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## RE: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain

Released on 2012-09-02 23:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1739708
Date | 2011-04-05 23:57:09
From | camilo.villarino@maec.es
To | marko.papic@stratfor.com

The Falklands had also, at that time, only a symbolic value and still were
the source of a war for internal political reasons, which would play a
very significant role in the case of Spain were something similar to ever
happen with Ceuta and Melilla.
Besides that, you are right about the LNG capacity, which was partially
developed to diminish our dependence on Algerian gas.
Best,
Camilo
Camilo Villarino-Marzo
Political Counselor
Embassy of Spain
2375 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel. (202) 728 2351
Fax (202) 833 5670
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
De: Marko Papic [mailto:marko.papic@stratfor.com]
Enviado el: martes, 05 de abril de 2011 15:51
Para: Villarino Marzo, Camilo
Asunto: Re: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
Dear Camilo,
Interestingly, even if Morocco was to have a regime change and take out
Ceuta and Meililla -- which by the way, do not fall within NATO's purview
from what I understand -- it would be only a cosmetic loss for Spain. The
two are fairly symbolic and are not really strategic anymore.
Overall the energy issue is a big concern for sure. But Spain does have
considerable LNG capacity and could replace piped gas with an expansion of
LNG facilities. Either way, any interruption to Algeria's exports due to
crises would be temporary as whatever political entity came to power there
would at the end of the day need to pay its bills one way or another.
I included the Ceuta/Melilla issue in my analysis, as well as a more
general issue of increased migration from Morocco due to some Tunisia
styled instability.
Cheers,
Marko
P.S. No problem about your answer, I thought it was quite thorough! Thank
you as always
On 4/5/11 2:43 PM, Villarino Marzo, Camilo wrote:
Dear Marko,
You are right that Spain does not face two many conventional threats
nowadays. Accession to NATO was considered more an instrument for Spanish
integration in the West (and Armed Forces' transformation), once Franco
was dead, than an instrument to strengthen our defense interests. Our
former "enemies" (mainly the French in the XVI and XVII centuries and the
Brits in the XVIII) are today our allies. Nevertheless, in today's defense
planning, it could be said that our potential conventional threats come
basically from the South:
First, Morocco, in case a future more aggressive regime could try to take
by force the two Spanish towns which are in the North Africa Mediterranean
coast: Ceuta and Melilla. These two towns are very difficult to defend
without a major counterattack on Moroccan soil or defense assets.
Second, Algeria, if a change of regime could affect our gas supply.
For the rest, Russia is too far away from us, although our interests would
be affected if Russia could one day dictate EU foreign policy. So is
China, unless it interferes with international free trade of energy
supplies, rare earth materials, food, etc., which I doubt. In any case,
for all those other risks, our alliance with the US through NATO is the
cornerstone of our defence posture.
Best,
Camilo
P.S. Sorry for this short answer but I have to rush into a meeting.
Camilo Villarino-Marzo
Political Counselor
Embassy of Spain
2375 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel. (202) 728 2351
Fax (202) 833 5670
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
De: Marko Papic [mailto:marko.papic@stratfor.com]
Enviado el: martes, 05 de abril de 2011 13:46
Para: Villarino Marzo, Camilo
Asunto: Re: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
Dear Camilo,
Thank you very much for your detailed reply. You are very correct that the
toll, in terms of personal losses, has been relatively small from ETA in
Spain in comparison to IRA in the U.K. I would just say that my point was
that the internal security threat in the wider political sense was more
existential to Spain than to any other West European country. If London
lost Northern Ireland, what would be the end result? Not much... So in
terms of the overall impact to the integrity of the state, Basque Land and
Catalonia are of greater importance to Spain than Northern Ireland is to
the U.K. The two Spanish regions are economically far more important than
Northern Ireland is to the U.K. -- in fact, Northern Ireland is a drain on
resources. Therefore, even though the actual deaths/murders were fewer,
the importance of keeping the threat contained was greater.
And yes, I completely agree that the threat has to a large extent passed
(we wrote about it a few years ago:
http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/137576/analysis/20090507_spain_changing_demographics_and_elections_basque_country).
So the point of the analysis was not that the threat was necessarily
contemporary, but more in the context of how Spain has perceived threats
-- internal/external -- since the democratic transition. How it has
evolved to think of threats.
And this really brings up an issue that has been to a large extent
puzzling me for years. What is Spain threatened by? I would say that other
than the latent internal security issues and potentially Morocco spilling
over the Straits in some near apocalyptic scenario, there is not much.
This is why Spain is the only country to have ever held a referendum on
NATO as a member state (in 1986). This is a luxury that a country with
very few conventional external threats can have.
What are your thoughts on that? (As always, completely off the record)
Cheers,
Marko
On 3/30/11 4:45 PM, Villarino Marzo, Camilo wrote:
Dear Marko,
I do have a comment, although it does not concern your perception of
Spanish international position in relation to Libya (to which I could
basically agree with some minor remarks), but your opinion on the internal
situation in Spain in relation to the Basque and Catalan nationalist
movements (see below texts in bold letters and underlined). I am somehow
surprised to read (it is not the first time I have read it in STRATFOR)
that you speak about these movements as a "security threat". There is, of
course, the terrorist group ETA, but even when it was more powerful
(beginning of the 80's) it never was able to go beyond 80 deaths (murders)
per year: extremely delicate from a political point of view, yes, no doubt
about it; source of many internal security problems, indeed, but "an
internal threat" even bigger than the Irish question in the UK? ETA has
never been a "guerrilla" force, but a terrorist organization with an
impact similar to that of the the Brigate Rosse in Italy, although
prorogued in time due to the support of 15%-20% of the population of the
Basque Country, a support very much diminished today. The Catalan case is
a very different, since violence has almost been inexistent there.
A different case is that of the support that independence may have (or
does have) in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Although it remains a
minority position, it is a very relevant one from a political point of
view. But not a security threat.
Best regards,
Camilo
Camilo Villarino-Marzo
Political Counselor
Embassy of Spain
2375 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel. (202) 728 2351
Fax (202) 833 5670
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
De: Marko Papic [mailto:marko.papic@stratfor.com]
Enviado el: miercoles, 30 de marzo de 2011 12:06
Para: Villarino Marzo, Camilo
Asunto: Fwd: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
Dear Camilo,
Would greatly appreciate your criticism and comments if you have any. Your
email helped me focus in on some key issues for this.
Feel free to disseminate this one to your colleagues in the Embassy and
Foreign Ministry.
Cheers,
Marko
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2011 07:36:49 -0500
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Stratfor logo
Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
March 30, 2011 | 1218 GMT
Europe's Libya
Intervention:
Germany and
Russia
STRATFOR
Editor's Note: This is the final installment in a five-part series
examining the motives and mindset behind the current European intervention
in Libya. We began with an overview and follow with an examination of the
positions put forth by the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Russia
and Spain.
Spanish Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez said March 29 that the option of
exile is still available to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi since he has not
been charged with any crimes. Madrid has therefore backed Rome's position
that exile should be an option to end the conflict in Libya. Spain is
participating in the international coalition by providing airbases for
U.S. AWACS and refueling missions. It also has sent four F-18 fighter jets
and a refueling aircraft as part of its contribution to enforce the no-fly
zone, along with an Aegis-capable frigate and a submarine to participate
in the enforcement of the arms embargo.
Related Special Topic Page
The Libyan War: Full Coverage
Special Series: Europe's Libya Intervention
The Spanish decision to intervene in Libya has not garnered much attention
in the global press. However, it stands out as Spanish Prime Minister Jose
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's most notable foreign policy decision, one made
only weeks after being elected, involved pulling Spanish troops out of
Iraq in April 2004. The Iraq pullout strained Madrid's relations with
Washington, as the U.S. perceived it as hasty and pandering to public
opinion panicked by the Madrid train bombings, which took place
immediately before March 2004 general elections. In reality, Rodriguez
Zapatero had campaigned throughout 2004 on an anti-Iraq War platform and
thus used the Madrid attack merely as a trigger for a decision he probably
would have made regardless.
The decision to intervene in Libya can thus be seen as a way to revitalize
Spain's image as a country capable of international activism when the need
arises - especially in the Mediterranean, its area of national interest -
but also as a last-ditch effort by an unpopular government to raise its
profile ahead of elections in early 2012.
Europe's Libya
Intervention:
Spain
(click here to enlarge image)
The Luxury of Isolation
Spain has often stayed aloof from European geopolitical entanglements.
Geography makes this choice possible. Essentially, Spain dominates the
Iberian Peninsula. The Pyrenees leave it geographically isolated from core
Europe. Its colonial linguistic and cultural links to this day provide it
access to a large and lucrative Latin American market where its goods and
services (especially financial) can out-compete its European rivals,
giving it easier markets than the rough competition in Europe proper.
Throughout its last century, Spain has been more self-absorbed than most
large European nations. Catalan and Basque agitation for autonomy and
independence, Madrid often has had no choice but to focus solely on
internal threats - giving it fewer resources with which to address foreign
issues.
This geographic and political aloofness combined with uniquely strenuously
internal security requirements for a major European power (even greater
than those imposed on the United Kingdom by the Irish question!) have made
Madrid's place in the Trans-Atlantic security establishment one of the
most ambivalent. Rodriguez Zapatero's about-face on Iraq from the stance
of his predecessor, Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, is therefore unsurprising.
Because of its isolation and because the Trans-Atlantic alliance matters
less for Madrid than for others in Europe, Spain is probably the only
major country in Europe that has the luxury of pursuing such dramatically
opposed policies purely on the domestic political calculus of its leaders.
For Spain, the security benefits of NATO membership therefore never really
have been clear. Focused on internal security - for which NATO membership
is of little use - Madrid's only true international concerns have been its
proximity to North Africa and the subsequent ill effects of organized
crime and smuggling. NATO's security guarantees do not apply to the
Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, across the Strait of Gibraltar from
Spain and surrounded by Morocco, which claims the territories. One could
still argue that Spain's NATO membership certainly would be at least a
psychological reason for Morocco to reconsider plans to seize the two
territories.
Europe's Libya
Intervention:
Spain
(click here to enlarge image)
Therefore, Spanish NATO membership ultimately is about being accepted into
the club of Western European states, which was still in serious doubt in
the immediate years following the Franco dictatorship when Madrid joined
the alliance in 1982. Joining the alliance at the time was a simple way to
reassure Madrid's European allies that Spain would not renege on its
commitment to democracy and that it would use NATO membership to begin
reforming its military leadership. Madrid joined the European Union four
years later in 1986. Spain has used its membership in NATO and often-close
alliance with the United States to balance against the France- and
Germany-dominated European Union. Spain often feels sidelined by the
Franco-German leadership duo and has never been able to form a counter to
it by allying with the United Kingdom or Italy. Spain's relationship with
the United States has therefore proven useful in keeping Berlin and Paris
on notice that Madrid's acquiescence to all things agreed upon by
Continental powers is not a given.
Precisely because Spain's NATO membership was more about international
assurances and the balancing of its U.S. and European commitments - and
not about its core security interests - Madrid has had the luxury of
ambivalence, as indicated by the extreme change of policy between Aznar
and Zapatero on Iraq. This ambivalence was further exemplified by the 1986
referendum, organized by a Socialist government, to see Spain withdraw
from NATO, the first and only such referendum by a NATO member. The
referendum was handily defeated by a popular vote, but the very act of
holding it illustrated Spain's attitude toward the alliance: A country
truly threatened by adverse geopolitical conditions and therefore truly in
need of a security alliance would not seek to depart such an alliance.
In the Libya intervention, Madrid accordingly seeks to illustrate its
solidarity with the United States and the other main European powers. For
Rodriguez Zapatero in particular, the intervention is a way to illustrate
that Madrid does not shy from international military action, especially as
Spain already participates in international efforts in Afghanistan -
thereby absolving Spain of its departure from Iraq. Also important for
Rodriguez Zapatero is proving that despite its considerable economic
crisis - and fears that Spain could be the next eurozone economy after
Portugal to require a bailout - Madrid can still play an important foreign
policy role.?
The Domestic Component, Energy and Morocco
There is also an important domestic political component in terms of how
Madrid is pursuing the intervention. The center-right People's Party (PP)
remains firmly ahead of the governing Socialist Party in national polls,
having enjoyed a steady 13-point lead for the past six months. Rodriguez
Zapatero is worried that government's austerity measures - imposed to curb
Spain's budget deficit and comply with demands from Berlin - are losing
him the support of his base among the center-left in Spain. Due to the
legacy of the Franco years, the left in Spain tends to be generally
anti-interventionist, with as much as 91 percent opposed to the country's
participation in Iraq. Therefore, while the Socialist government is trying
to raise Madrid's profile internationally, it must do so quietly, without
much fanfare at home to avoid further erosion of its support from its
base. That said, the intervention is thus far popular due to its
multilateral nature. The danger for Rodriguez Zapatero, however - as it is
for other European governments that have entangled themselves in the
Libyan intervention - is that public support for a humanitarian
intervention will not distract from economic austerity too long,
especially if the intervention starts looking drawn out and inconclusive.
Europe's Libya
Intervention:
Spain
(click here to enlarge image)
On top of all this, Spain does have strategic interests in Libya, albeit
not as great as Italy's. Spanish energy company Repsol YPF extracted 8.3
percent of its overall oil production from Libya in 2009, not an
insignificant amount and comparable to the 10.7 percent that Italian
energy giant ENI extracted. Spanish imports of oil from Libya are
comparable to those of France, with 9 percent of total Spanish consumption
coming from Libya, nowhere close to the almost 25 percent of its
requirements that Italy imports. French firm Total does extract more oil
from Libya, but as a larger company than Repsol, Libya is smaller as a
share of the French company's total. As such, Repsol was not necessarily
dissatisfied with the Gadhafi status quo in Libya and probably will look
askance at the French and British moves.
Europe's Libya
Intervention:
Spain
Finally, as a Mediterranean country in close proximity to the 32 million
people of Morocco, Madrid must consider what Libyan instability means for
the region. Protests have occurred in Morocco, although the situation is
thus far still under control and violence has been sporadic. Madrid cannot
oppose the international intervention in Libya because it does not want to
set a precedent that it may need to reverse shortly. Regime change in
Morocco, for example, could place Madrid's North African exclaves in an
untenable situation or could produce an exodus of migrants that Spain will
have to counter with aggressive naval force interdiction - as Italy is
threatening to begin doing with migrants streaming from Tunisia and Libya.
That said, Morocco is nowhere near the point of Libyan instability or even
Tunisian/Egyptian-style unrest.
Madrid definitely has an interest in joining in the intervention if for no
other reason than to have a say in the post-intervention diplomatic
resolution - when Paris and London may seek to use their patronage of the
eastern Libyan rebels to enhance their respective positions. Madrid is
wary of the French and British activism and is becoming far more aligned
with Rome on the intervention than with Paris and London. This became
clear in a meeting of European, American, African and Arab leaders in
London on March 29, with Spain, Germany and Italy favoring an option of
exile for Gadhafi to facilitate a conclusion to the intervention while
France and the United Kingdom continued their strong demands for regime
change.
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Marko Papic
Analyst - Europe
STRATFOR
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Austin, TX 78701 - USA
--
Marko Papic
Analyst - Europe
STRATFOR
+ 1-512-744-4094 (O)
221 W. 6th St, Ste. 400
Austin, TX 78701 - USA