THE SOUTH IN WORLD POLITICS

Chris Alden,
Sally Morphet and
Marco Antonio Vieira



The South in World Politics

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The South and World Politics: An Introduction

An introduction to a monograph devoted to the subject of the South and world politics presumes a number of contestable ideas, concepts and outlooks regarding the international system and its composite actors or units. We take as a starting point some of the misconceptions that have surrounded debates on the South so as to better discern what the concept is (and isn't) and why it is an absolutely vital, if neglected, area of study.

First, the idea of 'the South' is itself open to scrutiny and, in some circles, considerable (and at times well-founded) criticism. Not surprisingly exponents, opponents and those who claim themselves to be writing in the tradition of dispassionate scholarship disagree profoundly over the significance and utility of a geographic term whose origins reside in political entrepreneurship among a clutch of post-colonial leaders struggling to assert themselves both domestically and internationally. The preference of the South over that of other phrases in common parlance such as 'Third World', 'developing countries', 'less developed countries (LDCs)' and more recently the enriched terminology of the 'Global South' speaks to both its mutability and endurance as a descriptive term in the contemporary environment.

Equally, by deliberately situating this concept within a framework of international politics and political economy, the authors have seemingly tipped their hand and committed themselves to an account of the international system that privileges states over that of other actors as well as characterised processes or interactions as both conflictual and consensual in nature. Indeed, the notion of the South is deeply wrapped up in the concerns of states, be they questions of security, autonomy or territorial integrity, but at the same time it is also intensely concerned with the peoples, communities and livelihoods that make up

the developing world. The struggle for independence which galvanised societies under the yoke of colonialism cannot but be understood as the world's greatest campaign for human rights nor can the debate over genetically modified crops make sense without cognisance of the framework of prevailing asymmetries in North–South relations.

Some scholars have noted that the developing countries which identify themselves as being part of the South are not representative of all developing, post-colonial states. Here again, the rifts within the South and within states themselves are significant. For example, some Latin American countries have been traditionally uncomfortable with this association due to enduring ideological perceptions while their civil societies have in the main sought to embrace it. The same could be said about the former Soviet republics and some ex-communist states in Eastern Europe whose economic standing and concerns with nation building would naturally bring these states closer to others in the South but for the politics of identity and the draw of the European Union.

While acknowledging the validity of some of the criticisms, we nonetheless assert that an understanding of the South – the ideas, forces and history that constitute it – is crucial to grasp the character of the international system as it has developed over the past 50 years. Not only is this a case of rectifying the 'lost history' of the Cold War where the foreign policy and diplomacy of South states has been systematically ignored by traditional scholarship, but it is an effort to re-interpret the dominant discourses of international relations in light of the introduction of what for most academics based in the North will constitute 'new' empirical data. The hue and cry that accompanied the breakdown of sovereignty in the Balkans, inspiring Western disregard of the UN Charter principle of territorial integrity, or the debate over the effects of Mexico's entry into North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on American labour and industry are issues which have been a dominant feature of the international politics of the developing world. Indeed all the supposed hallmarks of the contemporary debate on globalisation – sovereignty's weak grip upon society, the dilatory effects of the transnational flows of capital, the advent of criminality and 'outsourcing' of war – have long been part of the experience of the South. Globalisation, which seemed to many observers in the North to have arrived suddenly in the aftermath of the Cold War, is a process that the South has been coping with from the very outset of its existence.[1] It is our task to bring these matters to light and to situate insights that this provides within the framework of contemporary international relations theory and practice.

What is the South?

A genealogical approach to this question provides a clue to the sources and meaning of the term. The South is a phrase used to describe those regions of the globe that have in common a political, social and economic history rooted in the inequalities of a colonial or imperialist past. As the levels of economic development have evolved among the countries of the South over the last few decades, the concept has come to signify more than the discussion and making of foreign policy, geographic proximity or the sense of shared history. The South is also increasingly understood to be an ideological expression for the range of concerns facing developing regions, which themselves are growing in economic and political diversity and experience. In this sense it serves as a mobilising symbol for a diverse set of developing countries and is part of a strategy for managing relations with the more powerful industrialised countries of the North through its decision-making groupings – the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G77, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and, more recently a range of sub-regional organizations like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). To summarise:

- *The term 'the South' is meaningful precisely because it forms a source of national and transnational identity for both state and non-state actors in the international system*. It is an identity that presumes a 'North' but unlike the states and peoples of the industrialised world, for whom acceptance of the notion of 'the West' has greater currency and meaning, the South recognises its contingent nature and this recognition informs the term with an acknowledgement of the relational dependency that is effectively denied by the North. Mere durability and persistence alone indicates that, while periodically declared 'dead' by North-based observers, the South does indeed rise again.
- *This identity is reified through the continuing formation of foreign policy within Southern pressure groups (at regular meetings at Summit, foreign minister and senior official level) such as the states members of the NAM, the G77 and the OIC, whose founding rationales were informed by their experience of dealing with Southern issues at the UN*. Many of these foreign policy issues are then debated and dealt with within the UN system. They are usually agreed by a host of regional and sub-regional organisations in the South as an ideological source for their cooperation (South–South). At the state level, foreign policy principles of major countries of the South such as China and India are drawn

directly from the five principles of 'pancasila' (1954) which helped form the NAM in 1961.

- *It is an identity that encapsulates the shared experience of colonialism and imperialism*. This experience spans the period from emergence of the South in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War – especially those instances which saw the taking of power by pre-war independence struggles in Indonesia, India and China – into familiar terrain of the Cold War and, more recently, with the collapse of the Soviet empire.
- *It is an identity that encapsulates the shared dilemmas of sovereignty*. The problems of nation building that confronted the leaders of newly independent states, forging nationalism out of the artifice of territories and peoples often divided by history, ethnicity and creed, continue to be an overriding preoccupation and source of conflict within (and sometimes between) states of the South.
- *It is an identity that encapsulates the shared dilemmas of developing economies*. Improving upon the dire inheritance of rural and urban poverty, commodity-based economies subject to the whims of international markets controlled largely (if not wholly) by sources in the North continues to be the dominant economic challenge for the South.
- *Finally, the South serves as a mobilising strategy based upon a profound critique of the contemporary international system*. Faced with the patent and persistent inequities of the international system, underpinned by asymmetries in power wealth and resources, the notion of the South informs both a critique of the global order and a rallying point for solidarity and activism.

The South as norms leader in the international system

Given this cascading series of assertions on historicity of meaning, identity politics and modalities of action, how does one determine what is the essence of the South in world politics? Indeed, when faced with the ineffectiveness of South institutions in achieving concrete aims such as aspirations to create a commodity stabilising instrument or use the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as a forum for North–South trade negotiations, the consensus of most scholars has been to dismiss the South altogether. Even sympathetic academics like Braveboy-Wagner, when confronted by the question of the South's accomplishments, have felt compelled to acknowledge its failure to achieve many of its most cherished aims.[2]

Clearly, a predominantly materialist reading of the South as concretised actor can be difficult to sustain without reference to its ideational dimensions and the recognition that this implies. For the authors of this book, it is the linkage between the notion of South as identity, bound to material dimensions of the international political economy and realised through its engagement in the international system that provides the basis for an understanding of both its significance and durability in the changing context of world politics. Following from this, to our thinking the principal contribution of the South in the realm of world politics is in constituting and shaping (or attempting to) the underlying norms of the international system. This has taken the form of acting as a norms leader with an explicit focus on three dimensions of global governance: (1) reinforcing norms on sovereignty and non-intervention, (2) broadening the parochial application of Western universalism in international institution and (3) redefining the mode of international decision making.

The first dimension, the South's active support for sovereignty and non-intervention, is arguably its most recognised position in international politics. Taking the colonial inheritance of legally sanctioned boundaries and conditional application of citizenship which conformed to the exigencies of European interests, Southern states have argued for an understanding of sovereignty as a cornerstone of international order and a domestic bulwark for nation building. This stance, articulated in tandem with contrary transnational impulses like pan-Arab and pan-African movements, has nonetheless been subject to collective reinterpretation in line with Southern state interests. For instance, the South has made clear that there are conditions when there is a moral imperative to intervention in the domestic affairs of states, namely in support of the anti-colonialism and anti-imperialist agenda, but it has adopted a much more ambivalent and circumspect approach to Western positions in favour of humanitarian intervention, democratisation and 'regime change' in the post–Cold War era. In this sense, it could be argued that the West can be seen to be moving away from the founding norms of international order whereas the South is in certain ways a conservative source of support for classic Westphalian principles. Significantly, Southern states attempted – and failed – to achieve a similar aim in reconstituting norms on the prevailing global economic system. They focused on pursuing a Southern development strategy based on the twin pillars of promoting domestic import-substitution industrialisation coupled to an international set of negotiations aimed at restructuring the inequitable global economic system. Indeed, the inability

to gain Northern country support and, concurrently, the remarkable development gains of export-oriented economies of East Asia, were to pave the way for acceptance of neoliberalism as the predominant system in the global economy.

Broadening the reach of Western ideas, encoded in the language of universalism but not applied to the formation and conduct of international institutions, was a second dimension that has seen the South play a key part in reshaping prevailing international norms. The unequal status of member states in the United Nations as presented by instruments like the Permanent Five, the systematic marginalisation of the Trusteeship Council and the question of voting rights in international financial institutions – which mirrored in some ways the conditions of statutory exclusion experienced by many people of colour under colonialism – formed part of the South's agenda for change. Through its assertion of growing strength, particularly in the General Assembly but also the UN agencies, developing countries were able to pass seminal resolutions that effectively took the moral initiative away from the West by 'grafting' their aims within the recognised framework of universal norms. Mobilising this moral discourse in support of developing country interests on issues as diverse as colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa to changing the terms of trade, the South has been able to gradually reshape the international architecture put into place in 1945 to reflect developing country concerns.

Finally it is important to acknowledge the South's role in promoting a new mode of decision making that emphasises solidarity through inclusion, consensus and quiet diplomacy. This is not to suggest that developing countries were unwilling to employ their numerical superiority in the General Assembly to make gains in the UN nor that they have themselves been able to produce a consistent bloc of voting on issues to match the behaviour of say the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Cold War.[3] Rather that they have sought where possible to ensure that decisions were taken in a manner that wove together the broadest possible coalition among developing countries. A significance feature of this approach is the preference for 'constructive engagement' over 'megaphone diplomacy', allowing states to save face while (presumably) undertaking to develop an adequate response to the issues being raised. This runs directly counter to a key operating tenet of the Western approach to internationalism that is the ladder of escalating responses predicated on public isolation and shaming of 'deviant' behaviour by states. Again, the Southern states are not totally opposed to application of this approach when it came to Western or

Western-oriented entities during the anti-colonial struggle – though history has forgotten initiatives by, for instance, Kaunda's Zambia or the Francophone states, to promote negotiated solutions to white settler rule in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa – but with the onset of independence have demonstrated considerable reluctance in employing, for instance, diplomatic sanctions against Burma or Zimbabwe's ruling elite. Underlying this position is the continuing premium placed on solidarity among developing countries, a lesson derived from the memories of the independence struggle when the odds were of success depended on cohesion.

By privileging the South's role in acting as a norms leader in the name of developing country interests, this enables one to put into context the paradox of developing countries having achieved substantive change in the international system without recourse to adequate, recognised forms of structural power capable of giving effect to these aims. In fact, it is only in the early twenty-first century, when sufficient material power has accrued to the leading developing countries in the G5 that we are beginning to see the forceful application of financial means towards the attainment of a renegotiation of their standing in key international institutions like the IMF. And yet even this new phenomenon must be understood to have been built upon the foundation of moral authority slowly and deliberately accumulated since the creation of the United Nations in 1945.

As such, the primary locus of action for the South is found in issue-based foreign policy pressure groups, traditional South–South organisations, such as the G77 and NAM, supplemented by cross-regional interactions and, most recently, through the fostering of epistemic communities in cyberspace. Given the centrality of the institutions of order and management of the international system to all aspects of the South, be it in the historical sense of conferring recognition upon newly independent governments or through the imposition of economic conditionalities upon states desperately seeking financial relief, it stands to reason that Southern states look to and focus their foreign policy conduct within the international institutional arena. The belief in the possibility of systemic change, 'peace through law' and equitable development, all grounded in a recognition of the underlying democratic ethos inherent in international institutions such as the United Nations and its founding charter – though questioned at times by some of the more radical states – remains one of the consistencies of practice observed by the South. Indeed, in keeping with a long-standing understanding of organisations like the League of Nations and its successor,

small and middle powers see in international organisations the potential to achieve a 'multiplier effect' upon their national interests through collective action and recourse to international law as well as through developing new legal standards.[4] States of the South, with a narrower resource base to draw upon have sought to exercise greater influence on international events through the UN and its specialised agencies as well as, more recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO). The emergence of 'groups' or 'bloc politics' working within and without the UN, as well as formal and informal gatherings of regional states such as the African bloc, has enabled otherwise weak states to exercise influence.

Theoretical approaches to the South and world politics

One of the presiding assumptions about the study of the South in world politics is that it occupies a specific time and place within general investigations of international relations. Although the greatest and most self-conscious intellectual ruminations about the South are to be found within the structuralist school and given policy applicability through development studies, in fact all major approaches to the study of international relations have considered the role and place of developing countries within the broader global system. In many respects, these various schools and their approach to the South outlined below provide avenues of insight into key issues such as power asymmetries, the role of agency and the possibility and impact of change on the prevailing international system.

The structuralist/world systems approach

The study of the developing world in relation to the international system has been most systematically carried out by scholars writing in the structuralist tradition. The *Dependencia School*, associated with Andre Gunder Frank, and the world systems approach, introduced by Immanuel Wallerstein, elaborated theories that situated the post-colonial world within an international framework of exploitation of the agriculturally based (or 'traditional') societies by the industrialised countries of Europe and North America. These approaches were in part a critical response to a set of arguments associated with American liberalism that placed responsibility for the 'backwardness' of South states on the specific features of their domestic systems, types of political leadership as well as their economic isolation from the rest of the world. Conversely, a number of Latin American scholars such as Dos Santos, Cardoso, Sunkel and Faletto depicted underdevelopment as a structural

characteristic of the global economic system. These authors pointed to a continuing relationship of exploitation between the developed states (centre) and the developing economies (periphery) that are dependent upon the former. For them, this global structure of dependency could be avoided by using a strategy of import substitution and a state-led rather than market-oriented model of economic development.[5] The ideological arguments of the *Dependencia School* provided the rationale that served as the legitimising force behind the demands associated with the New International Economic Order (NIEO). They also provided a coherent set of principles that helped inspire developing Southern states to create organisations within the UN, such as UNCTAD, that were potentially helpful to them as well as encouraging them to harmonise policy proposals within them.

More specific accounts of institutions of the South draw upon the structuralists for inspiration but themselves are functionalist renderings of the administrative apparatuses of organisations, such as, for example, UNCTAD, rather than critical studies that situate these institutions within a political context that takes the divisions within the South seriously.[6] Structuralists have remained curiously blind to the diversity of experience and outlook that characterises the South and, in treating the developing world as if it was a monolith – making some concessions to modest development growth among 'semi-periphery' countries – have lost the dynamism that informs new entrants to South leadership as NAM Summit Chairs such as Malaysia and South Africa. Walden Bello's work on the East Asian 'dragons' is perhaps the most notable exception to this.[7] And while some contemporary studies of the Third World are beginning to recognise this, they too neglect a discussion of the South and international institutions, seeing the latter as fundamentally a shell for industrial country interests.

Realism

Realists assert that the defining feature of the international system, and the one that drives the conduct of the key components in that system, namely states, is its anarchical character. Traditionally, realists have seen developing countries primarily as potential allies or adversaries in the 'great game' of the Cold War. While not exactly dismissive of the South, given the realist preoccupation with power measured in terms of military capability and – to a lesser extent – economic strength, this approach has tended to situate developing countries in terms of their respective alignment with the West or Soviet Union and has rendered their foreign policies as that of proxies to the superpowers. Thus

states of the South were rarely accorded a separate identity or rationale and, as such, realists viewed the NAM, the NIEO and other initiatives representing South interests that were critical of the West or the international system to be somewhere between 'soft socialists' to outright front organisations for the Soviet Union.[8] The exceptions to this perspective were first revolutionary Iran and secondly Saudi Arabia given its long-term support of the fundamentalist teachings of *Wahhabism*. Iran, in particular, carved out a position that realists recognised as distinctive from the bipolar politics of the Cold War and they identified as a third competing ideology, Islam. Contemporary realists such as Martin van Creveld, Robert Kaplan and Samuel Huntington have built upon this latter notion of a competing ideology and adopted a global dichotomy consisting of a 'zone of peace' and a 'zone of war', lifted without apparent irony from the Islamic phrase of the same name, which consigns most of the South to a status as outside Western civilisation (and therefore in opposition to it).[9]

Realists' concerns with the distribution of power in the international system, manifested primarily (if not exclusively) in material terms, have led them in recent years to recognise the rise of a new set of developing states. Coined 'emerging powers', China, India and Brazil are seen to be a challenge to the established powers in the (post) industrialised North and have inspired a debate around the possible modalities and implications of such a fundamental shift in the centres of power and whether it can occur without resort to conflict.[10] In fact, the emerging powers pose many of the same dilemmas for realists as Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) presented for structuralists in the 1980s in that they expose the weaknesses of a theoretical approach unable to explain significant changes in the prevailing international system.

Neo-realists/neoliberal institutionalists

The neoliberal institutionalists see the international system as anarchical but nonetheless providing opportunities for cooperation as manifested in the development of norms, regimes and international organisations (albeit motivated by somewhat different sets of concerns). Neo-realists see cooperation in relative terms, growing out of the perception of short-term gains to be made by cooperating while neoliberal institutionalist emphasis is on the absolute gains achieved through cooperation.[11]

Like the structuralists, while scholars in this tradition are predisposed to take international institutions and accompanying cooperation seriously, strikingly little attention has been given over to understanding

the context or concerns of the South. An important exception however is the work of Stephen Krasner who developed a neo-realist interpretation of the Third World's international behaviour during the Cold War. According to him

> Third World states, like all states in the international system, are concerned about vulnerability and threat [...]. Third World states want power and control as much as wealth. One strategy to achieve this objective is to change the rules of the game in various international issue areas.[12]

Given their domestic and international vulnerability, states in the South invest primarily in international regimes and institutions to ameliorate their structural weaknesses. They seek to alter the norms of international institutions from within, as exemplified by the proactive role of key developing states in trade negotiations in the GATT/WTO, or to create new ones, as in the case of the G77, NAM and OIC – and more recently the India, Brazil and South Africa partnership (IBSA). According to the neo-realist viewpoint, South–South organisations such as these create congruence of interests and amplify the negotiating power of otherwise weak and ineffective states.[13]

Neo-realism/neoliberal institutionalism's emphasis on rational sources of cooperation presupposes the Weberian archetype of a bureaucratic administrative structure that is autonomous from society – certainly not prevalent in some states of the South, being subject to the vagaries of clientalism and personal rule, and arguably not always in the North either – as well as an anarchical system that shapes the decision maker's choices. This lack of domestic differentiation in the neo-realist/neoliberal paradigms leads to an oversimplification of the varied range of motivations, interests, as well as sources of political legitimacy and purposive behaviour of states in the South. The diversity among states of the South, from impoverished Malawi to high tech visionary Malaysia, challenges the neo-realist/neoliberal idea of unitary equivalency in the conception of statehood as well as the implicit belief that functionally all states behave in a similar manner.

The notion of hegemony, which informs neo-realism, has direct applicability to the South in that it provides a description and rationale for forms of state behaviour at the international and regional level.[14] India, Brazil and South Africa have variously been characterised as regional hegemons, that is to say through their preponderance of hard and soft power they have been able to exert determining influence over states in

their near abroad and, through regional organisations, they have been able to develop stable sub-systems. More than any other person Raul Prebisch, the intellectual force behind the G77 initiative that gave birth to UNCTAD, symbolises the hope that is central to the neoliberal institutionalists' reformist approach towards the international order which anticipates equitable change through recourse to norms, international law and the UN system.

Critical theorists

Robert Cox and the neo-Gramscians have offered a fresh approach to international institutions which, while building upon some of the insights derived from neo-realism, situates these in the context of structuralist concerns regarding broader global inequities. In particular, Cox sees international institutions as

> [A] means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions take on their own life; they can become a battleground of opposing tendencies, or rival institutions may reflect different tendencies. Institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities. There is a close connection between institutionalisation and what Gramsci called hegemony. Institutions provide ways of dealing with conflicts so as to minimize the use of force.[15]

This critical theory approach, while not explicitly embracing the South–North debate, through its focus on hegemony and the role of international institutions in that process has generated a substantive critique of the existing international system that situates the South in a dependent position vis-à-vis the North in a manner that echoes Wallerstein's and the *Dependencia School*'s centre–semi-periphery–periphery triptych.[16] Cox's own emphasis on ideology and hegemony are especially interesting when examining the apparently contradictory role of state elites in some sectors of the South who actively promote the 'neo-liberal agenda' of the North both within their own economies and more broadly across the globe. Drawing on aspects of critical theory and neoliberal institutionalism, Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner's analysis of Southern institutions adopts a form of 'critical institutionalism' which holds

that developing countries continue to utilise international institutions as preferred instruments of foreign policy because they view them as 'practical and least costly' as well as continuing sources of 'tangible gains and global influence'.[17]

In a similar critical vein, post-colonial approaches to international relations point to the inadequacy of Western IR theory to understand the particular struggles and experiences of the South. According to this school of thought, traditional accounts of international politics are in fact misrepresentations that derive from an ethnocentric, and therefore distorted, analysis of the role of Western powers in world politics. Post-colonial scholars from across the South question the validity of widely accepted Western analytical categories and propose new ones based on their own experiences with the hegemonic core. Edward Said's influential book, *Orientalism*, contends that most Western studies of Islamic civilization were in fact tools of political domination rather than an objective account of the prevailing social reality in these regions.

Constructivism as an analytical framework for the South and world politics

This book shares the constructivist assertion that international institutions – in our case the constitutive institutions of the South – promote certain norms, values and interests as essential guides for international action. In line with critical and post-colonial authors in IR, we also acknowledge the highly politicised and conflictual nature of Western and non-Western normative understandings of North-South relations. This position shapes the present analysis of the South in world politics. Broadly, we focus on the constitutive role played by South institutions and their norms in influencing the foreign policy of post-colonial states by providing them with 'road maps' for international behaviour. In line with the focus of English School thinking, we also assess the place of the South as an alternative interpretation of order in the bipolar structure of the Cold War system as well as source of normative change in the context of twenty-first international society.

As noted above, for (neo-) realists and neoliberals, states are rational actors operating under conditions of 'international anarchy'. Constructivist writers and their older relatives in the 'English School' share a critique of the realist idea of 'anarchy' as a given condition

of the relations between states. For both perspectives, the anarchical system is a 'social construct' created by states rather than something imposed upon them.[20] Theorists from both traditions remind us about the need to consider the socialisation processes by which states define themselves and their normative contexts. They also stress the governing role of socially created norms, constraining the actions and shaping the interests of states.

By and large, constructivist authors are concerned with what neo-realists and neoliberals have recurrently ignored: the social construction of world politics. This particular mode of analysis seeks to understand how certain ideas, interests and norms are created and the social/political function they perform. According to this perspective, the 'North–South dichotomy' has historically functioned within a discourse that has given meaning to unequal power relations among states. In this sense, the production and perpetuation of 'South' and 'North' as stable identities in world politics was the result of mutually constituted understandings of states' national interests and material circumstances.

The mutual constitution of agents and structures is a core assumption of the constructivist scholarship. Contrary to the permanent structural features of the interstate system that neo-realist theories claim to explain, constructivist scholars express the contingent nature of international structures, which act as a constraint of state action and are also being continually (re)created by it.[21] From a constructivist standpoint, an important question concerns what sort of South–North identities – if any – would make sense in a post–Cold War era in which security, political and economic relations have changed quite significantly. Campbell, for example, proposes a more refined understanding of the borderlines between South and North which goes beyond the binary logic of two clearly defined antagonistic poles. According to him

> It makes little sense to speak of politics occurring in terms of a distinct 'inside' or 'outside' when, for example, U.S. economic policies encourage 'Third World processing zones' in Los Angeles, where manufacturers stamp their auto parts 'made in Brazil' and the clothing goods 'made in Taiwan' to attract lower tariffs; […] and when the poverty and poor health care in Harlem make the area a 'zone of excess mortality' with a death rate for black males higher than that for their peers in Bangladesh.[22]

Despite the increasing spatial indeterminacy of South–North identities, leading states in the developing world have recurrently reinstated their

South credentials as a way to understand themselves and their roles in the post–Cold War international system. Traditional leaders of the South, such as Egypt and India, have been eager to (re)define a new 'South' identity for states facing similar foreign policy challenges in a complex and more diffuse international order. Constructivism provides a lens through which we can understand these processes of identity formation and their impact on the structure and conduct of international politics.

In this book, we frame our understanding of the South through the lenses of a particular branch of constructivist scholarship. This sub-area of constructivism is exclusively concerned with the processes by which international norms emerge and spread throughout the international system. This school is divided into two inter-related perspectives.[23] The first research agenda looks primarily at the system level.[24] It focuses on how international norms are socially created and the means of their propagation in the international system. This perspective is also interested in the actors who embrace and promote these norms. They focus on the role of transnational social movements, multilateral institutions and states as *teachers* of norms.[25] The second group stresses the process by which international norms penetrate the domestic structure of states.[26] This perspective confines the analysis to how the particular political, societal and cultural characteristics of states produce distinct outcomes in terms of the domestic absorption of international norms. They describe the levels of convergence between international and domestic understandings of a given issue and how bureaucracies, legal systems and shared principled beliefs serve as filters for international norms.[27]

This strand of constructivism also highlights interesting connections with the English School.[28] The core focus of the English School approach to international relations is on the notion of an *international society of states*. The term conveys the idea that inter-state relations are governed by *normative patterns*, which are embodied in traditional practices of international law and diplomacy.[29] The uniqueness of this approach is the idea that states can learn to control their aggressive nature by agreeing on some universal principles (or norms), which would give a sense of society to an otherwise anarchical system.[30]

Although the focus of the English School was primarily centred on the creation and expansion of the society of Western European states, the concept of an 'international society' provides a satisfactory meaning for understanding other large normative ideas and institutions in international relations such as the 'South'. After World War II, the colonial

powers started, in part through the UN Charter, to grant membership in the *society of sovereign states* to a growing number of former colonies in Asia and Africa. Nationalists in these countries skillfully used normative ideas of the post-War international society, such as self-determination and democracy, to claim independence from colonialism.[31] They institutionalised inter-group cooperation through formation of a bloc of post-colonial states as a way to press further for changes in the governing rules of the international society. Although the ideology of anti-colonialism, underlying the creation of a society of Southern states, is at its heart a product of Western political thought, it is also the legitimising element of a distinctive normative model. The differences between these two broad *world views* (or 'international societies') and the disputes that followed in the economic and political dimensions of inter-state relations became known as the North–South divide.

In the following analysis, we lay out the development and trajectory of the South identity and norms as they emerge and spread through, initially, the action of a number of governments both inside and outside the UN and, then, by looking at South organisations and their strategies to (re)construct the main principles underlying the foreign policies of post-colonial states. As shown later, the Asian-African Bandung Conference of 1955 represented the first significant move towards the creation of a common South position within the rigid Cold War structure. Fifty years later, the reassertion of the 'Bandung Spirit' by developing nations is evidence of the normative resilience of the 'South' in response to and in spite of new challenges to international order posed by increasing tendencies towards inter-state political fragmentation, growing economic protectionism and strategic competition, cutting across the North–South divide.

The South in the era of globalisation

Among the many paradoxes emerging from a study of the South in world politics is that at first glance it appears to conform to a stereotypical portrayal as a state-centric bastion of the most restrictive forms of sovereignty. Indeed, the dilemmas of nation building imposed a bias towards order and stability in many newly independent countries that came, in time, to overshadow prior commitments to justice and equality. And yet, while arguably true in general terms during the Cold War period, this view does not account for the recognised scope of dissent within some of the countries in the South and that, like Northern countries in the waning years of the twentieth century, have allowed

the gradual acceptance of new ideas which have produced a 'softening' of sovereignty.

In this respect, the changing norms of state sovereignty in the post–Cold War era reveal an inescapable moral dilemma for the South. The spectacle of Southern states adopting a position critical, for example, of Western intervention in the Middle East and the destruction that has ensued, can too easily descend into a form of contesting acts of hypocrisy when one examines the conduct of individual Southern states within that region or elsewhere. Moreover, any discussion of morality which sidesteps the persistent use of the doctrine of 'non-interference' in South institutions as a shield for appalling regime conduct against its domestic opponents would be remiss. Unreflective support by Southern governments for tyrannical rule by a fellow state is surely a misuse of the solidarity impulse and remains one of the great stains on the Southern record. The reluctance of South–South groupings, such as NAM, the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to decisively condemn Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe is a clear example of how the imperative of 'non-interference' has been successfully used by some authoritarian leaders as a *carte blanche* to perpetrate humanitarian atrocities. And yet, at the same time, the record of the South on the most incendiary issues of our day – prevention of gross human rights violations including genocide – is not as bad as critics might lead us to believe. While Western governments were content to allow events to unfold in Southeast Asia, the armed intervention of Vietnam into Kampuchea (as Cambodia was then known) brought an abrupt end to Pol Pot's reign of terror. And, what else was the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda than a deliberate and successful effort to engage in regime change against Idi Amin's murderous rule? That these actions may have conflated morality and the interests of neighbouring states in maintaining regional stability with the decision to break with non-interference merely puts them in a category that would include, among others, the European Union when faced with the Balkan crisis. Moreover, it is worth underscoring that Southern regional organisations themselves exhibit differing positions on issues like gross human rights violations. Witness for instance the African Union's (though to date largely ineffectual) authorisation of a peacekeeping operation in Darfur and accompanying criticism of Khartoum against the actions of the Arab League, which has provided diplomatic succour to the Sudanese government throughout the crisis.

While the literature on globalisation tends to portray the South as a passive object of rampant market forces, the reality is that the leading

developing states within the South have used trade liberalisation and the opening of markets to their advantage, assuming a greater role in the world economy and, increasingly, in shaping the specific form that globalisation takes. The discourse of fear espoused by many (post) industrialised countries in the North that Southern economic dynamism is displacing them is surely testimony to this powerful phenomenon. The historical record of non-governmental organisations as sources of dissent – while muted if not stifled outright by some Southern governments – is carried on by trade unions, farmers' cooperatives, social movements, campaigners for indigenous rights and others in the South. For Southern civil society, meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century include retaining their own distinctive voice on social issues that reflect local concerns while recognising the opportunities presented through collaboration with like-minded Northern NGOs.

State actors

The nature of globalisation has imposed (or perhaps exposed) problems for the South that redound back especially upon states. As Robert Jackson and others have pointed out, the post-colonial state is notoriously bereft of the basic building blocks of sovereignty as understood in the classic Westphalian sense.[32] Founded in terms of the logic of nineteenth century European politics, many of the newly independent states of the South, were brought into being not through the nation-forming process of revolution ('blood and iron') but rather through elite negotiation with an increasingly enervated colonial power. But legitimacy gained in this manner did not always translate into domestically recognised, effective authority. Benedict Anderson's famous treatise on the 'imagined communities' of Southeast Asia elites and peoples captures the degree of contingency that was part and parcel of constructing post-colonial nationalism.[33]

The variety of post-colonial states experiencing the effects of disintegrating sovereignty – alternatively characterised by Westerner scholars as 'shadow'[34] or 'kleptocratic'[35] on one end of the spectrum and 'collapsed' or 'failed'[36] on the other end – are a testimonial to weakness of the Westphalian system as experienced in many states of the South. The emergence of non-state actors, coupled to the transnational effects of globalisation, have broadened the landscape of international politics in the developing world and, in some instances, have effectively served as a 'counter-weight' to state interests. So while the state as a primary unit of analysis remains at the centre of any study of the South, it is increasingly important to recognise the role of non-state actors as well.

Inter-governmental organisations

The UN system, of course, occupies the central position in world politics for developing countries. It is a forum for identification, interest articulation and debate between member states on global issues, the extension of international 'reach' through norm formation over these particular issues and finally the employment of methodologies of implementation. For many South states, strapped for finance, the UN in New York is the only setting where they will come into contact with all the constituent statutory states, inter-governmental and non-governmental members of the international community. More particular to the South, the G77, NAM and other entities associated with developing countries interests have used these circumstances to leverage their fewer resources towards conducting diplomacy on a global scale through the UN system and its component specialised agencies.

South organisations, such as NAM and the G77, supplied states with a collective identity which defined particular social roles, rules and obligations in the international system. The formative principles of the South became institutionalised within these international organisations serving as frameworks – or, according to Goldstein and Keohane, 'road maps' – for political action.[37] States that joined Southern groupings were taught the norms of South–South solidarity and were compelled to promote them as an integrative part of their foreign policies. For example, Southern states joining the NAM after 1961, the year of the first Summit meeting, found that the grouping had already developed its own perspective on fundamental issues partly based on a collective interpretation of the UN Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration. This included the abolition of colonialism, the condemnation of apartheid and racial discrimination, respect for the rights of ethnic or religious minorities, the right to self-determination and the fact that there should be no deprivation of a people's means of subsistence. The need for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine was also asserted. In this respect, the socialising role of these organisations lends support to the constructivist argument outlined above that emphasises the importance of international social action in shaping states' identities and interests.

At times, however, the social roles ascribed by international organisations can conflict with the national interest and purposive action of states. For instance, Brazil's reluctance to fully join NAM – it has never been a formal member – was the result of the Brazilian government's realisation that the shared 'Non-Aligned' identity could restrain Brazil's

political autonomy while pursuing its long-standing goal of being recognised by the West, especially by the US, as a key country and a bridge between the North–South/East–West divides.

Reflecting the enormous diversity and aspirations of states of the South, a plethora of regional and sub-regional organisations, from the Gulf Co-operation Council to Mercosur in South America, have emerged to promote the interests of their members. These regional sub-systems, often governed by norms privileging the concerns of elites and the maintenance of state sovereignty, have developed across the South in response to the security and economic challenges facing Southern states. In Southeast Asia, for example, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has developed an economic and political community that has (for the most part) effectively stabilised a volatile region through its active defence of sovereignty and non-interference. In Southern Africa, the relatively informal diplomatic coalition of leaders of the Front Line States which championed the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid cause, evolved into the formalised security component of the SADC and itself became a source of contention between member states. In each case, regional dynamics intersect with domestic factors and inform the response of Southern states to phenomenon on the wider global stage, highlighting the multi-layered character of actors and sites of action in the contemporary international system. One such example is the pressure group, the OIC, set up in 1969, which operates at a cross-regional level through African, Arab and Asian Groups.

Non-state actors

- *Civil society*: In an era of globalisation, the emergence of a range of new social movements which claim transnational constituencies has given rise to what Mary Kaldor and others have suggested is best conceptualised as 'global civil society'.[38] The transmission of ideas, the organisational requirements of international campaigns and the cultivation of a 'South' identity that transcends national boundaries are themselves greatly facilitated by technological innovations such as the Internet. The annual World Social Forum at Porto Alegre, launched in 1992 as a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum at Davos, represents a concrete expression of this phenomenon.[39] It is arguably as significant to the development of the notion of a distinctively 'South' vision of global civil society as the Bandung conference was to the formation of the NAM.
- *Epistemic communities*: More than ever, the technological innovations of the late twentieth century have opened up new opportunities for

specialists to play a key role in shaping policy debates. The role of specialists, and in particular policy-oriented research communities that transcend the structural impediments of access to political decision makers, have acted to exert considerable influence over how states perceive and define their interests and options.[40] In the case of the South, the growth of research policy centres with a Southern focus such as Third World Network and the South Centre have both marshalled these specialists from across the developing world and, concurrently, served as a new source of collective action for the South.

- *Transnational corporations*: In this case, the focus is not on the power and 'global reach' of Western-based multinational corporations but rather the growth of transnational corporations based in Southern countries. Operating under the ideological rubric of 'South–South' cooperation, these South transnational corporations have sought to displace traditional Northern sources of foreign investment as well as gain access to developing markets by using their comparative advantage in factor costs and, in some cases, offering 'South alternatives' to residual colonial dependency. For example, the Malaysian energy company, Petronas, has considerable investments across Southeast Asia and Africa while South African telecommunications companies are playing an important role in the expansion of cellular networks in Southern, West and Central Africa, both at the cost of traditional Northern transnational corporations.
- *Criminal, liberation/separatist and terrorist networks*: The rise of criminal and terrorist networks rooted in the changing societies, economies and persistent problems of statehood in parts of the South are another (and sometimes less salubrious) feature of globalisation. From the FARC in Columbia to al-Qaeda, these non-state actors use illegal means to achieve a variety of ends from the economic profits of the drugs trade to the overthrow of recognised governments.

Methodological approach

The present work combines constructivist analytical tools with historical methods to unpack the meaning of the South in world politics. The authors believe that any attempt to understand the role of the South in the context of world politics, especially in terms of its contribution to the creation, diffusion and reform of international norms, has to put its international pressure groups (the NAM, G77 and OIC) at the core of such a study. As noted above, international institutions have been at the

epicentre of the issues of global governance – though selectively ignored by states at times – and in the form of the UN's General Assembly the sole setting at which all sovereign states in the international system formally meet. Pressure groups such as those mentioned above work on foreign policy issues be they security, trade or development and build up coalitions of interest groups in support of positions and actions agreed at NAM or other pressure group meetings. They remain aware of the positions taken by the international community with an aim towards addressing the concerns raised by these issues. Furthermore, as resource constraints on the South serve to limit the level and intensity of engagement in the diversity of organisational settings and issues, the UN system and its specialised agencies are perforce the locus of action for the developing world. At the same time, as the institutional structures of global governance have diversified, partly in response to globalisation and partly as instigators of that process, the scope of analysis has shifted to inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations based at a regional level or aspiring to a global, albeit non-state, position (such as the World Social Forum).

As a reflection of changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War, the present study identifies and analyses new models of South–South cooperation, as illustrated by the proactive role of IBSA and the G20, and also discusses the important role of old ones, such as NAM, the G77 and OIC, in the reformed international context. As shown later, this strategic reaction and reassertion of the South in world politics has been articulated by leading developing states like India, Brazil, Malaysia, China and South Africa. These states are in fact the 'norms leader' of the new South in the sense of the key role they play in the redefinition of the collective values, institutions and strategic interests of developing states in the era of globalisation. Both these states (Brazil and China are observers in the NAM – the other three are members) and other committed non-aligned states continue to help manage foreign policy issues through their long-standing system of meetings. Ultimately, rather than dismissing the importance of the South in world politics, this book aims to demonstrate systematically and coherently both the vigour of the concept as an analytical tool in international relations and its relevance as a source of identity and power for many states traditionally deprived of economic wealth and political influence.[41]

Outline of chapters

The three chapters in the first section of the book focus on the historical development of the two major Southern pressure groups on

foreign policy issues – the NAM and the Group of 77. Chapter 1 looks at Southern activities which led to the setting up of these groups in, respectively, 1961 and 1964, and the formation of Southern norms on political and economic structures of the international system. Chapter 2 discusses the way these two groups were joined by the OIC in 1969 and how they worked at the UN and elsewhere in the context of the Cold War. Chapter 3 considers their continuing roles after the end of the Cold War (1990), their importance and how they continue to relate to a number of the themes discussed in the second section.

The second section of the book takes up the themes of the contemporary South, examining the role of states, regional organisations and civil society in shaping the political agenda and the ideological outlook of the Global South. Chapter 4 looks at key emerging states of the new South and their leading position as representatives of developing states' interests vis-à-vis the North. Chapter 5 examines processes of regionalism in the South. It focuses on different models of regional integration and the challenges South states face in maintaining/creating political stability and sustainable development in their regions. Chapter 6 considers the role of transnational civil society movements as a new and powerful player of the South acting within and without multilateral groupings through global networks of Southern activists. Finally, the conclusion sums up the main themes discussed throughout the book and briefly assesses the role and relevance of the (new) South in the current context of world politics.

1
The South and the UN: 1945–64

The establishment of the United Nations (UN) out of the ashes of WWII was not meant to usher in an era of political freedom for the three-quarters of the world's population still under various forms of colonial rule. This was in spite of the fact that two anti-colonial powers, the US and the Soviet Union had the coveted permanent membership and veto in the newly formed Security Council, and there was one non-Western permanent member in the Republic of China which expressed anti-colonial sentiments as well.[1] The remaining two permanent members were the world's largest colonialist states, Britain and France, and they – along with other European colonial states – expected that questions regarding their colonial territories would fall within the domain of domestic affairs and, as such, would be protected by the sovereign prerogative of non-interference. Remaining areas of concern involving territories and peoples outside of Europe would fall under the auspices of the Trusteeship Council, an organ on par with the Economic and Social Council and one which the Permanent Five dominated. Moreover, in the course of developing the structures of the UN, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill confidently expected, along with South African leader Jan Smuts, that the British Commonwealth would serve as a bulwark of support for what they believed were benign imperial interests.[2] When UN clauses on human rights were first invoked by newly independent states like India and Indonesia to attack practices in colonial territories, the response by European states (and white settler states like South Africa) was to take refuge in the non-interference clause.[3] By the early 1950s, to sidestep criticism, French and Portuguese efforts had shifted to formally incorporating colonies as 'overseas provinces', extend greater economic benefits to the population as well as political representation while other colonialists like Holland and even Britain began to contemplate

dissolution. This came against the background of growing dissent within Europe's colonial possessions including extended armed rebellions in Kenya, Malaysia and Algeria, which inspired a debate among European elites as to the costs of maintenance of empire.

In the case of the superpowers, the politics of the Cold War increasingly determined their outlook on political change in Africa, Asia, Middle East and Latin America. Though Franklin Roosevelt's promotion of the 'four freedoms' in the Atlantic Charter (1942) in many ways laid the foundation for Western decolonisation, US foreign policy vacillated between diplomatic or limited support for liberation movements – for instance, an unwillingness to provide military assistance to French forces bent on re-conquering Indochina in the late 1940s and 1950s but under Kennedy covert support for an Angolan liberation movement – to outright hostility in cases when the contours of emergent nationalism and leftist ideologies became increasingly apparent. For the Soviet Union, an ardent voice of support for abolition of colonialism (if not always a substantively supportive one), the problems of ensuring that friendly regimes were put into power at times came into conflict with its national foreign policy interests as well as its control over restive minorities within its own territory. From 1956 onwards, the split with the People's Republic of China provided a ready opponent in developing countries as Moscow sought to maintain global leadership among 'progressive forces'. At the same time, the role of newly independent India in working with Chiang Kai-shek's representative on the Security Council to influence American approaches towards colonial questions is often forgotten though after 1950 it too was to get caught up in the competing Chinese claims to official representation and ultimately the Sino-Indian border war.

Ironically, it was the right to self-determination of nations, a founding principle of the defunct League of Nations and one carried over to the UN Charter, which along with human rights clauses such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provided the normative basis for decolonisation. Efforts to use the Trusteeship Council to further dominance over colonial territories, which was responsible for overseeing the League-of-Nation-mandated territories with an aim towards fulfiling conditions for self-government and eventual independence, patently failed. In particular, the decision by the Dutch government to govern the territory of Western New Guinea under a separate mandate under the UN Trusteeship Council (invoking Article 73) from the rest of its former Indonesian possessions, which had achieved independence from Holland in 1949, demonstrated this institution's constraints.

The Indonesian leader Sukarno launched a fierce diplomatic campaign and insurgency action against this decision which intensified after the territory declared independence in 1961. Ultimately following a brief UN mandate over the territory organised through the UN Security Council, Western Guinea was transferred to Indonesian control a year later. An equivalent resistance to Belgian-inspired separatism of the Congolese province of Katanga in 1960 brought about joint US–Soviet authorisation of a UN peacekeeping operation, cooperation that was to dissolve into ideological strife within months. Behind the changing approach to colonialism within the UN was the influx of 14 newly independent African states in 1960 which tipped the balance within the General Assembly in favour of developing countries. This new political dynamic was reflected in the passage of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GAR 1514) in December that same year which effectively settled the debate on the UN's position on colonialism, if not all its particular manifestations around the world.

In the arena of development promotion, the initiative rested primarily with the Latin American states with their long history of political independence and engagement with these concerns. Led by Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, the emerging consensus within the South as to the best path to development, influenced in part by the successes of command economies in achieving rapid industrialisation, was through the application of import-substitution industrialisation strategies in conjunction with a negotiated restructuring of the global economic system within the UN framework. Rooted firmly within UN declarations on development, this Southern norm on development placed the emphasis on state-led growth and the redistribution of global wealth through a host of measures including restructuring of the terms of trade and a commodity price support mechanism. The bolstering of the UN Development Programme and the creation of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) by a conclave of 77 developing countries were concrete steps taken by the newly expanded General Assembly in 1964.

This chapter discusses the development of the 'South' and its institutions up to the point of the formation of major wide-ranging Southern political movements, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 (G77).[4] The efforts of developing country groups to enhance cooperation within the UN, supported by the manifest political will demonstrated through collective efforts like the Bandung conference, set the stage for the creation of the key Southern institutions and the

accompanying issues, including the development of appropriate norms that constituted the core of Southern interests.

1.1 Formation of the UN and the role of regional and other groups from the South

Developing countries, faced with the enormous challenges of delivering economic prosperity and retaining political legitimacy in the aftermath of colonialism, found it essential to promote their interests at regional, global and other cross-regional levels by forming groups dealing with foreign policy issues which could work both within and without the UN system. This political necessity was strengthened by the fact that states understood that they had more political leverage if they could ensure a fair share of electoral posts in part in terms of equitable, geographical distribution as laid down in the UN Charter. Most states were well aware that legitimacy could be given to a host of foreign policy causes through discussion and action within the UN system, and they were concerned, in particular, about developing standards of international law.

The role of leadership proved to be crucial in formulating the institutions and outlooks of the South, with Yugoslavia, India and Egypt playing a seminal role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement and Latin American states in the creation of the G77. At the same time, it was through the mobilisation of collective action that Southern interests were crafted and introduced as specific policies. Within the UN, regional and ethnic associations were the touchstone for cooperation, with the most effective Southern group being the Arab Group spurred on by the problem of Palestine. It was responsible for trying to increase the impact and membership of Southern countries as a group on the UN in the 1940s, the setting up of the important Arab-Asian Group in December 1950.[5] Latin American countries were involved in some formative aspects of economic development issues, especially in the creation of the G77 and UNCTAD, but the region's role overall was muted. With limited representation in the UN until 1960, African influence was primarily felt after 1960.

Outside the UN system, an array of conferences and summits between Southern leaders paved the way for a common assessment of international events and their interests. Particularly influential for the South during this formative period were the Arab League (set up in 1945) and the Organization of American States (set up in 1948). Within the UN the most effective Southern group originally was the Arab Group spurred on by the problem of Palestine. It was responsible for increasing the impact

of Southern countries as a group on the UN in the 1940s, the setting up of the important Arab-Asian Group in December 1950. Latin American countries were involved in some formative aspects of economic development issues, especially in the creation of the G77 and UNCTAD, but the region's role overall was subdued. There were few African states at the UN in the 1940s and the UN African group was not set up till 1958. African influence, seconded by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed in 1963, was felt principally through its voting in the period immediately before the creation of the Non Aligned Movement and G77. Finally Yugoslavia, India and Egypt – as founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement – played a seminal role in shaping the institutions and outlooks of the South in this period.

Out of this complex process of asserting national concerns and playing off regional dynamics, the notion of a South identity – characterised as 'third world' or 'developing country' at the time – began to take shape. Cast in political terms as a commitment to non-alignment, anti-colonialism and an imperative to enhance development prospects for their economies, these became the formative norms of Southern activism in world politics. The instrumental use of international institutions to further these aims reflected the recognition that liberal internationalism provided a promising foundation for expanding their influence over global events. Moreover, the simple expediency of proximity of all states in the UN, coupled to the growing numerical power of developing countries within the General Assembly, meant that international institutions were crucial platforms for introducing new ideas and ensuring their codification through international law.

The interaction between regionally based interstate groupings was a crucial element in the creation of a distinctive common identity and shared norms among Southern states within the UN. In this regard, the Latin Americans paved the way for setting up groupings at the UN at the meetings of the UN Preparatory Commission held in London between August and December 1945, by showing how grouping together and allying with other groups paid dividends. The development of this first distinct group of UN actors was initiated by the Colombian delegate to San Francisco, Eduardo Angel, who subsequently became Colombia's representative to the UN Preparatory Commission. In his unpublished memoirs[6] he states how he drew one important conclusion after talking to one of the main British negotiators on his arrival: 'If we Latin Americans, as happened in the League of Nations, are splintered into a myriad of viewpoints, we will receive nothing other than the crumbs other nations choose to give us. If, on the other

hand we work together with solidarity, we can obtain for each of the 20 delegations an honored position on the Preparatory Commission and at the General Assembly.' He went on to discuss these ideas with his incoming Latin American colleagues and gave them a feasible plan 'provided we worked as a team'. This gave the group 20 votes which were supplemented by six[7] from King Faisal, 'who dominated the Pan-Arab Movement' and 'realized the convenience of uniting with the Latin American countries…. Thus we were in control of 26 votes – a majority of the 51 member countries.'

Angel became both President of the Preparatory Commission and subsequently the first President of the General Assembly. As he states dryly, '[n]aturally the great powers were not overly pleased that their delegates had to follow the Colombian delegate around like lap dogs in their quest for votes – since it was he who presided over the meetings of the Latin American group.' He then describes how he allied with Andre Gromyko, the representative of the Soviet Union, to try to ensure that five Latin American judges were elected to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and not two as the US wished. Four were subsequently elected[8] in February 1946: one lost on a Security Council technicality. In spite of these clear successes produced by collaborating across regions of the South, the first 20 Latin American members of the UN remained divided as to whether they were part of the South or the West. This ambivalence over identity, still a feature of some contemporary debates in the region, effectively placed the initiative for shaping the institutions and interests of the South initially in Asian and African hands.

1.1.1 The original electoral and political groupings

The earliest emergence of electoral and political groups within the General Assembly revolved around decisions as to who should be the President of the General Assembly, who should be the seven Vice-Presidents and who should be the Chairmen of the six main committees. These together were to compose the important General Committee which controls the General Assembly agenda and therefore had to have a representative character. The General Assembly elected seven Vice-Presidents at its third plenary meeting. They were all five permanent members plus South Africa and Venezuela. The Chairmen of the original six main committees also elected inter alia on the basis of equitable geographical distribution comprised the Commonwealth (1), Eastern Europe (2), Latin America (2) and Middle East (1). Western Europe was represented by the President of the General Assembly, M. Spaak. A similar 'gentleman's agreement was made over the distribution of non-permanent seats in the Security

Council. The final decision was that the non-permanent seats of the 11-seat Council should be distributed according to the following pattern: Commonwealth 1, Eastern Europe 1, Latin America 2, Middle East 1 and Western Europe.[9] The non-permanent members were complemented by the five permanent members: the US, the Soviet Union, China (then represented by the Kuomintang), France and the UK.

1.1.2 Outside the UN system

The UN was also affected by the creation of political groupings outside its system including the aforementioned Arab League and the Organization of American States. In 1946 India took the lead at the instigation of Egypt to call for an all-Asian conference to promote their interests at the UN. The conference held in March/April 1947 was aimed at promoting good relations with neighbouring countries; pooling ideas and experience on raising living standards and strengthening cultural, social and economic ties among Asian peoples. A number of groups were also set up to discuss problems including race, migration, culture and the status of women as well as the creation of an Asian Relations Organisation. This latter organisation continued in existence until 1955 though it had effectively stopped functioning by 1952.

Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of newly independent India, acting at the behest of the British, approached a number of Asian countries to come to a conference in New Delhi in January 1949 to try and find a solution to the problem of colonial Indonesia after the second Dutch police action there. The attempt by the Dutch, with the initial backing of the British military, to regain control over the Japanese-occupied territories of Indonesia, had proved more than the enervated colonial power could manage and officials in London were looking for a resolution. The conference produced three resolutions on the question, one of which inter alia called for the transfer of power by 1 January 1950. These were officially submitted to the Security Council and influenced the next Security Council resolution on Indonesia passed the same month. Sub-Saharan Africa at that time did not come into the picture as it was only represented in the UN by Ethiopia and Liberia, apart from the special case of South Africa (at that time a Commonwealth member). The growing strength of the Soviet Union was mainly reflected in the Eastern European group[10] at the UN though it had to deal with the defection of Yugoslavia in 1948. Western Europe remained more divided despite the fact that the Western parties to the regional Brussels Treaty (1948), which had reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the other ideals proclaimed in the UN Charter, agreed in London in May

1949, to establish the Council of Europe. At the UN, the UK worked in the Commonwealth Group while Western continental European states were involved in the Western European Group.

While groups of like-minded states reflecting regional concerns were being formed, the onset of the Cold War was beginning to produce a burgeoning network of security alliances that locked in states on either the side of the US or on the side of the Soviet Union. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 by the US, Canada and Western Europe, followed immediately by the formation of the Warsaw Pact between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, set in motion bipolar competition to win allies and support among the new states emerging from the yoke of colonialism. The American policy of containment sought to replicate NATO's security structures through a web of similar regional defence arrangements in the Middle East (CENTO) and Southeast Asia (SEATO) surrounding the Soviet Union and its allies. Concurrently, Moscow attempted to woo newly independent states through diplomacy and, increasingly, military and economic assistance programmes. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's declaration of support for revolutionary movements in the Third World at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, though aimed in part at an increasingly assertive international role by Mao's China, was an attempt to draw nascent political movements and independent states into the Soviet orbit. US efforts to counter these measures included a stepping up of development assistance through the promulgation of PL480 and active military and police support programmes for what were deemed to be friendly (and threatened) regimes.

As the pressures of this emerging bipolar order began to be felt around the world, India played an important role in thinking about the problems of foreign policy which faced new decolonised states as they became independent in the 1940s and 1950s. The Indian government's two main concerns were how to exercise influence and advance their own interests and how to maintain their security. As early as 1946, Nehru stated that India 'would keep away from power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale'.[11] Many new states sought to assert their own identity and to contribute to regional problem-solving by linking up with others on a regional and/or cultural basis. But though the Arab League and the Organization of American States were set up in this period, the complexities of the Asian region, particularly its proximity to both the Soviet Union and China, were such as to make the formation of a similar bloc of Asian

states extremely difficult. The desire in a post-colonial era for communication among regional states was also fostered by common membership of institutions such as the UN, its specialised agencies and regional economic commissions, and the Commonwealth.

Nevertheless regional ties continued to be developed at a time when decisions over whether to align with major powers were becoming acute. Nehru attended a conference in Colombo in April 1954 with representatives from Burma, Ceylon (the host country, now called Sri Lanka), Indonesia and Pakistan at a time when the French were being besieged at Dien Bien Phu in a last ditch defence of its colonial possessions in Indochina; the US were pressing for a collective defence system in Southeast Asia and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was running the Geneva Conference on the Indochina issue. Eden had hoped that these powers would be prepared to participate in a military guarantee of Indochina's future; however, they were not able to agree.

At the Colombo conference, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan took a more robust view on the threat posed by communism than India and Indonesia. Ultimately they agreed on a formula which spoke of safeguarding themselves against interference or intervention in their internal affairs or institutions by 'any agency whatsoever, Communist, Anti-Communist or otherwise'.[12] This wish to stand apart from both the Western and Eastern blocs, though not necessarily to keep the same distance from each one is one of the salient features of non-alignment and was a dominant theme of the 1950s. The participants also agreed to an Indian proposal calling for, inter alia, an end to testing and the development of the hydrogen bomb and other weapons of mass destruction, and to an Indonesian proposal to hold an Afro-Asian conference in the near future. These growing interactions between the leaderships of newly independent states in Asia and the Middle East ultimately contributed to the formation of a seminal South grouping, the Arab-Asian group (see below).

1.2 Formative issues in the UN for the South

The coalescing of active political groupings drawn from Southern states within the UN system came about in response both to perceptions of shared interests and concerns around specific issues and crises. In many respects these issues were to exert a formative influence on the political character of the South, providing it with a concrete agenda that framed these shared interests and became areas of growing collaboration for developing countries. Their ability to shape the debate within the UN

system, particularly, as regards legal issues, if not always the outcome of the organisation's actions, played an important role in strengthening developing countries' resolve that the UN could serve as a site for collaboration on areas of mutual concern.

1.2.1 The issue of Palestine

The interplay between the changing groups and disagreements within groups can be seen in certain important votes of the period. The votes on Palestine (always seen by Southern countries as a major colonial issue) showed the First (the West) and Second World (the Soviet Union's bloc) combining against the Arab-Asian Group (the South or Third World). Iraq and Saudi Arabia thus failed in their attempt to inscribe an additional item on the agenda of the April/May 1947 General Assembly special session on Palestine calling for '[t]he termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence.' The Arab League's Pact noted that 'considering the special circumstances of Palestine, and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of the[13] selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work'.

At the end of November 1947 three resolutions were rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee which had been set up by the General Assembly to consider proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem. The first raised the question of the competence of the UN to recommend any solution contrary to the UN Charter and against the wishes of the majority of the people of Palestine and suggested that an ICJ advisory opinion be sought on a number of questions including 'whether the indigenous population of Palestine has not an inherent right to Palestine and to determine its future constitution and government'. The second called for international cooperation over the resettlement of Jewish refugees in their countries of origin and the third called for the establishment of an independent, unified Palestine.

Israeli claims to part of Palestine were immeasurably strengthened by the subsequent General Assembly partition resolution of November 1947 (GAR 181(II)) which recommended the division of Palestine into two states with Jerusalem as a trusteeship, a corpus separatum,[14] by 33 (the necessary two-thirds majority) to 13 votes against ten abstentions. India (with its large Muslim population) and Pakistan (both Asian Commonwealth states) joined the six Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen), and the other Islamic states (Afghanistan, Iran) and Turkey[15] in voting against the resolution (the others were Cuba and Greece). They saw this as a straightforward

colonial issue.[16] The resolution, in effect, gave 55 per cent of the land to a Jewish State and 45 per cent to an Arab state: Jerusalem was to become a trusteeship.

One of the main surprises was the Russian support for Zionism which was overall probably due to 'the overriding Russian aim' of the disruption of the British Empire. 'Without the endorsement of the eastern bloc (Byelorussia (now Belarus), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union, Ukraine – but not Yugoslavia which abstained) the United Nations could not have voted in favour of the creation of a Jewish state.'[17] Huge pressures were put on other states. The Commonwealth split: the mainly 'white' Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and also South Africa) voted for the establishment of a Jewish state; the UK as the previous Mandate holder abstained while two other Commonwealth countries, India and Pakistan, voted against. The split vote among Commonwealth countries was one of the first indications of the future demise of the Commonwealth Group as a UN collective actor.

Meanwhile the bulk of Western European states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden but not Greece) voted for the establishment of Israel with the recent European experience of the Holocaust clearly exercising influence in their position. The Latin Americans, some of whom were concerned about colonialism, were the most split – Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela voted for; Cuba voted against; and Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico abstained. China (represented by the Kuomintang) abstained, as did Ethiopia, while Liberia with its strong American connections voted for, as did the US. Siam (now Thailand) was diplomatically absent. This vote gave legitimacy to the Israeli claim to statehood and was used as one of the two bases for its declaration of independence in May 1948.

1.2.2 Racial discrimination, 1946; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

Not surprisingly South African racial policies were raised in the UN as early as 1946 when India complained of discriminatory treatment of South African residents of Indian origin. GAR 44(1) recommended that South Africa treat Indians in conformity with international agreements and the UN Charter. South Africa countered by maintaining that its policies were part of the domestic jurisdiction of a state (Article 2.7 of the UN Charter). Racial segregation and discrimination was subsequently deplored as 'a gross violation of human rights' and 'a denial of the

fundamental value of civilisation and the dignity of man' at the seminal Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955 which led to the setting up of the UN African group in 1958 and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (see below).

It was the considerable concern over lingering ambiguities surrounding the status of human rights within the UN Charter that brought together a coalition of non-governmental groups, scholars and political actors to produce a more sharply focused document. Jacob Blaustein, Rene Cassin and WEB Du Bois, working with the UN's Human Rights Commission chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, all contributed to the development and passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which enshrines the rights of individuals over that of states.[18] The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted on 10 December 1948 by 48–0–8 to be followed the next day by the UN resolution on the Palestinian right of return (GAR 194(III)). This contained Article 13(2) which stated that '[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.' The eight votes of abstention to the Human Rights Declaration were those of six Eastern Europeans including the Soviet Union,[19] South Africa and Saudi Arabia. The rest of the 15 other Southern countries, who shared concerns about human rights and in particular the right of self-determination, then in the UN voted for the resolution.

1.2.3 Indonesia, Korea and the Yugoslav connection, 1948–51

A significant development in the late 1940s was the forming of a partnership between Yugoslavia and India, both of whom were to join Egypt as non-permanent members on the Security Council in 1950. Yugoslavia, struggling to find security in the aftermath of its break with the Soviet Union, sought to ally with non-communist countries with which it could relate politically and economically, both to gain influence and a new role in world affairs, and for support against future threats to its existence and stability. It was in the context of the UN Security Council, where these three founders of the Non-Aligned Movement were confronted by polarising tendencies of the Cold War, which ultimately helped shape the development of their approach to world politics.

In June 1950, Communist North Korea, led by Kim Il-sung, launched a surprise invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. With the skeletal South Korean and US military forces driven out of Seoul, the US tabled a resolution to authorise a UN-sponsored police action aimed at legitimising a military response to the invading forces. On 25 June 1950, Egypt and

India voted for the Security Council resolution condemning North Korean aggression (the Soviet Union's representative was boycotting the Security Council's refusal to seat the People's Republic of China rather than the Kuomintang and hence was absent while Yugoslavia abstained). The three were the only abstainers on the General Assembly resolution of 7 October, which obliquely approved UN action north of the 38th parallel. On the subsequent Uniting for Peace General Assembly resolution of 3 November, only India abstained since the US persuaded other Arab and Asian states to vote in the affirmative. Yugoslavia also voted for the resolution since it wished the General Assembly to have the power to recommend action, in the face of a great power veto in the Security Council, on account of its fear of the Soviet Union.

The Chinese intervention in North Korea in late November and early December 1950 further transformed the military balance in Korea. This highlighted the efforts of the members of the Indian delegation as interlocutors, having made contact with the representatives of the People's Republic of China during their visit to New York to address the Security Council at the tail end of November. What is described as the first meeting of the Arab-Asian group[20] (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) at the UN was held on 5 December 1950.[21] The participants appealed to the North Korean authorities and the People's Republic to declare that no forces under their control would cross south of the 38th parallel of latitude. The same 13 states subsequently put forward two General Assembly resolutions on 12 December (though the Philippines did not sponsor the second). The first, requesting the Indian President of the General Assembly to set up a group to determine the basis for a satisfactory cease-fire, was approved by 52–1–5 on 14 December; the second which would have asked certain governments to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues, was ultimately not put to vote. Egypt and Yugoslavia abstained and India voted against the General Assembly resolution of 1 February 1951 which inter alia found that the People's Republic of China had committed aggression in Korea. The basis for future Yugoslav cooperation with India had been achieved by the end of 1950. Rubinstein notes:

> Prior to June 1950 the belief was widespread among Yugoslav officials that India, though nominally independent, was part of the West. But India's position on Korea made it evident that India was in fact an independent country. Yugoslavia came to appreciate the independent stand of these new nations, not only on this issue, but on

> disarmament and colonial questions, on the seating of Communist China, and on the urgency of promoting the economic development of the less-developed countries.[22]

The period December 1950 to January 1951 gave the Arab-Asian group 'a moral stature and political impetus that endured for several years'[23] though it had only acted collectively in real moments of crisis, and India often acted alone, particularly after Khrishna Menon replaced Benegal Rau as Indian Permanent Representative in 1952. Asian-Arab cooperation on colonial issues and on the ill treatment of underdeveloped countries was remarked on by Western observers, with US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, noting in October 1952 that 'the outstanding fact of the Assembly so far, is its dominance by the Arab-Asian bloc'.[24]

1.2.4 Negotiation on the right of self-determination, 1950–4

The Arab-Asian Group was, not surprisingly, passionately interested in developing anti-colonial norms, in part, by proclaiming the right of self-determination as integral features of the international system. Following on the League of Nations, the UN Charter just mentions the principle of self-determination, leaving it to member states to elaborate upon its meaning and application with respect to areas under colonial control or dispute. Taking this issue up in the early 1950s, the Arab-Asian Group played a key role in drafting Article 1 on the right of self-determination in both the major human rights covenants – on civil and political rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and on economic, social and cultural rights, the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR). The three main resolutions involved were master-minded by two persistent Southern permanent representatives at the UN – Jamil Baroody (a Lebanese Christian) representing Saudi Arabia and Abdul Rahman Pazhwak representing Afghanistan.[25]

Both representatives avoided becoming involved with the Soviet proposal on the right to national self-determination which was rejected in November 1950.[26] They did not wish to be seen as too cooperative with the Soviet Union and its allies. They then submitted a joint amendment to the draft Covenant in the General Assembly requesting the Human Rights Commission to study ways and means of ensuring the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. This was adopted by 38–71–2 in December 1950 as part of GAR 421(V) despite Western dissent. John Humphrey, the first Director of the UN's Division of Human

Rights, considered that these 'decisions marked the beginning of the politicisation of the covenants. The developing countries were in revolt, and new voices were beginning to be heard.'[27]

The Human Rights Commission found it impossible to prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its 1951 session. Consequently, the 13 members of the Arab-Asian group drew up a draft resolution proposing that the General Assembly should insert an article on the rights of peoples to self-determination into the Covenants. This GAR 545(VI) was adopted in February 1952 by 42–7(Australia, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, New Zealand, UK and US)–5.

The draft Article was subsequently debated in the Third Committee in 1954. All the delegations which had sponsored GAR 545(VI), except Iran, plus Bolivia, Chile, Greece, Haiti, Liberia, Thailand, Uruguay and, notably, Yugoslavia, jointly submitted a draft resolution proposing that the right of self-determination be maintained in both Covenants. In the end no vote was taken and the fraught question was again discussed in the Third Committee in 1955. The tension surrounding the question had been made evident on 11 October when the UN Secretary-General suggested that the Assembly should appoint an ad hoc Committee to try to reach agreement on basic principles: this would then be incorporated into a General Assembly Declaration. The Secretary-General had hoped to help the US proposal to have a study on self-determination as an alternative to the two Covenants recommended by the Human Rights Commission. However this ploy did not succeed. Instead a Working Party was set up to prepare a new text of Article 1. Their final text was adopted in the Third Committee by 33(including 11 of the 13-strong Arab-Asian group[28])–12(the 'white' Commonwealth and Western Europe), with 13 abstentions. This, with very minor adjustments, became the final text of Article 1 of each of the two major Covenants which were put forward for signature in 1966 and came into force in 1976.

1.2.5 The covenants on economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights

Despite the Cold War, the UN's Human Rights Commission began to focus on the question of putting the Universal Declaration on Human Rights into legal form in 1949. Australia and the Soviet Union proposed that economic, social and cultural rights should be put into one Covenant with civil and political rights, and this was agreed with difficulty in 1950–1. The decision was questioned in early 1952 and a two Covenant solution was agreed. This compromise had the advantage of treating both sets of rights equally and recognising Cold War realities

such as the fact that it was unlikely that the US would become a party to either Covenant.

The initiative in the human rights field was now primarily in the Arab-Asian group as had been the case on self-determination in the 1951–2 General Assembly. Their growing interaction with like-minded Latin Americans was illustrated by the fact that most countries forming the Arab-Asian group voted to accept a Chilean amendment to stop two Covenants being drafted in early 1952. This resolution only just failed to pass.

The three regional groupings (the West, the East and the South), with their distinctive perspectives on human rights, were finally able to agree to a new US initiative suggesting that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) asked member governments to report annually on developments regarding human rights in their states. This bore fruit in 1956. The first series of reports covered the period from 1954 to 1956. By the end of 1958, 41 governments from all three major groups had submitted reports on all five aspects of human rights. Interestingly the Arab-Asian group at Bandung in 1955 both supported the principle of self-determination as set out in the UN Charter, and also noted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights to be 'a common standard of mankind'. This commitment was further recognised in the 1960 General Assembly Declaration on Colonialism.[29]

1.3 Southern cooperation deepens

The growing complexity of group interaction within the UN was given further cohesion by the seminal Asian-African Bandung Conference of April 1955 which was crucial to the development of the Non-Aligned Movement six years later. The Conference was convened by Burma*, Ceylon, India*, Indonesia* and Pakistan* and attended by Afghanistan*, Cambodia, China (People's Republic), Egypt*, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran*, Iraq*, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon*, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines*, Saudi Arabia*, Sudan, Syria*, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, State of Vietnam and Yemen*. All the original (starred) 13 Arab-Asian members attended. The meeting was also strongly influenced by the April 1954 India/China agreement (known as *Panch Shila*[30]) on trade and intercourse between them which was based on five principles:

1 mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2 mutual non-aggression,

3 mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4 equality and mutual benefit, and
5 peaceful coexistence.

These were praised as a 'solid foundation for peace and security' in a statement by Nehru and Zhou En-lai in June 1954. The *Panch Shila*, however, was subsequently to become somewhat discredited in New Delhi as disputes of the demarcation of the Indo-Chinese border led to military clashes between 1959 and 1962.[31] In spite of this, India, China and others like Indonesia continued to utilise it as a basis for their foreign policy. Even Yugoslavia subscribed publicly to the principles of *Panch Shila* during Tito's first journey outside Europe to South Asia in December 1954. He told the Indian parliament that world peace was imperilled by the formation of blocs along military and ideological lines, and that only in the coexistence of nations and states with differing systems could catastrophe be averted. Both countries pointed out in a joint communiqué that non-alignment was not synonymous with neutrality or neutralism, a passive concept, but was rather an active, positive and constructive policy seeking to lead to a collective peace on which alone collective security could really rest. They also stated that the non-aligned countries had not created a third bloc. 'This is a contradiction in terms because such a bloc would involve them in the very system of alignments which they regard as undesirable.'

1.3.1 Bandung, 1955

The Colombo powers met briefly in Bogor, Indonesia at the end of December 1954 to discuss the proposed Afro-Asian conference.[32] By then Pakistan had become formally aligned with its entry into SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in September and Gamal Abdel Nasser had come into power in a coup in Egypt. Nehru insisted that countries invited to the conference should primarily be independent and include all Asian countries together with China. The enthusiasm and sense of moral purpose that was generated at Bandung is captured in the opening speech by the host, President Sukarno, addressed to fellow developing countries:

> What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the said of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilize what

> I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favor of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority are for peace, not war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on to the side of peace.[33]

Bandung's final communiqué set out four general purposes for the conference:

1 to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa;
2 to consider the social, economic and cultural problems of the countries represented;
3 to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, for example, those affecting national sovereignty and also problems stemming from racialism and colonialism;
4 to assess the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world and the contribution they could make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

By the time the Bandung conference opened, the *Panch Shila* principles had been accepted as regulating relations between India and China, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Cambodia. The opening speeches reflected the clash between aligned and non-aligned viewpoints which had been evident at Colombo in 1954 but Chou En-lai for the People's Republic played a diplomatic and conciliatory role during the Bandung conference which impressed participants. Suspicion of both Communism and colonialism (including Soviet colonialism) was expressed, and Nehru defended his policy of creating an 'unaligned area' arguing that entry into alliance pacts brought insecurity whereas the Five Principles though not a magic formula, did meet the needs of the day. The final Declaration (see Annex I) which was unanimously adopted showed signs of compromise and some illogicalities in parts of its drafting particularly in relation to its ten principles partly based on *Panch Shila* according to which nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another. Notably, the divergence between principle 5 for aligned participants and 6 for the non-aligned is one reason why this conference cannot be regarded as the first non-aligned meeting. The other was that it was a regional not a global meeting and included aligned participants like the People's Republic of China, Japan and Turkey.

The participants discussed the position of Africa and Asia, and the ways and means by which their peoples could achieve the fullest economic, cultural and political cooperation. The main items on the agenda were Economic Co-operation; Cultural Co-operation; Human Rights and Self-Determination, Problems of Dependent People: Other Problems Including Palestine; the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation. The final communiqué also specifically noted that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, was inadequate. It expressed 'the view that as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council'.

On questions of economic cooperation Bandung in some respects pointed the way to the subsequent formation of UNCTAD in 1964. The communiqué referred to the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region and the need of that region for foreign capital investment, for the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and for the stabilising of commodity trade. It recommended collective action to induce shipping conferences to lower freight rates and the encouragement of national and regional banks. The communiqué went on to welcome efforts to extend the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and called for the speedy establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency with adequate Asian-African representation. It also dealt with the danger of the outbreak of war and expressed the view that 'disarmament' was 'imperative'.

The Bandung Conference also recognised the significance of cultural cooperation and declared its full support of the fundamental principles of human rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations. It took note of UN resolutions on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, which was a prerequisite for the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights. The policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination were deplored. Colonialism in all its manifestations was an evil which should speedily be brought to an end. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights and was contrary to the UN Charter.

The Bandung conference remains immensely influential. It 'was the first international gathering outside the UN to deal with the apartheid issue in a substantive fashion' that also demonstrated the 'impact that

outside coordination could have on the progress of an issue in the UN'.[34] One such impact was on the continuing debate on the right of self-determination which subsequently became less fraught. As early as 1958, John Humphrey noted: 'I was now more optimistic about the future of the Covenants; so many dependent territories were becoming independent that the political implications of the articles on self-determination seemed less important.'[35] It was illustrated too by the fact that in 1960, the nine countries (Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France Portugal, South Africa, Spain, UK and US) who originally were unwilling to subscribe to the seminal Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GAR 1514) adopted by 89–0–9, only abstained on rather than voted against the Declaration.

The influence of the Bandung conference also derived from the myth created around it as much as from the detailed work done at it (though it did serve to lessen tension relating to the Quemoy and Matsu islands). The fact that Zhou En-lai attended and presented the Chinese case was itself significant as was the presence of nascent liberation movements like the African National Congress. In the context of the development of the Non-Aligned Movement, it was the occasion of Nasser's first visit outside the Arab world and it was the relationship that he, Nehru and Tito were to develop subsequently symbolised by their meeting in Brioni in July 1956, which was to bring about further development of the movement. Bandung certainly gave many decolonised states self-confidence of which one outcome may well have been President Nasser's action over Suez in 1956. At the same time, it also underscored that there were strong disagreements among developing states. Indeed, while African countries went on to form the Organisation for African Unity in 1963, the prospects for regional cooperation dimmed among Asian states after Bandung against the backdrop of growing Sino-Indian tensions over their common border.

In the months following Bandung, Tito was visited by both U Nu and Nehru, and in December 1955 he made official state visits to Egypt and Ethiopia. Yugoslavia was also re-elected to the Security Council at the end of 1955. This continuing and increasing Yugoslav role was reflected in the conference between Tito, Nehru and Nasser on the island of Brioni on 18/19 July 1956 just before the Suez Canal was nationalised. The discussions centred on non-alignment and on the effect of de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union. After the invasion of Egypt by France, Israel and the UK, Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution in the Security Council on 31 October calling for an emergency special session of the General

Assembly. The admission of 20 new UN members during 1955 and 1956 shifted the overall balance at the UN in favour of the Arab-Asian group as it now numbered 46 states out of 80. This expansion meant that the group, with the support of the Soviet bloc, could prevent or ensure the passing of important resolutions by the required two-thirds majority.

1.3.2 Tensions with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, 1948–60

As the Cold War became more intense with the blockade of Berlin in 1948, the Eastern European Group (then the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ukraine) consolidated its positions while Yugoslavia, which did not always follow their example (e.g., in its abstention on the Palestine partition resolution), remained a member for electoral purposes only. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies certainly did not always vote in the same way as the emerging South. Yugoslavia and India did not agree with the Soviet Union's proposal for a declaration of peaceful coexistence incorporating references to *Panch Shila* and the Bandung principles, put forward to the 1957 General Assembly by the Soviet Union after its invasion of Hungary in 1956. By the time the Declaration was debated in the First Committee, India, Sweden and Yugoslavia had also tabled a draft on the same lines as the Soviet resolution but worded differently. Most countries agreed with the substance of both drafts but were reluctant to vote for the draft submitted by the Soviet Union. At Indian request, therefore, their draft Declaration on Peaceful and Neighbourly Relations among States was voted for first, and passed in Plenary Session by 77–0–1 as GAR 1236(XII). These countries, including the 16 sub-Saharan African states admitted in 1960, were also hostile to the 1960 Soviet proposals for replacing the UN Secretary-General by a triumvirate representing all three blocs, as well as to their proposal for a declaration on colonialism. Southern countries also noted the Soviet attitudes to setting up or expanding institutions within the UN with the aim of furthering economic development, particularly as regards finance, were either similar to, or even more restrictive than, those of Western countries.

1.3.3 Electoral changes within the UN and the South, 1957–63

The most important electoral changes ever in the UN system took place between 1957 and 1963. They were spearheaded by the South (as noted at Bandung) and helped by the increase in numbers in the General Assembly from the original 51 to 82[36] in 1957 and supported by the East. The Commonwealth electoral group at the UN was by

this time reaching its end, burdened by apartheid, colonialism and Suez and was replaced by the Asian-African Group and the Western European and Others States Group – WEOG (the Others being the old British Dominions – Australia, Canada and New Zealand – with the notable exception of South Africa[37]). WEOG itself was much influenced by the foundation of the European Economic Community (1957) followed by the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 and the Western think tank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 1961.

These changes in groupings necessitated changes to the committee structures in the General Assembly, especially the important General Committee. The General Assembly therefore decided by GAR 1192(XII) of 1957 passed by 49–1–27(France, UK, US) that the number of Vice Presidents in the Assembly should be increased from eight[38] to thirteen as follows: four from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and Other States beside the five Permanent Members. The resolution also stated that at least one of the Vice Presidents among the Asian and African and the Western Europe and Other States Groups, or the President or one of the Chairmen of the main Committees should be from a Commonwealth country without altering the geographical distribution of seats in the General Committee[39] as defined by the resolution. This was the last time the Commonwealth was noted as a specific electoral group in the UN. The question of apartheid (and certain economic issues) had split it before the number of General Assembly Vice Presidents was expanded (1963). The subsequent changes made in UN electoral patterns in 1963 to accommodate the Asian-African group, discussed in the next chapter, remains the most fundamental in the UN system. It is worth noting that the political African Group includes all sub-Saharan states within the African continent; it does not include the Arab Mediterranean states within the continent. These have always been elected and work for political purposes within the Asian Group.

Concern about apartheid was one factor which brought about the replacement of the Commonwealth electoral group[40] in the UN in 1957 by the Asian-African group and the Western European and Others Group. The first Conference of Independent African States in Ghana in 1958 went on to establish the UN African group to coordinate 'all matters of common concern to the African states'. This group became more powerful with the admission of 16 Black African states into the UN in[41] 1960. As Bissell notes, 'the African bloc' possessed 'the initiative during 1961–2 without organised opposition.

1.3.4 Arab and Asian groups take new initiatives on Palestine, 1958–9

Emboldened by the electoral shifts in favour of the South, the Arab Group attempted to retake the initiative on Palestine in the UN from the West in the late 1950s. Previously certain states in the Western group had put forward resolutions based on the idea that the refugee problem needed to be resolved by resettlement outside former Palestine rather than being a matter for the right of self-determination and the right of return. The previous normal pattern of operation can be illustrated by the year 1958.[42] Iraq as usual made sure a Palestine Arab refugee addressed the Special Political Committee but the only draft resolution put forward was sponsored by the US, plus the UK, the Netherlands and New Zealand. This emphasised resettlement rather than repatriation and was passed as GAR 1315(XIII) by 57–0–20.

The new positive attitude by Arabs and Muslims towards the problems of Palestine both inside and outside the UN (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement – Fatah – was being set up at this time probably with support from the Algerian nationalists who had themselves demonstrated how to successfully use the UN to further their cause) was first noticeable in 1959. The ten Arab states at the UN circulated a report in October on the Secretary-General's proposals concerning UN assistance to Palestine refugees. This reaffirmed their stand on behalf of the Arab people of Palestine and the right of Arab refugees to return to their homeland. It also rejected proposals for resettlement. Indonesia and Pakistan from the Asian Group then put forward a draft resolution which gave more emphasis to repatriation and compensation for the refugees than resettlement. An amended version was approved by 80–0–1, GAR 1456(XIV), in 1959. The main paragraph which was adopted by 54–1–18 in Committee requested the UN Conciliation Committee for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of GAR 194(III) on the right of return.

1.4 Promoting economic development

One expert on the North–South dialogue suggests that the pursuit of the 'development imperative' was an immediate post-war priority given the fact that the UN Charter was guided by the principle that the maintenance of peace requires economic and social cooperation with permanent international machinery to back it up, and that Governments had primary responsibility for the management of their economy

and international economic relations.[43] In this regard, it is significant that Bandung gave pride of place in its Communiqué to Economic Co-operation. This recommended the early establishment of the SUNFED, the allocation by the World Bank (a UN specialised agency) of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries, the early establishment of an International Finance Corporation as well as the vital importance of stabilising commodity trade in the region. The participants also suggested that, without forming a bloc, there was a need for prior consultation of participating countries in international fora to further their mutual economic interests.

Underlying these institutional impulses was a growing consensus within the South as to the most appropriate path to development. Building on the work of Latin American economists working in UN regional structures conducted in the late 1940s and early 1950s, a dual approach was adopted which emphasised the protection of infant industries at home while endeavouring to negotiate better terms of trade with the leading industrialised countries at the international level. This fundamentally statist approach to development was to be complemented by the pooling of resources and creation of larger markets through the establishment of regional economic organisations.

1.4.1 The Latin American dimension, 1956–60

These perspectives on development were already shared by many Latin American countries which were combating the relative decline in their influence as a voting bloc as the UN continued to extend its membership, particularly to newly independent Asian and African countries. They also wished to propagate more widely certain ideas on economic development which had gained currency under the leadership of Raul Prebisch of the regional UN Economic Commission for Latin America (UNECLA) and to further economic development through the UN. Their lobbying for an increase in the size of ECOSOC had begun in 1956 but had been resisted. At the 1958 General Assembly meetings, some Latin American countries therefore combined with the Arab and Asian countries to sponsor a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to study the fields in which private capital could best be used by underdeveloped countries. This Assembly also approved the establishment of the Special Fund which was designed to augment existing technical assistance programmes of UN bodies by financing more ambitious longer-term projects. Western determination that this should not be regarded as a step towards the establishment of a capital development fund and that the Governing Council should not be elected

by the General Assembly but by ECOSOC, prevailed against a draft resolution sponsored by India and 17 less-developed countries. The Soviet bloc voted for the final resolution but abstained on the paragraph concerning the nature of contributions.

Decisions to establish the International Development Association (again the Soviet bloc abstained on this resolution) and the Commission for Industrial Development (the progenitor of UNIDO) were taken in 1959 through a resolution sponsored by Brazil and 32 others. And in 1960, the Capital Development Fund was set up and the Commission for Industrial Development expanded. This was followed in 1959 by a resolution sponsored by Brazil and 32 others proposing the establishment by ECOSOC of a Commission for Industrial Development. This took account of the growing interest in industrialisation and economic diversification among underdeveloped countries and was eventually, adopted unanimously. Yugoslavia, active as usual in both economic and political fields, noted during its debate on the Capital Development Fund in 1959 that the main obstacle to its establishment was the unwillingness of certain powers, who might be expected to become major contributors, to work for economic development in the UN. Another link between Latin American and the Arab/Islamic world began in 1960 when Venezuela joined with Iran and three Arab countries to form the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Southern countries also attempted to influence the politics of Latin American states, a number of whom were poised between the perception of themselves as being of the North and of the South and were experiencing a decline in their voting influence. Latin American countries therefore became more open to a situation in which they traded votes with other like-minded states. Significant to their 'realignment' with the African and Asian states was their recognition that countries like Yugoslavia and India had not gone along with the Soviet Union's proposal in 1957 for a declaration on peaceful coexistence after the invasion of Hungary in 1956. In 1958 two delegations from Arab countries visited Latin America and Scandinavia prior to the General Assembly with the aim of winning sympathy for the cause of Algerian independence. In 1959 Yugoslavia sent a large goodwill mission to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela. One example of their resultant cooperation was the fact that a number of Latin American states moved from abstaining in Committee to voting against in Plenary on a resolution (GAR 1379(XIV)) in late 1959 requesting France to refrain from nuclear testing in the Sahara. Fidel Castro met Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Nasser

and Sihanouk when he visited the General Assembly in 1960. Latin American countries have usually been divided on their attachment to the South rather than to the North, with the role of Castro's Cuba as a promoter of revolution in the Western Hemisphere and its close ties to Moscow arousing suspicion for some Latin American governments.

1.5 The founding of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77

The admission of 16 sub-Saharan African states into the UN in 1960 helped bring about the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement even though their views and those of other putative non-aligned countries were not necessarily in harmony: this was the case with regard to the former Belgian Congo – a major preoccupation of the General Assembly. Their views did, however, coincide on decolonisation (the General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that year), and this question, as before, continued to provide the main strand of unity in the formation of the movement. They also continued to oppose many Soviet proposals. A further crucial factor in favour of a non-aligned conference was the search by middle-rank powers for ways of influencing the US and Soviet Union. This dominant theme had guided the Arab-Asian group who, with European Yugoslavia, had been closely involved in the Korean crisis of the early 1950s. From 1959 Yugoslavia intensified its campaign to secure non-bloc participation at high-level conferences between East and West, and with the approach of the May 1960 summit conference, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno joined Tito in calling for such participation in meetings on disarmament. Following this abortive summit, a five-power resolution (sponsored by Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic[44] and Yugoslavia), calling for the restoration of direct contact between the leaders of the two blocs, was put before the General Assembly on 29 September 1960. This was opposed by the Western powers, partly on procedural grounds, and subsequently withdrawn.

The setback spurred Tito on to greater efforts to coordinate non-aligned countries, efforts which initially encountered resistance from Nehru and Nasser. He sought to win over the newly independent African countries during his first tour of sub-Saharan Africa in early 1961 when he visited Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Togo, besides some Asian countries within the African continent Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. However, after the US-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, which occurred when Tito was in Cairo, a

diffident Nasser became more interested in a non-aligned conference. On 2 April the Presidents issued a joint communiqué expressing their anxiety over the international situation and calling for 'consultations among uncommitted countries in order to strengthen world peace, preserve the independence of all nations, and remove the danger of intervention in the affairs of other countries.' A preliminary meeting was subsequently held in Cairo in June.

1.5.1 The first Non-Aligned summit, 1961

The first Non-Aligned summit conference opened in Belgrade on 1 September 1961 against a sombre background of East–West tension, due in part to the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August, but in larger measure to the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing on 31 August (an action that unilaterally abrogated an informal moratorium that had been in existence between the US and itself). The 25 participants were Afghanistan, the Algerian National Liberation Front, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba (the only Latin American participant), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The three Observer states (eligible to join the movement but not ready to do so) were Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador.

The Summit's main preoccupations, which were similar to those voiced at Bandung, were great power disarmament, concern over the cold war, territorial integrity, the elimination of colonialism, economic development and the right of all nations to self-determination, racism as well as the rights of people belonging to minorities, the restoration of all rights to the Arab people of Palestine, the condemnation of apartheid and the seating of the People's Republic of China at the UN. They recommended the expansion of the Security Council and ECOSOC, and particularly noted that they did not wish to form a new bloc and could not be a bloc. They considered it essential that the non-aligned should participate in solving outstanding international issues under the principles of peaceful coexistence. They argued that the extension of the uncommitted area of the world constituted the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs. They ended by unanimously agreeing on two documents. The first, a statement entitled Danger of War and Appeal for Peace with an accompanying letter, called on the US and Soviet Union to resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. The second eight-page Declaration covered, as have all subsequent, similar

non-aligned documents, the major international foreign policy issues (both economic and political) of the day[45]:

> The governments of the countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the cold war, is inevitable, as this view reflects a sense both of helplessness and hopelessness, and is contrary to the idea of world progress. They affirm their unwavering faith that the international world community is able to organize its life without resorting to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history … (They also stated that it was) essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security, as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.[46]

The cooperation of many of those who had attended the Belgrade Summit over the next three General Assembly sessions had the effect of expediting action on many of the issues raised in the Declaration. Immediately following the 1961 General Assembly, the US and the Soviet Union finally put forward a statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, and by 13 December 1961 they were able to endorse an agreement on the formation of an enlarged Disarmament Committee of 18, containing four non-aligned African-Asian countries. They also managed to secure the adoption of a draft resolution setting up a Special Committee of 17 (to become better known after its expansion in 1962 as the Committee of 24) to examine the implementation of the 1960 Declaration on Colonialism. The 1962 General Assembly set up a Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa to keep South Africa's racial policies under review and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly or the Security Council and ECOSOC. The concerted African campaign against South Africa in the specialised agencies led, in the first instance, to the South African decision to withdraw from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1963 and the International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Health Organization (WHO) in 1964.

External organisational efforts were completed with the setting up of the OAU in 1963. The General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1963 which was followed by the negotiation of what became the first major UN human rights convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965. The non-aligned countries, meanwhile, went on to host a Conference on the Problems

of Economic Development in Cairo in July 1962 attended by 31 countries which is discussed in the section on the development of the G77. This was complemented by the General Assembly's passing of the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources later in 1962.

1.5.2 Electoral changes, 1963

The important electoral changes made by GAR 1192(XII) in 1957 were enhanced in 1963 to accommodate the Asian-African group and remain the most fundamental ever made in the UN system. GAR 1991 A(XVIII) was passed by 97–11(France, Soviet Union) – 4(UK, US) despite the fact that only one permanent member (China – the Kuomintang) of the Security Council voted for it. This decided that the Security Council should be expanded from 11 to 15 (an amendment to the UN Charter) and that non-permanent members in this enlarged Council should be elected as follows: five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from WEOG. A further resolution GAR 1991 B(XXVIII) decided by 96–11(France, Soviet Union) – 5(China, UK, US) that ECOSOC should be enlarged from 18 to 27 members (a further Charter amendment) and that the nine additional members of ECOSOC[47] should be elected with seven from Africa and Asia, one from Latin America, one from WEOG. Charter amendments, of course, have to be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly including all the permanent members of the Security Council 'and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes'.

Meanwhile the numbers of Vice Presidents in the General Assembly were increased from 13 to 17 by GAR 1990(XVIII) (111–0) in 1963 as follows: seven from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, three from Latin America and two from WEOG. It also decided that the seven Chairmen of the main General Assembly Committees should be elected as follows: three from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, one from Latin America, one from WEOG. The seventh chairmanship would rotate every alternate year between the last two groups. This was the last time Asian and African groups were linked. They have been separately listed ever since. The General Assembly increased the number of its Vice Presidents from 17 to 21 many years later in 1978 (GAR 33/138). This marked the final separation of the Asian and African groups. The numbers were as follows: six from Africa, five from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, three from Latin America, two from WEOG as well as the five Permanent Members.

1.5.3 The development of the G77, 1961–4

One important Latin American contribution to the formation of both the Non-Aligned Movement and G77 was a resolution sponsored by Argentina at the summer meeting of ECOSOC in 1961 (i.e., before the first Non-Aligned Summit took place). This resolution (later revised in the General Assembly) called for international conferences to find solutions to the problems encountered by less developed countries in securing a steady expansion of their external trade. It was not therefore surprising to find eight Latin American countries[48] attended the 1962 non-aligned Cairo Conference on the Problems of Economic Development, of which four were participants – Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico – and four were observers – Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The Cairo Conference was crucial to the creation of a Southern norm on development strategy as it provided a forum for developing countries to reach a consensus on its features. The main issues discussed were cooperation among developing countries, problems of international trade, regional economic groupings, economic aid for development and international technical assistance. The participants were invited to work closely in the UN and other international bodies to ensure economic progress (ECOSOC resolution 1707 XVI on international trade as a primary instrument for economic development was welcomed). They declared themselves in favour of convening a world trade conference in 1963. The Declaration also aired worries about the growing disparity of standards in different parts of the world and proposed a series of mutual consultations and studies before the conference. This cooperation between Latin American and African and Asian states continued in ECOSOC and the General Assembly which subsequently endorsed an ECOSOC decision to convene such a conference later in 1962. The original text was put forward by 26 Afro-Asians plus Uruguay and Yugoslavia. Two more Latin American states (Brazil and Bolivia) joined in a further resolution on the timing of the conference.

Continued Latin American influence on the forthcoming UNCTAD-I was strengthened by the appointment of Prebisch as its Secretary-General during the first session of the Preparatory Committee in early 1963. Yugoslavia which had been the driving force behind the setting up of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 also played an important role on this Committee and was, unprecedently, in 1964, included by the Committee in the African-Asian group as a developing

country. This meant that it was, ultimately, included in Group A of UNCTAD – African and Asian states and Yugoslavia, rather than Group D Eastern Europe. Tito, visiting Latin America for the first time, went to Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico in September 1963.

The establishment of G77 in 1963/4 helped bring about the formation of UNCTAD. It contained three regional groups: African, Asian and Latin American (the few European members were incorporated in these groups); was similar to, but larger than the non-aligned and dealt almost exclusively with economic issues. Latin American states continued to need allies to make their presence felt given the increase of the number of states in the UN to 99 by the end of 1960.

The first appearance of the G77 can be seen in a draft General Assembly resolution put forward by 75 UN member states in October 1963. This welcomed the joint Declaration of the Developing Countries prepared in the Preparatory Committee, stressed the importance of the forthcoming conference for the economies of developing countries and the world economy as a whole, and insisted that the domestic efforts of these countries needed to be supplemented by adequate international action. It, secondly, emphasised the desirability of a new international division of labour with new patterns of production and trade. This, it argued, was the only way in which the economic independence of developing countries could be strengthened. This was approved unanimously as GAR 1897(XVIII). The call for the New International Economic Order really appears to begin here. Of the 75 states participating, 21 came from Latin America and the Caribbean, 31 from Africa (regarded as a geographical entity) and 20 from Asia (including the Middle East); the other three were two Europeans: Cyprus[49] and Yugoslavia and New Zealand (part of WEOG).

1.5.4 UNCTAD-I and the G77 – Geneva 1964

UNCTAD-I (March–June 1964) was preceded by Asian, African and Latin American regional conferences which set the subsequent pattern for the G77 relations with UNCTAD. All passed resolutions giving support to the proposition that existing trade machinery was inadequate. Its chair, Raul Prebisch, agreed that a new international trade organisation would be useful but also outlined a plan for a continuing organisation based on periodic UNCTAD conferences, a standing committee and an independent secretariat. The question of UNCTAD's institutionalisation became the major battle of the conference with the East, the Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans all putting forward somewhat different proposals. Western countries were forced to accept the idea of some such

organisation but determined to prevent any consequent diminution of ECOSOC's powers as they had more influence in a smaller body. A compromise proposal which reflected the growing unity between the developing countries was achieved when the Latin Americans and Afro-Asians amalgamated their original proposals. The final draft recommendation was adopted unanimously in June 1964 and UNCTAD was established as an organ of the General Assembly by GAR 1995(XIX) in December 1964. The G77 came into the limelight with the issuance of a ten-paragraph Joint Declaration at the end of the conference noting that the UNCTAD had been 'a significant step towards creating a new and just economic order'. However they declared that 'they do not consider that the progress that has been registered in each of the major fields of economic development has been adequate or commensurate with their essential requirements'.[50]

1.6 Conclusion

From a disparate collection of states emerging, with one major exception Yugoslavia, from the shadow of the West, either through colonialism in Asia and Africa or economic domination in much of Latin America, the developing countries gradually came to adopt strategies of greater cooperation to promote their interests. The pull of national and regional concerns, at times stifling collaboration between states of the developing world to its most nominal forms, gradually gave way to a broader embrace of a distinctively Southern set of norms. In this sense, the expansion and consolidation of the normative structure of the South was the result of discursive interactions within the institutional framework given by the UN which allowed South governments to identify and act upon a number of common concerns, aspirations and foreign policy objectives. These included a focus on *sovereignty and non-interference* as bulwarks of nation building for newly independent states. The notable exceptions to this were those regimes which were not in conformity with the expanded norms on self-determination engineered by Southern states in the UN and who therefore, according to this interpretation, opened themselves up to legitimate attempts to isolate or topple them. The appropriation of the universalistic principles which underlay liberal internationalism to further Southern political concerns and economic interests provided the moral basis for developing country challenges to the prevailing international system. In regards to economic concerns, the Southern norms focussed on the pursuit of a development strategy based on the twin pillars of

domestic-based import substitution industrialisation approach coupled to an *international set of negotiations aimed at restructuring the inequitable global economic system*. Again, the impetus and sources for developing country positions resided in seminal fonts of international law such as the UN Charter.

The centrality of the UN system to this process, providing both a site for the discussion of political and economic issues as well as a forum for sustained cooperation cannot be underestimated. So too, the important role played by key leaders in Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Egypt and India in pushing for closer cooperation and ultimately institutionalisation of Southern collaboration is evident. The modalities of consensus building and cooperation between developing countries commenced and were to be sustained within the framework of this international institution. By the mid-1960s, the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 was a fact of international politics. Their creation set in motion the mobilisation of international institutions such as UNCTAD as indispensable instruments for the fulfilment of virtually all the issues which were to preoccupy Southern states in the future.

2

The Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 77 During the Cold War, 1965–89

The emergence of a distinctive set of organisations and groupings whose orientation was focused on promoting developing and decolonised countries' interests was the hallmark of the South in world politics during the Cold War. With the United Nations (UN) system firmly fixed as a locus of attention and action for the South, the development of a political and economic agenda and the supportive institutional procedures became a priority. While the broader political agenda of the South was primarily set and promoted through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) process, the economic agenda was driven primarily by the expanding Group of 77 (G77) members and the newly created trade organisation, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). By 1973, these two parallel processes had converged with the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the NAM summit in Algiers. Building upon the succession of carefully crafted resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and UNCTAD, and bolstered by the successful cartel strategies by producers of oil, developing countries believed that they had established the normative framework for negotiating a restructuring of the prevailing international order. Despite expectations, the ensuing North–South dialogue produced few results and, with the strengthening of collective action among Western countries, and fading commodity prices, the high water mark of Southern radicalism began to fade. The thawing of the Cold War posed a new set of challenges for NAM and G77, changing the terms of political engagement between the superpowers and causing the once contested liberal market ideas to assume a virtually unassailable position in the global economy.

During this process of articulating and implementing the South's political and economic agendas, the parameters of South–South

cooperation were made manifest. Though often beset by tensions and competition, which undermined collective efforts in some cases and pitted radicals against reformists, South institutions nonetheless were able to maintain cooperation in promoting a broad range of political and economic issues in the UN system. Crucial to maintaining momentum was the role of leaders and states, which saw the continuing importance of having a forum for coordinating their political and economic foreign policies. Guiding this effort was a continuing commitment to creating the case for developing country interests through recourse to international law, underscoring the abiding faith that Southern countries had in the possibility of achieving major foreign and economic policy gains through their mobilisation of international institutions.

At the same time, the hubris, which accompanied the South's call for a NIEO in 1974, and the successes of the oil cartel were soon deflated by the fall in commodity prices and rise of acute sovereign debt in Africa and Latin America in the 1980s. And while the promotion of economic self-reliance through import-substitution and other state-led development strategies remained ascendant among G77 countries, the spectacular growth achieved in Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea (and later emulated in other parts of Southeast Asia and Latin America) through their export-oriented approach to development began to attract attention. The result was to lay the foundation for a new consensus on liberal trading regimes and development across most of the South.

Concurrently, the continuing spectacle of internecine conflict between developing countries, accompanied by rising arms purchases and local production capacities, dented the South's moral standing on disarmament which it had been able to articulate with some force in the early days. In particular, the fact that the detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974 and the onset of genocide in Cambodia generated a muted response if not silence by Southern institutions and states raised troubling questions about their employment of the sovereignty principle. So too, the unwillingness of many states within the North to take more than token positions against Israeli and South African aggression in their immediate region was also seen as deeply hypocritical. Indeed, the South's active support for a reinterpretation of the Security Council's definition of the conditions necessary to define apartheid South Africa as 'constituting a threat to international peace' opened up the possibility of a revision of the non-interference clause, a situation that was to hold enormous implications for the post–Cold War era.

This chapter will investigate the role of these leading South institutions during the Cold War which Tito noted as far back as 1953 was 'wearing out people and humanity both materially and psychologically'.[1] First it will examine the development of the NAM and G77 in the formative period between 1964 and 1972 followed by the rise and fall of the NIEO and accompanying North–South dialogue (1972–84) and the impact and response of the South to the waning of the Cold War (1985–90).

2.1 The NAM and the G77: Tensions and challenges, 1964–72

While the rhetoric of collective action was strong in the wake of the first NAM summit, the fact was that internal political problems began to dent its increased effectiveness from the outset. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ceylon's Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who hosted the preparatory Summit meeting at Colombo[2] in 1954, had become particularly active proponents of a second Summit in October 1963 in the face of Indonesian proposals for a second, more radical Bandung summit. Indonesian concerns, supported by Pakistan, were aired at a conference in Indonesia in April 1964 which decided to hold the second Bandung in Algeria in March 1965. By this time, domestic political disputes and even the outbreak of internecine conflict between developing countries had begun to tarnish the vision of cooperation expressed at Bandung in 1955. For instance, India was opposed to China being a participant, on account of their border conflict in 1962 and Beijing consequently focused its diplomatic efforts on enhancing the the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. In the end, the next NAM conference was delayed to June when President Ben Bella of Algeria was overthrown in a coup only to be followed by Sukarno's overthrow in September 1965 (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Structure of Production: Distribution of GDP 1976 (%)

	Agriculture	**Industry**	**Services**
Low-income countries	48.5	15.5	37
Middle-income countries	23.5	27.5	45.5
Industrialised countries	8	41	49.5

Source: World Bank (1978) *Structure of production: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product, 1976 (%).*

2.1.1 The Second Non-Aligned Summit, Cairo, October 1964

The battle between Tito, leader of the most moderate of the non-aligned states, and Sukarno's radicalism underpinned the approach to the second NAM summit held in Cairo in October 1964. Tito championed 'non-alignment, active and peaceful coexistence, and cooperation throughout the UN as the main political organisation of the international community' while Sukarno had wanted a movement exclusively predicated on racial and ethnic ties among Afro/Asian states, unremitting struggle against 'reactionaries' and the West and the creation of a new militant organisation of Afro-Asians outside the framework of the UN.[3] The Indonesian president failed, as did his successors, to move the movement into more radical channels and away from its original objectives.

The Cairo Summit participants supported the Joint Declaration of the G77 following UNCTAD I and called upon members of the Group to consult during the next General Assembly in order to consolidate their efforts and harmonise their policies before UNCTAD II in 1966.[4] They also discussed colonialism, self-determination, racial discrimination and apartheid; peaceful coexistence; respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter; disarmament, military pacts and the UN's role in international affairs. No further NAM meetings were subsequently held until 1969. The relative inaction can also be partially explained by the fact that much attention was then being focused on the problems of Vietnam (which the US handled outside the UN) and that the G77 maintained its predominance on economic matters within the UN system.The Cairo Summit's contribution was to propose that economic development was an obligation of the whole international community, and that it was 'the duty of all countries to contribute to the rapid evolution of a new and just economic order under which all nations can live without fear or want or despair and rise to their full stature in the Family of Nations'.[5]

Palestine

World attention continued to be focused on Palestine/Israel after the 1967 war, but the major resolution (SCR 242) did not mention the question of Jerusalem – a city of great importance to three of the world's major religions. The original General Assembly partition resolution had stated that Jerusalem should be put under

trusteeship. SCR 242 underscored the differences between the US and the Europeans on the issue. US ambivalence was demonstrated in May 1968 when it abstained with Canada on a Security Council resolution (SCR 252) which deplored Israel's failure to comply with two of the emergency special session resolutions on Jerusalem and considered that all administrative measures taken by Israel which tended to change Jerusalem's legal status were invalid. The US did join in a unanimous resolution in July 1969 (SCR 267) censuring Israel for all measures taken to change the status of Jerusalem and declaring they were invalid. But it subsequently abstained on SCR 271 (September 1969) which noted the Council's concern at the damage caused following the arson attempt on the Al Aqsa mosque; called on Israel to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law regarding military occupation, and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem and condemned Israel for its failure to comply with the resolutions passed in the General Assembly and the Security Council on Jerusalem since the 1967 war (for more on Islamic influence through regional organisations, see Chapter 5).

2.1.2 Tito's consultative meeting, Belgrade, July 1969

With the collapse of proposals for a second Bandung conference, Tito tried once again in early 1968 to encourage a revival of the NAM process to help resolve international issues in line with Southern interests. The Yugoslavian president attempted to enlist support for initiatives to settle the Vietnam War and the Middle East crisis of 1967, to organise resistance to 'neo-colonialism' and to give impetus to UN programmes for developing countries. He began to lobby for a non-aligned conference during his visits to Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic, and to Iran and Japan two months later. But as he noted in October 1968, this initiative met with a poor reception from leaders of socialist countries associated with the Soviet Union, which feared that any NAM summit would serve as a platform for criticism of its invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.

A NAM consultative meeting at Belgrade in July 1969 agreed that those countries interested in non-alignment, particularly those which had become independent since 1964 and all Organization of African Unity (OAU) members should also be invited to future gatherings based upon their conformity to and acceptance of the principles and criteria

observed at the Belgrade and Cairo NAM summits. The final 1969 communiqué stated that the economic situation of developing countries was deteriorating and underscored the need for intensifying joint political action by non-aligned countries. It asserted that the principles of non-alignment expressed at Belgrade and Cairo remained valid, supported the struggle of the people of Vietnam, pledged support for national liberation movements in Southern Africa and demanded for the full restoration of rights of the Arab people of Palestine. This was followed by an informal meeting of foreign ministers in New York in September 1969 who agreed to hold a preparatory meeting early in the next year to prepare for a Summit. Three preparatory meetings in Dar es Salaam (April 1970), New Delhi (June 1970) and Lusaka (July 1970) preceded the actual NAM Summit.[6] At the final preparatory meeting in New Delhi, India formally handed over the Chair to Zambia.

The final 1969 communiqué stated that the economic situation of developing countries was deteriorating and underscored the need for intensifying joint political action by non-aligned countries. It asserted that the principles of non-alignment expressed at Belgrade and Cairo remained valid, supported the struggle of the people of Vietnam, pledged support for national liberation movements in Southern Africa and for the full restoration of rights of the Arab people of Palestine. This was followed by an informal meeting of foreign ministers in New York in September 1969 who agreed to hold a preparatory meeting early in the next year to prepare for a Summit.

While the NAM and G77 remained key organisations in defining and implementing the South, the establishment of another body rooted in religious concerns presented a new form of Southern expression. The attack on the Al Aqsa mosque in August 1969 in Al Quds, Jerusalem brought together 24 Islamic countries to discuss the problems of occupied Palestine and their impact on the Muslim faith. Representing Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the Organization of the Islamic Conference went on to form a permanent secretariat in 1972 and subsequently an important forum for the discussion of global issues as they impacted upon the states and communities professing the Muslim faith (for further details, see Chapter 5).

2.1.4 The Third Non-Aligned Summit, Lusaka, September 1970

The third NAM Summit at Lusaka in September 1970[7] was preceded by three preparatory meetings in Dar es Salaam (April 1970), New Delhi (June 1970) and Lusaka (July 1970): the latter two were Standing

Committee meetings. At the final meeting, India formally handed over the Chair to Zambia and produced two Declarations, the second accompanied by a number of resolutions and statements. The Summit, as usual, covered all the main issues of interest to the non-aligned states noting in its first Declaration that, 'The growth of non-alignment into a broad international movement cutting across racial, regional and other barriers, is an integral part of significant changes in the structure of the entire international community' and that 'the economic gap between the developed and the developing countries is increasingly widening'.[8] The participants adopted a Programme of Action covering economic matters in the second Declaration.

A statement on the UN accompanying the second Declaration stressed the need to restore the People's Republic of China to its 'rightful place' in the UN. China finally took over the Chinese seat in the UN and permanent membership of the Security Council from the Kuomintang in 1971 after the South, East and certain Western countries subsequently combined to achieve a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly (76–35–17, GAR 2758) and thus overrode US opposition. The first Declaration also referred to 'the right of all peoples to the benefit of economic development and the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution'.[9] Resolutions on Africa covered decolonisation, apartheid and racial discrimination, the Portuguese colonies, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Foreign intervention in both Vietnam (the Republic of South Vietnam was an Observer) and Cambodia (with two rival delegations) deeply concerned the delegates in their resolution on Indochina.[10] These internal disagreements on Indochina, the subject of much controversy within the movement (see below), took a number of years to resolve but they did not break up the non-aligned.

The problem of continuity between NAM Summits was taken up by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's concern in his opening address to the delegates.[11] A specific resolution was passed at the Lusaka Summit aimed at strengthening the role of non-aligned countries. This set up machinery to 'provide for continuity, maintain contacts between member states and ensure the implementation of the decisions' of non-aligned conferences by entrusting the Chairman with the function of 'taking all necessary steps' to bring about the above. Non-aligned representatives in UN bodies were requested 'to co-ordinate and harmonise their efforts'.[12] The Chair was specifically asked to maintain contacts among member states to ensure continuity and Ministerial consultations were subsequently held in New York in September 1971.

2.1.5 The G77 and the UN system, 1965–72

The G77 continued to place its faith in the proposition that new international institutions or greater participation in existing international institutions could aid their economic development. At the 1965 General Assembly session when EPTA (Expanded Program of Technical Assistance) and the Special Fund were merged, a number of Latin American countries called for the 'establishment of an agency for industrial development within the United Nations system'. A counter resolution put forward by the UK, Denmark, Finland and Sweden concentrated on the expansion of operational activities through new voluntary finance. Eventually a resolution was agreed and co-sponsored by G77 countries plus a number of Western European countries and the US providing for the establishment of United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO): its administrative and research activities would be financed by voluntary contributions from member states and the UN Development Fund. The G77's enduring interest in economic questions could also be seen in the debate on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the decision to set up a UN Commission on International Trade Law. More important was the decision taken in September 1966 that joint meetings on improving the international payments system would be held for the first time between deputies of the Group of Ten (the major industrial nations of the West) in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Executive Directors of the Fund including representatives of developing states.

During this period, UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board served as the main focus for the G77. Its influence can be clearly seen in the change in the attitude of Washington on preferences in April 1967. They had realised that generalised preferences might be the best way to extend exclusive arrangement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and its African associates which worked against its own and Latin American interests.

The G77 (most of whom were members of the NAM) set up similar institutions as the NAM, which ultimately encouraged their coordinated and overlapping interests. Their first Ministerial meeting after UNCTAD I was held in Algiers in October 1967 to coordinate positions for the second UNCTAD. It was attended by 70 delegations: the meeting had, as before UNCTAD I, been preceded by regional meetings. The UNCTAD Secretary-General, Raul Prebisch, stressed the need for economic and social reforms in developing countries and close cooperation between them at the opening of the conference. There was

agreement on the need for more aid and debt relief and for access to the markets of developed countries. The Group split on how this should be achieved. The majority (most Latin Americans, India, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic) sought agreement on reasonably moderate measures which developed countries would be forced to take seriously. A militant minority (Algeria, Iraq, Senegal, Sudan and Syria) however demanded that the world economy should be fundamentally restructured.

The 1967 Algiers Charter reflected the divided opinion within the South and the differences between the regional groups. The phasing out of existing preferences was supported by the Latin Americans and Asians but not by the Africans who considered they had the most to lose. The Latin Americans, on the other hand, were less keen on giving extra benefits to least-developed countries since these were mainly in Africa and Asia. The Charter contained a general statement on the unfavourable situation for sustainable development and a Programme of Action which discussed what should be done under the headings of commodity problems and policies; expansion of exports of manufacturers and semi-manufactures; development financing, invisibles including shipping; general trade policy issues (this included an expression of dissatisfaction with Soviet bloc trade policies); trade expansion and economic integration among developing countries; and special measures to be taken in favour of least-developed countries among developing countries. The representatives decided to maintain 'continuous consultations and contacts' and to meet at ministerial level before each UNCTAD. They also decided that the 31 developing countries on the Trade and Development Board – the Groups' 'competent authority' should act for the Group between ministerial meetings, and that informal coordinating groups of the 77 should be established in the headquarter of UN specialised agencies.

The second UNCTAD conference held in New Delhi in February/March 1968, known as UNCTAD II, once again led to disappointment by the developing countries of the South since the industrialised Northern countries indicated that they were only ready to make a major contribution in the field of tariff preferences. Prebisch noted incomplete results in tackling the fundamental problems of preferences and finance; some positive results in the spheres of trade expansion among developing countries, trade with socialist countries; shipping; the food problem and policy in relations to least-developed and landlocked countries; virtually no results in access to markets and no contribution to the formulation of a global strategy for development.

In the wake of continuing disappointment, the G77 began to experience fissures around regional outlooks and technical questions. The Latin American group's concerns about the Africa and Asia partner groups were expressed at a meeting in Santo Domingo in 1968 recommending inter alia that only plenary sessions of the G77 could take binding decisions and that the Algiers Charter was not legally binding. These differences continued at the second Ministerial meeting of the G77 in Lima, Peru in October/November 1971 to discuss positions for UNCTAD III (Santiago, Chile, April/May 1972). The G77 was however able to compromise. The UNCTAD meeting followed immediately on the devaluation of the dollar and the expansion of the EEC. This meant that Western states were more concerned to negotiate their own international and monetary relations than to make concessions to the G77.

Despite the volatility produced by the changes to the financial system, concessions were made to concerns raised by the G77 and UNCTAD. Though the fundamental structures of power within the Bretton Woods institutions remained in the hands of the North, developing countries nonetheless were able to play a greater part in the IMF and the World Bank in the 1960s. A decision was taken in September 1966 that joint meetings on improving the international payments system would be held for the first time between deputies of the Group of 10 (the main Western industrial nations) in the IMF and the Executive Directors of the Fund including representatives from developing nations. The process continued after the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary order which was triggered by the US decision, in August 1971, to cease allowing the dollar to be convertible into gold. At UNCTAD III (April/May 1972) in Santiago the G77 elected 15 countries to represent them. One of the main results was agreement to include the less-developed countries in a new IMF Committee (sometimes called the Group of 20) to negotiate international monetary reform and to replace the Group of 10. This was possible because of Western divisions: the US had begun to fear the European strength in the Group of 20.[13] The G77 did not however succeed in gaining agreement for a direct link between Special Drawing Rights and development financing. They succeeded at their second Ministerial meeting in Lima (October/November 1991) in suggesting that an intergovernmental group of 24 members (eight from three regions) should be set up to review the international monetary situation, evaluate events and recommend G77 positions to appropriate fora including UNCTAD summits.[14]

As demonstrated above, the structural constraints on UNCTAD severely restricted efforts by G77 countries to win concessions from an

increasingly recalcitrant North. For instance, the discussion at UNCTAD II on the Inter-Governmental Commodity Agreements (IGA) produced a commitment to establish buffer stocks financed by both producer and consumer states but these were never implemented.[15] On the other hand, UNCTAD achieved success in promoting the idea of a Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs) which would allow developing countries market access in industrialised countries for selected manufactured products, though it has to be recognised that GSPs were first discussed at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and involved securing its agreement to be implemented.[16] Nevertheless major disagreements between the regional groups persisted on whether the IMF's role should be downgraded, what measures should be taken to help the least-developed countries, whether UNCTAD should become a specialised agency and whether the Group should have more formal institutional arrangements which might well favour the African group. Even Prebish began to despair at the unwieldy character of UNCTAD summitry saying, 'New Delhi was unmanageable.'[17] Despite these difficulties the G77 continued as did successive UNCTAD summits.[18]

2.2 The NAM and the G77 – the rise and decline of the new international economic order and North–South dialogue, 1972–84

In August 1972 NAM foreign ministers meeting in Georgetown, Guyana decided that henceforth annual meetings of non-aligned countries should be held at ministerial level in the last week of September in New York and to consider whether a standing committee (this eventually became the Co-ordinating Bureau) should be set up to review all preparatory work for this ministerial meeting.[19] Subsequently a meeting of the preparatory committee of non-aligned countries held in Kabul in May 1973 discussed preparations for the Fourth Summit in Algiers. Cambodia and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam attended as Observers: they had both participated fully at Georgetown and South Vietnam had been an Observer at Lusaka; Cambodia had had two rival delegations.

2.2.1 The Fourth Non-Aligned Summit, Algiers, September 1973

The pervasive influence of Algeria, the host to the fourth NAM summit was to dominate economic developments in regard to developing countries until the early 1980s. Seventy-five countries took part: these now made up half the member states of the international community

and between them represented the majority of the world's population. On the economic side, the conference resolved to press for the convening of a UN special session on problems of development, to establish a non-aligned economic and social development fund and to seek special measures in favour of the least-developed countries. Imperialism was stated to be the greatest stumbling block to the advancement of developing countries. At the same time socialist countries were also asked to grant more favourable terms to the non-aligned in the fields of trade and scientific cooperation.

Two significantly different views of non-alignment were expressed. The Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi declared that he supported socialism not communism and sided neither with the East nor the West. Fidel Castro announced Cuba's breaking of relations with Israel during the conference. He also denounced the theory, promoted by the Chinese, that there were two imperialist powers led by the US and the Soviet Union and stressed the need for the 'closest alliance amongst all the world's progressive forces'. The final Algiers Political Declaration maintained that previous non-aligned conferences had strongly demonstrated the aspirations of peoples for peace in the new world order founded on independence, progress and justice. It went on:

> the policy of non-alignment, together with other peace-loving, democratic and progressive forces, was an important and irreplaceable factor in the struggle for freedom and independence of peoples and countries, for general peace and equal security of all States, for the general enforcement of the principles of peaceful, active co-existence, for the democratization of international relations, for overall and just co-operation, for economic development and social progress.[20]

The Declaration also drew attention to 'the current easing of tensions in relations between East and West and progress towards solving European problems inherited from the Second World War'. It also noted that the people of the non-aligned countries must consolidate 'their independence through the effective exercise of their national sovereignty against any type of hegemony', a formula which had often been used to denote the influence of the Soviet Union.[21]

Finally the Political Declaration emphasised the need for more decisive action by the non-aligned countries to solve third-world conflicts stemming from imperialism and colonialism and stressed the need for detente between the great powers and stated that 'international

security can be achieved only if it includes the economic dimension, which guarantees all countries the right to use their own programmes of development without economic aggression or any other form of pressure'. The non-aligned countries called for 'joint action to promote the principles of economic security in international relations'.[22] A further Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation agreed on the creation of a fund to support and strengthen the effectiveness of liberation movements. A 15-member Co-ordinating Bureau (replacing the Standing Committees) was set up to make preparations for future conferences, and to coordinate governmental positions particularly at the UN.

The Economic Declaration stated that the trend towards detente had not had much effect on the development of the developing countries and on international cooperation, and that the increasing trend towards closer economic relations between developed countries should in no way adversely affect the basic interests of developing countries. The parties agreed to give priority to the elaboration of a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States at the next General Assembly. It stated that the Bretton Woods system had served only the interests of some advanced countries as well as recommending the setting up of bodies of solidarity such as Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), to defend the interests of primary producer countries. It also noted the rights of states to recover their natural resources and develop them for the benefit of their peoples within the framework of a freely chosen development programme. The Action Programme of Economic Cooperation which had been a feature at Georgetown in 1972 noted inter alia that the non-aligned should act as a catalytic force in the G77 in order to increase the effectiveness and solidarity of the developing countries (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Basic Indicators: low, middle and industrialized countries

	GNP per capita (US$), 1976	**Average annual growth (%), 1960–76**
Low-income countries	150	0.9
Middle-income countries	750	2.8
Industrialised countries	6200	3.4

Source: World Bank (1978). *Basic indicators: low, middle and industrialised countries*.

2.2.2 The North–South dialogue, 1974–6

Having established the case for a negotiated restructuring of the terms of trade and indeed economic power at NAM and through the UNCTAD, the UN General Assembly accepted the Algiers proposal for a special session on problems of development to be held in 1975. In January 1974 President Boumedienne went further by proposing a sixth special session of the UN General Assembly on raw materials and development. This action taken after the raising of oil prices by OPEC following the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 was in part due to a desire to prevent a wedge between the oil producers and other developing countries. The G77 submitted a draft Programme of Action (based on that agreed at the Non-Aligned Algiers Summit) to the sixth Special Session held in April/May 1974 which passed a Declaration of Principles and a Programme of Action on the establishment of an NIEO.[23] The session represented the height of the confrontation between developed and developing countries.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was subsequently passed in the General Assembly (December 1974) by 120–6 (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the UK and the US)–10. Major areas of disagreement with industrialised countries included nationalisation and compensation for nationalisation, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and relations between states and companies and the rights of each.

This 1974 General Assembly also saw the beginning of what became known as the North–South dialogue.[24] In October, the French President proposed the convening of an international conference on energy between producers, consumers and developing states as oil was regarded by the G77 as outside the competence of the General Assembly. A meeting in April 1975 to discuss the agenda attended by delegates from the EEC, the US, Japan, Algeria, Brazil, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Zaire, failed because of a disagreement between the industrialised countries who wished to discuss energy exclusively, and the G77 representatives who wanted a broader agenda. This disagreement provided the backdrop for the NAM foreign ministers meeting in Lima in August 1975, one of the main purposes of which was to coordinate action for the seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, for which the Algiers NAM Summit had called. This was done through documentation of 'Elements of a Strategy to Strengthen the Unity and Solidarity of the Non-Aligned countries and to Establish the New International Economic Order'. The seventh Special Session, held in September 1975, was finally able to adopt a consensus resolution on Development and Economic Co-operation since the US took a less hard line position.

These movements were part of the background to what can now be seen as the formation of the Group of 7 (or G7) and its first meeting at Rambouillet in November 1975. Proposals for a multilateral meeting of leading industrial countries had been put forward by both the US and France since 1971.[25] The original players at Rambouillet were France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.[26] This primarily 'Western' group primarily discussed their macroeconomic policies, international trade and monetary issues as well as energy, relations with developing countries and East–West trade. Flowing from the meeting was a decision to initiate 'intensified international dialogue' through four commissions (on energy, raw materials, development and financial affairs). This became known as the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC).

Meanwhile the G77 kept together in its pre-UNCTAD negotiations in 1976 despite the fact that its three main regional groups differed over the question of which commodities should be included in the integrated progamme and on preferential access to the EEC (later EU). However, they were once again disappointed at UNCTAD IV (Nairobi, May 1976). The industrialised countries were only able to reaffirm that the debt problem of developing countries would be considered constructively in a multilateral framework even though they finally agreed that a negotiating conference for a common fund should be held before March 1977.

2.2.3 The Fifth Non-Aligned Summit, Colombo, August 1976

The fifth NAM summit at Colombo was preceded by meetings of the Co-ordinating Bureau in Algiers (May–June 1976) and Havana (March 1975) as well as the Lima ministerial conference of August 1975. The latter noted optimistically that the Conference was taking place at the time of 'successes of historical movements for national liberation and of progressive forces within a process of détente which is still limited in its scope by the hardening of hegemonic and imperialistic pretensions in all their manifestations'.[27] It welcomed the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been made an Observer at the UN as well as being admitted to full membership of the NAM.

The Colombo Summit Political Declaration noted that non-aligned membership had reached 86 countries drawn from all continents. It went on to assess the role of the NAM since 1961 (again dismissing the idea that security could be ensured by countries joining one of the East–West power blocs) and proclaimed the increased role of the non-aligned in the solution of international problems. Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Sirimavo

Bandaranaike described the underlying anti–Cold War philosophy of the non-aligned countries at the UN in September 1976 as

> the deliberate choice of a large number of nations not to be drawn into the policies of confrontation implicit in the system of hostile military alliances, of the post-war era. It was for that reason a refusal to contribute to a division of the world into camps, hardening suspicion and distrust into morbid fear, consuming conflict and, eventually, a war of mutual annihilation. To the extent that nearly two thirds of the membership of this Assembly has opted for non-alignment, nearly two thirds of the world has been insulated from the waste and futility of confrontation.[28]

The Economic Declaration noted that 'breaking up of the resistance to the struggle for the new order represents the primary task of the non-aligned and other developing countries'. And the non-aligned reaffirmed their close cooperation with the G77 by stating that they had both influenced and been influenced by it. An Action Programme for Economic Cooperation was subsequently agreed.

The NAM Summit also addressed important procedural issues. A formal Decision on the Composition and Mandate of the Coordinating Bureau was reached: it should act between summits and should consist of 25 members: 12 African, eight Asian, four Latin American and one European. Thirty-two resolutions were passed including one on the use of the veto. Finally, the representatives at Colombo made the controversial decision to hold its next Summit at Havana. This was partly because the non-aligned have, on the whole, tried to rotate the Summits in line with its geographical groupings (i.e. Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America). Leading countries within the movement, particularly Yugoslavia, went on to express their fears at a NAM foreign ministers' meeting in Belgrade in July 1978 that Cuba would attempt to swing NAM more in the direction of the Soviet bloc on the premise that the socialist countries were the natural allies of the non-aligned. Yugoslavia, India and others wished to continue to stress the movement's traditional stance of keeping its distance but not necessarily equidistance from both blocs. In fact the 1979 Havana summit downgraded the role of the Co-ordinating Bureau. It was to meet once every three years at NAM foreign ministers' meetings and on a continuing basis on the level of Permanent Representatives in New York. All full members of the movement could participate in decision making if the Bureau agreed they were directly involved.[29]

2.2.4 North–South dialogue and the NIEO, 1977–9

Ministers from North and South finally met in Paris at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (significantly a conference held outside the UN framework for the reasons explained above) in May/June 1977. Consumer countries agreed to contribute to a special action programme to help individual low-income countries to establish a common fund, to finance buffer stock and to increase their volume of official aid. Although consensus was achieved on some of the broad issues discussed, no agreement on such key subjects as the relationship between the price of oil and its supply was reached. This outcome has often been described as the end of the North/South dialogue.

Under pressure from the G77, the General Assembly decided in 1977 (without a vote) to hold a Special Session in 1980 to assess progress made in the UN system on the establishment of the NIEO and, inter alia, to establish an inter-sessional Committee of the Whole (COW). Its role was to monitor and encourage work on North/South issues besides adopting a report on restructuring the economic and social sectors of the UN. Meeting for the first time in 1978, differences of opinion between the developed countries and the G77 which wished to see it used as a negotiating forum soon led to its adjournment. It was finally agreed (in late 1978) by GAR 33/2 that the COW would negotiate with a view to adopting guidelines on central policy issues as well as achieving agreement on fundamental issues underlying problems relating to international economic cooperation.

At the following Fourth G77 Ministerial meeting in Arusha in February 1979, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere stressed the need for the South to build its own power base through national and collective self-reliance and called for continuing unity of opposition.[30] He laid emphasis on the unequal interdependence of developing countries with the developed. The Declaration deplored new protectionist trends and asked the IMF's Group of 24 to intensify its work on fundamental reform of the international monetary system.

Agreement in principle on the setting up of a common fund was finally reached in March 1979, but the run-up to UNCTAD V (Manila, May–June 1979) was dominated by awareness of the continuing instability and recession in the world economy. UNCTAD V was marked by open disagreement among the G77 on the discussion of energy. Latin American countries led by Costa Rica sought to discuss this against the wishes of OPEC members. The G77 was profoundly disappointed by the failure of the conference which, they thought, was due primarily

to the negative attitude of the developed countries, particularly Group B (i.e. WEOG (Western European and Others Group)). The G77 subsequently decided at a meeting held in Sri Lanka at foreign minister level (June 1979) just after UNCTAD V, that energy should be properly discussed in global North/South negotiations.

2.2.5 The Sixth Non-Aligned Summit, Havana, September 1979

The sixth Summit was controversial and marked by a strong but ultimately unsuccessful attempt by the Cubans and like-minded countries to align the movement more closely with the Soviet bloc. The theoretical parts of the final Declaration were heavily amended by the Yugoslavs and Indians to reflect non-aligned theory while regional and other appropriate groups rewrote many of the paragraphs on regional issues. Fears about the ability of the Cubans to dominate the Summit and turn the movement away from its traditional determination not to be associated with either bloc turned out to be mainly mistaken. The Cubans were able to ensure the Cambodian seat remained empty but otherwise, they lost out on the 'natural allies' thesis (i.e. they could not get the non-aligned countries to accept that the Soviet Union was the natural ally of the movement), on the insertion of authentic non-aligned principles into the Declaration by the Yugoslavs and Indians, on the enlargement of the Co-ordinating Bureau and on the addition of a moderates' charter of procedures of the movement. The future of Zimbabwe was discussed as not only did Mugabe and Nkomo come in person to Havana but the Patriotic Front was endorsed by the non-aligned as the 'sole legitimate, authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe'.[31]

The Economic Declaration was revised even more substantially than the Political Declaration. It represented a victory for OPEC as regards the South–South dialogue. A resolution endorsed the Sri Lanka proposal for global North–South negotiations at the 1980 UN Special Session on raw materials, energy, trade and development, and finance as a contribution to the implementation of the International Development Strategy was taken to the COW meeting in New York the following week and presented there by the G77.

2.2.6 The New Delhi non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting, February 1981

Resentment of Cuba was shown at the subsequent General Assembly through the battle between Colombia, an Observer in the NAM, and Cuba, for a Latin American seat on the Security Council for 1980–1. After some 124 inconclusive ballots the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

in late December 1979 forced both countries to withdraw and the seat was won by the new contender, Mexico (a long-standing Observer to NAM and member of the G77). Fifty-four non-aligned countries voted for the resolution in January 1980 condemning the invasion and only nine voted against (Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Grenada, Ethiopia, Laos, Mozambique and Vietnam), 17 abstained and eight were absent (four of these were not UN members).

The post–Havana Summit paralysis of the movement was finally resolved by the Indians who held a NAM foreign ministers meeting in New Delhi in February 1981 and were able to get agreement on, respectively, texts implicitly critical of both the Soviet Union and Vietnam in relation to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. These formulations remained in use at NAM meetings until after 1986. Moreover, conflict between NAM continued to cast its shadow over the organisation. The onset of a brutal ground war between the Baathist government in Iraq and the Islamist revolutionary regime newly ensconced in Iran exposed a fissure in regional politics. In 1982 the Indians also agreed to host the next NAM Summit when it became clear that Iraq would not be able to do so because of the Iran–Iraq war.[32]

Permanent Members' Group 1986–90

In late 1986 the Soviet Union was ready with the other Permanent Members to discuss, at the instigation of the British Ambassador to the UN, whether the UN could provide more help to end the war between Iraq and Iran. The Permanent Members eventually achieved agreement between themselves and the other Security Council members including the non-aligned on SCR 598 of July 1987. This contained a Chapter VII determination which was then almost unprecedented in peacekeeping operations besides authorising a UN observer team to monitor the ceasefire and withdrawal.

The Soviet change of policy towards the UN was announced in September 1987 through an article by Gorbachev published simultaneously in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. This noted that the world was becoming increasingly interrelated and independent: there was therefore a need for a mechanism capable of discussing common problems. The Permanent Members could become guarantors of regional security. Subsequently the Soviet Government announced in early 1988 that it would begin to pay arrearages on its assessed contributions for peacekeeping operations.

Meanwhile the US Congress under the impact of a growing US budget deficit, the Kassebaum Amendment and a perception that United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was not successful, decided in 1986, to reduce appropriations for US assessed contributions to UNIFIL. Subsequently Congress delayed by ten months (until March 1989), the approval for funds to finance the US contribution to the Iran–Iraq observer force (United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)) and the anticipated operations for Angola and Namibia. The US administration then began to persuade Congress of the usefulness of peacekeeping, and partially succeeded in getting it to slow down the rate of withholding and to find ways of paying for old and new peacekeeping bodies.

While the US does not constitute a group in the UN and only plays a part in the electoral side of WEOG, by the end of 1986, however, it had become part of both the G7 and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process. It went on to take a position as one of the new Permanent Members Group and acted to ensure that decisions about the budget in the General Assembly should be agreed by consensus. Its attitudes to the UN over the years have been, and remain, very variable. As Anthony Parsons noted in 1987 'the trend in the 1980s has been for the major powers to address both political and economic problems bilaterally or in regional or functional groups, thus avoiding the tumult and shouting of the United Nations, which has been inexorably pushed to the outer margin of events'. This situation was reversed in the early years of the post–Cold War era following the UN's successful peace-enforcement activities in 1991 against Iraq in Kuwait. Nevertheless as late as January 1979 the US Ambassador to the UN said that the NAM had given him more trouble than the Soviet Union or China.

2.2.7 The final stages of the North–South Dialogue 1980–2

Though the North–South Dialogue process laboured on in the aftermath of the Havana Summit of 1979, in truth the changing global economic conditions had already begun to sap its momentum. The inability of non–oil producers to successfully emulate OPEC's cartel strategy, coupled to the massive sovereign debt incurred by African and Latin American governments based on false projections of high commodity producer prices being sustained, placed enormous strains on developing countries. This impact can be clearly seen in the case of Zambia and its

reliance upon a single commodity, copper. While copper prices rose in the early 1970s, the government was able to instigate as well as introduce an expanding range of social services to its population. Zambia's economic standing as a lower middle income economy was, however, fully undermined by the dramatic fall in worldwide copper prices in the late 1970s, with the result that per capita income declined at an annual rate of 5.6 per cent between 1980 and 1987, leaving it with per capita income of US$290 in 1988.[33] Similarly, in Brazil a decade of continuous economic development was wiped out by the tremendous growth of external debt and the country's incapacity to pay back loans as a result, among other things, of declining prices of Brazilian commodities in international markets.

From the perspective of the poorest developing countries as troubling as the fall in the trading values of commodities was the unwillingness of the oil-rich states to extend them any significant concessions and financial assistance to offset their economic problems. While OPEC had stated its commitment to the NIEO in a declaration in 1975, a few years later there was still little evidence that this declaration had been translated into much aid and support for putative South aims. As one scholar who produced a comprehensive study of OPEC aid said:

> In their use of aid as an instrument of national policy, the OPEC countries have behaved very much like the traditional donors. In fact any differences in the behaviour of the two groups have resulted from special circumstances rather than from conscious policy choices.[34]

Even the G77 voiced its concern with the failure of South–South economic cooperation to materialise, stating in 1981 that 'on more occasions than not, the ideas and concepts formulated in ECDC (Economic Co-operation between Developing Countries) meetings have not been translated into action'.[35]

Nevertheless the participation of Northern governments in the North–South dialogue received a temporary boost from the 1980 Brandt Commission report calling for a North–South meeting. This gave birth to a Summit at Cancun in October 1981[36] at which most Heads of Governments, with the exception of the US, agreed to participate in these global negotiations. Dialogue was given additional momentum at the G7 meeting at Versailles in 1982. According to one analyst:

> At French behest the G7 agreed to launch the global negotiations on the basis of the latest G77 text, subject to four amendments. The

> Group of 77 in New York felt able to accept two of these amendments but rejected the other two [on the specialised agencies and the nature of the detailed work of the conference].[37]

This marked the real end of the North–South dialogue but not the continuation of debate on economic questions of interest to the non-aligned countries particularly in view of the world economic crisis of the early 1980s. When the NAM foreign ministers met in Luanda in 1985 they asked that talks should be started on the establishment of a NIEO as well as reviving the demand for global negotiations to start based on UN General Assembly decisions. They also wanted a frank discussion of the serious economic position of countries south of the Sahara, 'labouring under the burden of droughts, and famine among millions of people and foreign debts. They put forward an elaborate programme to deal with the debts.' They noted, for the first time, that these were 'intolerable and that these were no longer merely an economic but a global international political problem' which must become the subject of political talks between the developing and developed countries of the West and banks and international financial institutions.[38]

The US position under the conservative Reagan administration which came into office in 1981 was that 'extraneous politicization was precluding much-needed technical agreement in one functional area after another to the point where the UN system ceased to be either useful or true to its original principle of universality'.[39] Other scholars noted 'that U.S policy has been the only insurmountable obstacle to the initiation of the Global Negotiations. Much more broadly, the United States is the leader of resistance to change in the global economic order'.[40] Much of the American disillusion and, perhaps misunderstanding of the UN system, dates from this period. At the same time, despite public differences on these issues, it should be underlined that the NAM was not always at odds with the US. SCR 435 on Namibia in 1978 was voted for by six non-aligned states and the US. US diplomacy in Southern Africa was put on the path to success when the American negotiators decided in 1981 'to operate within a UN framework and to retain Resolution 435 as the basis and pivot for a settlement' which provided 'indispensable credibility'.[41]

2.2.8 The Seventh Non-Aligned Summit, New Delhi, March 1983

The NAM Summit was finally held a year later than normal and in the month of March 1983 given the New Delhi climate. Under Indian chairmanship, the NAM concentrated more on economic questions, including the issue of debt, though overtly political issues such as

apartheid, the question of Palestine and disarmament received attention. The Summit set up a Committee on Palestine while criticism of intervention in Afghanistan and Cambodia continued to be voiced. The participants also produced a Political Declaration as well as a two-page New Delhi message on international economic relations, the arms race and Palestine. They agreed on a programme of immediate measures in areas of critical importance to developing countries and an Action Programme for economic cooperation among developing countries.

Subsequently Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, speaking to the UN in September 1983 as Chair of the non-aligned countries asked why the G7 industrialised countries should

> be afraid of the demands of the weak? It is time for bolder moves in trade and in financial and technological cooperation and a daring new initiative to eliminate global poverty by the end of the century. The demand of the developing countries for a North–South dialogue is all too often seen as yet another plea of the have-nots which has to be resisted by the haves. The world today is too complex for such a simplistic division. Political independence is not an end to problems, but only a recognition of the realities of governance in adverse circumstances.[42]

She ended by suggesting that a new order was 'struggling to be born' and its shape was not clear.

> When I speak of the new order, I am not talking merely of more effective and more widespread use of technology, however dramatic it may be…. I speak of entirely different thought processes and emotional reactions in the use of technology. We must imbue technology with deeper understanding of the difficulties of others and ensure protection against any further technological colonialism. The new order cannot be confined to the economic or social or cultural. It must encompass all of these and yet be much larger. We must create a new international order of humanity, where power is tempered with compassion, where knowledge and capability are at the service of all humanity.[43]

2.3 The Non Aligned Movement and the G77: The waning of the Cold War, 1985–89

The waning of the Cold War, coming in the wake of Mikhail Gorbachev's gradual liberalisation of the Soviet system through 'perestroika' and

'glasnost', had a tremendous impact on the South and its institutions. For the NAM in particular, the growing conformity of the main groupings of states at the UN and elsewhere (the South, the West/North and the East) which had been in operation since the early 1960s, began to change in the mid-1980s as the distinctive role played by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the Security Council started to disappear.[44] Instead, a new group consisting of the five Permanent Members was formed in late 1986. They worked closely together (initially by seeking a solution to the Iran–Iraq war culminating in the unanimous SCR 598 in July 1987) and, as occasion demanded, with the non-aligned countries of the South. The NAM and G77 also began to change meet new international circumstances.[45] Indeed, the Harare Summit of 1986 was to be the last of the old-style Summits: new thinking and less hostile material were noticeable at the major foreign ministers' meeting in Nicosia in 1988.[46]

The non-aligned and the Security Council 1979[47]

The development of closer cooperation between the Western countries among the Permanent Five and non-aligned countries on the Security Council proceeded in more slowly and, initially, more selectively than in the General Assembly. It built upon the fact that non-aligned countries had become 'increasingly assertive and conscious of their non-aligned identity during the 1970s. At the outset, they evolved a system of informal liaison with key non-aligned states outside the council. However 'in the absence of a more formal structure, individual council members continued to act primarily on the basis of charter responsibilities and national perceptions rather than particular group affinities. Although the non-aligned usually voted together, the phenomenon of bloc voting per se was, until the late 70s, largely confined to the General Assembly.' The non-aligned on the Security Council which they, of course, had expanded in the early 1960s, also began to work more closely together after they formalised their relationship, developed in 1978 under the guidance of Kuwait, in January 1979. The six non-aligned members plus one non-aligned Observer agreed to form a group with a rotating monthly chairmanship.

This change was expedited by the non-aligned experience of the way the Western Contact Group worked with African states on Namibia from 1977: there was often an advantage in using ad hoc

coalitions within this framework. The problems of Lebanon and Namibia were also susceptible to non-aligned activism and the non-aligned on the Council in 1978–9 were, luckily, 'more homogeneous and therefore, more organizable than before'. They could also use the new conference facilities completed in 1977 which permitted adjacent and private consultations among small groups. These and the device of friends of the Chair were already becoming more extensively used. The same year the non-aligned put forward a draft Security Council resolution suggesting the expansion of non-permanent members of the Security Council from 10 to 14.

At the same time, the significant economic strides made by the Newly Industrialised Economies of East and Southeast Asia had begun to impact upon the debates on economic development in the South. Starting in the 1960s, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore began to embark on rapid industrialisation by mobilising their relatively low-cost and educated labour to strategically located foreign capital and liberal market access provided by the US, Japan and others.[48] The result of these export-oriented state-led approaches to development was to produce remarkable growth rates that transformed the status of these countries to middle-income developing economies within a decade. For instance, Singapore's GDP grew at an annual rate of nine per cent between 1965 and 1980, initially on the basis of its low-cost manufacturing but increasing – through deliberate government planning – in the form of a shift to high technology and services.[49] This was accompanied by dramatic improvements in per capita income, rising from US$427 in 1960 to US$12,091 in 1990, as well as basic indicators on health, housing and education.[50] Moreover, within a few years the relocation of industries to poorer regional neighbours like Malaysia and Thailand ignited a chain of export-oriented industrialisation across the region, drawing in greater foreign investment flows from the capital-rich economies of the North. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico embarked on a similar process of development in selected sectors of their economies, posting strong growth rates in 1960s and 1970s though their domestic policies did not emphasise equity to the extent seen in Asia and resulted in wider income disparities in their societies. Even socialist economies like China took note of these developments and, by late 1978, under Deng Xiaoping had begun a historically significant programme of opening and reform that was to transform the country into a major economic power within a quarter century.

Beyond the discernible economic improvements experienced by these countries came a host of more explicitly political expressions of new-found power. The willingness to take leadership of Southern institutions and imbue them with fresh ideas and, in the economic sphere, a willingness to reconsider the place of foreign investment and the market in overall development strategy, began to exercise influence. Under the rubric of South–South cooperation, state-supported firms like Malaysia's Petronas and private multinationals like Brazil's Vale began to seek out investment opportunities and new markets in other developing countries (see Chapter 4). Concurrently, a desire to retreat from some of the more dogmatic and rigid anti-Western positions adopted by Southern institutions made these countries a voice of moderation in the wake of the more assertive radicalism of the NIEO period.

2.3.1 The non-aligned and Namibia, 1981–5

The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 had focused the attention on Southern African, specifically South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, the onset of a South African destabilisation campaign against states which hosted liberation movements and the continuing problem of apartheid within South Africa. Namibia had already been discussed in depth at an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau in Algiers in April 1981 just after a meeting by the Front Line States, a group of Southern African states supportive of independence and the anti-apartheid movement. The Algiers meeting had produced a Declaration on the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa with the support of certain Western powers who were denying the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination. The Declaration supported SCRs 385, 435 and 439; the deployment of the UN Transition Assistance Group and the organisation of free and regular elections besides deciding to increase their support for South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). The participants also produced a Programme of Action which inter alia urged the intensification of military assistance to SWAPO and appealed to the Security Council to impose global mandatory sanctions against South Africa.[51] A further extraordinary meeting of the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau on Namibia was held in New Delhi in April 1985 to evaluate the situation and to consider ways and means by which the non-aligned countries could intensify their assistance to the Namibian people. This again produced a Declaration and a Programme of Action, the latter calling for voluntary measures to sever all links and dealings with South Africa. They also condemned the South African decision to install a so-called 'internal administration' in Namibia.

2.3.2 The non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting, Luanda, September 1985

The normal meeting of non-aligned foreign ministers, usually held about a year before a Summit, was held in Luanda in September 1985. Ministers noted in their Political Declaration 'the marked deterioration of the situation in South Africa and the entire southern African region' and the 'special political significance' of convening the Conference in a front-line State. Ministers 'viewed with increasing concern attempts to weaken the foundations of the system of multilateralism and to undermine the United Nations'. On Southern Africa they 'stressed that there can be no peace, stability or security in Southern Africa until apartheid is completely eliminated'.

This was the first high-level meeting at foreign minister or head-of-state level since the 1983 New Delhi Summit. It is interesting to see that the section on South West Asia referred to the urgent call made in the February 1981 foreign ministers' meeting for a political settlement on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan besides strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference. Grave concern was expressed about Southeast Asia particularly as many of the states in the region were NAM members. Ministers warned there was real danger of the tensions in and around Kampuchea escalating over a wider area while the situation in East Timor was debated, though no concrete proposals were put forward.

2.3.3 Non-aligned ministerial meetings, New York and New Delhi, 1985–6

The next NAM ministerial meeting in New York (October 1985) issued a Special Communiqué on the Israeli attack on the premises of the PLO in Tunisia and South African aggression against Angola. This was followed by a Ministerial meeting of the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau in New Delhi (April 1986) inaugurated by Rajiv Gandhi. The meeting produced a detailed Political Declaration with special emphasis on Southern Africa. On the Middle East, they 'expressed concern over the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East caused by Israel's continued practice of aggressive and expansionist policies in the region, which poses a grave threat to international peace and security'.[52] Both Iraq and Iran made statements to the meeting regarding their ongoing conflict while a communiqué was issued noting with indignation the armed attacks by the US and the UK against Libya.

Ministers went on to emphasise the right to development and the challenges to the process of multilateralism. They noted with concern that 12 years after the adoption of the landmark resolutions on the NIEO there had been no significant progress in their implementation'.[53] They also stated that the Seventh NAM Summit had put forward a set of cohesive and balanced proposals consisting of Global Negotiations and a Programme of Immediate Measures including an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development. No substantial progress in their implementation had been made because of the absence of a positive response from the major industrialised countries. Ministers finally reaffirmed the important role of the G77 played in dialogue and negotiations with developing countries.

2.3.4 The Eighth Non-Aligned Summit, Harare, September 1986

The eighth NAM Summit demonstrated that the movement was not only able to recognise the changing international circumstances confronting the international community but to institute changes to meet these new international circumstances. Zimbabwe had been chosen to host the Summit at the 1985 Luanda foreign ministers' meeting to put more focus, both symbolically and realistically, on South African issues. 'The Indians who wished for a tougher line, were unable to break the cohesion off the Front Line States on the need for a careful approach (i.e. Western as well as African participation in sanctions). Their initiative in setting up the AFRICA Fund to help the Front Line States was, however welcomed'.[54]

By the eighth NAM Summit, the routines and procedures that guided the organisation were well set. Good organisation prevailed both at the Summit and in the drafting of the documents which are prepared by the incoming country that takes over the Chair. Since the early 1980s the incoming Chair who drafts the preparatory documents for the Summit, has to steer a middle course between the ideological 'right' and 'left' within the organisation so that one cancels out the other. This has meant that the final documents (in this case comprising a Political (324 paragraphs) and an Economic (188 paragraphs) Declaration besides an Action Programme for Economic Cooperation) normally remained in the moderate mainstream mould. The Ministers also put out an Appeal to Reagan and Gorbachev on the acceleration of the nuclear arms race; a Declaration on the 25th Anniversary of the Movement; the Declarations on Strengthening Collective Action, Southern Africa; proposals for alleviating difficulties arising from imposition of sanctions; the Africa Fund and finally a call for Namibian independence.

The incoming Chair sends the first draft to members (usually in New York) some six weeks before the meeting is due to take place. A second draft, if necessary may be circulated just before the meeting. Participants then put in numerous amendments (about two hundred in all at Harare) to the Political and Economic Declarations. At Harare the first drafts were well drafted both in terms of content and tactically: they were designed to appeal to the sophisticated mainstream of the movement (Yugoslavia, India, Algeria, Indonesia, Egypt and so on). This meant, as turned out to be the case, that amendments from the left (Cuba, Nicaragua and so on) could be played against those from the right (Saudi Arabia, Singapore and so on) particularly in relation to the Political Declaration. The material from texts implicitly critical of both the Soviet Union and Vietnam in relation to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia agreed in 1981 continued to be used. Certain US observers were concerned about some anti-US rhetoric.

At the meeting of senior officials, new items were suggested by the left – non-aggression and non-use of force in international relations (Iran), state terrorism and US threats against Arab states (Syria) and US aggression against Libya (Libya). None of these was accepted although the senior officials had undertaken to consider written suggestions. These points were remade at the foreign minister level meeting and then referred separately to the Summit (Heads of States). Ultimately both these final Declarations changed less than the drafts prepared for the previous two Summits (Havana 1979 and New Delhi 1983). On the economic side, the Summit set up a Standing Ministerial Committee for Economic Co-operation of 25 non-aligned and developing countries to evolve strategies for future cooperation. It had been recommended at a Co-ordinating Bureau meeting in New Delhi in April 1986. Outside the conference the Malaysians also succeeded in setting up the Non-Governmental and Independent Commission of the South for Development Issues (known as the South Commission – see Chapter 6) under the chairmanship of Julius Nyerere.

As so often, the one controversial subject remaining at the end of the conference was the decision as to who should host the next foreign minister and Summit conferences. The latter decision was postponed. North Korea was the only formal candidate, Libya having withdrawn. In the early hours of the morning Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iraq led the fight to ensure that the North Korean bid did not succeed. The final agreed outcome was that Cyprus (despite some Arab misgivings) was chosen to host the next foreign ministers' meeting.

One informed Yugoslav observer summed up the conference as follows:

'But what is certain at this moment is that the non-aligned countries have a greater sense of solidarity, are better organised and more action-oriented than they were at given times in the past just as it is certain that in the present political constellation in the world new avenues are opening up for the pursuit of their immediate and long-term interests and goals.'[55]

2.3.5 The non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting, Nicosia, September 1988

By the time the NAM foreign ministers met in Nicosia, the transformation of the international environment initiated by Gorbachev was gathering momentum. This was the meeting to discuss all major issues at ministerial level since the 1986 Harare Summit and to deal with these against the background of the Soviet Union's new approach to the UN. In a fundamental sense, the rationale for non-alignment itself needed to be considered in light of growing convergence between the West and the Soviet Union pervaded much of the discussion. The non-aligned countries had to decide who would take over from Zimbabwe as the next Chair; and whether and how the procedures and practices of the non-aligned could operate in a more pragmatic and active way in the context of US/Soviet Union rapprochement. They had also to update their views on a number of major issues (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran/Iraq, Palestine, Southern Africa and the Western Sahara), to restate their approach to major economic issues including debt and the Uruguay Round and to give more attention to environmental concerns.[56]

President Vassiliou of Cyprus went on to suggest that a ministerial committee be set up to study the NAM's organisation and methods of work and report to the next Summit. He further proposed that the foreign ministers should adopt a short Declaration, which they did, outlining non-aligned perceptions of their major objectives and future role. Like a number of other speakers, he noted the contrast between the hopeful political climate and the worsening economic climate. He also called for a ban on chemical weapons and noted the need to preserve both culture and environment. Unexpectedly the future role of the non-aligned was discussed in a number of meetings of the Political Committee and working papers were presented by Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Singapore, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav paper stressed the need to establish dialogue with those outside the movement, especially in the UN and to move to a more

action-oriented approach using small groups of interested countries. Methods of decision-making were also considered.

Overall one could argue that this meeting marked the growing influence of the moderate Arab and Islamic countries on the movement since Iran and Iraq had agreed to a ceasefire.[57] Pakistan managed to achieve its desiderata on Afghanistan, support for Indonesia's bid for the Chairmanship was widely accepted and Egypt, despite previous concerns about Camp David, which nearly led to its suspension at Havana, was able to ensure a suitable Summit venue. The Turkish viewpoint on Cyprus was taken more seriously and the discussion on Palestine was fruitful.

2.3.6 The Ninth Non-Aligned Summit, Belgrade, September 1989

Both Nicaragua and Indonesia, who were official candidates to host the next Summit, finally agreed to withdraw their candidatures, temporarily for the year 1989, on the understanding that the Summit would go to the European region. Yugoslavia was, with difficulty, persuaded to accept being host at a time when it was dealing with grave economic and minority problems. The Yugoslavs were also attempting to adapt to the changing Cold War climate and to give greater priority to human rights, the environment and the UN. Along with Algeria and Egypt and, on the whole India, the leadership in Belgrade remained determined to modernise the movement.[58] The desire of the mainstream to take a less confrontational and more cooperative global approach was noticeable in the short new-style Declaration modelled on the one produced at Nicosia the year before. This was designed to serve as an updated non-aligned credo of the 1990s. The NAM

> instituted a new strategy of integration in the world in order not to be left out from the mainstream of economic and technological development. Instead of the unsuccessful concept of the New International Economic Order, priority was given to various forms of regional linkages with developed countries.[59]

The NAM Summit in Belgrade was carefully staged by the Yugoslavs who wished to ensure that the procedures and rhetoric of the organisation were adapted to face the problems of the post–Cold War world. They and other modernising, moderate, mainstream countries combined (as they had at the 1979 Havana Summit when they perceived Cuban actions to threaten the NAM) to ensure the new-style Declaration laid more emphasis on human rights and the environment than had its

predecessors. They continued to seek ways to solve their major economic problems welcoming the initiative on regular consultations between North and South taken by the Presidents of Egypt, India, Senegal and Venezuela in Paris in July 1989 besides appreciating the work of the Standing Ministerial Committee for Economic Cooperation. They managed to eschew confrontational rhetoric both in their political and economic material hoping thereby to gain more response from the West. They continued to take this line at the NAM ministerial meeting in New York in April 1990 during the Special Session on international economic issues as well as at their yearly New York ministerial meeting in October.

The founding of a new grouping of leading economies in the South was announced at the end of the September 1989 Belgrade summit. The Summit Level Group of Developing Countries which came to be known as the Group of 15 (or G15) comprised countries that belonged to the NAM (Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe) and the G77, or had associations with them (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico all belonged to the G77 and Brazil and Mexico are NAM Observers). Meeting once a year, the G15 was established to promote South–South cooperation and a more positive and productive North–South dialogue. At its Dakar Summit in November 1992 the Group reaffirmed 'its commitment to a constructive and continuous dialogue with the developed countries, and in particular those within the G7, in a spirit of partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual benefit'. The G15 was determined to ensure that the South was not marginalised and retained and increased its voice on the world stage.

The consensus emerging from the Summit was that the NAM needed to maintain the moderate stance of the non-aligned and made sure that they had decided to take a less confrontational and more cooperative global approach. They had also recognised that foreign policy and domestic issues, particularly those dealing with economic questions, were becoming more and more interdependent as the world became effectively a global village. The Yugoslavs strengthened the human rights language in the final draft of their short declaration which called for inter alia 'the right of every individual to fully enjoy civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights'.[60] Even in the area of development, the ascendancy of the neoliberal economic system, with its emphasis on export-led growth, was increasingly acknowledged. It was clear that the South states were getting ready to confront issues that would face them after the Cold War had ended.

2.4 Conclusion

Both the NAM and the G77 managed to maintain cooperation if not always close cohesion and continue their basic political[61] and economic activities between 1964 and 1972 despite the threats, including the creation of a rival to the UN on the Sukarno model, and the lack of movement on questions of importance to the G77 at UNCTAD II and UNCTAD III. Their interests and concerns were consolidated and developed over the next 18 years. Their sometimes joint experiment with the NIEO and the North–South dialogue (1972–84) given life by the Algiers non-aligned summit of 1973 was to prove to be unsuccessful. Nevertheless it provided the developing countries of the South lessons in the importance of the appropriate form economic dialogue with the North: the avoidance of too much radicalism; the need to be flexible when necessary; and to safeguard assets such as oil besides ensuring some agreement on internal issues dividing members of both these Southern institutions. It also underscored the limits of South–South cooperation as a panacea for economic troubles facing the poorest developing countries, which experienced severed economic downturns and rising sovereign debt in the 1980s. Indeed by 1986 the G77 had accepted that such cooperation had to be 'self-generating, self-sustaining and self-financing'.[62]

With gradualism reaffirmed, especially so in the wake of global economic recession and the concurrent fall in commodity prices, the stage was set for the South to move closer to a changing consensus on development strategy. This found its echo in the growing affinity among some Southern countries to discourses on accountability and democratic practice, areas once seen as irrevocably negative tools of foreign intervention. In overall terms, the position emerging from the 1989 Belgrade summit as the Cold War came to an end was that the NAM needed to maintain the stance advocated by the moderate non-aligned countries and take a less confrontational and more cooperative global approach. They also recognised that foreign policy and domestic issues, particularly those dealing with economic questions, were becoming more and more interdependent.

Meanwhile influential Southern attitudes to colonialism and the Cold War were well described by the President of Sri Lanka. The non-aligned countries were flourishing as she told the General Assembly in September 1976 as a large number of nations had chosen 'not to be drawn into the policies of confrontation implicit in the system of hostile military alliances of the post-war era'. Instead 'nearly two thirds

of the membership of this Assembly has opted for non-alignment, two thirds of the world has been insulated from the waste and futility of confrontation'.[63] That these same states engaged in promoting internecine conflict both within and across state boundaries at times did not detract, at least in no more so than the gap between rhetorical and actual positions adopted by leading G7 countries on given issues, from the ideals that the NAM and G77 were willing to support.

3
The Rise of the New South, 1990–2005

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rebirth of Russian nationalism signalled for some Western pundits the 'end of history' and the triumph of liberal democracy. Certainly the ideological underpinnings of the Cold War had been swept away by the failure of the communist system and, in its wake, the emergence of market capitalism as the dominant ethos for both managing the world economic system and tackling the development dilemmas of the world's most impoverished states.

The implications for norms on sovereignty, the crucible of nation building for many Southern states, and a redefinition of the path to development were not lost for leaders in the South. For them, meeting the twin challenges of development within the dominant 'neo-liberal' paradigm and the changing terms of sovereignty in part exemplified by the new, extensive use[1] (often in relation to Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members) of legally binding resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter dealing with Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression became a primary focus as Southern countries grappled with the changing international environment. The use of Chapter VII by the Security Council to impose arms embargoes, sanctions and peace enforcement through the use of force, the growing saliency of ecological issues recognised at the Rio Summit in 1992, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the onset of further nuclear proliferation from India and Pakistan in 1998 posed new normative challenges for the South.

In the context of the post–Cold War era, the (re)balance between the norm of human rights on the one hand and sovereignty and non-intervention on the other hand became a central feature in the definition of the shared outlook of the South.[2] Similarly, the general adoption of neo-liberalism by the majority of countries, symbolised by their ascension

to the WTO in 1995, created tensions with sovereignty, territoriality and the traditional approaches to development by Southern states. In this regard, economic events outside of the framework of the United Nations (UN) system, in particular the G7/8 summits and the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, began to exercise influence over the debates and strategies in both North and South as the diminution of aspects of sovereignty gave global business interests and, increasingly, global civil society an enhanced role in shaping the international system. But interstate politics had not gone away. As demonstrated in this chapter, the NAM had much to debate at its post–Cold War summits starting at Jakarta in 1992. The US-led invasions of two of its members, Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003) coming in the wake of acts of terrorism in New York in 2001 signalled a new era of confrontation and conflict which, ironically, reinforced and simultaneously cut across developing and developed country boundaries.

Facing an increasingly complex landscape, the leaders of the developing countries by and large believed that they would have to adapt themselves to the prevailing terms of the global economy as well as to conform to the trend towards greater domestic plurality. Though much of the thrust of Southern economic activism had been aimed at the UN system in the past, the impact of globalisation introduced new dynamics, actors and institutions on the local, regional and international stage which required novel approaches to maintain Southern economic gains and enhance its political standing in international institutions. In this context, the rise of market economies like Malaysia, whose state-supported industries and private companies were competing directly with Northern businesses, played a vital role in shaping the South's initial response to the changing international economic system. Within a few years, emerging powers like Brazil, India and China, whose own economies began to surpass the traditional industrialised countries in the North, started to assume an overt leadership role in global affairs. Coalitions of Southern states such as the G15, the G20 and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) founded primarily in response to pressing trade and development issues, were able to mobilise support in favour of positions at the WTO, backed in part by an assertive civil society. The result was that a new era of Southern activism paved the way for a grand power shift in international politics the likes of which had not been seen since the turn of the nineteenth century.

This chapter will examine, first, the impact of post–Cold War environment, specifically the changing terms of political sovereignty and the new economic orthodoxy, on the South. This will be followed by

an examination of the South's response to these challenges by looking at the process of adjustment of South norms and institutions (NAM, G77 and G15) to the post–Cold War system. Finally, the rise of emerging powers and the concomitant assertiveness of the South against the background of the 'war on terror' will form the focus of the last section.

3.1 The South after the Cold War: The changing terms of political sovereignty and the new economic orthodoxy

Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 provoked widespread condemnation and the South was to be no exception. The foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Algeria and India met in Belgrade in September (under the auspices of Yugoslavia's NAM Chairmanship) and issued a statement on the crisis at their yearly New York meeting that the Iraqi invasion was unacceptable. They demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of its legitimate government and its independence. They also reiterated the need for the strict implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and asked the NAM Chair to attempt to bring about a peaceful solution. In fact, in late December the Yugoslav foreign secretary went to Baghdad and met Saddam Hussein. He put out a statement on 15 January 1991 hoping that it was not too late for Iraq to comply with the principles of law and peace and, a few weeks later, 15 NAM foreign ministers came to Belgrade to try and find a solution to the crisis: they did not succeed.

At the same time that Iraq breached traditional sovereign principles through its invasion, the aftermath of conflict produced another more fundamental challenge to the precepts of the global state system as well as questions arising from peace enforcement and the use of mandatory resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The US-led coalition's decision to maintain a humanitarian corridor across northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish minorities against reprisals by the regime in Baghdad was the first step in a process, aimed through the use of Chapter VII – subsequently reinforced after the genocide in Rwanda – at creating a legal norm for international intervention in the domestic affairs of states. Humanitarian intervention came about through a non-mandatory resolution, SCR 688, passed in April 1991. This remains unusual: further UN sanctioned missions in Somalia and the Balkans mostly agreed under Chapter VII, solidified it as a tool to prevent suffering among local populations through principles such as the 'responsibility

to protect'.[3] Overarching this development was the expansion of role of the UN Security Council in organising peacekeeping operations in terms of numbers and peace enforcement as well as making a more explicit commitment to electoral democracy.

The NAM meanwhile remained preoccupied by the need to ensure that the Security Council was more responsive to the General Assembly in terms of the need for transparency, accountability and explanations of its decision making. In what was to be an opening salvo on the issue of Security Council reform within the UN, the NAM noted its concern about the status of the veto, Chapter VII, protection of the General Assembly prerogative on finance (and the expense of peacekeeping/peace enforcement), the need for the Security Council to respect the rule of law and the General Assembly's prerogative to authorise human rights missions (unless these were connected with peacekeeping.) All these dimensions reflected the NAM member states' discomfort with the direction taken by the assertive position adopted by the Security Council in the aftermath of the post–Cold War; however, while they could agree on the need for Security Council reform there was no agreement at this point on the identity of new members or the way it should be expanded.[4]

Boutros Boutros Ghali, UN Secretary General, codified these changes in 1992 in the form of a guide to UN peacekeeping, *Agenda for Peace*, which outlined an ambitious programme for diplomatic prevention of conflicts, intervention and post-conflict peace building.[5] Indeed, within a few short years of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UN Security Council had authorised several peacekeeping operations across the developing world whose mandates (significantly often agreed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) included arms embargoes, ceasefire monitoring, disarmament, election support and sanctions.[6] Moreover, the industrialised countries of North America and Europe engaged in overt regime change through their funding of democratisation through organisations such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the German party foundations.[7]

For the countries of the South, these trends towards unbundling sovereign prerogatives were troubling. Committed to the principle of non-intervention, a position formally held since the articulation of the '*panch shila*' policies of the Bandung era and fortified by practicalities of needing this as a bolster to sometimes shaky claims to legitimacy, Southern governments attempted to blunt the impact of the new interventionist norm through actions in the UN system as well as developing a critique of cultural bias inherent in these measures (see below).

Meanwhile supporters of the 'responsibility to protect' pointed to the developing countries' past history of generating norms delegitimising colonialism, criminalising apartheid and organising armed national liberation movements in the 1960s–70s.[8]

Tied to the sense of concern with the encroachments into sovereignty was the South's growing alarm at the power and impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank[9] which, through their advocacy of 'shock therapy' and the wholesale opening of domestic markets to FDI and trade, wreaked havoc on the livelihoods of millions in these transitional countries. The euphoria of liberalisation that swept capitals like Buenos Aires, Accra and Jakarta was tempered by the onset of severe economic problems, some of which were induced by the IMF and ardent neoliberalists like economist Jeffrey Sachs. Driven by financial necessity to take on ambitious restructuring of former command or highly protected economies under the guidance of the IMF and World Bank, these transitional democracies found that the strictures of the neoliberal orthodoxy produced little of the promised growth and investment to offset the painful dislocation experienced by the national population. Russia's spectacular economic collapse in the mid-1990s was deeply sobering for developing countries to watch and, with the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997 and – half a world away – Argentina's subsequent economic disintegration, steeled them towards adopting a more critical view of neoliberalism and its institutional manifestations like the WTO.

At the same time, compromise and collusion with neoliberalism remained the dominant mode of engagement for the South, as witnessed by the ascension to the WTO in 1995. This followed upon the transformation of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1992 from a putative site for restructuring the global economic system to a research and advocacy body which sought to reform the liberal economic system. Informing this approach was, as was said at the NAM foreign ministers' Conference in April 1997, that

Table 3.1 Basic Indicators, low, middle and industrialized countries

	GNP per capita (US$), 1997	**Average annual growth (%), 1996–7**
Low-income countries	350	2.8
Middle-income countries	1890	3.8
Industrialised countries	25,700	2.2

Source: World Bank (1998/99). *Basic indicators: low, middle and industrialised countries*.

> (T)he South has lacked an up-to-date economic agenda. Its traditional platform, fashioned essentially during the 1960s and 1970s, has not been critically re-examined or reformulated in an integrated manner. Yet it has continued to serve as the basic reference for developing countries in their collective stance *vis-à-vis* the North.... Reformulating the developing country platform is also necessary in order to give expression and visibility to concerns and objective shared today by the developing countries but which have been lost sight of because they have not been formulated comprehensively, or articulated forcefully and continuously ... where simple repetition of earlier themes, however valid, no longer carries credibility or policy weight.[10]

In reformulating its 'traditional' norm on the necessity of state-led, autarkic development to better conform to the changing dynamics of the global economy, South states nonetheless sought to retain a collective position on development as well as identify the challenges and opportunities presented by globalisation. The result was to be reflected in Boutros Ghali's publication of the *Agenda for Development* and taken further with initiatives by his successor, Kofi Annan, ranging from the Millennium Summit to the Global Compact with 50 leading multinational corporations.[11]

In line with this new thinking, leaders of emerging economies increasingly saw the liberal trading environment as providing opportunities to enhance the position of their more competitive global industries and, in comparison with the non-economic sphere, relatively more responsive to pressure. Here, as in the case of Southern norms on sovereignty and non-intervention, the ability to employ the prevailing norms on liberal trading as embodied in WTO in service of Southern – or rather emerging economy – interests was a vital key to the success of this approach. The turning point, arguably, for the developing countries was their collective action alongside that of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) that blocked the proposed multilateral agreement on investment in 1997–8. Thereafter, developing countries began to articulate an increasingly assertive position. New Southern regional organisations like the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) sprung up as trade and investment arrangements based on the principles of 'open regionalism', bringing them into closer conformity with WTO rules and laying the groundwork for greater penetration of local and international capital in these regions (see Chapter 5).

3.2 Responding to the new challenges: The NAM, G77 and G15

The response of the South to globalisation ushered in new leaders determined to defend the gains of the South through reinvigorating its institutions and mobilising developing countries to address these challenges. While the traditional institutions of the developing countries, namely the NAM and the G77, remained the spine along which Southern states formulated their response to the changing global environment, a host of other groupings began to assume importance as well. Driven by a recognition of the acute challenges that developing countries were facing in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War, the leaders of the dynamic economies of Southeast Asia – and in particular Malaysia's Mahathir Mohammed – alongside prominent African leaders like Tanzania's Julius Nyerere had launched the South Commission in 1987 to consider strategies that would guide developing countries in the coming era of globalisation (see box).[12] The findings of the South Commission led to the creation of the South Centre in 1990, which, along with a host of other parastatal and civil society organisations, became a premier think tank for developing countries (see Chapter 6). The establishment of the G15 in 1989, another Malaysian initiative, provided an annual forum for leading Southern states to devise common approaches to key issues such as sovereignty, trading system and UN reform. Anchoring their responses was the continued commitment to collective action based on coalition strategies devised through the NAM process and its prodigies. At the same time, entities like the G15 and other like configurations of leading emergent powers like the G3 (which transmuted into IBSA) increasingly sought to engage the G7/8 directly.

The Role of South Commission

Mahathir Mohammed, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, announced the establishment of an independent, international South Commission under the leadership of the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. As Nyerere noted in his preface to the South Commission's 1990 book, *Challenge to the South*, the idea had been given concrete shape at a 1986 international conference in Malaysia held by the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies in cooperation with the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Kuala Lumpur. This was endorsed at the 1986 Harare NAM Summit, which was the setting up of the NAM Standing Ministerial Committee for

Economic Co-operation. The Commission's main purpose was to make a fresh and objective analysis of the formidable economic, social and political challenges confronting the nations of the Third World, and of the ways to meet them. Its purpose was to produce such an analysis and to derive from it a strategy and a set of policy and action-oriented proposals that stemmed from the South and were based on the needs of the South.

This was the first time that a group of thinkers and practitioners exclusively from the South, broadly reflecting interest and condition of different regions and countries that made up the Third World, had applied their collective mind over a period of time, to the issue of sustainable, people-centred, self-reliant development. This included a determination to highlight the immense potential of South–South cooperation. Their report, 'The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission' (Oxford University Press, 1990) adopted a non-confrontational approach similar to that of the 1989 Belgrade non-aligned Summit as well as giving unusual prominence to both effective population policies and corruption due primarily to 'excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of the government and the corporate sector'. It also accepted the new consensus on development as a 'process of self-reliant growth, achieved through the participation of the people acting in their own interests as they see them, and under their own control. Its first objective must be to end poverty, provide productive employment, and satisfy the basic needs of all the people, any surplus being fairly shared. This implies that basic goods and services such as food and shelter, education and health facilities, and clean water must be accessible to all. In addition development presupposes a democratic structure of government, together with its supporting individual freedoms of speech, organization, and publications, as well as a system of justice which protects all the people from actions inconsistent with just laws that are known and publicly accepted.'

The support of democracy and human rights remains extremely important. The report also pointed out that urgent action was needed on debt and it was in the interests of the North to do more on political, economic, environmental and moral grounds as social and political upheaval in the South was bound to affect the North in the 1990s (e.g. through refugee problems). The South had economic impact: it contributed one-fifth of global GDP before the crisis of the 1980s. These factors among others contributed to the need for

a fundamental reform of the international, financial, monetary and trading systems including the establishment of contingency mechanisms for resources flows to ensure the orderly continuation of development efforts in the face of unforeseen shocks and uncertainty.'

The report went on to suggest that a summit of representative leaders from South and North should be convened periodically under UN auspices to review the world economic situation. 'In the final analysis' (the report noted p. 287), 'the South's plea for justice, equity and democracy in the global society cannot be dissociated from its pursuit of these goals within its own society commitments to democratic values, respect for fundamental rights – particularly the right to dissent – fair treatment for minorities, concern for the poor and underprivileged, probity in public life, willingness to settle disputes without recourse to war-all these cannot but influence world opinion and increase the South's chances of securing a new world order'.[1]

Regarding the changing norms on sovereignty, the thrust of the South's response was threefold. The first focus was in the UN system itself, where Southern states held sway in most areas. Though unable to block outright a united Security Council (where a quiescent yet politically adept China and disabled Russia gave the other P5 members a freer hand), dissenting Southern governments used their positions on, for instance, the Human Rights Commission to limit or halt measures which might censure domestic conduct of states like Cuba, Zimbabwe and China. The non-aligned countries attempted to make the Security Council more responsive to the General Assembly (as Article 24 of the UN Charter calls for it to act on behalf of all UN members) partly by discussing the need to address the veto question; by raising fears about exclusivity of decision making by the Council and asserting the need for transparency, accountability and explanation of its decision making in the Council's report to the General Assembly. They also noted that SCR 678 had not provided for a clear system of reporting to the Council.[13] The emphasis on the democratisation of the UN system, especially by the Security Council including greater developing country participation was another approach and, if one looks carefully, the reformist proposals, would work towards narrowing the scope for interventionist policies pursued by the P5 by limiting or eliminating the veto outright.

The second response was the onset of the 'Asian values' debate representing a different tactic to stemming the new tide of interventionism, with a more fundamental claim that the international principles which underpinned the emerging humanitarian discourse was itself the product of cultural biases from the West and not particularly universal. Championed first by democratic (albeit 'guided') Singapore and secondly by states within Southeast Asia, eventually winning over the cautious Chinese leadership, the Asian values embodied in neo-Confucianism upheld family and community responsibilities over that of individual rights. Concurrently, as the debate took hold, the Chinese government began to initiate changes to their previously stated positions by officially enshrining economic and property rights and asserting the nobility of human rights.[14]

Finally, for some new voices within Southern states, themselves the product of democratisation of governments or an increasingly resilient civil society, support of democratic pluralism and the new interventionism or at least aspects of it was forthcoming. Perhaps the most notable expression of this was the reworking of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union in 2002, with a deliberately prescriptive approach to issues like genocide reflecting the African experience in Rwanda in 1994 that soon became a spur for intervention.

Regarding the new economic orthodoxy, the Southern response focused on the reform of international economic institutions as well as specific issues like lifting the debt burden off developing countries. In much the same way that the South sought to reform the UN Security Council, Southern efforts to gain more votes in the IMF and the World Bank sought not only to expand their influence but redefine the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) terms of engagement with developing countries. The onset of the Asian crisis in 1997 spurred a fierce debate over unregulated capital flows which were implicated in the collapse of newly industrialised economies like Thailand and Indonesia. The G15 drove the process of developing and coordinating policies for the South, though by the end of the decade it was overshadowed by emerging powers led by Brazil, India and China. Running alongside these initiatives was the growing spectacle of South–South cooperation, once primarily a slogan, which had become an important instrument in reorienting trade and investment away from its traditional North–South axis.

3.2.1 Revitalising Southern institutions: The NAM

The debate on the revitalisation of the NAM in light of the changing international environment occupied the Summits in the early 1990s.

At the core of discussions was how developing countries, against the backdrop of these changes, could best achieve the key economic and political goals which had always featured in NAM Summits and to what extent the movement itself would need to change in order to achieve them.[15] What was clear was that the NAM no longer could ignore the effect that their internal policies had upon their credibility in foreign policy nor did they seriously dispute the centrality of market capitalism to the global economic system. Driving this reformist impulse were states like Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, India and Singapore who all sought to devise new ways to maintain and expand the South's influence in an increasingly interdependent world and who thought that economic issues raised by globalisation were the main concern of developing countries.

The first acknowledgement of the new direction that the NAM would be taking was the initial draft of the main Declaration at the NAM foreign ministers' meeting in Ghana (September 1991) which was based on the previous documents produced at the 1989 Belgrade summit. The short Declaration referred, probably for the first time in a NAM document, to the fact that the NAM welcomed 'the growing trend towards democracy and political pluralism'.[16] It also considered that every individual should fully enjoy human rights while noting that the international community had yet to introduce meaningful action programmes to ensure economic and social rights in countries of the South. On economic issues, there was concern that the industrialised countries of the North would neglect the developing world as they concentrated their interests on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They therefore decided to reactivate the Standing Ministerial Committee on Economic Co-operation set up at Harare in 1986, to study the recommendations of the South Commission and report back to the next NAM Summit in Jakarta. The Chinese Government made clear at the end of 1991 that it would like to become an Observer in the NAM, a situation made possible by the break up of the Soviet Union which reduced India's influence within the movement, undermining Delhi's traditional position of blocking Beijing's application. China was subsequently accepted as an Observer at the preparatory meeting for the Jakarta Summit held in Bali in May 1992. The Chinese foreign minister in his speech to the Summit in September noted that the two main issues of peace and development facing mankind had not been resolved. China regarded closer South–South cooperation as an important part of its policy of opening up and reform. This formalised link between the NAM and China was to pay dividends in the coming years.

3.2.1.1 Tenth Non-Aligned Summit, Jakarta, August/September 1992

The convening of the tenth Non-Aligned Summit held in Jakarta[17] in September 1992, coming against the backdrop of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, was in many respects seminal to the direction that the South would take in the future. Yugoslavia and the ongoing conflict cast a shadow over the Summit and its proceedings, important positions were adopted on UN reform, disarmament and human rights. In the economic sphere, the Jakarta Summit strengthened the NAM commitment to devise responses to the challenges of development in the emerging trade system, including the launching of an initiative to lift the debt burden of its poorest member states. The Indonesians and others managed to overcome internal political divisions about the break up of Yugoslavia which they had not been able resolve at their preparatory Bali meeting.[18] The main supporters of a continuing Yugoslavia were a number of sub-Saharan African countries whose underlying concern was the importance of maintaining its territorial integrity and the precedent that would be set by the expulsion of the Federal Republic from the movement. Against them were ranged nearly all the 44 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, see Chapter 6) who were also members of the NAM, for whom solidarity with their fellow Muslims in Bosnia was to be the touchstone for international activism at this and subsequent NAM summits.

The controversy surrounding the situation in the Balkans was such that the Indonesians' first draft of the summit documents deliberately did not even mention Yugoslavia. The first mention came in the first revision of the documents which was circulated by Indonesia just before the summit was due to begin. This contained an Indonesian draft on Bosnia expressing grave concern over the tragic situation 'arising mainly from the acts of violence perpetuated by Serbian irregular forces'.[19] The battle continued in the NAM Political Committee as Islamic states led by the Malaysians submitted a draft amendment on 31 August 1992 which demanded that aggressor forces be withdrawn immediately from Bosnia; called for peacekeeping forces on the Bosnia/Serb border and the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia.[20] The Yugoslavs countered with an amendment which inter alia condemned attempts to gain territory by force and ethnic cleansing. This compromise text was reopened by Malaysia at both foreign minister and Heads-of-State level delaying the end of the meeting. The final compromise text in the Declaration strongly condemned 'the obnoxious policy of ethnic cleansing by Serbs in Bosnia'. However the issue was not mentioned in the Jakarta message

or a separate statement. The NAM called for the withdrawal of all external forces from Bosnia; the deployment of peacekeeping forces along the border besides supporting the London Conference. The Yugoslavs formally reserved their position on the text in a closed plenary session and reluctantly had to accept that the non-aligned countries had reached agreement by deciding to postpone decisions on a change of status for Yugoslavia within the NAM until its status at the UN had been dealt with at the forthcoming General Assembly.

While issues of sovereignty, conflict, territorial integrity and nationalism gripped the Jakarta Summit, the matter of economic development in the changing international climate continued to be a focus for the NAM. Pressed by their Indonesian hosts, for whom the need to refocus the NAM to the task of putting economic growth in the South and the eradication of poverty at the forefront of the global agenda was deemed crucial, the non-aligned countries shifted away from the remaining vestiges of the radical agenda in favour of accepting the prevailing market orientation of the world trade system. The 'new South' (see Chapter 4), particularly the prosperous newly industrialised economies of Southeast Asia led by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore exuded a sense of confidence, equality and ability to solve development problems. This confidence was strengthened by the use the Indonesians made of many of the ideas that had been expressed at Bandung in 1955 (see Table 3.1) where many delegates were taken to celebrate this connection the day before the Summit was due to close.[21] Indonesian President Suharto gave prominence to problems arising from protectionism, debt, commodity prices and the need for appropriate North–South negotiations as well as the importance of strengthening South–South cooperation. In devising these initiatives, Suharto had benefited from the work of an expert group under the chairmanship of Gamani Corea (a former SG of UNCTAD), who had all met at the South Centre 'to assist in identifying the current major economic challenges to the South and the approaches needed to meet those challenges'.[22]

During this period Indonesia played a key role in reorienting the NAM in line with the moderate reformist agenda. Suharto took steps to establish a closer dialogue between the G77 and the non-aligned countries since the NAM Summit (and the South Commission report) had endorsed ideas about the reactivation of North–South dialogue. Indonesia hosted a meeting of the Standing Ministerial Committee for Economic Cooperation which had been decided upon at the 1986 Harare Summit, in Bali in May 1993. Its first substantive meeting had been held in Harare in July 1988.[23] In his opening address, Suharto

noted that UNCTAD VIII and the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) had shown the 'possibility for successful dialogue and negotiation among developed and developing countries, and the recognition that problems of mutual interest can be resolved through equitably shared responsibility'.[24]

The Chair of the NAM concentrated on working with Japan, with whom Indonesia had had a longstanding and positive relationship, which was to host the 1993 G7/8 Summit. President Suharto had visited Japan after speaking to the UN General Assembly in late September 1992. At the Assembly he called for a new North–South 'compact on development and a new democratic partnership in fashioning global solutions' to global economic problems. In July 1993 he sent two memoranda to the G7; one on urgent actions on bilateral, multilateral and commercial debt of developing countries and the other an invitation to' dialogue. He also, after receiving a Japanese invitation, met the Chair of the G7/8 two days before the Tokyo Summit began.[25] This was one of the many Southern countries' attempts in the post–Cold War era to focus on the G7/8 in order to help solve its members' internal and external economic development problems. These contacts continued to grow, moving from ad hoc arrangements to increasingly frequent meetings at the G7/8 summits themselves. The Non-Aligned Declaration at the General Assembly Millennium Assembly session of 14 September 2000 welcomed both the North–South dialogues which culminated in a foreign ministers' meeting at Miyazaki as well as the meeting of the Chairs of the Non-Aligned, the G77, OAU and the Heads of State or Government of the G8 held prior to the G7/8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan in 1993.[26]

Behind the G7/8's responsiveness to NAM initiatives aimed at relaunching the North–South dialogue was a growing recognition among industrialised countries that it was the more rapidly developing countries of Asia and Latin America that were leading the revitalisation of the global economy, challenging the domination by the North and in so doing reshaping the geopolitical landscape. With 'emerging markets' of the South becoming the focus of FDI – and, crucially, both economic competitor and exports of capital – the industrialised countries had to adapt themselves to this development. A World Bank report noted that even in the two decades from 1974 to 1993, developing countries as a whole grew at a rate slightly higher (3%) than the rich industrialised countries (2.9%) and were expected to grow by almost five per cent per year in the next decade compared with 2.7 per cent in the traditional

industrialised countries.[27] On this basis *The Economist* declared that China would replace the US as the world's largest economy by 2020, India would replace Germany as the fourth largest economy and that nine of the top 15 economies of the world would be developing countries. The survey also projected the developing countries' share of world output would grow to 62 per cent by 2020 while that of the rich industrialised countries would decline to 37 per cent. At the same time, as one observer pointed out, the profound changes taking place needed to take into account the shift in economic growth and political weight towards the new South as well as the continuing entrenchment of debilitating poverty in these regions.

3.2.1.2 The non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting, Cairo, May/June 1994[28]

The foreign ministers' meeting was 'inevitably marked by the admission of South Africa as a member thus representing a historic development in the Non-Aligned Movement and fulfilling a long cherished aspiration after many years of struggle for the elimination of apartheid and the triumph of democracy'.[29] One of the main country concerns of the non-aligned had, at last, been resolved.

The Chairman's report (September 1992–May 1994) gave some indication as to how the talks between the NAM and G77 on the operationalising of the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) had panned out. Ministers decided to approve the terms of reference of the JCC which would be put into effect no later than the end of 1994 and urged it to consider issues of importance to the developing countries in particular the increasing use of political conditionalities.[30]

3.2.1.3 The Eleventh Non-Aligned Summit, Cartagena, October 1995

The reform agenda for the UN system was the central focus of the next NAM Summit held in Colombia in 1995. Fundamentally, member states were concerned that any reform efforts should not weaken UN developmental activities, though for a number of them, the trend towards interventionism in domestic affairs needed to be curbed. At the same time, they recognised that there were still differences within the NAM on the question of UN Security Council reform and that they needed to establish better relations between the General Assembly and Security Council. Although Mugabe, Mahathir and Rao all voiced concern at the outcome of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations in April–May 1995, the non-aligned countries had remained unable to agree a policy on the NPT during these negotiations.[31] NAM countries

remained deeply concerned about the UN financial crisis and pointed to the failure of certain developed states to pay their assessed contributions to the regular budget and peacekeeping operations. The phenomenon of 'mission creep', not only acted to raise costs of peacekeeping to the UN, but also contributed to the growing trend towards interventionism and its implications for sovereignty. The NAM expressed 'reservations at the emerging trend whereby peace-keeping operations evolve into operations of a military nature which are not authorised in conformity with the provisions of the Charter'.[32] Anxious to safeguard G77 institutions, two separate declarations were also made on the importance of UNIDO and UNCTAD.

The economic agenda emerging out of the NAM Summit in Colombia reflected the South's new accommodationist approach towards the prevailing global economic system. The participants called for better cooperation between the Bretton Woods institutions, other parts of the UN and the WTO. They encouraged the Chairs of both the NAM and the G77 to give increased focus to priority issues for development and identify ways of maximising the development impact of globalisation and liberalisation while minimising the dangers of instability and marginalisation. South–South cooperation was held out to be an essential feature of this response. The non-aligned countries decided to set up a troika of past, present and future Chairs to maintain continuity and focus between Summits. Moreover, through the newly established JCC, the NAM moved towards a policy of devising closer forms of cooperation with the G7/8.

Colombia went into new territory by inviting at least three NGOs to the NAM Summit: Greenpeace, the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (organisations such as the ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross – have been long-time 'guests') and the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Controversy over possible new members or guests was strong. Turkmenistan became the 113th member of the NAM while Ukraine became a guest following in the footsteps of permanent member Russia which had been given guest status earlier in 1995. Japan's bid to be a guest – motivated in part by its UN Security Council ambitions – failed on account of opposition from North Korea as well as India. Costa Rica was denied membership (it is an observer) by certain Arab states because of its Embassy in occupied territory of Jerusalem. Bosnia, a guest, was unable to get membership and Macedonia was denied guest status due to behind-the-scenes pressure from Beijing (as it recognised Taiwan). Tensions over dismembered Yugoslavia had, yet again, risen to the surface.[33]

3.2.1.4 The non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting, New Delhi, April 1997

The key subject for non-aligned countries at this meeting, especially India which expressed hopes of becoming a permanent member, was the question of UN reform, particularly the possible expansion of the Security Council. Their review in the Political Declaration went back to their position paper of February 1995. Ministers also adopted a separate Declaration[34] of the Open-Ended Working Group which emphasised the five points below plus-NAM considerations on Security Council reform and expansion taken in part from the Cartagena Political Declaration. The five points were as follows:

1 There shall be no partial or selective expansion or enlargement of the membership of the Security Council to the detriment of developing countries.
2 Efforts at restructuring the Security Council shall not be subject to any imposed time frame. While recognising the importance of treating this issue as a matter of urgent attention, no effort should be made to decide the question before general agreement was reached.
3 Ministers decided to remain seized of the issue and its development which they will review at their next annual meeting on the occasion of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly.
4 Use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual elimination.
5 Improvement of the working methods of the Security Council should be given equal importance.

NAM foreign ministers also reaffirmed NAM proposals in their Final Declaration. If there was no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should only take place in the non-permanent category. Significantly, the NAM called for the P5's veto power to be changed so that it should only apply to action taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This would not, however, shield these states from UN intervention into their domestic affairs as well as preserve the primacy of the sovereignty principle more generally. Seventeen Chapter-VII resolutions were passed in 1997 both setting up peacekeeping and peace-enforcement (SCRs 1101 and 1114) bodies as well as imposing sanctions and cooperation with an international tribunal.

The NAM also called again for a significant improvement of the annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly besides

underscoring the need for operationalising Article 50 of the Charter (i.e. enabling help to be given to states affected by changes within states against whom sanctions had been imposed). The Final Declaration noted that there was now an opportunity of banning and eliminating nuclear weapons, the only weapons of mass destruction still not banned, and that those who had them still lacked the political will to accept the overwhelming wish of the international community, led by the NAM.

3.2.1.5 The Twelfth Non-Aligned Summit, Durban, August–September, 1998[35]

The impact of the Asian crisis and the sudden surge in nuclear activity by India and Pakistan dominated the proceedings in Durban. Apart from economic issues (the non-aligned countries were particularly concerned to understand the Asian economic crisis as well as to find out how to make globalisation work for them) the South spent most of its political energy trying to find acceptable ways to deal with Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests detonated respectively on 11 and 28 May 1998. These were addressed by the Political Committee, chaired by President Khatami of Iran (who was at that time also serving as chair of the OIC). The Iranians used the NAM Summit as an opportunity to push their idea of a dialogue between civilisations.

The handling of the sensitivities of the nuclear testing issue was finessed by the addition of a sentence to the section on disarmament and international security stating that the non-aligned countries 'noted the complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which underlined the need to work even harder to achieve their disarmament objectives, including the elimination of nuclear weapons' as well as reiterating the 'the need for bilateral dialogue'.[36] There was also a reference in the section on Southeast Asia to the importance of the coming into force of the treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone. All nuclear weapons states were encouraged to extend their support and cooperation by acceding to the protocol of the treaty. Non-aligned states that were party to the NPT regretted the lack of a substantive result from a meeting of the NAM's Second Preparatory Committee due to the insistence of one delegation to support the nuclear policies of a non-party to the NPT (Israel and the US). They also called for an open-ended standing committee to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the NPT at its 2000 review conference.

The NAM agreed to a number of items in its chapter on global issues including a review of the international situation and the role of the

non-aligned as well as disarmament and terrorism. They continued to call for consultation with the G8 and shared concern at the weakening of the role and function of the General Assembly. They emphasised their gross under-representation on the Security Council and stated that its expansion must be determined on the basis of principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of states. Reflecting the South African input, the chapter on social issues reaffirmed that human rights were universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and that the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner.

The Durban economic chapter included material on the new context of international economic cooperation, agenda for development, international trade and South–South cooperation. Coming against the backdrop of the Asian economic crisis, participants like Malaysia were concerned about the marginalisation of many non-aligned countries under the impact of globalisation and liberalisation.[37] Ministers also discussed the conclusions of an ad hoc Panel of Economists set up at the New Delhi foreign ministers' meeting of 1997. A number were concerned that almost exclusive emphasis on the role of unfettered markets had displaced key principles that had underpinned earlier multilateral negotiations. New global negotiations needed to be based on genuine interdependence, mutuality of interests, common benefits and shared responsibility. Indeed, Malaysia reminded others that Southern resistance to Northern attempts to introduce some non-tariff barriers had been successful during the negotiation on the establishment of the WTO in Marrakech in 1994 because the South had been strongly united (Table 3.2).

3.2.1.6 The non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting, Cartagena, April 2000

Non-aligned foreign ministers met for two days at Cartagena before many left for the first South Summit in Havana (see below), underscoring the close relationship between the NAM and the G77, and one

Table 3.2 Structure of Production: Distribution of GDP, 1997 (%)

	Agriculture	**Industry**	**Services**
Low-income countries	34	26	40
Middle-income countries	15	41	44
Industrialised countries	3	37	60

Source: World Bank (1998/1999) *Structure of Production: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product, 997 (%)*.

which institutionalised these ties. They noted the paramount importance of following the UN Charter strictly besides reiterating their firm condemnation of all unilateral military actions including those made without proper authorisation from the UN Security Council. They affirmed full respect for the founding principles of NAM laid out at Bandung and in the UN Charter. They also adopted the Plan of Action formulated on the basis of decisions taken at the 12th Summit. On UN reform they stressed that these should focus on strengthening the role of the organisation in promoting international cooperation for development. The imposition of sanctions was a matter of serious concern for non-aligned countries. And they pledged their full support to the Millennium Summit in 2000. They endorsed the proposal by the JCC of the NAM and G77 that the overarching theme should be the Role of the UN in the twenty-first century and that ttwo subtopics should be (1) Peace, Security and Disarmament, and (2) Development and Poverty Eradication.

Changing North–South voting in the UN

The changes over the decade were reflected in voting patterns within the UN. Between 1980 and 1985, the Permanent Members voted together on 75 out of 119 Security Council resolutions. Their converging interests were illustrated by the fact that they voted together on 68 out of the 79 resolutions passed between 1986 and July 1990 as the Cold War came to an end. They differed on such subjects as Afghanistan, Palestine/Israel, Cyprus, the Falklands, the Gulf, Iran/Iraq, Lebanon, Namibia and South Africa. Vetoes were cast by four different Permanent Members (China was the exception) on some of the subjects noted above as well as US intervention in Grenada, Iran and Nicaragua. Non-aligned interests changed less. They voted together on 113 of the 119 resolutions passed between 1980 and 1985 and on 79 of the 79 resolutions passed between 1986 and July 1990. Both groups voted together more than they differed. Each voted together on 72 resolutions out of the 119 passed between 1980 and 1985 and on 68 resolutions out of the 79 between 1986 and July 1990.

Over this decade the differences and convergences on rights between the non-aligned and some in the West were expressed in the mid-1980s through the vote in the General Assembly on the

right to development in December 1986. The vote, 146 to 1 (US) to 8 (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden and the UK) showed that the non-aligned continued to take these human rights issues seriously. Both groups were also aware of the legitimacy that could be given to solutions to problems if one worked through the UN. This route, as has already been noted, was used by Chester Crocker in the context of the negotiations over Namibia from 1981 onwards.

3.2.2 The G15: Towards a G7 of the South?

During the ninth NAM Summit held in Belgrade in 1989, a new coalition of developing states emerged called the G15. A Malaysian initiative (see Chapter 4), the G15 was launched with a mandate to tackle the prevailing financial architecture and emerging trade system to ensure that it takes into account the interests of leading developing countries. The G15 represented a revamped South strategy to adapt to the challenges of a waning Cold War order. The deterioration of the developing countries' common front during the 1980s, given the plight of external debt and the resulting increased dependency on international financial institutions, led to the realisation that transformations in the model of South collective action were needed. In the Belgrade meeting, NAM members envisaged a new collective strategy based on a compact cluster of like-minded developing states which have achieved superior levels of economic development and political influence. Given their strategic advantage vis-à-vis the least-developed members of NAM, this small but critical group of states should come together and start a new dialogue with the North represented by the G7 most industrialised nations. This political reorientation of the South was further refined with the establishment of other groupings of the same kind such as the G20 and IBSA (or the G3) both created in 2003.

The actual engagement of some G15 states was complicated by their changing development thinking and macroeconomic preferences. In fact, attendance to the annual meetings was erratic with a number of states either sending lower-ranked officials or not been represented at all. Mexico, for example, had low profile participation at the G15 Summits during the 1990s. It was mostly due to the Mexican government's wariness of the impact the G15 could have on the ongoing negotiations with the US and Canada to establish the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).[38] From the late 1980s, key members of the G15,

such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, started to implement drastic neoliberal reforms on their domestic systems in line with the 'Washington Consensus', meaning the liberal economic orthodoxy promoted by the US government and international financial institutions with particular emphasis on market-oriented policy reform in Latin America. The 'neoliberal consensus' that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall strongly influenced the economic principles of development policies in developing countries. In the early days of the G15, the diplomacy of its Latin American members was intensively involved with negotiations to create free trade areas with the US and Europe rather than being preoccupied with initiatives to improve political coordination within South groupings such as the G15.

However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the economic stagnation experienced in Latin America during the 1990s showed the limits of free-market economic policies as a panacea for development. As a result, newly elected leftist governments such as those of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, of Nestor Kirchner in Argentina and of Lula da Silva in Brazil reoriented their development and foreign policies giving a new impetus to the G15. It currently consists of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The G15's proximity to the NAM is closer than initially envisaged, so that for example at the fourteenth NAM Summit in Havana, the next head of the G15 was elected. In certain respects the G15 is becoming overshadowed by the activist role of the emerging South powers like IBSA and even China, so that it may be accurate to characterise it as primarily an instrument of middle-income developing nations. Indeed the objective set out by the founders of the G15 back in 1989, to establish a kind of elite group of South states to act as an interlocutor with the G7/8 nations, has evolved towards smaller groupings or even single states with presumably a vested authority to negotiate on behalf of all developing states.

3.2.3 The G77, UNCTAD and the South Summit, Havana, April 2000

The influence of UNCTAD VIII Summit held in Cartagena, Columbia in February 1992 was paramount to the changing perceptions and development strategies employed by the South. The continued unwillingness of the North to link the organisation's activities to the ongoing GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations under the Uruguay Round spelled the end of the politics of confrontation.[39] As one scholar notes

> The Cartagena Conference initiated a reform process with widespread changes in UNCTAD's organisation and mandate. Until these … changes UNCTAD could be viewed as a counter-hegemonic organisation resisting the dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions.[40]

The inability of UNCTAD to meet its core aims of serving as a site for renegotiation of the structure of the global economy was widely acknowledged by this time[41] but the desire to retain it as an institution which nonetheless represented the South's interests in trade and development matters. Organisational reform, including adopting itself to the technical features of the Bretton Woods institutions to allow for closer comparison and collaboration followed, laying the foundation for what was called 'a new development partnership' that embraced the prevailing liberal trading regime. Its critics within Southern civil society, while bemoaning its demise as an alternative to the GATT/WTO, were harsher still:

> UNCTAD has been too long a club of Southern governments and states that are uncomfortable at the examination of their internal political and economic arrangements. UNCTAD, in other words, must see that its constituency goes beyond governments to include, more fundamentally, their citizens. Thus, UNCTAD must not only solicit input from civil society and non-governmental organizations but also open up its decision-making processes to them.[42]

By UNCTAD IX in 1996, under the chairmanship of South Africa, the organisation had moved towards implementing targeted critiques of specific areas on concern through its published research on, for instance, the adverse effects of structural adjustment and the development implications of trade proposals under consideration at the WTO.

The G77, which had seemingly slumbered since the close of the North–South debate and the recasting of UNCTAD, awoke anew in the late 1990s. Following the renewed call for a North–South dialogue by some Southern states and the rising tide of anti-globalisation activism on economic issues taking place outside of the UN setting, the G77 convened what came to be called the 'South Summit' in Havana in 2000. This important G77 summit produced two major documents: the South Summit Declaration and the Havana Programme of Action. The Heads of State and Government of the developing countries noted they accounted for almost four-fifths of the world's population. They sought

to establish a world order that would reflect their needs and interests while also laying the foundations for a more effective system of international development cooperation. They would exert every effort to shape the future. The South Summit was addressed by South African President, Thabo Mbeki, in his capacity as chair of the NAM. He noted the important and positive role played by the JCC of the Non-Aligned and Group of 77 over the past few years in advancing common positions of the developing countries on different global issues.

The Havana Programme of Action was structured round the concepts of globalisation, knowledge and technology, South–South Co-operation, North–South relations and institutional follow-up. On globalisation, delegates drew attention to the growing income gap between developed and developing countries as well as the increased marginalisation of a large number of developing countries and the vulnerability of Southern countries being integrated into the world economy shown up by the recent financial crisis. They decided to work for developing country interests on critical economic issues in the IMF, World Bank and WTO. They went on to note the fact that developing countries lagged far behind in knowledge generation and the growing 'digital divide' between North and South. Among their recommendations was a decision to establish a consortium of knowledge and technology between governments and the private sector initiated by the Chair of the G77 and to strengthen South–South cooperation in the area of social development. On North–South relations they considered that developed countries had weakened their commitment to international cooperation in support of development since the 1980s partly due to the 'Washington Consensus' which gave unprecedented scope for decision-making to the Bretton Woods institutions. North–South dialogue was needed to restore an international focus on and correct the imbalance against developing countries in the international economic system. The strengthening of the office of the Chair of the G77 in New York (appointed for a year each in January) was one outcome of the Summit, giving it a role in monitoring South–South projects and, finally, it was decided to convene a second South Summit in 2005.[43]

The G77 Declaration noted that developing countries were committed to a global system based on the rule of international law, democracy in decision-making and the UN Charter. They drew attention to the importance of regional cooperation and integration as well as to the growing scientific and technological North–South gap. They evinced grave concern over the impact of economic sanctions, the so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention as well as the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

On the Millennium Summit they reaffirmed the need for the G77 and the non-aligned countries to coordinate their positions and agreed the position adopted at the Cartagena foreign ministers' meeting.

3.3 A World Divided: The war on terror and the South, 2001–5

The surprise terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington had a distinctive and significant impact on global affairs. For the South, in the immediate period following the event, it raised questions around a cluster of issues involving sovereignty, security and their links with development. Over the longer term, the situation in the Middle East became a focal point for US foreign policy, leading to armed intervention and regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq that was ultimately to undermine expressions of sympathy in many parts of the developing world. At the same time, fears of the destabilising effects of radical Islamic movements brought some Southern states like India, formerly a major critic of US policy, closer to Washington.

South Africa's Permanent Representative in New York as Chair of the NAM issued a statement on 14 September 2001 condemning the terrorist attacks besides expressing its deepest sympathy and sincere condolences to the victims and families of the victims. He noted inter alia that the Durban Summit had 'urged all States to cooperate to enhance international co-operation in the fight against terrorism'. The subject was brought up in five paragraphs of the Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Non-Aligned Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of 14 November 2001 during the 56th session of the General Assembly. The participants welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (UNGA resolution 49/60), the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. They strongly and unequivocally condemned the terrorist acts of 9/11. They called for an international summit conference under UN auspices to formulate a joint organised response of the international community to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and emphasised that international cooperation to combat terrorism should be conducted in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter, international law and relevant international conventions.[44]

For the US, the spectacle of international terrorism at home not only spawned a reconsideration of the policy of pre-emptive strike but also

a need to build allies in areas of the world that had been neglected since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The convening of a UN conference on finance and development at Monterrey in 2002 produced a high level of participation, including unprecedented attendance by George Bush, and a re-commitment by the North to broadening its aid policy to meet the Millennium Development Goals agreed to two years before.[45] Moreover, the limits of trade liberalisation, which had been focused on opening markets in the South, took centre stage with the resistance by Washington and Brussels to further opening to agriculture products from the South being a main bone of contention.

At the same time, despite the expressions of sympathy following 9/11, the divisions between US, its allies and many states within the South were evident in the acrimonious debates on defining terrorism. The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September, in addition to calling for closer global coordination on restricting financial assets of terrorist organisations and intelligence cooperation, established a Counter-Terrorism Committee. Its work became bogged down in definitional disputes between Southern countries which wanted both a broader explanation of the root causes of terrorism and to exclude liberation movements form the category of 'terrorists', a position resisted by the US and its allies.[46]

South African report on the activities of the NAM during its full term as Chair, September 1998–February 2003

The South African Government issued a 24-page report during the 2003 Kuala Lumpur summit on the wide range of activities taken on by the Non-Aligned during their full term as Chair (September 1988–February 2003) which shows well how the non-aligned operated. They noted that the aftermath of 9/11 had demonstrated the need for international solidarity in combating the scourge of terrorism, but at the same time they were reminded that there continued to be a need for the independent voice of the 114 countries of the NAM in a world dominated by a few powerful and rich countries. They went on to discuss major conferences in which they had taken part including the WTO's Doha Ministerial Round, the Finance for Development Conference and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) as well as the Zimbali discussions on revitalising the NAM. They noted the Chair and New York's Co-ordinating Bureau's involvement with the NPT 2000 Review Conference, the Millennium Summit,

the G8, Sudan sanctions, Zimbabwe and Palestine. The Bureau also dealt with reports of the work of the nine NAM Working Groups and Committees on Disarmament; Peacekeeping; Human Rights; the Sixth Committee; Restructuring the Security Council; the Non-Aligned Security Council Caucus, the Troika of NAM Ambassadors, Palestine together with non-aligned activities in Geneva and Nairobi. Other issues dealt with by the Bureau included Kosovo, the resumption of the General Assembly's Tenth Emergency Special Session on Illegal Israeli Activities in Occupied Palestinian Territory, humanitarian intervention, the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and questions of methodology.

The report also covered South–South Co-operation including health matters and the need to devise an economic agenda for the South; and a non-aligned contribution to the foreign ministers' OIC session in Kuala Lumpur in 2000. On coordination with the G77 and China, the JCC aimed at enhancing developing countries' solidarity within the UN. The Committee also worked on issues such as the Millennium Summit sometimes with the European Union, negotiations on reform and improving the working methods of the General Assembly. The NAM Troika developed North–South Dialogue agendas, with help from t he JCC, for annual meetings at Ministerial level in New York between themselves and the Chair of the G8 and the EU. They became increasingly concerned as to the consultations with the G8 beginning with a NAM message to the Cologne Summit in 1999. This was sent as a letter noting the NAM position on globalisation, external debt and international trade from former President Mandela just before the Summit to Chancellor Schroeder. The NAM Troika plus a representative of the G77 Chair and China went on to meet the G8 foreign ministers in Cologne. They also participated at both senior official and foreign minister level at the Summits at Okinawa 2000, Genoa 2001 and Kananaskis 2002. The NAM Troika, the Chair of the G77 and the foreign minister of Thailand as President of UNCTAD and Chair of ASEAN attended a meeting at Miyasaki Japan with G8 foreign ministers in July 2000. G8 leaders met three Heads of State of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa representing the South. They also met G8 leaders in Tokyo. Interestingly the Okinawa Summit was the first G8 Summit focussing on the agenda of the South and the needs of developing countries. This demonstrates the lack of interest of the G8 in these problems between 1975 and 1999.

3.3.1 The Thirteenth Non-Aligned Summit, Kuala Lumpur, February 2003

The most important question that the non-aligned countries had to address was their role on Iraq given the looming threat of war. The NAM Heads of State declared their belief that a war in Iraq would be a destabilising factor for the whole region and bring about far-reaching consequences for the world besides affirming their commitment to the non-use of force and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and security of all UN member states. They supported efforts to avert war and called for these to be based on multilateral as opposed to unilateral actions and as well as reaffirming the central role of the UN and the Security Council.

They welcomed Iraq's decision to facilitate the unconditional return of UN Inspectors in accordance with SCR 1441 and called for Baghdad to comply with this resolution besides asking that its disarmament efforts should constitute as step towards the lifting of sanctions in accordance with SCR 687. Peaceful resolution of the crisis would ensure that the Security Council could guarantee Iraq's sovereignty in compliance with paragraph 14 of SCR 587 on the establishment in the Middle East of a 'weapons of mass destruction free zone', which notably included Israel.

Mahathir in a speech to the business forum on South–South cooperation noted that an attack against Iraq would simply anger more Muslims who saw this as being anti-Muslim rather than anti-terror. He contrasted attitudes to Iraq with the mild Western admonishment of North Korea which had withdrawn from the NPT. In his speech to the Summit he also referred to Israeli state terrorism and the double standards of many Europeans on Israel/Palestine.

The statement on Palestine expressed grave concern at the continuing destruction of Palestinian society and the Palestinian Authority by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000. These had undermined the Oslo agreements and the Israeli forces should withdraw immediately. The main danger to the realisation of the national rights of the Palestinians was settler colonialism in Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem. It drew attention to the legal obligations of States Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as Additional Protocol 1 and the need for their effective enforcement. It reiterated the NAM's desire for a peaceful solution and called for consultation between the non-aligned countries and the leading Northern mediators while welcoming the Arab League initiative of March 2002. The Heads of State maintained their unequivocal condemnation of international terrorism

besides calling for an international conference to define terrorism and differentiate it from the struggle for national liberation. India took the lead in resisting the Malaysian proposal for the early convening of such a conference. Differences between the North and non-aligned countries continued on the matter of Zimbabwe and the imposition of targeted diplomatic sanctions.

The NAM Summit was followed by the normal meeting of foreign ministers in Durban in August 2004 which issued a Declaration on Multilateralism. Ministers 'expressed strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed methods' and reaffirmed the centrality of the UN Charter and the principles of international law in the preservation of international peace and security.[47] Underdevelopment and poverty remained cardinal concerns on the agenda of the South. Globalisation and technological advances had created more interdependence and therefore required developed countries, developing countries and international institutions to intensify partnerships and coordinate resources to effectively address the imbalance of the global agenda. The central challenge for the international community was to undertake its commitment under the Millennium Declaration to make globalisation a positive force in which the benefits were shared evenly by all.

3.4 A New North–South dialogue: The G8 plus

While American unilateralism in Iraq, coupled to the prospects of regime change and long-term occupation of Afghanistan by NATO forces, raised particular concerns and vociferous criticism in nearly all corners of the South, alongside this was the onset of a process of dialogue between North and South that held tremendous significance for the developing world. Recognition of the growing economic power of countries like Brazil and China, which had transformed themselves through a state-led process based on strategic use of FDI, manufacturing and access to industrialised markets, caused many in the North to consider ways of drawing them, albeit selectively, into direct dialogue. Beyond this rationale for closer ties with the South's leading economies was the growing desire to engage with them on a range of global issues, from the 'digital divide' and the debt crisis to the environment and terrorism. The result was that the ad hoc inclusion of leading developing countries at the margins of G8 Summits, as well as their participation in other venues like the annual World Economic Forum meetings, gradually became formalised into a regular dialogue.

The G20 and the new radicalism

Following the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, which unexpectedly erupted into a riotous protest outside and a stalemate inside the conference hall, the battle lines between developed and developing countries were redrawn. A newly assertive coalition of interests among Southern states, led by emerging powers in the South such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa seemed to be presenting the North with a unified stance of resistance after a long period of South–South disarticulation.[48]

During the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003 this renewed South–South engagement became clear through the activism of the G20. Led by the diplomacies of Brazil, China, India and South Africa, the G20 pulled together the largest economies of the developing world alongside least-developed nations like Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador. In spite of the diffuse economic interests of its members, the G20 became in Cancun a strong voice of resistance to a perceived collusion between the US and Europe to consolidate their subsidising policies on agriculture. In the final stages of preparation to Cancun, in August 2003, the EU and the US put forth a joint draft on agriculture at the expense of the interests of developing nations. In response, a counter-proposal was signed by the representatives of 20 developing nations. This document officially established the G20.[49] (Concurrently, a grouping of the poorest developing countries, calling itself the G90, was created.)

In addition to agriculture, the G20 coordinated its actions in Cancun to prevent the inclusion of the so-called 'Singapore issues' (investment, competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation) in the WTO agenda.[50] These issues are seen as a major threat to the policy autonomy of developing states and ostensive differences over their inclusion eventually led to the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial. In the 2005 Ministerial in Hong Kong, the G20 maintained its strong posture yet progress was minimal in breaking the stalemate with the North. Principles and a clear time period for reducing tariffs and subsidies remained unresolved.

In spite of the actual failure of trade negotiations, the conclusion of the Doha 'Development' Round in July 2006 saw the resurgence of a proud and invigorated G20 led by the emerging powers of the South. In this sense, the following statement of Kamal Nath,

India's Commerce Minister, captures the vision underlying the common aspirations of the G20 as an established player in trade negotiations:

> This is a Development Round, completing it is extremely important but equally important is the content of the Round [...] This Round is not for perpetuating the flaws in global trade especially in agriculture, it's not to open markets in developing countries in order for developed countries to have access for their subsidized products [...]. We say the Round should correct the structural flaws and distortions in the system, and there should be fair trade, not only free trade.[51]

The first such initiative by the G7/8 was in Cologne in 1999, when leading developing countries were invited to attend the discussions on maintaining international financial stability as well as reducing the debt held by the world's poorest economies, the majority of which were in Africa. The industrialised North made 'the commitment to work together to establish an informal mechanism for dialogue among systemically important countries, within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system'.[52] By 2000, the Japanese government invited Africa's leading countries – South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal – to discuss ideas surrounding the proposed partnership between the G8 and Africa. Subsequent G8 Summits in Genoa, Kananaskis and Evian all included a special day devoted to discussing the terms and commitments of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).[53] Following the G8's Evian Summit in 2003, the leaders of India, Brazil and South Africa, which had characterised their pre-Summit coordination activities as the 'G3', decided to develop their collaboration on a more sustained basis and formed the IBSA process (see Chapter 6). In an acknowledgement both of its growing economic power and its role in Africa, China was invited to attend the G8 Summit at Gleneagles in 2005 by the British government as were Brazil, India, South Africa and Mexico.[54]

Concurrent with these events were the annual World Economic Forum meetings in Davos, which spotlighted the growing salience of emerging markets to the global economy. For instance, studies comparing the economic significance of the OECD countries with the BRICSAM (Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa and Mexico) point out that while BRICSAM's collective GDP is 21 per cent of the OECD's and

its purchasing power parity is 66 per cent of OECD levels in 2005, the current trends suggest that BRICSAM GDP will be greater than OECD by 2045 and the purchasing power parity will exceed it in 2015.[55] The diminishing role of Bretton Woods institutions in funding development projects in the South, when compared with either commercial banks or emerging donors like China's Exim Bank (which provided US$12 billion in loans to Africa in 2005 alone, far in excess of the World Bank), seemed to sideline traditional development financing institutions.[56] Contributing to the disenchantment with Northern-dominated institutions, even among ardent market-oriented states of the South, was Argentina's default on US$9.8 billion of IMF loans in late 2001. Like the Asian crisis of 1997, the collapse of Argentina's economy shook the proponents of neoliberalism not only because it seemed to underscore the fragility of progress but also due to the conduct of the IMF (and, within its structures, Northern governments) in managing the crisis.

3.5 R2P, the Human Rights Council and the Changing Norms on Sovereignty

In the aftermath of the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the Canadian government spearheaded a process aimed at formalising the emerging norms on international intervention. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty produced a document, 'The Responsibility to Protect' (subsequently referred to as R2P), which sought to find a framework which would reconcile the problematic of sovereignty with the imperatives of human rights. The then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, working with the UN Representative for Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, played a key role in this reformulation of the right to intervene as a responsibility of states.[56] R2P was debated at the UN's World Summit in 2005, the follow-up to the Millennium Summit of 2000 and the event which was to have marked the reform of the UN Security Council among other things. The failure to achieve this ambitious restructuring notwithstanding, the UN members states agreed to a non-binding resolution endorsing the R2P, a position that were reaffirmed by SC Resolution 1674. In an unexpected twist, while China and India (initially joined by the US) evinced objections to the notion of intervention as portrayed in R2P, the member states of the African Union supported the concept as did others like Argentina breaking with solidarity on this question.

A similar pattern accompanied discussions around the establishment of a new Human Rights Council with many countries of the South lodging objections to the proposed procedures and terms, supported by the US, while the bulk of Northern countries along with a number of developing countries which provided backing. The key innovation was the provision which allowed the General Assembly to vote by a two-thirds majority to suspend the rights and privileges of a member state found to be in consistent violation of human rights. Objections made by NGOs that these procedures were not sufficient to guarantee that gross violators would come under international censure were given short shift and the new Council was established in 2006.

3.6 Conclusion

The divisive politics of the Cold War had meant that, with the exception of the functional agencies and the occasional political crisis, the two superpowers had effectively marginalised the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. The breaking of the ideological logjam after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 introduced new opportunities for the international organisation to take an active role in the resolution of conflicts between states and, increasingly, within states. This impulse aimed initially at humanitarian emergencies, combined with the onset of democratisation campaigns led by the North, presented challenges to some of the South's most-cherished concepts for world order, namely sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Southern states, acting through the NAM and other UN-based forums, responded equivocally with some governments embracing pluralism and protection of human rights while others retaining a staunch commitment to sovereignty. In the economic sphere, the North's control over the Bretton Woods institutions and their consequential distance from significant input or/and oversight emanating from the South, meant that the global development agenda was dominated by neoliberal ideas and policies. The struggle to assert Southern interests and for the 'right to develop' was played out, mostly ineffectively, in the UN General Assembly and various agencies where it held sway while the preponderance of financial resources and key institutions like the IMF and World Bank remained in Northern hands. This was despite a consistent and coherent voice from the developing countries demanding a greater say in the management of these institutions.

In the end, it wasn't the declaratory politics of the NAM as much as the economic power of emerging countries in the South in conjunction with these aspirations that began the process of reshaping parts of the international system.[57] With a rising China and, alongside of it the power of economies like India, Brazil and Mexico, able to compete with traditional Northern economies and use their financial resources to invest in other Southern markets. Increasingly able to opt out of the traditional instruments such as international financial institutions and OECD donor approaches predicated on conditionalities, the developing countries of the South began to construct and implement their own development agenda. Buttressing the activities of emerging powers was a widening of the scope and activities of regional organisations across the developing world. Formed primarily in response to economic needs, these organisations gained in importance as markets and sites of production in the regional and global economy. Moreover, their role as diplomatic actors on the global stage, sometimes feeding directly into the activities of NAM and the G77, became increasingly significant as they undertook initiatives in areas as diverse as deepening of regional trade, implementing peacekeeping and fostering dialogue between regions. Finally, the rise of civil society in Southern states, in part flowing from the marked economic improvements being experienced by segments of society within the fast-growing economies, began to generate new forms of political activism. Working at times in tandem with Northern-based civil society – and at other times in opposition to it – the leading civil society actors built impressive networks of support which sought to influence their own governments, donor states and international organisations on key issues like environment, labour and the status of women.

The primary institutions and norms of the South were confronted, and had to respond to, deep changes in the nature of global economic and political relations. Symbolic of these changing conditions of the South was the decision, led by Indonesia, to revitalise the 'spirit of Bandung' through a new partnership between Asia and Africa in 2005, the launching of Africa's NEPAD initiative, cross-continental cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa as well as the launching of Hugo Chavez's 'Bank of the South'. The mantra of 'South–South co-operation', long held as the road to economic and ultimately political emancipation from the North, was at last being realised. At the same time, the shift in positions on questions of intervention by regional organisations like the African Union and the debate on institutionalising human rights that accompanied the public discussion of an ASEAN Charter point to

the internalisation of these norms within some sectors and settings of the South. All these initiatives drew upon and reflected the changing circumstances in the South – the role of emerging powers, the rise and reconfiguration of regional organisations and the growth in civil society. The remaining three chapters will unpack each of these themes and their implications for the South.

4
A South of States

The demise of the Cold War and the spread of globalisation appeared to many observers in both North and South to signal an end of the era of solidarity politics pursued by the developing world, or 'South'.[1] Deemed by many in the industrialised countries of North America and Europe to be an ideological construct with little relevance to the emerging 'new world order', the notion of the South – along with its companion ideas of non-alignment, South–South cooperation and state-led development – were expected to disappear with the fall of the Berlin wall and the concurrent triumph of the 'neo-liberal' model of development. Indeed, with once ardent proponents of the South such as Yugoslavia calling for modernisation of the movement at the Ninth NAM summit in 1989, the pressures to adapt to the changing international circumstances were considerable.[2]

However, far from fading away, the South as both a concept and an organising norm has stubbornly persisted and indeed evolved in response to a new set of global challenges. The transformation of a disaggregated and often poorly qualified Southern representation to the Summit on the Environment at Rio in 1992 by an increasingly sophisticated representation by South states at the World Trade Organization (WTO) after 1999 is a reflection of the changes in the South's approach to global governance. Against a backdrop of growing disparities in global wealth and discontent with rules in trade and security promulgated or enforced by multilateral institutions, the recognition of the need for the South's own perspective on governance has heightened among developing countries and resulted in a plethora of new or revitalised institutions, organisations and networks. Underlying this reinvigoration of the South lay the role of four key states in shaping the agenda of the developing countries, namely Malaysia, South Africa, India

and Brazil.[3] Their confidence as competitive market economies with a demonstrated capacity to succeed in a globalising world, coupled to their charismatic leadership, allowed them to take a leading position in shaping the South's agenda at regional and multilateral forums. These 'norm leaders' of the South took on the daunting responsibility to redesign a mission as well as to propose new and reformed institutional frameworks to advance commonly defined interests of Southern states. At the same time, the emergence of a 'superpower of the South' in the form of China, whose extraordinary trajectory from collectivist socialism to capitalism's main manufacturing base in three decades, as well as its well-established position within international institutions and recognised military capabilities, presented a substantive challenge to the North's pre-eminence in the international system but also, increasingly to the South itself.

This chapter firstly looks at changes in the outlook of the South and the concomitant emergence of a reinvigorated source of South leadership. Then, the analysis focuses on the role played by four key Southern states, namely Malaysia, South Africa, India and China while reshaping the goals and normative frameworks of the South. Here, special attention is given to the growing political and economic importance of China in world politics which challenges the traditional borderlines between North and South. The chapter concludes by pointing to current normative contradictions within the South bloc such as the one between, on the one hand, vibrant market-oriented economies and, on the other, supporters of older approaches to economic development. These divisions pose a clear challenge to South leaders in terms of building a unified stance vis-à-vis the North.

4.1 The 'New' South

Much of this reinvigorated 'South' is a product of the rise of the newly industrialised economies and the concomitant emergence of a self-confident leadership with resources, sophisticated markets, high levels of technical expertise and hubris. This situation is echoed in the growth of policy networks rooted in South-based civil society which have introduced a new set of concerns, ranging from environmental to human rights, to a region once dominated by state institutions and the pursuit of their respective interests. Together, these developments have imbued the South with a renewed commitment and capacity to articulate a vision of global governance that is rooted in the contemporary concerns of developing countries.

The multidimensional character of South-based governance has given rise to new strategies of mobilisation which have combined with traditional instruments and institutions to challenge the status quo on global governance in different settings. For example, in the area of trade, *South-based policy networks* have developed positions on complex areas such as trade in intellectual property for South countries and have provided training to enhance the ability of under-resourced states to negotiate effectively at the WTO. In the area of *South–South co-operation*, the summitry activities of the G15, G77 and NAM have resulted in the mobilisation of financial support from within the South and through multilateral agencies for the development of South-based chambers of commerce and the creation of business-networking facilities such as the South Investment, Trade and Technology Data Exchange facility (SIBEX) that enhance the ability of South entrepreneurs, small and medium enterprises and multinationals to compete internationally. In the area of *new South initiatives in multilateral governance*, traditional South organisations such as the G77 and NAM have cooperated with South-based policy networks and civil society to raise and sustain the profile of South concerns regarding the democratisation of multilateral agencies and organisations within the United Nations system in the build-up to the Millennium summit. And, finally, the emergence of *South-based civil society* has worked independently and with North-based counterparts to raise awareness around environmental, human and reproductive rights and labour issues while at the same time itself challenging the implicit hegemony of Northern civil society on 'South issues' as seen in the controversy over leadership of the campaign to eliminate third-world debt between Jubilee South and the North-based Jubilee 2000.

A key feature of the revitalisation of the South was the role assumed by pivotal middle powers whose economic development, in the case of Malaysia, or political experience, in the case of South Africa, Brazil and India, paved the way for a new agenda of activism. With respect to Brazil, a long-standing ambivalence about the traditional mechanisms of South solidarity borne of its history gave way to participation in shaping a Southern programme under its new government. Contrasting with the Brazilian case, India's foreign policy is firmly attached in traditional South activism. Its renewed influence in global politics after 9/11 has turned India into a key political player in the North–South struggles of the early twenty-first century. With diverse societies and bolstered by an emergent middle class, these states applied their growing commercial confidence, political and economic means and technical expertise to the articulation of initiatives and policies that were in tune with the

exigencies of globalisation. In addition, the position of these states as historically sympathetic with the West (though, one hastens to add, not uncritical of it) marked a turning point as the South shifted away from the unbridled censure of industrialised countries of the past to an approach that adopted aspects of capitalist economies while remaining secure in the promotion of its own interests.

This juxtaposition between active participant in the globalising world economy and, at the same time, vocal critic of the established international hierarchy, set these states of the 'new' South apart from their predecessors. At the same time, for some analysts, the rise of the new South marked the triumph of Western ideas in the developing world and, in turn, the death of the politics of developing country solidarity.

> There is a new generation of Southern leaders and advisers, often educated in economics at North American universities, who believe that market principles and a vibrant private sector offer the best prospects for their countries' development. Chile's 'Chicago boys' may be but the harbingers of a new generation of leaders in the 1990s. These leaders are likely to hold little faith in the old Southern agenda of a New International Economic Order, see little point in attempting to negotiate jointly with other Southern countries on such issues as technology transfer or market access.[4]

This pessimistic reading of the prospects of South solidarity was further fuelled by factors like the changing pace and direction of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the industrialised economies to developing economies. Between 1989 and 1992, over 50% of all FDI went to East Asia while sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia received 3% and 1%, respectively.[5] Furthermore nearly three quarters of these private capital flows were aimed at only ten countries: China, Mexico, Malaysia, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Venezuela and South Korea. The structure of the developing countries' economies, in short, was changing the fundamental orientation of Southern states, a condition that would be expected to eventually see expression in international politics. Writing in 1996, Broad and Landis declared:

> Representation of the South as a monolith was flawed back in the 1960s, but … it is increasingly misleading today. Over the next generation, if current trends continue, some 10–12 Southern nations are likely to join the ranks of the North or at least move much closer to

> Northern levels of economic performance. The remaining 140-odd Southern nations, however, are likely to slip further behind.[6]

These observations built on trends coming out of East and Southeast Asia in the 1970s and early 1980s when the emergence of export-oriented economies that grew at double-digit rates provided an alternative route to Third World industrialisation to that of the then prevalent import-substitution approach.[7] Indeed, the US Department of Commerce went so far as to designate ten emerging markets as crucial to the American (and global) economy in the coming century.[8] Concurrently, growing competition from Southern state-owned and private multinationals was another indicator that these emerging market economies were moving closer to Northern countries. By 2006, the FDI from emerging economies had reached 14% of world's total as opposed to only 5% in 1990.[9] India's Tata Group, Malaysia's Petronas, Brazil's Petrobras and Vale, and South Africa's De Beers are just a few examples of emerging-economy multinationals striding steadily onto the global stage. The fact that foreign investment flows and market competition was increasingly between leading South states and the traditional industrialised countries, and that this economic rivalry took place on the terrain of other generally poorer developing countries rather than within these self-same leading South countries, seemed to be further confirmation of the changing circumstances.

The rise of Southern state-owned multinationals

In 2008, there were five state-owned corporations from the South in the list of the top ten largest companies in terms of market value. Of these, three were from China (PetroChina, China Mobile and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) and the other two from Brazil (Petrobras) and Russia (Gazprom). In 2004, the list only contained private commercial companies which were either based in the US or Europe.[10]

Brazilian Petrobras will certainly raise its stakes in the global oil markets following the discovery in 2007 of potentially huge offshore reserves under a deep layer of salt in the Southeast Coast of Brazil. Vale, a Rio de Janeiro based mining conglomerate, is the world's biggest producer of iron ore. In 2008, it placed a bid of $85 billion to take over its Anglo-Swiss rival Xstrata. The mineral giant was privatised in June 1997 but the Brazilian government still holds veto

power in some of the company's permanent decisions.[11] PetroChina is one of the largest petroleum companies in the world. In the last 20 years, it has aggressively explored and produced oil in Africa in order to meet soaring energy demand in Asia. The Russian Gazprom is the leading producer of natural gas. It controls 16 per cent of the world's gas reserves. The company is the main gas supplier to the European Union covering 25 per cent of its whole demand.

The expansion in size and power of Southern state-controlled multinationals has been driven by increasing global demand for energy, commodities and raw materials. Oil and gas prices have soared to unprecedented levels in 2007 due to galloping worldwide demand. Some South states such as Venezuela and Russia have used their national oil and gas companies to wield power and defy the US and Western Europe, respectively. Similarly, China's growing presence in Africa promoted a re-balance of power relations in the continent. In this sense, PetroChina's deals with the Sudanese government have been a source of tension between Washington and Beijing. Khartoum has been accused by the US government of genocide and ethnic cleansing against tribes in the Western region of Darfur.[12] The Chinese government, through its oil conglomerate, is the largest investor in Sudan's oil fields. It has used its clout at the UN Security Council to protect Sudan from global pressure which has deeply angered Western powers (see below for more).

While prescient to an extent, these observations tended to ignore or misconstrue the concomitant political changes that were occurring at much the same time in the South. In fact, alongside the unparalleled expansion of market economies was an unprecedented embrace of democratic governance in the South. This development affected the states of the South in a number of important ways. First was the coming to power of parties and personalities whose outlook chimed with the traditional 'Third World' perspective. Though partly an expression of residual solidarity politics of a past era, especially in those cases where new governments had as their core constituency parties and movements of the Left, these new South states nonetheless reflected a desire to infuse the contemporary concerns of their foreign policy with this perspective. Secondly, on the broader international stage, it gave greater legitimacy to the demands of the South on issues like global governance and the lack of full representation for developing countries in multilateral institutions. Finally, through the opening of the domestic political process

that accompanies democratisation, it exposed South governments to a myriad of local interests and transnational forces that increasingly had a bearing on their foreign policy (see Chapter 6).

4.2 Pivotal states of the New South: Malaysia, South Africa, India and Brazil

Among the ten leading economies within the South, four in particular have consciously constructed their foreign policies to give them an explicitly 'South' orientation. Malaysia, South Africa, India and Brazil have all been characterised by their extensive use of financial and political resources aimed at promoting developing-country perspectives in multilateral institutions and regional bodies. Moreover, they are representative of the changing outlook and responses of developing countries from the closing days of the Cold War to the resurgence of the South at the turn of the twentieth century. Finally, as democracies (though not without controversy within their own societies, especially in the case of Malaysia) they were subject to the forces of electoral politics and transnational pressures that tempered, if not directly influenced, the form and content of their South-orientation in foreign policy.

4.2.1 Malaysia

Malaysia's role as a moderniser, and in particular since the mid-1980s, a promoter of Islam that is compatible with the requirements of globalisation, has allowed it to assume a leading role in both the Muslim world and within the broader framework of the South. Its development successes coupled to the forthright diplomacy of its prime minister has put this relatively small country on the international map as one of the power brokers of the 'new South'.

For Malaysia, the dilemmas of geography, demography, economic and colonial legacies, all conspired to make the possibility of development a difficult proposition at best. Unlike some of the other states in the South, Malaysia – along with the other so-called 'tiger economies' of Singapore, Taiwan and Korea – had committed itself to an explicit Western-orientation in the context of internal and external threats from Soviet or Chinese sources. In the case of Malaysia, the role of Beijing in supporting local, mainly Chinese, communist insurgents against the British colonial administration in the 1950s and later the independent Malay-dominated government in Kuala Lumpur meant that it retained a favourable outlook to the West during the seminal period of NAM activism. The political crisis that resulted in Singapore's

withdrawal and independence from the federation in 1963, coming on the heels of a concerted campaign by President Sukarno of Indonesia to assert dominance over the Malaysian territories of Sabah and Sarawak ('confrontasi') placed the government in a precarious position that was only exacerbated when ethnic tensions between Malay majority and the sizable Chinese minority broke out in 1969.

Seen in this context, Malaysia's transformation from ex-colonial backwater to a leading South state rests in no small measure with the towering personality of the Prime Minister for over two decades, Mahathir Mohamad. Mahathir's dominance of Malaysian politics commenced in the wake of widespread ethnic and sectarian rioting that gripped the country in 1969. Tun Abdul Razak, the deputy prime minister, stepped in to lead the government's response but increasingly political power shifted to the Education Minister, Mahathir, as he sought to devise a plan for addressing the causes of discontent within the Malay majority. The introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1971 aimed at reducing rural poverty among Malays through affirmative action came into being while the imposition of the Internal Security Act, which remains in force, was promulgated to curb dissent from all potential sources. By 1981, Mahathir had become the country's prime minister, taking over leadership of the governing United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), setting the stage for his commanding presence over domestic and foreign policy.

Malaysia's export-led economy, backed by profits from oil revenues, tin and palm oil and exploitation of natural resources, became the backbone of the country's development. Skillful employment of these revenues, coupled to the active courting of foreign investors including the 'Look East' policy aimed primarily at Japan, brought about increasingly impressive growth figures based on a programme of gradual industrialisation.[13] On the foreign policy side, the prime minister's use of regional and international institutions as instruments of Malaysian foreign policy began in earnest in this period, with the emphasis on Asian successes like Japan and Korea as potential models for Malaysia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a diplomatic springboard. This combined Asian-centric approach, which was characterised by vocal criticism of Britain and the US, culminated in a push to develop regional instruments such as the East Asian Economic Group as a means of breaking out of the Western-orientation of groupings like the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum.

The growing saliency of Islam as a source of national identity (despite the substantial minority of non-Muslims among the population) was

a response, at least in part, to the domestic challenges that Mahathir began to experience to his rule in the crisis-laden mid-1980s.[14] The global recession that commenced in that period hit the Malaysian economy hard, and forced the government to reign in some of its public spending and other ambitions. Hardship and neglect by Kuala Lumpur in some of Malaysia's outlying states fostered disenchantment with the government that came to be reflected in the growing electoral successes of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) in these regions. Mahathir's integration of an explicit Islamist orientation to the country's foreign policy was, in the words of one scholar, a 'particularly important and effective tool in advancing his domestic interests' against the electoral threat from PAS at the same time that it promoted a moderate vision of Islam which would continue to encourage foreign investment.[15] This new foreign policy impulse was reflected in Malaysia's active participation in the Islamic Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), including support for the Islamic Development Bank, as well as lending vocal support to the Palestinian cause. In the 1990s, the plight of Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia became a *cause celebre* in Kuala Lumpur and Malaysian diplomacy expended much time and effort, including the use of 1500 Malaysian peacekeepers, towards addressing their concerns while criticising the West's purported neglect of Muslims in the Balkan conflict.[16]

The Islamist orientation of Malaysia's foreign policy can be seen as a mobilising force while building effective South–South coalitions within multilateral organisations. According to Ayoob, 'political Islam has become the ideology of resistance *par excellence* in the contemporary era promoting ideas and agendas that at one time used to be termed "Third Worldism"'.[17] The 57 members of OIC constitute more than 25% of the international community and over 40% of the G77 membership.[18] The growing appeal of political Islam in the context of the North–South divide increases the influence of moderate Muslim regimes as bridges between Islam/South and the West/North. In this respect, the Malaysian regime provides clear political responses to the challenge of combining liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism (the main tenants of Western civilisation) with contemporary manifestations of Islamic ideology. In June 2005, during Malaysia's OIC chairmanship, the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, reiterated his support for a dramatic reform of the pan-Islamic body. According to his view

> The OIC definitely has to move with facts, has to be updated. We are moving into a world of globalization, we are moving into a world of market liberalization and OIC can not remain just purely a political

> body [...]. The present world look at Islam as equal to terrorism, so we must change this mindset of the West, we must create dialogue, we must say that it is not Islam that is wrong, so I think we need to change the way we move.[19]

Under Mahathir, the country's foreign policy assumed a crucial role in formulating the South's reaction to the changing international system in the last decade-and-a-half of the twentieth century. This was best represented by the Malaysian government's financial support for the creation of the South Commission in 1986, which grew out of the recommendations of a NAM summit in Harare, and the formation of the G15 in 1989 as a counterweight to the North's G7. The work of the South Centre, based in Geneva where the newly established WTO was housed, provided research and policy recommendations to developing countries especially on trade matters. The South Centre's impact was particularly important for the poorer countries, which lacked the capacity to manage the technical details of certain aspects of trade negotiations, and therefore were able to use the reports and policy recommendations as guides to action. Though it had lost some of its momentum by the end of the 1990s, the G15 nonetheless represented the first attempt by leading market-oriented South states to develop a collective stance on a host of new issues emerging out of the twin forces of globalisation and the 'new world order' led by the US. Annual meetings of heads of states and ministers sought to develop positions on a range of political and trade issues of interest to leading South states, such as the reform of the United Nations and the Asian economic crisis of 1997.

In addition to these steps, the Malaysian government created the South Investment Trade and Technology Data Exchange Centre and a bilateral payments arrangement, which served to guarantee export payments, based in Kuala Lumpur.[20] The expansion of Malaysia's state-owned companies like Petronas into other parts of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America was a priority for the government. Mahathir used diplomacy and financial incentives to access these new markets for Malaysian companies. This development gave content to the oft-spoken idea of South–South trade and, through its concurrent promotion of Malaysian business interests, it pointed the way to a form of cooperation that would be replicated (consciously or otherwise) by other market-oriented Southern states.

All in all, these initiatives by Malaysia were crucial to laying the foundation for a coherent South response to the end of the Cold War and the concurrent ascendancy of globalisation. Other leading South

states would, like Malaysia, use their financial wherewithal and political acumen to promote a form of Southern cooperation that was in concert with their national interests, Islamic identity and the needs of the market.

4.2.2 South Africa[21]

South Africa's emergence as a pivotal state in the 'new South' was a product of the timing of its political transformation from global pariah to celebrated democracy. The government's willingness to promote the virtues of democracy and the market, which took the form of a new initiative for restructuring African economies, was further reinforced by the prominent stature of Nelson Mandela, an imprisoned leader of the anti-apartheid movement and the country's first president. The commitment to a South-oriented foreign policy, especially one which focused on the African continent, became one of the hallmarks of the post-apartheid South African government.

South Africa's dominant economic position on the African continent has been actively resisted by neighbouring states during the apartheid era through the application of sanctions (which were not always universally applied) and an unprecedented regional development programme called the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. The presence of a white minority government which had harboured regional ambitions and an economic and financial infrastructure blunted by its isolation from all save the 'near abroad' (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia) set the stage for the post-apartheid era. The advent of democracy in 1994 ushered into power the African National Congress (ANC), which based its credentials as a liberation struggle and drew support from a domestic mass movement of dispossessed black South Africans. Though historically democratic socialist in orientation – with a significant radical strain through its links with the South African Communist Party and the trade union movement – the ANC was to shift its economic policy upon taking office to embrace a neoliberal approach that emphasised opening markets, robust trade and a preference for foreign investment as a source of capital accumulation. At the same time, the experience of opposition had inculcated in the ANC a network of solidarity links with liberation movements and significant experience in the efficacy of multilateralism. The impulse towards multilateralism in foreign policy, reinforced by problematic responses to unilateralism towards African states, mirrored aspects of classic middle power strategy as the new government sought to leverage its material deficiencies through recourse to international organisations.

Where it differed from established middle powers was that Pretoria sought to position itself, first and foremost, within the institutional and ideational framework of Southern international organisations such as NAM, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and UNCTAD.[22]

Under Thabo Mbeki, the South African government grew increasingly confident in the promotion of its position as a 'natural' leader of the African continent. Mbeki's articulation of the African renaissance, a reiteration of pan-African revivalism which began to appear in his speeches in 1998, aimed to reassert South Africa's 'Africaness' and legitimise its continental leadership status.[23] From this process flowed the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), an initiative that sought to engage industrialised countries in a programme of trade and development assistance in partnership to foster development within African countries.[24] This has involved diplomacy at two levels, first within Africa in order to secure support for NEPAD, and secondly, with the G8 states through bilateral and international contacts as a recognised interlocutor for African interests.[25] This role is based upon South Africa's diplomatic activism in the multilateral sphere and the desire by external states to work with like-minded actors with sufficient means to implement effectively any cooperative measures.

Indeed, the seminal statements on South African foreign policy emphasise the centrality of the sub-region, Africa as a whole and the South as appropriate sites of action for the post-apartheid era. Economic and trade policy produced by an outward-looking Department of Trade and Industry, which culminated in the launching of the 'butterfly strategy', a deliberate attempt to promote trade links with Brazil and India (the wings) and concurrently with continental Africa (the body).[26] This coincided with the establishment of bi-national commissions which meet annually to discuss issues at the ministerial level including trade, defence and general cooperation. South Africa's multilateral diplomacy increasingly involved leadership roles in key South organisations, as mentioned above, which provided it with an opportunity to put its imprint upon the South agenda. Mbeki himself declared his ambition to create a 'G7 of the South' and by 2001 this had been integrated into Department of Trade and Industry policy:

> In relation to possible future rounds of the WTO, our policy will be to seek to bring developing countries around a common agenda – the so-called G-South. It is evident that only a co-ordinated response from the South will be able to secure sufficient concessions from the powerful industrialized countries.[27]

The launching of the India–Brazil–South Africa initiative (IBSA) in 2004 was a culmination of this impulse and provided a mechanism for the three leading market-oriented democratic states in the developing world to coordinate policy (see Chapter 5). At the same time, domestic politics in the post-apartheid period reflected the socio-economic divisions of the recent past and continued to frame, if not intrude, upon the country's foreign policy. For instance, the growing presence of white-owned MNCs operating in the rest of Africa has drawn criticism and even fears of South African 'neo-colonialism'.[28] Certainly some aspects of the re-orientation of South African priorities towards Africa and the South was met with concern among traditionalists within government; however, the more entrepreneurial among South Africa's business community recognised the investment opportunities presented by Africa and the South and moved to support the ideological re-engagement with the continent as articulated by Mbkei's 'African renaissance'. Conflicts between the South African government and the corporate community nonetheless remain a feature of the relationship.[29] More generally, a hardening of attitude under Mbeki towards the business community has resulted in the promulgation of the Black Economic Empowerment programme, an explicit effort to legislate the transfer of white-owned business assets into black hands and in so doing change the face of South African MNCs.

Outside of the business community and the new black elite, the country's foreign policy seems out of touch with many key ANC constituencies and constrained by an absence of resources. With an estimated five million black South Africans living in poverty and somewhere between 30% and 40% unemployed, the pursuit of neoliberalism at home and abroad has come under considerable criticism as being detrimental to their basic interests.[30] Equally, the concerns of the ANC's governing alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), with respect to protecting labour's interests and promoting solidarity with fraternal organisations in the region for example in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Swaziland, have not been especially reflected in government approaches. With respect to the Mbeki government's attempts to restructure the continent's economies and state system, as manifested in NEPAD and the African Union, along neoliberal lines, the hard truth of limited administrative and financial capacity made its impact. For example, the president's wish to have South African peacekeepers participate in an African Union mission to Sudan in 2004 was shelved when the Ministry of Defence indicated that, with troops already in Burundi and a small mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it would not be able to take on any further missions. An

additional problem is the poor condition of the military, riddled by indiscipline and HIV/AIDS.[31]

The split within Southern African Development Community (SADC) over military intervention in the DRC in 1998 and the inability of South Africa's 'quiet diplomacy' to have any discernible effect on the conduct of an increasingly despotic Robert Mugabe in neighbouring Zimbabwe, also point to limits on Pretoria. It is, in the words of Hamill and Lee, especially ironic that

> [it] is in the Southern African sub-region that the tensions and contradictions that have beset South African policy in Africa are at their most pronounced and where the perception is that Pretoria acts not as a middle power managing collaboration but rather as a major power pursuing its own agenda, often at the expense of common interests.[32]

These patent failures in imposing its vision of security on the region are attributable to the absence of 'common values' or more particularly the unwillingness of African government elites to embrace in full what are seen to be alien ideas and institutional arrangements.[33] The attractive pull of South Africa is, however, evident across many parts of the continent driven by the expansion of South African companies in highly visible sectors such as cellular telephones, hotels, television and, above all, its commercial retailers.[34] The success of corporate South Africa in penetrating the markets in Africa (as well as other developing regions) contrasts with the failure of South African diplomacy in making much headway in conflicts such as in Zimbabwe or in Ivory Coast. Domestic political instability and economic decline led to further uncertainties on the future of South Africa's regional leadership and international stature. In September 2008, allegations of illegal political interference by Mbeki in a High Court case of corruption and fraud against ANC's current leader, Jacob Zuma, sparked mayhem in the leadership ranks of the ruling party. As a result, Kgalema Motlanthe, the party's deputy leader, provisionally replaced Mbeki as president while the country awaited the April 2009 general election. Some fear that the probable election of Zuma as South Africa's new president could upset foreign investors' confidence due to uncertainties about the political and economic policy outlook of the country under his rule. Furthermore many African states and NGOs remain uncommitted, resistant to or even ignorant of South Africa's emblematic foreign policy agenda, the NEPAD programme.[35] The result is a paradox with South Africa's inability to exercise effective influence over its region, despite the employment of military, economic and 'soft power' means – including

persuasion[36] – while being internationally feted as the authentic voice of African interests by the North at G8 summits.

4.2.3 India

India dominates the South Asia region in which it is found by virtue of its continental size and population, economic standing and military might.[37] Independence from Britain was largely negotiated by Jawaharlal Nehru, who became the dominant political figure in India until his death in 1964. Nehru articulated foreign policy goals – the improvement of the international economic and political order, independence in foreign relations, equal treatment among states, independence of colonies and many others – which placed a premium on the building of peace and cooperation in the world.[38] However, within South Asia itself India's position has been systematically challenged by Pakistan. The seminal role played by India in fostering the break-up of Pakistan and the consequent founding of Bangladesh, as well as its forcible incorporation of smaller territories into its formal and informal orbit, have all contributed to deep suspicion of New Delhi's intentions. This regional animosity has created a localised version of the Cold War in the sense that rivalry has informed decision makers' interpretations about other regional issues and affected the actions of smaller states.[39] The Indian prominence in South Asia was balanced by Pakistan's military alliance with the USA and China, which was instrumental in triggering a re-orientation of India's foreign policy in the direction of the USSR.

India's post-independence foreign policy under the Congress Party was driven by two sometimes contrary strands: first, power and national interest and, second, the idea that an activist role ('non-alignment') in international affairs would secure not only the interests of India but also of humanity at large. However, with the outbreak of the Indo-Chinese War in 1962 and subsequent clashes with Pakistan, the emphasis has moved away from Southern solidarity to a more pronounced expression of nationalism. This disjunction between India's role as a leader of the South and the strategic competition with its two regional rivals, Pakistan and China, has been a recurrent aspect of New Delhi's foreign policy during the Cold War period and after. In fact, Nehru government's decision to develop nuclear weapons – in a period in which India's investment in South–South cooperation was strongly manifested within NAM and the newly established UNCTAD and G77 – was closely related to military defeat to China in 1962 as well as to broader considerations about national security in South Asia. The two wars fought with Pakistan over the Kashmir region (1947/8 and

1965) and a number of political crises and skirmishes between the two armies increased regional instability during the 1980s.[40] The high political, strategic and material investment on national security has diverted India's attention from South activism except from rhetoric and the use of multilateral forums such as NAM as a platform to speak out against the major power bloc. In reality, however, the power determinants of India's foreign policy led it to establish close ties with one of the Cold War contenders, the Soviet Union, resulting in loss of credibility among its non-aligned partners.

India's complex sociopolitical heterogeneity and its uneven economic development have acted as a constraint on 'developing and consolidating a national identity appropriate for a major power'.[41] Despite the strong hand of the Indian central government in foreign policy, Bradnock notes that 'it is impossible to understand the origins of India's permanently strained relationships with Pakistan, for example, or its difficulties in the late 1980s over Sri Lanka, without reference to the domestic interests of which foreign policy was a projection'.[42] The abiding sectarian tensions between the majority (80%) Hindu and the minority (13%) Muslim populations, as well as other ethnic, separatist and social strains, made governance by the Congress Party a balancing act that ultimately diminished its ability to achieve effective action.[43] The ascendancy of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) into government in 1998 raised further questions as to the influence of Hindu nationalism over foreign policy. For example, the initial reconciliatory gestures by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee towards Pakistan were followed by bellicose rhetoric and the testing of weapons and formal declaration of India as a nuclear power. At the same time the problematic of this strain of political Hinduism and its relationship to social stratification, caste and non-Hindu minorities poses its own threat to unity, as demonstrated by the unrest fomented in the state of Gujarat.[44]

Although India's commitment to an open market economy is more limited than that of other emerging powers such as Brazil or South Africa, since 1991 and led by the then late Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, it has begun to liberalise its economy in a belated effort to achieve the growth and investment seen in China, as well as to stave off bankruptcy.[45] The BJP government initially pursued a form of economic nationalism, *swadeshi*, which stalled in the prevailing climate of the Asian crisis. Thereafter it embraced privatisation and independent management of formerly excluded areas of the domestic economy, such as electrical power, and gave more latitude to state governments to encourage FDI.[46]

Concerning multilateral trade negotiations, the consistency of India's positions at the WTO has been an important aspect of both the BJP and Congress governments. Even after liberalisation reforms, the Indian negotiators in Geneva have continuously demonstrated an unfettered commitment to the South–South agenda. India has played a key role not only in helping to establish the economic agenda of the Third World in the late 1950s and early 1960s but also while rethinking goals, strategies and modes of action – such as the G20 and IBSA (G3) – to reassert a South front in the multilateral commercial negotiations of the early twenty-first century. This is partially explained by domestic factors. India's post-colonial history created a strong mindset among political leaders and policy makers of different ideological denominations who perceive multilateral groupings such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank as representing the economic interests of the developed world.[47]

The installation of Manmohan Singh, associated with the reforms of 1991 under Congress, as prime minister in 2004 suggests that the basic consensus towards cautious reformism will be retained. This is in keeping with general perceptions of Indian foreign policy, which – despite deep-rooted interests and fierce political debate – retains a strong degree of consensus.[48] The South orientation of the current Congress-led government is rooted in the foreign policy legacies of Nehru's active role as a leader of the South and a founding father of NAM. The notion of 'nonalignment' was coined by Nehru himself, becoming a perennial feature of Indian foreign policy. Under the active leadership of Nehru's India – alongside Sukarno from Indonesia, Nkrumah from Ghana, Tito form Yugoslavia and Nasser from Egypt – the emergence of NAM represented the actual institutionalisation of the agenda of Southern politics. The political aims and founding principles of NAM were closely associated with the foreign policy tenets of the Indian post-colonial regime. Nehru's conspicuous contribution to the creation and growth of NAM brought India considerable prestige among newly independent states in Asia and Africa. In fact, the non-aligned character of India's foreign policy became a model for other Third World countries in search for an intermediate position in the bipolar system.

In more recent years, the improvement of bilateral relations with Islamabad over Kashmir and the political and economic rapprochement with Beijing has enabled New Delhi's diplomacy to concentrate on rebuilding a credible and holistic approach to the South and to work more closely with other like-minded South leaders. India is also well positioned to achieve political gains in its relations with Western powers. More so than most South states, India has been directly affected by the

post–9/11 environment. In particular, the NATO invasion and occupation of Afghanistan instigated a closer relationship with Washington as well as further propelling the BJP away from its autarkic impulses. With growing doubts in Washington about Pakistan's future as an ally in the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the Bush administration has been keen to emphasise the strategic importance of India in resolving regional conflicts and in fighting home-grown Muslim extremism. In November 2008, a three-day siege, which left 175 dead and more than 300 wounded, launched by Pakistani militants in Mumbai, the Indian financial capital, raised tensions between Delhi and Islamabad and intensified US political involvement in the region. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, urged Pakistan's government to take action and reaffirmed the US government's commitment to assist India in its fight against terrorism. India's diplomacy has explored its renewed strategic importance in South Asia to realise key foreign policy goals, such as acquiring international recognition of its nuclear power status. In July 2005, the US government formally acknowledged India as a legitimate nuclear state hoping to win India's support on a number of strategic issues, such as curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions, the threat posed by domestic unrest in Pakistan and the perennial issue of China's growing power and influence.[49] This bilateral pact has greatly raised New Delhi's regional and international profile as a prospective member of the exclusive group of established nuclear states.

Although the 2005 nuclear deal has further increased New Delhi's power and affluence, it has also posed challenges to India's traditional position as a leader of the South. Proximity with US on nuclear issues brings back to light the traditional dilemma of India's diplomacy since independence; that is how to reconcile strategic foreign policy goals with the broader political agenda of the South. Since the inception of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, India has been an outspoken critic of an alleged attempt by the nuclear powers to institutionalise their special nuclear status while at the same time permanently preventing other states to join the club. Now that India has finally gained open support from the only superpower, the question is whether Delhi will maintain a nuclear policy consistent with its traditional 'non-aligned' stance against the NPT or instead endorse the US' position of restricting access to nuclear technologies aimed at the development of nuclear weapons.[50]

4.2.4 Brazil

From the early years of twentieth century to the late 1950s the Brazilian diplomacy sought to maintain friendly relations with the hemispheric

power, the US, at the same time preserving some leverage with states in the developing world. Although widening the range of its foreign policy options, this two-tiered (and sometimes contradictory) foreign policy doctrine has traditionally prevented Brazil to become a fully engaged member of the South.

As a state with limited power capabilities, Brazil realised very early in its diplomatic history that only through formal participation in multilateral institutions it could exert influence in world affairs. Rather than based on classical power attributes or 'hard power', Brazil's influence in international politics has been achieved through 'normative leadership' and the use of 'opinion-shaping instruments'.[51] This diplomacy of multilateral engagement and pro-Americanism became important and permanent pillars of the Brazilian foreign policy until at least the 1960s. It was during this time, the era of the generals, that the intellectual basis of this revised foreign policy paradigm took hold, launching a nationalist critique of the Brazilian 'Americanist' perspective that actively sought to identify the country as an important member of the Third World. From this interpretative framework, it was imperative that Brazil's foreign policy be detached from the US.[52]

The so-called Globalist Paradigm[53] in the Brazilian foreign policy has its roots in the 'Independent Foreign Policy', implemented by the Brazilian presidents Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart (1961–4). It represented a point of divergence from the traditionally aligned Brazilian position towards the North American international agenda. The idea behind it was to coordinate an endogenous process of economic development with a proactive and independent foreign policy. This diplomacy retained the idea of Brazil as a mediator or bridge-builder between two worlds but introduced an ideological dimension as a rationale for developing a closer identification of countries of the South. The emphasis however was on the economic aspects of the South–South agenda rather than on political and security matters which partially explains the low-profile position of Brazil in a number of NAM deliberations. According to Lima and Hirst:

> From the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, [Brazil] stood strongly for the defence of certain principles, such as a preference for a trade regime based on the norm of cooperation and development (as stressed within UNCTAD) in opposition to the open market principles that dominated GATT; strong support for trade norms such as non-discrimination and most favoured nation (MFN) status as a way of seeking to curb the arbitrary measures and unilateral and

> protectionist action of the industrialized countries; strong support for the implementation of rules favouring developing countries, especially special and differential treatment, and non-reciprocity; and political alignment with the G77 on other multilateral agendas.[54]

During the transition to democracy (1985–9), liberal ideas regained prominence within the Brazilian government with the resulting change in the direction of the country's foreign policy. During the turbulent administration of Collor de Mello, the government (1990–2) invested in a diplomacy of rapprochement with the North, in particular the US, at the same time implementing a drastic macroeconomic programme of market-oriented reforms.[55] The following governments of Franco (1992–5) and Cardoso (1995–2004) kept the same line further deepening bonds with European and North American partners while promoting the liberalisation of the domestic economy. In short, the period from the 1990s to the mid-2000s was marked in Brazil by the abandonment of the previously dominant intrinsic model of economic development and South–South activism.

The election of Luis Inacio 'Lula' da Silva to the presidency in 2003 heralded a change in tone and substance in Brazilian foreign policy. A concerted effort was made to court Southern states, with numerous high-profile visits to Africa, Southeast Asia and China. Coupled with this was the raising of rhetorical concern for the poor, echoing Lula's close association with the global civil society movement's annual World Social Forum in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre.[56] His speech at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September 2004 was noted for its passionate depiction of the plight of the poor and global inequities in the new millennium. Concurrently, the unprecedented deployment of Brazilian troops in the war-torn Haiti in 2004 was a clear sign that Brazilian diplomatic elites were still committed to multilateralism and regional engagement to further legitimate its stance as a global player.

Brazil's investment in 'soft power', as a means to increase its regional and global stature, is illustrated by its willingness to promote democratic rule and the peaceful resolution of conflicts through the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms. In March 2008, Brazilian diplomacy played an important role within the 'Rio Group'[57] while mediating disputes between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela over the killing of a key member of the Farc guerrilla group by the Colombian armed forces within the Ecuatorian territory.[58] Notwithstanding the Brazilian government's increasing political engagement in South America, the

actual recognition of its regional leadership role should not be taken for granted.[59]

The advent of open regionalism, which flowed from changes to the international political economy of trade and reconciliation between newly democratising governments in Brasilia and Buenos Aires in the late 1980s, resulted in the formation of a common market in the southern cone (Mercosur). While trade initially surged within the region, the dominance of the Brazilian economy over the others was underscored by the unilateral decision to devalue its currency in 1999, a move that precipitated a meltdown in the Argentine economy and demonstrated that even the newly founded benevolent relationship could have a negative impact upon its neighbours.[60]

In May 2006, the nationalisation of the gas and oil sectors by the Bolivian president Evo Morales negatively affected bilateral relations with Brazil whose investments, through the state-owned giant Petrobras, are close to $1 billion. Moreover, Brazil has struggled to gain support among its neighbours for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council with Argentina and Mexico openly rejecting the Brazilian claims. The revival of 'bolivarianism' by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela as an alternative source of regional identity is a clear sign of a division in the process of region building led by the Brazilian diplomacy.

In the domestic arena, the current Brazilian foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, and the second in the foreign policy hierarchy, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, are key representatives of the aforementioned 'globalist tradition' in Brazilian foreign policy. After a period of ostracism during Cardoso's administration, the supporters of this foreign policy vision were catapulted to power following the election of Lula and the introduction of a leftist orientation in the Brazilian government's domestic and foreign policies. Amorim has taken the driving seat while conducting Brazil's South agenda. Guimarães, together with Lula's special adviser on international relations, Marco Aurélio Garcia, have also been extremely influential individuals while defining (and at some extent implementing) the ideological base of Brazil's current foreign policy. The former, a visceral critic of Cardoso's foreign policy of engagement with the North, was rescued from political irrelevance to become the mastermind of Lula's foreign policy doctrine.[61] The latter an intellectual from the Worker's Party (PT) and party secretary for international relations became a key figure while defending the government's interests in negotiations with Brazil's 'ideological' partners in Latin America, namely, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba.[62]

Undoubtedly, Lula's personal history as an union leader and one of the founders of the largest Latin American Left-wing party, PT, has given a great deal of legitimacy to Brazil's claim of South leadership. His social/political background and democratic credentials – Lula's resounding electoral victory in October 2002 and re-election in October 2006 was a groundbreaking development in Brazil's political history – helped the Brazilian diplomacy to make a strong case in favour of increasing South participation within international organisations, specially in the UN's Security Council. Through the use of presidential diplomacy, Lula seized the moral high ground in a number of multilateral meetings such as the G8 summit in Glenagles in 2005 and during the World Economic Forum annual meetings in Davos, occasions in which leaders of the richest nations discussed issues related to African development and climate change, among others.

With regard to relations with the US, George Bush's visits to Brazil in November 2005 and March 2007, followed by Lula's trip to Camp David, were seen as positive developments in improving bilateral relations. The issue of bio-fuels dominated the agenda of negotiations during those visits. Brazil and the US produce 70% of world's ethanol which is seen as an economically viable alternative to reduce American dependence on foreign oil.[63] At the same time, the Bush administration has been eager to support Brazil's attempts at regional leadership as a way to block the influence of Chavez's Venezuela in Latin America. Despite sharp disagreements on international trade, climate change and security issues, the recent rapprochement between Bush and Lula reveals that, notwithstanding the importance given by the Brazilian government to narrowing economic, ideological and political relations with Southern states, pragmatism and diversification are also essential factors in understanding the country's foreign policy.

The prospects of success for the South–South orientation of Brazil's foreign policy is highly dependent upon the skill with which the government manages to bring along strong domestic interest groups that are quite sceptical towards potential economic benefits coming out from this partnership. Itamaraty's capacity to isolate the process of decision-making from internal political struggles has been gradually undermined as a consequence of the globalisation and the resulting blurring of the division between national and international. Indeed, since the 1990s, issues emanating from the 'outside world' – mainly involving international trade – have gained more importance in the government's internal debates. Right-wing parties, liberal segments within the Itamaraty,

academics and representatives of business and agricultural sectors have all been criticising the Brazilian government's attempt to create deeper ties with the South. From the perspective of these varied groups, the negotiating power of a large group of developing countries had only a very limited effect during the Cold War period and they do not believe that their respective interests will be better achieved through deeper economic and political links with those states.[64] With roughly 1% of world's total trade, Brazil is still very dependent on the markets of the developed world. This means that any project that excludes these markets will be under harsh internal scrutiny by powerful interest groups and therefore can be easily undermined in case it goes against their economic interests.

4.3 China: The emergence of a developing country superpower

While market-oriented South states may have defined the response of the South to post–Cold war era, the rise of China – the epitome of a South superpower – in many respects poses important challenges for the developing world in the twenty-first century. The sheer size of China's population and economy, coming alongside its military strength and technological skills, as well as its established position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council always set China apart from the other South states. This sentiment was exacerbated by Chinese foreign policy, which deliberately forswore direct participation in many of the classic South institutions, preferring a stance as an observer in the NAM for instance. For many Southern states, the economic gains of the last decades were perceived to be under threat by China's ability to undercut their prices and products while Beijing's 'outreach' for resources presented an opportunity to regain the financial leverage lost when commodity prices fell in the 1980s.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the leadership has wrestled with the dilemmas posed by a need to restore the country to its historical standing as a leading power against the backdrop of its own considerable development challenges. Caught between its aspirations and the realities of technological backwardness and poverty, the new government sought to carve out a position as the world's leading developing country within the context of the dismantling of European empires under the shadow of its own alliance with the Soviet Union. As relations with the post-Stalin Soviet Union deteriorated, China's claims to Third World leadership – manifested in Mao Zedong's 'Three

Worlds' policy – put it at the forefront of ideological and military support for revolutionary regimes and anti-colonial struggles.[65] Notably, this claim to leadership was not exercised through engagement with the standard bevy of third world organisations like the NAM but 'at an aloof distance'.[66] This period of support for revolutionary change in the Third World was followed by the self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution. Relations with far-flung areas like Africa were severely curtailed as the Chinese political system turned on itself in a struggle for both the leadership of the country and the economic direction that it should ultimately take.

The new leader, Deng Xiaoping, set China on a gradualist road of capitalist-oriented development in 1978 that produced three decades of nearly double-digit growth and a rise in living standards that brought a nine-fold increase in per capita income to US$1700 in 2005.[67] In the course of this phenomenal economic growth, poverty in China was reduced from 250 million in 1978 to 26 million in 2001.[68] Bolstering Deng's foreign policy was, with the notable exception of the contentious issue of Taiwan, a benign relationship with the US and a welcoming approach to FDI. The shock of the emergence of a nascent democracy movement and the subsequent crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989, instigated a debate within the Communist Party as to the direction the country should take, a situation that was only resolved with Deng's 'Southern Trip' in 1991. Deng's recommitment to transforming the economy was coupled to an admonition on the best approach to foreign policy.

> Observe calmly, secure our position. Hide our capabilities and bide our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, never claim leadership[69]

This became the new watchword for Chinese foreign policy, helping the country to weather the international firestorm of criticism in the aftermath of Tiananmen as well as to reassert China's standing as a foreign investment haven and an emerging capitalist economy (or, as the official jargon preferred to call it 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'). Running alongside this renewed commitment were considerable developmental challenges arising out of the torrid streak of economic growth, from increasing inequality between the prosperous coastal belt and the interior to the decrepit condition of the loss-making State Owned Enterprise system. In particular, the certainties of self-sufficiency – a central pillar of Chinese policy since 1949 – in a host of vital areas to

development such as energy, strategic minerals, forestry resources and even food production no longer could be maintained. Even the famous Daqing oil fields, whose discovery and exploitation had inspired ideological campaigns in the 1960s, were beginning to run low under the combined weight of accelerating Chinese needs, technological shortfalls and general mismanagement. At the same time, China's economic development had begun to produce significant foreign currency reserves and, tied to the growing technical and managerial expertise in China, the possibility arose that Chinese themselves would be able to address these resource deficiencies. The situation was ripe for a new outreach to a new source of energy and natural resources – Africa and Latin America.

4.3.1 Chinese engagement and, African resources and markets

For the developing world, China's transition from an oil exporter to an oil importer in 1993 was a significant milestone in its development. Chinese officials recognised that, in order to maintain the roaring pace of its economy, the country would need to have secure sources of energy as well as other critical resources.[70] China's current strategy of engaging developing countries and locking in these resources through government-to-government agreements is an outgrowth of this recognition and, more recently, the dangers of political instability from Middle Eastern sources. It is for this reason, inspired primarily by the American-led military intervention and occupation of Iraq in 2003 as well as the serious disputes over Iran's nuclear programme that Africa is in the process of assuming greater prominence in China's global strategic calculus.

Africa's relatively unexploited energy sources, timber, agriculture and fisheries offer the Chinese a unique opportunity to lock in through formal or informal means a steady supply of key resources. Big projects, such as the investment in Sudan's oil industry from 1996 onwards, where the China National Petroleum Corporation has transformed an energy sector plagued by war and Western sanctions, into the country's leading export (with China as its top destination, providing nearly 10% of its oil requirements), are clearly at the forefront of China's interests in Africa. With a 40% share of the Sudanese government's Greater Nile Petroleum Corporation, China's leading oil multinational has demonstrated its ability to manage all facets of a petroleum extraction operation to international industry standards. Indeed, industry analysts have pointed out that PetroChina's position in Sudan has served as an important platform for attracting the interests of oil-rich

countries in both Africa and the Middle East. Equivalent investments, if not as significant to Chinese domestic consumption, have been made by Chinese multinationals in Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, as well as purchases of shares in Algeria's natural gas fields. Linked to these investments are projects aimed at improving the physical infrastructure of these countries, especially roads and port facilities which aim to enhance the attractiveness of Chinese ventures to African governments as well as in improving the export efficiency of these enterprises. Here Chinese companies have often successfully outbid their Western counterparts (as well as that of other developing countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa) through the traditional strategies of linking investment to tie-in projects and providing lower labour costs in the form of less costly managerial staff and by introducing their own contract workers.

Energy resources are the most important focus of China's involvement on the continent, and occupy the bulk of the thrust of its investment and diplomacy, but other forms of resource-based commercial engagement with Africa play an important part in shaping trade and investment ties. Commercial logging in Equatorial Guinea and Liberia, cotton and sisal plantation agriculture in Tanzania, the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure in Botswana, new investments in textile manufacturing in Zambia and Kenya and the installation of sophisticated telecommunications systems in Djibouti and Namibia. Some of these ventures are promoted and managed not by high-profile Chinese multinationals but small and medium enterprises. For example, China's third largest trading partner in Africa, Nigeria, non-oil exports topped US$500 million in 2004 based on the sale of agricultural products such as cotton and timber products, both of which involve Chinese companies or joint ventures. Chinese construction firms have played an increasingly prominent role in infrastructure development in all corners of Africa, often gaining a foothold in local markets through close bidding on Chinese government sponsored projects. The Chinese government has established eleven Trade Promotion Centres around the continent and Chinese businesses are actively encouraged to see Africa as a trade and investment destination. Thousands of Chinese retail trading shops are now strung across much of the continent, selling low-cost and low-value products made in China directly to Africa's rural population. The product of individual entrepreneurship, these shops are generally family-owned and staffed, and rely upon a supply chain stretching back to Hong Kong and the mainland.

The result of all this economic activity is a sharp increase in trade between the two regions. Total trade between China and Africa stood at US$10 billion in 2000, rising to US$18 billion in 2003 and exceeded US$50 billion in 2006. Moreover, Chinese investment in energy resources has played a key role in propelling African growth figures into an annualised rate of over 5% in 2005.[71] While oil is the top item imported from Africa, hardwood timber occupies the second spot with Liberia, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea serving as leading exporters of this forest resource. In the course of this dynamic development, China has become the continent's third largest trading partner after the US and France and a leading investor, topping US$15 billion in 2004 alone. Substantial trade deficits with China characterise all but a few countries such as Angola, Gabon and Zambia, whose escalating resource trade with China offsets the uninterrupted flow of imports of Chinese manufactured products.

4.3.2 Chinese engagement and Latin American resources and markets

In the case of China and Latin America, two regions which were separated by geography and history, the road to closer economic ties was more circuitous. Up until the mid-1990s (when ties with Africa were being forged in earnest) only a few Chinese trade missions had been opened in Latin America and commerce grew modestly, reaching US$6 billion by 1996. Formal bilateral arrangements with Latin American states were limited, the exception being Beijing's signing of an agreement with Brazil in 1988 that included a joint project to develop and launch four satellites from China's Taiyuan space centre that paved the way for the designation of a 'strategic partnership' between Beijing and Brasilia in 1994. China's participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum summit meetings gave it considerable exposure to the Pacific rim countries in Latin America, especially Chile, Peru and Mexico. All these events set the stage for China's emergence as a top player in the global trading system and, with that, a new role in heretofore neglected areas like Latin America.

Within Latin America, the combination of regional insularity, postcolonialism and its considerable development challenges had kept the region for the most part on the sidelines of international politics. Industrialisation and urbanisation, coupled to development policies such as import-substitution and tentative steps towards land reform in some countries, began a period of economic growth that was sustained by mainly US investment and development assistance over the next

few decades. Concurrently, a democratic 'wave' began in 1955, which ushered in elected governments in countries such as Venezuela and within five years only, Paraguay remained under authoritarian rule in South America. The liberal impulse in Washington, which had initially inspired support for these developments in Latin America through its 'Alliance for Progress' programme, was lost in the aftermath of Cuba's revolution and subsequent events. US-sponsored interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Chile in 1973 ensured that elections of Left-leaning governments were toppled in favour of military regimes which supported its diplomatic and economic interests. Interestingly, the anti-communist credentials of these military regimes did not preclude them from opening official ties with Beijing. Indeed, Chile maintained the decision to recognise Beijing that had commenced under the deposed Salvador Allende government, fuelled by economic concerns and diplomatic practicalities (even launching a Binational Commission in 1978). In fact, as Western allies became increasingly keen to adopt positions critical of the military regimes in Chile, Argentina and Brazil, the ideological differences which separated them from China were quietly ignored.[72]

The region experienced a second surge towards democracy started in the mid-1980s in Brazil that ultimately resulted in democratic elections across all of South America by 1990.[73] These states' shift to democratic politics was accompanied by an embrace of neoliberalism, especially so in the case of Argentina and Brazil (Chile had taken the lead in this area a decade beforehand), that combined restructuring of their domestic economies with wide-reaching privatisation of state-owned assets. Again, though the new governments in power had only just emerged from an era of active suppression of human rights, the leader of Argentina, Carlos Menem, was the first to embark on official visits to China in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Alongside these developments was the creation of a host of regional economic organisations, the most significant being the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) in 1991 and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1994, which promoted trade liberalisation between member states and brought unprecedented growth in intra-regional trade.

However, a series of financial crises, starting with the 'Peso crisis' in Mexico in 1994–5 and followed by the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001 (sparked in part by the unilateral devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999 against the conditions of the Asian financial crisis) punctured much of the uncritical enthusiasm for neoliberalism

in the region. A new populist politics, supported by a disparate coalition of workers, newly unemployed, indigenous peoples and other sectors of society, put Hugo Chavez in Venezuela into power in a landslide election in 1998 and Luiz Inacio 'Lula' de Silva in Brazil in 2002. With FDI to Latin America sliding to new lows and incomes falling in many countries, the prospects for achieving significant gains in development on the context of the opening of their markets and privatisation programmes seemed to be fading away.

It was against the troubled backdrop that the Chinese government launched its diplomatic and trade initiative towards Latin America. Though, as noted above, Beijing had already begun to make modest trade and investment inroads into the region as early as the late eighties, in fact the turning point in this new phase in Chinese–Latin American relations came with the visit of President Jiang Zemin to six countries in April 2001. On Jiang's itinerary were stopovers in Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba. Announcements of trade and investment deals as well as the establishment of 'strategic partnerships' with Venezuela, Argentina and Mexico featured in the joint press conferences held. His successor, Hu Jintao, followed up the APEC forum summit in Santiago, Chile, with highly publicised visits to Brazil, Argentina, Cuba and Chile in 2004. A year later, the Chinese president visited Mexico while the Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, toured Peru, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. Though Central American states were not part of these high-level regional visits, for the obvious reason of their continued recognition of Taipei as well as their relative economic insignificance, there were indications that a switch in recognition may precipitate an official tour. Panama, for example, was visited by the Vice Foreign Minister in June 2004, despite its declared diplomatic position in favour of Taiwan.

Like their African counterparts, the initial response of Latin American governments and businesses to Chinese diplomacy and commercial interest has been one of unbridled enthusiasm. In the case of Chile, having endured radical economic restructuring under the Augusto Pinochet regime and having participated actively in the APEC forum, the government was quite ready to embrace closer trade relations with the emerging economic giant. Brazilian enthusiasm for China reached fever pitch in 2004 when President Hu Jintao, accompanied by a large delegation of Chinese businessmen and government officials, toured the country. Hu's widely reported address to the Brazilian National

Congress, in which he stated that the Chinese expected to invest US$100 billion in the region over the next decade, fired the imagination of the Brazilian government and da Silva hastily organised a follow-up visit to Beijing, bringing along with him 400 top Brazilian business representatives. Venezuela's leader, Hugo Chavez, declared that Mao Zedong was a major inspiration for his 'Bolivarist revolution' while Cuban leaders emphasised their close ties with Beijing. An ageing Fidel Castro hoped to turn Chinese interest in the island's nickel deposits and prospective offshore oil into the economic lifeline as his regime fell under increasing pressure to reform.

This optimism extended beyond the politicians to the business community in Latin America. Brazilian firms moved quickly to set up offices and begin doing business in China. Petrobras opened discussions with Chinese oil companies while Brazil's Embraer aviation company established a joint venture with the China Aviation Industry Corporation II in late 2002. Argentine agri-businesses opened offices in China and the Venezuelan state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuala, began discussions with Chinese petroleum firms on refinery work. By 2006, two-way trade had surged from less than US$10 billion in 1999 to US$64 billion. Indeed, such is the attraction of the Latin American market for Chinese investors that it has become their top FDI destination, surpassing Asia and North America in 2005. At the same time, many Latin Americans look to an emerging China as a tremendous economic opportunity that can not only serve as a new source of foreign investment but also promote gains in trade that will lead to development. In a particularly vivid expression of this confidence, for one of the region's most liberalised economies, Chile has gone so far as to sign up for a Free Trade Agreement with Beijing. Finally, for Left-leaning governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba, the possibilities of de-linking their economies from the dominance of the US by engaging with China, thereby enabling them to pursue a more independent foreign policy, has great appeal as well.

For their own part, Chinese authorities seemed to have been taken somewhat aback by these wholesale displays of enthusiasm from Latin Americans but, in typically phlegmatic manner, have made clear their intentions in the region.[74] The Chinese ambassador to Chile, for instance, noted pragmatically that 'Chile is a good platform for Chinese firms to penetrate Latin American markets'. Indeed, a key aim of Beijing's diplomacy in the region was to gain official acceptance of China's 'market economy status' from Latin American governments,

a condition that would restrict their ability to use anti-dumping measures at members of the WTO. With Argentina, Brazil and Peru accounting for the bulk of submissions of anti-dumping cases against China at WTO, this was an important diplomatic coup.[75] Thus for all the political rhetoric of solidarity and South–South relations that accompanied the signing of deals, the foundation of the budding relationship has been clearly framed first and foremost in terms of economic interests.

4.3.3 China South, China North?

Despite its history of being a self-conscious proponent of developing countries' concerns in forums like the UN, Beijing's longstanding ambivalence towards classic South institutions like NAM only changed after the global reactions to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Faced with virulent Western criticism and sanctions, the shaken Chinese leadership re-focused its foreign policy away from its near-exclusive emphasis on the West towards the developing countries for which China's domestic travails were no impediment to maintaining strong ties. As staunch defenders of sovereignty, the Southern states shared Beijing's perspective and, particularly African states, defended China from overt criticism in international bodies like the Human Rights Commission. The result was a re-invigoration of Chinese diplomacy towards the South such that Beijing formally took up observer status in the NAM in 1992 and participated in subsequent meetings while fostering bilateral ties with developing countries grew in importance.

At the same time that the political dimensions of Chinese diplomacy towards the South was experiencing a revival, China's decision to join the WTO – though stymied by lengthy negotiations that lasted until 2001 – marked a sea change in its approach to international system. China's traditional criticism of the inequities of the world trade system was now supplemented by concern for, in the words of the Trade Minister Shi Guangsheng, 'the development of the world economy' and 'trade and investment facilitation'.[76] And though Beijing joined the G22 at the Cancun meeting in 2003, it nonetheless played a much more muted role than expected, acting as a mediator between South and North countries. Indeed, the WTO's Director General, Supachai Panitchpakdi characterised China's unique status within the international trading system as both a 'developing nation' and an 'emerging superpower'.[77] Finally, as noted above, the political rationale for closer links with developing countries was fast being overtaken by a commercial

Table 4.1 Key Indicators of Development: Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa, India and China

	Population (millions), 2005	GNP (US$ billions), 2005	GNP per capita (US$), 2005	GNP per capita growth (%), 2004–5	Adult literacy rates, 15 and older (%), 2000–4
Malaysia	25	753.4	4960	3.4	89
Brazil	186	644.1	3460	0.9	89
South Africa	45	224.1	4960	5.6	82
India	1095	793.0	720	7.1	61
China	1305	2263.8	1740	9.2	91

Source: World Bank (2007) *Key Indicators of Development: Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa, India and China*.

imperative of strengthening trade and investment ties among the Chinese.

The reaction of industrialised countries to the rise of China alternated between engagement and fear. At the G8 summits, Chinese representatives were invited to participate as observers while China was encouraged to sign up key protocols such as the OECD's Paris Agreement on foreign aid. Within the Chinese policy-making circles, a debate raged over the efficacy of becoming more actively involved in Northern initiatives, institutions and even alliances. By way of contrast, Southern states were much less successful in winning active Chinese adherence to their positions in trade negotiations, reflecting the growing distance between their economic interests and that of China. For instance, at the Singapore ministerial, the Chinese position on aspects of trade negotiations were at odds with the G20. Beijing's application for a large role in the weighted voting scheme of the IMF, commensurate with its growing clout as a leading financier in the developing world (surpassing the activities of the World Bank in Africa in 2006 with US$12 billion of loans), was opposed by Brazil and India.[78] Though the rhetoric of South solidarity remained high, Chinese diplomacy seemed set on maintaining a middle way between the developing and developed countries, reflecting its own unique status in the early twenty-first century.

4.4 Conclusion

The fact of diversity, be it economic status, political orientation or religious affiliation, has always been a fundamental part of the South.

In some sense, having to navigate this difficult terrain of diversity has given the leadership in Southern states an imposing diplomatic challenge from the outset which has in turn defined both the South institutions and their modes of engagement. Equally, the attitude towards the sovereignty principle is rooted in this fact of miscellany within and across state boundaries. At the same time, as shown in this chapter, the changing face of the state in the South has raised important questions about the ability of developing countries to maintain the unity of purpose as they themselves experience significant change and, in the case of leading South states, are able to exert unprecedented influence over regions, within international institutions and even in markets. Two themes in particular form the core of the debate about the changing role of Southern states and the impact that this has on the idea of the South.

The first theme is that of modernity and development, the core ambition for the overwhelming majority of South states. While in the initial decades that followed colonial rule the quest for modernity caused Southern states to adopt programmes of state-led development, central planning on the socialist model and outright autarky, by the 1980s a counter-trend towards promoting export-oriented growth – though still led by the state – had taken hold within market-friendly economies of East Asia and parts of Latin America. This occurrence, coming as it did within the context of accelerating globalisation, raised the question within Southern circles as to what constitutes modernity and what is the best path to development for South states. The ascendancy of the 'new South' reflects this division within the developing world, with the leaders in countries like Malaysia and South Africa articulating the case for the compatibility of the market within Islamic and African states, respectively, against older visions and outlooks.

The second theme is the impact of the rise of a cadre of economically vibrant states within the South whose capacity and willingness to exert leadership that challenges the established order in the developing world. Forging into the economies of fellow developing countries, spearheaded by their state-owned or private corporations flush with investment capital and technological expertise, these states are introducing new dynamics to relations within the South. For some critics, the mantra of 'South–South co-operation' that accompanies this investment seems merely diplomatic cover for the pursuit of naked self-interest by these emerging economic powers. China, due to its economic wherewithal and reach within the global trading system, represents this trend and is consequently subject to more negative

scrutiny on this score than most other emerging states though they too have been criticised. Against this backdrop, this raises the question as to this development impacts on South solidarity and the wider agenda held dear to the proponents of change in the established international system.

5
A South of Regions

In the face of an increasingly integrated and fiercely competitive global economy, many countries in the South have adopted a development strategy based on regional integration schemes. The appeal of regionalism as a route to development, coupled to the European Community's own positive experience of cooperation, provided the necessary foundation for a drive towards greater economic and political cooperation across the developing world. This economic impulse, which was inextricably linked to wider political ambitions within the South, has generally sought to marshal the potential of collaborative project financing, preferential trade agreements, the forging of larger markets and the taking advantage of economies of scale between Southern states in pursuit of creating the conditions for sustainable development. Moreover, the various attempts to devise regional entities which give greater authority to its member states in economic and political matters have concurrently set in motion a process of identity construction that is reshaping the landscape of international politics within the South and more broadly as well.

The first wave of regionalism, characterised as 'closed regionalism', attempted to address the development concerns with recourse to a hybrid form of collective reliance and aspects of customs unionism. This first wave was overwhelmingly political and centred on a 'core-periphery' logic. Its failure and the concurrent rise of globalisation brought about a second wave of regionalism, also known as 'open regionalism', which actively sought to integrate developing economies into the global economy, in line with the ideological, institutional and material parameters shaped by the dominant neoliberal world order. This post–Cold War 'neo-liberal consensus' compelled states in the South to sideline (or even totally abandon) traditional notions of

inequality, stratification and subordination in order to align their development strategies with the production structures of the global economy. The reconfiguration of regionalist associations within the South should be seen as an attempt to adapt to the new global paradigm.

This chapter focuses on processes of regionalism in the South. It starts by describing two waves of regionalism and their distinct approaches to economic and political integration. Subsequently, it discusses identity-based South organisations as a new modality of regionalism. The final session offers an overview of the aforementioned themes. It questions the prospects of normative uniformity in the Global South given the multi-layered and still loosely connected system of South–South institutional structures.

5.1 The 'first wave' of regionalism

In May 1974, the United Nations General Assembly, which had just approved the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted a resolution calling for a new international economic order (NIEO).[1] In addition to promoting a more equitable economic order as well as specific measures to realise structural change and improvements in North–South trade relations, the NIEO's Programme of Action called for cooperation among developing countries in terms which came to be intertwined with the notion of 'collective self-reliance'.[2] Collective self-reliance implied (1) the severance of existing links of dependence operated through the international system by the dominant countries, (2) full mobilisation of domestic capabilities and resources, (3) the strengthening of collaboration with other underdeveloped countries and (4) the re-orientation of development efforts in order to meet the social needs of people in underdeveloped countries. In political terms collective self-reliance represented a coordinated stance among developing countries in their negotiations with industrial countries on a NIEO. Developing countries, in cooperating with one another, could improve their collective bargaining power vis-à-vis the industrial countries, mobilise countervailing pressure and acquire more leverage.

Another facet of collective self-reliance came to be known under the general rubric of 'South–South co-operation' and included the intensification of trade and other linkages among developing countries, firstly, usually, through increasing cooperation among groups of countries at the regional or sub-regional level, and secondly, through collaboration across the Third World. In the long term, collective self-reliance would aim to replace the dependent and asymmetrical

relations between developing and industrialised countries through establishing integrated autonomous regional production and trading systems among developing countries. This, however, would necessitate the integration of their technological, services and communications and information infrastructure, with the primary purpose of meeting the social needs of the poorest layers of society.

Although radical Southern thinking on development issues was still incipient during the 1950s, regional economic commissions within the UN system, such as the Economic Commission for for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for Latin America and Caribbean were already active in persuading governments to think in broader regional models of development. As noted in Chapter 1, these commissions were under the institutional umbrella of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which became later a key arena for South–South coordination.[3] About a decade later, Latin American development theories became the underlying economic logic behind projects of regional cooperation among post-colonial states. The tenets of *dependencia* theory and the collective self-reliance doctrine inspired the decisions of a number of regimes to form regional groupings during the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, regional integration was clearly associated with economic ideas championed by the Argentinean Economist Raúl Prebisch. Prebisch's structuralist view of Latin American development became mainstream policy thinking within both CEPAL (Spanish for ECLA) and the UNCTAD.[4] This regionalist move was also motivated by the demonstration effect of the 'success' of the European Economic Community (EEC). Thus, their *modi operandi* were based not only on structuralist models of import-substitution industrialisation, autocentric or 'self-reliant' development, and the structural theory of change models of economic development, but also on the emulation of the institutions developed over time in the European Community. In practice, this has led to mostly unsuccessful attempts at regional integration, for a variety of reasons that will be discussed in the next section.

During the first wave of regionalism, developing groupings attempted to follow a 'positive' integration approach, also termed developmental regionalism. Thus, instead of focusing on removing tariffs only, they also viewed regionalism as a means to develop the industrial base of their economies. This could be achieved mainly through a regional industrialisation strategy of import-substitution, exploiting economies of scale in joint ventures and integrated production structures, and joint developing transport and communications infrastructure across regional groupings.

Such an approach implied some form of 'central' industrial planning at a regional level, particularly to determine the scope and direction of trade and the location and concentration of joint industries and development projects, and to formulate joint policies towards multinational corporations. Regionalism, therefore, was seen as an 'alternative' development strategy to nationally oriented strategies, which could assist countries in overcoming the economic disadvantages of small resource bases, low per capita incomes, small populations and a disproportionate dependency on fluctuating international commodity markets.

From 'old' to 'new' regionalism: The case of Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The SADC is an offspring of the political association of 'frontline' states that united against the apartheid regime in South Africa by forming the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) in 1980. The main objective of SADCC was to bring an end to the apartheid regime in South Africa, partly through international campaigning, and partly through isolating its economy from the region. Historically, the southern African economy (which includes the 14 member countries of today's SADC) has always centred on the industrial hub of South Africa, from where British companies explored and settled in other parts of the region. Today, three-quarters of the region's gross domestic product (including oil production in Angola and mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) is produced in South Africa. SADCC therefore aimed to develop an intra-regional transport and communications network and set up joint mega-industrial projects, such as energy and hydropower, to allow the region to become 'independent' from South Africa. Apart from the successful construction of some trans-regional transport corridors, SADCC was never really successful in 'delinking' the region from South Africa.

After 1992, when a new South African regime joined the grouping, it changed direction to become the South African Development Community (SADC). As before, the new grouping aspired to a form of 'developmental regionalism', which in practice meant that countries would cooperate to identify, raise funding for and implement joint projects and programmes in areas considered to be of mutual interest, such as the development of a regional electricity grid and telecommunications infrastructure, the development of harmonised

financial policies, joint management of regional water resources and pooling resources for agricultural research, early warning of crop failures and so on. Each member country was allocated a portfolio of projects to manage on behalf of the region and a small secretariat managed regional meetings, donor relations and policy development. In 2000, however, after a few years of deliberations, all portfolios were centralised to a more powerful and larger central secretariat to try to improve the efficiency of these projects.

In the early 1990s, SADC members became interested in negotiating a regional free trade area. Low income and landlocked members were interested to expand their small national markets in the hope that this will encourage domestic and foreign investment, especially from South Africa. The South African government and corporate sector view the southern African market as a 'hinterland' for South African business expansion. SADC joint infrastructure projects also offered many opportunities for state-owned or newly commercialised South African enterprises to buy into public–private partnership hydropower, electricity, telecommunications and energy projects across the region.

Critics argue that the South African government is using its political and economic weight to reinforce a core-peripheral or hub-and-spoke model of regional integration, whereby all commercial transactions and investment occur between South African and other member countries, but not between those countries. The government, in turn, argues that South African investment in infrastructure projects and industries in the region, facilitated by SADC programmes and projects, is contributing to the economic and social development of the region and will pave the way for direct investment from industrial countries.

The evolution from SADCC to SADC is a clear example of the shift from old regionalism, based on the philosophy of 'collective self-reliance' to new or open regionalism, where regional market integration is seen as a first step towards inclusion of least developed countries in the global economy.

Despite South Africa's investment in SADC since the end of apartheid, its market-driven approach to economic regionalism has proven unable to promote equitable and sustainable regional development. On the contrary, the neoliberal market integration model pursued by SADC has created new and exacerbated old challenges

posed by the dependent nature of intra-regional economic relations. During the 1990s, SADC did not devise any coherent regional development strategy that could promote structural changes in the economies of the poorest states in the region. Rather, the liberalisation of intra-regional trade was the only economic strategy guiding SADC's project of regional integration.

The concentration of regional trade and investment flows around South Africa's economy poses serious and unresolved challenges to cooperation in the SADC area. According to Pallotti, 'the rush to secure the best trade access to the South African market has pitted one SADC member state against the other'.[5] Moreover, the tremendous economic advantage given to South Africa by SADC's regional liberalisation programme has reignited long-standing concerns among SADC member states over South Africa's hegemonic agenda in the region.

SADC's security agenda, aimed at reducing conflict and fostering a more peaceful region, has not fared well. Disputes between leaders in South Africa and Zimbabwe over the security bureaucracy have led to separate SADC interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. More recently, the functioning of SADC has been fraught by political tensions over Zimbabwe. Sharp divisions within SADC on how to deal with Zimbabwe's economic collapse and political unrest and the organisation's inability to collectively address the human rights violations perpetrated by Robert Mugabe's regime have further exposed deep-rooted constraints to economic and political coordination among Southern African states.[6]

5.2 Failure of closed regionalism

The failure of most regional groupings within the developing world to achieve their ambitious objectives has, as well as the causes of these failures, been well recorded. They can be grouped into four broad categories: (1) weak states, (2) continuing dependency relations with industrial countries, (3) structure of their economies and (4) the fallacy of transposition of a Western model of integration.

Although responding to real or perceived threats by centralising political power developing states during this period have remained weak relative to internal groups competing for power and economic resources in a fractured society, which contained widely divergent

elements.[7] Regionalism demands that states cede authority to a regional decision-making body in certain functional areas of cooperation such as trade policy, transport policies, some areas of education and so on. As a consequence of the economic weaknesses of developing states, what traditionally was perceived as 'low politics', came to be seen as 'high politics' for these insecure and vulnerable states. This made them more reluctant to cede any authority in these areas. In addition, 'mutual suspicion and differences of political outlook arising from heterogeneous cultures and varied colonial heritage, fear of being dominated by others and an insular view imposed by ultra-nationalism', have also caused the disintegration of regional groupings.[8]

Second, the national development plans and annual budgets of developing states have tended to perpetuate and even accentuate their dependency through an over-reliance on foreign resources. The economies of weak states tended to be dominated by foreign capital in the form of investment, aid and loans, which undermined long-term development planning and thus impeded coordinated development planning at a regional level, by implication a long-term exercise.

Third, developing economies suffered from structural economic features, which impeded regionalism. These included a lack of complementary production structures, a narrow economic base, a lack of necessary infrastructure to facilitate intra-regional trade and production, and the production of similar or near-similar commodities. The latter meant that these economies were not only competing for external markets, but also had very little to trade with one another. A lack of sufficient skilled labour also prevented the internalisation of the development process and self-sustaining development. Not only did the nature of their non-complementary labour-surplus economies discourage the free mobility of labour in regional groupings, it perpetuated their dependence on foreign technicians and managers.

Fourth, the European Community model of linear regional integration, which would supposedly lead to a political union, was not suited to the socio-political, economic, cultural or spatial circumstances of developing countries. As a result of transposing this model to their own strategies, regional integration has come to be identified with the definition of technical and bureaucratic modalities and institutional mechanisms for enhancing economic cooperation among developing countries. The historical experiences and the specific characteristics of regimes, private enterprise and other actors of civil society were ignored in the conceptualisation of these regional schemes, as was the potential for conflict in the pursuit of different partners' socio-economic objec-

tives. These factors should have determined the modalities, time frames, sequencing, approaches and institutions of regional groupings. Instead, most groupings emphasised the creation of a free trade area and a customs union, rather than more pragmatic and strategic production and political cooperation. A more flexible, gradual and pragmatic approach, with a greater emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of states might have resulted in more successful developmental regionalism.

5.3 The 'Second Wave' of regionalism

The political ascendancy of conservative governments in the US, Canada, UK and West Germany in the 1980s provided a fertile environment for the neo-classical 'counterrevolution' in economic theory and policy. As opposed to the demand-side and systemic focus of the *dependencia* theorists, this school of thought emphasised the implementation of supply-side measures to achieve optimal development. It called for the dismantling of public ownership, statist planning and government regulation of economic activities in developing countries.

Many of the political proponents of this school have obtained controlling votes on the boards of UN financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They have argued that underdevelopment resulted from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing policies and too much state intervention in economic management, especially in developing countries. To stimulate economic efficiency and growth, they argued, trade barriers should be eliminated, state-owned enterprises privatised, export industries expanded, an enabling environment created for private investment and government regulations and price distortions be eliminated in factor, product and financial markets.

The predominance of this school of thought coalesced with the economic policy reform conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank during the 1980s on those countries applying for loans from these international financial institutions (IFIs). These reforms were to assist IFI clients to balance their import payments with export earnings and continue paying the rising interest on their high debt stocks. Their debt burden started to assume 'crisis' levels during the 1980s in the wake of a worldwide economic recession which was characterised by falling international market shares for the commodity exports of developing countries, hyper-inflation and the general contraction of industrial markets. Regional trade in the developing world also suffered a steep decline as countries sought to reduce their imports in an effort to

meet this balance of payments crisis. The economic reforms prescribed by the IMF and World Bank were similar for all client states, despite the different economic structures of Latin American, African and Asian countries. Throughout the developing world, therefore, governments progressively and gradually were abandoning import-substitution industrialisation and 'delinking' as a development strategy, and increasingly opening up their economies.

Simultaneous to the consolidation of this liberal ideology among the leading industrial nations, revolutionary developments in information and communication technology were facilitating a new international division of labour, which had its origins in three fundamental changes in global production conditions during the 1970s. First, the reserve army of comparatively cheap labour in the Third World was increasing and becoming more visible. Second, it became technically possible to split up the production process/chain into many constituent parts (in a radical departure from the Fordist model), many of which could be carried out by an unskilled or quickly trained and semi-skilled workforce. Third, the development of inexpensive global transport and communications systems was reducing the significance of geographical distance and location in production costs. Multinational companies could reduce their total production costs by relocating certain parts of their production to low-income countries. This was particularly true for the electronics and textile industries, which benefited from extremely cheap, female and non-unionised labour and improved transport and communications technology. Stricter environmental legislation and increasing wages in industrial countries throughout the 1980s further 'pushed' multinationals to developing countries. Where they chose to locate depended on factors such as the national legal framework, the 'discipline' and quality of the workforce, and the comparative incentive structure offered by countries in the developing world.

The revival of regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s has coincided not only with the abandonment of import-substitution industrialisation and collective self-reliance approaches to development, but also with the shift from the post-Fordist production modes of the 1970s, to global production methods. Whereas the 1970s were characterised by the relocation of certain production processes of national corporations to other countries, the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by a new production process termed globalisation. The rapid growth of global financial markets since the late 1970s, facilitated by national deregulation of financial transactions in Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) countries and new information technologies have facilitated

the emergence of transnational or mega-corporations, which organised their entire produces and sales process with the aim to operate worldwide in what is a profound reorganisation of manufacturing, trade and services (Oman, 1994). Since the 1990s, these new global production processes have been further facilitated by the gradual multilateral elimination of both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers under the Uruguay Round obligations of the GATT.

This, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, has led to the ascendance of a neoliberal world order, with an emphasis on economic deregulation, low inflation, reduced public intervention in social and economic services, and cuts in government expenditure. It has also led to a political effort, especially by 'neoclassical economists and financial capital' to establish international rules and institutions that would promote the policies desired by firms and capital owners, a development termed 'neo-institutionalism'.[9]

Open regionalism in South America: The case of Mercosur

The Treaty of Asuncion, signed in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, established the Common Market of the South, or Mercosur. During the five-year transition period, Mercosur states pursed their aim of building a common market through the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade with the goal of achieving full integration of external tariffs by 2006. Towards this end, average external tariffs – excluding automotive products – fell from 41% to less than 12% between 1991 and 1996 while intra-regional trade was boosted from US$3.6 billion to US$20.4 billion between 1991 and 1998.[10] Difficulties emerged in the competitive national automotive industry, which had strong trade union links in Argentina and was threatened by Brazilian imports. The unilateral devaluation of the Brazilian currency, which had a considerable impact upon the cost of regionally traded goods, was greeted with dismay in Buenos Aires and was credited (along with the Asian crisis) with causing intra-regional trade to drop to US$15.3 billion in 1999. Equally the onset of the financial crisis in Argentina in 2001 has resulted in economic hardship and political instability in that country, affecting trade as well as dampening expectations of further integration through Mercosur.

With the dominant economy in South America, the Brazilian government's approach to Mercosur appears to some to be largely

instrumentalist, seeing the regional organisation primarily as part of a wider national strategy aimed at increasing international bargaining power towards other proposed trading agreements and attracting foreign investment rather than as an end in itself. Interestingly, the increased levels of regional interaction have not resulted in higher levels of regional institutionalisation (the 'spill over' effect) or notable cooperation in other areas. The enhancement of the dispute settlement mechanism in 1994, for example, did not replace presidential diplomacy as a key source for resolution of trade-based disputes within Mercosur.

In March 1994, the Brazilian President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, floated the idea that Mercosur could serve as a reference framework to the creation of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA).[11] The idea was later taken up by his successor, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, who added strong political contours to the proposal. As a result of intense diplomatic activity by the governments of Brazil and Venezuela, in December 2004 representatives of 12 South American states established the South American Community of Nations, which was later renamed Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). Modelled on the European Union, UNASUL was an attempt to unite Mercosur and the Andean Community into a single regional organisation.

With the election of Leftist governments in Brazil and Argentina, in October 2002 and May 2003, respectively, Mercosur emerged as a sub-regional alternative to US-led projects of hemispheric integration such as the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). The use of Mercosur as a platform for grandiose declarations of political resistance to the dictates of US domination became apparent with the inclusion of Hugo Chavez's Venezuela as a full member in July 2006. Chavez has openly stated his intention to use Mercosur as a political instrument to circumvent Washington's influence in South America.[12]

The rationale behind Mercosur's creation is in line with the notion of 'open regionalism' but it should not be limited by it. Despite the declared intent of using Mercosur as a springboard for competitive integration in a liberalised global economy, the present governments of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, have demonstrated that the regional project is also about reinforcing the notion of Mercosur as a 'development community' rather than solely as a 'free-trade zone in South America'.

As of early 2008, however, Brazil's Congress still had not ratified Venezuela's accession to Mercosur. This was due to a series of public criticisms of Brazil made by Chavez who in turn had threatened to withdraw his country from the regional group altogether.[13] Political and economic power asymmetries between Argentina and Brazil, on the one hand, and their weaker partners, Paraguay and Uruguay, on the other, have clearly hampered attempts to further consolidate-Mercosur as a viable regional development community. In 2006, for example, a heated dispute between Argentina and Uruguay over two pulp-mill projects on the Eastern shore of the shared Uruguay River showed Mercosur's inability to deal with disputes between its members. Argentina did not seek a political resolution through Mercosur's dispute settlement mechanism, instead filing a case against Uruguay in the International Court of Justice over allegations of environmental damage.[14] It was the first time that the ICJ was involved in an environmental dispute between two South American states. Similarly, Paraguay is challenging the Brazilian government's advantageous position over the exploitation of Itaipu, a bi-national hydroelectric plant in the shared Paraná River. The Paraguayan government of Nicanor Duarte has often used nationalistic rhetoric to denounce the Itaipu Treaty of 1973 as the formal appropriation by Brazil of one of Paraguay's main natural resources.[15]

According to the IFIs, structural adjustment programmes are compatible with regionalism, which they define as the initial liberalisation of trade among developing countries, a stepping stone towards the gradual integration of their markets into the world economy.[16] It is the case that structural adjustment programmes have led to a greater convergence among economies of developing countries, which is a precondition of regional trade. It is also true that the correction of macro-economic imbalances and distortions in the form of overvalued exchange rates, protected and inefficient industries, and price controls could create an enabling environment for trade, competition and factor mobility within a region, all of which would assist regional integration.[17] For example, the across-the-board liberalisation of trade could reduce the administrative and tariff barriers to trade such as bans, quotas, import licences and duties and taxes. It could also stimulate new specialisations, since the transfer of investment decisions to the private sector have often led to different industrial choices than those previously

made by Third World governments, thus leading production structures to become more complementary than competing. The process of streamlining over-valued national currencies and establishing realistic exchange rates and minimum convertibility would facilitate the functioning of clearing houses and other payment systems in regional groupings, as well as the development of private banking services across national borders.[18]

However, many aspects of structural adjustment programmes have served to undermine developmental regionalism. First, structural adjustment programmes have focused exclusively on reforms in individual countries, and not at a regional level, thus discouraging countries from harmonising their economic policies or improving the efficiency of certain elements of structural adjustment programmes at a regional level. The design and implementation of short-term orthodox structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes have ignored the long-term objectives of the transformation of production structures and infrastructure through regional cooperation and integration, thus undermining regionalism as a means to development.[19] Second, their commitment to trade liberalisation has led to unwarranted opposition on the part of structural adjustment proponents to price discrimination of any kind, despite evidence showing that reciprocal preferential tariffs or the selective raising of non-tariff barriers have benefited industrial and agricultural development in some African regional groupings. In practice adjustment policies have reduced the size of existing preferential margins among member states of regional groupings, thus exacerbating the asymmetrical access of member states to one another's markets, in favour of the development of trade outside of the region.[20]

Structural adjustment policies have tended to reinforce and reproduce, rather than transcend the historical role of developing countries in the international division of labour, namely supplying industrial markets with non-beneficiated agricultural products and minerals. This is because the World Bank policy prescriptions insist on export-oriented industrialisation, or extraction and production for external markets. This outcome is a far cry from the original goals of developmental regionalism. Finally, the budget cuts prescribed by structural adjustment programmes, and their attendant social consequences, have increased xenophobic outbursts directed against citizens of neighbouring countries. The prolonged freezing of public spending has also created strong incentives to reduce national contributions to the budgets of regional organisations or regional development programmes

and projects more than proportionately, especially if they have to be paid in scarce foreign exchange.

The new regionalism emerging during the 1980s was guided in Latin America by a view of regionalism as complementary to structural adjustment policies. The gradual but spectacular shift from state intervention in economic management and import-substitution industrialisation strategies, to the privatisation of economic activity and export-oriented industrialisation strategies, combined with the emergence of a neoliberal disciplinary world order have created the environment for *open regionalism*.[21] New regionalist strategies have moved away from the principles of collective self-reliance, partly in response to an increase in the growth of trade and investment within South–South and North–South regional groupings. Such 'regionalisation' of production is a counterpart of globalisation, only on a different spatial scale.[22]

These processes of change at both the global and the regional level, which partly determine the opportunities and parameters for state policy, have given rise to state strategies that viewed regionalism as an effective form of regional governance in the face of economic globalisation and their concomitant marginalisation. The hyper-mobility of capital has forced states to yield some of their sovereignty to a system of corporate hegemony, in which transnational corporations, backed by their home states, are formulating the 'rules of the game'. In this context, developing states started viewing regionalism as a way to strengthen the competitive position of their national economies within the worldwide process of economic restructuring, which has caused their bargaining power vis-à-vis transnational corporations to erode. Regionalism, and the attendant process of regional policy coordination and harmonisation, might therefore serve to strengthen the effectiveness and the credibility of developing states.[23]

This 'regional governance' approach has been informed to a large extent by the neo-structuralist school. The latter is a response to the patterns of slow growth and social exclusion of Latin American states that have been practicing import-substitution industrialisation. While retaining Prebisch's original emphasis on the need to promote domestic industry, and the need for endogenous and structural conditions for economic growth, the neo-structuralists moved away from focusing on the state's central role in demand creation and investment planning. They acknowledged that the domestic markets of developing countries were too small to sustain extensive industrialisation processes, and therefore emphasised the importance of supporting the promotion and

formation of an efficient indigenous entrepreneurial class that would be able to compete in the international market.

To this end, the state had to extend its role to supply-side intervention, for example, by promoting industrial productivity so that exports may become more competitive. Their promotion of an export-oriented strategy, as well as their emphasis of the role of the state as a facilitator, instead of an agent of economic transformation, has set the neo-structuralists apart from the *dependencia* school. Middle-income developing states, according to the neo-structuralists, have been forced by globalisation to become 'competition' or 'entrepreneurial' states. These states view regionalism as a strategy through which to attract foreign investment to their markets, seen as an important stimulant of economic growth, and to improve the market position of companies with production sites within their geographical boundaries.[24] They therefore assign a key role to the private sector in regionalist projects, in a radical departure from previous attempts at regional integration among developing countries. These states realised that without the involvement of private enterprises in regional schemes, and without an emphasis on private sector development in such schemes, their collective attempts to build a more competitive and productive industrial base would remain at the level of political rhetoric and hopeful intention.[25]

In a new world of integrated global production, the South is no longer a homogenous bloc of underdeveloped countries, but consists of rather differentiated groupings where the more advanced states, or the 'semi-periphery', that is those with an already established industrial base, are aiming to adapt to the 'new rules of the game'.[26] One way in which to make this transition is to adopt new forms of regional networks, which could also include industrial countries. In so doing, they are trying to (1) attract foreign direct investment to a large and secure market, and to (2) 'lock-in' their economic policy reforms by underwriting them through regional cooperation (free trade and other) agreements. Such policy credibility is considered a dynamic effect of the new regionalism.[27]

Industrial states, in turn, tend to view their 'peripheries' or 'satellites' as 'captive' markets once they are locked into a regional agreement, both for the industrial country exports, but also to provide energy and labour for the various production chains of their transnational corporations. While this may seem like a continuation of the traditional dependency or neocolonial relationship between developing and industrial countries, neo-structuralist theories would view the developing state as an active agent that is pursuing regionalism to enhance its capability to influence the outcomes of its domestic production, finance and

trade policies. Combined with the 'positive assistance' given by the more advanced members of the regional grouping, which often include structural adjustment assistance, such regional schemes could potentially offer a 'structural historic opportunity' for developing countries to expand and deepen their commercial-industrial base.[28]

EuroMed and 'North–South' open regionalism

The Euro-Mediterranean (EuroMed) Agreement, signed in Barcelona in 1995, is an example of the new or 'open' regionalism. The agreement has three objectives: to establish a Mediterranean area of peace and stability, to establish a free trade comprising 40 countries and an estimated 800 million people by 2010, and to promote human development in the Mediterranean. It is an agreement between a core entity (the European Union) and its semi-periphery (the southern Mediterranean states including the Maghreb and Middle East).

This Agreement forms part of the then European Community's new Mediterranean policy, which has two axes: the negotiation of free trade area agreements with southern Mediterranean countries, and cooperation between the civil societies of Europe the southern Mediterranean. This policy stemmed from a new realisation of the strategic and economic importance of the southern Mediterranean countries and was partly based on an expanded understanding of the security 'threat' posed by these countries, to include a need for political, social, economic and human development. It followed a shift in the European Community's approach to developing countries away from development cooperation based on financial aid and trade concessions to partnership based on reciprocal trade and a multidimensional approach to cooperation, including security, human rights and democracy.

The EuroMed Agreement is also an extension of the European Union's trade policy, which is to gain access to emerging markets both through multilateral negotiations in the WTO, and through bilateral negotiation of free trade areas (FTAs) with developing countries or regions. Other bilateral FTAs include that with Mercosur, South Africa and Mexico and soon regional groupings or individual countries in the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries which until now have benefited from preferential access to EU markets without having to open up their own markets to EU exports.

In the context of the EuroMed Agreement, the EU has already negotiated bilateral FTAs with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Algeria.

A number of motivations have driven Maghreb states to negotiate free trade areas with the EU, despite the cost to their industries (and the associated loss of employment and potential for a rise in poverty) that compete with European imports. First, they are hoping that a free trade area with the EU would be an incentive to EU companies to relocate to Maghreb countries, where labour and other costs are much cheaper. This hope is based on evidence from NAFTA, where many US companies have relocated to Mexico, and the 'flying geese' model in Asia, where Japanese investment in low-cost developing countries have successfully helped them to adapt to new technological developments and diversify production through the creation of upstream and downstream industries. Second, Maghreb governments believe that a FTA with the EU will 'lock in' economic policy reforms they were planning to implement, such as trade liberalisation and privatisation, against the challenges of vested interest groups. The EU would act as a regional 'policy anchor', assisting them in their reform paths, partly through giving them financial assistance to implement reforms. This would impact positively on the way international capital markets would view their reforms. Third, for the semi-peripheral Maghreb states, a free trade area with Europe offered the best hope of inclusion in the international economy, which is increasingly regionalised around three main industrial poles – the US, Japan and in future, China, and Europe. They would now be able to compete on an equal footing with Eastern Europe and the southern EU members for European investment. Finally, Maghreb regimes are hoping to legitimise their increasingly contested hold over power by internal opposition forces and the international community, and deflect external critique of their dismal human rights records by entering into FTAs with the EU.

The new wave of regionalism is predicated on the emergence of a new form of 'competition' or 'entrepreneurial' state in the South, which wants to enhance its capability to influence production, finance, trade and migration policy outcomes by entering into regional agreements with core countries. These states are not necessarily ceding power or externalising key decision-making by negotiating North–South free trade area agreements, as Leftist critics would argue. Instead, they are trying to deepen and expand their industrial-commercial base through open regionalism.

According to this interpretation of regionalism, the world system is not static, or characterised solely by subordination and marginalisation of developing countries. Instead, the core-periphery structure is fluid and open to historical and human contingencies. Within the cycles of world economic fluctuations, geographic shifts and core-hegemony relations, a few countries may be presented with a unique structural opportunity to ascend in the world system. However, the economic reform conditionalities imposed upon the least-developed members of new regional groupings has undermined the goals of developmental regionalism.

ASEAN and regionalism in Southeast Asia: Towards a regional security complex

The establishment of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 came at a time of intensive regional political turmoil, external intervention and a host of developmental challenges to the states of the region. The leaders of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines committed themselves to a broad agenda of cooperation that included the economic, diplomatic and security spheres. In its first decade, ASEAN made notably little progress in furthering cooperation in any of these areas and it was only the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam that brought about a recommitment of the organisation to strengthening cooperation at the Bali Summit in 1976. The establishment of a Secretariat in Jakarta, followed by a period of intensive diplomacy aimed at resolving Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, culminated in a peace settlement in 1991. The subsequent expansion of ASEAN membership to include Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and, in 1997, Myanmar (Burma) brought with it the dilemmas of integrating substantively weaker economies into regional practice as well as highlighting shortcomings in human rights and democracy within ASEAN.

Throughout its history, ASEAN has proved to be adept at managing political dialogue with extra-regional actors like the US, Japan and China. Indeed, some analysts believe that ASEAN's success can be measured less in terms of its limited achievements in fostering greater economic integration and more in terms of its politico-diplomatic functions as a mediator between global and local security interests.[29] Intra-regional trade only took off after 1991 with the creation of an ASEAN free trade area, 'growth triangles' and tariff reduction programme. By 2002, intra-regional trade had increased

to US$86 million but this represented only a small percentage of the region's total worldwide exports of US$381 billion.[30] The Asian financial crisis, which was driven by currency speculation aimed at major trading states like Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia in 1997, resulted in serious economic and political fallouts across the region. Despite these economic difficulties, ASEAN continues to function as a regional hub for security issues as is witnessed by its engagement with China and North Asia through the Asian Regional Forum and its role in managing the East Timorese transition from province to independent state.

After decades of foreign interference in the region, ASEAN leaders were eager to develop a regional-building logic based on 'Asian values and culture' even though also accommodating liberal principles associated with Western models of regionalism. The case of Myanmar is illustrative in this regard. ASEAN states have been confronted with key strategic decisions concerning this small state in Southeast Asia. Its geographic situation, security concerns as well as cultural similarities with other ASEAN states, set Myanmar as a natural candidate to join the regional organisation. Fears of China's political, military and economic leverage in Myanmar, which dramatically increased following sanctions imposed against the Myanmese government by the US and other Western countries, have also significantly helped the country to win a place as a member of ASEAN in 1997.

Strong Western criticism over gruesome human rights violations perpetrated by Myanmar's hard-line military rulers, as detailed in annual reports by the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have put significant pressure on ASEAN leaders to act more aggressively towards Myanmar's regime. ASEAN's traditional policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states combined with a political culture that stresses 'informal compliance' instead of 'formal obligations', tipped the organisation in favour of a policy of 'constructive engagement' with Myanmar's authoritarian government.

However, domestic changes among some ASEAN member states, in particular democratic Indonesia, as well as rising anger at the massacres of Buddhist monks at Depayin in 2003 and the patent disregard of ASEAN diplomacy by Myanmar's military rulers resulted in a shift. After 2004, ASEAN members like Malaysia no longer actively shielded Myanmar from international criticism in settings like the

UN Commission on Human Rights or block discussions at the UN Security Council, a pattern that continued as human rights violations worsened.

5.4 Regionalism and identity in the South

The developmental rationale for regionalism has been, and remains, the most potent source of cooperation between Southern states. At the same time, the sources of cooperation across sovereign boundaries between the developing countries can embrace other motivations such as visionary political aims or religious identity. Moreover, the desire to deepen cooperation has inspired a conscious effort to promote new sources of solidarity including regionally based identities. Thus, in the course of pursuing these forms of regionalisms, Southern states are redefining themselves and their relationship to other political forces in the international system.

The rise of identity politics as a site and source of regionalism, while certainly not a new phenomenon in the South, has played a role in fostering cooperation between states. For instance, a precursor to ASEAN in Southeast Asia was the short-lived all-Malay grouping called Maphilindo (derived from the three participant countries, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia) whose purported aim was to build solidarity among Malay-dominated states. Maphilindo was conceived as a regional plan which would promote the common heritage of the Malay peoples, who had been artificially separated by the colonial powers.[31] The periodic efforts to build regional organisations around an Arab identity, which saw Egypt and Syria formally tied together in 1958 (and separating three years later), represents one expression of this. A more enduring version of this impulse has been the Arab League, which was formally founded in 1945 and has 22 member states, and has as its central purpose the safeguarding of Arab sovereignty, culture and promotion of closer cooperation. Throughout its history, the Arab League has played a key role on the matter of Palestine and in supporting the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

However, despite these examples, for the majority of leaders in newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, the active promotion of ethnically based or religious identities by the state was something to be treated with caution if not outright avoidance. This was in large measure because it was seen to be potentially dangerous to the viability of fragile post-colonial statehood with its demonstrated susceptibility to fragmentation along sectarian and ethnic lines. Indeed,

the Organization for African Unity (OAU) reflects these dual concerns in its founding charter and subsequent actions. Created in 1963, the OAU grew out of the pan-Africanist movement that shaped the thinking of many future leaders in colonial Africa that sought to erase the designated colonial boundaries in favour of a continent-wide political formation. In addition to acting against the forces of colonialism and apartheid, the OAU's Charter committed African states to the idea of an eventual political unification while, at the same time, serving as a guardian of the inviolability of state sovereignty (and in particular the territorial boundaries set out under colonialism) and source for legitimacy for the newly independent African countries.

This cautious approach to identity-based forms of regionalism has been modified in subsequent years, partly in response to the challenges of globalisation and its affect on statehood, but also due to the possibilities it presented to enhance regional cooperation. The deepening of regional cooperation through identity construction has been a feature of Northern entities like the European Union after Maastricht and increasingly in Southern regional organisations as well. While the Arab League and the IOC could call upon long-recognised (if not uncontested) identity markers to further their aims, organisations like ASEAN had no such base upon which to draw. In fact, competing ethnicities within the region such as animosities between Malay-Chinese and Thai-Khmer rivalries had been the source of historical tensions and bitter conflict. As a consequence, the ASEAN secretariat developed a series of measures, from cultural and sporting events to emblems and ceremonies, aimed at promoting an 'ASEAN' identity that would temper the excesses of ethno-nationalism within the region. This conscious construction of a regional identity fixed upon the regional organisation echoes the insights of Benedict Anderson and others on the formation of nationalism in post-colonial societies.[32] More recently, the creation of a cross-regional organisation embracing leading powers in Asia, Latin America and Africa, the India–Brazil–South Africa initiative, provides a more ambitious attempt to forge economic and political cooperation through the creation of regimes of cooperation that build upon the notion of a common 'South' identity (see below).

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and identity-based regionalism

In contrast with the previously discussed Southern regional entities, the OIC was founded on the basis of a shared religious identity.

Twenty-four Islamic countries including Palestine were so concerned about the arson attack in August 1969 on what they call the Blessed Al Aqsa mosque in occupied Al Quds, Jerusalem, that they met in September in Rabat to establish the organisation. They then met subsequently in Jeddah at foreign ministry level in March 1970. The ministers set up a General Secretariat, appointed a Secretary-General and decided to maintain temporary headquarters in Jeddah until the liberation of Jerusalem. Their current Secretary-General is from Turkey, a move with symbolic and historical resonance in Islam (the Turkish state had abolished the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 which had served as the supreme authority for Sunni Muslims since 1517). India, despite its large Muslim population, is not a member of the OIC. In addition, the OIC cut across traditional Sunni–Shia boundaries with Shia Muslim countries like Iran being members.

According to the OIC's Charter, established in 1972, the organisation's primary aims are to strengthen Islamic solidarity and to cooperate in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields. The OIC undertook to coordinate action to safeguard the Holy Places and support the struggle of the Palestinian people. They would work to eliminate racial discrimination and all forms of colonialism and to settle disputes peacefully. Since then they have held a number of summits (ten up to 2003) and foreign ministers' meetings (34 up to 2007). They now have 57 members, 51 of which are also members of the non-aligned. A number of bodies such as the Islamic, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade have links with the OIC. Other related bodies include Committees on Afghanistan, Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Jammu and Kashmir as well as Governmental Groups of Experts on Muslim minorities and communities in OIC non-member states and the problem of refugees in the non-Muslim world.

Like the NAM, OIC meetings are conducted within the framework of regional groupings, namely the Africans, the Arabs and the Asians. Their last foreign ministers' meeting was held in Islamabad in May 2007 where they, as usual, issued a Declaration, a final communiqué and numerous resolutions. The Declaration reiterated their resolve to find a just and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict under the auspices of the renewal of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. Their Senegal Summit was held in February 2008. At Islamabad they

condemned terrorism and gave support to the new international consensus to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on an universal and non-discriminatory basis. Interestingly they commended 'the concept of Enlightened Moderation to combat extremism and terrorism, resolve international disputes, conflicts and injustices affecting Islamic countries and peoples, to promote tolerance and harmony in accordance with the real values of Islam'. They called for the promotion of basic rights, including cultural and religious freedom for Muslim communities and minorities in non-OIC countries besides resolving to pursue social and economic development in Islamic countries.

The political OIC resolutions stemming from the Islamabad meeting give an interesting insight into the problems which need to be resolved in a UN group setting. Resolution 25 on security and solidarity among member states categorically rejects any attempt to misinterpret the provisions of the UN Charter. Resolution 26 on coordination and consultation among member states to adopt a unified stand in international fora and non-Islamic states invites member states and OIC Groups in Brussels, Geneva, UNESCO Paris and Vienna to coordinate their positions in line with OIC resolutions. It decided to set up an intergovernmental group to develop necessary rules for promoting and institutionalising the consultation and coordination of the OIC Groups and member states at capitals of non-Islamic states and international fora. The group would report to the next OIC foreign ministers' meeting. Resolution 27 on voting patterns 'Declares that coordination and cooperation between Member States in international organizations and conferences remains among the major objectives of the OIC, and is necessary for ensuring the protection of the interests of the Islamic world'. Resolution 29 requested the OIC Secretary-General to continue and improve OIC cooperation with the UN, NAM, UNESCO,WHO, ECO, AU, EU and LAS.

Resolution 28 on strengthening Islamic unity reflects the concept of enlightened moderation. It inter alia 'Recognizes the significant importance of promoting Islamic brotherhood and unity as a sacred religious obligation and objective in facing daunting challenges facing Islam and Muslims and the realisation of common interests of the Islamic Ummah in our increasingly complicated, interconnected and globalizing world'. A further clause 'Reiterates the firm determination of all Member States to adopt appropriate individual and

collective measures to remove all causes of prejudice, hatred, provocation, and incitement as well sectarian violence between the followers of different Islamic schools of thought and affirms the need for all Member States to refrain from politicising any possible religious dispute between Muslims to advance their own political objectives'. It goes on to appeal to the followers of all Islamic schools to abide by them and respect each other's beliefs and sanctities.

India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA): Rethinking regionalism and the South[33]

The Declaration of Brasilia, which created the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), was signed in June 2003 by the foreign ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa following conversations held by the three heads of state during the G8 meeting in Evian in June 2003. Mbeki, Da Silva and Vajpayee officially presented IBSA to the international community at the fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2003. Basically, the purpose of this forum is to share views on relevant regional and international issues of mutual interest as well as promote cooperation in the areas of defence, multilateral diplomacy, international trade, technology, social development, environmental issues and so forth. The Presidents and their foreign ministers have given high importance to IBSA's role in enhancing South–South cooperation.[34] Ministerial level gatherings, held in New Delhi in 2004 and 2007, Cape Town in 2005 and Rio de Janeiro in 2006, bolstered by two summit meetings, held in Brasilia in September 2006 and Tswane/Pretoria in October 2007,[35] seemed to confirm the countries' commitments to this process while joint positions at WTO meetings underlined the influence that it had on global politics.[36] The beacon of this partnership however is these states' common goal of becoming permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The diplomacy of India, Brazil and South Africa have quite often justified this claim in terms of their supposed role as leaders in South Asia, South America and Southern Africa, respectively.

IBSA is an innovative approach to South–South relations. Contrasting with traditional bloc-type coalitions of developing states, such as the G77, NAM and OIC, the governments of these three emerging powers sought to come together based on their mutually recognised status as middle powers and regional leaders. IBSA's

authority and legitimacy is strongly grounded on these states' perceived importance as key strategic bridges linking their regions to the larger international community. International recognition is integral to IBSA ambitions to be legitimised as leading states representative of their respective regions and, in so doing, earn support for a coveted seat on the UN Security Council as well as equivalent roles in other multilateral institutions. Clearly, all three states have received the tacit (and even explicit) support of the US, the erstwhile dominant hegemon, as the key states in South Asia, South America and Africa.

Most analyses of regionalism assume a physical reality and a kind of shared regional identity. IBSA, on the other hand, could be seen as a sort of 'regionalism without a clearly defined region'. This means that India, Brazil and South Africa are attempting to build a sense of belonging together without actually being (physically) together. These states are neither part of the same geographical space nor share a common regional past and identity. For them, the active leadership role they play (or are willing to play) is the actual expression of their common identity.

Regions are made and re-made, and their membership and frontiers are decided through political and ideological struggle and the conscious strategies of states and social actors. Like Anderson's nations, they are above all 'imagined communities', brought into existence by human agency.[37]

The 'imagined community' of IBSA states can be understood as a reaction to deep transformations in the patterns of North–South relations in the post–Cold War international order. After a prolonged period of liberal euphoria, which led to renewed investment in market-oriented (or open) regionalism in the developing world, many states in the South started to reassess their policy options and herald a more activist stance towards the developed world. It became very clear at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003 that the accommodating period in North/South relations was heading towards a conclusion. In fact, the unified stance of resistance showed in Cancun by major players in the developing world marked the beginning of a new era in the international of the Third World.

In this reformed international order, however, South–South solidarity is based in actual convergence of interests and power rather than

ideology alone. Since the late 1970s, but especially from the early 1990s, India, Brazil and South Africa have gone through significant changes in their economic models and political structures which set them in a different league of developing states. Given their position as consolidated democracies, representing a combined population of around 1.25 billion, and emerging economic powers, the foreign policy agendas of the IBSA members were likely to converge in a number of key issues.

5.5 Regional Organisations as Sites for Changing Norms

Though the impetus for regionalism may have resided in developmentalism and political solidarity framed at times in identity terms, the rationale and role for these organisations has evolved in line with the changing international and domestic environment. The increasing tendency of the UN to turn to regional organisations to manage difficult political and security issues within their geographic confines has introduced new pressures. Southern regional organisations' once unquestioned defence of sovereignty, for instance, has increasingly had to battle with not only the interests of their member states and even domestic constituencies in favour of action but also with a consciousness of the negative impact that inaction has on organisational image. Though experience has shown in the case of SADC and Zimbabwe that regional organisations are as often resistant to international entreaties as they are compliant to international pressure, nonetheless a shift in approach and attitude is increasingly discernable.

This can be seen, for example in the founding of the African Union in 2002 which coincided with a redefinition of the classic defence of sovereignty espoused by its predecessor, the OAU. The inclusion of a clause authorising the Peace and Security Council to call for intervention 'in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' was a remarkable change from the OAU's position.[38] According to one African scholar, the impetus for this change resides in an expansion of the tenets of Pan-Africanism: 'Realising the ideals of Pan-Africanism means that African countries can no longer remain indifferent to the suffering and plight of their neighbours.'[39] The result of this process of, to use Acharya's term, 'localisation' of an international norm, is the African Union's decision to intervene in Darfur in 2004. NGOs like the East Africa Civil Society Forum have actively sought to bolster these efforts by putting public pressure on African governments to abide by the African Union's commitment to R2P.[40]

ASEAN is another case where attitudes towards sovereignty and human rights are undergoing a change. In December 2005, the decision was taken by ASEAN to establish a formal legal entity through the promulgation of the ASEAN Charter which included a strong endorsement of human rights and democracy. The ensuing debate over the use of sanctions against member states which violated ASEAN declarations and agreements resulted in modification of the sanctions provisions. In this contentious climate, ASEAN members were able to convince Myanmar not to take up the rotational chairmanship of the organisation to avoid the spectacle of public condemnation (and the possibility of a boycott) by its Western dialogue partners.[41] The ASEAN Charter was formally adopted in November 2007 and though sceptics have pointed out that 'human rights remains subordinate to the Association's bedrock principle of non-interference', it is clear it reflects changing attitudes across Southeast Asia. Concurrently, the chorus of ASEAN government, parliamentary and civil society voices openly critical of the situation in Myanmar grow louder. For instance, the establishment of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus to promote the democratisation process in that country noted that negative image the situation had on the organisation.[42]

In South America, however, the multilateral idealism of R2P is at odds with traditional strategic concerns of regional states. Notwithstanding the investment in ambitious plans for political and economic integration, regional divisions are more salient today than in the past 20 years. The promotion of regional solidarity and 'human security' has been balanced by realist foreign policies. There has been growing ideological polarisation among governments in the region as well as concerns over increasing arms spending, especially among the Andean states of Colombia and Venezuela. Mercosur suffers from destabilising weaknesses due to growing economic assymetries between smaller partners (Paraguay and Uruguay) and larger ones (Brazil and Argentina). Moreover, the unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 has reinforced South American nations' long-standing bias against all forms of intervention, firing up traditional suspicions of US interests in the region.

Thus while the institutionalisation of new norms on key issues like sovereignty and human rights in some regional organisations, coupled to the conditional application of these norms to regional problems, marks a distinctive shift from past practice, it would be premature to declare the adoption of a new position altogether. Just as countries like

India, Brazil, China and South Africa have all voiced concerns over R2P during the UN General Assembly debate in 2005, so too such scepticism abounds at the regional level as to the motives and applications of these ideals.

5.6 Conclusion

Regionalism as a demonstrably successful strategy for promoting economic development and political independence among countries of the South remains in many respects an elusive goal. In examining the record over a broad sweep of time, it may be that the attainment of the development aims inherent in regionalism were fundamentally compromised by (if not incompatible with) the exigencies of the political aspects of the project. Indeed, with the onset of rapid globalisation and the concurrent adoption of the tenets of neoliberalism as a world standard by international institutions, bilateral and multilateral donors and most developing countries, the nationalist impulse underlying many regional projects has been subsumed within the framework of variants on open regionalism. Furthermore, developing countries have experienced tremendous socio-economic change in the decades since independence and this in itself has resulted in an unprecedented diversification of development among what was, roughly speaking, a relatively homogeneous grouping. A repositioning and reassessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation both with other developing countries and across the North–South divide is arguably a rational response by states as they confront the challenges posed by globalisation.

As is the case in all regional projects that aspire to move beyond the technical formalities of trading relationships to embrace explicitly political ambitions, the challenges of identity are manifold. The place of identity as both a possible source of cohesion within regional organisations and a countervailing force against the pulls of localised ethnicity and nationalism are evident. The ability of regional organisations in the South to adapt considerations of identity and its formation to the imperatives of sovereignty will determine the utility of regional initiatives that aspire to deepening forms of cooperation.

Similarly, new South–South models of regionalism, such as IBSA, which were born from the common definition of interests as well as identity, show the possibility of adaptation between global and sub-global/regional initiatives. In fact, the growing interplay between transnational civil society, multilateral institutions and regional organisations

is one of the most important structural features of the so-called 'Global South' in twenty-first century international politics. The question however is whether these still loosely connected South structures will develop into a relatively cohesive set of shared norms or whether such a holistic conception of the South is incompatible with the complexities of an increasingly fragmented international system.

6
A South of Peoples

The launching of the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre in 2001 was the culmination of a process of articulation, coordination and expansion of a vast array of anti-globalisation NGOs based in both the South and the North. Indeed, while the 'battle for Seattle' marked the Northern NGOs discovery of the South and its perspective and issues, the onset of the WSF process was important in defining the position of the South vis-à-vis the key features of the contemporary international system as the NAM summits and its precursor in Bandung were during the Cold War. In the first instance, the WSF reflects the dynamics of change within the South, most especially the rise and diversification of civil society which itself is linked to the increasing economic development and opening of political space within Southern countries. Representing a range of interests from environmental groups to social development organisations, Southern civil society has developed positions and outlooks based upon its assessment of the impact of the changing international system upon its states and societies. In the context of broad international jamborees such as the WSF and the UN's World Summit on Sustainable Development, Southern NGOs have sought to distinguish their concerns from those of their colleagues in the North while at the same time actively using these settings to build coalitions with like-minded Northern NGOs. At the same time, the relative proximity of some Southern NGOs to their governments – or, in some cases, the gap between the two entities – raised the issue of their status as collaborators or critics of sitting regimes. This underlying tension which at times was manifested as political pressure, coupled to the pecuniary needs of these organisations, is a theme that continually highlights the sensitivity of the issue of national sovereignty and the concomitant difficulties facing civil society in the South.[1]

This chapter will briefly examine the origins of civil society in the South; its development and influence, especially with regard to the role of policy networks in influencing approaches of states of the South in the international arena and the setting of a new global agenda for the South.

6.1 Origins

The origins of transnational Southern civil society reside in economic and social changes within states and the concurrent rise of technological innovations in the communications field. Rapid economic growth and development in selected states, led by the newly industrialised economies of East Asia (but a phenomena which found its counterpart in South America), had given rise to an enriched consumer society whose ambitions, outlook and interests echoed their middle-class brethren in the North.[2] Urbanisation and industrialisation both played a part in fostering conditions for the development of civil society. Once predominantly agriculturally based societies, with the accompanying clientist and tradition-bound networks, the massive population movement to the towns and cities brought about a restructuring of individual's relations with work and community as well as a redefinition of self. The urban environment presented a host of novel challenges to migrants, some of which fostered a drive on their part to organise or join existing social groups and institutions. In some cases these groupings were ethnically, kinship-based or confessional in nature; in others instances, they were rooted in employment concerns and, exceptionally, openly political in character.

Trade unions and religious organisations, which scholars have traditionally identified with civil society, were a critical feature of most anti-colonial and liberation struggles in the South.[3] Nonetheless newly independent leaders were increasingly ambivalent about civil society, recognising in it a force which could as easily be mobilised to challenge their authority as it had been used against their predecessors. The labour movement, with its roots in the productive activities of industry and agriculture (and its potential links to international communism), was always a controversial within the South irrespective of a government's ideological shade. For example, while trade union activist Tom Mboya's work in Kenya was as critical to securing independence as Jomo Kenyatta's equivocal position on the Mau Mau, in the aftermath of independence Kenyatta's 'market friendly' policies increasingly alienated the labour movement. Mboya's attempt to mobilise labour interests into a political force were cut short with his assassination and

the concurrent banning of political activism among trade unionists. Socialist Tanzania was no more supportive of organised labour, in spite of Julius Nyerere's ideological orientation, and actively persecuted trade unionists in the clove and cashew processing industries in Zanzibar as well as workers involved in sisal production inland.

In the case of Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) of East Asia and South America, the authoritarian nature of capitalism meant that organised labour was anathema to the state's development objectives, both in terms of its potential impact on labour costs and its politicising role, and as such it was actively discouraged through legislation if not outright repression. Thus while the rise of the development state provided, in the form of the emergence of a middle class that accompanied growing economic prosperity, the conditions for civil society, the scope for activism was limited to state-sanctioned organisations.[4]

Religious organisations represented a category that in certain respects and under certain circumstances were isolated from the excesses of authoritarian regimes in the South. The establishment of Islamic missionary movements (such as 'Dawa'), voluntary associations and educational foundations in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia provided a setting for non-state activism in the areas of education and social services.[5] This was seen in Egypt and Algeria, especially in light of the failure of the state to provide promised (or the cutting back of) social services in the wake of the global recession of the early 1980s. Crucially, the response of local Muslim activists to economic problems and natural disasters in Algeria in the 1980s was to give them a degree of credibility that translated into broad-based political support in the 1988 elections. In Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, churches and evangelical groups were in some instances able to adopt positions that were critical of authoritarian states. For instance, the Catholic Church publicly condemned the role of the security forces in the killing of thousands of people Matabeleland under Robert Mugabe and, concurrently, the actions of the security forces in El Salvador (the latter costing Archbishop Romero his life) in the 1980s. In Angola and Mozambique, where civil war and external intervention conspired to wreak havoc upon society, the churches played a crucial role in bridging the gap between warring factions and in launching peace initiatives.

At the same time, the status of religious bodies did not save them from close government scrutiny and in some instances led to the imposition of restrictions on action, systematic co-optation and outright banning. The role of the state in licensing and/or funding religious activities was but one way of exercising control over these entities seen in places as

diverse as Egypt and Indonesia.[6] Competition between Saudi supported religious schools (*madrassas*) and Iranian-funded initiatives in a number of countries, reflecting broader tensions within the Islamic world, were watched with unease by some host governments and Western analysts.[7] Sources of funding support were to remain problematic for virtually all civil society actors in the South, with civil society to varying degrees dependent upon beneficent foundations, aid donors and governments as membership dues were insufficient to cover costs.

A new variant of civil society in the South emerged in the late 1970s, one that grew out of the new social movements and the concomitant broadening of the social agenda at the international level.[8] The UN system became a focal point of this new agenda, as well as a setting at which Southern and Northern civil society actors (and their respective governments) would meet to debate global issues in the parallel NGO meetings that accompanied the inter-governmental conferences. The UN Conference on the Environment (1972), UN Conference on Women (1975), the UN World Population Conference (1974) and the UN World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1978), as well as a host of preparatory and follow-up meetings were contentious and highly polemical events that seemed to underscore the differences between the perspective held in the South and the North. For example, at the first UN Conference on Women in Mexico City, divisions emerged over practices in developing countries such as female genital mutilation, which Northern NGOs characterised as 'barbaric' and Southern NGOs defended as 'custom' (accusing their Northern counterparts as 'Western imperialists').[9] Furthermore, the social prohibition on discussing issues involved in reproduction (not to mention homosexuality and lesbianism) and which were featured in the Northern understanding of these concerns hampered dialogue between South and North.[10] Throughout this early period Southern NGOs remained a distinctive minority at these formative UN conferences, making up, for instance, only 10% of the NGOs present at the Stockholm meeting.[11] So-called social issues were not the only areas of contention: arms control conferences highlighted the gap between the South – as well as exhibiting divisions within it – and the North over the question of nuclear proliferation and the superpowers' monopoly on weapons of mass destruction.[12] These deeply held positions, in some instances rooted in social norms of a religious nature and in other cases reflective of statist concerns (and the influence or control exercised over NGOs), were played out primarily in the UN conference fora and contributed to the critique of the UN as a costly centre of debate and administrative paralysis.

Another source for the emergence of Southern civil society was the passing of the first generation of leaders (or regimes) and their replacement with democratic or at least more politically liberal governments in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. This was seen in countries as diverse as Zambia and Indonesia itself. While not necessarily embracing electoral democracy in its fullest sense, nonetheless these post-colonial governments were established in context of the universalisation of norms of human rights and democratic pluralism and as such were obliged to acknowledge the role of civil society in fostering political changes. Furthermore, many of the second generation of post-independence leaders had themselves been involved in trade unions, religious organisations or associated movements, so brought with them if not an affinity for civil society certainly an appreciation of its mobilising potential. Their relatively dependent position on international donors who had supported conditions for elections and the changing norms of economic governance – which, for example, actively sought to limit the pursuit of centralisation and the development of patronage networks – generally (but not always) served to check any repressive measures taken against civil society.

These localised trends within Southern states were mirrored by, or in some instances, received their impetus from broader changes in the international system.[13] Indeed, many of the transnational aspects of the dramatic transformation of the world's economic, political and security environment could be attributed to these systemic changes which themselves were seen to be part of 'globalisation'.[14] The effects of the post–Uruguay Round trade rules upon local agricultural producers or manufacturing enterprises in developing countries, some of which had been phased in over a number of years and whose impact was only being felt by the early 1990s, served as one spur to action. Concurrently, the determining influence of the Bretton Woods institutions' over domestic issues such as provisions for health care, education and civil servants' salaries – all of which fell under IMF or World Bank scrutiny in the context of a structural adjustment programme – placed key domestic issues out of the hands of local actors. This in itself inspired a critique among local elites, who often felt the pain of adjustment in terms of losses in income or state-sponsored position and privilege, and which resonated with the mass of the country's population. Finally, political conditionalities, which Northern donor states increasingly incorporated into their diminishing aid provisions for developing countries, also helped force the pace of political liberalisation in authoritarian states through the active promotion of electoral politics and local civil

society. Ironically, IMF-inspired devaluations of currencies caused many of the best-educated to foreswear traditional employment in the state sector for the burgeoning NGO sector, where they could in some cases command better, hard-currency denominated salaries. Civil society in the South was therefore both rooted in the domestic changes of an industrialising and urbanising society, as well as a diversifying economy with stronger links to the outside world, and a product of the Northern agenda for economic and political liberalisation which provided new rationale and resources to support Southern civil society.

6.2 Policy networks

As the depth and variety of international interaction increased in the 1980s, spurred on by the penetration of trade barriers, the information revolution and the spread of new communication technologies, the challenges facing policymakers in the South mounted. The dearth of South-based researchers with technical expertise in spheres as diverse as marine science and financial systems severely handicapped government policymaking in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the North.[15] At the same time, the proliferation of these policy networks and epistemic communities based in the North had a demonstrable role and influence over industrialised countries' stance at critical junctures like the Uruguay Round.[16] The UN had initially been the key institutional source, both in terms of expertise and in terms of funding, for developing countries to counter this situation through support for South–South cooperation and scientific exchange programmes as well as recourse to its specialised agencies such as UNCTAD and UNIDO. However, the systematic under-funding of the organisation – primarily due to the ideological machinations of the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in London and Washington – greatly reduced its capacity to support South-oriented research and, as such, precipitated a crisis for Southern governments. Much of the Anglo-American critique was aimed at UNESCO which had taken the lead in denying Israel and apartheid South Africa, seats in the organisation in 1974. This negative appraisal was compounded by the conduct of the UNESCO Secretary-General, Amadou-Mahatar M'Bow, who was accused of profligate spending and nepotism. Four years later, the UNESCO declaration of a 'New World Information Order', inspired by Western dominance of the global media but one which included curbs on freedom of the press precipitated a walk out by the US and Britain. A pattern of withholding UN funding by Washington, tied to an annual US Congressional

review, deepened the fault lines between Washington and many South governments.[17]

Recognition that greater technical expertise and new ideas were needed to supplement the activities of government bureaucracies in the South gave rise to a new 'breed' of policy-oriented think tanks with roots in the developing world – for example, Third World Network which is based in Malaysia, Ghana and Uruguay – was to become one of the most important changes in the contemporary period.[18] No longer necessarily bound by geography or time, South-based policy analysts were increasingly able to exchange ideas, pool resources and recognise shared interests in developing approaches towards addressing economic, social and even political issues facing their societies. The communications revolution, especially as manifested through the expansion of the Internet from the mid-1990s, allowed for a tremendous expansion in connectivity across the globe. In the South, where antiquated landlines and limited provisions for electricity acted as inhibitors of growth in adoption of ICTs, nonetheless it was in those middle-income developing countries which had invested in infrastructure improvements and education which became the most active in ICT promotion. And, most surprisingly, even the poorest economies in Africa and Asia experienced a high take-up rate of mobile or cellular telephones when the requisite infrastructure was put into place.

Unlike the North, where think tanks had been a feature of the policy landscape since the 1920s, South-based policy centres were most often 'quangos' (quasi-non-governmental organisations) with formal and informal links, sometimes cemented by finance, with governments.[19] Ministries within governments with sufficient financial wherewithal sponsored think tanks, such as B. J. Habibe's Center for Information and Development Studies in Jakarta, as a means of projecting and developing their policy agenda (especially as an alternative to the established perspectives). Foreign foundations and development assistance agencies were sources of seed capital for some think tanks, though local government support and consultancy contracts often were means of covering recurrent costs. For example, Southeast Asia's network of International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISIS) were launched with the assistance of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations in the 1970s while German party foundations played a key part in establishing policy research centres in Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.[20]

One of the clearest illustrations of the relationship between Southern inter-governmental organisations as instigators of think tanks and the emergence of policy networks is the case of the South Centre. At the

Non-Aligned Movement conference held in Harare in 1986 leaders decided to establish a special commission to examine the impact of the changing economic and political environment for the developing countries. The South Commission, staffed by senior policy advisors and scholars from India, Tanzania, Malaysia and funded by the newly formed G15, produced a thoughtful report on the eve of the ending of the Cold War which outlined key challenges facing the South in the coming millennium.[21] Encouraged by its tough-minded assessment of the international environment, Southern states led by Julius Nyerere decided to support the creation of a South Centre based in Geneva which would serve as a resource on trade and development issues as well as an advocacy body to promote Southern perspectives on global issues. Its office, which it shared with the G15 for a time, became a hub for policy-oriented research on technical aspects of trade, finance and development as well as the role of international institutions.

Third World Network is another example of a policy centre within the South, in this case Malaysia, Ghana and Uruguay (and more recently India), but one with a more ambivalent relationship to Southern governments. Led by Martin Khor, Third World Network has played a seminal role in raising concerns over the impact of the post-Uruguay trade agenda on the South and, through its critical studies into Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), was to provide a cogent case for developing countries to resist signing onto its terms.[22] Established in 1984, it also was among the first think tanks to examine environmental issues from a developing country perspective as well as a leader in integrating women's issues into its policy research.[23]

Focus on the Global South, funded primarily by Northern foundations and led by veteran scholar-activist Walden Bello, is a relative newcomer having been established in 1995. It tends to espouse a more radical approach to many of the same issues that the South Centre and Third World Network address reflecting its explicit orientation towards contemporary anti-globalisation movements such as the Landless People's Movement.[24] An active critique of international financial institutions (IFIs), Western MNCs and national governments' development policies – especially though not exclusively as they affect Asia – is promoted through its web site, publications, email lists and conference participation.

Policy institutions of the South are themselves – as is the case in the developed world – fundamentally elitist in character (though this feature is especially pronounced in poorer developing countries) and whose proximity to governments have in some cases 'prompted

questions of co-optation and independence of thought'.[25] The process of exercising influence over policymakers is through links with political and economic elites within policymaking and business circles, ties that are manifested through both formal (workshops, conference, publications, consultancies) and informal contacts. In many respects Southern policy networks would be considered 'epistemic communities' in that their approach involves the exchange and use of technical expertise, mediated through transnational links, between established experts but their commitment to promotion of South interests draws them at times closer to that of advocacy networks.[26] For example, the South Centre and Third World Network participated in a number of seminal studies of key international issues, among them the reform of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, as well as developing policy approaches to various aspects of trade and development.[27] These studies, which in some cases formed the basis for positions adopted by Southern governments in multilateral negotiation settings, were presented to selected policymakers in workshop settings as well as through publications.[28] The head of a more explicitly advocacy-oriented organisation, the Focus on the Global South, characterised his organisation's interaction with policymakers and government in the following way:

> We are also involved in what bureaucrats call a 'capacity-building' role. The Vietnamese government got in touch with us to discuss whether or not they should join the WTO. We gave them a great deal of technical information about the Organization that demonstrated how and why it would be a disaster if they did. One of our jobs is to keep grass-roots communities and national organizations, including some governments, informed about the workings of global institutions.[29]

However, one study of the influence of Northern-based policy networks on Northern countries' decision making at the GATT/Uruguay Round indicated that, in the final phase of negotiations, 'senior negotiators and politicians incorporated the views of these experts into their policy activities only when it served to support their policy objectives'.[30] Anecdotal evidence suggests the influence of Southern policy networks is felt most readily in the formative stages of broaching a given issue and that, in the case of those states with greater capacity, the process resembles that of the North. For countries with limited capacity in the technical areas or even representation at multilateral negotiations, institutions like the South Centre proved to be crucial to educating and developing policy positions that 'best represented their interests as a developing country'.[31]

As noted above, a crucial aspect of globalisation that was to foster the development and proliferation of transnational policy networks in the South was the communication revolution of the late twentieth century. Fuelled by the emergence of the 'new economy' based upon technological innovations in communication and computing, the rapid growth in the World Wide Web spawned a bewildering array of organisations and networks that found common cause in issues as diverse as consumer awareness and environmentalism to exposing corruption and monitoring human rights. China, for example, had two million internet users in 1998 but in two short years had increased that to 26 million.[32] India, Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia, Taiwan and China – all with nascent software and hardware industries and boasting educated and increasingly affluent sectors of their populations – became the principle exponents of a digitally networked society based in the South. Concurrently, civil society in these countries seized upon the possibilities of low-cost presence and means of rapid sourcing of information as well as the ease of networking inherent in ICTs. Policy institutions and advocacy networks in particular were among the first to recognise the potential of World Wide Web to enhance networking both within and outside of the South as well as use the Internet as a platform for promotional activism. The ease with which policy papers could be viewed and exchanged among South-based researchers and the interested public by those with access to the web opened up new avenues of contact.

However, the tension between the libertarian ethos of the World Wide Web and the more traditionalist societies of the South, not to mention the concerns of an authoritarian state such as China, resulted in the imposition of selective curbs on information sources, chat rooms and web sites by some governments. Anti-government political activism on the web (and sometimes the product of diaspora communities in the North) as well as other banned forms of conduct caused concern in Southern capitals from Windhoek to Kuala Lumpur. Indeed, according to one scholar the Internet has empowered Southern civil society because its 'speed and relative autonomy … facilitates popular protest', with bulletin boards in particular serving as 'uncaptured' space for the promotion viewpoints, raising of public awareness and organising protests.[33] But on the whole the web remained outside of normal strictures which governed the life of the bulk of the citizenry in poorer developing countries primarily because economic costs guaranteed that internet users in the South were among the relatively privileged middle and upper classes.

6.3 Transnational civil society and the new agenda for the South

At the same time that civil society was organising across the South, in the wake of the effects of the new international trading regime on issues such as environment and labour, the North had discovered some of the concerns which had for so long exercised the developing world. The unfair trade practices embedded by way of international agreements or the use of non-tariff barriers, the influence of the IFIs over national macro-economic policy, the role of capital flight in shaping economic prospects as well as a host of other concerns came to feature on the agenda of Northern civil society. This resulted in a convergence of perspectives and sometimes positions espoused by NGOs based in industrialised or developing countries in settings as diverse as the Environment and Development Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. Indeed the Rio Summit was seen by many to be a turning point for NGO inclusiveness, with 1400 being registered officially with the conference itself and a further 30,000 participants attending the parallel NGO Global Forum Summit.[34] Concurrently, the evolving impact of globalisation, especially pronounced on the classic role and centrality of the state to the international system, produced a widening of the sites (or perceived sites) of global decision making to include the G7/8 summits and the World Economic Forum (WEF) (the former an annual meeting of leading industrialised countries and the latter an annual gathering of key figures in international business and politics). Coordinated action aimed at influencing, or in some cases engaging in protest, at these meetings was undertaken by Northern and Southern civil society while parallel summits mushroomed alongside the more established processes. Of these parallel events, the most compelling was the WSF which came to symbolise transnational civil society's response to globalisation and give expression to the new concerns emerging out of the contemporary South.

6.3.1 Southern NGOs and the post–Cold War period

As the Cold War drew to a close and the ideological shibboleths of international politics were cast aside, the accelerating pace of liberalising trade and the unfettered movement of capital posed a host of challenges to developing societies in the South. While leading South states such as Malaysia, Brazil and even India actively sought to transform their economies into market-driven 'competition states', the task of assessing

the impact of the gathering forces of globalisation on long-standing goals of equitable development both within countries and across the international system increasingly fell to the nascent Southern civil society.[35] New contexts complicated their responses to globalisation, with, for instance, the rise of new forms of regionalism ('open regionalism' such as Mercosur) introducing localised economic blocs that sought to conform with the strictures of neoliberalism rather than, as in the past, attempt to carve out a autarkic space against market capital. State support for Southern 'quangos' was reduced, sometimes due to (external or self-imposed) restraints on public sector spending, in other cases due to the breakdown of patronage networks as a new generation of leaders came to power. Moreover, Southern civil society's advocacy positions increasingly put them at odds with developing country governments, especially in areas such as trade in global arenas like the WTO. Finally, the role of emergent Southern multinational corporations, often with direct ties to the state, threatened the solidarity politics of the past as these corporates embarked on forays into developing countries aimed at seeking new markets and instituting practices that in some cases echoed the worst features of classic MNCs.

While this was happening, the very relationship between NGOs and policy formation was undergoing fundamental, if gradual, changes. The acceptance of a role for civil society within multilateral bodies, perhaps an acknowledgement of its ability to influence policy processes even if formally excluded from that process, increasingly became a feature of virtually all forms of international diplomacy and policymaking.[36] Starting outside of the seminal multilateral bodies like the UN in 1945, through gradual expansion of the modest mandate provided by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), international NGOs were increasingly able to exert both indirect and direct influence on policymaking. Aiming at the preparatory phase of policy debates, NGOs were able to help set agendas that obliged state and inter-governmental organisations respond to their concerns (even if it meant countering or co-opting them).[37] Moreover, the UN and its agencies like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) increasingly relied on NGOs to 'deliver services, test new ideas and foster popular participation'.[38] By the early 1990s, the place of transnational civil society was well established so that a growing number of NGOs were accredited with the UN General Assembly and testifying regularly before their committees while others came to work closely with the UN Security Council on specific topics.[39] UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali recognised this role when he declared:

> Non-governmental organisations are a basic form of popular representation in the present-day world. Their participation in international organisations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those organisations.[40]

Equivalent circumstances developed in many industrialised countries, which shed their automatic aversion to consultation with NGOs and, to varying degrees, came to accept them as partners in foreign policy formation.[41] Transnational civil society's engagement with the policy process was demonstrated most forcefully in the case of the international ban on landmines where a network of advocacy groups arguing for the end of use of landmines as weapons of war were able to join forces with the Canadian state and put in motion a series of international conferences that, with the assistance of Southern NGOs in different regions, ultimately paved the way for a near universal prohibition.[42] Rapid mobilisation around this topic was facilitated through the use of a relatively new instrument, the Internet or World Wide Web.

For the South, the importance of transnational civil society was first and foremost in its contribution to policy formulation. The utility of Southern policy networks was demonstrated as they helped these states develop positions – a process especially pronounced for those countries with little or no capacity in areas where high levels of technical expertise were required – and in so doing facilitated the creation of coalitions across the South. This was especially the case with the WTO due to the fact that it was a new global institution and that most member states had yet to develop a domestic bureaucracy capable of handling the technicalities being negotiated. Coupled to this was the relative weakness of agencies such as UNCTAD, which in the past had served as a source of information for developing countries (some accusing it of serving as a self-serving one at that), meant that Southern policy networks gained heightened importance. However the utility of these networks was not evenly spread across the South. For emerging economic 'giants' like Brazil, India and China, their institutional depth allowed them to more readily articulate and participate in shaping negotiations that reflected closely their particular national interest than those of the bulk of poorer Southern countries. At the same time, it should be noted that this depth drew from a greater diversity in the spread of local civil society – especially in democratic Brazil and India – and introduced counter-pressures on state actors intent on pursuing a particular policy. This sometimes contentious relationship posed as many challenges for the statist approach adopted by Brasilia and Delhi as it did provide support for it.

In the area of environmental policy, domestic–international interactions among NGOs have played an influential role in changing state behaviour in some key developing nations. They provided governments and non-government actors with scientific evidence that clearly showed the devastating impact of man-made global warming on economic/human development. NGOs have also raised the issue of environmental degradation in the domestic debate in South states by public campaigning and congressional lobbying. They actively engaged in North–South debates at post–Cold War multilateral gatherings such as the UN Conference on Development and the Environment (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. According to Thomas, 'the current diplomatic profile of environmental issues derives largely from the activities of NGOs who took advantage of the political space provided by the fortuitous ending of the Cold War'[43].

In spite of their major impact upon domestic and international environmental politics, environmental NGOs face strong domestic resistance while pushing forward their policy agendas in South states. The NGOs' view of reconciling environmental protection with sustainable development is many times at odds with South states' development goals. Environmental NGOs are often perceived as instruments of foreign interests and barriers to economic development. Hostility against environmentalists is further inflamed by powerful nationalistic sentiments of some influential stakeholders regarding sovereign rights over the management of natural endowments.

6.3.2 Cooperation and conflict between Northern and Southern NGOs

Conflict and cooperation between Southern and Northern civil societies was not a new phenomenon. Indeed, as noted above, the onset of a host of UN-sponsored conferences tackling issues such as environment, women, development, human rights and population became settings in which the perspectives of Southern civil society advocates were often distinctly different from those of their counterparts from the North.[44] The post–Cold War environment, with its increasingly strong emphasis on the impact of globalisation on all economies and societies, provided new opportunities for transnational civil society to assess points of convergence in their interests and, on that basis devise tactical or strategic approaches to cooperation. Coalitions of interests came together, bringing the considerable financial and political resources of Northern NGOs with the legitimacy and access to local communities provided by Southern NGOs.

One important area of cooperation between Southern and Northern NGOs in the contemporary period was the international campaign to eliminate Third World debt. An idea mooted at the NAM Summit in 1992, it was an idea which gained greater attention through the actions of the Catholic Church and the Jubilee 2000 campaign, a coalition of NGOs in the North. Southern NGOs, again instigated in part around the support given by the Catholic Church, launched their own forum, Jubilee South. By 1998, debt relief for the world's poorest nations was tabled at the G7 summit in Birmingham and, against the backdrop of sustained action aimed at the media, leading G7 politicians and the Bretton Woods Institutions, individual states had forgiven hundreds of millions of dollars of bilateral debt. A year later, the G7 leadership established the Highly Indebted Poor Countries II initiative which expanded the terms for debt reduction among an identified select number of countries eligible for full debt relief.[45] Another area of cooperation was the reaction by environmental NGOs to the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) being negotiated at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The proposed framework, which would have diminished the legal possibilities for state oversight of corporate activities while extending the rights of investors, with its possible attendant negative consequences for social and environmental concerns, aroused Northern and Southern NGOs. The international outcry produced an unprecedented level of coordination between Northern NGOs and their Southern counterparts involving lobbying and rallies after the leaking of a draft version of the agreement was put on the Internet in 1998.[46] Within a year, the OECD had to abandon the MIA.

While tactical alliances aimed at countering particular initiatives or protesting specific events marked much of the cooperation in transnational civil society, more strategic forms of collaboration took place as well. For instance, Via Campesina, a North–South alliance of working farmers, actively works towards defending the interests of small family farms on a global scale. In the build-up to the Cancun meeting in September 2003, the leader of Via Campesina acknowledged the growing importance of links between the Southern NGOs and the anti-globalisation movement.[47] Though difficult to generalise, the ties that bound organisations such as these were as much ideological as they were financial.

While growing cooperation may have characterised relations between Northern and Southern NGOs in some areas, in others it was the increasing evidence of conflict between the two that was most notable. These

divisions between Northern and Southern civil society, the former being characterised by Filipino activist Walden Bello as 'Green protectionism', became manifest during and in the aftermath of the WTO meeting in Seattle.[48] Northern labour unions and environmentalists, like their governmental counterparts in the WTO negotiations, found common cause in promoting environmentally friendly measures which in effect acted as a non-tariff barrier to trade for the South. Bello voiced these concerns:

> It makes us deeply uneasy when people from our countries, who have been strongly supportive of workers' rights and have actively opposed ecologically damaging development policies, are cast (by Northern NGOs) in these polemics as anti-environmentalist and anti-labour.[49]

Conflict between Southern and Northern NGOs was seen in the area of forestry and environment, reaching a peak at the Rio Summit on the Environment and Development in 1992. The difference in perspective over logging in Sarawak, which had brought together an unprecedented alliance between environmentalists in Malaysia and in the Northern countries, was that Southern activists were themselves – unlike some of their Northern counterparts – not opposed to development as such but were against the use of the 'environmental issue as a weapon to prevent third world countries form developing'.[50] The periodic tensions between Jubilee South and Northern-based Jubilee 2000 were another manifestation of the gap between North and South.[51] Friction between Northern and Southern NGOs featured in the build-up to the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. With more than 1000 non-ECOSOC NGOs allowed to attend the Vienna Summit, based on an expanded definition of summit rules, clashes occurred between these groups and the traditional ECOSOC NGOs, along 'North–South' lines and splits within Southerner civil society all featured.[52] In particular, the promotion of 'Asian values' by Southern governments and some of their ECOSOC NGO allies was heatedly disputed by universalistic-oriented NGOs based both in the South and North.

Divisions between Southern NGOs themselves were also a feature of conflict and typically acted as an obstacle to cooperation. These were sometimes rooted in festering ethno-nationalism or residual Cold War ideological schisms that echoed the divisive politics of the far-Left. Sometimes, however, the sources of conflict were more prosaic involving leadership spats or competition over profile-raising activities central to

securing financial resources for organisations. All these tensions came together in the single most important event on the transnational civil society political calendar, the annual WSF meeting.

6.3.3 World Social Forum

The seminal expression of the new politics of transnational civil society, the WSF began as an outgrowth of a discussion between veteran French journalist Bernard Cassen and Brazilian activist Francisco Whitaker in the aftermath of the Seattle WTO meeting. According to one account, Porto Alegre was chosen for the event because it was 'on the periphery' yet embedded in Brazil's contradictory experience of globalisation and itself as the municipality had been governed by the Partido Tralbalho ('Worker's Party') and served as a model alternative to neoliberal governance.[53] Initially the WSF engaged in a confrontational approach with the WEF, highlighted by both the shared timing of the forum meetings and the televised debate between delegates from both events. The WSF evolved into a massive event with tens of thousands of delegates, a substantial international media presence and a broad array of topics, ranging from the incendiary to the mundane. Regional sub-meetings, again tracking the WEF's regional meetings, were convened which brought together local NGOs to address concerns that were sometimes glossed over in the larger event in Porto Alegre.

The WSF policy, embodied in the Charter of Principles, of excluding political parties (irrespective of the obviously crucial role of the Partido Tralbalho in founding and sustaining the WSF) remains controversial in some circles.[54] To whit, it declared that the WSF was 'plural, diversified, non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party context'.[55] The suspicion of many civil society actors, who wish to keep governments at arms length from the process has led to state representatives being turned away (as well as representatives of the World Bank); at the same time, the legitimacy of the WSF itself as representative of 'global civil society' has itself come under scrutiny. With the preponderance of delegates being Latin Americans of European origin, mostly male and even some speakers drawn from the traditional radical intelligentsia, the forum has been seen as unrepresentative geographically, racially and in terms of gender. Indeed, the decision to shift the fourth WSF in 2004 to India was in part a response to this critique (though notably it was brought back to Porto Alegre the following year) as was the holding of a preparatory meeting in Dakar in 2002 as well as the establishment of regional Social Forums in Asia, Africa and Europe.[56] All these critiques from various schools of the Left, however, tend to miss the obvious

point that links activist civil society with income levels. As Emir Sader says:

> The very act of defining themselves as 'non-governmental' explicitly rejects any ambition on the NGOs' part for an alternative hegemonic project, which would, by its nature, have to include states and governments as the means through which political and economic power is articulated in modern societies. They therefore either insert themselves, explicitly or implicitly, within the liberal critique of the state's actions, or else limit their activity to the sphere of civil society – which, defined in opposition to the state, also ends at the boundaries of liberal politics. In fact, the very concept of 'civil society' masks the class nature of its components – multinational corporations, banks and mafia, set next to social movements, trade unions, civic bodies – while collectively demonising the state.[57]

Furthermore, the WSF's relatively loose 'movement politics' approach to organisation and management led some natural allies to characterisation of the decision-making process as 'opaque' captures the closed nature of decision making which has opened the WSF to criticism and led to reforms.[58] The decision in April and August 2002 to shift the locus of decision making away from the Brazilian dominated Organising Committee (which in turn was transformed into a secretariat) to the International Committee consisting of 60 international networks and the launching of annual forums based in regions and constructed around a set of five themes reflects this outcome.[59] Round tables of 'dialogue and controversy' established after 2002 for the explicit purpose of having a forum for interface between NGOs and IGOs or state representatives. Northern foundation funding, coupled to generous support from Porto Alegre municipality, continued to be the backbone of financial support for the meetings.

And, though the French NGO ATTAC (loosely translated as Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction for the Aid of Citizens) and the Partido Tralbalho had a crucial part in the founding, by the second summit in 2002 the Brazilian NGOs were exercising considerable influence over the process. According to Walden Bello:

> What (the WSF) has principally tried to do is to bring people together to discuss alternatives and affirm their sense of solidarity, and it would be very difficult to transform it into a fighting organization along the lines of, say, Our World is Not for Sale. It needs to be an all-inclusive

> forum, where people who might not be able to agree on medium-level strategic factors can nevertheless still come and have a good, clarifying debate. What I would hope is that all these different movements and coalitions feel that it's inclusive enough to provide a yearly or bi-yearly arena where strategies and tactics can be discussed, not just ideas about alternatives. It's in the coalitions, a step below the Social Forum, that these actual strategies will be hammered out. The Our World is Not For Sale coalition is now leading an effort to derail the next WTO ministerial. Fifty Years is Enough, which has also played a key role in the WSF, is organizing against the IMF and the World Bank. The campaign around sweatshops and Nike is very dynamic – it could emerge as the principal anti-corporate network. The anti-war movement is being reborn. It's these coalitions, rather than the WSF, that could be the axis of a brains-trust on global strategies.[60]

What has been significant about the WSF is that it has revived the tradition of criticism of the prevailing international economic order that had once been the near-exclusive domain of Southern states and the now-defunct Soviet bloc. Interestingly, while the target of criticism leveled by many Southern NGOs operating in less open societies characteristically was the negative role of the North and its corporations in perpetrating a bevy of ills on the developing world, there is increasingly a willingness to emphasise the part played by venal leadership in the South or internecine conflict in fomenting problems. This placed the spotlight on practices among Southern governments or MNCs, signalling a reconfiguration of the political dynamics which put Southern civil society in a pre-eminent position to shape the new critical agenda and allowed for greater possibilities of coalition building across the North–South divide.

6.3.4 Towards a new agenda for the South?

The emergence of an alternative transnational civil society approach to globalisation, one which was rooted in the South and incorporated a critique of the prevailing activities of Southern states, marked a departure from the approach of civil society during the Cold War period. For some observers, it raised the possibility that there was a new global agenda developing in the South that held out the potential of producing a profound impact on the conduct of Southern states much in the way that the earlier gathering at Bandung had. In actual fact, closer scrutiny suggests that there were effectively three approaches emerging out of the South, rooted in different response to the globalisation

phenomenon system and concurrently connected to the social content of actors, which were being promulgated by the new actors within Southern civil society.[61] In each case the important distinction between them is their relationship with the state and attitude towards the international system.

The first approach focused on a neo-traditional project of reinforcing national sovereignty as a bulwark against the forces of capitalism emanating from the North. It held that the myriad of problems facing the South are best dealt with through 'deglobalisation'. This would mean a loosening of the role played by the WTO in managing the global trading system and a concurrent strengthening of UNCTAD and regional organisations to allow for local initiatives, re-linking industrial and trade policies, strengthening controls over financial capital and greater involvement of civil society in decision-making on development issues.[62] Though its heyday of influence was the period of closed regionalism, it retained a place in the debates within Southern civil society and especially so in those countries which experienced extremely negative effects of liberalization.

The second position is more reminiscent of an anti-capitalist movement that is anti-statist as well, a counter-hegemonic project that believes in the possibility of systemic transformation. Like the more radical elements in the trade union movement and even anarchist predecessors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this strand in the movement believes that representative democratic politics finds its best expression in the role of non-state actors. In the context of the WSF meetings, this position has played out in the form of the ongoing debate over the participation of political parties versus the rise of networks self-consciously formed outside of the conventional framework of politics.[63] Finally, there is a third approach which conforms to reformist tendencies within leading Southern states themselves. The so-called 'Monterrey consensus' is an attempt to incorporate and take account of South concerns from both state and non-state actors in conjunction with Northern counterparts. Coined in the aftermath of a UN Conference on Financing for Development held in Mexico in 2002, the event brought together the industrialised countries and the G77 countries, marking a resurgence of the North–South dialogue that had been largely absent in the 1990s. At the meeting in Monterrey, the OECD countries reaffirmed their commitment to providing a fixed 0.7% of their annual GDP income towards Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), confirming the trend towards untying of aid, providing debt relief to Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) countries and

greater trade liberalisation in favour of Southern interests. Its importance lay in the fact that, as one author put it, '[F]or the first time ever, Northern countries allowed substantive discussion of economic and financial policy issues in the UN system outside of the Bretton Woods institutions, which they control'.[64] Developing countries affirmed the importance of good governance and pro-growth macro-economic policies. This reformist approach, which retains some of the spirit of Raul Prebisch's initiative in the early 1960s, sees the UN as the vehicle for redressing global inequities and development challenges facing the South and, concurrently, states as key instruments – in partnership with Southern (and Northern) civil society – for achieving these aims.

These differing set of approaches emerging out of Southern civil society, though overlapping in some aspects, produced a discourse that was at times supportive of state aspirations and at other times more overtly critical (if not in some cases outright hostile). In short, increasingly it behaved much like transnational civil society in the North, all the while maintaining a distinctive sense of its own identity. It was on the latter point, the role of identity within a developing country context that distinguished Southern transnational civil society from its Northern brethren. This was more strongly the case when identity politics embraced areas like religion, reproductive rights and the status of women that were at odds with the generally liberalizing tendencies of Northern civil society. In this regard, Southern civil societies introduced not only developmental perspectives on matters like climate change but more fundamental challenges to the rough consensus that often characterized Northern civil society positions on issues.

6.4 Conclusion

Southern civil society has played an increasingly important part in shaping the debates within Southern states on key issues – trade, global governance and the security–development nexus – facing the developing countries in recent years. In some cases, its growing stature has enabled it introduce new ideas and advocate positions which reflect domestic constituencies within Southern society. The belief, however, that Southern civil society has contributed to the beginning of a fundamental restructuring of world politics away from the centrality state, at least in the South, seems misplaced. In those emerging economic powers, the enhanced sources of legitimacy enjoyed by civil society have enabled it to play a role that is largely in conjunction with state

interests. While the rise of distinctive socio-economic groupings which perceive their interests to be at odds with the development aims of the state (seen in cases such as the environmental protests in India, Brazil and China) reflect growing domestic diversity, their impact on state policy remains contingent and uneven.

Ultimately, the diversity of Southern civil society, which is often further complicated by the structure of formal and informal economies embedded within these societies, contributes to the difficulties experienced within Southern civil society circles in coming to a common view on issues as different as e-commerce and biotechnology.[65] As this plays out against the background of a strong commitment to sovereignty by basically all Southern states, the overall outcome is a limited role for civil society – perhaps most acutely felt on the global stage when they make common cause with governments in the South or, at times, Northern NGOs – in shaping the policy environment. The saliency of identity politics which separates groups from one another within Southern society, be it on the basis of ethnicity or religion, and the accompanying ties of affinity and clientalist politics that results, holds in check nationalism as well as impulses towards Southern universalism. In this way, the 'South of peoples' remains more an aspiration than a reality.

Conclusion: One South, Many Souths

In May 2005, the leaders of the developing world marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Bandung with a commemorative meeting. The three-day gathering in what had once been a hill station in colonial Indonesia, of dozens of presidents and prime ministers from across three continents demonstrated the enduring power of (to paraphrase Charles De Gaulle) this 'certain idea of the South'. Speech after speech paid homage to the founders of the South, from Nehru and Sukarno to Zhou En-lai and Nasser, drawing parallels to their contemporary situation and to the challenges of an earlier era. In a deliberate echo of Sukarno's famous words fifty years ago, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared:

> We come here today to remember and honour but also to reaffirm, to rejuvenate. We will pull together the … tremendous creative energies of Asia and Africa to solve some of the most persistent problems of development we are facing.[1]

His counterpart from South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, struck a more sober note suggesting that

> There is no doubt that we can report to our people that we are today stronger than we were 50 years ago …. Surely the objectives we seek to achieve demand of us that we should be frank and open about the reality we face, estimate our capabilities as accurately as possible and set ourselves achievable goals consistent with a vision spelt-out by the giants who met in Bandung.[2]

This grand coalition or alliance had been given shape and substance in the 1960s through the foundation of two political pressure groups – the

NAM and the G77 – with much overlapping membership and often similar methods. They worked to support their joint 'Southern' political and economic interests in and beyond the UN structures. The aims of these organisations were complemented (and sometimes even contradicted) by a host of regional organisations including the IOC. These leading pressure groups have all, remarkably, survived into 2008. They have enabled their Southern members to achieve a wider range of foreign policy goals by giving them expression within the global system.

The participants at the second Bandung meeting could also look back on five decades of achievement in some of the key areas that had been identified as challenges for the South in 1955. In particular, the programme aimed at decolonisation through the mobilisation of their collective political resources at the United Nations, bolstered by their promotion of new norms (e.g., self-determination) and in some cases hard military power, had won nations and peoples freedom from the colonial yoke. Whereas at the first Bandung meeting there had been 29 independent states in attendance (as well as a host of prospective leaders and movements), at the second there were 85 independent states along with 19 sub-regional organisations represented.[3] The UN Trusteeship Council, once the European colonial powers' preferred multilateral instrument for managing relations with their colonies was moribund. Moreover, the economic aims of South–South cooperation had, after many false starts, begun to take root. The palpable achievements of the newly industrialised countries of East and Southeast Asia, along with their confreres in Latin America, had inspired Southern giants China and India to open up their own economies. The result was that by the 1990s the beginning of an unprecedented transfer of investment capital from more developed South economies to lesser developed ones and, with that, a significant shift in the economic and trade structures of the world economy. The UNCTAD call for changing terms of trade through higher commodity prices was being realised not through multilateral fiat but by the demands of growing economies in the South.

At the same time, the fog of memory had evidently descended over this collective depiction of the past. Forgotten in the palaver of the day was the crucial part played by a state that no longer existed, Yugoslavia and its leader Tito, whose forward thinking, presence and financial commitments had for so long sustained the NAM and its political and economic agenda. The contribution of the Latin Americans, celebrated ironically by Castro's presence (which ignored his divisive promotion of solidarity with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War), neglected

the considerable role of technocrats like Raul Prebisch in shaping the South's agenda and institutions of economic development. Also lost to memory were the hundreds of thousands (or perhaps more) of independence era activists who had died at the hands of the post-colonial governments in the South, condemned for defying authoritarian political conventions of their new leaders.

Despite its commemorative nature, the politics of a changing international system coupled to competition ran alongside the commitments to collective action by the countries. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry, which had generated 'rogue' nuclear programmes making South Asia one of the globe's most volatile regions, had left the Kashmir region a festering sore. . Similarly, the failure to resolve the Palestinian question, arguably the outstanding political concern of the South, had endured beyond all expectation, highlighted both the limits of collective action in the face of Israeli (and US) determination as well as the fractious nature of Palestinian support. Iraq's occupation by American and allied military forces destabilised the Middle East as no other single event had in recent decades in a region already prone to uncertainty. Moreover, the rise of militant fundamentalist Islam posed a challenge to all countries with Muslim populations and, in a new precedent, Europe and North America had become targets of Islamist terrorist ire. External powers like Japan, for so long a contributor to development assistance programmes and South–South cooperation ventures, found themselves sidelined by the resplendent power of a rising China. Beijing successfully lobbied states at Bandung to the withdrawal of support for a permanent Japanese seat on the UN Security Council.

In economic terms, the gap between the Asian and African participants had clearly widened. While in 1955 there was rough parity between these developing regions, 50 years on the Asian economic 'miracle' had transformed the economic standing of most of the countries of that area into middle income – if not higher in some instances – status while African economies had actually deteriorated for most of the intervening decades. Indeed, the recent improvement in African economic standing owed much to Asian demand for commodities and, concurrently, its new financial power as an exporter of capital to Africa.[4] Though not featured in the Bandung meeting, back on the African continent, Asia's growing presence had begun to inspire a new, troubling discourse on – in particular – Chinese neo-colonialism.[5] The fissures between 'haves' and 'have-nots' was taking on an unexpectedly Southern dimension.

Though the second Bandung meeting may have been in part a stock-taking exercise, it nonetheless reflected a new commitment to Afro-Asian solidarity. The launching of the African Asian Strategic Partnership promised a renewal of the 'spirit of Bandung' but this time built around the pillars of economic opportunity, public–private business initiatives and common concerns surrounding the global economic system. Like previous initiatives such as Malaysia and the G15, the African Asian Partnership bore the hallmarks of its key instigators, Indonesia and South Africa, who had combined their resources to put the initiative together (see Chapter 4). Transforming this common outlook into a concrete programme of action posed the familiar array of political, bureaucratic and national interest laden obstacles that had been part and parcel of every South initiative since Bandung. The slow process of consensus decision making between participating governments made progress towards achieving declaratory aims such as the vow to stem capital flight from the poorest countries sometimes minimal, and two years later, the partnership had still little to show.

However, unlike other developing country initiatives that had come and gone in the past, the active core of the African Asian Strategic Partnership resided outside of the government-to-government framework. This is an expression of novel elements of twenty-first century international society that combine state and non-state actors in more complex transnational political structures which challenge traditional understandings of 'inside'/'outside'.[6] The mantra of 'South–South co-operation' was being held up by Southern multinational businesses and banking sectors which were engaged in investment projects in Asia and Africa, with South–South trade increasing from US$577 billion in 1995 to US$2 trillion in 2006 and predicted to reach half of all world trade within a few years.[7] This was a new form of dynamism within the South and one which moved to a different pace – the pursuit of profits – than classic South initiatives.

Moreover, the changing face of the societies within the South was reflected in the formation of the Yogyakarta Commemorative Group, a gathering of Southern civil society organisations – including Third World Network, Centre Tricontinental and the Socially Engaged Inter-Faith Network – which met in parallel with the Bandung 2005 meeting. Noting with concern that the African Asian Strategic Partnership made no mention of civil society, privileging government and business cooperation in its final declaration as the key source of cooperation, this group called for a 'global civil society movement' to act on a range of concerns from social and environmental to reforming the structures

of global governance.[8] Their leveling of a stinging criticism against the impact of globalisation, US hegemony and continuing poverty in the developing world – while primarily focused on the North – nonetheless posed some uncomfortable questions for Southern governments.

The South and global governance

The emergence of leading South states with vibrant economies, technological capabilities, corporate entities and investment capital in excess of the old industrialised countries of the North is challenging the structure of the international system. Bolstered by their rising sense of entitlement as regional and even global powers on par with the North, these South states nonetheless remain broadly committed to the prevailing norms and institutions which constitute the contemporary system of global governance. In part, this is reflective of their experience which has seen them profit from the expansive liberal trading regime as well as their abiding faith in the norms and values, many established by them, which underpin international institutions, even when the actual distribution of power remains unrepresentative. The reformist approach punted by leading South states has enabled them to extract concessions from the North by using the threat of a united developing country action while providing assurances that their own interests did not diverge significantly from the underlying principles of the contemporary global system.

Bringing these leading South states into the global power hierarchy has been recognised by industrialised countries as a key challenge since the waning days of the last century. The G8's decision to invite the Brazilian, South African, Indian and Chinese leaders (as well as a host of other emerging powers) to attend various G8 summits since 2000 signalled their intentions in this regard. By 2007, there was an overt call by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to formalise these ad hoc arrangements and expand the group to include Brazil, South Africa, India, China, Mexico and Turkey. Indeed, the fact that all the G8 members with the exception of the US, Japan and Germany had lower GDPs than the top three South economies underscored the necessity of transforming the G8 as a stage for global economic management. The near collapse of the global banking system in September 2008 precipitated by subprime crisis in the US and rippling across the world merely accelerated this process. Within two months the leaders of the G20 group of emerging and rich nations had gathered in a high-profile summit to discuss the reform of multilateral financial organisations and

the harmonisation of domestic policies in response to the crisis. In fact, this emergency meeting was symptomatic of these structural changes in the power outlook of the international society. Rather than rely upon the exclusive might of the G7 of industrialised nations to address the crisis, it had became abundantly clear in Washington, Paris, London, Tokyo and Berlin that there could be no lasting solution without the involvement of leading Southern states. Emerging South economies were finally at the cusp of power, participating in delicate international negotiations aimed at re-configuring global financial institutions and practices.[9]

At this stage it has become evident that key impediments to integrating these leading South states into the global power hierarchy were not just economic obstacles but the institutional barriers at multilateral institutions. Ironically, it has been the European 'middle powers' like the Netherlands, Switzerland and others which have occupied positions within multilateral institutions well beyond their economic and power status and are most threatened by these changes.[10] The expansion of weighted voting rights in the IMF, for instance, was done on the basis of increased financial contributions levied by Brazil and China (and over the objections of smaller European states). Other states within the South have also balked at seeing regional rivals assume a recognised global status that consign them to a lower status. The much vaunted reform of the UN Security Council stalled around the inability of both the P5 and the non-aligned to find a solution given the obvious problem of regional redistribution in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the sticking point of what to do with Europe's two permanent seats. The ambivalence expressed by other developing countries such as Argentina over the elevation of a select few emerging powers of the South to the top position – as well as the persistent call for two African seats by the African Union and an Arab seat – in multilateral institutions underscored continuing stresses within the South.[11] The formation of the Group of 4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – in 2004 to collectively promote their case for a permanent seat only contributed further to the perception of divisions within the South.

Even within this reformist framework, the singularity of China as an established permanent member of the UN Security Council, a significant military force in its own right as well as the developing world's top performing economy for over two decades, puts it in a category all of its own. China's unique standing poses special issues for both the North and the South in so far as its inherent economic capacity, environmental impact and demographic status make it an inordinately dominant

force to be reckoned with. China's development achievements are paradoxical, with wide-scale poverty continuing to be a condition in many parts of the country, alongside the image of fabulous wealth and power found in the coastal areas. This begs the question as to whether China should be considered a developing country or one that is rapidly transitioning to a fully developed country and, concurrently, if Chinese global aspirations conform more closely to a nationalist outlook rather than that of a South perspective. India in many respects mirrors these factors as well, though its active international presence still lacks the prestigious moniker and statutory power associated with being one of the Permanent Five in the UN Security Council. Other emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa have been accused of using regionalism (Mercosur and the African Union, respectively) as a stepping-stone to achieving a greater global role.

Within a few years of the millennium, the high water mark of post–Cold War multilateralism characterized by sweeping initiatives by the UN such as the Millennium Summit and the subsequent promotion of explicit development goals, seemed to be receding in the face of a persistent inability to meet commitments and achieve discernible outcomes. Five years after the Millennium Summit, not only had the expectations of substantive UN reform largely been shelved but the shortfall in meeting the Millennium Development Targets was becoming evident. The World Conference Against Racism held in 2001 in Johannesburg, far from being a site of reconciliation, reasserted the ideological divisions between North and South. In the area of security cooperation, the US-led invasion of Iraq, like the 1999 NATO decision to intervene in Kosovo, demonstrated the enfeebled condition of the UN in the face of great power determination. The emergence of a parallel structure of trading arrangements such as the European Union's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with select developing countries, coming in the wake of the failure of the Doha Round, seemed to signal the gradual end of faith in the neoliberal trading system to provide a negotiated solution to development was seen as remote. At the heart of this failure was the lack of movement by the US and the EU on promises to reform their domestic agricultural policies as well as open their markets to developing country producers. Similarly, since the early 1990s, the EU, Japan and US have pursued a strategy of bilateral trade deals with a growing number of states in the South aimed at side-stepping some of the constraints imposed by multilateral trading agreements. These so-called Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) further compromised trade liberalisation at the multilateral level.[12] Indeed, the frenzy of PTAs

promoted by industrialised countries with their counterparts in the developing world was a reflection of the development of a process that paralleled the formation of the inter-national trading system and trade-based regional organisations. Reflecting its assertive economic position, the Chinese government embarked on a similar set of initiatives aimed at negotiating free trade agreements with countries like Chile, Australia and South Africa, all major commodity producers.

The result of these changes was that the South was increasingly being defined outside of UN framework given the emergence of a new set of loose coalitions driven not by North–South conflict but by sectoral and national interests. For instance, the Cairns group – an agricultural producers' formation established in 1986 that brings together 19 countries, ranging from Argentina, Australia, to Pakistan and Thailand, clearly cuts across traditional developing/developed country distinctions. Is South reinforcing multilateralism or part of trend away from it? Many would suggest that it is unlikely to change its views about the importance of multilateralism and the need for the rule of international law; at the same time, the opportunities available to leading Southern economies continued to underscore a growing divergence in interests and abilities within the South.

The South faces the twenty-first century

The changing structure of the global economy, which has flowed from the significant development gains made by leading countries in the South in the liberalising trade environment, places the South in an unprecedented position. Developing countries – or at least those top ten middle-income economies from the South – are able to shape their own destiny more so than at any other time in their histories. At the same time, as these states become more deeply embedded in the global economy and the international institutions which manage global affairs, the challenges facing them have become more complex in character. Gone are the certitudes of an earlier era when invoking anti-colonialism or calling for fair deal for commodity trading states would suffice as an agenda from the developing countries. In their stead are a host of highly technical issues around matters like intellectual property, the establishment of regulatory frameworks around trade and environment, managing the impact of capital flows into an economy and the monitoring of compliance to international agreements by muti-national corporations and host governments.

Moreover, as the previous section highlighted, the interests of the leading South states are increasingly taken by the North to represent all developing country concerns: in fact a division of interests between a resurgent Malaysia and a static Mauritania is more evident in the contemporary period than in the past. All these matters raise serious questions as to how the South will address key areas in the economic, security and political spheres in the course of the twenty-first century.

During the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the successful challenge of key South states over the restrictions imposed by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to the import and manufacturing of essential AIDS drugs was revealing as to the improvement in the bargaining capabilities of developing states vis-à-vis the North. The skilful articulations between the diplomacies of Brazil, India and the African Group, combined with the pressure of transnational advocacy networks, helped to create a united South front against the US government and the corporate power of Western pharmaceutical companies. The coordinated efforts of these actors eventually paid off with the case being settled in their favour. This was perceived as a significant victory of the 'Global South' against the powerful economic interests of the North.[13]

In the *economic sphere*, the relationship between purveyors of the new South, who were proponents of trade and market values, and the old South, which was traditionally associated with autarky and socialism, has seemingly been resolved. The triumph of the market-based approaches among the leading South states disguises the unevenness with which it is applied across the South and a concurrent debate about the part played by the development state in instigating and organising the national economy. Concurrently, the role of South-based foreign investment and the rise of exploitation of least developed countries by their relatively wealthier South counterparts as seen in the case of Thai timber companies in war-torn Congo which are devastating the environment or Chinese petroleum companies in Sudan, is itself is becoming subject to criticism by South environmental and human rights NGOs.[14] Furthermore, the spectacle of international concerns around climate change impinging upon the rapid development strategies of many leading South countries, symbolised by the resistance of China and India to partake in the Kyoto Protocol, suggests that the dilemmas of development are taking on a new dimension. How South economies can achieve growth and social improvements under the restrictive conditions of the looming global environmental crisis remains to be seen.

In the *security sphere*, there have been widely divergent views on the question of nuclear non-proliferation between South governments as seen at the 1995 NPT conference and the 1998 NAM summit in South Africa. The onset of nuclear programmes with an apparent dual application such as that underway in Iran has split the South, with those states committed to the NPT siding with flagrant violators (like India) in raising concerns against states that assert their moral right to develop nuclear energy and weaponry. The actions of arms manufacturing and trading nations like China, Brazil and South Africa contravene the spirit (if not always the letter) of numerous declarations and conventions promoted by the South aimed at limiting arms proliferation.

Of even greater importance to the whole South in the realm of security is the impact of changing norms on sovereignty. Since the 1990s, the onset of internationally sanctioned humanitarian intervention in Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo and Sudan has raised the possibility that the carefully crafted legal position on sovereignty as a bulwark to legitimacy would be rendered less relevant. The rise of the notion of a 'responsibility to protect', which was endorsed by the UN World Summit in 2005 and passed by the General Assembly a year later by an unusual coalition of Northern and Southern support, remained nonetheless contentious amongst states as diverse as India, Brazil and China. Furthermore, the fragility of state sovereignty, as witnessed by the disintegration and threatened collapse of two of the South's leading states (Yugoslavia and Indonesia) in that same decade, served as a harbinger of what the forces of democratisation could do to apparently stable societies on the cusp of economic development. The apparent inability of the US to construct a stable democratic Iraq and Afganistan in the aftermath of its invasion only served to underscore this point for many observers in the South. At the same time, the fact that the newly formed African Union adopted explicit interventionist norms into its constitution in 2003 and, more importantly, has invoked these to justify sending a peacekeeping force into Darfur – which received the backing of the normally resistant Chinese government in the UN Security Council in 2007 – suggests that this norm is being gradually integrated into the South. Moreover, with many current Southern governments like that of Brazil and South Africa the product of democratisation and the rise of a vocal Southern civil society, there is less hostility to the idea of humanitarian intervention than in the past.[15]

In the *political sphere*, as noted above, the debate over the nature of reform of multilateral institutions reflects the trend towards privileging certain middle-income, politically or militarily significant South

states and their interests over the rest of the developing world. The gap between the Southern 'haves' and 'have nots' is set to become more evident, spearheaded by the rise of Southern multinational corporations and state-owned enterprises whose investments and practices in poorer regions have sometimes been worse than the established MNCs from the North. At the same time, the emergence of a vocal non-governmental sector within South countries challenges both the state's prerogatives and its ability to act with impunity in areas such as electoral policy, human rights, trade matters, environment and social legislation. The clash between avowed secular states like Turkey and Algeria, and the social practices promoted by domestic Islamic groups there is but one example of the power that Southern civil society can muster against the state.

One South, many Souths

Revisiting the concept of the South, it is clear that the onset of globalisation has had an impact upon it. The rise of the term 'Global South', a deliberate de-centring of the geographic certainties which framed the use of 'South' as a proxy for the former colonial and developing countries, seeks to simultaneously capture the rise of economic powers of the South and concurrently the emergence of substantial middle classes within these societies producing both new affluence and the spectacle of enduring poverty. At the same time, the use of the term reflects the changing dynamics in the North, with its burgeoning immigrant communities – whose orientation remains fixed in many ways in the South as well as the relative decline of European and American working classes – whose quiet slide into poverty puts them in increasingly close economic proximity to the circumstances found in the developing world. Finally employing the 'Global South' is a means of escaping the statist outlook which has dominated the discourse on developing countries, going beyond the pleas of those South governments for democratisation of the global order which nonetheless hide behind the veneer of sovereignty to avoid its application domestically. Sowing the seeds for a class-based transnational alliance is undoubtedly part of the appeal of the term 'Global South' and enables its proponents to explain the newfound power wielded by Brasilia and Beijing.

The idea of the South and its persistence as a marker of difference and an organising principle in international politics reaffirm one of the basic premises of this book, that is to say that – to paraphrase Alexander Wendt – 'the South is what states make of it'. It is unashamedly socially

constructed, emerging out of the debris of colonialism and world war in the mid-twentieth century, all under the shadow of the bipolar conflict, when the leadership of independent Asia and Africa confronted the problems of development. The successful construction of a normative and institutional framework establishing shared 'rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour'[16] for a mass of developing states is one of the most visible and enduring accomplishments of the South in world politics. This sort of 'logic of appropriateness'[17] of the South uniformly shaped both identities and interests which bypassed the regional level of states' interactions, unifying a large number of Southern states with different needs and from different geographical areas. The primary institutional sources of multilateral coordination for the South in the UN are its pressure groups: the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement and, increasingly, the OIC. These have used UNCTAD and ECOSOC as well as the General Assembly and the Security Council. The NAM and the others have also performed the role of 'teachers of norms'[18] while socialising newly independent states within those accepted rules and normative beliefs of South–South solidarity. The formative norms, rules and principles underpinning this broad ideational view both directed and constrained the foreign policy of governments in the developing world.

The contrast between Bandung 2005 and Bandung 2005 highlights the consistencies carried across two eras characterised by an intervening sea change in global economics and politics. As noted above, the assertion of development as a priority is now part of a new North–South debate over the impact of economic growth on global climate with China and India at the centre of this controversy. The centrality of sovereignty and non-interference remains a guiding feature of the South's approach to international politics. At the same time, the creation of a 'two track' South in the form of the elitist configuration of the G15 itself followed by the formation of the IBSA initiative and more recently the participation of top developing economies in the G20, demonstrates the growing diversity within developing country ranks. Finally, the emergence of significant non-state actors who claim to speak in the name of the 'South' identity challenges the statist monopoly over this concept.

And while the idea of the South is subject to criticism, it is worth reflecting upon the origins, mutability and sustainability of the South's Manichean opposite, the 'North'. It emerged in direct response to the NIEO and the oil crisis of the early 1970s as an ad hoc gathering of finance ministers from five leading industrial countries seeking to coordinate their reaction. This expanded to an annual summit level

event with a rotating presidency by 1975. Differences in approaching the NIEO were marked, with France's Giscard d'Estaing advocating a 'trilateral' arrangement with Arab petroleum-based earnings, French expertise and African resources while Thatcher and Reagan calling for confrontation with Southern radicalism. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the political fracture within the heart of the 'West' between Europe – especially France and Germany – and the US and the growing debate over the hubris and unilateralism of a new American empire challenge the cohesiveness and coherence of the North. As Robert Kagan declared,

> It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all important questions of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging.[19]

Thus it could be said that, as is the case with the South, the North, still periodically referred to in Cold War language as the 'West', remains as contingent and elusive as its counterpart but nevertheless retains a utility of expression and meaning in world politics.

The remarkable story of Southern unity for the last five decades, despite its geographic, political and social diversity, is one that is experiencing fundamental challenges as never before. While the leading states of the South are in the process of defining the international system of global governance in terms that reflect their concerns and implementing policies on that basis, this apparent harmony of purpose masks new complexities and differences in the South itself. As this book has shown, far from being a monolith, the countries and societies of the South hold a range of perspectives that reflect, among others factors, local contingencies of ethnicity and faith, differing socio-economic status and resource endowment. Attitudes and practices regarding key norms like intervention, human rights and environmental protection, while broadly conforming to traditional positions held by the South, are themselves beginning to exhibit signs of change, albeit selectively. The emergence of South-based civil society has added a new dimension to this terrain, both as a challenge to the role of the state in their own societies and even contesting the interests and, in some cases, paternalism of North-based NGOs.

The implications of this tremendous diversity for the structure of intra-South relations, the nature of the policy process within South

settings and the policy positions assumed by the South on the structure and content of global governance are significant. In spite of these conditions, the South has retained a high degree of coherency of position – at times more so than the North through its equivalence institutions. The long-standing norm of consensus decision making which has guided South initiatives since the onset of NAM in 1961, has allowed it to speak in multilateral fora with a clear and surprisingly consistent voice on core concerns. It is this capacity to maintain unity within diversity, despite serious differences in other areas, that has characterised the South's approach to global governance and continues to sustain it into the twenty-first century. For Indonesian politician, and daughter of Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the challenges are to translate the cohesion of purpose that brought about past political successes into the contemporary economic sphere:

> Today we the nations of Asia and Africa see ourselves as struggling not against imperialism and colonialism, but against the crushing rigours of development, against burden of debt, against our inability to compete in world markets and our marginalisation in the frenetic processes of globalisation.[20]

At the same time, it is apparent that the diversity across all dimensions of the South – at the state level, within and between regions and among civil society – is growing and tugs at or even defies the basic idea of the South. How this situation will impact upon the ability to the developing world to hold to a common source of shared values, function as a collective voice in multilateral settings and to represent the interests of its peoples will determine what shape the South in world politics will take in the future.

Appendices

Annex I: 1955 Bandung Declaration

The Asian-African Conference, convened upon by the invitation of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to the 24th of April 1955. In addition to the sponsoring countries the following 24 countries participated in the Conference:

1. Afghanistan	13. Liberia
2. Cambodia	14. Libya
3. China	15. Nepal
4. Egypt	16. Philippines
5. Ethiopia	17. Saudi Arabia
6. Gold Coast	18. Sudan
7. Iran	19. Syria
8. Iraq	20. Thailand
9. Japan	21. Turkey
10. Jordan	22. Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam
11. Laos	23. State of Viet-Nam
12. Lebanon	24. Yemen

The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation.

A. Economic co-operation

(1) The Asian-African Conference recognised the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic co-operation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to economic co-operation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for co-operation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognised that the assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region, through international or under bilateral arrangements, had

made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programmes.

(2) The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-operation with the existing international agencies.

(3) The Asian-African Conference recommended the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries; the early establishment of the International Finance Corporation which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment; and encouragement to the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common interest.

(4) The Asian-African Conference recognised the vital need for stabilizing commodity trade in the region. The principle of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognised that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing economic conditions.

(5) The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken by participating countries for stabilizing the international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and that as far as practicable and desirable they should adopt a unified approach on the subject in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade and other international forums.

(6) The Asian-African Conference further recommended that Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export; intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement given to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade; and normal facilities should be provided for transit trade of land-locked countries.

(7) The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to Shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from

time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem, and collective action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was suggested that a study of railway freight of transit trade may be made.

(8) The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies.

(9) The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation of common policies.

(10) The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for the Asian-African countries. The Conference welcomed the initiative of the Powers principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority of the Agency; and recommended to the Asian and African Governments to take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programmes.

(11) The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of Liaison Officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national Governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that fuller use should be made of the existing international organisations, and participating countries who were not members of such international organisations, but were eligible, should secure membership.

(12) The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

B. Cultural co-operation

(1) The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural co-operation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilisations which have enriched

other cultures and civilisations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately contacts among Asian and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries. The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world. All participating Governments at the Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer cultural co-operation.

(2) The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural co-operation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers have denied to their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been suppressed. Similar discrimination has been practised against African and coloured people in some parts of the continent of Africa. The Conference felt that these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural co-operation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression.

In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.

(3) It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilisations and cultures that the Conference viewed the development of cultural co-operation among Asian and African countries. True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural co-operation should be developed in the larger context of world co-operation.

Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural co-operation the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.

(4) There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa

which are more fortunately placed in this respect should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.

(5) The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural co-operation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards

(i) the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country,
(ii) mutual cultural exchange and
(iii) exchange of information.

(6) The Asian-African Conference was of the opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural co-operation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own, wherever possible and feasible.

C. Human rights and self-determination

(1) The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and for all nations.

The Conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a prerequisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.

(2) The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the dignity of man.

The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their cause; re-affirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries and pledged to

use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. Problems of dependent peoples

(1) The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.

The Conference is agreed

(i) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end,
(ii) in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation,
(iii) in declaring its support to the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples and
(iv) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

(2) In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

E. Other problems

(1) In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

(2) The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Iran based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon as possible, to implement their obligations under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.

(3) The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the Southern parts of Yemen known as the Protectorates and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

F. Promotion of world peace and co-operation

(1) The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that for effective co-operation for world peace membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security Council to support the admission of all those States which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter. In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference, the following among participating countries, namely, Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, a unified Vietnam were so qualified.

The Conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, was inadequate. It expressed the view that as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council, so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

(2) The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the

nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end.

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

G. Declaration on the promotion of world peace and co-operation

The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and co-operation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all States should co-operate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and

their own way of life, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill towards each other, nations should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friendly co-operation on the basis of the following principles:

1 Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2 Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3 Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.
4 Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5 Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6 (i) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
(ii) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
7 Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8 Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
9 Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.
10 Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian and African Conference declares its conviction that friendly co-operation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the Five Sponsoring Countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference, in consultation with the participating countries.

Bandung, 24 April, 1955.

Annex II: Membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (April 2008)*

Afghanistan	Ghana	Oman
Algeria	Grenada	Pakistan
Angola	Guatemala	Palestine
Bahamas	Guinea	Panama
Bahrain	Guinea-Bissau	Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh	Guyana	Peru
Barbados	Honduras	Philippines
Belarus	India	Qatar
Belize	Indonesia	Rwanda
Benin	Iran, Islamic Republic of	Saint Lucia
Bhutan	Iraq	Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia	Jamaica	Saudi Arabia
Botswana	Jordan	Senegal
Brunei Darussalam	Kenya	Seychelles
Burkina Faso	Korea, DPR of	Sierra Leone
Burundi	Kuwait	Singapore
Cambodia	Lao People's DR	Somalia
Cameroon	Lebanon	South Africa
Cape Verde	Lesotho	Sri Lanka
Central African Republic	Liberia	Sudan
Chad	Libyan Arab Jamahirya	Suriname
Chile	Madagascar	Swaziland
Colombia	Malawi	Syrian Arab Republic
Comoros	Malaysia	Tanzania
Congo	Maldives	Thailand
Congo, DPR of	Mali	Togo
Cote d'Ivoire	Malta	Trinidad and Tobago
Cuba	Mauritania	Tunisia
Cyprus	Mauritius	Turkmenistan
Djibouti	Mongolia	Uganda
Dominican Republic	Morocco	United Arab Emirates
Ecuador	Mozambique	Uzbekistan
Egypt	Myanmar	Vanuatu
Equatorial Guinea	Namibia	Venezuela
Eritrea	Nepal	Vietnam
Ethiopia	Nicaragua	Yemen
Gabon	Niger	Zambia
Gambia	Nigeria	Zimbabwe

*The members of the Group of 77 (G77) include all the current members of the non-aligned except Belarus. The extra G77 countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Paraguay, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Uruguay. China remains a special case.

Annex III: First Non-Aligned Summit conference attended by countries as full members of the Movement

The number of UN members is given for each Summit year. Details of members who have left, and so on, are given below. They are noted by an asterisk. The total number of non-aligned countries in 2008 is 118: all except Palestine are UN members.

1961 Summit Belgrade: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo Democratic Republic, **Cyprus*, Cuba, United Arab Republic (including both Egypt and Syria), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, **Myanmar*, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, **Yemen North*, **Yugoslavia*. There were 104 UN members.

1964 Summit Cairo: Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. There were 115 UN members.

1970 Summit Lusaka: Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malaysia, Rwanda, Singapore, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, **Yemen South*. There were 127 UN members.

1973 Summit Algiers: **Argentina*, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Madagascar, **Malta*, Mauritius, Niger, Oman, Peru, Qatar, United Arab Emirates. There were 135 UN members.

1976 Summit Colombo: Angola, Cape Verde, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Maldives, Mozambique, North Korea, **Palestine*, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Vietnam. There were 147 UN members.

1979 Summit Havana: Bolivia, Djibouti, Grenada, Iran, Nicaragua, Pakistan, **Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe*, Suriname, **SWAPO*. There were 152 UN members.

1983 Summit New Delhi: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Ecuador, St Lucia, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe. There were 158 UN members.

1986 Summit Harare: None. There were 159 UN members.

1989 Summit Belgrade: Venezuela. There were 159 UN members.

1992 Summit Jakarta: Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Guatemala, Namibia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Uzbekistan. There were 179 UN members.

1995 Summit Cartagena: **Argentina*, Eritrea, Honduras, South Africa, Thailand, Turkmenistan. There were 185 UN members.

1998 Summit Durban: Belarus. There were 185 UN members.

2003 Summit Kuala Lumpur: Dominican Republic, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Timor Leste. There were 191 UN members.

2006 Summit Havana: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis. There were 192 UN members.

Cyprus (a founder member) and *Malta* left the non-aligned in May 2004 after they joined the EU.

Myanmar, also a founder member, withdrew in October 1979 and rejoined in September 1992 at the Jakarta Summit.

Yemen North was a further founder member. *Yemen South* joined at the 1970 Lusaka Summit. They were united in May 1990.

Yugoslavia, now *Serbia and Montenegro*, was a founder member. The non-aligned decided at their 1992 Jakarta Summit that they would conform to a General Assembly decision about its status: Yugoslavia was later suspended. *Serbia* became a UN member in 2000 and has Observer status within the non-aligned.

Argentina joined the movement in 1973. It announced in September 1991 that it had withdrawn.

Palestine became a member as the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1975 and was then accepted as the State of Palestine after its independence declaration in 1988. It is the only non-aligned country which is not a UN member. *SWAPO* and the *National Front of Zimbabwe* became members in 1991 until Zimbabwe and Namibia became independent.

Annex IV: The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (April 2008)*

Afghanistan	Guyana	Pakistan
Albania	Indonesia	Palestine
Algeria	Iran	Qatar
Azerbaijan	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Bahrain	Jordan	Senegal
Bangladesh	Kazakhstan	Sierra Leone
Benin	Kuwait	Somalia
Brunei-Da Russalam	Kyrgyz	Sudan
Burkina-Faso	Lebanon	Suriname
Cameroon	Lybia	Syria
Chad	Malaysia	Tajikistan
Comoros	Maldives	Togo
Cote D'Ivoire	Mali	Tunisia
Djibouti	Mauritania	Turkey
Egypt	Morocco	Turkmenistan
Gabon	Mozambique	Uganda
Gambia	Niger	United Arab Emirates
Guinea	Nigeria	Uzbekistan
Guinea-Bissau	Oman	Yemen

*Fifty-one OIC members out of 57 are also non-aligned members. The other six are Albania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkey.

Notes

The South and World Politics: An Introduction

1. Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1999) *Globalization in Question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance*, London: Polity Press.
2. On the NAM, Braveboy-Wagner believes it has a mixed record of some key political successes and notable failures while on G77, she says 'the G77 has been effective in bringing concerns of the south to global attention, though the record is mixed with respect to its ability to actually negotiate solutions', Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2009) *Institutions of the Global South*, London: Routledge, pp. 24–9.
3. For instance, Braveboy-Wagner points out that NAM voting patterns in the UN in the 1980s and 1990s varied in form and cohesion when it came to voting along with the US during these periods, with significant regional differences coming into play. Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2009) *Institutions of the Global South*, London: Routledge, p. 25.
4. See Morphet, S. (1989) 'Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants: Its Development and Current Significance', in Hill, D. M. (ed.), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy Principles and Practice*, London: Macmillan.
5. See, for example, Dos Santos, T. (1973) 'The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America', in Berstein, H. (ed.), *Underdevelopment and Development*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
6. See, for example, Singham, A. W. and Hune, S. (1986) *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, London: Zed.
7. Bello, W. and Rosenfeld, S. (1990) *Dragons in Distress: Asia's miracle economies in crisis*, San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy; and Bello, W. et al. (1998) *Siamese Tragedy: development and disintegration in modern Thailand*, San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy.
8. See for instance, Shultz, R. (1988), *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare*, Hoover Institute, Stanford University Press, pp. 174–5.
9. Van Creveld, M. (1991), *On Future War*, Brassey's, Kaplan, R., (1994); 'The Coming Anarchy', *Atlantic Monthly*, 273, 44–76, Huntington, S. (1993), 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*.
10. See for example, Carpenter, T. G. (2005) *America's Coming War with China*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
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12. Krasner, S. (1985) *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: UCP, p. 3.
13. Krasner, S. (1985) *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: UCP, p. 4.
14. For an overview of the concept of hegemony, see Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (2001) *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd edition, London: Longman, pp. 40–2.

15. Cox, R. (1986) 'Social forces, states and world orders', in Keohane, R. (ed.) (1986) *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia: Columbia University Press, p. 219; also see Cox, R. (1996) 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 137–40.
16. Nel, P., Taylor, I. and Van der Westhuizen, J. (eds) (2001) *South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: the limits of reformism*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
17. Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2009) *Institutions of the Global South*, London: Routledge, p. 216.
18. Slater, D. (2004), *Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North–South Relations,* Oxford: Blackwell.
19. Said, E. W. (2003), *Orientalism*, London: Penguin.
20. The most popular constructivist argument on the 'social construction' of anarchy is from Wendt, A. (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46, 2, pp. 391–426.
21. Wendt, A. (1987) 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations', *International Organization*, 41, 3, pp. 335–70.
22. Campbell, D. (1998) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 18.
23. Cortell and Davis, Jr. (2000) pointed to 'two waves' in the scholarship on international norms. Acharya (2004) also acknowledged this division in the literature. Cortell, A. and Davis, J. (2000) 'Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda', *International Studies Review*, 2, 1, pp. 65–87; Acharya, A. (2004) 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism', *International Organization*, 58, 2, pp. 239–75.
24. Finnemore, M. (1993) 'International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Science Policy', *International Organization*, 47, 4, pp. 565–97; Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999) 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization*, 53, 4, pp. 699–732; Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1999) 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, 52, 4, pp. 887–917.
25. The idea of IOs working as 'teachers of norms' is from Finnemore, M. (1993) 'International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Science Policy', *International Organization*, 47, 4, pp. 565–97. There are a number of other concepts to define the role played by transnational actors in promoting norms, such as 'norm entrepreneurs', 'norm leaders', 'norm maker/norm taker' and so on. For examples, see Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca/ London: Cornell University Press; Checkel, J. (1998) 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', *ARENA Working Chapter 98*, 16, Copenhagen: Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-State, University of Oslo; and Naldeman, E. (1990) 'Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society', *International Organization*, 44, 4, pp. 479–526.

26. Cortell, A. and Davis, J. (1996) 'How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms', *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 4, pp. 451–78; Risse, T. (1994) 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', *International Organization*, 48, 2, pp. 185–214; Klotz, A. (1995) 'Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa', *International Organization*, 49, 3, pp. 451–78; Gurowitz, A. (1999) 'Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actor, Immigrants, and the Japanese State', *World Politics*, 51, 3, pp. 413–45; and Legro, J. (1997) 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', *International Organization*, 51, 1, pp. 31–63.
27. For a useful review of this literature see Cortell, A. and Davis, J. (2000) 'Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda', *International Studies Review*, 2, 1, pp. 65–87.
28. The connection is clearer with regards to the first group of constructivist authors, who focused at the system level. The English School has not yet developed an analytical framework aimed at understanding how the norms of the international society are absorbed in the domestic system of states.
29. The key contribution of the English School to the understanding of a system of norms impacting on state behaviour is from Bull, H. (1977/1995), *The Anarchical Society*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
30. Linklater, A. and Suganami, H. (2006) *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 121.
31. Jackson, R. (1993) 'The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations', in Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. O. (eds) *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
32. Jackson, R. (1990) *Quasi-states: international relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33. Anderson, B. (1991) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso.
34. Reno, W. (2000) 'Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars', in Berdalm, M. and Malone, D. (eds), *Greed and Grievance: economic agendas in civil wars*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
35. Bayart, J.-F., Ellis, S. and Hibou, B. (1999) *The Criminalisation of the State in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.
36. Zartman, W. (1995) *Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
37. Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. O. (1993) (eds) *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
38. Kaldor, M. (2000) 'Civilising Globalisation? The implications of the "Battle for Seattle"', *Millennium*, 29, 1.
39. Teivainen, T. (2003) 'The World Social Forum: arena or actor?', paper delivered at the International Studies Association meeting, Portland, OR.
40. Hass, E. (1990), *When Knowledge is Power*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
41. It is worth noting that a number of committed yet not destitute Southern states played a major role in South–South organisations. Those include, for example, Algeria, Brunei, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia.

1 The South and the UN, 1945–64

1. Guha, R. (2007), *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 167.
2. Barber, J. and J. Barratt (1990) *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 17–18.
3. Smuts said of criticism of the treatment of its Indian population in the UN in 1947 that Article 2(7) – which excluded domestic affairs from being considered by the organisation – 'is my veto'. Cited in Barber, J. and J. Barratt (1990) *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 22.
4. Much of this chapter discusses the way states and groups of states operated at the UN from 1945 to the early 1960s. It uses material from Sally Morphet's chapter on 'States Groups at the United Nations' in Taylor, P. and Groom, A. J. R. (eds) (2000) *The United Nations at the Millennium*, London: Continuum.
5. Jansen, G. H. (1966) *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*. London: Faber & Faber, p. 102. The group is often called the Afro-Asian Group. It seems more sensible to call it the Arab-Asian Group as most its African members were Arab-dominated states.
6. Angel, E. Z. (1982) 'How Latin America Shaped the U.N., the Memoirs of a Colombian Statesman', *Americas*, 34, 5:9–13.
7. These were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria (all Arab League members) and, probably, Afghanistan.
8. *The Yearbook of the United Nations 1946–47*, p. 62.
9. This decision was subsequently attacked in the 1955 Bandung Declaration (Annex I).
10. Daws, S. (1999) 'The Origins and Development of UN Electoral Groups' in Thakur, R. (ed.) *What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century*, Tokyo: The UN University.
11. Parameswaran, N. (1962) 'Growth of Non-Alignment in World Affairs', *India Quarterly*, 18, p. 33.
12. Jansen, G. H. (1966) *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*. London: Faber & Faber, 1966, pp. 156–60.
13. Gonwa, A. M. (1977) *The Foundation of the League of Arab States*, London: Longman Group Ltd., p. 301.
14. Khalidi, W. (1997) 'Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 27, 1, pp. 5–21.
15. Pakistan and Yemen had become UN members on 30 September 1947.
16. Zander, W. (1948) *Is this the Way? A Call to Jews*, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. As he notes (p. 15), '[t]he votes on the Palestine question in the General Assembly were an exact reflection (of Jewish violation of the rights of the native population – the Palestinian Arabs) and all peoples whoever in the past, directly or indirectly, were the objects of colonial policy were in opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state'.
17. Zander, W. (1948) *Is this the Way? A Call to Jews*, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., pp. 484–93.
18. Kennedy, P. (2007) *The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government*, London: Penguin, pp. 178–81.

19. The other East Europeans were Byelorussia (now Belarus), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine and, interestingly, Yugoslavia.
20. Jansen, G. H. (1966) *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London: Faber & Faber, p. 102, calls this the real beginning of Afro-Asian group action. This is not correct given the 1947 vote against Palestinian partition. It also seems more sensible to call this the Arab-Asian group, as Egypt was the only participant from the African continent and is Arab. The UN normally includes Arab countries, with the exception of those located in continental Africa, in the Asian group.
21. Sir Benegal Rau, the Indian Permanent Representative noted in Jansen's *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* that the appeal 'gave the first indication to a distracted world that the countries of Asia had taken the initiative … to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the East' (p. 106).
22. Rubinstein, A. Z. (1970) *Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 69–70.
23. Jansen, G. H. (1966) *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London: Faber & Faber, p. 109.
24. Acheson, D. (1969) *Present at the Creation*, New York: Norton, p .699.
25. Morphet, S. (1989) 'Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants: Its Development and Current Significance' in Hill, D. M. (ed.) *Human Rights and Foreign Policy Principles and Practice*, London: Macmillan.
26. This is one example of the tendency of Third World countries to keep their distance from the Soviet Union even if they agreed with much of the content of the Soviet Union's proposals.
27. Humphrey, J. P. (1984) *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, p. 129.
28. The two which did not vote were Burma and Iran.
29. Morphet, S. (1992) 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Development of Governments' Views, 1941–88' in Beddard, R. and D. M. Hill (eds) *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Progress and Achievement*, London: Macmillan, pp. 74–92.
30. Braillard, P. and Djalili, M.-R. (1986) *The Third World and International Relations*, London: Frances Pinter, pp. 56–7.
31. See Jansen, G. H. (1966) 'Afro-Asia Fails the Test: The India–China Dispute', *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, pp. 321–9.
32. See Kahin, G. M. (1956) *The Asian-African Conference*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; and Jansen, G. H. (1996) *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London: Faber & Faber.
33. President Sukarno, address to Bandung Conference, 18 April 1955, in *Africa-Asia Speaks from Bandong*, Djakarta: Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1955, p. 20.
34. Bissell, R. E. (1977) *Apartheid and International Organizations*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 20–1.
35. Humphrey, J. P. (1984) *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, p. 252.
36. Of these, 29 now came from Asia and Africa compared with 11 in 1946 (excluding South Africa).
37. Bissell, R. E. (1977) *Apartheid and International Organizations*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 106. He notes that South Africa joined the Western caucus in 1965.

38. There were originally only seven Vice Presidents.
39. This included both the Vice Presidents and the Chairmen of the Main Committees.
40. Daws, S. (1999) 'The Origins and Development of UN Electoral Groups' in Thakur, R. (ed.) *What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century*, Tokyo: The UN University, pp. 22–3.
41. Bissell, R. E. (1977) *Apartheid and International Organizations*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 31.
42. See Foreign Policy Document 223, *The United Nations: Does the Rhetoric Matter? A Case History: Palestine 1947–1983, October 1983*, Research Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
43. See Peter Marshall's chapter on 'The North–South Dialogue: Britain at Odds' in Jensen, E. and Fisher, T. (eds) (1990) *The United Kingdom – The United Nations*, London: Macmillan, pp. 160–4.
44. Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961 when it broke up.
45. *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, 1–6 September 1961*, The Publishing House of Yugoslavia.
46. Jankowitsch, O. and Sauvant, K. P. (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers,* Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Vol. 1, pp. 3–7.
47. ECOSOC was expanded once more from 27 to 54 by GAR 2847(XXVI) December 1971 as follows: 14 from Africa, 11 from Asia, 10 from Latin America, 13 from WEOG and six from Eastern Europe.
48. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department Memorandum of 1980 on *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77* Annex IV. The Latin American participants were Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico. Observers were Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.
49. Cyprus has been called both European and Asian; it was a member of the Asian Group for many years but had to leave after it had become a member of the EU in 2004.
50. The Joint Declaration of June 1964 is available on the G77 Major Documents web site.

2 The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, 1965–89

1. Extracts from Speeches by President Tito on Non-Alignment. Speech made on 17 May 1953. *Yugoslav Survey*, Vol. XVI, November 1975 p. 111.
2. Jankowitsch, O and K. P. Sauvant (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 65–71. These Collected Non-Aligned Documents in four volumes cover the period 1961–77. The Colombo meeting (March 1964) set up a Standing Committee to make the necessary arrangements for the October Cairo Summit.
3. Rubinstein, A. (1970) *Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World*, Princeton, pp. 301–2.
4. Jankowitsch, O and K. P. Sauvant (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, p. 58.

5. Jankowitsch, O and K. P. Sauvant (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, p. 57.
6. Both the latter events were Standing Committee meetings.
7. Most NAM Summits have been held in August/September to fit in with the schedule of the General Assembly which begins on the third Tuesday of September.
8. Jankowitsch, O and K. P. Sauvant (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, pp. 81–2.
9. Jankowitsch, O and K. P. Sauvant (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, p. 82.
10. Jankowitsch, O and K. P. Sauvant (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, p. 97.
11. Jankowitsch, O. and Sauvant, K. P. (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, p. 106.
12. Jankowitsch, O. and Sauvant, K. P. (1978) *The Third World Without Superpowers*, Vol. 1, p. 106.
13. Walter, R. (1973) 'UNCTAD: Intervener Between Poor and Rich States', *Journal of World Trade Law*, p. 546.
14. Sauvant, K. P. (1981) *The Group of 77*, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publishers, pp. 60–1.
15. Williams, M. (1994) *International Economic Organisations and the Third World*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 200.
16. Williams, M. (1994) *International Economic Organisations and the Third World*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 203.
17. Raul Prebisch's interview with David Pollock, Washington, DC, 21–23 May 1985, cited in Love, J. 'Latin America, UNCTAD and the Postwar Trading System' 17 June 2006, http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~facchini/werner/trade/Joe%20Love%20New.doc.
18. *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77*, April 1980, Research Department Memorandum, FCO Foreign Policy Document No. 91, para 57.
19. See *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement*, Volumes I and II, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. 1, p. 84.
20. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement*, Volumes I and II, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. 1, p. 93.
21. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement*, Volumes I and II, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. 1 p. 94.
22. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement*, Volumes I and II, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. 1 p. 94.
23. Marshall, P. (1990), 'The North–South Dialogue: Britain at Odds' in Jensen E. and T. Fisher, eds (1990) *The United Kingdom – The United Nations*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, pp. 159–208.
24. There is a wealth of material on this subject. Useful books include Mortimer, R. (1984) *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, Second Edition, Westview Press; Jones, C. A. (1983) *The North–South Dialogue: A Brief History*, Frances Pinter; Zartman, W., ed. (1987) *Positive Sum: Improving North–South Negotiations*, Transaction Books.
25. Putnam, R. and N. Bayne (1987), *Hanging Together Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits*, Second Edition, Sage, pp. 27–9. As they state, growing economic interdependence had 'ineluctably dissolved the barriers

between foreign and domestic economies and hence between foreign and domestic politics' (p. 14). See also Hajnal, P. (1999) *The G7/G8 System Evolution, Role and Documentation*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

26. Canada joined in 1976 to make a Group of 7. Russia was accepted by 1997.
27. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement,* Volumes I and II, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. 1 p. 142.
28. See *Official Records of the General Assembly Thirty-First Session Plenary Meetings,* Vol. I, *30 September 1976*, pp. 169–76.
29. Willetts, P. (1981) *The Non-Aligned in Havana*, London: Frances Pinter, pp. 207–12.
30. Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania – Address to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, Arusha, February 1979, in Sauvant, K. P. (1981) *The Group of 77*, Vol. III, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, pp. 433–9.
31. Willetts, P. (1981) *The Non-Aligned in Havana*, London: Frances Pinter, 1981, p. 21.
32. Rajan, M. S. (1994) *The Non-Aligned Movement, The New Delhi Conference and After*, South East Asian Affairs, pp. 60–72.
33. Sandbrook, R. (1993) *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32.
34. Shireen Hunter, cited in Bobiash, D., *South–South Aid: How developing countries help each other* (1992), New York: St Martin's Press, p. 15.
35. Cited in Bobiash, D., *South–South Aid: How developing countries help each other*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1992, p. 7.
36. Cancun 1981 Framework, Debates and Conclusions of the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, 1982; Marshall, P. (1990), 'The North–South Dialogue: Britain at Odds' in Jensen, E. and T. Fisher, (eds) (1990) *The United Kingdom–The United Nations*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, pp. 177–8.
37. Marshall, P. (1990), 'The North–South Dialogue: Britain at Odds' in Jensen, E. and T. Fisher, (eds) (1990) *The United Kingdom–The United Nations*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, p. 178. See also Putnam, R. and N. Bayne (1987), *Hanging Together Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits*, Second Edition, Sage, p. 136.
38. Minic, M, (1985) *Some New Phenomena in the Non-Aligned Movement* at the Third International Round Table, Novi Sad, November 1985.
39. Jones, C. A. (1983), *The North–South Dialogue: A Brief History*, London: Frances Pinter.
40. Mortimer, R. (1984) *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, Second Edition, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 174.
41. Crocker, C (1993), *High Noon in Southern Africa – Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood*, New York: Norton & Company, p. 454.
42. See *Official Records of the General Assembly Thirty-Eighth Session Plenary Meetings, Vol I, 28 September 1983*, p. 106.
43. See *Official Records of the General Assembly Thirty-Eighth Session Plenary Meetings, Vol I, 28 Sept. 1983,* p. 107.
44. Morphet, S. (1995), 'The influence of states and groups of states on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980–94', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 21.

45. Morphet, S (1996) 'Three Non-Aligned Summits – Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989 and Jakarta 1992' in Dunn, D., (ed.) (1996) *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan.
46. Morphet, S. (1989) 'The Non-Aligned Movement and the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Nicosia', *International Relations*, Vol. IX, No. 5, May, pp. 398–401.
47. Jackson, R. (1983) *The Non-Aligned the UN and the Superpowers*, Westport: Praeger.
48. See the World Bank (1993), *The East Asian Miracle*, Washington, DC: IBDR.
49. Harris, N. (1986) *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrialised countries and the decline of ideology*, London: Penguin Books, pp. 64–7.
50. Statistics Singapore, 'Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices', http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/hist/gdp.html, accessed 21 January 2009. For comparison with earlier statistics, see Chen, P. (1974) 'Growth and Income Distribution in Singapore', *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2, p. 120.
51. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement*, Vol. I, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, pp. 497–540.
52. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement,* Vol. I, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 242.
53. *Twenty Five Years of the Nonaligned Movement*, Vol. I, 1961–86, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 260.
54. Morphet, S. (1996) 'Three Non-Aligned Summits – Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989 and Jakarta 1992' in Dunn, D., (ed.) (1996) *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, p. 150.
55. Petkovic, R. (1986) 'Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries', *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, Vol. XXXVII, September, p. 5.
56. Morphet, S. (1989) 'The Non-Aligned Movement and the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Nicosia', *International Relations*, Vol. IX, No. 5, May, pp. 398–401.
57. Morphet, S. (1989) 'The Non-Aligned Movement and the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Nicosia', *International Relations*, Vol. IX, No. 5, May, p. 403.
58. Morphet, S. (1996) 'Three Non-Aligned Summits – Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989 and Jakarta 1992', in Dunn, D., (ed.) (1996) *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, pp. 152–3.
59. Morphet, S. (1996) 'Three Non-Aligned Summits – Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989 and Jakarta 1992', in Dunn, D., (ed.) (1996) *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, pp. 156–7.
60. *Belgrade Non-Aligned Summit Declaration*, A/44/551, 29 September 1989, p. 18.
61. The G77 deals mainly with economic issues but it does occasionally deal with certain political issues, particularly the question of Palestine.
62. Cairo Declaration of G77 in 1981, cited in Bobiash, D. (1992) *South–South Aid: How developing countries help each other*, New York: St Martin's, p. 9.
63. See *Official Records of the General Assembly Thirty-First Session Plenary Meetings, Vol I, 30 September 1976*, pp. 169–76.

3 The Rise of the New South, 1990–2005

1. Morphet, S. (1995) 'The influence of states and groups of states on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980–1994', *Review of International Studies*, 21, pp. 447–8. At least nine Chapter VII resolutions were passed in 1990, 13 in 1991 and ten in 1992. Two were passed in the 1980s.
2. The English School scholarship has produced an extensive debate on the relationship between 'order' (sovereignty) and 'justice' (human rights) in world politics. See, for example, Bull, H. (1977) *The Anarchical Society*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, London: Palgrave Macmillan); Mayall, J. (2000), *World Politics: Progress and Its Limits*, Cambridge: Polity Press; Jackson, R. (2000) *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, Oxford: OUP.
3. See Wheeler, N. (1997), 'Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics', in Baylis, J. and S. Smith, eds, *The Globalization of World Politics: an introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; see also Thakur, R. (2006), *The United Nations, peace and security*, Cambridge University Press.
4. Morphet, S. (1995) 'The influence of states and groups of states on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980–1994' *Review of International Studies*, 21, pp. 448–52.
5. See Ghali, B. B. (1992) *Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations. See also Morphet, S. (1993) 'UN Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring' in Roberts, A. and B. Kingsbury, (eds) (1993) *United Nations Divided World*, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 227–39.
6. Goulding, M (1993), 'The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping', *International Affairs*, 69, 3, pp. 451–464.
7. See Ottaway, M. and T. Carothers, (eds) (2000) *Funding Virtue: civil society and democracy promotion*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1991) 'Foreign Political Aid: German political foundations and their US counterparts', *International Affairs*, 67:1, pp. 33–64.
8. See Thakur, R. (2006), *The United Nations, Peace and Security*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 264–87.
9. See Woods, N., (ed.) (2000) Special Issue of *Global Governance* – Understanding Pathways Through Financial Crises and the Impact of the IMF, vol. 12, no. 4, October–December, pp. 373–93.
10. South Centre (1998), *Towards an Economic Platform for the South*, Geneva: The South Centre, pp. 3–4.
11. Traub, J. (2006) *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the era of American World Power*, London: Bloomsbury, pp. 146–7.
12. Mohamad, M. (2008), *Globalisation and the New Realities, Selected Speeches*, Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn Bhd, second edition.
13. Morphet, S. (1995) 'The influence of states and groups of states on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980–1994' *Review of International Studies*, 21 pp. 448–51.
14. Chen, A. H. Y. (2006) 'Conclusion: comparative reflections on human rights in Asia' in Peerenboom, R., Petersen C. J., Chen A. H. Y. (eds) *Human Rights in Asia*, London: Routledge, pp. 502–4.

15. These include discussions as to whether the NAM should merge with the G77.
16. See the Declaration of the NAM adopted at the Tenth Ministerial Conference at Accra, A/46/659, 19 November 1991, p. 3.
17. See Morphet, S. (1993) 'The Non-Aligned in "The New World Order": the Jakarta Summit, September 1992', *International Relations*.
18. Morphet, S. (1993) 'The Non-Aligned in "The New World Order": the Jakarta Summit, September 1992', *International Relations*, p. 360.
19. Morphet, S. (1993) 'The Non-Aligned in "The New World Order": the Jakarta Summit, September 1992', *International Relations*, p. 363.
20. Morphet, S. (1993) 'The Non-Aligned in "The New World Order": the Jakarta Summit, September 1992', *International Relations*, p. 363.
21. Morphet, S. (1993) 'The Non-Aligned in "The New World Order": the Jakarta Summit, September 1992', *International Relations*, p. 376.
22. The South Center (1992), 'Non-Alignment in the 1990s: Contributions to an Economic Agenda', South Centre, Geneva, August.
23. See *Final Document of the Meeting of the Standing Ministerial Committee for Economic Cooperation of the Non-Aligned Movement, Bali, 10–13 May 1993, A/48/338, 23 August 1993*.
24. President Suharto's Inaugural Address at the Standing Ministerial Committee for Economic Cooperation of the Non-Aligned Movement, Bali, 10–13 May 1993, NAC!0/SMCEC/2-93/DOC.2.
25. See report of the Chairman of the NAM on the activities of the Movement September 1992–May 1994 in *Documents adopted by the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo from 31 May to 3 June 1994, S/1994/834, 29 July 1994*, p. 89, pp. 102–3.
26. *Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Declaration* of l4 September 2000 (see http://www.nam.gov.za/minmeet/00091 14.htm).
27. Maurice Strong on the 'new South' *World Today*, Vol. 51, No. 11, November 1995.
28. All the Cairo documents adopted by the Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the NAM (May–June 1994) were put out on 29 July 1994, A/49/287.
29. See the Cairo Declaration.
30. See the Cairo Declaration.
31. They deplored the fact that nuclear weapons states had not fulfilled their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
32. *The Eleventh Summit of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries* held at Cartagena, Colombia, October 1995, A/50/752, 13 December 1995, p. 28.
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4 A South of States

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5 A South of Regions

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6 A South of Peoples

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through WTO open-market rules but by practices that are negotiated among different parties, with varying interests. Deglobalization doesn't imply an uncritical acceptance of existing regional organizations. Some of them are merely outposts of the globalized economy, common markets controlled by local technocrats and industrial elites. Others could sustain a genuine regional development programme.'

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Conclusion: One South, Many Souths

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