Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ANKARA1722, GULEN - TURKEY'S INVISIBLE MAN CASTS LONG SHADOW

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ANKARA1722.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA1722 2009-12-04 11:11 2011-03-17 15:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/abd-belgelerinde-fethullah-gulen.htm
VZCZCXRO7572
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1722/01 3381111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041111Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1371
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 6598
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: GULEN - TURKEY'S INVISIBLE MAN CASTS LONG SHADOW 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1029 
     B. ANKARA 834 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b),(d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Fethullah Gulen remains a political 
phenomenon in Turkey.  Although "exiled" in Pennsylvania for 
the past decade, Gulen's impact continues to expand, aided by 
legions of loyalist supporters and a network of elite 
schools.  The Gulen Movement's purported goals focus on 
interfaith dialogue and tolerance, but in the current 
AKP-secularists schism, many Turks believe Gulen has a deeper 
and possibly insidious political agenda, and even some 
Islamist groups criticize Gulen's lack of transparency, which 
they say creates doubts about his motives.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Gulen was born between 1938-1942 (varying dates have 
been given), and initially served as an imam and as an 
employee of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet).  He established his own movement in the 1970s 
based on the teachings of Said Nursi, an Islamic thinker of 
Kurdish origin, whose followers are called Nurcus.  Gulen 
then broke away from the Nursi framework.  Gulen's own 
philosophy emphasizes the role of science in Islam.  He 
supports interfaith dialogue and condemns terrorism.  In the 
past two decades, Gulen has focused primarily on education, 
not only in Turkey but around the world.  His schools have 
earned a reputation particularly in Central and South Asia 
for academic excellence and the advocacy of moderate Islamic 
views. 
 
Indicted, Then Acquitted 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Gulen has been living in the U.S. since 1999 when he 
went there ostensibly for health treatments (a heart 
condition and diabetes).  At the same time, however, he faced 
charges in Turkey of plotting to overthrow the state.  The 
charges were based on a 1986 sermon where Gulen is heard 
declaring that "our friends, who have positions in 
legislative and administrative bodies, should learn its 
details and be vigilant all the time so they can transform it 
and be more fruitful on behalf of Islam in order to carry out 
a nationwide restoration."  This indictment gave his travel 
to the U.S. the appearance of his being a fugitive from the 
Turkish judicial system.  A Turkish Court acquitted him of 
all charges in 2006.  That acquittal was appealed but the 
acquittal was upheld in 2008. 
 
4. (SBU) In the meantime, Gulen had applied for Permanent 
Residence status in the U.S.  Immigration officials initially 
rejected Gulen's application to be classified as "an alien of 
extraordinary ability," but a Federal Court ruled in late 
2008 that this rejection had been improper.  Gulen now holds 
a Green Card, and lives in a secluded compound in 
Pennsylvania's Pocono Mountains. 
 
5. (SBU) The core of the Fethullah Gulen Movement is his 
network of schools, which extend from South Africa to the 
United States.  The schools emphasize high academic 
achievement, and they openly recruit and provide scholarships 
to the brightest students from poor and working class 
families.  Gulenist schools in Turkey routinely produce 
graduates who score in the upper one percent of the annual 
university entrance exam.  These top graduates often become 
teachers themselves.  The Gulenist doctrine, with its 
conservative and religiously observant undercurrent, has met 
fierce hostility in regimes such as Russia, which expelled 
the Gulenists en masse in the 1990s. 
 
6. (C) But it is within Turkey that the movement has its 
roots, its largest following, and its greatest controversies. 
 The Gulen Movement includes not only educational 
institutions, including the famous Samanyolu ("Milky Way") 
school in Ankara and Fatih University, but also the 
 
ANKARA 00001722  002 OF 003 
 
 
Journalists and Writers Foundation, various businesses, and 
media outlets such as "Zaman," "Today's Zaman" (English 
language), "Samanyolu TV," and "Aksiyon Weekly."  Gulenists 
also reportedly dominate the Turkish National Police, where 
they serve as the vangard for the Ergenekon investigation -- 
an extensive  probe into an alleged vast underground network 
that is accused of attempting to encourage a military coup in 
2004.  The investigation has swept up many secular opponents 
of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), including 
Turkish military figures, which has prompted accusations that 
the Gulenists have as their ultimate goal the undermining of 
all institutions which disapprove of Turkey becoming more 
visibly Islamist. (COMMENT: The assertion that the TNP is 
controlled by Gulenists is impossible to confirm but we have 
found no one who disputes it, and we have heard accounts that 
TNP applicants who stay at Gulenist pensions are provided the 
answers in advance to the TNP entrance exam.  END COMMENT) 
 
Championing the Ergenekon Probe 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Gulenist newspapers such as "Zaman" relentlessly 
question the validity of the Ataturk legacy and argue that as 
an EU aspirant country, Turkey must ensure the diminished 
voice of the Turkish military in political issues.  These 
papers champion the Ergenekon investigation and continually 
stress that the traditional dominance of the Turkish military 
has been a negative factor in Turkey's history.  Not 
surprisingly, contacts close to the the Turkish General Staff 
openly loathe Gulen, and contend that he and his legions of 
supporters are embarked on a ruthless quest not only to 
undermine the Turkish military but to transform Turkey into 
an Islamic republic similar to Iran. 
 
8. (C) Even among some Islamist organizations, the Fethullah 
Gulen Movement seems to have a murky reputation.  The former 
head of the City Women's Platform, Hidayet Tuksal, told us 
that her group regards Gulen positively, because he 
disapproves of the use of violence, but that Gulen's lack of 
transparency creates doubt about his motives and leads to 
suspicions about what lies ahead -- even within the 
communities where Gulen is most active.  Gulen's purported 
main goal is to bolster interfaith dialogue and tolerance, 
but the notion is widespread among many circles in Turkey 
that his agenda is deeper and more insidious. 
 
9. (C) The Gulen movement has been described as a modernized 
version of Sunni Hanafi Islam.  It shares this orientation 
with "Milli Gorus," the grouping associated with former PM 
Necmettin Erbakan, but the two movements are otherwise 
distinct: "Milli Gorus" is Turkey-centric; the Gulen Movement 
has a broader scope and is more comfortable with the concept 
of justifying the means for the end, such as discarding the 
headscarf when necessary.  Still, there is some convergence: 
many of the founders of AKP came from "Milli Gorus," but many 
officials within AKP are known to be close to the Gulen 
movement. 
 
10. (C) Most discussions in Turkey which touch on Gulen tend 
to be somewhat delicate and deliberately artful.  Our 
interlocutors often seem reluctant to express their views, 
seemingly uncertain if it will rebound on them to their 
detriment.  In addition, the political context for 
conversations about Gulen is complicated because President 
Gul is himself seen by almost all of our contacts as a 
Gulenist, while Prime Minister Erdogan is not.  Indeed, some 
of our contacts have argued that Erdogan is so firmly outside 
the Gulen camp that Gulen loyalists view him as a liability. 
At the same time, the Republican People's Party and other AKP 
opponents of the ruling Justice and Development Party are 
quick to accuse the U.S. of working covertly to prop up 
Gulen, allegedly to weaken Turkey's secular foundation to 
produce a "model" moderate Islamic nation.  This accusation 
relies on the premise that Gulen was given refuge in the 
U.S., and ultimately permanent resident status, despite 
 
ANKARA 00001722  003 OF 003 
 
 
facing indictment in Turkey for illegal anti-secularist 
activities. 
 
11. (C) Gulen has his share of non-Islamic supporters, which 
includes the Eucumenical Patriarch in Istanbul.  In a recent 
conversation with the Ambassador, the Patriarch reported that 
he had visited Gulen during his last trip to the United 
States and had spent more than an hour together in a 
one-on-one discussion.  He planned to see Gulen again on his 
recent visit to New York.  The Patriarch told the Ambassador 
he had been "very impressed" with Gulen and commented on the 
quality of Gulen schools, including a Gulenist University in 
Kazakhstan named for Suleyman Demirel. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (C) Given the current AKP-secularist schism in Turkey 
today, it should not be surprising that any Islamist movement 
in Turkey would choose to be circumspect about its 
intentions.  Unfortunately, this simply feeds the reflexive 
tendency in Turkish society for conspiracy theories, and 
magnifies suspicions about the Gulen movement itself.  While 
the purported Gulen goals of interfaith dialogue and 
tolerance are beyond reproach, we see aspects of concern in 
the allegations that the USG is somehow behind the Gulen 
movement.  Accordingly, we would recommend the following 
standard press guidance: 
 
Q: 
 
Why is the U.S. sheltering Fethullah Gulen and doesn't this 
mean that the US is promoting a non-secular Turkey? 
 
A: 
 
-- The U.S. is not "sheltering" Mr. Gulen and his presence in 
the U.S. is not based on any political decision. 
 
-- Mr. Gulen applied for, and received, permanent residence 
in the U.S. after a lengthy process which ended in 2008 when 
a Federal Court ruled that he deserved to be viewed as an 
"alien of extraordinary ability" based on his extensive 
writings and his leadership of a worldwide religious 
organization. 
 
-- As a Green Card holder, Mr. Gulen is entitled to all the 
privileges which that status entails.  His presence in the 
U.S. should not be viewed as a reflection of US policy toward 
Turkey. 
 
JEFFREY