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### Viewing cable 08MANAGUA333, CORRECTED COPY -- LIBERALS UNITE FOR NOVEMBER

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MANAGUA333 | 2008-03-18 22:47 | 2011-06-01 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu

`

    VZCZCXRO8649
    OO RUEHLMC
    DE RUEHMU #0333/01 0782247
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 182247Z MAR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2284
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000333

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA/CEN AND DRL
    STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC - BONICELLI/CARDENAS
    NSC FOR FISK/ALVARADO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
    SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY -- LIBERALS UNITE FOR NOVEMBER
    MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

    REF: MANAGUA 209

    Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C) On March 4, Nicaragua's two largest Liberal movements,
    Vamos con Eduardo (VCE, formerly the Nicaraguan Liberal
    Alliance, ALN) headed by Eduardo Montealegre and the
    Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) led by ex-President
    Arnoldo Aleman officially formed an alliance to run jointly
    in the November municipal elections.  On March 14, through a
    haphazard and sometimes controversial process, the VCE-PLC
    alliance registered joint mayor and vice-mayor candidates
    (apparently) in all 153 municipalities, including the Managua
    ticket of Montealegre-Quinonez.  Montealegre told us his
    "party" (now technically just a "movement") was forced to
    choose between the lesser of two evils: joining the PLC to
    fight the growing authoritarianism of the Ortega/FSLN
    government or fighting the combined forces of the Pacto (the
    powersharing agreement between Aleman and Ortega) and face
    certain electoral defeat.  Promises of private sector
    financial support for the new alliance also played
    significantly into the decision to unite.  The unity
    agreement, if fully implemented, could offer voters a true
    referendum on the Ortega administration and thereby lead to
    Liberal victories in a significant number of municipalities.
    However, tough obstacles lie ahead, especially for
    Montealegre, and it remains to be seen how the FSLN, and
    Aleman, will respond.  End Summary.

    VAMOS CON EDUARDO AND PLC - A UNITED LIBERAL EFFORT
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶2. (C) According to our political party contacts, following
    the abrupt decision by the CSE to advance the electoral
    calendar and change the leadership of the ALN (reftel),
    Montealegre considered withdrawing from the race for mayor of
    Managua.  Without the ALN's legal status, Montealegre simply
    had no party banner with a firm legal footing under which to
    run.  However, following a February 26 decision by the PLC's
    executive committee to endorse Montealegre's vice-mayoral
    candidate, PLC National Assembly Deputy Enrique Quinonez, and
    to open the door to a formal alliance, Montealegre formally
    announced his candidacy for mayor of Managua and his
    intention to pursue an alliance with the PLC, but under the
    party banner of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI).
    Montealegre subsequently told us that the announcement
    concerning PLI was actually part of a negotiating tactic to
    force Aleman and the PLC to offer better terms for the
    proposed alliance and acknowledged that he knew from the
    start of the talks that the alliance would most likely to run
    under the PLC banner.

    ¶3. (C) Indeed, on March 4, the VCE, PLI and the PLC announced
    an alliance -- "a grand coalition of democratic forces" --
    and registered the same day with Supreme Electoral Council
    (CSE).  All three parties agreed to use the PLC's party
    registration for the elections -- a step designed to reduce
    the likelihood of CSE interference and manipulation.  In
    addition, the alliance registered two joint legal
    representatives -- PLC Deputy Wilfredo Navarro for the PLC
    and Mauricio Montealegre for VCE/PLI, as well as an evenly
    split team to manage the campaign.

    ¶4. (C) On March 14, in a contentious process lasting until
    midnight, the Liberals registered candidates for mayor and
    vice mayor in (apparently) all 153 municipalities.  According
    to an internal agreement, the party that gained the most
    votes in the 2006 elections in a given district would name
    the mayor candidate and the other party would choose the
    vice-mayor candidacy.  In practice, this arrangement appears
    to have not always been honored.  For example, in Bonanza,
    the PLC prevented the VCE and the Nicaraguan Resistance Party
    (PRN) from registering candidates, and instead inscribed its
    own candidates first.  There are reports of similar
    manipulation of registration in a few other municipalities.
    Furthermore, a last minute fight over the registration of the
    PLC candidate for Nindiri, anti-Aleman and pro-Quinonez ally
    Lucas Reyes, nearly scuttled the entire deal as Quinonez
    threatened to withdraw from the race and Montealegre refused

    MANAGUA 00000333  002 OF 003

    to register without Quinonez.  Minutes prior to the closing
    of registration, Aleman reportedly withdrew his objections to
    Reyes and the Montealegre-Quinonez ticket was duly inscribed
    with the CSE.

    IS THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ORTEGA OR THE PACTO?
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) In a series of meetings with Montealegre and other
    leaders of VCE over the past two weeks, Montealegre
    acknowledged to us the challenges facing his movement, noting
    that he was confronted with two less-than-optimal choices
    following his loss of the ALN presidency and the advanced
    date for alliance and candidate registration set by the CSE.
    On one hand, he could have formed an anti-Pacto alliance with
    the left-wing Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) and the
    smaller parties (PLI, Conservative Party (PC), PRN and
    others) but that grouping would have been saddled with
    serious problems which may have well ensured its defeat,
    namely, the lack of a legally viable party vehicle under
    which to run (i.e., one strong enough to withstand the CSE's
    pernicious legalisms), a dearth of funding, and the continued
    division of the Liberal forces.  He doubted these combined
    forces could put together a winning electoral coalition,
    particularly given the private sector's long-standing threat
    to withhold all funds from any alliance not representing
    Liberal unity.

    ¶6. (C) Alternatively, to run jointly with the PLC could serve
    to unite the Liberal forces and tap a greater percentage of
    the electorate, but also risked surrendering control over his
    movement (and his political credibility) to Arnoldo Aleman.
    "The question is -- is the main struggle against Ortega or
    the Pacto?" he postulated.  In Montealegre's view, Ortega's
    growing authoritarianism, lack of respect for the rule of
    law, and mismanagement of the economy and foreign policy, now
    present the greatest threat to the future of Nicaragua and,
    given the political circumstances, forced him to seek an
    agreement with the PLC against Ortega.  Montealegre maintains
    no illusions that Aleman will respect the terms of the
    agreement, but believes that the joint legal representation
    and campaign team, plus the growing influence of anti-Aleman
    leaders within the PLC, will give him enough space to operate
    and advance his candidates in key municipalities.

    ¶7. (C) Montealegre was clearly influenced in his decision by
    the private sector's continuing reluctance to provide
    financial support to the democratic forces in the absence of
    Liberal unity.  In particular, Nicaraguan businessman Carlos
    Pellas (Nicaragua's wealthiest person and head of the Pellas
    Group) told Montealegre (as well as us) that the leaders of
    the business class would not provide financing to him or
    other democratic groups unless the Liberals united.  It
    remains to be seen whether the inverse of the private
    sector's argument - that they will give money now that the
    Liberals are united - holds true.  Montealegre has placed a
    number of private sector leaders on his campaign team to
    expand the outreach to the business community and is looking
    to raise at least USD 2 million for the Managua race alone.

    OTHER PARTIES VOICE DOUBTS
    --------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Edmundo Jarquin, leader of the MRS, has privately
    expressed regret that Montealegre had joined with Aleman,
    thereby undercutting his anti-Pacto credentials.  Jarquin
    fears that Montealegre's decision has breathed new life into
    Aleman at a moment when his influence was clearly on the
    wane.  He believes the unity agreement will not help the
    Liberals attract more votes, noting that in 2000 the Liberals
    were united -- and still lost heavily to the FSLN.  Moreover,
    the association with Aleman will dampen the enthusiasm of
    independents, and increase the rate of abstention, further
    eroding the Liberals' chances for victory.  Jarquin had hoped
    that he and Montealegre could have formed an anti-Pacto,
    left-right coalition that would have been able to win the
    larger municipalities and establish a solid political base
    for the future.  Instead, the MRS will not participate in any
    formal alliance and indeed has registered Assembly Deputy
    Enrique Saenz to run for mayor of Managua.

    MANAGUA 00000333  003 OF 003

    ¶9. (C) The VCE-PLC alliance has also exacerbated tensions
    within the smaller Conservative Party (PC) and the Nicaraguan
    Resistance Party (PRN). Leaders of both parties formally
    declined to participate in the alliance and have registered
    their own candidates (septel) in many municipalities.  To
    further add to potential confusion voters will face, some
    prominent PC members opted as individuals to register as
    candidates within the unity alliance while others are running
    under the PC party banner.  In Granada and surrounding
    municipalities, this division threatens to further split the
    democratic forces and perhaps hand the FSLN victories they
    otherwise would not have earned.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶10. (C) The agreement of the two main Liberal movements
    (joined in some cases by candidates from other parties)
    represents a step forward by the pro-democratic movement to
    challenge Ortega in the upcoming elections.  With the two
    parties running jointly, they do have the potential to
    mobilize a majority of the electorate and capture a large
    number of municipalities.  The alliance also presents an
    opportunity to develop new political leadership within the
    democratic forces at the local level that will be more
    responsive to their constituents.  However, the combined
    effects of ill feelings within both parties over the
    haphazard candidate selection and registration process, and
    the electoral isolation of smaller parties like the
    Conservatives threaten to blunt some of the positive
    momentum.  Furthermore, it is not clear how much damage
    Montealegre may have done to his anti-Pacto and democratic
    credentials by joining forces with Aleman's PLC, regardless
    of how many institutional checks have been put in place by
    the terms of the agreement.  Finally, we can expect the CSE
    to throw up many more obstacles to Montealegre and his
    candidates in the coming weeks, including rejection of some
    hopefuls as well as limitations on domestic election
    observers and training for party poll watchers.  Whether the
    alliance, and the broader democratic movement, can overcome
    these internal and external challenges remains a serious
    concern.

    ¶11. (C) We also note that several prominent FSLN members have
    told us privately that they did not expect the Liberals to
    unite ("...shocked, shocked!!") and that they are "losing
    sleep" over the thought of confronting "the very powerful"
    Montealegre-Quinonez ticket in Managua.  Such uniform
    protestations are only making us more suspicious that the
    Sandinistas have the Liberals right where they want them --
    separated from several small parties on both the right and
    left, still bound to an ever-scheming Arnoldo Aleman, and at
    the mercy of a CSE which has shown itself adept and shameless
    at tilting the electoral playing field sharply towards the
    Sandinistas.
    TRIVELLI

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