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# The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict\*

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## 1. Introduction

In this article we shall use some fragments from general theories of conflict to analyze the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. We are painfully aware of the limitations of any such approach, and of the shortcomings of our results – for no coherent, general theory of conflict exists. And if it did exist, it is hard to see how it could steer clear of the major difficulty also found in the legalistic approach to conflict: a heavy orientation towards the past. Any body of thought on conflict – descriptions, predictions and prescriptions – will have to be based on certain preconceived ideas or paradigms that a real conflict, cut out of live, creative human reality, may transcend. Thus, in an effort to confront the Middle East situation and the theories of conflict with each other, certainly the latter could benefit most.

Basic in this connection is the search for a *language* in which the conflict can be formulated.

An adequate language of conflict would permit the formulation not only of the goals and interests of the parties and of the incompatibilities, but also of solutions that cannot easily be arrived at in ordinary language. For that reason, the conflict language should broaden the concept of reality, expanding it by bringing in possibilities that would belong to potential rather than empirical reality. On purpose, we use the term *language* here: a solution adequately formulated in a language of conflict theory is, of course, a paper solution and not the same as a real life solution. An adequately *formulated* solution is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary condition for a real life solution. But the search for it is nonetheless significant, particularly if one is concerned

both with the conflict in the Middle East – affecting directly millions of people, and indirectly the whole world – and with the general theory of conflict. The process of solution, however, will have to be in the hands of the participants themselves.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. A note on the background

The Middle East today is often described as a battleground between two *chosen*<sup>2</sup> (and therefore self-righteous<sup>3</sup>) peoples. We prefer to see it as a conflict between two *persecuted* (and therefore self-preserving) peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. Two peoples who have both been suffering immensely at the hands of others, but with one very significant difference: the stage of Arab suffering was in the Middle East, whereas the stage of Jewish suffering was mainly elsewhere; mainly in Europe and recently mainly at Nazi-German hands. The present author is of the conviction that the events that started with the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 and ended with the UN Resolution of November 29, 1947, calling for 'partition' and the establishment of a Jewish (and an Arab) state, belongs to the more tragic mistakes of recent history. The total scope of that tragedy still remains to be seen; we may so far only have witnessed the beginning of its implication in terms of lives lost in battle or reduced in quality because people have been uprooted from their existence and squander their lives in camps. Nor can the tragedy be measured only in terms of direct or structural violence against individual human beings. What has happened has also deeply affected a number of societies, diverting resources and energy away from the pressing

needs of real, meaningful development. And importantly, it has not only affected the region referred to as the Middle East, but in a deeper sense the whole world, particularly through Big Power involvement.

In referring to this as a 'mistake' we intend an implicit rejection of various claims of legitimacy for the Jewish state that was sanctioned by the UN Resolution. The claims are rejected because of their consequences in the region, and because of their implications if they were to be interpreted as general principles. To mention but three such claims frequently encountered:

(1) *The historical argument.* While it is hardly possible to draw a definite line in time and assert that ownership before a given date may no longer be subject to restoration, a time span of two thousand<sup>4</sup> years would seem to fall in that category. As an argument in a referendum in a population it may perhaps carry some weight, but that would be up to the population to decide. If the territory is (almost) unsettled, and the claimant was the last user (not necessarily owner) the claim might be reasonable – but none of these conditions obtains. The list of changes to be brought about if this were used as a precedent for territorial claims around the world would be impressive.

(2) *The persecution argument.* No people has ever been exposed to such a concentrated, deliberate and cool mobilization of direct violence in human history as the Jews at the hands of the Nazis. No one disputes the necessity of finding a lasting solution that could guarantee a Never More. But to let C suffer for a crime committed by A against B cannot be the solution. First, it introduces a new crime. Second, the responses by C cannot possibly guarantee a lasting solution, unless C should feel extreme sympathy for B or particular hatred for A – both emotions that may wash off. Of course, B may think C is so weak that there is no danger involved, but that argument would also be based on a much too static view on human affairs.

(3) *The superiority argument.* This argument would invoke the role of the Jews as a people

with a *mission civilisatrice*, to bear on intractable nature or 'less advanced societies'. Legitimacy would rest on ability to make the desert bloom, not to coexist with the desert for ages. It is productive use, not habitation, that constitutes the essence of ownership, and he who does not use productively forfeits his rights. The argument is rejected, off hand, as colonialist – not because of any denial of Jewish *capability*, but of Jewish *right* to engage in this type of mission, except by the explicit, unextorted invitation by the people concerned.

For the Jews the *validity* of these arguments is probably in the order 1–2–3; for others, often 3–2–1. For the Western observer, impressed with a technical-economic culture resembling his own (whether he is a liberal or the conservative or social democratic persuasion) legitimacy of the Jewish cause has probably been increasingly derived from similarity. But the persecution argument should not be underestimated, both because of the common enemy factor in Hitler Germany, and because of the latent or manifest anti-Semitism in practically all European countries. There seems to be a feeling of guilt and/or pity towards the Jews, as against a non-feeling, or vague paternalism and contempt, for the Arabs.<sup>5</sup> The historical argument, however, may be of less significance for non-Jews because it is not supported by much emotional ego-involvement. On the other hand, the Palestine which most Westerners know through their religious upbringing in any variety of the Christian tradition was always peopled with Jews, never with Arabs. Jewish claims, hence, fell on a cognitive ground prepared by biblical readings – the interlude between 'then' and 'now' was a cognitive void.

Again, when the succession of events is referred to as a 'mistake' it is also because we feel that there were other courses of action that could have been taken after the World War II. To carve out a Jewish state on the territory of the defeated German enemy,<sup>6</sup> with access to water-ways (the Rhine, the East or North Seas) can only be considered *a priori*

more 'impossible' as a 'solution' than the one that was chosen if Arab sentiments and reactions are accorded less significance than German ones. For this there is, of course, a tradition of long standing in European action and thinking, showing up very clearly in the way the Arabs have been treated by Turks, French, British, and Italians alike. To let the Nazi henchman in Central Europe suffer some territorial loss as a result of his action might not have made him more tractable afterwards, but it would be less of an affront against basic sense of justice. To export a European problem, a more or less shared anti-Semitism from East to West with an admitted peak in the Center of Europe and drop it, not at the doorstep, but well inside the house of the Arabs, can only be understood against a background of century-long traditions of Western colonialism. It should not be explained in terms of Zionism alone. For Zionism it may have been Israel or nothing. But Zionism would have been powerless if it could not operate within this tradition. The establishment of Israel should be seen as a *consequence* of Western imperialism, not only as an *instrument* for continued Western imperialism.<sup>7</sup>

Another possibility would have been for all the nations in the predominantly white and Western UN in 1947 who voted 'yes' (33 votes to 13, only 5 % more than  $\frac{2}{3}$ ) to share the responsibility for guaranteeing to all Jews first class citizenship. It would be highly understandable if the Jews themselves had rejected a territorial solution on German ground, for example since memories of the past and agonies for the future might become too vivid. At this point Jewish reaction is understandable: deep scepticism on the one hand, attraction to the idea of the Return on the other. This reaction was quite compatible with the general Western approach to Jews: dissociation rather than real association – with some exceptions. To Western anti-Semites this must have been an optimal solution: conceding to Jewish demands, and at the same time getting rid of the Jews. And who ever heard of 'Palestinians'?

In a sense, this development is tragic not

only for the Arabs – and for the Jews – but for the world in general, and the West in particular. *The Jews could have become the first really non-territorial nation*, a trans-national organization with Tel Aviv as its headquarter, much like the Vatican is for the Catholic Church, not with the aim of becoming a territorial one, one more nation-state in the old tradition, but with the aim of becoming increasingly non-territorial. International Jewry, instead of being an international constituency for Israeli views and deeds, a reservoir of demographic, economical, and political support, could have become a trans-national cementing force in a world community – and the world community badly needs such forces.

But such speculations are futile. For we agree with the thesis that (almost) nobody seems to challenge: the desire of the Jews to settle in Palestine was irresistible, and *the concentrated settlement of Jews in that particular region is irreversible*. This also carries with it the implication that their number will grow, as long as births exceeds deaths and/or immigration exceeds emigration. But this carries no *precise* implication in terms of extension of territory or sociological organization. There is considerable lee-way, and this is the basis for the analysis in the following section.

But if one rejects the Jewish claim to legitimacy, can one then at the same time maintain a thesis implying some kind of irreversibility? This is obviously possible by viewing the Jewish establishment as a *fact*. It does not become less of a fact if viewed against a background of power (their own and that of their supporters), and not against a background of legitimate claims. Legitimacy, in our view, rests with the Arabs, *in casu* the Palestinians, and on two simple grounds: the *principle of ownership* and the *principle of self-determination*. Of course, the Palestinians might have decided to give the territory away, that would be any owner's right – but they were never asked, despite the stipulation in the Balfour Declaration and their overwhelming majority<sup>8</sup> (92 % in 1919, 83 % in 1931, 68 % in 1949).

Implicit in this way of viewing what happened is also the rejection of the idea that the

rights Britain and the UN (as a successor to the League of Nations) had over British Mandated Palestine were so far-reaching as to make the Balfour Declaration and the UN Resolution valid. In other words, even if the UN Resolution had been completely representative of world opinion, not only at the governmental but even at the popular level, it could still be an invalid, illegitimate decision, because it can be said to go beyond legitimate powers of any supra-national body. If Britain, the Parliament or even the people, give away territory in defiance of any principle of local self-determination, this is bilateral colonialism; if the UN does the same it is multilateral colonialism, and not different in its implications. The UN, no more than Britain, can disregard the principle of self-determination. Again, if this should set a precedent, it would also make multilateral administration of territory a dangerous institution if administrative powers can be interpreted so broadly.

In short, Israel came into being in a way which, if codified and given the status of gen-

eral norms, would set an impossible precedent. It was conceived in sin, was born in sin and grew up in sin – but it is a viable fact. Now the question to be asked is not whether what happened in the *past* was a ‘mistake’ or not – that is now an academic question – but what can be done in the future to rectify the situation. In other words: how shall Jews be accommodated in the Middle East?

### 3. Defining the conflict

To define a conflict, the *parties* have to be specified, their *values* (goals as well as interests) must be given, and the *incompatibility* be demonstrated. That there is incompatibility is obvious, but about what? What is incompatible is not only the geographical location of Jews or Arabs, but the claims to control the polity in which they are living. ‘Polity’ is chosen here as a term roughly corresponding to ‘state’. It has two connotations: *territorial possession* as well as *social control*. The question is: *who shall exercise this control, Jews or Arabs?* Fig. 1 illustrates the issue.




Fig. 1. First approximation to definition of the conflict

At A there is Arab control, say, in the form of Palestinian state with a Jewish minority (history rewritten, with a gradually dissolving mandate, but without a Balfour Declaration, and without Return followed by Partition). At C there is the present situation with Jewish control, in its several, expanding varieties from November 1947 to June 1967. At D neither party is in control because of foreign domina-

tion – e. g. the British mandated Palestine situation. It must have been very important for the Jews that there be no intermediate A-type phase, but that history should proceed directly from D to C – exactly what the Arabs feared. From an Arab point of view, the absence of such an interlude must have reinforced the image of Israel as a successor to British imperialism. Due to this succession, Palestine was

the only Arab land denied Arab rule and denied independent statehood, although there is no guarantee that there would have been a Palestinian state if Israel had not come into being. And that is the simple point: Jews as well as Palestinians want, and feel they are entitled to, a 'state', not only a 'home'. Unfortunately, they both want it at the same place.

Let us then turn to the last point, *B*, with both parties in control. If both parties are to have monopolistic control over the *same* polity territorially defined, the incompatibility is absolute, there is no empirical *B* point. But there have been efforts to obtain the 'bliss' of point *B* by referring at least one of the actors to some *other* territory. Thus, the Jews have been offered Ugandan territory, as one more example of Western powers exporting their own problem to an area they dominate instead of solving it themselves. In a relatively unsettled area in Karamaja in Uganda this might have led to no open conflict as long as the British rule lasted, till October 1962 – but would then probably have led to exactly the same conflict as today is found in the Middle East.

Similarly, there has been a plethora of ideas as to where the Arabs brought under Jewish polity control, most of them today referred to as 'Palestinian refugees', might settle. These suggestions all have one thing in common: they should settle somewhere in what is today Arab territory. Absorption in existing polities, such as Kuwait, would not bring about point *B* in the diagram. A new polity would have to be brought into being and where should the territory be taken from? It would have to be taken from Nature, either by making available land currently functioning as a sea-bed (Dutch approach!) or by settling unused or at least underused land. One example is the Sinai scheme, with water pumped over from the Sudan, using Italian technology, financed by money from Libya, and populated by Palestinians. If taken from an existing polity the various West Bank proposals, combined with Gaza or not, would yield a basis for a polity, but not for *that* polity, whether it takes

the form of a state or a 'statelet', called Palestine or not.

But all these approaches to a *B* type solution are misreadings of the situation, because of the assumption that control over *a* polity can be substituted for control over *that* polity. If this were possible there would have been no conflict; nobody would have sacrificed his life for the homeland. Hence, the problem has to be attacked from another angle. Even if both parties cannot have monopolistic control over the *same* polity, they can, conceivably, *share* control. In other words, a solution can theoretically be found along the A–C line in Fig. 1 (whether this is acceptable to the parties is another matter). Since polity control is two-dimensional, territorial and social, there are many possibilities. Let us therefore rule out the extremes – that the Jews, or the Arabs, have total, exclusive, control over both – and start examining the mixed possibilities.

To give a satisfactory typology of the possibilities imaginable along the A–C line is difficult. We have taken as our point of departure the concept of a 'polity' with two aspects to it: territorial *and* social control. Let us now be more precise and conceive the 'territory' in terms of not only *how much*, but also *where* it is located; and conceive of 'social structure' in terms of 'pluralism-singularism', meaning by this to what extent citizenship, or 'first class' citizenship, is extended to everybody or restricted to certain ethnic-religious groups. The Jews seem to insist that *singularism is unarguable, exact extension of territory not*; whereas Palestinians (but here it is very difficult to talk about *the* Palestinian view) seem to feel that territory is *unarguable (the homeland), and singularism is not even an issue*. They argue in favor of a pluralist society, a society that would only exclude what they see as the enemies of pluralism (the Zionists).<sup>9</sup>

Combining the extremes on both variables yields what Arabs traditionally fear to be the Israeli goal, the really big (first 'Suez to Jordan', then the Greater Israel, 'Nile to Euphrates'), singularist Jewish state. It is hard to deny that such Arab fears have been stimu-

lated by so many events that one need not be unreasonable or hostile to Jews or Israel to interpret them as confirmation of this type of hypothesis. We shall assume the Nile-Euphrates hypothesis to be false, but we do not rule out the Suez-Jordan hypothesis, and this brings us to the present situation. But thinking has also centered on a much smaller, singularist Jewish state, even down to a non-viable singularist Jewish state, for instance like the 'Vatican' solution originally suggested at the London conference, making a 'statelet' out of Tel Aviv.

As points of reference, the following six values on the *territorial* variable may be useful:

nothing  
statelet  
1947  
pre-June 1967  
Suez-Jordan  
Nile-Euphrates

Which are the corresponding reference points on the *social* variable?

By a singularist state we mean one which, on a basis of ascription, makes a distinction between first and second class citizenship; *limiting immigration*, and *reserving basic power and other elite positions* to those who belong to the *first class*, and *adopting their cultural idiom* (in a much broader sense than language) *as the state idiom*. We have not found the terms 'racist', 'sacred', or 'theocratic' very useful in this connection, since Jews do not constitute a race, and Judaism in its modern form (if not in its orthodox form also found in Israel in minority position) seems to be closer to unitarianism than to, say, the Amish. But this does not mean that there is no Jewish exclusiveness which we assume to have the three aspects mentioned above: selective migration, key positions reserved for the Jews, and Jewish symbols used as state symbols.

This is a broad definition which makes many states, perhaps most, singularist. Norway, for instance, is singularist even in the religious sense, making one particular sect within one branch of one minority religion in the

world (the Evangelical Lutheran version of Protestant Christianity) a state religion.<sup>10</sup> More to the point: the definition would certainly make many Arab states (not Lebanon) surrounding Israel singularist, except when as to acquisition of citizenship through immigration, and much of their identity derives from that singularism. What right, then, would they have to request pluralism of Israel – in other words no guaranteed primacy to the idiom of any group, nor to persons from any group in terms of immigration and positions of power?

The situation is not symmetrical. If someone establishes an expanding state on somebody else's *territory*, establishing *territorial control*, and this seems irreversible (among other reasons because of Big Power guarantees), then the question of *social control* becomes significant as a next – and less well defined – battleground. *A priori* it seems clear that Arabs have more of a right to make demands along the singularism-pluralism axis on Israel than vice versa, unless we assume that territorial control (in the military sense) implies unlimited social control (in the sense defined above). But if Arabs make this request on another basis – e. g. on the basis that the pluralist state is also a more modern state concept, in line with world trends towards a higher degree of mixing, higher entropy, against the Herder nation-state concept – then they would also have to address this request to themselves. While agreeing with the last argument, we would also feel that the Arabs have sufficient basis in the first, without invoking the second.

What now remains is to spell out degrees of singularism and pluralism. This might be done by using the three criteria above (criteria of citizenship, recruitment to power positions, cultural idiom) in an effort to establish a *scale*, starting with all three, ending up with the least important one. Efforts in this direction failed, which indicates that in the present situation in Israel they come as a package, closely tied together. In a sense this is logical. Open immigration to Israel could mean general return of Palestinians who might threaten the other two aspects. To yield when it comes to basic power control would obviously be out of the ques-

tion, and an eclectic approach to the idiom of the state would again run counter to the whole idea of Israel – as symbolized by its name and its flag.

Hence, we have chosen another basis for graduation of singularism: the *size of the second-class element*. At one extreme is the pure Jewish state, then comes the Jewish majority state, then the Jewish minority state (the present situation according to some ways of counting). All three have in common the three criteria mentioned above.

For the pluralist end of the variable, however, we must use another basis for graduation. Since all inhabitants now would have the same rights to immigration, power position and propagation of their idiom within the territory the crucial variable is no longer the *relative magnitude* but the *degree of mixture*: the entropy.

Assuming, for simplicity, that there are only two groups, Arabs and Jewish, the lowest level of mixture would be a (con-)federation of two singularist parts. This would differ from a two states solution by having a super-structure; it would have to be associative rather than dissociative (to be spelt out later).

Then comes the possibility that the federation could have more parts than there are groups. In that case the term 'canton' may be more appropriate than 'state', and Switzerland could be a model in some respects. There could be a Jewish canton around Tel Aviv, an Arab canton on the Western Bank of Jordan, and so on; any number so that a minimum of reshuffling would be necessary. They could be singularist, but not necessarily pure, and Jerusalem could be federal territory.

Finally, at the third stage comes the highest level of entropy: the *one state solution*, pluralist, with complete mixture. Since a state accords free mobility to its citizens within the state (if it does not, it is because not all of them are real citizens) this would also imply complete mobility. There would be no internal borders to pass with the aim of reducing mobility. In short, what have referred to above as a *modern* state, as opposed to the *traditional* nation-state: a territory on Mother

Earth where any human being can settle and move around with equal opportunity as to power positions and cultural idiom.

All these pluralist solutions might have to be internationally non-aligned, even to the point of declining UN membership (also like Switzerland). But this is not an obvious condition.

Let us now combine the two dimensions, territorial and social, so as to be able to formulate some of the goals held by the parties, and compare them. This is hypothetical and for the purpose of illustrating some deeper issues only – for both the parties and their views are very volatile. Only one thing is certain: there are more than two parties. We shall operate with four, referring to them as the Arab and Israeli, moderate (dominant) and extreme (sub-dominant) parties respectively:  $A_m$  and  $A_e$ ,  $I_m$  and  $I_e$ .<sup>12</sup> These are defined in terms of their positions, their goals, not in terms of who today may or may not be the carriers of these goals.

It is very naive, a liberal fallacy of misplaced concreteness, to believe that the decline of an actor is also the decline of a goal. A goal may live on in the consciousness or sub-consciousness of a people to spring forth again when new carriers are ready. The decline of Palestinian resistance after the murderous attacks by Royal (Hashemite) Jordanian troops, with the rest of the world either encouraging or looking the other way, does not guarantee that there will not be a revival.<sup>13</sup> Any goal may be picked up again by, say, the younger generation all over the Arab world, by new classes, by other states. And correspondingly for Israeli views.

We now choose to define the four goals as shown in Table I and Fig. 2.

Arab and Israeli goals do not overlap – that is the conflict. Needless to say, this is a far too schematic presentation of an extremely complex reality, so let us at least try to spell it out further.

We take the dominant Arab view to be that whereas the territorial issue is unarguable, pluralism is not. Thus, this Arab side has conceded two very important points: (1) a



Table I. Four position in the conflict

	MODERATE ACTORS		EXTREME ACTORS	
	Arab side, $A_m$	Israeli side, $I_m$	Arab side, $A_e$	Israeli side, $I_e$
territorial issue	post-June unacceptable	pre-June unacceptable	territory arguable	post-June unarguable, desire to retain expansion
social issue	singularism acceptable	singularism unarguable	pluralism unarguable	singularism unarguable, desire for a purer version




Fig. 2. Four positions in the conflict

*singularist* Israel is acceptable, and (2) Israeli withdrawal is to the pre-June or the 1947 border, *not to nothing* ('pushing the Jews into the sea').<sup>14</sup> A singularist Israel within the pre-June perimeter as a maximum or the 1947 border as a minimum can be recognized as a 'fact'.

But there is one condition attached: that a solution be found for the Palestinians, acceptable to the Palestinians.<sup>15</sup> Since the Palestinians are very divided,<sup>16</sup> and since some (how many?) have the sub-dominant, extremist view that *pluralism is unarguable*, and since Egypt and other Arab states are committed to the idea that they cannot impose any 'solution' on the Palestinians, this *may* be interpreted as meaning no concession at all. On the other hand, it seems to mean that Egypt has spelt out conditions under which a singularist Israel would be recognized *as a fact*, whereas *complete* recognition, with all that implies, will not be conceded to a singularist Israel.

If we compare this to the dominant Israeli position *it would seem reasonable for Israel to make a move along the territorial axis in return for the long step Arabs took along the social axis*. (Actually, it is on this type of bargain that the 'solution' put forward at the end is based.) Israeli willingness to withdraw to the pre-June borders or beyond would make the two goals overlap. In other words, *there would be a solution between the dominant actors*, with recognition in exchange for withdrawal. But the dominant actors are not alone, and Israel did not make that move. Instead, Israel seems to have stipulated a number of post-June positions she would hold on to (Golan Heights, Eastern Jerusalem, Hebron, positions on the Jordan, Sharm-el-Sheikh) 'to make the borders secure and defensible'. Israel might back up this position by throwing doubt on the credibility of the Egyptian concessions, as indicated above.<sup>17</sup> If the Israeli reading is that the Palestinian condition means no concession at all, then the conclusion might be to prepare for continued war from the strategically and tactically best possible, advanced position, far inside what everybody would agree is Arab territory.

But another, more conciliatory, reading might have led them to explore further the Palestinian question, and here Israeli and Palestinian views seem to coincide: they both, for different reasons, reject a 'statelet' solution for the Palestinians, carved out on old mandate territory (West Bank plus Gaza, with corridor). Understandably, the 'solution' is also rejected by Jordan, and by the Palestinians.

At this point, a basic difference between the two subdominant actors and their relation to the dominant actors should be pointed out, easily seen from Figure 2 and Table I. It is simply a more extreme version of  $I_m$  – but  $A_e$  differs significantly from  $A_m$ . Palestinians wanting to return to their homeland is not an extreme version of Egypt, Syria and Jordan wanting territory back, possibly including more of British-mandated Palestine. Palestinians want changes inside Israel, away from singularism, more than, for instance, Egypt does. There is a fundamental difference in Israel's conflict with the two parties. The relation to the Palestinians is one of basic asymmetry: a conquering against a conquered people that only recently has risen to a high level of political consciousness and capability to act, if not yet in a concerted fashion. Adding to the asymmetry comes the circumstance that the Palestinians (unlike, say, the Africans living in the territory referred to as 'Rhodesia', or in Mozambique) have not had their own territorial base but have to operate out of the territories of other states, leading to obvious conflicts that Israel would be quick to exploit. (The occupation of Gaza changed this.) All this differs from the relationship between Israel and Egypt: a symmetrical relation between two nation-states highly aware of their goals and capable of pursuing them.

If the whole conflict were only a question of a relation between the two dominant actors, a solution might have been found – provided these two actors would still have had the same goals. The latter is not obvious. As long as both dominant actors are coupled to the subdominant actors – Arab governments by the twin principles of 'nobody else can negotiate

for the Palestinians' and 'United Arab Front'; Israel among other things by the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy – they can move further towards each other, using the more extremist positions for bargaining purposes. 'This is my final offer; if I move any further I will have unacceptable conflict in my own camp. To help me, and thereby yourself, you will now have to move.' For this age-old strategy to work, extremist positions have not only to be articulated in a visible/audible way, but their strength and capability have to be demonstrated. 'If you do not agree with me today you will have to deal with him tomorrow' has to be made credible. Hence, if the subdominant actors suddenly disappeared, the dominant actors may feel they have to move further away from each other in order to have more distance to bargain about, and because of the need to articulate less reconcilable stands extremists took care of before.

In short, the presence of extremists may make moderate stands possible. An Anwar Sadat may have reasons to believe that his real opposite party may be the Israeli hawks, a Golda Meir that Palestinian guerillas in one form or the other is the real party on the other side. The circumstance that this may also be used as a conflict strategy does not in and by itself make it invalid. There is a very broad spectrum of goals in this conflict, and even if there are overlapping goals found among some Israelis and some Arabs, the distribution of power to pursue the goals varies over time. A solution today may be challenged tomorrow by actors on either side, and all of them know that. *For that reason the current up and down game of finding compromises between the present articulations from the two dominant actors seems rather idle.* For a solution to last it has to be sustained by stronger forces than the signatures of what right then happens to be dominant actors. To explore the possibilities of *self-sustaining structural solutions* we have to look more deeply into the conflict, and that leads to a number of themes related to the dynamics more than to the genesis and definition of conflict.

4. Conflict dynamics: some symmetries and asymmetries

A conflict is defined in terms of incompatibilities, e.g. as is done in the preceding section. This should not be confused with the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of conflict, usually destructive (hatred and violence against objects and people). That this particular conflict has not remained an abstract incompatibility but has developed in all attitudinal and behavioral directions is an understatement. The A-B-C triangle has been highly operative, as illustrated in Fig. 3 in an ever escalating spiral.




Fig. 3. The conflict triangle

Important in this connection is how the original conflict through the mechanisms of *behavioral* escalation leads to new incompatibilities that were not there to start with, a string of derived conflicts, such as

- the acts of physical violence
- the acts of verbal violence
- the refugees
- the passage through the Suez Canal
- the passage through the Tiran Straits
- the boycott
- the territorial expansion
- Golan Heights–West Bank–Jerusalem–Sinai

Since they are derived conflicts, their solution in isolation will not solve the basic conflict,<sup>18</sup> but may perhaps serve the purpose of de-escalation and hence prepare the ground for solving the conflict. Another aspect is the use of derived conflicts for bargaining, according to the general principle that the more issues two parties have in common, the more possibilities would there be for trading off one issue

against the other. But this constitutes an incentive to engage in destructive behavior – escalation – as will be explored in the next section.

In this entire, conflict dynamics, *attitudinal* processes also take place, with their well known tendency for them to develop in a parallel fashion. There are important symmetries in the perception, they are *to some extent* mirror images of each other. Why these similarities? Basically because of similarities in human beings and human groups across any conflict border, and particularly in a symmetric conflict like the conflict between Israel and Egypt. The same or similar processes are started. *Both of them have a need to belittle the achievements of the other side and ascribe them to powerful outsiders* – to the US and Soviet, International Jewry (Zionism) and the Arab World respectively. Any achievement is due to outsiders, whether it be military, political, economic or cultural; any weakness is their own. Further, *both sides have a need to explain their own short-comings, and this may also be attributed to the outsiders*: ‘the Americans/Russians let us down’, and ‘the other side gets better support than we get’.

Obviously, neither party likes the image of another party not only fighting against them but feeling against them, strongly and genuinely. Hence, to reduce anxiety, there are the convenient and twin ideas: that there *is no quarrel with the ordinary people on the other side, only with the leaders and their propaganda*, and that *the leaders on the other side need the conflict to strengthen their regime*. ‘Some of my best friends are (or were) Arabs/Jews’ is an extremely frequent statement in either place, cited in an anecdotal way to back up the first of these images. That either party delights in stories, real or purely fictional, about tensions inside the other party is obvious.

To take one more example: in the process of polarization, conflict becomes institutionalized, protected by vested interests and hardened minds, and conflict resolution becomes a threat to conflict as an institution. *Any offer by the other side can be rejected by perceiving it as a trick*, and in this the two parties can develop a

shared interest, and everybody can appear politically sophisticated.

However, instead of continuing this list of symmetries, let us rather look into some of the asymmetries. An outsider may have a tendency to look for the symmetric aspects of a conflict in order to make it more manageable for himself:<sup>19</sup> he emerges with an aura of objectivity by invoking ‘plague on both your houses’. In the present conflict process there are certainly also asymmetries of a basic nature. Some are related to the asymmetry in the underlying conflict: the illegitimacy of the Israeli versus the legitimacy of the Palestinian claims to polity control, and some of them to Israel’s two-front war: an asymmetric conflict with the Palestinians and a symmetric one with the other Arabs.

All asymmetries can relate to the topdog-underdog aspect of this conflict: the Jews, the topdogs, imposing themselves on the Arab underdogs. Where the Arabs feel hatred, Jews may feel more contempt:<sup>20</sup> ‘Arab dogs don’t bite’. When Arabs may want an Israel willing to participate, as an equal partner, in a Middle East region, Jews may want to forget everything about the Middle East except their geographical location and see themselves as a part of the Western world accidentally washed up on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, the feelings and the perspectives are not complementary or contradictory; they are not at the same level. There is, of course, the basic symmetry arising from the conflict: both wanted to push each other out of British mandated Palestine. And Israel may also want to prevent a Palestine state from coming into being for the same reason as Palestinians are irreconcilably opposed to an Israeli state: it establishes a nation-state as a fact. But the basic asymmetry remains: for the Jews, the Arabs are a context full of noise and nuisance, for the Arabs, the Jews are a bone in, and a dagger at, their throat.

This asymmetry shows up particularly clearly in perceptions of the future of the Middle East. We made some exploratory field steps towards a study in 1966, with the hope of doing a real study in 1967. Needless to say,

our research plans were among the casualties of the June war. But the findings of the exploratory study may be used to illustrate the point. Briefly stated, the hypothesis was that although the images of past and present were totally incompatible, there might be some images of the future that would be compatible and give some ideas for solutions. Students and professors in Cairo were therefore asked in January 1966 to elaborate on their fears and hopes as to future relations with Israel. Of hopes they had little, but as to fears they had the following to offer:

We think Israel is expansionist. According to Zionist plans, there will be two phases: first an expansion stretching from Suez to Jordan, then a second phase from the Nile to Euphrates. The first phase will only be a preparation for the second. But although we fear and hate this expansionism there is something we fear even more: Israeli economic domination of the area. We are afraid that they want to turn us into suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products and unskilled labor, and above all into markets for industrial goods that they may then be free to produce, using their Zionist connections, their experience in banking, and so on. This is what Britain and France did with us, and it is not going to happen again!

Three months later, a spokesman for Israel's foreign ministry in Jerusalem gave the following answer when asked about future perspectives in the Middle East:

There are great possibilities of cooperation in the 1990's. Israel can supply the technical know-how that will make the desert bloom, desalination, drilling for water, adult education schemes, manufactured goods. The Arabs can supply raw materials and agricultural products; we can supply capital and experience. This will be in the interest of both parties for we have an experience in the type of setting in which the Arabs live unequalled

by any other developed nation. This may be rejected by their present leaders for propaganda reasons, but will not in the long run be rejected by the Arab peoples themselves.

The contradictory complementarity was perfect: hope for one was fear for the other.<sup>21</sup> Since these perceptions are general perceptions, held by people in developed and developing countries respectively (not only in Israel and Egypt), this is only a variation of the theme of asymmetry underlying the whole conflict: Israel as a continuation of a tradition of dominance of an imperialistic nature.

Phrased in different terms, this may mean that whereas both parties fear the direct violence of the other party and are willing to retribute in kind, the Arabs in addition fear structural violence or economic warfare from Israel and are unable to retribute in kind – so far. Complete polarization, cutting positive interaction down to zero and limiting exchange to negative blows, should therefore not only be seen as usual conflict polarization, *but also as a protection mechanism against structural violence*. The alternative to vertical exchange is not necessarily horizontal exchange; it can also be no exchange at all. And this adds yet another dimension to the conflict, and perspective to the polarization.

Last in our list of asymmetries comes the difference in attitude to direct negotiation. Whereas Israel has been pressing for this, no doubt partly as a drive to gain some type of recognition, the other side has refused. The Arab refusal to have direct negotiations can also be seen as an outcome of the conflict, as a typical part of the polarization process. At the extreme of a consistent policy of non-contact, as a part of conflict dynamics, there is also denial of the type of contact that might lead to conflict resolution. In so doing, the Arabs can build on conflict sentiment arising out of the conflict; polarization energy can be used as a raw material to be moulded into a refusal to engage in direct negotiations, *unless* Israel fulfills a certain number of conditions. This may then be presented in terms of illegiti-

macy, as an extension of non-recognition. Direct contact is perceived in moral terms, as an instrument of recognition, and not as an instrument to promote one's own case.

But this makes one speculate *why*. There need not be any particular motive behind this refusal. If one engages in polarization of the first order (refusal to have contact with the enemy) and to a large extent in polarization of the second order (refusal to have contact with those who have contact with the enemy – except at the very highest level, via UN or Big Power top officials) – then refusal to have direct negotiations fits in neatly.<sup>22</sup> But there could also be other reasons.

It is easy to find in Arab countries an exaggerated belief in the strength of the other side, not only militarily, technically, economically – but also politically. That the strength largely lies in social structure, and also in how Arab pressures have consolidated Israeli society and mobilized its population to an almost incredible degree, is more rarely mentioned. If one does not feel strong enough for a direct military confrontation one might also prefer not to engage in direct political confrontation. Thus, polarization energy may be used and translated into a strategy of avoidance, just as it can be translated into a strategy of expansion on the other side. By refusing direct negotiation, one avoids any element of recognition, but also a possibly difficult political confrontation as well as having to parade possible disunity for the other side. However, we doubt the wisdom of this policy, among other reasons because direct negotiations could be a training school in the active coexistence that would have to follow any possible settlement agreed to by both parties.

##### 5. *Israel's territorial expansion*

Let us then turn to the territorial issue and explore the fundamental question: is Israel a territorially expansionist state? This cannot be answered merely by referring to Israel's history of expansion after military confrontations, or to selective quotation, or even to the two in conjunction. The *motives* may still have been the traditional two of ensuring *security* for the

area already settled and to get some leverage for *bargaining*. The idea of settling in the territory and holding on to it *may* have come as an afterthought. That this type of theory is improbable in the case of Jerusalem with the strong religious/national motivation does not prove that it does not hold in other cases of Israeli expansion. Cartographic expansionism does not constitute any evidence either.<sup>23</sup>

Expansion may not only whet the appetites for more expansion, but also change the meaning of expansion into real conquest. On the other hand, the security and bargaining arguments are in themselves quite sufficient to explain and reinforce expansionism; expansionism breeds on itself. Thus,

(1) *as to security*: for each expansionist step there will be more Arab resistance, and highly understandable efforts to communicate to third parties that the Israeli positions are unacceptable. Lest absence of violence be misinterpreted, some level of violence has to be administered, and also behind the lines, for the same reason. The level of violence will have to increase with the distance from the center of expansion, and also exceed the inflation effect. Hence, Israeli positions will be more insecure, the further away they are from the center – not because of the logistic distance, but because of the symbolic significance and the despair they generate. Consequently, the positions will be increasingly valid. The positions on the Eastern Bank of the Canal are insecure because there is shooting from the Western side, so by this logic the Western Bank should also be captured. Of course, this logic does not respect such borders as Suez–Jordan or even Nile–Euphrates – all four of some significance for a military technology outdated by the end of the First World War.<sup>24</sup>

(2) *as to bargaining*: for each expansionist step Israel may have good reasons to believe that Arab attitudes will harden further. If attitudes harden, the price Israel would have to pay for some type of *de facto*, or even *de jure*, recognition, might have to be higher. A higher price

in terms of conquered territory means more territory, till the point where some Arab heartland may be credibly threatened with destruction or occupation. This will increase Arab 'intransigence', partly because of the deprivation, partly because what he rightly regards as his is used for bargaining. What this means to Arab dignity does not seem to be well understood on the Israeli side. There may even be a very serious misreading at work: 'if I cannot get recognition for this much expansion, then let me try more'. But the fact that 'less' does not work, does not mean that 'more' will work. On the contrary, it will make Arabs insist even more strongly that 'first you have to give up conquered territory, then we may look into the conflict'. Israel may interpret this as intransigence and expand further, to have a still higher value to offer. Incidentally, one purpose in expanding might be to have something to offer in return for holding on to less territory than deemed necessary for security; the two reasons may operate jointly.

Thus, both arguments are self-reinforcing if believed in and pursued. The quest for security increases the need for security; the search for bargaining leverage through expansion leads to more expansion. If in addition the Arabs engage in harassment for the same reasons the cycle is complete.

Altogether we have now three *reasons* for Israeli expansion: simple conquest, security and bargaining. Reasons are not the same as *motives*; reasons are imputed from the outside (e.g. by the present author), motives are held by the actor. We are not so interested in motives since we assume that the Jewish side, like all other human groupings, have plural and mixed motives for anything they do. For people seeking understanding of this tangle from a moralist-legalist viewpoint, motives may attain tremendous significance, but we are more interested in structural reasoning. However, since the counter-productive, self-defeating nature of the security and bargaining arguments are surely known also to the Israeli side, one may ask whether these are really the only motives, unpolluted by a yearning for simple territorial

acquisition, for conquest? So let us pursue the conquest theory for a moment.

Israeli is not free to engage in expansionism at any time. She can always count on Arab resistance, but she cannot risk resistance in action by third parties. Hence, expansion must be made justifiable. To justify expansion it must be seen as an act of self-defense against aggression of a type significant third parties would abhor. This leads to two basic conditions:

(1) *The Jews must present themselves as vulnerable*, and in fact be proven vulnerable.

(2). *The Arabs must be presented as inhumanly aggressive*, and in fact be proven so.

To make these two conditions more clear, let us try to indicate what their negation would mean.

With the first condition, the negation is invulnerability, at least to *fedayeen* activity. Without claiming any expertise in this field, we should point out that Israel is small enough<sup>25</sup> to make the border virtually impenetrable by means of electro-magnetic devices, shoulder-to-shoulder border guards, mining, etc.<sup>26</sup> As to internal enemies it is hard to believe that they could not be coped with through the usual measures of a net of informers and hardening of any likely object. Pre-June 1967 history also seems to indicate that Arab direct violence almost had to come from the outside (when the outside become the inside through occupation, this would of course change). But the assumption is that long distance weapons, particularly rockets, are not used.

As to the second condition, the negation is not Arab docility, but other forms of Arab aggression. More particularly, regular battle, e.g. a symmetric tank battle in some desert area, out in the open; or non-military, direct action. The ideal Arab aggression for obtaining third party sympathy for Israel, or at least acquiescence from third parties when Israel expands 'for security reasons', is *fedayeen* night activity, directed against defenseless people, e.g. a Kibbutz girl, school-children. The least ideal aggression from an Israeli viewpoint

would possibly be all the refugees coming out of their camps surrounding Israel in, say, 1964, marching without so much as a knife into Israeli territory, exposing themselves to Israel direct violence in a gandhian manner, rather than suffering the ignominies of defeat, expulsion, dispossession, and the refugee camp.

The pattern of Israeli expansion could only work for so many years with both above conditions fulfilled. The Arabs have played their part: with no reason to acquiesce, they have certainly not engaged in non-military defense of their homeland. They have tried the conventional military way, in the three years of 1948–49, 1956 and 1967 and been remarkably, even increasingly, unsuccessful. Obviously, it has been important for the Israelis to make them unsuccessful, not only because an Arab victory by such conventional means might force the Israeli to pull back their lines, *but also because conventional Arab aggression would not lead to the same type of sympathy for the Israeli side.*<sup>27</sup> Realistically speaking, there is probably less concern in, say, the Western world for the 6,000 Jews (about 1 % of the Jewish population at that time, about 10 % of the fighting population) who died in the war of 1948, or for the 50–60 who were killed monthly in the shellings across the Canal, than for the much smaller numbers of working, kibbutz youths killed in the manner both Israel and many Arabs have taught the world to expect. To defend this 'unconventional' type of Arab aggression is to invoke the ghost of nazism and expose the defender to accusations of anti-Semitism.

The Israelis have played their part of this deadly game by making themselves vulnerable to micro-, but not to macro-attacks. *The Israelis have been able to expose themselves sufficiently to accumulate the number of small attacks and wounds necessary to justify, in their own eyes and in the eyes of many of their sympathisers, not only an attack, but successive expansion.*<sup>28</sup> The Israelis have been able to balance in a masterly way between their need for security and their need for insecurity – security in order to avoid insecurity, and insecurity as a pretext to obtain more se-

curity – by strengthening the social and expanding the territorial control.

If the Arabs had not played their part, this would not have worked. Since the Arab side has not been able to play the conventional military game successfully, one way out would have been the non-military posture. But if lack of hardware and inadequate social structure militate against the former, the Arab culture (like the Latin American, with its *machismo* emphasis) militates against the latter. Hence all the Israelis had to do was to preserve a certain measure of vulnerability.

Again, we are not concerned with motives but with reasons, so no effort will be made to show that there was an *intention* along this line. It is rather that the circumstances seem to be compatible with this type of hypothesis. One such circumstance was the refusal by Israel (Ben-Gurion) in 1956 to permit double stationing of the UN peace-keeping forces (UNEF) Many reasons were given in Israel for this, but the one we never heard is not therefore unlikely: *the idea of exposure*. If it is beyond control to avoid single stationing of a third party peace-keeping instrument, double stationing can at least be avoided, and vulnerability can be increased by avoiding too dense control grids. Posts can be far between in space, and patrols far between in time – both exactly the impression we got by looking at the Israeli side of the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) in 1966.

We should emphasize again that our theory here does not mean that we reject any one of the eleven motives given to us for refusing stationing of UN forces also on the Israeli side. They were all related to Israeli sense of territory and security, and can be listed as follows:

- (1.) Stationing on the *Israeli* side would take away space needed for settlement and cultivation, and Israel needs space.
- (2.) Stationing on the *Israeli* side would be interpreted as Israeli recognition of the ADL as final borders; and more so the more impartial the forces.
- (3.) Stationing on the *Israeli* side would infringe on the rights of Israel as a sovereign state



and pave the way for other dictates from the UN/Big Powers.

(4.) Stationing on the *Israeli* side could be interpreted as an admission of guilt; that they and not the other side have to be contained in order not to aggress.

(5.) Stationing on the *Israeli* side could be interpreted as indicating that Israel was a loser to the conflict.

(6.) Stationing on the *Israeli* side would make it more difficult to engage in a first strike defensive strategy, the strategy Israel is forced to use.

(7.) Stationing on *any or both* sides makes it more difficult to have direct contact with Egypt, and they should settle directly with us.

(8.) Stationing on *any or both* sides gives a false sense of protection: UN is not efficient enough (besides, some of the UN troops may even be hostile).

(9.) Stationing on *any or both* sides would be artificial and different from the equilibrium border arrived at in an unimpeded military confrontation.

(10.) Stationing on *both* sides would impose a symmetry on Israel and Egypt that would be false, since Egypt wants to eradicate Israel while Israel has no such wish relative to Egypt.

(11.) Stationing on *both* sides would make the whole arrangement look more permanent and might stimulate intransigence, rather than acceptance, on either side.

The arguments differ in structure. The first six are directed against stationing on the Israeli side, the next three against stationing on any or both sides, and two against double stationing as such.

Thus, the first one seems to be false. The territory between Tel Aviv and the old ADL was remarkably unsettled, and although some kibbutzim were close to or even on the line, that in itself is not a serious argument. They could have been turned into supply bases, barracks, offices, etc.

Second, willingness to station UN troops does not carry clear normative interpretation, since there are so few cases. It could just as well be interpreted as a sign of the winner's

superiority and of good conscience, as the opposite. It can be seen as a way of containing that side, *and*, as a way of protecting it.

The other arguments all have a *prima facie* validity – which is not the same as accepting them. It is hard to see that Israel would have lost much by conceding to the demand to station troops on her soil. At any rate, with double stationing Egypt could not have brushed away more than one layer of the UN buffer in June 1967.<sup>29</sup> As to the second layer, on Israeli soil, Israel might have invoked argument (8.) above. But the answer to that argument is not necessarily to reject stationing; it could also have been to strengthen the protective shield in the ways mentioned above. Since this solution was pursued, one hypothesis is that the June 1967 situation was not entirely unwelcome to the Israeli leadership: it gave a chance to unleash action planned for years.<sup>30</sup> Refusal to station UNEF on their side can be seen as *one* element in preparing for it – the other arguments serve to back it up, as well as being genuine enough in their own right.

We do not say that all of this was calculated for conquest. But it does constitute a background against which Arab fears of a singularist, expanding Israeli state do not seem unreasonable.

#### 6. *Neither peace nor war: protracted conflict*

One approach to the problem of conflict is to preserve the parties and preserve the incompatibility, but at the same time to push the incompatibility far into the background of the political agenda because the goals are no longer so relentlessly pursued. The conflict is there, in that sense it is not resolved, it is *protracted*, institutionalized, made less salient and kept static. How can this be brought about, and what does it have to do with the Middle East situation?

There are four approaches to the reduction of the salience of the original goals, *in casu* polity control. All are based on the same basic idea: give the parties some other goals, something else to keep them busy, so that they forget about the conflict or change so much that

the goals they pursue no longer are incompatible.

- (1.) *Intra-action*, i.e. the parties turn inward, to themselves, keep busy with internal problems (conflict, development).
- (2.) *More positive interaction with each other* – as in all the co-operative schemes suggested by outsiders (such as the Johnston Plan).
- (3.) *More negative interaction with each other* – in other words escalation of the conflict.
- (4.) *Interaction with someone else*, negative or positive, i.e. the parties turn outward (Israel with West and South, the Arabs with West, East and South).

One problem with all these approaches is that they have to function more or less symmetrically on the parties in conflict: both have to be distracted about equally much. If the one party turns to development projects or internal tension and the other to consolidated pursuit of his conflict goal, the conflict will certainly not recede into the background. And if the conflict is already sufficiently salient, any deliberately initiated attempt by either party, or by third parties, to draw attention away from the original conflict will be seen as exactly that, particularly by the losing party. Since the Jews are in possession of what both parties covet, control over a certain policy, there is no doubt as to who is the 'losing party', i.e. as to who will be more suspicious, and for good reasons.

Approach (3) is of a different type: if you have a conflict, the disputed goal can recede into the background if you substitute for it an even larger goal. If I snatch your purse today and tomorrow set fire to your house, chances are that recovering of the house will loom larger than the purse.

In order to pursue this approach one always has to escalate. One approach would be to expand the original goal, the polity control. This can be done along both dimensions, social as well as territorial. The social approach would mean a transition towards an increasingly pure, singularist state, the territorial ap-

proach would mean expansion. In either case one possible consequence would be *change in the point of reference*. Relative to the Israel of 1949, the Israel envisaged in November 1947 may look more acceptable; relative to Israeli advanced lines of November 1956, 1949 Israel looks more acceptable; and relative to the Israel of 1967, the 1956 version again may look more acceptable. This is not the same as (territorial or social) expansion for *bargaining*. Under bargaining there is the original conflict all the time, only that one of the parties believes he gets into a position where he can get more because he has more to offer. Under protraction tactic (3.) the *original* conflict goals are somehow forgotten or permitted to recede into the background as parties get concerned with solutions to the *new* conflict. The net result may be the same, but the processes involved are different.

We have already mentioned that this tactic does not seem to have been entirely unsuccessful; the pre-June 1967 borders to some extent seem to have become the point of reference for the dominant actors on the Arab side. But the tactic cannot continue along the territorial axis, since the Israelis are now almost at Arab heartland, the Egyptian Delta. It can be continued along the social axis, however, and this seems to be exactly what is being done: drives towards a more pure singularism by evicting Arab nationals. If that continues, even June 1967 may look more attractive.

In the climate produced by pursuing this territorial and social zero sum-game for more than 50 years, all talk about a positive sum game between the contestants sounds ludicrous, except as a part of an image of the future. Only persons with deep-rooted disrespect for either or both parties and their conflict can put forward co-operative schemes as serious proposals for implementation today. And interaction with other parties will hardly be symmetrical enough to serve the purpose. Not even a real world catastrophe, a massive flood /earthquake, or a superpower nuclear confrontation will make the most deeply involved contestants forget the conflict and try to benefit from the new situation, if for no other reason

in order to prevent the other party from doing so. Hence approaches (2), (3), and (4) all seem impossible.

But is there something to be expected from internal change in the parties that may affect the conflict? As a point of departure let us take Israeli military superiority. That the confrontation involves two million or so Jews pitted against one hundred million Arabs, however, correct arithmetically, is clearly misleading. The *mobilization* factor, in the military and, more significantly, in the political and psychological sense, differs so conspicuously that this numerical comparison becomes meaningless. Intra-Arab dissent – horizontally between states, and vertically between classes and generations, not to mention the low level of living of the larger proportions of the Arab populations—all these contribute to low mobilization rates. Indeed, the militarily effective population of the joint Arab nation may be lower than the militarily effective population of Israel. Thus, Israel would have a vested interest in continued Arab dissent, in a prolongation of the underutilization of the working classes and the young, and of the low level of living of the Arab masses. Israel, and the layers in Arab societies afraid of basic social change that may lead to a more horizontal society and the commando-guerilla type of fighting that Israel and Fatah to some extent have in common, therefore have some common interests. Israel's real weapon is not only military hardware, but a social structure that mobilizes and liberates creative energy; hence the adequate response is not primarily in terms of different or better hardware, but in terms of *social structure*. This, needless to say, takes more time to develop than the purely technical adaptation to military hardware.

Israel is fairly unified and consequently able to mobilize;<sup>31</sup> the others are often in conflict, while Egypt seems still to have a social and military structure with the pasha-fallahin distance preserved.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, Egypt's position in the Arab world is so dominant<sup>33</sup> that it is hard to believe resentment will not start building up and take action forms – particularly if Egypt is unable to make decisive moves in this

conflict. But although all this means that the Arab side, more than the Israeli side, will lose a lot of energy in internal friction, it probably also means that *changes over time will increase the mobilization ratio in favor of the Arab side*. Even if we assume that Israel is able to maintain its high mobilization level through sophisticated crisis management, accumulated changes in the Arab world will probably be towards increasing mobilization. And this is *a fortiori* true with increasing development level which will increase the standard of living at the bottom of society, as well as lead to higher levels of political consciousness through education. Our general conclusion is that time, and hence protracted conflict, is working in favor of the Arabs, because they become stronger, not because Israel becomes weaker. Israel may be split by class conflict, generation conflict and the conflict between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews – but for the foreseeable future it is hard to believe that they will not be united in front of the Arabs.

#### *7. Conflict resolution and the quest for peace*

Having explored some possibilities for protracted conflict and found them wanting, we now return to the twin problems of conflict resolution and peace, as absolute necessities. We take peace in the Middle East to mean the *absence of direct violence* (war, destructive interaction) and *absence of structural violence* (domination, exploitative interaction). Obviously, this is a much broader condition than the absence of these two forms of violence between Israel and the Arabs – there can be both kinds of violence within and between the Arab states and within Israel. But we shall continue in the tradition of limiting the discussion to the special case of Israeli-Arab violence. The Marxist insistence that the real conflict is between proletariat and capitalists, not between Arabs and Jews, may be a good theory, but it is hardly a good model of Middle East reality.

In general terms, *peace* can be built in two ways: *dissociatively*, by keeping the parties apart in *zero* or *minimum* interaction; and Before taking a closer look at these, we should

associatively, by keeping them together in positive interaction. In either case negative interaction, or exchange of destruction, is avoided.

Thus, we get the four classes of possibilities shown in Table II below.

Table II. Approaches to peace

	against direct violence (war or threat of war)	against structural violence (domination or threat of domination)
dissociative methods	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. natural distance, impediments artificial fences</li> <li>2. social social distance, balance of power, third parties,</li> </ol>	cutting loose, breating ties
associative methods	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. symbiosis</li> <li>2. equity</li> <li>3. broad scope</li> <li>4. large domain</li> <li>5. super-structure</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. horizontal interaction</li> <li>2. no attempts to divide</li> </ol>

notice that none presupposes conflict resolution. On the contrary, precisely because the conflict so far has not been capable of resolution, it may be tempting at least to try to protect peace by dissociative or associative means. What comes first, peace-making (conflict resolution), peace-keeping (dissociation) or peace-building (association) is very much a chicken-egg problem<sup>34</sup> and cannot be stipulated in any general form. It is a triangular relation that can be turned into a vicious or a virtuous circle, as in Fig. 4.




Fig. 4. Conflict resolution and quest for peace

We have indicated above that the chances of conflict resolution are neither good, nor negligible. But conflict resolution as such is not sufficient.

The goals, the actors, the incompatibility – everything is taken out of the past. To support a solution, a structure is needed – no serious researcher would believe today that a codification of the solution in the form of a treaty properly negotiated, signed and ratified constitutes a lasting solution. The solution has to be protected – the dissociative approach – and if possible reinforced – the associative approach. Of course, the best would have been to have an accepted solution and then try to protect and/or reinforce it. But when a mutually accepted solution is missing, let us imagine that a solution has been found and ask: how could it be protected and/or reinforced? More basically, instead of deriving the protection and reinforcement mechanisms from the solution, could we try the other way round and get some ideas about solutions from the mechanisms?

Let us start with dissociation. Since parties generally can be kept apart in two ways – by geography (nature) or by social forces – there is a limited spectrum of possibilities.

Does geography yield a basis at all for separation? We have argued our doubts above.

Geography has its small discontinuities that can be made use of to defend *either* side against expansion or attacks by the other side. But they are of little more than symbolical significance. To deprive a party of a geographically advantageous position, e.g. for shelling, is to stimulate its inventiveness in creating some other military technology. Moreover, these small discontinuities – a river, some heights, a desert – all involve so much Israeli expansion as to make them more than unacceptable. Thus, if Israel really felt that there were a natural, defensible, border between British Mandated Palestine and the Canal, e.g. along some line from El Arish to Sharm-el-Sheikh – why did she not stop there in 1967? Maybe because success led to overshooting, maybe also in order to have some extra territory for bargaining as pointed out above, maybe out of pure expansionism. In any case, geography can only be used as an auxiliary, together with other forces, to institutionalize dissociation. Geography has to be aided, and one possibility is some kind of artificial Wall.

That brings us to all the other methods of dissociation. The utilization of *human psychology* for social distance could hardly be more complete, although it does not (yet) extend from all Arabs to all Jews or vice versa – in that case there would be no Jews left in Arab lands nor Arabs in Israel. *Balance of power* strategies are used, with the usual consequences in terms of an arms race, which, predictably, could only be possible with Big Power participation. In this race, the big powers are partly pitted against each other in a struggle for influence in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the world at large, partly cooperating in playing a balance of power game, supplying the military components the parties cannot supply themselves. To what extent the big powers are involved with and against their will is a metaphysical problem; the basic fact is that they cannot withdraw once they are in.<sup>35</sup> 'To be in' and to be 'big power' are two sides of the same coin. Their cooperation is indispensable for dissociative strategies, which again are needed as long as there is no conflict resolution, nor any use of associative

strategies. Neither singly nor jointly can they withdraw; jointly they may, possibly, impose some mechanisms of dissociation, but not resolution or association.

The only element missing in this picture is the introduction of a peace-keeping force, backed up and manned by the UN, the big powers and/or the superpowers.<sup>36</sup> The difficulty with this element, as with the defensible border and The Wall, is where it should be stationed since that could only be along an agreed-upon border-line. Either side could possibly tolerate foreign forces on either side of any border, but only if the forces were clearly partial. If they are clearly impartial the border to be protected also gets a stamp as 'impartial' and thus somehow agreed upon, But if the borderline is somehow agreed upon, *then a considerable step towards conflict resolution would already have been taken, and the need for real institutionalized dissociation would appear to be less.* This is the dilemma of any peace-keeping operation: to work really well it should be agreed upon by both parties, be perfectly symmetrical, serve as a link of communication between them, and so on. If all conditions are summed up, they amount to relations between the parties of such a kind that enforced dissociation would seem less necessary.

This reasoning may be too theoretically clear-cut. A border-line may be drawn that is less satisfactory to the Arab side than to the Israeli; a peace-keeping force may be introduced that is less satisfactory to the Israeli side than the Arab, and the two elements may somehow cancel each other. In short, dissociation hedged around by a combination of attitudinal and behavioral polarization, balance of power, some utilization of geography and technology, and then a third party PKF element stationed on both sides.<sup>37</sup> Imagine this has all been done: what would then happen?

It is difficult to imagine that this would be 'peace in our time', more than in the sense of the ill-fated Munich agreement, if there is not also conflict resolution for the major polity issue as well as the derived issues. As a minimum there would have to be Israeli withdraw-

al to pre-June borders. An agreement signed by the present power-holders in some Arab states would hardly be seen as binding on future power-holders, who may become power-holders for exactly that reason. Would Fatah accept? Hardly, and Fatah's revolutionary concept of social and military structure may easily become what the future generation in the Arab countries is looking forward to. One reason for this is precisely that since there is, at present, no Palestine state, Fatah can more easily take on the trans-national shape that would be an implementation of ideals of pan-Arabism very different from the League of Arab States. But even if this transnational integration should not develop much further, it is difficult to assume that *inter-* and *supra-*national Arab integration would not develop further, all the time being crystallized by a singularist, sizeable Israel in its midst, protected by dissociation. Both sides would have more than enough evidence from past history to presume that the other side is at least increasing the arms level, and there is no evidence from recent history that arms races can be effectively controlled. Moreover, the most important part of the arms race on the Arab side, some social reconstruction inside the states and some integration between them, are political processes that no outside forces can, should, or will stop – and since they alone will cause Israeli fears that will be translated into more hardware, the Arab side will also want more hardware. The only remaining assumption, that the two parties will put up more resources for such purposes than third parties will be willing to mobilize for a buffer between them, also seems intuitively obvious.

What about the coupling of the major actors to the super-powers and the possibility that an Arab-Israeli confrontation might develop into a super-power war, often referred to as a 'World War' in the tradition of white ethnocentrism? This theory is useful as an effort to persuade third parties to put pressure on the other party. Israelis as well as Palestinians use the world population as a hostage: 'if we go down, we shall all go down together'. But the theory does not carry much conviction. We

can easily imagine that the US would guarantee at least Tel Aviv, and the Soviet Union at least Cairo – in other words that either party would guarantee the heartland of their protégés. But the US would scarcely accompany the Israelis into Arab heartland, nor would the Soviet Union accompany the Arabs into Israeli heartland; and in-between (essentially Sinai) the two super-powers are more likely to let the parties fight it out than get directly involved themselves – just as they have done so far.

Hence, there would be no direct confrontation between the super-powers. The only exception would be if there were a super-power PKF somewhere between the two heartlands; an idea that is sometimes mentioned. But is it likely that the super-powers or their allies would agree to this, given the amount of tension between them and the proven volatility of the whole situation in the Middle East? And even if they do agree, ought they to agree? Would that not be just one more way of reinforcing the super-power domination, this time even clearly outside their major domain, the East-West conflict, and an unfortunate reversal of the trend towards non-alignment and detachment of the East-West system from the rest of the world?

But even if the coupling to the super-powers does not imply, by necessity, a threat to others than the parties themselves, there is another consequence of continued dissociative policy in the Middle East that has received far too little attention. The British are also basically responsible for another ethnic 'island' left behind, and with considerable similarity to Israel: *Rhodesia*. Just as Israel serves as a crystallizer of the Arab cause and Arab military integration, Rhodesia has a similar function further south. Of course, there is also South Africa – but Rhodesia came right after independence for many African states, just as Israel came right after independence for many Arab states – and had some of the same psychological effect. The background was also similar: foreigners who bought themselves into foreign land, and then converted economic superiority into political power. The dissimilarities are too

obvious to be pointed out, and uninteresting in this connection.

Even though the Arabs would hardly fight against the Rhodesians, nor the Black Africans against the Israelis, the problem nevertheless arises: what would happen if the two joint military commands (Arab and Black African) were pitted against each other over, say, the South Sudan issue – or any other issue due to the mutual interpenetration of Arab and Black African elements in a broad belt from West to East in Africa? Imagine it would take ten to twenty years to bring these military organizations into full operative capacity – what if that is also the period needed to bring all those latent and manifest conflicts to fruition? Great responsibilities rest on the shoulders of the British who managed to leave behind such problems, for neither the Arabs, nor the Black Africans can be blamed for reacting to such stimuli with such typical Western means as modern hardware and improved social organization – particularly since both hardware and organization are compatible with what is usually termed ‘development’ anyway.

Finally, why should the dissociative peace approach be turned down because it may lead to undesirable results for *others*, such as the parties to the East–West conflict or the parties to a possible future conflict on African territory? Are not the disastrous consequences of a real confrontation between the two parties bad enough? And do these consequences necessarily have to be counted in battle deaths? Could they not also be counted in all kinds of negative results stemming from the type of structural violence dissociative strategies always lead to: artificially low contact, pent-up energies, refugees, captial used for destructive purposes, and so on. Of course, this would all be different if the dissociative techniques were used for the purpose of institutionalizing conflict resolution, not only for institutionalizing separation. And here the points is that with a solution according to the entire Arab side there would be no need for dissociation (since ‘Israel’ would then have to be a pluralistic state, in full contact with the Arab world), whereas a solution according to the Israeli side

(singularist) would be in constant need for enforced dissociation, and the arms race would continue . . .

All this does not mean that dissociation may never lead to conflict resolution. It may lead to a state of affairs where one of the parties, suddenly or slowly, gives up its goal. Dissociation is fatiguing, it is a cold war of attrition. It imposes upon either party a state of crisis, which may be institutionalized and become a habit. New generations *may* come up to whom this state of crisis may look like an extremely bad or at least meaningless habit. Israel has probably gambled on this, and when it did not happen with the refugees, Egypt and other states are blamed for ‘exploiting the refugees politically’ and exposing them to propaganda. The Arab side may entertain similar hopes in connection with the younger generation in Israel, Israeli workers and particularly the Oriental Jews,<sup>38</sup> and are probably equally unrealistic. In a confrontation with the Arabs, they will rally together. Either side will tend to underestimate that the other side feels it fights not only out of self-righteousness, but also out a need for self-preservation; and this feeling, once institutionalized, is very contagious.

But all this is very speculative indeed. Most likely is that dissociation would not be converted into any conflict resolution at all, but simply lead to new manifestations of conflict, and to added conflict material not only between the original parties, but in any system to which day might be coupled. Hence, let us turn our attention to the third corner of the triangle in Fig. 4, the possibilities of some type of *associative* strategy.

Association means interaction, but for interaction to be peace-productive and peace-preserving it has to follow some principles. It should make the parties interdependent, but *sybiosis* is not enough, there has also to be *equity* or *symmetry*, so that the relation does not build now conflicts into the structure from the very beginning. There would be structural violence if the two parties were to relate to each other in the traditional way, with Israel as the center of a vertical division of labor,

supplying technology and manufactured goods to a divided Arab World which in turn would supply raw materials, agricultural products, unskilled labor, and consumers of manufactured goods.

Interdependence would translate into a high level of intraregional trade and equity into a horizontal division of labor, with agricultural products *and* manufactured goods in both directions, across the borders of Israel. Clearly, this would only be possible if there were an incentive to do so. The incentive would not necessarily be economic (as it normally is when countries trade according to some principle of comparative advantage); it could also be normative, because the parties believe in this type of exchange and carry it on with the hope that it may stimulate more peaceful relations.<sup>39</sup> This puts the problem clearly enough: with the development gap that exists, horizontal trade would be artificial and could only be brought about by a normative commitment that does not exist; whereas vertical trade would be 'economic' but in all likelihood add to the conflict material that is already more than high enough.

To this we should be added some of the other principles of association, such as *broad scope* of the exchange (over a wide spectrum, not only involving economic cooperation, so as to facilitate deals when conflicts arise), *large domain* of the exchange (it should involve more than two parties, so as to permit multilateral solutions if conflicts should arise), and various others. Finally, whereas two parties do not need a supra-national organization to stay away from each other, they need it when they come close: something like a Middle-East Community (not 'common market', that is too one-sidedly commercial) would be needed, possibly a UN Economic Commission for the Middle East.

If there is some advantage in having more than two parties the Arab side could not be one solidified unit, but would have to permit disunity to appear. This might stimulate Arab fears of divisive tactics on the Israeli side, and hence be counterproductive. But there is one possible solution to that problem: to bring in

more actors from the outside. Thus, the partners to a possible associative strategy should not be only Israel and the Arab states, but also bordering countries (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Libya)<sup>40</sup>. It should also, indeed, be remembered that in such a setting Israel would have a legitimate demand for cooperation partners with whom she would not have a shared history of intense conflict.

The five principles of symbiosis, equity, scope, domain and supra-national institution-building are certainly not impossible to fulfill if the will to fulfill them exists, but it is easier – it seems – the higher the level of development of the parties (as, for instance, between the Nordic countries and between the members of the European Community).

It is not so easy to imagine a singularist Israel as a party to the type of associative peace-making described here. It could only work with an Israel willing to focus on the Middle-East and engage in horizontal division of labor, and that means importing processed goods, culture, from their Arab neighbors. This means stepping down from real and imagined position of superiority – much as Western Europe will have to do if they one day would like to take steps to establish a firm, *all-European* peace system. In short, it is not only a question of what kind of Israel might be accepted by the Arabs, or of what kind of Israel would be compatible with a stable institutionalization of dissociative policy. It is also a question of what kind of Israel could ever become a party to a meaningful associative peace strategy in the region. *A pluralistic Israel could, and this seems to indicate that the associative peace mechanism presupposes a pluralist solution;* just as the dissociative mechanism presupposes a singularist solution.

All the reasoning about dissociative and associative mechanisms can now be repeated inside a pluralist solution. If it should be at the lowest level of entropy, a federation of two singularist nation-states, then everything already said seems applicable again. If this (con) federation should be internally protected by dissociation, then how should the borders be



protected? What kind of state would that be? Is there any reason to believe that it would be easier than the shielding of the borders of a singularist Israel, since these would also be borders between two singularist states? Any kind of two-state solution would make neighbors out of those who have most reason to hate and fear each other. And if it should be associative, where would that indispensable minimum of positive psychological sentiment come from? Again, is there any reason to believe that it would be easier than associative relations between a singularist Israel today and Arab states? We see no such reasons; as in the Chinese boxes, the properties at one level are transferred to the level below. This, however,

does not necessarily apply to the canton solution: there would be more units; and they would more obviously have to be interdependent and yet kept apart. And it does not apply to the one state solution either, but in that case individuals with a history of hatred and shared violence may come too close to each other.

Thus: neither the dissociative, nor the associative approach to peace can be used mechanically. Both presuppose certain elements of conflict resolution. And where this is concerned our analysis now seems to yield two possibilities, both extremely problematic – but not absolutely impossible. They can be spelt out as in Table III:

Table III. *Two possible solutions to the Middle East conflict*

	<i>Alternative I</i>	<i>Alternative II</i>
<i>Social control</i>	Singularist Israel, mixed population	Pluralist Israel-Palestine canton version
<i>Territorial control</i>	Not exceeding pre-June, except for very minor revisions	Anywhere from 1922 to 1917 version of British Mandated Palestine, or to post-June lines
<i>Palestinians</i>	Given choice between resettlement and compensation	Invited to join and settle where they want. Jews would be first class citizens in Jewish cantons, Palestinians in Palestinian cantons
<i>International status</i>	Recognized by Arab states, completely sovereign; guaranteed borders	Recognized by all, possibly not given status as a UN member to start with, non-aligned; guaranteed borders
<i>Protective mechanism</i>	Dissociative, with all methods	Associative, as spelt out, both within the new state and between the new state and the environment
<i>Derived issues; Suez Canal, Tiran Straits</i>	Open for all, easily solved in this context	Open for all, easily solved in this context

We have already mentioned that we do not think Alternative I is a lasting solution, since no dissociative mechanism will be strong enough if the solution to the Palestinian prob-

lem, the traditional formula, is not acceptable to the majority of the Palestinians, particularly the young generation. In that case, it should *at most be seen as a transition formula*, binding

for the parties for a certain number of years, then to be renegotiated with a view to Alternative II, which, in our view, would be a far better solution. And Alternative II should, in turn, be seen not as a permanent solution, but as a possible step towards an Alternative III: a completely pluralistic one-state solution; an 'Istina' (Israel-Palestine). But that is for the future. Today mutual repulsion would lead to a two-state formula like a radio-active element with very short half-time.

For this reason it is important the Alternative I, the singularist solution, ends up with a not-too-unbalanced population ratio – for under any version of Alternative II it would have to be balanced lest one party live in constant fear of the other. Further, a singularist Israel should not be permitted to retain territory conquered in June 1967 for the precedent that would set. Finally, the total battery of dissociative techniques should be employed to guarantee peace in the region – with a view to building associative ties as soon as possible. The latter should also be done in an effort to see whether Alternative I might possibly stick, so that the extremely difficult transition to Alternative II should not be necessary. In other words, transitions to new forms should not be automatically guaranteed: the guarantee should be that they would come up as options.

Alternative II it has one element usually not found in such plans: *the possibility of extended territory*. We feel that any of the three pluralist solution presupposes *space*. For instance the cantons should be more like islands in a desert no-man's land to start with. For this much space may be required, and it would be in the interest of all neighbors to contribute to it. As with Alternative I the borders would have to be guaranteed, but we would not invest much hope in that formula. A state of this kind would need resources, and its inhabitants and leadership should not feel too cramped. They should participate maximally in the extended, egalitarian Middle East mentioned above; and all the techniques developed by the highly gifted Israel the world has seen would be used in a regional context, but in a sym-

metrical way. Egyptian industrial goods, among others, would also find their way into this state, technical assistance would be mutual, not one-way, and so on.

Let us then go more into detail concerning the extension of the territory. We have found it fruitful to ask what extension that concept should have *first*; and then ask how it could be divided between Jews and Arabs, and with what degree of separation. It gives us a freer hand for speculation, useful in this deadlocked situation – and instead of being mesmerized by the lines defined by Israel's expansion and by strategic considerations that belong to Alternative I thinking.

One of present Israel's neighbors is in a peculiar position in this connection, *Jordan*. First, it was a part of the British 1921 original mandate Palestine – and not less 'Palestine' than the better known Western part – but the Mandate was split in 1922 by Churchill to placate Emir Abdullah. Second, in this country 80 % Palestinians are ruled over by a smaller group of Hashemite Bedouins. Third, the regime, although militarily strong, is politically and economically so weak that it cannot last long – unless artificially propped up by the US and UK, perhaps also by Israel – it is cut off from Mediterranean ports, an error any future plan will have to remedy.

Hence, one candidate for the Israel-Palestine area is the *original* British Mandate, which gives much more scope for viable states to be developed. This can only come about after a revolt or a war against the Hashemite Kingdom; and how Syria, Iraq and Saudi-Arabia (the other three neighbors) would act is difficult to predict. That they once more *might* like to have one part each is obvious; whether they would prefer this to inheriting Hussein's problem in addition to his country (ruling over increasingly conscious and capable Palestinians) is another matter.

Imagine, then, that the *original Mandate* were available – not only the Western part, which most speculations center on with the unrealistic idea of forging a Palestinian state out of Gaza and the West Bank. Should one, then, just work for a federation with every-

thing West of Jordan to Israel, and East of Jordan to the Palestinians, and then invite all Palestinians, refugees and Israeli Arabs and others to settle in Jordan and look to Amman as their capital?

A solution of this kind might be highly acceptable to Israel, and well worth giving up Sinai. But it does not touch the problem that *Palestinians also have rights in Western Palestine*.<sup>41</sup> It would actually be tantamount to Israel's solving her own problem at Jordan's expense by moving herself in on the West and pushing back all Palestinians to the east of Jordan. The result is predictable: after a short 'peace', phases of cold and hot war between Israel and the new Palestine.<sup>42</sup>

But this is precisely where the canton solution enters. The canton is in itself singularist; it is Jewish or Arab because both have the right to live in their own context. Since there are divisions among the Jews and among the Arabs, and since there may be more than two of them this gives room for several types of singularism within the broad categories 'Jewish' (for instance an orthodox canton) and 'Arab'. Further, there can be Arab cantons within today's, and also within pre-June Israel – that is a *sine qua non*. But this formula is much more flexible than the various partition formulas with or without a federation – which also have the additional drawback that they have once been proved not to work. But Jerusalem as a capital and possibly as a federal territory would be a part of this plan too, as of so many others.

Would the Jews, then, be permitted a canton or two east of Jordan? Possibly some time in the future, if a history of successful harmony and co-existence overshadows the present history of hatred and violence and fundamental conflict. Today this would only be interpreted to mean that the net result is a Jewish move eastward, towards Euphrates.

Would Jews be permitted to live as second-class citizens in Arab cantons, just as Arabs today are second-class citizens in Israel? This would have to be a fundamental principle, otherwise the net result would be too close to the two-states solution. One could imagine

many formulas here with a special view to protecting Arabs against Jewish penetration into their economic life. Thus, citizenship would only be granted to Jews in Jewish cantons and to Arabs in Arab cantons; and although there would be only one state in the total area, they might very well refer to themselves as Israelis and Palestinians, respectively. Each canton would elect representatives to organs of the pluralist state, with some rules about consensus for blocking attempts by one group to dominate the other. Needless to say, Jewish cantons would cooperate and coordinate, and so would Arab cantons, and this would be perfectly in order. These associations of cantons might very well be referred to as Israel and Palestine respectively – but they would not be states in the sense of being international actors.

Travel for all inside the total area would be a basic right, the right to live in the cantons of the other nation likewise. The right to work, conduct business, etc. should be highly circumscribed to start with, but the rules could be relaxed as time went on. There would have to be interaction of very many kinds between cantons of different nationality, but carried out in such a way that the principles of associative peace are respected. It has to be both symbiotic and based on equity, and the task of the state would be to see to it that the rules of the associative game are respected – everything would hinge on that.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, this new state would have to associate herself closely with her surroundings, and practice associative peace without, as well as within. And this would mean, among other things, a mentality change in Israel. A strong impression the present author obtained, at least from intellectuals in Israel, was how uninterested they were in the Middle East. It is understandable that a generation of hostilities has this effect, but the total absence of any curiosity or interest in Arab culture, and the tendency to see Jerusalem and Tel Aviv as extensions of such Western centers as New York and London was the dominant feature.

To conclude: we are led to the conclusion that *the choice is between a territorially limited,*

*singularist Israel protected by dissociative means and a territorially much more extended pluralist Israel–Palestine according to the canton model, tied to each other and the neighbors with associative means.* The former is more likely, given the views of the dominant actors, and might gradually be associated with the region, or the issue may be reopened with a view to develop the second alternative.

#### 8. Conclusion: some demands on the actors

We have tried to give some reasons why we, like others, feel that a solution is urgently needed, and have tried to spell out a long-term formula with phases. This formula places short-term demands on the parties, and they should be articulated. One set of suggestions would be as follows.

*The dominant actor on the Israel side should:*

- (1.) Play down, even give up, the claims to legitimacy and adopt a more realistic view of how Israel came into being.
- (2.) Play down, even give up, any vision of a future role for Israel in the Middle East based on vertical division of labor and efforts to divide Arab states.
- (3.) Try to develop visions of more egalitarian relations with Arab states, including respect for cultural and other achievements.
- (4.) Give up the 'secure and defensible border' idea, and retreat to pre-June lines, in exchange for the other side's promise of *de facto* recognition of a singularist Israeli state.
- (5.) Make a plan for how funds saved through reduced armament could make a fair deal for the refugees a reality.
- (6.) As to dissociation: permit double stationing of a peace-keeping force, and technical aids, also in order to deny the Arab side the argument of security.

On purpose, we have not referred to Security Council Resolutions nos. 242 and 941 since we prefer to derive these items from conflict theory, not from resolutions. Correspondingly,

*The dominant actors on the Arab side should:*

- (1.) Try to adopt generally a more future-oriented position since the solution lies in the future, not in reversing history to the past.
- (2.) Show willingness to enter into direct negotiations immediately, if for no other reasons to repeat the proposal made and to train for further negotiation. The definition for what constitutes the 'Arab side' is for Arabs to decide.
- (3.) Develop concrete images of an associative future, also with a singularist Israeli state on the assumption that it would be willing.
- (4.) Go in for a strong dissociative solution to start with, also to deny Israel the argument of security.
- (5.) Be prepared to extend *de facto* recognition to a singularist Israel, and do not eliminate completely the possibility of *de jure* recognition.
- (6.) Think in term of how territory could be made available to a pluralistic Israel–Palestine to make it more viable.

At this point, then, we stop. We have now carried the exploration so far into the future that it has become pure prescription, no longer tied to the empirical world. We think there are good reasons for these prescriptions, that they are tied to a theory which in turn reflects both the past and what could be a viable future. But this conflict is remarkably dynamic and develops every day, constantly evolving with new features. And what those features will be tomorrow we do not know – only that we join in the hope that a peace with justice may be found.<sup>44</sup>

#### NOTES

\*This study is based more on theory than on data. The author claims no expertise in 'Middle East affairs', as this web of human tragedy is sometimes euphemistically referred to. A study tour to Israel in 1966 and several trips to Arab states (Egypt in 1961, 1966, 1969, Gaza in 1964,

Syria-Jordan-Iraq in 1969, to Egypt again in 1971 as Visiting Professor at Cairo University, with side-trips to Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan) provided much important material, and above all invaluable discussions. But this article is based on a strong feeling that the basic facts are few and well known, the basic principles for evaluating them likewise, and that the rest is a question of ceaseless efforts spent on search and research — for a possible future. I am deeply indebted to friends and colleagues on either side, well aware that many of them would disagree with much, even with most. I am particularly grateful for discussions with Hany Hilmy of Cairo, and Joseph Abileah of Haifa, during their stay at PRIO, and to Daniel Heradstveit, Oslo. Needless to say, the responsibility for the conclusions drawn is entirely my own. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Prime Minister's Office and other government offices in Jerusalem for the helpfulness extended during my 1966 visit — particularly in connection with the field-trips to ADL and to Nazareth; and to the Ministry of Information and other government offices in Cairo for helpfulness extended during my 1971 stay. This article can be identified as PRIO-publication no. 1—19 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

1. The present author is deeply convinced that most of the dynamics of the Arab-Israel conflict will be in the hands of the participants, not of outsiders, Big Powers, or e.g. social scientists. What outside intellectuals can do is mainly to reflect on what has been or what is: they have to become participants in the on-going process if they are to contribute to shaping what will be. For a thoughtful review of recent literature on the conflict, see Ben-Dak, J.D. 1970: *Time for reorientation: a review of recent research on the Arab-Israel conflict*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, pp. 101-112.

Another approach to using social science creatively is headed by Joseph D. Ben-Dak at the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan. (See Ben-Dak, J.D. 1970: A social simulation strategy for researching the Arab-Israel conflict. Social science is much more used by Israelis than by Arabs; whether this reveals something about the parties, or about social science.

2. As an example of how a sense of uniqueness can be expressed, take the following 1944 quote from Martin Buber: 'It (Zion) is not simply a special case among the national concepts and national movements: the exceptional quality that is here added to the universal makes it a unique category extending far beyond the frontier of national problems and touching the domain of the universally human, the cosmic, and even of Being itself.' And 'Just as, to achieve fullness of life,

the people needed the land, so the land needed the people, and the end which both were called upon to realize could only be reached by a living partnership.' From *Ner* (monthly of the Ihud movement, Jerusalem) 1965, no. 9-10, p. III.

3. Tamarin, G.R., in The influence of ethnic and religious prejudice on moral judgment, *New Outlook* vol. 5, pp. 49-58, reports on one of many studies which form part of his *The Israeli dilemma — ghetto state or free society*. Tamarin presented various types of school-pupils with the Biblical story of Joshua: '... the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they took the city. And they utterly destroyed all that was in the city (Jericho), both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword.' As Tamarin says, 'Joshua's genocide is not the only one of its type in the Bible. We selected this particular example because of the special position the Book of Joshua has in the educational system, both as national history and as one of the cornerstones of a modern national mythology, with its notions like "the generation of the desert", etc.' A corresponding story about the Chinese General Lin 'who founded the Chinese Kingdom 3000 years ago' was also given, and the pupils were then asked to judge whether Joshua/Lin acted rightly or wrongly. The results were as follows:

	appro- val	in- between	dis- appro- val
General Lin's genocide	7%	18	75
Joshua's genocide	60%	20	20

'These results demonstrated most conclusively the influence of *ethnocentrism* on moral judgment', and represent 'a severe indictment against our educational system... as a tool for education towards intolerance, chauvinism and prejudice'. This becomes particularly clear when reading the reasons given by the pupils who approved of Joshua's action.

Similar data could possibly be collected from the Arab side, and would have been compatible with the image of the Arabs most frequently found in the West. Tamarin's data serve to balance this, by showing how the Bible can, to Israeli children, serve as a source of justification for acts of mass killing — for instance of the Deir Yassin type. It should be noted that this is not the same as saying that those who participate in such acts would themselves, necessarily, rank high on a possible Tamarin index, but the acts would pass uncensored because of their compatibility with such attitudes.

4. Dr. Gabriel A. David expresses this succinctly when he says that both Jews and Arabs have as their goal 'to be a free people in the land of our fathers... the difference between us and them is that they refer to their real fathers — their fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers etc., an unbroken chain of generations, whereas our "fathers" were here only thousands of years ago.' (David, G. A. Tel Aviv 1970: True peace will be established by peoples and not by governments).

5. For an eloquent expression of a view relatively similar to our own, see Amin, S.M. 1967: Israel's victory, *International Herald Tribune*, 22 August: '... Western nations are finding an outlet for their own great moral guilt for anti-Semitism by making the Arabs pay for it'. Amin also points out that Western newspapers tend to glorify Israel's victory in the June war to the point of using it as a justification for the State of Israel — perhaps in addition to the three elements we have mentioned.

6. As Arnold Toynbee puts it, in a UPI interview of 16 June 1967: the Jews 'should have been given German territory (e.g. the Rhineland), not Arab territory, as the site for a Jewish state'. They had no right 'to seize by military force the territory that has now become the State of Israel, and to turn its Arab inhabitants into either second-class citizens of Israel or into refugees whom the Israelis are depriving of their homes and their property'.

7. Components of the Arab attitude are summarized in a study, Newnham, J.D. 1967: Arab-Israeli relations: a pilot study of international attitudes (Second IPRA conference, Tällberg, Sweden). The Arabs see Israel as a bastion of Western influence in the area, prompted by the strategic interests of the Western powers. Israel is a continuation of the Western influence in the area with other means, using a Western elite (Ashkenazi Jews) who rule over an oriental majority (Sephardic Jews) — 'a pattern that Arabs are familiar with'. Further, there is the idea that Israel is expansionist, and that the refugee question is their creation. All this is then countered by the corresponding Israeli attitudes: the need for Jewish self-emancipation, the need for recognition of the state of Israel as a prerequisite for a settlement to the conflict, and a perception of the refugee question as being a creation of the Arab leaders.

8. See, for instance, Nutting, A., 1965, *The Arabs* Mentor, New York, pp. 316 and 320.

9. One example of a formulation taken from *The Militant*, October 1970: 'We are fighting today to create the new Palestine of tomorrow; a progressive, democratic and non-sectarian Palestine in which Christian, Moslem and Jew will worship, live peacefully and enjoy equal rights'. It is hardly necessary to point out that paper

formulation is one thing, practice another — but the formulation is clear.

Another statement of the Fatah views: '... we accept the Jews as citizens on an equal footing with the Arabs in everything. The meaning of the democratic Palestinian state is clear: it will liquidate only the racial Zionist presence inside Palestine. ... Fatah guarantees the right to every Jew who not only works against Zionism but has also purified himself of all Zionist thinking so that he has become convinced that Zionist thinking is an intruder on human society.' *Dialogue with Fatah*, p. 66.

10. Thus, the Norwegian Constitution says in its second paragraph that although all citizens have the same right to practice their religion, the Evangelical-Lutheran religion is the official religion of the Kingdom of Norway. This has some implications for members of government and others, not to mention for the King himself.

11. One example is the famous Tripartite Declaration of 1950 in which the US, the UK, and France guaranteed to protest the armistice lines. However, when this armistice was broken in 1956, the UK and France sided with the aggressor, Israel.

12. Buch, P. 1971: The Palestinian revolution and Zionism, *International Social Review* no. 1, gives some examples of extremist Israeli views, quoting Josef Weitz in *Davar*, 29 September 1967: 'When the UN passed a resolution to partition Palestine into two states, the War of Independence broke out, to our good fortune; and in this war a twofold miracle happened: a territorial victory and the flight of the Arabs. In the Six Days' War, one great miracle happened: a tremendous territorial victory: but most of the inhabitants of the liberated territory remained "stuck" in their places, which may destroy the very foundations of our state.' The same man made the following note in his diary in 1940 (he was Head of the Colonization Department of the Jewish Agency): 'We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine, without Arabs... And there is no other way but to transfer all of them: not one village, not one tribe should be left... There is no other way out.'

13. For an incisive analysis by Israel's outstanding defense intellectual, Y. Harkabi, see Harkabi 1968: Fedayeen action and Arab strategy, *Adelphi Papers* no. 53 (December). He concludes that 'Fatah is so much engrossed with the idea of the omnipotence of guerrilla warfare that it ignores its basic limitations.' Further, 'guerrilla warfare can be important mostly in intra-state, not in inter-state war', and 'the Arab-Israel conflict is a clash between nations with incompatible claims to

the same territory' (p. 34). But with Gaza and the West Bank inside, this argument loses much of its validity.

14. Many Arabs point out that 'pushing into the sea' does not mean drowning — there is no objection to Jews boarding a ship 'leaving the way they came'. That it is interpreted as a profession of intent to commit suicide is highly understandable — and the ambiguity in that as well as other Arab expressions may be intended. For instance, when Nasser spoke of a 'sea of blood', did he mean physical blood, or blood more like in Churchill's 'blood, sweat and tears'?

15. President Sadat's formulations during the early months of 1971 differed, but this is at least one reasonable interpretation.

16. Golda Meir's famous statement in an interview with the *Sunday Times*, 15 June 1969 (p.12): 'It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people, and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist' — is not entirely untrue. The British Mandate from 1921 was split into two parts as early as 1922: Palestine proper, and the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, with its capital in Amman with the Emir Abdullah, and under the supervision of a Mandatory Resident. In 1946 Abdullah became the Hashemite King of Trans-Jordan, a non-Palestinian ruling over Palestinians, and supported by the UK, with the Labour government following Churchill's footsteps. Golda Meir is therefore right in saying that the Palestinian 'problem' rests not only with Israel (as also shown by the fact that Palestinians in 1971 had to escape from the battle with troops of the Jordanian King across the border into the arch-enemy Israel). But the way Golda Meir puts it, makes it sound as if there were no Palestinians at all.

17. The *Time*-Louis Harris poll (published in *Time*, 12 April 1971) is interesting here even though the questions were not so formulated as to reflect well the basic issues in the conflict. Nor do we know how representative the samples are, but since they include Israeli Jews (Ashkenazi and Sephardi combined, however) and Israeli Arabs, they are worth studying. There is a clear majority among the Jews for annexing Golan Heights (86 %), Eastern Jerusalem (90 %), Sharm-el-Sheikh (72 %); and a plurality for annexing Gaza (49 %), the West Bank (39 %), and also Eastern Sinai (47 %). The only doubt is about Western Sinai, where 38 % argue it should be neutralized, 29 % that it should be annexed. The Israeli Arabs show majorities in favor of return and/or internationalization (Jerusalem) and the creation of a Palestinian State (Gaza and West Bank). In other words, the Arabs inside Israel share the attitudes of Arabs outside, or at least they differ consistently from the Jews: almost everywhere the solution

most favored by the Jews is most disfavored by the Arabs. In short: any return of occupied territory would be supported only by a minority of Israeli Jews. Of course, these attitudes may change with changing conditions.

18. The point made by Sami Hadawi (Hadawi, S. 1967: *The Arab-Israeli conflict*. Beirut) that there is a tendency to transform refugee problems 'from one between right and wrong, to one of refugees to be fed, clothed, and housed until absorbed' is well taken (p. 24). But Hadawi's claim that Palestinian refugees from Israel differ from other refugees 'from European Countries, Red China, Cuba and those who migrated when India and Pakistan became independent' because they were ousted by the governments, whereas the latter left on their own accord, is not convincing. Erich Fromm's argument, quoted by Hadawi on p.23, that whatever the reason for escape, Israel has no right to confiscate property, sounds more convincing.

19. I am indebted to Y. Harkabi for pointing to this general point so clearly in relation to this particular conflict.

20. It should be noted that the *Time*-Louis Harris poll shows a high level of prejudice among Jews against Arabs: they are seen as lazier, less intelligent, more cruel, not so brave, more dishonest, and in general inferior to the Israelis — according to Israeli Jews. Social distance scales reveal a high level of prejudice (p.31): and here it is interesting to note that the most prejudiced are the Sephardic Jews, the follow the Ashkenazi, and finally the Sabras. In line with this, 'the highest government job that the majority is willing to give to an Arab at the present time is a low-level civil service position'.

21. In this connection the brochure *The Middle East in the Year 2000* (The Association for Peace, Tel Aviv, Israel) should be commended. The authors have seen the importance of not making Israel the center of everything. Thus, in their conception 'the headquarters of the Middle East Common Market will (of course) be in Beirut'.

22. Nils Petter Gleditsch, in a thorough theoretical and empirical study of the Arab boycott of Israel (Interaction patterns in the Middle East, *Cooperation and Conflict* 1971, pp. 15-30), concludes that the only effective boycott is the direct one between Israel and the Arab countries on bilateral interaction. Multilateral boycotts do 'not appear to be carried out with any consistency' (p.26). For some comments on all the positive effects the boycott of Israel are said to have had on Israel, see The superfluous boycott, *Time*, 14 July 1971, p. 17.

23. Thus, in the tourist handbook *Facts About Israel 1968* the map of Israel gives only the cease-fire lines of 1967 — no other border indications.

24. One formulation used by Golda Meir (in an

interview with Arnaud de Bordgrave, *Newsweek*, 8 March 1971, pp. 14-16) when asked what would be the criterion of a secure and defensible border, was 'borders that are defensible if we are attacked again, borders that will deter attacks'. This formulation is not very helpful. Even if we add all the obvious arguments about flying-time, about the significance of a river or a canal as something that has to be crossed, so that it constitutes a clear line of observation, or command over mountains from which settlements may be shelled (Syria) or in which guerrillas may hide (Jordan, Sinai), history also seems to prove that 'defensible' borders invite attacks — because they stimulate inventiveness.

25. But length of border is of course not proportionate to size of territory. In the pamphlet *Secure and Recognized Boundaries*, Carta, Jerusalem, 1971, it is pointed out (p. 34): 'Following the Six-Day War Israel's land borders have been considerably shortened. The border with Egypt was 265 km. long and is now only 160 km.; that with Jordan has been shortened from about 561 km. to 300 km. This has made the frontiers far more defensible than before'.

26. E.g. something like the MacNamara line in Indo-China on the assumption that it could be set up more effectively, and that Israel does not have internal war (like South-Vietnam).

27. Suleiman, M.W. 1965: An evaluation of Middle East news coverage in seven American news magazines July-December 1956, *Middle East Forum* no. 2, pp. 9-30. Arabs were found to be the 'villains' and the Israelis the heroes; Arab were depicted as desert-living nomads, Israelis 'were presented as Western-like and democratic' (p.29). Suleiman's basic conclusion: the U.S. sees the Arabs through Israeli eyes.

28. In the U.N., this works the other way, however. In the period 1949-1966 Israel was officially condemned 70 times by the Security Council for attacks by its armed forces against Arab countries; there was no resolution against any Arab country (to this it may be objected that the Arabs used other forms of aggression).

'There will be no alternative but the resumption of fighting at a scale expected to be escalated speedily and dangerously' *Al Ahram* wrote on 13 March 1971 (quoted from *Kuwait Times*, 14 March 1971, p. 1).

29. U Thant brings up this point in analyzing the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967 as he saw it. (U Thant 1971: *The United Nations as scapegoat, War/Peace Report*, March, pp. 8-11) He writes: 'I knew all too well from UNEF's long experience that since the force was only stationed on the United Arab Republic side of the line, despite the original General Assembly intention that it be deployed on the Israel side as well, active United Arab Republic cooperation was indispensable

both to maintain the force and to provide a reasonable measure of security for its personnel' (p. 9).

30. General Hod: 'We lived with the plan, we slept on the plan, we ate the plan. Constantly we perfected it'. From 'The Six-Day War' by Randolph and Winston Churchill, *The Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), July 30, 1967, p. 27.

31. In the *Time*-Louis Hariris poll, 56 % of the 18-29 year-olds felt that there was a danger that Israel might develop a garrison state mentality.

Israel is the most open society in the Middle East, and, consequently, produces the largest number of people who are not afraid of publicly denouncing Israeli policy: e.g. Eldar, Y. 1968: *Israel darf kein Tabu sein, Das andere Deutschland*. The presence of vocal opposition hardly weakens the stand of the Israeli government. Opposition to the right makes a hawkish attitude credible; opposition to the left (as long as it remains a trickle) may serve as a beacon of hope for those who believe Israeli stands will change due to internal processes. We do not count the various groupings in Israel fighting for more understanding and friendship between Jews and Arabs *inside* Israel in this connection. These groups are status quo oriented in the important questions, and can be seen as essentially serving the government's cause by trying to smoothen out sources of internal strife.

32. Thus, for an interesting analysis of the difficulties involved when education is supposed to expand more than the population, see Louis Awad, 'The Counter-revolution and the Egyptian Education', *Al-Ahram*, 25 February 1971.

33. For an analysis, from a U.S. viewpoint, of how and to what extent the Middle East conflict is coupled to the super-power conflict, see Binder, L. 1967: *The Middle East crisis: background and attitudes*. University of Chicago Center for Policy Studies. Binder points out that the conflict certainly has its own momentum, is autonomous, but that there are 'serious issues of Arab nationalism which would not be resolved, and might even be more intense, if there were not Arab-Israel problem.' Thus, Binder analyzes some of the resistance to Egypt and the fear of Egyptian domination of a possible future Arab nation-state in terms of Egyptian Sunni Muslim domination over Shi'ites in both Lebanon and Iraq, Christians in Lebanon and Kurds in Iraq.

34. I am indebted to many interesting discussions during the two sessions of the International Peace Academy, in Vienna 1970 and in Helsinki 1971, for some of the ideas in this connection. The terminology peace-making/peace-keeping/peace-building is the terminology adopted by the Peace Academy.

35. J. S. Milstein: American and Soviet influences on Arab-Israeli violence: statistical analysis



(paper delivered at the 66th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles 1970) has some interesting conclusions. He makes a statistical analysis relating U.S. and Soviet inputs to the area (economic aid, military aid, loans, special imports, as well as military expenditure of each country) to Arab and Israeli violent actions (general war, encounters between guerillas and government forces, attacks on civilians, attacks on bases and strategic installations, mobilizations and alerts), and then investigates whether violence depends more on the violent actions of the enemy country, Soviet and U.S. military and economic aid and trade, or on the military balance between Israel and each Arab Country. Evidence favors the first explanation: the system is one of action-reaction inside the Middle East system, relatively independent of U.S. and Soviet inputs, and of the military balance as such. Milstein's analysis indicates that the super-powers have little leverage with the parties, that they move into action primarily because of 'the conflict over the existence of the state of Israel and the fate of the Palestinian Arabs who once lived on that land.' In addition, according to Milstein, there is a conflict between Israel and Egypt because Israel stands in the way of Egyptian efforts 'to establish a hegemony over the entire region so that it could develop and establish its position in the world as leader of all Arabs' (p. 57). The latter thesis is also put forward by Safran, N. 1969: *The alternatives in the Middle East, Commentary*, (May). Safran suggests that Sinai should be divided in such a way that Egypt could march on Jordan and Saudi Arabia giving Israel a corridor extending to the Suez — and hence to the Delta, and, eventually, Cairo.

We have played down the significance of the big powers in this conflict. There is no doubt that they place heavy constraints on the conflict and that the big powers come out in the open when there is open conflict. But the system is also autonomous. The big powers try to throw their weight around; the US sided with the Arabs in 1956 and with Israel in 1967; the Soviet Union sided with Israel in 1947/48 and then with the Arabs; Great Britain started as a supporter of the Arabs and then switched to the Jews, whereas France supported Israel in the beginning, and in 1956, and then turned to the Arabs afterwards. (I am indebted to Marek Thee for pointing this out.) However, this is what one might expect from big powers, and also seems to indicate that whereas the conflict between Arabs and Jews is consistent, the big powers are not.

36. The precedent set for big power cooperation in peace-keeping is, of course, Berlin and Vienna. But it is not obvious that this experience is transferable. After all, there was a common fight behind the events that placed the big powers

in those capitals; there is nothing similar that might place them in the Middle East. The danger is that they would be so afraid of getting into anything that might lead to escalation by somehow igniting the East-West conflict, that they would become inactive. The world would certainly prefer the latter outcome to the former.

37. Thus, the various proposals for partial or total Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and stationing of UN (or Big Power) troops in the vacuum created (e.g. IHUD Association in *Davar*, Tel Aviv, 29 May 1970) fall short of this proposal, which presupposes UN troops inside pre-June Israel.

38. For an account of the Israeli 'Black Panther' movement as an expression of the protest movement among the Sephardic Jews (Oriental origin) directed against the Ashkenazi Jews (Western origin, including the Soviet Union), see *New York Times* 24 May 1971, pp. 1, 8. The Ashkenazi Jews rank higher on education, wealth, power, but comprises only 40 % of the Jews in Israel.

39. The brochure *The Middle East in the Year 2000* seems to feel the same way and emphasizes common projects more than exchange. The danger is, of course, that in a 'common project' the technologically more advanced country will still gain the upper hand.

40. *The Middle East in the Year 2000* includes all these countries (with the exception of Greece) in its conception of the Middle East.

41. In the *Mapam Bulletin*, International service, no. 21, April 1971, this formulation is used: 'Just as the Jewish people returning to their historic homeland have realized their right to national self-determination by creating the State of Israel, so do the Palestinian Arab people have their right to a Palestinian or Palestinian-Jordanian state that will live in peace, good neighbourly relations and growing cooperation with the State of Israel, with a confederation of the two neighbouring national states in the homeland common to both, in the perspective'. One would like to see this more concretely formulated. Does it mean an export of all Palestinians to what is today Jordan? Does it mean partition of pre-June Israel, with possible unification between the Arab part and a Palestinian Jordan? We quote it here as one more example of vagueness.

42. Hilmy, Hany, 'Re-Partition of Palestine: Toward a Peaceful Solution in the Middle East', Oslo, PRIO, 1971 offers, perhaps, one of the most realistic plans for repartition, in two alternatives — a better partition than the UN November 1947 plan, into an Israel and Palestine that would have to recognize each other. But there is too little space for too much political energy, and there would be too many grievances for either dissociative, or associative strategies to work.

43. Two of the most interesting, in our view, proposals for the Middle East are found in Abileah, J., *Confederation in the Middle East* (Haifa, 1970) and the much more detailed proposal by Nathan, A. J., 'A Draft Proposal for Peace in the Middle East', *I. E. Stone's Weekly*, March 24, 1969, pp. 3 ff. However, one major point of disagreement is that they envisage a federation with three parts, Israel, Jordan and 'Arab Palestine (West Bank)' (Nathan includes Gaza in the latter) where we would see one Jewish and one Arab part. Another weakness, we feel, is that they both assume that Israel can continue within this framework — we assume a certain 'cantonization', some Arab cantons in pre-June Israel. And Abileah thinks, in addition, in terms of a United States of the Middle East 'open for any other country' — an idea that might look like a Middle East built around Israel as a nucleus. The difficulty is that Israel can hardly expect to get away from the present tangle that unscathed.

44. And this rules out the various 'peace by pieces' approaches, the efforts to fragment the conflict by splitting it up into components, trying to 'solve' one 'problem' at a time. This might work if it had not been for the strong sense most inhabitants in the region seem to have to the contrary, viz., that these issues constitute a whole, an entity that has a historical root, many aspects, but will have somehow to end up with a total solution. Of course, this does not mean that all have to come into being at the same time, but it does mean that no single issue will be solved unless a total solution is in sight.

As an example of this approach, but a brilliant and most informative example, see Reisman, M. 1970. *The Art of the Possible*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

## SUMMARY

The article presents some elements of a theory of conflict in general, and of the conflict in the Middle East in particular. It deals with the origin and the definition of the conflict, with its dynamics and with its possible resolution.

The conflict concerns the accommodation of Jews in the Middle East; and this conflict is seen as having two major dimensions, one territorial and one social. Along the *territorial* dimension are such points as 'Euphrates-Nile', 'Suez-Jordan', 'pre-June', 'UN 1947 Resolution', 'Tel-Aviv as a Vatican State', 'nothing' — and the original British Mandate till 1922, including trans-Jordania. Along the *social* dimensions the major distinction is between Jews accommodated in a *singularist* state with Jews in elite positions, with Jewish idiom as the state idiom and with only Jewish immigration; or in a *pluralist* state open to the nations in the area (mainly Arabs and Jews). For the

latter case the distinction is between a one-state solution and some kind of (con) federal solutions with cantons or with two states, one Arab and one Jew.

A major point in the article is that solutions along the territorial axis alone will fail. Israel may encapsulate herself with a combination of electromagnetic sensors, mining, UN troops stationed on both sides of the borders etc (e.g. pre-June borders). This will not be a stable solution, however, but will in all probability lead to a succession of wars in the area. Solutions might therefore be found by combining the territorial and social perspectives. The Jews should be willing to participate in a more pluralist state. But time is certainly not ripe for a one state solution, and a two state solution might be a continuation of status quo. A canton solution is therefore preferred, one which could also accommodate for differences between Jews and between Arabs. As to territory, the old British Mandate is preferred, combining cis- and trans-Jordania into a new state with a constitution similar to that of Switzerland. That would mean the discontinuation of the present Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

No 'solution' to the Middle East conflict being easy, the article attempts to show that other types of 'solutions' may be even more unattainable.

## КРАТКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

Эта статья представляет некоторые элементы теории конфликта вообще, и, в частности, конфликт в Среднем Востоке. Она рассматривает происхождение и определение конфликта, его движущие силы и возможности его решения. Приспособление евреев является конфликтом в Среднем Востоке. Этот конфликт рассматривается, как имеющий две главные стороны: территориальную и социальную. Территориальная сторона конфликта включает такие моменты, как «Евфрат-Нил», «Суэц-Иордан», «пред-июньский», «Резолюция ООН 1947 г.», «Тель-Авив, как штат Ватикана», первоначальный мандат Вел. Британии до 1922 г., включая транс-Иордан. Социальная — различие между однородным еврейским государством с евреями в руководящих постах и только еврейской эмиграцией и плюралистическим государством, открытым для в этом районе проживающих наций (в главном образе для евреев и арабов). В последнем случае различие состоит в введении одного государства или какой-нибудь федерации с кантонами, или двух государств — арабского и еврейского.

Главным в статье является мнение, что решение, опирающиеся только на территориальном принципе непременно потерпит неудачу. Израель

может окружить себя электро-магнетическими датчиками, минами, войсками ООН (напр. на пред-июньских границах) и т.п., однако это не явится прочным решением и приведёт к ряду войн на территории. Решения могут быть найдены сочетая территориальные и социальные перспективы. Евреи должны быть готовы на более плюралистическое государство. Но время для создания такого государства ещё не созрело, и решение два государства может явиться продолжением статус кво. Следовательно, предпочитается кантон, который мог также приспособлять разницы между евреями и между арабами. Что касается территории, предпочитается старый Британский мандат, сочетающий цис — и транс-Иордана в новое государство с конституцией похожей на швейцарскую. Это значило бы прекращение империи Хашемита в Иордане.

Остановиться на том, что не находится решения конфликта в Среднем Востоке — легко, но, как автор статьи хотел показать, другие типы решений могут явиться также недостижимыми.