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### Viewing cable 08WELLINGTON392, NEW ZEALAND - HOSTED PSI EXERCISE MARU

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08WELLINGTON392 | 2008-11-19 04:44 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Wellington

`

    VZCZCXRO4316
    RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB
    DE RUEHWL #0392/01 3240444
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 190444Z NOV 08
    FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5548
    INFO RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 1800
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5330
    RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0764
    RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
    RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
    RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
    RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
    RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RHFJUSC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
    RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000392

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EAP/ANP, PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: MARR PREL PTER NZ
    SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND - HOSTED PSI EXERCISE MARU

    WELLINGTON 00000392  001.2 OF 004

    ¶1. (U) Summary:  In September 2008, the United
    States participated in the New Zealand-hosted
    Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise,
    MARU, in the Hauraki Gulf and the port of Auckland,
    New Zealand.  MARU was the thirty-sixth PSI exercise
    since the inception of the initiative in 2003.  The
    exercise included the participation of Asia-Pacific
    nations and many global PSI partners.  MARU was
    unique among PSI exercises in that it incorporated
    live exercise play into a table top exercise
    focusing on post-interdiction disposition issues.
    Additionally, MARU had a strong customs and law
    enforcement focus, with military support
    highlighting the interagency nature of PSI
    activities.  Plenary sessions allowed discussion of
    issues such as legal standards for action, and
    intelligence sharing, by representatives of the 29
    countries present.  End summary.

    ¶2. (U) From September 13-19 2008, the New Zealand
    Customs Service (NZCS) hosted the Proliferation
    Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise MARU in Auckland.
    The 31-member USG delegation included
    representatives from several parts of the Department
    of Defense, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (ICE), the FBI, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
    the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S.
    European Command (EUCOM), the U.S. Seventh Fleet,
    and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).  Consulate General
    Auckland also played an active role, with the
    Consular Chief acting as a group leader for plenary
    discussions, and the Ambassador paying a visit to
    the U.S. delegation's task force workroom.
    Including the United States, there were eight
    countries participating in the exercise, eleven
    countries observing which have formally endorsed the
    PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and ten
    countries observing which have not endorsed these
    PSI principles.

    --------------------------------
    Exercise MARU Overview and Goals
    --------------------------------

    ¶3. (U) Exercise MARU consisted of several phases,
    including live exercises (LIVEX) dealing with
    maritime interception and interdiction, LIVEX port
    search demonstrations, and a tabletop exercise (TTX)
    gaming phase exploring post-interdiction disposition
    issues.  The exercise also included substantial
    outreach efforts to the attending non-endorsee
    delegations and an industry workshop dealing with
    trade security.  Objectives for the exercise
    included:

    - To demonstrate the law enforcement approach of
    PSI, which includes the interdiction, investigation
    and prosecution of proliferators attempting to
    circumvent domestic and international laws.

    - To give PSI partner countries an opportunity to
    participate in a maritime interdiction operation
    involving interception (location), surveillance
    (tracking), and interdiction (ship-boarding).

    - To advance understanding of issues related to
    interdiction, flag state consent, diversion,
    liability, proliferation network investigation, and
    the gathering of evidence to support prosecution.

    - To raise the profile of weapons of mass

    WELLINGTON 00000392  002.2 OF 004

    destruction (WMD) proliferation issues in the Asia-
    Pacific region and to enable non-PSI states to
    understand better the initiative and its
    contributions to nonproliferation.

    - To advance industry engagement and technical
    outreach regarding PSI.

    - To advance understanding of information and
    intelligence sharing at national and international
    levels.

    ¶4. The exercise was the first of its kind in several
    respects, including that it was the first PSI
    exercise to include TTX game play that dealt
    primarily with the decision-making process after the
    interdiction of a shipment of proliferation concern.

    --------------------------------------------- -------
    The Live Exercise and its Corresponding TTX Scenario
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶5. (SBU) MARU followed a general scenario designed
    to test the exercise objectives, using the transfer
    of proliferation-related dual use materials between
    two countries of concern (RED and GREEN) as the core
    of its storyline.  Intelligence and information
    gathered by the participating countries indicated
    that COUNTRY GREEN was attempting to procure
    materials, equipment, and technology necessary for
    its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs
    from COUNTRY RED.  To avoid detection of the
    transfer of these goods (which would be in violation
    of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    against the two countries), the WMD components were
    transported by an indirect route, transshipping
    through several countries, and repackaged in new
    containers to mask the origin and final destination.
    The materials included Missile Technology Control
    Regime-controlled aluminum powder, metal sheets and
    ball bearings, as well as various hazardous
    chemicals.  In addition to trying to conceal the
    transfer of materials by a circuitous route, the
    materials had also been given false end-users and
    had been improperly manifested.

    ¶6. (SBU) In the scenario, the materials had been
    sent in four identified containers from COUNTRY
    RED's procurement network in Asia to Singapore by
    the vessel Redstar.  Following this, three of the
    containers were loaded on the vessel MV Seabreeze,
    destined for transit through the Port of Tauranga in
    New Zealand next, before being transshipped once
    again to ports in Europe, from which the
    proliferation network of COUNTRY GREEN would then
    again re-route the cargo to GREEN.  However,
    intelligence and information gathered from several
    countries determined while the shipments aboard the
    Seabreeze were in transit that it would be necessary
    to locate, track, and board the vessel.  A decision
    was also made within the scenario that it would be
    necessary to divert the Seabreeze to the Port of
    Auckland rather than allow it to continue to
    Tauranga.  The corresponding live and tabletop
    exercises explored: the operational capabilities to
    perform these actions; the necessary international
    cooperation and information sharing involved; the
    ramifications for this type of interdiction
    including the ability to conduct a criminal case
    against the involved parties; further investigation
    of the proliferation network; and the costs of
    interdiction, including which parties would be
    liable for these costs.

    WELLINGTON 00000392  003.2 OF 004

    ---------------------
    The Tabletop Exercise
    ---------------------

    ¶7. (SBU) In the weeks prior to Exercise MARU, and
    continuing through the LIVEX, participant countries
    (with the exception of France) were involved in a
    table-top game which built further upon the
    activities being demonstrated in the live exercising
    phases.

    ¶8. (SBU) Before the exercise, participant countries
    received scenario "injects" with information and
    intelligence related to the COUNTRY RED and COUNTRY
    GREEN proliferation networks, including intelligence
    on the transfer of shipments and associated
    individuals and front companies connected to the
    networks.  The injects contained information limited
    to only certain countries, forcing participant
    administrations to determine if they wish to share
    the intelligence further with other countries based
    on its potential sensitivity.  The injects continued
    on September 15, 16, and 17 as the LIVEX was going
    on, and reflected a series of situation updates
    based on actions occurring within the LIVEX about
    the shipment of the three suspect containers aboard
    the MV Seabreeze, and also occurring with a fourth
    container identified already in New Zealand. This
    latter container was held and intended for export by
    the New Zealand-based front company (SCIFO Ltd NZ)
    associated with the other three inbound suspect
    containers (and was likely the fourth container from
    the Redstar, illegally transited to NZ with its
    origin hidden).  This fourth container was inspected
    and determined to contain controlled dual-use
    strategic goods including radial ball bearings and
    stainless steel sheets, which were not properly
    licensed for export.

    ¶9. (SBU) During the tabletop exercise, the seven
    participating countries manned country-room
    operations centers, and communicated with one
    another and with the Exercise MARU Ops Center by
    computer message and occasional interpersonal
    interplay.  The focus throughout the game play was
    to gain sufficient information from other playing
    countries to build as strong a case as possible
    against the proliferation network involved in the
    illicit movement of the WMD-related materials.  In
    this effort, the exercise players dealt with and
    shared potentially sensitive intelligence which
    might well not be obtained, or released in court, in
    the real world.

    ---------------------------
    Plenary Session Discussions
    ---------------------------

    ¶10. (SBU) Throughout the week of the exercise,
    additional activities enriched the experience of all
    countries involved, participating and observing
    states alike.  An example was an industry workshop
    dealing with trade security.  Perhaps of most use
    overall were the plenary sessions held in the last
    two days, which discussed independently issues that
    the countries participating in the TTX were dealing
    with, and which finally served as a summation of the
    whole week's activity.  Some of these central
    questions were:

    -What domestic and international authorities do
    governments have to divert, board, and search a

    WELLINGTON 00000392  004.2 OF 004

    vessel?
    -What domestic and international legal authorities
    do governments have to detain goods and claim
    jurisdiction?
    -What evidence are countries properly relying on to
    divert, board, search, and detain goods, and how can
    countries address the issues of information
    classification and intelligence sharing?
    -What information can or should be shared with the
    media through the investigative process?

    Participant countries played the strongest role in
    attempting to answer these questions, explaining
    their respective decision-making process, and the
    various laws and authorities used within that
    process.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶11. (SBU) By all accounts, Exercise MARU was a
    resounding success.  The Ambassador and the Acting
    Consul General in Auckland visited the virtual U.S.
    Ops Center, and were impressed with the complexity
    of the exercise and the quality of the U.S.
    involvement.  The field visits to New Zealand
    military installations, and especially the at-sea
    boarding exercises, contributed a strong sense of
    immediacy.  But the tabletop exercise was the major
    revelation, as it brought to focus the very real
    issues that would have to be confronted while states
    were trying to balance combating the threats of
    today's world with maintaining the legal norms that
    make our societies worth preserving.  There was a
    tremendous spirit of collegiality among the several
    hundred people assembled, which spoke well of what
    they had accomplished together, and what these
    continuing efforts could accomplish still.

    MCCORMICK

`