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Viewing cable 09DAKAR1504, CORRECTED COPY: GUINEA-BISSAU: OPPOSITION PRS PARTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DAKAR1504 2009-12-10 11:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO2411
OO RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #1504/01 3441113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101113Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3482
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1269
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0899
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0416
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 001504 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, DRL AND INR/AA 
PARIS, LISBON, LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM HDP SG
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: GUINEA-BISSAU: OPPOSITION PRS PARTY 
DISCRETE FOR THE MOMENT, WORRIED, LOOKING FOR HOLES IN THE PAIGC 
ARMOR 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a November 4 meeting with PolOff, Ibrahim Sori 
Djalo, Interim President of the opposition Party for Social 
Renovation (PRS) and Augusto Poquena, PRS Secretary General, started 
off describing their party's cooperation with the African Party for 
the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) on a list of 
projects before the newly convened Popular National Assembly. 
However, they quickly shifted to accusing the PAIGC of being 
responsible for violence and complaining complained about military 
control of civilian institutions and alleged Libyan influence in the 
military.  They accused recently elected Malam Bacai Sahna of being 
a weak president and said they view the recent border tension with 
Senegal as having been inflated to divert attention from the March 
and June assassinations.  Poquena expressed worry for his personal 
safety due to his criticism of military authorities.  The PRS hopes 
to capitalize on potentially dissident PAIGC deputies and public 
dissatisfaction with any reticence that the GOGB may show in 
reducing military control and impunity.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PRS Cooperates with PAIGC for Now... 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The PRS is the major opposition party in the National 
Assembly with 28 out of 100 seats (the PAIGC has 67).  Its 
presidential candidate, Kumba Yala, made it to the final round of 
the presidential elections in July, but lost heavily to Malam Bacai 
Sahna.  The PRS is a party whose base is in the Balanta ethnic 
group, the largest ethnic group in the country.  However, while the 
Balanta are a plurality they are not a majority of the population. 
As such, this ethnic base is too small to win a general election or 
a majority in the Assembly.  To correct for this weakness, many 
believe that Yala's recent conversion to Islam was a cynical 
electoral ploy done to increase his electoral support among Muslims 
(Note: Balata are primarily animists.  End note.), who make up a 
plurality among the country's religious groups.  However, in the 
second round of the recent presidential election, Kumba did not even 
win a major portion of the Balanta vote and won only 37 percent of 
the vote nationally.  The party is therefore searching for allies 
among potentially dissident PAIGC Deputies as they become unhappy 
with PAIGC policy and a lack of legislative successes. 
 
3. (SBU) PRS National Assembly deputies Ibrahim Sori Djalo and 
Augusto Poquena, both recognized their minority status in the 
Assembly and said that their party would engage in "responsible 
opposition" and would work constructively with the PAIGC because the 
voters are expecting this.  The PRS is ready to contribute to the 
passage of a responsible national budget, a working National 
Assembly budget, security sector reform, and a new system of 
government accounting.  They welcomed President Sahna's proposal to 
reform the constitution, since it has big holes and is a "bootleg" 
of the constitution of the former colonial power, Portugal. 
 
. . .  But Prepares for Later 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) In response to a question about the most urgent problems of 
the moment, Djalo and Poquena became very emotional and spoke about 
the March killings of Armed Force Chief of Staff Tagme na Waie and 
President Joao Bernardo Vieira, and on the June killings of 
ex-ministers Baciro Dabo and Helder Proenca.  Vieira was no friend 
of the PRS, said Djalo, but "everyone knows that the military did 
this in collaboration with Prime Minister Gomes."  They feel that 
the convening of an international commission to investigate and 
expose the killers is more important than security sector reform. 
Poquena also criticized the promotions of Jose Zamora Induta to Rear 
Admiral and Antonio Njai to Major General. 
 
5. (SBU) Poquena also charged, without elaborating, that Libya is 
influencing the armed forces in the form of large payments of which 
the government has no knowledge of.  Reflecting a sentiment among 
other public figures interviewed recently, Poquena also expressed 
concern that his criticisms of the government and armed forces 
rendered him vulnerable to physical attack and that he had no 
personal protection.  Djalo then tag-teamed back into the discussion 
positing that the current Senegalo-Guinean border dispute is 
artificial because the "frontier is not a simple straight line and 
never has been.  So why cry panic now, except to divert attention 
away from the assassinations?" 
 
Transforming PRS into National Party 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT: Given the structural limits of the electoral base 
of PRS, the party will be condemned to permanent minority status in 
 
DAKAR 00001504  002 OF 002 
 
 
the National Assembly and in the larger body politic, unless its 
leaders can begin to persuade non-Balata Bissau-Guineans that the 
party that oversaw the Balanta-ization of the armed forces can 
actually be a true national party.  Knowing this, the party's 
leaders are seeking to create an image of constructive participation 
in the deliberation of Assembly sessions as they wait to take 
advantage of all the weaknesses of the current president and prime 
minister, including perceived complicity in four assassinations, the 
militaries interference in civilian politics and law enforcement, 
and stalled security sector reform. In addition, there is some 
concern that widespread and growing public opinion holds that 
elections will not improve the well-being or quality of life of the 
population nor stabilize the country's political situation. 
BERNICAT