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Viewing cable 09ABIDJAN758, COTE D'IVOIRE: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABIDJAN758 2009-12-21 13:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abidjan
VZCZCXRO2031
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0758/01 3551300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211300Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5611
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000758 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT (ATTN: RHONDA SHORE), DS/IP/AF AND AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
Ref:  STATE 109980 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  There were few changes or emerging trends 
regarding counterterrorism in Cote d'Ivoire in 2009. The ongoing 
political crisis continues to weaken police and security forces and 
increase the risk that foreign terrorists can use Cote d'Ivoire as 
an operational or financial base.  Porous borders, widespread public 
corruption, and weak police and security services foster activities, 
e.g., money laundering and trafficking in drugs, arms and persons, 
that can be exploited by terrorists.  Both the central government's 
security forces in the south and the former rebel New Forces of the 
north are primarily focused on internal security concerns.  To date, 
violence associated with the country's crisis has not been 
associated with any international terrorist organizations, and there 
is scant evidence to indicate a significant threat of a terrorist 
attack. End Summary. 
 
Cote d'Ivoire's Security Environment 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Cote d'Ivoire does not engage in any major counterterrorism 
efforts.  Operational elements of terrorist groups are not known to 
be present, and terrorism is not generally perceived to be a threat 
in Cote d'Ivoire. Intelligence, police and security services (the 
central government's in the south and the former rebel New Forces in 
the north) are predominately focused on each other and maintaining 
domestic stability.  We believe that Cote d'Ivoire would cooperate 
in extraditing known terrorists should such a case arise.  Justice 
officials, although inefficient in the areas of the country 
administered by the government and hindered from operating normally 
in areas still under the control of the former rebels, would likely 
cooperate in assisting with U.S. counterterrorist efforts. 
 
3.  (SBU)Cote d'Ivoire does not provide political or financial 
support to any known international terrorist organization.  Although 
members of the Lebanese community in Cote d'Ivoire are known to 
donate personal income to Hizballah, it is unlikely that the 
government of Cote d'Ivoire supports or subsidizes any of these 
financial activities. 
 
4.  (SBU) On August 6, Ivoirian authorities detained Imam Abd al 
Menhem Qubaysi, a Hizballah spiritual leader and US Treasury 
designated terrorist financier, at the airport upon his arrival on a 
commercial flight from Lebanon.  Qubaysi, who lived in Cote d'Ivoire 
for a number of years, was denied entry at immigration and returned 
to Lebanon on the same flight.  The Lebanese community in Cote 
d'Ivoire continues to seek permission for his return, unsuccessfully 
to date. 
 
Safe Haven Assessment 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) While the Ivorian government does not provide diplomatic 
support to any international terrorist organization nor provide a 
safe haven, during 2009 there were uncorroborated reports of members 
of Al-Qaida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) being present in 
Cote d'Ivoire.  However, there have been no indicators that AQIM is 
attempting to extend its presence into Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
6. (SBU) Cote d'Ivoire remains vulnerable to becoming a possible 
terrorist safe haven due to porous borders, widespread public 
corruption, and weak police and security services.  As long as 
police and security forces remain underpaid and committed to 
internal security, this vulnerability will remain.  Measures to 
prevent the proliferation and trafficking of weapons of mass 
destruction are unknown; however, as a Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism partner nation, it is likely that Cote d'Ivoire 
would cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
 
Foreign Cooperation 
------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The Ivoirian Ministry of Interior, in cooperation with the 
United States, uses the Personal Identification Secure Comparison 
and Evaluation System (PISCES) at the major airport and seaport to 
enhance border security.  With sanctions in place, there are severe 
limits to what the US can contribute to Cote d'Ivoire's 
counterterrorism program.  In 2009, 11 Ivoirian officials attended 
regionally oriented seminars where terrorism was addressed.  The 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which was formed in 2008, 
received additional legal authority when Ordinance 637 on terrorism 
financing became law on November 12, 2009.  Although not used to 
date, the law extends FIU activities to the receipt, analysis, and 
dissemination of information on transactions suspected of being 
terrorism related. 
 
8.  (SBU) In the past five years, there has been no  evidence of 
activity by known terrorist groups in Cote d'Ivoire nor terrorist 
threats against U.S. citizens.  Hizballah elements are present 
 
ABIDJAN 00000758  002 OF 002 
 
 
within parts of the local community but they are not known to be 
actively engaged in, or planning for, terrorist activities in Cote 
d'Ivoire.  The Ivoirian government has not provided military or 
paramilitary training or supplied weapons to any known international 
terrorist group. There are no known cases of international terrorist 
groups seeking refuge in Cote d'Ivoire and the GOCI provides no 
provision of safe haven from prosecution to such groups. 
 
9. (U) Embassy Abidjan point of contact for this report is John 
Bray, RSO, (225) 22-49-45-01 or brayfj2@state.gov. 
 
NESBITT