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### Viewing cable 03FRANKFURT9824, The EU Stability and Growth Pact: Dead, On Ice, It

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
03FRANKFURT9824 | 2003-12-01 15:34 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Consulate Frankfurt

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 FRANKFURT 009824

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR PDAS RIES, EB, EUR/AGS, AND EUR/ERA
    STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
    STATE PASS NSC
    TREASURY FOR DAS SOBEL
    TREASURY ALSO FOR ICN COX, STUART
    PARIS ALSO FOR OECD
    TREASURY FOR OCC RUTLEDGE, MCMAHON

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ECON EFIN EUN
    SUBJECT: The EU Stability and Growth Pact:  Dead, On Ice, It
    Lives; Form Over Substance?

    T-IA-F-03-0062

    REF: (A) Frankfurt 08852; (B) Berlin 4399; (C) Paris 8585;
    (D) Paris 8620

      (1)  (SBU) Summary: The failure of EU Finance Ministers to
         find a compromise on November 25 acceptable to all on the
         treatment of Germany and France under the Stability and
         Growth Pact (SGP) sent another negative signal on the
         viability of rules to coordinate fiscal policy in a monetary
         union without political union.  The European Central Bank
         (ECB)'s statement that Econfin's conclusions "carry serious
         dangers" is a reflection of their concern that one of the
         institutional underpinnings of the European Monetary Union
         has been weakened.

      (2)  (SBU) A close reading of Ecofin's conclusions suggests
         that the disagreements were more over process than
         substance.  Fundamentally, the issue was who is responsible
         for fiscal policy coordination, member states or the
         European Commission?  By rejecting the Commission's
         recommendations, the Council sent a clear message: it's the
         member states.  Failure to find common ground between all
         member states and the Commission on such an important, high
         profile issue could be a set back for the cooperative spirit
         necessary for SGP rules to be effective.

      (3)  (SBU) On substance, the qualified majority of Ministers
         agreed that Germany and France should correct their
         excessive deficits by 2005 rather than 2004, given the weak
         economic recovery.  The Commission had come to the same
         conclusion.  However, the Commission had recommended that
         France and Germany (a) be found not to have complied with
         Ecofin's earlier recommendations (reftels); and (b) be
         notched up on the SGP's disciplinary rack, to just under the
         sanctions rung.  In so doing, the next time these countries
         were found not in compliance with the Ecofin's
         recommendations, they could face sanctions.  In this way,
         the Commission sought to bring along the hard-line, smaller
         countries that were disgruntled with giving the next year
         for Germany and France to get their budgets in shape.  This
         procedure proved to be the undoing of any compromise.

      (4)  (SBU) German Finance Minister Eichel took the lead in
         opposing the Commission's proposal, not wanting to appear to
         be "punished" (a German Finance Ministry characterization)
         for doing the "right thing," particularly at a time when he
         is facing tough domestic budget battles with the opposition
         and his own party.   France was comfortable riding in
         Germany's draft, calculatedly showing signs of "flexibility"
         that, in the end, would be meaningless given Germany's tough
         stance.

      (5)  (SBU) While seemingly orthodox on substance but off the
         consensus line on process, different portrayals of the SGP
         have been rendered:  it is variously dead, on ice, or lives.
         The consequences of failure to reach unanimous agreement,
         however, could be serious -- not immediately for financial
         markets, but for the future.  Other instances of this
         inability of member states or the Commission to find common
         ground in the economic world have cropped up under the
         Italian Presidency (Investment Services Directive, Takeover
         Directive) and could well spill over into other areas such
         as the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe.
         While one or two disputes might not send a signal to
         financial markets, the inability to shape a more workable
         Europe could.  End Summary

      The Setting and Conclusions of November 25: Just the
      Facts
      --------------------------------------------- ------------
      -

      (6)  (SBU) Earlier this year Ecofin had declared that France
         and Germany have deficits that exceed the 3% of GDP
         reference value in the EU Treaty and would be handled under
         the SGP's "excessive deficit procedures."  On October 8 the
         EC had recommended, in accordance with Article 104(8) of the
         Treaty, that France had taken no effective action to
         implement Ecofin's June recommendations to correct its
         excessive deficit.  On October 21 the Commission further
         recommended that France take further measures to reduce its
         deficit and that it submit implementation reports every six
         months over the next two years so the Commission and Council
         could assess progress.  The recommendation was under Article
         104(9), the last step before moving to possible sanctions if
         France were to fail to comply with the new recommendations.
         Finally, the Commission gave France an extra year, to 2005,
         to correct its deficit.

      (7)  (SBU) The Commission's autumn forecast showed that
         Germany also would fail to reduce its deficit below the 3%
         of GDP reference value in 2004.  On November 18 the
         Commission drafted similar recommendations for Germany under
         Articles 104(8) and 104(9).

      (8)  (SBU) At their November 25 session there was no
         qualified majority of the Ecofin to accept the EC's
         recommendations on France and Germany (reftels and USEU
         septel).  Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, the
         Netherlands, Finland and Greece voted for the Commission's
         recommendation that both countries had taken no effective
         action to correct their deficits.  The same countries voted
         for the Commission's recommendations under 104(9), except
         Denmark and Sweden who, because they have not adopted the
         euro, cannot vote on decisions under Article 104(9).

      (9)  (SBU) A qualified majority was mustered for an
         alternative conclusion, described below.  Backing the
         alternative approach on France was Germany, Italy, Greece,
         Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland.  The same group,
         but substituting France for Germany (since the country
         subject to the procedures cannot vote on its own case),
         voted for similar conclusions on Germany.

      (10) (SBU) The Commission recorded its position in Ecofin's
         report of its meeting by noting that Ecofin's rejection of
         the Commission's recommendation was without any explanation,
         as required in the SGP, and by stating that Ecofin's earlier
         recommendation - which was a "decision" -- is still in force
         (that calls for deficits to be under 3% in 2004).  The
         Commission declared that it regretted that the "spirit and
         rules" of the SGP were not followed and reserved "the right
         to examine the implications of the Council conclusions and
         decide on possible subsequent actions."

      Ecofin's Alternative: Broad Agreement with the Commission
      on Substance
      --------------------------------------------- ------------
      -------------

      (11) (SBU) On substance, Ecofin's conclusions were broadly
         similar to the Commission's recommendations.  These call for
         (a) an end to excessive deficits "as rapidly as possible and
         at the latest 2005;" (b) structural reforms recommended in
         the EU's Broad Economic Policy Guidelines to be reflected in
         implementing measures to reduce the deficits; and (c) an
         acceleration of the reduction in the cyclically adjusted
         deficits should the recovery be stronger than currently
         expected.  The Commission wanted any higher-than-projected
         revenues to be allocated to deficit reduction, while Ecofin
         agreed to do so only if growth were higher than expected.

      (12) (SBU) Slight differences in the speed of structural
         deficit adjustment in 2004 appear between the two texts.
         Ecofin called for 0.6 percentage point reduction in Germany
         compared with the Commission's 0.8.  For France Ecofin asked
         for 0.8 percentage point reduction, rather than 1.0 sought
         by the Commission.

      Econfin's Alternative: Major Difference on Procedures
      --------------------------------------------- --------

      (13) (SBU) The fundamental difference between Ecofin's and
         the Commission`s approach was on process. Ecofin did not act
         on the basis of Treaty Article 104(9) as proposed by the
         Commission.  Under this Article, if a member state "persists
         in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the
         Council may decide to give notice to the Member State to
         take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the
         deficit reduction.. And can request reports in accordance
         with a specific timetable to "examine the adjustment
         efforts."  Instead, Ecofin just issued more recommendations,
         an iteration of their earlier action under Article 104(7).
         The difference is that failing to comply with
         recommendations under 104(9) would mean that the next stop
         would be sanctions.

      (14) (SBU) In addition, Ecofin called for "biannual
         notifications" on progress in fulfilling their commitments
         with the Commission and Council to give "due attention to
         prevailing economic conditions and the structural reforms
         being implemented."  The Commission had recommended four
         "implementation reports" over the next two years to assess
         progress.

      Germany: Takes the Lead - France in its Draft
      ---------------------------------------------

      (15) (SBU) Germany would not accept being subjected to a
         recommendation under Article 104(9), full stop.  According
         to a Commission official, this was the fundamental stumbling
         block.  The German delegation could agree to many
         formulations, but none that included Article 104(9).  One
         formulation sought to give Germany assurances that a
         recommendation under 104(9) would not lead automatically to
         sanctions if Germany were doing its best to reduce the
         deficit.  No dice.

      (16) (SBU) The German position, according to several German
         Finance Ministry officials, was driven by their view that
         they had lived up to Ecofin's recommendations issued to
         Germany in February.  The Commission had confirmed that when
         they assessed Germany's policies in May (ref a and b).
         Deterioration in Germany's 2003 structural budget position,
         as highlighted in the Commission's new autumn forecast, was
         a reflection of other changed circumstances, not a change in
         Germany's budget policies.  Specifically, German Finance
         Ministry experts point that that revisions of the
         statistical series, lower inflation (meaning lower revenues
         than budgeted), and the Commission's assumption of lower
         potential output all conspired to increase Germany's
         structural deficit.

      (17) (SBU) The Commission's recommendation to reduce the
         structural deficit by an additional 0.2 percentage points to
         0.8 was unappreciated.  The government is still uncertain of
         getting its budget and reform package adopted that would
         cause an estimated 0.6 percentage point reduction already
         programmed into the Commission's calculations.  According to
         a German Finance Ministry, the Commission said it was trying
         to help Finance Minister Eichel in his tough budget debates.
         With the final shape of the package in flux, the Commission
         thought now was a good time to up the ante.  From the
         Ministry's viewpoint, the Commission's meddling came at a
         particularly bad time in the domestic political debate.
         Despite having taken tough, unpopular measures in 2003, the
         Commission's move to Article 104(8) and 104(9) was being
         construed as "punishment," in the words of one German
         official, for "doing the right thing."  It was asserting
         that Germany had taken no measures and was being put on
         formal legal notice of defaulting on its obligations.  "This
         is ridiculous; the Minister will not accept it."

      Buddy System:  Two Sink or Two Swim?
      ------------------------------------

      (18) (SBU) German Finance Ministry officials were also
         irritated that their case was being put together with that
         of the French.  In their view, France had been disdainful of
         SGP procedures.  German Finance Ministry officials explained
         that they had privately been working with French finance
         officials, coaxing them to take additional budget
         consolidation measures.  That seemed to be working, in their
         view.  France had announced a 0.1 percentage point
         additional cut to their structural deficit for 2004.  The
         SGP was exerting pressure and "working" in their assessment.

      (19) (SBU) The Commission's case on Germany was issued on
         November 18 and put on the November 25 Ecofin agenda
         together with the French case, the discussion of which had
         been postponed from the November 4 Ecofin meeting.  Why not
         postpone discussion on the German case, pleading the need
         for more time, thus de-linking the substantive debate on the
         two?

      (20) (SBU) One German Finance Ministry official said "there
         is a certain dynamic" between Germany and France that made
         the linkage inevitable.  Another was resigned that a fight
         was inevitable, so postponement "won't help."  The
         Commission logic, according to an official close to the
         process, was the assumption that Germany would not vote on
         the merits of the French case, rather would be driven by
         politics.  Despite their private displeasure with the
         French, the Germans would support them in a vote.

      (21) (SBU) Also, the French had insisted on equal treatment
         with Germany.  The Commission's recommendations on Germany
         were virtually identical to those for France, a point the
         Commission recorded in its press release.  An ECB official
         pointed out that while the German rhetoric had been positive
         toward the SGP, the numbers looked about the same.  Germany
         had not reduced its structural deficit as it had pledged -
         although not because of the central government's policies.

      (22) (SBU) Twinning benefited France.  According to a
         Commission official, Germany did most of the talking.
         France demonstrated some flexibility, but maybe, mused this
         official, because they knew it would not be taken up given
         Germany's immoveable position on Article 104(9).

      (23) (SBU) French Finance Minister Mer could never have
         accepted a recommendation under Article 104(9) directed at
         France alone.  While Germany might technically have asked
         for a final delay to December 12 in Ecofin consideration of
         its respect for the Commission's recommendations, France had
         no more room for maneuver.  Mer went into the Euro Group
         meeting having signaled to the press that the GOF would
         bring flexibility to the table, but all indications are that
         he had no mandate to accept the Commission's recommendation
         of a 1%-of-GDP cut in the 2004 structural deficit.  Thus he
         could stand shoulder to shoulder with Eichel (or perhaps,
         back to back) in an absolute rejection of a recommendation
         uner Article 104(9).

      (24) (SBU) Despite Italian Finance Minister Tremonti's
         claims just a few weeks that SGP targets should be upheld,
         his reversal to support the Germans and French is not
         surprising.  Tremonti has often expressed his concern that
         the SGP does not encourage economic growth - and in country
         with the lowest growth rates in the EU, this concern
         resonates particularly well.  The Italian Government also
         realizes that it could be well be standing in German shoes
         next year; even under the most optimistic economic
         predictions, Italy in 2004 will likely be hovering around
         the three percent deficit ratio.  Self-interest rather than
         esprit de corps with the French and Germans prompted
         Tremonti's "change of heart."

      The Commission: Rejected Again -- Principles and
      Practicalities
      --------------------------------------------- ------------
      ------

      (25) (SBU) The Commission wrapped its position in principle.
         In explaining the decision to the European Parliament in
         Strasbourg on November 18, Commissioner Solbes declared that
         "The College stood firmly by the principle that we are a
         Community of law and that the Treaty and the Stability and
         Growth Pact have to be applied together."  While Germany had
         taken budget consolidation measures in 2003, it is in "non-
         compliance" with the Council recommendation to end its
         excessive deficit situation in 2004.  Therefore the
         Commission has an obligation to inform the Council of this
         fact and "recommend further steps to be taken according to
         Article 104(9)."
      (26) (SBU) The Germans argued that the Commission took a
         "mechanistic" approach.  First, the Commission could not
         assert that Germany had taken "on effective action," since,
         as noted above, the Commission had signed off Germany's
         package as recently as May.  Second, even if the actions
         were inadequate, there is nothing in the Pact or the Treaty
         to suggest a country should be immediately treated under
         104(9), in their view.  A German Finance Ministry official
         reports that the Council's legal services shared this view -
         at odds with the Commission's legal services.  Ecofin's
         approach, in the view of theis official, was to "update" the
         earlier recommendations in light of changed circumstances
         since Germany has complied with the recommendations but the
         deficit failed to respond.

      (27) (SBU) By using Article 104(9), the last stop before
         landing on the possibility of sanctions, the Commission
         sought to increase pressure on Germany and France, thereby
         seeking to appease the hard-line countries who were
         disgruntled that the Commission had given both countries the
         extra year to correct their excessive deficits.  According
         to a Commission official, the smaller countries would have
         accepted the Commission's compromise.  Excluding action
         under 104(9) meant no compromise.  And so it was.

      (28) (SBU) A neater legal solution would have been for the
         Commission to see which way the wind was blowing then, with
         the appropriate concessions to save its face, proposed
         revised recommendations based on the approach favored by the
         qualified majority.  The Commission, according to this
         German official, knew it did not have the votes on France as
         early as the first week in November.  Not heeding the
         warning signs, the Commission barreled along, putting the
         German case on the table as well.  The Commission, in this
         official's view, was heading for failure.  In the
         negotiations the Commission demonstrated flexibility on
         substance, but not on process.  In the end, the Commission's
         decision to stick to their guns was not Commissioner Solbes
         decision to make, according to this official, but left to
         the President of the Commission.

      ECB: "Serious Dangers"
      ------------------------

      (29) (SBU) The ECB had been concerned about the debate and
         had weighed in on the side of the Commission's compromise.
         In its November Monthly Bulletin the ECB reported that the
         "Governing Council takes the view that the proposals of the
         Commission push the room for interpretation of the rules and
         procedures to the limit."  A senior ECB official repeated
         this statement when asked the ECB's view on the Commission
         compromise.

      (30) (SBU) In his first major policy speech on November 20,
         ECB President Trichet made an impassioned plea:  " I very
         profoundly wish an hope that all partners concerned will, in
         the coming days, live up to their responsibilities: The
         Commission, the Council, the governments concerned, so that
         we can not only preserve but reinforce the overall
         credibility of the euro area, and therefore growth."
         Trichet and Vice President Papademous participated in
         Ecofin's all night discussions on November 24 that ran until
         4:30 am.

      (31) (SBU) Following Ecofin's conclusions, the ECB's
         extraordinary press release declared that the Governing
         Council "deeply regrets these developments and shares the
         views of the Commission on the Ecofin Council conclusions.
         The Conclusions adopted by the Ecofin Council carry serious
         dangers.  The failure to go along with the rules and
         procedures foreseen in the Stability and Growth Pact risks
         undermining the credibility of the institutional framework
         and the confidence in sound public finances of Member States
         across the euro area."  This is "serious," in the words of
         an ECB official.

      A Word From the Market
      ----------------------

      (32) (SBU) As confirmed by an ECB official, the decision had
         no effect on the market.  However, one currency strategist
         said if this disagreement were to lead to a break-down of
         the Inter Governmental Conference, such a break down would
         send negative signals to investors about the euro.  Ecofin's
         decisions could have implications for the IGC's negotiations
         on a Constitutional Treaty for Europe, potentially making
         agreement more difficult rather than less.

      Two Observations: Deeper Meaning of the Pact
      --------------------------------------------

      (33) (SBU) As a comment, we limit ourselves to two
         observations, one on the operation of the SGP, the other on
         the potential deeper implications.

      (34) (SBU) With respect to the operation of the SGP, it has
         been variously described as "dead," (Financial Times),"on
         ice" (Dutch Prime Minister) and "living" (German Finance
         Minister Eichel).  We discount the FT's view since they are
         generally negative on the SGP in principle (although they
         have softened of late - agreeing on the need for rules to
         coordinate fiscal policy in the monetary union).  The FT's
         ability to generate so many stories on a "dead" agreement
         suggests the SGP has more lives than the proverbial cats'
         nine.

      (35) (SBU) The Dutch have a point, but one enshrined in the
         SGP.  If countries fulfill Ecofin's recommendations, then
         the excessive deficit procedures are considered to be in
         abeyance.  Ecofin made that explicit in its conclusions.

      (36) (SBU) Eichel too has a point.  The SGP continues to
         exert peer pressure and is taken seriously, very seriously
         in Germany.  Over the November 28-29 weekend German Finance
         Ministry officials conveyed their views to the press that
         the SGP included the necessary flexibility to accommodate
         the current economic situation.  Perhaps this could explain
         why Eichel reacted so strongly.  Entrenched in a political
         battle not only with the opposition but also his own party
         for his budget stewardship.  After using the SGP to help
         justify his own predeliction for subsidy cuts and keeping
         deficits as low as possible, to be seen as "punished" by the
         SGP procedures would be a political cut of the deepest sort.
         Groused one Finance Ministry official - "the SGP means
         nothing to the French population - in Germany it does."  The
         irony of Germany's position in the SGP continues to
         compound: the principal author, one of the first test cases,
         now running interference for the French.  Eichel is playing
         a high stakes game domestically that has washed over to the
         EU level - increasing the stakes considerably.

      (37) (SBU) The second observation is on the deeper meaning
         of Ecofin's decision.  One reason to be concerned with the
         outcome is the failure to find a compromise that was
         acceptable to all.  The SGP is more than rules.  It is
         almost a state of mind, of the individual members reflected
         the broad good of the whole - being communautaire.
         Coordination of fiscal policy in a single monetary union is
         a cooperative exercise, depending upon compliance with rules
         - not enforcement.

      (38) (SBU) A key to moving forward is to recapture that
         cooperative spirit.  Pursuing the issue in courts is a
         questionable tactic to foster cooperation.  Moreover, it
         implies that the SGP is a precise legal covenant.  The
         Commission's portrayal of its position as one of principle
         and legal correctness is also questionable.  Arguing that
         because its forecast estimates that Germany will have a
         deficit over 3% in 2004 requires the Commission to use
         104(9) because Germany "persists" in failing to adopt
         Council recommendations might be tough in front of a judge.

      (39) (SBU) The Commission itself chose to exercise the SGP's
         flexibility that excessive deficits "should" be corrected in
         the year after they are identified by pushing the date out
         one more year.  In fact, the Treaty, the basis for the Pact,
         gives no date certain for the deficits to be corrected.
         Both Solbes and Tremonti are correct when saying the
         Commission's and Ecofin's positions were, at once,
         "political" - both seeking to find a view acceptable to all,
         if not a qualified majority of member states, and "law
         based" using the SGP rules and Ecofin voting procedures.
         The SGP rules provide a framework, not a chemical formula.

      (40) (SBU) Existentialist believe that "we are our choices."
         Having made their choice, all Ecofin members and the
         Commission should come together.  Visible, meaningful
         results in Germany and France budget programs would be the
         most important and necessary step toward this end.  Going to
         court is a question of finding who has power.  Do member
         states coordinate fiscal policy or the Commission?  That
         should be settled in the IGC.

      (41) (SBU) Italy's EU presidency has seen two other
         decisions in which important interests were overridden by
         votes: the Investment Services Directive (UK, Ireland,
         Finland, Sweden opposition overridden)  and the Takeover
         Directive (the Commission's position overridden).  As to
         whether this is any indication of the current spirit of
         cooperation on larger issues, like the ICG, only time will
         tell.

      (42) (U)  This cable coordinated with USEU and Embassies
         Berlin, Paris and Rome.

      (43) (U)  POC: James Wallar, Treasury Representative, e-mail
         wallarjg2@state.gov; tel. 49-(69)-7535-2431, fax 49-(69)-
         7535-2238

      PASI

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