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### Viewing cable 09SANJOSE517, COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANJOSE517 | 2009-06-22 18:43 | 2011-03-08 16:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2702320.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2702324.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702325.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702326.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702327.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0007
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0517/01 1731843
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 221843Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0952
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000517

    SIPDIS
    SENSITIVE

    DEPT FOR S/CT Hillary Batjer Johnson and Paul Schultz; NCTC; DHS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV CVIS ASEC KHLS
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION
             COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING

    REF: STATE 322287

    ¶1. (SBU) As requested reftel, the following are Post's responses to
    questions on Costa Rica's government practices on information
    collection, screening and sharing.  Responses, cleared by all
    relevant Embassy sections, are keyed to reftel's questions:

    5A. IMMIGRATION DATA BASES AND TRAVELER INFORMATION COLLECTION:

    -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries
    and exits?  Costa Rican Immigration's (CRI) database is called POWER
    BUILDER and is based on SYBASE.  Their servers are from SUN
    Microsystems and the operating system is SOLARIS (latest version).
    CRI tracks all entries and exits by name, document number, departure
    point and destination.  However, the most reliable port of entry
    where this occurs is Juan Santamaria international airport in San
    Jose.

    -- Is the computerized immigration database available at all ports
    of entry (POEs)? Yes, but see above.

    -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems?
    For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary
    restraints, corruption, etc.? Although entries/exits at the major
    international airports are fairly well tracked, land and sea borders
    are porous; many entries and exits there go undetected.

    -- How often are national immigration databases updated?  On an "as
    needed" basis.

    -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on
    collecting information from travelers arriving in the country?
    Costa Rica is a part of theComisisn Centroamericana de Directores de
    Migracisn Central American Commission of Migration (OCAM ), which
    since the 1990s has made obligatory the use of a standard format for
    collecting information from travelers.  This standard is the entry
    and exit card or Tarjeta de Ingreso y Egreso (TIE), which is
    applicable to all Central American countries.  Article 31 of
    Immigration Law 8487 (2005) establishes that each person intending
    to enter or exit the country must present the card at the migration
    entry point; Article 144 of this law stipulates that transportation
    carriers must supply the card.  Currently, Costa Rica uses APIS for
    data collection from passengers arriving at the two principal
    international airports of Juan Santamaria (in San Jose) and Daniel
    Oduber (in Liberia).  Costa Rican Immigration tracks travelers as
    well as CR nationals.

    -- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, sea, and
    land POEs and for domestic flights?  No.  The policies are standard
    for all authorized migration entry ports, but as mentioned above,
    the APIS system is only used in the two major international
    airports.  Also, at those two entry ports an "invisible migration
    procedure" takes place for exiting passengers, because travelers do
    not pass through the migration entry/exit point.  Instead, the
    airlines collect the exit cards and turn them over to CRI.

    -- What agency oversees the collection of traveler information?
    Costa Rica Immigration, which is part of the Ministry of Public
    Security.

    -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that
    information with foreign governments? CRI's policy is to share
    information, but there should be a cooperative agreement and the
    sharing must not violate Costa Rican law; however, the GOCR does not
    share information on refugees.  Post has not encountered any
    restrictions to sharing info with the USG; the Embassy consular
    section routinely requests and receives Costa Rican Immigration
    reports on cases of interest.

    -- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data
    on incoming commercial flights or vessels?  Yes, both upon entry and
    departure. Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement
    purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way?  Yes, alerts for
    Immigration, Interpol, and Costa Rica's Judiciary are acted upon and
    the data based queried. Does host government have any existing
    treaties to share PNR data? Post is not aware of any official
    treaties, but we have access to PNR data whenever necessary.

    -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),
    interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS), or
    electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting
    other national security threats, such as wanted criminals?  CRI
    reports that APIS has been effective in locating fugitives of all
    types, including individuals in arrears on child support payments.
    Post notes that corruption is problematic in CRI, but is current
    director, Mario Zamora, has been effectively addressing this issue.
    Reports have been received that some officials can be bribed to
    overlook fugitive alerts particularly when offenders attempt to
    leave Costa Rica.

    5B. WATCHLISTING:

    -- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers
    at POEs? Yes.

    -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based
    watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts,
    criminal wants/warrants?  The CR intelligence service (DIS) is the
    main source of these kinds of watchlists.  Post notes that CRI will
    soon (estimated sometime this summer) implement a new immigration
    tracking system, the Electronic Migratory Movement System (SIMMEL),
    which during the second stage will be integrated with the existing
    Integrated Immigration System and to INTERPOL.  Deported persons,
    terrorist lookouts and criminal warrants populate the watchlist.

    -- If host government maintains a watchlist, how many records does
    the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related?
    Impossible to determine.

    -- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? CR
    Immigration.

    -- What international watchlists do the host government use for
    screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.?
    Interpol, once SIMMEL comes on line, see above.

    -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between
    host government and its neighbors?  None.

    5C. BIOMETRICS:

    -- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land,
    sea)?  If no, does host government have plans to install such a
    system?  If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not
    all, how does the host government decide what POEs will receive the
    tool?  No, there are currently no biometric systems in place.  The
    Chief of Immigration, Mario Zamora, does have an aggressive plan to
    upgrade all the immigration systems to incorporate biometrics data.
    However, the resources to fund the system are not yet secured and
    not all POEs would have access to the system if it were successfully
    developed and deployed.

    -- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government
    use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris
    recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based
    identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis?  Are the systems
    ICAO compliant? None currently, although the GOCR plans to use a
    combination of facial recognition and fingerprints with their new
    system.

    -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are
    the systems and models used? Are all passengers screened for the
    biometric or does the host government target a specific population
    for collection (i.e. host country nationals)?  Do the biometric
    collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the
    biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one
    to many comparisons (checking the biometric presented against a
    database of known biometrics)? No.

    -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know
    of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat
    biometric checkpoints?  None in place.

    -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the
    fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?  Currently the
    GOCR does not collect fingerprints of visitors.  The GOCR plans to
    incorporate taking fingerprints if/when the new biometric system is
    introduced.

    -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint
    system?  Multiple agencies share these responsibilities.
    Fingerprints are maintainted by the Organismo de Investigaciones
    Judiciales (OIJ-Costa Rican version of the FBI), the Ministry of
    Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice (Prisons).  In
    mid-2009, as part of the Merida Initiative's Central American
    Fingerprint Exchange (CAFE), an FBI fingerprint assessment team is
    expected to review the three entities above and make formal
    recommendations to the GOCR on how to logically integrate all three
    systems.

    -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or
    RTID compliant? Not known.

    -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency
    collects the fingerprints?  N/A.  See above on which agencies
    collect fingerprints.

    5D. BORDER CONTROL AND SCREENING:

    -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of
    security interest?  No.

    -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host-
    country nationals?  All travelers are tracked electronically.  What
    is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they
    hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose
    information is not actually recorded electronically? None.  What is
    the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and
    exits?  Impossible to determine.

    -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to
    use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the
    country?  Yes. If so, please describe this authority (legislation,
    mandates, etc).  It is convoluted, but includes legislation and
    executive mandates.

    -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining
    and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of
    entry into the country?  They are able to question and detain if
    necessary.  Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry?
    Costa Rican Intelligence Services (DIS) and CRI.

    -- How well does information sharing function within the host
    government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone with a
    valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how
    is this communicated and resolved internally?  It is resolved via
    coordination between DIS and Immigration.

    5E. PASSPORTS:

    -- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport
    containing biometric information? No. If so, what biometric
    information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, iris,
    facial recognition, etc.?  If not, does host government plan to
    issue a biometric document in the future?  Yes, fingerprints and
    photos will be added as soon as the new system (SIMMEL) is
    implemented. When? Unknown, but estimated for mid-2009.

    -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
    containing biometric information, does the host government share the
    public key required to read the biometric information with any other
    governments?  N/A If so, which governments?  Does the host
    government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity
    (i.e. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity
    for a replacement,etc.)? Full validity replacements are issued.

    -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for
    dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have
    reported their passports stolen multiple times? CRI maintains a data
    base for lost documents; reports of individuals suspected of
    repeated abuse can be generated.

    -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and
    page length as regular passports (do they have something along the
    lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? If issued
    in-country, they are the same as regular passports.

    -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer
    biometric fields as regular-issue passports?  Emergency passports
    issued abroad contain fewer biometric fields than regular-issue
    passports.

    -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of
    replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports
    used to apply for U.S. visas? N/A.

    -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series
    or otherwise identified? Yes, they are assigned a specific book
    number.

    5F. FRAUD DETECTION:

    -- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of
    fraud involving documents followed up? CRI resources are severely
    limited and thus so are fraud detection efforts.  We note an
    aggressive approach at the main international airport in San Jose,
    Juan Santamaria, with fraudulent document detection fairly frequent.
     Outside the context of international air travel, fraud detection
    efforts are not aggressive and the fabrication of fraudulent
    documents is as common as is corruption in obtaining documents.
    CR's Justice Department recently arrested a fraudulent document
    manufacturer who was making and selling CR National ID cards; the
    fraudulent cards were perfect because the machinery to produce them
    as well as all of the supplies (paper, laminates, ink, etc.,) were
    authentic and had been purchased from corrupt officials in the GOCR
    offices that normally produce them.

    -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of
    circulation, or made harder to use?  Although there is no systematic
    mechanism to take fraudulently issued documents out of circulation,
    claims by CRI and the Ministry of Justice that efforts are underway
    to tighten document security seem credible.

    5G. PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY:

    -- What are the country's policies on records related to the
    questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at
    points of entry into the country?  Post has been contacted to
    participate in CRI investigations at the main international airport
    in San Jose.  Suspected offenders are detained and, if violations of
    CR laws are evident, offenders are returned to their country of
    origin.  Records are maintained but not centrally; each office seems
    to maintain its own set of records on detentions and interrogations.
    How are those records stored, and for how long? Impossible to
    determine.

    -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of
    sensitive data? Laws are in place to protect privacy, however,
    corruption is also a major problem.  Post observes that possible
    offenders are asked for any and all types of information and that
    privacy waivers are not requested; there is a policy that a
    Miranda-like warning be served though we have never observed this
    service before any type of questioning.

    -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the
    implementation of new databases of records? None that we are aware
    of.

    -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government
    computer systems that hold personally identifying information?  Yes.
    CRI has free access to such information, however.

    -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that
    homeland security agencies hold about them? Individuals regularly
    try to obtain their records; this is an issue that is being debated
    legally in Costga Rica.

    -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth,
    etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement
    actions)?  No.

    -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government
    to obtain these types of data? Yes.

    5H. (SBU) IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE PARTNERS:

    Department would appreciate post's in-house assessment of whether
    host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing.
    Considerations include whether host government watchlists may
    include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to
    terrorists), and whether host governments would share or use U.S.
    watchlist data inappropriately, etc.  Post assesses that GOCR would
    be an appropriate partner in data sharing.

    -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to
    adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure
    of information?  No.

    -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally?
     Is there a single consolidated database, for example?  If not, do
    different ministries share Information amongst themselves?  There is
    no single consolidated database, although one would make sense for a
    small, but travel-dependent country like Costa Rica.  There is
    minimal internal GOCR sharing of information, and it is often
    complicated by hyper-legalistic requirements.

    -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes
    that do so?  There is no simple definition of terrorism found in
    Costa Rican law.  However, an existing definition, found in CP
    ("Codigo Penal") 246 of Law 4573 (1970), was recently modified by
    the passage of Law 8719 (2009) that strengthened counter terrorist
    legislation including the financing of terrorism.

    BRENNAN

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