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Democracy, Conflict and Development - Three Cases

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This paper explores the connections between democracy, peace and development in three cases of recent history - Uganda, Kenya and Sri Lanka. It is shown that there are no simple and universal relationships. The experience of all three countries shows that democratic institutions are not sufficient to prevent conflict and can foment it in sharply divided societies. The case of Sri lanka suggests that redesigning democratic institutions in order to reduce conflict can fail to do so and may actually accentuate it. The paper concludes that inclusive government, politically and economically, is necessary to prevent conflict. This entails political participation by all major groups and a spread of economic benefits throughout society. Such inclusive government may be consistent with non-democratic structures and may often be undermined by democratic institutions, especially where violence is recent and threatening. Political and economic conditionality should aim to promote inclusive government and even development, even at the cost of conventional economic conditionality and the promotion of democracy, in violence-prone societies.

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I. Introduction

What Samuel Huntington has called 'the third wave of democracy'[1] - the spread of democracy in southern Europe in the late 1970s, to Latin America in the 1980s, and parts of Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s - carried with it a tide of optimism. The sudden espousal of democracy by so many disparate countries was proclaimed to provide a foundation for the resolution of both domestic and international problems, to mutual advantage. Even when difficulties along the road of democratic transition became apparent,[2] the notion of 'democratic deliverance' was not abandoned, as Clinton placed 'democratic enlargement' at the centre of his foreign policy agenda.[3]

The promotion of democracy is seen as desirable by Western governments not only given the widely touted belief that democracies do not go to war with one another, but also due to the perception that democracies make better partners in trade and diplomacy.[4] While there is great debate about whether a proliferation of democratic states would actually usher in a more peaceful international order,[5] is there any basis to assume that democracy will bring *domestic* peace and stability to those countries who embrace it? Are democracies really less likely to suffer internal strife? Given the proliferation of conflicts *within* states today, this is a critical question for those concerned with human suffering and social and economic development.

Civil conflict is not only immediately damaging to the people directly involved, but also involves large development costs, as noted by John Fei : 'We must realize that, under conditions of social unrest, political upheaval and wars, economic modernization is impossible' (Fei, 1997, p510). Over recent decades, the presence of civil conflict appears

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[1]. Huntington, 1991. In Huntington's view, the first two waves occurred from 1828-1926 and 1943-1964 respectively.

[2]. For instance, in many states once a part of the former Soviet Union, the initial enthusiasm for democracy has given way to thinly disguised authoritarianism. See Carothers, 1992, pp. 85-99.

[3]. See Brinkley, 1997, pp. 111-127 and a piece by the American Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, 1996, pp. 47-63.

[4] Talbot, 1996, paraphrasing President Clinton p. 47.

[5] A notable exception is Sen's work on famines where he notes that not a single democratic regime has suffered a large scale famine. See Sen, 1994 , pp. 34-35.

to be one of the major causes of underdevelopment: six of the worst ten performers in the world, judged by HDI or GNP per capita, are countries which currently have, or have recently had, severe civil wars. An investigation into the countries worst affected by conflict in the 1970s and 1980s showed the heavy economic and social costs that typically arise, and therefore the importance, from a development perspective, of controlling conflict.[6]

This paper explores the connections between democracy, conflict and development by examining the experience of three countries: Kenya, Uganda and Sri Lanka. This is a small sample - and not one chosen for its especial representativeness. So the lessons must be suggestive rather than conclusive. But the stories of the three countries do appear to challenge some accepted views. Even a rapid overview of their stories suggests a more complex relationship than the simple equation of democracy with peace and development:

1. Uganda has had episodes of democracy, dictatorship and near anarchy, involving very widespread conflict leading to huge numbers of deaths with greatly damaging effects on development.
2. Kenya has not had sustained democracy in any real shape at the national level, but has had a certain amount of local democracy and has mostly maintained development.
3. Sri Lanka has had democratic institutions, yet longstanding conflict. Economic development has nonetheless been, broadly, sustained.

Combinations of democracy, conflict and development

Country	Democracy	Conflict	Development
Uganda	occasional	+	- (mainly)
Kenya	v. limited	-	+ (mainly)
Sri Lanka	+	+	+

A quick look at the matrix (which is a vast oversimplification of complex and changing events) shows that no simple generalisations are possible. By exploring the story of these

[6] See Stewart, Humphrey and Lee, 1997.

three countries in more depth we hope to arrive at some conclusions about the nature of the interactions between democracy, conflict and development, which will permit a critique of the simplistic view currently being purveyed by the international community. While our prime concern is the relationship between democracy and conflict, we shall also consider how these cases illuminate the connection between economic development and conflict, since development, like democracy, has been heralded as a 'cure' for conflict.[7]

The paper is organised as follows: the next section explores the cases of Kenya and Uganda; it shows that democracy does not appear to be effective in avoiding conflict, and indeed may encourage it, but suggests that, perhaps, this is due to the *form* of democracy, rather than democracy as such. This is the view of political scientists such as Lijhart and Horowitz, presented in Section III. They argue that if democratic structures are designed appropriately, they will encourage ethnic accommodation. Their hypothesis is explored in the case of Sri Lanka in section IV, where democratic institutions appear to have been structured to encourage such accommodation. Yet, this too, appears to be over optimistic. Indeed, even apparently well-designed institutional crafting may encourage conflict. The final section comes to some conclusions about appropriate political and economic policies in conflict prone societies, in the light of the earlier analysis.

II. The Cases of Kenya and Uganda[8]

Kenya and Uganda both acquired political independence from the British in the 1960s (Uganda 1962; Kenya 1964). At a superficial level, they appeared similar at that time - with respect to the economy, social indicators and multi-ethnic composition, for example. Both started the independence era with democratic structures of government. However, in the years since then, Uganda has had among the worst records of recurrent mass violence on the continent, involving the deaths of more than one million people, while in Kenya, violence has been episodic and relatively minor. The heavy economic and

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[7] Nafziger, 1996.

[8] This section draws heavily on some work on Kenya by Jeni Klugman (see Klugman and Stewart, 1997). We are grateful for her agreement to use some of the material here.

social costs of the violence in Uganda underlines the importance of avoiding civil conflict not only for the immediate human suffering it causes but also for the achievement of development objectives.

Both countries had been subject to British colonial rule from the late nineteenth century and together, along with Tanzania, formed the East Africa Protectorate. They had similar sized populations composed of a number of major ethnic groups around which local administrative boundaries had been drawn. Kenya had thirty recognised ethnic groups, nine of which each constituted more than 1% of the population, with the centrally located Kikuyu accounting for about a fifth of the population; Uganda had fifteen large ethnic groups, with the Baganda, also centrally located, forming about 30% of the population (Table 1). While aggregate per capita incomes were higher in Kenya in 1960, African incomes were very similar as were such indicators as life expectancy, adult literacy and access to safe water.[9]

In both countries, the constitutions adopted at Independence embodied democratic multiparty institutions. In each, there were many factors making it unlikely that such institutions would be maintained, including the past (non-democratic) colonial experience, economic inequalities, low levels of education, and ethnic divisions. In practice, both countries abandoned elements of their democratic structures soon after independence. In each, aspects of democracy have been periodically restored, typically following international pressure. But the 'democratic' periods have not succeeded in promoting peaceful development, but rather have been accompanied by rising tensions, leading to violence.

The countries present strong contrasts in terms of political stability and conflict over the period since Independence. Uganda has been much less stable politically and has experienced conflict on a massively greater scale (Table 2). The country is now under its seventh national leader since independence, whereas Kenya has had only two Presidents, the second having been deputy of the first. The comparative history of the two countries sheds considerable light on the role democratic structures can play in countries which are

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[9] The difference in per capita incomes between the two countries was due to non-African incomes being significantly greater in Kenya.

potentially divided and subject to conflict, and how this in turn impacts upon development.

Uganda

Each of the four distinct periods of Ugandan post-Independence political history has been marked by political violence, with much the worst episodes during the Amin period and the second Obote regime.

Uganda's post-independence history cannot be understood separately from its Colonial past - in particular the special position given to the Baganda by the British. The 1900 Agreement with Buganda, establishing the British protectorate, gave the Baganda a special role. A colonial law of 1908 awarded land to the Kabaka (King of Buganda), his family and major chiefs. In the system of 'indirect rule' the British appointed Baganda to administer much of the country outside Buganda, and Buganda was allocated land taken from neighbouring territory.[10] Cash crops were encouraged in the South generally (including Buganda) and education promoted. Westerners and Northerners, lacking economic opportunities in their own territories, came to Buganda as low paid labourers.

At the same time, there was a deliberate policy of ethnic imbalance in the army, which was recruited almost entirely from Northerners and Easterners. In every other respect Buganda, located in the South of the country, had a privileged role. This, together with the attitudes of the Baganda to the rest of Uganda and of others to them, which had antecedents in the pre-colonial era but was much strengthened by colonial policies, left a deep fault line in the centre of the Ugandan polity, with Northern domination of the army accentuating potential dangers to political stability.

The Independence constitution in Uganda was quite peculiar: Buganda alone was given some autonomy in a federal relationship with the centre and the Kabaka, was made President of the whole country; other areas had much less autonomy. This was an early example of an institutional innovation intended to solve one political problem, but creating others. The intention was to persuade the Baganda to join independent Uganda. But in practice such a constitution could scarcely be expected to endure as non-Baganda were

[10] Bunyoro: this land came to be known as the 'lost counties'.

unlikely to find the solution acceptable, while the illogicality of the constitution appeared to justify an absence of respect for it.

Obote I: 1962-1971: The ethnic composition of the country meant that no one tribe could achieve a majority, and some coalition among tribal groups was essential for a party or person to gain power in a democratic system.

Political parties at Independence followed a combination of religious and ethnic divisions; for example, the Democratic Party (DP) was formed in 1954 by Baganda to represent Catholics; the Kabaka Yekka (YK - King Alone) was formed by the elite Protestant Baganda to improve the position of the Kabaka; and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), led by Milton Obote, had Protestant backing, and was essentially an anti-Baganda party.

Milton Obote, himself an Acholi from the North, came to power following an election, through an unlikely alliance between the UPC and the KY, parties which had previously been strongly opposed to each other. As soon as he could manage without the support of the Baganda, Obote initiated policies which alienated them. In 1966, he suspended the Constitution, displacing the Kabaka and assuming the presidency himself, denying Buganda its federal status. Government troops attacked the Kabaka's palace, killing an estimated 2,000. Obote became increasingly authoritarian, alienating many groups by abuses of human rights and promotion of his own people, while relying on the military for support. A state of emergency was extended throughout the country. In 1969 Obote proscribed political parties, and proposed that the Presidency should be his for life. Political and religious leaders were arrested.

The Amin faction in the army carried out a coup while Obote was abroad in January 1971.

The Amin Regime 1971-1979: Initially the Amin coup gained wide support from the many groups who had been alienated by Obote.[11] But slaughter of civilians and members of the armed forces soon began. Amin used the occasion of abortive coups to attempt to

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[11] These included religious and ethnic groups. (See Mudoola, 1992).

eliminate Acholis and Langis from the Army, with massive killings. Expulsion of groups of foreign nationals followed, first, Israelis, then the 50,000 Asians, who together owned and controlled perhaps half of the country's wealth. Their assets were given to Amin followers, chiefly from his own tribe.

A 1973 decree empowered the Military Police to arrest people without a court order or an arrest warrant.[12] The army was brought directly under Amin's control and a Defence Council was created, encroaching on the duties of the Cabinet. Violence and murders became institutionalised. Disappearances of people and summary executions were common. Many prominent people were killed, including the Chief Justice. The independence of the judiciary and the rule of law had been destroyed. Many Ugandans fled to other countries, particularly among the well educated middle class.

The regime was brought to an end in 1978, when Amin invaded North Western Tanzania, and the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces together with Ugandan opposition groups attacked central and western Uganda, defeating the Amin army.

The Era of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) 1979-1980: From 1979-80, three administrations held office as rival groups jockeyed for power. During the confusion, Acholi and Langi soldiers in the Uganda National Liberation Army proceeded to revenge the massacres of Amin, with indiscriminate killings in West Nile, Amin's home area. According to the UNHCR, over a quarter of a million refugees from West Nile fled to neighbouring countries.[13]

In 1980 a general election, supervised by a group of Commonwealth observers, was contested by the traditional political parties, as well as a new party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), led by Yoweri Museveni. Although Obote was declared the winner by the Military Commission, a result endorsed by Commonwealth observers, the results of the election had clearly been rigged (Mudoola, 1988).[14] In the face of election

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[12] Bwengye 1985.

[13] Karugire, 1980.

[14] It appears clear that the DP won the majority of votes - the early results strongly favoured the DP, whereupon the head of the Military Commission announced that all further results would be declared

fraud, the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Museveni, along with some other opposition groups, launched an armed struggle against the new government

Obote II Regime, 1980-1985: Obote's second period of leadership was marked by continual, mounting and at times horrific violence by the regime in its attempt to suppress the Museveni uprising. The Baganda were especially victimised. Conservative estimates are that about 300,000 people may have been killed during these years and another 500,000 displaced in Buganda alone.[15] Many commentators suggest that the extent of human rights abuse under Obote II exceeded that in the Amin years.

In January 1986, the NRA captured Kampala and Museveni became President by decree.

Museveni: 1986 onwards: The government appointed by Museveni was broad-based politically and ethnically, although it has been accused of giving Ankole disproportionate jobs and influence. Prominent members of the various political parties and the different regions and religions in the country gained positions in the administration, the balance favouring the Western and Central regions. Despite declared democratic intentions, elections were delayed, and the role of traditional political parties was severely circumscribed. A presidential election - *without political parties* - was finally held in March 1996, resulting in an easy victory for Museveni.

The regime aimed to incorporate all the various military forces into a single national army, with a balanced ethnic composition,[16] including not only the various forces that had fought against Obote, but also soldiers from Obote's army and later Amin supporters from the West Nile.[17]

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by the Military Commission. From that point, the UPC and Obote were declared the winners. A decree announced that anyone who talked about the results would be subject to imprisonment (Mudoola, 1988).

[15] Mutibwa 1992.

[16] Mudoola, 1988.

[17] Soldiers who had served in the Obote army were sent to camps for screening and 'political education'.

The Museveni regime has faced chronic violent opposition, specially in the North and West. In both the West and the North, the persistent violence is intertwined with the situation in neighbouring countries; in the North, the Sudanese helped the rebels, while the Uganda government supported the opposition forces in Sudan. In the West, Ugandan government forces assisted the Zairean rebels and Mobutu government supported the anti-Museveni forces. But violence has persisted after the defeat of Mobutu.

Kenya

The Kikuyu in Kenya parallel the Baganda in Uganda, in being the largest tribe, located centrally and privileged economically. But during the Colonial era, far from being favoured by the British, they were the group that lost their land to the settlers. This eventually led to the Mau Mau rebellion. This rebellion gave Kenyatta, a Kikuyu leader detained by the British, the status of national leader with support throughout the Colony. This coming together against the British reduced the force of divisions within Kenya initially, in contrast to the situation in Uganda.

Kenya's post-independence history is not stained by the mass violence that has marked Uganda. Yet there have been episodes of conflict in Kenya since the 1950s, as indicated in Table 2. The major violent movements include the Shifta Wars and ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley and Western province and more recently around Mombasa, as well as growing criminality.

There was a steady centralisation of power in the Office of the President during the Kenyatta era. The *Preservation of Public Security* Act permitted detention without trial. A one party system became the rule *de facto* as the Kenya People's Union was banned and its leader, Oginga Odinga, detained. The regime was also allegedly involved in political assassinations of potential rivals to Kenyatta. A diverse array of patronage rewards especially favoured the Kikuyu. The Kenyatta period saw the growth of Kikuyu dominance over economic as well as political realms, and Central Province prospered. Contemporary reports in the media refer to a belief among 'peripheral' groups that the process of Kenyanisation was really one of 'Kikuyuisation'.

Nonetheless, taken as a whole the system of state patronage incorporated the

leaders of virtually all ethnic groups apart from the Luo (Throup, 1996). Moreover, electoral competition at the local level appeared vibrant with regular elections to the National Assembly. Critics of the Kenyatta regime (such as the Law Society and the churches) were allowed to express their opinions, and parliamentary critics were often elected. 'Political life remained remarkably open and its press comparatively free by African standards.' (Throup 1996 chapter 2). Provided that they remained within the party (which did not entail any strict ideological constraints) and did not criticise the President, there was considerable freedom for individual politicians. The regime managed to be responsive to popular demands despite the restrictions on democracy, while the regular (semi-competitive) elections helped diffuse potential conflict.

During the Kenyatta regime, the only systematic organised violence was the 'shifta' war, when the people of the north, who had voted in a referendum in the early 1960s to secede and join Somalia, took up arms against the state. The Government relied on punitive and repressive measures which provided extraordinary powers to the authorities to enter homes, search them, seize property and detain, and in certain proscribed areas, shoot people on sight, destroy any building and seize or destroy livestock. The original unity among the secessionists, however, gradually broke down (Sora, 1995, p. 6). A peace agreement was reached in 1968.

On the death of the first President, his deputy, Moi, took control. Coming from the 'periphery' (Tugen/Kalenjin), he faced fierce resistance from most of the Kikuyu establishment who perceived their privileged position to be under threat. The early Moi years were characterised by populist measures that sought to appeal to the poorer elements in Kenyan society, bypassing established patrons and undermining the potential bases for political competitors. Moi sought to broaden the base of development in Kenya and benefit his allies in the Rift Valley, Western and Coast provinces.

The prominence of Kikuyu in government and the civil service was gradually reduced. Most of the Kikuyu elite, nonetheless, managed to adapt to the new order with a continued presence in both business and parliamentary arenas. However, after an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1982 by the (Kikuyu dominated) air force, supported by university students, the Kikuyu were systematically excluded from positions of influence

within the government (Nelson, 1983) and the regime became increasingly repressive. A constitutional amendment made the state formally a one party regime. Kalenjin and Luyha interests were promoted within the ruling party (KANU), and party membership became a virtual pre-requisite for civil service advancement, access to loans and so on (Throup 1996, Chapter 3). Resort to detentions without trial and repression of union and other potential opposition continued (see Homquist, Weaver and Ford, 1994). The press began to exercise greater self censorship in response. Electoral rigging escalated and a system of queue voting (replacing secret ballot), introduced in 1986, facilitated voter intimidation.

In the early 1990s, international pressures for political liberalisation grew, culminating in the suspension of aid in 1991. In response, President Moi acceded to multi-party elections and controls over the media were relaxed. Three main parties and five much smaller ones emerged to oppose KANU, but were unable to unite effectively. During the presidential campaign, Moi relied on the security forces for surveillance and disruption of the opposition. Most notoriously, his political tactics extended to direct sponsorship of ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley (*Africa Watch*, 'State Sponsored Ethnic Conflict in Kenya', 1993). 1500 deaths occurred, and at least 300 000 were displaced. Homes and granaries were burnt, crops destroyed just prior to harvest, property was looted and livestock stolen. The primary aggressors were male youth, known as 'Kalenjin warriors'. The Government portrayed the clashes as a fulfilment of the forecast repercussions of a multiparty system. Several detailed studies,[18] however, concluded that the regime was closely implicated in the clashes. Senior government figures were alleged to have promoted violence through sponsorship of private armies and inflammatory public statements. The domestic security apparatus failed to control the violence, or arrest the perpetrators. Although the clashes had a clear anti-Kikuyu dimension, it should be noted that the violence was focussed against the smallholder Kikuyu, while large farmers were left relatively unscathed. Violent incidents on a small scale have continued. Insecurity prevails among the displaced, many of whom have not returned to their former homes.

The clashes served the regime both in creating a sense of insecurity so that voters

[18] Including that of a parliamentary committee of the (then) KANU only National Assembly, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Africa Watch.

would prefer the certainty associated with the status quo and in changing the ethnic balance in the Rift Valley - a crucial area in electoral terms accounting for 44 of the 183 seats.

Although the outcome of the election did not provide a majority endorsement of the President, with 36.5 percent of the vote, Moi obtained the largest share in the face of the divided opposition.

Unrest occurred againin 1997, this time centred around Mombasa, as new elections (due in early 1998) were anticipated ; there have also been violent clashes between the government and opposition in Nairobi; again it is believed that these have been provoked by the regime.

There have been other violent occurrences during the Moi period. Reports of the Kenya Human Rights Commission and Africa Watch suggest that significant episodes of violence in the larger urban areas are not uncommon. Attacks on government agents are frequent in the Northeast. Unsupervised private armies have emerged in Northeastern province with an effective abdication of power by the government (Umar, 1995 p. 68). But the scale of violence over the Moi period has been small compared with that found in Uganda.

Democracy, violence and development in Uganda and Kenya

Neither country has sustained democratic institutions. Uganda has had episodes of 'democracy', followed by violence and sharply reduced democratic and human rights. Kenya has been a one party regime for most of the time, with human rights also curtailed, but not so severely as Uganda, and with violent episodes preceding national elections. The history of the two countries suggests that if anything democratic institutions have led to violence rather than preventing it.

The Obote I period started democratically; however, once in power, Obote progressively suspended democratic institutions, using the army to sustain power. Amin completed and extended the process of eliminating democratic processes and human rights, undermining the legal system. Obote II might appear to constitute a 'democratic' era. It was ushered in by a multiparty election approved by international observers, while

the regime soon received the support of Western countries and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Yet the 1980 election was clearly fraudulent, and human rights abuse was enormous. It was the misuse of democratic institutions which led to the NRA revolt, the horrific violence that ensued in Obote's attempts to suppress it, and eventually the fall of the regime.

The Museveni regime was not democratic at all for a decade. Presidential elections, without political parties, followed after ten years. The government, however, appears broadly to have been an inclusive one, incorporating people from all over the country and all political parties in political positions and economic benefits, and not seeking revenge. There has been gradual restoration of the institutions of civil society including the legal and educational systems.

Kenya rarely fulfilled international demands for multiparty democracy, effectively having a one party system for most of the period. When multiparty democracy occurred it was the occasion of rising violence, with the clashes in the Rift valley in the early 1990s and around Mombasa in 1997. Yet the one party system in Kenya incorporated a number of ethnic groups; under Kenyatta most were involved in government other than the Luo; under Moi, the powerful Kikuyu have been largely disenfranchised. But because most other groups were included, it was difficult for the excluded to mount a serious challenge to the government. Moreover, successful economic and social performance diminished popular support for opposition, particularly violent opposition. The existence of some limited political freedom may also have helped diffuse opposition.

The economic and social record of the two countries suggests that economic stagnation is the outcome rather than the cause of conflict. There was fairly widespread improvement in economic and social indicators during the first Obote regime, with progress in per capita income, infant mortality rates, school enrolment, adult literacy and access to health services (Table 3 and 4) and a rapid rate of growth of GDP (of 6.0 per cent p.a.). In contrast, the Amin terrorism saw regress in economic and social indicators; GDP fell by 1.2 per cent p.a., tax revenue and government expenditure collapsed, while military expenditure rose sharply. Social expenditure fell from 4.5 per cent of GDP in 1972 to 0.5 per cent (1981). Social indiators worsened. In the early years of Obote II

there was some economic and social recovery, as resources flowed in from the international community and the tax base expanded. However, the severe war from 1984 disrupted this recovery.

The Museveni years have been ones of considerable and sustained economic recovery in both economic and social terms. IFI support was soon forthcoming, and the government adopted orthodox programmes, quite generously financed, without demur. Uganda indeed is seen as a model performer by the IFIs. Economic growth from 1990-94 was 5.6 per cent p.a. This improvement occurred during a non-democratic era, despite continuation of localised episodes of violence.

Kenya succeeded in maintaining economic growth and expanding social services for most of the post-independence era (Tables 3 and 4). In the 1960s the experience was similar to Uganda, with growth of over 6.0 per cent p.a.. Growth was maintained at over 4 per cent p.a. in the subsequent two decades, far better than Uganda in the Amin era, and also during Obote II. However, Uganda has outperformed Kenya during the Museveni period, especially in the 1990s when Kenya's economic performance deteriorated markedly. Kenya's investment rate has been persistently and substantially higher than in Uganda, reaching 25 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s.

In comparison with Uganda, Kenya continued to sustain a much higher share of revenue in GDP and social expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure. Consequently, even in the 1990s, social expenditure as a proportion of GDP was more than three times as great in Kenya as Uganda (Table 5). As a consequence, Kenya has outpaced Uganda on all indicators of social performance. By 1990, Kenya's primary enrolment rate was 95% while Uganda's was 67%; infant mortality in Kenya was 61 per 1,000 compared with 114 in Uganda. It is clear from a comparison decade by decade (Table 4) that again it was during the worst periods of political instability in Uganda that the two countries diverged sharply.

Both countries have shown marked divergencies in access to services, employment and incomes across regions. The Northern region of Uganda has been historically deprived and the central region privileged. Like Uganda, Kenya shows quite sharp regional differences in economic and social performance. In fact the coefficient of

variation of various dimensions of performance - a summary measure of regional disparities - is typically as great, and sometimes greater, in Kenya than Uganda. One might have expected, therefore, that such economic differences would have given rise to similar ethnic and political tensions. But there are some economic reasons why they did not. The most important one is that the general advance in social and economic indicators was widely shared (including by the most deprived regions). In contrast, with economic regress in Uganda, differentials became even more resented. Moreover, the pattern of development in Kenya created sharper *vertical* inequalities (i.e. between economic classes within ethnic groups) which tended to offset the political effect of *horizontal* (i.e. regional or ethnic) inequalities. The vertical inequalities created divisions within regional and ethnic groups, since the richer elements were gaining from the system and had much to lose from violence of any significant magnitude. In addition, over time the horizontal inequalities showed some diminution.

Economic factors help explain why the Kikuyu have tolerated their loss of political power under Moi. Kikuyu have continued to maintain economic advantages, with many large Kikuyu businessmen and farmers prospering. Potentially such people have a great deal to lose from serious political conflict. Central Province, where the Kikuyu are concentrated, has by far the largest share of formal employment opportunities. Although their previous advantage in terms of per capita income has been eroded, the province has the lowest rate of infant mortality and the highest adult literacy. Relatively high economic integration in Kenya compared with Uganda, and a much larger private sector mean, first, that more people have more to lose from violence; and secondly, that economic opportunities are not completely dominated by the state so that political control is of less overwhelming importance for generating economic opportunities.

Conclusions from the Kenya/Uganda comparison

The history of these years illustrates the complexity of the relationships between democracy, freedom from conflict and development. It is apparent, in the context of countries with many deep divisions, low incomes and low levels of education, that the introduction of democratic institutions does not guarantee their continued existence, nor

avoid conflict. Indeed, the reverse may be the case. Political parties tend to accentuate ethnic divisions to gain support, while government forces may incite violence in order to strengthen their position and avoid democratic challenges.

The violence does not obviously appear to have been the result of failed development, as such, since the worst episodes in Uganda followed economic progress (from 1962-1970, and 1980-83) not regress. Relative, rather than absolute deprivation appears to predispose to violence, especially in the context of economic stagnation. Most of the localised violence in both countries does seem to be associated with relative deprivation.

Where there are strong economic differences which are combined with ethnic ones, political parties may represent and use these differences in a way that can provoke violence, and if this spreads it can destroy development. In such societies widely shared economic and social development may be a necessary *precondition* for a democratic and peaceful society rather than the other way round. Inclusive government is what is needed in order to create 'cultural nationalism', as emphasised by John Fei, an essential initial stage in development as he recognised.[19] This is very difficult to attain. The examples of Kenya and Uganda over these years suggest that imposing democracy from outside is not an effective mechanism. Outsiders may play a more effective role in monitoring gross abuses of power, and promoting shared development through aid and policy conditionality.

III: Does the structure of democratic institutions influence democracy's ability to contain conflict?

The experiences of Uganda and Kenya seem to indicate that democracy has little conflict-solving potential. But before discarding democracy unceremoniously as a method of solving conflicts, it is necessary to undertake a more sophisticated evaluation of democracy's impact on conflict, differentiating between forms of democracy. Such an appraisal must recognise that certain democratic systems can actually cultivate conflict. For example, an ethnocracy -- where one ethnic group dominates the institutions of

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[19] See Fei, 1997..

government and the resources distributed by the state -- can fuel ethnic tensions by promoting one group at the expense of the other or persecuting smaller groups having no access to power. Where one ethnic group comprises a majority of the population, an ethnocracy can be the result of democratic elections, as has been the case in Sri Lanka in the past. Clearly, to be democratic -- in the conventional sense of competitive elections, limited government power, and public expressions of preference -- is not enough to mitigate conflict. For that, what is required is not simply a democratic system in the strict sense of the word, but a system that incorporates all groups or individuals in such a way that they benefit from it and therefore have a stake in its perpetuation and respect the institutions of mediation offered by it.

This realization has underpinned a substantial body of conflict management literature which is devoted to 'political engineering' or, in other words, to exploring how institutional structures can reduce conflict. For example, Lijhart, one of the best known scholars in this field, advocates a political structure based on elite cooperation. His prescriptions for group accommodation dictate a 'grand coalition of elites' from all groups, a mutual veto in decision making for the representative of each group, group proportionality in the allocation of certain offices and opportunities, and some sort of federal structure allowing for a measure of group autonomy.[20] Calling such an institutional arrangement 'consociationalism', he promotes it as holding the best prospects for peaceful governance in all divided societies,[21] despite the fact that his formulations arose out of an examination of Western states, the Netherlands in particular.

Other scholars advocate a variety of innovative institutional forms as being those most likely to guarantee that each group, and each individual as part of a group, feels incorporated into the system.[22] One of the approaches felt to hold the most promise for controlling conflict is the sophisticated institutional engineering best exemplified by the

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[20] Lijhart, 1977; 1968.

[21] See Lijhart, 1969; 1977; 1985.

[22] See Lapidoth, 1992; Esman, 1973; Coakley, 1994.

work of Donald Horowitz.[23] His work has focused on conflict-ridden countries and the effects that their various institutional arrangements have had on ethnic accommodation. Conscious of how different economic situations, distributions of ethnic groups, geographies, and social histories shape the ability of institutions to promote ethnic accommodation, Horowitz has provided examples of situations where institutions did contribute to ethnic accommodation and where they encouraged polarisation and conflict.[24] While his desire to include all the relevant variables in his analysis necessarily precludes any simple 'across-the-board' policy recommendations, he argues that it is possible to prescribe institutions that stand the greatest chance of promoting accommodation by taking into account the environment in which they operate.

For Horowitz, the purpose of institutional engineering is to structure the institutions of a divided society in a way which provides incentives for cooperation across the relevant cleavages, whether they be racial, ethnic, or linguistic; the ideal institutions in a given society are those which make it the self-interest of political actors to pursue policies of accommodation. While he does not advocate the same set of institutions for all countries in conflict, the ultimate *goal* of his institutional engineering in ethnically divided societies is the same: to induce the formation of *multi-ethnic coalitions of commitment*. A coalition of 'commitment' differs from one of 'convenience' as it requires an electoral pact between parties representing different ethnic groups *before* elections.[25] Such an agreement precludes either party from campaigning on a platform of ethnic chauvinism and requires at least a modicum of consensus on what measures to be adopted. In contrast, multi-ethnic coalitions of convenience are formed *after* elections, often between parties with conflicting platforms, out of desperation to achieve parliamentary majorities. Often these coalitions, having no common vision, result in competition, conspiracy, and chaos, leading to further conflict in themselves. A classic example of this is the coalition of convenience formed by Obote after the 1962 election in

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[23] For his most comprehensive work, see Horowitz, 1985.

[24] Horowitz, 1985; Horowitz, 1991; 1971.

[25] Horowitz refers to this phenomenon as 'vote pooling'. See Horowitz, 1991.

Uganda, between an anti-Baganda party (UPC) and the royalist Baganda party (KY).

According to Horowitz, the manipulation of institutions -- particularly the electoral system and devolution -- can create the conditions most conducive to the formation of these multi-ethnic coalitions of commitment. He argues that once group fragmentation, party proliferation, intra-group conflict, regional competition, and incentives for inter-ethnic bargaining characterize the political landscape -- all encouraged through the carefully prescribed use of institutions -- the ground is fertile for the formation of multi-ethnic coalitions of commitment. While Horowitz is well aware of the potential for disappointment, the failures he considers, such as that of Northern Ireland in the 1970s,[26] do not lead him to question the ability of multi-ethnic coalitions of commitment to foster ethnic accommodation, but rather allow him focus on the difficulties in evoking them.

IV. The Case of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka, in the decades following independence, often captured the praise of the development community as a society meeting the basic needs of its population despite its low income per capita. More recently, international attention on Sri Lanka has focused not on its achievements, but on its intractable and brutal civil war between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. Post-independence shifts in the political leadership of the Sinhalese elite from a secular, liberal attitude towards a more chauvinistic, nationalistic one led to changes favouring the Sinhalese in linguistic, economic, and political spheres. The consequent alienation of the Tamils grew, until in 1976, the main political representative of the Tamil population began advocating a separate state in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Rising militancy of the Tamil movement, Sinhalese insecurities, and unsatisfactory progress in devolution discussions have contributed to the more or less sustained violence between the two communities during the past 14 years.

Examining Sri Lanka's experience contradicts the usual hypotheses concerning democracy, conflict and development. First, it is important to note that hostilities

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[26] Horowitz, 1991, delineates how the Single Transferable Vote system did create incentives for inter-group compromise in the 1973 election in Northern Ireland, but still did not lead to the formation of a coalition advocating accommodation.

between communities developed during the decades after independence in the context of a vibrant parliamentary democracy. Moreover, these burgeoned into violence within a democratic context and, although at times the conflict has jeopardised Sri Lanka's institutions of liberal democracy, democratic structures have never been suspended nationwide. Therefore, even the bare outline of Sri Lanka's history discredits the notion that democracy necessarily abates conflict. Secondly, in the 1970s and 1980s constitutional changes were introduced along the lines which Horowitz prescribes. An examination of this experience thus provides some test of the question of how far democratic forms can be designed to reduce conflict. Thirdly, unlike most conflict-ridden countries, Sri Lanka has enjoyed sustained economic growth and continued overall improvement in human indicators even while suffering violent conflict on a large-scale.[27] This experience, therefore shows that economic development in itself does not guarantee reduced conflict, nor does conflict invariably prevent economic growth.[28]

Sri Lanka underwent a period of Horowitz-style institutional changes during the late 1970s and 1980s, the very time during which some of the most intense conflict occurred. The 1978 Constitution, ushered in by the new United National Party government of the time, transformed the political structure from a Westminster-like parliamentary system to a system much like the current French one, with a strong president as well as a parliament and prime minister. Moreover, the new constitution replaced the First Past the Post (FFP) electoral system based primarily on small single member constituencies with a list proportional representation system[29] operating along much larger district lines. Although these changes were not specifically enacted in response to the ethnic discord between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils, the motives behind the institutional structuring are irrelevant in evaluating its impact on ethnic

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[27] This derives from indicators available for Sri Lanka during the conflict period, most of which however exclude data from the northeast, the area of conflict.

[28] For an account of how Sri Lanka managed to sustain economic growth during conflict, see O'Sullivan, 1996.

[29] Under the list proportional representation system, the percentage of popular vote won by a party (in a district in Sri Lanka's case) secures the proportional number of parliamentary seats in the district for that party.

accommodation.[30] In contrast, the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord between the governments of Sri Lanka and India, and the territorial system of provincial councils which it established, was a specific attempt to quell the violence in the island by providing the Tamil population with a significant measure of autonomy in the northeastern areas.

Of course, the consequences of these institutional changes for ethnic accommodation were multiple and varied, and it would require an extensive study to evaluate all of the relevant repercussions. As such a comprehensive assessment is beyond the scope of this paper,[31] it will concentrate on one dimension of how institutional change altered the scope of the conflict. In examining how institutional structuring affected the Muslim community and their politics, it is possible to assess the ability of institutions to bring about that ultimate objective of institutional engineering, a multi-ethnic coalition of commitment. Constituting almost eight per cent of the island's population, the Muslims of Sri Lanka are the second largest minority in the country. Geographically dispersed, two-thirds of the community live among the Sinhalese in the provinces in the southwest, outside the main region of violent conflict in the northeast. While maintaining a distinct identity, the Muslims in these areas have been integrated into Sinhalese society. This intermingling is manifested by the Muslims recent willingness to learn Sinhala, the language of the majority community among whom they live, although historically the Muslims of Sri Lanka were a Tamil speaking people. In contrast, the remaining third of the Muslims lives among the Tamils in the northeast area which has been immersed in war for much of the last fourteen years. There, the Muslims constitute one third of the population of the Eastern Province. Remaining distinct from their Tamil neighbours in religion, these Muslims maintain linguistic as well as cultural traditions in common with the Tamils. Today, the southern and eastern Muslims differ not just in their language, but also in their economic profiles. Southern Muslims have, for the most part, been involved in trade and business while their eastern counterparts are primarily engaged in agriculture.

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[30] As Horowitz has noted, much institutional engineering is 'inadvertent'. See Horowitz, 1991, p. 155.

[31] For the impact of these institutional changes on minority voters in the southwest as well as the impact of the preference voting system on intra-party conflict, see de Silva, 1989.

Despite the significant differences between the two segments of the Muslim population, the entire community has historically been politically represented by Muslims operating within the Sinhalese national parties. While distinct from their Sinhalese and Tamil neighbours in cultural and religious terms, the Muslims did not extend this separateness to embrace a distinct political agenda as other communities on the island had.[32] However, the institutional changes implemented over the conflict period were critical in transforming this Muslim sense of separateness into a viable, significant, Muslim political formation represented by a Muslim political party, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC). First, as anticipated, the election of the president by a Single Transferable Vote proportional representation system - where the second and third preferences of voters could decide the outcome of an election - did encourage presidential candidates to seek out alliances with minority leaders. While this did promote moderation in the platform of the presidential candidates, it also gave leaders, local Muslim leaders in the east in particular, leverage to extract concessions and support for the building of their own political entities. Secondly, the PR system provided incentives for a Muslim regional party in the east where the Muslim population was geographically concentrated by allowing Muslim votes, formerly spread across smaller constituencies, to count towards the election of a candidate running on an exclusively Muslim platform. Lastly, although the provincial council system instituted under the Indo-Lanka Accord was ultimately a failure, the desire of the Sri Lankan and Indian governments to give the first elections in the northeast a sense of legitimacy motivated them to lend significant support to political parties, such as the SLMC, who were willing to contest the elections in 1988.

Given these institutional arrangements and the incentives they furnished, it is not surprising that local Muslim leaders formed the first political party, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, campaigning on an exclusively Muslim platform. Emphasising the need to link Muslim political and religious leadership and utilising mosques as well as religious groups, leaders, and symbols heavily in their campaign, the SLMC gathered a substantial following

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[32] Of course, this is a bit of an oversimplification. The simple existence of a 'Muslim ' community was a political construct, created over time in contestation to other identities such as a 'Moor community' or a 'Tamil-speaking ' one.

in the east and a fair-sized one in other parts of the country.[33] Naturally, the rise of this new Muslim political formation had repercussions elsewhere. As garnering the vote of one community is most easily done by creating an enemy out of another, in encouraging an exclusively Muslim party platform, the institutions also promoted anti-Tamil rhetoric. This fed local Muslim-Tamil tensions in the northeast and undoubtedly contributed to the rise in Muslim-Tamil violence there in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, as the Muslims of the southwest and those of the northeast espoused varying interests and conceptions of how best to promote them, the rise of a Muslim political party based in the east, yet speaking for the community as a whole, encouraged intra-group rivalry within the Muslim community. Lastly, the success of the SLMC at the polls siphoned away support traditionally thrown behind the national Sinhalese parties. Anticipating this shift of preferences of Muslim voters, the major Sinhalese parties made pre-election agreements with the SLMC. While in the 1989 election, the connection between the UNP and the SLMC was not formalised, in the 1994 parliamentary election, the People's Alliance (PA) and the SLMC struck an explicit electoral pact involving vote pooling. When the PA found themselves several seats short of a parliamentary majority, as expected, it turned to the SLMC[34] to form a multi-ethnic coalition of commitment.

In evaluating the capacity of Sri Lanka's institutions to facilitate conflict management, it is evident that institution crafting -- by promoting a new ethnic actor, the SLMC -- did contribute to a restructuring of the political system along the lines that Horowitz cites as being conducive to ethnic accommodation and conflict management. There was a fragmentation of ethnic groups, a rise in intra-ethnic rivalry, a proliferation of political parties, and an increase in competition at the regional level. Most importantly, as hoped for, these conditions led the way to a formation of a multi-ethnic coalition of commitment, the supreme objective of institutional engineering.

While it may be tempting to conclude there, claiming a victory for institutional

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[33] The support for the SLMC in areas outside the northeast declined in the 1990s, for a range of reasons.

[34] The PA also needed to incorporate into the government the one MP from the Upcountry Tamil People's Front to reach a one seat majority of 113 seats.

engineering, a responsible analysis goes one step further. Has this restructuring of the political system truly created the new incentives for ethnic accommodation as Horowitz promises and as common sense would have us believe? In Sri Lanka's case, the answer is an unequivocal no. In fact, it could even be argued that the current institutional system creates incentives which encourage continued marginalisation of the Tamils. First, the prominence of the Muslims in recent politics has at times enabled Sinhalese governments to relinquish responsibility for resolving the conflict by pitting the Muslims and Tamils against one another, as was the case in the 1989 All Party Conference. Secondly, by providing the Sinhalese parties with an alternative partner when faced with the need to form coalitions and cater to minority interests, the Muslim political formation which the institutional changes encouraged allowed the Sinhalese majority to continue to evade compromise with the Tamils. Moreover, although exclusion of Tamils from government does not necessarily imply the oppression of them, the incentive structure created by current institutions permits and may encourage government policies which neglect or even persecute Tamil citizens. As seen earlier, institutions have invited the Muslim party to take an anti-Tamil position in the east in order to win votes. Not only has this fomented conflict at the regional level, but it provides no reassurances, rather the opposite, that a Sinhalese-Muslim coalition of commitment would not also be an anti-Tamil coalition. Additionally, a permanent political split between the Muslims and the Tamils, with the former in government and the latter outside it, may contribute to an uneven balance of resources in the east where both communities live, thereby further exacerbating the conflict at the regional level.[35] Lastly, if we are to be truly cynical, the Muslim leadership, which has gained access to power and patronage by leveraging the weight of its community against the Tamils, could conclude that perpetuation of the conflict is in its own interests.[36]

The experience of Sri Lanka does not tell us what the usual cases do about

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[35] This has already happened to some extent with the opening of the South Eastern University in the east, an institution which unofficially caters to the educational needs of the Muslims.

[36] Muslim leaders would not be unlimited in their ability to promote conflict as they were elected by their constituents not only to gain access to patronage, but also to secure peace and stability.

institutional engineering. It does not suggest simply that institutional change may be unsuccessful in bringing about the desired conditions, as was the case in British Guyana, or that the desired conditions, such as intra-group rivalry and incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation, do not always lead to multi-ethnic coalitions of commitment, as in Northern Ireland. Rather, more disturbingly for the Horowitz case, the Sri Lankan experience indicates that even when institutional structuring does in fact produce the intended outcomes supposedly conducive to ethnic accommodation, these multi-ethnic coalitions of commitment -- the supposed guarantors of ethnic accommodation -- may not only be insufficient to promote peace, but can even be recipes for further conflict.[37]

Institutional engineering failed, even after it successfully created a multi-ethnic coalition of commitment, because it ignored certain factors which are critical in understanding the relations between ethnic groups. Perhaps the most important issue which must be considered in the search for ethnic accommodation is the role that differential rates of economic advancement play in shaping ethnic hostilities. In Sri Lanka, the Muslim community gained political salience not only due to encouraging institutional mechanisms, but also because a history of social and economic tension between the Muslims and the Tamils, and to a lesser extent, the Sinhalese formed the foundation for an exclusive, and sometimes chauvinistic, Muslim political agenda.

In the southwest, a rising Muslim middle class became frustrated with a government it felt was preoccupied with Sinhalese economic interests and uninterested in aiding Muslim socio-economic advancement. As a result, Muslim leaders increasingly turned to Arab nations to finance community development projects. Although such endeavors did not promote Muslim development on a wide scale, they did have the effect of increasing Sri Lankan Muslim identification with the Muslim world. Already wary of the Tamil minority and its links to India, the majority Sinhalese frowned on another

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[37] Some might respond to this analysis of Sri Lanka by proposing more institutional structuring which would promote moderation between Tamil and Muslim parties at a regional level. It might work, but it is likely that such a change would alter the balance elsewhere in the political structure. For example, an alternative voting proportional representation system for parliament might engender the formation of a moderate Muslim-Tamil party in the east. Yet the existence of such a party might encourage national Sinhalese parties to adopt anti-Tamil rhetoric in order to win the support of more strident Muslim voters. This turn or events could result in less seats for a moderate Muslim party and more for the Sinhalese national party, dispensing with the need for a coalition at the centre.

minority with significant international connections. In the east, certain patterns of socio-economic development stoked tension between the Muslim and Tamil communities living side by side. Policies geared toward promoting Sinhalese -- such as land colonisation -- created scarcity which intensified competition between Muslims and Tamils. Similarly, as both Muslims and Tamils in the east were educated in the Tamil language, policies to promote Muslim education siphoned resources and jobs away from the Tamil community, adding to a legacy of resentment. Institutional engineering is in no way responsible for these difficult socio-economic relations between the Muslims and other groups; it only allowed these sentiments to find expression in a Muslim political party.

Conclusions from Sri Lanka's experience

The experience of Sri Lanka, like the cases of Uganda and Kenya, cautions us against being over-confident in the conflict-reducing potential of democracy. While the experience of Sri Lanka shows that we should not ignore the form of democratic institutions, as they are critical in influencing the actors that promote or destroy prospects for ethnic reconciliation, the course of events in Sri Lanka further suggests that even the most successfully engineered democratic structures are not capable, in themselves, of eliminating conflict and may even encourage it. Moreover, the case of Sri Lanka has demonstrated that legacies of uneven development can be more potent in fuelling conflict than current growth is in abating it. This finding leads us to dismiss general reassurances that economic growth by itself will reduce conflict.

V. Conclusions

The three case studies have demonstrated that the interaction between democracy, development and conflict is much more complex than is commonly supposed. Clearly, the belief that democracy or development in themselves can guarantee peace and stability is erroneous.

In Uganda, democratic institutions were manipulated in a way that fomented conflict, both in the 1960s and in 1980. The experience shows that imposing democratic structures can result in leaders manipulating identities and worsening ethnic tensions,

especially where sharp economic differences broadly coincide with ethnic ones. In contrast, the experience of Kenya is of a country which was able to achieve relatively inclusive development with comparatively low levels of violence, despite limited manifestations of democracy. Indeed, the adoption of democratic structures at the behest of the international community in the early 1990s directly heightened levels of violence as the president orchestrated ethnic violence in order to maintain political power.

A possible conclusion from the cases of Uganda and Kenya is that while the *form* democracy took in these countries may have fuelled conflict, alternative democratic institutions might have avoided doing so by encouraging ethnic coalitions. The analysis of Sri Lanka, however, tends to refute this hypothesis. It shows how democracy, even when well-established, may not only be incapable of managing or preventing conflict, but can actually encourage it. Moreover, Sri Lanka's case challenges the claim that it is the form of democracy, not democracy *per se*, which fuels conflict. By exemplifying how even the most carefully 'engineered' democratic system may still contribute to conflict rather than mitigate it, Sri Lanka's situation calls on us to evaluate the merits of democracy as a whole from the perspective of conflict management. Furthermore, Sri Lanka's unusual experience of continued conflict within the context of economic growth indicates that a positive rate of economic growth may be less important in abating conflict than a pattern of economic and social development which is perceived to be shared fairly among potentially conflicting groups.

The differing experiences of the three countries suggest that two factors are of the utmost importance in mitigating conflict. The first crucial component is a politically *inclusive* government which incorporates people from most or all major groups at a political level, and consequently gives these groups a stake in the system, an interest in its perpetuation and the maintenance of avenues of mediation. The second critical element is the realisation of an economic and social system which *spreads the fruits of progress widely*, extending the benefits to all significant regions/ethnicities/ religious groups, and thus avoids the destabilising consequences of uneven development, i.e. *economically* inclusive government.

This model of inclusive development, politically and economically, was very

approximately achieved for much of the last forty years in Kenya and since 1986 under Museveni in Uganda - in neither case with full multiparty democracy.

Our findings suggest that, while not impossible, the type of inclusive system described is very difficult to achieve through the democratic process in conflict-prone societies, for a number of reasons. First, as Sri Lankan experience shows, the mere existence of democracy does not preclude the existence of ethnic nationalisms, and can actually encourage them. Clearly, a system - democratic or not - based on exclusive ethnic identification is unlikely to adopt an inclusive development programme or to incorporate other groups into government decision making. Secondly, the nature of democracy encourages each elected representative to cultivate a support base, something achieved most easily through the extension of political patronage. In societies where ethnic-based parties are likely to dominate, the distribution of political patronage by the parties in government is likely to exacerbate economic inequalities among ethnic or regional groups rather than to decrease them. Lastly, as the experience of Uganda and Sri Lanka shows, whether inside or outside democratic institutions, conflict can undermine civil society and other institutions. Without a strong civil society, a framework establishing the rule of law, a reasonably free press - all institutions which are eroded during conflict - a 'democratic' process is even more likely to result in a system dominated by one or two groups committed to selective developmental aims.

It follows that in highly divided societies, especially immediately after conflict, some sort of government of unity which incorporates members of all major groups[38] may be more developmentally oriented and inclusive than a multiparty democracy. But such a regime is difficult to secure or sustain. Problems with non-democratic regimes can be anticipated. They often exacerbate economic divisions among ethnic groups by selective patronage, and undermine civil society through repression. In some cases, such as that of Kenya, a non-elected regime may promote inclusive development but simultaneously undermine important institutions. An additional obstacle is that rulers are typically reluctant to give way to democratic pressures when the path for democratic transition has been laid. Yet in these cases, as economic development proceeds, it is likely that internal

[38] These group representatives may themselves be elected.

pressures for democracy will mount, making it increasingly difficult for non-elected regimes to maintain power.

While perhaps sounding much like the consociational system we rejected earlier, the key difference is that our inclusive, developmentally-oriented regime would be intended to be temporary in nature. The objectives of such a system would be explicitly to promote even development and decrease economic inequities between groups, to establish a working legal framework, and to encourage the growth of civil society. Once these aims were achieved (granted, a difficult judgment to make), the transitional government would be expected to be prepared to relinquish power through elections. But even after such a 'democratic transition' the need to maintain inclusivity remains essential if democratic institutions and the absence of violent conflict is to be sustained. Such considerations should inform both constitutional arrangements and external influences concerning political and economic choices.

Undoubtedly, the decision about the most appropriate regime in conflict-prone societies is not an easy one. The potential damage from a 'bad' non-democratic regime may be worse than that liable to arise from a democratic one. All we can conclude is that where external actors intervene they do so in ways that are liable to promote peace rather than exacerbate conflict. They should be sensitive to the actual context. When peace is fragile, external actors should be wary in demanding democracy as a condition for their support, and should focus on securing inclusive government and balanced development combined with respect for some fundamental human rights. Not only can democratic structures fuel conflict, but domestic 'ownership' of such structures is even more important than ownership of economic conditionality, because without it democracy certainly will not work.

Table 1
Size and location of largest ethnic groups in Kenya and Uganda

Kenya			Uganda		
Ethnic group	share of pop. 1989 %	province-location	Ethnic group	share of African pop. 1969 %	regional location
Kikuyu	20.8	Central	Baganda	28.2	Southern
Luyha	14.4	Western	Banyanko	12.2	Western
Luo	12.4	Nyanza	Basogo	10.0	Eastern
Kalenjin	11.5	Rift Valley	Batoro	6.1	Western
Kamba	11.4	Eastern-South)	Nubians	6.1	Northern-West Nile
Kisii	6.2	Nyanza	Bakedi	5.6	Eastern
Meru	5.1	Eastern	Langi	5.3	Northern
Masai	1.8	Rift Valley - South	Acholi	4.9	Northern
Embu	1.2	Eastern - central	Bagisu	4.5	Eastern

Source: Rep. of Uganda, Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kampala; Rep. of Kenya, *Population Census 1989;* Encyclopedia of World Culture, Vol. IX

Table 2
Violence in Kenya and Uganda, estimated deaths

	Kenya			Uganda		
		Homicide	**Deaths in Custody**		**Homicide**	**Deaths in Custody**
1950s	Mau Mau	15,000	na	-	-	na
1960s	Shifta	3,000	na	Riots after referendum on lost counties Narulabye Massacre Battle of Mengo	2,500	na
1970s	-	-	920[a] pa	Amin Terror, 71-79 esp against Acholi and Langi	300,000	na
1980s	-	-	1,410[b] pa	1979 attack on West Nile 1984-5: Massacre of Buganda in Luwero Triangle	300,000+	na
1990s	Ethnic Clashes, Rift Valley (95/95) Mob Violence	1,500 192	2,000[c]	1986-1996 Rebellions in North and West	10,000+	1,720[d] pa
Total (est)		19,692	1,780 (annual)		606,500	1,720 (annual)

[a] Based on two years.
[b] Based on one year.
[c] Est includes 819 deaths in custody, 94-5.
[d] 1991-1994 average

Source: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1995; Africa Watch, 1993 Sivard, 1992, Govt of Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1981, 1985, Uganda Country Paper

Table 3
Economic performance in Kenya and Uganda

		GDP, growth, % pa	GDP, p.cap., growth, % pa	private cons. growth, % pa	Inflat-ion, % pa	Invest/ GDP, %
1960s	Uganda	6.0[a]	2.3[a]	5.6	2.4[a]	1965 11
	Kenya	6.2[b]	2.8[b]	2.9	2.7[b]	14
1970s	Uganda	-1.2	-4.1	-4.0	47.4[d]	1980 6
	Kenya	4.4[c]	5.9[d]	5.9	10.1[d]	25
1980s	Uganda	3.1	0.2	3.2[e]	92.7	1987 12
	Kenya	4.2	0.5	4.7[e]	11.8	25
1990-94	Uganda	5.6	2.7		22.7	1994 14
	Kenya	0.9	-2.5		30.8	21

Source: World Bank, World Development Reports (various)
a. 1962-71; b. 1964-72; c.1972-81; d. 1970-82; e. 1980-93

Table 4

Social Developments in Kenya and Uganda, 1962-1997

	Cal. per person		Cal. % requ.		prim. enrol %		sec. enrol. %		Pop. per doctor		Pop. with access to safe water		Adult literacy, %		IMR	
	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug.	Ken.	Ug.	Ken.
1960	2383[e]	2289[e]	na	na	49	47	3	2	15050	10690	na	na	25	20	133	112
1970	2096[f]	2117[f]	90	91	54[f]	58	4	9	9210	8000	35[j]	17[j]	44	32	117	102
1980	1778[g]	2056	80	88	50	110	5	19	26810	7890	16[l]	28	43[k]	47	113	83
1990 or near	2180[a]	2075[h]	93[a]	89[d]	67[b]	95[h]	11[b]	29[h]	21681[c]	10130	34[i]	53[i]	54[b]	69	114[d]	61[d]

Source: UNDP, 1996; World Bank, 1996a;1989; *World Development Reports* (various); UNDP, *Human Development Reports* (various).a:1988-90; b:1991; c: 1989-90; d:1993; e.1965; f. 1974; g.1981; h. 1992; I.1990-95; j.1975; k. 1985;l.1983

Table 5
Government expenditure and revenue, Uganda and Kenya

	Govt. revenue as % GDP		Govt. exp. as % GDP		Defence as % govt. exp.		Social exp. as % govt. exp.		Social exp. as % GDP	
	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken	Ug	Ken
1972	13.7	18.0	21.8	21.0	23.1	6.0	20.6	29.8	4.5	6.3
1981	0.7	23.5	3.2	28.4	34.5	10.7	14.9	28.4	0.5	8.1
1990	7.4	22.4	14.6	28.1	26.9 (87-92)	10.0	16.7 (87-92)	25.3	2.2 (87-92)	7.1
1994	8.2	23.5	18.4	29.9		6.2		24.2		7.2

Source: World Bank, World Development Reports (various); World Bank, World * Data set.

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