



BRITTON & BOER





PRESIDENT KRÜGER

BRITON AND BOER

*BOTH SIDES OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN QUESTION*

BY

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WITH MAP AND ILLUSTRATIONS

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. BY THE RIGHT HON. JAMES BRYCE, M.P.	1
ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL. BY SYDNEY BROOKS	47
A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS (A REJOINDER TO MR. SYDNEY BROOKS). BY A DIPLOMAT	77
A TRANSVAAL VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUES- TION. BY DR. F. V. ENGELENBURG, EDITOR OF THE <i>PRETORIA VOLKSSTEM</i>	103
THE TRANSVAAL WAR AND EUROPEAN OPINION. BY KARL BLIND	133
THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION. BY ANDREW CAR- NEGIE	164
WILL THE POWERS INTERVENE IN THE WAR? BY FRANCIS CHARMES, FOREIGN EDITOR OF THE <i>REVUE DE DEUX MONDES</i>	177
A POSSIBLE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE AGAINST ENG- LAND. BY DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER	198
PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR. BY MAX NORDAU	230

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ILLUSTRATIONS

PRESIDENT KRÜGER	<i>Frontispiece</i>
A BOER'S FIRST HOMESTEAD	<i>Facing p. 4</i>
DINGAAN AND THE MURDER OF THE BOER EMISSARIES	" 12
A MATABELE NATIVE	" 30
OFFICE OF THE REFORM COMMITTEE DURING THE JAMESON RAID	" 34
MAJUBA HILL, THE SCENE OF THE BRITISH DEFEAT IN 1881	" 48
RT. HON. CECIL JOHN RHODES, P.C.	} " 60
RT. HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.	
A TREKKING OUTFIT	" 72
TRADING FOR ZULU LABOR	" 86
THE WAR-DANCE OF THE ZULUS	" 106
JOHANNESBURG	" 120
BRINGING IN THE RAIDERS TO JOHANNESBURG	" 142
PIETERMARITZBURG, THE CAPITAL OF NATAL	" 160
DR. L. S. JAMESON	" 190
GENERAL PIET JOUBERT	} " 218
M. T. STEYN	
LADYSMITH	" 232
MAP OF THE BOER REPUBLIC	

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BRITON AND BOER

THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE events which have led up to the present conflict in South Africa, which I am asked to sketch in outline for American readers, cannot well be understood without some little knowledge of the physical configuration of the country and the character of its people. It is a great, wild, dry, bare country, with an exceedingly small population of white men, and a population of blacks which is not large in comparison with its area. This area, taking South Africa to be the region which lies south of the Zambesi, is some 1,400,000 square miles, and within its limits there are much less than one million of white men, Dutch, English, and Portuguese, with a handful of Germans—that is to say, less than

BRITON AND BOER

the population of Philadelphia. Nearly one-half of that area is desert—by which I mean a practically waterless tract, no better for ranching or agriculture than the sagebrush deserts of Nevada. Of the rest, by far the larger part is much too dry for agriculture, but fit for sheep and cattle, resembling, roughly speaking, the ranching districts of western Nebraska or Wyoming. There are fertile valleys near the south and southeast coast, because the heat is there not so severe and the rainfall more abundant; but the interior is an elevated plain, where the strong sun rapidly dries up the rains of the summer months, so that cultivation must, nearly everywhere, be carried on by means of irrigation. Now there are very few places in South Africa where it pays to irrigate the soil; and, consequently, there is, except here and there towards the coast, a very small number of persons engaged in agriculture. Neither are there any forests worth mentioning, nor any manufactures, except small local industries in the few towns. Till very recently, the whole occupation of the country, and that wherein its wealth lay, was the rearing of sheep and cattle. It is an occupation which gives employment to very few persons in proportion to the surface over which flocks and herds feed; and

CAUSES OF THE WAR

this is why the population has grown so slowly during the last two centuries and a half.

For South Africa is by no means a new European colony, like Australia. It was discovered at the end of the fifteenth century by Bartholomew Diaz, six years before the discovery of America. The first European settlement was planted at Sofala, on the southeast coast, by the Portuguese in A.D. 1505, the next by the Dutch at Cape Town in 1652. The Portuguese, however, never succeeded in establishing any hold upon the interior, and the extreme unhealthiness of the region where their posts were placed blighted the growth of their settlements, which are to-day quite insignificant, and will probably some day pass into the hands of stronger Powers. Besides, their blood has become mixed with that of the natives to an extent which has caused the race to deteriorate.

The Dutch settlement advanced very slowly for many years. It was governed by a company whose aim was rather to make money by trade than to develop the country, and maladministration produced a discontent which had begun to reveal the bold and restless character of the settlers. When England captured the Cape during the great war against Napoleon (in 1806), there

BRITON AND BOER

were only some twenty-seven thousand whites in the whole colony. After the war was over, and when England, which had in 1814 paid six millions sterling to the Dutch for the country, was firmly planted there, some English settlers began to come in, as others have done from time to time ever since. But the influx of these settlers has been less than the natural increase of the Dutch population, so that in Cape Colony the inhabitants of Dutch stock to-day outnumber those of English stock, and the Dutch language is (except in the towns) more generally spoken than is the English.

These two stocks have so much in common that it might have been expected that they would readily amalgamate, and at any rate would, as the Dutch and English did long ago in New York, be on good terms with one another. They are akin in blood and in speech. They are both Protestant. In character and in habits, and, indeed, in appearance also, one may note many resemblances between the peasant of Holland and the peasant of East Anglia. If the English Government had been wise in its measures, if it had understood the country better and been careful to send out only sensible and sympathetic men as governors, the Dutch of South

CAUSES OF THE WAR

Africa, who had no attachment to Holland, might soon have become attached to England, and would at any rate have been, though they are naturally of an independent spirit, quiet and peaceable subjects. England, however, managed things ill. She altered the system of courts and local government, reducing the rights which the people had enjoyed. She insisted on the use of the English language to the exclusion of Dutch. In undertaking to protect the natives and the slaves, whom the Dutch were accused by the English missionaries of treating very harshly, she did what was right, but the farmers complained that the missionaries sometimes maligned them and greatly resented the attention which was paid to the charges. Finally she abolished slavery, and allotted a very inadequate sum as compensation to the South African slave-owners, much of which sum never reached their hands, because it was made payable in London. These grievances, coupled with displeasure at the unwillingness of the Government to prosecute the troublesome and costly wars against the south-coast Kafirs, who frequently raided cattle and burned the houses of the farmers on the frontier, determined a large body of Dutch farmers and ranchmen to quit the colony altogether, and go

BRITON AND BOER

out into the wilderness which stretched far away to the northeast, much of it, especially that which lay to the north, a waterless desert, but the eastern part reported by the few hunters who had traversed it to contain plenty of good pasture. About ten thousand thus set off, and, when they had advanced beyond the borders of the colony, spread themselves over a tract of country some seven hundred miles long by three hundred broad, between the Orange River on the west-southwest and the lower course of the Limpopo River on the north-northeast. Parts of this country lay empty of all inhabitants. Parts were inhabited by savage Kafir tribes, the more warlike of whom attacked the emigrants, and were defeated, and in some cases expelled by the latter, whose valor, whose firearms, and whose horses enabled them to overcome enormously more numerous hosts of undisciplined natives. This emigration of 1836 is known as the Great Trek, and the Dutch who formed it are usually described by their own name of Boers, a word meaning farmers or peasants. It is convenient to call them by this name for the sake of distinguishing them from the more numerous and more sedentary Dutch who remained behind in Cape Colony as British, though, strictly speak-

CAUSES OF THE WAR

ing, every farmer or ranchman would be described in the Dutch language by the name of Boer.

This Great Trek of 1836 has been the source of all subsequent troubles between the Dutch and English races in South Africa. The circumstances attending it developed in the minds of the emigrant Boers three passions which have characterized them ever since, and which must be understood, because they are the key to the subsequent history of the country. One of these is a deep dislike to the British Government, which they conceived to have forced them to quit their old homes by a course of injustice and oppression. Another is a love of independence for its own sake, a sentiment which is in their Dutch and Huguenot blood (for some of the leading families were sprung from French Huguenots who had gone to Africa from Holland after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes), and which had shown itself, even before England took the Cape, in risings against the Government of the Dutch East India Company. A third is an ardent attachment to their Calvinistic faith and to their old habits and usages. Cut off from all the influences of Europe, and leading a rude and solitary life on their enormous ranching farms, they were, when they went out into

BRITON AND BOER

the wilderness, nearly two centuries behind the people of Western Europe in the thoughts, as well as in the arts, of modern civilization. The conditions of their warlike life among hostile savages after the Trek kept them so backward that they might really be said to belong rather to the seventeenth century than to the nineteenth.

Their virtues, as well as their faults, were of a seventeenth-century type, and have remained, in the more remote and thinly peopled regions, still of that type—a fact which came into sharp relief when, within the last few years, a new crowd of English gold-seekers poured in among them. The old type has partially survived even among the more civilized Dutch of Cape Colony, and this has helped to keep up the sense of brotherhood between the emigrant Boers and their kinsfolk at the Cape.

Before I describe the relations of these emigrants to the British Government from 1836 to the present day, it may be well to say a few words about the natives, who constitute the vast majority of the inhabitants of the country.

When the first European settlers came, they found three races in the country—the Bushmen, a low type of aborigines, who lived by the chase;

CAUSES OF THE WAR

the Hottentots, savages of a somewhat higher order, who had sheep and cattle, but did not till the ground, and the Kafirs. The Bushmen were very few, and have now almost disappeared. They could not learn civilized ways or survive contact with a civilized people. The Hottentots, too, vanished, many tribes being swept off by small-pox, while the rest have either died out or become mixed with the negro slaves whom the Dutch brought from the coasts of Guinea. The Kafirs, however, have held their ground and even multiplied. The Dutch, and afterwards the English, have carried on many sanguinary wars with them, for they are fierce in fight, as well as strong, muscular men. The last of these wars was that which the British South African Company waged against the Matabele in 1893, renewed by a native revolt in 1896; and it may be hoped that it is the last that will have to be waged, at any rate to the south of the Zambesi River, for the tribes have now begun to realize the hopelessness of resistance to the discipline and the superior arms of the white men. These wars were, all of them, except that against the Matabele, fought out along, or not far from, the coasts of the Indian Ocean, because the northern parts of the country,

BRITON AND BOER

or both sides of the lower and middle course of the Orange River, is a desert region, which has no inhabitants, save a few wandering Hottentots and Bushmen. The result of the wars was to make the English masters of the whole country (except, of course, the Portuguese and German territories) which lies along the coast from Cape Town as far as the neighborhood of Delagoa Bay. The natives never took part in any of the conflicts between the English and the Dutch, to which I am going to refer, but their presence in several instances affected those conflicts, because the English more than once stopped the Boers when the latter were conquering some native tribe, and because the English Government sometimes declared that the relations between the Boers and the natives constituted a danger to the peace of the country generally, which made their own interference necessary. It must, therefore, be remembered that the rivalry between the Boers and the English, the course of which is now to be sketched, went on, not *in vacuo*, so to speak, but in the presence of a native population far outnumbering the English and the Boers taken together.

When the Boers trekked out into the wilderness in 1836, the British Government, though


CAUSES OF THE WAR

sorry to see them go, did not follow them. It did not wish to possess the interior of South Africa, because it did not think the country worth having. It valued the Cape chiefly as a half-way house to India, for in those days the Suez Canal had not begun to be even talked of. Neither in those days had the passion for acquiring territory outside the pale of civilization seized upon the European Powers. Least of all did they desire African territories, because all Africa (except the strip along the Mediterranean) was believed to be either hopelessly barren or hopelessly unhealthy, the parts which were uninhabited, worthless; the parts which were inhabited, full of savages whom it would be costly to subdue, and from whom, when they had been subdued, little profit could be drawn. Accordingly, the British neither sent troops after the departing emigrants, nor deemed the emigrants to be acquiring the interior for Great Britain. Still, they did deem the emigrants to be still British subjects, for, as they had not become subjects of any other State, it was held they must still owe allegiance to the British Crown. This notion has in a vague sense never quite vanished from the British mind ever since. The emigrants, however, held that when they went out they re-

BRITON AND BOER

nounced their British allegiance, and forthwith began to set up rude republican governments for themselves, governments which were managed by a meeting of all the adult males (called a Volksraad or People's Council), and in time of war—nearly all times being times of war—also by a smaller elective committee called a Council (Krygsraad). As the emigrants were scattered over an area of some three hundred thousand square miles, and were, even in 1846, ten years after the first of them left the Colony, less than twenty thousand in number, all told, it was impossible for them to have one Volksraad or one Government for the whole body. The various parties or communities, when they began to crystallize into communities, got on as they best could, each with its own Volksraad. After a time this became a small representative body, but when it was a primary assembly, the number of persons present was usually smaller than that of a town-meeting in rural New England.

The British Government soon found itself, or thought itself, compelled to abandon its original policy of indifference to the doings of the emigrants, and so there began that struggle for the possession of the extra-colonial parts of South Africa, which has been the central stream of



DINGAAN AND THE MURDER OF THE BOER EMISSARIES

CAUSES OF THE WAR

South African history for more than half a century. The first collision took place in what is now the Colony of Natal, a region then separated from Cape Colony by a mass of independent Kafir tribes, and itself ruled by the Zulu king Dingaan. Hearing of the fertility of this region, which is indeed one of the richest and best watered parts of Africa, a large body of Boer emigrants, who had been wandering over the great interior plateau, descended into it in 1838, and after a short but terrible struggle with Dingaan, who had treacherously massacred two parties of them, built the village of Pietermaritzburg (now the capital of Natal), and set up a republic which they called Natalia. This disquieted the British authorities at the Cape, who did not wish to see any non-British State established on the sea-coast. The interior they did not much care about, because in the interior the Boers would be in contact with the natives only. But an independent republic on the coast, flying its own flag, was another affair. They were, moreover, afraid that trouble between the emigrants and the coast Kafirs might breed further trouble between the coast Kafirs and themselves. Accordingly, they sent (in 1842) a small British force to Durban (then called Port Natal), the best harbor on the

BRITON AND BOER

coast, though they had some years before withdrawn a detachment which had been placed there, and had not complied with the request of the handful of English settlers who lived there to recognize them as a colony. The British troops were besieged by the Natalian Boers, but in the nick of time received reinforcements, which so completely turned the scale that the Boers presently submitted. The Republic of Natalia vanished, and many of the Boer emigrants returned north across the mountains, prizing their independence more than the good pastures of Natal, and full of resentment at the Government which had stepped in to deprive them of the fruit of their victory over the Zulu king. Thus ended the first of the four armed collisions which have occurred between the English and the Boers, the first of their many strivings for the possession of the unappropriated parts of Africa.

Meanwhile, the interior was in a state of confusion and disorder, the Boers being too few in number to reduce to submission their native enemies, and the half-breed hunting clans called Griquas, the offspring of Dutch fathers and Hottentot mothers, who lived in the northeastern border of Cape Colony. The British Govern-

CAUSES OF THE WAR

ment, after fruitless attempts to create petty semi-independent States out of these unpromising materials, yielded to the pressure of events, and moved forward the frontier of its influence by annexing the country between the Orange River and the Vaal River, thereby asserting authority over such of the Boer emigrants as dwelt in this region. They named it the Orange River Sovereignty, and built a fort in it at a spot called Bloemfontein. This took place in 1846. Some of the Boers, unwilling to come again under British dominion, took up arms, and with the help of other Boers beyond the Vaal, overpowered the small British garrison. A British force was led against them by the Governor of the Cape, a tried soldier of the Peninsular War, who defeated them in an engagement and re-established British authority. But the troubles showed no sign of ending. A large Kafir tribe, the Basntos, who occupied the mountainous country south of the Orange River Sovereignty, and were formidable both by their numbers and by the difficult nature of their country, attacked the British force in the Sovereignty on one side, while the Boers from beyond the Vaal threatened it on another. It so happened that Cape Colony was at the same time involved in a war

BRITON AND BOER

with the Kafirs of the south coast, so that troops could not be spared for these more remote districts, while there was not time to fetch any from England, then far more distant than now. Besides, the Government at home were getting tired of the vexations which their presence in the far interior caused them. They saw nothing to be gained by the possession of wide, pastoral wastes, where it was extremely difficult to keep order, difficult to control the rough white settlers, difficult to bridle the restless mass of Kafirs. Accordingly, the British Cabinet made up its mind to take what would now be called an act of self-denying and perhaps pusillanimous renunciation, but was then regarded as an exercise of obvious common-sense. It resolved to withdraw altogether from the interior, release the emigrant Boers from any claim it might still have to their allegiance, and leave them and the Kafirs to fight out their quarrels without further interference. In 1852, a treaty—known as the Sand River Convention—was made with representatives of the Boers who dwelt beyond the Vaal River, which guaranteed to them “the right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British Government.”

CAUSES OF THE WAR

It was also thereby declared that no slavery should be permitted or practised by the Boers beyond the Vaal. Two years later, after a troublesome war with the Basutos, in which the British general narrowly escaped a serious reverse, had confirmed the disposition of the Government to withdraw, another Convention was made at Bloemfontein, by which the Boers living in the Sovereignty between the Vaal and Orange Rivers were “declared to be a free and independent people,” and the future independence of the country and its government was guaranteed. The British garrison was thereupon withdrawn from the Sovereignty, which was left to set up a government on its own account, subject, however, to a provision forbidding slavery and the slave-trade—a provision not superfluous in either Convention, for the Boers were suspected of practising a system of apprenticing native servants which was with difficulty distinguishable from slavery. Both the great English parties were concerned in this abandonment of the interior, for the Convention of 1852 was approved by the Cabinet of Lord Derby; that of 1854 by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen. Neither Convention excited any remonstrance in England, so little did men then

care for colonial expansion in general or African territory in particular.

From these two recognitions of Boer independence there sprang up two Boer republics. After sixteen years of practical but legally unacknowledged independence, the emigrants who lived beyond the Vaal, and now began to be called Transvaal people, were at length masters of their own destinies. They were, however, divided into several small communities, as well as into numerous contending factions, and did not finally unite into one State till 1864. The Orange River farmers were less quarrelsome and better educated, and, as they lived nearer the Colony, they were less rude, being, moreover, mixed with a certain number of English settlers. Their Republic took the name of the Orange Free State, and gave itself a very short and simple constitution, which has worked smoothly. It was for a time plagued by wars with the Basutos, but since the British Government assumed control over that tribe in 1869 these have ceased. The country is mostly too dry for agriculture, but it is covered with excellent pasture, which supported, until the great cattle plague of 1896, vast herds of cattle. Fortunately, no gold mines have been discovered, and only one dia-

mond mine, so the temptations of wealth have not corrupted the simplicity of these republicans, who lived happily together till the outbreak of the present war, Englishmen sharing with Boers the offices of the State.

The Transvaal Republic was less fortunate. Its people were rather fewer in number, and were scattered over a wider territory. They were much rougher in habits, much more ignorant, much fonder of raiding the natives, and more prone to discord among themselves. What with their intestine divisions, their native wars, and their unwillingness to pay taxes, their Government was carried on with great difficulty, and had, in 1877, become not only bankrupt, but virtually unable to enforce obedience. The British Government, which thought, rightly or wrongly, that the weakness and disorder of the Republic constituted a danger to the surrounding territories by inviting native attacks, sent a Commissioner to the Transvaal, who, in April, 1877, used the discretion which the Colonial Office had intrusted to him to proclaim the annexation of the country to the British Crown. It was a high-handed act, for the Republic had enjoyed complete independence, and Britain had no more legal right to annex it than she had to

BRITON AND BOER

seize the neighboring territories of Portugal. The only justification was to be found in the circumstances of the State, which had only three dollars in its treasury, with no prospect of obtaining any more, because the citizens, who distrusted the President, on account of his supposed theological errors, seemed to care very little whether they had a government at all, and were certainly unwilling to contribute to its support. It was believed that Cetewayo, the powerful and martial Zulu king, was likely to attack it, and the Commissioner doubtless believed that the public opinion of the Boer people, of whom there were now some forty thousand, would approve—or at any rate would not actively resent—his conduct in placing them under a power which would defend them against Cetewayo and spend money on their country. The event, however, proved that he had acted foolishly, because precipitately. If he had waited a few weeks or months longer, it is possible, indeed probable, that the Boers would have asked him to promise them a British protectorate. But they did not like to have it thus thrust upon them; and, while the authorities of the Republic entered solemn protests, a memorial was drawn up and signed by a large majority of the citizens

CAUSES OF THE WAR

addressed to the British Government, and praying that the annexation should be reversed. Britain, however, refused to give way, believing that the opposition of the Boers would soon disappear, especially when they saw that English rule must conduce to the material prosperity of the country.

Unfortunately, the Colonial High Commissioner and the Colonial Office at home did not take the obviously proper steps to conciliate the people. They sent an arrogant and politically incapable military officer to govern men in whom the sentiment of democratic equality was extremely strong. They levied taxes stringently. They delayed so long in giving the free local government they had promised that the people despaired of ever receiving it. The passive displeasure which had at first showed itself now turned to active discontent; and when the leaders of that discontent found that the new English Ministry which came into power in April, 1880, just three years after the annexation, refused to reverse the act of their predecessors, they prepared to recover their independence by force of arms. In December, 1880, an insurrection broke out. The insurgents were few in number, but the British troops in the country

BRITON AND BOER

were still fewer and wholly unprepared, so they were obliged to surrender or were shut up and besieged in a few fortified posts. A Boer force seized the chief pass leading from the Transvaal into Natal, because this was the route which an English army coming to reconquer the country would be sure to take. Here they repelled a small English force, for the English had as yet very few soldiers in Natal, and shortly afterwards (February 26, 1881) defeated and killed the English commander, General Colley, who, with a want of prudence that has never been accounted for, led a detachment to the top of a mountain (Majuba Hill) commanding the pass, without taking proper steps to guard the position or to secure support from the rest of his force. There were loud cries in England that vengeance should be taken for this defeat, which could easily have been avenged, for in a few weeks reinforcements arrived far too strong for the Boers to resist. But the British Government, much to its credit, gave no heed to these cries. It was to blame for having failed sooner to discover the real state of things in the Transvaal, and for not having done its best, by a prompt removal of grievances, to appease the discontent of the people. But, now that it knew the facts ; knew

CAUSES OF THE WAR

that the hasty annexation had been a blunder ; knew how much the Boers valued their independence ; knew how strong was the sympathy felt for them by the Dutch element all over South Africa—a sympathy which might have ended in a war with the Free State and a civil war in Cape Colony—they determined to undo the annexation of 1877. A convention was accordingly concluded in August, 1881, with the provisional government which the Transvaal people had set up. By this instrument, Britain recognized the Transvaal State as autonomous, reserving to herself, however, the control of all foreign relations, and declaring the suzerainty of the Queen. The Cabinet of Mr. Gladstone was warmly attacked in England for its action in thus, as its opponents said, weakly surrendering to rebels, while others held that it had not only acted magnanimously, but also wisely, since the evil of a race conflict between English and Dutch in South Africa far outweighed the objections to sitting down under a defeat, especially when all the world knew that the defeat could have been easily avenged, were mere vengeance a proper object of war.

Men still wrangle over the question in England, and may long continue to do so, for it is to

BRITON AND BOER

some extent a moral as well as a political question, and different minds view moral problems differently. Regarded as a pure matter of politics, it may be pronounced to have been right, upon the *data* which the British Government then possessed, for there was nothing to be gained by reconquering a large country of slender value, and by undertaking to rule over a mass of disaffected subjects, while the danger of a race war in South Africa was to be at all hazards avoided. Nevertheless, as things have in fact turned out, much of the good which was then reasonably expected has failed to be secured. The Boers who deemed, and were indeed justified in deeming, the annexation of 1877 to have been an act of pure force, which gave the British Crown no *de jure* title to their allegiance, thought that when the insurrection had succeeded, their Republic ought to have been replaced in its old position under the Sand River Convention, a position of perfect independence. They, therefore, showed little gratitude for the concession of practical autonomy, and did not resign the hope of ultimately regaining complete independence. Besides, though they could not but see that the British Ministry had refrained from using their superior power to take ven-

CAUSES OF THE WAR

geance which might have been easily taken, they knew that the danger of alienating the Cape Dutch had been one of the motives which determined its conduct. However, the whole question might, and probably soon would, have lost its importance but for an event which happened four years after, the discovery in the Transvaal of a gold-field unique in the world.

When the Transvaal Boers had recovered their rights of internal self-government, they immediately began to work for two things: the concession of complete independence, such as they had enjoyed under the Sand River Convention, and the extension of their influence over the native territories that lay around them. Their War of Independence had stimulated in an amazing degree their national feeling, and had revived in them that bold and venturesome spirit which marked the first years after the Great Trek. Territorial expansion is, moreover, almost a necessity to them, because they live entirely by ranching, and need fresh pastures as the population increases. They began to spread out to the south into Zululand, and succeeded in establishing a petty republic there, which was afterwards absorbed into the mother State. They attempted similar tactics on the west in Bechuanaland, but

BRITON AND BOER

here the British Government interposed. It had been appealed to by the English missionaries, who disliked the Boers because they dealt harshly with the natives; and it was unwilling to see a region which might become important as opening a path from the Cape to Central Africa closed against it by the presence of another Power. Accordingly, an expedition was sent which chased the Boer adventurers out of Bechuanaland, and placed the Kafir tribes who dwelt there under British protection. There now remained only the country to the east and to the north of the Transvaal to be contended for by the Dutch and English races. To the east the Boers succeeded, after a long diplomatic controversy with Britain, in getting hold of Swaziland, a small native territory inhabited by a branch of the Zulu race. They would have liked to go still farther and reach the coast of the Indian Ocean, but Britain anticipated them by stepping in to proclaim a protectorate over the Kafir chiefs, who held the unhealthy little strip of land that lies between Swaziland and the sea. This was in 1894. On the north the British Government, who had again begun to doubt the wisdom of annexing huge slices of Africa—though the tide of English sentiment was now setting strongly

CAUSES OF THE WAR

for expansion—refused to occupy the country which lay between the Limpopo River and the Zambesi. But it did not refuse to allow one of its enterprising subjects to obtain a charter from the Crown founding a company intended to acquire land and work mines in that country. Mr. Cecil Rhodes, an Oxford graduate, and son of an English country clergyman, who had made a fortune at the Kimberley diamond mines, was the person who conceived this plan, and by whom the charter creating the British South Africa Company was procured. Under his auspices, a band of English settlers entered the unappropriated and little-known regions of Manica Land and Mashonaland, and, in 1890, set up a government there. They were just too quick for the Boers, who had meditated a trek into the same region, where there is plenty of good pasture. Three years afterwards the company established its power over the wide area of Matabeleland, west of Mashonaland, by a war with the martial tribe of Matabele, whose king, Lo Bengula, fled away and died. With these events the long rivalry for the possession of the interior between Dutch and English came to an end, and the Transvaal found itself surrounded on all sides by British territory, except on the northeast,

where it abuts upon the dominion of Portugal. Those dominions, however, it could not acquire from Portugal, even if Portugal were willing to sell them, because Britain has by treaty a right of pre-emption of the district round Delagoa Bay, the harbor which both the Boers and the English would be so glad to obtain. On the whole, therefore, the English came off winners; for, whereas the Boers get only Swaziland and part of Zululand, their rivals secured the vast areas of Bechuanaland on the west, of Mashonaland and Matabeleland on the north.

In its other aim, the recovery of independence, the Transvaal Government had a nearly complete success. In 1884 they persuaded the late Lord Derby, then Colonial Secretary in the British Cabinet, to agree to a new Convention, whose articles supersede those of the Convention of 1881. This later instrument sensibly enlarges the rights and raises the international status of the "South African Republic" (a title now conceded to what had been called in 1881 the "Transvaal State"). Under the Convention of 1884, the British Crown retains the power of vetoing any treaties which the Republic may make, except with the Orange Free State. But the Republic is entitled to accredit diplomatic representatives to foreign

courts; the protection of the natives is no longer placed under the care of a British Resident; the internal administration of the State is left entirely free from any sort of British control. The Republic is, in fact, with the important exception of the treaty-making power, to all intents and purposes independent. Most people in England now blame Lord Derby, who was certainly an unlucky Colonial Minister, for making this Convention. But his error—and it was an error—would have signified comparatively little, but for the event which befell immediately after it was committed. The Convention was signed in 1884. In 1885 the auriferous conglomerate beds of the Witwatersrand were discovered in the southern part of the Transvaal. They form not only the richest gold-field in the world, but a gold-field unlike any other in giving a fairly uniform and certain yield of so much gold, rather greater in some beds, rather less in others, to the ton of ore. Until this discovery, the Transvaal had been, though a few gold-reefs were being worked in the mountains on its eastern border, really a vast pastoral wilderness, very poor, and with only about one and a half white inhabitants to the square mile, most of them semi-nomad ranchmen. It was a country somewhat

BRITON AND BOER

like New Mexico, though the population was smaller and the pasture thinner. Now a stream of immigrants from the rest of South Africa, from Europe, from Australia, from North America, began to rush in, so that within a few years the white population more than trebled.

The first result of this great and sudden change was to enrich those few of the Boer farmers who had owned and who now promptly sold the land where the gold-beds were worked, and also to benefit a somewhat larger number by creating a market for agricultural produce. The revenue of the State, which had been trifling, began to rise rapidly. This was so far good. But the Government soon bethought themselves that the new-comers (most of whom were British), when they had become citizens and began to cast their votes, would constitute a large section, and before long a majority, of the voters. They would then be able, by electing persons like themselves to the Assembly and to the executive offices of the State, to revolutionize it completely, swamping the old citizens, getting rid of the old-fashioned Boer ways—in fact, making the country an English instead of a Dutch country. From this prospect they recoiled in horror. It was not in order to be overrun at last by a crowd of



A MATABELE NATIVE

CAUSES OF THE WAR

English, Australian, and American miners, employed by capitalists, mostly of Jewish extraction, that they or their fathers had trekked out of Cape Colony, fought and vanquished the hosts of heathen Kafirs, founded their own Republic, thrown off by their valor the yoke which England had for four years laid upon them. To keep out the immigrants and forbid the working of the mines might be difficult, and this course would, moreover, sacrifice the growing revenue which was raised from the mines. They, therefore, resolved to keep the immigrants, but to exclude them, at least for a good while to come, from exerting political power. This was done by lengthening the period of residence and other formalities prescribed for the acquisition of burgher rights and therewith of the electoral franchise. The method has been much denounced, and it has turned out badly, as the sequel has showed. But it was an obvious form of self-preservation. Those who have made a country, and are ruling a country; those who like the country as it is and object to new-fangled ways, cannot be expected to open their arms to new-comers and invest them with the fulness of their own political privileges. The immigrants complained bitterly that every-

BRITON AND BOER

where else in South Africa a settler from Europe could get a vote after two or three years' residence; why, then, not in the Transvaal also? The answer was that the Transvaal was the only part of South Africa where the new settlers were becoming more numerous than the old citizens; where, therefore, admission after three years' residence might mean a complete transfer of political control to a wholly new set of people, differing in thoughts, habits, tastes, and language from the folk that had theretofore possessed the land. What are the "natural rights" of these two sets of persons, and by what kind of compromise the justice of this very exceptional case ought to be met, is a question which I leave to the reader.

But unluckily for both the old Boers and the immigrant settlers (or *Uitlanders*, as they are commonly called), the matter was complicated by another fact. The Boers were an ignorant and rude people. They were skilful hunters, strenuous fighters, pious Calvinists, and endowed with many excellent qualities. But they were quite without the sort of knowledge and skill that are needed to administer a modern State, and especially one which, having become the field of a great industry, was swiftly growing in

CAUSES OF THE WAR

wealth and population. Accordingly, the administration which they provided for the new settlers was very inefficient and very costly. Moreover, the virtues which had adorned their rustic simplicity yielded, in too many instances, to the temptations presented by the control of a large revenue and by the power of granting valuable concessions. Thus the Administration became not only inefficient, but to some extent corrupt. As measles, which in civilized countries is only a passing childish ailment, has sometimes proved, when introduced among savage peoples, a deadly plague, so the bacillus of pecuniary corruption, which the great States of Western Europe have pretty well extirpated from their civil services and legislatures, sometimes appears as a virulent malady in communities where there had previously been too little wealth for the formation of a *nidus* fit for its growth. Thus it came to pass that, while the material prosperity of the Transvaal increased, its Government, so far from improving, became worse than before. It did not supply what a progressive industrial community needs; and it was certainly not altogether pure, though how far the impurity went is a matter of so much controversy that I will not venture to express a positive opinion.

BRITON AND BOER

Under such conditions, it was not strange that the new settlers should have soon become discontented. They complained that they were given neither good administration, nor any constitutional means of securing it. Being far richer than the old burghers, they paid nearly all the taxation, but had no voice in the disposal of the revenue. If the Administration had been reformed, their exclusion from the franchise would have sunk to a mere theoretic grievance. If the franchise had been granted to them, it would have been their own fault had the Administration remained unreformed. But, as things were, they felt aggrieved, and found no means of removing their grievances. Constitutional agitation was tried, but as they had few sympathizers in the Legislature, which consisted chiefly of old-fashioned Boers from the country, nothing came of it. Then a few of the leaders formed, in the end of 1894 or beginning of 1895, a secret plan for rising in arms against the Government. The objection to this plan was that while the Boers were all expert riflemen, few of the Uitlanders had arms, and still fewer were trained to use them. However, they persevered. Some of the capitalists came into the plan, for though capitalists do not as a rule favor revolutions, this

OFFICE OF THE REFORM COMMITTEE DURING THE JAMESON RAID



CAUSES OF THE WAR

particular revolution would have benefited the mine-owners, by enabling them to work the gold-reefs more cheaply and develop them more rapidly. Accordingly, they helped with money, and large stores of arms were secretly conveyed into Johannesburg, the city which had suddenly sprung into greatness in the centre of the mining district. Then, too, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, at that time Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and managing director of the British South Africa Company, came into the plan, and brought into it Dr. Jameson, administrator of the territories of that company, and able to direct the movements of the body of mounted police which the company maintained.

In a book called *Impressions of South Africa*, which was published two years ago, I have, besides sketching the history of the Boers, described pretty fully the circumstances which led to the formation of this plan, the motives which induced different sections of the inhabitants to favor it, and the causes which led to its failure. The story cannot be told here, for it is very much involved, and hardly admits of being told briefly; nor is the whole of it yet known to the public, although two Parliamentary Committees, one of the Cape Assembly, one of the British

BRITON AND BOER

House of Commons, have investigated the matter at great length. The point best worth noting is this, that the conspiracy might possibly have succeeded if it had been allowed to remain a pure Uitlander conspiracy at Johannesburg. But there was superadded to it an arrangement that Dr. Jameson, with a force of the company's armed and mounted police, should come in to help the insurrection which was to break out at Johannesburg. The conspirators, finding some difficulties crop up, postponed the day of the rising. But Dr. Jameson, becoming impatient of delay, started on the day originally fixed (in the end of December, 1895), before they were ready to meet or receive him. He was stopped by a rapidly summoned Boer force, and obliged, with all his men, to capitulate. The Johannesburg leaders, who had raised their followers so far as they could at short notice, on hearing of Dr. Jameson's departure, were then also obliged to lay down their arms, and the whole movement collapsed.

Its consequences, however, remained, and most pernicious have they been. All the subsequent troubles of South Africa, including the outbreak of the present war, are due to this Johannesburg rising, or rather to the still more unhappy

CAUSES OF THE WAR

expedition of the company's police, which is now commonly called the Jameson Raid. The dislike which the bulk of the Transvaal Boers felt for the British Government, already sufficiently pronounced, was intensified. The reforming party among the Boers, not very large, but including men of talent and influence, was discouraged, and has been able to effect little or nothing ever since. The power of the President, Mr. Paul Krüger, whose strength of character, long official experience, and intimate knowledge of the character of his countrymen, have given him an unequalled influence over them, has been further increased; and it has unfortunately been used to arrest all changes. Little or nothing had been done down to June last, either to improve the Administration or to conciliate the Uitlander population by making it easier for them to acquire citizenship, and therefore with a permanent interest in the country and a share of political power. The policy of repression had been pursued, not only by restricting the right of public meeting and of writing in the press, but also by the construction of a fort to dominate Johannesburg and by the continued importation of large quantities of munitions of war. These latter precautions were perfectly

BRITON AND BOER

natural. Any Government which had escaped destruction so narrowly as did that of President Krüger in December, 1895, would have done the like. The mistake was, that measures of reform were not made to go hand in hand with measures of defence. If the Uitlanders were not to be admitted to citizenship, they ought at least to have been given a better administration. By this time they vastly outnumbered the Boers. Nobody knows the exact figures, but it is conjectured that the total number of Transvaal burghers and their families does not exceed eighty thousand, while that of the recent immigrants may reach one hundred and sixty thousand. Most of the former are scattered thinly over the country; nearly all of the latter are gathered in the mining district round Johannesburg, which is practically an English, or rather Anglo-Jewish, city, with a sprinkling of Australians, Americans, Germans, and Frenchmen. (Among the Americans there have been some eminent mining engineers, who have brought their Californian experience and skill to bear upon the working of the auriferous strata.)

The effect of the Jameson expedition was no less mischievous in other parts of South Africa than in the Transvaal. It roused Dutch feeling,

CAUSES OF THE WAR

which as a political force was almost dying out in the British Colonies, into more than its old vehemence. The Orange Free State, which had up till December, 1895, condemned the exclusive policy pursued by President Krüger's Government, now rallied to its sister Republic, not only from a sense of kinship, but because it believed its own highly-prized independence to be in danger. It concluded a treaty with the Transvaal by which each of the two Republics bound itself to defend the other if unjustly attacked. In Cape Colony the two political parties, which had latterly been divided by lines of economic interest rather than by racial feeling—for the one was the party of the agriculturists and stock-farmers, the other of the commercial townsfolk—became identified with the two races, and passion ran high between them. The Dutch accused the English of desiring to acquire the gold-fields and blot out the two Republics. The English accused the Dutch of desiring to make all South Africa Dutch, and shake off the British connection; nor were they appeased by the fact that a Dutch majority in the Legislative Assembly, led by a Prime Minister who, though not himself of Dutch stock, had the support of the Dutch party, had in 1898 unanimously voted an annual sum of

BRITON AND BOER

£30,000 sterling (\$150,000), as the voluntary contribution of the Colony to the naval defence of the British Empire.

To an Englishman who examines the facts with calmness, six thousand miles away from the heated atmosphere of South Africa, both accusations appear equally groundless. There were, no doubt, some among the English who did desire to seize the richest gold-field in the world, and were working hard to bring on war with that aim. There were other Englishmen, far more numerous, who longed to humble what they thought the arrogance of the Dutch, and, as they expressed it, "to wipe out Majuba Hill," for the English in South Africa, strange as it may seem, have never forgotten or forgiven that petty reverse. But the great mass of Colonial English were wholly unaffected by the former, and only slightly affected by the latter motive. What they did wish was to bring down the pride of the Dutch, to vindicate the supremacy of England in South Africa, which they thought endangered, as well as to make the Uitlanders predominant in the Transvaal. With the Free State they had no quarrel. The Dutch, on the other hand, were proud of the existence of their two Republics, hoped to see them independent and prosperous,

CAUSES OF THE WAR

and desired to maintain among themselves what they call their Afrikaner sentiment. But it was only a few of the more violent and fanciful spirits who dreamt of ousting England and turning all South Africa into one Dutch commonwealth. There is not, so far as one can ascertain from any evidence yet produced, the slightest foundation for the allegation, so assiduously propagated in England, that there was any general conspiracy of the Colonial Dutch, or that there existed the smallest risk of any unprovoked attack by them, or by the Free State, or by the Transvaal itself, upon the power of England.

This was the state of facts in South Africa, these the feelings of the various sections of its population, when the controversy which has led to the present war became acute. I must not attempt to describe the negotiations which went on during the summer and autumn of this year, or to apportion the blame for their failure between the British Government and that of the Transvaal. To do so would lead me into a criticism of the conduct of the Colonial Office and the Cabinet of Lord Salisbury; and I do not think it desirable that one who is actively engaged in political life in his own country should address to the public of another country strictures on his

political opponents, even when he believes that party feeling has nothing to do with those strictures. I will therefore wind up this sketch by a few words on the legal position of the two parties to the war, a matter which is in the main outside the sphere of party controversy.

Under the Convention of 1884, which fixed the relations of Britain and the South African Republic, the latter had the most complete control of its internal affairs, and Britain possessed no more general right of interfering with those affairs than with the affairs of Belgium or Portugal. The suzerainty which has been claimed for her, if it existed (for its existence under the Convention of 1884 is disputed), related solely to the power of making treaties, and did not touch any domestic matter. When, therefore, the British Government was appealed to by the Uitlander British subjects who lived in the Transvaal to secure a redress of their grievances, her title to address the Boer Government and demand redress depended primarily upon the terms of the Convention of 1884, any violation of which she was entitled to complain of; and, secondly, upon the general right which every State possesses to interpose on behalf of its subjects when they are being ill-treated in

any foreign country. Under these circumstances it might have been expected that the questions which would have arisen before Britain went to war for the sake of her subjects living in the Transvaal, would be these two:

First: Were the grievances of her subjects so serious, was the behavior of the Transvaal Government when asked for redress so defiant or so evasive as to contribute a proper *casus belli*?

Secondly: Assuming that the grievances (which were real, but in my opinion not so serious as has been frequently alleged) and the behavior of the Transvaal did amount to a *casus belli*, was it wise for Britain, considering the state of feeling in South Africa, and the mischief to be expected from causing permanent disaffection among the Dutch population; and considering also the high probability that the existing system of government in the Transvaal would soon, through the action of natural causes, break down and disappear—was it wise for her to declare and prosecute war at this particular moment?

Strange to say, neither of these two questions ever in fact arose. That which caused the war was the discussion of another matter altogether, which was admittedly not a grievance for the

BRITON AND BOER

redress of which Britain had any right to interfere, and which, therefore, could not possibly amount to a *casus belli*. This matter was the length of time which should elapse before the new immigrants into the Transvaal could be admitted to citizenship, a matter which was entirely within the discretion of the Transvaal Legislature. The Boers made concessions, but the British Government held these concessions insufficient. In the course of this discussion the British Ministry used language which led the Transvaal people to believe that they were determined to force the Boer Government to comply with their demands, and they followed up their despatches by sending troops from England to South Africa. They justified this action by pointing out (and the event has shown this to have been the fact) that the British garrison in South Africa was insufficient to defend the Colonies. But the Boers very naturally felt that if they remained quiet till the British forces had been raised to a strength they could not hope to resist, they would lose the only military advantage they possessed. Accordingly, when they knew that the Reserves were being called out in England, and that an army corps was to be sent to South Africa, they declared war, having been for some

CAUSES OF THE WAR

time previously convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the British Government had resolved to coerce them. They were in a sore strait, and they took the course which must have been expected from them, and indeed the only course which brave men, who were not going to make any further concessions, could have taken. And thus the question whether the grievances amounted to a *casus belli* never came up at all. The only *casus belli* has been the conduct of the two contending parties during a negotiation, the professed subject of which was in no sense a *casus belli*. Some have explained this by saying that a conflict was in fact inevitable, and that the conduct of the two parties is really, therefore, a minor affair. Others hold that a conflict might have been and ought to have been avoided, and that a more skilful and tactful diplomacy would either have averted it, or have at any rate so managed things that, when it came, it came after showing that a just cause for war, according to the usage of civilized States, did in fact exist. No one, however, denies that the war in which England will, of course, prevail, is a terrible calamity for South Africa, and will permanently embitter the relations of Dutch and English there. To some of us it appears a calamity for England

BRITON AND BOER

also, since it is likely to alienate, perhaps for generations to come, the bulk of the white population in one of her most important self-governing colonies. It may, indeed, possibly mean for her the ultimate loss of South Africa.

JAMES BRYCE.

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

THE failure of the Bloemfontein Conference is a disappointment that may prove a tragedy. President Krüger and Sir Alfred Milner, the Governor of Cape Colony, met to discuss the Transvaal question with every external circumstance pointing to a happy issue. The time, the men, and the place were all well chosen. In the neat and compact capital of the Orange Free State, the Boer President was among friends of his own race, and the British representative was not among enemies. Both commissioners had behind them the free trust of their respective governments. The President, with the help of his more liberal followers, could have forced upon the conservatives of the Old Boer party any agreement he had cared to sign. It was a good omen, after all these years of obstinate warfare, that he had consented to a meeting at all. It was a better omen that he had declared his willingness to discuss "all, all, all, except the independence of the Transvaal." Sir Alfred

BRITON AND BOER

Milner, as Lord Cromer's right-hand man during the most arduous years of the reconstruction of Egypt, proved himself second only to his chief in farsightedness, tact, determination, and strenuous common-sense; and nothing he has done or said in South Africa has caused the Boers to mistrust him.

The portents of international politics were even more propitious. One may doubt whether there has been since Majuba Hill, whether there is ever likely to be again, any such favorable chance for a peaceful settlement of the great issue of South Africa. To Mr. Chamberlain, the success of the conference meant the restoration of personal credit in a matter that has brought him little but discomfiture. Unquestionably, before risking another rebuff, he must have convinced himself that in a friendly debate lay some hope of getting this troublesome mole-hill finally cleared away, and himself left free to make his mark on English history as the first Colonial Secretary with a policy of his own. The people of Great Britain, still somewhat humiliated by memories of the raid, were never less inclined to be overbearing, or more anxious to reach a just and pacific solution. There was nothing in the political situation in Cape Colony but what

Majuba Hill, the scene of the British defeat in 1881



ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

would quiet President Krüger's suspiciousness and urge him to moderation. His own kinsmen, the Dutch colonists, are there in control of the Government, their racial sympathies all on his side, as against forcible interference in the domestic affairs of the Transvaal, their rough business sense counselling justice to the Uitlanders for the good of South African trade. Nothing was to be feared from the masterful empire-builder through whose "keen, unscrupulous course" Great Britain has lost much, even if she has gained more. At the time the conference met, Mr. Rhodes was not even in South Africa. From Germany came no encouragement to obduracy. The Kaiser, indeed, has long since done penance for his telegram, and given the Boers to understand that he can no longer afford to be their friend; and, unless everything short of official confirmation is to be disbelieved, the Anglo-German agreement of last summer makes provision for the transfer of Delagoa Bay from Portuguese to British hands, and so cuts off from the Transvaal its last hope of reaching the sea. Even the French, who have capital invested in the Rand, have of late put aside their Anglophobia, and have been calling upon President Krüger to set his house in order.

BRITON AND BOER

England and the Transvaal were thus left face to face, with the path towards a reasonable adjustment of their differences made as smooth as possible. That the conference, with all these circumstances in its favor, should have failed, and failed without a step being gained towards harmonious compromise, is a fact that must cause the gravest apprehensions.

The conference broke up over the eternal franchise difficulty, which, while it is certainly the *crux* of the whole dispute, is only one of many points of controversy that will have to be straightened out before long. What is known as the suzerainty question is almost as important and considerably more interesting, because more abstract, and I do not apologize for going backward a little way into history to get its proper bearings.

When Mr. Gladstone made peace with the Boers, a few weeks after the defeat of Majuba Hill, he restored to them their former independence, subject to the suzerainty of the British Government. This suzerainty was very clearly defined by the second article of the Pretoria Convention of 1881. It consisted of a right to appoint a British Resident, to whom was given a vetoing power over the policy of the Republic

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

towards the Kafirs—a very necessary provision, for the Boers make Deuteronomy their text-book on all native questions; a right to move troops through the State in times of war; and a right to control and conduct all diplomatic intercourse with foreign Powers. Some such restrictions were necessary to make the surrender palatable to the British public, but neither Lord Derby, then Colonial Secretary, nor his successors, cared much about enforcing them. The Transvaal was held to be a *damnosa hereditas* before the discovery of gold, and the suzerainty clauses were thrown in to save England's face. They did not work well. The Boers chafed under an arrangement that kept them from dealing with the natives in their own way, and disputes became so frequent that Mr. Gladstone proposed a revision of the Convention in 1883.

The conference that led to the signing of the London Convention of the following year attracted very little notice. The British public was tired of the whole business. The spirit of Imperialism had not yet descended on the Colonial Office. The Boers badgered and badgered and got almost everything they wanted. All but complete independence was granted them in

BRITON AND BOER

domestic affairs. The title of Resident was dropped to gratify their susceptibilities, and the British representative at Pretoria became a sort of consul-general on a reduced salary. The word "suzerainty" was omitted as offensive to Boer sentiment. The Convention regulated the western boundaries of the Republic and pledged the Boers not to seek an extension of them. It laid an interdict on slavery or any "apprenticeship partaking of slavery." In one clause only did the British Government assert its external authority. "The South African Republic," says this clause, "will conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or Nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen." This clause again was intended chiefly for home consumption. It was often disregarded by the Boers, and it was not thought important enough to be pressed home by the Colonial Office. The Transvaal in 1884 was a large but barren tract of ground, barely sufficient for the support of one hundred thousand stock-raisers. It had but a small connection with British interests. The one clear thing about it to the mind of Downing Street was that it had given England

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

more trouble than it was worth, and that the best thing to do was to leave it alone.

But the finding of gold caused British officialdom to change its attitude with speed. Thousands of Englishmen, Australians, and Americans swarmed into Johannesburg, and in a few years converted a bankrupt and disorganized State into the second gold-producing country of the world. The Transvaal and its bewildered burghers woke up to find themselves the centre of European intrigue, and the London Convention was discovered to be a document of capital importance.

It is, I think, clear by the terms of the clauses I have quoted that the South African Republic is not an independent State. Its freedom of action is circumscribed both within and without its own territory. Its boundaries, at any rate on one side, are not only fixed, but fixed immutably. In that direction it is forbidden to expand. It cannot, under the clauses of the Convention, introduce slavery, either openly or in any of the veiled forms under which the institution is still countenanced. Especially—and this is the hinge of the whole Convention—is its liberty of negotiation and diplomacy placed under restrictions. Now, no State can be properly called independent which is prohibited from

BRITON AND BOER

managing its foreign affairs in its own way. The Transvaal is free to arrange treaties with the Orange Free State. With all other countries, as with all native tribes, to the east or west, its relations are ultimately controlled by the British Government. The exact word to describe the position in which the two countries stand to one another is hard to find. "Suzerainty" is a doubtful term of loose application in popular parlance, and of uncertain standing in international law. The word has simply been adopted as a convenient one to define the peculiar relations of England and the Transvaal. To employ it adds nothing to the real efficacy of the Convention of 1884; to drop it does not diminish British authority in any way. Call that authority by what name one will—suzerainty, control, or the right to veto—the fact remains that the Transvaal, in some most important branches of its national affairs, is finally subject to Great Britain.

The dispute between the two Governments over this point is, therefore, at bottom largely verbal and sentimental. Whether the amount of control possessed by Great Britain over the Transvaal constitutes a suzerainty cannot be settled until we know exactly what a suzerainty

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

is; and that nobody can tell us. The really important thing to know is that so long as President Krüger accepts and acts up to the terms of the London Convention, he is bound to the clause which carries with it the veto of the British Government on all the diplomatic negotiations of the Transvaal, except those connected with the Orange Free State.

It is one thing to believe in the reality of British control, and quite another to approve its necessity. The first is a question of fact, the second of policy and opinion. Great Britain stands committed to the maintenance of the London Convention by the supposed necessities of her position as the paramount Power in South Africa; and, after the coquetting between President Krüger and the German Emperor that followed the Jameson raid, the fear of foreign intrigue is too strong for any British ministry at present to allow the Transvaal the same latitude in foreign, as it enjoys in internal, affairs. The fear may seem unreasoning; to many it does seem unreasoning; but, though less potent to-day than it was three years ago, it is still vivid enough to make the preservation of the Convention appear a sacred duty and any revision of it a sacrifice of imperial rights. There is room for

a good deal of regret that this should be so. The London Convention has attained a quite undeserved and factitious sanctity in the eyes of English people. From seeing their Government constantly at work defending it against real or alleged breaches, they have come to think it something very well worth defending. It is spoken and written of as a sort of Magna Charta of British dominion in South Africa, without which Cape Colony, Natal, and the whole of Rhodesia would fall a ready prey to some designing Power in alliance with the Transvaal. The question of its real value and of the possibility of revising its hasty clauses has never been squarely considered. Yet there is not much, either in its inception or after-history, to command such perfervid adoration. It was hurriedly and carelessly drafted to bring to its quickest end an issue of which every one was wearied; it was so little thought of that the Boers might claim it has lapsed through frequent unrebuked violations; above all, it dealt with a state of affairs that has altered in every particular since its promulgation. Wherein does its peculiar virtue consist? Most Englishmen would answer, truly enough, in the clause that regulates the external affairs of the Transvaal. But

what, after all, is that clause worth? It has irritated and humiliated the Boers without benefiting England in a single essential. It has forced the British Government to an undignified and unproductive watchfulness over the doings of Transvaal emissaries abroad. If it was designed as an effective check on foreign diplomacy, then the intimate approaches of Germany proved its worthlessness to demonstration. It is, of course, impossible to believe that any Power that thought it worth while to negotiate a secret treaty with the Transvaal would be deterred from doing so by the London Convention; and equally impossible to imagine that, if any such treaty were to be negotiated, the Transvaal would submit it to the approval of the British Government. The obstacle that keeps foreign nations from intriguing with the Transvaal for the overthrow of British ascendancy in South Africa is not a fifteen-year-old piece of parchment, but the strength and position of the British Empire; and that strength and position would remain what they are and be a deterrent of undiminished persuasiveness were the Convention cancelled to-morrow. Either there is the possibility of foreign interference in South Africa, or there is not. If there is, the London

BRITON AND BOER

Convention is no safeguard against it. If there is not, the London Convention, or at any rate its most prominent clause, is superfluous.

As a matter of fact, we know now that neither Germany nor any other Power had serious thoughts of taking upon itself the tremendous responsibility of an attempt to oust Great Britain from South Africa. The true danger to the British position comes from quite another source, from the continued want of harmony and confidence between the English and the Dutch, due to the present turbulent condition of the Transvaal. A civil, not a foreign, war is the menace to be dreaded. It is in the power of the Boers to end the uncertainty that paralyzes commerce and provokes racial antagonism and unrest from Cape Town to the Zambesi by reforming their internal administration; and, as an inducement to set about the task, a guarantee of independence would be far more persuasive than the pointed summonses of the Colonial Secretary. It would seem to be at once an act of magnanimity and good policy if the British Government were to renounce its claims to a suzerainty and, if need be, abolish or revise the Convention, in return for the grant of those concessions to the Uitlanders which can alone make the Transvaal a contented and friend-

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

ly State. The Boers are keenly anxious to have their status as a nation placed beyond question. It galls them, as it would gall any high-spirited people, to find themselves, after all these years of struggle, still in a position of semi-dependence. From the British and imperial point of view, there is nothing in the London Convention to compare with the vital obligation of securing justice for the Uitlanders, and inducing the two races to live side by side in peace. Its abolition would involve the surrender of no right of guardianship over British subjects in the Transvaal that the ordinary law of nations does not already secure to the British Government; and the withdrawal of the suzerainty claims, which are an incessant source of bickerings between the two peoples, and bring no real profit to Great Britain, would do more than anything else to reconcile the Boers to an adequate measure of reform. On the bare terms of the London Convention, as a matter of technical legal right, it is more than doubtful whether Mr. Chamberlain is strictly justified in protesting against any of the features of the President's domestic policy. Yet no one can doubt that, had the Convention been non-existent, the protests would have flowed in just the same, and possibly with greater force and bold-

BRITON AND BOER

ness. The Convention, at best, throws but a dubious legality upon a course of action already founded on broad principles of duty and justice. It really hampers, rather than aids, British ministers in their endeavor to transform President Krüger's fascinating mediævalism into something approaching a modern system of government. No sooner are the Uitlanders shackled with fresh fetters than a brilliant and quite interminable debate springs up between the law officers of the Crown and the legal luminaries employed by Mr. Krüger, as to whether the new imposition is or is not a breach of the Convention; the fetters, meanwhile, remaining where they were placed. The net workings of the Convention have all along favored the Fabian tactics which the President knows so well how to pursue; and, but for one point, he would probably be quite well satisfied to let it remain as it is. That point is the limitations contained in the Convention on the full sovereignty of the Transvaal; and to sweep those restrictions away and place the Republic on an equality with Great Britain, there are probably few concessions which he would not be glad to make. There seems at all events to be here an opportunity for an honorable and satisfactory bargain. An independent Transvaal, with the

RT. HON. CECIL JOHN RHODES, P. C.



RT. HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M. P.



ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

Uitlanders admitted to the franchise, would be no more a menace to the British position in South Africa than is the Orange Free State.

Sir Alfred Milner, of course, went to Bloemfontein with no such heroic proposals in his portfolio. In the present state of England's attachment to the Convention, one has to admit that no such proposals are possible. National dignity, pride of possession, and fears of foreign interference are too keenly aroused to brook the seeming humiliation of retreat, even from a false and unprofitable position. Too much zeal has been spent on the defence of the Convention to make its surrender seem anything but a gross betrayal. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the conference foundered in part on this very rock. The President proposed that certain of the matters in dispute should be submitted to arbitration. Sir Alfred Milner was obliged to answer, in effect, that on any matter of real importance there could be no arbitration between a suzerain State and its dependency. Such pistolling diplomacy does not make for a peaceful issue. The concessions that will have to be granted to end the veiled warfare that threatens to disrupt the Transvaal and bathe the whole of South Africa in blood cannot be ex-

BRITON AND BOER

pected to come from one side only. It is the President's misfortune to have put himself morally in the wrong on almost every point of domestic policy. That does not relieve Great Britain from the obligation of considering whether it would not be an act of mingled wisdom and generosity to make the task of extrication as easy as possible. The renunciation of suzerainty is the only adequate reward in sight that will atone for the comprehensive surrenders required for the reorganization of the Republic's internal economy. It would remove, in great part, the fearfulness of the Boers lest, in yielding to the demands of the Uitlanders, they imperil their own independence; and it would show, as nothing else can, the sincerity and honesty of purpose which animate the English people in their dealings with the Transvaal.

In the Transvaal itself the situation is almost too fantastic for serious presentation. The Uitlanders, seven-eighths of whom belong to the English-speaking race, outnumber the Boers by more than two to one. They own half the land and contribute nineteen-twentieths of the public revenue. It is through their brains and energy that the Transvaal has been raised from bank-

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

ruptcy into its present prosperity. They are citizens of the most progressive countries in the world, accustomed to self-government and intolerant of any encroachments upon their liberty. The Boers have altered little, if at all, since the days when the Dutch East India Company planted them at the Cape, except to add some of the vices of the nineteenth century to the ignorance of the seventeenth. "In some of the elements of modern civilization," says Mr. Bryce, a witness of inspired impartiality, "they have gone back rather than forward." A half-nomad people, of sullen and unsocial temperament, severed from Europe and its influences for over two hundred years, living rudely and contentedly on the vast, arid holdings where their sheep and cattle are pastured—each man as far as may be from his neighbor—disdaining trade, disdaining agriculture, ignorant to an almost inconceivable degree of ignorance, without music, literature, or art, superstitious, grimly religious, they are in all things, except courage and stubbornness of character, the very antithesis of the strangers settled among them. The patriarch Abraham in Wall Street would hardly make an odder contrast. The Uitlanders have an even greater share of the intelligence of the country than of its wealth.

BRITON AND BOER

Nevertheless, they are kept in complete subjection to their bucolic task-masters. They are not allowed to vote, except for a legislative chamber that cannot legislate; they have no voice in the spending of the money taken from their pockets; they see millions of dollars lavished on the secret service and fortifications at Pretoria, while Johannesburg remains a pest-hole; their language is proscribed in the schools and law-courts of a city where not one man in a thousand speaks anything but English; a clipped and barren dialect, as much beneath pure Dutch as Czechish is beneath Russian, is enthroned in its place; and their children are forced to learn geography and history from Dutch text-books after passing the elementary standards—the President, with a directness that would have come home to the late Mr. Dingley, seeking to popularize his native *taal* by a tax of one hundred per cent. upon foreign books.

It is grotesque to think of Englishmen and Americans being treated in this fashion, and it is quite beyond imagination that they should rest passive in such a house of bondage. The restrictions on franchise and education fall hardest, not on the capitalists and large mine-owners, who are mostly absentees, but on the lawyers, doctors,

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

business men, and the working-classes who have settled in the Rand district less as a speculation than to make it their home and earn a living and bring up their families. The recent petition from the Uitlanders to the Queen was entirely the work of professional men and laborers. Neither Mr. Rhodes, nor the Chartered Company, nor the capitalists had anything to do with it. It was a genuine and thoughtful protest from the average working immigrant against the intolerable oppression to which he is subjected. Even raids and poets-laureate cannot weaken the solidity of these grievances. "Diggers," ventured an Australian Premier, "have no country." That may hold good for Coolgardie and the Klondike, but not for the Transvaal; for gold-mining in the Rand is less hazardous and uncertain than elsewhere. A payable reef once found, there is little anxiety of its suddenly petering out. Its owner can reckon with some confidence that deep borings will show the same percentage of gold to rock as appears near the surface; and this unique assurance makes it possible to speculate approximately on the duration of the mines. The opinion of the most competent specialists seems to be that the district, as a whole, will not be exhausted for fifty, and possibly not

BRITON AND BOER

for seventy or eighty, years to come. This puts the Rand on quite a different footing from the gold-fields of Australia and California. The foreigners who have rushed to Johannesburg are, for the most part, genuine settlers, men who look forward to spending their whole lives either in the employment of the mine-owners, or in the ordinary trades and professions that gather round the centre of a great industry. They are not of the order of speculative transients, whose interest in their new resting-place ceases with the discovery and exhaustion or sale of a "lucky strike." In other words, they have a country; and that country is the Transvaal; and as men who have taken up a permanent residence in it, they demand, not unreasonably, that it should be made politically and socially endurable.

Before the discovery of gold any settler in the Transvaal could secure the electoral franchise after a residence of two years. The Boers welcomed the money that flowed into the exchequer when the value of the Rand district became known; but they took instant alarm at the stream of capitalists, engineers, traders, and miners—all speaking the tongue of their hereditary foes—that threatened to overwhelm their independence. To preserve the political *status quo*.

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

they raised the probationary term of qualification for the franchise, first to five years and then to fifteen. In 1890, as a sop to the inevitable clamor for representation, they created a Second Volksraad for the members of which aliens might vote after taking the oath and residing for two years in the country. As the Second Volksraad is not allowed to discuss matters of taxation and as all its decrees are subject to the approval of the First Volksraad—which can legislate without requiring the assent of the inferior chamber—the concession is not worth much. At present no immigrant can vote for the First Volksraad unless he has passed the age of forty and lived for at least fourteen years in the country, after taking the oath and being placed on the government lists, lists on which, according to Mr. Bryce, the local authorities are nowise careful to place him. Even the niggardly reforms proposed by the President at the end of last May were negatived by his burghers. Practically, the Uitlanders are disfranchised. In every other State, Dutch and English stand on the same equality. In the Transvaal, the English are treated like Kafirs. They have not only taxation without representation, but taxation without police, without sanitation, without schools, without justice, without

BRITON AND BOER

freedom of the press, without liberty of association. Johannesburg is ill-paved, ill-lighted, and abominably deficient in drainage and water-supply, because it is English. The courts of law have been prostituted to the whims of the Legislature, in defiance of the written Constitution of the Republic, that thereby the English might be deprived of their one legal remedy against injustice. Education, except in the Boer *taal*, is forbidden above the third standard, in the hope of forcing the English to unlearn their native tongue. And these indignities are put upon the men who are the source of all the country's prosperity, and its saviors from internal dissolution.

There can be little doubt that, had President Krüger yielded to the demand for the franchise when it was first made, he would have to-day, in the gratitude and contentment of his new citizens, the best guarantee for the independence of the Republic. The suspiciousness and conservatism of the Boer character dictated a policy of refusal and delay and unfulfilled promises, from the effects of which the State has been saved more by the mistakes of its opponents than by the President's own shrewdness. If the existence of the Republic seems to be imperilled to-day, President Krüger has chiefly himself to thank for it.

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

His resistance to a just demand has driven the Uitlanders, by a process common to most political agitations, to put forward other and less reasonable claims. A section of the excluded settlers has started the theory, based on Great Britain's suzerainty, that the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Transvaal does not involve the surrender of British citizenship. If the contention were sound, President Krüger would be well within his rights in refusing the franchise to all such hybrid citizens. But the argument will not hold water for a moment. Mr. Chamberlain and all the best legal authorities in England have condemned and disowned it. A British subject on swearing the oath of allegiance to the South African Republic, or any other State, forfeits at once all his rights of British citizenship, and becomes, suzerainty or no suzerainty, a foreigner. It is a pity a contrary plea was ever urged. It has only served to misrepresent the intentions of the average Uitlanders. As a body, the Uitlanders demand, firstly, such an alteration of the present franchise law as will give them at least an effective minority representation; secondly, permission to educate their children in their own tongue; and thirdly, a rearrangement of the tariff. The present tariff

BRITON AND BOER

mulets the whole of Johannesburg for the benefit of a few Boer farmers, and forces the price of the necessities of life to an inordinate figure. Between the omnipotence of a few large capitalists and the fiscal exactions of the Boers, which press as hardly upon Natal, the Orange Free State, and Cape Colony as upon Johannesburg, the middle and working classes in the Rand district, in spite of the high rate of wages, are hard put to it to make both ends meet.

The capitalists have grievances of their own, which their enormous influence in a country of poor men has managed to keep well to the front. The nature and continuance of these grievances show to what lengths the distrust felt by the Boers towards the British will carry them, even to the detriment of the national exchequer. The Government of the Transvaal has made it its policy to hamper in every way the development of the mines from which the public treasury is filled. A French expert has calculated that better legislation and administration would decrease the cost of production by about thirty per cent. Heavy duties are levied on machinery and chemicals; the tariff more than doubles the price of maize, which is the chief food of the native workmen; and the liquor laws, by making it easy for

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

Kafirs to get drunk, reduce the supply of regular labor, and greatly increase the number of accidents. But the loudest complaints are directed against the dynamite and railroad monopolies, from the first of which the State derives not a penny in compensation, and from the second a mere fraction of the sum that goes into the pockets of German and Dutch stockholders. The dynamite monopoly was granted to a German firm some years ago, and securely hedged around by a prohibitive duty on the imported article. The usual consequences have followed. The dynamite is poor in quality and nearly fifty per cent. higher in price than it ought to be. The Netherlands Company, which owns all the railroads in the Transvaal, joins in the merry war of extortion with a series of outrageous freight charges. Taken altogether, these impositions make a difference of three or four per cent. on the dividends of the best mines, threaten the prospect of any dividend on the second best, and make it useless to persevere with those of a still lower grade; the State treasury, of course, suffering in proportion.* One most unwholesome result

* I am indebted for these and other facts to Mr. Bryce's *Impressions of South Africa*, a book the value and thor-

BRITON AND BOER

of this policy is that the rich mines, which can bear the exactions, buy up the poorer ones that cannot, and so tend to bring almost the entire Rand into the hands of two or three capitalists.

It must not be supposed that President Krüger has carried with him the unanimous support even of his own countrymen in making repression the key-note of his policy. There has always been among the Boers a small and liberal minority that favors reforms, and sees in the persistent refusal of the franchise a weapon of offence placed in the hands of their enemies. This minority is still further incensed by the President's importation of Hollanders to fill the government offices, and by his reckless defiance of the Constitution in making the Supreme Court subservient to the Volksraad. Nor have the more enlightened Dutch of Cape Colony and the Orange Free State stood unreservedly on the side of their northern kinsmen. It is true that if any attack were made on the independence of the Transvaal, their racial sympathies might bring them to the support of the Boers; but they are hardly less desirous than the Uitlanders of see-

oughness of which are hardly to be inferred from the modesty of its title.



A TREKKING OUTFIT

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

ing the unrest at Johannesburg put an end to. The heavy tariff on wool, wines, brandy, and food-stuffs all but closes the richest market in South Africa to their staple exports; and they, like every one south of the Zambesi, feel the effects of the discontent that radiates from the Transvaal, paralyzing commercial enterprise and development, and wrapping the whole country in a cloud of uncertainties. While opposed to any forcible interference with the domestic affairs of their kinsmen, they have used their influence more than once, but never with much effect, in the direction of peace and moderation. The President's strength lies in the aptitude of his appeals to the spirit and prejudices of the Old Boer party. These stalwart conservatives concentrate all their hatred and contempt for foreign ways and customs upon the British, the only enemies they have known. It was to escape from British rule that their forefathers struck out from the Cape, across the wilderness, and founded a Republic of their own. The incidents of the Great Trek in the thirties, of which the President is the last survivor, are still held in patriotic memory. The British annexed the new-born State under pledges delayed so long that the Boers took up arms to enforce them

BRITON AND BOER

and won back their old independence. The British stopped the expansion of the Transvaal on the north by occupying Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and on the west by pouncing upon Bechuanaland. It was with British gold, and under the command of British officers, that the raid of 1895 was planned and carried out. Small wonder that the Boers saw, and still see, in the demand for the franchise only another British plot to rob them of their independence. The Uitlanders had come into the country uninvited and undesired, seeking only gold, and with full warning that it was a Boer Republic they were entering. By what right could these strangers of yesterday claim to be put on a level with the old burghers, who had fought and bled to keep the State free from alien control? And what Boer, looking to the past experiences of his people with the English, could guarantee that their capture of the franchise would not lead to their capture of the entire State, that the Republic would not become an English Republic with an English President, and its original founders a despised and oppressed minority?

It would have been a high achievement in diplomacy if Sir Alfred Milner could have persuaded the President, and through him the

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL

Boers, that their fears, if not baseless, are very unlikely to be realized. So long as the reasonable grievances of the Uitlanders are met with an obstinate *non possumus*, the Transvaal runs the risk of perishing suddenly and in violence. The danger can only be avoided by altering the franchise laws to give Johannesburg a voice, not necessarily a preponderating voice, in the government of the country; and by removing the barriers upon the education of English children in English. A revision of the dynamite and railroad monopolies, and a rearrangement of the tariff schedule, would give the capitalists all the privileges they care for, and at the same time add largely to the revenue of the Republic. It is clear that the old suspicious policy of denial and opposition has only endangered the security it was foolishly meant to safeguard. The best hope for the independence of the State must lie in the happiness and contentment of its citizens; and that contentment can only be reached by abolishing racial discriminations and putting British and Boer on an equality before the law. Under a *régime* of frankness and conciliation, the two peoples will be able in time to forget their former animosities and come together in harmony and good-fellowship, as they did in the early days

BRITON AND BOER

of the American colonies, as they still do in Cape Colony. The newly enfranchised citizens, no more the victims of a mediæval oligarchy, will then be as little tempted to hoist the British flag over Pretoria as the French in Canada to return to their old allegiance. The people of England have no hostility towards the Boers, and no ambition to annex their country. They have, on the contrary, an uncomfortable feeling that, in their clashes with the Transvaal, the British reputation for fair-dealing, which so long as it is deserved is the backbone of the Empire, has not been altogether maintained. They admire the old President's pluck and shrewdness and wish him well in his struggle, even where they have to condemn his methods of carrying it on. They cannot find much in his policy that is defensible except its object, and yet they feel that, were they in his place, they would have done much as he has done; and it is because they are sincere in wishing the Transvaal to outlast the lifetime of its rugged champion, that they look to him even at the eleventh hour to overcome prejudice and rebuild his State on the only foundation that has in it the promise of permanence.

SYDNEY BROOKS.

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

A REJOINDER TO MR. SYDNEY BROOKS

ONE of the principal arguments used against the Boers is that they are not only a stationary, but a positively retrograde, people. Among the proofs adduced to substantiate this charge, no one has thought, "*et pour cause*," of mentioning the fact that they are totally ignorant of the art of using the press as a means of influencing public opinion.

The English, with whom, through centuries of initiation, the press has become such a mighty instrument of combat or propaganda, have flooded the world with a mass of publications designed to ruin the Boer cause in both hemispheres. The success of this campaign has been facilitated by the fact that foreign interests in the Transvaal, other than English, could only hope to benefit by it simultaneously with the English interests. Thus, the United States and even France have indorsed the British view of the

BRITON AND BOER

question. On the other hand, the Boers have done nothing to meet their adversaries on this most important field of international warfare. Trusting exclusively to diplomatic action and military resistance to foil the purpose of the English—with what success in the former line the ostentatious passage of the German Emperor from sympathy to indifference, and the open opposition of France to their claims, have already told us; and, in the latter line, England's determination makes it only too easy to predict—they have totally neglected to enlist public sympathy in foreign countries on their side; and yet their case offers aspects which, properly presented, could not fail to cause the impartial mind to pause and deny the righteousness of the English demands. Whether this feeling would take the form of any practical advantage to the Boers, is more than questionable; but it is always desirable for a nation, if only in the interest of morality and its own reputation, to establish its innocence and proclaim the guilt of the aggressor.

It has struck the writer of these pages that what the Boer Government and citizens have refrained from doing, a foreigner, totally unconnected with them, might think of achieving, prompted thereto simply by his sympathy with

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

the persecuted, and by the innate impulse of man to disprove error and combat injustice. By placing myself on the broad grounds of public and international law, natural equity and history, I hope to cover the whole subject of the debate now raging between the "Paramount Power" in South Africa and the Boers, and so help in popularizing the conclusion that the Transvaal is only fighting for dear life against a foe who is meditating a crime nearly as great as was the suppression of Poland.

Before going deeper into the matter, I should like to express the sentiment that, in constituting myself the champion of the Boers, or rather of international faith and honesty, in a United States Review, I address myself more particularly to that section of the American people whose inborn love of truth and justice will not allow their judgment to be obscured by sympathy of race, or by a certain analogy of situations and methods of solution between what was the Cuban Question for the Americans, and what is the Transvaal Question for the English.

The July number of the *North American Review* contains a very interesting article by Mr. Sydney Brooks, dealing with the subject we have in hand from the English point of view.

BRITON AND BOER

It has occurred to me that an excellent way of carrying out my object is to follow Mr. Brooks in his very complete statement of the case, esteeming that, if I can prove the appreciations of this earnest and well-equipped upholder of the Uitlander *Credo* to be false, I shall have achieved a sufficient triumph for the Boers.

After deploring the breakdown of the negotiations between President Krüger and Sir Alfred Milner, in which sentiment everybody must join, Mr. Brooks prefaces his account of the present condition of affairs in the Transvaal with a short review of what is known as the Suzerainty question. From this description we gather that, as a result of a struggle reaching far back into the beginning of the century, and marked by the passionate attachment of the Boers to their independence, and by a lesser tenacity of feeling on the part of the English, two conventions were concluded—one at Pretoria, the other in London, the last of which, although giving away a great deal of the authority maintained by England over the Transvaal, notwithstanding the defeat at Majuba Hill, still kept the Republic in a state of subjection to English control in one or two things. Mr. Brooks goes on to say, and he proves it vigorously, that this right of partial

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

control—call it “suzerainty” or anything else, the term has no importance—to which England clings with great fervor, especially since the discovery of gold in the Transvaal, constitutes a worthless instrument in her hands, whereas it is wormwood and gall to the Boers. Finally Mr. Brooks suggests—and this suggestion should be particularly noticed, because it embodies his idea of a solution of the Transvaal question—that the total surrender of this right of control on the part of the English should and might be a means of achieving a settlement of the affairs in dispute, because “there are probably few concessions President Krüger would not be glad to make, in order to sweep away the limitations on the full sovereignty of the Transvaal and place the Republic on an equality with Great Britain.”

Now, here I part from Mr. Brooks. If it is an illusory advantage for England to claim suzerainty over the Transvaal, as granted by the London Convention, it would be no less illusory a concession to the Republic to free her from the effect of mere empty words. Undoubtedly the Boers would derive a moral satisfaction from the proclamation of their complete independence; but, before making a bargain in that direction,

BRITON AND BOER

President Krüger, of whose shrewdness Mr. Brooks is rightly assured, must see to it that he does not give very valuable wares in exchange for false coin. Why, if the proposition of Mr. Brooks means anything at all, it signifies that the privilege of freeing itself from an insignificant state of dependency is to be acquired by the Transvaal for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders—that is to say, for a weapon with which the English will obtain a complete mastery over it. There is mockery in Mr. Brooks's advice; although he may deny this by saying, as in fact he does say in the course of his argument, that the enfranchisement of the English will not lead to any substitution of authority in the Transvaal. He may say so; but who can help smiling at such a declaration? However, this aspect of the case should not concern us just yet. Let us first look into the matter of enfranchisement, considered as a grievance of the Uitlanders, and speak of it together with their other complaints.

The whole Transvaal issue hinges on one question: Have the Boers the right to govern themselves as they choose; or, rather, have the English the right to interfere with the form of government, administration, and life that the Boers have chosen for themselves? The answer to this query

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

involves considerations of public and international law which are of great importance.

It is the practice of those Powers who have embarked on colonization to occupy territories belonging to savage or semi-savage populations, without much reference to the lawfulness of the operation. In this way, England, France, Germany, ill-advised Italy, and, recently, the United States have spread their dominion over immense tracts of country. Challenged to prove the justifiableness of their conduct, they will begin by solemnly invoking the clauses of conventions concluded with local potentates; and, when the flimsiness and utter hypocrisy of this line of defence are denounced—for we all know the part that intimidation and gin play in these transactions—they fall back on the plea that they are acting in the name of the higher interests of humanity; nay, some say, and they have said it in verse (*vide* Kipling's poem on "The White Man's Burden"), that they are *sacrificing* themselves in behalf of a high notion of duty. Thus, quite a new doctrine has sprung up. Undoubtedly the substitution of enlightened European or American rule for the primitive and too often ferocious modes of savage administration benefits mankind and the natives themselves, for whom

BRITON AND BOER

it is not much of a gain, but still a gain, to die from gin instead of by murdering one another. Yet it would seem that there is something lame in the colonial doctrine, since, even in the most flagrant cases of incapacity on the part of barbarous races to govern themselves, the violent or stealthy occupation of their territories causes a secret unrest to the public conscience and mind. This uneasiness does not result so much from the long-standing conviction, confirmed by the accusations imprudently hurled by the Powers against one another in their spiteful moods, that national, and sometimes only personal, greed is at the bottom of colonization, as from a deeper, though vaguer, source of misgiving. If we exert our minds to give body and shape to this feeling, we recognize in it the instinctive revolt of our nature against anything that threatens the foundations of society; and this the colonial doctrine does, because it is the indirect negation of the principle of property, whether individual or national. That this is so, and that it contains the germ of shocking disturbances to the peace of the world—a germ whose growth helps to render even more farcical the meeting of the conference which recently sat at The Hague—is strikingly proved by what is going on in China, and, what is of more

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

special interest to us, by the events hurriedly preparing in the Transvaal.

From being applied only to the savage populations of Africa and Asia, the principle of the rights of superior races and civilizations has come, by a steep incline, to mean also that it has reference to countries like the Celestial Empire and the Boer Republic. Between the Zulus and the Boers, what is the difference? Only one of degree. Fine reasoning clears the way for the perpetration of any outrage on the liberty and sovereignty of minor or weak States.

I do not mean to contradict my former statement, which is sincere, notwithstanding the irony it seems to contain, regarding the general profit arising from the substitution of civilization for barbarism—especially when the barbarism is of a sanguinary kind—and the justification of transfer of territory in such cases; but what I want to point out is that, invented in an hour of need, a principle has been laid down which is false, because it is loose in its aim and wording, and thus leaves the door open to abuse. We are thus confronted with the angry claims of the English to govern in the Transvaal—enfranchisement means nothing else—followed by threats of war if they are not satisfied.


BRITON AND BOER

The demonstration of the inferiority of the Boers is eagerly undertaken by Mr. Brooks, who calls the situation in the Transvaal "almost too fantastic for serious presentation." On the one hand, we are presented with a bright sketch of the qualities and achievements of the Uitlanders; on the other, with a sombre picture of the Boers, which represents them as being in a semi-barbarous condition. Mr. Brooks says:

"A half-nomad people, of sullen and unsocial temperament, severed from Europe and its influences for over two hundred years, living rudely and contentedly on the vast, arid holdings where their sheep and cattle are pastured—each man as far as may be from his neighbor—disdaining trade, disdaining agriculture, ignorant to an almost inconceivable degree of ignorance, without music, literature, or art, superstitious, grimly religious, they are in all things, except courage and stubbornness of character, the very antithesis of the strangers settled among them."

And yet, *horribile dictu*, these strangers are kept "in complete subjection to their bucolic task-masters." Thus, out of the superiority of the Uitlanders arises a demand for a share in the legislation of the Transvaal; and, because this is opposed, it becomes an additional grievance—the principal one.

Now, what are the specific grievances originally formulated by the Uitlanders? Mr. Brooks



TRADING FOR ZULU LABOR

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

speaks of bad administration, as illustrated by the absence of sufficient police and sanitary arrangements, by the prostitution of the law-courts to the whims of the Legislature, and by the adoption of prohibitive measures against commerce and industry, and the spread of the English language. Even if this is a correct representation of the state of things in the Transvaal—and it may be, except in its reference to justice, which is susceptible of reservations—the English cannot make it a plea for the suppression of Boer government, because that government, although primitive and slowly progressive, as I can afford to admit it is, does not come within the class of institutions which are an outrage to the moral feelings of mankind and provide the only excuse a State can invoke for the suppression of another State. No Englishman, I hope, will deny that the essential notions of morality, if not of civilization, pervade the Transvaal State. What is missing in it is a set of institutions and ideas productive of well-being and luxury. The faculty of a people to dispense with these calls forth the frequent commendation of the English themselves in their political and social literature, as well as in their current talk, with the help of expressions such as “healthy

simplicity of life," "freedom from the enervating and corrupting influences of civilization," and so forth. Besides, the unfriendliness of the soil, as well as the geographical situation of the Transvaal, together with other circumstances, conspired to maintain the Boer community in the state of primitiveness to which it adhered as a matter of temperament, as well as of social and religious principle. If, even after the discovery of the gold-mines, it did not adopt the Anglo-Saxon ideal of a State, it was—supposing there be any necessity to justify a belated form of existence in a nation on other grounds than that of its right to shape its destinies as it pleases, provided it does not tend to become a source of immorality—it was, I say, because, by opposing the spread of what is called civilization within its confines, it hoped to discourage the influx of foreigners, in whose presence, especially in that of the English, it immediately detected the germ of a great danger to its independence. In fact, the inertia of the Boers in the matter of reforms, and their activity in creating obstacles to the development of industry and commerce and to the use of the English language, are inspired as much by this thought as by their constitutional aversion to what the English are free to call "the

blessings," and what *they* are free to call "the curses," of civilization. If there is one duty to which a State is more particularly pledged than to any other, it is the obligation to maintain its existence, and to prefer its own interests to those of other Powers. With this object in view, the Boers are distinctly justified in overlooking the complaints of the British; and there are States which have gone a much greater length in their indifference to the choice of means in devising plans for the national safety, without international law allowing of interference on the part of their neighbors.

The safety and interest of the State are the supreme law of nations.

The methods it suggests very often take the form of downright unscrupulousness and cruelty, which is far from being the case in the Transvaal; and, if any great Power ever thinks of making representations to another on this head, which it can only do in a friendly and officious way, it is because it does not see the beam in its own eye. Need I quote Russia and Germany in this connection? Need I quote the United States? Nay, need I quote England herself? Who is ignorant of the painful aspects of the "language" and "religion" questions in the Em-

pire of the Romanoffs, and in that of the Hohenzollerns? Are the United States free from the pangs of conscience in the matter of the Indians; and, in excluding a whole race, the Chinese, from establishing themselves in American territory, have they not used incomparably more rigor, in order to defend the economical situation of the country, than the Boers in putting difficulties in the way of English immigration, in order to defend the very existence of the State? Or is Great Britain less open to criticism in this relation—she, who is the essence of liberalism when her own people are concerned, but who does not scruple to practise the most despotic principles, when it suits her purpose, in dealing with conquered and alien races; she, who, to quote a curious instance of inconsistency on her part, thunders against the intolerable abuse of the quarantine system in other countries, and yet applies the same system herself in Malta?

If the Transvaal State is against the development of commerce and industry on principle, it is within its rights to be so, as much as the United States in adopting the McKinley and Dingley tariffs. It is a matter of opinion, moral or social in the Transvaal, economic in the United States. If the English were more logical and

more careful to avoid the reputation of being overbearing with the weak, they would no more think of calling the Transvaal to account for its economic policy, than they would of challenging the United States for theirs. What Mr. Brooks calls the prostitution of the law courts to the whims of the legislature, does not apply to the ordinary dealings of justice in the Transvaal, but to the political situation, which, as we have explained, must be governed by the principle of the safety of the State. Finally, if the police and sanitary arrangements are not better, Mr. Brooks himself offers us the best possible explanation: it is because the Boers, in order to defend their threatened independence, are obliged to spend nearly all their money on fortifications and the secret service.

Because they cannot obtain redress, through the Boers, for their imaginary grievances, the English claim a share in the government of the Transvaal, insisting that they have a right to be represented in the Raad; and, being denied this privilege, they make it their principal grievance. On what is this claim founded? Certainly not on the doctrine or practice of other States. I defy anybody to prove that any State or, for that matter, any theory of international law, considers it

an "obligation" for governments to enfranchise aliens, however great their services to the country in which they reside, however great their contributions to its exchequer, however marked their superiority over the natives. Representation, where it exists, is a consequence of citizenship. "Well, then, we have a right to Transvaal citizenship, say the English. Again, why? Some States show a tendency to favor the naturalization of foreigners, especially the American Republics, others, like Russia, are opposed to it; and some, like France, from being very liberal in this matter are now undergoing the effects of reaction. In England, a clause of the law on naturalization provides the Home Secretary with the power to ultimately use his own discretion. But, even in those countries which are most distinctly favorable to naturalization, the practice of adopting aliens is in no way viewed as resulting from an obligation, moral or other, but from the consideration of their own convenience and interest, and it is subject to their own conditions. Nay, in the matter of naturalization, the opinion of the State is so absolutely considered to be all, and the opinion of the individual nothing, that the alien is often naturalized against his will, as is the case in the South American Republics. In fact, the

question is one that is connected to such an extent with the rights of sovereignty, that it can be only regulated by treaty. There is no treaty binding the Transvaal on this head; therefore, the Boers are perfectly free to oppose the English demands. But, says Mr. Brooks, the English are two to one in the Transvaal. If anything, that is an additional reason for refusing to naturalize them, and we know why. That a majority should be governed by a minority is an anomaly; but it is an admitted situation in public and international law. In India, a handful of Englishmen govern 300,000,000 of natives. In the Transvaal, the case of the governing minority is strengthened by the fact that their authority does not proceed from invasion and conquest, which is a vitiating element in the position of England in India, but from a prior establishment in the land, and is exercised against the majority in the defence of a settled order of things, which has received the sanction of international law.

I leave it to the appreciation of my readers to decide whether the foregoing pages do not contain sufficient proofs of the unrighteousness of the quarrel England has picked up with the Transvaal, and of the justifiableness, nay more, the positive meritoriousness of the attitude of the

BRITON AND BOER

Boers, whom no generous nation can do otherwise than admire for the pluck and stubbornness with which they are defending their sovereignty. Might I explain here that I have purposely adopted the darkest colors of Mr. Brooks's palette to reproduce the picture of the Transvaal, in order to strengthen my argument, by showing that, even if things are quite as the English represent them to be, the Uitlanders cannot make out a case for themselves. As a matter of fact, the Boers, whether they will it or not, are submitting much more than the English will admit to the intrinsic force of modern ideas. They are certainly not in a hurry to make a complete surrender to the tide of innovation and reform; but to depict them as radically refractory to the notions of progress is an injustice. The political situation is more to blame for their backwardness than their old-fashioned conservatism; and, as to the bitter complaints concerning the want of proper administration in the Transvaal, these might be proved on closer inspection to be considerably exaggerated, and to be more the result of the animosity of the English against the Boers, than of a real sense of annoyance and discomfort on the part of men who belong to a class accustomed to rough it, and who, moreover,

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

knew exactly what they had to expect in crossing the borders of the Republic.

I think it is also necessary to recall to mind that, notwithstanding the depth of his convictions in his differences with the English, and however great his stubbornness at heart in thwarting their purposes, Mr. Krüger has not pressed his case with all the force it derives from absolute legitimacy and from the importance of the points at issue; and that he has not only avoided provocative forms, but has actually made concessions, the value of which may be a matter of discussion, but whose existence is nevertheless proof of his desire to spare the pride of a great nation.

I will now revert to the important question of the franchise—the one that dominates the whole situation in the Transvaal and has absorbed in itself all the other grievances of the Uitlanders.

Following Mr. Brooks, I have once or twice taken up a stand on his own ground, that of the harmfulness or innocuousness of enfranchisement granted to the English. Although I have been hitherto more concerned with the legal aspects of this question, a practical view of it forced itself upon my attention at an early stage of this discussion, and I contended against Mr. Brooks, apart from all considerations of legitimacy or

non-legitimacy, that, as a matter of opportuneness, the franchise should not be granted by the Boers to the English, because it would lead to the loss of their independence. I will now prove it.

When representation is claimed, it is done with the idea that it will be efficacious; else why claim it? When the English demand representation in the Boer Parliament, they do so with the intention, not of satisfying a whim, but of modifying the legislation of the Transvaal in a way to make it meet their views. They cannot hope to do so without having a majority. Therefore, they aim at outnumbering the Boers in the Raad; and, once this desideratum has been fulfilled, the government of the country will have passed into the hands of men who, following the ordinary impulses of flesh and blood, will transform the Boer State into an English dependency—notwithstanding any assurances to the contrary or even the taking of the oath of allegiance. Can anybody contest this view? Is it at all conceivable that a large body of Englishmen, invested with the power to rule in the Transvaal, will continue to submit to the direction of a President and Government representing a helpless minority, and belonging to what they consider an inferior race? In many things the enfran-

chised Uitlanders may quarrel with one another, but they will act like one man to Anglicize the State. Is the contrary technically possible in a State founded on the play of liberal institutions? Besides, do not circumstances point to the existence of a deep-laid scheme, on the part of England, to annex the Transvaal? Has it not been made evident that, in pursuance of a gigantic conception, England is forging the links of a dominion that will extend from the North to the South of Africa, and that the Transvaal will be the next of these links? The Republic is an obstacle—geographical, ethnical, and political—to English expansion. Even if it did not stand seriously in their way, history teaches us that it would yet be impossible for the English to resist the temptation of occupying, for convenience' sake, a country that, being weak, is at the same time deprived of the traits that might render it sacred—as Greece is, for example—in the eyes of the world, and provide it with friends in the hour of need, even among the Philistines themselves. There is, what for want of a better and less flattering term I will call a sense of the artistic and æsthetic in the spirit of expansion, a sense which revels in conceptions of beautifully rounded and delicately finished frontiers, and un-

BRITON AND BOER

interruptedly national tracts of territory; and the Transvaal, if for no better reason, is marked out for suppression, because, in the eyes of the English Imperialist, it takes the aspect of an absurdity and an eye-sore in the midst of uniformly British possessions, and spoils the whole map of South Africa with the glare of its color imperpetually asserting itself within a huge mass of British pink. I shall make myself better understood by recalling the instinct of the individual landed proprietor, who is not happy until his estate shows continuity and unindented lines.

Mr. Brooks affirms that the English have no designs on the Transvaal; yet, at the same time, with a contradiction which does not in the least disturb his equanimity, he endorses the apprehensions of the Boers. What he says is too precious not to be literally repeated:

“The President's strength lies in the aptitude of his appeals to the spirit and prejudices of the Old Boer party. These stalwart conservatives concentrated all their hatred and contempt for foreign ways and customs upon the British, the only enemies they have known. It was to escape from British rule that their forefathers struck out from the Cape, across the wilderness, and founded a Republic of their own. The incidents of the Great Trek in the thirties, of which the President is the last survivor, are still held in patriotic memory. The British annexed the new-born State under

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

pledges, delayed so long, that the Boers took up arms to enforce them and won back their independence. The British stopped the expansion of the Transvaal on the north by occupying Matabeleland and Mashonaland and on the west by pouncing upon Bechuanaland. It was with British gold and under the command of British officers that the raid of 1895 was planned and carried out. Small wonder that the Boers saw, and still see, in the demand for the franchise only another British plot to rob them of their independence. The Uitlanders had come into the country uninvited and undesired, seeking only gold and with full warning that it was a Boer Republic they were entering. By what right could these strangers of yesterday claim to be on a level with the old burghers who had fought and bled to keep the state free from alien control, and *what Boer looking to the past experiences of his people with the English, could guarantee that their capture of the franchise would not lead to their capture of the entire State, that the Republic would not become an English Republic with an English President and its original founders a despised and oppressed minority?*”

Following up this amusing piece of treachery, of which he is unwittingly guilty towards himself and his thesis, Mr. Brooks goes on to say that it would have “been a high achievement of diplomacy if Sir Alfred Milner could have persuaded the President, and through him the Boers, that their fears, *if not baseless*, are very *unlikely* to be realized.” I need not point to the delicious effect of the words, “if not baseless, are very un-

BRITON AND BOER

likely to be realized." But the crowning point of Mr. Brooks's originality is to be found in the following passage :

"The people of England have no hostility towards the Boers and no ambition to annex their country. They have, on the contrary, an uncomfortable feeling that, in their clashes with the Transvaal, the British reputation for fair-dealing, which so long as it is deserved is the backbone of the Empire, has not been altogether maintained. They admire the old President's pluck and shrewdness* and wish him well in his struggle, even when they have to condemn his methods of carrying it on. They cannot find much in his policy that is defensible, except its object ; *and yet they feel that, were they in his place, they would have done much as he has done. . .*"

If ever there was truth in the saying, "I can cope with my enemies, but, oh, God! save me from my friends," it would be in its application by the English to Mr. Brooks.

To quote this gentleman's words for the last time, he says that "so long as the reasonable grievances of the Uitlanders are met with an obstinate *non possumus*, the Transvaal runs the risk of perishing suddenly and in violence." In other words, it is threatened with war.

Therefore, it is a choice of two evils for the

* I wonder what else "shrewdness" means here but the faculty to see through English schemes.

A VINDICATION OF THE BOERS

Transvaal, of suicide or death at the hands of another. One way or the other, whether they yield or appeal to arms, the Boers are doomed ; for, in case it is war, England is determined to bring all her might to bear upon them this time, and then all their bravery and military capacity will not save them from defeat and destruction. They can hope to achieve new distinction by a heroic resistance, by gaining some battles, but this will be of no material avail to them, as they must be overpowered and beaten in the end. With the confidence and increased energy of purpose derived from her triumphs in Egypt, Great Britain means to settle the South African problem in her own way and at any cost. Whatever the choice of the Boers, the end seems to be fast approaching. Most of us will probably live to see the curtain fall on the last act of the tragedy now enacting in the Dark Continent, the suppression of the Transvaal. Europe will look on, but will not stir ; and Great Britain, at the zenith of her power and glory and prosperity, will continue to shoot in the skies of international politics, a fiery and uncontrollable orb, until she meets the star that is rising from the East, borne on the wings of Autocracy and Orthodoxy, and which is slowly but steadily moving on the same



BRITON AND BOER

path. Then the heavens will ring and shake with the tremendous clash, and we shall witness the truth or falsehood of the proud English creed that there is no end to the mission of Great Britain, that she can only grow and spread her Empire, and that, superior to Rome, she will achieve durability in the midst of supreme power.

A DIPLOMAT.

A TRANSVAAL VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

SOUTH AFRICA is poor, extremely poor, in spite of its gold output of nearly two millions per month and its diamond export of five millions per year.

The disabilities from which South Africa suffers are manifold. The climate is glorious, the soil fertile, but the rainfall is uncertain and irregular. There are large tracts where rain falls only once every four or five years; and, where circumstances are more favorable, there are no natural reservoirs in which water can be stored, or certainly none to any appreciable extent. The rivers, dry in summer-time, become foaming torrents in the rainy season, and pour the whole of their waters into the sea. If the Witwatersrand were not situated alongside an extensive formation of dolomite, which absorbs rain-water, and stores it up like a sponge, it would have been utterly impossible for its unrivalled gold industry to attain its present condition, and the

Boers to-day would be enjoying the rest and peace which they have ever longed for and deserve.

In addition to the dearth of water, South Africa has had to contend with many other drawbacks, resulting from its clumsy topographical configuration. On its northern confines, it is defenceless against the ravages of nature, which sweep like a whirlwind through the whole of the southern continent. From olden days, Africa has been known as the land of plagues and calamities. Rinderpest sweeps down from the north, and its latest attack, in 1896, brought ruin to both white and black; from the north, too, come the locusts and other noxious insects; from the north, come the hot tropical winds, bringing drought and warding off the beneficent rain; and from the north have many clouds arisen casting sinister shadows on this part of the continent. The clumsy configuration of South Africa, to which I have alluded, is the natural result of its plateau-form, with its abrupt descent to the Indian Ocean. The region is devoid of navigable rivers; the sea-coast is an endless, monotonous line without fiords, without estuaries, without inlets of any kind, and therefore without harbors. The west coast is, moreover, separated

from the interior by wastes of sand-dunes; the east coast is unhealthy and haunted by the tsetsefly. No wonder that Phœnicians, Arabs, and Portuguese, after their first experience of the country, had little inclination to colonize it, and to make it their home. The only white men who manage to adapt themselves to the exigencies of the southern continent and build up a stalwart nation are the Afrikanders. They are destined to occupy the land forever, and to thrive here when diamonds and gold shall be things of the past.

And the blacks? I have already said that South Africa is poor, and has never possessed any large population, for the reason that it could not support it. The Bushmen live like beasts of prey in the wilderness; the Hottentots were subject to continuous decimation through sickness and famine. When the warlike Zulus, several centuries ago, came down along the east coast, they drove before them the few handfuls of human beings they encountered, like leaves before the wind, became masters of the best subtropical portion of the eastern provinces, murdering and slaying like swarthy Huns, and pressed down to Natal. But although their social organization was higher than that of the nomadic tribes which they superseded, the poverty of South

BRITON AND BOER

Africa constrained them to continue war among themselves. As soon as one Zulu tribe commenced to thrive and increased in wealth of cattle, it became necessary to obtain more land—in other words, to wage war against its neighbors; for South Africa was not able to give shelter to any dense population. That is why the Zulus could only manage to exist either by internecine strife or by occasional emigration, to the natural detriment of the weaker races. Both the legendary and documentary history of South Africa's blacks tends to prove that, when sickness had not to be reckoned with, war inevitably became the means of reducing the population of this region to its normal sustaining capacity. In recent years, the supremacy of the whites has materially affected internecine war as a limiting factor with regard to native population; but its place has been filled in some measure by disease and drink. There is no doubt, however, that the black population is greatly on the increase, now that they are not permitted to indulge in war among themselves. But, at the same time, the importation of foreign "mealies" (maize)—the staple food of the Kafirs—has also steadily increased; in 1897, the South African Republic imported nearly 36 million



THE WAR-DANCE OF THE ZULUS

A TRANSVAAL VIEW

pounds of mealies; in 1898, the total importation had risen to over 44½ millions. There will come a day when the natives will cease to get work at the mines, when the mines will be exhausted. Then the importation of South American cereals will fall off, and South Africa will be expected to provide food for its own native population. Will it be equal to the task? The history of the past supplies an eloquent answer.

But with the industrious European colonist, schooled and disciplined by labor, can South Africa not produce what is necessary for his support? The white population of this part of the world amounts, in round numbers, to two millions—a very generous estimate—inhabiting a vast extent of country, larger than France, Germany, and Italy together. This population is dependent on the outside world, not merely for the products of technical industry, but also for those of agriculture. We import potatoes and frozen meat from Australia, wood from Canada and Norway, eggs and butter from Europe, meal and mules from America. The sugar and tea grown in Natal cannot compete with the products of Mauritius and Ceylon, without the aid of protection. In order that these two millions of whites may be commercially accessible

to the outside world, and that this huge import trade may be practicable, more than fifty million pounds sterling have been devoted to railway construction. Every week sees numerous steamers arriving from all parts of the world, laden with every conceivable kind of goods, to supply the limited South African community with many necessaries of life. Should this means of supply ever be cut off, a large portion of our white and other population would simply starve, or at any rate be deprived of the comforts of life. Only the Boers, who eke out a frugal existence on their secluded farms, and have not yet become dependent on frozen meat, European butter, American meal, and Australian potatoes—only the Boers, who, with rare endurance, the heritage of their hardy race, boldly face years of drought, rinderpest, locusts, and fever, could survive such a collapse of the economic machinery of a country so severely dealt with by nature. The remaining Europeans would gradually disappear, just as the Phœnicians and the Arabs disappeared in the days long past. As long as the gold-mines and the diamond-mines can be worked and made to pay, so long will the abnormal economy of South Africa preserve its balance; but as soon as South Africa has swallowed up its capital to the

very last bit of gold, the Uitlander will have to seek for fresh fields for the exercise of his nervous energy, and the Afrikander will be abandoned to his struggle with the inimical elements, as has ever been his lot in the past. By the sweat of his brow he will have to lead his carefully stored-up water to the fields continuously threatened by locusts, he will have to shield his flocks from plague and theft, he will have to preserve continual watch against the inroads of the ever-increasing blacks. The Boer—that is, the agriculturist—is destined to be the Alpha and Omega of South Africa's white culture; he alone, in this quarter of the globe, can save civilization from the ultimate gulf of bankruptcy. To say that South Africa is a rich land, or to paint its future in glowing colors and to dilate on the brilliant prospects that it offers to an unlimited white population, is only possible to an extraordinarily superficial observer, to an unscrupulous company promoter, or to an over-zealous emigration agent, whose salary is in proportion to the number of his victims.

The first European Power which acquired a firm footing in the East Indies, the Portuguese, simply ignored South Africa. The Portuguese were succeeded by the Hollanders, who, not until

after much hesitation and two futile attempts to conquer Mozambique, decided to take possession of Africa's southern extremity. And the English, in common with the Hollanders, never desired aught but the few harbors which South Africa possesses; the interior had no value in the eyes of the European maritime Powers, which only looked to the opulent East. A clear illustration of this is furnished by the fact that, although possessing Walvisch Bay, England quietly acquiesced in Germany's protectorate over the hinterland; and another instance is to be found in the anxiety which England has recently shown to get hold of Delagoa Bay and Beira. The possession of these harbors would give to the British Empire control of the sea-way to the East, and to the English merchants such trade with the interior of South Africa as circumstances might permit. Neither the Dutch East India Company nor the British rulers bestirred themselves in any way, in connection with the steady expansion of the white colonists in the hinterland. And this interior colonization had barely acquired any importance before there arose both petty and material disturbances with the authority representing the purely European factor. This was not at all difficult to understand. The community at the

Cape was composed of administrators and merchants who amassed considerable fortunes by means of the uninterrupted trade between Europe and India; the luxury which reigned at the foot of Table Mountain was proverbial; all the comforts of European civilization could be enjoyed in sunny South Africa, untroubled by the shadows of the Old World. In vivid contrast to this luxurious life of ease, the burdens of the inland colonists were, indeed, grievous to be borne; rough, hardy pioneers of the wilderness, their life was one prolonged struggle with poverty, with ravaging beasts of prey, and with stealthy Bushmen and Hottentots. No wonder, therefore, that, little by little, a social gulf was created, that a marked dissimilarity of character was gradually developed between the up-to-date Cape patricians, treading the primrose paths of luxury, and the nomadic shepherds of the veldt, independent of aught save their fowling-pieces, and undisputed lords of the limitless plateau behind the mountains fringing the coast. No wonder, therefore, that the mere handful of conquerors of the Great Karroo had little love for the arbitrary rule of a Proconsul in Cape Town Castle, on behalf of an authority having its headquarters in Europe.

Under the Dutch East India Company friction often arose between the two white elements of the Colony, and when the Cape fell into the hands of the British, in the beginning of the present century, the old antagonism continued to exist. I once heard it said that when Napoleon surrendered to the British in 1815, there was some talk of assigning to him, as a final resting-place, that pretty country estate of the early Dutch Governors not far from Cape Town, but that this idea had to be given up, on account of distrust of the feelings of the inland colonists, there being some fear that South Africa might see a repetition of the Elba incident. As long as the Imperial authorities left the inland colonists to themselves, and only exercised a general repressive control, the relationship between the two white communities of South Africa remained satisfactory, but as soon as the strings were pulled too suddenly from Europe, and the Cape authorities had to carry out a grasping, despotic policy, the two elements inevitably came to loggerheads. The best South African politicians—both British and Boer—are those who have frankly admitted that the political key to South Africa lies in an intelligent insight into the limit which should be allowed to

Briton, Boer, and Black. In other words, let each of the three fulfil the mission which nature has allotted to him, and then this much-vexed continent will enjoy the rest and peace of which it so urgently stands in need.

Is it necessary to give a résumé of the painful episodes which thronged upon one another in South Africa in the nineteenth century? The result of a hundred years of incompetency, weakness, vacillation, and reckless greed culminates to-day in the awful probability of an insensate strife between two hardy vital races, races unique by reason of their capacity for colonial expansion, races of similar origin and religion, races whose internal co-operation could have made this country, if not exceptionally prosperous, at least a particularly happy land, so that the dream of one of its most gifted children, Thomas Pringle, might have been fulfilled in gladsome measure:

“South Africa, thy future lies
Bright 'fore my vision as thy skies.”

The first beneficent breathing-space which was granted to South Africa by the fatal British policy was when, in 1852 and 1854—after numberless mistakes had been committed by the Imperial authorities, mistakes which no historian

now attempts to deny—the South African Republic and the Free State were respectfully left to their own resources, by solemn covenants with the British Government—in other words, when the formal principle was adopted by England that the Briton should be “baas” of the coast and the Boer of the hinterland. The circumstances under which this took place had in the mean time become very grievous: the Boer States never had a fair start; the British maritime colonies levied enormous duties on goods consigned to the interior, and squeezed as much out of the Afrikaner republics as they possibly could. And thus while the British merchants at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban waxed fat and wealthy, the Boers became more and more impoverished. But they were sustained in their struggle against poverty by the hardy spirit which was their peculiar heritage from their forefathers. And although the Free State and the Transvaal languished in their material development, and Natal and the Cape batted upon them, the Boers were satisfied, like the lean dog in the fable who did not envy the lot of his richer brother, because the latter had to wear a heavy collar of gold.

The generous policy of 1852 and 1854 was only

too short-lived. The lucid moments of the Anglo-African politicians have been, alas! few and far between. First came the ruthless annexation of Basutoland by the British authorities, just at the moment when the Free State had clipped the wings of the Basutos and rendered further resistance futile. Then came the unrighteous annexation of Griqualand West, which suddenly found favor in the eyes of the British on account of the discovery of diamonds, and on which arose the Kimberley of to-day. This was followed by the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, with all the bitter feeling that naturally resulted therefrom. And then the Sir Charles Warren expedition, by which the Boers were deprived of Bechuanaland, because Mr. Rhodes—whose fortunate career at the Kimberley Diamond Fields enabled him to give the rein to his restless ambition—wanted to open up a pathway to the north, to the Rhodesia of to-day. Then came the establishment of the Chartered Company, followed by the notorious Jameson Raid. Such petty incidents as the Keate Award, the Swaziland Muddle, the Annexation of Sambaan's Land, I will pass over, for brevity's sake. In short, the beneficent policy of 1852 and 1854, which was for a moment revived under the Glad-

stone Ministry of 1881—when the independence of the South African Republic was restored—has been the exception during the century now speeding to its close. British statesmen apparently failed to see that South Africa could only be served by giving each race the domain which destiny had prepared for it, viz., the Boer the hinterland and the Britisher the coast, together with the rights and obligations connected therewith. The welfare of the interior States has ever been the life-buoy to which the whole of South Africa has clung, in times of darkness and depression. Let the interior have a fair opportunity of thriving as well as the peculiar circumstances of the country permit, and the subjects of Queen Victoria will be able to enjoy the manifold pleasures of life without one drop of English soldiers' blood having to be spilled.

The immediate motive which prompted Sir Theophilus Shepstone's annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 was the commencement made by President Burgers of the long-cherished railway to Lourenço Marques. Natal and Cape Colony were not satisfied with squeezing the inland States by means of heavy duties, high postal tariffs, and enormous trade profits; they sought the complete economic dependency of the Re-

publics, by prohibiting all railway traffic except through British ports. The selfishness of a commercial community knows no limit.

The second attempt to annex the South African Republic—with which the names of British politicians were connected—was not the result of a commercial policy, but it furnishes a striking illustration of the capitalism which has become such an important factor in South African policy, since the amalgamation of the diamond companies of Kimberley into one mighty body. The fact that to-day—while these lines are being written—this unhappy continent is on the eve of a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, can only be explained by the overwhelming influence acquired by certain "*nouveaux riches*"—whose social existence depends upon the Transvaal gold industry—among those who on the British side are shaping the fate of South Africa.

During the course of the present century, this part of the world has witnessed a variety of "agitations." It was the negrophilist agitation which drove the Boers in bitterness of spirit beyond the boundaries of Cape Colony; and it was an administrative agitation which for a long time impeded their progress and threw all manner of obstacles in their way; it was the politics of the

counting-house which suggested the annexation of the Diamond Fields and the annexation of the Transvaal; and it is a stock exchange organization which is pulling the strings of the movement of to-day. Of all these agitations, the last—that of the financiers—is the most despicable, the most ominous, the most dangerous, and the most unworthy of the British nation. The Boers can forgive Dr. Philip for his negrophilistic ardor, they can forgive Sir Harry Smith, Sir Philip Wodehouse, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Owen Lanyon for their excess of administrative zeal, but no Afrikaner will bow down at the bidding of a group of foreign speculators.

When the Witwatersrand gold-fields were discovered, the Transvaalers had already had some experience of the advantages and disadvantages attendant on the possession of mineral wealth. In the early seventies, the opening up of the alluvial deposits at Pilgrim's Rest, in the north-east of the Republic, was the cause of considerable immigration. In the eighties, there was a rush to the diggings at Dekaap, of which Barberton became the centre, the Afrikaner element being strongly represented. From the very beginning, the law-makers of the Transvaal dealt very leniently with the miners, the vast

majority of whom were foreigners. The Boers knew of the mineral wealth of their country at an early date, but they never felt constrained to exchange the quietude of their pastoral life for the feverish existence of the gold-seeker. The Boers have never endeavored to turn the presence of gold in their soil to practical account, and make it a direct source of national income; as, for instance, the Chartered Company has done, expropriating a large portion of the profits of the gold-fields. An instance of this liberal legislation, more striking than a long array of figures, is furnished by the public lottery of gold claims—some of which are extremely valuable—which is now taking place, and in which both burghers and Uitlanders can participate without distinction.

The exceptionally generous legislation of the Boers with regard to mining matters was effected with the sole object of fostering agriculture; this has, however, only been realized in part, owing to the fact that the expansion of the mining industry gradually made native labor dear, and thus heavily handicapped the agriculturist. The administration of the Boers in the days of Pilgrim's Rest and Barberton compares very favorably with that of the Diamond Fields

BRITON AND BOER

of Cape Colony. The Transvaalers were good-natured, but they had no inclination to be trifled with. In those days there was no talk of Uitlanders' grievances, nor even during the early years of Johannesburg. The Witwatersrand is not situated, like Pilgrim's Rest and Barberton, in an unfrequented part of the country, but it lies to the immediate south of Pretoria, between Potchefstroom and Heidelberg, in the very heart of the Boer States. Johannesburg sprang up with astonishing rapidity, and offered special attractions to the large number of South African adventurers who, like Mr. Micawber, were only "waiting for something to turn up." From their farms in the Free State, from their way-side stores in Cape Colony, from their plantations in Natal, from their broker offices in the Diamond Fields, they gathered together—men of every type and every class, but united in their feverish thirst for wealth. The expectations of the most sanguine were realized; they reaped a rich harvest in the shape of large exchange profits, although many of their number knew practically nothing about mining or financial administration. Then came the inevitable collapse in 1889, which only spared the most fortunate; and the great majority of this strangely mixed community were gradually com-



JOHANNESBURG

A TRANSVAAL VIEW

pelled to make room for more competent men from Europe and America. These brought brains and experience into their work, and placed the industry upon a more solid basis; but they also inoculated the Uitlanders with the *bacilli* of discord and revolution, much to the detriment of the shareholders across the sea.

The appearance of the present-day Uitlander—that is to say, the grievance-bearing, or rather grievance-seeking, stranger—dates from the period when qualified experts satisfied themselves as to the uniquely favorable situation of the precious metal in Witwatersrand—from the time when wild speculation began to make room for a genuine exploitation of the mines. The preliminary period to which I refer above was the cause of an influx of immigrants into the Republic. They spread themselves over the face of the country, penetrating into the most outlying spots, in order to procure material for the flotation of mining companies. This period also saw the birth of the “Land and Estate” Companies, who generally bought up the most uninhabited or uninhabitable farms for speculative purposes. By reason of foreign ownership of large tracts of land, the argument is often advanced that an enormous portion of the South African Republic

no longer belongs to the Boers. It may be remarked, *en passant*, that, while the Boer has been severely condemned for his slothfulness in matters agricultural, practically none of the land companies has ever devoted more than a few acres to the growing of crops. When the period of wild speculation suffered a collapse, the Uitlander no longer spread himself over the whole of the Republic. Henceforward, the Witwatersrand was the exclusive scene of his labors, and here he elected to pitch his tent. Outside the Rand, he confined himself to the ordinary occupations of the olden days—that of store-keeper for the folk of the few rustic centres, and bank manager, hotel-keeper, and clergyman in the solitary country towns.

After the crash of 1889, Johannesburg slowly became *the* Uitlander town *par excellence*. It deserves to be recorded that, as the output of gold began to show a continual increase, the "Uitlander question" acquired a proportionate magnitude. In every country where foreigners are to be found in appreciable numbers, there is an Uitlander question. It exists in France, in regard to the Italians and Belgians living there; in Japan, in regard to the Americans and Britishers; in London, in regard to the Poles; in

the Middle Ages the Jews were in many cases a powerful "Uitlander" element. During the last century the Germans in Russia have been "Uitlanders," and, according to the Czechs and Hungarians, they are so in Austria to-day. But the Uitlander question in the South African Republic differs from the Uitlander question elsewhere, as it has been made the cause of an international dispute between two States of unequal strength. In its present form, the Uitlander question is only the mask of a financiers' plot, of a piece of Exchange jobbery. It has steadily kept pace with the gold output. In 1889, £1,500,000 was produced. In that year, Johannesburg was horrified by a series of stealthy murders which were only explained as the handiwork of "Jack the Ripper." No one thought at that time, however, of saddling the Transvaal Government with responsibility for them, or of sending plaintive petitions to England as to the danger of life in the South African Republic! Every one understood, then as now, that gold-fields offer peculiar attractions to questionable characters of all classes. In March, 1890, during a visit of President Krüger to the Golden City, the Transvaal flag was pulled down from the Government buildings. It subsequently tran-

spired that this was only the work of some drunken rough, and the mining and mercantile communities lost no time in expressing their disapproval of the incident. The realization of the practical value of the deep-level theory—in other words, the ultimate conviction as to the indisputable durability and wealth of the Witwatersrand gold-fields—has, in the mean time, become the signal for an agitation against the Government and the people of the South African Republic. From this period dates England's claim to suzerainty over the South African Republic and the paramount-powership in South Africa, of which hitherto no mention had ever been made. In 1894, the then High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, was present at some diamond-drill experiments at the Rand, which proved beyond dispute the continuous nature of the gold-bearing reef at a considerable depth, and at an important distance from the outcrop reef. During this visit, Sir Henry Loch made a promise to the mining magnates—as per letter of Mr. Lionel Phillips, then the Chairman of the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines*—to stir up the Transvaal Government on condition that the "Uitlander" agi-

* *Vide* Transvaal Green Book, No. 2, of 1896.

tation increased in intensity. The Transvaal Green Book provides instructive reading even for to-day; it contains extracts from private letters from Mr. Phillips to his London friends. On the 10th of June, 1894, he wrote to Mr. Beit:

"As to the franchise, I do not think many people care a fig about it."

On the 1st of July of the same year, he wrote to Mr. Wernher:

"Sir H. Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone) asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms we had in Johannesburg, whether the population could hold the place for six days until help could arrive, etc., etc., and stated plainly that if there had been 3000 rifles and ammunition here he would certainly have come over. He further informed me, in a significant way, that he had prolonged the Swaziland agreement for six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared—as much as to say, if things are safer then we shall actively intervene."

This conversation took place at Pretoria, where Sir Henry Loch, as the representative of Her Majesty's Government, was the honored guest of the Transvaal people! On the 15th of July of the same year, Mr. Phillips wrote to Mr. Beit:

"We don't want any row. Our trump card is a fund of £10,000 or £15,000 to improve the Volksraad. Unfortunately the Gold Companies have no Secret Service Fund."

BRITON AND BOER

All this happened in 1894, when the gold output had already reached a total of nearly $7\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling. In 1895 it had risen to $8\frac{1}{2}$ millions; the "trump card" had also risen and amounted to £120,000, with which sum the Reform movement at Johannesburg was partially financed—a movement which came to an untimely end at Doornkop.

In 1897 the inquiry by the official Industrial Commission took place, the result being a substantial lowering of railway tariffs and import dues. But the "grievances" still remained, and increased in 1897 in sympathy with the gold output, which had now reached the large figure of $11\frac{1}{2}$ millions. Still more "unbearable" were these "grievances" in 1898, during which year $16\frac{1}{4}$ millions of gold was dug out of Transvaal soil. This was the year of the Edgar affair and of the Uitlander Petition, and in the same year forty-five gold companies of the Rand (the share capital issued being £20,294,675) paid out in dividends no less than £5,089,785—an average of 25 per cent.! The output for 1899 has already been estimated at $22\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and the number of dividend-paying companies increases every month.

In 1896 the rural population were visited by

A TRANSVAAL VIEW

a series of grievous plagues—by rinderpest, by drought, by locusts, and by the dreaded fever. While the Uitlanders of the Rand were reported to be groaning under the oppression of their Egyptian task-masters, and European shareholders were depicted as helpless victims of a corrupt Krüger régime, the Boers were "taking up arms against a sea of troubles" which threatened to overwhelm them, and of which we heard exceedingly little, either in the local papers or in the cable columns of the London press. While thousands of Boer families saw the fruit of long years of toil plucked away by the hand of God in a single season, the campaign of libel on behalf of the Uitlanders was vigorously prosecuted with the help of money won from Transvaal soil by mining magnates, the princely munificence displayed by whom in London and other places outside South Africa was occasionally referred to in the local papers as a joyous chord between the "grievance" symphonies that were struck in the minor key.

I have little inclination to expatiate on the true character of the present movement against the Boers; but I do say that to support the latest type of agitation against the white population of the interior of South Africa is unworthy of the

traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race. The South African Republic is not without political blemishes; as in every other country, we have our administrative scandals, both great and small; we have our social and economic plague-spots, which must be made to disappear. Gold-fields never were fountains of pure morality, nor are they so in South Africa. Has one ever pictured the future of the most civilized country of the Old World if a second Johannesburg were to spring up in mushroom fashion? I do not wish to speak evil of the wire-pullers of the present agitation against the Afrikaners; but, surely, those persons whose princely palaces have been built with Transvaal gold, and who cry out so loudly against our Government, should be the last to throw stones against the Republic. The "oligarchy" at Pretoria—to use Mr. Chamberlain's recent expression—consists of barely a few dozen Boers; there is, therefore, strong evidence in favor of this "oligarchy" in the fact that it has been able to offer such prolonged resistance to the well-disposed and undoubtedly disinterested attempts of such gentlemen as Lionel Phillips to "improve" them from Johannesburg and London. Such an "oligarchy" is without a parallel in modern times. It forms a striking contrast to the worship of the golden

calf on the Witwatersrand, from which Pretoria is only distant about three hours on horseback. Such an "oligarchy" deserves to be carefully preserved rather than destroyed, as we preserve from total extinction some rare plant or peculiar species of animal.

There are undoubted grievances in the South African Republic, but they are not the exclusive property of the Uitlanders; a discreet silence is observed with respect to the wrongs of the Transvaal burghers, and I do not feel it to be my task to dilate upon them now. But still they exist, although the absorbing selfishness of the mining magnates keeps back the light of day: the lust for gold stifles all generosity, compassion, mercy, brotherly love, and respect for the rights of the weak. What Monomotapa was to the Phœnicians and Arabs, Witwatersrand is to our present gold-seekers, and to most of the Uitlanders—a temporary land of exile, which they only endure for the sake of the gold. Can we picture the wise King Solomon demanding the franchise for his subjects in the realms of the Queen of Sheba?

South Africa is poor; it will remain poor in spite of its gold and its diamonds. It will never be able to pay back the cost of a bitter strife, unless the gold-bedecked princes come forward with

the treasure which they have wrung from the land. As long as the Boers allow the modern Phœnicians to dig the precious metals out of Transvaal soil without heavy impositions, and to have a free hand in the administration of the country and the government of the native population, it will be found that the best business policy will be to leave the Boers in undisturbed possession of their country, free to rule it by their own healthy instinct and according to the good old traditions of their forefathers, with their own language, their own rulers, their own aspirations—even with their own faults and prejudices.

It should not be forgotten that, from the earliest days of the gold-fields, the Uitlanders knew that the South African Republic was an "oligarchy"; they knew that the Boers were "illiterate," "stupid," "ignorant," and a great deal besides; they knew that a dynamite monopoly existed, and that President Krüger was a "hard nut to crack." Notwithstanding this knowledge the "Uitlanders" have flocked in by thousands, and foreign capital has been invested amounting to several hundreds of millions sterling. During the first five months of the present year, Transvaal gold and other companies were regis-

tered here with a combined capital of over £15,391,389. In July last—in the middle of the crisis—five new companies were registered with a capital of £1,159,000. And of all the Uitlanders only a section of the British subjects are genuinely dissatisfied. Notwithstanding that the "oppression" of the Transvaal "oligarchy" has been told and retold, until the world has become sick and weary, immigrants are still pouring in from all quarters of the globe.

The Boers do not ask for mercy; they ask for justice. Those who keep up the unfair agitation against the South African Republic are the last men, however, to listen to the voice of righteousness, or to be guided by any noble impulse; political corruption is the seed they sow, and by their unexampled opportunities they feel confident of reaping their criminal harvest. Up to the present they have gathered only tears; a still more bitter time of reaping has yet to come. In the past, the Boers have been able to fight against immensely superior odds. They feel that the final victory will be theirs; for they know they have right on their side.

Well would it be for the British nation if they could but realize the significance of those words of Russell Lowell :

BRITON AND BOER

“Truth forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne,
Yet that scaffold sways the future, and behind the dim
unknown
Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above
His own.”

F. V. ENGELBURG.

PRETORIA, *August*, 1899.

THE TRANSVAAL WAR AND EUROPEAN OPINION

I

ALL Europe is united in condemning the attack made by the English Government upon the independence of the South African Republic, in violation of the clearest treaty rights solemnly guaranteed in London in 1884. In Germany, men of most diverse parties—from the moderate Constitutionalist, or even Conservative, to the advanced Liberal and Democrat—those that favor a Colonial policy as well as those who oppose or bitterly attack it—are of one mind in this matter. They all say: The war which is now raging over the fair fields of South Africa cries aloud against the outrageous conduct of those in power in England.

The most indignant among them bring to recollection the telegram which Emperor William sent to President Krüger after the defeat of Dr. Jameson's Raid. Here I may state at once a

BRITON AND BOER

little-known fact. That telegram, generally supposed to have come from the Kaiser's personal initiative, was practically an answer to a message addressed to him by four hundred Germans at Pretoria who had offered themselves to President Krüger as a volunteer corps for the defence of the Republic. They had asked the Kaiser, on the arrival of the first news about the Raid, whether he would not say a word in favor of the threatened Boer Commonwealth.

It will be remembered that Krüger and the other members of the Transvaal Deputation, after having concluded the new Treaty in London, in 1883-4, went to Berlin for a visit. They were received in the most hospitable manner by the old Emperor William I. and his Chancellor; Prince Bismarck leading Mr. Krüger, with linked arms, to dinner, and talking to him in Low German, a dialect closely akin to Dutch. From that time the relations between the restored South African Republic and the Berlin Government were especially friendly. This emboldened the Germans at Pretoria to send their telegram to William II., at a moment when the existence of the Boer Commonwealth hung in the balance. And it was in reply to their telegraphic question that the young Emperor expressed to President

EUROPEAN OPINION

Krüger his congratulation for the escape from a grave danger.

Unfortunately, this single fact was suppressed. Had it been known, the wild, though utterly unjust, outcry which arose in England would probably have been less fierce. Three or four weeks afterwards, when the mail from South Africa came in, I learned the real connection of what had occurred; but in the mean time the worst mischief had been done. First impressions are apt to last; they are as difficult to eradicate as the proverbial falsehood when it is once fairly, or unfairly, started.

What creates dissatisfaction now in Germany is that, during the late diplomatic controversies between England and the South African Republic, the official or semi-official press of Berlin should have assumed an attitude which was quite uncalled for. It turned round to an extent which offended the conscience of the nation. Certainly, everybody understood that if war were to break out it was not for Germany to take part in it. At the same time, the mass of the Germans—being "honest men," as Shakespeare says of them in one of his plays—expected that even the Government organs would not virtually play into the hands of those in England who were bent upon

undoing the guaranteed independence of the Transvaal Republic. In all probability the official or semi-official press at Berlin was misled into its utterances by a belief that a compromise between England and the Boer Commonwealth would be effected, and that such a compromise would be promoted by taking sides, in a certain degree, with the demands put forth from London.

I may claim to have never shared that view. In a number of articles signed by me I over and over again expressed the conviction that war was the object of the prime movers in England, and that nothing remained for the threatened South African Republic—aye, and for the Orange Free State, too, whose fate would also be sealed if the former were subjected—than to defend its rights in alliance with the sister Republic against tremendous odds.

II

In 1896 I was the first, I may truly say, to put the facts of the abolition of the suzerainty—which England had possessed in virtue of the Pretoria Treaty of 1881—clearly before the public in the *North American Review*. Having followed the negotiations in 1883-84, when I

was in frequent contact with the Transvaal Deputation (President Krüger, General Smit, of Majuba Hill fame, and the Rev. I. S. Du Toit, the Minister of Public Instruction), I was able to give even personal testimony on that point. I can further say that when, in 1898, the Government of Pretoria met the astounding claims of suzerainty—which Mr. Chamberlain suddenly made after a lapse of thirteen years, during which Conservative and Liberal representatives of the Cabinet had openly and repeatedly confessed that no reservation of the Queen's suzerainty was expressed in the new Treaty of 1884—the arguments used by Dr. Leyds, in the name of President Krüger, were literally, and wellnigh in exactly the same order, given as had been done by me in the pages of the *North American Review*.

The same may be said of the arguments used by Sir William Harcourt, Sir Edward Clarke (both eminent legists, the latter formerly a Solicitor-General in Lord Salisbury's previous Government), and other Liberal and Conservative leaders. This concurrence of views, and this remarkable coincidence, even in the marshalling of arguments and facts, may seem extraordinary. It is, however, easily explainable from the strength of the case.

Any one conversant with the text of the two Treaties and the negotiations which preceded them—as recorded in the Blue-Books—must literally come to the same conclusion. The pity is that so few politicians will take the trouble of going to the sources. I have discussed this subject for many years with a few members of Parliament, public writers, and other generally well-informed men. As a rule, I found among them the crassest ignorance on that particular matter. Most of them did not even know then that there were two distinct treaties, one of which had been abolished!

It was Lord Derby himself who, with his own hand, struck out everything referring to suzerainty from the old Treaty. The proof of it is contained in the Blue-Book. The suzerainty was cancelled and crossed out by him, with black lines, in the Preamble, as well as in the three paragraphs in which it is mentioned. He then offered what he himself called “a New Treaty in substitution for the Convention of Pretoria.”

A new Preamble was also given to that New Treaty. The Transvaal Deputation had come for the express object of having the suzerainty abolished and a new Treaty put in the place of

the old one. They had also demanded that their country—which was until then called the “Transvaal State”—should be recognized once more as an “independent South African Republic,” as it had been before the violent annexation which Mr. Disraeli had craftily effected while the burghers of the Republic were harassed by risings of the natives.

When the Transvaal Deputation returned to Pretoria, the Volksraad ratified the Treaty, because these objects of its Delegates had been attained. Dr. Leyds, and even Sir William Harcourt and Sir Edward Clarke, have overlooked one telling fact. It is this: While the Queen’s suzerainty undoubtedly existed between 1881 and 1884, a so-called “Resident” was appointed at Pretoria to represent the British Crown in its suzerain capacity. Now, in 1884 the office of Resident was abolished and a Consul appointed in his stead. A Resident marks the country in which he acts as a vassal one. In the Parliamentary Statutes 52 and 63 Vict. (1889), c. 63, the protected Princes of India are described as “under the suzerainty of Her Majesty”; and at their Courts there is consequently a British Resident.

But in the Transvaal State, when it was re-

stored to its old rank as the South African Republic, the Resident was replaced by a Consul, who henceforth was no longer a representative of a suzerain Protector, or Protectress, but who was, on the contrary, himself to "receive *the protection of the Republic.*" That restored independent Commonwealth was consequently acknowledged, by this fact too, as a foreign Power, no longer under a suzerain. Hence, Mr. Chamberlain himself, during the Jameson Raid—that is, evidently, when its defeat was already telegraphically known in London—declared the South African Republic, in a despatch, to be "*a foreign State, a foreign Power, with which Her Majesty is at peace and in Treaty relations.*"

Can anything be clearer, then, than the fact of the suzerainty having been abolished? Is it not arrant hypocrisy to assert the contrary? Yet, during all the recent transactions it was continually held as a threat over the Transvaal Republic. "Conventions," in the plural, was always the word.

Not even when President Krüger proposed that the controversy about Suzerainty should be "silently dropped" on both sides, so that an agreement about the Suffrage Question might be come to, would the Colonial Secretary avoid the

mention of the Conventions in the plural, as if both were still lawfully in operation! Each time, moreover, the British terms were raised.

III

The Treaty of 1884 gives England no right whatever to interfere in the internal affairs of the South African Republic. There is not a word in it about the right of foreigners to claim equality of suffrage rights with the native Dutch inhabitants. To obtain such rights, foreigners have to conform to the existing laws. These laws for obtaining the vote were originally even more liberal than those existing in England. They were only made more restrictive—that is to say, a longer term of residence was fixed before a man could become a full burgher—when seditious aspirations for the overthrow of the Republic became ripe at Johannesburg. Among the motley crowd of foreigners there, a considerable number, even according to the testimony of the more fair-minded correspondents who were sent out by papers of the war party in England, is composed of utterly worthless characters. "I have never seen," one of

BRITON AND BOER

them wrote, "within the course of a quarter of an hour, a worse collection of rascaldom of various kinds."

When President Krüger, some years ago, visited Johannesburg, the British flag was hoisted by such immigrants as a symbol of their insurrectionary desires. When Mr. Rhodes organized the Raid, Johannesburg was in arms, though courage failed the would-be rebels at the decisive moment.

Was it reasonable, then, to expect that, in dealing with a Suffrage Question, all these occurrences should simply remain unheeded by the President, the Parliament, and the burghers of the Transvaal? Could they forget the destruction of their Commonwealth between 1877 and 1881? Were they simply to allow their Republic to be voted down, after it had been found that it could not be struck down by force of arms?

For all that, in order not to have to undergo a struggle on battle-fields with a World-Empire of nearly 400,000,000, Krüger and the Volksraad yielded more and more in the course of the negotiations. It was of no avail. They found themselves pressed each time by increased demands, while the English troops, of whom for-



BRINGING IN THE RAIDERS TO JOHANNESBURG

EUROPEAN OPINION

merly there were but 3000 at the Cape, were gradually increased to 25,000, and pushed forward to the frontiers of the two Republics—with even more troops announced to come afterwards. Thus both Republics saw themselves menaced in their very existence, and they took the decisive, inevitable step.

In London, papers hostile to them had, in the meanwhile, before the outbreak of war, boldly declared that not suzerainty, but full Sovereignty was aimed at over the Transvaal, and that, though the Orange Free State was, by public law, as independent as Russia, British paramountcy over it, too, must be set up as a self-understood thing. In short, all respect for treaty rights and the independence of neighboring States was thrown to the winds. In Mr. Chamberlain's recent words, there must be, in South Africa, English "supremacy, preponderance, paramountcy—call it what you will, call it Abracadabra, if you choose." Out of so convenient a formula every act of violence may be evolved. Can it be wondered at that foreign nations look with mistrustful amazement upon such a doctrine? Would any country feel itself safe in the future, would any Government attach the slightest credence to the pledged word of,

and the treaty stipulations accepted by, England, if Abracadabra is henceforth to be the parole?

Perhaps I may be allowed to mention here that, whatever I have done, by many writings, in furtherance of the Unionist cause of England, in opposition to Mr. Gladstone's fatal Home Rule bill, was once acknowledged by Mr. Chamberlain in terms of praise at a great public meeting. This cannot absolve me from the duty of saying what in Transvaal affairs I hold to be right. Again, I might say that when, in 1881, during the armed struggle of the burghers, there was a dark plan broached in London which would have increased the horrible Irish trouble of that time, I firmly set my face against that scheme, and it was nipped in the bud. It is as a friend of England, therefore, that I express my views.

And here I feel compelled to declare that violence is capped by unbearable cant when the hard-driven Republics, around whom the steel net was daily drawn tighter, are charged with having brought on this hideous war. You drive a man, forsooth, into a corner. You hold your fist before his face. You threaten him by saying that the sand of the hour-glass is running out, and that, unless he makes haste to kneel

down, you will use other measures against him. You hold your sword and gun ready to attack him; and then when he strikes a blow, *he* is, of course, the guilty party!

I say all this with a degree of sadness. I have known a nobler England, on some great historical occasions, since I first stepped on her soil as an exile after the great Continental Revolutions of 1848-49. On not a few occasions I have come forth to defend her cause—certainly not to my personal advantage, but the contrary. But there have not been lacking cases when the policy of England has been such that I could not shirk the duty of opposing it.

IV

It is the same now. Who can doubt that this is a war as unrighteous as it is unnecessary, and pregnant with grave perils for England's own future? Has not General Butler, a man of the fullest personal experience in South African affairs, uttered a serious warning against lighting up such a conflagration? He had to leave his post for giving that wise and earnest counsel. Has not Mr. Selous, the Nimrod of Africa, who was one of the first to open up unknown terri-

tories there, and who is, according to Lord Crewe's testimony, intimately acquainted with all the leading political personages of the Dark Continent, uttered similar warnings? Mr. Selous, himself an Imperialist, yields to none in his desire for England's greatness.

Yet, though one of the very party which wants to have the vast British Empire still further enlarged, Mr. Selous also has given warning which unfortunately was not listened to. In a long letter to the *Times*, in which he refuted the many calumnies spread about in regard to the character of the Boer population—a letter written before the outbreak of the war, but the publication of which he was ordered to withhold under an assurance given to him from influential quarters that the war would be avoided at the eleventh hour—he said:

“At present I believe that the Dutch population of the Cape Colony are as a body thoroughly loyal to the British Crown; but it cannot be denied that Dutch Afrikaner sentiment—the idea of becoming an independent nation—which was first aroused in South Africa by the unjust annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, and became stronger in 1880-81, gathered an extraordinary impetus at the time of the Jameson Raid. A war forced upon the Transvaal now by a demand for concessions which, however moderate they may appear in this country, are yet thought by the leaders of the

South African Dutch in the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State to be unreasonable, will, as soon as the blood of their kinsmen is shed beyond the Vaal, make one people of them—a people that will be from henceforth bitterly, though possibly for a long time to come passively, hostile to British domination. Such a contingency should surely be avoided if possible, and surely the matter in dispute between Mr. Krüger and the Uitlanders might be settled by a Court of Arbitration formed from among the highest jurists of all the different States of South Africa. But, of course, if all arbitration or discussion of the points in dispute should be arbitrarily refused by the Colonial Secretary, it is difficult to see how war can be avoided; for the Transvaal Boers are an obstinate people, and will probably rather fight than climb down very low. In that case we shall have entered upon a course which, though it may give us the gold-fields of the Transvaal for the present and the immediate future, *will infallibly lose us the whole of South Africa as a British possession within the lifetime of many men who are now living.* Through arrogance and ignorance Great Britain lost her American Colonies, and if arrogance and ignorance prevail in the present conduct of affairs in South Africa, history will repeat itself in that country.”

Arrogance and ignorance have prevailed. The blood-guiltiness of the war now raging lies, according to Mr. Selous's showing, at the door of the English Government. Arbitration would have prevented it. And arbitration between foreign Powers—of which Mr. Chamberlain acknowledged, in 1895-96, the South African

BRITON AND BOER

Republic to be one—is perfectly feasible. But then he suddenly altered his stand-point. Contrary to his own clear assertion, he all at once declared, in open disregard of the Treaty of 1884, that England was the suzerain, the South African Republic the vassal.

When the lives of the captured Raiders were at stake, and a sentence of death had legally to be pronounced against them at Pretoria, it was found convenient in London to treat President Krüger with great courtesy. The Republic, which had escaped from a great danger, showed itself generous towards the prisoners. None of them was executed. Their sentences were commuted to fines. Their leader was handed over to England. President Krüger was praised by the Colonial Secretary for his magnanimity.

I may mention here a personal incident showing what most people in England expected at the time. The son of a well-known English sculptor had been among Dr. Jameson's men, and was made prisoner at Krügersdorp. His mother, whom I had met in society, came in great distress to my house, expressing a fear that her son would be shot forthwith; she entreated me to intercede with President Krüger, with whom she had heard I was acquainted. I

EUROPEAN OPINION

told her I was perfectly sure that no such fate would befall her son, and that the most likely thing—nay, I should say the certainty—was that he, being only one of the men and not an officer in the Raid, would soon be released. Immediately afterwards the news came that he was set free.

In those days it was found useful in England to express hopes of "magnanimous" treatment being given to the prisoners; for everybody knew what would have been done by English justice to piratical raiders that had fallen into its hands. The capital punishment dealt out to raiders and insurgents in the Ionian Islands and in Canada is too well remembered to need special mention. Fearing the worst for Jameson and his companions, the English authorities were careful not to offend the South African Republic, but rather tried to humor it, so as to induce it to perform an act of generosity. Years afterwards, however, it was to be pushed into vassalage, and bullied into armed resistance, so that its gold-fields might be seized after a conquest. It was lightly assumed that this would be an easy war. After recent events, the *Times* has avowed that the advisers of Government were rather mistaken in their view.

When the South African Republic at last mobilized its militia forces of yeomen in defence of its independence, London papers declared that this was not war, but simply a revolt—a revolt of the vassal. “The Boer Revolt” was used, day by day, as a title for the war news. The English Government itself refrained from mentioning the word “war.” The supporters of Government asserted that the sending out of 25,000, of 50,000, perhaps of 70,000, men, or, if need be, even more, was simply “a *police* measure for the restoration of *order*” in the revolted territory of the suzerain.

Imagine the consequences this would have had for the English soldiers now in Boer captivity if the Governments at Pretoria and Bloemfontein had taken reprisals for such treatment as mere “rebels.” Happily, those Governments were more humane, and acted as belligerent foreign Powers towards their prisoners.

Compare, again, the refusal of the English Government to acknowledge these Republics as belligerent Powers with what, in May, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain had said in the House of Commons :

“In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Krüger, an ultimatum which would have certainly been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war ; it would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war. It would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Krüger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, in which Secretaries of State, standing in this place, have repudiated all right of interference—that would be a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise.”

Some months before that speech, which confirms everything Mr. Selous has said, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons :

“I do not say that under the terms of the Convention we are entitled to force reforms on President Krüger, but we are entitled to give him friendly counsel. . . . If this friendly counsel was not well received, there was not the slightest intention on the part of Her Majesty’s Government to press it. . . . I am perfectly willing to withdraw it, and to seek a different solution if it should not prove acceptable to the President. The rights of our action under the Convention are limited to the offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce.”

Mark that Mr. Chamberlain here spoke in

February, 1896, of the Convention—not of “Conventions.” That latter idea came as an afterthought to him in 1897. In 1896, he still again said, when speaking of the Franchise Question :

“The answer that has hitherto been given, not on the part of the Government of the Transvaal, but on the part of some of its friends, was that to grant this request would be to commit suicide, inasmuch as, the moment the majority got the franchise, the first use they would make of it would be to turn out the existing Government of the Transvaal and substitute a Government of their own liking. [‘Hear, hear,’ and laughter.] I confess I thought there was some reason in that objection. It is rather difficult to attempt to persuade any one so capable as President Krüger that it would be desirable that he should proceed to his own extinction, and accordingly I brought before him an alternative suggestion which, at all events, would relieve him from that difficulty. . . . The question is, whether President Krüger will consider that that proposal will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does, he will be perfectly justified in rejecting it.”

In subsequent speeches, Mr. Chamberlain once more laid stress on the fact of the Dutch population being the large majority in South Africa, and on the great danger of the policy of going to war in opposition to the Dutch sentiment in the Cape Colony and in the Orange Free State. Even as late as August, 1896, answering Sir Ashmead Bartlett, Mr. Chamberlain said :

“What is the policy which the honorable gentleman would put forward if he were standing here in my place? We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Krüger that unless the reforms which he was specifying were granted by a particular date the British Government would interfere by force. Then, I suppose, he would come here and ask this House for a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000—it does not matter particularly which [laughter]—and would send an army of 10,000 men, at the very least, to force President Krüger to grant reforms in regard to which not only this Government, but successive Secretaries of State, have pledged themselves repeatedly that they would have nothing to do with its internal affairs. That is the policy of the honorable gentleman. That is not my policy.”

Is it not? Instead of 10,000 men, 25,000 are now out there, with double that number, or more, to follow. A vote for £10,000,000 has been taken; and another will, in all likelihood, have to be asked for. All the declarations formerly made have thus been falsified.

A word has now to be said about that alleged Boer “oligarchy” of which men contemptuously speak, who submissively salaam before the most antiquated forms and institu-

tions of a Monarchy which still calls itself "by right divine," though in historical truth it is the issue of a successful Whig aristocratic Revolution.

The Boer oligarchy of the South African Republic is composed of simple farmers, every man of whom, from the age of sixteen up to sixty—nay, even mere boys of thirteen and men past seventy—stand together now on blood-soaked battle-fields for the defence of their country. That is their "corrupt" way of doing things. They have to meet the hired soldiers of an Empire in which, even after many hard popular struggles, "a hereditary oligarchy"—as Sir Wilfrid Lawson called it a few days ago—still wields an extraordinary political and social power, while the Crown, going on the old Norman maxim, "*Dieu et mon droit*," declares war and makes peace according to its own fancy.

I remember the time—it was long before Mr. Chamberlain had entered political life—when, out of about nine or ten million adult men in the United Kingdom, not more than one million had the vote. Strictly speaking, there were perhaps only eight hundred thousand to nine hundred thousand; for there were, as there are still, cumulative votes which an individual might possess.

Elections not taking place everywhere on the same day, a man might cast his vote here and there, in town and country—as a householder, as a land-owner, as a member of a university, and so forth.

What repeated violent struggles has it cost during the last thirty-five years—not to mention the Chartist agitation between the thirties and the beginning of the fifties—in order to obtain successive small instalments of electoral reform! I have vividly before my mind's eye the day when London was on the verge of revolution. I saw my friend, Mr. Edmund Beales, the leader of the Suffrage movement, sitting, before the march of the masses to Hyde Park, in the office of the Reform League, pale from excitement, with hat drawn over his brow, expecting, in much anxiety, the very worst. The Queen's troops were lying in ambush to prevent the entrance of the masses into the Park. Blood, it was feared, would be spilled, and unspeakable scenes of riot would then occur in those quarters of the working classes where there is an admixture of the criminal element. The railings of Hyde Park were on that day thrown down by the onset of the tumultuous crowds, an event at which I was personally present. Fortunately, the Queen, at

BRITON AND BOER

the last moment, countermanded the order for the action of the troops. So I heard afterwards from a friend in the War Office.

Again London had to be the scene of mass demonstrations, years afterwards, in order to carry a measure for the partial enfranchisement of the rural population. To this day, nevertheless, there is no manhood suffrage. Some three to four millions are outside the pale of the electorate. I state this as a simple fact, knowing well enough that an indiscriminate right of suffrage among the utterly uninstructed may sometimes be the very means of overthrowing freedom and hindering intellectual and social progress.

But if considerations like these have weight with politicians in England, is a young African Republic, in its struggle for life, not entitled to look round as well, in franchise matters, for the sake of avoiding danger?

England has an hereditary House of Lords, which may cancel any Act passed by the Representatives of the People. Is that oligarchy, or not? Is it right, broadly speaking, to assume that capacity for legislation goes by heredity? I believe England has escaped from a great public danger through the rejection of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill. But I doubt whether the House

EUROPEAN OPINION

of Lords, in thus acting, was moved exclusively by patriotic instincts, so many of its members having landed estates in Ireland, and being rather fond of retaining their oligarchical privileges.

Since the Norman conquest, the real tillers of the English soil have been dispossessed of the land. Their number continually decreases. They are mere hands, landless wage-laborers, living in cottages not their own, from which they may be driven out, week by week, if it so pleases the aristocratic land-owner or the large farmer he has put over them. Is it for a country with such feudal land-laws, the like of which does not exist in any European country, to speak of the free yeomen of the Boer Commonwealths as an "oligarchy"?

Again, looking at the ever-increasing proletariat in the unwholesomely expanding large towns, to which the landless laborers flock for better means of support, would it not be better to deal in England itself with the root of a crying evil than to fall upon a foreign Republic under the false plea of an oligarchy holding sway there?

VII

The Dutch people of Cape Colony, according to Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made as late as April, 1896, "are just as loyal to the throne and to the British connection as, let me say, our French-Canadian fellow-subjects in the Dominion of Canada." In a speech made two months before, he said :

"We are constantly reminded of the fact that our Dutch fellow-citizens are in a majority in South Africa, and I think I may say for myself as for my predecessor that we are prepared to go as far as Dutch sentiment will support us. It is a very serious thing—a matter involving most serious considerations—if we are asked to go to war in opposition to Dutch sentiment."

The loyalty of that population at the Cape was publicly acknowledged in England when its Legislature made a yearly grant of £30,000 for increasing the English fleet in view of a possible conflict with France. This is an occurrence of quite recent date. Yet, all of a sudden, the waters were said to have been troubled, and the world was mysteriously told about a tremendous conspiracy for establishing a vast Afrikander Republic, involving the overthrow of English

dominion at the Cape! For which deep reason the Transvaal was to be fallen upon, because there was the high seat of a great ambition. A sorrier farce it would have been impossible to concoct.

It is the *auri sacra fames*, the damnable hunger after gold, which has brought about this terrible war, in which, at any moment, the savage native races may come up to play their part with barbarous ferocity, to the terror and destruction of women and children left helpless in solitary farms. Is it to be wondered at that the kinsmen of the Transvaal people at the Cape, and in their original home in the Netherlands, are filled with indignation and deep wrath, and that there is an echo in the indignant voice of the whole civilized world?

Every close observer who has visited South Africa, even when going there with a biased mind, has usually come back with the conviction that it was in England's own interest not to act again as the aggressor towards the Transvaal Republic. England obtained forcible possession of the Cape Colony while Holland was overrun by France and lay under her iron heel. The Dutch inhabitants of that Colony, whose forefathers had created the settlement and intro-

BRITON AND BOER

duced laws and institutions which hold good to this day, felt for a long time the foreign yoke imposed upon them. They, nevertheless, became, in course of time, perfectly loyal to the connection with England. This loyalty was put to a severe strain when that section of the Dutch inhabitants which first emigrated to Natal and then to the land beyond the river Vaal was relentlessly pursued by English troops.

The strain became still more severe by the lawless overthrow in 1877 of the Transvaal Republic, in the midst of its difficulties with the black natives. When in 1881—after several defeats of English detachments, chiefly at Majuba Hill—peace was concluded and a compromise effected, the Dutch population at the Cape applauded this tardy and even incomplete act of justice. Tardy and incomplete it was, for Mr. Gladstone, shortly before entering office, had characterized the annexation effected by Mr. Disraeli as a deed of downright “insanity,” and acknowledged the right of the Boers to the restoration of their full independence in the most uncompromising terms.

Among those who had opposed the conclusion of peace in 1881 after the battle of Majuba Hill was the late Lord Randolph Churchill, a Con-



PIETERMARITZBURG, THE CAPITAL OF NATAL

EUROPEAN OPINION

servative. Having in later years visited South Africa, he saw his error. This is what he wrote in *Men, Mines, and Animals in South Africa* :

“The surrender of the Transvaal, and the peace concluded by Mr. Gladstone with the victors of Majuba Hill, were at the time, and still are, the object of sharp criticism and bitter denunciation from many politicians at home, *quorum pars parva fuit*. Better and more precise information, combined with cool reflection, leads me to the conclusion that had the British Government of that day taken advantage of its strong military position and annihilated, as it could easily have done, the Boer forces, it would indeed have regained the Transvaal, but it might have lost the Cape Colony. The Dutch sentiment in the Colony had been so exasperated by what it considered to be the unjust, faithless, and arbitrary policy pursued towards the free Dutchmen of the Transvaal by Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and Sir Owen Lanyon that the final triumph of the British arms, merely by brute force, would have permanently and hopelessly alienated it from Great Britain. Parliamentary government in a country where the Dutch control the Parliament would have become impossible, and without Parliamentary government Cape Colony would be ungovernable. The actual magnanimity of the peace with the Boers concluded by Mr. Gladstone's Ministry after two humiliating military reverses suffered by the arms under their control, became plainly apparent to the just and sensible mind of the Dutch Cape Colonist, atoned for much of past grievance, and demonstrated the total absence in the English mind of any hostility or unfriendliness to the Dutch race. Concord between Dutch and English in the Colony from that moment became possible,

BRITON AND BOER

and that concord the Government of Mr. Rhodes inaugurated and has since to all appearances firmly riveted."

Lord Randolph Churchill wrote that before the Raid which Mr. Rhodes treacherously organized, after having attained to power at the Cape by the Dutch. It is easy to imagine what the late Tory statesman would have written on that subject after the disgraceful event. The conviction with which Lord Randolph Churchill became imbued, after he had studied matters on the spot, that the Transvaal would have been overcome, but that the Cape Colony might have been lost, is certainly a notable one in a Conservative. One thing only he forgot. Not only had Mr. Gladstone to think of the feelings of the Dutch population in the Colony, but also of the tremendous Irish difficulty in which England was then involved. It was a difficulty so great that it could scarcely be mastered by a garrison of 40,000 men in the unruly Sister Isle.

Nowhere is greater regret expressed at the existing state of things than among those German Liberal Constitutionalists who until now had steadfastly stood by England, trying to uphold her as an example of representative Government in opposition to their own Government's doings.

EUROPEAN OPINION

They now turn away sorrowfully—nay, with expressions of open disgust.

It is with a greater sorrow than I can express that I have written all this. I deeply feel the danger to which this country, in which I have spent the better part of my life, has exposed itself with a light heart, in spite of an ever more darkening prospect of the future. But though so many ties bind me to England—nay, I will say for that very reason—I hold it to be a duty to speak out fearlessly, even as I did against Governments of my own native country when they outraged right and justice and kept Italians and Hungarians under their iron heel. This is the duty which I owe to the better England; and here I fulfil it.

KARL BLIND.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

IN considering this question we must push aside as irrelevant the reason given for the recent demand upon the Transvaal. This, it will be remembered, was the wrongs of the foreigners there. The negotiation started with the presentation of a petition, ostensibly signed by these Uitlanders, imploring the Queen to consider their "wrongs" and to obtain redress. The British Government called the attention of its High Commissioner to this request and asked him to confer with the Transvaal Government. This resulted in a conference. The main demand made by the British Agent was for a shorter residence for these foreigners to render them eligible for the franchise. Britain wished five years' residence; the Transvaal proposed seven. The difference not being great, it was generally supposed that subsequent negotiations would result in a compromise and all would be well. Subsequently, five years was offered by President Krüger, under conditions which the British

THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

Agent at Pretoria, Mr. Greene, stated he thought his Government would accept, and which, Mr. Chamberlain admitted, conceded nine-tenths of British demands.

This franchise demand was very soon seen to be a flimsy foundation for Britain to rest action upon, because it placed her in the attitude of laboring for increased facilities for her own subjects to denationalize themselves and become subjects of the Transvaal. The public in Great Britain, however, did not see for a time that the Uitlanders' wrongs were merely an excuse for raising the real issue. The London *Times*, however, from near the very beginning, and continually as the negotiations proceeded, did not fail to state that this whole business of franchise for Uitlanders did not reach the problem, which was, in short, whether the British or the Dutch were to control South Africa.

When Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Morley, and Sir Edward Clarke demonstrated that "the suzerainty" of Britain was abolished by the existing Convention, the *Times* boldly replied that this was a matter not at all depending upon such subtle legal considerations, and stood, as before stated, upon the broad issue, Briton *versus* Boer. In this the *Times* was quite right; such is the

issue and none other. Nor is it a new one. It was the issue in the last war between Britain and the Transvaal, in which the former was worsted, and there is no other issue in this war.

It is the fashion to-day to censure Mr. Gladstone's decision to end the last Transvaal war, and concede to the Boer, as the practical fruits of victory, the independence of the Republic. A party in Britain held then, as it holds now, that the war should have been continued, "Majuba Hill" avenged, and British ascendancy then firmly established. Mr. Gladstone's critics to-day describe him as having acted under the influence of sentiment as opposed to practical politics and giving way to the *natural* dislike of a great empire to push matters to extremes against a few Boers. In this the writer thinks they do Mr. Gladstone grave injustice as a statesman. Much to this great man's credit, he was more open to the charge of magnanimous treatment of other nations than most British statesmen; but Mr. Gladstone had the advice of the ablest men conversant with the situation in South Africa, when he decided that force, in this case, was no remedy; that far-seeing statesmanship required that the Dutch element be conciliated, not destroyed, if it were ever to be amicably merged into the

British. There have always been two parties advising different courses in regard to this serious question. There were two in Mr. Gladstone's time and there are two to-day—one urging peace, the other war.

The situation may be thus described: The Dutch settled in the Cape nearly 250 years ago, and were the dominant power. Britain subsequently took the Cape as a harbor on the route to India, and has remained in power. The Dutch race has settled there, is to-day increasing rapidly, and has made South Africa its home. Sufficient time has elapsed for successive generations of the Dutch strain to be reared there, who now call themselves "Afrikanders" and have a strong league, the soul of which is the idea that Africa belongs to the Afrikanders—to those who were born there, whether British or Dutch.

Britain is too prosperous at home to furnish many emigrants in our day to any foreign lands. The few who do leave Britain usually prefer Canada or the United States, those who land in the former generally gravitating to the more genial south. In the Cape Colony, the principal of the four divisions of South Africa, the Dutch are largely in the majority, which is the case also in the Orange Free State. In Natal there

BRITON AND BOER

are only a few thousand British. In the Transvaal there were scarcely any people but the Dutch, until the discovery of the mines, which have attracted foreigners from all nations, until to-day, by counting all foreigners as British, there may be a small majority against the Dutch; but these are not all British; some estimate that there are not more than six thousand Britons among the miners. Those of other nationalities do not side with the British as against the Dutch. The vast majority of these, as well as of the British, are opposed to the present attack upon the Transvaal. Of this there can be no doubt. These people are working in the mines, receiving enormous wages, and only wish to be let alone. They do not wish to become burghers in order to vote; especially is this true of the British. I have peculiar means of knowing this. Several of the tenants upon my Skibo estates have sons or brothers in the mines, and I have from time to time been informed of the letters which they write home. There is one now in charge of an important mine whose letters are most significant. He stated to his father, in one of these, what I have already said, and that the Britons liked the Boers, and did not wish to become burghers. They were

THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

there as Britons to make money, and finally to return to their own home. They wanted no franchise. He stated that the petition to Her Majesty praying her to interfere was not generally signed by the Britons, and that many of the foreigners signed the petition believing that it had reference to some dreaded temperance legislation in which they were deeply concerned.

I have also met Transvaal students who attend the Edinburgh medical schools. One of these was born in Britain, and his parents took him when young to Cape Colony. His father is a judge. Another, who was born in the Cape, of English parents, is the son of a member of the Cape Assembly. These young men have since returned to their homes to fight for the coming "South African Republic," which they expect, and which shall be independent of all foreign Powers, Britain included.

Now the question which presented itself to Mr. Gladstone in the last war presented itself to-day to the present Government of Britain, and there were not wanting now, as there were not wanting then, some of the ablest and most experienced British officials who counselled the pursuance of the policy which Mr. Gladstone had adopted. They reason thus: "We, the

BRITON AND BOER

British, are in a minority in South Africa, which is becoming greater and greater year by year, as the Dutch residents multiply, and we receive but few of our own countrymen as settlers, most of those who do come being only temporary residents, looking forward always to the arrival of the day when they have secured enough upon which to return to their own home. The home of the Dutch in the Cape is Africa. Our true policy now, the only policy open to us, which promises a chance of our becoming and remaining the paramount Power, is one of co-operation and of friendliness with the more numerous and constantly increasing Dutch. We must trust to the superior qualities of our race, peaceably exercised, to its ability to rise to the top and to control affairs, and to the merging of the two races into the coming South African, the product of a union of Dutch and British."

The late Commander-in-Chief of the British forces at the Cape, General Butler, was, and is still, esteemed by many as a wise Governor, but he differed from the present Government as to the true policy, and he was called home. The British Agent at Pretoria, Mr. Greene, assured the Transvaal Government that he believed the proposal they made would be acceptable to his

THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

Government. It is no secret that Mr. Greene's policy was not that of Mr. Chamberlain, although while Mr. Greene remains in the diplomatic service there can be no expression of the difference of his views. Neither can General Butler enter into public controversy with his Government. These are servants of the Government and must be silent, although disgraced.

The policy now adopted is that of forcing the issue, raising a racial war, and suppressing Dutch aspirations. This policy was attractive when it was believed that the mere decision to send a full army corps of thirty-five thousand men to supplement the British forces in South Africa would so appall the Dutch element that it would never raise a finger in the face of such tremendous forces against them, feeling that it would be madness to do so. This was the belief prevalent in England. It was reported that the new General-in-Chief assured Her Majesty when he took his departure that the British flag would wave over Pretoria by Christmas.

Warnings were not wanting that the conflict might not be restricted to the Transvaal Republic if the race issue were the cry, and that the Orange Free State Republic, which is Dutch to the core, might join forces with her neighbor,

that thousands of fighting men from the Cape Colony, also overwhelmingly Dutch, might flock to the Dutch standard, were the race question pressed home.

The war party took no heed of such dangers, and the able Britons who, knowing the situation, saw these possibilities were only rebuked for their baseless fears.

It was believed by most that it would be a mere parade to the Boer capital. Attention was everywhere called to the fact that no such stupendous force ever left the shores of England. This was not the opinion of the party who counselled the continuance of Mr. Gladstone's pacific policy. These, as it has since been proved, knew the situation. What they feared has come to pass. To-day a second army corps of thirty-five thousand men is already found necessary, and is soon to sail, Britain thus denuding herself of proper reserves and laying London open, as a French critic has recently said, to an attack by a few thousand men.

It is not to be a parade as expected; quite the reverse. This racial dispute promises to prove as severe a strain upon Britain as the Crimean war, and Lord Salisbury's successor may say of it, as he has recently said of that war, that it

was "one in which Britain put its money upon the wrong horse." That the resources of Britain, if fully drawn upon, can ultimately overpower the Dutch temporarily need not be questioned, but whether the end attained can justify the sacrifice seems open to question.

It does not appear to the writer that it can possibly do so, because the suppression of the Dutch element to-day, if such be the result, will accomplish nothing permanent, if the situation is to remain as before described and the Dutch are to remain in South Africa as residents and increase rapidly, being a very prolific race, and the British are not to emigrate to South Africa in great numbers, and also settle there and increase. The result must inevitably be that the Dutch will be in a majority, growing constantly greater. Even more important than this is the fact that the people born in Africa must more and more desire to rule themselves. It will be found very hard to drive out of the mind of an Afrikander, whether of British or Dutch extraction, the idea that the country belongs to those who are born in it. The native-born must inevitably draw together and become one race, firm against any foreign race.

Should Britain endeavor to hold sway in South Africa through free institutions—such govern-

ment, for instance, as Canada and Australia have—then the Parliament becomes Afrikander, as that of Cape Colony now is, as the Parliament of Canada is Canadian, and the Parliament of Australia Australian—with the difference that in Canada and Australia the people have no cause to be opposed to Britain, and there is no racial question involved. People living in Canada and Australia have not been crushed by a foreign power of different race from beyond the sea, which assumes to dominate them. Besides this, Britain disclaims all wish to hold either Canada or Australia against its will; for its protectorate over Canada and Australia it has the indisputable requirement, the consent of the governed. It is there by the wish of all sections of the inhabitants.

The war party made much of President Krüger's so-called ultimatum, but the wonder is not that this was issued, but that it was so long delayed. War was practically declared when Britain began the movement of large bodies of troops towards the borders of the Orange Free State, and to points which hemmed the Transvaal in. An English military critic said before the ultimatum came that for the Transvaal to allow these masses of soldiers to press closer daily would be military

insanity. The British continued to mass troops, confident that the Transvaal authorities would never take up the challenge. When they did so the British forces were still unprepared.

The right of Britain to attack the Dutch simply because they were rapidly increasing in South Africa and promised soon under free institutions to regain their lost control, need not be considered. If the real issue be Briton *versus* Dutch, as it is admitted now to be by Britain, she stands condemned before the civilized world. Her conduct is indefensible and her policy foolish. No nation has a right to attack and endeavor to suppress a people so capable of self-government as the Dutch, and force its own supremacy, although in a minority. So much for the moral question. And as for the policy, the attempt must ultimately fail; for, sooner or later, the more numerous race will prevail. Hence the folly of departing from Mr. Gladstone's course.

It does not seem to the writer that to plunge South Africa into a racial war, in an endeavor to suppress the Dutch, is the best and surest way to insure the peaceful and satisfactory paramountcy of Britain. On the contrary, he believes that Mr. Gladstone was well advised years

BRITON AND BOER

ago to adopt the policy of peaceful co-operation ; that Lord Salisbury was equally well advised recently by able servants of the Crown in South Africa to continue Mr. Gladstone's wise course and avoid raising the dangerous racial issue.

It is probable that Britain will have good reason, before the contest ends, and even after it ends in a supposed victory, to ponder Shakespeare's words :

"When force and gentleness play for a kingdom,
The gentle gamester will the sooner win."

ANDREW CARNEGIE.

WILL THE POWERS INTERVENE IN THE WAR?

FROM one end of Continental Europe to the other public sentiment is, we will not say hostile, but certainly opposed to England in regard to the war which she has just inaugurated against the little South African Republic. We believe there is not a single exception to this general statement—or, at least, no national exception, for there are, of course, individual ones. The conviction is current everywhere that England has been the real aggressor, although the actual rupture of the peace was the act of the Transvaal. The real author of a war is considered to be that nation which by its deliberate procedure has rendered it inevitable. Now, even if the Transvaal has committed, in its policy, or, rather, in its domestic administration, blunders and faults which have served England as a pretext, nobody doubts that she has looked forward to the approach of war with apprehension and sadness, and that she has done all that was in her power

to avert the scourge. The idea that the Transvaal desired the conflict and coolly provoked it cannot enter the mind of any reasonable man. Not so with England. The superiority of her strength—great indeed, though she may have had an exaggerated estimate of its immediate efficiency in a war of this kind—was an encouragement and a temptation to her. Hence the universal opinion in Europe is that nothing would have been easier for her than to avoid war if she had the will or even the serious desire, and that the war broke out because she did not have the desire and the will to prevent it. The odium of being the aggressor, therefore, falls upon her, and this odium could be dissipated only by a clear and cogent demonstration that great wrongs were on the side of the Transvaal.

This does not mean that no wrong is apparent on the part of the latter, for there even was a time when public sentiment was greatly opposed to the Republic. Probably all that would have been required on the part of England was to foster that sentiment and use it as a lever; but she neglected it and preferred the use of force. From the time of the Jameson Raid, the sympathies of all have been with the Transvaal. That act was so disloyal and so brutal that it

could not and did not fail to arouse unqualified reprobation. However, it soon appeared clear that all was not right at Johannesburg and that the situation of the Uitlanders there was intolerable in certain respects. If they exploited the country, the Boers for their part exploited them, taxing them by all known means of oppression and refusing them rights which might serve them as means of defence and protection. The complaints of the Uitlanders then appeared legitimate, and if they found an echo all over Europe, that echo was perhaps more distinct in France than anywhere else, and for the simple reason that about fifteen hundred millions of francs of French money are employed in the gold and diamond mines of South Africa. A reform in the inner situation of the Transvaal was therefore necessary, and it began to be demanded more and more imperiously, when the English Government took the matter in hand. Its intervention was at first hailed with favor; the happiest results were expected. But it was soon found that England was placing other interests of a different character alongside and even above the economic interests of the Uitlanders; in a word, that under cover of defending a general cause, she had in view a

merely personal one which was entirely political.

The diplomatic publications, which followed in large numbers, confirmed this feeling, and it became evident when the results of the interview at Bloemfontein were made known. It was a surprise to hear that Sir Alfred Milner demanded for foreigners rights which were almost exclusively political, or, rather, electoral. The extreme importance which was attached in these discussions to the question whether the plenary right to vote should be enjoyed by the Uitlanders after five years of residence, or after seven or still more, seemed out of all proportion to the practical interest involved. In fact, the Uitlanders would have been perfectly satisfied with the granting of certain municipal rights in the Rand that were connected with the needs of their daily life, and they probably cared more for the unhindered continuation of their original nationality than for the acquisition of a new one which they would afterwards have laid aside again as soon as possible. They protested, for example, against certain monopolies, which were positively oppressive, such as the dynamite monopoly. These, however, were hardly mentioned at Bloemfontein. Sir Alfred

Milner, faithful to the instructions he had received from Mr. Chamberlain, laid down a political basis for the question; that is to say, a basis on which it was sure to clash with another—namely, that of the internal sovereignty of the Transvaal, which the treaties had perhaps left in doubt, and which could not be touched, especially at such a moment, without extreme danger. From that day, people began to wonder whether England really meant to bring about a peaceful settlement, and they soon reached a negative conclusion. President Krüger clearly understood the case, and he would have done better if he had accepted the first propositions of the English. He would have placed them in a difficult situation by obliging them to declare themselves satisfied or to show their hands. These propositions were not such as could not be accepted, for he had to accept them later, unfortunately too late. The English had already formulated others. Mr. Chamberlain's adroitness consisted in continually shifting the ground, in constantly inventing new and more exorbitant demands until he tired out Mr. Krüger and induced him to say that he would grant everything provided the independence of the Transvaal were preserved. But Mr. Chamberlain immediately replied that the Trans-

vaal was not an independent State, that it was a rebellious vassal, and that Great Britain could no longer tolerate its attitude of revolt. The words which the British Minister used were wilfully insulting and stinging. If the Transvaal had been able up to this time to entertain the slightest doubt as to her adversary's intentions, that doubt was now dissipated. War had become inevitable.

It was then that a revulsion of European opinion took place in favor of the Transvaal. In France especially—and America will not be surprised at that—there is a love of countries that struggle for their independence, that are ready to stake all in order to acquire or maintain it. And so the sympathies of the people went out to the brave little Republic. At the same time they were curious to know for what reasons the English Government desired and brought about a rupture, and these reasons were not found to be very edifying. It is certain that money, the thirst for material wealth, has had much to do with the sad outcome. When blood is shed for gold, when cupidity is combined with cruelty, the conscience of mankind is revolted. It is thought in Europe that the affairs of the Chartered Company were dull and on the point of becoming poor; that a

crash was already threatening; that Mr. Cecil Rhodes's bold speculations were about to end in a catastrophe in which a large part of the English aristocracy would have been involved. The Chartered Company had to be saved at any cost, and the only chance of saving it was by war. That was, perhaps, the principal motive that brought about this decision. But there was another. For various reasons there is great discontent in the English colonies of South Africa, which, without impairing their loyalty, showed itself in the last elections by a movement which put the Afrikanders in power. Now the Afrikanders are the friends and relatives of the Boers in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The same blood flows in their veins and appeals to their imaginations. By reason of its independence the Transvaal was, as it were, the pivot about which all sorts of discontent collected. So this independence had to be crushed, and England determined to crush it, being convinced that when that task was accomplished the impatience of the Afrikanders would be checked, submission would be general, and all the dangers of the future would be averted.

It will be understood that these considerations, some of which, moreover, do not appear on the sur-

face, have had a different effect on public opinion in England and in the rest of Europe. We have stated what the latter was; but between it and the conclusion that it will lead to an intervention between England and the Transvaal there is a very long step, especially when we attempt to decide what Government will be driven to intervene; indeed, the step is so long that it will not be taken. When a conflagration breaks out nowadays, the first thought of everybody is to confine and localize it—that is to say, not to interfere; and the principle of non-intervention has never been so much in favor as at this conclusion of our century. It was believed in America during the war with Spain that there existed in Europe, or at least on the part of some of the Powers, some desire to intervene diplomatically if not by force of arms. It was stated that England had objected, and so prevented any manifestation of ill-will. This idea, which was adroitly exploited by those who might profit by it, was absolutely erroneous. The tendency to-day is to form a ring around the combatants without meddling with their quarrel, until they have had enough, and themselves solicit the good offices of one or more Powers. Even in the last war between Greece and Turkey, notwithstand-

ing the general sympathy with Greece, Europe waited patiently until Greece was beaten, and did not intervene until requested to do so. Even then Europe interfered only because she knew that Turkey was quite willing, that after having gained some glory Turkey also desired the end of a war from which no other profit was to be derived. We do not say that that was very chivalrous, but so it was; such are the new ways of countries which have all become more or less democratic and subject to military service. To bring them out of their apathy, it requires some important, evident, urgent self-interest, for the Old World is now governed by selfishness far more than by generous sentiment. Now, we do not see that there is any Power which is sufficiently interested, near or far, in the Anglo-Transvaal war to impose or even spontaneously to propose intervention. If France, for example, had a mind to pick a quarrel with England, or even to accept quarrels which England seemed to seek, she would have had better opportunities. We need not speak of Austria—the smallest of the great Powers from a maritime point of view, and absolutely insignificant as regards colonies; no Power could be less interested in what is going on in a continent where she does not possess an inch

of territory. As for Italy, she calls herself England's friend, and perhaps believes it herself, notwithstanding the absolute sterility mingled with some mortification that this friendship has brought her. She can certainly not be suspected of preparing any move that might embarrass England, or that would be regarded by the latter as anything but an entirely friendly act. There remain Russia and Germany.

Evidently Russia cannot be regarded as indifferent like Austria, or as following in the wake of Great Britain, like Italy. But what interest has she in Africa? We should be tempted to say that she has not any if it were not inevitable for so great a Power to have some interests everywhere, either directly or indirectly. It is known, moreover, that certain common religious tendencies have awakened her traditional sympathies with Abyssinia; but they are quite platonic. In reality, Russia's entire efforts are concentrated in Asia, and it is quite true that she there encounters England at several points as an obstacle or a limit. England and Russia may, therefore, consider themselves as eventual enemies in an undetermined future, which is, however, probably remote. Both have in these latter times made so many mutual concessions

as to suggest that they entertain a sincere desire not to offend each other. If it were not so, we might say of Russia what we said of France, that more favorable opportunities than the present one have not been lacking; as she refrained then, she will certainly refrain now. The only secret desire she may be supposed to harbor is that England may remain occupied and in a certain measure absorbed as long as possible by the Transvaal war; but for that it is only necessary to let her alone. There is no need of any intervention. Indeed, if such intervention were successful, England would at once have her South African army disengaged for other purposes. Who can tell but she might then be tempted to use it elsewhere, either in consequence of her present warlike impulse, or because, when that impulse has been suddenly arrested at one point, she might attempt to seek revenge or compensation at another. And it does not seem that Russia would be the gainer.

As for Germany, she is perhaps the country in which the unscrupulous policy of England has been condemned most vehemently. Her newspapers have distinguished themselves by the bitterness which they have mingled with their anger. But we are not now speaking of the

BRITON AND BOER

opinions of the people—that is unanimous, as we have said—but of the attitude of the Governments. Governments can think and feel like peoples without speaking like them, and, above all, without acting according to their feelings. In Germany, since the time of Kant, and even before, a great difference has always been made between pure reason and practical reason, and they are all the more apt to give themselves up to the speculations of the former the less they know how to avail themselves of the latter. For how many centuries did not Germany tend towards unity without making the energetic effort that would bring it to a consummation? Her thinkers and her poets wrote about it long before her men of action seriously thought of pursuing it, as Bismarck said, with fire and sword—that is to say, by the only means suitable for its accomplishment. We must not, then, believe that Germany is ready to act when she speaks, and only because she speaks; but judging from her history, it is perfectly permissible to believe that she does not speak in vain, but bides her time. Her true feelings towards England are not feelings of sympathy; one is often tempted to believe that they are quite the contrary, but the time has not yet come to make

WILL THE POWERS INTERVENE?

them the rule of her policy. In this respect William II. is the true representative of his nation. He does not like England, and she can hardly be in doubt on this point; for, whether impelled by the ardor of his temperament or the exuberance of his speech, he has not hesitated on numerous occasions to speak his mind freely. In this matter, Germany and her Emperor obey an instinct which does not deceive them. It is almost inevitable, unless the two countries are always governed by very able and very pacific statesmen, that their conflicting interests will sooner or later provoke a quarrel. The Emperor is well aware of it, and it is on this account that he insists with passionate obstinacy on the development of his navy. It is his fixed idea, which continually besets him; even when he himself imagines that it has given him a respite, it suddenly springs up again in his mind and lays hold of him like a nightmare. It is well known at what cost he succeeded last year in inducing the Reichstag to adopt his naval sexennial bill. It was then generally believed, and he no doubt believed it too, that thereafter he would need to ask for nothing more for six years; but lo! on the 18th of October last, he uttered a new note of alarm and distress at Hamburg, and once

BRITON AND BOER

more denounced the insufficiency of his navy for sustaining the policy which would enable Germany to work out her manifest destiny. The very next day the Government papers announced that further very important and very heavy appropriations would be asked of the Reichstag to carry out a scheme of naval construction laid out not for a space of only six, but for seventeen years. Will the Reichstag grant these appropriations, and once for all shackle not only its own liberty, but that of three subsequent legislatures in order to conform to the imperial plan? We do not know; at any rate, there will be great resistance, but the Government is not without the means of overcoming it. What are we to conclude from all this, but that a Hohenzollern once more seeks to give Germany, even in spite of herself, the means of realizing her violent but vague aspirations? He for his part shares these aspirations, but in his position, with the sense of the responsibility that he would incur by hasty and inadequate execution, he sees very clearly and feels very keenly that he still lacks the means of action. So he negotiates with England on the subject of the east coast of Africa; he seeks to obtain by diplomacy what he cannot take by force; he goes to London to see his old grand-



DR. L. S. JAMESON

WILL THE POWERS INTERVENE?

mother. In short, he restrains himself, and we are quite convinced that he will continue to restrain himself and that he will not intervene in the present war.

England will therefore be allowed to fight out her quarrel with the Transvaal to the end, and the disparity of strength of the two combatants is so great that the weaker must infallibly succumb. But whatever may happen hereafter, the Transvaal will not succumb without glory. The boldness with which she declared war because she was resigned to die rather than voluntarily surrender her independence, the coolness she has shown on the battle-field, and the first successes which have demonstrated her courage—all this will be recorded to her credit in history. But she will be conquered. To make this outcome doubtful, the Afrikanders would have to rise and make common cause with the Boers. Then the situation would assume some resemblance to that which arose in America at the close of last century; but even then, if England persisted in the struggle, she would undoubtedly win. Only the war, which even now threatens to be a long one, would then be greatly protracted; it would be marked by greater atrocities; in short, the situation would long remain in suspense, and the

problem of the difficulties and the remedies which England has encountered in Ireland—a problem referred to by the few orators of the Liberal opposition—might easily be again realized. In that case, which we deem improbable, we should have to affix a note of interrogation to all that we have said above, and England, whose prestige would not be increased by anything that could then happen, might find embarrassments in Africa or elsewhere, although it may be impossible now to foretell how they would arise.

Nothing tangible therefore is likely to happen at present in consequence of the Anglo-Transvaal conflict. Public opinion will condemn the war, but the Governments will not move. None of them, as we have said, has an interest sufficiently great or direct to intervene between London and Pretoria, and the interests which some of them have outside of Africa would not be well served by intervention. Moreover, before provoking the Transvaal, England was careful to take precautions in all directions. At the close of last year she came to an understanding on all African questions with France, and the arrangement thus made assured to the latter the continuity of her territories and satisfied her for the present. Eng-

land has also had an understanding with Russia concerning the extreme East, so there is no immediate clash to be feared in that quarter. The same is true respecting Germany. In treating with that Power, England seems to have had two points in view at once—the Samoan Islands and the east coast of Africa. They had a strong desire for the Samoan Islands in Berlin, the more so because the imperial diplomacy had suffered some mortifications, the sting of which was still felt. By consenting to submit the definite situation to be established in the islands to negotiations which promised to be protracted, and which, moreover, could be drawn out as long as the English Government desired, it felt sure of being able to occupy and restrain the German Government by holding out a hope to which the latter attached a very great value. This hope has now been realized, and Germany has obtained her desire. She could not therefore manifest any hostile sentiments so soon afterwards. There is, however, reason to believe that she regards the cession of the principal islands in the Samoan group as a mere sop, and that her pretensions do not stop there. She already has considerable possessions in the east and in the west of Africa—we shall speak at present only of the former—and she has

been giving her attention to the extension which the English possessions cannot fail to take in the near future in consequence of the Transvaal war. They are, in fact, destined to grow prodigiously. But a few years ago Mr. Cecil Rhodes was credited with the scheme of establishing between Northern and Southern Africa, between Egypt and the Cape, an uninterrupted continuity of territory over which England exercised either paramount influence or actual sovereignty. That scheme seemed chimerical. It is no longer regarded as unattainable at the present day, and it was natural that Germans should take it into consideration. Would she be prevented from expanding farther in any direction? Nobody can tell exactly what has been agreed upon between Berlin and London, but everybody knows that something has—doubtless to the detriment of the Portuguese colonies—and it is thought also that Germany too is satisfied for the present. There may be some difficulties on this head later on between her and England. However that may be, it is known that the latter has taken the precaution and found the means of securing a certain respite for herself during which she need fear no trouble from any quarter. There is also reason to believe that this respite will be suf-

ficiently long for her to complete her undertaking. If she rushed into the conflict headlong in a military sense, she acted more prudently in her diplomacy, which is an additional reason for believing that she will not be disturbed by anybody in the execution of what everybody regards as an atrocity. But the opinion will prevail that an atrocity has been committed against a weak nation whose chief fault was the possession of gold-mines. It will be seen once more what England is capable of when her interests are involved in the slightest degree, and how lightly she then esteems the rights of others and humanity. She speaks continually of civilization; but outside of her own boundaries nobody admits that the cause of civilization is interested in the Transvaal war. The high-sounding words with which she disguises her conduct may deceive herself, but abroad they produce a very different effect. It would have been more sincere if she had invoked only her great material interests and the right of the stronger in this affair. After all, there are other European nations in whose history sins of the same kind are found, but then they committed them in a less pharisaical, and therefore less offensive, manner. All of which is a subject for serious reflection for all the na-

tions of the old continent—at least, for all those which have a navy and colonies. The fact is that the Transvaal affair is only an episode which has a root from which others may spring. At the present time there may be observed in England the fermentation of a peculiar virus which we call Chauvinism or jingoism with which the policy of that great country is, as it were, infected. This policy has become more and more brutal in its methods than it used to be. The generation to which Mr. Gladstone belonged is gone, and we may say the same of that to which Lord Salisbury belongs, for Lord Salisbury is no longer the master of his own party. The Liberal party and the Conservative party both obey similar influences which are well represented by Lord Rosebery and Mr. Chamberlain. New men have come into political power who not only possess insatiable ambition, but a certain hard, cold, inexorable quality as regards the means by which they would realize their ambition—a personal arrogance and a disdain of others, a cruel absence of feelings that come from the heart such as used to give evidence of their existence, even when force was used, by a certain considerateness prompted by esteem and pity. Of these not a trace is now left, and of a

truth Europe would not be sorry to have Prince Bismarck back, whose soul was not too tender, if she were to fall under the hegemony of statesmen such as shine to-day in the British firmament.

These are the impressions she has received from the events of these last months. The nations feel them keenly, and the Governments are not insensible to them. Each makes its own reflections on them, and there are lessons that will not be lost in what is now going on. However, a part of these impressions consists in the horror which war inspires more and more as our manners grow more gentle, and hence we must not conclude that they will necessarily lead to military conflicts. Everybody desires peace, but feels at the same time that this peace may be disturbed notwithstanding this general desire by some particular opposing desire. For this reason many differences between certain nations are beginning to be minimized, and at the same time new interests involving new alliances are arising. It is still only a psychological condition, but in the inevitable evolution of things, that which enters deeply into men's minds and consciences will some day produce its influence on events.

FRANCIS CHARMES.

A POSSIBLE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE
AGAINST ENGLAND

No Englishman can have resided on the continent of Europe during the last two years, as I have done, with some special opportunities of watching the trend of political events, without becoming aware of a remarkable anti-English movement, which I may call a consolidation of Continental opinion against Anglo-Saxon expansion. It began before the United States went to war with Spain, but rather in a debating-society mood than with the serious purpose of responsible statesmen. The American public do not need to be told that the sentiment of every Foreign Office and of every nation on the mainland of Europe was against them in their contest with Spain. They also know very well that the one substantial fact which made irate potentates and irritated crowds on that continent pause before turning their sentiments into action was the presence and the power of the British fleet. The United States completed their business amid

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

the frenzied exclamations of Continental journalists on behalf of "the innocent" and "nonoffending" Spaniards. But America is far off, and when the war closed the venom and the fear of Continental Governments and nations became concentrated on Great Britain. Additional force was given to these feelings by the knowledge of the part taken by the British Government in lending its moral support to the United States, by the spectacle of the British and American peoples arriving at spontaneous agreement as to their identical interests and common mission, and by the inevitable consequence of those circumstances in the conclusion that the growth of Anglo-Saxon power, instead of being arrested, was on the point of taking a fresh and remarkable expansion.

How long these feelings might have remained in the chrysalis stage of suppressed resentment and secret intention, if there had been no war in the Transvaal, is uncertain; but, at the present moment, the floodgates of Continental eloquence and wrath are let loose for the denunciation of England. All that was said to the discredit of the American people during the Spanish war has been written of England's action in South Africa with intensified vindictiveness and an en-

larged vocabulary. It is not a question merely of the rights or wrongs of the Uitlander population being ignored and thrust aside without a moment's consideration, nor is it one as to whether some compromise might not have been discovered in the Transvaal, short of the stern arbitrament of war. A friend might hold an opinion contrary to ours without offending us or giving us the right to complain. We could make allowance for some defect in his knowledge of the facts, we should admit that his point of view was not ours. But there is all the difference in the world between the protest of a friend and the snarling of a foe. Our Continental critics leave us in no doubt as to their sentiments. They use the loftiest language, they invoke the ideal principles, they speak in the name of sublime justice, whenever they have to comment on British action; but they forget to exact from the opposing side an equal compliance with these non-terrestrial conditions, and they fail to observe them themselves when they are called on to deal with colonial problems and difficulties. The Boers may play the tyrant on the veldt without a word of censure. In their truculent intolerance they might insult the British army and drag its flag in the dirt, and the boulevard loungers

would only be amused. But France may repress, as the savage disposition of some of her officers may dictate, tribes fighting for their independence in the Soudan or in Madagascar; Russia may make an example of the inhabitants of Tashkent, when they show an inclination to dispute her authority; Germany can ride roughshod, in her characteristic official manner, over her subjects in the Cameroons; all these things may be done with impunity, while England is howled at for vindicating her authority and for punishing those who have reviled at and defied her. Only in her case does the Continental critic adopt his severest mood, take down his book of homilies, and after the most edifying admonition condemn her to the public pillory among the nations, and—what is more congenial to their mood and nearer to their practical purpose—to the discomfiture and overthrow an all-powerful Deity will mete out for such iniquity. Our Continental critics and enemies who arrogate to themselves, under an appropriated decree of Providence imagined in their own conceit, the position of judge, jury, and court of appeal in one, evolve out of their own rhetoric the arrest and downfall of Anglo-Saxon supremacy.

These expressions of violent prejudice and un-

reasoning wrath are merely the froth on the surface of the waters of public opinion. But, in the depths, there is a serious movement, a profound agitation, not to be ignored, threatening serious disturbance when it acquires the necessary volume, and calling for careful and timely examination. The questions that require consideration are not limited to the one raised in the title of this paper. They are not confined to the possibility or probability of a general Continental alliance against England. A far graver danger is threatened by the general hostility of all the Powers, which, moving on their own independent lines, are yet inspired by the common sentiment that England's farther expansion must be stopped. That opinion is common to them all in different degrees of intensity, and when people are agreed in their views it is certain that they will do nothing to hinder their realization, although they may not openly combine for the purpose. I hope to make it clear, before the end of this paper, that the peril of England in this latter form already exists, and that England has begun, unconsciously, a struggle in which the whole of Europe is arrayed against her; that the struggle will pass through several distinct episodes or chapters; and that the result will decide

the fate of the British Empire. In studying so momentous a problem, the most exalted persons are merely pieces on the chess-board. They are not entitled to any greater consideration than their inherent value and position on the table may give them, in deciding the course and the issue of the game. It would be absurd to discuss the question at all if we were obliged to consider the personal susceptibilities of an Emperor, to gloss over the rottenness of an administration, or to ignore the decadence of a nation.

Prince Bismarck said in 1885 that England had got enough of the world's surface. It was a moment of profound national depression and humiliation. Mr. Gladstone was in office. Majuba Hill was recent. The ineffaceable tragedy and disgrace of Khartoum had just happened. The Berlin Conference was summoned. What occurred? In the centre of Africa was formed a great independent and neutral State, on the west and also on the east coast Germany acquired vast territories, while France came down to the Congo and its tributaries. In this manner barriers were placed in the path of farther British expansion in Africa. To appreciate the full significance of that rebuff it must, however, be remembered that England had to cancel her

BRITON AND BOER

own Convention with Portugal on the subject of the Congo, and to assent to her vassal, the Sultan of Zanzibar, being stripped of his possessions on the mainland, for the benefit of Germany.

The ten years that followed the Berlin Conference were, for England, a period of meditation on the errors of the years from 1881 to 1885, and for attaining collectedness as to how they might be repaired. With regard to the Soudan, the country gradually adopted General Gordon's weighty conclusion, that it "could not be divorced from Egypt." Hence followed the gradual reconquest of the country by Lord Kitchener, who destroyed the military power of the Khalifa at the Atbara and Omdurman. The retrieval of that part of the Gladstone legacy of national loss and discredit was almost accompanied by a war with France over the incident at Fashoda, where a French officer, with the permission of M. Hanotaux, notwithstanding the repeated warnings of our Foreign Office, erected the tricolor. The incident ended with the establishment of British predominance throughout the Nile Valley, but the French people have decided to cherish the name of Fashoda as constituting for them a humiliation, and to use it as a war-cry when they close the doors of their Exhibition.

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

The delay of ten years in commencing the reconquest of the Soudan did not make the task appreciably more difficult, for the dervishes were isolated, and the clever scheme formed by Russia and France to make our task more troublesome by inciting and assisting Abyssinia to join the Khalifa, or at least to attack us, was not allowed sufficient time to mature or come off. But the nineteen years that have elapsed since Majuba have served to enlarge a local question of comparatively little importance into a problem of the first magnitude, affecting the general international position, and influencing more or less the attitude of the Continental Powers towards England. There is no more uncertainty as to the persons who have created for us this aggravation of difficulty in South Africa than there was about the intrigues in Abyssinia and on the Upper Nile. Germany, and, above all Germans, the German Emperor, is just as responsible for President Krüger's defiance as France and M. Hanotaux were for Marchand's appearance at Fashoda, and for the hostile intentions of M. de Bonchamps and Henry of Orleans at the court of King Menelik. But they are responsible for a great deal more. Their encouragement, advice, and practical assistance, in the form of officers, drill-ser-

BRITON AND BOER

geants, artillerymen, and arms, have made the Boers a formidable military opponent, only to be crushed by the loss of many brave lives and by an extraordinary effort. In South Africa, as in the Soudan, British supremacy will be reasserted; but it is impossible to ignore the quarter whence the Boers received inspiration, not merely as to their line of policy, but as to their strategy in the field, which might well have gained for the Boers some military successes at the beginning of the war.

Without an alliance, therefore, it is clear that for a number of years France, Germany, and Russia have been pursuing an anti-English policy, opposing our plans, raising difficulties in our path, and diminishing by extensive colorings of the map the area left vacant for the introduction of our commerce and civilization. There is no reason to suppose that these measures have been carried out on any systematic plan, but they certainly indicate the prevalence of a general anti-English sentiment, such as Prince Bismarck crystallized in the phrases, "England had got enough of the world's surface," and "It might not be Germany's interest to take any specific colony, but it certainly was her interest to prevent England getting it." These sentences were not ap-

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

preciated at the time, but a little reflection will show how the ideas they expressed have influenced foreign policy during the last fourteen or fifteen years. But in no part of the world—for the time is not yet ripe for treating China after the fashion of Africa in 1885—has the effort been greater to create for England a situation of danger and embarrassment than in South Africa. When the first campaigns with the Boers were undertaken no outsiders were interested in the question. Not a gold-mine had been worked, hardly one Uitlander could be discovered on the veldt. But the stubbornness and success of the Boer resistance in 1881 aroused some interest in them, and that interest has certainly not diminished by the extraordinary gold discoveries and the consequent inrush of European adventurers and settlers, chiefly British, but with a very considerable number of Germans, Dutch, and Cape Dutch, all of whom gradually adopted, as comprehensive names, those of Hollanders in the Transvaal and Afrikaners in the Cape Colony. In this way was created a party, not confined to the Transvaal, but extending its organization and influence throughout South Africa, distinct from and opposed to the British settlers and Government. The strength

and cohesion of that party were insured by the use of their common language, and thus, for the first time, German and its offshoots entered the lists as a rival to English, on the ground of colonial dominion.

But if the project was not restricted to the Transvaal, it was thence that it derived its chief solidity and resources. The gold of its mines, applied to the purchase of warlike stores and to the employment of German and other officers and ex-soldiers, gave it a military power far in excess of the number or general knowledge of the inhabitants. The love of independence shown throughout Boer history, and the prestige acquired by the successes in 1881, made the Transvaal the natural leader in a Teutonic movement throughout South Africa. But not merely is the Transvaal to be regarded, in the development of the question, as a free agent acting for and on its own behalf. If it had not possessed another rôle—if, in plainer words, it had stood alone—the decisive interference in its affairs might have been put off till the disappearance of Mr. Krüger in the ordinary course of nature should have given a chance for more enlightened and saner counsels. But the Transvaal was the *imperium in imperio* which supplied our ene-

mies with the means of organizing, within our limits, a formidable confederacy that, at the given moment of external complications, might have revealed all its power and ambition, to the serious peril and perhaps temporary disappearance of British supremacy south of the Tropic of Capricorn. Before the Jameson Raid, it was well known how active German agents had grown in the Transvaal, and in the four years since that episode their activity has increased and grown more systematic and dangerous. Under these circumstances, it would have been madness to defer action any longer. The German Emperor's telegram of congratulation and support to President Krüger in 1896 was the indiscreet lifting of the veil as to all Germany had done and intended still to do in the Transvaal.

Four years have passed since that telegram, and we are now assured that the German Emperor has purged him of his offence, and that the British plans will encounter no opposition at his hands. Before these lines can appear in print, he should have visited England, and many opinions will be hazarded as to the true significance of that perhaps farewell interview between grandmother and grandson. But even if the visit comes off, it will perhaps not enable us to

see very much more clearly, or a great deal farther ahead, as to the true intentions of Germany. The affectionate and confidential utterances of royal personages will not arrest the course of State policy nor turn aside from their purpose statesmen and diplomatists whose efforts and reputation are staked on the arrest of Anglo-Saxon expansion. Any new agreement with Germany will be like that already signed, but unpublished, of which the one thing certainly known is that it *did not* give us Delagoa Bay, when its possession would have enabled us to take the Boers in flank and at a great disadvantage; or, perhaps, it will more resemble the unsigned agreement with Mr. Rhodes at Berlin, which will create German railways, without carrying us much on the road for the Cape-to-Cairo railway. The German Emperor has left both England and America in no sort of doubt as to his views, wishes, and plans in regard to their affairs. He is their enemy, but their waiting enemy, because his fleet is in its infancy, "a mere baby," to use his own words; but it seems to have escaped the notice of his critics that babies, especially such a fine healthy baby as the German navy of to-day, become men.

These preliminary observations, necessary for

the correct appreciation of what follows, may have made clear one thing, viz., the hostile intentions, towards England in the first place and the United States in the second, of the three leading military Powers, France, Germany, and Russia. With regard to Russia, it need only at this stage be observed that she has open to her in Asia a wide field for ambitious operations, that occupy her attention and render her less keen than the others to interfere with Great Britain in quarters with which she has little or no concern. It may be said of her at once that, if she were induced to interfere with England over any African question, it would be not of her own free will, but under the pressure of France. The crippling of England in any quarter might bring the Cossacks nearer to the Indus or Peking, but the secret of Russia's success hitherto has been the concentration of her policy, and she may prefer to attain her objects in her own way and without seeking remote adventures. With the exception of the Abyssinian scheme, Russia has as yet shown no inclination to come into collision with England outside of Asia. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that whatever St. Petersburg may do in support of others, the initiative of any offensive measure against Eng-

land in Africa will be at Paris or Berlin. In both those capitals there has for many years been a systematic plan of embarrassing and thwarting England in Africa. The French designs were brought to a summary check at Fashoda, but the German have continued down to the present hour under a friendly guise.

But there is a radical difference between hostile intentions and a definite alliance. All the Continental nations may dislike and envy us; but they have their own relations and differences to consider. Europe is an armed camp from the Channel to the Caspian; but the explanation of that fact is not the wish to make war on England, but the need of defending their several frontiers against one another. The practical questions are: Can the Powers lay aside, even momentarily, their mutual jealousies and apprehensions, to combine against England? Do statesmen at Berlin seriously contemplate a union with Paris and St. Petersburg, in order to call a halt on the British in South Africa? Can they afford to face the consequences of the success of a policy in which they would be following the lead of France and Russia? Can they feel confident that the policy would succeed, either by England's yielding to a formidable international

demonstration, or by the Powers vanquishing England on the sea? We may be sure, at least, that the German Government will carefully consider these points in all their bearings before they come to the momentous decision to quarrel with England. They will be swayed very much by their estimate of the relative strength of the Continental Powers and the British Empire. They will carefully examine, by the light of the information they possess, the condition of the allies who are only waiting their signal to present England with an ultimatum which, if signed by Germany, would make her for good and forever an enemy. If that step would isolate England to-day, Germany at no remote date might find herself in the same position, and exposed on both her frontiers to the double peril of Slav ambition and French revenge.

The material and political condition of European countries may also appear discouraging under the close and critical examination of German spectacles. Germany is allied with two tottery States in Austria and Italy, in both of which exist serious elements of internal dissension and weakness, that might greatly diminish their value at the critical moment when Germany had need of them. With regard to any

BRITON AND BOER

possible action against England, Austria would not count at all, and Italy is the one European Power that would certainly not take part against her, because the co-operation of the British Navy is needed, and assured by a definite understanding, for the protection of her own coasts. Spain does not seriously exist, and the sentiment of little States like Holland and Belgium, however noisily uttered, can have no influence on the question. The continent of Europe, therefore, resolves itself, for practical purposes, into the three Powers—Germany, France, and Russia; and when the possibility of an alliance between those three rival Powers is suggested, one realizes the exact difficulties that lie in the path of those who would effect it.

Russia and France being already allies for better or worse, the practical point to be discovered is whether there is any reasonable probability of Germany's associating herself with them for the arrest of England's progress, and, if need were, for her more serious discomfiture. There was a time when the mere proposition would have been received with ridicule, and when an equal repugnance to the suggestion would have been shown at both Berlin and Paris. But as much cannot be said to-day. The

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

alliance may be impracticable, but at least it excites no repugnance. The idea of such a combination has sunk into the minds of both peoples, and it will at least afford abundant material for discussion. Nor can it be forgotten that such an alliance existed, for all practical purposes, at the Berlin Conference of 1885, and still more openly in 1895, when the three Powers arrested Japan's progress and ignored England. The old theory that France and Germany could and would never combine requires at least more careful examination before passing current than formerly. It may still be sound, but it has not such a sure foundation as it once had. France is undoubtedly willing to sink her ancient feud with Germany, in order to gratify her more pressing irritation against England. The German Emperor has but to give a nod and he can fold the French Republic, Cap of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and all, with the French army to boot, in his arms. If Germany had only to think of theatrical effect, the inclination to make the sign would be irresistible, but she must look a little further ahead and think what will come after.

It is not going too far to say that France has offered Germany her alliance against England, with the object of stopping her conquest of the

BRITON AND BOER

two South African Republics. Of course, France has not put herself in the position of inviting a formal rebuff, but at Berlin they are in no doubt as to what France is willing to do, and also as to what France wishes Germany to do. The visit of the German Emperor to Windsor is regarded as the cold-water douche to these indirect overtures, but it may not have all the significance or importance imagined. Still, it means that Germany is not as eager as she was supposed to be to enter the lists against England. She has reckoned up the odds, and she has come to the conclusion that the fleets of the three Powers would not be certain to have the better of the English fleet, which could count on the co-operation of Japan at once, and probably of Italy as well, with the possible intervention of the United States on the same side following, perhaps, at a short interval. The paper odds of the German-French-Russian fleets against England would thus be turned into the material and incontestable superiority of England and her allies, when the nations vanquished would certainly lose their navies and their colonies. From inviting that catastrophe the Emperor William has drawn back, and just in time. Four years ago he went very near to the edge of the precipice; but, after some irrita-

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

tion and resentment, he seems to have placed upon himself a prudent restraint which the excited exhortations of the German Colonial Party are not likely to break down.

His policy is not dictated by any sincerely friendly feeling towards England, but by a careful regard for German interests. Perhaps the occasion will arise, before the Transvaal difficulty is settled, for him to show how very little he cares about England and her interests, although he is not disposed to enter the field openly against her. If, for instance, as is by no means improbable, France and Russia take steps which assail our rights in some quarter, and provoke a war for which England was never more ready than at the present hour, Germany would stand aside and observe the strictest neutrality. She would not move a finger to help us, and would take a cynical satisfaction in seeing her formidable military neighbors injure themselves; and, at the same time, the damage that could not fail also to be inflicted by such a war on England would facilitate the Emperor's schemes for the commercial and colonial expansion of his own country. Moreover, the German Emperor and Government will expect to be paid for this neutrality, whether there is war or peace, by

BRITON AND BOER

concessions in Africa or the Pacific; and, as the Germans are good hands at driving a bargain—the title of “honest broker” was not gained by Bismarck without reason—the highest value will be set on their services in order to gain the largest amount of reward. Provided there is no general outbreak of war, and Great Britain is left undisturbed to establish firmly and indisputably her supremacy in the Transvaal and Orange Free States, no Englishman could object to see Germany come down to the Zambesi, when Portugal quits the east coast, with Walfisch Bay on the west coast thrown in. But if war ensues with France and Russia, then Germany should receive nothing unless she openly ranges herself on the side of England. It is very doubtful if the arrangements between England and Germany have provided for that contingency.

Germany has very practical reasons for not combining with France and Russia in any serious enterprise. If she contributed to their success, she would be strengthening her enemies, and a day of reckoning would be sure to arrive. If they failed, she would share in their discomfiture; and, on measuring the comparative sea-forces of the world, the balance is against success.



GENERAL PIETER JOUBERT
Commanding the Transvaal Forces



M. T. STEYN
President Orange Free State

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

But Germany has other reasons for pausing before she commits herself to a line of action that would make her subordinate to Russia and France. What is her estimate of the real strength and resources of those two Empires? Do the confidential reports from Paris and St. Petersburg represent them as being in a sound and healthy condition, and able to bear the strain, not of a single campaign, but of a long war, waged in every quarter of the world? No one questions the military spirit of the French soldier, but the French soldier would have very little to say in a war with England. Nor need the merit of the best part of the Russian army be disputed; but India and China are still a long way off, and where else is the British Empire vulnerable from Russia? Such military strength as France and Russia undoubtedly possess is not of the kind to make them dangerous opponents to England at the present moment. On the other hand, the German authorities cherish no illusion on the capacity of the British fleet to deal with that of France and Russia combined. The immediate consequences of a war would be, therefore, the sweeping of the Mediterranean Sea, the Channel, and the China Seas by the British Navy. There would be some sanguinary

BRITON AND BOER

engagements, some losses by the victors, but the result would be to put "Paid" to the account of French and Russian schemes beyond their land frontiers. What would be the consequences of those facts in the two Empires? How would France, overtaxed, miserable as she is at heart under the overshadowing military superiority of Germany, stand the humiliation of that discomfiture? How would Russia, immature, unready, and probably rotten at the core, retain her position if to the loss of her fleet were added the collapse of the position she has laboriously gained in Eastern Asia, and which is based on an insecure foundation? There is no reason to believe that an accurate dissection of either of those States, if it were possible, would reveal a thoroughly sound constitution; and the first collision of the opposing fleets would reveal the truth as under the touch of Ithuriel's spear. Germany cannot pretend to be omniscient, but she showed that she possessed good information in 1870, and there is no reason to suppose that she is less accurately informed to-day. The policy of her ruler has so far been modified that he has drawn back from the policy which would have made him the ally of France and Russia against England; and all the barking of the anti-English

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

press incited by Dr. Leyds and his influential German friends will not make him swerve from his course. But that policy is dictated by no regard for England; it is the result of a calm consideration of all the elements in the question. For this occasion, at least, we can feel sure that Berlin will not dance to the music set by Paris and St. Petersburg.

The possible Continental alliance against England resolves itself, by a process of elimination, into the opposition of France and Russia—an opposition which, however serious, the British Empire can face with a reasonable amount of equanimity and confidence in the result. It is regrettable to see that, after over eighty years of peace and on some occasions of alliance, the rivalry and hatred of France for England exist just as keenly as at any time during the previous eight centuries of war. The French hate the Germans, but are afraid of them. They know that, unless they can produce a military genius of the highest order, the odds are overwhelmingly against them in any renewed struggle with Germany, and their "great" generals of late bear the names Boisdeffre, Mercier, and Roget! They think it safer, therefore, to take out of the cupboard their old animosity towards

BRITON AND BOER

England, and to provide their army with an opportunity of redeeming its good name at the expense of *perfidie Albion*. That is a dangerous sentiment to cherish against a State which has legitimate grievances against France's attitude from Newfoundland to the Chinese Province of Yunnan. A spark may at any moment produce an explosion in such a magazine of internal irritation and discontent as is the France of to-day. The further forbearance of England is not to be relied on if a Waima incident occurred on the Burmese frontier, or if Pierre Loti repeated in any form at Cabul Marchand's theatrical exhibition at Fashoda. Anglo-French relations have entered on a phase which must inevitably have a hostile termination, unless France has the wisdom to tack and steer an opposite course.

Neither the Russian Government nor the Russian people are swayed by any bitterly hostile feelings towards England such as animate all the nations of French race. They see in the British Empire a rival with which, at some future date, they will probably come into collision; but they have no wish to hasten the date. The rivalry of England and Russia is like the approach of a comet towards our planet. The political astrono-

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

mers have not been able to fix the date of the impact, nor can they be absolutely sure that nature will not, at the eleventh hour, provide some means of averting the collision. But Russia is tied to France for better or for worse, and the conditions of her ally may cause her some reasonable apprehension. In a choice of evils, Russia may prefer to accompany France along a course that she does not approve of to leaving her in a state of internal discontent and disorder, which may sap her value to Russia as an ally. Even during the Fashoda business, France received assurances that Russia would not fail her, although that Power hoped there would be no war. Nor was Russia's action confined to words. She sent 10,000 more troops to Central Asia, and strengthened her garrisons on the Afghan frontier. If she did this in regard to the Upper Nile difficulty, it is certain that she would do a great deal more in so important and interesting an occurrence as an attempt to save the Transvaal from becoming British. But there is no fear that France and Russia will attempt anything so Quixotic as helping the Boers to emerge from their condition as the vassals of England. All the denunciation in the press of England's tyranny and ambition will not, on the eve of a new century, induce

those Powers to openly oppose what they know England has a perfect right to do. The practice of throwing projectiles, in the form of abuse and epithets, at the head of the English has always been a favorite pastime with Continental journalists. It amuses them and does not hurt us, as the song says; but the Governments know very well that the Boers have brought their punishment and changed fate on their own heads.

The action of France and Russia will be of a different form to that. It will not be less hostile to England, but it will be more practical. They cannot dream of aiding the Boers directly; nor, without the co-operation of Germany, which, I have shown by weighty reasons, they will not get, can they think of presenting an ultimatum to England of "Hands off the Transvaal!" But they may think that England is so occupied in South Africa that she will not oppose their proceedings somewhere else, and that she will look on while they appropriate certain points which they think will prove advantageous to them in the future. They may hold this opinion so strongly that, like the Emperor Nicholas I, they will believe that England, under the very considerable provocation they propose offering her, will still not fight at such a time as she is em-

ployed in South Africa, and, like that ruler, they may find that they are mistaken and have gone too far. At this moment it is not very certain what steps these two Powers are going to take; but one of the steps is undoubtedly a joint naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf, and another is probably a similar movement in the vicinity of Ceuta. In regard to both movements, Russia would take the lead, and it is believed in well-informed circles that Count Mouravief arranged for the occupation of Ceuta during his visit to Spain. Russia wishes to obtain a port on the southern coast of Persia, in order to secure a terminus for her projected line across that country and to anticipate the arrival of the Germans down the Euphrates. In regard to France, the direct practical advantage of these two moves is far from being clear, even if they were accompanied by a sentimental gain in the marriage of a Spanish princess, and possible future Queen, with so patriotic and chauvinistic a Frenchman as Prince Henry of Orleans.

Such are the schemes of our enemies, and the only practical question is whether the British Government will allow them to be carried into effect. The position of Ceuta is so admirable that the proposition has sometimes been put forward in Spain to offer it in exchange for Gib-

raltar. If there never was any strong reason for believing that the proposal would be accepted, there was at least nothing in the offer to make it appear ridiculous. If Ceuta was a strong place twenty years ago, the increased range of fortress artillery has made it more formidable than ever, and Gibraltar itself would be within the reach of its guns if it fell into the hands of a first-class Power. Before these lines can appear in print, the policy of the two Powers may have been unmasked, and England may have shown how she will regard it, and what measures she proposes to take to safeguard herself. But it may be confidently predicted that any attempt to seize Ceuta will be treated as a *casus belli*. With regard to the proposed demonstration in the Persian Gulf, it is not possible to speak so clearly and positively. It depends very much on the size of the demonstration and the incidents accompanying it. It would not be a friendly step, of course, but its gravity might not warrant a declaration of war. We can all see that Russia is bound to have a hand in deciding the future of Persia, just as she is of China. These sick Asiatic countries will have to be healed by some one or other, and it is problematical if Russia will be stronger with a

port on the Persian Gulf or without one. If Russia and France confine themselves to some movement in this quarter, war may be averted, because England can adopt counter-precautions of her own at the Indian entrance to the Persian Gulf. The only obscurity is what benefit France expects to derive from measures so exclusively Russian. Perhaps she will receive assurances of future support in regard to her plans in south-western China, plans that are certain to bring England and France as rudely into conflict as they were brought on the Nile.

Taking a broad view of the international situation, and in the endeavor to pierce the clouds hanging over the European world, the final word may still be given in favor of the balance turning for peace, and for the adjournment of any serious effort to cripple England. This is probably the last occasion on which the hostile Powers will place a restraint on themselves before, taking wishes for certainties, they cross swords with the British Empire. The French people will conceal or restrain a little longer their desire to fight England. They may talk and threaten, but they will not imperil the success of their Exhibition. Russia is quite willing to wait, and also prefers her own slow methods to

BRITON AND BOER

the impetuosity of her vivacious partner. The risk is that they may both go a little further than the British Government can stand, and before they well know what they have done they may find themselves engaged in a naval war that they little expected. The French military authorities cherish many fine schemes of establishing their reputation by a brilliant stroke at the expense of England. They have had, for some years, a plan for throwing a force across the Channel and seizing Dover. Its merit may be inferred from the fact that General Boulanger drew it up; and now they have added a project for seizing Malta or Gibraltar, one or both, by a *coup de main*, in which absolute treachery would play no small part. It is not strange that French generals should conceive these schemes, but it certainly is strange that they should think the schemes can be kept secret.

The real danger of the hour to England comes, then, from France, behind whom stands Russia, and if there is to be war, "The rescue of the Boers!" will be as good a cry as any other. It will be received with general acclamation by the European public in States which have no pretence to have a voice in the matter, and even in

ALLIANCE AGAINST ENGLAND

Germany, where the decision to remain neutral will not prevent the mass of the people from hoping that England will meet with discomfiture and damage. At the latest, the close of the year will tell us what we must expect; but, in the worst event, the British Empire of to-day will give a good account of Russia and France combined, and make them bitterly regret their decision to assail it.

DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR

I

No war has met with such general condemnation as the war in the Transvaal. In cases of the clash of arms between two nations, disinterested spectators usually divide into two groups, taking sides with one or the other of the combatants. This phenomenon does not appear to arise in this case. Outside of the Anglo-Saxon world, not a single voice has been raised for England up to the present time. The sympathies of all are on the side of the Boers. Meanwhile, the different Governments are maintaining a proper attitude, observing strict neutrality and warning their people against a too violent manifestation of feelings. But public opinion, as it finds expression in the press and in meetings, is unrestrained, and overwhelms England with execrations more emphatic even than those used in past centuries against the arch-enemy of Christendom—the Turk.

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR

Whence this unanimity of hatred against England among the people of the European Continent? The sentiment has a variety of roots. Some of these lie on the surface, others are more deeply concealed. Some originate from noble motives, others from fairly ignoble ones. When David and Goliath step into the ring, brutal realists will always bet on the giant; but knightly enthusiasts will pray for the success of his diminutive opponent. The fact that a tiny people faces death without hesitation to defend its independence against an enemy fabulously superior in number, or to die in the attempt, presents an aspect of moral beauty which no soul, attuned to higher things, will disregard. Even friends and admirers of England—yea, even the English themselves—strongly sense the pathos in the situation of the Dutch Boers, who feel convinced that they are fighting for their national existence, and agree that it equals the pathos of Leonidas, William Tell, and Kosciusko. With many, partisanship for the Boers rests upon genuine abstract ethical grounds. With others these nobler grounds are pretexts disguising previously existing hatred of the British. Most of the nations envy England its enormous territorial possessions in all parts of the world; its wealth, its

BRITON AND BOER

high cultural development, its freedom; some are jealous of its competition in the world's market; one or the other of the nations reproaches it with the fact that it desires no neighbor in its colonizings, and they all regard its racial pride as an offence to their egotism.

But one fundamental note resounds through all the different cries which voice the public opinion of Europe against England—resentment because of a lost illusion.

The war in the Transvaal follows the Peace Conference at The Hague without an interval; it therefore reacts upon the mind like a cruel satire upon it. The representatives of the Powers assembled with the solemn peal of bells and sweet music, and separated with a thundering of cannon at Glencoe and Ladysmith. A thousand entranced peus celebrated the peace manifesto of the Czar as the beginning of a new era in the world's history, and these now stand convicted of the fact that the thought of turning over a new leaf is still far from Clio's mind.

The disenchantment is the more humiliating, since the illusion was sincere in the case of but very few open admirers of the initiative of the Czar. There are few general manifestations of our times in which hypocrisy played so large a



LADYSMITH

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR

part as it did in the extravagant hymns of praise that greeted the call to the conference at The Hague. The fundamental principles upon which our civilization rests, the religious doctrines, the moral and judicial standards which we pretend to follow, logically require that war should be condemned and that one should pose as a disciple of peace. No man can serve God and Mammon. It is impossible to declare: "*Justitia regnorum fundamentum*" (justice is the foundation of kingdoms) and "Might is right" at one and the same time. To be confirmed as a Christian upon a catechism which teaches: "Love thy neighbor as thyself; Thou shalt love thine enemies," and to recognize methodical preparations for murder and arson as the chief duty of every well-ordered government, are two incompatible things. But millions of people who indulge in conventional speeches as to their love of peace know very well that their heart does not coincide with their lips. They were grateful to the Czar, since his manifesto seemed to take their alleged love of peace for good coin of the realm, and they felt complimented therein upon the high degree of culture which it apparently assumed in them, and they are vexed with England because its actions give the lie to their assertions of their

BRITON AND BOER

love of peace before all white humanity. An unmasked hypocrite cannot be expected to be in good humor. It scarcely wrongs the Christian Powers if it be surmised that not one of them—not even Russia—would have acted differently from England under the same circumstances. But they would not admit it. They want to have the semblance of respect for right and neighborly love preserved. England should have allowed some little time to elapse between the Conference at The Hague and the war in the Transvaal. It might have assumed the appearance of seeking mediation or arbitration, in which case it could have adjusted matters in such a way that the attempt at a peaceful solution should have proved a failure. England has done violence to international decorum. But a breach of etiquette, this most serious of all drawing-room sins, is as unpardonable with the political hypocrite as with his social counterpart.

II

Is it not unfounded pessimism to assume in the heart of one's neighbors murder and robbery as general sentiments? Is it not calumny to

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR

denounce white humanity as a horde of warlike barbarians lightly coated with a veneer of rational civilization?

I do not believe it is. A comparison of the factors which practically labor for peace with those which prepare, justify, and train humanity for war, will show the latter as having overwhelming preponderance. The number of the apostles of peace outside of individual poets, *litterati*, artists, and thinkers includes a few international and national societies, whose membership is not great, comprising but few representative men of the time. Sad but true. The official organs of these societies have an incomparably smaller circulation than the most insignificant financial or sporting journal, and their periodical congresses attract far less attention than a floral exhibit or a cattle-show. On the other hand, all organized powers of State and society are pronounced or tacit adherents of war.

Religion is not necessarily, or at all times, an advocate of peace. That the Old Testament is filled with a warlike spirit needs no proof. Jehovah is "The Lord of Hosts" and His commands to His people more frequently involve bloodshed than compromise. The prophet Isaiah is the first to feel a premonition of a better future,

when "people will beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks, and nation will no longer lift up sword against nation." His God is no longer the angry God, who imposes the extermination of the Canaanites upon His people as a sacred duty. He is a loving father, who preaches: "Peace, peace—to those who are afar and to those who are near."

Christianity is indeed the religion of peace. Above the portals of the Church of Christ, the Christmas greeting of the angels, "Peace on earth and good will to men," glows as an inscription. This is theory. The practice of the Church is quite different. She has scarcely ever prevented war, and frequently pressed the sword into the hands of the faithful. In all the centuries of her sway, the Church has shed blood like water. She exterminated the Goths because of their Arianism, and she did what she could to prepare a similar fate for the Vandals and Lombards. In the Crusades she armed the Occident against the Orient, and sent hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of pious Christians and brave Mahometans to their death. She unleashed Simon de Montfort's assassins like a pack of wolves against the Albigenses; she visited the Waldenses with fire and sword; she prepared the

Night of St. Bartholomew for the Huguenots; and when she instigated neither foreign nor civil wars, she catered to the taste for the drama of human suffering and to the habit of bloodshed by the Inquisition and her Auto-da-Fes. In our day the Church has lost the power to set nation against nation, but she does not withhold her blessing from the banners of war; the hosts that march to the front are sped by her pious wishes, and she prays to God that He grant victory to the arms which she has blessed. In every country does the Church render this service to the native banners and arms, and she does not seem to see that it is blasphemy to ask of the God of Love to look with favor upon murder and destruction; or to ask of the God of the Universe to take sides with one portion of His children against another portion; especially when she knows that that other portion is turning to God with exactly the same impertinent request. Never yet has a clergyman had the common-sense to say: "I refuse to pray for the victory of our arms. From the altars in the enemy's country this same prayer is rising to Heaven in this self-same hour, and to hearken to both prayers, to grant victory to both hostile armies, lies beyond the pale of even God's Om-

nipotence." When, in the dispute over the Carolines, Prince Bismarck asked the Pope to act as arbitrator between Germany and Spain, Leo XIII. indeed declared that it was part of his office to make peace between Christian nations. But no head of a State Church has yet dared to answer the temporal authorities who asked his blessing upon banner and host: "You desire war, and our God teaches peace. I cannot bless the hand armed to maim and kill men. If you must shed blood, do so; but do not mix God and His religion with your devil's work."

Islam does not claim to be a religion of peace. Jihad, or Holy War, is one of its fundamental institutions; but there is no need of stopping on this, since no one seeks the highest expression of human culture among the Mahometan peoples.

In justice, religion should not be rebuked that it does not raise a more decided voice against war. According to the religious concept, war is not so dreadful an evil as it is according to the materialistic concept. Why is war a horror? Because it inflicts misery upon men and because it destroys life. But the sufferings of war reach only the flesh, which is transitory, and what concerns the death of the

body has little import for him who believes in the immortality of the soul and in the continuity of personality beyond the grave. There was no contradiction to her fundamental doctrines in the Church's maintaining that it was in the interests of religion that she instigated wars and revolutions. What is the loss of property, of bodily members, or even of life itself, in comparison with eternal salvation, which she could promise to him who fought for a good cause?

III

The cause of peace has little to expect from the Church. She will pray and preach peace when the Government of the State desires peace; and she will implore God for victory, she will bless the arms and praise death upon the battle-field to the troops as pleasing to God, when the Government is carrying out a warlike policy. But religion also, which I distinguish from the Church, is not in itself an ally of peace. Whatever its ideals or theoretical dogmas may be, in practice it always savors of the opportune. It adapts itself to the attainment of the spirit of the age. It preaches words into which every nation and

every individual puts the meaning corresponding to their own feelings, culture, and comprehension. I do not say that religion does not gradually mould minds along the lines of its doctrines, but, on the other hand, it is likewise a fact that minds mould religion. When the Gospel was preached to Chlodwig, the King of the Franks, he had but one thought: "Ah, if I could but have been present at the crucifixion of Christ with my Franks, what havoc could I have wrought among those Romans and Jews!" In his warlike soul the religion of love aroused concepts of combat and murder only. The catechism which missionaries teach the negroes of Australia is the same from which the whites derive their knowledge of religion. No one will seriously maintain that the Australian negro fills the crystal vessel of the catechism with the same emotional and intellectual content as the white Christian. Instincts control intellect and polarize it in their own direction.

As in religion, so in the most intellectual of all intellections, Philosophy. This does not mould the feelings of men; it pleads for their intellectual authorization only; it finds reasons for them; it gives them methodical expression; it gathers them into a system. There are, of course, phi-

losophers in every generation who strive for an objective verity and care little for the subjectivity of their contemporaries. But they are solitary dreamers, without perceptible influence upon the thought of the times. Whole nations honor as philosophers only those wise men and teachers who formulate, as reason and science, that which lives in the hearts of millions as sentiment. And since, unfortunately, the masses today still entertain violent and bloody instincts, almost all philosophers teach the justification, the necessity, and even the morality and beauty of war.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century Abbé de Saint-Pierre created a sensation with his *Projet de Paix Éternelle* (Plan for Eternal Peace). The book is a landmark in a century of rationalism. Saint-Pierre fails, as did the encyclopedists after him, to allow for the instinctive bases of human nature; he deals only with the visible surface, with inane forms of speech, which man bandies on his lips, when his feelings are asleep. It seemed to him a very simple and easy matter to abolish war in a Congress of all Nations, and to establish a world-police, whose duty it should be to maintain eternal peace among the peoples. One hundred and seventy

years later the Czar found it a trifle less easy to realize the thought of Saint-Pierre. The latter's contemporary, Voltaire, was cruelly amused with him, and demonstrated in his entertaining critique upon his book how utterly unfamiliar the good Abbé was with the realities of human nature and of life. Rousseau was a friend of peace on principle; but he considered Saint-Pierre's plan as impracticable, although it was sensible, or, rather, because it was sensible—"for," he said, "men are insane; it would furthermore be a sort of insanity to be the only sane man among the insane."

The French "nationalists" of to-day, who acknowledge themselves with candid brutality as worshippers of Force; who, with M. Jules Lemaitre, adore the "Sword of Salvation," and with M. G. Hanotaux, praise the murderers of the officers Klobb, Voulet, and Chanoine as heroes, have tried to introduce Kant as a crown witness for their theory. M. Brunetière tried to prove that the Koenigsberg philosopher speaks a word for war, by citing a disconnected sentence from a work later on repudiated by Kant himself. This is false. The most recent number of "Kant-Studies" shows the hardy ignorance of M. Brunetière, and the true opinion of

Kant, who actually condemns war as a crime, and desires to introduce the same judiciary forms between peoples as hold between individuals. John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte belong to the peace party among the philosophers.

On the other hand, Fichte is enthusiastic for war. And his "Speeches to the German Nation" are the chief sources of the emotions which animated the German people in the wars of liberation. Hegel takes the same stand at Fichte. Since he teaches that everything that exists is rational, the logic of his own dogma compels him to find war rational, since it exists. But he goes further than that; he declares that war is not only rational, but also beautiful and useful; it is the great reconstructor of humanity; the logic of his system does not compel him to go as far as that.

About the same time Xavier de Maistre wrote his fiery hymns in praise of war, which since have become the Gospel of all scrap-politicians, and whose arguments are to be found under the pen of all militarists, polished indeed, but deteriorated, like coins that have passed through many hands.

But the greatest authority of all advocates of war is Darwin. Gladly do they accept his

BRITON AND BOER

"struggle for existence" as the fundamental law of all life and all progress; and they conclude that war is a mandate of Nature, which man can escape as little as he can the law of gravitation. I will not here discuss Darwin's theory. Neither need I show that, according to Darwin's concept, combat may assume moral and lovable forms; as in cases where the individuals of a species do not battle against one another, but turn against other species in loyal solidarity; or, in higher degrees of mental culture, against the inimical forces of nature; or, when the male bird woos the female and tries to outdo his rival by a more graceful dance-step, more beautiful song, or a richer ornamentation of feathers. In such combats no blood is shed, no life is destroyed. They develop the best qualities of the combatants, and at best produce some slight distress in the egotism of the conquered. In this way, however, the pseudo-Darwinian philosophers and politicians do not understand the "struggle for existence." They always impart to the word of Darwin the sense of the prize-fighter and the gladiator, and subject the history of mankind to the law of the jungle. As Christians, as citizens of communities theoretically based upon right, they felt hitherto that a sense of decorous duty

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR

impelled them to simulate a love of peace and to weep a few crocodile tears over war as a necessary evil. But since the theory of evolution has been promulgated, they can cover their natural barbarism with the name of Darwin and proclaim the sanguinary instincts of their inmost hearts as the last word of science.

Only this faintly veiled foundation of savagery can explain the fact that the ravings of Nietzsche, an insane man, suffering with psychic paresis, which finally paralyzed the enfeebled brain entirely, could be enthroned as the philosophy of fashion. Nietzsche thinks that he is an opponent of Darwin, but, in reality, his work is but a parody on Darwin's theory misunderstood. And this by reason of grotesque exaggerations. "The Over-Man"—"the free-roving blond beast"—"all is allowable"—"the laughing lion"—"on the other side of good and evil"—"the morals of the classes"—these prison formulæ, these shibboleths of brigandage harmonized too well with the most secret sentiments of the red-skins in dress-coat and uniform, wherewith alleged white humanity teems, not to be greeted by them with joy as the highest form of revelation.

IV

It seems to me that the cause of peace is not being defended with proper arguments on right ground. Mr. Herbert Spencer regards the history of civilization as an evolution from war to industrialism, and uses these two conditions as antitheses. They are not necessarily such. War is not abrogated by resting the entire existence of a people upon commerce and trade. If industrialism is really to mean the end of war, an equality of evolution must exist between all peoples who have reached the industrial phase of civilization. But, within the limits of calculable time, this is a greater Utopia than eternal peace through general altruism. As long as there are Free-Trade and Protection States, advanced and retarded nations, industry is also open to the temptation to handle tools and swords alternately, and to open markets, which threaten to close, or are monopolized by rivals, by force. Thus industrialism, in the present condition of things, may become a cause of war, instead of a guarantee against it. Herr Johann von Bloch, the Russian State-Councillor, recently brought into prominence through the Conference at The

Hague, has, in his gigantic work of six volumes, *War*, tried to prove by a multitude of figures that war is impossible to-day between the Great Powers. I fear that facts would easily convince Herr von Bloch that he errs. Where there is a will there is a way. The horrors of war are the same for both contestants, and he who enters upon the combat with the greater assurance and with the more intense craving for victory, will bear them longer than his more timid opponent. It is this ability to "bear longer" that constitutes him the victor.

One argument is on the tongue of all defenders of peace; it is the sentimental argument. It seems to be the strongest, but in reality it is the weakest. It appeals to our sympathies with reference to the manifold sufferings which war entails upon humanity; but it facilitates the answer for the advocates of war.

The spectacle of a corpse with yawning wounds or of a heap of maimed dead is horrible. It is heart-rending to see mothers weeping for their sons, wives for their husbands—for the bread-winners of their children. But are these spectacles produced by war alone? The sociologist, who overlooks broad fields of national life from a high stand-point, will answer that war is but one

of many evils which cloud human existence; and by no means the worst, although the most melodramatic. As a moral phenomenon war is a crime. As a material phenomenon it by no means plays the part in ethnic and social economy which one would suppose *prima facie* before the first impression has been mathematically controlled by means of statistics.

War destroys many human lives. It is true. Yet not so many that the rate of mortality is perceptibly influenced thereby. In 1870-71 the German army lost, in round numbers, 40,000 men, killed in battle and by disease. At that time the rate of mortality in Germany was 27 in 1000, or, with a population of 41,000,000, in round numbers, it was 1,107,000 per year. The 40,000 fatalities of the war increased this number about 3.6 per cent. and raised the mortality less than 1 in 1000. The French losses were greater. They amounted to 88,000 men. But the epidemic of influenza in 1890 increased the rate of mortality in France to a greater extent than the war, although the war was one of the most sanguinary of the century. Typhoid fever has claimed more victims than all wars; and shipwrecks do not rank far below it. But typhoid fever could assuredly be prevented more easily

than war, by a little concerted caution, and it is probable that a large number of shipwrecks could be traced to other causes than the irresistible forces of the elements.

War brings suffering upon the people — assuredly. But these sufferings are more rare and less painful than those which every great strike, every important lockout, every loss of labor, in consequence of commercial stagnation, carries in its train. In the sections of our great industrial centres inhabited by the proletariat more continuous misery exists than in camps or villages visited by war. The coal-miner is exposed to greater dangers than the soldier in the field. The stoker on the steamer of a tropical line suffers more intolerable bodily discomfort than the soldier on the most dreadful day of battle, and receives less moral and material compensation. The cynic might say that these hysterical lamentations are raised about war because its devastation strikes all, even the upper strata of society; while the denunciation of other causes of sickness, pain, and death is neglected, because their devastations are confined to the lower layers of the people.

The sentimental argument, therefore, will not down the advocates of war, for they defend

BRITON AND BOER

themselves readily with ethnic data and statistics.

The emotion which sustains the warlike tendencies of cultured men is stronger than religion, which preaches love to one's neighbor; stronger than philosophy, which teaches the irrationality of brute force; stronger than morals and right, which civilized man pretends to recognize as the leading powers of his life. This feeling is ruthless egotism, which lusts merely for self-gratification, and remains untouched by the concept that the neighbor also has rights which deserve respect. All the culture of to-day is calculated to strengthen this egotism, not to weaken it. Art, poetry, and fiction exalt the individual. Their ideal is "sovereign personality," which knows neither self-control nor duty towards the neighbor. This "sovereign personality," which is praised as the most perfect blossom of human development, is the worst enemy of all moral advance. Anarchism, the war of the classes with the masses, political and economical rings, patriotism which swells into Chauvinism and national megalomania, are but different aspects of this delirium of self-love.

If war is to disappear from national life, the individual must first feel his solidarity with the

PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS OF WAR

race in his heart, and not only recognize it as mere verbal wisdom; and the law of progress must be co-operation instead of competition. But in such a world-concept, which recognizes the individual only as a social being, as a civic entity (*Zoon politikon*), and imposes upon his subjectivity the law of the collective organism, the egotism of "sovereign personality" can scarcely find room.

MAX NORDAU.

THE END

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