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### Viewing cable 10KABUL12, MILITIAS IN KUNDUZ; A TALE OF TWO DISTRICTS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10KABUL12 | 2010-01-03 07:07 | 2011-01-24 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO9712
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #0012/01 0030725
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 030725Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4433
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000012

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
    STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
    USFOR-A FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS AF
    SUBJECT: MILITIAS IN KUNDUZ; A TALE OF TWO DISTRICTS

    Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Coordinator Scott F.
    Kilner for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since Kunduz authorities helped stand up
    pro-GIRoA militia forces in early Fall 2009, the forces have
    evolved in very different directions. In Qala-e-Zal
    district, a well-disciplined force has brought about a marked
    improvement in security, while the picture in the Aqtash
    areas of Khanabad district is much less positive because the
    GIRoA clearly lacks adequate control over the fighters. End
    Summary.

    BAKCGROUND

    ¶2. (C) In June 2009, Kunduz Governor Mohammad Omar announced
    the creation of an Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) in
    Kunduz province, for which 150 to 200 men were to be
    recruited in each district to complement regular ANP. In
    July, Gov. Omar and provincial security officials conducted
    shuras throughout the province, in which elders and former
    mujahedeen commanders were asked to identify suitable
    recruits for the force. Omar subsequently learned, however,
    that APPF would not be expanded to Kunduz province and
    increasingly frustrated with a shortage of ANSF, especially
    ANP, Kunduz authorities moved to stand up militia forces
    which would work with the ANSF to combat the growing
    insurgency. Funding for the initiative was obtained
    primarily through the National Directorate of Security (NDS).
    QAL-E-ZAL: A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY- BASED SECURITY

    ¶3. (C) In the northwestern district of Qala-e-Zal, militia
    forces under the command of Nabi Gichi have been the most
    organized and disciplined of the various militia groups
    operating in Kunduz province. A large part of the credit for
    this must go to District Manager Mohammad Nazir, who was
    involved from the beginning in the standing up of a pro-GIRoA
    militia and recruiting for its leader, the Turkmen former
    mujahedeen commander Nabi Gichi from Mazar-e-Sharif. The
    commanders received some weapons as well as funding from the
    NDS to supplement to supplement their own weapons, and
    community elders agreed to provide some food for the militia
    members. The commanders submitted to Nabi as the overall
    commander in the district, and they promised not to collect
    taxes from or harass the population. According to Nazir,
    each sub-commander of Nabi is responsible for a certain area,
    and those forces are not permitted to operate outside of the
    area. In the event of a security incident or allegations of
    misconduct by militia members, Nazir told us, he holds the
    sub-commander of the area personally responsible.

    ¶4. (C) Nabi's forces proved themselves in fighting
    insurgents in September, at a time when insurgents appeared
    close to taking over much of Kunduz province. Together with
    ANSF, his forces successfully fended off an insurgent attack
    on a border police post in Qala-e-Zal, along the border with
    Tajikistan, and have successfully driven insurgents from much
    of Qala-e-Zal district. During a visit by PRT Kunduz in
    November to the district to assess the situation and explore
    opportunities for quick-impact projects, Nabi's forces were
    present, yet both the commander himself and his forces
    (identifiable by their wearing of a yellow armband) remained
    discreetly in the background and visibly deferential to the
    District Manager. The local population expressed strong
    appreciation for the improvement in security Nabi's forces
    have brought.

    KHANABAD: GIROA HAS LITTLE CONTROL

    ¶5. (C) In Khanabad district in eastern Kunduz province,
    particularly in the Aqtash area, militias have also been
    active, but the picture is altogether different from that in
    Qala-e-Zal. While in Qala-e-Zal a commander was recruited
    from outside the area, the move to support militias in
    Khanabad district has significantly increased the influence
    of local power brokers from the area. The most powerful of
    the militia leaders in Khanabad are Mohammad Omar (unrelated
    to the Kunduz Governor of the same name), an ethnic Pashtun;
    and Mir Alam Khan, a Tajik commander and the most powerful
    power broker in the province. Mir Alam is also the
    brother-in-law of Kunduz NDS Chief Gen. Mohammad Daoud.
    While the full extent of the cooperation between NDS and Mir
    Alam is not clear, it is likely that Mir Alam's relationship
    to Gen. Daoud has given him a privileged position in
    receiving NDS support.

    ¶6. (C) The most problematic aspect of developments in
    Khanabad district is the lack of adequate GIRoA control over
    the forces operating in the area, an issue over which both
    KABUL 00000012 002 OF 002
    District Manager Nezamuddin Nasher and Kunduz Deputy NDS
    Chief Karim Atrafi have repeatedly expressed concern. In
    Atrafi's assessment, unlike in Qala-e-Zal, the situation in
    Aqtash has become quite confused, and neither NDS nor other
    GIRoA authorities have much control over the situation.
    According to Atrafi, the fighters active in Aqtash do not
    have a clear chain of command, and these militia forces are
    also fighting among themselves and settling old scores.
    Atrafi also noted that some groupings were cooperating with
    both insurgents and GIRoA, changing their behavior
    opportunistically depending on their own interests.

    ¶7. (C) Already, there are indications that the situation in
    Aqtash, which militia forces cleared just before the
    election, is quite fragile, and reports from the area suggest
    there is significant resentment among the local population
    toward the militias' practices of collecting taxes.
    Further complicating the picture is the complex ethnic makeup
    of Khanabad district. Unlike in Qala-e-Zal, where the
    population is overwhelmingly Turkmen, Khanabad district, like
    the province as a whole, comprises a plurality of Pashtuns as
    well as smaller numbers of Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. As
    the militias loyal to Mir Alam are mostly Tajiks, there
    exists a real risk that conflict between the population and
    militias or among the militias themselves will take on an
    ethnic dimension, in which the militias are perceived by
    Pashtuns as not anti-Taliban but anti-Pashtun.

    ¶8. (C) The very different development in Qala-e-Zal and in
    Khanabad highlight the significant benefits and risks
    associated with such informal security mechanisms. In
    Qala-e-Zal, the militias have undoubtedly been a stabilizing
    force. The involvement of the District Manager from the
    start, the inclusion of the community into the process, their
    benign behavior toward the population (not collecting taxes),
    and the (comparatively) clear chain of command have all
    helped to make the force in Qala-e-Zal a success. The
    picture in Khanabad is much less clear, and it remains to be
    seen whether the security gains that have been made there
    will be durable, or if they came at the price of increasing
    ethnic tensions in the long-term. Furthermore, as Afghan
    officials increasingly see a need to bring the militia forces
    into an official framework, these different characteristics
    among militia groups will have significant implications for
    any possible future integration of the forces into ANSF.
    Post will engage with GIRoA authorities on the potential for
    that integration and will continue to monitor the development
    of these informal security mechanisms. End Comment.

    ¶9. (U) This cable was drafted by PRT Kunduz.
    RICCIARDONE

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