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### Viewing cable 06TAIPEI2921, FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG ON HIS CENTRAL AMERICA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06TAIPEI2921 | 2006-08-23 22:10 | 2011-03-04 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2697549.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697564.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2697557.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697581.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697579.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702553.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-04/Investigacion/Relacionados/Investigacion2702554.aspx

`

    VZCZCXRO9185
    OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHIN #2921/01 2352207
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 232207Z AUG 06
    FM AIT TAIPEI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1782
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002921

    SIPDIS

    ASEAN

    AMEMBASSY BELIZE
    AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
    AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
    AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
    AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
    AMEMBASSY SEOUL
    AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
    AMEMBASSY TOKYO
    USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    CIA WASHDC
    DIA WASHINGTON DC
    SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
    TAGS: PREL PM CS HO BH NU TP CH TW
    SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG ON HIS CENTRAL AMERICA
    TRIP, FUTURE TAIWAN FOREIGN POLICY

    REF: A. TAIPEI 02800
         ¶B. TAIPEI 133192

    Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s):
    1.4 (B/D)

    ¶1.  (C) Summary.  Taiwan Foreign Minister James Huang
    believes his visit to Central America last week shored up
    Taiwan's fragile relations with Panama, Costa Rica and
    Honduras.  He remains deeply concerned, however, that Daniel
    Ortega might win the November presidential election in
    Nicaragua and shift relations from Taipei to Beijing, and
    that Sao Tome and Principe is Beijing's next diplomatic
    target after facilitating the break in relations between
    Taiwan and Chad earlier this month.  Huang explained that
    economic development and humanitarian assistance programs,
    the bulwark of Taiwan's relations with Panama, Costa Rica and
    Honduras, will become the basis of Taiwan's efforts to create
    a new, more substantive foreign policy, one less focused on
    world-wide jousting with Beijing for diplomatic partners.
    Other officials, however, are less optimistic that Huang can
    transform Taiwan's "dollar diplomacy" in the face of the Chad
    setback and Chen Shui-bian's embattled presidency.  End
    Summary.

    Stabilizing Relations with Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶2.  (C) In the Director's courtesy call on Foreign Minister
    James Huang (Chih-fang) to introduce new Deputy Director Bob
    Wang, Huang expressed appreciation for U.S. transit
    assistance on his visit last week to Central America.  The
    visit, he said, had helped stabilize Taiwan relations with
    Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras.  Huang detailed his visits
    to those three countries:

    -- Panama:  Huang told the Director that his visit received
    excellent press coverage in Panama and that his meetings with
    President Torrijos and Vice President Lewis Navarro had gone
    very well and functioned to reinvigorate the relationship.
    The three men discussed a number of cooperative projects over
    the next three years, including Taiwan participation in
    construction to expand the Canal, set to begin after an
    October 22 referendum.  Acknowledging that China was "as
    always" continuing to press Panama to break relations with
    Taiwan, Huang insisted that in his meeting President Torrijos
    did not seem concerned by this pressure.

    -- Costa Rica:  Huang felt his visit to Costa Rica and
    meeting with President Arias reinforced bilateral relations.
    In San Jose, he signed a bilateral MOU for a series of
    projects:  (1) USD 50 million for the reconstruction of a
    hospital destroyed by fire (which "will benefit millions," he
    said), (2) USD 2 million for a housing project for poor
    people in the northern part of the country, and (3)
    assistance on police training (particularly important, he
    noted, in a country which has no armed forces and a spiraling
    crime rate).

    -- Honduras:  Since President Zelaya was relatively new in
    office, Huang told the Director, Taiwan's major need there is
    to consolidate relations, which he believed his visit had
    helped accomplish.

    ¶3.  (3) In response to the Director's inquiry on Huang's
    further travel plans in Latin America this year, Huang
    replied that he might visit Belize for the 25th anniversary
    of independence on September 21.  Prime Minister Musa had
    invited President Chen Shui-bian to attend the celebration,
    and Huang might go in Chen's stead.  Noting that he had told
    the press that politics should not affect foreign affairs,

    TAIPEI 00002921  002 OF 004

    Huang insisted Taiwan would not cease its senior level trips
    abroad, including that of President Chen to Palau in
    September.  (Note: Huang did acknowledge that the impending
    "Depose Chen" street demonstrations might inhibit access to
    MOFA and suggested the Director might have to enter through
    the rear entrance of the building.  The media, Huang lamented
    in a nonsequitur, is now "ruling the country." End Note.)

    Nicaragua Relations Hanging in the Balance
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶4.  (C) Noting that Nicaraguan Ambassador Marcos Garcia had
    expressed concern to him earlier that day about the upcoming
    November 5 presidential election and the possibility of an
    Ortega victory, the Director asked for FM Huang's assessment
    of the political situation in Nicaragua and the prospects for
    Taiwan relations with Nicaragua.  Huang responded that
    Nicaragua remains especially worrisome in the run up to the
    election, with the most recent polls giving Ortega a slight
    lead over Montealegre, 31 to 29 percent, and the other two
    candidates trailing at 15 and 12 percent.  This could put
    Ortega within striking distance of a first-ballot victory.
    If he received at least 35 percent of the vote with a 5
    percent margin over his closest rival, Huang said, Ortega
    could win the presidency outright and avoid a run-off.  While
    he was quite worried about the possibility of an Ortega
    victory, Huang told the Director, Taiwan was working to
    maintain ties to all political parties in Nicaragua to give
    Taiwan options no matter who wins.  If Ortega wins, Huang
    noted resignedly, Taiwan would just "go from there."

    ¶5.  (C) The Director encouraged FM Huang to keep Taiwan
    low-key toward the Nicaraguan elections, noting that while
    the U.S. privately has its views on the candidates, our
    official position is to affirm publicly our support for
    Nicaragua's democratic process.  The Director passed on
    Ambassador Garcia's report that Ortega himself had waited for
    several years after assuming the presidency in the 1970s
    before he broke ties with Taiwan, to which Huang added that
    when Taiwan resumed relations with Nicaragua in 1989 after it
    had negotiated with Ortega's brother.

    ¶6.  (C) (Comment:  Ambassador Garcia told the Director
    earlier on August 22 that he anticipated there would be a
    run-off between Ortega and Montealegre, since neither would
    likely gain either the 40 percent plurality or a five percent
    lead if their total vote was between 35-40 percent required
    by Nicaraguan election law to win outright in the first
    round.  Garcia admitted that contributions from foreign
    businessmen were legal under Nicaraguan law, but cautioned
    that any sign the Taiwan government was trying to influence
    the contest would be received very badly within his country.
    That is why, he said, Nicaragua has discouraged visits by FM
    Huang and other high level Taiwan officials in recent months.
    End Comment)

    Sao Tome and Principe:  PRC's Next Target?
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) FM Huang raised Taiwan concerns about its relations
    with Sao Tome and Principe, stating that it appeared Beijing
    was targeting Sao Tome next after Chad in its drive to
    isolate Taiwan internationally at the same time it sought to
    gain access to more oil resources.  Sao Tome's offshore oil
    fields, Huang explained, are tied into Nigeria's offshore
    fields, and Beijing is seeking to exert diplomatic pressure
    on Sao Tome via its relations with Nigeria.  (Comment: The
    implication seemed to be that if Sao Tome balked, it might
    find its oil fields being tapped by Nigeria. End Comment.)

    TAIPEI 00002921  003 OF 004

    Future Directions in Taiwan Foreign Policy
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) Noting FM Huang's late July comments to the press
    about a "new diplomacy" for Taiwan and Premier Su
    Tseng-chang's proposal last week for a more "substantive

    SIPDIS
    diplomacy" rather than an exclusive focus on the number of
    diplomatic allies, the Director inquired about future
    directions in Taiwan foreign policy.  Had the shock of the
    recent break in relations with Chad, he asked, affected this
    search for a new Taiwan foreign policy?

    ¶9.  (C) FM Huang responded that Taiwan needed a new foreign
    policy strategy, one that reflected what Taiwan could offer
    the world.  While Taiwan must continue doing all that it
    could to maintain its diplomatic relations, he said, it also
    must work to expand its informal relations with other
    countries.  Pointing out that this would require a lot of
    creativity and ingenuity by Taiwan, the Director stressed the
    importance of Taiwan not doing anything to undermine
    democratic regimes.  Huang responded that his ideas for a new
    foreign policy and his public announcement in July were
    intended to distinguish Taiwan from China and to put
    democratic and human rights values at the forefront of
    Taiwan's foreign policy.

    ¶10.  (C) At the same time, Huang told the Director, Taiwan
    would continue focusing on its relations with the U.S., "the
    most important of Taiwan's important relations."   Following
    the DPRK missile launches in early July, he explained, he had
    convened an interagency meeting to discuss Taiwan's response.
     The resulting decision to tighten up Taiwan's report control
    regime vis-a-vis the DPRK, he pointed out, had been conveyed
    to AIT last week (see Ref A).  After the interdicted airline
    bombings in London last week, Huang continued, he had
    directed all Taiwan missions in Europe and South and
    Southeast Asia to "take special consideration" in issuing
    visas to Pakistani nationals, since 24 of the plotters
    arrested were Pakistani nationals.

    ¶11.  (C) The Director expressed appreciation for Taiwan
    assistance on proliferation and terrorism issues, stressing
    that it was important for the U.S. and Taiwan to continue
    working closely together.  The Director then gave FM Huang a
    copy of the talking points on U.S. concern over the Swedish
    exclusion of Taiwan from AMRAAM International Working Group
    meetings in Sweden (Ref B), stressing the U.S. would not sit
    idly by if this was repeated in the future.  Huang expressed
    appreciation for the strong U.S. position in support of
    Taiwan participation in AMRAAM IWG activities.

    Comment:  Diplomatic Creativity in a Time of Turmoil
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶12.  (C) FM Huang's and Premier Su's efforts to develop a
    new, more "substantive" diplomacy for Taiwan is something AIT
    has long been urging on Taiwan authorities.  The Director has
    repeatedly urged senior Taiwan leaders to reach out to the
    world on the basis of Taiwan's "comparative advantages" --
    its experience with hugely successful economic development
    and political democratization -- rather than focusing solely
    on the diplomatic numbers game, which it can never win
    against a rising China.  Criticism by New Zealand last week
    of Taiwan's destabilizing influence in the Solomon Islands
    highlights the negative impact of Taiwan's traditional
    "recognition diplomacy," often labeled "dollar diplomacy."
    (FM Huang, however, bitterly complained to the Director that
    the New Zealand criticism was unfair because, he pointed out,
    PRC diplomacy was really "much worse.")

    ¶13.  (C) The new diplomacy of which FM Huang and Premier Su

    TAIPEI 00002921  004 OF 004

    speak will not be an easy task, and it is one that has been
    rendered more difficult by the shock to Taiwan of its break
    in relations with Chad earlier this month.  On the other
    hand, this shock may also spur consideration of new
    approaches.  NSC Senior Counsellor Lin Cheng-wei told AIT
    this week that FM Huang and President Chen are under heavy
    pressure over the Chad "loss."  Because PM Su is buffered on
    this particular issue, he may have a bit more political space
    to prognosticate foreign policy changes, as he did last week
    both in his weekly cabinet meeting and when he met with the
    Director.  Since FM Huang, along with the President himself,
    will be held publicly and politically accountable for further
    diplomatic losses, however, Huang may have been forced back
    into the bottom-line diplomatic numbers scramble before he
    can safely proceed with his touted new, or Su's more
    pragmatic diplomacy.

    YOUNG

`