Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18 2011/07/19 2011/07/20 2011/07/21 2011/07/22 2011/07/23 2011/07/25 2011/07/27 2011/07/28 2011/07/29 2011/07/31
2011/08/01 2011/08/02 2011/08/03 2011/08/05 2011/08/06 2011/08/07 2011/08/08 2011/08/10 2011/08/11 2011/08/12 2011/08/13 2011/08/15 2011/08/16 2011/08/17 2011/08/19 2011/08/21 2011/08/22 2011/08/23 2011/08/24 2011/08/25

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/03 1972/08
1973/04 1973/10
1975/03
1979/08
1985/01 1985/02 1985/03 1985/04 1985/05 1985/06 1985/10
1986/02 1986/05 1986/08 1986/09 1986/11 1986/12
1987/04 1987/06 1987/07 1987/09 1987/12
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/09 1988/10 1988/11 1988/12
1989/01 1989/03 1989/04 1989/06 1989/09 1989/11 1989/12
1990/01 1990/02 1990/03 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10 1990/11 1990/12
1991/01 1991/03 1991/05 1991/06 1991/07 1991/08 1991/09 1991/10 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/04 1992/05 1992/06 1992/07 1992/08 1992/09 1992/10 1992/11 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/04 1993/07 1993/10 1993/11 1993/12
1994/01 1994/02 1994/03 1994/04 1994/05 1994/06 1994/08 1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/02 1995/03 1995/04 1995/05 1995/06 1995/07 1995/08 1995/09 1995/10 1995/11 1995/12
1996/06 1996/07 1996/08 1996/09 1996/11
1997/01 1997/02 1997/03 1997/04 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/09 1997/10 1997/11 1997/12
1998/02 1998/03 1998/05 1998/07 1998/08 1998/11 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09 1999/10 1999/11 1999/12
2000/04 2000/05 2000/06 2000/07 2000/08 2000/09 2000/10 2000/11 2000/12
2001/01 2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/08 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/05 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/10 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Antananarivo Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Alexandria Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Brazzaville Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangui Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Chengdu Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar DIR FSINFATC Consulate Dusseldorf Consulate Durban Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka Consulate Frankfurt
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Grenada Embassy Georgetown Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Izmir Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Johannesburg Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kolonia Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Krakow Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Lusaka Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lome Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Leipzig Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Mogadishu Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maseru Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Merida Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo Consulate Osaka Kobe
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Praia Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Moresby Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Podgorica Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Ponta Delgada Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Mosul REO Kirkuk REO Hillah REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Surabaya Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy Tirana Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USMISSION USTR GENEVA USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Mission CD Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary US Delegation FEST TWO UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde Consulate Yekaterinburg
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ADANA ASEC AFIN AMGT AE AORC AID AR AO AU ASEAN AGOA AFGHANISTAN AFFAIRS AMED APER ASECARP APEC AEMR AS AA ANET AFLU ABLD AL ASUP AJ APECO AMER ABUD AODE AM AFSN AESC AND AG ALOW AROC AVIANFLU ATRN ACOA AEGR AMGMT AADP AFSI ACABQ APRM AZ AIDS ASE AGAO ADCO ABDALLAH ARF AIDAC ACOTA ASCH AC ASEG AGR ACS AMCHAMS AN AMIA ASIG ADPM ADB ANARCHISTS ALOWAR ARM AUC AINF AINT AORG AY AVIAN AMEDCASCKFLO AK ARSO ARABBL ASO ANTITERRORISM ARABL AOWC AGRICULTURE ALJAZEERA AMTC AFINM AOCR ABER ARR AFPK ASSEMBLY ASSK AZE AORCYM AINR AGMT AEC ACKM APRC AIN ASCC AFPREL ASED APERTH ASFC ASECTH AFSA AOMS AORCO ANTXON ARC AFAF ADIP AIAG AFARI AEMED AORL AX ASECAF AOPC ASECAFIN AFZAL APCS AMB AGUIRRE AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL AIT ARCH AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR AORCD AVIATION ARAS AINFCY ACBAQ AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG ASEX AFR ASCE ATRA ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY APR AMAT AEMRS ASPA AFU AMG ATPDEA ALL AECL ACAO ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORD AFL AME ADM ASECPHUM AGIT ABT ASECVE AGUILAR AT ABMC ALZUGUREN ANGEL ASR ANTONIO
BMGT BEXP BM BG BL BA BR BTA BO BY BBSR BLUE BK BF BTIO BELLVIEW BE BU BN BH BD BC BTC BILAT BT BX BRUSSELS BP BB BRPA BUSH BURMA BMENA BESP BIT BBG BGD BMEAID BAGHDAD BEN BIO BMOT BWC BLUNT BURNS BUT BGMT BAIO BCW BOEHNER BFIF BOL BASHAR BIMSTEC BOU BIDEN BZ BFIN BTRA BI BHUM BOIKO BERARDUCCI BOUCHAIB BORDER BEXPC BTIU BTT BIOS BEXB BGPGOV BOND BLR
CE CG CH CVR CASC CU CI CD CO CDG CB CJAN CPAS COM CVIS CMGT CT CENTCOM CNARC CTERR COUNTER CHIEF CDC CTR CBW COUNTRY CLEARANCE CY CA CM CS CWC CN CITES CF CWG CIVS CFIS CASCC CROATIA CONS COUNTERTERRORISM CASA COE CJ CHR CODEL CR CBC CACS CHERTOFF CAS CONTROL CONDITIONS CONDOLEEZZA CITEL CV CLINTON CHG CZ CON CTBT CEN CRIMES COMMERCE CLOK CRISTINA CFED CARC CND CTM CARICOM COUNTRYCLEARANCE CBTH CHINA CSW CICTE CJUS CYPRUS CW CAMBODIA CENSUS CIDA CRIME CBG CBE CMGMT CAIO CEC CARSON CPCTC CEDAW COMESA CVIA CWCM CEA COSI CAPC CGEN COPUOS CGOPRC COETRD CKGR CFE CQ CITT CIC CARIB CVIC CLO CAFTA CVISU CHRISTOPHER CACM CIAT CDB CIS CUL CHAO CNC CL CSEP COMMAND CENTER COL CAN CAJC CUIS CONSULAR CLMT CIA CBSA CEUDA CAC CROS CIO CPUOS CKOR CVPR CONG CONTROLS CEPTER CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF CDCE
DPOL DEMARCHE DHS DR DA DISENGAGEMENT DEMOCRATIC DEFENSE DJ DY DARFUR DHRF DEA DTRO DPRK DO DARFR DOC DRL DK DOJ DTRA DOMESTIC DAC DOD DEAX DIEZ DEOC DELTAVIOLENCE DCOM DMINE DRC DCG DPKO DOMESTICPOLITICS DE DB DOT DEPT DOE DHLAKAMA DHSX DS DKEM DAO DCM DANIEL DEM DAVID DCRM
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
FR FREEDOM FINREF FJ FI FRELIMO FOREIGN FAA FETHI FAS FTAA FRB FAO FCS FINANCE FWS FTA FEMA FDA FLU FRANCISCO FBI FORCE FO FARC FK FT FCSC FAC FM FMGT FINV FCSCEG FARM FERNANDO FINR FIN FINE FIR FDIC FOR FOI FCUL FKLU FMLN FISO FIXED
GM GMUS GG GR GE GAZA GT GH GZ GJ GLOBAL GV GABY GOI GA GCC GB GY GATT GC GUAM GEORGE GTIP GOV GOMEZ GUTIERREZ GL GKGIC GF GU GWI GARCIA GTMO GN GANGS GIPNC GAERC GREGG GUILLERMO GASPAR GERARD GI
HK HR HUMANR HUMAN HO HA HUMANRIGHTS HU HHS HIV HUM HRKAWC HILLEN HILLARY HDP HUMRIT HSTC HUMANITARIAN HCOPIL HADLEY HURI HL HRETRD HOURANI HG HARRIET HESHAM HI HNCHR HARRY HRECON HRC HOSTAGES HEBRON HUMOR HSWG HYMPSK HECTOR HN HYDE HUD HRPGOV HIGHLIGHTS
ID ILC IS IZ ICAO IMO ITU IR IAEA ICRC IPROP IT IBRD ISRAELI IRAQI ISSUES ITRA IV IO IGAD IRAQ IN IMF ICTR ISCON IADB IDB IEA INR IWC ICCAT ILO INMARSAT IOM ICJ IQ ISPA ITRD IPR INTELSAT ISN IAHRC INTERNAL IFAD IICA IHO IRAN IL IRCE IC INTELLECTUAL IRM IE ICTY IDLI IFO ISCA INF INL ISRAEL INV IBB INFLUENZA ISPL ITER ITIA INRA ISAF IACHR INTERPOL IFR IRS INRB IEF ISAAC ICC INDO IIP IATTC INAUGURATION IND INS IZPREL IACI IEFIN INNP ILAB IA IMTS ITALY ITALIAN IFIN IRAJ IX ICG IF ITPHUM ITA IP IACW IK IUCN IZEAID IRPE IDA ISLAMISTS ITF INRO IBET IDP IRC ISO ICES IRMO ITPGOV IQNV IMSO IRDB IMET INCB IFRC
JA JO JP JM JCIC JOHN JE JEFFERY JS JUS JN JOHNNIE JAMES JKUS JOSEPH JML JAWAD JSRP JIMENEZ JOSE JKJUS JK JAPAN
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
LE LU LH LA LG LO LY LANTERN LI LABOR LORAN LTTE LT LAS LAB LAW LVPR LARREA LEBIK LAURA LS LOTT LOVE LR LEON LAVIN LGAT LV LAOS LOG LN LB
MOPS MO MARR ML MASS MZ MR MNUC MX MV MCC MY MEDIA MTCRE MG MCAP MOPPS MP MI MK MC MD MA MU MASC MW MT MEPP MN MTCR MH MEPI MIL MNUCPTEREZ MMAR MICHAEL MUNC MDC MPOS MONUC MAR MGMT MAS MEPN MENDIETA MARIA MONTENEGRO MOOPS MSG MARITIME MURRAY MUKASEY MOTO MCA MFO MEX MRSEC MMED MACP MAAR MINUSTAH MCCONNELL MAPP MGT MARQUEZ MANUEL MNUR MCCAIN MF MOHAMMAD MOHAMED MNU MFA MILITANTS MINORITIES MTS MLS MILI MIAH MEETINGS MERCOSUR MED MARAD MNVC MINURSO MNUCUN MIK MARK MBM MPP MILITARY MAPS MNUK MILA MTRRE MACEDONIA MICHEL MASSMNUC MUCN MQADHAFI MPS MARRGH MRCRE MTRE MORALES MAP MCTRE MHUC MOPSGRPARM MOROCCO MCAPS
NL NU NS NI NPT NATO NO NG NATEU NSF NZ NAS NP NDP NLD NGO NEPAD NAFTA NASA NEA NGUYEN NIH NK NIPP NONE NR NANCY NEGROPONTE NRR NERG NSSP NSG NSFO NE NATSIOS NFSO NATIONAL NTDB NT NCD NTSB NRC NELSON NAM NH NPG NEC NSC NFATC NMFS NATOIRAQ NAR NZUS NARC NCCC NA NC NEW NRG NUIN NOVO NATOPREL NEY NV NICHOLAS NPA NW NARCOTICS NORAD NOAA NON NTTC NKNNP NMNUC NUMBERING
ODIP OIIP OPRC OSCE OREP OTRA OPET OSCI OVIP OECD OCII OUALI OPDC OEXC OFPD OPIC OFDP OPCW OECV OAS OM OMIG ODAG OPREP ORA OIC OEXCSCULKPAO OIG OASS OFFICIALS ORTA OSAC OIL OIE OEXP OPEC OPDAT OMS OES OHI OMAR OCRA OFSO OCBD OSTA OAO ONA OTP ORC OAU OXEC OA ODPC OPDP OVIPPRELUNGANU OASC OSHA OPCD OTR OPPI OPCR OF OFDPQIS OSIC OHUM OSTRA OASCC OBSP OFDA OPICEAGR OIM OGAC OTA OTRAORP OPPC OESC OCEA OVP ON OPAD OTAR OCS ODC OTRD OCED OSD ORUE OREG
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS
QA QUAN QUOC QM QI QADRI QT QU
RS REFUGEES RW RP RELFREE RO REGIONAL RIGHTS REACTION REPORT RU RENAMO RIGHTSPOLMIL REFORM RM REFUGEE REL RELATIONS ROW RREL REGION RATIFICATION RBI RICE ROOD RODENAS RUIZ RODHAM ROBERT RGY ROY REUBEN RELIGIOUS RUEHZO RODRIGUEZ RUEUN RELAM RSP RF RSO RCMP REO ROSS RPTS RENE REID RUPREL RMA RI REMON RPEL RFE RFIN RA RAFAEL RAY RUS RPREL ROBERTG RECIN RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR SP SN SMIG SL SOCI SU SG SF SENV SZ SOE SCUL SY SO SR SYR SE SA SW SIPDIS SCIENCE SADC SI SCI SOCIETY SC SAARC STR SECRETARY SANC SSH ST SNA SGWI SEP SOCIS SETTLEMENTS SPECIALIST SK SHUM START STET SCVL SREF SCHUL SCUIL SYRIA SECURITY SPCE SYAI SMIL SOWGC STEPHEN SNRV SKCA SENSITIVE SECI SNAP SPP SCUD SOM SPECI SMIGBG SENC SCRM SGNV SECTOR SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SENVSXE SASIAIN SACU SENVSPL SWMN STEINBERG SOPN SOCR SCOI SCRS SILVASANDE SWE SARS SNARIZ SUDAN SENVQGR SM SNARKTFN SAAD SD SAN SIPRNET STATE SENS SUBJECT SFNV SECSTATE SSA SPCVIS SOI SOFA SCULKPAOECONTU SPTER SKSAF SENVKGHG SHI SEVN SANR SPSTATE SMITH SCOM SH SNARCS SNARN SIPRS SNARM SIPDI SCPR SNIG SELAB SULLIVAN SENVENV SECDEF SOLIC SOIC SPAS SASC SOSI SEC SEN SENVCASCEAIDID
TU TH TW TSPA TRGY TPHY TBIO TIFA TS TZ TX TSPL TT TK TC TINT TERFIN TERRORISM TIP TURKEY TI TECHNOLOGY TNGD TRSY TRAFFICKING TOPEC TPSL TP TD TR TA TIO TREATY TO THPY TECH TRADE TPSA TG TAGS TF TRAD THKSJA TVBIO TNDG TN TBIOZK TWI TV TWL TRT TWRO TSRY TTPGOV TAUSCHER TRBY TRBIO TL TPKO TIA TGRY TSPAM TREL TNAR TBI TFIN TPHYPA TWCH THOMMA THOMAS TERROR TRY TBID TPP TE THANH TJ TBKIO
UNGA USUN UN UG UNSC UK UP US UNCTAD UNVIE UNHRC USTR UNAMA UNCRIME UNESCO UV UNDP UNHCR UNCSD UNCHR UZ USAID UNEP UNO UNPUOS UY UNDC UNCITRAL UNAUS UNCND UA UNMIK USTDA USEU USDA UNICEF UR UNFICYP USNC USTRRP UNODC UNRWA UNOMIG USTRPS USAU USCC UNEF UNGAPL UNFPA UNSCE USSC UGA UEU UNMIC UNTAC UNION UNCLASSIFIED USPS UNA UMIK USOAS UNMOVIC UNFA UNAIDS UNCHC USGS UNSE UNRCR UNTERR USG UE UAE UNWRA UNCSW UNSCR UNCHS UNDESCO UNPAR UNC UB UNSCS UKXG UNGACG UNREST UNHR USPTO UNFCYP USCG UNIDROIT UNSCD UPU UNBRO UNECE USTRUWR UNCC UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM VE VT VETTING VN VZ VIS VC VTPREL VIP VTEAID VTEG VOA VA VTIZ VANG VISIT VO VENZ VAT VI VEPREL VEN
WFP WTO WHO WTRO WBG WMO WIPO WA WI WSIS WHA WCL WE WMN WEBZ WS WAR WZ WMD WW WILLIAM WEET WAEMU WM WWBG WWT WWARD WITH WMDT WTRQ WCO WEU WALTER WRTO WB WHTI WBEG WCI WEF WAKI WHOA WGC
XA XM XR XL XY XC XK XF XT XD XG XI XH XB XE XW XX XV XXX XJ XU XS XZ XQ XO XP XFNEA XTAG
YM YMOEXC YI YE YL YEH YMCS YOUSSEF YU
ZO ZI ZK ZR ZF ZU ZL ZP ZA ZIM ZANU ZJ ZM ZOELLICK ZCTU ZB ZN ZH ZT ZFR ZEALAND ZW ZXA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 04BRASILIA450, BRAZIL'S PUBLIC-DEBT VULNERABILITY LESSENS, FOR NOW

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRASILIA450.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04BRASILIA450 | 2004-02-29 13:11 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRASILIA 000450

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR SHANNON, DEMPSEY, CRUZ
    TREASURY FOR OASIA/SEGAL
    EXIMBANK FOR DIRECTOR FOLEY
    FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR ROBATAILLE
    USDA FOR U/S PENN, FAS/FAA/TERPSTRA
    USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/IEP/WH/OLAC-SC
    SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

    SENSITIVE

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV ETRD PREL PGOV SOCI BR
    SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S PUBLIC-DEBT VULNERABILITY LESSENS, FOR NOW

    REF: (A) 03 BRASILIA 3682, (B) 03 BRASILIA 3911

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.    (U) Brazil's nominal net public debt and debt/GDP
    ratio both continued to rise in 2003, but there are grounds
    for guarded hope that the debt burden is not now the
    imminent threat it has been in recent years.  The debt/GDP
    ratio (58.2% end-December) is far down from its brief late-
    2002 spike of 64% and is forecast to decline year-on-year in
    2004 -- a first since 1993.  The GoB has worked well to
    reduce the debt's exchange-rate vulnerability:  foreign
    public debt grew fractionally in 2003, but the dollar-linked
    component of domestic debt was steeply down, to 10% of the
    total (20.5%, including swap exposure) from end-2002's 20.3%
    (53.5%, including swap exposure).  The Real's appreciation
    since late 2002 from almost four to under three per USD has
    in itself greatly eased service of the debt's foreign-
    currency component.  And Brazil's soaring exports have added
    a new shock-absorber against sudden depreciation of the Real
    and consequent surges in dollar-linked debt.

    ¶2.   (U) Eighty percent of the total debt is domestic, i.e.,
    denominated in Reals.  Half of that 80% is tied to the
    Central Bank's benchmark SELIC interest rate.  Thus, the
    SELIC's drop from 26.5 to 16.5% since June 2003, if
    continued, means future-year savings in interest payments of
    1.5-3.0% of GDP, as the GoB replaces or retires old debt
    issued at high SELIC rates.  In a "virtuous-circle" effect,
    the return of market confidence during Lula's first year has
    allowed the GoB to improve the composition of its
    securitized debt by issuing more fixed-rate paper, as well
    as (since August) lengthening maturities.  GoB optimists
    speak of cutting debt-service costs enough to achieve
    nominal/nominal balanced budgets by 2008, paving the way for
    debt/GDP to decline to the low 40% range within the decade.

    ¶3.   (SBU) Yet Brazil's public debt remains far too close
    for comfort to a macroeconomic knife's edge.  The Lula
    government's hard-won primary surplus of 4.32% of GDP in
    2003 still covered less than half of the interest payment
    (9.49%) on its debt stock.  The overall nominal debt and
    debt ratio each thus still grew by around three percent.
    (The Real's appreciation partly counteracted the nominal-
    deficit effect, by shrinking the valuation in Reals of
    foreign-exchange-linked debt.)  For 2004, the GoB itself
    projects only a modest reduction in the ratio, to 57.3% --
    even assuming 3.5% GDP growth.  Domestic and/or external
    shocks could reverse recent positive trends.  Meanwhile, the
    huge costs of debt-service sap the GoB's ability to make
    investments needed for growth, without which the debt burden
    will become more intractable.  Bottom line:  Lula's team in
    its first year made more progress in managing the public
    debt than even they might have dreamed possible -- but the
    debt worry looks sure to remain, hovering like a ghost over
    his entire term.  END SUMMARY.

    Scope and Structure
    -------------------

    ¶4. (U) Brazil's net public-sector debt rose in 2003 from 881
    to 913 billion Reals (from 55.5 to 58.2% of year-end GDP).
    Converted at the then-exchange-rate of Reals 2.89 per USD,
    the end-2003 total amounted to $316.1 billion.  That dollar
    figure may mislead, however.  Net public foreign debt
    constituted just USD 64.6 billion, or 20.4% of the total.
    The other four-fifths was domestic and denominated in Reals.
    Thus, the GoB can finance itself almost entirely on the
    local market.  About 90% of new debt issued is domestic;
    recent modest external issues have involved simply rolling
    over foreign-exchange debt.  The domestic debt admittedly
    includes foreign-exchange exposure of about USD 55.8 billion
    in the form of domestic securities tied to the exchange rate
    or currency swaps issued in parallel with those securities.
    The total foreign-exchange-rate exposure of Brazil's public
    debt thus amounts to roughly USD 121 billion, 30.4% of the
    total (40.9% including swaps).

    ¶5. (U) FOREIGN-DEBT NOTE:  The GoB (and IMF-approved) figure
    for Brazil's foreign public-debt total is net/net of
    official gross/gross reserves.  The latter at end-2003 were
    below USD 60 billion, of which over USD 38 billion
    represented IMF loans.  Net reserves then were under 20
    billion, a small fraction of their average since the early
    1980s.  The GoB has since increased its net reserves by over
    two billion dollars via open-market purchases, an ongoing
    process.   END NOTE.

                               -------
                               Table 1
                               -------

            Brazil's Consolidated Net Public Sector Debt
                (1998-2003, End-Year), Billion Reals

                  1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003

    Net Debt     385.9   516.6   563.2   660.8   881.1    913.1
    (% of GDP)    41.7    48.7    48.7    52.6    55.5     58.2

    Foreign 1/    57.2   108.8   111.3   130.8   226.8    186.4
    (in dollars)  47.3    60.8    57.0    56.4    64.2     64.6
    (% of GDP)     6.2    10.3     9.6    10.4    14.3     11.9

    Net Domestic 328.7   407.8   451.8   530.0   654.3    726.7
    (% of GDP)    35.5    38.4    39.1    42.2    41.2     46.3

    -1/ Net of Central Bank foreign exchange-denominated assets
    including gross reserves; converted at contemporary exchange-
    rate.

    Sources: Central Bank and Finance Ministry.

                               -------
                               Table 2
                               -------

                   Breakdown of Public-Sector Debt
                          Billions of Reals
                            December 2003

    NET PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT               913.1

    Gross Debt                              1,344.6
     - Federal Government                     940.0
     - Central Bank                           312.4
     - State Governments                       21.9
     - Municipal Governments               5.2
     - Federal para-statals               51.2
     - State para-statals                      13.9
     - Municipal para-statals                   0.3

    Assets netted out                        -431.5
     - Federal Government               -203.3
         (primarily domestic assets of the Workers' Guarantee
         Fund, assets of similar domestic funds and renegotiated
         state debts to federal government)
     - Central Bank                          -161.5
        (primarily international reserves)
     - State Governments                      -11.3
     - Municipal Governments                   -2.5
     - Federal para-statals              -52.6
         (includes foreign exchange deposits, renegotiated debt,
         other credits)
      - State para-statals                -0.3
      - municipal para-statals                 -0.1

    Source: Central Bank

    ¶6.  NOTE:  To avoid confusion amongst specialist followers
    of Brazilian finances, it should be noted that Brazil's net
    public domestic debt ("divida liquida") is not the same as
    its Federal Domestic Securitized Debt (FDSD -- "divida
    mobiliaria").  The latter includes some GoB paper which does
    not reflect net debt, e.g., extra issuances to sterilize the
    CB's open-market purchases of dollars to boost reserves, or
    other monetary-policy operations.  FDSD thus is sometimes
    greater, sometimes less, than net domestic debt, as a
    comparison of Table 1 above with Table 3 displays.

                               -------
                               Table 3
                               -------

              Federal Domestic Securitized Debt
                (1998-2003), Billion Reals

                  1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003

    Stock        323.9   414.4   510.7   624.1   623.2    731.4
     -(% of GDP)  35.0    39.1    44.2    49.7    39.2     46.1

    Source: Central Bank and Finance Ministry

    How Did We Get Here?
    --------------------

    ¶7. (U) Multiple dynamics raised Brazil's federal debt/GDP
    level from 1994's 30% to the current 58+%.  The key drivers
    have been: a) high nominal deficits (and, before 1998,
    primary deficits), generated fundamentally by the high
    interest rates to which successive GoBs have resorted to
    stabilize the currency and fight inflation in the face of
    various shocks; b) centralization of state, municipal and
    other liabilities at the federal level after the mid-1990s;
    c) currency devaluation since 1998; and d) stubbornly low
    GDP growth.

    High, Interest-Driven Deficits
    ------------------------------

    ¶8. (U) Before the 1997-99 emerging-market financial crisis,
    the GoB ran not just nominal but primary consolidated budget
    deficits.  The Cardoso government of that era maintained an
    overvalued exchange rate by means of high interest rates.
    When forced to float the Real in 1999, it raised interest
    rates still further to control inflation.  These factors
    help explain how interest costs of what was initially a
    relatively modest stock of debt have for years been so high.

    ¶9. (U) The years since 1998 have seen primary-budget
    surpluses of 3.2% of GDP or better.  However, in those same
    years debt service has grown to 7-9% of GDP in interest
    payments alone.  This tremendous expense soaks up as much as
    a quarter of government revenues (federal and state.)  It
    has been the primary agent behind Brazil's fiscal deficits
    since the Plano Real in 1994.  To illustrate:  the Lula
    government's hard-won 4.32% of GDP primary surplus covered
    less than half its interest expenditures (9.49% of GDP) in
    ¶2003.  Result: a nominal deficit of 5.16% of GDP.  Table 4
    illustrates the impact of debt service on Brazil's fiscal
    accounts over the last half-decade.

                               ------
                               TABLE 4
                               -------
               Interest Payments Drive Fiscal Deficits
              (In Billions of Reals and Percent of GDP)

    Year         1998    1999    2000    2001    2002     2003

    -Nominal
    Interest    68.3    87.4    78.0    86.4    114.0    145.2
    -% GDP       7.5     9.0     7.1     7.2      8.6      9.5
    (accrual basis)

    -Primary
     Surplus     0.1    31.1    38.2    43.7     52.4     66.2
    -Pct of GDP  0.0     3.2     3.5     3.6      4.0      4.3

    -Nominal
     Deficit    68.2    56.3    39.8    42.7     61.6     79.0
    -Pct of GDP  7.5     5.8     3.6     3.6      4.6     5.16

    Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank

    ¶10. (SBU) NOTE:  Unibanco's chief economist once lamented to
    Econoff that his former employer, the World Bank, had ever
    convinced the IMF to fix primary surpluses instead of actual
    deficits as program benchmarks.  This policy, he said, masks
    the extent of a country's fiscal problems.  In Brazil's
    case, even the current 4.3% of GDP primary surplus is not
    enough to bring down the debt-to-GDP ratio, he argued.  END
    NOTE.

    "Skeletons"
    -----------

    ¶11. (U) The Cardoso administration's responsible process
    through the late-1990s of acknowledging bad state, municipal
    and parastatal debt, plus some other liabilities, has also
    driven up the official GoB debt level.  Much of these debts,
    commonly referred to as "skeletons", have been centralized
    in the federal government.  "Skeletons" added an officially
    estimated 8.62% of GDP to the stock of federal public debt
    in the eight years to December 2003.  Pessimists opine that
    more skeletons remain to be unearthed, perhaps another 5-8%
    of GDP, but this upper figure seems increasingly unlikely.

    Currency Depreciation
    ---------------------

    ¶12. (U) Since 1998, the dominant factor in worsening the
    debt/GDP ratio has been the exchange rate.  This was
    reflected by the jump in the ratio after the GoB was forced
    to float the Real in early 1999.  From 41.7% in 1998, the
    ratio leapt to 48.7% at the end of 1999.  (The particularly
    high interest rates briefly imposed in 1999 were also a
    factor, but those rates themselves stemmed from the need to
    staunch capital flight and inflationary effects arising from
    the devaluation.)  The Real's renewed plunge from April into
    October 2002 -- combined with the effects of high interest
    rates employed to combat inflation and restore market
    confidence during the presidential campaign -- likewise took
    a toll, causing the brief spike at 64%.

    ¶13. (U) A CSFB study gave as the rule-of-thumb for the
    second half of 2002 (with the Real in the 3.50-4.0/dollar
    zone) that a 10% currency devaluation translated to a 2
    percent rise in Brazil's debt/GDP.  At its worst, in
    November 2002, it meant a 3.4% increase.  This effect was
    not mainly due to Brazil's relatively modest foreign public
    debt.  Rather, it was driven by the then-burgeoning level of
    the dollar-linked portion of domestic public debt.  That, in
    turn, was generated by the GoB's practice, adopted out of
    necessity, of holding down interest rates on its new debt by
    increasing issuance of dollar-linked instruments.  As part
    of this process, starting in April 2002 the Central Bank
    also began issuing dozens of billions of dollars' worth of
    swaps in parallel with new Treasury SELIC issuances.  (IMF
    rules forbid Treasury from selling swaps or other
    derivatives.)

    ¶14. (U) Lula's GOB has assiduously reduced this exposure to
    exchange-rate volatility.  As market confidence in his
    financial team has grown, the latter has been able to
    retire, rather than roll over, massive portions of dollar-
    linked debt coming due, replacing them with non-dollar-
    linked debt.  In 2003, it retired from the market over $20
    billion in dollar-linked debt and debt-related swaps.  By
    year's-end, the dollar-linked part of the domestic debt had
    halved, from 20.3 to 10.0%, year-on-year.  Including swaps,
    the drop was from 33.5 to 20.5%.  The process has
    accelerated since, with a total of $7.6 billion more in
    dollar-denominated debt retired in the first two months of
    2004, according to the latest GoB figures.

                               -------
                               Table 5
                               -------

                COMPOSITION OF DOMESTIC FEDERAL DEBT

                          End-2002     Sept.'03   End-2003
                          --------     --------   --------

    Fixed-interest            1.5%       6.9%          9.5%
    Floating-interest        42.4%      48.9%         46.5%
    Inflation linked          9.2%       9.8%         10.3%
    Total Dollar and
     Dollar-linked        45.8%      33.0%         32.4%
     Others                   1.6%       1.4%          1.4%

    Source:  Central Bank and Finance Ministry

    FLOATING INTEREST RATE EXPOSURE
    -------------------------------

    ¶15. (U) As the debt's foreign-exchange component has shrunk,
    its interest-rate component has grown.  Half the domestic
    debt is floating-rate, linked to the Central Bank's discount
    (SELIC) rate.  To illustrate the potential downside of this
    factor: the Central Bank's interest-rate hikes in response
    to the crisis of confidence in 2002 increased average
    interest on Brazil's domestic public securitized debt to a
    peak of 31.7% in November 2002.

    ¶16. (U) The GoB has begun to turn the tide in this area, as
    seen in Table 6.  New financial-market confidence has
    allowed it to reduce interest rates, increase issues of
    fixed-rate debt (from under two to over twelve percent of
    the total, year-on-year by end-2003) and, beginning in
    August 2003, also to lengthen maturities.  By December 2003,
    the SELIC had dropped to 16.5% from 26.5% in mid-2003, and
    the average interest rate on domestic debt was down to
    around 22%.  This, to be sure, still left the real rate well
    in the double-digit range.  As for foreign-debt service:  by
    January 2004, the GoB was able to launch a 30-year Eurobond
    with a spread of 377 basis points above U.S. Treasuries --
    quite remarkable after the spreads of 24% above U.S.
    Treasuries little more than a year before.

                               -------
                               TABLE 6
                               -------

      DOMESTIC SECURITIZED FEDERAL DEBT INDICATORS/1

                          End 2002  Sept 03    Dec 03

    Ave. maturity
           (months)        33.20       31.20     31.34
    - fixed rate            3.06        6.64      6.50
    - SELIC linked       21.83      22.38     22.74
    - Dollar linked         35.47      40.82     40.51
    - inflation link        79.18      75.29     77.88

    Duration (months)       20.0        15.2
    Percent maturing within one year
     (total)                38.9        32.1      33.4
    - fixed rate            96.8        86.9      85.9
    - SELIC linked          48.8        30.9      28.9
    - Dollar linked         31.1        33.5      42.7
    - inflation link         1.3         1.7       1.4

    Average Interest Rate
    - w/swap exposure    20.9           18.6
    - w/out swaps        29.1           21.2

    Exchange-Rate Exposure (Billions of Reals)
    - Dollar-linked       139.47         83.24    78.67
    - Swaps                91.10       103.37     82.72
    - Total               230.57        186.62   161.39

    1/ Federal domestic debt in the form of securities
       held by the public

    Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank

    GDP:  The Stagnant Variable
    ---------------------------

    ¶17. (U) The final variable in the debt/GDP equation is GDP
    itself.  Brazil's anemic growth over the last several years
    has exacerbated the ratio's increase.  Growth in 2004 is
    widely forecast to recover to 3.5%.  But even if that
    scenario is borne out, along with market expectations of
    relative exchange-rate stability (3.1-3.2 Reals/$) plus a
    further decline in the SELIC interest rate to 13.5% at end-
    year, private-sector specialists calculate debt/GDP at end-
    2004 will still be 58%.  The GoB itself forecasts just a
    modest fall, to 57.2%.

    ¶18. (U) After 2004, projections of declining debt/GDP levels
    depend critically on sustained growth rates of at least 3.5
    to 4%.  Indeed, the public debt will only be payable to the
    extent that Brazil solves its longer-term growth problem.
    That solution, in turn, hinges on the raft of microeconomic
    reforms necessary to increase economic efficiency and
    promote investment (Ref A.)

    ¶19. (U) Meanwhile, Brazil's debt level in itself stymies
    longer-term growth.  Most GoB borrowing is to roll over
    maturing debt and to pay current fiscal deficits.  Public
    investment has dried up, squeezed both by debt service and
    constitutional spending earmarks which leave only about 9%
    of the federal budget as discretionary spending.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶20. (SBU) Financial-market enthusiasm for Brazil debt-paper
    seems ready for the long-haul.  Certainly Brazil has come a
    good way from the "vicious circle" near-panic induced by the
    presidential campaign of 2002, with that period's plummeting
    exchange rate, interest-rate hikes, and extreme difficulty
    in debt-rollover.  But, for all the debt-management skill
    and progress of Lula's first year, Brazil's public-debt
    profile could quite easily again fall prey to negative turns
    of market mood if, e.g., local interest-rate or global risk-
    capital trends take a bad turn, and/or domestic growth in
    the real economy continues not to materialize.

    ¶21. (SBU) Beyond keeping its fingers crossed against
    external and domestic shocks, the GoB can now best improve
    its debt sustainability by enacting structural and
    microeconomic reforms to attract investment and boost
    growth.  Unfortunately, the early results of its efforts to
    reform the tax, pension and regulatory systems have been
    economically underwhelming, however politically resolute.
    The phantoms of doubt about Brazil's debt have withdrawn to
    the wings for now, but will surely hang around, ready again
    to haunt the GoB, through Lula's term.

    HRINAK

`