



United Nations
Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
(OSAA)



Government
of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)

**Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo
12-14 June 2007¹**

Issue Paper

“Linkage between DDR and SSR”

**Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in
Africa²**

¹ This Conference is organized with the generous support of the Governments of Belgium and Sweden

² This document was prepared by an Independent Consultant engaged by UN/OSAA.
The opinions contained in this document do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Table of Contents

1.	Introduction.....	3
2.	Linking DDR and SSR.....	5
3.	DDR and SSR: Activities and Actors.....	8
4.	DDR and SSR: the Evolving Policy Discourse.....	11
5.	Key Challenges to Operationalising the DDR-SSR Nexus.....	13
5.1	Linking DDR and SSR.....	13
5.2	Peace Agreements.....	15
5.3	Sequencing.....	18
5.4	Local Ownership and Participation.....	20
5.5	Capacity and Coordination.....	24
5.6	Funding Arrangements.....	25
6.	Conclusion & Recommendations.....	26

Boxes and Tables

Box 1.	Why are DDR and SSR Linked?	6
Box 2.	A Security Governance Approach to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding	7
Box 3.	Local Ownership.....	8
Box 4.	Broad and Narrow Understandings of SSR.....	10
Box 5.	Outsourcing SSR in Liberia.....	15
Box 6.	Comparing Peace Agreements in Sierra Leone and Liberia.....	17
Box 7.	(Mis)perceptions and DDR in DRC.....	20
Box 8.	Human Security, Participation and the Transformation of the South African Security Sector.....	23
Table 1.	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration.....	9
Table 2.	The Security Sector.....	11

Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa

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Executive Summary

There is a growing awareness among policy-makers, analysts and practitioners of the strong interrelationships between different elements of post-conflict peacebuilding and the consequent need for conceptual clarity as a precondition for coordinated, coherent and comprehensive interventions. The close links between DDR and SSR have been acknowledged by experts in both fields. However, more work is needed to understand and operationalise these linkages.

This paper attempts to map some of the key linkages between DDR and SSR that should be taken into account in developing policy frameworks as well as approaches to supporting these activities in a given post-conflict context. In particular, it argues that supporting security sector governance institutions provides an important, underacknowledged means to link DDR and SSR concerns. Some of the key challenges to achieving better synergies in practice between DDR and SSR are identified and related to post-conflict peacebuilding experience in Africa. Finally, the paper proposes a number of policy recommendations while pointing to areas where further work is required – that must be grounded in the practical experience of how these issues play out on the ground – in order to more effectively operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR.

1. Introduction³

Since the end of the Cold War, a steady rise in interventions by the international community in states emerging from conflict has given increasing prominence to the significance of post-conflict peacebuilding. The importance of such interventions is demonstrated by both the positive message that armed conflicts and the numbers of people killed in them have declined during this period and the more cautionary statistic that around half of all post-conflict states fall back into political violence within a few years⁴. Maximising the potential synergies between linked post-conflict peacebuilding issues such as DDR and SSR is essential if peace, stability and development are to be achieved in fragile states.

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³ I am indebted to a number of people for their valuable contributions to earlier drafts of this paper. DCAF colleagues Megan Bastick, Adedeji Ebo, Heiner Hänggi, Fairlie Jensen, David Nosworthy and Vincenza Scherrer provided incisive comments as did Michael Brzoska, Head of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Particular thanks also go to Kelvin Ong, Acting Chief of the DDR Unit, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, as well as Paul Eavis, Francis James and Luc Lafreniere, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, for their very helpful comments and advice.

⁴ The Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia (2005), *The Human Security Report 2005* (Oxford University Press).

Africa has suffered disproportionately as a result of such conflicts and so has been the major theatre of engagement for peacebuilding activities by the United Nations (UN) as well as a host of other bi- and multilateral actors. It therefore merits special attention in terms of the benefits to be accrued from improving the record of post-conflict peacebuilding. In order to understand the relationship between DDR and SSR in Africa it is essential to draw on experience from a range of different contexts with states in different phases of their transition from war to peace. Examples highlighted in this paper include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa. Some represent mature peacebuilding processes; others remain in the early stages of this challenge. There is a clear need to draw lessons from such interventions in order to shape future policy and practice.

In the early 1990s, a major emphasis of peacebuilding activities was directed towards economic and social reconstruction. The broader and more sensitive task of facilitating the building of domestic capacities to provide security was often neglected. Security governance issues such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and reinforcing the rule of law are now increasingly recognised as priority peacebuilding tasks. This was highlighted by the Presidential Statement emerging from the 20 February 2007 Open Debate in the UN Security Council which stresses the importance that the Security Council ‘recognises the interlinkages between security sector reform and other important factors of stabilisation and reconstruction, such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues’⁵. There is therefore a growing awareness among policy-makers, analysts and practitioners of the strong interrelationships between different elements of post-conflict peacebuilding and the consequent need for conceptual clarity as a precondition for coordinated, coherent and comprehensive interventions.

From the early 1990s, there has been strong international involvement in and support for DDR programmes in a wide range of different contexts. More recently, processes such as the *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration*⁶ and, in particular, the development of the United Nations *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*⁷ have sought to learn from this practical experience in order to better understand challenges, identify good practice, and make a positive contribution to developing more coherent, effective DDR programmes. By comparison, although becoming highly visible with actors in a range of different policy fora, the SSR discourse is relatively young. Its profile has not been matched to date by significant, sustained experience on the ground from which to distil guidelines for policy makers and practitioners. Unlike DDR, whose component activities are well recognised, the SSR agenda is extremely broad and very different understandings exist of activities and actors caught within it (see Box 4 below). The SIDDR and IDDRS, as well

⁵ *Statement by the President of the Security Council* at the 5632nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 20 February 2007; S/PRST/2007/3 (21 February 2007).

⁶ Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (2006) *Final Report* (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden).

⁷ Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006) *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards*, (United Nations).

as the new OECD DAC *Handbook on Security System Reform*⁸ acknowledge the close links between DDR and SSR. More work is required to understand and build on these linkages in ways that are useful for policy makers and practitioners.

There are no miracle solutions for these complex, sensitive and highly political issues that sit at the nexus between security and development. The purpose of this paper is therefore both modest and practical. It attempts to map some of the key linkages between DDR and SSR that should be taken into account in developing policy frameworks as well as approaches to supporting these activities in a given post-conflict context. The paper then identifies some of the key challenges to achieving better synergies in practice between DDR and SSR and relates this to post-conflict peacebuilding experience in Africa. Finally, the paper proposes a number of policy recommendations while pointing to areas where further work is required – to be derived from assessing at ground level the practical experience of the UN and other actors – in order to more effectively operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR.

2. Linking DDR and SSR

Within the framework of post-conflict peacebuilding, strong linkages are particularly apparent between DDR and SSR because both activities concern the military, the security sector more broadly, as well as overlapping groups responsible for their management and oversight. Addressing the needs of former combatants is directly linked to opportunities to reform (or transform) the security sector both immediately following conflict and as a contribution to longer term security and development. This is acknowledged in the Brahimi Report which makes a clear case for the impact of DDR on SSR as ‘an area in which peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order’.⁹ It is also a finding of the OECD-DAC Handbook which affirms that ‘the two issues are often best considered together as part of a comprehensive security and justice development programme’.¹⁰ If issues must be understood in terms of how they relate to each other then this is all the more true for the stakeholders that are (or should) be involved in these processes. Increased coordination and cooperation are crucial to operationalising the DDR-SSR nexus on a number of levels:

- At the strategic policy level to ensure coherence of actors within the UN system (or within a donor government/multilateral organisation);
- In the interface between headquarters and field operations to provide adequate support to the latter;
- Across the range of external actors operating in a given theatre to ensure effective mechanisms for effective policy and operational coordination;
- Between different strands of a UN field mission (or different parts of a donor government/multilateral organisation) to ensure coherence across its post-conflict peacebuilding commitments in a given theatre;

⁸ OECD DAC (2007) *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*, (OECD DAC). Available online at: www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr

⁹ United Nations Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations. UN doc. A/55/305.5/2000/809 (2000), para 42.

¹⁰ OECD DAC (2007): p.105.

- At the points of interaction between external actors and national authorities to develop meaningful political and operational coordination.

Box 1

Why are DDR and SSR linked?

DDR and SSR are both recognised as key elements of post-conflict peacebuilding. DDR has a direct impact on the prospects for SSR since Disarmament and Demobilisation – often conducted before SSR is addressed – set the terrain for future reform efforts by establishing the numbers and nature of the security sector. A successful DDR programme may also free up much needed resources for SSR. Decisions on the mandate, structure and composition of security services can impact on the numbers of personnel that will need to be demobilised and reintegrated into society. It can also be argued that DDR *is* SSR to the extent that demobilisation is a form of defence reform, albeit ad hoc in nature: decisions are often made by former warring parties and reflect concerns such as rewarding loyalty or removing troublemakers. This may result in performance improvements (depending on who is demobilised or retained) but may also run counter to the central goal of developing effective or accountable armed and security forces loyal to the state and its citizens (as opposed to the regime in power). If former soldiers are employed in other parts of the security sector as a reintegration measure, DDR can also contribute directly to SSR. However, if not done selectively and according to clear criteria, this may only fuel insecurity if individuals with inappropriate backgrounds and inadequate training are simply re-deployed within the security sector. Finally, failed reintegration places significant strain on SSR by increasing the pressure on police, courts and prisons.¹¹

A common feature connecting the UN with other intergovernmental organisations such as NATO, the OSCE and the EU is the absence of a specific doctrine to underpin SSR and link it to broader peacebuilding work. The general principles guiding the UN’s approach to DDR are¹²:

- People-centred and rights-based
- Flexible
- Transparent and accountable
- Nationally owned
- Integrated
- Well planned.

These points could equally apply to an overarching UN approach to SSR, thus offering a potentially valuable bridge between DDR and SSR in terms of first principles. The OECD-DAC Handbook would seem to provide such a base-line understanding for SSR; the EU has said that the DAC guidelines and good practices ‘provide an important basis for EC engagement in this area in terms of norms, principles and operational guidance’.¹³

¹¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the linkages between DDR and SSR see: Brzoska, M. ‘Embedding DDR Programmes in Security Sector Reconstruction’; in Bryden, A. and Hänggi, H. (2005) *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Lit Verlag: Munster): pp. 95-113.

¹² UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, *Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the IDDRS*, p.4.

¹³ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* (Brussels, 24 May 2006): p.6.

Although in substance there is much to be drawn from the DAC work, it represents a guide for donors developed by an organisation perceived as an exclusive Western club and as such is regarded suspiciously by some states from the developing world. The Security Council debate on SSR was revealing in that it reflected both a widespread awareness of the need for more holistic approaches that integrate DDR and SSR but also a suspicion – which needs to be addressed – that SSR implies the imposition of Western methods and approaches. As *the* global body playing a role in peace and security, at a time of international interventions that are contested to varying degrees, a key challenge for the UN is to build on existing good practice and better integrate its activities with those of other actors while preserving this legitimacy.

It is fundamentally important that externally assisted DDR and SSR reflect the realities of individual post-conflict contexts in their design, implementation and evaluation. Yet, in practice, both policy-making and operational activities are often conducted in parallel rather than in ways that promote mutually reinforcing synergies and are not adequately tailored to highly specific security, political and socio-economic framing conditions.¹⁴ There is therefore a compelling argument to identify and better understand the potential synergies and the countervailing forces that impact on these interrelated but disconnected activities.

A security governance approach must lie at the heart of efforts to address the challenges of DDR and SSR because it provides a means to integrate activities and actors, formal and informal, at international, state and sub-state levels based on common understandings and core principles. This perspective goes beyond state-centric approaches to emphasise the human security of individuals and communities as the key criterion for success. In this regard, due attention must be paid not just to enhancing the performance of security and justice providers but to national capacities to manage reform processes and to ensure democratic control and oversight of the security sector by parliaments as well as civil society. Particular onus must be placed on under-represented groups such as women and children.

Box 2

A Security Governance Approach to Post-conflict Peacebuilding
Security governance combines two concepts that have evolved significantly in recent years. Our understanding of *security* has expanded to comprise political, economic, societal and environmental as well as military threats. Alongside this ‘securitisation’ there is a growing recognition that security issues should be addressed not only at national and international levels but should focus on the human security concerns of communities and individuals. The concept of *governance* has emerged in the context of globalisation to reflect the fragmentation of political authority among public and private actors on multiple levels as well as the emergence of formal and informal cooperative problem solving arrangements. The governance discourse attempts to understand the multiplicity of actors beyond the state and how they interact. *Security governance* thus considers complex governing mechanisms in the broad security field. A security governance approach therefore allows disparate activities, policies and programmes to be treated coherently. Security governance is a particularly useful analytical perspective in the context of post-conflict states characterised by weak

¹⁴ Bryden, A. & Hänggi, H., ‘Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector’, in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): pp.34-35.

central authority, as well as the privatisation and internationalisation of the use of force.

A key yardstick for success in both DDR and SSR is the attention given to the needs and priorities of local and national actors. Assisting national authorities in building effective, legitimate and sustainable security institutions is a key element of both immediate postconflict stabilisation and longer-term recovery and development. Emphasising the building of national capacities in these areas also offers a means to judge the right time for a transfer of responsibilities from external to national actors. Ensuring that DDR and SSR processes take root at local levels is essential to their legitimacy and sustainability. Local ownership requires that external actors accept and internalise the premise that they are only facilitators for a peacebuilding process designed, implemented and managed at the national level. It is the only way to ensure that reforms are grounded in the specific contexts in which they take place. It is also the key to building trust in sensitive postconflict contexts.

The principle of local ownership is firmly enshrined in the IDDRS which states that ‘the primary responsibility for DDR programmes rests with national actors...(G)enuine national ownership requires the participation of a wide range of state and non-state actors at the national, regional and local levels.’¹⁵ Indeed, this principle can be found across the spectrum of post-conflict peacebuilding activities. Mine action is one other area where national ownership and responsibility are strongly emphasised; yet, in many cases, the reality is less impressive than the rhetoric.¹⁶

Box 3

Local Ownership¹⁷

A genuine commitment to the principle of local ownership in DDR and SSR requires an approach to policy making and programming that is firmly grounded in local contexts with external actors facilitating the design, management and implementation of reforms rather than imposing their own models and expertise. Local ownership is a process characterised by participation, communication, humility and long-termism. It requires building the capacities of national and local actors to take responsibility for their own security and its governance, thus providing a genuine prospect for a meaningful transfer of responsibility. Local ownership requires a long-term approach that recognises the need for national will and commitment to societal re-positioning rather than just institutional change as a precondition for sustainable peace and development.

In practice, a strong case can also be made in the context of SSR that ‘local ownership is a rhetorical device than a guide to donor officials’.¹⁸ In part, this reflects the difficulty (particularly if underestimated) of applying such an approach at a time when national capacities are at their weakest and local actors lack both expertise and legitimacy. The conflicting interests of different domestic constituencies and the presence of spoilers are

¹⁵ United Nations (2006) *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards* (United Nations): p.29.

¹⁶ See: Bryden, A. ‘Optimising Mine Action Policies and Practice’; in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): pp. 159-184.

¹⁷ For a state of the art guide on operationalising the concept of local ownership see: Nathan, L. (2007) *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform* (University of Birmingham).

¹⁸ Scheye, E. & Peake, G. ‘Unknotting Local Ownership’, in Ebnother, A. and Fluri, P. (Eds.) *After Intervention: Public Sector Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership*, PfP Consortium Working Group on SSR (2005): p.240.

also particularly relevant. Yet, as with any other part of the peacebuilding agenda, the challenging framing conditions that shape any post-conflict intervention should not mask shortcomings in policy and practice that ignore local actors, demonstrate a lack of flexibility in programmes and their financing, or political agendas and timeframes which may be inimical to local realities, interests and priorities.

3. DDR and SSR: Activities and Actors

A DDR process ‘aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict to peace, recovery and development’.¹⁹ The official UN definition of DDR set out in Table 1 below focuses on four stages: disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration.

Table 1²⁰

Disarmament
Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
Demobilization
Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.
Reinsertion
Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longerterm process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.
Reintegration
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

By contrast, there is no generally accepted definition of what the security sector comprises or what security sector reform entails with different actors embracing broader or narrower understandings of the concept (see Box 4). Nonetheless, there appears to be some convergence around the definitions put forward by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).²¹ Donor countries such as the OECD DAC member states and international organisations such as the EU tend to base their SSR strategies on the DAC guidelines and definitions. SSR means – according to the DAC definition – transforming the security sector/system, ‘which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a

¹⁹ IDDRS Operational Guide p.24.

²⁰ Note of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005.

²¹ See, for example, OECD DAC (2007); OECD DAC (2004) *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series.

manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well functioning security framework'.²²

Box 4

Broad and Narrow Understandings of SSR²³

The scope of activities and actors covered by the SSR agenda remains contested. Narrow understandings reflect state-centric approaches to security, focussing on those public sector institutions responsible for the provision of external and internal security, as well as the civilian bodies relevant for their management, oversight and control. Some narrower interpretations of SSR also include justice institutions in recognition of the complementary relationship between security and justice. Although it could be argued that an even narrower understanding of SSR would focus solely on reform of security forces as well as the applicable 'power' ministries, the absence of any emphasis on democratic governance means that such activities should not be termed 'SSR'. Broader understandings of SSR emphasise the influential role of non-state actors in delivering security and justice services, taking into account further categories such as customary justice providers, armed non-state actors, private security companies and civil society.

A broad understanding of SSR is particularly relevant in post-conflict contexts, favouring a holistic approach that well reflects the complex and fragmented nature of security governance. This emphasises the need to integrate partial reforms such as defence, intelligence, police and judicial reform which in the past were generally seen and conducted as separate efforts. It also links measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of security forces, to overriding concerns of democratic governance. And finally, adhering to a broad – governance-oriented – understanding of SSR recognises the reality that non-state actors, whether non-statutory security forces or civil society actors, are highly relevant for security sector reform.

Notwithstanding different understandings of SSR, its purpose – creating effective and accountable security forces in order to improve human security – is clearly defined whereas DDR can be motivated by anything from a desire to downsize as a cost reduction exercise to forming a central pillar of a peacebuilding strategy. By contrast, in practice the activities comprising DDR, although context-specific, are relatively standardised whereas the SSR agenda is exceptionally broad.²⁴ A further distinction is that DDR programmes have been conducted over a number of years in many countries while SSR is relatively new and, as already discussed, policy guidelines heavily outweigh lessons learned drawn from concrete SSR programming.

The scope of DDR and SSR activities is reflected by the key actors that participate in them. For DDR, once the political decision-making process has been conducted, a distinction can be made in practice between the predominantly technical defence and security related expertise involved in the 'two Ds' and the development related experience directed towards Reintegration-focused activities. Actors involved in SSR come from a much broader pool of both domestic political actors and specialists in different parts of the SSR agenda, as set out in Table 2 below:

²² OECD DAC (2004), p. 20.

²³ See: Hänggi, H. 'Security Sector Reform'; in *A Peacebuilding Lexicon* (forthcoming, 2007).

²⁴ Brzoska in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): p.96.

Table 2²⁵

Core security actors including law enforcement institutions
Armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities and reserve and local security units.
Security management and oversight bodies
Parliament/legislature and its relevant legislative committees; government/the executive, including ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; national security advisory bodies; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society actors, including the media, academia and NGOs.
Justice institutions
Justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and tribunals); implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers); other customary and traditional justice systems; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; etc.
Non-statutory security forces
Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.

A focus on security sector governance provides a means to better understand how DDR and SSR influence each other. Security-related issues in post-conflict contexts cannot be seen in isolation from each other and promoting democratic governance of the security sector is a way to address DDR challenges within this broader framework. The two activities are related in both supply and demand terms. On the supply side, DDR provides the basis for SSR by shaping the size and nature of the post-conflict security sector. In this regard, demobilised soldiers often find employment in other areas of the formal and informal security sector. On the demand side, how DDR is conducted influences the security situation on the ground and therefore the prospects for SSR.

Differences in concept and practice between DDR and SSR can lead to an artificial delinking of related issues, creating tensions in policy and programming and thus a loss of potential synergies.²⁶ This ignores the reality that DDR decision-making, no less than SSR, is highly political and may have serious consequences for future SSR. While asking applicants to link DDR funding requests to SSR commitments, the World Bank led MDRP – the largest current post-conflict DDR programme – at one time maintained on its website that the MDRP is not an SSR programme. Yet as Brzoska asks, ‘if that is so, how has the World Bank arrived at the numbers of ex-combatants to be demobilised, and, in consequence, to be kept in the armed forces of the African Great Lakes area?’²⁷ Security sector governance institutions should therefore be the focus of efforts to link these activities since they contain stakeholders in both DDR and SSR. These institutions are well placed, as part of efforts to promote a transparent and participative decisionmaking process, to address the question of who should be demobilised, how reintegration should be conducted and what should be the shape and size of the reformed security sector.

²⁵ OECD DAC (2005), pp. 20-21.

²⁶ Brzoska in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): p.97.

²⁷ Brzoska, in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): p.107.

4. DDR and SSR: the Evolving Policy Discourse

The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 as one of the key decisions emerging from the 2005 World Summit²⁸ represents a recognition by the UN system of the need to develop more comprehensive, coordinated and coherent approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding. The intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund are tools geared towards developing integrated strategies, mobilising predictable and sustained financing as well as ensuring effective sequencing in the UN's support to post-conflict states.²⁹ It is too early to judge the effectiveness of these new mechanisms in achieving their stated objectives. The first two countries taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission – Burundi and Sierra Leone – should provide early clues as to its value-added.

Concrete efforts to ensure more effective UN engagement in these areas has already been seen in practice. The cumulative experience, lessons learned and good practice developed within the UN system on DDR has been consolidated into the IDDRS. These standards, developed in a two year process involving a range of stakeholders, are intended to provide direction and guidance to those preparing, implementing and supporting DDR programmes. The IDDRS recognises that 'DDR should be adequately linked to other security-related interventions, such as mine action, SALW control and reduction, and security sector reform.'³⁰ The IDDRS therefore acknowledges the DDR SSR link and highlights some issues that relate to both. However, these linkages are partial and have not yet been operationalised in the Standards. There is therefore a strong need to integrate SSR concerns, set within a framework of democratic security sector governance, in the IDDRS. This work should bring policy and practice closer together by addressing the need to embed recommendations within institutional policy and practice.

The SSR discourse is currently going through a much needed phase of consolidation in terms of policy formulation and its relationship to SSR programming. The European Union has established new policy frameworks for SSR and with the European Advisory and Assistance Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) launched its first bespoke SSR Mission. The OECD DAC Handbook was developed in order to translate SSR guidelines into more operational guidance for practitioners. Leading donor countries, the UN as well as a number of SSR policy specialists and practitioners have contributed to the development of this handbook which provides guidance on how to assess, design, support, monitor and evaluate SSR programmes. In part as a consequence of work in the DAC, bilateral donors are following the lead of the United Kingdom and improving coordination through developing 'whole of government' approaches to SSR which seek to align the contributions of the '3 Ds': diplomacy, development and defence. In 2006, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported a study from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) looking at SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding as conducted in UN Integrated Missions.³¹

²⁸ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/180; Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005).

²⁹ A brief summary of UN involvement in DDR and SSR is found at Annex A to this paper.

³⁰ IDDRS Operational Guide, p.39.

³¹ 'The UN Approach to Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Review of Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in SSR Activities'. A project conducted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in conjunction with DPKO and UNDP. Funding for the project was provided by Canada.

Political consensus-building on the need for more integrated approaches to DDR and SSR has been furthered by Slovakia's initiative as a non-permanent Security Council Member to launch a debate on the UN's role in post-conflict SSR.³² A process beginning with workshops in Bratislava in July and New York in November and December 2006 culminated in an Open Debate in the Security Council on 20 February 2007 on the UN's role in supporting post-conflict SSR.³³ The call emanating from the Security Council debate for the Secretary-General to prepare a report on UN approaches to SSR will itself result in valuable lessons learned for the UN system.

Awareness within the international community of the need to include SSR concerns in DDR programmes is part of a broader recognition that different elements of the postconflict peacebuilding agenda should be better linked. An open question at present is how far a raised profile, coupled with a raft of policy analysis, translates into tangible achievements on the ground in terms of operationalising these linkages.

5. Key Challenges to Operationalising the DDR-SSR Nexus

This section discusses some of the key issues and challenges identified in the policy literature that must be addressed in order to better link DDR and SSR concerns. Although a number of other issues are also relevant, those considered seem to offer the most promising avenues for influencing policy and practice. Experience drawn from Africa is used to ground these issues in practical experience. It begins by considering some of the tensions inherent in linking DDR and SSR before assessing the specific entry point of peace negotiations. Questions of sequencing are examined before focusing on the cross-cutting imperative of infusing programmes with local ownership. Finally, coordination as well as funding issues are discussed.

5.1 Linking DDR and SSR

The international community – at least in policy statements – pays close attention in DDR programmes to categories of particular concern for reintegration such as former child soldiers and female combatants. However, beyond this, parties that negotiate peace settlements are frequently left to decide on who is demobilised or retained. This can represent a point of tension between the interests of peacebuilding – which might make the case for former warring parties being best placed to make such judgements – and with SSR which would require certain types of individuals to populate effective and accountable security services.

As well as focusing on the *obligations* of security personnel, a security governance-based approach should also focus on their *rights*. Ensuring a well managed transition to civilian status is therefore an SSR goal that exactly mirrors a central DDR priority. As Brzoska

³² The Slovak Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York has set up a sub-page on its website documenting this process:

http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/newyorkosn?MT=/App/WCM/ZU/NewYorkOSN/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_621F5291AE4A5FD4C125715B004FFE51_EN&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&HM=50-aktualtemy&NCH=Y&OB=0&DS=Y&TG=BlankMaster&URL=http://www.mzv.sk/App/WCM/AktualneTemy.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C7C29B5D0679D7F7C125727C002D8E7A

³³ *Security Council*, 5632nd Meeting, 'The Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Role of the Security Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform'; S/PV.5632.

argues, assisting the armed forces and their institutions to play this role can make good sense because it is practical: the soldiers are already well known within the system; it demonstrates a 'duty of care' and therefore has a positive effect on morale; and, most importantly, unsuccessful reintegration would have a negative effect on security and the security sector.³⁴ Existing records held by the armed forces also provide an entry point for the census and identification programmes necessary to rebuild security governance institutions.

Reintegrating former soldiers into different parts of the security sector may meet the needs of both DDR and SSR while building on the existing skills sets of those concerned. Gender balance and ethnic diversity should underpin such approaches. However, using former soldiers in policing roles has seen negative results in cases where candidates have not been properly screened or adequately trained. Problems have included applying military approaches to policing challenges that require sensitivity and communication rather than direct force, or employing police officers with a prior history of war crimes. This is not only unfortunate on an individual level but undermines in the public eye nascent, reconstructed, security forces as well as the governance institutions responsible for their oversight. Greater coherence between DDR, SSR and transitional justice is therefore essential. In particular, vetting conducted as part of a transitional justice process needs to feed into efforts to integrate former combatants into state military and security forces. On a related point, having former combatants who have committed war crimes and/or sexual violence against women and children being released back into their community for 'reintegration' seriously affects community perceptions of safety, and undermines the legitimacy of the justice system. DDR therefore needs to be linked with justice mechanisms that ensure accountability for war crimes and human rights violations.

The private security sector also offers an avenue for reintegrating former soldiers. In some cases, private security actors provide security to communities and individuals when the state is unwilling or unable to fulfill this role. However, private security providers tend to be subject to even less oversight than state actors so the risks of their contributing to insecurity may be significant. A merging of public and private roles is perhaps best exemplified by the 'sobel' (soldier and rebel) phenomenon – combining a role in the state security sector with engagement in criminal activities for profit.³⁵ A telling example of privatisation and its impact on DDR and SSR is found in South Africa. Although there are many positives to be drawn from its transformation, the consequences of the post-Apartheid downsizing and reform of the South African security sector still play out today. The same resource pool of ex-South African National Defence Force (SANDF) personnel fuels both private military and security companies and mercenary activities in third countries.³⁶

If the roles of different security actors have become blurred during conflict then 'an important part of the link between DDR and SSR programmes is to clearly distinguish these roles, codify the distinction in legislation, and raise awareness on this issue'.³⁷ SSR

³⁴ Brzoska in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): pp. 100-101

³⁵ Schneckener, U. 'Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance'; in Bryden, A. & Caparini, M. (Eds.) *Private Actors and Security Governance* (Lit Verlag): p.27.

³⁶ Taljaard, R. 'Implementing South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act' in Bryden and Caparini (2006)pp.167-186.

³⁷ OECD DAC (2007): p.105.

considerations – in the shape of clear criteria for entry into the security sector – should therefore come first in such arrangements. If the requirements of reintegration can be met then that is a bonus but they should not be a driver of policy. If it is a stated goal to place former soldiers in other parts of the security sector then this needs to be linked to the capacity of the security sector to absorb them.³⁸

Box 5

Outsourcing SSR in Liberia

After 14 years of civil war, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in August 2003, provided an opening for post-conflict peacebuilding that placed clear emphasis on timely, effective DDR and SSR. Although the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was responsible for the DDR process in Liberia, its responsibility for SSR centres on police reform while a US firm,³⁹ Dyncorp International, has been contracted to restructure and train the military – the first time in African history that such a task has been given to a private company.⁴⁰

Significantly, there appears to be little relationship between the DDR process and the framework for the restructuring of the armed forces. Nor does the restructuring process reflect broader security sector governance concerns. Size estimates for the restructured armed forces veered from 6'500 (proposed by the Liberian MOD) to the current figure of 2'000 soldiers identified through a US-funded technical review. The CPA provides explicitly for the reform of the security forces but does not explicitly demand the reform of oversight institutions, nor does it propose the development of a coherent national vision of security that will allow for effective governance of the security sector. Such an approach reflects neither the ownership nor the input of a wide section of Liberian stakeholders. The Liberian Parliament does not have any genuine oversight of Dyncorp's activities and there is limited civil society involvement in the reform process, highlighting an inherently asymmetrical relationship between donors and locals.⁴¹ It is therefore unsurprising that these omissions remain in the current US-funded restructuring programme.

The Governance Reform Commission (GRC), headed by former Liberian President Amos Sawyer, was created under the CPA to promote good governance in the public sector. The GRC is seeking to inject local transparency and accountability into the SSR process in order to ensure as far as possible that decisions on the reform of the security sector, its management and oversight, are grounded in Liberian authority and realities. However, fragmented approaches by different actors coupled with a lack of transparency, oversight and democratic control inherent to the outsourcing of significant aspects of this process, pose significant challenges to the legitimacy and sustainability of current SSR efforts. Addressing these deficits is essential if the security sector is to shake off its historical legacy as a tool for repression and win the trust of the communities and individuals they are mandated to protect.

5.2 Peace Agreements

³⁸ Ginifer, J. (2004) 'Support for DDR and SSR after Conflicts in Africa: Lessons-Learnt and New Agendas in Africa', p. 17. Available at: www.upi-fiaa.fi/document.php?DOC_ID=166

³⁹ Article VII of the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) gives a leading role to the USA in reforming the Liberian armed forces. The US Government decided to outsource this role to a private company.

⁴⁰ Ebo, A. 'The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia'; *DCAF Occasional Paper No. 9* (December 2005): p.24.

⁴¹ Ebo, A. 'Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies'; in Nathan (2007): pp.78-85.

DDR decisions often form part of peace negotiations. Yet agreements on the numbers and type of soldiers retained or demobilised that may be beneficial from a peacebuilding perspective can actually be counter-productive in terms of SSR. It is self-evident that decisions as to the size and nature of post-conflict security forces are inherently interestdriven and if left to former warring parties will reflect the need to maintain a power base and reward allies. But as Brzoska points out, ‘satisfying the security concerns of former foes is not the only security concern that should inform decision-making even early in a post-war situation’.⁴² This argues for careful consideration of how DDR decisions taken in Peace Agreements can and do shape opportunities for SSR.

The immediate pressures of post-conflict stabilisation mean that SSR is often considered as a later priority that comes after DDR. Indeed, this is of necessity a lengthy and unpredictable process that will take place well after peace negotiations have concluded. This argues for flexibility to ensure that agreements do not bind parties too tightly to unrealistic figures that will later have to be adjusted. Reflecting the DDR-SSR link in peace agreements can provide a valuable entry point to shape the framework for SSR⁴³ (as opposed to simply enduring the consequences of a *laissez-faire* approach). The final report of the SIDDR supports a DDR framework in peace agreements that takes into account the needs of the future security sector and includes broad participation by national actors as well as the international actors, supported by the international community.⁴⁴

Broadening the range of actors involved in peace negotiations is one way to invest negotiations with security governance concerns by enlarging the expertise base of participants and ensuring that under-represented parts of society are provided with opportunities to participate and input their views and perspectives. In particular, this addresses the long-term risks posed by marginalising groups from the peace process. On one level, this can reduce the risk of politically-marginalised ex-combatants renewing tensions in order to achieve their aims.⁴⁵ Giving a prominent role to women, as called for in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, is one obvious step. But civil society more broadly as well as lawmakers are also important. Functionally, developing consultation mechanisms represents a process-based approach to decision-making that is deliberative, may contribute to taking some heat out of highly sensitive political issues, and will provide locally generated understandings of security needs that should inform longer term reform processes. International support for peace processes can include the provision of impartial security advisers. Drawing such expertise from regional organisations such as ECOWAS or the African Union has the added benefit of contextual awareness and legitimacy in the eyes of negotiating parties.⁴⁶

⁴² Brzoska in Bryden & Hänggi (2005): p.98.

⁴³ OECD DAC (2007): p.101.

⁴⁴ SIDDR Final Report (2006): p.18.

⁴⁵ Pouligny, B. ‘The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’ Programs’; Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche Internationales Sciences Po/CNRS, Secrétariat Générale de la Défense Nationale, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, (September 2004): pp.17-18.

⁴⁶ OECD DAC (2007): p.102.

Box 6

Comparing Peace Agreements in Sierra Leone and Liberia

The framing conditions in Sierra Leone and Liberia that led to and shaped the conflicts in both countries also reflect the opportunities and constraints on sustainable SSR. Both states suffered from internal conflicts during the 1990s between government forces and armed non-state groups in which civilians bore a particularly heavy burden. Both also demonstrated the inherently regional nature of conflict in West Africa with interventions by external political actors as well as combatants as was the case with former combatants from Liberia being recruited to fight in Cote d’Ivoire⁴⁷. Trafficking in weapons and natural resources as well as massive, conflict-driven migration flows also rendered national borders meaningless. This has posed particular challenges for DDR with some former combatants – in the absence of effective registration procedures – doubledipping between reintegration programmes within the region in order to accrue their material benefits. Addressing these challenges through DDR processes that contribute to the development of effective and accountable armed and security forces was therefore essential to peace negotiations in both countries.

The peace agreement in Liberia reflects learning from its antecedent in Sierra Leone.⁴⁸ The Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 which provided the basis for reconstruction in Sierra Leone was limited to the major parties to the civil war (the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)). This resulted in an agreement that narrowly focussed on addressing the needs of the majority groupings of ex-combatants rather than the broader range of stakeholders affected by conflict. The sidelining of certain groups of ex-combatants such as the pro-government Civil Defence Force (CDF) and the Kamajors has fostered resentment that still lingers.⁴⁹ By contrast, the August 2003 Accra Peace Agreement for Liberia was a multi-stakeholder process with civil society and political parties having a full place at the table as well as being actively represented in the power-sharing arrangements. The Lomé Agreement included a general amnesty provision for offenders – prompting the UN to withdraw its backing for the agreement – while the Accra Agreement did not, demonstrating an increased awareness of the sensitivity of this issue. The Accra Agreement also reflected a much more process-based approach through setting out benchmarks for progress on issues such as DDR, elections, armed forces reform and institution building.

Fayemi attributes these developments to the Liberian-driven nature of the peace process and the influential role of ECOWAS as opposed to foreign-brokered approaches.⁵⁰ This points to the broader lesson that agreements must be participative and flexible rather than generic and embody long-term objectives in a process-driven approach that includes both DDR and SSR. If processes are not steeped in local contexts nor driven by local actors they are unlikely to shape sustainable reconstruction outcomes.

Lomé Agreement (Sierra Leone, 1999)	Accra Agreement (Liberia, 2003)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Signed between GoSL & Revolutionary United Front. 2. Power sharing agreement between major parties to conflict – 4 Cabinet positions, 4 non-cabinet positions to each and Chairmanship of Strategic Minerals Commission to RUF. 3. Elected President continues in office with vice-presidency to Rebel Leader, Foday Sankoh. 4. Existing Legislature remains in office. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Signed between GoL, LURD, MODEL, Political Parties & Civil Society representatives. 2. Power sharing agreement – 5 cabinet positions each to GoL, LURD & MODEL and 6 cabinet positions to political parties and civil society. 3. Elected president replaced with an Independent Chairman of Transitional Government and no key position for rebel leaders. 4. New Transitional Legislative Assembly with 76 members with 12 each for the factions and 18 seats to

5. Amnesty provision	political parties and civil society.	
6. Sketchy SSR agenda	5. No amnesty provision.	
7. Transitional justice provisions	6. Detailed SSR provisions	
8. No implementation timetable	7. Similar transitional justice provisions	
	8. Timetable for implementation	

5.3 Sequencing

A realistic assessment of political, security and socio-economic framing conditions must form the basis for decision-making on the nature of DDR and SSR. The *UNDP Practice Note on DDR* emphasises that the specific sequencing of activities depends on the particular circumstances of each country and that careful timing is essential in order to achieve complementarity.⁵¹ Ideally, decisions on DDR should follow a broad-based SSR assessment process that involves a wide range of national stakeholders – facilitated by the international community – in defining their own security needs as a point of departure to determine the size and nature of the security sector. Developing a national security strategy can be an important process in helping to define a state’s security needs and therefore the type of security sector most suited to it. The development of Sierra Leone’s Defence White Paper provides a positive example of such a process. Specific reforms are framed by a strategic-level appreciation of the country’s security context including threats, priorities and, in particular, the values that should underpin such a process.⁵² DDR can also be an entry point for SSR. Given the often highly sensitive nature of SSR, discussion on demobilisation issues can serve as a catalyst for national-level discussion in a broader range of security concerns as was the case in DRC (see Box 7).

It is an important sequencing issue to consider how best to achieve mutually reinforcing efforts across the range of DDR and SSR-related issues. How this plays out in practice is highly context-specific. Processes may be parallel with little direct relationship between the two. In some cases DDR provides an entry point for SSR. In others, DDR can be considered as an integral part of a broader SSR programme. The bottom line is to avoid situations where efforts in one area have ripple effects that adversely affect broader peacebuilding. For example, misunderstandings surrounding disarmament measures in Monrovia led to riots that raised wider security concerns.⁵³ This highlights the potential dangers of pursuing DDR programmes in isolation from broader SSR concerns. A lack of explicit awareness in programming between DDR, SSR and transitional justice can lead to imbalances that, for example, might seem to favour former combatants over other parts of society. There is therefore a need to share information between efforts that link DDR and SSR – such as using former combatants in other parts of the security sector – with information gathered for prosecutions or truth-telling that details the human rights or war crimes histories of former combatants. Greater focus on assessment, monitoring and evaluation of these interrelated activities would be an important way to build synergies and avoid conflicting approaches. The OECD DAC general criteria for evaluating development programmes should offer useful insights for evaluating the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of DDR and SSR programmes.⁵⁴

This paper has already emphasised the importance of promoting measures to enhance national capacities for the democratic control and civilian oversight of the security sector from the earliest stages of post-conflict peacebuilding. The role of legislatures in the development of security policy and oversight of the security sector is a particular gap in support for SSR programmes.⁵⁵ Not only will this build trust through promoting transparency and accountability, it will enable actors at different levels of society to

contribute to defining their own security needs. The OECD DAC handbook reinforces this point by stressing that failure to take into account democratic governance of the security sector may have serious long term effects on the development of the security sector.⁵⁶

Sequencing also includes the difficult question of when to hand over responsibility to local actors. There is no simple answer to this question and it must be based on a careful consideration of the specific context. However, Rees warns of the tendency in the context of peace support operations ‘for this to be done too early because ‘SSR is all too often viewed as part of a peace operation’s exit strategy rather than an entrance strategy’.⁵⁷ It is therefore important to understand ownership transfers as a process, with decision-making based on an assessment of the development of national capacities. This reinforces the importance of building such capacities as a key focus of donor assistance.

Box 7

(Mis)perceptions and DDR in DRC

DDR and integration of the different state and non-state armed forces under a unified command structure have been recognised as key elements of the post-conflict peacebuilding challenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Indeed, DDR as provided an entry point for SSR. The first multi-partner talks on army restructuring occurred with the context of DDR (the Comité Technique de Planification et Coordination) while some of the first documents on SSR in the DRC were drafted from a DDR starting point.⁵⁸

Due to resource shortages and other challenges, the ongoing DDR process in DRC has suffered delays, in particular in implementing reinsertion and reintegration aspects of the process. This has led to suffering for civilian populations in areas containing ex-combatants with no legitimate means to support themselves. In some cases, where reinsertion support has been provided, it has not been appropriate to local conditions. A report by *ActionAid*⁵⁹ describes how focusing on the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants has been at the expense of preparing civil society for their reinsertion. The absence of such measures risks problems including retribution from civilian populations, non-employment of former combatants and fear among victims of human rights abuses that perpetrators are being freely released among them. Women, as a particularly vulnerable group to deprivations both during and after conflict, face significant trauma if unprepared for the reinsertion of ex-combatants into their communities.

This example illustrates the interconnected nature of DDR and SSR in DRC. It also highlights the risk of contradiction between a numerically ‘successful’ DDR programme that in reality may work counter to the overarching SSR goal of delivering increased security to individuals and communities. Finally, it demonstrates the importance of public perception and thus the need for effective communications strategies in DDR and SSR programmes. In DRC, where the security sector has been an instrument of repression throughout the country’s history, it is essential to involve communities in order to ensure engagement, support, and the building of trust in these processes following the country’s successful elections.

5.4 Local Ownership and Participation

Beyond their specific linkages, DDR and SSR share a tension that is inherent to the postconflict peacebuilding agenda: the difficult balance between the predominantly externally assisted nature of such endeavours, and the need to foster local and national ownership. Achieving such a balance is essential if there is to be a shift from short-term security to longer-term development involving the timely handover of responsibilities to national actors. In the context of peace support operations (PSOs), the OECD DAC Handbook finds that ‘PSOs are most effective at supporting SSR when they do not focus too narrowly on their own role of service provision. Building the capacity of local security and justice institutions to play that role is vital for sustainable progress’.⁶⁰ In reality, the distinction between local and external actors may be an unhelpful one since it is exactly the interplay of assistance from international actors to national processes – shaped by local contextual appreciation and priorities – that will ensure that who is recruited, how they are trained and where they are deployed contributes to peace and security rather than its reverse. The IDDRS proposes that a letter of agreement be drafted jointly by national stakeholders and the UN to outline respective roles and responsibilities.⁶¹ Such a mechanism can be used to hold all sides accountable and may be a means of operationalising DDR-SSR linkages.

Fundamentally, local ownership must extend beyond central government to include broad civil society participation at national and local levels. Without underestimating the difficulties of achieving a degree of consensus, involving local authorities and communities in planning, implementation and monitoring is the only way to ensure that programmes respond to local needs. A recent report by *International Alert* emphasises that ‘the crucial point is that communities need to be involved in decisions on the provision of security as they should be on the process of DDR...if communities are not given the chance to voice their concerns, needs and expectations around the role of the new security sector then they are unlikely to support or accept the changes and may well continue to resort to making their own provisions’.⁶² Ultimately, therefore, it is at the community level that DDR and SSR processes succeed or fail, with a direct bearing on prospects for SSR. For this reason the Final Report of the SIDDR recommends parallel DDR programmes that mirror measures in favour of ex-combatants with support for the communities that receive them.⁶³ The need for locally-driven approaches is therefore evident. Human security concerns will only be met through effective DDR as part of the broader goal of providing security and justice to individuals and their communities.

Encouraging dialogue, for example on DDR and transitional justice, is one way to address local security concerns and inform decision-making on the timing of disarmament and or reintegration measures.⁶⁴ It is important to counter perceptions that DDR processes ‘reward’ former combatants at the expense of civilian populations or, worse, have committed crimes against them. Dialogue is also essential if reformed security forces are to gain acceptance and trust. This calls for public consultation and information programmes to build support for the DDR process and openly address concerns of accountability and legitimacy. Field research in Burundi as part of the DCAF Integrated Missions Study showed that the DDR and SSR programmes have not been the subject of public information campaigns.⁶⁵ Such a gap must be addressed in the future to facilitate the further disarmament of the civilian population as well as to support civil society oversight of the security sector.

Gender concerns are a key dimension of encouraging more participative approaches to DDR and SSR. On the one hand, programmes should take into account the special needs and vulnerabilities of marginalised men, women, boys and girls.⁶⁶ A specific focus on female combatants, supporters and dependants in DDR processes as well as ensuring equality of opportunities and conditions in the reconstituted security sector is essential but its omission has been a criticism levelled at some DDR processes such as in Sierra Leone.⁶⁷ On the other hand, in Burundi there has been a regular exchange of information between the gender unit and the DDR/SSR unit of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). This has resulted in concrete activities that have successfully contributed to the DDR and SSR process. For example, during the DDR process, ONUB's gender unit, with the support of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), planned a workshop on gender issues with the National DDR Commission to ensure that female ex-combatants in the Assembly Areas were properly dealt with. Support was also provided to the National Burundian Police whereby two specific units (*Unités de Protection de L'Enfant et des Mères*) were set up in Bujumbura with dedicated staff trained for treating victims of sexual violence.⁶⁸ Sensitive programming also requires better harnessing the capacities of women as a resource base for building peace.⁶⁹ Women's groups play a powerful role in peacebuilding and this should be further developed in contributing to peace agreements, DDR processes as well as in providing a strong voice in the oversight of the security sector as members of the executive, legislative and civil society more broadly.

If accusations that local ownership is more rhetoric than reality are to be addressed, it is wrong-headed to consider the issue in unitary terms without regard to the political sensitivities of specific reform processes. The nuanced reality is that local actors have conflicting interests which are not necessarily aligned with those that underpin the DDR and SSR processes. Spoilers may be opposed to the peace process per se but may also, in order to safeguard influence and position, work against measures that seem threatening. Processes must therefore take into account these challenges. In recognising this dilemma, Scheye and Peake suggest that 'it may be possible to negotiate a middle ground that privileges local knowledge, traditions and capacities, and, only when necessary, is tempered by external intercession'.⁷⁰ Such a middle ground can only be developed through deconstructing ownership in ways that link DDR and SSR programming to the realities and limitations of the specific post-conflict settings in which they are situated.

Box 8

Human Security, Participation and the Transformation of the South African Security Sector⁷¹

After the collapse of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) government that came into power following the country's first democratic, fully participative elections in 1994 enacted a paradigm shift in policy and practice at the national level. Reforming the security sector, as the central instrument of repression during the Apartheid era, represents a central element of South Africa's transformation from a state embodying regime security as its *raison d'être* to one founded on the human security of its citizens.

The principles characterising South Africa's Defence Review process and the White Paper that underpinned it included: respect for national and international law; transparency; subordination to parliament and the executive; political neutrality and nondiscrimination; promotion of regional and international security; and respect for the human rights of armed forces personnel. National security was defined as a means to secure the rights and needs of South Africa's people. But of greater significance than these principles is the *process* that ensured they were embedded in an MOD and national defence forces integrated and cohesive at cultural, political and organisational levels.

The South African defence review process began in 1994 and produced a White Paper (1996), Defence Review (1998) and Defence Act (2002). The process was marked throughout by a strong commitment to consultation within government and the security community and, in particular, across a broad range of civil society actors including NGOs, academics, businesses and communities. The drafting committee for the development of the White Paper, led by a well-known researcher and activist, included senior members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the civilian Defence Secretariat. Hotly-debated rounds of drafting saw disputes resolved through discussion and, where necessary, reference to international expert opinion. The draft revised as a result of public consultations was presented to the Parliamentary Defence Committee where a commitment to consensus proved decisive in shaping a final version that secured a delicate balance between technical realism, constitutionality, core values and priorities. The Defence White Paper provided a vital launch pad for subsequent elements of the defence review process.

South Africa's transformation, which has included both DDR and SSR as core components, provides a powerful example for other states undergoing or in need of root and branch reform. This in no way implies a 'mission accomplished' perspective. The shortcomings in South Africa's DDR process are illustrated today by the numerous 'violence entrepreneurs' working (contrary to South African law) as part of private military and security companies in areas such as Iraq or by the continued involvement of former apartheid era security actors in mercenary-related activities. Moreover, the particular framing conditions, including South Africa's relative economic might, means that the wholly locally-driven nature of the process is unlikely to be replicated in other African contexts. Yet a process-driven approach, based on inclusivity, political nonpartisanship, flexibility, transparency and long-termism, provide important guiding principles that are relevant regardless of the reform context.

5.5 Capacity and Coordination

UN support for DDR has shown a high level of coordination as demonstrated by the creation of an Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG-DDR) as well as the development of the IDDRS. Joint planning by DPKO and UNDP of missions in Haiti and Sudan are a further concrete example of increased coordination. However, a recent inventory of UN peacebuilding capacities identifies that coordination between UN entities and with external actors in the SSR field is often lacking or carried out in an ad hoc manner.⁷² This may be as much due to an absence of political will as to the lack of coordination measures, thus raising the question of whether coordination on the ground has improved where such mechanisms exist. A recent decision to establish an Inter-Agency Working Group on SSR (IAWG-SSR) co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP (now known as the SSR Task Force) should constitute a first step in providing an overall strategy for the UN system that makes more coherent its contribution to SSR and links this more explicitly to related areas.

A pre-condition for effective coordination is that all actors share the same understanding of DDR and SSR. The relative novelty of the SSR concept and its varying interpretations represent an obstacle in this respect that argues for commonly applied definitions. Bringing more clarity at the policy level would have a consequent effect in programming terms, particularly in avoiding duplication of efforts. In the case of Burundi, regular meetings between the UN peacekeeping mission and other international actors took place within the framework of the International Coordination Group for SSR. Moreover, the DDR/SSR unit of ONUB instituted a system which mapped the SSR activities carried out by the different international actors engaged on the ground. This mapping was divided into the categories of support provided by different countries and organisations to the *Police Nationale du Burundi*, the *Forces de Défense Nationale*, and to the *Service Nationale de Renseignement*; and it contained the relevant timelines of support. This was considered by international stakeholders to have been a very useful tool for the coordination of SSR in Burundi. However, DDR did not figure explicitly as a category of support.⁷³ Putting forward one potential coordination measure, the OECD DAC Handbook suggests that the inclusion of security concerns in post-conflict needs assessments could improve coordination at the strategic level and in programme planning.⁷⁴

The Statement by the President of the Security Council at the February 2007 Open Debate on SSR encouraged the drafting of a comprehensive report by the UN Secretary General that, inter alia, should identify ‘core security sector reform functions that the United Nations system can perform, roles and responsibilities of UN system entities, and how best to coordinate UN support for security sector reform with national and international activities in this field, as well as interaction with regional and sub-regional actors.’⁷⁵ The UN Peacebuilding Inventory notes that, with few exceptions, ‘the overall UN capacity in SSR, understood both as support to governance and to the development of national capacities in core security operational tasks remains limited, when not practically non-existent, as in the case of specialist defence reform capacity. What capacity exists is dispersed and poorly coordinated’.⁷⁶ This statement reinforces the point that neither external actors who support SSR nor national actors who own and implement it have adequate capacities to address the range of issues on the SSR agenda. It is important not to try and do everything but to identify gaps in capacity, understand where comparative advantage lies, and seek complementary approaches with other actors on the ground.

5.6 Funding Arrangements

The UN Secretary-General's 2006 report on DDR recognises the problems posed by 'the absence of adequate, timely and sustained funding. This has frequently resulted in a gap between disarmament and demobilisation activities on the one hand, which are relatively easy to fund, plan and implement, and reintegration on the other, which is dependant on voluntary contributions and on expertise and conditions that are not always present in a timely manner in a post-conflict environment'.⁷⁷ Different funding streams address the 'two Ds' and reintegration. Disarmament and demobilisation are met by assessed UN contributions, predominantly from the peacekeeping assessed budget, while the main source of reintegration funding is through bilateral channels. The SIDDR emphasises the importance of assessed funds in covering security-related expenditures that would not be met through development funding. Yet it suggests that the management of such contributions exclusively by DPKO precludes opportunities for national ownership.⁷⁸ Reintegration funding comes from development assistance budgets which may suffer from slow disbursement. This has created an artificial distinction between different parts of the DDR process. Ball and Hendrickson concur with one of the findings of the SIDDR Final Report⁷⁹ in identifying the growing use of multi-donor trust funds, pooled resource funds as in the UK and Netherlands and 'whole of government' approaches as a positive development that demonstrates a growing awareness of the need for coordinating financing as a key part of overall coordination.⁸⁰

The OECD-DAC guidelines on official development assistance (ODA) for 'the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries' reflect development donors' reluctance to fund armed forces professionalisation by excluding support for military training, the supply or financing of military equipment or services. An 18-month process ending in 2005 clarified the definition of ODA to include management of security expenditure, enhancing the role of civil society in the security sector, supporting legislation to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, SSR, civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities and measures to curb small arms and light weapons (SALW).⁸¹ A wider spectrum of SSR activities can therefore be funded through ODA than had previously been the case. This is significant as DDR funding may be more attractive than SSR to some donors because it is more measurable (numbers of arms handed over, soldiers demobilised etc.). However, donors that support SSR frequently do so in an ad hoc manner with short budget cycles for individual projects rather than sustained support for long-term programmes. Addressing this gap was one of the key arguments behind the development of the OECD DAC Handbook.⁸² Effecting change requires a shift in donor thinking that moves away from achieving more visible *outputs* to influencing longer-term if less marketable *outcomes* that influence prospects for security and development.

From an SSR perspective, funding for the reform and reconstruction of the security sector represents a significant potential source of political leverage for the international community since they provide much of the financial support for these activities. Such measures need to be deployed carefully. Limiting military expenditures under pressure of losing development assistance has proved a blunt instrument in this regard, leading in some cases to creative accounting and a lack of transparency in security budgeting. The World Bank led Multi-Donor Recovery Programme (MDRP) in the Great Lakes area asks governments seeking funding to submit a letter demonstrating how demobilisation is linked to SSR. This is an example of the leverage that can be applied to link DDR and

SSR. However, it has been observed that ‘there appears to have been very little follow up to the letters of demobilisation policy such that SSR is reduced to a means of supporting former combatants that have become part of the national armed forces...rather than as a catalyst for a strategic review of force requirements and structures which could lead to more appropriately sized, affordable and better-managed armies’.⁸³ Challenging the arguments and figures provided by national governments would seem to be a vital element of responsible donoring. However, even if observed, such approaches fail the test of democratic governance since policies drawn up by governments absent discussion with other stakeholders will be neither realistic nor legitimate.

Resources provided to support DDR and SSR processes have not in the past been tailored to the budget limitations of national authorities. The IDDRS reinforces this point by stressing that ‘while taking ex-combatants into public service may be an important part of overall reconciliation and political integration strategies, especially as part of SSR, it can be sustainable only when economic circumstances allow for the expansion of public services.’⁸⁴ The OECD DAC Handbook stresses the importance of sustained financial support if reforms are to be sustainable and that ‘great care should be taken to ensure that such assistance is eventually assimilated into government budgets and revenue streams so as to minimise the risk of creating fiscally unsustainable services’.⁸⁵ A commitment to local ownership in support for DDR and SSR therefore imposes an obligation on donors to ensure that programmes are sustainable and that financing is accompanied by capacity building in the institutions that must manage and process such support.

6. Conclusion

DDR processes are often judged by the numbers of former combatants that are disarmed, demobilised and successfully reintegrated. By contrast, there is significant debate on how to measure success in SSR programmes where the object is understood not just to effect institutional change but to reform or even transform a dysfunctional relationship between the security sector, elected authorities and society. Injecting such broader considerations may seem to muddy the waters in terms of evaluating DDR programmes. But understanding and operationalising this linkage is essential if the contribution of DDR in shaping broader security and development outcomes is to be optimised.

The need to understand and operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR is increasingly recognised. It forms part of a growing awareness of the imperative to provide more coherent and coordinated support from the international community across the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. Greater clarity on roles and capabilities of different actors and how they have been deployed in specific contexts is an essential precursor to meaningful policy frameworks for the UN, but also for other bi- and multilateral actors engaged in these fields. In order to operationalise such a linkage there is a need to marry findings drawn from the policy literature with a clear picture of how engagements have been planned and implemented at headquarters and in the field. These are highly sensitive and political issues. The size, shape and orientation of the security sector reflect the interests of local political actors and other interest groups. Focussing on the security governance dimensions of DDR and SSR can take into account some of these sensitivities through fostering participation, increasing oversight and building trust.

Supporting security sector governance institutions provides a concrete means to further these goals. This requires much greater commitment to enhancing national capacities to

manage DDR and SSR processes and to ensure their democratic control and oversight by parliament and civil society. Participation by under-represented groups increases the legitimacy of such processes, provides a valuable source of expertise and builds trust in peacebuilding efforts. This should not be regarded only as a longer term goal but is equally relevant as part of both immediate post-conflict stabilisation as well as longer term recovery and development.

This paper has scoped out a number of issues and challenges that surround the DDR/SSR nexus. Further work, firmly grounded in an analysis of the assessment, design, implementation and evaluation of specific DDR and SSR interventions, will be necessary in order to operationalise the crucial linkages between DDR and SSR. In particular, these issues merit further discussion among the policy makers and practitioners – national and international – who are immersed in this work on a day to day basis. The number and scope of DDR and SSR interventions in Africa make clear that this work is both necessary and urgent.

The following recommendations are put forward as a contribution to the debate on linking DDR and SSR:

Recommendations

- Concepts count. In particular, conceptual clarity on what constitutes ‘SSR’ both within the UN family and across the range of relevant actors will provide a frame of reference for coordination. The definitions contained in the OECD Guidelines on SSR form a useful basis given their emphasis on a comprehensive approach to security and justice development.
- A specific chapter should be developed in the IDDRS to address the DDR-SSR nexus. This will facilitate the integration of these concerns into institutional policy and practice. Further consideration should also be given to developing synergies between other related activities such as mine action, small arms and light weapons programmes or transitional justice. An increased emphasis on assessment, monitoring and evaluation of DDR and SSR programmes should be pursued with the specific goal of facilitating harmonisation and alignment.
- It is important to be realistic about the level of coordination that can be achieved in terms of policy and programming between actors with different roles, objectives and structures. Better coordination between DDR and SSR stakeholders at headquarters and in the field can be achieved through mechanisms that provide for structured information sharing that prioritises a division of labour based on comparative advantage. At the strategic level, including security concerns in post-conflict needs assessments may facilitate coordination. Fundamentally, coordination between international actors involved in DDR and SSR will be of limited value unless national actors play a central role in these processes.
- Coordination will only be meaningful if appropriate human and material resources are deployed to implement DDR and SSR programmes. This calls for a multi-disciplinary approach that utilises a wide range of skills sets from military and police professionals to legal, financial management and human resource experts.

If DDR is to make a direct contribution to SSR e.g. through providing a resource pool for reformed police forces, then expertise in this field needs to be reflected within the DDR programme. Equally, SSR practitioners need to understand expertise in DDR processes and their relationships to SSR.

- DDR and SSR programmes require timely and sustained funding. This has often been absent in the past with negative consequences for the broader security and development outcomes that DDR and SSR seek to influence. Slowly disbursed funding for reintegration frequently causes broader security problems while short budget cycles and individual project funding for SSR lack the sustainability necessary to shape outcomes in long term reform processes. The increased use of multi-donor funding arrangements for DDR and SSR is recommended as a potentially significant mechanism to address these shortcomings.
- Reintegration of former combatants into other parts of the security sector is a concrete way that DDR can contribute to SSR. This should not be an ad hoc process based on the preferences of political leaders or individual choice but should reflect clear SSR-driven criteria. Candidates must be vetted for war crimes or human rights abuses and tailored training must be provided (e.g. for former soldiers assuming policing roles). The numbers involved in such processes must be a reflection of the needs and absorptive capacity of the security sector.
- The international community has significant leverage – often not effectively deployed – to influence the shape of peace processes. To integrate DDR and SSR concerns, strong efforts must be made to ensure that peace agreements reflect the needs of the future security sector rather than simply the preferences of former conflict parties. DDR provisions should be flexible and process-based to meet shifting perceptions of threat and need. Support for the provision of impartial security advisors, ideally drawn from the same region, is a useful way to support such processes. Broad participation by national and local stakeholders should be encouraged to avoid the risk of marginalisation.
- DDR and SSR programmes will be best linked if they reflect an expression of national priorities and will. Local actors need to be intimately involved in DDR and SSR activities from their inception. The recommendation in the IDDRS that DDR obligations on all parties be set out in a jointly drafted letter of agreement should be extended to SSR commitments. Building trust through participative, transparent processes is key to successful outcomes. Unsustainable ‘Rolls Royce’ programmes that are not viable through national financial means and mechanisms must be avoided.
- Programmes must be designed to have a positive impact at the community level. Giving a voice to local stakeholders will build trust as an enabler for effective DDR and SSR. Programming must be accompanied by media and communications strategies that promote transparency and accountability as well as contributing to the avoidance of potentially dangerous misconceptions.
- A security governance approach provides the right optic to link DDR and SSR. Fostering national capacities in security sector governance institutions provides a key means of linking DDR and SSR through supporting those best placed to

design and implement these programmes. This area should be a central focus of donor support. This will promote local ownership and thus sustainability and legitimacy, creating a process that will lead towards an gradual transfer of responsibility to local actors.