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Viewing cable 09BUCHAREST840, BASESCU STARTS ON A CONCILIATORY NOTE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BUCHAREST840 2009-12-17 13:54 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bucharest
VZCZCXRO9272
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHBM #0840 3511354
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171354Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0168
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS BUCHAREST 000840 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CE ASCHEIBE, EEB/IFD 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON RO
 
SUBJECT: BASESCU STARTS ON A CONCILIATORY NOTE 
 
REF. BUCHAREST 834 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified; not for Internet distribution 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  After the Constitutional Court certified his 
victory on December 16, incumbent president Traian Basescu adopted a 
new conciliatory tone, pledging improved performance in his second 
term and announcing "state modernization" as his main priority. 
Basescu declared his commitment to having a government by Christmas 
and a CY2010 budget adopted in early January.  Basescu once again 
nominated acting PM Emil Boc to form a new government.  Boc should 
have a slim if confirmed parliamentary majority consisting of his 
own Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), the Hungarian Ethnic Party 
(UDMR) and a group of "independents" who split off from the 
opposition Social Democrat (PSD) and National Liberal (PNL) parties. 
 End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The results of the December 6 presidential election were 
finally settled December 16, when the Constitutional Court solemnly 
validated incumbent Traian Basescu's re-election.  Basescu took the 
opportunity to reinvent himself as a conciliatory politician ready 
to leave behind the old, conflict-prone Basescu.  He thanked his 
supporters for their trust and those who did not vote for him for 
"teaching him a lesson."  Basescu acknowledged that this second term 
brings greater responsibility because he must build on past 
experience and learn from his mistakes.  Later in the day, he 
stressed that this new mandate would be entirely dedicated to 
Romanians (and not to narrow party objectives) as he has no plans to 
run for office again. 
 
Boc Reloaded 
 
3. (SBU) On December 17 Basescu re-nominated acting PM Emil Boc for 
Prime Minister in the new administration.  Basescu praised Boc as a 
"man of dialogue" and tasked him to assemble a Cabinet and win 
parliamentary approval by December 23.  Basescu explained the 
urgency in terms of the need to comply with IMF requirements.  He 
suggested that the new cabinet must submit a draft budget to 
Parliament before Christmas.  The Parliament would then be called 
into extraordinary session in early January 2010 to analyze, amend 
and vote on the budget by January 17, in order to allow the IMF 
Board time to approve release of the remaining two installments of 
financial assistance to Romania one month later.  Basescu disclosed 
that half of the USD 2.3 billion expected from the IMF will go as 
normal to the National Bank, the other half to the Ministry of 
Finance to cover the state deficit. 
 
PDL Parliamentary Majority 
 
4. (SBU) The major opposition parties PSD and PNL announced they 
would not support a cabinet led by Boc.  However, PDL has managed to 
win the crucial support of the UDMR and has attracted a critical 
mass of defectors from the PSD and PNL caucuses.  Since the 
election, half a dozen PSD and PNL MPs left their parties and joined 
a group of Parliamentary "independents" with clear pro-PDL, 
pro-Basescu inclinations.  With the 18-vote support of the group of 
ethnic minorities, this provides PDL a fragile working majority of 
241 out of the 470 seats in Parliament. 
 
5. (SBU) There is much speculation over the make-up of a Boc 
government, but the PM-designate has yet to name any names.  Given 
Basescu's timetable, he will likely unveil the ministerial line-up 
within days.  In exchange for their political support, UDMR can 
expect to get a deputy PM slot and two or three ministerial 
portfolios, likely regional development, communications or SMEs. 
Gabriel Oprea, the most senior PSD defector and leader of the 
"independents," will likely receive a senior portfolio such as 
Defense or Interior, the latter of which he briefly held in early 
2009.  PDL "heavyweights" Vasile Blaga and Adriean Videanu will 
likely continue in senior posts.  If Parliament can convene on 
December 21 to hear Boc's program and vet the individual ministers, 
it is quite possible that Basescu could get his wish of having a 
functioning Cabinet in place before Christmas. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment.  With validation of his re-election, Basescu is 
genuinely "back in power."  He is trying to present himself as 
having learned from his mistakes and willing to seek compromise and 
reconciliation over conflict.  Nonetheless, he will clearly remain a 
"hands-on" president exercising tight control over the government, 
as shown by his unsurprising renaming of the ever loyal Boc.  With 
the slim parliamentary majority that PDL has cobbled together, Boc 
now appears to have enough support to gain quick approval of his new 
cabinet.  This comes largely at the expense of PSD and PNL, which 
are both rent by internal divisions and still trying to recover from 
their recent electoral defeats.  The eternal question remains 
whether Romania will finally have a government more concerned with 
governing than politicking.  End comment. 
 
GITENSTEIN