Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/12
1996/11
1997/06 1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AR AEMR AMGT AE AU AID AORC APER AS AM AFIN AMED AJ AGR ACOA ANET ASIG ABLD AL AA APECO AGAO AY AGMT APEC AINF AG ACS AECL AFFAIRS ABUD ASUP ADANA AADP AMCHAMS ARF ASEAN ADPM ATRN ALOW APCS ADCO ACAO AORG AROC AO AODE ACABQ AX AMEX AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL ADM AN AIT
BU BR BL BO BA BB BG BM BBSR BH BEXP BK BD BTIO BT BE BY BF BX BP BRUSSELS BILAT BIDEN BC BMGT BWC BN BTIU
CH CG CF CU CE CVIS CASC CO CS CA CIDA CBW CW CMGT CI CODEL CY CPAS CJAN CD CWC CDG CIA CL CROS CAPC CTR CT CR CBSA CEUDA COM CFED CV CACS CARSON CLINTON CN CONS CM CAC CIC COPUOS CDC CONDOLEEZZA CICTE COUNTER COUNTRY CBE CKGR CHR CVR COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CARICOM CB CSW CITT CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CLMT CBC CNARC CIS
DR DA DJ DHS DAO DCM DEA DOD DOMESTIC DO DK DPRK DEPT DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE DE DEAX
EG EZ EUN ECON ETRD ECPS EFIN ENRG ETTC EPET EINV EAID EAIR EWWT EU EAGR EC ELAB EIND EN EMIN ESENV ENNP EFIS ELTN ET ECIN EFTA ES EINT EI ENGR ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENVI ETRDECONWTOCS ECINECONCS ELN ELECTIONS ENVR EXTERNAL EXIM ETRO ENIV ESA ER EK EUR EFINECONCS EUMEM EUREM EPA ERNG ENERG ECA ETRC EINVEFIN ETC EAP ECONOMY EINN ECONOMIC EXBS ECUN ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EREL EINVETC ECONCS ETRA EAIG EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH
FR FI FJ FAS FBI FOREIGN FAO FOR FTAA FDA FM FTA FREEDOM FISO FARC FAC FINR FINANCE FOI FMLN FO
GM GG GH GR GT GAERC GA GY GCC GERARD GV GOI GZ GE GANGS GOV GTMO GL GF GAZA GLOBAL GTIP
HR HA HO HK HSTC HILLARY HU HI HURI HUMAN HYMPSK HEBRON HUMOR
IS IZ IR IC IO IN ID IGAD IT ILC IAEA ITU ICAO IMO IBRD IMF ICJ IAHRC ITF INRA INRO IWC IQ IV ICRC ICTY INRB IEFIN ILO ITRA ITALY IBET ISRAELI IL INTELSAT IRC IDP ICTR IRAQI IPR IIP INMARSAT ITPGOV ITALIAN INTERNAL IRS IA INTERPOL IEA INR IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM ISRAEL IACI INDO IDA ISLAMISTS
JO JA JAMES JUS JP JOHNNIE JM JOHN JOSEPH
KSPR KNNP KWBG KAWK KISL KPAO KN KS KIPR KCRM KDEM KIRF KJUS KHLS KSCA KOMC KAWC KV KFRD KWMN KTIP KPWR KSUM KGHG KTIA KTFN KIRC KCOR KACT KMDR KGIC KOLY KUNR KIDE KMPI KPKO KCFE KVPR KRAD KPAL KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTEX KTDB KFSC KZ KSEP KFLU KE KU KPLS KRVC KRIM KSTH KG KFLO KPOA KICC KDDG KPRV KTBT KBCT KSAF KMOC KDRG KBIO KREC KSTC KVRP KBTR KMIG KENV KNSD KCGC KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMM KPRP KNEI KPAI KO KVIR KX KMCA KCRS KMFO KID KCIP KNAR KR KCRCM KBTS KSEO KHDP KFIN KOCI KGIT KNUP KPAONZ KNUC KNNPMNUC KERG KSCI KTLA KHIV KCSY KTRD KMRS KNPP KJUST KCMR KTER KRCM KCFC KSAC KCHG KREL KFTFN KCOM KLIG KDEMAF KAID KGCC KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KRGY KIFR KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KHSA
LE LY LI LO LG LH LU LA LTTE LAB LOG LT LABOR
MPOS MOPS MARR MTCR MNUC MASS MX MCAP MAR MTRE MASC MK MG MTCRE MI MD MA MO MY MU ML MRCRE MAS MEDIA MC MR MIL MW MARAD MAPP MZ MP MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MT MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MDC MEPP MASSMNUC MUCN MQADHAFI
NATO NG NL NZ NT NW NO NU NS NPT NASA NI NK NSG NE NORAD NAFTA NP NATIONAL NSSP NSF NA NGO NV NR NDP NIPP NZUS NH NC NEW NRR NAR NATOPREL NPG NSC NPA NSFO
OPDC OPRC OEXC OTRA ODIP OIIP OVIP OPIC OPCW OAS OREP OSCE OSCI OES OFDP OECD OCS OIC OPAD OVP OHUM OFFICIALS OIE OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA ON OCII
PREL PGOV PARM PINR PTER PHUM PK PREF PM PHSA PA PINS PE PBTS PCI PO PL POGOV PAK PEL PGIV PROP PP PBIO POL POLITICS POLICY PINL PBT PMIL POV PTBS PG POSTS PALESTINIAN PROV PNAT PINF PRL PAS PDOV PRAM PREO PAHO PHUMPGOV PAO PREFA PSI POLITICAL PAIGH PARMS PROG PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PNG PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA PSEPC PNR POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PGOC PY PLN PHUH PF PHUS PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PHUMPREL
QA
RS RU RW REACTION RCMP RSO RO RP ROOD RM ROBERT RICE REGION RSP RF RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL RUPREL RELATIONS RFE REPORT
SY SP SOCI SMIG SNAR SCUL SC SU SO SI SENV SZ SW SA SR SF SEVN SN STEINBERG SEN SG SYR SWE SK SH SNARCS SAARC SNARIZ SPCE SARS SNARN SCRS SYRIA SL SENVKGHG SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SANC SHI SHUM SIPRS
TSPA TSPL TU TBIO TRGY TPHY TS TP TW TBID TI TF TZ TD TT TN TNGD TC TX TH TL TIP THPY TV TK TERRORISM TO TRSY TURKEY TINT TFIN TAGS TR
US UNSC UNGA UK UP UNCHC UN UNMIK UNCSD UY USTR USOAS UNHRC UNFCYP UG UNAUS UNESCO UNIDROIT UNO UV UNHCR USUN UZ USNC UNCHR UNCND UNEP USEU USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE UNDP UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNICEF
VT VE VZ VTPREL VN VTIZ VTEG VM VAT VC VI
WFP WHO WBG WTRO WS WTO WI WB WMD WIPO WZ WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WA WHTI
XA XR XL XK XV XF XM XE XTAG XS XB XU XG XT XX XW XY XZ XH XD XC XQ XI
YI YM YMCS YE
ZI ZO ZP ZR ZK ZF ZU ZL ZOELLICK ZB ZJ ZEALAND ZN ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI8010, MEA FORMULATING "MORE ACTIVE ROLE" IN SRI LANKAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NEWDELHI8010.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05NEWDELHI8010 | 2005-10-14 13:31 | 2011-03-20 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1554090.ece

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008010

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS CE IN
    SUBJECT: MEA FORMULATING "MORE ACTIVE ROLE" IN SRI LANKAN
    PEACE PROCESS

    REF: SECSTATE 178108

    Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

    ¶1.  (C) Summary: The MEA's Deputy Secretary for Sri Lanka Anupam Ray told us that New Delhi is concerned about the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka, and has decided the ""time has come"" for India to start ""taking a higher profile in Sri Lanka.""  The GOI does not, however, wish for a facilitation or mediation role in the conflict, nor does it want to join the Sri Lankan Co-Chairs Group, but it feels pressure from Sri Lankan political parties to look for other ways to make its presence felt.  In contrast, non-GOI Sri Lanka analysts in Delhi were doubtful that India would or should become more involved.  The MEA is reacting to a perceived need to step up its engagement in response to political challenges in Sri Lanka, but has not yet clearly formulated what kind of role it will take.  We will follow up as Indian thinking evolves.  End Summary.

    India Looking for a Higher Profile in Peace Process
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶2.  (C) In a recent meeting to further explore Lakhdar Brahimi's statement (reftel) that India was seeking ""a more active role"" in Sri Lanka, MEA Deputy Secretary Anupam Ray was open about the Foreign Secretary's vision to take a higher profile in the peace process.  Noting that his country shares a two thousand year history with Sri Lanka, Ray lamented that India's Tamil population and close proximity to the conflict means that it can never disengage.  ""Ever since India withdrew its peacekeeping force from Sri Lanka in 1990,"" he reflected, ""political parties there have been demanding for India to provide a guarantee its commitment to the peace process""  Ray opined that the peace process has deteriorated, LTTE leader Prabhakaran is more unpredictable than ever, and Norway has outlived its utility; thus the ""time has come"" for India to reengage.  India would prefer to wait until there is a ""Sinhalese consensus about the outline of a solution,"" but the GOI ""can't wait forever because Prabhakaran wants Tamil Eelam in his lifetime.""

    ¶3.  (C) Regarding India' future role, Ray was most clear that New Delhi ""does not want to mediate or facilitate, just make it presence known.""  India does not want to officially join the Co-chairs, but will take a more active role in the Donor's group.  When asked how the GOI planned to make its presence felt, given its already close defense cooperation with Sri Lanka, Ray predicted that India would begin by making clearer statements against LTTE violence and the need for a consensus on the peace process in the south.  Revealing what may be the true inspiration behind the change in policy, Ray worried that ""if the GOI doesn't get its act together now, it will eventually be dragged into the process when things get worse.""

    Sri Lanka Watchers Don't See Room for Greater GOI Role
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶4.  (U) New Delhi's non-GOI analysts of Sri Lanka uniformly believe that the GOI should not get more involved in the peace process.   P. Sahadevan, an Associate Professor covering Sri Lanka at Jawaharlal Nehru University commented that India's current approach, which he generally described as  supporting Sri Lankan sovereignty and minority rights while allowing military cooperation with the GSL, has paid off with enhanced relations with Colombo.  In his opinion, the ""increasingly pragmatic"" GOI won't want to risk these relations by taking any sort of lead in this ""mess."" Acknowledging that Sinhalese groups such as the SLFP, JVP and UNP view the GOI as anti-LTTE and call for a greater Indian role, Sahadevan does not see any Indian leader who has the political will or capability to involve the government in this conflict.  He also warned against increasing military cooperation with the GSL, which he feared could lead to greater ""chauvinism within the GSL"" and further scuttle the peace process.

    ¶5.  (U) Prabhakaran biographer and Indo-Asian News Service journalist M.R. Narayan Swamy also questioned an Indian role in the peace process.  He explained that political parties in Sri Lanka claim that India has a ""moral duty"" to be part of a solution in light of its past military involvement in the 1980s, and that obligation has grown stronger ""in the last two years, as people in both countries realize the Cease Fire Agreement is not the end of the problem.""  He speculated that FM Kadirgamar's assassination has ""woken up the sleeping elephant,"" and India is unsure how to respond.  He commented that India's clear stand against the LTTE since Rajiv Gandhi's assassination precludes it from ever taking a mediator's role.  ""If India assumes that its involvement will necessarily facilitate a solution, then it is wrong,"" Narayan Swamy concluded emphatically.

    ¶6.  (U) Mohan Tikku, a Senior Fellow studying Sri Lanka at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, also does not foresee a greater role for India in the peace process.  As a result of India's negative experience with the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) and the LTTE's assassination of PM Rajiv Gandhi, the GOI is not an unbiased actor in Sri Lanka.  Therefore, Tikku noted, India has no leverage with the LTTE and should not strive for any type of diplomatic role.  The SLFP, UNP and JVP may want India to become more involved, but Tamil parties are ""deeply suspect"" of New Delhi's intentions. Tamil politics in South India, which have thus far prevented the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Sri Lanka, would make it even more difficult for the GOI to go in on the GSL's side in the conflict.  Tikku worried that any Indian role would be overtly biased against the LTTE, and would give the GSL greater confidence to return to hostilities.

    Norwegians in Delhi Weigh in on India's Involvement
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶7.  (C) Norwegian Charge Lasse Bjorn Johannessen emphasized that India's recent actions have indicated that it does not look to play a more active role in Sri Lanka.  Lasse indicated that there was no formal response to a Norwegian demarche earlier this summer requesting the GOI to ""take on more constructive involvement"" in the conflict.  After being invited to the Co-Chairs meeting along the sidelines of UNGA, India never showed up.  As further proof, he described the difficulties the Norwegian government faced trying to get the GOI on the phone after the Kadirgamar assassination.  He wearily commented that Norway welcomes a greater Indian role, but thus far have seen no indications to this effect.

    Comment:  The Will, But Not The Way
    -----------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) Sri Lanka has reappeared on the GOI list of regional priorities, but the MEA is still in the initial stages of formulating a policy to deal with a strained peace process. India's Free Trade Agreement, defense cooperation and its tsunami assistance to Sri Lanka have yielded its best SIPDIS regional relationship with Colombo.  While some of India's neighbors prefer that New Delhi mind its own business in South Asia, the GOI perceives a genuine need and desire from Sri Lanka for it to become more involved.  As India contemplates its role in Sri Lanka, it must take into consideration the difficulties presented by New Delhi analysts and decide how it can be most helpful to its southern neighbor.  We will closely follow Indian thinking as it evolves.

    ¶9.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)

    BLAKE

`