Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ATHENS2192, GREEK PARLIAMENT ADOPTS 2010 BUDGET: TARGETS AMIBTIOUS, BUT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ATHENS2192.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ATHENS2192 2009-12-28 15:33 2011-06-25 08:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXRO6504
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTH #2192/01 3621534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 281533Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1262
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIK/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0031
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 002192 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ECIN EFIN PREL GR
SUBJECT: GREEK PARLIAMENT ADOPTS 2010 BUDGET: TARGETS AMIBTIOUS, BUT 
SPECIFICS LACKING 
 
REF: ATHENS 1705 
 
-------- 
 
Summary 
 
-------- 
 
 
 
1.  (SBU) The Greek budget for 2010, which was passed by Greek 
Parliament on December 23, is an attempt to bring order to Greece's 
public finances and restore its badly-dented credibility with 
foreign investors, international credit ratings agencies, and the 
European Union.  The budget aims to reduce the country's deficit 
from 12.7 percent of GDP in 2009 to 9.1 percent in 2010 through a 
series of revenue-enhancing and expenditure-reducing measures.  The 
government has already promised to aim for a bolder deficit cut to 
8.7 percent of GDP, which may be included in the January update of 
Greece's 3-year Stability and Growth Plan (SGP). 
 
 
 
2.  (SBU) Summary Continued. While many analysts believe the 2010 
budget targets are probably attainable, the EU and ratings agencies 
see the passage of the budget and measures therein as an inadequate 
response to Greece's chronic and structural fiscal weaknesses.  The 
reasons for this include the one-off nature of the measures, a less 
than ideal policy mix that relies too heavily on measures where the 
payoff is uncertain and negligible in the near-term, and the lack 
of vetting with and acceptance by the public, particularly major 
labor unions, which have already said they are planning a series of 
strikes to protest against planned wage freezes and/or cuts and 
pension reforms.  These legitimate concerns, however, may mask the 
EU's and markets' chief complaint: the GoG's refusal to follow in 
the footsteps of Ireland by cutting public sector wages - a step 
many see as the holy grail for public sector reform and which could 
buy the GoG the time and credibility it needs in the short term in 
order to implement longer-term reforms.  While most analysts and 
the EU are waiting for the GoG to introduce more concrete and 
quantifiable measures as part of the updated SGP, it remains to be 
seen whether anything short of wage cuts will buy their patience. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
The 2010 Budget 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
3.  (SBU) On December 23, following five days of sharp exchanges 
between the government and opposition parties, Greek Parliament 
adopted a crisis budget for 2010 in a bid to bring order to its 
chaotic public finances and restore its badly dented credibility 
with foreign investors and the European Union.  The budget passed 
by a healthy majority as the 160 Socialist deputies in power since 
October 2009 voted for the budget, while the entire opposition, 
from extreme left to extreme right, voted against.  The budget aims 
at reducing the country's deficit from 12.7 percent of GDP in 2009 
to 9.1 percent in 2010.  The government has already promised to aim 
for bolder measures in order to reduce the deficit to 8.7 percent 
of GDP in 2010.  This revised target may be included in an updated 
3-year stability and growth plan, which will be unveiled next 
month.  The PASOK government claimed during the debate in 
Parliament that the 2010 budget was the nation's "toughest" since 
the restoration of democracy in 1974 after seven years of military 
rule. 
 
 
 
--------- 
 
Revenues 
 
--------- 
 
 
 
4.  (U) The government plans to increase net ordinary budget 
revenues by about 4.5 billion euros or 9 percent over 2009, 
following a 4.7 percent contraction over 2008.  According to the 
GoG, additional revenues will come from the following measures: 
 
-- 1.2 billion euros from cracking down on tax evasion and settling 
taxpayers' overdue debts; 
 
 
 
-- 1.5 billion euros from an increase in tobacco, alcohol and real 
estate taxes; 
 
-- 1 billion euros from a one-off corporate tax; 
 
-- 865 million euros from the reintroduction of a progressive tax 
on large property holdings, inheritances and bequests (in a 
separate tax bill, which the GoG plans to table in March); 
 
-- An unknown amount from the abolition of tax exemptions and a 
current, flat-rate tax regime for certain professional groups (in 
forthcoming tax bill); and 
 
-- An unknown amount from the introduction of capital gains tax and 
effective taxation of offshore companies (in forthcoming tax bill). 
 
--------- 
 
Spending 
 
--------- 
 
 
 
5.  (U) The budget provides for a decrease in ordinary spending of 
1.4 billion euros or 2.3 percent over last year, following a growth 
of 15.9 percent in spending last year.  According to the GoG, 
savings from expenditure cuts will come from the following 
measures: 
 
 
 
-- 2.3 billion euros (or 3.8 percent savings) from a cut to primary 
spending (before debt payments); 
 
 
 
-- 1.4 billion euros of savings by not repeating one-off 2009 
payments to settle state hospital debts; 
 
 
 
-- 457 million euros (or a 6.6 percent cut) of savings from defense 
spending cuts; 
 
 
 
-- A 26 percent fall in ministries' operating costs, such as travel 
expenses and power bills; and 
 
 
 
-- An unknown amount from a freeze on public sector wages above 
2,000 euros a month (civil servants making less than that amount, 
however, would receive pay rises above inflation). 
 
 
 
---------------- 
 
Macro Forecasts 
 
---------------- 
 
 
 
6.  (U) According to the GoG's 2010 budget, GDP is expected to 
shrink by 0.3 percent  in 2010, a slight improvement over the 1.2 
percent drop the GoG expects in 2009.Inflation is forecast at 1.4 
percent against 1.2 in 2009, while unemployment will continue to 
rise to 9.7 percent in 2010 against 9.0 forecast in 2009.  The 
budget projects public debt will rise to 120.8 percent of GDP, 
compared to 113.4 percent for 2009.  The government plans to borrow 
up to 53 billion euros (about 22 percent of GDP) in 2010 and 
expects to pay out 12.95 billion euros (just over 5 percent of GDP) 
in interest payments next year to service the debt. 
 
---------------------------- 
 
The Budget's Key Numbers 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
7. (U) The following table represents the top-line targets passed 
as part of the budget: 
 
 
 
(in pct, euros bln) 
 
                            2010          2009 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
DEFICIT TO GDP (%)          9.1*         12.7 
 
DEFICIT (bln)              22.176        30.557 
 
GDP GROWTH (%)             -0.3          -1.2 
 
GDP (bln)                 244.233       240.150 
 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT (% y/y)  +8.4          -1.3 
 
NET ORDINARY REVENUES (%)  +9.0          -4.7 
 
NET ORDINARY REVENUES (bn) 53.700        49.260 
 
ORDINARY SPENDING (%)      -2.3          15.9 
 
ORDINARY SPENDING (bln)    69.796        71.438 
 
PUBLIC DEBT (% to GDP)    120.8         113.4 
 
PUBLIC DEBT (bln)         294.950       272.300 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
*Following the submission of the budget to Parliament in November, 
the GoG announced it would aim to reduce the budget deficit further 
to 8.7 percent of GDP next year. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
Further Measures Coming 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
8.  (SBU) The government has already announced a series of measures 
that were not included in the 2010 budget, but which the GoG has 
indicated will be included in an updated three-year Stability and 
Growth Plan to be submitted to the European Union in mid- to 
late-January.  These measures, announced by the Prime Minister on 
December 14 (see reftel) include: a 10 percent cut in supplemental 
public sector wages (which often account for a substantial part of 
civil servants' salaries); a hiring freeze for permanent public 
sector jobs in 2010, excluding the health and education sectors, 
and the hiring on one new civil servant for every five retiring 
from 2011 onwards; a one-third reduction of all short-term 
employment contracts in the public sector in 2010; a 10 percent 
reduction in social security expenditures in 2010 (likely to be 
tabled to Parliament in a bill in May); a 50 percent cut in board 
members' pay at public enterprises in 2010; managers' pay in 
state-run firms will be capped and cut by at least 10 percent; no 
bonuses will be paid to managers of state-controlled banks, while 
bonuses for private bank managers will be taxed at up to 90 
percent.  The government has not quantified the savings that would 
be achieved through the implementation of these measures. 
 
 
 
-------- 
 
Comment 
 
-------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Many local and international analysts believe the 2010 
budget targets are probably attainable. However, the EU and markets 
see the passage of the budget, and measures contained therein, as 
an inadequate response to Greece's chronic and structural fiscal 
weaknesses.  They view the measures as being largely of a one-off 
nature, providing little guarantee of fiscal restraint in 
subsequent years.  The policy mix is less than ideal, with an 
overreliance on revenue-raising measures like a clampdown on tax 
evasion, which has been the aim of many governments in the past 
with no results.  Also, cutbacks in spending are not as courageous 
as anticipated, and measures such as the public sector hiring 
freeze are expected to yield negligible results in the near-term. 
Finally, much depends on the degree of public support for the 
government's austerity measures.  Already, major labor unions have 
announced plans for a series of one-day (or longer) strikes to 
protest against planned wage cuts and pension reforms. 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) The key challenge facing macroeconomic policy at this 
time is managing to reverse unfavorable market sentiment toward 
Greece, according to the Bank of Greece's (the central bank) 
Interim Financial Stability report published the same day 
Parliament voted for the budget.  Ambitious budget projections and 
additional deficit-reducing measures announced by the Prime 
Minister to date have not reversed this sentiment.  The foremost 
reason for this may stem from the GoG's refusal to follow in the 
footsteps of Ireland by cutting public sector wages - a step many 
see as the holy grail for public sector reform and which could buy 
the GoG the time and credibility it needs to implement longer-term 
reforms.  While most analysts and the EU are waiting for the GoG to 
introduce more concrete and quantifiable measures as part of the 
updated SGP in January, it remains to be seen whether anything 
short of wage cuts will buy their patience.  END COMMENT. 
Speckhard