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## Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change

By I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

**ABSTRACT:** Regional conflicts can be thought of in three different ways, each suggesting a different approach to their resolution. One is as a clash of conflicting unilateral solutions, which then require a formula for a joint or multilateral outcome satisfactory to both parties. A second is as a succession of opposing policies based on cost-benefit calculations, which then require a ripe moment—comprising specific components of mutually hurting stalemate, impending catastrophe, and a formula for a way out—for resolution. A third is as an event in a process of change, requiring the negotiation of a new regime to replace an old one that previously embodied certain expectations and behaviors. These different notions are illustrated with many examples of regional conflicts and their attempted—and sometimes successful—resolution.

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**NOTE:** An expanded version of this article will appear as chapter 20 in *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*, ed. Victor Kremenyuk (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991).

REGIONAL conflicts present a real challenge for the maintenance of world order and the resolution and management of international political issues. Such conflicts often involve basic values of territorial integrity and political independence as well as the domestic political consolidation and international rivalries of recently independent countries in the Third World. As such they are not trivial. Their stakes are often typical of the high political values that have characterized state building in more established states and have animated the growth of the world political system. Furthermore, they frequently involve external powers, and sometimes superpowers themselves, called in to lend strength to the parties to the conflict or inserting themselves because of their own perceived interests in the parties or the outcomes. Since regional conflicts involve serious stakes for the parties and carry with them the danger of transcending the original actors and becoming no longer merely regional, they deserve serious attention.

An understanding of the mechanisms and possibilities of regional conflict reduction can be gained by linking management and resolution to theories of conflict itself.<sup>1</sup> A very basic notion sees conflict as a simple contest of parties each trying to impose a unilateral solution to a problem. In this view, conflict management and resolution mean finding a multilateral solution to the problem

that replaces the attempt of each to impose its will. The second notion sees conflict as an exercise in which parties will do what they want as long as the cost-benefit ratio stays below a certain level. Rather than contending with others as a source of conflict, parties contend with themselves. Conflict management and resolution then become a matter of comparing costs and benefits by calculating the opportunities offered by circumstances as viewed from each side. In this view, as opposed to the first, conflict, and its resolution, is not just a matter of contending wills but of the costs and advantages inherent in the context at any given time.

The third notion of conflict is both more complex and more benign. It sees conflict as the result of changes in patterns of world order or regimes and not just of contending wills or more or less costly contexts. Accepted patterns of action are continually challenged, but at some point, they begin to break down, the requirements of the new situation have to be identified, and a new order has to be established. The process is both lengthy and uncertain, and yet neither resolution nor even management of specific conflicts takes on meaning and durability only as part of regime testing and formation. Conflict and conflict reduction become part of an evolutionary process.

Each of the views of conflict and the measures of conflict reduction that they suggest fit into the following approach, providing a nest of concepts by which to analyze situations and appropriate responses.

1. Cf. Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin, *Social Conflict* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 89-96, 109.

### FORMULAS FOR MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS

Since cooperation requires compromise over ends and means, people prefer to accomplish their objectives by themselves whenever possible. The desire to act alone may sound out of place in an interdependent world, but it is basic to the egotistical nature of rational actors. In Namibia, Vietnam, Algeria, the Falklands, Palestine, Kuwait, Afghanistan, the Western Sahara, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere, the party in possession at any time has wanted to be able to solve the problem unilaterally, by holding on and denying the claims or even the existence of the challenging party. The latter, in turn, feeling itself driven to desperation, wants to resolve the problem in its own unilateral fashion. When the two attempts at unilateral resolution run up against each other, there is conflict, and either one side can prevail or the conflict must be resolved by negotiation.

Seen in these terms, conflict management and resolution become an effort to make multilateral outcomes more attractive than unilateral ones. The usual concept of negotiation, as a process of exchanging concessions or reaching below the bottom line, makes negotiation sound like half a defeat and does not provide guidelines for making multilateral outcomes enticing. It is no surprise that negotiations conducted primarily as a mutual-concession process often come to naught, as seen in Cyprus and the Falklands. Conflict resolution involves finding a formula for agreement, conceived as a common

definition of the problem and a principle of justice or terms of trade that can frame a solution.<sup>2</sup> Backing up these positive measures, but insufficient in themselves, are negative pressures to make multilateral solutions more attractive. The negative pressures lower parties' expectations and security points, outcomes obtained without negotiation.

Parties turn to multilateral solutions when unilateral solutions are out of reach. Unilateral solutions become impossible because of inadequate unilateral resources, because of effective counteraction by another party, or because of the innate impossibility of carrying out the action—like a handshake—alone. Often an adversary may prefer to forgo the outcome if the other party cannot be kept from sharing in it—the adversary refuses to have a handshake if it means recognition, for example. This is a particularly frequent perception when the outcome is to be a newly created good and therefore one that the party has lived without all along anyhow. Unresolved border disputes at a low level of hostilities—such as Morocco-Algeria, Ethiopia-Sudan, but even Iran-Iraq, where the level was not low—are an example. Palestine, the Falklands, and Cyprus are excellent examples of continuing conflicts in which parties cling to the vain hope of resolving the issue by themselves and refuse to do it jointly

2. The notion of formula is developed in I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); I. William Zartman, ed., *The Negotiation Process* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978).

with the other party, who has a veto on its ultimate settlement.

The party that wants the multilateral solution must show the unilateralist that there is a solution available that will leave the other better off, not just through the end of a costly conflict but through a multilateral outcome that is attractive for the other party, and that it is willing and able to grant the other side a solution in exchange for recognition of its own place as part of the problem. The examples are not as frequent as one might like; however, Somalia can serve as one. Somalia's management of its conflict with Djibouti has come through its renunciation of its territorial claim in exchange for Ethiopian renunciation of a counterclaim, leaving Djibouti independent and the Djibouti Somalis a dominant force in the independent political system. Similar trade-offs were discussed in the 1986-88 conflict management arrangements with Ethiopia, a conflict still awaiting its resolution.<sup>3</sup>

A salient case of regional conflict management that has been treated as a search for a formula capable of enticing the parties away from competing attempts at imposing a unilateral solution is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<sup>4</sup> The first two decades of

the conflict were punctuated by wars and other vain attempts to make division palatable. But the third decade was opened by the articulation of a formula—"territory for security"—in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and its implementation along the Syrian and, above all, the Egyptian borders. Unfortunately, the fourth decade was wasted in trying to apply the formula to the Lebanese and Jordanian borders, where it did not fit because territory and security were not the predominant ingredients of the situation. A new formula is needed, which also takes into account population and juridical entity, in order to apply to the Palestinian part of the conflict. Nonetheless, "territory for security" stands as a particularly concise example of a trade-off formula, serving as the basis for general formula notions such as normalization around established boundaries, an overarching definition of a goal designed to make a multilateral solution possible and more attractive than mutually frustrating attempts at imposing a unilateral solution.

In the same vein, the trade-offs proposed in the article in this *Annals* issue by Zviagelskaia as a basis for a formula for a solution to the Palestinian problem, where the Palestinian right to return is acknowledged in exchange for the Israeli right to remain, translates a large sense of impartial justice—equivalent exchanges—and also a broader sense of a future bistate situation in which two populations coexist, juxtaposed and intermingled. Although obviously not yet a reality, this

3. I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 3.

4. See Jeffrey Rubin, ed., *The Dynamics of Third Party Intervention* (New York: Praeger, 1981); S. Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982); William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986); Ga-

briel Ben Dor and David Dewitt, eds., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1987).

formula could represent a goal at which to aim.

The Panama Canal dispute is another case of regional conflict that has been resolved through the search for appropriate formulas.<sup>5</sup> It took Panama a decade after the flag riots of 1964 to impress the United States with the fact that contested unilateral operation based on the 1903 treaty would be so costly as to be impossible. Thereupon, the two states turned to an effort, beginning with the Tack principles in 1973, to set up a formula that would combine elements that were important to each of the parties. The resulting formula, "use in exchange for sovereignty, with paired defense," served as a set of guidelines for the subsequent details of the treaty.

The conflict over Namibian independence was ended through a search based on successive formulas for a just, balanced outcome.<sup>6</sup> However, the formula that underlay the first attempt—"one-person-one-vote elections under UN and South African auspices"—while just in terms of current international law, did not contain equivalent trade-offs for both sides and so was not sufficient to entice all of the parties away from their

efforts to impose a unilateral solution. Originally formulated as U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, it provided a way to independence for Namibia but no compensations for South Africa that would make the outcome in any way attractive. But when Namibia was linked with Angola, and the formula was extended to a trade-off providing mutual military withdrawal from both territories, the framework for an agreement attractive to both sides was available. It would have taken a fully paired set of trade-offs, providing not just mutual military withdrawal but also paired one-person-one-vote elections, to cover all the issues of the two conflicts—not only Namibian independence and Cuban troops but also Angolan national reconciliation. Such a comprehensive settlement did not come about until two and a half years later, in June 1991.

Formula alone, however, does not explain the entire process of managing or resolving regional conflicts. Potential formulas and trade-offs are lying around for the taking, and often the final resolving package for a dispute is found in the archives of the early discussions of the problem. "NIBMAR"—"No Independence before Majority African Rule"—was launched as a slogan as early as the time of the unilateral declaration of independence of Rhodesia to bar attempts at compromise; when real independence finally came 14 years later, it was based on the NIBMAR formula.<sup>7</sup> Regional autonomy and a trade-off of economic cooperation for

5. William Jorden, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); W. Mark Habeeb, *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); W. Mark Habeeb and I. William Zartman, *The Panama Canal Negotiations* (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1986); Diane Bendahman and John McDonald, eds., *Perspectives on Negotiation* (Washington, DC: Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1986).

6. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*, chap. 5.

7. Steven Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

a confirming referendum have been mooted as a fair formula for resolving the Western Sahara conflict involving Morocco and Algeria ever since its beginning in the mid-1970s, but it was not scheduled to be implemented until 1991.<sup>8</sup> Something more than mere enticements to a positive-sum solution on a multilateral track is clearly needed.

#### RIPE MOMENTS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A more time-oriented view of conflict goes beyond the notion of absolute incompatibilities of will and solutions and posits the idea that at any moment policies are chosen from among many desirable goals on the basis of comparative costs and benefits. Since these can be altered by both the external context and the parties' interactions, some moments are better than others for managing and resolving conflict. Thus the course of the conflict itself can be an effective influence on its management, and an evaluation of when and how to use carrots and sticks is important to an assessment of the possibilities for resolution. In this approach, the life cycle of the conflict, including its intensification, escalation, turning points, and crises, is as important in determining the chances of settlement as are the various outcomes.

The basic component of a ripe moment is a deadlock that keeps both parties from achieving their goals.<sup>9</sup>

8. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*, chap. 2.

9. *Ibid.*, chap. 6; George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, ed. James

But deadlock alone is not enough; it must be a particular kind of stalemate that hurts both parties enough to make them feel uncomfortable and unable to break out by an escalation with acceptable costs. But a mutually hurting stalemate is not enough either; in order to be effective, it generally needs to be riveted to the parties' perception through a recent or looming catastrophe that acts as a deadline or is remembered as a warning and that threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs of a higher magnitude. But even this is not enough; it is not helpful to be painted into a corner, even a stifling one, if there is no way out. Finally, there must be not only a formula for a way out but an indication that the parties are willing in principle to choose it if it is attractive enough and that they will respond positively to the other's moves in that direction—a trait that can be termed "requitement."

It is a message of utmost importance, particularly in the light of the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91, that carrots or sticks alone will not get a party to the bargaining table. The two are required, as the model for the ripe moment suggests: the stalemate must be tight and hurting, reinforced by additional sticks if necessary, but there must also be inducements to choose the negotiated way out rather than make vain stabs at escalation. Furthermore, there is a particular characteristic to the laying on of

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Rosenau (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); Elmer Jackson, *Meeting of the Minds* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952); Oran Young, *The Intermediaries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).

sticks and escalation that produces the beginnings of movement. One party often seeks to escalate its way out of the stalemate only to be caught in an overly costly, unsuccessful attempt that it cannot maintain; the other party can contribute to the final ripening of the moment through an "escalation to raise," pointedly indicating its intent merely to produce a stalemate and pointedly refraining from escalating so far as to invite counterescalation.<sup>10</sup>

A number of regional conflicts have been handled in these terms. The war in the Western Sahara was waged on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, with the Polisario fighting on in the expectation that the burdens of the war would topple the Moroccan monarchy.<sup>11</sup> Instead, a stalemate was produced, but the threat of a catastrophe was largely removed by repeated Moroccan-Algerian agreements not to fight each other directly. Only when a number of external events weighed in, such as the fall of oil prices and the impending loss of European markets, and Morocco's defensive wall in the desert plus superpower disinterest blocked further chances of escalation, did the mutually hurting stalemate evolve, and even then it took the U.N. secretary-general and Saudi Arabia to provide parts of a way out in order for the possibilities of management leading toward resolution to appear. Yet the

absence of a real looming catastrophe and the uncertainty of requirement made it a real challenge to make that possibility a reality before the end of the secretary-general's term in 1992, the deadline that he had set for himself.

Cost-benefit analysis also explains why a settlement in Namibia and its neighbor, Angola, appeared when it did. Characterized initially as conflict management without conflict, the Namibian struggle for independence did not develop the possibilities for a mutually hurting stalemate or for a balanced formula attractive to both sides until the early 1980s, when explicit linkage brought in the Angolan problem as well, providing both a countervailing benefit and a gradually increasing cost for South Africa. Even then it was not until 1987 that the fully ripe moment appeared, based on a worsening economic situation for both sides and formed by a sudden escalation to call by the movement of a vastly increased number of Cuban troops to the Namibian border, providing both the hurting stalemate, the impending catastrophe, and a desire for a way out. The latter was crystallized by a formula provided both by the compound mediator and by the U.N. Secretariat.

The Zimbabwean conflict has been the subject of a serious debate over the question of a hurting stalemate, with some claims that the final agreement was snatched from the jaws of victory and defeat rather than from a mutually hurting stalemate.<sup>12</sup> Yet the

10. I. William Zartman, "Power Strategies in Deescalation," in *Timing and Deescalation*, ed. Louis Kriesberg (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming).

11. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*, chap. 2; John Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).

12. Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War*; Robert Matthews, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," in *Managing Regional Conflict*, ed.



debate may well be less sharp than would appear, since the case is an example of a hurting stalemate in a more dynamic sense; Zimbabwe is a case where stalemate was born of asymmetry, where a previously stronger side was weakening and a previously weaker side growing stronger, yet with victory still out of the short-term reach of the latter and the capacity to do damage still available to the former. The dynamic stalemate was dramatically exemplified in the situation after the war of October 1973 in the Middle East, where again the comeuppance to the formerly dominant power and the momentary surge of the reputedly weaker power, coupled with the mutual encirclement of the two armies on the banks of the Suez Canal, produced a mutually hurting stalemate in both symmetrical and dynamic terms. Costs and benefits were key to the calculations of the parties and to the tactics of the mediator.

The Iran-Iraq war was resolved on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis and a sense of the ripe moment. The stalemate grew out of the collapse of Iranian arms sources after both sides had been worn out by nine years of brutal war; the catastrophe was seen in the possibility of an Iraqi chemical missile raid on Tehran. Requite was shown in Iraq's earlier acceptance of U.N. cease-fire plans in 1982 and 1987, contingent on Iranian acceptance, which was finally obtained through Iraqi escalation to call at the

end of 1987 and early 1988. Again, the U.N. secretary-general provided the formula for an agreement, finally enacted in 1991, when the regional agenda changed and Iraq needed Iran more as an ally than as an enemy.

The cost-benefit notion of conflict leads to a clearer understanding of the conditions of management and resolution and of the relation between the two. It also raises some of the important dilemmas of the business: Is conflict the only way to get to resolution? Must relations be pushed to war and costly encounters before obvious formulas in the public domain can be adopted? Once the means of carrying out the conflict have been managed, what is the incentive for resolution? Analysts and practitioners are still looking for ways through these dilemmas.

#### CONFLICT AS REGIME CHANGE

In the third approach, conflict and resolution are two sides of the same coin. As in the previous approaches, this one includes the others in its broader coverage. It sees conflict as an earthquake, a shifting of structures and relations that produces strains to the point where a specific restructuring is required. The structure can be thought of by using the current notion of regimes, the rules and routines that govern behavior around specific issues in international—or other sociopolitical—relations.<sup>13</sup> Regimes are not only pat-

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Fen Osler Hampson and Brian Mandell, *International Journal* 45(2) (Spring 1990); Jeffrey Davidow, *A Peace in Southern Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Bendahman and McDonald, eds., *Perspectives on Negotiation*.

13. Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Oran Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and*

terns of behavior; they reflect power structures and regulate them at the same time. The broadest regimes are actually structures of world order, such as the colonial system or regional hegemonies.

Regimes are continually under challenge and are reaffirmed when they successfully overcome those challenges and reassert their structures and habits. But at times the challenges accumulate and begin to represent growing structural shifts, new issues, or an exhaustion of old answers. Forces favored by the existent regime exert their usual efforts to repel the challenges, with less and less success. An interregnum appears, in which new alternatives are proposed, debated, tried, discarded, and defended. During this process, structural relations continue to shift, until gradually the basis of a new regime is formed. Negotiation is necessary to create the replacement regime and have it accepted since there is no authority or decision rule in international relations to formalize a new order.

An understanding of the management and resolution of regional conflict within this ripening context brings in a number of crucial elements that the other approaches to conflict do not use or analyze. Conflicts are not resolved if the resolutions do not take into account the power relations between the parties, and they are unlikely to be durable if they are isolated from general routines, rules, and behaviors associated

with other, similar conflicts. Placing negotiations in an evolving context of regime change also helps explain why the search for a resolution takes so long. A shift from an old regime to a new one is an evolutionary process based on changes in reality that themselves take time, and it incorporates necessarily slow, incomplete, debated, and resisted changes in perceptions instead of unambiguous realities.

In this process of regime change, regional conflicts are eruptions that mark the challenges and changes in regimes. The Zimbabwean conflict, which has served as an example of analysis for the preceding two approaches, can also be interpreted as a case of ripening conflict and regime transition. Rhodesia was one of the last holdouts to challenge the collapse of the colonial order and its replacement by a large number of interacting, juridically independent and equal states. The Rhodesian attempt at a unilateral declaration of independence was the last effort to preserve the old regime under a new uniform; the subsequent effort at an internal settlement was part of the process of eliminating prominent alternatives before negotiating a settlement within the new regime. The guerrilla struggle, led by the Patriotic Front and its armies, forced the parties after 1965 to recognize the need for a new regime but also imposed a readjustment of the power relations in the country. Conflict resolution at Lancaster House in 1979, then, did not take place in a vacuum; its success was not predetermined, but its outcome was, since the direction of the settlement was indicated

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*the Environment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); idem, "The Politics of International Regime Formation," *International Organization*, 43(3):349-75 (May 1989).

by the evolution of the applicable regime.

The conflict in Cyprus, another special case in regime transition, began as an instance of decolonization in 1960 but then turned into a series of attempts at finding an appropriate institutional structure for a binational state.<sup>14</sup> Since the independence formula included Britain, Greece, and Turkey as guarantors, the possibilities of competitive intervention were always available to be invoked by local forces who wished to improve the formula in their favor. As a result, independence was repeatedly compromised; the colonial conflict was resolved by the negotiations for an independent regime, but the binational conflict was not, and attempts to try out alternatives and adjust new power relations destroyed the original independence formula. Rothman's article in this *Annals* issue examines the lengths to which parties must be taken at the present stage of the conflict to be able to restructure their perceptions and search for a new regime.

Central America is a different case, where the independence regime established at the beginning of the nineteenth century to replace the previous colonial regime was soon transformed into a hegemonic regime based on dominance by the United States in collaboration with national elites of the region.<sup>15</sup> The Panama

Canal dispute concerned an instance of colonization within, not of, a country. An attempt to provide a new treaty in 1967 was, like the Rhodesian internal settlement, a flawed effort at a resolving formula; the alternative had to be eliminated and it failed because it simply did not address the outstanding issues. Beyond the first approach, a new regime was needed because the world notion of legitimate relations had changed and Panama now had the legitimate power to make the canal inoperable. The 1977 treaty reflected these changes.

The Honduran conflict of 1954 was an attempt to break the old hegemonic regime, but it failed. In the Central American conflicts of the 1980s, centered around the Nicaraguan revolution and responses to it, the Arias and Esquipulas plans were attempts to set up a new security regime for the region and are still being elaborated and tested.<sup>16</sup> The situation bears marks of a hurting stalemate, also a sign of changing power relations.

Even in the absence of full regime transition and conflict resolution, regional conflict management can focus on the use of secondary regimes. Confidence-building measures and small security regimes are arrangements that permit de-escalation when ac-

14. Bendahman and McDonald, eds., *Perspectives on Negotiation*.

15. Morris Blachman et al., *Confronting Revolution: Security through Diplomacy in Central America* (New York: Pantheon, 1986); R. Fagen, *Forging Peace: The Challenge of Central America* (New York: Basil Blackwell,

1987); Liisa North and Tin Draimin, "The Decay of the Security Regime in Latin America," in *Managing Regional Conflict*, ed. Hampson and Mandell.

16. P. Terrence Hopmann, "Negotiating Peace in Central America," *Negotiation Journal*, 4(4):361-80 (Oct. 1988); Bruce Bagley and Juan Tokatlian, *Contadora: The Limits of Negotiation* (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1987).

tual resolution is not yet possible. Thus Ethiopia and Somalia provided for a set of rules of interstate behavior in the years 1986-88 to reduce the heat of the conflict and prepare for its subsequent resolution. The same thing happened in 1967, but when the de-escalation did not produce any further results a decade later, Somalia reescalated and went to war.<sup>17</sup> A more complicated security regime was established between Israel and Egypt in first a simple form in 1956, to be removed in 1967 and then restored in greater complexity in 1974 and 1975, leading to the basis of conflict resolution in 1979.<sup>18</sup>

The shape of the agreement is best analyzed through the concept of a formula that then determines the implementing details; the timing of the agreements is best seen through the notion of the ripe moment; but the evolving relationship is best seen as a security regime for changing alternatives and power relations between the two countries.<sup>19</sup>

### CONCLUSION

The current Persian Gulf crisis rudely reminds us that it is possible to have a clear understanding of a conflict in all its forms without gain-

17. Touval, *Peace Brokers*; Thomas J. Farer, *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979).

18. Janice Stein, ed., *Peacemaking in the Middle East* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1985); Nathan Pelcovitz, *Peacekeeping in the Sinai* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985).

19. Harold Saunders, *The Other Walls*, 2d ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

ing much insight into appropriate ways of conflict resolution. Regional conflict in the gulf—and indeed even linked to include the Palestinian problem as well—can be understood as a clash of unilateral pursuits of incompatible goals, as a cost-benefit exercise awaiting a ripe moment, and as a search for new systems of world order or at least as an attempt to take advantage of a breakdown in an old system not yet replaced by a new one. Yet formulas, ripe moments, and benign processes of regime change do not easily exorcize the conflict. The missing element is a desire to use the available ways of doing so, rather than taking advantage of an apparently ripe moment for escalating the conflict itself.

The situation recalls the distinction introduced in the classic work of Nicolson on diplomacy between the warrior and the shopkeeper.<sup>20</sup> The first was the leader who pursued conflict to victory alone, the second the leader who pursued conflict to a mutually satisfactory solution. In terms of modern game theory so helpful to thinking on conflict management and negotiation, the first sought zero-sum or win-lose situations and outcomes; the second, positive-sum or win-win results. Nicolson's warning, on the eve of World War II, was that a shopkeeper should not negotiate with a warrior. The nagging question, which he never answered, was, How to turn a warrior into a shopkeeper? There are indeed some conflicts, or some actors' views of conflict, that have moved beyond a search for solu-

20. Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939).

tions and instead aim at the destruction of the other side, the ultimate zero-sum situation. Once a conflict has arrived at this point, in the reality of perception, it is hard to turn it back as long as the warriors are in control.

The answer to the question, then, is that positive-sum ways of perceiving conflict need to be propagated before escalation brings the warrior to the fore. Such thinking does not

eliminate conflict and is not incompatible with it. It depends on conflict to trigger positive perceptions and creative conceptualization. As the gulf crisis indicates as well, the time for these various efforts to turn the conflict into reduction and resolution is to be sought before escalation, lest the parties—and the onlooking world—be required to wait for escalation to be played out in all its destructive potentialities.