Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12532 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AR ARF AG AORC APER AS AU AJ AM ABLD APCS AID APECO AMGT AFFAIRS AMED AFIN ADANA AEMR AE ADCO AA AECL AADP ACAO ANET AY APEC AORG ASEAN ABUD AINF AFSI AFSN AGR AROC AO AODE AL ACABQ AGMT AORL AX AMEX ATRN ADM AFGHANISTAN AZ ASUP AND ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ ADPM AC ASIG ASCH AGAO ACOA AUC ASEX AIT AMCHAMS AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN ALOW ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ACS
BA BR BU BK BEXP BO BL BM BC BT BRUSSELS BX BIDEN BTIO BG BE BD BY BBSR BB BP BN BILAT BF BH BTIU BWC BMGT
CO CH CA CS CE CASC CU CI CDG CVIS CG CWC CIDA CM CICTE CMGT COUNTER CPAS COUNTRY CJAN CBW CBSA CEUDA CD CAC CODEL CW CBE CHR CT CDC CFED COM CIS CR CKGR CVR CIA CLINTON CY COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CN CARICOM CB CONDOLEEZZA CACS CSW CIC CITT CONS COPUOS CL CARSON CACM CDB CROS CLMT CTR CJUS CF CTM CAN CAPC CV CBC CNARC
DR DA DK DJ DHS DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DE DOMESTIC DOD DOE DS DTRA DEFENSE DO DAO DCM DEAX
ETTC EFIN ECON EAIR EG EINV ETRD ENRG EC EFIS EAGR EUN EAID ELAB ER EPET EMIN EU ECPS EN EWWT ELN EIND ELTN EINT ECA EPA ENGR ETRC EXTERNAL ELECTIONS EZ ECIN EI ENVI ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRN ET EK ES EINVEFIN ERD EUR ETC ENVR EAP ENIV ECONOMY EINN EFTA ECONOMIC EXBS ECUN ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP ENERG EFIM EAIDS EAIG ECONCS EEPET ESA EXIM ENNP ECINECONCS EFINECONCS EUREM ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA ERNG
FI FR FTA FARC FJ FTAA FAC FOREIGN FBI FAO FAS FM FINR FREEDOM FOR FINANCE FOI FMLN FDA FO FISO
GV GG GM GH GOV GOI GL GT GY GAERC GA GF GR GE GZ GAZA GANGS GCC GTIP GERARD GLOBAL GTMO
HR HA HO HU HUMAN HK HILLARY HI HURI HSTC HYMPSK HUMOR HEBRON
IR IC IN IAEA IT IBRD IS ITU ILO IZ ID ICRC IPR ISRAELI IIP ICAO IMO INMARSAT IWC INTERNAL IV INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IO IBET INR ICJ ICTY IRS IA INTERPOL IRAQI IEA INRB IL IMF ITRA ISLAMISTS ITALY IQ IAHRC IZPREL IRAJ IDP ILC IRC IACI IDA ITF IF ISRAEL ICTR IGAD INRA INRO IEFIN INTELSAT
JA JUS JO JM JP JOSEPH JAMES JOHNNIE JOHN
KCRM KJUS KWMN KISL KIRF KDEM KTFN KTIP KFRD KPRV KCOR KNNP KAWC KUNR KGHG KV KIPR KFLU KSTH KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSUM KTIA KTDB KPAO KMPI KZ KMIG KBCT KSCA KN KPKO KPAL KIDE KOMC KS KOLY KU KWBG KPAONZ KNUC KHLS KMDR KE KNNPMNUC KSTC KWAC KERG KACT KSCI KHDP KDRG KVPR KICC KPRP KBIO KFLO KCFE KCIP KTLA KTEX KSEP KHIV KCSY KTRD KID KGIC KRVC KNAR KSPR KMRS KNPP KJUST KMCA KPWR KG KTER KRCM KIRC KR KSEO KNEI KTBT KCFC KSAF KSAC KCHG KAWK KGCC KPLS KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KVRP KBTR KCOM KO KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KOCI KAID KNSD KGIT KFSC KWMM KPAI KICA KHUM KREC KRIM KSEC KCMR KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KOM KRGY KPOA KBTS KHSA KMOC KCRS KVIR KX KWWMN KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KDDG KIFR KFIN KOMS KCRCM KNUP
LE LY LI LG LH LTTE LU LO LAB LOG LA LT LABOR
MARR MU MOPS MNUC MO MASS MCAP MX MY MZ MUCN MTCRE MIL ML MEDIA MPOS MA MP MERCOSUR MG MR MI MD MK MOPPS MASC MTS MLS MILI MAR MEPN MAPP MTCR MEPI MEETINGS MW MAS MRCRE MT MCC MIK MAPS MARAD MDC MQADHAFI MTRE MV MEPP MILITARY MASSMNUC MC
NZ NL NATO NO NI NU NS NASA NAFTA NP NDP NIPP NPT NG NEW NE NSF NZUS NR NH NA NSG NC NRR NATIONAL NT NGO NSC NPA NV NK NAR NORAD NSSP NATOPREL NW NPG NSFO
OVIP OPDC OTRA OREP OAS OPRC OPIC OECD OPCW OFDP OIIP OEXC ODIP OSCE OBSP OSCI OIE OTR OMIG OSAC OFFICIALS ON OFDA OES OVP OCII OHUM OPAD OIC OCS
PREL PGOV PHUM PINR PTER PARM PREF PK PINS PMIL PA PE PHSA PM PROP PALESTINIAN PBTS PARMS POL PO PROG PL PAK POLITICS PBIO PTBS POLICY PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PTERE PRGOV PORG PP PS PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PINF PNG PFOR PUNE PDOV PGOVLO PAO PHUMBA PSEPC PCUL PNAT PREO PLN PNR POLINT PRL PGOC POGOV PU PF PY PGOVE PG PCI PINL POV PAHO PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PAS PHUMPREL PGIV PRAM PHUH PSA PHUMPGOV PEL PSI PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS
QA
RU RS RP REACTION REPORT RIGHTS RO RCMP RW RM REGION RSP RF RICE RFE RUPREL ROOD RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS RSO
SNAR SOCI SZ SENV SU SA SCUL SP SMIG SW SO SY SL SENVKGHG SR SF SYRIA SI SWE SARS SC SAN SN STEINBERG SG ST SPCE SIPDIS SYR SNARIZ SNARN SSA SHI SK SPCVIS SOFA SEVN SIPRS SNARCS SAARC SHUM SANC SEN SH SCRS
TRGY TBIO TU TS TSPA TSPL TT TPHY TK TI TERRORISM TH TIP TC TZ TNGD TW THPY TL TV TX TO TRSY TINT TN TURKEY TBID TD TF TFIN TP TAGS TR
UV UK UNGA US UY USTR UNSC UN UNHRC UP UG USUN UNEP UNESCO USPS UZ USEU UNCHR USAID UNMIK UNHCR UE UNVIE UAE UNO USOAS UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNDP UNAUS UNPUOS UNC UNCND UNICEF UNCSD UNDC USNC
VT VE VZ VTPREL VI VM VN VTIZ VAT VC VTEG
WTO WTRO WS WTRQ WI WZ WHO WWARD WBG WB WHA WITH WMD WIPO WMO WFP WHTI WEU WA
XG XT XZ XM XR XA XY XX XF XL XW XV XB XU XS XH XK XD XI XC XE XQ XTAG
YM YI YE YMCS
ZR ZB ZI ZU ZJ ZEALAND ZK ZF ZP ZN ZL ZA ZANU ZO ZOELLICK

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05MUMBAI1708, GUJARAT: WILY MODI WEAKENS HIS OPPONENTS AND POSITIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MUMBAI1708.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05MUMBAI1708 | 2005-08-10 11:16 | 2011-03-22 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Mumbai
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1559555.ece

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 001708

    SIPDIS

    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KIRF PINR CVIS IN

    SUBJECT: GUJARAT: WILY MODI WEAKENS HIS OPPONENTS AND POSITIONS
    HIMSELF FOR BIGGER THINGS

    REF: A) Mumbai 876;  B) Mumbai 1303

    Summary and Comment -------------------

    ¶1.  (C) On August 1, controversial Gujarat BJP Chief Minister Narendra Modi (whose visa we revoked for his role in the 2002 Gujarat Hindu-Muslim riots) expanded his cabinet by inducting 11 new ministers.  In doing so, Modi met a long-standing demand of the rebels within his own party who had openly criticized him for not sharing power more broadly.  A closer look at the timing of the expansion and the allocation of the portfolios, however, leads most of our contacts to argue that Modi actually ingeniously weakened his critics by only appearing to devolve some power to them, and by securing pledges of loyalty. Following the cabinet expansion, many rebels all but conceded defeat in their long drawn-out battle for power with Modi, whose star is rising in national BJP politics.  Modi's move also demonstrates that caste-based politics remain alive in Gujarat. The chief minister, himself from a small, economically weak caste group, used the expansion to weaken the position of the long dominant Patel caste to the advantage of what are categorized by the government as Other Backward Castes (OBCs). Modi's latest actions may alienate both the better-off, urban middle classes that have supported him until now as well as the hard-line Hindu VHP, which used the swearing-in ceremony to rebuke Modi publicly.  On balance, however, it appears that Modi has solidified his power in Gujarat and that the rebellion of his fellow BJP politicians could likely flicker out.  Modi is using his strong base in Gujarat to position himself for the BJP power struggle and to crow about Gujarat's investment-friendly (but certainly not minority-friendly) record.  End summary and comment.

    Modi Shares Power With His Critics...
    -------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C) In late March, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) national president Lal Krishan Advani directed Modi to expand his cabinet after BJP parliamentarians openly criticized the chief minister's autocratic leadership style (ref A).  Modi consented under the condition that the BJP appoint a state party president loyal to him.  In early June, Advani kept his part of the bargain when the BJP appointed Vajubhai Vala as Gujarat BJP president (ref B).  Vala is widely seen as pro-Modi.

    ¶3. (C) On August 1, Modi finally expanded his cabinet by swearing in 11 new ministers.  The cabinet, which had far fewer ministers than allowed under Indian law, expanded to 26 as a result. Opinions differ among our Gujarat contacts as to whether or not the cabinet expansion is truly a sign that Modi is finally prepared to share power with the rebels, whose opposition to the chief minister was founded primarily on questions of power and personality and less on any political or ideological differences.  The new ministers were drawn in nearly equal numbers from the rebel faction, from Modi's supporters, and from so-called fence sitters that are neither Modi's supporters nor opponents.

    ...And Weakens Them in the Process
    ----------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Many contacts, including journalists Anosh Malekar and Uday Mahurkar as well as BJP official Pankaj Mudholkar, told us that none of the new ministers will have any significant policy-making clout or sizable budgets that can be diverted for political patronage.  The newcomers received departments such as woman and child welfare, employment guarantee and fisheries. The CM and his core supporters still control the most important portfolios, such as Home, Finance, Industry, Irrigation and Rural Development.

    ¶5. (C) Mudholkar and Mahurkar said that Modi has ingeniously strengthened his position while weakening that of his opponents by superficially devolving some power to them.  Modi timed the expansion of the cabinet to take advantage of the absence of the leader of the rebels, former Gujarat chief minister Keshubhai Patel.  Patel is currently in the U.S., where his wife is undergoing medical treatment.  Modi reportedly focused on two influential Patel supporters and enticed them to join his cabinet under conditions that Patel himself would probably never have supported.  Modi also offered selective cabinet postings to rebels and fence sitters who he knew could be easily co-opted. ""The rebels are weakening,"" journalist Malekar told us.  ""The so-called opponents inducted in the cabinet have also actually assured Modi of their loyalty.""  Bimal Shah, an outspoken rebel parliamentarian who had hoped to get a cabinet posting, concurred.  He said the rebels realized that the central BJP leadership is firmly with Modi, while rebel leader Patel is old and weakening.  Shah conceded to us that he and several other key rebels had decided it is in their own best interests to make peace with Modi.

    Caste Politics Still Alive in Gujarat
    -------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Modi also appears to be using the cabinet expansion to change the power equation among castes in Gujarat.  The Patel caste had long dominated Gujarat state politics, even before Modi became chief minister in 2001.  The Patel caste has given Gujaratis the image of being a hardworking, businesslike and pragmatic people.  Tensions between the sizeable, landowning and better-off Patel caste and economically weak castes with the statutory definition ""Other Backward Castes"" (OBC) have long simmered in Gujarat's politics.  Modi belongs to a small and economically weak OBC group.  The Patel hold on state politics began to weaken when the BJP central leadership replaced chief minister and current rebel leader Keshubhai Patel, a figurehead of the caste, with Modi in 2001.  Our contacts tell us nine of the 11 new cabinet members are from the OBC grouping.  They are also drawn evenly from all regions of Gujarat.  Having effectively manipulated religious strife to strengthen his power base during and after the 2002 riots in Gujarat, Modi is now using caste/class resentments within Hinduism to tighten his grip, many of our contacts believe.

    ¶7. (C) Some of our contacts see Modi's move to change the caste equation as a masterful stroke.  Others warn that he might be creating future troubles for himself, as his move might alienate many of the wealthier business interests that have supported him in the past.

    Are Troubles Brewing with the VHP?
    ----------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Modi may also be facing new troubles from the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).  One parliamentarian close to the VHP, Ahmedabad-based Govardhran Zhadapia, used the cabinet-induction ceremony to openly refuse the cabinet posting that Modi had offered him.  Zhadapia said he refused the cabinet seat to protest what he called Modi's non-democratic ways.  Ironically, the VHP worked hard for Modi's election in the 2002 state elections.  In particular, the VHP had been instrumental in reaching out to urban, higher-caste Hindus, many of whom were not predisposed to supporting a lower-caste figure like Modi. Zhadapia's open affront now to Modi is seen as the VHP's shot across his bow. The VHP is reportedly angry that Modi has not sufficiently acknowledged the group's role in his election, but caste/class tensions may also factor in their thinking.  Most of our contacts do not expect an open break between Modi and the VHP, however, since they are so closely ideologically linked. At the very least, we have heard, the VHP may not work as whole-heartedly for the BJP in the civic elections scheduled for Ahmedabad and other cities in 2006.  (Comment:  We find this doubtful, however, as ideological birds of a feather should flock together.  End comment.)

    ¶9. (C) Our sources, including journalist Mahurkar, tell us the chief minister further alienated urban middle class Hindu voters by granting a cabinet post to a shady and controversial OBC leader named Purushottam Solanki, who is wanted by the Mumbai police in various extortion cases.  Several Modi supporters expressed their disappointment, arguing that the appointment of Solanki was undermining the clean, non-corrupt, no-nonsense image that made Modi attractive to many voters from castes far higher than his own.  Journalist Mahurkar, an otherwise strong backer of Modi, told us that the parliamentary opposition to the chief minister may grow significantly in the coming weeks because of disappointment over Modi's choice of appointments like Solanki.

    Eyes on The National Stage
    --------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Despite the shenanigans in Gujarat local politics, it is clear Modi has his eyes on bigger things.  His governing style has its appeal among a nationwide set of conservative Hindus, and that could translate into growing power in the national BJP.  Moreover, in a BJP beset by internal struggles, Modi's revival sets him up nicely to influence the king making when the time comes.  Having recovered from the crisis invoked by our visa revocation and his tyrannical management style, Modi is positioning himself as a national leader by reminding people that Gujarat has done a fine job of economic governance, notwithstanding the black stain the riots left.  When the Gurgaon riots broke out in Congress-ruled Haryana, Modi published full-page ads in the major national broadsheets to remind voters everywhere that Gujarat had model labor relations, sound macroeconomic policies, terrific infrastructure, and responsible local government.  Modi's face and name were prominent in these costly pokes in the Congress' eye.  Moreover, Modi can crow to the nation that the respected newsmagazine ""India Today"" just named Gujarat among the best-run states in the union, an accomplishment for which Modi can be justifiably proud.  These developments mean that Modi can try to develop a national ""brand image"" that speaks of good government and sound economics instead of the riots and hatred for which he is still best known.

    Comment: A Force to be Reckoned With
    ------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) We agree that power sharing has weakened the rebels, who appear to have accepted the reality that they are not strong enough to topple Modi.  Modi's caste-based machinations, and his run-in with the VHP, could pose new threats to him in the future, but his popularity within the BJP and in Gujarat should blunt short-term VHP ire.  At present, Modi appears stronger than at any time since the rebels took their opposition to him public, and he is using that strength to position himself within the national BJP and, by extension, on the national stage. End comment.

    CHEATHAM

`