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### Viewing cable 09ABIDJAN406, ELECTIONS IN COTE D'IVOIRE: THE MYTH AND THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ABIDJAN406 | 2009-07-02 14:30 | 2010-12-09 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abidjan

`

    VZCZCXYZ0004
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAB #0406/01 1831430
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 021430Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5230
    INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0239
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T ABIDJAN 000406

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2019
    TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL EAID IV
    SUBJECT: ELECTIONS IN COTE D'IVOIRE: THE MYTH AND THE
    REALITY

    Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L. Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

    ¶1. C) Summary: Although key figures in the Ivorian government
    and opposition continue to insist publicly that elections
    must be held as scheduled on November 29, resident diplomats
    are highly skeptical, as are most politically-savvy Ivorians.
    The gap between public pronouncements and the
    behind-the-scenes reality has become so clear, in fact, that
    UN SRSG Choi has started referring in private conversations
    to the "myth and reality" of elections in Cote d'Ivoire. This
    message describes the key myths and realities as we see them.
    End Summary

    MYTH #1: Cote d'Ivoire Will Hold Elections in November 2009
    --------------------------------------------- ---------------

    ¶2. (C) The Ivorian government, Independent Electoral
    Commission(CEI), and opposition candidates have not deviated
    in public from the commitment to hold elections this year.
    But the date was set in response to international pressure
    (predominantly from the French and the UN) and a key
    motivation of each of the central actors is to avoid being
    fingered as being responsible for the delay. Continuing to
    pay tribute to the 'myth' that elections will take place as
    scheduled is viewed as necessary to demonstrate a commitment
    to the process. The truth, however, is that electoral
    preparations are already lagging behind schedule and deep
    doubts persist about the willingness of those currently in
    power to risk losing office.

    ¶3. (S) The Reality: There will not be an election unless
    President Gbagbo is confident that he will win it -- and he
    is not yet confident of the outcome. This has been the
    assessment of some analysts since 2005 and the political
    landscape in Cote d'Ivoire helps to explain why. Gbagbo's
    political party, the FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien),
    consistently comes in at third place is still associated with
    a minority ethnic group (the Bete). To win a presidential
    election, the FPI needs an alliance with one of the larger
    parties - either the PDCI (Parti Democratique de Cote
    d'Ivoire) or the RDR (Rassemblement des Republicains), but
    the latter have remained remarkably united in an alliance
    against the FPI, known as the RHDP (Rassemblement des
    Houphouetistes). Reliable sources indicate that Gbagbo has
    tried since at least 2007 to cut a deal with Alassane
    Ouattara, president of the RDR, but has not succeeded.
    Ambassador was told just last week that having failed yet
    again to co-opt Ouattara, Gbagbo is now focused on promoting
    a rift within the PDCI by helping to finance and support
    former-Prime Minister Charles Banny's efforts to replace
    aging former-President Henri Konan Bedie as the PDCI's
    candidate for president. Whether or not Banny succeeds is
    irrelevant from the FPI's perspective, as long as the
    internal struggle induces a certain percentage of PDCI voters
    to go elsewhere. Gbagbo recently told a well-placed source
    that he wants to face Alassane Ouattara in the second round
    (no one expects a winner to emerge from the first round)
    because he (Gbagbo) believes that the ethnic groups who
    traditionally support the PDCI will vote FPI, rather that
    support an RDR leader who has links to the rebellion.

    ¶4. (S) In addition to these calculations, there are other
    reasons for the governing coalition to want to hang on for as
    long as they can. Cote d'Ivoire will celebrate the 50th
    anniversary of its independence in August 2010. Savvy
    observers do not believe that President Gbagbo (who savors
    the role of Le Grand Chef) will risk losing the prestige and
    celebrity that goes with hosting such an historic event.
    Also, the GOCI lobbied successfully to host the spring 2010
    meeting of the African Development Bank's general assembly,
    an event that we believe Gbagbo will use to declare that Cote
    d'Ivoire's crisis has been resolved and the country has
    returned to normal, even if elections have not been held.
    Thus the fall of 2010 currently appears to be the most
    realistic potential timeframe for elections. President Gbagbo
    will been in office for ten years (the equivalent of two
    terms) and although he has stated publicly that he considers
    himself to be in an extended first mandate,remaining in
    office without a new mandate will become harder to justify
    after 2010. The financial benefits of the status quo are, of
    course, a prime consideration and not just for the FPI but
    for individuals such as the PM Soro (Secretary General of the
    Forces Nouvelles) as well.

    ¶5. (C) Embassy will be sending septel a detailed report on
    the status of the voter registration process and logistical
    preparations for the elections. While progress is being made,
    the picture is not encouraging in terms of a vote this year.

    For despite months of dedicated work and millions of dollars
    worth of expenditures, not a single voter registration or
    national ID card has been produced. Data collected partly by
    hand on over 6 million individuals must be computerized,
    linked up with fingerprints and vaQed before cards can be
    produced and distributed. The likelihood that this will be
    accomplished before November is slim, and there is no
    indication that either the President or the Prime Minister's
    office is pushing for rapid action.

    MYTH #2: The Forces Nouvelles Are Disarming;
    Cote d'Ivoire Is Being Reunified
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶6. (SBU) Cote d'Ivoire has held a number of symbolic
    ceremonies to mark advances in the sortie de crise (crisis
    recovery) program, such as the Flame of Peace cermony in
    2007, numerous demobilization ceremonies in 2008, and most
    recently on May 26, a ceremony to launch the handing over of
    power from rebel zone commanders (comzones) to civilian
    authorities. Genuine progress has indeed been made:
    thousands of young men have abandoned the rebellion and
    civilian authorities have returned to every major city in the
    north, if not every district.

    ¶7. (S) The Reality: The progress that has been made is,
    unfortunately, only superficial, for it now appears that the
    Ouaga IV agreement (the fourth agreement to the Ouagadougou
    Political Agreement) is fundamentally an agreement between
    Blaise Compaore and Laurent Gbagbo to share control of the
    north until after the presidential election, despite the fact
    that the text calls for the Forces Nouvelles to return
    control of the north to the government and complete
    disarmament two months before the election. Ambassador
    Badini (Facilitator Blaise Compaore's representative in
    Abidjan) confirmed to Ambassador on June 26, the
    power-sharing nature (but not the details) of the accord.
    Badini acknowledged that the mixed brigades (joint FAFN-FDS
    units) slated to provide security for the elections are
    intended in part to give both sides a window onto what is
    happening in the north, and increase confidence that massive
    fraud will not take place. But the 5,000 Forces Nouvelles
    soldiers who are to be "disarmed" and regrouped into barracks
    in four key cities in the north and west until a new national
    army is created, represent a serious military capability that
    the FAFN intends to keep well-trained and in reserve until
    after the election. The hand-over of administrative power
    from the FAFN to civilian government authorities is a
    pre-requisite for elections but, as travelers to the north
    (including Embassy personnel) confirm: the FAFN retain
    de-facto control of the region, especially when it comes to
    finances. Disarmament and reunification are not separate
    processes. They are intertwined. As long as the confidence
    needed to effect disarmament is lacking, reunification will
    prove elusive.

    Implications
    -------------

    ¶8. (C) There is a silver lining to this cloud, and it is the
    fact that Compaore (perceived as the benefactor of the FAFN)
    and Gbagbo are engaged in a direct dialogue designed to put
    an end to the conflict that erupted with the failed coup
    d'etat in 2002. They have taken ownership of the problem and
    while this has effectively reduced the role the international
    community can play, their apparent willingness to resolve
    their differences peacefully has led to distinct
    improvements. Tensions have been reduced as the relationship
    between the President Gbagbo and PM Soro has improved, and no
    one expQ a full-scale civil war to resume although there
    is still a potential for clashes between rival elements. Our
    posture as an interested and active member of the
    international community has been the most effective stance we
    have taken and we will continue to play that role unless the
    situation changes.
    NESBITT

`