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Viewing cable 09ASTANA2257,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA2257 2009-12-30 07:48 2011-06-09 00:00 SECRET Embassy Astana
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988312.ece
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2257/01 3640748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300748Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7126
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1615
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2368
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0096
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2655
S E C R E T ASTANA 002257

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR JA KZ

REF: SECSTATE 131723

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan initially respondedQeptically to a U.S. non-paper alleging that Iran is negotiating to buy a large amount of yellowcake uranium from KazAtomProm, but promised to undertake a serious investigation and report its findings to Embassy Astana. It is possible the investigation will be slightly slowed because the Kazakhstani government closes early on December 31 in observance of New Year and will not re-open again until January 4. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) In response to December 29 e-mailed information from USUN Vienna that the Associated Press (AP) was about to publish a report alleging that Iran was in the late stages of negotiating to buy a very large quantity of yellowcake uranium from an entity in Kazakhstan associated with KazAtomProm (KAP), the Department instructed the Ambassador to raise the matter urgently in Astana at the highest possible level. On December 29, the Ambassador met with State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, a close confidante of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The Ambassador passed to Saudabayev the as yet unpublished AP report and told him that if this is true, it is a huge problem, a violation of UNSCR 1737, a violation of the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of which Kazakhstan is a member), and would seriously harm the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. The Ambassador asked Saudabayev to bring this report urgently to the attention of the proper officials in the government of Kazakhstan.

3. (S) Saudabayev said, "My initial response is nyet, nyet, and nyet. This cannot be true. Give me the full report and we will follow up and look into every detail. If this is true, it would violate the principles of our policy since independence. We have always been the strongest supporters of non-proliferation. Please give us complete details soonest, and we will investigate fully."

4. (S) With the AP report having appeared later on December 29, the Ambassador delivered on December 30 to Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov, who had been in the previous days meeting, the U.S. interagency-cleared non-paper from para eight of reftel. Umarov said that following the December 29 meeting, the Foreign Ministry had immediately gotten in touch with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral ResQces (MEMR), which is responsible for KAP. According to Umarov, MEMRs initial response was that such a large volume of yellowcake uranium could not be transferred without notice. Kazakhstan maintains a strong export control regime and stringent control of its ports. There has been and there will be no negotiations with Iran on something this sensitive. It is not credible, MEMR added, that rogue individuals could be involved because Kazakhstan maintains strict government control over its uranium stocks. Umarov added that KAP expects to release an initial response to the AP report later on December 30.

5. (S) Umarov added that the Foreign Ministrys initial response on December 29 had been that the AP report must be "false information." With fuller information from the non-paper, the government of Kazakhstan will continue to investigate, but, he said, it would be easier if we could provide more detailed information. He also asked that we provide a read-out of any response from the government of Japan. The Ambassador urged that the government of Kazakhstan take this matter with the utmost seriousness and provide a full account of its investigation, preferably no later than January 5. (NOTE: It is possible the investigation will be slightly slowed because the Kazakhstani government, except for essential services, closes early on December 31 in observance of New Year and will not re-open again until January 4. END NOTE.)

6. (S) GRPOQesented the same non-paper to appropriate counterparts and strongly encouraged them to investigate thoroughly.

7. (SBU) On December 30, the Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, citing the AP report published by the "Guardian" in the UK, broke the story in Kazakhstan. A spokesman of the government of Kazakhstan responded that all of its uranium activities fully comply with IAEA safeguards, and is investigating the report. An official response will be
forthcoming within a few days, the spokesman said.

8. (S) COMMENT: Because the AP report was datelined Vienna where ex-First Son-in-Law Rakhat Aliyev is believed to be in exile, the initial knee-jerk reaction of some in the government of Kazakhstan was likely that this must be one more attempt by Aliyev to blacken Kazakhstans image. However, we believe the government of Kazakhstan is fully aware of the seriousness of this report and its potential ramifications and will investigate it fully. Any futher detail that we might be able to provide would assist in that investigation. END COMMENT.