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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3593, VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE JARAMILLO RESIGNS OVER THIRD TERM,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA3593 2009-12-21 23:20 2011-04-10 12:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles:
http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks
VZCZCXYZ1799
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3593/01 3552321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 212320Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1698
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003593 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER CO
SUBJECT: VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE JARAMILLO RESIGNS OVER THIRD TERM, 
DEMOCRATIC SECURITY 

REF: BOGOTA 3375 

CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 

Summary 
------- 

1. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo resigned on 
December 17.  He told the Charge d'Affaires on December 18 that 
despite his poor relationship with Minister of Defense Gabriel 
Silva Lujan, the real reason for his departure was his disagreement 
with President Alvaro Uribe's intention to stand for a third term. 
Jaramillo laid out these concerns in a December 20 editorial in 
which he concluded that Uribe's intention to remain in office would 
undercut gains achieved under his own "Democratic Security Policy." 
Nevertheless, Jaramillo relayed to the Charge his dissatisfaction 
with Silva's management of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). 
Jaramillo's departure, while not a complete surprise, represents 
the loss of the MOD's (and perhaps the GOC's) best strategic 
thinker and nearly eight years of institutional memory.  End 
summary. 

Reasons for Resignation 
----------------------- 

2. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo called on the 
Charge December 18 to personally convey the news of his 
resignation.  He thanked the USG for its support during his tenure. 
VMOD Jaramillo explained that news of his resignation was already 
out along with rumors as to why.  He said that despite rumors of 
his contentious relations with MOD Silva, he had been considering 
resigning for over six months due to his profound concerns over 
President Uribe's third term re-election push.

3. (C) Jaramillo said that the December 2008 jamming through of the 
referendum legislation and Uribe's subsequent political posturing 
had made it clear that Uribe was serious about reelection to a 
third term and not simply posturing to avoid lame-duck status. 
Jaramillo continued that democratic security represented, at its 
essence, an exercise in institution building.  Uribe's drive for 
re-election undercut the next stage of democratic security by 
weakening Colombia's institutions.  Furthermore, Uribe's focus on 
politics has prompted him to avoid dealing with tough issues such 
as corruption (he cited the ArangoBacci case, ref a), while 
instead seeking to solidify his political base around the country 
through patronage. 

4. (C) Jaramillo said that a new president, like former Minister of 
Defense Juan Manuel Santos (and Jaramillo's mentor), could 
aggressively address the next stage of state building and 
democratic security and demonstrate that Colombia was far bigger 
than one man.  Despite his close links to Santos, Jaramillo did not 
tell the former minister of his resignation beforehand. 

MOD Silva's Management 
---------------------- 

5. (C) In response to Charge's question, Jaramillo said that rumors 
of Silva's brusque, rude, and detached management style were true. 
He recalled that Silva had recently insulted him over a perceived 
failure to inform him on a policy issue.  Jaramillo said that Silva 
often ignored briefing memos and still has not read the "Strategic 
Leap" comprehensive strategy.  Silva has "no relationship" with 
Chief of Defense Freddy Padilla and is largely ignorant of military 
operations, he added.  Jaramillo opined that Silva does not 
understand his role, having skipped meetings with SOUTHCOM 
Commander Douglas Fraser and Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Kyung-wha Kang to meet with Colombian miners expelled from 
Venezuela -- a waste of time in Jaramillo's view.  Jaramillo called 
Silva smart with good instincts on human rights, but arrogant and 
ill informed; a "very dangerous combination."  He credited 
Colombian National Police Commander General Oscar Naranjo as one of 
the few people able to manage him. 

Loose Ends 
---------- 

6. (C) The Vice Minister will serve until January 4 and remains 
focused on resolving outstanding International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) and human rights issues before him.  Jaramillo worried that 
without GOC progress on the Soacha extrajudicial executions case, 
the government would be open to action by the International 
Criminal Court, for example.  He was most proud of his work in 
completing an operational law manual to help commanders navigate 
the complex IHL/HR issues inherent in the Colombian conflict with 
both criminal and insurgent actors.  Jaramillo said he was 
physically tired and wanted to rest after nearly eight years in 
government.  He mentioned that he had some concerns about his 
personal security given his years of pushing the military on human 
rights issues but was confident the GOC would provide him 
appropriate protection.  He was also worried that the Inspector 
General (Procuraduria) might revive a slander case lodged against 
him by an army coronel who was dismissed for alleged human rights 
abuses.  He had no plans for the future beyond occasionally writing 
on events in Colombia and the region.  He lamented the paucity of 
good analysis in the Colombian press and felt he could add to the 
debate. 

Publicly Disagreeing with Reelection 
------------------------------------ 

7. (C) Jaramillo followed up his resignation with an op-ed piece in 
leading news daily El Tiempo on December 20 in which he indirectly 
linked his decision to resign to Uribe's attempts to stay in 
office.  Democratic Security, he posited, sought to spread the 
State's authority and legitimacy to all of Colombia.  Extending a 
presidential term to continue the policy, he asserted, constituted 
a change in the "rules of the game" that would jeopardize the 
legitimacy of the State and undermine the principles inherent in 
Democratic Security.  While paying deference to President Uribe, he 
argued that anyone who believes in Colombia's tradition of 
democracy cannot be in favor of changing the proposed 
constitutional reform to permit a third term. 

Comment:  Losing a Valued Partner 
--------------------------------- 

8. (C) Jaramillo told President Uribe after the departure of 
Minister Santos last May that he would stay through the end of the 
Administration.  We do not doubt his decision to leave sooner is 
based on his objections to reelection.  However, his distant 
relationship with Silva was likely a catalyst.  Jaramillo's 
departure robs the MOD (and perhaps the GOC as a whole) of its most 
strategic thinker.  A scholarly technocrat with little talent for 
operations, Jaramillo had focused on global policy issues such as 
human rights, public diplomacy against the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the exterior, and the National 
Consolidation Plan.  Jaramillo was also a key USG interlocutor, 
having played key roles in the negotiation of the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement and the pending Colombian military deployment 
to Afghanistan. 
BROWNFIELD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================