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### Viewing cable 09CARACAS750, TEN TENETS OF CHAVISMO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09CARACAS750 | 2009-06-16 13:01 | 2010-12-10 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Caracas

`

    VZCZCXRO0130
    PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
    RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHCV #0750/01 1671323
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 161323Z JUN 09 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3212
    INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
    RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000750

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
    HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
    SUBJECT: TEN TENETS OF CHAVISMO

    Classified By: CHARGE d'AFFAIRES JOHN P. CAULFIELD, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
    (D)

    ¶1. This message is the end of tour analysis of the political
    situation in Venezuela by Embassy Deputy Political Counselor
    Dan Lawton.

    ¶2. (C) Summary. Despite President Chavez's professed
    allegiance to socialism, his political project lacks any
    consistent ideology. Instead, the Venezuelan president
    exercises an increasingly authoritarian playbook that ensures
    his unquestioned, indefinite leadership and concentrates more
    and more power in his hands. The Government of the
    Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) aggressively defends
    its democratic legitimacy at the same time that it targets
    key opposition leaders, polarizes society along political and
    class lines, and hypes the existence of external and internal
    enemies to justify repressive measures. Chavez's preference
    for loyalty over competence, creation of parallel Bolivarian
    institutions, efforts to forge a one-party state, and
    chest-thumping nationalism also smack of creeping
    totalitarianism. Overall, Chavismo poses a serious threat to
    democracy not just in Venezuela but throughout the region,
    and it directly competes against U.S. influence in Latin
    America. Moreover, it is becoming ever more difficult to
    begin any dialogue with a GBRV increasingly consumed by its
    own solipsistic "revolutionary" fervor and outsized ambition.
    End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------- ------
    One - There Is Only One Great, Indispensable Leader
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶3. (C) President Chavez has carefully cultivated his own
    personality cult, such that for most Venezuelan voters,
    President Chavez embodies Chavismo. Outsized billboards and
    posters of Chavez dominate public buildings as well as the
    rallies and campaigns of his United Socialist Party of
    Venezuela (PSUV). Venezuelans can buy a wide range of Chavez
    paraphernalia from Chavez action figures to Chavez watches to
    a compact disc of Chavez singing Venezuelan folk songs. He
    dominates all state media, which also broadcast his Sunday
    "Alo, Presidente" talk show. Chavez regularly requires all
    local television and radio networks to carry his speeches
    ("cadenas"); he has wracked up over 1200 such hours (50 days)
    on the air. He has not groomed any successor and he
    frequently rebukes even his most trusted advisors publicly.

    ¶4. (C) In pursuing the elimination of presidential term
    limits, Chavez declared publicly numerous times that he is
    indispensable to his Bolivarian Revolution. While voters
    rejected his constitutional reform package in December 2007,
    he succeeded in winning public approval of the elimination of
    term limits for all elected offices in the February 2009
    referendum. Chavez has repeatedly stated that he plans to
    govern at least until 2020. A corollary to the Venezuelan
    president's protagonism is that there can be no Chavismo
    without Chavez. No Chavez supporter who has broken with
    Chavez has prospered politically. The formerly pro-Chavez
    Podemos party is all but broken after opposing Chavez's 2007
    constitutional reform package. Former Defense Minister Raul
    Baduel also spoke against indefinite reelection; he is
    currently sitting in a Caracas military prison awaiting trial
    on corruption charges.

    ----------------------
    Two - Centralize Power
    ----------------------

    ¶5. (C) Chavez's "Socialism of the 21st Century" exalts the
    government's active role in the economy and vilifies
    capitalism, but in the minds of most Venezuelans, it remains
    a vague notion of a state bearing benefits. The thread that
    most consistently ties together Chavez's political project is
    the increasing concentration of power in his hands. Chavez
    has firm control over all the other branches of government.
    The opposition foolishly boycotted National Assembly
    elections in 2005, and currently only approximately 15 former
    government supporters do not automatically support Chavez in
    the 167-seat unicameral legislature. With few exceptions,
    the judiciary rules in favor of the executive branch, even in
    civil cases bereft of political implications.

    ¶6. (C) Chavez is also squeezing state and local governments
    from above and below. He recently promulgated a law that
    allows the central government to take state control over
    ports, airports, and highways. The central government has
    done just that in states run by opposition governors.

    CARACAS 00000750 002 OF 004

    Moreover, Chavez created an appointed position to take over
    virtually all the functions and budget of the opposition
    mayor of Caracas. The National Assembly is considering
    creating presidentially appointed regional vice presidencies
    that would undermine elected governors. The Venezuelan
    president also created community councils nationwide which
    are registered by and report directly to the Office of the
    Presidency. Chavez diverted 30 percent of state and local
    discretionary development funds to these community councils.

    --------------------------------------------
    Three - Hype External and Internal "Enemies"
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Chavez insists on depicting the United States (which
    he habitually refers to as "The Empire") as Venezuela's
    enemy. Although most Venezuelans are not anti-American,
    Chavez's radical foreign policy plays to his base of firm
    supporters and serves as a convenient rallying cry during
    Venezuela's frequent elections. Although he holds virtually
    absolute power in Venezuela, Chavez tries to reframe public
    perceptions by depicting himself as David fighting Goliath,
    usually the United States, but also occasionally Spain,
    Colombia, or Israel. Chavez and other senior GBRV leaders
    have tempered this script somewhat since the election of
    President Obama. They tend to praise the President and
    Secretary personally, while quickly adding that "imperial"
    political power continues to be exercised in the United
    States by big business, the military establishment, and the
    CIA.

    ¶8. (C) Although domestic opposition to Chavez is weak and
    disunited, Chavez and senior GBRV officials regularly accuse
    it of plotting to overthrow or assassinate the Venezuelan
    president in coordination with the United States. The GBRV
    does not produce proof or in most cases actually pursue
    charges; such allegations conveniently serve to circle the
    wagons within Chavismo, to prevent across-the-aisle political
    dialogue, and to discredit the opposition. The GBRV
    regularly reminds voters that large sectors of the opposition
    participated in the short-lived 2002 coup to give greater
    credence to current "threats." Chavez also accuses the
    opposition of doing the USG's bidding, calling them
    "pitiyanquis." Moreover, government supporters regularly
    accuse opposition-oriented press outlets of "media
    terrorism," essentially building the case for continued
    government harassment of the vestiges of independent media.

    ---------------
    Four - Polarize
    ---------------

    ¶9. (C) Railing against the "oligarchs," Chavez exploits class
    divisions in stratified Venezuela for political gain. By
    playing almost exclusively to the over 70% of Venezuelans who
    are poor, Chavez has maintained a reliable electoral majority
    (with the exception of the 2007 constitutional referendum
    vote when many Chavistas abstained). He is not only
    channeling government resources to the economically
    disadvantaged, but also prioritizing the GBRV's role in the
    economy at the expense of the private sector. Such policies
    squeeze the middle class and are feeding a growing brain
    drain of professionals, sectors of society traditionally
    associated with the opposition. They also increase citizens'
    economic dependence on the GBRV.

    ¶10. (C) Politically, Chavez tolerates no middle ground.
    Although increasingly large numbers of voters consider
    themselves politically neutral, most Venezuelans still
    habitually self-identify themselves as either with "the
    process" or against. Moreover, the GBRV has a good idea
    where most voters stand. Those that signed the 2004 recall
    referendum soon found themselves on the infamous "Tascon
    List" by which the GBRV discriminated in terms of government
    jobs, contracts, and other benefits. In his speeches, Chavez
    frequently cites mentor Fidel Castro, bellowing in stark
    terms, "With the revolution, everything; outside, nothing."
    After its most recent registration drive, the PSUV claims
    over seven million members. Local analysts believe the PSUV
    party list is becoming the "reverse Tascon List" -- if your
    name is not on it, you cannot expect to get government
    services (at least not without paying intermediaries).

    ---------------------------------------
    Five - Insist on Democratic Credentials
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Senior GBRV leaders insist that "participatory"

    CARACAS 00000750 003 OF 004

    democracy is superior to "representative" democracy. They
    contend that real democracies give priority to "social
    rights" and argue that concepts such as checks and balances
    and institutional autonomy are discredited "bourgeois"
    concepts. Chavez also regularly stresses that he has held
    national elections almost yearly since he was first elected
    in 1998, blurring any distinction between being elected
    democratically and governing democratically. Anxious to
    preserve their democratic legitimacy at home and abroad,
    Chavez and senior GBRV officials lash out immediately and
    disproportionately to any criticism of GBRV abuses. They
    traditionally dismiss any criticism as interference in
    Venezuela's domestic affairs and insult or try to discredit
    any government or organization that faults the GBRV (without
    ever engaging on the substance of the critique). The GBRV
    forcibly expelled a Human Rights Watch leader and a member of
    the European Parliament when they publicly took issue with
    the GBRV's human rights record while in Caracas.

    ------------------------------------
    Six - Reward Loyalty Over Competence
    ------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) The single most important common characteristic of
    Chavez's ministers and other senior officials is their
    unquestioning loyalty to the Venezuelan president. He tends
    to rotate a small coterie of firm supporters through senior
    positions, simultaneously rewarding his inner circle while
    preventing them from accruing either real expertise or an
    independent power base. A substantial portion of Chavez's
    appointed officials participated in his failed 1992 military
    coup. Moreover, Chavez retains loyalists despite their poor
    administrative or electoral track records. He named
    Diosadado Cabello, who last year lost his re-election for the
    Miranda Governorship, to be Minister of Infrastructure and
    Telecommunications. Chavez appointed Jessie Chacon
    Information Minister after he lost the mayoral race in the
    Sucre borough of Caracas. By contrast, Chavez's PSUV
    temporarily expelled Henri Falcon, the then widely hailed
    competent mayor of Barquisimeto, only to quickly reinstate
    him after it became obvious that Falcon would win the
    governorship of Lara State in 2008 with or without the PSUV's
    endorsement.

    ---------------------------
    Seven - Repress Selectively
    ---------------------------

    ¶13. (C) The GBRV picks its political victims carefully,
    making examples of sector leaders. Such calibrated
    repression has so far avoided any significant public backlash
    while at the same time created a climate of fear in civil
    society and fostered self-censorship in the media. Examples
    abound. The GBRV recently pressed corruption charges against
    Maracaibo Mayor and 2006 consensus opposition presidential
    candidate Manuel Rosales; Rosales fled to Peru where he was
    granted asylum. The GBRV jailed Carlos Ortega, the leader of
    the largest opposition trade union confederation. He escaped
    from military prison in 2006 and was also granted asylum in
    Peru. The GBRV closed the only critical free-to-air
    television network in 2007 and is threatening to do the same
    to opposition-oriented cable news network Globovision.
    Prominent electoral NGO Sumate has been subject to numerous
    government investigations. Chavez and other senior GBRV
    officials have blasted prominent Catholic Church officials
    for defending democracy, and pro-Chavez thugs briefly
    occupied the Cardinal's residence in downtown Caracas.

    ----------------------------------
    Eight - Create Parallel Structures
    ----------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) Over the last ten years, the GBRV and its supporters
    and allies have created new bodies and institutions in an
    effort to undermine and outflank organizations that it could
    neither control nor co-opt. Domestically, the GBRV and its
    adherents have spawned pro-government NGOs, business groups,
    labor unions, television and radio networks, and even a
    socialist spin-off of the Catholic Church. Chavez's social
    programs ("misiones") generally sidestep and starve long
    established government ministries of resources.
    Internationally, Chavez is endeavoring to establish
    multilateral organizations that both magnify Venezuela's
    influence and combat purported "U.S. imperialism." From the
    GBRV's perspective, ALBA, Petrocaribe, UNASUR, and the Bank
    of the South are tools with which to supplant or weaken the
    OAS, IMF, and the World Bank.

    CARACAS 00000750 004 OF 004

    -------------------------
    Nine - Party Equals State
    -------------------------

    ¶15. (C) Since creating the United Socialist Party of
    Venezuela (PSUV) in 2007, President Chavez has been trying to
    forge a one-party state. Chavez uses government resources,
    especially state media, and pressures the over two million
    government employees to support the Venezuelan president,
    PSUV candidates, and his referendum proposals during
    elections. The National Electoral Council (CNE) staffs PSUV
    registration drives. Chavez demanded that all pro-government
    parties join the PSUV, but three parties, the Communist Party
    (PCV), Patria Para Todos (PPT), and the Podemos party,
    declined. Podemos later joined the opposition in 2007. The
    PSUV declined to support any PPT or PCV gubernatorial and
    mayoral candidates in the 2008 state and local elections and
    neither party now exercises any meaningful local power.
    Moreover, the National Assembly is seriously considering an
    electoral law that would almost certainly expand the PSUV's
    absolute legislative majority and diminish the influence of
    the PPT and PCV after the 2010 parliamentary elections.

    ----------------------------
    Ten - Monopolize Nationalism
    ----------------------------

    ¶16. (C) Calling himself the heir to Venezuelan founder Simon
    Bolivar, Chavez asserts exclusive claim to Venezuela's
    forefathers and national symbols. He regularly cites Bolivar
    and other national heroes out of context, insisting that they
    were early socialists. One of Chavez's stock stump speech
    messages is that his Bolivarian Revolution liberated
    Venezuela from being an American colony and will make
    Venezuela a world power in coming decades. In contrast,
    Chavez and his supporters depict the opposition as
    unpatriotic, stateless, or paid U.S. agents. Chavez's own
    exaggerated demonstrations of patriotism conveniently
    distract public attention from local problems or demonstrate
    incontrovertibly that he can do what he wants. In 2006,
    Chavez added a star to the Venezuelan flag and flipped the
    horse on the national seal to make it run left, not right.
    In 2007, he eliminated three zeros from the currency and
    changed its name from "bolivars" to "strong bolivars." He
    also added the prefix "People's Power" to all ministries and
    ordered all Venezuelan clocks changed by thirty minutes to
    create a unique Venezuelan time zone. In 2008, he suggested
    that he would exhume Bolivar's body to prove that he was
    poisoned (He has not done so yet).

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶17. (C) The increasingly authoritarian nature of Chavismo,
    not to mention its habitual and politically convenient
    vilification of the United States, pose considerable
    challenges to any effort to improve bilateral ties. Chavez
    and other senior GBRV officials publicly express interest in
    greater dialogue with the USG, but the reality is that to
    date, the GBRV has been reluctant to create meaningful and
    easily accessible channels of communication, let alone engage
    substantively on issues that should be of common interest.
    The GBRV also makes it clear that it will not accept or look
    past any USG criticism, however well-founded or required by
    congressionally-mandated reports or testimony. Facing no
    checks on his power at home, Chavez craves international
    attention and influence abroad. Whether it is funneling arms
    and money to the FARC, sending suitcases of money to the
    Kirchner campaign in Argentina, or exporting elements of
    Chavismo to ALBA countries, to name just a few prominent
    examples, Chavez's outsized ambition backed by petrodollars
    makes Venezuela an active and intractable U.S. competitor in
    the region.
    CAULFIELD

`