

Seminar Publication on

Comprehensive Approach

**Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for
Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management**

Based on

**Comprehensive Approach Seminar 17 June 2008 Helsinki
Articles from International Actors and from National Delegations
Work of the CAS Research Team
Expertise of the Crisis Management Initiative**

Edited by: Crisis Management Initiative, Kristiina Rintakoski & Mikko Autti



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**CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
INITIATIVE**
Building Bridges for Sustainable Security

Crisis Management Initiative, Kristiina Rintakoski & Mikko Autti

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Note by President Martti Ahtisaari

Former President of the
Republic of Finland
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008
Chairman of the
Crisis Management Initiative



Increasingly, actors in multidimensional peacebuilding efforts have come to recognise that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs. Indeed, tackling the challenges of cooperation is now widely viewed as an operational imperative. The lessons learned for mission success over the 15 years of crisis management, stabilisation and peace support operations, whether conducted by the United Nations, the OSCE, the EU or coalitions of the willing, all point to the centrality of effective coordination between international actors and the local society. Moreover, while state-building tasks are often initiated in the context of international peace operations, they require long-term commitment. Development actors, including a subset of specialist peacebuilding NGOs, have demonstrated experience in post-conflict state-building and have, in practice, been at the forefront of doctrinal developments in areas such as community policing, rule of law, Security Sector Reform and dimensions of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

However, creating and maintaining coherence in the planning and implementation of interventions is a long term endeavour. It is important to note that national governments represented in different multilateral organisations play a vital role in bringing coherence to multilateral approaches. If the national approaches are consistent across international organisations, i.e. the representatives of a country in NATO, the UN, the OSCE and the EU speak with one voice, it is bound to have an impact. Unfortunately, this is currently not the case as the majority of governments' national agendas are not effectively coordinated.

Therefore, I would like to congratulate the Finnish Government on their initiative to bring together key players in the crisis management field in order to share information on practises at the national level promoting coherence and to establish how to continue increasing coherence at the multilateral level.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH SEMINAR

17 JUNE 2008 FINLANDIA HALL HELSINKI

Multinational, Inter-ministry Senior Leader Seminar on
Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Co-operation in Crisis Prevention and Management



The Comprehensive Approach Seminar was called and arranged by Finland as an inter-ministry effort. More than 200 senior leaders from international organisations and nations attended.

The key Finnish ministries involved in international crisis management participated in the seminar with their respective ministers making appearances.



Alexander Stubb
Minister for Foreign Affairs



Jyri Häkämies
Minister of Defence



Anne Holmlund
Minister of the Interior

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The seminar was made possible by the distinguished guest speakers addressing the current initiatives in their respective organisations and by the comprehensive inter-ministry delegations from the invited nations. The intense behind the scene work of the event management and background studies were crucial for the success of the seminar.

The organising ministries want to express their sincere gratitude especially to the multinational academic research group. Their input into the Read Ahead- package provided the seminar audience with good and relevant advance information. And finally, this publication was made possible by their enthusiastic work during and after the seminar. Thank you all!



Executive Summary

Due to the complexity of conflicts and crises, many governments and organisations are currently in a process of developing their concepts and approaches for comprehensive crisis management, which have not necessarily been shared with partners. Whilst there is no commonly accepted definition for the 'Comprehensive Approach', there is broad agreement that it implies the pursuit of an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions.

This report is based on the Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Prevention and Management Seminar (CAS) held on 17 June 2008 in Helsinki, Finland, and on relevant research carried out to support it. The aim of this report is to improve the sharing of information and understanding and provide a basis for discussing pragmatic ways and means of developing flexible and adaptive mechanisms, tools and processes for comprehensive crisis management that ultimately benefit the people suffering from crises and conflict. The report gives an overview of the international community's efforts as a whole – both international organisations' and national governments' endeavours to improve the coherence of their response to crises and conflicts. The report defines the key concepts relevant to the debate on the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and identifies challenges, opportunities and incentives for pursuing the matter further.

The third chapter of the report describes and analyses the Comprehensive Approaches adopted at a multilateral level. Multinational actors such as the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU are developing new concepts for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management. Even if substantial progress has been made by these organisations, they have a long way to go in developing internally coherent operational concepts. What's more, the organisations have an even longer way to go in developing models for mutual cooperation. Achieving a functioning culture of cooperation is far more important in relations between international organisations than formal structures, an area in which much has already been achieved.

The fourth chapter of the report gives an overview of the trends and gaps identified in the Whole-of-Government Approaches (WGA) by the 15 countries involved in the CA Seminar. It particularly reflects on the challenges that the international community needs to work together on to improve policy and practice in a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. The first analysis seems to indicate that WGA is still very much a concept and that first experiences from experimentation and practical cooperation efforts are building the necessary bridge from strategies to actual implementation. It is obvious that there is no, and probably never will be, one single definition of WGA or CA. A Comprehensive Approach will, rather, be a flexible amalgam of different approaches – a way of thinking or a method, rather than a mechanical process.

The fifth chapter brings forward a number of challenges and possibilities that the whole concept of Comprehensive Approach produces in the research community and among the actors involved in crisis management. The report clearly shows that a Comprehensive Approach is beneficial on all levels of crisis management: strategic, operational and tactical. Special attention should be paid to linking security and development together in fragile states and taking the local population and authorities increasingly into consideration in the field. Furthermore, the capabilities invested in various NGOs are assets which are currently underused by all crisis management actors. NGOs could play a much bigger role, for instance, in the training and research sectors.

The Comprehensive Approach is not an end in itself but a means to an end. The aim is not to build new structures and hierarchies, but to achieve better outcomes and to resolve a crisis in a sustainable way. The sixth chapter on the way forward looks at the cooperative development of the Comprehensive Approach at four parallel levels: Culture and Values, Doctrine and Strategy, Leadership and Structures, and Management. The Comprehensive Approach is all about developing mechanisms and cultures of understanding, sharing and collaboration, both vertically between nations and international organisations and horizontally between nations and between organisations. The chapter identifies several practical steps forward for all actors seeking to make their actions in crisis environments more coherent, flexible and effective.

1 Introduction

The international community has for some time recognised the need for a Comprehensive Approach in crisis management¹ as the nature of international crisis management operations has changed considerably in the last decade. Not only have such operations increased in frequency and size, but they have also become more complex. The erosion of state structures, the dissolution of entire states, as well as civil wars, create opportunities for armed groups and non-state actors. Moreover, they encourage terrorism, organised crime, corruption, and trafficking in humans and drugs. This report aims to give an overview of the efforts of the international community as a whole –both international organisations' and national governments' endeavours to improve the coherence of their response to crises and conflicts. The report will define the key concepts relevant to the debate on the Comprehensive Approach and identify challenges, opportunities and incentives for pursuing the matter further.

This report is based on the Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Prevention and Management Seminar (CAS) held on 17 June 2008 in Helsinki, Finland, and on the research² which was conducted to support it. The Seminar itself aspired to promote discussion and the exchange of views between various co-operative initiatives in the field of international crisis management, as well as to promote dialogue between key partners and actors internationally and across administrative sectors. The Seminar sought to provide an analytical framework for the co-operative continuation of the Comprehensive Approach (CA). While recognising the differences between various actors, there is a broadly shared view on the need and potential for co-operative development in international crisis management.

Before the seminar the Finnish organisers invited all participating organisations and governments to contribute a short article describing their approaches to crisis management and their means of trying to bring their different departments and resources together. All were asked to explain their conceptual thinking on the Comprehensive Approach to crisis management, leadership arrangements, planning processes, training, resources, interoperability and evaluation. Participants were also asked to analyse the key challenges and opportunities for the development of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. The organisational and national articles are included in this report as annexes. In addition, members of the research team contributed articles that further explore some of the key thematic issues, such as local ownership, information exchange and the culture of cooperation. These articles are also annexed to this report.

Many governments and organisations are currently in the processes of developing their concepts and approaches for comprehensive crisis management and these have not necessarily been shared with partners. The aim of this report is to improve the sharing of information and understanding and provide a basis to discuss pragmatic ways and means to develop flexible and adaptive mechanisms, tools and processes for comprehensive crisis management that ultimately benefit the people suffering from crises and conflict.

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- 1 The term Comprehensive Approach in this paper does not refer to any particular definition or approach. The views presented in this paper are of those of the Finnish-led research team. Crisis management is understood in this report as the coordinated actions taken to defuse conflicts or crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result. It covers the different terms and concepts used by different actors, such as peace support operations in the UN or reconstruction and stabilisation operations of the US.
 - 2 The CAS Research Team is composed of experts from the Crisis Management Initiative, National Defence University of Finland, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Crisis Management Center, Finnish Defence Forces International Centre, Finland's Futures Research Centre, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Norwegian Defence Staff College, Real Instituto Elcano and Bundeswehr Transformation Center. Research Team members are listed in the annex of this report.

2 Background of the Comprehensive Approach

Managing complex conflicts and crises requires a wide range of internal and external actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international agencies, to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort. Security and development cannot be guaranteed by the efforts of any one nation or organisation alone. Instead, it requires effective multilateralism and a networked approach combining in the best possible way all available civil and military instruments. Political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others.

The amount and complexity of the actors, both internal and external, is a particular challenge from the perspective of the Comprehensive Approach. Internal actors vary from governmental officials and parties in the conflict to private sector agents and local NGOs. The variety of external actors can include peace operation(s), other international organisations and NGOs, donor governments and representatives of the private sector. This complexity highlights the need to develop coherence and coordination at different levels in parallel, within an organisation or government, between organisations and governments and between external and internal actors in crisis areas. There is broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately a reduced capacity for delivery.

Multinational actors such as the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU as well as many nation states are developing new concepts for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management. These include models and concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach of MNE5, NATO's 'Effects-based Approach to Operations (EBAO)', 'Whole-of-Government' approaches in national governments, and the United Nations' 'integrated missions' concept.

Whilst there is no commonly accepted definition for 'Comprehensive Approach', there is broad agreement that it implies pursuing an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions.

The report³ from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) preparatory workshop identifies different degrees of coherence for interagency relationships, namely Coherence, Cooperation, Collaboration & Coordination and Coexistence. Various actors may operate in a more or less comprehensive fashion, depending on their motivations, identities and organisational independence.

The rationale behind the Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA)⁴ is two-fold. The first motive is to avoid duplication of efforts, interfering with the plans of other departments, and the consequent waste of energy and resources. The resulting information flowing between actors increases situational awareness and enhances the capacity for 'strategic' planning and intelligent decision-making, including more awareness of second- and third-order effects. The second motivation for a Whole-of-Government Approach stems from a recognition that the goals of military and civilian organisations are co-dependent: without security, development cannot happen, and without

3 Comprehensive Approach - Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management. Karsten Friis & Pia Jarmyr (eds); NUPI, 2008.

4 There is no one established abbreviation for the Whole-of-Government approach. This paper uses WGA, which was adopted in the OECD as an abbreviation.

development, lasting security cannot be sustained. Harmonising these efforts requires compromises and developing understanding between military and non-military actors. The distinguishing characteristic of the Whole-of-Government Approach is that there is an emphasis on objectives shared across organisational boundaries, as opposed to working solely within a ministry. WGA has been developed particularly in the context of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG)⁵. Meeting the special needs of fragile states often requires the use of a range of instruments in addition to aid—including humanitarian assistance, diplomacy, security, justice, and financial measures such as debt relief. A coherent Whole-of-Government Approach is therefore required of international actors, those agencies responsible for e.g. political, security, justice, and financial affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance with respect to the mandates of each agency. To improve knowledge of existing good practice in the area, FSG is conducting work on evaluating existing practice in Whole-of-Government initiatives, and identifying useful approaches and new directions for the future, looking for examples at the issues of Integrated Planning, Diplomacy and Development, and Public Financial Management. The OECD DAC has also worked in developing WGA guidance for Security Sector Reform.

A vital question is how multinational Comprehensive Approaches and national Whole-of-Government Approaches interact and what the relationship between them is. When national policies are developed according to WGA it is crucial to take into consideration not only national concerns, but also those of a higher level, i.e. the strategies of those organisations with which national agencies are going to interact with in the field. It is perhaps useful to distinguish between WGA as a policy and WGA operations. The former is about developing and ensuring a consistent national policy in various fora and organisations, the latter describes the actual work that all government agencies do together in the field.

5 See further Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States, DAC Guidelines and reference series, A DAC reference document, OECD, 2006.

3 Comprehensive Approaches at the multilateral level

This chapter will briefly review Comprehensive Approaches adopted at the multinational level: in the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as in the context of the Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5). The chapter will also discuss the identified good practises as well as challenges to be addressed.

3.1 The United Nations

The UN Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions describes the concept as follows: "An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner". Peacekeeping also includes participating in humanitarian assistance, a field in which the UN has a leading role in the world.

The Integrated Missions concept thus refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach among the political, security, development and human rights sectors and, where appropriate, humanitarian UN actors at the country level.⁶

The point of view from the field level is that CA / Integrated Approach methods look and work well 'on paper', but the critical question to address is how to put them into practice in the field. In practise, there is no unified definition of the concept, nor are there set templates for integration. A variety of practices have emerged based on different actors' and different missions' own interpretations of the concept, some being more successful than others.

3.2 The European Union

The European Union, like other actors in the field of crisis management, has been grappling with the overarching issue of how to generate greater civil-military coherence. The EU has developed its concept for Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), which refers to internal EU processes, both civil-military processes within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as to civil-civil processes between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Commission competencies. This poses a series of distinct challenges: How to better coordinate the EU's civil and military crisis management tools within the CFSP; how to achieve better coherence between the ESDP and those activities that are planned and implemented by the Commission; how to align EU Member States' ongoing national activities; and how to improve cooperation between the EU and other actors such as the UN, OSCE and NATO. Furthermore, within the CFSP/ESDP context the EU has developed the concept for Civ-

6 United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005. See also United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) 13 June 2006 which is annexed to this report.

il Military Coordination (CMCO) that addresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of an ESDP operation.

At the field level the case of the EU Force in Chad is probably the best example of the EU's CA. The operation is carried out in close cooperation with the UN's MINURCAT operation, which is mostly funded by the Commission's Stability Instrument. The EUFOR Chad/RCA is the most multinational operation the EU has ever carried out in Africa and its main focus is on protecting refugee camps near the border of Sudan/Darfur. Regardless of how successful the EUFOR Chad/RCA turns out to be, the EU will need to develop its capabilities further. It will most likely keep on bringing together the necessary tools and root out the last remnants of internal institutional rivalries. It must be said that with the Lisbon Treaty in place the EU's CA capacity would deepen even further.

The prerequisites in the background are improvements made in the culture of cooperation and information exchange between the actors. The culture of cooperation must be built on institutional and personal levels. The adoption of a new culture is also a key objective in crisis management training. Current training methods do not create enough volume and further progress is still needed, especially in civil-military training. The focus of future training needs to be mainly on cooperation, practicalities and the culture of joint training.

The EU has started to develop systematic ways for engaging with NGOs in crisis management. Regular informal exchanges between NGOs/CSOs and the appropriate level of Council bodies, in particular the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, are taking place. Fact-finding and pre-planning missions should take into account, where appropriate, NGO and CSO expertise. NGO/CSO liaison officers are to be identified within the Council Secretariat, with a view to strengthening its capacity for dialogue with civilian agencies, NGOs and CSOs.

3.3 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

At present NATO is focusing on developing the Comprehensive Approach as an operational concept based on its Effect-based Approach to Operations (EBAO). However, NATO is essentially a military alliance and can only deploy as such. NATO can thus only participate in a larger Comprehensive Approach as it is incapable of achieving a system-wide effect on its own.

NATO's challenge is that civil-military interaction requires information from both civilian sources and military sources and such reciprocity is a key to successful and sustainable information sharing practices. Promoting the 'need to share' principle and encouraging proper classification markings will improve the current framework at the theatre level and enable the exchange of information that will help in deconflicting programmes and activities, while ensuring the safety of the local population and IO/NGO personnel.

Its biggest internal challenges are improvements to its crisis management instruments, including its military and political planning procedures. NATO has acknowledged that all of its operations include civil-military interaction with non-NATO actors. Its effectiveness in its own military domain requires a new approach to civilian-military and international cooperation. NATO sees CA on different levels: strategic & political, intermediate and theatre. In the future, the Alliance will also continue to be a predominantly military organisation and will comprise only one part of a larger CA of the international community.

Externally, NATO will focus on improving its practical cooperation, for instance, with the UN, EU, OSCE, AU and NGO's in planning and conducting operations. NATO is also enhancing its ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts.

3.4 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The OSCE works within three dimensions of security: the politico-military, the economic-environmental, and the human dimension. All three dimensions carry equal weight, are embedded in all activities of the organisation's institutions and Field Operations and are a substantial part of the political dialogue among its participating states. In addition, the OSCE addresses new threats and challenges such as organised crime, trafficking in human beings and international terrorism, working to strengthen the structural capacities of states and to deepen international cooperation.

The OSCE's strength and weakness is for some observers the same issue, that of inclusiveness. All members must support the organisation in its actions and be involved in the decision-making processes. This requires a lot of patience as it takes time to take into account all aspects and dimensions of a conflict and also to form cooperation with other organisations. The consensus-based approach is however also a hidden success story. The OSCE provides a forum for 'permanent negotiations' and the creation of good will in the field with a long term scope, often using methods of silent diplomacy.

The OSCE also faces a number of challenges in its conflict prevention and crisis management role. They stem from rising tensions between participating states and within their borders. Sanctions, belligerent rhetoric and sometimes armed provocations have increased in some regions, creating difficulties for all international actors. While cooperation between the OSCE and other organisations is generally strong, a lack of clarity can be detrimental. The OSCE has a rich array of mechanisms for crisis management, and wide commitments in the field of confidence-building, although, not always used to their full potential.

The OSCE could increase its importance as an international actor if it were to consider more closely the role of early warning and dealing with crises in a more preventive manner. The mixed staffing of the OSCE, with a heavy weight placed on secondment in field operations, is not without cost in terms of continuity. Finally, developing a coherent system for evaluating long-term conflict prevention as well as shorter-term crisis management is a complex undertaking.

Greater coordination with other international organisations (the UN, the EU and others), as well as with NGOs and non-state actors involved in early warning and crisis management, would benefit the OSCE and allow it to develop a more comprehensive response system. The pooling of lesson learning processes (for instance, regarding the role of Special Envoys and Special Representatives) and the development of coordinated mediation support systems could be important steps to consider. Sharing early warning capabilities would also be crucial for greater efficiency. It may also be useful to initiate discussions on sharing financial resources, where appropriate. Examples of such sharing exist and could be developed.

The OSCE is also presented with significant opportunities. The OSCE continues to provide a unique forum for an inclusive and pan-European security dialogue with all relevant actors from the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian areas. It remains the most inclusive actor for channelling international efforts to settle the protracted and unresolved conflicts in the OSCE area. In some cases, the OSCE is the only international actor able to legitimately and effectively talk to all sides in a particular crisis situation. Flexibility remains the OSCE's signature strength.

3.5 Experimental approach - The MNE5 Concept

Multinational Experiment 5 is experimenting with the Comprehensive Approach within a coalition. Even though it differs from the organisational approaches described above it is being discussed here as it is multinational by nature. In the context of MNE 5, the term 'Comprehensive Approach' is used in a broad sense to describe the wide scope of actions undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner with the affected nation(s). Coordination and collaboration include coalition civilian government agencies and their defence and security forces, international and intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and the private sector to achieve greater harmonisation in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of actions required to prevent, ameliorate, mitigate and/or resolve the conditions precipitating the crisis.⁷

Beginning in June 2006, the MNE community agreed to focus its efforts on MNE 5 and on integrating the individual results from previous experiments and examining their interrelationships within a coherent, comprehensive framework, as well as incorporating lessons learned from practitioners in the field.

The central theme in MNE 5 is a 'Whole-of-Government' or 'Comprehensive Approach' in which the effects-based approach to multinational operations and rapid expeditionary force projection will explore various aspects of interagency operational and military support for these operations. A primary goal is to develop a capability for effective, day-to-day involvement across agencies in order to support crisis prevention and consequence management activities. The Comprehensive Approach conceptual framework is applicable from pre-crisis interventions to post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction on through to the transition of responsibility to local authorities.

The Comprehensive Approach concept for MNE 5 describes the overarching framework in which various nationally sponsored concepts (or focus areas) are being evaluated for their individual practicality and for the critical integration linkages between focus areas to support effective and efficient coalition operations. MNE 5 has aimed to provide capabilities through which concerned nations and organisations can harmonise potentially divergent views and interests in order to respond to a crisis in a unified manner. The capabilities developed through the MNE 5 series of experimentation is offered to practitioners in the field.

MNE5 has been criticised because it is led by the military and under-represented by relevant civilian actors, and for its limited engagement with the United Nations. Despite these shortcomings it is seen as a unique opportunity to develop understanding and cooperative practises.

7 The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2008.

3.6 Synthesis – conceptual interoperability of multinational CAs

Even though substantial progress has been made by these organisations, they also have a long way to go in developing internally coherent operational concepts. The UN, EU and OSCE suffer from internal, institutional and interagency rivalry, and all suffer from disagreement and fragmentation between member states. Furthermore, there is still an ideological gap between political/military actors on the one side and humanitarian actors on the other. That gap runs through both the UN and the EU and potentially blocks NATO's effort to bring humanitarian partners into its Comprehensive Approach.⁸ However, the organisations have an even longer way to go to develop models for cooperation amongst themselves.

Achieving a functioning culture of cooperation is much more important in relations between international organisations than formal structures are; this is an area where much has already been achieved. This culture would deliver the best effects if it were implemented not only at the top level, but also at the lower (field and individual) level. People working in international organisations should make themselves familiar with CA, which after all is more a mindset than a formalised way of working. Humble attitudes and reasonable expectations are needed between organisations and at all levels of operation.

Experimentations such as MNE5, though ideally with more equal participation from military and civilian fields, are important tools in cultivating this culture of cooperation, studying and experimenting with the needed cooperative planning and implementation processes. In the future, experimentation engaging the key multilateral organisations might pave the way towards a strategic framework.

It is important to note that national governments represented in different multilateral organisations play a vital role in bringing coherence to multilateral approaches. If national approaches are consistent across international organisations, i.e. representatives of a country in NATO, UN, OSCE and the EU speak with one voice, they are bound to have an impact. Unfortunately, this is currently not the case as the national agendas are not effectively coordinated in the majority of governments.

UN practises from Integrated Missions have created a number of dilemmas in relation to integration: The humanitarian dilemma reflects a tension between the partiality involved in supporting a political transition process and the impartiality needed to protect humanitarian space. The human rights dilemma relates to the tension that arises when the UN feels compelled to promote peace by working with those who may have unsatisfactory human rights records, while still retaining the role of an 'outside critic' in the process. The local ownership dilemma relates to the need for rooting peace processes in the host country's society and political structures without reinforcing the very structures that led to conflict in the first place.⁹

8 See further *Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations*, NUPI working Paper 728, page 13, http://english.nupi.no/publikasjoner/notater/2007/multidimensional_and_integrated_peace_operations.

9 Report on *Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and Hippel, 2005, p. 6.

4 National approaches

Before the seminar the Finnish organisers invited all participating organisations and governments to contribute a short article describing their approaches to crisis management and their means of trying to bring their different departments and resources together. All were asked to explain their conceptual thinking on the Comprehensive Approach to crisis management, leadership arrangements, planning processes, training, resources, interoperability and evaluation. Participants were also asked to analyse the key challenges and opportunities for the development of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. The organisational and national articles are included in this report as annexes.

This chapter gives an overview of the trends and gaps identified in the Whole-of-Government Approaches by the countries involved in the CA-seminar¹⁰ and particularly reflects on the challenges that the international community needs to work together on to improve policy and practice in the Comprehensive Approach to crisis management.

4.1 Concept and organisation

The articles provided by the participating countries reveal that the 'comprehensiveness' of the Comprehensive Approach varies because countries have developed the concept so as to be compatible with their national processes and needs. There are different interpretations on which actors should be included in the CA: '3D' means the Comprehensive Approach for some, but others want to go beyond that. Actors are currently in the process of gaining their first ever concrete experiences from the field, having now pursued CA in recent years. A certain commonality of language has developed and strategic planning has also moved forward.

National administrations need more tactical harmonisation as they might have completely different development, deployment and training cycles between ministries. Even the rationale for engaging in crisis management may also differ between national ministries. The military establishments may be used to thinking about international engagement, but for some other ministries it can be difficult to see a meaningful scope outside of the national sphere.

The donors' unity of effort is especially at risk when there are tensions between the donors' national political and/or security and development interests, or when there are tensions between short and long-term needs. Donor defence ministries may prioritise concrete challenges of crisis response and counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency, whereas justice and interior ministries may prioritise the need for counter-narcotics, tackling human trafficking and other serious domestic and cross-border crimes.

As many nations have come to the realisation that a cross-government approach is indispensable to effective and efficient performance and success in crisis interventions, WGA processes and specialised inter-ministerial crisis management units have been developed at the national level. Examples of the approaches include:

- Canada: The Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START)
- UK: Stabilisation Unit (former Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit - PCRU)
- USA: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
- Norway: Inter-department Working Group on Afghanistan
- Finland: Inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination process on crisis management

10 The countries include Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Spain, Poland, Sweden and the United States.

So far very little evidence and evaluation findings exist about the pros and cons of these different approaches. One perspective raised at the Helsinki seminar was that processes allow planning and joint decision-making but they do not allow actors to learn together, which is vital for the overall learning process.

The majority see WGA as a key means by which the synergies of the vast array of civilian and military tools are being promoted. Many national interagency task forces and/or joint committees have been founded in the past few years to provide governments with models of coordination.

Many actors struggle at national and international levels with the question of how to work with non-governmental actors that are significant players in many conflict environments. It seems that the role of NGOs in WGA is still somewhat difficult to define. Only two national articles referred at all to NGOs and how to engage with them. Their experience was that having functioning relationships between the authorities and NGOs at a national level facilitates shared understanding and information sharing at an international level.

The first analysis seems to indicate that WGA is still very much a concept and first experiences from experimentation and practical cooperation efforts are building the necessary bridge from strategies to actual implementation. It is obvious that there is not and probably never will be one single definition of the Whole-of-Government Approach or of the Comprehensive Approach. A Comprehensive Approach will, rather, be a flexible amalgam of different approaches – a way of thinking or a method, rather than a mechanical process.

4.2 Leadership and resources

Clear political guidance and leadership is the starting point for an effective WGA. There is a need for clarity on who plays what role in creating an integrated approach and the need for a lead coordinating role. Otherwise, the risk of fragmentation remains. Establishing coordination is crucial and sensitive; it should not be underestimated. Here, one should differentiate between leadership and coordination. The first implies that other ministries and departments have to follow directions, the latter indicates equal relationships which are essential for joined-up working.

It is important to create the right incentive structures for cooperation at the national level. WGA has considerable resource implications, both in financial and human terms. In view of the potentially high transaction costs, governments should acknowledge that there are disincentives for collaborative working (e.g. it is time consuming, requires compromise and a willingness to dilute one's own policy agenda and possibly has less visibility). Similarly, existing and new incentives for joined-up working should be identified. An important incentive is providing the means and resources for joined-up working on crisis management, allowing ministries and departments to devote part of their budget to crisis management activities.

A WGA to crisis management requires access to both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funds, which are usually managed by different departments and have different criteria. In addition, the amount of non-ODA funds available is very restricted within many donor countries and organisations. Pooled funding is considered an important alternative instrument for fostering integrated planning, which allows flexibility. Some donors have already created pooled funds to support integrated approaches in the area of security and development, including SSR activities. Examples are the UK's Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which merged into the Conflict Prevention Pool in April 2008, and its new Stabilisation Aid Fund. Further examples include Canada's Global Peace and Security Fund and the Dutch Stability Fund.

Using the method of pooling funds from various organisations towards a common task has been seen as a beneficial step in some countries as it has contributed in reducing competition. However, other countries still prefer to fund crisis management mainly through international organisations. This is mainly due to the fact that very few national entities or even international parties have the funds for notable stand-by capacities.

There continues to be an imbalance of available resources between civilian and military actors and this causes concern for many. It is felt that more funds should be appointed for civilian crisis management in order for it to be effectively combined with military tools. It is difficult to have a reserve of civilians that can be deployed to dangerous parts of the world on short notice. Civilian crisis management tools have only been developed during the past decade and their effective implementation in the field is just beginning. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been a good incentive as they have provided many governments the impetus to really pursue WGA, or at least begin thinking about it.

4.3 Training

Training is identified as a key tool in overcoming organisational and human challenges related to the implementation of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. Many countries emphasised the value of training and most notably the importance of sharing training assessments and practices with those parties interested in learning from others' experiences. The majority of countries still organise military and civilian training separately even if joint civil-military training methods are being developed. In some countries training is already being conducted in an increasingly joint manner and, for instance, NGOs are being used for training purposes more often. Further integration of civilian elements into military training modules should be advanced. Building the capacity of African crisis management tools was a notable heading for many delegations at CAS under training related issues. The need to organise more training within international organisations, not only on a national basis, was recognised. One must also have realistic expectations for training due to limitations of time and resources.

Achieving meaningful output from training requires evaluation on various aspects and the identification of some core principles and values that should be reflected in training. What kind of training is needed in the first place: high-level, middle-level, and/or boots and sandals –level? What is needed and for whom? Who will implement it? Training is interlinked with developing capabilities, in relation to which some countries are presenting the need for a high-readiness pool of and training systems for civilian experts for peace operations. It is important to understand what skills, knowledge and competences are needed in this regard.

Some countries stipulate that joint training is mainly directed at government departments for promoting the Whole-of-Government thinking, not for comprehensively covering all civilian or military experts or representatives of civil society. There are even indications that civilian training is mainly provided for government officials and not for people that will be deployed to the field, at least not in a structured manner. The concentration of training on capital-level officials reflects the state of affairs in WGA and CA. Most nations are focusing on getting their own nests sorted out and only some forerunner-countries are moving forwards on implementing WGA in line with CA in operations. They are trying to address what effect WGA does/should deliver in the field and what skills or capabilities are needed to make WGA and CA effective.

An increasing trend nowadays seems to be the inclusion of civilian expertise in military training, and thus the promotion of better understanding.¹¹ Joint civil-military training that includes NGOs is effective in building trust and understanding. Civilians are brought alongside military personnel to bring expertise and different aspects. There is already a tradition of using civilian advisors in US and NATO forces from the Cold War era. This habit has recently been strengthened because of the lessons learned in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Training is often most efficient and useful when it is executed in the area of operations. This results in a situation where all those trained will inevitably use the training they have re-

11 See in Annex 1 an example of the joint civil-military training in the article Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management – a new approach to promoting civil-military cooperation.

ceived. Unfortunately, there is still far more importance put on practical training (e.g. driving a 4-wheel drive) than, for instance, on learning cultural awareness.

There are different frameworks for training. Some European countries are, for instance, either following the UN or NATO training curricula/framework, whereas others see the EU as the main reference point for training their civilian and military personnel. Common training criteria would constitute a valuable tool in enhancing training between different frameworks.

The issue of training in relation to CA needs to be further discussed in detail. Developing and enhancing joint civilian-military training is often brought forward, but we still lack sufficient and concrete suggestions on how to promote joint training and education. Joint training is not the desired end state as such, but it must be based on the evaluation of the need for skills and knowledge. Some skills and knowledge have been recognised earlier, such as the knowledge of different structures and cultures between civilian and military organisations and the need for inter-organisational dialogue and knowledge of different planning processes.

4.4 Interoperability and information sharing

Information sharing and interoperability are identified as vital enablers in a complex operating environment. Typically, the organisational structure of actors in crisis management is not designed for collaboration and smooth information sharing. Instead, organisations are often structured to reflect their vision, mission and activities. To enable effective action, information should flow smoothly, both internally in an organisation and between organisations. The use of new information technology in planning and decision-making was promoted by a number of countries. A few articles also reminded their readers that public sector information should also be taken into account.

Planning for CA should begin with a sharing of assessments of the drivers and dynamics of the conflict. The ever-changing situation on the ground and among all the actors requires flexible and adaptive implementation of any plans; it also requires evaluation so that the actors know how to adapt. Governments seek to ensure national and international interoperability as well as between international organisations. It was noted at the CA Seminar that the use of non-standard language and terminology constitutes potential communication obstacles between agencies, setting the stage for considerable misunderstanding and miscommunication. It is clear that new Information Technology platforms may lower the threshold of communication between different kinds of actors but the IT-tools being used by different countries/organisations are not always technically interoperable. Improvements in interoperability have been achieved, for example, through the MNE5-context, which many saw as a major forum of cooperation.

The exchange of information with people from other organisations during crisis situations is often done informally. These contacts are not institutionalised, but are established on a personal basis. Information is shared more easily with people whom one knows and trusts. However, it is clear that technology cannot help with information exchange if it is based completely on personal contacts. On the other hand, trust can be built through, for example, common training sessions in the mission area. This creates a sense of community and trust which increases information sharing during crisis situations. In post-conflict crisis management operations, where the situation is relatively calm, information sharing settles into more institutionalised ways and is not as ad hoc as during the acute crisis.

There are a number of shared requirements in terms of essential information and tools in national, cross-border and international crisis management. The widely shared information needs include things such as the situation picture, incidents, and other actors, but otherwise the essential information needs are mostly mandate-related. The different levels also share many of the same obstacles in achieving interoperability. Obtaining and maintaining a shared situational awareness and picture is often seen as a key challenge in crisis response where several organisations are working in parallel. Organisations continue to plan and procure their information and communications technology

for their own organisational mission, partly ignoring the multi-actor reality of crisis response. At the national level there are more efforts and investments into interagency interoperability. It is a positive development that interoperability is not seen as mainly a technology related issue any more, but rather, organisational and human aspects of interoperability are better recognised.

Crisis response organisations need leadership and the initiative to determine how communication systems best support the delivery of the organisational mission in a complex interagency environment. Political, organisational and other substance related factors should determine the development of systems, not the availability and push for technology solutions. Senior management should take an increased interest in what kinds of tools and systems ought to be used in crisis management operations, so as to develop the tools from a needs-based perspective.¹²

4.5 Evaluation

Until now the emphasis of the Comprehensive Approach and WGA has been on coordination, integration and planning. However, as a number of operations and missions are starting to mature, a new set of questions has emerged around the topics of monitoring progress and evaluating impact in a system-wide or Comprehensive Approach context.

Evaluation is lagging behind in the overall planning structure of crisis management. Governments are only beginning to think how jointly-owned and operated missions could be evaluated in a joint manner. However, monitoring and evaluation at an early enough stage provides actors with the requisite information to adapt their strategies accordingly and improves the likelihood that an operation will achieve its goals while at the same time avoiding unintended consequences. Sharing best practices and lessons learned has proven to be a great challenge for many even on an intra-governmental level. It is important for many actors to receive measurable short-term goals for their own needs. Therefore, new forms of evaluation methods have been established to study all of the phases of engagement in crisis management.

The set of questions that arise in the Comprehensive Approach context go beyond the donor-specific approaches to evaluation, and is primarily aimed at assessing the overall effect a system-wide or Comprehensive Approach strategy has on a given crisis situation. This implies that such evaluations would have to be multinational, multi-agency and multi-dimensional (peace, security, socio-economic, human rights, rule of law and humanitarian) in nature. Such evaluations would have to attempt to monitor and/or evaluate the impact of the combined overall effort, or preferably a specific strategic approach, which presuppose, for instance, that some kind of integrated strategic framework exists, over a specific time period. There is both a need for real-time or short-term monitoring of effects, and long-term and broader-ranging evaluations.

Determining progress is an art and a science, since hard science tells but one side of a story. Ultimately, political and military leaders make decisions, and those decisions should be based on input from a multitude of different organisations. The constant assessment of progress at all levels is of utmost importance. It is also imperative that actors move from sharing evaluation reports to sharing actual evaluation processes and that they perform joint evaluations across country, with results shared throughout the government.

At the national level, it would be important to combine the expertise and experience from evaluation units in development departments with practices in measuring progress in civilian and military crisis management. This would help develop evaluation practices that include relevant qualitative and quantitative indicators and give accurate information about the progress and impact that an operation is experiencing on the ground.

12 More in Rauno Kuusisto's article which is annexed to this report. See also: Information sharing models and Interoperability; In National, Cross-Border and International Crisis Management. Crisis Management Initiative & Tilburg University & Crisis Management Centre Finland & Elisa Ltd, 2008.

5 Challenges and opportunities

This chapter brings forward a number of challenges and possibilities that the whole concept of Comprehensive Approach produces in the research community and among the actors involved in crisis management. The report clearly shows that a Comprehensive Approach is beneficial on all levels of crisis management: strategic, operational and tactical. Special attention should be paid to linking security and development together in fragile states and taking the local population and authorities increasingly into consideration in the field. Furthermore, the capabilities invested in various NGOs are assets which are currently underused by all crisis management actors. NGOs could play a much bigger role, for instance, in the training and research sectors.

Applying CA and WGA in crisis management entails several challenges due to the complexity of the situation being addressed and the multidimensional nature of the response. This chapter will discuss some of the challenges identified in the articles by the research team and in the CAS Seminar in June. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of challenges but the identification of a number of key issues to be addressed when planning the way forward.

5.1 Complexity of the context – engagement in fragile states

Crisis management operations are often carried out in fragile states which confront particularly severe development challenges, such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war. Linking security and development is fundamentally relevant in those conditions. Therefore, a broad developmental approach to security that integrates human security concerns is vital in ensuring a durable exit from poverty and insecurity.

For the international community in general, dealing with a fragile state involves four distinct communities – the humanitarian, human rights, development, and security – but each of these communities sees the problem from a different perspective, which thereby undermines the dialogue on approaches and responses. The need to make security and development interventions work more effectively together and to share the same objectives, without undermining each other, is currently recognised by most donors. Nonetheless, there is a strong disconnection between the policy rhetoric concerning integrated approaches at the international level and policy realities at the sectoral and field levels. Moreover, countries are usually on different security and development trajectories, which require different combinations of security and development policies specific to their needs, while international actors rely upon a standard set of policy tools that are not necessarily compatible.

The UN, donors, regional and continental organisations prioritise integrated approaches for engaging in fragile situations. There is also a need to acknowledge that fragility is primarily a matter of degree. It is widely acknowledged that conventional aid instruments can be problematic in fragile states as the payoff is often very risky. And more money does not necessarily create more progress and development but can have unintended consequences, particularly if a lack of absorption capacity co-exists with corruption. One way to potentially alleviate these constraints is to provide aid via non-government channels, such as NGOs, the private sector or independent service authorities. However, the levels at which aid becomes counterproductive in fragile states also needs to be clarified. There is also a need to learn much more about which aid modalities work well in fragile states and about the optimal sequencing of interventions.

However, there is no common understanding on how crisis management interventions, which tend to focus on short-term actions and limited timeframes, and development which is regarded as a long-term quest, can be effectively combined. There are also fears of development being subordinated to the security objectives, especially in the post-9/11 international context, or that attention would be diverted to countries where there is no evident security challenge.

The recognition of the overall complexity of the present crisis management scene in general, and the achievement of shared understanding was noted in almost all of the national articles. Establishing a shared analysis and understanding of the conflict and of the intervention strategy is seen as challenging. An underlying assumption of the Comprehensive Approach concept is that the various actors and institutions involved share a minimum of objectives, goals and principles. However, it was acknowledged that in real situations, the multitude of mandates, strategies, approaches and practices are often perceived as running contrary to each another, causing tension and difficult working relations. Institutions and agencies form different kinds of relationships. Some cooperate due to similar interests and others because they might not have a choice. These different approaches are echoed in the way in which parties communicate and act in the field.

5.2 Enhancing shared understanding

The baseline for all action is to understand the situation and relationships that have an effect in the field. In a multinational intervention national interests may affect the ability to arrive at a shared assessment. Although a shared assessment would be desired among the partners under the same mandate, some differences between national assessments are natural and should be appreciated.

Every actor has to understand the environment in order to be able to respond professionally to emerging or existing crises. Proper analysis of the situation, the determination of root causes, identification of issues in the field, and the presence of the other actors' networks form the basis for adapting the response. This basis is a prerequisite for building crucial, viable relationships and collaboration with other actors.

Shared understanding or consensus cannot be achieved among all actors who need to collaborate with each other. Therefore, the sharing of different perspectives becomes more important in complex environments. Information sharing is not a goal in itself, but a necessity because the activities in the field tend to be interdependent on other actors' activities. Sharing perspectives is the first step towards de-conflicting actions and complementing each other's efforts.

The more comprehensive the response is, the more difficult it is for the intervening community to fully understand the networks of the actors with whom it has to collaborate. Dealing with a broad variety of humanitarian, developmental, and security issues automatically positions the intervening actors in the midst of networked communities.

There are obstacles which make it hard to communicate with other high-impact actors. Communicating with all of the actors may be too resource-intensive and time consuming and it may be inefficient to organise meetings with a very large number of different actors participating and voicing their opinions. Without adequate trust between the actors it will be difficult for them to openly communicate and share their perspectives. This consideration cannot be overstated as it implies commitment to cultivating the will and developing the means to establish trusting relationships.

Defining fundamental concepts and terms into a basic terminology is vital, as they are widely used but often mean different things. It is clear that we need to share information, but we must also be aware of what is behind other partners' agendas so that we know what kind of information to release to them. Releasing too much information is not beneficial as it will result in clogging the channels and burying vital information underneath secondary information. An effective implementation of the 'need to share' principle presupposes that the provider knows what information the collaboration partners need, not what they think they need.

Actors typically have different motives and objectives that determine the nature and scope of their operations in the field. True appreciation of other actors' motivation is an imperative for honest collaboration. Embracing diversity of perspectives opens the possibility to understand the environment far better than assessing the situation in isolation. However, integrating other actors' understanding into your own understanding is an intellectual challenge. If successful, it will contribute to developing an atmosphere of increased mutual trust and confidence.¹³

Making key decisions in all phases of an operation is aided by developing a clear definition of understanding. Understanding the situation helps to determine if and how to intervene and when to exit. It will also make focusing on rooting out causes of conflict and minimising unintended consequences possible. Whether actors like it or not, all of them are mutually dependent in the field. Although actors may conduct independent activities, those activities are likely to be interactive and have an impact on each other in indeterminate ways. Developing understanding reduces unnecessary duplication and helps to gain synergies. It also promotes the picture of a consistent response to the local population and gives staff organisations awareness and motivation.¹⁴

5.3 Creating synergies between different levels of CA

One of the vital questions from the national perspectives seems to be the coordination and compatibility of national and multinational approaches, the main challenge being the question of how to achieve this compatibility. Interdependence between Comprehensive Approaches on the national and international levels is very clear as more coherent national approaches could facilitate a better coherence of multilateral responses and vice versa. It would be useful to dig deeper into past examples of how it was done in national/international contexts previously: What was the recipe for achieving common understanding of concepts and proceedings?

As discussed earlier, at least three levels of Comprehensive Approaches can be identified: interagency, intra-agency and national coherence. The possibly negative impacts of improved WGA on international CA efforts seem to frighten some nations. It is not always evident if a possibly firmer WGA would have positive effects on multilateral CA. It could even complicate the process if national agencies were to arrive at an operational theatre with their hands already tied to national goals.

However, it is necessary to start CA at home in order to have a national 'position' when going international, but not one that cannot then be changed if circumstances so require. Having a WGA should thus be a concept more for developing consistent national policy, not be about operations themselves. Flexibility is the key to success, after all, a country or an organisation must constantly adjust budgets and other resources. What is needed is to build up the capability to do CA and then use it flexibly depending on what the circumstances dictate.

If we have an integrated strategic vision among players, following a unified policy, we can freely have 'different CAs' in different areas. The PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Afghanistan, for instance, are a tool for CA for many operators. Some also prefer to proceed under the whole umbrella of ISAF goals. The focus should always be on the practical effect. 'What is being achieved' as opposed to 'who is achieving it' should be the ultimate aim for all. The national ministries of justice, foreign affairs, defence and the interior are usually the main agencies dealt with. However, there need not be limitations on the use of imagination with regard to CA. For instance, there could be intense international cooperation in the fields of agriculture and forestry.

13 More in Tone Danielsen's article which is annexed to this report.

14 Information Paper for the CA Seminar on Developing Understanding; Tommi Koivula, National Defence University of Finland, 2008.

There are certain preconditions without which CA can be difficult or even impossible to achieve. Firstly, everyone has to accept being coordinated or coordinating with others. Secondly, partners have to accept the fact that their own resources can be used for the benefit of others. Thirdly, actors from all fields of work have to respect the continuum of security-development-security. Finally, it must be understood that the shift to something resembling CA happens between the ears before it can happen in the field.

5.4 Flexibility and delegation of authority

The Comprehensive Approach is desirable at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. However, consideration needs to be given to where it is most effective and needed. A Comprehensive Approach has proven particularly important in the field, where lack of cohesion or differences among international actors can be exploited by local parties.

A key to CA-success is achieving increased flexibility, the ability to adapt and adjust operations and budgets on the operational/theatre level. This is where the success of a mission is usually determined. Improved national coherence through WGA-efforts can contribute substantially here, if the field is entered into in tune with other international actors, and with the necessary flexibility for adapting and adjusting over time.

It is important, however, to check one's enthusiasm for coherence and coordination with a healthy dose of moderation and humility. The Comprehensive Approach is not a goal in and of itself. If pursued blindly it is likely to generate unintended consequences and distort our ability to achieve our objectives. We need to develop a set of values, perhaps even a code of conduct, that will steer our appropriate use of the Comprehensive Approach and ensure that ultimately it serves those whom we have been mandated to protect and assist.

5.5 Local ownership and building local capacity

Building local capacity is vital but often neglected. Long-term commitment of the international community is needed in order to support the local and national authorities in strengthening their capacities. Local capacity building and local ownership are the ultimate exit strategies.

A conflict situation may be stabilised in the short term with the use of quick impact humanitarian efforts, diplomatic initiatives, economic incentives, and in the last resort the use of military force. However, achieving long-term stability through a system-wide Comprehensive Approach will depend on establishing a functioning rule of law. In any intervention, the tasks of running, staffing and developing rule of law institutions will ultimately fall on local authorities since the local population is the end-user of the justice and security systems. They are in fact the focus of this process and the ones who must have confidence in the rule of law in order for the systems to work effectively and equitably.

When local counterparts were mentioned in the conceptual presentations during the CA Seminar in Helsinki, the general comments centred on the host authorities. This reflects the recognition among many international actors that host authorities are inevitable partners, but it disregards the complexity of local ownership. Wanting to engage relevant international actors early on was a recurrent theme, but there was little thinking on how local actors could be brought in at an early stage. This observation is not surprising, given that current procedures and structures in international interventions run counter to the time and mechanisms needed to establish local ownership. However, the views from the field, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, revealed a deeper understanding of the dilemmas of establishing local ownership. Emphasis was put on the fact that there are valuable partners in the civil society and that it is important to meet local views with respect and to be open to lo-

cal input. Many practitioners have recognised the need to demonstrate peace dividends and differentiate between various local actors.

However, despite this valuable insight, international missions often assume that they would do a better job than the inadequate local authorities, despite being limited in terms of their duration, funding and scope. It is important to realise that international actors inevitably will have to coexist and cooperate with a wide spectrum of local actors with varying degrees of domestic support at different stages and at different levels of the transition and that there will be contested power relations in every post conflict society.

Many of the current challenges for the development of a Comprehensive Approach, e.g. information sharing and media strategies, are heightened when put into the context of local ownership. Several participants in Helsinki displayed awareness of the need for improved communication to improve or secure local support for an international undertaking.

There are basically three types of mechanisms that can be used to integrate local owners: consultations, shared authority (interim governments, integrated international-local chains-of-command or hybrid courts), and the use of local professionals from the country in transition in its justice and security structures. These mechanisms can be applied in different phases and to different components of the international engagement, ranging from initial fact finding and strategic planning processes, to meeting immediate justice and security needs, to institution and capacity building, to engaging civil society and measuring progress. There are of course no black and white answers and sometimes there can be fundamental differences between the basic values of a mission and local ownership. This has been evident, for instance, in Afghanistan where building schools for girls does not come without its political implications.

Emphasis should be placed on improving local ownership and rid the system of an unwillingness to accept local 'results' after having increased local ownership. This kind of behaviour is seen by locals as not genuinely local. Local ownership should not be a catch phrase to get support for a mission. It should be a genuine effort to reach out to the local community and enforce the normative agenda that crisis management inherently has. Local ownership is about making delicate tradeoffs, e.g. if we do something in the field ourselves things may happen faster, but as a result the local capacity will not increase. The key to implementing local ownership lies in being transparent, allocating significant effort and resources for communication, and meeting local counterparts and their concerns with respect and an open mind.¹⁵

5.6 The Comprehensive Approach and African organisations

The role of regional organisations in crisis management and peace operations has grown significantly. Regional arrangements, such as the EU, OSCE and NATO complement and support the UN's capacity. However, it is extremely important that not only European or transatlantic regional organisations are included in the debates on the Comprehensive Approach, but also organisations such as the African Union, which is looking for a more active role in peacekeeping and peace support operations, are included. There is an increased African commitment to peacekeeping but African groups face major organisational and resource challenges. Within the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) political will and ambitious leadership are fuelling efforts for both organisations to take on peace operations, ranging from mediation and early warning to peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention.

15 Extract from an article for the Comprehensive Approach Seminar; Annika S. Hansen and Stian Kjeksrud, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 2008. More on the matter is annexed to this article.

The African Union, in addition to launching its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi and its second mission now in Darfur, aims to develop five regional brigades that will comprise an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. The ECOWAS has led numerous peacekeeping operations in West Africa and is developing its regional standby force and moving to increase its planning and management staff at the headquarter level. Other African organisations, traditionally focused on development and economics, are moving towards peace and security issues, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The development of an East African Standby Brigade for the African Standby Force concept was announced in September 2004.

Key challenges face these organisations in their efforts to deploy peacekeepers. Most forces are not self-sustainable, many lack sufficient logistical and transport support, and some even need basic equipment, food and medical supplies. The African Union, the ECOWAS and other regional groups also face disparity in their headquarters and leadership capacity to organise, manage, deploy and fund peace operations. Outside partners are offering some support to African organisations and nations in funding, training and deployment support for peace operations. The AU has previously focused on the military aspects in peace and security issues but recently a clear need to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management has also been noted.

There is a clear need from the AU's side for support in building capabilities in order to reach their goals in the fields of peace and security. For the future of the Comprehensive Approach it is vital that African organisations are included in the CA development processes and fora.

5.7 Applying WGA in Security Sector Reform

Security System Reform (SSR) is an important area of work in many operations in post-conflict countries. Realising WGA in SSR has proven to be a difficult and politically challenging endeavour. SSR processes are complex by nature and there is no such thing as a universal SSR process. Depending on the needs in a certain country an SSR programme can, for instance, entail activities as diverse as conducting a defence review, setting up a community policing programme, and, at the same time, improving pre-trial detention conditions. These different kinds of activities clearly involve different organisations with different mandates and objectives, whose level of involvement differs as the process evolves.¹⁶

It is highly unlikely that a single government department or intergovernmental agency will possess the full range of skills needed for any of the abovementioned SSR support activities, and the same holds true for almost any other SSR assistance endeavour. The required expertise is scattered among many governmental (and non-governmental) actors, necessitating a coordinated and integrated approach, in other words, a Whole-of-Government Approach.

Implementing WGA in SSR operations requires similar tools and approaches as in WGA crisis management, in general: A clearly defined common policy, to which the key departments/agencies involved have committed themselves and can be held accountable, country-specific SSR strategies, a joint assessment and planning process which takes into account the broader local context, pooled funding allowing flexibility and well trained professionals. The continuum between national WGA in SSR and that of the multilateral level is equally as challenging as in crisis management.

16 Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform, Conference background paper, The Hague 9-10 April 2008, Prepared by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', March 2008.

5.8 The role of civil society organisations in CA

Utilising the expertise of local NGOs in planning the missions was mentioned in the seminar as a crucial way of defining strategic approaches for missions. It is however very hard to lump international and local civil society actors under one overarching NGO umbrella. The current mosaic of international and local actors seems to puzzle governmental actors who are not aware of the present fragmented picture in the NGO field.

NGOs often weigh their options with regard to their relations with other actors in the field on a three tier scale: cooperation, coordination and coexistence. During cooperation they retain their organisational independence, but are willing to stretch relatively far in organising activities with others. Coordination describes the activity taking place between actors with different mandates, or between those who require strong organisational independence (e.g. being politically neutral) but who nonetheless share some similar interests or strategic vision, and thus see the need for a degree of coordination with others. Coexistence, however, describes the relationship between actors with limited ambitions concerning cooperation, for example in the case of sceptical or even opposing political and military forces. They may not be directly hostile but could resist activities that interfere in their sphere of interest.¹⁷

The discussions should move away from the traditional civil-military dichotomy towards incorporating development, humanitarian and diplomatic fields. Understanding the value of civil society in this work is pivotal. CA requires understanding and defining the aims and objectives from the points of view of both sides, the mission and the assistance-receiving country. Civil society organisations can contribute to these processes in a meaningful way.

After understanding and defining the CA's aims and objectives, having an integrated strategy to implement them is vital in order to create missions which can be considered justified and legitimate. The EU has started to take into account the work of NGOs in a more active manner.¹⁸ This has contributed to the success of EU-led missions. The national articles provided to the research team prior to the seminar, however, all but ignored the role of NGOs in today's Comprehensive Approach to crisis management.

The importance of local ownership is crucial for any mission to succeed and create grounds for sustainable peace. In this work local civil society actors and their work need to be strategically incorporated into the CA processes. Crisis management missions have to be able to enable, empower and facilitate the active participation of actors from different levels of society, including civil society and NGO's.¹⁹

17 Comprehensive Approach; Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management. Karsten Friis & Pia Jarmyr (eds). NUPI, 2008.

18 More in: Partners in Conflict Prevention & Crisis Management: EU and NGO Cooperation. European Peacebuilding Liaison Office & Crisis Management Initiative & Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007.

19 More in: Partners Apart: Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis management in the Framework of ESDP, Catriona Gourlay, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network & Crisis Management Initiative & European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2006.

6 The way forward

The Comprehensive Approach is not an end in itself but a means to an end. The aim is not to build new structures and hierarchies, but to achieve better outcomes and to resolve a crisis in a sustainable way. It is important to underline the value of knowledge and awareness in the leadership and management of organisations about the other actors' mandates and recognise the fact that one organisation or entity can no longer conduct crisis management on its own. The Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Prevention and Management Seminar in June 2008 in Helsinki aimed to identify pragmatic ways and means for developing flexible and adaptive mechanisms, tools and processes for comprehensive crisis management. The cooperative development of a Comprehensive Approach can and should be pursued at different levels in parallel. The following will identify four levels for analysis and initiatives for the way forward.

6.1 Culture and values

The Comprehensive Approach is about developing mechanisms and cultures of understanding, sharing and collaboration, both vertically between nations and international organisations, and horizontally between nations and between organisations. Creating a culture of trust and knowledge among potential Comprehensive Approach actors before deployment to the field can bridge many cultural barriers and false presumptions. In order to develop a true **culture of cooperation** and to mainstream Whole-of-Government and intra-agency coherence, it is necessary to **embed coherence as a core value in our own organisations**. We can do that by, for instance, making it a requirement that our policies, strategies and plans declare the degree to which they are coherent with an overall strategy, related projects and relevant policy. Implementation at different levels could be ensured through including coherence as an obligatory reporting item and evaluation criteria.

The organisational values and operating principles that guide different actors involved in solving a conflict may be contradictory. Human rights and humanitarian actors, for instance, may well be in conflict with the values and principles of political and security actors, at least in contexts where some of the international and local actors are hostile to each other. The first step is to be aware of and accept these differences.

Knowledge is a key resource in comprehensive crisis management. The Helsinki seminar participants highlighted the need to **move from the 'need to know' to the 'need to share' approach in information sharing**. Implementing this requires both organisational learning and also the commitment of leadership and organisational information management strategies that allow flexibility. A networked working environment also requires moving from content and actor-based information exchange towards situation and context-based information exchange.

6.2 Doctrine and strategy

A common strategic framework is a prerequisite for downstream planning and programming. We cannot pursue coherence if we do not have a common strategic framework. Without one we lack a shared vision to be coherent with. And yet, there are very few crisis situations where we have a meaningful common strategic framework in place. If we are serious about pursuing a Comprehensive Approach, one of the first things we will have to do when responding to any crises, is to prioritise the development of a common strategic framework. In the seminar there seemed to be broad consensus about the importance of establishing and

agreeing upon top-level objectives early on, and subsequently have them cascade down in the system. Effective multilateralism is the way forward.²⁰

Crisis management operations are required in order to respond to acute situations in fragile and poor states, where political conflict is accompanied by unrest, violence and humanitarian crisis. There is a need to consider the '**Human Security Doctrine**', i.e. making improvement of human security the goal of all functions in the field. Human insecurity, even in conflict, is not just about the impact of military violence; it is also about the consequences of human rights violations and violent crime as well as the material consequences of conflict. This means that both civilian and military initiatives have to put the protection of civilians before the defeat of an enemy. Protection refers to both physical and material protection, that is, economic and social, as well as civil and political rights. The Human Security Doctrine could bring the needed conceptual coherence – being clear about shared goals and principles – to encourage notions of public service and commitment. It could also increase effectiveness as the principles of Human Security²¹ provide a focus for external mandates. They offer a framework for standardising doctrines and the rules of engagement.

Addressing **national legislative barriers and conflicting mandates** is a vital but very complex endeavour. A starting point is the acknowledgement that diversities do exist – in mandates, strategies, approaches and practices. National interests, for instance, often obstruct coherent policies and practices at both strategic and operational levels. Multinational or international organisations, like the ICRC, MSF and UNHCR, have specific mandates that may not always be compatible with the goals of those engaged in the political or security sectors. A common strategic framework as a reference point would contribute to a meaningful division of labour with less gaps and overlaps.²²

Much of the emphasis in developing the Comprehensive Approach has been on crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. For a meaningful contribution to international security, policymakers should also **find ways to jointly engage more proactively in preventive measures**. International policies in this regard should aim to contribute to a secure and sustainable livelihood for the poor. These efforts range from addressing root causes of potential conflict and strengthening socioeconomic development to supporting reform of the security sector.

6.3 Leadership and structures

There are no perfect structures in place for WGAs or the Comprehensive Approach. What works best for a specific donor or international organisation will depend on its constitutional set-up and the prevalent rules of the game. Likewise, there is no 'one size fits all' approach to conflicts as the structures must be adapted to local realities to be successful. A golden rule is that **form must follow function**.

Multiple international actors engaged in the same crisis or conflict create challenges for coordination and leadership. The **relative size of the engagement of different actors is likely to have an impact on leadership roles**. A Comprehensive Approach cannot be based on command and control. It requires facilitative leadership that balances the need to respect the independence of the participating agencies while at the same time manages their interdependencies. The larger actors in terms of resources and manpower are likely to have more influence. It is unrealistic to expect all agents to have an equal role in the coordination process, but the process should ensure that those voices representing a genuine con-

20 Comprehensive Approach Seminar, Helsinki, 17 June 2008; Session 3: How to develop comprehensive capabilities needed for complex crises? Prepared Remarks by Cedric de Coning, NUPI.

21 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, pp 15-20.

22 Comprehensive Approach - Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management. Karsten Friis & Pia Jarmyr (eds); NUPI, 2008.

stituency are heard.²³ Besides resources, **legitimacy is a foundation for leadership**. Host country authorities, if legitimate, should ideally provide such leadership. In situations with a weak or collapsed state, the senior UN representative or leaders of regional intergovernmental organisations may be the most credible actors to facilitate strategic or country-level Comprehensive Approach activities.

From the NGO perspective, leadership is seen as required or desirable by the community on the ground and may reflect on the lead agency's sectoral approach and not lead towards a command-and-control relationship. Leadership may also be a function of presence, resources, and accommodations resulting from a concern with security. In some circumstances, the determination of which NGO takes a leading role may be connected to variables such as experience in the area, staffing levels, and relations with the local community.

In very practical terms **leadership is also a question of personal qualities and skills**. Different phases of a crisis, such as the start-up or transition phase, might require different skills and profiles. There is a need to educate and train people for senior leadership positions in operations.

We can improve interagency coherence by **delegating the responsibility for operational coherence at the mission/country-level**, where we can most meaningfully interact with the broadest possible range of internal and external actors. This would mean delegating budgetary and management authority downwards in the structure, giving the in-theatre staff the necessary leverage to be able to engage with other actors and adjust plans and programmes accordingly. Accountability would naturally have to follow increased responsibility for actors in the field. Necessary interagency supervision mechanisms would need to be established to ensure the continuation of the confidence of tax payers at home.

Local ownership and inclusion of local actors into leadership mechanisms benefits all parties. It helps to create long term stability and exit strategies for international actors. We cannot achieve a sustainable solution without the internal actors taking responsibility and ownership of the peace process. And yet, many of our current systems and practises pathologically undermine this reality. None of us underestimate the complexity of the challenge, but the maxim is unforgiving, and if we are serious about achieving a Comprehensive Approach we must considerably invest more resources into generating new ways to enable, empower and facilitate the active participation and leadership of the broadest possible cross-section of internal actors.

While humanitarian organisations need to coordinate their efforts with other actors, including military and political ones, there is a need to recognise the importance of **observing the Humanitarian Principles and protecting the Humanitarian Space** in all situations. Humanitarian objectives should always be autonomous from political, economic, military or other objectives, to ensure that the sole purpose of humanitarian aid remains to relieve and prevent the suffering of victims of humanitarian crises. Humanitarian aid is never a crisis management tool. We must balance the need to maintain a humanitarian space in a conflict situation with the need for security.

23 Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) Report of Synthesized Findings, 2008.

6.4 Management

At the Management level, national governments and international organisations can take concrete and practical steps that contribute to attaining the aims at the other levels. CA is a major process and organisational learning and cumulative knowledge take time to develop. Through experimentation, training, evaluation and research and development we can create capabilities and tools that build the Comprehensive Approach from the bottom-up.

There is a **need to diversify civilian input in the planning**: 'Defense, diplomacy and development' do not cover all aspects of crisis management. The police, the judiciary and a wide range of other civilian expertise, from both governmental and non-governmental organisations, should also be an integral part of the planning process and of missions in the field. Policymakers should strive to share more information with these actors and to improve consultation and cooperation with them.

Experiments allow the nations to test, adjust and iterate until the best solution is found. Additionally, multinational experimentation provides a process for developing and evaluating concepts that are multinational and multi-organisational in nature from the very beginning while leveraging the expertise and contributions of all partners. **Experimentation** is also a useful and practical tool in increasing understanding, a cooperative culture and management practices among crisis management organisations and should therefore continue to be one method in developing the Comprehensive Approach further.

Developing **funding mechanisms that better support coherence and the Comprehensive Approach both on the national and multilateral level** is vital. To support synergetic action, financial instruments need to be flexible in their setup and quickly disbursable. Pooling funds at the national and multinational level, combining ODA and non-ODA funds and establishing flexible decision-making procedures offer a number of advantages. National pools, multi-donor trust funds and joint programmes can promote a more programmatic and long-term approach. They reduce fragmentation, provide finance for important large-scale infrastructure projects, rebuild state capacity, and give some predictability for national planning.

Civilians and the military face a common challenge in verifying progress on the ground and towards achieving overall goals. Many organisations are able to measure their own project-level activities; however, adequate methods have not yet been developed **to evaluate the mission-wide impact of collective efforts**, making it more difficult to implement shared multi-organisational solutions. At the end of the day, we must be able to determine if the objectives of the strategy are being achieved.

There is a need to further **develop civilian-military training capabilities** as it is clear that joint training is critical as a means of avoiding misunderstandings and dealing with institutional prejudices. **More secondment of staff** between different ministries and international organisations can greatly help to develop shared understanding of the synergy between defence, diplomacy and development. In addition, synergy can be improved by making political and development advisors cooperate closely with military commanders in the field, and by joint training of personnel from different departments.

There is a need for research and development to address the existing infrastructural gaps between actors. For instance, the use of incompatible IT tools hinders information sharing and interoperability.

A broad range of **common standards** (including training) needs to be developed, agreed upon and implemented. As far as is practical, **agreement on the common use of language and standardisation of terms** should be encouraged. For example, it is important to describe in common terms what each participant does. It's imperative to avoid confusion based on differing understandings of terms of reference when the NGOs and the military occupy the same space and where missions may overlap.

6.5 Conclusion

According to several participating delegations, the Helsinki seminar on Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Prevention and Management and the preparation of this report has already made a positive impact by giving an incentive for different national actors to sit together and clarify and describe their WGA to crisis management. As the debate on CA and WGA and their interrelationship is relatively new and only a limited amount of research is currently available, this report hopefully provides a useful contribution to the debate.

Since the seminar in June, a number of the practical way forward items are already being implemented. The conceptual debate about the CA and WGA will continue in November when the Government of Norway will host a seminar examining the concepts in the context of Afghanistan. Also, the MNE6 might provide useful opportunities to further develop the common approach and understanding in some of the specific areas mentioned in this report.

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