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### Viewing cable 08TOKYO3435, DPJ SECURITY POLICY STILL MUDDLED, AS ELECTION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08TOKYO3435 | 2008-12-17 08:33 | 2011-07-02 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo

`

    VZCZCXRO8173
    OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
    DE RUEHKO #3435/01 3520833
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 170833Z DEC 08
    FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9531
    INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6876
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2940
    RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 2877
    RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 1483
    RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 3840
    RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 5274
    RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 2049
    RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 7213
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/USFJ  IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003435

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV JA
    SUBJECT: DPJ SECURITY POLICY STILL MUDDLED, AS ELECTION
    APPROACHES

    REF: A. 07 TOKYO 3102
         ¶B. TOKYO 3387

    Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  The possible shift from an LDP-led
    administration to one led by the DPJ has potentially serious
    implications for Japan's security policy, as well as for the
    future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  The leading
    opposition party has opposed the war in Iraq and used its
    majority in the Upper House to slow the passage of
    legislation authorizing anti-terror refueling support in the
    Indian Ocean.  Campaign literature outlines the need to
    obtain a UN mandate for all security-related deployments
    overseas.  Party leaders routinely castigate U.S. policies
    and call for a more equal security alliance.  With an
    ideological range that runs from left to right and little
    cohesion between the party's assembly of former ruling LDP
    members and refugees from several small defunct parties, the
    DPJ has done little to lay out a clear framework for foreign
    policy decision-making.  In advance of Lower House elections
    sometime next year, the party has mostly deferred to its
    leader, Ichiro Ozawa, to set the parameters for the debate,
    but he has been much more focused on the elections than on
    what comes next.  Ultimately, the contours of DPJ security
    policy in the event it wins a majority may depend most on the
    ability of the leadership to maintain a sense of unity and
    cohesion among members  at the two ends of the political
    spectrum.  Whatever happens, it is clear at this point, based
    on numerous conversations with DPJ Diet members, that a new
    government will continue to maintain a strong alliance
    relationship with the United States, but will likely oppose
    the OEF refueling mission and certain aspects of U.S. force
    realignment.  End Summary.

    DPJ Poised to Take Power
    ------------------------

    ¶2. (C) For the first time in its history, the ruling  Liberal
    Democratic Party (LDP) faces the very real  possibility that
    it will emerge from the next Lower House  election as the
    second-largest political party in the Diet,  behind the
    Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  If polling is any guide,
    the DPJ could take an outright majority, if not merely a
    plurality of the 480 seats.  The LDP has held power, either
    alone or in coalition, for most of the last 50 years,
    ensuring a fair degree of continuity in Japan's foreign
    policy.  The current Lower House term ends on September 10
    and the Prime Minister must call an election by no later than
    that date (with an automatic extension into October if the
    Diet is in session).  Embassy contacts are nearly unanimous
    that the most likely time frames for an earlier snap election
    are January/February or April/May.   The LDP has been girding
    itself to lose seats in the next Lower House race ever since
    its landslide victory under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
    in the ""postal privatization"" election of 2005.  The outlook
    has become steadily worse through the subsequent
    administrations of Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda,
    and Taro Aso.  Even some senior LDP members, such as former
    Secretary General Koichi Kato, believe the clock may have run
    out on the LDP.  He told the Embassy recently that the LDP
    has lost the meaning of its existence, which was to stop the
    spread of communism and grow the economy.

    ¶3. (C) Should power shift to the DPJ in the next election,
    security policy is likely to be less predictable than it has
    been for most of the last half-century under a steady stream
    of LDP governments, according to a wide range of Embassy
    contacts and other political observers.  Lower House Vice
    Speaker Takahiro Yokomichi, a former Socialist Party member,
    told the Embassy recently that the DPJ has a ""100-day plan in
    three steps"" for the transition.  He notes, however, that
    because the focus will be mostly on domestic issues in the
    early stages of a DPJ administration, there are not likely to
    be many immediate changes to foreign or security policy.

    Diversity Hinders Unified Policy
    --------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The DPJ, founded in 1998, is an amalgam of lawmakers
    who have migrated from other parties over the past ten years,
    supplemented by a relatively young cadre of members who
    entered national politics for the first time on the party's
    own ticket (Ref A).  The leadership, starting with the three
    top executives, Chief Representative Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary
    General Yukio Hatoyama, and President Naoto Kan, is drawn
    almost entirely from the first category.  Those three, along
    with fellow transplants Seiji Maehara, Katsuya Okada, and
    Yoshihiko Noda, form the axis for six of the eight main
    groups that comprise the DPJ.   All but Noda have served as
    party leader at one time, and all six are cited frequently by
    Embassy contacts and the media as the most likely successors
    to Ozawa in the future.  Most of their followers trace their
    lineage to the LDP, the Liberal Party, Sakigake, or the New
    Frontier Party.  Remnants of the now-defunct Socialist Party
    (SP) and Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) comprise the
    remaining two groups, and help extend the ideological
    parameters of the party from far-left to far-right.

    ¶5. (C) Policy differences among the groups clustered around
    the ideological center of the DPJ can indeed be vague and
    difficult to articulate.  Generally speaking, the Hatoyama,
    Maehara, Noda, and former DSP groups tend mostly toward the
    conservative side of the spectrum, particularly on security
    policy, meaning they are supportive of the U.S.-Japan
    security alliance, take a firm position with regard to China
    and the DPRK, and are comfortable with the idea of lifting
    some of the constitutional constraints that prevent Japan
    from playing a more active role overseas.  The Kan, Okada,
    and former SP groups generally take a more dovish stance,
    placing greater emphasis on relations with Asian neighbors
    and looking for ways to take on a more substantive
    international role outside of the Alliance and within the
    existing constraints.  While many in the latter category are
    still supportive of the alliance at some level, they tend to
    favor a more equal partnership and can often be quite
    critical of U.S. foreign policy.  Ozawa's group is probably
    the most diverse ideologically, followed by Okada's, and is
    therefore more difficult to categorize.

    ¶6. (C) Some academics have argued that while the DPJ
    membership itself has become more conservative over the
    years, in keeping with the general decline of the left in
    Japanese politics, the party has actually moved further to
    the left ideologically as a means of distinguishing itself
    from the LDP.   A primary focus of the DPJ's attacks on the
    LDP over security policy for the past two years has been
    Japan's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of
    Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Internal DPJ debates over
    the constitutionality of the mission in the absence of a UN
    mandate and the best role for Japan to play in assisting
    Afghanistan have threatened at times to split the party along
    ideological lines.  Ozawa was criticized heavily by both
    wings of his party in 2007 for suggesting that it might be
    more appropriate to send ground forces than to provide
    maritime refueling support, and quickly drew back to his
    original position that the SDF cannot be legally deployed
    overseas without UN mandate.  Maehara sided with Ozawa in
    opposing SDF deployments to Iraq, but opposed him strenuously
    on the OEF deployment.  The party remains divided over
    whether the current OEF refueling mission, which was just
    extended for another year on December 12, violates the
    constitution or not, but critics of the official line have
    maintained discipline to avoid airing the party's dirty
    laundry before an election.  DPJ Lower House member Mitsuo
    Mitani cautioned the Embassy recently against reading too
    much into the Diet debates, noting that ""it is easier to
    oppose government bills related to foreign policy.""

    ¶7. (C) Ozawa is widely acknowledged as the key to holding the
    party together, but there is no unanimity as to what will
    happen if the party gains power, or if Ozawa steps down.
    Some contacts conjecture that the DPJ will implode within
    some relatively brief period of time, leading either to a
    return of the LDP or some sort of political realignment.  A
    few Embassy contacts have even posited the theory that the
    former Socialist Party elements within the DPJ might seek to
    take advantage of the political capital they have earned over
    the past several years for keeping a low profile by claiming
    the spoils of an electoral victory.  DPJ Lower House member
    Keiro Kitagami told the Embassy recently, however, that ""the
    DPJ is currently more unified than the LDP, because the DPJ
    is close to achieving its goal.""  Some DPJ lawmakers,
    including Maehara, have registered their disappointment that
    Ozawa ran unopposed in the party's September 2008 leadership
    race, eliminating the possibility of open debate.  Discontent
    remains, Kitagami acknowledged, but the members are committed
    to staying with Ozawa, at least until the election.

    Manifesto Provides Basic Policy Plank
    -------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) The DPJ Manifesto, revised for the 2007 Upper House
    election, provides a quick snapshot of what might be expected
    from a future DPJ administration, although deep divisions
    remain over even some of the party's most fundamental
    policies.  The Manifesto lists ""Seven Proposals,"" the last of
    which is ""to build proactive foreign relations.""  The term
    proactive, according to DPJ contacts, is intended to signify
    a shift away from the ""reactive"" policies of the LDP, bred of
    an over-dependence on the United States.  As DPJ
    International Bureau head Tetsundo Iwakuni told the DCM
    recently, ""the United States takes for granted that Japan
    will always say 'yes' when asked for something.""  Specific
    goals listed under the heading ""Foreign Affairs and Defense""
    include the immediate withdrawal of the SDF from Iraq
    (already overtaken by events), increased public engagement in
    U.S. force realignment, proactive diplomacy toward the DPRK,
    and a more Asia-centered foreign policy.  Not clearly
    outlined in the Manifesto, but mentioned often by Embassy DPJ
    contacts, is a plan to dispatch 100 lawmakers and some
    unspecified number of political appointees to the various
    ministries to exert control over the bureaucrats, a proposal
    with potentially serious repercussions for policy formulation
    and implementation.

    ¶9. (C) In the broadest context, the DPJ promises in its
    Manifesto ""to re-examine the role of the U.S. military in the
    security of the Asia-Pacific region and the significance of
    U.S. military bases in Japan...from the perspective of
    taxpayers and in consideration of the principle of civilian
    control and the need to reduce the burden on specific regions
    and communities.""  At the same time, the party pledges ""to
    make the greatest possible effort to develop relations of
    mutual trust...and to strengthen the bonds of solidarity with
    Asian countries within the framework of the international
    community.""   Current plans for U.S. force realignment are
    criticized for the ""massive costs"" imposed on Japan based
    solely on agreements between the two governments, without
    regard to the understanding of the affected communities.
    ""Unresolved problems"" include total costs of the realignment
    and the use of subsidies to obtain buy-in at the local level.

    ¶10. (C) The Manifesto also blasts Japan for supporting the
    war in Iraq based on ""arbitrary and inaccurate information,""
    and calls for a full accounting before Japan considers how to
    assist in Iraqi reconstruction ""within the framework of
    international cooperation.""  The document notes the
    importance of retaining sanctions on the DPRK and describes
    resolution of the abductions issue ""essential.""   DPJ Lower
    House member Hiroshi Nakai has clarified for the Embassy that
    the DPJ is currently studying ways to impose additional
    sanctions against the DPRK, but is not considering any sort
    of independent designation of North Korea as a terrorist
    state.  He was not certain that Japan would remain in the
    Six-Party Talks under a DPJ-led government.

    Ozawa's Policy is the DPJ's Policy, for Now
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) For now, understanding Ozawa may be the key to
    divining the direction of security policy under a future DPJ
    administration, assuming he is willing and able to take on
    the post of Prime Minister, or continues to wield power
    behind the scenes.  Ozawa has argued for greater ""autonomy""
    within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, particularly with
    regard to decision-making.  In the past, he has expressed
    support for close consultations, but he has also accused the
    LDP of failing to consider Japan's national interests when
    pressured by the United States.  Lately, his rhetoric has
    become more stridently anti-U.S., a move intended solely to
    position the DPJ for the looming Lower House elections, DPJ
    contacts tell the Embassy.  He continues to argue for
    wrapping the national security of Japan in the broad mantle
    of the UN, and limiting Japan's overseas activities to those
    covered by a UN mandate.  He has stated his opposition to
    revising the current interpretation of the Constitution to
    allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense,
    although other voices within the DPJ support constitutional
    revision of some kind.

    ¶12. (C)   Unfortunately, some Embassy DPJ contacts admit that
    Ozawa has grown increasingly difficult to read in recent
    years, isolating himself from daily contact with party
    lawmakers and relying more and more on a very small inner
    circle of advisors.  A number of Embassy contacts, citing
    Ozawa's strong support for the Alliance during his years as
    an LDP power broker, question whether his current positions
    on security issues represent a true change in thinking, or
    are merely a matter of political expediency for tactical
    advantage.  Countless DPJ lawmakers and staffers have assured
    the Embassy and official visitors from Washington over the
    past year that Ozawa has not really changed his stripes, but
    is focused on achieving a change in government at any price.
    In response to those who question his intellectual integrity
    for straying so seemingly far from the rather more hawkish
    and nationalist positions laid down in his LDP days, or in
    his 1993 book, ""Blueprint for a New Japan,"" Ozawa supporters
    assert that his view of Japan as a more ""normal country"" has
    always presumed a more equal partnership with the United
    States.

    ¶13. (C) Known as ""the Destroyer"" for his pivotal role in the
    creation and subsequent break-up of a number of small
    political parties on his journey from the LDP to the DPJ,
    Ozawa helped form the first non-LDP administration in 1993
    before leaving the party.  Many Embassy contacts have cited
    his decision to forgo the top job at that time as evidence
    that he prefers to wield power behind the scenes.  His health
    also continues to be a cause of concern, with some DPJ
    members hinting to the Embassy that his heart condition could
    actually limit his ability to lead.  The Embassy has heard
    from numerous sources that Ozawa has had to make serious
    adjustments to his daily schedule and diet, and a recent
    article in one of Japan's weekly magazines noted his frequent
    absences from the Lower House during afternoon deliberations.
     Allegations of financial scandals involving his sizeable
    real estate holdings are often mentioned by the press as
    another possible roadblock to his election as Prime Minister.

    Successors Waiting in the Wings
    -------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) DPJ contacts stress that Okada, DPJ leader during the
    party's lop-sided loss in the ""postal privatization"" election
    of 2005, has worked hard to repair his image as a leader by
    staying above the fray of internal party politics.  Young and
    telegenic by comparison to Ozawa, he is seen as a
    bridge-builder within the party, and the only potential
    leader who can fill Ozawa's role of keeping the peace between
    the ideological wings of the party.  The relatively dovish
    Okada has faulted the LDP for relying on ""a very small number
    of Japan experts"" in managing relations, and recently
    traveled to the United States to lay the groundwork for
    broader exchanges with the incoming U.S. administration.
    Returning from his trip, Okada has proposed playing a
    ""mediating role"" in negotiating with the Taliban, in lieu of
    dispatching the SDF.

    ¶15. (C) The generally more conservative Hatoyama has also
    criticized the LDP for being ""overly dependent on the United
    States,"" asserting that a DPJ administration ""will strike the
    right balance"" in relations with the United States and with
    Asian neighbors, ""but with slightly more emphasis on the
    latter.""  Speaking to the Embassy recently, he claimed there
    is little difference between the LDP and DPJ on foreign
    policy.  Like the LDP, he said, ""the DPJ positions the
    U.S.-Japan alliance as the axis of its foreign policy.""  He
    acknowledged, however, that a review of U.S. force
    realignment will be the first security issue that the DPJ
    will deal with once it gains power.  What the DPJ wants to
    do, he continued, is ""to build equal relations with the
    United States in which Japan can say what it wants to say as
    a friend.""  He cited Germany and its disagreement with the
    United States over the war in Iraq as an example.   While
    Hatoyama believes it is important to focus on UN-based
    civilian cooperation, and has pledged publicly ""to place UN
    decisions ahead of U.S. decisions,"" he has told the Embassy
    that he regards a totally UN-centered approach as ""too much.""

    ¶16. (C) Maehara, regarded as one of the more hawkish
    lawmakers in the DPJ, told the Embassy recently he views the
    bilateral alliance as a ""public asset"" for Japan and the
    region and as the ""underlying framework"" of DPJ security
    policy.  That doesn't mean he is entirely supportive of
    existing U.S. policies.  He has defined the first order of
    business for a new DPJ government as reviewing the OEF
    refueling mission and elements of U.S. force  realignment --
    halting the former, in favor of some other form of
    contribution to Afghanistan, and looking for  alternatives
    that would be more ""acceptable to the people  of Okinawa"" for
    the latter.  At the same time, Maehara has called openly for
    increasing Japan's defense capabilities to protect national
    interests and safeguard the sea lanes, amending the
    Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right to
    collective self-defense, and taking a harsher stance against
    China and the DPRK.  He has also promoted the view that Japan
    needs to make its own efforts to improve relations with China
    and the DPRK outside of the alliance, while still preserving
    capabilities for deterrence.  Notably, Maehara recently
    expressed concern to the Embassy about the ideological divide
    within his party, warning that should current shadow foreign
    minister (and former Socialist Party member) Yoshio Hachiro
    actually become foreign minister in a DPJ government, Japan's
    foreign policy and security framework ""would cease to
    function"" (Ref B).
    ZUMWALT

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