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### Viewing cable 08SOFIA87, BULGARIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLAN POSITIVE BUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08SOFIA87 | 2008-02-11 08:42 | 2011-05-05 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia

Appears in these articles:
http://www.bivol.bg/wlarmy.html
http://balkans.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/05/05/et-la-bulgarie-renonca-aux-corvettes-francaises/
http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/05/05/1085393_kak_se_pileiat_pari_v_otbranata/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSF #0087/01 0420842
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 110842Z FEB 08
    FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4754
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM  IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0966

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000087

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
    SUBJECT: BULGARIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLAN POSITIVE BUT
    MAY LACK LEADERSHIP TO IMPLEMENT FULLY

    REF: A. A) 07 SOFIA 1122
         ¶B. B) 07 SOFIA 1219
         ¶C. C) 07 SOFIA 1271

    Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (C)  Summary: A new Bulgarian Ministry of Defense plan
    for military modernization calls for a reduction of 3,000 to
    5,000 service members, elimination or closure of certain
    unnecessary weapon systems and facilities, and the
    integration of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
     The full details of the plan have not been made public, but
    information provided to the Embassy reveals a more positive
    and ambitious plan than expected.  It is likely, however,
    that the Minister of Defense will not force difficult reforms
    on the services, and as a result, some recommended measures
    will be watered down and cuts may be made on the basis of
    political expediency rather than strategic rationale.  The
    reduction in troops, for instance, may be achieved through
    attrition rather than targeted cuts of obsolete systems.
    Integration of the top-heavy and stove-piped General Staff
    into the Ministry of Defense is also likely to be only
    cosmetic (or skipped entirely) due to the Minister's
    reluctance to challenge the generals.  The plan notably
    avoids taking a position on controversial procurements such
    as French Corvette-class ships or multi-role fighters.  A
    delegation led by Deputy Minister of Defense Sonya Yankulova
    will travel to Brussels for meetings with NATO defense
    planners on 11 FEB.  This is an important opportunity for the
    alliance to encourage Bulgaria to continue on the right track
    and to push for meaningful and targeted reforms, rather than
    unfocused cost-cutting.  End Summary.

    THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

    ¶2.  (C)  Mid-level MOD experts involved with the development
    of the plan have told us that approximately 9,000 positions
    will be eliminated as a result of the reforms, with around
    8,300 of these cuts coming from the uniformed military and
    the bulk of these from the Land Forces.  (Bulgaria's current
    armed forces number approximately 37,000 with the Land Forces
    comprising around 20,000.)   The majority of the positions to
    be cut are currently unfilled.  In other words, although
    9,000 positions may be cut, only 3000-5000 actual service
    members would be let go.

    ¶3.  (C)  What is most significant is where these cuts will
    fall.  The Embassy has made a steady push (Ref A, B) for
    Bulgaria to end its wasteful legacy programs such as
    submarines, coastal defense systems and out-dated air-defense
    systems that are incapable of differentiating between allied
    and enemy aircraft.  Our understanding is that some of these
    programs will be cut back in the course of the reform effort
    but there is the danger that the majority of the cuts in
    personnel will simply be achieved through attrition.  This is
    particularly problematic since our sources indicate that
    higher rates of attrition will occur at lower ranks,
    exacerbating an already top-heavy military structure.

    ¶4.  (C)  The integration of the Ministry of Defense and the
    General Staff is the most ambitious portion of the MOD,s
    plan, drawn from, its authors say, the best practices of
    other nations, particularly the United States and New
    Zealand.  Clearly, a great amount of waste and redundancy
    could be reduced through this merger and the tremendous
    divide in culture and operations that currently exists
    between the two organizations could be narrowed or
    eliminated.  According to the plan, a procurement office and
    an audit office/inspectorate would be kept independent, while
    other offices from the two organizations such as
    communications, travel, protocol, human resources, planning,
    policy, etc. would be merged.  The new hierarchy is designed
    so that decision-making authority and consensus could be
    reached at lower levels.  The State Secretary for Defense (a
    civilian) and the CHOD would be equals and would represent
    the two highest ranking officials beneath the Defense
    Minister and a single Deputy Minister.  Predictably, the
    General Staff has opposed this plan, since it is seen as
    reducing the CHOD,s status in the Ministry.  The transition
    to a structure with a single Deputy Minister (versus six in
    the current format) also ruffled feathers since many DepMins
    would be forced to accept a demotion in name if not any
    actual reduction in authority.

    ¶5.  (C)  Wisely, the authors of the plan did not make
    specific procurement recommendations in their plan, but

    rather focused on what capabilities Bulgaria needed to
    possess in order to be an effective participant in
    international security operations.  The stated goal is for
    40% of Bulgaria's forces to be deployable, with six to eight
    percent deployed at any given time.  (A rough estimate of
    Bulgaria's current situation is that two percent of its total
    or approximately 3.6% of its Land Forces are currently
    deployed overseas.)  The planners suggested that Bulgaria
    ultimately wants to be able to deploy a full battalion and
    one company, and to do this estimates it needs a Land Force
    strength of five battalions.

    WHAT IS THE MISSION:  MILITARY TRANSFORMATION OR COST CUTTING?

    ¶6.  (C)  Prime Minister Stanishev ordered a revision of
    Bulgaria's "Plan 2015" for military modernization in October
    ¶2007.  The public rationale was to re-energize the defense
    reform process and to update the five year-old plan which was
    seen as increasingly irrelevant.  But behind the scenes, it
    was clear that Stanishev ordered the review with an eye
    toward reducing the share of GDP allotted to defense and
    buying time to respond to mounting French pressure on
    Bulgaria to purchase an over one billion dollar package of
    French ships.  For the moment, it appears the PM has been
    successful in holding off the French.  In December 2007,
    Bulgaria bought two used frigates and a minesweeper from
    Belgium instead, and Defense Minister Bliznakov said publicly
    that the Corvettes were not in Bulgaria's near-term plans.
    Still it was made clear to MOD,s defense planning team that
    recommendations for transformation must involve troop cuts
    and base closures and should plan for shrinking resources.
    In its current form, the authors estimate the new plan will
    save approximately 70-120 million USD.

    ¶7.  (C)  Bulgarian planners (reporting to DepMin Yankulova)
    prepared a surprisingly ambitious plan which calls for
    substantial troop cuts, an integrated MOD and General Staff
    (based on a hybrid of the US and New Zealand military
    organizations) and a move away from decade-spanning,
    procurement-centric planning toward a shorter-term,
    capabilities-based planning model.  While full details are
    not yet public, the thrust of the plan is forward-leaning and
    in line with Embassy advice to focus on interoperability,
    deployability, reducing waste, avoiding mega-procurements and
    maintaining niche capabilities.

    ¶8.  (C)  Although the authors of the plan continue to lobby
    for full implementation of their work, they have expressed
    doubt that Defense Minister Bliznakov (who has drawn the ire
    of his party's leadership and is perennially rumored to be
    replaced in the next cabinet reshuffle) has the will to push
    forward with far-reaching reforms.  Others involved in the
    creation of the new plan suggest that, although Bliznakov is
    loath to make waves or push too strongly against the General
    Staff, he is also anxious for the plan to be viewed as a
    success.  The concern is that "success" will be judged by top
    political decision-makers solely in terms of finances,
    without regard for the long-term consequences for the
    military.

    THE ROAD AHEAD

    ¶9.  (C)  A delegation led by Deputy Minister of Defense Sonya
    Yankulova will travel to Brussels for meetings with NATO
    defense planners on 11 FEB.  The following week the plan will
    be discussed in a Defense Council meeting of all Deputy
    Ministers and senior generals.  Depending on the degree of
    friction within the Ministry, the plan is expected to proceed
    to the Council of Ministers for final approval in March.

    ¶10.  (C)  COMMENT:  While the thrust of the Bulgarian plan is
    positive, the measure of its success or failure will depend
    on the specifics of where troop reductions are made and which
    capabilities are maintained. The MOD appears to have
    internalized consistent embassy engagement on improving
    interoperability and deployability, reducing waste, avoiding
    mega-procurements and maintaining niche capabilities, as
    these themes are all echoed in the new plan.  We strongly
    recommend that these priorities be reinforced during Deputy
    Minister Yankulova's visit to Brussels this week.  Further
    embassy and NATO engagement will be necessary to present the
    strategic rationale for targeted cuts and to ensure that the
    positive measures outlined in the plan are not made
    meaningless or even counterproductive through poor
    implementation.  END COMMENT.
    Beyrle

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