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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1435, Strategy for Engaging Brazil on Defamation of Religions

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1435 2009-12-22 19:28 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1435/01 3561928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 221928Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0203
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0002
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001435 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/22 
TAGS: PHUM PREL KISL KDEM PGOV OPDC BR
SUBJECT: Strategy for Engaging Brazil on Defamation of Religions 
 
REF: STATE 128320; STATE 128322; BRASILIA 1134; BRASILIA 1194 
BRASILIA 1280; BRASILIA 1418 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Brazilbs position on the bDefamation of Religionsb 
issue in the UN Human Rights Commission reflects a compromise 
between its objection to the concept on human rights grounds and 
its desire not to antagonize OIC countries with which it is trying 
to build relationships and which it sees as an important set of 
votes as iteyes a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In 
light of the political rationale for Brazilbs abstention, I propose 
a four-pronged approach involving approaches to senior-level 
contacts at the Foreign Ministry; a visit to Brasilia aimed at 
finding ways to work with the GOB on this and other human rights 
issues; other governments willing to speak with the GOB; and more 
intense public affairs outreach via media and religious 
communities. End summary. 
 
 
 
Background: Where Human Rights and Security Council Ambitions 
Collide 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) Embassy has raised the issue of Brazilbs voting record on 
bdefamation of religionsb several times in the Department of Human 
Rights and Social Affairs (DDS), Ministry of External Relations 
(MRE). (NOTE: All UNHRC and UN human rights matters generally are 
handled out of DDS, not out of the International Organizations 
Department. END NOTE.) The last time was with DDS Chief (A/S level) 
Minister Glaucia Gauch. Brazil has not disagreed with a single 
argument in our previous demarches and non-papers. The response has 
been always the same: the concept of bdefamation of religionsb is 
repugnant to Brazilian values and principles, and it is 
inconsistent with Brazilian law and international law. For those 
reasons, Brazil cannot and will not support a resolution that 
purports to punish the bdefamation of religions;b instead, Brazil 
consistently abstains. 
 
 
 
3. (C) When asked why Brazil does not vote against a resolution it 
finds totally objectionable, Gauch responded that it was enough to 
abstain. In the GOBbs view, Brazil is taking a principled but 
practical position on the issue, not desiring to offend OIC 
countries, in particular powerful ones like Iran, Egypt, Turkey, 
and Saudi Arabia with which Brazil is attempting to deepen 
relations. Moreover, obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC remains 
Brazilbs overriding foreign policy goal. As a result, the GOB 
prefers to avoid antagonizing countries and groups of countries 
whose votes might be valuable in a future election. 
 
 
 
A Four-Pronged Approach 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) In light of this complicated reality, I propose a 
four-pronged approach to Brazil on this issue. At the forefront of 
each element must be the stated USG commitment to dialogue and 
cooperation, as well as a careful effort to cultivate Brazil as a 
leader and partner on this issue. 
 
 
 
o,7 High-Level Discussions: Essential to persuading Brazil to change 
its vote on bDefamation of Religionsb and to work with us toward a 
compromise solution is an approach at the highest levels of MRE. A 
call from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Amorim, following up 
her recent letter, would demonstrate the importance the USG 
attaches to this issue. Approaches from the Deputy Secretary to 
Secretary General (Deputy Minister) AntC4nio Patriota and from Under 
Secretary Burns to Under Secretary for Political Affairs I Amb. 
Vera Machado (who oversees both human rights and international 
organizations policy) would similarly help elevate the importance 
of the issue in the Braziliansb minds. Lower level approaches alone 
are unlikely to change Brazilbs hands-off approach to the subject. 
 
o,7 A Dialogue on Human Rights: A visit exclusively on this issue 
would, in my view, be of limited value, as Brazil accepts the basic 
premise of our objection. At the same time, a more detailed 
discussion of our views and action plan with both working-level and 
policy-level MRE players would be of value. The most effective 
approach (and, in the long run, a more valuable one to broader USG 
interests) would be to include the issue in a new regular dialogue 
on human rights, something that the MRE itself (via Amb. Patriota) 
has recently proposed. The broader context of an effort to exchange 
views and to find ways to work more closely with the GOB on human 
rights issues in international organizations (addressing, perhaps, 
some of the key country concerns, including Iran and the DPRK, on 
which Brazil has consistently abstained) would provide an ideal 
forum for discussing and seeking GOB support for the USG proposed 
action plan. Such a broad-based approach, which would appeal to 
Braziliansb interest in partnership with the United States that 
serves to validate their desire to be perceived as an international 
leader, will be better received than a targeted approach on this 
one issue. 
 
 
 
o,7 Third-Country Approaches: As it has stepped out onto the 
international stage, the current Brazilian government has been 
careful to avoid aligning its policies with those of the United 
States. It values what it sees as its position as a bbridgeb 
between developing and developed countries, and its ability to talk 
with all countries. This general approach tends to limit the weight 
of USG opinions within the GOB. Because Brazil views itself as a 
leader in the Latin American bloc of countries, their influence on 
Brazilbs views is limited. It is more likely to listen to other 
countries it perceives as bindependentb of the United States, 
including South Africa, Russia, China, India, and France. Gaining 
support for our approach from some OIC membersb" particularly Egypt, 
Turkey, and other influential bindependentb voicesb"would be very 
important to our success in influencing Brazil. In general, 
approaches from any other country that supports our proposed action 
plan and testify to the collaborative nature of our effort will be 
helpful. 
 
 
 
o,7 Increased Media and Religious Community Outreach: There are 
currently no groups within Brazil that have taken up this issue. 
However, Brazil is a multi-religious, multiethnic society that 
values  freedom of religion, and an effort to increase 
understanding of the dangers of the bDefamation of 
 
Religionsb approach might well yield dividends. Large media outlets 
such as O Estado de S. Paulo, the O Globo media outlets, and Veja 
magazine, were they to focus on this issue, could raise the public 
concern, particularly among the elite. Mission has had significant 
 
success in placing interviews and op-eds by senior USG officials 
and respected academics. Visits by experts or senior USG officials 
would be excellent opportunities to address this question with the 
press. Again, third-country experts and officials supporting the 
view would provide important impetus to our efforts. In addition, 
outreach on the issue targeted, in the first instance, to religious 
communities that seemed to influence the GOB when they opposed the 
visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad in Novemberb"particularly the 
Bahabis and Jewish communityb"could be expanded to include activist 
Catholics and Evangelicals and even indigenous groups and moderate 
Muslims. 
KUBISKE