Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6236 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AM AE AG AR AORC AJ AMGT AU AS ACOA AX AFIN AL APER AFFAIRS AA AEMR AMED ABLD AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AID AC AVERY APCS ASIG ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BR BA BM BRUSSELS BL BO BTIO BEXP BH BE BK BX BU BIDEN BG BY BF BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
COUNTER CH CO CG CASC CU CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CVIS CA CBW CMGT CE CAN CN CJAN CY COE CD CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CV CJUS COUNTERTERRORISM
DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DJ DEA DK DHS DR DTRA DS DOMESTIC DOD
ECON EG EAID EFIN ELAB EUN ETRD EU EXTERNAL ENRG ETTC EPET EINV EMIN ECIP ECPS EINDETRD EAGR EN EAIR EZ EUC EI EIND EWWT ELTN EREL ER ECIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS ES EC ENVR ECA ET ENERG EINT ENGY ETRO ELECTIONS ELN EK EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ECONEFIN ENIV EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS ENVI ENNP EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA ECINECONCS EFINECONCS ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FAO FTAA FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FJ FINR FMLN
GTMO GOI GM GG GV GH GA GT GR GE GAZA GCC GZ GOV GY GTIP GANGS
HA HU HR HUMAN HO HURI HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IS IR IZ IAEA IN IT ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IC IIP ICRC ISRAELI IMO IL IA INR ITALIAN ITALY ITPGOV IZPREL IRAQI ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF IACI ICJ ITRA
JO JAMES JOSEPH JA JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KDEM KJUS KCOR KOLY KIPR KNNP KU KWBG KPAL KN KS KZ KAWK KISL KPAO KSEC KGHG KIFR KTFN KDRG KV KSUM KAWC KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KTIP KHLS KSPR KGCC KPIN KG KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KFRD KPKO KMDR KPLS KUNR KIRF KIRC KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMN KACT KRAD KTIA KCIP KGIT KPRP KOMC KSTC KFLU KBTS KPRV KBTR KVPR KTDB KERG KWMM KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KSEP KNSD KFLO KWAC KMPI KICC KVIR KBCT KNUP KTER KCFE KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KNPP KCOM KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KLIG KOCI KRFD KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS KX KSAF KFSC KCRS KR KPWR KMIG
LY LE LG LH LI LO LOG LT LTTE LU LAB
MX MARR MOPS MCAP MNUC MZ MO MASS MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MPOS MOPPS MAPP MU MY MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MD MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MAR MC MTRE MV MRCRE MEPI
NATO NG NI NO NL NU NIPP NPT NS NSG NA NZ NATIONAL NP NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NGO NSF
OTR OREP ODIP OVIP OPDC OPRC OSAC OAS OEXC OIIP OFDP OTRA OSCE OECD OPCW OSCI OPIC OIC OFFICIALS OIE OVP
PREL PGOV PTER PHUM PINR PAK PREF PL PBTS PHSA PARM PO PINS PK PROP PE POGOV PINL POL PBIO PSOE PKFK PMIL PM PY PFOR PALESTINIAN PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PA PMAR PGOVLO POLITICS PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINT PINF PEL PLN POV PG PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON
QA
RS RU RO RW RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SOCI SP SY SCUL SNAR SA SENV SF SO SR SG STEINBERG SW SU SL SMIG SZ SIPRS SH SI SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SN SEVN SYR
TIP TERRORISM TI TU TC TRGY TX TS TBIO TW TSPA TH TO TZ TK TSPL TPHY TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TT TP TURKEY
UN US UK UG UNSC UP USEU UNMIK UZ UY UNGA UNO UV UNESCO UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VZ VE VT VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WI WBG WHO WA WMO WZ WEU
XF XG XT XM XR XS XL XH XA XZ XW XY XE XD XK XC
YE YM YI YMCS
ZI ZU ZP ZR ZB ZF ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09SANJOSE517, COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANJOSE517.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANJOSE517 | 2009-06-22 18:06 | 2011-03-08 16:04 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2702320.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2702324.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702325.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702326.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702327.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0007
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0517/01 1731843
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 221843Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0952
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000517

    SIPDIS
    SENSITIVE

    DEPT FOR S/CT Hillary Batjer Johnson and Paul Schultz; NCTC; DHS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV CVIS ASEC KHLS
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION
             COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING

    REF: STATE 322287

    ¶1. (SBU) As requested reftel, the following are Post's responses to
    questions on Costa Rica's government practices on information
    collection, screening and sharing.  Responses, cleared by all
    relevant Embassy sections, are keyed to reftel's questions:

    5A. IMMIGRATION DATA BASES AND TRAVELER INFORMATION COLLECTION:

    -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries
    and exits?  Costa Rican Immigration's (CRI) database is called POWER
    BUILDER and is based on SYBASE.  Their servers are from SUN
    Microsystems and the operating system is SOLARIS (latest version).
    CRI tracks all entries and exits by name, document number, departure
    point and destination.  However, the most reliable port of entry
    where this occurs is Juan Santamaria international airport in San
    Jose.

    -- Is the computerized immigration database available at all ports
    of entry (POEs)? Yes, but see above.

    -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems?
    For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary
    restraints, corruption, etc.? Although entries/exits at the major
    international airports are fairly well tracked, land and sea borders
    are porous; many entries and exits there go undetected.

    -- How often are national immigration databases updated?  On an "as
    needed" basis.

    -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on
    collecting information from travelers arriving in the country?
    Costa Rica is a part of theComisisn Centroamericana de Directores de
    Migracisn Central American Commission of Migration (OCAM ), which
    since the 1990s has made obligatory the use of a standard format for
    collecting information from travelers.  This standard is the entry
    and exit card or Tarjeta de Ingreso y Egreso (TIE), which is
    applicable to all Central American countries.  Article 31 of
    Immigration Law 8487 (2005) establishes that each person intending
    to enter or exit the country must present the card at the migration
    entry point; Article 144 of this law stipulates that transportation
    carriers must supply the card.  Currently, Costa Rica uses APIS for
    data collection from passengers arriving at the two principal
    international airports of Juan Santamaria (in San Jose) and Daniel
    Oduber (in Liberia).  Costa Rican Immigration tracks travelers as
    well as CR nationals.

    -- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, sea, and
    land POEs and for domestic flights?  No.  The policies are standard
    for all authorized migration entry ports, but as mentioned above,
    the APIS system is only used in the two major international
    airports.  Also, at those two entry ports an "invisible migration
    procedure" takes place for exiting passengers, because travelers do
    not pass through the migration entry/exit point.  Instead, the
    airlines collect the exit cards and turn them over to CRI.

    -- What agency oversees the collection of traveler information?
    Costa Rica Immigration, which is part of the Ministry of Public
    Security.

    -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that
    information with foreign governments? CRI's policy is to share
    information, but there should be a cooperative agreement and the
    sharing must not violate Costa Rican law; however, the GOCR does not
    share information on refugees.  Post has not encountered any
    restrictions to sharing info with the USG; the Embassy consular
    section routinely requests and receives Costa Rican Immigration
    reports on cases of interest.

    -- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data
    on incoming commercial flights or vessels?  Yes, both upon entry and
    departure. Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement
    purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way?  Yes, alerts for
    Immigration, Interpol, and Costa Rica's Judiciary are acted upon and
    the data based queried. Does host government have any existing
    treaties to share PNR data? Post is not aware of any official
    treaties, but we have access to PNR data whenever necessary.

    -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),
    interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS), or
    electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting
    other national security threats, such as wanted criminals?  CRI
    reports that APIS has been effective in locating fugitives of all
    types, including individuals in arrears on child support payments.
    Post notes that corruption is problematic in CRI, but is current
    director, Mario Zamora, has been effectively addressing this issue.
    Reports have been received that some officials can be bribed to
    overlook fugitive alerts particularly when offenders attempt to
    leave Costa Rica.

    5B. WATCHLISTING:

    -- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers
    at POEs? Yes.

    -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based
    watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts,
    criminal wants/warrants?  The CR intelligence service (DIS) is the
    main source of these kinds of watchlists.  Post notes that CRI will
    soon (estimated sometime this summer) implement a new immigration
    tracking system, the Electronic Migratory Movement System (SIMMEL),
    which during the second stage will be integrated with the existing
    Integrated Immigration System and to INTERPOL.  Deported persons,
    terrorist lookouts and criminal warrants populate the watchlist.

    -- If host government maintains a watchlist, how many records does
    the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related?
    Impossible to determine.

    -- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? CR
    Immigration.

    -- What international watchlists do the host government use for
    screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.?
    Interpol, once SIMMEL comes on line, see above.

    -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between
    host government and its neighbors?  None.

    5C. BIOMETRICS:

    -- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land,
    sea)?  If no, does host government have plans to install such a
    system?  If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not
    all, how does the host government decide what POEs will receive the
    tool?  No, there are currently no biometric systems in place.  The
    Chief of Immigration, Mario Zamora, does have an aggressive plan to
    upgrade all the immigration systems to incorporate biometrics data.
    However, the resources to fund the system are not yet secured and
    not all POEs would have access to the system if it were successfully
    developed and deployed.

    -- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government
    use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris
    recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based
    identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis?  Are the systems
    ICAO compliant? None currently, although the GOCR plans to use a
    combination of facial recognition and fingerprints with their new
    system.

    -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are
    the systems and models used? Are all passengers screened for the
    biometric or does the host government target a specific population
    for collection (i.e. host country nationals)?  Do the biometric
    collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the
    biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one
    to many comparisons (checking the biometric presented against a
    database of known biometrics)? No.

    -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know
    of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat
    biometric checkpoints?  None in place.

    -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the
    fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?  Currently the
    GOCR does not collect fingerprints of visitors.  The GOCR plans to
    incorporate taking fingerprints if/when the new biometric system is
    introduced.

    -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint
    system?  Multiple agencies share these responsibilities.
    Fingerprints are maintainted by the Organismo de Investigaciones
    Judiciales (OIJ-Costa Rican version of the FBI), the Ministry of
    Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice (Prisons).  In
    mid-2009, as part of the Merida Initiative's Central American
    Fingerprint Exchange (CAFE), an FBI fingerprint assessment team is
    expected to review the three entities above and make formal
    recommendations to the GOCR on how to logically integrate all three
    systems.

    -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or
    RTID compliant? Not known.

    -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency
    collects the fingerprints?  N/A.  See above on which agencies
    collect fingerprints.

    5D. BORDER CONTROL AND SCREENING:

    -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of
    security interest?  No.

    -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host-
    country nationals?  All travelers are tracked electronically.  What
    is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they
    hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose
    information is not actually recorded electronically? None.  What is
    the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and
    exits?  Impossible to determine.

    -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to
    use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the
    country?  Yes. If so, please describe this authority (legislation,
    mandates, etc).  It is convoluted, but includes legislation and
    executive mandates.

    -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining
    and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of
    entry into the country?  They are able to question and detain if
    necessary.  Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry?
    Costa Rican Intelligence Services (DIS) and CRI.

    -- How well does information sharing function within the host
    government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone with a
    valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how
    is this communicated and resolved internally?  It is resolved via
    coordination between DIS and Immigration.

    5E. PASSPORTS:

    -- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport
    containing biometric information? No. If so, what biometric
    information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, iris,
    facial recognition, etc.?  If not, does host government plan to
    issue a biometric document in the future?  Yes, fingerprints and
    photos will be added as soon as the new system (SIMMEL) is
    implemented. When? Unknown, but estimated for mid-2009.

    -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
    containing biometric information, does the host government share the
    public key required to read the biometric information with any other
    governments?  N/A If so, which governments?  Does the host
    government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity
    (i.e. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity
    for a replacement,etc.)? Full validity replacements are issued.

    -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for
    dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have
    reported their passports stolen multiple times? CRI maintains a data
    base for lost documents; reports of individuals suspected of
    repeated abuse can be generated.

    -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and
    page length as regular passports (do they have something along the
    lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? If issued
    in-country, they are the same as regular passports.

    -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer
    biometric fields as regular-issue passports?  Emergency passports
    issued abroad contain fewer biometric fields than regular-issue
    passports.

    -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of
    replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports
    used to apply for U.S. visas? N/A.

    -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series
    or otherwise identified? Yes, they are assigned a specific book
    number.

    5F. FRAUD DETECTION:

    -- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of
    fraud involving documents followed up? CRI resources are severely
    limited and thus so are fraud detection efforts.  We note an
    aggressive approach at the main international airport in San Jose,
    Juan Santamaria, with fraudulent document detection fairly frequent.
     Outside the context of international air travel, fraud detection
    efforts are not aggressive and the fabrication of fraudulent
    documents is as common as is corruption in obtaining documents.
    CR's Justice Department recently arrested a fraudulent document
    manufacturer who was making and selling CR National ID cards; the
    fraudulent cards were perfect because the machinery to produce them
    as well as all of the supplies (paper, laminates, ink, etc.,) were
    authentic and had been purchased from corrupt officials in the GOCR
    offices that normally produce them.

    -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of
    circulation, or made harder to use?  Although there is no systematic
    mechanism to take fraudulently issued documents out of circulation,
    claims by CRI and the Ministry of Justice that efforts are underway
    to tighten document security seem credible.

    5G. PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY:

    -- What are the country's policies on records related to the
    questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at
    points of entry into the country?  Post has been contacted to
    participate in CRI investigations at the main international airport
    in San Jose.  Suspected offenders are detained and, if violations of
    CR laws are evident, offenders are returned to their country of
    origin.  Records are maintained but not centrally; each office seems
    to maintain its own set of records on detentions and interrogations.
    How are those records stored, and for how long? Impossible to
    determine.

    -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of
    sensitive data? Laws are in place to protect privacy, however,
    corruption is also a major problem.  Post observes that possible
    offenders are asked for any and all types of information and that
    privacy waivers are not requested; there is a policy that a
    Miranda-like warning be served though we have never observed this
    service before any type of questioning.

    -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the
    implementation of new databases of records? None that we are aware
    of.

    -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government
    computer systems that hold personally identifying information?  Yes.
    CRI has free access to such information, however.

    -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that
    homeland security agencies hold about them? Individuals regularly
    try to obtain their records; this is an issue that is being debated
    legally in Costga Rica.

    -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth,
    etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement
    actions)?  No.

    -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government
    to obtain these types of data? Yes.

    5H. (SBU) IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE PARTNERS:

    Department would appreciate post's in-house assessment of whether
    host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing.
    Considerations include whether host government watchlists may
    include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to
    terrorists), and whether host governments would share or use U.S.
    watchlist data inappropriately, etc.  Post assesses that GOCR would
    be an appropriate partner in data sharing.

    -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to
    adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure
    of information?  No.

    -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally?
     Is there a single consolidated database, for example?  If not, do
    different ministries share Information amongst themselves?  There is
    no single consolidated database, although one would make sense for a
    small, but travel-dependent country like Costa Rica.  There is
    minimal internal GOCR sharing of information, and it is often
    complicated by hyper-legalistic requirements.

    -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes
    that do so?  There is no simple definition of terrorism found in
    Costa Rican law.  However, an existing definition, found in CP
    ("Codigo Penal") 246 of Law 4573 (1970), was recently modified by
    the passage of Law 8719 (2009) that strengthened counter terrorist
    legislation including the financing of terrorism.

    BRENNAN

`