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State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

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Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a "resource-extraction" model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.

In the mid-nineteenth century, China and Japan faced the rising threat of Western imperialism. Yet, despite the historical cultural ties between the Middle Kingdom and Japan, their responses to the same external threat were quite different. When confronted with the dual problems of growing

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anti-Manchu rebellions at home and British demands for trade concessions in the 1830s, the Qing dynasty proved unable to mobilize the resources necessary to defend the empire. The first and second Opium Wars revealed disparities in military technology between China and the European great powers. Faced with internal unrest and the prospect of China's dismemberment, Chinese provincial leaders made an attempt at internal reform, the so-called Tongzi Restoration (1862–74), aimed at reforming the military, creating an arms industry, and strengthening traditional Confucian government. Although these and later reforms prolonged the Qing dynasty until 1911, they were insufficient to halt China's relative decline.

News of China's defeat in the Opium Wars, carried by Dutch and Chinese ships to Nagasaki and then relayed to the shogun at Edo (Tokyo), shocked Japan's feudal elite. The arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and his "black ships" in Edo Bay in July 1853 ended Japan's two centuries of self-imposed isolation. The Tokugawa shogunate's inability to defend the country led to its overthrow in 1867–68 by a group of reform-mined samurai from Satsuma and Choshu, who acted to "restore" the sixteen-year-old Emperor Meiji. The new leadership then spent the next twenty years consciously and methodically emulating the military, political, technological, and economic practices of the European great powers. In particular, they built a mass army, a general staff system, and a centralized state bureaucracy modeled on those of Germany, and a navy modeled on the British Royal Navy. Within thirty years of the Meiji Restoration, Japan waged two wars: the first to supplant Chinese hegemony in East Asia and the second to prevent Russia from filling that power vacuum.[1]

Even when confronted with the same threat, states vary in their ability to mobilize domestic resources for defense. The creation of the mass army enabled Revolutionary and later Napoleonic France to enjoy ten years of nearly unbroken battlefield victories. However, Austria, Great Britain, and Russia did not rush to emulate the French military model. Only Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, was willing to risk upheaval to undertake a fundamental transformation of its military. Even then, Prussian reform efforts came relatively late. In 1794, King Friedrich Wilhelm II rejected proposals to institute *levée en masse,* fearing such a move would be "infinitely dangerous" to the social and political order. It took the catastrophic defeat of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 and the humiliating Treaty of Tilsit imposed

[1] For an overview of the impact of military modernization in Meiji Japan and Qing China, see David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 107–41; Shin'ichi Kitaoka, "The Army as Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited," *Journal of Military History* 57, no. 5 (October 1993): 67–86; Ernst Presseisen, *Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965); and S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

by Napoleon to convince the king and his advisers of the need for sweeping military and political reforms.[2]

These cases raise questions about the extraction and mobilization of resources for national security: Under what circumstances are states more likely to emulate the successful military institutions, governing practices, and technologies of more powerful states? When confronted with similarly threatening international environments, why are some states able to emulate, while other states fail to do so? Under what circumstances will states create entirely new military institutions, practices, and technologies in an effort to offset the perceived advantages of rival states? Finally, why are some threatened states willing and able to create efficient means to extract and mobilize greater resources from their societies, while other states will not or cannot?

Neorealism, specifically Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory, holds that the international system provides incentives for states, especially the great powers, to adopt similar adaptive strategies or risk elimination as independent entities. States generally balance against powerful states or coalitions by forging alliances with weaker states or by arms racing. States will tend to emulate the military, technological, and governing practices of the most successful states in the system.[3]

The problem, as both proponents and critics of neorealism point out, is that Waltz's theory purports to explain only broad systemic outcomes, namely, the recurrence of balances of power and the absence of sustained hegemonic systems across history. It does not explain why and how states choose among different types of "internal" balancing strategies, such as emulation, innovation, or the continuation of existing strategies.[4] Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables. While systemic variables have causal primacy in shaping states' external behavior,

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[2] See William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 185–215; Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 123–42; Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 80–124; and Geoffrey L. Herrera and Thomas G. Mahnken, "Military Diffusion in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Napoleonic and Prussian Military Systems," in *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas*, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 205–42.

[3] See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979). Throughout this paper, I use the terms "balance-of-power theory" and "neorealism" interchangeably to denote the theory Waltz developed in *Theory of International Politics*. The term "neorealism," however, also applies to several systemic realist theories that often make predictions that diverge sharply from Waltz's theory. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (winter 2000–2001): 128–61; and Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (autumn 1996): 7–53.

[4] The distinction between internal and external balancing originates in Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 168; and Barry R. Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 17–18.

domestic-level variables intervene to determine the types of balancing strategies they are likely to pursue.

This article outlines a resource-extraction model of the state in neoclassical realism, a growing body of realist theories of foreign policy.[5] It argues that the competitive nature of the international system provides incentives for states to emulate the successful political, military, and technological practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Domestic variables, however, limit the efficiency with which states can respond to these systemic imperatives. Neoclassical realism suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by the institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies a state is likely to pursue.

States that initially enjoy higher extraction and mobilization capacity, but also face high external vulnerability, are more likely to emulate the military, governing, and technological practices of the system's most successful states, at least in the short run. On the other hand, states that lack or have low extraction and mobilization capacity, but that also face high external vulnerability, will have greater difficulty in pursuing emulation, at least in the short run. States with higher extraction and mobilization capacity but low external vulnerability have the luxury of engaging in innovation to enhance their long-term security and power. Conversely, states lacking high mobilization and extraction capacity, but that also face low external vulnerability, are less likely to pursue emulation or innovation. In the long term, states can try to increase their extractive and mobilization capabilities, and consequently their ability to pursue emulation or innovation, by purveying nationalist or statist ideologies. A lack of nationalist sentiment or an anti-statist ideology held by the public or elites, however, can limit the state's ability to emulate or innovate. In these circumstances, vulnerable states are more likely to persist in existing strategies.

Neoclassical realism stresses the causal primacy of structural variables, chiefly the relative distribution of material power and anticipated power trends, in shaping states' foreign policies. Systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for greater efficiency in causing security for themselves. Yet, as Jennifer Sterling-Folker has noted, "anarchy does not dictate how states should arrange their domestic processes to achieve that end. States are free to experiment, to emulate one another's practices, or to do nothing.

[5] For overviews of neoclassical realism, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–72; Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 311–48; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism," in *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), 266–79.

Nonetheless, domestic processes act as the final arbiter for state survival within the anarchic environment."[6]

Proponents of constructivism and critical theory charge that realism, in general, and neorealist theory, in particular, lack a theory of the state.[7] Following several other scholars, I submit that Waltz does indeed present a theory of the state, albeit a highly restrictive and underdeveloped one.[8] Neoclassical realism, on the other hand, provides a fuller conception of the state by specifying how systemic imperatives will likely translate, through the medium of state power, into actual foreign and security policies. Therefore, it might account for the different responses of late Qing China and Meiji Japan to the common threat of Western imperialism or the variation in the European great powers' ability and willingness to emulate the mass army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

It is important to note the limits of the neoclassical realist model outlined on the following pages and the limits of this article. I do not purport to offer a complete realist theory of state formation and persistence. I agree with Stephen Walt that "a realist approach to state formation would emphasize the imposition of sovereign authority to mobilize power and create security for ruler and ruled alike, as opposed to approaches that regard the state as a voluntary contract between sovereign and subject or between free and equal citizens."[9] Undertaking such a task is beyond the scope of this article. While I build upon sociologist Charles Tilly's oft-cited mantra that "war made the state and the state made war," I do not address the debates between economic and coercive theories of state formation.[10] The resource-extraction model treats states' external alignments as exogenous.

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[6] Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 7.

[7] See Richard W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory"; and John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," in *Neorealism and Its Critics,* ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 204–54, esp. 227–32, and 131–57; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 42, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391–426; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–98; and Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 11–21.

[8] See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 116–21; Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," esp. 16–22; Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1998), 66–69; and John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 24–30.

[9] See Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," in *Political Science: State of the Discipline,* ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 277. See also Ashley J. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," in *Roots of Realism,* ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 91–94. For an attempt to develop such a realist theory of state formation (what he terms a "theory of negative association"), see Ioannis D. Evrigenis, "'Carthage Must Be Saved': Fear of Enemies and Collective Action," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005, esp. chap. 3.

[10] Coercive theories of state formation include Otto Hinze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hinze,* ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University

It does not address debates over the prevalence of balancing against powerful or threatening states, as opposed to other alignment strategies such as bandwagoning, buck-passing, chain-ganging, appeasement, and hiding.[11] Finally, the objective of this article is merely to outline a neoclassical realist extraction model and not to empirically test hypotheses derived from that model. Consequently, the historical cases all involve instances in which the state in question faced high levels of external vulnerability. As discussed below, the variation in the level of external vulnerability is the independent variable, while variation in the level of state power is the intervening variable. By holding the value of the independent variable constant, I seek to establish the plausibility of state power as an intervening variable between systemic imperatives and the internal balancing strategy that a state will likely pursue.

This article consists of four sections: The first establishes the theoretical context by examining the treatment of the state and the balance of power in classical realism and neorealism. The second outlines the resource-extraction model and discusses the relationship between neorealism and neoclassical realism, including the issues of reductionism and whether by incorporating unit-level variables, neoclassical realism violates realism's structural logic. In the third section, I posit hypotheses about the circumstances under which state power will be likely to facilitate or inhibit a state's ability to adapt to changes in its strategic environment. Historical examples from the experiences of five rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, Great Britain, France, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of the neoclassical realist resource-extraction model. The conclusion discusses some directions for future research.

Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," in *Formation of the National States of Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 900–1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32, no. 4 (autumn 1978): 881–912; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *War and State Making: The Shaping of Global Powers* (Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1989); Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1994); and Michael C. Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (spring 1996): 237–68. Economic theories of state formation include Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: NLB, 1974); Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981); Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System,* vol. 1 (Orlando: Academic Press, 1974).

[11] For a discussion of what constitutes balancing and whether balances of power recurrently form, see Colin Elman, "Introduction: Appraising Balance-of-Power Theory"; Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design"; and Richard Rosecrance, "Is There a Balance of Power?" in Vasquez and Elman, *Realism and the Balancing of Power,* 1–22, 128–53, and 154–65.

THE STATE AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN CLASSICAL REALISM AND NEOREALISM

The resource-extraction model in neoclassical realism integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables to explain variation in the types of internal balancing strategies that threatened states will likely pursue. Accordingly, this section undertakes two tasks. First, it defines the term "state" and delineates the range of likely internal balancing strategies. Second, it distinguishes the conception of the state and the balance of power in neoclassical realism from those of its theoretical forebears: the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Arnold Wolfers and E. H. Carr and the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz. Neoclassical realism incorporates the complex model of state-society relations implicit in classical realism, while building upon neorealism's insights about the constraints of anarchy and the relative distribution of material power.

Defining the State and Delineating Possible Internal Balancing Strategies

The term "state" has widely different meanings within the fields of anthropology, history, and sociology, and in the comparative politics and international relations subfields of political science. I adopt Stephen Krasner's definition of the state as a "set of roles and institutions [that] have peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group. These goals relate to general material objectives or ambitious ideological goals related to beliefs about the ordering of society."[12] For my purposes, the "state" consists only of the top officials and central institutions of government charged with external defense and the conduct of diplomacy. Furthermore, I use "state" or "unit" as generic terms to denote a variety of polities with different geographic scopes, internal attributes, bases of legitimacy, and relative capabilities that coexist and interact in an anarchic environment. Tribes, city-states, feudal principalities, urban leagues, universal empires, and modern territorial national states, therefore, all fall into the rubric of "states" for my purposes, whereas colonies, protectorates, and other types of polities based on formal hierarchic relationships and de facto control by another state would not. The term "state building" refers to an increase in the mobilization and extractive capacity of central

[12] Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interests: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 10–11. For similar definitions see Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 14–16; Margaret Levi, "The State and the Study of the State," in Katznelson and Milner, *Political Science: State of the Discipline,* 39–42; and Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 35–41.

state institutions relative to other societal actors. In most modern states, "state building" refers to the efforts to increase the size and strength of the central executive instead of the legislature, the judiciary, or provincial or local levels of government.[13]

When faced with external threats, states have a choice among three broad categories of internal balancing strategies: (1) to continue with existing politico-military strategies and technological practices; (2) to engage in emulation; or (3) to engage in innovation. The first strategy is self-explanatory. Senior officials recognize or anticipate an increasingly threatening strategic environment but conclude that a continuation or perhaps an escalation of current diplomatic and military policies or technological practices will likely ameliorate that threat. The two other strategies, however, entail the abandonment of existing institutions, technologies, or governing practices in favor of new ones.

Emulation is the "conscious, purposeful imitation, in full or in part, by one state of any institution, technology, or governing practice of another state."[14] It is distinct from the imposition of such practices by one state on another state or the imposition of such practices by one state on its colonies, protectorates, and other dependencies. Instead, emulation is a strategy voluntarily undertaken by a state in response to its strategic environment.[15] By definition, it is a large-scale and sustained process affecting the organization of a state's politico-military institutions, rather than the mere adoption of new weapons systems, minor adjustments to existing practices, discrete reforms guided by foreign models, or shifts in military doctrine. Innovation, on the other hand, is a conscious, purposeful effort by one state to offset the perceived relative power advantage of another state by the creation of entirely new institutions, technologies, or governing practices. Both adaptive strategies—emulation and innovation—entail the reallocation of resources or increased extraction from society. They further entail the creation of new

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[13] See Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 9–10. For discussions of comparative state strength, see Krasner, *Defending the National Interests,* esp. 55–90; Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., "The State and American Foreign Economy Policy," special issue, *International Organization* 32, no. 1 (winter 1988).

[14] João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870–1930," in *Realism: Restatement and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 199. See also João Resende-Santos, "Military Emulation in the International System (Chile, Argentina, and Brazil)," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1997.

[15] For example, Napoleon's imposition of the French military system on his protectorates—the kingdoms of Holland, Westphalia, Italy, and Naples, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw—does not constitute emulation. See Herrera and Mahnken, "Military Diffusion in Nineteenth-Century Europe," 210–212. The selective adoption of Soviet military doctrine, weapons, and organization by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq after the 1967 Middle East war, however, do constitute emulation. See Michael J. Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Armies of Snow and Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," in Goldman and Eliason,*The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas*, 63–92.

institutions or social structures and often the destruction of older ones. Of the two, innovation is far more costly and time consuming. Finally, both are future-oriented strategies undertaken to redress current vulnerabilities and to anticipate future competitive advantage. States emulate one another's military practices based on the perceived "lessons of the last war," but their objective in doing so is always to improve their competitive advantage in the event of a future war.

Classical Realism on the State and the Balance of Power

Classical realism is concerned primarily with the sources and uses of national power in international politics and the problems that leaders encounter in conducting foreign policy. These issues lead the analyst to focus on the power distributions among states as well as the character of states and their relation to domestic society. Twentieth-century classical realists have an implicit notion that the state is both distinct from and the agent of the nation or society.[16] Morgenthau wrote, "A nation pursues foreign policy as a legal organization called a state, whose agents act as representatives of the nation in international affairs. They speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means for achieving them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate its power."[17] Similarly, Kissinger distinguished between state and society in his study of the Concert of Europe: "The statesman is inevitably confronted with the inertia of his material. . . . [T]he acid test of a policy . . . is its ability to obtain domestic support."[18] Wolfers argued, "There can be no 'state behavior' except as the term is used to describe the combined behavior of individual human beings organized into a state. . . . Therefore, only when attention is focused on states, rather than on individuals, can light be thrown on the goals pursued and means employed in the names of nations and on the relationship of conflict or co-operation, of power competition and alignment that characterize international politics."[19]

There are four noteworthy aspects of the classical realist view of the state and the balance of power. First, although classical realists rarely distinguish among levels of analysis, they clearly present a "top-down" conception of the state. Governments do not simply aggregate or respond to the demands of different segments or interest groups within society. Rather, leaders define the "national interests" and conduct foreign policy based on their assessment

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[16] Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 460.

[17] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1966), 102.

[18] Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 326–28.

[19] Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 9.

of the relative distribution of power and other state's intentions. The process of net assessment, however, is often difficult and prone to error. Edward Gulick wrote that "statesmen, whether accurate in their estimates or not, must measure power, regardless of the primitive nature of the scales at their disposal."[20] According to Morgenthau, "the task of assessing the relative power of nations for the present and for the future resolves itself into a series of hunches, of which some will certainly turn out to be wrong, while others may be proved by subsequent events to have been correct."[21] In a similar vein, Wolfers noted that, for great powers, particularly in the nuclear age, "neither the difficulties nor the importance of accuracy in the estimates of power can be exaggerated."[22]

Second, in conducting foreign policy, leaders must draw on domestic society for material resources and popular support. Morgenthau listed geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, and national morale as components of national power. He also wrote, "The quality of government is patently a source of strength or weakness with respect to most of the factors upon which national power depends, especially in view of the influence the government exerts upon natural resources, industrial capacity, and military preparedness."[23] Carr argued, "Power over opinion is therefore not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader."[24] Nevertheless, as in the case of net assessments, most classical realists devoted scant attention to the practical problems that leaders encounter in extracting and mobilizing resources from domestic society.

Third, the capacity to extract and mobilize societal resources varies across different countries and across different historical periods. Classical realists do not assume states have similar extractive capacities, such that aggregate economic and potential capabilities are synonymous with a state's actual power and influence in the international arena. Instead, they assume states have varying levels of what neoclassical realists now call "state power," defined as the relative ability to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society.[25]

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[20] Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 14.

[21] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 154.

[22] Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration,* 112.

[23] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 138.

[24] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,* 2d ed. (1945; New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 132.

[25] Hobson, *State and International Relations*, 5–6 and 24–26. Hobson uses the term "domestic agential power," which he defines as "the power of the state to determine (foreign) policy and shape the domestic realm free of domestic structural constraints or non-state actor interference." I prefer the term "state power" because it is more consistent with current usage in the neoclassical realist literature.

Classical realists draw a sharp distinction between the European balance of power in the age of "monarchical sovereignty" in the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries and the age of "nationalist universalism" in the twentieth century. The operation of the balance of power succeeded in preventing any state from gaining universal dominion for four hundred years. Yet, from 1815 to 1914, there were no major (or hegemonic) wars in Europe. In the twentieth century, by contrast, the great powers fought two devastating world wars in the span of twenty years. What might explain this?[26]

Morgenthau, Kissinger, Gulick, and Carr attribute the "long peace" of the nineteenth century to the "high" state power of the major states.[27] Monarchical sovereignty insulated governments from the masses, enabling states to conduct foreign policy free from the vicissitudes of public opinion and legislative interference, and thus to keep the international struggle for power within relatively peaceful bounds and avoid major war. The maintenance of the balance of power often required the wholesale transfer of territory or even the complete elimination of weaker states, as in the three partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century or Prussia's annexation of 40 percent of Saxony after the Napoleonic Wars. Such moves maintained the equilibrium among the European great powers, but with little regard for the nationalist and political aspirations of subject peoples.[28]

The nationalist and democratic revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries eroded states' autonomy vis-à-vis their societies, which in turn led to a decline in their ability to sustain an international balance of power. The masses acquired a direct role in shaping foreign policy. A crusading "universalistic nationalism," in which national states sought to impose their own ethics on all others, replaced the restraint that had embodied the age of monarchical sovereignty. The rise of nationalism allowed states to extract more resources from society and thus generate greater military power, but at the price of lost autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy and a heightened probability of all-out war.[29] Morgenthau lamented, "Nations no longer oppose each other, as they did from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Napoleonic Wars, and then again from the end of the latter to the First World War, within

[26] For a definition of major war, see Dale Copeland, *Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 3–4. By Copeland's criteria, there have been six major wars in the modern state system: the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), the wars of Louis XIV (1688–1714), the Seven Years' War (1756–63), the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), the First World War (1914–18), and the Second World War (1939–45).

[27] Hobson, *State and International Relations,* 51.

[28] See Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 205–6 and 218–19; and Kissinger, *A World Restored,* 156–57. See also Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5–20.

[29] For similar arguments see Alan C. Lamborn, "Power and the Politics of Extraction," *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (June 1983): 125–46; and Paul A. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance-of-Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 42–76.

a framework of shared beliefs and common values, which imposes effective limitations upon the ends and means of their struggle for power."[30]

Fourth, as suggested above, many classical realists see the balance of power as a system or pattern of relations created consciously and maintained by the great powers. Drawing on four centuries of European statecraft, Morgenthau contended, "The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying to maintain or overthrew the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration . . . called the balance-of-power and to policies aimed at preserving it."[31] A balance-of-power system functions only if the great powers (or at least most of them) adhere to the rules of that system. Chief among those rules are the fluidity of alliances, respect for other great powers' vital areas of interest, postwar settlements that do not eliminate the defeated great power, and territorial compensation.[32] Nicholas Spykman commented, "Political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherent stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces. States cannot afford to wait passively for the happy time when a miraculously achieved balance-of-power will bring peace and security."[33]

Neorealist Balance-of-Power Theory and the "Passive Military Adaptive" State

Waltz's balance-of-power theory is concerned primarily with explaining the high degree of continuity in international politics. As a systemic theory, it expects that the outcomes produced by interacting states will fall within specified ranges. Since Waltz is interested in explaining not the foreign policies of individual states, but rather systemic outcomes over time, he begins with assumptions about the characteristics of the international system itself and the states whose interactions spontaneously and inadvertently generate that system. Chief among the system's characteristics are its ordering principle (the "first tier" or "deep structure"), the differentiation of the units within the system (the "second tier"), and the distribution of capabilities among the units (the "third tier" or "surface structure").[34] The theory posits a single independent variable: the systemic distribution of power as measured by the number of great powers (or polarity). It makes two probabilistic predictions: (1) that

[30] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 256.

[31] Ibid., 167.

[32] For a recent discussion of the classical realist conception of the European balance of power as a type of "republic" or "society," see Marc Trachtenberg, "The Question of Realism: A Historian's View," *Security Studies* 13, no. 1 (autumn 2003): 26–27.

[33] Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance-of-Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), 25. Inis Claude, however, draws a distinction between manual balancing and automatic balancing. See Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962).

[34] See Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," 135–36.

across different international systems, balances of power tend to form, and (2) that states tend to emulate the successful practices of others.[35]

In an anarchic realm, states tend to keep up with one another's efforts and gains that might enhance their relative capabilities and competitiveness. States face pervasive uncertainty about one another's present and future intentions. A state must not overlook the possibility that potential adversaries will use their capabilities against it, and it therefore must focus on other states' capabilities, not their intentions. Unlike units in a hierarchic order, states in an anarchic realm cannot specialize but must instead perform roughly the same functions. Furthermore, if states are to survive, they must often eschew cooperation in favor of self-help.[36]

Due to competition and the socialization effects of anarchy, states tend to emulate the practices and institutions of the leading states in the system. A failure to emulate, and thus to conform to the logic of anarchy, would risk succumbing to relative power gaps, heightened vulnerability, or even extinction. Before interacting with one another, states may have vastly different internal attributes. Once states begin to interact, however, their military, institutional, and technological practices tend to converge.[37] Waltz does not expect that "emulation will proceed to the point where competitors become identical." Nor does he specify "how quickly and closely the imitations will occur."[38] Nevertheless, states that fail to conform to successful practices find themselves at a disadvantage. "Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. In power, most of them quickly change their ways [for fear of military defeat or political extinction]."[39]

Figure 1 illustrates what John M. Hobson calls the neorealist "passive military adaptive" model of the state. Several aspects of balance-of-power theory support this characterization.

Unlike classical realists, who write about the state but say little about the constraints of the international system, Waltz does the opposite: his theory focuses on the constraints imposed by the international system, but treats the state as a "black box." The second tier of the system—namely, the characteristics of the units—effectively drops out of his theory. He wrote, "A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: They are unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their own preservation, and at maximum, drive for universal domination."[40] States differ greatly

[35] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 124.

[36] For critiques of neorealism's "competition bias," see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Frankel, *Realism: Restatement and Renewal,* 122–63, esp. 128–29; and Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 445–77, esp. 447–50.

[37] Buzan, Jones, and Little, *The Logic of Anarchy,* 117–19.

[38] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 124.

[39] Ibid., 128. Despite Waltz's warnings about falling by the wayside, the death rate of great powers is quite low. See Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 133–34.

[40] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 118.



FIGURE 1 Waltz's Basic Neorealist Model. Adapted from John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25, fig. 2.2.

in terms of relative capabilities, but over time, they become functionally alike due to the socializing effect of anarchy.[41]

Waltz assumes that even great powers must conform to systemic survival requirements through balancing and emulation or risk military defeat and extinction. He is careful to point out, however, that "structures shape and shove. They do not *determine* behaviors and outcomes, not only because unit-level and structural causes interact, but because the shaping and shoving of structures may be successfully resisted."[42] Thus, neorealist theory claims to delimit the expected range of unit-level responses to structural constraints; it generates probabilistic expectations about international outcomes, not determinate ones. International structure in this sense goes beyond the

[41] Ibid., 95.

[42] Waltz, "Response to My Critics," 343 [emphasis added]; see also Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 69.

denoting the configuration of units in relation to one another. David Dessler noted that, in neorealist theory, "structure is an environment in which action unfolds. In a positional approach, international structure stands in relation to state action much as an office building stands in relation to the workday activities that take place within its walls: it is a fixed, enduring set of conditions that constrains and disposes, shapes and shoves behavior."[43] Yet the theory cannot explain exactly what the characteristic behavior of any state will likely be in the face of some structural constraint.[44]

Building on a microeconomic analogy, Waltz argued that anarchy pressures states to make continuous improvements in their internal organization. His restrictive definition of competition, however, results in a narrow view of competition's effects.[45] Just as free-market competition need not lead all firms to produce identical projects, competition under anarchy need not lead to emulation. Waltz acknowledged, "Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of the greatest capability and ingenuity."[46] Nevertheless, as João Resende-Santos observed, "competition in the system means constant striving, since the absence of a central agent forces states to seek the marginal advantages that innovation brings. Without *dynamic innovation,* selection will only lead to the dominance of those institutions or states that started the context."[47] Waltz's theory does not explain why states that are more powerful innovate in the first place, why they might do so in the absence of external threats, or why variation occurs in the relative innovativeness of states.[48]

Finally, Waltz's theory assumes that units have an unlimited capacity to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society. For balance-of-power theory, what matters is a state's aggregate power, the sum of its economic, potential, and military capabilities. One cannot separately weigh these capabilities. Therefore, a state's status as a great power depends on its scores

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[43] David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization* 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 466. See also Dale Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (fall 2000): 187–212, esp. 205–6; and Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," 5.

[44] Waltz's theory presents an extremely restrictive and static conception of structure and systems. For a discussion of this, see Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 80–84; Jervis, *System Effects*, 107–10; Buzan, Jones, and Little, *Logic of Anarchy*, esp. 29–80; Copeland, *Origins of Major War,* 12–13; and Glenn H. Snyder, "Process Variables in Neorealist Theory" in Frankel, *Realism: Restatement and Renewal*, 167–92.

[45] Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 75–82.

[46] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127.

[47] Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," 207–8 [emphasis added]. See also Buzan, Jones, and Little, *Logic of Anarchy,* 40–41.

[48] Matthew Evangelista defines innovation in terms of "new weapons that portend major organizational changes, reallocation of resources, [or] the possibility of diminished organizational autonomy.... The weapons innovations investigated... entailed major restructuring of military organizations, significant changes in strategy, or both." Matthew Evangelista, *Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 12.

(relative to other states) on each of the following: population size, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence. All else equal, the great powers are better equipped, and therefore more likely, to engage in adaptive strategies such as balancing, emulation, or innovation, than are weaker states.[49]

Waltz's conception of the state represents the internal dimension of balance-of-power theory. Through balancing and emulation, states strive to maintain their competitive advantage and enhance their likelihood of survival. The recurrence of balancing and emulation, while intended mainly to ensure the survival of individual states, has the unintended consequence of sustaining an anarchic system.[50] Waltz, however, devotes most of his attention to balancing and leaves the notion of emulation underdeveloped. In its spare form, therefore, his theory cannot account for variation in rate, scope, or extent of military diffusion or the likelihood that any particular state will pursue large-scale emulation, innovation, or any other internal balancing strategy. Resende-Santos, Emily Goldman and Richard Andres, and Colin Elman have sought to test neorealist hypotheses on the emulation and diffusion of military practices.[51] To explain variation in the rate and scope of emulation, they each add structural variables—chiefly the offense-defense balance, demonstration contexts, geography, and factor endowments.[52] While each of these authors further specifies the external context in which emulation and innovation are more likely to occur, none of them systematically examines the domestic constraints that states face in responding to systemic imperatives.

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND THE RESOURCE-EXTRACTIVE STATE

Neoclassical realism builds on the complex relationship between state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealist balance-of-power theory. Like classical realism, neoclassical realism holds that state power varies across states and across different historical periods. Yet, like neorealism, neoclassical realism holds that the international

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[49] See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 120. For a definition of potential power, see Copeland, *Origins of Major War*, 5–6.

[50] See Buzan, Jones, and Little, *Logic of Anarchy*, 44.

[51] See Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems"; Colin Elman, "The Logic of Emulation: The Diffusion of Military Practices in the International System," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1999; and Emily O. Goldman and Richard B. Andres, "Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion," *Security Studies* 8, no. 4 (summer 1999): 79–125.

[52] The theories of Resende-Santos, Goldman and Andres, and Elman fall under the rubric of defensive realism because they attribute the rate, scope, and likelihood of emulation to both the relative distribution of power and to variables that affect the severity of the security dilemma. See Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," esp. 136–41; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 42–63, esp. 47–50; and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 168–214.

environment in which states interact is the primary determinant of their interests and behavior. Both neorealism and neoclassical realism, therefore, proceed from an environment-based ontology.[53]

Nonetheless, there are several questions about the relationship between neoclassical realism and neorealism: Does the former represent an attempt to supplement the latter with unit-level variables, a move that Waltz clearly and repeatedly rejected? Alternatively, does neoclassical realism represent a new body of theory within the realist research program? By incorporating both systemic and unit-level variables, is neoclassical realism guilty of "reductionism"—the tendency to explain the whole (international political outcomes) with reference to the internal attributes and the individual behavior of the units (states)? Finally, by incorporating unit-level variables, does not neoclassical realism violate the structural logic of realism?

The Neorealist–Neoclassical Realist Relationship

Neoclassical realism is not simply a refinement of Waltz's balance-of-power theory or an attempt to smuggle unit-level variables into that theory to explain empirical anomalies. Nor is it correct to characterize realism as a tightly constructed research program whose "hard core" is synonymous with Waltz's theory, thus rendering any departure from that theory as evidence of a "degenerative problem shift."[54] Both neoclassical realism and neorealism fall into a broader realist research program. They proceed from the same core assumptions about the centrality of conflict groups, the importance of relative power distributions, and the conflictual nature of international politics. Yet it is clear that neorealism and neoclassical realism differ from each other based on the phenomena each seeks to explain (the dependent variable). The former seeks to explain patterns of international outcomes but is indeterminate about the likely foreign policies of individual states. The latter seeks to explain variation in the foreign policies of individual states over time or of different states when confronted with similar external constraints.[55] Most

[53] Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," 4–8.

[54] See, for example, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24, no. 2 (fall 1999): 5–55, esp. 27–32; Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment," in Elman and Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory*, 189–96; John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Research Program and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 899–912; and John A. Vasquez, "The New Debate on the Balance-of-Power: A Reply to My Critics," in Vasquez and Elman, *Realism and the Balancing of Power,* 87–113.

[55] The one exception is Randall Schweller's balance-of-interest theory, which purports to explain both the foreign policies of individual great powers and the likelihood of major war across different types of international systems (multipolar, tripolar, and bipolar). See Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy for World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

neoclassical realist theories make no pretense about explaining systemic outcomes.[56]

A related question concerns reductionism. Waltz is highly critical of reductionist theories of international politics. The interaction of differently configured states produces similar as well as different international outcomes. Likewise, the interaction of similar states produces different as well as similar international outcomes. The same causes sometimes lead to different effects, and the same effects sometimes result from different causes.[57] Since neoclassical realism locates causal properties at both structural and unit levels, the unit-level factors help to explain states' balancing behavior. A critic might argue there is no way to avoid the reductionist trap, so long as unit-level factors have causal property in neoclassical realism.[58]

The charge that neoclassical realism is reductionist is mistaken, however. Reductionist theories locate the causes of systemic outcomes—such as the likelihood of interstate war or general patterns of alliance formation in the international system—in the internal attributes of states. Waltz is quite clear on this point: "One cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal composition of states, nor can one arrive at an understanding of international politics by summing the foreign policies and the external behavior of states."[59] His criticism of Hobson's and Vladimir Lenin's respective theories of imperialism stems not from their incorporation of unit-level independent variables, per se. Rather, he is critical because Hobson and Lenin attribute the likelihood of imperialism across history to the existence of capitalist states seeking new markets abroad to absorb excess capital.[60] Likewise, he criticizes the work of Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Rosecrance, and Morton Kaplan because those scholars do not distinguish between systemic and unit-level causes, offer overly broad definitions of structure and international systems, and make indeterminate predictions about international outcomes and the foreign policies of individual states.[61]

Finally, some critics might charge that by incorporating unit-level variables, neoclassical realism violates the structural logic of neorealism. By focusing on non-systemic variables, neoclassical realists are really incorporating elements of liberal and institutionalist theories in an effort to salvage

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[56] Schweller, unlike other neoclassical realists, maintains that a neat division between theories of foreign policy and theories of international politics is unsustainable on logical and methodological grounds. See Schweller, "Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism" 321–22. I disagree with him on this point.

[57] See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 18–19 and 37; and, earlier, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[58] I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of this article for pointing this out.

[59] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 64. Waltz also notes that theories of foreign policy can and should include causal factors at the unit and systemic levels. He constructed such a foreign policy theory in his second book. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The American and British Experience* (1967; Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1992).

[60] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 35–37.

[61] Ibid., chaps. 2 and 3.

neorealism.[62] This criticism stems from a mistaken reading of the role of unit-level variables in realist theories, in general, and neoclassical realism, in particular. As explained below, there is no deductive reason why neoclassical realism cannot incorporate unit-level variables while maintaining the causal primacy of structural variables.

Anarchy and Contingency in Neoclassical Realism

The anarchic nature of the international system, relative power distributions, and other structural variables such as the offense-defense balance and geography set the parameters of how states define their interests and pursue particular ends.[63] That said, as even Waltz admits, the international system does not dictate exactly *how* each state will respond within those parameters.[64] Again, Dessler's office-building analogy is illustrative. The exterior walls and the configuration of the internal spaces generate broad behavioral patterns for the people working within them. Most office workers do not attempt to walk through walls, crawl through air-conditioning ducts, or leave the building via windows on the twentieth floor.[65] Central to the realist conception of anarchy is its intrinsically threatening and uncertain nature. The workers may be aware of hidden trapdoors and that the consequence of falling through them is severe injury or death, but they have no knowledge about or control over the placement of these traps. It not simply that anarchy leaves states unregulated and unsupervised, so that war may break out at any time, Sterling-Folker observed. "It is instead that the anarchic environment allows death to occur in the first place while providing no guidance for how to avoid it in the short-term and ultimately no means of doing so in the long-term."[66] This lack of guidance automatically renders anarchy a self-help environment.

Unlike employees in a hypothetical office building, human beings cannot survive in an anarchic environment as individuals. Instead, they can survive only as members of a larger group. Although groups may come into existence for a variety of reasons, the one necessary condition is that they differ from the same outside entity, such as a common enemy. Fear plays

[62] Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" 27–32; and Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory," 189–96.

[63] Contrary to Rose's original formulation, neoclassical realism is not a theoretical competitor to defensive realism and offensive realism. See Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 132–34, esp. table 1. For two different discussions about the relationship between neoclassical realism and defensive realism, see Glaser, "The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism," 271–72; and Schweller, "Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 344–47.

[64] See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 69.

[65] Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" 466.

[66] Jennifer Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining* U.S. *International Monetary Policy-Making after Bretton Woods* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 73.

a crucial role in the formation of political groups, if only because physical security is a prerequisite for the pursuit of any other individual or collective goal. *Metus hostilis,* or the fear of enemies—manifested in the form of xenophobia, whether directed at internal minorities or at external groups—is indispensable for the creation and maintenance of political groups, because it offers a way of overcoming barriers to collective action insurmountable by positive inducements alone. The concept of the *metus hostilis* appears, in one form or another, in the writings of classical realist thinkers as varied as Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Morgenthau.[67] Research in the fields of evolutionary biology and social psychology provides additional support for long-standing realist assumptions about the centrality of in-group/out-group discrimination, inter-group comparison, and competition in political life.[68] Realists of all stripes tend to treat "states" as unitary, although not necessarily rational, actors because, according to Robert Gilpin, "The essence of social reality is the group. The building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life are not the individuals of liberal thought nor the classes of Marxism[, but instead] conflict groups."[69] The size, composition, and ordering principles of those groups vary across different historical contexts and geographic regions, but tribalism is an immutable aspect of the human condition and political life.[70]

Neoclassical realism accepts the importance of competitive pressures and socialization effects in shaping the internal composition of political groups. What motivates such adaptive behavior is not the normative appeal of others' practices or domestic institutions, but rather the desire to enhance competitive advantage and probability of survival. "The nation-state is by no means the teleological end-point of group identification," observed Sterling-Folker, "but its development as the primary constitutive unit of the present global system is explicable as a result of anarchy's imitative dynamics."[71] Indeed, as much of the state-building literature argues, the territorial state

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[67] For a detailed discussion of the "theory of negative association," from Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century to Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau in the twentieth century, see Evrigenis, "'Carthage Must Be Saved,"' chaps. 3 and 4.

[68] See Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation*, 70–76; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (spring 2002): 73–97; Bradley A. Thayer, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (fall 2000): 124–51; and Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization* 49, no. 2 (summer 1995): 229–52.

[69] See Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics,* 305; and Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, *Realism: Restatement and Renewal*, 3–26.

[70] See Randall L. Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources," in *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War,* ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), chap. 2; and Daniel Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism's Roots," *Security Studies* 8, no. 4 (summer 1999): 126–72.

[71] Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation*, 83.

simply proved more effective than other polities in early-modern Europe in managing internal resources and responding to external threats. This process of inter-group comparison, emulation, and innovation led to the spread of the territorial state as an institutional form, first throughout Europe and later around the world. It also led to the demise of competing institutional forms over time.[72]

Systemic forces shape domestic processes within states, which in turn constrain states' ability to respond to systemic imperatives. Put differently, unit-level variables are themselves dependent variables of prior structural conditions.[73] The cases of England (later Great Britain) and Brandenburg-Prussia in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries illustrate this dynamic. Since the English Channel lessened the chances of invasion, England never developed a large standing army and the extractive mechanisms necessary to sustain it. Instead, the navy was the first line of defense. Since navies are less useful for domestic repression than are standing armies, the Tudor and Stuart monarchs were never able to create the absolutist state institutions that appeared on the continent. Britain's relatively benign security environment contributed to the gradual emergence of a liberal domestic political order. Conversely, Prussia's geopolitical location was very vulnerable. The Hohenzollern dynasty's original territories in northern Germany were not contiguous and lacked defensible borders. Prussia owed its existence to warfare, which in turn shaped the kingdom's internal organization. In the 1650s, Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm persuaded the Prussian Estates to raise a standing army with autonomous financing under the direct control of the crown, without any legislative supervision. The result was the rise of a garrison state. A high degree of external vulnerability gave the Prussian army, and successive Hohenzollern kings, far greater autonomy and extractive capacity than might have been the case had security mattered less.[74]

Anarchy's competition and socialization effects provide no single guide or set of "best practices" for how states ought to arrange their domestic processes to maximize their probability of survival. To return to the case of Japan, from the late 1850s onward, there was consensus among Tokugawa officials and later the Meiji oligarchs about the country's military and economic vulnerability. There was no immediate consensus, however, about which great power provided the most appropriate overall "model" for the

[72] Ibid., 83–84. Also see Porter, *War and the Rise of the State,* 64–105; Desch, "War and Strong States"; and Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the State," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 1 (April 1988): 45–65.

[73] Again, I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this article for suggesting this point.

[74] See Gourevitch, "Second Image Reversed," 896; Desch, "War and Strong States," 244–45; Porter, *War and the Rise of the State,* 113–21; and Hinze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," 178–215. Also see Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 1–22.

new Japan, let alone over the specific technologies and institutions to emulate. Multipolarity and uncertainty about the actual distribution of land-based military power in Europe during the late 1850s and early 1860s led the Meiji oligarchs to consider emulating different types of constitutions, political and military institutions, and technologies from France, Prussia, and the United Kingdom.[75] The unexpected victory of Prussia and the North German Confederation in the1870–71 Franco-Prussian War convinced one of the Meiji oligarchs, Yamagata Aritomo, that the new Japanese army should emulate the Prussian army model. Likewise, after various trips to Europe and North America and after studying the constitutions and political institutions of several great powers, Yamagata's fellow oligarch, Itō Hirobumi, concluded that the new German empire offered the best constitutional model for Japan to emulate.[76]

Neoclassical realism does not expect all vulnerable states to adopt authoritarian and centralized domestic institutions, nor does it expect more secure states to adopt uniformly liberal and decentralized institutions. Janice Thompson noted the historical reasons for the distinction between the state and society: society was an adversary in the process of state building because "it resisted state rulers' efforts to extract resources and monopolize political and judicial authority."[77] The arrangement of domestic institutions often reflects particular bargains reached between rulers and societal actors. This tension between the state and societal actors is one of the reasons why different polities always have different domestic institutions.[78]

Neoclassical realism recognizes that there is no perfect "transmission belt" linking the relative distribution of power and states' foreign policy behavior.[79] Politicians, military leaders, and bureaucrats make foreign policy choices based on their perceptions and calculations of relative power and other states' intentions. This means that, over the short and medium terms, different states' foreign policies may not be objectively "efficient" or predictable based on an objective assessment of relative power.[80] Furthermore, states have varying amounts of state power. Even if leaders make "accurate"

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[75] On the difficulties of assessing the actual balance of power on the European continent in the 1860s, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1860–1940," *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (winter 1997): 65–97.

[76] See Richard J. Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53–62; and W. G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 152–53.

[77] Janice E. Thompson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 216.

[78] Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation*, 85.

[79] See Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 147.

[80] Elite calculations and perceptions of relative power and other states' intentions are central themes in several neoclassical realist works, especially Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perception during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993); Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in East Asia: The United



FIGURE 2 The Neoclassical Realist Model of the Resource-Extractive State. The resource-extraction model treats states' alignment behavior as exogenous.

estimates of relative power and power trends, they do not always have complete access to the resources of their own societies to pursue foreign policy objectives. Unit-level variables intervene between systemic incentives and states' actual policy responses. Domestic variables do not operate independently of structural variables in shaping states' foreign policies, though.

Figure 2 depicts the resource extraction model of the state in neoclassical realism. The level of external threat or vulnerability is the independent variable. This is a function of the relative distribution of power (both in the international system and in the particular region), the offense-defense balance in military technology, and geographic proximity.[81] State power—the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources as determined by the institutions of the state—as well as nationalism and ideology, is the intervening variable. The dependent variable is the variation in the types and intensity of the adaptive strategies the state will pursue: emulation, innovation, or persistence in existing strategies.

The resource-extraction model assumes that states are reasonably cohesive and that leaders attempt to pursue foreign and security policies based on their assessments and calculations of relative power and other states' intentions. It assumes that states do not suffer from various types of internal fragmentation, such as elite dissensus and fragmentation, a lack of social or ethno-nationalist cohesion, or regime vulnerability. In reality, the majority

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States, Japan, and Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 261–91; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (spring 2001): 107–46; David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and Rise of Great Powers," *Security Studies* 12, no. 1 (autumn 2002): 1–40; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); and Jeffrey Taliaferro, "Power Politics and the Balance-of-Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 2 (March 2004): 177–211.

[81] On the components of threat, see Stephen M. Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 22–26; and Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 18–45.

of states, particularly those in the developing world, have exhibited various kinds of fragmentation for some portion of their histories. Here, however, for the sake of developing the basic resource-extraction model, it is assumed that states are reasonably coherent.[82]

States respond to shifts in their level of external vulnerability. To explain variation in the types and intensity of the adaptive strategies the state will likely pursue, however, we need to account for how systemic variables filter through a unit-level intervening variable: state power. The remainder of this section discusses how the institutions of the state, nationalism, and ideology might influence the level of state power, and then derives several hypotheses on how state power might constrain or facilitate a state's reaction to shifts in the external environment.

State Institutions

The politico-military institutions of the state are the first component of state power. Institutional arrangements affect the ability of central decision-makers to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society. Michael Mastanduno, David Lake, and John Ikenberry drew a distinction between two domestic strategies that states employ in the pursuit of foreign policy goals: mobilization and extraction. Mobilization generally takes two forms. A state can directly control economic activity and reallocate resources through centralized planning, the nationalization of key industries or particular firms, and other means. Alternatively, the state can indirectly intervene in the economy to facilitate the accumulation of societal wealth and thereby the tax revenues available to the state. Neither strategy is cost-free. The state must make a certain political and economic investment in these mobilizations, whether in the form of expenditures on a large administrative apparatus (direct mobilization) or in the form of subsidies and concessions to nonstate actors as an inducement to expand production (indirect mobilization). In resource extraction, the state directly converts societal wealth into military power through taxation, requisition, and expropriation.[83]

Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry noted that there is a trade-off between extraction and the two strategies of mobilization: "As extraction increases, the state is likely to redouble its efforts at mobilization, but the latter may decline because (1) the sum of investable wealth is now lower and (2) incentives for future wealth creation are undermined by discouraging investment and introducing inefficiencies into the economy."[84] Centralized and insulated states

[82] For a neoclassical realist theory of how government or regime vulnerability and social cohesion inhibit timely balancing behavior, see Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[83] Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," 467.

[84] Ibid., 463.

can extract societal wealth better than decentralized and constrained states can, but the authors' point is that even capitalist democratic states vary greatly in their ability to convert potential capabilities into actual economic and military power. The downside to this form of domestic-international strategy is that it may generate discontent among affected social groups.

Building on the work of Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, Fareed Zakaria and Aaron Friedberg have examined how variation in extractive and mobilization capability affects states' ability to adjust to shifts in their international environment. Zakaria developed the concept of state power, which he defined as the government's ability to extract resources for its own end, to explain why the United States did not expand abroad more rapidly between 1865 and 1899, but then expanded rapidly between 1899 and 1908. Despite a dramatic increase in its economy, population, and access to natural resources during the first period, the United States acquired no overseas territories, maintained a small military compared to those of the European great powers, and generally avoided entanglements in great-power politics. Yet, in the second period, the United States not only fought a lopsided war against Spain, but acquired colonies in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico and a naval base in Cuba as a result, built the world's second-largest navy, and began to assert itself in great-power diplomacy.

Zakaria attributed this shift in U.S. grand strategy to an increase in the size and extractive capacity of the federal government in the late 1880s and 1890s. He measured the relative strength of a state along several dimensions: the degree of cohesion in central institutions (particularly the civil bureaucracy and the military); the degree of autonomy from society; the ability to generate revenue; and the scope of governmental responsibilities. Strong states have higher scores on each of these dimensions. Weaker states, by contrast, suffer from fragmentation, penetration by interest groups, lack of revenue, and minimal responsibilities.[85] All else being equal, stronger states have greater access to economic and potential resources and are therefore more likely to adopt ambitious foreign policies.

Friedberg argued that, while bipolarity, anticipated power trends, and uncertainty about future intentions pushed the Soviet Union and the United States toward some form of confrontation after the Second World War, variation in state power ultimately shaped the types of grand strategies the superpowers pursued during the Cold War. Like Zakaria, he drew a distinction between the economic and potential capabilities and the ability of the state to direct those resources toward national security objectives. A combination of weak institutions, the material interests of various societal actors, and a deeply embedded anti-statist ideology eventually led the United States to adopt an outward-directed force posture and military strategy. In support

[85] See Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*, 33–39.

of this military strategy, the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations created a set of inward-directed power-creation mechanisms, including a de facto industrial policy whereby the federal government served as a procurement agent but eschewed any central-planning role, and a reliance on private industry to produce weapons systems and supporting technologies.[86] Taken together, these mechanisms allowed the United States to generate military power, undertake technological and weapons innovations, and compete with the Soviet Union on a global scale for decades, without becoming a "garrison state" in the process.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, lacked countervailing domestic constraints on extraction and mobilization; there were no powerful and independent societal actors. Friedberg noted, "To the contrary, the few influential groupings in the Soviet system, were in essence, state actors; all benefited from its growth. Communist ideology and the structure of Soviet political institutions combined to elevate the state and to permit, indeed to encourage, a strategically stimulated metastasis in its internal power."[87] During most of the Cold War, the Soviet Union undertook a far more expansive program of power creation. The highly centralized nature of the Soviet system allowed the second-ranked great power to acquire nuclear weapons quickly, control Eastern Europe, and compete with the United States on a global scale for forty years. The downsides of the Soviet system were numerous: sluggish economic performance, strong disincentives for innovation, overinvestment in the military sector to the detriment of the consumer sector, lack of access to information technologies, and "imperial overstretch."[88]

The ability of states to extract resources from society is not simply a function of the strength of institutions: it also depends on leaders' ability to raise and maintain support for national security strategies. Thomas Christensen developed the concept of national political power, which he defined as "the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation's human and material resources behind security policy initiatives."[89] The degree to which state-society relations distort the policies that leaders prefer to use in dealing with extant threats depends on the heights of the domestic-mobilization hurdles they face. The heights of those mobilization hurdles are a function of (1) the ability of the state to raise or maintain levels of taxation before the mobilization drive, (2) the nature and immediacy of the international challenge and the expense of the leaders' preferred policies in comparison with past responses to similar challenges, and (3) the novelty and salient history of policy details within the preferred grand strategy.

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[86] See Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State,* chaps. 4–8.

[87] Ibid., 75.

[88] See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Revisiting the Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (winter 2000–2001): 5–53.

[89] Christensen, *Useful Adversaries,* 11.

Christensen presented a "two-level" domestic mobilization model to explain an anomaly for Waltz's balance-of-power theory: Sino-American enmity during the height of the Cold War. The United States and the People's Republic of China not only failed to balance against the Soviet Union for twenty years, they "were each other's most active enemy in the years 1949–1972, fighting wars in Korea and Vietnam that claimed the vast majority of each country's Cold War casualties."[90] Christensen argued that, in the late 1940s and 1950s, American and Chinese leaders sought to mobilize domestic resources to balance against the long-term Soviet threat but lacked sufficient national political power to do as they pleased. Therefore, the Truman administration and the regime of Mao Zedong used domestically popular but overly aggressive policies in areas of secondary concern as a diversion for necessary, expensive, and largely defensive policies in areas of primary concern.

Leaders often encounter difficulties convincing the public to make significant sacrifices for national security, even if such efforts are in the public's own long-term interest. This is especially true in liberal democracies, where the average citizen "does not have the time or expertise to understand the subtleties of balance-of-power politics," tends to have a higher discount rate regarding geographically distant and indirect external threats than held by foreign policy elites, and has a further incentive to free ride on the sacrifices of others for national-security objectives.[91] In authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, "the only significant hurdle to immediate, all-out mobilization [is] the morale and spirit of sacrifice in the population at large."[92]

Mobilization hurdles are likely to be particularly high where states currently face low levels of external vulnerability, but leaders nonetheless fear the emergence of new long-term threats. In order to mobilize and maintain broad support for strategies considered essential to national security, leaders might rationally adopt policies in secondary areas "that appear overly aggressive, ideological, or otherwise wasteful of resources and alliance opportunities."[93] Emulation and innovation both entail costs for societal actors in the form of higher taxation, the reallocation of resources, and conscription. Innovation is potentially more costly and disruptive.

The work of Friedberg, Zakaria, and Christensen suggests the following: States that initially enjoy high extraction and mobilization capacity, but that also face high external vulnerability, are more likely to emulate the military, governing, and technological practices of the system's most successful states, at least in the short run. On the other hand, states that must augment those capacities, but that also face high external vulnerability, will have greater

[90] Ibid., 4.
[91] Ibid., 17.
[92] Ibid., 245.
[93] Ibid., 3.

difficulty in pursuing emulation, at least in the short run. States that initially enjoy high extraction and mobilization capacity, but that also face relatively low external vulnerability, have the luxury of engaging in innovation, continuing existing strategies, or simply doing nothing to enhance their long-term security and power. Conversely, states that do not enjoy high mobilization and extraction capacity, but that also face low levels of external vulnerability, are less likely to pursue emulation or innovation. Under these circumstances, states are more likely to continue or escalate existing strategies.

Ideology and Nationalism

Ideology and state-sponsored nationalism are two other determinants of state power. In general, state-sponsored nationalism tends to increase social cohesion and the propensity of individuals to identify with the state, which in turn facilitates leaders' efforts to extract and mobilize resources from society for national-security goals. Ideology, on the other hand, can facilitate or inhibit leaders' efforts to extract and mobilize resources, depending on the content of that ideology and the extent to which elites and the public hold common ideas about the proper role of the state vis-à-vis society and the economy.

There is no universally accepted definition of nationalism in the literatures of international relations or comparative politics. For the purposes of this article, "nationalism" is broadly defined as a propensity of individuals to identify their personal interests with that of a group that is too large to meet together; to identify those interests based on a common "culture," "ethnicity," "civic" or "national identity" that the members of the group share to the exclusion of other groups; to believe that the members of the group share a common history; and to believe that the group requires its own state if it is to survive.[94]

Three points about this treatment of nationalism deserve emphasis. First, it assumes that leaders deliberately inculcate nationalism primarily as a means to achieve societal cohesion against external adversaries. This conception of state-sponsored nationalism deliberately excludes ethnic, secessionist, and vernacular nationalisms that might hinder and threaten the state from within.[95] Second, this definition of nationalism presumes that individuals' loyalty to the state supersedes their loyalty to more exclusive groups, such as those based on common kinship and location, and that such

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[94] This definition of state-sponsored nationalism draws on Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," 82–83; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 6–7; and Ernst B. Haas, "What Is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" *International Organization* 40, no. 3 (summer 1986): 709.

[95] There is a voluminous literature on elite manipulation of ethnic or secessionist nationalism as a cause of ethnic civil war, genocide, and state failure. For an overview, see Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, rev. ed., ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

identification increases the cohesion of the group. Third, social cohesion is the not the same as political unanimity or the absence of deep-seated political disagreements within society. All societies, including highly nationalistic ones, exhibit various conflicts and cleavages arising from divergent class interests, resource allocations, competing political goals, regional differences, and ethnic rivalries. Yet nationalism can enhance social cohesion and the willingness of individuals to make sacrifices to the extent that most individuals and societal groups view the state's institutions as legitimate. Particularly during periods of high external vulnerability, leaders have an incentive to inculcate nationalism as a means to extract greater societal resources for the production of military power.[96]

Consider the following: During the 1793–97 War of the First Coalition, France deliberately inculcated nationalism, through the medium of compulsory primary education, propaganda campaigns, and political indoctrination of military recruits, to generate public support for the *levée en masse* and the social and economic disruptions necessary to create a mass-conscription army. External vulnerability provided an impetus for the Committee of Public Safety and later the Directory to pursue military innovation. Nationalism, however, played a key role in increasing the state power of the French state and thus its ability to engage in large-scale military innovation in wartime.[97] In Japan, the Meiji oligarchs used the same methods to build a "'national essence' (*kokusui*)—the symbolic order that would unite the archipelago and enable Japan to achieve parity with the West."[98] State-sponsored nationalism was a precondition for the Meiji oligarchs' subsequent campaign to emulate the military, economic, and governing practices of Prussia/Germany and the United Kingdom in the 1870s and 1880s. In nineteenth-century China, on the other hand, the Qing dynasty was unable to respond to the rising threat of Western imperialism by inculcating a sense of Chinese nationalism. On the contrary, the majority of ethnic Chinese perceived their Manchu leaders as barbarians, largely because the Manchus "succeeded in their efforts to maintain an ethnically and, to a degree, culturally separate identity while ruling the country according to the Chinese mode and partaking in the benefits of Chinese civilization."[99]

Ideology is closely related, but not identical, to nationalism. Whereas state-sponsored nationalism focuses on the individual's identification with the nation or the state, the term "ideology" is used here to denote a series of widely held beliefs, causal relationships, and assertions about the proper

[96] On the other hand, in instances where states lack domestic legitimacy or are vulnerable to overthrow, leaders will be wary of fomenting hyper-nationalism and mobilizing a mass army. See Schweller, *Unanswered Threats,* 49–50.

[97] Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," esp. 92–95.

[98] See Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*, 33–34. Also see Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[99] Ralston, *Importing the European Army*, 109.

relationship of the state to domestic society and the role of the state in the international system across a range of issues—political, economic, social, and military. Ideology can facilitate or inhibit leaders' ability to extract and mobilize resources from society depending on its content and the extent to which the population and elites share it. For example, although the Bolsheviks had no coherent theory of international politics when they seized power in 1917, they developed one as they went along. As William Wohlforth has noted, the so-called correlation of forces or "détente through strength" thesis articulated by Joseph Stalin and his lieutenants in the 1930s held that the more powerful the Soviet Union became, the better its relations with the irrevocably hostile capitalist states would be. This thesis, along with Marxist-Leninist ideology about politics, economics, and the nature of history, not only reflected the true beliefs of the Soviet leaders, but also gave the Soviet regime an additional tool with which to extract greater resources for the crash industrialization program of the 1930s and the military buildup of the post–Second World War period.[100]

In other instances, ideology can moderate leaders' efforts to extract or mobilize resources. Friedberg has argued that an American anti-statist ideology, consisting of a deep-seated fear of concentrating power in the hands of the federal government and a commitment to economic liberalism, filtered the range of policy options under consideration in response to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. This filtering process worked in two ways. First, since would-be state builders had to assemble winning coalitions in Congress and among the electorate, they were unlikely to knowingly advocate policies that were impassable and not in keeping with what they perceived to be the country's basic ideological principles. "Whatever their initial preferences, most prudent, pragmatic leaders are likely to conclude [that] what the political traffic will bear and what is best for the country are, almost by definition, the same."[101] Second, while calculations of political advantage were never absent, senior officials in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations subscribed to the dominant anti-statist ideology, which in turn drew them toward certain courses of action and away from others. "Ideology thus shapes the counters of the terrain, even if it does not determine the road that will finally be taken; it lays out signposts and warning signals that lead

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[100] Wohlforth, *Elusive Balance,* 51–53.

[101] Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, 22. At the same time, objective shifts in the relative distribution of power filter through the medium of Wilsonian or liberal internationalist beliefs shared by U.S. foreign-policy elites and the public to produce overly ambitious (and often self-defeating) foreign policies aimed at remaking the world in America's image. See Christopher Layne, *Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), esp. chap. 6; and Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

policy makers down certain paths and cause them to avoid or to overlook others."[102]

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This article began by posing several questions: Under what circumstances are states more likely to emulate the successful military institutions, governing practices, and technologies of another? When confronted with similar international threats, why do some states respond by emulating the practices of the system's leading powers, while others respond through innovation or the continuation of existing strategies? Neorealist balance-of-power theory holds that the competitive nature and socialization effects of the international system provide incentives for states to balance against threatening increases in power and to emulate the practices of the system's leading states. In its spare form, however, the theory merely delimits a range of probable international outcomes; it does not explain why and how states choose among different types of "internal" balancing strategies, such as the emulation of other states' military practices, innovation, or the continuation or escalation of existing strategies. Explaining such variation in a state's foreign policy requires a theory that integrates systemic and unit-level variables.

This article has asserted that neoclassical realism can explain variation in states' abilities to adapt to changes in the international environment through internal balancing better than Waltz's balance-of-power theory can. Like classical realism, neoclassical realism expects variation in state power (the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society). Yet, like neorealist balance-of-power theory, neoclassical realism stresses the importance of the international system in shaping the parameters of states' external behavior. The arguments presented above are not a challenge to neorealist balance-of-power theory. Rather, they supplement balance-of-power theory by specifying how systemic variables might combine with intervening variables at the unit level to explain variation in individual states' foreign and defense policies. Thus, neoclassical realism, in general, and the resource-extraction model of the state developed herein seek to explain phenomena that Waltz's theory does not.

External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Although systemic variables provide incentives for such adaptive behavior, unit-level variables affect the choices states make among innovation, emulation, or the continuation of existing military strategies and practices. The hypotheses derived in this article address the circumstances under which state power would likely affect a state's choice among these internal

[102] See Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, 22.

balancing strategies. Historical examples from the experiences of five rising or declining great powers (France, Prussia/Germany, Great Britain, China, Japan, and the United States) over the past three hundred years were used to illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.

This article sought merely to outline a resource-extraction model of the state. It did not purport to test the hypotheses derived from that model against rival hypotheses from other theories, such as cultural theories of strategic adjustment.[103] The next stage of this research entails creating measures of the different components of state power: the relative strength of existing state institutions, levels of nationalism, and existence of state-sponsored or anti-statist ideology. This will not be an easy task. That said, every concept or variable of any interest to students of international relations is ambiguous, hard to operationalize and measure, and open to multiple interpretations. In the interest of outlining the resource-extraction model, the historical illustrations provided above all involved states arguably facing high levels of external vulnerability. Future research would involve identifying a universe of cases involving states facing different levels of external threat or a single state that experiences varying levels of external threat over time. Likewise, there should be variation in the level of state power across particular states or within the state over time. Other avenues for research might involve testing the neoclassical realist hypotheses using cases involving second-tier and third-tier states in past international systems, as well as cases involving states in the developing world today.

[103] On cultural theories of strategic adjustment, see Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).