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### Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO280, LABOR LEADERS DIFFER OVER LULA GOVERNMENT, BUT MOST WORKERS WILL LIKELY SUPPORT HIS RE-ELECTION SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SAOPAULO280 | 2006-03-15 13:28 | 2011-03-05 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo

`

    VZCZCXRO9524
    PP RUEHRG
    DE RUEHSO #0280/01 0741328
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 151328Z MAR 06
    FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4663
    INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 5823
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2769
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6905
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2098
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0207
    RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2449
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1865
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1612
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2648
    RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2323
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SAO PAULO 000280

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND DRL/IL
    NSC FOR SCRONIN
    STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY
    DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
    USDOC FOR 332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWARD
    USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/EOLSON/DDEVITO/DANDERSON STATE PASS EXIMBANK STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONESE, NRIVERA, CMERVENNE DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER

    TAGS: ELAB ECON PGOV SOCI BR

    SUBJECT: LABOR LEADERS DIFFER OVER LULA GOVERNMENT, BUT MOST WORKERS WILL LIKELY SUPPORT HIS RE-ELECTION SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

    ------- SUMMARY -------

    ¶1. (SBU) During his March 6-7 visit to Sao Paulo, Labor Attache met with representatives of three major labor organizations and the ruling Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT), as well as some academics specializing in labor issues. With the exception of representatives of the influential United Workers' Center (CUT), labor leaders expressed concern about workers' economic situation, especially the problem of the large informal economy in which workers are not protected. Some unions were prepared to support President Lula's re-election; others expressed highly negative views of his administration. One eminent labor consultant was pessimistic about the prospects for labor reform. End summary.

    --- CGT ---

    ¶2. (U) Labor Attache (Labatt), accompanied by Sao Paulo Poloff and Econ Assistant, met with General Confederation of Workers (CGT) President Antonio Carlos dos Reis, International Relations Secretary Lourenco Ferreira do Prado, and Secretary general Caninde Pegado. The CGT is the third largest federation of labor unions in Brazil and is close to the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). It is one of six umbrella labor organizations recognized by the Brazilian government, and is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Ferreira began with a brief overview of the CGT's history dating back to the military dictatorship. He stressed the CGT's good relationship with the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, as well as its constructive relations over many years with the United States. Lest there be any misunderstanding, he assured Labatt that "we're not crazy leftists" and that, in fact, the CGT had grown by attracting into its ranks workers and organizations who found the powerful United Workers' Center (CUT - Brazil's principal labor federation, which supports a socialist political ideology and is closely affiliated with President Lula and the PT) to be too far to the left. The CGT is active in the fight against racial discrimination and child labor, and in helping to improve conditions for women and old people.

    ¶3. (SBU) Asked about the CGT's views on the upcoming elections, Reis replied that the Confederation has not yet defined a position. In 2002, the group supported Ciro Gomes, who ran under the banner of the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) in alliance with the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and finished fourth in the first round with 12 percent of the vote. (NOTE: Gomes serves as Minister of National Integration in Lula's government and is considered by some a possible running mate for Lula in this year's election. He was forced to leave the PPS when it broke with the government, and is now a member of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). END NOTE.) The CGT supported Lula in the second round, in which he defeated Jose Serra. Though the CGT has not yet taken a position on any candidate, none of our three interlocutors is inclined to support Lula in this year's election. They believe he has forgotten the workers, and point out that average worker incomes have fallen during his administration. He has created some jobs, but not good jobs, not jobs for skilled workers. Unemployment remains high (over 16 percent, for example, in Sao Paulo city, though at its lowest level in five years). The CGT is involved in programs to try to organize workers in Brazil's large informal sector. The CGT leaders we spoke to strongly oppose Lula's macroeconomic policies, which are a carryover from the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and they believe he has brought more misery and corruption to Brazil.

    SAO PAULO 00000280 002 OF 005

    ¶4. (U) In discussing a list of possible and likely presidential candidates, the three CGT leaders acknowledged that, for the most part, the candidates do not speak for ordinary workers or address their concerns. One who might, they think, is Senator Heloisa Helena of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), which she founded after being expelled from the PT for breaking party discipline. But Helena, while she is expected to run, will be lucky to get five percent of the vote.

    ---------- PT AND CUT ----------

    ¶5. (U) The view was quite different at PT headquarters, where Labatt met with Marlene Rocha, National Secretary for Political Orientation and a member of the National Executive Committee; Ramatis Vacino, adviser to CUT President and PT National Union Secretary Joao Felicio, and Angelo d'Agostini Junior, a CUT leader SIPDIS at the Sao Paulo state level. Rocha outlined the parallel histories of the PT and the CUT, noting that the two organizations were founded four years apart (1980 and 1984), but by many of the same militants, and had grown together in the struggle against the military regime and later in the democratic political system, though there is no formal relation between the two. Polls show the PT has the support of 19 percent of the electorate, she said, down from 23 percent before the political scandal. The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) is second with 14 percent, followed by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) with 7 percent and the Liberal Front Party in fourth place. The rest of the numerous parties will have trouble reaching the five percent threshold required by the so-called "barrier clause" in balloting for federal deputies in order to retain government funding, free TV time, and committee chairs in the Chamber of Deputies. (NOTE: This requirement will be in effect for the first time in the 2006 elections and is expected to lead to the disappearance of many small parties. END NOTE.) Rocha noted that the PDT was once allied with the PT - legendary PDT leader Leonel Brizola was Lula's running mate in one of his unsuccessful presidential campaigns - but they had parted ways after the PT won the presidency. Likewise, the PPS was once part of the PT coalition but is now in opposition.

    ¶6. (U) The PT's main objectives this year are re-electing Lula and registering new members. The party will be conducting a great deal of outreach. The PT-affiliated Perseu Abramo Foundation will organize a series of six seminars between March 24 and the end of May to highlight the party's priorities. The National Directorate will meet March 18-19 to approve position papers in preparation for the PT's "National Encounter" in late April, at which time the party will determine its electoral alliances. Rocha acknowledged that the Lula government had maintained the macroeconomic principles of the 1995-2002 Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, but with different objectives, since Lula was trying to promote growth in order to distribute wealth. Among the materials she handed out was Lula's June 2002 "Letter to the Brazilian People," which, at a critical time in the campaign, reassured voters that Lula would manage the economy responsibly. (NOTE: According to press reports, some senior advisers are urging Lula to issue a new letter to the people as part of his re-election effort. END NOTE.)

    ¶7. (U) The CUT representatives indicated that although they didn't agree with everything the Lula government had done, they were generally satisfied and would support Lula's re-election. They pointed to a newly promulgated law protecting domestic employees as an example of progress on the labor front. Though the CUT had pushed for a higher minimum wage than the government had delivered, and has criticized the government from the left, they indicated they

    SAO PAULO 00000280 003 OF 005

    would work for Lula in the campaign while continuing to press for more labor-friendly policies.

    -------------- FORCA SINDICAL --------------

    ¶8. (U) At Forca Sindical (FS), Labatt met with Secretary General Joao Carlos Goncalves and International Relations Secretary Luis Carlos Motta. Goncalves described Forca Sindical, founded in 1991, as a union of various ideologies in search and defense of democracy, and the application of new ideas to the operation and management of labor unions through open discussions. FS developed out of an ideological conflict among the major labor unions and has grown to be Brazil's second-largest union, comprising 986 workers' entities totaling 8.5 million members. Like the CGT, FS does not discriminate against any ideology or party membership, and its executive committee has adherents to the PSDB, PFL, PL, and other parties across the ideological spectrum. FS has made significant contributions towards changes in the way unions used to operate that prejudiced and suppressed some important worker rights and job security. As the fastest-growing labor organization in Brazil, FS has representation in all 27 Brazilian states, representing millions of workers, principally metalworkers and workers in such other sectors as commerce, transportation, construction, engineering, footwear and clothing, and services. The National Union of Retirees is also affiliated with FS, which works closely with the Solidarity Center, other unions, the government, the private sector and the community at large to promote worker rights, racial equality and social justice.

    ¶9. (U) Looking back over the 15 years since FS was founded, its leaders believe the labor movement has brought important improvements to the quality of life of workers and has made them an active part of wage negotiations. They remain concerned, however, about the economic plight of workers. High interest rates have led to growing unemployment throughout the country. Almost 50 percent of workers are not registered and thus do not enjoy social benefits (minimum wage, health insurance, overtime, pensions, etc.). They work under informal arrangements with employers, outside the reach of labor law. This situation exacerbates inequality and injustice.

    ¶10. (U) FS is prepared to support Lula in his bid for re-election, provided he accepts FS's demands in support of worker rights, labor reform, changes to the current system of industrial relations ("reforma sindical"), which affects collective labor rights, and replacement of the labor tax with a voluntary contribution. The organization will also continue to speak out against high interest rates and lack of investment in areas that can create jobs. Although Lula says his government created 3 million new jobs, FS insists that these jobs are in the informal economy where workers are paid below minimum wage. The FS leaders believe Lula's chances of winning a second term have increased considerably since the launching of Bolsa Familia and the recent economic rebound, and with the political scandal losing impetus. The Bolsa Familia program gives Lula around 15-20 million "captive votes," since impoverished recipients of government handouts are unlikely to vote for someone who might reduce or eliminate the program.

    ---------------------------- EXPERT PESSIMISTIC ON REFORM ----------------------------

    ¶11. (U) Jose Pastore is a consultant, retired professor, and expert on labor issues. He provided Labatt with a status report on labor reform and industrial relations reform. There is a consensus within

    SAO PAULO 00000280 004 OF 005

    the Lula administration and union circles that of the two types of reform to be done, the current system of industrial relations, which affects collective labor rights, needs to be overhauled before individual employment rights are addressed. The former determines what kind of unions should exist, how they should be supported, and what kinds of collective agreements they can enter into. It is upon this framework that individual rights rest. Brazil has a form of attenuated hybrid corporatism, created in the 1930s by the Getulio Vargas regime, that rests on three pillars: monopoly of representation; the obligatory union tax of one day's wage per worker per year (imposto sindical); and the normative power of the labor courts.

    ¶12. (U) The system is cumbersome and outdated. It has survived several regimes, including the military dictatorship, and was slightly modified by the 1988 Constitution which left its main pillars intact. The result has been fragmentation, with thousands of unions in existence. The system is clearly unsuited to contemporary economic and social realities.

    ¶13. (U) Another problem is that 10 percent of the unemployed (approximately 8.5 millon workers) plus the 60 percent of workers in the informal sector combined represent nearly 50 percent of Brazil's total workforce. These workers don't enjoy social, medical and labor benefits, annual leave, insurance protection, or a retirement fund. For these reasons, Professor Pastore believes that reform of the industrial relations system and the labor law urgent, both as a human necessity and as an economic imperative. He was disappointed that Lula didn't push the two reforms through Congress immediately after being inaugurated in 2003, when he had ample Congressional support and broad popular support. Neither initiative will be addressed by the Congress in an election year, because both are controversial and involve reducing somebody's benefits and privileges. However, the existing anachronistic labor structure significantly damages Brazil's global competitiveness. Real wages are smaller than they were ten years ago, but labor costs are high because of benefits paid into several different funds that seldom benefit the worker. In Brazil, these costs are 103 percent of salary, probably the highest in the world. Pastore is concerned that many multinational companies are moving operations to China and other Southeast Asian countries due to high interest rates, the strong real, and labor costs. In addition, companies operating in Brazil are disadvantaged by the "Brazil cost," reflecting the country's critical infrastructure limitations (bottlenecks at ports and airports) and cumbersome bureaucracy.

    ¶13. (U) Pastore does not believe labor reforms will be passed by the new legislature to be seated in 2007 after the elections, because there is a strong lobby in the congress against workers giving up any of their hard-won rights. He further opined that Lula will be re-elected due to his popular, populist programs. However, he asked rhetorically, "Where will he find the funding for these programs if he's elected for four more years?"

    ------- COMMENT -------

    ¶14. (SBU) President Lula was a worker and a labor leader, and many workers and labor leaders like and respect him, and may still identify with him. It is clear, however, that many workers believe that as President he has forgotten them and neglected their interests in favor of more conventional economic policies. We suspect that the CUT representatives might have voiced similar complaints, were they not at PT headquarters in the presence of a PT executive. On the other hand, workers have few alternatives; PSDB pre-candidates Geraldo Alckmin and Jose Serra are unlikely to be

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    viewed by many workers as more labor-friendly than Lula, and while Rio de Janeiro former Governor Anthony Garotinho may have populist appeal, many workers will not take him seriously. Hence, it appears for now that Lula will likely end up with the labor vote, at least in the second round. End comment.

    ¶15. (U) This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.

    MCMULLEN

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