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### Viewing cable 00HANOI1299, VIETNAM'S BANK SYSTEM REFORM PLAN: TIME TO IMPLEMENT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
00HANOI1299 | 2000-06-14 00:52 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Hanoi

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    140052Z Jun 00

    2000HANOI01299 - UNCLASSIFIED

                               UNCLASSIFIED     PTQ7980

    PAGE 01        HANOI  01299  01 OF 05  140054Z
    ACTION EB-00

    INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  CTME-00  DODE-00
          ITCE-00  DOTE-00  ANHR-00  SRPP-00  EAP-00   EXME-00  E-00
          FAAE-00  FBIE-00  UTED-00  VC-00    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00
          INR-00   ITC-01   L-00     VCE-00   MOFM-04  MOF-03   AC-01
          NSAE-00  OMB-01   OPIC-01  ACE-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00
          STR-00   USIE-00  FMP-00   R-00     DRL-02   G-00     FDIC-01
          NFAT-00  SAS-00     /016W
                      ------------------627D8E  140054Z /38
    FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0117
    INFO USDOC WASHDC
    ASEAN COLLECTIVE
    AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    AMCONSUL HONG KONG
    DEPTTREAS WASHDC
    NSC WASHDC
    AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HANOI 001299

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA, EB/IFD/ODF, EAP/BCLTV
    STATE PAS USAID/ANE/D SOULES/DMCCLUSKEY
    DEPTTREAS ALSO FOR OASIA/SURBANA
    USDOC ALSO FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OKSA/VLC/HPPHO
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 02        HANOI  01299  01 OF 05  140054Z
    NSC ALSO FOR R HUSO

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ECON EFIN EAID VM FINREF SOE
    SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S BANK SYSTEM REFORM PLAN: TIME TO IMPLEMENT

    REF: A) 99 HANOI 3358;  B) FBIS 2813114Z FEB 00

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (SBU) THE IMF/WORLD BANK ENHANCED STRUCTURAL
    ADJUSTMENT FACILITY (ESAF) AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
    CREDIT (SAC) AGREEMENTS FOR VIETNAM HAVE BEEN
    SUSPENDED FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS DUE TO DISAGREEMENTS
    OVER THE PACE AND EXTENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
    VIETNAM'S (GVN) ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE AREAS OF
    TRADE, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOE'S), AND BANKING.
    ON JUNE 7 THE IMF'S RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD
    EMBASSY THE GVN RECENTLY URGED THE IMF AND BANK TO
    REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE THE AGREEMENTS.  A MAJOR
    COMPONENT OF THE REFORM AGENDA WILL BE TO REVAMP
    VIETNAM'S WEAK, ILL-MANAGED BANKING SYSTEM.

    ¶2. (U) THE LATEST DRAFT PLAN BY THE STATE BANK OF
    VIETNAM (SBVN) FOR BANKING REFORM INVOLVES A
    RESTRUCTURING OF ALL VIETNAMESE BANKS, ESPECIALLY THE
    FOUR STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS (SOCB'S) THAT
    DOMINATE THE SECTOR.  IT IS INTENDED TO CREATE A
    `LEVEL PLAYING FIELD' FOR ALL BANKS, INCLUDING
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 03        HANOI  01299  01 OF 05  140054Z
    SOCB'S, J-S, AND FOREIGN.  THE MAIN POLICY GOALS ARE
    REMOVAL OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR `POLICY LENDING'
    FROM THE SOCB'S, WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE ON
    A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS; RESTRUCTURING OF
    NONPERFORMING LOANS, REPORTEDLY AS MUCH AS 27-28
    PERCENT OF TOTAL DEBT, THROUGH CREATION OF AN `ASSET
    MANAGEMENT COMPANY'; AND, ENHANCEMENT OF THE
    INSTITUTIONAL AND MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES OF THE
    SOCB'S AND THE SBVN.

    ¶3. (U) THE SBVN'S PLAN ALSO AFFECTS OPERATIONS OF THE
    J-S AND FOREIGN BANKS IN VIETNAM.  SOME OF THE J-S
    BANKS WILL BE MERGED AND THE SBVN WILL DEVELOP NEW
    MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING CRITERIA TO ENSURE THEIR
    FINANCIAL HEALTH.  AS PART OF THE GVN'S OVERALL
    PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IT
    PLANS TO MINIMIZE THE CURRENTLY `LARGE' NUMBER OF
    RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN BANK OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM TO
    MOVE TOWARD CREATION OF A `LEVEL PLAYING FIELD'.
    ONE SBVN OFFICIAL SAID THE GVN MIGHT EVEN ATTEMPT TO
    MAKE THE `DOMESTIC ROADMAP' FOR REFORM FASTER THAN
    THE SCHEDULE AGREED IN THE UNSIGNED BILATERAL TRADE
    AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

    ----------
    BACKGROUND
    ----------
    ¶4. (U) REF A REPORTED RESULTS OF SEPTEMBER 1999
    NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN A JOINT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
    FUND (IMF)/WORLD BANK (WB) TEAM AND THE GVN ON NEW
    ENHANCED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY (ESAF) AND
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 04        HANOI  01299  01 OF 05  140054Z
    STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAC) AGREEMENTS FOR
    VIETNAM.  BOTH FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN
    SUSPENDED FOR NEARLY TWO YEARS DUE TO DISAGREEMENTS
    OVER THE PACE AND EXTENT OF THE GVN'S ECONOMIC
    REFORMS.  IN PARTICULAR, THE WB AND IMF HAVE
    TARGETTED THREE AREAS FOR REFORM -- THE TRADE REGIME,
    SOE'S, AND THE BANKING SYSTEM.  THE SEPTEMBER ROUND
    OF TALKS BROUGHT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE FIRST
    TWO BUT LESS ON THE THIRD.  TWO MORE COMPONENTS OF
    THE AGREEMENTS WILL ADDRESS THE MACROECONOMY AND
    SUPPORT FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

    ¶5. (U) PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE
    REFORM AGENDA CONCERNS VIETNAM'S WEAK, ILL-MANAGED
    BANKING SYSTEM.  WORLD BANK PRESIDENT JAMES
    WOLFENSOHN RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH HIS SBVN
    INTERLOCUTORS AND OTHER HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS DURING
    HIS FEBRUARY 21-24 VISIT TO VIETNAM.  HE WAS QUOTED
    IN THE PRESS AS SAYING `IF YOU HAVE STATE-OWNED BANKS
    LENDING TO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, YOU DON'T
    TYPICALLY GET VERY GOOD REPAYMENTS.'  SBVN GOVERNOR
    LE DUC THUY RESPONDED THAT `VIETNAM SHARES ... THESE
    CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES'.

    ¶6. (U) ON FEBRUARY 28, THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S DAILY
    NEWSPAPER `NHAN DAN' (THE PEOPLE), IN A REMARKABLY
    CRITICAL EDITORIAL ENTITLED `LET'S RESTORE ORDER AND
    RENOVATE THE BANKING SYSTEM' (REF B), CHARACTERIZED
    VIETNAM'S FINANCIAL AND BANKING SYSTEM AS `FULL OF
    WEAKNESSES AND DISCREPANCIES'.  IT SAID `URGENT
    MEASURES' WERE REQUIRED TO RENOVATE THE SYSTEM AND
    PREVENT `MORAL DEGENERATION' OF BANKING PERSONNEL.

    -----------
    REFORM PLAN
    -----------
    ¶7. (SBU) ON JUNE 7 THE IMF'S RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE
    TOLD EMBASSY THE GVN, IN PARTICULAR DEPUTY PRIME
    MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG, WAS URGING THE IMF AND
    WORLD BANK TO ACCELERATE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AND
    CONCLUDE THE LONG-STALLED AGREEMENTS.  HE HOPED TO
    HAVE MORE DETAILS OF THE GVN'S PLANS BY JUNE 9, BUT
    THE FINAL FORM OF THE PROGRAM PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE
    SOME ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATION.  EMBASSY HAS NOT YET
    SEEN THE GVN'S LATEST PROPOSAL, BUT BASED ON RECENT
    DISCUSSIONS WITH DIRECTOR XUAN NGHIA LE OF THE
    BANKING STRATEGY DEPARTMENT AND OTHER SBVN OFFICIALS
    WE BELIEVE IT WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS.
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 03        HANOI  01299  02 OF 05  140054Z

    ¶8. (U) THE PLAN WOULD INVOLVE A RESTRUCTURING OF ALL
    VIETNAMESE BANKS, ESPECIALLY THE FOUR SOCB'S THAT
    DOMINATE THE SECTOR.  IT IS INTENDED TO CREATE A
    `LEVEL PLAYING FIELD' FOR ALL BANKS, INCLUDING STATE-
    OWNED, J-S, AND FOREIGN.  THIS, SAID MR. LE, WAS THE
    ONLY WAY TO ENSURE A SOUND AND SAFE BANKING SYSTEM.

    -------------------------
    SEPARATE "POLICY LENDING"
    -------------------------
    ¶9. (U) THE SBVN PLAN INCLUDES FOUR MAIN POLICY GOALS.
    FIRST, RESPONSIBILITY FOR `POLICY LENDING' SHALL BE
    REMOVED FROM THE SOCB'S, WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED TO
    OPERATE ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS.  THE TASK OF
    POLICY LENDING WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO A NEW AND
    SEPARATE AGENCY, SUPERVISED BY THE SBVN.  DIRECTOR LE
    EMPHASIZED THIS POLICY LENDING WOULD INCLUDE LOANS
    FOR STUDENTS, POOR PEOPLE, AND VICTIMS OF NATURAL
    DISASTERS, RATHER THAN COMMERCIALLY UNSOUND LOANS TO
    SOE'S.

    ¶10. (U) LE SAID `IN PRINCIPLE' THE SOE'S WOULD HAVE
    TO BORROW FROM BANKS ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS.  IN THE
    PAST THE GVN HAS CHANNELLED STATE FUNDS THROUGH THE
    SOCB'S TO SELECTED SOE'S TO INCREASE THEIR PRODUCTIVE
    CAPACITY.  TO REPLACE THIS MECHANISM, THE NEW PLAN
    WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN `INVESTMENT ASSISTANCE FUND'
    COMPLETELY OUTSIDE THE BANKING SYSTEM.  THIS FUND
    ALSO WOULD BE USED FOR WORLD BANK AND ASIAN
    DEVELOPMENT BANK PROJECTS CO-FUNDED BY THE GVN.
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 04        HANOI  01299  02 OF 05  140054Z

    -------------
    BAD BANK DEBT
    -------------
    ¶11. (U) THE SECOND POLICY GOAL IS TO RESTRUCTURE
    NONPERFORMING LOANS EXTENDED BY THE SOCB'S WITHIN A
    RELATIVELY SHORT TIME.  ALTHOUGH SBVN AND MINISTRY OF
    FINANCE OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY HAVE REFUSED TO DIVULGE
    THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF BAD DEBT IN VIETNAM'S BANKING
    SYSTEM, ON FEBRUARY 17 THE VIETNAMESE PRESS REPORTED
    TOTAL BAD DEBT HAS REACHED 9.92 TRILLION DONG (U.S.
    $708 MILLION), EQUIVALENT TO 27-28 PERCENT OF TOTAL
    DEBT.  SEVERAL FOREIGN BANKERS, HOWEVER, ESTIMATE THE
    ACTUAL AMOUNT IS SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER.

    ¶12. (U) BECAUSE THIS ISSUE IS INTERCONNECTED WITH THE
    PROBLEM OF SOE BAD DEBT, THE GVN INTENDS TO CREATE AN
    `ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANY' (AMC), SUBORDINATE TO THE
    SBVN BUT FUNDED FROM THE STATE BUDGET, TO PURCHASE
    SOE AND OTHER CORPORATE DEBT.  THE OBJECTIVES ARE TO
    INSURE THE SOCB'S BECOME FINANCIALLY HEALTHY AS SOON
    AS POSSIBLE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME EXPEDITE
    LIQUIDATION OF COLLATERAL ASSETS OF CORPORATE
    BORROWERS.

    ¶13. (U) LE EXPECTED THE AMC TO BEGIN OPERATIONS LATER
    IN 2000 AND CONTINUE FOR UP TO 5-7 YEARS, OR UNTIL
    THE BAD DEBT PROBLEM IS SOLVED.  WHILE UNWILLING TO
    SAY HOW MUCH BAD DEBT WAS ON THE BOOKS, LE SUGGESTED
    THE AMC'S INITIAL BUDGET WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO
    PURCHASE ALL OF IT.  INSTEAD, THEY WOULD CHOOSE THE
    MOST URGENT COMPANIES FOR THE FIRST TRANCHE OF THEIR
    OPERATIONS.  HE SAID IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE TOTAL SOCB
    BAD DEBT WAS ONE BILLION DOLLARS, THEN AMC'S LIKELY
    BUDGET WOULD BE ABOUT 300 MILLION, WHICH OBVIOUSLY
    WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO PURCHASE ALL THE
    COLLATERAL AT ITS ORIGINAL VALUE.

    ¶14. (U) LE CLAIMED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPROVAL FOR
    CREATION OF THE AMC IS NOT REQUIRED, ALTHOUGH SOME OF
    ITS OPERATIONS MIGHT BE LIMITED IF THEY CONTRADICTED
    ANY EXISTING LEGISLATION, SUCH AS THE LAND LAW OR THE
    ENTERPRISE LAW.  HE SAID THERE ALSO MAY BE LEGAL
    RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSURE AND LIQUIDIZATION OF
    COLLATERAL.  IF, FOR EXAMPLE, AN ITEM OF COLLATERAL
    INITIALLY WAS VALUED AT ONE BILLION DONG, THEN WAS
    ACQUIRED BY THE AMC AND SOLD FOR JUST 500 MILLION,
    UNDER VIETNAMESE LAW `SOMEONE' WOULD HAVE TO BE
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 03        HANOI  01299  03 OF 05  140055Z
    RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS.  DIRECTOR LE SAID THE GVN
    WAS `FRIGHTENED' BY THIS POSSIBILITY, AS THE SOCB'S
    WOULD BE AFRAID TO SELL COLLATERAL ASSETS TO THE AMC
    IF THEY MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOSSES.

    ¶15. (U) THE NON-PERFORMING LOANS FROM THE SOCB'S
    WOULD BE RESTRUCTURED IN THREE WAYS.  FIRST, A
    CERTAIN AMOUNT SIMPLY WOULD BE WRITTEN OFF, ALTHOUGH
    BUDGETARY CONTRAINTS WOULD REQUIRE THIS PROPORTION TO
    BE RELATIVELY SMALL.  FURTHER, LE SAID THIS INABILITY
    TO WRITE OFF AS MUCH OF THE DEBT AS NEEDED MAY LEAD
    TO MORE BAD DEBT IN THE FUTURE AND TO CONTINUING
    FINANCIAL ILL HEALTH FOR THE SOCB'S, BUT THE GVN HAD
    NO CHOICE.  SECOND, A SOMEWHAT LARGER PROPORTION OF
    THE DEBT WOULD BE RESCHEDULED AND/OR RESTRUCTURED.
    FINALLY, THE GVN WILL REPAY SOME OF THE LOANS,
    ALTHOUGH LE WOULD NOT SAY HOW MUCH.

    ¶16. (U) IN A RELATED MOVE TO PROTECT BANK DEPOSITORS
    FROM RISK, AND THEREBY ENTICE MORE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
    TO KEEP THEIR SAVINGS IN BANKS RATHER THAN GOLD OR
    DOLLARS, THE SBVN ANNOUNCED INAUGURATION OF A
    `DEPOSIT INSURANCE ORGANIZATION' (DIO).  THE DIO WILL
    BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INSURING DEPOSITS UP TO 30 MILLION
    DONG (USD 2,100).  ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS AND CREDIT
    INSTITUTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED TO JOIN THE PROGRAM AND
    PAY THE INSURANCE PREMIUM, REPORTEDLY TO BE SET AT
    0.15 PERCENT OF THE DEPOSIT VALUE.  SOME OF THE
    LARGER SOCB'S BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RISKIER
    (JOINT-STOCK) BANKS SHOULD PAY A HIGHER PREMIUM.

                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 04        HANOI  01299  03 OF 05  140055Z
    ---------------------
    TIGHTEN UP THE SYSTEM
    ---------------------
    ¶17. (U) THE THIRD AND FOURTH POLICY GOALS OF THE NEW
    REFORMS ARE TO ENHANCE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND
    MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES OF THE SOCB'S AND TO
    STRENGTHEN THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS OF THE SBVN OVER
    THE SOCB'S.  LE SAID THE SBVN ALREADY HAD RECEIVED
    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THIS FROM THE WORLD BANK,
    IMF, ADB, AND SOME BILATERAL DONORS, BUT NEEDED MORE.
    HE CLAIMED THERE HAD NOT BEEN MUCH PROGRESS IN THIS
    AREA BECAUSE THE `CONCEPTIONS' OF THE DONORS WERE
    `NOT SATISFACTORY'.  IN PARTICULAR, SOME OF THE
    SOCB'S WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY MEETING REQUIREMENTS
    SET BY THE WORLD BANK FOR EACH SOCB TO FORMULATE ITS
    OWN STRATEGY TO MEET INTERNATIONAL CRITERIA.  THIS,
    HE SAID, WAS SIMPLY BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE
    SOCB'S.  IT ALSO WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE SBVN ITSELF TO
    EVALUATE THE SOCB PROPOSALS BECAUSE THE SOCB'S WOULD
    NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENTLY TRANSPARENT INFORMATION ON
    THEIR OPERATIONS.

    ¶18. (U) THE PLAN ALSO REPORTEDLY INCLUDES A PROPOSAL
    FOR A PILOT SOCB RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM FOR THE
    AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK AND THE BANK
    OF FOREIGN TRADE.  IT WILL INVOLVE RESTRUCTURING AND
    IMPROVING THEIR FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS,
    DEBT, PERSONNEL, AND STRATEGY.  THE SBVN HOPES THEY
    CAN BE UPGRADED TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS.

    -----------------
    JOINT STOCK BANKS
    -----------------
    ¶19. (U) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FOUR POLICY GOALS,
    THE SBVN'S REFORM PLAN ALSO CONTAINS PROVISIONS
    AFFECTING OPERATIONS OF THE JOINT STOCK (J-S) AND
    FOREIGN BANKS IN VIETNAM.  SOME OF THE 48 J-S BANKS
    CURRENTLY OPERATING IN VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY THE
    SMALLER ONES, WILL BE MERGED, WHILE IN GENERAL THE
    SBVN WILL TRY TO INCREASE BOTH THE NUMBER OF
    SHAREHOLDERS AND THE AMOUNT OF REGISTERED CAPITAL.
    ADDITIONALLY, THE SBVN WILL DEVELOP NEW CRITERIA TO
    ENSURE THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF THE J-S BANKS.  THESE
    CRITERIA WOULD FOCUS ON `MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY' OF
    THE BANKS AND ALSO INCLUDE STRICTER REQUIREMENTS FOR
    SUPERVISION, INSPECTION, AND REPORTING.  THE SBVN
    WILL ASSIST THE BANKS TO RESTRUCTURE THEIR ASSETS AND
    LIABILITIES BASED ON RISK ASSESSMENT.
                           UNCLASSIFIED

    PAGE 03        HANOI  01299  04 OF 05  140055Z

    ¶20. (U) ACCORDING TO DIRECTOR LE, MANY OF THE J-S
    BANKS ARE `RELUCTANT' TO MERGE AND THEREFORE THE SBVN
    WILL HAVE TO INTERVENE IN THE MERGER AND ACQUISITION
    PROCESS.  HE SAID A NUMBER OF THEM ALREADY HAD BEEN
    MERGED OR DISSOLVED, AND NONE HAD FAILED.  THEIR
    MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY, HOWEVER, REMAINED A MAJOR
    WEAKNESS, AND THE SBVN WILL PROVIDE TRAINING IN THIS
    AREA.  LE ALSO HOPED SOME J-S BANKS WOULD FORM JOINT
    VENTURES WITH FOREIGN BANKS, WHICH COULD TRANSFER
    MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE.

    -------------
    FOREIGN BANKS
    -------------
    ¶21. (U) ACCORDING TO LE, AS PART OF THE GVN'S OVERALL
    PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IT
    PLANS TO MINIMIZE THE CURRENTLY `LARGE' NUMBER OF
    RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN BANK OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM.
    IN PARTICULAR, HE SAID THE SBVN WOULD REDUCE
    RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
    IN LOCAL CURRENCY AND ON ABILITY OF FOREIGN BANKS TO
    ACCEPT DEPOSITS IN LOCAL CURRENCY.  THIS, HE SAID,
    WAS A PRECONDITION FOR CREATION OF A `LEVEL PLAYING
    FIELD'.

    ¶22. (U) FURTHERMORE, LE SAID THE SBVN WOULD PROPOSE
    TO PHASE OUT LIMITS ON FOREIGN BANK EQUITY SHARES AND
    THEIR PERCENTAGE SHARES IN JOINT VENTURES WITH
    VIETNAMESE BANKS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE
    AGREED IN PRINCIPLE UNDER THE BILATERAL TRADE
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    PAGE 04        HANOI  01299  04 OF 05  140055Z
    AGREEMENT.  HE SAID THE SBVN WOULD ATTEMPT TO MAKE
    THE `DOMESTIC ROADMAP' FOR REFORM FASTER THAN THE
    SCHEDULE AGREED IN THE BTA, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS
    `REALISTIC' BUT IMPROVEABLE.  HE ADDED THAT VIETNAM
    ALREADY HAD AGREED TO A BANKING REFORM TIMETABLE FOR
    THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA) THAT WAS BOTH FASTER
    AND STRONGER THAN PROPOSED COMMITMENTS TO THE U.S.
    AND WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.  FOR AFTA, VIETNAM
    WOULD BEGIN TO OPEN ITS BANKING SECTOR BY THE YEAR
    2006 AND COMPLETE THE PROCESS BY 2010, BUT HE
    BELIEVED THE MORE DEVELOPED ASEAN MEMBERS HAD
    PROPOSED THAT VIETNAM, MYANMAR, AND LAOS SHOULD
    ACCELERATE THIS PROCESS.  LE ALSO SAID THE SBVN WAS
    CONSIDERING EQUITIZATION (PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION) OF
    ONE OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS, AND FOREIGN
    BANKS MAY BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶23. (SBU) REFORM OF VIETNAM'S BANKING SYSTEM CANNOT
    SUCCEED WITHOUT A SIMULTANEOUS AND SEVERE ASSAULT ON
    THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, A FORMIDABLE OBSTACLE,
    AND PROBABLY NOT WITHOUT MAJOR LIBERALIZATION OF THE
    TRADE REGIME.  THIS IS WHY THE WORLD BANK AND
    INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAVE LINKED THE THREE
    ISSUES, AND ALSO WHY WE TARGETTED ALL THREE IN THE
    BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS. YET WHILE
    THIS IS TRUE, IT IS ALSO CRITICAL THAT VIETNAM BEGIN
    THE PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURING IN A MEANINGFUL WAY.
    THE TIME FOR PLANNING IS OVER, IT'S NOW TIME TO
    IMPLEMENT.

    ¶24.  (SBU) THIS CABLE INDICATES THERE ARE A NUMBER OF
    OPTIMISTIC SIGNS THAT CHANGE IS IN THE AIR,
    PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO BANKING AND FINANCIAL
    SECTOR REFORM.  MOREOVER, THE HANOI-BASED IMF
    REPRESENTATIVE CONSIDERS THAT VIETNAM MAY NOW BE
    CONSOLIDATING THE POLITICAL WILL NEEDED TO MOVE
    FORWARD ON A MAJOR RESTRUCTURING EFFORT ALONG THE
    LINES PROPOSED BY THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF.
    HOWEVER, HE, LIKE EMBASSY OFFICERS, REMAINS PERPLEXED
    WHY VIETNAM WOULD CHOOSE THE PRESENT TIME TO PROCEED.
    THIS IS A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INTROSPECTION, AS THE
    PARTY PREPARES FOR THE WATERSHED EVENT OF ANOTHER
    PARTY CONGRESS IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2001, NOT AN
    IDEAL TIME TO TAKE RADICAL DECISIONS WHICH CAN
    GENERATE CRITICISM.  MOREOVER, IT IS AGAINST
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    PAGE 03        HANOI  01299  05 OF 05  140055Z
    VIETNAMESE CHARACTER TO UNDERTAKE BOLD MOVES UNLESS
    THEY FEEL BACKED INTO A CORNER.  THEY ARE NOT.  WHILE
    NEW FDI COMMITMENTS CONTINUE ON A DOWNWARD SPIRAL AND
    EMPLOYMENT GENERATION IS NEGLIGIBLE, MANY GOVERNMENT
    OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED WITH RECENT ECONOMIC DATA:
    GROWTH (SIX PERCENT FOR THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR),
    EXPORTS (ROBUST) AND INFLATION (NONE).  THE ECONOMY
    IS IN MANY WAYS IMPROVING ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE
    ASIAN REGION. REGARDLESS OF THE REASONS WHY THE
    VIETNAMESE MAY MOVE NOW, IF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
    SECTOR REFORM PROCEEDS, IT WOULD GIVE FURTHER LIFT TO
    THE ECONOMY.  WE HOPE THIS HAPPENS SOON.
    HARTER

                           UNCLASSIFIED

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