Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 19673 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18 2011/07/19 2011/07/20 2011/07/21 2011/07/22 2011/07/23 2011/07/25 2011/07/27 2011/07/28 2011/07/29
2011/08/01

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05 1991/07 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/11
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maseru Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AE ATRN ADM ACOA AID AG AY ALOW AND ABUD AMED ASPA AL APEC ADPM ADANA AFSI ARABL ADCO ANARCHISTS AZ ANET AMEDCASCKFLO AADP AO AGRICULTURE ASEAN ARF APRC AFSN AFSA AORG ACABQ AINF AINR AODE AROC APCS AGAO ARCH ADB AX AMEX ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ARAS ACBAQ AC AOPR AREP ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BE BO BTIO BH BM BAIO BRPA BUSH BILAT BF BX BOL BMGT BP BC BIDEN BBG BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CB CY CW CM CDC CONS CHR CD CT CR CAMBODIA CN COUNTRY CONDOLEEZZA CZ CARICOM COM CICTE CYPRUS CBE CACS COE CIVS CTR CFED CARSON CAPC COUNTER COPUOS CV CITES CKGR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CITT CSW CIC CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CAJC CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DB DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DE DK DOMESTIC DISENGAGEMENT DOD DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES ECONOMY ENV EAG EET ELECTIONS ESTH ETRO ECIP EXIM EPEC ENERG EREL ERNG EK EDEV ENGY EPA ETRAD ELTNSNAR ENGR ETRC ELAP EUREM EEB EETC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN ECOSOC ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EAIDS EDU EPREL ECA EINVEFIN EFINECONCS EIDN EINVKSCA ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS EDRC ENRD EBRD ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FOREIGN FREEDOM FARC FAS FBI FINANCE FAO FTAA FCS FAA FJ FTA FK FT FAC FDA FINR FM FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GE GH GY GB GLOBAL GEORGE GCC GV GC GAZA GL GOV GOI GF GTMO GANGS GAERC GZ GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HN HUD HU HURI HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IPR IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN IADB ID ICAO ICRC INR IFAD ICJ IO IRAQ INL INMARSAT INRA INTERNAL INTELSAT ILC INDO IRS IIP ITRA IQ IEFIN ICTY ISCON IAHRC IA INTERPOL IEA INRB ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRO IBET IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOHN JUS JAMES JOHNNIE JOSEPH JML JIMENEZ
KNNP KFLO KDEM KOMC KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KSAF KU KHIV KSTC KNUP KIRF KIRC KIDE KTDD KMPI KSEO KSCS KICC KHLS KNUC KCFE KGLB KNNNP KIVP KPWR KR KCOM KESS KWN KCSY KRFD KBCT KREL KREC KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KGIT KOCI KMCC KPRP KPRV KAUST KPAOPREL KVIR KIRP KLAB KHSA KCRIM KPAONZ KCRCM KHDP KNAR KINR KICA KGHA KPAOY KTRD KTAO KWAC KJUST KSCI KNPP KMRS KHUM KTBT KNNPMNUC KBTS KACT KFSC KERG KPIR KTLA KAWK KX KO KNDP KAID KVRP KMFO KPOA KENV KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGCC KSEC KPIN KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LH LAB LI LTTE LO LU LA LVPR LT LG LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MCC MO MCA MAS MZ MIL MU ML MTCR MEPP MG MI MINUSTAH MP MA MD MAPP MAR MR MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MIK MN MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MACEDONIA MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NU NG NL NPT NS NSF NA NP NATIONAL NASA NC NDP NIH NIPP NSSP NEGROPONTE NK NGO NE NAS NATOIRAQ NR NAR NZUS NARC NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OSCI OPAD OIE ODIP OM OFFICIALS OEXP OPEC OFDP OHUM ODPC OVIPPRELUNGANU OSHA OSIC OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PA PNAT PAS PALESTINIAN PCI PO PROV PRELBR PH PROP PERM PETR PJUS POLITICAL PREZ PAO PRELPK PAIGH PROG PMAR PU PG PDOV PTE PGOVSOCI PGOR PY PMIL PBTSRU PRAM PINO PGOF PTERE PPA PARMS PERL PREO PSI PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PETER PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RO ROBERT RM RICE REGION ROOD RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SG SENS SF SENVQGR SEN SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SN SC SNA SK SL SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SAARC STEINBERG SARS SWE SCRS SNARIZ SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TW TRSY TZ TN TINT TC TIO TR TF TK TRAD TT TWI TD TL TV TERRORISM TP TO TURKEY TSPAM TREL TRT TFIN TAGS THPY TBID
UNSC UK UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNRCR UNESCO UNICEF USPS UNSCR UNHCR UNHRC UNFICYP UNCSD UNEP USAID UV UNDP UNTAC USUN USDA UNMIC UNCHR UNCTAD UR USGS USNC USOAS UA UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VEPREL VN VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VISIT VENZ VAT VC VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WHO WFP WS WA WZ WI WMD WBG WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WB
XA XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XY XR XG XT XC XH XD XE XV XB XU XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YE YL YMCS
ZU ZI ZOELLICK ZP ZR ZO ZK ZF ZL ZB ZN ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD4008, REASSURING PAKISTAN ON THE F-16 SALE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ISLAMABAD4008.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07ISLAMABAD4008 | 2007-09-17 12:09 | 2011-05-30 02:00 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad
Appears in these articles: http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/wikileaks-us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem/201017 http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem-108985

`

    VZCZCXRO9273
    OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
    DE RUEHIL #4008/01 2601209
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 171209Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1759
    INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 7363
    RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 3427
    RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1881
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004008

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
    TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PK
    SUBJECT: REASSURING PAKISTAN ON THE F-16 SALE

    REF: A. ISLAMABAD 3658
         ¶B. ISLAMABAD 3526
         ¶C. ISLAMABAD 3168

    Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  In meetings with the Deputy Secretary last
    week, President Musharraf, Prime Minister Aziz and Foreign
    Secretary Khan told us the U.S. had violated the F-16

    SIPDIS
    agreement with Pakistan.  A series of misunderstandings and
    delays, including important ones on our part, has prompted
    Pakistan to cease payment, at least until these issues can be
    resolved.  We know many in Washington are dismayed by what
    they consider a juvenile reaction on Pakistan's part.  But it
    is hard to exaggerate the effect the failure of the F-16 sale
    would have on U.S. relations with Pakistan and on our allies
    in the Pakistani military.  While many of the issues are
    technical, they have now crossed into the political realm.
    Musharraf himself appears to be increasingly concerned about
    political fallout from unresolved issues with the sale.  The
    upcoming visit of Air Chief Tanvir will offer a chance to
    address these topics.  In our view, the outstanding F-16
    related issues would more usefully be addressed as a package
    and not as discrete (and often confusing) technical and legal
    issues.  We recommend the U.S. Government offer Pakistan
    assurances that the United States is committed to this sale,
    while reassuring the Air Chief that a number of the
    restrictions are not unique to Pakistan.  End summary.

    ¶2. (C) During meetings last week with the Deputy Secretary
    (septels), President Musharraf, Prime Minister Aziz and
    Foreign Secretary Khan all raised concern about problems
    relating to the F-16 sale.  Musharraf said that the Air Force
    believed the U.S. had "violated" the agreement intentionally
    and he urged that we resolve this problem before it
    undermined bilateral relations.  Musharraf was particularly
    agitated about the F-16 sale during his September 16 meeting
    with CODEL Boehner, as he emphasized that the "man in the
    street" (i.e. voter) was aware of the previously failed F-16
    sale, and now it looked as if "history was repeating itself."

    ¶3. (C) The Prime Minister characterized the U.S. as "moving
    the goalposts" and confirmed what Defense Production
    Additional Secretary MG Tariq Salim Malik wrote in a
    September 1 letter to DSCA Director Admiral Wieringa, namely
    that Pakistan would cease making payments on this case until
    problems are resolved.  Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood
    Ahmed reiterated  his concerns to Office of Defense
    Representative MG Helmly on September 14.  We understand the
    next payment was due September 15.  (We also understand that,
    as a practical matter, there is a grace period of several
    weeks.)

    Need for Reassurance
    --------------------

    ¶4. (C) The decision to pursue this $3 billion deal was
    difficult for Pakistan.  Air Chief Marshal Tanvir overcame
    the Finance Minister's concerns about the cost of the planes
    and the diversion of spending from social programs.  Tanvir's
    military colleagues warned him the U.S. would repeat the
    Pressler Amendment sanctions experience of the l990s when the
    Pakistanis paid for F-16s that were never delivered.  Now,
    the Air Chief, who is pro-American, is embarrassed and
    weakened by the perception among his colleagues that the sale
    -- for whatever reason -- will not be successful.  Much of
    his aggressive demeanor relates to his weakened standing.
    Moreover, President Musharraf views this sale as a symbol of
    a long-term U.S. commitment to Pakistan and a singular
    benefit of his alliance with us.

    ¶5. (C) From our standpoint, the sale was a strategic decision
    to rebuild relations with a nation critical to the war on
    terror, despite Congressional and technology transfer
    concerns.  The notification that the MLU upgrade could not be
    performed in Pakistan was made just as the press reported the
    findings of the NIE and the passage of 9/11 Commission
    recommendations with its Pakistan-related provisions.  Our
    notification to the Pakistanis of this decision a year after
    it was resolved in Washington has further clouded the
    picture.  Much of the Pakistani mistrust is based on
    incomplete understanding of our security assistance process,
    and an assumption they are being singled out for specific

    ISLAMABAD 00004008  002 OF 003

    conditions on the F-16 sale.  We can effectively address
    these concerns and should do so quickly.

    Problems & Recommendations
    --------------------------

    ¶6. (C) In September 2006, Pakistan signed an LOA to  purchase
    18 new F-16 fighter aircraft; it also agreed to  purchase 34
    MLU kits, with the option of buying an additional 26 to
    support the used Excess Defense Articles (EDA) USAF planes
    being  provided to them.  Four EDA F-16s have been delivered;
    delivery of the new planes is scheduled to begin in January
    ¶2010.

    Mid-Life Upgrades
    -----------------

    ¶7. (C) In August 2007 (ref C), Ambassador advised the Air
    Chief Marshal of a letter signed by the Secretary in July
    2006 assuring the HIRC (now HFAC) and SFRC Chairmen that the
    MLUs would  not be performed in Pakistan.  At the time the
    LOA was signed on September 30, 2006, neither post nor
    Pakistan was aware of the Secretary's letter.  The LOA does
    not state that the MLUs can be performed in Pakistan, but
    Pakistan inferred that the clause relating to U.S. training
    of Pakistani technicians meant that the MLUs would occur in
    Pakistan.

    ¶8. (C) The Deputy Secretary in his meetings made it clear
    that the Secretary's decision was final.  But we need to
    provide the background of our decision and smooth the way for
    helping Pakistan perform the MLUs in a third country.
    Pakistan cannot carry out the upgrades elsewhere without our
    help.

    ¶9. (C) Recommendation:  (1) As a follow-up to their meeting,
    a message from the Deputy Secretary to President Musharraf
    reassuring him of our commitment to this sale and pledging to
    work together to resolve outstanding concerns.  This should
    be delivered  before the September visit to Washington of Air
    Chief Marshal Tanvir.  (2)  We thank DSCA Director Admiral
    Wieringa for his offer to meet with Tanvir and recommend he
    explain our decision and offer specific DCSA assistance in
    helping the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) evaluate its options and
    implement its decision on where to perform the MLUs.

    Basing
    ------

    ¶10. (C) Reftels explain in detail the problems of the
    proposed security plan for basing the new F-16s in Pakistan.
    Simply put, the requirement to base separately the F-16s and
    foreign-origin SAR and support aircraft is impractical and
    will undermine the safety and effectiveness of air
    operations.

    ¶11. (C) Recommendation:  Use Air Chief Marshal Tanvir's visit
    to brief key Congressional interlocutors and build support
    for Congressional approval of alternative basing proposals
    that both protect U.S. technology and allow the PAF
    reasonable air operations.

    Encrypted Software
    ------------------

    ¶12. (S) Additional Secretary MG Malik in his letter to DSCA
    cites as additional evidence of our lack of transparency the
    fact that the LOA did not contain provisions explaining the
    need for encrypted devices.  He fears the U.S. will be able
    to limit the capability of the F-16s by withholding access to
    the cryptokeys.

    ¶13. (S) Recommendation:  We need to explain to the Pakistanis
    that the provision was in the LOA and many countries are
    subject to the same restrictions.  The Pakistanis do not
    fully understand our requirements for sharing encrypted
    devices and need to be reassured that the aircraft will still
    fly without the cryptokeys.  A briefing for Air Marshal
    Tanvir and/or his staff could resolve this misunderstanding.

    Link-16
    -------

    ¶14. (S) When Pakistan signed the LOA, they were aware that

    ISLAMABAD 00004008  003 OF 003

    the Link-16 command and control technology had not yet been
    approved for release to Pakistan but assumed it would occur
    in a timely fashion.  The delay in approval concerns them.

    ¶15. (S) Recommendation:  The Joint Chiefs of Staff has
    approved the release; the decision now rests with the
    National Security Agency.  We understand that the Defense
    Intelligence Agency has some concerns about potential
    technology transfer, and CENTCOM is working to address those
    concerns.  This issue needs to be resolved quickly.

    Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM)
    -------------------------------------

    ¶16. (S) Pakistan was previously cleared for separate elements
    of DRFM; now they need approval for the whole package.  USAF
    supports immediate release, but the Defense Technology
    Security Administration appears to have concerns.  SAF/IA is
    meeting this week with DTSA to review the issue.

    ¶17. (C) Recommendation:  This decision process needs to be
    accelerated.

    ¶18. (C) The National Disclosure Policy Committee will return
    to Pakistan in December to perform a security survey to
    confirm adequate Pakistani protection of U.S. classified
    information.  Tanvir is eager to participate in this survey
    and is working to meet the security restrictions as stated in
    the LOA.  We should make it clear to Tanvir that we can speed
    up the approval process of Link-16 and DRFM with enhanced
    cooperation on this survey.

    ¶19. (C) We suggest Washington agencies address these issues
    as a package with Tanvir.  Of particular concern to the
    Pakistanis is the completion of the mid-life upgrades in a
    third country.  This can be resolved by U.S. engagement that
    reduces Pakistan's costs and involves Pakistani technicians
    in the third-country effort.

    PATTERSON

`