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Viewing cable 09COLOMBO1179, Action Request for FY 2010 Funds for Northern Sri Lanka

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09COLOMBO1179 2009-12-23 10:51 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #1179/01 3571051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231051Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1055
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS COLOMBO 001179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND PRM 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA 
AID/W FOR DCHA to JBRAUSE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP, OFDA, DG, OTI, CMM 
AID/W FOR EGAT/EG, ED, WID, PR 
AID/W FOR ODP/PSA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL PHUM PREF ECON CE
Ref:  A) Colombo 1148; B) Colombo 1109 
SUBJECT:  Action Request for FY 2010 Funds for Northern Sri Lanka 
 
1. (SBU) This is an action cable.  Please see paragraphs 7-13. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The coming months offer a unique window of 
opportunity for the United States and other donors to assist the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) in supporting peace and reconciliation 
through development and assistance programs for the North.  In May 
2009, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) declared victory over the 
terrorist organization the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.  Few anticipated 
that the LTTE would be defeated militarily in 2009, or that the 
North would be open for post-conflict development and reconstruction 
assistance so quickly; therefore Post's original request for FY 2010 
resources did not include funding for the North.  Under current 
programming, no Development Assistance or Economic Support Funds 
(ESF) are available for the North until FY 2011.  The opportunity is 
now:  with this cable, Post requests an additional $34 million in FY 
2010 funds for Sri Lanka to enable timely assistance to meet 
immediate needs in the North.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
3. (SBU) Sri Lanka is in a period of post-war transition in the 
aftermath of its 26-year separatist conflict.  Although the GSL won 
the war, it is not clear that they will address the underlying root 
causes of the conflict in order to win the peace.  A successful 
resettlement, economic recovery, and development program would 
demonstrate to Sri Lanka's minorities, especially the Tamil 
community, that they have a far brighter future within a united Sri 
Lanka. 
 
4. (SBU) The accelerated release of the nearly 300,000 internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) who were confined to closed camps (ref A) 
in the North creates new conditions for international assistance, 
with the focus shifting from short-term humanitarian needs to 
longer-term economic development.  Based on USAID's experience in 
post-conflict assistance in the Eastern Province, Post assesses that 
the immediate priorities for the North include job creation and work 
force development; reconciliation, stabilization and governance 
programs; justice sector assistance; basic education support; and 
micro-enterprise programs. 
 
5. (SBU) These programs would enable residents and returnees in the 
former LTTE-controlled areas of the country to benefit from and 
participate in the country's development.  A timely response to 
these needs is critical to address reconciliation and meet Mission 
objectives. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Putting USAID Experience to Work 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) Since 2003, USAID has invested more than $45 million in 
programs in the Eastern Province which have helped to jump-start the 
economy in that post-conflict region (ref B).  All of USAID's 
current programs focus on the Eastern Province and adjoining areas. 
USAID's track record of successful programs in areas such as private 
sector engagement, business partnerships, job creation, work force 
development, protection of human rights, conflict mitigation, 
governance, reintegration of ex-combatants, and infrastructure 
reconstruction programs could be applied to address the unique 
opportunity available now in the North. 
 
7. (U) Action Request:  Post requests that the Department and USAID 
provide $34 million in FY 2010 Development Assistance or Economic 
Support Funds (ESF) and support the re-establishment of an OTI field 
office to meet the urgent requirements outlined in the paragraphs 
below.  USAID's experience, network of community-based partners, 
relationships with local authorities, and track record of delivering 
rapid assistance in the conflict-affected and politically volatile 
areas of Sri Lanka puts USAID in a unique position among donors to 
respond to the post-conflict programmatic needs listed in priority 
order in the following paragraphs.  To determine the funding request 
levels indicated below, USAID conducted a Mission review of the 
immediate and most strategic requirements in the North to assess the 
kinds of programs which would be most useful in addressing those 
needs, and then completed a broad analysis on the costs for each 
area inclusive of program and management costs. 
8. (U) Job Creation and Work Force Development ($12 million).  The 
lack of economic means contributes to insecurity and 
destabilization.  The long conflict in northern Sri Lanka severely 
degraded the workforce skills of the local population; for example, 
English language and IT skills are critically lacking in the North. 
Increased investment through the private sector is a prerequisite to 
creating job opportunities and enhancing economic security.  USAID 
would use its experience in implementing public-private business 
partnerships to create sustainable jobs through a $12 million 
program with indigenous companies in the North.  Based on other 
private sector partnerships in Sri Lanka, Post expects that this new 
initiative would leverage an additional $25 million from the private 
sector partners for the North; create 12,000 new jobs; and train 
1200 young men and women to enter the current market place. 
 
9. (U) Reconciliation and Stabilization ($7 million).  Many 
government functions are being re-established in the North.  To 
mobilize and address post-conflict programming needs quickly, now is 
the time to re-establish a field presence for the Office of 
Transition Initiatives (OTI).  A small-grants program managed by OTI 
could mobilize communities to address priority needs related to the 
return of displaced populations in collaboration with existing local 
government structures.  Such a program would also lay the groundwork 
for longer-term initiatives.  Possible activities include 
rehabilitation of small-scale infrastructure; livelihoods support; 
civil society development; and information dissemination and 
confidence-building measures to create and/or restore trust between 
conflict-affected individuals and communities.  Funding at the 
requested level of $7 million would leverage the establishment of 
the Office of Transition Initiatives or direct implementation of 
similar activities by the Mission. 
 
10. (U) Justice Sector ($3 million).  An integral element in the 
stabilization of post-conflict regions is the establishment and 
presence of rule of law.  In Sri Lanka's conflict, the behavior of 
paramilitary groups and the failure of law enforcement and legal 
processes resulted in generations of victims who sought 
"alternative" mechanisms to dispense justice.  Legal processes must 
be perceived to be fair and just by all communities:  a $3 million 
program would support training on case management; judicial 
training; creation of a trilingual court system and strengthened 
youth courts; modernized and transparent administrative procedures; 
and improved technical skills of officials in areas such as human 
rights, conflict sensitivity, and combating gender-based violence. 
 
 
11. (U) Governance ($3 million).  There is an immediate need to 
address key governance issues in northern Sri Lanka, including the 
capacity of provincial and municipal officials to deliver services 
and the resolution of land tenure issues for returning populations. 
A $3 million program would enable us to build the capacity of local 
government officials and to assist with land rights and access 
issues which were central to the separatist conflict.  A governance 
program in the North would enable Post to advocate for and support a 
national land policy for returnees, assist with modernized legal 
frameworks for resolving land disputes and documentation issues, and 
support a short-term alternative dispute mechanism to resolve land 
disputes in a timely manner. 
 
12. (U) Basic Education ($5 million).  Many of the schools in the 
North were destroyed during the last phases of the war.  The 
destruction of these schools and no integration of effort at the 
national level resulted in poorly trained teachers and a curriculum 
insufficient to meet the needs of students in the North.  A $5 
million basic education program to address these needs would be 
positively received by the community and would support the 
reconciliation process.  Elements of the program would include the 
rehabilitation of 12 primary schools; the implementation of teacher 
training; enhancement of computer skills for both teachers and 
students; and support for the development of a civic education 
curriculum. 
 
13. (U) Microenterprise ($4 million).  Many people lost their 
livelihood means during the war but do not currently have the means 
to restart their businesses and access their lost resources.  USAID 
would initiate a timely $4 million community grants micro-enterprise 
program to support small businesses, and expects this program would 
enhance economic security and stability for the conflict-affected 
communities in northern Sri Lanka. 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) Post recognizes that there will be challenges to working 
in the North.  It is in our interests to engage pro-actively and 
positively with Sri Lanka, given the political and economic dynamics 
of the region and the imperative to avoid a destabilizing return to 
armed conflict on the island.  The end of the LTTE era provides the 
first opportunity in a quarter century for the GSL, USG, and other 
donors to address equity issues, both real and perceived, throughout 
the country among all the ethnic groups.  The GSL will need 
substantial donor assistance to ensure that the development needs of 
the war-affected North are met.  Providing early development 
assistance would serve as a force-multiplier in support of Mission 
reconciliation goals.  We will continue to join other donors in 
stressing the importance of free and fair elections, political 
reconciliation, and improved human rights and accountability.  We 
appreciate Washington's consideration.  End Comment. 
 
BUTENIS