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### Viewing cable 09PANAMA639, MARTINELLI WIRETAP QUEST SHOWS DARK SIDE OF NEW GOP

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PANAMA639 | 2009-08-22 14:02 | 2010-12-25 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0639/01 2341446
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 221446Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3679
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 2843
    RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0800
    RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0646
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3855
    RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 2041
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 1571
    RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 0441
    RUEABND/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH  PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T PANAMA 000639

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2039
    TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM PM
    SUBJECT: MARTINELLI WIRETAP QUEST SHOWS DARK SIDE OF NEW GOP

    Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reason 1.4 b and d.

    Summary
    -------
    ¶1. (S//NF) President Martinelli has reached out to the
    Embassy, among other actors, to request help in building
    infrastructure to conduct wiretaps against ostensible
    security threats as well as political opponents.  The
    Ambassador has made it clear to the president that the USG
    will continue our successful judicialized law enforcement
    wiretap program with Panama, but we will not be party to any
    effort to expand wiretaps to domestic political targets.
    Martinelli's seeming fixation with wiretaps and his comments
    to Ambassador during an August 12 meeting demonstrate that he
    may be willing to set aside the rule of law in order to
    achieve his political and developmental goals.   Martinelli
    has publicly declared that wiretapping will be a key law
    enforcement tool, and has submitted a draft wiretap bill to
    the national assembly.  Civil liberties advocates are girding
    for a fight, and this issue could provide the first serious
    challenge to Martinelli's popularity.

    "I Need Help"
    -------------
    ¶2. (S//NF) Late last month Martinelli sent the Ambassador a
    cryptic Blackberry message that said, "I need help with
    tapping phones."  The Ambassador, who was traveling outside
    Panama at the time, did not respond to the substance of the
    message, but directed DCM and DEA chief to meet with
    Martinelli's staff to get a better understanding of the
    president's request.  DCM and DEA chief met Minister of the
    Presidency Jimmy Papadimitriu on July 29 and again August 1.
    The latter meeting also included chief of intelligence Jaime
    Trujillo and newly-appointed Security Secretary Jose Abel
    Almengor.   Papadimitriu explained that the Martinelli
    administration's aggressive anti-corruption campaign is
    taking on powerful and corrupt individuals whose economic
    status is being threatened.  He said some of those
    individuals may attempt to retaliate by threatening
    Martinelli's personal safety.  In addition, Martinelli
    believes that his right-of-center political orientation makes
    him a target of leftist governments in the region who will
    attempt to infiltrate Panama's trade unions and destabilize
    the GOP.  Papadimitriu said Martinelli believes he is not
    getting adequate information from Panama's security services
    to counter these potential threats, and that he hoped to gain
    greater insight by establishing a wiretap program.

    ¶3. (S//NF) DCM and DEA chief explained the USG's "Operation
    Matador" judicialized wiretap program which currently
    operates in conjunction with Panama's police and security
    services.  They emphasized the requirement that all targets
    must be related to drug trafficking and related crimes, and
    that all taps must be approved by a Panamanian supreme court
    judge, following basic legal protections that are
    well-established in the U.S.  The present program provides
    half of the wiretapped lines to the GOP for its own organized
    crime investigations, which could include national security
    targets.  Under current procedures, DEA prepares an affidavit
    every 30 days which contains a list of DEA and GOP wiretap
    targets, which is reviewed and approved by the supreme court.

    ¶4. (S//NF) Papadimitriu, Trujillo and Almengor suggested that
    the current system did not allow the GOP enough flexibility
    to select targets, and mentioned short-fuse incidents such as
    kidnappings where rapid wiretap capability was needed.  DCM
    and DEA chief countered that the technical capacity already
    exists, and that the GOP should explore a new rapid-response
    procedure for getting court orders that would authorize taps
    for emergency situations.  DCM made very clear to
    Papadimitriu that the USG would not assist in expanding the
    program to include domestic political targets.  Papadimitriu
    laughed and said that Panama's security problems were far too
    serious to waste limited investigative capacity on political
    enemies.

    Darker Intent
    -------------
    ¶5. (S//NF) A recent conversation with President Martinelli,
    however, paints a less benign picture.  On August 12 Vice
    President Juan Carlos Varela invited Ambassador, DCM and DEA
    chief to meet with him and Papadimitriu to discuss the issue
    further.  Upon arrival at Varela's office, we were redirected
    to Martinelli's office as the president had taken over the
    meeting.

    ¶6. (S//NF) Martinelli opened by repeating his request for USG
    help to expand wiretaps, saying "we are in darkness" fighting
    against crime and corruption.  He said it is not fair that
    DEA collects information but that Panama does not benefit
    from that information.  He made reference to various groups
    and individuals whom he believes should be wiretapped, and he
    clearly made no distinction between legitimate security
    targets and political enemies.  Martinelli suggested that the
    USG should give the GOP its own independent wiretap
    capability as "rent" in exchange for the use of GOP
    facilities.

    ¶7. (S//NF) The Ambassador forcefully defended the DEA program
    and pointed out that the jointly-investigated cases were
    taking criminals off of Panama's streets and making the
    country safer.  Martinelli made an implicit threat to reduce
    counter-narcotics cooperation if the USG did not help him on
    wiretaps, to which the Ambassador promptly countered that she
    would readily inform Washington and we would all see Panama's
    reputation as a reliable partner plummet dramatically.
    Martinelli immediately backed off, and said he did not want
    to endanger cooperation.

    ¶8. (S//NF) Martinelli said the GOP could expand wiretaps on
    its own, but would rather have USG help.  He said he had
    already met with the heads of Panama's four mobile phone
    operators and discussed methods for obtaining call data.  The
    Ambassador reiterated the points made in our earlier
    meetings, that the current technical capacity was adequate
    and that the GOP should streamline its process for obtaining
    court orders for emergencies.

    Naive and Dangerous
    -------------------
    ¶9. (S//NF) Martinelli's near-obsession with wiretaps betrays
    a simplistic and naive attitude toward the criminal
    investigative process.  He appears to believe that wiretaps
    are the solution to all of his crime problems, and seems
    unable to grasp the concept that wiretaps are only one tool
    in the investigative process.  We believe that he has tasked
    several subordinates to obtain wiretap capacity by reaching
    out to other governments and the private sector.  His effort
    is an open secret among security professionals in Panama
    City.  His behavior also tracks with an attitude of suspicion
    and vindictiveness we have seen since the early days of the
    campaign, when he was convinced that the PRD-controlled
    security service was tapping his phones.  (Comment: This was
    very probably true.)

    ¶10. (S//NF) More worryingly, Martinelli seems prepared to
    dispense with legal procedure in order to achieve his reform
    agenda.  During the August 12 meeting he proudly recounted to
    the Ambassador how, earlier that day, he had twisted the arms
    of casino operators and threatened to cancel their
    concessions if they did not pay their back taxes and cut
    their ties to the opposition political figures who had
    granted their generous concessions.  Referring to businessmen
    who received corrupt concessions, Martinelli promised to
    "throw them to the sharks."  He chided the Ambassador for
    being "too legal" in her approach to the issue of wiretaps.

    ¶11. (S//NF) Martinelli has visited the DEA/GOP wire room and
    has been fully briefed on how the joint program operates.
    Our conversation made clear that he wishes to establish his
    own independent wire program under the cover of the DEA
    program.  If he were able to establish such a program, he
    could blame it all on the gringos if it were exposed, which
    in this tiny country it inevitably would be.  That could
    provoke a political backlash that would endanger the DEA wire
    program and its significant value to USG law enforcement.
    Martinelli's bullying style with the Ambassador made it clear
    that he is prepared to push the limit to get what he wants,
    even with his "friends."  VP/FM Varela went out of his way to
    apologize to the Ambassador and to minimize fallout from the
    meeting, noting that he hates Martinelli's bluster but has
    not yet convinced him that whatever his persona is as
    "Ricardito," such behavior is inappropriate for the President
    of the Republic.

    Big Fight Coming
    ----------------
    ¶12. (S//NF) The GOP last week introduced a draft bill to the
    national assembly that would require registry of prepaid cell
    phones and compel mobile operators to submit call data to the
    GOP for criminal investigations.  Panama's outspoken
    "civilista" sector has already voiced its strong opposition
    to the bill.  In addition to the wiretap bill, civil
    liberties advocates are deeply concerned about Martinelli's
    intent to defer modernization of the criminal code through
    transition to an accusatory system, as well as his moves to
    distance the new GOP from the process of civil society input
    to judicial policy dialogue established under the previous
    government.  The noisy and potentially powerful forces who
    once resisted Manuel Noriega could unite in common cause over
    these issues to negatively impact Martinelli's popularity.
    At the very least, Martinelli's comportment manifests the
    autocratic tendencies which have long been predicted by
    friend and foe alike.

    Comment:
    -------
    ¶13. (S//NF) A president only gets his "first hundred days"
    once, and Martinelli is spending his obsessing about
    vengeance against his political foes.  Most of his government
    appointments have favored loyalty over competence.  This is
    negatively affecting his ability to pursue his top
    priorities, as well as our bilateral cooperation on shared
    priorities.  His penchant for bullying and blackmail may have
    led him to supermarket stardom but is hardly statesmanlike.
    He risks losing the good will of his backers in the
    Panamanian elite and business communities.  Martinelli is not
    a member of Panama's traditional elite, and he could be on
    thin ice if his "anti-corruption" measures end up being seen
    primarily as shake-downs for fast cash.

    ¶14. (S//NF) Martinelli ran as a pro-U.S. candidate, and now
    assumes the U.S. owes him a debt as a right-of-center
    counterbalance to Hugo Chavez in the region. Our challenge is
    to convince him and others in his government that the 1980s
    are over in Central America.  In our discussions with
    Panamanians across the board, we are emphasizing the message
    that the U.S. has no interest in a left-right divide in the
    hemisphere, but rather in long-term institutional stability.
    Our desire is that ten years from now, Panama is a stable,
    secure, democratic, prosperous country which is friendly to
    the U.S. and capable of administering and protecting the
    Canal.

    ¶15. (S//NF) In addition to sending that message, we are
    carefully directing embassy programs to take advantage of new
    opportunities, for example a reinvigorated effort to reach
    "youth at risk" and reduce street crime, while avoiding
    potential pitfalls, particularly in the security arena.  Our
    wiretap program, which works well and upholds the rule of
    law, would easily withstand public scrutiny were it to come
    to light.  We are coordinating closely with counterparts in
    the Council for National Security and Public Defense
    (Consejo) to meet our own collection requirements, but we
    must remain vigilant against the danger of local officials
    trying to commandeer the program for internal political
    games.  We must be able to defend every action we take and in
    doing so make ourselves immune to threats to reveal our
    programs if we don't cave to pressure.  Close coordination by
    all USG agencies with Embassy Panama City is therefore more
    important than ever.
    STEPHENSON

`