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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## RE: turkey monograph for comment

Released on 2012-08-27 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1742946
Date | 2010-05-27 18:56:27
From | bokhari@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

That's not true. It was after they had begun to decline did the Ottomans
needed the Europeans to counter the Russians. For the longest time the
Europeans were not major powers. And when the U.S. came around the empire
had long fallen.
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com]
On Behalf Of Reva Bhalla
Sent: May-27-10 12:33 PM
To: Analyst List
Subject: Re: turkey monograph for comment
Did a great job incorporating earlier comments and fleshing this out a
bit. I do still ahve a few comments, particularly toward the end.
In addition, one big thing that I see missing in the monograph is
describing how the imperatives influence Turkey's relationship with other
states. For example, throughout much of Ottoman history, Turkey
constantly had to find a power patron (usually Britian or France) to fend
against Russia. Then that shifted to the US and we saw what drove TUrkey
into NATO membership. Today Turkey can stand on its own much more than it
could in the 50s, etc.
Summary/Introduction
The Turks - like the Romans before them - did not originate at the
crossroads of Europe and Asia. The Turks hail from what is now post-Soviet
Central Asia, migrating to Marmara around the time of the Mongol invasions
of the Middle East and Europe. Stratfor begins its assessment of Turkey at
the Sea of Marmara because until the Turks secured it for themselves -
most famously and decisively in May 1453 with the capture of
Constantinople - they were simply one of many groups fighting for control
of the region. This consolidation took in excess of 150 years, but with it
the Turks transformed themselves from simply another wave of Asian
immigrants into something more: a culture with potential to be that could
be a world power.
The Turkish Geography
Modern Turkey straddles the land bridge that links the southeastern
extremes of Europe with the southwestern extremes of Asia. In modern times
nearly all of its territory lies on the Asian side of the divide,
occupying the entirety of the Anatolian plateau -- a thick, dry and rugged
peninsula of land that separates the Black and Mediterranean seas. Modern
Turkey, with its Asiatic and Anatolian emphasis, is an aberration.
"Turkey" was not originally a mountain country and the highlands of
Anatolia were among the last lands settled by the Turks, not the first.
The core of Turkey is not the high plateaus and low mountains of Asia
Minor. Instead the Turkish core is the same territory as the Byzantine
Empire that preceded it: the lands surrounding the Sea of Marmara. This
lowland is not home to vast fertile plain like the middle of the United
States, nor is it cut by a wealth of navigable rivers like the Northern
Europe. Such lowlands ease the penetration of peoples and ideas while
allowing centralized government to easily spread their writ. One result is
political unity. Rivers radically reduce the cost of transport,
encouraging trade and with it wealth.
The Sea of Marmara region has neither of these features, but the shape of
the Sea of Marmara in many ways encourages political unity and wealth
nonetheless.
It terms of agricultural production and political unity, the region's
maritime climate smoothes out the region's semi-arid nature. Similarly,
its position on the flanks of the mountains of Anatolia grant the sea
lowlands access to a series of broad valleys that rise with insufficient
speed to make agriculture difficult, but sufficient speed so that the
cooler, higher air wrings out rain that waters the entire valley
structure. Additionally, those extreme western Anatolian valleys are broad
enough that they give rise to relatively few independence-minded
minorities; central authority can easily project power up into them.
Combined with the flat lands on the European side of the sea, the result
is a sizable core territory with reasonably reliable fresh water supplies
- and one that sea transport on the Sea of Marmara ensures remains part of
a singular political system. It may not a large unified well-watered
plain, split as it is by the sea itself, but the land is sufficiently
useful that it is certainly the next best thing.
In terms of trade and the capital formation that comes from it, by some
measures the Sea of Marmara is even better than a navigable river. Access
to the sea itself is severely limited by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles:
in some places maritime access to the Turkish core is a mere mile across.
This has two implications. First, Turkey is highly resistant to opposing
sea powers. For foes to reach the Turkish core they must make amphibious
assaults on the core's borderlands, and then fight against an extremely
determined and well-equipped defending force that can resupply both by
land and sea. As the British Empire learned famously at Gallipoli in the
First World War, that is a tall order. Second, the geographic pinches on
the sea ensure that Marmara is quite literally a Turkish lake - and one
with a lengthy coastline at that. This holistic ownership has encouraged a
vibrant maritime trading culture reaching back to the days of antiquity
that rivals the economic strength of nearly any river basin. As a result
the core of Turkey is both capital rich and physically secure.
The final dominant feature of the Turkish core region is that while it is
gathered around the Sea of Marmara, the entire region is a doubly
important tradeway. The Sea of Marmara links the Aegean (and from it the
Mediterranean) Sea with the Black Sea, granting the Turks full command of
any bi-sea trading, and providing it with natural, close-by opportunities
for economic expansion. Turkish lands are also in essence an isthmus
between Europe and Southwest Asia, allowing Turkey nearly as much
dominance over European-Asian land trade as it does over
Black-Mediterranean sea trade.
This is both a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing in that the trade
that flows via the land route absolutely must travel through Turkey's
core, granting Turkey all of the economic benefits on offer. Combined with
the naval maritime tradition this land grants to its inhabitants, the
Ottomans and Byzantines both managed to dominate regional - and in many
cases global - trade for centuries. For example, partnership with the
merchant cities of Italy's Po Valley granted the Turks exclusivity over
European-Asian trade for centuries.
However, as all isthmuses do, the land funnels down to a narrow point,
allowing large hostile land forces to concentrate their strength on the
core territory, and bring all their strength to bear against one side of
the core (with the other half of the core being on the other side of the
sea). It was precisely in this way that the cousins of the Mongols
dislodged the Byzantines. In short, Turkey's core is more vulnerable to
land invasion than sea invasion.
Imperatives
Many empires form after a country has already consolidated control over
its local geography. For example, once England consolidated control over
Great Britain, it was logical for it to expand into empire (largely
because there was nothing left to do at home). But there was nothing that
required England to do so. The empire obviously enriched London and made
it more secure, but even had England remained limited to Great Britain, it
would have been a powerful, successful and secure entity.
This is not the case with the Turks. The Sea of Marmara offers many
advantages, but it is neither a large region nor one without regional
competitors. Reduced simply to Marmara, the Turks lack both strategic
depth and a large population. They can limit their access to the world
within their mini-Mediterranean, but in doing so they invalidate many of
the economic benefits of that sea. The Marmara region thrives on trade -
isolationism greatly circumscribes that trade, and with it the Turks'
options.
Addressing these shortcomings forces whoever rules the Marmara lands to
expand. Just as the Japanese are forced to attempt expansion to secure
resources and markets, and as the Russians are forced to attempt expansion
to secure more defendable borders, the Turks find themselves at the mercy
of others economically, politically and militarily unless they can create
something bigger for themselves.
1: Establish a blocking position in Anatolia
But before the Turks can expand, they first must secure their rear, and
that means venturing into Anatolia. As noted earlier, the Sea of Marmara
region is a rich, unified, outward-oriented region, but none of this is
true for the rest of what comprises modern day Turkey: the Anatolian
Peninsula.
Anatolia is much dryer and more rugged than the Marmara region, starkly
raising the capital costs of infrastructure and agriculture. While it is a
peninsula which would normally generate a maritime culture, it coastline
is smooth, greatly limiting the number of good ports. The mountains also
rise very rapidly from the coast, so unlike the Marmara region there is
little hinterland to develop to take advantage of the maritime access.
There are notable exceptions - the flat coastal enclaves of the Antalya
and Adana regions - but the norm is for an extremely truncated coastal
identity. Anatolia's valleys are also higher, narrower and steeper than
those at the peninsula's western end. This encourages the development and
independence of local cultures, thus complicating the matter of central
control. Taken together Anatolia is as capital poor, parochial and
introspective as the Sea of Marmara region is capital rich, worldly and
extroverted.
Because of this the Turks have little interest in grabbing all of Anatolia
early in their development; the cost simply outweighs the benefits. But
they do need to ensure that natives of Anatolia are not able to raid the
core, or that any empire further afield can use the Anatolian land bridge
to reach Marmara. The solution is a blocking position beyond the eastern
end of the valleys that drain to the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean. The
specific location is unimportant. In fact, by most measures it is better
to have that block very close to the western end of the peninsula - no
more than one-third the way down the peninsula's length - for as one moves
east Anatolia becomes higher, dryer and more rugged. One certainly would
not want to move past the 36th meridian where Asia Minor fuses with Asia
proper, which would expose the Turks to more and more land-based rivals.
But while this blocking position is taken not for economic reasons, its
strategic benefits are nearly unrivaled. Just as Anatolia is difficult to
develop or control, it is equally difficult to launch an invasion through.
A secure block on Anatolia both starkly limits the ability of Asian powers
to bring war to Turkey - using the entire peninsula, even if not under
Turkish control - as a buffer, and freeing Turkey to focus on richer
pastures within Europe.
2: Expand up the Danube to Vienna
The Danubian Valley is the logical first point of major expansion for the
Turks for a number of reasons. First, it's the closest major river valley
of note, only 350 kilometer (220 miles) away from the Marmara. Second,
there are no rival naval powers on the Black Sea. The Black Sea is too
stormy to sustain a non-expert navy, most of its coast is rugged, its
northern reaches freeze in the winter. Only the Turks have ice-free,
good-weather, deep-water ports (mostly on the Sea of Marmara) that can
maintain a sustained competition in the region, practically handing naval
superiority to them. Consequently, it is extremely easy for the Turks to
leverage their naval expertise to support initial gains in the eastern
Balkans (water transport is far more efficient than land transport,
whether the cargo is commercial or military in nature). Third, the Danube
is a remarkable prize. It is the longest river in the region by far, and
is navigable all the way to southern Germany. On its banks lie ample
tracts of arable land.
There are also four natural defensive points the Turks can use to make
defense of any conquered territories more efficient. The first lies in
modern-day Bulgaria. The Balkan Mountains which cross central Bulgaria
from west to east and the Rila and Rhodope Mountains of southwestern
Bulgaria effectively sever extreme southeastern Europe from the rest of
the continent. The Turks could simply launch from Marmara, travel up the
Maritsa river, fortify what is now the city of Sofia, and slice off and
digest a chunk of territory that is nearly as large as the land
surrounding the Sea of Marmara itself. All without needing to worry about
forces from outside the immediate region intervening.
The second plug is where the Black Sea nearly meets the Carpathians, just
north of the marshy Danube delta: the site of modern day Moldova. This
location - often referred to as the Bessarabian Gap - allows the Turks to
concentrate forces and hold off any force that might seek direct access
from the Eurasian steppe. Combined with support from Turkey's naval acumen
and the natural defensive nature of the Danube delta, this is a priceless
defensive location.
The third gap lies in the Danube Valley itself, on the river where
modern-day Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria meet. At this point Romania's
Carpathians and Bulgaria's Balkan Mountains impinge upon the Danube to
form the famous Iron Gate, a series of stark cliffs and water hazards that
inhibit the passage of both land and maritime traffic. Securing this
location prevents the advance of any western Balkan power. Holding the
second and third defensive locations allows the Turks to easily command
and assimilate the fertile regions of modern-day northern Bulgaria and
southern Romania.
The final - and most critical - defensive point is the city of Vienna,
located at a similar gap between the Carpathians and the Alps. If Vienna
can be secured by the Turks, then it plus Bessarabia allows for an
extremely efficient defense against any northern European power or
coalition.
The problem is getting to Vienna. Unlike the pieces of land that the Turks
could obtain piecemeal to this point, the Pannonian Plains lies between
the Iron Gate and Vienna. The Pannonian alone is larger than all of the
territory seized by the Turks to this point combined, and is criss-crossed
by a series of useful rivers of which the Danube is but one. It is most
certainly a prize worth holding in its own right.
But it is not unoccupied. Its nearly unrivaled fertility has traditionally
boasted a large population. Local powers - capital rich and more than able
of putting up their own defense - hold sway there and need to be brought
to heel. In addition, there are a number of internal barriers - both water
and mountain - that inhibit military maneuvering and encourage the
independence of several different ethnicities (specifically Croatians,
Serbs and Hungarians in the modern age). Complicating matters, the eastern
edge of the Pannonian gives way to Transylvania, a region unique for its
mix of mountains, isolated plains and rivers, providing the geographic
oddity of a well-funded and populated mountain fastness. This combination
of capital richness from the plains and waterways and political fracturing
from the other terrain features makes the Pannonian a potential imperial
kill zone - particularly since any Turkish operations there have to flow
through the Iron Gate, and since northern European powers are just as
aware of the significance of Vienna as the Turks are. Vienna is not simply
a strategic fortress, it is also a door that can swing both ways.
In the end this fourth strategic blocking position proved to be just out
of reach for the Ottoman Turks, with two massive multi-decade military
campaigns failing to secure the city. Consequently, the Europeans were
able to bleed the Ottoman Empire in the Pannonian, sowing the seeds for
the empire's withdrawal from Europe and eventual fall.
don't you need to show Ottoman borders on this map?
3: Develop a political and economic system to integrate conquered
populations
Like most empires, the Ottoman Empire expanded quickly enough that it had
to develop a means of dealing with its success. While it was unable to
ever capture Vienna, simply reaching the point that it could attempt to
capture Vienna meant that it had already taken control over vast tracts of
territory. In fact, the Danube region below the Iron Gate already granted
the Ottoman Turks useful land roughly five times the size of the useful
land in the Sea of Marmara region. The Pannonian, had it been completely
secured, would have doubled that area again. It also would have been the
most fertile lands of the entire empire.
The Sea of Marmara's problem was that it couldn't simply displace its
conquered peoples even if it had wanted to - in lacked sufficient
population to then restock the emptied lands. The conquered lands were too
vast to be made productive simply relying upon the labor of Turks, who
lacked the manpower to work, of even manage, the territory they
controlled. Unlike the Russians who were numerically superior to their
conquered populations and so could rule via terror, the Turks were only a
plurality. The Turks needed these people to make the conquered lands
productive and profitable, and the relative dearth of Turks meant that
these peoples had to want to be part of the empire. It key word was not
exploitation, but integration.
The result was the world's first truly multi-ethnic governing system (as
opposed to a multi-ethnic empire). Preexisting local authorities were
granted great freedom in managing their populations so long as they swore
fealty to the empire. Suzerainty relationships were established where
localities could even collect their own taxes so long as they paid a
portion to the center and deferred to the Ottomans on defense and foreign
policy. Entire sections of cities were preserved for different ethnic
groups with Muslim law ruling the Muslims, and local laws holding sway
elsewhere in the city. Religions different from the Sunni Islam that
dominated the Turks not only tended to be respected, but local religious
leaders often were granted secular legal authority to augment their
positions. High ranking officials - not simply at the local level, but
also at the imperial level back in Istanbul - were regularly selected from
subject populations. By tradition the grand vizier - the second most
powerful person in the empire - was never a Turk. And the most potent
military force the empire boasted - the Janissaries - was comprised almost
exclusively of non-Turk ethnics. The Turks were very clearly in charge -
and if Turkish/Muslim laws every crossed paths with local/Christian
legalities there was no doubt which code held precedence - but the fact
remains that Istanbul forged a governing system that granted its conquered
peoples solid reasons to live in, work with, profit by and even die for
the empire.
But not all conquered populations were treated equally. As one might
surmise from the order of the Ottoman expansion, not all lands in the
Balkans were considered prizes. The plains of the Danube basin formed the
economic and even intellectual core of the empire, but there is far more
to the Balkans than plains. The Balkan Peninsula has no small number of
mountains - and mountain people - with the most notable being the Greeks,
Albanians, southern Croatians, southern Serbs, and western Bulgarians (the
latter groups have since split to form additional groups: the Montengrins
and Macedonians). These people did not live in the fertile plain regions
that the Turks coveted, and their (largely mountainous) territories tended
to be more trouble than they were worth. Developing the regions
economically was a thankless task, and the security concerns of such
mountains were the same in the Balkans as they were in Anatolia. The Turks
saw little need to integrate these mountain people into Ottoman society,
and as such Turkish treatment of them was far more in line with how other
empires of the era treated their conquered populations. Such peoples could
still ascend in Ottoman society, but such exceptions tended only to prove
the rule.
4: Seize and garrison Crimea
The lands of the Danube are the only territories that can be gained easily
and profitably by any entity based on the Sea of Marmara. After this point
the question becomes one of a proactive defense; what forward positions
can the Turks take to prevent other regional powers from threatening the
Turkish core at Marmara or its territories in the Balkans? Vienna, can it
be captured, solves the problem of the Northern European Plain. That only
leaves two possibilities for would-be rivals: the Eurasian steppe and the
Mediterranean.
Solving the Eurasian steppe problem is the easier - and by far cheaper -
of the two. The Eurasian steppe is the center section of the vast plain
that stretches nearly without break from Bordeaux to Tianjin. Powers
ranging from the Spain to France to Germany to Poland to Russia to
Mongolia to China have bled for centuries attempting to dominate this
space; it is simply a realm that Turkey lacks the population to compete
in. To limit the ability of this super-region to interfere with Balkan,
Black Sea and Anatolian affairs the most effective strategy is to ensure
that whoever rules the Eurasian steppe - traditionally Russia - is always
on the defensive. The single most valuable piece of territory for
achieving this end is the Crimean Peninsula.
First, the Crimea (roughly the same size as the Sea of Marmara region) is
connected to the mainland by a mere 5 kilometer (3.5 mile) wide isthmus,
meaning that a single fortification can hold off a mass attack relatively
easily. Second, the Crimea splits the northern Black Sea into two pieces,
breaking up most military or commerce possibilities for whatever power
holds the Black Sea's northern shore.
Third, the Crimea greatly impinges upon the drainage of the Don River, one
of the very few navigable waterways in the Russian sphere of influence.
The water between the Crimea and the Don's delta is the Sea of Azov, a
brackish waterway that freezes in the winter (along with the Don in its
entirety in most years). Relatively limited Turkish military facilities in
the Crimea can therefore easily destroy any seasonal Russian naval force
that attempts to break out of the Don. Shipbuilding until very recently
was largely impossible under ice conditions, so the Russians would only
have a few months to prepare while the Turks could simply shuffle their
larger and better-trained forces around their all-warmwater ports as
needed.
Fourth, such command of the river's mouth means that any trade seeks to
travel from the river to the Black Sea only occurs should it abide by
whatever rules the masters of the Crimea set.
Finally, using the Crimea as a base the Turks could regularly raid
anywhere in the northern Black Sea coast, wrecking enormous damage on
Russian assets wherever the Turks chose to - yet being able to leave
before the Russians could bring their slow-moving but numerically superior
land forces to bear.
5: Establish naval facilities throughout the eastern Mediterranean
Turkey's final imperative is to replicate the Crimea strategy in the
eastern Mediterranean. There is no single magic location here as there is
in the Black Sea, but there are additional locations in the Eastern
Mediterranean region that are worth seizing for economic purposes. Naval
facilities in the Aegean - culminating in the island of Crete - provide a
degree of security for the Turkish core at Marmara. Add in the island of
Cyprus and the Turks now hold every major potential maritime base in the
region, enabling them to seize operational control of the Suez region, and
the Nile Valley and Hijaz beyond it. Once the eastern Mediterranean is
secured, Turkish eyes turn to the Sharik Peninsula (modern day
northeastern Tunisia), Malta and Sicily in order to block off access to
the Eastern Mediterranean altogether.
However, unlike the Ottoman's Danubian expansion, the benefits of any
Mediterranean expansion are not self-evident, and unlike the Crimean
occupation it is not cheap. The Danubian expansion was organic. One asset
led to a geographic plug, which led to another asset and to another plug
(and so on). The process built upon each other until the Turks had layer
upon layer of geographic barricades, each supplied with local food,
capital and soldiers. The Crimea allowed the Turks to inflict a maximum
of disruption on the Russians for a minimum cost in resources.
The Eastern Mediterranean is a far more hostile - and less rewarding -
place than the Danube, and there is no single spot like the Crimea. The
Aegean islands have low populations -- unless they all are held a foe
could use them in an island hopping strategy to approach the Turkish core.
Cyprus has a larger population than the Aegean islands, but its relative
lack of arable land means any force there will be an occupation force. It
is not a territory worth integrating politically and economically. As such
it will face rebellions, just as any of the Ottomans' mountainous
provinces regularly did. And should control ever be lost, so too would be
any provinces that depended upon such naval support (like North Africa).
The extremely mobile nature of naval warfare means that reliable power
projection in the Eastern Mediterranean is a dubious proposition unless
all of these islands are held. And even if they are all under singular
Turkish control, any empire built upon those naval bases are then utterly
dependent upon those naval bases for supply. Yes, via the Levant the Turks
could establish land-supply routes to Mecca and Cairo, but such land
routes were far slower and more expensive than maritime supply. And the
inland desert nature of the Middle East meant that most routes needed to
hug the coast anyway, making those routes vulnerable unless Turkish
regional sea power was iron-clad.
In the Eastern Mediterranean a large (expensive) military force was
required simply to attempt to create an empire, whereas the Danube region
was rich enough in farmland, capital and population to defend itself. The
Danube portion of the empire therefore grew organically, whereas the
Mediterranean section suffered from imperial overstretch.
The Other Ottoman Territories
There are many regions near the Sea of Marmara that simply do not make
sense are not as suitable for integration into empire, but which the
Ottoman Empire absorbed nonetheless.
Much of this territory was in the Western and Southern Balkans. Regions
such as today's Bosnia and Greece were made imperial territories largely
because there was no other power competently competing for them. Once the
Turks had advanced into the Pannonian Plain, these regions were largely
cut off from the rest of Europe, allowing the Turks to digest them at
their leisure let's rephrase.. sounds a bit hyperbole. Many pieces of this
region had some use - Bosnia, for example, served as a useful trade
corridor to Europe - but overall they were too mountainous to enrich the
empire. These regions simply fell into the Ottoman lap because they had no
other place to fall. And as the Ottomans fell back from the Danube, these
regions broke away as well.
Others, like what is currently southern Ukraine, turned Ottoman strategic
doctrine on its head. Normally the Crimea was used to disrupt Russia's
southern holdings with irregular raids on the Russian-held coast. But once
the decision was made to hold the coast the Russians - with their far
larger population and army - could return the favor. Such expansions bled
the Turks dry and contributed to imperial overstretch and fall.
Similarly, neither the Caucasus nor Mesopotamia served large-scale
strategic or economic purposes for the Turks. In addition to being
mountainous and somewhat arid, and therefore of questionable economic use,
neither boast navigable rivers and both lie on the wrong side of Anatolia.
Developing the region requires large financial transfers from other
portions of the empire. Any serious effort in the Caucuses region pit the
Ottomans directly against the Russians in a land competition that the
less-populated Turks could not sustain. Any large-scale commitment to
Mesopotamia put Turkey into direct competition with Persia - a mountainous
state that Turkey could only reliably counter should the empire's other
borders remain quiet (which only rarely occurred). Supplying garrisons in
either was problematic even in the best of times, and once the Russians
captured the Crimea in 1783 sea supply routes to the Caucasus were no
longer assured. Mesopotamia could only be supplied by land.
North Africa is only a viable addition to the empire should naval
supremacy of the Eastern Mediterranean already be achieved, while
exploitation of the Nile - for all its riches - is utterly dependent upon
a strong naval command. Unsurprisingly, with the exception of the Western
Balkans, all of these territories were acquired later in the Ottoman
advance, and were among the first provinces surrendered.
The core point is this: much of the territory gained late in the Ottoman
period was gained late for very good reasons. These later acquisitions
added very little to the empire in terms of economic strength, but drained
Istanbul's coffers considerably simply by being held both in terms of
development and defensive costs. It is not so much that these regions were
useless. While Mesopotamia and the Caucasus did expose Turkey to the
Persians and Russians, they also helped contain Persian and Russian power.
Do not confuse `less useful' with `of no use' this is why I wanted to
rephrase the `made no sense' phrase at the top of this section . But these
regions could only be effectively dominated if the rest of the empire
could support the effort in terms of soldiers and money - unlike the
Danube region these territories did not pay for and maintain themselves.
Once the Europeans were able to eject the Turks from the Pannonian Plan
and ultimately the Balkans completely, most of the economically profitable
pieces of the empire were gone, leaving the empire with only the costly
bits.
As such in the empire's final decades, all of these `other' territories
were lost in rapid succession - as the Turks could not sustain the
provinces militarily or financially. But there is a glaring exception to
this rule of thumb, and it is an exception that has come to radically
reshape Turkey: Anatolia.
Turkey today
The most notable feature of modern Turkey - from a geographic point of
view - is that it holds very little of the territory that has historically
fallen within its sphere of influence. The Crimea was lost to Russia in
the late eighteenth century, the Balkans carved away bit by bit in the
nineteenth, and finally its Arab territories in the early twentieth. Since
then Turkey has existed in a sort of geopolitical coma, being acted upon -
rather than being the actor - in an aberration of history.
In the aftermath of World War I, however, Turkey was left with a single
piece of non-core territory: the Anatolian Peninsula. Unlike the rest of
the territories that Ottoman Turkey or the Eastern Roman Empire held at
their heights, Anatolia is of questionable use. It lacks useable rivers
like the Balkans. It lacks clear strategic value like the Crimea. It isn't
a road to a greater prize like the Levant. It can't even reliably feed
itself as Mesopotamia can. As one moves further east on the peninsula the
land becomes steeper, drier and rocker, even as the size of the valleys
shrink. In short, all of the benefits of the core Marmara region steadily
wither as one moves east before disappearing altogether as the land merges
with the Caucasus and Persia. Between its aridity, its elevation, its
steepness and its neighbors, developing Anatolia requires a mammoth
expenditure of resources for very little return.
The combination of the capital richness of the Sea of Marmara with the
capital poverty of Anatolia is an accident of history that has changed
Turkey - and the Turks - radically.
First, it has created a balance of power issue where in imperial days none
existed.
Since modern Turkey was shorn of the bulk of its empire in 1920, capital
generated in the Sea of Marmara region lost the ability to invest in
locations other than itself and Anatolia. Need to tweak this a bit so it
doesn't sound like trade was completely cut off to present-day Over the
course of three generations, the Turks have steadily made Anatolia their
own, investing in infrastructure, education and a slow-but-steady
urbanization campaign. As Anatolia developed, it not only generated its
own merchant class, but steadily expanded its presence in Turkey's
bureaucracy, police forces and military. By the 2000s the combined
Anatolian cultural and economic strength had matured sufficiently to
challenge the heretofore unassailable hold of the Sea of Marmara region on
Turkey's political, cultural, economic and military life. It would be an
oversimplification to say that the current disputes between Turkey's
secular and Islamic factions are purely geographic in origin, but it is an
equal oversimplification to assert that they are purely based on the
secular-religious split. The two overlay and reinforce each other.
Second, Turkey's cultural outlook has evolved so substantially over the
past three generations that the Ottoman Turks might not even recognize
their modern brethren. The Ottoman Turks, like the Byzantines before them,
were an extremely cosmopolitan and confident culture. Their easy access to
the maritime and trade possibilities of the Sea of Marmara region -
combined with the security granted by the sea's very limited access points
- gave the Turks easy access to capital, and the ability to easily and
cheaply protect it.
Expansion into empire only entrenched this mix of openness and security.
The greater Danube basin brought the Turks into contact with productive
region after productive region, yet Ottoman Turkey lacked the demographic
strength to simply displace the locals and repopulate the land with Turks.
The solution was to integrate the peoples of the valuable territories into
Ottoman society. The Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs and Hungarians may of
course dispute the assessment, but these nationalities enjoyed more social
and economic rights than any other subject peoples until the onset of
democracy as a governing system in the late 18th and early 19th century.
Eventual expansion to the Crimea, Levant, Cyprus, the Nile and Mesopotamia
only deepened this inclusiveness.
But that world ended for the Turks 90 years ago. Since then the Turks were
left with rump Anatolia, a zone whose arid climate and rugged topography
has more in common with Greece or the Caucasus than the Danube basin. The
land held few fertile regions, only a pair of small coastal plains in the
south, no navigable rivers, and a relative dearth of other resources.
Unlike the Danube region where the Turks needed the active participation
of the local populations to make use of the land, in Anatolia there was
little useful land to make use of in the first place. As such there was
little reason to integrate with non-Turk populations, and by extension a
lack of political integration predominated. Turkey's relations with the
Kurds and Armenians of Anatolia was far more similar to its relations with
the Greeks, Cypriots or Montenegrins than it was with the Romanians or
Bulgarians. Ie. hostile? May need to explain what you mean by this last
line a bit better
The end result of this transformation from an `imperial' political
geography that included the Danube to a `republican' political geography
that was limited to Anatolia is that Turkey is no longer the multi-ethnic
polity it once was. The Turkish political demographic has shifted from a
proactively multi-cultural governing system to that of a dominating
Turkish supermajority that attempts to smother minority groups out of
public life. This mindset shift from `dominant-but-inclusive' to simply
`dominant' is reflected across the political landscape well beyond the
issue of inter-ethnic relations.
No longer are the Turks a maritime power at the border of global trade.
One of the means with which the British and French pushed the Ottomans out
of the Eastern Mediterranean and hobbled imperial finances was by
redirecting global trade away from the Eastern Mediterranean, a process
which the Cold War completed with utter finality. The sequestering of the
Balkans beyond Turkish reach, first by the Cold War and then with the NATO
and EU expansions of the 2000s effectively closed off Turkey's most likely
avenue for re-expansion. Turkey still holds echoes of its Ottoman
political culture, but shifts in the region's political geography have
made resuscitating regional trade ties - much less regional economic
domination - problematic at best. And if Turkey is no longer a marine
merchant power, then what is it?
The answer is Anatolia. The shift in political geography from the Balkans
to Anatolia changed who the Turks were.
Non-mountain peoples tend to have access to plains, rivers and oceans -
the building blocks of productivity and capital formation. Put simply,
non-mountain peoples tend to have larger and richer populations, and so
when non-mountain peoples and mountain peoples encounter each other they
tend to do so at the time, place and for reasons that the non-mountain
people determine. Unsurprisingly, the access of mountain peoples to the
outside world more often than not is limited to infrequent contacts that
the mountain people often look back at in anger. Consequently, mountain
peoples tend to have a relatively parochial view of the broader world from
these truncated, largely negative interactions.
Ninety years of absence from international affairs has forced the Turks to
find cultural refuge in the Anatolian Peninsula, and that has - in essence
- transformed them into mountain people. There is now an ossification,
parochialism and self-aggrandizing nature to the Turkish mindset where
there once was flexibility and cosmopolitanism. Just as the Turks
discovered upon their encounters with the peoples of Greece or the Western
Balkans, mountain peoples tend to be extremely insular, resistant to
outside influences in their lives and tenacious in protecting their way of
lives.
So modern Turkey faces twin challenges. First, there is a deep, and
perhaps unbridgeable, spilt within Turkish society between the `secular'
faction of the Sea of Marmara region who see the country's future in
association with Europe, and the `religious' faction of the Anatolia who
pursues relationships with the Islamic world. Both groups have any number
of advantages and disadvantages.
The Marmara group - typically referred to as the secularists - are the
heirs to Turkey's historical legacy, they control most of the trade with
Europe and from it most of the country's income and merchant activity.
They dominate both the courts and the military, and are credited with the
large-scale development that has driven Turkey the past three generations.
But their link to the country's former territories is blocked by both the
NATO alliance and the EU - organizations that are far too strong for the
Turks to break, limiting this faction's powerbase to simply Marmara. That
was not enough for the Ottomans, and alone it will not be enough for the
secularists.
The Anatolian group - currently represented by the ruling AK Party -
increasingly controls the country's political life and holds the hearts of
the bulk of the population. And where the secularists embrace the military
aspects of Turkey's Ottoman past, the Anatolians embrace the religious
side - after all, the Ottomans held the Islamic Caliphate for centuries.
That link has allowed the Anatolians to extend their influence throughout
the entire Islamic world. The problem with that strategy is that it is
often difficult to ascertain what the winner gets. I would cut/rephrase
this.. it sounds a bit derogatory. It's not just about economic gains...
it's about influencing a very hot region of the world The entire combined
Middle East from Morocco to Iran boasts an economy that is but
three-quarters the size of Spain. One thing that this strategy does have
going for it is that competition for this region is remarkably thin, and
the current dominant regional power - the United States - is both reducing
its exposure and encouraging the Turks to increase theirs. But just as the
the Americans are leaving this region due to a combination of overstretch
and a high cost:benefit ratio, so too did the Ottomans before them. For
now that lesson has yet to be internalized by modern Turkey. This is
going too far in assuming Turkey will overstretch itself in this region.
They're not planting soldiers in faraway places... they're sending
businessmen to countries, building schools and opening embassies. That's a
big difference. Plus the spread is not limited to the Middle East. This
talk of a `lesson' and the `prize' sounds condescending and not totally in
line with what Turkey is setting out to do right now
And so Turkey rages a power struggle between two groups of varied
geography. The prize is "merely" Turkey same thing here.. I would scratch
this `prize' lingo. But Turkey's location is one that cannot be ignored,
and whoever emerges victorious will determine the region's future in ways
that cannot be predicted. We don't need to say victorious - it's a shift
taking place, the Islamists are slowly and steadily gaining the upper hand
but that doesn't mean the secularists can be snuffed out. And it is pretty
predictable how this will play out After all, neither group holds a vision
that is relevant to the political geography of the present. I don't
understand this last line
On May 27, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Peter Zeihan wrote:
yep
Kevin Stech wrote:
asafp = as soon as fucking possible?
On 5/27/10 10:06, Peter Zeihan wrote:
pls get comments in asafp -- we need to get this processed in order to get
some hard copies to folks tomorrow
tnx much
--
Kevin Stech
Research Director | STRATFOR
kevin.stech@stratfor.com
+1 (512) 744-4086