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### Viewing cable 09QUITO15, WHITHER CORREA: A SHIFT FURTHER LEFT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09QUITO15 | 2009-01-14 00:18 | 2011-04-13 17:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Quito
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/12/1/1355/cable-186986.html

`

    VZCZCXYZ0008
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHQT #0015/01 0140018
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH(CCY AD1B8B49 MSI7873-695)
    O 140018Z JAN 09 ZDS
    FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9851
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7912
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4066
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3335
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 2976
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0155
    RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4021
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0041
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0025
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171

` `

    id: 186986
    date: 1/14/2009 0:18
    refid: 09QUITO15
    origin: Embassy Quito
    classification: SECRET//NOFORN
    destination: 08QUITO1047|08QUITO1115|08QUITO1128|08QUITO1145|08QUITO1146|08QUITO1162|08QUITO327|08QUITO442|08QUITO723|08QUITO963|09QUITO1|09QUITO10
    header:
    VZCZCXYZ0008
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHQT #0015/01 0140018
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH(CCY AD1B8B49 MSI7873-695)
    O 140018Z JAN 09 ZDS
    FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9851
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7912
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4066
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3335
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 2976
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0155
    RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4021
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0041
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0025
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    S E C R E T QUITO 000015

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (CHANGE IN CLASSIFICATION)

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2034
    TAGS: PREL EFIN PGOV SNAR MARR EAID EC VE CU IR
    RS, CO
    SUBJECT: WHITHER CORREA: A SHIFT FURTHER LEFT

    REF: A. QUITO 10
         ¶B. 08 QUITO 963
         ¶C. 08 QUITO 1115
         ¶D. 08 QUITO 1145
         ¶E. 08 QUITO 1146
         ¶F. 08 QUITO 1162
         ¶G. 08 QUITO 1128
         ¶H. QUITO 01
         ¶I. 08 QUITO 327
         ¶J. 08 QUITO 442
         ¶K. 08 QUITO 723
         ¶L. 08 QUITO 1047

    Classified By: Ambassador Heather Hodges for reason 1.4 (D)

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  President Correa's rhetoric and actions in
    the last two months have veered off the pattern we witnessed
    during much of his earlier presidency.  A harder left
    orientation is evidenced by his trips to Iran and Cuba, debt
    default, and sharp attacks on the U.S.  In the past, while
    conceding enough to keep his far-left political bases happy,
    he acted pragmatically more often than not, and aside from
    the aftermath of the March 1 Colombian incursion only
    occasionally criticized the U.S.  The reasons behind this
    shift remain murky.  We are advising the GOE of the
    consequences of its actions (Ref A).  End Summary.

    LURCH TO THE LEFT

    ¶2.  (C) Over the past two months, Correa has taken an
    increasingly leftist, anti-American posture, apparently
    unconcerned that his actions would result in frayed ties with
    the United States:

    -- Last week in Havana, Correa demanded that the "Empire" end
    its blockade (sic) of Cuba, calling U.S. policy absurd.  He
    accused the "Empire" of ethnocide (apparently meaning
    destruction of a people's culture) and criticized the
    "perverse injustice" inflicted upon the five Cuban spies
    imprisoned in the U.S.  Correa declared himself an
    unconditional ally of Cuba.  He commended the Cuban
    revolution's achievements, claiming it had succeeded in
    ensuring human rights for all Cubans.  He called for an
    Organization of Latin American States that would include Cuba
    and exclude the U.S.  Ecuador and Cuba signed nine
    cooperation agreements in the areas of science and
    technology, health, education, and culture, among others.

    -- Correa closed out 2008 by inviting the ambassadors of
    Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Iran, China and Russia for a
    December 30 New Year's luncheon, a slap in the face for the
    rest of the diplomatic corps.

    -- The President's office continued to defer the Ambassador's
    request for a meeting, which Correa had agreed to when she
    presented credentials on October 2 (Ref B).  Two close
    presidential advisors promised to arrange such a meeting for
    December (Ref C), but it has still not transpired.

    -- Changes at the Foreign Ministry are expected to make it
    more ideological.  Correa appointed Proud and Sovereign
    Fatherland (PAIS) movement co-founder Fander Falconi as
    Foreign Minister December 15 (Ref D), saying the Government
    had been naive to focus on commercial and not geopolitical
    matters.  The Legislative Commission is likely to approve an
    Executive-proposed bill that would allow political appointees
    below the ministerial level in the MFA, including as Vice
    Minister, Under Secretaries, and Directors General.  Correa
    defended this move, "We want to politicize the foreign
    service in the positive sense, meaning that it reflect the
    foreign policy of a democratically-elected government."

    -- Correa decided to default on part of the country's
    commercial debt on December 13 (Ref E).

    -- During his December 5-9 trip to Iran, Correa railed
    against U.S. imperialism and condemned IAEA and UN Security
    Council policies and resolutions related to Iran (Ref F).  He
    has approved Iran establishing a fully accredited Iranian
    embassy in Quito.
    -- The GOE welcomed Russian FM Lavrov on November 27,
    discussing trade and military cooperation.

    -- Correa aligned Ecuador more closely with the Bolivarian
    Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) by attending its meeting
    in Venezuela on November 26, although still without becoming
    a full member.  He sought and obtained the group's support
    for Ecuador's position on foreign debt.  (In parallel, he
    also sought support from more moderate governments in the
    region.)
    ¶3.  (C) We see only a few items on the positive side of the
    ledger in the past two months.  The most notable was that
    Ecuador hosted a cordial and constructive first Bilateral
    Dialogue meeting on November 24 (Ref G).  In addition, the
    MFA responded positively on December 30 to our diplomatic
    note on Military Group activities during 2009.  In regard to
    U.S. investment, the GOE paid an arbitral award to Duke
    Energy on December 16 (Ref H) and is close to making payment
    to Machala Power, in which case Machala Power would lift its
    arbitration case (septel).  Although not a new development,
    it is also worth noting that USAID, DEA and most other USG
    programs continue unimpeded.

    AN EARLIER ROUND OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

    ¶4.  (C) The U.S. first moved into Correa's crosshairs after
    Washington defended Colombia's March 1, 2008 incursion into
    Ecuador, which prompted Correa to allege participation by the
    United States and make his first call for an Organization of
    Latin American States.  The low point of the period was in
    early April 2008 when Correa charged that the CIA had taken
    over Ecuadorian intelligence services and suggested the CIA
    might be out to kill him (Ref I).

    ¶5.  (S/NF) During the summer and early fall of 2008, the
    GOE's actions were mixed, giving us hope that the fallout
    from the Colombian incursion did not signal a permanent shift
    further to the left and against the U.S.  Among the
    encouraging developments was that Correa largely retreated
    from harshly criticizing us; his Saturday radio addresses
    from June to August 2008 contained more positive or neutral
    references to the U.S. than negative ones.  He allowed
    bilateral cooperation to continue in all areas except
    intelligence.  Correa accepted USAID's recommendation on ten
    economic sectors to target for investment (Ref J).  He
    instructed FM Salvador to sign the Letter of Agreement with
    the U.S. on Narcotics Affairs Section programs.
    (Unfortunately, the GOE did not notify us of its decision by
    September 30, and we are still waiting for the funding to be
    reassigned back to us.)  In this context, we were willing to
    accept that the two-month delay in Correa receiving the
    Ambassador's credentials was due to his hectic campaign
    schedule; at least she was able to present them to the
    President, rather than being asked to present credentials to
    the Vice President as many other Ambassadors had.

    ¶6.  (C) There were a couple of worrisome events during the
    summer and early fall as well.  Although Correa's intent was
    clear, we were surprised by the undiplomatic delivery of the
    diplomatic note informing us that Ecuador would not renew the
    Forward Operating Location agreement when it expired (Ref K),
    and FM Salvador's anti-U.S. comments at the Non-Aligned
    Movement meeting in Tehran.  The GOE's intelligence
    commission report, released on October 30, called the March 1
    Colombian action a joint operation with the United States and
    repeated allegations about involvement by a FOL plane (Ref L).

    THE CORREA WE THOUGHT WE KNEW

    ¶7.  (C) What we hoped for during the summer and early fall of
    2008 was the return of the pattern we witnessed during
    Correa's first year in office.  In 2007, Correa's government
    had continued ) and even improved ) bilateral cooperation
    (asking only for tweaks in the exchange of diplomatic notes
    on Military Group activities to show greater respect for
    Ecuadorian sovereignty).  His actions were generally
    pragmatic that year, such as paying the debt.  Although he
    occasionally took a swipe at us (e.g., when TSA searched him
    at Miami Airport), Correa did not use the U.S. as his regular
    whipping boy, instead lashing out against the traditional
    domestic political parties, bankers and other economic elite,
    and the media.

    ¶8.  (C) In the foreign policy arena, while Correa clearly
    wished to reduce dependence on the U.S., he appeared during
    his first year in office to want to cultivate good relations
    with countries across the political spectrum.  He accepted
    the assistance Venezuela offered, but chose not to join ALBA
    at that time.  When Iran pressed to open embassies in 2007,
    he decided on commercial offices.  And he repeatedly put off
    trips to Cuba.

    DECIPHERING THE UNDECIPHERABLE

    ¶9.  (C) We attribute Correa's more radical shift to a
    combination of some or all of the following, although their
    relative weight is difficult to gauge:

    -- The Iran and Cuba trips and rhetoric, together with the
    debt default, may be aimed at countering criticism from far
    left elites and undercutting prospects for a more radical
    presidential candidate (e.g., former Constituent Assembly
    president Alberto Acosta).

    -- The debt default decision plays to the electorate since it
    strikes a chord still raw from the late 1990s banking crisis.
     (In contrast, the Iran and Cuba trips mean little to the
    large majority of voters who just want a meal on the table
    and a roof over their heads.)

    -- Correa may have been emboldened when almost 64% of the
    electorate approved the country's new constitution on
    September 28, 2008.

    -- He remains angry at the Colombian government, which he
    sees as a puppet of the U.S.

    -- Correa blames the U.S. for its role in the global
    financial crisis.

    -- He seems to be marginalizing his moderate advisors.

    -- Correa may have decided to throw in his lot with Chavez
    and other anti-American populists.  Former Vice FM Jose
    Valencia explained Correa's behavior to us on December 22 as
    gravitating toward Chavez's orbit.

    WILL THE REAL CORREA PLEASE STAND UP

    ¶10.  (C) COMMENT:  Only time will tell whether Correa's
    behavior in recent months shows his true colors.  Some
    analysts suggest we will not know for sure until after the
    April 26 election when the composition of the National
    Assembly may push him in one direction or another.  In the
    meantime, we are conveying the message in private that
    Correa's actions will have consequences for his relationship
    with the new Obama Administration, while avoiding public
    comments that would be counterproductive.  We do not
    recommend terminating any USG programs that serve our
    interests since that would only weaken the incentive for
    Correa to move back into a more pragmatic mode.  However, we
    cut off support for a Department of Homeland
    Security/Immigration and Customs Enforcement vetted unit when
    the Police Commander insisted on a new leader who was not
    subject to polygraphing, which is required for all vetted
    unit personnel.  We will do the same if any of our other
    programs lose integrity.
    HODGES

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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