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### Viewing cable 09MADRID612, SCENESETTER FOR MOD CHACON'S JUNE 30 - JULY 2

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MADRID612 | 2009-06-26 12:12 | 2010-12-08 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMD #0612/01 1771212
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 261212Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0831
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5438
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0196
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1556

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000612

    SIPDIS

    EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON, STACIE ZERDECKI
    OSD FOR MAGGIE SADOWSKA
    JCS FOR LTC THERESE PAWLOWSKI
    KABUL FOR POLAD SHERWOOD MCGINNIS
    KABUL PLEASE PASS TO QAL-E-NOW PRT SHANNON FARRELL
    BOGOTA FOR COL MARK WILKINS, DATT

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO SP
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MOD CHACON'S JUNE 30 - JULY 2
    VISIT TO WASHINGTON, DC

    REF: A. SADOWSKA E-MAIL JUNE 22 READOUT OF CUESTA MEETINGS
    ¶B. MADRID 551
    ¶C. DAO MADRID IIR 6 889 0175 09
    ¶D. MADRID 201
    ¶E. 2008 MADRID 1281
    ¶F. 2008 MADRID 678
    ¶G. MADRID 432

    Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a
    nd (d)

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: When Spanish Defense Minister Carme Chacon
    arrives in Washington June 30, she will be looking among
    other things to restore and consolidate her image as the
    rising star and heir-apparent of President Zapatero's
    cabinet. Since taking office in April 2008, Chacon has
    talked of the importance she places on close ties with her
    U.S. counterparts and of her desire to go to Washington. The
    first woman to head Spain's Ministry of Defense and the first
    Minister to give birth while in office, Chacon met with only
    one bilateral ambassador, then-U.S. Ambassador to Spain
    Eduardo Aguirre, during her 2008 maternity leave (ref F), as
    a demonstration of the significance of the bilateral
    relationship. Twice nominated and invited previously to
    participate in the 2002 and 2003 U.S. International Visitor
    Programs, Chacon had up to that point never traveled to the
    United States and has yet to do so in an official capacity.
    Although well connected and politically savvy, her relative
    inexperience in defense issues, particularly in coordination
    among NATO allies, has led to mis-steps and put her on the
    defensive against opposition attacks in the lead-up to June 7
    European Parliament elections. On the eve of her July 1
    meeting with Secretary Gates, Chacon has more to prove
    domestically than ever before. While the conservative
    opposition has used a series of recent faux pas for political
    mudslinging, Chacon's personal standing is undiminished, and
    in public opinion polls she is held in higher regard than
    Zapatero. USG interlocutors should by no means underestimate
    her, or the importance ministry places on a successful visit.
    While the focus of Chacon's trip will be bilateral issues --
    including the U.S.-Spain Agreement on Defense Cooperation
    (ADC) and U.S. plans to re-open the KC-30 tanker competition
    -- she will review existing operations including Spanish
    participation in Afghanistan and in counter-piracy efforts,
    as lead in the EU Atalanta mission. She is also expected to
    address GOS interest in closer U.S.-EU ties and
    civilian-military coordination during Spain's European Union
    (EU) Presidency January-June 2010. While in Washington, she
    will also lay a wreath at Arlington National Cemetery,
    decorate former CJCS Peter Pace and former SACEUR NSA James
    Jones, and address the Organization of American States. END
    SUMMARY.

    //BILATERAL RELATIONS//

    ¶2. (SBU) U.S.-Spain relations are strong and based on shared
    global interests. Spain is an important friend and ally of
    the U.S., and we value its cooperation in the fights against
    terrorism and narcotics and on security issues. Spain has
    approximately 3000 troops deployed in hot spots such as
    Afghanistan (over 800), Lebanon (over 1,100), Bosnia
    (approximately 260), Indian Ocean / Somalia (over 300),
    Kosovo (nearly 500), and in various UN & EU observer
    missions. Spain announced at international conferences in
    March and April a temporary increase of 450 troops in
    Afghanistan to assist with forthcoming elections. Spain has
    long fought a domestic terrorist threat from the Basque
    terrorist group ETA and suffered tragically from Islamic
    extremist terrorism in the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Since
    winning a second term in March 2008, but especially since the
    U.S. election in November 2008, President Zapatero has
    publicly and privately stressed his desire to further improve
    bilateral relations, and a strong atmosphere of goodwill has
    emerged in Spain for closer bilateral cooperation. As a
    gesture of this goodwill, the GOS presently is considering
    accepting up to five of the detainees currently held
    Guantanamo. Counter-terrorism and law-enforcement
    cooperation is strong, as are commercial and cultural
    relations (e.g., tourism). Finally, Spain is a leader in
    renewable energy technologies and has important investments
    in the U.S. in this field (e.g., wind and solar), as well as
    in road construction projects. The relationship will be of

    increasing importance when Spain takes over the EU presidency
    in January 2010.

    ¶3. (SBU) Minister Chacon is visiting Washington on the heels
    of a very successful visit to Washington by her chief rival
    in the cabinet, Interior Minister Rubalcaba, who met with DHS
    and DOJ officials as well as intelligence chiefs June 23-24
    (ref B). The two visits are but the latest in a series of
    high-level exchanges, including a presidential bilateral on
    the margins of the U.S.-EU Summit in Prague in April, a
    meeting between NSA Jones and King Juan Carlos I in Florida
    in February, and Foreign Minister Moratinos's February
    meeting in Washington with Secretary Clinton. At the end of
    May, U.S. Transportation Secretary LaHood became the first
    cabinet-level visitor to Spain on behalf of the Obama
    Administration, and Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano
    will travel to Madrid while Chacon is in Washington.

    //POLITICAL OVERVIEW//

    ¶4. (SBU) In office since 2004, Zapatero won reelection to a
    second term in March 2008, but his center-left Spanish
    Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) is seven seats shy of a
    majority in the 350-seat Congress. More than a year of
    worse-than-expected economic news has led to widespread
    criticism of Zapatero and his economic policymakers for
    having downplayed the economic difficulties. Although
    popularity ratings for Zapatero and the Socialists are low,
    the conservative opposition Popular Party (PP) has struggled
    to capitalize on this, including by attacking Carme Chacon.
    The PP has suffered internal divisions and more recently has
    been dogged by corruption accusations. Nevertheless,
    Zapatero suffered his first serious political reverse since
    winning reelection when his party lost power in March 2009
    regional elections in Galicia. Zapatero shuffled the cabinet
    April 7 as a response to criticism of the GOS' inability to
    resolve the economic crisis and with an eye to the June
    European Parliament elections. The most prominent change was
    the replacement of the Second Vice President and Minister of
    Economy/Finance. Even so, the PP secured more seats than the
    Socialists in the June 7 European Parliament elections,
    dealing a further blow to Zapatero.

    //DEFENSE TIES//

    ¶5. (SBU) Spain is an excellent defense partner with whom the
    United States enjoys robust military-to-military relations
    based on cooperation within NATO, the U.S. presence at
    Spain's bases (approximately 1335 personnel primarily located
    at Naval Station Rota and Moron Air Base), and U.S. Foreign
    Military Sales (FMS) to Spain. The southern Spanish bases of
    Rota and Moron are strategic hubs, midway between the U.S.
    and theaters of operation in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S.
    planes and ships account for approximately 6,000 flights and
    200 port calls a year in Spain. Spain remains a leading U.S.
    FMS client, with USD $3.2 billion worth of open FMS cases.
    The Spanish military, especially the Navy (SPN), is familiar
    with U.S. equipment and tactics. The SPN employs the AEGIS
    system on its frigates, and is interested in the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF). At the same time, the Spanish defense
    industry is a U.S. supplier, as with the United States Coast
    Guard (USCG) purchase of eight EADS-CASA CN-235-300M maritime
    patrol aircraft (245 million USD total). Overall, the
    Spanish military is pro-U.S. and pro-NATO.

    //CHACON IN THE HOT SEAT//

    ¶6. (SBU) Chacon has been on the defensive against opposition
    attacks over her handling of a trifecta of thorny issues in
    the past three months. Spain's announced withdrawal of
    troops from KFOR in mid-March was widely criticized not for
    the substance of the decision so much as for the apparent
    lack of coordination -- since refuted by the GOS -- of the
    decision internally as well as with NATO Allies (ref C).
    Vice President Biden clarified to reporters March 28 in Chile
    that the U.S.-Spain bilateral relationship exceeded any
    disagreement over Kosovo, and Spanish leaders publicly touted
    "absolute (U.S.) understanding of the Spanish decision."
    Chacon survived a congressional censure motion brought by
    opposition critics over her handling of the withdrawal, which
    began the end of April and will be accomplished by the end of
    the summer.

    ¶7. (SBU) In mid-May, Chacon was again criticized for poor
    coordination and inadequate public information regarding an
    outbreak of H1N1 flu at a military academy outside Madrid. A
    group of school children had been allowed to visit the
    installation two days after the first symptoms were reported.
    Testifying May 26 in the Spanish Senate and May 27 in the
    Congress, Chacon fiercely defended her ministry,s role in
    containing the H1N1 outbreak, insisted her ministry had
    followed all World Health Organization (WHO) protocols in
    coordinating with Spain's Health Ministry, and accused an
    opposition questioner of fear-mongering. (NOTE: Spain had
    at least 537 confirmed cases of the H1N1 virus by mid-June
    (up from 167 at the end of May), making it the most affected
    European country by virtue of daily flights from Mexico and
    various U.S. points of origin. All the victims are reported
    to have mild systems and be responding well to treatment.
    Health Minister Trinidad Jimenez announced June 12 her
    ministry would not continue to report new cases, in order to
    avoid the "numbers dance," since the origin of all the cases
    was clear. END NOTE.)

    ¶8. (SBU) The H1N1 incident is but one anecdote in a recent
    series of opposition attacks on perceived blunders by the
    Zapatero Administration in the lead up to European Parliament
    elections June 7, in which the Socialists fared poorly. On
    June 10, Chacon was forced to make statements denying Spanish
    involvement in detention of Israeli spies in Lebanon after a
    video conference with Spanish military commanders the
    previous week was broadcast by media who had been invited to
    film the onset of the meeting. The Defense Ministry later
    asserted the arrests were carried out by Lebanese Security
    Forces in an area of southern Lebanon controlled by Spanish
    troops in coordination with UNIFIL. The conservative
    opposition Popular Party continues to allege Chacon knows of
    Spanish involvement and has demanded she clarify the GOS's
    role in the operations. So far, Chacon seems to have
    weathered and learned from the criticism and perhaps come out
    stronger for having kept her composure under pressure.

    //CHACON'S WASHINGTON AGENDA//

    ¶9. (C) Post expects Minister Chacon will use her time with
    Secretary Gates to review current Spanish operations and to
    place a marker on future discussions of the Agreement on
    Defense Cooperation (ADC). She may also raise the long-term
    resolution -- important to Spain for supplying its troops in
    Afghanistan -- of the Manas Transit Base. Any discussion of
    industrial participation or pending defense contracts should
    be considered in the context of Spain's budget woes and
    severe recession. The latest OECD prediction is that the
    Spanish economy will shrink by 4.2 per cent this year and
    unemployment is expected to reach 20 per cent by 2010. The
    economic slump has the potential to affect political-military
    relations inasmuch as the GOS is feeling pressure to prevent
    further job losses, including potential cuts in DOD
    contracts.

    //AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE COOPERATION//

    ¶10. (C) MOD staff do not expect Chacon to discuss the future
    of the ADC. If raised, we believe the Defense Minister could
    lay out a broad way ahead on this issue, and we understand
    her staff has advised her that only minor changes or
    technical adjustments are necessary. The current ADC is in
    effect until February 2011 and three potential directions
    exist: complete re-negotiation, minor improvements, or
    continue as is with automatic extension. Secretary General
    for Defense Policy (SEGENPOL) Luis Cuesta indicated June 18
    to OSD staff Spain's overall satisfaction with the ADC (ref
    A). Spanish interlocutors have further advised us even
    "improvements" are off the table until the middle of 2010,
    once Spain's EU presidency is completed. In fall 2008,
    however, Chacon had raised the idea of elevating the status
    of the document from an international agreement to treaty
    (refs D and E). We believe U.S. efforts and those of her own
    staff have dissuaded her of that notion.

    //POSSIBLE CUTBACKS AT ROTA AND MORON//

    ¶11. (C) Minister Chacon's visit presents an opportunity to
    reiterate how much we value the use of Rota and Moron.

    Access to both bases is an excellent example of a balanced
    and mature defense relationship that brings great security
    benefits to both our countries and serves as a cornerstone of
    the larger bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, the U.S. Air
    Force in Europe (USAFE) has been deliberating since 2006 and
    is in the final stages of a pre-decisional draft plan to cut
    costs at Moron by eliminating several hundred Spanish jobs.
    Assuming USAFE pursues the matter, the plan will be
    considered by the highest levels of the GOS and could end up
    costing a lot more financially and politically than the Air
    Force is likely to save annually. Relatively minor labor
    issues involving Spanish employees at those bases go straight
    to the Presidency. The potential for massive personnel cuts
    resulting from cost reductions at Moron and simultaneous
    budget cuts at Rota would rise to Zapatero's level. Coupled
    with unemployment at 18 per cent and rising -- the highest in
    the European Union -- and a severe recession, such changes
    could cause a number of problems, the least of which might be
    a complete re-look at the ADC. Strikes and lawsuits are
    possible. Other possible ramifications of large manpower
    cuts include strained relations, anti-American sentiment,
    impact on the ease of operations on these bases including
    complications for aircraft clearances (currently 6,000/year),
    and attempts to mitigate financial losses in the form of
    additional taxes and landing fees. DOD should also consider
    the potential impact on current military operations of, in
    one worst-case scenario, the forced removal by GOS of all
    U.S. forces from Moron. The autonomous community where the
    bases are located is a key stronghold of the President's
    party (indeed, the "governor" of that region was elevated in
    April to the President's cabinet). Any attempt in tough
    economic times to cut several hundred Spanish contract jobs
    at the bases would be controversial and would at a minimum
    diminish GOS interest in allowing us continued access. While
    we have no indications that Minister Chacon is aware of the
    Moron possibility at this time, the Embassy is discussing
    scenarios with USAFE and so many people know about the issue
    that we should be prepared for the possibility the Spanish
    might have gotten wind of it. If and when they do, we should
    expect significant political blowback that could bleed over
    into other areas of the mil-mil relationship (indeed, into
    the entire bilateral relationship).

    //PALOMARES//

    ¶12. (C) One issue Chacon might possibly raise is GOS interest
    in USG participation in a final cleanup of the Palomares
    radiation site that was contaminated in 1966 when three
    hydrogen bombs fell near the town of Palomares after a
    collision of a USAF B-52 and a USAF refueling tanker
    aircraft. The site was cleaned according to standards of the
    time, and radioactive soil and vegetation was shipped to the
    United States. The Department of Energy has helped fund
    health and environmental monitoring for decades, along with a
    recently completed GOS study that outlined the considerable
    amount of remaining contamination. The Spanish Embassy sent
    a diplomatic note in March asking for USG participants in a
    working group to define collaboration responsibilities for a
    final cleanup. The USG has not responded, and post
    understands that DOD is seeking to determine its position.
    In reftel G, Post recommended an interagency meeting to
    determine a USG response. Minister Chacon has not been
    closely involved in the issue in the past, but the Foreign
    Ministry's Director General for North American Affairs raised
    the issue with EUR A/S Gordon in a recent meeting, and GOS
    frustration over the lack of a response to the diplomatic
    note may lead Chacon to do so as well.

    //AFGHANISTAN//

    ¶13. (C) Spain has invested about 300 million Euros in
    Afghanistan, including development assistance pledged since
    2006 and more recent monetary support pledged since March to
    the Election Trust Fund and the ANA Trust Fund. Spanish
    officials have also indicated Spain will contribute more
    money for infrastructure (road from North-South of RC-W) in
    excess of Spain's London Conference pledge (ref A).
    Militarily speaking, Spain has deployed more than 800 troops
    under ISAF. Spain shares responsibility with the Italians
    for a Forward Support Base in Herat, where it has two OMLTs,
    and is running a provincial reconstruction team in Qal-e-Now,
    in Badghis province. The Spanish have begun construction on

    a base for the ANA battalion Spain is sponsoring and,
    adjacent to that facility, a new facility for the PRT. In
    Post's assessment, Spain is doing what it does well, but
    could do even more.

    ¶14. (C) Minister Chacon testified before the Spanish
    Congressional Defense Committee and secured parliamentary
    authorization and funding June 17 for Spanish contributions
    to the Elections Security Forces (ESF), scheduled to deploy
    temporarily in support of Afghan elections for three to four
    months. In addition to the 450 temporary troops for the
    Afghan elections (to be deployed in mid-July), the Committee
    authorized longer-term deployments of 70 guards for Kabul
    International Airport and 12 instructors to train the Afghan
    National Army. The authorization also included 33 armored
    vehicles to increase the total number of Spanish armored
    vehicles in Afghanistan to 93. Chacon requested and received
    funding for the 450-troop battalion to stay one month beyond
    the elections, to allow for a second round of voting, if
    necessary. COMMENT: It is possible a company (out of a
    battalion to be dedicated to the ESF) may remain in
    Afghanistan after the 3-4 month timeframe is completed,
    pending the security situation following the elections, when
    Spain would determine whether it should or could leave some
    of its ESF battalion behind. END COMMENT. Regardless of
    what happens with the ESF, Spain will take the lead for
    security operations at Kabul International Airport (KAIA)
    from the Polish contingent from October 2009 through April
    2010, and Spain will provide 40 Civil Guard personnel to
    either NTM-A or European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) (ref A).

    ¶15. (C) Spanish Chief of Defense GEN Rodriguez met in Kabul
    the week of June 22 with COMISAF General McChrystal. Spanish
    Joint Staff said the encounter could not have been better,
    describing it as "exceptional" and oriented to the future.
    Following on what the Spanish perceived to be a fruitful and
    positive visit both with COMISAF and with Commander of the
    Combined Security and Transition Command - Afghanistan
    (CSTC-A), General Formica, this July 1 meeting would be a key
    opportunity to ask directly at the highest level to
    underscore any stated COMISAF needs and expectations in the
    Spanish sector, reinforce military requirements which Spain
    could provide, and request Spain demonstrate leadership in
    other key areas. Possible opportunities that Spain could
    seize, if asked, include: extending promised Spanish
    election support in place beyond August 20; lengthening time
    between rotations to improve continuity in the regional
    command; expansion to the north; not moving Spanish
    helicopters from the PRT back to Herat; and following through
    on Spain's formalized sponsorship of Colombian troops to
    serve alongside Spanish forces in Badghis. If there is no
    possibility that the United States will fund airlift for
    Colombian troops going to serve with Spain's contingent in
    Afghanistan, we should be clear about our expectations and
    limitations, in order to avoid any hard feelings over the
    potentially earlier arrival of any U.S.-sponsored Colombian
    Special Forces.

    ¶16. (C) COMMENT: In the lead up to the strategic review of
    U.S.-Afghanistan policy, Spanish leadership here in Madrid
    stressed that Spain needed to be asked directly and at the
    highest level for more support in Afghanistan. Absent a very
    direct request to fulfill requirements in RC-West or
    elsewhere, Spanish officials can claim to be off the hook.
    Even with a high-level political intervention, the Spanish
    may resist additional contributions or plead a lack of
    Spanish public support for the mission. That being said,
    without a high-level discussion, we are nearly certain that
    none of the election support forces will stay in ISAF after
    the Afghan election. This is our opportunity to tell
    Minister Chacon exactly what else Spain could do, at a time
    when she needs to maintain the upward trend in her political
    standing. After receiving negative press over the Kosovo
    withdrawal, Chacon appears to be working consciously on
    improving her image and her media posture, and her Washington
    schedule positions her for critically important photo
    opportunities. We hope she has also learned something about
    proper consultation among Allies. Any number of the hot
    issues raised here, improperly handled in the current
    economic climate, could severely undermine Chacon, erode
    expressions of goodwill, and threaten our future operational
    effectiveness.

    CHACON

`