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### Viewing cable 06BOGOTA224, SWISS AMB ON FARC AND ELN PEACE PROCESS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BOGOTA224 | 2006-01-11 21:09 | 2011-04-29 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0006
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #0224/01 0112120
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 112120Z JAN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1109
    INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0968
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6468
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7018
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 3093
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8768
    RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0286
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8668
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0768
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3691
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1327
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

` `

    id: 49555
    date: 1/11/2006 21:20
    refid: 06BOGOTA224
    origin: Embassy Bogota
    classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    destination: 05BOGOTA12031|06BOGOTA65
    header:
    VZCZCXYZ0006
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #0224/01 0112120
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 112120Z JAN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1109
    INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0968
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6468
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7018
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 3093
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8768
    RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0286
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8668
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0768
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3691
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1327
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000224

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
    TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CO
    SUBJECT: SWISS AMB ON FARC AND ELN PEACE PROCESS

    REF: A) BOGOTA 65 B) 05 BOGOTA 12031

    Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Swiss Ambassador Kupfer expressed
    disappointment on January 6 with the FARC's rejection of the
    Swiss-led international commission proposal for a
    humanitarian exchange between the GOC and the FARC.  He
    reported that, despite the setback, international commission
    members (one from France, Spain and Switzerland) would meet
    again with the FARC in Colombia in early 2006 to continue
    discussions on the same proposal. Kupfer said coordinating
    the commission was going along fine for now but the French
    continued to do as they pleased.  He cited the January 3
    announcement that French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy would
    travel to Colombia to discuss efforts to release
    Colombian-French Ingrid Betancourt.  Kupfer said this was
    news to both the Swiss and Spanish. He also said GOC Peace
    Commissioner Restrepo was a challenge to deal with and that,
    unlike past humanitarian exchange initiatives, the Catholic
    Church had little involvement in this one.  Kupfer
    represented Switzerland, one of the three accompanying
    countries, at the GOC-ELN exploratory talks last month in
    Havana.  He said round two later in January would focus on an
    agenda for future talks, and that the roles of the five civil
    society guarantors and the three countries would have to be
    re-defined.  He predicted the GOC will want less involvement;
    the ELN more.  He said Norway and the ELN pressed for moving
    the talks to Europe.  According to Kupfer, the ELN is looking
    to challenge its placement on the EU terrorist list and wants
    to explore funding opportunities in Europe.  In the end, both
    the ELN and GOC agreed to keep the talks in Havana for now.
    Kupfer underscored that, while the Swiss were happy to go
    along with that, they would support moving the talks to
    Europe if they advanced sufficiently, to enhance their
    legitimacy.  The ELN's placement on the EU terrorist list
    would prove no obstacle to Switzerland if the circumstances
    were right. End Summary.

    ------------------------------
    HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE PROPOSAL
    ------------------------------

    ¶2. (C)  On January 6, polcouns met with Swiss Ambassador
    Thomas Kupfer to discuss FARC rejection of an humanitarian
    prisoner exchange proposal (ref a), put forward by the
    recently assembled "international commission" with
    representatives from France, Switzerland, and Spain.  Kupfer
    expressed disappointment with the FARC reaction, which he
    characterized as a "clear and categorical no."  He said it
    was difficult to find anything positive in the FARC's Dec. 29
    communiqu, and complained that the FARC's leaders were
    playing politics.  First they complained they did not have
    the details of the proposal (which Kupfer said they received
    weeks earlier on December 15 along with the GOC), and then
    they complained they were not accorded sufficient respect
    when it was presented (i.e. by email).  Kupfer insisted that
    the proposal was a good one. "They were stupid to reject it
    because they will only have to back down later," he said.

    ¶3. (C) Despite the setback and low chance of success, Kupfer
    said the GOC and the FARC leadership had agreed to another
    meeting in Colombia "at the technical level" between
    international commission members and the FARC early in 2006,
    perhaps in January.  He noted that "difficulties with
    organizational details" still needed to be resolved,
    including the FARC's insistence that the GOC not know where
    or when the meeting would take place.  Kupfer stressed that
    the FARC's attitude was unrealistic and that they had to show
    more transparency.  He said upcoming discussions would be
    based on the proposal already rejected by the FARC.

    -----------------------
    IMPACT ON U.S. HOSTAGES
    -----------------------
    ¶4. (C) Even if both parties finally agreed to discuss the
    possibility of a humanitarian exchange, Kupfer said the
    challenges would be overwhelming.  FARC negotiators have
    added the return of Simon Trinidad and Sonia (both extradited
    to the U.S.) as critical to any deal.  Kupfer speculated that
    the FARC would probably try holding back one or more
    Americans in any exchange, something the GOC had refused to
    consider.  And finally, said Kupfer, the FARC still had not
    decided which FARC prisoners held by the GOC could be part of
    any humanitarian exchange.

    --------------------------------------------- -----------
    DEALING WITH THE FRENCH, THE GOC; THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶5. (C) According to Kupfer, Switzerland has the coordinating
    lead among the three countries on commission initiatives but
    reining in the French continues to be a challenge. "The
    French generally do what they want," he said.  The latest
    surprise was the January 3 announcement out of Paris that
    Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy would visit Colombia
    soon to discuss efforts to release Ingrid Betancourt.  Kupfer
    complained that Douste-Blazy would presumably not come
    without a new bilateral initiative, something neither the
    Swiss nor Spanish knew anything about.  The only bright spot,
    said Kupfer, was that Spain planned to be much more engaged
    in the process.

    ¶6. (C) Kupfer acknowledged that dealing with the GOC, in
    particular with Peace Commissioner Restrepo, continued to be
    a challenge.  Restrepo's attitude and style were difficult.
    He was too forthright and stubborn, unwilling to take advice.
     While everyone was more or less in agreement on the role of
    the international commission, Kupfer was convinced Restrepo
    would seek to limit its involvement when "it could be the
    most useful."  Kupfer concluded that Restrepo had little
    experience in dealing with international community
    facilitators and this would complicate matters in any future
    negotiation.

    ¶7. (C) Kupfer noted with surprise that, unlike past
    initiatives, the Catholic Church was minimally involved with
    the initiative of the international commission.  He surmised
    that relations between Church negotiator Monsignor Castro and
    the presidential palace, in particular Restrepo, were not
    good.   At the same time, he acknowledged that the Church
    remained skeptical the FARC would agree to anything while
    Uribe is president, an argument strengthened by the FARC's
    most recent communiqu (ref b).

    ---------------------------
    GOC-ELN ENCOUNTER IN HAVANA
    ---------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Kupfer, who attended the December talks in Havana, was
    more optimistic about exploratory discussions between the GOC
    and the ELN, which will resume later this month.  Restrepo
    will meet with the ELN's Francisco Galan on January 11 to
    prepare for a second round of talks.  Kupfer said all the
    goals were achieved during the first round: a dialogue was
    launched, confidence building began, and a follow-on meeting
    was set.  Both parties "prudently" avoided trying to create
    problems for the other.  Round two will still be
    "exploratory" and tackle the agenda for future talks.  He
    noted that in Havana the ELN commander Antonio Garcia at
    first appeared distant and uninformed about the reality of
    present day Colombia, but is now thoroughly engaged in the
    process.  Kupfer reported that Galan was more confident than
    in previous encounters and exhibited less need to take cues
    from Garcia.  Kupfer said Evo Morales' election victory in
    Bolivia gave the ELN negotiating team a psychological boost
    as well.

    ¶9. (C) Kupfer underscored that the five guarantors were
    crucial in getting both parties to Havana but their function
    at the negotiating table would now need to be re-defined into
    a supporting role.  Kupfer predicted that this would be a
    problem as the five want to continue as major players.  What
    was important now, said Kupfer, was a real facilitator in the
    process.

    ¶10. (C) Regarding the three "accompanying" countries (Norway,
    Spain and Switzerland), Kupfer said their role, too, would
    have to be clarified, both on the political side as well as
    on the logistics/accompaniment/facilitation side.  The GOC's
    approach so far has been, "we're glad you're here and we'll
    call you if we need you."  Kupfer said Norway in particular
    took considerable umbrage at this.  The ELN, on the other
    hand, wanted the three countries more involved as the process
    develops.

    ¶11. (C) Kupfer also reported some discussion of Brazil
    joining as an accompanying country but no decision was taken.
     He stressed that the minimal role played by Cuba and
    Venezuela, the former as host and the latter as facilitator
    for Garcia's travel, was also helpful.  It is better to have
    them involved this way than sabotaging the process from the
    outside, he said.

    ¶12. (C) According to Kupfer, Norway pressed hard for a
    European venue for the second round; Switzerland and Spain
    did not.  The ELN supported Norway, preferring to travel to
    Europe for political and financial reasons.  Kupfer said the
    ELN complained several times about their terrorist
    designation status and wanted a European venue to challenge
    it. The ELN also made clear that Europe contained
    opportunities for future funding needs.  In the end, the ELN
    agreed to keep the talks in Cuba, as did the GOC.  Kupfer
    underscored that, while Bern was happy to go along with the
    Cuban venue for now, they would support moving o Europe if
    the talks advanced sufficiently, to enhance legitimacy and
    chances for success.  The EU designation of the ELN as a
    terrorist group would prove no obstacle to Switzerland.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶13. (C) For now, U.S. redlines are covered, in particular
    with the FARC initiative, as the GOC continues to insist that
    all American hostages be part of any exchange.  However, we
    will continue to monitor both processes closely as France and
    Switzerland in particular, may begin pressing the GOC to make
    further concessions to keep the initiative with the FARC
    alive.  We agree with the pessimistic assessment of the
    Catholic Church that the odds for a humanitarian exchange
    between the GOC and the FARC remain low.
    WOOD

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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