



Crucial steps

Security sector reform in the
Central African Republic

Published with support from the United Nations Development Programme

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Central African
Republic

Crucial steps

Security sector reform in CAR

The Central African Republic

Basic facts and figures

CAR is among the ten least developed countries in the world.

The Central African Republic (CAR) is among the world's least-developed countries, ranking 171st (of 177) on the Human Development Index. Surrounded by unstable neighbours, the country is currently led by President François Bozizé, who, after taking power in a coup in 2003, won legitimate elections in 2005.

Troubled since independence from France in 1960, CAR has often faced civil unrest and violence, and discontent continues today. Salary arrears led to public sector strikes in 2007, followed by the resignation of the government in early 2008. A new Prime Minister, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, was named on 22 January.

The government's new development strategy emphasizes security sector reform, good governance, economic rehabilitation and human capital development. In addition, an inclusive national political dialogue has been scheduled for 2008. Donors have begun to re-engage, and a recent donor round table saw pledges of \$600 million for development through 2010.

Long stalled, the economy has begun to re-

cover but remains dominated by subsistence agriculture. Exports are hindered by poor infrastructure, and the World Bank estimates that cross-border trade is more difficult than in any other country in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the presence of diamonds and uranium, the country has been unable to translate these resources into public wealth.

CAR continues to face serious humanitarian problems, as well. Over 1 million people are affected by clashes between rebels, government troops and bandits in the north, and almost 300,000 people have fled their homes.

Still, in many ways CAR appears to have turned a corner. Thirty-five international organizations are now engaged in the country, and their presence is expanding. Greater reinforcement will come from an EU/UN peacekeeping force, which has begun deployments to Chad and CAR with a mandate to protect refugees and aid workers in areas adjacent to Darfur.

With increased support and a democratic government, CAR has an historic opportunity to move beyond conflict and poverty.


CAR's current Human Development Index is lower than it was in 1985.

Key country statistics

Area and population	
Area	622,984 km ²
Population in 2007 (estimate)	4.2 million
Internally displaced persons (estimate)	197,000
Refugees in Chad, Cameroon, Sudan	98,000

Economy and development	
Human Development Index (HDI)	0.384
HDI Rank	171 (of 177)
Population living on less than \$1 a day	67%
GDP per capita in 2007 (estimate)	\$380
Ease of Doing Business Rank in 2007	177 (of 178)

Health and education	
Life expectancy at birth	43 years
Maternal mortality rate	1,355
Global acute malnutrition	10.1%
HIV prevalence (15-49 year olds)	6.2%
Adult literacy rate	54% (m), 32% (f)
Primary school enrolment rate	55%



Key office data

UNDP in the Central African Republic	
Programme budget in 2007	\$20.3 million
National staff in 2007	110
International staff in 2007	18
Staff based outside Bangui	37

Security sector reform and CAR

Security for everyone

A strong sense of security is essential to creating an environment that encourages inclusive development. ‘Security’ must go beyond traditional notions of a powerful military, however. Security sector reform (SSR) is the process by which governments recast domestic security and justice services into a coherent set of organizations that work together to uphold the law, promote human rights and foster development.

OECD definition of SSR

Security sector reform is the transformation of the security system which includes all the players, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

Major security threats in CAR

CAR has suffered chronic instability since independence from France in 1960. This instability deteriorated into a series of political and military crises between 1996 and 2003 that plunged the country into violence and accelerated the decay of public institutions. Pockets of violence persist, particularly in the north-west and north-east, where observers have accused government soldiers, rebel fighters and bandits of serious human rights violations.

This violence implies inadequate democratic control of CAR’s security sector. Extreme poverty – more than 67 per cent of the population lives on less than one dollar per day – serves to exacerbate domestic instability, indirectly encouraging banditry and corruption, as well as fuelling popular resentment of the government.

External threats pose a serious challenge for CAR as well, as the country is wedged among highly unstable neighbours, including Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Foreign rebel groups routinely transit through CAR, using the country as a base for operations or pillaging border communities.

Security sector shortcomings

The CAR security sector is marked by an inability to guarantee adequate protection of people

or borders. The sector is further handicapped by a politicized management culture. In addition, there is often a near total lack of justice and security providers outside the capital. These conditions have contributed to recurring bouts of violence in the country and the rapid erosion of popular trust in government.

Keenly aware of this fragility, the government has launched several reform programmes in the past. These efforts tended not to address the security sector as a whole, however, and in 2007 CAR decided to engage in a comprehensive SSR process based on the OECD approach. As a first step, the government approached its international partners about organizing an SSR seminar that would allow wide consultations and establish a two-year timeline for reforms.

A first for Central Africa

Organized by the National SSR Committee, CAR’s National Security Sector Reform Seminar took place in April 2008. The seminar’s scope and approach were unprecedented for the region and demonstrate the government’s desire to effect real change both within and across sectors. The main outcome is an ambitious two-year reform schedule that coordinates changes across the security system and tasks government institutions with concrete steps for implementation.

CAR deserves recognition and support for the challenge it has embraced. At every step, the government has worked to integrate global expertise, and collaboration with donors and other partners was a key part of preparing the seminar. As the country moves these reforms into practice, it will require greater engagement and ongoing donor partnerships. As an unprecedented initiative in a volatile region, bolstering CAR’s efforts into a larger success could have tremendous implications for neighbouring countries.

This report summarizes the status of SSR following the April seminar and is intended for the country’s current and potential partners. It takes readers through major reform targets and presents strategies outlined during the seminar. More detailed information about each sector is available at <http://hdptcar.net/blog/ssr>.

Strengthening the security sector in CAR could offer stability to a long troubled country and an example to a volatile region.

Table of Contents

Background on the Central African Republic	4
Security Sector Reform and CAR	5
Army and the Gendarmerie	8
National Police	10
Justice and Penitentiaries	12
Intelligence Services	14
Customs Service	16
Good Governance	17
Annex I: Full reform proposals and implementation timeline	18

Covering a territory the size of France and Belgium, the Central African army and gendarmerie have a combined force of less than 7,000. A history of impunity makes the services ripe for reform.

Army and Gendarmerie



BASIC FACTS

- National Army has 5,000 soldiers.
- Gendarmerie has 1,800 officers.
- Recruitment is irregular and, since 1981, clientelist.

Without strong international support, CAR risks being unable to implement SSR and perpetuating its instability.

Background

Of CAR's national defence and security forces, the army (*Forces armées centrafricaines*, or FACA) and the gendarmerie are the most visible examples of the need for SSR. As recently as 2007, the FACA was accused of human rights violations by international observers.

In a country as large as France and Belgium with a population of 4.3 million, the FACA counts 5,000 soldiers in its ranks. These soldiers are charged with ensuring national defence, territorial integrity and citizen protection. Although intended to function as a garrison force, soldiers are based in Bangui, meaning campaigns outside the capital are expeditionary and strain limited equipment and logistics capability.

Starting in 1981, recruitment became increasingly clientelist, undermining the perception of the FACA as a national force. A 1996 reform initiative focused on the FACA but was cut short by a deteriorating security situation, leading to the destruction of much of the army's infrastructure between 1996 to 2003.

The CAR gendarmerie was detached from the

national military in 1996, allowing it an independent administration within the Ministry of Defence. The gendarmerie has 1,800 officers tasked with enforcing judicial and administrative rules, maintaining public order and military police duties. Proportionally, the national gendarmerie in France is triple the size; in Italy, it is quadruple. Equipment and personnel shortages plague the service, whose role is further complicated by an uncertain legal mandate.

Shortcomings

Closely linked, the army and gendarmerie suffer from many of the same problems, which can mostly be grouped under issues of discipline and resources. Some of these challenges are long-standing, while others emerged (or intensified) following the upheaval of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Discipline issues

Major problems	Examples
Human rights	Collective punishment of suspected civilian supporters of militants has led to village burnings, summary executions and other violations.
	Concentration of soldiers in Bangui leaves the countryside open to attacks by militants and bandits.
	Lack of systematic human rights training indirectly encourages on-going violations.
Disrespect for legal norms	Soldiers operate illegal checkpoints, harassing and extorting civilians.
	Absence of a universal military code of conduct encourages moral ambiguity.
	Laws regulating military behaviour need updating or are entirely missing.
No punishment mechanism	Lack of military prisons or other sanction mechanisms fosters impunity.
	Overly fraternal relationships between officers and enlisted men discourages punishment of misbehaviour.



Protracted instability and violence between 1996 and 2003 destroyed most of the army's infrastructure.

Photo: BB

Army and gendarmerie

Undoing decades of impunity

Resource issues

Major problems	Examples
Staffing	5,000 soldiers and 1,800 gendarmes are inadequate to cover CAR's large territory and serious security concerns.
	At least 15 per cent of soldiers are past the mandatory retirement age, blocking recruitment and advancement.
	Recruitment has been largely clientelist since 1981, with emphasis placed on connections rather than merit.
Working conditions	33 months of accumulated salary arrears strain soldiers' resources and increase likelihood of extortion.
	Housing is often unavailable for soldiers and families, straining budgets.
	Training is erratic and undeveloped, contributing to indiscipline.
Equipment	Most military infrastructure was destroyed between 1996 and 2003.
	Missing, decrepit or rapidly decaying equipment complicates force projection beyond Bangui.

Proposed solutions

The challenges facing the FACA and the gendarmerie are formidable. The SSR Committee conducted a review of existing laws and practices in these services, submitting a detailed overview to seminar participants. This research was used as the basis for seminar discussions and working groups tasked with formulating

early reform proposals. Early action will build a sense of momentum, and the seminar identified priority actions to take over the next two years. The full timetable can be found in Annex I.

Proposed solutions

Objective	Proposed reform and deadline
Improve human rights	October 2008 Establish training that integrates civics and humanitarian law.
	October 2008 Establish a universal code of conduct.
Establish legal norms	December 2009 Create a parliamentary committee to update laws governing the military.
	May 2008 Evacuate all soldiers from illegal checkpoints and forbid uniforms in unofficial settings.
	October 2008 Create military detention centres and impose punishments.
Punish infractions	September 2008 Establish recruitment centres in every region to combat clientelism.
	November 2008 Enforce retirement age with assistance for soldiers moving into civilian life.
Regularize staffing	December 2008 Build suitable military housing, capable of hosting families.
	December 2009 Permanently deploy soldiers to the north-west and re-establish garrisons.



STRATEGY

The National SSR Committee consulted prior reform efforts, such as this 1996 initiative.

With a murky institutional structure and accusations of clientelist recruitment practices and corruption, the Central African national police force is in need of comprehensive reforms.

National Police



Photo: BB

POLICE IN CAR

- 1,350 personnel make up the entire national police.
- National police have no clear legal mandate.
- Confused organization complicates action.

Background

The Central African national police is responsible for domestic law enforcement for the entire country. Created in 1960 from the former colonial force, the national police is supervised by the Ministry of the Interior and organized into 12 directorates, which are sub-divided into some 50 separate special services.

As of 1981, the national police counted 3,500 officers. Staff has since steadily declined, however, reaching an estimated 1,350 officers in 2008 – meaning that CAR has proportionally fewer police officers than any country in the region. The force is chronically overextended, which, combined with payment irregularities and a lack of equipment, has contributed not only to a perception of ineffectiveness, but to corruption, petty harassment and human rights violations.

During the turmoil of 1996-2003, police stations were often directly targeted. As a result, the force is severely under-equipped, and infrastructure is typically in short supply and in poor condition. Confusion on the precise role of the national police further muddles the force's

ability to carry out its mission.

Members of the police force participated forthrightly in the SSR seminar, contributing an honest accounting of their current problems and proposing important solutions. Their willingness to recognize the range of challenges confronting the force is indicative of a real commitment to change, which will in turn require an energized partnership with international partners

Shortcomings

The national police is burdened by a great number of shortcomings that run the spectrum of institutional, resource and capacity issues. The lack of clarity on the force's legal mandate, taken with chronic shortages of manpower and equipment, has fostered a sclerotic police organization that is unable to maintain order effectively. Major issues are described in the table below.

Challenges

Major problems	Examples
Institutional confusion	A bloated 12 directorates and 50 services organize a total force of 1,350 officers.
	No firm legal grounding defines the role and responsibilities of the national police.
	No dedicated management structure within the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the national police.
Indiscipline	Police officers man illegal checkpoints, extorting money from passers-by.
	Some police officers are openly sympathetic to political parties, undermining the neutrality of the force.
	Use of 'contractors' to conduct police work has resulted in human rights violations and other abuses.



Discipline, equipment and staffing issues are compounded by an unclear legal mandate.

National police

Restoring order

Challenges (continued)

Major problems	Examples
Equipment	Almost no officers have a means of self-defence, proper uniforms or even whistles.
	Poor quality of buildings hinders work and contributes to sub-standard detention conditions.
	Communications equipment and vehicles are almost universally lacking.
Staffing	There are significantly more high-ranking officers on the force than 'beat cops' who conduct daily policing.
	Hierarchy within the force is poorly defined and widely disrespected.
	Recruitment is not actively pursued.

over the next two years. The most pertinent are summarized below; for the complete set, see Annex I.

Proposed solutions

Objective	Proposed reform and deadline
Clarify institutions	June 2008 Pass a law that clearly defines the status of the national police.
	August 2008 Appoint a Director-General of National Police to the Ministry of the Interior.
Re-establish discipline	September 2008 Publish a universal code of conduct.
	April 2010 Rehabilitate and build new police academies.
	February 2009 Reinvigorate internal oversight mechanisms.
Regularize staffing	July 2008 Issue a decree establishing objective admission criteria to enter the police academy.
Improve equipment	April 2009 Supply officers with means of self-defence and other essential equipment.
	June 2008 Supply officers with uniforms that clearly indicate their role.
	April 2010 Acquire communications equipment to link Bangui to the countryside.

Proposed solutions

Addressing these issues will require a sustained commitment from the CAR government as well as from the international community. The national police's participation in the seminar – as well as a reform initiative focused on the force in March 2007 – is reason for optimism regarding government engagement.

Although the task at hand will require years of corrective measures, seminar participants agreed on a priority set of actions to be implemented

BUILDING POLICE

Sustained external support coupled with committed domestic efforts can make police reform a success in CAR.

An effective justice sector is an essential component of a functioning security system. In CAR, justice services are largely limited to the capital and some major towns, and prisons operate far below global standards.

Justice and Penitentiaries



er regulations or ratified international treaties. This contributes to a sense of confusion regarding the law in CAR, undermining the justice sector’s efficacy. Severe deterioration of the sector’s infrastructure has also strongly impeded the fulfilment of its mandate.

Prisons are perhaps the most emblematic of this deterioration. Today, 34 prisons operate in CAR, although only two in Bangui can claim to respect any standard norms. Buildings are dilapidated, with extremely poor hygiene facilities and erratic formal management. Rehabilitating the penitentiary system is key to reforming the justice sector as a whole – an essential step in building a healthy security sector.

JUSTICE IN CAR

- One magistrate per 40,000 citizens
- Many laws out of date or in conflict with other laws
- Only 34 prisons operate in the country, run by soldiers.

A functioning justice system supported by professionally run prisons is key to developing a mature security sector.

Background

The justice sector constitutes a key counterpart for security services, ensuring that justice is administered equitably to those who have broken the law, and providing an essential sense of protection and fairness to the population. Modelled on the French justice system, CAR justice is currently concentrated in Bangui and, to a lesser extent, in prefectural capitals. The number of magistrates in the country is 150 – or roughly one per 40,000 Central Africans.

In CAR, the constitution mandates that the judicial branch be independent of the executive and legislative branches, although this principle is not always respected in practice. Judges and prosecutors are appointed by the President on the advice of the Magistracy Council and can be recalled by the same process.

Updating the country’s legal framework is an essential task, as laws are often out of step with current conditions, and many conflict with oth-

Shortcomings

The most serious shortcoming of the current CAR justice sector is the lack of reliable access, which undermines popular trust in the system. In addition, serious equipment deficits and staffing issues – in terms of both numbers and capacity – are challenging the sector.

Challenges

Major problems	Examples
Access to justice	Limited number of courts and inability to hear cases away from main centres has sharply reduced popular access.
	Poor understanding of the law and its applications has created a population that is alienated from the rule of law.
	High fees for justice and public records discourage citizen engagement.
Equipment	Lack of vehicles makes it impossible to render justice outside of main centres.
	Lack of computers complicates records keeping and slows processing of cases.



Lack of access to the justice system contributes to mistrust of government, thus perpetuating on-going instability.

Justice and penitentiaries

Bolstering security's essential tools

Challenges (continued)

Major problems	Examples
Staffing	Severe shortage of clerks and magistrates clogs the judicial system, rendering it slower and less efficient.
	Irregular training programmes do not ensure a standard knowledge base across judicial professions.
Prisons	Buildings and physical infrastructure are severely dilapidated.
	Standard civilian management of prisons does not exist, with prisons being guarded by military officers.
	Violations of basic prisoners' rights are common.

established a set of priority reforms for the next two years, which CAR will be able to implement with continued international support.

Proposed solutions

Objective	Proposed reform and deadline
Improve access and clarity	December 2008 Revise the texts of five Central African legal codes.
	December 2009 Train village and neighbourhood chiefs on their legal role, as well as basic judicial rules.
	July 2008 Re-evaluate fees for judicial proceedings and public records.
Supply adequate equipment	August 2008 Identify the five trial courts with the biggest needs in the country and provide basic infrastructure.
Recruit capable staff	October 2008 Recruit 40 magistrate students and 20 legal clerk students.
	July 2008 Revise training programmes for all magistrates.
Improve prison quality	September 2008 Conduct a national survey of prison conditions.
	December 2009 Create a civilian corps of properly trained prison guards.

Proposed Solutions

Earlier projects have targeted justice sector improvements in CAR, particularly since the elections in 2005. UNDP and other partners have worked to respond to the most outstanding judicial needs in ex-conflict areas, rehabilitating courthouses and training local actors, as well as organizing a National Assembly on Justice in October 2007. SSR efforts to incorporate justice can build on these accomplishments, although it will still take years of concerted effort to repair the sector entirely. SSR seminar participants es-



STRATEGY

Justice reform can build on previous and on-going efforts from a range of international partners.

With a history of more than ten attempted or successful *coups d'état* since 1996, CAR has an acute need for reliable intelligence. Dependable information flows could be crucial to preventing future conflict before it begins.

Intelligence Services



The *Direction de la surveillance du territoire* (DST) focuses mainly on monitoring foreigners in CAR who may be work for governments or organizations hostile to the government. The office is also responsible for diplomatic and presidential security, as well as conducting investigations and archiving.

Shortcomings

Major problems are visible in the organization of intelligence agencies, which are uncoordinated and report to numerous different government offices. Staffing remains a serious problem, with effectively no agents operating outside Bangui. Equipment shortages are also pervasive, and training is highly sporadic. Major problems are summarized in the table below.

INTELLIGENCE

- No real surveillance equipment, not even cameras
- No regular, active intelligence agents outside Bangui
- No foreign-based intelligence collection

Intelligence could boost stability in CAR, heading off domestic or external threats to the country's democracy.

Background

Intelligence agencies in CAR act domestically to monitor CAR and foreign nationals who may pose a threat to the government, such as coup plotting, hostility to democratic institutions, extremism and certain crimes. Agencies are divided across several government organizations, including the Office of the President, the FACA and the Ministry of Public Security. The National Office of Documentation, a coordinating authority, was created in 2007 in order to centralize information but remains inoperative.

CAR intelligence is mostly divided into two services. The *Direction des services de la police administrative* (DSPA), also known as the *Resignements généraux* (RG), is part of the national police. It is responsible for a large portion of domestic intelligence, including monitoring violent (or potentially violent) groups, militant social movements, strikes and other potential disruptions to public order.

Challenges

Major problems	Examples
Institutional confusion	Services operate without clear mandates and under the authority of different offices.
	Executive coordinating body is not operational, meaning information is not always shared.
Equipment	Vehicles and communications equipment are almost entirely lacking.
	Services do not possess basic surveillance equipment, including cameras.



Photo: BB

Lingering violence outside Bangui highlights the need for reliable information networks in the provinces.

Intelligence services

Preventing future crises through intelligence

Challenges (continued)

Major problems	Examples
Staffing and capacity	Staff numbers are inadequate, with none outside Bangui. An informal network of unofficial agents has been introduced in some prefectures, placing them beyond official control.
	No dedicated training facility or standardized training exists, undermining capacity.

Proposed Solutions

For a country with a long history of social upheaval and among the world's greatest number of coups and coup attempts, CAR has an acute need for accurate intelligence in order to maintain stability. The SSR seminar's intelligence working group put forward priority reform proposals meant to reinvigorate the country's intelligence agencies in the next two years, with an eye towards ongoing improvements in the future. CAR will need sustained external assistance to ensure that these reforms can be implemented successfully. A full accounting is available in Annex I.

Proposed solutions

Objective	Proposed reform and deadline
Clarify institutions	July 2008 Distinguish the mandates of different agencies and update the existing legal framework.
	December 2009 Assign the Defence Committee of the National Assembly to create a single authority for intelligence.
Improve equipment	December 2008 Identify and meet specific needs for communications and computers.
	December 2008 Identify and meet needs for vehicles and other modes of transport.
Bolster staff and capacity	December 2009 Create and operationalize prefectural-level intelligence liaisons.
	August 2009 Create standard training procedures for all intelligence officers.
	August 2009 Recruit more analysts and organize a partner-led training in analysis.



DEFENCE

Accurate intelligence is a key line of defence in protecting democracy in CAR.

Given rich natural resources and long, porous borders, customs enforcement in CAR could significantly boost national revenue. The current service is often marked by erratic enforcement and corruption.

Customs Service



Photo: PH

Background

The CAR Customs Service monitors all goods coming into and leaving the country. In total, 396 agents fulfil this mission on a territory the size of France and Belgium, in addition to preventing cross-border crime and illicit trafficking. Customs is part of the Ministry of Finance but works closely with other security agencies.

Unlike most of CAR's security institutions, Customs has functioning offices outside of Bangui, including border crossings with its neighbours. In addition, three offices operate abroad, two in Cameroon and one in Republic of Congo.

Infrastructure is somewhat better than that of other services, with 14 transport vehicles, 10 radio posts and 20 walkie-talkies. Also, Customs is computerizing its records and putting in place a VSAT-based transmission system.

Important problems remain, however. Integrated border policing remains problematic, and the sheer size of the country means that existing staff and equipment are sorely insufficient. Poor monitoring of customs offices has fostered a culture of corruption, particularly in the appointment of officers.

CUSTOMS IN CAR

- 396 customs officers serve the entire country.
- Three offices operate abroad.
- Infrastructure needs are pressing.

Shortcomings

Major shortcomings are typically related to the low capacity and corruption, as well as other examples of internal dysfunction.

Challenges

Major problems	Examples
Low capacity	Unfamiliarity with the Customs Code is common.
	Customs has been unable to keep pace with the informal sector.
	Fees are often levied without any sort of record, raising suspicion of wide-spread corruption.
Internal dysfunction	No clear structure governs customs, particularly outside Bangui.
	Recruitment is often based on connections rather than merit.
	Standardized training is unavailable, despite several individual programmes.

Proposed solutions

The SSR seminar, with the participation of customs officials, outlined a series of priorities that will build a solid foundation for future improvements over the next two years. For the full set of reforms, see Annex I.

Proposed solutions

Objective	Proposed reform and timeline
Strengthen capacity	May 2008 Institute merit-based hiring practices.
	December 2009 Recruit more personnel to cover the entire country.
	December 2009 Train personnel in line with specific focuses (e.g., diamonds, timber, etc.)
Combat corruption	May 2008 Operationalize a committee dedicated to streamlining customs exemptions.
	June 2008 Dismantle the CAR customs 'single window' office in Douala.

Good governance of security and justice services is essential to building a functional security sector capable of protecting both official institutions and private citizens.

Good Governance

Governance and security

Civilian control under democratic governance is essential to a security sector that respects human rights and offers meaningful protection to the entire population. The 2005 elections in CAR signalled to the international community that the country was serious about re-instituting democracy, and CAR's external partners have continued to work closely with the government to entrench participative institutions.

Role of governance

The role of governance in the security sector is essentially two-fold: to determine the proper form of civilian control and to ensure transparent, accountable leadership of the sector. Seminar participants proposed that the National Assembly take the lead on security affairs, expanding the purview of the current Defence Committee to include all relevant security questions. During this time, laws would be drafted or updated to create appropriate guidelines for the different services, and the Assembly would charge the Human Rights Commission with specific tasks related to monitoring the sector.

There can be no good governance without transparent management – particularly of public funding. Seminar participants were concerned with ensuring that democratic governance of the security sector would be paired with rigorous oversight, including better financial planning, increased revenue collection and anti-corruption measures.

Ensuring good governance

Because civilian officials will manage the security sector, it is essential that these officials do so competently and transparently, so as not to contribute to a further deterioration of public trust. Seminar participants issued a series of recommendations for the National Assembly over the next two years, intended to bolster



Photo: UNDP

the Assembly's capacity to manage the sector and entrench democratic control. The full set of recommendations is available in Annex I.

Ensuring good governance

Objective	Proposed reform and deadline
Strengthen the role of the National Assembly	October 2008 Expand the authority of the Defence Committee to include most security-related issues.
	May 2009 Develop specific training for MPs on security and defence issues.
Strengthen conflict prevention	September 2008 Provide training for security forces in conflict prevention and resolution.
	October 2008 Dismantle illegal checkpoints and reduce legal ones.
	December 2009 Provide literacy and civics training for mayors and village and/or neighbourhood chiefs.
Ensure sound financial management	September 2008 Institute regular financial audits of all government departments.

Good governance implies strong civilian control over a security sector that will foster development.

Annex I

Full reform proposals by sector

Implementation timeline

**Published with support from the
United Nations Development Programme**

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