Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 11098 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AMED ASEC AORC AF AS AEMR ABUD AMGT AR APECO AFIN AM AJ AU AE ABLD AG AY ASIG APER AMBASSADOR ASEAN AA AL ASUP AX AID AUC ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ADANA AFFAIRS AND AN ADCO ARM ATRN AECL AADP ACOA APEC AGRICULTURE ACS ADPM ASCH AMEX ACAO ANET AODE ARF ACBAQ APCS AMG AQ AMCHAMS AORG AGAO ADM AFSI AFSN AINF AIT AO ATFN AROC AFGHANISTAN AFU AER ALOW AC AZ AVERY AGMT
BO BD BR BEXP BA BRUSSELS BL BM BH BTIO BIDEN BT BC BU BY BX BG BK BF BBSR BMGT BTIU BE BWC BB BP BILAT
CS CASC CA CDC CVIS CY CO CI CMGT CODEL CFED CH CW CU CONDOLEEZZA CR CSW CPAS CJUS CDG CE CG CBW COUNTER CN CKGR COUNTERTERRORISM CWC CJAN CIA CD CLINTON CT CARSON CONS CB CM CLMT CROS CNARC CIDA CBSA CIC CEUDA CHR CITT CAC CACM CVR CAPC COPUOS CBC CBE CDB CAN COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CACS CF CL CIS CTM COM CV CICTE
DEA DR DA DOMESTIC DHS DAO DCM DEPT DTRA DPRK DEFENSE DE DJ DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEAX DOE DK DS
ETRD ELAB ECON EG EUN EAIR EAID EU ECIN ENRG EPET EFIN EAGR EINT EIND ENERG ELTN ETTC EINV ECPS EFIS EWWT EK ES EN EPA EC ER EI EZ ET EINVECONSENVCSJA ECONOMICS EXTERNAL ELN ELECTIONS EMIN EINN EFINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENIV ECUN ENGR ENNP EUR EAP EEPET ETRDEINVTINTCS ENVI EFTA ETRO ESENV ECINECONCS ENVR ECONOMY ECONOMIC EUMEM EAIDS ETRA ETRN EUREM EFIM EIAR EXIM ERD EAIG ETRC EXBS EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL ECA ENGY ECONCS EINVETC ECONEFIN ESA ETC ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH
FI FJ FR FREEDOM FTAA FARC FAO FMLN FBI FOR FTA FOREIGN FINANCE FO FISO FDA FAC FOI FM FINR
GOV GAERC GG GT GM GV GH GOI GA GTIP GR GZ GE GCC GY GANGS GL GLOBAL GERARD GF GAZA GTMO
HK HR HO HA HUMAN HU HILLARY HSTC HUMOR HEBRON HI HURI HYMPSK
IR IS IRS IMO ID IWC IZ ICAO IV IC IT IZPREL IRAQI IO IN IAEA ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IPR INRB ITALY ICRC INTERPOL IQ ICTY INTELSAT IEFIN IA INR IRC IACI ITRA IL ICJ INTERNAL ISRAELI INMARSAT ITU ILC IBRD IMF ILO IDP ITF IBET IGAD IEA IAHRC ICTR IDA IIP INRA INRO IRAJ IF
JA JP JO JOSEPH JOHNNIE JM JUS JAMES
KISL KIRF KWBG KSCA KDEM KIRC KPAO KMDR KCRM KWMN KFRD KTFN KHLS KN KCIP KNNP KSTC KIPR KOMC KTDB KJUS KOLY KIDE KSTH KS KMPI KZ KG KRVC KICC KTIA KTIP KVPR KV KU KR KPKO KGHG KCOR KE KSUM KPAL KSEP KGIC KFLO KAWC KUNR KNPP KNEI KBIO KPRP KMCA KTEX KGIT KNSD KCFE KLIG KFLU KBCT KOMS KBTS KACT KCRS KGCC KDRG KWMM KAWK KHIV KSPR KRAD KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KPAI KHSA KTLA KO KFSC KVIR KX KFTFN KHDP KPLS KSAF KMFO KRCM KCSY KSAC KPWR KTRD KID KWNM KMRS KICA KRIM KSEO KPOA KCHG KREC KOM KRGY KCMR KSCI KFIN KVRP KPAONZ KCGC KNAR KMOC KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KNUC KPIN KPRV KBTR KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNUP KTER KDDG KPAK KREL KCOM KNNPMNUC KRFD KHUM KDEV KCFC KWWMN KTBT KWMNCS KJUST
LE LY LU LTTE LI LO LH LG LAB LA LOG LT
MARR MCAP MOPS MY MNUC MX MARAD MASS MIL MO MU MEPI MR MDC MPOS MEETINGS MD MTCRE MK MUCN MASC MRCRE ML MA MEPP MAR MAPP MP MT MAS MTS MLS MI MERCOSUR MC MV MEDIA MILI MEPN MG MW MIK MTCR MZ MOPPS MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MTRE
NZ NI NPT NZUS NL NATO NO NAFTA NDP NIPP NP NS NU NATIONAL NPG NGO NG NK NA NSSP NRR NSG NSC NPA NORAD NT NW NEW NH NSF NV NR NE NSFO NC NAR NASA
OTRA OIIP OPRC OVIP OPDC OPIC OREP OEXC OAS OSCE ODIP OSAC OFDP OIE OECD OPCW OVP OPAD OFDA OIC OSCI OMIG OBSP ON OCS OCII OHUM OTR OFFICIALS
PGOV PREL PTER PINR PHUM PK PE PO PREF PHSA PINS PARM PROP POL PSOE PAK PBTS PAO PM PF PNAT POLITICS PARMS PBIO PSI POLINT POLITICAL PARTIES PL PA PGOVLO PORG PGOVE PLN PINF PRELP PAS PPA PRGOV PUNE PG PALESTINIAN POLICY PROG PDEM PREFA PDOV PCI PRAM PTBS PSA POSTS PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PGIV PHUMPGOV PCUL PSEPC PREO PAHO PMIL PNG PP PS PEPR PINT PU PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PMAR PHUMPREL PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PGGV PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PEL POV
QA
RS RICE RUPREL RU RIGHTS RO RW RSP RP REACTION REPORT RCMP RSO RF RFE RM ROBERT REGION
SOCI SARS SMIG SCUL SENV SNAR SW SA SP SY SENVKGHG SU SF SAN SZ SR SO SHUM SYR SAARC SL SI SNARCS SWE SN SPCE SNARIZ SCRS SC SIPDIS SEN SNARN SPCVIS STEINBERG SG SIPRS SH SOFA SANC SK ST SEVN
TBIO TSPL TPHY TT TRSY TRGY TN TSPA TU TW TC TX TI TS TO TH TIP TP TERRORISM TURKEY TD TZ TFIN TNGD TINT THPY TBID TF TL TV TK TR
UNGA UZ UK UP USTR UN USEU US UNSC UNHCR UNMIK USUN UNESCO UNHRC UY UNO UG UNDC UAE UNAUS UNDESCO UNEP UNCHC UNFICYP UNCHR USNC UNIDROIT UNCSD UNDP UNC UNODC USOAS UNPUOS UNCND USPS UNICEF UV UNCHS UNVIE UE USAID
VE VT VTPREL VZ VM VI VAT VN
WTO WHO WS WTRO WITH WTRQ WBG WI WHA WMD WMO WIPO WHTI WFP WB WWARD WA WEU WZ
XF XM XV XR XA XK XH XL XS XG XW XY XE XT XD XZ XX XTAG XQ XB XU XI XC
YM YI YMCS YE
ZR ZI ZANU ZU ZO ZP ZB ZL ZK ZF ZEALAND ZN ZA ZOELLICK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07CAIRO2871, EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07CAIRO2871.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07CAIRO2871 | 2007-09-23 16:04 | 2010-12-13 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHEG #2871/01 2661601
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 231601Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6995
    INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002871

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR RWATERS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EG
    SUBJECT: EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK

    REF: A. CAIRO 2839
    ¶B. CAIRO 2825

    Classified By: ECPO Minister Counselor William R. Stewart
    for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a
    post-Mubarak future. It has been almost exactly twenty-six
    years since Egypt last faced such a transition. Although one
    could argue that some of the elements that led to the
    dramatic events of September and October 1981 are back in
    place -- shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political
    pressures, and crackdowns on political adversaries --
    tensions now are different, and not on the same scale. While
    we should not place too much weight in analogy, it can
    nevertheless be instructive to review the events of September
    and October 1981 to see what useful comparisons can be made.
    End summary.

    ---------------
    Rumors Run Amok
    ---------------

    ¶2. (C) This September, as in past late summers, salon talk
    and front page headlines have focused on that most sensitive
    of topics: the health of the president and the eventual
    transfer of power. Talk has been so pervasive, Prime
    Minister Nazif felt obliged to announce that "there is a
    system for the smooth transfer of power." Rumors of
    President Mubarak's deteriorating health -- and even his
    demise -- have been so insistent, even Suzanne Mubarak felt
    the need to publicly assert that he is alive and well.

    ¶3. (C) At least half a dozen editorials have compared the
    tensions and rumors of this September to September 1981.
    Although the majority of Egyptians are too young to recall
    personally those momentous times, the lore of it remains deep
    in the national consciousness. Even young Egyptians recall
    hearing of the great "round up" of September 3, 1981 when
    Sadat seemed to "go crazy" as one commentator recalled,
    arresting and imprisoning opponents and critics of every
    stripe. Communists, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, academics,
    and liberal-minded journalists found themselves cell-mates
    that late summer day. Even Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed
    under house arrest. Although Mubarak has hardly gone so far,
    some observers have argued that his feuds with Ayman Nour,
    Anwar Esmat El-Sadat (the late president's nephew), Saad
    Eddin Ibrahim, independent editors, and other perceived
    opponents, combined with his sweeping roundup of the Muslim
    Brotherhood -- arguably his only real political threat -- is
    reminiscent of 1981, and they fear it could lead to similar
    consequences.

    -------------------
    Mubarak Is No Sadat
    -------------------

    ¶4. (C) According to some of Egypt's most astute political
    observers, this is over-analyzing the situation and drawing
    very wrong -- and dangerous - comparisons. Mohammed
    El-Bassiouni, chairman of the Majlis al-Shura's National
    Security Committee (which also has responsibility for Foreign
    Affairs and Arab Affairs), believes that the two Septembers
    have very little in common. El-Bassiouni recently told
    MinCouns that in 1981, when he was Egypt's military attach
    in Tel Aviv, President Sadat was under extreme pressure for
    not providing the "peace dividend" he had promised would be
    the result of his bold move towards Israel, and his deepening
    friendship the United States. When prosperity for all did
    not appear, Sadat felt under enormous pressure. Combined
    with Egypt's isolation in the Arab world, it seemed that his
    gamble had failed. In his pride, he lashed out at perceived
    opponents.

    --------------
    No Comparison?
    --------------

    ¶5. (C) Such a scenario simply does not exist today,
    El-Bassiouni opined. Egypt's economy is growing, the fruit
    of President Mubarak's reform program launched in 2004.
    While relations with Israel are still "problematic," Mubarak
    has taken Egypt back to its rightful position as leader of
    the Arab world. The external pressures that helped stoke the
    tension of September 1981 "simply do not exist today."

    ¶6. (C) Another alleged similarity between the present and
    Sadat's September is the shortage of basic commodities.
    Egyptians have been angered in recent weeks by reports of
    villages without access to drinking water -- in some cases,
    for years (ref A). Shortages of subsidized bread have also
    been in the headlines, as the poorest Egyptians wait in
    queues for shrinking loaves. At least one observer has made
    the case that September 2007 is more reminiscent of January
    1977 -- when riots erupted throughout Egypt due to price
    increases for bread and other basic foodstuffs -- than
    September 1981. But Dr. Galal Amin, economics professor at
    AUC (as he was in 1981) thinks there is little in common,
    economically, between the two eras. Egypt under Sadat, he
    argued, was actually better off in many ways: unemployment,
    which he sees as the single greatest problem facing Mubarak
    today, was lower then, and the overall standard of living was
    higher. The average Egyptian, he said felt that
    opportunities were greater in 1981, leading to general
    optimism. Sadat's "infitah" program, opening up Egypt's
    economy to foreign investment appeared to be working and
    creating jobs. Tourism was taking off, and the average
    Egyptian "felt good" about his life and better about his
    future than Egyptians today, according to Amin. Economic
    statistics refute Amin's assertions, but there is a
    perception within a certain statist/elite/academic
    demographic, represented by Amin, that somehow Sadat's were
    "the good old days."

    -------------------------------------------
    Economic Reform Still Masks Underlying Woes
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Sadat trumpeted economic reform, touting
    privatization, pointing to a freer market that would benefit
    all Egyptians. These thoughts have been echoed under
    Mubarak, especially since the appointment of Prime Minister
    Nazif and his cabinet of economic reformers in 2004.
    However, as in 1981, recent economic advances are incomplete.
    Gigantic government subsidies then, as now, have served to
    brake greater economic reform. In 1981, 21.5% of the Gross
    National Income (GNI) went to the wealthiest 5% of the
    population, while the poorest 20% of the population received
    a mere 5% of Egypt's income. In 2007, there remains the
    general sense that Egypt's economic growth is benefiting only
    a tiny portion of the population. 17% of today's population
    lives under the poverty line, almost identical to the
    percentage in 1981, and the poorest 20% of the population
    received 4.8% of the GNI in 2004/05, while the richest 10% of
    the population received 30% of GNI. Although statistically
    the standard of living has not dramatically deteriorated,
    neither has it improved, leaving Egyptians with the feeling
    that others have passed them by to a brighter economic
    future.

    --------------
    The Odd Couple
    --------------

    ¶8. (C) What the two periods unquestionably do have in common
    are a pair of increasingly isolated dictators, set in their
    ways and fearful of any kind of dissent. But though alike in
    certain personal characteristics (particularly paranoia),
    there are at the same time some very fundamental differences,
    including age (Sadat was a robust 63 years old when
    assassinated; Mubarak is a slowing 79) and length in office
    (barely 11 years for Sadat, closing on 26 years for Mubarak).
    Importantly, Sadat had a clear successor -- his vice
    president, Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak, in turn, has scrupulously
    avoided naming a VP, and although most believe that son Gamal
    will succeed him, no one can say for certain how that will
    play out. Another dissimilarity: Minister of Information
    Enas El-Fiqi, under intense scrutiny and pressure himself for
    allowing the rumors about Mubarak's health to get out of
    control, recently told the Ambassador that "there is no
    comparison" between Sadat and Mubarak because, "Mubarak never
    loses his temper." (El-Fiqi, though, admitted that the
    stress of his job was literally driving him to drink.)

    ¶9. (C) Mubarak relishes his self-image as a benign, paternal
    leader, tough but fair. Still, he has shown signs of moving
    toward Sadat's modus operandi in dealing with political
    opponents. In the past year, Mubarak has arrested upwards of
    a thousand Muslim Brothers. While some have subsequently
    been released and only 40 are facing trial before a military
    tribunal so far, the message is unmistakable: after allowing
    the MB to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections as
    "independents" (in which they won 88 seats, 20% of the
    Assembly), Mubarak is cracking down. Another similarity is
    the recent phobia Mubarak has developed towards the press.
    The Egyptian media, arguably as free as it has ever been (and
    certainly freer than it was under Sadat), is suddenly facing
    a cost for that liberty. In early September, four editors of
    independent newspapers were convicted of insulting the
    president and other GoE officials, while another editor is
    facing trial October 1 for allegedly spreading false rumors
    about Mubarak's health which were damaging to Egypt's
    reputation and to its economy. These arrests have been
    widely seen here as blatant attacks on the freedom of the
    press, much as Sadat's rounding up of journalists was in
    ¶1981.

    -------------------------
    Love and Hate For the USA
    -------------------------

    ¶10. (C) One of the more striking similarities between the two
    leaders is their uneven relationship with the United States.
    Sadat's September madness came close on the heels of a
    profoundly disappointing trip to the United States to meet
    the new President, Ronald Reagan. By discarding the Soviet
    Union and reaching out to the United States -- and Israel --
    he had taken considerable political risk. He had calculated
    that the payoff in tangible and intangible terms would more
    than justify that risk. But as his international stature
    increased spectacularly as the Arab world's "Man of Peace,"
    his standing at home did not keep pace, as heightened
    expectations for peace and prosperity were unrealized.
    Still, in the U.S. he felt he had found a faithful ally, one
    that would stand by him even when his own people did not.
    Unfortunately, President Reagan's reception of Sadat in
    August 1981 was lukewarm, and Sadat came under severe
    criticism by the U.S. press for not delivering true peace to
    the Middle East. According to Mohamed Heikal, Sadat's former
    Minister of Information (who was himself arrested on
    September 3, 1981), Sadat returned to Egypt a bitter man,
    feeling betrayed by the Americans. Shortly afterwards came
    the arrests.

    --------------
    Twin Twilights
    --------------

    ¶11. (C) At the end of the day, and the end of their reigns,
    Sadat faced and Mubarak faces similar situations. But
    Mubarak seems to have managed the dilemma better in at least
    one key area: he has systematically and "legally" eliminated
    virtually all political opposition, leaving only the MB
    standing, having foresworn violence and politically
    emasculated. Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an
    estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it
    was under Sadat. Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the
    legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent
    change of leader unlikely.

    ---------------------
    The One Certain Thing
    ---------------------

    ¶12. (C) The two presidents share another undeniable point in
    common: their mortality. Mubarak's street credibility, like
    Sadat's, is very low. The was illustrated by the insistent
    rumors of Mubarak's illness and death, despite numerous
    official denials. This lack of faith by the people of Egypt
    in their political leaders could well come back to haunt
    Mubarak's successor, whomever he may be. Will it make the
    transition more difficult? Yes. Will it matter in the end?
    Probably not, as long as the successor enjoys the support of
    the elite and the security apparatus, including the military.
    And even if there is a valid analogy to draw between
    September 1981 and September 2007, it is at best uneven. The
    world -- and Egypt -- have fundamentally changed. While
    President Mubarak clearly faces significant challenges, and
    has reacted with at least some measure of Sadat's paranoia,
    we do not foresee September 2007 leading to another October
    ¶1981.
    JONES

`