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The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century*

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Although peace research as a professional institution has lost some of its earlier appeal, the end of the Cold War did not cause any particular identity crisis within the field. Quite the contrary, peace research co-contributed to the end of the Cold War via Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. In a world plagued by unnecessary violence, both actual and potential, peace research as an emancipatory conception can readily reorientate to the study of issues relevant in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, there is plenty of potential to develop the methodological framework from where Galtung and others left off. The article discusses the challenge that critical theories pose for the ontology and epistemology of peace research, and argues that the task of peace research should be related to transformations from politics to violence and vice versa. Informed by critical realism and a pluralistic, republican notion of politics, this argument proposes a direction for both peace research and political *praxis*. Both should be consistent with realist ontology of open systems and history; with epistemological relativism appropriate for 'heterodoxical' discourses; and with critical peace theories concerning violence-prone social processes such as mystification, reification and enemy-construction.

Introduction

Superficially, the end of the Cold War signified an identity crisis in the field of peace research. If history is about to end, there will be no need for further research on the causes of war and conditions of peace (as acknowledged, e.g., by Boulding, 1992: 1). I shall argue, however, that there is also a clear place for critical peace research at the start of the new century. What is needed is a partial redefinition of the task of peace research and, in particular, new theoretical ideas, ideas which take into account the methodological and ethico-political lessons learned in the past decades.

There are good reasons for focusing on the acute problem of state/society relations and on societal conflicts where the issues are socio-economic and identity-political. In fact, peace research can be said to have anticipated much of the post-Cold War shift of focus. Yet the problems of war between states and weapons of mass destruction have not

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disappeared. Most importantly, the quest for emancipation from false necessities remains. Also, to avoid self-marginalization as 'a refuge for those good people who habitually support life's good (i.e. lost) causes' (see Neufeld, 1993: 171, citing Dunn), there is a constant need to reflect upon the grounds, meaning and methodology of this emancipatory project.

Critical theories challenge peace research in two ways. On the one hand, they encourage the further development of emancipatory ontology and methodology. On the other, they force us to take seriously the politics of identity of peace research itself, and the conditions for its successful practice. It is the job of peace research to show how real historical tendencies can be overturned. More precisely, how can peace research act consistently to prevent the transformation of politics into violence, and in turn to support the transformation of violence into politics? By analysing the question this way, I shall conclude that peace research promotes peaceful, democratic *world politics*.

The End of the Cold War

Peace research has been readily equated with the concerns of the Cold War, concerns such as disarmament, confidence-building and the prevention of nuclear war. Their importance seems to have diminished. For empirical reasons, perhaps there is less need for peace research? On the much stronger presumptions that the Soviet Union alone was the cause of the Cold War, and that history is about to end, the end of the Cold War could also be seen as the cause of a fundamental identity crisis in peace research. Yet, the implications of the unanticipated end of the Cold War could have been levelled against other research traditions as well, including Neorealism and Strategic Studies (see Grunberg & Risse-Kappen, 1992; Patomäki, 1992) and in particular the faintly journalistic field of Sovietology (Pursiainen, 2000: 1–4, 78–83). In fact, Wiberg (1992) has argued that peace research fared better than most. So why has peace research been singled out and many peace research institutes attacked, reorganized or even closed?[1] Why do many critically minded academic researchers opt for philosophy, International Relations or Global Political Economy rather than peace research?[2]

The identity of peace research has been under discussion for nearly 40 years, yet there has never been any clear and widespread unanimity about what it is, and what, strictly speaking, its tasks are. These debates have above all revolved around the meaning of the contested term *peace* (see, e.g., Boulding, 1977; Galtung, 1964). However, the core concepts of the older discipline of

[1] The original impetus to write this paper stemmed from the aftermath of the struggle in Finland in the early 1990s over the future of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). This (second) attempt to merge peace research with the Finnish Institute for International Affairs failed, but TAPRI nonetheless lost in the process its institutional autonomy and part of its funding. Since the rise of conservative neoliberalism in the early 1980s, reinforced by the end of the Cold War, similar attacks on peace research institutes have occurred in Australia, Canada and Germany, among others. However, there have also been opposite tendencies, most notably in Denmark, where COPRI's position was strengthened, and in the Mediterranean area, where new peace research institutes have been established in response to the conflict-prone developments on the African side of the Mediterranean. However, with the notable exception of COPRI, these new institutes have not, thus far, contributed significantly to discussions about theories or basic ideas of peace research. As in Germany, the increased funding due to 'centre-left' governments has often been geared towards policy-oriented mainstream International Relations or European Studies research.

[2] One indication is the lack of interest in peace research conferences. The IPRA Conference in Groningen (1990) and the first EuPRA Conference in Firenze (1991) were vibrant affairs. Since then, peace research conferences have increasingly failed to attract scholars. Two EuPRA conferences were cancelled because of lack of participants, and the 1998 IPRA Conference in Durban was a failure. The Tampere Conference in 2000 had some 350 participants, quite a few of them peace activists. Of the academic researchers, many were from Finland. In sharp contrast, the annual ISA Conventions have been characterized by an upward trend, with thousands of participants from all over the world, and the same holds true for ECPR and BISA conferences.

International Relations have been equally contested. International Relations, too, was originally committed to the idea that through research it would be possible to rid the world of war or at least to reduce its incidence.

Yet, challenges and innovations appear to be rising in International Relations, whereas peace research often struggles against diminishing resources or administrative closure decisions; it continues to function at a more or less routine level or has lost its distinctive identity. As a symbol, the term *peace research* has lost its rhetorical attraction in most circles. It is long since there has been any great theoretical breakthrough within the field. Perhaps, for some reason, peace research is simply not developing?

Peace research was not merely linked with the concerns of the Cold War. With the structuralist turn of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it also began to look Marxist, or at least Leftist, and the popularity of the traditional Left collapsed. In addition, people grew tired of gurus such as Johan Galtung. New preoccupations and fads came and went. The study of International Relations has been much closer to the mainstream ideologies of the West, 'realism' and liberalism. With the end of the Cold War, liberalism appeared to have achieved an unshakeable global leadership, with peace breaking out on Western terms. Fukuyama (1989, 1992) attempted to justify this dominance by adapting Hegel's argument about the end of history. However, as Bhaskar (1993: 367) maintains, from a consistent dialectical point of view, there is no reason to believe that change and emancipation should be limited to the mutual recognition of a few liberal rights within the frame of a nation-state.

More power-political voices have also arisen within the establishment of Western power, most conspicuously that of Huntington, who, in 1991, claimed that a third universal wave of liberal democracy was washing across the globe. Soon, thereafter, he seems to argue that it never amounted to more than a momentary splash (1993). Cultures and civilizations are irrevocably different, they are likely to clash, and the West should prepare in various ways, including military buildup, against potential enemies and refrain from interventions in the affairs of other civilizations. This is because 'violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars' (Huntington, 1993: 48).

Huntington notwithstanding, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Western 'we won' euphoria, and the subsequent developments, peace research was often represented as 'old-fashioned'. Given the *zeitgeist* of the turn of the 1990s, the winds of global history seemed to be blowing against it. This version of the story of the development of peace research, however, is oversimplified. Under neoliberal attack, many other social studies have also suffered cuts around the world (in Latin America, these attacks succeeded particularly well in the 1980s, whereas in Europe and the white English-speaking world resistance has been stronger). Strategic Studies has also been struggling with problems of purpose and funding (see, e.g., Jones, 1993). As a concerned observer put it, 'a specter is haunting strategic studies – the specter of peace' (Betts, 1997: 7).

My aim, though, is not just to complicate the story. I will argue that critical peace research, (re)defined according to its essential characteristics, is very much needed at the beginning of the new century. But peace research understood in this way cannot be equated with peace research as it is conducted in institutes around the world. In fact, many of the researchers in peace research institutes have withdrawn to the traditional mainstream research of

International Relations.[3] Many of them support positivism against metatheoretical and other challenges, even though these same challenges have been a source of innovation and inspiration in the creation of new ground-breaking areas in the study of international relations. For example, Østerud's (1996) attack on 'postmodernism' was widely espoused by the older generation peace researchers (for a debate, see Patomäki, 1997a; Østerud, 1997; Smith, 1997).

The conditions for the success of innovations are not only reflectively contextual, but also real and causally effective, whether acknowledged or not (Bhaskar, 1986: 127–129; Harré, 1979: 362–365). This is how the future of peace research also needs to be understood. Peace research has a place in the world at the start of the new millennium. What is needed is a redefinition of its task, as well as new theoretical ideas taking into account the methodological and ethico-political lessons learned in past decades.

Emancipatory Research

Powerfully boosted by the US financiers of the Cold War, classical political 'realism' – transformed into scientific 'neorealism' already in the 1950s – began to dominate the study of international relations. The 'idealists' were pushed to the margins in International Relations. However, peace research continued the research agenda of the 1920s and 1930s by new scientific means. Peace research topics included armament and disarmament, the creation of international institutions, the right of national self-determination and peaceful changes. Different theories concerning the causes of war were tested and models developed for resolving and transforming conflict.

As a reaction to the bleak religious and metaphysical assumptions of human nature and the violent nature of human politics which form part of the classical realist view,[4] 'original' peace research reflected a belief in scientific knowledge and an ability to enlighten humanity. By creating their own research centres and journals, peace researchers created the institutional frameworks for their own research programme. But how different was positivist peace research compared with scientific 'neorealism' or strategic studies?

Following the first sharply positivist phase, many peace researchers began to develop the concept that science could help people to become free of undesirable and unnecessary regularities or conjunctions. Peace research was defined as an applied science, and an analogy was often drawn with the role of the physician (e.g. Galtung, 1975: 170–172; see also Lawler, 1995: 56–60). Peace research is an applied science charged with the task not only of presenting how things actually are, but also of telling how they should be. Just as the normative objective of medicine is health, the objective of peace research is peace. Therefore, not only are peace researchers expected to produce original high-quality studies, they must also be relevant. At this time, however, Galtung expressed the belief that as long as the newest

[3] A comment from the Editor of *Journal of Peace Research* is revealing. He says that most *JPR* contributors 'avoid the word peace, possibly because it sounds too grand and pretentious' (Gleditsch, 1989: 3). It is no wonder that Galtung (1994: 40) stated: 'Let's forget *JPR*. It has betrayed the whole idea of peace research.' Although the word 'peace' has always been contested and may in fact have appeared more often in *JPR* since 1989, the difference between pragmatically positivist and emancipatory-dialectical (or 'critical' or 'constructivist') research remains a divisive issue, the latter being pushed to the margins in mainstream peace research.

[4] Indeed, classical political realism also ponders the problem of war and peace with the goal of promoting *both* national interest *and* peace. Korhonen (1983: 160) is not therefore entirely unjustified in saying that Hans Morgenthau too was a 'peace researcher', even though Galtung (1969: 53) notes that promoting the interests of your own country abroad 'is, as is well-known, not the goal of peace research'.

methods for data collection, even 'including modern data processing with its punch cards and electronic computers', can be harnessed exponentially into the service of the growing peace research community, the result will eventually be a much more peaceful world (Galtung, 1969: 51, 55).

In methodological publications in the 1970s, Galtung became more concerned about how peace research could actually help to overturn undesirable regularities (1977a). He now drew a distinction between absolute and conditional invariances. When our interest is emancipatory, that is to say when we want to be free of undesirable invariances, we have three alternatives:

(1) According to the postulated invariances, relevant outcomes are strongly dependent on the values of certain variables, which we can try to influence. For example, when Richardson's armament model demonstrates that state attempts to maintain a small surplus security margin in their armaments have radical consequences for the instability of relations between states, this margin must be taken into consideration as a subject of political influence (Rapoport, 1960: 15–30; Richardson, 1960).
(2) Second, few invariances are empirically imperfect: there are 'deviant cases'. Study of such cases may help discover those contextual factors or third variables which can overwhelm or change the invariance. For example, according to Choucri & North (1975), the factors included in Richardson's armaments model depicted only one limited part of the interaction among European colonial powers before World War I. Complex, interrelated demographic and socio-economic factors contributed to the armament race and the outbreak of the war. A particular view of the demands of national security played an important role by reinforcing their identity and actions as sovereign states. It may be possible to change these contextual factors and thereby overturn the original invariance.
(3) When the invariance appears as empirically perfect and the variables beyond influence, and when an analysis of the exceptional cases does not help find critical variables or contextual factors, one has to resort to inductive guesswork concerning how the invariance could be overturned. This is a question of the systematic use of theoretical and programmatic imagination.

Galtung's new idea of emancipatory peace research brings peace research into the realm of critical theory, albeit hesitantly (see his explicit discussion on the *Positivismusstreit* in German sociology) (1977b). The distinction between positivist and critical study in fact goes back to the 1930s. According to Horkheimer (1989: 199, 204–205), the positivist looks for scientific laws as empirically observable constant conjunctions and aims at technical manipulation of nature or society. At least in liberal capitalist societies, positivist knowledge tends to result in the reproduction of the status quo. In contrast, critical theory assumes that human ideas and concepts are significant from the point of view of reproducing or changing social relations. In critical theory, it is argued that societal facts and regularities are produced historically by positioned, relational *human actors* (themselves historical) and, therefore, can also be changed by them. In spite of resistance of the powerful and other contingencies, purposeful, emancipatory change is, at least in principle, possible.

Galtung (1977a: 90–95; 1977b) tries to find some sort of dialectic synthesis between the search for invariances and attempts to break them. His articulation is nevertheless just a gateway in the right direction. What are

the crucial variables and conditions, and what relation do they have to the conscious actions of the agents? Are not these variables and conditions subject to (other) invariances and thus already determined? On the other hand, if there are even conditional, contextual regularities, what *produces* them? What *exists*, and does that which exists actually *change*? Where does the human *freedom to act otherwise* come from? It is here that critical theories pose an ontological and methodological challenge to peace research.

In a context of widespread fear of irrelevance or self-marginalization, the contradictions and underlying empiricism of Galtung's emancipatory project may be taken as pointing towards a soft or 'pragmatic' positivism. Many institutional peace researchers have opted for this solution. By contrast, it is my argument that it is necessary to go deeper and develop the emancipatory project further. The target should be to articulate an emancipatory social ontology as well as an adequate conception of causality and a related research methodology.[5] To make the case for this focus stronger, and to indicate the potential power of emancipatory research concretely and historically, I shall discuss the role of peace research in the episodes and processes that led up to the end of the Cold War.

Peace Research Contributed to the End of the Cold War

As peace research moved towards the methodology of critical social science, the research area itself was vastly expanded. In particular, development questions and North–South relations became popular areas of research. Other global problems came under the spotlight, too. Even though the central aim remained 'a radical breaking away from the politics that had locked the world into a bipartite confrontational situation and an ever-increasing spiral of armament' (Rytövuori-Apunen, 1990: 183), the Cold War was by no means the only research subject in the 1970s and 1980s.

At the same time, a central aim of peace research was achieved: peace research contributed to the end of the Cold War. Galtung (1995) claims that the essential causes for the end of the Cold War were the peace movement, dissidents and Gorbachev. Galtung tells how, already in 1982, he observed in Moscow how PRIO's publications were very closely studied within the IMEMO.[6] Galtung (1995: 100) notes that:

> I had naively assumed that things I had been doing would have an effect on some Western establishment – not at all. They would rather read anything from one hundred U.S. think tank documents than anything from PRIO. Yet Moscow was the place where a group of young people were digesting our work.

Similar views have also received attention in mainstream International Relations. Although the hardline Reaganites may have had an insight into the internal weakness of the Soviet Union (see Pipes, 1995: 157–158), they have failed to acknowledge that Gorbachev's foreign policy was based on ideas that were partly in accordance with those of peace research, in part taken directly from the texts of peace researchers. For example, Risse-Kappen (1994) suggests that a significant role was played by ideas developed by Western liberal internationalists (supporters of disarmament in particular), actual peace researchers and Western

[5] See Patomäki (forthcoming) and 'Realist Ontology and the Possibility of Emancipatory Social Science', an Appendix to this article, available at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp, in which I try to show in some detail how to move forward from Galtung's residual positivism towards a critical realist articulation of the ontological basis for emancipatory research.

[6] IMEMO (The Institute of World Economy and International Relations) was founded after the death of Stalin in 1956. From the end of the 1970s, and especially following the arrival of Primakov as leader at the beginning of the 1980s, the institute became a hotbed for the 'new thinking'. Since the 1990s, the multinational corporation ABB has taken over an increasing share of IMEMO's offices; IMEMO itself occupies only a small part of the building.

European non-communist parties of the Left. Similarly, Evangelista (1995, 1999) shows in great detail how a transnational disarmament community was influential in the early Gorbachev years, despite the resistance of the mainstream of the military and Soviet conservatives. This transnational community consisted of scientists – many of whom were taking part in Pugwash conferences, continuing the work of Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein – and various disarmament experts. Similarly, Checkel (1997: xii) emphasizes that 'while the broader structure of the Soviet state hindered the adoption of new foreign policy ideas, it also insured consolidation of those adopted by the leadership'. Herman (1996: 275) points out that in addition to these cross-national links, Gorbachev's 'new thinking' was also based on ideas originally developed in IMEMO and other Soviet institutions.

During *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the Soviet leadership began to talk of *one* global economy, of the interdependence of countries or blocs, of everyone's common security and of global problems which bring together all people, regardless of class or nationality. What were the social conditions for these redefinitions? As a Politburo member, Gorbachev (1996: 116–121, 127–131, 138) became aware of the catastrophic state of agriculture and other economic problems. Evangelista (1986: 567–569, 576–577; 1995: 20) maintains that economic concerns weighed heavily in the learning process of the Gorbachev regime. Other concrete experiences and threats conditioned the learning process as well. For instance, various accounts have suggested that Soviet intelligence interpreted the November 1983 Able Archer exercise as a cover for a NATO first strike and a nuclear alert was triggered (see Andrew & Gordievsky, 1991: 85–89; Ralph, forthcoming). This, and other experiences of the immediacy of the threat of nuclear war, seems to have precipitated Gorbachev's looking for alternative paradigms of security.

Nevertheless, it took some time in the Kremlin for Gorbachev to take a real departure from the Soviet ideological rhetoric (Gorbachev, 1996: 173). Through open-minded communication with dissidents inside the Soviet Union, and divergent views transnationally, Gorbachev and his close aides forged the basics of 'new thinking' in foreign policy, close to the conceptions of the Palme Commission, and to 'pragmatist' peace researchers (see Rudney, 1990), left-leaning disarmament experts, and Pugwash scientists. Gorbachev's foreign policy developed with the 'new thinking' and top-down reforms of the Soviet society. However, the process was conditioned by external realities. For instance, Galtung (1995: 99) refers to Georgi Arbatov's speech in Washington in 1986 and proposes that it was the West German peace movement that made Gorbachev's new thinking possible, reassuring the Politburo that Germany did not harbour revanchist intentions and that there could be a place for the 'new thinking'.

There were also unacknowledged conditions and processes. Thus, Gorbachev's new foreign policy was soon to have unintended consequences. The velvet revolutions sprang spontaneously from below. For example, Havel's 'moral civil society' played a central role in the 1989 revolutions. Gorbachev had overturned the arms race and, partly unintentionally, empowered the dissident movements, which soon ended the Cold War. Shortly afterwards, Gorbachev lost his grip within the Soviet Union, over westernizers, nationalist reformers and old Soviet supporters alike. The failure of the coup attempt by the supporters of the old Soviet regime in August 1991 led to the fall of the Soviet Union.

Who Needs Peace Research at the Start of the New Century?

Who needs peace research at the start of the new century? Western funders do not appear

enthusiastic; peace research conferences are increasingly losing their colour, or disappearing altogether, and in Moscow ideas of peace research have once again been sidelined. But perhaps peace research is here for some other purpose?

According to Galtung, 'the peace researcher has no fatherland'. The peace researcher's home is the 'whole world' (1969: 17). Like medicine, peace research should serve humanity in general, and no one humanity in particular. If peace researchers were one day to agree on some plan for world peace, it would contain a mélange of those thoughts that dominate discussions, without being tied specifically to any of them, as well as presenting a whole collection of new ideas. For this reason, Galtung (1969: 50–51) believes it is wrong to claim that peace research is a faithful tool supporting the basic ideology of some international organization, foreign ministry or peace organization. To the extent to which peace research has become such a tool, it has ceased to be science and research. The task of peace research is, without prejudice, to help understand war and peace in a more realistic and able manner.

Galtung's answer is no longer entirely adequate. Knowledge is neither outside the world nor politically neutral. Justification of peace research cannot be made merely in terms of medical analogies. The first and apparently simpler task is to convince potential funders that peace research is worth investing in. Most actors claim to support peace, at least in general terms. Political violence remains a major problem, but it cannot be equated merely with the problem of war between states or alliances. Since World War II, only a small number of wars have been fought between states, or between military alliances, although many violent conflicts were involved in Cold War stances. Of 110 armed conflicts recorded for the years 1989–99, only seven have been 'traditional' wars between states (of which two were active in 1999), even if it is true that in many civil-war-type armed conflicts there has often been more than one state involved, either directly or indirectly (see Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2000). Rummel (1995) has estimated that, during the 20th century, states have murdered 170 million people, which is more than four times the number of deaths in all wars within and between states. The objects of murder do not defend themselves, while in a war there are at least two fighting opponents. Rummel's estimate is obviously open to dispute, yet it is indicative of the repetitious source of massive violence in the 20th century.

Although it is not possible to draw conclusions about possibilities and potential from the past trends, it seems none the less plausible that peace research should focus, up to an extent, more on state/society relations and on societal conflicts where the issues are, first and foremost, socio-economic and identity-political. In fact, peace research can be said to have anticipated much of the post-Cold War shift of focus (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999: 748). Perhaps in attempts to secure the support of Western funders, peace research may even have gone too far.

The problem of war between states has not disappeared. We must not mistake actual for real, which consists of non-actualized possibilities.[7] Moreover, a third world war fought with weapons of mass destruction still threatens human civilization. Humankind cannot 'forget' these technologies, so they are potentially always available 'to everyone'. Some states continue to have them in sufficient quantities to destroy life on this planet. How could monitoring of these technologies and control of existing weapons of mass destruction be effectively and

[7] See the Appendix 'Realist Ontology and the Possibility of Emancipatory Social Science', available at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp.

legitimately organized? Silence on these questions legitimizes exclusive control of nuclear weapons by a few and current military buildups to protect some against the others.

The Area of Peace Research

What is the area of peace research and its place in this area? Galtung's analogy to medicine fails to locate peace research in sociohistorical processes. The starting point is that the interest of peace research is emancipatory. Political violence, the threat of violence and the preparation for violence define the subject of peace research. The subject can be expanded by extending the term *violence* in a metaphorical sense, for example, to include 'structural violence', 'psychological violence' or 'interpretative violence against *otherness*'. The aim of peace research is to emancipate humanity from unnecessary violence. But is the basic concept of *political violence* itself a contradiction?

Clausewitz is often claimed to have said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. War is political violence. Sakharov (1969: 32) countered that 'a thermonuclear war cannot be considered a continuation of politics by other means (according to the formula of Clausewitz); it would be a means [to] universal suicide'. Technological development would therefore have made the old formula untenable. But is it just a matter of technological development?

The relation between politics and violence depends upon how politics is conceptualized. When the actors are seen as rationally pursuing their own given interests, nonviolent political struggles and violence or war can simply be seen as different *means*. From this economistic conception arises the one-sided reception of Clausewitz's famous statement; forgotten is his romantic and tragic view of politics. For Clausewitz (1976: book 1, ch. 1, para. 28), the slippage of politics into violence often seems beyond anybody's control because of the decisive roles of passionate hatred ('blind natural forces') and chance and probability ('within which the creative spirit is free to roam'). However, because there are, and have been, collective actors which deliberately decide upon 'means to fulfil their will' in economistic terms, peaceful politics and violence may well be alternative means to promoting ends for those actors.

But should we call war 'continuation of politics'? The crux of the matter is that Clausewitz took for granted the existence of a predetermined *will*, which has enemies. 'Our aim' must therefore be to 'compel you to do our will' (Clausewitz, 1976: book 1, ch. 1, para. 2). This is the origin of purely instrumentalist politics – and violence. In contrast, in classic republicanism, especially in the 20th century versions of it, politics hints at the sort of speech and action in public characterized by an approval of diversity and pluralism (Arendt, 1958: 175–247). In the public sphere of politics, identities and interests are transformable and new processes are initiated. Republican politics is nonviolent. Violence inevitably destroys the preconditions of politics in this sense (Arendt, 1970: 54–56). Wæver (1996: 127) says the same thing when he notes that, 'for politics to emerge – not necessarily "democracy", but the precondition for it – we need to eliminate the logic of war'. He does not speak generally of political violence, suggesting instead that 'politics in this [Arendtian] sense demands the exclusion of security – the exclusion of security policy as well as of insecurity'.

How should we understand the main area of peace research when the starting point is a republican view of politics? Bourdieu's (1977: 159–171) concepts of doxa, ortodoxa and heterodoxa are helpful. The consensual

background, *doxa*, is the universe of the undiscussed or undisputed. Bourdieu (1977: 168) suggests that 'the adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness'. In slight contrast to this, however, I would include explicable presuppositions and agreements in the area of consensual background of any social action. *Ortodoxa* emerges when the undisputed is brought to the field of competing discourses, but the opinions are still claimed to be beyond doubt and dispute. Ortodoxa involves reification and mystification and other processes safeguarding its certainty. Liberalism can be seen as an individualistic solution to the problem of peace in a complex society that includes many competing ortodoxas. There are elements of ortodoxa in liberalism, too. However, *heterodoxa* presupposes a self-reflective, critical and pluralist discourse and a recognition of its own historicity.

Social activity and inter-activity are always linked with certain shared background assumptions and these are considered self-evident – or not even noticed – by the agents. Compare also the views of two major theorists of modernization and modern European societies. Gadamer (1977: 38) argues that 'something – but not everything – for what I have called the *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* is inescapably more being than consciousness, and being is never fully manifest'. Habermas (1984: 335) puts it less mystically: 'If the investigators of the last decade in socio-, ethno-, and psycholinguistics converge in any one respect, it is on the often and variously demonstrated point that the collective background and context of speakers and hearers determine interpretations of their explicit utterances to an extraordinarily high degree.' Even when A and B struggle violently against each other, they can share a large number of the same background assumptions, some of them perhaps explicitly agreed upon.[8]

Public disagreements require conscious public airing. Politics and violence both fall within the area of conscious, purposeful conflicts. (Threat of) violence emerges with the rise of Clausewitzian wills. Under certain circumstances, however, violence can, in principle, be explained by phenomena at different layers of reality. For example, realist interpretations of Lacanian psychoanalysis provide an opportunity for this, as do some theories about complex subpersonal processes. These explanations assume that, at the deeper level, the violence is not always a mere question of conflicts in the sense of conscious and intentional social activity. Subconscious mechanisms are usually connected with the collective taken-for-granted background. War can be part of mythico-ritual practices and reproduced by ortodoxas that reify and mystify war.

The transformations from politics to violence and vice versa form the main subject of peace research. Both transformations typically feature changes of the consensual background. Understandings and practices also change what politics itself is. Once modelled, different contexts can be systematically analysed and compared, and conclusions about their transformative capabilities drawn.

Integration generates a *security community* based on an agreement that common social problems must and can be resolved by institutionalized processes of *peaceful change*. The formation of a security community is a

[8] To avoid the post-structuralist trap of over-valuing conflict and politics, I emphasize that in many contexts it must be the task of peace research to build *consensus* by drawing on these shared background assumptions and to devise *compromise* settlements in bargaining situations. In many other contexts, emancipation nevertheless requires the starting of dissensus. Like the legitimation of system of domination, a clash of *ortodoxas* does stem from concepts of identity, actions and history buried deep within 'self-evident' assumptions, as well as from various reifications and mystifications.

condition of nonviolent, peaceful politics (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Patomäki, forthcoming: ch. 9). On the other hand, a number of taken-for-granted preconceptions based on reification and mystification, as well as violent symbols and practices (including modern militarism), can produce the sort of social background which, almost unnoticed, can maintain violence and preparation for violence and thereby an *insecurity community*. And in any context, with the emergence of Clausewitzian will, a security community can degenerate into an insecurity community.

Modern Peace Research and the Subjects of Politics

Galtung's answer to the question 'to whom is peace research directed' is 'no one in particular'. Peace research serves the whole of humanity without excluding anyone, at least intentionally or in advance. This answer is problematic because it pushes the subjects of politics into the background. The construction of political agents must be brought to the fore. What is the role envisaged for peace research in relation to construction of agency and agents?

Galtung's answer is problematical because of its belief in the universal applicability of 'applied science' and the doctor metaphor. Galtung's idea is that, regardless of time and place, the peace researcher makes an objective diagnosis and prognosis and plans therapies. His knowledge is equally effective always and everywhere. Subsequently, Galtung himself has defined the limits of effectual knowledge, spoken of the significance of cultural differences and stressed the importance of the dialogical position (1990, 1994, 1996). But as long as there is no decent theory about how the subjects are structured and positioned, these important definitions and ideas nevertheless remain superficial.

Peace research inevitably meets varying 'others' on the multivalent and conflict-ridden public political arenas and tries to transform social worlds. Theory and practice have to be consistent. When the objective is emancipation from undesirable and needless violence, and thereby towards peace, the practice of peace research should at least meet the following criteria:

(1) Peace research is an emancipatory endeavour and should be based on a *realist ontology* that is consistent with its transformative aspirations. In open systems, within which social actors possess generic powers, predictions are not possible, but qualitative changes and emergence are. Realist ontology implies that history is and will remain open.
(2) The practice of peace research itself should be consistent with a critical and pluralist methodology and moral discourse ('heterodoxa'), and thus also with *relativism* regarding the force and area of validity of the rational truth judgements.
(3) The practice of peace research should be consistent with those specific *peace theories* and beliefs deemed to be true at any given time by a relevant community of peace researchers. This includes, for example, theories concerning the social construction of the 'enemies' and the results of the reification and mystification.

The first condition raises those philosophical, preconceived assumptions which make it possible for peace research to participate in changing the world and in an emancipation from undesirable and unnecessary violence. The second condition anchors peace research to politics in the republican sense, which prevents it from contributing to a transformation from politics to violence. The third condition further specifies the first condition in such a way that the constituent theories about transformation from politics to violence are also considered. Judgements

about truth and validity by concrete subjects are always situated – even when they make universal claims.

Will Peace Research Develop?

Peace research should not be understood primarily on the basis of what peace research institutes at the moment produce. Rather, it should be understood as an emancipatory ideal which learns, changes and develops through its own experiences. From this perspective, the end of the Cold War did not result in an identity crisis for peace research.

As an institution, peace research has nevertheless lost its rhetorical attraction. The end of the Cold War, the downhill slide of social democracy, the dominance of pure Western (neo)liberalism, as well as the rhetorical association of peace research with the sort of left wing which had ties with Soviet foreign policy – all of these factors made critical peace research appear suspect. Peace research has also suffered from the questioning of the whole modern belief in science and progress. Besides orthodox economics, the most ardent, uncritical supporters of positivist social science and related ideals of enlightenment can be found in many peace research institutes. Often it seems as if peace research is seeking to slow down change and metatheoretical reflections, holding on to positions from the 1960s.[9] Attempts to stick to positivist scientism and avoid self-marginalization readily turn peace research into US-style International Relations mainstream research or researchers into pragmatist servants of Western foreign ministries. Many may want to desert the sinking ship, and visionaries may be tempted by other fora.

The challenge of critical theories has been more firmly grasped in the field of International Relations and Global Political Economy than in peace research. Since Galtung, few have developed the critical ideals and methodology of peace research. Apart from Wæver, Hayward Alker is almost the sole exception, although his academic career, too, is closely linked with the side of International Relations. Alker's visionary texts nevertheless offer possibilities for progress in many important directions (Alker, 1988, 1996; see also Patomäki, 1997b).

The challenge of critical theories to peace research is twofold. On the one hand, critical theories spur the development of an emancipatory ontology and methodology. On the other, they force us to take seriously the politics of identity and the conditions for practical political activity inherent within peace research. It is the task of peace research to show how existing historical trends and tendencies can be overturned. Peace research has to act consistently to prevent a transformation from politics to violence and to promote, instead, a transformation towards peaceful, democratic world politics.

[9] See the attack on 'postmodernism' in Østerud (1996). An exception is made by the researchers from COPRI in Copenhagen who, under the leadership of Håkan Wiberg and Ole Wæver, have tried to create new theoretical frameworks. Wæver identifies himself with the study of international relations and security research and has distanced himself from the tradition of peace research. His interpretative frameworks of the world consist, in important respects, of mainstream 'realism' and liberalism, even though he has also made a number of important and innovative steps in the direction indicated in this article, by bringing in a number of pivotal critical theoretical ideas which are concomitant with many peace research conceptions, yet redefine them and, in some respects, take them further.

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