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Johan Brosché

DARFUR –

Dimensions and Dilemmas of a Complex Situation



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Complex Situation**

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Darfur– Dimensions and Dilemmas of a Complex Situation
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Executive Summary

- The purpose of this report is to deepen knowledge about the current crises in Darfur through a broad approach. The point of departure is a field study conducted by the author in Sudan during November and December, 2007 divided into three weeks in the Sudanese capital Khartoum and one week in Juba, Southern Sudan. While in Sudan a sample of politicians, academics, traditional leaders, rebel leaders from varying factions, students, NGO representatives, people working for different UN-organs, human rights workers etc were interviewed. This sample deliberately includes both biased and unbiased sources to achieve as broad a view as possible. One intention with this report is to use this unique material as extensively as possible but it is also complemented with secondary sources.
- Sudan is characterised by a persistent domination of the centre over the marginalised peripheral areas leading to extreme regional imbalances. This periphery-centre dimension has been stressed in the armed conflicts within Sudan. Various rebel groups have demanded increased share of resources and political influence for marginalised areas.
- Since the conflicts in Sudan have this periphery-centre dimension, arguably, a solution to these conflicts requires change in the centre. The best chance for such a change is the CPA-stipulated elections in 2009. If these elections take place and if they are free and fair this might open up possibilities for the creation of a more peaceful Sudan. However, it is important to note the obstacles in the path of such elections. There are doubts both regarding if the elections will be held at all and also whether or not the elections will be free and fair. Both these aspects have been stressed by different experts.
- It is important to take other areas of Sudan into account while dealing with Darfur since the situation there is highly affected by, and affects, other parts of Sudan. Of highest importance is to carefully observe the regions of Kordofan, the East and the far North since potentially large-scale fighting might erupt in these areas. These problems must be dealt with before these crises deepen further.
- The current disaster in Darfur is a result of three parallel interlinked types of conflicts: communal conflicts, conflicts between different regional elites and periphery-centre conflicts. It is important to keep this in mind, since different solutions are needed for the different conflicts.

- Darfur also has to be examined with interstate regional reflections in mind. The regional aspects are sometimes not considered enough and the approach can therefore be too simplistic. For instance the ongoing conflict in Chad is often said to be spreading from Darfur without taking into account the different reasons, internal as well as external, for the conflict in Chad.
- “The Arabs” from Darfur have to be seen in a multidimensional approach. Some of them have been perpetrators, some victims, but most have been neutral bystanders. Nevertheless, they are an important part of Darfur and their interests have to be taken into account.
- The NIF/NCP-government has been in power since 1989. Hence it is possible to draw some historical lessons on what has worked and what has not worked in interaction with the international community.
- Minni Minawi, leader of SLM/A (MM), and the most important signatory of the DPA from the rebel side is in a precarious situation and a possible spoiler to an eventual coming agreement in Darfur. Also, the SLM/A (MM) has conducted large-scale atrocities since they signed the DPA.
- The movement of tens of thousands of people, mainly from Chad but also from other countries, into Darfur accentuates the vast problems of land control and land use. These people are now living on the land that has been left by refugees and IDPs. People that have left their homelands have to be given security so that they safely can return and cultivate their land. In the future this should be guaranteed through police forces and a proper court system but until such a system is in place an external force has to act as a guarantor.
- The situation in Darfur should be dealt with in parallel with the implementation of the CPA. Hence, efforts must be undertaken so that the CPA-stipulated 2009 elections will take place.
- At the moment the deployment of UNAMID is severely delayed. The main reason for this are obstacles raised by the Government of Sudan such as hindering troops from particular countries, not giving permission for flights during night, and not providing the land needed for UNAMID bases. However, also the rebels and international community create problems in regard to this: the rebels through refusing to accept troops from particular countries and the international community by not providing the necessary technical equipment. The slow pace of the deployment makes UNAMID vulnerable to attacks and restricts it from providing security to the people of Darfur.

- The negotiation process faces a multitude of problems and every step is extremely complicated. First there needs to be rebel unification, and rebels have to agree to come to negotiations, then if/when negotiations take place it will be very difficult to achieve an agreement. Furthermore, taking the historical record of the regime in Khartoum into account, the real challenge is probably in implementation of a signed agreement.
- The international response to the situation in Darfur has had some success when it comes to humanitarian assistance. Other measures have lacked coherence, commitment and co-operation between major international actors. The reaction by the international community has been characterized by threats that have not been followed up, thus making the international community lose credibility among many Sudanese actors.

Policy Recommendations

For the Humanitarian Assistance Programs

- The humanitarian operation in Darfur has to be broadened. There are alarming reports of latent starvation in Darfur, afflicting those living in the camps as well as those staying in their villages. Hence, the humanitarian operation has to be extended to include people outside the camps.
- Humanitarian assistance in Darfur should be combined with development projects so that people in the camps can see some improvements which may reduce frustration among IDPs.

For the International Negotiators

- The negotiation team representing the Darfur-side in the conflict should preferably consist of a combination of armed movements and civilians. The team should reflect the ethnic diversity that categorizes Darfur. Various ethnic groups with an “African” identity as well as various ethnic groups with an “Arab” identity should be included. Otherwise any solution might be dealing with one ethnic group (or a few) provoking other groups to start a new conflict.
- An agreement for Darfur has to include implementation mechanisms since lack of implementation is a consistent problem for peace agreements in Sudan, and risks complicating, rather than solving the problems.

For the Peacekeeping Operation

- The necessary technical equipment, such as helicopters, has to be provided for UNAMID. To send troops to Darfur with inappropriate technical assistance is risky for the soldiers, and heavily restricts their ability to protect the people of Darfur as well as the humanitarian workers in the region.
- The UN and AU should insist that they have the sole responsibility for the UNAMID mandate and hence they should decide from which country the troops should be. Not the GoS or the rebels.
- The mandate of UNAMID should be extended to include monitoring and enforcing of the UN arms embargo.

For China and Russia and other arms exporters to Sudan

- There is compelling evidence that arms exported to the central government are used in the Darfur conflict. Strictly speaking, China, Russia and others may not be legally breaking the UN arms embargo, but should be encouraged to impose a moratorium arms export to Sudan.

For the international community

- The historical track-record for constructive engagement with the NIF/NCP-government is bleak. However, when the international community has used some form of enforcement strategy, it has been more successful. That protests, without enforcement mechanisms, do not seem to change the NIF/NCP policy is exemplified by the appointment of the Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal to a governmental position, and the promotion of the ICC-accused Ahmed Muhammed Harun to a position where he is responsible for investigating atrocities in Darfur.
- The international community has to *stop barking without biting*. The strategy of threatening but not imposing the threats is not just inadequate, it is also counter-productive since it risks worsening the situation in Sudan. An example how this could be counterproductive is that it creates expectations among people living in the camps and when these expectations are not fulfilled it leads to increased frustration.
- The issue of sanctions has to be carefully scrutinized. A comprehensive case study is necessary to see what effect the current sanctions measures have had on Sudan and how possible future sanctions should be designed to have the desired effect. Sanctions should not just be for appearance only nor have unintended negative effects.
- The EU should take a more active role in a multilateral approach to Darfur. The UN is constrained by some of the permanent members of the Security Council while the US is restrained from real commitment, probably due to its counter-terrorism co-operation with Sudan, and China is concerned about its reliance on Sudanese oil.

For the rebel movements

- Unification efforts are needed, without it the future for the rebel movements and the people of Darfur, is bleak.
- It is important to improve the political knowledge base within the movements, so that fighters can be transformed into politicians. Other sectors of Darfur should be let into the negotiations.

For the Government

- Fully accept the deployment of UNAMID.
- Co-operate with the International Criminal Court regarding the Sudanese cases.
- Stop attacks against civilians as well as aerial bombings that break the no-flight zone.
- Fulfil the commitments stipulated in CPA and DPA as well as in other agreements.

Acronyms

- AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan
- APRD – Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy
- BI – Border Intelligence
- CAR – Central African Republic
- CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- DPA – Darfur Peace Agreement
- DDD – Darfur-Darfur Dialogue
- ESPA – Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
- GoS – Government of Sudan
- GoSS – Government of Southern Sudan
- GoNU – Government of National Unity
- HRW – Human Rights Watch
- ICG – International Crises Group
- IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting
- JEM – Justice and Equality Movement
- JEM- CL Justice and Equality Movement Collective Leadership
- NCP – National Congress Party
- NDA – National Democratic Alliance
- NIF – National Islamic Front
- NRF – National Redemption Front
- OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- SAF – Sudanese Armed Forces
- SFDA – Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
- SLM/A – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
- SLM/A (MM) – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minni Minawi)
- SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
- SSRC – Social Science Research Council

UFDD – The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UFLD – United Front for Development and Liberation
UNAMID – United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNDPKO – United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program

I. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to deepen knowledge about the current crisis in Darfur through a broad approach. The study includes a short background to the crisis in Darfur and examines some of the major actors, the situation on the ground, the peacekeeping process, the negotiations and the international response to the crisis in Darfur. The point of departure is a field study conducted by the author in Sudan during the fall of 2007, from 11 November until 11 December. The field study was divided into three weeks in Khartoum and one week in Juba, Southern Sudan. The author also tried to enter Darfur but unfortunately the required permits were not granted. Despite the failure to get to Darfur, a wide variety of Darfurians and people dealing with the issue of Darfur were interviewed. This sample included politicians, academics, traditional leaders, rebel leaders from varying factions, students, NGO representatives, people working for different UN organs, human rights workers etc. Information gathered in Sudan is the basis for this report, but additional information has also been collected from other sources; especially in regard to acquiring the views of actors where first-hand information is lacking. Using the unique data collected in Sudan means that opinions of the people on the ground are presented – these are often absent in various reports by experts. Because of this, several different perspectives on the same issues will be presented, and the author wishes to stress that it is very important to keep in mind who the sources for the different opinions are. There exists an extensive literature dealing with Darfur but there are aspects that the author thinks are not adequately ventilated, and these factors are in focus here. One gap in the current research on Darfur is the lack of a comprehensive view of the whole of Sudan. With this in mind, the approach in this report will be upon placing the Darfur region in the wider scope of the whole of Sudan as well as discussing the implications for Darfur's neighbours Chad and the Central African Republic. The span of this report is wide and there are two main reasons for this. Firstly, it allows for the use of much of the unique information collected in Sudan. Secondly, a wide scope is a fruitful way for deepening knowledge of the Darfur problem that is the purpose of this study.

The situation in Darfur has changed to a great extent since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 and hence the focus here is on the post-DPA period. Some historical factors will be briefly touched upon too, but the author has deliberately refrained from going deeper into the history of the crises in Darfur. For more information on the history of Darfur (and other problems in Sudan) the author recommends Alex de Waal's and Julie Flint's *Darfur- a Short History of a Long War*, Alex de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* and Gérard Pruniers *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. These books should preferably be read in combination with reports from the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch in order to get a more updated picture.

This report starts off with a section about background and comprehensive view of Sudan. This is followed by descriptions of some of the major actors, the situation on the ground, peacekeeping, negotiations and international response. Each chapter is rounded off with a discussion and the report ends with some conclusions and some possible avenues for future research.

2. Background and Comprehensive View of Sudan

Background on Sudan

Sudan became independent in 1956 from Egypt and the United Kingdom, who had ruled Sudan jointly. The northern part of the country was under Egypt whilst the Southern area was controlled by the United Kingdom.¹ In 2007 the UN estimated that Sudan had a population of 38.6 million.² Sudan is Africa's largest country, measuring about one-fourth the size of the United States. Sudan is located in a conflict-torn region of the world, with many of its adjacent countries being involved in armed conflicts: Chad and the Central African Republic in the west, Egypt and Libya in the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east, and Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the south, all have seen interstate or intrastate conflict in the last 50 years. Sudan is a very heterogeneous country when it comes to ethnicity, language and religion. The north is mainly "Arab" and Muslim whilst the south is primarily "African" and Christian/Animist. However, this dichotomy is very simplistic and the reality is much more complex, with a large variety of ethnic groups both in the north and in the south.³

Sudan is characterised by a persistent domination of the centre over the marginalised peripheries. The centre is located in the capital Khartoum and consists of different elites from the Nile Valley area located in the Northern Region (not to be confused with northern Sudan) of Sudan. Even though the Northern Region comprises less than two percent of the Sudanese population this region utterly dominates the politics of Sudan.⁴ However, this is not a solidly united elite but different elites that compete for power among themselves. This competition has meant that Sudan has been ruled

¹ UCDP (2008) Database www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

² BBC (2008) "Country Profile: Sudan"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm

³ UCDP (2008) Database www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

⁴ Kamal el-Din (2007) "Islam and Islamism in Darfur" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 105

by a series of unstable parliamentary governments and military regimes. Regardless of the type of government, the elites from the Northern Region have been at the country's helm. This dominance is also evident when it comes to the economy, with the elites based in the centre possessing immense private wealth and the people in the marginalised areas being exceedingly poor.⁵

Since the end of colonial rule Sudan has been characterised by war, the first Sudanese civil war beginning soon after independence. This first conflict was initiated by a southern-based rebel group called Anya Nya, which fought for the independence of the south. This conflict ended in 1972 through the Addis Ababa agreement.⁶ During two years in the 1970s a small-scale conflict over governmental power took place, involving a communist group in 1971 and an Islamic group in 1976. In 1983 the second north-south war broke out when the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) initiated a rebellion. The group was based in the south and some factions of the SPLM/A had a secessionist agenda whilst their leader John Garang stated that "*The SPLM/A is fighting to establish a united Socialist Sudan*". The conflict between SPLM/A and the government ended in 2005 when the parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).⁷ Some of the fighting in the conflict between the SPLM/A and GoS took place in the eastern part of Sudan. Eastern Sudan has also seen rebellion after the signing of CPA. The fighting in this conflict was comparatively limited, and ended through the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) signed in 2006.⁸ In addition to these intrastate conflicts, Sudan has suffered from many non-state conflicts, as well as large scale one-sided violence conducted primarily by the government side.⁹ The government of Sudan (GoS) has had a practice of arming militias as a response to rebellions. These militias are infamous for their gross violations of human rights and these types of attacks have taken place both in the south and in Darfur.¹⁰

⁵ de Waal (2007) "Sudan: the Turbulent State" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 20

⁶ Enough (2008) "Abyei Sudan's 'Kashmir'" by Roger Winter and John Prendergast <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1.pdf>

⁷ UCDP (2008) Database www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

⁸ ESPA (2006) available at http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Eastern_Sudan_Peace_Agreement.pdf

⁹ One-sided violence means *intentional attacks on civilians by governments or formally organized armed groups* and Non-State Conflicts means *communal and organized armed conflict where none of the parties is the government of a state* see UCDP "Our Data" <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>

¹⁰ UCDP (2008) Database www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

Background on Darfur

Darfur is the most western region of Sudan and has an estimated population of six million.¹¹ The current phase of conflict in Darfur started in 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms against the GoS. However, communal conflicts¹² had been ongoing in Darfur for a long time prior to these rebellions. In addition, Darfurian discontent with the regime in Khartoum had also existed for a long time. In 2003 the conflicts between different ethnic groups and the dissatisfaction combined into a rebellion and a very decisive moment for the future of Darfur.

The cliché picture of the conflict in Darfur is that of African rebels taking up weapons against the government in Khartoum due to marginalisation. The subsequent government response to this was the arming of Arab militias, which conducted genocide on the Africans in Darfur. Even though this picture is correct in some ways, every aspect of the description is much more complex than it first appears. For instance the African/Arab distinction is a gross simplification: there are numerous ethnic groups on each side of that divide. The largest ethnic group in Darfur is the Fur, which has given the region its name (Dar Fur means Home of the Furs). The Fur is an African people that together with two other African ethnic groups, the Zaghawa and the Masalit, are the most important components of the rebellion that emerged in 2003. Being an Arab or an African is an identity issue more than an ethnic issue, and the lines between who is an African and who is an Arab are somewhat fluid. These identities can for instance be transformed if one changes lifestyle or marries a person from a certain ethnic belonging.

Another simplification is the general view that the Arabs are nomads whilst the Africans are farmers. This is true to some extent but there also exist some exceptions. For instance the African Zaghawa are mainly nomadic. Although some analytical problems are caused by the use of this simplified view of Arab and African identities, the distinction will sometimes be used in this report, since the dichotomy does have some explanatory value and is heavily in use by the Darfurians themselves.

Analyses of the conflict in Darfur often talk about there being several layers of conflict in the region. This is certainly true, but these different

¹¹ US Department of State (2004) "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur"
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm>

¹² Communal conflicts can be defined as events where (a) there is violence, and (b) two or more communally identified groups confront each other or members of the other group at some point during the violence (Varshney 2002, 309.)

layers can also preferably be seen as three parallel conflicts. Adam Azzain, a leading Darfur scholar, argues that the current disaster in Darfur is a result of interlinked communal conflicts, conflicts between different regional elites and periphery-centre conflicts.¹³ These differing but entangled conflicts (and the lack of understanding of the complexity of the situation) constitute one factor that makes a solution to the Darfur crisis so elusive. These parallel conflicts will be described in different sections of this report. Communal conflicts mostly in the section *Background and Comprehensive View of Sudan* but they are also an important factor in *Some of the Major Actors* and *Situation on the Ground*. The conflicts between different communal elites are apparent in the rebel-unification process, especially in relation to their reluctant to become more democratic. The centre-periphery conflict is reflected upon as an important factor in most of the sections in this report.

Conflicts between different ethnic groups have been part of Darfurian society for at least 75 years. These have mainly been conflicts over grazing and water rights but also over local politics and administrative boundaries. Most of these conflicts have pitched nomads against farmers but there exist several exceptions to this broad generalisation. A critical factor that increased the severity of these conflicts was the environmental degradation that began in Darfur in the 1970s and became acute in the 1980s. Despite severe problems in Darfur, no steps were taken by the rulers to safeguard livelihood for the population in the region. A simultaneous population influx from Chad increased the population in Darfur, putting further pressure on already scarce land resources.¹⁴ The breakdown of resource access is seen by many as a primary factor for the escalation of violence in the last few years. Severe droughts have also contributed to increasing the level of fighting.¹⁵ Observers have pointed to a parallel experience in Kenya where a livelihood strategy called Zero-grazing-system has been developed. The core of this approach is to use small farms that have impounded cattle instead of moving over vast areas. It has been argued that this system

¹³ Mohamed, Adam Azzain (2007) "Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement – A call for an Alternative Approach to Crises Management", conference paper presented at the Peace Agreement Programme African Review Workshop 7-9 November 2007

¹⁴ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁵ Khalil el-Amin, Associate Professor, Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum interviewed 5 December 2007, Khartoum

would increase the livelihood possibilities in Darfur and work in a conflict-reducing manner since the nomads are not crossing over farming land.¹⁶

Another factor essential for understanding the current situation in Darfur is the constant marginalisation of the region since the time of independence. The marginalisation in itself is important but in particular the rising awareness of this process. People who are not aware of their marginalisation will not start a rebellion. The consciousness of marginalisation in Darfur increased in the 1960s when Ahmed Ibrahim Draige founded a movement called the Darfur Resistance Front. This movement demanded more political representation for Darfur and argued that the voice of Darfurians was not heeded in Sudan. The lack of political representation of Darfur was apparent both during military rule and under the democratic regimes since Darfurian representation in parliament was very limited. In addition, the movement also demanded more development resources for Darfur. The idea of resisting marginalisation by violent means was also raised during the 1960s when two different movements emerged. One of them was called Sooni (named after a place in Jebel Marra, Western Darfur), which planned a military coup. These plans were never realised. The second movement was called the Red Flame, which also considered using violence to change the situation in Darfur. Like Sooni, these plans were not put into practice. Although they never conducted any military action these movements were important in triggering a consciousness about the marginalisation of Darfur. These examples also show that the idea of using military means to change the situation in Darfur is not new. After the creation of these two movements, other Darfurians tried to initiate a change for Darfur through different peaceful means using national political parties.¹⁷

Julie Flint, a Darfur expert, points out three parallel events in the 1980s that are crucial for understanding the present Darfur crisis: (1) the drought and famine of 1984-1985; (2) the creation of a new ideology of Arab supremacism promoted by the openly racist Arab Gathering, and (3) the Arab-Fur war of 1987-1989.¹⁸

¹⁶ Mohammed, Adam Azzain (2007) "Three types of conflict in the Darfur crisis" in the *Horn of Africa Bulletin* http://www.life-peace.org/sajt/filer/pdf/Horn_of_Africa_Bulletin/HAB1b.2007.pdf and Mohammed Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁷ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁸ Flint, Julie (2007) Darfur's armed Movements in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 142

The famine in 1984-1985 changed the political, economical and social landscape in Darfur in several different ways as it accelerated ongoing changes. Moreover, rain-shortages led to lack of food supplies. The effects of this situation became much more severe due to governmental neglect i.e. they were not giving any support to the region.¹⁹ More than two decades later the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated “*Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.*”²⁰ This statement is examined by Darfur expert Alex de Waal who concludes:

“Drought and environmental degradation caused migration and livelihood changes, creating actual and latent disputes that later became the focus of armed conflict. In all cases, significant violent conflict erupted because of political factors, particularly the propensity of the Sudan government to respond to local problems by supporting militia groups as proxies to suppress any signs of resistance. Drought, famine and the social disruptions they brought about made it easier for the government to pursue this strategy. In summary, Ban Ki-Moon’s linking of climate change and the Darfur crisis is simplistic. Climate change causes livelihood change, which in turn causes disputes. Social institutions can handle these conflicts and settle them in a non-violent manner—it is mismanagement and militarization that cause war and massacre.”²¹

The starvation also meant that many lost their livelihood and hence were more receptive to being recruited to different militias. In 1987-1988 several raids against villages took place in Darfur and the word Janjaweed²²

¹⁹ de Waal Alex (2007) “Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur” posted at the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* 2007-06-25
<http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/06/25/is-climate-change-the-culprit-for-darfur/>

²⁰ Ki-Moon, Ban (2007) “A Climate Culprit In Darfur”
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html>

²¹ de Waal Alex (2007) “Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur” posted at the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* 2007-06-25
<http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/06/25/is-climate-change-the-culprit-for-darfur/>

²² The growth of and role played by Janjaweed is an extremely complex and essential part of the disastrous development of the conflict in Darfur. It will just be very briefly touched upon here but for further reading see for example Hagggar Ali, (2007) “The Origins and Organisation of the Janjaweed in Darfur” in de Waal Alex *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*.

appeared for the first time in Darfur. To a large extent the raiders were poor people from communities that had suffered from droughts and famine. This militia that became known as Janjaweed derived as a combination of Chadian militia living in Darfur at the time and their Sudanese hosts.²³ Historically the Chad-Darfur linkages have been close. One important connection is that different armed groups formed during the Chadian civil wars between 1962 and 1991 contributed to the formation of armed militias in Darfur, in particular Janjaweed. The emergence of Janjaweed also has its roots in a combination of local politics in Darfur and the Libyan sponsored militarization of Chadian Arabs.²⁴ Lack of understanding of these regional linkages is a major reason for the failure of different peace initiatives in Darfur according to Ali Hagggar, a senior researcher at the University of Omdurman.²⁵ One such element is that the Libyan leader Gaddafi had a dream of an Arabisation of the countries neighbouring Libya. Most central in this plan was Chad and this was one reason for the Libyan-Chadian war over the Aouzou strip in 1987. As front soldiers in his offensives, Gaddafi formed an Islamic Legion consisting of different Sahelian Arabs and Tuaregs. However, the Islamic Legion was defeated by Chadian troops in 1988 and Gaddafi abandoned his plan. This caused the dismantling of the Islamic Legion but its components still existed, armed, trained and with an Arab supremacism ideology. This vision was also the leading ideology when a political coalition called the *Arab Gathering* was formed in 1987 by different Darfur leaders of Arab descent. The ideology of the Arab Gathering was clearly racist and in their documents Arabs are presented as more civilised than the Africans.²⁶ In addition to being backed by Libya, the pro-Arabism was also supported by successive governments in Khartoum.²⁷

Government support for Arab ethnic groups in different communal conflicts continued from the end of 1980s throughout the 1990s, and one of the most severe of these conflicts was the Fur-Arab war in the end of the 1980s. The Fur-Arab conflict was halted in mid-1989 when the National

²³ de Waal, Alex (2007) "Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur" posted at the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* 2007-06-25
<http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/06/25/is-climate-change-the-culprit-for-darfur/>

²⁴ Hagggar Ali, (2007) "The Origins and Organisation of the Janjaweed in Darfur" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 113-114

²⁵ Hagggar Ali, (2007) "The Origins and Organisation of the Janjaweed in Darfur" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 138-139

²⁶ Jok Madut Jok (2007) *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence* p. 138-139

²⁷ Tubiana, Jérôme (2007) "Darfur: A Conflict for Land" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 70-71

Islamic Front (NIF) took power in Khartoum. One reason behind the termination of this conflict is the practice of halting tribal conflicts when a government changes so as to see if the new regime will provide any change. However, the Fur-Arab conflict re-emerged again as the new government later promoted the interests of specific ethnic groups to the detriment of others, sparking new communal conflicts.²⁸ Another important event for the coming rebellion in Darfur took place in December 1991 when an SPLM/A unit attempted to invade Darfur. The unit was led by Fur activist Daud Yahya Bolad, who wanted to inflame a rebellion in Darfur. However, a combined force of the regular army and a militia from the Beni Halba Arabs annihilated the attackers and Bolad was captured and killed. This uprising led by a Fur caused the ruling NIF party to view the Fur as its main enemy in Darfur and subsequently it increased its support to Arab militias around Jebel Marra, a home area for many Furs in western Darfur. This support was especially directed to a young tribal leader, Musa Hilal, from the Arab Um Jalul ethnic group.²⁹ This meant that for the people in Jebel Marra the war did not start in 2003 but in the 1990s when attacks on villages began. In short, this means that the Fur had been afflicted by armed conflict for ten years before the latest phase of the war began. The strategy of burning villages has consistently been used since this period and from 2003 on an even larger scale.³⁰

In 1994 the GoS made use of another strategy when it divided Darfur into three different regions. This led to the Fur becoming split between North Darfur, West Darfur and South Darfur which reduced the group's overall power. In Khartoum a group of Darfurian students who believed that a change for Darfur could only come through armed rebellion analysed Bolad's defeat. This group consisted of future rebel leaders such as Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdelshaafie. Their conclusion was that they needed the support of all Darfurians, not least the Arabs, otherwise the government would use the Arabs against them, as had been done before. This group, and especially Abdul Wahid, strengthened self-defence forces among the Fur with the stated aim of being able to defend them against attacks from Arab

²⁸ Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PhD researcher in political conflict and administration, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

²⁹ Flint, Julie (2007) "Darfur's armed Movements" in De Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 142-143

³⁰ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

militias. But the group also had a hidden agenda, a plan of later attacking what they saw as the root of their problem, the Sudanese government.³¹

Simultaneously the position of the Zaghawa was about to change. In 1990 the Zaghawa Idriss Déby took power in neighbouring Chad from Hissèn Habré. Even though the Zaghawa had gained power in N'Djamena they were reluctant to fight for power against the government in Khartoum. Instead they felt that they should continue to fight the Awlad Zeid Arab nomads that the Zaghawa in Darfur had continuously clashed with since the early 1980s. But during the 1990s it became more and more apparent that the GoS was supporting and even facilitating these Arab attacks on the Zaghawa in Darfur. In 1997 several Zaghawa tribal leaders were killed by the Awlad Zeid Arabs and a number of Zaghawa believed that this was done by order of the government. This led the Zaghawa to do the same as the Fur, to mobilise for stated reasons of defence against Arab attacks. But increasingly they also started to see the regime in Khartoum as their main enemy. In 2001 a massacre that killed 70 Zaghawa was carried out by Awad Zeid Arabs, but with clear governmental involvement. This attack took place close to an important water source used by both Zaghawa and Arabs and after the attack the regular army prevented the Zaghawa from using the wells. This made it even clearer for many Zaghawa that fighting the Arabs would not be enough to solve their problems as they saw the regime in Khartoum as being behind their problems.³² Another critical event in 2001 was when Abdul Wahid met with representatives from the Zaghawa and agreed that they faced the same problems. They all viewed the GoS as being behind their problems and as being their main enemy. The Masalit, a third major non-Arab ethnic group in Darfur, had also organised self-defence movements against Arab attackers by this time. The Masalit group is probably the ethnic group that has suffered the most in Darfur next to the Fur.³³

After many discussions also Masalit joined the Fur-Zaghawa struggle against the GoS. The organisation of this rebellion grew more and more in the early 2000s and in February 2003 the rebels carried out a first armed attack on a government position. The target was an army outpost in Golo, in Jebel Marra, and was done under the name Darfur Liberation Front. The

³¹ Flint, Julie (2007) "Darfur's armed Movements" in De Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 143-144

³² Flint, Julie (2007) "Darfur's armed Movements" in De Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 144-145

³³ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

name was soon changed to the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army, the SLM/A.³⁴ In a press release in March 2003 the SLM/A stated that they were fighting for a secular Sudan with a decentralised form of governance, using armed struggle as one of the means to achieve these political goals.³⁵

Soon after the SLM/A organisation was made public, another Darfurian rebel movement called the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) announced its existence. Even though the JEM and SLM/A appeared almost simultaneously, the roots of JEM are very different from those of the SLM/A. The JEM traces its roots to the mid-1990s, when some disillusioned people within the Sudanese government, including Hassan el-Turabi, the architect behind the NIF coup in 1989, formed a secret group composed of people from different regions in Sudan. This group collected information about marginalisation in Sudan and investigated the regional political power imbalances in the country.³⁶ In 1999 a conflict between Sudan's military ruler Omar el-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi led to a split in the Islamist regime in Khartoum.³⁷ Many people have argued that the JEM was founded by Turabi, but both he and the JEM deny this. Some people even see the current conflict in Darfur as one between al-Turabi and el-Bashir.³⁸ In any case, connections with the government are clear since most of the JEM's top officials are former holders of regional government positions. For instance, Khalil Ibrahim, who became the leader of the JEM, had served in different regional governments. In May 2000 a book called *the Black Book* was distributed in Khartoum. It concluded that all the political, as well as economic, power had been in the hands of a small elite from an area along the Nile, north of Khartoum, since independence. In 2001 the group that published this book took the name Justice and Equality Movement and sent Dr. Khalil Ibrahim abroad as its spokesman.³⁹ In early 2003 JEM developed its political program, stating a wish for:

³⁴ Flint, Julie (2007) "Darfur's armed Movements" in De Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 146

³⁵ UCDP (2008) Database www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

³⁶ Flint, Julie (2007) "Darfur's armed Movements" in De Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 150-151

³⁷ de Waal (2007) "Sudan: The Turbulent State" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 11

³⁸ Ali Aidam Adam, Lecturer Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁹ Flint, Julie (2007) "Darfur's armed Movements" in De Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 150-151

- A unified Sudan
- Justice and equality instead of social injustice and political tyranny
- "Radical and comprehensive constitutional reform" that would "guarantee the regions their rights in ruling the country"
- Basic services for every Sudanese
- Balanced economic and human development in all regions of Sudan⁴⁰

When SLM/A was formed, the ethnic dimensions constituted an integral part of the organisation and it was decided that the chairman of the movement should be from the Fur, the chief of staff from the Zaghawa and the deputy chair from the Masalit. In addition to these ethnic considerations, there was some Arab involvement in the formation of the movement.⁴¹ Despite the aspiration to create a multi-ethnic resistance movement the ethnic divisions soon became apparent. The group was characterised by divisions at the top level and continuously shifting alliances lower down in the hierarchy. The SLM/A subsequently split along tribal lines. The first and most important split occurred when Minni Minawi (a Zaghawa) organised a conference in Haskanita in November 2005 and was elected chairman of SLM/A. However, Abdul Wahid (a Fur) boycotted this conference and did not accept Minawi's ascension to the post as chairman. The power-struggle between Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi led to fighting between two factions of the SLM/A during the spring of 2006. At the same time negotiations took place in Abuja (Nigeria) with three distinct rebel movements: SLM/A-Abdul Wahid faction, SLM/A-Minni Minawi faction and the JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim. These negotiations led to the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by the GoS but only by one of the rebel movements, SLM/A (MM). Minawi signing the agreement led to a further fragmentation of the rebels' positions during the second half of 2006 and the first half of 2007 before a unification process took off in the fall of 2007. This process is described further on in this report.

Comprehensive View of Sudan

The crisis in Darfur is composed of several layers of conflict or different but parallel conflicts. Still, it is important to have a comprehensive view of

⁴⁰ JEM homepage (2007) <http://www.sudanjem.com/en/index.php> and <http://www.sudanjem.com/sudan-alt/english/english.html>

⁴¹ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

Sudan while dealing with Darfur since the situation there is highly affected by, and in turn affects, the other parts of Sudan. For instance some rebels speak of creating a union with rebels from all the other marginalised areas of Sudan to fight the government.⁴² Also there have been attacks conducted by Darfurian rebels in Kordofan (a region neighbouring Darfur to the east), an area which has the potential of being the next site of large-scale violence in Sudan.⁴³ Thus, areas affected by conflict in Sudan have included the south, the west and the east and experts are now warning that the far north can be the new front of conflict in Sudan. Tensions have been rising in that area during 2007 because of the construction of two hydro-electric dams. The first dam is the Merowe Dam and is strongly opposed by the Manassir ethnic group but also by the neighbouring Amri and Hamadab ethnic groups. These three ethnic groups will lose traditional native soil and have been refused access to the new waterfront by the government. This resistance has led to protests and at a peaceful demonstration in April 2007 the police killed three civilians. The other contested dam is located even further North in the Kajbar Area.⁴⁴ This area is inhabited by the Nubians which is a non-Arab group with its own language and culture. The Nubians also take pride in being one of Africa's oldest civilizations. This ancient homeland is threatened with flooding by the Kajbar Dam. Because of this the Nubians are vehemently opposing its construction and a Nubian-based group, the Kush Liberation Front, has been created.⁴⁵ On 13 June 2007 police and security forces killed four unarmed civilians at a protest in Kajbar and the risk of a further worsening of the situation in the far North can not be ruled out.⁴⁶ These new tensions further increase the challenges for the regime in Khartoum.

⁴² Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

⁴³ de Waal Alex (2007) "Watch Kordofan" posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* 2007-09-13 <http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/09/13/watch-kordofan>

⁴⁴ International Crisis Group (2007) "A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan" p. 10-11 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/130_a_strategy_for_comprehensive_peace_in_sudan.pdf

⁴⁵ Los Angeles Times (2007-08-31) "In Nubia, fears of another Darfur as tensions flare over proposed dams, many fear the northern Sudan territory will be the next region to erupt violence" <http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2007/08/in-nubia-fears-.html>

⁴⁶ International Crisis Group (2007) "A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan", p. 10-11 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/130_a_strategy_for_comprehensive_peace_in_sudan.pdf

Looking at the government it is clear that its possibilities in Darfur are greatly influenced by what is going on in the other areas of Sudan. Another aspect worth noting are the similarities of the demands of rebels in different parts of Sudan, indicating similar causes for conflict in the country.⁴⁷ The single most fundamental aspect of this is the extreme regional imbalances that characterise Sudan.⁴⁸ Rebel leaders and some UN experts argue that the GoS is weaker at this moment than it has been for a long time. This is a much-contested issue but if the future involves a process of the government getting weaker, experts believe that their might also be increased troubles in the east. The reason being that if different areas see a possibility of that the government might fall, everyone wants to take part in cutting up the power, a further reason for a comprehensive approach.⁴⁹

In an examination of the situation in Darfur it is important to also look into the relations between the north and the south. The southern rebel group SPLM/A fought the regime in Khartoum for more than two decades before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in the beginning of 2005. The situation in Darfur is highly influenced by the CPA. First of all, the agreement places negotiations in Darfur in a precarious situation since the CPA's power-sharing provisions carefully balance the political clout of the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A. Neither the NCP, nor the SPLM/A wants to give away the access to power supplied by the agreement. Secondly, the CPA also sets the agenda for how a final agreement in Darfur could look. Comparisons between the CPA and the DPA are often made and the DPA has much smaller concessions by the government to the rebels than the CPA.⁵⁰ The SPLM/A had been fighting the government for 22 years and were militarily stronger at the signing of the CPA than the Darfurian movements were during the DPA negotiations. Nevertheless representatives of the Darfurian movements make comparisons between the agreements. For example, Nouri Abdalla, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie who is the leader of one of the SLM/A factions, states:

⁴⁷ UCDP (2007-08-23) Database : www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

⁴⁸ Mohammed, Adam Azzain (2007) "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 199

⁴⁹ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, & Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

⁵⁰ Sundberg, Ralph (2008-01-29) Researcher, Peace Agreement Expert, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, see also the CPA (2005) available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Sud%2020050109.pdf> and DPA available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Sud%2020060505.pdf>

“The DPA falls short from our demands; in a comparison with the CPA it is not even close to the same and if it takes 22 years of fighting let it take 22 years of fighting. That is better than to agree on the terms offered in the DPA.”⁵¹

Clearly, CPA affects the situation in Darfur. Other Darfurian rebel representatives, such as those from the United Resistance Front (URF)⁵², emphasise that the Darfurians can play an important role in the implementation of the CPA, through bridging the south-north divide. Furthermore, they emphasize that the international community must put more pressure on the GoS when it comes to the implementation of the CPA. The representatives of URF also state that the implementation of the CPA and making the unity of Sudan attractive in the referendum in 2011 is very important.⁵³

The future of Darfur is also highly influenced by the path that the entire Sudan will follow, and the most decisive factor in this regard is the implementation of the CPA. The main reasons for the importance of this factor are that the CPA stipulates both national elections in 2009 and a referendum on independence for the South in 2011. Currently, the implementation of the CPA is delayed in several essential aspects, which creates a precarious situation for the entire country.⁵⁴ When it comes to the CPA-stipulated referendum most experts believe that the South will vote for independence in 2011. However, there are different theories about what this will lead to. The most prevailing theory is that the regime in Khartoum could accept the secession of the south if the border demarcation is in favour of the north. However, most experts believe that finding a mutually acceptable border demarcation solution satisfying to both the south and the

⁵¹ Nouri Abdalla, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba and UN UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld), interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

⁵² URF is an umbrella group created during the Juba process. The group is described in that section.

⁵³ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

⁵⁴ For more information on the implementation of CPA see Brosché, Johan “CPA-New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudan- A review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement” in *Journal of African Policy Studies* Volume 13 No. 1, 2007 and for monthly reviews of the implementation of the CPA and DPA see UNMIS (2007) “The CPA Monitor- Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA” at <http://www.unmis.org/english/cpaMonitor.htm> and “The DPA monitor” at <http://www.unmis.org/english/dpaMonitor.htm>

north will be extremely difficult. Abyei, a disputed oil-rich area located between the Bahr el-Ghazal and South Kordofan provinces, exemplifies this problem. The area is in geographic, ethnic and political terms caught between southern and northern Sudan. Resolving the Abyei issue is crucial, as the area has been pointed out as the location where the risk of return to a north-south war is at its greatest. Moreover, success in the solution of the issue of Abyei could be the measure that pilots the implementation of the CPA in the right direction. Consequently, the opposite could make the CPA evaporate. The major reasons for Abyei being so important are that the region ties into the issues that are at the heart of CPA, border demarcation, oil-revenues and the referendum.⁵⁵ Abyei has been referred to as *Sudan's "Kashmir"*, a classification which amply emphasises the essentiality of the issue.⁵⁶ Matthew LeRiche, a PhD-candidate at the Department for War Studies at Kings College in London and an expert on southern Sudan, believes that the area around Abyei might be where the Darfur and southern conflicts finally merge. He elaborates on this by claiming that the area is extremely tense and also that the Darfurians are interested in the oil that is located in Abyei. Moreover, he states that there are signs of some form of co-operation between SPLM/A or SPLM/A-affiliated elements and some Darfurian movements in the area. As an example he states that when elements from JEM kidnapped Chinese oil-workers in Kordofan⁵⁷ they needed to pass through southern Kordofan. The area they needed to pass is controlled by SPLM/A-affiliated groups and they could not have done so had there not been some form of tacit approval from the groups in the area. He concludes by stating that there exists a relationship between the groups in the area and different Darfurian actors. For instance, people in the area have sold weapons, that they received from the government to fight southerners years ago, to the JEM and other Darfurians.⁵⁸ Needless to say the return to a north-south war, or a split of Sudan into two countries would have vast implications for Darfur. Due to this fact it is important to have a comprehensive view of Sudan and to deal with the implications of the CPA and the situation in Darfur in tandem.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group (2007) "Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock" p. 2
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/b47_sudan_abyei_web.pdf

⁵⁶ Enough (2008) "Abyei Sudan's 'Kashmir'" by Roger Winter and John Prendergast
<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1.pdf>

⁵⁷ BBC (2007-10-25) "Rebels tell China' Leave Sudan"
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7061066.stm>

⁵⁸ LeRiche, Matthew, PhD-candidate at the Department for War Studies at Kings College London, mail conversation 2008-01-29

Another aspect also important to reflect upon, is that if the South becomes independent the risk for a civil war in the South is significant. This is due to the fact that several groups in the South are scrambling for a piece of the SPLM/A's power. The SPLM/A has tried to conduct the disarmament of these groups in accordance with the CPA, something that on several occasions has led to fighting between the SPLM/A and the groups to be disarmed. In this respect, another important aspect to take into account is that one of the bloodiest periods of the north-south war took place during the early 1990s when the main SPLM/A led by John Garang was fighting breakaway factions of the SPLM/A, especially a faction led by Riek Machar. Garang (and his successor Salva Kiir) were from the largest ethnic group in southern Sudan, the Dinka, whilst Riek Machar was from the second largest group, the Nuer. The fighting that followed had a clear ethnic dimension and one reason for that was the ethnic split in the leadership and that they were recruiting along ethnic lines. Much of the fighting consisted of attacking and burning villages inhabited by people from the other faction's ethnic group. The most well-known example of this is the Bor massacre, where an estimated 2000 civilian Dinkas were killed by a Nuer militia.⁵⁹ The previously mentioned Matthew LeRiche fears that there is a risk that a civil war in the South would be the bloodiest war we have seen this far in Sudan with incidents like the Bor massacre taking place in several places.⁶⁰ A chaotic independent south with large-scale killings would of course also influence neighbouring countries and regions, one such neighbouring region being Darfur. A new bout of fragmentation and ethnic violence in the south would thus be severely detrimental for the situation in Darfur.

Discussion About Background and Comprehensive View of Sudan

To be able to analyse and understand the complexities existing in Sudan, it is necessary to have a comprehensive approach. One example of when this lack of comprehensiveness caused quandaries in the Sudanese context, was when Darfur was not taken into account when the focus was on finalizing the CPA. Now it is the other way around, and the CPA is getting little attention as Darfur is the focal point. Moreover, there are emerging problems in the

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch (2001) "Analysis of the Current Fighting and its Relation to Famine"
<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sudan98/sudan-analysis.htm>

⁶⁰ LeRiche, Matthew PhD-candidate at the Department for War Studies at Kings College London, interviewed 23 November 2007, Khartoum

far North as well as in Kordofan and also these areas have to be dealt with through an all-inclusive approach. To prevent an emerging conflict is a hard task, but still far easier than solving a full-fledged war. Therefore the latent conflict areas should be dealt with now, not when/if a bloodier conflict takes place. It is exceedingly complicated and could be very frustrating to take other areas into account when you are dealing with an already existing complex situation, such as Darfur, but it is necessary. Although the situation in Darfur is devastating at the moment, people dealing with Sudan in general and Darfur in particular have to be aware that the situation in Darfur and in Sudan as a whole could be worse. Currently the international community is seeing an ongoing humanitarian disaster and hence want to have a quick fix. Of course the situation in Darfur should be solved as soon as possible but it is important to really scrutinize every step taken so that the result will not be counterproductive to what was intended. Moreover, it is worthwhile to also take into account the time frame. The current phase of conflict in Darfur has 'just' been going on for five years compared to the latest phase of conflict concentrated to the south that continued for 22 years. The purpose of taking that into account is not to be cynical or decrease the essence of improving things as quickly as possible, but just to further raise the awareness on how complicated the problems are and the risk of a lengthy conflict. Ideally steps taken for a solution of the disaster in Darfur should be quick and appropriate but if there has to be a choice between these two factors, the appropriateness is of higher importance. To be suitable they have to deal with the root causes for conflict in Sudan and the most crucial of these is the inequality between the different regions in Sudan. Therefore, steps taken to seek a solution in Sudan have to go in the direction of decreased disparity, both as this will reduce the risk of war and because it will decrease the poverty in the marginalised areas. Moreover, Sudan is a very centralised state, and decentralisation that would increase the responsibilities of the different regions could possibly solve some of the problems that Sudan faces. Decentralisation of Sudan could be a way to decrease the differences between the centre and the peripheral areas, and thereby ameliorate some of the root causes of conflict. In addition to political decentralisation, a shift in how the economical resources are distributed could work in a peace-enhancing direction. At the moment resources are collected in the peripheral areas of the vast country of Sudan, taken to Khartoum and rarely/never redistributed back to the remote regions.

For an appropriate examination of Darfur, an inclusive approach is needed. However, this broad way of studying Darfur might entail a breakdown of the problems in Darfur in separate categories. There are parallel conflicts going on and to take this into account is crucial since a solution to

a communal conflict probably looks decidedly different than measures that have to be taken for solving a conflict over political marginalisation. The general division of how Darfur should be approached is power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security. All these issues are fundamental, but to be able to deal with these issues more suitably it could be appropriate to reflect on them by distinguishing between communal conflicts, centre-periphery conflict and conflicts between different local elites.

3. Some of the Major Actors

This section of the report is dealing with some of the major actors in the Darfur crisis. The examination is not complete since important actors such as SLM/A-Unity and JEM are not carefully scrutinized. The reason for this is that the author did not have the chance to meet any representatives from these groups when in Sudan. For the same reasons the report does not have any first hand information from the government. However, there are strong arguments for focusing on the NCP, Abdul Wahid, Minni Minawi, the ongoing rebel unification process and the Arabs in Darfur. NCP is the political party that utterly has dominated the Sudanese politics since they took power in 1989. Abdul Wahid is the only rebel leader known to all people in Darfur and in a particular important position due to his strong support in the camps whilst Minni Minawi is in precarious position as the most important signatory to the highly disliked DPA. A successful unification process of the rebel movements is a pre-condition to fruitful negotiations hence that process is given much room in the analyses. To use the term *Arabs in Darfur* is problematic as it is a simplistic term used for a much diverse group. However, since there is a lack of good alternative, the term is highly used by Darfurians and in the literature dealing with Darfur, that concept will be used in this section.

The National Congress Party: Strengths and Weaknesses

The National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in Sudan through a military coup on 30 June 1989. This coup placed Omar el-Bashir in the highest office, but it is widely recognised that it was the prominent Sunni Muslim, Islamist and Sharia advocate Hassan al-Turabi who was the architect of the coup.⁶¹ Bashir, in a televised statement after ascending to power, stated that the reason for the coup was “*to save the country from rotten political parties*”. Also, the coup aimed to prevent a peace treaty with the SPLM/A that was about to grant the South a secular system of governance and law. General el-Bashir joined the military in 1960 and has been a military man

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch (2002) “Biography of Hassan al-Turabi” <http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/turabi-bio.htm>

since. El-Bashir still draws his strongest support from the army.⁶² The Sudanese army composes over 100 000 active troops in 2007.⁶³ In 1993 the NIF changed its name to the National Congress Party (NCP) and in 1999 a conflict between Turabi and Bashir arose due the introduction of a bill to limit the power of the president. When Turabi resisted the re-election of Bashir in 2000 the split between the erstwhile companions was total.⁶⁴ The NIF/NCP has a poor human rights record since coming to power. Atrocities committed by NIF/NCP include summary executions, torture and arbitrary detentions.⁶⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a program that collects data on different types of organised violence. One type is called “one-sided violence”, meaning intentional attacks on civilians by governments or formally organized armed groups. In the dataset on one-sided violence the government of Sudan is recorded as a perpetrator in every single year since data collection began in 1989.⁶⁶

Numerous scholars, politicians and human rights activists see the NCP as a primary problem in a solution to the Darfur crisis and argue that the international community has to put pressure on the NCP in order to reach a solution.⁶⁷ There is, however, a lack of consensus on how influence should be applied and what kind of pressure the GoS is receptive to. Khalil el-Amin, Associate Professor at the Development Studies Research Institute of the University of Khartoum, states that it is very hard to effectively influence GoS since it has power bases among some of the elites in Darfur. To get around this problem a bottom-up approach is necessary. This would entail that the local communities should select their leaders from the grassroots level. These persons know who is influenced by the government and who is not. He states that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue (DDD)⁶⁸ stipulated in the DPA is a sham, since the GoS still influences it in different ways. Also, Darfurians are not allowed to discuss matters on

⁶² BBC (2003-11-25) “Profile: Sudan’s President Bashir” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3273569.stm>

⁶³ UCDP (2008) Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University

⁶⁴ BBC (2005-06-30) “Profile: Sudan’s Islamist leader” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3190770.stm>

⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch (2002) “Biography of Hassan al-Turabi” <http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/turabi-bio.htm>

⁶⁶ UCDP (2007) Database www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

⁶⁷ See for instance Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group or Amnesty International

⁶⁸ DDD is the name of a process for overcoming the problems between different ethnic groups within Darfur through discussions. For detailed information see DPA (2006) available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Sud%2020060505.pdf>

their own. El-Amin believes that the DDD and other forms of grassroots engagement might be slow in yielding results but that this still is the only possible way to reach real solutions in Darfur. He further states that the GoS is using its connections in Darfur as to deflect attempts to put pressure on it. In addition to this the government often says that it will not intervene in certain Darfur issues but still it does and this creates suspicion in Darfur.⁶⁹

Abdelshaafie, leader of one of the SLM/A factions, says that the group will lobby internationally to put pressure on the GoS, and if that does not help fighting will be the only answer. He continues to say that everyone knows that NCP is “*a terrorist government*” but that its members still move freely in international capitals and as long as the GoS controls the oil, everything will continue in the same way.⁷⁰ Representatives from the URF also emphasize the importance of oil income as NCP’s only strength. Without oil revenues the regime in Khartoum would be very weak. The reasons for this weakness, according to JEM-CL chief negotiator Tadjadine Bechir Niam, is the GoS’ problems in the South, in Darfur, with Minni Minawi and with other political parties. Thus, without oil the GoS’ has nothing to draw on. This belief in the weakness of the government also makes him convinced that the outcome of the war will be a victory for the Darfurian rebels.⁷¹

In social science it is hard to do experiments than in natural sciences. However, NIF/NCP has been in power in Khartoum since 1989 and this enables a look at what international measures have worked earlier and what have not worked when interacting with NCP. John Prendergast from the ICG has examined earlier issues were the international community has been involved with the regime in Khartoum. He claims that there exists three separate cases where the NCP/NIF have turned its policy around due to international pressure. These are; ending its support for terrorism⁷², terminating the civil war in the South and stopping slave raiding. The NCP’s reversal from supporting terrorism during the Clinton administration and to work as a partner with the U.S. in the war on terror after 9/11 is according to Prendergast the result of a combination of: *a) aggressive international*

⁶⁹ Khalil el-Amin, Associate Professor, Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 5 December 2007, Khartoum

⁷⁰ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

⁷¹ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

⁷² Unconfirmed reports state that the NCP still support terrorism but if they do it is in a much more covert manner than earlier so still the NCP has definitely changed their manner

diplomacy, b) multilateral sanctions and condemnations, and c) U.S. military threats. The end to the war in the South he claims to be the result of: *a) rebel unity b) intense and sustained international diplomacy c) White House engagement d) commitment by Christian groups in the U.S. and by the U.S. Congress, and e) divestment.*⁷³ Similar explanations are used in Prendergast's final example of GoS ending support for slave raiding. In contrast to the policies that have worked Prendergast lists measures that have not. They are focusing on lack of patience from the international community, threats that are not followed up and strategies of constructive engagement. Prendergast states:

“There continues to be a fundamental misreading of the NCP-controlled government. Former U.S. official Roger Winter and others have rightly pointed out that the United States and the international community (and most recently, the new U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon) have been premising policy and strategy on the faulty assumption that Bashir and the NIF want to be a 'good government', and, as Winter says, can be successfully appealed to 'do the right thing' for all of its citizens, including those strategically marginalized for centuries by Sudan's ruling elites. This is one of the baseline reasons why 'constructive engagement' and many of the strategies listed immediately above do not and will not work – ever.”⁷⁴

Abdul Wahid

In the analyses of the founder of SLM/A, Abdul Wahid, extremely contradictory views emerge. Rebel leaders argue that his power has diminished significantly lately, while academics and aid-workers say that especially people in the refugee camps still wholeheartedly back him. Taken together the comprehensive picture is that Abdul Wahid still is a significant player in the Darfurian crisis.

Although many rebels have their own reasons for underrating the importance of Abdul Wahid they are correct in saying that he has lost much of his military capacity. When Minni Minawi signed the DPA he lost the

⁷³ Enough (2007) “The Answer to Darfur: How to Resolve the World's Hottest War” by John Prendergast p. 3-6
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/answer_to_darfur.pdf

⁷⁴ Enough (2007) “The Answer to Darfur: How to Resolve the World's Hottest War” by John Prendergast p. 7
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/answer_to_darfur.pdf

support of many of his commanders and at the same time a parallel process took place where Abdul Wahid lost the support of many of his followers. The reason for commanders leaving Minawi was that he signed the DPA and the major reason for followers leaving Wahid was that he was thinking of signing the DPA.⁷⁵ During the final days of the Abuja negotiations 19 commanders left Abdul Wahid and formed a group called G19, led by Khamees Abdallah.⁷⁶ Although Abdul Wahid has lost significant parts of his military power he is still hugely popular among the locals in Darfur, especially in the IDP camps. If you travel in Darfur you will see the graffiti “*One nation under Abdul Wahid*” written in many places in the camps.⁷⁷ This support is especially strong in his home area of Zalingi in West Darfur. One reason is that Abdul Wahid keeps close contacts with people in the camps by talking to some of them on a daily bases from Paris, his recent home.⁷⁸ His control has increased further since he is influencing some chiefs for some ethnic groups that in turn persuade the IDPs of giving him support. Despite this, Ilham Saydna from Care International states that in comparison to what is happening on the ground leaders are not important and that the most essential thing for the IDPs is security.⁷⁹ Some politicians from Darfur argue in a similar manner when they say that if the real issues of Darfur are addressed in a coherent and forceful way the people of Darfur might forget Abdul Wahid.⁸⁰ Dr Musa Adam Abdul at the University of Khartoum says that one reason for the IDP’s solid backing of Abdul Wahid is that he shares the same history of suffering as they since he is from the Fur ethnic group.⁸¹ Persons that have been working closely with Abdul Wahid at an earlier stage say that he has turned into a very suspicious persons and that,

⁷⁵ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

⁷⁶ International Crisis Group (2007) “Darfur’s new Security Reality” http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

⁷⁷ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

⁷⁸ OCHA, A women working for OCHA at the IDP camp in Zalingi (name withheld), interviewed 1 December 2007, Khartoum

⁷⁹ Ilham Saydna, Assistant GED Advisor Care International – Sudan, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

⁸⁰ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

⁸¹ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

primarily, the Haskanita conference (where Minawi claimed to be the real leader of SLM/A) turned him into the Abdul Wahid he is today.⁸²

Many of the rebels are very critical when talking about Abdul Wahid. He is said to lack visions and not to focus at all on the fighters but solely on the IDPs. Elhadi Idriss Yahya (advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie) also states that Abdul Wahid is not the sole founder of the SLM/A. Elhadi was doing his Masters in Political Science in 2003 at the University of Khartoum and he and others were with Abdul Wahid in Khartoum at that time. He claims that they are all founders of the SLM/A. One argument often heard by Abdul Wahid is that UN troops should protect the people of Darfur. However, since this is not about to happen, the rebel movements are, in the words of Elhadi Idriss Yahya, the ones that can protect the people. But to be able to do this the rebels have to be united. The people of Darfur cannot be protected from Paris, Elhadi Idriss Yahya concludes.⁸³ The leader of one of the SLM/A factions, Abdelshaafie, says that Abdul Wahid cannot bring anything to the people of Darfur from Paris, and that it is not true that you need Abdul Wahid to get the support of the people and IDPs in Darfur. Furthermore, he says that Abdul Wahid has not been in Darfur for several years and that you can not be away from your people for that long and still claim to be its leader. He continues to state that the people in Darfur have high expectations on the Juba process and that Wahid should absolutely be part of this process. But Abdul Wahid refused to come to Juba and also declined to meet with Magdom Adam Rijal, a traditional Fur leader of high position, who had gone to Paris to convince Wahid to come to Juba. Magdom Adam stayed in Paris for a week but Wahid constantly refused to meet him. All this taken together has diminished the support for Abdul Wahid and is likely to lead to the isolation of this actor, according to Abdelshaafie.⁸⁴

Minni Minawi

As the first rebel leader that signed the DPA in Abuja on 5 May 2006 Minni Minawi is in a special position in the complex Darfur situation. At later dates other rebels have signed the DPA, but Minawi is by far the most prominent signatory from the rebel side. As result of the DPA his group

⁸² Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

⁸³ Elhadi Idriss Yahya SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

⁸⁴ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

is now part of the Government of National Unity (GoNU)⁸⁵ and Minni Minawi himself has become the Chief Advisor to the Presidency, a position created by the DPA.⁸⁶ The DPA gives political influence to SLM/A (MM) but in reality this power has become limited and Minawi has on several occasions complained about this. Trayo A. Ali, Advisor to Minni Minawi, says that the group is still adhering to the DPA but that the agreement has to be properly implemented. Currently, only some parts are in place but others are not, according to him. Among the former Mr. Trayo prints to issues such as Minni Minawi's appointment as a Senior Assistant to the President, the allocation to SLM/A (MM) of seats in the national assembly as well as at the state level, and the creation of certain key commissions. On the other hand the most important part that has not been implemented is the security arrangements for the people in Darfur. Improving the situation on the ground is a precondition for success in the negotiations. Another problem is that on many important issues the SLM/A (MM) is not allowed to take part in the discussions, according to Mr. Trayo. One example given is the negotiations on the hybrid force where the SLM/A (MM) was not allowed to participate no matter if the discussions were held in Khartoum, Abuja or New York.⁸⁷

At the time when Minni Minawi signed the DPA the SLM/A (MM) was in a weak position in relation to the NCP and the group has been further weakened after that since many commanders have left the movement. The main reason is their resistance to his signing of the DPA. Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim, a former advisor to Minawi, expresses the prevailing view among many of the people that left Minawi:

“The Abuja was not a peace agreement since it did not deal with the root-causes for the conflict in Darfur. Until now the international community has just focused upon the effects of the war not the root causes for the war.”⁸⁸

In addition to this, persons that were not part of the Minawi movement were critical about his signing of the agreement. Tadjadine Niam from

⁸⁵ Government of National Unity was formed as part of the CPA and the primary parts in the GoNU is NCP and SPLM/A but also some points have been approved to Darfurians through DPA and Easterners through ESPA (2006) available at http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Eastern_Sudan_Peace_Agreement.pdf

⁸⁶ Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Sud%2020060505.pdf>

⁸⁷ Trayo A Ali, SLM/A (MM), advisor to Minni Minawi, interviewed 18 November 2007, Khartoum

⁸⁸ Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

JEM-CL says that on 28 February 2006 the AU through Sam Ibok, Head of the African Union Mediation team, offered the rebel movements 40% of the seats in the legislature, executive and judiciary at the Darfur state level. This was rejected by the movements, including Minni Minawi, and instead they demanded 80%. Two months later Minni Minawi signed the DPA, an agreement that gave 28% of the seats in these three institutions to the Darfurian movements. Tadjadine also states that he does not think that the Abuja was a peace agreement since it did not deal with the core problems of the people of Darfur.⁸⁹

Even though the SLM/A (MM) and NCP are partners in the GoNU their relationship is far from unproblematic. They clashed militarily several times in Darfur even after the signing of the DPA, both in 2006 and 2007. A further backlash was in March 2007 when Minawi's headquarters in Omdurman was besieged by government forces. After the Omdurman incident Minawi was thinking of withdrawing from the DPA, but community leaders and Minawi supporters pressured him to remain with the agreement. They argued that the gains that they had made through signing the DPA would be jeopardized and that their situation would become even more vulnerable if they withdrew from the DPA. If SLM/A (MM) resigns from DPA it would put it in a situation where it would lack allies and be at the risk of being attacked by rebels, government forces or Janjaweed. Minawi subsequently stayed within the GoNU but further weakened.⁹⁰

When it comes to the Darfur negotiations the SLM/A (MM) wants to take part, using an independent team of its own since the leaders do not feel that any other party can represent them. Moreover they also feel that peace is not conceivable without them and that they have to play an important role in reaching peace in Darfur.⁹¹ The GoS position is that Minawi should not have any other role in the negotiations than as part of the government's team. If he is given another position the GoS has threatened to not take part in the negotiations.⁹² In addition to this the general view among other Darfurians, both members of the rebel movements and civilians,

⁸⁹ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

⁹⁰ International Crisis Group (2007) "Darfur's new Security Reality" p.12 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

⁹¹ Trayo A Ali, SLM/A (MM), advisor to Minni Minawi, interviewed 18 November 2007, Khartoum

⁹² International Crisis Group (2007) "Darfur's new Security Reality" p.13 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

is that the time of Minawi has passed. Amin Mahmoud, a member of the Fur consultative council, is of the opinion that Minawi lost his chance in Abuja and has no role left to play. Mahmoud also adds that Minawi has almost no soldiers left on the ground.⁹³ According to an advisor to Abdelshaafie, the current significance of Minawi is limited since he has so few troops left. This advisor also states that Minawi is welcome to join the SLM/A whenever he wants if he leaves the government, but that he cannot expect to become the Chairman.⁹⁴ The significance of Minawi's troops is a contested issue, however. The other rebel movements say that he has almost nothing left on the ground, whilst the SLM/A (MM) itself states that its military capacity is still strong. Before the signing of the DPA SLM/A (MM) was the rebel group most feared by the GoS, but as has been stated earlier, many of Minawi's commanders have left the group after the signing. However, most neutral experts seem to be in consensus that even though he is weaker now he still has a significant military presence in some areas of Darfur. For instance, UN Human Rights officer Joseph Bonsu states that:

“Minawi still has a lot of troops in Darfur and controls several different areas in the region. He is a strong force that should be recognized, no doubt about that”.⁹⁵

The peculiar negotiating position of the SLM/A (MM) and its military presence in Darfur has resulted in Minawi having been identified as a potential spoiler in the event of a coming peace agreement in Darfur.⁹⁶

⁹³ Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PhD researcher in political conflict and administration, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

⁹⁴ Elhadi Idriss Yahya SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

⁹⁵ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

⁹⁶ International Crisis Group (2007) “Darfur’s new Security Reality” p.24 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

Rebel Unification / The Juba Process

The two rebel movements that existed at the start of the Darfurian rebellion in 2003, the JEM and the SLM/A, have gone through major structural changes with fractionalisations, umbrella-movements and the re-emerging of some groups. The SLM/A group has had the most such experiences, but the JEM has also been through this process. The most important split within the JEM was when a group left Khalil Ibrahim in October 2007 and formed the Justice and Equality Movement- Collective Leadership (JEM-CL).⁹⁷ Most experts predicted that this split would make the JEM-CL the militarily stronger of the two JEM movements. However, soon after the split the JEM led by Khalil Ibrahim scored some military successes in West Darfur, with most experts believing that this came about since Ibrahim had received new and strong support from the Chadian President, Idris Déby.⁹⁸

The two primary incidents that created the split among the SLM/A rebels were the Haskanita conference in November 2005 (organised by Minawi supporters) and the signing of the DPA by Minawi. The latter also led to splits when many commanders left Minawi, it also led to some clans and sub-clans starting their own rebel movements. The reasoning behind these moves by the clans was that when Minawi signed the DPA it benefited him and his Zaghawa sub-clan and hence, some people in Darfur believed that if they started a movement their ethnic group could benefit from it. The basic argument being that “*we are a tribe so we are a movement*”.⁹⁹ The trend of fragmentation continued during 2007 and the number of reported rebel groups varied widely, with the highest reported figure being around 50. This fragmentation is a major obstacle for negotiations. To be able to conduct substantial negotiations the joint UN/AU mediation mission has put a lot of effort into trying to unify the rebels. In addition to this, neighbouring countries also put efforts to unify the rebels, and unifications talks were facilitated by Eritrea and Chad. Even though these processes had some success substantial unification was not achieved until the fall of 2007 when a unification process took place in Juba, Southern Sudan, under the supervision of the SPLM/A. The Juba process was preceded by unification talks in Arusha, Tanzania, in August. Rebels stressed the importance of

⁹⁷ Sudan Tribune (2007-10-08) “JEM veteran rebel establishes collective leadership confirms split”
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24118>

⁹⁸ Discussion with different experts, name withheld

⁹⁹ Elhadi Idriss Yahya SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

these talks since the movements formed commissions and decided that they should begin negotiations with the GoS within 2-3 months.¹⁰⁰ In Juba most of the movements were represented, making the process quite inclusive. For instance, some prominent Arab groups and individuals were part of the process, which shows that the majority of the people of Darfur are represented in Juba, according to Abdelshaafie.¹⁰¹

Rev. Canon Clement Janda, SPLM/A Special Envoy on Darfur and Chairman of the SPLM Darfur Task Force, states that what they were doing in Juba was facilitating a forum for the Darfurian movements, not negotiating. He continues to state that the Juba process should be a time where the Darfurians got the chance to talk and try to reach more unified positions without outside interference.¹⁰² Darfur rebel representatives agree with this view and point out that a major difference is that in Juba the SPLM/A let them be alone and did not push them. This has not been the case when they have been trying unification efforts in, for example, Chad and Eritrea. From November 2006 to May 2007 several of the movements were in Abeche, Chad, to try to form a common political agenda. However, regional powers such as Eritrea, Chad and Libya all tried to influence the movements and this was one reason why no mutual political agenda could be formulated. The movements have experienced the same thing when conducting a unification process in Asmara during 2007.¹⁰³ Furthermore, several of the rebel leaders stressed that the SPLM/A did not have an agenda of their own in the Juba process, in contrast to meetings in Asmara when Eritrea had an agenda of trying to become the mediator in future negotiations.¹⁰⁴ Ahmed Abdelshaafie, leader of one of the SLM/A factions elaborates further, stating that one reason why the SPLM/A has no other agenda than to unify the Darfurian movements is that the SPLM/A's does not need Darfurians as a partner. Since it holds the independence card to play against the government. He continues to state that another benefit of talks supervised by the SPLM/A is that the visions of the SLM/A and the SPLM/A are similar, something which increases

¹⁰⁰ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰¹ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰² Rev Canon Clement Janda, Special Envoy of the Chairman of SPLM/A on Darfur, Chairman of SPLM Darfur task force, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰³ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰⁴ Discussion with several different rebel representatives from each of the JEM-CL, SLM/A Abdelshaafie, SLM/A-Khamees

their understanding of each other.¹⁰⁵ The SPLM/A Special Envoy on Darfur agrees with this and states that the Darfurians and the SPLM/A trust each other and have something in common since they have both been exposed to marginalisation.¹⁰⁶ Abdelshaafie states that the conditions for unifying the rebel positions could not be better than they are at the moment, since the atmosphere is perfect.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the experiences of the SPLM/A in terms of marginalisation, fragmentation and unification are aspects that the Darfurian movements believe helps them in their unification process.¹⁰⁸ Sudan expert John Prendergast argues with aspect to the negotiated outcome of the SPLM/A war against the regime in Khartoum that:

“Perhaps the most important reason for Khartoum’s reversal was the unification of a badly splintered rebellion. In 1991, Khartoum had helped engineer a deadly split in the SPLA. It took years of southern Sudanese reconciliation efforts and extensive U.S. diplomacy to finally pull the SPLA back together. Once they posed a serious military challenge to the regime that brought about a stalemate on the battlefield that, in turn, made an accord possible. Under the late John Garang’s leadership, the SPLA was developing alliances with Sudanese opposition movements in the north and what was believed to be simply a ‘north-south civil war’ was transforming into a revolution of the periphery against the center. The military threat posed by that unity, when combined with international pressure and high-level engagement, pushed the regime into genuine negotiations with the SPLA.”¹⁰⁹

Although the SPLM/A and some Darfurian rebel factions were in agreement in Juba over their fruitful relationship there were outsiders that were more sceptical. Representatives of a Darfurian political party rejected going to Juba because in their opinion the process was used by the SPLM/A as a tool

¹⁰⁵ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰⁶ Rev Canon Clement Janda, Special Envoy of the Chairman of SPLM/A on Darfur, Chairman of SPLM Darfur task force, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰⁷ It should also be noted that reportedly the SPLM/A are supporting Abdelshaafie’s movement, which might influence his views upon SPLM/A.

¹⁰⁸ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹⁰⁹ Enough (2007) “The Answer to Darfur How to Resolve the World’s Hottest War” by John Prendergast p. 4-5
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/answer_to_darfur.pdf

to put pressure on the NCP.¹¹⁰ This view was also supported by independent experts, who believed that the view among the Darfurian movements that SPLM/A did not have an own agenda was naive.¹¹¹ Another possibly complicating factor for the SPLM/A-Darfurian rebels' relation is the North-South war. During this war the regime in Khartoum heavily recruited and used troops from Darfur in the fighting, which led to Southerners often fighting against Darfurians. It has been suggested that this will have an effect on the Southern support for the Darfurians. On the other hand the SPLM/A has also played a supportive role for the rebels in Darfur and it is probable that this connection, as well as the companionship that could be created by having a mutual enemy, is stronger than the animosity created during the North-South war.¹¹² This latter view is supported by a Fur leader who states that the historical problems between the South and Darfur are now solved.¹¹³ SPLM/A's Clement Janda says that the Darfurian involvement in the North-South war has no effect at all on the current relationship. He continues to state that during the Juba process there were 140 Darfurians in Juba, and if the relations were not good this could not have happened.¹¹⁴ Despite this consensus on the top-level there could still be a different effect on a lower level. The following statement by a SPLM/A soldier points in this direction: *"We will intervene in Darfur but only when the people of Darfur have suffered a bit more because they played a crucial role on the government side during our war"*.¹¹⁵ Even though the importance of this statement should not be overestimated it shows that Darfur-South relations are not uncomplicated.

During the unification process in Juba there existed two different opinions on how the regrouping of the movements should be carried out. Some argued that the formula should be a return to the original movements (SLM/A and JEM) and others argued that it was better to simply analyse the situation on the ground at the moment and the present goals of the different

¹¹⁰ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

¹¹¹ UN-experts, academics etc, discussions in Khartoum 5-8 December 2007

¹¹² LeRiche, Matthew, PhD-candidate at the Department for War Studies at Kings College London, interviewed 23 November 2007, Khartoum

¹¹³ Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PhD researcher in political conflict and administration, Ibraheam Ahmed Adam, Tunjor consultative council and former minister in northern Darfur and General Mohammed Alseladhi Shafi, Fur consultative council, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

¹¹⁴ Rev Canon Clement Janda, Special Envoy of the Chairman of SPLM/A on Darfur, Chairman of SPLM Darfur task force, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

¹¹⁵ Secret information

factions.¹¹⁶ This led to two different parallel processes being conducted at the same time in Juba. One of these resulted in an umbrella movement called the United Resistance Front (URF) made up of five different rebel groups: JEM-CL, SLM/A-Khamees, NMRD (National Movement for Reform and Development), URFF (United Revolutionary Forces Front an Arab rebel group) and SLM/A-Adam Bakheit. The other was a pure SLM/A unification process that included different SLM/A factions. Some of them united into a cluster called the Group of 11. This process resulted in a SLM/A movement led by Ahmed Abdelshaafie. However, some of the most prominent rebel groups, such as SLM/A Abdul Wahid, SLM/A-Unity and the JEM led by Khalil Ibrahim, were not part of any of these new movements although some of them had representatives in Juba.¹¹⁷ It is important to note that the SLM/A movements led by Abdul Wahid, Ahmed Abdelshaafie and Khamees Abdallah all call themselves SLM/A since they see their own faction as the only legitimate SLM/A. However, to be able to distinguish among the different factions I will name them after the leader of each faction.

The tone and words that the URF and the SLM/A-Abdelshaafie used against each other in Juba were harsh and both accused the other of being only “individuals” and not factions. Abdelshaafie also said that an umbrella formation did not have any support among the people of Darfur and that he was sure that Khamees would later join the SLM/A-Abdelshaafie.¹¹⁸ Khamees on the other hand said that many of the people that were coming to Juba were just individuals who claimed to be a faction. He elaborates on this argument by stating that some of these persons came from Rome and London and that “*they might have a name, they might have a homepage but they are not factions, they are just individuals since they do not have any presence in Darfur*”. Khamees argues that these individuals have to form one solid faction before they can join a more extensive group.¹¹⁹ In contrast to this Abdelshaafie states that: “*the interest of our people is the only interesting thing and I will not allow any other groups because they are hurting our people*”. He elaborates by stating that he is not talking about fighting, but claims that there are other means to do this, without

¹¹⁶ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

¹¹⁷ Discussion with several different rebel representatives as well as representatives from the Negotiation team, Juba end of November 2007

¹¹⁸ Ahmed Abdelshaafie interviewed 28 November 2007, Khamees Abdallah, interviewed 25 November 2007

¹¹⁹ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

specifying what type.¹²⁰ Elhadi Idriss Yahya, adviser to Abdelshaafie, says that earlier umbrella organisations such as the National Redemption Front (NRF) and the United Front for Development and Liberation (UFLD) have not worked out and that he thinks that the URF will “*just last for a month*”.¹²¹ In contrast to this Mokhtar A. Adam, advisor to Khamees, says that they have learned from earlier mistakes and that the URF is a solid movement.¹²² Moreover the SLM/A-Khamees faction has been criticised for working with the JEM-CL since the SLM/A and JEM have different political agendas, one important difference between them being that JEM has a more Islamic agenda. Moreover many among the SLM/A are sceptical about JEM since they think that the group is too close to the government. Arguments to support this, used by some of the rebels, are that Khalil Ibrahim was minister in Darfur until 1999 and that when Turabi and Bashir started to fight each other, Turabi formed the JEM and made Khalil the leader.¹²³ The response to this from SLM/A-Khamees is that they are firmly committed to its principles but are working with JEM-CL because they are dealing with “*a very tricky enemy*” and that this is the best way of defeating the NCP.¹²⁴ High-profile representatives of the JEM-CL say that the formation of the URF was based on mutual interests and that some of the movements within the URF had been fighting together for a long time. In addition to this the JEM-CL has also been allied with SLM/A-Unity in military operations since the summer of 2007. According to JEM-CL representatives the level of cooperation has gone far and they are even sharing vehicles¹²⁵

All the representatives that met in Juba are in agreement that they are negatively affected by the splits between and within the movements, but they differ on what the main reasons for this. Elhadi Idriss Yahya, advisor to the Ahmed Abdelshaafie SLM/A faction, believes that the biggest problem for the SLM/A is the one of leadership. According to him the movement had these problems from the beginning because it lacked an

¹²⁰ Ahmed Abdelshaafie interviewed 28 November 2007, Khamees Abdallah, interviewed 25 November 2007

¹²¹ Elhadi Idriss Yahya, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹²² Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, mail conversation 4 December 2007

¹²³ Elhadi Idriss Yahya, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹²⁴ Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, mail conversation 4 December 2007

¹²⁵ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

organisational structure. This has been used by the government to further weaken the movement. Another problem according to Elhadi Idriss Yahya is that Darfur is still a tribal society, something which causes problem when trying to organise a movement.¹²⁶ Khamees Abdallah's opinion is that the conference organised by Minni Minawi in Haskanita in November 2005 was the biggest mistake conducted by the movements, and that the effects of this also became more severe when the international community believed that Minawi was the most important player and thus focused all their interest on him.¹²⁷ The Chief Negotiator of JEM-CL, Tadjadine Bechir Niam's, is of the opinion that the fragmentation is largely caused by the personal agendas of the leaders. The most severe mistake was that the political strength of the NRF¹²⁸ was more limited than its military power. He suggests that, if the NRF would also have had a strong political umbrella organisation it would have been a very potent force; especially since the NRF scored some remarkable military victories.¹²⁹

A representative of the group that became the SLM/A-Abdelshaafie faction says that one important factor within their movement is that people from many different ethnic belongings are represented, such as the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit and different Arab ethnic groups. For instance the chairman of the Unification Commission Mohammed Ali Klai has an Arab ethnic background. The SLM/A-Abdelshaafie representative continues to say that a lot of Arabs and even former Janjaweed now state that what they have done was wrong and that they now wish to join the rebels. For the movements to be attractive for the Arabs and even to being attractive for themselves the rebels need to unite. He continues to state that a lot of people on the ground that did not have any political leadership had now come to take part in the Juba process. According to this representative there now exists a situation where field commanders can say that *"I am not with Abdul Wahid, I am not with Khamees, I am not with Abdelshaafie, I am not with Abdallah Yahya, I am just SLM/A"*. A lot of these commanders are now in Juba and are taking part in this process. The representative also states that the SLM/A has never had a real manifesto but that this has now

¹²⁶ Elhadi Idriss Yahya, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹²⁷ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

¹²⁸ NRF was an umbrella rebel movement formed by non-signatories to the DPA in the summer of 2006, they scored some extra-ordinary military victories during 2006 but was split in the spring of 2007.

¹²⁹ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

been created in Juba.¹³⁰ Another advisor to Abdelshaafie says that it is a natural process within rebel movements to split and then merge again. As an example he states that:

“Dr Garang went to the master of rebel movements, Fidel Castro, in 87 and Castro asked: Have any of your five top commanders left for the other side? No! Have any of your enemies’ top commanders left for you? No! Then your movement has not matured yet.”¹³¹

Khamees and his advisor Mokhtar A. Adam state that they have grand plans for the unification process and that it is not just the movements that have to unite but also the people in Darfur. After this unification has taken place they wish for the movements from different marginalised areas to unify into a cohesive struggle against the NCP. The main parties in this coalition, in their words, should be the SPLM/A, since the other marginalised areas all look upon them for guidance; but forces from the East and the far North should also be an integral part of such a unified front. These two leaders believe that this type of unification has to be done for the goals of the movement to be achieved and they are optimistic of the chances of succeeding with such a process.¹³² Abdelshaafie himself argues in a similar manner, and says that the different marginalised areas have to be connected in order to create the prosperity and peace that the country is capable of reaching.¹³³ Mr Niam, from the JEM-CL, has similar opinions but points out the importance of keeping visions limited and realistic. In his opinion the Darfurian movements have to unite before “*we start to talk about other areas*”.¹³⁴ According to an anonymous UN employee an additional complicating factor for rebel unification are the rumours in Darfur that some commanders that have left Minni Minawi are still working for

¹³⁰ Elhadi Idriss Yahya, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹³¹ Nouri Abdalla, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie advisor to Ahmed Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹³² Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

¹³³ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹³⁴ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

the government and have just pretended to leave his side in order to get information about the non-signatories of the DPA.¹³⁵

Arabs in Darfur; Janjaweed, Rebels or Neutral Onlookers?¹³⁶

The conflict in Darfur has often been depicted as an ethnic conflict between Arabs and Africans. This is a severe simplification and at times completely incorrect. One part of this erroneous description false assumption is the fact that on several occasions people “Arabs” have fought other “Arabs”, and on other occasions so-called African ethnic groups have fought other African groups.¹³⁷ Another common inaccuracy in external reporting on Darfur is that the Arabs inhabiting Darfur are all part of the Janjaweed militia, this is far from true. A better picture of what has happened in Darfur is found in the following statement of an Arab intellectual, sympathetic to the Darfurian movements, given at the end of the Abuja talks:

“Ninety percent of the Arabs of Darfur are neutral so far. We cannot continue like this if there is no agreement. We may (have to) take a role.”¹³⁸

There is no doubt that the Africans have been those most victimized by the violence characterizing Darfur since the SLM/A and JEM took up arms against the GoS in 2003.¹³⁹ However, the groups with a more Arab identity have been casualty of another type of suffering. They have been made into symbols of the Janjaweed and depicted as “murderers”, although when they have not taken part in any atrocities, and despite many of them having

¹³⁵ UN, Person working for the UN in Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

¹³⁶ Although simplistic the term Arabs are used here to describe people with a more Arab identity since they are seen as a separate group (or rather groups) of people of most people dealing with Darfur and the people of Darfur themselves.

¹³⁷ UCDP (2007) Internal Coding Document, Uppsala University

¹³⁸ Flint, Julie 2007-12-31 “Darfur’s Emerging Arab Leader under Government Assault” posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* on 2007-11-31 <http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/12/31/darfurs-emerging-arab-leader-under-government-assault/>

¹³⁹ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

been neutral, or even sympathetic, towards the rebels.¹⁴⁰ In addition to this they have also suffered from the fact that all efforts by the international community have been focused on the IDPs in the camps. Many Arabs (and others) have stayed in their villages and there they have hardly received any aid from the international community although the living conditions have become extremely harsh.¹⁴¹

At the time when the Darfurian rebels initiated their rebellion against the regime in Khartoum the government responded by arming elements from different ethnic groups as part of its counterinsurgency strategy. Bloodhound is a Danish research group that has studied attacks on villages in Darfur from January 2001 till September 2005. They conclude that 97% of attacks during the period were conducted by the Janjaweed, governmental forces or a combination of them. 3% of attacks were conducted by the rebels. The majority (58%) of all reported attacks were done by a combination of government and Janjaweed forces.¹⁴² Joseph Bonsu, a UN human rights officer for Darfur, says that despite overwhelming evidence of the close links between the government and the Janjaweed, and that it was obvious to everyone working on the ground, the government claimed that it had nothing to do with the Janjaweed.¹⁴³ However, this denial was not mutual since the most notorious Janjaweed leader, Musa Hilal, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, stated that he was carrying out governmental policy in Darfur. According to Hilal:

“All of the people in the field are led by top army commanders..... These people get their orders from the Western command centre, and from Khartoum.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Flint, Julie 2007-12-31 “Darfur’s Emerging Arab Leader under Government Assault” posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* on 2007-11-31 <http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/12/31/darfurs-emerging-arab-leader-under-government-assault/>

¹⁴¹ Ilham Saydna, Assistant GED Advisor Care International – Sudan, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁴² Petersen, A.H. & Tullin, L. (2006). “The Scorched Earth of Darfur: Patterns in death and destruction reported by the people of Darfur. January 2001- September 2005”. Copenhagen: Bloodhound. 22pp. + Appendices.
http://www.bloodhound.se/06_04_26_DARFUR_report.pdf

¹⁴³ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch (2005) “Darfur Militia leader Implicates Khartoum”
<http://hrw.org/video/2005/musa/>

According to Mr. Bonsu another way for the regime in Khartoum to give misleading information is to blame its attacks on “tribal conflicts”. Since the international community, in Mr. Bonsu’s words, has their eyes on Darfur at the moment the government cannot conduct the same type of joint militia/government attacks to the same extent as before. Mr. Bonsu further states that these types of attacks still occur. For instance, a village in western Darfur has been attacked in this manner several times during the fall of 2007.¹⁴⁵ According to Mewahib Yagoub Abdalla Mohamed with the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, a typical strategy was to burn villages to the ground, and by now 1 595 villages has been totally burnt down. In her views there are now not many villages left to attack.¹⁴⁶ A new policy by the regime in Khartoum has been the incorporation of the militias into more organised armies, such as the Border Intelligence (BI) or Popular Defence Force (PDF). This strategy has been implemented during 2007 and, according to Mr. Bonsu, in Darfur there are now soldiers with new uniforms and shining new boots. Mr. Bonsu thinks that despite this transformation of militias into the traditional army the link between the Sudanese government and the different militias is not as strong as it was before. Mr. Bonsu illustrates this by stating that some Arab Terjam ethnic group were previously earlier part of government militias but have now been incorporated into the PDF, while some Arab Rizeigat group are now integrated into the BI. These former militias have been fighting each other during 2007.¹⁴⁷ The conflict between Terjam and Rizeigat groups was the Darfur conflict that killed most people in 2007. The fighting was mostly a battle for control over land that had been abandoned by displaced persons.¹⁴⁸

The incorporation of some former government militias into the traditional army is one of several important changes that the Darfurian Arabs have gone through lately. As discussed above in the chapter on the Juba Process the Arab influence on the rebel side has increased during 2007. UN personnel working on the ground believe that the new Arab involvement in the rebel sphere has not significantly changed things on the

¹⁴⁵ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁴⁶ Mewahib Yagoub Abdalla Mohamed, Head of Engineering and Projects Department, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁴⁷ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁴⁸ UCDP (2007) Database, www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University

ground yet, but may be important in the long-term.¹⁴⁹ When Arab militias were conducting attacks on the behalf of the regime in Khartoum they were also promised land and other benefits, but lately many of them feel rejected and manipulated by the government since these promises have not been fulfilled. In addition the government as a party to the DPA committed itself to disarming the Janjaweed. Although no steps have been taken in this direction this was viewed with dislike among some militias. Their point of view is that they have only carried out government policies and now the government is trying to blame everything on them. This might in turn lead to them being sold out by Khartoum to the ICC. From a broader Arab point of view many feel that they should be part of the negotiations on Darfur's future. The claim of having a rightful place at the negotiations has its roots in that many of the Arabs felt disappointed that they were not represented in the Abuja negotiations and that their interests (most importantly land) was not looked after. In 2007 the Arab disappointment with Khartoum increased and some ethnic groups that had been fighting in the government's militias changed sides.¹⁵⁰

Sudan expert Alex de Waal writes in his book *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*:

“Khartoum's biggest challenge in Darfur in 2007 is managing the Arab tribes. Arab militia leaders are acutely conscious of the way in which they have been exploited as the vanguard of the government's counterinsurgency. They took casualties. They were able to make short-term economic gains from looting and were able to settle in some areas, but they also lost the social and economic interconnectedness with their now-displaced neighbours that had sustained their livelihoods. Above all, their reputation was badly sullied and the label “Janjawiid” achieved an international notoriety that was applied indiscriminately to all Darfur Arabs. In many parts of Darfur, the Arab militia are stronger than the army and can dictate the government appointments and security policy. Opinion is divided among Darfur's Arab leaders as to whether to be loyal to

¹⁴⁹ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁵⁰ Arab rebel sympathizers and Arab neutrals from Darfur interviewed in end of November and early December Juba/Khartoum

the government, switch to an alliance with the non-signatory SLA, or remain neutral.”¹⁵¹

The ambivalence among many Arabs has led to a power-struggle between the rebels and Khartoum over the support from the Arabs. Both sides are trying to convince them to take their side. The military strength of several of the Arab groups has made this struggle even more central in the war in Darfur. The armed potential of many of these groups comes from the fact that they traditionally have been well armed but now also many have been armed by the government. Arabs also appear in several different groups of the anti-government side of the conflict in Darfur. There are rebel groups that are Arab, such as the United Revolutionary Forces Front (URFF), part of the URF, and there are Arabs among the other rebel groups. Abdul Wahid, Ahmed Abdelshaafie and other rebel leaders have been eager to point out the Arab contribution to their movements.¹⁵² It has also been reported that high-level Janjaweed leaders, including Musa Hilal, have been making moves to get closer to the rebels.¹⁵³

The government feels pressured by this, especially since the weapons that it has given to be used against the rebels have now occasionally instead been used against it. The Arab leader that has received the most weapons from Khartoum is Musa Hilal, leader of the Darfurian Arab Mahameed clan and the most notorious of the Janjaweed’s leaders. In addition to this Musa Hilal is also one out of four persons that the UN Security Council imposed travel and financial sanctions on in April 2006.¹⁵⁴ Interestingly, the favours of Musa Hilal were also contended for when the armed rebellion in Darfur took off in 2003. The rebels tried to convince Musa Hilal to join them and he was reportedly thinking of doing so. This possibility was, however, effectively removed when some Zaghawa attacked his kinsmen in 2003.¹⁵⁵ In a move to secure the loyalty of Musa Hilal and his powerful

¹⁵¹ de Waal, Alex (2007) “Prospects for Peace in Darfur” in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 387

¹⁵² Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba and Sudan Tribune (2007-11-27) “Darfur rebel leader slams proposal to include Arabs in Darfur talks” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24919>

¹⁵³ de Waal, Alex (2008) “Darfur Activism: The Debate Continues (Part 2)” posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* on 2008-01-08 <http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2008/01/08/darfur-activism-the-debate-continues-part-2/>

¹⁵⁴ International Herald Tribune (2008-01-23) “Once again, Sudan shows its scorn for the world” <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/opinion/edsudan.php>

¹⁵⁵ Flint, Julie (2007) “Darfur’s armed Movements” in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 161

forces Omar el-Bashir appointed him as an adviser at the Ministry of Federal Government on 18 January 2008.¹⁵⁶ This decision quickly met heavy international criticism, since Musa Hilal is widely seen as one of the main perpetrators of atrocities in Darfur. In February 2007 a prosecutor at the ICC also labelled Hilal a racist who was eager to fight in Darfur; a war that Hilal himself saw as a holy war.¹⁵⁷ In addition to this, several international human rights organisations were critical to the appointment of Musa Hilal to a government position.¹⁵⁸ However, President Bashir defended his action at a press conference in Ankara:

“Mr. Hilal himself is a Sudanese citizen. He is a very influential personality in Darfur. He has contributed greatly to stability and security in the region.”¹⁵⁹

Parallel processes of the shifting position among some Arab elements in Darfur could also be seen in other parts of Sudan. The Misseriya is an ethnic group that fought on the government side in the South-North war but lately has been disappointed at the regime in Khartoum and more and more views Juba as the preferable power centre. This has reportedly resulted in 10 000 to 15 000 Misseriya troops now looking to join the SPLM/A.¹⁶⁰

Discussion About Some of the Major Actors

As NIF/NCP has been in power since 1989 a historical enquiry is helpful. Bearing the NIF/NCP history in mind it seems that patient comprehensive diplomacy backed up with pressuring elements such as sanctions and military threat is the most enduring if one wants to affect the regime in Khartoum. But if the threats are empty and if the policy too extensively anticipates good will from the regime in Khartoum, the historical track-record is bleak.

¹⁵⁶ Sudan Tribune (2007-01-17) “Sudan president appoints notorious Janjaweed leader as special adviser” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25601>

¹⁵⁷ Sudan Tribune (2008-01-22) “Profile: Musa Hilal from a convicted felon to a government official” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25660>

¹⁵⁸ See for instance Human Rights Watch (2008) “Sudan: Notorious Janjaweed Leader Promoted Appointment of Musa Hilal an Affront to Darfur Victims” <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/01/20/sudan17835.htm>

¹⁵⁹ Sudan Tribune (2008-01-22) “Sudan feeling heat on the appointment of a Janjaweed leader” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25667>

¹⁶⁰ International Crisis Group (2007) “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock” p. 6 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/b47_sudan_abyei_web.pdf

Looking at the rebel side, further unification of the Darfurian rebel movements is crucial for fruitful negotiations to take place. Lessons might be learned through looking at how SPLM/A went through the same process in the 1990s. The international community is restless for some result in the negotiation process and this could make it attractive for the negotiators to put pressure on the movements to unite. At the same time the historical record says that most productive unification process is the one where the movements have been left on their own. To be recognised as an equal partner to the government and to be consulted with in all questions dealing with Darfur is stressed as a central issue among several different rebel movements. This feeling should be taken seriously and be used in a constructive way. A possibility for the international negotiators is to sit down and talk to the rebels, asking them how much time they need for further unification and let them make their schedule publicly. The reason behind doing it openly is that if they cannot follow their own agenda it hits back on them and makes it harder to blame someone else. It is also important that such a unification process involves Abdul Wahid because of his strong position primarily in the camps. If Abdul Wahid returns from Paris to Darfur he could more productively way take part in the negotiation process. Convincing arguments might be that he can take care of “his” people in a better manner if he is closer to them and that if he stays in exile too long he risks being marginalised. This might seem unlikely considering his strong support but most Darfurians seem to want a unified rebellion and if it becomes evident that Wahid acts in a counter-productive manner this might turn against him. Another risk is the position of the DPA-signatory Minni Minawi. He is indeed in a problematic situation with barely any power in Khartoum, strongly disliked among other rebels and by many civilians in Darfur but still militarily significant. These factors make him a potential spoiler of another agreement and hence his movement’s precarious situation has to be dealt with one way or another.

The part that the Darfurian Arabs can, and should, play will be examined in more detail in later discussion but already here it is important to stress the complexity of this group. Arab ethnic groups in Darfur have been victims, perpetrators and neutrals in the conflict and without differentiating between these different positions played by the Arabs, an appropriate solution to the crisis cannot be reached. The Arabs from Darfur (not external Arabs that recently moved into Darfur) and people with a more African identity from Darfur are all Darfurians and have to live together in the future in Darfur. This means that this relationship has to be dealt with carefully and reconciliation processes launched for instance, between different categories of ethnic groups. To use a widely used categorisation, they should take place between Arab-African, Arab-Arab and African-African ethnic groups.

4. Situation on the Ground

Humanitarian Situation, Camps and Human Rights

The crisis in Darfur has for a long time been described as the worst humanitarian situation in the world. As of November 2007 there are 4.2 million people in need of assistance in Darfur and 2.2 million are internally displaced. The displacement of civilians is still ongoing with 600 000 more people having been displaced after the signing of the DPA on 5 May 2006 and 270 000 more having been displaced during 2007. The humanitarian operation in Darfur is the largest in the world of its kind, with 12 700 humanitarian aid workers, around 75 international NGO's and 14 UN agencies involved. The humanitarian operation has made some accomplishments such as having halved the rate of acute malnutrition and having decreased crude mortality rates with 60%.

At the moment insecurity for the humanitarian workers is the most severe threat for the humanitarian operation. This is the result of the different types of fighting this report illustrate; government versus rebel clashes, government attacks on villages with militia support, inter-tribal fighting and DPA-signatories attacks mostly targeting civilians but also non-signatories. In addition to this, shifting frontlines, the fragmentation of armed groups and unclear chains of command have seriously complicated the humanitarian operations. Twelve humanitarian workers were killed in 2006 and as of November 2007 an additional twelve have been killed. This has led to a reduced access to those in need of humanitarian support. Access now is far lower at the end of 2007 than it was in 2004.¹⁶¹ To be able to coordinate and communicate with the local communities is an important part of the humanitarian work, especially in the current situation where the situation on the ground changes on a daily basis.¹⁶² A further complicating factor for the humanitarian situation during 2007 was that

¹⁶¹ OCHA (2007) "Darfur Humanitarian Overview" received at the OCHA-office in Khartoum 15 November 2007, Khartoum

¹⁶² Rahma Mohammed Ibrahim, Darfur Coordinator Sudanese Red Crescent, interviewed 10 December 2007, Khartoum

the GoS tried to empty some IDP camps. There are numerous reasons behind this government policy, with two of them being that the camps function as recruiting grounds for the rebels and that the government wishes to show the international community that the situation is now so calm that people can return to their home villages. In contrast the rebels use the camps as examples to the international community of how severe the situation is. This has made the camps a political battle ground for the rebels and for the GoS. Furthermore, the government blames the NGOs for being the main culprits of making people stay in the camps and claim that the people of Darfur would be better off if they returned to their villages and had the NGOs deliver food there. According to humanitarian workers the government wishes to close all camps in Darfur. Another aspect of the issue of these camps is that the GoS wants to organise them along ethnic lines, presumably since this could decrease co-operation between different ethnicities and hence diminish the threat they can constitute to the government. However, many of the camps are already organised along ethnic lines, for example the Kalma camp which is divided into two areas according to ethnic affiliation. One reason is that when an entire village has to leave, the inhabitants of that village will all prefer to settle at the same location. An official with Care International says that the NGO's do not agree with the government's vision of wanting to organise camps ethnically even though sometimes the camps that are more ethnically homogenous work better than the more heterogeneous ones. It makes it possible for the traditional leaders (Sheiks) to retain more of their influence calming "their" people and asserting some amounts of control. The official continues by stating that there is "a war-culture" in the camps, something which makes everyone very suspicious.¹⁶³ According to another official, a further problem in the camps is that there have been clashes between ethnic groups, notably Fur and Zaghawa, another argument used for having ethnically homogenous camps.¹⁶⁴

The people in the camps have been in the focus of the humanitarian organisations, thus, leaving those that remain in their villages in difficult and harsh conditions.¹⁶⁵ Some of these villages have hosted IDPs since 2004 but have not had any support. Nearly all humanitarian support goes

¹⁶³ Ilham Saydna, Assistant GED Advisor Care International – Sudan, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁶⁴ Rahma Mohammed Ibrahim, Darfur Coordinator Sudanese Red Crescent, interviewed 10 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁶⁵ Ilham Saydna, Assistant GED Advisor Care International – Sudan, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

to the IDP camps. Rahma Mohammed Ibrahim, Darfur Coordinator at the Sudanese Red Crescent, predicts a very bleak future for Darfur in the coming period. He elaborates on this prediction by saying that no crops are currently cultivated as farming areas are too insecure and leaving your camp or village is associated with life-threatening danger. According to the Sudanese Red Crescent the situation is further worsened by the fact that the rural areas are now mostly inhabited by nomads. The majority of the farmers have fled to the camps, as a consequence of being the main target of government and militia attacks. The nomads do not cultivate their land which makes the food situation in the region even worse. Mr. Ibrahim believes this situation will place people outside the camps in need of food assistance, putting Darfur in danger of famine and widespread starvation.¹⁶⁶ The issue of possible famine is mentioned by Ali Aidam Adam at the University of Khartoum, who believes that this is one of the most worrying scenarios in the near future for Darfur.¹⁶⁷

The scale of the atrocities that have been committed in Darfur is enormous. Joseph Bonsu, a UN Human Rights officer for Darfur, has worked in Darfur specifically on reporting issues of human rights abuses. He states that the UN's mandate is to monitor and investigate such acts, but not to stop them. This mission has been operating under UNMIS but will be transformed and placed under UNAMID. This will, hopefully and probably, have positive effects for the work conducted by the HR-officers, Mr. Bonsu says. Under UNMIS they have had offices in four places (el-Fasher, Nyala, el-Genina and Zalingi) but under UNAMID the plan is that officers will be located in eleven different places, something which for instance will decrease the distances that have to be covered to investigate crimes.¹⁶⁸ Philip N. Tyrell, Darfur's Security Coordinator at World Food Program (WFP) Security, states that this lack of access also creates problem for the WFP. According to him it was earlier relatively easy to get permission to go to different places since you knew who was in control of which area. However, according to Mr. Tyrell, it is now much harder because of the fragmentation among the rebels and because things on the ground currently changes so quickly.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Rahma Mohammed Ibrahim, Darfur Coordinator Sudanese Red Crescent, interviewed 10 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁶⁷ Ali Aidam Adam, Lecturer Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁶⁸ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁶⁹ Tyrell, Philip. N, Darfur's Security Coordinator WFP Security, interviewed 1 December 2007, Khartoum

From 2003 and until the signing of the DPA on 5 May 2006 the most common type of attacks were large-scale joint GoS-Janjaweed attacks. After the signing of the DPA things have changed, but not for the better, according to Mr. Bonsu. He feels that many places in Darfur are in a state of anarchy that enables extensive banditry throughout the region. In Mr. Bonsu's analysis attacks from militias have decreased (but still occur) since the signing of the DPA, and one reason for this is that there simply is not much left to attack. There has also been a decrease in aerial bombardments that now do not take place as often as before. However Mr. Bonsu states, this type of warfare still occurs occasionally, with the Kutum area in North Darfur being particularly targeted. Mr. Bonsu further states that the majority of abuses against human rights have been conducted by the government of Sudan and by government-affiliated militias, but atrocities against civilians have also been attributed to various rebel movements.¹⁷⁰

According to Mr. Bonsu one of the most common forms of violations of human rights in Darfur are sexual and gender-based violence. Women in the IDP camps are the most vulnerable to these types of violence since they have to leave the camps in order to earn an income. Such opportunities are not available in the camps. In camps located in GoS-controlled areas militias and GoS soldiers are the most common perpetrators of such abuses. But in camps in rebel held area the rebel fighters are responsible for most abuses. Most of the IDP camps are, however, in GoS controlled areas, as the largest towns (where most camps are located) are controlled by the GoS. According to Mr. Bonsu in areas controlled by the government civilians run the risk of being abused because of their ethnic affiliation. The perceptions of GoS soldiers are that civilians are spies if they come from a specific ethnic group. He further states that there is also an ethnic dimension to the rapes, since perpetrators almost always rape someone from another ethnic belonging. According to Mr. Bonsu it is often very hard to find out who the perpetrator of a certain crime is. Many in Darfur carry uniforms at the moment, be they militias, traditional soldiers or even rebels. This situation, he explains, has been worsened by the fact that a culture of impunity is extensive in Darfur. Mr. Bonsu gives several reasons for this: a lack of political will, a lack of resources and the general effect of war. According to Mr. Bonsu this is the situation in areas controlled both by the GoS and rebels. In some of the war-affected areas that the SLM/A controls the movement has put up its own courts and has also started police forces. This, however, does not seem to have decreased the level

¹⁷⁰ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

of abuses in these areas, since these institutions reportedly sometimes are used to carry out attacks on civilians. According to the SLM/A everything is handled fairly in its courts. But this could not be confirmed by the UN since the UN has not been allowed to visit these courts. The courts mainly deal with people that have deserted from the rebel movements but they also act as normal criminal courts.¹⁷¹

Fur-Zaghawa Relations

According to Mr. Bonsu, Human Rights Officer at the UN, abuses committed by the rebels increased after the signing of the DPA. The bulk of these atrocities are to have been conducted by SLM/A (MM) forces that find themselves in a problematic middle ground, being a signatory to the DPA but still not really part of the government. Another effect of Minawi's signing of the DPA, according to Mr. Bonsu, is that it has increased Fur-Zaghawa tensions, with atrocities being carried out by rebels belonging to one of the ethnic groups against the other.¹⁷² There was a widespread disappointment within the Fur community, and also among many Zaghawa elements, when Minawi (a Zaghawa) signed the DPA. After this further difficulties arose when the SLM/A (MM) attacked civilians that did not support the DPA. These attacks, conducted by the SLM/A (MM), have led some people refer to Minawi's forces as the Janjaweed II.¹⁷³ However, two different leaders in the Fur community state that the Fur-Zaghawa relations are a bit harsh but still manageable.¹⁷⁴ It is hard to get a clear picture of the severity of these conflicts since different persons tell different stories. However, most Darfurians seem to believe that if the government does not get involved to a large extent and side with one of the parties, then the people of Darfur can solve these problems among themselves.¹⁷⁵ However, others have stressed the importance of Darfur being a society there stereotypes

¹⁷¹ Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁷² Bonsu, Joseph, UN Human Rights Officer in Darfur, interviewed 4 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁷³ International Crisis Group (2007) "Darfur's new Security Reality" p.12 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

¹⁷⁴ Bashar, Muhammed Ahmed, Traditional leader among the Fur community in Gansila, Deleige Western Darfur, interviewed 15 November 2007, Khartoum & Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PHD researcher in political conflict and administration, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

¹⁷⁵ Views gathered through discussions with different Darfurians (academics, civilians and community leaders) end of November and early December in Khartoum and Juba

exist about different ethnic groups. According to two young politicians from Darfur, belonging to different ethnic groups, these stereotypes have a strong influence on the daily life in the region. In their view the stereotypes are old views that have been there for generations, and although leaders often try to deny their importance the promulgation of these stereotypes is extensive throughout Darfur. They elaborate further, stating that one of these stereotypes is that the Zaghawa think that they are superior to the Fur. Moreover they claim that the typical answer you would get if asking a Zaghawa what the biggest problem is with the Fur, the answer would be that they think the Zaghawa are even worse than the Arabs. Moreover, the Zaghawa think that they are tougher and harder than the Fur since they live in harsh desert conditions. Another view that the Zaghawa have is that members of their group help each other more and have stronger family relations than the Fur.¹⁷⁶ Despite complicated relations between different ethnic groups it is also important to keep in mind the fact that many of the ethnic groups are also composed of different sub-clans. Roland Marchal writes:

“Zaghawa is a confederation of a great number of highly individualized clans, with separate habitats connected by religion and language. This cultural, tribal, and geographical diversity is accompanied by multiple names.”¹⁷⁷

Elections

The CPA stipulates that democratic elections are to be held throughout Sudan by July 2009. These elections are often thought to be the best option for a more democratic and peaceful future for Sudan. The importance of democratic transformation in the peripheral areas is clear in that the main grievance that the Sudanese rebel groups usually state - no matter if they are located in the south, east, west, or north - is economic marginalisation and a lack of political influence.¹⁷⁸ However, there exists numerous possible obstacles that might hinder this democratic process. The first critical step in the election process is a population census, stipulated in the CPA to take place no later than 9 July 2007. This census has been delayed several

¹⁷⁶ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁷⁷ Marchal (2007) “The Unseen Regional Implications of the Crises in Darfur” in deWaal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*

¹⁷⁸ UCDP (2007) *UCDP Database* www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

times due to funding and capacity problems. The current schedule for the census is that it should take place in April 2008. Further delays will make it difficult to hold elections before the CPA deadline of July 2009.¹⁷⁹

After conducting a fair census the next task will be the elections themselves. A first problem is whether there will be any elections at all. An insightful viewpoint expressed by a professor at the University of Khartoum is that if the NCP believes it will win the elections they will be held, but if they do not believe this there will be no elections. According to Professor Mohammed this will be a complicated process, since gauging sentiments in Sudan is hard due to the lack of surveys, polls and the like to get an appropriate view of people's political opinions.¹⁸⁰ However, most people in Sudan appear to be critical of the NCP, with the general view on the street in Khartoum being that the NCP is heavily disliked. This has led some to be convinced that the NCP will lose if an election takes place.¹⁸¹ The accuracy of such beliefs is hard to gauge. During the process leading up to the elections the NCP has certain advantages, compared to other parties. The NCP is by far the most well-organised party and has the most funds. According to members of the political opposition this enables the NCP to go to poor areas and promise a lot of benefits that they will provide for that area. Other parties are not seen as having the same opportunities. Some members of the political opposition further state that locals often ask other parties what they can do for them, and since they do not have the same financial resources as the NCP it is hard for them to give answers that are appreciated by the poor.¹⁸² Many of the opposition parties have problems to present good alternatives to NCP. The traditional parties such as UMMA and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) both have old leaders that many young voters find it hard to identify with. Furthermore, they have previously been in power and in general the way they handled that

¹⁷⁹ United Nation Mission In Sudan (2006) *The CPA Monitor- Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA September 2007* p. 10-11 and Enough (2008-01-09) "Democracy: A Key to Peace in Sudan" http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/sudanpeacekey_20080108.pdf

¹⁸⁰ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁸¹ Several discussions conducted during the fall of 2007, identities of interviewees withheld.

¹⁸² Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

is not seen in a positive light today.¹⁸³ Another factor benefiting the NCP, according to Professor Mohammed, is that many people have jobs that are dependent on the government, such as within the police and the army. They usually vote for the party in power.¹⁸⁴ But, according to Professor Mohammed, even if there is an election and the NCP is victorious it is probable that the elections will result in the creation of a strong opposition that can influence the actions of the government.¹⁸⁵

Views on the holding of national elections in 2009 differ among the representatives of Darfurian movements. Rebel leader Abdelshaafie states that elections cannot be held in Darfur within the context of the present situation. He continues to state that before elections Darfurians must begin to be seen by the government as human beings, after which an agreement must follow. Only when that agreement is fully implemented there can be talk about democracy.¹⁸⁶ Other Darfurians believes, that their exist possibilities of making a change for Darfur through the elections in 2009. Many of the traditional leaders in Darfur are part of the UMMA party, some even at the same time being members of the SLM/A. Other Darfurians do not believe in this old party structure and are planning to launch a new party in 2008 to contest elections: the *Darfur Democratic Forum* (DDF). Some leading persons in DDF are former SLM/A members who argue that the armed rebellion has been beneficial, since it has placed the focus on Darfur issues, but that the time for peaceful struggle has now come.¹⁸⁷ Their political goals are very similar to those of the SLM/A. The group still has close relations to Abdul Wahid, and he has told them to continue with their organisation as a political party. In order to get support for their party the representatives are working hard both in Sudan and with the people in the Diaspora. In attempts to get money for the party they are approaching Darfurian businessmen, but they have also received financial support from different NGOs. Support for the DDF within the NGO community is

¹⁸³ Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum, Seminar 5 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁸⁴ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁸⁵ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁸⁶ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹⁸⁷ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

mixed; some NGOs reject giving support to the movement since the group is a political organisation, whilst others see this as unimportant. According to representatives of the party some members of the party are currently in jail, something which has resulted in other party members being afraid of the government's security forces. Finally, the DDF-representatives stress that the international community has to put pressure on the NCP in order for the elections to take place. The DDF boycotted the Juba process since they saw it as a SPLM/A strategy of using the Darfurians to put pressure on NCP. But the group has still had daily contact with the representatives in Juba and appear to have good relations with many of the participants. In addition to this the DDF is also cooperating with people from other marginalised areas, such as the Nubians in the far North.¹⁸⁸

Chad and CAR

All countries neighbouring Sudan have interests in, and pursue their preferred outcomes to the conflict in Darfur, but to differing extents. To scrutinize these regional aspects in detail falls outside the scope of this report.¹⁸⁹ Chad and the Central African Republic are in an apparent and crucial way affected by the crisis in Darfur. Therefore these countries will be focused upon here when dealing with the regional aspects of the conflict.

Since new conflict episodes have broken out in Darfur's neighbouring countries Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) since the conflict in Darfur escalated it is often stated that the conflict in Darfur has spread to these adjacent countries. This is a gross simplification. The crisis in Darfur has definitely affected the situations in both Chad and CAR, but these are two countries with severe internal problems and a history of armed conflict. Both Chad and CAR have suffered from extreme poverty, corruption, internal conflicts, military coups and abuses of human rights since the countries gained independence from France. Even though they share a similar history in this sense it is important to view them as two distinct countries and units of analysis. The countries differ in many senses, not least in how they have been affected by the conflict in Darfur. In 2002, a year before the SLM/A and the JEM took up arms against the regime in Khartoum the movements sought support for their endeavour from the

¹⁸⁸ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

¹⁸⁹ For a more thoroughly description of the regional complexities see Marchal, R (2007) "The Unseen Regional Implications of the Crises in Darfur" p. 189-191 in deWaal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*

Chadian president Idriss Déby. He declined to support them and instead sided with the regime in Khartoum, sending 500 soldiers to quell the rebellion in Darfur. This support for the government in Khartoum by Déby was a continuation of the good relations that prevailed between Khartoum and N'Djamena during the 1990s and which began with Khartoum's help in bringing Déby to power in Chad.¹⁹⁰ One reason for Khartoum to pursue these relations was that it was a strategy to wriggle out of the US containment policy enforced on the NIF. From the Chadian point of view one of the benefits of good relations with Sudan was that Darfur had often worked as a safe haven for rebels that had attacked and taken power in Chad. Déby himself used this strategy when he ousted Hissène Habré in 1990. A good relation with Khartoum thus decreases the risk of a rebellion against Déby launched from Darfur. Even though Déby had good relations with the Sudanese government throughout the 1990s and early 2000s there were many in his ranks that instead had close relations with the rebels in Darfur, especially their Zaghawa kinsmen, primarily within the JEM.¹⁹¹ The same scenario played out within the Libyan administration, where some Zaghawa gave support to their kinsmen in Darfur.¹⁹² Déby's lack of ability to control the support that went from Chad to the Darfurians made the regime in Khartoum more and more sceptical towards him. This discontent led to Khartoum initiating support to Chadian rebels opposed to Déby. The Chadian president's response was to, in turn, support Darfurian rebels.¹⁹³ This support to rebels with different goals has led to rebel-on-rebel fighting on some occasions in the last few years, underscoring the involvement of Darfurian rebel activity in Chad and Chadian rebel activity in Darfur. Mr. Abdelshaafie, leader of one of the SLM/A factions, states that he was in N'Djamena in May 2006 with the goal of defending the city against attacks by Mahmat Nouri and his FUCD (supported by Khartoum), when this movement tried to take control over the city and oust Déby.¹⁹⁴ His statement was contested by an UN-expert who says that Abdelshaafie had not been in N'Djamena at the time. Be this how it may, there exists several examples of when Chadian and Darfurian rebels have been fighting

¹⁹⁰ UCDP (2007) *UCDP Database* www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

¹⁹¹ Marchal, R (2007) "The Unseen Regional Implications of the Crises in Darfur" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 189-191

¹⁹² Flint, J (2007) "Darfur's Armed Movements" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 147

¹⁹³ Marchal, R (2007) "The Unseen Regional Implications of the Crises in Darfur" in de Waal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 194

¹⁹⁴ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

each other.¹⁹⁵ Abdelshaafie continues by stating that Khartoum is behind the rebellion in Chad and that the Darfurian rebels need to fight the Chadian rebellion. Otherwise, in his view, Khartoum can put a person in power in N'Djamena who is supportive of Khartoum; which will in turn place the Darfurian rebels in a situation where they are stuck between two hostile forces. Abdelshaafie stretches his claims even further when stating that if the NCP is out of power there will be peace in the region, even in Somalia. He argues that the NCP is supporting the Islamic courts movement in Somalia and that many of the leading persons in the courts received their education in Khartoum, at the International African University. When it comes to support to his own group, Abdelshaafie denies receiving any support from Chad.¹⁹⁶ However, there is substantial proof of the governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum giving support to the other's enemies.¹⁹⁷ In addition to this Abdelshaafie is the rebel leader that receives the most support from the SPLM/A.¹⁹⁸

The above discussion sheds light on the links between the conflicts in Chad and Sudan. However, no such clear links exist between the conflict in CAR and Darfur. Instead, the conflict in CAR is mainly driven by Central Africans with local grievances, and the linkage to the situation in Darfur seems to have been exaggerated. In the last years there have been two parallel rebellions taking place in CAR, one in the northwest by a rebel group called the APRD (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy) and one in the northeast by a rebel group called UFDD (The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity). The APRD is not operating in a region neighbouring Sudan, is very poorly equipped and there exists no proof of any external support. The possibility of foreign support being channelled to the UFDD is greater since the groups operates in a region that borders Darfur, it is also better equipped and contacts between the UFDD and Chadian rebels sponsored by Sudan have been documented. However, experts from Human Rights Watch conclude that foreign support does not

¹⁹⁵ UN, UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

¹⁹⁶ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

¹⁹⁷ See for example: Human Rights Watch (2006) "Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-border Violence in Chad" <http://www.hrw.org/background/africa/chad0206/chad0206.pdf> and International Crisis Group (2007) "Darfur's new Security Reality" http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

¹⁹⁸ Secret Document

seem to be a motivating factor behind this rebellion.¹⁹⁹ Another important factor to take into account when it comes to analysing CAR is the country's extreme poverty and the lack of oil-resources that have boosted the Chadian and Sudanese economies. This limited access to resources is shown in that the army of CAR is composed of only 4, 000 troops, of whom only 1, 200 are assessed to be operational. This could be compared to the over 100, 000 troops in the Sudanese army and the 25, 000 in the Chadian army. The limited economic and military capability of CAR makes it almost impossible for this country to influence the situations in the neighbouring countries, but instead makes it very vulnerable to external influences. At the moment neither Chad nor Sudan seem to use any influence in CAR and are instead occupied with supporting each other's rebels. This mutual support of the other's enemies is continuing (up until the time of writing), despite several agreements signed to end such activities.²⁰⁰ Supporting the view that CAR does not influence Darfur an UN-expert on the region stated that he did not see any significant effects from the scenario in CAR on the situation in Darfur, or the other way around.²⁰¹ Although the military and political links between CAR and the adjacent countries are small the humanitarian situation is an essential issue that affects all three countries. The different conflicts, atrocities and a dire humanitarian situation have created hundreds of thousands of refugees coming from all of these countries and going to all these countries in varying directions.²⁰²

Discussion About the Situation on the Ground

The response by the international community to the humanitarian disaster in Darfur has been commendable and in extremely dire conditions they have had some admirable successes. The focus of the humanitarian operation has been bringing acute assistance to IDPs in the camps. Even though it continues to be a central task, there is also a huge need for enlarging the

¹⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch (2007) "Central African Republic, State of Anarchy, Rebellion and abuses against civilians" p. 4
<http://hrw.org/reports/2007/car0907/car0907webwcover.pdf>

²⁰⁰ UCDP (2007) *UCDP Database* www.ucdp.uu.se/database Uppsala University

²⁰¹ UN, UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

²⁰² UNHCR (2008) "Chad/Darfur/Central African Republic" <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/UNHCR/831ddc848bdba9e48c6328b76c7391a6.htm> and UNHCR "Darfur: Refugees reach Central African Republic after 200-km trek" <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/UNHCR/c2c3a00943de3ee48ac9a22703e55953.htm> and International Crisis Group (2007) "Darfur's new Security Reality" http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

humanitarian operation to include people outside the camps. There is a clear risk of an emerging famine in Darfur that would affect people inside and outside the camps. The local population sometimes feels neglected in comparison to the refugees or IDPs living in the camps. A comparison could be made with western Zambia where this relation has existed for decades with Angolan refugees living in refugee camps (even though most of them now have been repatriated since the end of the Angolan civil war). The government of Zambia had a programme called the *Zambian Initiative* that dealt with these problems in an appropriate way. There are lessons from this project that could be transferred to the conditions in Darfur.²⁰³

Underdevelopment is one of the main root-causes for the Darfurian conflict, therefore it is also important to start with different development projects where it is feasible. These projects should take place in areas belonging to different ethnic groups. One benefit with such a project is that it will demonstrate improvements in an area that could seem hopeless. For example rebuilding burnt villages could mean jobs and send hopes to desperate IDPs and thus decrease frustration in the camps. These development projects have to work in close cooperation with UNAMID so that the peacekeeping force could protect the projects. The challenging situation in Darfur means that such development project must be co-ordinated between different UN-organs, NGO's and the, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, stipulated in the DPA.

The refugee situation in the Darfur/Chad/CAR with hundred of thousands of IDPs and refugees going in different directions is one of the world's most complex humanitarian challenges. Continued support for UNHCR and other agencies involved is of highest importance. This support should preferably be combined with actions to improve the security situation in the region since if that is not dealt with, the long-time situation will not improve. In CAR, the small numbers and poor equipment of government forces and rebels, even a small external force could quickly secure the situation among many civilians. Another potential effect of an external force in this region is that it might lead to decreased tensions between Chad and Sudan.

²⁰³ For a thorough review of these problems see Johan Brosché and Maria Nilsson, 2005 *Zambian Refugee Policy: Security, Repatriation and Local Integration* Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Minor Field Study No.24 http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/MFS/mfs24_broche.pdf

5. UNAMID

Background

Much focus of the debate concerning Darfur during the last year has been circling around getting UN-peacekeepers into Darfur. At first the plan was to replace the AU mission in Darfur with a UN force, but when the Sudanese government rejected this UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan came up with the suggestion to transform the AU peacekeeping force in Darfur (AMIS) to a UN/AU hybrid peace operation. The focus on this issue is due to the fact that AMIS has not been able to deliver security to the people of Darfur and the aspiration is that the hybrid force should be able to do this.

The GoS has constantly been reluctant to accept the involvement of UN-peacekeepers since it resists too much international involvement in something it sees as an internal affair.²⁰⁴ However, intense mediation by different actors in combination with pressures on GoS led to an agreement on a hybrid force in June 2007.²⁰⁵ This was conditional, the most important demand being that the force should be mainly African. On 31 July 2007 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1769 that authorized a joint African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur under chapter VII of the UN Charter. This mission was named United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and it was to replace AMIS. UNAMID's mandate is to take necessary action to support the implementation of DPA as well as to protect its personnel and civilians. Moreover it was decided that the mission should start no later than 31 December 2007.²⁰⁶ The UNAMID is to comprise of 19, 555 soldiers, 6, 432 police officers and 5, 105 civilians making it a mission with 31, 042 troops in total while AMIS has consisted of 7, 000 troops. Moreover it was stated that the full deployment of UNAMID should be concluded in early 2008.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁴ UN, UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

²⁰⁵ UN (2007) "Darfur-UNAMID Background"
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html>

²⁰⁶ UN (2008) "UNAMID" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/>

²⁰⁷ UN (2008) "UNAMID Deployment Background Fact Sheet"
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/UNAMID_Deployment.pdf

Problems Concerning UNAMID

There are four major, interlinked, problems connected to UNAMID at the moment. Firstly, is the issue of when/if the force will be fully deployed, the second one which countries will be contributing to the force, the third major problem is the technical equipment that the UNAMID needs for it to be able to work properly, and the fourth concern is the lack of peace for the peacekeepers to keep. All of these problems are further complicated by the fact that this is the first hybrid peacekeeping force in the world to be deployed. These problems are severely delaying the deployment of UNAMID and Ian Divers, a UN official, states that with luck half of the force might be deployed by the middle of 2008.²⁰⁸ Other UN officials working in Khartoum said in mid December 2007 that they saw 2008 as a lost year for UNAMID and that real changes were not possible until 2009.²⁰⁹

The Sudanese government has been reluctant to accept the deployment of peacekeepers and this is shown in several different ways. First of all, it accepted the force only after pressure by the international community and most importantly China, which is the external party with the highest leverage on the regime in Khartoum. China sells weapons to Sudan and buys most of Sudan's oil.²¹⁰ After accepting the UNAMID, the GoS nevertheless maintained its unwilling stance by complicating the deployment of UNAMID. Examples of this are: refusing troops from particular countries; holding equipment in the customs in Port Sudan from where most equipment has to be transported; not giving permission for flights at night; etc.²¹¹ This foot-dragging was expected in the light of earlier policies by the government to try to obstruct other peacekeeping initiatives. For example, in 2005 it prevented the delivery of 105 Canadian APCs (armoured personnel carriers) to Darfur intended to help AMIS protect civilians, humanitarian workers and its own troops. Finally the APCs were let in but this was just after an attack that left four AMIS soldiers dead. In addition to this the GoS has tried to stop helicopters essential for the AMIS to work properly. This history makes it likely that the GoS will continue to

²⁰⁸ Bloomberg (2007-11-22) "Darfur mission may need China to avert humiliation" <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24847>

²⁰⁹ UN, UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

²¹⁰ Small Arms Survey (2007) "Arms, oil, and Darfur The evolution of relations between China and Sudan" p. 1 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%207%20Arms.pdf

²¹¹ Bloomberg (2007-11-22) "Darfur mission may need China to avert humiliation" <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24847>

put obstacles in the way of the full deployment of a workable peacekeeping force in Darfur.²¹² Adam Azzain, Professor at the University of Khartoum, states that the Sudanese people can not put pressure on the regime in Khartoum, instead it has to be done through an external powerful force during an interim-period to calm things down. A fully deployed UNAMID could have such a role but the force has to be strong enough to keep rebels, government and Janjaweed at bay and compel some elements to disarm. He further says that this has been done during colonial times and it could be done again. Moreover, UNAMID is a Chapter VII UN mission so it is within the mandate to bring about disarmament through coercion. He concludes by wondering why the UN yields to the government all the time, instead he thinks that it should bypass the government if it resists, and put the troops in place anyhow.²¹³

The opposition to international peacekeepers in Darfur seems to be part of a wider strategy from the government to make it difficult for internationals to get into Darfur and make it troublesome for the agencies let into Darfur to work properly in the region. UN aid officials as well as NGO-representatives have complained about bureaucratic harassment by Sudanese officials. One example of this is the expulsion of Wael Al-Haj Ibrahim Head of OCHA South Darfur office.²¹⁴ OCHA felt that they had not got any good explanation to why he was expelled and said that Ibrahim was extremely important for their work in Darfur. One of the reasons for his importance was that most people working in Darfur are young and that it was hard to get seniors to work under the tough conditions in the region. Ibrahim was one of few seniors and according to UN personnel in Khartoum he was expelled because he was doing his job too well.²¹⁵ There were some protests from UN against his expulsion but most UN and NGO workers felt disappointed since they thought that the protests were too lame.²¹⁶

²¹² HRW (2007) "Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID" p. 68 <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/sudan0907/sudan0907web.pdf> and UN, UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

²¹³ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

²¹⁴ IRIN news (2007-11-11) "OCHA concerned over official's expulsion from South Darfur" <http://en.afrik.com/article12362.html>

²¹⁵ UN, UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

²¹⁶ European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), official working in Darfur, interviewed 17 November 2007, Khartoum

Sometimes the government also tries to discredit the international community and aid organisations working in Darfur with the purpose of turning the local population against the international community. One example of this is taken from the pro-government newspaper called el-Rai el Aam (public opinion in English). They stated in an article 5 December, 2007 that “the international organisation might be behind this”. What they were talking about are 60 women from a village named Khor Baraanga, close to Habila, in Western Darfur who say that their blood has been taken from them.²¹⁷ There is just one aid organisation working in the village and they strongly reject any accusations of them being involved. The information on what really had happened to the woman is still unclear. It is not even certain that they had their blood taken. Maybe they just woke up after fainting and someone told them that their blood had been taken. To take someone’s blood is a very serious matter in this area and it is seen as among the worst things that can happen to a person. Despite the circumstances being very unclear and the absurdity of accusing the aid organisation, this can have an affect because a lot of people are poorly educated and illiterate and when hearing rumours like this they might believe that it is true. According to persons at the University of Khartoum it is very common that the GoS plays such games. It says the international community *might* be behind different things because then it can claim that it did not say that it was sure if it is proven to be untrue. The article in the pro-government newspaper can be seen as an example of GoS trying to turn the locals against the international community because it does not want the presence of them in Darfur.²¹⁸

When Kofi Annan proposed a hybrid force for Darfur, this was done with the purpose of mediating the Sudanese government’s resistance towards non-African peacekeepers. Even though this was a successful strategy in the sense that it met with acceptance by the government it has also caused some problems. One of these is that UNAMID is the first hybrid peacekeeping force in history and this has raised some question as to how well it could work.²¹⁹ Diplomats have said that Western countries that have the capability to provide needed equipment for the UNAMID are hesitant to do so because of a lack of confidence in the command and control structure

²¹⁷ el-Rai el Aam (2007) pro-government newspaper, 2007-12-05

²¹⁸ University of Khartoum, Academics from Darfur (name withheld) Interviewed 5 December 2007

²¹⁹ Save Darfur (2007) “Fact Sheet: UNAMID”
http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/policypapers/fact_sheet_unamid/

for the joint force. One thing that might get more complicated in a hybrid force is that there are two headquarters to report to.²²⁰

Another complicating factor is that the force should be *mostly* African. What was meant with that was not specified in the UN-resolution and now there is a debate as to which countries that will contribute troops for the UNAMID. The GoS is refusing to accept troops from particular countries with various arguments. For example, the President of Sudan Omar el-Bashir has stated that:

“We refused to receive [engineers] from Norway and Sweden, and we will not accept this. We are convinced that the elements whom they insist to send to us from Sweden and Norway are intelligence elements; namely, MOSSAD [Israeli Intelligence] and CIA The boots of those who blasphemed the prophet Muhammad would never trample on Sudanese land”²²¹

The last part of the Bashir statement was in relation to the fact that some Scandinavian newspapers have published pictures of the prophet Muhammad. The statement by Bashir was challenged by Jan Pronk, former head of UNMIS, who stated that Swedish and Norwegian troops previously had proven to be both professional and impartial.²²² The Nordic countries wanted to contribute with engineers who should be working on building airstrips and digging water wells, tasks that would have been essential to be able to move in soldiers by early 2008. In addition to this GoS, has also refused to accept troops from Thailand and Nepal.²²³ This resistance from GoS resulted in Sweden and Norway on 9 January deciding to withdraw their offer of troop contribution to UNAMID since the opposition by the Sudanese government makes it impossible to maintain the offer of troop contribution.²²⁴ UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson says in a comment to the news that the Nordic countries will not send any troops to Darfur, that this will delay the deployment of UNAMID due to the role that engineering

²²⁰ AFP (2007-11-19) “US Short of helicopters for Darfur mission-Gates”
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24790>

²²¹ Sudan Tribune (2007-11-18) “Bashir says Sudan will not accept troops from four countries in Darfur” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24795>

²²² Sudan Tribune (2007-11-18) “Bashir says Sudan will not accept troops from four countries in Darfur” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24795>

²²³ AFP 2007-11-22 AU, “UN work hard to have troops for Darfur force”
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24851>

²²⁴ AP (2008-01-10) “Sweden, Norway wont send 400 UN troops to Darfur”
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25510>

troops would play and also states that it is unfortunate that a country is choosing who will be part of a peacekeeping force since if you are part of a UN-force you leave your national beret at home.²²⁵ Representatives from Darfur argue that it is very shameful for the international community that they let the terrorist government decide who will be part of UNAMID and who will not. The UN should insist on the countries that they want for the force. Moreover they say that if the Sudanese government can not provide security for the UNAMID, the movements can provide this security.²²⁶ Rev Canon Clement Janda, SPLM/A special envoy on Darfur, stresses that to provide UN troops is not a policy issue, it is a security issue. He continues that since the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are not providing security in Darfur there has to be an international force providing this security. He also says that the SPLM have offered to send 10, 000 troops to Darfur to provide this security but the government turned down this offer.²²⁷

The only non-African countries that the regime in Khartoum is accepting to send troops to Darfur are Pakistan and China.²²⁸ On the other hand some of the rebels are not accepting troops from China and Pakistan since they see them as too close to the government.²²⁹ The UN on their hand argues that they need to be able to choose troops from which country they want, and it will need many different countries to make UNAMID fully workable. The UN view is supported by a peacekeeper working in Southern Sudan who states that:

“No matter how many African troops they put in Darfur they will not be able to guarantee peace due to lack of education and technical equipment, when I say this people say that I am a racist but this has nothing to do with racism it is my view from having been working as a peacekeeper for a long time”.²³⁰

²²⁵ SVT Rapport (2008-01-10) “Eliasson: Fredsprocessen fördröjs” (in Swedish, translation by the author)

²²⁶ Ibraheam Ahmed Adam, Tunjor consultative council and former minister in northern Darfur, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

²²⁷ Rev Canon Clement Janda, Special Envoy of the Chairman of SPLM/A on Darfur, Chairman of SPLM Darfur task force, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

²²⁸ Reeves, Eric (2007-11-13) “Darfur peace talks in Libya produce only an emboldened Khartoum” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24721>

²²⁹ Sudan Tribune 2007-12-29 “Darfur rebel group rejects Egyptian, Chinese and Pakistani troops” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25361>

²³⁰ Peacekeeper (name withheld) Peacekeeper within UNMIS in Southern Sudan, interviewed 11 December 2007, Khartoum

Another argument put forward by several Darfurians, rebels as well as civilians, is that the bulk of the UNAMID should not be African since it is easier for the Government to bribe people from poor countries than troops from rich countries.²³¹ Amin Mahmoud from the Fur Consultative Council states that the government is laughing at the international community when it comes to UNAMID since the government feels that it can decide anything it wants.²³² Khamees Abdallah from the URF states that the mandate of UNAMID is not very clear and that UN is only consulting with the government and not also with the movements as it should. For example where the UNAMID should be deployed is an essential issue that has to be discussed with the movements.²³³ Tadjading Bechir Niam from JEM-CL but also part of the URF umbrella organisation makes similar claims saying:

“What is meant with hybrid? Where will it be deployed? Etc. We are a major part in the conflict and should be consulted all the time in every issue but we are ignored. And we will not let go of any land to the UNAMID as things are at the moment; we can not give away land to a force that is unknown to us. Finally they have to consult with us since we are on the ground in Darfur, if the UNAMID gets outside Nyala, el-Fasher or el-Genina they will meet us”.²³⁴

In addition to Sudanese actors (mostly but not only GoS) causing problems for the deployment of UNAMID, the troop-contributing countries are also obstructing. The most severe difficulty is that no country has provided much-needed helicopters for the UNAMID. The lack of infrastructure in Darfur makes helicopters indispensable for the hybrid force to work probably. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has stated that the UNAMID needs to be equipped with 18 transport helicopters and six light attack helicopters otherwise the force will not be capable of protecting its own troops, let alone civilians.²³⁵ However, so far no suitable helicopters have been

²³¹ Several discussions in Khartoum and Juba held during November and December 2007

²³² Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PHD researcher in political conflict and administration, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

²³³ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

²³⁴ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

²³⁵ AP (2007-12-07) “European Unlikely to Meet UN Darfur Goal”
<http://www.wtop.com/index.php?nid=387&pid=0&sid=1268462&page=1>

offered. Countries that say they can not release any helicopters usually argue that they have their helicopters occupied in other countries foremost, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq.²³⁶ However, Thomas Cargill, Africa program manager at Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London thinks that this argument does not hold. He states:

“There’s something like 12,000 military helicopters in Europe, so it’s bizarre that not one has been found available so far to commit to this force.”²³⁷

In a report named *UNAMID Deployment on the Brink- The Road to Security in Darfur Blocked by Government Obstructions* released in December 2007, 35 different NGOs call for the rapid full deployment of UNAMID. The report comments on the helicopter issue in the following way:

“For those governments that have called so vociferously for an international force in Darfur to now fail to deliver the helicopters and heavy transport trucks it needs to be effective, is disgraceful. In effect the international community is abetting the government of Sudan’s policy of obstruction, handing the Sudanese government an easy excuse to explain delays and a ripe opportunity to direct attention away from its calculated inaction.”²³⁸

Another explanation to why countries able to deliver the helicopters are reluctant to do so, is the prevailing distrust among many western countries of the workability of the hybrid force.²³⁹ Selena Brewer from the Human Rights Watch (HRW) argues in a similar manner and states that many governments are reluctant to loan helicopters to the mission because they fear losing them in a hostile environment.²⁴⁰ A further assessment is that

²³⁶ AFP (2007-11-18) “US short of helicopters for Darfur mission”
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24790&var_recherche=helicopter and
AP 2007-12-07 “European Unlikely to Meet UN Darfur Goal”
<http://www.wtop.com/index.php?nid=387&pid=0&sid=1268462&page=1>

²³⁷ AP 2007-12-07 “European Unlikely to Meet UN Darfur Goal”
<http://www.wtop.com/index.php?nid=387&pid=0&sid=1268462&page=1>

²³⁸ Joint NGO Report (December 2007) “UNAMID Deployment on the Brink- The Road to Security in Darfur Blocked by Government Obstructions” p. 9
<http://www.hrw.org/pub/2007/africa/unamid1207web.pdf>

²³⁹ UN UN-expert on Darfur (name withheld) interviewed 2007-12-07, Khartoum

²⁴⁰ IPS (2008-01-25) “Weakness exposed in Darfur peacekeeping force”
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25697>

people are afraid that there is a real risk that the helicopters will have to be used, either towards rebels or the government. If a western country provides the helicopters it is problematic with the colonial history and they can be viewed as imperialists. On the other hand if an African country (South Africa and Egypt are two of the few African countries with such capabilities) provides and uses the helicopters there is trouble with Africans shooting at Africans.²⁴¹

A different problem connected to the UNAMID is that it has created high expectations among locals in Darfur, foremost IDPs living in camps. A women working for OCHA in the IDP-camp in Zalingi describes these expectations by saying that many in the camp believe that they can return home on January 1 (the planned deployment date for UNAMID).²⁴² Jean-Marie Guehenno, the head of U.N. peacekeeping, raised his concern over this when he said that the mission faced enormous expectations and he was afraid that there might be a gap between the expectations and what could really be delivered.²⁴³ Most of the IDPs and other Darfurians are very disappointed with AMIS and see them as a weak actor. One example of how AMIS is seen is that children have painted pictures where the AMIS soldiers run away when the men on horses (Janjaweed) come to attack them. Moreover the AMIS soldiers are painted with small guns whilst the Janjaweed have machine guns.²⁴⁴ Mr Muhammed Bashar Ahmed, traditional leader among the Fur community in Gansila, Deleige Western Darfur and living in the camp since 2004 states that the desire of the people in the camps is to return home to their villagers. However, for a possible return they have to feel secure and that is not the case for the time being. A removal of the guns from the area is a pre-condition for the return of the IDPs that live in the camps. Mr. Bashar says that the Janjaweed is in the area and the only potential organisation that could guarantee security as far as he can see is the deployment of an extensive UN-force.²⁴⁵

High expectations are also seen in some parts of the international community that seem to believe that this transition will greatly increase the security among the Darfur population. However among international

²⁴¹ Diplomats (2007) Different diplomats, interviewed 10 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁴² OCHA, a women working for OCHA at the IDP camp in Zalingi (name withheld) interviewed 1 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁴³ AP 2007-11-22 "UN concerned Darfurian mission could fall short of expectations" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24850>

²⁴⁴ Ilham Saydna, Assistant GED Advisor Care International – Sudan, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁴⁵ Bashar, Muhammed Ahmed, Traditional leader among the Fur community in Gansila, Deleige Western Darfur, interviewed 15 November 2007, Khartoum

experts working on the ground there seems to be a consensus that this is not the case. They believe that it will take time before it is deployed, and when deployed the difference between UNAMID and AMIS will not be that extensive. The parallel high expectations (by the population of Darfur and some parts of the International Community) of the effects that the transformation of AMIS to become UNAMID will have for the situation in Darfur are problematic in several ways. If the hopes of the locals are not fulfilled, there is a risk of further complications in the situation. Living conditions in the refugee camps are harsh and if the only hope that many of the IDPs in the camps see is vanishing, there is a clear risk that an even tenser situation will be created.²⁴⁶ When looking into the expectations of the international community there is a risk that they have invested so much and have had so high expectations for UNAMID that they will feel lost if the expectations are not fulfilled. The transformation from AMIS to UNAMID also causes a lot of practical problems. An example of such problems is that decisions about whether people working for AMIS now should continue to work for UNAMID are taking a long time. For example, the Swedish Rescue Agency has been working to support AMIS but at the time when the field study was conducted it was not clear if they also should work to support UNAMID. This put the Swedish Rescue Agency in a position where they loose several contacts and networks since they can not offer prolongation for their local employees who then start to look for other job-opportunities.²⁴⁷ In addition, it has been suggested that the hybrid force can be used as a way of getting away from pressure from grassroots-level organisations. In the United States a mass movement focusing on Darfur has emerged during the last years. This movement is putting pressure on the US government to do more for the people of Darfur. Sudan-expert Alex de Wahl states in his book *War in Darfur and the search for peace* that:

“Perhaps it is not too cynical to assume that President Bush’s advisors calculated that once a UN force had been approved, any disappointments could be placed at the door of the UN and the troop contributing countries not the U.S.”²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Officials working for different UN-organs and different NGOs, interviewed November/ December 2007

²⁴⁷ Blank, Jonas, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Medical/Project Coordinator/ Team Leader, interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁴⁸ de Waal (2007) “Darfur’s Elusive Peace” in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 378

The focus at the moment is to get the UNAMID fully deployed and equipped but also if/when it is fully deployed the hybrid force will face extensive problems. If fully deployed the UNAMID will be the world's largest peacekeeping force operating at the moment. Even though this sounds promising, some conditions have to be taken into account that show how complicated the Darfurian situation is. Darfur is a vast area, almost the same size as France or Iraq which might be a better example when it comes to trying to keep peace, where transports are extremely difficult because of poor infrastructure.²⁴⁹ As a comparison we can look into Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Darfur 2007. There are indeed numerous differences between the two contexts but still a comparison can be fruitful and pin-point some of the problems that the UNAMID will face. The peacekeepers in Bosnia at the time of the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 numbered 28, 044.²⁵⁰ When/if UNAMID will be fully deployed it will consist of 26 000 troops in an area that is more than ten times larger than the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the UNAMID is the first hybrid force in the history of UN and it is possible that this will cause some problems when it comes to information sharing, lines of command etc. One of the main reasons why the massacre in Srebrenica could not be prevented is, according to leading scholars, the problem of coordinating troops and information. The best information and equipment was in the hands of USA but it did not have a peace-keeping mandate at that time.²⁵¹ The UNAMID will have a single mandate and the desire is that there should not be any difference between the UN and the AU. However, dual Headquarters and co-operation might cause some problems so it is of highest importance that the information, command and equipment are of the best quality so that the failures of the past not will be repeated in the future. Also important to note is the timing of the Srebrenica massacre/genocide. It took place when the UN force was about to leave and was to be replaced by a more aggressive force (IFOR) that arrived to Bosnia in December 1995 a few months after the massacre in July. It has been argued that the time when UN was about to leave, and hence could not be expected to act firmly, and before the stronger NATO-force was fully deployed, could be seen as a "*window of*

²⁴⁹ Jok Madut Jok (2007) *Sudan Race Religion and Violence* p. 264

²⁵⁰ UNDPKO (1995) "Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations as of 31 July 1995" United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations

²⁵¹ Kostic, Roland, Doctor in Peace and Conflict Studies and an expert on the Balkans, msn-conversation 16 November 2007 and Kling, Andreas, Former logistic coordinator and field officer for Malteser, (a German NGO) implementing projects for ECHO & UNHCR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 interviewed 15 November 2007

opportunity” for the Serbs carrying out the massacre.²⁵² To compare this with Darfur it is crucial that UNAMID is fully deployed and equipped as soon as possible so no actor in Darfur also sees a “window of opportunity” to carry out a massacres before UNAMID is fully workable.

The final, but arguably the most severe, problem that the AU/UN peacekeeping will face is that there is no peace to keep. For a peacekeeping mission to succeed, a peace to keep or at least a cease-fire that the parties mostly hold too, is a precondition. None of this is true in Darfur.²⁵³

Attacks on AMIS and UNAMID

The first troops from AMIS were deployed in Darfur at the beginning of June 2004 and, 31 December 2007 was the day when AMIS was replaced by UNAMID.²⁵⁴ During this time AMIS lost 59 of its troops because of attacks by different actors.²⁵⁵ The bloodiest attack took place on 29 September 2007 when ten AMIS soldiers were killed in an attack on their camp in Haskanita, in the eastern part of Darfur.²⁵⁶ There is an extensive debate about who was behind this attack but most experts believe that there was some form of rebel involvement.²⁵⁷ Despite the general view that it was a rebel group that lay behind the Haskanita attack, some representatives from the rebels have a different view. Some of them assert that the GoS was behind the attack and the reason for this was to put the blame on the rebels, and the timing was chosen because it was before the negotiations and this should show that the rebels were bad. They continue to state that the GoS was the part that had something to gain by such an attack and claim that since GoS was the actor dragging its feet on deployment of the hybrid-

²⁵² Honig, Jan Willem (2001) “Avoiding War, Inviting Defeat: The Srebrenica Crisis, July 1995” in *Journal of contingencies and crisis management*

²⁵³ Washington Post (2008-01-13) “Attack Seen As a Setback For the U.N. In Darfur” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/12/AR2008011202410.html>

²⁵⁴ AMIS (2007) AMIS homepage <http://www.amis-sudan.org/>

²⁵⁵ AMIS (2007) “News Bulletin Issue 19. December 2007” <http://www.amis-sudan.org/Bulletin/AMIS%20News%20Bulletin%20No%2019.pdf>

²⁵⁶ AMIS (2007) “News Bulletin Issue 9 October 2007” http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2007/octobre/PSC/Amis/AMIS_News_Bulletin_9%20final.pdf

²⁵⁷ Flint, Julie (2007) “Accounting for Haskanita” posted at the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* 2007-10-11 <http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/10/11/accounting-for-haskanita>

force it was that gained by this attack.²⁵⁸ Nor has UNAMID been spared of attacks but, 7 January 2008, just a week after the change from AMIS to UNAMID, they suffered a humiliating defeat. An UNAMID supply convoy came under attack from governmental troops in West Darfur with a driver severely wounded but no fatalities.²⁵⁹ At first the government denied it was behind this attack through their UN envoy but later the Sudanese Defence Minister admitted that their troops were behind the attack. However, the defence minister said that the peacekeepers were to blame since they had not announced their route in advance to the government but UN officials say that the convoy was clearly marked as a UN-convoy. During the attack UNAMID did not shoot a single shot back at the attackers but the UN chief peacekeeping official, Jean-Marie Guehenno said, that future attacks will be repelled. However, other UN officials say that UNAMID at the moment do not have the fire-power to do this effectively. Guehenno pointed out the problem with lack of helicopters:

“If in this particular situation we had helicopters capable of flying at night and quickly reinforcing a convoy under attack, of course we would have been in a completely different situation....We would have been in a position to deter.”²⁶⁰

These attacks reveal the vulnerability for peacekeeping operations in Darfur. In 2000 Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian diplomat, conducted a major review of UN peacekeeping. In this review he concludes that peacekeepers should not enter war zones if they lack approval from key belligerents or without a political settlement that could be implemented, and where the UN deploys peacekeepers they must be equipped so they can counter armed spoilers. None of these three preconditions is currently at place in Darfur.²⁶¹ In Darfur there were many different theories (and every theory was met with a counter-theory) about what would happen

²⁵⁸ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

²⁵⁹ UN News Centre (2008-01-08) “Sudanese army elements attack UN convoy; Ban Ki Moon protests”
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25231&Cr=Darfur&Cr1=>

²⁶⁰ Washington Post (2008-01-13) “Attack Seen As a Setback For the U.N. In Darfur”
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/12/AR2008011202410.html>

²⁶¹ Washington Post (2008-01-13) “Attack Seen As a Setback For the U.N. In Darfur”
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/12/AR2008011202410.html>

for instance when UNAMID was deployed. One theory heard in Darfur during the autumn of 2007 was that the government is publicly distancing itself from the Border Intelligence (BI) so that the BI can attack UNAMID when it is in place and the government can refer to its earlier statement of no connection to BI.²⁶²

Discussion About UNAMID

The Sudanese government's *acceptance* of a hybrid-force was widely hailed as a major breakthrough for the situation in Darfur. The international community believed that this would bring security for the people in Darfur but NCP continued to cause all possible problems for the UNAMID and at the time of writing the biggest change for the people of Darfur has been that the peacekeepers wear blue UN-berets instead of green AU-berets. The regime in Khartoum is mostly to blame for this but also the international community is partly responsible for the situation since they are not providing the appropriate equipment. It is of highest urgency that the international community somehow resolve the problem with the much needed helicopters for UNAMID. The international community has for a long time called for a peacekeeping force in Darfur and people that are willing to go down to Darfur, risking their own lives, must be provided with all necessary technical assistance. It is immoral, with regard to both the troops deployed and the people of Darfur, to not properly equip the peacekeepers going to Darfur.

The foremost reason for rapid supply of proper technical material is that the UNAMID can not work properly without them. Just a week after the deployment of UNAMID, a supply convoy was attacked by the government. They could not defend themselves and when a peacekeeping force deployed to protect civilians and aid-workers can not even protect itself, it shows how severe the problems are. The regime in Khartoum is putting all possible restrictions on the UNAMID and causes as much problem for the force as it can. But the unwillingness among the international community gives the GoS a perfect excuse for this behaviour. It suits the GoS desire to not have UN-peacekeepers in Darfur, that the international community can not provide the needed equipment. As long as the needed equipment is not provided the GoS can argue that it is not to blame for the lack of deployment of UNAMID even though the reality is that both GoS and the international community is to be blamed for the lack of the deployment of a workable peacekeeping force. Moreover, it makes it extremely troublesome to put

²⁶² UN-official, working in Darfur (name withheld), interviewed 1 December 2007, Khartoum

pressure on foremost the GoS (but also some rebels) to accept troops from different countries. The discussion about which countries should contribute to UNAMID is unfortunate. It should be the UN and not the government nor the rebels that decides who should take part in the peacekeeping force. UNAMID has a mandate and the UN is the ones who know what it takes for them to carry out this mandate.

Finally, currently there is no peace to keep for the peacekeepers in Darfur which put them in a precarious position. At the same time, a stronger external force might be necessary to calm down things to be able to get to peace or at least a ceasefire. This indicates the tremendous need for the peace-negotiations and deployment of UNAMID to work in tandem. The success of UNAMID can not be fulfilled without progress in the negotiations, and the other way round.

6. Negotiations

In the beginning of 2007 Jan Eliasson was appointed Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Darfur. Since 2004 Salim Ahmed Salim has been the African Union Special Envoy to Darfur and since, the beginning of 2007 they have jointly worked towards getting a political solution to the crises in Darfur. In this context they have had a four-fold strategy. The first step was to be the only negotiators on the scene since parallel negotiations could create problems. The second phase was to get the neighbouring countries to work in a peace-enhancing way. The third step was to unify the fragmented rebels and the fourth was the actual negotiations. The first negotiations between the GoS and Darfurian rebels after this process started took place in Sirtre, Libya in the end of October 2007. However, several high-ranking rebel leaders boycotted the talks so the negotiations were postponed after just one day and no new negotiations have taken place at the time of writing.²⁶³

Venue

The choice of Sirtre as a venue for the negotiations was extremely unpopular among many of the actors representing the Darfur side in the negotiations. A reason behind this is that they felt that Libya is biased towards the government. Mr Ahmed Muhammed Bashar, traditional Fur leader from West Darfur, further says that Libya has a special interest in Darfur and their aspiration is to incorporate Darfur and Chad into Libya. Moreover, the Libyan leader Muammar al-Gadaffi stated that the conflict in Darfur was a conflict “over a camel” a statement that insulted many Darfurians. Mr Bashar proposed that the negotiations could take place in any other African country but not Libya.²⁶⁴ Amin Mahmoud from the Fur consultative council agrees with Mr Bashar that Libya is not a good venue since the Arabic countries have assisted the Arabs in Darfur. Nor does he think that the negotiations should be held in any other African country

²⁶³ AP (2007-11-01) “Sudan: Darfur peace negotiation postponed”
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21587960/>

²⁶⁴ Bashar, Muhammed Ahmed, Traditional leader among the Fur community in Gansila, Deleige Western Darfur, interviewed 15 November 2007, Khartoum

since it is easy to bribe African leaders and the Government of Sudan uses this policy extensively.²⁶⁵ Abdelshaafie, leader of one of the SLM/A groups, answers the question of whether the venue-issue is overrated with “absolutely not”. His argument is that the environment is very important for negotiations. If the hosting country tries to influence the situation too much it causes problems for the negotiations and because of this he demands that the venue be in a country that Khartoum does not have a security contract with and can not influence too much.²⁶⁶ Another SLM/A representative says that the negotiations should not be held in any country bordering to Sudan. One reason for this is that if it is in Libya, Egypt asks why not there, and if in Asmara, Chad asks why not there, etc because of this they have proposed the Netherlands as a venue for the negotiations.²⁶⁷

Most Important Issues

In the negotiations in Abuja there were three different commissions, security, power-sharing and wealth-sharing.²⁶⁸ These broad categories of different issues are also the ones that the negotiation team are focusing upon in the current negotiations.²⁶⁹ Ibraheem Ahmed Adam, from the Tunjor consultative Council and former minister in northern Darfur, states that the most important issues in the negotiations are power-sharing, wealth-sharing, compensation, repatriation of IDPs and refugees, infrastructure such as fixing the bad roads, national law and the deployment of police. General Mohammed Mohammed Alseladhi Shafi from the Fur council further adds that Darfur should be one region with the boundaries from 1956 and not three as it is at the moment. Darfur should also have second Vice President and the Janjaweed should be disarmed. General Mohammed also states that 50% of the Janjaweed consists of people coming from other countries such as Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PHD researcher in political conflict and administration, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

²⁶⁶ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

²⁶⁷ Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim, SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

²⁶⁸ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

²⁶⁹ Different rebel leaders, academics and UN-people interviewed in late November and early December Juba and Khartoum

²⁷⁰ Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PhD researcher in political conflict and administration, Ibraheem Ahmed Adam, Tunjor consultative council and former minister in northern Darfur and General Mohammed Alseladhi Shafi, Fur consultative council, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

An issue raised by different people connected to the Darfur problems as being very central is that foreigners have moved into Darfur and are now living on the land that refugees and IDPs have been forced to leave. If the security issues, which keep refugees and IDPs away from their homelands, are solved they are going to want to return. However, if the issue of foreigners inhabiting their land is not solved, it will mean that the returnees do not have any land to return to.²⁷¹ This problem is not just focused upon by Darfurians, but in August 2007 aid organisations too were alarmed about this problem and stated that close to 30, 000 Chadian Arabs had moved into Darfur over the last six months. Many of them had settled on land owned by people that were now in the IDP-camps or refugees. It has been argued that this migration by Chadian Arabs is part of a plan in Khartoum to Arabise Darfur. Moreover there have been rumours that the Chadian foreigners have been offered Sudanese citizenship and one reason behind that was said to be that they would be able to vote in coming elections.²⁷² According to Khamees Abdallah, a leader within the URF, there are currently Arabs from Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Mali in Darfur living on the land that has been left by displaced persons. In addition to this, Khamees believes that there are Arabs from non-African countries that are moving into Darfur but that there is not any clear evidence for this yet.²⁷³ This occupied land affects the negotiations in several ways. Especially the people of Western Darfur have had their land occupied and because of this they demand guarantees by the international community that it will help to restore their land to them.²⁷⁴

Another problem highlighted by, for instance, representatives from the Darfurian movements and academics is that too much focus in the negotiations is upon the effects of the conflict instead of the causes. The international community's major concern has been the humanitarian situation and not the core of the problems that has to be dealt with first.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

²⁷² Los Angeles Times (2007-08-12) "In Darfur, another obstacle to Peace"
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/africa/la-fg-resettle12aug12,1,6022763.story?coll=la-africa>

²⁷³ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

²⁷⁴ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁷⁵ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

The SPLM/A special envoy on Darfur states that it is important to not lose sight of the political problems behind the uprising among the Darfurians. Darfur it is not just a security problem, it is a political problem and he sees a clear risk that this focus is lost.²⁷⁶ Ali Aidam Adam, a lecturer at the Development Studies and Research Institute (DSRI), University of Khartoum argues in the same manner. He states that the real problems of Darfur that caused the current situation are now lost, and everything deals with the effects of the war. The people of Darfur have been complaining for a long time that the international community has not done anything to deal with the root causes for conflict in Darfur. He declares that even though people in the west might not have known anything about Darfur, at least the NGO offices in Khartoum know Darfur and should have taken these issues seriously and taken some action to deal with the root causes. Now the international community is doing a lot but this is just dealing with the effects of the crises through giving aid to Darfur in form of water, health and education.²⁷⁷

During SPLM/A's struggle against the regime in Khartoum the group had some people that promoted independence for the South whilst others, including the founder John Garang, promoted a new united Sudan. In Darfur the rebel groups have rejected independence but in 2007 the rebel group Darfur Independence Front was formed and the thought of independence seemed to be increasing among Darfurians.²⁷⁸ The prominent Darfuri Human Rights Advocacy, Salih Mahmoud Osman, states that the aspiration is to stay within a united democratic Sudan but that the option of independence for Darfur should not be ruled out. He continues to say that Darfur has been an independent kingdom for hundreds of years and it was not until 1917 that Darfur became part of Sudan. He also thinks that Darfur has better chances than Southern Sudan as an independent country.²⁷⁹

An issue that the rebel movements often argue for is power-sharing and some rebel representatives state that what is needed is real power-sharing not something artificial such as the DPA. They argue that DPA just includes artificial power-sharing since Minni Minawi does not have any real power even though he signed the DPA that includes power-

²⁷⁶ Rev Canon Clement Janda, Special Envoy of the Chairman of SPLM/A on Darfur, Chairman of SPLM Darfur task force, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

²⁷⁷ Ali Aidam Adam, Lecturer Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁷⁸ Sudan Tribune (2007-09-22) "New rebel group says struggling for Darfur independence" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article23877>

²⁷⁹ Mahmoud Osman Salih, Advocate Human Rights Lawyer MP. Sudan National Assembly, interviewed 14 November 2007, Khartoum

sharing on paper. They further argue that the CPA could solve a lot of the problems if properly implemented. The Government of Southern Sudan and the SPLM/A representation in the centre can work as a model for how solutions in other areas can look.²⁸⁰ Even though both the rebels and the negotiation team focus on power-sharing, Dr Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil at the University of Khartoum wants to emphasize some problems with power-sharing. He claims that a power-sharing agreement that grants a percentage of power to a certain party involves a democratic problem. Because if a party is granted power why should it than conduct democratic transformations? The agreement gives them political influence and they do not need to democratize. Dr. Musa also states that you might get a temporary secession of hostilities but no real peace if you do not have a democratic transformation.²⁸¹

However, Liberia can be seen as a case where a power-sharing agreement has led to a successful democratisation process. In 2003 the Accra accord was signed between the Government of Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). This accord called for power-sharing during a transitional period and after that should multiparty elections take place in 2005. The elections took place as stipulated and the Accra accord was successful in this democratisation process. In addition to this it should be noted that it was 15 000 UN-peacekeepers deployed in Liberia during the interim period.²⁸² These peacekeepers were still deployed in Liberia at the time of writing (early 2008).²⁸³

To transform a rebel group into a political party is a complex and problematic task and different rebel groups have different possibilities for such a transformation. Dr. Söderberg Kovacs finds that:

“..... the rebel groups are more likely to become viable political parties when the leadership of the group is united on the decision to abandon the armed struggle and enter peaceful politics; when the

²⁸⁰ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

²⁸¹ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁸² Nilsson, Desirée and Söderberg-Kovacs, Mimmi (2005) “Breaking the Cycle of Violence? Promises and Pitfalls of the Liberian Peace Process” in *Civil Wars*, Vol.7, No.4 (Winter 2005), pp.396–414

²⁸³ BBC (2007-11-30) “Female peacekeepers reach Liberia”
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6314263.stm>

rebel group has a relatively high level of popular support among the domestic population; and when key international actors and donors recognise the rebel as a legitimate political actor.”²⁸⁴

Looking into Darfur, all these factors for successful transformation is absent. The leadership is heavily split, there is no agreement on abandon the armed struggle, there is no consensus among the population in Darfur to support the rebels (especially not on which rebel group to support) and the political actors in Darfur that the international community recognise might not be the most appropriate ones.²⁸⁵ Dr. Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil states that the SPLM/A are struggling in a hard process of transforming from a rebel group to a political party. He continues to state that even though the SPLM/A has extensive problems in this process they were far better prepared for such a transformation than the Darfurian rebel movements since they had developed a political structure etc. All the Darfurian movements are insufficiently prepared for transforming into political parties, for instance they have not developed any institutions etc. JEM and SFDA (Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance) have more academics in their movements and have made some attempts to develop their political programme but the debate is not public and not particularly comprehensive. This means that there is a large lack of fruitful debate also within these movements, and the other movements are even worse. Furthermore he says that even though Abdul Wahid has a support base that is more political than the other rebel leaders, it is doubtful that he has the capacity to utilize it in a creative way. Many of the other rebel leaders are commanders without much political knowledge. This creates a tricky situation because the rebels might want to prolong the war since they risk losing their power if the war ends. As long as the war is going on, their skills as fighters will give them power but in a peaceful time this skill is not as needed and they risk losing control after the war. As a consequence of the lack of political capacity among the rebels Dr. Musa argues that you need to have broader political representation at the negotiations than just the ones that are carrying the weapons. If the negotiations are going to be meaningful they have to be broad, and all parties should be included if they claim to be comprehensive. Of course there are problems involved with too many players at the negotiation table

²⁸⁴ For a deeper knowledge of this see Söderberg-Kovacs, Mimmi PhD dissertation *From Rebellion to Politics The Transformation of Rebel Groups to Political Parties in Civil War Peace Processes* Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2007

²⁸⁵ Interviews with different UN-experts on Darfur and academics during end of November 2007.

but the negotiation team representing Darfur has to represent all of Darfur. The rebels need to prove that they represent the people and if they can not show this (which they can not) the talks need to include other people than the fighters i.e. a percentage fighters and a percentage unarmed movements, concludes Dr. Musa.²⁸⁶ Ilham Saydna from CARE international argues in a similar way when she states that it is important to get representatives from the camps to take part in the negotiations because if they are not represented you will have enormous implementation problems.²⁸⁷ However, Abdelshaafie, leader of one of the SLM/A-factions, says that there should just be one or two negotiation teams from the rebel side. The preferable alternative is one team but if that is not possible then there should be one team from JEM and one from SLM/A.²⁸⁸

Adam Azzain Mohammed, Professor at the University of Khartoum, has conducted surveys among Darfurian elites. One of the questions was who they believed to be most suitable to run Darfur at the moment. The majority among Darfurian elites wanted it to be technocrats that should run Darfur for an interim period before democratic institutions were built up etc. The only group that rejected the technocrats were the rebel leaders. Adam Azzain argues that the reason behind this is that they are power-seekers and just have a short time perspective. Professor Azzain thinks that an interim-period with technocrats in control could work to decrease hostility on the ground.²⁸⁹ Mokhtar A. Adam, from the SLM/A-Khamees raised the question of who should control the army if the technocrats were in power. He continued to say that technocrats can play an important role in ruling Darfur but someone has to be in command of the forces that the movements have on the ground, and that can not be technocrats.²⁹⁰ In response to this, Professor Azzain said that if you agree on the principal

²⁸⁶ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁸⁷ Ilham Saydna, Assistant GED Advisor Care International – Sudan, interviewed 2 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁸⁸ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

²⁸⁹ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁹⁰ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

of technocrats you can discuss details such as who will be in command of the military.²⁹¹

Views on Negotiation Team

In a discussion with different Darfurian representatives about the negotiation team, the prevailing view is fairly critical. One argument raised by civil Fur representatives is that they do not have any trust in Salim Salim since they argue that there is evidence that he is too close to the government. Furthermore they argue that since Mr. Jan Eliasson gets his information from Salim Salim they can not trust him either.²⁹² Rebel leaders have also criticized some people in the negotiation team for being too close to the government and they say that if someone from the negotiation team shows too strong relations with the government they will remove him. In discussions with different rebel leaders they state that one of the main mistakes conducted by the negotiation team is that they have not considered the rebel movements an equal partner to the GoS.²⁹³ At the moment the international community is just consulting with the government and never with the movements, and this has to change. *“Our opinion is important because we are a major player in this crisis and we should be part of the discussion at every issue”*, is an often-raised opinion. Moreover, rebel representatives claim that the regime in Khartoum is not serious about negotiations. They develop this by stating that they started to negotiate with the government already in 2003 and have negotiated with it several times since but the government has constantly shown that it is not serious about negotiations and agreements, for examples, Abeche I, Abeche II, N’Djamena and Abuja.²⁹⁴ The Abuja process is widely seen as a failure partly because of mistakes made by the international community. This raises the issue whether the international community has learned from the mistakes made in Abuja. The chief negotiator from JEM (CL) Tadjading Bechir Niam says that maybe they have learnt something. He states that

²⁹¹ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

²⁹² Mahmoud Amin, Fur consultative council and PhD researcher in political conflict and administration, Ibraheem Ahmed Adam, Tunjor consultative council and former minister in northern Darfur and General Mohammed Alseladhi Shafi, Fur consultative council, interviewed 22 November 2007, Khartoum

²⁹³ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

²⁹⁴ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

he is optimistic if the negotiation team has the people of Darfur as their main objective and do not think too much about regional countries. He continues to say that the Abuja started as an AU-negotiated process but at the end when the UK and the US entered the process the negotiations were more focused upon pleasing the US and the UK than to find a solution for the people on the ground. Moreover, sometimes the Government of Sudan gives up things to the US and the international community to please them but this does not change things for the people of Darfur. As an example he says that already early on in the Abuja process, aerial bombings were forbidden but the Government is still carrying out aerial bombings and recently several places in Darfur were bombed. When it comes to the rebels, Mr. Niam's opinion is that this is the last chance for a negotiation solution to Darfur and that the rebels need to get to an agreement that they can sign because you can not reject peace twice because then you will be looked upon with suspicion among the outsiders.²⁹⁵

Mohamed Othman Abusaq, Professor in Political Science University, of Khartoum claims that the mistrust between NCP and SPLM and NCP and SLM/A (MM) is the main problem for the situation in Sudan at the moment. He continues to argue that one important reason behind this mistrust is that the parties were pushed into the agreements that they have signed.²⁹⁶ The issue of lack of trust is also emphasised by U.S. Charge D'Affaires Alberto Fernandez who states that:

“The biggest obstacle right now of course is ... the deep distrust that exists.... Do you trust the government of Sudan if you are a rebel or if you are an IDP (internally displaced) or if you're a member of an Arab tribe that was given all these promises by the government that were never met?”²⁹⁷

Another argument that is focused upon is that the Sudanese government (in particular, but also other external parties) has to partly withdraw from Darfur because if that is done the problems of Darfur could be dealt with in a better way. This would create space for traditional leaders and others to solve the problems between different Darfurian groups. The outside interference in groups' interaction has to decrease; there are well established

²⁹⁵ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

²⁹⁶ Othman Abusaq Mohamed, Professor in Political Science, seminar 2007-12-05, University of Khartoum

²⁹⁷ Reuters (2008-01-28) “Distrust main obstacle to Darfur talks – US Diplomat” <http://uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKL2489364320080124>

forms for how group interaction can take place and these have to be given a chance to work. People can manage if left alone.²⁹⁸

Ali Aidam Adam, a lecturer at the Development Studies and Research Institute (DSRI) and from the Beni-Halba, an Arab ethnic group in Darfur, has a bleak view of negotiations and the future of Darfur. He thinks that the negotiations might lead to some elites getting a better position but do not think that it will change anything for the people on the ground in Darfur and that he, as an individual from Darfur, does not have expectations at all. One reason for this discouraging view that Mr. Adam gives is that there is no real link between the people from Darfur that get posts in Khartoum in a possible agreement and the people of Darfur. The ethnic groups are polarized and the people negotiating on the behalf of their ethnic group are not in control over their own group, just over the media. People within the ethnic group are saying to the negotiators that they are just trying to become members of the government and ask what they have provided for the people. Peace? Development? Moreover, one's ethnical belonging is very central in Darfur and since the rebel fighting is now mostly carried out by Masalit, Zaghawa and Fur, an agreement will be their agreement. These ethnic groups are the ones that have been suffering the most and hence naturally they want to get something out of an agreement. He further believes that if an agreement is reached, these groups, or at least some individuals from that particular ethnic group, will get the benefits from the agreement. He thinks that this will lead to a situation where some other ethnic groups will feel neglected by an agreement since they were not consulted in the negotiation process and are not getting anything of the gains. A consequence of this could be that some other ethnic groups take up their weapons because all people in Darfur are marginalised and all the different ethnic groups want development of the region. He emphasises that the silent masses are currently preparing a new war that will be very destructive. One of these potential groups is the Reizegat who are good fighters and got their weapons from the GoS and hence has the potential to make the whole process collapse. The land issue is the most important in negotiations in Darfur and if you do not have land you have a hard time negotiating. Some people agree to go and negotiate with the GoS but they do not accept that the land that they are controlling will be part of the negotiations. Mr. Adam concludes by saying that he is not positive at all and a major reason for this is that the centre is not interested in solving the problems in Darfur. Another reason is that the armed groups are fighting

²⁹⁸ Khalil el-Amin, Associate Professor, Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 5 December 2007, Khartoum

among themselves and the only way he sees out of this nightmare is to get the people in Darfur to sit down and talk.²⁹⁹

Signing, not Implementing

During the last two years the GoS has signed three different peace agreements: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) in September 2006. However, in general the implementation of these agreements is slow and not following the stipulated schedule. This creates an impression that the GoS is not determined to implement these agreements. This impression has been strengthened on account of different official statements during the autumn of 2007. The Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir has publicly condemned the findings of the Abyei Border Commission, stipulated in the CPA, saying the border commissioner “*should dilute their report and drink it*”.³⁰⁰ Likewise the Youth Department Secretary of Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP), Haj Majed Suwar, has stated that “*Jihad was a tradition that could not be stopped by signing peace agreements*”.³⁰¹ Roger Winter and John Prendergast argue in their Enough Project paper *Abyei: Sudan’s Kashmir* that this non-implementation of agreements is a long tradition for the regimes in Khartoum. They write:

“The first North-South war ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement in which the South won regional autonomy, which was later abrogated, and Abyei won a referendum promising its population the free choice either to remain in Kordofan or to be integrated into South Sudan. But that referendum was never held. Khartoum’s pattern of signing agreements with adversaries and then failing to implement them is well established in the South—going back at least three governments—and now more recently in Darfur. Until there is a wider sharing of power and more democratic and transparent decision making in Sudan, it is likely no agreement providing for meaningful change will be honoured.”³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Ali Aidam Adam, Lecturer Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁰⁰ Enough (2008) “Abyei Sudan’s “Kashmir” by Roger Winter and John Prendergast <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1.pdf>

³⁰¹ Reuters/Sudan Tribune (2007-11-21) “Sudanese respond to militia call-up- report” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24837>

³⁰² Enough (2008) “Abyei Sudan’s “Kashmir” by Roger Winter and John Prendergast <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/aneyi%2029-1.pdf>

The non-implementation has been pointed out as one of the most severe problems in Sudan at the moment. Trayo A Ali, adviser to Minni Minawi, claims that the biggest problem for Sudan at the moment is different agreements that have not been implemented, such as the DPA and the CPA. To change this situation, the outside signatories have to step in as guarantees much stronger according to Mr Trayo.³⁰³ The lack of implementation of the DPA creates far-reaching problems for the current situation on the ground in Darfur. The DPA created a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) that should receive \$ 700 million in 2006-2008, \$ 500 million of these should have been received by the end of 2007 but at that time only 1% of the money had been delivered. President Bashir has said that there has to be comprehensive peace in Darfur before DRDF can receive any money but this was not stipulated in the DPA. The DRDF has a broad agenda for Darfur, for instance it wants to build up burned villages in incombustible material, 1595 villages have been totally burned and many more partially. But as of the end of 2007 DRDF has not been able to deliver anything on the ground due to financial arrears. In addition to having a devastating effect for the people in Darfur, this also undermines the authority of DRDF. Despite ongoing conflict there are some peaceful and secure areas in Darfur and it is possible to start to rebuild villages there. The lack of funding for the DRDF is very unfortunate also since development can be a bridge from war to peace, states Ms. Mewahib Yagoub head of Engineering and Projects Department of the DRDF. She continues to say that funds are needed for development not just peacekeeping and since they have not received the money from the GoS they have also tried to get funds from other places such as the Islamic development bank and different states in the Gulf.³⁰⁴

The government's procedure of signing but not implementing, is also an argument stated by influential rebel leaders, such as Abdul Wahid, as one reason for rejecting the current negotiations. To overcome the problems of not implementing, different persons argue that there has to be a strong external part pressuring the NCP. Trayo A Ali from SLM/A (MM) states that when a movement is signing an agreement with a government the government always has the upper hand in terms of economy, possibilities to influence others and so on and so forth. To overcome this power imbalance an outside party has to step in and put pressure on the government if it

³⁰³ Trayo A Ali, SLM/A (MM), advisor to Minni Minawi, interviewed 18 November 2007, Khartoum

³⁰⁴ Mewahib Yagoub Abdalla Mohamed, Head of Engineering and Projects Department, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, interviewed 2007-12-02, Khartoum

is not honouring its commitments.³⁰⁵ Professor Adam Azzain argues in a similar way when he declares that the UN is the force that should guarantee implementation of agreements. He continues to say that the actors have to be committed to peace but it should be a UN responsibility to guarantee that transformation of power is effected in a democratic way. A potential benefit of UN as a guarantee is that then the movements do not have to keep as much military.³⁰⁶ A politically active youth from Darfur argues that the movements need to have military presence in Khartoum and security arrangements have to be part of an agreement as a guarantee for implementation. As an example he goes on to say that the SPLM/A has 1, 500 troops in Khartoum and despite the implementation problems of CPA it has provided good things for the South.³⁰⁷ However his claim that the SPLM/A had 1, 500 troops in Khartoum could not be independently confirmed and was doubted by Matthew LeRiche, expert on SPLM/A.³⁰⁸ Tadjading Bechir Niam, the chief negotiator for the JEM-CL, argues that the security commissions have to be very strong and concludes by saying that *"the government of Sudan has a tradition of non-implementation and this is one reason for us to keep our forces very strong also after signing an agreement"*.³⁰⁹

Discussion About Negotiations

As with other aspects of Darfur, the negotiations have to be conducted from a comprehensive approach. The two most essential interlinked issues that have to be dealt with in tandem are the implementation of CPA and the situation in Darfur. In addition within Darfur the negotiations and deployment of UNAMID also have to be very coordinated. A key issue is also implementation, both how lack of implementation affects the will to negotiate and how you can secure implementation of an eventual agreement. International actors often tend to focus on getting to an

³⁰⁵ Trayo A Ali, SLM/A (MM), advisor to Minni Minawi, interviewed 18 November 2007, Khartoum

³⁰⁶ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁰⁷ Darfur Democratic Front (DDF), three primary persons from DDF (name withheld), interviewed 6 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁰⁸ LeRiche, Matthew, PhD Candidate at Department of War Studies, Kings College London, e-mail conversation 2008-01-16

³⁰⁹ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

agreement and have less energy left for implementation. This can have tragic results since non-implemented agreements can make things worse. One example of when a positive development (on paper) had negative effect and severely complicated the situation was when the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006. The DPA did not enhance the humanitarian situation in Darfur and in addition to this it fragmented the rebels, making a genuine negotiated solution much harder. Moreover the history of non-implementing of agreements could put into question why you should negotiate at all. If you are certain that what you agree upon will not be executed, on the ground, it severely decreases the will for negotiations. Therefore some kind of mechanism or enforcement that could get the signatories of an agreement to stick to the agreement is needed. It is also crucial that such a mechanism, or at least potential mechanism, could be presented as soon as possible. The unwillingness for example by Abdul Wahid can be seen in another light taking the NCP history of signing but not implementing into account.

In addition to unification, the rebels in Darfur need to expand their political-knowledge basis and democratize so that they one day can transform from guerrilla movements to political parties. All the rebels say that they are representing the people and Darfur, and that their focus is the Darfurians. Possibly this fact can make the rebels more receptive to democratization since if they represent the people they do not have anything to fear from a democratic process. This argument should be used against movements that are rejecting transformation in a democratic way. For instance this argument can be used towards Abdul Wahid, since he says that he is the leader of the people of Darfur he should not have anything to fear from a democratisation process. The rebels want power-sharing but some academics have stated that power-sharing agreements decrease the incitement for the rebels to democratise. This makes power-sharing a contested issue when it comes to negotiations. Worth noting in this respect is that there exist several different types of power-sharing, political power-sharing at the centre is one type and another is territorial power-sharing where a region acquires the rights to decide on certain issues. Sudan is a vast country that also is very centralised, so some form of territorial power-sharing could be suitable. However, for this territorial power-sharing to be valuable the centralisation has to decrease because if all the power still remains in Khartoum it will just be artificial but not real power-sharing. In relevance to power-sharing, some lessons could be drawn from the case of Liberia where a democratisation took place after a power-sharing agreement. Worth taking into account is that this process was done under the supervision of 15, 000 peacekeepers. This number of peacekeepers is

another example for, that even if the UNAMID is fully deployed with its 26, 000 peacekeepers, the number is not that extensive taking into account that Darfur is about five times larger than Liberia.

A controversial way to get new input into the negotiations is to give China a role in the mediation process. From China's point of view it would probably appreciate to be seen as having a peace-enhancing effect in Sudan, since that would give it some international goodwill. However, the Chinese policy to not interfere in internal affairs could be an obstacle. Some would argue (especially the rebels) that China could not be used as a mediator since they are not seen as impartial in the conflict. However, previous research has shown that biased third parties under some conditions can be more constructive than non-biased ones³¹⁰ and that government-biased mediators seem to outperform rebel biased-mediators.³¹¹ The literature in this research area is extensive and a review of this debate falls outside the scope of this paper.³¹² Thus a few arguments for why it could be useful to get China involved in the negotiating process will be put forward here. First of all China is essential to the GoS because of the close economic links between the countries, with China buying Sudanese oil and selling weapons in return. This means that China has leverage on the GoS. Optionally the rebel groups can see this leverage as positive if they believe that it will make the GoS more committed to the peace-process and a possible future agreement which is extra important considering previous implementation problems of Sudanese peace-agreements. In addition, if the rebels accept a governmental-biased mediator it will send a signal to the government that they are committed to the peace process.³¹³ To get the rebels to accept such a solution is an elusive task, but by emphasizing that the lack of implementation (pointed out by the rebels themselves) is a major problem for peace in Sudan, it might be feasible.

³¹⁰ Svensson, Isak (2006) "Intermediaries, Information, and Impartiality - Types of Mediators and Negotiated Settlements in Africa" in *Elusive Peacemakers A Bargaining Perspective on Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts* Uppsala University

³¹¹ Svensson, Isak (2007) "Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 44 No2 p. 178

³¹² For more information on this debate see for instance Fearon 1998; Schmidt 2005 and Walter 2002

³¹³ See Svensson, Isak (2007) *Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace* for elaboration of this argument.

7. International Response

The crisis in Darfur has created much international response at different levels the last years. In the United States a mass movement led by the *Save Darfur* coalition has developed. Also in other places similar organisations have been created but this type of organisation is much more extensive in the US compared with, for instance, Europe.³¹⁴ The United Nations has for years worked with the Darfur issues and Ban Ki-Mon has made Darfur one of his top priorities.³¹⁵ The UN is working with a parallel process of trying to reach a political solution through negotiations and to get UN-peacekeepers deployed in Darfur. Both these processes are dealt with at other places in this report and therefore the UN is not focused upon in this section. In addition to this the UN have several sanctions in place related to Sudan.³¹⁶

United States

The United States has a very special and dual relationship when it comes to Sudan. On the one hand the administration calls the atrocities in Darfur genocide. On the other hand they have a counterterrorism deal with Khartoum, and Sudan is a partner in the United States war on terror. On 9 September 2004 the United States Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that genocide had been committed in Darfur.³¹⁷ With this statement the United States became the first (and at the time of writing only) state in the world to use that description. A few months later the CPA was signed with heavy US involvement in the negotiations. In both the declaration of Darfur as genocide and the involvement in the negotiations of CPA,

³¹⁴ For a thoroughly review about this process see Cheadle & Prendergast *Not on our watch: The mission to end genocide in Darfur and Beyond* and Hamilton/Hazlett "Not on our watch: The emergence of the American Movement for Darfur" in deWaal (2007) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*

³¹⁵ AP (2007-12-18) "Bush says Darfur troops deployment moving too slowly" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25607>

³¹⁶ For a summary over United Nations sanctions see SPITS-The Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions, <http://www.smartsanctions.se/>

³¹⁷ CNN (2004-09-09) "Powell calls Sudan killings genocide" <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell/>

the US government has been heavily pushed by different interest groups. The religious right was a key spokesperson to get to an agreement to the conflict between the more Christian South and more Muslim North.

The United States has for a long time accused Sudan of supporting terrorism and one reason for this is that Osama bin Laden lived in Khartoum from 1991 until 1996.³¹⁸ When he was expelled by Sudan, after strong pressure from the US and Egypt, and forced to leave the country.³¹⁹ Despite this expulsion the United States still believed that Sudan was supporting terrorists and in November 1997 the Clinton administration imposed comprehensive sanctions on the Sudanese Government for this reason.³²⁰ On 7 August 1998 the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed and as a response to this two weeks later a plant in Khartoum was bombed on the orders of Bill Clinton. The plant was believed to have links to Osama bin Laden but later investigations show that it was medicine factory.³²¹ This shows a very tough US policy towards Sudan. But the United States-Sudan relationship was about to change and one thing that promoted this change was that the Sudanese government started to co-operate with the United States on counter-terrorism right after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington. An example of this different relationship was that Washington abstained from vetoing UN lifting of sanctions against Sudan at the end of September 2001. Instead State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said:

“In the last few weeks since the attacks in New York and Washington, we have had some serious discussions with the government of Sudan about ways to combat terrorism”³²²

This above statement shows the start of the US-Sudan counterterrorism cooperation that has prevailed ever since. As Bin Laden has lived in

³¹⁸ Enough (2007) “The Answer to Darfur How to Resolve the World’s Hottest War” by John Prendergast p.3
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/answer_to_darfur.pdf

³¹⁹ MSNBC (2007-05-24) “FAQ: Osama bin Laden”
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3907198/>

³²⁰ Dagne, Ted (2006) “Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Division CRS Issue Brief for Congress Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy”
<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB98043.pdf>

³²¹ HRW (2003) “Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights” p.171
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan103/sudanprint.pdf>

³²² BBC (2001-09-28) “UN lifts sanctions on Sudan”
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1569308.stm>

Sudan this puts Sudan in a position where it has access to some unique information about al-Qaeda and this uniqueness has increased the US-Sudan intelligence co-operation. In addition to this, it is still believed that the regime in Khartoum has tight relations with al-Qaeda and that al-Qaeda is recruiting and has training camps in Sudan.³²³ Colin Thomas-Jensen, an Africa expert at the International Crisis Group states that the US is reluctant to put heavy pressure on the Sudanese government because of counterterrorism and Washington's approach in the war on terrorism. That the intelligence cooperation between US and Sudan continued despite the atrocities committed in Darfur and despite the fact that the US government had labelled Darfur "*genocide*" became known to the public in 2005. At this time the Los Angeles Times revealed that the CIA had flown in Salah Gosh, head of Sudan's National Security and Intelligence Service, to Washington. The purpose of this was to get information about terror suspects that were operating in East Africa. Salah Gosh is seen as one of the architects of Khartoum's policies in Darfur and hence the US cooperation with him caused a vast outcry among human rights groups.³²⁴

The intelligence co-operation between United States and Sudan started as an attempt to deter terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Sudan has, for instance, helped US to screen Islamist groups in Somalia. However, this intelligence co-operation has also had influence on the war in Iraq. A former US intelligence official states that Sudanese agents have infiltrated networks in the Middle East and Africa that are inaccessible for America and this has had spill-over effect on Iraq. Sudan is credited with stopping militants on their way to join anti-American units in Iraq. He goes on to say that the only state in the Arab League that has contributed to protection of US forces and citizens in Iraq is probably Sudan.³²⁵ One reason for the importance of Sudan's intelligence services is that many African Islamic militants travelling to Iraq and Pakistan pass through Sudan. This flow of anti-American fighters has made it possible for Sudan to put spies into Iraq. Sudanese spies also have an advantage benefit in the way they look, another former CIA official told the Los Angeles Times:

³²³ LeRiche, Matthew, PhD-candidate at the Department for War Studies at Kings College London, interviewed 23 November 2007, Khartoum

³²⁴ Sudan Tribune (2007-11-26) "US reluctant to put too much pressure on Sudan: Expert" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24921>

³²⁵ The Guardian (2005-04-30) "Sudan becomes US ally in 'war on terror'" <http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1473788,00.html>

“There’s not much that blond-haired, blue-eyed case officers from the United States can do in the entire Middle East, and there’s nothing they can do in Iraq.....Sudanese can go places we don’t go. They’re Arabs. They can wander around.”³²⁶

The value of the intelligence provided by Sudan is a disputed issue. Some argue that it is limited since no Sudanese will get near the top of al-Qaeda whilst others say that the contribution is significant since they get information on movements and supplies. However, in a U.S. State Department report Sudan was called a “strong partner in the war on terror.” One of the benefits that the Khartoum regime gets in return for this information, is a backdoor to the U.S. government through the CIA.³²⁷

In May 2007 the United States imposed new sanctions against Sudan that prevented 31 companies and three individuals from doing business in the United States or with US companies. The three individuals were Ahmed Muhammed Harun, Sudan’s state minister for humanitarian affairs, Awad Ibn Auf head of military intelligence and security and Khalil Ibrahim leader for the rebel group JEM one of the rebel groups that refused to sign the DPA.³²⁸ However, some people stated dissatisfaction with these sanctions. John Prendergast senior advisor to International Crisis Group calls these “window dressing” designed to look tough but not actually placing real pressure on Sudan, and that the main reason for the weakness of these sanctions is fear of endangering the counter-terrorism cooperation.³²⁹

This mix of sanctions, counterterrorism, and labelling of genocide put the regime in Washington in a problematic position when it comes to the situation in Sudan. The *Save Darfur* movement is pressuring it to take stronger stands against the regime in Khartoum and several persons in the US administration are traditional supporters of the more Christian Southern Sudan in their conflict with the more Muslim North. But at the same time the rulers in Sudan have information about al-Qaeda that is crucial for the US in its war on terror. This has created a split in the US government as to which policy to have towards Khartoum. The strongest advocacy

³²⁶ Los Angeles Times (2007-06-11) “U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning it” <http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/06/11/1790/>

³²⁷ Los Angeles Times 2007-06-11 “U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning it” <http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/06/11/1790/>

³²⁸ CNN (2007-05-29) “U.S. impose new sanctions against Sudan” <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/29/bush.sudan/index.html>

³²⁹ Los Angeles Times (2007-06-11) “U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning it” <http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/06/11/1790/>

for stronger action against Khartoum is led by US-aid whilst the faction focusing on intelligence promoting and on a softer stand, is CIA.³³⁰

China

Sudan's undoubtedly most valuable export commodity is the oil, and China its most important economical partner since China buys two-thirds of the oil that Sudan exports.³³¹ In 2007 the oil export from Sudan to China went up to 200, 000 barrels a day, which was more than double the amount that was exported in 2006, making Sudan the fifth largest exporter of oil to China.³³² Another way to show the importance of China as a trading partner with Sudan is that 70 percent of Sudan's total export goes to China.³³³ Of the revenues that the Government of Sudan gets from exporting oil, 70 percent is used on the army.³³⁴ This means that the money Sudan gets from selling oil to foremost China is used on the international weapon market. On this market China is the largest provider of weapons to Sudan. In 2002 transfers of military weapons and small arms from China to Sudan were valued at one million US\$ and in 2005 (the last year with available data at the time of writing) this value had increased to 23 millions US\$. In addition, China has helped Sudan in its development of domestic arms production through technical assistance, transfers of technology and assistance in building arms factories close to Khartoum.³³⁵ It is also important to consider that the CPA stipulates that 50 % of the revenues from the oil from Southern Sudan should go the Government of Southern Sudan. Whether the NCP gives 50% of that revenue to the South is a disputed issue, but of the money that the Government of Southern Sudan receives it spent 40% on the military budget.³³⁶

³³⁰ LeRiche, Matthew, PhD-candidate at the Department for War Studies at Kings College London, mail-conversation 23 January 2008

³³¹ AP (2007-11-28) "China won't tolerate threats to Darfur peacekeepers" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24939>

³³² Reuters (2008-01-23) "Sudan doubles crude export to China in 2007" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25671>

³³³ Economist (2006-10-28) "Never too late to scramble - China in Africa"

³³⁴ New York Times (2006-10-24) "War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows" and AP (2007-11-28) "China won't tolerate threats to Darfur peacekeepers" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24939>

³³⁵ Small Arms Survey (2007) "Arms, oil, and Darfur the evolution of relations between China and Sudan" http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%207%20Arms.pdf

³³⁶ Economist (2006-12-09) "Glittering towers in a war zone – Sudan"

The UN Security Council Resolution 1556 from 2004 prohibits all states from being involved in selling or supplying weapons to Darfur. However, this embargo does not prohibit countries to sell weapon to Khartoum, just acts that bring weapon to Darfur. This makes it almost impossible to prove violations. A UN Panel of experts concluded in 2006 that collected shell casings hinted that the ammunition used by the parties in the conflict came either from Sudan or from China. Moreover, 222 military vehicles and other arms, such as grenade launchers, produced in China were found by the panel. However, this does not provide proof that china is violating the embargo since it is feasible that it was the regime in Khartoum that brought the weapons to Darfur.³³⁷ In a report from May 2007, Amnesty International shows photographic evidence that the GoS is breaking the UN arms embargo through transporting weapons to Darfur. Even though they state that the regime in Khartoum is responsible for this, they also point severe criticism at China and Russia for continuing to sell weapons to Sudan despite evidence that these weapons are used in the conflict in Darfur.³³⁸ A way of controlling this weapon embargo, suggested by embargo-experts, is to give the peacekeepers operating the area the mandate to supervise the weapon embargo.³³⁹ The theory that such mandate could work in a peace-enhancing way is supported by Johannes Saers who served as an officer within the MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo). He states that within MONUC they had a mandate to confiscate weapons through “cordon and search” operations which contributed to decrease the numbers of weapon within the conflict area.³⁴⁰

This role that China plays has been met with massive criticism by human rights organisations and others. But China can not see that they have anything to be blamed for. Liu Guijin, China’s special envoy to Africa states that China is helping Sudan in its development and creating prosperity for the people of Sudan but that he was moved by the poverty that still was prevailing in Darfur. Mr. Guijing further criticised Western approaches to solving the conflict:

³³⁷ Small Arms Survey (2007) “Arms, oil, and Darfur the evolution of relations between China and Sudan” p. 5 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%207%20Arms.pdf

³³⁸ Amnesty International (2007-05-08) “Sudan Arms continuing to fuel serious human rights violations in Darfur2 http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/8bfe199c-a2b8-11dc-8d74-6f45f39984e5/afr540192007en.pdf

³³⁹ SPITS/SIPRI (2007) “United Nations Arms Embargoes :Their impact on arms flow and target behaviour”

³⁴⁰ Saers, Johannes (2008) Former officer within the MONUC, interviewed 2008-02-08, Uppsala, Sweden

“China has asked the international community, especially Western countries, not to resort too easily to sanctions, not to turn too easily to embargoes and not to turn too easily to use of force,”³⁴¹

He concludes by saying that the conflict in Darfur should instead be solved through dialogue with Sudan’s sovereignty respected and that some non-governmental organisations are providing false information about the situation in Darfur and China’s involvement.³⁴² In another statement, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu says that to link the Olympics in Beijing with China’s involvement in Sudan is violating the spirit of the games and strongly repudiates these accusations and concludes by saying that China will continue to play a constructive role for a solution to the Darfur issue.³⁴³ It has been reported that China’s role has started to change a bit, and when it put pressure on Khartoum to accept the UNAMID this is seen as an example of that.³⁴⁴ A further example of a possible stronger stance from China towards the Sudanese government was when The Special envoy of the Chinese government to Sudan, Liu Guijin, in the end of January 2008 stated that: *“the world is running out of patience over what’s going on in Darfur”*.³⁴⁵

In addition to this China’s position and their policies more in general has to be examined. China is a huge country with a booming economy with great needs for many different natural-resources, foremost oil. In addition to this China has a policy of not intervening in other countries domestic affairs and as part of this they advocate not to mix economics and politics. The country also believes that it does not receive the respect in the international community that it deserves. China put forward the argument that the major Western powers have already secured their needs for oil in for instance the Middle East and thereby excluded China from getting its share of these markets. Moreover China emphasizes that the Western countries often work with non-democratic countries with bad human-rights

³⁴¹ Reuters (2008-01-11) “China defends role in Sudan against Olympics critics” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25528>

³⁴² Reuters (2008-01-11) “China defends role in Sudan against Olympics critics” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25528>

³⁴³ Xinhua (2008-01-25) “Linking Olympics with Darfur issue “strongly” opposed – China” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25699>

³⁴⁴ Small Arms Survey (2007) “Arms, oil, and Darfur the evolution of relations between China and Sudan” p.1 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%207%20Arms.pdf

³⁴⁵ Sudan Tribune (2008-01-30) “China issues a warning to Sudan over Darfur crisis” <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25753>

records in order to receive important resources; so why could not China do the same?³⁴⁶

Rebel leader Abdelshaafie strongly opposes the view among some experts that the role of China has changed and states that the position of China has not changed a bit. He further says that he is certain that there is oil in Darfur and that is the reason why China is interested in the region. He continues to say that the reason why China has sent peacekeepers to Darfur is that they will install technology in preparation for Chinese oil-companies and another purpose with the technology is that it will make it easier for the NCP to fight the rebels. Further he accuses China of not caring about people and human rights. Abdelshaafie concludes by stating that if you support our enemy you are also our enemy.³⁴⁷

EU

The European Union has provided extensive humanitarian support to Darfur both through the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and through the member states separately.³⁴⁸ Monetary support has also been given to AMIS, EU provided 110 million USD (out of 250) for AMIS in 2003.³⁴⁹ In addition to this EU has provided observers for the Ceasefire Commission stipulated in the DPA.³⁵⁰ During the Abuja process the EU also had observers at the negotiations.³⁵¹ Despite these humanitarian contributions the EU has been criticised for not concentrating enough on Darfur. Some of the leading newspapers in the US that have been campaigning for a harder response to the situation in Darfur have shown frustration over EU and other countries not taking the situation as seriously as the US.³⁵² Another way that has been promoted by leading EU

³⁴⁶ Kreutz, Joakim, discussion with UCDP researcher and China expert, Joakim Kreutz, 11 November 2007

³⁴⁷ Abdelshaafie, Ahmed, Leader of SLM/A-Abdelshaafie, interviewed 28 November 2007, Juba

³⁴⁸ ECHO (2005) "The humanitarian crisis in Greater Darfur, Sudan"
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field/sudan/darfur/index_en.htm

³⁴⁹ Prunier, Gerard (2007) *Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide* p. 144

³⁵⁰ Toga, Dawit (2007) "The African Union Mediation and the Abuja Talks" in de Waal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*

³⁵¹ Nathan Laurice (2007) "The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur peace Agreement" in de Waal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 248-249 see also 269-270 in the same book

³⁵² Murphy (2007) "Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the U.S. Press, March-September 2004" in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 315

politicians as the, British Conservative leader David Cameron, has been to try to convince China to put more pressure on Sudan.³⁵³

Sudan expert Gérard Prunier writes in his book *Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide* that:

“*The European Union many voices into one won't go. In its usual way of treating diplomatic matters, the European Union presented a spectacle of complete lack of resolve and coordination over Sudan problem in general and the Darfur question in particular. The French only cared about protecting Idris Deby's regime in Chad from possible destabilisation ; the British blindly followed the Washington's lead, only finding that this somewhat difficult since Washington was not very clear about which direction it wished to take; the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands gave large sums of money and remained silent; Germany made anti-GoS noises which it never backed up with any sort of action and gave only limited cash; and the Italians remained bewildered.*”³⁵⁴

In contrast to UN and the United States, the EU does not have any sanctions against Sudan despite having threatened for a long time to impose such sanctions and that the EU foreign ministers 53 times formally have declared their concern over Sudan since April 2004. That EU does not have any sanctions against Sudan has been met by criticism by some humanitarian organisations. One of these critics is Lotte Leicht from the Brussels office of Human Rights Watch who states:

“There has been a catastrophic lack of leadership on the part of the EU recently..... Without smart, punitive and targeted sanctions, the government of Sudan has no incentive to stop the crimes it has been getting away with cost-free.”³⁵⁵

International Crisis Group (ICG) is a leading NGO working with conflict resolution worldwide. They point out that it is hard to put pressure on the government of Sudan but one way to go is through targeting the petroleum sector. In relation to this ICG condemns the fact that European Union

³⁵³ BBC (2008-01-18) "China open to UK business – Brown"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7194864.stm

³⁵⁴ Prunier, Gerard (2007) *Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide* p. 140-141

³⁵⁵ Inter Press Service (2007-04-05) "Rights: EU Watches Sudan, Then Watches Some more" <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37230>

countries are letting companies working in the Sudanese oil sector still operate freely in EU. The ICG writes:

“EU and other European governments could enact legislation to ban companies based in their countries that are either still directly involved in the Sudanese petroleum sector or are in industries related to it (the U.S. has had comprehensive sanctions in place since 1997). For example, Sweden’s Lundin Petroleum AB operates directly in Sudan. European companies working in industries that assist the oil industry might also be forbidden by the EU or their governments to operate in Sudan. This would affect such entities as ABB of Switzerland, which invests in Sudan’s power grid, and Siemens of Germany, which supplies telecommunications systems to the main oil-producing consortium (GNPOC) and is building one of the largest diesel-generating plants in Khartoum.”³⁵⁶

The European Union has been a strong promoter of the deployment of UNAMID but they have not delivered sufficient equipment. Thomas Cargill, Africa program manager at Chatham House, the London based Royal Institute of International Affairs says that European countries risk undermining their credibility, “*if they commit themselves to resolving a crisis but then can’t commit themselves to providing the necessary hardware.*”³⁵⁷

Arab Countries

The extent of involvement from the Arab countries in the Darfur issue is a widely discussed issue. It is often argued that the Arabic countries should try to do more to stop the urgent situation in Darfur especially since the people dying in Darfur are Muslims.³⁵⁸ Egypt is a country with an extensive interest in Sudan since they are afraid that the Sudan situation might have security impacts on their national security. They are supporters of a united Sudan since they are afraid that a succession of Southern Sudan makes their prioritised Nile issues more problematic this has made them a

³⁵⁶ International Crisis Group (ICG) “Getting the UN into Darfur” http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b043_getting_the_un_into_darfur.pdf

³⁵⁷ AP (2007-12-07) “European Unlikely to meet UN Darfur Goal” <http://www.wtop.com/index.php?nid=387&pid=0&sid=1268462&page=1>

³⁵⁸ Different Arabs from Darfur interviewed in the end of November and early December in Juba and Khartoum

strong NCP supporter. An example of this is that Egypt has backed Sudan's resistance to the contribution of non-African troops for UNAMID. That Egypt is seen as being close to the government is the reason for some Darfurian rebels opposing Egyptian troops within UNAMID.³⁵⁹ Two Arab countries, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have been pointed out as being in a special position, together with China, to be able to bring peace to Darfur, by Andrew Natsios former US envoy to Sudan. He says that these countries have special influence on the regime in Khartoum and the rebels and that this special position should be used in a peace-enhancing way.³⁶⁰

International Criminal Court- ICC

Another response by the international community to the atrocities committed in Darfur is that the UN Security Council in March 2005 referred the case to ICC. In April 2007 the ICC judges issued arrest warrants on Ahmed Harun a government minister and Ali Kushyb a Janjaweed commander. The United Nations further urged all countries to provide all necessary assistance in the work to get these two persons arrested. However, Sudan has determinedly refused to co-operate with the court. Instead Ahmed Harun has been appointed Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs and liaison for the UNAMID after the arrest warrants were issued against him.³⁶¹ In addition to this he has also been selected as co-president of a committee responsible for investigating human rights violations in Darfur and other areas of Sudan. The Sudanese government state that they have trust in Ahmed Harun and hence it is not strange that he can be part of such committees.³⁶² Moreover, China and Russia have invalidated a Security Council statement calling for the Sudanese government to co-operate with the ICC.³⁶³

³⁵⁹ International Crisis Group (2007) "Darfur's new Security Reality" p.20
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/134_darfur_s_new_security_reality.pdf

³⁶⁰ Sudan Tribune (2008-01-25) "China, Saudi Arabia and Qatar can bring peace to Darfur – ex US envoy" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25695>

³⁶¹ IWPR (2008-02-23) "China, Russia quash ICC efforts to press Sudan over Darfur Crimes" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25544>

³⁶² Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2007-10-05) "Darfur: The Elders call for transfer of suspects to The Hague; HRW and PHR react to Kushayb's release; PHR reaction to attack on AMIS forces; Lam Akol interview" <http://www.iccnw.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=2148>

³⁶³ IWPR (2008-02-23) "China, Russia quash ICC efforts to press Sudan over Darfur Crimes" <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25544>

Professor Adam Azzain at the University of Khartoum states that the Government of Sudan is afraid of ICC and that this fear could make the NCP more reluctant to leave power. But despite this he is not advocating impunity since he argues that justice is needed to achieve lasting peace. He continues to argue that his resistance to impunity is not just a moral issue but practical as well, since it is impossible to build a well-working state if you do not punish perpetrators.³⁶⁴ Khalil el-Amin, another Professor at the University of Khartoum, stresses the importance of reconciliation and states that there are a lot of processes that can be conducted for helping people to heal their wounds and bring about reconciliation. For instance, compensation can be part of both rehabilitation and reconciliation processes. In this process it is important that people are ready to confess their actions because denial does not work in reconciliation. He concludes by stating that all these processes have to be conducted while respecting the local traditions to be effective.³⁶⁵ Salih Mahmoud Osman, a lawyer who defends people that have been victims of human rights abuses in Darfur argues in a similar way. Mr Osman states that there is no peace without justice, and the reason why justice is so important is not revenge but accountability. If perpetrators are punished for their crimes and do not come away with impunity it has a preventive effect on future possible atrocities. Justice also has a healing effect on the victims since the worst feeling for a victim is to not be seen. Moreover, reconciliation is an important factor for creating long-lasting peace and also from this perspective there has to be justice and accountability.³⁶⁶ In 2004 Salih Mahmoud Osman was in jail for seven months because of his work. After being released from prison Mr Osman has been granted an award from the Human Rights Watch in 2005.³⁶⁷ Also, in 2007 the European Parliament honoured the work of Mr. Osman by awarding him the European Union's most prestigious human rights award, the Sakharov Price.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁴ Mohammed, Adam Azzain, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Public Administration and Federal Government University of Khartoum, interviewed 3 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁶⁵ Khalil el-Amin, Associate Professor, Development Studies Research Institute, University of Khartoum, interviewed 5 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁶⁶ Mahmoud Osman Salih, Advocate Human Rights Lawyer MP Sudan National Assembly, interviewed 14 November 2007, Khartoum

³⁶⁷ HRW (2005-10-27) "HRW Honors Sudanese Activist Darfur Lawyer Defends Victim of Ethnic Oppression" <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/25/sudan11919.htm>

³⁶⁸ International Herald Tribune (2007-10-25) "Sudanese Lawyer Salih Mahmoud Osman wins EU human rights award" <http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2007/10/25/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Human-Rights.php>

“Barking Without Biting”

One factor pointed out as a major problem with how the international community is interacting with the parties involved in the Darfur crises (foremost the GoS) is the practice of “barking without biting”. This policy has been prevailing for so long time that the warring parties no longer regard the threats promoted by the international community as credible.³⁶⁹ This view from the involved parties can be seen in a statement by a senior Sudanese government spokesman who in July 2006 said that they no longer took the threats from the United Nations seriously since they had been threatened so many times before.³⁷⁰ During the negotiations in Abuja, which led to the signing of the DPA, representatives from the international community on several occasions stated that their patience was running out and set new deadlines for the negotiations to be finalized. The problem was that the threats were not followed up in any way and the representatives for the international community did not have any plan for how these threats should be followed up.³⁷¹ Many of these threats targeted Khalil Ibrahim and Abdul Wahid to get them to sign the DPA. However, they did not sign and none of the threats were realised. Another connected problem focused upon by Dr Musa Adam Abdul at the University of Khartoum is that sometimes the international community is pressing some parties to sign an agreement even though they know that it is not a fair agreement. He continues to state that this happened in Abuja and might happen again. In relation to this he continues to argue that it is very contradictory to threaten to punish non-signatories when you know that the agreement is not fair.³⁷²

In March 2004 the UN Humanitarian coordinator for Sudan Mukesh Kapila stated that the numbers involved was the only difference he saw between Darfur and Rwanda. A few days later he followed up this statement by declaring that he did not:

³⁶⁹ Enough (2007) “A Plan B for Darfur” <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/plan_b_20070509.pdf

³⁷⁰ Nathan, Laurice (2007) “The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement” in de Waal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 249

³⁷¹ Nathan, Laurice (2007) “The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement” in de Waal (ed.) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 249

³⁷² Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

“see any reason why the international community should not consider some sort of international court or mechanism to bring to trial the individuals who are masterminding or committing war crimes in Darfur.”³⁷³

This statement brought the international attention to the issue of Darfur and the international pressure that followed upon that helped in getting the warring parties to sign a Humanitarian Ceasefire. The time after these statements and the Humanitarian Ceasefire saw a sharp drop in attacks against villages in Darfur. The international community followed up this focus on Darfur with a visit to the region by Kofi Annan and Colin Powell in the end of June 2004. The expectations were high upon this visit but they did not come up with any concrete steps to end the crises in Darfur. This failure was perceived as a weakening of the pressure on the parties in Darfur and after their visit the number of attacks on villages rose sharply again.³⁷⁴ This is an example of when barking without biting has had disastrous effects for the civil population in Darfur.

Many also argue that this is the prevailing manner that the UN is acting in when it is not implementing its resolutions. At the moment several UN-resolutions are imposed but not enhanced and that has a deplorable effect on the situation on the ground in Darfur.³⁷⁵ The General Assembly in the UN has taken over 30 resolutions about Darfur but has not implemented any of these, claims rebel representatives. Mokhtar A. Adam from the SLM/A-Khameese, part of the United Resistance Front (URF), points out the lack of implementation of UN-resolutions as one of the most severe problems in the Darfur crisis. He says that he hopes that the UN could implement at least some of these issues, for example disarming the Janjaweed. Khamees Alsakker, from the same group, state that the international community is adopting numerous of resolutions, declarations etc but it is not strong enough, the response from international community must be harder and quicker.³⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW) argues in the same manner and

³⁷³ Petersen, A.H. & Tullin, L. (2006). *The Scorched Earth of Darfur: Patterns in death and destruction reported by the people of Darfur. January 2001- September 2005*. Copenhagen: Bloodhound. 22pp. + Appendices. p. 16

³⁷⁴ Petersen, A.H. & Tullin, L. (2006). *The Scorched Earth of Darfur: Patterns in death and destruction reported by the people of Darfur. January 2001- September 2005*. Copenhagen: Bloodhound. 22pp. + Appendices. Figure 5 p. 16

³⁷⁵ Trayo A Ali, SLM/A (MM), advisor to Minni Minawi, interviewed 18 November 2007, Khartoum

³⁷⁶ Khamees Abdallah and Mokhtar A. Adam, SLM/A-Khamees part of URF, interviewed 25 November 2007, Juba

say that the international response has to be harder for the atrocities conducted in Darfur. Adopted UN resolutions that has not been followed up in an appropriate way include disarming of Janjaweed, co-operating with the International Criminal Court and deployment of peacekeepers.³⁷⁷ One mistake that the international community repeatedly is doing is that it starts too hard with a tough position, that it can not hold, or implement, which makes them to back down, argues representatives from the JEM-CL, part of the URF. It is better to do it the opposite way, start with some smaller things that you can assure and implement and then increase. By doing that you will become stronger but by doing the other round your opponent gets stronger. The JEM-CL chief negotiator concludes by saying that the international community must be more realistic and just state things and put on resolutions that it can reach.³⁷⁸ The HRW carries out a similar approach when they promote a ten step programme that can make immediate changes for the situation in Darfur. Later this program can be supplemented with more long-range changes but it is very important to get some quick changes both for the dreadful situation in Darfur and to get a momentum in the process.³⁷⁹

The practice to threat and not enforcing the threats is not just inappropriate but counter-productive according to Dr Musa Adam Abdul – Jalil, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum. He elaborates by saying that there are three ways in how these non-enforced threats worsen the situation for the Darfurians. Firstly, the threats raise the expectations among the local population in Darfur and create extensive disappointments when they are not enforced. This is especially important since many of the threats are announced in the media. Secondly, if these threats stop the rebels get the chance to build their strategy on the reality instead of hoping for internationals intervening in Darfur; now a lot of the tactic is build upon assumptions instead of real facts. Thirdly, the threats from the West increase the chances for the NCP to get funding from organisations with an Islamist agenda. The GoS often publicly argues in an Islamist way and says that it is threatened by a Zionist complot and these threats from the international community sometimes play a part in this argumentation. Dr Musa concludes by answering the question on what the international community can do to put pressure on

³⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch (2007) “Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design” p.55-59 <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/sudan0907/sudan0907webtext.pdf>

³⁷⁸ Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

³⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch (2007) “Ten Steps for Darfur – Implementation Report” <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/05/darfur17488.htm>

the government of Sudan with: “if they can not do anything else, at least they can shut up”.³⁸⁰

Discussion About International Response

The complexities of Sudan in general, and Darfur in particular, require a multilateral approach by the international community. Also historical accounts show that multilateralism has worked better than unilateralism when it comes to Sudan. Unfortunately this multilateralism is lacking at the moment. Another general lesson from history is that constructive engagement is not feasible when it comes to the NIF/NCP, some form of enforcement must be part of the policy carried out by the international community.

To be able to get improvements in Darfur and a fruitful implementation process of the CPA, a situation has to be created where the warring parties see commitment to the implementation of the CPA and progress in Darfur as less costly than continued unwillingness to do so. This could be done with both carrots and sticks. To raise the NCP willingness for implementation of CPA, a carrot could be a secured part of the oil-revenues in the South even after the referendum³⁸¹ and an example of sticks could be international sanctions. If the international community wants to create a change in Sudan, an investigation of how their earlier efforts have been received by Sudan is essential. There is an overwhelming consensus among experts on Sudan that the NCP is mostly to blame for the continuous wars in Sudan, so looking into how NCP has reacted on external involvement is especially central. The promotion of the ICC-accused Ahmed Harun to positions with responsibility to investigate the abuses perpetrated in Darfur shows that the Sudanese government does not see any reason for being co-operative with the ICC that symbolises the international community. The January 2008 appointment of Musa Hilal to a governmental position is another example of how the Sudanese government sees working with the international community as secondary to other issues. Musa Hilal is under UN-sanctions, widely recognised as the most notorious Janjaweed

³⁸⁰ Abdul – Jalil, Musa Adam, Associate Professor, Head of Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, interviewed 8 December 2007, Khartoum

³⁸¹ Here lessons could be learned from the Aceh 2005 peace agreement, between the Indonesian Government and GAM (Free Aceh Movement) since its also regulates nature resources and this is an agreement that have held this far. See UCDP (2008) Uppsala Conflict Database or <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/govidn-idn-l5aug.pdf> for the full agreement

leader but the international condemnation that the government knew would follow upon such an appointment was indisputably subordinate to trying to secure the loyalty of some powerful forces in Darfur. Musa Hilal and Harun are examples that constructive engagement with the NCP does not work, instead there has to be some enforcement mechanism to make the regime in Khartoum co-operative. The appointment of Musa Hilal also shows the absurdity of letting the government being responsible for disarming the Janjaweed. Now when the most infamous Janjaweed leader is part of the government, it is like asking the government to disarm itself.

“To bark without biting”, to threaten but not follow up, or to make empty noises are different wording used for describing the prevailing policy among the international community towards Darfur. So why is the international community “barking without biting”? One reason for making the noise is probably an aspiration that it will really make a change. Another reason for “barking” is that among different NGOs and civilians (especially in the United States) Darfur is a focused issue and hence it is important for politicians to state that they are serious about Darfur. But what is the reason for not “biting”? In contrast to the former the latter is arguably more country specific. To follow up on threats and make a real change in such a complex issue as Darfur takes a huge amount of commitment that the international community currently is lacking. The United Nations has had some extraordinary effects when it comes to the humanitarian situation in Darfur. But when the UN wants to act in a stronger way when it comes to other issues, it suffers from not having support of all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. China and Russia have several times restrained the UNSC from acting strongly on the Darfur issue. The United States reluctance to act harder against Sudan is mostly due to their counter-terrorism co-operation with Khartoum. Since the US and some other countries are hesitant to act more strongly on Darfur for various reasons, this opens up a possibility for the EU to be a leading actor. Another reason for the EU and not the US taking the lead in the international response to the regime in Khartoum, is that it constantly uses an Islamic rhetoric and blames Israel and the United States for perpetrating an anti-Islamic agenda against Sudan. If the international response is broad and not led by the US, it will decrease the legitimacy of such rhetoric. However, the EU has not taken this role, rather its response has been purely humanitarian. Examples of areas where the EU has been criticised for not being active enough is it has not provided the needed equipment for UNAMID and in contrast to the US and the UN the EU does not have any sanctions against Sudan.

To go through China to put pressure on the regime in Khartoum is an often-heard argument among human right activists. This argument is

understandable since China is the country with the most leverage on GoS as it buys Sudanese oil and sells most of the weapons Sudan is buying. However, when the argument is raised by politicians within the EU, it loses some credibility since there are EU-companies that are helping Sudan produce the oil that later is sold to China. However, it can still be fruitful to try to pressure China so that it will apply a more peace-enhancing policy. China's interest in Sudan is economic and if you can convince it that it would be economically beneficial for China to work for an end to the different crises in Sudan, it is possible that China would make this policy shift. One possible way of doing this is if other major powers would assure China that it would get the right to buy the Sudanese oil even if Sudan transformed into a more peaceful and democratic state. It is also possible to emphasise that a peaceful Sudan might be able to extract more oil than it is doing at the moment, since potential oil-fields are not used at the moment because of the conflict situation. Another criticised role that China plays in Sudan is as the main weapon provider for the regime in Khartoum. They are not breaking the arms embargo in Darfur, but still Chinese weapons are heavily used in the war. This shows that the UN does not have the ability to monitor its own arms arms embargo. The measure at the moment is inadequate since weapons can be sold to Khartoum, and nothing prevents Khartoum from taking the weapons to Darfur. Hence the mandate of UNAMID should be extended so that it also includes monitoring the UN embargo. In addition, primarily China but also other arms providers to Sudan such as Russia, should restrict their arm transfers to Sudan since there is clear evidence that these arms are used in the conflict in Darfur.

8. Conclusions and Future Research

The crisis in Darfur has its roots in interlinked, parallel, conflicts consisting of communal conflicts, centre-periphery conflicts and conflicts between different local elites. A solution requires awareness of these different conflicts. Moreover, future studies in this area are needed since the interaction between parallel conflicts in the same region is an underdeveloped research area. The connection between communal conflicts and more traditional conflicts has not been focused upon in previous research. In Darfur, communal conflicts between Fur and Arabs, as well as between Zaghawa and Arabs, have been one of the root causes of the current situation. Moreover, new communal conflicts have also been a result of the crisis. An example is the conflict in 2007 between the two ethnic groups with a more “Arab” identity, Terjam and Rizeigat Abbala.

Sudan has experienced conflict to different extent in the south, west, east and north and a focused study of how these conflicts interact could be fruitful. Common to them is that they are examples of a centre-periphery conflict between Khartoum and the marginalised areas. Therefore, arguably, a solution to these conflicts requires a change at the centre and the best chance for such a change is the CPA-stipulated 2009 elections. The main grievances that rebel groups usually state in Sudan, no matter which region they are based in, are economic marginalisation and a lack of political influence. If there are free and fair elections in 2009 this might open up possibilities for the creation of a more peaceful Sudan. However, it is important to note the difficulties involved leading up to the elections as well as the doubt whether the elections will be free and fair that has been stressed by different experts.

UNAMID is the first hybrid peace-keeping force in the world and there seem to be many uncertainties about this force that emanate from this fact. Therefore careful research about other peacekeeping forces, especially when it comes to command structure, has to be conducted so that UNAMID can learn from that and work as effectively as possible. In addition, UNAMID must be scrutinized in detail to investigate the pros and cons of a hybrid-force for the future. When it comes to the negotiations, the joint UN/AU team faces extraordinary challenges in every step of the process. Unification of the rebels and the negotiations themselves are all

very complicated issues but looking into the history of Sudan the most severe challenge to getting a lasting peace in Darfur will probably be the implementation of an agreement.³⁸² A fear raised by academics in Khartoum is that there is a risk that an agreement could be seen as just belonging to some ethnic groups, provoking others to take up arms. This danger must be taken seriously and an agreement has to attempt to be so broad and “Darfurian” as possible to diminish this risk

The international response to the crisis in Darfur has achieved some extraordinary results when it comes to the humanitarian response. However, in other ways there has been a lack of co-ordination, coherence and commitment which has severely weakened the response from the international community. The reaction by the international community has been characterized by threats that have not been followed up, making the international community lose credibility among the different Sudanese actors. This has to change if the international community is to play a more decisive positive role in Sudan. The historical record of dealing with the regime in Khartoum shows that some form of enforcement policy has worked better than constructive engagement. In addition, patience, co-ordination and commitment have been crucial, when the international community has played a vital role in Sudan. Lessons could, for instance, be learned from the signing of the CPA where rebel unity, intense and sustained international diplomacy, and White House engagement were crucial. Also worth noting from the signing of the CPA, was that it combined engagement by neighbouring countries through IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development the regional organization for the Horn of Africa) and international players with high enforcement capacities such as the United States and United Kingdom. A similar momentum of engagement and patience has to be created now. The negotiations could continue to be led by the joint UN/AU team, but the UN lacks leverage capacity since some of the permanent members of UN Security Council resist too tough action on the Darfur issue. Hence, some other powers have to step in and add enforcement capacity to the joint UN/AU team. This is necessary both when it comes to negotiations and deployment of UNAMID. In addition, the enforcement mechanisms must work to put pressure both on the regime in Khartoum and on different rebel groups. However, it is extremely important that the prevailing policy (of threatening but not imposing the threats when demands are unmet) ends since this strategy has

³⁸² For a book examining the problems of implementation of peace-agreement see *Ending Civil Wars: The implementation of peace agreements* edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (2002)

not just shown itself to be ineffective, but also to be counter-productive. An example how this could be counterproductive is that it creates expectations among people living in the camps and when these expectations are not fulfilled it leads to increased frustration. Therefore, threats should only be issued if there is a guarantor who is willing to impose the threats. Moreover, threats should be part of a very clear schedule with set deadlines, without this the international community's credibility will be eroded further.

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The point of departure for this report is a field study conducted by the author in Sudan during the fall of 2007. The purpose of this analysis is to deepen knowledge about the current crisis in Darfur through a broad approach. The study includes a short background to the crisis in Darfur and examines some of the major actors, the situation on the ground, the peacekeeping process, the negotiations and the international response. It is argued that the current situation in Darfur is a result of three parallel and interlinked types of conflicts: communal conflicts, conflicts between different regional elites, and periphery-centre conflicts. It is also argued that a comprehensive approach to Sudan is needed to find a lasting solution in Darfur and other areas of Sudan. Moreover, the report stresses the vast problems that both the negotiations and the peacekeeping operation face at the moment. Finally, a call is made for a stronger commitment from, and co-ordination by, the international community to solve the conflicts in Darfur.

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