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Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945

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ABSTRACT. Political protest and rebellion by communal groups has become a major impetus to domestic and international political change. This study uses new coded data on 227 communal groups throughout the world to assess a general model of how and why they mobilize to defend and promote their collective interests. Statistical analysis shows that cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy all contribute substantially to their grievances. Political mobilization, grievances, and the international diffusion and contagion of communal conflict jointly explain the extent of political action in the 1980s. Democracy, state power, and institutional change help determine whether conflict takes the form of protest or rebellion.

Introduction

Communal groups—cultural and religious identity groups that do not have recognized states or institutionalized political status—have been major actors in national and international politics throughout the twentieth century. The international system has been repeatedly reshaped by the claims of emergent nations to statehood and sovereignty. After 1918 the maps of Central Europe and the Middle East were redrawn to accommodate some of their aspirations. Similarly, some peoples were granted and others denied statehood during the thirty-year epoch of decolonization that followed World War II. National politics in most states, old and new, have experienced divisive conflicts over the terms of incorporation for ethnic minorities, religious sects, and ethnonationalists. There are varied frames of reference for describing such conflicts: from the perspective of dominant groups they usually are seen as retrograde resistance to "natural" processes of nation-building and assimilation, whereas subordinate groups justify their assertiveness by invoking doctrines of collective rights and representation, pluralism and autonomy. The

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prevailing international view has been that minority rights should be protected but not at the expense of state sovereignty (for alternative approaches, see Hannum 1990).

The evidence on communal rights and conflicts comes mainly from substantive studies of one or several cases. The cumulative knowledge is substantial (see for example Horowitz 1985 and Montville 1990), but few firm generalizations can be made about *general* causes or dynamics of communal conflict. Empirical political science has been preoccupied with large-*n* comparisons either at higher levels of analysis, in the form of quantitative studies of properties of states and the international system, or at lower levels of analysis, for example in research on voting behavior and political parties. This article breaks new ground by applying some of the models and techniques of empirical conflict analysis to politically mobilized communal groups. States are the units of analysis in most cross-national studies of conflict; by contrast, this study examines the status and political actions of 227 communal groups.

Because communal groups have not been studied in this way before, more must be explained about cases and procedures than in articles that build on an established research tradition. This also helps justify the wide range of analyses and results that are reported. Nonetheless this study has a central theoretical purpose: it tests elements of a general model of the conditions under which communal groups mobilize for political action to assert and protect group interests.[1] The dependent variable is the extent of each group's protest and rebellion (measured separately) against the state during the 1980s. The model incorporates elements from a number of theoretical approaches, including "deprivation," "mobilization," and "global system" perspectives, and specifies variables at the group, state, and international levels of analysis.

The universe and types of communal groups are described in the following section, followed by a sketch of the theoretical model and description of the indicators used to operationalize its concepts. The next section reports the testing of components of the model, including regression analyses for the full model. The implications of the results for a general understanding of communal conflict are summarized in the final section.

Defining and Categorizing Communal Groups

No international body certifies, counts, or records statistics on communal groups (but see Nietschmann, 1987 and Nielsson and Jones, 1988). Some observers and group representatives portray communal groups as primordial social entities based on a set of genetic, cultural, linguistic, and religious givens, in contrast to the states that govern them, which are held to be artificial entities established and maintained by coercion (see Geertz, 1963; Stack, 1986: 1–5; van den Berghe, 1978). This study, by contrast, assumes that all group identities, both communal and national, are to a degree situational and subject to change (for similar views see McKay, 1982; Okamura, 1981; Scott, 1990).

One essential reason for focusing on communal protest and rebellion is that conflict is critical in defining and strengthening group identities: communal and national identities become more salient in response to external challenges, whereas they weaken when the utilities of integration into larger communities increase. Communal identities that are given institutional form and substantial resources tend to persist; identities denied lead to political mobilization; identities ignored

usually weaken, but can be activated by new leaders responding to threats to group identity and status (see, for example, Spicer, 1971; Brass, 1991; Eriksen, 1991; Gurr and Harff, 1991; Mikesell and Murphy, 1991).

This study focuses on non-state communal groups that were politically salient or active at some time between 1945 and 1989. Communal groups are defined generally as those whose core members share a distinctive and persistent collective identity based on cultural and ascriptive traits that are important to them and to others with whom they interact.[2] These identities are politically salient, for our purposes, if the group meets one or both of these primary criteria: (1) the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state; and/or (2) the group is the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests. The timeframe of the dataset needs to be highlighted: it is based on the political map of the world at the beginning of 1990, so it does not include the "new minorities" of the successor states of the USSR or Yugoslavia. In our analysis of conflict in the 1980s the Baltic people are still ethnonational minorities in the USSR, for example, whereas in 1993 there are politically significant Russian minorities in each of the new Baltic states.

The Minorities at Risk project used the general criteria to screen information on a large number of communal groups throughout the world (a preliminary list is reported in Gurr and Scarritt, 1989).[3] Five operational guidelines were used to sort out the groups to be included in the final set. (1) The survey includes only communal groups in countries with a population c. 1985 greater than one million. (2) It is limited to groups that in 1990 numbered at least 100 000 or, if fewer, that exceeded 1 percent of their country's population. (3) Groups are counted and coded separately in each country in which they meet the general criteria—e.g., the Kurds are treated as a separate group in each of four countries.[4] From a larger analytic perspective, and in the eyes of most Kurds, they are a single nation. Each segment is analyzed separately here because their status, mobilization, and political actions are markedly different across countries. (4) The survey includes advantaged minorities, like the Serbs of Yugoslavia (politically advantaged), the Chinese of Malaysia (economically advantaged), and the Sunni Arabs of Iraq (a dominant minority, with both political and economic advantages), because they too mobilize in response to challenges by other groups (the Serbs) and, when not in power, are often subject to discriminatory restrictions (as are the Malaysian Chinese). (5) The survey identifies groups at the highest within-country level of aggregation. Thus, all Native Americans in the United States are coded as a single group because many of them share a sense of larger, pan-tribal identity and because they usually are regarded and treated by Euro-Americans as one aggregate group.[5] Similarly, the southern Sudanese and the Eritreans are each analyzed as a single group, despite their cultural diversity and sharp internal cleavages, because each shares a common political status. Now that Eritrea has secured *de facto* independence, old communal and religious rivalries are likely to reemerge and, if so, new groups will need to be profiled.

The roster of Minorities at Risk thus is subject to change as political circumstances change. The 227 groups analyzed in this paper are our best, if imperfect, approximation of the universe of politically salient communal groups at the beginning of 1990. Excluded from the analysis, but not the dataset, are five dominant minorities—Sunni Arabs in Iraq, Alawis in Syria, white South Africans, the Tutsi of Burundi, mainland Chinese in Taiwan. By definition they have no potential to mobilize against the state because at the time of writing they control their respective states.

The 227 groups are highly diverse, which raises questions about whether any generalizations about the dynamics of communal protest and rebellion might be expected to hold across the entire set. Sartori (1991: 247–249) has recently restated a familiar criticism that many cross-national studies focus on sets of actors/events/institutions which are meaninglessly broad: in his analogy, we too often try to generalize about the pseudocategory of cat–dogs, rather than recognizing that this consists of two categorically different entities. Are "politicized communal groups" a cat–dog? My *a priori* assumption is that some conflict dynamics are common to virtually all politically restricted communal groups, whereas many others will be distinctive to particular types or categories of groups. The argument for common dynamics follows, first, from the general similarity in these groups' status vis-à-vis the state and dominant groups and, second, from the global diffusion of information among embattled communal groups about rationales and techniques for political action. By the 1960s there was a standard repertoire of anticolonial strategies and tactics, known to virtually all leaders of colonial people throughout the world and used, then and now, by many communal nationalists. By the 1980s a comparable repertoire of strategies had emerged for taking action against discrimination and repression in plural societies.

The argument that we should expect to find different strategic strokes for different folks follows from distinct cultural traditions of intergroup relations that prevail among the world regions. Overseas Chinese, for example, have accommodated to their restricted status in most Asian polities. Afro-American minorities in Latin America seemingly accept dominant groups' myth that Luso-Hispanic societies are benignly color-blind.[6] By contrast, in the 1960s virtually every region in Western Europe with a historical claim to autonomy gave birth to nationalist movements, most of them created by political entrepreneurs who found limited public support. In the 1980s there are dense networks of communication among groups of particular types: Muslim minorities are more open to encouragement from other Muslims, indigenous people are selectively responsive to developments affecting other indigenes, and so forth.

The strategy followed here is to propose a general model of how communal groups mobilize for protest and rebellion, then to test it globally (using all 227 cases) and separately for each of five overlapping types of communal groups. Because of space limitations, findings for the types are reported and discussed only selectively.[7]

The numbers of communal groups in each world region, excluding dominant minorities, are shown in Table 1, along with tabulations of numbers of groups of each type. The groups and their categorization are listed in Appendix Table 1. The five types are not mutually exclusive: more than a third of all minorities have the defining traits of two or more types.[8] Jointly classified groups are, in theory, subject to the influences of two different networks of actors. These are the types:

Ethnoclasses. These 43 groups are ethnic minorities, usually descended from immigrants or slaves, who occupy caste-like positions in which they specialize in certain economic roles. In the advanced industrial societies they are situated at or near the bottom of the economic hierarchy—e.g., Maghrebins in France, people of color in Britain and the Americas, Koreans in Japan. In Third World societies they often are economically advantaged but politically restricted, like the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia and the residual European and Asian minorities in postcolonial Africa. The Roma (gypsies) of Europe also are categorized here. The main

Table 1. *Overview of Politicized Communal Groups by Region and Type of Group in 1990*[1]

World Regions	No. of countries with politicized groups	No. of politicized groups	Types of Groups[2]				
			Ethnoclasses	Ethnonationalists	Militant sects[3]	Indigenes	Communal contenders
Advanced industrial democracies[4] (21)	12	23	8	10	3(1)	4	0
Eastern Europe and the USSR (9)	5	32	4	17	14(1)	11	0
East, Southeast, and South Asia (21)[5]	15	42	7	19	8(2)	25	3
North Africa and the Middle East[6] (19)	11	29	5	13	9(5)	11	8
Africa South of the Sahara (36)[7]	29	72	10	21	5	12	51
Latin America and the Caribbean (21)	17	29	9	1	0(1)	19	0
Totals (127)	89	227	43	81	39(10)	82	62

Notes: 1. Excludes five dominant groups. Countries and groups in each region are listed and categorized in Appendix Table 1. Numbers in parentheses here are numbers of countries and dependent territories in each region whose estimated population c. 1985 exceeded one million. Excluded from the study are communal groups in smaller countries and groups with populations less than 100 000 and less than 1% of the country population. See text.

2. See text for category descriptions. Since they are not mutually exclusive, 90 groups are classified under more than one type; therefore the total adds to more than 227.

3. Listed first are numbers of Muslim minorities; numbers in parentheses are non-Muslim religious minorities: Northern Irish Catholics, Jews (in the ex-USSR and Argentina), Copts in Egypt, Maronites in Lebanon, Hindus (in Pakistan and Bangladesh), Sikhs in India, Baha'is in Iran, and Ahmadis in Pakistan. The latter two have been condemned as non-Muslin heresies in Iran and Pakistan, respectively, which is a warrant for discrimination against their followers. The total number of sects is 49.

4. Included in the advanced industrial democracies are the countries of Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan; Puerto Rico is treated as part of the US. Israel is included in the Middle East. South Africa is included in Africa south of the Sahara.

5. Indonesia, Papua-New Guinea, and the Philippines are included in the Asian region, Japan is included with the Western democracies. China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are counted as separate countries. Two minorities in northwestern China, the Uighurs and Kazakhs, are counted in the East Europe/USSR region because they are segments of groups that live mainly in the ex-USSR.

6. Turkey, Israel, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are included in this grouping. North Africa includes only Libya, Egypt, and the countries of the Maghreb. The Occupied Territories (the West Bank and Gaza) are treated as part of Israel and their Palestinian populations are coded as a minority within that country.

7. Including South Africa and Magagascar. Namibia is treated as a separate country. Mauritius, which usually is included in the African region, and whose population now exceeds one million, was inadvertently omitted from the study.

issues of conflict for these groups are usually their quest for political and economic equality and for cultural rights.

Ethnonationalists. These 81 groups are relatively large, regionally concentrated peoples who historically were autonomous and who actively seek to improve their status in the modern state system. The East Timorese, Karens, Sri Lankan Tamils,

Eritreans, Corsicans, and Québécois exemplify the type. Not are all separatist in the literal sense that they seek independence; many of their leaders demand or are willing to settle for greater regional autonomy. Degrees of public support and mobilization for ethnonationalist movements vary widely.[9]

Indigenous peoples. While indigenous peoples like Native Americans, Australian Aborigines, the Masai and San of Africa, Nagas and Santals in India, and Dayaks in North Borneo are concerned most fundamentally about issues of group autonomy, they have other characteristics that distinguish them from typical ethnonationalists, noted above. Culturally these 82 groups are more sharply distinct from the distant centers of state or colonial authority. Most have lived a low-energy-technology existence as subsistence cultivators, herders, or hunter-gatherers. Until recent decades most lacked modern political organization, cohesion, or a sense of common purpose. And their political actions have been mainly reactive rather than proactive, aimed at protecting what is left of their lands and culture against the intrusive demands of larger societies.[10]

Indigenous peoples like the Kurds, Nagas, Karens, Tibetans, and Miskito have mounted full-scale insurgencies for independence. The typology categorizes 25 such groups, mainly Asian and Middle Eastern, as both indigenous and ethnonationalist.

Communal contenders. Most African states consist of heterogeneous collections of competing ethnocultural groups in which political power at the center is based on intergroup coalitions, usually dominated by an advantaged group that uses a mix of concessions, cooptation, and repression to maintain its leading role in the coalition. Similar patterns are characteristic of a few Middle Eastern and Asian states, including Lebanon, Pakistan, and Malaysia.[11] Communal conflict in these systems usually arises from group efforts to improve their position in ruling coalitions. While such conflicts usually are of low intensity, they can escalate into intense and protracted communal rebellions.

Twelve of the 62 African communal contenders categorized here also are cross-classified as ethnonationalists. Many communal contenders are regionally concentrated and have substantial political resources. When they find themselves losing position in a coalition, their leaders may opt for "exit" in the form of autonomy movements, hence their resemblance to ethnonationalists.

Militant sects. Most of the 49 politicized minorities that are defined wholly or in part by their religious beliefs are Muslim. They include Islamic minorities in societies dominated by other religious traditions, like Turks in Germany, the Muslim Albanians of Yugoslavia, the Arab citizens of Israel, and the Malay Muslims of Thailand. They also include the warring Sunni, Shi'i, and Druze communities in Lebanon and Shi'i communities in Sunni-dominated countries like Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Ten non-Muslim sects (see Table 1, note 3) are counted in this category. All but 11 of the "militant sects" are also classified in other categories: 15 as indigenous groups, 10 as ethnonationalists, the remainder divided between ethnoclasses and communal contenders.

A General Model of Communal Mobilization for Political Action

The model's most basic theoretical premise is that protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status *and*

by the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs. In other words the model explicitly incorporates theoretical perspectives that usually are treated as antithetical. In conflict analysis the competing theoretical perspectives are those of *relative deprivation* and *group mobilization*: the former treats discontent about unjust deprivation as the primary motivational force of political action;[12] the latter emphasizes the calculated mobilization of group resources in response to changing political opportunities (compare Rule, 1988, chaps. 6 and 7). In studies of ethnonationalism the competing viewpoints are *primordialist* and *instrumentalist*: the first treats ethnic nationalism as a manifestation of a persisting cultural tradition based on a primordial sense of ethnic identity; the second regards ethnicity as "an exercise in boundary maintenance" and interprets communal movements as an instrumental response to differential treatment (see Douglass, 1988, quote p. 192).

It is evident from the comparative study of politically active ethnic and communal groups that their mobilization and strategies are based on the interaction of both kinds of factors. Grievances about differential treatment and the sense of group cultural identity provide the essential bases for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims made by the group's leaders. If grievances and group identity are both weak, there is little prospect of mobilization by any political entrepreneurs in response to any external threat or opportunity. On the other hand, deep grievances and a strong sense of group identity and common interest—as among black South Africans and Shi'i and Kurds in Iraq—provide highly combustible material that fuels spontaneous action whenever external control weakens. Whenever these sentiments can be organized and focused by group leaders who give plausible expression to members' grievances and aspirations, they animate powerful political movements and protracted communal conflicts.



Figure 1

The general model is summarized below and shown schematically in Figure 1. It consists of three interdependent core variables, Active Grievances, Mobilization, and Communal Political Action, and three blocs of exogenous variables: (1) predisposing conditions, which determine the (unobserved) intervening variables of persisting grievances and potential for mobilization; (2) international diffusion and contagion of communal conflict; and (3) state characteristics that shape the costs and benefits of political action. The concepts, arguments, and operational indicators are sketched below.

Note on Indicators of Group Traits, Status and Conflict

Indicators of most of the variables in the model are operationalized using data from the Minorities at Risk dataset (Gurr and Scarritt, 1989; Gurr and Marshall, 1990; Gurr, 1993). The dataset consists of information coded from historical, anthropological, political, and journalistic sources on these blocs of variables for each of 227 groups:

(1) the traits of communal groups, including their absolute and proportional population, regional concentration, and cohesion;
(2) the ethnocultural, religious, and demographic traits that distinguish each group from others in its social environment;
(3) indicators of the character and severity of political and economic differentials and discrimination vis-à-vis other groups;
(4) the political, economic, and social grievances articulated by the group's movements and leaders during the 1980s; and
(5) profiles of the group's involvement in intercommunal conflict, nonviolent protest, violent protest, and rebellion from the 1940s to 1989.

Traits of the political systems with which minorities come in conflict are measured with data from the author's Polity II dataset (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1990).

The indicators used in the study are justified below; technical details are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Most are discussed in greater detail in Gurr, 1993. A methodological note: all indicators used here, except for group population, are built up from judgmentally coded or categorical data. For the purpose of correlation and regression analysis these composite indicators are treated as "interval-like" measures of the underlying conceptual variables. This kind of analysis is widely practiced in empirical social science, especially for exploratory analyses where more precise interval-level data cannot be collected. Most researchers accept this practice if it can be plausibly argued that the indicators tap underlying continuous variables, which is the case in this study (see for example John Tukey's arguments as summarized in Gurr, 1972, pp. 63–64).

The Core Variables: Political Action, Grievances, Mobilization

Communal political action refers to actions initiated by members of a group on behalf of its interests and directed against, or designed to influence, state authorities. Three dimensions of political action are distinguished in the Minorities dataset: Nonviolent Protest (PROT80), Violent Protest, and Rebellion (REBEL80).[13] Ordinal scales were designed for each dimension of action, their categories representing increasing levels of scope and intensity of political activity (see Table 2). Each group

Table 2. *Coding Scales for Communal Political Action*[1]

Non-Violent Action
0 = none reported
1 = verbal opposition (public letters, petitions, posters, clandestine publications, agitation, etc.)
2 = political organizing activity on a substantial scale, including conventional party activity on behalf of group interests
3 = a few demonstrations, strikes, rallies, total participation in the hundreds or low thousands
4 = a number of demonstrations, strikes, rallies, total participation in the 10 000 range or higher
5 = similar events, total participation over 100 000
6 = other (specify)[2]

Violent Protest
0 = none reported
1 = scattered acts of sabotage, symbolic destruction of property
2 = limited rioting (one or two small riots or clashes)
3 = substantial rioting
4 = serious and widespread rioting
5 = local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale. (If they develop into protracted guerrilla or civil war, code the latter rather than local rebellion)
6 = other (specify)[2]

Rebellion
0 = none reported
1 = political banditry, sporadic terrorism, unsuccessful coups by/on behalf of the group
2 = campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by/on behalf of the group
3 = small-scale guerrilla activity
4 = large-scale guerrilla activity, distinguished from small-scale by a large number of armed fighters (more than 1000) carrying out frequent armed attacks over a substantial area
5 = protracted civil war, fought by military units with base areas
6 = other (specify)[2]
7 = group members are involved in civil or revolutionary war that is not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues[3]
8 = group members are involved in international warfare that is not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues

[1] Each group is scored for successsive five-year periods from 1945–49 to 1985–89 using a Guttman-scale procedure: the score for each dimension is the highest scale value recorded during a period.
[2] Recoded 3 when constructing composite indicators.
[3] Recoded 4 when constructing composite indicators.

was coded on each of the three scales for successive 5-year periods from 1945–49 to 1985–89, using a Guttman-scale procedure: the score on each dimension is the most severe action recorded for a period in our sources.[14] Note that the low end of the Nonviolent Protest scale refers to conventional political activity to promote group interests.

Political mobilization refers to a communal group's organization for and commitment to joint action in pursuit of group interests (see Tilly, 1978: 69 ff). The concept is indexed using information on the extent of a group's political organization and actions in the 1970s. Mobilization for protest (MOBPRO70) is a five-category scale based on actions that reflected a high level of political organization, with additional

Table 3. *Summary List of Variables and Indicators*[1]

Type and Label	Description
Indicators of Group Mobilization and Political Action: See text and Table 2 for more details.	
PROT80	*Group Protest in the 1980s* Extent of nonviolent protest by the group in the 1980s: summed Guttman-scale scores for nonviolent protest 1980–84 and 1985–89 (see Table 2 for scales)
REB80	*Group Rebellion in the 1980s* Extent of group rebellion in the 1980s: summed Guttman-scale scores for rebellion 1980–84 and 1985–89
MOBPRO70	*Mobilization for Protest in the 1970s* 5-category scale, 0–4, of organization for nonviolent political action in the 1970s; see Appendix Table 2.
MOBREB70	*Mobilization for Rebellion in the 1970s* 7-category scale, 0–6, or organization for rebellion in the 1970s; see Appendix Table 2.
Indicators of Group Grievances Note: All grievance indicators are constructed by adding the scale values of checklists of specific grievances expressed by group leaders or advocates. Each checklist item is ordinally scaled using these weights: 2 = issue highly salient to the group 1 = issue is of lesser salience, *or* its relative salience cannot be judged	
ECORIGHT	*Grievances about Economic Rights* Sum of 6 ordinal scales for checklist items such as greater share of public funds; greater economic opportunities; improved working conditions; protection of land/jobs/resources
SOCRIGHT	*Grievances about Social and Cultural Rights* Sum of 4 ordinal scales for checklist items such as freedom of religious belief and practice; recognition of own language, culture; protection from other communal groups
POLRIGHT	*Grievances about Political Rights* Sum of 6 ordinal scales for checklist items such as greater political rights in own region; greater participation in politics at state level; equal civil rights and status
ALLRIGHT	*All Grievances about Rights* Sum of ECORIGHT, SOCRIGHT, POLRIGHT
POLAUTON	*Grievances about Political Autonomy* Sum of 4 ordinal scales for checklist items such as union with kindred groups; independence; greater regional autonomy
Indicators of Group Disadvantages	
ECDIF	*Economic Differentials* Ordinal scale, –2 to +4, of intergroup differentials in economic status and positions, using a checklist of six conditions; negative scores signify relative advantage for the group being coded by comparison with others
POLDIF	*Political Differentials* Ordinal scale, –2 to +4, of intergroup differentials in political status and positions, using a checklist of six conditions; negative scores represent relative advantage

Table 3. *Continued*

Type and Label	Description
ECDISCR	*Economic Discrimination* Ordinal scale, 0–4, of severity of economic discrimination affecting group members. The categories summarized: 1 = substantial poverty, underrepresentation in desirable occupations due to historical conditions; public policies are designed to improve the group's well-being 2 = substantial poverty due to historical conditions; no social or legal exclusion; no remedial public policies 3 = substantial poverty due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups; public policies neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination 4 = public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict group economic opportunities
POLDISCR	*Political Discrimination* Ordinal scale, 0–4, of severity of political discrimination affecting group members, categories similar to ECDISCR
DEMPOOR	*Demographic Stress: High Birthrates and Poor Health* Sum of 3 ordinal scales, each with values 1–3,[2] for checklist of demographic traits signifying poverty: high birth rates; youthful populations; and poor public health conditions by comparison with other groups in the country
DEMLAND	*Demographic Stress: Land Scarcity* Sum of 3 ordinal scales, each with values 1–3,[2] for checklist of pressures on group resources: competition for settlement of vacant lands; dispossession from land by other groups; forced internal resettlement
Indicators of Group Identity, Cohesion, and Size	
CULDIF	*Cultural Differentials* 5-category ordinal scale based on a checklist of six cultural traits that differentiate the group from others: ethnicity or nationality, language, religion, social customs, historical origins, and urban vs. rural residence
COMCON	*Communal Conflict with Nonstate Groups 1940s–1980s* Sum of decennial Guttman-scale scores for open conflict with communal groups not associated with the state, 1940s–1980s
COHERE	*Group Coherence* 5-category ordinal scale using judgmental categories ranging from 1 = "category" to 5 = "strong identity group"
AUTLOST	*Historical Loss of Group Autonomy* Complex indicator of historical group status and extent of autonomy lost, weighted by length of time since loss; see Appendix Table 3 for specifics
BESTPOP	*Group Population in 1990* Best 1990 estimate of group population in thousands; often estimated by applying census or expert-provided percentage to current country population
GROUPOP	*Group Population as Proportion of Country Population* Best 1990 estimate of group size proportional to country population
CONCEN	*Group Geographical Concentration* 6-category ordinal scale based on demographic information on group dispersion ranging from 1 = widely dispersed in most urban and rural areas to 6 = concentrated mainly in one or several adjoining regions

Table 3. *Continued*

Type and Label	Description
Indicators of International Diffusion and Contagion of Conflict	
IDIFPRO7	*Diffusion of Protest from Transnational Segments of the Group in the 1970s* The highest protest score registered by any other transnational segment of the group in the 1970s
IDIFREB7	*Diffusion of Rebellion from Transnational Segments of the Group in the 1970s* The highest rebellion score registered by any other transnational segment of the group in the 1970s
IDIFPRO8	*Diffusion of Protest from Transnational Segments of the Group in the 1980s*
IDIFREB8	*Diffusion of Rebellion from Transnational Segments of the Group in the 1980s*
ICONPRO7	*Contagion of Protest from Similar Groups in the 1970s* Mean 1970s protest score of all groups of the same region and category
ICONREB7	*Contagion of Rebellion from Similar Groups in the 1970s* Mean 1970s rebellion score of all groups of the same region and category
ICONPRO8	*Contagion of Protest from Similar Groups in the 1980s*
ICONREB8	*Contagion of Rebellion from Similar Groups in the 1980s*
Indicators of Traits of National Political Systems: See text for more details	
DEM86	*Institutionalized Democracy in 1986* 10-point composite scale of institutionalized democracy in 1986
DEM7586	*Democratization 1975–86* The number and direction of changes on the institutionalized democracy scale from 1975 to 1986
SCOPE86	*Scope of State Power in 1986* 9-category judgmental scale of the scope of state control of economic and social activities in 1986, 9 = totalitarian, 1 = minimal state
SCOPE6086	*Changes in Scope of State Power 1960–86* Number and direction of changes on the scope of state power scale 1960–86
POLCH7586	*Political Changes 1975–86* Number of years 1975–86 with significant changes in national political institutions
POLDUR86	*Political Durability 1986* Number of years as of 1986 since the last abrupt, major change in a country's national political institutions

[1] Variables are discussed in the order in which they are first discussed in the text.
[2] Weights used in these ordinal scales are
3 = condition serious
2 = condition of moderate significance
1 = condition present but minor

weight for protest sustained throughout the decade. Mobilization for rebellion (MOBREB70) is a seven-category scale which gives highest weight to a group's capacity to carry out sustained, widespread guerrilla and civil war during the 1970s. The weights used to construct the scales are given in Appendix Table 2.

This operational approach does not take into account other aspects or causes of mobilization such as a group's size, its material resources, cohesion, or prior social organization. Some such variables therefore are incorporated separately in the

analysis. Another consequence of the operational approach is that the measures of mobilization in the 1970s are highly correlated with past levels of conflict. Therefore the models tested do not separately include or control for groups' pre-1980 levels of protest or rebellion.

Active grievances are the demands or grievances articulated by group spokesmen. They are key intervening variables between objective conditions such as inequalities and coercive control and political action, but are not measured in most empirical research on conflict.[15] It should not be assumed that statements and acts on behalf of minorities' interests are precisely accurate indicators of group sentiments. They are appeals for action and programs for change whose authenticity can be judged by the extent to which they do in fact lead to mobilization and collective action (see Moore and Jaggers, 1990).

Our research strategy is to index grievances for the 1980s, based on "statements of spokesmen, observers, and/or unambiguous actions by the group." Three kinds of demands are associated with efforts to improve a group's status within an existing social and political system: *political rights* (POLRIGHT), *economic rights* (ECORIGHT), and *social and cultural rights* (SOCRIGHT). A summary measure of all grievances about rights (ALLRIGHT) also is used in the analysis. The demand for *political autonomy* (POLAUTON), by contrast, implies "exit" or a fundamental restructuring of an existing system.[16]

A short checklist of categories was developed for each general type of grievance, based on our observations about the kinds of issues raised by the groups under study. Coding for each specific category (listed in Table 3) used a dichotomy to register the relative salience of the grievance. These salience codings were used in the construction of composite indicators of the magnitude of each of the four kinds of grievances.

Predisposing Variables: Group Status, Identity, Traits

The heart of the theoretical argument sketched in Figure 1 is that a group's disadvantages and identity are the sources of its persisting grievances and potential for political mobilization. Three aspects of disadvantage and identity are described below, plus group size and concentration; most are the residues of long-run social and political processes and are relatively slow to change.

The Extent of a Group's Collective Disadvantage vis-à-vis other groups. Three types of disadvantage are indexed in the Minorities at Risk dataset. *Economic and political differentials* are inequalities that result from intergroup differences in access to scarce resources and positions, irrespective of their origins. *Economic and political discrimination* refer to patterned social behaviors by other groups (and the state) that systematically restrict group members' access to desirable economic resources and opportunities, and to political rights and positions. Our indicators of *differentials*, ECDIF and POLDIF, are built up from dichotomous judgments about checklists of traits on which group members are relatively disadvantaged by comparison with other social groups. The indicators of *discrimination*, ECDISCR and POLDISCR, by contrast, are judgmental scales that take into account the origins and social and political intent of differential treatment (see Table 3).

Demographic stress taps a different dimension of disadvantage. We coded a checklist of demographic and ecological conditions affecting each minority, including such factors as high birth rates, poor public health conditions, migration, and land scarcity. Preliminary analyses showed, unexpectedly, that most of these conditions

correlated strongly with group grievances and political action in almost all world regions and types of groups. Two dimensions of demographic stress are included in this study: high birth rates/poor health (DEMPOOR) and competition for/alienation of group lands (DEMLAND).

The general hypothesis is that the greater a group's relative disadvantage on these variables, the greater the sense of grievance and, consequently, the greater its potential for political mobilization.

The Strength of Group Identity and Cohesion. Group identity is a "primordial" condition but one that varies considerably in salience. Among isolated indigenous peoples and embattled ethnonationalists it is usually strong; among ethnoclasses it usually is weakened by assimilation and cross-cutting membership in associational groups. As observed at the outset, the maintenance of group identity is usually valued in and of itself. Two conditions that enhance the salience of group identity are considered here.

Cultural differentials (CULDIF), derived from a checklist like those used for political and economic differentials (see Table 3), are included on the premise that the greater the cultural and social differences between a communal group and others with which it interacts, the greater will be the strength of group identity.[17] *Open conflict with other communal groups* (COMCON) can be expected to further strengthen group identity, as it does for other groups in conflict (a classic statement is Coser, 1956).[18]

Group cohesion is a function of political organization, past and present. For communal groups it is closely related to but conceptually distinct from the strength of group identity.[19] We use two indicators. One is a direct measure: a five-category judgmental scale of group coherence (COHERE). Second is an indicator of a group's historical loss of separate political status (AUTLOST), a conditions that is repeatedly cited by ethnonationalists to justify their claims for greater autonomy. The indicator takes into account the length of time since the change in status, the magnitude of change, and the extent to which the group was politically organized prior to the change (see Appendix Table 3).

The hypothesis is that the strength of group identity and cohesion affects both grievances and potential mobilization, as depicted in Figure 1. Since the maintenance of group identity has intrinsic value for (some) group members, threats to it add to grievances. Strong group identity and cohesion are also vital resources for leaders who seek to mobilize a group.

Repressive Control by a Dominant Group. Groups that have been forcibly subordinated by dominant groups usually nurture deep grievances but are cautious about acting on them. The apparent apathy and acquiescence of Southern blacks to white dominance before the 1950s, and of Native Americans until the 1970s, was based on a hard-learned, culturally transmitted belief that open resistance to discrimination was risky. The cultural norm, and a myriad of day-to-day utility calculations based on it, was a heavy drag on efforts at mobilizing action on behalf of civil rights and indigenous rights. The principle is a general one that can be formulated in this hypothesis: The potential for political mobilization varies inversely with the extent and intensity that dominant groups have used coercion to maintain a group's subordinate status. Simultaneously, coercive control contributes to persisting grievances, which implies that when coercion is relaxed or group mobilization increases, the potential for political action will increase sharply.

Two aspects of repressive control are indexed in this study. High levels of political discrimination (POLDISCR) are usually maintained coercively, which means that under some circumstances political discrimination can be expected to inhibit

political action, an effect that in cross-sectional analysis would negate its postulated effect on persisting grievances. The loss of a group's political autonomy (AUTLOST) also implies the use of state coercion to impose and maintain control, and persistence of the underlying grievances.

Group Size and Regional Concentration are objective conditions which, jointly with the less tangible factors of cohesion and identity, facilitate mobilization. Groups that are large in absolute numbers (BESTPOP) and in proportion to the country's population (GROUPOP) hypothetically are more likely than small groups to mobilize for substantial political action. And communal groups that are concentrated in one geographical region are more likely to engage in rebellion than dispersed and urban groups, a variable indexed by an indicator labeled CONCEN.[20]

International Diffusion and Contagion Effect on Communal Mobilization and Political Action

Many international factors facilitate the proactive mobilization of communal groups by increasing a group's resources and opportunities for political action. This study is limited to the diffusion and contagion effects of communal conflicts in other countries; material and diplomatic support by foreign governments and international actors are shown in Figure 1 as "international support," but are not indexed or analyzed here (a more comprehensive review is Gurr, 1992).

Diffusion of Political Action Involving Transnational Kindred. Diffusion refers to the processes by which conflict within one country expands across international boundaries. Political activists in one country can readily obtain sanctuary and support from their transnational kindred. They also may be able to take advantage of international hostilities to pursue their own transnational interests, as some Iraqi and Turkish Kurds have done in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Of the communal groups in this study nearly two-thirds (148 of 227) have kindred in one or more adjacent countries. We focus specifically on the extent to which political action by one segment of a transnational group facilitates political mobilization and action by other segments.

The conflict profiles were used to construct four diffusion indicators, all of them labeled IDIF. . . .The highest recorded violent or nonviolent protest score registered by any transnational segment of a group during the 1970s (excluding action by the segment being coded) is IDIFPRO7. Similarly, IDIFREB7 is the highest rebellion score of any transnational segment during the 1970s. For example, the highest rebellion score for any segment of Kurds in either half of the 1970s is 5 (for Kurds in Iraq), the second-highest is 4 (for Kurds in Iran). The IDIFREB7 score given to Kurds in Iraq is 4, the IDIFREB7 score given to other Kurdish minorities (including those in Turkey and the USSR) is 5. Similar measures were constructed for the 1980s: IDIFPRO8 and IDIFREB8.

Contagion of Communal Activism. Contagion is the complex set of processes by which one group's actions provide strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere. It was noted above that many communal groups are linked by informal networks so that, for example, one finds Australian Aborigines in the 1960s carrying out Freedom Rides, and Dayaks in north Borneo in the 1990s resisting commercial logging of their forests using rhetoric and tactics remarkably like those used by Canadian Indians. More precisely, a set of international networks of communication, political support, and material assistance have developed since the 1960s among groups with shared traits and in similar circumstances. The two most

dense and widespread networks link Islamic minorities and indigenous peoples. Groups that are tied closely into these networks have more of the resources for effective mobilization: plausible appeals, informed leadership, organizational skills, repertoires of tested tactics, and selective incentives (moral and material) for activists.

Our operational boundaries for contagion processes are drawn more narrowly than these examples imply: we assume that contagion processes are strongest among similar groups within each geocultural region. For example, Sardinian ethnonationalists are one of ten such communal groups in the advanced industrial democracies (see Table 1). The general hypothesis is that, if contagion is a strong force among such sets of reference groups, their mean levels of protest and rebellion should have positive simultaneous and lagged correlations.

This logic dictated the construction of a set of four contagion indicators. The potential contagion of protest for each group in the 1970s (ICONPRO7) is the mean level of 1970s protest among all groups of the same region and category; ICONREB7 is the mean level of 1970s rebellion among the same reference group.[21] Parallel indicators were constructed using 1980s data.[22]

The State Context of Communal Political Action: Democracy and State Power

Myriad features of national political systems affect the status, organization, and actions of communal groups. This study examines the effects of three general properties that should have strong effects: the extent and process of democratization; the scope and expansion of state powers; and the rapidity of institutional change. A methodological note: since the five indicators developed here refer to political-system variables, all communal groups in a country are given the same score on each indicator.

Democracy v. Democratization. it is essential to distinguish between democracy as a stable, institutionalized pattern of rule, and the process whereby many autocratic states in the Second and Third Worlds are attempting to incorporate elements of democratic participation. The two have quite different effects on ethnopolitical conflict.

Institutionalized Democracies in the twentieth century have been relatively successful at accommodating politicized ethnic groups, though not without considerable protest. In the advanced industrial democracies the resolution of ethnopolitical conflicts depends most fundamentally on the implementation of democratic norms of equal rights and opportunities for ethnoclasses, and pluralistic accommodation of indigenous and regional peoples' desires for separate collective status.[23]

Democratization of multi-ethnic authoritarian states has more problematic outcomes. The Soviet and Eastern European regimes relaxed coercive restraints on nationalism and intergroup hostilities in circumstances where institutionalized means for their expression and accommodation did not yet exist, or were fragile and distrusted. The result is an explosion of communal activism. Similar consequences can be expected to follow from democratization in multi-ethnic Third World autocracies. The most dubious expectation of all is that authoritarian states like Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, and Burma might be able to defuse ethnopolitical wars by moving toward democracy.

Two general relationships thus are incorporated in the model sketched in Figure 1. In long-established democracies the opportunities for ethnic mobilization are substantial and the utilities high—for cohesive groups that rely largely on non-

violent tactics. *The hypothesis is that institutionalized democracy facilitates non-violent communal protest.* Ethnoclasses in the democracies and indigenous movements throughout the Americas appear to be acting on this principle. In *democratizing autocracies*, by contrast, mobilization opportunities are rising but so are the potential costs, because the most likely outcomes are not accommodation but rather civil war and the reimposition of coercive rule. In these societies, *democratization is predicted to facilitate mobilization for violent communal protest and rebellion.*

An indicator for *institutionalized democracy* (DEM86) is adapted from the Polity studies (Gurr, 1974; Gurr, Jagger and Moore, 1990). This is a 0–10 scale built up from weighted categorical information on the competitiveness of national political participation, the competitiveness and openness of recruitment for the chief executive, and the extent of institutional constraints on executive authority. Virtually all the Western democracies score 9 or 10 on this indicator in 1986, the year of reference; the state socialist regimes score 1 to 3. The indicator is reported annually in the Polity II dataset, which provides the basis for a measure of *democratization* (DEM7586): the number (and direction) of scale-point changes on the democracy indicator between 1975 and 1986.[24] While most changes are positive, especially in Latin America, some Third World countries—Pakistan, Turkey, Ghana, Nigeria—shifted sharply toward autocracy during this decade.

Activist States. Powerful, resource-rich states have the capacity both to accommodate and to suppress communal minorities at relatively low cost, depending on elite preferences. Rulers of weak states face more stark, zero-sum choices. They can expand the governing coalition at risk to their own positions, or they can devote scarce resources to warfare against communal rebels. The alternative of letting ethnonationalists secede was virtually never chosen voluntarily between 1945 and 1990.[25] It follows from this argument that communal political action in the most powerful states is likely to be limited in scope and to take the form of protest, whereas protracted communal rebellion will typify weak states.

The indicator of state power or "scope" used to test this hypothesis is a nine-category judgmental scale, SCOPE86, also drawn from the Polity II dataset. The scale values range from 9 for totalitarian authority structures, in which the state attempts to regulate or directly control all aspects of economic and social life, to 1, representing the minimal state. We use the 1986 scores on the indicator, on the assumption that it has simultaneous effects on group strategies. The Western democracies scored in the upper-middle range of this indicator, 5 to 7, compared with scores of 8 or 9 for the socialist states (most of which would now be scored 7).

More problematic is the question of how communal mobilization and action are affected by *changes* in the scope of state power. In virtually all post-colonial and post-revolutionary states "state-building" has meant policies aimed at assimilating communal group members, restraining their collective autonomy, and extracting their resources and manpower for the use of the state. Such policies have cross-cutting effects on communal action: they intensify grievances but also increase the costs of acting on them, and may offer payoffs for cooperating with and assimilating to dominant groups. The indicator used to explore these effects, SCOPE6086, is the number and direction of changes on the Scope variable from 1960 through 1986. Almost all changes over this period are positive.

Institutional Durability and Change. Irrespective of the type and powers of political systems, it has been argued (e.g., by Harff, 1987) that communal conflict intensifies during and after periods of political upheaval. The Polity II data provide several alternative indicators for testing the proposition globally. One is the number of

years between 1975 and 1986 in which significant institutional changes (other than changes of Scope) were recorded (POLCH7586), the other is the number of years as of 1986 since the last abrupt, major change in political institutions (POLDUR86).

Findings: Components of the Model

These are the results of tests of key elements of the model, beginning with the sources of grievances and mobilization. Communal protest and rebellion are analyzed separately throughout because they are only weakly correlated (the *r* between PRO80 and REB80 = .136) and their causes are substantially different.

Determinants of Group Grievances in the 1980s

The economic, social, and political grievances of communal groups are postulated to be responses to seven indicators of group disadvantage and three indicators of group identity summarized in Table 3. Exploratory regression analysis showed that most of these independent variables have effects specific to one or two dimensions of grievance. For example, political disadvantages proved to have little impact on the expression of economic and social grievances either in general or in most regional and typal analyses. These results and conceptual considerations dictated the specification of the final equations for grievances, reported in the first four columns of Table 4.

Grievances about economic rights (ECORIGHT) are largely a function of economic disadvantages; group coherence is the only "group identity" variable that adds to them. *Grievances about social and cultural rights* (SOCRIGHT) depend mainly on group identity variables, somewhat less on economic disadvantages. *Grievances about political rights* (POLRIGHT), by contrast, are about equally dependent on economic and political disadvantages. The group identity variable "coherence" plays a small but significant role. *Grievances about lack of autonomy* (POLAUTON), which characterize virtually all ethnonationalists and many indigenous peoples in the study, are principally a function of groups' historical loss of autonomy, plus two indicators of strength of group identity.

We hypothesized that group disadvantages and identity are only indirect sources of communal protest and rebellion: their effects are felt through the intervening variables of grievances and group mobilization. This proves to be correct: all ten measures jointly account for only 15 percent of the variance in protest and rebellion during the 1980s, as shown in the regression equations summarized in the last two columns of Table 4. Note also that the indirect causes of protest differ substantially from those of rebellion. The regression analysis shows that communal protest in the 1980s (PRO80) is most closely associated with poverty, lost autonomy, and group coherence. But it is not correlated with any of the indicators of economic or political differentials or discrimination. Rebellion in the 1980s (REB70) was mainly a response to the group's historical loss of autonomy and differential political status, but was minimized by severe political discrimination and sharp cultural differentials. The latter result is consistent with a distinctive syndrome we have observed among most of the indigenous peoples of the Americas: they are sharply differentiated culturally from dominant groups and experience severe discrimination, but their political actions are limited almost entirely to protest. These initial findings will be reassessed when we examine the joint effects of grievance, mobilization, and political system variables on communal protest and rebellion (Table 8, below).

Table 4. *Multiple Regression of Group Grievances and Political Action in the 1980s as Determined by Group Disadvantages and Identity*[1]

Independent variables	Dependent variables: Grievances ECORIGHT	SOCRIGHT	POLRIGHT	POLAUTON	Political Action PRO80	REB80
Economic Disadvantages						
ECDIF	.094	–	–	–	–.047	–.111
ECDISCR	.250***	.216***	.228***	–	–.034	.031
DEMPOOR	.274***	–	.134**	–	.341***	.108
DEMLAND	.248***	.126*	.102*	.177*	.094*	.139
Political Disadvantages						
POLDIF	–	–	.113*	.088	–.068	.322***
POLDISCR	–	–	.141*	.099*	.025	–.218**
AUTLOST	–	–	.143**	.426***	.226***	.314***
Group Identity						
CULDIF	–	.230***	–	.161**	.060	–.125*
COMCON	–	.283***	–	.011	.060	.062
COHERE	.084*	.091*	.123*	.159**	.092*	.012
Constant	.137	–.394	–.113	–.434	.569	1.317
Adjusted R^2	.350	.247	.234	.293	.153	.151

[1]For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. The *n* for all regressions is 227; means were substituted for missing data. The data in the tables are standardized regression weights (betas) for variables in each equation. Variables excluded from an equation are represented by dashes (--). Significance levels of coefficients:

*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

Determinants of Group Mobilization 1980

In "resource mobilization" theories of conflict the mobilization and collective action of a group are said to depend on members' shared interests and organization, as well as their opportunities (see Tilly, 1978: pp. 55ff). Our data provide a test of the relative importance of interests (in the form of grievances), group cohesion, and group size on mobilization. Recall that we indexed mobilization using information on the degree of groups' organization and political action in the 1970s, and distinguished between mobilization for protest (MOBPRO70) and rebellion (MOBREB70).

The results in Table 5 show that grievances are more closely correlated with mobilization than any of the group traits except lost autonomy. Reciprocal causality is at least partly responsible: groups that were mobilized at the end of the 1970s were better able to articulate grievances during the 1980s. But it is surprising, given the emphasis on group resources in mobilization theory, that persisting conditions like group size, concentration, and coherence had so little effect on mobilization. For example, group coherence (COHERE) and the magnitude of past communal conflict (COMCON), one or both of which are significantly correlated with grievances

Table 5. *Correlations Among Determinants of Mobilization for Political Action in the 1970s*[1]

Variables	MOBPRO70	MOBREB70
Group Grievances		
ECORIGHT	.252***	–.050
SOCRIGHT	.220***	.056
POLRIGHT	.334***	.326**
POLAUTON	.305***	.369***
Group Identity and Cohesion		
COMCON	.081	.118*
COHERE	.002	.002
AUTLOST	.227***	.320**
Group Size		
GROUPOP	.141**	.062
BESTPOP	.145**	–.032
CONCEN	–.140**	.116*
Mobilization		
MOBREB80	.279***	1.000

[1] For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. The correlation coefficients shown are Pearson's *r*'s for $n = 223$ to 227 cases, using pairwise deletion for missing data. Significance levels of coefficients:
*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

(Table 4), had trivial effects on mobilization. The theoretical inference is that threats to communal group identity and cohesion are more important for the articulation of grievances than for group mobilization. It also seems that measures of group size and distribution have weak but plausible effects on mobilization. Specifically, dispersed groups (low CONCEN scores) are a little more likely to mobilize for protest than rebellion, concentrated groups a little more likely to organize rebellions. And large communal groups (high GROUPOP and BESTOP values) are slightly more disposed to mobilize for protest than for rebellion. Clearly, though, no "strong forces" are at work here.

The Diffusion and Contagion of Communal Conflict

As theoretically predicted, we find significant diffusion and contagion of communal protest and rebellion among the 227 groups, as shown in Tables 6 and 7. The strongest effects are those of contagion—the "imitation" effects of communal conflict by similar groups in the same region. Conflict has a weaker tendency to diffuse among transnational segments of a group.

The time-lagged effects of contagion are more interesting than simultaneous ones, because they provide more decisive evidence about the direction of causality. Thus we focus on the contagion of regional levels of protest and rebellion in the 1970s on each group's conflict in the 1980s. *Regional protest in the 1970s* (ICONPRO7)

Table 6. *Correlates of the Diffusion and Contagion of Protest*[1]

Variables	Correlates with Protest MOBPRO70	PRO80	Contagion ICONPRO8	ICONPRO7	Diffusion IDIFPRO8
Diffusion of Protest from Transnational Segments of the Group					
IDIFPRO7	.160**	.153**	.231***	.254***	.758***
IDIFPRO8	.111*	.060	.231***	.228***	1.000
Contagion of Protest from Similar Groups in the Same Region					
ICONPRO7	.506***	.373***	.777***	1.000	
ICONPRO8	.376***	.415**	1.000		

[1] For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. The correlation coefficients shown are Pearson's *r*'s for $n = 223$ to 227 cases, using pairwise deletion for missing data.
Significance levels of coefficients:
*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

Table 7. *Correlates of the Diffusion and Contagion of Rebellion*[1]

Variables	Correlates with Rebellion MOBREB70	REB80	Contagion ICONREB8	ICONREB7	Diffusion IDIFREB8
Diffusion of Rebellion from Transnational Segments of the Group					
IDIFREB7	.180**	.110*	.342***	.322***	.755***
IDIFREB8	.101*	.039	.314***	.276***	1.000
Contagion of Rebellion from Similar Groups in the Same Region					
ICONREB7	.516***	.476***	.969***	1.000	
ICONREB8	.515***	.505***	1.000		

[1] For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. The correlation coefficients shown are Pearson's *r*'s for $n = 223$ to 227 cases, using pairwise deletion for missing data.
Significance levels of coefficients:
*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

has its greatest impact on group mobilization for protest in the same decade (MOBPRO70) ($r = .506$), somewhat less on actual levels of protest in the 1980s ($r = .373$). This time-lagged effect of ICONPRO7 is only slightly less than the concurrent effect of regional protest in the 1980s (ICONPRO8 with PRO80 $r = .415$). The contagion effects of *regional rebellion in the 1970s* (ICONREB7) are similar: they have a strong impact on mobilization for rebellion ($r = .516$) and on the 1980s level of rebellion ($r = .476$). Again, the lagged effects are virtually as strong as the simultaneous ones (ICONREB8 with REB80 $r = .505$).

Diffusion effects are weaker but of considerable theoretical interest: the lagged effects of segmental protest and rebellion in the 1970s on political action in the 1980s are both stronger than the simultaneous effects. For example, 1970s rebellion by transnational segments of a group correlates significantly with mobilization

in the 1970s and with actual levels of rebellion in the 1980s (IDIFREB7 with MOBREB7 $r = .180$; IDIFREB7 with REB80 $r = .110$) whereas the level of 1980s rebellion by transnational segments of a group is unrelated to the group's own rebellions (IDIFREB8 with REB80 $r = .039$). The weakness of these effects may be an artifact of the indicators used, because the highest-conflict segments of a transnational group get the diffusion score of conflict among their less active kindred. This does not explain away the differences over time, however: the lagged effects of conflict diffusion from the 1970s to the 1980s are relatively stronger than the simultaneous effects in the 1980s.

Determinants of Communal Protest and Rebellion in the 1980s

The results of the foregoing analysis provide the basis for specifying efficient equations of the group-level determinants of communal protest and rebellion (Table 8). The five predictor variables used in each equation include two indicators of grievance and one each for mobilization, diffusion, and contagion. They explain 37 percent of the variance in communal protest in the 1980s and slightly less than 50 percent of the variance in communal rebellion. The mobilization variables dominate

Table 8. *Multiple Regression of Communal Protest and Rebellion in the 1980s as Determined by Grievances, Mobilization, and Contagion*[1]

Independent Variables	Dependent variables PRO80	REB80
Grievances		
ALLRIGHTS	.142**	.098*
POLAUTON	.112**	.120**
Mobilization		
MOBPRO70	.451***	–
MOBREB70	–	.566***
Diffusion and Contagion		
IDIFPRO7	.031	–
IDIFREB7	–	.046
ICONPRO7	.102*	–
ICONREB7	–	.103*
Constant	.446*	–.128
Adjusted R^2	.374	.492

[1] For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. The *n* for all regressions is 227; means were substituted for missing data. The data in the table are standardized regression weights (beta's) for variables in each equation. Variables exluded from an equation are represented by dashes (–). Significance levels of coefficients:
*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

the equations, as is to be expected because of their high bivariate *r*'s with the dependent variable: MOBPRO70 correlates .578 with PRO80, MOBREB70 correlates .673 with REB80. As noted above, we measure mobilization as a function of organized political action in the 1970s, action that in turn represents the summed effects of past grievances and mobilization. The time-lagged effects are reinforced by the fact that political action in the 1970s often took the form of long-term campaigns of protest and rebellion that were sustained into or resumed in the 1980s.

If mobilization is regarded as a control for all time-lagged group-level determinants of communal political action, the equations in Table 8 show that grievances and international contagion effects add significantly to those effects. Both summary indicators of grievances are relevant to both forms of communal action; ALLRIGHT (grievances about economic, social, and political rights combined) affects protest more than rebellion, whereas autonomy grievances (POLAUTON) contribute more to rebellion than protest. Lagged diffusion effects from the 1970s are not statistically significant, lagged contagion effects are weakly significant.

Effects of Democracy, State Power, and Political Durability

The political context of communal action is set by the state's political institutions and capabilities. Political systems shape the opportunity structures which guide communal decisions about exit, loyalty, or voice. If the choice is voice, then the openness and resources of the state influence what group leaders demand and their strategic choices between protest and rebellion. Our empirical strategy for assessing these effects at the macrolevel is, first, to examine bivariate correlations between traits of communal groups and characteristics of the political systems within which they live (Table 9). The next step is to include the most significant

Table 9. *Correlations of Traits of Political Systems with Communal Group Grievances, Mobilization, and Political Action, 1980s*[1]

Variables	Grievances		Mobilization		Protest and Rebellion	
	ALLRIGHT	POLAUTON	MOBPRO70	MOBREB70	PRO80	REB80
Level of Democracy in 1986 and Democratization 1976–86						
DEM86	.236***	.026	.234***	−.144**	.224**	−.165*
DEM7586	.044	−.011	−.038	−.091*	−.090*	−.128*
Scope of State Power in 1986 and Change in State Power 1960–86						
SCOPE86	.000	.071	.061	−.032	.180***	−.084
SCOPE6086	.000	.046	−.159**	.252***	−.242***	.230***
Durability of National Political Institutions in 1986 and Number of Institutional Changes 1975–86						
POLDUR86	.142**	−.012	.250**	−.052	.243***	−.082
POLCH7586	.113**	−.011	.001	.063	.029	.047

[1] For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. The correlation coefficients shown are Pearson *r*'s for $n = 223$ to 227 cases, using pairwise deletion for missing data.
Significance levels of coefficients:
*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

political system indicators in multiple regressions for the complete models (Tables 10 and 11, below).

Institutionalized Democracy (DEM86) has distinctive effects on communal political action, as is evident from the significant correlations in the first row of Table 9. In democratic environments groups express high levels of grievance (about economic, social, and political rights); mobilization for protest is higher than in autocratic regimes, and so is protest in the 1980s. Communal rebellion, on the other hand, tends to be greater in non-democratic states.[26] But grievances about autonomy (POLAUTON) are not correlated with type of political system or with any other political traits shown in Table 9.

Democratization between 1975 and 1986 (DEM7586) has only weak effects (shown in the second line of Table 9) but all are in the same direction: democratizing states tend to have lower mobilization for rebellion, less protest, and less rebellion. Before we jump to grand conclusions it is worth examining the polities in which significant shifts toward or away from democracy occurred during this period. These are the countries with shifts of +/–2 or more on this indicator:

Spain	+9	Yugoslavia	+2
Peru	+9	Egypt	+2
Thailand	+8	Iran	+2
Sudan	+6	Senegal	+2
Argentina	+5	India	–2
Ecuador	+5	Sierra Leone	–2
El Salvador	+4	Morocco	–2
Guatemala	+4	Sri Lanka	–3
Bolivia	+3	Lebanon	–4
Dominican Rep.	+3	Pakistan	–4
Brazil	+2	Turkey	–6
Honduras	+2	Ghana	–6
Mexico	+2	Nigeria	–8

In several countries the shift toward democracy was associated with efforts to resolve communal conflict: in Spain after Franco's demise; in Sudan, where the 1973 settlement of a protracted secessionist conflict with the south was part of President Numeiri's democratic reforms; and in Yugoslavia, where there was a shift toward more participatory federal institutions after Tito's death in 1980. In democratic Spain the policies of accommodation did contribute to a decline in the intensity of Basque and Catalonian separatism; Sudanese democracy and accommodation with the south was short-lived and the return to autocratic rule in the mid-1980s contributed to the resumption of insurgency. In Yugoslavia continued democratization led to resurgent communal nationalism and civil war; as the Polish activist Adam Michnik has ironically observed, "nationalism is the final stage of communism" (quoted in Mihajlov and Staus, 1991: 8).

At the other end of the spectrum, protracted rebellion contributed to the decline or demise of democracy in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey (because of leftist terrorism, which was not distinctively communal). In Nigeria in 1983–84 the military overturned the democratic Second Republic to preempt the resurgence of regionally based political conflict among corrupt civilian politicians. In most of the countries between—mainly Latin American ones—democratization had no obvious linkage to communal conflict. The most that can be said in this region is that democratization coincided with rising activism by advocates of indigenous rights, a

sequence that is consistent with the positive correlation, discussed above, between institutional democracy and communal protest.[27]

The observed correlation of democratization with lessened communal conflict therefore appears to be a consequence of two more complex processes: efforts to use democratic means to defuse conflicts (with decidedly mixed results), and the corrosive effect of communal conflict on democratic institutions in plural countries such as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria.

State power in the 1980s (SCOPE86) is significantly correlated with communal protest but not with rebellion or grievances. The likely explanation is that the advanced industrial democracies score relatively high on this variable and thus have the resources to respond favorably to grievances expressed within the democratic framework; the opportunity structure for communal groups in the powerful democracies therefore provides incentives for protest and disincentives for rebellion. Then why should the *expansion of state power* (SCOPE6086) be associated with the opposite conditions: low protest, high rebellion? Examination of states scoring high on this variable shows that most are activist Third World regimes, a number of which sought to establish state socialism during the 1960s and 1970s: Burma, Laos, Algeria, Guinea, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. In these and non-socialist cases like the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mali, Sudan, and Zambia, the expansion of state efforts to control resources and socioeconomic activity more or less directly stimulated resistance by adversely-affected communal groups. Most of the negative impact of state expansion is felt among ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples whose autonomy and resources are being subjected to central control. Given their situations, regional rebellion is a more feasible strategy than urban protest.

The effects of political durability (POLDUR86) and instability (POLCH7586) on communal grievances and conflict are consistent with the above results. The correlates of POLDUR86 are similar to those of democracy (DEM86), because the more durable political systems also tend to be democratic. And the frequency of institutional change is (weakly) correlated only with the articulation of grievance, not with mobilization for or levels of communal action. This, together with the findings discussed above, suggest that it is the nature and direction of political change that shapes communal conflict, not the magnitude of change alone.

Estimating the Complete Models

The findings reviewed above provide the basis for estimating complete models of the causes of communal protest and rebellion in the 1980s, incorporating variables at all levels of analysis. The equations shown in Tables 10 and 11 include group grievances about political rights and autonomy; indicators of group mobilization and contagion for the 1970s for protest and rebellion, respectively; and selected political system traits.[28] The tables also report the regressions for the five types of groups, using the same sets of predictor variables so that direct comparisons of causal structures can be made.

The regression equations account for substantial proportions of variance in communal protest and rebellion: 43 percent of the variance in PRO80 among all 227 groups is accounted for, and 51 percent of the variance in REB80. Greater variance is explained among most of the types, up to 70 percent, except that the models fare poorly in accounting for rebellion by communal contenders (adjusted $R^2 = .301$) and for protest by militant sects (adjusted $R^2 = .268$) and by indigenous groups ($R^2 = .324$). The primary objective is not to maximize variance, however, but to identity

Table 10. *Multiple Regression of Communal Protest in the 1980s as Determined by Group and Systemic Variables, by Type of Group*[1]

Independent variables	All groups (227)	Ethno-classes (43)	Ethno-nationalists (81)	Muslim Sects (39)	Indigenes (82)	Communal Contenders (62)
Group Grievances and Mobilization for Protest in the 1970s						
POLRIGHT	.163***	.268**	–.048	.469**	.170*	.233**
POLAUTON	.127**	.096	.411***	.109	–.073	.029
MOBPRO70	.412***	.505***	.254***	–.019	.360***	.476***
Contagion of Protest from Similar Groups in the Same Region						
ICONPRO7	.054	–.102	.000	.220	.306***	–
Democratization, State Power, and State Expansion						
DEM7586	–.083*	–.058	–.238***	–.244*	–.048	–.215**
SCOPE86	.155***	.126	.286***	.111	.090	.193*
SCOPE6086	–.223***	–.226*	–.393***	–.380**	–.123*	–.117
Constant	.087	–.018	–1.151*	.156	–.191	.413
Adjusted R^2	.426	.513	.526	.268	.334	.489

[1] For variable descriptions and a key to variable labels see Table 3. Group types are described in the text and in Table 1; some groups are cross-classified in two categories. The *n*'s for each category are shown in parentheses; note that only Muslim sects are included in the analysis reported here. Means were substituted for missing data on all variables. The data in the table are standardized regression weights (beta's) for variables in each equation. Significance levels of coefficients:
*** $p < .01$
** $p > .01$ but $< .05$
* $p > .05$ but $< .20$

Table 11. *Multiple Regression of Communal Rebellion in the 1980s as Determined by Group and Systemic Variables, by Type of Group*[1]

Independent variables	All groups (227)	Ethno-classes (43)	Ethno-nationalists (81)	Muslim Sects (39)	Indigenes (82)	Communal Contenders (62)
Group Grievances and Mobilization for Rebellion in the 1970s						
POLRIGHT	.118**	–.109	.216**	.323**	.082	.087
POLAUTON	.154***	–.091	.118	–.012	.196**	.210*
MOBREB80	.522***	.803***	.519***	.540***	.618***	.317**
Contagion of Rebellion from Similar Groups in the Same Region						
ICONREB7	.078*	.225**	–.091	.156	–.012	.130
Democracy, State Power, and State Expansion						
DEM86	–.094*	–.165*	–.026	–.205*	–.072	.079
SCOPE86	–.090*	.121*	–.094	.033	–.036	–.126
SCOPE6086	.050	.085	.230**	–.101	.134*	–.118
Constant	.801*	–.257	.684	–.402	–.191	2.098
Adjusted R^2	.508	.688	.459	.520	.680	.301

[1] See note 1 to Table 10.

parsimonious empirical models that yield comparable and theoretically plausible results; and that has been largely accomplished.

Determinants of Communal Protest. The group-level determinants of communal protest in the 1980s (Table 10, first three rows) are generally similar across all types of groups: mobilization is the strongest explanatory variable, and one or both grievance variables are also significant in each equation. The one exception is that mobilization for protest in the 1970s has no effect on 1980s protest by religious sects. The effects of regional contagion of protest (ICONPRO7) prove to be specific to two types of communal groups: Muslim minorities and indigenous groups. This is consistent with the substantive evidence, cited in the theoretical discussion, that groups of these types are more tightly linked than others by international networks.

Most characteristics of political systems have similar effects across all equations, though not all of them are significant for all types of groups. Institutional democracy (DEM86, not included in the protest equations; see note 28) generally facilitates communal protest and discourages rebellion, whereas *democratization* (DEM7586) appears to inhibit protest but has significant effects on rebellion. The statistical evidence needs to be interpreted by reference to the country-specific data (above) which show that a number of Third World regimes shifted *away* from democracy during this period. We observe, moreover, that the negative effects of democratization are strongest among ethnonationalists, militant sects, and communal contenders—all of them concentrated mainly in the Third World. The most plausible interpretation, therefore, is that the statistical results are a consequence of *increased communal protest in reaction to shifts away from democracy.*

As we observed from bivariate analysis, communal protest is greater in powerful and activist states, those with high SCOPE86 scores. This relationship is strongest for ethnonationalists and communal contenders, and is just short of significant for ethnoclasses, which suggests that protest by these groups aims at securing a larger share of public resources and services. In states that are attempting to expand their powers (high SCOPE6086 scores) the obverse pattern is evident: these expansionist states face less protest by all types of communal groups—but greater communal rebellion, as can be seen in the Table 11 equations. This evidence reinforces the general theoretical argument proposed above: the expansion of state powers provokes rebellious communal resistance—especially among ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples, who are the groups most likely to lose autonomy, status, and resources to hegemonic state elites.

Determinants of Communal Rebellion. The determinants of communal rebellion in the 1980s also tend to be similar across the types of groups. As with protest, mobilization for rebellion in the 1970s is the strongest group-level cause, but one or both kinds of political grievances also have significant effects. Grievances about lack of political rights have most salience for ethnonationalists and Muslim minorities; grievances about loss of political autonomy are particularly important among indigenous peoples and communal contenders. Ethnoclasses are an exception: neither of the grievance variables correlates with magnitudes of rebellion across these groups. The statistical results probably reflect the fact that rebellion is uncommon among ethnoclasses. Their primary political strategy is protest, and when they resort to rebellion at all it usually takes the form of terrorism by small cells of radical activists. It is not surprising, therefore, that mobilization for rebellion in the 1970s is the only significant group-level correlate of ethnoclass rebellion in the 1980s.

Ethnoclasses also are the only type of group whose rebellions are substantially influenced by regional contagion. There also is weak evidence of contagion effects among rebellions by religiously defined groups, which parallels the stronger evidence for the contagion of protest among the same groups. The effects of political system traits are generally consistent with previous observations: institutional democracy (DEM86) significantly reduces rebellion among ethnoclasses and religious sects, but has insignificant effects for other types of groups. Powerful states (high SCOPE86 scores) face higher levels of rebellion by ethnoclasses, but in all other comparisons high state power discourages communal rebellion. The effects of *expanding* state powers are discussed above.

Conclusions and Forecasts

Communal grievances have driven the most persistent civil wars of the last 40 years, as in Burma and Ethiopia. They motivated social and political movements that have profoundly transformed politics in the United States, Canada, and now in South Africa. They also played the leading part in the devolution of the Soviet and Yugoslav states. The question is what can be learned about the dynamics of communal conflict from global analysis that was not evident from more narrowly focused case and comparative study.

This study makes use of coded data on 227 politically mobilized communal groups in 90 countries, groups which in the aggregate make up about 17 percent of the global population. It has been a formidable task to develop usable indicators of these groups' status, traits, and political actions: the judgmentally based indicators employed here have considerable face validity but are less exact than those ordinarily used in empirical conflict analysis. The usual cautions about imprecise results apply. Nonetheless they are comprehensive: the causal models estimated here reflect conditions and dynamics that hold across virtually the entire universe of politically active communal groups, and within more homogeneous categories of them.

The consistently strongest determinant of magnitudes of communal protest and rebellion in the 1980s is the group's prior mobilization for political action—based on what it did and how during the 1970s. If forecasting is the objective, these are by far the most efficient predictors: mobilization for nonviolent protest at the end of the 1970s predicts 33.4 percent of the magnitude of protest in the 1980s, mobilization for rebellion predicts 45.5 percent of the 1980s magnitude of rebellion.[29] These results are consistent with conflict theories that emphasize the importance of group mobilization, but fail to address the most interesting theoretical question, which is why groups mobilize in the first place. In what political and economic circumstances, given what agenda of demands, and in what political and international context do communal groups mobilize and make strategic choices to take different kinds of political action? The models developed here provide some general answers to these questions.

Group disadvantages—political and economic differentials, poverty, discriminatory treatment—have a major impact on the grievances articulated by communal groups during the 1980s. Economic disadvantages, especially those associated with discrimination and poverty, are consistently correlated with economic and social grievances and with demands for greater political rights. They also were weakly but consistently correlated with magnitudes of communal protest. Resentments about restricted access to political positions and a collective history of lost autonomy drive separatist demands and rebellion generally. But whereas these all are significant

social forces, they are not as strong in the aggregate as prior mobilization.

The general findings do suggest a resolution of theoretical debates between "deprivation" and "mobilization" theories of civil conflict: objective conditions (poverty, discriminatory treatment, loss of autonomy) determine the issues around which leaders are able to mobilize collective action. The greater the differentials between groups, the easier it is for leaders to recruit members of disadvantaged or threatened groups. During the mobilization process communal leaders give stronger voice to grievance (the rights and autonomy indicators used here) *and* commit their followers to strategies of protest or rebellion. But once a group is committed to a particular strategy, self-sustaining conflict dynamics tend to develop: fighting groups and their opponents get locked in to action–reaction sequences from which it is difficult to escape. This is particularly the case with rebellion, less so with nonviolent protest, which usually is easier to accommodate and to deescalate. This interpretation helps account for the finding that across all 227 groups, and within all types except communal contenders, mobilization for protest has substantially weaker effects on future conflict than mobilization for rebellion. A number of other aspects of this interpretation are subject to further analysis using more fine-grained data on communal groups. This is the general argument summarized: *grievances (and the objective conditions to which they are a response) are critical in the early stages of group mobilization, but become less significant than group organization, leadership, and state response once campaigns of organized political action are underway.*

We also examined the extent to which conflict diffuses among transnational segments of communal groups, and the contagion of conflict among larger regional sets of similar groups: ethnoclasses, ethnonationalists, religious sects, indigenous peoples, and communal contenders. There are consistent but relatively weak effects of both kinds across all groups, with contagion having a greater impact than diffusion. Moreover the lagged effects of contagion and diffusion (from the 1970s to the 1980s) are about as strong as the simultaneous effects. In the complete models, however, we find that contagion effects are significant only for a few types of groups. Protest by indigenous peoples in the 1980s was strongly influenced by the political actions of indigenous groups elsewhere in the 1970s; rebellion by ethnoclasses (usually in the form of terrorism) was also contagious; and protest and rebellion by Muslims were both influenced by the political mobilization of similar groups elsewhere. These findings are consistent with what we know about the global and regional networks of communication and interaction that link indigenous activists and the peoples of the Islamic world.[30]

Finally we examined empirically the effects of political context on communal activism. Consistent with other macro-analyses of conflict behavior, we found communal protest to be characteristic of institutionalized democracies, whereas communal rebellion prevails in nondemocratic states. More complex are the effects of democratization. A handful of democratizing states have been able to accommodate communal conflict (Spain in the 1980s, Russia now) but we found more numerous examples of democratic and quasi-democratic Third World states which shifted toward autocracy in the 1980s under the pressure of communal conflict (Sudan, Lebanon). The findings are consistent with the general theoretical argument that *in long-established democracies the utility of nonviolent communal activism is high, whereas the process of democratization provides opportunities that spur the mobilization of communal groups for both protest and rebellion.*

The power of the state, and especially the extent to which states attempt to direct or regulate social and economic life, also have complex effects on communal

activism. The statistical results show that in powerful states the balance of opportunities and risks favor communal protest over rebellion. In states that most rapidly expanded their powers during the 1960s and 1970s, however, communal rebellion in the 1980s was intensified and protest diminished. These effects were especially pronounced in the Third World and among ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples, the groups that incur the greatest losses of resources and autonomy to expanding hegemonic states. As we suggested theoretically, the process of "state-building" in the Third World has inimical effects on many communal groups, especially those on the social and geographic margins. The consequence is a long-term increase in communal rebellion. It is evident from events in what used to be the Soviet bloc that authoritarian regimes are always at risk of renewed resistance from subordinate communal groups whenever control from the center is relaxed.

Communal conflict, especially rebellion, has increased more or less steadily since the 1950s in most world regions and among most of the seven types of communal groups surveyed in this study.[31] The upward trends are almost sure to continue during the 1990s and beyond for three general reasons as well as many specific ones. First, the breakup of the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Ethiopian states along communal lines has created restive new minorities in the successor states and gives encouragement to ethnonationalists everywhere to intensity their pursuit of autonomy. Second, the growing flood of economic and political refugees from Third- and Second-World countries to neighboring states and to the First World is creating new minorities who differ in ethnicity, culture, and often in religion from their host societies. Migrants already are the focus of growing communal hostilities in many parts of the world—Western Europe, the Gulf states, South Asia, West Africa—and it is evident that many of them will remain to form the nucleus of new and politically volatile ethnoclasses. Third, the process of democratization that is so vigorously fostered by US foreign policy is bound to increase the opportunities for communal protest and rebellion in plural societies throughout the world, with effects analogous to those we observed in the 1980s: some new democracies may be able to accommodate rising communal demands, but the odds are that most will not. And the ensuing civil wars will add to the diffusion of communal conflict and to the floods of refugees who will create future communal tensions.

The models and measures of communal conflict reported here will be tested by the events of the 1990s, in several senses of the word. The most challenging possibility is to use the models to forecast the onset of magnitudes of communal protest and rebellion among disadvantaged peoples who are just beginning to articulate their grievances.

Notes

1. For a broader and more interpretive analysis of the status of minorities, the historical and regional context of communal conflicts, and their outcomes, see Gurr, 1993.
2. The plasticity of the bases and parameters of ethnic group identity are analyzed by many scholars: see Barth 1969: 9–38; Brass 1991; Horowitz 1985: 41–54; and Smith 1986 *passim*.
3. The Minorities at Risk project, initiated by the author in 1986, incorporates the work of a number of collaborators and assistants. An initial list of groups was derived from prior work on group discrimination and separatism (Gurr and Gurr 1983) supplemented by reports of the Minority Rights Group (London) and Cultural Survival (Cambridge, MA). Background files on each group were then developed, evaluated, and selectively coded. Monty G. Marshall, now at the University of Iowa, surveyed Asian, Soviet, and East European groups and developed the Minorities database. Latin American groups were

analyzed by Michael Hartman, then a research assistant at the US Institute of Peace. Middle Eastern minorities were coded by Monty G. Marshall, Deina Ali Abdel-Kader, and Christina Perlioni. Most African groups were identified and coded by a research group directed by James R. Scarritt at the University of Colorado, Boulder: Martha Gibson, Keith Jaggers, Kook Shin Kim, Michael Obert, and Joshua B. Rubongoya. The author coded Western European and North American groups, plus those in the Horn of Africa and South Africa. The analyses reported in this paper were carried out by Scott McDonald and Shin-wha Lee.

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4. Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and the ex-USSR. The Kurdish minority in Syria falls below the 100 000 or 1 percent size threshold, according to sources consulted at the outset of our study.
5. One class of exceptions: in the Andean countries there are marked differences between highland and lowland *Indios* in group identity, status, political organization, and in how they are regarded and administered by the dominant society. Therefore in these societies highland and lowland peoples are coded as two separate aggregate groups.
6. The Minorities at Risk dataset includes nine black minorities in Latin America, from Honduras to Peru, virtually all of them poor and politically underrepresented. With the exception of black Brazilians and Panamanians there is no evidence of political action on behalf of group interests among them at any time between 1945 and 1989.
7. Analyses also have been done for groups classified by world regions; none are reported here but some are discussed in Gurr, 1993.
8. Four groups fit the defining criteria of three categories: Northern Irish Catholics (ethnonationalist, sectarian, ethnoclass); Palestinians in Lebanon (ethnonationalist, sectarian [Muslim], communal contenders); the Baluchis of Pakistan (indigenous, ethnonationalist, and communal contenders); and the Somalis of Kenya (indigenous, sectarian [Muslim], ethnonationalist). For analytic purposes they are cross-classified using only the first two of the three categories.
9. Some autonomy movements have limited public support, as is the case among Corsican, Sicilian, and South Tyrolean separatists, for example. We cast a wide net by including in this category all groups that gave rise to autonomy movements that persisted as an active political force (not necessarily in open rebellion) for five years or more between the 1940s and the 1980s. The persistence of a movement for five years or more in its region of origin suggests that it draws on a significant undercurrent of support.
10. For a working definition of indigenous peoples, see Burger (1987: 9). Scott McDonald identified indigenous peoples for this study by applying this definition to coded data in the Minorities dataset in a Minorities Project working paper, "Indigenous Minorities: A Statistical Survey" (1991).
11. Horowitz's (1985) major study of ethnic groups in conflict is limited to groups of this type. He characterizes them as "parallel or unranked groups, divided by a vertical cleavage" which "are relatively large and. . .interact at the center of politics. . . ." (1985: 17). The characterization and identification of such groups in the Minorities at Risk project is based mainly on James R. Scarritt's work on communal groups in Africa.
12. The relative deprivation perspective is generically similar to the "emergent human needs" theory used by Edward Azar and John Burton (1986) to account for protracted communal conflicts.
13. Nonviolent protest and rebellion are more common forms of communal action than violent protest. Preliminary analyses also showed that the first two forms of action were strongly correlated with different independent variables, whereas violent protest had few significant correlates. Examination of the violent protest scale suggests why: some of its categories resemble those of nonviolent protest; others refer to (local) rebellions. The alternative empirical strategy would be to divide it into protest and rebellion components

and fit them to the other two scales. Since that would require reevaluating and rescaling the entire dataset, we chose the simpler option of excluding violent protest from the analyses reported here.

14. Political action coding relied heavily on historical accounts and reports of the Minority Rights Group, supplemented by regional and international news sources; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* was the most widely used of the latter.
15. In macro-empirical research on relative deprivation it is generally assumed that collective action is a function of objective conditions which are defined *a priori* as sources of deprivation and discontent. In research on resource mobilization the assumption is that collective action is a function of a group's structurally determined interests. In neither research tradition are grievances, interests, or demands measured directly.
16. We do not assume unity of views or actions among mobilized communal groups. Most members most of the time are quiescent; most politically active groups have multiple organizations and competing sets of leaders; and different objectives and strategies often are pursued simultaneously. Grievances, protest, and rebellion all are measured for each group in the aggregate.
17. Disadvantages are not inherent in cultural differentials. Groups of different culture, language, and religion can coexist without persistent material or political disadvantage to any of them. There is nonetheless a tendency for sharply different peoples to be stratified.
18. *Intercommunal conflict* is open conflict with other communal groups not associated with the state, and is coded for each decade for each antagonist group from the 1940s through the 1980s using a six-category Guttman scale. The independent variable COMCON used in the analyses is the sum of all decennial scores for communal conflict with all antagonist groups.
19. Group identity and cohesion are equivalent to Tilly's concepts of CATNESS—the extent to which members of a group form a distinctive, self-conscious social *category*—and NETNESS, the extent to which they are linked into networks (Tilly, 1978: 62–68).
20. The indicator does not take into account the extent to which groups are spatially homogeneous in the regions where they are concentrated. Most are, but others are intermixed, like Croats and Serbs in eastern Croatia.
21. Some minorities (non-Muslim sects, the Roma of Eastern Europe, a few others) have no regional reference groups and are scored 0.
22. For example, the Kurds of Turkey are one of 13 Middle Eastern ethnonationalist groups whose mean 1970s protest score is 4.0, which therefore is the ICONPRO7 score assigned to the Turkish Kurds. The group also was cross-classified as one of 11 Middle Eastern indigenous groups, whose mean 1970s protest score is 2.5. In this, as in all other such cases, the higher score is assigned. Simultaneous correlations will be slightly inflated by including the group's own conflict scores in the reference-group means. The analyses reported below are concerned with the lagged effects—i.e., of reference-group means in the 1970s on group political action in the 1980s.
23. Israel and South Africa are at best quasi-democracies, because large communal groups in each are denied political and economic rights. In 1992 the two states were moving in opposite directions, Israel toward greater repression of Arab minorities, South Africa toward extension of democratic practices toward the black majority.
24. The last year coded in the Polity II dataset is 1986. We assume that the strongest effects of democracy/democratization on communal mobilization are simultaneous ones. Since virtually all the pro-democratic changes in the Communist states occurred after 1986, they are not reflected in our data and thus the analysis underestimates their impact on ethnonationalism at the very end of the decade.
25. The only exception was Singapore's peaceful secession from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, by mutual agreement.
26. This is consistent with evidence from cross-national aggregate analyses of conflict behavior which show that protest of all kinds is greater in democratic regimes, whereas rebellion typifies autocratic regimes. See, for example, Gurr 1989 and Zimmermann 1980 *passim*.

27. Guatemala is an exception: "democratization" in that country was relevant mainly to the dominant Ladinos; repression of Maya Indians suspected of supporting leftist guerrillas has continued. In this respect the policies of Guatemala's military-influenced governments toward indigenous rights resembled those of Chile's military government under General Pinochet, which used coercive means to reverse the Mapuche Indians' gains of the 1960s.
28. Not reported are many exploratory analyses using larger numbers of independent variables. The final equations are a compromise between "efficiency" (high explanatory power) and consistency of effects across the different kinds of groups and forms of conflict. For example, the POLRIGHT grievance indicator is used because it has stronger and more consistent effects than the summary measure of all grievances, ALLRIGHT. The indicator of democracy, DEM86, is not included in the protest equations because exploratory analyses showed that its effects are consistently controlled for by the other political system variables. Change in democracy, DEM7586, is omitted from the rebellion equations for the same reason. None of the indicators of group status, identity, or size add consistently and significantly to the equations reported here.
29. Based on bivariate correlations alone.
30. Most of the 39 Muslim groups included in the study are communal minorities in societies dominated by non-Muslim peoples. Others are Shi'i communities in Sunni-dominated countries. Most non-Muslim sects included in the subanalysis of militant sects are politically inactive and have no politically active transnational kindred to emulate.
31. Based on trend analyses reported in Gurr, 1993, chap. 4. Exceptions to the generalizations are the advanced industrial democracies, where communal conflict has declined since the late 1970s, and ethnoclasses, whose political actions declined in the last half of the 1980s. Both declines are likely to reverse, for the reasons that follow.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1. *Basic Characteristics of Minorities at Risk*

Groups are listed alphabetically by country within each region. These variables are listed for each group:

POP90 Best 1990 estimate of group population
PROP90 Best 1990 estimate of group size proportional to country population
TYPE 1 Primary classification of group:
- ETHCL = Ethnoclass
- ETHNA = Ethnonationalist
- INDIG = Indigenous people
- SECT = Religious sect
- COMCO = Communal contender

TYPE 2 Secondary classification of group
* These five groups are dominant groups which are included in the complete dataset but are not analyzed here

Advanced Industrial Democracies

Country	Group	POP90	PROP90	TYPE 1	TYPE 2
Britain	Afro-Caribbeans, Asians	2270	.0397	ETHCAL	.
Britain	Catholics-N. Ireland	565	.0099	ETHNA	SECT
EuroComm	Roma (Gypsies)	1720	.0048	ETHCL	.
France	Basques	247	.0044	ETHNA	.
France	Bretons	3816	.0680	ETHNA	.
France	Corsicans	348	.0062	ETHNA	.

Country	Group	POP90	PROP90	TYPE 1	TYPE 2
France	Afro-Arabs	1925	.0343	ETHCL	SECT
Greece	Muslims (Turks)	117	.0116	SECT	.
Italy	South Tyroleans	294	.0051	ETHNA	.
Italy	Sardinians	1940	.0337	ETHNA	.
Spain	Basques	1780	.0450	ETHNA	.
Spain	Catalans	3986	.1006	ETHNA	.
Switzerland	Jurassiens	147	.0222	ETHNA	.
Switzerland	Foreign Workers	959	.1447	ETHCL	.
WGermany	Turks	1421	.0233	ETHCL	SECT
Japan	Koreans	705	.0057	ETHCL	.
Australia	Aborigines	200	.0120	INDIG	.
NewZealand	Maoris	340	.1000	INDIG	.
Canada	French Canadians	6800	.2560	ETHNA	.
Canada	Native Peoples	610	.0230	INDIG	.
USA	African Americans	30821	.1231	ETHCL	.
USA	Hispanics	21300	.0840	ETHCL	.
USA	Native Peoples	1650	.0066	INDIG	.
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union					
Bulgaria	Turks	800	.0900	ETHCL	SECT
Czechoslovakia	Hungarians	643	.0410	ETHNA	.
Czechoslovakia	Slovaks	4856	.3094	ETHNA	.
EastEurope	Roma	3250	.0231	ETHCL	.
Romania	Germans	372	.0160	ETHNA	.
Romania	Hungarians	1834	.0788	ETHNA	.
USSR	Armenians	4713	.0162	ETHNA	.
USSR	Azerbaijanis	6924	.0238	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Chechens, Ingushes	844	.0029	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Tatars	6983	.0240	ETHNA	SECT
USSR	Estonians	1047	.0036	ETHNA	.
USSR	Georgians	4044	.0139	ETHNA	.
USSR	Germans	2124	.0073	ETHNA	.
USSR	Jews	2007	.0069	ETHCL	SECT
USSR	Karachays, Balkars	145	.0005	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Kazakhs	8292	.0285	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Kyrgyz	2589	.0089	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Kurds	120	.0004	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Latvians	1484	.0051	ETHNA	.
USSR	Lithuanians	3113	.0107	ETHNA	.
USSR	Roma	233	.0008	ETHCL	.
USSR	Tajiks	4305	.0148	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Turkmen	2764	.0095	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Ukrainians	44950	.1545	ETHNA	.
USSR	Uzbeks	16991	.0584	SECT	INDIG
USSR	Moldavians	3320	.0114	ETHNA	.
Yugoslavia	Albanians	1840	.0771	ETHNA	SECT
Yugoslavia	Croats	4694	.1967	ETHNA	.
Yugoslavia	Serbs	8663	.3630	ETHNA	.
Yugoslavia	Slovenes	1909	.0800	ETHNA	.
China	Kazakhs	1005	.0009	SECT	INDIG
China	Uighurs	6800	.0061	SECT	INDIG

Country	Group	POP90	PROP90	TYPE 1	TYPE 2
Asia					
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes	570	.0049	INDIG	.
Bangladesh	Hindus	14120	.1220	SECT	.
Burma	Arakanese (Muslims)	1530	.0370	SECT	INDIG
Burma	Zomis (Chins)	990	.0240	ETHNA	INDIG
Burma	Kachins	455	.0110	ETHNA	INDIG
Burma	Karens	4210	.1020	ETHNA	INDIG
Burma	Mons	1030	.0250	ETHNA	INDIG
Burma	Shans	3180	.0770	ETHNA	INDIG
Burma	Hill Tribal Peoples	1030	.0250	ETHNA	INDIG
China	Hui (Muslims)	7800	.0070	SECT	.
China	Tibetans	4900	.0044	ETHNA	INDIG
India	Kashmiris	2890	.0034	ETHNA	SECT
India	Muslims	98600	.1160	SECT	.
India	Nagas	850	.0010	ETHNA	INDIG
India	Santals	5610	.0066	ETHNA	INDIG
India	Scheduled Tribes	51850	.0610	INDIG	.
India	Sikhs	15980	.0188	ETHNA	SECT
India	Mizos (Lushai)	575	.0007	ETHNA	INDIG
India	Tripuras	575	.0007	ETHNA	INDIG
Indonesia	Chinese	5010	.0262	ETHCL	.
Indonesia	East Timorese	765	.0040	ETHNA	.
Indonesia	Papuans	1205	.0063	ETHNA	INDIG
Kampuchea	Cham	175	.0250	SECT	INDIG
Kampuchea	Vietnamese	315	.0450	ETHNA	.
Laos	Hmong	440	.1100	INDIG	.
Malaysia	Chinese	5800	.3400	ETHCL	COMCO
Malaysia	Dayaks	675	.0395	INDIG	.
Malaysia	East Indians	1415	.0830	ETHCL	COMCO
Malaysia	Kadazans	665	.0390	INDIG	.
Philippines	Cordilleras (Igorot)	930	.0140	INDIG	.
Philippines	Moros (Muslims)	4330	.0650	SECT	INDIG
Singapore	Malays	395	.1460	ETHCL	SECT
SriLanka	Indian Tamils	940	.0550	ETHCL	.
SriLanka	SriLankan Tamils	2150	.1260	ETHNA	.
Taiwan	Aboriginals	310	.0150	INDIG	.
Taiwan	*Mainland Chinese	2760	.1350	COMCO	.
Taiwan	Taiwanese	17384	.8500	COMCO	.
Thailand	Chinese	5645	.1000	ETHCL	.
Thailand	Malay Muslims	1410	.0250	ETHNA	SECT
Thailand	Northern Hill Tribes	850	.0150	INDIG	.
Vietnam	Chinese	1370	.0200	ETHCL	.
Vietnam	Montagnards	1200	.0175	INDIG	.
PapuaNewGuinea	Bougainvilleans	180	.0466	ETHNA	INDIG
Middle East					
Algeria	Berbers	5400	.2100	INDIG	.
Egypt	Copts	4780	.0850	SECT	.
Iran	Azerbaijanis	14330	.2600	ETHNA	.
Iran	Baha'is	475	.0086	SECT	.
Iran	Bakthiaris	900	.0165	ETHNA	INDIG
Iran	Baluchis	950	.0170	ETHNA	INDIG
Iran	Kurds	5000	.0905	ETHNA	INDIG

Country	Group	POP90	PROP90	TYPE 1	TYPE 2
Iran	Turkomans	795	.0145	ETHNA	INDIG
Iran	Arabs	950	.0173	ETHNA	.
Iraq	Kurds	4150	.2200	ETHNA	INDIG
Iraq	Shi'is	9800	.5200	ETHCL	SECT
Iraq	*Sunni Arabs	3950	.2100	COMCO	.
Israel	Arabs	800	.1310	ETHCL	SECT
Israel-OT	Palestinians	1600	.2620	ETHNA	SECT
Jordan	Palestinians	1070	.3500	ETHNA	SECT
Lebanon	Druze	170	.0445	SECT	COMCO
Lebanon	Maronite Christians	1360	.3558	SECT	COMCO
Lebanon	Palestinians	430	.1125	ETHNA	SECT
Lebanon	Shi'is	1085	.2839	SECT	COMCO
Lebanon	Sunnis	780	.2041	SECT	COMCO
Morocco	Berbers	9700	.3700	INDIG	.
Morocco	Saharawis	160	.0060	ETHNA	INDIG
Pakistan	Ahmadis	3960	.0350	ETHCL	SECT
Pakistan	Baluchis	4640	.0410	ETHNA	INDIG
Pakistan	Hindus	1800	.0160	SECT	.
Pakistan	Pashtuns	14710	.1300	INDIG	COMCO
Pakistan	Sindhis	11540	.1020	COMCO	.
SaudiArabia	Shi'is	500	.0300	ETHCL	SECT
Syria	*Alawis	1620	.1300	COMCO	.
Turkey	Kurds	10180	.1800	ETHNA	INDIG
Turkey	Roma	620	.0110	ETHCL	.
Africa South of the Sahara					
Angola	Bakongo	1230	.1400	ETHNA	COMCO
Angola	Ovimbundu	2900	.3300	COMCO	.
Botswana	San	46	.0360	INDIG	.
Burundi	Hutu	4540	.8300	ETHCL	COMCO
Burundi	*Tutsi	985	.1800	ETHCL	COMCO
Cameroon	Kirdi	2440	.2200	INDIG	.
Cameroon	Westerners	2220	.2000	COMCO	.
Cameroon	Bamileke	3000	.2700	COMCO	.
Chad	Northerners	2630	.5200	SECT	COMCO
Chad	Southerners	2420	.4800	COMCO	.
Congo	Lari (Bakongo)	265	.1150	COMCO	.
Ethiopia	Afars	2570	.0500	ETHNA	INDIG
Ethiopia	Eritreans	3850	.0750	ETHNA	SECT
Ethiopia	Nilo-Saharans	820	.0160	ETHNA	INDIG
Ethiopia	Oromo	20550	.4000	ETHNA	.
Ethiopia	Somali	2570	.0500	ETHNA	SECT
Ethiopia	Tigreans	4620	.0900	ETHNA	.
Ghana	Ashanti	4265	.2800	COMCO	.
Ghana	Ewe	1980	.1300	COMCO	.
Ghana	Mossi, Dagomba	2440	.1600	COMCO	.
Guinea	Fulani(Fulbe)	2180	.3000	COMCO	.
Guinea	Malinke	2180	.3000	COMCO	.
Guinea	Susu	1160	.1600	COMCO	.
IvoryCoast	Lebanese	160	.0134	ETHCL	.
Kenya	Kikuyu	5330	.2100	COMCO	.
Kenya	Luo	3300	.1300	COMCO	.
Kenya	Masai	405	.0160	INDIG	.
Kenya	Somali	510	.0200	SECT	INDIG

Country	Group	POP90	PROP90	TYPE 1	TYPE 2
Kenya	Turkana, Pokot	760	.0300	INDIG	.
Kenya	Rendille, Borana	250	.0100	INDIG	.
Liberia	Americo-Liberians	75	.0285	ETHCL	COMCO
Madagascar	Merina	3070	.2600	COMCO	.
Mali	Tuareg	430	.0470	INDIG	.
Mali	Mande	3950	.4300	COMCO	.
Mauritania	Kewri	410	.2000	COMCO	.
Namibia	Europeans	78	.0489	ETHCL	COMCO
Namibia	San	36	.0276	INDIG	.
Niger	Djerema-Songhai	1460	.1900	COMCO	.
Niger	Hausa	3540	.4600	ETHNA	COMCO
Niger	Tuareg	850	.1100	ETHNA	INDIG
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani	34470	.2900	SECT	COMCO
Nigeria	Ibo	20210	.1700	ETHNA	COMCO
Rwanda	Tutsi	840	.1100	ETHCL	COMCO
Senegal	Diola	620	.0800	ETHNA	.
SierraLeone	Creoles	80	.0190	ETHCL	COMCO
SierraLeone	Limba	333	.0800	COMCO	.
SierraLeone	Mende	1290	.3100	COMCO	.
Somalia	Issaq	2100	.2500	ETHNA	COMCO
SouthAfrica	Asians	1030	.0280	ETHCL	COMCO
SouthAfrica	Black Africans	26935	.7340	ETHCL	COMCO
SouthAfrica	Coloreds	3340	.0910	ETHCL	COMCO
SouthAfrica	*Europeans	5180	.1411	ETHCL	COMCO
Sudan	Southerners	6510	.2600	ETHNA	COMCO
Togo	Ewe	790	.2220	ETHNA	COMCO
Togo	Kabre	500	.1400	COMCO	.
Uganda	Acholi	705	.0400	COMCO	.
Uganda	Ankole	1410	.0800	COMCO	.
Uganda	Baganda	2810	.1600	ETHNA	COMCO
Uganda	Kakwa	530	.0300	COMCO	.
Uganda	Karamojong	350	.0200	INDIG	.
Uganda	Konjo, Amba	530	.0300	ETHNA	COMCO
Uganda	Langi	1060	.0600	COMCO	.
Uganda	Lugbara, Madi	860	.0490	COMCO	.
Uganda	Nyarwanda	1040	.0590	COMCO	.
Zaire	Bakongo	3640	.1030	ETHNA	COMCO
Zaire	Luba of Kasai Province	2155	.0610	ETHNA	COMCO
Zaire	Lingala	7070	.2000	COMCO	.
Zaire	Lunda, Yeke	1980	.0560	ETHNA	COMCO
Zaire	Kivu Region	4600	.1300	ETHNA	.
Zambia	Bemba	3000	.3700	COMCO	.
Zambia	Lozi (Barotse)	570	.0700	ETHNA	COMCO
Zambia	Tonga	1540	.1900	COMCO	.
Zimbabwe	Europeans	370	.0350	ETHCL	.
Zimbabwe	Ndebele	2100	.2000	COMCO	.
Latin America					
Argentina	Jews	320	.0100	SECT	.
Argentina	Native Peoples	365	.0113	INDIG	.
Bolivia	Native Highland Peoples	4105	.6100	INDIG	.
Bolivia	Native Lowland Peoples	135	.0200	INDIG	.
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	9475	.0600	ETHCL	.

Country	Group	POP90	PROP90	TYPE 1	TYPE 2
Brazil	Native Lowland Peoples	235	.0015	INDIG	.
Chile	Native Peoples	1070	.0823	INDIG	.
Colombia	Afro-Americans	2095	.0643	ETHCL	.
Colombia	Native Highland Peoples	225	.0069	INDIG	.
Colombia	Native Lowland Peoples	110	.0034	INDIG	.
CostaRica	Antillean Blacks	46	.0150	ETHCL	.
Ecuador	Afro-Americans	860	.0800	ETHCL	.
Ecuador	Native Highland Peoples	2805	.2600	INDIG	.
Ecuador	Native Lowland Peoples	108	.0100	INDIG	.
ElSalvador	Native Peoples	565	.1000	INDIG	.
Guatemala	Native Peoples (Maya)	3330	.3600	INDIG	.
Honduras	Black Caribs	95	.0180	ETHCL	.
Honduras	Native Peoples	370	.0700	INDIG	.
Nicaragua	Native Peoples (Miskitos)	126	.0350	ETHNA	INDIG
Panama	Afro-Caribbeans	121	.0500	ETHCL	.
Panama	Native Peoples	133	.0550	INDIG	.
Paraguay	Native Peoples	115	.0250	INDIG	.
Peru	Afro-Americans	112	.0050	ETHCL	.
Peru	Native Highland Peoples	8940	.4000	INDIG	.
Peru	Native Lowland Peoples	265	.0120	INDIG	.
Venezuela	Afro-Americans	1975	.1000	ETHCL	.
Venezuela	Native Lowland Peoples	195	.0100	INDIG	.
DominicanRep	Afro-Americans	650	.0870	ETHCL	.
Mexico	Native Peoples	10425	.1200	INDIG	.

Appendix Table 2. *Weights Used to Construct MOBPRO70 and MOBREB70*

MOBPRO70 Weights[1]				MOBREB70 Weights[2]		PRO80 & REB80	
NonviolentProtest 1975–79		ViolentProtest 1975–79		Rebellion 1975–79		Add for Highest 1970–74 Score	
Score	Weight	Score	Weight	Score	Weight	Score	Weight
1	1	1,2	1	1,2	1	1	0
2,3	2	3,4,6	2	3,7,8	2[3]	2,3	1[4]
4,5,6	3			4	3	4,5	2
				5	4		

[1]MOBPRO70 = the highest weight for either nonviolent or violent protest in 1975–79, plus the highest weight for 1970–74 protest *if* Protest or Rebellion 1975–79 > 0.

[2]MOBREB70 = the highest weight for rebellion in 1975–79, plus the highest weight for 1970–74 rebellion *if* Protest or Rebellion 1975–79 > 0.

[3]Weight also used for MOBREB70 if Violent Protest 1975–79 = 5 (local rebellion).

[4]Weight also used for MOBPRO70 if 1970–74 Violent Protest = 4.

Appendix Table 3. *Variables and Weights Used to Construct Loss of Autonomy (AUTLOST)*

AUTLOST is indexed by adding the weights for Magnitude of Change and Group Status Prior to Change, subtracting one, and dividing by the Year of Loss weight.

Year of Loss of Autonomy or Transfer of Control Period	Weight	Magnitude of Change Type	Weight	Group Status Prior to Change Status	Weight
1960–79	4	Loss of long-term autonomy	3	State or republic	4
1940–59	3	Loss of short-term autonomy		Autonomous region or province, or autonomous people under colonial rule (3a)	3
1900–39	2	(<10 years)	2	Traditional centralized authority, religious or secular (3b)	3
pre-1900	1	Transfer only	1	Province in another state or colonial territory (2a)	2
				Part of larger segment of group (2b)	2
				Autonomous but acephalous or fragmented people (1a)	1
				Other(1b)	1

Note: Information on loss of autonomy/transfer was recorded and coded for (a) all groups which met general criteria for political separatism (active separatist movements at some time since the 1940s, either in the group itself or in transnational segments); and (b) groups which lost autonomy or were transferred from one state or colonial territory to another during the 20th century. The number of groups meeting these criteria is 108; others are coded 0. Changes from colonial status to independence are not regarded as "transfers" for the purpose of this coding. For groups which experienced several such changes in status, only the most recent is coded.

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