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## Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence

BY CHRISTOPHER HEWITT

**ABSTRACT:** Although violent conflict between ethnic groups occurs in many societies, its severity varies considerably. Some societies, such as Lebanon or Cyprus, have experienced protracted conflict which has taken many lives. In other societies, such as Switzerland or Finland, ethnic conflict has been of little importance in recent decades. The political, economic, and demographic situation in 19 multi-ethnic societies is examined to see whether any pattern of majority-minority relations is associated with high or low levels of violence. It is concluded that there is a difference in the characteristics of high violence and low violence societies. Violent multi-ethnic societies are marked by severe political and economic inequality, constitutional differences, and demographic instability. Peaceful multi-ethnic societies are characterized by economic parity between the ethnic groups, adequate political representation of the minority, and political decentralization. The existence of several "deviant" cases, with lower levels of ethnic violence than expected, is noted.

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THIS paper examines ethnic violence in 19 societies and considers some characteristics of the minority-majority relationship which may help explain such violence.

An ethnic group is one whose members differ from members of other groups with regard to one or more ascriptive characteristics (race, language, or religion) and whose members typically feel solidarity with other members of their group and different from members of other groups (a "we-they" feeling). This feeling of distinctiveness leads to interaction, especially intimate interaction, being concentrated within the group. No assumption is made that ethnic differences necessarily lead to the creation of ethnic groups nor that ethnic identities are fixed for all time. However, in all the societies which will be considered, the ethnic cleavages are salient, stable, and unambiguous. In addition, all 19 societies have the following characteristics:

1. They have at least one minority group which constitutes 5 percent or more of the population.

2. The ethnic cleavages are such that the population can be dichotomized into a majority and one or more minorities. Those societies which are so fragmented that every group is a minority and no group may hope to dominate or fear domination by the rest are excluded.

3. They are, or were, democracies with free elections and universal suffrage. Nondemocratic states possess their full share of ethnic problems, but many indicators of the minority situation which will be used in this paper, such as legislative representation, do not exist or do not mean the same thing outside a democratic context. Table 1 lists the countries and minorities which will be considered.

A preliminary survey suggests that perhaps as many as 40 societies meet the above criteria. The 19 societies were selected because information on their ethnic situation was available from case studies or official publications.<sup>1</sup> The exclusion of societies for which information was not readily available may bias the sample in unknown ways. However, the cases are widely dispersed geographically and include societies at various levels of development. The paper first examines the variation in ethnic violence between societies, then it discusses some factors which might be related to ethnic conflict, and in conclusion compares the characteristics of societies with different levels of violence.

#### ETHNIC VIOLENCE

Ethnic violence is defined as violence between groups drawn from different ethnic communities or violence over any issue that affects the situation of one ethnic community relative to the other. Ethnic based violence is an important and widespread phenomenon. One estimate suggests that worldwide 20 to 30 percent of all domestic violence in 1961-65 was between ethnic groups, and another source calculates that the sum of fatalities in ethnic hostilities during the 1945-70 period exceeded 10 million.<sup>2</sup> Of the societies considered

1. A complete list of all the sources used (over 200 books and articles) would take up too much space. I welcome any comments, corrections, or queries on the information given in this paper.

2. Ted Robert Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, *Violence in America* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), pp. 454, 457; Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), p. 3.

TABLE 1  
ETHNIC VIOLENCE BY COUNTRY

MINORITIES	COUNTRY	DEATH/ MILLION WORST YEAR	DEATHS/MILLION WHOLE PERIOD (ANNUAL AVERAGE)	CHARACTERISTICS
Arabs	Zanzibar (1961-64)	45592.0	15273.10	brief rioting, then revolution
Christians	Lebanon (1946-76)	10606.1	684.30	civil war
Turks	Cyprus (1960-74)	500.0	100.00	civil war
Catholics	Northern Ireland (1945-76)	164.7	34.40	protracted terror- ism, with riot- ing
East Indians	Guyana (1961-76)	171.3	13.34	protracted rioting with terrorism
Creoles	Mauritius (1957-76)	33.3	1.72	repeated rioting
Tamils/Moors	Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (1948-76)	29.2	1.56	protracted rioting
Arabs	Israel (1949-76)	24.5	1.46	intermittent riots
Chinese/Indians	Malaysia (1955-76)	15.9	0.72	one major riot
Malays/Indians	Singapore (1959-76)	9.8	0.54	one major riot
Muslims	India (1960-70)	0.7	0.58	chronic rioting
Blacks	U.S.A. (1963-68)	0.4	0.20	Chronic rioting, some terrorism
East Indians	Trinidad (1956-76)	0.9	0.05	brief rioting
French	Belgium (1945-76)	0.6	0.07	frequent rioting
French	Canada (1945-76)	0.1	0.01	intermittent terrorism
French/Italians	Switzerland (1945-76)	0	0	intermittent terrorism
Fijians/Europeans	Fiji	0	0	brief rioting
Swedes	Finland (1945-76)	0	0	—
Maoris	New Zealand (1945-76)	0	0	—

in this paper, only two experienced no intercommunal violence during the postwar period.

However, although very few multi-ethnic societies completely escaped ethnic violence, there is a striking variation in its incidence and character between countries. Table 1 indicates the type of violence that

occurred in each country and gives two measures of its severity; deaths per million in the worst year and deaths per million for the period specified.

The calculations ignore ethnic violence between different communal groups than those noted and do not include violence leading to national

independence. Although the distinction between domestic and international conflict is frequently a subtle one, violence involving troops of two sovereign countries or cross-border terrorism is excluded. The result of these exclusions<sup>3</sup> is that only that violence attributable to the contemporary domestic situation of the minority will be considered.

Ethnic violence takes various forms: civil war, communal rioting, and terrorism. Civil war is marked by widespread conflict between highly organized and heavily armed military units. There is either a struggle for control of the state, as in Zanzibar, or the state fragments and its authority passes to ethnic factions who battle for territory, as in Cyprus and Lebanon. This type of conflict, threatening a revolutionary transformation of the preexisting state, is clearly the most serious kind of ethnic conflict, leading to very high death rates as well as widespread social disruption and property damage.

Communal rioting is of two types. The first involves clashes between civilian crowds rather than between organized military units. The violence is spontaneous and the weapons used are often homemade and primitive. Communal rioting, while it may involve incursions into the other group's areas, does not typically involve attempts to gain or control territory such as occur in civil war situations.<sup>4</sup> Nor is there any serious likelihood that the government will

be overthrown by this kind of violence. In this kind of communal rioting there is a widespread willingness to attack members of the other community simply because of their ethnic identity.<sup>5</sup> Communal riots of this type occurred in 12 societies, although their severity varied considerably.

Another type of communal riot does not involve confrontations between rival crowds, but rather clashes between soldiers or police and civilians of one ethnic community together with some looting and property damage. Such confrontations have been significant in the United States, Israel, and Northern Ireland.<sup>6</sup>

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police and the British Army were excluded. This may indicate that the situation was about to develop into civil war.

5. In Malaysia during the 1969 riots, Malays "set up barricades on access roads, stopped all vehicles, pulled out, slashed and killed Chinese occupants. Other groups hunted for Chinese within the kampongs . . . blocked the four-lane federal highway with logs, massacred Chinese [and some Indians], then burned their cars. . . . [The Chinese] took revenge on hapless Malays found within the confines of Chinese neighbourhoods. Malays caught in the massage parlors . . . with Chinese prostitutes were unceremoniously put to death. Movie theatres were invaded; Malay patrons were sought out and with iron rods systematically and quite dispassionately beaten to death." Women and children were killed and mutilated including "one six-year-old Indian girl with both hands severed" admitted to hospital. Karl von Vorys, *Democracy without Consensus* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 332-33, 349.

6. Morris Janowitz's distinction between "communal riots" and "commodity riots" is similar to that made here, but the term "commodity riot" emphasizes one characteristic—looting—which was rare in Northern Ireland and Israel. Janowitz notes that interracial clashes in the U.S. gave way to commodity riots during World War II. "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence," in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America*, pp. 317-39.

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3. The most serious ethnic conflicts excluded by these criteria are language riots in India, Arab-Jewish conflict up to 1949, the EOKA campaign against the British, Partition and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, Arab-Israeli wars, and Palestinian guerrilla activity.

4. Northern Ireland appears an exception to this generalization since for a period each side held "no-go" areas from which the

Terrorism is defined as violence carried out by small but highly organized groups. It includes such acts as assassinations, bombings, and small-scale gunbattles. Although such acts are often committed in association with other kinds of violence, terrorist campaigns of any significance are not common. The activities of the Irish Republican Army and the Protestant Loyalist groups have been responsible for the great majority of deaths in Northern Ireland. Intermittent racial terrorism in the United States has had little social impact and claimed only a handful of lives. In Canada the separatist "Front de Liberation du Quebec" was responsible for a handful of kidnappings and bombings.<sup>7</sup> The extremists among the Jura separatists and their opponents set up vigilante groups, but there are no reports of deaths, only of property damage. Furthermore the area affected was only a small part of Switzerland.

In Trinidad, Fiji, and Belgium, political demonstrations or labor disputes not overtly ethnic in character have led to sporadic violence which had an ethnic aspect, but such violence tended to be brief and to result in very few deaths.

It is a mistake to concentrate too much on the details of the death

7. In Northern Ireland, of the first 500 deaths, 385 were a result of terrorist activities. Michael McKeown, *The First Five Hundred* (Belfast: Irish News, 1972). In the United States, during the worst period of racial conflict (1963-68), 23 people were killed by white terrorists as against 191 riot deaths. Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America*, pp. 446-47. Most racial terrorism since then has involved black attacks on whites and resulted in 46 deaths. Lester A. Sobel, *Political Terrorism* (New York: Facts on File, 1975), pp. 174-77. Only six deaths resulted from FLQ terrorism. Ronald Manzer, *Canada: A Socio-Political Report* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp. 78-9.

"scores." Situations in which people are getting killed are unlikely to encourage accurate record keeping, and estimates of deaths from violence frequently vary widely. More importantly, once a certain kind of conflict situation has arisen the exact number of deaths which result is dependent upon various fortuitous circumstances. However, the ranking of countries according to the severity of their ethnic conflict suggested in table 1 is probably realistic, except in the case of Israel, which will be discussed in more detail later.

#### SOME POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE

A number of factors have been suggested to explain ethnic violence. They will be grouped under three headings: economic grievances, political grievances, and demographic characteristics. Table 2 summarizes the economic, political, and demographic situation of the minority in each society.

##### *Economic grievances*

Economic grievances exist when groups complain of, or make demands for, a change in the distributive system. There are very few societies where one community does not complain about its economic situation relative to the other. This situation is highly predictable, given that different historical experiences and cultural values usually result in economic differentiation, with each ethnic group concentrated in particular occupations, economic sectors, and geographic regions. In only three cases is there no significant economic difference between ethnic groups.<sup>8</sup> In all the other countries

8. In Fiji and Sri Lanka, the income of the majority community was close to the national average, but one minority had a much higher

noticeable differences exist. The extreme situation in which class and ethnicity coincide was approached by prerevolutionary Zanzibar.<sup>9</sup>

The extent of relative deprivation in each society is calculated by expressing minority income as a percentage of majority income and by comparing the proportion of white-collar workers in minority and majority populations. A statistic above 100 means that the minority has a higher income or a greater proportion of white-collar workers than the majority population. A statistic below 100 means that the minority is economically disadvantaged. No figures could be found for four societies, but other sources suggest considerable economic differences between minority and majority in these societies.

### *Political grievances*

Ethnic conflict is frequently associated with grievances or demands of a political nature. The most general complaint is that one community is denied its fair share of political power—that is, a share which approximately corresponds to its proportion in the population. In order to measure the extent to

which legislatures and cabinets are ethnically representative of the national population, their actual ethnic composition is expressed as a percentage of the “expected” composition. A figure of over 100 shows that the minority was overrepresented and constituted a greater proportion of the political elite than of the general population. The figures are averaged for all postwar elections and cabinets for which information was available.

In some situations a minority is so overrepresented it becomes politically dominant. In five cases the more numerous community was denied a majority of cabinet positions at some time during the postwar period. This outcome is not only contrary to the widely accepted theory of majoritarian democracy, but allows the ruling minority to monopolize the spoils of government if it so chooses. In Cyprus the Turkish minority while not dominant, was given a disproportionate number of legislative and administrative positions and veto power with respect to certain types of legislation. They were thus able to thwart the wishes of the majority.<sup>10</sup>

In several societies, ethnic groups have demanded territorial autonomy or self-government. For minority self-government to be possible, however, there must be a dispersal of power to states or provinces from the central government, and the minority population must be concentrated in such autonomous units. Nine societies have a three-level (national, state or provincial, local) system of administration, but in

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and one a much lower income. These societies are, therefore, classified as having significant economic differences.

9. One writer talks of “the pronounced tendency for race to coincide with economic class. Arabs . . . were the owners of the largest coconut and clove plantations and occupied many of the highest administrative positions in the Zanzibar civil service. Africans . . . were the unskilled manual and agricultural laborers, tenant farmers and petty agriculturists . . . race relations were conducted in the idiom of economic superior to economic inferior: employer-employee, master-servant, or landlord-laborer.” Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 14.

10. On the details of the Turkish Cypriot veto powers and Greek Cypriot opposition to such powers, see Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 83–103.

TABLE 2  
CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETIES WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF VIOLENCE

	ECONOMIC SITUATION		POLITICAL SITUATION				DEMOGRAPHIC Situation	
	IN-COME*	OCCU-PATION†	LEGIS-LATURE‡	CABI-NET§	SELF-GOVERN-MENT**	CONSTITUTION††	SIZE‡‡	TREND§§
Zanzibar		240	181	245 U	low	C	22.7	
Lebanon		142	110	110 U		C	49.6	T
Cyprus	low		167	167 U		C	18.0	
Northern Ireland	85	73	63	0	low	C	34.9	PT
Guyana	83	100	89	65 U			49.4	T
Mauritius		200	104	84			32.4	
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	94		73	35			28.6	
Israel	66		50	0	low	C	12.5	I
Malaysia	207		72	67			49.0	
Singapore	low		146	160	low		22.6	
India	low		43	101	low		10.3	I
U.S.A.	58	34	10	13	low		10.1	I
Trinidad	low		97	31			36.5	PT
Belgium		97	108	120 U	high		44.5	
Canada	84	79	110	105	high		30.4	
Switzerland	96		77	114	high		31.2	
Fiji	100	91	126	164 U			49.5	T
Finland		114	110	209			8.1	
New Zealand	82	32	77	34	low		6.5	I

\* Minority income as a percentage of majority income. Generally per capita or household income, but for Belgium and Switzerland regions or cantons are compared.

† Proportion of white-collar workers in minority group as a percentage of the proportion of white-collar workers in the majority group.

‡ Proportion of minority legislators as a percentage of the proportion of total population which is minority.

§ Proportion of cabinet which is minority as a percentage of the proportion of total population which is minority. "U" signifies that an undemocratic outcome occurred in that the minority formed a majority of the cabinet at some stage since 1945 or (as in Cyprus) had extensive veto powers.

\*\* "Low" signifies that less than half the minority population lived in local areas which they controlled. "High" signifies that over three quarters of the minority population lived in "federal" units which they controlled.

†† "C" indicates that majority and minority differed about the constitutional identity of the state.

‡‡ Minority as a percentage of the total population. Average for whole period.

§§ "T" indicates that one ethnic group was transformed into the majority since 1945. "PT" indicates that such a transition is projected within a generation if current trends continue. "I" means that the minority is increasing relative to the majority.

six the minority is so geographically distributed that only a small proportion lives in ethnically homogeneous areas. However, in most societies, the greater part of the minority population lived in local

government areas in which they constituted a majority, and which they controlled politically.

The most basic political conflict is that which is concerned, not with the distribution of political power



within a state generally accepted as legitimate, but with the very existence or identity of the state itself. In five societies there was strong support, concentrated within one community, for a change in the basic character of the state.

#### *Minority size and rate of increase*

The size and rate of increase of the minority relative to the majority is an important factor in ethnic conflict. First, since the size of a group is closely related to its "combat strength" one would anticipate that prudential considerations alone would make small minorities reluctant to challenge or provoke the majority. On the other hand, sizable minorities or majorities should be much more likely to risk violent confrontation when they perceive themselves to have a grievance.

Second, the ideology and institutions of majoritarian democracy with its "winner take all" emphasis is likely to generate the most intense conflict when a minority is close to, or shows signs of being transformed into, a numerical majority. In three of the societies considered, such a transformation has taken place since the end of the Second World War, and in two other societies it is predicted that the minority will become the majority within a generation if current trends continue.

Third, even where power is shared between groups rather than monopolized by one group, large changes will result in friction. If the original allocation is maintained, the growing community will be aggrieved at the injustice. If the allocations are changed, disputes over the changes are probable, and the declining ethnic group must accept losing constantly.

#### CONCLUSIONS: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETIES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE

A comparison of the ethnic violence rankings against the characteristics of the societies suggests that there is indeed a relationship.

#### *High violence societies*

Five societies—Cyprus, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Zanzibar, and Guyana—are in a class of their own as regards violence. The difference between their death rates and those of other countries is very apparent. These societies each possess a combination of those characteristics identified as likely to produce violence. In all five societies, there were noticeable economic differences between the ethnic communities. In three societies, the minority was politically dominant; in Cyprus it had veto powers and in Northern Ireland was completely excluded from any executive role. In each society, therefore, there existed substantial and visible inequities, both political and economic, between the ethnic communities. Furthermore in all these societies, with the exception of Guyana, constitutional issues divided the communities. "Enosis" or union with Greece was desired by most Greek Cypriots, and a plurality of Northern Irish Catholics similarly hoped for a united "Thirty-Two County Republic." Although at times these groups may have been willing to abandon their national aspirations, the other communities, Turkish Cypriots and Ulster Protestants, were not persuaded that this abjuration was genuine.<sup>11</sup> In Zanzibar,

11. See *ibid.*, p. 177, for Turkish opinion that "the real aim of Greece and of the

Arabs emphasized a distinctive Zanzibar identity, loyalty to the Sultan, and a multiracial culture based on Islamic precepts. The Afro-Shirazis stressed pan-African racial solidarity, and after the revolution incorporated Zanzibar with Tanganyika to form Tanzania. Christian (particularly Maronite) Lebanese were conscious of a distinctive Lebanese identity linked to the West, with roots in a Phoenician past. Muslims have stressed the Arab character of the country and the Syrian Nationalist party which strives for a "Greater Syria" was involved in violence in 1949, 1958, and 1961. The current civil war began as a clash between Palestinians and Maronite militia units who saw the Palestinian guerillas as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty.

All five societies are marked by demographic situations which produce instability. In Cyprus and in Zanzibar a very small minority enjoyed a grossly privileged position which in no way corresponded with their potential military strength. Thus the African revolutionaries completely overthrew the Zanzibar Arabs in only a few days, and the Turkish Cypriots were in desperate straits prior to the Turkish invasion. The combination of weakness and privilege, once peaceful change was found impossible, made resort to violence by the majority predictable.<sup>12</sup> In the other three societies, the demographic balance was such that one community was frightened

by the increase of the other<sup>13</sup> and responded to this threat in ways that provoked violence. The Lebanese Christians rejected any revision of the pact by which political positions were distributed. The Northern Irish Protestants discriminated against Catholics, so some have argued, because this resulted in high rates of Catholic emigration, thereby maintaining the Protestant majority. In Guyana racial violence was associated with the successful attempt by the Afro-Guyanese to seize power from the predominantly East Indian P.P.P. government while the East Indians were still a minority.<sup>14</sup>

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African state by constitutional means." Lofchie, *Zanzibar*, p. 257. The fighting in Cyprus followed attempts to negotiate constitutional changes.

13. The ex-Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O'Neill, said that "the basic fear of the Protestants in Northern Ireland is that they will be outbred by the Roman Catholics. It is as simple as that." Cited in Richard Rose, *Governing without Consensus* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 301. For a discussion of Catholic fertility and its political consequences, see *ibid.*, pp. 364-67. In Lebanon, "such is the Maronite neurosis that not only is any mention of a new census taboo, but no new telephone book has been published for fear that it would contain more Moslem names than Christian ones." *Washington Post*, 30 September 1975, p. 1.

14. After the 1962 election was won by the East Indian Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.), the black Peoples National Congress (P.N.C.) and the unions "deliberately attempted to create sufficient disturbances to force the P.P.P. Government to resign." After strikes and demonstrations, the British imposed a proportional representation system which resulted in a coalition of the P.N.C. and one small multiracial party taking power in 1964. Joseph Landis, *Race Relations and Politics in Guyana* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 203. The P.N.C. has won all subsequent elections, despite the fact that East Indians are now a majority. Electoral malpractice is alleged, but surprisingly the majority community has not reacted to black domination by violence.

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Cypriot Greek leaders is to annex the Island of Cyprus to Greece." Protestant beliefs concerning the "real aims" of the Catholic Civil Rights Association (C.R.A.) were summed up in the slogan CRA = IRA.

12. "This was the immediate cause of the revolution—Africans overthrew the [Arab] Government by force, because there no longer seemed to be any way to create an

*Low violence societies*

At the other extreme, four societies—Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and Finland—experienced only mild conflict. In part this can be explained by the lack of serious grievances in these societies. The French-speaking Belgians held a majority of cabinet positions into the early sixties, but during this period ideological divisions between left and right crosscut each linguistic community, and so this imbalance was not salient. The constitutional issue was significant only in Canada, and until recently the goal of Quebec independence was supported by only a minority of the French-speakers. The French Canadians did, however, complain of economic discrimination,<sup>15</sup> and of being underrepresented in the federal administration.

Otherwise there appears to have been little to fight about. The only three societies where there is economic parity between ethnic groups are included in this category. Politically the minorities are fairly represented in legislatures and cabinets; in fact, they tend to be slightly overrepresented. The groups were not only equal, but also separate. The only three societies in which the minorities received self-government through federalism are included here, and in Finland while only one province had a Swedish majority, most Swedes lived in “communes” (the unit of local gov-

15. According to one separatist leader, the French Canadians are “Negres blancs.” Pierre Vallieres, *White Niggers of America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). Liam de Paor, *Divided Ulster* (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1971), p. 13, says that “in Northern Ireland Catholics are blacks who happen to have a white skin.” Table 2 suggests that both these comparisons are considerably exaggerated.

ernment) in which they were a majority. Demographic factors were generally conducive to peaceful relations. In Finland the proportion of Swedes has been declining steadily through intermarriage, while in the other societies the relative proportions of the groups have been very stable.<sup>16</sup>

*Intermediate violence societies*

In six countries, the level of violence has been intermediate between the two groups of societies previously discussed. The relationship between majority and minority in these societies is also intermediate in that they have neither the very bad characteristics of the high violence societies nor the good characteristics of the low violence societies. In all six countries, one ethnic group is economically deprived relative to the other, and in four countries the minority is noticeably underrepresented in either the legislative, the cabinet, or both. However, there are no disputes over constitutional matters in which one community is aligned against the other, and there is no case in which a minority is politically dominant. The demographic situation is stable except in India and the United States, where the minority population is growing at a noticeably faster rate than the majority. However, the small size of the minority

16. Kurt Mayer argues that ethnic harmony in Switzerland “to a large extent . . . rests on an underlying balance of demographic factors. . . . the basic demographic equilibrium has remained practically undisturbed for more than a century.” “Cultural Pluralism in Switzerland,” *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16 (April 1951), pp. 157–63. In 1798, 22 percent spoke French and 70 percent German, compared to 20 percent and 74 percent in 1960. In Canada at the first national census in 1871, French Canadians were 31.1 percent and in 1961, 30.4 percent.

in both countries means that this increase is not perceived as a threat by the majority. In Malaysia, Malay fears of being transformed into a minority have been reduced by their own high fertility.<sup>17</sup> It is perhaps coincidental, but it is interesting that within this group of countries violence varies according to the size of the economically deprived group; the larger the economically deprived group the greater the violence.

*Societies with the "wrong" level of violence*

Four countries are deviant cases in that they appear to have considerably lower rates of violence than they should have, given their characteristics.

In Israel, Arabs are economically deprived, they are underrepresented in the legislature and Israel is one of the two countries in which no minority individual has received cabinet office. It is also apparent that very few Arabs accept, and most resent, the constitutionally defined Jewish character of the state. One would expect therefore much higher rates of violence than those suggested in table 1. Two explanations can be given for this discrepancy. First, it can be argued that the violence measures are invalid since Palestinian guerilla activity is excluded as being international rather

than domestic in character. Yet, since the Palestinians are struggling against the very existence of the state of Israel and assert that all Palestinians, wherever they live, form one nation, the "international-domestic" distinction is spurious. If Palestinian guerilla activity is included, ethnic violence is as high in Israel as in Northern Ireland or Cyprus.<sup>18</sup> A second explanation for the low level of violence between Israeli Arabs and Jews is that the expression of Arab dissatisfaction or hostility is vigorously checked by Israeli repression.

In New Zealand, Fiji, and Trinidad, the unexpectedly low degree of violence can be looked at in two ways. The pessimistic interpretation might be that the potential for violence is genuine but has not been realized yet. The analysis has not identified deviant cases but rather predicted where violence is going to occur. In Trinidad, for example, there have been several occasions already when severe conflict was narrowly averted. A more optimistic interpretation is that these exceptions would repay further study by suggesting some additional factors that serve to reduce ethnic hostility and conflict.

17. "That Malays in 1970 comprise over half the population calms Malay fears that higher Chinese and Indian fertility would convert them into a permanent minority." Alvin Rabushka, *Race and Politics in Urban Malaya* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 20.

18. From 1951-56 one source lists 967 Israelis killed by Arab guerrilla activity, and from June 1967 to March 1971, 303 Israelis and 1,873 guerrillas were killed. Martin Gilbert, *the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). The worst period of guerrilla activity from June 1967 to December 1968 resulted in 881 deaths, which gives an annual death rate of approximately 200/million. Sobel, *Political Terrorism*, p. 29.