Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3998, 2009 Colombian Demobilization Rates Down, Yet More

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BOGOTA3998.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA3998 2009-12-15 18:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3998/01 3491834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151833Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1610
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 003998 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP PHUM PREL PTER MOPS PGOV PREF SNAR PM VE PE EC
BR, CO 
SUBJECT: 2009 Colombian Demobilization Rates Down, Yet More 
Experienced Insurgents Increasingly Surrendering 
 
Summary 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Colombia's robust Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) policy continues to bear fruit late into 2009 
primarily due to several years of sustained security operations. 
Yet, after high rates in 2007 and 2008, a natural leveling off is 
evident with demobilization slowing by more than 20%. 
Encouragingly, countermeasures implemented by illegal groups have 
not prevented a strong upswing in quality since 2007, with twice as 
many mid-level leaders laying down arms.  The Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) has intensified efforts against illegal recruitment by 
incorporating it into the demobilization strategy for 
implementation in 2010. MOD budget shortfalls stalled some program 
efforts during the first half of the year, but most large, 
important contracts have since been awarded through mid-2010. 
Efforts are underway to modernize the Programa de Atencion 
Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD) information technology (IT) 
infrastructure, analytical capabilities and positive identification 
through biometrics.  Future DDR success depends largely on 
sustaining or improving existing DDR policies and Colombia's 
ability to persuade its neighbors to collaborate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
52,000 in Seven Years 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) Colombia's DDR policy continues to bear fruit late into 
2009, primarily due to several years of sustained military and 
police operations under the Democratic Security Policy.  Since 
2002, the MOD has transitioned 20,398 fighters into society via the 
individual demobilization program, PAHD, while using the 
information volunteered about illegal organizations to further tear 
down such groups.  PAHD candidates historically include 
paramilitaries from groups like the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC) or insurgents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN).  While 31,671 
of the AUC demobilized in a collective process under the High 
Commissioner for Peace, 3,682 demobilized individually until the 
statute of limitations ran out for paramilitary groups in December 
2006.  The Ministry of Defense welcomes demobilized fighters and 
their immediate family to one of 29 homes in six major cities where 
they receive meals, new clothes, psychological assistance and a 
modest transportation stipend.  Once certified by an interagency 
committee they transition to the High Commission for Reintegration 
(ACR) for continued assistance while participating in reintegration 
activities.  Assistance includes psychological therapy, education, 
job training, small business development and a monthly living 
stipend equivalent to Colombian minimum wage. 
 
 
 
Down but Not Out 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) The PAHD is experiencing a natural leveling off after the 
extraordinarily high demobilization rates in 2007 and 2008, 
including a peak enrollment in 2008 when 3,461 insurgents 
demobilized.  These dramatic increases strongly correlated to areas 
under sustained military pressure, especially when combined with 
desertion, capture, or death of insurgent leaders.  Reduced 
pressure and a lack of major psychological blows may lower the 
 
 
motivation to desert, but a more important factor is an increased 
tendency for insurgents to avoid direct contact with security 
forces and withdrawal to more remote areas.  The COLMIL has had 
fewer direct engagements with the FARC, and according to the PAHD 
in 2009.  One of the most common reasons cited for desertion is 
military pressure.  The isolation of would-be deserters combined 
with less frequent engagements reduces their opportunities to 
escape.  As of November 30, 2009, the program has demobilized 2,481 
individuals.  To date, FARC demobilization numbers are short of 
last year's total of 3,027, but ELN demobilization numbers are 
already a record 470 plus. 
 
 
 
Counter-measures Implemented to Prevent Desertion 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) The MOD has uncovered evidence of demobilization 
"counter-measures" through testimony and the examination of 
captured FARC computers.  Examples of reported counter-measures 
include limiting contact with the local populace, separation of 
FARC couples, prohibiting the use of radios, and execution of those 
caught or accused of attempts at desertion. 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) In response to FARC counter-measures, the MOD created 
tactical demobilization positions throughout the Joint Task Force 
Omega (JTF-O) area of operations and other tailor-made 
demobilization initiatives.  For example, the Catatumbo region of 
Norte de Santander department employs a custom communications 
strategy designed to take advantage of a local FARC leader's 
tendency to abuse his personnel. 
 
 
 
Insurgency Losing More of Its Leaders to Desertion 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) A steady increase in the quality of demobilization 
candidates began in 2007.  The number of experienced combatants and 
mid-level leaders demobilizing has doubled each year, indicating 
more seasoned combatants are no longer convinced that their "cause" 
is just and creating a leadership void difficult to fill with 
inexperienced recruits.  ACR education and training programs have 
been refitted to match this increasingly significant demographic. 
 
 
 
Anti-Recruitment Efforts to Stem Flow 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) The MOD has redoubled efforts against illegal recruitment 
by incorporating it into the demobilization strategy and combining 
it with communications initiatives as well as special events for 
high risk populations.  Design, coordination and funding of the 
strategy have been accomplished this year and include plans for 
full implementation in 2010.  Successful anti-recruitment efforts 
would potentially break the cycle of violence and prompt arrival at 
a post-conflict scenario. 
 
 
Budget Ready for 2010 
 
--------------------------- 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) The PAHD was not immune to large MOD budget shortfalls in 
early 2009; however they were able to sustain critical operations 
such as humanitarian assistance to the demobilized.  Communications 
and rewards for information and war material were hit hardest.  The 
program was unable to execute contracts with private media outlets 
for the first half of the year or to pay demobilized fighters for 
information and material surrendered in a timely manner.  In 
anticipation of potential budget shortages in 2010 and the unknowns 
associated with an administration change, large contracts for 
demobilized housing, psychological assistance and communications 
initiatives were awarded through mid-2010. 
 
 
 
Database, Biometrics and Analysis Capabilities Upgraded 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
-- 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) Our efforts to modernize the PAHD information technology 
(IT) infrastructure, analytical capabilities and positive 
identification through biometrics will be completed in early 2010. 
Information from those demobilized is one of the best sources of 
intelligence available to security forces, but thus far the volumes 
of data have not realized their full potential.  In addition to 
internal program benefits, such as paperless management processes 
and dramatically improved information security, the system will 
facilitate a more effective transition from the PAHD to the 
Reintegration phase. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) Looking ahead two to three years after the demobilization 
or displacement of the majority of insurgents in Colombian 
territory, the most serious challenges for the PAHD will be the 
demobilization of insurgents who have found refuge in neighboring 
countries, and the prevention of illegal recruitment by criminal 
groups involved in drug trafficking (BACRIM).  Two potential 
strategies to deal with these problems include a Regional 
Demobilization Workshop led by Colombia using cooperation between 
the Governments of Panama and Colombia as a model, and dramatically 
increased efforts against recruitment by criminal groups 
complimented by nation-wide, U.S. supported consolidation efforts 
such as the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI).  End 
Comment. 
NICHOLS