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### Viewing cable 10ASUNCION97, GOP SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT NEW CELL PHONE INTERCEPT SYSTEM, BUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10ASUNCION97 | 2010-02-18 20:08 | 2010-12-22 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Asuncion

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAC #0097/01 0492052
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O R 182052Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0569
    INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM FP MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T ASUNCION 000097

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN
    WHA/FO CMCMULLEN, WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, MDASCHBACH, INL/LP DHOOKER, DS/TIA/ITA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/18
    TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL PA
    SUBJECT: GOP SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT NEW CELL PHONE INTERCEPT SYSTEM, BUT
    PROMISES TO KEEP SIU PROGRAM INTACT

    CLASSIFIED BY: Ambassador Liliana Ayalde, Ambassador, State, Front
    Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Interior Minister Filizzola told the Ambassador
    February 10 that the GOP would soon be rolling out a new, expanded
    cell phone intercept program, which would continue to cover
    counternarcotics but would also include anti-kidnapping cases as
    the GOP ratchets up efforts to capture the EPP. Filizzola assured
    the Ambassador that the DEA-SIU cell intercept program would remain
    alive, but encouraged the Embassy to allow the use of the
    DEA-funded cell intercept software to the GOP or it would be
    rendered obsolete. Despite some initial technical doubts, it
    appears that Filizzola's plan is technically feasible. However, we
    want to ensure that the DEA-supported program is not compromised in
    the process. Given the pressures on the GOP to arrest the EPP
    members responsible for the Zavala kidnapping, there is no doubt
    that the Lugo government will press to increase its intercept
    capability. Our participation and concurrence is key to our
    counternarcotics-- and broader law enforcement-- goals in Paraguay.
    END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------------
    -----------

    FILIZZOLA INFORMS AMBASSADOR OF NEW GOP PROGRAM

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------------
    ------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola told the Ambassador
    February 10 that the GOP would soon be rolling out a new, expanded
    cell phone intercept program, which would continue to cover
    counternarcotics but would also include anti-kidnapping cases as
    the GOP ratchets up efforts to capture members of the Paraguayan
    People's Army (EPP) involved in the Fidel Zavala kidnapping.
    Since September 2009, DEA has had an active cell phone intercept
    program limited solely to counter-narcotics, managed by the
    Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD) (which is independent of the Interior
    Ministry). On several occasions since the October kidnapping of
    rancher Zavala by the EPP, Minister Filizzola asked Ambassador
    Ayalde and/or DEA to allow the Interior Ministry access to the cell
    intercept program so that it could pursue leads in the kidnapping
    case. Embassy declined access to the system, but cooperated with
    the Interior Ministry in order to monitor 12 lines related to the
    kidnapping. On February 10, Minister Filizzola told the Ambassador
    that the GOP had everything in place (legal framework, equipment,
    etc.) for a broader intercept program, but he learned that his
    program would impact the DEA-SIU program. The Ministry procured
    Brazilian intercept equipment for USD 1.2 million but needed access
    to the software available via the DEA-SIU program at SENAD in order
    to make it operational. The Minister further said that he now
    understood that the technology did not permit both programs to
    operate independently. Thus the USG could either authorize the
    Ministry to link up with the DEA software or the GOP would procure
    the rest of its own system which would mean that the USG program
    housed in SENAD would be shut down. While acknowledging that drugs
    are a serious problem, the Minister stated that they are not the
    only security issue confronting Paraguay. Kidnapping, arms
    trafficking and corruption, the Minister stated, could not be
    subordinated to the war on drugs. Filizzola said the GOP's top
    priority was capturing the EPP, which had to take precedence over
    counternarcotics. He was specifically concerned about the USD
    550,000 the EPP received during the Zavala kidnapping, the EPP's
    interest in generating instability, and the leads the GOP had on
    some other possible kidnappings. "Counternarcotics are important,"
    he said, "but won't topple our government. The EEP could."

    ¶3. (S/NF) Filizzola assured the Ambassador that the DEA-SIU cell
    intercept program would continue, but encouraged the Embassy to
    cede access to its cell intercept software to the GOP or it would
    be rendered obsolete. The Minister said SENAD would still be able
    to intercept lines, but the Ministry of Interior would need to
    utilize our software. Filizzola said President Lugo had approved
    the new program, and would speak to SENAD Minister Cesar Aquino
    regarding same. (NOTE: As of this writing, Lugo had not broken the
    news to Aquino. END NOTE). Filizzola told the Ambassador that he
    wanted to ensure transparency with the Embassy and secure our

    continued cooperation. The Minister stressed that he had the
    support and legal framework from the courts, Public Ministry, and
    the telephone regulatory agency CONATEL. The Minister noted that
    since the DEA already owns the connecting software (LMNS)
    equipment, it would be more sensible and helpful to the GOP if the
    U.S. would authorize its use by the Ministry. The alternative-the
    GOP starting from scratch-- would waste precious time in the GOP's
    urgent effort to capture members of the EPP and would render our
    equipment/software obsolete.

    ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador made clear that the U.S. had no interest
    in involving itself in the intercept program if the potential
    existed for it to be abused for political gain, but confirmed U.S.
    interest in cooperating on an intercept program with safeguards, as
    long as it included counternarcotics. While noting that the
    Interior Ministry's current personnel are trustworthy, the
    Ambassador noted that others could abuse this technology in the
    future. The Minister concurred and added that both he and the
    President were keenly aware of the potential risks. The Minster
    added that he believes there are currently three or four
    clandestine pieces of equipment in Paraguay capable of intercepting
    cellular phone calls. This equipment was purchased by members of
    the previous government using questionable funding and disappeared
    once the Lugo government took over. Both Filizzola and Vice
    Minister Caballero, who was also present for the meeting, confirmed
    that controls are crucial. Caballero assured the Ambassador that
    the following judicial and procedural protections are in place: 1)
    the intercept room will be managed by Public Ministry prosecutors
    and the Interior Ministry; 2) cellular phone providers will know
    which lines the GOP is listening to and will only grant permission
    based on a judicial order; 3) judicial orders can only be issued
    by three Asuncion-based judges, which are the same judges
    authorized to issue the orders under the current DEA-SENAD program;
    4) the Supreme Court will ensure that only authorized taps are in
    place; 5) the equipment purchased by the GOP automatically tracks
    every action taken and its historical account cannot be altered or
    erased; and 6) the law only permits cell phone interception for
    anti-kidnapping (in this case, pursuit of the EPP) and
    counter-narcotics; there are no other lawful purposes.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------------
    -----------------------

    IN SPITE OF SOME QUESTIONS, THE PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE FEASIBLE

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------------
    -----------------------

    ¶5. (S/NF) Despite some initial technical questions from DEA, it
    appears that Filizzola's plan is feasible given the GOP's purchase
    of additional technology. The highly technical nature of this
    program has lent itself to confusion about what is and is not
    possible. From Filizzola's first request to use the software
    (LMNS) that the Embassy installed at SENAD, we had consistently
    indicated that DEA Washington had to weigh in. So the Embassy
    arranged for a February 17 video-teleconference (VTC) between the
    Minister, Vice Minister Caballero, and Filizzola's Chief of Staff
    Claudia Guanes and DEA Washington, led by XXXXXXXXXXXX, DEA's
    Unit Chief Coordinator for the Science and Technology Section.
    Also present were the Ambassador and DEA Country AttachC)XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    ¶6. (S/NF) During the VTC, Minister Filizzola laid out his plans for
    the program in general terms, highlighting its urgency. He said
    his program would start with cell phone provider PERSONAL, which is
    the only currently operational cell provider using the DEA-procured
    LMNS. Filizzola asked about the status of the second DEA- procured
    LMNS for TIGO, and expressed the GOP's commitment to continue the
    counternarcotics intercept program. He discussed the technical
    limitations with the DEA experts and concluded that expansion of
    the intercept program was technically possible with the purchase of
    additional hardware and licenses. The Minister saw two

    alternatives: (1) the Ministry buys additional equipment/software
    and replaces the DEA-purchased LMNS; or (2) the Ministry and SENAD
    (read DEA-supported program) share the connecting software (LMNS).
    Both DEA and the Minister asked some clarifying questions which
    demonstrated that the Ministry had the equipment for the Monitoring
    Center and only needed the use of the DEA software currently in use
    at PERSONAL. Between PERSONAL and the next cell provider scheduled
    to come on-line, TIGO, they would cover 90% of the cellular
    telephone market. DEA indicated that it took them over a year to
    install the PERSONAL system because full cooperation from the
    company is required. The Minister emphasized that this would not
    be an issue because they already had the decree from CONATEL
    (telephone industry regulator) that forces the telephone companies
    to cooperate, in addition to the proper legal authorities (based on
    the Constitution and the anti-kidnapping law).

    ¶7. (S/NF) In light of the highly sensitive nature of this program,
    the Ambassador asked Minister Filizzola to provide the Embassy with
    a written request for access to the existing cell intercept
    software, along with copies of the laws that serve as a legal basis
    for the expanded program. Both Supreme Court President Fretes and
    SENAD Minister Aquino expressed doubts to Emboffs about the
    legality of the expanded program. (NOTE: While Fretes told
    Filizzola that he was "on board," it is very common for Paraguayans
    to avoid voicing disagreement. Aquino's concerns, in turn, may
    have more to do with his rivalry with Minister Filizzola. END
    NOTE). TIGO (Millicom), one of Paraguay's leading cell phone
    providers, told the Ambassador that though they had concerns about
    the GOP's decision to move forward with an intercept program, they
    felt that U.S. involvement in the program would provide them with
    some "cover."

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------

    COMMENT: GET ON BOARD OR GET LEFT BEHIND

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Given the political pressures on the GOP to arrest the
    EPP members responsible for the Zavala kidnapping, there is no
    doubt that the Lugo government will continue intense efforts to
    improve its intercept capability. Our participation and
    concurrence is key to our counternarcotics-- and broader law
    enforcement-- goals in Paraguay. If we are not supportive, the GOP
    will view us as an obstacle to a key priority, which could
    jeopardize our broader relationship and the DEA's ability to pursue
    counternarcotics leads. Capturing the EPP has become a top
    priority of the Paraguayan government, and there is a real sense of
    urgency that it happen quickly. We now have an opportunity to
    help the GOP and be viewed as a reliable and valuable partner, as
    well as to ensure that U.S. interests in counternarcotics are
    protected. However, we want to limit our involvement to protecting
    DEA's program, as opposed to legitimizing the GOP's broader CT
    intercept program. DEA will send XXXXXXXXXXXX to Asuncion in
    coming weeks, who will offer advice to the GOP on how to best set
    up the program (in order to protect our part of it). We have
    carefully navigated this very sensitive and politically sticky
    situation, and hope that we can move forward quickly in order to
    make the most of it. It appears that we have no other viable
    choice. END COMMENT.
    AYALDE

`