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Viewing cable 09CHENNAI319, COCHIN PORT SEEKS TO EAT COLOMBO'S LUNCH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CHENNAI319 2009-11-06 05:11 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chennai
VZCZCXRO0684
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHCG #0319/01 3100511
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060511Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL CHENNAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2517
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3895
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRALASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 2079
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0085
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0250
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0005
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0183
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0185
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CHENNAI 000319 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD EWWT PGOV PREL IN CE
SUBJECT: COCHIN PORT SEEKS TO EAT COLOMBO'S LUNCH 
 
REF: COLOMBO 971 
 
CHENNAI 00000319  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) Summary: The Port of Cochin, located on India's southwest 
coast, is expanding in an ambitious attempt to alter shipping 
patterns in the region.  Seventy-five percent of the containers that 
reach India's ports are trans-shipped via other (non-Indian) ports, 
and the Port of Cochin is hoping to steal a chunk of this business, 
particularly from Sri Lanka's Port of Colombo.  Cochin hopes its 
port expansion will attract mainline shipping vessels, reducing the 
need for trans-shipping via third countries.  The new trans-shipment 
terminal is scheduled for completion on November 30 and should be 
fully operational in March 2010.  Some obstacles remain to the 
success of this project:  road and rail links from the port to major 
transit routes within India are still incomplete, and Kerala's 
famously militant labor unions may well protest some of the changes 
the upgraded port will require.  End Summary. 
 
Port of Cochin project nears completion 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) N. Ramachandran, Chairman of the Port of Cochin told us in 
late October, that the port's ambitious expansion project will make 
it India's largest container terminal, able to manage container 
ships up to a 14.5-meter draft.  He explained that the project, 
which will be inaugurated on November 30 and fully operational by 
March 2010, should allow India-bound containers to reach their 
destinations 7 to 10 days more quickly, emphasizing that it lies 
only 70 nautical miles from the Suez Canal route and 11 nautical 
miles from the Persian Gulf shipping route.  He also said that he 
expects the port to take business from Colombo's port, which 
currently serves as a major trans-shipment point for India-bound 
containers, as do Singapore and Dubai. (see reftel).  He noted that 
fully 75 percent of containers that reach India's ports are 
trans-shipped via other countries and that he expects to 
"drastically reduce" that figure when the Port of Cochin is fully 
operational. 
 
Colombo's trans-shipment business a tempting target 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3. (U) The Port of Cochin's sights are aimed squarely on Colombo. 
According to "livemint.com" (associated with the Wall Street 
Journal), some 60 percent of the 2.7 million TEUs (twenty-foot 
equivalent units, the standard measure in the container business) 
handled by Colombo's port in 2008 originated from or were destined 
for South Indian ports, and another 10 percent from/for other ports 
in India.  A study conducted at Chennai's National Institute of Port 
Management estimates that the Cochin Port could reduce 
importer-exporters' costs by some USD 150 per container compared 
with trans-shipping containers via third countries, a figure 
confirmed by DPW's managing director for the Indian sub-continent, 
according to a June press report.  India's shipping ministry has 
calculated that India's exporters and importers incur extra costs of 
more than USD 200 million per year on trans-shipment of containers 
via other ports.  Until the global slowdown, India's port container 
traffic had been increasing at about 15 percent annually, and stands 
at approximately 7.8 million TEUs now. 
 
4. (SBU) The project has the support of significant business 
interests.  Dubai Ports World (DPW, the world's fourth-largest 
container port operator) won a 30-year contract in a public auction 
in 2004 to develop and operate the terminal on Vallarpadam island in 
Cochin's port area.  DPW's Chief Executive Officer told the Indian 
press that his company had invested USD 500 million in the project 
and expected to commence operations there by mid-2010.  DPW expects 
the Vallarpadam facility to be able to handle more than 1 million 
TEUs annually in the initial phases, but has plans to eventually 
increase capacity to 5.5 million TEUs.  (Note:  Cochin's port 
currently consists of two main parts, the Rajiv Gandhi container 
terminal and another terminal for bulk cargo.  Once the Vallarpadam 
container terminal is operational, the Rajiv Gandhi terminal will 
become a bulk cargo facility.  End note.) 
 
Infrastructure may not be ready in time 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Some of our contacts in the shipping industry have pointed 
out some potential problems with the port, and doubt that it will be 
operational as soon as the port's promoters expect.  One shipping 
company CEO told us that the terminal's location on an island poses 
 
a road and rail connectivity challenge.  He noted that a 
seven-kilometer rail bridge has been completed, but that it is not 
 
CHENNAI 00000319  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
fully connected to the railway lines in the existing port areas.  In 
contrast, Cochin Port Chair Ramachandran had told us that all rail 
connectivity to the port was complete. 
 
6. (SBU) There may also be delays in road connectivity.  An 
18-kilometer, four-lane highway linking the terminal to the mainland 
is still incomplete, according to another shipping company 
executive, adding that roads are the primary transport link for 
goods going to and from the port.  Ramachandran admitted to us that 
the road is some three months behind schedule but stressed that it 
will be completed by March 2010.  He noted that the port will use 
roll-on, roll-off (RORO) barges to move containers to Vallarpadam 
Island in the interim.  All of our shipping industry contacts 
expressed serious skepticism about the feasibility of the March 2010 
timeline.  The shipping company CEO also told us that the RORO 
barges are very inefficient, extending loading times, which will 
discourage operators of mainline shipping vessels from using the 
port. 
 
Managing militant labor is key 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) While the infrastructure challenges may be surmountable, 
given enough time and resources, a potentially much bigger challenge 
also faces the port, namely labor issues.  Kerala has a long history 
of both communism (the Communist Party-Marxist currently heads the 
state's government and has headed the state's government for about 
half of the past 50 years) and labor militancy.  While none of the 
port's five unions has caused major trouble for DPW yet, they are 
laying the groundwork by calling publicly for the Rajiv Gandhi 
terminal to remain open even after the Vallarpadam facility opens. 
 
8. (SBU) The Rajiv Gandhi terminal is a notoriously high-cost, 
low-productivity facility, according to a shipping company 
executive.  He told us that the facility currently takes about 12 
hours for a feeder ship to discharge its cargo, while the same-sized 
ship would need only an hour to do so at other international 
trans-shipment hubs.  He said that he expects the unions to agitate 
actively to keep the Rajiv Gandhi terminal open even after 
Vallarpadam opens, which would be a major headache for DPW. 
 
9. (SBU) A knowledgeable former trade unionist (now a Congress Party 
state legislator) told us that even though the Port's unions have 
"somewhat mellowed," their aggressiveness "continues to pose a 
problem for the development of the port."  He said that he expected 
labor trouble as laborers are transitioned from the current 
container terminal to the bulk container terminal, noting that 
unions' tendency to launch "flash strikes" in Cochin has resulted in 
a lot of business lost to Tamil Nadu's port in Tuticorin. 
 
10. (SBU) A port official was more optimistic about the labor 
situation, noting that the unions have "generally agreed" to the 
plan to move all the operations of the existing container terminal 
to the new facility.  He said that the employees who cannot be 
absorbed by the new facility will be retained by the port for the 
bulk cargo operations, which ought to increase.  He admitted that 
there might be some problems with port workers who are employed by 
private contractors, but argued that there should be enough jobs for 
everybody as business picks up with the opening of the new terminal. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) There is little doubt that the backers of the Port of 
Cochin's expansion smell a legitimate business opportunity.  Given 
India's size and rapid economic growth, it makes sense to pursue 
this kind of project, which also sits well with the multitude of 
other major infrastructure development projects in India needed to 
help overcome the country's severe "infrastructure gap."  The 
physical stumbling blocks in this particular project are almost 
certainly surmountable.  As with most big projects, it will likely 
come in over budget and behind schedule, but there is every 
indication that the project will come online within the next year or 
so.  There is less certainty about the labor issues, but Keralites 
have lots of practice in working around tricky labor issues. 
Ultimately, it will be the shipping companies who determine the 
project's ultimate success or failure as they determine where they 
get the best value.  Like Colombo's port, Cochin's backers are also 
pursuing a "build it and they will come" strategy.  Perhaps there 
will be enough business for both; if not, may the best team win. 
End Comment 
 
 
CHENNAI 00000319  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
SIMKIN