reasons for Hawkwood's promotion are unclear, as is their effect on the erstwhile captain Albert Sterz, who appears to have remained with the Company, but the switch may have sowed the seeds of the rift that would later destroy the band.

In his initial stint as commander, Hawkwood was not especially effective. He embarked on his first offensive in the middle of a particularly cold winter, when the snows were piled high and the temperatures were unusually frigid. Villani lauded Hawkwood and the English for even attempting such an enterprise, which evoked for him images of the great Carthaginian general, Hannibal. Using the now familiar techniques, Hawkwood seized the town of Vinci under the cover of darkness. But here, his success ended. He found the passes leading to Florence difficult to traverse and adequate provisions lacking. He advanced as far as the Mugello region, a fertile valley northeast of Florence, but, unable to sustain himself there, he

¹⁰³ "Frammenti della Cronaca di Messer Luca di Totto Panzano," ed. Vincenzo Borghini, in *Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani*, 7 vols. (Florence, 1861), 5:71 Ibid., 5:239-40.

¹⁰⁴ Sercambi, "Le croniche Lucchese," ed. Salvatore Bonsi in *Fonti per la storia d'Italia* (Rome, 1963), 124.

¹⁰⁵ "Sozomen of Pistoia," 15: col. 1073.

was soon forced to turn back, losing men and horses along the way. The offensive was perhaps an instance of "*tropo baldanza*," the English vice noted earlier by Villani.

After the winter offensive, the Pisans reinforced Hawkwood's army with a German mercenary company led by the renowned captain Hannekin Baumgarten. On paper, the army constituted an irresistible force. It mobilized in the spring of 1364 and rode rapidly toward Florence, laying waste to the countryside as it advanced. The band penetrated to the town walls and pushed aside Florentine resistance with relative ease. At this point, the Florentines shut down the offensive by bribing the enemy—according to the anonymous Pisan chronicler by means of wine flasks filled with gold coins.¹⁰⁶ Baumgarten's whole German company deserted, as did Albert Sterz and the majority of the English, including Andrew Belmont and Hugh Mortimer della Zouche.¹⁰⁷ Unlike his subordinates, Hawkwood remained faithful, acquiring in the process a reputation for fidelity that has survived to this day.

In the end, it was the English deserters, not Hawkwood, who retained the name White Company, which appears in their contract with Florence dated July 28, 1364.¹⁰⁸ In the service of Florence, the White Company failed to achieve its former success in performing as a cohesive fighting force. Although it fought alongside the Germans in the victory at Cascina (August, 1364), defeating a hastily-assembled and poorly-organized Pisan army commanded by Hawkwood, shortly thereafter, the band became involved in a bitter feud with these same Germans, who appear to have been jealous of the special status afforded the English. The German troops attacked the English camp, and Florentine officials were forced to separate the two nationalities.¹⁰⁹ When the war ended, the feud continued.

The vicissitudes of the conflict are confused and difficult to follow. Peace between Pisa and Florence coincided with a truce in the war between Milan and the pope, leaving virtually all the mercenary companies operating in Italy free to roam the countryside. Hugh Mortimer della Zouche took over the command of the White Com-

¹⁰⁶ "Chronica di Pisa," 15: col. 1045.

¹⁰⁷ Filippo Villani, *Cronica*, 5:284.

¹⁰⁸ Canestrini, "Documenti," 58 (doc. x).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

pany, which headed south after leaving Florentine service.¹¹⁰ Albert Sterz went over to the Germans, and together with Hannekin Baumgarten formed the Company of the Star.¹¹¹ It too traveled south, looting and pillaging as it went.

In November, 1364, the two companies met on the field not far from Perugia. According to the local chronicler Graziani, the Germans dispersed the English with blasts from five hundred hand-held “bombards,” or hand guns, which purportedly “passed through all armor.”¹¹² If Graziani’s account is accurate, it would constitute the earliest effective use of hand guns in Italian warfare. But Graziani cannot be confirmed elsewhere, and it is instructive that the success was not soon repeated. Hand guns were not widely incorporated into armies until the next century.

After their victory over the English, the Germans advanced into papal territory at Todi and Orvieto. The pope and his ally, Queen Joanna of Naples (1343–1382), now fearing the Germans, hired the White Company to protect them. The contract signed in January, 1365, indicates that the force swelled to 5000 cavalry, with Hugh Mortimer della Zouche still in overall command.¹¹³ In another turn of the wheel, the parties to the agreement now quarreled, leading the pontiff to summarily dismiss the White Company and hire the Germans instead. This set the stage for a final clash between the two mercenary bands, one which occurred in the summer of 1365,

¹¹⁰ ASF, Provisione, registri, 52, ff. 29–35v; Signori-Carteggi, Missive I Cancelleria, 13, ff. 8, 9, 32. Among the corporals in the band were Andrew Belmont, Richard Romsey, Hugh Eton, Thomas Marshall and John Brice.

¹¹¹ Archivio di Stato di Siena [ASS], Concistoro 1774 # 25; ASF, Signori-Carteggi, Missive I Cancelleria, 13, f. 23; *Storia di Milano*, 430.

¹¹² *Cronaca del Graziani*, 196–97; Pompeo Pellini, *Dell’historia di Perugia*, 2 vols. (Bologna, 1968), 1:1007; Maria Pecugi Fop, “Il comune di Perugia e la chiesa durante il periodo Avignonese,” *Bollettino della deputazione di storia patria per l’Umbria*, 65 (1968): 62.

¹¹³ L.A. Muratori, ed., “Cronaca d’Orvieto,” *RIS* (Milan, 1729), 15: cols. 687–88; Albert Sautier, *Papst Urban V und die Soldnerkompagnien in Italien in den Jahren 1362–1367* (Zurich, 1911), 49, 56–58. In a letter to Siena, the Florentine ambassador Giovanni de Guigni reported that the White Company was offered 120,000 florins for six months from the pope, of which 70,000 were to be supplied by Queen Joanna of Naples. [ASS, Conc 1774, # 90 (dated January 22, 1365)]. The contract is reproduced in Theiner, *Codex diplomaticus*, 2:419 and in *Lettres secrètes et curiales du Pape Urbain V* (1362–1370), 272. Jean Glénisson and Guillaume Mollat, *Gil Albornoz et Androin De La Roche (1353–1367)* (Paris, 1964), 333–34; Henri Bresc, “Albornoz et le royaume de Naples de 1363 a 1365,” in *El Cardenal Albornoz y el Colegio de España*, ed. Evelio Verdera (Zaragoza, 1971), 701–2. See also Francesco Filippini, *Il Cardinale Egidio Albornoz* (Bologna, 1933), 364.

again not far from Perugia.¹¹⁴ At the battle of San Mariano (July 22, 1365), the Germans, once again, defeated the English.¹¹⁵ Again, the sources supply little detail of the fighting. It is nevertheless clear that provisions (or the lack thereof) proved the decisive factor. The pope and his Umbrian allies successfully denied the White Company food, forage, and even water.

In the end, the Company surrendered to the Germans, by means of a letter signed “your impoverished, imprisoned servants, the English.”¹¹⁶ The Germans took many of the English captive, including Hugh Mortimer, Andrew Belmont, John Brice, and placed them in a Perugian jail.¹¹⁷ The majority of the prisoners were released within a week, but members of the high command were detained for much longer. Andrew Belmont remained in prison for a year, while Mortimer and Brice were not let go until 1369.¹¹⁸

The defeat at San Mariano marked the effective end to the White Company. Albert Sterz, its original captain, was assassinated by the Perugians in 1366. Mortimer and Belmont returned to England when they were finally let out of prison. By contrast, John Hawkwood remained in Italy and became the *de facto* leader of the expatriate community of English soldiers, a mantle he willingly assumed.¹¹⁹ Hawkwood’s bands have been called by some modern historians, the White Company, but the continuity was lost.¹²⁰ In later years, contemporaries generally referred to Hawkwood and the men he commanded as “English companies.”

¹¹⁴ Despite the “national” nature of the dispute, both bands had contingents of Hungarians and Italian mercenaries. ASS, Concistoro 1774, # 25; ASF, Signori-Carteggi, Missive I Cancelleria, 13, f. 23; Responsive, originali, 6, # 63. See also *Storia di Milano*, 430; Sautier, *Urban V*, 58 and Glénisson and Mollat, Gil Alborno, 334–35; Theiner, *Codex Diplomaticus*, 2:419–26.

¹¹⁵ *Cronaca del Graziani*, 198; Maria Pucugi Fop, “Lineamenti di una storia dei rapporti tra il cardinal Egidio Alborno ed il Comune di Perugia, attraverso i documenti perugini,” in *El Cardenal Alborno*, 619.

¹¹⁶ The letter is reproduced by the editor of the *Cronaca del Graziani*, 199–200.

¹¹⁷ Brice’s capture is mentioned in a Siense ambassadorial dispatch. ASS, Concistoro 1778, # 15; *Cronaca del Graziani*, 200; Alessandro Lisini and Fabio Iacometti, eds. “Cronache Senesi,” *RIS* (Bologna, 1931–1937), [n.s.] 15, pt. 4:609; “Cronaca di Orvieto,” 15:col. 689.

¹¹⁸ A letter in the Siense archives indicates that Mortimer was released in September, 1369. ASS, Concistoro 1778 # 15. The records relating to the captivity of the men are in the Perugian archive. ASPer, Conservatore della Moneta, 13, ff. 8v–10v. An entry for September 16 contains payments to a local butcher, Cola Maggi, for meat, which indicates that at least the captives ate well.

¹¹⁹ ASF, Missive I Cancelleria, 13, ff. 63v–64; Sautier, *Urban V*, 67–68.

¹²⁰ See Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, 39.

Under Hawkwood, the military reputation of the English in Italy reached its apex. He would learn from his initial mistakes at the helm of the White Company and distinguish himself over the next thirty years as the premier mercenary captain—of any nationality—operating on the peninsula. When Hawkwood died in 1394, his last employer, the Florentine government, buried him with honor in the cathedral, and commemorated him with a wall mural, later repainted by Paolo Uccello.

Despite the disappearance of the White Company, its legacy lived on through Hawkwood. That legacy, stripped of its romance, was one of high discipline, brutality and cunning—the attributes of Villani's fox and lion. The White Company brought south skills learned in the Hundred Years War, but it also showed remarkable adaptability and receptivity to its new environment. It innovated in Italy, adding Hungarian horse archers to brigades where longbowmen were lacking and mastering the difficult art of the night attack. As at San Mariano, the English were not invincible. They suffered losses, particularly when denied adequate provisions and supplies. But the White Company and its successors left its imprint in Italian warfare and set the stage for John Hawkwood's spectacular career.

APPENDIX

Table 1. *Captain and Corporals of the White Company,
November 22, 1361*

Albert Sterz, captain general
Andrew Belmont
John Hawkwood
William “Quatreton” (Thornton?)
Robin du Pin
William of Arras
William Folifet (Folifait)
John Stockland
Adam Scot
William Bosson
John Bassin
Robert Thornborough (Thornbury)
Thomas Bomont (Beaumont)
Thomas Beston
Hugh Heton
John Borgelay
Thomas Ludley
William Kirkeby

The names are listed in the order they appear in the document.
Francesco Cognasso, “Note,” 158–59.

Table 2. *The Agreement between the White Company and the
Marquis of Montferrat (November 22, 1361)*

We, John Marquis of Montferrat, Imperial vicar, etcetera presently promise to the egregious and noble men: lord Albert Stertz, captain of the great society of English and Germans, now in Rivarolo, Andree de Belmonte, Ioanni de Hakeude, Guillelmoá Quatreton, Rubino de Pingo, Guillelmo d’ Arras, Guillelmo Folifet, Ioanni Stocheland, Adam Scoto, Guillelmo Bosson, Iohanni Baxino, Roberto de

Thorborough, Thome de Bomont constables of the said society and to Eyghino de Heton, Thome de Biston, Iohanni Borgelay, Thome Ludelay, Guillelmo Kerkebi and all others and each of the said society that up until next July we will not give aid, counsel or favor against the same society or state of the same. Rather, we will keep and treat all and each as our dear and faithful friends.

Item, that to them as our dear friends we will allow to be given food, merchandise, refreshment and other material that they need in any place or territory of ours in return for their money.

Item, that they are able to stay and depart from our lands as our dear friends provided that they come not in unwieldy numbers and provided that they have our letters conceding them license, that is, that in our lands and with our people and subjects they are able to associate and do business with freely and securely.

Item, that to whomever of our enemies wishes to join the said company we will give transit and passage though our territories, if we are required, notwithstanding any obstructions, and on the condition that they obligate themselves to us by the same pacts as the others.

Also, that to Count of Landau and other, Italian, traitors or our exiles we do not wish to be held to give passage in any way. Indeed, we wish that these be handled carefully everywhere as traitors and exiles.

Item, that to the same [society] we will give in every case our authority, counsel, aid and favor, provided that they not oppose our subjects or those sworn to allegiance to us.

With the exception, however, that it is understood that they not oppose our nephew, the illustrious Count of Savoy, nor oppose his lands, his people or subjects, but rather, notwithstanding the above, it is permitted to ourselves to act toward our nephew the lord Count in whatever manner we wish.

And we promise to observe all and each of these things legally and in good faith without fraud, as they are expressed above until the aforementioned day.

We, also, Albert Stertz, knight and captain aforementioned, Andreas de Belmonte, Iohannes de Hakeude, Guillelmus Quatreton, Rubinus de Pingo, Guillelmus d'Arras, Guillelmus Folifet, Iohannes Stochland, Adam Scot, Guillelmus Boson, Iohannes Baxinus, Robertus Thoinborough, Thome de Bomont, constables, Eyghino de Heton, Thomas Biston, Iohannes Borgelay, Thomas Ludelay, and Guillelmus Kerkebi

for ourselves and all others and associates of our said society of English and Germans and others who are in the said society or will be in the future, promise to the previously mentioned illustrious and magnificent prince and Lord John, the Marquis of Montferrat, imperial vicar, etcetera, that until next July we will not oppose him or his honor and state or any of his lands, cities, localities, forts, people and subjects or the lord Doge and commune of Genoa and both subjects and those who are allied to him, and we will do no injury either collectively or individually, publicly and secretly and we will not go over to the service of any of his enemies; but indeed, if we know anything or anyone to procure or treat of something that can go to the damage of the said Marquis and Doge and their subjects we will notify them and avoid those men as well as much as possible.

Item, that all and each lands, cities, forts and places of the Marquis and his subjects that we are or any of our men are in, we shall defend legally and faithfully, without fraud, against all persons the honor and state of the Marquis of Montferrat and the Doge of Genoa.

Item, to the same lord Marquis we will serve at his request well and faithfully against his enemies provided that (if only) he requires us to wage war or remove his enemies from camp if they are encamped in the territory and jurisdiction of any places or forts which the said lord Marquis holds or possesses or in the future will hold and that it is understood that the said places be left decently armed.

Item, that the person of the same lord Marquis and the illustrious lord Otto, duke of Brunswick, relative and brother of the said lord Marquis and lord of Captain of Genoa and each and all knights, noble, officials and subjects of the said Marquis and Doge while they are with us and in our company we will honor, defend and treat as the person of our own lords and just as our own dear and special brothers and friends, by custom of fraternity.

And that the said lord Marquis and said lords Otto and lord Captain and each and all other knights officials men and subjects of the said lords can with us, among us and in whatever place we are, come, stay, go, associate with, return by their own free will with each and all of their things, horses, merchandise freely and securely just as our dear friends and brothers by whatever way we can.

Item that in all cases we will dispose of our charge wholly against whosoever of the enemies of the lord Marquis and the Doge and the nobles, people and subjects of their honor and state.


And to the same we forcefully give aid, counsel, and favor.

And that to any subject of the aforementioned Marquis and the said lord Doge we will do no violence

With the exception, however, that by the aforementioned we are not held to do anything against another English society or any subjects of the lord King of England if they should come to Lombardy, unless the same society is at the service of the enemies of the said Marquis.

And we promise, well and faithfully, to observe each and all of the aforementioned things in good faith without fraud as is stated above until the aforementioned date.

Given at Ripparolo on 22 November in the of our lord Jesus Christ 1361. On the fourteenth indiction.



Map 13. Northern Italy.

THE DUCHY OF BRABANT CAUGHT BETWEEN
FRANCE AND ENGLAND: GEOPOLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF
THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

Sergio Boffa
Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique

The Hundred Years War is a conflict which extends beyond the limits of the kingdoms of France and England.¹ Scotland and Spain were also zones of engagement. The southern Low Countries played an extremely important part in the first half of the conflict and was dominated by the campaigns of the English king, Edward III (1327–1377). Modern historiography long ago took note of this significant military theater. Over six decades ago, H.S. Lucas investigated in great detail the war's effect on the Low Countries.² In recent decades, however, except for a few studies on the county of Flanders, however, historians have largely ignored this localized aspect of the Hundred Years War. During this same period, monographs on the region's political, military, economic, and social history have greatly proliferated. It seems useful, then, to systematically reexamine how the Low Countries were caught in the bitter struggle between England and France for most of the fourteenth century. To geographically and chronologically narrow the scope of investigation, this article will focus exclusively on the duchy of Brabant in the first half-century of the great conflict between France and England.

¹ Abbreviations, *AGN: Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden*; *AGR: Archives générales du royaume*; *AVB: Archives de la ville de Bruxelles*; *AVL: Archives de la ville de Louvain*; *BCRH: Bulletin de la commission d'histoire*; *BEC: Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*; *BN: Biographie nationale*; *CB: Chartes de Brabant*; *CC: Chambre des Comptes*; *NBW: Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek*; *RBPH: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*.

² H.S. Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War (1326–1347)* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929); H.S. Offler, "England and Germany at the Beginning of the Hundred Years' War," *The English Historical Review [EHR]*, 54 (1939): 608–31; F.W.N. Hugenholtz, *Ridderkrijg en burgervrede. West-Europa aan de vooravond van de Honderdjarige Oorlog* (Haarlem, 1959); C.J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp. English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 127–56.

I

The duchy of Brabant was centrally located in the southern Low Countries. It was bordered on the west by the county of Flanders, on the north, by the counties of Zeeland, Holland, and Guelders; to the east by the county of Looz and the principality of Liège; and to the south by the counties of Namur and Hainault. Its strategic position allowed Brabant to control an important section of the famous economic road that linked the port of Bruges and the French fairs to the town of Cologne and the Rhineland. It also dominated the southern Low Countries by controlling traffic along the Scheldt and Meuse Rivers. What is more, Antwerp gave Brabant access to the North Sea and allowed it to compete with the ports of Flanders.

Brabant's pivotal position was not without disadvantages, often embroiling it in conflicts with neighbors jealous of the region's economic supremacy. Besides intermittent disputes with smaller rivals, Brabant had three archenemies: (1) the count of Flanders whose vital economic interests often led him to stand as an ally of the English sovereign, though feudally bound to the king of France; (2) the bishop of Liège, a great lay lord in his own right who was a traditional ally of the French crown; and (3) the count, later duke of Guelders, who often sided with the English.³

Brabant had frequent disputes with these over-mighty and turbulent neighbors, but the geopolitical situation of the region became desperate shortly before the Hundred Years War commenced. Between 1332 and 1334, a large coalition of states from across the Low Countries invaded Brabant on two different occasions. A war of succession to the Brabançon crown in 1356–1357 would also align much of the region into two hostile camps.⁴ Another prime point of contention was the lordship of Malines, an important enclave in the duchy of Brabant which controlled the Rupel River basin and trade between Antwerp and the duchy; southern cities of Brabant. The Brabançon dukes and Flemish counts would be locked in a bitter struggle for this vital territory well into the fifteenth century.⁵

³ There is no recent history of the duchy of Brabant. See, however, P. Avonds, "Brabant en Limburg 1100–1403," *AGN*, 2 (1982): 452–82; A. Uyttebrouck, "Brabant-Limburg 1404–1482," *AGN*, 2 (1982): 224–46.

⁴ C.W. Privité-Orton, *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, 2 vols. (1952; reprint, 1979), 2:1040–41.

⁵ P. Avonds, "Mechelen en de Brabantse steden (1312–1355)," *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis* 53 (1970): 17–80; A. Kempeneer, "Les aliénations de Malines au XIV^e

Despite these dangers, the fourteenth-century duchy of Brabant was at the height of its power. The Brabançon economy was expanding even as that of its Flemish rival was entering a serious recession. This competition had begun in thirteenth century when both areas emerged as important centers of cloth manufacture. Since they both depended on English wool, they competed for the favor of England's monarchy which used this pivotal economic position as a political tool. Levying embargoes and granting trading rights in its wool, the English crown moved to either punish or reward Brabant and its rivals, depending on their political stance towards England.⁶ In time, the duchy's market came to be dominated by such English staples as wool and leather.⁷ Though important in the fairs of Ile-de-France, Brabançon goods also found markets in other regions of France and in Italy. The consequences of this economic interdependence with both England and France would prove incalculable.⁸

With this new economic and military position, Brabant became a key element for any ruler of the region wishing to form a political coalition in the Low Countries. Its strategic significance extended far beyond the region and allowed the duke to take an independent stance in regard to his suzerain, the Holy Roman emperor, and economically play England off against France. Utilizing this new fiscal ascendancy, the dukes of the region were able to form a powerful army that rivaled those of their most powerful adversaries.⁹

Caught in the middle of numerous political and economic pressures, Brabant continually attempted to assert its independence.

siècle. Etude sur la situation politique de la seigneurie (1300–1357),” *Bulletin du cercle archéologique, littéraire et artistique de Malines* 15 (1905): 81–104; 17 (1907): 157–99; 18 (1908): 113–29; J. Laenen, *Geschiedenis van Mechelen tot het einde der Middeleeuwen* (Malines, 1934), 91–105.

⁶ H. Berben, “Une guerre économique au moyen âge: L’embargo sur l’exportation des laines anglaises (1270–1274),” in *Etudes d’histoire dédiées à la mémoire de Henri Pirenne par ses anciens élèves* (Brussels, 1937), 1–17; J. de Sturler, *Les relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et l’Angleterre au moyen âge. L’étape des laines anglaises en Brabant et les origines du développement du port d’Anvers* (Paris, 1936), 179 (doc. 24).

⁷ J. de Sturler, “Le trafic anglo-brabançon dans ses rapports avec les origines de l’étape d’Angleterre et les premiers déplacements de celle-ci sur le continent,” in *Annales de la fédération archéologique et historique de Belgique* 29 (Liege, 1932) 3–21 (fasc. 5); idem, *Les relations*, 172–226.

⁸ H. Laurent, *Un grand commerce d’exportation européen au moyen âge. La draperie des Pays-Bas en France et dans les pays méditerranéens (XII^e–XV^e siècle)* (Paris, 1935).

⁹ No study is devoted to the armies of John III, but we know that the duke had several thousand vassals who constituted his feudal host. L. Galesloot, *Le livre des feudataires de Jean III, duc de Brabant (1312–1355)* (Brussels, 1865).

Though a vassal of the Holy Roman Empire who had had to swear fealty and homage to the distant potentate for his lands, the Brabançon duke developed a strong sense of independence.¹⁰ The vassalic bond gradually eroded to such an extent that the emperor could no longer depend on the duke for military service. Thus, when Louis IV (1314–1347) prepared to invade Lombardy in 1327, Brabant's duke, John III (1312–1355) chose to shun his feudal duty and ignore the imperial summons.¹¹ On October 12, 1363, Emperor Charles IV (1347–1378) ordered all the bishops and princes of the Low Countries, including the duke of Brabant, to militarily help Arnold of Rummen, all to no avail. Even when this summons was issued for a second time on December 18, this call for troops seemingly went unanswered.¹² From these two examples, it is clear that the Holy Roman Emperor had become too weak to impose his authority over the princes of the Low Countries.

This defiance of the imperial suzerain, however, came with a high price. When Antoine of Burgundy usurped control of the duchy of Brabant in 1406,¹³ the break with the emperor was made permanent and Antoine became the first Brabançon duke who refused to render homage to the emperor.¹⁴ Before the end of the fourteenth century, the leader of the duchy had become an independent prince who, though not formally rejecting his feudal ties to the Holy Roman Emperor, was a largely free political agent and was accepted as such

¹⁰ L. Genicot, "Empereur et princes en Basse-Lotharingie. Suggestions de recherches," *Revue de l'université de Bruxelles* 5 (1970): 1–19.

¹¹ Lucas, *Low Countries*, 63.

¹² F. Quicke, *Les Pays-Bas à la veille de la période bourguignonne (1345–1384). Contribution à l'histoire politique et diplomatique de l'Europe occidentale de la seconde moitié du XIV^e s.* (Brussels, 1947), 129; S. Bormans and E. Schoolmeesters, *Cartulaire de l'église Saint-Lambert de Liège (826–1390)*, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1900), 4:388, 395.

¹³ For Antoine of Burgundy's reign, see A. Mathieu, "Antoine de Bourgogne," *BN* (Bruxelles, 1866), 1: col. 345–348; F. Quicke, "Antoon I van Brabant," in *Geschiedenis van Vlaanderen*, ed. R. van Roosbroeck, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1938), 3:83–100; R. van Uytven, "Anton van Bourgondië," in *Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek* (Brussels, 1964) 1: cols. 36–43; S. Mund, "Antoine de Bourgogne, prince français et duc de Brabant (1404–1415)," *RBPH*, 76 (1998): 319–55.

¹⁴ J. Stengers, "Philippe le Hardi et les Etats de Brabant," in *Hommage au Professeur Paul Bonenfant (1899–1965)* (Brussels, 1965), 383–408; A. Uytnebrouck and A. Graffart, "Quelques documents inédits concernant l'accession de la Maison de Bourgogne au duché de Brabant (1395–1404)," *BCRH*, 137 (1971): 57–137; L. Galesloot, "Revendication du duché de Brabant par l'Empereur Sigismond (1414–1437)," *BCRH* [4^e sér.] 5 (1878): 437–70; F. Quicke, "Les relations diplomatiques entre le roi des Romains Sigismond et la Maison de Bourgogne (fin 1416–début 1417)," *BCRH* 90 (1926): 193–241.

by foreign sovereigns who freely entered into negotiations with him.¹⁵

The lack of imperial protection, however, could cost the duchy dearly. On three different occasions, Brabant's succession was contested: (1) in 1355, when John III's two sons died one after the other, he had to choose a successor from one of his three daughters, Joan, Marguerite, and Marie; (2) in 1406, when Duchess Joan of Brabant (1356–1406) died without an heir; and in 1430, when the second and last son of Antoine of Burgundy died before reaching marriageable age and leaving an heir. During these crises, Brabant's neighbors attempted to use influence and military threat to gain control of the duchy.

II

At the end of his reign, Duke John II (1294–1312) of Brabant had attempted to effect a *rapprochement* with France. In 1311, his heir, the future John III, married Marie, daughter of the count of Evreux.¹⁶ Despite this connection to the French nobility, John's early relationship with the king of France remained particularly tense. When Louis X (1314–1316) requested the young duke to forbid his subjects from trading with the Flemings and to participate in a French attack on Flanders, John, influenced by the political stance of his towns, refused to help the French sovereign.¹⁷ In reprisal, Louis angrily prohibited all French trade with Brabant on February 29, 1316.¹⁸ Brabant experienced how painful French economic displeasure could be; with the coming of the Hundred Years War, this Brabaçon pain would intensify.

¹⁵ J.-M. Cauchies, "Pouvoir législatif et genèse dans les principautés des Pays-Bas (XII^e–XV^e siècle)," in *Renaissance du pouvoir législatif et genèse de l'Etat*, ed. A. Gouron and A. Rigaudière (Montpellier, 1988), 58–74; idem, "Le prince territorial au bas moyen âge dans les anciens Pays-Bas, Quinze années de recherches en Belgique (1975–1990)," in *Les princes et le pouvoir au moyen âge* (Paris, 1993), 35–48.

¹⁶ For John III, see A. Wauters, "Jean III," in *BN* (Brussels, 1886–1887), 9: cols. 237–74; P. Avonds, "Jan III," in *NBW* (Brussels, 1996), 15: cols. 392–403; idem, *Brabant tijdens de regering van hertog Jan III (1312–1356). De grote politieke krisissen* (Brussels, 1984); idem, *Brabant tijdens de regering van hertog Jan III (1312–1356). Land en Instellingen* (Brussels, 1991).

¹⁷ This violated a general alliance John had concluded with Louis on October 29, 1315. AGR, CB, f. 245.

¹⁸ *Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race*, ed. M. de Lauriere, 21 vols. (Paris, 1723–1849), 1:619–20.

From the first years of his rule, Philip VI (1328–1350) attempted to form a pro-French party among the princes and towns of the Low Countries. In line with this policy, he tried to re-established his authority in Flanders, became an ally of the principality of Liège, and took measures to improve his relations with the counts of Hainault, Holland, and Zealand. In the context of this general French strategy, the royal attempt to profit from friendship with the duke of Brabant was an inherently logical one. Because of these alarming French plans in a region of crucial interest to him, King Edward III of England (1327–1377) also tried to establish closer ties with John III. For his part, the duke preferred to put off both of his great royal suitors. He consistently refused to bind himself to the interests of Edward, but was also careful to avoid serving as an arbitrator for Philip in the legal suit concerning his feud with the lord of Fauquemont.¹⁹ This Brabançon attempt to maintain neutrality rapidly fall apart when Philip's persistent enemy, Count Robert III of Artois (1329–1342) took refuge in Brabant on his journey to asylum in the English court (1334).²⁰ The fierce pressure exerted by the French king on John III caused the duke to abandon his usual caution. He reminded Philip that he was vassal of the Empire and not of France and that he was the only lord in Brabant:

The duke was greatly astonished
 At this matter;
 For he did not hold it
 [his land] from the king.
 Brabant was his own land;
 For as far as Brabançon territory
 legitimately stretched,
 He has no master
 Except for God, who gives
 and will give everything.
 Three villages are located there
 Nivelles, Louvain, and Brussels
 And the surrounding territory . . .²¹

¹⁹ On the feud with the lord of Fauquemont, see Lucas, *Low Countries*, 67–70.

²⁰ E. De Dinter, *Chronicon ducum Brabantiae*, ed. by P.F.X. de Ram, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1854–1860), 2:556–57; J. Le Bel, *Chronique*, ed. by J. Viard and E. Déprez, 2 vols. (Paris, 1904), 1:98–99; Jonathan Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, vol. 1 of *The Hundred Years War* (Philadelphia, 1990), 170–71.

²¹ J. De Klerk, *De Brabantsche Yeesten of rymkronyk van Braband*, ed. by J.F. Willems and J.H. Bormans, 3 vol. (Brussels, 1839–1869), 1:494 (vv. 2234–43). *Harde sere van*

The king of France was furious with John's attitude and led a broad coalition against him in 1332.²² After the failure of these military operations, Philip grudgingly concluded an armistice with John on May 11.²³ In the following month, the two parties entered into serious negotiations at Compiègne and on July 8, 1332, the duke became Philip's liege vassal.²⁴ The French king gave John a fief worth 2000 *livres*; in exchange, the duke promised to aid Philip against any man except the king of Germany and his other suzerains.²⁵ By this agreement, the duke's oldest son, also named John, was betrothed to Philip's daughter, Marie.²⁶ The pact arranged for the completion of the education Brabaçon heir in Paris.²⁷

Having sworn not to help Philip's enemies or to allow them entrance into Brabant, John immediately exiled Robert of Artois from the duchy. Overjoyed at this diplomatic triumph, the French king surrendered all claims to the jewels that Robert left behind with John for safekeeping.²⁸ The agreement of 1332 was a true sea change in the political and military fortunes of the Brabançon duke. John clearly entered into the French alliance to both negotiate away old scores with Philip and gain the king's recognition of the duke's supremacy in Brabant and to Limburg.²⁹

The French-Brabançon alliance brought an immediate response from the signatories' old enemies. Before Philip even had time to address the differences he had with the princes of the Low Countries,

dierre dinc;/Want hi niet en hilt van den coninc./Brabant es sijn eigen lant/Alse verre als duert trechte Brabant./Hi en heefter ghenen here af/Dan Gode, diet al gheeft ende gaf:/Drie steden sijn daer in gheset,/Nivele, Lovene, Brusele met,/Ende tlant datter leghet ontrent.

²² Jean Froissart, *Chroniques (1325–1400)*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 26 vols. (Brussels, 1867–1877), 18:22–25 (IX).

²³ De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:788 (CXV). On this campaign, see A. Leroux, *Recherches critiques sur les relations politiques de la France avec l'Allemagne de 1292 à 1378* (Paris, 1882), 176–78; Lucas, *Low Countries*, 117–21; Avonds, *Brabant . . . De grote*, 78–183.

²⁴ AGR, CB, 343–45; H. Laurent, *Actes et documents inédits intéressant la Belgique conservés aux Archives de l'Etat à Vienne (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. Niederländische Urkunden)* (Brussels, 1933), 1:81–86 (doc. 62).

²⁵ AGR, CB, f. 347; De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:789 (CLVI).

²⁶ AGR, CB, ff. 346–47.

²⁷ De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:507.

²⁸ AGR, CB, f. 349 (October 23, 1332); A. Wauters, "Analectes de diplomatique (troisième série)," *BCRH* [4^e sér.] 10 (1882): 96–97 (doc. XXXVI).

²⁹ E. Fairon, "Un projet de démembrement du diocèse de Liège proposé par les Brabançons en 1332 et 1336," *BCRH*, 78 (1909): 142–92; Lucas, *Low Countries*, 130–32.

they made peace with each other and concluded a new defensive alliance against the duke of Brabant on June 24, 1333.³⁰ In early 1334, after months of planning, the new coalition began military operations against Brabant.³¹ Philip could not show favor to one side or the other without losing credibility. Nevertheless, calling the princes to Amiens, he succeeded in resolving at least some of their grievances and restored a shaky peace to the Low Countries by August, 1334. Not only did the French king have them rescind their pledges of mutual defence, he also ordered them to maintain peace with John of Brabant.³² The French king also attempted to restore trade and diplomatic contacts between all the principalities.³³ To solidify the new peace, the duke of Brabant was required to marry his younger daughter, Marie, to the count of Guelders's son, Renaud.³⁴ John had come out of this dangerous situation fairly well. He had to pay large monetary reparations to his former enemies, but was not required to make sizeable territorial concessions. In reality, the French king had skilfully dismantled the formidable coalition that threatened Brabant and the stability of the Low Countries.³⁵

III

When Edward III decided to claim the throne of France in 1337, most of the rulers of the Low Countries were his natural allies as their predecessors had been with his grandfather, Edward I (1272–1307).³⁶ The English king looked on the region as an excellent base of operations for carrying out his prime objective of luring his French adversary into a pitched battle and then crushing him. Relying on the long standing support of the Flemish cities, Edward counted on

³⁰ I.A. Nijhoff, *Gedenkwaardigheden uit de geschiedenis van Gelderland*, 8 vols. (Arnhem, 1830–1875), 1:284–87.

³¹ On this campaign, see Leroux, *Recherches*, 179–82; Lucas, *Low Countries*, 145–66.

³² AGR, CB, ff. 377–78; C. Butkens, *Trophées tant sacrés que profanes du duché de Brabant*, 4 vols. (The Hague, 1724–1746), 1: (preuve): 166–74; De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 2:573–91.

³³ De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 2:573–81; F. van Mieris, *Groot charterboek der graven van Holland, van Zeeland en heeren van Vriesland*, 4 vols. (Leiden, 1753–1756), 2:565–68.

³⁴ AGR, CB, ff. 375–76; De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 2:584.

³⁵ AGR, CB, ff. 385, 387, 391, 395, 398; Avonds, *Brabant . . . De grote*, 155–75.

³⁶ Michael Prestwick, *War and State in England 1272–1377* (1980; reprint, London, 1996), 166.

the resentment some of the princes, such as Count William IV of Hainault (1337–1345), harbored against Philip. He also assumed that John of Brabant could easily be drawn away from the French crown.

Early in 1337, Edward launched a great diplomatic offensive to have his way with the Low Countries.³⁷

For their part, the princes of the region, though well disposed towards Edward, had no intention of immediately declaring war on their powerful and vindictive neighbor, Philip of France. The duke of Brabant was extremely happy for a number of reasons to receive Edward as a political suitor. The disruption of trade between England and Flanders might prove extremely profitable for Brabançon craftsmen and merchants. Many of Edward's allies in the region (the counts of Guelders, Hainault, Holland and Zealand, and the marquis of Jülich) had long been in the ranks of John's principal rivals. Arguably, a stronger English connection could lead to improved relations since his arch-enemies, the count of Flanders and the bishop of Liège were strongly in favor of the French cause, the duke of Brabant was instinctively drawn to the English side.

As the dukes had foreseen, when Edward unleashed serious economic sanctions against the county of Flanders, the Brabançon merchants greatly profited from the new English relationship with their homeland. As early as 1336, John had requested that a wool exchange be reestablished in Brabant; by December 3 of that year, Edward was happy to comply.³⁸ With a communique of April 12, 1337, the English monarch forbade the arrest of Brabançon merchants in his domains or the confiscation of their goods.³⁹ One month later on May 24, he issued another royal privilege which allowed them to trade anywhere in England they wished for as long as the struggle with the French lasted.⁴⁰ The English king then showered Duke John with favors. On July 1, 1337, he promised to pay him the immense sum of £60,000.⁴¹ He also assured the duke that he would make

³⁷ Rogers, *War*, 127–56; Malcolm Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy 1250–1340* (Oxford, 1996), 264; Bruce D. Lyon, *From Fief to Indenture: The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 207–8.

³⁸ T. Rymer, *Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cuiuscumque generis. Acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates*, 6 vols. (London, 1816–1869), 2, pt. 2:952.

³⁹ AGR, CB, f. 441.

⁴⁰ AGR, CB, ff. 442–43; Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:971–72, 1031–32.

⁴¹ Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:981.

compensation for all revenues the king of France might confiscate from him.⁴²

England's new relationship with Brabant was by no means one-sided. On July 13, 1337, Duke John promised to serve Edward with 1,200 men-at-arms if the English king decided to attack France.⁴³ John would not have to bear the cost of these soldiers since their salary would be paid by the English.⁴⁴ On August 20, when Edward pledged not to negotiate a truce with the French unless he had attained the previous consent of the Brabançon duke.⁴⁵

Despite these agreements, Edward launched no attacks against France in 1337; as a result the duke of Brabant had to maintain at least the show of impartiality between the two great powers to which he was politically, economically, and militarily bound. For his own safety, John insisted that the alliance with Edward remain secret.⁴⁶ This undoubtedly explains why some modern historians who have claimed that the Brabançon duke remained undecided in the looming conflict between England and France until he saw which direction it was going to take.⁴⁷

The situation, however, changed during the following year. At the diet of Coblenz on September 3, 1338, Louis IV granted Edward the title of General Vicar of the Holy Roman Empire and of all German territories and provinces (*sacri romani Imperii, per totam Alemanniam et Germaniam ac universas et singulas earum provincias sive partes, vicarius generalis*).⁴⁸ This move tipped the scale toward Edward and all the princes of the Low Countries who had been hesitant about taking up weapons against Philip of France now scrambled to follow the English standard.⁴⁹ On September 18, Edward informed John of the

⁴² Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 18:38–39 (XV).

⁴³ Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:985; Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 18:38–39 (XV).

⁴⁴ AGR, CB, f. 448.

⁴⁵ AGR, CB, f. 451; Laurent, *Actes*, 120 (doc. 79).

⁴⁶ AGR, CB, ff. 451, 459, 492; De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:811 (CLXXIV); J. De Sturler, "Une démarche politique inconnue de Jean III, duc de Brabant (1337–1338)," *RBPB*, 14 (1932): 1319–27.

⁴⁷ The testimony of Jean le Bel undoubtedly influenced this view. Le Bel, *Chronique*, 1:138–39, 148.

⁴⁸ Froissart, *Chronique*, ed. Lettenhove, 18:161; Laurent, *Actes*, 127–28; Leroux, *Recherches*, 210–11; E. Deprez, *Les préliminaires de la guerre de Cent Ans. La papauté, la France et l'Angleterre, 1328–1342* (Paris, 1902), 195–97; Vale, *Origins*, 264; Offler, "England," 611–2.

⁴⁹ Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:984.

measures taken at the diet.⁵⁰ Two months later, he summoned him to join the English army between Mons and Binche no later than December 18, since shortly after this he planned to start military operations against Philip.⁵¹ The duke of Brabant had anticipated these orders and had already begun military preparations, hiring men-at-arms for most of 1338 and 1339 so he might fulfil his contracted military obligations with England.⁵²

IV

Edward's invasion force landed at Antwerp on July 22, 1338. He established his headquarters at Louvain where he began to his preparations for war.⁵³ During this period, the Brabançon duke and his subjects received a great number of grants from the English king.⁵⁴ On March 3, 1339, Edward paid John the promised subsidy;⁵⁵ on June 22, the two parties concluded a marriage agreement by which John's second daughter, Marguerite, would wed Edward, the Black Prince, heir to the English throne.⁵⁶

In September, 1339, Edward commenced his attack on the kingdom of France.⁵⁷ He ravaged the regions of Cambrésis, Vermandois, Soissonnais, and Thiérache, without any military response from the cautious Philip. Exhausted and without money, the English force finally had to return to Brussels.⁵⁸ On December 4, the English king directed that the duke of Brabant maintain his troop of 1,000 men-at-arms for English service. The size of the contingent John was

⁵⁰ Laurent, *Actes*, 125–26 (doc. 83).

⁵¹ Laurent, *Actes*, 127–29 (doc. 84); De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 2:626; De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:813–14 (CLXXVI); Nijhoff, *Gedenkwaardigheden*, 1:395–96.

⁵² A. Wauters, "La formation d'une armée brabançonne du temps du duc Jean III, de 1338–1339," *BCRH* (5^e sér) 1 (1891): 192–205.

⁵³ J.F. Verbruggen, "Koning Edward III van Engeland te Vilvoorde in 1339 en 1340," *Driemaandelijks Ts Heemkr. Hertog Hendrik I* 6 (1992): 6–20.

⁵⁴ De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:812–13 (CLXXV).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1:819 (CLXXXII).

⁵⁶ AGR, CB, ff. 605–6; Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1036, 1083; De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:815–16 (CLXXVIII); *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, 70 vols. (London, 1891–1982) 4:510; Richard Barber, *Edward: Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1996), 33.

⁵⁷ It is at this time that John III officially issued the king of France a feudal "defiance" De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:559; Le Bel, *Chronique*, 1:158–59, Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 1:161, 453.

⁵⁸ Rogers, *War*, 157–73.

responsible for could double if Edward needed soldiers for future military operations. After his short sojourn into war with France, the English king returned home early in 1340.

Even Edward's return to the continent shortly afterwards and the English maritime victory at Sluys (June 24, 1340) could not fully re-establish confidence among his allies that he was committed to the fight. Among other problems, the king had run so short of money that he could not pay Duke John the large installments he had promised him. Despite this, Edward launched another campaign with the siege of Tournai in the summer of 1340.⁵⁹ This second campaign also ended in failure when the city held out.⁶⁰ Following the opinion of the Brabançon duke and the other princes of the Low Countries, Edward ordered the siege abandoned on September 25.⁶¹ On the same day, Edward agreed to the treaty of Esplechin which established a truce that would last until June 24, 1341.⁶² After two years of unsuccessful warmaking, the king again returned to England penniless and owing huge debts to his allies, the duke of Brabant and the count of Hainaut.

After two years of uneasy peace, Edward again renewed hostilities, this time focusing his efforts on Brittany.⁶³ The king of England would never return to the Low Countries, and his absence would take a heavy toll on the anti-French coalition he had spent so much time and money to carefully build.

In March, 1340, Edward had been warned by Pope Benedict XII (1334–1342) of unreliability of his Flemish and German allies:

Beloved sons, you must not put much trust in the Germans and Flemings, as we remember we have written you at other times. Indeed, you will find them friendly and favorable to you as long as they can consume your supplies. Otherwise, however, you should not trust in their assistance. If you would review the history of your ancestors and how these same Germans and Flemings once acted toward them, you clearly will discover why you cannot trust them.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Ibid., 199–216; idem, "An Unknown News Bulletin from the Siege of Tournai in 1340," *War in History* 5 (1998): 358–66.

⁶⁰ Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 348–51.

⁶¹ AGR, CB, f. 641.

⁶² AGR, CB, f. 642; Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1135–37.

⁶³ The truce of Esplechin was extended until September 24 1342. AGR, CB, ff. 658–60; Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1135–37, 1165–66; L. Devillers, *Cartulaire des comtes de Hainaut de l'avènement de Guillaume II à la mort de Jacqueline de Bavière*, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1881), 139, 150–53; van Mieris, *Groot*, 2:651–52; Laurent, *Actes*, 148–51 (doc. 90).

⁶⁴ Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1117: "*Nec est tibi, amantissime fili, ut alias tibi scripsisse meminimus, multum confidendum de Teutonicis et Flamingis; nam eos affabiles et propitios tibi*

Meanwhile, Emperor Louis IV had become disillusioned with the war, and, hoping to bringing it to a speedy end, he removed the title of General Vicar from the English king on June 13, 1341.⁶⁵ The count of Flanders, Louis of Nevers (1322–1346), a political figure stripped of all authority in his own lands by the uprisings of the Flemish communes during the 1320s, had come to live in Brussels and acted as a constant pro-French influence on the city leaders as well as on the duke of Brabant.⁶⁶

V

Despite an increasing groundswell of anti-English opinion, in the Low Countries after 1340, Edward could not resign himself to the downfall of the Brabançon alliance. In 1343, he attempted to arrange for the marriage of one of his sons to John's daughter, Marguerite.⁶⁷ In April of that year, the duke sent ambassadors to the pope to seek dispensations which would allow for the wedding to proceed.⁶⁸ At the same time, Edward denounced Philip's efforts to tempt the duke of Brabant into a closer relationship with France.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Duke John was unwilling to take such a step and showed his opposition to the king of France in 1343 by harboring the traitor, Godfrey of Harcourt, lord of Sainte-Sauveur-le-Vicomte, much as he had Robert of Artois in 1339.⁷⁰ Thus, as the new year dawned, the duke was still viewed as a supporter of England, but this situation would ultimately change. On September 17, 1345 at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, French and Brabançon delegates signed a diplomatic preliminary agreement between their masters.⁷¹

reperies, quamdiu facultates tuas poterunt exhaurire, alias autem de ipsorum assistentiâ non confidas. Et, si gesta progenitorum tuorum revolveris, qualiter erga eos se olim gesserunt tidem Teutonici et Flamingi, quomodo de ipsis possis confidere, reperies manifestè."

⁶⁵ Laurent, *Actes*, 146–48 (doc. 89); Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1166; Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 18:188–92 (XLIX–LI).

⁶⁶ For Louis of Nevers and the communal revolt, see Henri Pirenne, *Early Democracies in the Low Countries: Urban Society and Political Conflict in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, trans. J.V. Saunders (1915; reprint, New York, 1963), 184.

⁶⁷ AGR, CB, f. 675.

⁶⁸ The pope refused to grant these. S. Riezler, *Vatikanische Akten zur Deutschen Geschichte in der Zeit Kaiser Ludwigs des Baiern* (Innsbruck, 1891), no. 2214; Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1083–87.

⁶⁹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 20:65; Leroux, *Recherches*, 239.

⁷⁰ J. Favier, *La guerre de Cent Ans* (Verriers, 1980), 104; Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 412–3.

⁷¹ AGR, CB, ff. 699, 700; H.S. Lucas, "John III, Duke of Brabant, and the

Following the battle of Crécy (1346), the victorious Edward renewed his efforts to reinforce his position in the Low Countries. He hoped to marry his daughter to the new count of Flanders and his son to Marguerite of Brabant. Unfortunately, Louis of Male, son of the old count of Flanders, could not forget that his father had fallen fighting for France and any reconciliation with England was impossible.

While Duke John's motivations were extremely different, but they also led him toward France. A few months later, he signed the treaty of Saint-Quentin (June, 1347) which made him a full fledged retainer of the French.⁷² The principal stipulations of the agreement were that: (1) Duke John would publicly repudiate his alliance with Edward;⁷³ (2) Philip would extend an amnesty to the Brabançon population for any misdeeds they might have committed during the war;⁷⁴ (3) the Brabançon princes, Henry and Godfrey, would be sent to the court of France where they would be engaged respectively to Joanna of France, elder daughter of the duke of Normandy, and Bonne, daughter of the duke of Bourbon;⁷⁵ and (4) John's daughter, Marguerite, would marry Louis of Male, count of Flanders (1346–1384).⁷⁶

The duke of Brabant had only agreed to become a French ally in exchange for economic benefits and Philip's guarantee that the lordship of Malines—long a bone of contention with John's neighbors—would come under full Brabançon control.⁷⁷ Tying Brabant to his policies now became one of Philip's principal aims. The new alliance both deprived Edward of a formidable supporter, and compensated Philip for the inability of the count of Flanders to aid the French crown since Louis of Male was no longer the political master of his own lands.⁷⁸

French Alliance, 1345–1347," *University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences* 4 (1927): 5–63, esp. 14–20 (docs. II–III).

⁷² H. Laurent, "Les conventions de Saint-Quentin (juin 1347). Contribution à l'histoire de la première phase de la guerre de Cent Ans dans les Pays-Bas," *BCRH* 91 (1927): 89–180.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 137 (art. VIII).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 137–39 (arts. IX–X).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 119–20 (arts. I–II), 150–57 (arts. XVI–XXVI). The weddings took place on June 21, 1347 in the Louvre. *Les grandes chroniques de France*, ed. P. Paris, 6 vols. (Paris, 1836–1838), 5:471.

⁷⁶ H. Laurent, *Les conventions*, 121 (art. III), 166–70 (arts. XXX–XXXII).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 141–43 (art. XII), 147–48 (art. XIV), 158–65 (arts. XXVII–XIX), 170–75 (art. XXXIII).

⁷⁸ It is highly likely that John's shift in alliances was partially responsible for the negotiation of a truce between England and France on September 28, 1347 which was extended on several occasions until June, 1355.

Edward would try consistently to upset the new alliance by attempting to stymie John's drive to make good dynastic marriages for his children. On May 6, 1347, the English king tried to convince the duke of Guelders not to marry John's younger daughters, Marie.⁷⁹ Despite this interference, Edward spent part of 1348 in trying to reestablish the relationship with his former allies, the dukes of Guelders and Brabant.⁸⁰ Even after receiving word from Edward that he was willing to forgive John for all the wrongs he had committed against the English crown, the duke remained faithful to the French cause until his death in 1356.⁸¹

VI

A question central to the understanding of Duke John's reign was his attitude about Edward of England and the war the English would so long wage against France. This subject has brought down on the duke of Brabant a great deal of criticism from modern historians.⁸² H. Laurent and F. Quicke have questioned the duke's devotion to either the English or French cause in the following way:

If John III happened to hesitate for so long in deciding to change sides, it was because he wanted to make Philip VI of Valois realize the full significance of his support and pay the highest possible price for his illustrious allegiance to the French cause.⁸³

This image of the Brabançon duke must be re-examined. Several pieces of evidence point to the sincerity of the duke of the Brabant's allegiance to the English king throughout the 1330s. John undoubtedly did hesitate before openly declaring himself as Edward's ally, but this is hardly surprising. He was, after all, making the terrible choice between war and peace. An alliance with the English would

⁷⁹ Rymer, *Foedera*, 3, pt. 1:119.

⁸⁰ L. Mirot and E. Deprez, "Les ambassades anglaises pendant la guerre de Cent Ans," *BEC*, 59 (1898): 550–77; 60 (1899): 177–214; 61 (1900): 20–58, 570–71 (docs. CXXXVII–CXXXVIII, CXLII).

⁸¹ Rymer, *Foedera*, 3, pt. 1:160. This letter was dated May 4, 1348.

⁸² Deprez, *Les préliminaires*, 344; Lucas, *Low Countries*, 251, 292–293, 304; E. Perroy, *La guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1945), 85; A.H. Burne, *The Crécy War. A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the peace of Breigny, 1360* (London, 1999), 61–62; Rogers, *War*, 210, 214.

⁸³ H. Laurent and F. Quicke, "La guerre de la succession du Brabant (1356–1357)," *Revue du Nord* 13 (1927): 82.

expose his domains to the depredations of both French and English men-at-arms.⁸⁴ John also had to consider the question of a dynastic marriage between one of his daughters and an English prince. At Buironfosse, when commander of the rear-guard during Edward's campaign of 1339, John had personally tried to rally his men to the English cause.⁸⁵

In 1339, John had acted as an honest ally. The English king knew it and fully trusted the duke. On December 4, before returning to England, Edward put John in charge of 1,000 men-at-arms, whose salaries were paid for by the English sovereign.⁸⁶ Later in the month, Edward bestowed a *fief rente* of 1,500 pounds on his faithful vassal.⁸⁷

The Brabançon duke declared war on Philip in September, 1339, shortly before participating in the English invasion of France. Some historians point to this fact as proof that John had little real interest in serving with Edward.⁸⁸ Much is made of the timing of John's war declaration, but a conflict, even one in the Middle Ages, was not rendered unjust if a belligerent did not announce his warlike intentions a long time in advance of the fighting.⁸⁹ The English king had made clear his invasion plans for France during the summer of 1337, but his actual attack on French territory did not commence until two years later. If John had followed the same timetable, he would have suffered French reprisals long before he could count on the protection of an English expeditionary force. Although the duke's attitude might have appeared unchivalric to his contemporaries, it was surely motivated by a desire to safeguard the good of his duchy and that of his English ally. Even with his last-minute declaration of war, John pleased the other princes of the Low Countries when he commanded a force of 1,200 men-at-arms in Edward's first actions against Philip.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ The danger of even one's allies was well known to John and his successors. In 1388, the Estates refused a French Army coming to help them fight against the duke of Guelders free passage through Brabant.

⁸⁵ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 18:92.

⁸⁶ AGR, CB, f. 623; Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1100.

⁸⁷ AGR, CB, f. 624.

⁸⁸ Rogers, *War*, 165–66.

⁸⁹ Sometimes, a month's advance warning was required to inform an potential adversary of one's intention to go to war. Devillers, *Cartulaire*, 1:181; Butkens, *Trophées*, 1:498, doc. app., 201.

⁹⁰ Le Bel, *Chronique*, 1:158–59.

Before Edward's return to the continent in 1340, John consistently refused to lead his men across the Scheldt River and counter-attack the French. He had no intention of unnecessarily endangering the troops promised for English service in a personal foray.⁹¹ Although, for some scholars, this incident reveals the first signs of John's weakness, these actions can also be interpreted as that of an experienced man of the world. Admittedly, the duke's attitude during the siege of Tournai was a confusing one. Edward's other allies reproached John for his lukewarm military performance against the French. Some even said that he was a traitor to the English cause; this very question caused a heated dispute between Jacques van Artevelde and a Brabançon knight in Edward's tent.⁹²

It seems clear that during these years the duke of Brabant was an agent of peace between the French and English kings. In October, 1339, a few days before hostilities commenced, John mounted a last-ditch attempt to find an arbitrated settlement between Edward and Philip.⁹³ During the first invasion of France, he advised the king of England to suspend military operations when Philip refused to engage in a pitched battle on October 17.⁹⁴ In 1340, he counselled his English ally to raise the siege of Tournai and start the negotiations which would lead in short order to the truce of Esplechin. The fact that he desired peace, however, did not make John a traitor.

The Brabançon duke's military performance at the siege of Tournai must be understood in its fullest context. In 1339, John had led soldiers bound to him feudally; he was thus the uncontested commander of this force. In 1340, the situation was radically different. The siege of Tournai was the first military operation of the war in which the urban militias from Brabant took part. From the very start of the campaign, the militiamen proved unwilling to endanger themselves unnecessarily. They took too long to muster and for this reason the Brabançon contingent was late in arriving before Tournai.⁹⁵

⁹¹ J. Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. S. Luce *et al.*, 13 vols. (Paris, 1869–1957), 2:30–31.

⁹² *Chronographia regum Francorum*, ed. by H. Moranvillé, 3 vols. (Paris, 1891–1897), 2:153; G. Des Marez, "Un document inédit relatif à Jacques van Artevelde," *BCRH* [5^e sér] 8 (1898): 305–10; N. De Pauw, "Note supplémentaire en rapport sur le document inédit relatif à Jacques van Artevelde," *BCRH* [5^e sér] 9 (1899): 197–201; F. Prims, *Geschiedenis van Antwerpen*, 10 vols. (Brussels-Antwerp, 1910–1948), 4, pt. 1:88–89; Deprez, *Les préliminaires*, 343–44; Lucas, *Low Countries*, 414ff.

⁹³ Rymer, *Foedera*, 2, pt. 2:1092.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1094; Froissart, *Chroniques*, 18:86; Knighton, *Chronica*, 2:12.

⁹⁵ De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 2:636.

Several chroniclers have mentioned the reluctance of John's troops to fight as the siege progressed. Some even claimed that the burgers from Brussels committed treason against Edward and John by allowing several food shipments to enter the besieged city.⁹⁶

How can one explain this strange attitude among the Brabançon militiamen? The mitigating circumstances are extremely complex. The town troops, motivated more by the interests of their cities than from any sense of general military obligations, seldom proved determined fighters. In economic terms, they were still smarting from the transfer of the English wool exchange from Antwerp to Bruges. Contending points-of-view among the towns themselves underlined their systemic weakness as a military force. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Brussels was attempting to gain some market share in the French fairs; Antwerp, on the other hand, preferred to trade with the English; Louvain remained undecided.⁹⁷ In reality, these urban rivalries were both economic and political. Shortly before the siege of Tournai began, the militias of Brussels and Louvain engaged in a ludicrous but serious dispute centering on which of these groups would march at the head of John's force. To make both sides happy, the duke decided that when his army left Brabant and marched to the north or east, Brussels would lead it; if it moved to the south or west, Louvain would take up the front ranks.⁹⁸ From the preceding, it is obvious that the Brabançon army was not a homogeneous force, but rather one riddled by internal tensions.

The towns of Brabant did not hide their sympathy for the French cause. Instead, the officials of Brussels wrote John that it thoroughly disapproved of the war, but would serve him as its lord.⁹⁹ Later, the cities would enter direct communication with Philip. At the end of 1341, Louvain and Malines took it on themselves to initiate peace talk with the French without ducal approval.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, well before Edward returned in 1340, at a time when members of the English coalition were preparing for the siege of Tournai, the captains of

⁹⁶ Deprez, *Les préliminaires*, 343–44 (doc. 1); Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Luce, 2:71.

⁹⁷ Wauters, *Jean III*, col. 239.

⁹⁸ *Den luyster ende glorie van het hertogdom van Brabant*, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1699), 1:116–8; De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 2:633–36; Le Bel, *Chronique*, 1:210–11.

⁹⁹ AVB, A-Thymo, II, ff. 153v–54: (December 31, 1340).

¹⁰⁰ AGR, CB, ff. 662–63.

his urban militiamen were already demanding that John allow them to return home.¹⁰¹

The militias, even when under the command of their own prince, were reluctant to fight the French sovereign. The inhabitants of Brussels seemed to be the most pro-French units in John's army.¹⁰² Strongly influenced by his militia captains, the duke himself soon lost any enthusiasm he might have had for the struggle with France.¹⁰³

Besides these divisions in the Brabançon army during the Tournai siege, John also had to deal with a round of social disorders within his duchy itself. In Louvain, the weavers benefited from the absence of a great number of city leaders at the front to seize power.¹⁰⁴ In Brussels, the cloth workers led a very similar revolt.¹⁰⁵ Even though these two uprisings were quickly put down, the motivation of the duke and the city leaders to return quickly to Brabant is understandable. The threat of a general revolt, similar to that which occurred in Flanders at the same time, must have terrified them. Given the complex circumstances, John III cannot be fairly accused of betraying English interests in campaigns between 1337 and 1339.

From the end of 1339 into 1340, the situation changed radically. The king of England renewed his economic support of Flanders, much to the detriment of Brabançon trade. Once John had allied with the English, there was also a great fear among the Brabançon militia that while they were away from their homes on campaign, Philip's army might ravage Brabant.¹⁰⁶ As if that were not enough, societal uprisings in the duchy's two largest towns spread fear among

¹⁰¹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Luce, 2:31.

¹⁰² Ibid., 3:308; Le Bel, *Chronique*, 1:210; A. Henne and A. Wauters, *Histoire de la ville de Bruxelles*, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1968), 1:99–100.

¹⁰³ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Luce, 3:317–8, 308, 314, 507–8.

¹⁰⁴ W. Boonen, *Geschiedenis van Louvain geschreven in de jaren 1593 en 1594*, ed. E. van Even (Louvain, 1880), 30; J. Molanus, *Historiae Lovaniensium libri XIV*, ed. P.F.X. de Ram, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1861), 2:1254; H. Sermon, *Geschiedenis van Peeter Coutherele, meïer van Louvain, een volksvriend uit de XIV^e eeuw* (Antwerp, 1860), 14; H. Vander Linden, *Geschiedenis van de stad Louwen* (Louvain, 1899), 22; De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 1:825–27 (docs. CLXXXVII–CLXXXVIII).

¹⁰⁵ Henne and Wauters, *Histoire*, 1:99–100; Favresse, *L'avènement*, 98–100; Laurent, *Actes*, 151 (doc. 2); De Sturler, *Les relations*, 410–12, 475.

¹⁰⁶ The threat of a French attack on Brabant was well founded. Philip, indeed, referred to such a plan in a letter addressed to pope. A. Fierens, *Lettres de Benoît XII (1334–1340)*, *Textes and analyses* (Rome, 1910), no. 946; G. Gorrini, "Lettere inedite degli ambasciatori Fiorentini alla corte dei Papi in Avignone (anno 1340)," in *Archivio storico italiano* [4th sér] 14 (1884): 169–70.

the Brabançon ruling class, most of whom were serving with John's army. Because of all of these factors, the duke found himself in a particularly delicate position. It increasingly became impossible for him to honor his promises to Edward that he would vigorously prosecute the French war, while maintaining the support of his townsmen who were largely pro-French. Pulled in two very different directions by these forces, John was largely unable to develop a coherent foreign policy. Edward understood this very well and never accused the duke of treason or even military malfeasance. Instead, even after the bitter disappointment of the siege of Tournai in 1340, the English king continued to hold the Brabançon duke in high regard—a fact that modern historians might do well to re-consider.

VII

In 1356, when Joan of Brabant¹⁰⁷ and her husband, Wenceslas of Luxemburg (1356–1383)¹⁰⁸ succeeded John III, they soon faced a crisis caused by their land-hungry rival, the count of Flanders who invaded Brabant only months after the new rulers claimed their crown.¹⁰⁹ The stipulations of the treaty of Saint-Quentin were now null and void. Louis of Male took advantage of the situation to again occupy the key territory of Malines. Joan and Wenceslas, surprised by the suddenness of the attack, rather than looking to their suzerain, Emperor Charles IV, turned to the sovereigns of France and England for help. On July 19, 1356, they and the Brussels town government sent an embassy to the French king, John II (1350–1364).¹¹⁰ On the same day, another Brabançon delegation, composed of a representative of the duke and a burger of Louvain, made its way to the Edward's court.¹¹¹ Because hostilities between the two major powers had just begun again, nothing came of these negotiations.

¹⁰⁷ H. Pirenne, "Jeanne," in *BN* (Brussels, 1888–1889), 10: cols. 454–63.

¹⁰⁸ H. vander Linden, "Wenceslas I^{er}," in *BN* (Brussels, 1938) 23: cols. 169–178; R. van Uytven, "Wenceslas I van Bohemen," in *NBW* (Brussels, 1966), 2: cols. 935–40.

¹⁰⁹ On this war, see Laurent and Quicke, "La guerre," 81–121.

¹¹⁰ AGR, CB, f. 924; L. Galesloot, "Acte de Wenceslas et de Jeanne, duc et duchesse de Brabant, du 19 juillet 1356, concernant la ville de Bruxelles," *BCRH*, [3^e sér] 5 (1863): 21–24.

¹¹¹ AGR, CB, ff. 911, 913, 925; L. Mirot and E. Deprez, *Les ambassades*, 575 (doc. CLXXV–CLXXVI); Quicke, *Les Pays-Bas*, 47. The city seals of Brussels and

In spite of being rebuffed by the major powers of the region, the duke and the duchess had little choice but to learn quickly how to survive the hazards posed by the French and English rulers. Since they could not depend on Charles IV for protection and their arch-rival, Louis of Male, was pro-French, Joan and Wenceslas soon began gravitating back toward the English cause. The duke personally went to England where Edward welcomed him with great honor at Windsor during the feast of Saint George in April, 1358.¹¹² There, Wenceslas swore homage to Edward for himself, his wife and the parliament of Brabant; for his part, Edward promised to help his new vassals against the count of Flanders.¹¹³

Wenceslas's journey again firmly placed Brabant in the English orbit. The new relationship, however, was not formalized until sanctioned by the duchess, the nobles, and the towns. When this was forthcoming, English envoys provided with full power came to Brussels and on May 22, 1358, joined the Brabant rulers and estates in concluding a perpetual alliance between their countries. They also took ceremonial possession of the duchy of Brabant in the name of their royal master.¹¹⁴

Despite possible geopolitical consequences, this act of feudal submission and alliance eventually came to nothing. First of all, the estates of Brabant would not sanction Wenceslas's actions, arguing that they were incompatible with the *Joyeuse Entrée*.¹¹⁵ Then, as chances for peace between France and England decreased at the end of 1358, it became clear to all that the effect of the treaty would be to oblige Brabant once again to aid England in its war against France. This awful reality quickly persuaded Wenceslas and Joan to look for a

Louvain were attached to these diplomatic documents. Moreover, for each ducal representative in these embassies, the town sent one of their number. The urban role in these missions was thus highly significant.

¹¹² H. Knighton, *Chronica de eventibus Angliae a tempore regis Edgardis usque mortem regis Ricardi secundi*, J.-R. Lumby, 2 vols. (London, 1889–1895), 2:99; Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 22:303.

¹¹³ For parliament of Brabant, see J. Dhont, "Les assemblées d'Etats en Belgique avant 1795," *Recueils Société Jean Bodin* 24 (1966): 325–400; A.R. Myers, *Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789* (London, 1975), 79–80.

¹¹⁴ Quicke, *Les Pays-Bas*, 48.

¹¹⁵ The *Joyeuse Entrée* was an oath sworn by Joan and Wenceslas at the beginning of their reign. This document limited the rulers' powers and established their obligations to the people. R. van Bragt, *De Blijde Inkomst van de hertogen van Brabant Johanna en Wenceslas (3 januari 1356). Een inleidende studie en tekstuitgave* (Louvain, 1956).

way out of the English alliance. A justification for scuttling the agreement soon appeared when in 1359 English troops involved in the invasion of Champagne threatened to overrun Wenceslas's own duchy of Luxemburg.¹¹⁶ This attack would considerably worsen Anglo-Brabançon relations for some time to come.

VIII

The death of Philip of Rouvres, husband of the heiress of Flanders, on November 21, 1361 was important for diplomatic relations within the Low Countries and once again spurred the English into action. On February 8, 1362, Edward proposed the marriage of his son, Edmund, count of Cambridge, to the Flemish widow.¹¹⁷ The involved parties had a draft contract for the union drawn up on August 5, 1364,¹¹⁸ which was formally ratified in the following autumn.¹¹⁹ This action posed an enormous threat to Brabant since, by it, Edward and his sons swore to help the count of Flanders and his heirs to seize the duchies of Brabant and Limburg if Joan died childless. To offset the Flemish defection, Wenceslas had no other choice but to gravitate toward the French standard.

The crowning of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor in 1364 provided an excellent opportunity for an informal meeting of the Brabançon and French leaders. In both the church of Notre-Dame at Rheims and at the table of the wedding banquet, Wenceslas enjoyed a place of honor next to King John.¹²⁰ This stay at the French court marked an important stage in Brabant's *rapprochement* with France. During this visit, the king surely reminded Wenceslas of the long-standing alliances between the House of Luxemburg and that of Valois and recalled the memory of the duke's father, John the Blind, duke of Luxemburg (1313–1337) and king of Bohemia

¹¹⁶ Le Bel, *Chronique*, 2:309–10.

¹¹⁷ Rymer, *Foedera*, 3, pt. 2:636.

¹¹⁸ D. Scott and L. Gilliodts Van Severen, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire des relations entre l'Angleterre et la Flandre de 1431 à 1473 (Cotton Manuscript, Galba, B. 1)* (Brussels, 1896), 15 (doc. VII).

¹¹⁹ Rymer, *Foedera*, 3, pt. 2:750–51; Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 7:66–67.

¹²⁰ AGR, CB, f. 2184; Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 7:1; De Klerk, *De Brabantsche*, 2:177–80; De Dynter, *Chronicon*, 3:54.

(1310–1346) who had died at Crécy fighting against the English. Wenceslas was not unresponsive to the French message, even before John and his son, Charles V (1364–1380) showered him and his lands with presents and favors over the next few years. In 1368, John granted the duke a revenue of 6,000 florins;¹²¹ in 1375, Charles bestowed on him the lordship of Vailly;¹²² and, finally, in April, 1377, the French sovereign formally took the merchants of Brussels and Louvain under his protection.¹²³ All of these grants would be confirmed in the next reign, that of Charles VI (1380–1422).¹²⁴

Even with this movement toward France, Wenceslas had not cut all contacts with the English.¹²⁵ In 1367, he was still regarded as Edward's ally; by 1369, however, the English viewed him as firmly under French influence. For this reason, Thomas of Beauchamp, captain of Calais, sent into Brabant a spy named John of Saint-Amand, canon of Cambrai. The mission of this agent was to gather information concerning the extent of Brabançon military aid to France, the routes the duke might follow with these troops to link up with the French army, and how such reinforcements to French army could be stopped. Saint-Amand was also instructed to use the 20,000 francs he carried "to find a way one could poison Wenceslas's food and drink" if the English did not succeed in signing a truce with the duke. Eventually, this English spy was arrested and decapitated.¹²⁶

After such an episode, it is surprising to find English ambassadors visiting Wenceslas in May, 1370 in an attempt to revive the former Brabançon alliances with Edward.¹²⁷ Though the duke's reaction to

¹²¹ AGR, CB, ff. 2952, 3017, 4825, 5416, 5477, 5821; H. Moranville, "Extraits des journaux du Trésor (1345–1419)," *BEC* 49 (1888): 376, 380 (docs. 284, 306).

¹²² AGR, CB, f. 5051.

¹²³ AVB, A.-Thymo, II, c. 73.

¹²⁴ On December 3, 1380, Charles confirmed all royal grants to the city, castellan, and dependencies of Coulommiers-in-Brie [AGR, CB, f. 5821; F.X. Wurth-Paquet, "Table chronologique des chartes et diplômes relatifs à l'histoire de l'ancien pays de Luxembourg. Règne de Wenceslas de Bohême, comte, puis duc de Luxembourg. 1352–1383," *Publications de la section historique de l'institut grand-ducal de Luxembourg*, 24 (1869): 1–202 (doc. 908)]. On April 7, 1383, he affirmed the gift of revenue of 6,000 florins [AGR, CB, f. 5974bis].

¹²⁵ Rymer, *Foedera*, 3, pt. 2:775.

¹²⁶ F. Quicke, "Jean de Saint-Amand, chanoine de Cambrai, chapelain du pape: faussaire, traître et espion (133?–1368)," in *Etudes d'histoire dédiées à la mémoire de H. Pirenne* (Brussels, 1937), 265–88.

¹²⁷ Rymer, *Foedera*, 3, pt. 2:892.

this mission does not survive, it was surely a negative one. Nevertheless, Wenceslas agreed to remain neutral in the conflict with France.¹²⁸ Duchess Joan and her husband thus summoned their towns, nobles, and clergy and formally confirmed that they were non-belligerents in the war. This neutrality marked a new ducal policy which was more advantageous to the common good of the duchy's subjects and attempted (though unsuccessfully) to abandon the necessity of committing soldiers to fight on either the English or French side.

After the battle of Baesweiler in 1371 brought on by Edward's support of the duke of Guelders, Joan petitioned the French king, Charles V, to help with the release of her husband who had been taken prisoner in this action.¹²⁹ Involved with turning back an English *chevauchée* in southwest France, Charles suggested that she take up Wenceslas's case with her proper suzerain, the emperor.¹³⁰ Despairing of much help in this quarter, Joan eventually gained Wenceslas's release on her own. Despite Charles's failure in this regard, the relations between France and Brabant remained cordial. In 1380, the Brabançon duke attended the French king's funeral and his son's coronation.¹³¹ Wenceslas even mounted a force to aid the French king in his war on Flanders, but arrived too late to fight in the battle of Rosebecque (1382).¹³²

Despite this, Brabant's duke and duchess remained faithful to their promise to maintain good relations with England. Thus, in 1375, they punished their subjects who attacked English merchants who were in Brabant.¹³³ The deaths of Edward III (1377), Charles V (1380), Wenceslas (1383), and Louis of Male (1384) along with the ascendance of Duke Philip "the Bold" of Burgundy (1363–1404) would now radically modify the diplomatic world of the Low Countries.¹³⁴

¹²⁸ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 7:315–16.

¹²⁹ H. Oidtman, *Die Schlacht bei Baesweiler am 22 August 1371* (Geilenkirchen, 1905); K. Zimmerman, "Die Schlacht bei Baesweiler am 22. August 1371," *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter* 11 (1941): 270–77; Quicke, *Les Pays-Bas*, 177–204.

¹³⁰ Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Lettenhove, 13:24.

¹³¹ AGR., CC, f. 2366. D. Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, 7 vols. (Nancy, 1747–1757), 3:399.

¹³² AGR, CB, ff. 5922, 5925.

¹³³ AGR, CB, f. 4670.

¹³⁴ For the emergence of Burgundian power, see Richard Vaughn, *The History of Valois Burgundy, 1384–1477* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003); idem, *John the Fearless. The*

IX

For the entire period of the Hundred Years War, the duchy of Brabant was a virtually autonomous principality. Though the Brabançon dukes occasionally acknowledged the Holy Roman Emperor as their feudal overlord, they never failed to act as independent princes and the emperors regularly showed a total disregard for Brabant's misfortunes during the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. Even during the reign of Wenceslas, who was an important member of the imperial family, the emperor was a thoroughly unreliable ally. Because of this imperial neglect, Brabant was endowed with a freedom of action which allowed its dukes to organize foreign policy as they, and not their overlord, wished. As the emperor was increasingly marginalized in the conduct of Brabant's foreign policy, France, England, and finally the duke of Burgundy vied with each other to control the wealthy and strategically-placed principality.

Despite the international chaos which allowed them to craft their own foreign policy (imperfect as it was), the dukes of Brabant could not do so without the approval of the parliament which was dominated by the region's wealthy and independent towns.¹³⁵ One of the principal responsibilities that this evolving institution assumed for itself during the turbulent period of the Hundred Years War related to foreign affairs.¹³⁶ The power of the Brabançon Estates was so politically advanced that in both 1345 and 1347, John III admitted to his newly-acquired French ally, Philip VI, that he had to make use all of his influence with the major towns of Brabant to gain their approval for alliance.¹³⁷

Growth of Burgundian Power (London, 1966); idem, *Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy* (London, 1970).

¹³⁵ For the political power of the Brabançon towns as well as the three Estates of Brabant, see G. Boland, "Un siècle d'alliance interurbaines en Brabant," in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Alberti de Meyer*, 2 vols. (Louvain, 1946), 1:613–25; P. Godding, "Le pouvoir urbain en Brabant au Moyen Âge," in *Wavre 1222–1972* (Gembloux, 1973), 95–122; A. Uyttebrouck, "Le rôle politique des villes brabançonnes au bas moyen âge," *Bulletin trimestriel du Crédit Communal de Belgique*, 116 (1976): 115–30; idem, *Le gouvernement du duché de Brabant au bas moyen âge (1355–1430)*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1975), 1:429ff.; Avonds, *Brabant . . . Land en instellingen*, 223–32.

¹³⁶ A. Uyttebrouck, *Le gouvernement*, 1:465.

¹³⁷ Lucas, *John III*, 14–20 (docs. II–III); Laurent, *Les conventions*, 144–46 (doc. XIII).

The dukes were also influenced by factions among their courtiers, many of whom were feudally tied to either the French or the English sovereign.¹³⁸ Pressured by his parliaments and advisers while also being motivated by the good of the duchy and by his personal interests, the duke seldom followed a coherent foreign policy, frequently hesitating and changing their minds during times of crisis.

Those wishing to politically dominate the southern Low Countries from the inside had to maintain Brabant's friendship.¹³⁹ The duchy's military potential was also of prime interest to northwest Europe's two principal power brokers, France and England.¹⁴⁰ In 1332, 1334, 1339, 1356, and 1357, John III showed himself to be a very competent campaigner who skilfully resisted the two great power blocs that surrounded and coveted his lands. The military interest that its powerful neighbors had in the duchy remained proportional, however, to the risk of war between themselves. With periods of truce, the rivals were satisfied with Brabant's neutrality. After 1360, when the Hundred Years War shifted away from the Low Countries, Brabant's significance to England and France decreased as that of Burgundy increased.¹⁴¹

The economic influence on Brabant from the lengthy English-French conflict was enormous. If raw material for ducal industry came from England, its markets were in France. During the first stages of the war, Edward III put an embargo on the wool trade with Brabant. At the same time, Philip VI barred Brabant's merchants from the lucrative, French fairs. In reality, the dukes of Brabant were much less interested in English economic inducements than they were in the French recognition of the Brabant title to the lordship of Malines. Brabant's craftsmen were, after all, never as

¹³⁸ Laurent and Quicke, *L'accession*, 81–86.


¹³⁹ Friendship with the duke of Brabant was not the only factor in forming such an alliance. It was necessary to reconcile the many quarrels among the princes. For this reason, the kings of France and England often served as judges or arbitrators.

¹⁴⁰ For an opposite view, see Lucas, *Low Countries*, 338–39.


¹⁴¹ During the last twenty-seven years of the reign of John III, there were twelve English embassies to Brabant and only four in the following seventy-five years. Mirot and Deprez, *Les ambassades*, 556 (doc. VIII: 1328) 559 (doc. XXVII: 1331), 564 (docs. LXXII, LXXVI: 1337), 564–65 (docs. LXXVII–LXXVIII: 1337–1338), 566 (doc. XCVI: 1344), 567 (doc. CIII: 1345), 568 (doc. CXII: 1345), 568 (doc. CXIV: 1345–1346), 570 (docs. CXXVII–CXXVIII: 1348), 571 (doc. CXLII: 1350), 576 (docs. CLXXXV, CLXXXVII: 1358), 577 (doc. CLXXXVIII: 1358, and 203 (doc. CDXLIII: 1383).

dependent on England as their Flemish counterparts were. Edward's misunderstanding of this fact defeated all his efforts to prevent Duke John from establishing a *rapprochement* with Philip of France. The Hundred Year War had an enormous impact on Brabant's economic life. The rebellion of the county of Flanders and the English embargoes spurred the industrial and commercial development of the duchy and sorely damaged that of its nearest rivals, Guelders and Flanders. Though Brabant leaders and troops died in the long conflict (generally fighting on the side of France), the duchy itself was spared both bloody invasion and lengthy occupation.


In conclusion, the role played by the duchy of Brabant and its leaders in the first half of the Hundred Years War should not be underestimated. John III was critically important to Edward III in the first decades of the struggle. The English leader greatly relied on Brabant troops, a fact born out by their significant presence in the siege of Tournai in 1340. If the duke of Brabant could have fully supported Edward, the English army may have been even more successful in the two decades before the treaty of Brétigny (1360). A viable English-Brabant coalition might have led France into even more abysmal defeats and even greater territorial dismemberment. After 1347, however, Brabant's place in the struggle was diminished. In reality, the duchy's unique core position between the warring states of France and England was neither permanent nor stable, undergoing several stages fashioned by the power and talent of Brabant's duke and the every-shifting combination of forces arrayed against him. John III, though a skilled politician and opportunist in playing off his international and local rivals against each other, was also a true national leader who respected the wishes of his Estates. Wenceslas, a member of the imperial family, normally turned to the emperor for help and was always disappointed. Considering his alliances carefully, he eventually settled on the king of France as his most likely protector. The duke's assumption that great friends brought great security sadly proved an incorrect one as both France and England repeatedly let him down. When the Hundred Years War shifted to other theaters after the reign of Wenceslas and Joan, the conflict left behind a power vacuum in the Low Countries, one that the dukes of Burgundy and especially Philip the Bold moved quickly to fill.



Map 14. Low Countries in the Later Middle Ages.



Map 15. Flanders and Neighboring Regions in the Fourteenth Century.



Map 16. Textile Production Centers in Northwestern Europe in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.

PART THREE
URBAN REACTIONS

LONDON'S WAR EFFORT DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REIGN OF EDWARD III

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In 1357, the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of London sent a letter to Edward III (1327–1377) asking for a confirmation of the city's privileges found in their charter. To justify this demand, the city reminded the king of how its population had aided him in his war efforts over the previous thirty years. The letter states that Londoners had lent or given Edward more than £130,000 to finance his military ventures, and had also sent soldiers to assist the crown on "expeditions to Scotland, Gascony, Brabant, Flanders, Brittany, and France, as well as the siege of Calais, and against the Spaniards."¹ This paper will discuss how the English capital lived up to this claim and aided the English government in the wars with Scotland and the early stages of the Hundred Years War.

A great amount of evidence about the city's war effort survives in municipal records such as the Plea and Memoranda rolls and the Letter Books. Within these sources, one can find information about how its inhabitants raised military contingents and monetary grants for the crown, as well as how its inhabitants prepared defenses when threatened with invasion. Furthermore, the documents shed light on the soldiers who joined various military campaigns, revealing public attitudes towards these conflicts, and the burdens placed upon Londoners by their participation.

I

Prior to the reign of Edward II (1307–1327), the city of London had little involvement in warfare. Chronicles and other sources from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries contain scattered references to

¹ *Calendar of Letter Books [LB] G*, ed. Reginald R. Sharpe (London, 1905), 85.

city residents taking part in battles, the most notable being to their poor performance at the battle of Lewes in 1264. There are some records which show that the royal government did make demands on Londoners to support their military campaigns with men and supplies. During the siege of Bedford castle in 1224, Henry III (1216–1272) summoned 19 crossbowmen from London, and issued several writs to the city's sheriff to procure various items, such as £20 worth of rope, 200 pickaxes, and over 16,300 crossbow bolts. Furthermore, two master carpenters from London were paid to travel to Bedford to construct siege machines.²

The reign of Edward I (1272–1307) did not mark any major changes in the amount of military support from London. In the spring of 1296, London raised sixty men-at-arms and fifty crossbowmen to assist in defending England's southern coast, which was threatened by a French invasion.³ But in many cases, the city's contribution was limited to raising and distributing supplies to other English forces.⁴

After Edward II's defeat at the battle of Bannockburn in 1314, the royal government increased its demands on the city of London. Over the next twelve years, it would send at least six different military contingents to aid in England's wars with Scotland and France. It would also raise forces to serve against English rebels.⁵ On some occasions, the support of Londoners for Edward's wars was lukewarm, an attitude demonstrated by the dispatch of contingents much smaller than those requested, or ones sent only after long delay. The English king was not pleased with the lackluster effort of his capital, and wrote the inhabitants to complain first, that the soldiers they sent were fewer than he expected and second, that no arrangements had been made concerning how long they were to stay or who was to pay their wages. This led Edward to conclude, "that the citizens took the king's affairs less to heart than they were accustomed."⁶

London's contribution to the crown's military effort increased during the reign of Edward III. During the 1327 Weardale campaign against Scotland, the city supplied 100 men-at-arms on horseback

² Emile Amt, "Besieging Bedford: Military Logistics in 1224," *The Journal of Medieval Military History* 1 (2002): 112–13.

³ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, 7 vols. (London, 1783–1832), 1:26.

⁴ *LB C*, 91; *LB D*, 240, 279.

⁵ *LB D*, 308–10; *LB E*, 93–96, 99, 153, 168–69, 191–92; *Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls [CPMR]* ed. A.H. Thomas (Cambridge, 1926), 7.

⁶ *LB D*, 154.

and an equal number of foot soldiers.⁷ Furthermore, a skinner named John de Bedford organized a mercenary unit of nearly 250 Londoners for that campaign.⁸ In the next thirty years, the city would supply King Edward's military units on fourteen separate occasions (and would send eight naval contingents to serve with the fleet. The size of these forces varied considerably, from the 100 soldiers sent in 1338 to the 820 men dispatched to Calais eight years later. Naval contributions ranged in size from the two vessels outfitted in 1339 to the twenty-six ships furnished by the city in 1341.

Records from the city of London allow the historian to examine the complex process by which town authorities managed to raise these contingents. Sometimes, this involved three or four meetings of mayor and aldermen before any troops would be ready to depart. These authorities needed to discuss who would serve, what would be their wages, and the expenses associated with this gathering, and how the money would be raised to pay for them.

Recruiting men to serve in the military was accomplished by two different methods. In 1337 and 1338, city officials selected the soldiers. On the first occasion, a board of three men made the choice. Afterwards, the recruits were sent to the Guildhall, where they swore an oath promising to be obedient to their commanders and serve for the required amount of time.⁹ In 1338, William Hauteyn, the contingent's commander, and William Maleseurs, were paid 40 s. and directed to recruit that year's contingent of forty men-at-arms and sixty archers.¹⁰ A committee consisting of the mayor, twelve aldermen, and twenty-eight commoners then approved their choice.¹¹

Another method for raising troops, used in 1327, 1340, 1345, and 1350, involved each of London's twenty-four wards providing a pre-determined number of men. Larger and wealthier wards would be responsible for sending more soldiers than the smaller ones. In 1340, the wards of Cheap and Cordwainer were each required to

⁷ *CPMR*, 1:41, *Corporation of London Records Office: Plea and Memoranda Roll [PMR]*, A 1b, M 9 (11).

⁸ *PMR*, E101/35/2, no. 1; E101/18/7, Andrew Ayton, "John Chaucer and the Weardale Campaign, 1327," *Notes and Queries* 36 (n.s.) (1989): 9.

⁹ *Memorials of London and London Life in the XIIIth, XIVth, and XVth Centuries*, ed. Henry Thomas Riley (London, 1868), 189–90.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 202.

¹¹ *CPMR*, 1:191–92.

send 24 men-at-arms, while those of Aldgate, Portsoken and Bassishaw had to provide only two soldiers apiece.¹²

Once quotas were set, a ward might collectively raise the money necessary to outfit and send the specified force. Alternatively, it might assign to some of the wealthier residents responsibility of personally providing the soldiers. Most of the 263 men-at-arms sent in 1340 were recruited through this latter method. City records supply both the names of these soldiers and of the men who sent them. In most cases, one or two Londoners had to provide a single soldier for the military levee, but there were variations. For example, John Hamond of Walbrook ward sent four men-at-arms. The master list mentioned fifteen London residents who between them still owed nine men to the unit. There was also a warning that if they failed to supply these soldiers each would be fined 50 s.

Military contingents were usually formed into groups of one hundred men, each commanded by a *centainer*. These centuries were further sub-divided into groups of twenty, captained by a *vintainer*. Many, but not all of these leaders had previously gained experience through service in other London contingents.

Once it was determined who would serve, the city then had to decide how it was going to raise the money to pay and supply these men. In some instances, the royal government covered the expenses, but more often than not, Londoners themselves had to pay the costs.¹³ As with the recruiting of soldiers, two methods were used to do this. The first was to have only the wealthiest residents contribute a sum of money, either as a loan or a gift to the city. In 1336, the city raised £86, 10 s., to pay the crews for three warships.¹⁴ Twenty-six Londoners supplied these funds in the form of a loan, with each lender handing over between 50 s. and 100 s.

As an alternative, the city council could collect money through a general tax levied on all the residents and administered by the wards. In 1334, for example, the mayor and aldermen agreed to raise 1200 marks by requiring each Londoner to provide a fifteenth part of his or her goods. Each ward selected two to four men to assess and levy this tax on their neighbors.¹⁵

¹² *PMR*, A3, mm 19; 20, 20d; 21, 21d.

¹³ The expenses for the 300 armed men sent by London in 1340 were supposed to be covered by the royal government. *LB F*, 51.

¹⁴ *LB F*, 5.

¹⁵ *Memorials*, 187–90; *LB E*, 2.

The resistance of some Londoners towards these measures can be seen in an episode of 1334, when a fishmonger named William de Mordone was imprisoned after he refused to pay his share of the money granted for that year's contingent. While he was in jail, the mayor learned that William was very vocal in his opposition. A few days earlier, he had told a crowd near London Bridge that he knew of at least a hundred men who felt the same way he did, forty of whom were ready to drag the greatest and wealthiest men of the city out of their houses, and behead them outside London's gates.¹⁶

The account book shows that money raised in the capital was used for a variety of expenditures.¹⁷ The largest share of these funds was devoted to paying the soldiers. Although military wages varied somewhat, an archer could expect be paid between 3 and 4 pence per day, a "light cavalryman" (*hobelar*) 6 p. and a man-at-arms between 8 p. and 1 s. per day.¹⁸ Captains and mounted men-at-arms would receive a far higher salary. In 1327, each horseman was paid 100 s.¹⁹ Seven years later, other men of this rank received ten marks apiece for forty days service, or 3 s., 5 p. per day.²⁰

In addition to their regular wages, in at least two cases the soldiers received extra money from the city as a gift. In 1334, a detachment of 100 foot soldiers was granted £10; four years earlier, the same amount was given to the entire force.²¹ If everyone got an equal share, then each individual received as his bonus 24 p. Not all the gifts given to soldiers came in the form of extra money. The 1337 account shows that 50 s. were spent on a tun of wine for the London men.²²

Money was needed in order to meet a variety of other expenses. The city had to supply suitable clothing for the troops. Large amounts of cloth were bought and then sewn into gowns with hoods for the troops. Often these were quite colorful. In 1334, the city spent over £50 to supply its 200 soldiers with red gowns and green hoods.²³

¹⁶ *Memorials*, 191–92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 189–90, 196, 202.

¹⁸ For *hobelar*, similar to the Muslim *jinet*, see Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 124; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1990), 71, 153.

¹⁹ *CPMR*, 1:41.

²⁰ *Memorials*, 189–90.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 189–90, 202.

²² *Ibid.*, 196.

²³ *Ibid.*, 189–90.

In 1345, eighty archers were outfitted with red and white stripped coats and hoods.²⁴ In several other cases, the city also purchased weapons for its men. In 1337, it bought ten lances for 16 s., 8 p., probably to be distributed to the ten men who led that year's contingent.²⁵ It was also necessary to buy standards and pennons for the troops. The 1334 account records a purchase of 107 pennons and six standards which cost £4, 5 s.²⁶

The documents even record a few curious expenditures. In 1334, 100 s. were given to a minstrel who accompanied the troops. Another 40 s. were paid to a man called "Quadewille" for having traveled to Normandy and Brabant tracking down rumors.²⁷

II

The records from the city of London often include the names of the men who served in its military detachments. Muster lists survive from 1327, 1334, 1337, 1338, 1340, 1345, and 1350.²⁸ In addition to these, there is a 1327 list of Londoners serving a mercenary unit commanded by John de Bedford.²⁹ Together these documents preserve hundreds of names, allowing one to examine who participated in military campaigns and why.

One historian has disparagingly characterized the soldiers sent by London as "an army of drapers' apprentices and journeymen tailors."³⁰ But a detailed examination of all contingents from 1327 to 1340, along with the mercenaries listed in 1327, shows that many Londoners were very experienced in warfare. Of the 842 names that

²⁴ *CPMR*, 1:221.

²⁵ *Memorials*, 196.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 189–90.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 189–90.

²⁸ [1327] *PMR*, A 1b, M 9 (11); [1334] *LB E*, 2–5; [1337] *LB F*, 11–14; [1338] *LB F*, 26–27; [1340] *PMR* A3-mm 19; 20, 20d; 21, 21d; [1345] *PMR*, roll A5-m 27b; [1350] *LB F*, 217–20.

²⁹ E101/35/2, no. 1; V.B. Redstone, "Some Mercenaries of Henry of Lancaster," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (3rd Series) 7 (1913): 154–56. Redstone's article about John de Bedford and the London mercenaries of 1327 contains numerous mistakes. Most notably, he confused the 1340 London contingent with the one that went with the mercenary company in 1327. Redstone also stated that certain members of the mercenary force were involved in criminal acts a year later, but several of the men he named were not part of Bedford's contingent.

³⁰ Reginald R Sharpe, *London and the Kingdom: A History* (London, 1894), 152.

appear on these six lists, 208 served on at least two different occasions. Thirty-nine served at least three times. There was even one man, John Peverel, who fought in all five campaigns, either as an archer, a hobelar, or a man-at-arms. When the city would send small forces to the aid the crown, most of the men it provided had previous combat experience. When 200 archers were sent to Gascony in 1337, 195 of them had already taken part in earlier campaigns. In the following year, forty armed men and sixty archers were sent to France, all but seven of whom had previous tours of duty.

By contrast, the 1340 contingent, made up of men selected either by individuals or small groups of London residents, had only thirty-nine experienced soldiers within its ranks. On this occasion, many of the London residents supplied family members and servants for the campaign. William Huansard sent both his son and namesake and another family member named John. Godfrey le Botiller and Thomas Swanlond did not send substitutes but served themselves.³¹ Similarly, the 1224 contingent, which was organized in the same fashion as in 1340, had only twenty men who would take part in another campaign. These soldiers included John de Dunstable, sent by Nicholas de Dunstable, and John Aleyn, sent by Stephen Aleyn.³²

Even if a Londoner was not selected to serve, he could have found plenty of opportunities to join the English military. For example, in 1339, ten ships were sent from the port of London to take part in that year's naval campaign. This was in addition to thirteen ships supplied by the Tower of London. The navy hired over 1100 men to serve on these ships, many of whom were undoubtedly Londoners.³³ Nor was the mercenary unit of 1327 for whom we have muster records the only group of Londoners to contract their services to the crown. John Wrench, who had already served in that mercenary company and in the 1338 London contingent, commanded a force of thirty-nine armourers and sixty mounted archers in 1339.³⁴ These men were paid over £1,330 for sixty-four days of service. Around the same time, eight Londoners enlisted as mounted men-at-arms for a period of 100 days. Among them was Walter Russel, who had

³¹ *PMR*, A3, mm 19, 20, 20d, 21, 21d.

³² *Letter Book*, E, ff. 2b–3b.

³³ *The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to May 1340*, ed. Mary Lyon, Bryce Lyon, and Henry Lucas (Brussels, 1983), 363–65.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 359–60.

taken part in three previous London campaigns, and Robert Devenysh, who had served twice before.³⁵ Many Londoners, including the famous mercenary leader John Hawkwood, were soldiers by profession.

On the other hand, only a handful of men who served between 1327 and 1340 reappeared on the troop lists of 1345 and 1350. Several things could account for this. In the 1345 campaign, many experienced London soldiers may have already been serving in other units. Age and wounds could have caught up with other Londoners who had served in the previous decade, and the Black Death would undoubtedly have killed a large percentage of London soldiers by 1350.

III

The abundant records from the city of London during this period help provide a picture of the lives of some these soldiers. Although most only appear on the muster list, some can be found in other city records as well. The references are often brief. For example, one person might show up as a juror at a trial, as a witness to a contract, or a grantor of property in a will. Sometimes, there is adequate information to learn what these men did for a living. John of York, who served in 1327 and 1337, was a physician, which probably led to his recruitment. Many trades and professions were represented on the master lists, ranging from a lowly servant to an individual who would eventually become a mayor of London.³⁶ With a couple of exceptions, these London soldiers cannot be found in city tax records from the period, which contained only the names of the wealthiest Londoners.³⁷ One cannot assume that those who went to war were among the city's poor, but at least they were not included among the richest residents.

In a few cases, a little more can be said about the lives of particular soldiers. John Tany, an armourer, served as an archer in both

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 351.

³⁶ A sixteenth century source states that a man named Henry Pitchard served in the armies of Edward III before he became the Mayor of London. This is most likely Henry Picard, who was mayor of London from 1356 to 1357. Richard Johnson, *The Nine Worthies of London* (London, 1811), 174.

³⁷ *LB F*, 5–8, 143–52.

1327 and 1338. He again entered military service around 1346 or 1347, at which time he was maimed in an action near Calais. On November 15, 1347, the crown granted Tany an allowance of 2 p. a day as compensation; he would die two years later.³⁸ His will shows that he was still financially secure, owning a couple of properties that he used to establish a chantry for himself.³⁹

Many of the references we have to these London soldiers comes from reports on their criminal activities. Grace le Palmer, for instance, was mainprised for good behavior in 1327, soon after returning from service in the London mercenary unit commanded by John de Bedford.⁴⁰ A year later he was brought back to the mayor's court to face the charge that he and his brother Matthew had attempted to extort £40 from a knight named Thomas West.⁴¹ Grace makes one more appearance in London records twelve years later, when he and another man are described as

nightwalkers, well dressed and lavish of their money . . . [who], if they had their opportunity, would sooner consort with bad characters and disturbers of the peace than with men of good report.⁴²

Andrew Saleman was already known to London's criminal courts before he became a soldier. In November 1324, he and his father, following an assault, were released on bond. Soon afterwards, they were involved in another fight.⁴³ Although these matters were settled out of court, in August, 1326, Saleman went into hiding when a coroner's jury indicted him for murder.⁴⁴ Despite these criminal charges, he served in 1327 and 1340, and was still alive in 1351, when he received a legacy.⁴⁵

William Malesuers, one of the captains in the 1338 contingent, was accused of murdering John Grane a year later, but fled and

³⁸ George Wrottesley, *Crecy and Calais, from the Original Records in the Public Records Office* (London, 1898), 157.

³⁹ *Calendar of Wills proved and enrolled in the Court of Husting, London A.D. 1285–A.D. 1688* [CWCH], ed. Reginald R. Sharpe, 2 vols. (London, 1889), 1:619–20.

⁴⁰ *LB E*, 224.

⁴¹ *Annales Londonienses*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, ed. William Stubbs (London, 1882), 1:245.

⁴² *CPMR*, 1:176.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴⁴ *Calendar of Coroners Rolls of the City of London A.D. 1300–1378* [CCRCL], ed. Reginald R. Sharpe (London, 1913), 168–69.

⁴⁵ *CWCH*, 1:645.

managed to get a royal pardon in May, 1340, in return for military service to the crown.⁴⁶ Maleseurs was not the only Londoner to earn a pardon by serving in the English military. From the reign of Edward I, hundreds of men were recruited through this method. Between 1339 and 1340, 850 to 900 men were granted pardons for army service in Flanders, with at least six of them being Londoners.⁴⁷

Other soldiers can also be found involved in homicide cases, but, unfortunately for them, they were the victims. In mid-June 1340, one Ralph Turk of Bridge ward was sent by John Turk and left with the rest of the London company. Either Ralph was one of the many soldiers whom Edward III sent home before the army left England or he quickly made his way back to London after his forty days of service was done. We find him again on the streets of the city on August 1. On that day, a brawl took place in the Walbook and Bridge wards between a group of fishmongers and skinnners. Coroner's records state that Ralph Turk, servant of John Turk of Bridge ward, was among those involved, that he got struck by an axe in the back of his head, and was killed instantly.⁴⁸

Ralph Turk was not the only London soldier to be murdered that year. Three months earlier, John Wrench, the commander of the hundred Londoners hired by the crown a year earlier, got into an argument with a "plate-maker" named William Walroun. The latter individual may have been one of the armourers who served under John. While there is no indication of why this argument took place, coroner's records reveal that it ended with a knife slicing into John's chest.⁴⁹

Although it may seem from the previous references that many of the London soldiers were violent criminals, this is pushing the evidence beyond its limit. First of all, records that speak to the levels of crime in medieval London are sketchy at best. Furthermore, only a few dozen of the hundreds of London soldiers mentioned in the muster list were implicated in an assault, murder or other crime.

⁴⁶ *CCRCL*, 226, *CPR* (1338–1340), 539.

⁴⁷ John Aberth, *Criminal Churchmen in the Age of Edward III: The Case of Bishop Thomas de Lisle* (University Park, Pa., 1996), 194; *Calendar of Patent Rolls [CPR]*, 70 vols. (London, 1891–1982) (1338–1340), 217, 229, 440, 539.

⁴⁸ *CPR* (1338–1340) 266–69.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 253–54.

IV

In addition to providing soldiers to serve in the royal army, London played a considerable role as a supplier of ships and their crews. Living in England's largest port, Londoners would be able to supply many vessels, either for ferrying troops and supplies across the channel or in the capacity of warships. A London chronicler reports that during the battle of Sluys in 1340, one of his city's ships belonging to William Haunsard, arrived shortly after fighting began, "and did much good in the said battle."⁵⁰

London's municipal records yield more information about the city's naval service. For example, in 1336, the authorities spent over £86 to outfit three ships for the king's service.⁵¹ This included paying the wages of the captain, constable, and men of each ship for twenty days, and for rigging and repairing these vessels. Three years later, a request was made to the city to supply four ships and four scummers with 460 men serving onboard and supplied with enough food to last three months. The mayor and aldermen petitioned to have this request reduced to two ships, with 220 armed men serving for two months. Most of the armed men were also equipped by the city with a *hacqueton* (quilted vest), mail, a bacinet with visor, and a pair of plate mail gauntlets.⁵²

Many ships from the port of London could carry only a small contingent. Ten that were hired by the crown in 1339 had crews ranging between fifteen and forty men. These were much smaller than other vessels owned by the crown and based at the Tower of London, such as the *Christopher*, which carried a complement of 120.⁵³ As a result, London found itself hiring larger ships from other ports to transport its soldiers and sailors. In 1340, when the city was called upon to provide five ships with nearly 300 men-at-arms and 100 mariners, four came from outside London. Two were sent by Dartmouth, while Tynemouth and Greenwich each supplied one vessel. All of these ships had a company of eighty men. The only London vessel in the fleet, the *Nadeau*, had a crew of only nineteen.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *Chronicle of the Mayors and Sheriffs of London*, ed. Henry Thomas Riley (London, 1863), 277.

⁵¹ *Memorials*, 198.

⁵² *LB F*, 32–34.

⁵³ *Wardrobe Book*, 363–65.

⁵⁴ *CPMR*, 1:131–32.

V

In addition to military and naval contingents, the city of London also contributed money to Edward III's war effort. Sometimes the money was sent instead of providing soldiers, such as in 1335, when the city gave 500 marks rather than raise 200 hobelars.⁵⁵ In 1336, London supplied the crown 500 marks "towards the war in Scotland."⁵⁶

Loans by the city to the crown were also common. In 1340, the city raised £5000, money which Edward repaid through a subsidy from the county of Kent.⁵⁷ In 1346, the city made an assessment of all Londoners who possessed goods and chattels of £10 or more to raise 3,000 marks for the crown, "partly as a gift and partly a loan."⁵⁸ On the other hand, it was through royal taxes that Londoners made their principal monetary contribution to the war effort. The 1338 wool subsidy netted Edward III nearly £4,000. The following year, residents of London paid military taxes amounting to 20,000 marks.⁵⁹ A 1357 letter from the city of London to its monarch states that through taxes and loans, many of which had not been repaid, the city had contributed over £130,000 to Edward's military endeavors, including £60,000 to the campaigns fought in the Low Countries between 1338 and 1340, and £40,000 to the year-long siege of Calais.⁶⁰

Even with all this revenue coming in, Edward III found it necessary to solicit loans from many London residents. In his recent study on the financial relationship between London merchants and the king, Roger Axworthy found that over 247 different Londoners lent money to the crown during Edward's reign. Most of the creditors only lent small amounts of money once or twice, but there were twenty-six people who made at least four loans, and nine of them made at least a dozen. John de Pulteneye, for example, made

⁵⁵ *Calendar of Close Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office: Prepared under the Superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records, Edward III [CCR]*, 14 vols. (London, 1896–1913), 3 (1333–1337), 435.

⁵⁶ *LB E*, 296.

⁵⁷ *CPR* (1338–1340), 534.

⁵⁸ *LB F*, 143.

⁵⁹ *Wardrobe Book*, lxxxii; Robert Fabyan, *The New Chronicles of England and France*, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1811), 447–49.

⁶⁰ *LB G*, 85.

twenty-six loans to the crown between 1332 and 1348, with the sums ranging from £3 to £1000.⁶¹

VI

In addition to these other contributions, Londoners also had to maintain the defenses of their city. On several occasions, the threat of a French invasion spurred the inhabitants into action. One of the most detailed accounts of these defensive preparations came at the start of the Hundred Years War. During the fall of 1338, rumors spread that a French fleet was being assembled for an invasion of England, a threat made all the more real by a French raid on Southampton. Some defensive measures had already been completed by this time, including the installation of beacons upon Shooter's Hill and other places. These would be lit so that "notice might be given to the inhabitants of Kent, Surrey and London of the approach of the enemy."⁶²

On October 11, 1338, numerous residents of the city held a meeting at the Guildhall, where they adopted several measures to protect the city. Twenty-four-hour guard was posted on the walls and along the river front. Six men were assigned to guard Aldgate near the Tower of London by day and twelve men by night. A large springald for hurling missiles armed with forty quarrels was set up there.⁶³

Giant piles were driven into the Thames, so that only one ship could pass through at a time. To further increase the defenses along the river, a fortified building was constructed near the Tower of London, called the "Bretask", in which the city stored seven more springalds and nearly 900 quarrels. The city's chamberlain records that a loan of £110 was made to cover the construction costs of the piles and the "Bretask".⁶⁴ The city also demanded that all people

⁶¹ Roger Leonard Axworthy, "The Financial Relationship of the London Merchant Community with Edward III, 1337 to 1377," (Ph.D. diss., Royal Holloway, University of London, 2000), 353–54.

⁶² *CPMR*, 1:167.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 176–77; *Memorials*, 204. This weapon, similar to an oversized crossbow, gave its name (spingald, espingarda) to a small variety of bombard "which shot projectiles of iron or stone." Antoni Ignasi Alomar i Canyelles, *L'armament i la defensa a la Mallorca medieval* (Palma de Majorca, 1995), 298.

⁶⁴ *LB F*, 16.

who owned riverside property between the Tower and the Bridge were to construct wooden walls parallel to the Thames. This would cost one riverside property owner over £10 per Londoner.⁶⁵

The city could also make use of a new type of weapon. Within the Guildhall, there were six instruments called “gonnes” along with a great quantity of lead pellets and thirty-two pounds of powder.⁶⁶ Whether these were hand-held devices or larger pieces of artillery is unknown.

The costs of these defensive arrangements were met in part by a special assessment made in November, 1338, to be paid by a number of the property owners including several religious houses. Among the assessed were the abbot of Westminster (£4), the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul’s (10 marks), and Joan, widow of a knight named John de Bokeland (20 s.).⁶⁷

The London government also established a special force of men who were to be responsible for safeguarding the city in case of attack. Records supply the names of 219 Londoners chosen to fulfill this task.⁶⁸ Surprisingly, none of these people had any previous military experience in the city’s contingents. Instead, many of them were people already employed for the city government. Some served as ward assessors; others were involved in recruiting the soldiers for the 1338 campaign in France. Fourteen of these individuals would later go on to become aldermen in London. About half the people on this list can also be found in the taxation records from 1337 or 1343, indicating that they were among the wealthier residents of the city. Although the threat of invasion subsided by the spring of 1339, and the “Bretask” and other defensive works were dismantled,⁶⁹ London would face other threats of invasion during the Hundred Years War.⁷⁰

On a more personal level, many Londoners would find their lives and fortunes in jeopardy from the ongoing war. For example, Thomas de Blackeneye had his merchant ship, *la Paternoster*, attacked by armed men from Normandy and Picardy after he left the port of

⁶⁵ *CPMR*, 1:177.

⁶⁶ *Memorials*, 205.

⁶⁷ *CPMR*, 1:101–2.

⁶⁸ *LB F*, 21–23.

⁶⁹ *CPR* (1338–1340), 172.

⁷⁰ For details of London’s defensive efforts in the 1380s, see Caroline Barron, “Richard II and London,” in *Richard II: The Art of Kingship*, ed. Anthony Goodman and James Gillespie (Oxford, 1999), 138.

Beaupre in 1338. Some of Blackeney's men were killed in the battle; he and the remaining crew were captured and imprisoned at the castle of la Gernach.⁷¹

VII

The last major way that the city of London got involved in England's war effort was through the public displays it held for Edward III. These included processions, such as the one that followed the English victory at the battle of Halidon Hill in 1333. During this event, clergy and citizens of the city walked throughout London with relics removed from St. Paul's Cathedral.⁷² In 1357, a more elaborate celebration was held following the Black Prince's victory at Poitiers. The city busily decorated its streets and buildings with flags, pennons, and other displays. When the royal couple arrived, accompanied by their highborn prisoners, including the king of France, over a thousand men waited outside the city on horseback to escort them through the city. During this three-hour procession, the Black Prince was showered with gold and silver leaves.⁷³

The city of London represented the most prominent example of a new trend in the development of the English military system. Edward III became the first English monarch to make full use of the resources of the towns and cities in aid of his war efforts. In 1346, when calling upon London to provide 600 men, he also summoned troops from 142 other English towns and villages. His levies ranged from 120 armed men to be provided by Norwich, to the two required of Hungerford. Altogether, Edward anticipated raising over 1,800 soldiers from his cities and towns.⁷⁴ In addition, many coastal places such as Winchelsea and the Cinque Ports gave a great deal of naval support to the crown.⁷⁵

Nevertheless the size and wealth of the city of London made it the most important contributor during the Hundred Years War. Over

⁷¹ *CCR*, 4 (1337–1339), 455–56.

⁷² Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990), 132.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁷⁴ *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, ed. Clifford Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), 120.

⁷⁵ David Sylvester, "Maritime Communities in Pre-Plague England: Winchelsea and the Cinque Ports," (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1999), 137–49.

the course of many decades, the city provided hundreds of soldiers to Edward's campaigns in France and Scotland. It also provided dozens of ships for naval service. At the same time, Londoners gave or lent a great deal of money to finance these military efforts. In addition, they organized their own defenses whenever threatened with invasion. As indicated in the 1357 letter, all of this was done "while the city . . . endured a great pestilence which had emptied the city of more than a third of its inhabitants and impoverished the rest of them." The letter concluded that "the City had at all time loyally kept . . . the peace, thus setting an example to the whole realm."⁷⁶

⁷⁶ *LB G*, 85.

APPENDIX

London Contingents
(Requests made by the English government shaded in gray)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Contingent Size</i>	<i>Site of Service</i>
1327	100 men-at-arms on horseback and 100 foot soldiers. They were accompanied by a London mercenary contingent, commanded by John de Bedford, consisting of 70 men-at-arms, 30 hobelars, and 164 archers.	Took part in the Weardale campaign against Scotland.
1334	100 men-at-arms and 100 foot soldiers.	Scotland
1336	Naval force consisting of three ships.	Unknown
1337	200 archers.	Gascony
1338	49 men-at-arms and 60 archers.	France
1339	Naval force of two ships with 220 armed men and 20 grooms on board.	Unknown
1339	Mercenary force from London hired by Edward III commanded by John Wrench, consisting of 39 armourers and 60 mounted archers.	Flanders
1340	Naval contingent of five ships, containing 293 men-at-arms, 99 mariners, and 25 boys.	Unknown
1340	300 men-at-arms.	France
1341	Naval force of 26 ships with men-at-arms.	Unknown
1344	400 archers.	France
1344	100 men-at-arms and 200 hobelars.	France
1345	80 archers.	France

Table (*cont.*)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Contingent Size</i>	<i>Site of Service</i>
1345	320 archers and an unknown number of men-at-arms.	Calais
1346	100 men-at-arms and 500 armed men.	Calais
1346	120 archers.	Calais
1347	Naval contingent of 2 ships, containing 70 armed men and 100 archers.	Unknown
1347	Naval contingent of 1 ship, containing 80 archers.	Calais
1350	Naval contingent of two ships, containing 120 armed men and 40 archers.	Against a Castilian fleet.
1350	100 armed men.	France
1355	20 armed men and 500 archers.	France
1355	Built two warships.	Unknown



Map 17. Medieval London.

THOLOSANNA FIDES:
TOULOUSE AS A MILITARY ACTOR
IN LATE MEDIEVAL FRANCE

Paul Solon
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In the autumn of 1355, Edward, heir to the English throne and governor of Guienne, known as the Black Prince (1330–1376), led an Anglo-Gascon force of about five thousand men southward from Bordeaux into the lands of the count of Armagnac. Thus began one of the most destructive of the *chevauchées* in the annals of English warfare during the Hundred Years War.¹ While these campaigns seldom had a specific objective, Toulouse emerged as a likely target as this raid laid waste to the lands of Armagnac and then passed eastward into Languedoc. The focal point of regional communication and commerce, Toulouse remained the only point at which the Garonne River was bridged and could be crossed by an army en route to the rich cities and lands of France's Mediterranean coastline.

Both duty and interest should have led Jean I, count of Armagnac (1330–1384), the regional commander of Valois forces, to conduct an active regional defense. Instead, despite his superior troop strength, he avoided combat and pursued a passive strategy that abandoned the countryside and imperiled its most important city. Hoping simply to prevent further English penetration, he ordered the reinforcement of regional fortresses and focused his attentions on the

¹ The classic history of the Hundred Years War is Edouard Perroy's *The Hundred Years War* (New York, 1965). The best recent study is from Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War; England and France at War c. 1300–c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1988). For studies of the strategy of the *chevauchée* see two works by Clifford J. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327–1360* (Rochester, N.Y., 2000) and idem, "By Fire and Sword; *Bellum Hostile* and 'Civilians' in the Hundred Years' War," in *Civilians in the Path of War*, ed. Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (Lincoln: Neb., 2002), 33–78. The definitive study of the campaign of 1355 is from H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–7* (Manchester, 1958). The best discussion of the involvement of Toulouse in the campaign is in Philippe Wolff, *Commerces et marchands de Toulouse (vers 1350–vers 1450)* (Paris, 1954).

defense of Toulouse. Preparing for a siege that never came, the city leveled buildings on its exterior, reinforced its walls, and cut all but the one bridge across the Garonne that lay safely within its defensive perimeter. In late October, the English were within a dozen miles of the city. For its permanent population of perhaps 20,000 inhabitants, Armagnac's provincial levies, and numerous refugees clustered within the walls, the moment of crisis approached.

Events more anticlimactic than heroic ensued. Ill-prepared to lay siege to a well-defended city, the Black Prince simply by-passed it and in a single day forded both the Garonne and the Ariège rivers to the south. The passage was audacious for, according to the English chronicler, Geoffrey Baker, the waters were dangerously deep and rapid and had never been crossed by cavalry. Evidently believing such a passage impossible for a large force, the French had not even defended the crossings leading Baker to characterize them as incapable of resistance, "panic-stricken, unwarlike in temperament—for they believed they were secure behind their rivers—not knowing what course to take and unable to flee."²

His contempt is made even more understandable by Armagnac's failure to offer battle at a time when the city was being scouted from the south and the inhabitants were being provoked by local pillaging. Froissart, the only other chronicler to speak of the event, gives us a nobler picture. In his version, as the English skirmishers approached, the city manned its walls and gates and mobilized levies by craft and neighborhood "eager to exit the city and fight the English."³ Exercising either good military judgment or misguided chivalric contempt for urban levies, Armagnac ordered restraint, arguing to the Toulousans that their wisest course was simply to defend the city and warning them that if they gave battle they would be destroyed and lose all because of their relative military inexperience.⁴

And so the Black Prince continued southeast devastating the countryside and wreaking immense damage upon Carcassonne and Narbonne while Armagnac's forces did nothing but await reinforce-

² Geoffrey Baker, *Galfridi Le Baker De Swinbroke Chronicon Angliae Temporibus Edwardi II et Edwardi III*, ed. J.A. Giles (New York, 1967), 131.

³ Jean Froissart, *Chroniques de J. Froissart*, ed. S. Luce, G. Raynaud, L. and I. Mirot, 15 vols. to date (Paris, 1869–1975), 4:163: "en grant volonté de issir hors et de combatre les Englés."

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4:163. "il n'estoient mies usé d'armes ensi que li Englés et li Gascon."

ments. The Anglo-Gascon army finally withdrew, re-crossing both the Ariège and Garonne. Once again, Armagnac neither forced a battle nor contested crossings so perilous that local observers considered the successful English passage an act of God.⁵ Finally, perhaps out of embarrassment, and only when assured that the Black Prince was safely across the rivers, did Armagnac even begin to harass the English from the rear. In this effort, he enjoyed mixed success in accelerating and channeling the withdrawal, though ignominiously retreating whenever the raiders turned to face him.

Armagnac's conduct throughout the campaign was more than disappointing; it was both humiliating and demoralizing. At the time, the constable of France rebuked him for his tactics and few defend him even today.⁶ According to Froissart, the people of Toulouse were so enraged when they heard that the English had again passed unchallenged that they assaulted the men Armagnac had left within the city.⁷ The expedition thus proved a great success from the English point of view with their forces enriched and emboldened and their adversaries impoverished and embarrassed.

Yet we misunderstand this dramatic moment if we focus only on the brutality of the raid's conduct or the inadequacy of the defense while ignoring its lasting political implications. Devastating the campaign may have been, but its material consequences were ephemeral. The enduring legacy of the raids was not in destroying goods, but shaping memory. For the first time in over a century, the people of the city had suffered the consequences of open war. They observed the campfires of an invading army from their walls and traced its passage through a trail of pillaged villages and ruined fields. Toulouse was understandably traumatized by the experience and remained haunted by the specter of invasion for generations to come.

The people of Toulouse and its region, commonly called the *Toulousain*, who had been mobilized to an unparalleled degree were made painfully aware that they needed protection that neither Armagnac nor any other Valois commander could assure. The unmistakable

⁵ Baker, *Swinbroke Cronicon*, 241.

⁶ For the rebuke see Baker, *Swinbroke Cronicon*, 243–44. To some extent, Hewitt defends Armagnac in his conclusion. Hewitt, *Expedition*, 77.

⁷ Froissart, *Chroniques*, 4:173–74, 381–82. In the second version he mistakenly conflates this outrage with a tax revolt of a few years later when Armagnac was driven from the city.

lesson of 1355 was that the city was on its own. A distinct era of military and urban history thus opened in the aftermath of the Black Prince's *chevauchée*. In the ensuing centuries of military self-reliance only a few major campaigns were conducted in its vicinity, but as the possibility of sudden danger was ever-present, Toulouse was compelled to remain permanently on guard, prepared to act as best it could in the defense of its interests and security.

These circumstances were, of course, not unique. Toulouse was but one of many French cities compelled to become military actors in the Hundred Years War. The phenomenon of the walled, self-sufficient urban polity became commonplace enough that the French crown at the time and historians in retrospect speak of them as a type, i.e. the *bonnes villes*. Though historians have often commented on the military character of the *bonnes villes*,⁸ little has been done to study their specific role in the sphere of military affairs. Reconsidering the experience of Toulouse should thus prove useful in the ongoing study of the *bonnes villes* of late medieval France.⁹ What did the wars of the later Middle Ages look like on the urban level? How did the character and structure of military life change in particular regions sometimes torn by war, but often blessedly far removed from the actual scenes of combat? What role did cities play in the military revolution that began in these centuries? A detailed study of Toulouse will help supply answers to these questions. Throughout the era, the city demonstrated both resilience and resourcefulness in responding to challenges and exploiting opportunities provided by over two centuries of interminable warfare.

Toulouse undeniably became the site of variegated military activity, but was it itself a military actor? This article will argue that the elites of Toulouse conducted an independent and creative military and diplomatic policy, one that played an important role within the regional balance of power. They used their armed force and logistical capacity judiciously to obtain urban policy objectives. In so

⁸ See Michael Wolfe, "Siege Warfare and the *Bonnes Villes* of France," in *The Medieval City Under Siege*, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1995), 49–68.

⁹ Again, the literature in the field is vast and I restrict myself simply to citing Bernard Chevalier's justly celebrated *Les Bonnes Villes de France, du XIV^e au XVI^e siècles* (Paris, 1982) which transformed the writing of French urban history and has produced innumerable follow-up studies.

doing, Toulouse played an under appreciated, but nonetheless significant role in the modernization of warfare as well as in the constitutional evolution of the absolute monarchy.

I

We shall begin our analysis by considering the military history of the city during the Hundred Years War from a broader perspective than a single campaign. The war as it affected southwestern France was engendered in large measure by long-standing territorial disputes. For Toulouse, the formal defiance issued by Edward III (1327–1377) to Philip VI (1328–1350) served as little more than the occasion for the intensification of conflict long underway. Over the decades, the threat of English invasion would remain an ever-present reality. Not until the late fifteenth century would those territorial disputes that fostered the war or the magnate indiscipline that prolonged it come to an end with the final defeat of the houses of Armagnac, Burgundy, and Brittany.

For Toulouse, we might better treat this lengthy development into three distinct periods. (1) The opening campaigns (1337–1356) culminated in crushing defeats for the house of Valois and an apparent Plantagenet victory embodied in the 1360 treaty of Brétigny which left Toulouse to rely on its own military resources during a time of unprecedented risk. (2) There followed a long era of military instability and political chaos in which ill-kept truces were interspersed with years of destructive, but indecisive combat (1360–1442). (3) The final period began in 1442 when Charles VII (1422–1461) implemented his military reforms. During the campaigns of this last period, Toulouse played a valuable and unprecedented role that would help drive the English from France and then make possible the expansion of Valois power both at home and abroad.

II

Although Toulouse was little touched by the opening campaigns, the first period of the war drew to a close with the spectacular military crisis described at the outset of this article. Initially, the city served simply as a command center that occasionally supplied arms and

manpower for forces operating further down the Garonne valley.¹⁰ Sporadic Anglo-Gascon frontier raids fostered renewed attention on local defense. Only after the disaster of Crécy did the city intensify its fortification efforts, just as the southern theater of the war became fully active. In these years, plague and famine left a dramatically reduced and impoverished city to deal with a series of shocks. The earl of Lancaster led the first sizeable raid deep into Languedoc, pillaging nearby Grenade and challenging Toulouse to battle. Although they declined the challenge, this town councilors (*capitouls*) levied a force to destroy bridges in Lancaster's path. This action persuaded the invaders to accept a truce and withdraw.¹¹

Less dramatic but more threatening was the 1352 Anglo-Gascon attack on Lafrançaise. Capture of the fortified town (*bastide*), strategically located near the confluence of the Tarn, Aveyron, and Garonne rivers, would have opened Toulouse to sustained attack. Provoked again to urgent action and frustrated by the inadequacy of royal commanders, the *capitouls* turned to the young Gaston, Phoebus III, count of Foix (1331–1391). He quickly reinforced the city and signed an accord promising to break the siege in return for financial support. A month later, a combined force commanded by the count and the seneschal of Toulouse successfully relieved Lafrançaise, an act that won Gaston Phoebus enduring popularity within the city. This confrontation was followed by the notorious *chevauchée* of 1355. Representing the peak of Toulouse's direct involvement in the major military activity of the Hundred Years War, it remained a unique event. In fact, the 1355 *chevauchée* was the only time in these decades that the city was seriously threatened by a foreign army.¹²

Beneath the surface narrative of invasion lies a more complex story that better explains why the Hundred Years War here, as elsewhere in France, was so catastrophic. The dynastic confrontation between Valois and Plantagenet was under-girded by innumerable regional conflicts between rival magnate factions. In the case of south-western France, this strife was between the houses of Armagnac and

¹⁰ Froissart comments regularly on Toulouse as repository for catapults and other war engines often summoned for use elsewhere in the region, *e.g.* 3:63, 103 and 4:123.

¹¹ Henry Knighton, *Knighton's Chronicle, 1337–1396*, ed. and trans. G.H. Martin (Oxford, 1995), 108.

¹² The 1355 assault stood between that of Simon de Montfort in 1213 and of the duke of Wellington in 1814.

Foix whose rivalry for regional ascendancy would produce generations of internecine, small scale conflict that constituted the “real” Hundred Years War for Toulouse. Indeed, even the Black Prince’s raid would not have been possible were it not for the benign neutrality of the count of Foix whose lands were conspicuously spared by the English in the judicious expectation that the count would not intervene to save his rival Armagnac, either from the embarrassment or the material loss the campaign would inflict.¹³

Less than a year later, French defeat at Poitiers (1356) opened the way to the nominal restoration of peace; however, for Toulouse the real horrors of the war were just beginning. The battle opened the second phase of the conflict, an era of interminable political chaos and military anarchy in which no major armies assembled and no significant campaigns took place, but during which the city remained in a constant state of alarm. In 1357, open revolt, the so-called *capage* uprising, broke out against increased taxes. Mobs sacked the seneschal’s château and forced most of the *capitouls* and the count of Armagnac to flee the city.¹⁴ Order was quickly restored and a general amnesty granted, but the revolutionary pressures of war were readily apparent. They would only intensify as the false promise of peace in 1360 was negated by the arrival of the free companies. While the city itself was physically secure in the face of these mercenary bands, its trade and agriculture were virtually ruined. In the words of Froissart, “the city was so enveloped that people could not leave . . . [it] to work their lands or vines or to transport goods without having some sort of truce or ransom arrangement.”¹⁵

For the next eighty years, the greatest challenge for the city was to assure order in a region routinely ravaged by mercenary companies. Toulouse had to challenge or negotiate with these armed bands marching through its territory or, worse, remaining in its vicinity. This task proved more daunting and more prolonged than simply

¹³ The English chronicler Baker (240) comments on the Prince’s “reverence” for Foix’s holdings, e.g. at Auterive just south of Toulouse.

¹⁴ Dom J. Vaissete and Dom Cl. Devic, *Histoire générale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pièces justificatives* [HGL], 18 vols. (Toulouse, 1872–1892), 9:672–73. This is the revolt that Froissart describes in somewhat exaggerated terms as the popular response to the count of Armagnac’s failures a year earlier. Froissart, *Chroniques*, 9:381–82.

¹⁵ Quoted in Philippe Wolff, *Histoire de Toulouse* (Toulouse, 1974), 190: “ils avaient si environné la bonne ville et cité de Toulouse que les bonnes gens ne pouvaient aller hors labourer leur vignes ni terres, ni s’éloigner de Toulouse pour aller avec leurs marchandises, fors en grand peril, s’ils n’étaient accordés avec eux par trèves ou pâtis.”

resisting an invading army.¹⁶ Neither royal authority nor attempted diversions of companies could spare the *toulousain*.

In August, 1361, a force under the Gascon, Bérard d'Albret, joined other *routiers* to enter the city's territory. Here, for the first time, they sacked outlying towns while avoiding defended fortresses. Under the circumstances, the city's most practical response was to bribe the companies to move on by signing with them nominal alliance treaties or "ransoms" (*appatis*). Consequently, in September, 1361, Toulouse negotiated a treaty with d'Albret, by the terms of which he and his men would withdraw to the north. This provided only a short respite; during the next summer, the companies again passed through the region on the way to Spain.

The houses of Foix and Armagnac were long-term rivals for regional ascendancy in southwestern France. Their dispute over succession to the county of Comminges often served as a flashpoint for combat between them and the treaty of Brétigny further complicated matters by transforming their relationships with Valois and Plantagenet overlords. Nominal peace between the royal dynasties simply allowed these regional adversaries to concentrate their energies on their more immediate enemies.

By September, 1362, *routier* companies hired by both sides were pouring into Foix and Armagnac assembly points and a momentarily decisive engagement was fought in December at Launac northwest of Toulouse. The larger Armagnac force was crushed and the count, Jean I, captured. Exploiting his victory to the fullest, the count of Foix, Gaston Phoebus, extracted huge sums in ransoms and assured his military ascendancy for years to come. Following the battle, most of the companies withdrew or dissolved, but not until they had wreaked immeasurable havoc. In 1363, Toulouse was still paying ransom to the companies for their ill-kept promises to spare the *Toulousain*; and as late as 1367, the company of the Breton *routier*, Olivier de Mauny, still held nearby Castelsarrasin from which he terrorized the region.¹⁷

¹⁶ For an excellent general study of the great companies see Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001). Toulouse's situation was typical of much of Europe at the time. For a detailed study of what might be called the worst-case scenario, see William Caferro, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena* (Baltimore, 1998). See also "'The Fox and the Lion': The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy," in this volume.

¹⁷ Fowler, *Mercenaries*, 1:61–72. For documentary indications see CC1847, no. 7v; CC1848, no. 21; CC687, nos. 74v, 126v.

Ironically, Charles V's renewed warfare against the English in 1369 somewhat relieved the situation by recalling to military service many of the free companies. However, with the French king's death in 1380 and the regency of his successor, Charles VI (1380–1422), the problem of the free companies once again arose.

Most of the *routiers* were career soldiers from the region itself and more often than not their services were on behalf of a Foix or Armagnac partisan, even if that allegiance was discreetly cloaked. Toulouse had to navigate between the two factions to protect its interest or at least help channel the activities of the companies. It was exactly such circumstances that led the city to once again accept the "protection" of the count of Foix in 1380, in defiance of the newly appointed provincial governor, the Duc de Berry, who just happened to be the brother-in-law of the count of Armagnac. Bringing a force of over 1,000 men-at-arms into the *Toulousain*, Foix briefly took up residence on the west bank of the river and served as the city's *de facto* captain after signing an accord with the *capitouls*.

For Toulouse, this arrangement brought a modicum of peace; for Foix, control of the main routes and bridges assured access to his many landholdings in the region and allowed him to disrupt communications between Armagnac territories on either side of the Garonne. The city not only contributed generously in money and men to reinforce Gaston's troops; it even urged Charles VI to appoint him governor of Languedoc. The alliance proved especially valuable when Foix brought temporary order to the region by defeating assembled Armagnac *routiers*, first at Rabastans and later at Buzet and Corbarieu, though all of the actions carried an aura of resistance to royal authority that resulted in serious fines. Sustained royal intervention and the visit of the young Charles VI in 1389 eventually provided a twenty-year period of relative peace until the assassination of Louis d'Orleans in 1407 reopened the Armagnac-Foix struggle locally as well as the Armagnac-Burgundian struggle nationally.

The renewal of the Hundred Years War also brought on by English invasion of 1415 opened the region to new military aggression. Recurrent military insecurity manifested itself with particular force in the crisis of 1417–1419 when the count of Foix aligned himself with the Burgundians against the Armagnacs, once again backed by the crown. Internally divided between loyalists to the Foix-Burgundy and Armagnac-Valois factions, Toulouse struggled to maintain peace and order. In 1418, the city aligned itself with the Burgundians in

partial exchange for provincial tax relief. However, when the count of Foix switched sides after the assassination of Count Bernard VII of Armagnac, constable of France¹⁸ and formed a temporary alliance with the Armagnac faction, the Burgundian party in Toulouse declined in importance. After some vicious street fighting, the *capitouls* loyal to Burgundy were forced to withdraw, and when the future Charles VII (1422–1461) entered the city, it re-aligned itself with his cause.

Nevertheless, the city's new stance in national politics did nothing to change the immediate reality that the *Toulousain* would be insecure as long as the Armagnac-Foix rivalry endured and the English maintained a military presence in Bordeaux. Throughout the next several decades, Toulouse remained prey to English and Armagnac raids and continued to pay heavily in *appatis*, ransoms, taxes, men, and materiel to defend its interests in alliance with the Valois cause. There was a surge in destructiveness in 1426 when a company under the self-styled Bastard of Armagnac occupied several sites and systematically ravaged the region while the count of Foix also sent in his own hired free companies to resist them. Repeated attempts to buy the companies' departure failed; ironically, they were eliminated only by inviting the assistance of the most dreaded of all the *routier* captains, Rodrigo de Villandrando, who now entered the Toulousain for the first time.¹⁹

The middle portion of the war closed as it had begun—in a paroxysm of military anarchy. The period from 1435–1445, known as the *escourcherie*, rivaled the era of the Free Companies in its horrors. For Toulouse, the greatest threat came in the late 1430s and early 1440s when Rodrigo de Villandrando's company virtually settled down in the region, and becoming more or less active, depending on the city's ransom payments and the ebb and flow of the Armagnac-Foix struggle.

Eight decades of destructive raids, feckless national defense, and internecine struggle began to draw to a close in the third and final stage of the war. In 1442, Charles VII launched the most significant

¹⁸ Bernard VII was the leader of the Armagnac faction. As father-in-law of the dauphin, the future Charles VII, he virtually ruled the French government from 1415 to 1418. Forced out of Paris in 1418, the constable was eventually killed by his enemy, John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy.

¹⁹ See Jules Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando, l'un des combarrants pour l'Indépendance Française au Quinzième siècle* (Paris, 1879), 31–32 for a thorough discussion and full documentation.

military campaign in the region since 1355, as a result of which he was finally able to impose a settlement on the regional Armagnac-Foix rivalry. In the spring of that year, Charles mobilized an army in Toulouse that combined mercenary troops with the assembled local forces of western Languedoc. Numbering about the same as the army of the Black Prince a century earlier, this force moved slowly and destructively westward across the nominally friendly seneschalsy of Toulouse into Gascony arriving before the fortified town of Tartas in time to lift an English siege. While the campaign itself had limited military impact, Charles was emboldened to insert the crown directly in the Armagnac-Foix feud, confiscating the long disputed county of Comminges and intimidating both factions into an uncomfortable peace, after which both redirected their military energies to supporting campaigns against the English.

By 1444, the crown was able to introduce reforms that offered permanent resolution to the problems of military indiscipline. The successful creation of the famed *companies d'ordonnances* in 1445 led to the reduction in the number of men under arms within France that so astonished contemporaries effectively ended the era of the great companies. The new royal companies, including those stationed in the *Toulousain*, were not all that much better behaved than their predecessors, and their means of support was little more than a legalization of their previous extortions. Nevertheless, the absence of more widespread abuses made them relatively popular and they would soon demonstrate their battlefield superiority in the decisive campaigns of the war.

Less celebrated but arguably as important in reforming the military establishment was Charles VII's creation of the *francs archiers* infantry in 1448. It is true that neither in this form nor reconstituted and re-labeled as legions by Francis I (1515–1547) a century later did these popular levies represent a final answer to the problem of how to mobilize footsoldiers required for modern armies.²⁰ Nonetheless, they undeniably provided considerable improvement in meeting the manpower needs of the Valois state and they contributed significantly to the successful campaigns of that century and the next. These included attacks on Bordeaux in 1451 and 1453, several campaigns against the Armagnac stronghold of Lectoure, and repeated

²⁰ For a similar medieval case of such recruitment, see Manuel Sánchez Martínez, "The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona" in this volume.

invasions and brief occupations of the county of Roussillon by both Louis XI (1461–1483) and Francis.

The military reforms helped end a war that had seen far more banditry than battles in a region where noble impoverishment and popular misery assured a surplus of violent men and gave rise to a social crisis that prolonged the fighting. The return of regional peace and quiet is unmistakable after 1453, the date traditionally assigned to mark the end of the Hundred Years War. Even after the conflict ended, however, its legacy endured. The walls of Toulouse remained an ongoing project while the city continued as it had in the time of war to act in its own defense, foster order in the countryside, and support the military efforts of the crown, now directed increasingly against new foreign enemies in Italy and Spain.

III

By virtue of its geographic position, population, and political coherence, Toulouse possessed a significant military capacity, but its actual power depended upon an ability to maximize and exploit that potential. The preceding narrative has suggested that the city did so effectively during the conflicts of the later Middle Ages, thus making itself an important player in the regional balance of power. Does a closer analysis of the city's specific conduct reinforce this conclusion? We shall begin by examining some traditional aspects of military activity centered around the physical circumstances and historical traditions of Toulouse.

This great *bonne ville* of southern France had often played an important military role in its previous history. Located athwart intersecting routes between the massif central and the Pyrenees and between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic as well as near the confluence of the Ariège and Garonne rivers, Toulouse dominated crucial roads and waterways as well as fertile farmlands. Its sizeable population underscored and enhanced this strategic importance. From Roman times until the destruction of the independent county of Toulouse during the Albigensian Crusades, it exercised a regional hegemony.

When the the city's *de facto* military independence was suspended with its thirteenth century seizure by the crown, Toulouse came to embrace a peaceful subsidiary role as a provincial capital far from the major battlefields of the high Middle Ages. Once subjected to

royal authority, its walls were pulled down and its militia traditions abandoned.

Toulouse thus found itself unprotected by the crown in the many wars of the later Middle Ages and compelled to resume again the role of a regional power. It became, in the words of its governing *capitouls*, the “frontier barrier of all the country.”²¹ As military confrontations between Plantagenet and Valois, Armagnac and Foix, France and Spain ebbed and flowed, the strategic value of the city varied constantly. Moreover, the polity itself evolved between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, as circumstances transformed Toulouse from an urban entity under royal authority into an independent urban republic and then back again.

Throughout this period, the focal point of urban authority also shifted within governing elites between urban, judicial, and military authorities of *urbs*, *vigurie*, seneschalsy, and province. Regardless of all the political and military unrest, Toulouse remained important as a center for the regional command, control, and mobilization of armed force just as it was for commerce, culture, and governance. Throughout, it played a major role in regional politics, functioning as a distinct polity in a fluid political universe where armed force played a central role. With the coming of the Hundred Years War, the city reluctantly rebuilt its walls and revitalized its military traditions. Toulouse maintained and manned those walls guarding the frontier separating the forces of Plantagenet, Valois, Foix, and Armagnac. Remaining a vital source of funds, men, and material for wars elsewhere, the city provided these necessities of war for Valois campaigns against Plantagenet, Armagnac, Breton, Burgundian, and eventually Habsburg adversaries, both inside the realm and abroad.

IV

To argue that Toulouse was a military actor is not to deny that it was in some ways an inchoate and ill-directed polity. Whatever myths of community Toulousans shared, no single individual or body was authorized to command them in time of war. Throughout the Hundred Years War, the city never had either a professional garrison or a

²¹ Philippe Wolff, “Doléances de la ville de Toulouse aux Etats de Languedoc de 1438,” *Annales du Midi*, 55 (1942): 88–98: “*barriere e frontiera de tot lo pays*.”

designated military commander and it strenuously refused any suggestion that it accept one. Responsibility for defense as well as its contribution to regional, national, and international military efforts was loosely diffused among a wide range of authorities, including the region's great nobles, the city's *capitouls*, wartime theater commanders, the governor and estates of Languedoc, the seneschal, the *viguier*, and, after 1444, the *parlement* of Toulouse.

Among all these, the *capitouls* had the city's collective interest most at heart. None of their many functions was more important than the military authority vested in them as controllers of the gates and walls, paymasters of the watch, and unit commanders of the militia. They also had the advantage of permanent residence in the city as opposed to their most consistent rival for military authority, the often-absent seneschal. His role as commander of forces raised through the use of the ban and other armed contingents in the region necessarily involved him directly in the military affairs of the city.²² At the same time, these responsibilities also took him away from the city while on campaign.

A good example of conflicting authority within Toulouse can be seen at the outset of the war in 1337. When theater commanders requested supplies and artillery from Toulouse, it was the seneschal rather than the *capitouls* who issued the city's initial response, reporting that such materiel was currently unavailable.²³ At almost the same time, two *capitouls* visited these same commanders to whom they made a seemingly contradictory offer of "voluntary" support for the royal campaign, in return for certain legal considerations. Upon their return to the city, they also arranged for a public procession to be held the day after Easter to support the war effort, only to find themselves in turn challenged by the archbishop of Toulouse, who denied their authority to order any such demonstration.²⁴

Rivalries were most heated when it came to the actual mobilization and command of armed forces. In 1339, when the seneschal ordered residents of Toulouse to mobilize for active duty, the *capitouls* protested so vigorously that he was compelled not only to withdraw the order, but admit formally that his action had been in

²² See note 33 for the use of the ban in Toulouse.

²³ Accounts of the Seneschal of Toulouse 1336–7, *HGL*, X, *Prewes*, cols. 795–96.

²⁴ *Chronique de Guillaume Bardin*, *HGL*, X, *Prewes*, col. 42.

violation of the city's traditional legal privileges.²⁵ The uncertainties of authority as well as the factional and institutional rivalries of the urban elites would endure throughout the war.

Even generations later, when more than a century of bitter military experience might have established more efficiency in command structures, military policy was slow to develop and difficult to maintain. Consider, for example, the many conflicts within the city elites in 1465 when France was both involved in a foreign war in Roussillon and in the civil war of the Public Weal. Within the *parlement* of Toulouse, a bitter dispute between the president and a councilor of the court required the issuance of an injunction, ordering them both to cease and desist, threatening to use armed force (*voies de fait*) against one or both if they failed to do so.

At the same time, the *parlement* and the governor were locked in a controversy regarding the proper handling of urban unrest in nearby Carcassonne. The *parlement* became embroiled in a fight between the seneschal and *viguier* of Toulouse, when it denied the seneschal legal access to several of the *viguier's* prisoners whom he had sought to press into military service. (He forced them to accompany him on campaign in Roussillon nonetheless.) Finally, the *parlement* prevented the count of Foix from levying a forced loan on the inhabitants of Toulouse to support the Roussillon campaign, only to turn around and assume the responsibility for raising the money itself.²⁶

V

This is not to suggest that Toulouse was incapable of acting with reasonable coherence and unmistakable effectiveness. Although Toulouse was not a state in the modern sense, the city's inhabitants had shared interests and a sense of cohesion, leading to the view that they constituted a "republic." The very titles taken by the *capitouls*, unique within France, speak volumes regarding the political

²⁵ AMT, AA45, no. 7.

²⁶ All of these actions are referred to in Archives Départementales de la Haute Garonne [ADHG], B2, ff. 395–425.

pretensions of the city.²⁷ In the words of a contemporary observer, “the city prides itself on privileges so considerable and defends them so jealously that one truly can call it a republic.”²⁸

Notwithstanding the difficulties resulting from the divided sovereignties of medieval France (some of which have been treated in the previous section), Toulouse actually possessed a remarkably coherent military policy focused on consistent objectives: 1) assurance of the physical security of the city itself, 2) pacification of the countryside to allow as much rural production and commerce as possible, to be accomplished through the projection of power in the endemic, low level warfare of the period, 3) a moderate tax policy, and 4) protection of regional and national interests through diplomatic and financial means. Over the decades, every imaginable policy device was employed from the use of bribery to divert threatening mercenary forces, to the conclusion of regional military alliances, the rare mobilization of expeditionary forces, and of course, the reliable provision of men and resources for Valois armies when called upon to do so.

The omnipresence of conflict, the habits of violence, and the enduring legitimacy of resort to arms combined to insure that military engagement would pervade all aspects of urban life. Not the least of the city’s military activities therefore was the simple management and, when necessary, mobilization of public opinion. Although military success ultimately rested on the acceptance and support of the general population, the people of Toulouse often demonstrated reluctance to sacrifice their resources for war. Coercion was not unheard of but could be taken only so far. Under the right circumstances, the poor could be mobilized as, for example, when massive numbers of city workers as well as migrants from a radius of some 50 kilometers were dragooned into labor gangs for wall reconstruction.²⁹

²⁷ John Hine Mundy, *Society and Government at Toulouse in the Age of the Cathars* (Toronto, 1997), 23–24.

²⁸ Michel Taillefer, *Vivre à Toulouse sous l’Ancien Régime* (Paris, 2000), 80. As the document says, “*La ville louit de franchises si considérables et les defend avec un soin si jaloux qu’on dirait une véritable République.*”

²⁹ The specific example is from 1525 and included even the modern need to extract saltpeter for munitions, but similar undocumented mobilizations can be inferred in earlier times from the rapidity with which walls were thrown up at moments of seeming danger. Barbara B. Davis, “Poverty and Poor Relief in Sixteenth-Century Toulouse,” *Historical Reflections/Reflexions Historiques*, 17, no. 3 (1991): 284–85.

On the other hand, much of the urban population remained beyond the public authority's capacity to compel service. In such a world, the willing contributions of common folk were important. Private initiative was necessary for the stocking of food reserves to withstand a siege. Personal arms had to be maintained for the watch and militia service was indispensable to urban security. Though there was little prospect of overt resistance to official activities, passive resistance or even mere disregard was more than sufficient to cripple them. Delay or the insufficient mobilization of resources could have a major adverse effect on military policy. As a result, public officials went to great lengths to assure their compatriots of the wisdom, justice, and propriety of their actions and called upon all Toulousans to support them.

Officials had many means of communicating this message to the townspeople including most obviously sermons and speeches. According to Froissart, during the crisis years of the 1360s, the archbishop of Toulouse was a particularly powerful and persuasive spokesman, rallying opinion not only in the city, but throughout the region.³⁰ Clerical officials were in fact jealous of their authority in this area, as the previously mentioned dispute of 1337 over the ordering of processions makes clear.

The importance of public opinion was well-recognized by all members of the elite and is nicely articulated a century later when the *Parlement* sent representatives both to the town council and to other city inhabitants "... in order to explain the Kings affairs and why troops could not go on campaign without money in the hopes that "by sweet words" (*par douces paroles*) people could be persuaded to offer a loan of 4,000 *livres tournois* [*lt*]."³¹

Two propaganda devices can be particularly well studied in the case of Toulouse because of unusual surviving documentation: town criers and militia assemblies. We now think of town criers as a picturesque anachronism, but in late medieval Toulouse their announcements were the sole regular source of news and a powerful instrument for the molding of opinion. Criers visited over sixty sites for every official announcement and through this medium, officials provided information (and disinformation) about everything from mundane

³⁰ Froissart, *Chroniques*, 7:124.

³¹ ADHG, B2, f. 417.

garbage collection to melodramatic descriptions of the king's battlefield victories. The regularity of the cries taught all who could hear them that the city's enemies were theirs as well, that they lived in a violent society where control of urban and regional violence was a problem that affected their well-being, that those who posed a threat must be identified and expelled, that a disciplined martial spirit was the mark of the good citizen, and that there were times when the citizens' armed service must be called upon.³²

Supplementing these rhetorical gestures were the tangible manifestations of the city's martial traditions, found in its regular military assemblies and mobilizations. Such gatherings ranged from seemingly innocuous parades to musters and troop reviews that included the urban watch and militia, the city and seneschalsy ban, local *francs archiers* and their successors, the so-called legions, and even passing professional infantry and cavalry companies.³³ It might be argued that many such demonstrations were little more than show; however, on occasion, mobilizations could be undertaken in all seriousness.³⁴ Even when they did assume the features of mere pageantry, such events surely served to inspire and identify those available for service as well as reminding residents that they best served their own interests by meeting their military obligations to the community.

Toulouse was privileged in both the ability and the obligation to assure its own defense. By raising the necessary forces, it not only contributed to provincial and national defense, but also assured its own relative autonomy within the monarchy. Consequently, a necessary infrastructure of military preparedness was maintained at all times. Toulouse supported both a modest arms industry and an arsenal of individual arms and engines of war. Gunpowder weapons were added in due course as the arsenal was repeatedly modernized at no little expense.

³² See AMT, BB150–52, no. 156 for over 1,200 pages of cries.

³³ Innumerable examples are available including parades welcoming back victorious troops, *e.g.* AMT13, nos. 29–31, 1515 and musters of up to 20,000 men for royal entries, *e.g.* AMT, BB150–1533. The mobilizations of the city *ban* may have been unique to Toulouse. In 1472, the crown granted resident nobles the privilege of fulfilling their vestigial military obligation by mustering and serving within the city walls, AMT, AA39, nos. 19–20. A long detailed set of subsequent musters is to be found in the city's military archives, AMT, EE2.

³⁴ See, for example, discussion of the full mobilization of 1523 at a moment when a Spanish invasion was threatened, AMT, BB151 (October 1523).

However, the city's most fundamental military activity was the building and manning of the walls that assured its constitutional status as a *bonne ville* and guaranteed success in the prime objective of its military policy, the physical security of the city itself. Even if the seriousness of the threat varied from time to time, the need for defense was permanent. The city's walls were virtually impregnable; only a prolonged siege beyond the endurance of any field army likely to invest Toulouse could seriously threaten the city's security. The decision of the Black Prince to bypass the city in 1355 amply confirmed its new invulnerability and, happily, Toulouse was never again so threatened. Nonetheless, rumors of war kept the city alert as even a small force, once within the walls, could wreak havoc, a fact tragically demonstrated during the later Wars of Religion. Regular efforts were required to maintain the walls, just as constant vigilance was required to guard against their surprise.

The construction and maintenance of the walls as well as the effort put into guarding them predictably intensified in periods of perceived danger such as the passages of free companies and magnate armies or periods of civil unrest and foreign invasion. In 1345, as the Hundred Years War first heated up, Philip VI authorized the *capitouls* to rebuild the walls destroyed in 1229.³⁵ As a result, Toulouse commenced a massive program of wall construction. This consumed an enormous portion of city revenues and resources, thus coming to represent an irreplaceable legacy to be treasured. The walls were in principle financed by special taxes the most famous of which was the *soquet*, a sales tax on wine that was initially authorized for a specified period, but which by 1400 had become permanent.³⁶

It is impossible to assess the true cost of the walls because so much of their construction and maintenance depended on labor conscripted in times of emergency. Even estimating their fiscal cost is problematic. In 1408, the city estimated it at 200,000 *lt*;³⁷ a century later the estimate would have been far higher. Surviving construction contracts

³⁵ The crown letters are found in AMT, AA35, no. 62. For a nice overview of wall construction until about 1400, see Wolff, *Commerces*, 95–101; this narrative is nicely updated and extended in the more recent article by Gratien Le Blanc, "Toulouse: Les remparts du Faubourg Saint-Cyprien," *Mémoires de la société archéologiques du Midi de la France* 45 (1983–1984): 19–137.

³⁶ AMT, AA36, no. 1. Much of this set is devoted to innumerable reaffirmations of the grant across several centuries.

³⁷ AMT, FF24, no. 15v.

from the early sixteenth century suggest replacement construction costing at least 600,000 *lt*, a sum exceeding all other normal expenditures, far beyond the fortifications tax that would generate at most 15,000 *lt*/year.³⁸ In short, fortifications have to be understood as a major community investment which, despite its high cost, was regarded as a good value, since the only alternative to walls was a more expensive, and considerably less reliable, royal garrison.

During the two centuries when wall-building activity was at its height, the medieval city centered on the high ground along the right bank of the river. As a result, initial construction efforts were concentrated there. It is uncertain whether the left bank, the faubourg Saint-Cyprien, was fortified at all until decades later. Although some stone remnants of Roman and earlier medieval walls were utilized, at first the inhabitants relied largely upon earthworks and palisades, easily degraded by inclement weather. A second, more ambitious stage of construction began after the crisis of 1355 and accelerated with the intensification of conflict after 1400. At this point, construction shifted to a more stable material, dried earth blocks faced with mortar. Major floods in the 1430s demolished extensive portions of the earthen walls and construction shifted once again, this time to brick. While reconstruction slowed after 1453, the war's lasting impact inspired Toulouse to continue modernizing and extending its walls for another century. Fortunately for the inhabitants, an economic golden age that occurred during this period gave them the means to continue this costly enterprise.

Subsequent improvements in artillery, both in the quality of cannon and the projectiles gradually transformed the military circumstances of Toulouse, as it did those of every fortified point, necessitating recurrent cycles of modernization. Magnificent masonry walls were built that gradually incorporated the newer defensive styles of the gunpowder age, creating a wall that truly could confront modern artillery and resist an early modern siege. Toulouse eventually encircled itself with a curtain wall 2 meters thick and 9 meters high and a moated perimeter of over 5 kilometers punctuated by 11 gates protected by a number of towers. All told, it enclosed 140 hectares on both sides of the river.

³⁸ Dimensions of the wall and unit costs can be variously estimated on the basis of numerous construction and maintenance contracts: *e.g.* a 1481 payment to clean the moat, AMT, CC2322, a 1536 contract specifying the dimensions of the walls, AMT, 1140, and a 1543 construction contract, AMT, BB274, no. 9.

VI

Arms and walls were, of course, only as good as the men who bore and guarded them so Toulouse had good reasons to keep its military traditions alive. An organized corps of determined men was necessary if the city walls were to provide the security intended and there was an understandable emphasis by the governing elite on maintaining institutional traditions that would make emergency mobilizations possible, thereby justifying their refusal to accept a professional garrison. There was a longstanding obligation for adult males to serve and in times of great crisis, such as 1355, royal commanders did not hesitate to order a general mobilization of all men over age 14 in the city and *vigurie* for the traditional period of 40 days.

Although the *capitouls* felt free to act upon these traditions, they were generally reluctant to see the armed force they had raised used outside the walls. On the rare occasions they mobilized the city, they primarily did so for its immediate defense. Wealthy men were expected to maintain personal arms, in an emergency, it was a public obligation to make available personal or family stores as a means of preparing for a siege or other events which might isolate the city from the surrounding countryside.

Since real military crises were unusual, the *capitouls* had greater fear of civil disorder than external threat.³⁹ It was easier to assemble an armed mob than to control it; such a force could easily become as an instrument of internal division, with the potential to overthrow the governing structure.⁴⁰ Consequently, although the city could mobilize thousands of men, it rarely did so. This situation led a city chronicler to observe that any successful full mobilization was virtually miraculous.⁴¹

³⁹ Bernard Chevalier comments on the use of the militia more for domestic than external security in his *Les bonnes villes*, 124–28; see also Jean-Pierre Leguay, *La rue au moyen âge* (Rennes, 1984), 141–51 when he comments on the disproportionately violence-prone criminality of the urban labor force.

⁴⁰ For an in depth exploration of this potential, see Kevin C. Robbins, “The Social Mechanisms of Urban Rebellion: A Case Study of Leadership in the 1614 Revolt at La Rochelle,” *French Historical Studies* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 559–90.

⁴¹ M.G. Lafaille, *Annales de la ville de Toulouse depuis la réunion de la Comté de Toulouse à la Couronne: avec un abrégé de l’ancienne histoire de cette ville: et un recueil de divers titres et actes pour servir de preuves au d’éclaircissement à ces Annales*, vols. (Toulouse, 1687–1701) 2:99 and AMT, BB9, nos. 257–60, AMT, BB77, no. 389 and AMT, B274, no. 13 for descriptions and characterizations of another mobilization.

Whenever possible, the *capitouls* discreetly called up only the town militia, a body that incorporated not only the best armed, but also the most prosperous and reliable portions of the population. This militia was organized on the basis of urban districts. The eight *capitoulats* of Toulouse were further subdivided into *dizaines* of armed citizens commanded by *dizainiers* who reported to the commanding *capitouls*. Detailed documentation relating to this militia is rare, but one surviving tax roll lists 136 *dizainiers* in the eight *capitoulats*. The resulting force can be estimated as somewhere between 1,300 and 2,500 men.⁴² Finally, to establish internal security on a regular basis, the city hired a paid night-watch which grew over the years from roughly 20 to 200 men. Throughout these centuries, the inhabitants preferred the obligation to man the walls in their own defense than accept the presence of a mercenary garrison.

VII

During the Hundred Years War and its immediate aftermath came an endless series of disruptive incidents. These included the great *chevauchée* of 1355, the passages of the free companies, local conflicts such as the Armagnac-Burgundian Wars, and magnate revolts such the Praguerie of 1439, the War of the Public Weal in 1465, and the *Guerre Folle* of the 1480s and 1490s. In the midst of these repeated threats, maintaining and defending city fortifications became the primary military policy of the people of Toulouse. On the other hand, such activities did virtually nothing to promote the second most

⁴² The tax role in question comes from the sixteenth century; and here again, we can only infer that the practice far antedates the documented incident. One-hundred-and-thirty-six *dizainiers* in the eight *capitoulats* and “*hors de ville*” are listed. If one assumed *dizaine* actually meant ten this would result in a force of 1,360. But with each named *dizainier* are listed a number of men in their group totaling 8,866 who presumably are all heads of households, AMT, CC297, nos. 437, 512, 603, 697, 784, 867. The only actual muster roll of this force I can identify also comes rather late, 1575, and is only a fragment with names indicated by trade (butcher, etc.) or by group (*locataires de, heretiers de, religieux de*). Clearly the term *dizaine* had no correlation with the number ten; ten *dizaines* were listed by name of *dizainier* for a total of 345 men (192 *arquebusiers* and 152 *hallbadiers*). If the proportion of men equaled the proportion of tax liability this would be 22% of a militia of 1,725 men, AMT II76, 1575–6. On the other hand, city records for the royal entry of 1533 indicate that a militia force of 2,700 was mobilized on that occasion, AMT BB9, nos. 173–94.

important policy—rural pacification. While walls were necessary to protect the city and its inhabitants, how could Toulouse protect its interests outside of those walls? And how much success did it enjoy in this endeavor during the centuries when endemic violence disrupted agriculture and commerce?

Even though Toulouse rarely deployed armed force beyond city walls, its resources, status, and location positioned it to play a significant role in regional hostilities. The population of Toulouse waxed and waned, beginning at 35,000 before the Black Death, descending as low as 17,000 in the depths of the fourteenth century crisis, and then expanding rapidly to as much as 50,000 by the mid-sixteenth century.⁴³ Regardless of these variations, it always constituted a significant reserve of manpower.

Blessed with such a population, Toulouse could have assembled sizable units for field combat as, in fact, it had, on several occasions, in the High Middle Ages. However, such traditions of extra mural service were moribund even at the outset of the Hundred Years War. The count of Armagnac's conviction that the city's men would do no more than defend their walls when the Black Prince passed within sight of Toulouse in 1355 is suggestive. From that moment onward, the militia endured as a purely defensive institution and never ventured far beyond their fortifications throughout the Hundred Years War. When the city did, in extraordinary circumstances, contribute to an expeditionary force, its levies no longer constituted a city militia *per se*.

Although the deployment of armed force was contemplated from time to time, the option was seldom exercised. In April, 1379, the *capitouls* discussed mobilizing a force to repulse an anticipated English raid in the region, but apparently delayed doing so indefinitely.⁴⁴ Whenever such actions are documented, they appear to be modest in size and scope. For example, in the 1430s, we see repeated payments to small groups of up to 20 men to watch the roads traveled by *routiers* and resist them if possible.⁴⁵

To the extent that Toulouse used its population to project power, it did so primarily by making itself available to others as a source

⁴³ For the most recent consideration of Toulouse's population history see Jean-Luc Laffont, "Relecture critique de l'évolution de la population toulousaine sous l'Ancien Régime," *Revue d'Histoire Economie et Société* 3 (1998): 458.

⁴⁴ AMT, BB1, no. 52.

⁴⁵ AMT, CC695, nos. 91, 95v.

of recruitment. In such instances, it did its best to minimize its commitment of manpower, consistent with the reasons for allowing recruitment in the first place. In 1374, when the duc d'Anjou demanded 200 men at arms, 200 crossbowmen, and 500 infantry, the *capitouls* offered only 100 men-at-arms and 200 of all other ranks.⁴⁶ Allusive comments in chronicles and elsewhere indicate that men from Toulouse played an active role in the many campaigns of the Hundred Years War, but it is almost impossible to document most of these activities in any detail. What is more, there is no reason to think that most of the comments refer specifically to Toulousan companies rather than just individuals.

There are exceptions. In March, 1346, an army departed Toulouse to besiege Aiguillon. On that occasion, Toulouse provided 1,000 *sergens de leur ville* under the apparent command of the patrician Ysalgier brothers.⁴⁷ In 1366, a force including the *communes de Toulouse* under the command of the three Languedoc seneschals was assembled against the companies ravaging the *Toulousain*. In August, that force encountered some companies near Montech, in the vicinity of Montauban, and killed over 100 while capturing 80 and taking 500 horses. The next day, the English in Montauban counterattacked taking many prisoners including men from Toulouse.⁴⁸ In 1381–1382, Toulouse sent troops to help besiege Buzet and Corbarieu, both occupied by *rou tiers*, an action that was seen as rebellious by the crown and resulted in an expensive fine.⁴⁹

Only the creation of the *francs archiers* in 1448, very near the end of the Hundred Years War, seems to have regularized the practice of contributing city men to regional armies. The new force provided a mechanism for selected men from Toulouse to play a combat role in the final campaigns of the conflict, but no indication of how many were levied or whether they served in discreet Toulousan units exists. *Francs archiers* were mobilized and served in the conquest (1451) and re-conquest (1453) of Guienne. For decades thereafter, they continued to play a role whenever there were threats of renewed English

⁴⁶ AMT, BB1, nos. 1–2.

⁴⁷ HGL, IX:588—no source cited; probably La Faille.

⁴⁸ HGL, IX:783–85 again no source is cited.

⁴⁹ HGL, X, *Preuves*, cols. 1724 and 1749–52; financial indications are in AMT, CC688, nos. 21–27v, 32v and AMT, CC689, no. 160; The crown amnesty is in AMT, AA36, nos. 69–71.

attack.⁵⁰ They also served to good effect in the final campaigns against the counts of Armagnac on the western reaches of the seneschalsy in 1455 and again in the 1470s.⁵¹

Despite the establishment of the *francs archiers*, Toulouse did continue to take direct military action when its interests were unmistakably threatened. A good case in point came several decades after the Hundred Years War ended, during a struggle in the 1480s and 1490s for the throne of Navarre.⁵² During the summers when this conflict was raging, the city maintained special watches to assure its security and used the occasion to justify further strengthening of its walls and the replacement of wooden palisades with walls of brick. There was also a good deal of strife within the city between partisans of the two sides who came to the city when on leave from fighting. Though the city was physically secure from the spillover of this conflict, many of its residents held lands in nearby communities like Auterive that were far more directly threatened by marauding forces. Here, troops lived off the land and devastation was severe enough that years later the civil diocese of Toulouse was still levying special taxes to pay for it.

A rare intervention in these extramural events occurred in the spring of 1489 when the seneschal sent a small force from the city to nearby Auterive when it was threatened by the viscount of Narbonne's marauding force.⁵³ The record does not show how effective this gesture was, and related issues regarding such "crimes and excesses" (*malefices et excès*) were still being heard by the court in 1508.⁵⁴ Certainly, the force cannot have been as effective in diverting the viscount as payment of 6,000 *lt* with which the city council bribed him to withdraw from the area.

By the early sixteenth century, such expeditionary forces were virtually unheard of.⁵⁵ Given its relative reluctance in deploying armed

⁵⁰ Archives Départementales de l'Herault [ADH], A3, nos. 115–7 for such a mobilization in 1465; nos. 106–7 for one in 1467.

⁵¹ Henri Rament offers the evaluation in his *Histoire de Toulouse* (Toulouse, 1935), 207–11.

⁵² For a brief discussion of the impact, see Lafaille, *Annales*, 254–65.

⁵³ ADHG, B8, 48–49.

⁵⁴ ADHG, B13, 511–2.

⁵⁵ During the reign of Francis I (1515–1547), the crown appointed a legion for Toulouse and put it under the command of the city's seneschal. The force, which consisted of 1,000 men drawn from Toulouse and its environs, saw very little active service. The urban patriciate, in fact, feared such a force for fiscal and social reasons.

force to obtain its regional or even local policy objectives, Toulouse often found itself in difficult circumstances when dealing with those who used armed force to devastating effect in its vicinity. More often than not, the *capitouls* felt that their best alternative was to negotiate with rather than confront the threat, even when these forces were not formally hostile. To protect their interests, the officials of Toulouse necessarily constructed a coherent diplomacy, one key element of which was the city's ability to grant or deny entry within its walls, thereby providing or denying physical haven in time of crisis as well as access to the most important bridges across the Garonne. No less significant was the city's provision of men, materiel, and money for the support of the armed companies whether to support their regional activity in the interests of the city or simply to encourage their departure with the greatest possible rapidity. It was by such means that the city best fostered rural peace, minimized the costs of war, and advanced its political and economic interests in times of severe crisis such as the Hundred Years War.

VIII

There was never any serious doubt about the patriotism of the city; loyalty to the French monarchy was a given. Invading foreign armies like that of the Black Prince would be resisted and crown forces supported, whether commanded by the inept count of Armagnac in 1355, the resurgent Charles VII in 1442, or the expansionist Francis I in 1542. Such clear-cut demonstrations of the city's loyalty were not, however, all that common. While royal armies would be accommodated (or at least endured), decisions regarding other forces required a finer judgment on the part of the *capitouls*. How did one distinguish between legitimate private armies, irregular *routiers*, and sim-

In 1528, Toulouse's governor refused to mobilize a contingent of 10,000, saying that the region was already sufficiently defended. When such urban forces were called out, their operations often resembled more of a comic opera than a true military campaign. In 1544, for example, when Spanish incursions brought a Toulousan mobilization of 1,000 men, this small force spent some time in the field but never saw combat and ended up raiding across the Spanish Pyrenees, perhaps to compensate themselves for the expensive, but pointless military exercise. AHDG, B 13, 511-2; Archives Départementales Basses-Pyrenees [ADBP], B2027; HGL, XII:*p.j.*189; AMT, BB10, nos. 19-42; BB274, nos. 66-7; CC2408, nos. 129-83; EE120.

ple bandits? And how far should Toulouse go toward accommodating any of these? Throughout the period 1337–1453, and indeed for a century thereafter, armed men repeatedly threatened Toulouse and the countryside. Only the level of violence varied.

Considering Toulouse as a military actor, we must remember the distinctive character of late medieval warfare which was not solely, or even primarily, conducted through battles and sieges, but rather by raids, the destruction of property, and the disruption of daily life. Notwithstanding the drama of the *chevauchées* and occasional battles and sieges, the clash of arms more often than not started locally, be it in the form of an aristocratic feud over a disputed inheritance, a peasant revolt regarding access to lands, or an urban uprising provoked by any number of causes.

Undisciplined, often irregular armed force was an immutable fact of life. Worse yet, these bands were often comprised of local men and could never be definitively eradicated. On the other hand, in certain circumstances they might be managed. When such efforts at management proved inadequate, the city and its residents were left with no alternative but to reconstruct damaged property and pay ransoms for prisoners.⁵⁶ When forceful resistance either failed or was impractical, the most commonplace approach was simply to pay the enemy to move on. Such payments, typically in the form of *appatis* to *routiers* to withdraw from the *Toulousain*, date from the era of the free companies in the 1360s.⁵⁷

Sometimes, a situation arose that called for more than simple payments. In the late 1380s, when companies of *routiers* moved back into Languedoc, more than a thousand men under Guillaume de Ligneac and Gautier de Pasach settled in the region, living off the land. Theoretically, these bands were on route to a campaign in Spain via the lands of the count of Foix, who had mobilized his forces to prevent their undisciplined passage. In these dangerous circumstances, Toulouse did what it could to minimize the depredations of the *routiers*, even allowing one of the commanders to use the city as a residence and center of operations while his comrades tried to negotiate with the count of Foix for a peaceful passage. Only

⁵⁶ For a remarkable listing of ransoms see, the appendix in Wolff, *Commerces*, 65–66.

⁵⁷ AMT, CC687, nos. 74v, 126 for payments in 1363.

when the mercenary captains provided assurance of their troops good behavior did the count relent.⁵⁸

Arrangements made with irregular forces were ad hoc. Depending upon the circumstances, Toulouse selected from a range of options, ranging from forceful resistance to ransom to accommodation. On the other hand, city practices in dealing with royal armies took a more regular form. Throughout the Hundred Years War, the city offered as little as possible consistent with its duty and generally tried to negotiate a reduction in royal demands. What proved trickier, especially as the war progressed were those situations where the actions of the crown exacerbated the local feuds. The accession of Charles VI in 1380 provides a case in point. When the young king's government appointed as governor of Languedoc, the duc de Berry, brother-in-law of the count of Armagnac, the count of Foix predictably resisted. When Toulouse, which was traditionally supportive of Foix, took the count's part, these interventions came to be viewed as rebellious by the crown, resulting in an expensive fine.⁵⁹

The crises of the early fifteenth century produced even greater uncertainty provoking even more dangerously independent activity on the part of the city. In 1415, the *capitouls*, believing that a royal levy had been inappropriately authorized, went so far as to convoke an unauthorized meeting of the estates of Languedoc for the purpose of protesting to the crown. Both king and dauphin reacted forcefully, expressly prohibiting the meeting and ordering the governor to restore order and collect the tax.⁶⁰ By this time pro-Burgundian feelings apparently dominated the *capitouls* who, early in 1418, refused to acknowledge the Dauphin Charles as lieutenant of the realm.

During summer of 1418, the assassination of Bernard VII, count of Armagnac, produced a complete political reversal as the count of Foix capitalized on the local Burgundian victory by signing a treaty with the city and then winning appointment from the dauphin as the legitimate Valois commander in Languedoc. Sealing this arrangement was an astonishing, albeit brief regional alliance between the newly-appointed commander and the newly-installed count of

⁵⁸ Froissart, *Chroniques*, XIII:173–77, 184–5.

⁵⁹ AMT, CC688, nos. 21–27v, 32v and CC689, no. 160. The crown amnesty is in AMT, AA36, nos. 69–71.

⁶⁰ *HGL*, X., Preuves, cols. 1979–83: letters from King to duc de Bourbon and *Capitouls* and from duc de Berry to seneschal of Toulouse.

Armagnac. In the wake of these events, the Burgundian party within Toulouse rapidly declined.

In 1420, the political maneuvering of Toulouse seemingly bore fruit when the dauphin, having moved the *parlement* of Paris to Poitiers, also set up a *parlement* in Toulouse in an apparent bid to secure the city's recognition of his authority. Henceforth, the city's consistent policy was to remain loyal to the crown prince, the future Charles VII, as the best hope for reduced taxes, minimized military exactions, and a viable solution to the interminable warfare between Armagnac and Foix. In this way, Toulouse played a role in assuring the eventual Valois victory, even if motivated less by patriotism than mundane political expediency.⁶¹

IX

Of all the challenges Toulouse faced during the Hundred Years War and the attendant modernization of French armed forces, the most expensive in monetary terms came in supplying the military's expanding and demand for goods and services. To assemble and deliver such support eventually fostered institutional and bureaucratic innovation as the city struggled to meet the new demands levied upon it by distant ministries of the crown while at the same time continuing to support traditional local military expenditures. Beginning in the late fourteenth century, the ad hoc arrangements developed into a coherent system that served the city and, eventually, the monarchy well.

It is above all as innovative administrators of the supply system that city elites acted as a catalyst in the military revolution. Given its standing as a *bonne ville*, Toulouse rarely had to house garrisons or supply passing troops. On the other hand, it was pressed to contribute ever larger amounts to the constantly increasing needs of the royal army for men and materiel. It also served as the administrative center for the assembly and transport of troops and supplies to armies serving on the frontiers of the province or even beyond as

⁶¹ These incredibly complicated events of 1415–1420 are most fully described in HGL, IX:1029–62; Wolff, *Histoire*, 52–55 offers a more succinct and coherent narrative.

Valois ambitions expanded. After 1453, Toulouse found itself devoting relatively fewer resources to its own defense and relatively more to the defense of the realm as a whole.

As a result, its key policy objective became not the physical defense of space, but the political defense of tax privilege. The city regularly sent ambassadors to the king or his governor and representatives to the provincial estates as the *capitouls* entered into a relentless struggle to minimize their own provincial and national military obligations while, at the same time, seeking to maximize what they received from both the province and the nation for their local defense. In the words of the king who received many of these Toulousan embassies, "when there is a profit to be made in Languedoc, the people of Toulouse are there; but when there is an obligation, they declare themselves exempt."⁶² Eventually, the crown allowed Toulouse in most cases to avoid making regular military contributions, but stoutly insisted that it contribute in emergencies.⁶³

The campaign of 1542 that occurred nearly a century after the Hundred Years War, is an apt point at which to draw this discussion to a close, just as that of 1355 opened it. In that year, Francis I mobilized an army almost ten times larger than that of Charles VII in 1442, approximately 40,000 men. This army too passed through the vicinity of Toulouse before laying siege to the Catalan-held Mediterranean coastal city of Perpignan. The campaign was ill-conceived and anything but glorious in its results; what makes it of interest in this context was how slight its impact on Toulouse. The armies of late Valois France, modernized as a result of the revolutionary transformations of the Hundred Years War and its immediate aftermath, in no way threatened regional commerce and agriculture as their predecessors had. A national army could pass, local forces such as the infantry legions could be mobilized, and military resources could be assembled and transported efficiently with the full cooperation of a city like Toulouse, now comfortably integrated into the military apparatus of the monarchy.

⁶² Robert J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge, 1982), 355.

⁶³ For example, during the 1542 siege of Perpignan Toulouse initially refused support and argued that such demands constituted an unprecedented violation of its privileges. It did, of course, eventually relent when the governor insisted that such privileges were outdated in current circumstances. Characteristically, city records describe the consequent enormous expense for labor gangs, supplies, and transport as a voluntary payment in view of the king's special need.

X

To what extent was this circumstance simply the city's good fortune and to what extent was it the fitting reward for the city's astute conduct as a military actor in the Hundred Years War? In the two centuries between the 1355 *chevauchée* and the 1542 expedition, Toulouse succeeded in making itself indispensable to the defense of the realm modernizing and maintaining a military capacity and spirit effectively devoted to the protection of its own interests under the aegis of the Valois monarchy. In those years, Toulouse's military conduct is characteristic of that displayed by most *bonnes villes* of late medieval France, distinguished by their great walls, capacity for self-defense, and regional political dominance. But, while the military character of the *bonnes villes* has long been acknowledged, we have yet to fully appreciate their military role in the internal French balance of power.

Toulouse's capacity to choose to whom it would commit its military capabilities made it a force to be reckoned with. It did far more than simply negotiate the most favorable terms of its subjection to absolutism; it helped create an absolutism that best served its interests.⁶⁴ The city's tenacious loyalty to the Valois in the face of Plantagenet, Lancastrian, and Habsburg challenges as well as aristocratic defiance helped assure the survival of that dynasty into the sixteenth century and helped determine the character of its rule. Equally important, Toulouse's willingness to maintain both its own military capacity and its ability to influence how its military resources would be made available to the crown not only made it a military actor, but helped shape the character of early modern armies.


The impetus for military modernization and the attendant constitutional transformation of the late medieval monarchy came in part from below, as much the creation of the regional and urban elites of France as of the monarchy. Claims that Toulouse functioned as a sovereign power would be overblown, but it is not overstating

⁶⁴ For a recent example of scholarship that see cities as able to do no more than negotiate their terms of subjection see Wim P. Blockmans, "Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial Europe," in *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, ed. Wim P. Blockmans and Charles Tilly (Boulder, Col., 1994), 218–45. The alternative view that the monarchy in France was too weak to impose itself is most fully expressed in J. Russell Major, *From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy* (Baltimore, 1994).

the case to insist that it played a significant military role, characterized by considerable independence of action. On the other hand, despite its humanist rhetoric and remarkable potential in men and materiel, the city was no Sparta nor even a Flemish commune. There was no infantry revolution here until the crown introduced it with the creation of the *francs archiers* allowing the city to recast itself as a purveyor rather than supplier of infantry, as an administrative center for the recruitment of infantry from the foothills of the Pyrenees. So too the *trace italienne* came late to Toulouse with its wall modernization climaxing only when absolutism replaced urbanism as the solution to magnate indiscipline.⁶⁵

Toulouse seems to have been well-served by the end of one era and the beginning of another. Although the community protected its privileges at the price of its nominal republican sovereignty, this transformation was not imposed from above; the "subjection" to absolutism was self-imposed. The price of integration in the late Valois state was affordable and the resulting privileges sufficient to compensate for the sacrifice. The *capitouls* and others of the governing elite ultimately lived up to the royal faith in Toulouse that their one known battle flag declared, *Tholosanna Fides*, and the long-term policy objectives of physical security, rural peace, and manageable military expenditure were obtained in concert with the crown.

⁶⁵ The *trace italienne* was the first real adaptation of medieval fortifications to the immense influence of cannon. The new form consisted of much shorter and thicker walls with bastions strategically placed to rake all approaches with artillery fire. See Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1990), 6–13, 24–26; idem, "The 'Military Revolution, 1560–1660'—A Myth?" in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder, Col., 1995), 41–41; Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics* (Baltimore, Md., 1997), 158–64.



Map 18. Medieval Toulouse.

THE INVOCATION OF *PRINCEPS NAMQUE* IN
1368 AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE
CITY OF BARCELONA

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One of the prime duties of medieval kings was the protection of the realms they held. In Catalonia, this crucial responsibility was linked from the twelfth century onward to article sixty-four of the land's traditional law, the *Usatges of Barcelona*.¹ Catalonia's national defense clause, known by its incipit *Princeps namque*, mandated a general mobilization of all the inhabitants (“whether they be from the king's men, the prelates or ecclesiastical persons, barons, knights, townsmen, or villagers”) when the Principate was threatened by a foreign enemy.²

The invocation of this national defense clause differed from the summons of the feudal army composed of all those bound to render military service from their feudal ties as vassals. *Princeps namque* was also unlike the royal vicar's host which allowed the monarch or a vicar in his name to call out troops, but only within the royal patrimony.³ Naturally, the remission of such duty and the consequent

¹ *Usatges de Barcelona: El codi a mitjan segle*, ed. Joan Bastardas (Barcelona, 1984), 102–3 (art. 64); *The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), 80:

Princeps namque si quolibet casu obsessus fuerit, vel ipse idem suos inimicos obsessos tenuerit, vel audierit quemlibet regem vel principem contra se venire ad debellandum et terram suam ad succurrendum sibi monuerit, tam per litteras quam per nuncios vel per consuetudines quibus solet amoneri terra, videlicet per fars, omnes homines, tam milites quam pedites, qui habeant etatem et posse pugnandi, statim ut hec audierint vel viderint, quam cicius potuerint ei succurrant. Et si quis ei fallerit de iuramine quod in hoc sibi facere poterit, emendet ei fallimentum et deshonorem quem ei facerit, cum avere et sacramento manibus propriis iurando, quoniam nemo debet fallere ad principem ad tantum opus vel necessitatem.

² Arxiu de la corona d'Aragó [ACA], Cancilleria real, R. 1519, f. 155. See appendix document 1. Since Catalonia was never ruled by a king by rather by the count of Barcelona who was also referred to as a “prince” (*princeps*) and his jurisdiction a “principate” (*principatus, principat*). *Usatges*, trans. Kagay, 34–38.

³ There are more than evident similarities between the general mobilization that *Princeps namque* brought about with the French *arrière-ban* and in a certain way with

transformation of military service into a monetary sum which a community paid to the monarch was a well-known and -documented practice from the thirteenth century onward. The uniqueness of *Princeps namque* lay in the fact that, once the king invoked it, it would be in force for all Catalan territory and have authority over all of its individual jurisdictions. For this reason, when individual towns, clerics, or nobles wanted to negotiate changes to service due under *Princeps namque*, they normally had to do so in a parliament (*corts*).

Princeps namque retained its importance both because of its universal applicability and its adaptable nature that allowed the sovereign to undermine certain noble rights. During the later Middle Ages, the national defense clause was considered a “royal right” (*regalia*), or more exactly, one of the most well known and important prerogatives enjoyed by the count of Barcelona. Several jurists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries confirmed this position.⁴ According to these experts, the ruler could invoke the article whenever he thought it right to do so without the need to gain parliamentary consent.⁵

Princeps namque had the distinctive characteristic of applying to all Catalan territory and not just that belonging to the crown. With it, royal officials could convoke “hosts” (*hosts*) inside lay and ecclesiastical lordships. They could collect money for commutation of military service and could also impose penalties for failure to observe

the general *cavalcade* of Provence. See Philippe Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1972), 26–38; Michel Hèbert, “Aux origines des États de Provence: la ‘cavalcade’ générale,” *CX Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes, Montpellier, 1985* (Paris, 1986), 3:53–68. It would be worthwhile in the future to compare the similarities and significant differences of these institutions. In respect to the *arrière-ban*, its most obvious contrast with *Princeps namque* is rooted in the fact that, according to Contamine, its “golden age” took place between 1302 and 1356. After this, the French monarchs found other more efficient means—the product of the new fiscal system of the state—to pay the troops. On the contrary, in Catalonia the golden years of *Princeps namque* began precisely in 1360, just when a new financial system was being built outside the monarch’s control.

⁴ *Usaticus hec est insignis regalia principis Cataloniae et comitis Barchinone*. See *Commentaria Jacobi de Marquilles super usaticis Barchinone* (Barcelona, 1505), f. 199. For his part, Jaume de Montjuïc considered it “particularly significant for the lord king, exercising great support for his office, interest, and protection.” See *Antiquiores Barchinonensium leges, quas vulgus usaticos appellat cum comentariis . . . Jacobi a Monte Judaico, Jacobi et Guielermi a Vallesicca et Jacobi Calicii [ABL]* (Barcelona, 1544), f. 223v.

⁵ Several important Catalan legists, including Jaume de Montjuïc, Jaume and Guillem Vallseca, and, especially, Jaume de Marquilles, produced excellent commentaries on the national defense clause delineating when it could be invoked, who could set it in motion, who was obliged to serve, etc.

these regulations. As Pere III “the Ceremonious” (1336–1387) said to his officials in December, 1374, penalties resulting from non-fulfillment of the national defense clause should be assessed even

in those places where we do not have jurisdiction, for even though the jurisdiction of these places belongs to others, yet it is the nature of the said article that by our royal right we can levy the same tax in the other places that we do in those sites subject to our jurisdiction.⁶

Because of mounting expenses of the fourteenth-century royal court and government, Pere desperately attempted to gain financial independence (what might be called “fiscal space”) that was protected against parliamentary influence and controlled directly by the crown and its officials. By considering the invocation of the *Princeps namque* article as a royal right and the re-establishment of ancient custom, Pere would consistently try to establish a new royal fiscal system in the 1360s at precisely the moment when he was losing full control of Catalonia’s financial apparatus.⁷ Because the *corts* of this era attempted on more than one occasion to limit the frequent use of the national defense clause, *Princeps namque* stood in the middle of a political controversy that would have significant repercussions far beyond the operations of the exchequer.

It is the purpose of this paper to closely investigate the gradual transformation of *Princeps namque* from a military duty into a tax, modeled after the “hearth tax” (*fogatge*), that was paid by the urban and rural communities of Catalonia.⁸ It will focus on 1368 since this year represents a principal landmark in the process of transformation. Successive changes in the way the clause was invoked ultimately achieved much more efficient military service, but this was accomplished by converting that service into a simple *fogatge*.⁹ This line of

⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1520, f. 37v.

⁷ This is not the place to discuss in detail why this hypothesis came into being. In any case, I have worked with several members of a research team on a project entitled “Power and Fiscal Affairs in Catalonia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries” (PB 98–0478). In this project, I specifically focused on the fiscal system of the crown and the state, especially between 1360 and 1390 which has allowed me to present a coherent synthesis of the period.

⁸ For the *fogatge*, an impost assessed on each *fòch* or hearth, see Josiah Cox Russell, *Medieval Regions and their Cities* (Newton Abbot, 1972), 166–68.

⁹ I have repeated on more than one occasion that only the simultaneous use of both types of documentary material allows one to understand in its complex entirety the fiscal relations between the crown and the towns. See Manuel Sánchez Martínez, “Fiscalité royale et fiscalité municipale en Catalogne (XIV^e siècle),” in *La fiscalité des*

investigation will permit us to observe in a small way the repercussions of *Princeps namque* in urban matters. Our study will carefully compare the documentation preserved in the *Archivo de la Corona de Aragón* with that emanating from the municipality of Barcelona. Especially useful in this regard are the royal chancellery registers, 1519 and 1520, that contain summons of *Princeps namque* between 1361 and the end of the fourteenth century. This article will also look at the *corts* of 1368 in which the national defense “settlement” was worked out.¹⁰ Municipal records will provide information concerning the impact of military mobilization on the finances by using the references for 1368–1369 contained in the book of the “treasury” (*clavaria*). Finally, this article will attempt to assess the level of compliance with the summons to military service exhibited by the population of Barcelona, using for this purpose the extant registers of receipts that were issued to combatants and then recorded by town officials.

I

The invocation of the *Usatges* article in medieval times has not been well studied; the entire process of exchange of service for money is even less understood.¹¹ We can say, with some certainty, that before 1360, there were at least four invocations of the article when foreign invasion threatened Catalan territory. These occurred in 1285 in connection with the French war; in 1344 and 1347 because of the struggle with the king of Majorca, and in 1359 when the Castilian fleet attacked Barcelona.¹² Before 1368, all the invocations of the

villes au Moyen Âge, ed. D. Menjot and Manuel Sánchez Martínez 2 vols. (Toulouse, 1996), 1:135–36.

¹⁰ *Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y principado de Cataluña* [CAVC], ed. Fidel Fita y Colomé and Bienvenido Oliver y Estreller, 27 vols. (Madrid, 1896–1922), 3:1–38; 15:152–79. Concerning the grant made by this *Cortes*, see Manuel Sánchez and P. Orti, *Corts, parlaments i fiscalitat a Catalunya. Els capítols del donatiu (1288–1374)* (Barcelona, 1997), 409–22 (doc. 23).

¹¹ In the little-used work of Jaime Peres Unzueta, *El sometent a través de la Història* (Barcelona, 1924) provides a sizeable number of documents and archival references concerning the different summonses of the *sometent general* which he attributes to *Princeps namque*.

¹² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 61, ff. 107v–108; Bernat Declot, *Crònica* in *Les quatre grans cròniques* [QGC], ed. Ferran Soldevila (Barcelona, 1971), 535 (chap. 139); Bernat Desclot, *Chronicle of the Reign of King Pedro III of Aragón*, trans. F.L. Critchlow, 2 vols.

clause were connected with the steady stream of mercenary troops passing into Catalonia from France during a lull in the Hundred Years War. With this massive incursion of the Free Companies into the Pyrenean counties during 1361–1362, Pere was forced to use the clause on several occasions. He did the same in 1363 to defend Roussillon; in 1365, to protect the Catalan littoral from the Castilian fleet, and yet again in 1366, to deny mercenary companies free entry through northern Catalonia.¹³

From the end of the 1360s, the Spanish realms were increasingly caught up in the Hundred Years War. For Catalonia, this meant escalating royal reliance on *Princeps namque*. After the defeat of Enrique II de Trastámara (1369–1379) at Nájera (April, 1367) and the reestablishment of Pedro I (1350–1369) on the Castilian throne, Pere III was fearful that war would again consume his realms.¹⁴ Influenced by an anti-Trastámara faction in his court, Pere took the risky course of changing sides. He broke with Enrique and made peace with England. After lengthy negotiations with the English commander, the Black Prince, Pere signed a peace treaty with the prince shortly before he evacuated the peninsula in late August, 1367.¹⁵

(Princeton, N.J., 1928–1934), 1:235–36; Pere III, *Crònica* in *QGC*, 1087, 1134 (chap. 3: no. 194; chap. 6, no. 22; Pere III, *Chronicle*, trans. Mary Hillgarth, ed. J.M. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 1:376; 2:523; E.G. Bruniquer, *Rúbriques de Bruniquer: Ceremonial dels magnífichs consellers y regiment de la ciutat de Barcelona*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1913), 2:225; Donald J. Kagay, “*Princeps namque*: Defense of the Crown and the Birth of the Catalan State,” *Mediterranean Studies* 8 (1999): 66–72.

¹³ In 1361, the first and most important “interpretation” (*interpretatio*) of *Princeps namque* took place as the result of the protest headed by Bernat de Cabrera. A commission, composed of the members of three parliamentary estates and six jurists, decided that the article could be legitimately invoked by the king, even though the military forces were commanded by a captain and not by “a king or prince” as the text of the *Usatges* prescribed. ACA, *Cancillería real*, R. 1519, ff. 41–43; *Comentaria Jacobi de Marquilles*, f. 200. For the other summonses, see ACA, *Cancillería real*, R. 1519, ff. 53v–95. The defense of the western regions in 1361–1365 has been analyzed by J.R. Julia Viñamata, “Defensa y avituallamiento de los castillos del Rosellón y la Cerdaña en la segunda mitad del s. xiv,” *Acta Historica et Archaeologica Medievalia* 9 (1988): 281–310; Donald J. Kagay, “The ‘Treasons’ of Bernat de Cabrera: Government, Law, and the Individual in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon,” *Mediaevistik* 13 (2000): 44–45; idem, “*Princeps namque*,” 72–75.

¹⁴ For the battle of Nájera, see L.J. Andrew Villalon, “Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera,” in this volume.

¹⁵ Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Los ingleses en España (s. XIV),” *Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón* 4 (1951): 230–56; P.E. Russell, *English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward II and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955), 83–126; Luis Suarez Fernández, “Castilla (1350–1406),” in *Historia de España*, ed. Ramon Menendez Pidal, 37 vols. (Madrid, 1963–1984), 14:112–20.

At almost the same moment, Enrique, who had rebuilt his army with French aid, returned to Castile to recover his throne. Pere now opposed the return of his former ally by invoking *Princeps namque* in September, 1367. Enrique successfully crossed the Pyrenees and arrived at Calahorra before the end of September.¹⁶ Two months later, Enrique and Pere sent their envoys to Tarbes in an attempt to bring an end to their peninsular disputes. Shortly afterwards, Aragonese ambassadors left for London to engage in diplomatic discussions with Edward III (1327–1377). These activities greatly disturbed the French sovereign, Charles V (1364–1380), who, perhaps to intimidate the Aragonese sovereign, allowed Free Companies to pass through the Vall d’Aran.¹⁷ In response, Pere immediately invoked *Princeps namque* “because foreigners are entering in a great multitude through the Vall d’Aran and Pallars.”¹⁸ On January 2, 1368, Pere rescinded the earlier summons to clerics and barons since the invaders had by then left Aragonese and Catalan territory. In March and April of the same year, in the face of new mercenary threats from the north, the king again had to alert his Catalan subjects to make preparations to muster out for the national defense.¹⁹

II

In early August, 1368 in response to the many crises that had arisen throughout the decade, a Catalan *corts* gathered at Barcelona. Several

¹⁶ After ordering the governor of Roussillon among others to resist Enrique II on September 6, 1367, the king then proceeded to issue “the convocation and summons because of the *Usatges* article *Princeps namque*”, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 96–102. For the Trastámaran king’s invasion of Catalan and Aragonese territory, Pere III, ed. Soldevila, 1152–53 (bk. VI; chap. 62); Pere III, trans. Hillgarth, 2:580–81; Jeronimo Zurita y Castro, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Angel Canellas López, 9 vols. (Zaragoza, 1967–1985), 4:568–71 (bk. 9, chap. 62); Gutiérrez de Velasco, 257–60; Russell, *English Intervention*, 128–31.

¹⁷ For French political background of this decision, see John Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996), 44–45; F. Autrand, *Charles V le Sage* (Paris, 1994), 491–518.

¹⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 115–8. On December 26, 1368, the Ceremonious communicated his intention of going to Cervera and of advancing from there to the territory of Huesca. His letters, sent to the Aragonese *sobrejunteros*, the governor of Aragon, and the nobles of the realm, instructed that they take part in the defense of their lands. For letters, see R. 1519, ff. 105–6, 110r–v.

¹⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 115v–18.

items appeared on the agenda, including the question of how to stem the revolt of the judge of Arborea in Sardinia, a recurring Aragonese problem throughout the later fourteenth century.²⁰ On August 27 as the parliamentary session began, the king also alerted the assembly concerning rumors that Bertrand Du Guesclin (d. 1380), was at the point of invading Catalan and Aragonese territory. The future constable of France had already crossed the Rhone at the head of a large force.²¹

The *corts* temporarily tabled its discussion of Sardinian affairs and concentrated on finding a way to defend the Principate from this threat posed by the French constable. For his part, Pere wanted to invoke *Princeps namque* to mobilize troops in northern Catalonia. The delegates resisted, bringing to their sovereign's attention the problems involved in such an action:

The activation of the article (as experience has often shown) does great damage to the people of the Principate since by the article's invocation both horsemen and foot soldiers have to present themselves. This does not provide the Republic . . . with a better defense. . . . Many of those who answer the call for defense are not trained in war or in the use of arms, they merely consume the supplies and waste the property of the lord king's subjects.²²

To the onerous responsibility that *Princeps namque* imposed on all subjects, there was added its inability to adequately defend Catalonia. The weakness sprang from the fact that many of those summoned

²⁰ CAVC, 3:1–12; 15:153–66. For Sardinian rebellion, see, David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, 1200–1500* (London, 1997), 123–28, 180, 183.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3:12; 15:166. To the threat represented by Du Guesclin, there had to be added that of the count of Foix. According to the documentation from the Barcelona assembly, the immediate reason for Du Guesclin's incursion was to file suit before the Aragonese king to settle a dispute he had with the English knight, Hugh de Calveley, over a large debt to be paid back to the future constable of France. Concerning this matter, see Gutiérrez de Velasco, 309–14; Kenneth A. Fowler, "Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIV^e siècle: Bertrand Du Guesclin and Sir Hugh Calveley," in *Le combattant au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1995), 243–56; *idem*, "The Wages of War: The Mercenaries of the Great Companies," in *Viajeros, peregrinos, mercaderes en el Occidente medieval* (Pamplona, 1992), 217–44; *idem*, "L'emploi des mercenaires por les pouvoirs ibériques e l'intervention militaire anglaise en Espagne (vers 1361–vers 1379)," in *Realidad e imágenes del poder: España a fines de la Edad Media*, ed. A. Rucquoi (Valladolid, 1988), 23–55.

²² CAVC, 3:12: *sed, quia convocatio ipsius usatici, prout facti experientia multociens demonstravit, est multum damnosa gentibus dicti Principatus, pro convocacione cuius omnes homines tam equites quam pedites accedere habent nec propter hoc res publica dicti principatus melius deffenditur cum plures qui, pro dicta deffensione, accedunt non sint apti in deffensione nec armati prout decet, immo vastant victualia et depredantur bona subditorum ipsius domini regis.*

were not fit for combat nor did they come with suitable weapons and equipment. They also presented serious problems to public peace. To avoid these disadvantages, the sovereign suggested to the *corts* that, if it were necessary to invoke the clause, the parliamentary estates should agree to change the general mobilization into a monetary grant that would pay for a limited number of trained and suitably armed men.²³ In late September, 1368, after deliberating for a month, the three estates fully accepted the royal proposal and pledged that, whenever *Princeps namque* was invoked, they would vote a subsidy to support “a certain number of men to defend Catalonia . . . as provided for by the parliamentary estates.”²⁴ After making this general grant, the *corts* established a commission of nine persons, three from each estate, to make recommendations and prepare permanent ordinances.²⁵

The text of this “settlement” has been preserved. The noble estate negotiated one agreement with the crown, while the clergy and townsmen hammered out another.²⁶ All of the estates, however, offered one “soldier” (*cliens, serviens*) for each twenty hearths. After some days of wrangling, the members of the assembly lowered this ratio to one combatant for each fifteenth hearths. They issued this formal agreement

for the aid which all residents of the Principate of Catalonia have to render to the king and in the defense of the said Principate by reason of the *Usatges* article *Princeps namque* in case the said article is in force.²⁷

The mobilized contingent provided for in the settlement would be composed of infantry, half of whom were “crossbowmen” (*ballesteres*) and the other half, “shieldmen” (*empavesats*). The ordinances of the noble estate reduced the number of crossbowmen to a third of the total. Each of these ranks of combatants would possess very specific

²³ *Ibid.*, 3:12; 15:166–67.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 3:15; 15:172–73.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3:16; 15:173. This commission was composed of the dean of Urgel, the archdeacon of Vich, and Brother Guerau de Pomar of the Order of the Hospital for the ecclesiastical estate; Pere Galceran de Pinós, Joan Berenguer de Rajadell and Pauquet de Bellcastell for the noble estate; and Pere Bussot (syndic of Barcelona), Antoni de Navés (Lerida), and Ermengau Martí (Perpignan) for the urban estate.

²⁶ For the chapters of the noble estate, see *ibid.*, 3:16–17. For those of the Church and the towns, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 126–31.

²⁷ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, f. 132.

weaponry and equipment. “Shieldmen” were to wear “upper body armor” (*espatleres, jubet*) with a “helmet” (*bacinet, cervellera*) and carry a lance, body shield, sword, and knife. In addition to their principal weapon, every crossbowman had to carry forty-eight bolts. He also had to wear a cuirass, upper body armor, and a helmet. As an example of how the settlement was supposed to work: Barcelona, with 6,568 hearths, had to furnish 437 foot soldiers and pay each a daily salary.²⁸ A copy of this document, dated December 2, 1368, a copy of which was also in the Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona, was edited by Antonio de Capmany y de Montpalau, *Memorias histórico sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1962), 291–91 (doc. 196). It was cited by Martín de Riquer. *L'arnès del cavaller. Armes i armadures catalanes medievals* (Barcelona, 1968), 75. Since the remainder of dividing 6,568 hearths by 15 is thirteen and the daily salary of a foot soldier was 2 *sous*, the result of this process was 1 *sou*, 9 *diners* per day. Since the service would last a month, the commissioner would receive from Barcelona the sum of 52 *sous*, 5 *diners* to disperse.

The settlement had time limits. For the clerical and urban estates, it would be in force for six months; for the noble estate, it would last only until the following Christmas (less than three months). The assessment was made in line with the *fogatge* of 1360 which had been approved in the *corts* of Cervera of 1359 and revised in 1365. These earlier assessments, however, had only applied to several cities and villages within royal territory. By the new arrangement, the provision of troops would be allocated in the following way: for every fifteen hearths in a community, the inhabitants were required to provide one combatant; if this number was not exactly divisible by 15, then residents would have to pay a further cash settlement at the rate of 2 *sous*-per-day for each combatant.²⁹

In mid-October, 1368, the *corts* began to mobilize forces according to this formula. The assembly appointed “vicars” (*veguers*) who would make “public announcements” (*cridas*) and summon the combatants to the village of Figueres. The *corts* also appointed several

²⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 147r–v: *quel pillatge e reemço de ço que cascun pendrà de sia seu entegrament.*

²⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, f. 154v: *per ço que li toca segons los fochs que han e quaix en cascun se escaen alguns diners, per ço com no.ls vé a compliment de servent comptant servent a IIs.*

commissioners for each vicarate to collect the cash settlements and hire more soldiers with these funds.³⁰ Using the *fogatge* records of 1360–1365 and the 1368 settlement, the parliamentary officials could calculate in advance the number of combatants-per-hearth in each vicarate and the amount of additional money that would be generated through the cash settlements. These officials immediately sent a list of figures to each vicar so the mobilization might begin. The parliamentary vicars and commissioners would eventually send a memorandum to the royal “scribe of accounts” (*escrivà de ració*). This document contained the number and names of the mobilized combatants as well as the sum of money they had collected. This provided a means of checking on the number of soldiers carrying out military service.³¹

The records of the 1368 settlement reveal significant changes in the way soldiers were mobilized. A force raised through *Princeps namque* was totally under royal jurisdiction; by contrast, that of 1368 was financed by a sizeable parliamentary grant and was recruited and organized by the commissioners who operated outside of royal control.

III

There is little evidence that the new settlement was actually implemented. Pere managed to negotiate an agreement with Du Guesclin’s representatives, heading off the threatened invasion of Catalonia. This temporarily rendered unnecessary the new defensive organization provided for in the *corts* of 1368.³²

³⁰ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 132–142: see appendix document 1. The commissioner charged with collecting money in the vicarate of Barcelona was Pere Vicens. “Supervising the accounts of the Diputació,” Pere Vicens stood as the administrator of the grant conceded in March, 1369 by the clerical and urban estates in the *Corts* of Barcelona. Perhaps for this reason, he was later relieved of his post as commissioner for *Princeps namque* and Pere Ermengol was substituted for him [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, d. 159v].

³¹ Concerning the role of the vicar in the mobilization of urban militias, see F. Sabaté Curull, “El veguer a Catalunya. Anàlisi del funcionament de la jurisdicció reial al segle XIV,” (Ph.D. diss., Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1995), 536–50, 945–55.

³² For this agreement, confirmed on October 17, 1368, in which the king promised to pay Du Guesclin 45,000 *doblas* in exchange for the service of the force in Cerdanya, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1346, ff. 99–104.

It would not take long, however, for the new arrangement to re-emerge. In order to depose Pedro, the French king, Charles V, wanted to totally eradicate the pro-Pedro faction in Castile; consequently he dispatched Du Guesclin into the peninsula. As Russell has observed, the French ruler did not take the trouble to ask his Aragonese counterpart permission for the Breton captain and his men to cross the northern realms of the Crown of Aragon, since such permission would surely have been withheld. Therefore, from the middle of November, 1368, the Free Companies under Du Guesclin began to stream across Pallars and Val d'Aran. They "burnt, laid waste, and damaged" (*creman, talan e damnifican*) while Pere, respecting the truce with Pedro and the Black Prince, attempted measures to defend his frontiers against them. During late December, part of the mercenary force deeply penetrated into Pere's territory through Noguera Pallaresca. Here, it laid siege to Tremp. After capturing the village, the mercenaries plundered the entire district. Continuing their march to the south, they arrived at Agramunt, threatening the village of Cervera where Pere had gathered troops to oppose them.³³

In February, 1369, Du Guesclin rejoined Enrique de Trastámara in hopes of delivering a critical blow against Pedro I. Despite Du Guesclin's removal from Aragonese territory, Pere maintained his defensive stance. Eventually, the Aragonese sovereign had the humiliating duty of confessing to the Black Prince and Pedro that his own military weakness and the complicity of several of his courtiers who favored the French had allowed Du Guesclin's uncontested passage through Catalan and Aragonese territory.³⁴

Meanwhile, in fall, 1368, when the danger posed by the Free Companies had reached its peak, Catalan defensive operations, suspended a month earlier, were set in motion once again. The crown ordered the vicars to carry out an immediate mobilization of "foot soldiers" (*servents*) in accordance with the *Princeps namque* settlement.³⁵

³³ Russell, *English Intervention*, 140–41; Suárez Fernández, "Castilla," 127–28. For capture and sack of Tremp, see Jerónimo Zurita y Castro, *Anales de la corona de Aragón*, ed. Angel Canellas López, 9 vols. (Zaragoza, 1967–1985) 4:583–84 (X:ii); M. Lledós i Mir, *Historia de la antigua villa, hoy ciudad, de Tremp* (1917; reprint, Tremp, 1977), 95, 104–5. As if he were discussing terrible *sans-culottes*, the author referred to "gangs of revolutionaries coming from France" and the "mob of thugs" who sacked the village.

³⁴ Russell, *English Intervention*, 142.

³⁵ For the royal order to the vicar of Barcelona and Vallès, see ACA, Cancellaría real, R. 1519, ff. 142r–v. The mustering place for the troops would be Tremp,

At the same time, he instructed the collectors of the cash payments to begin their work. Once the proper assessments were determined, the commissioners then had to collect the full amount within ten days. With this money, they would hire more troops—as provided, half of them crossbowmen and the other half, shieldmen.³⁶

A few days before Pere left Barcelona to confront the Free Companies, the *corts* offered each urban site that had to supply infantry according to the new settlement the possibility of supplying cavalry instead. To accomplish this, the assembly initially established three ranks of “men-at-arms” (*hòmen d’armes*) and specified the daily wage for each. “A man whose body and horse were armored” (*hom armat de cors e de cavall*) was to be paid 7 *sous*; “a man armed from head to toe with a lightly-armed horse, pack animal, or mule” (*hom armat de cap a peus ab cavayl, roci o mul alforrat*), 5 *sous*; and “a man whose body was armored by a cuirass, gorget, helmet, gauntlets, along with a mount” (*armat de cors ab cuyraçes, gorjal, capellina, mànagues o braçals ab cavaladura*), 4 *sous*.

Transforming the body of foot soldiers owed by each site into the various ranks of men-at-arms was facilitated by the following scale: the first-class combatant (the one paid 7 *sous*) would be worth three-and-a-half foot soldiers; of the second class combatant paid 5 *sous* was the equivalent of two-and-a-half foot soldiers; and the third class warrior paid 4 *sous* equaled two foot soldiers. Each of these new soldiers would be permitted retain all his booty as well as any profit derived from the ransom of prisoners.

With these military preparations in place and after proroguing the *corts* for fifteen days, Pere left Barcelona in early December. He then traveled to Cervera which he hoped to use as a headquarters for operations against the Free Companies.³⁷

Despite these careful preparations, from the beginning, the sovereign nevertheless apparently harbored serious doubts about the efficacy

although mustering point for the forces mobilized in vicarates of Roussillon and Cerdanya as well as the subvicariate of Vallespir was to be Tírvia [ACA, Cancelleria real, R. 1519, ff. 143v–144v].

³⁶ For the commission of P. Vicens in the vicariate of Barcelona and Vallès, see ACA, Cancelleria real, R. 1519, ff. 144v–145.

³⁷ The assembly was prorogued on December 6, 1368. For this postponement, see *CAVC*, 3:28. For the order to the vicar of Barcelona and Vallès to muster soldiers at Cervera, see ACA, Cancelleria real, R. 1519, f. 149.

of the new military arrangement. On December 8 he wrote from Cornellà to an official in the viscounty of Cabrera, confessing that

we have left Barcelona with very little money. There are clear signs that the aid owed is going to be delayed and we worry about how more money can be raised; for if the said Companies continue their march to the south, our men will have to fight them and we are with the only force we have jurisdiction over.³⁸

Immediately after this, the king ordered Pere Ermengol (the substitute-tax commissioner in the vicarate of Barcelona-Vallès) to offer all those places obliged to supply at least five foot soldiers the option of commuting this duty for money, at the usual rate of two *sous* per day for each combatant. With funds collected in this way, Ermengol would then proceed without delay to hire soldiers who had to be “good and battle-hardened as well as fit and experienced in the use of weapons” (*bons e bé arreats e tals que sien aptes e bons a exercici d’armes*). Such men had to be either “gentlemen” (*hòmens de paratge*) or “vil-lagers” (*hòmens de vila*) who knew how to ride a horse.³⁹

When Pere arrived at Cervera, he was severely disappointed because of the paltry number and unpreparedness of the assembled troops. Given the fact that “it would be better to have a large number of horsemen armed from head to toe than to have foot soldiers,” on December 15 Pere ordered Commissioner Ermengol to force all the sites in his vicarate (not just those bound to provide five foot soldiers) to supply funds to hire horsemen.⁴⁰ The responsibility of recruiting combatants was thus transferred from each urban council back to royal officials. As a result, military service took on a much clearer form since communities were limited to paying the required sums to a different group of commissioners who were entrusted with the duty of seeking out the best men-at-arms.

³⁸ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 150r–v.

³⁹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 151–52.

⁴⁰ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 159v–160. Since it was very easy to find horsemen in the city of Barcelona, Pere instructed all of tax commissioners of the various vicarates to turn over the money coming from the commutations to P. Ermengol.

IV

When the Free Companies gravely endangered the town of Cervera, the severe limitations of the parliamentary settlement became increasingly apparent. The number of combatants anticipated from the terms of the settlement did not materialize nor was their service carried out within the specified time-period. Therefore, in desperation, the king decided to rescind the settlement and, in an attempt to gather an adequate force, he simply re-invoked *Princeps namque*. In this manner, he called out all Catalans that were bound to render customary service and threatened to impose the penalties contained in the *Usatges* if they refused to do their duty.⁴¹ The circle was thus complete. The inefficiency of the general mobilization outlined in *Princeps namque* had originally led to the settlement of 1368 that specified a certain number of combatants would be provided from a prescribed number of hearths. Unfortunately, the poor fulfillment of this agreement forced the king once again to fall back on the old and often ineffective procedures embedded in the national defense clause.

Letters from the last dramatic days of 1368 reveal Pere's frantic efforts to gather the largest force the letter of *Princeps namque* would allow. Several documents also reflect the king's bitterness at the poor turnout of warriors at Cervera. Reluctantly, he had to confess that he could not free the crown from the use of mercenary troops. On Christmas day, the sovereign wrote to the vicars of Roussillon and Conflent, informing them that the Free Companies were only three leagues from the village of Cervera. In this letter, he complained bitterly.

⁴¹ For royal letter to the "town councillors" (*consellers*) of Barcelona and all the vicars of the Principate, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 155–156 [Appendix document 2]. On December 20, the king ordered the host to leave Barcelona [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 101r–v], even though a few days later he wrote the queen, telling her he only needed 1500 men from the Catalan capital. Thus, once the host had been mobilized, the town councillors would chose this number from the better armed troops and "men of the honest poor" (*hòmens de verguonya*) and the rest of the force would return to Barcelona [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1222, ff. 105v–106]. Yet on December, 26, Pere urged the queen to pressure the Barcelona host to leave the city. Whether she had done this or not, it is doubtful that she could have influenced the hosts from the other Catalan sites to commence their journeys to the capital [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1222, ff. 110r–v].

Although we have been here for twelve days making preparations to attack them, they have now assaulted us. We cannot do anything about it and this has brought great danger and dishonor to us and all of our nation . . . This happened because of the great delay engaged in by our officials and by the men who are bound to help us. . . . They know we are here in the jaws of our enemies and yet they have not made a move to do their duty.⁴²

When the danger from the Free Companies finally passed in the middle of February as many returned to Gascony, Pere discharged the small force gathered at Cervera.⁴³ From this period until mid-June, 1369, a number of documents contained in registers 1519 and 1520 refer to the collection of cash penalties from those who had not fulfilled their military service, had done so only in a partial way, or had deserted before their time of service was over.⁴⁴

V

Surviving evidence does not permit a complete understanding of how Barcelona dealt with the invocations of *Princeps namque* and the various alterations to the national defense clause negotiated at the *corts* of 1368. The skimpy archival material for this year obscures, at least partially, the response of Barcelona's "Council of 100" (*Consell de cent*) to these military initiatives. These materials relate little concerning the Council's deliberations on recruitment nor does they reveal the

⁴² ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 166–167. Two days later, Pere informed his queen about the grave situation he faced, adding that "you see that all our men are so hardhearted that they care very little about the danger in which we and all the land are in today" (*veets que tota la gent està axí endurehida es cura poch del perill en què som nós huy e tota la terra*) [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1222, ff. r–v].

⁴³ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, f. 171.

⁴⁴ See, for example, the instructions for the collection of the penalties for "default of service" (*faltes*) sent to several tax commissioners in ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 171r–v. It must also be remembered that royal rights in regard to the investigation and collection of such penalties for default of service was interfered with by the *Corts*. Because of a petition of the ecclesiastical and urban estates in late February, 1369, the king permitted a board, composed of a scribe of the accounts, Ramon de Màrgens, the dean of Urgel, P. Galceran de Pinos, and Barcelona citizen, R. Busquets, to study, one by one, all the cases and determine if the collection of the default penalty was warranted. In this office, the royal officials and commissioners had to delay every investigation until they received suitable instructions from the said board. [*CAVC*, 3:31; ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 176–179v].

source of funds used by the city to muster soldiers. On the other hand, some available documentation does clarify the later stages of the process; namely, the royal arrangements for the transport of troops to the front and the final report concerning Barcelona's recruitment of these troops.

We are able to identify a number of individuals who actively participated in the mobilization and transport of Barcelona's troops. Two officials, Jaume Fivaller and Marc Sarrovira, were charged by the town councillors with carrying out military recruitment.⁴⁵ Three scribes, Francesch Lluch, Pere d'Orts, and Joan Lendric, were in charge of the "board of arrangements" (*taula del acordament*) or "board of foot soldiers" (*taula dels servents*).⁴⁶ Pere de Sancliment was the captain given the responsibility of leading the Barcelona contingent to Cervera where it was supposed to link up with the king. Two town councillors, Pere Bussot and Gilabert Santcliment, were assigned to accompany the troops to the front (ff. 60, 65v, 67, 69, 73). An important source for various aspects of Barcelona's military contribution is the book of the "treasury" (*clavaria*), much of which provides very concrete and specific information. The treasury book containing records of Barcelona's financial activity between November 30, 1368 and November 29, 1369 is largely intact.⁴⁷

Payments noted in the treasury book fall into several categories.⁴⁸ To begin with, there were the monies granted by order of the Council to the three scribes for use in the recruitment of combatants. Lluch received a total of 1,045 *libras* (ff. 56, 59, 69); d'Orts, 550 *libras* (ff. 56, 59r-v), and Lendric, 192 *libras*, 10 *sous* (ff. 60v-61). For his part, Lluch accompanied the troops to Cervera and received 110 *libras* to pay the expenses run up by Captain Santcliment (f. 60). Later when he was in the village of Cervera, Lluch received by courier a further 110 *libras* to be used for the same reason (f. 67).

⁴⁵ Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona [AHCB], 1B-XI, *Clavaria*, 8. To avoid repetition, all references to folio numbers which appear in the text belong to this register.

⁴⁶ Information of these is provided from the receipts contained in the AHCB, 1C-VII, *Armades i port*, 4. Also see Appendix document 2.

⁴⁷ There are abundant references to this mission in the treasury book and in the register of receipts which we will analyze later.

⁴⁸ According to the register of receipts, it was between December 2 and December 16 that the "board of arrangements" actively functioned. See ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 147r-v.

Before their departure with the Barcelona troops, Bussot and Santcliment probably received 50 *libras* to defray the expenses they incurred in the so-called “journey to Pallars” (*anada de Pallars*) (f. 65v).

Another important expense was the “compensation” (*esmena*) for two horses wounded in askirmish with the Free Companies that took place at Das in lower Cerdanya.⁴⁹ For the first of these wounded animals, its owner, Rotlan Delbosc, received restitution of 50 *libras*; for the second, P Pallarés received 40 *libras* (ff. 77–78v).⁵⁰

Finally there were a number of miscellaneous payments, interesting more for the incidental references they contain than for the sketchy financial information they provide. These include salaries received by different scribes and other persons mentioned in the four notebooks. The accounts also contain a list of all Barcelona residents who had returned to the capital after serving in Cervera, as well as those required to remain there (f. 68).⁵¹ An interesting piece of information is provided in connection with the considerable sum (2 *libras*, 10 *sous*, 3 *diners*) paid to the protnotary, Jaume Conesa, for sealing a royal letter, in which the king allowed the city use of 1500 *libras*, funds that could then be used to pay for the recruitment of the soldiers being sent to Cervera (f. 67).⁵²

While Barcelona’s men performed their military service, a continual stream of messengers kept the town councillors informed and

⁴⁹ From this incidental reference, we know that one part of the Barcelona contingent fought against the Free Companies. For its possible interest for military vocabulary, the reference to this battle in the treasury book is included here. Thus the knights were wounded “in a assault (*afrenta*) that they took part in at the place of Das in the territory of Conflent (AHCB, 1B–XXI, *Apoques*, 2, f. 77); or “at Das in a fight (*pallatís*) they had with a troop (*rota*) of the foreign companies” (f. 78v). Even in the receipt of one of the wounded, it is claimed that those mobilized by Barcelona arrived at Das “where we found a troop of these men and then we engaged in a skirmish (*bricam*) with them.”

⁵⁰ The first horse, returned in a crippled condition, was sold by order of the Council by a veterinarian for 4 *libras*. 7 *sous*, a quantity that was included in the “received funds” (*reebudes*) of the city; the second, in turn, remained under the control of his owner who had brought the animal to the front [AHCB, 1B–XXI, *Apoques*, 2, f. 21v].

⁵¹ Given the date of the “receipt of command” (*albará de manament*), January 4, 1369, this was the point at which Pere returned to the simple invocation of *Princeps namque*, once the settlement had been canceled.

⁵² There is a strong barrier between debt bonds and “taxes.” Debt bonds were issued by the ruler to deal with the war grants and liquidate the debts contracted to pay them off. Thus, each bond diverted the proceeds of the taxes so that the bonds had to be expressly authorized by the sovereign.

delivered orders to the troops in the field.⁵³ For example, a certain amount was paid to the messenger of Barcelona's subvicar for information concerning "the Free Companies' whereabouts" (f. 68v). On another occasion, a messenger was sent to Tremp to gather similar intelligence concerning the exact position of the invaders (f. 77). Other minor payments were made to royal officials who had to take part in the "mustering" (*mostra*) of Barcelona's troops. Payment were also made to a "veterinarian" (*menescal*) of the court, for counting the horsemen who had come to Cervera "to protect the frontier from the foreign companies" (f. 79v), and to a royal porter for his efforts in acquiring pack animals (f. 83).

Finally, the treasury book records sums for the purchase of Barcelona's battle banners. The council paid a merchant, J. Cutxo, 21 *libras*, 6 *sous*, 9 *diners* for "a red and yellow pennant" (*sendat groch e vermell*) and "a white pennant" (*sendat blanch*) (f. 87). B. Gombau, "armored man-at-arms" (*perpunter*), received 3 *libras*, 7 *sous*, 3 *diners* for his work on a "banner" (*senyera*) (f. 80v). A further payment of 2 *libras* 5 *sous* went to the purchase of a "pennon of silk with the symbol of the city and silken fringes woven on it" and a small trumpet.⁵⁴

Much of the rest of the treasury book is devoted to general expenses that were clearly connected to the war. All told, the information contained in the part of the treasury book that survives places military expenditures from the end of 1368 to the beginning of 1369 at 2,213 *libras*, 19 *sous*, 6 *diners*. Of this total amount, at least, 1, 787 *libras* (80.7%) went to the payment of combatants.⁵⁵

Unfortunately, the treasury volume dedicated to miscellaneous expenses is incomplete; the final folios, containing the grand total for the year's spending, are missing. Nevertheless, when some of the volumes of the treasury book from the 1360s are compared, it appears that the annual expenses of Barcelona fluctuated between 40,000

⁵³ B. Cuir, "messenger of the host" (*hosta de correus*) received 15 *libras*, 2 *sous* for the payment of various couriers sent by the councillors to Cervera and other places (ff. 69, 75).

⁵⁴ AHCB, 1C-VII, *Armades i port*, 4, folios cited in text: *unius vesiliū sive 'penó' de çindone cum signo dicte civitatis et cum 'flocs' cirici; ad opus cuiusdam tubicelle quam dicti clientes portant cum els*.

⁵⁵ This grand total would increase to 2, 007 *libras* (90.6%) if, as appears probable, the 220 *libras* sent to Lluch, when in the company of Captain Santcliment, were used for military salaries.

and 50,000 *libras*.⁵⁶ If this general range of figures is correct, then the city treasury dedicated between 4.4% and 5.5% of its expenses to mobilizing the troops in 1368. From this precise comparison of outlays, we can conclude that military expenses did not constitute a sizeable portion of Barcelona's finances.

One must balance these statistics, however, with common sense. Given the diversity of the "files" (*cajas*), it is possible that some expenses generated by the conflict of 1368 were not recorded in the treasury book.⁵⁷ The small percentages mentioned above may only refer to expenses listed in each specific register.

It is not clear if Barcelona had established any "imposts" (*tallas*) to provide the funds needed for military salaries as indeed the other Catalan cities and villages had done.⁵⁸ Most of Barcelona's outlays of funds probably came from the city's main sources of ready cash—direct taxes or the sale of certificates of debt.

VI

In the Archivo Histórico de la Condal de Barcelona, there is preserved a notebook of twenty-four unnumbered folios. This quire provides a partial record of receipts from the soldiers recruited by Barcelona in late December, 1368, in accordance with the *Princeps namque* settlement.⁵⁹ Despite being incomplete, this register allows us to know the names of many of the city's soldiers, their daily rate of pay, geographical place of origin, quantity received in advance for

⁵⁶ I appreciate the information from Dr. Pere Ortí who is making a thorough study of the treasurers of this period.

⁵⁷ Concerning this matter, see P. Verdés "Les finances del 'calvari': Abast, limits i funcionament (Cervera, 1442)," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 29 (1999): 1113–64.

⁵⁸ For example, in the city of Manresa, a *talla* was collected in December, 1368 to recruit the "soldiers" (*clientes*) of Pallars. *Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Manresa* [AHCM], I-380, s.f.; I-161, s.f.

⁵⁹ AHCB, 1C–VII, *Armades i port*. The notebook, as well as the other documentation contained in this volume, is badly catalogued in a series entitled *Armades i port*. It is worthwhile to transcribe in full the title of the register of receipts: *Liber apocharum factarum per equites et clientes qui stipendiarii seu acordati fuerunt per civitatem Barchinone pro eundo versus partes Pallarienses, per quas partes multe gentes extranee intrant principatum Cathalonie pro invadendo et dampnificando eundem principatum; quas milites et clientes dicta civitas tenebatur stependiare et mittere ad dictas partes sequendo dominum regem in locum exercitus dicte civitas [civitatis] vigore compositionis noviter facte super usatico Princeps namque*. To give an idea of the contents of the receipts, I have transcribed four of them in appendix document 2.

a month's service, the number and type of troops that arrived with each captain, and, finally, the identity of the paymasters who carried out the disbursements for the city.

The records establish three categories of soldiers grouped according to the type of military equipment each possessed, his daily salary, and the grand total received for a month's service. Thus, Barcelona paid each of the thirteen men "whose person and horse were armored" (*armati corpore et equo*), 7 *sous* a day; the forty-eight men "armed from head to foot and foot to ground with a sword" (*armati ferro a pedibus usque ad caput "de peu a terra"*), 5 *sous* a day; the 114 crossbowmen "with their bodies armored and with a sword" (*armate de corpore ferro*), 4 *sous* a day; and the eight "shieldbearers . . . with lances and shields" (*cum lanceis et clipeis*), 2 *sous* a day. The grand total of these payments was 1,204 *libras*, 10 *sous*.⁶⁰

One can clearly discern two different salary levels for leaders and common soldiers. The higher salary is paid those who promised to serve with a determined number of troops. With very few exceptions, all of these number among those paid daily wages of 7 *sous* or 5 *sous*. This can be seen in Table 1 in the appendix.

The family names on this list closely mirror the Barcelona patriariate of the period and include members of the following clans: Serra, Sarrovira, Santcliment, Cànoves, Terre, Sabastida, Gualbes, etc. The drive to attain upper-class soldiers became readily apparent on December 8, 1368, when Pere permitted the localities bound to contribute five or fewer foot soldiers to pay money to hire troops at the daily wage levels of 7 *sous* or 5 *sous*. In administering the royal order, Ermengol, tax commissioner of the vicarate of Barcelona, specified

in regard to the directive that you hire soldiers at 7 *sous* or 5 *sous*, you . . . should be diligent in assuring that they are good gentlemen, townsmen, and villagers who are well experienced in riding and in the use of arms and that no others should serve at the [daily] rate of 7 *sous* and 5 *sous*.⁶¹

Those well off enough to render military service accompanied by their retainers comprised the top rungs of this force. Simon d'Olzet was accompanied by three horsemen: G.P. de Bellvehí, P. Febrer, J. Terré, by two; B. Serra, P. de Santcliment, T. Jutge, and P. Pallarès,

⁶⁰ See appendix document 2.

⁶¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 151–52.

by one. Table 1 indicates that several commanders brought small companies: Simon d'Olzet with eleven combatants, Pere Febrer with six, Simon de Gualbes with five, or B. Serra, B. Santcliment, J. Terré, and J. d'Agres with four apiece. Several such small groups, raised by members of the Barcelona oligarchy, were compensated at the higher rate; on the other hand, the vast majority of combatants listed in the register served "as crossbowmen" (*pro ballestario*) with a daily salary of only 4 *sous*.⁶²

It is difficult to know where the combatants of the first group came from; while the captains who collected their salary all came from Barcelona, no information survives concerning the men themselves.⁶³ By contrast, except for two, the home towns of the 110 serving "as crossbowmen" are known. Approximately half (sixty-one) were from the vicinity of Barcelona. Nineteen were referred to as "citizens" (*cives*) and forty-two as "inhabitants" (*habitatores*). In addition to those who came from Barcelona, many of the remainder (thirty) came from other Catalan districts. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these men were recruited in villages close to the capital: Badalona, Tiana), Olesa, Palleja), Santa Fe, Sant Fost, Martorelles, Sabadell, Terrassa, Sant Quirze, and Barberà. Other places outside Barcelona's jurisdiction sent a single soldier apiece: Castellbell, Vidreres, Arbúcies, Gerona, Castelló d'Empúries, Solsona, Lerida, Bell-Lloc, Horta and Torroja. Montblanch sent two combatants. Only seventeen crossbowmen (15.4%) came from the other territories of the Crown of Aragon: eight from Valencia; five from Aragon, and four from Mallorca.⁶⁴

From this, it seems clear that, rather than send randomly-selected foot soldiers, the Council of 100 chose to collect the money to pay men-at-arms at the rate provided for by the *corts* and the king in

⁶² For a typical receipt of this type, see appendix document 2.

⁶³ Only Ramon Pallarés was referred to as an inhabitant" (*habitator*). P. Febrer, for his part, lived in Vilafranca del Penedès, even though born in the capital.

⁶⁴ Certainly, no reference to the use of cavalry appears in the text of the receipts and one could be misled by the Catalan expression *de peu a terra*, which accompanied the job description of this type of combatant. But we must not forget that, as Contamine, *Guerre*, 20 says, given the insufficient defense of horses, the soldier from the mid-fourteenth century dismounted and kept the mounts in reserve. The expression *peaterra* was perfectly documented. The so-called "military census" of Barcelona (1389) contains abundant references to this type of combatant possessed complete or partial suits of armor. See F. Marsà, *Onomástica barcelonesa del siglo XIV* (Barcelona, 1977).

December, 1368. In fact, the 1368 salary levels associated with the three troop categories (7 *sous*, 5 *sous*, and 4 *sous*) corresponded almost exactly to those later established by the Barcelona councillors.⁶⁵

VII

The new military procedures undertaken by Barcelona in 1368 generated some social problems since the combatants had to provide their own equipment and horses. By accepting money in place of contingents of foot soldiers and then using it to employ trained men-at-arms, Pere and the Catalan parliament had raised the economic and social threshold of military service.

Again, let us consider in detail what all this meant to Barcelona's contribution to the royal force gathering at Cervera. Taking into account the number of its hearths under *Princeps namque*, the city was required to provide 437 foot soldiers. In line with the settlement of 1368, it actually sent 183 men-at-arms to Cervera.

In either case, the figure of 183 is very close to the 437 infantry required by the crown. For his part, Pere seemed satisfied by the size of his capital's military contingent. On December 20, 1368, he informed the councillors of Barcelona that

as our natural and loyal vassals [...] you have complied very well with the settlement of the *Usatges* article *Princeps namque* sending to us

⁶⁵ See appendix document 1. Under the daily salary level of 7 *sous*, the thirteen men "whose persons and horses were armored" corresponded to those men *armati corpore et equo* discussed before the *Corts*. Thus, this class referred to combatants with complete armor and an armored horse. At the same time at the salary of 5 *sous* a day, the forty-eight men "armored from head to foot and from foot to ground" contracted by Barcelona correspond to those armored *de cap a peu ab cavayl, roci o mul alforrat* specified by the *corts*. The difference from the previous category resided in the fact each of the combatants wore lighter armor and his mount was "lightly armed" (*alforrada*) rather than being "armored" (*armada*). In regard to the salary category of 4 *sous*, it can be assumed that the 114 crossbowmen of Barcelona "whose body was protected with mail" have to correspond to the men, who, according to the ruling of the *corts*, were to be armed *de cors ab cuyraçes, gorjat, capellina, mànagues o braçals ab cavalcadura*. This undoubtedly refers to crossbowmen who rode some kind of horse. Finally, the eight footsoldiers paid two *sous* a day pose no problem: the receipts simply specify that they had to come "with lances and shields" (*cum lanceis et clipeis*). These men were surely equivalent to the category of "shieldmen" with the above-mentioned weaponry: "a mail doublet, helmet, lance, body shield, sword, and knife."

the required number of well equipped men and this is a very praiseworthy thing."⁶⁶

Barcelona's performance in the crisis of 1368 can only be fully understood when placed in the context of the city's other military activities; however, certain general conclusions can be drawn from the current study. In 1368, the Catalan capital diligently fulfilled the *Princeps namque* settlement in a satisfactory manner. The city seems to have rendered its military service within the required time limit. The militia that it mobilized contained important figures in the urban patriciate as well as a variety of soldiers from Barcelona, its environs, and other parts of the Crown of Aragon.

VIII

The gradual transformation of *Princeps namque* into a tax that underwrote military operations is now somewhat better understood. Clearly, it was a development of mid-fourteenth century condition in the Crown of Aragon; in particular, the War of the Two Pedros and the repeated threat of invasion by the Free Companies, this latter danger an outgrowth of the Hundred Years War.

Consequently, *Princeps namque* was frequently invoked between 1361 and 1367. Nevertheless, the most serious invocation came in 1368 when Du Guesclin's troops advanced on Tremp and then threatened the royal headquarters at Cervera. Chronically short of resources, Pere had to use every means possible to defend his lands.⁶⁷ The invasion by Du Guesclin's companies surprised a badly defended Catalonia and also its inadequately armed inhabitants.

As M. Hébert has observed in his study of medieval Provence, the permanence of war and the obligation of cities and villages to maintain their own defenses while regularly supplying the sovereign with troops converted each townsman into a potential soldier. As such, he had who had to supply all weapons necessary for his military function.⁶⁸ The inventory of weapons possessed by inhabitants

⁶⁶ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1222, ff. 101r-v: *axi com a naturals e layals vassalls nostres [...] hajats ben satisfet a la composició del usatge Princeps namque en quantitat e en qualitat, trametents a nós lo nombre degut e hòmens bé arreats, de la cosa sots dignes de laor.*

⁶⁷ See, for example, ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 119-21, 131v-132.

⁶⁸ Hébert, "Une population en armes," 215.

of the Provençal town of Manosque between 1359 and 1374 reveals many different types of military equipment and dispels the impression that medieval urban populations were poorly armed. Very much the same could be argued about its residents.⁶⁹

Despite their many differences, the cities and villages of the Principate engaged in military preparations after 1368 that mirrored those of Barcelona.⁷⁰ In mid-December of that year, the ecclesiastical and urban estates issued an important “ordinance of weapons” (*ordinació de les armes*). The population was divided into six different categories, whose wealth ranged from 5,000 to more than 70,000 *sous*. Each one now had to obtain specific weapons and equipment for use on military campaigns and each was given a year to acquire these. During this period, two musters were held to check that the ordinance was being observed.⁷¹

The periodic forays of mercenary companies from France throughout the 1360s confronted Catalan military leaders with new challenges. These novel conditions severely tested the defensive capacities of Catalan cities and villages. Military service defined in *Princeps namque* was also put to the test—generally proving an abysmal failure. In reality, a new type of war was gradually evolving, one that transcended the strategic limits of general mobilization. It demanded both the professionalization of the army and the fiscal transformation of military service.

In the past, the invocation of the national defense clause would set in motion a general mobilization of military units throughout

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 216–20.

⁷⁰ This was made clear in a session of the *corts* of Tarragona (May, 1370) when, because of the mercenary incursions in the years immediately preceding the meeting, the estates recognized that “the Catalan men-at-arms are not prepared either with horses or the weapons necessary to oppose these men” (*les gents d’armes de Catalunya no eren aparellades ne de cavalls ne de aquelles armes qui al contrast de les dites gents eren necessàries*). [*CAVC*, 3:63].

⁷¹ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 162–65; R. 1520, ff. 7v–10; Legislación, caja 4. The *ordinance* was approved and sworn to by the king in February, 1369 [*CAVC*, 3:32]. The noble estate never accepted it and, even though its legal applicability was questioned for the next five years, the *ordinance* was only abolished in the *Corts* of 1370–1371. [Sánchez y Ortí, *Corts*, 429]. Besides studying this source, the *ordinance* will have to be put in context with the other very well known source contained in ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1529, ff. 54–56 and published in *Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Prospero de Bofarull y Moscaró, 42 vols. (Barcelona, 1850–1856), 6:72–76. Despite the opinion of Riquer, *Amés*, 81 that the date of this document was made in 1357, I believe that from internal evidence of the text, the said *ordinance* date from earlier than the 1360s.

Catalonia. The financial burden caused by such military activity fell on each of the male inhabitants of a sufficient age and social position to personally serve in the host with his own weapons. In 1368, when the *Princeps namque* settlement was worked out, financial responsibility was transferred from the individual townsman to the municipality. The settlement attempted to lessen the responsibility of individuals for host service and to promote greater military efficiency providing better-equipped troops and of paying them a proper salary.

The possibility of commuting the obligation to provide foot soldiers into a payment to hire men-at-arms aimed at even greater military effectiveness. The municipality had to obtain the necessary money to pay either the infantrymen it provided or the men-at-arms who would substitute for them. Thus, the *Princeps namque* settlement demonstrated that military service had assumed a new monetary dimension.

Though town councils now took the responsibility or raising troops and municipal vicars arranged for mobilization, there was still a risk that the required number of combatants would not actually assemble and that those troops who did answer the summonses would not show up when or where they were supposed to.⁷² Municipal authorities quickly learned these lessons of 1368. In 1370, the estates, assembled in a *corts* at Tarragona, recognized the potential weaknesses inherent in the system of commutations. As a result, it decided to establish for the next two years a company of 300 men with armored horses, 400 lances, and 400 crossbowmen. These troops were to be recruited from social groups better fitted for war; namely, gentlemen, townmen, and villagers. The parliament simultaneously specified in great detail what equipment each of the three classes of combatants should possess. Since the *corts* had voted the grant, it also claimed the right to collect the money necessary to pay these troops. In this way, the collection of funds fell into the hands of a number of "tax boards" (*generalitats*), each composed of six persons appointed by the parliament. While the parliamentary grant was in force, the king was prevented from invoking *Princeps namque*.⁷³

⁷² In this regard, the king complained on December 25, 1368 concerning "the great delay of our officials and men . . . who did not take action as they were supposed to" [ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 166–167v].

⁷³ *CAVC*, 3:63–72; Sánchez y Ortí, *Corts*, 423–51 (doc. 24–25). This appears to have taken place in the *corts* of 1375 in exchange for a loan to Pere III for Sardinian military operations.

With this new system in place, the Principate was better defended from new French threats. National defense could now be carried out by a well-chosen company of professionals rather than through a general mobilization.

Another modification of Catalonia's new military policy took place during the last incursions of mercenary companies across the Pyrenees. In November, 1374, when Pere once again invoked *Princeps namque* to defend the Principate from mercenaries hired by the Mallorcan prince, Jaume IV (1349–1375). On this occasion, the king instituted a revised schedule of payments. With the *fogatge* of Cervera/Tortosa at the rate of one soldier for every ten households to be paid 4 *sous*-a-day, it was anticipated that the sum of 36,000 *sous* for daily salaries would be sufficient to support 1,500 lances and 4,000 crossbowmen. All of these combatants would have to be "fit and suitable persons" (*persones aptes e suficientes*). To guarantee that this sum would be collected, a commission of four individuals (one coming from each estate and one appointed by the crown) would administer its provisions.⁷⁴

By providing an effectively armed and increasingly professionalized force recruited not by the municipality, but by a commission chosen for the purpose by the *corts*, the settlement of 1374 capped the military reforms of this period. Military mobilization thus escaped the clutches of *Princeps namque* which was no longer an effective means of gathering troops. The municipality was transformed into a tax collection agency. The tax bill owed by each community was then turned over to the commission charged with the recruitment of troops. The reforms of 1374 would again be put into operation ten years later when a war against the count of Empurias and his French allies produced no less than four *fogatges* in a single year.⁷⁵

After the reign of Pere III, *Princeps namque* had little formal impact, a fact demonstrated by the decreasing number of invocations in the second half of the fourteenth century. Pere's frequent use of the clause and the resulting settlements concerning its terms negotiated by the monarchy and the *corts* coincided with a period of increasing economic stress throughout Catalonia. During the critical decades at the end of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth, increased military demands steadily worsened the precarious financials of Catalonia's cities and villages.

⁷⁴ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1520, ff. 20v–21.

⁷⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1520, ff. 77–155.

The changes occurring in Catalonia mirrored those taking place in other regions of Europe. For example, late in the thirteenth century, Philippe IV of France (1285–1314) had already utilized the “general mobilization” (*arrière ban*) as a fiscal instrument by steadily increasing the number of taxpayers who could replace actual military service with a cash payment.⁷⁶ In transforming the requirement of military service into an impost paid by all male residents and not simply those living in the lands of the royal patrimony, Pere III was engaged in the same fiscal experiment the Capetian monarch had tried sixty years before: the legitimization by law and custom of a procedure that would allow his fiscal and jurisdictional power to spread into every corner of Catalonia. Such a process would ultimately provide pre-conditions from which the modern state could emerge.

⁷⁶ Albert Rigaudière, “L’essor de la fiscalité royale, du règne de Philippe le Bel à celui de Philippe VI,” in *Europa en los umbrales de la crisis (1250–1350)* (Pamplona, 1995), 335. See also J.R. Strayer and C.H. Taylor, *Studies in early French Taxation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 56–65; J.B. Henneman, *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Development of War Financing (1322–1356)* (Princeton, 1971), 19–21.

APPENDIX

I. *Table*

Salaries and Service in Barcelona Host of 1368		
<i>Recipient</i>	<i>Salary</i>	<i>Service</i>
Guillem P. de Bellveí	28 l. 10 s.	2 <i>armati corpore et equo</i> 1 <i>armatus ferro e pedibus . . .</i>
Bernat Serra, son of Joan Serra, Sr.	33 l.	1 <i>armatus corpore et equo</i> 3 <i>armati ferro e pedibus . . .</i>
Bernardó Serrovira	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro e pedibus . . .</i>
Berenguer Santcliment	30 l.	4 <i>armati ferro e pedibus . . .</i>
Deushovol Cànoves	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro e pedibus . . .</i>
Joan Terré	36 l.	2 <i>armati corpore et equo</i> 2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Simon de Gualbes	37 l. 10 s.	5 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Joan Sabastida	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Ramon Capcir, <i>menescal</i>	7 l. 10 s.	1 <i>armatus ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Jaume d'Avellà	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Pere Pallarés	18 l.	1 <i>armatus corpore et equo</i> 1 <i>armatus ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Pere de Santcliment	36 l.	1 <i>armatus corpore et equo</i> 1 <i>armatus ferro a pedibus . . .</i> 2 <i>armati de corpore ferro</i> 2 <i>cum lanceis et clipeis</i>
Bernat Serra, son of Bernat Serra, Sr.	22 l. 10 s.	3 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>

Table (*cont.*)

<i>Salaries and Service in Barcelona Host of 1368</i>		
<i>Recipient</i>	<i>Salary</i>	<i>Service</i>
Simon d'Olzet	64 l. 10 s.	3 <i>armati corpore et equo</i> 2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i> 6 <i>cum lanceis sive "empavesats"</i> ⁷⁹
Martín de Terol, royal porter	7 l. 10 s.	He himself <i>armatus ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Pere Febrer	51 l.	2 <i>armati corpore et equo</i> 4 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Tomàs Jutge	18 l.	1 <i>armatus corpore et equo</i> 1 <i>armatus ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Ramon Pallarés	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Ramon Dezplà	22 l. 10 s.	5 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Francesc Dezplà	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Gabriel Ros	15 l.	2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i>
Joan d'Agrers, of the royal household	27 l.	2 <i>armati ferro a pedibus . . .</i> 2 <i>armati de corpore ferro . . .</i>

II. *Selected Documents*

1

ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, f. 133.

Barcelona, October 14, 1368. Public announcement which demanded military service in connection with the *Princeps namque* settlement

Ara hoiats que us fa hom saber per manament del senyor rey que, com en les Corts generals que'l dit senyor celebra en Barcelona sia

⁷⁹ In the second group of receipts which I will refer to below, there appears three persons named Piera, one from Vic and two from Cardona, who served with d'Olzet as shieldmen at the wage of 2 *sous* a day.

feta avinença ab lo dit senyor a cert temps duradora per la dita Cort que de XV fochs sia donat I servent en compensació del usatge “Princeps namque”, en cas que·l dit usatge haja loch, e lo dit senyor rey haja declarat lo dit usatge e, per consegüent, la dita avinença haver loch, per ço com gran multitud de gents estranyes d’armes entren per esvair e dampnificar la terra del principat de Cathalunya; e per ço lo dit senyor vulla e deman los dits servents a ell ésser trameses envers la vila de Ffigueres per fer la dita defensió, dels quals servents, segons la dita avinença, deuen ésser la meytat ballesters e l’altra meylat empavesats; e los ballesters deuen portar cascú ballesta e croch, I dard, IIII dotzenes de passadors, bacinet o cervellera, cuyraces o espatleres o jubet; e los empavesats deuen portar cascú espatleres o jubet, cervellera o bacinet, lança e pavès, espasa e coltell; e, si alcú farà falta en ço que li toca, serà tengut esmenar al doble. Per ço, ab tenor de la present pública crida, significa aytal veguer a tots e sengles habitants dins la sua juredicció, si·s vol sien reyalis o de prelats o persones ecclesiàstiques o de barons o de cavllers o de ciutadans o de hòmens de vila, que encontinent trameten vers les dites parts los dits servents aparellats en la dita manera, al qual aparellament los dóna hom II dies d’ací avant comptadors e que d’aquí avant partesquen e vagen cascú per ses jornades. Sabents que, si alcú en açò farà feita, serà punit en la pena de la dobla sens tota mercè, per la qual pena a exigir irà lo dit veguer per tots los lochs de la sua juredicció, passats los dits II dies, com axí ho man lo senyor rey per tal car és de gran necessitat cuytar la dita ajuda e defensió. Jacobus prothonotarius.

2

ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 154v–155

Cervera, December 18, 1368. Public announcement of the invocation of the Catalan hosts in connection with the Usatges article Princeps namque

Ara oiats que us fa saber lo senyor rey que tot hom havem edat e poder de combatre vaja ajudar decontinent al dit senyor qui és anat a Cervera e entén anar més avant per contrastar a gran multitud de gents estranyes qui molts dies ha passats són entrades en Cathalunya en les parts de Pallars e a Tremp e·s attansen més avant envers lo dit senyor rey. E, segons que ell ha ohit, altres moltes que·n vénen

per esvahir, guerrejar e dampnificar la sua terra e són en tan gran moltitut que tot lo principat de Cathalunya és vist al dit senyor rey ésser neecesari a defensió del dit principat, sabents que, si algú desfalrà o tardarà fer la dita ajuda, encorrerà les penes contengudes en l'usatge "Princeps namque" e declaracions daquèn seguides perquè lo senyor rey notifica que tot hom qui sa haja acostumat de tenir cavall e armes e huy ne haja deu anar ab cavall e armes; e tot hom qui sàpia e sia acostumat de portar ballesta deu anar ab ballesta, en altra manera encorreria les penes del dit usatge. E açò fa saber lo senyor rey per tal que alcú no puga ignorar la manera segons la qual és tengut fer la dita ajuda. E aquells qui no han cavalls ne han acostumat de portar ballesta són tenguts anar com mils arreats e aparellats poran segons lur condició si les penes del dit usatge volran esquivar.

3

AHCB, 1C-VII, Arnades i port, 4 (s. f.).

Barcelona, December 12-14, 1368. Several receipts referring to the men-at-arms contracted by the city of Barcelona to fulfill the Princeps namque settlement.

Sit omnibus notum quod ego, Guillelmus Petri de Bellvehí, civis Barchinone, confiteor et recognosco vobis, venerabilibus Iacobo Fivellarii et Marcho Sarrovira, civibus Barchinone, deputatis per venerabiles consiliarios Barchinone ad stipendiandum sive acordandum, nomine dicte civitatis, milites et pedites armatos ferro et clientes pro mittendo eos versus partes Pallarienses, per quas partes multe gentes extranee intrant principatum Cathalonie pro invadendo et darnpnifficando eundem principatum; quos milites, pedites et clientes dicta civitas teneret stipendiare et mittere versus dictas partes sequendo dominum regem in locum exercitus dicte civitatis, vigore compositionis noviter facte cum domino rege ad certum tempus per Curiam generalem que nunc celebratur in dicta civitate super usatico "Princeps namque," quod solvistis michi per manus Petri de Ortis, scriptoris tabule dicti acordamenti, viginti octo libras et decem solidos barchinonensium, quas michi dare debebatis pro solido meo unius mensis per quem ego promitto servire domino regi, nomine dicte civitatis, in resistendo dictis gentibus extranels, scilicet, cum duobus hominibus armatis de corpore et equo, ad rationem septem solidorum pro quali-

bet die pro quolibet homine, et cum uno homine armato ferro a pedibus usque ad caput de peu a terra, ad rationem quinque solidorum pro qualibet die. Et ideo, renuncio excepcioni non numerate et non solute peccunie et doli mali. In cuius rei testimonium ffacio vobis presentem apocham de soluto.

Actum est hoc Barchinone, XII^a die decembris anno a nativitate Domini M^oCCC^oLX^o VIII^o.

Sig + num Guillelmi Petri de Bellvehí predicti qui hec laudo et firmo. Testes huius rei sunt Iacobus Landrich, Pontius de Fontibus et Franciscus de Ortis, scriptores.

4

Sit omnibus notum quod ego, Petrus de Sanctoclemente, civis Barchinone, confiteor et recognosco vobis, dictis venerabilis deputatis, quod solvistis michi per manus Petri de Ortis scriptoris tabule dicti acordamenti, triginta sex libras Barchinonensium que michi debebantur pro solido meo unius mensis proxime venturi, per quem ego promitto servire domino regi, nomine dicti civitatis, in resistendo dictis gentibus extraneis, scilicet, cum uno homine armato et corpore et equo, ad rationem septem solidorum pro qualibet die, et cum uno homine armato ferro de pedibus usque ad caput de peu a terra, ad rationem quinque solidorum pro qualibet die et cum duobus ballistariis armatis de corpore ferro, ad rationem quatuor solidorum pro qualibet die pro quolibet ballistario, et cum duobus hominibus cum lançeis et clipeis, ad rationem duorum solidorum pro quolibet ipsorum. Et ideo renuncio excepcioni non numerate et non solute peccunie et doli mali. In cuius rei testimonium ffacio vobis presentem apocham de soluto.

Actum est hoc Barchinone.

Testes: Guillelmus de Sanctoclemente, filius dicti venerabilis Petri de Sanctoclemente, et Ffranciscus Luch, scriptor Barchinone.

5

Sit omnibus notum quod ego, Guillelmus Eymerici, loci de Terraçia, confiteor et recognosco vobis, Iacobo Lendric, scriptori tabule dicti acordamenti, quod solvistis mihi sex libras barchinonensium pro solido meo unius mensis proxime venturi, per quem teneor et promitto

servire dicto domino regi, nomine dicte civitatis, pro ballistario in resistendo dictis gentibus extraneis, ad rationem quatuor solidorum pro qualibet die. Et ideo renuncio excepcioni non numerate et non solute peccunie et doli mali. In cuius rei testimonium ffacio vobis presentem apocham de soluto.

Actum est hoc Barchinone.


Testes: Michael Guardiola, dicti loci de Terraçia, et Ffranciscus de Ortis, scriptor Barchinone

6

Sit omnibus notum quod ego, Dominicus Camuel, loci de Alcanis, regni Aragonum, confiteor et recognosco vobis, Francisco Luch, scriptori tabule dicti acordamenti, quod solvistis mihi sex libras barchinonensium pro solido meo unius mensis, per quem teneor et promitto servire dicto domino regi, nomine dicte civitatis, pro ballistario pro resistendo dictis gentibus extraneis, ad rationem quatuor solidorum pro qualibet die. Et ideo renuncio excepcioni non numerate et non solute peccunie et doli mali. In cuius rei testimonium ffacio vobis presentem apocham de soluto.

Actum est hoc Barchinone.

Testes: [Left blank].



Map 19. Medieval Barcelona.

PART FOUR
WOMEN AT WAR

A MEDIEVAL “ROSIE THE RIVETER”?
WOMEN IN FRANCE AND SOUTHERN ENGLAND
DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

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The army of Florence was marching out of the gates; and a certain fool, who wandered nearly naked about the streets, was struck by the sight. He asked what it was all about. A bystander answered:

“Don’t you know, fool, that war has been declared against the Pisans?”

Said the fool: “And after this war there will be peace?”

“How can you think of peace, you idiot? Now the great war is just beginning.”

“I still wonder,” said the fool. “Won’t there be a peace sometime after this war?”

Well, certainly. No war lasts forever. Of course there will be peace sometime; but now there is war.

“Well then,” said the fool, “wouldn’t it be better to make the peace now, before the war begins to rage?”

What shall I say to that? Merely, if it were permissible, that the fool was very wise. Would that our warmakers might ponder his words! So might a war never be begun, or it might be ended before we should sink under war’s ravages and calamities, after which indeed peace would come.¹

Few figures in this endless debate between war and peace are less visible than the women whose lives are often disrupted by the ebb and flow of such primal forces. In the United States, one iconic figure, Rosie the Riveter, shed this anonymity and still stands as a symbol for American women in warfare. When the United States entered World War II in December, 1941, and the men exchanged their tools for rifles and left to fight the Axis, Rosie the Riveter appeared: a womanly ideal depicted in illustrations and in song, characterized by her trademark coveralls and the kerchief that bound

¹ From a letter from Petrarch to Gasparo Squaro dei Broaspini of Verona November 22, 1372. Cited *The Voice of the Middle Ages*, ed. and trans. Catherine Moriarty (New York, 1989), 158–59.

her hair, working as a WOW (Woman Ordnance Worker) to equip the troops overseas. (Figure 1). As a cultural icon, Rosie was eponymous for the six million American women who poured into factories to take up the labors their soldier husbands, sons, fathers, and brothers performed before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.² With the armistice in 1945, most of these women peeled off their greasy and stained wartime attire, once again donning dresses and aprons and returning to the tasks of motherhood and domestic labor. Though the millions of women Rosie represented never fired a weapon at an enemy soldier, they enabled innumerable Allied soldiers to do so.

It is significant that the participation of women in World War II was almost exclusively indirect. With the notable exception of military nurses, members of the signal corps, or of the United Services Organization (USO), the typical American woman remained thousands of miles away from the nearest theater of military operations.³ If we are to ascribe to Jean Elshtain's extremely useful depiction of warfare as a series of concentric circles in which the directness and degree of involvement determine proximity to the center, then we can see that with a few notable exceptions, from the Middle Ages to the present, women have been pushed outward from the innermost circles.⁴

Symbolic spatial reasoning aside, the women epitomized by Rosie the Riveter during the 1940s find an analogue in the realities that women experienced in France and southern England six hundred years earlier. Several clear parallels exist between American women of the Second World War and the women inhabiting the battle-

² Statistics from "Rosie the Riveter" Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000, <http://encarta.msn.com/find/Concise.asp?ti=00BFE000>. According to Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York, 1987), 189 while Rosie the Riveter was a popular figure, the scale of women's actual involvement in the work force was not as high as is conventionally believed. She claims women's involvement was more personally and privately fostered, particularly in the form of victory gardens. For the alteration of roles for European women of the same era, see Bonnie S. Anderson and Judith S. Zinsser, *A History of Their Own: Women in Europe from Prehistory to the Present*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2000), 2:308-13; Jack Cassin-Scott, *Women at War, 1939-1945* (London, 1980).

³ Also of note are the women who were living in Hawaii during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, who for one day at least experienced the reality of life in a combat zone. Here again Elshtain, *Women*, 189 is critical popular conception, declaring that "women never comprised more than two percent of the military in the Second World War," describing war as "man-made."

⁴ Elshtain *Women*, 183.

grounds of medieval warfare. This paper argues that both are part of a larger, long-standing tradition.⁵ The Rosies of the Hundred Years War found themselves far more directly involved in a conflict which they did not incite, and without the opportunity to cite maternal or other responsibilities as grounds for non-participation. What is more, the immediate stakes for the women involved were far higher. Personal politics aside, women were as actively involved in warfare as men, albeit with one critical difference: men participated in the Hundred Years War both as attackers and defenders; women purely as defenders.⁶ It is precisely this reconsideration that underscores the need for a realignment of our interpretation of normal gender roles in medieval warfare.

Definitions, Sources, and Scope

To begin, certain definitions need to be clarified, and sources and methodology outlined. The first and most obvious matter at hand is an explanation of the term Hundred Years War.⁷ For the purposes of clarity, this paper will adopt the "traditional" stance of dating the Hundred Years War as the periodic series of hostilities between England and France from 1337–1453. These dates cover the major campaigns in question, and the "supplemental" military activities that occurred amidst the larger conflict.

⁵ For an example of a work that bespeaks a sense of universality of human experience in warfare from the Middle Ages to the present, see John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York, 1976). As an earlier link to this tradition, see, discussion of Simeon of Durham in Emilie Amt *Women's Lives in Medieval Europe* (New York, 1993), 95–96. Simeon describes several Viking raids into England with disastrous consequences to the men, women, and children (even priests and monks) who fell victim to these raids. For other examples of female military experiences in medieval Europe, see Alan J. Forey, "Women and the Military Orders in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Studia monastica* 29 (1987): 63–72; James M. Powell, "The Role of Women in the Fifth Crusade," in *The Horns of Hattin*, ed. B.Z. Kedar (Jerusalem, 1992), 294–301.

⁶ As my sources fail to reliably reveal women's thoughts on their circumstances particularly the chronicles used, whose writers doubtless had little to no interest in the thoughts of the women involved, I will not be attempting to demonstrate the appeal or lack thereof to the women in question.

⁷ Kenneth Fowler, "Introduction," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (New York, 1971), 1.

In its broadest sense there is little debate as to the standard format of medieval European warfare, which is recognized as a series of related but disparate short campaigns, with actual pitched battles, the aberration rather than the norm. Specifically, in the Hundred Years War, despite the great acclaim and legendary status accorded Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415), the pitched battles were few and far between. Indeed not a few proved largely impracticable and strategically insignificant.⁸

The bulk of official martial activity during the conflict assumed one of two diametrically-opposed formats: *chevauchées* and sieges.⁹ The former involved an army sweeping through a region quickly, burning and pillaging as much as possible. According to Kenneth Fowler, *chevauchées* were “designed to destroy the enemy’s resources by devastating the countryside, burning the defenseless villages, small townships, and the suburbs of walled towns.”¹⁰

By contrast, siege warfare usually assumed one of two forms (or a combination of the two): (1) direct assault that involved the use of bombardment, siege towers, scaling ladders, or mining to storm a castle or fortified city and (2) blockade, success of which depended upon waiting for those inside to exhaust their resources while preventing them from receiving further assistance.¹¹

Each scenario finds women playing active roles, mainly during, but to some extent, after the conflict. Much like her twentieth-cen-

⁸ Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War: The English in France 1337–1453* (New York, 1978), 86–87, 170 explains that these famous battles were all intentional, served little or no strategic purpose, and were the result of unwelcome circumstances.

⁹ Jim Bradbury *The Medieval Siege* (Rochester, N.Y., 1992), 156; Fowler “Introduction.” *Hundred Years War*, 12; idem, *Age of Plantagenet and Valois* (New York, 1967), 204–9.

¹⁰ Fowler, “Introduction,” 12; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (New York, 1984), 290–91; in contrast, N.A.R. Wright, *Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside* (Rochester, N.Y., 1998), 67–69 argues that this scorched-earth policy was extremely rare, as warfare requires “a healthy and prospering peasantry.” Also of note is the fact that the besieged also often burned their suburbs to clear fields of fire. For example, *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, trans. Thomas Johnes, 2 vols. (New York, 1867), 2:196 outlines the garrison’s destruction of St. Léon, suburb of Bayonne.

¹¹ For general orchestration of various types of siege, see Michael Wolfe, “Siege Warfare and the *Bonnes Villes* of France during the Hundred Years War,” in *The Medieval City Under Siege*, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1999), 49–51; Philip Warner, *The Medieval Castle: Life in a Fortress in Peace and War* (London, 1971), 187–217; Randall Rogers, *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford, 1992).

tury counterpart, the average medieval woman returned to her normal activities when the siege ended, though for a time thereafter, she might assume the additional tasks of rebuilding, repairing, and tending the wounded.¹²

In addition to this "official" warfare between the forces of the English and French kings, a second, unofficial struggle raged, one that pitted the people of the local communities against *écorcheurs*, pillagers, and brigands, men who, despite nominal affiliation, belonged to neither side of the conflict, but rather constituted an independent variable, as they could strike without notice, and remained unfettered by commanders who might impose any limits on their behavior.¹³ These bands could include former soldiers from either side (or even from both). They evinced a marked lack of scruples regarding the affairs and/or property of others.¹⁴ Finally, political divisions within what is today France resulted in factional infighting that led to further strife, usually with both sides hoping to gain the support of the English.¹⁵

Most of the historiographical debate regarding war and the non-combatant in the Middle Ages, with a few exceptions, marginalizes

¹² Madeleine Pelter Cosman, *Women at Work in Medieval Europe* (New York, 2000), 75–93; Jo Ann McNamara and Suzanne Wempe, "The Power of Women through the Family in Medieval Europe, 500–1000," in *Women and Power in the Middle Ages*, ed. Mary Erler and Maryanne Kowaleski (Athens, Ga., 1988), 83–101; Barton Hacker, "Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe," *Signs* 6 (1981): 643–44, pursues this point in another direction, looking at the roles of the women who accompanied armies from the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, and determining that they "were not only normal, they were vital." Another interesting point Hacker, 653 makes is that many of the tasks women had in the armies were virtually identical to "ordinary" women's tasks: It is ironic that the only women for whom wars and battles changed nothing in their routines were those who actually accompanied the armies.

¹³ According to Paul Solon, "Valois Military Administration on the Norman Frontier, 1445–1461: A Study in Medieval Reform," *Speculum* 51 (1976): 91–111, it was this sort of unruly, harsh, and wicked treatment of the people that led the French kings to reform the military in the mid-fifteenth century.

¹⁴ N.A.R. Wright, "Pillagers and Brigands in the Hundred Years War," *Journal of Medieval History* 9 (1983): 15; Jean Froissart "Chronicle," in *Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War*, ed. Christopher T. Allmand (New York, 1973), 88.

¹⁵ One chronicler, Jean de Venette, in describing the duke of Normandy's assault on and destruction of Meaux in 1358. He claims, "For in truth the English, who had been the chief enemies of the realm before, could not have done what the nobles of France did." *The Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, trans. Jean Birdsall, ed. Richard A. Newhall (New York, 1953), 78.

the role of women. This paper will examine some examples of women functioning in each of the above-mentioned scenarios: among the townspeople during a *chavauchée*, contending with the activities of brigands, and during sieges.¹⁶ The most persuasive evidence comes from chroniclers of the period: Jean le Bel, Jean Froissart, Jean de Venette, and Enguerrand de Monstrelet, as well as contemporary letters. (Christopher Allmand recommends that “the history of war in the late medieval period must be extended beyond the impression gained from reading the chronicles alone.”)¹⁷

All of these sources underscore a clear tradition of women partaking in warfare when called upon to do so, one that finds its roots centuries earlier and has echoes that continue into the present. In Britain, there existed a long tradition of warrior queens stretching back to Boudicea.¹⁸ Throughout medieval Europe, women of power such as Eleanor of Aquitaine helped shape the socio-political landscape.¹⁹ Women found themselves in command on various occasions, forced to make difficult decisions upon which their own lives and the lives of their neighbors and fellow townspeople might depend. Perhaps nowhere are there more archetypal examples of women war-

¹⁶ This paper will not examine the involvement of “camp followers” (laundresses, prostitutes, and others), not because their circumstances are less interesting or significant, but rather because they merit their own independent study, something which I could not hope to provide here.

¹⁷ Allmand, “War,” 165. In addition to chronicles and letters specific to the Hundred Years War, I will include some letters that do precede the conflict in question, as I feel these help to illustrate a system already in place by the beginning of the mid-fourteenth century.

¹⁸ Sharon MacDonald, “Drawing the Lines—Gender, Peace, and War: An Introduction,” in *Images of Women in Peace and War: Cross-Cultural and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Macdonald, Sharon, Pat Holden, and Shirley Ardener (Madison, Wisc., 1987), 16–18; Jean A. Truax, “Anglo-Norman Women at War: Valiant Soldiers, Prudent Strategists or Charismatic Leaders,” in *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1999), 111–25; Wendy Chapkis and Mary Wingis, “The Private Benjamin Syndrome,” in *Loaded Questions: Women in the Military*, ed. Wendy Chapkis (Washington, D.C., 1982), 20. Once again, we must not discard the figures in the mythological/literary tradition of the age. Arguably the best examples of this in the British Isles lie in the *Tain Bo Cualinge* in such figures as Queen Medb, and rival warrior chieftains Scathach and Aife. Spellings taken from *The Tain*, trans. Thomas Kinsella (New York, 1970).

¹⁹ For nature of female political power in the Middle Ages, see *Women of Power: Queens, Regents, and Potentates*, ed. Theresa M. Vann (Cambridge, 1993); Judith M. Bennett, “Public Power and Authority in the Medieval English Countryside,” in *Women and Power*, 18–36; Martha C. Howell, “Citizenship and Gender: Women’s Political Status in Northern Medieval Cities,” in *Women and Power*, 37–60.

riors than in the work of contemporary writer and courtier, Christine de Pizan, whose *Book of the City Of Ladies* (*Livre de la Cité des Dames*), first appeared in 1405, and devoted considerable space to naming great warrior women and retelling their histories.²⁰

Finally, we must closely examine the career of the woman who might be considered the exception to the rule: Joan of Arc. In this regard, Linda DePauw cautions her reader, "The reality of women's experience is distorted by focusing exclusively on exceptional females, but it is also distorted by focusing only on the most typical."²¹ Even Joan, despite leading charges and actively attacking the English, was also serving as defender of the inhabitants of Orleans, of the *dauphin*, and of the people of France. Thus, Joan serves as both an exception that defies the rule and as an example that confirms it. She is, however, only the best-known of the women who actively fought during the Hundred Years War; consequently, we must consider her case, not as a unique one, but as illustrative of the highly active role a few women played in war and the expectations placed upon them.

Much modern historiography points to the overwhelming suffering of the peasant community during the Hundred Years War, though few authors make any distinction between "non-combatant" men and women when considering the degree of suffering sustained.²² This implies that women suffered alongside their men, starved with them, and often died with them.

It is significant that so many of those who recorded the events of the conflict were men, a fact that requires us to look at not only what they are saying, but also what they left out.²³ It is also imperative that we consider the concept of "fighting" in its broadest sense—

²⁰ See Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the City of Ladies*, trans. Earl Jeffrey Richards (New York, 1998), 32–74 for several examples of this. However, Linda Dufresne, "Women Warriors: A Special Case from the Fifteenth Century: The *City of Ladies*," *Women's Studies* 23 (1994): 111–31, esp. 128–29 makes a convincing case that Christine's effectiveness is severely undermined by the illustrations in her work, which cast the women in question in distinctly traditional "feminine" models.

²¹ Linda Grant De Pauw, *Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present* (Norman, Okla., 1998), 17.

²² Some notable examples: Allmand, "War," 165; Fowler *Plantagenet*, 152; M.H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (Toronto, 1965), 191. I have placed Allmand's term "non-combatant" in quotes because the term belies the realities of the age: strictly speaking, these people became combatants when forced to do so—the term "civilian" better reflects the circumstances, and it is the term I shall be using throughout.

²³ Elshtain, *Women*, 164; De Pauw, *Women*, 17–18.

in short, by recognizing that any meaningful contribution to a conflict constitutes a kind of “fighting.”²⁴

Finally, it is important to recognize that battle, like plague or even carnival, was a “time out of time” when traditional mores (among them gendered relations) ceased to apply.²⁵ The ideas of what constituted “normative” behavior disappeared for everyone: farmers and craftsmen became soldiers, and women stopped preparing meals and set to preparing defenses. Perhaps the most significant example of this is the idea of women in command.

One feminist scholar in particular, Megan McLaughlin, recognizes this unusual circumstance of the woman as military leader, but downplays this aspect of female involvement, arguing that the liminal nature of such situations makes them less significant than the armor-clad woman on the battlefield, swinging a sword in the name of her liege.²⁶ This essay, however, takes a different viewpoint: here we shall look at female command not as a question of “the tensions inherent in the medieval system of gender roles,” but rather as a problem with our own perceptions in recognizing what was essentially an accepted (if not expected) practice during the later Middle Ages.²⁷ War is not something that involves only a few select individuals; it touches all those who might go on leading normal lives but for its intrusion. Only by refocusing our lens can we see how the distinctions between male and female roles became increasingly blurred in a time of crisis.

²⁴ For distinction between warlike and unwarlike in the peace and truce of God, see *The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), 14–15; *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious response in France around the Year 1000*, ed. Thomas Head and Richard Landes (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992).

²⁵ For a more detailed explanation of the idea of “time out of time,” see Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Chicago, 1969); Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1978), 178–99; Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Ind., 1984), chaps. 1, 3. All three of these deal primarily with festival, but also deal in a general sense with deregulating factors, of which warfare is a notable example.

²⁶ Megan McLaughlin, “The Woman Warrior: Gender Warfare and Society in Medieval Europe,” *Women’s Studies* 17 (1990): 195, 197.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 197.

English and French Village Women in Wartime

Among the earliest civilian casualties of the Hundred Years War were the denizens of communities along England's southern coast.²⁸ In the first years of conflict, these individuals found themselves beset by the forces of French fleet commander, Nicolas Behuchet and his successors, most notably Robert Houdetot,²⁹ The French forces inflicted considerable physical and psychological damage upon the inhabitants of Portsmouth, Guernsey, and Southampton in 1338. In 1339, these same forces "raided from Cornwall to Kent, attacking Dover and Folkestone, putting the entire Isle of Wight to fire and sword, and even appearing in the Tharnes Estuary."³⁰

As civilians did not enjoy the same protections afforded prisoners of war, their lives and property were essentially forfeit, and men, women, and children found themselves fortunate simply to be left homeless. In March, 1338, for example, the damage to Portsmouth was apparently so severe that the only buildings to remain standing were the parish church of St. Thomas (now Portsmouth Cathedral) and the hospital *Domus Dei*.³¹ Southampton harbor remained closed for a year following the October, 1338 assault.³² Exactly how the civilians reacted to such disasters is not known, though it is clear that following the attacks they undertook the multitude of tasks necessary for the rebuilding of their burned and looted communities.

Philippe Contamine reminds us that the laws of chivalry (so beautifully illustrated in Honoré Bouvet's *Tree of Battles* that appeared some forty years after these raids) state that

²⁸ Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 36.

²⁹ Michael Hughes, "Fourteenth-Century French Raids on Hampshire and the Isle of Wight," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Rochester, N.Y., 1994), 125–26; W.C. Ormrod, "The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War," in *Arms*, 85 who considers the 1338 attack on Southampton as essentially an exceptional occurrence (it is the only coastal raid he specifically mentions), and who argues that no one in England during the Hundred Years War experienced "the realities of war" or "total war." Behuchet was captured by the English and executed in 1340, though, according to Hughes, raids continued until the 1360 treaty.

³⁰ Keen, *Laws*, 191; Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 70.

³¹ Hughes, "French Raids," 125.

³² Ormrod, "Domestic Response," 85.

no woman should be taken or carried off, whether married or free, nor should the harvest or houses be burnt, for this action affected the innocent and poor who had done nothing to deserve such punishment.³³

These rules, however, were not always adhered to by either side. Clearly, in both Portsmouth and Southampton, houses were destroyed, and if one of Bouvet's injunctions was violated, then it seems likely that others also would be.

Before the war, victims of this sort were unusual throughout much of England. With the notable exception of those living along the Welsh and Scottish marches, most of the English never experienced such injuries.³⁴ By contrast, their counterparts on the other side of the Channel were not so fortunate. Attacks that lasted sporadically for a quarter century in England were considerably more frequent and prolonged than those on the French coast.³⁵

The average villager of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France found him or herself beset on all sides. Bitter struggles among the forces of England, France, Brittany, Languedoc, and Burgundy left little of modern-day France untouched, and often the destruction wrought by these conflicts helped promote the advance of famine and plague.³⁶ Unlike the cities, most rural communities were neither built nor organized with a view to civic defense. At best they might have some walled spaces, or perhaps a stone church in which the civilians could seek refuge. Fourteenth-century chronicler Jean de Venette describes the horrors of the *chevauchées* in 1358 while highlighting the problems of civic defense:

In this same year the English entered Lagny, took the town, pillaged it, killed many men, took others as prisoners to their fortress of La

³³ Contamine, *War*, 274; Honoré Bouvet, *The Tree of Battles*, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1949), 185. For the violent reality of chivalry, see Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (New York, 1999), 225–30; Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven, Conn., 1984), 233–37.

³⁴ Froissart includes examples of Scottish and French raids into northern England: "So the Scots and the French made for the English border near Carlisle, through the forests and mountains, and they burned towns, villages, and houses along the border." *Froissart's Chronicles*, ed. and trans. John Joliffe (New York, 1967), 271.

³⁵ For the long-term effect of border wars on fourteenth-century England, see Richard Lomas, *North-East England in the Middle Ages* (Edinburgh, 1992), 32–52; Colm McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England, and Ireland 1306–1328* (East Lothian, Scot., 1997); John Aberth, *From the Brink of the Apocalypse* (New York, 2001), 37–55.

³⁶ Fowler, "Introduction," 13.

Ferte-sous-Jouarre, set fire to the town, and retreated unharmed, having encountered no opposition. . . . In this same year, in the Île de France and elsewhere, the peasants dwelling in open villages with no fortifications of their own made fortresses of their churches by surrounding them with good ditches, protecting the towers and belfries with planks as one does castles, and stocking them with stones and crossbows. Thus they could defend themselves if perchance enemies should attack them as, I have heard, they did fairly frequently.³⁷

It is logical that defensive measures of this nature would began to find their way into rural France, turning would-be raids into miniature sieges.³⁸ The effectiveness of such measures, however, remains questionable, especially when one considers that any sort of defensive stand consisted of hurriedly gathered, untrained villagers fighting against a force with superior numbers, training, and equipment.³⁹ While in rare instances these measures might prove successful, resistance usually proved futile and capitulation that occurred after resistance could be more costly than immediate unconditional surrender.⁴⁰ While there were some instances in which local "militias" managed

³⁷ *Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, 85.

³⁸ For long-term effect of such warfare on French village life, see Marc Bloch, *French Rural History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics*, trans. Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley, 1966), 112–26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 78–79 describes a carefully planned and orchestrated defense implemented by the people of Senlis against the troops of the duke of Normandy after his merciless devastation of Meaux. Unlike many communities, Senlis had received advance warning of the enemy's approach. Relying heavily on the use of surprise and defending the high ground, the townspeople so soundly defeated the attacking force that "many of the nobles were killed and those who escaped were forced to flee in confusion. When they got back to Meaux and related their misadventure, they were a laughing stock to all their friends." Also of note here is that the women of the town played a prominent role in its defense: they were placed at the windows "to pour great quantities of boiling water down upon the enemy." One example Froissart recounts of a force fearing an ambush is that of Louis of Navarre's capture of the town of La Charité. Froissart, trans. Joliffe, 187.

⁴⁰ Froissart, trans. Joliffe, 139 claims that the inhabitants of Poix agreed to pay only a ransom to Edward III in order to save their town. The king's marshals left a few men behind to collect the ransom. When the people of Poix saw this, "they refused to pay, and ran out to attack the English, who defended themselves stoutly and quickly sent to the army for help." The plan did not work, for the English rearguard returned and found their companions still fighting the people of the town. Almost all of the inhabitants of Poix were killed, the towns burned, and the two castles demolished." Michael Jones, "War and Fourteenth-Century France," in *Arms*, 112 contains Hugh de Montgeron's "letter to posterity written on the inside cover of a manuscript belonging to his house by the prior of Brailet (Yvone) in 1359." This describes the suffering inflicted upon the town of Chantecoq as a result of the castle's unwillingness to surrender.

to stave off an attack, all those who made a stand within the church could perish in an assault, as happened at Orly and Chartres in 1360.⁴¹

Since the *chevauchée* did not attempt to subjugate territory, its participants would give less consideration to preserving material or human resources; the chief purpose of such raids was to demoralize the enemy through destruction of lives and property, with a secondary focus on the collection of booty.⁴² These raids often proved successful in both respects; according to Froissart, the soldiers in the duke of Lancaster's 1346 foray into Poitou were "so laden with riches that they made no account of cloths unless they were of gold and silver, or trimmed with furs."⁴³

If a community was caught unawares by the advancing army (as seems to have been the case along the English seacoast and in French towns such as Lagny), it is doubtful that either men or women offered much resistance.⁴⁴ In any such crisis, both found themselves occupied with self preservation, running for their lives or seeking shelter in the church. The prior of Brailet, Hugh de Montgeron, describes the punishments he believes were inflicted upon some Frenchmen by their English captors. He also describes "huts in the woods" to which his community fled, as even his religious stature apparently afforded him no additional personal security.⁴⁵ In communities where someone sounded an alarm, the women, much like the men, had

⁴¹ *Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, 99–100; Wright *Knights and Peasants*, 68.

⁴² *Chevauchées* could create further havoc by the implementation of defensive measures. For instance, Monstrelet, trans. Johnes 1:228 recounts how the English forces "invaded the Boulonois, and did much mischief." The chronicler also claimed that the French king ordered additional forces for the region, "and thus was the country harassed on all sides." For *chevauchée* in the Hundred Years War, see Herbert J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–1357* (Manchester, 1958); idem, *The Organization of War under Edward III* (New York, 1966), 98–101; Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (Urbana, Ill., 1987), 54–57; Yuval Noah Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," *The Journal of Military History* 64 (2000): 300.

⁴³ Fowler, *Plantagenet and Valois*, 150.

⁴⁴ Monstrelet, trans. Johnes, 1:640.

⁴⁵ Jones, "War and Fourteenth-Century France," 112. Brigands might also disguise themselves as legitimate soldiers to give themselves the element of surprise. Froissart recounts that "various fortresses in the regions of Caux, Normandy, Beauce and Perche were still in the hands of large companies of brigands, some pretending to support the king of Navarre, others unashamedly pillaging and destroying the country for their own ends." Froissart, trans. Joliffe, 186.

specific roles to play in preparation for the invader's approach. Young women might be responsible for herding the livestock to safety. Such was the responsibility of the young Joan of Arc in Domrémy, where her father commanded the defenses.⁴⁶

If the town had a fortified church, women would be set to work inside in preparation for the building's defense: loading crossbows, boiling water, moving stones or other projectiles to be cast down upon the attackers. If there were no viable fortifications, or the community leaders saw fit to abandon their village, the women would accompany their husbands, and in all likelihood, be responsible for conducting their children to safety. They may also have prepared the supplies and food necessary to survive the passage of an enemy or band of raiders. If the raiding party was small enough, villagers might attempt resistance, occasionally managing to drive off or capture their tormentors. On the other hand, they often feared violent retribution for any harm inflicted upon "pillagers" (*pillars*).⁴⁷

That people fled or barricaded themselves in makeshift fortifications should hardly seem surprising. The laws and customs of war offered no protection for civilians.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the average medieval French villager would probably not be able to pay a ransom that made taking him hostage particularly worthwhile. In his letter of March, 1395 to Richard II, entreating the king to end hostilities, Philippe de Mezieres remarked on "the countless ills and cruelties which occur in war, against and outside the laws of chivalry."⁴⁹ Soldiers and marauders had no compunctions about destroying the homes of the civilians, nor did they think twice about carrying off or otherwise

⁴⁶ Wright, *Knights and Peasants*, 114.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 97–98. In both the book and article consulted for this paper, Wright provides anecdotal evidence from Chancery registers JJ 104–112 for several circumstances, including one town in which the residents fled for ten days from two brigands.

⁴⁸ Wright, "Pillagers," 16–17; Keen, *Laws*, 191. Froissart also records an instance in which Edward III "halted the troops and ordered them on pain of death to do no damage to the town, either by burning or in any other way." However, in the chroincler's opinion, Edward's motives were not noble or altruistic, since it was clear that Edward "wished to spend a day or two there, to find out where he could most easily cross the river Somme, which, as you shall hear, it was necessary for him to do." Froissart, trans. Joliffe, 139.

⁴⁹ Philippe De Mezieres, *Letter to King Richard II*, ed. and trans. G.W. Coopland (New York, 1976), 53.

violating women.⁵⁰ Although some commanders issued proclamations in an attempt to protect the lives (if not the property or dwellings) of civilians, their effectiveness was questionable. For example, the *Chronique de Mont-Saint-Michel* records the duke of Bedford, acting on behalf of the infant King Henry VI of England (1422–1461) issuing the following order:

We wish and therefore command you that all men-at-arms who have come from England whom you may find living off the land or practicing theft or extortion upon the poor people, should be taken by you and put into prison, where they shall be punished as was formerly ordered both by the king and by us.⁵¹

It is unclear just how many individuals were arrested for committing such offenses, although records do survive that tell of English soldiers caught and charged with their crimes.⁵² Even in those instances, however, there was no guarantee that the offenders would be punished. Soldiers could receive pardons for good service, as with Nicholas de Bolton in 1350. De Bolton had been charged with the rape of Eleanor de Merton, but Edward III (1327–1377) pardoned him “in consideration of good service in a late conflict at Calais.”⁵³

In the villages and small towns of the Channel coast and throughout the French countryside, women exercised certain specific responsibilities occasioned by war, but did not ordinarily join their men in open battles. They did participate, however, in the defense of fortified churches or buildings. While their roles were largely passive and reactive in nature, they were no less vital. Given the ineffectiveness of resistance, driving to safety a herd of sheep was at least as important as firing a bow or swinging a sword when it came to maintaining the community’s well being.

⁵⁰ Froissart recounts an example of lawless, leaderless men assaulting, torturing and murdering knights and their families. In one instance, the men raped the knight’s wife and daughter in front of him, and then killed his wife and children before killing him. *Historiens et Chroniqueurs du Moyen Age*. ed. Albert Pauphilet (Paris, 1952), 393: “*et violerent sa femme et sa fille les plusieurs, voyant le chevalier; puis tuerent la femme qui estoit enceinte et grosse d’enfant, et sa fille, et tous les enfans, et puis le dit chevalier a grand martyre, et ardirent et abattirent le chastel.*”

⁵¹ Quoted in Allmand, “War and the Non-Combatant,” 167. Allmand, “War,” 172 also makes reference to a proclamation issued by Henry V “granting the royal protection to all women, children and churchmen.”

⁵² See Philippa Maddern, *Violence and Social Order* (New York, 1992), 2–13 for a convincing argument against taking a quantitative approach in assessing crime rates and violence in medieval society.

⁵³ The Letter Patent is reproduced on Goldberg 256.

Women Under Siege

To understand the circumstances of siege warfare and the roles women performed as defenders requires us to shift our focus from a rural to an urban landscape, where women were more actively involved than in the small villages of the *plat pays*.⁵⁴

Invading armies found tactically-important regions endowed with considerable resources, castles, and walled cities both necessary and appealing targets. Sieges were by far the most usual type of military action during the Hundred Years War.⁵⁵ Such events followed a general pattern ranging from massive assault to blockade and starvation. Most sieges involved bombardment, using the latest in military technology. During the Hundred Years War, besieging armies made use of the most powerful form of counterweight artillery, the trebuchet, and early forms of cannon such as the bombard and the mortar.⁵⁶ While primarily used for battering down fortress walls, such weapons could also set fire to the town or even spread disease among the defenders.

Within a city under siege, the populace fell into three categories: the inhabitants, refugees who had flocked into the town, and the military garrison. While the garrison troops might help in the defense of the town itself, they would often flee into the tower or fortress if the outer wall were breached. J.R. Hale stresses the level of cooperation between the garrison and the townspeople that grew out of

⁵⁴ Fowler, *Age of Plantagenet and Valois*, 152; Philip Warner, *Sieges of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1968), 32–34.

⁵⁵ Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 155–56 provides a useful map of the sieges of the Hundred Years War. Allmand, "War and the Non-Combatant," 166, argues that castles and fortified towns had the latent effect of perpetuating the struggle, for "the longer foreign armies were present on French soil, the more all classes of French society were likely to suffer."

⁵⁶ For counterweight and gunpowder weapons in era of the Hundred Years War, Paul E. Chevedden, Les Eigenbrod, Vernard Foley, and Werner Soedel, "The Trebuchet," *Scientific American* 273 (July, 1995): 66–71; Paul E. Chevedden, Donald J. Kagay, Zvi Shiller, and Samuel Gilbert, "The Traction Trebuchet: A Triumph of Four Civilizations," *Viator* 31 (2000): 433–86; Kelly DeVries, "Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Modern State," *War in History* 5 (1998): 127–45; idem, "The Use of Gunpowder Weaponry By and Against Joan of Arc during the Hundred Years War," *War and Society* 14 (1996): 1–16; Bert S. Hall, "The Changing Face of Siege Warfare: Technology and Tactics in Transition," in *Medieval City*, 257–75; idem, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics* (Baltimore, 1997), 41–66.

shared urgency.⁵⁷ However, in the most desperate hours of a siege garrisons often abandoned civilians to their fate and withdrew into the fortified inner sanctum.⁵⁸ As a result, citizens not only had to defend their own walls and finance the defense, they would pay the most serious consequences if that defense failed.⁵⁹

In cities as in villages, women had specific tasks and responsibilities when their community attempted to withstand a siege. Once again, their roles were largely supportive in nature. They helped repair damaged fortifications and constructed secondary defenses. Referring to a slightly later period (the 1524 siege of Marseilles), J.R. Hale states that “women of all ranks toiled with spades and wheelbarrows.”⁶⁰ Women also were pressed into service preparing and delivering siege munitions: boiling water, fat, lead, or pitch; quicklime; stones; sulphur powder; caltrops; and incendiary devices, as well as ammunition for artillery pieces.⁶¹ This support function was a significant responsibility for women, one that Linda DuPauw quite reasonably describes as “usual.”⁶²

At times, women even participated in actual combat. Men in the community would often be occupied with missile weapons such as bows, crossbows, and guns. On the other hand, pouring boiling substances required no such skills, and could thus be performed by any

⁵⁷ J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620* (New York, 1985), 191. Bruce Allen Watson, *Sieges: A Comparative Study* (Westport, Conn., 1993), 39 makes a similar remark regarding “those un-armed civilians” in Malta during the 1555 siege by Suleiman: “The defenders could not have survived without them.”

⁵⁸ Anne Curry, “Towns at War: Relations Between the Towns of Normandy and Their English Rulers, 1417–1450,” in *Towns and Townspeople in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. John A.F. Thomson (Wolboro, N.H., 1988), 161, 163; Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 156 cites the example of Caen in 1346, when “the knights locked in the great tower watched the carnage below.”

⁵⁹ Curry, “Towns,” 153.

⁶⁰ Hale, *War and Society*, 191–92. Hale also describes women during the siege of Siena in 1552–53 being organized into labor crews, with the threat of capital punishment for anyone who failed to comply. Watson, *Sieges*, 30 provides an interesting example that demonstrates that women defenders could be active in Islamic culture as well. At the siege of Jerusalem in 1099, according to Raymond of Le Puy, two Moslem women “were trying, for whatever reasons, to bewitch a Crusader catapult as a stone shot from a Moslem catapult hit and killed them, together with some slaves.”

⁶¹ Malcolm Hebron, *The Medieval Siege: Theme and image in Middle English Romance* (New York, 1997), 29 even includes beehives as a possible countermeasure; Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 159, 164; Régine Pemoud, *Joan of Arc by Herself and Her Witnesses*, trans. Edward Hyams (New York, 1966), 73, 120.

⁶² De Pauw, *Battle Cries*, 95.

defender, male or female. For example, Jean de Venette describes women pouring boiling water on the attackers during the 1358 attack on Senlis.⁶³

Both contemporary chroniclers and modern military scholars show great interest in the technology of warfare;⁶⁴ on the other hand, very little mention is ever made of the suffering incurred by those subjected to this technology. For example, Malcolm Hebron and Jim Bradbury both describe the preparation of a variety of materials to be thrown or poured over walls in a siege defense, but say nothing of those on the other side of the wall.⁶⁵ By contrast, men and women of the age were neither ignorant of nor immune to the horrors of siege warfare; they witnessed firsthand the effects of their actions.

One instance that regularly attracts the attention of scholars was the death of young Sir Edmund Springhouse, killed in the English siege of Caen (1417). According to the chroniclers, on this occasion, the English scaling ladders were too short and were easily pushed away by the defenders. Springhouse was knocked off his ladder into a ditch "whereupon the French threw flaming straw on top of him and burnt him alive, an atrocity which enraged the English."⁶⁶ Though Desmond Seward was clearly horrified by this event, he does not seem to recognize that Springhouse personifies the rule rather than the exception. In fierce struggles such as the fighting at Caen, defenders would do anything possible to beat back the attackers. And as the sex of Springhouse's killer(s) remains unknown, it is entirely possible that those who cast the burning straw upon him were women. While women may not have remained in combat for any prolonged period, they could (and doubtless did) fight as fiercely and mercilessly as their men, since they faced the same fate (or worse) if their city or town fell to enemy forces.⁶⁷

⁶³ *Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, 78–79.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Allmand, *War and Society*, 132–33 for Froissart's account of the Black Prince's attack on Limoges, which discusses use of mining to destroy the wall, but does not address anyone who may have been harmed in the blast or the initial attack before the inhabitants were overwhelmed.

⁶⁵ Hebron, *Medieval Siege*, 29; Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 159, 164. Although Hebron's example refers to a siege in the literature of the era, it serves as an archetype for the medieval siege which could be relentless, and merciless. See De Pauw, *Battle Cries*, 17 for more on the downplaying of women's roles in combat throughout history.

⁶⁶ Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 172.

⁶⁷ Contamine, *War*, 290–91; Keen, *Laws*, 121.

Among the most widely-known examples of successful assault-based sieges during the Hundred Years War were the Black Prince's sack of Limoges in 1370 and the attack of Henry V (1413–1422) on Caen in 1417. In both cases, chroniclers have recorded the events in horrific detail. Neither of the conquered cities was offered or accepted terms of surrender, and each ultimately paid a heavy price. Their walls were breached by a combination of bombardment and undermining, after which both endured a massacre.⁶⁸ Froissart describes the taking of Limoges in vivid detail:

On the next day, as the Prince had ordered it, a large section of the wall was blown up, filling in the ditch at the place where it fell. The English saw this happen with pleasure, for they were all prepared, armed and drawn up in their ranks, ready to enter the town when the moment should come. The foot-soldiers were able to enter this way with ease: on entering, they ran to the gate, cut the supporting bars, and knocked it down, together with the barriers. And all this was done so suddenly that the townspeople were not expecting it. Then the Prince, the duke of Lancaster, the earl of Cambridge, the earl of Pembroke, Sir Guiscard d'Angle and all the others, together with their men, rushed in . . . all prepared to do harm and ransack the town, and to kill men, women, and children; for this is what they had been ordered to do. This was a most terrible thing; men, women and children threw themselves on their knees before the Prince crying "Mercy, gentle sires, have mercy." But he was so enraged by hatred that he heard none of them; thus none, neither man nor woman, was heeded, and all were put to the sword, . . . wherever they were found . . . men and women who were in no way guilty . . . More than three thousand persons, men, women and children, were killed and executed on that day.⁶⁹

The women of Limoges found that their gender afforded them no protection, regardless of any chivalric ideals or literary traditions; they were executed alongside their husbands and their children. In the words of the chronicler, "Limoges was mercilessly pillaged and looted, and the whole city burnt and destroyed."⁷⁰

The inhabitants of a city that resisted were given no quarter because they were all viewed as contributors to the defense.⁷¹ Even

⁶⁸ Mining underneath the walls to bring them down was, like much of medieval siege strategy, based on the Roman model, particularly as set forth by Vegetius. Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 6–7.

⁶⁹ Reprinted in Allmand, *Society at War*, 132–33.

⁷⁰ *Contemporary Chronicles of the Hundred Years War*, ed. and trans. P.E. Thompson (London, 1966), 140.

⁷¹ Keen, *Laws*, 121; Hale, *War and Society*, 192.

if no women cast stones or poured molten substances down upon the invaders, they had at least loaded or transported the material, freeing the men for the duties of active defense. Hence, anyone inside a city which resisted, regardless of age or gender, was deemed guilty of having stood against the victors, who exacted a heavy price.⁷²

Nearly half a century after Limoges, the seizure of Caen followed a strikingly similar pattern.⁷³ Henry V set his men to work at several different points along the walls. The defenders could not work quickly enough to shore up the defenses, which were soon breached in several places.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the city refused to surrender. Henry and his brother, the duke of Clarence, now led assaults from the east and west respectively, meeting in the middle of the city. Enraged by the defenders' obstinacy, the king ordered the destruction all of Caen's inhabitants that could be found.⁷⁵ Over two thousand men, women and children were executed that day, and those who survived were left to suffer "all the horrors of plunder and rape."⁷⁶

From the besieger's point of view, women were considered no different from men. They were as much an enemy as any man who had fired a culverin or shot an arrow. They had cost the lives of soldiers on the victor's side; consequently, they would be treated no more mercifully than a male combatant. This view is not altogether unjustifiable, as women certainly played critical roles in resisting a siege; they supplied weapons, missiles, and equipment, tended the wounded, reinforced and repaired the defenses, perhaps even pushed aside scaling ladders or poured molten substances on the besieging forces.⁷⁷

⁷² Enguerrand de Monstrelet provides another particularly savage example of a town taken in a siege: the capture of Soissons by King Charles of France. His men went beyond the "normal" actions of rape, murder and plunder, "they despoiled the churches and monasteries. They even took and robbed the most part of the sacred shrines of many bodies of saints, which they stripped of all the precious stones, gold and silver, together with many other jewels and holy things appertaining to the aforesaid churches." He was particularly horrified because "the many persons of high rank that were present, and who made no efforts to check them." Monstrelet, trans. Johnes, 1:302-303.

⁷³ Desmond Seward, *Henry V as Warlord* (New York, 1987), 98-110.

⁷⁴ Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 172.

⁷⁵ Curry, "Towns," 157.

⁷⁶ Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 172.

⁷⁷ De Pauw, *Battle Cries*, 17.

Women and Starvation Sieges

During a siege that depended on starvation rather than assault, the primary concern of those within the city was to find enough food to survive. Anyone who did not contribute substantially to the war effort was an unnecessary mouth to feed and in some cases was forced to leave. By successfully blockading a fortified site, the attackers simply needed to outwait its inhabitants, who daily watched their food supply dwindle, often with the simultaneous onset of contagion. Cities held out as long as they could, but were often forced to surrender if no relief arrived. The siege of Calais by Edward III in 1346–1347 and that of Rouen by Henry V in 1418, amply illustrate this.

Having attempted unsuccessfully to take the extremely well-fortified city of Calais by storm, Edward decided to blockade it and starve out its defenders. Although Philip VI of France (1328–1350) attempted to send relief to the inhabitants, according to Jean de Venette, “those entrusted with the provisions for the men of Calais, so it is said, converted them to their own uses.”⁷⁸ As the remaining supplies dwindled, the defenders were forced to subsist on horses, mice, and rats while “many were dying miserably of hunger.”⁷⁹ Around Christmas, 1346, the city, in an effort to conserve what little food remained, expelled hundreds of poor men, women, and children.⁸⁰ Trapped between the city walls and the blockading army and already starving, most of them had little hope of survival. Edward, however, permitted them to pass through his lines and in a show of Christmas spirit, apparently gave each of them a meal and a penny or two.⁸¹

Ultimately the French king marshaled an army and advanced on the beleaguered city with the intention of raising the siege, but he never engaged Edward’s forces; after setting up camp for a short time, he marched away, leaving the starving inhabitants to fend for themselves. Despairing, malnourished, and disgusted with the French king, Calais finally surrendered. According to Jean le Bel, Edward III:

sent his marshals, Sir Walter de Manny and several others into the town to take possession of it, ordering them to take [commander] Jean

⁷⁸ *Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, 45.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ How many were expelled is uncertain. Seward sets the approximate number at five hundred, Bradbury a seventeen hundred. Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 69; Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 157.

⁸¹ *Contemporary Chronicles*, 79–80.

de Vienne and some of the others and sent them to England, and that all the soldiers and townspeople should be turned out of the town in the clothes they had on and nothing else. These orders were carried out.⁸²

Although everyone, with the exception of the six wealthiest burghers, was free to go most of their property was lost. Throughout the starvation siege of Calais, men and women shared the same fate: they were either turned out by their neighbors or later by the English. No proclamations insisted that women be treated differently.⁸³

The horrors of the Calais siege find a counterpart nearly seventy-five years later at Rouen.⁸⁴ Once again an English king, this time Henry V, blockaded the city and called for its surrender, while he awaited supplies from England.⁸⁵ Food quickly became scarce within the city walls. According to English soldier, John Page, "Thirty pence was charged for a rat, sixpence for a mouse. The diet was enlivened by vegetable peelings and dock roots. Girls sold themselves for a crust of bread."⁸⁶ Rouen endured, subsisting on little more than rumors that relief was on the way. The poor were expelled from the city, though now in far greater numbers: Seward estimates that no fewer than twelve thousand men, women, and children, some as young as two or three were forced to leave.⁸⁷ Unlike his great-grandfather, however, Henry V did not permit the expelled individuals to pass through his army; they remained trapped between the city walls and the besiegers. Women and children were driven from the city along with men. Page, a witness of this event, describes: "a woman . . . clutching her dead child to her breast to warm it, and a child . . . sucking the breast of its dead mother."⁸⁸ He characterized the citizens of Rouen as "wretched people . . . some starving to death, some unable to open their eyes and no longer breathing, others

⁸² Ibid., 82.

⁸³ Bradbury does include one unusual anecdote regarding an act of chivalry at the siege of Rennes in 1356. Olivier de Mauny swam the moat to engage in single combat with John Bolton for a bag of six partridges with the agreement that if de Mauny was victorious, the partridges would be used to feed the women of the besieged city. De Mauny won and returned with the birds. Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 160.

⁸⁴ Seward, *Henry V*, 111–20.

⁸⁵ Allmand, *Society at War*, 71.

⁸⁶ Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 169.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 169–70; Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 176.

⁸⁸ Seward, *Hundred Years War*, 176.

cowering on their knees as thin as twigs.”⁸⁹ Enguerrand de Monstrelet reports that “four gentlemen and four citizens of Rouen” went to Beauvais to request the king’s help. They informed him that thousands of persons were dead of hunger within their town; and that, from the beginning of October, they had already been forced to live on horses, dogs, cats, mice and rats, and other things unfit for human consumption. They consequently drove twelve thousand poor men, women and children, out of the city, and then watched most of them perish wretchedly in the town moat. The defenders did take pity on the newly-born infants of these refugee women, hauling them up in baskets so they would not die without the benefit of baptism.⁹⁰

Rouen finally surrendered in January 1419, and, only with his victory, did Henry allow the starving inhabitants to be fed. Unlike Edward, he did not expel the remaining population, but instead re-fortified the city and installed his own garrison and administration.

Again, there is no evidence to indicate that women received better treatment than men in either assault-based or starvation sieges. They contributed to the defense of their cities, witnessed and committed atrocities, and, in they end, starved and died alongside their men.

Women in Command

Long before the beginnings of the Hundred Years War, women were occasionally responsible for commanding territorial defense. In Christine de Pizan’s *Livre de la Cité de Dames*, we find examples of both legendary and historical women who assumed the mantle of authority.⁹¹ It was not uncommon for a lord to entrust his holdings to his wife, his sister, or even his mother in his own absence. The great French king, Louis IX (1226–1270), when leaving on crusade, told his mother, Blanche of Castille: “I leave my three children for your

⁸⁹ Ibid., 177.

⁹⁰ Monstrelet, trans. Johnes, 1:408.

⁹¹ See for example Christine de Pizan, *Book*, 32–36, 59–60. Though most of her warrior women and mistresses of statecraft and queenship are of classical and/or mythological origin, the above pages include some more contemporary and concrete examples. Many of these mythical personages (such as the Amazons) were considered to have been historical figures in Christine’s time.

wards. I leave this realm of France to you to govern it. Truly I know that they well guarded and it well governed be.⁹²

In the same period, the earl of Pembroke wrote to his wife, to informing her that she would be responsible for commanding the defense of the castle of Winchester:

Know that we are sending Sir Robert de Immer to supply the castle of Winchester with corn and provisions, and to stay with you to defend the aforesaid castle with Sir Martin de Roches and Philip le Clerik. And . . . commend them on our behalf that they act in all things with one accord and one counsel. And we give you power over them all . . . to ordain and arrange in all things according to that which you shall see to be best to do. In witness whereof we send you these our letters patent.⁹³

Such cases show that women might be expected to serve in the stead of their husbands, sons, or brothers if the need arose.⁹⁴ Megan McLaughlin has suggested that some noble women might even have received rudimentary military training to prepare them for a military crisis.⁹⁵ Running a household would not alone have served as an effective education for overseeing a defense, even though both functions required an ability to organize, plan, command, and administer. Since a city or castle would be more susceptible to attack in the absence of its lord, there would be an even greater premium placed on having present a woman capable of conducting a defense. During the Hundred Years War, both English and French noble

⁹² "Female Heroes: The Women Left Behind." <http://www.womeninworldhistory.com/heroine3.html>. An equally illuminating quote from the same site comes from Lady Alice Knyvet, who, when her husband's castle was attacked said: "I will not leave possession of this castle to die therefore; and if you begin to break the peace or make war to get the place of me, I shall defend me. For rather I in such wise to die than to be slain when my husband cometh home, for he charged me to keep it." Apparently, a woman in command was no more expected to surrender without a fight than a man.

⁹³ *Voice*, trans. Moriarty, 138. The date is May 29, 1267.

⁹⁴ Elshtan *Women*, 133; Contamine, *War*, 241. Perhaps the most famous example of a woman in command from the time of the Hundred Years War (aside from Joan of Arc) is "Margaret Paston's Preparations for Lord Moleyns' Attack on the Manor-House at Gresham, 1448" from the Paston letters included in *Women of the English Nobility and Gentry 1066-1500*, ed. and trans Jennifer C. Ward (New York, 1995), 121. Margaret wrote to her husband to request armor, poleaxes, and crossbows for the defense of the manor because "your houses here are so low that no man can shoot out with a longbow."

⁹⁵ McLaughlin, "Woman Warrior," 202.

women were often placed in this position. Hearing a rumor of a possible French invasion while he was off fighting in Scotland, Edward III ordered three women, Margaret, widow of the earl of Kent, Marie, widow of the earl of Pembroke, and Joan, wife of Thomas Botetourt, to assist in the defense of the realm:

Desiring to meet the cunning and presumptuous villainy [of our enemies], and to provide for the salvation and defense of our realm and people, with the Lord's inspiration, and fully trusting in the maturity of your counsel and of other prelates and magnates in your region, we firmly order you in the faith and love in which you are bound to us that, leaving everything else, you should send some of the more discreet of your close advisers to London . . . Notwithstanding this, you should meanwhile arm and array your people, so that they are well arrayed and may set out promptly with other of our faithful men for the defense of the realm and people, and of you and yours, to repel powerfully and courageously the presumptuous boldness and malice of our same enemies, with God's help, if those enemies invade. You and the rest of our realm are bound in every possible way to give help for the defense of the kingdom against hostile invasions of this kind, especially as we are in remote parts for the realm's defense, and we are heartily assuming that you would not deservedly be blamed for any negligence or lukewarmness in so great and so arduous a business, but rather be commended for showing strength and mature counsels.⁹⁶

Not only were these women required to provide the crown services of their advisors, they were also called upon to arm their servants and tenants as a means of beating back an attack. Edward placed the same sort of faith in his queen, Philippa de Hainault, leaving her in charge of the defense of his realm while he campaigned in France. She served as regent until the Scots were vanquished and their king made a prisoner. At that point, according to chronicler Jean le Bel, the queen crossed the Channel (at no small risk to herself) to be with her husband.⁹⁷

The Hundred Years War provides other important examples of women in command. In 1343, while awaiting the arrival of her ally, Edward III, the countess de Montfort found herself under siege at Hennebont on the Breton coast. Froissart recounts the tale of how

⁹⁶ *Women of the English Nobility*, 146–47.

⁹⁷ *Contemporary Chronicles*, 75. According to Froissart, trans. Joliffe, 152, Edward III's queen, Philippa, led the English army against the Scots at Nevill's Cross, in 1346. Joliffe considers this to be unlikely "and not mentioned in earlier English sources."

the fully-armored countess mustered troops, while "mounted on a fine courser."⁹⁸ He also describes how she recognized the vulnerabilities of her enemy and took a calculated risk leading to a victory:

The countess studied the enemy positions from a tower and discovered that most of the Blois army was concentrating for a major assault on the town, leaving their camp exposed. She led three hundred horsemen out from a side gate and charged into the enemy camp, setting the tents on fire. Seeing the flames, the men of Blois abandoned the assault, and the countess escaped to Brest where she met the English army.⁹⁹

Nearly a century later, during a period when the French were besieging English towns, the wife of the English captain of Cherbourg was left to command the garrison in place of her absent husband.¹⁰⁰ As the invaders were steadily and successfully working their way into the town, she donned trousers "to encourage the garrison to resist."¹⁰¹ Later, she was seen "putting on a skirt to use her feminine charm in getting a good deal in the negotiations."¹⁰² Though her efforts were not as successful as those of the countess of Montfort, they showed no less ingenuity, and allowed the captain's wife to exhibit masculinity to her own troops while stressing her femininity to the enemy. Duchess Jacqueline of Bavaria, who escaped her imprisonment in Ghent, was another good example of "unwomanly" ingenuity. According to Enguerrand de Monstrelet,

she dressed herself in man's clothes, as did one of her women, and quitting her apartments unobserved, they mounted horses which were waiting for them, and, escorted by two men, rode off full gallop from Ghent to Antwerp, where she re-assumed her female dress.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Quotes in Contamine, *War*, 242. It should be noted that Contamine's translator, Michael Jones expresses his skepticism regarding Froissart's credibility regarding this particular story. For my purposes, the veracity of the tale is less significant than what was believed at the time. See Michael Jones, "The Breton Civil War," in *Froissart, Historian*, ed. J.J.N. Palmer (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1981), 68-69.

⁹⁹ De Pauw, *Battle Cries*, 95.

¹⁰⁰ My source for information regarding the wife of the Cherbourg captain (Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 176) does not provide her name. It may be that it has not survived, or that his source [A.E. Burne *The Agincourt War* (London, 1956), 324] did not reveal it.

¹⁰¹ Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 176.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Monstrelet, trans Johnes, 1:528.

These examples point to more than military training or a husband's confidence in his wife, or even the cleverness of the woman who assumed command. They speak to a particular set of historical circumstances involving the notion of "time out of time" or the "world upside down."¹⁰⁴ Warfare simply did not permit life to go on within accepted peacetime norms. As a result, regularly-accepted gender roles were sacrificed to the necessity of protecting lives and property. In two examples provided above, the countess of Montfort and the captain of Cherbourg's wife acted adroitly; undoubtedly because of this they captured the attention of the chroniclers who recorded their deeds. Yet in all likelihood, they merely exemplify a larger phenomenon: women directing men in battle.

Joan of Arc

No treatment of the role of women in the Hundred Years War would be complete without briefly considering the conflict's most visible female figure, the only woman who played a major role on the battlefield, the Maid of Orleans, Joan of Arc. The literature on this pivotal figure is enormous and continues to appear at a prodigious rate. Over the centuries, the Maid (*la Pucelle*) has been viewed in different ways. Her English enemies and their allies originally regarded Joan as a witch and heretic, whose success in battle was diabolically inspired. By contrast, from the start, the French have considered her a national hero, a woman embodying the French spirit and inspired by God through saintly voices, who helped free her country from its oppressors. An acknowledgement by the church that she was divinely inspired led eventually to her canonization (1920).

This has led some to question whether in the final years of her life Joan should be viewed as a woman or as a tool of the Almighty, as an androgyne, largely stripped of her womanhood, a sexless being whose gender (perhaps even humanity) had been sacrificed to duty, not unlike the cleric or nun expected to discard all notions of gender and sexuality upon taking the cloth.

It became Joan's overriding concern to drive the English out of her homeland and have the dauphin, the future Charles VII (1422–1461), proclaimed sovereign of France. In moving to break the siege

¹⁰⁴ Bakhtin, *Rabelais*, 6.

of Orleans, she sent messengers to the English commanders proclaiming that "I have been sent by God, the king of Heaven, to drive you, body for body, out of all France."¹⁰⁵ It should be noted, however, that she did not bring to the task a trained military mind and often relied upon her professional advisers. In his chronicle, Monstrelet refuses to give Joan sole credit for the rescue of Orleans, her greatest military feat, reminding his readers of "all the most expert and gallant captains who for the most part had daily served at this siege of Orleans."¹⁰⁶ Despite this, the Maid must have possessed a natural talent for leading and inspiring an army on the battlefield for as one contemporary observed: "she behaved as if she had been the shrewdest captain in the world and had all her life been learning the art of war."¹⁰⁷ Her repeated military successes during a period of English ascendance has made "Joan, the Defender of France" into an icon that permeates French consciousness to this day.¹⁰⁸

It is useful to consider how Joan envisioned her role and how that role fit into the Christian tradition. Among contemporary scholars, there is considerable agreement concerning Joan's self-image: she appears to have regarded herself as a tool of God, chosen expressly for the purpose of freeing France from internal strife and external oppressors.¹⁰⁹ Sven Stolpe argues that Joan "found it natural and reasonable that God should have chosen a weak and unknown woman for the defence of the country and the Church."¹¹⁰ Apparently, others shared her conviction. There could be no other logical reason for entrusting an illiterate, untried peasant girl with command of an army, were it not for the belief that there was something very special about her.

Believing that she was God's chosen instrument, Joan eschewed the standard elements of womanhood. She also demanded a standard of piety rarely observed in a military force. She forbade swearing

¹⁰⁵ DePauw, *Battle Cries*, 96.

¹⁰⁶ Monstrelet, trans. Johnes, 1:553.

¹⁰⁷ DePauw, *Battle Cries*, 96. This statement was made by one of Joan's opponents.

¹⁰⁸ Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (London, 1999).

¹⁰⁹ Pernoud, *Joan of Arc*, 70; Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* (New York, 1981), 146; Sven Stolpe, *The Maid of Orleans*, trans. Eric Lewenhaupt (London, 1956), 26, 91.

¹¹⁰ Stolpe, *Maid*, 26. The author bases this rationale on examples of such contemporary female saints as Catherine of Siena (1347?–1380) and Bridget of Sweden (1303–1373) who established a powerful precedent for Joan's mission to the *Dauphin*.

and ordered her soldiers to take confession before going into battle.¹¹¹ Fifteenth-century depictions of Joan in Martial d'Auvergne's *Vigiles* portray her as a pious young woman expecting the same from others. In the accompanying illustration from Auvergne [Figure 2], she is driving out of the camp the less-than-pious camp followers, wives as well as prostitutes.

Although Joan took no religious vows, her conduct often mirrored that of a nun or canoness. By entering the service of God, even if unofficially, she had become something other than simply a woman, if not a man, at least a "not-female" figure.¹¹² On this matter, a father of the church, St. Jerome, went so far as to say

As long as a woman is for birth and children, she is different from man as body is from soul. But when she wishes to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be a woman and will be called man.¹¹³

Sources stress that Joan retained her virginity. What is more, they do not mention her having killed anyone in battle; if true, this would have permitted the maid to observe the Ten Commandments while still fulfilling her divine mission.¹¹⁴

Over the centuries, much has been made of her male attire. In 1431, the issue of her transvestism was central to her trial; it has remained a subject of debate among scholars. It is important to recognize that while the practical demands of the battlefield necessitated adopting men's clothing, Joan persisted in wearing it long after her capture and throughout most of her trial. Under interrogation, she explained repeatedly that God had instructed her to forego women's attire.¹¹⁵ Marina Warner has argued that this cross-dressing enabled Joan to assume a "different third order, neither male nor female, but unearthly, like the angels whose company she loved."¹¹⁶ For his part, Sven Stolpe described Joan's life as an *imitatio Christi*, a practice which according to Caroline Walker Bynum falls clearly within the realm of medieval female piety.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ Pernoud, *Joan of Arc*, 23–24, 87, 169; Warner, *Joan*, 15–24.

¹¹² Warner, *Joan*, 151.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹¹⁴ Stolpe, *Maid*, 141.

¹¹⁵ Pernoud, *Joan of Arc*, 174.

¹¹⁶ Warner, *Joan*, 145–46.

¹¹⁷ Stolpe, *Maid*, 167; Caroline Walker Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley, 1987), 119.

Conclusion

Although women in the Hundred Years War did not commonly appear on the battlefield, they did experience at first hand many of the horrors of war, especially during sieges and the pillaging of towns and villages by warrior bands that characterized the period. The number of medieval women involved in war has led Megan McLaughlin to observe that female warriors were "more common in the Middle Ages than in the classical world or in early modern Europe, and certainly more common than has usually been assumed."¹¹⁸ Though men surely dominated the offensive side of combat, women played significant supporting roles, often participating actively in the defense of hearth and home. Not infrequently, they suffered the same harsh fate as frontline combatants. Even Joan of Arc, one of the few women of the era to experience the battlefield firsthand, fell into the tradition of women participating on the defensive side of warfare, as she fought to defend her king and country. In some sense, this epitomizes the female role in war right down to the twentieth century. Although portrayed as a young woman in all World War II iconography, Rosie the Riveter is in reality far older than typically imagined.

¹¹⁸ McLaughlin, "Woman Warrior," 196.



Figure 1. Rosie the Riveter.



Figure 2. Joan of Arc driving out Camp Followers.

JUST WAR, JOAN OF ARC, AND THE POLITICS OF SALVATION

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The Christian doctrine of “just war” infused the Armagnac struggle in the Hundred Years War with an imperative to liberate the French kingdom from its foreign oppressors and uphold the sacred kingship of the Valois line. French just war ideology¹ was distinctively spiritual, claiming God’s command to take up arms against the prideful English invaders who defiled French soil and caused profound suffering for the French people. While there exists a sizeable scholarly literature on the development of just war doctrine among the French educated elite, especially on the part of official propagandists such as Jean de Montreuil and Jean Juvenal des Ursins,² the significance of the Armagnac ideology as a popular movement voiced by the uneducated as well as educated, poets as well as soldiers, women as

¹ In this essay, the term “ideology” does not carry the negative connotations it might engender in some academic circles. Instead, I employ the term sociologically: to describe a social framework that unifies individuals around an ideal or set of ideals, thereby establishing corporate identity. The term “movement” refers to the array of activities spawned by popular adherence to such an ideology. These activities often include the waging of war.

² The path-breaking study on French loyalist propaganda in the Hundred Years War is provided by P.S. Lewis, “War, Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, ser. 5, vol. 15, 1–21. More recently, Craig Taylor has built fruitfully upon Lewis’s legacy in two articles: “Sir John Fortescue and the French Polemical Treatises of the Hundred Years War,” *English Historical Review*, 114 (1999), pp. 112–29; “War, Propaganda and Diplomacy in Fifteenth Century France and England,” in *War, Government and Society in Late Medieval France*, ed. C.T. Allmand (Liverpool, 2000), 70–91. Leading works on just war ideology in medieval Europe beyond France include the following: *War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. C.T. Allmand (New York, 1976); Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (New York:, 1984); James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200–1740* (Princeton, 1975); James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton, 1981); Alfred Vanderpol, *La doctrine scolastique du droit du guerre* (Paris, 1919); Richard B. Miller, *Interpretations of the Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism and the Just-War Tradition* (Chicago, 1991); Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975).

well as men, peasants as well as nobles, lay people as well as clergy, has heretofore been overlooked. Diverse strata of French society united during this era of prolonged social conflict in a distinctive spirituality of prophetic, political resistance that instilled a broad-reaching sense of *peoplehood* and energized a new humanism in France and across Europe. Social values embracing vernacular culture, national identity, and personal freedom took root in the just war ideology espoused by the Armagnac faction and fostered democratic ideals that have engaged modern western culture.

This freshly evolving self-definition of French society cleared a path for Joan of Arc (1412–31) to demonstrate that even the very least among the kingdom's supporters—a young and uneducated peasant laywoman—if her cause were just could embody the powers granted by heaven for the common good.

The Scope of Armagnac Just War Ideology

In the early decades of the fifteenth century, the Armagnac faction was home to the most fervent supporters of the Valois dynasty. Its members professed a belief that God in his justice favored their party for victory over the English and their Burgundian allies. P.S. Lewis has carefully documented the just war arguments put forward by leading royal propagandists in fifteenth-century France, figures such as Jean Juvénal des Ursins, bishop of Beauvais and Laon, archbishop of Reims, author of the *Chronicle of Charles VI* and Jean de Montreuil, a diplomat who wrote *A toute la chevalerie de France*. According to Lewis, their works exerted little or no genuine impact on their fellow countrymen, if that impact were to be measured by the degree to which Frenchmen became fervent Valois supporters.

No amount of patriotic special pleading can obscure the fact that the majority of Frenchmen were, as far as action went, at least apathetic about the identity of their ultimate ruler and even about his nationality.³

This article will argue that, in fact, quite a number of men and women, varying in both social position and literary attainments, expressed a strong personal attachment to the Valois cause, arising out of their belief in the concept of a just war, a concept insistently

³ P.S. Lewis, "War, Propaganda, and Historiography," 7.

promoted by the Armagnac faction. For the most part, however, their views sprang not from the writings of official propagandists like Ursins and Montreuil, who concentrated attention on the traditional, legalistic arguments for a just war, appealing to Salic Law and its customary exclusion of women and their cognates from the royal line of succession.⁴ Such arguments failed to engage all but a relative few of the population. Instead, growing support for the monarchy reflected a highly spontaneous, rapidly spreading conviction in French society that the powers of justice, directed from above, would inevitably intervene to transform the troubled world below. This conviction found its most powerful expression in the Maid of Orleans, a prophet who seemingly appeared out of nowhere and effectively gave voice and concrete form to the French struggle against English domination.

Throughout her career, first in battle (1429–1430) then during her trial by the inquisition (1431), Joan of Arc frequently prophesied that heaven had directly endowed her with military power to be used for the welfare of all the French people. God would redeem them by granting victory over the English. In her charge to the French people to take up arms, Joan elevated traditional chivalric vows to defend France into moral mandates incumbent upon all citizens. While it appears that Joan may have never uttered the term “just war,” she inspired others to use it in reference to her activities and define it in accordance with her words.

Alongside Joan, the Armagnac movement gave rise to a number of unique French voices, strong in the extent of their conviction, but inadequately considered by modern historians. Together, they offer fresh perspectives into the particular cultural solidarity that issued from the movement. Among the various contributors to Armagnac just war ideology that this article will examine are (in chronological order): Honoré Bouvet,⁵ the Benedictine monk who wrote the *Tree of Battles*; Philippe de Villette, abbot of Saint-Denis and court preacher of King Charles VI (1380–1422); Philippe de Mézières, soldier, minor nobleman, and author of *The Dream of an Old Pilgrim*; Christine de Pizan, one of the leading female authors of the Middle Ages who

⁴ Craig Taylor, “Salic Law and the Valois Succession,” *French History*, vol. 15, no. 4 (2001): 358–77.

⁵ Bouvet is often rendered as “Bonet” in the scholarly literature. In the opinion of this author, “Bouvet” is a more correct spelling.

wrote a number of works including *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*; Marguerite la Touroulde, widow of a royal treasurer and an eyewitness to events interrogated in Joan of Arc's nullification trial; and Martin Berruyer, a theologian from the University of Paris, bishop of Le Mans, and official participant in that trial.

These staunch supporters of Valois restoration shared Joan's belief that victory in battle issued from divine justice rather than military power. They held that God's power made itself manifest when the weaker armed force commanding the superior moral cause prevailed on the battlefield. Their ideology ultimately fueled the popular drive to expel the English from France and supplied a justification for killing them if they refused to leave. The spontaneous movement emerging from that ideology reached its peak in the charismatic career of Joan the Maid, whose victories over the English vindicated the Armagnac belief that divine justice invincibly wields control over humanity's social injustice.

In his analysis of French propaganda, P.S. Lewis draws a useful distinction between "political reason" and "political sentiment," both of which were components of the Armagnac movement. This article will argue that Joan of Arc herself provided an exemplary voice of *political reason*, a voice that did not embrace Salic Law as its foundation. For while the argument to Salic Law might be meaningful to some royal propagandists, it nevertheless failed to ignite the loyalties of the French people. By contrast, when Joan of Arc took the reins of history directly into her hands and explained in her simple fashion the roots of her actions, she gave birth to a lively and popular political sentiment that could galvanize contemporaries in a way the theorizing of men like Ursin and Montreuil could not. Although every bit as supportive of Charles VII's divine right to the throne, Joan and the just war arguments she both espoused and embodied proved far more effective.

Armagnac ideology professed its faith in a divine deliverance of the French people from the bitter suffering engendered by war and political oppression. It helped forge among them a sense of sharing in a communal "soul," a corporate selfhood, fashioned and sustained by God, that called on them to observe God-given standards of moral judgment and to take responsibility for penance and the atonement of sin. Christian spiritual processes that had long shaped personal piety were now perceived as being at work in the unfolding of political events, as a result of which every individual bore respon-

sibility to serve the welfare of the whole and the welfare of every individual likewise became the responsibility of the whole.

According to the Armagnac view, the downfall of the English in France would benefit not only the victors, but also the vanquished. By humbling the English aggressors, God could redeem their souls from the unjust war they were waging; by taking their earthly lives in battle, He would preserve their heavenly ones. Armagnac just war ideology therefore consciously extended Christian charity to the English enemies (who were, after all, also baptized in Christ) and justified their killing as a token of God's grace.

It also recognized that the misfortunes of war were the result of divine justice. The French people were suffering for their own sins and a redeeming God had imposed upon them as penance the victories that England had thus far achieved. During these years, the French widely embraced an Armagnac belief that evil powers in the world had to win some battles as part of God's plan for salvation; on the other hand, only the righteous could and would win the war.

Moreover, the triumph of divine justice would not be limited to the eschatological plain; it would ultimately be experienced in this world by ordinary French men and women—if not those of the present generation, then those who would come later. Armagnac ideology articulated a spirituality that encompassed political rewards in this world, rewards that could be enjoyed corporately. Inspired by that ideology, the French could look forward not only to the judgment day when righteous individuals would gain their eternal home in heaven, but also to a more immediate political deliverance, when English oppression would end and they as a people would share a life of peace, freedom and fellowship.

In the end, the Armagnac movement energized the war of liberation not by convincing the population of the "rightness" of Salic Law, but by engendering a humanistic ideology that deemphasized traditional social and political divisions. It stressed instead the virtues of a redeemed French *people*, distinguishable above all others by virtue of their most devout Christian character led by a monarch rightfully referred to as the "most Christian, most high, most powerful king."⁶

⁶ Jean Juvénal des Ursins, for example, addressed his official correspondence to the king of France with the traditional acclamation, *Tres crestien, tres hault, tres puissant roy*. See *Écrits Politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins*, ed. P.S. Lewis, vols. (Paris, 1985), 2:13.

Origins of the Just War Tradition

“Just war” as a moral concept originated in the fourth century B.C. with Aristotle and subsequently underwent numerous philosophical and legal developments during the Roman period. Christian thinking on just war emerged in the early Middle Ages when Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354–430),⁷ addressed Christian citizens and rulers of the Roman Empire concerning the violence and political upheaval resulting from the Germanic invasions. In addressing the question of how Christian faith could be reconciled with violence, Augustine first cited Jesus’s straightforward command for passivity when confronted with violence: “But I say to you, do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also,” (Matthew 5:39).⁸ The great church father then attempted to temper this stern pacifism of the New Testament Scriptures by highlighting the Old Testament where wars were explicitly commanded and won by God’s hand, such as those undertaken by Moses in Exodus. Yahweh had chosen the Israelites over other nations, blessing them in battle and chastening their enemies for worshipping false gods.⁹

Augustine sought to reconcile these two competing strands in the Christian tradition—a righteous spirit of military aggression and a righteous spirit of humanitarian nonviolence—for practical implementation by ruling authorities in his politically tumultuous era. From this reconciliation emerged his just war doctrine, the essence of which is contained emerges in his well-known statement, “Love, and do what thou wilt.”¹⁰ The presence or absence of love as a motive determined whether an outward action could be judged good or evil.

It was Christian love that established a “right intention” for choosing violent courses of action. And thereafter, for western Christians

⁷ According to James Turner Johnson, two identifiable strands emerge in the history of just war doctrine, *jus ad bellum* (the right to make war) which belonged to ecclesiastical and theological traditions of the Middle Ages, and *jus in bello* (proper conduct in war) which belonged to medieval civil and chivalric codes. The “classic doctrine,” as Johnson terms it, incorporating both strands did not fully appear before the early modern period. See Johnson, *Ideology*, 8. For the Armagnac just war ideology of the fifteenth century discussed here, the emphasis was *jus ad bellum*, though that precise term did not appear in the literature.

⁸ Augustine of Hippo, “Reply to Faustus the Manichaean” in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers [NPNF]*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 13 vols. (1906–1908; reprint, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1989), 4:301 (12.76).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 4:301 (12.75).

¹⁰ Augustine of Hippo, “Homilies on the First Epistle of John,” in *NPNF*, 7:504 (8.8).

having a “right intention” became the first test in waging a just war. For Augustine, right intention could only be the preservation of peace: “War is waged in order that peace may be obtained.”¹¹ In support of this view, Augustine alluded to the works of Vegetius, a fourth-century Roman military theorist who advised in *Epitoma rei militaris* (*A Summary of Military Matters*), “He who desires peace, let him prepare for war.”¹² Augustine admonished against soldiers killing for other reasons, especially cruelty, lust for domination, and bloodshed which created discord and aggravated ill will. However, it was possible in Augustine’s schema to justify a whole range of aggressive actions on the basis that they were motivated by a Christian love which enhanced the general peace. “It does not benefit to prohibit warfare, but to prohibit malice.”¹³

Further, Augustine argued that the demands of justice might require punishment in forms of physical force and discipline against offending parties in order to chasten their pride—a principle later applied by Armagnacs in justifying death for the English invaders as a gift of salvation. Punishment inflicted as redemptive penance actually upheld the principles of selfless Christian love for fellow human beings. In this way, Augustine’s moral theory harmonized a righteous spirit of aggression with the fundamental Christian principles. As Frederick H. Russell has put it with irony, “Love for one’s neighbor could legitimate his death.”¹⁴

After “right intention,” the second key component of Augustine’s just war theory was that a just war may only be waged by “legitimate authority.”¹⁵ Augustine did not allow a private Christian to commit violence against other private individuals. The bishop of Hippo ruled against homicide and forbade individual Christians to take justice into their own hands. God was of course the ultimate “legitimate authority” and any war commanded by him directly to a prophet, like the Old Testament wars, was righteous. Apart from direct revelation, however, only rulers and governing officials might declare war.

¹¹ Augustine of Hippo, “Letters of St. Augustine” in *NPNF*, 1:554 (189.6).

¹² Flavius Vegetius Renatus, *Epitoma rei militaris*, ed. and trans. Leo F. Stelten (New York, 1990), 121–22.

¹³ Augustine of Hippo, “Sermo,” in *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series latina [PL]*, ed. J.P. Migne, 221 vols. (Paris, 1845–1890), 38:1391 (302, 15). Author’s translation.

¹⁴ Russell, *Just War*, 18.

¹⁵ Augustine of Hippo, “De Civitate Dei,” in *NPNF* 2:15 (1.21); “Reply to Faustus,” 4:301 (12.75).

Augustine stated that subjects called to arms by a legitimate authority were required to serve; refusal on their part was to commit treason.¹⁶ In this argument Augustine reflects the influence of the Apostle Paul who obliged Christians to submit to all governing authorities (Romans 13), and justified his teaching with the statement that no government rules unless God wills it so.

Consequently, Christian just war doctrine (including its Armagnac expressions) encompassed two convictions historically bound in active tension with one another: (1) that what Christians see in the world is what God has willed, and (2) that God also wills that this same world undergo transformation to place it in greater conformity with his will. In this framework of spiritual values, war is an avenue whereby divine authority claims and re-claims its renewal of life on earth.

The third and final key to Augustine's just war doctrine pertained to "just cause." For a cause to be just, legitimate authority must seek to redress wrongs inflicted by an offending party.¹⁷ Robert L. Holmes defines this component in Augustine's ethical schema:

Just cause is provided by a state's having suffered a wrong at the hands of another state, either by direct action of the other or by actions of its citizens for which it refuses to make a restitution.¹⁸

To right a wrong endured by its people or to avenge injuries inflicted upon its citizen(s) were occasions for legitimate authorities to proclaim a just cause as motivation for their violent actions.¹⁹ "Injuries" might include crimes against persons, property or rights, and even transgressions against God. To avenge sins against God became the particular battle cry of medieval holy wars, the crusades launched several centuries after Augustine against Christian "heretics," religious "infidels," and pagans. In short, although Augustine's treatment of just war was not perfectly systematic, it did set forth these three key components and defined such conflicts for the Middle Ages: right intention, legitimate authority, and just cause.

¹⁶ Augustine of Hippo, "Reply to Faustus," 4:301 (12.75).

¹⁷ Augustine of Hippo, "De civitate Dei," 2:405 (19.7).

¹⁸ Robert L. Holmes, "St. Augustine and the Just War Theory," in *The Augustinian Tradition*, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley, 1999), 330.

¹⁹ Augustine of Hippo, *Quaestionum in Heptateuchum*, ed. J. Fraipont, in *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [CCSL]*, 177 vols. (Turnholt, 1958), 33:318–19 (6, q. 10).

During the twelfth century, the legal scholar Gratian elaborated upon Christian just war theory in his compendium of canon law, the *Decretum* (1140).²⁰ Here, he drew upon the work of generations of canonists who had reflected upon Augustine's doctrine and developed its legal implications for western Christendom. In the thirteenth century, the "Holy Doctor" Thomas Aquinas (1225/27–1274), reiterated the three justifications for war already articulated by Augustine, offering more precise detail for their proper application. Importantly for later Armagnac ideology, Aquinas agreed with Augustine's prohibition of homicide, but differed in ruling in favor of the individual's right to use violence in self-defense against an attacker. Nevertheless, he specified that the degree of violence used to protect oneself from attack must be proportionate to the threat and that use of more violence than necessary must be avoided. While Augustine had been vague in his treatment of the evils resulting from "cruelty" and "bloodthirstiness" in war, Aquinas's teaching on violence clearly obliged both individual Christians and governing authorities to develop reasoned criteria governing the application of violence. Violence sufficient to preserve one's safety was authorized by natural law.²¹ Where to draw the line constituted the ethical challenge.

The fourteenth century ushered in the era of the Hundred Years War. The impact of that conflict evoked a major treatise from an Italian scholar in defense of Christian warfare that wielded profound influence on Armagnac spirituality. In 1360, John Legnano of Milan (d. 1383), professor of Civil and Canon Law at the University of Bologna, published *Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello* (*A Treatise on War, Reprisals and the Duel*), a complex work that drew its authorization for just war from such divergent sources as astrology, political theory, Scripture, canon law, and Roman manuals for military procedure and strategy. In this work addressed to the educated classes throughout Christendom, Legnano explicitly reemphasized what Christian doctrine had affirmed since Augustine: God instituted war for good purposes in the world.²²

²⁰ *Corpus juris canonici*, ed. Emil Friedberg, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1879–81), 1: C. 23.

²¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Thomas R. Heath O.P. (New York: Blackfriars, 1972), 35:81, 83 (2–2, q. 40.1); 38:43 (2–2), q. 64.7).

²² Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello*, ed. and trans. Thomas Erskine Holland (Washington, D.C., 1917).

All power is from God, by His command or permission; therefore war-like power proceeds from Him, but it so proceeds not only by His permission, but also by His command.²³

Avoiding Jesus's command of non-resistance to violence, Legnano instead opened his argument with an Old Testament citation: "The king of Israel changed his raiment and entered war," (1 Kings 22:30b).²⁴ The Hebrew biblical heritage features prominently in Legnano's justification of war as a *Christian* moral responsibility. Taking cues from Augustine, Legnano not only argued that war served to root out evil, he also proclaimed that war had its origins in *heaven*. God in his justice had cast out Satan who had pridefully struggled to advance his cosmic powers over those of the Almighty, an insufferable violation on the part of the fallen angel. The Lord similarly enacted violence on earth, by forcibly casting out evildoers in the fallen world where Satan now continued his bid for power. According to Legnano, "every act punishing evil persons proceeds from God; the declaration of a lawful war is an act punishing evil and rebellious persons."²⁵

To demonstrate God's punishment of the wicked in the world, Legnano cited the earlier chapters in Genesis, including those narrating the punishment of Cain's fratricide (Genesis 4) and the tale of the Great Flood that purified the world of its wicked humanity, sparing only Noah and his family (Genesis 6). According to Genesis 19, God introduced into the world physical forms of discipline "to punish and destroy the bad."²⁶ What is more, he sustained with his mercy those whose goodness merited the gift of life and earthly rewards.

Legnano thus identified war as a radical "medication" that exterminated vices which otherwise might infect the existing good in the world, a euthanasia administered by God "the most high physician" upon humanity. The Lord of creation rewarded Noah and his kinfolk with life in a world renewed in its creation and freed from evil. This latter statement sums up the essence of later Armagnac just war ideology as I will discuss below—God's grace makes itself concretely manifest in human society for the good of the whole through the goodness of a single individual.

²³ *Ibid.*, 225.

²⁴ Legnano, *Tractatus*, 209.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 224.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 225–26.

According to Legnano however, the varied wars of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament that ensued after Genesis included not only victories in which Israel, God's chosen nation, triumphed against ungodly enemies, but also occasions in which God imposed military defeat upon Israel to atone for its own sins.²⁷ Legnano named this violent initiative by God "eradicatory war" because it served to root out human vices. In order to eradicate Israel's own sinful pride and while yet embracing the chosen nation and its birthright among other nations, God afflicted the kingdom's capital Jerusalem with the armies of Babylon, destroying the Temple and the very dwelling place of divinity, to the great grief of the people. In the next generation however, a more faithful people reemerged casting out false gods and rebuilding the Jerusalem Temple and the walls of the holy city.

According to Legnano, not only did God function as the heavenly physician administering violent cures in order to restore health to a sinful people, He also restrained those who abused their greater physical power over those less powerful than themselves. Here, the Bolognese scholar cited St. Jerome's teaching on the use of physical violence to ward off aggressive attacks from criminals such as highway thieves. Legnano endorsed the use of such forces in part because it was a blessing on the offenders themselves. In other words, inflicting physical injury upon active criminals literally prevents them from injuring anyone else, and thus, in their disabled state, they are unable to commit new sins.

If a man enfeebles the strength of a robber [and] a pirate and renders them weak, their weakness advantages them; for the weakened members, which formerly they used ill, will cease from evil works.²⁸

Legnano's endorsement of personal physical violence surpassed that of Aquinas who allowed only the degree of physical force sufficient for self-preservation. By contrast, Legnano justified an escalation of violence to the point of permanently disabling an unrepentant criminal from further harm against his own soul. Jesus's principle of turning the other cheek found little echo in Legnano's doctrine of just war.

Of special significance for the Armagnac view of the Hundred Years War was Legnano's concept of "particular war," a conflict

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 226.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 227; St. Jerome, "Commentarii in prophetas minores in Sophoniam," ed. M. Adriaen in *CCSL*, 76A:671 (1.13–14).

waged in a people's self-defense. Influenced by Aquinas's discussion of individual self-preservation in natural law, Legnano considered self-defense a right instilled by God in each living creature. *Every* living thing, plant and animal, naturally strives to preserve its life and resist external violation. Self-defense is therefore an "instinct" (*instinctus*), a principle of justice inherent in creation that Legnano explained in scientific terms:

For a thing acted upon resists the thing acting, and reacts upon it, solely to the end of its own conservation, and the destruction of the thing acting against it.²⁹

In the fifteenth-century, the Armagnac movement, informed by Legnano's work, espoused a rhetoric of "self-defense" which defined the French social body as a creature of heaven, currently being redeemed for its sins through political struggle. Most importantly, the full power of the people's self-preservation was exercised by the least among them, Joan the Maid, whose divinely-inspired faith embodied the strengths of the whole people beyond the ordinary capability of any single member, including the king himself.

For Legnano, the war conducted by Joan was meant to purge wickedness in the world, a world intended for good both in its creation and in each unfolding moment of its history. A just war enhanced corporate human life by casting out evildoers and rewarding the righteous.

Armagnac Advocates of Just War Ideology

In the Hundred Years War, supporters of both the English and French crowns argued that their cause was just, though the claim developed more deeply and extended more broadly among the Armagnacs who did not seek to attack England, but only drive the English out of France.³⁰ They believed that ultimate victory would

²⁹ Legnano, 278.

³⁰ The focus of this article is on the French Armagnac movement. For a discussion of the English perspective see *Society at War: The Experience of England and France During the Hundred Years War*, ed. C.T. Allmand (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1998), chap. 1; idem, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300–1450* (New York, 1988), 39; and Philippe Contamine, "La théologie de la guerre à la fin du

come from God at His chosen hour. Drawing directly from Legnano, Honoré Bouvet (c. 1340–c. 1407), a fourteenth-century Benedictine monk and native of Provence, portrayed the Armagnac struggle as divinely ordained. In his 1387 *The Tree of Battles* (*Arbre des batailles*), dedicated to the French king, Charles VI (1380–1422), Bouvet unequivocally defined war as a heavenly institution:

Thus we must understand that war comes from God, and not merely that he permits war, but that He has ordained it; for God commanded a man called Joshua that he should do battle against his enemies, and advised him how he should set an ambush for the discomfiture of his enemies. Further, we say that our Lord God Himself is lord and governor of battles.³¹

God alone determines the winner in war: “All victory comes from God.”³² When addressing the problem of why sinners are sometimes victorious in war and good people defeated, Bouvet cited God’s own plan for salvation.

If sinners sometimes gain the victory we know not whence this comes, unless it be that God allows and suffers it . . . And all this in order that the good man may be crowned with patience, and that his virtue may be tested . . . it pleases our Lord that [good men] should do penance in this world, so that in the other they may not have to purge themselves in the fires of hell, or in purgatory.³³

Thus without using the precise term, Bouvet develops Legnano’s idea of “eradicatory war,” one involving the punishment of the good as a concrete enforcement of God’s discipline. This meant that suffering endured in war was redemptive; in fact, Bouvet apparently did not construe any experience of suffering in this world as non-redemptive.

Philippe de Mézières (1327–1405), a poor French nobleman who wrote in the latter half of the fourteenth century, continued to build on the idea that God granted victory in war. “Victories come from heaven,” he stated in 1389 in *The Dream of an Old Pilgrim* (*Le songe du vieil pelerin*). Here, he offered the following advice to Charles VI:

Moyen Age: La Guerre de Cent Ans, fut-elle une guerre juste?” in *Jeanne d’Arc: une époque, un rayonnement* (Paris, 1982), 9–21.

³¹ *The Tree of Battles of Honoré Bonet*, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1949), 125.

³² *Ibid.*, 157.

³³ *Ibid.*, 157–58.

As Judas Maccabeus testified, God will readily give victory to a moderate number of well disciplined men rather than to a disorderly crowd moved by arrogance and hope for empty glory.³⁴

Mézières's implicit just war principles maintained that right intention (not arrogance) and just cause (not hope for glory) prevail over physical strength. An army fortified with good moral purposes was inevitably more powerful in battle, even if its forces were ostensibly smaller and weaker than those of its opponent. According to Old Testament teachings cited by Mézières and which frequently resurfaced in the Armagnac struggle: "Victory in war is not in the size of an army, but strength is from heaven" (1 Maccabees 3:19).

Around 1410, Christine de Pizan (1364–1429), a strong supporter of the Valois monarchy and widowed noblewoman exiled by war from her beloved France, outlined theoretical grounds for just war in *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry* (*Fais d'armes et de chevalerie*). In another historical context, this work about the theory and craft of war would have been viewed as unusual, authored as it was by a woman. However, the Armagnac movement drew strength from the diverse voices raised in support of its cause. Christine wrote at a time when the French royal house was destabilized internally by a mentally incompetent Charles VI, and preyed upon by the political machinations of his relatives.

Christine addressed a wide readership including literate members of the military class, a fact which has led James Turner Johnson to refer to her as a "popularizer" of just war doctrine. Through her colloquial and conversational prose, she made accessible the sophisticated ideas of Vegetius, Legnano, and Bouvet, paraphrasing and restating their works in vernacular French.³⁵ Christine played a vital role in disseminating just war ideology to segments of society beyond the world of scholars and universities, regularly disregarding Salic Law in favor of other moral arguments for the Armagnac cause.

Christine laid out five grounds that justified war, three based on law and two based on what she called "will":

The first lawful ground on which wars may be undertaken or pursued is to maintain law and justice; the second is to counteract evildoers

³⁴ Philippe de Mézières, *Le songe du vieil pelerin*, ed. G.W. Coopland, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1969), 2:75, 382.

³⁵ Johnson, *Ideology*, 72.

who befool, injure, and oppress the land and the people; and the third is to recover lands, lordships, and other things stolen or usurped for an unjust cause by others who are under the jurisdiction of the prince, the country or its subjects. As for the two of will, one is to avenge any loss or damage incurred, the other to conquer and take over foreign lands or lordships.³⁶

While all of these might be applicable, the struggle against England was undoubtedly a just war based on the third lawful ground, for the English had disregarded a generous peace treaty and usurped control over territories belonging to France.

Christine explained that in an earlier period, Charles V (1364–1380) had sent ambassadors to the English king inquiring if he were willing to make amends for his unjust actions; that monarch had responded with outrageous behavior, having the ambassadors killed. Charles had subsequently assembled counselors and jurists who duly deliberated and resolved that just cause existed to resume the war. “So with his own great prudence, all the lost lands were reconquered by the sword, as is well known.”³⁷

Like Mézières, Christine believed that a just war would inevitably be won because God would not permit justice to be defeated. Furthermore, Christine appealed to *political reason* in her contribution to the Armagnac ideology. After first establishing reasoned criteria for waging a just war, she then cogently argued how France had properly implemented those criteria in its diplomatic efforts, and, how England in response had egregiously violated them.

In April, 1414, Philippe de Villette, abbot of Saint-Denis, preached a sermon to Charles VI as the king prepared for war against the English.³⁸ The head of the famous abbey, which maintained strong ties with the French monarchy, assured Charles that God stood with him and would aid in repairing the injustices and offenses perpetrated by his enemies. Like Christine, he pointed to the wise counsel of “noble clerics,” who, having judiciously reviewed the facts, had determined that the French struggle was just. The abbot explicitly guaranteed Charles that the decision to wage war was legitimate.

³⁶ Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, trans. Sumner Willard, ed. Charity Cannon Willard (University Park, Pa., 1999), 16.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 21–22.

³⁸ C.J. Liebman, “Un sermon de Philippe de Villette, abbé de Saint-Denis, pour la levée de l’oriflamme (1414),” *Romania*, 68 (1944–1945): 444–70.

Using political reasons that recalled those of Christine, the abbot urged the king “to guard the rights of your crown and defend your subjects against oppression, as well as to punish the rebellious and disobedient malefactors.”³⁹

Joan of Arc

In 1428, at a crucial moment in the conflict, a young, uneducated woman from rural France stepped forward and articulated the Armagnac principles in language and with deeds that seized the national imagination. Joan of Arc was born in 1412 to a peasant family in Domrémy, a village in the Lorraine region of France. From the age of thirteen, she experienced mystical visitations from angels and saints who instructed her to alleviate the misfortunes of the French kingdom. In a remarkable sequence of events, seventeen-year-old Joan, “the Maid” as she was to be popularly called, left home and journeyed to Chinon where she met the *dauphin*, Charles, the future king, Charles VII (1422–1461). Having gained an audience, a remarkable achievement in itself, she underwent a thorough interrogation conducted at Poitiers by a panel of elite churchmen. Then, with Charles’s patronage, she led the French armies to raise the English siege on Orléans.

Joan’s social mission as she envisaged it was twofold, her first goal was explicit: to carry out God’s will to return France to its rightful ruler. At the same time, she was also called upon to restore a sense of “France” to the shattered kingdom. In her own simple words, Joan advanced the idea that God had chosen her to proclaim a victory on behalf of all French men and women, a victory wrought by one who was a simple and humble peasant girl.

Although Joan offered no learned political analysis in support of her just war principles, she nevertheless embodied the Armagnac criteria of *political reason*, both in her dictated statements and her military actions. To her supporters, Joan exemplified the qualities of moral discernment that Augustine and Aquinas had called for in a Christian application of violence against aggressors; for example, she advocated using only the degree of violence required for self-preservation and the eventual maintenance of peace.

³⁹ Ibid., 462–63. Author’s translation.

On March 22, 1429, Joan forewarned the king of England and the duke of Bedford of these principles in a letter, implicitly stating her “right intention” to uphold peace as she prepared for battle:

The Maid begs you and requests that you cause no more destruction. If you will settle your account, you can come to join her company, in which the French will achieve the finest feat ever accomplished in Christendom. And give answer, if you wish to make peace in the city of Orléans; and if indeed you do not do so, be mindful soon of your great damages.⁴⁰

Under Joan’s leadership and against the daunting odds, the French did indeed raise the siege of Orléans on May 8, 1429. The Maid instantly became an Armagnac heroine. Thereafter, whenever she entered towns loyal to the crown, people flocked to her as a miracle-worker.

While Joan never spoke of “just war” and perhaps never even heard of the term, it is remarkable how closely she adhered to its principles in her strategy. She had at least implicit awareness about the three standard components of the doctrine. At the outset of her mission in 1429, she requested permission to wage war from the legitimate authority, the dauphin, whom she believed was rightful heir to the French throne. After her lengthy interview by a panel of churchmen, in which Joan claimed that God had sent her to drive out the English, Charles sanctioned her mission and granted her permission to lead French forces into battle. Later, in her heresy trial, the Maid reasserted her conviction that the *dauphin* represented legitimate authority, prophesying that as true heir, he would inevitably regain his kingdom.⁴¹

At the outset of her public career, the English siege of Orléans supplied Joan with her just cause. It was an obvious act of aggression, one that she specifically targeted in her defiant statements to the English.⁴² In all of her subsequent actions, she sought to drive

⁴⁰ Régine Pernoud and Marie-Véronique Clin, *Joan of Arc*, trans. Jeremy du Quesnay Adams (New York, 1998), 33–34; Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Thrupp, 1999), 68.

⁴¹ *The Trial of Joan of Arc*, ed. W.S. Scott (Westport, Conn., 1956), 87: “She said also that she was well assured that her king would regain his kingdom; this she knows as well as she knows us [the bishop] to be present here.”

⁴² *Ibid.*, 67, 82. According to her trial testimony in 1431, Joan believed from the outset of her mission that God had sent her to raise the siege of Orléans.

the English from French soil, not to retaliate or wield dominion over them.⁴³ For Joan, the just cause was rooted in French self-defense and her people's political independence; therefore, her ideas coincided with the views of Legnano and Christine de Pizan concerning lawful grounds for war. Again, it is highly unlikely that Joan was even aware of these works. She had no formal education and could not read. However, she appeared either to intuit the principles or to have a second-hand knowledge of them, perhaps from listening to preaching similar to that of Philippe de Vilette.

Finally, Joan demonstrated what just war theorists referred to as right intention: she offered terms of peace to the English before she resorted to attacking them. This was a conscious tactic on her part as she testified in her heresy trial. She called for violence only as a last resort and wrote the enemy letters of warning, like the one cited above, giving them full opportunity to resolve the matter peaceably by withdrawing voluntarily.⁴⁴ What is more, in her personal conduct in battle, she herself carried the standard and thereby avoided killing anyone, something she also made clear in the trial.⁴⁵ In the flush of victory, she prohibited her soldiers from looting the enemy and on one occasion even comforted a dying English soldier.⁴⁶ In short, Joan took up Aquinas's challenge to engage moral discernment by applying an appropriate degree of violence. She waged a just war, whether conscious of any of the theory or not.

The Maid also dealt with the thorny issue of why the English cause had succeeded in France at all if the French cause had been just from the beginning. Like the theorists, she argued that God allowed the French to be conquered "for their sins," an idea that resonates with Legnano's concept of "eradicatory war." Joan testified to this belief at her trial:

Questioned as to whether God were for the English while their cause prospered in France, She answered that she did not know whether

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 123. "She said that as to the love or hate that God has for the English, or what He would do for their souls, she knows nothing; but she is well assured that they will be driven out of France, except those who die there; and that God will send the French victory over the English."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 69. "She said that she sent letters to the English, who were before Orléans, wherein she wrote to them that they must leave."

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴⁶ *Procès en nullité de la condamnation de Jeanne D'Arc*, ed. Pierre Duparc, 5 vols. (Paris, 1977–1988), 1:366, 373.

God hated the French; but she believes that He will allow them to be defeated for their sins, if in fact they are [in a state of sin].⁴⁷

For Joan, French defeats as well as French victories were each part of God's plan; just war ideology sustained this ongoing tension between what God had willed in the past and what He now wills throughout the Armagnac resurgence. In her own personal attempt to atone for sins that God might want punished, Joan confessed to a priest frequently and admonished her soldiers to do the same.⁴⁸

In July 1429, just two months after the siege of Orléans ended, Christine de Pizan took up her pen to write a stirring poem, an overt expression of political sentiment that tied the improvement of French fortunes to God's intervention through the Maid. Christine's poem, the *Ditié de Jehanne d'Arc*, portrayed the French cause as blessed and that of the English as condemned by God.⁴⁹ She compared the Maid's victories to those of ancient Israel, making concrete once again the cultural link between the Hundred Years War and the Hebrew wars:

Moses, upon whom God in His bounty bestowed many a blessing and virtue, miraculously and indefatigably led God's people out of Egypt. In the same way, blessed Maid, you have led us out of evil!⁵⁰

Christine attributed right intention to Joan, stating explicitly that her purpose was not to destroy the English, but to ensure the survival of the Christian faith.⁵¹ She applauded Charles for waiting as long as possible before killing or wounding anyone, but claimed that, in the end, he had been justified for using force and shedding blood to reclaim what was rightfully his.⁵² She argued that through French victory, God had chastened the English for their pride. Once again, in accordance with Legnano's idea of eradictory war,

You [the English] have been check-mated. A short time ago, when you looked so fierce, you had no inkling that this would be so; but you were not yet treading the path upon which God casts down the proud. You thought you had already conquered France and that she

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁴⁸ *Procès en nullité*, 1:319, 363, 373, 390–91, 486.

⁴⁹ Christine de Pisan, *Ditié de Jehanne d'Arc*, ed. Angus J. Kennedy and Kenneth Varty (Oxford, 1977), 42: "See if God, in whom all grace abounds, does not in the end support what is right."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 50.

must remain yours. Things have turned out otherwise, you treacherous lot!⁵³

The *Ditié de Jehanne d'Arc*, written in the exaltation of victory when the tide of the war had turned in favor of the French crown, vindicated the Armagnac just war ideology.

The career of Joan after Orléans is well-known. Having raised the siege, her primary goal was to bring Charles to his coronation which took place at Reims in July, 1429. Thereafter, she was present at other battles until her capture by the Burgundians at Compiègne in 1430. Once captured, she was brought to trial for heresy in Rouen by a Burgundian bishop, Pierre Cauchon. The trial, although an ecclesiastical affair, was actually financed by the English crown and was considered by many to be an unjust and politically motivated.⁵⁴ On May 30, 1431, Joan was burned at the stake. The Armagnac just war ideology had failed to convince the French contingent that still supported the English crown. The persecution and untimely death of Joan of Arc at the hands of Burgundians, her fellow countrymen, revealed the still fragile nature of the society's sense of French unity.

The Rehabilitation of Joan of Arc

Early in the 1450's, the Hundred Years War reached its end. The French crown recovered the last of its territories with an exception of Calais and the rebuilding of royal authority began. With the end of the war came an era of renewed public enthusiasm for Joan of Arc and her mission. During the next decade, a complex rehabilitation process was undertaken on her behalf, culminating in judicial proceeding commonly referred to as the nullification trial of 1456–1457. Twenty years after her original conviction and execution as a heretic, the retrial nullified the original verdict and restored honor to Joan's memory.

The initiative for this action seems to have come from Charles VII. With Normandy finally returned to his rule and the ecclesias-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁵⁴ The charges brought against her and affirmed by the court are summarized in the *Trial of Joan of Arc*, 154–59. They indicate just how eager her captors were to bring in a guilty verdict.

tical archives at Rouen opened, his advisors found numerous procedural violations in the trial record and suggested that a case could be made to nullify it. The new trial, like the preceding one, was in the hands of the Church. It was officially launched when Joan's surviving family appealed directly to the pope. The second action was completed in 1457, setting aside the first verdict and restoring Joan's good name.

Joan's impact on the French public is demonstrated by eyewitness testimony gathered during her posthumous rehabilitation. Over one hundred witnesses, mostly from the Armagnac faction were interviewed about her faith, character, and activities. The ecclesiastical tribunal, made up of senior churchmen, travelled from town to town where Joan had stayed, receiving the testimony of those who knew her at varying stages of her career. The Armagnac movement had been fully vindicated by the time of the nullification and support for Joan and her cause was strong throughout the testimony gathered.

An example is Marguerite La Touroulde, a widow whose husband had handled the king's finances and who had hosted Joan in her home when she arrived in Chinon for the first meeting with the *dauphin*. Marguerite remembered Joan as the single remaining hope for the Armagnac cause:

At this time there was in the kingdom and the regions obedient to the king such great calamity and shortage of money that there was misery; what is more, the subjects of the king were nearly in despair. She knows this, she who speaks, because her husband was receiver general and he did not have more than four crowns of either the king's money or of his own; also the city of Orléans was besieged by the English, and there was no way to bring it help. Into this distress arrived Joan, and the witness believes firmly, she came from God, sent to relieve the king and the subjects obedient to him, because there was no other hope than in God.⁵⁵

Throughout her statement, La Touroulde makes implicit references to just war ideology. Without using the precise term, she speaks of Joan's "right intention" in alleviating the distress of an oppressed people, her acknowledgment of legitimate authority in the person of the king, and her adherence to a just cause growing out of the injuries sustained during the siege of Orléans. Moreover, Marguerite's testimony reveals the extent to which just war was a spiritual ideology, claiming

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1:376–77.

heaven as the determining force in the ultimate success of the war. Many of the nullification trial's eyewitnesses echoed these sentiments.

In addition to eyewitness testimony, the nullification trial record included an anthology of opinions by prelates and canon lawyers who evaluated the original condemnation.⁵⁶ The senior churchmen, all supporters of Charles VII, refuted the verdict that Joan maliciously desired to shed blood⁵⁷ and argued that her mission had indeed been a just war. One of these clerics was Martin Berruyer (d. 1465) whose written opinion is representative of the material compiled and published in the course of the retrial.⁵⁸ Berruyer was a rhetorician and theologian trained at the University of Paris who after 1452 served as bishop of Le Mans.

Berruyer explicitly applied the term "just war" to Joan of Arc's military career. According to the bishop, when Joan exhorted the English and Burgundians to make peace before she attacked them, she faithfully adhered to biblical directives that called on warriors to offer peace before pursuing a violent alternative. Berruyer cited Deuteronomy 20:19: "When you draw near to a town to fight against it, offer it terms of peace." Further, when Joan had prohibited the soldiers under her command from plundering the retreating English armies, she demonstrated that she was not motivated by a desire to inflict harm or seek vengeance.⁵⁹

Rather indeed her intention was right, according to that which Augustine says in his book *On the Sermon of the Lord*: "Not from desire or cruelty, but with a zeal for peace did he wage war, so that evil . . . would be restrained and good would be raised up in war."⁶⁰

⁵⁶ These documents have been under-utilized by historians and few studies have considered their historical value as testaments of Armagnac ideology.

⁵⁷ *Trial of Joan of Arc*, 157. According to the censures issued by the University of Paris at the conclusion of the condemnation trial, Joan was guilty of waging an immoral war: "The clerks say that you are cruel and a murderess, desirous of the shedding of human blood, seditious, provoking to tyranny, and blaspheming God and His commandments and revelations."

⁵⁸ *Procès en nullité*, vol. 2. Among the opinions published in the retrial, references to just war are also found in the writings of the bishops of Périgueux and Avranches and Robert Ciboule, Rector of the University of Paris.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2:231. "For she proceeded justly and piously to the liberation of the kingdom, because as for those in whose company she was in the army of the king, she forbade blasphemies to God, plunder and violence to the poor as much as she was able, and she drove out harlots from the army of the king."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2:231. This statement, although attributed by Berruyer to Augustine does not appear in Augustine's authentic writings and belongs to the corpus of spurious works imputed to the Doctor.

Berruyer went on to argue that Joan had demonstrated just cause for her actions:

She claimed to be sent for a just cause, namely that our lord King Charles would be restored to his kingdom, and his subjects who were subjugated to the tyrannical power of the English would be liberated from their iron furnace and brought back to obedience under their natural and legitimate lord.⁶¹

Perhaps the most important point for Berruyer was Joan's allegiance to legitimate authority: first of all, the authority of the king who sanctioned her mission, but even more significantly, the authority of God who commissioned her. "The English . . . saw that they were vanquished and expelled from this kingdom not by human power, but by the omnipotent hand of God, through the ministry of a lowly, ignorant and poor girl."⁶² Berruyer attributed to Joan's mission all three components of a just war.

It was a just cause that she waged, with right intention and public authority, indeed with the authority of our lord king and, as she herself claimed, the supreme authority of God who sent her.⁶³

Churchmen such as Berruyer who contributed to the nullification trial wrote their opinions after the war had been resolved in favor of the French crown. Their contribution to just war ideology placed the Church's imprimatur on the Armagnac movement, thereby crystallizing an interpretation of the war for future generations.

It is noteworthy that when the authorities requested Jean Juvénal des Ursins, then Grand Inquisitor of France, to participate in the rehabilitation process, he declined. While Ursins had shared the Maid's political cause, the success of her charismatic just war movement had obscured his own official effort as propagandist, including its tight embrace of Salic Law. Ursins declined to honor France's victory on the terms that Joan and her supporters had set.

The Politics of Salvation

Just war ideology in France presented a moral problem to its advocates. Both of the principal enemies, the English and Burgundians,

⁶¹ Ibid., 2:230.

⁶² Ibid., 2:235.

⁶³ Ibid., 2:231.

were fellow Christians. If the enemy had been infidels, condemning and killing them might have been a straightforward matter justified in the same manner as Christian crusades. But all participants on both sides had been baptized into the indivisible body of Christ, which, as Paul had taught, was composed of neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free.⁶⁴

All French proponents of just war theory from Philippe de Mézières to Martin Berruyer, faced this quandary. Mézières's response was to urge the English and French to reconcile in order to wage war jointly against the real enemy, the Saracens who controlled the Holy Land. Berruyer on the other hand, held that defeat of the English was part of God's plan for their own salvation, thereby applying Legnano's principle of "eradicatory war." These alternative formulations sought means of redressing the blow to Christendom caused by the Hundred Years War. The remainder of this discussion focuses on the dilemma and its resolution, beginning with Mézières and ending with Berruyer.

In his letter of 1395 to the English king, Richard II (1377–1399), Mézières depicted the war between the French and English as a festering wound on a single body, as a civil war among one people—a Christian people bound by love. Consequently, he expressed hopes that the conflict would soon be resolved, permitting the two kingdoms to embark on a joint crusade to regain the Holy Land.

And so, with the dew of Heaven falling upon the two sides of the wound, it will, by the goodness of God, be found to be healed, and the two edges, so long apart and divided, will be rejoined in love, so that in brief space the fatal poison, which in our time has flowed in great streams, may be halted and the wound healed.⁶⁵

Although temporarily divided by politics, France and England were at heart united in Christian fellowship, within one Roman Catholic Church. As such, they should be able to unite against the enemies of the of the Faith—heretics and Saracens.

Let this be said, so that, as this old, solitary writer believes, the valiant knights of England and France may henceforward abandon the task of the iron goad which, as already said, has pierced so deeply their Christian brothers, and by the command of God and the two Kings

⁶⁴ Galatians 3:28.

⁶⁵ Philippe de Mézières, *Letter to King Richard II*, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1975), 9.

turn their weapons against the enemies of the Faith, to make recompense in the sight of God for the great evils which they have wrought.⁶⁶

Mézières lamented the suffering and loss of life that the conflict between England and France had generated, seeing the war itself as a sin that required joint atonement. The broken fellowship offended God and the payment properly due to God was a new war, a righteous war waged on behalf of Christendom. The weapons of war used by Christians to kill other Christians would then be used for legitimate ends, to vanquish the non-Christians who controlled Jerusalem.

Mézières's thinking on the war between England and France was complex. On the one hand, he argued that victory in war came from God; but on the other, he condemned war between Christians. Was the war wrong, being between Christians, or was it permissible being from God? It seems that for the politically astute Mézières it depended on whom he was addressing.

In 1395, the same year that Mézières wrote his letter, Charles VI also sent an emotional plea to the English king addressing him as "beloved brother" and calling for reconciliation between the two royal houses for the greater good of Christendom.⁶⁷ [See Appedix B] While the authenticity of this letter is debated, its message represents a clear instance of the just war requirement to offer peace before waging battle. Moreover, the appeal to the Christian fellowship between England and France suggests again the dilemma posed by the struggle. The author calls for a collaborative holy war in the East as a renewal of the spiritual solidarity between the two warring powers so long divided by the war. This appeal to crusade was less a practical suggestion and more a rhetorical strategy on the part of the king to move the just war to a desired resolution.

Like Philippe de Mézières and Charles VI, Joan of Arc addressed the English with a plea to reunify Christendom. In her letter to the king of England and the duke of Bedford (cited above), Joan invited the English to "join her company" and thereby recognized a Christian fellowship between the two kingdoms. Her statement about "the finest feat ever accomplished" points to her awareness of Christendom at odds with the Islamic world.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 15.

⁶⁷ Cited in J.J.N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom: 1377-99* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1972), 180.

Of particular importance was Joan's concept of the French as the chosen people of her day. It would be the French—with or without the help of the English—who would reclaim the Holy Land. Hints of France as a new Israel and the Maid as a new Moses was voiced by Joan herself.

In the original trial, when Joan's interrogators asked her what she believed God thought about the English, she responded that she did not know what God thought except that he wanted them out of France.⁶⁸ Had Joan been more diplomatic about the fate of the English, her own fate might have been different. Her trial judges were, after all, mostly Burgundians. It may have been a tactical error on Joan's part that during her trial she did not affirm a Christian bond with her enemies in war and in the courtroom.

At the height of Joan's mission, around 1429, a quasi-theological treatise entitled *On a certain girl (De quadam puella)* appeared. While the treatise has long been attributed to Chancellor Jean Gerson (1363–1429) of the University of Paris, evidence about its authentic authorship remains inconclusive.⁶⁹ *De quadam puella* presents Scriptural arguments pro and con on the question of whether Joan of Arc might be considered a prophet from God. Significant for the discussion here is the view of France set forth in the work: "Not inappropriately can the people of the kingdom of France be called the people of Israel since it is well known that they have always prospered through their faith in God and their observance of the Christian religion."⁷⁰ This concept of "divine chosenness" was at the heart of just war ideology. Joseph R. Strayer describes this ideal of "holy France" that evolved in the Middle Ages:

The basic theme ran something like this: the kings of France have always been pillars and defenders of the faith; the people of France are devout and pious; the kingdom of France is so specially favored by God that it is the most important part of the church . . . Therefore, any attack on the rights of the king or the independence and integrity of his kingdom is an attack on the faith. Conversely, any steps taken by the king to defend and strengthen his kingdom are for the good of the faith and the benefit of Christendom.⁷¹

⁶⁸ *The Trial of Joan of Arc*, 123.

⁶⁹ For a full discussion on the subject see Deborah A. Fraioli, *Joan of Arc: the Early Debate* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 25, 41–42.

⁷⁰ English translation by Anne Llewellyn Barstow, *Joan of Arc: Heretic, Mystic, Shaman* (Lewiston, 1986), 135.

⁷¹ Joseph R. Strayer, "France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most

The present analysis reveals that this view became vital to justifying the struggle against the English and accrued much popular appeal in the Hundred Years War. From Joan of Arc to Martin Berruyer, a peasant woman to a prelate, belief in the sanctity of France shaped the Armagnac movement. God chose the French and their wars as he had chosen the Israelites, chosen for victory and chosen to be a light to the nations.

Among Armagnac supporters, perhaps the staunchest proponent of this view was Christine de Pizan. She, like Philippe de Mézières, had a tragic concept of Christendom broken by the war and expressed her fervent desire that it be repaired.⁷² To her way of thinking, Joan of Arc had been a prophet not only for the French people, but for all of Christendom. She glorified the Maid and the recent success at Orléans in an eschatological crescendo:

She will destroy the Saracens, by conquering the Holy Land. She will lead Charles there, whom God preserve! Before he dies he will make such a journey. He is the one who is to conquer it. It is there that she is to end her days and that both of them are to win glory. It is there that the whole enterprise will be brought to completion.⁷³

Christine's expectations were apocalyptic; Joan's efforts would bring about the salvation of the world. Under the king of France, God would inaugurate his kingdom on earth. The English would have no place in her new kingdom for it would be a Christendom purified of evil elements. Christine designated the English for hell and explicitly denied them salvation, falling short of Christian just war ideals.

And know that she [Joan of Arc] will cast down the English for good, for this is God's will: He hears the prayer of the good whom they wanted to harm! The blood of those who are dead and have no hope of being brought back to life again cries out against them. God will tolerate this no longer—He has decided, rather, to condemn them as evil.⁷⁴

Christine de Pizan died in 1429, only months after the victory at Orléans. As a result, she did not live to see either Joan's demise or the eventual resolution of the war in France's favor. While her views

Christian King," in *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History* (Princeton, N.J., 1971), 305–6.

⁷² Christine de Pisan, *Diuié de Jehanne d'Arc*, 47: "She [Joan of Arc] will restore harmony in Christendom and the Church."

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 47.

appear extreme, she was a poet and her hyperbole may be attributed to artistic license. Most importantly, she addressed the question of intra-Christian strife, and resolved the problem to her satisfaction by severing defective members of the ailing body (the English) from salvation, recalling Legnano's "eradicatory war."

In his opinion issued during Joan's retrial, Martin Berruyer also extolled the exemplary piety of the French: "O kingdom of France—long have you been considered to be most Christian, and your kings and princes most Christian!"⁷⁵ At the same time, Berruyer argued that Joan's mission not only demonstrated the divine favor enjoyed by France, but also facilitated the salvation of the English. The English were redeemed in losing the war because their pride was thwarted.

According to Berruyer, "The English indeed saw that they were vanquished and expelled from this kingdom not by human power, but by the omnipotent hand of God, through the ministry of a contemptible, ignorant and poor girl."⁷⁶ The bishop professed belief in the Christian teaching dating back to Paul that God confounded the strong through the meek.⁷⁷ This had also been an argument in *De quadam puella* for the claim that Joan of Arc was a prophet of God.

To conclude, just war ideology in France during the Hundred Years War involved a set of political and spiritual values that united a number of segments of society. The Armagnacs considered their mission just because it was founded on the three principles long-standing in Christian tradition. Fundamental to this ideology was the belief that God ordained just wars and guaranteed victory to the right side. This ideology fueled the Armagnacs's perseverance in the face of difficult odds. In their view, how better could God have demonstrated his power than to bring victory to an oppressed people through a simple girl, untrained in the art of war?

The just war ideology also gave force to humanistic values of social responsibility to guarantee the welfare of every individual member of the society in order to assure the welfare of the society as a whole. This cultural sensitivity was fortified and documented with traditions of political warrant and reason, officially inscribed in the Latin legal

⁷⁵ *Procès en nullité*, 2:221: *O regnum Francie olim reputatum christianissimum, regesque tui ac principes christianissimi.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 2:235.

⁷⁷ 1 Corinthians 1:27.

treatises of the nullification trial records of Joan of Arc, under the supervision of and at the request of papal authorities in Rome. The intended audience for these texts was the ruling elite in Christendom responsible for political advocacy and implementation of Christian social values. Most importantly, these texts define Joan's lasting impact on just war ideology for modern humanism in her appeal to the active use of impartial reason and conscious self-restraint in inflicting violence, a self-discipline of diplomatic moderation rooted in the spiritual assurance that God has already won the struggle for justice at hand.

APPENDIX A

At the close of her trial, Joan of Arc was censured on twelve points by the University of Paris:

- 1) The revelations from heaven and the apparitions of angels and saints that she claimed to experience were lies, superstition, and evil.
- 2) The sign that she claimed to give to her king to show that she was sent by God—the sign being that St. Michael the archangel approached the king, bowed and gave him a crown—was a seductive and pernicious lie for which she gave contradictory testimony.
- 3) Her ability to recognize Saint Michael the archangel along with Saints Catherine and Margaret as beings from heaven was a claim for which she did not have sufficient evidence.
- 4) Her claim to know the future and that certain events would take place was superstition and divination and vain boasting.
- 5) The fact that she wore men's clothing and cut her hair like a man violated divine law, the Holy Scriptures, and the laws of the Church.
- 6) She was deceitful, cruel and a murderess.
- 7) She left home without telling her parents and so violated the commandment to honor one's mother and father.
- 8) She leaped from the tower of Beaurevoir into the moat and so demonstrated suicidal tendencies.
- 9) She believed that she would be going to heaven because of revelations from Saints Catherine and Margaret which was presumptuous.
- 10) She said God was on the side of the French and not that of the English and Burgundians, violating the command to love one's neighbor.
- 11) She knelt before the spirits that she claimed to be Saints Michael, Catherine and Margaret, kissed the ground that they walked on and vowed her virginity to them—indicating that she was an idolater and invoker of demons.

- 12) She said that if the church commanded her to do the opposite of a commandment which she had from God, she would not do so for anything in the world—making her guilty of not honoring the truth and authority of the church.

See: *Trial of Joan of Arc*, 154–59.

APPENDIX B

Letter of Charles VI to Richard II of England written in 1395 and calling for reconciliation between the two great royal houses for the greater good of Christendom.

Beloved brother, we devoutly pray to God that through His Grace He will cause us to meet together in person as soon as this can well be arranged. We greatly desire this meeting, for which you will always find us ready and willing; and we hope that through Him who said to His apostles, "Peace be with you, I give you my peace," we shall meet not in royal pomp but in all humility in the love of God, trusting that He will show us grace and restrain His chastising rod, which has long belabored Christianity through the faults of our predecessors.

Then by your holy labours, fair brother, and by our own, the enemies of Christianity in all countries will be converted to a true peace; and by virtue of this peace between us, descended from Heaven and confirmed in our two persons by the Holy Spirit, our mother, Holy Church, crushed and divided this long time by the accursed Schism, shall be revived in all her glory through the prayers of the most gentle Virgin Mary.

Then, fair brother, it will be a fit moment, and one pleasing to God, that you and I, for the propitiation of the sins of our ancestors, should undertake a crusade to succour our fellow Christians and to liberate the Holy Land, first won for us by the precious blood of the Lamb who was slain for His flock. And so through the power of the Cross we shall spread the Holy Catholic Faith throughout all parts of the East, demonstrating the gallantry of the chivalry of England and France and of our other Christian brothers.

PART FIVE

STRATEGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
COMBAT TECHNIQUES

HENRY V'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN 1415

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For nearly forty years after 1415, the history of western Europe rolled out in the shadow of Agincourt. Henry V (1413–1422) spent the rest of his reign capitalizing on the advantages the battle had won him; his occupation and defense of Normandy would likely have been impossible had it not been launched by such a favorable beginning.¹ After Agincourt, the French were never willing to risk another battle with Henry V, just as they had been unwilling to face a general engagement against Edward III (1327–1377) or the Black Prince after Crécy, Poitiers, and Nájera. This was in part due to their demoralization, in part to the very serious loss of military manpower and leadership they suffered in the battle. Without being willing to attack English armies, the captains of Charles VI (1380–1422) and the *dauphin* could not prevent Henry's methodical conquests.² The English presence in northern France became and long remained the principal preoccupation of the two most developed monarchies of the West, and the repercussions of their sustained conflict echoed across the continent, prolonging the Great Schism (1378–1417) and significantly influencing politics and policy within the Empire and in Iberia.

Just how outnumbered the English were on the field of Agincourt cannot be determined with any certainty, but a good guess would be that the French had at least a 10:1 superiority in men-at-arms, and a 4:1 advantage overall.³ Those are substantially worse odds

¹ See Appendix.

² See Appendix.

³ I intend to discuss the numbers involved in the battle more fully in a separate article on the battle of Agincourt itself. For the moment, it will suffice to say that I generally accept the logic of A.H. Burne's conclusions concerning French overall numbers in *The Agincourt War* (1956; reprint, 1991), 91–4, as did John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York, 1984), 87, Christopher Hibbert, *Agincourt* (1978; reprint, Norwalk, Conn., 1995), 89, and Matthew Bennett, *Agincourt 1415* (London, 1991), 72. However, it is likely that the 24,000-or-so combatants in the French army

than the English faced at Crécy or Poitiers, a fact which naturally raises the question of how the English managed to win, and win so decisively. There has been much written on Agincourt, but the analytical focus of most historians of the campaign has been on the battle itself: how the English were deployed, why the French attacks failed, the effectiveness of the archers' arrows, etc. The question of why the battle took place at all (why, that is, King Henry chose to march overland from Harfleur to Calais, thus setting in motion the chain of events which culminated in the face-off between the two armies between Agincourt and Tramecourt on St. Crispin's day) has been relegated to the periphery of scholarly inquiry. Yet it is a very important question, for it lies at the root of the momentous consequences of the events of 1415, and also has great implications for our understanding and assessment of Henry V as king and as commander.

The Background

Before turning to that key decision, it will be helpful to review the background to it. The campaign of 1415 was launched in order to press the claims in France Henry V had inherited from his great-grandfather, Edward III. Edward had been the closest male relative of King Charles IV of France (1322–1328) at the time of that monarch's death, and so considered himself the rightful inheritor of the realm. His consistent diplomatic position, however, had been that as a lover of peace he was willing to settle for a compromise with the Valois dynasty which had (as he saw it) unjustly seized the throne while he was a minor. Essentially, Edward was willing to give up

included only around 10,000 men-at-arms, with the remainder being the same number of *gros valets*, plus a force of urban militiamen, mainly armed with crossbows. (I reached this conclusion independently, then discovered it was almost the same as that of Philippe Contamine, in "Crécy (1346) et Azincourt (1415): une comparaison," *Divers Aspects du Moyen Age en Occident, Actes du Congrès Tenu à Calais en Septembre 1974* [Calais, 1977], 35.) As to the English numbers, the *Gesta's* figures of 900 men-at-arms and 5,000 archers should be (and have been) accepted as basically accurate. *Gesta Henrici Quinti* in *The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations* ed. Anne Curry (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 27; see also chart (12). Since Curry has done such an excellent job of collecting and translating the sources for the campaign, I will cite the texts as they appear in her book rather than the scattered original publications where that is possible.

his claim to the crown of France in exchange for full and sovereign possession of the lands his ancestors had held as dukes of Aquitaine.

That was not a compromise to which the French kings would willingly agree. As far as they were concerned, the issue of Charles IV's successor had been closed with the coronation of Philip VI (1328–1350), and bolted shut by Edward III's homages to Philip, as king of France, in 1329 and again in 1331. As they saw it, Edward's "compromise" involved the dismembering of their kingdom, in exchange for the Englishman giving up something he did not really have in the first place. Only military defeats of exceptional severity could convince them to accept such a deal. Accordingly, Edward III and his son, the Black Prince (d. 1376), aided by an extraordinary group of able lieutenants, proceeded to inflict a series of exceptionally severe military defeats on the French and their allies: Sluys (1340), Auberoche (1345), Bergerac (1345), Crécy (1346), Neville's Cross (1346), Calais (1346), la Roche Derrien (1347), and Poitiers (1356), to name only the greatest of them.⁴ In addition to victories in battle and siege, the English reduced the countryside and the economy of France to misery and ruin, through the combination of devastating *chevauchées* and the brutal activities of the *routiers*.⁵ The result was the treaty of Brétigny in 1360, by which Jean II (1350–1364) and the future Charles V (1364–1380) agreed to transfer about one third of the realm to English sovereignty, including Ponthieu, the Calais Pale, and an expansively defined Aquitaine in the south-west.⁶

The complicated land-transfer provisions of the treaty, however, were never fully implemented, and so the planned mutual renunciation of claims (Edward's to the crown of France, and Jean II or Charles V's to sovereignty over Aquitaine) were not carried out. In

⁴ For this phase of the Hundred Years War, see my *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), and Jonathan Sumption's first two volumes of his *Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990) and *Trial by Fire* (London, 1999). I have also treated Bergerac and Neville's Cross in articles: "The Scottish Invasion of 1346," *Northern History* 34 (1998): 51–69 and "The Battles of Bergerac (1345) and the Generalship of Henry of Lancaster," *Journal of Medieval Military History* II (2003): 89–110.

⁵ Clifford J. Rogers, "By Fire and Sword: *Bellum Hostile* and 'Civilians' in the Hundred Years War," in *Civilians in the Path of War*, ed. Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (Lincoln, Neb., 2002), 33–78.

⁶ In addition to the books cited in note 4, see my "The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1354–1360 Reconsidered," in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. James Bothwell (New York, 2001), 193–213.

1369, after France had enjoyed a decade of recovery and the Black Prince had run into fiscal and political trouble because of his intervention in Castile, King Charles renewed the conflict.⁷ After 1370, the English military leaders who had most excelled in the first phase of the war were nearly all dead or unable to campaign. Furthermore, the French, under Charles V and du Guesclin, adopted a strategy of strict battle-avoidance, relying on their superior resources and favorable political circumstances to gradually reconquer the lands that had been captured by or surrendered to the English. This policy was so successful that by the time Richard II (1377–1399) came to the throne, English holdings were back more or less where they started in 1337. Against that hard core of pro-English territories, French offensives made no further headway. Growing internal troubles in both realms led to a de facto suspension of the war through the reign of Henry IV (1399–1413).

English Strategy

Immediately on his accession in 1413, Henry V turned his attention to France. He sent ambassadors to press Charles VI's government for a new peace agreement along the lines of Brétigny. When his offers were refused, he began preparations to enforce his claims. By the summer of 1415, he had assembled at least 1500 ships to carry an exceptionally powerful army to the continent.

Landing unopposed at the mouth of the Seine, his men quickly took up positions around the key port of Harfleur, which it was the king's firm intention to capture. When the defenders refused Henry's demand for their surrender, a long process of bombardment, mining, and assaults began. After five weeks of steady pressure, the garrison was ready to negotiate. Their repeated calls for aid from the royal forces gathering at Rouen had gone unanswered.⁸ Now Henry granted them one last chance to send a message to the French army, to announce that the town would be surrendered in four days unless relieved by a battle. Though they had already advanced into Normandy, Charles VI and the *dauphin* made no move to save the port.

⁷ See L.J. Andrew Villalon, "Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera," in this volume.

⁸ *Gesta Henrici Quinti: The Deeds of Henry V*, ed. and trans. F. Taylor and J.S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), 48, 51 (n. 5).

On the twenty-second of September, King Henry received the keys to the town.⁹ Five days later, the noble prisoners were released on parole after promising to surrender themselves at Calais in the second week of November. The chief among them, the sire de Gaucourt, also carried to the Dauphin a challenge to settle the issue of the war by personal combat. Henry promised "to wait for him [at Harfleur] for a further eight days."¹⁰ At the end of the eighth day, October 5, there had been no reply. Consequently, the next morning, Henry ceased waiting, and the army began its march to Calais.¹¹

Henry had by then been considering his options for some time. There is no reason to doubt the sources that suggest the king and his council engaged in some rather stormy debates on the topic.¹² The siege had been long and difficult, and the English army had been savaged by dysentery as well as combat casualties.¹³ An all-out effort had enabled Henry to raise over 12,000 men for the start of the campaign—nearly as many as Edward III had gathered for the Crécy campaign, a remarkable feat considering that the population of England had declined by nearly fifty percent in the interim, mainly due to the Black Death (1348–1352). But of this powerful force, only around 7,200 soldiers remained fit for duty.

So long as the English continued the siege of Harfleur, they could refuse to fight a battle except on their own terms, i.e. on the tactical defensive and in prepared positions. With 12,000 men, or even 7,200, they could face that prospect with confidence, which is why the French neither chose to attack them nor were able to terrify them into withdrawal. But it was by no means clear that 7,200 men would be enough to withstand the might of France in an open field.

⁹ James Hamilton Wylie, *The Reign of Henry the Fifth*, 2 vols. (1914–1919; reprint, New York, 1968) 2:1–54 covers the siege with thorough documentation.

¹⁰ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, 54–57.

¹¹ Wylie, *Reign*, 2:88 n. 3 gives the documentary evidence, overriding the *Gesta*, which inconsistently states that the departure was on "die Martis pridie ante festum sancti Dionisi [i.e. October 8] in nonis Octobrium [i.e. October 7]." *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, 60.

¹² *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, in Curry, *Sources*, 27, see also *Vita et Gesta*, in Curry, *Sources*, 65; Titus Livius, *Vita Henrici Quinti* in Curry, *Sources*, 56. The "large majority" of the council opposed the decision.

¹³ Thomas Hostell was doubtless not the only Englishman to take a springald bolt through the head during the long weeks of the siege, though he may well be the only one of those who did suffer such a wound (which cost him an eye and broke his cheekbones) to still go on to fight at Agincourt! Curry, *Sources*, 449.

Still less would it be safe to expect a victory with the smaller force that could be mustered for field operations, after deducting a garrison sufficient to defend dearly-bought Harfleur. The French already had some 14,000 men assembled at Rouen, and their army included a much higher proportion of heavily-armored men-at-arms.¹⁴ They could expect large numbers of reinforcements if a battle appeared imminent; the English could not.

Furthermore, Henry's soldiers had been paid a quarter's wages in advance, but the quarter was about to expire. If the campaign were to continue, it would have to be conducted on credit, for which the royal jewels had been assigned as collateral.¹⁵ That would make it far more difficult to pay for a new campaign the following spring.

Considering all this, it is easy to see why the majority of the council opposed the king's proposal to march from Harfleur to Calais, through the midst of his enemies.¹⁶ It is less clear what Henry hoped to accomplish by this maneuver. One obvious answer would be that he made the march because he hoped to gain what in fact he *did* gain, in the event: a major battlefield victory. There is in fact substantial evidence to support this view, but few if any modern historians accept the idea that the English march was undertaken precisely because King Henry *wanted* a battle with the French army, and saw no other prospect for getting one.

It was once common to see the advance to Agincourt simply as strategic incompetence, a risk taken without rational calculation. To quote the most extreme statement of this standpoint, Henry's plan was "the most foolhardy and reckless adventure that ever an unreasoning pietist devised."¹⁷ There are two problems with this stance.

¹⁴ *Chronique du religieux de St.-Denis*, in Curry, *Sources*, 102. Burne says this is "doubtless exaggerated," but he also calculates the French force on the battlefield at 24,000. Given the latter figure, which I agree is a reasonable one, a nucleus of 14,000 troops only about two weeks earlier seems quite credible, and the source is a good one. Note also the general (though not specific) confirmation in the *Geste des nobles François*, in Curry, *Sources*, 113.

¹⁵ See Curry's discussion, in *Sources*, 412–17; as she says on 412 and 417, "Henry wanted to make a big show in France, yet did not have enough money to do so," and his army "embarked without the crown having fully paid for its service, a case of mortgaging the future if ever there was one." But to make a truly "big show" within the time-limit imposed by his finances, he had to fight a battle.

¹⁶ *Gesta*, in Curry, *Sources*, 27.

¹⁷ Wylie, *Reign*, 2:76. In a note on the same page, Wylie cites over a dozen earlier writers who considered the march "unaccountable," "foolhardy to a degree of

First, we should always at least be cautious about criticizing a general's plan if that plan leads to an outstanding success. That is not to say that commanders never do stupid things, nor that every great triumph derives from a great or even good strategic conception, but, as Clausewitz notes, "success enables us to understand much that the workings of human intelligence alone would not be able to discover."¹⁸ In other words, the calculations of a great general take full account of the powerful influence of moral and psychological motivations. Military geniuses appreciate the character of their opponents, and recognize the tremendous importance that differences in organization, training, discipline, morale, and military spirit play in determining victory in war.¹⁹ "The moral factors," Clausewitz observes, "are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade," while by comparison, "the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt."²⁰ The moral factors, however, are much more difficult for the historian to assess, especially as we go back further in time (and have to work with thinner sources), except insofar as they are revealed by results. "The critic, then, having analyzed everything within the range of human calculation and belief, will let the outcome speak for that part whose deep, mysterious operation is never visible."²¹ If a particular commander leads numerous successful military operations, and rarely or never suffers defeat, then it is only reasonable to presume

madness," "reckless," "very rash," etc. E.F. Jacob, *Henry V and the Invasion of France* (London, 1947), 93, quotes Wylie's phrase, describing it as "perhaps an exaggeration"—but only because "there was a reasonable chance of his getting through to Calais without having to fight." His basic stance is thus similar to Burne's and Keegan's. In his later judgment he is more favorable to Henry: the march "was a justifiable movement," he concludes, given that Henry could expect to avoid being met by a large French force, and in any case "was perfectly confident of his ability to engage a much larger force than his own within his own duchy . . . based on intelligible military calculations." idem, *The Fifteenth Century, 1399–1485* vol. 6 of *The Oxford History of England*, ed. Sir George Clark et al., 6 vols. (London, 1964), 148–49. Still, Jacob continued to view the operation as "a reconnaissance in force," "a limited operation, enabling him to gauge the strength of the French command," rather than an invitation to a full-scale battle which might bring decisive results. Ibid., 149, 151–2. Labarge describes the decision as "brave but not prudent," because it rested on the presumption "that he would be able to avoid a direct confrontation with a fresher French army far superior in size." Margaret Wade Labarge, *Henry V, The Cautious Conqueror* (London, 1975), 83.

¹⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, rev. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 167.

¹⁹ Ibid., 189.

²⁰ Ibid., 185.

²¹ Ibid., 167.

that a good part of his success derives from his ability to see and rightly weigh those factors which remain incalculable for us, doubly obscured by the fog of war and the mists of time.²²

Second, Henry was in 1415 already a seasoned veteran with substantial experience from the wars against Glyn Dwr and the Percies.²³ He knew first-hand what battle meant, having experience both as a commander and a combatant at Shrewsbury, where he was wounded in the face by a rebel's arrow.²⁴ Furthermore, it is hard to dispute that his conduct of the French war in the years between Agincourt and his early death demonstrated "generalship and statesmanship of a high order."²⁵ Contemporaries, both French and English, judged Henry to be the very opposite of rash. For example, the monk of St. Denis says he was throughout his reign "worthy in arms, prudent, [and] wise," adding "no prince of his time appeared to surpass him in capability to subdue and conquer a country," by reason of his prudence and other good qualities.²⁶ His conquest of Normandy was characterized by methodical, exceptionally well-organized and well-conceived siege campaigns, combined with the calculated boldness which has been praised by military thinkers from Christine di Pizan and Jean de Beuil to Clausewitz.²⁷ After Harfleur fell, there were good reasons for Henry to take risks, but there is nothing in

²² *Ibid.*, 103.

²³ He was described as being "young in years, but old in experience [*maturitate*]" at his accession in 1413, when he was 25. *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, 2–3.

²⁴ See Christopher Allmand, *Henry V* (Berkeley, 1992), chap. 2; R.R. Davies, *The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr* (Oxford, 1995); Rhidian Griffiths, "Prince Henry's War: Armies, Garrisons and Supply during the Glyndwr Rising," *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies* 34 (1987): 165–73. Modern historians sometimes lose sight of the importance and seriousness of his military experience while Prince of Wales, as for example when Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 89 has Henry give the order to advance at Agincourt only after "the veterans had endorsed his guess that the French would not be drawn," as if Henry were not himself a hardened veteran.

²⁵ Richard Ager Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy, 1416–1424: A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare* (New Haven, Conn., 1924), xiv. See also Burne's overall assessment of Henry V as a soldier: "his resolution . . . in conjunction with careful forethought and preparation, resulted in success invariably crowning his efforts" [*Agincourt War*, 179.] Margaret Wade Labarge subtitles her biography of the king "The Cautious Conqueror."

²⁶ *Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis: contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422*, ed. and trans. L. Bellaguet, 6 vols. (Paris, 1839–1852), 6:480.

²⁷ Henry: See especially Newhall, *Conquest*. Boldness: Jean de Beuil, *Le Jowencel*, ed. Léon Lecestre, 2 vols (Paris, 1887–1889), 1:160; Clausewitz, *On War*, 190–92

his earlier or later conduct to suggest that he would take those risks without exercising due foresight, or without a reasoned assessment of the probabilities.

Alfred H. Burne's analysis of Henry's motivations is more subtle and more credible, and has been widely accepted, by John Keegan among others. Burne's basic argument is that Henry had made a reasonable, though ultimately incorrect, strategic calculation. Like all strategic plans, the march to Calais involved some risk: in this case, the risk that the French would be able to overtake the English field force with a massively superior army and force the invaders to battle, just as they actually did. This outcome did represent a failure of Henry's plan, but not one that was at all inevitable. The king, Burne believes, reckoned that he would have every chance of making it to Calais before the French could do anything to stop him. The English would have a head-start, since it would take a while for the French to learn of the army's departure from Harfleur, and then more time to gather their forces and get into motion. Marching hard, and having taken "all possible steps to minimize the chance of an actual encounter with the main French army in the field,"²⁸ the English would get in front and stay in front of their enemies. They would reach Calais without having to fight a battle. Henry, in Keegan's words, "could both *appear* to seek battle with the French armies which were known to be gathering and yet safely out-distance them by a march to the haven of Calais."²⁹ There would be risks, but, Burne reminds us, "in war if you risk nothing, you gain nothing."³⁰

The essence of this argument is that the dangers of the traverse to Calais were not as great as they might seem at first glance. But

("we consider this quality the first prerequisite of the great military leader," on p. 192). The very first phrase of Christine di Pizan's *Livre des faits d'armes et de chivalerie*, written a few years before Agincourt, states "As boldness is essential for great undertakings . . ." See Christine di Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, ed. Charity Cannon Willard, trans. Sumner Willard (University Park, Penn., 1999), 11, 35.

²⁸ Burne, *Agincourt War*, 53. As noted above, however, Henry did *not* take all possible steps to minimize the chance of an encounter. On the contrary, he took two steps which greatly increased the chance of an encounter: he let the French know eight days in advance, by the terms of ransom agreements for the prisoners of Harfleur, and by the challenge delivered to the Dauphin, indicating where he was planning to march, and when he was planning to leave.

²⁹ Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 80–81. Emphasis added.

³⁰ Burne, *Agincourt War*, 52.

rational strategic planning requires considering both cost and benefit. What was the advantage to be gained, that would justify taking even this calculated risk? Burne argues as follows:

There was a great deal to be gained. The alternative was a return to England. This would be construed as failure in both countries, the king's prestige would fall, there might even be a revolution and he might be supplanted by the legitimate heir to the throne, the earl of March; in any case conditions for a future invasion of France would be bad. On the other hand if Henry succeeded in his march, he would be reviving the memories of similar English *chevauchées* which had done much to raise English prestige in the days of Edward III; he would show that an English army could apparently go where it liked in the lands he claimed as his own . . . All this might be accomplished by taking risks.³¹

Subsequent writers have generally followed similar lines. Matthew Bennett says that Henry intended to "show the flag," indicating that the main value of the operation was to score a sort of propaganda coup.³² Keegan's view is similar, though shifting emphasis from gaining strength in public opinion to avoiding a loss in reputation: "honour demanded that he should not leave France without making a traverse, however much more circumspect [than originally planned], of the lands he claimed."³³ Bennett further observes that "the most important factor" in the decision to make the march was "the example of Edward III, whom Henry was eager to emulate and surpass."³⁴ At the time Bennett was writing, the reference to Edward III implied an opinion similar to Keegan's and Burne's concerning Henry's aversion to a general engagement, for it was then universally accepted that the English *chevauchées* of the fourteenth century had been intended not to seek battle, but rather to undermine the enemy politically and economically while avoiding the risks of an open fight.³⁵

While this perspective on Henry's decision might rescue him from Wylie's charge of extreme folly, it certainly would not win the king many points for generalship.³⁶ If he did not want to fight a battle

³¹ Ibid.

³² Bennett, *Agincourt 1415*, 44.

³³ Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 80–1.

³⁴ Bennett, *Agincourt*, 23.

³⁵ See the historians cited in Clifford J. Rogers, "Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy, 1327–1360," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6th ser, 4 (1994): 84 (n. 10).

³⁶ It would fit better with Newhall's earlier view, that in 1415 Henry "had been

with his depleted and worn-down army, but took a course that entailed at least a significant risk of being forced to fight—or worse yet, of being pinned in place and starved into surrender—only because he believed that “honor demanded” it, or in order to gain a propaganda victory, that cannot be called a wise choice. A quick march from Harfleur to Calais might recall Edward III's campaign of 1346, but it would also bring to mind the much longer traverse of Henry's own grandfather in 1373 and similar expeditions of 1370 and 1380, which had won but little glory and less profit for English arms. The difference between those ineffective forays and 1346 and 1356 was that the latter campaigns had culminated in major English victories on the battlefield.

The boost to Henry's and England's reputation that might come from the march to Calais would only be a small increment to the moderate sense of accomplishment already earned by the capture of Harfleur; likewise, the undermining of the French government's prestige accomplished by such an operation would only slightly add to the harm already inflicted by Charles VI's failure to rescue the defenders of the town.³⁷ Honor did *not* “demand a traverse,” not after the successful capture of “the key to Normandy,”³⁸ “the principal key to France”³⁹ “a fortress of great strength, generally esteemed impregnable, and the safest port of the glorious realm of France,”⁴⁰ which had been selected in 1404 as the jumping-off point for a planned attack on England.⁴¹ If the cross-country journey had been a necessity of honor, the large majority of the royal war council would not have advised against it. The traverse, in other words, was a choice, not a necessity. The potential gain would be minor; the

completely outgeneraled in the field, and owed his victorious escape to the enemy's egregious tactical blunders, and to the fighting qualities of his men” [Newhall, *Conquest*, 23].

³⁷ The fact that Henry had remained in French territory for the length of the siege, and that the surrender contract for the town had included an opportunity for the French king or his heir to rescue it before its fall by delivering battle, would make any charge of *Henry's* cowardice or fear of the French rather easy to deflect.

³⁸ Juvenal des Ursins, Monstrelet, and others are quoted to this effect in Wylie, *Reign*, 9–10 (n. 16).

³⁹ *Rotuli Parliamentorum: ut et petitiones, et placita in parlamento*, 6 vols (London, 1767–1783), 4:94.

⁴⁰ Letter, possibly of 1415, in Curry, *Sources*, 273. Wylie, *Reign*, 2:15, n. 5, for additional testaments to its strength.

⁴¹ Wylie, *Reign*, 2:10. Presumably for this reason and because of the activities of pirates based there, the town was proclaimed in Parliament to have been “the greatest enemy to the king's lieges.” In Curry, *Sources*, 270.

potential loss, if Henry's calculations proved wrong and the English were forced to fight a battle they could not reasonably hope to win, would be nothing short of catastrophic.

Agincourt: Alternate Explanations

There are sound reasons to look for a different explanation of Henry's behavior in 1415, one that would fit better with his overall reputation as a wise commander, deriving both from his success and from his prudence in earlier and later campaigns. Can it be argued that the king's decision to march across Normandy and Picardy was an intelligent choice, even a brilliant one, rather than merely a forgivable error?

Such an argument would require, first and foremost, that Henry had something more to gain by this operation than a propaganda coup. Anything that would show that the potential dangers of the operation were less than they appeared would likewise make the cost-benefit analysis for the march more favorable, and hence Henry's decision more sound. Both of these criteria would be satisfied if we start from the assumption that Henry was *hoping* for a battle with the French, and expected to win regardless of the numerical odds against him. Indeed, both of those assumptions seem necessary to any assessment of the king's decision as a wise one. Unless he expected a victory if attacked, he would clearly be foolish to want a battle, and unless he wanted a battle, he would have been unwise to risk one for insignificant gains. Conversely, if he did expect that a general engagement would produce an English victory, he would have been foolish not to want one.

Is there any reason to believe that Henry wanted a battle and expected to win one if the French would fight? Certainly. There are, in fact, many. First, there is the logic of his situation. In medieval warfare, the side on the strategic defensive had a tremendous advantage, stemming in part from the great superiority of the defense in siege warfare, and in part from military, political, and economic structures, conditions, and traditions that made it far easier to raise a short-term army for home defense than a long-service army for distant offensive campaigning. Hence, a "Vegetian" strategy (avoiding battle, protecting fortresses with strong garrisons, shadowing and harassing the enemy to prevent him from foraging, thus depriving

him of supplies and plunder) was a very popular and effective response to invasion. Aggressors, consequently, found it extremely difficult to make lasting gains against a reasonably strong and determined defender, so long as the latter stuck to a Fabian strategy. But if avoiding battle was the best course for a defender, that naturally meant that ensuring battle was often the best course for an attacker; as Vegetius himself observed, a general should generally do whatever his enemy would wish not to be done.⁴²

If Henry V had not fought a battle in 1415, he might with difficulty have managed another large-scale invasion in the next several years, though he would have been hard-pressed to gather a force much larger than even the depleted remnants of his army that were left to him in October of 1415 following the siege of Harfleur.⁴³ If, as would be likely, the best he could do in that second campaign was to capture another town of the same size, he would have pretty well shot his bolt. His siege of Rouen in 1418 was of course immeasurably aided by the military weakness and political confusion the defeat at Agincourt imposed on the French, and by the gains he had made in 1417 against little opposition, and yet it was an extraordinarily difficult enterprise even so.⁴⁴ It is unlikely that it could have been brought to a successful conclusion had the French not still been reeling from the sledgehammer-blow of St. Crispin's day, any more than the Germans could have succeeded in the siege of Paris in 1871 had it not been for Metz and Sedan in 1870.⁴⁵

⁴² For the effectiveness of, and widespread preference for, a battle-avoiding strategy, see especially John Gillingham, "Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages," in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. John Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1984). References to other works which exemplify this view of medieval battle, and an argument that in general belligerents on the strategic *offensive* typically did seek battle, can be found in my "The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare in the Middle Ages,'" *Journal of Medieval Military History* 1 (2002): 1–19, which should be read in conjunction with Stephen Morillo, "Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 1 (2002): 21–41, and John Gillingham's response, "'Up with Orthodoxy!': In Defense of Vegetian Warfare," in *Journal of Medieval Military History* 2 (2003): 149–58.

⁴³ See Appendix.

⁴⁴ Newhall, *Conquest*, 104–115; also 121: "A pitched battle that might prove another Agincourt the Duke [of Burgundy] dared not risk, even in the face of growing discontent at the government's inaction. Upon the French withdrawal from Pontoise, Rouen began to treat with the English."

⁴⁵ See Appendix, and consider that even after the decimation of the chivalry of France at Crécy and Poitiers, and the capture of King Jean at the latter, Edward III had not been able to capture Reims in 1359–60, for example.

Bear in mind that Henry V's war aims, when he re-opened active campaigning in the Hundred Years War, were lofty ones. Essentially, he aimed at forcing the French to implement the terms of the treaty of Brétigny.⁴⁶ Any such arrangement would require massive concessions from his enemies: they would have to accept the permanent dismemberment of the realm of France and tamely hand over to English sovereignty vast areas which Henry neither had control of, nor had any real prospect of occupying by force. Even after Agincourt—as after Crécy—the rulers of France had no immediate inclination to accept any such deal. It took the combination of Agincourt, and a vigorous and impressive set of campaigns in 1417–1419, and the Orléanists' murder of John the Fearless in 1419 to bring the achievement of Henry's goals (and indeed the more ambitious goal of truly gaining the French crown he claimed) within sight. In 1415, it would hardly have required supernatural prescience to recognize that *only* a major battlefield victory early in the resumed war would offer any real possibility of leading to a political result of the sort Henry was aiming for.

Battle, moreover, was in his blood; glorious victories against heavy odds were a commonplace of his family tradition. Three of his great-grandfathers had between them commanded at five battlefields where enemies heavily superior in numbers had tumbled to ignominious defeat: William de Bohun at Morlaix (1342), Henry of Grosmont at Bergerac and Auberoche, Edward III at Halidon Hill (1333) and Crécy. His great-uncle the Black Prince could claim to have defeated five kings in three great battles.⁴⁷ He himself had helped his father win at Shrewsbury, as already noted. He knew that the last-mentioned combat had put an end to the Percies' rebellion. He knew that Nájera had put Pedro the Cruel back on the throne, that Crécy and Poitiers had pushed Jean II and his heir into accepting the treaty of Brétigny, and that Duke Henry's extensive conquests in 1345–6 had only been possible because of Bergerac, Auberoche, and Crécy. He knew that great, though not in every case lasting, military and political results had followed from the victories of Dupplin Moor,

⁴⁶ See John Palmer, "The War Aims of the Protagonists and the Negotiations for Peace," in *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London, 1971), 66–68.

⁴⁷ The kings of France, Germany and Majorca at Crécy, where he commanded the vanguard—which did virtually all of the fighting—under his father; Jean II at Poitiers; and Henry of Trastámara at Nájera.

Halidon Hill, la Roche Derrien (won by another relative),⁴⁸ Neville's Cross, and Halidon Hill.

On the other hand, he knew that the grand *chevauchées* of 1369–1383, which had not involved battles, had not accomplished much of anything. Likewise, his own Welsh campaigns of 1401–1404 had given him personal experience of how difficult and expensive it was to subdue an enemy—even an enemy close at hand, with few men-at-arms and little money—*without* the running start provided by an initial battlefield victory. After four years of effort to quell the revolt, in February of 1405, the Welsh rebels “were prouder and more confident (*hautes*) than ever before.”⁴⁹ But the turning point in the whole war came in the following month, near Grosmont, when a “very small force” led by men from Prince Henry's household defeated a vastly larger Welsh army, reportedly 8,000 men “by their own account,” and captured Glyn Dwr's eldest son, Gruffydd. At the time it seemed to Henry a “miracle,” a confirmation that “it is indeed true that victory lies not in multitude of people . . . but in the power of God.”⁵⁰

What family history and personal experience taught concerning the power of battlefield victory, the difficulty of conquest without it, and the relative unimportance of superior numbers in determining the outcome of a combat, authority confirmed. The late Roman writer Vegetius was considered the greatest authority on strategy and tactics, and he made all these points.⁵¹ As to the significance of

⁴⁸ His great-great-uncle (by marriage, to William de Bohun's sister) sir Thomas Dagworth, who had also won another victory against great odds a year earlier in a minor engagement at Restellou.

⁴⁹ Letter of the earl of Arundel, February 7, 1405, in *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England*, ed. Sir Harris Nicolas, 7 vols. (London, 1834–1837) 1:247: “*les ditz rebelles ne ferount unques sy hautes ne sy orgoilouses come ils sont a present . . .*”

⁵⁰ Letter of Prince Henry to his father, March 11, 1405, *Proceedings*, 1:248–50. “Dieu monstre gracieusement pour vous soun miracle . . . Car Mescredy le xi. jour de cest present moys de Mars voz rebelx des parties de Glomorgan Morgannock Uske Netherwent et Overwent feurent assemblez a la nombre de oyt mil gentz par leur aconté demesne . . . et jenvoia tantost hors moun trescher cousin le Sire de Talbot et moun petit meigne de moun hostel . . . lesqueux ne feurent qun trespetit pouoir en tous, mes il est bien voirs que la victoire nest pas en la multitude de poeple, et ce feut bien monstre illoques mes en la puissance de Dieu et illoques par laide de la benoitee Trinitee voz gens avoient le champs et vainquerent tous les ditz rebelx et occirent de eux par loial aconté en le champs a leur revenue de la chace aucuns dient viii^c et aucuns dient mil sur peine de leur vie.” No prisoners were taken except Gruffydd.

⁵¹ Power of battle: “In the decision of pitched battle consists the fulness of victory”;

numerical superiority, just a few years before 1415, Christine di Pizan made the following observations in her *Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*:

all author[itic]s who have written on this matter agree with Vegetius that too great a number of men encourages confusion . . . One finds that many armies have been thrown into disarray by their own great number . . . the large army cannot move forward [in good array], but so many men will rather get in the way of each other. . . . For this reason, as has been said, the ancients who had mastered such things useful in battle, knowing the perils from experience, placed a higher value on an army well taught and well led than in a great multitude . . . victory is frequently achieved by a small number of combatants, if only the wise commander puts them where expediency and reason require.⁵²

Thus, considering the lessons Henry could have drawn from history, contemporary military theory, and his own experience, there are very solid grounds for at least considering whether he might have undertaken the march towards Calais precisely in order to bring on a battle, hoping for and even expecting just the outcome which did in fact follow from his actions. If so, his strategy, and not just its results, would have been very much in line with his predecessors' conduct of the war. It used to be believed that, for example, Edward III had been trying to avoid battle in 1346, fighting and winning the battle of Crécy only when he was forced to do so. This view, closely analogous to the current orthodoxy on the campaign of 1415, has now been shown to be incorrect. In fact, Edward III and the Black Prince consistently sought battle in every campaign they undertook.⁵³ Thus, if we accept (as I think we should) Matthew Bennett's already-noted view that "an important factor [in Henry's decision to march to Calais] was the example of Edward III, whom Henry was eager to emulate and surpass," the implication would be that Henry intended to draw the French into a fight.

"an open battle is decided in two or three hours, after which all the hopes of the defeated side fall away and are lost." Flavius Renatus Vegetius, *De Re Militari*, in *Ammien Marcellin, Jordanès, Végèce, Modestus, avec la traduction en français*, ed. C. Nisard (Paris, 1878), 698–9 (III.9). Unimportance of numbers: 715 (III.28). "Bravery is of more value than numbers. Position is often of more value than bravery."

⁵² di Pizan, *Book of Deeds*, 37–8, 55, 59, 74–75.

⁵³ See Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 385–422, for the campaigns through 1360; no one disputes that the Black Prince actively sought the battle of Nájera.

There is another way in which the fourteenth-century analogy can be helpful. Careful analysis shows that in 1346 and again in 1356, King Edward and his son, though eager for battle and not much worried by their own numerical inferiority, were very concerned to ensure that they be able to fight on the tactical defensive when the combat began. Their greatest fear was that they would be outmaneuvered by the French and compelled to fight an *offensive* battle to break out of a trap, or be starved into surrender. Fast marching to avoid this situation was often misinterpreted by modern historians as an intention to avoid battle.⁵⁴ This observation may lead us to a better understanding of similar elements of the campaign of 1415.

Contemporary Opinion

The idea that King Henry undertook the march to Calais for the sake of honor and reputation, to “show the flag” and avoid any appearance of fear of the French, does have a foundation in the sources.⁵⁵ But the sources are clear that he had other things on his mind as well. A traverse without battle was not the best outcome he envisioned: at the council, as later in the campaign, he clearly expressed the belief that if the French disturbed the English march, the result would be an English victory in battle.⁵⁶ To the extent we

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, chaps. 10–11, 15. The same reasoning applies to the truce offers made by the Black Prince before the battle of Poitiers. These offers were also inspired by fear of being pinned in and starved; they were not made because of a desire to escape battle, but *despite* eagerness for a defensive battle.

⁵⁵ Mainly *Vita et Gesta*, in Curry, *Sources*, 65. “The noble king, with the firmness of his spirited heart in the Lord strengthened by faith in his troops, objected to that opinion, maintaining that his heart was moved to see those places which he claimed as his own on the grounds of hereditary right. He also maintained that he would rather throw himself on the mercy of God in determining the outcome of events, not shirking the dangers, than offer himself to the enemy as grounds for elevating their pride, diminishing the reputation of his honour by flight.”

⁵⁶ *Gesta*, in Curry, *Sources*, 27: “our king, relying on divine grace and the justice of his cause, piously reflecting that *victory* consists not in a multitude but with Him for Whom it is not impossible to enclose the many in the hand of the few and Who bestows *victory* upon whom He wills, whether they be few or many”; echoed in Titus Livius, in Curry, *Sources*, 56: “if they try to hinder us, we shall triumph as victors with great praise”; see also 58. *Vita et Gesta* in Curry, *Sources*, 65: “The king, immovably resolute in his intention noted earlier, constantly maintaining that the *victory* depended not on the weight of numbers but on divine will.” Note also *ibid.*, 67, and Jean Juvenal des Ursins, in Curry, *Sources*, 132; Thomas Basin, in Curry, *Sources*, 189. (Emphasis added).

accept these statements as sincere, then, we logically must conclude that he did want a battle. Of course, that still leaves the questions of whether these statements were sincere, and, if so, whether his expectation of victory in case of battle was rational or the “madness” of “unreasoning pietism.”⁵⁷

The arguments made above concerning the historical precedents that might lead Henry to anticipate a French defeat, and the fact of the outcome of the fight, show sufficiently that an expectation of victory was not unreasonable; and if that is so, then what reason is there to doubt Henry’s sincerity? There appears to be none, especially when one considers that both religious sentiment and the military science of his day would have reinforced any decision derived from a belief that numerical superiority was not the key to tactical success.⁵⁸

Even those opposed to the decision for the most part did not cite fear of a tactical defeat as their primary concern; rather, they emphasized the risk that the French would “enclose them on every side like sheep in folds.”⁵⁹ This worry was well justified; the French were indeed planning a strategy aimed at “trussing up” the invaders in order to gain a certain victory.⁶⁰ The wiser and more experienced among the French leaders were well aware that Henry would have a good chance of defeating them in an open fight, despite their great advantage in manpower.⁶¹ One of these was apparently the aged duke of Berry, who had seen with his own eyes the sleeting arrowstorms of Poitiers almost sixty years earlier.⁶²

It also appears that the French commanders were operating under the belief that, “even from the moment [Henry] left his own king-

⁵⁷ See note 17, above.

⁵⁸ On religious sentiment, see di Pizan, *Book of Deeds*, 59. See also Philippe de Mézières, Philippe de Vilette, and John Bromyard, in *Society at War*, ed. Christopher Allmand (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1998), 39, 42, 50. Vilette’s sermon is particularly apropos for it was preached to the court of Charles VI in April, 1414.

⁵⁹ *Gesta*, in Curry, *Sources*, 27; see also 29. By contrast, Titus Livius does have Clarence advise against the march because the French were intent on battle while the English army was too weak to fight. *Sources*, 56.

⁶⁰ *Chronique du religieux de Saint Denis*, in Curry, *Sources*, 102; note also 103 and 104, and Elmham’s *Liber Metricus*, in Curry, *Sources*, 43.

⁶¹ Jean Juvenal des Ursins, in Curry, *Sources*, 129; Monstrelet, in Curry, *Sources*, 150, indicates, however, that only five of thirty-five royal councilors disagreed with the order for the army to seek out and engage the English.

⁶² Berry herald, 180.

dom, his desire was to give battle to the French."⁶³ They had good reason for this assumption. First, the simple fact that the English had been in France for weeks indicated at least willingness to fight. As far away as Venice, informed observers had assumed that the French would respond forcefully to the siege, and that a great battle would ensue.⁶⁴ Second, if this implicit throwing down of the gauntlet was not clear enough, Henry had explicitly declared his readiness for a fight. As part of the surrender deal negotiated with Harfleur, the garrison had been allowed to send messengers to Charles VI's court, giving the French the chance to rescue the port by gage of battle.⁶⁵ Third, though Henry's enemies may not have known this, it was believed in the English army earlier in the campaign that the king's intention was to march from Rouen to Dieppe to Paris—a route that certainly suggested a desire for a fight.⁶⁶ Henry had also written, shortly after the fall of Harfleur, that his intent was "to do our duty to achieve as soon as possible our rights in this area."⁶⁷ (Of course, the way to "achieve his rights"—i.e. win the war—so quickly as possible would be through seeking a decisive battle.) Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, before setting off, Henry had released many of the prisoners from Harfleur, after making them swear to present themselves at Calais the following Martinmas to pay their ransoms.⁶⁸ Henry's decision to advertise the destination of his march must have been understood as demonstrating willingness to be met along the way.

In fact, "willingness" is probably too weak a word. Le Févre and Waurin report that the King "received . . . with great joy" the heralds sent by the French leaders to announce their intention to give battle.⁶⁹ Jean Juvenal des Ursins agrees that "the king of England was very joyful at this news,"⁷⁰ and that at an earlier point he had

⁶³ LeFévre and Waurin, in Curry, *Sources*, 149.

⁶⁴ Morosini, in Curry, *Sources*, 193.

⁶⁵ Henry's letter, in Curry, *Sources*, 442.

⁶⁶ Letter of Jean de Bordiu, in Curry, *Sources*, 445.

⁶⁷ Letter, in Curry, *Sources*, 442.

⁶⁸ Monstrelet, in Curry, *Sources*, 144; *St. Denis*, in Curry, *Sources*, 101; Wylie, *Reign*, 2:61. According to Berry herald, in Curry, *Sources*, 179, the prisoners were released "on the condition that, *if he was not brought to battle before he reached Calais*" they would surrender themselves again. What would have been the purpose of a clause like this? Perhaps so that the released knights would urge their lords and friends to press for battle?

⁶⁹ LeFévre and Waurin, in Curry, *Sources*, 149.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 132. Cf. Jacob, *Henry V*, 98 note, who does not accept this.

“decided to wait for the French if they were willing to fight with him.”⁷¹ All this is entirely consistent with the well-informed chronicler Thomas Basin’s suggestion that the basic reason for the march was to “entice the French to fight with him.”⁷²

Thus, the only disagreement among the primary sources whose authors were best positioned to know the truth is whether Henry faced the prospect of a battle with equanimity or with eagerness.⁷³ With only one exception,⁷⁴ none of the sources, English or French, makes the claim that Henry began his march with the intention of avoiding battle.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Jean Juvenal des Ursins, in Curry, *Sources*, 132, with an emendation.

⁷² Basin, in Curry, *Sources*, 189. Basin was still a toddler in 1415, but later he was one of the principal men of Henry VI’s French bureaucracy, serving as president of the Norman *chambre des comptes*. Hence, he could easily have discussed the Agincourt campaign with eyewitnesses of the debates of 1415, for example Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester.

⁷³ The pseudo-Elmham is typical of the authors describing what seems to be equanimity, or even pietistic fatality: “As the Lord hath decreed, let all things be fulfilled. . . . We intend to direct our steps straight towards our town of Calais, from which road, if our enemies have determined to drive us, let them attempt to do so at their peril, for we will neither seek them, nor move faster or more slowly on their account.” (*Vita et Gesta*, in Curry, *Sources*, 67; see also Waurin, in Curry, *Sources*, 149). But a proclamation like this is fully consistent with a desire for battle; it closely echoes similar statements by, among others, Edward III in 1346. Henry would not seek them, even if he wanted a battle, because he wanted that battle to take the form of a French attack on him, an attempt to drive him from his route: in other words, he wanted the tactical defensive, not the offensive. See Clifford J. Rogers, “The Offensive/Defensive in Medieval Strategy,” *From Crécy to Mohacs: Warfare in the Late Middle Ages (1346–1526)*. *Acta of the XXIIInd Colloquium of the International Commission of Military History (Vienna, 1996)* (Vienna, 1997), 163, and idem, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 256–58.

⁷⁴ The Religieux de St. Denis claims that “as winter approached [Henry] was persuaded to break off military operations and to seek winter quarters. On the advice of his most important men, he did not wish to trust to the dubious fate of military engagement with troops so unequal in number. So he decided to go to Calais and to await there the spring . . .” But no explanation is given as to why he would “seek” winter quarters in Calais, rather than staying in Harfleur (which had just been emptied of many of its citizens), if he did not wish for an engagement. In Curry, *Sources*, 101–2.

⁷⁵ The *Chronique anonyme du règne de Charles VI*, in Curry, *Sources*, 115, comes closest when it says “he could not escape without giving battle” and that “the English were very upset about this, because against them was the flower of the chivalry of the kingdom of France, and they were outnumbered four to one by the French.” But note that this refers to the English generally, not Henry. As to the king’s own attitude, consider the implication of the same chronicle’s statement that after the fall of Harfleur “the princes and lords of France gathered in great strength to advance against the English. *When the king of England knew that they had assembled*, he departed from Harfleur . . .” *Ibid.*, 114. (Emphasis added).

The Evidence of Actions

In the cases of the *chevauchées* in 1346 and 1356, it can be shown that the English commanders were aiming to provoke a battle, since certain actions they took were consistent with that hypothesis, but inconsistent with the hypothesis that they wished to avoid a fight. Much the same can be said of Henry V's actions *before* the beginning of the march to Calais: most notably the decision to make the march at all, the broadcasting of his destination and intended departure date, and the delay in departure to wait for a response to the challenge he had issued to the *dauphin*. All of these make perfect sense if he wanted to draw the French into an engagement, and little or no sense if he wished to avoid an open fight, something he could most easily have accomplished simply by sailing instead of marching out of Harfleur.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, however, there is no further evidence to this effect during the march itself.

Indeed, various aspects of the march may seem to lend credence to the proposition that Henry was doing his best to ensure that he would *not* encounter a major French army.⁷⁷ First, there is the king's decision to march light, leaving all wagons behind and relying only on pack animals. In addition, there is the hard pace he imposed on his men. If he wanted to be met, why not go slowly, to give the French plenty of time to come up with him? Finally, there are the concessions Henry purportedly offered to the French in an attempt to buy his way out of fighting. If Henry was willing to give up Harfleur, pay an indemnity, etc., in order to *avoid* a battle, then obviously he did not *want* a battle.

⁷⁶ Newhall, *Conquest*, 5 writes that "the English king, fearful of being cooped up in the conquered city [of Harfleur], attempted to make a dash for Calais," but offers no supporting citation or explanation to indicate why he thinks that Henry could not have departed from Harfleur the way he arrived, by sea.

⁷⁷ I do not see any merit in the claims of the *Chronique Normande* (in Curry, *Sources*, 160) and Berry herald (in Curry, *Sources*, 186) that Henry tried to "slip past" the French, contrary to his stated intent to march straight to Calais, in the days immediately prior to Agincourt. The route he followed from Péronne was fairly natural assuming he was aiming for the well-known ford at Blangy, where he could take up the same route followed by the English army returning to Calais in 1355. See a good road-map of the area, and also Burne, *Agincourt War*, 71; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 298. Just as Berry herald is mistaken in having the English go to Hesdin and the French to Blangy, his suggestion that the English agreed to march to Aubigny-en-Artois, which would have carried them substantially to the west of any direct route to Calais, is highly improbable.

These points must be addressed in order. To begin with, a similar logic led to the mistaken belief that Edward III was trying to avoid battle in 1346, as he sped north from Paris towards Picardy. In reality, King Edward's fast movements were to escape a trap he knew the French were attempting to spring. They were trying to pin him against the Seine or the Somme and starve him into submission (or at least into taking the highly disadvantageous tactical offensive), the same trick he himself had tried to pull on the Scots in his first campaign twenty years earlier. Once he had evaded that risk by crossing the Somme at Blanchetacque, he turned to fight.⁷⁸ Henry's decision to travel light and his long forced marches are both equally consistent with either of two possibilities, that he was trying to avoid a fight or that he was trying to avoid a trap. As we have already seen, the contemporary opinion offered more support for the latter than the former.

Actually, the same logic applies to the offers Henry is said to have made to the French on the eve of the battle: they might well have been made (like the concessions proffered by Prince Edward in 1356)⁷⁹ because Henry was afraid of seeing his hungry army surrounded and cut off from all supplies, even if he were also eager for a straight-up battle. It is also possible that Henry set off on the march with the primary purpose of bringing about a battle, even if it meant fighting against two- or three-to-one odds, calculating that with his head start, the dispersal of the French forces, and his speed of march, they would not be able to bring any greater odds against him. However, the delay imposed by the Somme detour gave the French more time to gather their forces, so that by the time he saw their army it was around four times the size of his. He could then have decided that battle on those terms was undesirable, and tried to avoid it by negotiation.

It should be noted, however, that the sources concerning Henry's proposed terms are neither consistent nor reliable. The chronicler of St. Denis says that the English offered "reparation for all the damage they had caused and restitution of all that they had taken on condition that they [the French] would agree to let them return to their own country."⁸⁰ LeFèvre and Waurin say that the French offered

⁷⁸ Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 257–66.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 367–73.

⁸⁰ Curry, *Sources*, 104.

to let Henry keep what he held in Guienne and the Calais Pale if he would give up his claim to the throne, terms which the English king refused. He did, according to their account, offer to renounce his claim to the French crown and give up Harfleur in exchange for the full duchy, Ponthieu, and the hand of Princess Catherine with a dowry of 500,000 or 800,000 *écus*.⁸¹ But this does not tell us *the* key point about the offer and counter-offer: whether the territories in question would be held by Henry as fiefs, or owned by him in full sovereignty. It seems very likely, given the history of the peace negotiations throughout the Hundred Years War, that the French in 1415 were offering fiefs, and Henry was demanding sovereignty. Otherwise the difference between the two positions would have been closer than ever before (except in 1357–1360), and negotiations, rather than battle, would likely have ensued. On the other hand, if this hypothesis on the nature of the proposals and counter-proposals is correct, then Henry was simply reiterating the same diplomatic position he had taken before beginning the invasion,⁸² not making any significant new concessions on the eve of battle, thus indicating some confidence in the situation rather than any strong desire to avoid a fight.

Thomas Basin notes that while some say the English tried to buy their way out of battle with concessions, he does not know if it is true. The Berry Herald wisely notes that no one on the French side knew the content of the English offers, “save the duke of Orléans, as all the others were killed in the battle.”⁸³ Thus, in sum, we do not know what terms Henry offered, but there is at least a good chance that he did not put any real concessions on the table in order to escape a fight. Hence, the negotiations just prior to Agincourt do not offer any significant support for the case that Henry had hoped to reach Calais without battle.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁸² Palmer, “War Aims,” 67–68; *idem*, *England, France and Christendom, 1377–9* (Chatham, 1972), 15–16. Many other discussions of this topic are perplexing because they fail to emphasize, or even make clear, the difference between lands offered as fiefs and lands offered in sovereignty.

⁸³ Thomas Basin, in Curry, *Sources*, 189; Berry herald, in Curry, *Sources*, 181; note also “or so I have heard,” in Waurin/LeFèvre, in Curry, *Sources*, 159.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the balance of evidence suggests that Henry decided to march to Calais because he hoped that the result would be a general engagement, which he needed for strategic reasons and which, despite facing heavy numerical odds, he could reasonably expect to win, based on historical precedents and rational confidence in the tactical superiority of his veteran forces.⁸⁴ His religious sentiments reinforced his confidence, but he was not simply an “unreasoning pietist.” He practically gave the French advance notice of his destination and departure date to help ensure that they would have the chance to meet him on his route, but marched light and fast to reduce the odds he would likely have to face and to try to avoid being headed off and starved, or forced to take the tactical offensive. But when he knew that the French were getting ready to give battle, he rejoiced at the prospect, for that had been his aim all along. As a pious man, he sent messengers to the French to give them one last chance to surrender—which is what it would have amounted to if they had agreed to let him have Aquitaine in full sovereignty—but when they declined, he gladly readied his army for the fight. Events then proved his judgment correct, for he won a decisive tactical victory, which provided the foundation on which his conquest of Normandy and the subsequent treaty of Troyes (1420) were built.

Sun Tzu notes that “to foresee a victory which the ordinary man can foresee is not the acme of skill.”⁸⁵ Even with the benefit of hindsight, most analysts of the 1415 campaign have not been able to see its outcome as a natural consequence of the English king’s strategic decision to march to Calais. If Henry was able to see through the “fog of war” to recognize the wisdom of seeking battle, and if he possessed the self-confidence and determination to overrule his advisors and insist on the operation despite their doubts, then he exemplifies the very characteristics that Clausewitz defined as the essence of military genius.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Note Clausewitz, *On War*, 185: “History provides the strongest proof of the importance of moral factors and their often incredible effect: this is the noblest and most solid nourishment that the mind of a general may draw from a study of the past.” For the importance of the greater experience of the English on the outcome of the battle, see Basin, in Curry, *Sources*, 189.

⁸⁵ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, IV.8.

⁸⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 100–3.

APPENDIX

Agincourt and the Conquest of Normandy

Part of my argument above rests on the assertion that Henry recognized that the conquest of Normandy, much less the securing of his full war aims, would be almost impossible without the running start provided by a battlefield victory. This assertion, however, is flatly contradicted by one of the chief modern authorities on this phase of the Hundred Years War. R.A. Newhall—in his excellent volume *The English Conquest of Normandy*—writes that:

Agincourt is customarily classed with [Crécy and Poitiers], as the basis for the success of Henry V. This is an exaggeration, and from the military point of view has very little foundation. Normandy could have been conquered in 1417 and the succeeding years by the same strategy as was employed, had Agincourt never been fought.⁸⁷

Part of the flaw in Newhall's reasoning is indicated by what he says just a little later: "The test of the English ability to hold their frontier came at the battle of Verneuil, which was thus of much more strategic significance than Agincourt . . . That victory [Verneuil] assured the success of the strategy of Henry V."⁸⁸ But making a conquest (in an age and area of strong fortifications) was more difficult than retaining it; therefore the battle that enabled the former was more significant than the battle which made possible the latter. Furthermore, Verneuil was a narrower victory for the English than Agincourt, as Waurin, who fought in both battles, specifically attests.⁸⁹ It seems highly unlikely, given that fact, that Bedford could have won at Verneuil had he not been fighting a French army still weakened by the losses (mainly physical, but also in confidence and *élan*) suffered at Agincourt.

Similarly, Newhall admits that "there were political results of [Agincourt] which were far-reaching":

⁸⁷ Newhall, *Conquest*, xiii.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, xv.

⁸⁹ Waurin, xi.

The disaster of St. Crispin's Day confronted the Orleanist government with a more serious situation than any which the French monarchy had faced since Poitiers. National integrity was threatened . . . Party power, and with it the personal power of the partisans, was jeopardized by the duke of Burgundy, to whom this English victory offered an opportunity for accomplishing a revolution in the state. With Orleans himself a prisoner and many of his lieutenants dead or sharing his captivity, with the administrative and military organization shaken by the loss of personnel, with military prestige shattered and the nation in mourning, prompt organization for defense against English and Burgundians was imperative.⁹⁰

In other words, when Henry resumed his conquest of Normandy in 1417, he was opposed by a regime that had been severely weakened in all respects—militarily, politically, and administratively—by the battle of Agincourt. His enemies, in large part because of the battle, had to devote a substantial portion of their seriously diminished resources to dealing with the Burgundians, who would not have been anything like such a great threat had the combat not been fought.

Indeed, had it not been for Agincourt, it is fairly likely that the two rival French parties would have come to some agreement to meet the threat of English invasion in 1417. It is doubtful that Henry could have conquered Normandy if opposed by the intact strength of the Armagnacs combined with Burgundy's power; the occupation of that province would surely have been infeasible. But because of Agincourt, the Armagnacs were too weak to oppose both the Burgundians and the English effectively. And because of that fact, John the Fearless had much less incentive to compromise with his French enemies.⁹¹

To consider specific instances, the French attack near Valmont in March, 1416, would likely have produced a serious defeat for the English if the French had been reinforced by just a fraction of the thousands slain and captured at Agincourt, or supported by Burgundian forces. Additionally, during the campaigns of 1417–1419, many strong places surrendered to the English with little or no resistance—a huge contrast to events at Harfleur, and one which doubtless had more than a little to do with the fear of English arms that the outcome of Agincourt had inspired.

⁹⁰ Newhall, *Conquest*, xiii, 6.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 101–2. He did make a bid for cooperation once he was in the dominant position.

Furthermore, the pace of these surrenders was greatly increased by the ability of the English to send small columns on simultaneous operations. In October, 1417, while the main English force remained at Argentan, detachments were sent to capture strongholds as distant as Verneuil, Mortagne, and Bellême.⁹² Likewise, in the campaign of 1418 to early 1419, Henry, Gloucester, Huntingdon and Warwick were all making conquests with divided forces, none of which had to contend with a French army. It is hard to imagine that the French would have reacted to all this so passively had it not been for Agincourt.⁹³ Indeed, the Armagnac government in Paris specifically said as much in explaining why it could not help the local authorities in Anjou.⁹⁴

It is also important to note that the victory at Agincourt not only weakened Henry's enemies, it also strengthened him. As already noted, at the close of the siege of Harfleur, the fiscal position of the English crown was rather precarious. The prospects of recruiting volunteers for the next campaign were not exactly excellent, considering the high dysentery rate during the siege and the fact that the city had ultimately surrendered, rather than being systematically sacked, which "displeased many, who were avaricious."⁹⁵ The glory and profit won by his soldiers in the battle would have made a second round of service for them, or a first campaign for those who had stayed in England, more appealing. The soldiers' profits may also have meant some financial relief for the king, for he was entitled by indenture to a third of the gains of his captains, and a third of a third of the winnings of their men.⁹⁶ While he doubtless did not get all he was legally entitled to, and the ransoms were mostly granted at a large discount because of the difficult circumstances,⁹⁷ the large number of prisoners taken⁹⁸ must surely have meant a substantial

⁹² It is 17 km by road from Bellême to Mortagne. From Mortagne, Verneuil is then 39 km to the north-east, while Argentan is 58 km to the north-west.

⁹³ Newhall, *Conquest*, 70–74, 92–98.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁹⁵ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, 50–51.

⁹⁶ Juvenal des Ursins, in Curry, *Sources*, 134, indicates that before the battle, he granted that his men "should have all the profit from their prisoners without any reservation unless such prisoners were dukes or counts." However, this seems not to be the case, for the plaintiffs in one chancery case regarding ransoms of prisoners taken at Agincourt twice refer to the king's portion. In Curry, *Sources*, 451.

⁹⁷ Wylie, *Reign*, 2:249–52 has some details.

⁹⁸ 700 according to Walsingham, *Chronicle*, 53; 1,400 knights and esquires according to *Saint Denis*, in Curry, *Sources* 110; 1500 or more knights and esquires accord-

windfall. Indeed, in France at least, it was believed that the ransoms were a principal source of funding for Henry's preparations for the 1417 campaign.⁹⁹ Yet despite the advantages for recruiting and financing brought to the king by Agincourt, he was only able to field an army of 10,000 in 1417. All subsequent expeditions were much smaller.¹⁰⁰

The indirect effects of the prestige and glory Henry won on St. Crispin's day were even more important. When royal representatives went to Parliament to ask for the large sums of money needed to resume campaigning, they could make the persuasive argument that "well begun was half done."¹⁰¹ The Commons were also clearly swept along in the wave of popular enthusiasm that the triumphant conclusion of Henry's campaign engendered: "Truly," wrote an anonymous cleric to Henry, "it behoveth you not to fear for the subsidies of your realm, both spiritual and temporal, to be raised in this matter; because your faithful people so delight in their present happy auspices, that they offer to you themselves and their goods."¹⁰² As a result, the community of the realm agreed to extraordinary grants of taxation "the likes of which were never before made to any king," including *life-grants* of various customs duties.¹⁰³

In sum, Newhall notes that Agincourt "enhanced the prestige of English troops enormously and, by its effect on the French political situation, greatly increased the chances for further successful attacks in the near future."¹⁰⁴ But if the chances of success in 1417–19 were "greatly increased" by Agincourt, that means they would have been "greatly reduced" without Agincourt. Considering the cost and difficulty

ing to Monstrelet, in Curry, *Sources*, 168; 1600 knights and esquires according to Le Fèvre and Waurin, in Curry, *Sources* 169; an estimated 2,200 according to the *Chronique de Ruisseauville*, in Curry, *Sources*, 127.

⁹⁹ Furthermore, the ransoms hurt the French royal treasury at least as much as they helped Henry's, for the Agincourt captives' estates were made exempt from taxation. Newhall, *Conquest*, 12–13.

¹⁰⁰ See the table in Anne Curry, "English Armies in the Fifteenth Century," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*. ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), 45.


¹⁰¹ Though the first record of this argument having been used dates to March of 1416. Newhall, *Conquest*, 25.

¹⁰² Curry, *Sources*, 274.

¹⁰³ Wylie, *Reign* 2:236–8; quotation from *Archives Municipales de Bordeaux, vol. 4: Registres de la Jurade: deliberations de 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422* (Bordeaux, 1883), 327; see also *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, 4:62.

¹⁰⁴ Newhall, *Conquest*, 5–6.

of the siege of Harfleur, and the essential disparity in resources between England and France, it seems hard to believe that the prospects of a successful conquest of Normandy before the battle were so bright that they could be “greatly reduced” and still be much above zero.



Map 20. Battle of Agincourt.

“THE WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN”:
THE CAMPAIGNS OF PHILIP THE GOOD AND
THE MYTH OF FORTIFICATION VULNERABILITY
TO EARLY GUNPOWDER WEAPONS

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It is a cornerstone of the “Military Revolution” thesis that gunpowder weapons easily brought down medieval fortifications.¹ In the words of Maurice Keen advocates of this position hold that “medieval walls were too high and too thin to resist prolonged bombardment.”² Consequently, not until the introduction of the *trace italienne* fortification system, beginning in the last two decades of the fifteenth century in Italy and then spreading slowly throughout Europe,³ were fortifications constructed capable of resisting the new gunpowder weapons. This article⁴ will test that thesis by focusing on the campaigns of Philip

¹ For general treatment of medieval fortifications, see André Châtelaine, *Architecture militaire médiévale: principes élémentaires* (Paris, 1970); P.A. Faulkner, “Castle Planning in the Fourteenth Century,” *Archaeological Journal* 120 (1963): 215–35; Paul Gille, “Fortifications,” in *A History of Technology and Invention: Progress Through the Ages*, ed. Maurice Daumus (New York, 1969), 464–72; John R. Kenyon, *Medieval Fortifications* (New York, 1990).

² Maurice H. Keen, “The Changing Scene: Guns, Gunpowder, and Permanent Armies,” in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 278 (but see the entire article, 273–91). See also Clifford J. Rogers, “The Age of the Hundred Years War,” in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 136–60; idem, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War,” *Journal of Military History* 57 (1993): 241–78 (also published in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder, Colo., 1995), 55–94; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1988); Thomas Arnold, *The Renaissance at War* (London, 2001); David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1995); and many others who have adopted this theory.

³ On the adoption of the *trace italienne* see, as well as some of the references above, John R. Hale, *Renaissance Fortification: Art or Engineering?* (London, 1977); idem, “The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology,” in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. John R. Hale (Evanston, 1965), 466–94; and Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, *Firearms and Fortifications: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Siena* (Chicago, 1986), among others.

⁴ In other articles, I have dealt with the same issue from different perspectives. See Kelly DeVries, “The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry on Siege Warfare in

the Good, duke of Burgundy (1419–1467) during the later decades of the Hundred Years War, a period in which the Burgundians possessed one of the most potent artillery forces in Western Europe.⁵ We shall examine in particular three campaigns in which Philip made extensive use of gunpowder artillery: (1) the attack on Compiègne in 1429–1430 which led to the capture of Joan of Arc (2) the 1436 siege of Calais, and (3) the Ghent War of 1449–1453.

I

The victories won by Joan of Arc along the Loire River and elsewhere in 1429, enlivened the French army while discouraging the English.⁶ Several locations which had once been held by the Anglo-Burgundians capitulated at the very prospect of French military victory, sometimes even without being attacked, including the town of Rheims where Charles VII (1422–1461) was crowned king of France. One of those sites lost to the Anglo-Burgundians was the extremely well-fortified town of Compiègne. In 1430, following the French defeat at Paris and retreat to the Loire, the English and Burgundian leaders decided that Compiègne would be recaptured, and that this would be the responsibility of the Burgundian army.

Philip the Good may have felt that as easily as Compiègne had gone over to Charles, it might just as easily leave him, especially as

the Hundred Years War,” in *The Medieval City Under Siege*, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolff (Woodbridge, 1995), 227–44, and idem, “Facing the New Military Technology: Non-Trace Italienne Anti-Gunpowder Weaponry Defenses, 1350–1550,” in *Colonels and Quartermasters: War and Technology in the Old Regime*, ed. Brett Steele (Cambridge, 2003), forthcoming.

⁵ Burgundy’s ascendance in gunpowder weaponry dated back as least as far as the beginnings of the fifteenth century. According to *Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne*, at the siege of Ham undertaken in 1411 by John the Fearless (1404–1419), three shots were fired from the bombard known as *Griet*, a gunpowder weapon which had been made earlier that year in St. Omer and tested in the presence of the duke himself. The first passed over the town’s castle and fell into the Somme; the second hit the ground in front of the castle, but still had enough power that it began to destroy a tower and two adjacent walls; the third shot, which also struck the ground, made a breach in the wall itself. Before a fourth shot could be fired, the town capitulated. Clearly, according to this source, the intimidating power of the Burgundian gunpowder weapons, especially *Griet*, determined the defeat of Ham. *Livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne*, in *Chroniques relatives à l’histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (textes Français)*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove. (Brussels, 1873), 96.

⁶ Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Stroud, 1999), 122–34.

he had so quickly abandoned the town in his retreat to the south. However, Compiègne was not about to do so. The townspeople received the news in March, 1430, that Philip was planning to lay siege to their town and determined that they would not surrender to him. Their desire to remain French meant that they would be forced to resist largely by themselves any military attempts to recapture their town. The citizens of Compiègne began to stockpile supplies and weapons. Such bravery inspired Joan of Arc who felt that she had been restrained from conducting military engagements since the beginning of the year and she eventually joined the townspeople in their defense, arriving at Compiègne before the Burgundians.⁷

To conduct the siege, Philip amassed a large army and an impressive artillery train. At this date, there was perhaps no European power with a stronger or more numerous arsenal of gunpowder weaponry than the Burgundians, and almost all of it was now directed at Compiègne. Contemporary chroniclers report the presence of at least five large bombards, two *veuglaires*, one large and one small, innumerable *couloverines*, and two "engins" among the besieging Burgundian army.⁸ Other sources record the transportation of at least 17,000 lbs. of gunpowder with the artillery train.⁹ Extant artillery *comptes* for the Burgundian forces have shown that these tallies are actually far too low.¹⁰

But this show of military technology did not intimidate either Joan of Arc or Guillaume de Flavy, the governor of Compiègne and leader of its defense effort. The fortifications of the town were very strong.

⁷ Ibid., 135–72.

⁸ Jehan de Waurin, *Récueil des croniques et anciennes istories de la Grant Bretagne*, ed. W. and E.L.C.P. Hardy. 5 vols. (London, 1864–1891), 3:362; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 3:418–19; Georges Chastellain, *Œuvres*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 8 vols. (Brussels, 1863–1866), 2:53; and Antonio Morosini, *Chronique: Extraits relatifs à l'histoire de France*, trans. and ed. L. Dorez, 4 vols. (Paris, 1898–1902), 3:319–23. See also DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 170–81, and Claude Gaier, *L'industrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennes principautés Belges du XIII^{ème} à la fin du XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1963), 111. The bombard was an iron tube fifteen feet long that fired iron or stone shot with a high trajectory. The *veuglaire* and *culverin* were various calibers of bronze cannon. An "engine" could refer to either counterweight or gunpowder artillery.

⁹ Philippe Contamine, "La guerre de siège au temps de Jeanne d'Arc," *Dossiers de archéologie* 34 (May 1979), 16.

¹⁰ One of these is published as a *pièce justificative* in Pierre Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy: Capitaine de Compiègne: Contribution à l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc et à l'étude de la vie militaire et privée au XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1906), 174–83. See also Alain Salamagne, "L'attaque des places-fortes au XV^e siècle à travers l'exemple des guerres anglo et franco-bourguignonnes," *Revue historique* 289 (1993): 78–79.

The walls were tall and thick; indeed, several still stand today as extremely impressive examples of medieval defensive power. More than 2,600 meters long, they surrounded an urban space of 53 hectares. A large number of towers had been built along these walls, with no fewer than forty-four of them running parallel to the Oise River. This waterway served as a “moat” on one side of Compiègne, while its water also filled a wide and deep ditch surrounding the rest of the walls. A rampart, made from the dirt taken out of the ditch, served as a counterscarp outside the moat. Should these defenses be breached, there was also the large royal castle, modeled after the Louvre in Paris, located within the walls. The only defensive weakness lay in the numerous gates built into the town walls and a single 50’ long bridge over the Oise. Constructed with nearly a dozen arches, this bridge was lined with houses and ended on the town’s shore in a large fortified gate and on the shore opposite the town in a boulevard.¹¹ Each of the gates into the town was protected by a large gatehouse.

Additionally, the defenders of Compiègne had their own gunpowder weapons and they had prepared their defenses to use cannon more effectively by destroying any superfluous structures which hindered gunfire.¹² These defensive weapons would prove very effective, especially, as reported by an anonymous eyewitness, “the great number of small engines, called *couloverines*, which were made of bronze and which fired lead balls.” Such missiles could easily penetrate the armor of a man-at-arms.¹³ This was not going to be a quick siege; nevertheless, the Burgundian leaders, especially their commander, Jean of Luxembourg, felt that they still could achieve a victory, even against such a fortified location and even against Joan of Arc.

The defeat of Joan of Arc as a goal was actually accomplished quite easily. Not accustomed to stand behind walls in a defensive posture, on May 23, 1430, with a small group of soldiers, she decided to ride out of the town and strike into the Burgundian army. What she hoped to accomplish with this misguided tactic, no one has adequately explained; in the event, it proved spectacularly unsuccessful. At her trial, she gave the following testimony to what happened next:

¹¹ See DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 170–71, and Régine Pernoud and Marie-Véronique Clin, *Joan of Arc: Her Story*, trans. and rev. J.D. Adams (New York, 1998), 232.

¹² Champion, *Guillame de Flavy*, 48.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 49 (n. 10). These facts are related in the report of an anonymous eyewitness account.

She crossed over the bridge and through the French bulwark and went with a company of soldiers manning those sections against the lord of Luxembourg's men whom she drove back twice, all the way to the Burgundian camp, and a third time half way back. And then the English who were there cut her and her men off, coming between her and the boulevard, and so her men retreated. And withdrawing into the fields on her flank, in the direction of Picardy, near the bulwark, she was captured.¹⁴

Joan's capture proved to be worth 10,000 *livres tournois* to Jean of Luxembourg, whose men had taken her prisoner and to whom the English paid her ransom. On May 30, 1431, a little more than a year after she had been captured, Joan of Arc was burned to death as a heretic in the market-place of Rouen.¹⁵

However, the capture of Compiègne was quite another matter. In fact, it never did occur. Despite the large number of gunpowder weapons which Philip the Good had at the siege, and their constant bombardment of the town, its walls, gates, and inhabitants, Compiègne did not capitulate. All contemporary narrative sources record the Burgundian guns as very powerful and destructive. Monstrelet describes the Burgundians building a large *bastille* or bulwark of earth, a bow-shot from the town, in which they set up their artillery. These guns were aimed against Compiègne and continually rained large stones down on the town where they "disrupted and breached the gates, bridge, mills, and bulwark . . . in many places." Mills ceased to produce flour. One of these gunshots even killed Louis de Flavy, the brother of the governor, Guillaume. In addition to their artillery, the Burgundians also (unsuccessfully) made use of mines.¹⁶ Still, Guillaume de Flavy continued to diligently defend the city and, according to *Le livre des trahisons* and the chronicle of Jean de Waurin, the gunpowder weapons of the townspeople seemed to match the effectiveness of those employed by the Burgundians, with at least one cannon mounted on the wall killing ten or twelve besiegers.¹⁷

¹⁴ Joan of Arc, as quoted in *Procès de condamnation et de réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc dite la Pucelle*, ed. Jules Quicherat, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841–1849), 1:207–8. See also DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 176.

¹⁵ DeVries, *Joan of Arc*, 181–85.

¹⁶ Enguerrand de Monstrelet, *Chronique*, ed. L. Douet-d'Arceq, 15 vols. (Paris, 1857–1862), 4:390–91. See also Waurin, *Récueil*, 3:361–63, 385–89; Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:53, and Morosini, *Chronique*, 3:319–23.

¹⁷ *Livre des trahisons*, 176. See also Waurin, *Récueil*, 3:388–89.

Throughout the summer, the attack on Compiègne continued. Soon the joy at capturing Joan of Arc diminished, and the interminable siege began to wear on the Burgundian soldiers. Surprisingly, little fatigue is recorded as having afflicted the besieged; they seem to have been well provided for, despite being encircled by hostile forces. No contemporary source even mentions hunger being a problem inside the town, thus missing a narrative *topos* so prevalent in accounts of other Hundred Year War sieges. On the other hand, the besieged became both fatigued and tormented by their inability to conquer the site.

Suddenly, the Burgundians abandoned the siege so quickly that they left behind many of their numerous artillery pieces, weapons that the inhabitants of Compiègne captured and brought within the gates. Why this occurred is one of the biggest mysteries of the Hundred Years War; the original sources fail to provide an adequate explanation. Monstrelet claims that the decision to withdraw was made by Jean of Luxembourg, the Burgundian general, in consultation with his leading advisers. But, if this was the case, why did they leave with such speed that they abandoned to their adversaries their ordonnance? Such weapons were an extremely expensive part of any army's equipment. As Monstrelet put it: "This artillery was the duke of Burgundy's!" and the duke could not have been pleased by its loss.¹⁸ Jean de Waurin expresses the same surprise at the abandoning of "a large quantity of large bombards, cannons, *veuglaires*, serpentines, and other artillery which fell into the hands of the enemy."¹⁹ For his part, the author of *Le livre des trahisons* alleges that it was the defensive gunfire which "convinced them to retreat."²⁰ On the other hand, this can hardly be the sole or even the primary reason for such a quick and costly withdrawal.

II

A second example of the unsuccessful use of gunpowder artillery came during the siege of Calais waged by Philip the Good in 1436.

¹⁸ Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 4:418–19.

¹⁹ Waurin, *Récueil*, 3:389–90. There is perhaps an irony in the fact that almost immediately after this, Waurin reports the English capture of French gunpowder artillery at Castillon that same year (Waurin, *Récueil*, 3:392–93).

²⁰ *Livre des trahisons*, 176.

Having abandoned his English alliance with the signing of the treaty of Arras the year before, Philip was determined to strike a blow against his previous ally's most important town, one which lay amidst the duke's central holdings. To do so, Philip assembled perhaps the largest artillery train to that time. If nothing else, the number of gunpowder weapons at Calais certainly shows just how vast the Burgundian arsenal was.²¹ This artillery force was so large that to utilize it effectively, Philip not only placed guns opposite weak spots around the walls, but also constructed earthworks around Calais, for the placement of artillery, as well as individual siege towers for that same purpose.²²

The result was an intense bombardment of the town which began in earnest on July 9, 1436. Day and night cannonballs smashed into the walls and flew over them to land on the buildings inside. The most dramatic portrayal of this comes from a Middle English poem written contemporaneously with the siege. The anonymous author of this poem describes the weapons which the duke had brought to Calais:

With gones grete and ordinance,
That theyme myght helpe and avance,

²¹ See Robert D. Smith and Kelly DeVries, *A History of Late Medieval Gunpowder Weapons: The Artillery of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy, 1363–1477* (forthcoming). An inventory preserved in the Archives de la Côte-d'Or (as transcribed by Joseph Garnier, *L'artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne d'après les documents conservés aux archives de la Côte-d'Or* (Paris, 1895), 151–63) includes the following gunpowder weapons: 3 iron *gros* bombards and 3 other *gros* bombards from Holland; 2 iron bombards from Picardy; 3 bronze bombards from Burgundy; 2 iron and 1 other bombard from Abbeville; 2 bronze bombards, named *Pruce* and *Bergiere*, and 1 iron bombard from the Saint-Bertin Monastery in Saint-Omer; 1 bronze bombard chamber for the *Bourgoinge* from the monastery of Saint-Bertin; 7 *gros veuglaires* taken from naval vessels; 4 Iron and 1 other *gros veuglaires* from Saint-Bertin Monastery; 2 iron and 3 other *gros veuglaires* (no site mentioned); 2 *gros veuglaires* from Gravelines; 1 *gros veuglaire* from Damp; 17 iron and 13 other *veuglaires* from Sluys; 23 *veuglaires* from Bruges or Sluys; 11 *veuglaires* from Holland; 14 iron and 9 other *veuglaires* (no site mentioned); 6 Iron *veuglaires* from naval vessels; 1 *veuglaire*, named *Anvers*, and 2 other *veuglaires* from Abbeville; 2 iron *veuglaires* from Avennes; 2 *veuglaires* from Bruges; 23 *petit veuglaires* (no site mentioned); 2 *petit veuglaires* from Abbeville; 4 *veuglaire* chambers from Sluys; 23 cannons or *veuglaires* from Sluys; 2 *petit* cannons from Abbeville; 12 iron *crapaudeaux* (site not mentioned); 5 iron *crapaudeaux* from Gravelines; 3 iron *crapaudeaux* from Abbeville; 2 *petit crapaudeaux* (site not mentioned); 48 (or 52) *gros coulouvines*; 200 bronze *coulouvines*; 40 iron *coulouvines*; 3 other *coulouvines*; and 2 bronze *coulouvines a escaphe*.

²² See Waurin, *Récueil*, 4:175; Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 1:243–44; and *The Brut, or the Chronicles of England*, ed. F.W.D. Brie, 2 vols. (London, 1906–1908), 2:578.

With many a proude pavis;
 Gailly paynted and stuffed wele,
 Ribawdes, armed with Iren and stele,
 Was neuer better devyse.

Then he describes the cannoneers beginning their attack on the town:

Gonners began to shew thair art,
 Into the town in many apart,
 Shot many a full grete ston.

But, according to the poet, the townspeople were miraculously preserved from the terror of these weapons by God, Mary, and, interestingly, the patron saint of cannoneers, Saint Barbara:

Thanked be god, and marie mylde,
 They hurt neither man, woman, ne childe.
 Houses thogh they did harme;
 “Seynt Barbara!” than was the crie,
 Whan stones in the tovn flye,
 They cowde noon other charme.²³

In the end, these Burgundian cannon, despite their power and numbers, were not successful in breaching the walls or bringing about the town's capitulation. For fifteen days, they fired on the town, but without success. In part, this may be credited to the defensive artillery deployed inside the town. According to the English chronicle, *The Brut*, these guns proved highly effective in defending the town, with a shot from one of them even ripping through Philip the Good's tent.²⁴ However, most contemporary chroniclers give no credit to the town's defensive weapons in relieving the siege. Instead, they discern little effectiveness in the gunfire from either the attackers or defenders. The Burgundian forces were easily able to reduce outlying fortifications, such as Oye, Marck, and Balinghem, by placing their guns near the walls and battering them down. On the other hand,

²³ The version of this poem which I have used is Ralph A. Klinefelter, ed., “The Siege of Calais: A New Text,” *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 67 (1952): 888–95. The quotes which appear in the text above are found on pp. 891–93. Another version can be found in *Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth centuries*, ed. Rossell Hope Robbins (New York, 1959), 78–83. See *The Brut*, 2:578, for the people also crying “Saint Barbara.”

²⁴ *The Brut*, 2:578. Monstrelet, *Chronique* (5:245) confirms this, adding that while the cannonball did not kill the duke, it did kill a trumpeter and three knights who were with him. See also Olivier van Dixmude, *Merkwaerdige gebeurtenissen vooral in Vlaenderen en Brabant van 1377 tot 1443*, ed. J.J. Lambin (Ypres, 1835), 154–55.

when it came to the larger and better defended walls of Calais, their guns were incapable of breaching them, despite inflicting a certain amount of damage.²⁵

At Calais, blame for Burgundian defeat may lie in the rivalry between two of the larger factions of Flemish troops, the Brugeois and Ghentenaars, which had begun to effect the morale of the entire Burgundian army. Unexpectedly, defensive activities on the part of the townspeople aggravated this rivalry. On July 26, the town's inhabitants made a sortie from the Boulogne gate, surprising a unit of Brugeois troops, personally commanded by Philip the Good. The defeat of the Brugeois was met by jeers and mockery from the Ghentenaars. On July 28, a group of English defenders of the town launched another surprise attack against a wooden artillery tower, this time manned by Ghentenaar troops. It was the Brugeois soldiers' turn to respond with their own derision. By this time, the Ghentenaars were about to forsake the siege of Calais. Motivated by the rumors of fresh attacks, they suddenly decamped during the night. On waking the next morning, the Brugeois joined their rivals in flight. The rest of the Burgundian army soon followed suit.²⁶ The defeat was made even more serious by another abandonment of the besiegers' artillery.

The Brut indicates that the Brugeois tried to bury some of their guns in the sand in an effort to keep them from falling into English hands, but most seem simply to have been left behind.²⁷ Regardless of any rivalry, had Philip's gunpowder weapons been effective, the Fleming contingents would not have abandoned the siege and, with it, their guns. Thus the failure of the Burgundian siege of Calais adds another to a lengthy list of Hundred Years War engagements at which gunpowder weapons were not decisive.

²⁵ Monstrelet, *Chronique*, 5:243, 245. See also Waurin, *Récueil*, 5:175; *The Brut*, 2:577–79; the *Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae ducis*, in *Chroniques relatives à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts latins)*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1876), 63; and Richard Vaughan, *Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy* (London, 1970), 79. The fortifications of the nearby castle of Guines also held out during the siege.

²⁶ Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 79–80. See also Waurin, *Chronique*, 4:186.

²⁷ *The Brut*, 2:581, 583. See also Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 80; Waurin, *Récueil*, 4:188–89 claims that the Flemings did take their best gunpowder weapons with them.

III

By contrast to these earlier examples, the Ghent War of 1449–1453 shows how effective gunpowder artillery could on occasion prove to be. During the same years when the French were using their artillery to good effect against the English, thus ending the Hundred Years War, Philip turned his weapons against the people of Ghent, who had risen up against Burgundian rule.

In 1447, Philip had tried to impose on the Ghentenaars a new tax on salt, an event which eventually led to the city's revolt two years later. When the people of Ghent refused to pay this impost, other populous towns in the region followed suit.²⁸ Although no military action would take place until 1452–53, from 1449 onward, the town of Ghent was in open rebellion against its Burgundian overlord. Philip did his best to head off hostilities with his most populous town; however, the Ghentenaars had tasted self-rule and, despite the dangers of such a course, determined to press the rebellion to its bitter end.²⁹ When several Burgundian partisans within the town were imprisoned and executed late in 1451, Philip recognized that military action was his only option. On March 31, 1452, the duke declared war against the Ghentenaar rebels.³⁰

For the next two years, the Ghent War remained stalemated. Although Philip's Burgundian forces made some inroads against the rebels, their success was limited by the duke's desire not to wage wholesale warfare against his largest tax base. For the most part, the Burgundians launched only minor attacks on Ghent and its holdings. At the same time, the Ghentenaar rebels hunkered down behind their fortifications, waiting for the coming of winter when the Burgundians would shut down offensive operations. The people of

²⁸ See Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 306–11. Only Thomas Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, ed. and trans. Charles Samaran, 2 vols. (1933; reprint, Paris, 1944), 2:204–6 differs from this conclusion, believing that there was insufficient evidence to see the salt tax as the cause of rebellion.

²⁹ See Kelly DeVries, "The Rebellions of Southern Low Countries' Towns during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," forthcoming. On the attempts by Philip the Good to keep the peace see Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 311–12, who contends that the participation in the rebellion by the lower social classes in Ghent prohibited this peace being made.

³⁰ Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 312–17. Philip's declaration of war is translated in its entirety at 313–17.

Ghent were then able to recoup their losses and even make some forays of their own, including an abortive attack on the ducal gunpowder artillery arsenal at Lille.³¹

These dilatory tactics so incensed Philip that, on June 18, 1453, he began the final campaign in the Ghent War. His strategy was now simple: the army would attack three smaller Ghentenaar fortifications before advancing on the rebel town itself. The first target was at Schendelbeke; the second at Poeke; and the third, Gavere.³² All three fortifications were to be reduced by the duke's large artillery train, gathered from towns allied with the duke as well as the central depot at Lille.³³ Although the actual size of this artillery force is not indicated in any contemporary inventory or in the numerous contemporary narrative sources, it can be estimated to have been quite large indeed.

On June 27, Schendelbeke fell, after less than two days of siege and gunpowder weaponry bombardment. Georges Chastellain writes:

The artillery was set up and aimed, and the place was so battered by the cannons and bombards that those Ghentenaars there lost heart, so much that they surrendered to the will of the duke, who commanded that they all be hanged and strangled.³⁴

The Burgundians, who had suffered no casualties in this first engagement, then marched to Poeke, arriving at the castle on July 2. Their bombardment began immediately. According to Olivier de la Marche,

³¹ The Ghentenaar rebels failed to destroy the duke's gunpowder and gunpowder artillery, which had been put into storage there for the winter, but just barely Jean de Waurin reports, when "someone went into the cellar [of the tower where the gunpowder was kept—the gunpowder artillery being stored above] at the time when the fuse (*les cercles d'une queue*) to the powder was burning" and put it out. Jehan de Waurin, *Récueil des croniques et anciennes istories de la Grant Bretagne*, ed. W. and E.L.C.P. Hardy, 5 vols. (London, 1864–1891), 5:223). For a more complete account of the Ghent War, see Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 303–33; Smith and DeVries, *History*, forthcoming.

³² Adrien de Budt, *Chronique*, in *Chroniques relatives à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts latins)*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1870), 344. See also Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 327.

³³ For example, two of the duke's requests for gunpowder weapons and for their operators from Mechelen, dated April 6 and May 29, 1453, can be found in *Collection de documents inédits concernant l'histoire de la Belgique*, ed. L.P. Gachard, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1833–1835), 2:125–28.

³⁴ The whole garrison of 104 rebels soldiers wasw executed. Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:357–58. See also Mathieu d'Escouchy, *Chronique*, ed. G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, 3 vols. (Paris, 1863–1864), 1:82–83, and Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 327–28.

the artillery, large and small, was trained on one part of the wall between two towers. This section contained a hall and two other chambers, and it could be seen clearly by their windows that they would not be able to withstand much force. Also, this site was good for the placement of artillery while marshes surrounded the other sides.³⁵

For four days and three nights, cannon balls flew back and forth as the artillery on both sides kept up a steady fire. Burgundian leader, Sir Jacques de Lalaing, was killed by a *veuglaire* firing from within the Poeke Castle defenses. Finally, on July 5, the castle walls had become so battered and weakened that the garrison was forced to surrender. Once again, to a man, the garrison was put to the sword.³⁶

The last small target for the Burgundians before advancing on Ghent was the castle at Gavere, which posed no significant threat to the duke's gunpowder weapons. Philip arrived there on July 18 and immediately began a bombardment that lasted for five days before the castle surrendered.³⁷

The Ghentenaars arrived on the morning of July 23, too late to relieve a castle that had already fallen, but in time to fight the battle of Gavere. The duke's scouts had seen the approach of the enemy, marching along the Schelde River, and Philip had time to draw up his forces at a favorable site north of the castle. Meanwhile, the Ghentenaars deployed their troops "inside and in front of a wood." After some preliminary skirmishing, both side began to exchange artillery fire. Jean de Cerisy, secretary to the count of Étampes, and one of the Burgundian generals, has left an account of this artillery duel:

As soon as the Ghentenaars saw the duke's vanguard and his above-mentioned patrols [those involved in the skirmishing], without leaving

³⁵ Olivier de la Marche, *Mémoires*, ed. Henri Beaune and J. d'Arbaumont, 4 vols. (Paris, 1883–1888), 2:308–9.

³⁶ All of the Burgundian chroniclers who report the attack on Poeke refer to de Lalaing as the "bon chevalier" and mourn his death. Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:360–65; la Marche, *Mémoires*, 2:309–13; Escouchy, *Chronique*, 2:84–85; Waurin, *Réceuil*, 5:226–27; Basin, *Histoire*, 2:213; *Livre des trahisons*, 225; Jacques de Clercq, *Mémoires*, in *Collection complète des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, 11, ed. M. Petitot (Paris, 1826), 94–95; and Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 328. For a description of the *veuglaire* see Smith and DeVries, *History*.

³⁷ Waurin, *Réceuil*, 5:227; Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:366–671; Escouchy, *Chronique*, 2:86–89; and la Marche, *Mémoires*, 2:313–15.

the wood, they opened fire with the *ribaudequins* and *coulovrines* which they had brought with them, and also with crossbows and longbows. Likewise, the Burgundian patrols, composed of valiant knights, experienced in deeds of arms and battles, engaged the Ghentenaars, firing at them *veuglaires*, *ribaudequins*, *coulovrines*, and longbows. Several *coulovrines* belonging to the town of Valenciennes, and some others, did excellent work.³⁸

According to Olivier de la Marche, since "the Ghentenaar artillery was being employed so effectively, Duke Philip was advised to transport his light artillery forward among his front ranks."³⁹ This maneuver did the trick. As the ducal gunfire fell among the Ghentenaars, many became demoralized and within a short time, broke ranks and fled. Seeing this, the Burgundian vanguard surged forward. Some rebels tried to regroup in small units and fight on until Burgundian archers were able to disperse them. One Ghentenaar soldier was even able to wound the duke who had entered the fighting in the later stages of the battle. Others tried to swim the Schelde to safety, but many of them drowned. Casualty figures among the Ghentenaars ranged from sixteen to twenty thousand, according to most contemporary narratives.⁴⁰

Why did the Ghentenaar lines break after being only slightly engaged in combat? Burgundian chronicles have no answer, except to trumpet Philip the Good's military prowess and that of the Burgundian army. A different version can be found in one of the Ghentenaar narrative sources, the *Kronyk van Vlaenderen*. The *Kronyk* reports that the rebels broke ranks and fled when one of their cannons allowed a spark from his ignitor to fly into an open sack of gunpowder, the explosion of which panicked all the nearby cannons. When others

³⁸ Cerisy in Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 329–30. See also Waurin, *Récueil*, 5:230–31; Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:369–73; Escouchy, *Chronique*, 2:89–90; la Marche, *Mémoires*, 2:314–21; and *Chronique des Pays-Bas, de France, d'Angleterre et de Tournai*, in *Corpus chronicorum Flandriae*, 3, ed. J.J. de Smet (Brussels, 1856), 518–19. Two modern studies of the battle are V. Fris, "La bataille de Gavre," *Bulletin de la société d'histoire et d'archéologie de Gand* 18 (1910): 185–233, and Luc De Vos, "La bataille de Gavere le 23 juillet 1453. La victoire de l'organisation," in *XXII. Kongress der Internationalen Kommission für Militärgeschichte Acta* 22: *Von Crécy bis Mohács Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter (1346–1526)* (Vienna, 1997), 145–57.

³⁹ La Marche, *Mémoires*, 2:320–21.

⁴⁰ Cerisy in Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 330; Waurin, *Récueil*, 5:231–32; Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:373–76; la Marche, *Mémoires*, 2:321–25; Escouchy, *Chronique*, 2:90–91; and *Chronique des Pays-Bas*, 519–20.

saw this, they also took flight.⁴¹ Shortly thereafter, Ghent surrendered without further military action.⁴²

IV

One of the few campaigns of Philip the Good to be entirely determined by gunpowder artillery, the Ghent War exemplified the growing reliance of mid-fifteenth-century armies on the new military technology. The duke's successes against Ghent joined two more celebrated gunpowder victories of 1453: the French triumph over the English at Castillon and the Ottoman siege of Constantinople.⁴³ Both guns and gunpowder were getting better as the century progressed. Given the spectacular success of that year, is it not possible that 1453 was a watershed, after which gunpowder weapons were effective against medieval fortifications? Again, Burgundian military operations in the latter half of the fifteenth century belie such an easy generalization.

The first of the post-1453 examples—the last major military action undertaken by Philip the Good—was the siege of Deventer in 1455. The reason for this siege was yet another rebellion against the Burgundian duke by his Low Countries' subjects. This latest revolt arose when the duke invested his own illegitimate son, David, then serving as bishop of Théroutanne, in the vacant episcopal seat of Utrecht. Of course, there was really never any doubt who would

⁴¹ *Kronyk van Vlaenderen van 580 tot 1467*, ed. P. Bloomaert and C.P. Serriere, 2 vols. (Ghent, 1839–1840), 2:194. See also Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 34, and Kelly DeVries, "Gunpowder and Early Gunpowder Weapons," in *Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology*, ed. Brenda Buchanan (Bath, 1996), 121–36.

⁴² On the end of the rebellion see Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 2:376–90; Waurin, *Récueil*, 5:232–38; la Marche, *Mémoires*, 327–35; and Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 331–33.

⁴³ Although this is not necessarily my view of the conquest of Constantinople. See Kelly DeVries, "Gunpowder Weaponry at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453," in *War, Army and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–16th Centuries*, ed. Yaacov Lev (Leiden, 1996), 343–62. Gunpowder weaponry as the determining factor at the battle of Castillon is a fairly widely received thesis. See, Alfred H. Burne, "La bataille de Castillon, 1453: la fin de la guerre de cent ans," *Revue de histoire de Bourdeaux* n.s. 2 (1953): 293–305; idem, "The Battle of Castillon, 1453," *History Today* 3 (1953): 249–56; and Michel de Lombardès, "Castillon (17 juillet 1453), dernière bataille de la guerre de Cent Ans, première victoire de l'artillerie," *Revue historique des armées* 6 (1976): 7–31. However, the small number of English soldiers, and their psychology of defeat by this time in the Hundred Years War, must certainly be taken into consideration.

succeed to that bishopric: Philip the Good was simply too powerful; he also had the support of the pope. On September 12, 1455, Pope Calixtus III (1455–1458) transferred Bishop David from Thérouanne to Utrecht.

It was not, however, a popular choice. In response, the following year, the people of the Utrecht rebelled. They were aided by the Burgundian duke's erstwhile ally, the duke of Guelders. In a technical sense, Guelders, not being part of Burgundian lands, was not in rebellion. However, since its duke had signed a number of treaties with Burgundy, Philip certainly regarded its support for Utrecht as treacherous if not treasonable. In return for a bribe of 50,000 gold lions, Gijsbrecht van Brederode and the townspeople of Utrecht soon backed down from their military stance and accepted Philip's son as their bishop.⁴⁴ Guelders, on the other hand, did not surrender.

Philip responded by besieging the town of Deventer, on the border between the bishopric of Utrecht and the duchy of Guelders. The siege, however, was not long, nor did it end in a victory for the Burgundian duke. Despite an extremely heavy bombardment of the town's walls by Philip's artillery, as the autumn rains fell, the conditions of the besiegers worsened more than those of the besieged, and ultimately Philip was forced to abandon the effort and return south to Brussels.⁴⁵

Georges Chastellain, the ducal chronicler and friend to Philip, suggests that it was not so much conditions at Deventer but the unexpected arrival of Louis, the *dauphin* of France, that led to the end of the siege. As a result of his problems with his father, King Charles VII, Louis had come seeking Philip's assistance, which caused the raising of this siege.⁴⁶ Whether weather conditions or problems in France saved Deventer, the fact remains that Philip the Good's artillery failed to bring down the city's medieval walls. Nor were those walls in any way remarkable. Archaeological remains show nothing more than a traditional double circuit without any of the anti-gunpowder

⁴⁴ Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 3:129 on the other hand contends that the bribe worked only when Philip showed up with his gunpowder artillery, "large serpentines, *veuglaires*, cannons," which had been brought to Utrecht's walls and were discharged a few times.

⁴⁵ Waurin, *Récueil*, 5:370–72. No historian has yet undertaken a study of this unsuccessful siege, leaving the student of Philip's life to guess from the meager original sources why it failed. Vaughan's account of the engagement (*Philip the Good*, 228–30) is uncharacteristically weak.

⁴⁶ Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 3:69–80, 98–106.

innovations of the sort that were starting to be found elsewhere in Europe in the mid-fifteenth century.

The siege of Deventer was the last military engagement which Philip led himself. By the time of his defeat, the duke had already turned sixty. For over thirty-seven years, he had been fighting within and outside of his extended duchy. A great many of his military engagements, including a number in which gunpowder weapons had played a large part, ultimately proved unsuccessful. Only in the Ghent War did Philip the Good see victories determined largely by his artillery dominance.

Philip's son, Charles the Bold (1467–1477), did not find any greater success in using gunpowder weapons against traditional medieval fortifications than had his father, despite being involved in military activities for each of the ten years of his reign. In 1472, in a desire to continue fighting the War of the League of Public Weal against King Louis XI (1461–1483), the new Burgundian duke drove into the very heart of French territory and struck at an imposing target, the city of Beauvais.⁴⁷ His siege became a spectacular failure. Philippe de Commynes contends that on the first day at Beauvais, Charles should easily have breached the fortifications of the town:

[Charles the Bold] . . . had two cannons which were fired only twice through the gate and made a large hole in it. If he had more stones to continue firing he would have certainly taken the town. However, he had not come with the intention of performing such an exploit and was therefore not well provided.⁴⁸

This lack of preparation was not the only problem the duke faced. Since Charles could not fully surround the walls, the gaps in his encirclement allowed the besieged citizens to be continually supplied with victuals, men, and armaments, including gunpowder and gunpowder weapons. The Burgundian forces eventually grew weary and hungry for lack of similar supplies and after twenty-five days retreated to Burgundy.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Technically this campaign was not a part of the War of the League of Public Weal, as the League had effectively dissolved by this time, leaving Charles essentially on his own in this attack. See Philip Vaughan, *Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy* (London, 1973), 79–80.

⁴⁸ Philippe de Commynes, *Mémoires*, ed. J. Calmette and G. Durville (Paris, 1924), 1:235.

⁴⁹ Again, this siege is in need of a more complete study. Only in Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 78–79, and Paul Murray Kendall, *Louis XI: The Universal Spider* (London,

Finally, at Neuss, a Burgundian siege was laid for almost a year, from July 30, 1474 to June 13, 1475, during which time the town walls were constantly bombarded by Burgundian cannon. Here, Charles the Bold used bombardars, *courtaux*, serpentines, culverins, and haquebusses; indeed, Olivier de la Marche reports that the Burgundian duke brought more than three hundred carts of guns with him to Neuss, not counting the hand-held gunpowder weapons, culverins and hacquebusses.⁵⁰ One eyewitness reports that "It was pitiful how *coulouvines* were fired at [the people of Neuss] thicker than rain."⁵¹ Yet, Charles was never able to force the inhabitants to surrender. Nor was the duke able to breach the fortifications. Midway through the siege, the gates and walls of the town lay in ruins, but only twice were Burgundian soldiers able to fight their way into Neuss and on both occasions, they were beaten back. Finally, in May, 1475, with a German relief force rapidly approaching, Charles, influenced by the fatigue of his soldiers and the rumblings of revolt in the Low Countries, was forced to seek a truce and raise his siege. Once more gunpowder weapons had failed to defeat medieval fortifications.

V

This article has dealt exclusively with the use of gunpowder weapons by Burgundian armies largely during the reign of Philip the Good,

1974), 249–51, is there any discussion of Charles's attack of Beauvais, and in both cases it is quite short.

⁵⁰ La Marche, *Mémoires*, 2:553–54. For a full account of Charles' gunpowder weapons at the siege of Neuss see Smith and DeVries, *History*, forthcoming.

⁵¹ Quoted from a letter sent by Jehan Baugey to the mayors and echevins of Dijon on September 16, 1475, in Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 322–23. On the siege see also "Lettre au Comte de Chimay," in Chastellain, Quoted from a letter sent by Jehan Baugey to the mayors and echevins of Dijon on September 16, 1475, in Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 322–23. On the siege see also "Lettre au Comte de Chimay," in Chastellain, *Œuvres*, 8:262–63; la Marche, *Mémoires*, 10:295–96; Jean de Haynin, *Mémoires*, ed. R. Chalon, vols. (Mons, 1842), 1:251–74; *Dépêches des ambassadeurs Milanais en France sous Louis XI et François Sforza*, ed. B. de Mandrot and C. Samaran, 4 vols. (Paris, 1916–1923), 1:107; Jean Molinet, *Chroniques*, ed. G. Doutrepoint and O. Jodogne, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1935), 1:31–102; Conrad Pfettsheim, *Chronique rimée des guerres de Bourgogne*, in *Recueil de pièces historiques imprimées sous le règne de Louis XI*, ed. E. Picot and H. Stein (Paris, 1923), 105–6, 130–37; *Légende Bourgignonne*, in *Recueil de pièces historiques imprimées sous le règne de Louis XI*, ed. E. Picot and H. Stein (Paris, 1923), 79; and Jean de Margny, *L'Aventurier*, ed. J.R. de Chevanne (Paris, 1938), 59, 83–84.

but spilling over into that of his spectacularly unsuccessful son, Charles the Bold. All of the campaigns under consideration were conducted in Flanders and northern France, two of the most urbanized regions of medieval Europe. With few exceptions, the use of gunpowder weaponry, even at a relatively largescale, did not lead to an easy victory by besiegers attacking what were clearly medieval fortifications.

This issue is further confused by the fact that for every instance where guns were successfully used against these fortified sites, such as Schendelbeke, Poeke, and Gavere in 1453, there are numerous examples of armies failing to capture medieval fortifications even when using gunpowder weapons, as was the case with Philip the Good's siege of Compiègne in 1430. Although artillery was introduced throughout Europe during this period, similar examples of its failure to knock down medieval walls could be found in other regions where it was deployed, including Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire.⁵² The chronology of this development could be lengthened to include the 1494 invasion of Italy by Charles VIII (1483–1498)⁵³ and beyond.⁵⁴ In fact, one medieval fortress, the castle of Bouillon, even withstood a bombardment of German high explosives during the Ardennes campaign in World War II.

At least in the earliest phases of the “gunpowder revolution,” it seems safe to say that, more often than not, “the walls did not come tumbling down!”

⁵² See Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics* (Baltimore, 1997), and DeVries, “Gunpowder Weaponry” 343–62.

⁵³ See Simon Pepper, “Castles and Cannon in the Naples Campaign of 1494–95,” in *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494–95: Antecedents and Effects*, ed. David Abulafia (Aldershot, 1995), 263–93.

⁵⁴ Ruth Rhynas Brown is currently compiling a list of medieval fortifications which withstood English Civil War bombardments, including the royal castles of Pontefract, Sandal, Knaresborough, Pickering, and Scarborough, among numerous others.

WIELDING THE WEAPONS OF WAR:
ARMS, ARMOR, AND TRAINING MANUALS
DURING THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

John Clements
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Feet lopped off at the knee and ankle, heads from shoulders neatly shorn, bodies carved from neck to hip-bone, hands and arms sent spinning off, through the ribs he thrusts his sift bale, though the head's already gone

From a fourteenth-century poem by William of Apulia

Although the Hundred Years War is filled with incidents when adversaries showed one another gracious and considerate behavior, the underlying reality in that conflict, as in any other, involved trying to kill or disable the enemy before he killed or disabled you. In the words of a fourteenth-century French constable, as related by the great chronicler of the age, Sir John Froissart, “it is better to hurt one’s enemy than to be hurt by him. Such is the fate of war.”¹ During this period, the growing use on the battlefield of well-armed infantry caused warfare in Europe to become bloodier.² Arguably, another factor in producing longer casualty lists was the development of improved weaponry and an increasing skill in its employment.

Despite an extensive literature on the Hundred Years’ War, relatively little has been written concerning the actual use of weapons by individual warriors or the martial skills such men required in order to use them. How did a medieval fighting man wield these

¹ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles of England, France, and Spain and the Adjoining Countries from the Latter Part of the Reign of Edward II to the Coronation of Henry IV*], trans. Thomas Johnes, 2 vols. (London, 1839) (Book II, ch. 9–10), 1:533–36. This is just one of the many sections of Thomas Johnes’ translation of Froissart into English that has been made easily available on the web by Professor Steve Muhlberger of Nipissing University’s Department of History. Muhlberger’s website, entitled *Tales from Froissart*, is taken from the 1849 edition printed in London and appears at the following URL: <http://www.nipissingu.ca/departement/history/muhlberger/froissart/tales.htm>. [hereafter cited as *Tales from Froissart*, and the URL of the page within the website]

² For a short study of some reasons for increasing carnage, see Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War” in *The Journal of Military History* 57 (1993): 271–88. Reprinted in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder, Colo., 1995), 55–94.

deadly instruments that were the tools of his trade, tools designed to inflict severe damage of the sort described by William of Apulia? And how did that individual learn his trade? Systematic investigation into these topics is still in its infancy. Consequently, even among academic historians well-versed in the Middle Ages, there exist many gaps and misconceptions concerning the reality of medieval combat. By exploring the dynamics at work in hand-to-hand fighting during the period of the Hundred Years War, the current article will attempt to correct some of these misconceptions and fill in some of the gaps. It will delve into the subject of historical fencing from the perspective of how the necessary skills were developed and applied; and it will examine the arms and armor used by combatants, in particular, that defining weapon of a medieval warrior, his sword.

Medieval Martial Arts and the Training Manuals

The study and practice of medieval martial arts is a newly emerging field combining traditional scholarship with hands-on investigation. To build a meaningful understanding of his subject, the martial artist must conduct research in a variety of academic fields including military history and the history of fencing, art, literature, language, and archaeology. The knowledge gained from these studies both informs and is informed by actual hands-on expertise of a sort that can be gained only by “wielding the weapons of war.”

Careful research into the use of medieval arms and armor (as distinct from mere costumed re-enactment) has greatly expanded our understanding beyond that provided by traditional academics and arms curators. Such research centers on the use of arms in a historically accurate and martially sound manner, taking into account the methods described in contemporary manuals of arms. The result has been a much greater appreciation for the sophistication and effectiveness exhibited by teachers of the past.

The later centuries of the Middle Ages witnessed the appearance of a growing number of martial handbooks (*fechtbücher*), designed to impart fighting skills, skills that a trained warrior would need in order to employ his weapons with brutal efficiency. While these handbooks are indeed worthy of study, they have largely remained, in the words of one authority, a “historiographical curiosity.”³

³ Sydney Anglo, *The Martial Arts of Renaissance Europe* (New Haven, Conn., 2000), 3.

The majority, not a few of which are illustrated, were produced by either German or Italian masters at arms, most notably the great Swabian practitioner and teacher, Johannes Liechtenauer,⁴ and his Bolognese counterpart, Fiore Dei Liberi.⁵ In addition, there are works by Hanko Doebringer,⁶ Sigmund Ringeck,⁷ Peter von Danzig, Hans Talhoffer,⁸ Hans Leckuechner, Paulus Kal, Filippo Vadi,⁹ and Pietro Monte as well as a number of anonymous authors. From England, only two obscure fourteenth century works on swordplay survive;

⁴ The verses of Johannes Liechtenauer are collected in Grzegorz Zabinski's work in progress, *The 14th century Fighting Art of Johannes Liechtenauer* [hereafter: Zabinski, Liechtenauer], forthcoming from Chivalry Bookshelf (2004–05). The principal manuscript belonging to the Preußische Königliche Staatsbibliothek is at present in the collection of the Jagiellonian Library in Kraków (ms.germ. quart. 2020). The difficulties of citing Liechtenauer derive from the nature of the source materials. Liechtenauer's teachings in verse set forth a systematic method of combat with medieval weaponry that was fully developed by the mid-1300s. They were first compiled by the priest and master at arms, Hanko Döbringer, sometime around the year 1389. Subsequently, the verses were quoted or commented upon by a number of later masters, such as Sigmund Ringeck and Peter von Danzig, whose own works, both published and in manuscript form, served as the basis for still other treatises such as the "Goliath." The fact that no one work contains all of Liechtenauer's purported teachings necessitates reliance upon multiple sources. In this article, citations to the writings of Johannes Liechtenauer, Hanko Döbringer, and Peter von Danzig come from Zabinski's work in progress, unless attributed to the Codex Wallerstein.

⁵ The treatise of Fiore dei Liberi, dated to 1410, presents the author's system for unarmed combat as well as the use of a variety of knightly weapons. It is the premier Italian fencing work of the fifteenth century and survives in three known editions each displaying textual and iconographic differences: Fiore Furlan dei Liberi da Premariacco, *Flos Duellatorum in armis, sine armis, equester, pedester*, Getty Museum 83.MR.183; Fiore Furlan dei Liberi da Premariacco, *Fior di Battaglia*, Pierpont Morgan, Library, M.383; and the Pissani-Dossi manuscript, *Flos Duellatorum: Il Fiore di battaglia di maestro Fiore dei Liberi da Premariacco*. The latter was edited by F. Novati and published at Bergamo, Italy in 1902. Material from this treatise can be found at www.thearma.org/Manuals/Liberi.htm.

⁶ Hanko Döbringer 1389 *Fechtbuch* [hereafter Döbringer, *Fechtbuch*], containing Liechtenauer's verses, is preserved in Codex Ms. 3227a, f. 15 of the Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nürnberg. In preparing this article, I have used a 2003 translation by Bartłomiej Walczak and Grzegorz Zabinski that I quote with their permission. References are to folio pages in the Nürnberg mss.

⁷ Sigmund Ringeck, *Die Ritterlich Kunst des Langen Schwerds*, Transcript by Martin Wierschin (Berlin, 1965); David Lindholm, *Sigmund Ringeck's Knightly Art of the Longsword* (Boulder, Colorado, 2003), 18.

⁸ Hans Talhoffer's *Fechtbuch aus dem Jahre 1467*. An English translation can be found in *Medieval Combat: a Fifteenth-Century Illustrated Manual of Swordfighting and Close-Quarter Combat*, ed. and trans. Mark Rector (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 2000). See also the recent English translation by Michael W. Rasmussen at URL: <http://www.schielhau.org/tal.html>.

⁹ Filippo Vadi, *De Arte Gladiatoria Dimicandi* (c.1482). Codice 1324 in the Vittorio Emmanuele collection of the Biblioteca Nazionale, Rome.

while there are no known French fencing texts predating the 1570s.¹⁰

Although most of the handbooks were generated outside of geographical regions normally associated with the Hundred Years War, their contents reflect both the training and practices of contemporary warriors throughout most of western Europe. The techniques they called for involved arms and armor that were in general use among warriors fighting in the greatest conflict of the later Middle Ages.

Among the authors were both knights and commoners. They taught skills useful not only in warfare, but also in judicial combat, dueling, tournaments,¹¹ and even day-to-day self-defense. The audience for these works stretched beyond the warrior class: the practice of martial arts was advocated by humanists as a means of achieving physical fitness and even some clerics practiced arms or advocated their study for self-defense and recreation.

The handbooks constructed elaborate fighting systems suitable to both armored and unarmored combat. They acquainted readers with the use of all manner of weapons including not only swords, but also daggers, axes, staffs, war hammers, and various pole-arms. They dealt with the differing methods necessary for mounted and unmounted combat. They described techniques for grappling and wrestling with an enemy, vital components of the close quarter, no-holds-barred fighting experienced in medieval battles. They even offered advice on the ethics involved in such combat.

Out of use and largely ignored for centuries, these medieval manuals are only now coming back into the consciousness of researchers and practitioners. The process of recovery has been slow, in part due to the considerable difficulties involved in both the translation and interpretation of these texts.¹² Only in later centuries, as fencers became hemmed in by rules of deportment and the conventions of etiquette, did they come to regard as “unscientific” the earlier fighting styles laid out in these manuals, styles designed to prepare a man to face a wide range of arms and armor. To the practitioners of an increas-

¹⁰ British Library, Ms. 3542 and Ms. 39564. While their cryptic wording makes it difficult to determine the relation of these English works to other writings of the period, the techniques they seem to reflect Germanic influences.

¹¹ Ironically, some of those who taught such techniques would have been barred by their lower social status from actually participating in tournaments.

¹² For an account of the challenges and difficulties faced when trying to reconstruct and practice these fighting skills see: “The Modern Study of Renaissance Martial Arts . . . History, Heritage, Exercise, Camaraderie, and Self-Defense” at ARMA—the Association for Renaissance Martial Arts, www.thearma.org/study.htm.

ingly formal and sporting swordplay, the more dynamic, flexible, and inclusive methods of the past appeared (incorrectly) to be little more than a mix of chaotic gimmicks unconnected by any larger “theory.”

In reality, the older theories of combat were broader and more developed than the much more limited styles of fencing common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The techniques taught by medieval masters of defense involved moves known to work in combat, moves that they named, perfected, and then systematically passed on to others. Over the centuries, warriors compiled a repertoire of such techniques and the manuals passed them down as a legacy of acquired wisdom and experience.¹³

Skill, Strength, or Practice?

The late medieval handbooks are full of advice on the need and value of “striking strongly” and “fencing with force.” The great fourteenth century master, Johannes Liechtenauer advised, “Hit hard and be good at it.” He went on to tell his reader, “*Mit ganzem leib ficht/was du starck gerest treibn.*” “If you want to strike strongly, use the whole body.”¹⁴

This advice was echoed by most later medieval writers who taught martial techniques. In his 1410 treatise, *Flos Duellatorum in Armis*, the Italian master Fiore dei Liberi included as one of four animals whose attributes symbolized the fencing art the elephant, representing strength (*fortitudo*), which Liberi said “carried all.” During the 1440s, Master Sigmund Ringeck stated: “This is the first tenet of the longsword: learn to strike properly from both sides so that you learn to fence well and with strength.” Ringeck also admonished his readers: “to fence with your whole body and with force is your wish.”¹⁵ A decade later, Peter von Danzig began a general lesson on longsword use with the instruction to “fence strongly . . . fight with all your body and drive with strength.”¹⁶ The anonymous mid-fifteenth century

¹³ For an outline of the systems of combat used in the Latin west during the period see: “Historical European Martial Arts” at ARMA, www.thearma.org/HEMA.htm.

¹⁴ Zabinski, *Liechtenauer*, ff. 1v, 8, 19v.

¹⁵ Lindholm, *Ringeck*, 18.

¹⁶ Johannes Liechtenauer’s *Art of the Long Sword*, accompanied by an anonymous commentary in the Goliath manuscript (MS 2020). The original manuscript is a

fighting manuscript, “Gladiatoria”, stated “strike him with the whole strength where you know you can hit him . . . so that you can bring him to the ground.”¹⁷

Early modern fencing manuals echoed their medieval predecessors: the *Codex Wallerstein* indicated the importance of strength in fighting at close quarters,¹⁸ and George Silver in his 1599 treatise, *Paradoxes of Defence*, wrote of the cutting power of “the blow being strongly made.”¹⁹ The historical record clearly demonstrates not only that swords and other edged weapons can cause terrible wounds, but that human beings can sustain considerable injury and still continue fighting. The idea, therefore, was to take out an opponent as quickly, efficiently, and completely as possible: you did not want to hit someone only to find that your blow was not forceful enough to stop him from hitting back. As Silver said, it was strong blows that wounded and killed an opponent, not light touches or short stabs.

Cuts that would have been debilitating or lethal on bare flesh alone might have no effect if delivered against an armored opponent. If they were executed with appropriate strength, however, they could traumatize the underlying tissue and bone, thus incapacitating without actually cutting the target. On a late medieval battlefield, a warrior would encounter and have to overcome various forms of armor, ranging from reinforced leather to plate. Consequently, while he could never count on using blows sufficient only for fighting unarmored opponents, a cut or thrust that might not penetrate the opponent’s armor could still cripple him if administered with enough force.

At the same time, the role of strength can be and often is overstated. While medieval handbooks stressed the importance of strength, they did not ignore the equally important role played by skill and technique. Today, one all too often encounters the stereotype of

fechtbuch that begins with a recital of Liechtenauer’s verses, followed by the commentary and examples, not unlike what one finds in other fifteenth century *fechtbücher*. The English translation by Michael W. Rasmuson, based on Grzegorz Zabinsky’s transcript, was updated in 2003. <http://www.schielhau.org/von.danzig.html>. trans. Mike Rasmussen, 2003.

¹⁷ The German manuscript, belonging to the Bibliotheca 1 Regia Berlinensium, is currently in the collection of Jagiellonian Library, Kraków Ms. 5878, Plate 30r. See: G. Zabinsky’s unpublished translation, 2003.

¹⁸ *Codex Wallerstein—A Medieval Fighting Book from the Fifteenth Century on the Longsword, Falchion, Dagger, and Wrestling*, ed. Grzegorz Zabinski and Bartłomiej Walczak (Boulder, Colo., 2002), 66 (plate 29).

¹⁹ George Silver, *Paradoxes of Defense* (London, 1599), 21 (chap. 13).

medieval knights relying largely or even exclusively on sheer strength for their fighting prowess. Throughout much of the last two centuries, the popular view, not infrequently reinforced by inaccurate scholarship, has seen pre-rapier fencing as almost entirely about strength and endurance with minimal attention paid to agility, finesse, or technique. The myth that knights and men-at-arms were little more than witless bashers relying on brute strength, clumsy weapons, and the weight of their armor has been highly persistent in the literature.

The dean of medieval military studies, Sir Charles Oman, did a disservice in his classic 1885 essay, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, when he alleged that for most of the medieval centuries, battlefields were primarily the scene of an untutored clash between mounted knights encased in heavy armor. Such sentiments frequently find their echo in more recent literature. For example, the noted Czech arms historian, Eduard Wagner wrote in the 1960s, "The mastery of the sword required considerable strength more than skill."²⁰ Two influential theatrical combat researchers, Craig Turner and Tony Soper, describe such a contest as follows:

The technique of medieval sword fighting was hardly subtle. The winner was usually the biggest and strongest knight who could continue pressing the attack, an attack consisting almost exclusively of slashing, smashing blows. This was the time of the two-handed or the 'hand-and-a-half' (bastard) swords. Great strength and endurance, not skill, was praised.²¹

Robert Morsberger, also an expert on Elizabethan theater, has observed that "swordplay in the days of knightly paladins was an endurance contest more than a test of skill,"²² while French fencing pundit, C.L. de Beaumont, stated confidently, "in the Middle Ages swords were heavy and clumsy and great strength rather than skill was required to wield them."²³

Unfortunately, some of the blame for these views lies with those who should have known better, fencing masters of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who, in comparing the arms and armor of the past to their own featherweight fencing tools,

²⁰ Eduard Wagner, *Cut and Thrust Weapons* (London, 1967), 41.

²¹ Craig Turner and Tony Soper, *Methods and Practice of Elizabethan Swordplay*. (Carbondale, Ill., 1990), xvi-xvii.

²² Robert E. Morsberger, *Swordplay and the Elizabethan and Jacobean Stage* (Salzburg, Austria, 1974), 7.

²³ C.L. de Beaumont, *Fencing: Ancient Art and Modern Sport* (New York, 1960), 1.

assumed that the former must have been impossibly ponderous and unwieldy. Opinions of this nature were commonly articulated by such fencing authorities as Egerton Castle in his *Schools and Masters of Fence* (1885), Jacopo Gelli, *L'arte dell'armi in Italia* (1906), and Gabriel Letainturier-Fadin, in two works, *Le Duel à travers les Ages* (1892) and *Les joueurs d'espée à travers les siècles* (1905).²⁴ Among them, Castle is perhaps the most notorious as well as the most influential proponent of the mistaken claim that medieval warriors relied only on strength. In the same year Oman penned his famous essay, Castle declared:

The rough untutored fighting of the Middle Ages represented faithfully the reign of brute force. The stoutest arm and the weightiest sword won the day. Those were the days of crushing blows with mace or glaive, when a knights superiority in action depended on his power of wearing heavier armor and dealing heavier blows than his neighbor, when strength was lauded more than skill.²⁵

Castle went on to praise the sixteenth century as the period “when something more than brute strength became a requisite in personal combat.”²⁶ In 1887, another noted historical fencing writer, Gustav Hergsel, added his voice to the list, asserting that in wielding the sword “the heroic master was determined not by conditioning and technique, but by strength.”²⁷

By contrast to these later experts, fencing masters of earlier periods did not subscribe to the oversimplified view that strength carried all before it. The myth of medieval swordsmen having to fight by strength alone is debunked from the start in the writings of Johannes Liechtenauer, who refers to *buffel* or “buffalos,” a demeaning term for untrained fencers who, relied on brute strength rather than skillful technique.²⁸ While realizing that strength was a significant attribute of the warrior, Liechtenauer opposed the idea that it could simply be substituted for skill. In his view, one could (and should) be both

²⁴ Sydney Anglo, “How to Win at Tournaments: The Techniques of Chivalric Combat.” *Antiquaries Journal* 68 (1988): 248.

²⁵ Egerton Castle, *Schools and Masters of Fence: From the Middle Ages to the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1885), 5.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁷ Hergsell made this statement in his 1887 edition of the *Fechtbuch aus Jahre 1467*.

²⁸ Taking his cue from Liechtenauer, Sigmund Ringeck later referred to *Buffel* in even more explicit terms—as “the fools that usurp mastery with violence.” See: Ringeck, *Die Ritterlich Kunst*, 110.

skillful *and* strong. He laid out the proper relationship between these two key attributes when he stated “above all the things you should learn to strike *correctly*, if you want to strike strongly,”²⁹ also indicating that “a weak man would more certainly win with his art and cunningness than a strong man with his strength.”³⁰

In the late-fourteenth century, Hanko Döbringer, writing on how to face multiple opponents, stressed the importance of technique. For example, Döbringer advocated the *Eysem Pforte* (a position with the blade in front toward the ground and pointed off to the side) that made it possible for the skilled fighter to “fight against four or six farmers” (to whit, untrained men who presumably relied on their strength alone).³¹

Nor can one easily find sources from the early modern period that labeled the fighting methods of preceding centuries as crude, artless, or inferior. Indeed, contrary to the opinions of fencing authors of a more recent vintage, those of the sixteenth century generally spoke of the old ways as being both sound and wise. For example, in 1598, the English master George Silver, declared forcefully in his *Paradoxes of Defense*, “there is no manner of teaching comparable to the ancient teaching.”³² In an echo of the contemporary debate between “the ancients and the moderns,” there were a number of sixteenth century masters who lamented the decline of martial skills in their own day and looked back to some earlier golden age.

The *Codex Wallerstein* indicated the greater importance of skill when the combat grew deadly: allowing that “in a friendly combat strength has always advantage,” the author indicates that “a weak fighter in a serious combat can be equal to a strong opponent, if he has previously learned agility, reach, fighting-tricks and death-tricks.”³³ In the 1480s, Italian master of arms Filippo Vadi put it even more starkly, “cunning wins [over] any strength.”³⁴

Although training for lethal combat was the overwhelming concern of warriors, there were occasions when one might need merely to restrain or subdue an opponent, such as dealing with a drunken

²⁹ Zabinski (citing von Danzig, f. 7v), 154.

³⁰ Ibid. (citing Döbringer, f. 22v), 133.

³¹ Döbringer, *Fechtbuch*, ff. 44r–45v.

³² Silver, *Paradoxes*, 21 (chap. 13).

³³ Codex Wallerstein, 69.

³⁴ Vadi, *De Arte*, 5v.

friend or irate relative. Even on the battlefield, the issue of subduing rather than injuring might arise in respect to taking a prisoner for future ransom, an important and lucrative consideration of medieval warfare. Since weapons are, by their very nature, designed to do injury, fighting techniques intended to safely incapacitate or immobilize an opponent without serious harm put an even greater premium on skill and training than do those designed simply to kill or maim.³⁵

In addition to both strength and skill, all of the handbooks advocated regular practice as a necessary adjunct to learning the fighting arts. In Hartmann von Aue's thirteenth-century tale, *Iwein*, we read that "with practice the weak man can too learn to fight far better."³⁶ Hanko Döbringer left no doubt as to its importance: "Practice is better than art, because your practice will suffice without art, while the art means nothing without practice."³⁷ A 1434 work entitled *Regimento para aprender algunas causas das armas* by King Duarte I of Portugal (1433–1438) reminded readers that the principle foundation of learning martial arts was practice since, once having been learned, the proper methods will not be forgotten.³⁸

Nor were practice sessions to be undertaken in a perfunctory manner. Since practice was not for show, but a preparation for real combat, potentially a matter of life and death, men had to perform the techniques with the same strength and speed they would need to exhibit on the battlefield.

The importance of all three elements—strength, skill, and practice—comes through clearly in a medieval legend concerning the supposed origins of the warrior class, a legend found in various Spanish works, including Gutierre Diaz de Gamez's early fifteenth-

³⁵ This particular motivation for developing increased skill, while affecting knightly combatants did not extend downward on the social ladder. Common fighting men did not share in the "fellowship in arms" that created brotherhood among the knightly classes. They neither profited from ransom to the same degree nor could they expect a similar *noblesse oblige* in their treatment if taken prisoner. What is more, the weapons wielded by common soldiers—bows, crossbows, pikes, halberds, etc.—were not as conducive to taking of prisoners as swords and daggers.

³⁶ Hartmann von Aue, *Iwein*, trans. John Wesley Thomas (London, 1979), line 7000. The work is based Chrétien DeTroyes' twelfth-century, *Yvain, Or the Knight with the Lion*.

³⁷ Döbringer, *Fechtbuch*, f. 15.

³⁸ *Regimento para aprender algunas causas das Armas*, BITAGAP Manid 3154 in the Biblioteca Municipal of Santarém, 31–7–10, f. 132v cited in Anglo, *Martial Arts*, 257.

century biography of the great Spanish knight, Pero Nino.³⁹ According to Diaz, the warrior estate was born when society first sought a means of selecting its fighting men. Men began by sending into battle those who practiced “the mechanical arts,” such as stone cutters, carpenters, and smiths, on the grounds that these were men “accustomed to strike great blows, to break hard stones, to split wood with great strength, to soften iron which is very hard,” believing that they would “strike mightily and give hard blows” and would thus conquer their enemies.

When such men were sent into the fray, however, “some were stilted in their armor, and some lost their strength through fear, and some took to flight, so that all their host was brought to defeat.” Next to be chosen were the butchers “who were cruel and accustomed to shedding blood without pity, men who slaughtered great bulls and strong beasts.” It was thought that these “would strike without mercy and without fear” avenging the earlier defeat. Instead, when well-armed and sent into the forefront of battle, their courage failed them and they too took to flight.

Finally, it was decided that in the next battle, men would be stationed on the heights to watch the battle unfold and identify those who displayed a truly martial character, men who fought with good heart and struck good blows and who did not give in to any fear of injury or death, but who stood fast. This time, when the battle was won, society honored these men and placed them in a special group where they would do no work other than train for war. This tale brings home the fact that its author viewed the ideal attributes of a warrior as a combination of strength, skill with arms, and courage, that would be reinforced through constant practice.

³⁹ Gutierre Diaz de Gamez, *The Unconquered Knight—A Chronicle of the Deeds of Don Pero Nino, Count of Buelna*, trans. Joan Evans (London, 1928), 4–5. This legend of a primordial selection-process determining the identity of the earliest knights had appeared in Iberian writings several centuries before Pero Niño’s chronicle. See: David Cohen, “Secular Pragmatism and Thinking about War in some Court Writings of Pere III el Cerimonios,” in Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies around the Mediterranean* (Leiden, 2003), 46–47.

Late Medieval Swords and Sword-fighting Techniques

During the closing centuries of the Middle Ages, as use of plate armor became widespread, the diversity of sword forms also increased considerably.⁴⁰ In earlier periods, large hand-held shields had placed practical limits on the length of the sword that a warrior could effectively wield. Now, as plate replaced shields in protecting the human body, thereby freeing up the warrior's other hand, the number of long-bladed swords proliferated—war-swords, great-swords, bastard swords, *estocs*, *grossmessers*, etc. Held in a double-hand grip, these versatile weapons opened up a range of new tactical options far exceeding those available to the shorter sword used single-handedly.

Shield bearers with their shorter swords had fewer possible targets, feints, or lines of attack; consequently, the shift to longswords necessitated learning an array of new strikes, counter-strikes, and parries. It also led to more use of grappling and wrestling in combat, as well as more complicated stabbing attacks less applicable in sword and shield combat.

In the *Flos Duellatorum*, Master Fiore dei Liberi described the thrust as the most dangerous form of sword attack, one that was responsible for more deaths than any other stroke. Filippo Vadi referred to his *ponta* (thrust) as the “highest master” and Pietro Monte declared his *stoccata vel puncta* (straight thrusting point) the primary component of his attack. And yet, an edge could also deliver a crippling blow, as William of Apulia suggests when considering certain swords that were especially long and sharp, including “those in the habit of cutting a body on two.”⁴¹

Great stress was placed upon keeping the sword well extended toward an adversary. Hanko Döbringer commented on the need for a swordsman to straighten the hands when cutting, stating that “when he strikes to you and . . . does not straighten [his] arms with the stroke, his sword is shortened.”⁴² Peter von Danzig described a long-guard position (*langer ort*), with the arms extended straight out and the weapon pointed at the opponent's face, as being among the most secure when blades are suddenly crossed.⁴³ While this same position

⁴⁰ The study and classification of swords has been given its own name, *spathology*.

⁴¹ Ewart Oakeshott, *Sword in Hand—A Brief Survey of the Knightly Sword* (Minneapolis 2001), 95.

⁴² Döbringer, *Fechtbuch*, f. 34v.

⁴³ Zabinski (citing von Danzig), 303.

is found illustrated in the three known manuscript editions of the *Flos Duellatorum* where the name *posta longa* is clearly visible for the posture.⁴⁴

The author of the *Codex Wallerstein* supplied advice that had the same end in mind

When you fight . . . against someone . . . you should stretch your arms and your sword far from you, and put yourself into a low body position (*die Waage*), so that you have a good grip and long reach in your sword. . . .⁴⁵

By the period of the Hundred Years War, longswords had become the basic weapon used in the study of fencing. They proved highly effective in learning such core fighting skills as footwork, timing, reach, and the parrying of blows, all of which are necessary for wielding any hand weapons.

The actual techniques for employing longswords found in historical manuals differ considerably from those depicted in Hollywood sword fights and other popular (mis)conceptions of medieval fencing. The sword was not usually wielded in the conventional hack and slash “style”; instead, it was used in a tighter, more closely controlled manner that employed offensively not only the point and forward edge, but also the back edge and even the hilt. Fifteenth century fencing instructors recommended a wide variety of techniques: such as using the back or “short” edge of the sword for cutting, grappling with opponents, striking with hilt or pommel, or even seizing the opponent’s hilt or blade.⁴⁶ Many techniques involved thrusting, contrary to a not-uncommon, but incorrect assertion that point-fencing did not develop until after 1500.

Another feature of medieval combat unseen in cinema swordplay was half-swording—gripping the blade of one’s own sword with the second hand to either deflect attacks or help guide thrusts and strikes, almost as one would handle a spear, poleaxe, or quarterstaff. These and other such simple yet vicious techniques appear prominently in medieval texts that are, after all, designed to give the warrior an edge in deadly combat.

⁴⁴ See the comprehensive sample of fighting manuals (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries) online at ARMA, www.thearma.org/manuals.htm.

⁴⁵ *Codex Wallerstein*, 34.

⁴⁶ One is reminded of the closing scene from a recent film version of *Rob Roy* starring Liam Neeson, where the beleaguered hero defeats and dismembers a far more skilled fencer by grabbing his opponent’s sword blade at a critical moment.

In the era of the Hundred Years War, the longsword became not only the principal training weapon, but also the symbol of chivalry and courtly honor, used extensively in judicial duelling. When in combat, a trained warrior equipped with such a weapon could guard, parry, slice, as well as cut and thrust. Swung with both hands, the longsword was capable of delivering devastating wounds. Speaking of an English defeat at the hands of the Scots, Froissart tells of Sir Archibald Douglas who

wielded before him an immense sword, whose blade was two ells long, which scarcely another could have lifted from the ground, but he found no difficulty in handling it, and gave such terrible strokes, that all on whom they fell were struck to the ground; and there were, none so hardy among the English able to withstand his blows.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, on the battlefield, longswords still faced competition from other popular weapons including the battleaxe, poleaxe, spear, and various shorter arming swords and bastard swords (a term originally referring to the acutely tapering shape of certain blades), all of which were popular and appeared frequently in literature of the period. In medieval combat, the choice of weapons was a highly individual matter.

Modern scholarship has raised an interesting question in respect to the use of medieval swords: did one actually cut an opponent or merely batter him? According to one school of thought, swords were relatively incapable of delivering cutting blows against mail armor, whether it consisted of metal ring links sewn to a leather garment or interlocking chain. Instead, swords were intended more to “bludgeon” or “bruise” an adversary; fighters sought to injure by blunt trauma or the shock of broken bones.

Undoubtedly, blunt trauma injuries did play a substantial role in medieval combat. The edge of a swordblade swung with modest force can deliver a significant impact, even if that edge is fairly blunt. It is largely for this reason that padded garments (gambesons) were regularly worn under medieval armor. Modern experiments on raw meat clad in mail and underlying padding have demonstrated that flesh can be severely traumatized by hits that do not penetrate either layer of protection. Repeated blows can pulverize meat and bone.

⁴⁷ *Tales from Froissart* (book II, chap. 10) ed. Steve Muhlberger at URL: <http://www.nipissingu.ca/departement/history/muhlberger/froissart/melrose.htm>.

On the other hand, the blunt trauma argument can easily be overstated. Evidence from medieval accounts and images, from skeletal remains unearthed at battle sites, and from modern experiments pitting sharp swords against accurate reproductions of maile⁴⁸ all indicate that swords were effective cutting weapons. Hardened and well-honed sword blades when used by well-trained warriors were fully capable of delivering penetrating blows. Even semi-sharp blades could sometimes cut through armor and slice meat and bone in a horrendous fashion. Although maile with its associated under-padding did absorb or deflect some of the force of a swordblow, such a weapon in skilled hands was capable of splitting, popping, or rending the links of which maile was composed and delivering a cutting blow to the wearer.

Even the best armor was never full-proof; and armor, like the weapons it was designed to fend off, varied considerably in quality and composition. Some was composed of thicker rings or a tighter “weave”; some was made of softer links. (Interestingly, softer links tended to “give” more when struck, an ability that may on occasion have actually lessened the severity of an injury.) Even the location of the blow was critical: swords striking against portions of the maile loose enough to bunch up frequently had a less damaging impact on the wearer than comparable blows delivered at points where the netting was stretched more tightly.

As Froissart indicates, French knights preparing for battle at Commines expressed confidence in the cutting ability of their weapons:

[Our enemies] are badly armed, whilst our spears and swords are of well tempered steel from Bordeaux; and the haubergeons they wear will be a poor defence, and *cannot prevent our blows from penetrating through them.*⁴⁹

If, indeed, medieval swords did not cut effectively against maile armor, but instead did their damage by mere concussive impact, one wonders, why bother to sharpen them at all? If blunt trauma injuries had been the principal goal of swordfighting, a well-honed blade would have been superfluous.

⁴⁸ Although the term “chain mail” is not infrequently used, it is a redundant Victorian misnomer. The preferred term is simply “maile.”

⁴⁹ *Tales from Froissart* (Book II, Chapter 115), <http://www.nipissingu.ca/departement/history/muhlberger/froissart/prepare.htm>.

The weight of medieval swords has also been a subject of great misunderstanding.⁵⁰ Typical of this is the following quote from the 1930 *Book of Fencing* by Eleanor Baldwin Cass:

With a few rare exceptions, the sword, throughout Europe in 1450, was still a heavy, clumsy weapon. It was designed for dealing downright armor-hewing blows, with but little point work in its manage, and for balance and ease of fence it was about as convenient as an axe. [The sword was] an armor-hewer that was little better than a club.⁵¹

Later in the same decade, a work co-authored by arms-curator Charles Ffoulkes and Captain E.C. Hopkinson, echoed these sentiments:

The so-called ‘Crusader’ sword is heavy, broad-bladed, and short gripped. There is no balance, as the word is understood in swordsmanship, and to thrust with it is an impossibility. Its weight made swift recovery impossible.⁵²

The belief that medieval swords were overly heavy and awkward to use, a view that has taken on the proportions of urban folklore, perplexes those who today exercise with them on a fairly regular basis. Such views could only have been arrived at by inappropriate comparison between the lightweight sport fencing tools of the modern era, designed for use in highly stylized, unarmored bouts between individual fencers, and their deadly, utilitarian predecessors. In fact, medieval swords were in general well-made, light enough to be used with agility, and capable of delivering swift, but dismembering cuts or cleaving deep into body cavities. They were far from being “clubs with edges.” As a leading sword expert, Ewart Oakeshott, has correctly stated:

Medieval swords are neither unwieldably heavy . . . their average weight . . . [being] between 2½ lb. and 3½ lbs. Even the big hand-and-a-half ‘war’ swords rarely weight more than 4½ lbs.⁵³

⁵⁰ For an extended summary of misconceptions concerning the actual weights of medieval swords, see: “What Did Historical Swords Weigh?” at ARMA, www.thearma.org/essays/weights.htm.

⁵¹ Eleanor Baldwin Cass, *The Book of Fencing* (Boston, 1930), 29–30.

⁵² Charles Ffoulkes and E.C. Hopkinson, *Sword, Lance, & Bayonet: A record of the Arms of the British, Army and Navy* (Cambridge, 1938), 18. For similar views, see also: Beaumont, *Fencing*, 143.

⁵³ Ewart Oakeshott, *Medieval Swords Part II*, in “The Gun Report” (London, 1982), 18.

Unhorsed and Helpless?

It was once believed that the late medieval warrior encased in plate armor, when afoot became a helpless figure, somewhat akin to a turtle turned on its back. Statements to that effect abound in the literature. “By the 1400s horsemen had become clanking tanks. Unhorsed, a knight was at his foe’s mercy.”⁵⁴ “When unhorsed or surrounded [the knight] became a poor crustacean and an easy prey for common foot soldiers.”⁵⁵ According to Richard Barber, a dismounted knight was “unable to move swiftly”—due, not to the weight of his armor, but “because his armor was not designed for movement on foot”—making him “easy prey to the dagger of a lightly armed soldier thrust between the joints of his carapace.”⁵⁶

Such views fail to take into account improvements in late medieval plate armor that enabled armorers to construct suits flexible enough for an athletic man to move about with roughly eighty percent of normal agility, even performing cartwheels and rolls.⁵⁷ As modern experiments have demonstrated, a man in well-fitting plate-armor has more mobility than his counterpart wearing a full coat of heavy chain-link armor and carrying a large shield. In short, far from being helpless and ineffectual, dismounted men-at-arms wearing plate armor and wielding a longsword proved under normal conditions to be formidable adversaries. Given this fact, it is not surprising that the fencing literature of late medieval and early modern Europe shows a clear preference for foot combat. At the same time, most training for combat was accomplished on foot and unarmored—as the fencing manuals of the age reveal.

Despite the familiar image of mounted knights in heavy armor dominating medieval battlefields, almost all major battles of the later Middle Ages (sieges in particular) were actually fought and decided on foot. By the era of the Hundred Years War, armies were coming to rely increasingly on their infantry.

Infantry armies fought battles during the early fourteenth century using distinctive, and in most cases, decisive tactics. This occurred through-

⁵⁴ *The Age of Chivalry* (New York, 1969), 213.

⁵⁵ Jacques Le Goff, *Medieval Callings*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago, 1987), 108.

⁵⁶ Richard Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry* (New York, 1974), 232.

⁵⁷ A video of modern researchers performing such moves filmed at the Royal Armouries in Leeds is available at www.theARMA.org.

out Europe. . . . Only when infantry was used to support the knights, and when archers were used to soften the enemy in preparation for cavalry charges, were great victories had in medieval battles. . . . While cavalry alone rarely won battles, infantry alone sometimes did.⁵⁸

Andrew Ayton describes a tactical revolution in the 1300s that involved the way English aristocrats conducted themselves in battle.⁵⁹ Increasingly, they abandoned mounted charges in favor of foot combat. Ayton notes the use of such tactics in both the Scottish border wars of the period and across the channel in France. By the 1360s, Englishmen serving in the White Company had introduced the tactic into Italian warfare.⁶⁰

As a result of this change, the English modified their plate armor to allow for easier use in foot combat. According to Ayton, this tactical revolution comes though in English writings from the period that describe traditional deeds of chivalry being conducted on horseback, while actual combat was carried out on foot and in combination with archers.

The Declining Use of Shields

By the time the Hundred Years War began, full length shields were disappearing from the battlefield. Dismounted combat with shields was much less common in European warfare by the 1300s and by the 1400s it was clearly uncommon. An English priest of the 1330s named William Herebert could state confidently that the shield is “rarely carried in war because it hinders rather than helps.”⁶¹ What is more, the average size of those shields still in use continued to

⁵⁸ Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1996), 191.

⁵⁹ Andrew Ayton, “Knights, Esquires, and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry,” in *The Medieval Military Revolution. State, Society, and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price (London, 1995), 24–25.

⁶⁰ For more information on the English move into Italy, see William Caferro’s article in this volume, entitled “‘The Fox and the Lion’: The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy.”

⁶¹ In 1583, the Italian military writer, Cesare d’Evoli, declared his dislike for wooden shields because spear tips would stick in them. In their place, he advocated the use of round steel shields (*rotella*). Anglo, *Martial Arts*, 205, 220.

decrease, a result of warriors adopting for their protection new forms of rigid body armor.⁶²

By the fifteenth century the armorers' craft had advanced to such an extent as to make the shield an unnecessary encumbrance, and it ceased to be carried by knights for purposes other than the joust. It was used only by infantrymen who carried small bucklers which used in conjunction with swords.⁶³

Though a shield can be a formidable defense, it is also an encumbrance, one that hinders the individual using it from freely employing his weapons, particularly when fighting on foot. Against an opponent with a shield and shorter weapon, the man wearing articulated plate armor and armed with a longsword enjoyed several significant advantages. His weapon had a greater reach. Not only could he deliver forceful, two-handed blows, he could utilize highly effective "half-sword" techniques. His plate armor and greater reach largely freed him from the danger of being struck by cutting blows.⁶⁴ He could close on his opponent without being sliced by draw cuts and his armor would protect him from forceful impacts by the shield.

Meanwhile, the shield bearer could be placed at an added disadvantage by having his shield pressed up against him or having its rim grabbed by the other fighter's free hand. He might even be rushed and flung down in such a manner that he or at least his arm would be pinned by the shield meant to protect him.

Large free-standing shields (such as the *pavis* or *steczchild*) were still employed on the battlefield to protect front rank troops against assault by slings, arrows, and crossbow bolts. What is more, shields continued to be used effectively in siege warfare throughout the Middle Ages. But the traditional kite-shaped shield worn on the arm was progressively abandoned. By the late fourteenth century, the development of full plate armor and the longsword combined with increasing use of pole-arms and more powerful missile weapons had greatly reduced its value in European warfare.

The medieval and early modern handbooks reflect this changing reality. There are over a hundred surviving fencing texts dating from

⁶² Nicolle, *Arms and Armor*, 134.

⁶³ Edge, *Arms*, 121.

⁶⁴ An element of European plate armor that has gone unappreciated is the fact that it was often designed to prohibit an opponent from easily grappling with the wearer by grabbing his armor at the elbow, wrist, or shoulder.

the late-thirteenth to the early-seventeenth centuries. Nowhere do they mention the battlefield use of shields, with one important exception—the buckler.

Fighting with Sword and Buckler

The buckler is a small, highly maneuverable shield carried in the non-sword hand. Although most often associated with fencing methods of the early 1500s and with common soldiers rather than knights, the combination of sword and buckler dates well back into the Middle Ages, at which time the two weapons were used by both knights and commoners. Early medieval pictorial sources, dating from c. 650 to c. 1100, show bucklers in use by Celtic, Frankish, and Byzantine horsemen while both the literature and artwork of the later Middle Ages frequently depict men-at-arms, mounted or on foot, carrying these convenient defensive weapons.

The widespread popularity of the buckler in late medieval warfare can be traced largely to the fact that it was less cumbersome and more agile than a larger shield and easier either to carry about or wear on the hip. Nor was the use of bucklers limited to combat; they were also important in training and non-lethal sword play. Fencing with sword and buckler was a popular pastime in northern Italy, Germany, and England. As British historical fencing researcher-practitioner Martin J. Austwick has pointed out:

The earliest references to professional combat instructors or masters of defense as they were to become known all have one thing in common. They refer to schools of sword and buckler. Add to this the fact that the earliest known *Fechtbuch* (fight book) is dedicated solely to sword and buckler combat, then it becomes apparent that sword and buckler combat is arguably the oldest martial tradition within Western Martial Arts today.⁶⁵

Regular exercise with the sword and buckler, originally known as *Eskirmye de Bokylers*, appears to have become common as early as the twelfth century. In training, the sword and buckler's value lay in

⁶⁵ This quotation appears on the website of what was formerly known as the Albion Academy of Arms, at URL <http://albionacademyofarms.org/essay1.htm>. The Academy has since divided into two organizations: the Company for Historical Combat and the Academie Glorianna.

learning to coordinate the two weapons, using them cooperatively both to attack and defend, cut and thrust. The warrior's timing and footwork were also improved. Medieval literature suggests that once developed, techniques of sword and buckler combat remained fairly consistent over time.

Throughout Europe, the primary use of the buckler was by infantry. As early as the 1100s, light infantry, made up of commoners armed with bucklers and either a sword or falchions often lined up behind troops with pole-weapons. As the Middle Ages wore on, this weapon system came increasingly into its own and by the time of the Hundred Years War, sword and buckler infantry were playing a significant role on the battlefield. What is more, the buckler was not limited to use with a sword or falchion; it could also be carried by a soldier wielding a bow or even one with a polearm since its size made it easy to wear by one's side.

The versatility of the sword-buckler combination recommended its use in combat situations. Although the buckler offered some protection against missile weapons, it was particularly valuable when facing hand held weapons such as polearms and axes. One the buckler's advantages in the crush of medieval combat lay in its flexibility. Whereas a larger shield worn on the arm could become a deadly encumbrance when hooked or pulled by various types of polearms and axes, the smaller, more nimble hand-held buckler could be easily disengaged from attempts to entangle it or simply be dropped from the hand. Nor could the point of an opponent's weapon get stuck in the face of a metal buckler as it could in a large wooden shield (though at times, the ability to entangle an enemy's weapon might actually prove an advantage to the shield bearer.) Combined with a good shearing sword or tapering cut-and-thrust blade, the buckler could deflect attacks, strike blows of its own, and yet still allow the user's sword to cut around in any direction.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ For an extensive collection of images (twelfth to sixteenth centuries) depicting knights and men-at-arms wielding sword and buckler see: "The Sword and Buckler Tradition", at ARMA, www.thearma.org/essays/SwordandBuckler.htm. The accumulated material supports the argument that for several centuries the sword and buckler was a common training weapon among all classes of fighting men, as well as a knighthood weapon for both battlefield and judicial combat.

Conclusion

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the period of the Hundred Years War, witnessed enormous innovation in both weaponry and fighting tactics. Plate armor increasingly replaced mail. The short sword and full length shield gave way to longswords and bucklers. Infantry armed with pikes, halberds, and other deadly pole arms, as well as longbows, crossbows, and eventually firearms played an ever greater role on European battlefields.

Prior to the fourteenth century, the mounted knight dominated hand-to-hand combat against anyone not similarly equipped and equally well-trained. With a coat of mail, great helm, large shield, gauntlets, and armed with a fine sword or battleaxe, he normally enjoyed a decided advantage against any common soldier or even against several such opponents. During the Hundred Years War, however, the knight was forced by necessity to develop more effective martial skills in order to face a better armed, better armored, and better trained array of common infantry.

In close-quarter combat, increasing numbers of infantrymen equipped with quality weapons of their own, including swords, pole-arms, crossbows, and longbows, posed a far more deadly threat than they had in the past. A mounted man in armor could no longer confidently rely either on the protective value of his armor or his ability to ride down his opponent with a lance. The late medieval warrior who attempted such a brash maneuver against a hedgehog of polearms would quickly find himself lying on the ground with men rushing forward to jab sharp metal spikes into his eyes.

These new battlefield pressures occasioned a late medieval flowering of the martial arts. As plate armor provided men-at-arms greater protection, they required more complex fighting moves for defeating one another as well as confronting the vastly improved infantry of their day. It was a period of constant experimentation leading to developments that affected weapons, armor, and the techniques involved in using both.

The diversity of plate armor worn during the period was considerable with no standardization in either the thickness or number pieces available. And the arsenal of weapons at the warriors disposal was truly profound. As a result, the art and *science* of defence (as Fiore dei Liberi called it in 1410) was a highly individualized one: each warrior had to make choices on which his life (and death)

depended—choices concerning which weapons to use in combat and how best to use them. It was to help make such choices that a new literature came into being and flourished.⁶⁷

The medieval battlefield was a frightening place to be. To survive its many dangers required skill, strength, and frequent practice in the martial arts—despite which there always remained a large element of chance. It is no wonder that the late-fourteenth-century poet, Geoffroi de Paris, wrote, *Enssi avient li fait d'armes: on pier tune fois el l'autre fois gagn'on*—“That’s the way it is with fighting, sometimes you win, sometimes you lose.”

⁶⁷ For a concise overview of the emerging field of historical fencing studies as it relates to research in Renaissance martial arts literature, see: “An Introduction to Renaissance Martial Arts Literature” at ARMA, www.thearma.org/RMAlit.htm.




Figure 3. Armored fighting employing “half-sword” techniques from Fiore die Liberi’s *Flos Duellatorum*, c. 1410.




Figure 4. Fiore's *meza spada* ("half-sword") techniques for armored combat.




Figure 5. Armored longsword fighting in a judicial duel from the 1443 edition of Hans Talhoffer's *Fechtbuch*.



Figure 6. Fighting with the poleax from the 1443 edition of Talhoffer.



Figure 7. A half-sword technique according to Talhoffer teachings.




Figure 8. Armored and mounted combat techniques from the *Solothurner Fechtbuch*, late-fourteenth century Swiss-German.




Figure 9. The close-in actions at half-sword with long armor-fighting swords from the *Solothurner Fechtbuch*.




Figure 10. The coup de grace with dagger and grappling techniques from the *Solothurner Fechtbüch*. Note the *estocs* or *tucks*, heavy, rigid spike-like rod weapons specifically designed for fighting plate armor.

APPENDIX ONE: GENEALOGIES

The genealogical tables, The Succession in 1328. The Houses of Lancaster and Beaufort, and France, Burgundy, and Naples can be found on the pages liii, liv and lv.

Popes

Avignon Papacy (1305–1378)
Clement V (1305–1314)
John XXII (1316–1334)
Nicholas V (1328–1330)*
Benedict XII (1334–1342)
Clement VI (1342–1357)
Innocent VI (1352–1362)
Urban V (1362–1370)
Gregory XI (1370–1378)
Great Schism (1378–1417)
Urban VI (1378–1389) [Rome]
Clement VII (1378–1394) [Avignon]
Boniface IX (1389–1404) [Rome]
Benedict XIII (1394–1424) [Avignon]
Innocent VII (1404–1406) [Rome]
Gregory XII (1406–1417) [Rome]
Council of Pisa (1409)
Alexander V (1409–1410) [Rome]
John XXIII (1410–1415)*
Council of Constance (1414–1418)
Martin V (1417–1431)
Clement VIII (1424–1429)*
Benedict XIV (1424)*
Eugene IV (1431–1447)
Felix V (1439–1449)
Nicholas V (1447–1455)
*Anti-popes

*European Rulers and Nobility**Kings of England*

Plantagenet Dynasty

- Edward I (1272–1307)
- Edward II (1307–1327)
- Isabella [regent] (1327–1330)
- Mortimer [regent] (1327–1330)
- Edward III (1327–1377)
- Richard II (1377–1399)

Lancaster Dynasty

- Henry IV (1399–1413)
- Henry V (1413–1422)
- Henry VI (1422–1461)

York Dynasty

- Edward IV (1461–1483)
- Edward V (1483)
- Richard III (1483–1485)

Kings of France

Capetian Dynasty

- Philip IV (1285–1314)
- Louis X (1314–1316)
- Philip V (1316–1322)
- Charles IV (1322–1328)

Valois Dynasty

- Philip VI (1328–1350)
- John II (1350–1364)
- Charles V (1364–1380)
- Charles VI (1380–1422)
- Charles VII (1422–1461)
- Louis XI (1461–1483)
- Charles VIII (1483–1498)
- Louis XII (1498–1515)

French Noble Houses

Anjou

- Charles I (1266–1285)
- Charles II (1285–1309)
- Robert II (1309–1343)
- Joanna I (1342–1382)
- Charles III (1382–1386)
- Ladislav (1386–1414)

Brittany

- Charles of Blois (1341–1364)
- John III (1312–1341)
- John IV of Montfort (1364–1399)
- John V (1399–1442)
- Francis I (1442–1450)
- Peter II (1450–1457)
- Arthur III (1457–1458)
- Francis II (1458–1488)
- Anne (1488–1514)

Burgundy

- Philip the Bold (1364–1404)
- John the Fearless (1404–1419)
- Philip the Good (1419–1467)
- Charles the Bold (1467–1477)

Foix

- Gaston I (1302–1315)
- Gaston II (1315–1343)
- Gaston III Phoebus (1343–1391)
- Matthew (1391–1398)
- Archimbald (1398–1423)
- John (1413–1436)
- Gaston IV (1413–1472)

Low Countries

Brabant

- Henry II (1235–1248)
- Henry III (1248–1261)

Henry IV (1261–1267)
John I (1267–1294)
John II (1294–1312)
John III (1312–1355)
Joanna (1355–1404)

Flanders

Guy de Dampierre (1278–1304)
Robert of Béthune (1305–1322)
John (1304–1331)
Louis I (1322–1346)
Louis II de Male (1346–1384)

Guelders

House of Wassenberg

Otto II (1229–1271)
Reinoud I (1271–1318)
Reinoud II (1318–1343)
Reinoud III (1343–1361)
Edward (1361–1371)
Reinoud III (1371)

House of Jülich-Hengebach

William I (1371–1402)
Reinoud IV (1402–1423)

Hainault

John I (1246–1257)
John II (1257–1304)
William III (1304–1337)
William IV (1337–1345)
William V (1356–1389)
Albert (1389–1404)
William VI (1404–1417)

Holland

Floris IV (1222–1234)
William II (1234–1256)
Floris V (1256–1296)

John I (1296–1299)
 John II (1300–1304)
 William III (1304–1337)
 William IV (1337–1345)
 Margaret (1345–1356)
 William V (1356–1389)
 Albert (1389–1404)
 William VI (1404–1417)

Holy Roman Emperors

Richard of Cornwall (1257–1262)
 Alfonso X of Castile (1257–1284)
 Rudolf I of Hapsburg (1273–1291)
 Adolf of Nassau (1292–1298)
 Albert I of Habsburg (1298–1308)
 Henry VII of Luxemburg (1308–1313)
 Louis IV Wittelsbach (1314–1347)
 Frederick of Habsburg (1325–1330)
 Charles IV of Luxemburg (1347–1378)
 Günther of Schwarzburg (1347–1349)
 Wenzel of Luxemburg (1378–1400)
 Rupert of the Palatinate (1400–1410)
 Sigismund of Luxemburg (1410–1437)
 Jobst of Moravia (1410–1411)

Albert II (1438–1439)
 Frederick III (1440–1493)
 Maximilian I (1493–1513)

German Noble Houses

Hapsburg

Rudolf I (1273–1291)
 Albert I (1308–1308)
 Frederick I (1325–1330)
 Albert II (1330–1358)
 Albert III (1358–1395)
 Albert IV (1397–1404)

Albert V (1404–1439)

Ladislav (1440–1459)

Luxemburg

Henry VII (1308–1313)

John of Bohemia (1310–1346)

Charles IV (1346–1378)

Wenceslas of Bohemia (1378–1400)

Sigismund (1410–1437)

Spanish Rulers

Crown of Aragon

House of Barcelona

Alfonso II [Alfons I] (1163–1196)

Pedro II [Pere I] (1196–1213)

Jaime I [Jaume I] (1213–1276)

Pedro III [Pere II] (1276–1285)

Alfonso III [Alfons II] (1285–1291)

Jaime II [Jaume II] (1291–1327)

Alfonso IV [Alfons III] (1327–1336)

Pedro IV [Pere III] “the Ceremonious” (1336–1387)

Juan I [Joan I] (1387–1395)

Martin I [Martí I] (1395–1410)

Interregnum (1410–1412)

Trastámara Dynasty

Fernando I [Ferran I] (1412–1416)

Alfonso V [Alfons IV] (1416–1458)

Juan II [Joan II] (1458–1479)

Fernando II [Ferran II] “the Catholic” (1479–1516)

Married to Isabella I

Castile

Alfonso X “the Wise” (1252–1284)

Sancho IV (1284–1296)

Fernando IV (1296–1312)
 Alfonso XI (1312–1350)
 Pedro I “the Cruel” (1350–1369)
 Enrique II (1369–1379)
 Juan I (1379–1390)
 Enrique III (1390–1406)
 Juan II (1406–1454)
 Enrique IV (1454–1474)
 Isabella I “the Catholic” (1474–1516)
 Married to Fernando II

Navarre

Charles I (1322–1328)
 Joan II (1328–1349)
 Philip III (1328–1349)
 Charles II “the Bad” (1349–1387)
 Charles III (1387–1425)
 Blanche (1425–1441)
 Joan (1425–1479)

Muslim Rulers

Nasrid Dynasty of Granada

Muḥammad I (1232–1273)
 Muḥammad II (1273–1302)
 Muḥammad III (1302–1309)
 Naṣr (1309–1314)
 Ismā‘īl I (1314–25)
 Muḥammad IV (1325–1333)
 Yūsuf I (1333–1354)
 Muḥammad V (1354–1359; 1362–1391)
 Ismā‘īl II (1359–1360)
 Muḥammad VI (1360–1362)
 Yūsuf II (1391–1392)
 Muḥammad VII (1392–1408)
 Yūsuf III (1408–1417)
 Muḥammad VIII (1417–1419; 1427–1429)

Muḥammad IX (1419–1427; 1429–1445; 1447–1453)
 Yūsuf IV (1430–1432)
 Muḥammad X (1445–1448)
 Muḥammad XI (1448–1454)
 Yūsuf V (1445, 1450, 1462–1463)
 Saʿīd (1454–1464)
 Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī (1464–1485)
 Muḥammad XII (1482–1492)
 Muḥammad XIII (1485–1487)

Ottoman Turks

ʿOman I (1290–1326)
 Orkhân I (1326–1359)
 Murâd I (1359–1389)
 Bâyezîd I (1389–1402)
 Mehmed I (1402–1421)
 Murâd II (1421–1451)
 Mehmed II (1451–1481)

Byzantium

Michael VIII (1260–1282)
 Andronicus II (1282–1328)
 Michael IX (1295–1320)
 Andronicus III (1328–1341)
 John V (1341–1391)
 John VI (1347–1354)
 Andronicus IV (1376–1379)
 John VII (1390)
 Manuel II (1391–1425)
 John VIII (1425–1448)
 Constantine XIII (1448–1453)

APPENDIX TWO: BATTLES, CAMPAIGNS, TREATIES

- 1337 Jacob Van Artevelde's Uprising in Ghent and other cities
- 1339 First English Campaign: Invasion of France from the Low Countries
- 1340 Siege of Tournai
- 1340 Sluys (June 24) (naval engagement)
- 1341 Hennebont (naval engagement)
- 1345 English invasion of Gascony
- 1346 Edward III's *chevauchée* through Normandy (Summer)
Crécy (August 26)
Cortay (naval engagement)
Neville's Cross (October 17)
- 1346–47 Siege of Calais (August–August)
- 1347 Aiguillon (May)
Crotoy (naval engagement)
- 1350 Winchelsea (naval engagement)
- 1355 *Chevauchée* of the Black Prince through Armagnac and Languedoc
- 1356 Poitiers (Maupertuis) (September 19)
- 1357 Cadsand (November 10)

- 1359 Edward III's unsuccessful *chevauchée* through northern France
- 1360 TREATY OF BRÉTIGNY (May)
TREATY OF CALAIS (October)
- 1361 Brignais
- 1364 Cocherel (May)
Auray (September 27)
- 1366 Free Company invasion of Castile (Winter-Spring)
Montauban
- 1367 Black Prince's invasion of Castile (Winter-Spring)
Nájera (Navarette) (April 3)
- 1369 Montiel (March 13)
French attack on the Isle of Wight (naval engagement)
Burning of Portsmouth (naval engagement)
Lussac
- 1370 Siege and sack of Limoges
Pont Valain
- 1372 La Rochelle (June 22) (naval engagement)
Guernsey (naval engagement)
Duke of Lancaster's *chevauchée*
Chizai (July)
- 1379 Earl of Buckingham's *chevauchée*
- 1382 Beverhoutsveld (May 3)
Siege of Oudenaarde (November)
Roosebeke (Rosbecque; Westrozebeke) (November 27)
- 1385 Aljubarrota (August 14)
- 1387 Margate (March 24) (naval engagement)

- 1415 Siege of Harfleur (Autumn)
Agincourt (October 25)
- 1416 Seine Mouth (August 15) (naval engagement)
- 1418 Siege of Rouen (surrendered January 19)
- 1420 TREATY OF TROYES (May)
- 1421 Beaugé (March 22)
- 1423 Cravant (July 31)
- 1424 Verneuil (August 17)
- 1428–1429 Siege of Orléans (October–May)
- 1429 Herrings (Rouvray) (February 12)
Orléans (May 6–7)
Patay (June 18)
Siege of Paris
- 1430 Siege of Compiègne (May)
- 1436 French retake Paris
- 1450 Formigny (April 25)
Blancfort (November 1)
- 1453 Castillon (July 17)

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INDEX

- A toute la chevalerie de France* 366
 Abū Inan 88–89, 157 n. 23, 161, 161 n. 29
 Abū Sa‘ād 153, 163–64
 Abū Salim, Ismā‘īl, Marinid sultan (1359–1360) 163–65
 Abū Zayyan 165, 165 n. 42
adelantado 80
 Agramunt 307
albacar 105
albara 138
 Albarera 96
alcazar 169
aldeas 91
 aldermen 243, 245–46, 253, 256
 Aldgate 246, 255
 Aleyn, Stephen 249
 Alfons, count of Ribagorza and Denia 96, 98, 100
 Alfonso XI, Castilian king (1319–1350) 6
alforrats 101
alhama 124
 Alicante 76, 80–82, 83 n. 34, 84–85, 85 n. 42, 87, 87 n. 51, 92, 92 n. 77, 93–94, 99–100, 108
 Allmand, Christopher 186, 186 n. 37, 263 n. 1, 338, 338 n. 17, 339 n. 22, 346 n. 51, 347 n. 55, 349 n. 64, 365 n. 2, 376 n. 30
 Almoradí 96
 Amadeo VI, count of Savoy (1342–1385) 181
 Andalusia 151, 169–73
 Antwerp 212, 221, 228, 357
 Aquinas, Thomas 373, 375–76, 380, 382
 Aquitaine xxxi–xxxiv, xlii, 18, 23, 50, 53, 401, 422
 Arborea, judge of 81, 303
Arbre des batailles 377
Archivo de la Corona de Aragón 300
 Archivo Histórico de la Condal de Barcelona 315
 Argentan 425, 425 n. 92
 Armagnac xxx, xxxvii, xxxvii n. 32, xxxix–xl, xlvi–xlvii, 25 n. 96, 38, 45, 166, 263–95, 365–96, 424–25
 Arnau Joan 90 n. 65, 100–101
 Arnold of Rummen 214
arrière ban 323
 artillery
 bombard 203, 255 n. 63, 347, 430 n. 5, 431, 431 n. 8, 434, 435 n. 21, 439, 445
 coulov(e)rine 431–32, 441, 445
 engins 431, 431 n. 8
 hacquebuss 445
 veuglaire 431, 431 n. 8, 434, 435 n. 21, 440, 440 n. 36, 441, 443 n. 44
 Astor, Robert 199
atzembla 144
 Auberoche 401, 412
 Avignon Papacy xxvi, 10, 12
 Axworthy, Roger 254, 255 n. 61
 Azario, Pietro 180–96

 Baker, Geoffrey 264, 264 n. 2, 265 n. 6, 269 n. 13
 Balearics 94, 118, 118 n. 6, 129 n. 55, 136, 146
 Barberà 317
 Barberino 200
 Barbiano, Giovanni 192–93
barbuta 190
 Barcelona xlv–xlvii, 17, 20, 51, 75 n. 2, 77, 94, 101 n. 116, 126, 129 n. 54, 131, 132 n. 65, 133, 138 n. 91, 141 n. 106, 162, 168, 297–330
 clans
 Santcliment 316
 Sarrovira 316
 clans, Serra 316
 Basin, Thomas 418, 418 n. 72, 421, 421 n. 83, 422 n. 84, 438 n. 28, 440 n. 36
 Bassin, John 206
 Bassishaw 246
bastide 268
bastille 433
 battles
 Agincourt (1415) xxxix, xlii, xlviii, 6 n. 10, 36, 42 n. 151, 57, 336, 399–428

- Aljubarrota (1385) 14, 47 n. 169
 Auray (1364) xxxiii, 20, 55
 Baesweiler (1371) 234
 Bannockburn (1314) 6, 244
 Brignais (1361) xxxiii
 Castagnaro (1387) 191
 Castillon (1453) xliii, 434 n. 19,
 442, 442 n. 43
 Caturino (1363) 191, 193–94, 199
 Coutrai (1302) 5
 Crécy (1346) xxx–xxxii, 6, 13,
 13 n. 9, 36, 40, 57, 189, 191,
 224, 233, 268, 336, 399–401,
 403, 411 n. 45, 412, 412 n. 47,
 414, 423
 Dupplin Moor (1332) 184, 412
 Epila (1348) 122, 128 n. 49
 Halidon Hill (1333) 184, 257,
 412–13
 Kosovo (1389) 6
 la Roche Derrien (1347) 401, 413
 Lewes (1264) 244
 Nájera (1367) xxxiv, xliii, 3–74,
 96, 111, 111 n. 174, 112, 170,
 170 n. 66, 171, 301, 301 n. 14,
 399, 402 n. 7, 412, 412 n. 47,
 414 n. 53
 Neville's Cross (1346) 401, 401
 n. 4, 413
 Nicopolis (1396) 6
 Poitiers (1356) xxxii, 6, 11, 13, 13
 n. 39, 24, 36, 39–40, 57, 79, 183,
 189, 191, 257, 269, 291, 336,
 380, 399–401, 411 n. 45, 412,
 412 n. 47, 415 n. 54, 416,
 423–24
 Roosebeke (1382) xxxviii, 6
 San Mariano (1365) 204–205
 Sluys (1340) xxix, 222, 253, 401,
 435 n. 21
 Verneuil (1424) xl, 423, 425,
 425 n. 92
 Baumgarten, Hannekin 202–203
 Bayonne xlii, 24–25, 25 n. 98, 49,
 336 n. 10
 Beaufort 394
 Bedford xl, 244, 346, 381, 389, 423
 Behuchet, Nicolas 341, 341 n. 29
 Belmont, Andrew 184, 188, 199, 202,
 203 n. 110, 204
 Benedict XII, pope (1334–1342) 222
 Bennett, Matthew 399 n. 3, 408, 414
 Bergerac 401, 401 n. 4, 412
 Bernabò Visconti, lord of Milan
 (1378–1385) 179
 Bernard VII, count of Armagnac,
 constable of France 272, 272 n. 18,
 290
 Berruyer, Martin 368, 386–88,
 391–92
 Berry, duc de 271, 290, 290 n. 60,
 416
 Berry Herald 417 n. 68, 419 n. 77,
 421, 421 n. 83
 Berton, Thomas 199
 Beston, Thomas 206
 Biar 81, 108
 bin Laden, Osama 151, 151 n. 1,
 173
 Binche 221
 Black Death xxiii n. 1, xxx, 7, 7
 n. 13, 156, 159, 250, 285, 403
 Black Prince xxx, xxx n. 14, xxxii,
 xxxiv–xxxv, xxxvii, xxxix, xliii, 3, 13,
 13 n. 39, 15, 16 n. 52, 18, 20, 23,
 24 n. 91, 31, 33, 36, 47, 49, 51–52,
 56–57, 111, 169, 169 n. 56, 170,
 183, 221, 257, 263–66, 269, 273,
 281, 285, 288, 301, 307, 349 n. 64,
 350, 399, 401–402, 412, 414,
 414 n. 53, 415 n. 54
 Blanche of Castille, French Queen
 354
blats menors 98
 Boffa, Sergio xlv, 211
 Boil, Pere 90 n. 65, 97, 97 nn. 95,
 98
 Bomont (Beaumont), Thomas 184
 n. 26, 206–207
bonnes villes xlvi, 266, 283 n. 39, 293
 Bordalba 84
 Bordeaux xxx, xxxii, xxxvi, xlii, 19,
 25–26, 169, 263, 272–73, 461
 Borgelay, John 206–207
 Bosson, William 206
 Boudicea 338
 Bouillon 446
 Bourges xl
 Bouvet, Honoré 341–42, 367,
 367 n. 5, 377–78
 Brabant xxviii, xlv, 211–40, 243,
 248
 Bradbury, Jim 192 n. 63, 347
 n. 55, 348 n. 58, 349, 349 n. 65,
 350 n. 68, 352 n. 80, 353 n. 83,
 357 n. 100

- Brice, John 203 n. 110, 204, 204 n. 117
- Brittany xxix, xxxiii, xxxvi, xliii, 5 n. 6, 20, 26, 42, 51, 222, 243, 267, 342
- Bruges xxviii, xxxviii, xlv, 212, 228, 435 n. 21
- Brussels 216, 221, 223, 228–30, 230 n. 111, 231, 233, 443
- The Brut* 436, 436 n. 24, 437
- Buckingham, earl of xxxv
- Buironfosse 226
- Burgos 21–22, 26, 30, 32–33, 38, 168
- Burgundy xxxii, xxxvii n. 32, xxxviii–xli, xlvi, 12, 235–37, 267, 271–72, 342, 411 n. 44, 424, 430, 430 n. 5, 434, 435 n. 21, 443–44
- Burne, Alfred H. 399 n. 3, 404 n. 14, 405 n. 17, 406 n. 25, 407, 407 n. 28, 408, 419 n. 77, 442 n. 43
- Bussot, Pere 304 n. 5, 312–13
- Buzet 271, 286
- Cabdet 92
- Cádiz 76–77
- Caen 348 n. 58, 349–51
- Caferro, William xxxiv n. 24, xlv, 12 n. 35, 51 n. 184, 180 n. 5, 270 n. 16, 464 n. 60
- Calaforra 95, 100 n. 111
- Calais xxv, xxv n. 2, xxxi–xxxii, xxxvi, xxxix, xlvi, 12, 233, 243, 245, 251, 254, 346, 352–53, 384, 400, 401, 403–404, 405 n. 17, 407, 409, 414–15, 417, 417 n. 68, 418 nn. 73–74, 419, 419 nn. 76–77, 421–22, 430, 434–35, 437
- Calatayud 9, 22, 126, 128 n. 48
- Calatrava 46, 70, 77, 80, 99
- Callosa de Segura 91
- Calpe 94
- Calveley, Hugh 20, 20 n. 72, 21, 21 n. 73, 23, 26–27, 29–31, 38, 45–46, 51, 51 nn. 183–84, 52, 58, 64, 66, 166, 303 n. 21
- Cambresis 221
- Cánoves 316, 324
- Capet, Hugh, French king (987–996) xxv–xxvi
- Capetians xxv–xxvi, 323
- Carcassonne 264, 277
- Castel, Robin 199
- Castelló d'Empúries 317
- Castile xxiii, xxxiv, xliii–xliv, 3–74, 75–116, 117, 120, 122, 126, 135 n. 76, 141 n. 106, 142, 144, 145 n. 122, 148, 151–75, 302, 307, 402
- Castro de Urdiales 25
- Catral 96
- Caturino 191, 193–94, 199
- Cauchon, Pierre 384
- Cervera 302 n. 18, 305, 307–15, 318–19, 322, 326
- Ceuta 156 n. 15, 163–64
- Chandos herald 4 n. 3, 14, 14 n. 41, 15–16, 18–19, 21 n. 77, 23, 27, 27 n. 109, 28 n. 113, 31 n. 122, 33 n. 129, 34, 38 n. 139, 39 n. 145, 40, 42 n. 154, 43–46, 48 n. 174, 54 n. 186, 56, 58, 62
- Chandos, John xxxiii, xxxv, 20, 24–25, 25 n. 98, 31, 38–39, 42, 49, 58, 64, 66
- Charles II “the Bad,” Navarrese king (1349–1387) 24, 79, 166
- Charles IV, French king (1322–1328) xxvi, 400–401
- Charles V “the Wise”, French king (1364–1380) xxxi, xxxiii–xxxvi, 5 n. 6, 11, 19–20, 30, 54–55, 168, 232–34, 271, 302, 307, 379, 401–402
- Charles VII, French king (1422–1461) xxv, xxxix–xlii, 267, 272, 272 n. 18, 273, 288, 291–92, 358, 368, 380, 384, 386, 430, 443
- Charles VIII, French king (1483–1498) 446
- Charles of Blois xxix, xxxiii
- Charles of Bourbon, duke 78
- Charles of Valois xxvi–xxvii
- Chastellain, Georges 439, 439 n. 34, 440 n. 36, 442 n. 42, 443, 443 n. 44, 445 n. 51
- chevauchée* xxix–xxxi, xxxv, xlvi, 40, 112, 234, 263, 263 n. 1, 266, 268, 284, 289, 293, 336, 342, 344, 344 n. 42, 401, 408, 413, 419
- Chinon xl, 380, 385
- Chronicle of Charles VI* 366
- Chronique de Mont-Saint-Michel* 346
- Clarence, duke of 18, 351, 416 n. 59
- clavaria* 300, 312
- Clements, John xlix
- Clifford, John 191

- Coblentz 220
 Cognasso, Francesco 182, 182 n. 15, 206
 Cologne 212
compagnie di ventura 179
compagnies d'ordonnance xlii
 Compiègne xli, 217, 384, 430–34, 446
comptes 431
 Conan Doyle, Arthur 179–80, 187
condotieri xlv
 Conesa, Jaume
 Conflent 310, 313 n. 49
 Congress of Arras xli
Consell de cent 311
 Constantinople 442, 442 n. 43
contestatio 128
 Corbarieu 271, 286
 Córdoba 171–72
 Cornellà 309
 Cornwall 341
cortes 119, 121, 125, 159, 300 n. 10
corts 17, 87, 100, 102, 117–50, 298–300, 302–306, 306 n. 30, 308, 311, 311 n. 44, 317, 318 n. 65, 320 nn. 70–71, 321, 321 n. 73, 322
cosa pública 86
costum d'Espanya 114
courtaux 445
 Crevillente 80, 93, 95, 95 n. 86, 97, 97 n. 98, 99, 100 n. 111, 102, 104–106
 Crown of Aragon xliii–xliv, 6, 6 n. 11, 75–116, 117, 120–22, 124–25, 127 n. 46, 133 n. 71, 134–35, 137 n. 84, 141 n. 106, 146, 155, 307, 317, 319
 Cutxo, J. 314
 Cyprus 198

dauphin xxxi, xxxi n. 17, xxxix–xl, xlii, 272 n. 18, 290–91, 339, 358, 359 n. 110, 380–81, 385, 399, 402–403, 407 n. 28, 419, 443
 Dax 19, 25
 Denia, count of 21, 35, 37–38, 41, 43, 45–46, 47 n. 169, 60–61, 63, 65, 81, 96, 96 n. 92, 97, 97 n. 98
 d'Abella, Berenguer 100
 d'Auvergne, Martial 360
 d'Orleans, Louis 271
 de Alicante, Portitxol 91
 de Bedford, John 245, 248, 248 n. 29, 251, 259
 de Beuil, Jean 406
 de Bourbon, Blanche 10, 159
 de Cabrera, Bernat 107, 123, 128, 141, 301 n. 13
 de Centelles, Pere 98
 de Cerisy, Jean 440
 de Clisson, Olivier xxxv, 42, 55, 64, 66
 de Codinacs, Berenguer 95 n. 86, 100
 de Commynes, Philippe 444, 444 n. 48
 de Dunstable, Nicholas 249
 de Flavy, Guillaume 431, 433
 de Grailly, Jean (captal de Buch) xxxvi
 de Guzmán, Leonor 7, 158
 de la Carra, Martin 28, 38, 43, 58, 66
 de la Marche, count xxxiii
 de Lalaing, Jacques 440, 440 n. 36
 de Lara, Juana 93
 de Loaysa, García Jofre, lord of Petrer 89, 92
 de Loriz, Garcia 77, 81 n. 24, 91, 97 n. 98
 de Mauny, Olivier 270, 353 n. 83
 de Mauny, Walter 183
 de Mezieres, Philippe 345
 de Monstrelet, Enguerrand 338, 351 n. 72, 354, 357
 de Montgeron, Hugh, prior of Brailet 343 n. 40, 344
 de Montreuil, Jean 365–66
 de Mordone, William 247
 de Padilla, María 10, 159
 de Pizan, Christine 339, 339 n. 20, 354, 354 n. 91 367, 378, 382–83, 391
 de Pulteneye, John 254
De quadam puella 390, 392
 de Sancliment, Pere 312, 324
 de Venette, Jean 337 n. 15, 338, 342, 349, 352
 de Villandrando, Rodrigo 272
 de Villette, Philippe 367, 379, 382
 de Vonico, Peglio 198
 de Waurin, Jean 431 n. 8, 433–34, 439 n. 31
 de Xèrica, Pere 81, 90 n. 65, 95, 97, 103
 della Zouche, Hugh Mortimer 199, 202–203
 DePauw, Linda 339

- Deventer 442–44
 Devenysh, Robert 250
 DeVries, Kelly xxiii n. 1, xxiv,
 xxiv n. 1, xlviii, 347 n. 56, 429
 n. 4, 435 n. 21, 438 n. 29,
 439 n. 31, 440 n. 36, 442 n. 43,
 445 n. 50, 446 n. 52
Diputació del General 136, 147
disinherison xxvi
Ditié de Jehanne d'Arc 383, 383 n. 49,
 384, 391 n. 72
 Domrémy xl, 345, 380
 Dover 341
 DuGuesclin, Bertrand xxxiii–xxxvi,
 xliii, 35, 60, 69–70
 du Pin, Guiyot 184
 du Pin, Robin 184, 206
- Edmund, count of Cambridge 232
 Edward I, English king (1272–1307)
 218, 244, 252
 Edward II, English king (1307–1327)
 xxvii, 243–44
 Edward III, English king (1327–1377)
 xxv n. 2, xxvii–xxxii, xxxv, xxxvii,
 xxxix, xlv–xlvi, 3, 11, 15, 18, 25,
 169 n. 56, 182, 194, 211, 216, 218,
 220, 234, 236–37, 243–61, 267, 302,
 343 n. 40, 345 n. 48, 346, 352,
 356, 356 n. 97, 399–401, 403,
 408–409, 411 n. 45, 412, 414, 418
 n. 73, 420
 Elche 76, 89, 91, 93, 95–97, 99–102,
 104–105, 108
 Eleanor of Aquitaine 338
 Elionor, Aragonese queen 81 n. 24,
 85 n. 42, 90 n. 66, 93–96, 99, 102,
 104, 106
 Elshtain, Jean 334, 334 nn. 2–3
empresiones 119
 Enríquez, Fernando 92
 Enrique II, Castilian king (1369–1379)
 xxxiv, xxxvi, 4, 17, 50, 54, 60,
 62–63, 112, 301, 302 n. 16
 Enrique III, Castilian king (1390–1407)
 14
Epitoma rei militaris 371, 371 n. 12
 Ermengol, Pere 306 n. 30, 309, 309
 n. 40, 316
escourcherie 272
Estates General xxvi, xxxi, xlii, 11
estimes 138
 Estow, Clara xxxiv n. 25, xlv, 4 n. 4,
 9 n. 21, 15 nn. 47, 49, 160 n. 25
- Étampes, count of 440
 Evreux, count of 215
Exodus 370
- Fadrique, master of Santiago 87
 Farnese, Piero 198
 Fauquemont, lord of 216, 216 n. 19
 Favarella 91
 Felton, Thomas 28, 58, 66
 Fernandez de Gaona, Ruy 47
 Ferran, prince 75–116, 128,
 128 n. 49, 129 n. 54, 141
 Ferrellón 88
 Ferrer i Mallol, Maria Teresa xliii,
 75 n. 3, 76 n. 4, 83 n. 34,
 121 n. 17, 128 n. 51, 141 n. 106,
 161 n. 28
 Fez 155–56, 156 n. 15, 157, 160–61,
 161 nn. 28–30, 164–65, 165 n. 42,
 171 n. 69, 173
 Figueres 306
 Fivaller, Jaume 312
 Florence xlv, 186, 190, 192, 198,
 200–202, 333
 Foix xlv, 18, 79 n. 17, 269–73, 275,
 277, 289–91, 303 n. 21
 Folkestone 341
 Fowler, Kenneth 12 n. 35, 110
 n. 169, 125 n. 34, 141 n. 106,
 155 n. 14, 180 n. 6, 183 n. 21,
 184 n. 22, 186 n. 33, 270 n. 16,
 303 n. 21, 336, 336 n. 10, 339
 n. 22
franc archiers xlii
 Francis I, French king (1515–1547)
 273, 287 n. 55, 288, 292
 free companies xxxiii, xlii–xliii, xlv,
 11–12, 12 n. 35, 13, 17, 19–23, 25,
 51, 51 n. 184, 52, 69, 269, 271–72,
 281, 284, 289, 301–302, 307–308,
 310–11, 313, 313 n. 49, 314, 319
 Froissart, Jean 12–32, 36, 44,
 44 n. 159, 46, 48 nn. 172, 174, 50
 nn. 179, 181, 56, 62, 66, 69, 221
 n. 57, 264, 264 n. 3, 265, 265 n. 7,
 268 n. 10, 269, 269 n. 14, 279, 338,
 342 n. 34, 343 nn. 39–40, 344,
 344 n. 45, 345 n. 48, 346 n. 50,
 349 n. 64, 350, 356, 356 n. 97, 357
 n. 98, 447, 447 n. 1, 460–61
 Frontinus 197
 Further Jijona 76, 79–80, 83,
 84 n. 39, 89, 91, 93, 96, 98–99,
 102–103, 107–108, 110

- Galindo, Pere 94, 94 n. 82
 gambeson 460
 García de Padilla, Diego 80
 Gascony xxx, xxxii, xlii, 53, 169
 n. 56, 243, 249, 259, 273, 311
 Gaston III Phoebus, count of Foix
 18, 79, 268, 270–71
 Gaupp, Fritz 180 n. 6, 184 n. 24,
 189, 189 n. 47, 191
 Gavere 439, 440, 441 n. 38, 446
 Gelli, Jacopo 454
Generalitat 95 n. 86, 96, 104, 136
Genesis 374–75
 Genoa 16, 76, 76 n. 5, 120, 122,
 208
 Gerona 138 n. 91, 317
 Ghent xxviii, xxix, xxxviii, xlv, 357,
 430, 438–40, 442, 444
 Gibraltar 7, 7 n. 15, 156, 156 nn.
 15–17, 157, 170, 173
 Gibraltar, Straits of 122, 155–56,
 156 n. 15
 Gilbert, James xlvii
 Glyn Dwr 406, 413
 Godfrey of Harcourt, lord of
 Sainte-Sauveur-le-Vicomte 223
 Gombau, B. 314
 Granada xlv, 3 n. 2, 9, 9 n. 21, 21,
 50, 88, 88 n. 56, 89, 91, 105, 122,
 125, 151–75
 Gratian 373
 Great Schism xxxvii n. 32, 18, 399
 Grosmont 412–13
 Gruffydd 413, 413 n. 50
 Guadix 162, 165
 Gualbes 316
 Guardamar 90, 91, 93–94, 96,
 104–105, 130 n. 58
 Guelders xxviii, 212, 218–19, 225,
 226 n. 84, 234, 237, 443
 Guernsey 341
guiatge 87, 87 n. 48
 Guienne 20, 263, 286, 421
 Guildhall 245, 255–56
- Hainault xxviii, xlv, 15, 18, 212, 216,
 219
 Hale, J.R. 347–48, 348 n. 60,
 429 n. 3
 Hamond, John 246
 Harfleur xxxix, xlvi, 400, 402–404,
 406–407, 407 n. 28, 409, 411, 417,
 418 nn. 74–75, 419, 419 n. 76, 421,
 424–25, 427
 Haunsard, William 253
 Hauteyn, William 245
 Hawkwood, John xlv, 51 n. 184, 184,
 191–92, 197, 199, 201–202,
 204–206, 250
 Hébert, M. 319, 319 n. 68
 Hebron, Malcolm 348 n. 61, 349,
 349 n. 65
 Hennebont 356
 Henneman, John xxxiv n. 27, 18
 n. 60, 42 n. 153, 55–56, 302 n. 17
 Henry III, English king (1216–1272)
 244
 Henry IV, English king (1399–1413)
 xxxviii, 402
 Henry V, English king (1413–1422)
 xxxviii, xxxix–xl, xlvi, 346 n. 51,
 350–53, 399–428
 Henry VI, English king (1422–1461,
 1471) xxxix–xl, xlii, 346, 418 n. 72
herba de ballestes 79
 Herebert, William 464
 Hergsel, Gustav 454, 454 n. 27
hermandades 119
 Heton, David 183
 Heton, Hugh 183, 206
 Holland xxviii, 212, 216, 219, 435
 n. 21
 Holy Roman Emperor xxviii, 213–14,
 220, 232, 235
honor 92
 Hopkinson, E.C. 462, 462 n. 52
 Horta 317
host 298
 Huntingdon 425
- Ibn al-Khatib 151 n. 3, 161 n. 29,
 172 n. 74
 Ibn Khaldun 151 n. 3, 155 n. 12,
 161 n. 29
 Ile-de-France 213
 Innocent VI, pope (1352–1362) 12,
 88, 179
 Isle of Wight 341, 341 n. 29
 Ismā'īl II, Granada emir (1359–1360)
 153, 162–63
Iwein 456, 456 n. 36
- Jacqueline, duchess of Bavaria 357
Jacquerie xxxi, 11

- Jaén 171, 171 n. 69
 Jativa 118, 118 n. 6, 129 n. 54
 Jaume I "the Conqueror," Aragonese king (1213–1276) 17, 118, 120, 128, 130 n. 56
 Jaume II, Aragonese king (1292–1327) 82 n. 25, 84 n. 39, 93 n. 80, 120–21
 Jean of Luxembourg 432–34
 Jean I, count of Armagnac (1330–1384) 263, 270
 Jean II, French king (1350–1364) xxxi, xxxii, 78, 401, 412, 412 n. 47
 Jean III, French king (1312–1355) 213 n. 9, 215 n. 16
 Jean V, count of Harcourt 182
 Joan, duchess of Brabant (1356–1406) 215, 230, 231 n. 115, 232, 234, 237
 Joan I, queen of Naples (1343–1382) 203, 203 n. 113
 Joan of Arc xl, xlvii, 339, 345, 355 n. 94, 358, 361, 365–96, 430–34
 Joan, wife of Thomas Botetourt 356
 John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster xxxvi, 26, 66
 John of Monfort xxix
 John of Saint-Amand 233
 John of York 250
 John the Blind, duke of Luxemburg (1313–1337) 232
 John the Fearless, Burgundian king (1404–1419) xxxvii, xxxix, 272 n. 18, 412, 424, 430 n. 5
 John XXII, pope (1316–1334) 184
Joyeuse Entrée 231, 231 n. 115
 Juan I, Castilian king (1379–1390) 14, 47 n. 169
 Jülich, marquis of 219
 Jumilla 80, 82–83, 86–88
 just war xlvii–xlviii, 365–96
 Juvenal des Ursins, Jean 365, 409 n. 38, 415 n. 56, 416 n. 61, 417, 418 n. 71, 425 n. 96
 Kagay, Donald xxxiv n. 24, xlv, 75 n. 1, 121 n. 17, 126 n. 41, 127 n. 46, 133 n. 71, 302 n. 13, 340 n. 24, 347 n. 56, 457 n. 39
 Kal, Paulus 449
 Keegan, John 6 n. 10, 42 n. 151, 335 n. 5, 399 n. 3, 405 n. 17, 406 n. 24, 407–408
 Keen, Maurice 339 n. 22, 429, 429 n. 2
 Kent 254–55, 341
 Kirkeby, John 183
 Knighton, Henry 182
 Knowles, Robin 183–84
 Konieczny, Peter xlv
Kronyk van Vlaenderen 441
 La Coruña 23
 La Guardia 31
 La Rochelle xxxvi, 54, 69
 la Touroulde, Marguerite 368, 385
 Languedoc xxx, xlvi, 12, 263, 268, 271, 273, 276, 286, 289–90, 292, 342
 Lanzo 194–95
 Las Huelgas 22, 168
 Launac 270
 Laurent, H. 222 n. 63, 225, 225 n. 83, 230 n. 109
 Le Bel, Jean 220 n. 47, 221 n. 57, 338, 352, 356
 le Botiller, Godfrey 249
Le livre des trahisons 430 n. 5, 433–34, 440 n. 36
 Le Mans 368, 386
 le Palmer, Grace 251
Le songe du vieil pelerin 377
 Leckuechner, Hans 449
 Legnano, Giovanni 373–78, 382–83, 388, 392
 Leslie, Walter 183
 Letainturier-Fadin, Gabriel 454
 Lewis, P.S. 365 n. 2, 366, 368, 369 n. 6
 Liechtenauer, Johannes 449, 449 n. 4, 451, 451 n. 16, 454, 454 n. 28
 Liège 212, 216, 219
 Lille 439
 Limburg 217, 232
 Limoges 56, 349 n. 64, 350–51
Livre de la Cité des Dames 339
 Logroño 26, 28, 28 n. 112, 29–32, 32 n. 123, 37, 40
 Lombardy 180, 182, 186, 193, 197–98, 200, 209, 214
 London xlv–xlvi, 11 n. 33, 241–61, 302, 356
 wards
 Bridge 252

- Cheap 245
 Cordwainer 245
 Walbrook 246, 252
 London Bridge 247
 Looz 212
 Lopez de Ayala, Pedro 4 n. 4, 14,
 14 n. 42, 37, 62, 65
 Lopez de Orozco, Iñigo 48, 62, 64
 Lorraine xxviii, 380
 Los Fayos 84
 Louis IV, French king (1314–1347)
 214, 220, 223
 Louis IX, French king (1226–1270)
 354
 Louis X, French king (1314–1316)
 xxvi, 215
 Louis XI, French king (1461–1483)
 xlii, 274, 444
 Louis of Anjou xxxii
 Louis of Male, count of Flanders
 (1346–1384) xxxviii, 224, 230–31,
 234
 Louis of Nevers, count of Flanders
 (1322–1346) xxviii, 223,
 223 n. 66
 Louvain 216, 221, 228–30, 231
 n. 111, 233
 Louvre 224 n. 75, 432
 Lucas, H.S. 211, 216 n. 19, 218
 n. 31, 236 n. 140
 Lucca 201
 Luna, counts of 86–87
- Maça, Pero 82, 86–87, 92, 92 n. 73
 Machiavelli, Niccolò xlv, 182, 197
 Magallón 83
 Majorca 16–17, 38, 45, 129 nn.
 54–55, 300, 412 n. 47
 Maleseurs, William 245, 252
 Malines 212, 224, 228, 230,
 236
 Mallett, Michael 180 n. 6, 189, 191,
 204 n. 120
Mallotins xxxvii
 Manosque 320
 Manuel, Luis 99
 Marc, Jaume 78
 Marcel, Etienne xxxi, 11
 Marchena 173
 Margaret, widow of earl Kent 356
 Marguerite 215, 221, 223–24
 Marguerite of Brabant 224
 Maria of Portugal, Castilian queen 7
 Marie, widow of earl of Pembroke
 356
- Marinids 155, 155 n. 12, 156 nn.
 15, 17, 157, 157 n. 23, 161, 164,
 166 n. 46, 170 n. 59, 173
 Marseilles 348
 Martí, Aragonese crown prince 102,
 105
 Martorelles 317
maurofilia 169, 171
 McLaughlin, Megan 340, 355, 361
 Meuse 212
 Milan 18, 179, 194–96, 202, 373
 military equipment
atzagaya 143
bacinet 143, 187, 253, 305, 326
camisol 143
cuyrase 143
darga de scut 143
hacqueton 253
jubet 305
loriga 143
 maille 460–61, 461 n. 48, 468
perpunt 143
 military formations
lancia 189
schiltrom 190
 Military Revolution xlix, 266, 291,
 429
 Miranda 26
 Molina 21, 96–97
 Monovar 80, 84
 Montblanch 317
 Monte, Pietro 449, 458
 Montereau, bridge of xxxix
 Montferrat 179, 181–83, 187, 193–94,
 196, 206, 208
 Montfort, countess of 356–58
 Montiel 50, 112, 172
 Moquita 96
 Morelli, Pagolo 184, 198
 Morocco 88–89, 157 n. 23, 163
 n. 35, 165 n. 42, 170
mostres 138
 Mugello 201
 Muhammad V, Granada emir
 (1354–1359; 1362–1391) xlv, 9,
 89, 91 n. 71, 106, 125, 151–75
 Muhammad VI, Granada emir
 (1360–1362) 125, 153, 163
- Namur 212
 Naples xxviii
 Narbonne 25 n. 98, 264, 287
 Navarette 5, 28, 33, 38
 Navarre xxxiii, 3, 3 n. 2, 9, 24,
 26, 28–29, 31–32, 38, 120, 122,

- 133 n. 68, 154 n. 10, 155, 172,
287, 344 n. 45
- Neuss 445, 445 n. 50
- Newhall, R.A. 337 n. 15, 406
n. 25, 27, 408 n. 36, 411 n. 44,
419 n. 76, 423, 426, 426 nn. 99,
101
- Nino, Pero 457
- Noguera Pallaresca 307
- Normandy xxv, xxx, xxxiii, xxxix,
xlii–xliii, 51, 183, 224, 248, 256,
337 n. 15, 343 n. 39, 344 n. 45,
384, 399, 402, 406, 409–10,
422–24, 427
- Norwich Crusade of 1383 xxxviii
- Núñez, Alvar 92
- Oakeshott, Ewart 462
- officials
- capitoul* 268–69, 271–72, 275–77,
281, 283–86, 288, 290, 290 n. 60,
292, 294
 - centainer* 246
 - cullidor* 137
 - distribuydor* 137
 - escrivà de ració* 306
 - mestre racional* 124
 - oidors* 137
 - reebedor* 137
 - veguer* 305
 - vintainer* 246
- Oman, Charles xxiii n. 1, xxvii n. 10,
47 n. 169, 453–54
- orden de la banda* 37
- ordinació de les armes* 320
- Orihuela 63, 76, 80, 83, 83 n. 34,
90–91, 92 n. 77, 93, 95–102,
104–105, 107, 109, 113 n. 183
- Orléans xl, 380–81, 381 n. 42, 382
n. 44, 383–85, 391, 421
- Orvieto 203
- Osuna 173
- Paer, Heinrich 200
- Page, John 353
- Paleologo, John 179
- Palestine 151
- Pallars 302, 307, 313, 315 n. 58,
326
- Pamplona 27–28, 30
- Paradoxes of Defence* 452
- Paris xxxi, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxix,
xli–xlii, 11, 54, 217, 272 n. 18,
291, 411, 417, 420, 425, 430,
432
- parlement* 276–77, 279, 291
- Pavia 196
- Pearl Harbor 334, 334 n. 3
- Peasant's Revolt xxxvii, xxxvii n. 30
- Pedro I "the Cruel," Castilian king
(1350–1369) xxxiv, 4, 4 n. 5, 7,
9, 9 n. 21, 15, 15 n. 47, 16, 24
n. 91, 58, 64, 66, 75, 122–23, 125,
128 n. 49, 132, 134, 145, 153, 157,
157 n. 23, 301, 307
- Pere II, Aragonese king (1276–1285)
120–21, 130 n. 56
- Pere III "the Ceremonius," Aragonese
king (1336–1387) xxxiv, xlv, 9, 9
n. 25, 10, 10 n. 29, 14, 16, 19,
47, 75–116, 121–22, 122 n. 20, 123
n. 25, 124, 126 n. 40, 133 n. 68,
160, 160 n. 26, 299, 301, 321 n. 73,
322–23, 457 n. 39
- Pérez de Guzmán, Alvar 92
- Perpignan 77, 88 n. 56, 126, 129
n. 54, 131, 138 n. 91, 292, 292
n. 63, 304 n. 25
- Perugia 188, 203–204
- Petrarca, Francesco 181
- Peveler, John 249
- Pforte, Eysern 455
- Philip IV "the Fair," French king
(1285–1314) xxvi
- Philip V, French king (1316–1322)
xxvi
- Philip VI, French king (1328–1350)
xxvii, xxx, xxxi n. 17, 216, 225,
235–36, 267, 281, 352, 401
- Philip "the Bold," Burgundian duke
(1364–1404) xxxii, xxxvii, 234,
237
- Philip "the Good," Burgundian duke
(1419–1467) xxxix, xlvi, 429–46
- Philippa, Castilian queen 15, 18,
356
- Pian di Ripoli 200
- Piedmont 179–80, 198
- Pinzino, Jane Marie xxiv n. 1, xlvii
- Plantagenets xxv
- Poblet 17
- Poeke 439–40, 440 n. 36, 446
- Poitou xxxii, xxxvi, 59, 344
- Ponthieu 13 n. 39, 401, 421
- Portsmouth 341–42
- praepositio* 127
- Princeps namque* xlvi, xlvii, 121,
121 n. 17, 132, 133 n. 68,
297–330
- Pucci, Antonio 197

- Pyrenees xxiii, xxxiv, xliii–xliv, 3, 6,
 10, 13, 19, 24, 26–27, 36–37,
 50–51, 53–54, 57, 66, 110, 120,
 126, 133 n. 68, 156, 274, 288
 n. 55, 294, 302, 322
- Quicke, F. 225, 230 n. 109
- Rabastan 271
- Rabelais, François 117–18
- Ramon Berenguer, count of Ampurias
 77–78, 81, 82 n. 25
- raval* 96
- regalia* 298
- Renaud 218
- Rheims xl, xli, 13, 232, 430
- Rhineland 212
- Rhodes 198
- Ribagorza 63, 96, 96 n. 92, 126
- Richard II, English king (1377–1399)
 18, 25, 345, 388, 396, 402
- Richard III, English king
 (1483–1485) 7
- Ricotti, Ercole 181
- Ringeck, Sigmund 449, 449 n. 4,
 451, 454 n. 28
- Rivarolo 195, 206
- rivers
- Araquil 26, 28–30
- Ariège 264–65
- Aveyron 268
- Ebro 28, 28 n. 112, 29–30, 32
- Garonne 263–65, 268, 271, 274,
 288
- Guadalquivir 77
- Loire xxxix, xl, 183, 430
- Najarilla 5, 33 n. 129, 37, 46
- Oise 432
- Rhone 303
- Rupel 212
- Scheldt 212, 227
- Somme 6 n. 10, 345 n. 48, 420,
 430 n. 5
- Robert III, count of Artois
 (1329–1342) 216
- Roger Bernat III, vicount of Castellbó
 79
- Rogers, Clifford xxiv n. 1, xlvi,
 41 n. 150, 169 n. 56, 184 n. 26,
 263 n. 1, 408 n. 35, 414 n. 53,
 418 n. 73, 419 n. 77, 429 n. 2,
 447 n. 2
- Romagnano 186, 193
- Roncesvalles 24, 66
- Rouen xxxvii, xli, 352–54, 384–85,
 402, 404, 411, 411 n. 44, 417, 433
- Roussillon 82 n. 25, 133 n. 68, 274,
 277, 301, 308 n. 35, 310
- routiers* xlvii, 12, 13, 128, 270–71,
 285–86, 288–89, 401
- Ruskin, John 179–80, 187
- Russel, Walter 249
- Sahla 170
- Saint Augustine 370–74, 380, 386,
 386 n. 60
- St. Crispin's day 400, 411, 424, 426
- St. Denis 406, 420
- Saint-Germain-en-Laye 223
- St. Jerome 360, 375
- Saint Marguerite xl
- Saleman, Andrew 251
- Salic Law xxvi, 367–69, 378, 387
- Salvatierra 28
- San Esteban del Puerto 40
- Sánchez Martínez, Manuel xlvi–xlvii,
 101 n. 116, 273 n. 20, 299 n. 9
- Sancho, Castilian prince 155
- Sant Fost 317
- Santa Fe 317
- Santcliment, Gilibert 312
- Santo Domingo de la Calzada 26, 28
- Sardinia 17, 75 n. 2, 81, 120, 303
- Sarrovira, Marc 312
- Schendelbeke 439, 446
- Scot, Adam 183, 206–207
- Scot, Robert 183
- Scot, William 183
- Sercambi, Giovanni 201
- Seville 22–23, 49, 63, 93, 168–71
- Seward, Desmond xxiii n. 1,
 336 n. 8, 349, 352 n. 80, 353
- ships
- Christopher* 253
- galiota* 93
- Nadeau* 253
- Portsoken* 246
- Silver, George 452, 455
- Soissonnais 221
- soldiers, types of
- almogavers* 92
- armat de cors ab cuyraçes, gojral,*
 capellina, mànague o braçals 308
- cliens* 304
- crossbowmen 38, 38 n. 139, 41,
 43, 95 n. 86, 141 n. 106, 192–93,
 244, 286, 304, 308, 316–17, 318
 n. 65, 321–22

- empavesats* 304, 325
espatleres 305
gimete 4, 37, 42
hobelar 247, 247 n. 18, 249, 254, 259
hom armat de cap a peus ab cavayl, roci o mul alforrat 308
hom armat de cors e de cavall 308
hòmen d'armes 308
hòmen de paratge 309
hòmens de vila 309
pillars 345, 390
serviens 304
 Solon, Paul xlvii, 337 n. 13
 Solsona 317
 Soper, Tony 453
 Sot 84
 Southampton 25
 Springhouse, Edmund 349
 Sterz, Albert 183, 186, 193, 199, 201–204, 206
 Stolpe, Sven 359, 359 n. 110, 360
 Strayer, Joseph R. 323 n. 76, 390
 Sumption, Jonathan xxiii n. 1, 183 n. 20, 199, 401 n. 4
 Swanlond, Thomas 249
 sword maneuvers
 buffel 454
 pavis 465
 ponta 458
 posta longa 459
 stezchild 465
 stoccata vel puncta 458
 Talhoffer, Hans 449, 449 n. 8
 Tany, John 250
 Tarazona 21 n. 77, 84, 88, 96, 106, 129, 129 n. 54, 130 n. 58
 Tarn 268
 Tarragona 129 n. 54, 320 n. 70, 321
taula del acordament 312
taula dels servents 312
 tax
 appatis 270, 272, 289
 ayuda 125
 bovatge 119
 fogatge xlvii, 102 n. 123, 124, 131, 134, 146, 299, 299 n. 8, 305, 306, 322
 fouage xxxiv, xxxiv n. 27, 125 n. 34
 monedaje 119
 paria 154 n. 9, 163, 163 n. 33
 taille xlii
 Tello, Castilian prince 30, 35, 37–38, 42–43, 60, 62, 69–70, 93
 Templars xxiii n. 1, xxvi, xxvi n. 8, 188
 Terrassa 317
 Terre 316
 Théroouanne 442–43
 Thomas of Beauchamp 233
 Tlemcen 152 n. 3, 166 n. 46, 170
 Todí 203
 Torroja 317
 Tortona 196
Toulousain xxx, xlvi, 265, 270–73, 286, 289
 Toulouse xlv–xlvi, 263–95
 Tournai xxix, 222, 227–30, 237
 Tower of London 249, 253, 255–56
trace italienne 294, 294 n. 65, 429, 429 n. 3
Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello 373
 Tramecourt 400
 treaty
 Brétigny (1360) xxxi, xxxiii, xxxv–xxxvi, xxxix, xliii, 5 n. 6, 11–12, 54, 110, 110 n. 169, 179, 188, 237, 267, 270, 401–402, 412
 Esplechin (1341) 222
 Monzón (1362) 10
 Saint-Quentin (1347) 224, 230
 Terrer (1357) 106
 Torrellas (1304) 84, 84 n. 39
 Troyes (1422) xxxix, 422
 Tremp 307, 307 nn. 33, 35, 314, 319, 326
 Turin 195
 Turk, John 252
 Turk, Ralph 252
 Turner, Craig 453
 Ubeda 171, 171 n. 69
 Uccello, Paolo 205
Unión 81, 81 nn. 22, 24, 82, 86, 119, 121–22, 128 n. 49
 United Services Organization 334
 University of Paris 368, 386, 386 nn. 57–58, 390, 394
 Urban V, pope (1362–1370) xxxiv, 12–13, 168
Usatges of Barcelona xlvii, 121, 297, 300, 301 n. 13, 302 n. 16, 304, 310, 318, 326
 Utrera 171, 171 n. 68

- Vadi, Filippo 449, 455, 458
 Vailly 233
 Valencia xliii–xliv, 6 n. 11, 9,
 9 n. 25, 21 n. 77, 75–116, 118, 118
 n. 6, 121, 123, 128 n. 49, 129 nn.
 54–55, 131 n. 60, 132, 132 n. 65,
 136, 138 n. 91, 141 n. 106, 146–47,
 167, 317
 Valenciennes 18, 441
 Vall d’Aran 302
 Vall d’Elda 80, 91, 93
 Valmont 424
 Valois Dynasty xxv, xxviii, xlvii, 232,
 267–68, 365–66, 400
 van Artevelde, Jacob xix, xxviii, 227
 van Artevelde, Philip xxxviii
 van Brederode, Gijsbrecht 443
 Vegetius 197, 350 n. 68, 371, 378,
 411, 413–14, 414 n. 51
 Velluti, Donato 198
 Venice 183, 417
 Vermandois 221
via francorum 26
 Viana 31
 Vidal Castro, Francisco 152
 Villalon, Andrew xxxiv n. 26, xliii,
 4 n. 4, 111 n. 174, 170 n. 66,
 301 n. 14, 402 n. 7
 Villani, Filippo 181–82, 187–93,
 196–201
 Villani, Matteo 182, 185, 187–88,
 195
 Vitoria 14, 26, 28–31, 31 n. 122, 32,
 36–37, 37 n. 135, 40, 60
 Vizcaya 14 n. 42, 24, 38 n. 138, 49
 von Aue, Hartmann 456
 von Clausewitz, Carl 405–406, 422,
 422 n. 84
 von Danzig, Peter 449, 449 n. 4,
 451, 458
 von Landau, Konrad 191, 193–94,
 199
 Walroun, William 252
 war
 eradictory 375, 377, 382–83, 388,
 392
 Ghent War (1449–1453) 430,
 438–39, 439 n. 31, 442, 444
 just xlvii–xlviii, 365–96
 Public Weal 277, 284, 444,
 444 n. 47
 Two Pedros (1356–1366) xxxiv,
 xliii, 6, 9 n. 23, 17, 75–116,
 117, 123, 148, 319
 Warner, Marina 360
 Warwick 58, 67, 425
 Wenceslas of Luxembourg (1356–1383)
 230–31, 231 n. 115, 233–35, 237
 West, Thomas 251
 White Company xlv, 179–210, 464
 William I “the Conqueror,” English
 king (1066–1087) xxv
 William IV, count of Hainault
 (1337–1345) 219
 William of Apulia 447–48, 458
 William, William 199
 Winchester 355
 Woman Ordinance Worker 334
 wool staple xxx
 Wrench, John 249, 252, 259
 Yecla 92
 Ypres xxviii
 Yusuf I, Granada emir (1333–1354)
 153, 153 n. 8, 157, 157 n. 23
 Zaldiarán 30
 Zaragoza 84, 129 n. 54, 130, 138
 n. 91
 Zealand 212, 216, 219