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### Viewing cable 07ANKARA1733, TURKEY: AKP IN THE PROVINCES - TOP DOWN IS THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07ANKARA1733 | 2007-07-06 14:39 | 2011-04-14 10:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO5152
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHAK #1733/01 1871439
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 061439Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2869
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
    RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
    RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
    RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001733

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2017
    TAGS: PGOV TU
    SUBJECT: TURKEY: AKP IN THE PROVINCES - TOP DOWN IS THE
    TREND

    REF: ANKARA 1437

    Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary and comment:  A series of trips to Turkey's
    provinces have made it clear that PM Erdogan's Justice and
    Development Party (AKP) has turned into the top-down Erdogan
    machine.  He picked the candidate lists, he set the
    priorities and the platform.  If AKP returns to government,
    all will be beholden to him.  On the provincial side, there
    is less of a sense of participatory democracy, though in most
    places they are working to maintain party solidarity,
    including by flashy Erdogan-led rallies.  It is an encore of
    the "great man", central government control complex that has
    always plagued Turkish politics.  End summary and comment.

    ¶2. (C) Erdogan has always been top dog in AKP, even before he
    had his political ban lifted and replaced Abdullah Gul as
    prime minister in 2003.  Early on, AKP touted its democratic
    credentials and billed itself as an uncharacteristically
    Turkish internally democratic big tent party.  That has
    gradually eroded as Erdogan exerted ever-increasing control
    over party structures and appointments, culminating in this
    year's candidate lists for the July 22 parliamentary
    elections.  He has studiously moderated the party's profile,
    cutting MPs who voted "no" on March 1 (2003), trimming back
    those stemming from the Islamist National View perspective
    and pruning deadwood elsewhere.  He has also parachuted
    candidates into districts based on who he wants to get
    elected (as with Mehmet Simsek who tops the list in moderate
    Gaziantep) or whose district he wants to control (as with the
    number 1 candidate in Sivas, an Erdogan Istanbul protege who
    replaced Sivas' own, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener, to the
    dismay of locals).  In a long-running Turkish tradition, this
    will give Erdogan solid control over his party; newly elected
    deputies will know they are beholden to Erdogan and
    understand the PM will not hesitate to axe them next election
    period if they do not toe the line.

    3.(C) The mirror image of such control is disillusionment,
    resignation and a drop in enthusiasm at the provincial level,
    where local AKP organizations feel Erdogan and his cronies
    ran roughshod over their internal primary system, rejecting
    candidates they had tabbed as qualified for those preferred
    by Ankara (as was the case in Van).  In Sivas, where the
    city's own Deputy PM did not make the election lists,
    purportedly because he disagreed with how they were drawn up,
    Sener's photo still graces AKP campaign posters and the
    locals seem perplexed at why an experienced politician -- and
    co-founder of AKP -- was given the brush-off.  In other
    places -- often the sub-provinces or poorer areas such as
    Yozgat, east of Ankara, the local party organization seems
    grateful for the PM's hand, and those who made the candidate
    lists are careful to include those who did not, introducing
    them formally to visitors.  In the sub-provinces, Erdogan
    worship is in full swing.

    ¶4. (C) This was encapsulated in an Erdogan rally we witnessed
    in Yozgat on June 28.  Preparations were impeccable --
    quality soundstage, large screen for those at the back,
    flags, enormous banners with candidates' pictures and
    slogans, decorations, music, confetti, balloons (all trucked
    in).  An MC - and a burning sun - warmed up the crowd for
    several hours.  When the main act arrived, the crowd was
    lukewarm on former Justice Minister Cicek and a local AKP
    candidate, generally (but not universally) polite to FM Gul,
    but people got to their feet for PM Erdogan.  While crowd
    numbers did not approach the 50,000 AKP organizers were
    touting (it was a work day, it was hot, and a number of those
    who attended were clearly spectators vice supporters), there
    were probably 30,000 in a traditional National Action Party
    (MHP) stronghold.  Gul, who did not connect well with the
    crowd, focused on how AKP (and he personally) had been the
    victim in the abortive April presidential election; the PM
    touted actions taken to make the average working Turk's life
    easier, and what AKP still planned to do.  Finally, Erdogan
    worked hard to pump them up, western campaign style, to shout
    out the AKP election slogans, before departing by helicopter
    for his next rally of the day.

    ANKARA 00001733  002 OF 002

    ¶5. (C) In the provinces, AKP candidates and provincial
    chairmen are unfailingly upbeat and optimistic about the
    numbers they will gain on July 22.  But AKP is starting to
    look more like an old-style Turkish party than a new,
    internally democratic one.  The party lost one potentially
    potent calling card with the enormous youth vote:  with early
    elections AKP was not able to offer candidacies to those
    under 30 (25-29), since that constitutional amendment will
    not take effect until the fall.  AKP's strength has been its
    base and its volunteer grassroots organizations;  these
    remain committed to AKP and Erdogan.  But Erdogan's top-down
    tactics may dim enthusiasm at the mid-level, and AKP -- along
    with other parties -- is looking for every vote it can
    muster.

    Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

    WILSON

    id: 115136
    date: 7/12/2007 8:19
    refid: 07ANKARA1778
    origin: Embassy Ankara
    classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    destination: 07ADANA78
    header:
    VZCZCXRO0288
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHAK #1778/01 1930819
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 120819Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2935
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
    RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001778

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2022
    TAGS: PGOV TU
    SUBJECT: TURKEY:  THE PRO-KURDISH DTP - ITS ELECTION AND
    POST-ELECTION PROSPECTS

    REF: ADANA 78

    Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: The largest and most influential pro-Kurdish
    political party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), running
    candidates as independents, seems set to take some two dozen
    seats in the July 22 parliamentary election.  This is enough
    seats to form a parliamentary group and -- if DTPers stick to
    their moderate rhetoric -- potentially wield some clout in
    the new parliament.  The DTP, however, has links with the
    terrorist PKK and it is unclear just how moderate their voice
    will be.  Their candidacies stand in sharp contrast to a rise
    in PKK violence, which seems aimed at creating further
    divisions and instability in Turkey's southeast.  PM Erdogan
    has called on DTPers who enter parliament to be responsible
    political actors, not beholden to a terrorist organization.
    How DTP acts in parliament will prove a bellwether for openly
    Kurdish aspirations in Turkey for years to come.  End summary.

    DTP Endorsing "Independent" Candidates
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) In recent meetings throughout southeastern Turkey,
    local politicians, journalists and businesspeople told us
    that DTP-endorsed independent candidates are expected to win
    up to two dozen seats in Parliament in the July 22 elections.
     In the region's most populous provinces, Diyarbakir and Van,
    the party is expected to win a total of eight seats, while
    winning one or two seats in 10 other southeastern provinces
    plus in selected regions of western Turkey (reftel).  Should
    they win at least 20 seats, they will have enough to form a
    formal parliamentary group, entitled to floor time and
    allowed to present legislative proposals.  DTP officials,
    including party chairman Ahmet Turk, have stressed that their
    parliamentarians will work to achieve their objectives by
    working responsibly with other parties and avoiding the type
    of confrontational stunt -- specifically, insisting on
    speaking in Kurdish when taking the oath of office -- that
    landed their predecessors (including Turk himself) in hot
    water in the early 1990s.

    ¶3. (C) PM Erdogan has publicly thrown down the "moderation"
    gauntlet to DTP, calling on those who enter parliament after
    the July 22 elections to be responsible political actors.  He
    implied that, should he lead Turkey's next government, that
    government could work with (though not be in coalition with)
    the DTP if their aims and behavior are moderate.  The PM also
    made clear that if DTP wants to play a constructive role in
    parliament, it cannot be beholden to the terrorist PKK.  The
    PM's Justice and Development Party (AKP) believes it can
    benefit from DTP support within parliament on democratic
    reforms, but not if the votes are PKK-tainted.

    ¶4. (C) That there are links between the DTP and the terrorist
    PKK is clear.  Some noted to us that the DTP has parachuted
    candidate into districts, which will make them answer to the
    group that put them there -- a political practice in Turkey
    not unique to DTP.  In previous meetings with DTP chairman
    Ahmet Turk, we have urged him unequivocally to condemn PKK
    violence; he has demurred, saying that while he abhors
    violence, it would be political suicide for him to issue such
    a public statement.  In indications of Turk's attempt to push
    the envelope, he condemned the May Ankara bombing; attempted
    (unsuccessfully) to place some relatively independent Kurdish
    moderates on the election lists, such as Diyarbakir Bar
    President Sezgin Tanrikulu, and tried (again, unsuccessfully)
    to enter an election alliance with two small Kurdish parties,
    KADEP and HAK-PAR, both untainted by any association with
    violence.  Regarding the still-born election alliance,
    HAK-PAR chairman Serdac Bucak told us that Kurdish society
    wants unity, "but the decision was made elsewhere - by the
    PKK."  And with respect to his proposed candidacy, Tanrikulu
    explained to us that, based on his discussions with the DTP
    about his candidacy, it was clear they wanted obedient
    servants, not independent thinkers (also hardly unique among
    political parties, unless the organization pulling strings is
    the PKK).
    ¶5. (C) But some of the DTP's established figures are not
    helping to convey a moderate party image.  A case in point is

    ANKARA 00001778  002 OF 002

    Diyarbakir mayor Osman Baydemir, under investigation for
    remarks he made in a recent interview on pro-PKK Roj TV, in
    which he categorized the PKK as fighters (not terrorists).

    PKK Breathing Fire
    -------------------

    ¶6. (C) Equally puzzling is the PKK's stepped up activities in
    recent weeks, further raising the temperature in an already
    tense region and political race.  Many observers are
    suspicious that the PKK's increased attacks are deliberately
    intended to provoke stepped up Turkish military activity in
    the southeast, further aggravating pre-existing cleavages
    between Turks and Kurds.  It is also possible that the PKK,
    which does not exercise absolute control over DTP, may not
    want the party to succeed in the political arena, where a
    group of pro-Kurdish MPs could steal the limelight and media
    attention, as well as rob the PKK of its primacy on the
    Kurdish issue.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶7. (C) The July 22 general election remains an opportunity
    for DTP and Turkey's Kurds.  How they choose to play their
    card -- how brave they are in the face of inevitable PKK
    pressure -- may determine the voice, or lack thereof, in
    Turkey of those with Kurdish ethnic aspirations for years to
    come.

    Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

    WILSON

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